Minority Politics within the Europe of Regions

ISTVÁN HORVÁTH MÁRTON TONK (EDS.) MINORITY POLITICS WITHIN THE EUROPE OF REGIONS

FACULTY OF SCIENCES AND ARTS, CLUJ-NAPOCA DEPARTMENT OF EUROPEAN STUDIES

MINORITY POLITICS WITHIN THE EUROPE OF REGIONS Edited by ISTVÁN HORVÁTH MÁRTON TONK

S C I E N T I A Publ is h i ng House Cluj-Napoca · 2011

The book was published with the support of:

Publisher-in-chief: Zoltán Kása The articles of the volume were subject of double-blind peer review process.

The authors takes all the professional responsibility for the present volume.

Series cover: Dénes Miklósi

The international conference “Minority Politics within the Europe of Regions” (17–19th June 2010) was organised by: Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania; The Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities; University of Amsterdam; ECPR – Standing Group on regionalism and Federalism.

First English edition: 2011 © Scientia, 2011 All rights reserved, including the rights for photocopying, public lecturing, radio and television broadcast and translation of the whole work and of chapters as well.

Descrierea CIP a Bibliotecii Naţionale a României Minority politics within the Europe of regions / Horváth István, Tonk Márton; ed.: Horváth István, Tonk Márton. - Cluj-Napoca : Editura Institutului pentru Studierea Problemelor Minorităţilor Naţionale : Scientia, 2011 Bibliogr.

ISBN 978-606-92744-4-6 ISBN 978-973-1970-57-8 I. Tonk, Márton II. Horváth, István (ed.)

II. Tonk, Márton (ed.)

323.1(4)

CONTENTS Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 I. ETHNO-REGIONALISM, STATELESS NATIONS, AUTONOMIES AND FEDERALISM IN WESTERN EUROPE BRITT CARTRITE “New” Nations in “Old” Europe: Ethnogenesis and Ethnopolitical Mobilisation in the Shetland and Orkney Islands of Scotland. . . . 21 TOVE H. MALLOY Minority Rights and the Dynamics of Europeanisation: Convergence in the Regional Governance of the Danish-German Border Region or What One Preaches, the Other Practises. . . . . . . 37 KLAUS-JÜRGEN NAGEL Between “Independence in Europe”, a “Europe with a Hundred Flags”, and a “Europe of” or “with the Regions”. Conceptualising the Relation between Stateless Nations and European Integration in Western Europe (1945–2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 IVAN SERRANO Constitutional Preferences, National Identity and Electoral Behaviour: The Three Circles of Nationalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 ISTVÁN SZILÁGYI Spain: from the Autonomy Model to the Federalism.

The Case of Catalonia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 II. LANGUAGE RIGHTS AND CULTURAL POLICIES TARGETING MINORITIES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE GORAN BANDOV The Protection of the Mother Tongue of National and Ethnic Minority Communities in the Republic of Croatia . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 MICHAEL HORNSBY – TOMASZ WICHERKIEWICZ To Be or Not to Be (A Minority)? The Case of the Kashubians in Poland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

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LÁSZLÓ MARÁCZ Language Policies in Central and East European States with Hungarian Minorities: Implications for Linguistic Rights Protection of National Minorities in the EU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 MYKOLA RIABCHUK Making Sense of Ambiguity: Redefining Minority-Majority Relations in a Post-Soviet Country. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 III. THE POLITICAL REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES AND THE PROSPECTS OF AUTONOMY IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE ANDREI AVRAM Territorial Autonomy of the Gagauz in the Republic of Moldova: a Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 ANA PAVLOVIC Contemporary Minority Protection in Europe: Collision and Harmony between National and International Law . . . . . . . . . . . 237 CSABA MÁTÉ SARNYAI – TIBOR PAP Personal Autonomy and/or National Councils in Vojvodina. . . . . 251 EDINA SZÖCSIK Friend, Foe or Simply Indifferent? EU Conditionality in the Field of Minority Protection in the Light of the Demands of Ethnic Minority Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277 EDINA-ILDIKÓ ŢIPŢER The Szekler Autonomy Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303 IV. THE TROUBLED PASTS AND PRESENTS OF ETHNICALLY OR RELIGIOUSLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES BARNA BODÓ – ALPÁR ZOLTÁN SZÁSZ Deconstructing a Region: the Banat/Bánság. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329 SÉBASTIEN GOBERT The Backstage of a Success Story. Minority Protection in Lithuania. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351 BALÁZS MAJTÉNYI – ANDRÁS LÁSZLÓ PAP Minority Regimes at Work – Hungarian Experiences

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on the Interrelated Complexities of Data Protection and Minority Protection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367 PIETER H. VAN DER PLANK A History of Collective Minority Rights in the European Historical Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393 MAIK SCHMERBAUCH The Treatment of Minorities in Religious Perspective: The Catholic Church and the German Minority in Upper Silesia between 1922 and 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413 JEROEN TEMPERMAN Recognition/Registration Policies towards Religious Minorities: A Comparative Legal Analysis and a Human Rights-Based Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425 FAHRI TÜRK The Historical and the Present Status of the Turkish Minority in Bulgaria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 443 ELENI VELIVASAKI Accommodating Religious Pluralities: The Case of Greece . . . . . 455 V. ETHNOPOLITICS AND MINORITY PROTECTION IN ROMANIA ISTVÁN HORVÁTH Minorities, Minority Protection in Romania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 475 JÁNOS KRISTÓF MURÁDIN Recommencement without Prospects. The Transylvanian Museum Society between 1944 and 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 501 BENEDEK NAGY Szeklerland: The Touristic Way to Autonomy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 527 MÁRTON TONK–TÜNDE SZÉKELY Present and Future of Higher Education in the Hungarian Language in Romania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 549 Abstracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 563 Kivonatok . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 591 Rezumate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 621 About the Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 651

TARTALOMJEGYZÉK Előszó . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 I. ETNOREGIONALIZMUS, ÁLLAM NÉLKÜLI NEMZETEK, AUTONÓMIÁK ÉS SZÖVETSÉGI ÁLLAMRENDSZER NYUGAT-EURÓPÁBAN BRITT CARTRITE „Új” nemzetek a „régi” Európában: Etnogenézis és etnopolitikai mobilizáció a skóciai Shetland- és Orkney-szigeteken . . . . . . . . . 21 TOVE H. MALLOY Kisebbségi jogok és az európaizálódás dinamikája: Konvergencia a dán-német határrégió területi kormányzásában . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 KLAUS-JÜRGEN NAGEL „Függetlenség Európában”, egy „száz zászlós Európa” és a „régiók Európája” avagy „Európa régiókkal” között.

Az állam nélküli nemzetek és a nyugat-európai integráció (1945-2010) kapcsolatának megfogalmazása . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 IVAN SERRANO Alkotmányos preferenciák, nemzeti identitás és választói magatartás: a nacionalizmus három köre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 SZILÁGYI ISTVÁN Spanyolország: az autonómia modelltől a szövetségi államrendszerig. Katalónia esete . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 II. KÖZÉP- ÉS KELET-EURÓPAI KISEBBSÉGEKRE IRÁNYULÓ NYELVI JOGOK ÉS KULTURÁLIS POLITIKÁK GORAN BANDOV A nemzeti és etnikai kisebbségi közösségek anyanyelvének védelme a Horvát Köztársaságban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 MICHAEL HORNSBY – TOMASZ WICHERKIEWICZ Lenni vagy nem lenni (kisebbségnek)? A lengyelországi kasubok esete . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141

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MARÁCZ LÁSZLÓ Magyar kisebbséggel rendelkező közép- és kelet-európai államok nyelvpolitikái: a nyelvi jogok védelmének implikációi az európai uniós nemzeti kisebbségek esetében . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 MYKOLA RIABCHUK A kétértelműség megértése: a kisebbség-többség összefüggéseinek újrafogalmazása egy posztszovjet országban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 III. A KISEBBSÉGEK POLITIKAI KÉPVISELETE ÉS AZ AUTONÓMIA TÁVLATAI KÖZÉP- ÉS KELET-EURÓPÁBAN ANDREI AVRAM A gagauzok területi autonómiája a Moldovai Köztársaságban: esettanulmány . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 ANA PAVLOVIC Európai kisebbségek védelme napjainkban: Összhangok és ellentétek a nemzeti és nemzetközi törvények között . . . . . . . . . 237 SARNYAI CSABA MÁTÉ – PAP TIBOR Személyes autonómia és/vagy nemzeti tanácsok a Vajdaságban . . . 251 SZÖCSIK EDINA Barát, ellenség, vagy egyszerűen közömbös? EU kondicionalitás a kisebbségvédelem területén az etnikai kisebbségi pártok követeléseinek fényében . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277 ŢIPŢER EDINA-ILDIKÓ A székely autonómia kezdeményezései . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303 IV. AZ ETNIKAILAG VAGY VALLÁSILAG MEGOSZTOTT TÁRSADALMAK ZAVAROS JELENE ÉS MÚLTJA BODÓ BARNA – SZÁSZ ALPÁR ZOLTÁN Egy régió dekonstrukciója: a Bánság . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329 SÉBASTIEN GOBERT Egy sikertörténet kulisszái mögött. Kisebbségvédelem Litvániában . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351 MAJTÉNYI BALÁZS – PAP LÁSZLÓ ANDRÁS Kisebbségi kormányformák a gyakorlatban – magyar tapasztalatok az adat- és kisebbségvédelem összefüggéseinek bonyolultságáról . . . . 367

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PIETER H. VAN DER PLANK A kollektív kisebbségi jogok történelme európai történelmi kontextusban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393 MAIK SCHMERBAUCH Kisebbségi bánásmód vallási szemszögből: a katolikus egyház és a német kisebbség Felső-Sziléziában 1922–2010 között . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413 JEROEN TEMPERMAN A vallási kisebbségekkel szemben folytatott elismerési/bejegyzési politikák: egy összehasonlító jogi elemzés és egy emberi jogokon alapuló elemzés. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425 FAHRI TÜRK A török kisebbség történelmi és jelenlegi helyzete Bulgáriában . . . 443 ELENI VELIVASAKI Vallási pluralitások egyengetése: Görögország esete . . . . . . . . . . 455 V. ETNOPOLITIKA ÉS KISEBBSÉGVÉDELEM ROMÁNIÁBAN HORVÁTH ISTVÁN Kisebbségek, kisebbségvédelem Romániában . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 475 MURÁDIN JÁNOS KRISTÓF Kilátások nélküli újrakezdés. Az Erdélyi Múzeum Egyesület 1944–1950 között . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 501 NAGY BENEDEK Székelyföld: a turisztika, mint az autonómiához vezető út . . . . . 527 TONK MÁRTON–SZÉKELY TÜNDE A magyar nyelvű felsőoktatás jelene és jövője Romániában . . . . . 549 Abstracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 563 Kivonatok . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 591 Rezumate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 621 A szerzőkről . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 651

CUPRINS Prefaţă . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 I. ETNOREGIONALISM, NAŢIUNI FĂRĂ STAT, AUTONOMII ŞI FEDERALISM ÎN EUROPA DE VEST BRITT CARTRITE „Noi” naţiuni în „vechea” Europă: etnogeneză şi mobilizare etnopolitică în Insulele Shetland şi Orkney din Scoţia . . . . . . . . . 21 TOVE H. MALLOY Drepturile minorităţilor şi dinamica europenizării: convergenţă în guvernarea regională a regiunii de graniţă dintre Danemarca şi Germania. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 KLAUS-JÜRGEN NAGEL Între „independenţa în Europa”, o „Europă cu o sută de drapele” şi o „Europă a regiunilor” sau o „Europă cu regiuni”.

Conceptualizarea relaţiei dintre naţiunile fără stat şi integrarea europeană în Europa de Vest (1945–2010) . . . . . . . . . 61 IVAN SERRANO Preferinţe constituţionale, identitate naţională şi comportament electoral: cele trei cercuri ale naţionalismului . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 ISTVÁN SZILÁGYI Spania: de la modelul de autonomie la federalism.

Cazul Cataloniei . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 II. DREPTURI LINGVISTICE ŞI POLITICI CULTURALE PRIVIND MINORITĂŢILE DIN EUROPA CENTRALĂ ŞI DE EST GORAN BANDOV Protecţia limbii materne a comunităţilor minoritare naţionale şi etnice în Republica Croată . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 MICHAEL HORNSBY – TOMASZ WICHERKIEWICZ A fi sau a nu fi (o minoritate)? Cazul caşubienilor din Polonia . . 141

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LÁSZLÓ MARÁCZ Politici lingvistice în statele din Europa Centrală şi de Est în care trăiesc minorităţi maghiare: implicaţii pentru protecţia drepturilor lingvistice ale minorităţilor naţionale în UE . . . . . . . 155 MYKOLA RIABCHUK A da un sens ambiguităţii: redefinirea relaţiei minoritatemajoritate într-o ţară post-sovietică . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185 III. REPREZENTAREA POLITICĂ A MINORITĂŢILOR ŞI PERSPECTIVELE AUTONOMIEI ÎN EUROPA CENTRALĂ ŞI DE EST ANDREI AVRAM Autonomia teritorială a găgăuzilor din Republica Moldova: un studiu de caz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211 ANA PAVLOVIC Protecţia contemporană a minorităţilor în Europa: coliziune şi armonie între dreptul naţional şi internaţional . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237 CSABA MÁTÉ SARNYAI – TIBOR PAP Autonomie personală şi/sau consilii naţionale în Voivodina . . . . 251 EDINA SZÖCSIK Prieten, duşman sau doar indiferent? Condiţionalitate UE în domeniul protecţiei minorităţilor în lumina solicitărilor partidelor minorităţilor etnice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277 EDINA-ILDIKÓ ŢIPŢER Iniţiativele autonomiei secuieşti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303 IV. TRECUTURILE ŞI PREZENTURILE TULBURII ALE SOCIETĂŢILOR DIVIZATE ETNIC ŞI RELIGIOS BARNA BODÓ – ALPÁR ZOLTÁN SZÁSZ Deconstruind o regiune: Banatul . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329 SÉBASTIEN GOBERT Culisele unei poveşti de succes. Protecţia minorităţilor în Lituania. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351 BALÁZS MAJTÉNYI – ANDRÁS LÁSZLÓ PAP Experienţele maghiare privind complexităţile interdependente ale protecţiei datelor şi ale protecţiei minorităţilor. . . . . . . . . . . . 367

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PIETER H. VAN DER PLANK O istorie a drepturilor colective ale minorităţilor în contextul istoric european . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 393 MAIK SCHMERBAUCH Tratamentul minorităţior în perspectivă religioasă: Biserica Catolică şi minoritatea germană din Silezia Superioară în perioada 1922–2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413 JEROEN TEMPERMAN Politici de recunoaştere/înregistrare faţă de minorităţi religioase: o analiză juridică comparativă şi o analiză bazată pe drepturile omului . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 425 FAHRI TÜRK Statutul istoric şi cel actual al minorităţii turce din Bulgaria . . . 443 ELENI VELIVASAKI Adaptarea pluralităţilor religioase: cazul Greciei . . . . . . . . . . . . . 455 V. POLITICI ETNICE ŞI PROTECŢIA MINORITĂŢILOR ÎN ROMÂNIA ISTVÁN HORVÁTH Minorităţi, protecţia minorităţilor în România . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 475 JÁNOS KRISTÓF MURÁDIN Reluare fără perspective. Societatea Muzeului Ardelean între 1944 şi 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 501 BENEDEK NAGY Ţinutul Secuiesc: calea turistică spre autonomie . . . . . . . . . . . . . 527 MÁRTON TONK–TÜNDE SZÉKELY Prezentul şi viitorul învăţământului superior în limba maghiară din România . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 549 Abstracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 563 Kivonatok . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 591 Rezumate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 621 Despre autori . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 651

FOREWORD

The present volume of essays and studies includes the presentations of the international scientific conference organised between 17-19 June 2010 by the European Studies and International Relations Department of the Faculty of Sciences and Arts of the Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania and the Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities. The co-organisers of the conference entitled “Minority Politics within the Europe of Regions” (held in Cluj-Napoca/Kolozsvár) were the European Consortium for Political Research (Standing group on regionalism and federalism) and the University of Amsterdam, while among the participants there were internationally recognised experts from many countries worldwide.

The conference was a natural continuation of another conference held two years ago and entitled “Nations and National Minorities in the European Union”, but in the same time it was a very strong expression of the main research areas of the two organising institutions: minority research, minority rights and discriminations research, regionalism and European-level minority protection. The interest for these prominent research areas is a logical one: our specialists work in institutions (the Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania and the Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities) that are related to national minorities, our specialists – most of them – are members of national minorities, and for our specialists, the minority status is not only a scientific object, but at the same time a very subjective and personal issue.

The international conference “Minority Politics within the Europe of Regions” formed an integral part of these research initiatives and the lecturers of the session (most of them authors of this volume) investigate issues related to the status of European national minorities and European regionalism and federalism. The central elements of the conference (as it is also reflected in the present volume) were such topics as language rights and cultural policies, ethno-regionalism and autonomy, the political representation of European minorities, the past and present of ethnically or religiously divided societies, ethnopolitics, and minority protection in Romania.

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We are convinced that the present volume of studies will contribute with new results to the international-level minority research, and it will become a useful tool for the researchers and policy makers preoccupied by these subjects.

October 2011 On behalf of the organising committee István Horváth László Marácz Márton Tonk

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ABSTRACTS

Britt CARTRITE

“NEW” NATIONS IN “OLD” EUROPE: ETHNOGENESIS AND ETHNOPOLITICAL MOBILISATION IN THE SHETLAND AND ORKNEY ISLANDS OF SCOTLAND As many have noted, studies of ethno-political mobilisation in Western Europe draw overwhelmingly from a relatively small universe of highly visible and mobilised ethnic groups; further on, such studies focus on ethno-political mobilisation only in recent years (typically on votes for ethnic parties in national elections), failing even to capture the emergence of such movements over time. In contrast, Miroslav Hroch (1968 [2000]) sought to articulate a framework of mobilisation to account for trajectories of mobilisation over time among some of Europe’s most mobilised groups. Cartrite (2003), building on this framework, examined all fifteen linguistically distinct groups in France, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Both studies focused on linguistically distinct groups, again raising the possibility of case selection bias. Further, much of the analysis focuses on later phases of ethno-political mobilisation, particularly once interest groups and political parties emerge, although both studies clearly demonstrate the importance of early mobilisation structures for subsequent activism.

This study focuses on the dynamics underlying what might be termed “ethnogenesis”: initial efforts to articulate a distinct group identity that may facilitate subsequent ethno-political mobilisation. Focusing on the Shetland and Orkney Islands of Scotland, this study assesses the current nascent state of ethno-political mobilisation with a particular focus on the mobilisation of local dialects as a salient marker of ethnic identity.

Both island groups in recent years have had activists focusing on the standardisation and teaching of the local dialects of Scots, in addition to other symbols such as flags, to “preserve and protect” the local identity.

And in both cases, individuals oppose these efforts as indicative of initial efforts at nationalist agitation. This study finds that despite the lack of a distinct language and history of political activism, models of ethnopolitical mobilisation developed to explain that more advanced cases apply well to these groups.

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ABSTRACTS

Tove H. MALLOY

MINORITY RIGHTS AND THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEANISATION: CONVERGENCE IN THE REGIONAL GOVERNANCE OF THE DANISHGERMAN BORDER REGION The politics of regional governance in the Danish-German border region is breaking new grounds for the European minority rights regime. Drawing not only on their well-developed cross-cultural knowledge and natural social capital but also on years of institutionalised intercultural dialogue at various levels, the national minorities have increasingly informed an emerging regional discourse seeking economic development through crossborder institutionalisation and capacity-building (Competence Analysis 2007). When a need for new cross-border infrastructure or service projects is identified, it is often the members of the national minorities that spot the opportunities. When harmonisation of social protection regulation was identified as a major hurdle to labour commute across the border, the national minorities engaged their national heads of governments to address the issue. When the 2007-2013 INTERREG Commission was established, representatives of the national minorities were seated alongside local representatives. When public authorities and local governments meet to review cross-border projects and progress, the national minorities participate. When the Euro-region assembly meet, representatives of the national minorities take their seats as elected officials. This is by no means a ‘best case’ scenario. The national minorities have fought hard for an increased influence through their local commissions and representative offices. Their political parties have been active since the end of World War II (Kühl 2001). And there are still areas where the national minorities are excluded even though their actions complement the ongoing strategydefinition (Competence Analysis 2007). But where the early years saw the minority parties pursuing an emancipation discourse, the broader European integration discourse has seen them turn to regional development (Klatt and Kühl 1999). Thus, years of trust building have enabled a ‘marriage’ between former antagonists in the common pursuit of regional development.

This is a pursuit that aims at transforming a region that is still peripheral to nation-states’ economies into a progressive and modern border region.

The ultimate goal is a prosperous region that can compete in the ‘new’ regionalism of the European Union (EU) (Keating 1998). But it is a region suffering the legacy of a ‘hard’ security border, even as the Schengen co-

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operation was initiated in 2001 (Klatt 2006). Thus, a common identity of the people residing in the region does not exist. Biculturalism is, however, everyday life for the national minorities and a united Europe without borders; it is a natural desire, the state boundaries having separated them from their kin-states for centuries. Moreover, a certain ‘Europeanness’ has come to inform their collective identities (Competence Analysis 2007, Malloy 2009). These factors contribute to the desire of elite actors for greater European integration, and thus create a new type of minority-majority politics in the border region. This politics is informed not only by the EU’s cohesion strategy, the Regional Policy, but also by the Council of Europe’s democratisation strategy, especially the Outline Convention. EU Structural Funds played a first role in initiating the cross-border co-operation, and the establishment of a Euro-region institutionalised the partnership. But it was the Council of Europe’s normative framework on minority rights, the Framework Convention, which became, if not key, at least a major factor in ensuring national minority participation in this co-operation. There is thus reason to argue that the intersection of these integration strategies makes for a view that the democratisation narrative on minority rights converges with the Europeanisation narrative in this border region.

Although neither the EU’s Regional Policy nor the Council of Europe’s Outline Convention provisions national minority rights; they nonetheless address an issue of European integration that is contingent, namely the co-operation across state boundaries that for years has separated national minorities from their kin-states. Coupled with the ongoing implementation of the normative framework on minority rights ratified by both nationstates, this paper argues that the convergence of these narratives lends itself to support a different view of the European minority rights regime, a view based not as heretofore on normative frameworks but also on the dynamics of Europeanisation. Europeanisation is seen here not in terms of outward expansion of European values but as the ex post process of entrenching European values through deepened inward integration. The paper will describe and analyse the new type of minority-majority politics in the Danish-German border region with specific focus on the actions and functions of the national minorities in relation to the border region’s development strategy. It will be argued that because this new type of minority-majority politics is rooted in minority rights and functions on the basis of the core tenets of diversity and pluralism in European values, it speaks not only to the dynamics of Europeanisation but also puts the European minority rights regime in a new light.

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MÁRTON TONK–TÜNDE SZÉKELY

Klaus-Jürgen NAGEL

BETWEEN “INDEPENDENCE IN EUROPE”, A “EUROPE WITH A HUNDRED FLAGS” AND A “EUROPE OF” OR “WITH THE REGIONS”.

CONCEPTUALISING THE RELATION BETWEEN STATELESS NATIONS AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION IN WESTERN EUROPE (1945–2010) Representatives of stateless nations in Western Europe have usually (but not always) taken positive views on European Integration but defend different standpoints on the role of their nations in this process.

My paper describes the history of conceptualising the relation between the stateless nations and the process of European integration in Western Europe since the Second World War, looking for continuities and discontinuities. The starting point is the West European Europeanist movement. Under the influence of Proudhonian federalism, the “personalist” movement provided a first understanding of a “Europe of the regions”. The second chapter deals with the development of a “Europe of a hundred flags” (Yann Fouéré), that is the development of an alternative to the European Economic Community from the standpoint of stateless nations, different from the regions and substituting the old states. During the sixties and seventies, the “revolt of the province” brought a new understanding of this relation: In the framework of a protest movement against capitalist and state-controlled European integration, the fight against “internal colonialism” provided leftist nationalist groups in some stateless nations with a (partially) new ideological framework, defending alternative concepts of European integration. These ideas afterwards linked with green “small is beautiful” ideas (Leopold Kohr) of a bottom-up process of European Integration that would be based on the regions. However, the governments of the European Regions took up a very different approach in order to achieve regional inclusion in the institutional framework of the newly founded EU. This movement in favour of a “Europe of the regions” was partially successful. However, the Maastricht and post-Maastricht institutional structure and political practice can be probably better described as a “Europe with the regions”, where stateless nations do not find the asymmetrical recognition they claim. As a reaction, concepts of a “Europe of” (autochthonous) “ethnic groups” were developed at the far

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right of the party system (Vlaams Blok), while some of the nationalist movements of stateless nations formulated “independence in Europe” as their new goal, and thereby returned to the idea of the nation-state, albeit in the inclusive framework of a new European Union.

Ivan SERRANO

CONSTITUTIONAL PREFERENCES, NATIONAL IDENTITY AND ELECTORAL BEHAVIOUR: THE THREE CIRCLES OF NATIONALISM Based on two recent surveys conducted in 2008 and 2009, this paper analyses the relation between national identity, constitutional preferences, and electoral behaviour in Catalonia. A reasonable starting hypothesis could expect the existence of a strong relation between support to independence, feelings of exclusive identity, and vote for nationalist parties. According to this ‘congruence hypothesis’, these three particular positions could be represented as almost perfectly overlapping spheres – the three circles of nationalism. However, different studies have suggested that such a clear relation does not exist. Rather to the contrary, complex and multifaceted relations are the norm. Furthermore, in the case of Catalonia, constitutional preferences have been usually approached by a four-grade scale of self-government (‘region’, ‘autonomous community’, ‘state within a federal Spain’, and ‘independent state’), but relatively little work has addressed them in terms of support or opposition to an independence referendum. The paper will present some evidence on the relation between national identity and electoral behaviour with regard to constitutional preferences in both dimensions, the four-grade scale of self-government, and the referendum question. Based on the results of this twofold analysis, a number of issues will be discussed from the extent to which the ‘hypothesis of congruence’ is a useful tool to interpret the Catalan case to the limits of well-established contributions that emphasise the importance of the socalled ‘dual identities’ in order to explain the varying levels of support to the different constitutional options. This complementary approach can contribute to understand why, far from fulfilling certain expectations of a non-conflictive accommodation within a decentralised state, the question of self-government has remained an important element in the political agenda of Catalan and Spanish politics.

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István SZILÁGYI

SPAIN: FROM THE AUTONOMY MODEL TO THE FEDERALISM. THE CASE OF CATALONIA The 21st century is the era of globalisation, encounters of different cultures, civilisations and identities, as well as political systems and governmental forms recorded in universal models. The turbulent international system including several participants and actors is being organised and operated in the forms of networks and streams. The situation „Governance without Government” and the institutional solutions of classical regionalism are being supplemented with the multilevel governing structures of new regionalism. The Westphalian-type international system based on the absoluteness and omnipotence of state characters was transformed and disappeared. The validity of the notion „nation-state” used in the 18-19th centuries, which involved homogeneity, came to an end.

Simultaneously with the integrationist tendencies and organisations of the new regionalism superseding the territorial principle, the processes of disintegration concerning the ethno-regionalism have intensified.

They have led again to the establishing of multinational states in CentralEastern Europe and in the territory of the former Soviet Union. It emerged the questions of defending ethnic minorities, and thus, the minority politics got into the limelight.

The identities of different types encountering and living together in the regions of Europe have changed the classical meaning of the „holy trinity” of state, nation, and nationality. In 1992, regarding the multi-ethnical Spain, Juan José Linz pointed out that „Spain today means the state of all the Spanish; it means nation-state for the majority of the population, but for the minority, it only means state and not nation.” In Spain, the democratically ruled co-existence of state (the Spanish Monarchy), the historic nations (Basque, Gallego, Catalan, and Valencian), and the nonhistorical regions (Cantabria, Asturias, Extremadura, Madrid, Murcia, La Rioja, etc.) has been realised.

All this happened in a country where 20% of the population is Catalan, 6% Basque, 2.5% Gallego, and 2% is Valenciano.

It is vital that Spanish new democracy played an important part in solving a 100-year-old problem by creating an autonomy model based on 17 self-governing communities.

The system carried out between 1979 and 1983 still proves to be viable. The stability does not mean motionlessness. The constitutional

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system in the state is constantly changing. Between 1983 and 2010, unprecedented process of decentralisation and democratisation took place in Spain. As a consequence, nowadays, the state of autonomies has the features of a federal system.

The changes leading from half-federalism to federalism were accelerating from the second half of the 1990s, and in July 2006, it resulted in accepting the new autonomy status of Catalonia. The self-governing territory with the capital of Barcelona, which gained the status “sovereign nation”, came up with a real alternative of separation from Spain.

The process and the changes in Spain and Catalonia led to some conclusions that were useful for the minorities struggling for autonomy in Central and Eastern Europe. The Spanish and Catalonian solution, in the name of the concept „cultural nation”, raised the question of the validity of the model for the minorities that live in multinational Central European states. The political self-governance, the territorial autonomy, the connection between keeping the national identity and using their mother tongue, and the creation and maintenance of the governmental system draw the attention to the adaptability of this type of state-building model realised in the EU. The system of the problems being very serious, it needs a comparative analysis. The replies to the indicated questions go beyond the frame of this study.

Goran BANDOV

THE PROTECTION OF THE MOTHER TONGUE OF NATIONAL AND ETHNIC MINORITY COMMUNITIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA In the academic discourse of South-East Europe, language plays the central role in protecting the cultural dimension of national identity, and further holds a strong influence over the national political identity (in terms of group identification) for members of minority groups. This discourse recognises the importance of mother tongue as the constructing element of the elites in the process of nation-building as independent subjects of international relations in South-East Europe.

The non-implementation of measures that protect mother languages may be interpreted as a direct attack on the national identity of the respective minority groups and an effective incentive for the escalation of ethno-political conflict. Therefore, the execution of broad language protection mechanisms is essential in avoiding such conflict.

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Within the territory of the Republic of Croatia, the system of mother language protection for national and ethnic minority communities has been effectively implemented since the period beginning after the Second World War. Furthermore, these protective institutions have decidedly strengthened during the period of democratic transition and Croatia’s movement toward its independence from Yugoslavia beginning the 1990s.

