Journal of Public Policy Research-Volume II, Issue I

November 2016

Vol II Issue I

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH GRADUATE JOURNAL OF THE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC POLICY AND GOVERNANCE The Changing Face of Resistance Politics: An Analysis of Kashmir Secessionist Politics Waseem Shah Territorial Autonomy in Bodoland Territorial Area Districts (BTAD) Cihnnita Baruah Bollywood Bazaar: Understanding the market of Bollywood from the Social Embedded Lens Ronak Asrani M Critical Terrorism Studies: The Kashmir Conflict Shivani Yadav ‘Body Politic’ and the Philosophical Foundations of Political Participation Ajinkya D TATA INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, HYDERABAD CAMPUS

The Journal of Public Policy Research (JPPR) is a peer-reviewed journal focusing on different aspects of public policy and public affairs in India and the world. It invites scholars to apply diverse disciplinary lenses, methodologies, social science theories and concepts to pressing issues of public policies and public affairs.

It endeavours to study governance, accountability and institutional frameworks that can create better human opportunities, promote wellbeing, generate wealth and deepen democracy. The journal serves as a platform to publish original and high quality research articles, perspectives, commentaries, book reviews, and case studies. Initiated by the graduate students of the School of Public Policy and Governance at the Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Hyderabad, the journal is published biannually. It welcomes contributions from all persuasions.

Editor-in-Chief Prof. S. Parasuraman, Director, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, India

Editors Aseem Prakash, Professor and Chairperson, School of Policy and Governance, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Hyderabad (SPPG,TISS­Hyd) Amit Upadhyay, Assistant Professor, SPPG,TISS­Hyd Amit Sadhukhan, Assistant Professor, SPPG,TISS­Hyd Ekta Singh, Assistant Professor, SPPG,TISS­Hyd

Managing Editors Amish Sarpotdar, Graduate Student, SPPG,TISS­Hyd Divya Ruth Jose, Graduate Student, SPPG,TISS­Hyd Shruti Prasad, Graduate Student, SPPG,TISS­Hyd

Associate Managing Editors Kashmiri B. Deori, Graduate Student, SPPG,TISS­Hyd Sneha Kuriakose, Graduate Student, SPPG,TISS­Hyd Syed Jaasirah Syedain, Graduate Student, SPPG,TISS­Hyd

Designer Sonny Chungkham, Graduate Student, SPPG,TISS­Hyd

Content Aggregator Rajeev Agur, Research Assitant, SPPG,TISS­Hyd

Editorial Advisory Board Ajey Sangai, Research Fellow, Vidhi Centre for Legal Policy, New Delhi, India Himanshu, Associate Professor, Centre for Economic Studies & Planning, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India Joerg Friedrichs, Associate Professor at Oxford Department of International Development, St Cross College, Oxford, England Badri Narayan Rath, Assistant Professor & Head, Department of Liberal Arts, Indian Institute of Technology, Hyderabad, India Mitu Sengupta, Associate Professor, Department of Politics and Public Administration, Ryerson University, Canada Padmini Swaminathan, Professor & Chairperson, School of Livelihoods and Development, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Hyderabad, India

Vindhya Undurti, Professor & Chairperson, School of Gender Studies, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Hyderabad, India Sanjeev Routray, Sectional Instructor, Department of Sociology, University of British Columbia, Canada Sony Pellisery, Associate Professor, National Law School of India University, Bangalore, India.

Rekha Pappu, Associate Professor & Chairperson, Azim Premji School of Education, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Hyderabad, India

Contents The Changing Face of Resistance Politics: An Analysis of Kashmir Secessionist Politics 1 Waseem Shah

Territorial Autonomy in Bodoland Territorial Area Districts (BTAD): A quest for Identity 30 Cihnnita Baruah

Bollywood Bazaar: Understanding the market of Bollywood from the Social Embedded Lens 53 Ronak Asrani M

Critical Terrorism Studies:The Kashmir 87 Conflict Shivani Yadav

‘Body Politic’ and the Philosophical Foundations of Political Participation 99 Ajinkya D

Foreword It gives us immense pleasure to introduce the third issue of the Journal of Public Policy Research (JPPR). The issue marks yet another step in the journey that we embarked upon with the launch of the first ever graduate journal on public policy and governance.This edition delves into the nuances of federal polity in conflict situations from the lens of public policy. The dominant understanding of markets as an institution of exchange has also been explored and contested.The issue thereby dwells on certain critical socio-political and economic concerns of the current period.

In its third iteration, we have further strengthened our resolve in providing a platform to young policy researchers to share their research findings with the world. Therefore, the journal continues to endorse its professed aim of promoting democratization of knowledge generation and dissemination by giving an opportunity to promising policy students and professionals from diverse backgrounds to disseminate their research findings. With this aim the journal invites papers from all persuasions.

Editors

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Changing Face of Resistance Politics: An Analysis Of Transition In Kashmir Secessionist Movement WASEEM SHAH1 Abstract: Massive rigging in elections marred the mandate of Muslim United Front (MUF), a local pre-election coalition formed by different political parties in Kashmir in mid 90’s, to curb the mandate of National Conference which was seen as a puppet government by these political groups. Though the MUF was expecting a landslide victory, it could only win four seats. Thus reported rigging and subsequent jailing of its leaders led to wide discontentment among its cadre base against the Indian democracy. This disillusionment went to the extent that the armed resistance was opted as a tool for political change. The armed uprising started in 1989 against the Indian rule after the episode of rigged assembly elections of 1987, making Kashmir defunct politically as well as administratively. Massive deployment of the Indian army and paramilitary forces changed the confrontational dynamics between the asymmetrical parties.

Sudden barge of troops to control what was a miniscule militancy limited in Srinagar, spread fiercely into the countryside within a short span of time. More than calming people, the government’s high-handed approach alienated them, thus pushing a larger section of the youth to militancy. The Gawkadal massacre of 1990 in which around fifty people were killed in a non-violent protest march followed by many such incidents ransacked all of the people’s hopes on state institutions. In this armed tussle between militants and State forces, the song of gun reverberated in the vale for a decade and suddenly disappeared behind the slogans of Azadi by huge non-violent demonstrations and rallies in 2008 and 2010. As the militancy was on an upsurge, most of these parties again came under a common platform called the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) to give a political voice to the armed groups and also restage their politics. As the asymmetrical warfare couldn’t stand against the strong state coupled with many local and international dynamics, nuance of resistance shifted to nonviolence.

The campaign of Safre-i-Azadi (Journey to Freedom) led by Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) one of the pioneers in armed resistance who submitted to non-violence in mid 2000’s, became a precursor for the precipitation of what is called the first and second non-violent popular uprising.

Safre-i-Azadi was a signature campaign which saw protest marches across the 1|Page

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state of Jammu and Kashmir, in which more than one million signatures were collected and presented to the international community and India and Pakistan.

The parabolic shift in the resistance movement from armed to non-violence merits an attention and scientific scrutiny here. By focussing on the use of disproportionate force, social fatigue, restaging of dissident politics and changing international context, this paper will try to examine the different dynamics of the Kashmir conflict that led to the transition of Armed opposition to non-violent resistance in Kashmir 1

Waseem Shah Ph.D Scholar Department. of Peace and Conflict Studies,Sikkim University

Key Words: Kashmir, Indian Forces, Militants, Human rights, Resistance

Armed phase of the Kashmir movement started in late 1980’s after the rigged state assembly elections of 1987. This was the time, when the youth of Kashmir gave up the hope of any political solution to their aspirations when a large percentage had participated in the electoral process. The repetition of the malfeasance in Kashmir elections and the Centre’s meddling in local affairs, suddenly surged the youth towards armed rebellion, who were traditionally involved in non-violent modes of political participation. A large number of them went across the line of control (LOC), attained some amateur arms training and started the rebellion. The expulsion of the USSR forces from Afghanistan by Taliban coupled with people’s power as evident in Romania led to the popular belief that young Kashmiri can also win the battle with India. Initial fervent saw a large participation of local youth joining these militant organizations for the liberation of Kashmir. JKLF was a pioneer in armed struggle which was later superseded by Hisbul Mujaheddin numerous other splinter groups. As the counterinsurgency operations were launched against the militants, the disproportionate power differentials between the contending parties led to a tactical change in the militant movement to sustain the asymmetric relationship against the State.

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The indigenous nature of the rebellion garnered legitimacy for militants among local population which put them on an ideological advantage over the State forces.

The consolidated support base for militants among the local population put them to reigns of honour because most of them were local residents and shared the ethnic or kinship ties. This dimension gave an extra burden to the security forces that were not only alien to the difference between a militant and a civilian, but were also unacquainted to the hostile geography. The hit and run attacks by militants, in the old guerrilla fashion led to a severe rebuttal by State Forces by charging disproportionate force against all the potential rival population. The interest of modern nation state heavily rests on the premise of safeguarding their territories in peripheries and inside Kashmir, this principle of national interest gave an extraordinary situation to the Indian State to deal with. States can go to any extent to defend the objective of “core national territories and the large principle of territorial integrity” (Mayall, 1990, Horowitz & Sharma, 2008:751). Therefore in this adverse condition host States bear heavy costs to retain and control such territories. If the states possess conventional military superiority over the insurgent group they are likely to defeat the insurgents, but there are other factors that can prolong the insurgent operation for a long time. “however, a host state enjoying a conventional military advantage should be more able to extinguish an ethnic insurgency, or at least grind it down to less threatening levels”(Horowitz & Sharma, 2008:751) States use counterinsurgency strategies on a continuum varying from more intense to balanced, carrot and stick approaches. Pure coercive strategies may include extreme steps of genocide or ethnic cleaning of insurgents and their local support base. “Alternatively, the host state may use its armed forces to conduct intense, relatively indiscriminate operations in the ethnic out group regions, seeking to crush the insurgents and intimidate the local ethnic population into neutrality or cooperation.”

Or they may use more specific policy of operation targeting the

insurgents and their core supporters which have likelihood of success if coupled with economic and political inducement and local political elite inclusion. The other alternative is to cede to the demands of insurgent groups and give de jure independence to the ethnic insurgents (Horowitz & Sharma, 2008:752).

Host states fighting ethnic insurgencies choose from a wide range of strategies, ranging from highly coercive ones such as indiscriminate conventional warfare 3|Page

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against insurgent-controlled areas, to more constrained, targeted warfare, often coupled with political outreach efforts towards moderate elements of ethnic minorities.(Horowitz & Sharma, 2008:749). The state uses overwhelming force to crush insurgents and their civilian population base who support them in a highly cooperative ethnic group. During operations in ethnic conflict, the State forces find it harder to elicit cooperation from local ethnic groups and target directly the insurgents only. “The less able the state is to narrowly target insurgents, the more it will have to rely on overwhelming use of force to cull the insurgents” (Horowitz & Sharma, 2008:753). Such broader intimidation may work to physically restrain a population from supporting the insurgents and keep away from it.

The political processes and events that serve to undermine the calculations and assumptions of political establishments mark a shift in political opportunities for insurgents groups. The notion is that social insurgency is shaped by broad social processes that usually operate over a longer period of time. As a consequence, the processes shaping insurgency are expected to be of a more cumulative means (McAdam, 1982:41). Various shifts in the structure of political opportunities, depending on the context, increase the chances of successful insurgent action. Most fundamentally, such shifts enhance the chances for successful political mobilisation and give power to insurgent groups. The development of a successful mobilisation increases the likelihood that insurgent interests will prevail in a confrontation with State. Successful mobilisation and collective action does not necessarily mean that insurgent groups and their interests will inevitably be accepted in all conflict situations. Even in the context of an improved bargaining position, the insurgent groups are usually at a disadvantage in any confrontation with an established political system. The denial of participation in political processes to the aggrieved population shifts weight towards the bargaining position of insurgent groups and thus creates new opportunities for insurgent action. “An improved bargaining position for the aggrieved population raises significantly the costs of repressing insurgent action.

Unlike before, when the powerless status of the excluded group meant that it could be repressed with relative impunity, now the increased political leverage exercised by the insurgent group renders it a more formidable opponent” (McAdam, 1982:43).

Political opportunity for any radical movement mainly condenses to five main clusters - i.e. degree of openness in the polity, formation of political alignments, the 4|Page

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presence of allies and support groups, division within the leadership (elite) and its attitude towards the dissident movements and repression of dissent by state (Tarrow, 1998:76-80). In a reductionist approach, the opportunity structures can be understood in terms of the nature of the resource available and external constraints to a movement. The changes in the State policy and the political space provided by the government to engage the dissidents and encourage them to take their opposition outside government framework and break the conventional form of political participation. If the state goes at ease, the dissidents may support continuing the armed struggle as a method of resolve. And when the state puts severe restrictions on the violent activities of the movement, the dissident leadership may pursue a balanced approach by augmenting the armed struggle with a political front to subside greater repression and loss to the movement resource.

Sustainability of armed movement in asymmetrical relationship where is international dimension is also involved needs to be critically analysed. Underlying are the main subheads that will help in explaining the transition in Kashmir Armed Movement

Asymmetrical warfare: Conventional Military superiority of Indian forces in the battlefield: Conventional military superiority of the State to disengage or destroy the insurgent groups and their demographic base is necessary precondition for the defeat of the insurgency. Along with military superiority, states also need local ethnic cooperation; ethnic authorities and local police must be reliable to the host state.

This arrangement will make it easier to targeted operations by state forces and restrict the fight between state forces and insurgents, the damage inflicted on the civilian population can be significantly reduced. It will help in limiting the local ideological legitimacy for insurgents (Casaddy, 2006:47-62) and also the recruitment base could be prevented from joining the militant ranks. Such meaningful cooperation was difficult to attain in Kashmir because of the strong social and political linkages between the militants and their demographic base. Thus the Indian State in such circumstances relied on the indiscriminate force to prevent the dissidents from achieving their political objectives. In the early days of militancy, the cooperation of Indian forces with local police was very weak as the Indian forces couldn’t trust the local authorities. In the wake of this insight of fighting, the State 5|Page

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forces could hardly recognise the difference between civilians and militants and thus treated all the people alike as militants and opponents.

With the sudden nature of uprising, the early response towards the insurgency was not well planned. The intelligence had failed to report any advent towards it and the Indian State herself was taken by surprise. The early attacks by militants were not taken seriously. It was assumed that perhaps the Sikhs who were fighting for Khalistan in Punjab are involved. But once the alarming bells of Azadi rose in Srinagar, the forces were immediately relocated in Kashmir to fight a battle in a field they were least acquainted with. The Indian Army was already involved in Nagaland, Punjab, Assam. Soldiers were poorly trained, often brought from Border Security Forces. Placed in a new field and faced with the attacks from militants, the poorly disciplined forces engaged in frequent outrages against the local population. The accesses done by forces served to benefit the militants thus giving the people yet another reason to resent India. Internationally, the abuses by CRPF and BSF also caught attention and many organizations criticised the Indian government for the torture and random killings.

To control the insurgency, Indian legislation, rather than discouraging these allegations of misconduct by the security forces, amended a number of laws for facilitating a greater control on the militants and legal impunity for the forces. “Indian laws, including the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act of 1987 were already vague enough to warrant the arrest of anyone guilty of committing ‘disruptive acts’ but the amendments expanded these laws, flying directly in the face of most internationally respected legal rights”. Along with legitimate avenues of political expression the basic rights such as the right of the accused to be informed about the charges against him were eliminated (Jones, 2008: 11). Under the leadership of Governor Saxena in 1990, the rights of military were expanded further under the Disturbed Areas Act. With the help of this Act, Indian forces were able to employ violence against civilians as this act even gave power to the low rank officers to use violence without the permissions from higher authorities (Ganguly, 1997:112). Many people question that had the Indian approach to counterinsurgency been well planned employing trained and disciplined forces, it would have served better to mitigate the losses and stop the insurgency from intensifying.

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The legal conditions of conflict and militarisation established through securityrelated special ordinances, for example the Disturbed Areas Act, the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) and the Public Safety Act (PSA), gave the Indian forces unrestricted power to carry out the operations in civilian areas. These laws are used to legitimise the acts of routine violence by identifying the civilian population as threat to national security and authorizing the use of excessive force by the security forces against them, giving rise to human rights violations (HRW, 2006). Through AFSPA, the non-commissioned officers are also given the authority to kill on the basis of suspicion to maintain the rule and public order. The Act also ensures immunity from prosecution by establishing that no legal proceeding can be brought against any member of the armed forces without the permission of the central government – a provision that, in practice, leaves victims with no legal mechanisms for seeking justice (Duschinski and Hoffman, 2011:46, PUDR report 2007). By such extraordinary power and culture of impunity, the security force felt no limitation in counterinsurgency operation.

The counterinsurgency measures taken initially were crude and ineffective and therefore had resulted in massive human rights violations, dislocating life in the valley and thus creating a strong anti-Indian sentiment. The measures taken by State Forces in the counterinsurgency operations included security cordons and crackdowns, separating men from women for long periods, “the arbitrary arrest of Kashmiri Muslim males and a high incidence of custodial deaths associated with detentions without trial or judicial review”. In 1995 Terrorism and Disruptive Activities Prevention Act (TADA) was repealed due to national and international pressures (ICG Report, 2003:15). Despite a visible shift from armed to political means in Kashmir militancy, New Delhi continued to believe that order can be restored through force only.

The immediate counter-insurgency response by India to the upsurge of militancy in Kashmir was to deploy disproportionate number of the soldiers. There were more than 500,000 Armed forces personnel in Jammu and Kashmir by 1994, drawn from the army and paramilitary units. The highest degree of militarization was seen in Kashmir since 1990 from a glaring deployment of 150,000 soldiers to now, the number is estimated between 500,000 to 700,000. The ratio in 1990 was one soldier for more than 40 civilians that means 17 soldiers per sq. km which increased 7|Page

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to one soldier for every 10 civilians in recent years. The former Deputy Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir during an assembly session in 2006 revealed that there were more than 667,000 Armed forces in the state for a population of 12 million (Dabla, 2012:197). The number of militants has varied from few hundreds to few thousands which is numerically very small in comparison to the Indian forces. Huge presence of the army made it virtually impossible to carry the armed struggle forward with the same intensity. Indian forces made their presence in every village and street of Kashmir, installing sand bankers on the street corners, camping at high altitude places to keep safe from militant attacks, road checkpoints and also occupying place in abandoned hotels, cinemas, and hospitals.

India was approaching the actual combat from thoroughly ineffective direction engaging in a positional warfare. The tactic of blanketing the countryside with soldiers and manpower-intensive method of fighting low intensity armed campaign and neglecting the political aspect of the fight initially raised the recruitment to militant groups. But continuously employing this doctrine of disproportionate force ultimately forced the insurgents to retreat though not completely. A major divide between those who believed that only armed struggle can lead to exercise of the right to self-determination and those who think it is only a part of the movement to achieve the objective started to surface in mid-1990’s. After the formation of the Hurriyat Conference, in the successive years many militant leaders who spoke of guns as not providing the complete answer were responded coldly by the Indian State. Azam Inquilabi one of the militant leaders laid down arms and returned to Kashmir for a peaceful struggle. Soon his house was raided by security forces for search of arms and his advisor was arrested. The very next day militants visited him to ask if he still believed that India could be persuaded to dialogue without the help of gun. The Charar-e-Shareif incident clearly demonstrated that the Indian strategy was not to appease the people and the militants. When some militants were suspected in a Mosque in a small town Charar-I Sharief, Budgam district, the Government did not allow the JKLF and Hurriyat leadership to visit the town and persuade the militants to pull out. They were instead beaten and humiliated, yet again showing the hard attitude towards the insurgency (Navlaka, 1995: 2106). The town was razed to ground burning almost 1500 residential houses and other structures while the suspected militants escaped.

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The resurrection of local surrendered militants into renegades also became detrimental for the militant operations. Renegades also known by the name “Ikhwan� were the former militants who surrendered and changed allegiance towards Indian forces. These renegades have been used in extrajudicial executions of militants, human rights activists, journalists and other civilians and later any allegations against them would be dismissed as intergroup rivalries or not being part of government machinery. In 1997, DIG Gurbachan Jagat acknowledged that an estimate of 5000 renegades have been inducted as Special Police Officers (SPO) and a number of 2000 - 3000 were operating as most dreaded force (Renegade Militants in Kashmir, 2002).

These former militants having all the knowledge of the militant networks, hideouts and operational strategies under the cloak of State forces also got involved in counter-insurgency operations. A carrot and stick approach was in place. The onslaught by local renegades on the militants substantially decreased local recruitment and participation in militancy. During this period however, the militancy intensified to a war like situation with the local militants diminishing on the ground. A study by Thomas Marks reveals that the participation of foreign militants in Kashmir struggle till 1995 was less than five percent. The number started rising by 1996, in which the total the percentage of foreign militants killed rose to 18 percent and in the subsequent years, the percentage grew gradually to the maximum of

82 in 2004

(Marks, 2006: 125). By this time the total number of militants had squeezed to a two or three digit figure indicating a narrower participation of locals.

Soon after the 1996 elections, the Ikhwan started facing hard days. Despised by the people for their ruthless oppression against the Kashmiris, along the local campaigns, they also found the political establishment arrayed against them. Using these surrendered and captured militants as renegades to fight against their former companions also kept apprehensions in the minds of the militants. Swami quoted one of the top BSF officials saying the attacks on Ikhwan and lack of clear surrender policy has deterred many militants from laying down arms (Swami, 2003).

With the rise in the deaths of civilians, militants, and security forces, the alienation of Kashmiris also increased. While the militants could not hope to defeat the Indian army, they tried to sustain it. Unfortunately the stick approach to discipline the Kashmiris had drawn sharp marks on Kashmir Psyche. In an interview with 9|Page

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Parvez Matta, program coordinator at JKCCS, he revealed that force used by the Indian state against militants and civilians alike shook the people. The militants’ families would be harassed in all possible ways by government forces and a systemic denial to immediate relatives has been in place. These people would not receive a positive report of verification that is required for government jobs or their passports would not be cleared. Families of these militants would be nocturnally raided and their relatives are in constant surveillance and would have to report to police stations regularly. This was confirmed in interviews with many ex-militants, who apart from other reasons found maltreatment of their families unbearable and gave in.

State repression and human rights violations created a culture of fear and collective trauma. The widespread personal experiences and collective narratives of personal and collective victimization only reveal that the disproportionate force yielded in the attitudinal shift towards shunning the gun and embracing the nonviolence.

State Repression: Social Fatigue and Retreat from Militancy In pursuing purely coercive strategies, democracies are likely to use sufficient force to further alienate the local ethnic population, without going far enough to maximize attrition of insurgent networks or to make the cost of supporting the insurgency prohibitively high for the local ethnic population. Unless national security is fundamentally at risk, and no alternative strategies seem likely to succeed, democracies are unlikely to be willing to engage in mass killing or ethnic cleansing (Horowitz & Sharma, 2008:755). Indian State employed both defensive as well as offensive tactics in the counterinsurgency. Primarily, the State forces including local police would be employed to guard vulnerable places and vital installations such as the residences of the Governor and Chief Minister, power grid stations, telecommunication centers, radio/TV stations, major bridges, and the Jawahar tunnel, the only road link connecting India with Kashmir. Roads will be deployed with road-opening parties (RoPs) to have smooth movement of VIP’s, police and army convoys. A constant surveillance is maintained by foot patrols in streets, market places and also residential areas to show the presence of the State and repress

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subversive activities. The offensive action would include pre-emptive actions or retaliations in the event of militant attacks. “Reinforcements are called, the area surrounding the scene is cordoned, and a search for the culprits starts. Suspects are detained, causing fear among their relations that they would be tortured in interrogation centers” (Jafa, 2005:155). If militants are suspected to be in some house, that will be razed to ground, if some State Forces personnel is killed by militants that will mean indiscriminate firing on civilians infamously known as crossfire.

Early 1990’s saw random attacks by militants on security installations, encounters by state forces supplanted by cordon and search operations with severity. Road checkpoints were used to search cars, frisk people for arms and identity, anyone suspected would be detained and interrogated. The results of counterinsurgency tactics by the State are evident from many documented reports on Kashmir. One of the results of military engagement has been the proliferation of human rights violations. A fact finding team comprised by seven activists from human rights organizations from Punjab and Andhra Pradesh after knowing the facts about human rights violation mentioned that “killing in custody and killing in alleged crossfire are two means by which the life of unarmed civilians has been taken away in this State for last 13 years” (JKCCS report, 2005:18). This gives us a measure about how violence can be used to discipline people and how it will generate alternate rationality for movement and shift the population to a cost benefit analysis of the conflict and their approach towards it.

