Operational Warfare by Francisco Azevedo

NWC 1004

Table of Contents Page List of Military Maps ...............................................................................................v List of Geographic Maps ....................................................................................... vi List of Figures ....................................................................................................... vii List of Abbreviations ............................................................................................. I x Preface.................................................................................................................. xiv Part I: FUNDAMENTALS On Operational Art ..................................................................................................1 Levels of Command and Levels of War ................................................................17 Part 11: OPERATIONAL FACTORS Operational Factors................................................................................................29 The Factor of Space ...............................................................................................33 The Factor of Time ...............................................................................................47 The Factor of Force................................................................................................59 The Factors of Space, Time and Force ..................................................................79 Information and Operational Factors .....................................................................95 Part III: THE THEATER Theater Organization and Structure .....................................................................109 Theater Physical Features ....................................................................................123 Theater Geometry ................................................................................................151 Part IV: OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS Operational Functions..........................................................................................185 Operational Command and Control ....................................................................187 Operational Intelligence.......................................................................................203 Operational Command and Control Warfare .......................................................221 Operational Fires..................................................................................................239 Operational Logistics ...........................................................................................259 Operational Protection .........................................................................................277

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Part V: STAGES AND ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL WARFARE Stages and Elements of Operational Warfare ......................................................287 Force Deployment................................................................................................289 Critical Factors and Center of Gravity.................................................................307 Operational Maneuver .........................................................................................319 Concept of Culminating Point .............................................................................341 Part VI: METHODS OF COMBAT FORCE EMPLOYMENT Methods of Combat Force Employment..............................................................373 Naval Tactical Actions ........................................................................................383 Major Naval Operations.......................................................................................393 Part VII: OPERATIONAL PLANNING Operational Planning ...........................................................................................409 Campaign Design.................................................................................................433 Major Operation Design ......................................................................................469 Operational and Strategic Deception ...................................................................495 Deception Planning..............................................................................................519 Operational Sequencing.......................................................................................531 Operational Synchronization ...............................................................................545 Part VIII: OPERATIONAL LEADERSHIP Operational Leadership........................................................................................561 Exercising Operational Leadership......................................................................577 Tenets of Operational Leadership........................................................................593 The Decisions.......................................................................................................603 Part IX: THE FUTURE The Future of Operational Warfare......................................................................619 GLOSSARY OF OPERATIONAL TERMS ..................................................633 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................651 APPENDICES ......................................................................................................... Appendix A: Military Maps....................................................................................... Appendix B: Geographic Maps .................................................................................

List of Military Maps Page A-1: Strategic Situation in the Pacific, Spring 1942..................................................... A-1 A-2: Allied Theaters of Strategic Direction/ Theaters of Operations/Command Areas, 1 November 1944................................... A-2 A-3: The Pacific and Adjacent Theaters, 30 March 1942 ............................................ A-3 A-4: Soviet Military Theaters (TVs) & Theaters of Military Actions (TVDs), 1986 ............................................................. A-4 A-5: The North Sea Theater.......................................................................................... A-5 A-6: Solomons Campaign, 1942-1943: Physical Objectives....................................... A-6 A-7: The Mediterranean: Choke Points of Shipping .................................................... A-7 A-8: Operational Fires in Support of Leyte Operation, 1 0 September-17 October 1944................................................................................ A-8 A-9: Allied Invasion of Sicily (Operation Husky): Operational & Tactical Fires, 15 June-9 July 1943.................................................. A-9 A-10: Operational Fires in Support of the Allied Invasion of Sicily, 10 July-17 August 1943............................................................A-10 A-11: Operational Fires prior to the Landing at Salerno (Operation Avalanche), 18 August-8 September 1943 ........................................... A-l l A-12: Penetration Maneuver Combined with a Single-Sided Envelopment: The German Plan for the Operation Wacht am Rhein [Watch On The Rhine], December 1944 .....................................A-12 A-13: UN Amphibious Landing at Inchon (Operation Chromite), 15-16 September 1950........................................................ A-13 A-14: Strategic Deception Plan Bodyguard for the Normandy Invasion (Plan Overlord), June-August 1944............................ A-14 A-15: Deception Plan in Support of the Allied Landing in North Africa (Operation Torch), November 1942 ..................... A-15 A-16: Operational Deception Plan Wedlock, Fall 1943-June 1944............................ A-16 A-17: Strategic Deception Plan Bluebird, December 1944-April 1945...................... A-17 A-18: Deception Plan in Support of the Landing in Normandy (Operation Neptune), June 1944........................................................A-18