This process itself had a significant impact on the magnitude and structure of the protection of minority groups largely because it introduced a host of new minority groups. Prior to Croatia’s gaining independence, protections were granted to Hungarian, Italian, Czech, Slovakian, Ukrainian, and Rusyn minority groups. In the period after independence, protective measures were extended to a number of other groups, including Serbians and others within the former-Yugoslavia. Today, these protections are granted to 22 different national and ethnic groups.

The system of language protection in Croatia encompasses first and foremost the right to education in the language of a national minority group and the right to use minority language before administrative and judicial bodies. These rights have been recognised and guaranteed via a series of constitutional and legal norms whose implementation has been effectively controlled by European and Croatian legal bodies. Minority education is the most effective way of implementing language protection, which functions through the following models: model A (all classes are taught in the mother language); model B (classes of social studies are taught in the mother language while natural sciences are taught in Croatian); model C (all classes are taught in Croatian with compulsory additional classes of the minority language, tradition, and culture of a national minority group).

Michael HORNSBY–Tomasz WICHERKIEWICZ

TO BE OR NOT TO BE (A MINORITY)? THE CASE OF THE KASHUBIANS IN POLAND When Poland signed the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages on 12 February 2009, out of the fifteen languages listed all but one were categorised as minority languages. Kashubian was (apparently) the only regional language. Of course, the original wording of the Charter, when it was first drawn up in 1992, did not specify what the difference between a minority and a regional language actually was (Woerhrling 2005: 54). Thus Poland’s ratification, while totally complying with the

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Charter’s original wording, is nevertheless controversial in its application of the Charter’s principles.

In this paper, we aim at exploring the tensions that have been created by the implementation of the Charter in Poland. The most obvious point of friction concerns the singling out of the Kashubian to the detriment of other less widely-used languages; this will be discussed in the context of one presenter’s expert knowledge and close association with the Charter’s implementation in Poland. Less obvious, but equally important, is the identification of the conflicting language ideologies at play here.

If all minority languages in Poland (apart from Kashubian) are located within the confines of a ‘language-and-identity’ ideology, then locating Kashubian within a framework of territoriality (or a ‘language-andterritory’ ideology [Myhill 1999]) is not only bound to lead to a clash of counterproductive ideologies, but it also seems anachronistic at a time in the history of Kashubian when in only three districts of the traditional Kashubian-speaking area (Mordawski 2005: 56; Nestor and Hickey 2009) it is spoken regularly by more than 50% of the population. Given these conditions, we address the question of the effectiveness of such language planning for Kashubian in the final section of our paper László MARÁCZ

LANGUAGE POLICIES IN CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN STATES WITH HUNGARIAN MINORITIES: IMPLICATIONS FOR LINGUISTIC RIGHTS PROTECTION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES IN THE EU Due to the peace-treaties of the twentieth century, Hungarian minorities live in seven different Central and East European states, including Slovakia (520,000), Ukraine (200,000), Romania (1,930,000), Serbia (400,000), Croatia (30,000), Slovenia (20,000), and Austria (5,000). In agreement with Central and East European tradition, the most important feature of ethnic identity is the mother tongue. Hence, these states are de facto multilingual states, although not all of them consider themselves de jure as such, but rather as monolingual nation-states. In the latter cases, Hungarian minorities are confronted with a ‘policy of exclusion’, that is discriminating language laws restricting the use of the Hungarian language in the official and public space. This leads to polarised, divided societies along the lines of ethno-linguistic cleavages.

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This paper compares exclusive and inclusive language policies in multilingual Central and Eastern European states with Hungarian minorities.

We will investigate the legal system in these countries concerning the status and use of the languages of national minorities. It will be concluded that the position of the Hungarian language in the countries concerned can be classified into two groups: (1) Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia, and Austria; (2) Slovakia, Romania, and Ukraine. In the first group, the minority language has a legal status equal to the language of the majority and is included into the official domains. This is especially true for Serbia’s Vojvodina region where an official policy supporting multilingual, multicultural society is pursued. In the second group, minority languages are subordinated to the official state language, they are restricted in the official domains, and additional requirements and conditions determine their use. Hence, the second case does not match the EU’s democratic standards whereas the first case respects these standards.

This grouping is interesting as all the countries involved are subject to the process of Europeanisation. All seven countries mentioned above are members of the Council of Europe (CoE), they have ratified the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, and foremost, four countries, Austria, Slovenia, Romania, and Slovakia are members of the Union. Two of these countries, Romania and Slovakia are however not in the group where democratic values and standards are satisfactory. Hence it follows that the membership of the Union is not a guarantee for the protection of the linguistic rights of national minorities. Thus, we can observe a discrepancy between the theory of the Union celebrating linguistic diversity and democratic values and the practice in the Member States. It turns out that there are no effective controlling and sanctioning mechanisms in the Union available when the linguistic rights of national minorities are violated and multilingual practice is banned from the public and official space. The state of affairs in the second group is not only violating human rights but it undermines the cohesion of the Union and affects the deepening of conflicts between the states with Hungarian minorities and the kin-state of Hungary (see Brubaker et. al. 2006, Csergő 2007). This implies that we have to reconsider the controlling and sanctioning mechanisms in the legal framework of the Union. An important step forward would be the adoption of the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention and the Language Charter as a benchmarking system by the Union, as well as the integration of these into the Union legal system. This would allow sanctions against states violating them.

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Mykola RIABCHUK

MAKING SENSE OF AMBIGUITY: REDEFINING MINORITY-MAJORITY RELATIONS IN A POST-SOVIET COUNTRY The paper examines highly complex and ambiguous minoritymajority relations in the post-Soviet republic of Ukraine. This ambiguity, the paper argues, largely stems from the Soviet tradition of arbitrary ethnic classification based on a formal notion of parents’ ethnicity rather than on people’s ethnic, cultural, and linguistic self-identification. Such a formal approach makes Ukrainians a strong majority in their country and, at the same time, downgrades Russians to the status of one of many ethnic minorities such as Poles, Jews, Crimean Tatars, Hungarians, Romanians, and many others. The formal and arbitrary classification does not only completely distort the ethno-linguistic reality but it also precludes effective implementation of appropriate policies in the field.

First, it ignores an obvious fact that a substantial part of Ukrainians are heavily russified and therefore, in many parts of Ukraine, it is not the Russophones but the Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians who represent a cultural and linguistic minority, which like any other minority, requires state-sponsored support and protectionism for their cultural and linguistic rights.

Secondly, by the same token, it ignores that it is Russians and russified Ukrainians who, in many parts of Ukraine, make up a strong majority that barely needs any help – contrary to the socially disadvantaged and culturally marginalised Ukrainian-speaking minority. On the one hand, the Russophone cultural group feels undermined and dissatisfied by the highly arbitrary and ambiguous ‘minority’ status. On the other hand, the status relieves them from any responsibility vis-à-vis real minorities, including Ukrainophones, and strengthens their commitment to a laissezfair cultural and linguistic policy that benefits them as the strongest players.

And thirdly, the laissez-fair policy promoted by the Russian/ Russophone group as a response to the ambiguity and as a way to preserve the de facto dominance is especially harmful for small minorities in Ukraine, who can neither benefit from the symbolical status of a ‘titular nationality’ (like Ukrainians) nor rely on de facto social and cultural dominance like Russians/Russophones.

The dissolution of ambiguity, the paper claims, is the only way to craft proper policies for minorities in Ukraine and harmonise tense

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relations between the two major groups – Ukrainians/Ukrainophones and Russians/Russophones – that do not fit in with the traditional minority/ majority paradigm.

Andrei AVRAM

TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY OF THE GAGAUZ IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA: A CASE STUDY In December 1994, the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova passed the Law on the Special Judicial Status of the Gagauz Yeri, formally ending a stand-off between the central government and the self-declared Gagauz Republic in the south of the country. The Gagauz were granted territorial autonomy covering almost the entire spectrum of domestic policy areas and were provided with a regional legislature and executive body. This peaceful solution was hailed as a “spectacular victory of reason” (Troebst 2001: 76), given the fact that the Republic of Moldova was engaged in a further conflict in the breakaway region of Transnistria. However, the effectiveness of an autonomy model primarily depends on its subsequent implementation and the consequences it has for the state as a whole (Protsyk/Rigamonti 2007:1).

The aim of the present paper is to shed light on the success of Gagauz territorial autonomy by analysing its capacity to enhance Gagauz identity, as well as the extent to which it can be considered a (de-)stabilising factor for the Republic of Moldova. The first criterion appears to be relevant in the Gagauz context because the legitimacy of an ethnically-based territorial autonomy is related to the right of a national minority to pursue its own nation-building at sub-state level (Kymlicka 2001), whereas political elites in the region have been accused of being more intent on maintaining Soviet identity than promoting Gagauz nationhood (Nantoi 2009: 6). The second criterion involves examining if the territorialisation of Gagauz collective rights resulted in an increased secessionist potential. This risk has been voiced for all new democracies in Eastern Europe (Hughes/Sasse 2002: 9) and it has periodically been invoked by Moldovan analysts due to the Gagauz’ co-operation with Transnistrian authorities (Praporşcic 2008) and their demands for a federalisation of the Moldovan state (Gherasim 2010). At the same time, territorial autonomy is also viewed as having the potential of strengthening weak states with a multiethnic population (Kolstø 2001: 214) – a hypothesis that needs to be considered, especially since Gagauz experts underline the wish of their people to contribute to the unity of the country (Angheli 2009).

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The present paper therefore aims to present the development of Gagauz autonomy after 1994 in order to measure its degree of success as a model for accommodating both minority rights and state consolidation.

Ana PAVLOVIC

CONTEMPORARY MINORITY PROTECTION IN EUROPE: COLLISION AND HARMONY BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW In the introduction of her paper, the author brings up the history of minority protection briefly recalling its most important moments. In addition, she explains what minority rights mean today and stresses on the most relevant parts of contemporary international agreements concluded under the auspices of the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the European Union, and the OSCE. The main part of the paper is dedicated to the tension between the state and the international community, as well as how this collision is contributes to the minority question. Does the fact that the state delegates many of its responsibilities to other members of the international community, to the regions, mean that some day it will die out conceptually?

The author discusses why this will probably never happen and why the state should be strong and effective. This stands for a democratic and responsible state, one that can become a suitable model for the region of Central and Eastern Europe. Globalisation is placing many challenges in front of the governments and old state theory is not enough anymore; therefore, states should reconceptualise themselves in order to survive.

One of the key issues here is the necessity to transfer some of the power from the top to the middle levels, which implies different forms of selfrule and autonomy. This is precisely the issue that casts a new light on minority question, leaving us in doubt why the process is going easily in some countries while others fight strongly against it.

The leading idea of this work is to point out that nowadays, in the 21st century, with numerous newly emerging demands our reflections on this issue must also change and evolve according to the present state of affairs. While the international organisations will obviously continue to seek better solutions, the primary responsibility for minority policies will remain with the state itself.

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Csaba MåtÊ SARNYAI–Tibor PAP

PERSONAL AUTONOMY AND/OR NATIONAL COUNCILS IN VOJVODINA One of the greatest political challenges of the 21st century is the local treatment of global social risks. Among these, the establishment of the possibility of legal power to enforce interests is of utmost importance.

An essential element of this is the involvement of an ever-growing layer of voters into decision making. However, these days, this fell into the background because of the current and acute economic challenges. The focus of the problem seems to be shifted. The reason for this shift is to be found in the appearance of the so-called electoral democracies in the former Eastern block and in the spreading of universal suffrage.

These weaknesses derive from the internal logic of the institutions that are supposed to establish democracy. From these, the most significant problem is provided by the difficulties of expressing minority interests in the currently operating parliamentary systems. The European Union set the goal to preserve the cementing force of the member states. This political effort placed on regional bases highlighted some average (NUTS 2.) solutions of the issue. These include e.g. the settling practice of British, Spanish, Belgian, and Italian ethnic and national minority challenges covering several decades back in time.

For the new millennium, the problem-solving models have become more universal, globally followable, and exemplary models. After some time, they have become the basic guiding requirements of democracy for the EU applicant countries. Among others, this motivated Serbia when it wanted to provide EU-conform answers for the challenges arising from its multiethnic population structure and heterogeneous geographic structure deriving from the local forms of territorial and personal autonomies. An example for the first is the regionalisation of the Voivodeship (the so-called statute-debate) coming from below while an example for the latter is the issue of the representability of national minorities constituting separate cultural worlds (the so-called National Councils). This presentation wants to use the case of the Hungarians in Serbia to highlight the political consequences of the problem and its handling in a social-theoretical framework.

We want to handle the following separately: 1. the institutions that actually came or are coming into being as a result of political compromises;

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2. their reception in political discourses; 3. their politological consequences that can be derived from the normative character of the long-term perspective: the development of the partner nations from monolith national states into an equal community.

In the course of our investigation, we will draw a parallel between the solutions of the abovementioned European examples and the Western Balkan efforts that can be found in a narrower environment. In our comparison, we try to present the institutional possibilities arising from the different situations of politically relevant and residuary minorities. We will also elaborate on the problem of theoretical and practical classification possibilities of minority role-taking (loyalty, protest, and leaving).

Meanwhile, we keep in mind that the arising local solutions should also serve the guiding institutional elaboration of the global challenges of the 21st century.

Edina SZĂ–CSIK

FRIEND, FOE OR SIMPLY INDIFFERENT? EU CONDITIONALITY IN THE FIELD OF MINORITY PROTECTION IN THE LIGHT OF THE DEMANDS OF ETHNIC MINORITY PARTIES Many studies analysed whether and how the EU succeeded to induce a higher level of minority protection in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) through the conditionality of the EU membership.

The prevalent opinion in the literature is that, in general, the EU conditionality was effective. However, the EU conditionality in the field of minority protection came under criticism due to its lacking EU internal foundations, its inconsistent application, and the lacking transparency of the monitoring process by the European Commission. This paper explores the EU conditionality in the field of minority protection from a new angle. The aim of this paper is to assess in a descriptive manner how the conditions in the field of minority protection of the EU are related to the demands of ethnic minority parties during the accession process. Did EU conditionality support or undermine the demands of ethnic minority parties? This question is highly relevant as ethnic minority parties provide the political representation of national minorities in many cases and are often the most important and legitimate actors pushing for higher levels of minority protection in the domestic area of the CEECs. As an example, the demands of the Hungarian minority party in Romania (UDMR) and

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the conditions of the EU related to the Hungarian minority are compared based on the content analysis of the most important programmatic documents of the two actors. The results show that the EU backed only the demands of the UDMR in the field of restitution and Hungarian language use but it did neither in the field of education in the Hungarian language nor related to the reform of the public administration.

Edina-Ildikó ŢIPŢER

THE SZEKLER AUTONOMY INITIATIVES The aim of the present paper is to assess the feasibility of the Szekler autonomy initiatives between 1989 and 2009 based on the nine criteria of Yash Ghai. The conflict arose between the Romanian majority and a Hungarian minority group, the Szeklers, who claim back their right to territorial autonomy in order to preserve their national and cultural identity in a region where they represent the majority of the inhabitants.

The conceptual framework in which the paper is embedded is represented by the autonomy concept and the nine criteria of Yash Ghai. By analysing the autonomy bills, statutes, and memoranda, I have reached to the conclusion that not all the criteria are entirely fulfilled. Consequently, my assessment is that even though the autonomy project has undergone significant progress throughout the years, that was not enough for complete success and further improvements are needed. However, with the correction of the weaknesses I specified and paying more attention to the unfulfilled criteria, the chances of success can appreciably increase.

Barna BODÓ–Alpár Zoltán SZÁSZ

DECONSTRUCTING A REGION: THE BANAT/BÁNSÁG The Banat/Bánság is a special region in Europe. Its modern history began in 1716 when it was conquered back from the Turks and obtained a special status as part of the Habsburg Empire. This meant that the region became part of the latter without having to adopt its system of territorial administration. The special status lasted approximately one hundred years and entailed a rather unique colonisation policy practised by the Viennese Court, which resulted in an ethnic diversity that is seemingly unparalleled on the continent. These processes and their consequences still influence the situation of the region and the life of the national minorities inhabiting it.

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The primary aim of our paper is to identify the factors that currently shape the regional discourses developed mainly on the basis of the historical elements presented in the previous paragraph. Needless to say: there are indeed several discourses. However, the one adopted by the Romanian majority focuses on the basic values characterising the history of the Banat/Bánság without mentioning which elements are attached to national minorities. Rallying around this discourse devoid of elements concerning minorities could call into question the future of the Banat’s minorities. The secondoray aim of our paper is to provide empirical evidence for this process and analyse it.

Sébastien GOBERT

THE BACKSTAGE OF A SUCCESS STORY. MINORITY PROTECTION IN LITHUANIA Since it declared its independence in 1990, Lithuania has been praised for the consensual integration of its national minorities. Thanks to a favourable demographic situation, the government adopted the socalled‚ ’zero-option’’, that is an inclusive citizenship law, as early as 1989. The further development of minority representative institutions and media allowed Lithuania to overcome most of the problems Estonia and Latvia had been facing.

Yet, despite this formal integration, some tensions still occur among minorities, especially among the Polish community, the largest, geographically most concentrated, and most controversial ethnic group.

Recurrent rows over the ‚lithuanised’ spelling of Polish names on passports and street signs, as well as regular reports on discrimination in the media have demonstrated the contradiction between a well-achieved formal integration and the persistence of prejudice and discrimination practices among the majority population against the national minorities. Furthermore, the recent introduction of an exclusive dual citizenship law, limited to a part of the ethnic Lithuanians, has highlighted a structural divide between the ‚’ethnos’’ and the ‚’demos’’ among the country’s very citizenry.

This research stresses the existing lag between a successful formal integration of Lithuania’s minorities and their persisting status of ‚alien’ in the country’s public discourse. This work intends to provide some elements of understanding on why the inclusive and tolerant integration framework has not yet led to the actual inclusion of the minorities.

The study focuses on the case of the Polish community. I investigate

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the legal provisions regarding minority integration on both domestic and international scale, as well as the different theoretical conceptions of citizenship. I examine then the most sensitive issues related to the participation of ethnic Poles in Lithuanian public life and analyse the short- and long-term consequences of their incomplete inclusion into the Lithuanian public sphere.

Balázs MAJTÉNYI–András László PAP

MINORITY REGIMES AT WORK – HUNGARIAN EXPERIENCES ON THE INTERRELATED COMPLEXITIES OF DATA PROTECTION AND MINORITY PROTECTION Looking at the regulatory context of the Republic of Hungary, this essay proposes to examine the relationship between the protection of sensitive data and protection against violations of minority rights, on the one hand, and the free flow of ethnic data, which is required for the unimpeded provision of additional rights, on the other hand. In other words, we attempt to identify cases where a conflict between various fundamental rights may arise, as well as the circumstances in which placing restrictions on the right to the protection of personal data may be justified in the interest of making a distinction between the fundamental right associated with the prohibition of discrimination and the preferential treatment (affirmative action or reverse discrimination) of disadvantaged groups, as well as in order to uphold the constitutionally guaranteed rights of national and ethnic minorities. Such cases often harbour a conflict between even more fundamental rights than those mentioned above, but the only lawful objective of any restriction is the protection of subjective fundamental rights. In cases of preferential treatment, however, the restriction is invariably based on the consent of the subject.

Pieter H. van der PLANK

A HISTORY OF COLLECTIVE MINORITY RIGHTS IN THE EUROPEAN HISTORICAL CONTEXT Autonomy was a traditional solution that state and church authorities implemented to solve the problems of ethnic diversity predominantly represented by religious denominations. Although the 17th century Ancien Régimes generally used compulsion and violence to maintain homogeneity among the objects of their sovereignty, in the run of the 18th

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century, this policy was no longer a guarantee for stability and control.

Shifting political boundaries too often brought dissident denominations under the control of states dedicated to other (state) religions. The Age of Enlightenment would no longer accept traditional solutions of converting and expelling minorities, and granted particular privileges, in other words, collective rights, in order to control such minorities by juridical isolation.

In the 19th century, collective rights were no longer acceptable in unitary democratic states. Because their citizens emancipated from objects of the sovereign to subjects of the state, they had to become individuals equal in rights and living together under the same laws. In Western Europe, a so-called Kulturkampf (culture struggle) was necessary to secure the predominance of the state over the (Roman Catholic) Church, restricting her jurisdiction.

So, the national democratic concept became successful in mononational Western European states. In East-Central Europe, it could not be implemented without a severe threat to the integrity of the multinationally composed states: Russia, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire.

Here, national dissident emancipation was fostered by strongholds in religious denominations and organisations. Anyway, the great powers had to cope with growing and centrifugal national separatist movements among their citizens. Each of them tried to solve this problem in different and often reactive and repressive ways, and none of them succeeded.

Austria tried in vain to work out compromises between personal, collective, and territorial rights. In this respect, important contributions were made by social democrats (Renner and Bauer) with the aim to reconcile old collective and new individual rights in a territorial solution.

But besides an interesting implementation of their ideas in the crown provinces of Moravia and Bucovina, an outspoken nationalism dominated the discourse in other provinces, paralysing any further debate and the development of a tolerant and liberal climate.

The collapse of the multinational great powers in WW I gave way to the political reorganisation of Central Europe in some seven new nationstates founded by the Peace-Treaties of Paris on the confusing basic principle of the international law: the Peoples’ Right of Self-determination.

Although this right was a collective one, giving a people sovereignty as a nation was implemented in states inhabited not only by such a nation but also by large national dissident minorities, mounting up to thirty million Central Europeans. State citizenship proved to be a weak concept in the new nation-states. They were not able, and most of them also not

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willing, to work out a compromise between constitutionally guaranteed individual rights of their citizen subjects and the need of collective rights by those citizens belonging to minority groups willing to maintain a social and cultural life of their own. Since then, religious as well as national provisions of minorities have deteriorated under state jurisdiction, becoming play things in the hands of politicians.

In the last years before the outbreak of WW II, the Axis Powers in co-operation with the Soviet Union provoked and forced large-scale territorial annexations as a correction upon the peace-treaties, making the fear for irridenti real. Even new national (puppet) states were erected for nations who formerly had not received recognition in the peace-treaties.

These territorial solutions could only solve the old minority problems by creating new ones. Ethnic cleansing was carried out to enforce national homogeneity within the new boundaries. Jewish minorities were eliminated by genocide. In German-occupied territories, German-speaking minorities were privileged by a collective status. In agreement with the state authorities of the Axis-confederates, some and in particular also these germanophone minorities got a bi-national status, and finally had to accept German nationality exclusively. These constitutional distortions discredited collective minority status as a solution.

After the war, the victorious Allied Powers considered the existence of minorities to have been a war cause in the hands of the Axis Powers and their confederates, and collective minority rights still to be a source of severe international troubles for the future. They not only decided to return to the pre-war state boundaries (with the exception of the annexations by the Soviet Union) but also to accept and even guide massive national cleansing of the population within these boundaries.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights reflects this juridical reenforcement of the individual citizen, but in a new quality: as a sovereign human subject of a state. The date of the proclamation can hardly be coincidental: December 1948, just after three years of the massive and forceful replacing of some twenty million Central Europeans just because of an unwanted ethnic or national identity.

Since then, in the Soviet-controlled parts of Europe, minority problems were marginalised in bureaucratic regulation. The socialist peoples’ republics implemented an ideological solution of these problems, making individual rights unnecessary and collective rights unlawful.

Only one territorial experiment – the autonomous Szekler region in Romania – had a short and unhappy life.

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In 1990, a new era would start, giving new perspectives to minority rights within the framework of a European legislature. And, covered by this jurisdiction, national minorities should no longer be a threat to the integrity of a modern European state. Nevertheless, anachronistic reflexes still continue to define and (mis)use their existential need for collective rights as such.

Maik SCHMERBAUCH

THE TREATMENT OF MINORITIES IN RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVE: THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AND THE GERMAN MINORITY IN UPPER SILESIA BETWEEN 1922 AND 2010 With the exception of my researches and investigations during the last years, there has not been any scientific or modern research on this topic in the (ecclesiastical) history, although the relationship between the Catholic Church and the German Catholic minority in the diocese of Kattowitz between 1922 and 1939 was a very interesting and important period of the twentieth century ecclesiastical history.

After the defeat of the German Empire at the end of the First Word War in 1918, the German province of Upper Silesia was divided by the Völkerbund between Poland and Germany in 1922. So the eastern part of Upper Silesia, with the important industry area of Kattowitz and Königshütte, went to Poland. In this area, there had lived over one million inhabitants of Polish and German origin, although the Upper Silesian folklore has been a mixed one with German and Polish elements intermingled for centuries so that one couldn’t identify a person as expressly German or Polish. Normally, a person identified his nationality with the language he spoken and the confession to his own folklore. So, after 1922, there has been a big exodus of German Upper Silesians from this part into the German Empire while Polish people came to the new Polish Upper Silesia from all parts of this country. Finally, around 20% of German people remained in this area as a political minority in the Polish Wojewodschaft of Silesia between 1922 and 1939. This political process has caused a changing process even in the Catholic Church.

Upper Silesia was a very Catholic part and in 1922 it belonged to the big German diocese of Breslau with Bishop Cardinal Bertram. After 1922, the Holy See decided to create a new diocese in the part of East-Upper Silesia that was divided from Germany. So, in 1925, the Holy Seat created

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the new Polish diocese of Kattowitz with its first bishop, Cardinal Hlond, who was followed by Arkadisuz Lisiecki (1926-1930) and then Stanislaus Adamski (1930-1967).

For the new Polish diocese, the existence of a Catholic minority they now had to take care was a new experience in this area. For centuries, German and Polish Catholics had lived peacefully in their community, shared the churches for the services, praised together, and went together to the big pilgrim places in Upper Silesia such as Annaberg or Piekary.

Because of the political change in 1922, there has developed a great mistrust between German and Polish inhabitants not only in general matters but also in the Catholic life. Consequently, the German Catholics were angry to lose their former way of life in the church they had enjoyed as German citizens. The Bishop of Kattowitz and his priests recognised this problem in their communities and tried everything to avoid political problems in the Catholic Church during the time between 1922 and 1939.

For them, it was clear that regarding faith, there could not be a difference between the faith of a German and that of a Polish. The Church was the shelter without any folkloristic problems. But this matter was hard to manage. The German priests tried for several of times to avoid radicalism among the German Catholics during the period between 1922 and 1939.

They provided and supported the German Catholic societies: the children, the youth, men, and women all went together to the great pilgrim places; they taught them about social and religious life and warned them not to believe in the new political systems of Nazism and communism, which tried to convince the German faithful to their ideology. With their efforts, the Catholic Church could convince the majority of the German Catholics very successfully to stay in the Church until the end of the thirties. This time, the political situation between Germany and Poland changed for the worse, and the Polish government of Upper Silesia began to persecute a lot of societies and magazines of the German minority until the beginning of World War 2 in 1939, which could not be prevented even by the Catholic Church.

So, the discussion and exploration of this area of the twentieth century ecclesiastical history is expected to be a huge project with new results for the current research. I think, this project is going to give new perspectives to minority research in Catholic theology and will offer new ways how to handle as Catholics a religious community living in minority.

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Jeroen TEMPERMAN

RECOGNITION/REGISTRATION POLICIES TOWARDS RELIGIOUS MINORITIES: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS AND A HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED ANALYSIS The issue of freedom of association is inextricably linked up with the freedoms enjoyed by organised religious groups. Focusing on Eastern European countries, this paper examines the question of what the precise legal ramifications of the norm which holds that ‘states may not discriminate between different religions and beliefs’ are in the field of registration of religions. It will be outlined that religious association laws may be used in practice to confirm and/or cover up historical financial prerogatives of the dominant and traditional religion of the state (i.e. Eastern Orthodox national churches predominantly, in most states in this region that maintain de jure or de facto ties with this religion) or to restrain the activities of religious groups (in secular states with strict interpretations of state secularism or separationism). Thus, it may be that financial support schemes are based on the prima facie neutral criteria (“all recognised/registered religions and beliefs receive funding”) but the rules for registration, in turn, are actually not. If a state’s predominant religion or church is automatically granted financial support yet other religious groups are to go through arduous procedures to reach that same level of legal recognition, the policy of allocation of financial benefits can hardly be considered ‘based on objective criteria’. The same holds true, a fortiori, if religious association laws lay out illegitimate registration criteria that non-dominant or non-traditional religious communities can simply never meet. Thus, two different issues which may both lead to discrimination against certain religions can be distinguished from each other: (i) basic recognition as a legal entity by the state (and the rights that come with this status); (ii) eligibility criteria for state funding (which is often interwoven with the issue of the status of the religious groups). On the basis of state policies towards the recognition of religious groups and, more specifically, on the basis of the terms and criteria enshrined in so-called “religious association laws”, it might happen that a religious community is denied legal entity status altogether, or a religious community might be granted this basic legal status but finds itself disadvantaged nonetheless when compared to churches or religious organisations that are granted a (higher) status making them eligible for additional benefits. The paper presents a comparative legal overview of state practice in this region so as to chart the main issues in this field.

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The paper will argue that registration systems as such can be reconciled with human rights law (on the basis that neither the manifestation of a religion nor the right to freedom of association is an absolute freedom).

Equitable policies of recognition and registration of religions and religious organisations could in fact facilitate and accommodate religious freedoms.

Having said that, state practice is that these policies are occasionally designed and implemented not with a view towards facilitating religious freedom but rather so as to tightly control the practice of religion, actively discriminate against what these governments consider dangerous ‘sects’, or privilege the traditional and predominant church. The paper will argue that the precise requirements for registration must strictly accord with the international standards on freedom of association being in conjunction with freedom of religion or belief.

Fahri TÜRK

THE HISTORICAL AND THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE TURKISH MINORITY IN BULGARIA Although the Bulgarian Turks had been suppressed by the government authorities since the Independence of Bulgarian Kingdom in 1908, after the collapse of the communism they have gradually become the most influential minority in Eastern Europe. According to the 2005 census in Bulgaria, there live 7,450,000 people totally, out of which the Bulgarian Turks make up 9.4 % (700,300).

Although Sofia guaranteed the cultural and religious rights of the Turks according to bilateral agreements with Ankara, it started to suppress the Turkish minority to a great extent in 1984. The Bulgarian government banned the usage of Turkish names for its citizens. So, the Turkish minority had to take Bulgarian names until 1991. It was even forbidden to speak Turkish in public places. In the end, the Bulgarian government declared that it would not recognise a Turkish minority in Bulgaria. The Turks in Bulgaria “were not” Turks but Bulgarians forced to convert into Islam by the Ottoman government.