The nature of State violence in Jammu and Kashmir from 1990 has been reported by various human rights organizations, civil society groups, and activist and to some extent by international groups and media also. The clash between the militants and State forces remained escalated in early years of militancy. By the mid of 1990’s militant resistance started losing the steam and State forces started gaining upper hand and that became a precursor for decline in militancy. The militants were to rely on local population for food and shelter, and thus would take refuge in civilian areas. The State forces used harsh methods against the civilians and those who showed sympathy towards militants. Amid such strategies and policies of the state repression, the local people had to pacify to stop incurring more costs.

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“The state of Human Rights in Jammu and Kashmir 1990-2005” a report compiled by Public commission on Human rights, Srinagar details the list of killing. Relying on the government figures the report mentions number of killings as 46,581 from 1990 to 2004 in various districts of Jammu and Kashmir. The report also mentions that if a village to village survey is conducted, the figures would rise to 70,000. 23199, half of the figure of total casualities are said to be militants, although figures varies in different sources. 16,468 were civilians, 5,731 security forces, 587 Ikhwani (renegades), 480 Political activists and 196 informers. Year wise data makes it clear that except for 1990, 1992 and 1996 civilian deaths exceed the number of militants killed (JKCCS report 1990-2005, VI). The report details the status of children in Kashmir, detainees and prisoners, extrajudicial killings, disappearances, use of civilians as Human Shield, internal migration, inquiries and probes, harassment of Kashmiris outside Kashmir, massacres, violence against women, torture and relief and rehabilitation.

International people’s tribunal on Human Rights and Justice in Indian Administered Kashmir (IPTK) and Association of Parents of Disappeared persons (APDP) released a report “Alleged perpetrators - stories of impunity in Jammu and Kashmir” in 2012. It mentions 214 cases of human rights violations and 500 State forces personnel as perpetrators. The individual perpetrators mentioned are further categorised as 235 army personnel, 123 paramilitary personnel, 111 Jammu and Kashmir Police personnel and 31 Government backed militants/associates. Name of two Major Generals, three Brigadiers, nine Colonels, three Lieutenant Colonels, 78 Majors and 25 Captains are mentioned who hold high official positions in the Indian Army. In addition to this, 37 senior officials of the CRPF, and many local police officers are mentioned. The report sums up that “the official designations of the alleged perpetrators and the geographical spread of the crimes committed against the people of Jammu and Kashmir indicate a decisive will of the Indian State, carried out by its functionaries as part of a policy” (JKCCS Press Note, 2012).

The Indian State uses “discipline” and “death” as techniques of social control in Indian Administered Kashmir. The structures of militarised governance dispense the intense forms of psychosocial regulation. “Discipline is affected through military presence, surveillance, punishment, and fear. Death is disbursed through “extrajudicial” means and those authorized by law. Psychosocial control is exercised 12 | P a g e

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through the use of death and deception to discipline the living. Discipline rewards forgetting, isolation, and depoliticization” (Buried Evidence, 2009: 9).

International People’s Tribunal on Human Rights and Justice in Indianadministered Kashmir (IPTK) conducted the research into the unknown, unmarked, and mass graves between November 2006 and November 2009, graves entombed bodies of those murdered in either in custody or in fake encounters between 19902009. The Tribunal conducted extensive research in the border districts of Bandipora, Baramulla, and Kupwara in north-western Kashmir on these clandestine, unnamed, unmarked and undecorated graves. “They exist amid habitations, next to schools and homes, by the roadside and town square, in prayer grounds and forests, at the edges of fields and community cemeteries across rural and urban space” (Buried Evidence, 2009). IPTK researched around 2700 graves in these three districts and 99 percent are men. “Next-of-kin, community, collective testimony, and archival research evidence that, in various instances, “encounter” killings across Kashmir have, in fact, been authenticated as “fake encounter” killings. Post-death, the bodies of these victims were routinely handled by military and paramilitary personnel, including the local police. The bodies were then brought to the “secret graveyards” primarily by personnel of the Jammu and Kashmir Police” (Buried Evidence, 2009) Amnesty International (AI) produced a security with human rights report “A LAWLESS LAW” in 2011. The report mentions PSA (Public Safety Act) in violation of India’s international human rights legal obligations. The report mentions the violations of principle of legality, reasons for detention, access to judicial and legal counsel, indefinite detention of foreign nationals and immunity of official from prosecution. PSA detentions would include incommunicado detention, torture during interrogation and coerced confession, detention without legal basis, lack of information and access to family, detention on vague and fabricated grounds and illtreatment and conditions of prisons. Detentions mostly include dissident political leaders and activists, ‘stone pelters’ and bar association leaders. The State works through paralegal or an Informal ‘Criminal’ justice system which means slapping of PSA instead of any criminal charges, continued detention despite acquittal or bail from courts and repeated and successive detention orders. “A number of political leaders have been detained under the PSA in J&K, suggesting that the PSA is being 13 | P a g e

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used to disable the first and second tiers of the leadership of the major proindependence political parties, taking them “out of circulation” and thereby preventing political mobilisation”. Allegation would vary from “anti-national” statements and inflammatory speeches to instigating mobs for rioting and violence which is typically vague and general with few details of time and place provided (AI, 2011:42).

These reports are of great relevance to the affliction by Indian forces and other security services in Kashmir. On the part, these reports also reflect the willful failure of State to keep the record of these atrocities, render accountability to institutions or any redress to the wailing valley. These serious acts and omissions have meant that people have been killed or seriously injured.” The report also records how the enquiries have been obstructed. It concerns the collusion between security forces and renegade militant bodies they support. These renegades kill militants who are in revolt. It was in 1995 that renegade militants were let loose in Kashmir following the precedent set in Punjab (Noorani, 2003: 2344). Noorani thinks Sir John’s report is of little importance to India but recommends an independent agency necessary to check the grave abuses. While the symbolic representation of the Jalil Andrabi’s murder, a senior lawyer, identified army official as complicit, there is lot more to be brought to book.

There are numerous cases of rights violations that are not even reported. In most of the cases, the victims and their kin have been threatened for dire consequences for reporting the abuses. Further during the peak years of militancy and intense counterinsurgency, police would not even register an FIR against the government forces. It appears that the reported abuses in the human rights reports are only a tip of an iceberg and many people are fearful due to social and other constraints to report the violations. Azam Inquilabi, a militant leader conceded that the primary reason for laying the gun and embracing nonviolent politics has been the immense suffering of Kashmiri people. “We wanted to give relief to people, we thought once the armed struggle starts Pakistan will intervene militarily and it will be over in months.”

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Restaging of Dissident Politics While the armed insurgency overshadowed the nonviolent modes of political participation and mobilisation in the early years, the dissolution of MUF (Muslim United Front) now gave space for new political processes. The militants were allied to different political groups but individually the groups were not enough to constitute a political power for representing the movement wholly. When the armed struggle was at its peak, the armed groups needed a political front to put their point across. A consensus developed among the dissident leaders, Shabir Ahmad Shah of the People’s League, Syed Ali Shah Geelani of the Jamaati- Islami, Abdul Gani Lone of the People’s Conference, Maulvi Mohammed Abbas Ansari of the Ittehad-ulMuslimeen, and Abdul Gani Bhat of the Muslim Conference while being held together in jail in 1992 to form a unified multi party coalition to guide the movement.

All the ideological differences were set aside and they united for asserting the right to self-determination. Around thirty political, religious and civil society organizations came together to form ALL Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) in Feb, 1993. The Hurriyat Conference led a unified demand for the recognition of Kashmiris’ Right to Self-determination and also included the option of independence to earlier UN mandated choices of either joining India or Pakistan.

Constitution of APHC mentions a peaceful struggle to secure for the people of Jammu and Kashmir the exercise of the right of self determination in accordance with the UN Charter and the resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council.

However, the exercise of the right of self determination shall also include the right to independence.

To make endeavour for an alternative negotiated settlement of the Kashmir dispute amongst all the three parties to the dispute -- India, Pakistan and people of the Jammu and Kashmir -- under the auspices of UN or any other friendly countries, provided that such settlement reflects the will and aspirations of the people of the state.

To project the ongoing struggle, in the state before the nations and governments of the world in its proper perspective as being a struggle directed against the forcible and fraudulent occupation of the state by India and for the achievement of the right of the self determination of its people. (SATP)

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Fazlul Haq Qureshi put it pithily that the APHC was set up in the wake of the disillusionment with the gun, precisely to serve as a political interlocutor with Delhi, as ones who enjoyed the confidence of the militants (Noorani, 2000: 3950). The creation of the APHC thus maintained non-state democratic representation of Freedom Movement. “Its initial resonance with the Kashmiri people was a direct result of both its appeal to Kashmiri political values and its anticipatory call for selfdetermination” (Cockell, 2000: 335). Dramatic increase in counterinsurgency operation in the meantime, resulted suppression of armed groups, hence made no progress for APHC to force Indian Government into tripartite dialogue which also resulted in loss of public confidence in it as a genuine representative of the Freedom movement. APHC boycotted the elections in 1996 on the grounds of harassment by security forces and Ikhwan (govt sponsored renegades) and held on the call for a tripartite dialogue between India, Pakistan and Kashmir.

By 2003, the APHC was showing conciliatory gestures towards India and moderation on its stand. APHC chairman Moulvi Abbas Ansari expressed his willingness to hold talks with Indian government and dropped the condition of having a trilateral dialogue mentioned in its constitution and changed its policy by not stressing on the inclusion of Pakistan in the dialogue process. They maintained that Pakistan as party to the dispute could be involved in the dialogue process at a later stage. This caused severe crisis in the group between the hardliners and moderates when the chairman Molvi Abbas Ansari went against founding principle of the coalition. The support base was divided. Almost half of the parties went to Syed Ali Shah Geelani and formed Tehreek-I Hurriyat retaining the position on tripartite dialogue. Geelani maintained that “If India wants to resolve the issue through talks, the talks should be trilateral (among India, Pakistan and Kashmiris) and held under UN supervision or monitored by a friendly country” (Dawn, 2003).

Hurriyat group led by Mirwaiz continued its bilateral dialogue with India and Pakistan. Mirwaiz maintained his position with respect to the talks held with the then Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Deputy Prime Minister, L.K. Advani and Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh, “These were not backdoor negotiations or close-door meetings but open dialogue in which we stated our position, and our public statements are our private statements as well”. However, he maintained that the dialogue process or talk were mere rhetoric unless some change is brought in 16 | P a g e

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ground situation and stressed for release of detainees, revocation of Armed Forces Special Powers Act and Disturbed Area Act, and dematerialization of the Jammu and Kashmir (Ganai, 2006).

Rise of Hizbul Mujaheddin (HM) had given a severe blow to JKLF armed wing by 1993 and the organization was left with a small cadre base. After Yasin’s release from jail in 1994, he renounced the armed struggle, ‘we offered a unilateral ceasefire and offered to negotiate with all concerned powers - Pakistan, India and Kashmiri.

We believe all be given equal status” (Schofield, 2000:174). The unilateral ceasefire declared by Yasin Malik divided JKLF with Amanullah Khan and Yasin Malik forming separate organizations. In a press conference Yasin Malik said that the unilateral ceasefire deal of 1994 was brokered by the US and UK and also some civil society members from India, also convinced him (Islam, 2013). Thus a major armed group was returning to nonviolent politics.

Yasin Malik in a speech at India Today Conclave in 2008 said, ‘when I went out in search of Gandhi in the land of Gandhi, I was shocked to find the spirit of Gandhi is no more. This same country whose freedom struggle gave the world the example of ahimsa, which inspired the likes of Mandela and Martin Luther King and freedom-seeking people across the globe, has provided little space for a nonviolent freedom struggle in Kashmir and has used every sort of violent means to crush it.

After we declared a unilateral ceasefire in 1994 and committed ourselves to Gandhian means of resistance, 600 of my own colleagues have been killed. If only nonviolent struggle in the 21st century was as easy as standing in front of someone’s door with flowers and holding a sign reading,“Get Well Soon” (Malik’s Speech: 2008). Malik in an interview with author reiterated that, ‘even though we (JKLF) put down the gun and moved to nonviolent struggle, the state repression and bloodshed of our cadres continued. Now the new generation which was born and raised during the years of turmoil and violent conflict possess intense anger, memories of violence and sense of injustice but they are passionate to work out a solution through nonviolence’.

On the eve of the elections in 1996, Congress government was satisfied that its strategy of conducting elections in Punjab was successful and thus threw its toil.

Kashmir was not settled like Punjab and had much antipathy towards India. The parliamentary elections were scheduled for May 1996 and the state election in 17 | P a g e

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October. The conditions for elections in Kashmir were poor; the elections were boycotted by Hurriyat Conference, JKLF and other militant parties. JKLF leader Yasin Malik threatened to burn himself to death if election were held in Kashmir.

Yasin was quoted saying that elections proposed for Jammu and Kashmir “is a challenge to the pride of the people of Kashmir who have been laying down their lives for the cause of freedom” (Kashmir Leader Threatens, 1995). “Intelligence assessments for the Home Ministry suggested the voter turnout in the Vale of Kashmir could be as low as 10-20 percent, even worse than the farcical 1992 Punjab poll. Desperate to avoid an electoral embarrassment, the government seems to have ordered the police and army to ensure a good turnout” (Telford, 2001).

State can pursue a negotiated compromise with the militants by offering concessions such as representation in local elections, economic inducements and packages, and increased local autonomy. If such negotiated compromise are acceptable both to the both the militants and local ethnic populace, militants can be convinced that “they cannot prevail militarily or through superior staying power, or that the costs of doing so are too high”. Militants must also be willing to “accept the political consequences of peace, which may include loss of external state support and local political marginalization”. In other words, there should be a moderate position by Nationalist militants and State rather than the extreme preference of political advantage (Horowitz & Sharma, 2008:755).

By 1996, the Indian government started a dialogue with former militants of Hizbul Mujaheddin, and Muslim Janbaz was forced to create an alternate political base to the APHC (Schofield, 2000: 175). Hizbul Mujaheddin was disowned by Jamaat-I Islami in 1997 and thus the militant leadership of this organization stood for political negotiations by themselves. The continued fighting between State Forces and Mujaheddin was now turning the tide toward the State forces by inflicting more casualties on militants. On July 24, 2000 Hizbul Mujaheddin’s Commander in Chief (operations),Abdul Majid Dar proclaimed a unilateral ceasefire. It was a defining moment in the decade old insurgency as the one of the largest organization has shown signs of reconciliation. The announcement was widely welcomed as relief to the decade of violence by people of Kashmir. While the Government of India met the representatives of Hizbul Mujaheddin in Srinagar on August 3, the hope that the process will culminate into a final solution or a more modest one was shattered.

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Hizbul Mujaheddin soon ended the process and India accused Pakistan of sabotaging the process by putting pressure on Hizbul Mujaheddin (Noorani, 2000:3949). In such an asymmetrical negotiation the bargaining position of Militants was not strong enough. India saw this as a weakness on the part of militants and tried to force a surrender of the militants. “Its strategy has been to use military force in aid of a policy of engineering splits among the ones it hopes to demoralise; splits between HM and Pakistan, Dar and Salahuddin, HM and APHC, HM and other groups� (Noorani, 2000:3950).

Change in Local Governance in the Valley In 2002, the central government promised free and fair state elections in Kashmir, and encouraged the local ethnic political parties to participate. Despite threats from militants, who assassinated 46 moderate political activists during the pre-election campaign, these efforts showed some success. The elections showed an improved turnout of nearly 50 percent in the Kashmir Valley. The elections were taking place at a time when many militants were in weak position on ground and separatists in the process were showing gestures for peaceful dialogue. Elections were seen as turning point for a change to the recurrent turmoil of the previous years. Previously in 1996, despite all of these problems the elections were successfully carried out by blanketing the whole of Kashmir with Indian security forces to ensure twenty fold increase in voter turnout by intimidation to a total voter turnout of 40%, up from 2% in 1989 (Jones, 2008:14 ).

Elections had proved illusory in 1996 by re-election of Farooq Abdullah which did little to soothe the pains of militants. Militants could not accept his government because he had failed to stop Indian forces from repressing the people and militants alike. Violence continued under this government till new elections were announced.

Year 2003 saw a shift in Kashmir politics. National Conference was defeated for the first time and People Democratic Party (PDP) and Congress formed the coalition government. Since then PDP claimed to have created a conducive atmosphere for initiating peace process and taking Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) to normalize relations between India and Pakistan.

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Until 1994, sporadic dialogues were held between India and Pakistan. The institutionalised process of dialogue was started in 1997 in which eight areas were selected for deliberation. Foreign secretaries of both countries continued to meet until the process was called off at the time of Kargil confrontation. Post 9/11 the process continued to be at a low or stalemate and in 2004 a renewed peace process was launched known as composite dialogue to resolve all outstanding issues between India and Pakistan. Official and back-channel diplomacy was used to carry on the dialogue process between these two States. On official level Kashmir and security issues were discussed periodically and the progress would be reported to foreign secretaries. Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) were a result of this composite dialogue process.

Trade across LoC was also started apart from the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad and Poonch-Rawalakot roads were opened for travel. Other developments works included the revival of tourism, establishment of new universities, and vacation of hotels by security forces. At the ground, people felt a change, democratic process was reviving, and indiscriminate State violence started declining from the previous levels. For the first time in 2005, a delegation of the moderate faction of the All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) headed by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq and the JKLF leader Yasin Malik was allowed to cross the LoC into Pakistan administered Kashmir. They interacted with leaders from Pakistan and PAK and with civil society, media and militants groups. Such visits contributed to a consensus building process and definitely created a trust and hope among the political and dissident forces in and across Kashmir. The leaders started endorsing the need to include Kashmiris in the dialogue process.

In addition to this, the pro-Indian political leadership of J&K, including the PDP President Mehbooba Mufti and Omar Abdullah of the National Conference, also travelled to Pakistan and met Pakistan’s political leadership to exchange views (Akhtar & Choudhury, 2013). The cross-LoC bus service in 2005 and trade service initiated in 2008 was an important development in creating conducive environment for pacifying the armed violence. People on both sides including the leaders showed interest in peace as a result of these CBM’s. Cross-LoC travel opens opportunities for people to people contact; families and relatives divided across LoC meets after many years, thereby addressing longstanding grievances. Trade also gives an 20 | P a g e

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opportunity to people across the LoC to undertake joint activities that have mutual tangible economic and emotional benefits. “However both initiatives suffer from operational challenges, which limit their socioeconomic and peace-building potential�

(Akhtar & Choudhury, 2013).

War on Terror and Militancy in Kashmir The ethnic insurgencies that are widely supported locally and across the borders sustain operation on the cross border havens. As a counter measure, it is necessary to seal off the domestic area of operation from the external state intervention. The restricted flows of insurgents across the borders will preferably hold prolonging the insurgency to moderate levels (Horowitz & Sharma, 2008:753). Halting external state assistance to militants in an area where moderate or high degree of local cooperation exists may not significantly alter the course of action but a continuing dependence on local limited resources will tend to lose the intensity of their operations. The aim of militancy will also be detracted i.e. to make the counterinsurgency protracted, costly and difficult for the host State. Earlier from 1989 onwards militants sustained an intensified struggle by large scale external military support from Pakistan and due to lack of local cooperation with counterinsurgency indiscriminate force was used which further intensified it. However the conventionally superior forces of India tilted the balance in favour of the host State. This was because Indian state devised plans with massive resource to successfully seal the border between Indian and Pakistani controlled parts of Kashmir to subside the impact of the external intervention.

India and Pakistan had worked on normalising the relations after the Kargil episode. After the gestures from militant organizations and changing scenario in the establishments of Pakistan, India had offered ceasefire to militants on the first day of Ramadan (Month of fasting for Muslims), Nov, 28, 2000. The Indian government instructed the security forces not to initiate operation against the militants and this was well received in Pakistan also. On weeks Pakistan responded by announcing a unilateral withdrawal of its troops deployed along the LoC. Musharraf government had taken significant steps since his inception as President of Pakistan in 1999.

Musharraf government had announced a policy of restraint along the LoC, reduced

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number of soldiers along the LoC and also a ceasefire was started in Siachin (Jamal, 2009:220-1).

Following the September 11, attacks, U.S. pressure on Pakistan may also have yielded in squeezing the infiltration by armed groups into Kashmir (Horowitz & Sharma, 2008:768). Before Musharraf could change the political prospects and policy for Kashmir Militancy, Indian parliament attacks took place. India mobilised the army along the borders which created a difficult situation for Musharraf. Pressure was mounted on him to address the issue of ‘terrorism’ in Kashmir. In a speech on 12, January 2002, he assured that “no groups would be allowed to wage jihad and banned two extremist groups operating in Kashmir” while reiterating Pakistan’s commitment towards Kashmir on moral political and diplomatic ends (Patanaik, 2008: 392) In early 2002, many militants were crossing the line of control to enter Kashmir. Due to international pressure and a belligerent India, finally militants were instructed to hibernate. President Musharraf retained a strict and hard-line position on Kashmir. He continued his hold that the insurgency in Kashmir is an “indigenous revolt of freedom fighters struggling to overthrow an oppressive occupier” (ICG, 2002: 6). Under the immense pressure, Musharraf made some tactical moves to prevent the rising blame consolidating the ground and also deflect some international pressure over its Kashmir policy.

Musharraf dealt with a planned strategy by pleading with the international community to pressure India to exercise the military restraint on the pretext of using his nuclear weapons. A lack of will to stop the cross border militancy seemed to exist in Pakistan and a widespread belief Pakistan “could largely restrain non-Kashmiri militants if it so desired” (ICG, 2002: 6). President Pervez Musharraf seems to agree with the view that if the militancy can’t be stopped completely but could be reduced (BBC News, 2007). “Cross-border infiltration has decreased significantly since the military government, under U.S. pressure, ordered militants to freeze cross-border operations after Armitage’s visit on 6 June 2002. Given its heavy presence, the Pakistani military could largely seal off its side of the Line of Control, and if this happened, the flow of militants into Jammu and Kashmir would dwindle considerably” (ICG, 2002:6)

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While India tried to dub the Kashmir Struggle for self-determination as a terrorist movement and gain international support for its agenda, “The New York Times, reminded India more bluntly that, “it cannot crush Muslim aspirations in Kashmir with the use of force”. Much more needs to be done at the diplomatic level and within the state to resolve the issue” (Puri, 2001:4044). Lashkar-i-Taiba and the Jaish-iMohammed, two large international militant organizations were banned by Musharraf following the Indian parliament attack (ICG, 2002: 7), however a large local base and acceptance to these organizations could not affect their existence grossly. These organizations are not part of UJC but operate in Kashmir as well. Pakistan arrested around 2000 people belonging to different organizations banned by Musharraf.

Some groups changed their names and transferred funds to other bank accounts.

However no ban was imposed on groups like Hizbul Mujaheddin, Harkat-Ul Ansar and Al-Badr who were under the cloak of UJC. These groups belong to indigenous Kashmiris and Pakistan maintained its claim to support them morally, politically and diplomatically. Hizbul Mujaheddin was asked to purge its foreign cadres to avoid international attention (Pattanaik, 2008:396).

After Musharraf made a pledge to contain the militant activity; many left their camps in Azad Kashmir, and moved to various destinations in Pakistan. A series of raids and dismantling operations were started against these organizations. These militants waited for normalising situations to return to Azad Kashmir (ICG, 2002:7). A part of the belief is that militant organizations inside Pakistan rely on government support and if they are deprived such support in terms of finance, bases, and sanctuaries,

it will have huge impact on militancy in Kashmir. “Most Pakistanis

support resolving the Kashmir dispute and have genuine anger at what is often seen as Indian abuses of Kashmiris” (ICG, 2002:8). If Pakistan agencies completely squeeze the militant organizations in Azad Kashmir, militant attacks over army installations will decline in Kashmir but will not necessarily cease unless some broader political solution supported by majority of Kashmiris is concluded.

Internally, Pakistan also realized that the policy of promoting militants in Kashmir and elsewhere was backfiring. These groups were becoming cause of internal security threat to Pakistan, with rising sectarian violence, rise in illegal arms and burgeoning armed groups. “Quite expectedly, Pakistan’s ruling military elite understood that the strategy of promoting radical elements as an instrument of its 23 | P a g e

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foreign policy vis-à-vis India in Kashmir would now become unsustainable” (Patanaik, 2008:391). Pakistan as a policy shift towards the armed groups in Azad Kashmir offered the militants assistance to marry or establish businesses. “They are said to have established three camps to help former militants to readjust and reintegrate to the civilian life. The BBC has taken notice of one such transit camp in North West Frontier Province for militants displaced in Azad Kashmir by earthquake in 2005 (Plett, 2007).