List of Geographic Maps Page B-1: Central and Southern Pacific ................................................................................. B-1 B-2: The Korean Peninsula and the Adjacent Seas ....................................................... B-2 B-3: Solomons Archipelago & Southwestern Part of New Guinea............................... B-3 B-4: European Russia, 1941-1945 ................................................................................ B-4 B-5: Southwestern Russia and Caucasus ....................................................................... B-5 B-6: Norway................................................................................................................... B-6 B-7: The North Sea ........................................................................................................ B-7 B-8: France..................................................................................................................... B-8 B-9: The Caribbean Sea................................................................................................. B-9 B-10: The Mediterranean Sea......................................................................................B-10 B-11: The Arabian (Persian) Gul£............................................................................... B-11 B-12: Western & Northern France............................................................................... B-12 B-13: Sicily..................................................................................................................B-13 B-14: The Atlantic Ocean............................................................................................B-14

List of Figures Page Figure 1: Military Art...........................................................................................................3 Figure 2: Types of Operational Art......................................................................................7 Figure 3: Operational Factors ........................................................................................... 29 Figure 4: Combat Potential vs. Combat Power................................................................. 61 Figure 5: Theater Structure and Levels of War ...............................................................109 Figure 6: Concept of Battlefield in Land Warfare...........................................................117 Figure 7: Main and Intermediate Base of Operations......................................................159 Figure 8: Maritime Bases of Operations..........................................................................161 Figure 9: Main and Secondary Lines of Operations ........................................................169 Figure 10: Number and Directional Orientation of Lines of Operations (LOOs) ..........170 Figure 11: Interior vs. Exterior Lines ..............................................................................173 Figure 12: Lines of Retreat ..............................................................................................176 Figure 13: Lines of Communications (LOCs) .................................................................179 Figure 14: Operational Functions (in Generic Terms) ..................................................... 185 Figure 15: Scale of Intelligence Effort.............................................................................205 Figure 16: C2W Concept ................................................................................................222 Figure 17: Type of Operational Fires..............................................................................241 Figure 18: Operational vs. Tactical Fires: Planning Process ..........................................243 Figure 19: Scale of Logistics Support.............................................................................260 Figure 20: Stages and Elements of Combat Force Employment .................................... 288 Figure 21: Segments of Combat Force Deployment.......................................................290 Figure 22: Concept of Critical Factors............................................................................308 Figure 23: Center of Gravity and Its Elements ...............................................................310 Figure 24: Operational Maneuver, Part 1 .......................................................................321 Figure 25: Operational Maneuver, Part 2 .......................................................................322 Figure 26: Theory of Culminating Point.........................................................................343 Figure 27: Attacker's Culmination .................................................................................344 Figure 28: Defender's Culmination ................................................................................347 Figure 29: Culminating Point and the Levels of War..................................................... 349 Figure 30: Tactical Actions.............................................................................................373

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Figure 31: Major Operations...........................................................................................376 Figure 32: Campaigns .....................................................................................................378 Figure 33: Development of Strategy (in Generic Terms) ...............................................412 Figure 34: Operational Idea (Scheme)............................................................................417 Figure 35: Campaign Plan Development........................................................................418 Figure 36: Major Operation Plan Development..............................................................418 Figure 37: Desired End-State and Strategic Objective ...................................................434 Figure 38: Determining the Enemy's Center of Gravity ................................................439 Figure 39: Operational Design for a Campaign (in Generic Terms) ..............................444 Figure 40: Methods of Defeating the Enemy (in a Campaign) ....................................... 446 Figure 41: Branches and Sequels for a Campaign ..........................................................454 Figure 42: Operational Phasing for a Campaign.............................................................455 Figure 43: Operational Design for a Major Operation....................................................476 Figure 44: Methods of Defeating the Enemy's Operational Center of Gravity (in a major operation) .....................................................................478 Figure 45: Branches and Sequels for a Major Operation ................................................ 487 Figure 46: Phasing for a Major Operation ......................................................................488 Figure 47: Scale of Deception Effort..............................................................................496 Figure 48: Sequencing for Operation Cartwheel, April 1943.........................................532 Figure 49: Operational Sequencing: Objective-Oriented Method ..................................534 Figure 50: Operational Sequencing: Task-Oriented Method .......................................... 536 Figure 51: Sequencing Plan for Operation Desert Storm, January 1991........................537 Figure 52: Synchronization Dynamics............................................................................546

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List of Abbreviations

AA AAA ABDA ACOM ACR AFSOUTH AI ALCOM ALOC AO AOA AOR ASW ATACNIS AWACS

Anti Aircraft Anti Aircraft Artillery American-British-Dutch-Australian p ., 4 Atlantic Command Armored Cavalry Regiment ` A,1'icr Allied Forces South Area of Interest Alaskan Command Air Line of Communications Area of Operations Amphibious Objective Area Area of Responsibility Anti-Submarine Warfare Army Tactical Missile System Airborne Warning and Command System

BDA BEF BOS

Battle Damage Assessment British Expeditionary Force Battlefield Operating Systems