After the collapse of the communist system, the Turkish minority engaged itself in the political arena of Bulgaria. S, the Rights and Liberties Party, whose members are from the Turkish minority, gained 34 seats in the 240-seat parliament during the general elections in 2005. Afterwards, the Rights and Liberties Party took part in building a new coalition government in Sofia, where it was represented by three ministers. This

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engagement gave the Turkish minority the possibility to regain their rights they had lost in the wake of the assimilation policy of Todor Zhivkov. In January 1991, the Bulgarian government allowed the Turkish minority to learn Turkish in the schools where they live in majority such as in the city of Razgrad. Beside that, the National Bulgarian Radio started to broadcast Turkish programmes in 1993. The EU membership of Bulgaria gave new impulse to the Turkish minority to become aware of their cultural and other civil rights.

Eleni VELIVASAKI

ACCOMMODATING RELIGIOUS PLURALITIES: THE CASE OF GREECE The question of how to manage diversity has been central in today’s prominent debates on multiculturalism. The region of the Balkans has demonstrated a number of techniques and policies in dealing with diversity, varying from violent wars to silent assimilation and the unique technique of exchange of populations. In the case of Greece, the recognition of broad religious rights – what at first seems as a rather compatible method to manage diversity, considering all the human rights and tolerance requirements of the modern times – has been reserved for the only officially recognised minority of the country, namely the Muslim/Turkish minority of Western Thrace. Yet, what we experience today in Greece is the paradox survival of the neo-millet system by the sustenance of pro-modern community institutions and the recognition of special religious rights for a religious minority that has been gradually nationalised. An Islamic personal law system is applicable for the members of the minority, who may take their private law disputes of inheritance and family matters to the courts of special jurisdiction, the Muftis. This paper aims to examine the institutional solution of the “neo-millet system” and evaluate any positive results achieved by the accommodation of Islamic law as a separate normative order. For this purpose, I will briefly discuss the extent and input of Islamic law within the Greek legal system as well as the religious rights awarded to the minority. Finally, I will attempt an assessment of the Greek example: is it a legal anachronism or an applied multiculturalism, a possible model for today’s European minority policies?

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Istvรกn HORVร TH

MINORITIES, MINORITY PROTECTION IN ROMANIA The article is a general overview of the Romanian situation of national minorities and and a brief analysis of the post 1990 shaped minority protection system in Romania. The first two parts are analysing the Romanian ethnic landscape with a special focus on the margins of the panorama: ethnographic groups striving for official recognition as national minorities and the (still marginal) presence of the new, immigrant minorities. Figures and demographic dynamics of the recognized national minorities are presented followed by indicators on the ethno-linguistic vitality of these groups. Also a typology of Romanian minority ethnogeography is outlined too.

Analysing the Romanian minority protection system the article first offers a historical overview of the last two decades ethno-political debates and trends, and in the last part of the article the major institutions of the present day Romanian minority protections system are inventoried.

Jรกnos Kristรณf Murรกdin

RECOMMENCEMENT WITHOUT PROSPECTS. THE TRANSYLVANIAN MUSEUM SOCIETY BETWEEN 1944 AND 1950 My lecture deals with a most controversial period in the life of a Hungarian academic-scientific institute from Transylvania. The Transylvanian Museum Society (TMS) was founded in 1859, based on the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and it was the most important scientific institute for the Hungarians living in the region. Its life of ups and downs seems to reflect the destiny of the separated nation. This comparison becomes distinct most strikingly in the events of the period between 1944 and 1950, which was the period of narrow opportunities and of increasingly limited scopes for action both in the history of the TMS and the life of the Hungarians living in Transylvania.

Many people have written and expressed their opinions about the TMS in many ways, but one thing is certain: the importance and defining role in the Hungarian cultural life of this scientific institution has never been disputed. This might be the reason why in 1944 the new Romanian power occupying Northern Transylvania, in the shade of the Soviet arms, aimed at making impossible, putting an end to, and winding up

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the leading institutional structure of the Hungarians and among them, the TMS seated in Kolozsvár.

In my lecture, I am trying to present this silent and continuous battle going on behind the scenes between the scientific institution and the state. First of all, I am trying to outline the steadily regenerated TMS – a scientific institution trying to meet the political-ideological expectations of the period – in the continuously changing transition period following the war. At the same time, I will follow with stressed attention the scientific work, the bringing out of publications, creating a historic past, and organising educational and scientific series of lectures carried out within the TMS, marking the end of an era.

Benedek NAGY

SZEKLERLAND: THE TOURISTIC WAY TO AUTONOMY The main purpose of our short article is to outline if there are other possible ways for obtaining the so much desired autonomy. The political way is already very much exploited and probably efficient, too, to a certain extent. But probably there would be a need for some other ways of communication, too, for convincing the Romanian majority about the existence and the importance of an ethnic minority such as the Hungarians in Transylvania, and within that, the Szeklers.

In the first part, we try to present the current political and public life events and evolutions in our region, to demonstrate that there is a strengthening internal will to have a self-governing structure for Szeklerland and to have common projects, so to say, Szekler regional initiatives. These were absent in the 1990s, but now we can experience a rise in the number and quality of the different kind of Szekler „products”: common development projects, tourism initiatives, communication, scientific works, and so on.

In the second part, we present the tourism-related communication and the symbols used for these purposes, as well. What are the regional symbols, who use them, and how much are they unified and conceptually settled?

The third part should bring foreign, best-practice examples in Europe, where the local tourism and communication has contributed to the process of regionalisation not only through the gained incomes and taxes but also by the changes they have achieved with the communication and proclamation of the distinct elements of the local cultures.

This way, if used with a very conspicuous manner, tourism can have – in our belief – a double positive effect: beside generating a wide range of

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healthy economic effects (we are not going to deal with them in this paper), it can also persuade a very opposing national majority about the importance of preserving cultural heritage, different ethnic values, and, above all, that difference does not necessarily mean segregation, or exclusion.

Márton TONK–Tünde SZÉKELY

PRESENT AND FUTURE OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE HUNGARIAN LANGUAGE IN ROMANIA The purpose of the study is to analyse the current problems and challenges of Hungarian language education policy in Romania in the context of the education policy of the European Union, respectively, the processes going on in the European Higher Education Area. In this sphere of thought, we briefly outline some of the consequences of the so-called “Bologna Process” regarding domestic higher education (and Hungarian minority higher education within it), after which we attempt to analyse the specific problems of Hungarian language university education. In the course of the latter inquiry, which is the larger part of our study, we intend to be mindful of both the national policy, demographic and minority aspects pertaining to the Transylvanian Hungarian minority and the higher education offer and institutional system in a qualified sense.

Our analyses can obviously not ignore the “topos” of the independent Hungarian language state university either – its dilemmas and questions constitute the last thematic unit of our study.

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Britt CARTRITE

„ÚJ” NEMZETEK A „RÉGI” EURÓPÁBAN: ETNOGENÉZIS ÉS ETNOPOLITIKAI MOBILIZÁCIÓ A SKÓCIAI SHETLAND- ÉS ORKNEY-SZIGETEKEN Miként már sokan megjegyezték, az etnopolitikai mobilizációról szóló tanulmányok túlnyomó többsége Nyugat-Európában az igencsak feltűnő és mozgósított etnikai csoportok viszonylag kis világából merít. Továbbá, az ilyen tanulmányok csupán az utóbbi évek etnopolitikai mobilizációjára összpontosítanak (jellemző módon, az országos választásokon a különféle etnikai pártokra történő szavazások tárgyalására szorítkoznak), az idők során megfeledkezve az ilyen mozgalmak felbukkanásának a megörökítéséről is. Ezzel ellentétben, Miroslav Hroch [1968 (2000)] azt kutatta, hogyan fogalmazhatna meg olyan mobilizációs kereteket, melyek között értelmezni lehetne Európa néhány leginkább mozgósított csoportjának az idők során kialakult mobilizációs görbéjét. Ezeket a kereteket alapul véve, Cartrite (2003) megvizsgálta mind a tizenöt, nyelvészeti szempontból egymástól eltérő csoportot Franciaországban, Spanyolországban és az Egyesült Királyságban. Mindkét tanulmány a nyelvészeti szempontból eltérő csoportokat taglalta, újból felmutatva a szelekciós torzítás esetének lehetőségét. Továbbá, az elemzés javarésze az etnopolitikai mobilizáció későbbi szakaszaira helyezi a hangsúlyt, különösen hajdani érdekcsoportokra és politikai pártokra, habár mindkét tanulmány világosan kimutatja a korai mobilizációs szerkezetek jelentőségét a későbbi aktivitásokra nézve.

Jelen tanulmány azokat a dinamikákat vizsgálja meg, amelyek az „etnogenézisnek” nevezhető fogalom alapjain helyezkednek el. Ez a jelenség a következőképpen foglalható össze: kezdeti erőfeszítések egy eltérő csoportidentitás kifejezésre juttatásának érdekében, mely mozgatórúgója lehet egy későbbi etnopolitikai mobilizációnak. A skóciai Shetland- és Orkney-szigetekre helyezve a hangsúlyt, jelen tanulmány felméri az etnopolitikai mobilizáció keletkezési állapotait napjainkban, különös figyelmet szentelve a helyi nyelvjárások mobilizációjára, mint az etnikai azonosság kiemelkedő markerére. Az utóbbi években mindkét szigetcsoporton tevékenykednek olyan aktivisták, akik – olyan jelképek mellett, mint a zászló – a helyi skót nyelvjárások standardizálását és oktatását helyezik előtér-

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be a helyi identitás „őrzése és védelme” érdekében. Mindkét esetben az emberek ellenzik ezeket a törekvéseket, mint a nacionalista agitáció kezdeti erőfeszítéseinek jeleit. Jelen tanulmány arra a következtetésre jut, hogy egy különálló nyelv és a politikai aktivitás múltjának hiányában is ki tudtak alakulni különféle etnopolitikai mobilizációs modellek, melyek arra mutatnak, hogy sokkal előrehaladottabb helyzetek is kialakulhatnak ezeknél a csoportoknál.

Tove H. MALLOY

KISEBBSÉGI JOGOK ÉS AZ EURÓPAIZÁLÓDÁS DINAMIKÁJA: KONVERGENCIA A DÁN-NÉMET HATÁRRÉGIÓ TERÜLETI KORMÁNYZÁSÁBAN A dán-német határrégió területi kormányzási politikája úttörő munkákat folytat az európai kisebbségi jogrendszer berkeiben. Nem csupán fejlett kultúrközi ismereteikből és természetes társadalmi tőkéjükből, hanem több szinten és éveken át folytatott intézményesített nemzetközi dialógusokból merítve, a nemzeti kisebbségek fokozatosan behoztak a köztudatba egy olyan felszínre kerülő regionális diskurzust, mely a gazdasági fejlettség nyomába szegődik határokon átnyúló intézményesítés és kapacitás-építés által (Competence Analysis 2007). Amikor megfogalmazódik egy-egy új, határokon átnyúló infrastruktúra, vagy szolgáltatási projekt szükségessége, olyankor gyakran a nemzeti kisebbségek tagjai azok, akik felfigyelnek a lehetőségekre. Amikor a szociális védelem szabályozásának harmonizációját felismerték, mint a határokon túlra ingázó munkavállalók legfőbb akadályát, a nemzeti kisebbségek felszólították nemzeti kormányfőiket, hogy foglalkozzanak az üggyel. Amikor megalakították a 2007-2013-as Interregionális Bizottságot, a nemzeti kisebbségek képviselőit a helyi képviselők mellé ültették le. Amikor a hatóságok és az önkormányzatok találkoznak, hogy áttekintsék a határokon átnyúló projekteket és az előremenetel helyzetét, a nemzeti kisebbségek is jelen vannak. Amikor az Eurórégiós Gyűlés összeül, a nemzeti kisebbségek képviselői, mint megválasztott hivatalnokok foglalnak helyet. Ez egyáltalán nem felel meg az ideális helyzetnek. A nemzeti kisebbségek keményen megküzdöttek, hogy befolyásukat növelni tudják helyi bizottságaikon és képviselő hivatalaikon keresztül. Politikai pártjaik a második világháború végétől működnek (Kühl, 2001). Mégis léteznek még olyan területek, ahonnan kizárják a nemzeti kisebbségeket, még akkor is, ha intézkedéseik kiegészítik a folyamatban lévő stratégia menetét (Competence Analysis 2007).

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Azonban míg a korai években a kisebbségi pártok az emancipációs diskurzus mellett kardoskodtak, a nagyobb kiterjedésű európai integrációs diskurzus tanúja volt annak, miként helyezik át a hangsúlyt a regionális fejlesztésre (Klatt és Kühl, 1999). Így tehát, az évek során folytatott bizalomépítés egyfajta »frigyet« szült a hajdani ellenfelek között, hogy közösen állhassanak a regionális fejlesztés szolgálatába.

Ez egy olyan törekvés, melynek célja a régió átformálása haladó és modern határrégióvá, mivel még mindig periférikus szereppel bír a nemzetállamok gazdaságát tekintve. A végső cél egy olyan virágzó régió, amely versenyképes lesz az Európai Unió (EU) „új” regionalizmusában (Keating, 1998). Azonban egy olyan régióval állunk szemben, mely a »szigorú« határbiztonság hagyatékától szenved, még azzal együtt is, hogy a Schengen együttműködést 2001-ben elindították (Klatt, 2006). Így tehát, a régiót benépesítő embereknek nincs egyetlen közös identitásuk. Mindazonáltal, a bikulturalizmus mind a nemzeti kisebbségek, mind pedig egy határok nélküli egyesült Európa mindennapjaiban természetes vágyként van jelen, lévén, hogy az évszázados államhatárok rokonokat választottak el egymástól. Ezen túlmenően, egy bizonyos “európaiság” ráébresztette őket kollektív identitásukra (Competence Analysis 2007, Malloy, 2009). Ezek a tényezők az elit szereplők egy nagyobb európai integráció utáni vágyait szolgálják, mely által egy újfajta kisebbség-többség politikát hoznak létre a határrégióban. Ezt a politikát nem csak az EU kohéziós stratégiája, a Regionális Politika hangoztatja, hanem az Európai Tanács demokratizálási stratégiája is, különösen a Keretegyezmény. Az EU Strukturális Alapok játszották az indító szerepet a határokon átnyúló együttműködés kezdeményezésében, partnerségüket pedig egy euró-régió létrehozása intézményesítette. Azonban az Európai Tanács kisebbségi jogokra vonatkozó normatív keretei, a Keretegyezmény volt az, mely, ha nem is kulcsfontosságú, de mindenképpen főszerepet játszott abban, hogy a nemzeti kisebbségek részvétele biztosítva legyen ebben az együttműködésben. Így tehát, okkal érvelhetünk a mellett, hogy ezen integrációs stratégiák metszőpontjai arra mutatnak, hogy a kisebbségi jogok demokratizálási narratívája azonos irányt követ az európaizálódási narratívával ebben a határrégióban.

Habár sem az EU Regionális Politikája, sem az Európai Tanács Keretegyezménye nem rendelkezik a nemzeti kisebbségi jogokról, ezek mégis felvetik az európai integráció egyik lehetséges problémáját, éspedig az államhatárokon átnyúló együttműködést, melyek évekig elválasztották a nemzeti kisebbségeket hozzátartozóiktól. Vállvetve a kisebbségi jogok normatív kereteinek éppen zajló beépítésével, melyet mindkét nemzet-

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állam törvénybe iktatott, jelen értekezés a mellett érvel, hogy ezeknek a narratíváknak a konvergens mivolta az európai kisebbségi jogrendszer egy újfajta szemléletmódját segíti elő, mely mindeddig nem csupán a normatív kereteken alapult, hanem az európaizálódás dinamikáján is. Az európaizálódásra itt nem úgy tekintünk, mint az európai értékek kiterjesztésére, hanem, mint azok védelmét szolgáló utólagos folyamatokra egy elmélyített, befele irányuló integráció által. Jelen értekezés leírja és elemzi a dán-német határrégió újfajta kisebbség-többség politikáját, különös figyelemmel a nemzeti kisebbségek intézkedéseire és funkcióira a határrégió fejlesztési stratégiájával kapcsolatban. Bizonyítani fogjuk azt is, hogy mivel ez az újfajta kisebbség-többség politika a kisebbségi jogokban gyökerezik, valamint az európai értékek diverzitása és pluralitása központi elveinek alapján működik, nem csupán az európaizálódás dinamikájához szól, hanem egy új megvilágításba is helyezi az európai kisebbségi jogrendszert.

Klaus-Jürgen NAGEL

„FÜGGETLENSÉG EURÓPÁBAN”, EGY „SZÁZ ZÁSZLÓS EURÓPA” ÉS A „RÉGIÓK EURÓPÁJA” AVAGY „EURÓPA RÉGIÓKKAL” KÖZÖTT. AZ ÁLLAM NÉLKÜLI NEMZETEK ÉS A NYUGAT-EURÓPAI INTEGRÁCIÓ (1945-2010) KAPCSOLATÁNAK MEGFOGALMAZÁSA Az állam nélküli nemzetek képviselői Nyugat-Európában általában (de nem mindig) pozitívan állnak az Európai Integrációhoz, azonban eltérő álláspontokat foglalnak a tekintetben, hogy nemzeteik milyen szerepeket játszanak ebben a folyamatban. Értekezésem leírja, hogy az idők során miként fogalmazták meg az állam nélküli népeknek az európai integráció folyamatával való kapcsolatát Nyugat-Európában a második világháború óta, melyen belül a folytonosság és a törésvonalak felkutatására vállalkozik. A kiinduló pontot a nyugat-európai európaista mozgalom jelenti.

A proudhoni szövetségi államrendszer befolyása alatt a „perszonalista” mozgalom szolgált a „Régiók Európájának” első olvasatával. A második fejezet a „Száz zászlós Európa” (Yann Fouéré) kialakulásával foglalkozik, vagyis egy alternatíva kialakulásával az Európai Gazdasági Közösséggel szemben, mely az állam nélküli nemzetek álláspontját emeli ki, különbözik a régióktól és helyettesíti a régi államokat. A ’60-’70-es években a „tartomány lázadása” új értelmezéssel vértezte fel ezt a kapcsolatot: a

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kapitalista és az államilag ellenőrzött európai integráció ellen tiltakozó mozgalom keretében a „belső gyarmati rendszer” elleni harc néhány állam nélküli nemzet köreiben baloldali nacionalista csoportosulásokat eredményezett, (részben) új ideológiai keretekkel, az európai integráció alternatív elképzeléseinek a védelmében. Ezek az elképzelések később a zöld „a kicsi az szép” elképzelésekkel (Leopold Kohr) fonódtak össze, melyek részei egy visszájára fordított európai integrációs folyamatnak, amely a régiókra tette volna le alapjait. Mindazonáltal, az európai régiók kormányai egy merőben különböző megközelítést vetettek latba annak érdekében, hogy a régiók is bekerüljenek az újonnan alapított EU intézményesített keretébe.

Ez a „régiók Európáját” szolgáló mozgalom részben sikeres volt. Mindazonáltal a maastrichti és a Maastricht utáni intézményes szerkezetet és politikai gyakorlatot valószínűleg jobban jellemzi az „Európa régiókkal” megnevezés, amelyben az állam nélküli nemzetek nem találják meg azt a megkülönböztető elismerést, melyre jogot formálnak. Válaszként erre, míg a pártrendszer szélsőjobboldali berkeiben kialakult az (őshonos) „etnikai csoportok Európája”, addig az állam nélküli nemzetek némely nacionalista mozgalmai a „függetlenség Európában”-t fogalmazták meg, mint új célkitűzést, mely által visszatértek a nemzetállam gondolatához, mindamellett megmaradva az új Európai Unió inkluzív keretei között.

Ivan SERRANO

ALKOTMÁNYOS PREFERENCIÁK, NEMZETI IDENTITÁS ÉS VÁLASZTÓI MAGATARTÁS: A NACIONALIZMUS HÁROM KÖRE 2008 és 2009-ben vezetett két kutatás alapján jelen tanulmány elemezni próbálja a nemzeti identitás, az alkotmányos preferenciák és a választói magatartás közötti kapcsolatot Katalóniában. Kiindulásból indokolt lenne feltételezni egy szoros összefüggés meglétét a függetlenség támogatása, az exkluzív identitás érzése és a nacionalista pártok melletti szavazás között. Ennek a “kongruencia hipotézisnek” megfelelően, e három sajátságos helyzetet úgy lehetne bemutatni, mint egymást tökéletesen fedő köröket – a nacionalizmus három körét. Mindazonáltal különféle tanulmányok arra engednek következtetni, hogy ilyen nyilvánvaló kapcsolat márpedig nem létezik. Annál inkább érvényes ennek az ellentéte, vagyis szabály szerint egy összetett és sokoldalú kapcsolatokról van szó. Továbbá, Katalónia esetében az alkotmányos preferenciákat általában egy négy fokos önkormányzati skála segítségével közelítik meg (“ré-

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gió”, “autonóm közösség”, “állam a szövetségi Spanyolországon belül” és “független állam”), azonban nagyon kevés munka foglalkozik velük a függetlenségi népszavazás támogatása vagy ellenzése szempontjából. Ez az értekezés néhány bizonyítékkal szolgál a nemzeti identitás és a választói magatartás kapcsolatára, tekintettel az alkotmányos preferenciákra mindkettőt illetően, a négy fokos önkormányzati skálára, valamint a népszavazás kérdésére. E kettős elemzés eredményeiből kiindulva számos kérdést megtárgyalunk, kezdve azzal, hogy a “kongruencia hipotézis” egy hasznos eszköz a katalán eset értelmezésében, egészen azokig a jól megalapozott hozzászólásokig, melyek az ún. “kettős identitás” fontosságát hangsúlyozzák; mindezek által szándékunk megmagyarázni a különféle alkotmányos opciók eltérő támogatási szintjeit. Ez a kiegészítő megközelítés hozzájárulhat annak megértéséhez, hogy az önkormányzat kérdése – távol attól, hogy eleget tegyen egy konfliktusmentes megoldás feltételeinek egy decentralizált államban – miért maradt meg a politikai napirend lényeges pontjaként a katalán és a spanyol politikában.

SZILÁGYI István

SPANYOLORSZÁG: AZ AUTONÓMIA MODELLTŐL A SZÖVETSÉGI ÁLLAMRENDSZERIG. KATALÓNIA ESETE A huszonegyedik század a globalizáció kora, a különböző kultúrák, civilizációk és identitások találkozóhelye, ahol új politikai rendszereket és kormányformákat vesznek fel az egyetemes modellek lajstromába. A szervezetlen nemzetközi rendszert, mely számos résztvevőt és szereplőt foglal magába, szervezetté alakítják, hálózatok és irányzatok formájában működtetik. A “kormány nélküli kormányzás” helyzetét és a klasszikus regionalizmus intézményes megoldásait kiegészítik az új regionalizmus többszintű kormányzási struktúrái. Átalakították, majd pedig végleg eltűnt az a westfáliai típusú nemzetközi rendszer, amely az állam szereplőinek teljhatalmán alapult. A homogenitást magában hordozó 18-19-edik századi „nemzetállam” érvényessége megszűnt.

Az integrációs tendenciákkal és az új regionalizmus szervezkedéseivel egyidejűleg, a területi elvet felváltva, az etnoregionalizmust érintő dezintegrációs folyamatok felerősödtek. Ezek újból multinacionális államok megalakulásához vezettek Közép-Kelet-Európa és a volt Szovjetunió területén. Felszínre került az etnikai kisebbségek védelmének a kérdése is, s így a kisebbségpolitika reflektorfénybe került.

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A különféle identitások találkozása és együttélése Európa régióiban megváltoztatta az állam, nemzet és nemzetiség „szentháromságának” klasszikus értelmét. 1992-ben Juan José Linz a következőket jelentette ki az etnikailag sokszínű Spanyolországgal kapcsolatban: „Spanyolország ma minden spanyol államát jelenti; a lakosság többségének nemzetállam, a kisebbség számára azonban csupán állam, nem nemzet”. Spanyolországban megvalósult az állam (a spanyol monarchia), a történelmi népek (baszkok, gallegók, katalánok, valenciaiak) és a nem történelmi régiók (Kantábria, Asztúria, Extramadura, Madrid, Murcia, La Rioja, stb.) demokratikusan uralt szimbiózisa. Mindez egy olyan országban ment végbe, ahol a lakosság 20%-a katalán, 6%-a baszk, 2,5%-a gallegó és 2%-a valenciai.

Említésre méltó, hogy a spanyol új demokrácia az autonómia – 17 önkormányzati közösségre alapozott modell – megalkotásával fontos szerepet játszott egy százéves probléma megoldásában. Az 1979-83 között érvénybe léptetett rendszer még mindig életképes. A stabilitás azonban nem egyenlő a mozgás hiányával. Az államban uralkodó alkotmányos rendszer állandó változásokon megy keresztül. 1983 és 2010 között egy előzmények nélküli decentralizációs és demokratizálási folyamat ment vége Spanyolországban. Ennek következményeképpen az autonómiák állama jelenleg a szövetségi rendszer jegyeit hordozza magán.

A részleges föderalizmusból a teljes föderalizmusba való átmenet a ’90-es évek második felétől felgyorsult és 2006 júliusában Katalónia autonóm státusának elfogadásában csúcsosodott ki. A „független nemzet” státusát elnyerő önkormányzati terület, melynek fővárosa Barcelona, egy életképes alternatívát mutatott fel Spanyolországtól való elszakadását illetően.

A Spanyolországban és Katalóniában végbement folyamatok és változások olyan következményekhez vezettek, melyek hasznára váltak az autonómiáért küzdő közép- és kelet-európai kisebbségeknek. A „kulturális nemzet” gondolatának égisze alatt kieszközölt spanyol és katalán megoldás felvetette a modell érvényességének a kérdését a multinacionális közép-európai államokban élő kisebbségekre nézve. A politikai önkormányzás, a területi autonómia, a nemzeti identitás megőrzése és az anyanyelv használata közötti kapcsolat, valamint a kormányzási rendszer megalkotása és fenntartása mind felhívták a figyelmet az EU-ban megvalósított effajta államépítési modell alkalmazhatóságára.

Nagyon súlyos problémákról lévén szó, egy összehasonlító elemzésre lesz szükség; a jelzett kérdésekre való válaszok azonban meghaladják jelen tanulmány kereteit.

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Goran BANDOV

A NEMZETI ÉS ETNIKAI KISEBBSÉGI KÖZÖSSÉGEK ANYANYELVÉNEK VÉDELME A HORVÁT KÖZTÁRSASÁGBAN Délkelet-Európa akadémiai diskurzusában a nyelv központi szerepet játszik a nemzeti identitás kulturális dimenziójának védelmében, s további erős befolyással bír a kisebbségi csoportok tagjainak nemzeti politikai identitására nézve (csoportidentitás szempontjából). Ez a diskurzus felismeri az anyanyelv fontosságát, mint az elitek építőanyagát a nemzetépítés folyamatában, s mint a délkelet-európai nemzetközi kapcsolatok független anyagát. Az anyanyelv védelméül szolgáló intézkedések végre nem hajtása közvetlen támadásként értelmezhető az illető kisebbségi csoport nemzeti identitása ellen; ugyanakkor pedig ez egy hatékony stimulus az etnopolitikai konfliktusok továbbgyűrűzésére is. Éppen ezért a széleskörű anyanyelvvédelmi mechanizmusok kivitelezése alapvető fontossággal bír az efféle konfliktusok elkerülésében.

A Horvát Köztársaság területén a nemzeti és etnikai kisebbségi közösségeket érintő anyanyelvvédelmi rendszert a második világháború utáni időszaktól kezdődően sikerült hatékonyan gyakorlatba ültetni. Továbbá, ezek a védelmi intézkedések tagadhatatlanul megerősödtek a demokratizmusra való áttérés időszakában, valamint Horvátországnak a ’90-es években kezdődő Jugoszláviától való függetlené válása során.

A folyamat maga jelentős hatással volt a kisebbségi csoportok védelmének struktúrájára és kiterjesztésére, legfőképpen, mivel számos új kisebbségi csoportot eredményezett. Horvátország függetlenségének megszerzése előtt magyar, olasz, cseh, szlovák, ukrán és ruszin kisebbségi csoportoknak biztosítottak védelmet. A függetlenség megszerzése utáni időszakban számos más csoportokra is kiterjesztették a védelmi intézkedéseket, beleértve a szerbeket és más volt jugoszláviai csoportokat. Jelenleg 22 különféle nemzeti és etnikai csoport részesül ilyen támogatásban.

A nyelvvédelmi rendszer Horvátországban elsősorban magába foglalja a nemzeti kisebbség nyelvén történő tanuláshoz való jogot és a kisebbség nyelvének használati jogát közigazgatási és jogi szervek jelenlétében. Ezeket a jogokat egy sor alkotmányos és jogi norma ismeri el és szavatolja, melyeket az európai és horvát törvényes szervek hatékonyan ellenőriznek. A kisebbségi oktatás a nyelvvédelem érvényre juttatásának a leghatékonyabb módja, mely a következő modellek révén működik: A

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– minden tanórát anyanyelven tartanak meg; B – a társadalomtudományok tananyagait anyanyelven adják le, a természettudományokat pedig horvát nyelven; C – minden tanórát horvát nyelven tartanak meg, melyet kötelező kiegészíteni az illető nemzeti kisebbségi csoport nyelvét, hagyományát és kultúráját oktató tanórák megtartásával.

Michael HORNSBY–Tomasz WICHERKIEWICZ

LENNI VAGY NEM LENNI (KISEBBSÉGNEK)?

A LENGYELORSZÁGI KASUBOK ESETE Amikor Lengyelország 2009. február 12-én aláírta a Regionális Vagy Kisebbségi Nyelvek Európai Kartáját, a tizenöt felsorolt nyelv közül egyetlenegy szerepelt kisebbségi nyelvként. (Látszólag) a kasub volt az egyetlen regionális nyelv. A Karta eredeti, 1992-es megszövegezése természetesen nem tért ki a kisebbségi és a regionális nyelv közötti különbségre (Woerhrling, 2005: 54). Így Lengyelország ratifikálása, bár teljesen megegyezik a Karta eredeti kiadásával, mégis vitatható a Karta elveinek alkalmazását illetően.