The 9/11 attacks in America definitely gave a severe blow to Jihadi groups inside Pakistan and the militant activities in Kashmir also received a setback. “The LoC has been coiled by India with several metres high double-row concertina-wire fencing to block armed rebels from entering and launching attacks on Indian soldiers inside Indian-administered Kashmir. The wall always remains electrified and is linked with what many believe are Israeli-made surveillance devices” (Aljazeera, India planning). “The Government noted a significant decline in infiltration from Pakistani Kashmir during 2004, attributing the drop in large part to the fence it constructed during the year-long ceasefire with Pakistan and more effective counter-insurgency methods.”(Global security, 2012) Graphic Representation of Transition in Kashmir Conflict Chart 1. Direct Violence in Kashmir Conflict 1989-2001

1757

1695

1996

1997

1998

842

617 799

513

297

1995

528

296

840

877

1067

1313

1565

1333

1678 1161

1023

1012 424

269

1992

263

205

1991

313

194

594

862

1990

17 19 79

500

225

761

1000

1004

1136

1500

859

1398

1695

2000

1809

2149

2500

2000

2001

0 1989

1993

Militants

1994

Forces

1999

Civilians

Figure 1 representing the number of deaths of Militants and Indian forces during the conflict from 1989-2001. The exact figure of civilian could not be estranged from the 24 | P a g e

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available resource thus the figures recorded for civilian casualties are taken from South Asian Terrorist Portal data base. Other Data is collected from JKCCS reports and Strategic Foresight Group Report.

Chart 2 - Direct Violence in Kashmr Conflict :2002-2013

1752

2000

1960

2500

995

State Forces

Civilians

35

82

2012

48

75

2011

73

100 71 56

2009

36

242 117 84 138 69 178

359 156 152

198 125

455

706 227 367

435 210

500

423 556

463

651

1000

Militants

727

958

1035

1500

0 2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2010

2013

Figure 2 representing the number of deaths of the Civilian, Militants and Indian Forces during the period of 2002-2013.

Source: JKCCS Reports (State of Human Rights in Jammu and Kashmir-1990-2005, Peace and Processes of Violence: An Observation on Situation in Jammu And Kashmir From 2002 to 2009, JKCCS Human Rights review 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013) From figure 1 and figure 2, we can make inference on the level of violence at different stages of the Kashmir Conflict in last two decades. The figures show the causalities of civilian, armed forces and militants during the ongoing conflict from 1989-2013. The early years of insurgency from 1989-1994 show a steep rise in number of killings per year which shows the intensity of armed conflict was very high.

From 1994 to 2003 the conflict sustained on the same level of armed fighting as indicating by the number of casualities in figure 1 and figure 2 and then a gradual decline started to happen. From 2003 onwards armed action started having less space and more of the activities of the movement turned to nonviolent political action as indicated by the number of casualties per year in figure 2. Thus a visible shift is observed in armed conflict towards nonviolence.

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Public Commission on Human Rights (J&K) and People's Union for Democratic Rights (Delhi) (2007), Missing In Action, Delhi.

Puri, Balraj (1995), Tracts for the Times, Kashmir towards insurgency, New Delhi: Orient Longman.

Puri, Balraj (2001), India, Kashmir and War against Terrorism, Economic and Political Weekly. 4044 Schofield, Victoria (2000), Kashmir in Conflict: India Pakistan and the unending war, London/New York: I. B. Taurus Swami, Praveen (2003), India’s Forgotten Army, The Hindu. Retrieved on 03-062014http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/2003/09/14/stories/2003091406170800.h tm Swami, Praveen (2007), India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947-2004, London and New York: Routledge Tarrow, S (1998), Power in Movement, 2nd edition, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Telford, Hamish (2001), Counter-Insurgency in India: Observations from Punjab and Kashmir, Journal of conflict studies. Vol. XXI No. 1 Yasin Malik’s speech (Chairman JKLF), If I Could Change the World, 2008: leadership for the 21st century, India Today Conclave: New Delhi on March 15, 2008

Interviews Bhat, Gani (2014), Chairman Muslim Conference, Srinagar, Interview, 03, February, 2014 Inquilabi, Azam (2014), Chairman of Freedom Front, Srinagar, Phone Interview, 25 May 2014

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Territorial Autonomy in Bodoland Territorial Area Districts (BTAD): A Case of Quest for Identity and Divisions in Society Cihnnita Baruah1 Abstract: Northeast India, a home to multitude ethnicities is prone to quest for

identity struggles by the different groups existing here. Ethnic assertion, revivalism, and the demand for a separate state are the major trajectories around which such identity struggle revolves. Identity struggle among groups is the result of different issues such as official language, cultural identity, intertribal or tribe-non tribe relations, tribal self image and identity, infiltration or the migration problem etc.

This paper is an attempt to understand the issue of conflict in Northeast India, specifically the conflicts occurring in Bodoland Territorial Area Districts (BTAD). These conflicts apart from acting as an obstacle for development of this region have also led to formation of divisions in the society. Ethnic politics along with conflicts among different ethnic groups have risen at an alarming rate in this region. This has led to formation of demand and aspirations of the groups which have not only hindered the political environment but have also formed a new threat to the security of BTAD. Along with it, the paper will also highlight the problem of tribal land alienation due to the influx of infiltrators that have raised several issues like the tribal non-tribal conflicts, conflicts among different tribal groups, creating turmoil in society.

1

M. Phil Research Scholar Centre For the study of Law and Governance

Jawaharlal Nehru University

Keywords: Territorial Autonomy, Bodoland Territorial Area Districts (BTAD), Security Threat, Immigration

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Introduction The present day Northeast has been carved out ‘since a radical redrawing of the region’s political map in the 1960s.’1 However, considering the present day conflictual situation of northeast, questions can be raised on this redrawing mechanism. The Indian state initiated this technique to wipe off rebellions which started among the different ethnic groups (Nagas and Mizos initially), and thought that, thwarting such rebellions at the very onset will prevent other ethnic groups from undertaking a rebellious character in future, in which they failed miserably. Bhaumik alleges that, ‘Northeast India is rooted more in accident of geography than in the shared bonds of history, culture and tradition’.2 He points out that Northeast is a colonial construct which subsequently got accepted by the postcolonial nation state.

The North-eastern region of India is a home to multitude of ethnicities and each ethnicity strives hard to assert its claim of indigenousness in this region. An observation of the lines along which mobilization has taken place in Northeast will bring into limelight that, it is largely based on Ethnicity and Identity. The search for identity by different ethnic groups is a living phenomenon of politics of Northeast region. Ethnic assertion, revivalism, and the demand for a separate state are the major trajectories around which such identity struggle revolves. Quest for identity is associated with different issues such as official language, cultural identity, inter-tribal or tribe-non tribe relations, tribal self image and identity, infiltration or the migration problem, etc contributes towards the growth of identity struggle. As such, ethnic conflicts remain one of the central forms of contestation which operates in Northeast India.

The Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) was set up as a self-governing body for Bodo Areas in 2003, after an agreement with the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) to address the problem of secession and separatism. To follow from Gurpreet Mahajan’s argument, this is a clear attempt on the part of the Indian state to accommodate minorities and the demands of diverse indigenous peoples.3 However, 1 2

3

Sanjib Baruah, Durable Disorder Understanding the Politics of Northeast India, New Delhi, 2005, p. 4.

Subir Bhaumik, Troubled Periphery Crisis of India’s Northeast .Sage, 1999, p.26.

Gurpreet Mahajan, ‘Negotiating Cultural Diversity and Minority Rights in India’, in Reignald Austin, Democracy, Conflict and Human Security: Further Readings, Stockholm, 2006.pp.111-122.

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a scholar like Sanjib Baruah questions this celebratory asymmetry and views the centre’s direct intervention in Assam as counterproductive.4 The Indian state under the pretext of controlling secessionism actually legitimised the insurgent Bodos and made them political elites, leading to a democratic deficit in BTAD; the reasons for this could be the lack of democratic tendencies among the ruling class (political ethnic elites) who have a lineage of violence thereby leading to the lack of incorporation of accommodation of minorities and their rights. The accord has accelerated the fear psychosis of the Non Bodos since it does not represent them enough. Other existing tribes like the Koch-Rajbongshi, Santhals residing in Bodoland Territorial Area Districts (BTAD) have expressed displeasure over the acute concentration of power in the hands of the Bodos alone. In appearance then, the Constitutional arrangement seems to have been a way to appease the Bodo community, thereby depriving and socio-politically excluding other legitimate communities in that particular region.

This paper makes an attempt to understand and analyse the issue of conflict operating in Northeast India, examining the conflicts particularly in the context of BTAD. These conflicts have lead to the creation of divisions in the society among the different ethnic groups residing in BTAD. The rapid growths of ethnic politics and conflicts among different ethnic groups, along with the demands and aspirations of the groups has not only hindered the political environment but have also formed a new threat to the security of BTAD. The major security problem emerging being the ‘problem of insurgency’. Further, the paper will also highlight the problem of tribal land alienation due to the influx of infiltrators that have raised several issues like the tribal non-tribal conflicts, conflicts among different tribal groups, creating turmoil in society.

Hence, the central proposition of this paper is to problematise the idea of deepening of democracy in BTAD and question the issue of non-representation of the members of other ethnic communities.

4

Sanjib Baruah, India Against Itself Assam and the Politics of Nationality, New Delhi, 1999.

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Methodology The methodology followed for this paper is basically secondary sources which include

books,

journals,

magazines,

newspaper

articles,

online

websites,

memorandums, books and pamphlets of student organisations, etc. However, since

this paper is a part of my M. Phil dissertation, a few primary sources were also included, which consisted of a series of semi structured interviews being conducted in Kokrajhar, the headquarter of BTAD. The sample for the interviews was drawn following Purposive sampling and Snowball sampling method. Purposive sampling was put to use as it was better to understand and identify the elite members among the political groups, students community. The category of respondents for this interview mainly included leaders of students organisations, local level functionaries, members of political party comprising of both Bodo and Non-Bodo population.

Further, another set of semi structured interviews with the help of snowball sampling was conducted on the general population of BTAD. The category of respondents here consisted of common people from different communities residing in BTAD that is, the Koch Rajbongshi, Bengali speaking Muslims, Adivasis wherein it was attempted to analyse people’s perception on BTAD and the affects of the reoccurring conflicts.

Structure of the Paper This paper is divided into five subsections. The first subsection deals with understanding the Sixth Schedule as a measure of decentralisation - the provision which led the grounds for creation of BTAD. Moving forward, the second subsection deals with the concept of territorial autonomy and the debates surrounding the concept. The third subsection deals with the case in point, that is Bodoland Territorial Area Districts (BTAD) and problematize the idea of territorial autonomy in this region.

The fourth subsection deals with the issue of insurgency, conflict and illegal immigration which are also responsible for the conflicts occurring in BTAD and fifth subsection concludes the paper by providing a way forward for a more representative BTAD.

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Sixth Schedule – a measure for decentralisation Local governance is considered to deepen democracy as it caters to demands of all the sections of a community or society. A conventional manifestation of this would be the Panchayati Raj Institutions. However, in case of Northeast, specific provisions were formulated in the Indian Constitution to provide them with a measure for ‘self- rule’ over certain subjects. Thus, as a case in point, the Sixth Schedule was incorporated into the Indian Constitution.

The Sixth Schedule was primarily evolved to protect the customary tribal’s traditions and culture of the excluded areas. The original Sixth Schedule areas were created in 1952 comprising of the hill areas. Later, the plain areas of Bodoland were also included. In normal terms, the Sixth Schedule could be defined as the provision under the Indian constitution which enables administration of certain tribal areas as autonomous entities. The Juridical ambit of the Schedule applies to the states of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram which provides an innovative tool of self government for the Tribal people via the formations of Autonomous District Council(s). Structurally, administrative power of an autonomous district is to be vested in a District Council, and in case of an autonomous region, in a Regional Council. These Councils are expectedly endowed with limited legislative, judicial, executive and financial powers. Most Councils consist around 30 members, including a few nominated members. However, Bodoland Territorial Council is an exception and can have up to 46 members.

The introduction of the Sixth Schedule is the result of a long historical process, developments which took place in both the British period as well as the period after India attained independence. It was after acquiring the Diwani rights of Bengal in 1765 that the East India Company came into direct contact with the medieval kingdoms of Manipur, Jaintia, Cachar and Assam. As these regions were not seen to be economically beneficial, the British did not venture much into these regions until the Burmese invasion (1817-24). The British government which occupied Assam after the Anglo- Burmese war in 1862 maintained an ‘isolationist’ attitude towards the tribes of Northeast India, which resulted in the exploitation of the tribes. They intentionally kept the tribes isolated and cut off these areas from the mainstream India. This policy of the British government was exclusively coordinated 34 | P a g e

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to benefit the colonial interest, based on isolation and misuse of tribals. However, the British could not proceed with this policy for quite long and among the British administration, those who had a soft corner for the tribal people, urged the British administration to take some measures for the security of the tribal individuals. As a result, a number of legislations were implemented. Further, in the name of upliftment, Government of India (Excluded & Partially Excluded Areas) Order 1936 was enacted wherein the hill areas of Assam were divided into two categories- “excluded and “partially excluded” areas. The Naga Hills, Lushai Hills and North Cachar Hills were included in the excluded areas whereas all other hill areas were included under the partially excluded areas. The Governor was entrusted with the responsibility of administering these areas and the Ministry had no jurisdiction over them. However, the issue of finance was still in the hands of the province. The central purpose of the policies adopted by the British government was to seclude the tribal people from the general masses and separate the tribal areas from the domain of normal administration. Apart from policy isolation, the British Government intervened in the administrative process of the tribals, at times through brutal repression or by appeasement policies so as to reap maximum benefits from the tribals.

However, after independence, the leaders of the nation brought in most of the ‘excluded’ and ‘partially excluded areas’ under the larger Indian Union. But, with time they realised that in order to accommodate the people, special provisions were necessary for the protection of the tribals. Initiative was taken to introduce policies which would assure less intervention on part of the government, thereby providing a guarantee for preservation of cultural traditions and norms of the tribal’s. Thus, a sub-committee named, The Northeast Frontier (Assam) Tribal and Excluded areas Committee under the chairmanship of Gopinath Bordoloi was created to mitigate the problem. The committee which was popularly known as the Bordoloi Committee comprising of J.J. Nicholas Roy, Rupnath Brahma, and A.V. Thakkar, toured and met the representatives of different tribal groups ; and presented a report proposing a different scheme of administration for these areas, which was ultimately called the ‘Autonomous Districts’. The report had the following three provisions a) The distinct social custom and tribal organization of the different people as well as their religious belief.

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b) The fear of exploitation by the people of the plains on account of later superior organization and experience of business. c) The fear that unless suitable financial provisions were made or power was conferred upon the local councils themselves, the provisional government might not, due to pressure of plain people, set apart adequate funds for the development of tribal areas.

The Constituent Assembly after taking into consideration the views of the different members, gave more emphasis on the views put forward by Gopinath Bordoloi, who was supposed to be quite respected among the hill people .And, thus, in the final deliberation the constituent assembly accepted the recommendation of Bordoloi committee and adopted the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India, which provides autonomous district council in the hill district of Assam. Articles 244(2) and 275(1) deal with these provisions. The Indian government also setup an Interim Tribal Advisory Council in each hill district. Presently ten autonomous councils are functioning in four states of North East India under Sixth Schedule among which three are present in Assam, three in Meghalaya, one in Tripura and three in Mizoram.

Defining territorial autonomy and debates surrounding territorial autonomy Autonomy can be defined as transferring or decentralising certain powers from the central government to that of an autonomous entity.

5

It is seen that, states

have been endorsing autonomy as a method of state-building process and also at the same time, using it as an instrument to tackle minority issues and ethnic conflict.

Scholars such as Heintze and Nordquist define autonomy as “that parts of the state’s territory are authorized to govern themselves in certain matters by enacting laws and statutes, but without constituting a state of their own” 6. It is in this perspective that autonomy is dealt with in this paper.

5

Wolff, Stefan and Weller, Marc, 2005 as cited in Roger Suso. “Territorial Autonomy and Self-Determination Conflicts: Opportunity and Willingness Cases from Bolivia, Niger, and Thailand.” in ICIP Working Paper 2010/01, International Catalan Institute for Peace, 2010 , p.

11, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1884156 (accessed November 12, 2015).

6 Nordquist (1998) and Heintze (1998) as cited in Roger Suso. “Territorial Autonomy and Self-Determination Conflicts: Opportunity and Willingness Cases from Bolivia, Niger, and Thailand.” in ICIP Working Paper 2010/01, International Catalan Institute for Peace, 2010 , p. 11, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1884156 (accessed November 12, 2015).

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The provision of territorial autonomy is expected to result in fostering peace and security in a region and bring an end to the conflicts. However, the question as to how successful is territorial autonomy in solving the problem of ethnic conflicts is questionable. Conversely, there has also been an increase in the self-determination conflicts or identity-based territorial conflicts, which can be alleged to have acquired the character of a regular, prolonged and obdurate form of political tumult and armed conflict at present. Thus, there is little consensus in the scholarly debate regarding the efficiency of autonomy as a response to identity-based territorial conflicts.

Nonetheless, the general consent is that minorities with a legacy of autonomy are more likely to mobilize around separatist or autonomy demands against the central government (Gurr 1993; Jenne et al. 2007; Cunningham 2007; Daftary 2008). As such, it remains unclear as to whether territorial decentralization actually reduces conflict. There is existence of both sections of scholars who agree as well as disagree to the idea of territorial autonomy as a conflict solving mechanism. Scholars who agree on autonomy to ease ethnic conflicts are largely based on Tiebout’s classical model (1957)7. Further, it is also argued that apart from efficiency, decentralisation strengthens democracy by bringing government closer to the people and increasing participation. In addition, Lustick, Miodownik and Eidelson assert that “by making government more responsive to the concerns of disgruntled minorities, potentially secessionist groups will be encouraged to feel confident of representation and protection for their most vital concerns”8. Representation entails formal recognition of the secessionist group by integrating it within the legal framework of peaceful political coexistence. As such, territorial autonomy contributes to satisfy the group’s concern about guaranteeing its physical security as well as the survival of its ethno nationalist identity.9

However, another section of scholars such as Brubaker (1996), Bunce (1999), Kymlicka (1998) and others espouse a dubious perception on regional autonomy.

They are of the opinion that territorial autonomy is an ineffective method for conflict resolution. Similarly, Snyder argues that, regional autonomy has a, ‘terrible track 7

Tibeout’s model classical model is based on the idea that decentralised provision of public goods can be an efficient to resolved conflict in the presence of preference heterogeneity.

8 Lustick, Ian S., Dan Miodownik, and Roy J. Eidelson. “Secessionism in Multicultural States: Does Sharing Power Prevent or Encourage It?” in American Political Science Review ,vol 98, 2004, p.10.

9 Hannum, 1996 as cited in L, Cederman, Erik, Simon Hug et al. “Territorial Autonomy in the Shadow of Conflict: Too Little, Too Late?” in American Political Science Review, vol.109, no. 2, 2015, p. 355.

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record,’ and evidence can be found in the partly violent breakups of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in early 1990s and also in the separatist violence in Russia, in the successor states of the Soviet Union.10 As such, these interpretations enthused disapproval for decentralisation along ethnic lines. Thus, critics allege that divisive ethnic identities are inculcated under the provision of autonomy. As such, autonomy can result in formulating discriminatory treatment to the inhabitants within the state.

Thus as asserted by Lake and Rothchild and Rothchild and Roeder, territorial autonomy proves to be a mechanism for post conflict settlements only under specific circumstances such as a robust democratic mechanism, moderate group leadership, mixed settlement patterns and absence of ethnic dominance.11 Additionally Suso in his study have also highlighted that autonomy is a kind of disguise and aggravates a conflict: ‘serves as a stepping stone towards separation as it serves to construct a national identity around which a separatist movements may advance demands based on the right to self determination’12

Thus, a central puzzle remains in terms of assessing the impact of territorial autonomy on self determination conflicts. It is along these lines that we attempt to examine the specific case of BTAD.

Illustrating Bodoland Territorial Area Districts The Sixth Schedule which initially applied to the hill tribes of the Northeast was later on extended to the plains, as the plain tribes of North Eastern states were deprived from the privileges given under sixth schedule.

The foundation of the Bodoland Movement is linked to political outrage which led to beginning of the Assam Movement. The Assam Movement during the later years became highly discriminatory and catered only to the interest of the Assamese Hindu 10

Snyder , 2005 as cited in Hannum, 1996 as cited in L, Cederman, Erik, Simon Hug et al. “Territorial Autonomy in the Shadow of Conflict: Too Little, Too Late?” in American Political Science Review, vol.109, no.

2, 2015, p. 355.

11 Lake and Rothchild(2005) and Rothchild and Roeder(2005), as cited in L, Cederman, Erik, Simon Hug et al.

“Territorial Autonomy in the Shadow of Conflict: Too Little, Too Late?” in American Political Science Review, vol.109, no. 2, 2015, p. 355.

12 Cornell, 2002 as cited Roger Suso. “Territorial Autonomy and Self-Determination Conflicts: Opportunity and Willingness Cases from Bolivia, Niger, and Thailand.” in ICIP Working Paper 2010/01, International Catalan Institute for Peace, 2010,p.13.

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middle class. As such, around early 1928 Bodos asserted their demand of separate statehood and distinguishing their identity to be different and distinctive from the Assamese. Consequently, after the Assam Accord was signed in 1985, the Bodos felt betrayed. They felt that even after rendering equal support to the cause of the Assam movement, the Assamese have totally ignored the demands of the tribal people. The accord contained certain clauses which were against the interest of the Bodos. For instance, ‘Clause 6 of the accord had promised to safeguard cultural identity of the “Assamese people”.’13 A major concern arose as to why have the Assamese identity been specifically highlighted when Assam houses a large collection of indigenous tribes. It is then that, the Bodos started to constantly feel that their identity was subsumed under the larger umbrella of Assamese identity. As such, they developed a sense of insecurity.

As time passed, the movement adopted a bigoted character and the militants’ factions emerged who indulged in ethnic cleansing by adopting harsh measures such as kidnapping, extortion etc, to pressurize the central government to accede to their demands. The state in order to control the situation signed an accord with the ABSU and BPAC (Bodo People’s Action Committee) in 1993; which agreed to the formation of a Bodo Autonomous Council (BAC). However, the agreement quickly collapsed due to the inability on the part of the government to negotiate with ABSU and BAC regarding the issue of boundary of the council; and as such this led to emergence of another movement for a separate state. As the BAC faltered, the BSF (Bodo Security Force) which had earlier committed insurgent violence due to ABSU’S acceptance to formation of an ADC; organised itself as the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB). Further, another rival insurgent group, the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) was formed in 1995. Both these insurgent groups, from 1995 to 2001 have relentlessly fought with the security forces and each other; they have also targeted other tribes and migrants in an attempt to ethnically cleanse Bodo areas of Assam. The movement subsided by 2001 as tripartite talks began among the central and state government and the BLT; which ultimately led to the culmination of a new accord on the

February 10, 2003 for the formation of a

‘Bodoland Territorial Area Districts’(BTAD) under the Sixth Schedule of the 13

Sanjib Baruah, India Against Itself: Assam and the Politics of Nationality.Philadephia, 1999, p.174

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Constitution. The newly formed BTAD comprises of four new districts, namely, Kokrajhar, Baksa, Chirang and Udalguri by reorganizing the eight existing districts.

Each of these was further divided in eight subdivisions.

Problematising territorial autonomy in BTAD Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) suffers from a democratic deficit which is why it can be stated that territorial autonomy led to the further creation of divisions in the society rather than solving ethnic conflicts. There has been an inherent and inbuilt ‘democratic deficit’ in the accord right from its inception. It can be stated that the Accord was not based on democratic principles because the very idea of bringing in democratic stabilisation through this accord in BTAD was not fulfilled; the major flaw being taking into consideration only the Bodos who constitute only 30% of the total population of that area. As such, the accord has led to the development of a feeling of fear and contempt among the minorities as no legitimate power has been provided to them. One of the respondents highlights as to how the Santhals have been neglected from the very beginning ‘Jetiya 2003 Accord khon bonale tetaiye amar kotha bhaba nai, etiakio bhabibo. Hehotor eku najai santhali manuh morile.