C2 C2W C3 C3I

Command and Control Command and Control Warfare Command, Control, and Communications Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence Command, Control, Communications, and Computers Civil Affairs Caribbean Command Close Air Support China-Burma-India Command, Control, and Communications Cover, Concealment, Deception Combined Chiefs of Staff Central Command Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence Counterintelligence Commander-in-Chief Commander-in-Chief, Central Command Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Area Commanding Officer Center of Gravity Commander, Joint Task Force

C4 CA CARIBCOM CAS CBI CCC CCD CCS CENTCOM CEWI CI CINC CINCCENTOM CINCPACFLT CINCPOA CO COG COMJTF

COMMZ CONUS CRAF CS CSS CVBG

Communications Zone Continental United States Civil Reserve Air Fleet Combat Support Combat Support Service Carrier Battle Group

DA DCA DE DMZ

Direct Action Defensive Counter Air Direct Energy Demilitarized Zone

EA EAC ELINT EMCON EMP EMS EP EPW ES EUCOM EUSC EW

Electronic Attack Echelon Above Corps Electronic Intelligence Emission Control Electromagnetic Pulse Electromagnetic Spectrum Electronic Protection Enemy Prisoner of War Electronic Support European Command Effective U.S.-Controlled Fleet Electronic Warfare

FEAF FECOM FLOT FRY FSCL FSS

Far East Air Force Far East Command Forward Line of Own Troops Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Fire Support Coordination Line Fast Sealift Support Ship

GII GRT

Global Information Infrastructure Gross Register Ton

HARM HNS HUMINT

High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile Host-Nation Support Human Intelligence

I&W IDF IJN ILOC IMINT INFOSYS IO

Indications and Warnings Israeli Defense Forces I mperial Japanese Navy Intermediate Location Imagery Intelligence Information Systems Information Operation

IPB IPT IW-A IW-D

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield Intelligence Preparation of the Theater Information Warfare-Attack Information Warfare-Defense

JCS JFC JFCE JOA JRA JSOA J-STARS JTF

Joint Chief of Staffs Joint Force Commander Joint Forces Command-East Joint Operations Area Joint Rear Area Joint Special Operations Area Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System Joint Task Force

KTO

Kuwaiti Theater of Operations

LCM LLOC LOC LOO LST

Landing Craft, Medium Land Line of Communications Line of Communications Line of Operations Landing Ship, Tank

MAG MASINT MCM MEB MEZ Mil MILDEC MIO MRLS

Maritime Action Group Measurement and Signature Intelligence Mine Counter-Measures Marine Expeditionary Brigade Maritime Exclusion Zone Military Information Infrastructure Military Deception Maritime Intercept Operation Multiple Rocket Launcher System

NAAF NATO NCA NCO NDRF NEI NFZ NGO Nil NKPA NSFS

Northwest African Air Force North Atlantic Treaty Organization National Command Authorities Non-Commissioned Officers National Defense Reserve Fleet Netherlands East Indies No-Flight Zone Non-Governmental Organization National Information Infrastructure North Korean People's Army Naval Surface Warfare Fire Support

OCA

Offensive Counter-Air

OGA OOB OOS OPSEC OSINT

Other Government Organization Order of Battle Operational Operating Systems Operations Security Open Source Intelligence

PA PACOM PEO PKO PL PLA PO POA POD POE POL POS POW PRC PSYOP PVO

Public Affairs Pacific Command Peace Enforcement Operations Peace-Keeping Operations Phase Line People's Liberation Army Peace Operations Pacific Ocean Area Port of Debarkation Port of Embarkation Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants Port of Support Prisoner of War People's Republic of China Psychological Operation Private Volunteer Organization

R&D RAF RCT RDF ROE ROK

Research and Development Royal Air Force Regimental Combat Team Radio Direction Finding Rules of Engagement Republic of Korea

SAM SEAC SEAD SHAPF SHAPE SIGINT SLOG SOPAC SOWESPAC SP

Surface-to-Air Missile South East Asia Command Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers, Europe Signal Intelligence (ELINT & COMINT) Sea Line of Communications Southern Pacific Southwest Pacific Area Self-Propelled

TAA TBD TECHINT TEZ

Tactical Assembly Area Theater Ballistic Defense Technical Intelligence Total Exclusion Zone

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TF TL TO&E TOO TOS TV TVD

Task Force Time Line Table of Organization & Equipment Theater of Operations Theater Operating Systems Military Theater [ Teatr' Voyennykh] Theater of Military Actions [Teatr' Voyennykh Deystviy]

USCENTCOM USEUCOM USMC USSR

U.S. Central Command U.S. European Command United States Marine Corps Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