Jelen értekezés megkísérli feltárni azokat a feszült helyzeteket, melyek a Karta törvénybe iktatása nyomán keletkeztek Lengyelországban. A legnyilvánvalóbb súrlódási felületet a kasub nyelv kiszemelése képezte a többi, kevésbé széleskörűen használt nyelv rovására. Mindezt az egyik szakértő előadó által ismertetett értelmi összefüggésben fogjuk tárgyalni, szoros kapcsolatban a Karta törvénybe iktatásával Lengyelországban. Kevésbé nyilvánvaló, azonban egyaránt fontos azoknak a konfliktusban álló nyelvi ideológiáknak a meghatározása, melyek itt közrejátszanak. Amenynyiben Lengyelországban minden kisebbségi nyelvet (kivéve a kasubot) a “nyelv és identitás” ideológia korlátai közé helyezünk, úgy a területi vezérelvet [avagy a “nyelv és terület” ideológiát (Myhill, 1999)] figyelembe véve, a kasub nyelv nem csupán a hátrányos ideológiák összecsapásának elkerülhetetlen vezérfonala lesz, hanem ez a felosztás úgyszintén elavultnak minősül a történelem olyan szakaszában, amikor a kasub nyelven beszélők területének csupán három körzetében a lakosság több, mint 50%-a rendszeresen beszéli a nyelvet (Mordawski, 2005: 56; Nestor és Hickey, 2009). Kiindulva ezekből a feltételekből, értekezésünk utolsó fejezete megkérdőjelezi a kasubokat érintő nyelvi tervezés hatékonyságát.

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MARÁCZ László

MAGYAR KISEBBSÉGGEL RENDELKEZŐ KÖZÉPÉS KELET-EURÓPAI ÁLLAMOK NYELVPOLITIKÁI: A NYELVI JOGOK VÉDELMÉNEK IMPLIKÁCIÓI AZ EURÓPAI UNIÓS NEMZETI KISEBBSÉGEK ESETÉBEN A huszadik századi békeszerződéseknek köszönhetően, a magyar kisebbségek hét külön államban élnek Közép- és Kelet-Európa-szerte: Szlovákia (500.000), Románia (1.930.000), Szerbia (400.000), Horvátország (30.000), Szlovénia (20.000) és Ausztria (5.000). A közép- és kelet-európai hagyománynak megfelelően, az etnikai identitás legfontosabb jellemzője az anyanyelv. Így ezek az országok valójában többnyelvű államok, azonban nem mindegyikük tartja magát jogilag is ebbe a kategóriába tartozónak, hanem inkább egynyelvű nemzetállamnak. Az utóbbiak esetében a magyar kisebbségek a “kizáró politikával” szembesülnek, mely szerint a megkülönböztető nyelvi törvények korlátozzák a magyar nyelv használatát a hivatalos és nyilvános helyeken. Mindez polarizált és megosztott társadalmak kialakulásához vezet az etnolingvisztika törésvonalai mentén.

Jelen tanulmány összehasonlítja az exkluzív és inkluzív nyelvpolitikát a magyar kisebbséggel rendelkező közép- és kelet-európai többnyelvű államokban. Megvizsgáljuk ezeknek az országoknak a jogrendszerét, tekintettel a nemzeti kisebbségek nyelvének státusára és használatára. Következtetésképpen levonjuk, hogy a magyar nyelv helyzete az érintett országokban két kategóriába sorolható: (1) Szerbia, Szlovénia, Horvátország és Ausztria; (2) Szlovákia, Románia és Ukrajna. Az első csoportban a kisebbségi nyelv a többségi nyelvvel egyenlő jogi státussal rendelkezik, beleértve a hivatali környezetben való használatot is. Ez különösen igaz a Szerbiában elhelyezkedő Vajdaság régiójára, ahol a hivatalos politika is támogatja a többnyelvű, multikulturális társadalmat. A második csoportban a kisebbségi nyelvek alá vannak rendelve a hivatalos államnyelvnek, korlátozva vannak a hivatalos körökben, valamint további követelmények és feltételek határozzák meg használatukat. Ennélfogva, míg a második eset nem egyezik az EU demokratikus szabványaival, az első eset tiszteletben tartja ezeket a szabványokat.

Figyelemre méltó ez a csoportosítás, mivel az összes szóban forgó ország alá van vetve az európaizálódás folyamatának. Mind a hét fennebb említett ország tagja az Európai Tanácsnak (ET) és ratifikálta a Nemzeti Kisebbségek Védelmének Keretegyezményét, valamint a Regionális vagy Kisebbségi Nyelvek Európai Kartáját; ami pedig leginkább lényeges, hogy négy ország (Ausztria, Szlovénia, Románia, Szlovákia) ezek közül tagja is

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az Uniónak. Ez utóbbiakból két ország, Románia és Szlovákia, mégsem tartozik abba a csoportba, ahol a demokratikus értékek és szabványok kielégítőek lennének. Mindebből az következik, hogy az uniós tagság még nem garancia a nemzeti kisebbségek nyelvi jogainak védelmére. Tehát, megfigyelhető egy ellentmondás a nyelvi diverzitást és a demokratikus értékeket ünneplő uniós elmélet és a tagállamok gyakorlata között. Kiderül, hogy az Unióban nem állnak rendelkezésre hatékony ellenőrző és megtorló mechanizmusok, amikor a nemzeti kisebbségek nyelvi jogai csorbát szenvednek, s a többnyelvűség gyakorlását kitiltják a nyilvános és hivatalos helyekről.

A tényállás szerint, a második csoport államai nem csupán megsértik az emberi jogokat, hanem alá is ássák az Unió kohézióját, valamint hozzájárulnak a magyar kisebbségekkel rendelkező államok és a magyar rokonállam közötti konfliktusok elmélyüléséhez (ld.: Brubaker é. m. 2006, Csergő, 2007). Ez azt jelenti, hogy újra kell gondolnunk az ellenőrző és megtorló mechanizmusokat az Unió jogrendszerében. Egy lényeges előrelépés lenne az Unió számára az Európai Tanács Keretegyezményének és a Nyelvi Kartának, mint szintjelző rendszernek az elfogadása, s ezeknek beépítése az uniós jogrendszerbe. Így lehetővé válna az ezeket áthágó államok megtorlása.

Mykola RIABCHUK

A KÉTÉRTELMŰSÉG MEGÉRTÉSE: A KISEBBSÉGTÖBBSÉG ÖSSZEFÜGGÉSEINEK ÚJRAFOGALMAZÁSA EGY POSZTSZOVJET ORSZÁGBAN Jelen tanulmány megvizsgálja a többszörösen összetett és kétértelmű többség-kisebbség viszonyokat a posztszovjet Ukrán Köztársaságban. Ez a tanulmányban vitatott kétértelműség javarészt a szovjet hagyomány szerinti önkényes etnikai besorolásban gyökerezik, amely az emberek etnikai, kulturális és nyelvi önazonosítása helyett a szülők etnikumához való merev ragaszkodáson alapul. Egy ilyen formális megközelítésmód teszi az ukránokat többségi nemzetté saját országukban, s ezzel egyidejűleg minősíti vissza az oroszokat a többi kisebbség státusának szintjére, mint a lengyelek, zsidók, krími tatárok, magyarok, románok és sokan mások. A formális és önkényes besorolás nem csupán eltorzítja az etnolingvisztikai valóságot, hanem úgyszintén eleve kizárja az illető területen a megfelelő politika hatékony érvényesítését.

Elsősorban figyelmen kívül hagyja azt a nyilvánvaló tényt, hogy az ukránok jelentékeny része nagymértékben el van oroszosítva, melyből kifolyólag Ukrajna számos szegletében nem az oroszul, hanem az ukránul

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beszélő ukránok képezik a kulturális és nyelvi kisebbséget, akik, más kisebbségekhez hasonlóan, állami támogatottságra és védelemre szorulnak kulturális és nyelvi jogaik érdekében.

Másodsorban, ugyanilyen alapon, figyelmen kívül hagyja, hogy az oroszok és az oroszosított ukránok azok, akik Ukrajna több részében is szilárd többséggé nőtték ki magukat, s aligha szorulnak bármilyen segítségre, ellentétben a társadalmilag hátrányos helyzetbe juttatott és kulturálisan marginalizált ukránul beszélő kisebbséggel. Egyfelől, az oroszul beszélő kulturális csoport kijátszva és elégedetlenül érzi magát a túlzottan önkényes és kétértelmű “kisebbségi” státus miatt. Másfelől pedig, ez a státus mentesíti őket minden tulajdonképpeni kisebbségekkel szembeni felelősségük alól, beleértve az ukránul beszélőket is; továbbá pedig, megerősíti elkötelezettségüket egy laissez-fair típusú kulturális és nyelvi politika iránt, amely az ő malmukra hajtja a vizet, mint leginkább kompetens játékosok.

Harmadsorban pedig, az orosz/oroszul beszélő csoport által felkarolt laissez-fair politika, mely mintegy válaszként érkezik erre a kétértelműségre, megmutatva a valódi fölény megőrzésének egyik járható útját, különösen ártalmas az ukrajnai kis létszámú kisebbségekre nézve, akik sem hasznot nem tudnak húzni a “névleges nemzetiség” jelképes státusából (mint az ukránok), se nem támaszkodhatnak a tényleges társadalmi és kulturális fölényre, mint az oroszok/oroszul beszélők.

A tanulmány kijelentése szerint a kétértelműség eloszlatásának egyetlen módja, ha megfelelő politikát állítanak össze az ukrajnai kisebbségek számára, s harmonikussá teszik a két többségi csoport – ukránok/ukránul beszélők és oroszok/oroszul beszélők – közötti feszült helyzeteket, melyek nem illeszkednek a hagyományos kisebbség/többség paradigmába.

Andrei AVRAM

A GAGAUZOK TERÜLETI AUTONÓMIÁJA A MOLDOVAI KÖZTÁRSASÁGBAN: ESETTANULMÁNY 1994 decemberében a Moldovai Köztársaság országgyűlése jóváhagyta a Gagauz Föld Különleges Jogi Státusára Vonatkozó Törvényt, ezzel formálisan véget vetve a központi kormány és az ország déli részén fekvő, önmagát kikiáltó Gagauz Köztársaság között. A gagauzoknak területi autonómiát ítéltek oda, amely majdnem lefedte a teljes belpolitikai hatáskört, melyen felül egy regionális törvényhozó és végrehajtó testületet is biztosítottak számukra. Mivelhogy Transznisztria szakadár régiójában a Moldovai Köztársaság további konfliktusoknak is részese, e békességes

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megoldást a „józan ész látványos győzelmeként” köszöntötték (Troebst, 2001: 76). Mindazonáltal, egy autonómia modell hatékonysága elsősorban annak a későbbi megvalósításától és az állam egészét érintő következményeitől függ (Protsyk/Rigamonti, 2007: 1).

Jelen tanulmány célja rávilágítani a gagauz területi autonómia sikerességére, melynek érdekében elemzés alá vetjük az autonómia gagauz identitást növelő horderejét, valamint azt, hogy milyen mértékben lehet (de) stabilizáló tényezőnek tekinteni azt a Moldovai Köztársaságra nézve. Gagauz összefüggésekben vizsgálva, az első kritérium lényegesnek tűnik, mivel az etnikai alapú területi autonómia törvényessége kapcsolatban áll a nemzeti kisebbség saját nemzetépítésének állami szint alatt gyakorolt jogával (Kymlicka 2001), holott a régióban tevékenykedő egyes politikai eliteket azzal vádolták meg, hogy sokkal elszántabban pártolják a szovjet identitás megőrzését, mint a gagauz nemzeti létet (Nantoi, 2009: 6). A második kritérium magába foglalja annak vizsgálatát, hogy a gagauz kollektív jogok területi egységhez való rendelése mennyire járul hozzá egy szeparatista vonal felbukkanásának a lehetőségéhez. Kijelentették, hogy a kockázat fennáll Kelet-Európa minden új demokráciájának esetében (Hughes/Sasse, 2002: 9), melyet a moldovai analitikusok időnként felemlegetnek, köszönhetően a gagauzok és a transznisztriai hatóságok közti együttműködésnek ((Praporşcic, 2008), valamint az előbbiek azon követeléseinek, hogy a moldáv államot föderációba egyesítsék (Gherasim, 2010). Ugyanakkor a területi autonómiára úgy is tekintenek, mint az etnikailag sokszínű gyenge államok potenciális „vitaminjára” (Kolstø, 2001: 214) – ezt a hipotézist nem lehet figyelmen kívül hagyni, főként amióta a gagauz szakértők kihangsúlyozzák népük vágyát, hogy hozzájáruljanak az ország egységéhez (Angheli, 2009). Így tehát, értekezésem kísérletet tesz a gagauz autonómia 1994 utáni fejlődésének bemutatására, hogy sikerességének mértékét felmérhessük, mint egyaránt alkalmazható modellt a kisebbségi jogok kezelésére és az állam megszilárdításának helyreállítására.

Ana PAVLOVIC

EURÓPAI KISEBBSÉGEK VÉDELME NAPJAINKBAN: ÖSSZHANGOK ÉS ELLENTÉTEK A NEMZETI ÉS NEMZETKÖZI TÖRVÉNYEK KÖZÖTT A tanulmány bevezetőjében a szerző előhozakodik a kisebbségvédelem történelmével, röviden felidézve legfontosabb momentumait. Ezen felül megmagyarázza, mit jelentenek manapság a kisebbségi jogok, majd

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kihangsúlyozza a legjelentősebb aktuális nemzetközi megállapodásokat, melyeket az Egyesült Nemzetek, az Európai Tanács, az Európai Unió, valamint az EBESZ égisze alatt kötöttek meg.

A tanulmány fő része az állam és a nemzetközi közösség között húzódó feszültséggel foglalkozik, valamint azzal, hogy ez az ellentét miként járul hozzá a kisebbségi kérdéshez. Vajon az, hogy az állam többrendbeli felelősségét is átruházza a nemzetközi közösség más tagjaira, a régiókra, azt jelenti, hogy a jövőben ennek létezése konceptuális szempontból meg fog szűnni? A szerző megmagyarázza, hogy ez várhatóan miért nem fog soha bekövetkezni, s az államnak miért kellene erősnek és hatékonynak lennie.

Ez azt jelenti, hogy egy államnak demokratikusnak és felelősségteljesnek kell lennie, amely így megfelelő modellként állhat Közép- és Kelet-Európa régiói előtt. A globalizáció számos kihívást emel a kormányok elé, a hajdani államelmélet többé már nem elégséges; így az államoknak át kell értelmezniük önmagukat a túlélés érdekében. Itt az egyik kulcskérdés a felső szintek egyes hatáskörei átruházásának szükségszerűsége a középszintekre, amely magába foglalja az önrendelkezés és az autonómia különböző formáit. Ez pontosan az a kérdéskör, amely új megvilágításba helyezi a kisebbségi kérdést, kétségek közt hagyva a felől, hogy egyes országokban miért zajlik le a folyamat gördülékenyen, míg mások hevesen küzdenek ellene.

Jelen értekezés vezérgondolata rámutat arra, hogy manapság, a huszonegyedik században, amikor számos újonnan felbukkanó követeléssel találjuk magunkat szemben, a kérdéskör kapcsán megfogalmazott gondolatainknak változniuk és fejlődniük kell, a mindenkori helyzethez mérten. Míg a nemzetközi szervezetek nyilvánvalóan továbbra is jobb megoldások után kutatnak, a kisebbségpolitika elsődleges felelőssége maga az állam marad.

SARNYAI Csaba Máté–PAP Tibor

SZEMÉLYES AUTONÓMIA ÉS/VAGY NEMZETI TANÁCSOK A VAJDASÁGBAN A huszonegyedik század egyik legnagyobb kihívása a globális társadalmi kockázatok helyi kezelése; mindezek közül pedig a legfontosabb, hogy egyes érdekeknek törvényes úton érvényt lehessen szerezni. Ennek lényeges eleme az egyre gyarapodó szavazóréteg bevonása a döntéshozatalba. Mindazonáltal, manapság ez háttérbe szorul a jelenlegi megterhelő gazdasági kihívásoknak köszönhetően. Úgy tűnik, a kérdés hangsúlya áthelyeződött. Ennek a váltásnak az oka az ún. választói demokrácia látszata a volt keleti tömbben, valamint az általános választójog elterjedése. Ezek a

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gyengeségek a demokrácia megalapítására hivatott intézmények belső logikájából származnak. A legszembetűnőbb problémát a jelenleg működésben levő parlamenti rendszereken belül a kisebbségi érdekek kifejezésre juttatásának nehézségei jelentik. Az Európai Unió kitűzte magának a célt, hogy megőrizze a tagállamok összetartó erejét. Ez a regionális alapokon fekvő politikai törekvés rávilágított a kérdés néhány köznapi (NUTS 2) megoldására. Ide tartozik pl. a néhány évtizede tartó brit, spanyol, belga és olasz etnikai és nemzeti kisebbségi kihívásainak kezelése.

Az új évezred beköszöntésével a problémamegoldó modellek univerzálisabbak és példamutatóbbak lesznek, globális szinten követhetőbbé válnak.

Némi idő elteltével ezek a modellek az EU-ba felvételt kérelmező országok számára irányadó alapkövetelmények lesznek a demokráciát illetően. Többek között ez motiválja Szerbiát is, amikor „EU-képes” válaszokkal szeretne szolgálni az etnikailag sokszínű népességi összetételéből, valamint – a területi és személyes autonómiák helyi formáinak köszönhetően – heterogén földrajzi szerkezetéből adódó kihívásokra. Egy példa az előbbire a vajdaság területi szervezése (az ún. statútum-vita), mely egy alulról indított kezdeményezés; az utóbbira pedig felhozható a nemzeti kisebbségek képviselhetőségének a kérdése, melyek külön kulturális világokat alkotnak (az ún. Nemzeti Tanácsok).

Ez az értekezés a magyarok esetét használja fel Szerbiában, hogy rávilágítson a probléma politikai következményeire és egy társadalmi-elméleti szerkezeten belül történő orvoslására.

A következőket szeretnénk külön-külön tárgyalni: 1. olyan intézmények, melyek politikai kompromisszumok eredményeként jöttek létre, vagy ezután fognak létrejönni; 2. ezek fogadtatása a politikai diskurzusokban; 3. politológiai következményeik, melyek levezethetők a hosszú távú perspektívák normatív jellegéből: a partner nemzetek átalakulása monolit nemzetállamokból egyenrangú közösséggé.

Vizsgálatunk során párhuzamot vonunk a fent említett európai példák megoldásai és a szűkebb környezetet érintő nyugat-balkán törekvések között. Összehasonlításunk alkalmával megkíséreljük bemutatni azokat az intézményes lehetőségeket, melyek a politikailag jelentős és a maradékot képviselő kisebbségek különféle helyzeteiből adódnak. Úgyszintén kifejtjük a kisebbség szerepvállalásának (hűség, tiltakozás, távozás) elméleti és gyakorlati besorolási lehetőségeit.

Mindez alatt szem előtt tartjuk, hogy a felmerülő helyi megoldásoknak szolgálniuk kell a huszonegyedik század globális kihívásainak irányadó intézményes előkészítéseit is.

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SZÖCSIK Edina

BARÁT, ELLENSÉG, VAGY EGYSZERŰEN KÖZÖMBÖS? EU KONDICIONALITÁS A KISEBBSÉGVÉDELEM TERÜLETÉN AZ ETNIKAI KISEBBSÉGI PÁRTOK KÖVETELÉSEINEK FÉNYÉBEN Számos tanulmány elemezte, hogy mennyire sikerült az EU-nak egy kompetensebb kisebbségvédelem kialakítása Közép- és Kelet-Európa országaiban az EU tagság kondicionalitása révén. Az irodalomban túlsúlyban lévő vélemények szerint az EU kondicionalitás általában véve hatékonynak mondható. Mindazonáltal, a kisebbségvédelem területén kritika érte az EU kondicionalitását, mivel hiányoztak az EU belső alapítványai, a gyakorlatban következetlenül jártak el, továbbá pedig az Európai Bizottság monitorizálási folyamata sem volt átlátható. A tanulmány egy új szögből tárja fel az EU kondicionalitását a kisebbségvédelem vonatkozásában.

Leíró írásmódban közöl, s célja felmérni, hogy az EU kisebbségvédelmi feltételei milyen mértékben kapcsolódnak az etnikai kisebbségi pártok követelményeihez a felvételezés folyamatában. Az EU kondicionalitás vajon támogatta, vagy aláásta az etnikai kisebbségi pártok követeléseit?

Ez a kérdés nagyon lényeges, mivel számos esetben az etnikai kisebbségi pártok látják el a kisebbségi nemzetek politikai képviseletét; ők a leginkább fontos és legitim szereplők, akik a kisebbségvédelmet minél magasabb szinten szeretnék megszilárdítani a közép-kelet-európai országokon belül. Példának okáért, összehasonlítjuk a romániai magyar kisebbségi párt (RMDSZ) követeléseit az EU magyar kisebbséget érintő feltételeivel, alapul véve a két szereplő legmérvadóbb dokumentumainak tartalmi elemzését. Az eredmények azt mutatják, hogy az EU az RMDSZ-nek csupán a restitúcióra és a magyar nyelv használatára vonatkozó követeléseit támogatta, melyből kimaradt a magyar nyelven való oktatás és a közigazgatás megreformálása. ŢIPŢER Edina-Ildikó

A SZÉKELY AUTONÓMIA KEZDEMÉNYEZÉSEI Jelen tanulmány célja felmérni a székely autonómia 1989-2009 közötti kezdeményezéseinek megvalósíthatóságát Yash Ghai kilenc kritériuma alapján. A konfliktus a román többség és egy magyar kisebbségi csoport, a székelyek között alakult ki, mely utóbbiak visszaigénylik területi autonómiához való jogukat, hogy megőrizhessék nemzeti és kulturális

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identitásukat egy olyan régióban, ahol ők képezik a lakosság többségét. A konceptuális szerkezetet, melybe a tanulmány ágyazódik, az autonómia fogalma és Yash Ghai kilenc kritériuma alkotja. Elemezve az autonómia törvényjavaslatait, a statútumokat és az előterjesztéseket, arra a következtetésre jutottam, hogy ezek nem minden kritériumnak tettek eleget. Következésképpen, az a meglátásom, hogy bár az autonómiatervezet jelentős fejlődésen ment keresztül az évek során, az mégsem volt elég a teljes sikerhez, s további igazításokat igényel. Mindazonáltal, amennyiben az általam részletezett gyenge pontok korrigálásra kerülnek és a kritériumok elégtétele több figyelemben részesül, úgy látványosan megnőhetnek az esélyek a sikerre.

BODÓ Barna–SZÁSZ Alpár Zoltán

EGY RÉGIÓ DEKONSTRUKCIÓJA: A BÁNSÁG A Bánság Európa egy különleges régiója. Modern történelme 1716ban kezdődik, amikor visszahódítják a törököktől, és a Habsburg Birodalom részeként különleges státust nyer el. Ez azt jelentette, hogy a régió az említett birodalom részévé vált, anélkül, hogy annak területi közigazgatási rendszerét át kellett volna vennie. Ez a különleges helyzet körülbelül száz évig állt fenn, s egy meglehetősen egyedi gyarmatosító politikai gyakorlattal járt együtt a bécsi udvar részéről, mely a kontinensen eddig páratlan etnikai diverzitást eredményezett. Ezek a folyamatok és következményeik még mindig befolyással vannak a régió helyzetére és az azt benépesítő nemzeti kisebbségek életére egyaránt.

Tanulmányunk első célja meghatározni azokat a tényezőket, amelyek jelenleg formálják az előző bekezdésben tárgyalt (főként) történelmi elemek révén kialakult regionális diskurzusokat. Szükségtelen mondanunk, hogy valóban számtalan ilyen diskurzus létezik. Mindazonáltal, a román többség által átvett diskurzus a Bánság történelmét jellemző alapértékekre összpontosít, anélkül, hogy megnevezné a nemzeti kisebbségekhez kötődő elemeket. Amint körbejárjuk ezt a kisebbségi vonatkozású elemektől mentes diskurzust, a bánsági kisebbségek jövője kérdőjelessé válik számunkra. Tanulmányunk második célja empirikus bizonyítékokkal alátámasztani és elemzés alá vetni ezt a folyamatot.

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Sébastien GOBERT

EGY SIKERTÖRTÉNET KULISSZÁI MÖGÖTT. KISEBBSÉGVÉDELEM LITVÁNIÁBAN 1990-es függetlenségi kikiáltása óta Litvániát mindenki felmagasztalja nemzeti kisebbségeinek konszenzus alapú integrációja miatt. Egy kedvező demográfiai helyzetnek köszönhetően a kormány már 1989-ben foganatosította az ún. „zéró opciót”, amely egy inkluzív jellegű állampolgárisági törvény. A kisebbséget képviselő intézmények és média továbbfejlődése lehetővé tette Litvániának, hogy felülkerekedjen a legtöbb olyan problémán, melyekkel Észtország és Lettország is szembesül.

Mégis, e formális integráció ellenére, bizonyos feszültségek jelen vannak még a kisebbségek között, főként a lengyel közösség köreiben, amely a legnagyobb, földrajzilag legkoncentráltabb és legvitatottabb etnikai csoport. Az útleveleken és utcai jelzőtáblákon szereplő lengyel nevek “litvanizálása”, valamint a médiában felbukkanó rendszeres beszámolók diszkriminatív esetekről meg-megújuló vita tárgyát képezik, ill. bizonyítékul szolgálnak egy jól sikerült formális integráció és az előítélet és diszkrimináció gyakorlatának fennmaradása közötti ellentmondásra, amely a többség/kisebbség kapcsolatában áll fenn. Továbbá, egy exkluzív kettős állampolgársági törvény új keletű bevezetése, amely a litván etnikumú lakosság csupán egy részére vonatkozik, rávilágított az „etnosz” és „démosz” közötti strukturális megosztottságra az ország saját polgárainak körében.

Jelen kutatás kifejti az időbeli eltolódást a litván kisebbségek sikeres formális integrációja és a között, hogy az ország nyilvános diskurzusában ezek még mindig “idegen” előjelű státussal szerepelnek. A tanulmány megkísérel néhány értelmezési fogódzóval szolgálni arra, hogy az inkluzív és toleráns integrációs szerkezetnek miért nem sikerült még elérnie a kisebbségek tényleges bevonását. A tanulmány a lengyel közösség esetére fekteti a hangsúlyt. Megvizsgálom a kisebbségi integrációra vonatkozó törvényes rendelkezéseket mind hazai, mind nemzetközi mértékkel mérve, valamint áttekintem az állampolgárság különböző elméleti elgondolásait is. Mindezt követően, megvizsgálom a legkényesebb kérdéseket, melyek a lengyel etnikumúak Litvánia közéletében való részvételét érintik, valamint elemzés alá vetem azokat a rövid és hosszú távú következményeket, amelyek a litván közéletbe való hiányos integrálásukból erednek.

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MAJTÉNYI Balázs–PAP László András

KISEBBSÉGI KORMÁNYFORMÁK A GYAKORLATBAN – MAGYAR TAPASZTALATOK AZ ADAT- ÉS KISEBBSÉGVÉDELEM ÖSSZEFÜGGÉSEINEK BONYOLULTSÁGÁRÓL A Magyar Köztársaság szabályozó kontextusát szem előtt tartva, jelen értekezés célja megvizsgálni a kényes adatok védelme és a kisebbségi jogok megszegése elleni védelem kapcsolatát az etnikai adatok szabad forgalmával, mely szükséges a további jogok akadálytalan odaítélése érdekében. Más szóval, kísérletet teszünk olyan esetek meghatározására, melyek során különféle alapvető jogok összeütközésbe kerülhetnek, valamint megvizsgáljuk azokat a körülményeket, melyek között a személyes adatok védelméhez való jog korlátozása indokolt, mivel segít megkülönböztetni a diszkrimináció tilalmához kapcsolódó alapvető jogot a hátrányos helyzetben lévő csoportokkal való tetszőleges bánásmódtól (jóváhagyás vagy pozitív diszkrimináció), továbbá pedig védi a nemzeti és etnikai kisebbségek alkotmányosan biztosított jogait. Bár az ilyen esetek gyakran táplálják a fentebb említetteknél sokkal alapvetőbb jogok közti konfliktust, azonban minden korlátozás törvényes célja az egyéni alapvető jogok védelme. Mindemellett, a tetszőleges bánásmód eseteiben a korlátozás mindig az állampolgár jóváhagyásán alapul.

Pieter H. van der PLANK

A KOLLEKTÍV KISEBBSÉGI JOGOK TÖRTÉNELME EURÓPAI TÖRTÉNELMI KONTEXTUSBAN Az autonómia egy hagyományos megoldás volt, melyet az állami és egyházi hatóságok azért foganatosítottak, hogy megoldják az etnikai diverzitással kapcsolatos problémákat, melyet túlnyomó többségben a vallási felekezetek képviseltek. Habár a XVII. századi Ancien Régime-k (régi kormányformák) általában kényszert és erőszakot alkalmaztak a felségjoguk alá tartozó tárgyak közötti homogenitás fenntartása érdekében, a XVIII. században ez a politika többé nem biztosította a stabilitást és az irányítást.

A politikai határok túlzottan gyakori áthelyezése szakadár felekezeteket hozott magával az állami felügyelet alatt, melyek más (állam)vallásokhoz kötelezték el magukat. A felvilágosodás kora már nem fogadja el a kisebbségek eltávolítására és megtérítésére irányuló hagyományos megoldásokat, hanem sajátos előjogokat, ún. kollektív jogokat biztosít, hogy törvény általi elszigetelés útján irányítás alatt tudja tartani az ilyen csoportokat.

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A XIX. században a kollektív jogokat már nem fogadták el a központosított demokratikus államokban. Mivel állampolgáraik felségjoguk tárgyaiból az állam alanyaivá fejlődtek, így jogokban egyenlő és egyazon törvényeket betartó egyénekké kellett váljanak. Nyugat-Európában egy ún. Kulturkampf (kulturális harc) volt szükséges ahhoz, hogy biztosítani lehessen az állam fölényét a (római katolikus) egyház felett, visszaszorítva annak hatáskörét. Így tehát, a nemzeti demokratikus elgondolás sikeres lett a nyugat-európai egynemzetes államokban. Kelet-Közép-Európában ezt nem lehetett megvalósítani a több nemzetből álló országok (Oroszország, Ausztria-Magyarország és az Oszmán Birodalom) integritásának súlyos veszélyeztetése nélkül. Itt a nemzeti disszidens egyenjogúsítást a vallási felekezetek és szervezetek erődjei táplálták. A nagyhatalmaknak mindenképp meg kellett küzdeniük az állampolgáraik köreiben egyre növekvő és centrifugális nemzeti szeparatista mozgalmakkal. Mindegyikük próbálkozott a probléma különféle, gyakran haladásellenes, elfojtó megoldásaival, azonban egyikük sem járt sikerrel.