Khali etu bahbiye dukh lage je amiu andolan pothom obostat arombho hote, hehotor loge loge goisilu...Jibonok loi bohut bhoi aru sankhya thake etia’.(When the Accord was signed in 2003, then itself our consent was not taken. Why will they think about us now? It is no loss for them if a Santhali resident is killed. I feel sad just because we have also equally rendered our support to the movement, when it was started initially, we went together with them...There is no security for life now here. ) 14 This explains the sense of resentment built in the minds of the Non-Bodo population residing in BTAD. Their fate was left to be decided by the Bodo people, who had less than 30% population in that area.

As such, scholars such as Uddipana Goswami while highlighting the failure of the BAC accord to maintain peace and security states that the 1993 carnage had officially left almost 18,000 individuals from 3,658 families (almost all of them immigrant Muslims) displaced in Kokrajhar and in the 1996 case 202,648 individuals

14

Personal interview with a respondent. Translation is by interviewer.

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who were mainly Adivasis were displaced in Kokrajhar District alone.15 Similarly, Kaustubh Deka

while describing the discrepancy of BTC in acting as a potent

instrument of democratisation asserts that the provisions of the BTC Accord what the Bodo nationalists claim to be their historical right, actually results in a gross violation of equality and rights of the nearly 70 per cent non-Bodo population of the area.16 As highlighted by Mahanta, the BTC accord suffers from a structural deficit; i.e. a disproportionate mechanism for the seat allotment is in operation.17 As per the provision para 2(1) of the Sixth Schedule, the total number of seats in the BTC is 46, out of which 30 seats are reserved for Scheduled Tribes, five for non tribal communities, five open to all and 6 to be nominated by the Governor of Assam from the unrepresented communities for BTC area of which at least two should be women. But, the population pattern is different from this representative system.

According to the data provided by the OSD Kokrajhar, in BTC the ST population comprises 51% but according to the seat allocation it gets 75% reservation in BTC. A major constrain has been the gerrymandering of the reserved constituencies, in such a way that there is a minimal Bodo population in each (minimal in this case refers to a sizeable population that can compete with the other ST groups in order to win seats in the council) Further, the areas where Bodos are in majority are drawn under the ‘open to all category’ and as such the Non Bodos stand a very bleak chance of being elected. The last category of ‘six nominated members from unrepresented community’ is also considered to be biased as most of the members are selected on the basis of their relation and connection to the ruling community.

Another deficit put forth by Mahanta, is the unjust development initiatives carried out by the BTC authorities. Leaders of Non-Bodo organisations state that most of the major educational institutions including universities, schools, health centres, central and state government departments etc are all setup in Bodo dominated areas and as such the Bodos enjoy a disproportionate representation even in the administrative and employment sector. Thus, it can be seen that as a reaction to this form of discrimination, various Non-Bodo organisations have started 15

Uddipana Goswami , Conflict and Reconciliation: The Politics of Ethnicity in Assam, New Delhi. p.154 Kaustubh Deka, Bodo hopes and minority rights, in The Hindu, 12 May, 2014, available at http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/bodo-hopes-and-minority-rights/article5998693.ece (accessed on 27 May, 2015) 17 Nani Gopal Mahanta, ‘Politics of Space and Violence’, in Economic and Political Weekly, vol. XLVIII , no.

23, June 2013, pp.49-58.

16

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agitations. One such organisation is the Sanmilita Janagosthiya Sangram Samithi (SJSS: United Ethnic People’s Struggle Committee), an alliance of 20 non-Bodo organisations. SJSS is mainly constituted by two most important tribes i.e. the KochRajbongshis and the Adivasis who have been demanding inclusion in the ST category. The Bodos are not ready to accept these demands and consider it as an intrusion into their political space.

Conversely, the leaders of BTAD claims that in the sector of development, remarkable changes have occurred once the BTC Accord was signed and the BTAD was formed in 2003. However, a few discussions with respondents proved otherwise. Nevertheless, there are both sides of the picture which can be presented.

Samudra Gupta Kashyap writes how the leaders project an improved picture of BTAD stating that the BTAD cites the example of how erstwhile military leaders can efficiently run the government.18 Deputy Chief Kampa Borgiari states: After formation of BTC, I won’t use the word ‘a lot’, but visible change has been seen because in this area there was no school, roads, health facilities. If we analyse this till now what we have achieved is quite considerable. Communication is much better now you can see for yourself. Although we have not been able to build pacca roads everywhere but still motorable roads exist. We did not have universities, technical institutes; Bodoland University was established, CIT established; a lot of junior colleges were also established. Situation is better than earlier. Even in the health 19 sector, malaria was rampant out here. We have succeeded in controlling it.

However, another respondent talks about development happening but only in terms of transport and communication which increased a lot after the formation of the BTC.20 She alleged that the leaders in power were not thinking about the larger picture and were focussed only on bringing economic development. Adding further, she highlighted how many villages in BTAD, especially the villages which are at a distant from BTC secretariat still did not have proper road connectivity, electricity etc.

Another grievance voiced out by respondents was the non availability of employment opportunities and basic benefits from the government. Discussing about the lack of employment schemes and non-availability of benefits from the government one of the respondents stated about the complexities in daily life, and how difficult it was to 18

Samudra Gupta Kashyap, ‘From militancy to candidacy, changing roles in Assam’ in The Indian Express, 24 March 2016, available at http://indianexpress.com/article/elections-2016/india/india-news-india/frommilitancy-to-candidacy-changing-roles-in-assam/, (accessed on March 27 2016).

19 Interview with Deputy Chief of BTC, Kampa Borgiari on 12 December, 2015 at Kokrajhar, Translation is by the author.

20 Interview with a respondent.

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make ends meet with the meagre income that he managed to earn by planting small plants in his backyard garden and doing daily wage labour. He also pointed out, how most of the people in their village have not received a job till date although they possess a job card.21 Further, another striking anomaly is the biases in appointments in VCDCs. Since BTC is set up under Sixth Schedule, according to the Clause 4.8 of the BTC MoS, the Panchayati Raj System will cease to be force in the council, as such there is not much empowerment of the people at the grass root levels. However, there are Village Development Councils which are supposed to look after the villages. The members of the Village Development Councils are selected by the members of the BTC. One of the respondents highlights the discrepancy in the functioning of the Village Development Councils that operates in lieu of Panchayats in BTAD: There is biasness in the appointment of the members, only people who have good connection with the leaders are appointed. The members of VCDC are supposed to have good relations with the members of the villages. However, because of the partial system of appointment, villagers hardly know the executive members of the VCDC. As such there are problems in the functioning of the VCDC.22

This brings into question the structure of the autonomous arrangement itself in BTAD. According to Goswami, this arrangement echoes the unitary bias of the Indian state 23. The very purpose of autonomy is questionable here because the idea of making people to view themselves as a part of a local community rather than that of a centralised state or structure is not fulfilled here and BTC assumes the character of a centralised body with no provision for further devolution of powers.

The political sphere too, suffers from a kind of deficit in the terms that it is majorly the elite ethnics who dominate it. Divisions have surfaced within its rank immediately after the political power was handed over to it (i.e. after the co-option of the BLT leaders into the political mechanism). When elections to the BTC were announced, a scuttle for power arose among the community which was already fragmented, resentment also occurred on the issue of selecting candidates. For instance, The All Bodo Women’s Welfare Forum (ABWWF) was forced to take backseat during the

21

Interview with a respondent of Baganbara, Kokrajhar.

Interview with a respondent of Bangalduba, Kokrajhar.

23 Uddipana Goswami, Conflict and Reconciliation The Politics of Ethnicity in Assam, New Delhi, 2014, p.158.

22

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elections, not a single women candidate was allowed to contest for the BTC elections; barring the fact that ABWWF had played a pivotal role in the Bodo Movement. A former party member of BPF and founding leader of ABWWF highlighting the role of women and the unequal power allocation in the present scenario states how ironical it is that the leaders do not consider a women representative to be necessary in the political scenario24. She quit the party as she was unhappy with the fact that even after so many years of voicing out her opinion and establishing the fact that women representation was very necessary in ADC, she could not achieve this.

Another dissatisfaction against the ruling elites is that they enjoy the financial largesse without thinking about the aspirations of the community. The leadership has been alleged to have indulged in excesses and splendour- for example the multi million rupees wedding of the Executive Chief of BTC, Hagrama Mohilary instead of using the money for development work. But members of the government on being asked about the delay in the completion of most projects pointed out that it was precisely because the State government did not give adequate funds. 25 He further adds: ‘However we can expect that most of the projects will be completed if the ongoing talks on BPF-BJP alliance works and funds are delivered to us as promised’.26 Conversely, one of the respondents points to how the political ethnic elite misuse their power: Even if Hagarma himself does not indulge in anything, the activities of his subordinates are definitely not for the betterment of the society. For around 5 years, everything was fine, but I don’t know what went wrong now, all they care about is how can they spend more money....they are constructing hospitals here and there. It is not wrong to construct hospitals, we indeed need them, but what is the point of making hospitals in areas inaccessible to people.

They just want to show that they have spent the money somewhere... what is use of making so many hospitals, there are no doctors and facilities available to it accordingly.27

24

Personal interview with Ex- party BPF member and founding member of ABWFF. Interview with Executive Secretary of BTC, Kokrajhar.

26 Ibid.

27 Personal interview with Ex- member of BPF party and founding member of ABWFF. 25

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The masses portray an unsatisfactory perspective in terms of development mainly on the basis of two reasons, firstly that the development did not benefit all the sections of the society and secondly that development occurred mostly in Kokrajhar and not the other districts of BTAD. The above discussion highlights the discrepancies in development and unequal power allocation. This scenario of unequal power allocation also operates in term of representation from other ethnic communities which has resulted in the clashes among the communities. Thus as a consequence of this, a sense of political contention has developed among the minorities in BTAD, and they have formed organisations such as The All Bodoland Minority Students Union (ABMSU) and ‘Sankhyalagu Aikhya Mancha’ (Minorities United Front). The minorities resent their inclusion in BTAD and demand more power. To argue in terms of what Benedikter states that when there are two or more ethnic groups in an autonomous region, a provision must be made for all the groups to have access to power and participation.28

The Problem of insurgency - the brunt of conflict and immigration BTAD has been witnessing various conflicts where several people have lost their lives. Respondents assert that what is unfortunate is that huge losses occur in terms of life and property in the recurring conflicts, and this has forced the people to question the doubtful role of the Government of Assam and the ruling political ethnic elites of BTAD to address the killings. An ABSU booklet entitled The Killing Enigma in BTAD published in 2008 gives a detailed account of the number of deaths that have occurred in the year 2008 in BTAD and states: It is found that within a year 82 innocent people reported to be supporter either of NDFB, BPF, BPPF, BPF (youth) and ex-BLT had to embrace in the meantime their untimely death leaving a frail of fear psychosis among the public as to when, where and who will be the next victim of the situation even Teachers, Lecturers, Peace Activists and Journalists were not spared. The Parties or organisations are alleging each other for the killing while the Administration and public representation.29

28

Thomas Benedikter, The World’s Working Regional Autonomies: An Introduction and Comparative Analysis, London, 2007,p. 426.

29 The Killing Enigma of BTAD published by All Bodo Students’ Union (ABSU).

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Bhattacharya argues that “insurgency in Northeast India is explained by many as a long and legitimate struggle of the people for securing their right to selfdetermination”.30 However, the insurgent’s attempt to secure rights and recognition has actually proven to be detrimental for the masses and resulted in creating a situation of turmoil and unrest. This also applies to the case of the present operating insurgent group in BTAD, i.e., National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB). Bodo terrorism can be said to have emerged in the State during 1987 and since then the Bodo terrorists have contributed in every possible way to keep the State beyond the range of peace. The formation of NDFB can be said to have begun with the formation of a resistance force formed by ABSU, namely Bodo Volunteer Force (BVF) which later got reconstituted into Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT). Further, this was followed by the creation of a powerful militant faction termed as the Bodo Security Force (BSF) which was formed on 03 October 1986, by a section of educated Bodo youths in Udalguri District who vouched to fight for attaining sovereignty for Bodoland by resorting to arm rebellion and started to operate since the 1990s. The outfit aims to establish Bodoland as a sovereign nation seceding from the Indian union. The BSF renamed itself as NDFB in November 25, 1994.

This militant organisation in the name of fighting against underdevelopment and influx of settling communities has actually committed large scale violence in Kokrajhar which has affected both the other communities as well as the Bodos. The militant organisation is active in the areas of Kokrajhar, Barpeta, Bongaigaon, Dhubri, Nalbari, Darrang, Sonitpur and Dhemaji districts of Assam31. This Bodo insurgent group in its attempt to transform BTAD into a homeland exclusively for the Bodos has resulted in the mass ethnic cleansing exercises. The NDFB has been responsible for blowing up railway tracks, railway coaches, bridges, and roadways along with committing atrocities upon civilians especially the Non Bodo population of BTAD. NDFB is considered to be accountable for the ethnic riots in 1993, 1994, 1996 and 1998 which took place in Kokrajhar and Bongaigaon. The most recent attack being made by NDFB(S) on 23 December 2014 on Adivasis in Kokrajhar, Chirang, Udalguri and Sonitpur districts of Assam, led to the death of 87 persons including 36 children and 32 women. Since 1987, not less than 20,000 people have 30

Rakhee Bhattacharya, Development Disparities in Northeast India, New Delhi, 2011, p.91.

Subhrajeet Konwar, ‘Swadhin Assam Contesting Territories and linkages ‘, in Dilip Gogoi (ed.), Unheeded Hinterland: Identity and sovereignty in Northeast India, Abingdon, 2016, p. 81.

31

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been killed by Bodo militants and in ethnic clashes in the Western part of Assam (BTAD region).

In a discussion, one of the respondents pointed out the reason for the conflict is related to land. He states that “… the demographic changes that have occurred due to movement of people from the different parts has lead to an imbalance and rise in encroachment issues, this is a real problem”.32 He further adds, “…not exactly territory, but land is very important for expression of identity. And so when land is threatened there is emergence of conflict”.33 This is precisely what happened in the 2012 conflict between Bodos and Bengali Muslims, “...the Bodos felt targeted in their region and in retaliation to it they chose this method as a solution to stop it. You see they fight back for their survival”.34 Another respondent concurs and points out that there is a factor of identity crisis due to immigrants: “How will we stay in Assam, when Assam Government is neglecting us and thinking only about immigrants? It is the indigenous tribal people who are being displaced because of land encroachment”.35 However, respondents also pointed out to the callousness on the part of the Indian government to find a long lasting solution to conflicts.

This highlights that land or territory which forms an important factor in terms of preserving and protecting one’s identity is under threat and that is why conflicts take place. The major objection that the Bodos have is the encroachment of land, as land was a major source of identity portrayal. Thus any threat to land was considered as a threat to ethnic identity Besides the growth of population owing to demographic change and pressure on available resources, land alienation is the main contention behind the conflict between the immigrants i.e. the outsiders and the inhabitants who fight for the same geographical space to protect and preserve their identity and culture. Conflicts result in internal displacement of population which give rise to some other problem like poverty, unemployment, security problem etc. One of the respondents while highlighting the reason of conflicts pointed out that conflict takes place because of the issue of survival. Adding further, he states as to how some people belonging to Bodo and ST community have not got land documents, but some Muslim people have got it. Also he alleged that, the Muslim people have

32

Interview with the Director of NERWSN, Kokrajhar.

Ibid.

34 Ibid.

35 . Interview with the Secretary of Bodo Sahitya Sabha (BSS), 33

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encroached their land and they themselves agree that they are Bangladeshi. 36 A similar opinion was voiced out by another Ex-MLA who alleged that people from outside, especially Illegal Bangladeshis’ were committing a silent aggression in their ancestral lands. Population explosion is happening at an alarming rate as a result of which local people are uprooted, which results in people voicing out their discontentment against the government.

37

Land forms an indisputable source of life

for the tribal’s and as such the struggle the Bodos have is mainly for the protection of their land and identity. It also pinpoints to the incapability of the ruling political ethnic elites to safeguard the defining elements of an ethnicity whereby the groups threatening an intrusion into their ethnic communities thus fight back to maintain their ethnic boundaries.

Insurgency is another factor which is to be blamed for these conflicts. The insurgents take advantage of the situation of misunderstanding and distrust among the groups to instigate people. Respondents state that the sense of mutual distrust which existed among the communities is put in use by militant groups to incite feelings of distrust among communities. Also the inability of the government to initiate methods to deal with unresolved issues leads to further alleviation of conflict.

An assessment of the reasons of conflict when analysed from the views of the respondents, results in a framework that has the following namely: economic issues pertaining to land and resources, developmental issues of providing basic entitlements and issues regarding socio-regional variation, as the three most important variable. In addition, the role of elites as perceived by the respondents is essential in interpreting the framework. Many respondents see the reigning conflicts as a struggle for resources which has its historical linkages. From the responses which were gathered, it became evident that BTC has fallen short of delivering basic facilities of development to the people such as no job opportunities even after getting job cards, or even basic facilities like electricity. Following from the previous point, a lack of a balanced developmental approach on part of the BTC has led to deepening of socio regional differences, i.e., is to say that an imbalance in developmental design has led to the deepening of inter-communal fissures. Respondents pointed out as to how developmental projects could be seen to have been implemented in 36 37

Interview with a respondent from Janagaon , Kokrajhar.

Interview with an EX-MLA.

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Kokrajhar alone and not in other districts.38 Also respondents from Non Bodo communities pointed out as to how differences could be seen in terms of developmental works such as building of roads and facilities of electricity being provided between a Bodo dominated village and a Non-Bodo dominated village.39 Factors as such have further aggravated the grounds of conflict. In such a scenario, where the probability of occurrence of violent conflicts is high, the role of elites in order to pacify the situation is extremely important, which going by the sense of the responses received from the field has usually been unsuccessful. In fact, one of the respondents has gone to the extent of blaming the statist elite for fuelling the violence.40 Nevertheless, it is important to state here that conflict is not always seen as a pre-planned act depriving it of its spontaneity. However, there are strong reasons to believe that unrest in a society is a result of the structure within which it occurs.

Therefore, this framework helps us to understand that conflict in the region is not just based on a superficial idea of assertion of identity, but rather a culmination of different variables at play.

Conclusion The Bodoland exercise shows that sustainable peace has remained unattainable. No settlement, resolution or transformation of the conflict is to be seen.

The Accord fails to protect both the Bodos as well as the Non Bodos from exploitation. The Accord was just a simple attempt to transfer administrative authority to the Bodos so as to de-escalate the conflicts. However, this provision is faulty as it guaranteed indispensable power only to a certain section of the society i.e., the erstwhile insurgent elites, transformed into political elites; who continued the process of the dominance even after the ADC was formed. Hence, the need of the hour in BTAD is a changing set of power relations in the days to come, taking into consideration the demands of the inhibiting ethnic groups so that legitimate autonomy and self-rule is percolated.

38

Interview with a respondent from Bangalduba, Kokrajhar Interview with a respondent belonging to Koch-Rajbongshi community from Janagaon Kokrajh 40 Interview with a civil society worker.

39

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Further, the government also needs to opt for radical measures to stop this widespread culture of violence that is taking place. The volatile situation in BTAD is majorly because of the possession of a huge number of unlawful weapons by a considerable number of Bodo reprobate. As such, there should be confiscation of these illegal arms to ensure an atmosphere of non-violence in BTAD for maintaining sustainable peace. In addition, a closer monitoring at the local level will help to reduce the problem of infiltration, which is also necessary.

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References ABSU, The Killing Enigma of BTAD, Kokrajhar: All Bodo Students Union, 2009.

Barbora, Sanjay, ‘Autonomy in the Northeast: The Frontiers of Centralized Political’, in Ranabir Samaddar (ed.), The Politics of Autonomy: Indian Experiences, New Delhi, Sage, 2005, pp.196-215.

Baruah, Sanjib, Durable Disorder Understanding the politics of Northeast India, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005.

—.India against itself: Assam and the politics of nationality. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999.

Bhattacharya, Rakhee, Development Disparities in Northeast India, New Delhi: Cambridge University Press India Pvt. Ltd. under the imprint of Foundation Books, 2011.

Bhaumik, Subir, Troubled Periphery Crisis of India's Northeast, New Delhi: Sage, 1999.

Brubaker, Rogers, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Bunce, Valerie, Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Cederman, Erik, L, Simon Hug et al. “Territorial Autonomy in the Shadow of Conflict: Too Little, Too Late?” American Political Science Review, vol. 109, no.2, 2015 ,pp.354-370.

Deka, Kaustubh. (2014, May 12). Bodo hopes and minority rights.

The Hindu.

Retrieved October 29, 2014 from http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/bodohopes-and-minority-rights/article5998693.ece Goswami, Uddipana. Conflict and Reconciliation: The Politics of Ethnicity in Assam.

New Delhi: Routledge, 2014 Kakati Bhaben. “Democracy in Sixth Schedule: A Study in BTAD Assam”. Indian Streams Research Journal 2014(4):1-9.

Lustick, Ian S., Dan Miodownik, and Roy J. Eidelson. “Secessionism in Multicultural States: Does Sharing Power Prevent or Encourage It?” American Political Science Review 2004 (98): 209–29.

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Mahajan, Gurpreet, 'Negotiating Cultural Diversity and Minority Rights in India’, in Reignald Austin,

Democracy, Conflict and Human Security: Further

Readings, Stockholm: International IDEA, 2007, pp:111-122.

Mahanta, Nani Gopal, ‘Politics of Space and Violence’, Economic and Political Weekly, vol. XLVIII, no.23,June 2013,pp. 49-58.

Mochahari, Monjib, NDFB Movement: An Examination of Role of Civil and Political Organisations

in

Peace

Process.

Accessed

November

8,

20-15.

http://www.internationalseminar.org/XIV_AIS/TS%202/9.%20Monjib%20Moch ahari.pdf Rothchild, Donald and Caroline Hartzell. “Security in deeply divided societies: The role of territorial autonomy”. Nationalism and Ethic Politics 5 (1996): 254-271.

Accessed February 25,2015. http://www.tandfonline.com.ezproxy.jnu.ac.in/doi/pdf/10.1080/1353711990842 8579 Roy, Ajay. 1995. The Bodo Imbroglio. Guwahati: Spectrum Publishers.

Suso, Roger. “Territorial Autonomy and Self-Determination Conflicts: Opportunity and Willingness Cases from Bolivia, Niger, and Thailand.” ICIP Working Paper

2010/01,

International

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http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1884156

Peace,

2010

(accessed

November 12, 2015).

Tiebout, Charles M. “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures.” Journal of Political Economy 1957(64): 416–24.

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Ronak Asrani M1 Abstract: There has been no significant study as to how the market of Bollywood

operates. This paper is an effort towards it. It is seen that the market of Bollywood is dominated by networks which were initially formed by the Bollywood Families whose family business deals in film-making. This informal institution (i.e. Family Business of Bollywood) happens to be the starting point of my study. This family business of Bollywood dominated the initial period through network created by clanship. Later this network incorporated members across other Bollywood families (not a part of clan, but joined network because of trade relationship) and slowly it incorporated outliers (not a part of any Bollywood family) due to the assets and capabilities it possesses. These networks make use of the formal and informal institutions in Bollywood (mutually reinforce one-another) for their benefit. Such networks control the information in the market. They help in accessing finance for a movie, casting and in marketing and distribution of a movie. These three aspects form major components of the market in Bollywood.

Thus Bollywood Market happens to be a case for self-regulation Keywords: Family Business, Outliers, Markets, Formal and Informal Institutions, Networks Ronak Asrani is Former graduate student, School of Public Policy and Governance, TISS-Hyderabad Campus, currently Young Professional at Dept of Industries and Commerce MSME WING, Government of Andhra Pradesh.

1

Note: - Henceforth the following abbreviations shall be used in this paper. CBFC – Central Board for Film Certification; FFI – Film Federation of India; NFDC – National Film Development Corporation of India; FICCI – Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry; YRF – Yashraj Films Pvt. Ltd.; RK – Raj Kapoor Studio; BSK – Boney S Kapoor Films; IMDB – Internet Movie Database

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Bollywood is the sobriquet for Hindi Movie. This industry is based in Mumbai. It happens to be the second largest film industry market next to Hollywood in terms of revenue collection. On an average around 200 odd movies get released in Hindi (including dubbed versions) every year and the expected revenue that Bollywood makes is about Rs. 10,000 crores (Forbes India, 2014). It is expected to grow with time.