YPA

Yugoslav People's Army

WEU WMD

West European Union Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Preface This publication replaces the fourth draft of NWC 1035C, On Operational Art, printed in September 1999. The new title, "Operational Warfare," is used for the first ti me because, in the author's view, it more accurately describes what "operational art" really is. The U.S. Army adopted the Soviet term "operational art" in the early 1980s when it revived the operational level of war. However, that term does not imply that operational art encompasses both theory and practice; it is not only an art but also a science. Hence the need to adopt a more accurate term. This publication is a collection of the author's articles and essays on selected aspects of operational warfare written in the forms of notes or drafts since the mid-1990s. The author's principal aim is to explain in some detail the most important theoretical and practical aspects of operational warfare conducted by multiservice and multinational forces in high-intensity conventional conflicts. However, some aspects of operational warfare as applied in a low-intensity conflict (or "operations other than war," in U.S. terms) are discussed as well. This work represents solely the author's ideas and interpretations on operational warfare. The ideas presented here do not reflect the views of the U.S. Naval War College, the JMO Department, or the Department of Defense (DoD) and its organizations. Since the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, technological and societal changes have been the principal factors in the steady evolution of warfare at all levels, but especially at the operational level. Operational warfare has played an irreplaceable and critical role in orchestrating tactical actions for the accomplishment of strategic and operational objectives through the planning, preparation, and conduct of campaigns and major operations. This is not going to change in the foreseeable future. The gap between tactics and strategy is too large to be bridged by physical combat only. While full mastery of tactics is and will remain fundamental for success, there is no greater error than to assume that technology and tactics alone are sufficient for winning the nation's wars. Unfortunately, however, there is an increasingly strong tendency in recent years not only to dismiss the critical importance of operational warfare, but also to ignore strategy and even policy in preparing and employing combat forces-fighting has been reduced to simple targeting and shooting. Such an approach has proven false in the past and will fail in the future, especially when fighting a strong opponent who is willing to counter one's strength by responding asymmetrically. Military history shows conclusively what happens when there is a serious mismatch or disconnect between ends and means at the strategic and operational level. All three components of military art-strategy, tactics, and operational art-must be in harmony; otherwise, success in war will be elusive at best, or unattainable. Future operational commanders must not have a narrow, tactical perspective in the performance of their duties in peacetime and in time of war. To be fully successful, they must possess a much broader perspective on all aspects of the situationpolitical, diplomatic, military, economic, informational, and others-or what is arbitrarily called "operational perspective." This broad perspective is ensured by thinking "operationally." It is not an inherent trait of the commander, but requires a conscious and systematic effort by future operational commanders over many years. Service College education can provide only the fundamentals of knowledge and understanding of operational warfare.

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The greatest efforts must be exerted by the future commanders themselves through study of military history, political history, geography, international politics, economics, international law, and other disciplines. There were many excellent tacticians who utterly failed as operational commanders because of their inability or unwillingness to think "operationally." This work is aimed in part, through the use of selected historical examples, at demonstrating how critical it is for future operational commanders to possess the ability to think operationally. The author's intention is not to present a set of firm beliefs on operational warfare that must be blindly followed. The area of study and practice of operational warfare is so large and complex that it is simply not possible to develop and present an all encompassing theory to be uncritically accepted. It would be highly misleading and even dangerous to accept anyone's views and interpretations of the facts without a healthy dose of suspicion. This work is intended to make a modest contribution to the discussion on the critically important subject of operational warfare. The discussion cannot be fruitful, however, without first reaching agreement on the meaning of key operational terms. Unfortunately, the U.S. service and joint doctrinal publications often explain key operational terms imprecisely or not at all; indeed, some terms are explained inconsistently within the same document. To make matters worse, there is no common agreement among the services and in the joint community on the meaning of many operational art terms. This makes communication within a service and among services even more difficult. Therefore, it was necessary to provide generic or universal terms to bridge inconsistencies in the definition (or lack of definition) of key operational terms in U.S. service and joint doctrinal documents. The definitions presented here reflect the author's efforts to create a common basis for discussion. This work comprises nine arbitrarily entitled parts. With some exceptions, each part corresponds to a "component" or "aspect" of operational warfare. Each part contains a number of chapters dealing with related topics. This format was chosen to allow incorporation of additional chapters without undue effect on the flow of the narrative. The sequence of parts does not imply that some components or aspects of operational warfare are more important than others. The primary consideration in their arrangement was to present material in a logical sequence and thereby facilitate the reader's understanding. Part I, "Fundamentals," defines and explains the main aspects of operational art and levels of command and levels of war. Part II, "Operational Factors," describes and analyzes the factors of space, time, and force individually and then collectively. The chapter entitled "Information and Operational Factors" describes the effect information has on each of the three traditional operational factors. Part III, "The Theater," is related to the factor of space. It discusses and explains the military organization of physical space, operational features of the theater, and theater geometry. Operational functions are explained in Part IV. In addition to commonly accepted functions, one chapter is devoted to the discussion of operational command and control warfare (C2W). This topic is often inadequately emphasized, because it is increasingly subsumed in information warfare. However, C2W is clearly an operational function, because it is employed in support of a campaign or major operation. Part V, "Stages and Elements of Operational Warfare," explains fundamentals of force deployments and conceptual underpinnings of selected elements of combat force employment. Part VII, "Operational Planning," describes, in