Ausztria hiába próbált kidolgozni egy kompromisszumot a személyes, kollektív és területi jogok között. Ebben a tekintetben egyes szociáldemokraták (Renner és Bauer) lényeges részesedést vállaltak azzal a céllal, hogy egy területi megoldás érdekében egybehangolják a régi kollektív és az új egyéni jogokat. Azonban elgondolásaiknak Morvaország és Bukovina királyi tartományaiban végbevitt figyelemre méltó megvalósítása mellett, egy nyílt nacionalizmus uralta a más provinciákban meglévő diskurzusokat, s megbénította a további tárgyalások és egy toleráns, szabadelvű közhangulat kialakulását.

A multinacionális nagyhatalmak első világháborúbeli összeomlása megnyitotta a politikai átszervezés útját Kelet-Európa körülbelül hét új nemzetállama számára, melyek a párizsi békeszerződések révén keletkeztek, a népek önmeghatározáshoz való joga nemzetközi törvény homályos alapelve nyomán. Habár a nemzeti szuverenitás biztosítása a népeknek egy kollektív jog volt, mégis megvalósították az államokban, mely harmincmillió kelet-európait érintett. Az állam alapú állampolgárság ingatag elképzelésnek bizonyult az új nemzetállamokban. Nem voltak képesek, sokuk pedig nem is akart kidolgozni egy kompromisszumot állampolgáraiknak alkotmányosan biztosított egyéni jogai és a kollektív jogok szükséglete között, melyeket a kisebbségi csoportok állampolgárai igényeltek saját szociális és kulturális életük fenntartása érdekében. Azóta a kisebbségek vallási és nemzeti szükségleteinek ellátottsága egyaránt rosszabbodott az állami fennhatóság alatt, játékszerré válva a politikusok kezében.

A második világháborút megelőző utolsó években a tengelyhatalmak, együttműködésben a Szovjetunióval, hatalmas területi bekebelezéseket erő-

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szakoltak ki a békeszerződések korrigálása gyanánt, valóra váltva az irredentizmustól való félelmet. Új (báb-)nemzetállamokat is létrehoztak olyan nemzetek számára, akiket előzőleg nem ismertek el a békeszerződésekben.

Ezek a területi megoldások csak úgy tudták megoldani a régi kisebbségi problémákat, hogy helyettük újakat termeltek. Etnikai tisztogatást végeztek, hogy a nemzeti homogenitásnak érvényt tudjanak szerezni az új határokon belül. A zsidó kisebbségeket népirtás révén iktatták ki. A németek uralta területeken a németül beszélő kisebbségeket egy kollektív státus bevezetésével kiváltságokban részesítették. A tengelyszövetségesek állami hatóságaival megállapodva, némelyek, különösen ezek a németül beszélő kisebbségek, kettős nemzeti státust kaptak, végül pedig kizárólagosan el kellett fogadják a német állampolgárságot. Ezek az alkotmányos elferdítések hiteltelenné tették a kollektív kisebbségi státust, mint megoldást.

A háború után a győztes szövetséges hatalmak a kisebbségi létet a tengelyhatalmak és szövetségeseik háborús indítékainak tekintették, a kollektív kisebbségi jogokat pedig komoly nemzetközi problémák forrásának látták a jövőt illetően. Nem csak azt döntötték el, hogy visszatérnek a háború előtti államhatárokhoz – ez alól kivételt képeztek a Szovjetunió bekebelezett területei –, hanem elfogadják, sőt, irányítani fogják a nagyméretű nemzeti tisztogatásokat a határokon belül élő lakosság köreiben.

Az emberi jogok egyetemes nyilatkozata az egyéni állampolgár törvényes alátámasztását tükrözi új minősítésben, mint az állam szuverén emberi alanya. A nyilatkozat keltezése aligha véletlenszerű egybeesés: 1948 decembere, pontosan három évvel a nemkívánatos etnikai vagy nemzeti identitású, körülbelül húszmillió közép-európai lakos nagyméretű és erőszakos áthelyezése után.

Azóta, Európa szovjetek által ellenőrzött területein, a kisebbségi problémákat bürokratikus szabályozások révén marginalizálták. A szocialista népköztársaságok egy ideológiai megoldást foganatosítottak e problémák megoldására, az egyéni jogokat szükségtelenné, a kollektív jogokat pedig törvénytelenné téve. Csupán egyetlen területi kísérlet – a romániai székely autonóm régió – örvendhetett egy rövid ideig tartó keserű pályafutásnak. 1990-ben egy új kor kezdődött, új perspektívákkal kecsegtetve a kisebbségi jogokat az európai törvényhozás keretein belül. Továbbá, e törvénykezés rejtekében, a nemzeti kisebbségek többé már nem kellene veszélyeztessék egy modern európai állam osztatlanságát. Mindemellett, egyes idejétmúlt berögződések továbbra is a kollektív jogok iránti létszükségletüket tévesen határozzák meg.

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Maik SCHMERBAUCH

KISEBBSÉGI BÁNÁSMÓD VALLÁSI SZEMSZÖGBŐL: A KATOLIKUS EGYHÁZ ÉS A NÉMET KISEBBSÉG FELSŐ-SZILÉZIÁBAN 1922–2010 KÖZÖTT Saját kutatásaim és vizsgálataim kivételével, az utóbbi években nem folytattak semmilyen modern tudományos kutatást a téma (egyház)történelmi vonatkozásában, habár a katolikus egyház és a német kisebbség kapcsolata a katowicei egyházmegyében 1922–1939 között nagyon érdekes és fontos szakasza a huszadik század egyháztörténelmének.

A német birodalom 1918-as legyőzése után, az első világháború végén, a felső-sziléziai német tartományt a Népszövetség 1922-ben felosztotta Lengyelország és Németország között. Így Felső-Szilézia keleti része, Katowice és Königshütte jelentős ipari területével együtt, Lengyelországhoz került. Ennek a területnek több mint egymillió lengyel és német származású lakosa volt, habár a felső-sziléziai néphagyomány már századok óta német és lengyel elemeket egyaránt magába foglalt, ami lehetetlenné tette az egyének kizárólag németekre és lengyelekre való felosztását. Általában az ott élők annak alapján határozták meg nemzetiségüket, hogy melyik nyelvet beszélték, és melyik néphagyományt vallották magukénak.

1922 után, tehát, míg a németajkú felső-sziléziaiak részéről egy hatalmas tömeges kivándorlás vette kezdetét a Német Birodalomba, addig a lengyelajkúak az ország minden részéből az új lengyel Felső-Sziléziába özönlöttek. Végül, az 1922 és 1939 közötti időszakban 20%-nyi német maradt meg ezen a területen a lengyel Sziléziai Vajdaság politikai kisebbségeként. Ez a politikai folyamat még a katolikus egyházban is változásokhoz vezetett. Felső-Szilézia egy erősen katolikus rész volt, amely 1922-ben a Bertram bíboros által irányított boroszlói nagy német egyházmegyéhez tartozott. 1922 után a Szentszék úgy döntött, hogy a Németországtól leválasztott Felső-Szilézia keleti részéből egy új egyházmegyét létesít. Így tehát, a Szentszék 1925-ben létrehozta az új egyházmegyét katowicei székhellyel, melynek első püspöke Hlond bíboros volt, akit Arkadiusz Lisiecki (1926-1930) és Stanislaus Adamski (1930-1967) követtek.

Az új lengyel egyházmegye számára az újonnan rájuk bízott katolikus kisebbség egy újszerű tapasztalatnak számított. A német és lengyel katolikusok évszázadok óta éltek békességben közösségeikben, a miseszolgálatok ideje alatt templomaikat megosztották, együtt végezték a dicsőítéseket és látogattak el Felső-Szilézia nagy zarándokhelyeire, mint Annaberg vagy Piekary. Az 1922-es politikai változások miatt a német

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és lengyel lakosok nem csak mindennapi ügyeikkel kapcsolatosan, hanem a katolikus életmódot illetően is mélyen bizalmatlanokká váltak egymással szemben. A német katolikusok nehezteltek a miatt, hogy fel kellett adják megszokott életvitelüket az egyházon belül, melyet német állampolgárokként annyira megkedveltek. Katowice püspöke és a helyi papság felismerték ezt a problémát közösségeikben, és 1922-1939 között mindent megtettek annak érdekében, hogy elkerüljék a katolikus egyházon belüli politikai összetűzéseket. Számukra világos volt, hogy nem létezhetnek különbségek a németek és a lengyelek hite között. Bár az egyház egy olyan menedékként szolgált, ahol nem voltak néphagyománybeli különbségek, a probléma kezelése mégsem bizonyult könynyűnek. 1922–1939 között a német papok több ízben is próbálkoztak a radikalista megnyilvánulások elkerülésére. Ők ellátták és támogatták a német katolikus közösségek gyermekeit, fiatalságát, férfiait és nőit, velük együtt látogattak el a nagy zarándokhelyekre, nevelték őket a társadalmi és vallási életre, s figyelmeztették őket, hogy ne higgyenek a nácizmus és kommunizmus újfajta politikai rendszereiben, amelyek megpróbálták a német hitet megnyerni ideológiájuk javára. A katolikus egyház erőfeszítései egészen a ’30-as évek végéig sikeresnek bizonyultak a német katolikusok többségének meggyőzésében, hogy maradjanak meg az egyházban. Arra az időre azonban a Németország és Lengyelország közt fennálló politikai helyzet megromlott, s a felső-sziléziai lengyel kormány elkezdte üldözni a német kisebbség több közösségét és sajtóját is, egészen az 1939-es második világháború kirobbanásáig, melyet még a katolikus egyház sem tudott megakadályozni.

Következésképpen, a huszadik század egyháztörténelmében ennek az időszaknak a feltárása várhatóan egy óriási projektnek ígérkezik, mely új eredményekkel kecsegteti a folyamatban lévő kutatást. Úgy gondolom, hogy ez a projekt új rálátással fog szolgálni a katolikus teológia kisebbségkutatásában, valamint új majd megoldásokat mutat fel a kisebbségben élő hitközösségekkel katolikus szellemben való bánásmódra. Nagy örömömre szolgálna témám felvezetése az Önök jövő évi konferenciáján. Úgy gondolom, hogy a konferencián nagyon érdekes lenne többet hallani hasonló esetekről, melyek más országok katolikus kisebbségeivel fordultak elő.

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Jeroen TEMPERMAN

A VALLÁSI KISEBBSÉGEKKEL SZEMBEN FOLYTATOTT ELISMERÉSI/BEJEGYZÉSI POLITIKÁK: EGY ÖSSZEHASONLÍTÓ JOGI ELEMZÉS ÉS EGY EMBERI JOGOKON ALAPULÓ ELEMZÉS A társulási jog kérdése elválaszthatatlanul összekapcsolódik a szervezett vallási csoportok által élvezett szabadságokkal. A kelet-európai országokra helyezve a hangsúlyt, az értekezés megvizsgálja, hogy melyek az “államok nem diszkriminálhatják a különféle vallásokat és meggyőződéseket” norma jogi szövődményei a vallások bejegyzése területén.

Rámutatunk arra, hogy a vallási társulási törvényeket a gyakorlatban fel lehet használni az állam hagyományos és uralkodó vallása (pl. a keleti ortodox nemzeti egyházak teszik ezt azokban az államokban, amelyek tényleges vagy jog szerinti kapcsolatot tartanak fenn ezekkel) történelmi-pénzügyi kiváltságainak fedezésére és/vagy szentesítésére, valamint egyes vallási csoportok tevékenységének korlátozására (világi államokban az állami szekularizmus vagy szeparatizmus szűk értelmezésében). Így tehát, lehetséges, hogy a pénzügyi támogatási rendszerek a prima facie (első látásra elfogadható) semleges kritériumon alapulnak („minden elismert/nyilvántartott vallás és meggyőződés anyagi támogatásban részesül”), azonban a bejegyzési szabályok nem így működnek. Ha egy állam uralkodó vallása vagy egyháza automatikusan pénzügyi támogatásban részesül, holott más vallási csoportoknak vesződséges eljárásokon kell keresztülvergődnie magát, hogy ugyanazt a törvényes elismerést elérhesse, akkor a pénzügyi juttatások szétosztási politikájáról végső soron aligha mondható el, hogy „tárgyilagos kritériumok határozzák meg”.

Ugyanez még inkább, a fortiori érvényes, ha a vallási társulási törvények olyan alaptalan bejegyzési kritériumokat írnak elő, amelyeknek a nem domináns és nem hagyományos vallási közösségek egyszerűen nem tudnak eleget tenni. Így tehát, két különböző megközelítést különíthetünk el egymástól, melyek egyaránt bizonyos vallások diszkriminálásához vezethetnek: (i) egy vallás (és a státussal járó jogok) jogi személyként való feltételek nélküli elismerése az állam részéről; (ii) alkalmassági kritérium teljesítése az állami támogatás érdekében (ez gyakran összefonódik a vallási csoportok státusának problematikájával). Amennyiben figyelembe vesszük a vallási csoportok elismerésére irányuló állampolitikákat, vagy még inkább azokat a szempontokat és kritériumokat, melyek a „vallási társulási törvényekbe” vésődnek bele, úgy előfordulhat, hogy egy vallási

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közösséget elutasítanak jogi személyi státusával együtt, vagy megadják az alapvető jogi státust, viszont ezzel együtt hátrányos helyzetben találja magát, amikor olyan egyházakkal vagy vallási szervezetekkel kerül öszszehasonlításra, amelyek (magasabb) státust nyertek el, s ez által további javakra jogosultak. A legfőbb kérdéspontok feltérképezésének érdekében, a tanulmány egy összehasonlító jogi áttekintést nyújt az állam gyakorlatáról ebben a régióban.

A tanulmány a mellett érvel, hogy a bejegyzési rendszereket, mint olyanokat, egybe lehet hangolni az emberi jogok törvényével (annak alapján, hogy egy vallás kinyilvánítása még nem jelent abszolút szabadságot, se nem vértez fel a társulási jog gyakorlására). A vallások és vallási szervezetek elismerésének és bejegyzésének igazságos eljárása valójában hozzájárulhat a vallásszabadsághoz. Mindezt ismertetve, az állam gyakorlata szerint nem a vallásszabadság elősegítését szem előtt tartva tervezték és valósítják meg ezeket az eljárásokat, hanem oly módón, hogy szoros ellenőrzés alatt tudják tartani a vallás gyakorlását, miközben különbséget tesznek vagy a kormányok által veszélyesnek tartott „szekták” rovására, vagy a hagyományos és uralkodó egyház javára. A tanulmány arra is rámutat, hogy a konkrét bejegyzési követelményeknek szoros összefüggésben kell állniuk a társulási jog nemzetközi szabványaival, egyetértésben a vallás és meggyőződés szabadságával.

Fahri TÜRK

A TÖRÖK KISEBBSÉG TÖRTÉNELMI ÉS JELENLEGI HELYZETE BULGÁRIÁBAN Habár a bulgáriai törököket a Bolgár Királyság 1908-as függetlensége óta elnyomták a kormányhatóságok, a kommunizmus összeomlása után fokozatosan Kelet-Európa legbefolyásosabb kisebbségévé váltak. A 2005ös bulgáriai népszámlálás szerint összesen 7.450.000 lakosa van az országnak, melyből a bulgáriai törökök 9,4%-ot (700.300) tesznek ki.

Habár Szófia, az Ankarával kötött kétoldalú megállapodás szerint, biztosította a törökök kulturális és vallási jogait, 1984-től kezdődően mégis nagymértékű elnyomást gyakorolt a török kisebbségre. A bolgár kormány megtiltotta, hogy állampolgárai török neveket viseljenek. Így tehát, egészen 1991-ig, a török kisebbségnek bolgár neveket kellett felvenniük. Úgyszintén tilos volt a török nyelv használata nyilvános helyeken. Végül pedig, a bolgár kormány kijelentette, hogy nem ismeri el a török kisebbséget Bulgáriában. A törökök Bulgáriában így nem törökök voltak, hanem

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bolgárok, akiket az oszmán kormány rákényszerített, hogy felvegyék az iszlám vallást.

A kommunista rendszer összeomlása után, a török kisebbség színre lépett Bulgária politikai küzdőterén. A Jogok és Szabadság Pártja, melynek tagjai a török kisebbségből tevődnek össze, 34 helyet szerzett meg az összesen 240 helyes parlamentből a 2005-ös általános választások alkalmával. Majd a Jogok és Szabadság Pártja Szófiában részt vesz az új kormányszövetség létrehozatalában, ahol három miniszter képviseli. Ez a kötelezettségvállalás lehetővé tette, hogy a török kisebbség visszaszerezze jogait, melyeket Todor Zsivkov asszimilációs politikája nyomán vesztett el. 1991 januárjában a bolgár kormány engedélyezte a török kisebbségnek az anyanyelvükön való tanulást az iskolákban, azokon a településeken, ahol többségben voltak, mint pl. Razgrad városa. Mindemellett, 1993-ban a Bolgár Nemzeti Rádió elkezdett török műsorokat is sugározni. Bulgária EU-s tagsága újabb ösztönzést adott a török kisebbségnek, hogy tudatosítsák kulturális és más polgári jogaikat.

Eleni VELIVASAKI

VALLÁSI PLURALITÁSOK EGYENGETÉSE: GÖRÖGORSZÁG ESETE A diverzitás kezelésének kérdése központi szerepet kap napjaink kiemelkedő vitáiban a multikulturalizmusról. A balkáni régió a diverzitás kezelésének számos technikájáról és eljárásáról tett tanúbizonyságot, kezdve az erőszakos háborúkkal, a csendes asszimiláción keresztül, egészen a népesség kicserélésének egyedi technikájáig. Görögország esetében a teljes körű vallási jogok elfogadását, mely első látásra egy megfelelő módszernek tűnik a diverzitás kezelésére, amely összeegyeztethető a modern idők emberi jogaival és tolerancia követelményeivel, kizárólag az ország egyetlen hivatalosan elfogadott kisebbsége számára tartották fenn, a Nyugat-Trákiában élő muzulmán/török kisebbségnek. Mégis, amit ma tapasztalhatunk Görögországban, az az új millet-rendszer paradox módon való túlélése, melyet a modern kommunizmust pártoló intézmények és egy fokozatosan államosított vallási kisebbség különleges vallási jogainak elfogadása tartott fenn. Egy személyes iszlám jogrendszer érvényes a kisebbség minden tagjára, aki örökösödési és családi vonatkozású magánjogi vitáival a különleges hatáskörű törvényszékre, a muftik elé járul. A tanulmány célja megvizsgálni az „új millet-rendszer” intézményes megoldását, valamint kiértékelni az iszlám törvény akkomodálásának, mint

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külön normatív rendszernek, a pozitív eredményeit. Ennek érdekében röviden tárgyalni fogom a görög jogrendszeren belül az iszlám törvény inputját és hatáskörét, valamint a kisebbségeknek megítélt vallási jogokat. Végül pedig megkísérlem kiértékelni a görög példát: egy jogi anakronizmus, egy gyakorlati multikulturalizmus, vagy egy lehetséges modell a mai európai kisebbségpolitikákra?

HORVÁTH István

KISEBBSÉGEK, KISEBBSÉGVÉDELEM ROMÁNIÁBAN A cikk egy általános rálátást nyújt a nemzeti kisebbségek romániai helyzetére vonatkozóan, valamint egy rövid elemzéssel szolgál az 1990 után kialakult kisebbségvédelmi rendszerről Romániában. Az első két rész a romániai etnikai tájképet veszi górcső alá, különös tekintettel a panoráma marginális pontjaira, ahol a nemzeti kisebbségként hivatalos elismerésre törekvő néprajzi csoportok, valamint az új (még marginális) bevándorló kisebbségek helyezkednek el. Az elismert nemzeti kisebbségek számadatai és demográfiai dinamikái kerülnek bemutatásra, amelyet ezen népcsoportok etnolingvisztikai vitalitásának mutatói követnek.

A romániai kisebbség népességföldrajzát úgyszintén terítékre kerül. A romániai kisebbségvédelem rendszerét elemezve, a cikk először egy történelmi áttekintést nyújt az elmúlt két évtized etnopolitikai vitáiról és irányzatairól; továbbá pedig, a cikk utolsó részében, a mai Románia kisebbségvédelmi rendszerének főbb intézményei vannak felleltározva.

MURÁDIN János Kristóf

KILÁTÁSOK NÉLKÜLI ÚJRAKEZDÉS. AZ ERDÉLYI MÚZEUM EGYESÜLET 1944–1950 KÖZÖTT Előadásom az egyik erdélyi magyar tudományos intézmény legellentmondásosabb életszakaszával foglalkozik. Az Erdélyi Múzeum-Egyesületet (EME) 1859-ben alapították a Magyar Tudományos Akadémia alapján, s a régióban élő magyar lakosság számára a legfontosabb tudományos intézménynek számított. Buktatókkal és sikerekkel teli élete látszólag tükrözi az elkülönített nemzet sorsát. Ez az összehasonlítás leginkább az 1944–1950 közötti időszak eseményei révén válik kézzelfoghatóvá, amely a lehetőségek leszűkítésének az időszaka volt, ahol rendkívül lekorlátozódtak a tevékenységi körök mind az EME, mind pedig az Erdélyben élő magyarok számára.

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Sok ember sokféleképpen írta meg és fejezte ki véleményét az EMEvel kapcsolatosan, azonban egy dolog biztos: ennek a tudományos intézménynek a jelentősége és betöltött szerepe a magyar kulturális életben sohasem volt kérdéses. Ezzel magyarázható az is, hogy 1944-ben a szovjet erők árnyékában Észak-Erdélyt elfoglaló új román hatalom megpróbálta ellehetetleníteni, beszüntetni, véget vetni a magyarok vezető intézményes struktúrájának, melybe a kolozsvári székhelyű EME is beletartozott.

Előadásomban megpróbálom bemutatni ezt a csendes és állandó küzdelmet, amely a kulisszák mögött játszódott le a tudományos intézmény és az állam között. Először is megpróbálom felvázolni a rendszeresen megújított EME-t a háborút követő, folyamatosan változó átmeneti időszakban; egy olyan intézmény, mely megpróbált megfelelni a kor politikai-ideológiai elvárásainak. Ugyanakkor feszült figyelemmel követem nyomon a tudományos munkát, a megjelenő kiadványokat, a történelmi múlt formálását, az oktatási és tudományos előadássorozatok megszervezését, melyek az EME-ben mentek végbe, egy kor lezárását jelezve.

NAGY Benedek

SZÉKELYFÖLD: A TURISZTIKA, MINT AZ AUTONÓMIÁHOZ VEZETŐ ÚT Rövid cikkünk fő célkitűzése, hogy felvázolja az esetleges alternatív lehetőségeket a hőn áhított autonómia megszerzésére. A politikai ösvényt már meglehetősen körüljártuk, s bizonyos mértékig hatékonyan ki is használtuk. Azonban valószínűleg más kommunikációs csatornákra is szükség lesz a román többség meggyőzéséhez az olyan etnikai kisebbséglét fontosságáról, mint az erdélyi magyarok helyzete, s azon belül is a székelyeké.

Ebben az első részben megkíséreljük bemutatni a jelenlegi politikai és közéleti eseményeket, fejleményeket régiónkban; megpróbáljuk bebizonyítani, hogy létezik egy olyan egyre fokozódó belső akarat, melynek tárgya egy székelyföldi önkormányzati szerkezet, közös projektek, egyszóval székely regionális kezdeményezések megvalósítása. Habár a ’90-es évekből ezek hiányoztak, újabban a legkülönfélébb székely „termékek” számban és minőségben egyre gyarapodó hozamát tapasztalhatjuk meg: közös fejlesztési projektek, turisztikai kezdeményezések, kommunikáció, tudományos munkák, stb.

A második részben bemutatunk egy turisztikai jellegű kommunikációt, valamint az e célból használt jelképeket. Melyek a regionális jelképek, ki használja ezeket, s mennyire vannak egységesítve és fogalmilag lerögzítve?

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A harmadik rész külföldi, Európában bevált gyakorlatokra vonultat fel olyan példákat, ahol a helyi turizmus és annak kommunikációja nem csak a bevételek és adók révén járultak hozzá a regionalizálás folyamatához, hanem azokkal a változásokkal is, melyeket a kommunikáció, a különbségek hirdetése és a helyi kultúra által értek el. Így tehát, ha megfelelő módon használjuk fel, meggyőződésünk, hogy a turizmusnak kettős pozitív hatása lehet: nem csupán sokrétű és üdvös gazdasági hatásokat idézhet elő (jelen tanulmány nem tér ki ezekre), hanem meggyőzhet egy felettébb ellenséges nemzeti többséget is a kulturális örökség és a különféle etnikai értékek megőrzésének fontosságáról, mindenekfelett pedig arról, hogy a különbség nem feltétlenül jelent elszigetelést és kizárást.

TONK Márton–SZÉKELY Tünde

A MAGYAR NYELVŰ FELSŐOKTATÁS JELENE ÉS JÖVŐJE ROMÁNIÁBAN A tanulmány célja a romániai magyar oktatáspolitika jelenlegi problémáinak és kihívásainak az elemzése az Európai Unió oktatási politikájának, illetve az Európai Felsőoktatási Térség folyamatainak a kontextusában. Ebben a gondolatkörben röviden vázoljuk az ún. „Bologna Folyamat” néhány következményét, tekintettel (s ezen belül pedig, természetesen, a kisebbségi magyar) a hazai felsőoktatásra, melyet követően a romániai magyar egyetemi oktatás sajátos problémáinak elemzésére törekedtünk.

Ez utóbbi, a tanulmány nagyobbik részét kitevő vizsgálódásaink során tekintettel kívánunk lenni mind az erdélyi magyar kisebbséghez kapcsolódó nemzetpolitikai, demográfiai, kisebbségjogi szempontokra, mind pedig a szűk értelemben vett felsőoktatási képzési kínálatra és intézményrendszerre. Elemzéseink során természetesen nem hagyhatják figyelmen kívül az önálló magyar állami egyetem „toposzát” sem – az erre vonatkozó dilemmák és kérdésfelvetések képezik tanulmányunk utolsó tematikus egységét.

REZUMATE

Britt CARTRITE

„NOI” NAŢIUNI ÎN „VECHEA” EUROPĂ: ETNOGENEZĂ ŞI MOBILIZARE ETNOPOLITICĂ ÎN INSULELE SHETLAND ŞI ORKNEY DIN SCOŢIA După cum mulţi au observat, studiile privind mobilizarea etnopolitică în Europa de Vest s-au inspirat în mod preponderent dintr-o lume relativ mică a unor grupuri entice extrem de mobilizate şi vizibile; în plus, aceste studii se concentrează doar asupra mobilizării etnopolitice din ultimii ani (în special asupra voturilor acordate partidelor etnice la alegerile naţionale), nereuşind nici măcar să surprindă apariţia în timp a unor astfel de mişcări. În contrast, Miroslav Hroch (1968 [2000]) a căutat să formeze un cadru de mobilizare pentru a ţine cont de traiectoriile de mobilizare ale grupurilor din Europa care s-au mobilizat în cea mai mare măsură. Pornind de la acest cadru, Cartrite (2003) a examinat toate cele cincisprezece grupuri distincte din punct de vedere lingvistic din Franţa, Spania şi Regatul Unit. Ambele studii s-au concentrat asupra unor grupuri lingvistice distincte, ridicând posibilitatea unei deplasări de selecţie. Mai mult, o mare parte din analiză se concentrează pe fazele ulterioare ale mobilizării etnopolitice, în special pe apariţia grupurilor de interes şi a partidelor politice, deşi ambele studii demonstrează clar importanţa formării din timp a structurilor de mobilizare care precedă activismul.

Acest studiu se concentrează pe mişcările care stau la baza a ceea ce ar putea fi numită „etnogeneză”: eforturi iniţiale pentru articularea unei identităţi ca grup distinct, care poate facilita ulterioarele mobilizări etnopolitice. Concentrându-se pe Insulele Shetland şi Orkney din Scoţia, acest studiu evaluează actuala stare nascentă a mobilizării etnopolitice, acordând o atenţie deosebită mobilizării dialectelor locale, aceasta fiind percepută ca un indicator remarcabil al identităţii etnice. În ultimii ani ambele grupuri din cele două insule au avut activişti care s-au ocupat de standardizarea şi predarea dialectelor locale scoţiene (pe lângă alte simboluri, cum ar fi steagurile) în scopul de a „conserva şi proteja” identitatea locală. În ambele cazuri indivizii se opun acestori eforturi, considerându-le ca fiind încercări iniţiale de agitaţie naţionalistă. Acest studiu constată că, în pofida lipsei unei limbi distincte şi a unei istorii de activism politic, s-au format modele de mobilizare etnopolitică cu scopul de a explica că se aplică cu succes cazuri mai avansate pentru aceste grupuri.

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Tove H. MALLOY

DREPTURILE MINORITĂŢILOR ŞI DINAMICA EUROPENIZĂRII: CONVERGENŢĂ ÎN GUVERNAREA REGIONALĂ A REGIUNII DE GRANIŢĂ DINTRE DANEMARCA ŞI GERMANIA Politicile de guvernare regională în regiunea de frontieră danezo-germană deschid noi drumuri pentru regimul european al drepturilor minorităţilor. Folosindu-se nu numai de propriile cunoştinţe interculturale bine dezvoltate, respectiv de capitalul social natural, dar şi de anii de dialog intercultural instituţionalizat la diferite niveluri, minorităţile naţionale au informat într-o măsură din ce în ce mai mare un discurs regional emergent, al cărui scop este dezvoltarea economică prin instituţionalizarea şi consolidarea capacităţilor transfrontaliere (Competence Analysis 2007). Când se identifică necesitatea de noi proiecte de infrastructură sau de servicii transfrontaliere, de multe ori membrii minorităţilor naţionale sunt cei care observă oportunităţile existente. Atunci când armonizarea reglementării protecţiei sociale a fost identificată ca fiind un obstacol major pentru deplasarea peste graniţă a forţei de muncă, minorităţile naţionale au exercitat presiune asupra conducătorilor guvernelor naţionale cu scopul ca aceştia să abordeze problema. La înfiinţarea Comisiei INTERREG 2007–2013, reprezentanţii minorităţilor naţionale au fost aşezaţi alături de reprezentanţii locali. Atunci când autorităţile publice şi guvernele locale se întâlnesc pentru a revizui proiectele şi progresele transfrontaliere, participă şi minorităţile naţionale. La întrunirile Adunării Regiunilor Europene reprezentanţii minorităţilor naţionale participă ca funcţionari aleşi. Acesta nu este cel mai bun scenariu posibil. Minorităţile naţionale au luptat din greu prin intermediul propriilor comisii locale şi birouri reprezentative pentru o influenţă sporită. Partidele lor politice au fost active de la sfârşitul celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial (Kühl 2001). Şi încă există domenii din care minorităţile naţionale sunt excluse, chiar dacă faptele lor complementează continua definire de strategie (Competence Analysis 2007). Pe când în primii ani de existenţă partidele minoritare urmăreau un discurs al emancipării, în timp discursul mai larg al integrării europene i-a orientat spre dezvoltarea regională (Klatt şi Kühl 1999).