Knowing the potential of this market, there have been number of studies/portals/reports by firms1 that have documented this fact as to how much money the film makes, the total revenue Bollywood earns in a year and also the number of movies that release in a year. But the irony is that there has been no significant study that has documented as to how this market of Bollywood works. What is important to note here is that this market of Bollywood has charted its own way right from the establishment of its first studio “New Theatre Studio, Calcutta2” till now with least intervention from the state. Over the years, this market has seen the predominance of Bollywood Families that has selfregulated to control this trade. This family business3 (one of the largest informal institutions4) of Bollywood run by the so called Bollywood Families has set the rules of the games. It is on those lines the Bollywood market functions. With time the Bollywood Families have formed a network based on clanship and trade (network across families in Bollywood and outliers5) that has helped them to have access to the resources. This access to resources in a market is based on the information that the network holds.

Therefore it becomes imperative to understand how market of Bollywood functions.

Therefore the objective of this paper is to understand how “Market of Bollywood” functions. This market of Bollywood is understood from those who operate within this market sphere.

1

By firms I mean the reports published on the potential of entertainment industry by Indian Brand Equity Foundation, FICCI, PwC (Pricewater House Coopers), EY (Ernst and Young) etc 2 New Theatre Studio, Calcutta – Started by BN Sarkar (Director cum Producer) in 1921 3 Family Business is defined as one in which family members dominate the ownership and management of a firm. It is dominated by four Cs – Continuity, Community, Connection and Command (Littunen and Kyrsky, 2000).

4 Informal Institutions - informal institutions are socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels’ (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). Informal institutions are equally known but not laid down in writing and they tend to be more persistent than formal rules (North, 1997) 5 Outliers – people who don’t have a family support and merely rely on their assets and capabilities to catapult them

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To understand this market a “qualitative study” was undertaken. The sampling technique used is “Non-Probability Sampling” under it “Snowball Sampling Method” was used to collect data. “In-depth Interviews” were conducted with the respondents, where each interview on an average lasted for 30 minutes. Each respondent was questioned based on an interview scheduled with semi-structured questions prepared for it. The respondents were drawn from the film fraternity i.e. Bollywood. It was mere snowball technique that led from one respondent to another. Efforts were put in to have a diverse segment of people from Bollywood who could provide information pertaining to the objectives of the research.

The number of people interviewed was 43 . They are categorized into the following categories – Producers/Production Houses; Distributors; Actors; Institutions (FFI, CBFC, NFDC) and Miscellaneous (Film Critic, Assist. Director, Studio Owner/Manager, Marketing Head and Choreographer).

The field work undertaken to understand the markets of Bollywood is been described about in the following 4 sections of the paper. In section I of this paper I shall provide the theoretical framework to the understanding of markets based on different schools of thought. Why social embedded approach to the understanding of the market serves my purpose in understanding this market of Bollywood and why other schools of thought aren’t able to capture this market of Bollywood. The section II of this paper shall bring out how family business of Bollywood controls the market of Bollywood. This is understood by how the families in Bollywood form a network, whether the network so formed is a dense or a feeble network, how this network uses the formal and informal institutions in Bollywood to access the resources. The outcome of this chapter is that the networks are formed either via clanship or through trade relationship across families or a mix of both. The network so formed has primary benefits of raising finance, casting for a movie and in marketing and distribution of a movie. The section III of this paper takes a note of the Outliers – that is those professionals who do not have family support but possess the assets and capabilities for film making. The argument of this section is to show how these outliers are during their initial phase of struggle and when they taste success, they also get integrated into the network dominated and 55 | P a g e

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controlled by the Bollywood Families (either a part of a dense or a feeble network) or form their own network of outliers. The outcome is that the outliers in their initial phase depend hugely on the informal institutions for the resources and once they achieve success and become a part of the network or create their own network, they are able to access resources much easier than before. Finally, section IV of this paper would be the Conclusion that states how Market of Bollywood has been a case of self regulation by networks formed by clanship, across families in Bollywood and outlier and finally it would sum up the arguments and outcomes discussed in section II and III of this paper.

Section I Theoretical framework to the understanding of markets We live in the age of market. In a layman sense markets are understood as a place for exchange for a price. But in theory there are different schools of thought that have conceptualized the understanding of markets. Therefore this section of the paper shall provide the theoretical framework to the understanding of markets based on different schools of thought. Why social embedded approach to the understanding of the market serves my purpose in understanding this market of Bollywood and why other schools of thought aren’t able to capture this market of Bollywood.

The Neoclassical school of thought premises their theory on two central assumptions. First, it assumes that economic agents (such as the firms and households) are rational in their behaviour, i.e. the firm looks to maximize its profit and the household/consumers look to maximize their utility. This objective of maximizing utility and profits form the basis of demand and supply in the market. Second, it assumes that market provides full access to information (related to price of the product – which is determined by the demand and supply and on the product utility) thereby eliminating the transaction cost (cost in participating in market). This allows the consumer to take a decision (Walras, 1877 & Weintraub, 1985).

Though widely

accepted, yet it lacks an adequate understanding of how markets function. To elaborate it further, the assumption of human being a rational person means ignoring the other aspect of human behaviour such as social issues, ideologies, beliefs, dogmas in his/her 56 | P a g e

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interaction with other human being. Also market does not provide full access to information (asymmetric information) due to the self serving tendencies of the firms itself thereby increasing the transaction cost (Stiglitz, 2001). These short comings of the neoclassical school of thought were addressed by the New Institutional Economics.

The New Institutional economics premised their theory stating that market does not provide full access to information and the very nature of a human being is to maximize its return thereby withholding information to serve self purpose. Thus institutions are created that can channelize this information to people so that they can take an informed decision thereby keeping the transaction cost less (rather than zero).

Thus new institutional economics tries to understand the evolutionary role of the institution and how it shapes the human behaviour in market. As they believed that market is a result of complex interactions of various institutions (say: individuals, firms, state and social norms) (Williamson, 2000). Thus institutions became a unit of analysis in the New Institutional School of Economics. Though widely accepted, yet it faced criticisms for not taking into consideration non-economic institutions (religion, family etc) which constrains the economic activities in a market sphere. These criticisms were addressed in the form of Embedded Approach.

It was Karl Polanyi’s work on “Substantivist Economics” which addresses these concerns of non-economic institutions playing a vital role in the economic activities in a market. As Polanyi stated that in normative sense in a pure market society the economic activities have been rationalized and economic actions are disembedded from the society. While as in a non-market society there is no pure economic institution to which formal economic models can be applied to. Therefore he argued that economy is embedded in both economic and non-economic institutions. The exchange takes place within and is being regulated by the society. He cites an example of “religion and government can be just as important to economics as economic institutions themselves” (Polanyi, 1944). Subsequently, the term embeddedness was further developed by Mark Granovetter’s work on Social Network Analysis and Strength of Weak ties (1983).

Granovetter had argued that the neoclassical school of thought separated economics from society and theorized their theory on the atomistic human behaviour. To 57 | P a g e

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Granovetter “Actors do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social context, nor do they adhere slavishly to a script written for them by the particular intersection of social categories that they happen to occupy. Their attempts at purposive action are instead embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations” (Granovetter, 1985).

Therefore to Granovetter rational economic exchanges are influenced by pre-existing social ties and economic exchanges are not carried between strangers but rather by individuals involved in long term continuing relationships which over the years form a network for doing transactions in the market.

Here I would like to cite Alfred Marshal who in 1920s itself had acknowledged this concept of embeddedness in market activities. Alfred Marshall had explicitly stated that “Everyone buys, and nearly everyone sells in a ‘general’ market. But nearly everyone has also some ‘particular’ markets; that is, some people or groups of people with whom he is in somewhat close touch: mutual knowledge and trust lead him to approach them in preference to strangers.”(Marshal, 1920).

Therefore network studies talk about “how a set of nodes which represents classes of actors, such as individuals, teams, agencies or nations of which at least two are connected by specified set of ties and these ties may be bound by resource transaction, affiliation, kinship authority, economic exchange or technology bound.

These ties can either be direct or non-direct (Hoffman, 2011). The four main factors that sustain network ties are power, goodwill, trust and special tastes – non economic factors (Granovetter, 2005). Thus network studies lay emphasis on social relations (and family being one of the area of emphasis – as an informal institution) that are fundamental to market functioning as they channelize information in the market. Access to information in a market helps in lowering the transaction cost. This access to information can come from a weak tie6 (Granovetter, 1983) or from the structural hole7 (Brutt, 1992) or strong tie8 (David Krackhardt, 1992).

6

Weak Tie – The strength of weak tie, concept propagated by Mark Granovetter, in 1973. Weak tie means acquaintances i.e. friends friend. Granovetter’s argument is that more novel information flows to an individual from a weak tie that the strong tie

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Therefore, Network analysis helps in understanding markets from a socioeconomic lens where different agents are knitted in a network that (re)produces rules, practices parameters of debate, categories and subjects for the benefit of the industry per se which in turn serves their interest more than the others. Such understanding of markets helps in knowing how informality has crept into the formal channel. This understanding of embedded approach is true for Bollywood, as stated initially that this market of Bollywood is dominated by the Family Business of Bollywood who have formed a network via clanship, across families in Bollywood and outliers and it is this network that guides the pattern of interaction in the Bollywood Market. Therefore the starting point of analysis of this market would be to understand the family business of Bollywood and how they form network.

Section II

Family Business of Bollywood Family Business as an institution is considered to be an extremely influential informal institution. In turn, it influences, and is influenced by, society structure and other social, cultural and religious factors (Akerlof, 1976). Therefore this section of the paper shall bring out how family business of Bollywood controls the market of Bollywood. This is understood by how do the families in Bollywood form a network, whether the network so formed is a dense or a feeble network, how this network uses the formal and informal institutions in Bollywood to access the resources. The outcome of this chapter is that the networks are formed either via clanship or through trade relationship across families or a mix of both. The network so formed has primary benefits of raising finance, casting for a movie and in marketing and distribution of a movie.

Bollywood is characterized by more of informality and even the formal spaces have been captured by informality. These informal institutions function as a “Market 7

Structural Hole – The concept was given by Ronald S Brut, 1992. Where an individual may be a part of two networks which would give him access to information from both networks 8 Strong Tie – The concept was given by David krackhardt, 1992. Information flows through strong ties due to trust factor. Example of a strong tie is kinship

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Subtracting/Substituting Institutions – such institutions drive out market agents or keep the potential market agents and organizations from entering the existing markets or creating a new one (Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi, 2003). These informal institutions have been dominated over the years by family/clan. Thus understanding this social network with predominance of family/clan which has an impact on the market of Bollywood is the focus area of my study. This understanding is sort by analyzing the pattern of interaction by these Bollywood families with both the formal and informal institutes in Bollywood and a few outliers and their interaction with the formal and informal institutes in Bollywood and what impact it has had in the market of Bollywood.

The following figure explains the pattern of interaction in the market of Bollywood Studios

Independent Houses

Technology

Land, Labour, Capital Entrepreneurship

Infrastructure R U L E S

Institution

I N U S E

Impact

Factors of Production

Family/Clan (Informal Institution)

Informal Institution Friendship Community Informal Credit Market

A C T I O N A R E N A

Formal Institution FFI, NFDC, CBFC, Financial Institutes, Corporate Entry (Reliance, EROS, TATA…), Unions

Outliers Impact Source of Finance Casting of a movie Marketing and Distribution of a movie Information Access Short Budget Movies Outdoor shoot Settling Controversies

Fig. 1 – Pattern of Interaction in the Market of Bollywood 60 | P a g e

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Note the above diagram is author’s conceptualization based on field work understanding Note: Action Arena involves intermix of different players from the industry – Bollywood. They are the Actors, directors, producers, technician, distributors, exhibitors, corporate (National and MNCs), consumers and state apparatus – people from Censor board, NFDC (National Development Council), and FFI (Film Federation of India)

Family/Clanship – The Dominant Informal Institution in Bollywood:Larenzen and Taeube (2007) titled their paper as Banyan and Birch Tree. The banyan tree symbolizes how family as an institution strengthens its network through interconnectedness. Such interconnections between different branches are often deliberately organized through marriages. Example Shashadhar Mukerjee extended his family clan by getting married to Ganguly family then their kith and kin got married to Samrath family and Chopra family, another noted family in Bollywood.

Brothers Sashadhar Mukerjee Bollywood Producer

Married Sati Rani Ganguly (sister of Kishore and Ashok Kumar)

Shomu Mukerjee (director, writer, and producer) married to Tanuja Samrath (actress). Their kids kajol (actress) and Tanisha (actress). Kajol is married to Ajay Devgan (actor, director and producer)

Rono Mukerjee

Ravindranchan Mukerjee

Son is Ram Mukerjee married to Krishna and their daughter is Rani Mukerjee (Actress).

Rani is married to Aditya Chopra (son of Yashraj Chopra)

Deb Mukerjee (Actor) married to Manisha Mukerjee His son is Ayan Mukerjee (Bollywood Director)

Fig. 2 Mukerjee - Ganguly - Samrath – Chopra family clan Source: IMDB 61 | P a g e

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Bollywood popularly known as Hindi Cinema has been controlled by a few number of families. These families have been in this trade for more than three generations now or two in some cases. The notable film makers of the pre-1950s were Dada Saheb Palke9, Himanshu Rai, BN Sarkar10, Shashadhar Mukerjee, Mehboob Khan, Raj Kapoors11, Yash Chopra etc. Out of these above mentioned names some of them went on to own studios. For instance, BN Sarkar set up the New Theater Studio in Calcutta, Bombay Talkies was set up by Himanshu Rai and Devika Rani. Later it was taken over by Shashadhar Mukerjee12 who later on went to establish his own studio “Filmistan”. While the former two stopped functioning by 1950s, the latter is still functioning but the ownership has been transferred to Tolaram Jalan 13. Mehboob Khan set up the Mehboob Studios, Raj Kapoor set up the RK Studios and Yashraj Chopra went on to establish Yashraj Studios. These above mentioned studios still exist. The most prominent studio at present happens to be the Yashraj Studio. The present status of the studios apart from YRF Studio is that they function as a shooting space for films.

Today they are looked after by the kith and kin of these families. Initially these studios performed all three functions of film making i.e. pre-production, production and postproduction. Due to financial viability and rigid rules these have just become a shooting space now. To elaborate it further these studios had their own terms and condition of work. Every person was a contracted employee working on a fixed monthly salary basis.

The employees were not allowed to work with other studio in times of no work with the studio they are contracted with. Thus restricting the scope of growth among the employees (note even a star was a contracted employee of the studio, in case anyone violated and worked with the other studio they were terminated as employees of the studio they were initially part off). So these extended Bollywood families either leased the same for shooting or sold the studios to business men. These ties went on to

9

Dada Saheb Palkhe – Father of Hindi Cinema, Director and Produced Movies.

BN Sarkar – noted director cum producer, was able to set up studio as his dad was the attorney general to the then British Government.

11 Raj Kapoor – Director, Producer and Actor, was the first to break ties from the studio system of work and started the system of stardom and charged exuberant fee for movies he used to do and this set the future trend for other actors to come by.

12 Shashadhar Mukerjee – married to samrath clan, the prominent figure from this clan was Kishore Kumar – famous singer 13 Tolaram Jalan – NRI Business man.

10

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establish their own independent units (such as production houses, distribution houses).

Taking a cue from the above example itself, Ajay Devgan 14 who happens to be a noted actor, due to his success in box office has now ventured as a producer and a distributor apart from being an actor. Similarly, Ayan Mukerjee (grandson of Shashadhar Mukerjee) happens to be an ace director in Bollywood. But there is an exception to this functioning in the form of YRF studio.

The YRF studio that still exists has set its own system of functioning. They have their own rules and regulations in place. Every new entrant has to sign a three year contract with the studio and they are paid a fee for it. This fee may not necessarily be based on the market value, but a value between market value and face value. During this period, the director or technician cannot work with any other banner, and if they do, their contract and future ties with YRF would terminate. While the case with a star is that he/she needs to get a no objection certificate before working with another banner and incase if the dates clash with that of YRF then they need to work with YRF films. YRF also leases the studio space in order to generate revenue when their home production movie is not being shot. I would like to highlight here that nowhere are there written rules that the studio needs to bind their employees but this has been the informal code of conduct governing business relationship and is in practice since the inception of the first studio. Next, the studio never tends to pay a market value to the star should their first movie become a huge hit and their market value goes up. The reason cited is that the banner has provided them the platform and a career so they need to be indebted, we do accommodate and pay him certain incentives but not the market value. Thus these families tend to control the resources thereby controlling the market.

Amongst the resources, land happens to be one such resource that is of prime importance. In, case of film industry, these studios have come up in anywhere between 10 acres to 500 acres of land. These studios tend to be located in the prime locality in Mumbai. The space occupied by these studios has never been a zone of contention among the local municipalities and even if it happens to be within this contention, the power the families in Bollywood possess is sufficient to wade out of such issues. Citing 14

Ajay Devgan – son of Veru Devgan (Veru Devgan was a famous stunt man in Bollywood)

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one of the issues that was highlighted during my field work was that the filmcity in Mumbai, is a government run entity since 2000. One of the leading Bollywood Families had purchased a land prior to 2000 in the filmcity space and created an institution for film learning. He also leased his premises for shooting. When the government took control of the filmcity, they had asked him to vacate as no private entity could earn from government owned property. The Bollywood Family had used his network and power to subside the issue and it has been almost 15 years and the institute still functions (the informer chooses to be anonymous).

Creation of Networks and its importance:The markets of Bollywood in India is said to be controlled by the Bollywood Families and these families have established themselves and expanded their network in two ways. First is through Clanship about which I have highlighted in the previous section. The next network that is formed in Bollywood is that off trade relationships. This trade relationship network is determined based on the assets and capabilities 15 that a person possesses with respect to film making. On the whole there is a combination of both i.e. clanship and the trade relationship that forms the members in a network.

Example of such network is Yashraj Films Source of Finance

Distributor

International Arena Distributor

Yashraj (family) Aditya Chopra (family) Sanjay Shivalkar (friend close ally and prominent person) Aashish Singh (friend – close ally and prominent person) Yogendra Mogre (friend – close ally and prominent

15

YRF (in India) Red Chillies (in India)

AMC entertainment (Netherlands) Rapid Eye Movies MG Distribution (Australia) Raja Cinema (Canada) Mind Blowing (Australia) Jalan Distributor (Singapore) Alive AG (Germany) Visionary Thinking (Serbia)

Asset and Capabilities in the field of Bollywood includes – access to resources such as finance, distribution and casting.

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person) Padam Bhushan Sudhanshu Kumar Dibakar Banerjee Smriti Jain Gaurav Mishra Guy Nockel (Namibia) AB Moosa (SA) Prashanth Shah, Sri Rao and Shaun Roger (USA – prominent person) Mitu Bhowmick (USA and Australia) Chris Martin (UK) Swaratmika Mishra Pradeep Sarkar (Director) Kulthep and Rachvin Narula (Thailand) Willi Jezier and Poonam Thripathi (Switzerland) Giulia Salvador (Italy) Brendan Mccarthy (Ireland) Boris Dmitrovic (Croatia)

Nikkatsu (Japan) Aana Films (France) Geo Films (Pakistan) Star Films (Peru) Tohotowa (Japan) Film Village (Poland) Formula Films (Croatia)

Table 1: Network of Yashraj Films Source: IMDB website on Bollywood; field work This above table describes the network of Yashraj Chopra16. It is a mix of family, friends and others. The above diagram of the ties of Yashraj banner has been bifurcated on the basis of source of finance, distributor and international distributor for their movies. Among these players there is still an inner core of network that discusses and brings other players within this network for a movie.

These networks specially dominated by the family/clanship make use of the informal institutions and the formal institutions in the market of Bollywood to their advantage. The informal institutions in the field of Bollywood are the communities, informal credit market 16

Yash Chopra was the leading producer, director and a distributor. Has a strong family presence in Bollywood.

This clanship extends to three leading families in Bollywood – Chopra – Johar – Mukerjees (inclusive of his family)

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and friendship/peer circle. The formal institutions that exist are the FFI, NFDC, CBFC, Financial Institutions, Unions and the Corporate Entity. There happens to be a symbiotic relationship that exists between the family and these institutions. The stronger the relationship among the members in a network, the better is its functioning. Therefore, one needs to analyze the importance/reason as to why such networks exist.

The importance of such networks that are formed by these families in Bollywood helps them in the following ways: a. Raising Finance for a movie b. Marketing and Distribution of a movie c. Casting of a movie The above three reasons are the prime reasons for networks to exist. Apart from it, these networks do help in having arrangement of outdoor shoots and settling controversies.

Before discussing each of them I would emphasis on the role of information in market because it is the information within the market sphere which is controlled and dominated by the networks. Several scholars such as Hayek (1945), Marshal (1920), Stigler (1961) have given primacy to price as the information sought by market players.

To elaborate further, to have access to the resources one needs to pay a price for it.

Networks are formed in Bollywood to hold and have access to this information which helps them to capture the market. What kind of information is sought in the market and how networks control this information is argued here. Nature of information that flows in Bollywood is grapevine – all about whispers and rumors. So the information that Bollywood looks out for is, say Director in search for producer, production house is in look out for a new face to launch, a script writer, the fee for a star, movie release slots, availability of dates of a star etc. A discussion on it happens with various agents in a network who provide the valuable information to a person who is in need of it.

Information also flows in from a weak tie in the social gatherings apart from the strong ties in a network. The sources of information can come from the following – 

Friend’s friend

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

Social events



Good nexus between PR (Public Relation Officer of the Actor) and the Journalist



Camps – a network of close friends for a single fraternity (mostly) that come together



Informal meeting

Therefore a formed network has a connection with players in the action arena that provide them with this needed information which is valuable to film process.

Now let me discuss the benefits derived from network -

Raising Finance for a movie:Finance is considered to be the bedrock for any project. Based on the scale of a project the finance is decided. The question that arises in front of the production house/producer/director is how to raise money for the movie. There are two sources either formal or informal institutions. The line dividing the formal and informal credit market is very thin. Formal markets are institutionalized credit market where the interest rates are regulated and credit is disbursed after due procedures, whereas the informal credit market is less cumbersome than the formal market in all aspects (Srinivas, 1992).

There is high volatility in the business of Bollywood. The success rate of Bollywood films is around 7 percent (FICCI)17 that is the movies that make returns on investment. This being the prime reason why the formal institutions hesitate to invest more in films.

Despite the Film Industry being accorded the status of “Industry” in the year 2001, to avail the benefits from the formalized credit institutions such as banks, the trend remains the same. One notices informal institutions financing the majority of the project.

Thus one notice interlink of both formal and informal credit institutions in Bollywood. So the components of the formal and informal institutions has been diagrammatically explained.

17

FICCI – Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry

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Informal Channel

Formal Channel Pre savings Music and Satellite Rights Banking Studio (Fox, Viacom…)

In film Marketing Distributor/Exhibitor Merchandising State incentive NFDC

Contribution from: Family members Friends Informal credit market Actors themselves Politicians Local Goons Friend’s friend

Fig. 3 Formal and Informal Channel for source of Finance Source: Author’s conceptualization from the field work The above diagram highlights the source of money from formal and informal channels. The percentage of credit from formal and informal channel in a movie varies from project to project. The formal source of finance such as pre-savings – the production house/producer through his/her earned money from previously done movies invests in the upcoming project; Music and Satellite rights – they bring in about 10 to 20 percent (source: data collection) of revenue to the movie i.e. the producer/production houses sells the music rights and satellite rights to television channel, FM (frequency Modulation – Radio), etc; Formal Institutions such as Banks that lend money for the movie, one of the dominant players happens to be YES Bank; production houses – with the entry of EROS, FOX, Viacom etc have ventured off-late in this industry. They are into financing and distribution, the most prominent house happens to be EROS who have ties with the various producers/production houses and directors so that they could fetch in rights of the movie to distribute and also be a part in financing so that they can share the returns earned from the movie; In-film marketing say movie like PIKU18, a good portion of finance was raised by the movie through in-film marketing, the brand 18

PIKU – 2009 movie directed by Shoojit Sircar, starring Deepika Padukone and Amitabh Bachchan

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partners associated in this movie were AMUL19, Ceat Tyres, Himalayan Water20, Kayam Churan21, Parachute Oil, Red Label, Snapdeal22 and many more. The film was able to raise a substantial amount due to the presence of the star power in the movie and these celebrities also being a brand ambassador for the products. Such in-film marketing has become a huge market to tap resources for movie, as the company stands to pay for the product to be filmed in the movie and used by a particular star of the movie with the hope that it would boost their sales of the product so featured; Merchandizing and Gaming Zone of the movie – say CHAK DE INDIA23 (T-shirts, Caps etc); State Incentives – states such as Uttar Pradesh provides an incentive of an amount not more than 2 crore if fifty percent or more is shot in Uttar Pradesh, this exercise is done as it promotes the state and its tourism; Distributor/Exhibitor – they contribute partial amount to the producer/production house to confirm their booking for this movie and the final payment is done on delivery of the movie and finally NFDC (National Film Development Corporation). To elaborate it further NFDC is a central agency established in 1975.