generic terms, the process of and the main considerations in planning for a campaign or major operation. Differences in the operational idea for a campaign or major operation are highlighted; hence, separate chapters are devoted to these two topics. Also, two chapters deal with operational and strategic deception, a subject generally neglected today. Part VIII, "Operational Leadership," explains in some detail the personal traits and professional qualities of the operational commanders, their leadership in peacetime and in war, tenets in exercising that leadership, and the decisions to be made. Part IX, "The Future of Operational Warfare," lays out in broad terms the possible evolution and the key characteristics of operational warfare in the foreseeable future. A number of fold-out maps are included in two appendices. Appendix A contains eighteen military maps referring to the most important historical examples described in the narrative. Appendix B encompasses fourteen geographic maps of the selected theaters or areas of operations. They are intended to help the reader in following the description of various campaigns and major operations conducted since the end of the Napoleonic Wars. This publication should be considered a work in progress. A number of new chapters will be added in the next edition, while existing chapters will be refined, modified, or rewritten based on new theoretical evidence and practical application. To facilitate understanding of theory, a number of historical examples were liberally used throughout the work. The focus is on the examples of campaigns and major operations in the past century. However, whenever possible the examples of more recent conflicts, specifically the Gulf War of 1990-1991 and the Kosovo Conflict of 1999, were presented. Their only purpose is to illustrate various theoretical points or assertions made in the text. Some historical examples provide more details; others less. More detailed discussion of various historical examples would obscure the theoretical point to be made. To understand the points being made, a broad knowledge of past wars, and especially past campaigns and major operations, is a prerequisite; otherwise, it is difficult to follow the text. The author has made arbitrary use of historical examples, some of which might be contested by well-informed readers. A particular historical example, might not, in another's view, serve as a good illustration of the point made by the author; perhaps a better example could have been presented. Despite these problems, historical examples are necessary to illustrate theory; otherwise, the readers might not be convinced as to the value and critical importance of operational warfare in the employment of combat forces. This work would not have been possible without the cooperation and help of many people on the JMO faculty and support staff at the Naval War College. My heartfelt thanks to Colonel Bill Spain, USMC, Chairman of JMO Department, for his full support in completing the project. I was freed from teaching in the spring trimester and in the summer of 2000 so that I could devote all my efforts to writing this manuscript. Without the staunch and strong support of COL Spain and Professor Chuck Hodell, Executive Officer, this project would not have been completed. I also appreciate very much that I was given full freedom of action during my work on this project. These men displayed "operational thinking" of the highest order. Despite his heavy work schedule, Professor Hodell also read the entire manuscript. Without his frank criticism, the manuscript would contain many serious errors of fact or misstatements. Several members of JMO faculty also read early versions of the manuscript. I want specifically to thank CAPT John DuGene, USN, CAPT Mike Critz, USN, CAPT Jim Fitzsimonds, USN, CDR Jeffrey Barker, USN, and Colonel Pat Sweeney, USA, for their critique of pertinent chapters. I

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am also grateful for the input that CAPT Chet Helms, USN, CAPT Read Saunders, USN (Ret.), and Colonel Doug Hime, USAF (Ret.) gave to earlier versions of the manuscript. Colonel Hime also provided technical help on many occasions, for which I am deeply grateful. My thanks also to Ms. Carol Durkin for her great patience and superb performance in fulfilling my numerous requests during the work on the project. This work could not be completed without a solid and professional work performed by JIL Information Systems at the Technical Publications Department, Naval War College. I am greatly indebted for a superb job and great patience to Ms. Kimberly Knight, Joan R. Vredenburgh, and Margaret A. Richard, who proofread and edited the manuscript, and to Mr. Jeremiah Lenihan, who coordinated and formatted the entire work for publication. Also, many thanks for consistent support by Mr. Gerard L. Lamothe, head of the Graphics Division, and his entire staff, who always tried with grace and a great deal of patience to meet my often-impossible deadlines. I am especially grateful to Mr. Pat Rossoni and Mr. Joe Nunes for the excellent work over many years on the maps and figures. Ms. Gina Atkins and Mr. Art Lamoureux also performed great work on the graphics, while Mrs. Cheryl A. Reilly coordinated my requests. Finally, this publication would not be completed without the enormous patience and great support of my wife Victoria. My ideas and interpretations of operational warfare evolved over many years not only due to my research of the subject, but also through numerous seminar discussions, critiques and insights of our students, and discussion with the other members of the JMO faculty. There are too many individuals to name, but they deserve my sincere thanks as well.