Astfel, anii de consolidare a încrederii au permis o unire între foştii antagonişti în scopul comun de a realiza dezvoltarea regională.

Acesta este un efort care are ca scop transformarea unei regiuni încă periferice în economia statelor naţionale într-o regiune de frontieră mo-

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dernă şi în dezvoltare continuă. Scopul final este dezvoltarea unei regiuni prospere şi capabile să concureze în „noul” regionalism al Uniunii Europene (UE) (Keating 1998). Însă aceasta este o regiune care suferă din cauza moştenirii lăsate de frontiera de securitate de tip hard, chiar dacă cooperarea Schengen a fost iniţiată în 2001 (Klatt 2006). Prin urmare nu există o identitate comună în rândul oamenilor care locuiesc în regiune. Însă biculturalismul este ceva obişnuit pentru minorităţile naţionale şi pentru o Europă unită, fără frontiere. Este o dorinţă naturală, minorităţile fiind separate de statele-mamă ca urmare a graniţelor stabilite în urmă cu secole. În plus, a apărut o anumită „europenitate” cu scopul de a lămuri identităţile lor colective (Competence Analysis 2007, Malloy 2009).

Aceşti factori contribuie la dorinţa personajelor de elită de a obţine o integrare europeană mai avansată, creând astfel un nou tip de politică minoritară-majoritară în regiunea de frontieră. Această politică este informată nu numai de strategia de coeziune a UE sau de politica regională, dar şi de strategia de democratizare a Consiliului Europei, în special de către Convenţia-cadru Europeană Privind Cooperarea Transfrontalieră a Colectivităţilor sau Autorităţilor Teritoriale. Fondurile structurale ale UE au jucat un rol de pionier în iniţierea cooperării transfrontaliere, iar crearea unei euroregiuni a instituţionalizat parteneriatul. Însă a fost cadrul normativ privind drepturile minorităţilor al Consiliului Europei (Convenţia-cadru pentru Protecţia Minorităţilor Naţionale) care a devenit un factor major în asigurarea participării minorităţilor naţionale în această cooperare. Prin urmare, există motive pentru a argumenta că intersecţia acestor strategii de integrare au ca scop în această regiune de frontieră convergenţa naraţiunii de democratizare privind drepturile minorităţilor cu naraţiunea europenizării.

Cu toate că nici politica regională a UE şi nici Convenţia-cadru Europeană Privind Cooperarea Transfrontalieră nu asigură drepturile minorităţilor naţionale, acestea totuşi adresează o problemă a integrării europene, care este condiţionată de cooperarea transfrontalieră, graniţele de stat fiind cele care au separat minorităţile naţionale de statele-mamă. Împreună cu implementarea continuă a cadrului normativ privind drepturile minorităţilor, ratificat de ambele state, această lucrare susţine că convergenţa acestor naraţiuni pretează pentru a sprijini o viziune diferită a regimului european al drepturilor minorităţilor. Această perspectivă nu se mai bazează doar pe cadrele normative, ci şi pe dinamica europenizării. Europenizarea nu este percepută ca o expansiune externă a valorilor europene, ci mai degrabă ca un proces ex post de consolidare a valorilor

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europene prin intermediul unei aprofundate integrări interioare. Lucrarea va descrie şi va analiza noul model de politică minoritară-majoritară în regiunea de frontieră danezo-germană, punând un accent deosebit pe activităţile şi funcţiile minorităţilor naţionale în raport cu strategia de dezvoltare a regiunii de frontieră. Datorită faptului că acest nou model de politică minoritară-majoritară îşi are rădăcinile în drepturile minorităţilor şi că funcţionează conform principiilor de bază ale diversităţii şi pluralismului valorilor europene, acesta nu relatează doar despre dinamica europenizării, ci pune într-o lumină nouă regimul european al drepturilor minoritare.

Klaus-Jürgen NAGEL

ÎNTRE „INDEPENDENŢA ÎN EUROPA”, O „EUROPĂ CU O SUTĂ DE DRAPELE” ŞI O „EUROPĂ A REGIUNILOR” SAU O „EUROPĂ CU REGIUNI”. CONCEPTUALIZAREA RELAŢIEI DINTRE NAŢIUNILE FĂRĂ STAT ŞI INTEGRAREA EUROPEANĂ ÎN EUROPA DE VEST (1945–2010) Reprezentanţii naţiunilor fără stat din Europa de Vest au avut, de obicei (dar nu întotdeauna), opinii pozitive despre integrarea europeană, dar apără puncte de vedere diferite în ceea ce priveşte rolul naţiunilor în acest proces. Lucrarea mea descrie istoria conceptualizării relaţiei dintre naţiunile fără stat şi procesul de integrare europeană în Europa de Vest după al Doilea Război Mondial, căutând continuităţi şi discontinuităţi.

Punctul de plecare este mişcarea europenistă din Europa de Vest. Sub influenţa federalismului proudhonian, mişcarea „personalistă” a oferit o primă înţelegere a unei „Europe a regiunilor”. Al doilea capitol prezintă dezvoltarea unei „Europe de o sută de drapele” (Yann Fouéré), care, din punctul de vedere al naţiunilor fără stat, este dezvoltarea unei alternative la Comunitatea Economică Europeană, diferită de regiuni şi care înlocuieşte vechile state. În anii ’60–’70 „revolta provinciei” a adus o nouă înţelegere a acestui raport: în cadrul unei mişcări de protest împotriva capitalismului şi al integrării europene controlate de stat, lupta împotriva „colonialismului intern” a oferit grupurilor naţionaliste de extrema stângă aparţinând unor naţiuni fără stat un cadru ideologic (parţial) nou, apărând conceptele alternative de integrare europeană. Ulterior aceste idei s-au unit cu ideile verzi „micul este frumos” (Leopold Kohr) ale pro-

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cesului de integrare europeană de jos în sus care s-ar baza pe regiuni. Cu toate acestea, guvernele regiunilor europene au avut o abordare foarte diferită în ceea ce priveşte includerea regiunilor în cadrul instituţional al recent înfiinţatei UE. Această mişcare pentru o „Europă a regiunilor” a fost parţial reuşită. Totuşi, structura instituţională şi practica politică care au fost consolidate începând cu Tratatul de la Maastricht pot fi descrise mai degrabă ca o „Europă cu regiuni”, unde naţiunile fără stat nu obţin recunoaşterea asimetrică pe care o pretind. Ca o reacţie, la extrema dreapta a sistemului de partide au fost elaborate conceptele unei „Europe a grupurilor etnice (autohtone)” (Vlaams Blok), în timp ce unele dintre mişcările naţionaliste ale naţiunilor fără stat şi-au formulat ca nou obiectiv „independenţa în Europa”, revenind astfel la ideea statului naţional, însă în cadrul unei noi Uniuni Europene.

Ivan SERRANO

PREFERINŢE CONSTITUŢIONALE, IDENTITATE NAŢIONALĂ ŞI COMPORTAMENT ELECTORAL: CELE TREI CERCURI ALE NAŢIONALISMULUI Bazată pe două sondaje recent realizate în 2008 şi 2009, această lucrare analizează relaţia dintre identitatea naţională, preferinţele constituţionale şi comportamentul electoral din Catalonia. O rezonabilă ipoteză iniţială ar sugera existenţa unei relaţii strânse între sprijinirea independenţei, sentimentele de identitate exclusivă şi votarea partidelor naţionaliste. Conform acestei „ipoteze congruente”, aceste trei poziţii speciale pot fi reprezentate ca nişte sfere care se suprapun aproape perfect – cele trei cercuri ale naţionalismului. Cu toate acestea, diferite studii au arătat că nu există o asemenea legătură clară. În mod contrar, relaţiile complexe şi multidimensionale reprezintă norma. Mai mult, în cazul Cataloniei preferinţele constituţionale au fost de obicei măsurate pe o scară cu patru trepte a autoguvernării („regiune”, „comunitate autonomă”, „stat într-o Spanie federală” şi „stat independent”), însă aceste preferinţe n-au fost abordate din punct de vedere al sprijinului sau opoziţiei faţă de un referendum pentru independenţă. Lucrarea va prezenta anumite dovezi cu privire la relaţia dintre identitatea naţională şi comportamentul electoral, luând în considerare preferinţele constituţionale în ambele dimensiuni, scara cu patru trepte a autoguvernării şi întrebarea legată de referendum.

Pe baza rezultatelor acestei duble analize vor fi discutate o serie de probleme, în măsura în care „ipoteza de congruenţă” poate fi considerată

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un instrument util în interpretarea cazului catalan în cadrul limitelor unor contribuţii bine stabilite, care subliniază importanţa aşa-numitelor „duble identităţi” în scopul de a explica diferenţele în nivelul sprijinului acordat diverselor opţiuni constituţionale. Această abordare complementară poate contribui la înţelegerea persistenţei problemei autoguvernării, care a rămas un element important în agenda politică din Catalonia şi Spania (aşteptările de acomodare nonconflictuală într-un stat descentralizat fiind departe de îndeplinire).

István SZILÁGYI

SPANIA: DE LA MODELUL DE AUTONOMIE LA FEDERALISM. CAZUL CATALONIEI Secolul al XXI-lea este epoca globalizării, a întâlnirilor dintre diferite culturi, civilizaţii şi identităţi, precum şi sisteme politice şi forme guvernamentale înregistrate în modele universale. Turbulentul sistem internaţional, care include mai mulţi participanţi şi actori, este organizat şi pus în funcţiune în formă de reţele şi curente. Situaţia „guvernare fără guvern” şi soluţiile instituţionale ale regionalismului clasic sunt completate cu noile structuri de guvernare multinivel ale regionalismului nou. Sistemul internaţional westfalian, bazat pe omnipotenţa şi puterea absolută a statelor, a fost transformat, iar ulterior acesta a dispărut. Valabilitatea noţiunii de „stat naţional”, folosită în secolele XVIII–XIX, care a implicat omogenitate, a fost depăşită.

Concomitent cu tendinţele integraţionaliste şi cu înlăturarea principiului teritorial de către organizaţiile noului regionalism, s-au intensificat procesele de dezintegrare referitoare la etnoregionalism. Acestea au dus din nou la înfiinţarea unor state multinaţionale în Europa Centrală şi de Est, respectiv pe teritoriul fostei Uniuni Sovietice. Au scos la iveală întrebări legate de protecţia minorităţilor şi, prin urmare, politicile minoritare au ajuns în lumina reflectoarelor. Întâlnirea şi coexistenţa în regiunile Europei a diferitelor tipuri de identităţi a schimbat sensul clasic al „sfintei treimi”, reprezentată de stat, naţiune şi naţionalitate. În 1992, referitor la Spania multietnică, Juan José Linz a subliniat că „Astăzi Spania reprezintă statul tuturor spaniolilor; aceasta înseamnă stat naţional pentru majoritatea populaţiei, însă pentru minorităţi aceasta înseamnă doar stat, nu şi naţiune”. În Spania s-a realizat, sub egida conducerii democratice, coexistenţa dintre stat (Monarhia Spaniolă), naţiunile istorice (basci, galicieni, catalani, valencieni) şi

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regiunile care nu au un trecut istoric (Cantabria, Asturias, Extremadura, Madrid, Murcia, La Rioja, etc.).

Toate acestea s-au întâmplat într-o ţară unde 20% din populaţie sunt catalani, 6% basci, 2,5% galicieni şi 2% valencieni.

Este esenţial faptul că noua democraţie spaniolă a jucat un rol important în rezolvarea unei probleme ce a persistat timp de 100 de ani prin crearea unui model de autonomie bazat pe 17 comunităţi autonome.

Sistemul realizat între 1979 şi 1983 încă se dovedeşte a fi viabil. Însă stabilitatea nu înseamnă imobilitate, sistemul constituţional fiind în continuă schimbare. Între 1983 şi 2010 în Spania a avut loc un proces fără precedent de descentralizare şi democratizare. În consecinţă, în prezent statul autonomiilor are caracteristicile unui sistem federal.

Schimbările care au dus de la semifederalism la federalism s-au accelerat în a doua jumătate a anilor ‘90, iar în luna iulie a anului 2006 s-a ajuns la acceptarea noului statut de autonomie a Cataloniei. Teritoriul autonom cu capitala la Barcelona, care a obţinut statutul de „naţiune suverană”, a venit cu o reală alternativă de separare de Spania.

Procesul şi schimbările din Spania şi Catalonia au condus la unelele concluzii care au fost utile minorităţilor care se străduiesc pentru obţinerea autonomiei în Europa Centrală şi de Est. Soluţia aleasă de spanioli şi catalani, în numele conceptului de „naţiune culturală”, a ridicat problema valabilităţii modelului în cazul minorităţilor care trăiesc în statele multinaţionale din Europa Centrală. Autoguvernarea politică, autonomia teritorială, legătura dintre menţinerea identităţii naţionale şi folosirea limbii materne, respectiv crearea şi menţinerea sistemului guvernamental atrag atenţia asupra adaptabilităţii acestui model de stat realizat în UE. Sistemul problemelor necesită o analiză comparativă, dat fiind faptul că este unul foarte serios. Răspunsurile la întrebările indicate depăşesc cadrul acestui studiu.

Goran BANDOV

PROTECŢIA LIMBII MATERNE A COMUNITĂŢILOR MINORITARE NAŢIONALE ŞI ETNICE ÎN REPUBLICA CROATĂ În discursul academic din Europa de Sud-Est, limba joacă un rol central în protejarea dimensiunii culturale a identităţii naţionale şi deţine în continuare o influenţă puternică asupra identitţii naţionale şi politice (în ceea ce priveşte identificarea de grup) pentru membrii grupurilor mi-

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noritare. Acest discurs recunoaşte importanţa limbii materne ca element de construire a elitelor în procesul de construire a naţiunilor ca subiecţi independenţi ai relaţiilor internaţionale în Europa de Sud-Est. Neimplementarea măsurilor care protejează limbile materne poate fi interpretată ca un atac direct asupra identităţii naţionale a respectivelor grupuri minoritare, precum şi ca un stimulent eficient pentru escaladarea conflictului etnopolitic. Prin urmare este esenţială implementarea unor ample mecanisme de protecţie a limbii pentru evitarea unor astfel de conflicte. Încă de la începutul perioadei de după al Doilea Război Mondial, sistemul de protecţie a limbii materne a comunităţilor minoritare naţionale şi etnice a fost implementat într-un mod eficient pe teritoriul Republicii Croate. În plus, aceste instituţii de protecţie s-au consolidat în mod considerabil pe parcursul perioadei de tranziţie democratică, precum şi în timpul războiului croat de independenţă, care a marcat separarea de Iugoslavia la începutul anilor ‘90.

Acest proces a avut un impact semnificativ asupra mărimii şi structurii protecţiei grupurilor minoritare, deoarece a introdus mai multe grupuri noi de minorităţi. Înainte de a obţine independenţa, în Croaţia li s-a acordat protecţie grupurilor minoritare maghiare, italiene, cehe, slovace, ucrainene şi rusine. În perioada de după obţinerea independenţei, măsurile de protecţie au fost extinse şi la alte grupuri, printre care s-au numărat sârbii şi alte popoare din fosta Iugoslavie. Astăzi sunt protejate 22 de grupuri etnice şi naţionale diferite. În Croaţia sistemul de protecţie a limbii cuprinde în primul rând dreptul la educaţie în limba grupului minoritar şi dreptul de a folosi limba minoritară în faţa organelor administrative şi judiciare. Aceste drepturi au fost recunoscute şi garantate printr-o serie de norme constituţionale şi legale, ale căror implementări au fost controlate în mod eficient de către organe judiciare europene şi croate. Educaţia minoritară este cea mai eficientă metodă de implementare a protecţiei limbii, care funcţionează conform următoarelor modele: modelul A (toate materiile sunt predate în limba maternă), modelul B (materiile din cadrul ştiinţelor sociale sunt predate în limba maternă, iar ştiinţele naturii sunt predate în limba croată), modelul C (toate materiile sunt predate în limba croată cu materii suplimentare şi obligatorii de limbă minoritară, tradiţie şi cultură a grupului minoritar naţional).

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Michael HORNSBY–Tomasz WICHERKIEWICZ

A FI SAU A NU FI (O MINORITATE)?

CAZUL CAŞUBIENILOR DIN POLONIA Când Polonia a semnat Carta Europeană a Limbilor Regionale sau Minoritare la 12 februarie 2009, din cele cincisprezece limbi enumerate doar una nu a fost clasificată ca limbă minoritară. Limba caşubiană a fost (aparent) singura limbă regională. Desigur, textul original al Cartei, care a fost întocmit în 1992, nu a precizat diferenţa dintre o limbă minoritară şi o limbă regională (Woerhrling 2005: 54). Astfel, ratificarea Poloniei este controversată din punct de vedere al aplicării principiilor Cartei, cu toate că respectă în totalitate textul original al acesteia. În această lucrare dorim să analizăm tensiunile create de implementarea Cartei în Polonia. Cel mai evident punct de fricţiune priveşte evidenţierea limbii caşubiene în detrimentul altor limbi mai puţin utilizate pe scară largă. Acest aspect va fi discutat în contextul cunoştinţelor de specialitate ale unui prezentator, respectiv asocierii strânse a acestuia cu implementarea Cartei în Polonia. Identificarea ideologiilor lingvistice conflictuale este mai puţin evidentă, dar la fel de importantă. Dacă în Polonia toate limbile minoritare (cu excepţia limbii caşubiene) sunt situate în perimetrul unei ideologii „lingvistice şi a identităţii”, atunci situarea limbii caşubiene într-un cadru teritorial (sau al ideologiei „lingvistice şi teritoriale” [Myhill 1999]) nu numai că duce la conflicte ideologice, dar pare a fi şi anacronistică într-un moment al istoriei limbii caşubiene în care aceasta este vorbită în mod regulat de mai mult de 50% din populaţie în doar trei districte din zona în care este considerată o limbă tradiţională (Mordawski 2005:56; Nestor şi Hickey 2009). Având în vedere aceste condiţii, vom aborda problema eficienţei planificării lingvistice în cazul limbii caşubiene în secţiunea finală a lucrării.

László MARÁCZ

POLITICI LINGVISTICE ÎN STATELE DIN EUROPA CENTRALĂ ŞI DE EST ÎN CARE TRĂIESC MINORITĂŢI MAGHIARE: IMPLICAŢII PENTRU PROTECŢIA DREPTURILOR LINGVISTICE ALE MINORITĂŢILOR NAŢIONALE ÎN UE Datorită tratatelor de pace ale secolului XX, minorităţile maghiare trăiesc în şapte state diferite din Europa Centrală şi de Est. Acestea

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sunt: Slovacia (520.000), Ucraina (200.000), România (1.930.000), Serbia (400.000), Croaţia (30.000), Slovenia (20.000) şi Austria (5.000). Conform tradiţiilor din Europa Centrală şi de Est, cea mai importantă caracteristică a identităţii etnice este limba maternă. Prin urmare, aceste state sunt, de facto, state multilingve, deşi nu toate dintre ele se consideră de jure ca atare, ci mai degrabă ca fiind state naţionale monolingve. În cazurile din urmă, minorităţile maghiare se confruntă cu o „politică de excludere”, adică legi lingvistice discriminatorii care restricţionează utilizarea limbii maghiare în spaţiul public şi oficial. Aceasta duce la societăţi polarizate şi divizate de-a lungul liniilor de separare etnolingvistică.

Această lucrare compară politicile lingvistice exclusive şi inclusive ale ţărilor multilingve din Europa Centrală şi de Est în care trăiesc minorităţi maghiare. Vom investiga sistemul juridic din aceste ţări cu privire la statutul şi utilizarea limbilor minorităţilor naţionale. Se va ajunge la concluzia că în ţările respective poziţia limbii maghiare poate fi clasificată în două grupe: (1) Serbia, Slovenia, Croaţia şi Austria; (2) Slovacia, România şi Ucraina. În ţările din prima grupă limba minoritară are un statut juridic egal cu limba majorităţii şi este inclusă în domeniile oficiale.

Acest lucru este valabil mai ales pentru regiunea Voivodina din Serbia, unde se urmăreşte o politică oficială pentru sprijinirea societăţii multilingve şi multiculturale. În ţările din a doua grupă limbile minoritare sunt subordonate limbii oficiale de stat, sunt restricţionate în domeniile oficiale şi utilizarea lor este determinată de cerinţe şi condiţii suplimentare. Prin urmare, al doilea caz nu se potriveşte standardelor democratice ale UE, în timp ce primul caz respectă aceste standarde.

Această grupare este interesantă, deoarece toate ţările implicate sunt supuse procesului de europenizare. Toate cele şapte ţări menţionate sunt membre ale Consiliului Europei, toate au ratificat Convenţia-cadru pentru Protecţia Minorităţilor Naţionale şi Carta Europeană a Limbilor Regionale şi Minoritare şi, înainte de toate, patru ţări (Austria, Slovenia, România şi Slovacia) sunt membre ale Uniunii. Două dintre aceste ţări, România şi Slovacia, nu sunt însă în grupa în care valorile şi standardele democratice sunt satisfăcătoare. De aici rezultă că statutul de membru al Uniunii nu este o garanţie pentru protecţia drepturilor lingvistice ale minorităţilor naţionale. Prin urmare, putem observa o discrepanţă între teoria Uniunii, care celebrează diversitatea lingvistică şi valorile democratice şi practica în statele membre. Se pare că nu există mecanisme eficiente de control şi sancţionare în Uniune pentru cazurile în care drepturile lingvistice ale minorităţilor naţionale sunt încălcate şi practicarea multi-

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lingvismului este interzisă în spaţiul public şi oficial. Situaţia din a doua grupă nu numai că implică încălcarea drepturilor omului, dar în acelaşi timp atrage după sine subminarea coeziunii Uniunii şi afectează aprofundarea conflictelor între statele cu minorităţi maghiare şi statul-mamă, Ungaria (Brubaker et. al. 2006, Csergő 2007). Această situaţie presupune regândirea mecanismelor de control şi de sancţionare în cadrul juridic al Uniunii. Un pas important înainte ar fi adoptarea ca punct de reper pentru Uniune a Convenţiei-cadru pentru Protecţia Minorităţilor Naţionale şi a Cartei Europene a Limbilor Regionale şi Minoritare, precum şi integrarea acestora în sistemul juridic al Uniunii. O astfel de iniţiativă ar permite sancţionarea statelor care nu respectă aceste convenţii.

Mykola RIABCHUK

A DA UN SENS AMBIGUITĂŢII: REDEFINIREA RELAŢIEI MINORITATE-MAJORITATE ÎNTR-O ŢARĂ POST-SOVIETICĂ Lucrarea analizează relaţiile extrem de complexe şi ambigue dintre minoritate şi majoritate în republica post-sovietică a Ucrainei. Conform lucrării, această ambiguitate provine în mare parte din tradiţia sovietică de clasificare etnică arbitrară, care se bazează pe noţiunea formală a etniei părinţilor în loc de autoidentificarea etnică, culturală şi lingvistică a oamenilor. Datorită unei astfel de abordări formale, ucrainenii sunt o majoritate puternică în ţara lor şi, în acelaşi timp, ruşii sunt reduşi la statutul altor minorităţi etnice, cum ar fi polonezii, evreii, tătarii crimeeni, maghiarii, românii şi altele. Clasificarea oficială şi arbitrară nu numai că denaturează complet realitatea etnolingvistică, dar în acelaşi timp împiedică implementarea eficientă a politicilor adecvate din domeniu. În primul rând ignoră faptul că o mare parte a ucrainenilor este puternic rusificată, prin urmare în multe părţi ale Ucrainei nu rusofonii, ci ucrainenii vorbitori de limba ucraineană sunt cei care reprezintă minoritatea culturală şi lingvistică, care, precum orice altă minoritate, necesită din partea statului sprijinirea şi protejarea drepturilor culturale şi lingvistice. În al doilea rând, tot din acelaşi motiv, ignoră faptul că în multe părţi ale Ucrainei ruşii şi ucrainenii rusificaţi sunt cei care alcătuiesc o majoritate puternică care nu necesită ajutor – spre deosebire de minoritatea vorbitoare de limba ucraineană care este dezavantajată social şi marginalizată din punct de vedere cultural. Pe de o parte grupul cultural rusofon se simte subminat şi nemulţumit de statutul „minoritar” extrem de arbitrar

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şi ambiguu. Pe de altă parte statutul îi scuteşte de orice responsabilitate faţă de minorităţile reale, înclusiv cele ucrainofone, şi consolidează angajamentul lor faţă de o politică culturală şi lingvistică de tip laissez-fair, datorită căreia pot fi consideraţi cei mai puternici jucători. În al treilea rând, politica laissez-fair, promovată de grupul rus/rusofon ca un răspuns la ambiguitate şi ca o modalitate de menţinere a dominanţei de facto, este dăunătoare în special pentru minorităţile mici din Ucraina, care nu pot beneficia de statutul simbolic al unei „naţionalităţi titulare” (ca ucrainenii), nici să se bazeze pe dominanţa socială şi culturală de facto ca ruşii/rusofonii.

Conform lucrării, dizolvarea ambiguităţii reprezintă singura modalitate de a crea politici adecvate pentru minorităţile din Ucraina, respectiv pentru a armoniza relaţiile tensionate dintre cele două grupuri majore – ucrainenii/ucrainofonii şi ruşii/rusofonii – care nu se încadrează în paradigma tradiţională de minoritate/majoritate.

Andrei AVRAM

AUTONOMIA TERITORIALĂ A GĂGĂUZILOR DIN REPUBLICA MOLDOVA: UN STUDIU DE CAZ În decembrie 1994 Parlamentul Republicii Moldova a adoptat Legea despre statutul legal special al Găgăuziei (Gagauz Yeri), punând capăt în mod oficial impasului dintre guvernul central şi autoproclamata Republică Găgăuză din sudul ţării. Găgăuzii au primit autonomie teritorială care acoperă aproape întregul spectru al domeniilor politicilor interne şi au obţinut o legislatură regională şi un organ executiv. Această soluţie paşnică a fost apreciată ca fiind o „victorie spectaculoasă a raţiunii” (Troebst 2001: 76), având în vedere faptul că Republica Moldova a fost implicată într-un alt conflict în regiunea separatistă a Transnistriei. Cu toate acestea, eficienţa unui model de autonomie depinde în primul rând de implementarea sa ulterioară şi de consecinţele pe care le are pentru stat ca un întreg (Protsyk/Rigamonti 2007: 1).

Scopul prezentei lucrări este clarificarea succesului autonomiei teritoriale găgăuze prin analizarea capacităţii sale de a consolida identitatea găgăuză, precum şi a măsurii în care aceasta poate fi considerată un factor de (de)stabilizare pentru Republica Moldova. Primul criteriu pare a fi relevant în contextul găgăuz, deoarece legitimitatea unei autonomii teritoriale bazate pe criterii etnice este legată de dreptul unei minorităţi naţionale de a urmări propriul proces de construire naţională la nivel substatal

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(Kymlicka 2001), în timp ce elitele politice din regiune au fost acuzate că ar fi mai dornice să menţină identitatea sovietică decât să promoveze naţiunea găgăuză (Nantoi 2009: 6). Al doilea criteriu implică examinarea cazului în care teritorializarea drepturilor colective ale găgăuzilor ar duce la un potenţial crescut al separatismului. Acest risc a fost exprimat în cazul tuturor noilor democraţii din Europa de Est (Hughes/Sasse 2002: 9) şi a fost invocat periodic de către analiştii din Moldova din cauza cooperării dintre găgăuzi şi autorităţile transnistrene (Praporşcic 2008) şi a cererilor acestora pentru federalizarea Republicii Moldova (Gherasim 2010). În acelaşi timp, autonomia teritorială este privită ca având potenţialul de a consolida statele slabe cu o populaţie multietnică (Kolstø 2001: 214) – o ipoteză care trebuie luată în considerare, mai ales că experţii găgăuzi subliniază dorinţa găgăuzilor de a contribui la unitatea ţării (Angheli 2009).

Prin urmare, această lucrare vizează prezentarea dezvoltării autonomiei găgăuze după 1994, cu scopul de a măsura gradul de succes al acesteia ca model pentru acomodarea atât drepturilor minoritare, cât şi a consolidării statului.

Ana PAVLOVIC

PROTECŢIA CONTEMPORANĂ A MINORITĂŢILOR ÎN EUROPA: COLIZIUNE ŞI ARMONIE ÎNTRE DREPTUL NAŢIONAL ŞI INTERNAŢIONAL În introducerea lucrării autorul menţionează istoria protecţiei minorităţilor, reamintind pe scurt cele mai importante momente ale acesteia. În plus, autorul explică ce înseamnă în prezent noţiunea de drepturi minoritare şi subliniază cele mai relevante părţi ale acordurilor internaţionale contemporane încheiate sub egida Organizaţiei Naţiunilor Unite, a Consiliului Europei, a Uniunii Europene şi a Organizaţiei pentru Securitate şi Cooperare în Europa (OSCE).

Partea principală a lucrării este dedicată tensiunii dintre stat şi comunitatea internaţională, precum şi a modului în care această coliziune contribuie la problema legată de minorităţi. Faptul că statul deleghează multe dintre responsabilităţile sale altor membri ai comunităţii internaţionale, regiunilor, va conduce într-o zi la dispariţia acestuia din punct de vedere conceptual? Autorul discută de ce acest lucru nu se va întâmpla, probabil, niciodată şi de ce statul ar trebui să fie puternic şi eficient.

Acesta este valabil în cazul unui stat democratic şi responsabil, unul care poate deveni un model potrivit pentru regiunea Europei Centrale şi de

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Est. Globalizarea aduce multe provocări guvernelor, iar vechea teorie a statului nu mai este suficientă. Prin urmare, statele ar trebui să se redefinească pentru a supravieţui. Una dintre problemele cheie este reprezentată de necesitatea de a transfera o parte din putere, din sus la nivelurile de mijloc, ceea ce implică diferite forme de autoguvernare şi autonomie.