Their function encompasses financing, production and distribution of films this is all done under the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India in order to foster excellence in Indian cinema.

While the informal channel is mostly dominated by the family and their closest friends and their friends24, also by the informal money lenders, though the family and their friends themselves raise from these informal money lenders. In some cases the actor also put in their money.

Marketing and Distribution of a Movie:Marketing of a movie starts right from the trailer and the first motion poster/poster which needs to be certified by the CBFC (Central Board of Film 19

AMUL – Anand Milk Universal Limited, Leading Cooperative Dairy Farm, Gujarat Himalayan Water – packaged water, owned by Tata Group 21 Kayam Churan – ayurvedic medicine for acidity 22 Snapdeal – ecommerce website 23 CHAK DE INDIA – Movie from YRF starring Shahrukh Khan 24 Family, its friends and their friends may have contact with the politican and their money might be brought in the name of these friends or family members itself to which they later pay interest with the principle. The same might go with the local Goons and Community who might through their nexus and contact with the family and its friend might bring in the money and invest it in the movie 20

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Certification)25. Next is the promotion aspect of the movie and finally booking the theatres and the digital cinema players (like Qube, UFO)26. By understanding the marketing and distribution I am trying to understand how the markets are distorted based on the bargaining capacity of the production houses which is family controlled.

How a particular production house puts his/her network to use to capture the market.

The marketing of the movie starts off with the trailer and motion poster/posters and later with the songs from the movie. But before it is aired it needs to be passed by the publicity committee under the CBFC. But even before that the trailer and songs are shown to a few closest friends or the film critic to get their first opinion. They also have a few copies of trailer that they showcase to them and later it is taken to the publicity committee that sees it and then to the audience. The production house have their team that works on social media to capture the people’s attention and also there are agencies that work in order to promote the movie and its songs. Next stage is blocking theatres i.e. tie ups with the distributors/exhibitors that the production house does. What is fascinating to know is that the theatres are blocked even before a single shoot of movie takes place. To elaborate it further the process of film making has moved from top-down approach to bottom-up approach, this is done in order to have a surety in the market that their product would release on a particular date. This date is decided based on several factors such as the star cast of a movie, the available date slot for movie release and any other incident (externalities) that might occur during the release of a movie about which information is known (say in case of Cricket World Cup, Indian Premier League27 etc), distributors within the circle of network does provide an insight about such information. Having known the date of release of a movie the production house goes in for blocking theatres. There happens to be a typology to it.

The typologies are as follows,

25

CBFC - duty is to review the movie and certifies it as to which segment of people can watch it. There are three categories, U – anyone can watch it, U/A – Children below the age of 18 need to watch it under the guidance of their parents and A – anyone above the age of 18 can watch it.

26 Qube, UFO – are the satellite medium through which a movie releases.

27 Indian Premier League – T20 Cricket tournament run by different franchise in India

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The production house/producer may give the rights to/partner with the distributor to sell the movie across and in turn the distributor contracts with the exhibitor (theatre) based on the star cast of the movie. This contract is in terms with leasing the theatre for ‘n’ number of days. During this period the distributor bares all the expenses and pays a fee to the theatre owner. The theatre owner happens to earn less from the tickets of the movie but does earn a lot from the accessories – parking, food joints etc..

Note most of the family business of Bollywood follows this pattern of trading of movies for exhibition.

Next type is the studio type.

-

Banners such as Yashraj films. They entered the distribution prior to the MNCs flooding in. They tied up with the local exhibitors and businessmen who purchased movies from YRF for a sum based on the circle and released it because of their good relationships with the exhibitors and with time they catapulted this tendency and made such people their business partners and tagged them under Yashraj distributors. Thereby the distributor not only pays a sum to purchase the movie but also shares the profit incurred by that movie in the circle of his/her operation. Also the distributor gets the right to all YRF movies for a 6 year time period.

Post 90s period we have seen mushrooming of corporate companies like PVR, EROS, Reliance etc who have entered this business have tried to contract out with the Exhibitors/theatres. They try to venture in during the pre and production stage itself by investing in the movie and take in the distributorship of the movie. Therefore a new typology is formed to boost up the sales and expand the market.

-

The production house/producer ties up with the corporate (PVR, Eros, Viacom, Reliance etc..) who also own theatres in the tier I area and to some extent tier II area and in some places contracted with the local exhibitor of that circle. In areas where they are not able to penetrate they take in the help of Yashraj distributors to exhibit their movies in tier II and tier III area or else they use their weak tie

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among their network to exhibit their movies. The network in this case may use the concept of structural hole or that of a weak tie to capture the other markets where they haven’t still penetrated.

Coming to the international scenario, the production houses/producer/director do have their trade relationships with international distributors via a means of contract. If one sees the trend over the last ten to fifteen years one can easily figure out the trade partners in international distributor who purchases the movies of a particular banner and releases in that circuit. Thus making the international players a part of the network of a particular banner.

Example: Distributor

International Arena Distributor

Dharma Productions YRF UTV Red Chillies Star Reliance Media AA films (Rohit Sharma)

YRF Bharat Entertainment (Netherlands) Rapid Eye Movies (Germany, Japan) Mind Blowing films (USA) Imagination (Abu Dhabi) Warner Bros.

Irfan Films (Turkey) 20th Century Fox Video Palace (Canada) Golden Village (Singapore) Slide Screen (Canada) Unplugged (Japan) Eros Thati Media (Japan) KVH Media (Oversees marketing) Night ED Films (France) IMGC (Pakistan) Spot On (Switzerland)

Table 2: Domestic and International Distributors of Dharma Production 72 | P a g e

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The next source of marketing is the one which we are all accustomed to. That is on store marketing, promotion with the help of products, coming up on the television shows, online games, Facebook, YouTube, Twitter etc. The television channels, Talk shows… do not pay anything in money to one and another but there is a lot of revenue generation from the perspective of the channel that promotes these films get as in the TRP of show increases, their advertisement rate during that episode increases, while the film maker views this as a platform to reach the audiences (as TV is at No. 1 spot in revenue generator).

The next trend that is found here is that of the digital cinema, such as the Qube, Digital Dolby Atoms etc who have tried to form a cartel among themselves. The producer has to abide to their terms and conditions, and next is that when they attach the trailer of another movie with their movie one needs to pay a fee for that also, so some of the producers did opine that we as a goodwill gesture take in our friends movie or sometimes when a movie comes in for collaboration with us we charge a fee and that fee which forms a review also get forfeit because of the fee charged by these companies. Next is since these digital cinema providers provide the needed technology to the theatre owners they have the tie up with those theatres also. Thus the producers try to bring them on board during the pre-production stage itself so they can capture that screen space also.

Final Clearances of the Movie:The final clearance of the movie is given by CBFC – the body was commonly known as the CENSOR board established under the Cinematography act of 1952. Their main duty is to certify the film and not censor it. This has been the take of all the people whom I have interviewed. Censor board comprises of members appointed by the central government and the ratio of film members and the non film members in the board is 1:3.

Thus making is highly bureaucratized in its functioning.

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certificate. This has to do with the economics of a movie. A “U certificate” at the face level decides the audience that can watch the movie, next in various states certification of a movie fetches whether a movie gets tax free or not, say U certificate is tax exempted and finally the satellite rights, a U certificate of a movie has takers, for even a U/A where the movie may be censored by the television channel that shows in as they pay the movie for the movie they control the movie they showcase as a larger family audience does view the movie and they see that their viewership is not impacted because of it.

Thus having ties with people from these spaces does help in wide release of a movie and gaining a head start right from day one of the movie release.

Casting of a Movie:The concept of Structural Hole proposed by Ronald Burt (1994) has a significant understanding in this aspect. Structural hole is understood as a gap between two individuals who have complementary sources to information. That is a person in a network may be a part of another network and may have an access to the information that may be useful to another network which he/she is also a part of. Thus the person bridges the two individuals and this might lead to the economics of movies. Thus network and good relationship with the film industry does open access to the stars and technicians but it doesn’t guarantee their participation until and unless the script is of a value that appeals them. As no star would like to stake his/her career.

Outdoor shoots:Certain scripts are written in such a way that they demand to be shot in the original backdrop and sometimes even a few scenes in a movie are shot in real time situation. During such instances one

needs

to

get

clearances

from

various

departments of the state government and also from the resident welfare association or any other institutions of prime importance in that locality. The respondents did say that they get entangled in the bureaucratic web28 to get the paper work done. They also opined that incase if they have any known people the work becomes easier. Citing 28

Bureaucratic web – is a phase that has red tapism involved and excessive price than the required to be paid.

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certain examples stated by the respondents that when they carried on shoots for the movie “Bindi Bazaar and Bhootnath returns29” in Dharavi slum in Mumbai they had to get the support from localities and shed some money to the local goons as welfare funds to shoot in that locality. In return the localities co-operated and the local goons gave them due protection to carry on the shoot without any hindrances. The argument here is that people having contacts with key people at key areas serves purpose and provides less hindrance to work.

Controversies:Market is a place where trade-offs happen. When there are tradeoffs there are bound to be conflict of interests that may arise between two parties. This conflict of interest is mostly due to the price. Such conflict of interest gives rise to institution (supporting the theory of Carl Menger). These institutions are mostly informal in nature.

So what kind of trade off happens in Bollywood and how conflict of interest is settled via institutions created for it and how network has a role to play in it.

The controversies that involve in the field of Bollywood related to payment dues to the 22 crafts – they are a body of associations comprising of light man, choreographers, producers, actors, directors etc.., payment clearance to the lab which does the processing of the movie or issues pertaining to the damages caused during the time of shoot. While such controversies hardly reach the court, sometimes the agreement does mention that the mode of settlement in case of controversies, or it is up to the party how he/she wants to handle the case that is either the party can go to the court directly or opt for o ut of court settlement i.e. mediation/negotiation. Mostly from the data collected , people opt for the latter. Citing one such instance from the field work is that there was a shoot that was happening in the “L” studio where damages occurred to the studio (due to the blast sequence). The studio claimed for charges and the production house stated some reason to avoid the claim, the studio incharge seized their lighting equipments and asked them to settle the dues. Finally the actor’s father who happens to be well known in the industry had to intervene in it to settle the matter as the studio owners were about to move the court.

Another instance was where a movie incurred losses, and there was a tussle between the producers and the distributors regarding the same and finally an arbitrator from the industry along with the people with influence had sat in the production unit to settle the claims – 29

Bindi Bazaar and Bhootnath Returns were Hindi feature film shoot in Daravi Slums (considered to be the asias largest slum)

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Kangaroo court phenomena 30. The instance of network here happens to be less but one cannot rule out because the person who intermediates it is one with influence and experience and whom people trust, there also exist s certain trade off to settle it where things are scripted prior to the meeting and neither parties is aware of this thing and just a formal session begins and no one knows where they would be heading to. Next the players in this industry always try to have a good relation with the people who are in power (local leaders, influential people, politicians, bureaucrats, business people) the reason being is that they would seek their intervention in case of any trouble (Income tax returns, any public issues etc). Thus people within a network maintain an arms distance relationshi p with people in power, such as attending the wedding reception of the daughter of a political leader.

In this above source of information, one can find in that controversies are settled more often than not in an informal way. But there happens to be FFI (Film Federation of India) under which one has those 22 crafts registered. To elaborate further on FFI – it is the apex body of the film industry in India. They promote the commerce of this industry and also promote and protect the interest of this industry. They are an interface between film industry and the government. Members of this body are all from this industry. When I interviewed the people from FFI, they happen to speak out their grievances stating that the government does not happen to pay any heed to their problems. Despite this sector being accorded the industry status we don’t get the perks which the other sector gets from the industry status. Therefore we ourselves have to look after us. We have fought hard for funds and for reduction of tax specially the service tax, after heavy lobby we were able to get the benefits which would indeed reduce the cost of a film by 3 percent. The main concern is that the film industry feels that they are treated on unequal terms when it comes to other sectors under the umbrella term of entertainment. Their network of lobbying would be seen as to how they bargain and negotiate with the incumbent government, to garner support they use the star power which helps them to articulate their concern, they make use of various platform say meets/forum etc and special concession to the party in power as in routing their money in films.

30

Kangaroo Court Phenomenon - is a judicial tribunal or assembly that blatantly disregards recognized standards of law or justice, and often carries little or no official standing in the territory within which it resides.

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Thus from the above discussion it is seen that the networks are formed either via clanship or through trade relationship across families. The network so formed has primary benefits of raising finance, casting for a movie and in marketing and distribution of a movie.

Section III

Outliers in Bollywood This section of the paper takes a note of the Outliers – that is the professionals who do not have family support but possess the assets and capabilities in the film making. The argument of this section is to highlight the initial phase of struggle of these outliers and when they taste success, they also get integrated in the network dominated and controlled by the Bollywood Families (either a part of dense or a feeble network) or form their own network of outliers. The outcome is that the outliers in their initial phase depend hugely on the informal institutions for the resources and once they achieve success and become a part of the network or create their own network, they are able to access resources much easily than before.

The market of Bollywood happens to be a closed space for a few family networks, which operate as effective informal institution by having ties with the formal institutions. Despite that, Bollywood does provide a little room for those who don’t hail from these families “termed as outliers” and this is due to the vacuum that is left in the different units in the film making process. To elaborate it further films from the content perspective that happens to be a creative subject, there is always a niche audience that appreciates content driven than a commercial cinema. This space is now being occupied by outliers who are being accepted by the film industry, such as Imtiaz Ali 31, Shoojit Sircar32, Hansal Mehta33, Ketan Mehta34, Anurag Kashap35, Guneet Monga36,

31

Imtiaz Ali – director cum producer, recent movie being Tamasha Shoojit Sircar – Director, movies – Vicky Donor, PIKU etc 33 Hansal Mehta – director cum producer cum writer, latest movie being Aligarh and Citylights 34 Hetan Mehta - Director cum writer, latest movie “Manjhi” 35 Anurag Kashyap – Director cum Producer, Gangs of Wasseypur Fame 36 Guneet Monga – Producer “Sikhya Entertainment” 32

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Neeraj Ghaywan37 etc. Some of the names cited have been in this industry for a long time, but their acceptance has not been than much. As the Bollywood families did struggle they too did face their share of struggle and hardship much more than them to make a mark in this industry. It is seen that these outliers after sometime form a part of this network which is dominated by the family and/or the outliers among themselves form a network to sustain and function in this market of Bollywood. So what are the issues these outliers face, how do they make use of the formal and informal institutions and their acceptance/they being absorbed by the Bollywood families and their network is what I would be discussing in the coming section of this chapter.

The issues confronting any movie is access to the resources, such as raising finance for a movie, getting the right casting and marketing and distribution of the movie. This goes for an outlier as well. Even if he/she crosses the first hurdle of arrangement of finance mostly from the informal institutions as the formal institutions won’t like to risk in their movie with a new comer and the volatility of this industry. The same reason goes in for casting also, as now well known actor would like to associate with a new comer until he/she has come with a reference or backing from the existing industry players as seen in the case of “Airlift” movie example. The case is no different for marketing and distribution of the movie. Even if they find some takers for their movie, the film maker doesn’t get the required date for his movie to release nor does the movie get a world wide release nor the required screen count for the movie, as here the distributor would have a bigger bargaining capacity in this case as all these factors depend on the star cast of the movie. So how do these outliers survive in the first instance?

Citing one of the respondents views on it “One of the independent production houses who shared their experiences and are known for parallel cinema stated that we still find difficulty in raising finance for our movies despite the success we have shown over time. We don’t find distributors for our movies because they say that the fulcrum of our collection comes from Friday, Saturday and Sunday, if we take your

37

Neeraj Ghaywan – Director, latest movie - Masaan

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movie without star backing and less of promotion and one that merely depends on word of mouth, we lose on our collection so rather pay us case if the movie doesn’t fares well at the box-office so that we don’t lose on our income. Their team narrates that they started using a different strategy for such type of movies. Once we are done with filming the movie, we send it to film festivals by paying a fee and see that jury watches our movies (for the first time we did use some reference to see that right people watch our movie, now we are a regular entrant so now we don’t have to worry they themselves ask us if you have any movie to showcase this year). Once shortlisted we start getting recognition and this reaches the media, social media, and critics and then we find some distributors, studios who come in for purchasing the movie”.

Source: the Informant chooses to be Anonymous In spite of that, still we face the box office crunch due to some factors. Those factors could be because another movie with star power releases alongside it, lack of interest in spending to watch a movie, example Masaan and The Lunch Box. Both had positive reviews from critics and on social media platform but one did well and the other didn’t. The reasons for the latter to perform well are multiple the movie had a star cast starring Irfan Khan38 and he did bring in Dharma Production39 on board with his influence and one does rely on such names for promotion of a movie and pulling the audience to cinema halls.

The basic outcome of such an incident is that the distributors as an institution never rely on the content of the movie which should be the basis of how one needs to function in a market of Bollywood. They rely on the star power or well known production houses who release the movie. A trust is placed on them that their movies will bring in crowd to the theatre. Next is also the power equation of these production houses that we being a regular supplier of movies no distributor can say no to them as it might affect their market position. As the collection of the distributor lies in first three days of a 38 39

Irfan Khan – is a well known Bollywood star world over, does more often a niche cinema Dharma Production – is headed by Karan Johar, a well known Bollywood Family

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movie, thereby it doesn’t provide a level playing field for production houses/distributor in the field of parallel cinema.

Having understood the hardships these outliers face, nevertheless these outliers over a period of time due to their success of films have come to the limelight were the families of Bollywood have started associating with them. As is the case with Shoojit Sicar whose second movie “PIKU” was done by Deepika Padukone, Irfan Khan and Amitabh Bachchan, while his first movie Vicky Donor was with Ayshuman Kurana 40 and Yami Gautam41 financed by Johan Abraham42 which was a superhit at the Box-office, Anurag Kashyap started off as a writer and his initial film “Panch” didn’t even release due to its content. The censor board stayed its release at the box-office. His subsequent films did well at the box-office due to its hard hitting content. If one takes a look at his movies, he has directed movies on a particular incident of the past that has taken place in India or based his movie content in that context, Black Friday 43, Gangs of Wasseypur44 etc. Due to his success at the box-office how he comes under the network of Bollywood families that dominate the market, say with Dharma Production, Phantom Films45. Such cases are true for the names I have cited above say Imtiaz Ali, Guneet Monga. While Hansal Mehta and Ketan Mehta have given us movies that have hard hitting social message in it, though they are being appreciated for their work they remain out of the network of these Bollywood families due to difference of opinion.

Citing one such example of an outlier and the list of movies done by him, as well as the ties associated with each of his movie, is Imitiaz Ali.. With success he happens to be associated with his own big league of Bollywood families.

40

Ayushman Kurana – A new entrant into this film industry, he was previously a radio jockey presenter at MTV and VTV 41 Yami Gautam – A new entrant into this film industry 42 John Abraham – actor cum producer runs the production house under JA Films 43 Black Friday – movie based on 1993 Bombay Blast 44 Gangs of Wasseypur – based on Coal Mafia 45 Phantom Films – a consortium of several directors who finance the movies

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Imtiaz Ali Source of Finance

Distributor

International Distributor

Imtiaz Ali Sunny Deol Dharmendra Deol Deepak Raai Sharma Shahnaab Alam Anjum Rizvi Naren Kumar Dhilin Mehta Saif Ali Khan Kamlesh Kumar Sunil Lulla Chris Martin Shwetanjali Rai Dinesh Vijan Martin Hulovec (Germany) K Raghunandan (Singapore) Matt Zemlin (Germany) Aleem Allie (Capetown) Nizam Allie (Capetown) Mehboob Bawa (Capetown) Noorie Hasan (Capetown) Sajid Nadiadwala Rajesh Sharma Rakesh Madhotra

Dharmendra Films46 Anjum Rizvi Films Company Shre Ashtavinayak Cine Vision Eros International Illuminate Films Shree Ashtavinayak Cine Vision Window Seat Films Nadiadwala Grandson Entertainment T-series

Eros International Illuminate Films Euro Video (Germany) Golden Village Pictures (Singapore) Solomon Pictures (Germany) Mind Blowing (Australia)

Table 3: Network of Imtiaz Ali Source: IMDB

46

Dharmendra Films – is run by famous Bollywood star Dharmendra – Bollywood family

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List of Movies by Imtiaz Ali and ties associated with each movie S.No

Movie

Director

Producer

Production

Distributor

Team

47

1.

Socha Na Tha

Imtiaz Ali

2.

Ahista Ahista

3.

Jab We Met

Shivam Nair Writer – Imtiaz and Arif Ali Imtiaz Ali

4.

Love Aaj Kal

5.

Rockstar

Imtiaz Ali

Family Ties

Dharmendra Sunny Deol Deepak Raai Sharma Shahnaab Alam Anjum Rizvi Naren Kumar

Dharmendra Films47 Vijeta Films

Euro Video (Germany) Dharmendra Films

3

Anjum Rizvi Films Company

T-series

2

Dhilin Mehta

Shre Ashtavinayak Cine Vision Illuminati Films Eros International

Studio 18

0

Eros International

0

Eros International Golden Village Pictures (Singapore) T-series Solomon Pictures (Germany) Shree

0

Saif Ali Khan Kamlesh Kumar Sunil Lulla Chris Martin Shwetanjali Rai Dinesh Vijan Imtiaz Ali Sunil Lulla Dhilin Mehta Martin Hulovec K Raghunandan Matt Zemlin

Eros International Shree Ashtavinayak Cine Vision Reel India Pictures Seri Pictures Prague Punk Films

Dharmendra Films – owned by Dharmendra Deol famous Bollywood star. His family is also in this business

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6.

Cocktail

Homi Adajania Writer – Imtiaz Ali and Sajid Ali

7.

Highway

Imtiaz Ali

8.

Tamasha

Imtiaz Ali

Andrew Heffernan Saif Ali Khan Sunil Lulla Dinesh Vijan Smiriti Jain (Capetown) Aleem Allie Nizam Allie Mehboob Bawa Noorie Hasan Imtiaz Ali Sajid Nadiadwala Rajesh Sharma Sajid Nadiadwala Rajesh Sharma Rakesh Madhotra

Cocktail Film Eros International Illuminati Films Prime Focus Raj Film Production

Window Seat Films

Nadiadwala Grandson Entertainment

Ashtavinayak Cine Vision Eros International Illuminati Films

Mind Blowing Films (Australia) UTV Motion Pictures UTV Motion Pictures

0

0

0

Table 4: List of Movies by Imtiaz Ali and the ties associated in each of the movie Source: IMDB Imtiaz Ali who started his career with the Deol Family, now closely works with the Kapoors (clan). He is a sought after director as he tends to feature in a couple of networks of the noted production houses (Nadiadwala Grandson Ent., Illuminate Films, EROS) who in turn are connected with Bollywood Families and its network.

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Section IV

Conclusion This section of the paper brings out how Market of Bollywood has been a case of self regulation by networks formed by clanship, across families in Bollywood and outlier and finally it would sum up the arguments and outcomes discussed in section II and III of this paper.

Self-regulation involves private provision and distribution of goods and service and this takes place outside the institutions of government and hence in the realm of private rather than public politics48. This self regulation can result from a variety of motivations such as self-interest, private politics, forestalling public (i.e. art of preventing the state entry) and moral concerns (Baron, 2010). This self-regulation is initiated and brought in by the well known members of an industry, who try to pre-empt, complement or even replace the public regulation. But if the self-regulation reconciles among the inconsistencies in rules and does well to the market then it might influence the government authorities to sanction this self-regulation (Gravin 1983; Levin, 1967).