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Part I: FUNDAMENTALS

ON OPERATIONAL ART War is not an affair of chance. A great deal of' knowledge, study and meditation is necessary to conduct it well. Frederick the Great The only really practical man is one who is grounded in theory. Frederick Augustus Mahan It is only when we have reached agreement on names and concepts that we can hope to progress with clearness and ease in the examination of the topic and he assured of finding ourselves on the same platform with our readers. Carl von Clausewitz Operational art occupies an intermediate and indispensable position between policy and strategy on the one hand, and tactics on the other. It serves both as a bridge and as an interface between these two areas of study and practice. The strategic and operational objectives cannot be accomplished by tactics alone. Tactical perspective is too narrow, and strategic perspective too broad, to ensure the most effective use of military and nonmilitary sources of national power in the accomplishment of strategic objectives. The principal role of operational art is to soundly sequence and synchronize or, simply stated, to "orchestrate" the employment of military forces and nonmilitary sources of power to accomplish strategic and operational objectives in a given theater. Strategy is not concerned with actual fighting, but operational art and tactics are. The results of tactical actions are useful only when linked together as part of the larger design framed by strategy and orchestrated by operational art. By themselves, technological advances, numerical superiority, or brilliant tactical performance is insufficient to achieve ultimate success in war. A sound and coherent strategy and operational excellence were the true keys to winning wars in the past and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Yet, for all its well-documented and proven importance in winning wars decisively and with the least loss of resources and time, too many military theoreticians and practitioners have neglected or, even worse, disregarded operational art. Much emphasis is given to technology and tactics (and, to a lesser degree, strategy), but operational art-the key piece spanning these two is given short shrift. Until the turn of the nineteenth century, the successful conduct of war required a sound and coherent strategy and skillful use of tactics. Afteward, it became steadily more difficult to achieve strategic objectives by fighting a single "decisive" battle, or even several battles. The increased role of science and industrialization and the changes in the l

relationship between war and society cumulatively led to profound changes in the way a war was prepared for, conducted, and sustained. Among other things, the steady expansion of the battlefield led to the emergence of "theater warfare"-the operational level of war. General conscription resulted in massive armies, which needed to be moved and supplied. The increased role of nationalism, ideology, and public opinion brought a steady expansion of war aims. Mobilization became increasingly dependent on railroad schedules. - Wars on land between strong opponents became progressively more protracted. Large battles and smaller tactical actions had to be fought almost continuously to defeat the enemy's army in the field. The ultimate strategic objective was accomplished through a series of intermediate "operational" objectives. Military strategy, at its upper end, had become closely tied to national strategy and policy, while its lower end that dealt with planning, preparation, and movement of large forces prior to physical combat emerged as "operations" ] or "operational art" today. 2 Term Definition: The scope of the study and practice of operational art is rather large and difficult to define in both precise and encompassing terms. 3 In one definition, operational art is described as a component of military art concerned with planning, coordinating, and sequencing of outcomes of individual tactical events into a chain of linked actions, within the context of major operations and campaigns, so as to achieve the objectives established by a theater strategy. 4 Operational art is also understood as the employment of military forces to accomplish strategic objectives in a theater of war or theater of operations through the design, organization, and conduct of campaigns and major operations. It involves fundamental decisions about when and where to fight and whether to accept or decline combat. Its essence is the identification of the enemy's center of gravity and the concentration of superior combat potential to achieve decisive success. s In generic terms, operational art today can be defined as a component of military art concerned with the theory and practice of planning, preparing, conducting, and sustaining major operations and campaigns aimed at accomplishing operational or strategic objectives in a given theater. A major operation consists of a series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes, etc.) sequenced and synchronized in time and place and aimed to accomplish an operational (or sometimes strategic) objective. A campaign consists of a series of major operations (land, air/space, naval) sequenced and synchronized in time and place to accomplish a strategic objective in a given theater. The term operational art is, in general, misleading because it implies that this component of military art deals only with practice. However, like strategy and tactics, operational art is both an art and a science (see Figure 1). 6 Each component of military art demands reflection, study, and practical application. The art aspect implies that operational art, like the other two components, is ambiguous and imprecise, requiring a creative and highly innovative approach to its application. Therefore, the term operations would be more appropriate, if not for the fact that within the U.S. military this term is so extensively and loosely used that it has lost its true meaning. The term operational warfare is perhaps the best term to use when referring to both the study and practice of war at the operational level.

Another problem is the extensive abuse of the term operational. In its proper meaning, this term directly relates to some aspect of the planning and conduct of major operations and campaigns. However, as currently used, "operational" generally means something that is in service (e.g., operational weapon or equipment) or active. To make the situation worse, this term is also used in a number of combinations with other articles-for example, operational readiness, operational control, operational strategy, and operational command. In the U.S. Navy and some other NATO navies, the term "operational concept" is often used for what is in fact, a tactical concept. However, in all these and similar cases the term does not mean what is properly understood to be within the domain of operational art. 7 Importance: Operational art provides a framework to assist commanders in ordering their thoughts when designing campaigns and major operations. Without operational art, war would be a set of disconnected battles or engagements, with relative attrition the only measure of success or failure. Operational art requires broad vision, an ability to anticipate events, and effective joint and multinational cooperation. 8 It is applied across the entire spectrum of warfare, from a low-intensity conflict 9 to a high-intensity conventional war. The full value of operational art can be appreciated only in the framework of large-scale conventional operations, because it is there that all its aspects can be fully applied. Operational art is not tied to any specific command echelon or a certain force's size. l° It is always the objective, not the size of combat force or level of command that determines whether operational art should be applied, not the opposite. At the tactical level, the war is usually conducted by force-to-force combat-that is, by attrition. The higher the level of war, the more protracted and more costly attrition warfare is in terms of human resources and materiel and time. The art of the operational commander is to prevent attrition warfare from becoming a predominant feature of war at