Exact aceasta este problema care aruncă o lumină nouă asupra problemei minoritare, lăsându-ne în dubiul: de ce este acest proces unul uşor în anumite ţări, în timp ce în altele se duc lupte grele împotriva acestuia?

Ideea principală a acestei lucrări este să subliniem că în prezent, cu numeroase cereri emergente, reflecţiile noastre asupra acestor probleme trebuie să se schimbe la rândul lor şi să evolueze în funcţie de starea actuală a lucrurilor. Cu toate că organizaţiile internaţionale vor continua în mod evident să caute soluţii mai adecvate, responsabilitatea principală pentru politicile minoritare va aparţine statului.

Csaba Máté SARNYAI–Tibor PAP

AUTONOMIE PERSONALĂ ŞI/SAU CONSILII NAŢIONALE ÎN VOIVODINA Una dintre cele mai mari provocări politice ale secolului XXI este tratamentul local al riscurilor sociale globale. Printre acestea, crearea posibilităţii ca puterea legală să impună diferite interese este de o importanţă enormă. Un element esenţial în acest sens este implicarea unui strat tot mai mare de alegători în procesul decizional. Cu toate acestea, în prezent acesta nu se mai află în prim-plan datorită provocărilor economice actuale. Accentul problemei pare a fi schimbat. Motivul pentru această schimbare poate fi găsit în apariţia aşa-numitelor democraţii electorale în fostul bloc estic şi în răspândirea votului universal. Aceste deficienţe provin din logica internă a instituţiilor care ar trebui să stabilească democraţia.

Dintre acestea, cea mai importantă problemă se datorează dificultăţilor de exprimare a intereselor minoritare în sistemele parlamentare care funcţionează în prezent. Uniunea Europeană a stabilit obiectivul să păstreze forţa coezivă a statelor membre. Acest efort politic introdus pe baze regionale a evidenţiat câteva soluţii medii (NUTS 2) la această problemă. Acestea includ, de exemplu, practicile britanice, spaniole, belgiene şi italiene cu privire la soluţionarea problememlor legate de minorităţile etnice şi naţionale, care au un trecut de mai multe decenii. În noul mileniu modelele de rezolvare a problemelor au devenit mai universale şi exemplare, precum şi mai uşor de urmărit la nivel global. În

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timp acestea au devenit cerinţele orientative fundamentale ale democraţiei pentru ţările candidate pentru aderarea la UE. Printre altele, aceasta a motivat Serbia atunci când a dorit să ofere răspunsuri conforme cu condiţiile UE pentru provocările rezultate din propria structură a populaţiei multietnice, precum şi din structura geografică eterogenă, provenite din formele locale ale autonomiilor teritoriale şi personale. Un exemplu pentru prima este regionalizarea Voievodatului (aşa-numita dezbatere pe statut) care provine de la un nivel inferior, în timp ce un exemplu pentru aceasta din urmă este problema legată de reprezentarea minorităţilor naţionale care constituie lumi culturale diferite (aşa-numitele consilii naţionale). Această prezentare doreşte să utilizeze cazul maghiarilor din Serbia pentru a evidenţia consecinţele politice ale problemei, precum şi gestionarea acesteia într-un cadru social-teoretic.

Dorim să tratăm în mod separat: 1. instituţiile care au luat naştere sau sunt în proces de formare ca rezultat al compromisurilor politice; 2. primirea acestora în discursurile politice; 3. consecinţele politologice ale acestora, care pot fi derivate din caracterul normativ al perspectivei de termen lung: dezvoltarea naţiunilor partenere din state naţionale monolitice într-o comunitate egală. În cursul anchetei noastre vom face o paralelă între exemplele europene menţionate anterior şi eforturile din Balcanii de Vest, care pot fi găsite într-un mediu mai restrâns. În comparaţia noastră vom încerca să prezentăm posibilităţile instituţionale care rezultă din situaţiile diferite ale minorităţilor relevante din punct de vedere politic şi ale celor „reziduale”.

De asemenea, vom discuta despre problema posibilităţilor de clasificare teoretică şi practică a rolului minoritar (loialitate, protest sau separare). În acelaşi timp, ţinem cont de faptul că soluţiile locale în desfăşurare ar trebui să servească, printre altele, elaborarea instituţională orientativă a provocărilor globale ale secolului XXI. Edina SZÖCSIK

PRIETEN, DUŞMAN SAU DOAR INDIFERENT? CONDIŢIONALITATE UE ÎN DOMENIUL PROTECŢIEI MINORITĂŢILOR ÎN LUMINA SOLICITĂRILOR PARTIDELOR MINORITĂŢILOR ETNICE Multe studii au analizat modul în care UE a reuşit să inducă un nivel mai ridicat de protecţie a minorităţilor în ţările central şi est-europene prin condiţionarea aderării la UE. Conform opiniilor predominante apă-

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rute în literatura de specialitate, condiţionalitatea UE a fost, în general, eficientă. Cu toate acestea, condiţionalitatea UE în domeniul protecţiei minorităţilor a primit multe critici din cauza lipsei fundaţiilor interne ale UE, a aplicării inconsistente a acesteia şi a lipsei de transparenţă a procesului de monitorizare de către Comisia Europeană. Această lucrare studiază dintr-o nouă perspectivă condiţionalitatea UE în domeniul protecţiei minorităţilor. Scopul acestei lucrări este de a evalua într-un mod descriptiv felul în care condiţiile din domeniul protecţiei minorităţilor din UE sunt legate de cererile partidelor minorităţilor etnice pe durata procesului de aderare. Condiţionalitatea UE a sprijinit sau a subminat solicitările partidelor minorităţilor etnice? Această întrebare este extrem de importantă, având în vedere că în multe cazuri partidele minorităţilor etnice sunt cele care oferă reprezentarea politică a minorităţilor naţionale şi, de multe ori, sunt cei mai importanţi şi legitimi actori care se zbat pentru un nivel mai ridicat de protecţie a minorităţilor în zona internă a ţărilor central şi est-europene. De exemplu, cererile partidului minorităţii maghiare din România (UDMR) şi condiţiile UE legate de minoritatea maghiară sunt comparate pe baza analizei de conţinut a celor mai importante documente programatice ale celor doi actori. Rezultatele arată că UE a sprijinit cererile UDMR doar în domeniul restituirii şi al utilizării limbii maghiare, dar nu şi în domeniul educaţiei în limba maghiară sau al reformei administraţiei publice.

Edina-Ildikó ŢIPŢER

INIŢIATIVELE AUTONOMIEI SECUIEŞTI Scopul prezentei lucrări este de a evalua fezabilitatea iniţiativelor autonomiei secuieşti între 1989 şi 2009 pe baza celor nouă criterii ale lui Yash Ghai. Conflictul a apărut între majoritatea românească şi un grup minoritar maghiar, secuii, care pretind înapoierea dreptului la autonomie teritorială, în vederea menţinerii identităţii lor naţionale şi culturale într-o regiune în care ei reprezintă majoritatea populaţiei.

Cadrul concepţional în care lucrarea este încorporată este reprezentat de conceptul de autonomie şi de cele nouă criterii ale lui Yash Ghai.

Analizând proiectele de lege privind autonomia, statutele şi memorandumurile, am ajuns la concluzia că nu sunt îndeplinite în întregime toate criteriile. În consecinţă, evaluarea mea este că, deşi proiectul de autonomie a obţinut progrese considerabile de-a lungul anilor, acestea nu au fost de ajuns pentru un succes deplin şi sunt necesare îmbună-

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tăţiri suplimentare. Cu toate acestea, prin corectarea punctelor slabe menţionate şi prin acordarea unei mai mari atenţii criteriilor neîmplinite, şansele de succes pot creşte semnificativ.

Barna BODÓ–Alpár Zoltán SZÁSZ

DECONSTRUIND O REGIUNE: BANATUL Banatul este o regiune deosebită în Europa. Istoria sa modernă a început în anul 1716, când a fost recucerit de la turci şi a obţinut un statut special ca parte a Imperiului Habsburgic. Acesta a însemnat că regiunea a devenit parte a Imperiului Habsburgic fără să fi nevoit să adopte sistemul de administrare teritorială a acestuia. Statutul special a durat timp de aproximativ o sută de ani şi a impus o politică de colonizare destul de neobişnuită practicată de curtea vieneză, care a dus la o diversitate etnică aparent unică pe continent. Aceste procese şi consecinţele lor încă influenţează situaţia din regiune, precum şi viaţa minorităţilor naţionale care trăiesc în această zonă.

Scopul principal al lucrării este identificarea factorilor care în prezent formează discursurile regionale dezvoltate în special pe baza elementelor istorice prezentate în paragraful anterior. Este inutil de spus că într-adevăr există mai multe discursuri. Cu toate acestea, cel adoptat de majoritatea românească se axează pe valorile de bază care caracterizează istoria Banatului, fără să menţioneze elementele legate de minorităţile naţionale. Susţinerea acestui discurs lipsit de elemente referitoare la minorităţi ar putea pune sub semnul întrebării viitorul minorităţilor din Banat. Scopul secundar al lucrării este furnizarea de dovezi empirice pentru acest proces, precum şi analizarea acestuia.

Sébastien GOBERT

CULISELE UNEI POVEŞTI DE SUCCES. PROTECŢIA MINORITĂŢILOR ÎN LITUANIA Din 1990, când şi-a declarat independenţa, Lituania a fost lăudată pentru integrarea consensuală a minorităţilor naţionale. Datorită unei situaţii demografice favorabile, guvernul a adoptat încă din 1989 aşanumita „opţiune zero”, care este o lege inclusivă a cetăţeniei. Dezvoltarea ulterioară a instituţiilor reprezentative ale minorităţilor, precum şi a mediei a permis Lituaniei să depăşească majoritatea problemelor cu care s-a confruntat Estonia şi Letonia.

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Totuşi, în ciuda acestei integrări formale, apar în continuare unele tensiuni în rândul minorităţilor, în special în comunitatea poloneză, care este cel mai mare, din punct de vedere geografic cel mai concentrat, precum şi cel mai controversat grup etnic. Conflictele recurente privind „lituanizarea” numelor poloneze în paşapoarte şi pe semnele stradale, precum şi rapoartele periodice despre discriminarea în mass-media au demonstrat contradicţia dintre o integrare formală bine realizată şi persistenţa prejudecăţilor şi a practicilor discriminatorii în rândul populaţiei majoritare faţă de minorităţile naţionale. În plus, recenta introducere a unei legi exclusive a dublei cetăţenii, limitată la o parte din lituanienii etnici, a scos în evidenţă un decalaj structural între „ethnos” şi „demos” în rândul cetăţenilor ţării.

Această cercetare accentuează decalajul existent dintre o integrare formală reuşită a minorităţilor din Lituania şi statutul lor persistent de „străin” în discursul public al ţării. Această lucrare îşi propune să ofere câteva elemente de înţelegere privind motivul pentru care cadrul de integrare inclusiv şi tolerant nu a condus încă la includerea efectivă a minorităţilor. Studiul se concentrează asupra cazului comunităţii poloneze. Am investigat prevederile legale ce privesc integrarea minorităţilor atât pe scară internă, cât şi pe scară internaţională, precum şi diferitele concepţii teoretice despre cetăţenie. Apoi am examinat cele mai sensibile probleme legate de participarea polonezilor etnici în viaţa publică lituaniană şi am analizat consecinţele pe termen scurt şi pe termen lung ale includerii lor parţiale în sfera publică lituaniană.

Balázs MAJTÉNYI–András László PAP

EXPERIENŢELE MAGHIARE PRIVIND COMPLEXITĂŢILE INTERDEPENDENTE ALE PROTECŢIEI DATELOR ŞI ALE PROTECŢIEI MINORITĂŢILOR Privind contextul de reglementare al Republicii Ungare, prezenta lucrare propune pe de o parte să examineze relaţia dintre protecţia datelor sensibile şi protecţia împotriva încălcării drepturilor minoritare, pe de altă parte libera circulaţie a datelor cu caracter etnic, care este necesară pentru dispoziţia liberă a drepturilor suplimentare. Cu alte cuvinte, vom încerca să identificăm cazurile în care poate să apară un conflict între diferitele drepturi fundamentale, precum şi circumstanţele în care introducerea restricţiilor asupra dreptului la protecţia datelor cu caracter personal poate

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fi justificată în interesul de a face o distincţie între dreptul fundamental asociat cu interzicerea discriminării şi cu tratamentul preferenţial (acţiune afirmativă sau discriminare inversă) al grupurilor defavorizate, precum şi în scopul de a sprijini drepturile garantate constituţional ale minorităţilor naţionale şi etnice. Asemenea cazuri pot genera de multe ori conflicte între drepturi şi mai fundamentale decât cele menţionate anterior, dar singurul scop legitim al oricărei restricţii este protecţia drepturilor subiective fundamentale. Cu toate acestea, în cazurile de tratament preferenţial restricţia este întotdeauna bazată pe consimţământul subiectului.

Pieter H. van der PLANK

O ISTORIE A DREPTURILOR COLECTIVE ALE MINORITĂŢILOR ÎN CONTEXTUL ISTORIC EUROPEAN Autonomia a fost o soluţie tradiţională pusă în aplicare de autorităţile de stat şi bisericeşti pentru a rezolva problemele legate de diversitatea etnică reprezentată în principal de cultele religioase.

Deşi vechile regimuri din secolul al XVII-lea au utilizat în general metoda constrângerii şi a violenţei pentru a menţine omogenitatea ca element al suveranităţii lor, în perioada secolului al XVIII-lea această politică nu mai reprezenta o garanţie pentru stabilitate şi control. Desele schimbări ale graniţelor politice au adus cultele disidente sub controlul unor state dedicate altor religii (de stat). Epoca Iluminismului nu mai accepta soluţiile tradiţionale de convertire şi expulzare a minorităţilor, ci a acordat privilegii speciale, cu alte cuvinte drepturi colective, în scopul de a controla minorităţile prin izolare juridică. În secolul al XIX-lea drepturile colective nu mai erau acceptabile în statele democratice unitare. Deoarece cetăţenii acestora s-au emancipat de la statutul de supus al suveranului la statutul de subiect al statului, au trebuit să devină persoane egale în drepturi şi să trăiască împreună în temeiul aceloraşi legi. În Europa de Vest a fost necesar un Kulturkampf (luptă pentru civilizaţie) pentru a asigura preponderenţa statului asupra Bisericii (Romano-Catolice), limitând jurisdicţia acesteia.

Astfel, conceptul democratic naţional a devenit de succes în statele mononaţionale din Europa de Vest. În Europa Centrală şi de Est acesta nu putea fi implementat fără o ameninţare gravă la adresa statelor multinaţionale: Rusia, Austro-Ungaria şi Imperiul Otoman. Aici emanciparea naţională disidentă a fost stimulată de cultele şi organizaţiile religioase. În

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orice caz, marile puteri au fost nevoite să se confrunte cu mişcări naţionale separatiste din ce în ce mai vehemente în rândul cetăţenilor lor. Fiecare dintre acestea a încercat să rezolve această problemă în moduri diferite şi de multe ori reactive şi represive, însă niciuna dintre ele nu a reuşit.

Austria a încercat în zadar să ajungă la vreun compromis dintre drepturile personale, colective şi teritoriale. Social-democraţii (Renner şi Bauer) au avut contribuţii importante în această privinţă, scopul lor fiind reconcilierea vechilor drepturi colective cu noile drepturi individuale în cadrul unei soluţii teritoriale. Dar în afară de o implementare neobişnuită a ideilor lor în provinciile Moravia şi Bucovina, discursul din alte provincii a fost dominat de un naţionalism făţiş, paralizând astfel orice altă dezbatere, precum şi dezvoltarea unui climat tolerant şi liberal.

Prăbuşirea marilor puteri multinaţionale în Primul Război Mondial a dus la reorganizarea politică a Europei Centrale, fapt care s-a materializat în cadrul Tratatelor de pace de la Paris prin înfiinţarea a şapte noi state naţionale pe confuzul principiu de bază al dreptului internaţional: dreptul popoarelor la autodeterminare. Cu toate că acest drept a fost unul colectiv, acordarea suveranităţii naţionale a unui popor a fost pusă în aplicare în state locuite nu numai de o astfel de naţiune, dar şi de un număr mare de minorităţi naţionale disidente, numărul acestora ajungând la 30 de milioane de persoane în Europa Centrală. Cetăţenia s-a dovedit a fi un concept fragil în noile state naţionale, deoarece acestea nu au reuşit, iar foarte multe nici nu au dorit să ajungă la un compromis în ceea ce priveşte drepturile individuale ale propriilor cetăţeni garantate prin constituţie şi necesitatea de drepturi colective a acelor cetăţeni aparţinând unor grupuri minoritare care au dorit să menţină o viaţă socială şi culturală proprie. De atunci dispoziţiile religioase şi cele naţionale ale minorităţilor s-au deteriorat sub jurisdicţia statului, devenind unelte în mâinile politicienilor. În ultimii ani înainte de izbucnirea celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial, Puterile Axei, în cooperare cu Uniunea Sovietică, au provocat şi au forţat anexiuni teritoriale pe scară largă, ca o corecţie la tratatele de pace, frica de iredentism devenind astfel reală. Au fost înfiinţate chiar şi noi state naţionale (state marionetă) pentru naţiunile care anterior nu au primit recunoaşterea în tratatele de pace. Aceste soluţii teritoriale au rezolvat vechile probleme legate de minorităţi prin crearea altora noi. Au fost efectuate epurări etnice pentru a impune omogenitatea naţională în înteriorul noilor graniţe. Minorităţile evreieşti au fost eliminate prin genocid. În teritoriile ocupate de Germania, minorităţile vorbitoare de limba germană au

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fost privilegiate de un statut colectiv. În concordanţă cu autorităţile de stat ale Alianţei Axei, unele minorităţi, în special cele germanofone, au primit un statut binaţional şi, în cele din urmă, au fost nevoite să accepte în mod exclusiv cetăţenia germană. Aceste abateri constituţionale au compromis ca o soluţie viabilă statutul colectiv de minoritate.

După război, Puterile Aliate victorioase au considerat că existenţa minorităţilor ar fi fost o cauză de război pentru Puterile Axei şi a aliaţilor acestora, şi că drepturile colective ale minorităţilor vor reprezenta şi în viitor o sursă de serioase probleme internaţionale. Acestea nu numai că au decis să revină la frontierele de stat de dinainte de război (cu excepţia anexiunilor făcute de Uniunea Sovietică), dar şi să accepte şi să ghideze masiva epurare naţională în cadrul acestor graniţe. Declaraţia Universală a Drepturilor Omului reflectă această „reaplicare juridică” a cetăţeanului individual, dar într-o nouă calitate: ca un subiect uman şi suveran al unui stat. Data proclamării nu este o coincidenţă: decembrie 1948, doar trei ani după înlocuirea masivă şi forţată a aproximativ douăzeci de milioane de europeni centrali, doar din cauza unei nedorite identităţi etnice sau naţionale.

De atunci, în părţile controlate de sovietici ale Europei, problemele legate de minorităţi au fost marginalizate în reglementarea birocratică.

Republicile socialiste au pus în aplicare o soluţie ideologică a acestor probleme, drepturile individuale devenind astfel inutile, iar cele colective ilegale. Doar un singur experiment teritorial – regiunea secuiască autonomă din România – a avut parte de o viaţă scurtă şi nefericită.

Anul 1990 marca începutul unei noi ere, care oferea noi perspective pentru drepturile minorităţilor în cadrul unei legislaturi europene. Şi, aflând sub incidenţa acestei jurisdicţii, minorităţile naţionale nu ar mai trebui să reprezinte o ameninţare pentru integritatea unui stat european modern. Cu toate acestea, unele reflexe anacronice încă îşi mai definesc şi utilizează (în mod eronat) nevoia existenţială de drepturi colective.

Maik SCHMERBAUCH

TRATAMENTUL MINORITĂŢIOR ÎN PERSPECTIVĂ RELIGIOASĂ: BISERICA CATOLICĂ ŞI MINORITATEA GERMANĂ DIN SILEZIA SUPERIOARĂ ÎN PERIOADA 1922–2010 Cu excepţia cercetărilor şi investigaţiilor mele din ultimii ani, nu a existat nicio cercetare ştiinţifică sau modernă în această temă a istoriei (ecleziastice), cu toate că relaţia dintre Biserica Catolică şi minoritatea

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germană de religie catolică din Dieceza de Katowice în intervalul anilor 1922–1939 a reprezentat o perioadă foarte interesantă şi importantă din istoria ecleziastică a secolului XX. După înfrângerea din 1918 a Imperiului German la sfârşitul Primului Război Mondial, provincia germană Silezia Superioară a fost împărţită în 1922 de către Völkerbund (Societatea Naţiunilor) între Polonia şi Germania. Astfel, partea de est a Sileziei Superioare, cu importanta zonă industrială Katowice şi Chorzóv (Königshütte), a fost obţinută de Polonia. În această zonă au trăit peste un milion de locuitori de origini poloneze şi germane, cu toate că folclorul din Silezia Superioară a fost un amalgam de elemente germane şi poloneze amestecate de secole, astfel o persoană nu putea fi considerat în mod explicit german sau polonez. În mod normal, o persoană îşi identifica naţionalitatea cu limba vorbită şi cu folclorul său. În consecinţă, după 1992 a avut loc un mare exod al germanilor din Silezia Superioară în Imperiul German, în timp ce polonezii veneau în noua Silezie Superioară poloneză din toate colţurile acestei ţări. În final au rămas în această zonă aproximativ 20% din germani, care au devenit o minoritate politică în Voievodatul Silezia între 1922 şi 1939. Acest proces politic a provocat un proces de schimbare şi în Biserica Catolică.

Silezia Superioară a fost o zonă catolică care în 1922 aparţinea importantei Dieceze de Wroclaw (Breslau), condusă de episcopul-cardinalul Bertram. După 1922, Sfântul Scaun a decis să întemeieze o nouă eparhie în partea de est a Sileziei Superioare, aceasta fiind separată de Germania.

Astfel, în 1925, Sfântul Scaun a creat noua dieceză poloneză în Katowice, primul episcop al acesteia fiind Cardinalul Hlond, care a fost urmat de Arkadiusz Lisiecki (1926–1930) şi de Stanislaus Adamski (1930–1967).

Existenţa unei minorităţi catolice de care noua eparhie poloneză trebuia să aibă grijă a reprezentat o nouă experienţă în această zonă. Timp de secole germanii şi polonezii catolici au trăit paşnic în comunitatea lor, au participat împreună la slujbele bisericeşti, s-au rugat împreună şi au mers împreună la marile locuri de pelerinaj din Silezia Superioară, cum ar fi Annaberg sau Piekary. Datorită schimbărilor politice din 1922, s-a dezvoltat o mare neîncredere între locuitorii germani şi polonezi, nu doar în aspectele de ordin general, dar şi în viaţa catolică. Prin urmare, catolicii au fost iritaţi de faptul că şi-au pierdut fostul mod de viaţă în biserica de care s-au bucurat în calitate de cetăţeni germani. Episcopul de Katowice şi preoţii acestuia au recunoscut această problemă a comunităţii lor şi în perioada 1922–1939 au încercat totul pentru a evita problemele politice în Biserica Catolică. Pentru ei era clar, că în ceea ce priveşte credinţa, nu

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putea exista vreo diferenţă între credinţa unui german şi a unui polonez.

Biserica a fost un adăpost fără probleme folcloristice, însă această problemă a fost greu de gestionat. Preoţii germani au încercat de mai multe ori să evite radicalismul în rândul catolicilor germani în perioada dintre 1922 şi 1939. Au protejat şi au susţinut societăţile germanilor catolici: copiii, tinerii, bărbaţii şi femeile au mers împreună la marile locuri de pelerinaj; i-au învăţat despre viaţa socială şi religioasă şi i-au avertizat să nu creadă în noile sisteme politice ale nazismului şi ale comunismului, care au încercat şă-i convingă pe credincioşii germani de necesitatea ideologiei lor. Datorită acestor eforturi, Biserica Catolică a reuşit să convingă majoritatea catolicilor să rămână în Biserică până la sfârşitul anilor ‘30. De data aceasta, situaţia politică dintre Germania şi Polonia s-a schimbat în rău, iar guvernul polonez din Silezia Superioară a început să persecute mai multe societăţi şi reviste ale minorităţii germane până la începutul celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial din 1939, care nu a putu fi evitat nici măcar de Biserica Catolică.

Aşadar, discuţia şi analizarea acestei părţi a istoriei ecleziastice a secolului XX este de aşteptat să fie un proiect uriaş, aducând noi rezultate cercetărilor actuale. Consider că acest proiect va oferi noi perspective cercetării minorităţilor în teologia catolică şi că va oferi noi modalităţi pentru gestionarea acelor catolici care trăiesc în minoritate ca o comunitate religioasă.

Jeroen TEMPERMAN

POLITICI DE RECUNOAŞTERE/ÎNREGISTRARE FAŢĂ DE MINORITĂŢI RELIGIOASE: O ANALIZĂ JURIDICĂ COMPARATIVĂ ŞI O ANALIZĂ BAZATĂ PE DREPTURILE OMULUI Problema libertăţii de asociere este indisolubil legată de libertăţile de care se bucură grupurile religioase organizate. Concentrând asupra ţărilor din Europa de Est, această lucrare analizează problema legată de ramificările juridice exacte ale normei care susţine că „statele nu pot face discriminări între diferitele religii şi credinţe” din domeniul de înregistrare a religiilor. Va fi subliniat faptul că legile privind asocierea religioasă pot fi utilizate în practică pentru a confirma şi/sau a acoperi prerogativele financiare istorice ale religiei dominante şi tradiţionale a statului (de ex.: în principal bisericile ortodoxe naţionale din majoritatea statelor din această regiune, care menţin, de jure sau de facto, legături cu această religie) sau pentru a restrânge activităţile unor grupuri religioase (în state seculare cu

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interpretări stricte despre secularismul sau separatismul statului). Astfel, este posibil ca schemele de sprijin financiar se bazează pe neutrele criterii prima facie („toate religiile şi credinţele recunoscute/înregistrate beneficiază de finanţare”), însă normele de înregistrare nu se bazează pe aceleaşi criterii. Dacă religiei sau bisericii predominante a unui stat se acordă în mod automat sprijin financiar, dar alte grupuri sunt nevoite să parcurgă proceduri dificile pentru a ajunge la acelaşi nivel de recunoaştere juridică, atunci politica de alocare a beneficiilor financiare nu poate fi considerată una „bazată pe criterii obiective”. Acelaşi lucru este valabil, a fortiori, în cazul în care legile privind asocierea religioasă stabilesc criterii nelegitime de înregistrare conform cărora comunităţile religioase nedominante sau netradiţionale nu se pot întâlni niciodată. Astfel, pot fi distinse două probleme diferite care pot duce la discriminarea împotriva anumitor religii: (i) recunoaştere de bază ca o entitate juridică din partea statului (şi drepturile care însoţesc acest statut); (ii) criterii de eligibilitate pentru finanţare de stat (care este adesea întreţesut cu problema statutului grupurilor religioase).

Pe baza politicilor de stat cu privire la recunoaşterea grupurilor religioase şi, mai precis, pe baza termenilor şi criteriilor consacrate în aşa-numitele „legi privind asocierea religioasă”, s-ar putea întâmpla ca unei comunităţi religioase să i se refuze în totalitate statutul de persoană juridică sau unei comunităţi religioase să i se acorde acest statut juridic fundamental, dar aceasta este totuşi dezavantajată în comparaţie cu bisericile sau organizaţiile religioase cărora li s-a acordat un statut (mai mare), ceea ce le oferă posibilitatea să fie eligibile pentru beneficii suplimentare. Lucrarea prezintă o privire comparativă de ansamblu despre practicile statelor din această regiune cu scopul de a arăta principalele probleme din acest domeniu.

Lucrarea susţine că sistemele de înregistrare pot fi compatibile cu legislaţia în domeniul drepturilor omului (pe baza faptului că nici manifestarea unei religii şi nici dreptul la libertate de asociere nu este o libertate absolută). Polticile echitabile de recunoaştere şi înregistrare a religiilor şi a organizaţiilor religioase ar putea facilita şi acomoda libertăţile religioase. Acestea fiind spuse, practica statului este de a concepe şi de a implementa ocazional aceste politici, nu pentru a facilita libertatea religioasă, ci mai degrabă pentru a controla mai bine practicarea religiei, pentru a discrimina în mod activ acele organizaţii pe care aceste guverne le consideră „secte” periculoase sau pentru a privilegia biserica tradiţională şi predominantă. Lucrarea susţine că cerinţele precise pentru înregistrare trebuie să corespundă cu stricteţe standardelor internaţionale cu privire la libertatea de asociere împreună cu libertatea de religie sau convingere.

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Fahri TÜRK

STATUTUL ISTORIC ŞI CEL ACTUAL AL MINORITĂŢII TURCE DIN BULGARIA Deşi turcii din Bulgaria au fost oprimaţi de autorităţile guvernamentale după independenţa Regatului Bulgariei, proclamată în 1908, după prăbuşirea comunismului au devenit, treptat, cea mai influentă minoritate din Europa de Est. Conform recensământului din 2005, în Bulgaria trăiesc în total 7.540.000 de oameni din care 9,4% (700.300) sunt turci.

Cu toate că Sofia a garantat respectarea drepturilor culturale şi religioase ale turcilor, în conformitate cu acordurile bilaterale cu Ankara, în 1984 a început să oprime într-o mare măsură minoritatea turcă. Guvernul bulgar a interzis cetăţenilor săi să folosească nume turceşti, în consecinţă minoritatea turcă a fost nevoit să folosească nume bulgare până în 1991. A fost interzisă chiar şi folosirea limbii turce în locurile publice. În cele din urmă, guvernul bulgar a declarat că nu recunoaşte minoritatea turcă din Bulgaria. Turcii din Bulgaria „nu au fost” turci, ci bulgari forţaţi de guvernul otoman să se convertească la islam.