So in the case of Bollywood which is self-regulated, it can be analyzed from company level and from industry level. At Company Level say the production houses run by the Bollywood Families such as the YRF, Dharma Production, Balaji Motion Pictures, EROS, etc have their own set of rules in place with respect to working conditions, terms of payment etc, as seen in the case of YRF. But these companies when they have a joint venture with another company/star which is having an equal brand value in the market, in such cases there is a negotiation between them on prices and terms and conditions related to work. For instance if YRF signs an actor like Ayushman Khurana49, the former would pay him the value based on the project and not on the actors market value, but if the actors market value is less than the project the

48

Public Politics happens within the realm of government while private politics happens outside the government realm. Private politics pertains to individual and collective action to influence the conduct of private agents, including oneself 49 Ayushman Khurana – Indian Film Actor and Singer started his career as a Television Anchor, he began his career in 2012 as an actor, done 5 films

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lesser amount would ply. Likewise, if YRF signs a movie with any of the Khans,50 then the price is paid as based on certain combination of factors such as market value of the actor, his relationship with the production house and based on the scale of the project, such issues are discussed by both teams across board. Similarly when the loan is borrowed from the market from the informal credit market, the interest rate varies based on the production house which asks for money on credit. The monitoring clause in case of company is the contract itself. Such are the cases of self –regulation at the company level.

At Industry level the self-regulation mechanism is set by the experienced personalities from the film fraternity. Say what could be the welfare measures to the employees who are working in this industry. Such rules have been formulated by the different association formed for such person and they are monitored by the unions of each association.

The Code of Conduct happens to be the primacy in the enactment of selfregulation. This code of conduct happens to be influenced by the network operated by the Bollywood Families.

The case may be argued that self-regulation may not be advantage because of the predominance of Bollywood families who occupy the prime position in formulating the rules. But to my understanding this isn’t a fair assertion because the families do need the support of the people for making films, since it being restricted space any dominance of by a person would lead to self destruction. Therefore Bollywood has survived and would survive in future via self-regulating mechanism, under the predominance of network formed by Bollywood family clan, across Bollywood families and outliers.

To conclude it is evident that the Bollywood Bazaar is controlled by Bollywood Families and its network which is self-regulated. This network was initially formed through clanship and with time this network saw players across different Bollywood

50

Khans – Bollywood is apparently ruled by three Khans who have strong network. They are Shahrukh Khan, Salman Khan and Amir Khan. These khans not only act but also produce and distribute movies

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families and outliers. These networks make use of the informal and formal institutions working in this sector by incorporating the players from these institutions in their network to gain access and control the resources in the market. So the impact these networks have on the Bollywood industry market is that the networks are able to raise finance for the movie and market and distribute the movie. Apart from it, these networks also help in getting the right casting for the movie, accessing information, boost to short budget movies, helps in outdoor shoot and settling controversies. Thus understanding how networks are created and their operations helps in understanding the market of Bollywood.

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YADAV: Critical Terrorism Studies

Critical Terrorism Studies: The Kashmir Conflict Shivani Yadav1 Abstract : The paper attempts to highlight the utter lack of Kashmiri voices in resolving the issue of terrorist violence in the valley.

Firstly, the Kashmir problem is referred to as the India-Pakistan problem, which means that the solution is to be negotiated between, and to the satisfaction of, the two states. Even though India and Pakistan would agree on very little when it comes to the Kashmir problem, the one point on which they both seem to agree is denying Kashmiris the right to speak up and determine their own fate. The problem has escalated to such a level that it is hard for the parties to decide from where to even start solving it. Clearly, biding away time and arriving at no concrete line of action has only led to more bad blood between New Delhi and the residents of Kashmir. The argument that good governance is a good starting point for stability is just another way to bring Kashmir into the fold of the state by seduction, if repression proves insufficient.

Secondly, neither the Kashmir problem is just a political one, as the two governments would want us to believe; nor would an end to political violence bring justice to the local population. It is not just the territory, but also the Kashmiri identity which is split between the two countries. The Kashmiri people, some of them residing in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, don’t relate to either India or Pakistan, and the residents of the valley are further alienated from those in Jammu and Leh. When one starts to dismiss the waving of the ISIS flag in Kashmir or the recent spate of incidents where the youth have picked up arms as actions of ‘some idiots’, it’s just looking the other way from the real problem- that being caught up in the cross-fire between the two nations has led to an entire generation growing up in a conflictual environment where violence is being naturalised.

Since the current approach to terrorism privileges continuance of state institutions or order over freedom of the individual or justice, and takes issue of violence by the people on state as problematic but not the other way around (since state security is primary concern and not individual security), there is a need for analysis of violence, terrorism and counter-terrorism measures at the base level.

Keywords: Kashmir, terrorism, militarization, insurgency, state violence 1

Shivani Yadav is a Research Scholar, MPhil Semester II, Diplomacy and Disarmament Division (DAD), Centre for International Politics, Organisation and Disarmament (CIPOD), School of International Studies (SIS), Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU)

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Introduction On the surface, the issue of Kashmir problem may seem to be one of substate violence. However, a closer inspection reveals that the two States involved may not be completely blameless in continuation of the violence. The Kashmir case can, in fact, be seen as an example where the states are seen to be using violence as a political tool to transmit nationalistic rhetoric1.

Firstly, the Kashmir problem is referred to as the India-Pakistan problem, which means that the solution be negotiated between, and to the satisfaction of, the two states. Even though India and Pakistan agree on very little when it comes to the Kashmir problem, the one point on which there seems to be a complicit agreement is on denying Kashmiri people the right to determine their own fate. The 2015 National Security Advisor-level bilateral talks between India and Pakistan’s were delayed as India was insistent to keep any ‘third party’ out 2, referring to the Moderate and Hardliner Hurriyat who hold a pro-independence stand for Kashmir. India, after making clear its reluctance to involve separatists in the Talks3, went to the extent of putting the Hurriyat leaders under house arrest4.

The problem of arriving at negotiations has escalated to such a level that it is hard for the parties to decide from where to even start negotiating. Clearly, biding away time and arriving at no concrete line of action has only led to more bad blood between New Delhi and the residents of Kashmir. The argument that good governance is a good starting point for stability is just another way to bring Kashmir into the fold of the state by seduction, if repression proves insufficient. As scholars5 1

Gupta, M. (2015, September 29). Pakistan muzzles pro-India voices in Pak-Occupied Kashmir with brutal force, human rights violations. CNN-IBN. Retrieved from http://www.ibnlive.com/news/world/pakistanmuzzles-pro-india-voices-in-pak-occupied-kashmir-with-brutal-force-human-rights-violations-1122655.html 2 India-Pakistan ties: 6 takeaways from NSA-level talks in Bangkok. (2015, December 7). Hindustan Times.

Retrieved from http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/indo-pak-ties-six-key-takeaways-from-nsa-talks/storyIOU5C4QSbZDcpkR2kkvByH.html 3 Haider, S. (2015, August 19). NSA talks on track: officials. The Hindu. Retrieved from http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/indiapakistan-nsa-talks-with-hurriyat-invite-pakistan-challengesindias-red-lines/article7556731.ece 4 Jeelani, M. (2015, August 20), Kashmiri separatists under house arrest. The Hindu. Retrieved from http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/crackdown-on-kashmiriseperatists/article7560994.ece?ref=relatedNews 5 Ghosh, P. (2010). Kashmir Revisited: Factoring Governance, Terrorism and Pakistan, as Usual (Working Paper No. 54). Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics. Retrieved from http://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/volltextserver/10490/

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have pointed out that governance, per se, though important during any social conflict, is comparatively less important in Kashmir where the most important issue continues to be securing legitimacy of the Indian rule and Army occupation.

Secondly, neither the Kashmir problem is just a political one, as the two governments would want us to believe; nor would an end to political violence bring justice to the local population. It is not just the territory, but also the Kashmiri identity which is split between the two countries. The Kashmiri people, some of them residing in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, don’t relate to either India or Pakistan, and the residents of the valley are further alienated from those residing in Jammu and Leh. As scholars have elaborated, Kashmir has exhibited a complex mix of interestsincluding those represented by Kashmiris, Indians, and Pakistanis as well as those represented by the International Islamic Jihad. Kashmir’s individual identity has become hard to extricate from competing interests.

When Jammu & Kashmir Chief Minister Omar Abdullah6 dismissed the waving of the ISIS flag in Kashmir as ‘an act of some idiots’, it is just looking the other way from the real problem- that is, being caught up in the cross-fire between the two nations, has led to an entire generation of youngsters growing up in a conflictual environment where violence is being naturalised.

Since the current approach to terrorism privileges continuance of state institutions or order over freedom of the individual or justice, and takes issue of violence by the people on state as problematic but not the other way around (since state security is primary concern and not individual security), there is a need for analysis of violence, terrorism and counter-terrorism measures at the base level.

This is where Critical Theory comes in to understanding the Kashmir problem in a more nuanced manner.

Situation on ground Scholars have written on the strong interplay between rise of extremist Islamic Jihad on the one hand, and the state terrorism perpetrated by the Indian Army, on the other hand7 - the two forces that operate against each other and catch the 6

ISIS flag in Kashmir valley worries Army. (2014, October 16). The Times of India. Retrieved from http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/ISIS-flag-in-Kashmir-valley-worries-Army/articleshow/44831687.cms 7 Bhatt, S. (2003). State terrorism versus Jihad in Kashmir. Journal of Contemporary Asia, 33(2), 215-224.

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civilians in the crossfire. This has led to massive human rights violations and the number of casualties has been building up over the years8.

One of the reasons why there has been no public outcry against the death of innocent residents is due to the fact that the Kashmiri voices have not found an outlet in the mainstream media. The media has been complacent by its silence on the violence on the Kashmiri people while the nationalist propaganda has been reiterated time and again. Scholars have pointed out through partial or selective journalism that is being practised by the national media that the voice of dissent from Kashmir has been ignored in favour of the official narrative. The findings from a study9 that employs the method of content analysis establish that either the protests by the people are not reported in the national press at all, or the demands are generally downplayed or that they are given a negative connotation by portraying them as being conducted by factions with extra-territorial loyalty, or that they are aimed at disrupting the normal life in the valley. The aim is to dismiss violence as a symptom rather than a cause and to privilege order over questions of justice.

Most media reports are dripping with nationalist sentiments 10 and the violence committed by terrorists is used as a political tool by the governments to score one up against the other. Joseph (2000) studied the content of the articles appearing over a three month period in the largest national daily newspapers in Kashmir between the years 1991-199211. Her findings included that the mainstream media projected the situation in Kashmir Valley as a territorial dispute between India and Pakistan; and reiterated Pakistan as the sponsor of cross-border terrorism in the Valley. The primary sources for these reports included mostly the government-issued sources and statements, and resultantly it excluded non-state versions that questioned the unintended issues emerging out of the securitisation of the Kashmir conflict. Human rights activists and organizations were labelled as anti-nationals who were allegedly catering to foreign interests for money.

8

South Asia Terrorism Portal Data. (2016). Casualties by Terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir from January 1999 to October 31, 2001. Retrieved from http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/data_sheets/casualities_by_militants.htm 9 Gadda, D. N. (2014). Partial Journalism—A study of national media of India and Kashmir conflict. Trends in Information Management, 10(1), 13-23.

10 Gupta, M. (2015, September 29). Pakistan muzzles pro-India voices in Pak-Occupied Kashmir with brutal force, human rights violations. CNN-IBN. Retrieved from http://www.ibnlive.com/news/world/pakistanmuzzles-pro-india-voices-in-pak-occupied-kashmir-with-brutal-force-human-rights-violations-1122655.html 11 Joseph, T. (2000). Kashmir, Human Rights, and the Indian Press. Contemporary South Asia, 9(1), 41-55.

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Torture, rape12, custodial deaths and extra-judicial killings have become a tool in the hands of the Armed Forces as counter-terrorism measures13. The ratio of the presence of Army to civilians is very high in Kashmir as it one of the most heavily militarized areas14 in the world. The constant presence of the Army, whose conventional role is at the border to defend from external threats of the nation, has been employed to contain any possible public unrest from within the country. The fact that the Army is generally trained to think in terms of the self and the other adversary has worked against nationalist integrative intentions that may have been the reason for stationing the soldiers in the first place.

Even though the government is generally held more accountable for their actions than the terrorists, a draconian measure like the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (enacted since 1990) gives scope for the officers to deflect responsibility and punishment, as it shields them from prosecution for the atrocities15. While a measure like AFSPA does not rule out persecution of the army personnel in toto, it requires state authorities to secure prior approval from the central government for civilian prosecution of military personnel acting in the disturbed area, to be charged with penal offenses. The central government has rarely, if ever, granted permission for such civilian prosecutions to take place16. Whatever may be other achievements of the Army in the valley, it has certainly not been able to secure legitimacy by the people.

Limitations of traditional terrorism studies In traditional terrorism studies, there is an over emphasis on terrorism perpetrated by non-state actors and a lack of research on terror measures employed by the State actors. This research bias exists in the discipline as mainstream security

12

Ranjan, A. (2015). A Gender Critique of AFSPA: Security for Whom?. Social Change, 45(3), 440-45.

Pervez, A. (2015, February 19). Politics of rape in Kashmir. The Hindu. URL: http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/lead-article-politics-of-rape-in-kashmir/article6909603.ece 14 Ganai, N. (2009, May 5). When a Guinness world record isn’t news. The Hoot. Retrieved from http://www.thehoot.org/media-watch/media-practice/when-a-guinness-world-record-isn-t-news-3860 15 Miklian, J. & Kolas, A. (2014). India's Human Security: Lost Debates, Forgotten People, Intractable Challenges.

New York: Routledge.

16 Duschinski, H. (2009). Destiny Effects: Militarization, State Power, and Punitive Containment in Kashmir Valley. Anthropological Quarterly, 82(3), 691-717. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/20638657 13

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studies place States at the centre of the security problematique17 i.e. states are the referent objects of security while individuals are relegated to the margins. As illustrated by Ken Booth18, while traditional Security Studies consider absence of threats as constituting security; real security comes with ‘emancipation’ i.e. the freeing of individuals from physical and human constraints which would stop them from doing what they would freely choose to do. This formulation explains why, despite the military intervention (rather partly due to it), the on-ground situation in Kashmir remains adversarial for the people, who lack a sense of both security and emancipation; both order and justice.

The label ‘terrorist’ applies to the actors and non-state entities which the state considers a threat to national security. Who is a terrorist, who needs to be protected against whom and how- are matters of the State prerogative. Traditional terrorism studies take a problem solving approach to terrorism, which is to attempt to treat the symptoms, without diagnosing the cause. A wide gap exists between the fields of security and terrorism studies, a divide which Critical Terrorism Studies aims to bridge by inspecting the causes of terrorism that remain invisible in traditional terrorism analysis.

Not to say that there is complete absence of scholarship on State Terrorism in traditional terrorism studies. State assistance for terrorism has been referred to the tacit participation in and encouragement of terrorist behaviour by a State 19. However, this becomes too restrictive if it only includes a State assisting a politically violent proxy operating beyond its borders and against another state. An illustrative example would be international violence encouraged by the Pakistan government through anti-Indian factions in Jammu and Kashmir, including the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front. However, the above definition needs to be broadened to include the violent and non-violent means of terror inflicted by a State upon its own citizens and within its own borders. Just as a state employs terror to politically destabilize another country, a State can also employ terror to maintain political stability within its own borders.

17

Baldwin, D. (1997). The Concept of Security. Review of International Studies, 23(1), 5-26. Retrieved from http://www.princeton.edu/~dbaldwin/selected%20articles/Baldwin%20%281997%29%20The%20Concept%20 of%20Security.pdf 18 Booth, K. (1991). Security and Emancipation. Review of International Studies, 17(4), 313-326 19 Martin, G. (2013). Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues (4th ed.). (pp. 92-129). USA: Sage. Retrieved from http://www.sagepub.com/sites/default/files/upm-binaries/18627_Chapter_4.pdf

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A case in point is the fact that it is the government that maintains a database of deaths caused in the valley i.e. the civilians killed in ‘terrorism violence’. The South Asia Terrorism Portal20, for the month of April 2016 lists only 1 civilian death, as opposed to 32 terrorist deaths. However, there have been many criticisms 21 from within the media and human rights organization, on whether the number of civilian deaths has been downplayed in official records and if the terrorists were, in fact, victims of extrajudicial executions. The database is silent on the arbitrary arrests, detentions, torture and deaths of civilians. The fact that many deaths are not even accounted for, casts the first shadow of doubt on the authenticity of the database and the existing human rights situation in the region. It is by inspecting these internal workings of the state and the everyday world of state officials, bureaucratic procedures, meetings, committees, report writing, decision making, procrastination, filing22, etc that would help to de-exceptionalise state terrorism. This would make it seem less as an aberration from ‘normal’ state practices, and more as the regular and routine state functions and practices23.

Conflating the resistance movements in the valley (e.g. the young stone pelters) with cross-border terrorism or branding it as a communal movement with extra-territorial loyalty makes the debate appear to be one of national security concerns, instead of a political struggle against the increasing lack of politicoeconomic inclusion in the state. According to CTS prescriptions, the politics of naming has a role to play here. Although their instruments may appear similar, the distinction between insurgency and terrorism produces two completely different response strategies24. The violent acts by insurgents are seen as rational and coherent while those by terrorists are seen as evil and irrational. It is not uncommon to see counter-insurgent writers possessing a sense of cold respect for the

20

South Asia Terrorism Portal Data. (2016). Fatalities in Terrorist Violence 1988 – 2016. Retrieved from http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/data_sheets/annual_casualties.htm 21 Ashraf, Y. (2016, April 15). India uses AFSPA to obscure civilian killings in Kashmir: US Report. Greater Kashmir. Retrieved from http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/front-page/india-uses-afspa-to-obscurecivilian-killings-in-kashmir-us-report/214789.html 22 Painter, J. (2006). Prosaic Geographies of Stateness. Political Geography, 25(7), 752–774. Retrieved from doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2006.07.004.

23 Jarvisa, L. & Lister, M. (2014). State terrorism research and critical terrorism studies: an assessment. Critical Studies on Terrorism, 7(1), 43-61. Retrieved from DOI:10.1080/17539153.2013.87766 24 Jackson, R. (2009, December). Critical Terrorism Studies: An Explanation, a Defense and a Way Forward.

Paper presented at the BISA Annual Conference, University of Leicester, UK, 14-16 December 2009.

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insurgents and not altogether averse of the idea of using violence selectively and pragmatically.

Terrorists are usually seen in ‘absolutist’ terms as groups that pursue violence as an end in itself, who target civilians indiscriminately and with whom no negotiation is possible. The protestations by young Kashmiris seen in the light of terrorism and not insurgency appear to be a wilful act on the part of the Indian State agencies, which has subsequently determined their counter-strategy.

Critical approach for studying terrorism While prevalent terrorism knowledge helps in prevailing particular interests, what Critical Terrorism Studies does is to include both state and non-state terrorism25, counter-terrorism, and other forms of violence such as structural or domestic violence, as well as its social context.

Governmental or State terrorism26 or ‘terror from above’ is where a government terrorizes its own population to control or repress them. These actions usually constitute the acknowledged policy of the government, and make use of official institutions such as the judiciary, police, military, and other government agencies. The main targets, however, are not necessarily the direct victims of the violence but the watchers or the audience to whom the actions are demonstrative of the powers of the state. The incidents of civilians disappearing to never return or turning up dead at the door-step of hapless family members are not unusual in the valley27.

A good starting point is to reframe the conflict 28 in a way that moves beyond the stereotypical understanding of the problem as that of between two nations, and Kashmir ultimately having to reconcile its fate with one amongst the two. Even though academic debates allude to the framework of the 1949 United Nations' resolutions on holding a plebiscite, for advocating self-determination for Kashmir; the

25

Jackson, R. (2007). The core commitments of Critical Terrorism Studies. European Political Science, 6, 244– 251.

26 International Terrorism and Security Research. (n.d.) State Sponsored Terrorism. Retrieved from http://www.terrorism-research.com/state/ 27 Human Rights Watch. (2007, September 11). Everyone Lives in Fear: Patterns of Impunity in Jammu and Kashmir. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/report/2006/09/11/everyone-lives-fear/patterns-impunityjammu-and-kashmir 28 Behera, N. (2010). Re-framing the Conflict. India International Centre Quarterly, 37(3/4), 80-89. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/41804078.

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option of independence for Kashmir seems far-fetched. This is because Kashmir figures prominently in the nationalistic discourse of both India and Pakistan and it is subordinated to the pre-existing adverse political relationship between the two countries. Politicians on both sides have used it as a rallying point to the extent that a compromise is seen as political suicide29.

The problem with limiting the problem to mere territoriality dispute is that it leaves little scope for imaginative solutions. The problem of Kashmir ‘independence movement’ is ‘secession’- a grey area under international law.

A study30 of the

secession movements since World War II and the international community's response to them as evidence that no general right of secession has historically existed under international law.

Scholars have also pointed out the problem with assuming Kashmiris to have an immutable identity31, and downplaying the Pakistani historical and commercial connection on the Indian side. It is important first to understand is the rise of insurgency to start analysing the failure of counter-insurgency in Kashmir. While the insurgency started as disaffected sections of the local population taking up arms, it eventually ran out of support and participation at home. The Kashmiriyat (soul of Kashmir) mutated to become regional terrorism32. The insurgency soon became international by more foreign involvement through Pakistani training and funding to the insurgents, so much so that the very continuation of the movement depended on it. Soon, even Pakistan lost control of some of these groups like Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed as they enlarged, got a life of their own, collaborated with global terrorist outfits and stated perpetrating violence elsewhere in India33.

Critical Terrorism Theory focuses on reflexive self-introspection, and Indian Army's Rashtriya Rifles, the counterinsurgency wing, the premier agency for the recruitment of the Kashmiri counter-insurgent gangs, has a lot to borrow from the ideals of CTS. The issue of reformed militants and the nature of their association with the Counter-Insurgency operations and the methods of their operation are 29

Coleman, P. (2011). The Five Percent: Finding Solutions to Seemingly Impossible Conflicts. USA: PublicAffairs Behera, N. (2010). Re-framing the Conflict. India International Centre Quarterly, 37(3/4), 80-89. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/41804078.

31 Zutshi, C. (2004). Languages of Belonging: Islam, Regional Identity, and the Making of Kashmir. (pp. 16-56).

London: Hurst and Co. 32 Fidler, D. & Ganguly, S. (2009). India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned. (pp. 65-78). New York: Routledge.

33 Fidler, D. & Ganguly, S. (2009). India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned. (pp. 65-78). New York: Routledge.

30

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stories mostly unknown outside the valley, but it does significantly blur the distinction between terrorists and counter-terrorists. There is a need for critical examination of methods of operation adopted by the militant groups, and the problems emerging from the background of the recruits, who have been described by Ghulam Mohammed Magami, the Congress MP from Srinagar, as a "gang of ruffians"34.

Described in the words of K. Balagopal (1996)35: …The recruits are almost all criminalised former militants of the various groups, or victims or kith and kin of victims of the vengeful acts of violence indulged in by the militant groups. Quite a few are gangs of former militants who have turned to the Indian army for protection, having lost out to a rival group in violent battles for supremacy. It is unlikely that Kashmiris are unaware of the roots that counterinsurgent criminality has in the very methods of operation adopted by the mujahideen…

The counter-terrorism strategy is further hampered by the inability of the Indian government to accurately identify the initial and changing goals of the insurgent groups36. Again, this is owing to the addition/subtraction of members of insurgent groups that disappear or fold into other larger groups, thus, changing their goals as well. The problem is further compounded by the fact that the units of counter-insurgency operations in Kashmir, for instance Indian Army and security forces in Srinagar consist of thirty-two battalions comprised of Border Security Forces, the Rashtriya Rifles Special Counterinsurgency Units, a Special Operations Group, and the Central Reserve Police Force, have little exchange with the local police. Since these units are largely seen as outsiders, they lack in establishing any emotional connect and end up being viewed as patronizing37 by the locals.

Conclusion Duschinski (2009) writes on ‘destiny effects’ and examines the juridicalpolitical logic of exception in Kashmir Valley which has reduced the residents to 34

Balagopal, K (1996). Kashmir: Self-Determination, Communalism and Democratic Rights. Economic and Political Weekely, 31(44), 2916-2921 35 Balagopal, K (1996). Kashmir: Self-Determination, Communalism and Democratic Rights. Economic and Political Weekely, 31(44), 2916-2921 36 Wagenen, M. (2009). An analysis of the Indian government’s counterinsurgency campaign in Jammu and Kashmir (Ph. D Thesis). Marquette University, Wisconsin.