the operational and strategic level. The knowledge and skillful application of operational art greatly enhances the prospects for a highly capable, well trained, and skillfully led force, guided by a sound and coherent strategy to defeat a much stronger opponent. The very essence of operational art is to win decisively in the shortest time possible and with the least loss of human lives and materiel. This is especially important in an era of smaller forces, limited resources, and low tolerance of casualties. Operational art can also help overcome a serious disadvantage in the country's or alliance/coalition geostrategic position or the mismatch in numerical strength with the opposing force. Skillful and determined application of operational art ensures that each tactical action is linked with another and directly contributes to the accomplishment of the assigned operational or strategic objectives. It sequences and synchronizes the individual tactical actions within a framework of a major operation or campaign, which together achieve the objectives determined by military or theater strategy." A series of disconnected tactical actions may ultimately result in operational success, but over a longer time and incurring more losses for one's forces than had these actions been an integral part of a major operation. Operational art highlights the need for the commanders and their staffs to fully consider not only military but also diplomatic, political, economic, financial, social, religious, and other aspects of the situation in a given theater when planning, preparing, and executing major operations or campaigns. It also shows that in modern times, national (or theater) strategic objectives cannot be accomplished without properly sequenced and synchronized employment of multiservice and often multinational forces. This, in turn, requires the closest cooperation among the services. Failure to do so can bring serious consequences for the employment of one's forces. Knowledge and understanding of operational art is essential for the subordinate tactical commanders' success. They need to understand a broader-that is, operational picture of the situation to successfully act in accordance with the operational commander's intent. By understanding operational art, tactical commanders can make decisions that not only will be sound, but also will greatly contribute to the accomplishment of the overall operational or strategic objective. Study of past major operations and campaigns greatly improves the quality of the professional education of officers. It underscores the fact that all fundamental warfare areas are critical to success and, in particular, emphasizes that it is invariably wrong to artificially divide warfare into "offensive" and "defensive" categories. Operational art provides a framework for writing operational (service/joint/combined) doctrine. Tactical employment of one's forces cannot be successful without a clear and unmistakable focus on operational warfare, that is, on the theater-wide employment of combat forces and logistics. Relationships: Each component of military art overlaps each other. These relationships are highly dynamic and constantly changing. In general, strategy guides operational art by determining objectives, allocating forces and assets, and imposing conditions on tactical combat. A serious mismatch or an imbalance between means and ends is invariably fatal, as the examples of Germany in both world conflicts, and Japan in World War 11 show. Likewise, a disconnect or mismatch between ends and means caused Great Britain to suffer serious military setbacks in both world conflicts as shown at Gallipoli in

1915, Norway in 1940, and Greece in 1941. When operational and tactical considerations alone determine strategy, the results are usually disastrous. A sound and coherent strategy, in and of itself, cannot secure victory in a war because an intermediate stage is needed to orchestrate the accomplishment of strategic objectives through physical combat tactics. To be successful, major operations or campaigns must be conducted within a framework of what is operationally and broaden his strategically possible. 1 2 Strategy demands that the operational commander 13 perspective by thinking beyond the limits of immediate physical combat. It must fully take into account the existing and projected strategic realities of the situation. However, at times, strategy could dictate the accomplishment of an operational objective without providing adequate forces as was the decision of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staffs (JCS) to land on Guadalcanal in August 1942 (Operation Watchtower). To finally secure Guadalcanal, the Allies bitterly fought the Japanese for almost seven months. Only after that, the Japanese decided to evacuate their remaining troops from the island. Strategy must always dominate operational art; otherwise the results will be 1 4 The Axis' campaign in North Africa in 1941-1942 was driven and dominated by fatal. operational, vice strategic considerations. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's successes against the British led to the steady expansion of the Axis' war aims, which, in turn, required more forces to be drawn into a secondary theater of operations. Rommel tried to advance to the Suez Canal and seize Middle Eastern oil fields, far beyond a reasonable distance from his bases of support resulting in a serious mismatch between ends and means. i s Brilliance at the operational and tactical level, as the Germans consistently displayed in World War II, can only delay, but could not prevent, the country's ultimate defeat if ends and means at the national-strategic level are seriously disconnected or mismatched. The situation becomes even more untenable if the political leadership is unwilling to commit all available sources of power, as the U.S. example in the Vietnam War shows. The accomplishment of operational and strategic objectives depends upon the results gained by tactics. Strategy on its part must ensure that tactical combat is conducted under conditions favorable to accomplishing strategic objectives while considering the limitations imposed by tactics. Because bad tactics can invalidate a good strategy, a sufficient level of tactical competence is always required to accomplish strategic or operational objectives. The U.S. Navy did not match tactical skills with the Japanese during the protracted struggle for Guadalcanal. However, the Allies ultimately won because they matched means and ends at the operational and strategic level better than the Japanese did. Defeats in a major battle, as were those of the Germans at Stalingrad and the Japanese at the Battle of Midway, not only doomed the entire major operation, but also invariably had an immediate and profound effect on the strategic situation in a given theater. In a low-intensity conflict where public support is fragile, relatively small tactical defeats, or even the perception of the insurgent's strength might undermine the country's will to fight. The French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 in the First Indochina War and the North Vietnamese/Vietcong Tet offensive in January 1968 were not militarily crippling. Yet, they decisively undermined the popular and political support for the war in France and the United States, respectively. 1 6