După prăbuşirea sistemului comunist, minoritatea turcă s-a angajat în arena politică din Bulgaria. Astfel, partidul Mişcarea pentru Drepturi şi Libertăţi, al cărui membri sunt din minoritatea turcă, a câştigat 34 de locuri parlamentare din cele 240 la alegerile generale din 2005. Ulterior, Mişcarea pentru Drepturi şi Libertăţi a luat parte în crearea unui nou guvern de coaliţie în Sofia, unde a fost reprezentat de trei miniştri. Acest angajament a oferit posibilitatea minorităţii turce să-şi recapete drepturile pierdute în urma politicii de asimilare a lui Todor Jivkov. În ianuarie 1991, guvernul bulgar a permis minorităţii turce să înveţe limba turcă în şcolile unde trăiesc în majoritate, cum ar fi oraşul Razgrad. În plus, postul naţional de radio din Bulgaria a început să difuzeze programe turceşti în 1993. Aderarea Bulgariei la UE a dat un nou impuls minorităţii turce să devină conştient de propriile drepturi culturale şi civile.

Eleni VELIVASAKI

ADAPTAREA PLURALITĂŢILOR RELIGIOASE: CAZUL GRECIEI Întrebarea legată de gestionarea diversităţii a fost esenţială în actualele dezbateri proeminente despre multiculturalism. Regiunea Balcanilor a demonstrat o serie de tehnici şi politici în abordarea diversităţii, variind

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de la războaie violente la asimilarea silenţioasă, precum şi la tehnica unică a schimbului de populaţii. În cazul Greciei, recunoaşterea drepturilor religioase generale – ceea ce la început pare a fi o metodă destul de compatibilă pentru gestionarea diversităţii, luând în considerare toate cerinţele vremurilor moderne care privesc drepturile omului şi toleranţa – a fost rezervată pentru singura minoritate recunoscută oficial, şi anume minoritatea musulmană/turcă din Tracia de Vest. Totuşi, ceea ce vedem astăzi în Grecia este supravieţuirea paradoxală a noului sistem al millet-urilor prin susţinerea instituţiilor comunitare pro-moderne, precum şi prin recunoaşterea unor drepturi religioase speciale în cazul unei minorităţi religioase care a fost naţionalizată în mod progresiv. Se aplică un sistem legislativ islamic cu caracter personal pentru membrii minorităţii, care, în cazul litigiilor de drept privat cu privire la moştenire sau probleme familiale, au posibilitatea de a se adresa instanţelor cu competenţă specială, cunoscute sub denumirea de muftii. Prezenta lucrare îşi propune să examineze soluţia instituţională a „noului sistem al millet-urilor” şi să evalueze orice rezultat pozitiv obţinut datorită adaptării legii islamice ca ordin normativ separat. În acest scop voi discuta pe scurt despre extinderea şi introducerea legii islamice în sistemul juridic din Grecia, precum şi despre drepturile religioase acordate minorităţilor. În final, voi încerca să evaluez exemplul grec: este un anacronism juridic sau o aplicare a multiculturalismului, un posibil model pentru politicile minoritare de astăzi ale Europei?

István HORVÁTH

MINORITĂŢI, PROTECŢIA MINORITĂŢILOR ÎN ROMÂNIA Articolul este o trecere în revistă a caracteristicilor minorităţilor naţionale din România şi se constituie ca o scurtă analiză a sistemului de protecţie a minorităţilor din această ţară. Primele două subcapitole reprezintă o analiză referitoare la numărul grupurilor recunoscute ca minorităţi naţionale cu un focus specific la limitele politicilor recunoaşterii: reflectând atât asupra grupurilor etnografice militând pentru recunoaşterea lor ca minorităţi naţionale cât şi asupra noilor minorităţi imigrante (încă marginale în peisajul etnic din România). Cifrele despre volumul populaţiilor minoritare şi dinamica lor demografică, întregite de alţi indicatori oferă schiţează diferenţele în ceea ce priveşte vitalitatea etnolingvistică a acestor grupuri. De asemenea este conturată o tipologiei etno-geografică a peisajului minoritar din România.

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Analizând sistemul protecţiei minorităţilor din România, articolul prezintă o trecere în revistă atât a dezbaterilor şi principalelor dinamici etno-politice din ultimele două decenii, cât şi a instituţiilor menite a oferii protecţie minorităţilor naţionale.

János Kristóf MURÁDIN

RELUARE FĂRĂ PERSPECTIVE. SOCIETATEA MUZEULUI ARDELEAN ÎNTRE 1944 ŞI 1950 Conferinţa mea tratează una dintre cele mai controversate perioade din viaţa unui institut academic-ştiinţific maghiar din Transilvania. Societatea Muzeului Ardelean (SMA) a fost fondată în 1859, pe baza Academiei Maghiare de Ştiinţe, şi a fost cel mai important institut ştiinţific pentru maghiarii din regiune. Viaţa sa, caracterizată de suişuri şi coborâşuri, pare să reflecte destinul naţiunii separate. Această comparaţie devine evidentă pe durata evenimentelor din perioada 1944–1950, care era caracterizată de raritatea oportunităţilor şi de sferele de acţiune din ce în ce mai limitate, atât în istoria SMA, cât şi în viaţa maghiarilor din Transilvania.

Mulţi au scris şi şi-au exprimat opiniile în nenumărate feluri despre SMA, însă un lucru este cert: niciodată nu a fost contestată importanţa şi rolul definitoriu în viaţa culturală maghiară a acestei instituţii ştiinţifice.

Acesta ar putea fi motivul pentru care în 1944 noua putere românească, care ocupa Transilvania de Nord în umbra armelor sovietice, a ţintit să aplice lovitura de graţie principalelor structuri instituţionale ale maghiarilor, printre care s-a numărat şi SMA cu sediul în Cluj. În prelegerea mea încerc să prezint această bătălie silenţioasă şi continuă, care se desfăşoară în culise între instituţia ştiinţifică şi stat. Mai întâi de toate, încerc să conturez constant regenerata SMA – o instituţie ştiinţifică care încearcă să răspundă aşteptărilor politico-ideologice ale epocii – în perioada de tranziţie aflată în continuă schimbare după război. În acelaşi timp, voi urmări cu atenţie sporită activitatea ştiinţifică, editarea de publicaţii, crearea unui trecut istoric şi organizarea unei serii de prelegeri educaţionale şi ştiinţifice, toate efectuate în cadrul SMA, marcând astfel sfârşitul unei ere.

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Benedek NAGY

ŢINUTUL SECUIESC: CALEA TURISTICĂ SPRE AUTONOMIE Scopul principal al articolului nostru este de a contura dacă există alte modalităţi pentru obţinerea autonomiei atât de mult dorite. Modalitatea politică este deja foarte exploatată şi, probabil, într-o oarecare măsură şi eficientă. Însă ar fi necesare şi alte moduri de comunicare pentru a convinge majoritatea românească despre existenţa şi importanţa unei minorităţi etnice cum ar fi maghiarii din Transilvania, printre care se numără şi secuii. În prima parte încercăm să prezentăm actualele evenimente şi evoluţii ale vieţii politice şi publice din regiunea noastră cu scopul de a demonstra că există o dorinţă internă în creştere pentru a obţine o structură autonomă Ţinutului Secuiesc şi pentru a avea proiecte comune, adică iniţiative regionale secuieşti. Acestea au fost absente în anii ’90, dar acum putem observa o creştere a numărului şi a calităţii diferitelor „produse” secuieşti: proiecte comune de dezvoltare, iniţiative turistice, comunicaţii, lucrări ştiinţifice, etc. În a doua parte vom prezenta comunicările legate de domeniul turismului, precum şi simbolurile utilizate pentru aceste scopuri. Care sunt simbolurile regionale, cine le foloseşte şi în ce măsură sunt acestea unificate şi conceptual stabilite?

A treia parte aduce exemple de bună practică din Europa, unde turismul şi comunicarea locală au contribuit la procesul de regionalizare, nu numai prin intermediul veniturilor şi taxelor dobândite, dar şi prin schimbările realizate cu ajutorul comunicării şi proclamării elementelor distincte ale culturilor locale. În acest fel, dacă este utilizat într-o manieră extrem de vizibilă, turismul poate avea – în convingerea noastră – un dublu efect pozitiv: pe lângă generarea unei game largi de efecte economice pozitive (care nu sunt tratate în această lucrare), acesta poate să convingă o majoritate naţională ostilă despre importanţa menţinerii patrimoniului naţional, a diferitelor valori etnice şi, mai presus de toate, că diferenţa nu înseamnă neapărat segregare sau excludere.

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Márton TONK–Tünde SZÉKELY

PREZENTUL ŞI VIITORUL ÎNVĂŢĂMÂNTULUI SUPERIOR ÎN LIMBA MAGHIARĂ DIN ROMÂNIA Scopul studiului este de a analiza problemele şi provocările actuale ale politicilor educaţionale cu privire la limba maghiară din România în contextul politicii educaţionale a Uniunii Europene, respectiv al proceselor actuale din Spaţiul European al Învăţământului Superior. În această sferă de gândire vom prezenta pe scurt câteva dintre consecinţele aşanumitului „Proces de la Bologna” privind învăţământul superior intern (inclusiv învăţământul superior în limba maghiară), după care vom încerca să analizăm problemele specifice ale învăţământului universitar de limbă maghiară. În cadrul investigaţiei acestor probleme, care reprezintă partea mai mare a studiului nostru, ne propunem să fim atenţi atât la politica naţională şi aspectele demografice şi minoritare referitoare la minoritatea maghiară din Transilvania, cât şi la oferta de învăţământ superior şi sistemul instituţional. În mod evident, analizele noastre nu pot ignora „toposul” universităţii de stat în limba maghiară – dilemele şi întrebările acesteia constituie ultima unitate tematică a studiului nostru.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

AVRAM, Andrei – MA degree obtained in Political Science at the Free University of Berlin in February 2011. Between 2008 and 2010, he was a co-ordinator of international academic and youth projects at the Moldova-Institut Leipzig e.V. He is now Assistant to the Chairman of the Christian-Democratic Foundation in Bucharest.

BANDOV, Goran (1976-) – Lawyer and politologist. He studied law, international relations and political science in Osijek, Zagreb and Hamburg; PhD in Political Science / International Relations at University of Hamburg (2009). Since 2005, he works as Research Fellow at the University of Hamburg, Germany, and since 2009, as University Assistant Professor of International Relations and Vice Dean at the University College of International Relations and Diplomacy, Zagreb, Croatia. He is a member of many academic and expert organizations, amongst others: Academic Network South East Europe; International Standing Group European Multilingualism (ISGEM); German Association for Political Science; Open Society Institute Network, Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Liberty.

BODÓ, Barna (1948-) – Political scientist, writer, associate professor at Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania in Cluj/Kolozsvár. He studied journalism (University of Bucharest), administrative law (University of Timişoara), cultural policy (Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest), obtained PhD in political philosophy (Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj-Kolozsvár).

Also, he teaches political science at the West University of Timisoara and Babeş-Bolyai University in Cluj/Kolozsvár. He is founding president of the Diaspora Foundation Timişoara and head of Centre for Ethno-regionalism; president of Federation of Hungarian Non-governmental Associations from Transylvania; founding president of the Politeia – Hungarian Political Science Association in Romania and member in the Board of the Intercultural Institute of Timişoara and the International Society for Hungarian Language and Culture: member of the Hungarian Society for Regional Studies. Editor-in-chief of the periodical “European and Regional Studies” edited by the Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania, and member of the Editorial Board of the publications ‘Magyar Kisebbség’ (Hungarian Minority, Cluj/Kolozsvár) and ‘Civil Fórum’ (Civic Forum, Cluj/

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Kolozsvár) and ‘Convietuirea’ (Szeged). Editor-in-chief of the yearbook ‘Romániai Magyar Évkönyv’ (Hungarian Annual from Romania) since 2000; participant in various international research projects. Main research interests: national identity, public policy, ethno-regionalism, and regional development. He published as author and co-author many books, such as: ‘Politica regională şi dezvoltarea teritoriului’ (Regional Policy and Rural Development) – Editura Marineasa, Timişoara, 2003; ‘Talpalatnyi régiónk’ (The Region under our Sole) – Editura Komp-Press Cluj, 2003; ‘Az identitás egyetemessége’ (Universalism of the Identity) – Editura Polis, Cluj, 2004; ‘Régióba zártan’ (ed.), Diaszpóra Könyvek, Marineasa Kiadó, Temesvár, 2008: ‘Szórvány és nyelvhatár’ – Lucidus Kiadó, Budapest, 2009, ‘Nations and National Minorities in the European Union’ (ed. with M. Tonk), 2009, Scientia, Cluj, ‘Közpolitika’ (Public policy), 2011, Scientia, Cluj. Published a large number of articles in Hungarian, Romanian, German, and English.

CARTRITE, Britt (1968-) – Associate Professor, Alma College Department of Political Science. Former post-doctoral research fellow at the Solomon Asch Center for Study of Ethnic Conflict, University of Pennsylvania. His current research explores the dynamics driving the emergence and politicisation of ethnic identities, particularly during the earliest phases of these processes, and the use of agent-based computer modelling to study a range of socio-political phenomena.

GOBERT, Sébastien (1985-) – French Social researcher and Journalist based in Kiev (Ukraine). Studies in political sciences in France (Instituts d’Études Politiques de Lille & Strasbourg) and in nationalism studies in Hungary (Central European University, Budapest). His subjects of interest: immigration, integration, citizenship, post-communist transitions, and European integration.

HORNSBY, Michael (1965-) – Sociolinguist and Celticist. Degrees in French and Welsh (University of Cardiff, UK), Irish studies (Bath Spa University, IK), and a PhD in sociolinguistics (Southampton University, UK). Assistant professor at the University of Poznań and professor at Koszalin Polytechnic, Poland, where he teaches a variety of courses on Celtic languages and modern sociolinguistics to undergraduates and postgraduates. His research interests include multilingual diversity involving minority languages and the documenting of language shift through language memoirs.

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HORVÁTH, István (1966-) – Sociologist, assistant professor at the Department of Sociology, Babeş-Bolyai University (Cluj-Napoca) and since 2007 he is the Chairman of the Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities. From 2003, he is the editor-in-chief of the Erdélyi Társadalom sociological journal. He published books and articles on Romanian ethno-politics, ethnic migration, and minority sociolinguistics.

MAJTÉNYI, Balázs (1974-) – Associate professor, head of the Department for European Studies at ELTE Social Science Faculty and senior research fellow at the Institute for Legal Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. He obtained his PhD degree at the Eötvös Loránd University in 2006. Since 2007, he has been a member of the research team of the Hungarian National Focal Point of the Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA). He authorised three monographs, published over sixty articles and book chapters, and edited twelve books. He is the editorin-chief of the ‘Hungarian Journal of European and International Law’ (Föld-rész) and the ‘Föld-rész’ book series. Subject interest: international human protection.

MALLOY, H. Tove – Political theorist by background specialising in the political and legal aspects of national and ethnic minority rights in international law and international relations, especially in the European context. Her current research interests include minority citizenship, agonistic democracy, ethno-ecologism, minority indicators, and intersectional discrimination. Dr. Malloy has taught at the EU’s Master Programme in Human Rights and Democratisation in Venice, Italy, the Master in European Integration and Regionalism in Bolzano, and the University of Bologna’s European Master in Peace-making and Peacebuilding. She is Director of the European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) in Flensburg, Germany and currently serves as member of the Advisory Committee to the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Before assuming her duties as Director of ECMI, Dr. Malloy was Senior Researcher and Consortium Director at the European Academy, Bolzano/Bozen, South Tyrol. In addition to her academic career, Dr. Malloy has served in the Danish Foreign Service in numerous positions. Dr. Malloy holds a doctorate in Government from the University of Essex (UK) and an MA in Humanities and Social Sciences from the University of Southern Denmark.

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

MARÁCZ, László (1960-) – Linguist. He studied Hungarian studies and general linguistics at the University of Groningen (1978-1984). At the same university, he defended his PhD dissertation in Hungarian linguistics in 1989. In 1990-1991, he was Research Fellow of the Niels Stensen Scientific Foundation. From 1992, he is affiliated to the European studies programme of the University of Amsterdam. In present, he is assistant professor of East European studies and director of the MA-programme European policy at the same university. Subject interests: Hungarian and general linguistics; European history, ethnic and national minorities, and multilingualism; European policy, international relations, and geopolitics.

MURÁDIN, János Kristóf (1980-) – Historian. Studied in Cluj/Kolozsvár (Babeş-Bolyai University, 1999–2003). PhD degree in contemporary history (Babeş-Bolyai University, 2010). Assistant professor at Sapientia University Cluj/Kolozsvár (2008-). Member of the Transylvanian Museum Society (2005-), the ‘Bolyai’ Society (2006-), and the External Public Body of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (2011-). Subject interests: Hungarian-Romanian relations in the period of the Second World War, deportation of Hungarian civilians from Cluj to the Soviet Union in October 1944 and history of their captivity in Soviet labour and concentration camps, development of Hungarian minority culture in Romania, and the transformations inside the cultural institutions of the Hungarians living in Transylvania between 1944 and 1948.

NAGEL, Klaus Jürgen (1955-) – Political Scientist and Historian, professor at Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona (Catalonia). His current research interests include political theory (nationalism, federalism) and comparative politics (nationalist parties and movements, European Integration). He has published on Catalan history (national movement, working class movement, and history of the wine sector) and German politics, too. He studied at the universities of Münster and Bielefeld (Germany) and obtained his Staatsexamen in 1981 and his doctoral degree in 1989. Before he changed to Barcelona, he worked at Universität Bielefeld (history department) and Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main (social sciences department).

NAGY, Benedek (1978-) – Economist. He graduated the Academy of Economic Studies in Bucharest in 2002, and obtained the PhD degree at the University of Pécs in June 2011. His major fields are tourism and

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services, ecotourism, place marketing, and place branding. He participated in many researches and development papers of the Szeklerland region and smaller destinations, especially around the subjects of regional marketing, tourism and tourism related investments. He is an assistant professor at Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania, Economic Faculty from Miercurea-Ciuc/Csíkszereda.

PAP, András László (1973-) – Lawyer. Education in Budapest (ELTE, CEU; JD 1998, MA 1999, M.Phil., Ph.D. 2005, Habil. 2009) He is Associate Professor at Eötvös University (ELTE) Faculty of Humanities, Department of Media and Communication and Senior Research Fellow at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Institute for Legal Studies in Budapest. He is also a Recurrent Visiting Professor at Central European University’s Nationalism Studies Program and serves as Project Manager of the Hungarian Focal Point of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. He is staff editor of the Hungarian Internal Affairs Review (Belügyi Szemle), as well as chairman of the editorial board of ‘Föld-Rész’: Nemzetközi- és Európai Jogi Szemle (International and European Public Law Review, Hungary) and editorial board member of the Föld-Rész book series at L’Harmattan, Hungary. His research interests include constitutional law, minority rights and law enforcement issues, surveillance, privacy, and challenges brought by the new digital technology. He has published four books and over 200 articles on comparative constitutional law, human rights, and minority rights.

PAP, Tibor (1970-) – Minority researcher, PhD candidate at the University of Szeged, Department of Comparative Literature. He taught sociology of minorities at ELTE in Budapest; in present he is in the last year of his MA studies in political sciences at the University of Szeged.

His main fields of research are minority institutional systems and policy making in minority issues.

PAVLOVIĆ, Ana (1983-) – Politologist for international affairs, MA. Graduated at the Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade (2008). Fields of research: international public law, human rights , civil society, and environmental questions. She has several published works in domestic and international publications. Working for several NGOs, she is mainly dedicated to human rights issues and she is a member of the directive board of the Center for Society Development. She is fluent in speaking Spanish, English, and French.

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

PLANK, Pieter H. van der (1944-) – Took up academic work by a Ph.D. thesis, discussing the assimilation of ethno-linguistic minorities (Utrecht State University, 1971), organised the first sociolinguistic section of the VIIIth World Congress of Sociology (Toronto 1974), and was appointed

by Groningen State University (1976), which provided the opportunity to investigate the bilingualism and ethnicity of the Frisians, resulting in a series of publications. He concluded his professional life with a D.Litt. thesis (Groningen 2004), investigating and explaining the massive cleansing of ethnically, racially, and nationally unwanted citizens in the Central-European nation-states during the first half of the 20th century, when 37 million were violently removed from their homesteads, partly in a genocidal way. International public opinion and law were and still are reluctant to encounter these historical atrocities, waiting for recognition in our common European history.

RIABCHUK, Mykola (1953-) – Political and Cultural Analyst, Senior Research Fellow at the Ukrainian Center for Cultural Studies in Kyiv and a co-founder and a member of the editorial board of the “Krytyka” monthly. He published six books and numerous articles on civil society, nation-state building, national identity, nationalism, and post-communist transformations in Ukraine and Eastern Europe.

SERRANO, Ivan (1974-) – Holds a BA in Political Science from the Autonomous University of Barcelona, an MA in Public Management from UPF-UAB-ESADE and a PhD in Political Science from the Pompeu Fabra University. He has been Postgraduate Research Visitor at the Queen Mary College – University of London, and he is currently Postdoctoral Researcher at the Open University of Catalonia. His research activity includes nationalism studies, devolution, federalism, and secession.

SARNYAI, Csaba Máté (1968-) – He got MA degrees in history, literature, and comparative literature in 1993 and in philosophy in 1995 at the University of Szeged. He got a PhD degree in history at the University of Pécs 2001. Associated professor at Károli Gáspár University Budapest (2008-) and Research Fellow at University of Szeged (Hungarian Scientific Research Fund (OTKA) (2009-). Vice-president of the Hungarian SYLFF Fellows’ Association, secretary of the Working Committee of the Szeged Academy Committee [SZAB] for Modern Church History, member of the public body of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, member of the

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Hungarian Historiographic Society, and the also member of the Hungarian Association for the Academic Study of Religions. Interest fields: modern church history, autonomies in the modern societies.

SCHMERBAUCH, Maik (1979-) – Theologian historian. Studied in Germany, Israel, and Poland; PhD at the Philosopic-Theologic University St. Georgen in Frankfurt am Main in Germany; Special subject: Ecclesiastical History of the Catholic Church in the Silesian Area in 1918-1945 and the history of the expulsion of the German Catholics from former eastern parts of Germany after 1945.

SZÁSZ, Alpár Zoltán (1966-) – Political scientist, social researcher.

He studied political science and social theory at Central European University, Budapest College. Teaches political science at the BabeşBolyai University, Cluj and is the executive president of the Politeia – Hungarian Political Science Association in Romania. He participated in various international research projects. His main research interests are: parties and party systems as well as political behaviour with special regard to phenomena and processes involving ethnic and national minorities. Published a large number of articles, while (co-)authoring and editing several volumes.

SZÉKELY, Tünde (1981-) – Political scientist. She studied Political Science at the Babeş-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca. At the moment, she is a PhD student at the Corvinus University of Budapest, attending the Political Science Doctoral Programme and she is a assistant teacher at Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania.

Her main research topics are the civil society and the European higher education policy, starting from the Bologna Process. Published a few articles on civil society and on higher education policy.

SZILÁGYI, István (1950-) – Lawyer and Politologist. He graduated law at the University of Szeged (1974) and political science at ELTE, Budapest (1977). PhD in contemporary history (1978) and political science (1984).

Dr. habil. in political science (1998). Doctor of Hungarian Academy of Sciences (1999). Jobs: Professor at the Institute of Geoography, University of Pécs. Editor: Mediterranean World and Comitatus.

Subject interests: theory of international relations; geopolitics; comparative politics; comparative geopolitics, political science;

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

constitutional law; transitions, changes and modernisations of political systems in South-America, East-Central Europe and Southern Europe; European Union: regionalism and the social cohesion; The Mediterranean World – Portugal and Spain (history, politics and law) in the twentieth century.

He published ten books and more than 180 studies.

SZŐCSIK, Edina (1980-) – Political Scientist, PhD student at the chair of European Politics at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) in Zurich. She holds an MA in Political Science, Economics, and Philosophy and studied at the University of Zurich and the Pompeu Fabra University in Barcelona. She is part of the PhD programme ‘External democracy promotion & civil society in post-socialist Europe’ funded by the Heinrich Böll Foundation. Subject interests: ethnic politics, party politics, democratisation, and Europeanization.

TEMPERMAN, Jeroen (1981-) – Associate professor of public international law at the department of international law of the Erasmus University Rotterdam (Netherlands), lecturing international human rights law and public international law. Jeroen Temperman is the editor-in-chief of Religion & Human Rights: An International Journal.

In 2010, his monograph State–Religion Relationships and Human Rights Law: Towards a Right to Religiously Neutral Governance (Leiden/ Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 382 pp.) was published. Other key publications include articles on issues of religious freedom, freedom of expression, or religion–state relationships in Human Rights Quarterly (2009, 2010), Netherlands Quarterly on Human Rights (2008), Annuaire Droit et Religion (2009/2010), and Religion & Human Rights (2006, 2007, 2008); and book chapters in edited volumes on religious freedom, such as the recent compendium entitled Law and Religion in the 21st Century: Relations between States and Religious Communities (ed. Silvio Ferrari; Aldershot: Ashgate Publ., 2010). In December 2010, Jeroen Temperman was awarded a research grant for his 4-year project: “The prohibition of advocacy of religious hatred in international and domestic law”.

TONK, Márton (1973–) – PhD in Philosophy; at present, Associate Professor and Dean of the Faculty of Sciences and Arts at Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania. He teaches History of Political Thought, Political Ideologies and History of Philosophy and Educational

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

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Policies at the European Studies` Department at Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania. At the same time, he is an invited lecturer at Partium Christian University in Oradea. Founder and member of the editorial board of the philosophical review Kellék. Director of the Pro Philosophia Foundation in Cluj. Member of the Public Body of the Hungarian Philosophical Society, and of the Public Body of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, member of the Board of Directors of the Hungarian University Federation of Cluj. His more specific areas of research include the history of Hungarian philosophy, history of political thought, minority theory and EU minority rights, and educational policy; his published volumes and studies are also connected to these areas.

TIPTER, Edina Ildikó (1986-) – Student Records Coordinator at the Central European University, Budapest. She has a Bachelor’s Degree in International Relations and European Studies, an MA in Public Policy from the Central European University and an MA in Entrepreneurship and Business Management from the Babeş-Bolyai University, ClujNapoca. Subject interests: national and ethnic minorities, decentralised governance, regionalisation, and rural development.

TÜRK, Fahri (1969-) – He got a diploma in political science at the Free University of Berlin (1997). PhD Thesis in the German arms industry and its trade with Turkey, 1871-1914, at the Free University of Berlin (2006), Project Manager in the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, organised an international conference on Eurasian Gasallianz in Almaty, Kazakhstan (2005), Associate Professorship (21 April 2011), Lecturer in the department of Political Science of the Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences at the Trakya University in Edirne/Turkey.

VELIVASAKI, Eleni (1984-) – Legal practitioner. She studied law at the Democritus University of Thrace (Greece), (2002-2008). She completed her master in law (LLM) on Human Rights, Conflict and Justice at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London (2008-2009). She is currently a PhD Candidate at the Department of Balkan Slavic and Oriental Studies, University of Macedonia (Greece). At the same time, she works for the Greek Council for Refugees as a member of the Legal Assistance Unit at the region of Rhodopi (Greece). She has completed various projects and essays on the institution of the Ombudsman, on issues of diversity, multiculturalism, religious freedom, legal pluralism,

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and Islamic law. Co-ordinator for the Group for Conscientious Objectors of the Greek Section of Amnesty International.

WICHERKIEWICZ, Tomasz (1967-) – Linguist, Sociolinguist. Studies at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, and Universität Bielefeld Graduated in comparative linguistics. Head of the Department of Language Policy & Minority Studies at Poznań University, member of institutions dealing with language planning in Kashubia, Poland, and Europe. Independent expert of the Council of Europe’s European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. Field work projects among minority and regional language communities in various European and Asian regions. Teacher of linguistics, sociolinguistics, language policy, and the typology of minority language situations.

PUBLICATIONS IN THE WORKSHOP SERIES

ALBERT-LŐRINCZ ENIKŐ (SZERK.) Fekete éden. A 2000. november 26-án és 2001. november 15-én Kolozsváron megtartott Drogfórum című konferenciák előadásai.

Kolozsvár. 2003.

MÓCSY ILDIKÓ–NÉDA TAMÁS (SZERK.) Környezettudományi konferencia. 2005. március 17–18.

Kolozsvár. 2006.

GAGYI JÓZSEF (SZERK.) Emlékezet és kommunikáció. Narratívák az egyéni, a társas és a közösségi identitás teremtésében. 2004. március 19–20.

Marosvásárhely. 2007.

ELEK SÁNDOR (SZERK.) Agrárpolitika – vidékfejlesztés. Csíkszereda, 2007.

PAP LEVENTE–TAPODI ZSUZSA (SZERK.) Közösség, kultúra, identitás. Válogatás a Kultusz, Kultúra, Identitás (Csíkszereda, 2003. szeptember 26–28.), Közösség és Idegenek (Csíkszereda, 2005. szeptember 14–16.) című konferenciák előadásaiból. Csíkszereda, 2008.

BODÓ BARNA–TONK MÁRTON (SZERK.) Nations and National Minorities in the European Union. 2008. március 27–29. Kolozsvár. 2009.

CSATA ANDREA–ELEK SÁNDOR (SZERK.) Gazdaságpolitika – vidékpolitika. Az európai uniós tagság kihívásai Székelyföldön. Csíkszereda. 2009.

DOMOKOS JÓZSEF (SZERK.) MACRo2010. Proceedings of the 2nd Conference on Recent Achievements in Mechatronics, Automation, Computer Science and Robotics. Marosvásárhely. 2010.

KOVÁCS RÉKA ROZÁLIA Egymást segítve hogyan segíthetünk? Erőforrás–Együttműködés– Eredmény. Marosvásárhely. 2010.

ÁRMEÁN OTÍLIA–GAGI JÓZSEF Új média és kommunikatív magatartás. 2008. február 29. – március 1.

Marosvásárhely. 2011.

TAPODI ZSUZSA – PAP LEVENTE Tükörben. Imagológiai tanulmányok. Csíkszereda. 2011.

The Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities 400697 Cluj-Napoca Gavril Muzicescu street 5.

Tel: +40-364-103154 Fax: + 40-364-103177 E-mail: office@ispmn.gov.ro www.ispmn.gov.ro Scientia Publishing House 400112 Cluj-Napoca Matei Corvin street 4.

Tel./fax: +40-264-593694 E-mail: scientia@kpi.sapientia.ro www.scientiakiado.ro English Proofreading: Emőd Farkas, István Szász-Köpeczi Layout Editor: Piroska Dobos Typography: Elemér Könczey Printed by Gloria Printing House, Cluj-Napoca in 300 issues Director: Péter Nagy