37 Wagenen, M. (2009). An analysis of the Indian government’s counterinsurgency campaign in Jammu and Kashmir (Ph. D Thesis). Marquette University, Wisconsin.

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mere ‘prisoners of state’. The focus of the paper is on the patterns of impunity that operate outside the domain of law in the region, and is brought about by intensive militarization which is authorized through legal provisions. She writes that neoliberalism (that produces differential patterns of citizenship), nationalistic jingoism, and militarism (used to exercise coercive control over marked sections) in the national security sphere has relegated the people of Kashmir to a category of civilly disabled people who have lost their agency to act and to determine their own destiny. In other words, they are destined for a life of captivity and imminent death in order to consolidate state power.

Decades of conflict in Kashmir has left the entire economy in tatters leading to worsening social conditions of the residents. Large sums of funds allotted by the Central Government are siphoned off by the elite group leaving the common man in despair38. Vibrant democracy requires free press, free speech, expression and assembly, all of which have been curtailed in Kashmir. Political inclusion cannot be achieved through mere holding of elections, a sustained democratic setup considers people’s aspirations in policy making, even when that means self-determination.

Kashmir is a battle ground of contending interests and nationalisms. Even though India has recognised Kashmir’s unique situation since incorporating it into the Indian constitution in 1949, India has been unwilling to put its promises to practise especially when it comes to conducting the plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir as it does not want to risk losing Kashmir to Pakistan. The discourse of Kashmir’s independence does not find any favours in either India or Pakistan, as the nationalist egos are written into the script of Kashmir’s fate.

Inevitably, reliance cannot be put on the two states alone to arrive at a solution for Kashmir which puts local ambitions above political rivalry. A responsible role of the media is imperative to avoid jingoistic reiterations of linking Kashmiri territory to national security discourse of India and Pakistan39 and to help normalisation of relations on both sides of the border between Azad Kashmir, Baltistan, Jammu and Ladhakh. The United Nations is also expected to play its trusteeship role if the plebiscite is likely to be realised as it has to be conducted 38

Ali, M. (2012, August 16). More money siphoned off, more officials involved. Retrieved from http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/kashmir/-more-money-siphoned-off-more-officialsinvolved/127282.html 39 Cheema, P. (1986). Solution for Kashmir Dispute. Regional Studies, 4(4), 3-15.

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within the aegis of International Community. The culmination of political violence should not be seen as the end point but the beginning of the solution as the ‘Kashmir problem’ is itself multi-faceted.

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Ajinkya: Body Politic

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‘Body Politic’ and the Philosophical Foundations of Political Participation Ajinkya D1 In this paper I use the tools of analytic philosophy to understand the philosophical foundations of political participation. My agenda is to explore the relationship between state sovereignty and individual agency against the backdrop of the creation of national identity. First, I argue that the political agent/citizen that participates in political processes should be understood as a physical, embodied subject.

I use this embodied agent to represent the foundational paradox between state sovereignty and individual agency. This is an exercise in practical philosophy and hence I will also consider how my analysis applies to the practice of political participation in independent India, and what implications it has on the discourse of development and democracy.

This paper is informed by the principle of descriptive minimalism. Since words such as ‘state’, ‘agent’, ‘identity’ each have a rich past of scholarship, I will define how I use them in this paper such that the definition is minimal in a way that most scholars, irrespective of their political and intellectual persuasions, should be able to agree with the criteria I provide.

Keywords: Nation, State, Identity, Political Agent, Minimalism

1

Ajinkya D is Graduate Student of Philosophy at the Manipal Centre for Philosophy and Humanities, Karnataka.

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The Nation State The first term that we encounter which can help with some clarification is the nationstate itself. Political participation - which I will define as I use it in this paper later - is an umbrella term for a large number of activities. If politics is understood loosely as any activity that centres around the exercise of power and questions of governance, then political participation happens virtually everywhere in the world where humans organize to pursue common goals. For my purposes here, I must restrict that broad spectrum to a more manageable proportion. Political participation in the way that it is most commonly understood today happens within the logic of the nation-state, and hence my focus will be on political participation within the nation-state. This is not surprising given that the vast majority of the world’s population is organised in nation-states. This is a fairly recent development though.

Nationalism became the most dominant force of collective identity formation only in the 20th century. The project of nationalism took on a special force and significance in Europe and its colonies during and after the Second World War, as entire population had to be re-imagined into cogent nation-states based on either strong claims to collective identity such as common language, race, and religion, or more contentious ones such as a common morality, history, and culture.

Each nation-state thus required an imagination or a story that would become the basis for national self-identification for its citizens. In the case of historically and culturally diverse colonies, such as India, this re-imagination was especially challenging. Some of its most influential figures articulated their imagination of the Indian state. Sensing the inevitability of the Indian nation-state, everyone from Jawaharlal Nehru and Abul Kalam Azad to Mulk Raj Anand and Rabindranath Tagore took a jab at articulating their imagination of the Indian state – and consequently, the Indian citizen (Gopal 2005, Mufti 2007). This meant defining the basis for Indian self-identification. For Nehru and Anand this basis was reason and the scientific temper, welcoming, if not uncritical, of the West, while more conservative nationalists articulated their ideology in the ‘spiritual sphere’ where, they argued, India was superior to the West (Chatterjee 1989: 623).

While these narratives, often referred to as ‘foundational fictions’ of a nation, are important objects of study, the way I understand the nation-state is not in terms of an abstract, all-pervading entity at large. Thus, I do not use the nation-state as a disembodied concept here. I define the nation-state as minimally having two features.

The first feature is taken from Max Weber (1968) in his lecture Politics as a Vocation.

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Quoting Trotsky at Brest-Litovsk who said, ‘Every state is founded on force’, Weber goes on to define the state as ‘a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’ (original emphasis, ibid.) While Weber spoke solely of the state, and not the nation, I modify his definition slightly and use it as one of the features of the nation-state. The nation is, among other things, the geographic territory over which the state has the exclusive right to employ violence. However, given the changing nature of the nation-state, I propose the modification to be: ‘a human community that (successfully) claims and allows the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’.

For it is clear that there are private contractors and non-state militia that often operate with violence within the purview of legal nation-states. For any such non-state group to use physical force requires the consent, implicit or explicit, of the nation-state. This feature is a descriptive claim. Once again, minimally, this is something that a wide variety of scholars can agree on. The nation-state may, indeed does, have many other features, but insofar as those features do not contradict this feature, I have nothing to say about them.

The second feature of the nation-state draws from the work of many 17th and 18th century scholars who advocated the idea of the social contract.1 While the reader may be familiar with the idea of the social contract, I define it as it relates to the nation-state using a negative construction. Simply put, a nation-state is that entity that does not voluntarily cause the death of its own citizens. The reason for this peculiar construction is to adhere to the principle of descriptive minimalism that I stated earlier. Defining social contract as citizens abdicating certain freedoms in exchange of the state ensuring their remaining rights runs into the quagmire of defining what those remaining rights are. Is well-being a right? What must a state do to ensure well-being? Questions such as these have spawned a lot of literature in development studies and economics with vociferous advocates for various competing positions. My attempt at providing a minimal definition is to encompass these many positions with a definition that is uncontroversial enough to merit acceptance by any reasonable scholar. Thus, to reiterate, the second feature of the nation-state is that it does not voluntarily cause the death of its own citizens2. This is a normative claim. Both libertarians and liberals of all shades should have little to no discomfort in admitting this as a minimal criterion for the nation-state irrespective of their differences over the other features of the state.

There is however, another aspect to the idea of the social contract. It is not only

1. Chief among them would be Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

2. This presumes a nation-state at peace time, not war.

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entered between the citizens and the nation-state, but among the citizens themselves. The abdicating of certain freedoms is done in a manner that there are actions that are forbidden vis-a-vis other citizens. The entire edifice of law in a modern state is tasked with – among other things – codifying and penalising these abdicated freedoms of the citizens. The extent of the freedoms that are given up may vary from state to state, but no nation-state can be established without any freedoms being given up. There does not appear to be, prima facie, any definitive list that all nation-states must share when it comes to citizens abdicating freedoms against one another. Thus, while the right to bear arms – and use them on fellow citizens trespassing property – can remain an American freedom, it is considered preposterous in Australia after the Port Arthur massacre of 1996. Thus, the second feature of a nation-state, that of a social contract also exists among citizens. A minimal articulation of this would be that it is not possible to establish a nation-state where every conceivable individual freedom for every citizen is maintained. Such an establishment would be indistinguishable from pure anarchy.

The Political Agent Having defined the two basic features of the nation-state, I now turn to defining the political agent or the citizen that participates in the political processes of the state. The modes of political participation in a political system are strongly shaped by the model of the political agent that the system employs. Each political system has ideological underpinnings which in turn creates an ideal type of citizen. This idealised political agent is then free to interact with her nation state. However, the very idealisation of the political actor restricts and informs the possibilities of political engagement with the state. In western political thought, this agent has mostly been the disembodied rational being for whom the only faculty that mattered in interacting with the state was the faculty of reason. The state governs and imparts laws and justice that the political agent must assess through reason. The body as an instrument of political participation is conspicuously absent. This archetype of the political agent shares a long history that can be traced to Plato who put forth his model of the political agent in Republic. Plato’s actor had three parts to her soul: the reasoning part, the spirited part and the appetitive part – with the reasoning part reigning supreme over other faculties (Plato in Cooper & Hutchinson 1997: 1071). Years later in the 17th century, Descartes drove home the point with his famous mind-body dualism, claiming: ‘there is a great difference between mind and body, inasmuch as body is by nature always divisible, and the mind is entirely indivisible...

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the mind or soul of man is entirely different from the body.’ While Descartes’ thesis was not so much political as metaphysical, it was influential in shaping political thought nonetheless.

Indeed a few years after that, even his empiricist rival John Locke, while destroying Descartes’ idealism, would still imagine both personal identity and personhood without any reference to the body. Locke chose instead to focus on consciousness and the recollection of memory as the criteria for both, and Locke’s was a politically charged thesis. This privileging of the mind over the body was to remain the mainstay of philosophical conceptions of personhood till the 20th century, and as a consequence, informed the ideas of personhood in politics, psychology and cognitive sciences. Despite the serious challenges posed to this view, which I shall discuss shortly, the view of the disembodied political agent remains resilient even in modern political theses. To name just one instance, Rawls’ (1985: 233) theory of justice all but does away with the need for a bodily engagement with society when he claims that political agents are beings that have the features of ‘freedom’ and ‘equality’: ‘The basic intuitive idea is that in virtue of what we may call their moral powers, and the powers of reason, thought, and judgment connected with those powers, we say that persons are free.

And in virtue of their having these powers to the requisite degree to be fully cooperating members of society, we say that persons are equal.’

This model of the free and equal Homo rationalis came under philosophical scrutiny at the turn of the 20th century through the works of, among others, Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and John Dewey. Their entire philosophical project need not detain us here, but I will briefly discuss Merleau-Ponty’s ideas that found later resonance in the politically engaging work of Michel Foucault. Merleau-Ponty’s key contribution was to challenge the mind-body dualist position and argue that cognition does not reside in a mind that is somehow divorced from the body, instead that cognition is embodied, and hence all our interactions with objects and systems in the physical world are mediated through the body as perceptions.

The more recognisable political form of this idea came from Michel Foucault almost half a century after Merleau-Ponty in the form of Foucault’s ideas of biopolitics, biopower and governmentality. Briefly stated, Foucault argued that the state must construct its citizen through the means of power, and this construction often takes the form of regulating bodies and their conduct through political and legal discourse. This discourse could take the shape of restricting movement (curfews, ghettoisation, imprisonment), delineating accepted forms of sexuality and gender identity (homophobia, transphobia), or marking bodies as unfit for political and civic participation through medicine (mental illnesses).

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Group Identity: Can/not and Should/not Lists With this as my background, I now turn to conceptualising group identity. This is important to understand the effect a national identity has on its political agents. The question of identity in politics is a contentious issue that has traditionally been left aside by philosophers who prefer to focus more on personal identity. As political philosopher Bilgrami (2014: 241) writes:

Some [philosophers] have even denied that it (the notion of identity in the study of politics) even needs to be studied because each person possesses multiple identities, which contextualise the notion to such an extent that is lacks the stability needed to carry the weight it is given in the idea of “identity” politics. I have satisfied myself […] that there is no reason to be bullied out of being interested in interesting things because of these superior attitudes of philosophical colleagues.

Bilgrami (ibid.: 245) distinguishes between ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ identities, a distinction that I build upon in understanding group identity in general and national identity in particular. Subjective identity is understood as when a person has a certain identity ‘owing to some characteristics she has and with which she identifies’ (original emphasis). Likewise, if a person has an identity ‘owing to some characteristics she has but with which she does not necessarily identify’ then she is said to have an objective identity. Examples of the former would be identifying as a father, a paraplegic, or as a writer. Examples of the latter would be biologically one sex or another (even though the possessor of that sex might reject it), class identity (that one may not identify with), or racial identity. Both kinds of identities necessarily begin with what characteristics one has, but differ in whether the possessor of those characteristics actively identifies with them as an agent.

If we accept the model of the embodied political agent as our starting point, any form of group identity that has any bearing on political participation expresses itself in terms of the actions of the agent. To put it another way, to identify with an identity is to accept certain cans and cannots, and shoulds and should-nots that come with that identity. Therefore, the locus of identity is in the actions of the political agent. If an identity has no bearing on what an agent can and cannot do, or should and should not do, that identity effectively has no bearing on the agent’s life. Thus, if one identifies as a musician but there is no difference in ones actions before and after identifying as a singer, then that identity has no bearing on one’s life. Such identity is therefore shed altogether – that is the agent stops identifying with it – or is 104 | P a g e

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vacuously held with no real world consequence.

This picture gets murkier with national identity. As we mentioned earlier, every nationstate invests heavily in its ‘foundational fictions’ and therefore constructs a comprehensive national identity that is socio-political in nature. This is to say that identifying with a national identity brings with it a comprehensive set of cans and cannots, and shoulds and should nots.

These may be inscribed in the law of the nation-state or may be unwritten rules of conduct that have become convention. They may exist commonly throughout the territory of the nation-state or have smaller variations based on the legal and political conditions of specific areas.3 But it is a given that identifying as Indian or German or Latvian brings with it a set of cans, cannots and shoulds and should nots. While there might be some leeway in violating these sets of actions, no group identity – especially nationality – can be permissive of all violations of these sets for then there will be nothing that gives the identity a sense of unity.

However, while one can choose not to identify with many of one’s objective identities such as biological sex, gender, sexuality, etc. and choose another subjective identity in its place as a form of radical protest or dissent or preference, this cannot be done in the case of nationality. Given how nationality is bound within the legal discourse, a national citizen as a political agent becomes a forensic category within that legal framework. She does not have the option of effectively not identifying with her nationality insofar as the decision to identify or not is borne out on the actions that are permissible of her with regard to the sets of can/nots and should/nots.

Political Participation Given these descriptions of the nation-state, the political agent and identity, the question arises, how do these concepts interact? In this section I tie together these concepts to give an account of political participation of an individual agent within a nation-state.

I propose that the interaction between the nation-state and the political agent is always an embodied one. One often finds mention of the ever-present state or the all pervading machinery of the state as if referring to a non-physical entity that somehow has an influence on political agents. As to the ontological status of such a non-physical, all-pervading state, I am unsure. What can be asserted with a large degree of certainty is that the ontological status of the everyday interactions with the state is clear and real. The political agent always 3. For instance, the lists of can/not and should/not will wary in a state with AFSPA rule or one where a politically left-liberal party is in power.

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confronts a physical representation of the nation-state in the form of a bureaucrat or government school or clerk. The list of permissible actions that the agent can undertake is then dictated by the physical representatives of the nation-state. The embodied encounter becomes a conflicting one when the subjective identities that the political agent has demand of her actions that are in direct contravention with her national identity. This is commonly seen in India when a citizen’s subjective identity as a gay person comes in conflict with her (at times objective) identity as an Indian that disallows many of her actions as a gay person.

Thus, the national identity supersedes other identities whether or not it is subjective.

In most such cases, the political agent relinquishes her desire to perform actions that are in conflict with her national identity. But there are cases where the demands on her actions from conflicting identities are irresolvable and it is at such times that she may choose to use her body as the last site for individual agency as a direct affront to the state. This may take the form of self-harm or harm to the physical representations of the state. Classic examples of this would be the hunger strike, destruction of public property, attacks on public officers, etc. In each instance where such behaviours are noticed, I suspect that there lies a fundamental conflict between the demands of national identity on political agents.

What makes these forms of protest particularly interesting is the way that they bring into play, through the use of the body, the two features of the nation-state that I listed earlier.

At the moment of confronting the state through the sheer physicality of a body that is defying its demands of national identity, the political agent exposes the fundamental paradox of the two features of the nation-state. It cannot at once have monopoly on violence and safeguard the physical bodies of its citizens. In exercising one feature, it forgoes the other. The only exception to this paradox is when the actions of one political agent can come to cause the physical annihilation of another agent/citizen that is when the nation-state can nonparadoxically resolve the two features of itself.

Body Politic in India after 1947 The formation of India as a democratic nation-state without the usual unifying discourses of a state religion, language or ethnicity came as a shock to several eminent political observers around the world. As Guha (2007) has noted, the first reaction among more mature democracies was to dismiss the Indian democratic national project as an anomaly, with commentators tripping over each other to write the obituary of what was seen as a democracy ineluctably heading towards a collapse into some form of totalitarianism. While 106 | P a g e

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India has survived as a secular democracy, it has not been without frequent and fervent challenges to state authority.

India has a rich legacy of embodied protest against the state, though this should not be surprising. Undoubtedly the greatest exponent the country has produced of this form of embodied protest is Mohandas K. Gandhi. He elevated the use of his body as a political medium to an art form – there is significant scholarship on everything ranging from his sartorial choices to communications analyses of the material and visual symbolism (such as public spinning of the charkha) that went into the construction of his politician-saint image.4 Gandhi used fasting as an act of moral resistance that directly pitted his body against what he felt were moral transgressions of British colonial power. However, Gandhi’s first fast in independent India happened within 15 days of Independence, and was for Hindu-Muslim unity. The last fast of his life, in January 1948, was for the same cause, and he only broke it upon assurances of peace from politicians and leaders of communal bodies. It is hard to argue that these fasts for unity had any lasting impact on Hindu-Muslim relations in India, but Gandhi’s legacy of fasting has surely taken root. Rechristened as ‘hunger strikes’, this form of embodied protest finds recurrence in Indian political resistance for claims ranging from profound to banal.

One of the earliest successful, if tragic, attempts at using embodied protest against the Indian state came in 1952 when Potti Sreeramulu – a follower of Gandhi15 – undertook a hunger strike in support of the formation of a separate state for Telugu speaking people. For a country constitutionally built upon strong federalist foundations exactly to avoid separatist and secessionist claims like this, Sreeramulu’s chosen method of protest presented a major challenge to the Indian state. Its strong rhetoric of Gandhian moral courage was at odds with its demand for regional segregation that chose to set Telugu speakers apart from the singular national narrative pushed by Prime Minister Nehru. Nonetheless, Nehru conceded to Sreeramulu’s demand three days after he succumbed to his fast.

On the other hand, the longest running, as yet unsuccessful attempt by an individual to resist the state through embodied protest is that of Irom Sharmila Chanu of Manipur. Refusing food and water since November 2000 in protest of the draconian Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act of 1958, the Indian state has held her in confinement for over a decade as an ‘undertrial prisoner’ for force-feeding. She is charged with attempted suicide under the Indian

4. See for instance research by Emma Tarlo (1996), Lisa Trivedi (2007).

5. He was imprisoned during the Salt Satyagraha in 1930, and participated in the Quit India Movement in 1942.

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Penal Code.6 Between the presentation and the publication of this paper, Irom Sharmila broke her fast after holding on for 16 years, declaring her intention to actively participate in politics as a candidate. There were two immediate repercussions of her decision. The first was widespread dissatisfaction among the Manipuris, and the second was her dramatic fall from being seen as a moral authority to being reduced to another political contender. 7 A more positive reading of her decision is of course possible. Perhaps it marks a turn in Sharmila’s political philosophy.

As Žižek (2007) argued almost a decade ago against Simon Critchley’s book Infinitely Demanding, ‘resistance is surrender’: The lesson here is that the truly subversive thing is not to insist on ‘infinite’ demands we know those in power cannot fulfill. Since they know that we know it, such an ‘infinitely demanding’ attitude presents no problem for those in power: ‘So wonderful that, with your critical demands, you remind us what kind of world we would all like to live in. Unfortunately, we live in the real world, where we have to make do with what is possible.’

It is hard to make a conclusive case for what philosophical motivations lay behind her move unless she articulates them herself. For the purposes of this paper, it matters that her moral authority stemmed from and held for over a decade-and-a-half because it made the state confront the dilemma of its essential features: its absolute sovereignty over violence and its negative obligation not to take lives.

An uncritical reading of history often smooths out such violent contestations of identity into the settled dominant discourses as fashioned by nation-states. Some of the most important contests of identity are played out on the sites of bodies in the form of brutal violence that establishes ‘otherness’ as a means to fortify fragile, makeshift identities that can later be ossified into the national discourse. However, there is the more insidious structural violence of national self-identification that forces people into norms of identity that fit well with the statist logic of home and belonging often at the expense of sacrificing their own subjective identities.

6. In 2014, Amnesty International declared Sharmila a prisoner of conscience. Other forms of embodied protests against AFPSA include women in Manipur protesting the rape of Thangjam Manorama by Indian soldiers by walking naked to the Assam Rifles headquarters in 2004.

7. See for instance ‘No food for 16 years, now no home. Angry Manipur shuts out Irom Sharmila’ (NDTV, August 10 2016), ‘Irom Sharmila a lonely figure in Manipur today’ (Times of India, August 11 2016), ‘Manipur moves beyond the icon Irom Sharmila’ (Livemint, August 31 2016).

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Conclusion I have argued that when commonly used terms of political discourse are well defined, we arrive at a paradox between individual agency and state sovereignty that manifests itself in the physical body of the political agent in times of conflicting claims to identity. The body becomes the last site of individual agency for mounting a resistance against the demands of coercive nationalism as a form of identity that attempts to supersede all other forms that go against it. I have shown that it is possible to understand this phenomenon through analytical reasoning as long as the reader accepts the basic definitions that I put forth. I have tried to adhere to the principle of descriptive minimalism to ensure that the definitions themselves are as wide ranging as possible.

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References Bilgrami, A. (2014). Secularism, Identity, and Enchantment (Vol. 33). Harvard University Press.

Chatterjee, P. (1989). Colonialism, nationalism, and colonialized women: The contest in India.

American ethnologist, 16(4), 622-633.

Cooper, J. M., & Hutchinson, D. S. (1997). Plato: Complete Works. Hackett Publishing Company.

Gopal, P. (2005). Literary Radicalism in India: Gender, Nation and the Transition to Independence.

London: Routledge.

Guha, R. (2011). India After Gandhi: The History of the World’s Largest Democracy. Pan Macmillan.

Mufti, A. (2007). Enlightenment in the Colony: the Jewish Question and the Crisis of Postcolonial Culture. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Rawls, J. (1985). Justice as fairness: political not metaphysical. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 223-251.

Tagore, R. (1992). Nationalism. New Delhi: Rupa.

Tarlo, E. (1996). Clothing Matters: Dress and Identity in India. University of Chicago Press.

Trivedi, L. N. (2007). Clothing Gandhi's Nation: Homespun and Modern India. Indiana University Press.

Weber, M. Politics as a Vocation. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1968. Žižek, S. (2007). Resistance is surrender. London Review of Books, 29 (22), 7.

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Note for Contributors The Journal of Public Policy Research (JPPR) is a peer­reviewed journal that publishes articles, review articles, perspectives, research notes/commentaries and book reviews. It encourages original contributions in order to promote debate and discussion on social, economic, political and legal concerns from the public policy perspective. Expression of all shades and opinions is welcome. Articles should range between 7000­8000 words, perspectives between 4000­6000 words, and notes/commentaries between 2000­3000 words. Manuscripts should be sent in electronic format (Microsoft Word Document) and addressed to Editor at editors.jppr@gmail.com Each contribution should be accompanied by an abstract/summary of around 150 words and short biographical note/s on the author/s.

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