Tactics is both the art and science of planning, preparation, and employment of individual platforms, weapons and associated sensors, and combat arms to accomplish assigned tactical objectives in a given combat sector or zone. Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, Sr. observed that tactics are the basis of operations (operational art today). Tactics must create the prerequisites for operational or strategic success, which the operational commander must then exploit.' 7 Tactics must ensure that results are in harmony with the operational objectives. No battle or engagement should be fought unless it is part of the larger design and directly contributes to the accomplishment of operational or strategic objectives. Admiral William F. Halsey's victory in the Battle off Cape Engano in the Leyte Operation was not only irrelevant, but also almost led to the failure of the entire supporting major naval operation. That battle was not imposed by the Japanese but was actively sought by Admiral Halsey. It was fought outside the operational contex t providing effective distant cover and support to the Allied forces that landed on Leyte-and only Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita's decision to turn north and leave the scene of action when his force was on the verge of defeating the U.S. forces in the Battle off Samar saved the Allies from suffering an ignominious defeat at the hands of a much weaker force. Poor application of operational art can lead to tactical defeats, which, in turn, might have not only operational but also strategic consequences. The Japanese Combined Fleet led by Admiral lsoroku Yamamoto suffered a decisive defeat in the "Battle of Midway" (Japanese Operation M/) in June 1942 because of a flawed operational plan, despite the Japanese huge superiority in forces. These two examples perhaps best prove how superiority of one's forces can easily be squandered when operational thinking on the part of the higher commanders is seriously lacking. Tactical brilliance rarely can overcome poor operational performance. No number of tactical victories, as the U.S. example in Vietnam conclusively showed, could save one's forces from ultimate defeat. Lack of operational thinking invariably results in wasting the fruits of tactical victories. The German offensive in April 1918 on the Western Front resulted in heavy losses for the Allies and considerable gain of space for the Germans. However, despite the series of tactical victories, the Germans never succeeded in penetrating the Allied front. 1 8 The German tactical victories meant little because they failed to achieve operational breakthrough at any part of the Western Front. Tactics can sometimes be heavily influenced by politics, especially domestic policy considerations. This excessive "politicization" of one component of military art often has fatal consequences for military effectiveness as a whole. The reason is that politics influences not only tactics but also operational art. The French tactical doctrine of "offensive at any price" before 1914 affected the operational level. During World War I, as casualties mounted and the public outcry became deafening, this doctrine became i ncreasingly disconnected from the strategic reality. 1 9 Types: Each service uses different methods in the employment of their combat arms to accomplish operational objectives. Strategic objectives are normally accomplished with the participation of two or more services. There are both commonalties and differences in the ways services employ their forces at the operational level. These distinctions are largely the result of the characteristics of the physical "medium" (land, air/space, and sea/ocean) in which each service predominantly operates, and consequently their unique weapons platforms. It is possible to speak about operational art common (or joint) to all 6

services and also about operational art with a distinctly naval, air, or army flavor (see Figure 2).2° In contrast to joint operational art, each service is chiefly concerned with developing theory and conducting major joint air, land, naval, and special forces operations, which are an integral part of land or maritime campaigns. Each service is also capable of conducting major operations by using predominantly, or even exclusively, their own forces .' 1 A major operation aimed at destroying or neutralizing an enemy fleet at sea or in its bases is primarily conducted by naval forces. Most amphibious landings are conducted by marines (or naval infantry) and naval forces. Air combat arms are mainly used to obtain air superiority in part of the theater or to conduct offensive counterair (OCA) operations. Major operations on land or in the littorals are usually multi-service efforts. Major operations to attack enemy trade or protect one's trade are conducted by maritime forces as well as forces of the other services. Campaigns-in contrast to major operations-are inherently multi-service and also often include multinational forces.

Theory and Practice: The theory and practice of operational art are inextricably linked to each other. Whenever theory has been ignored, or neglected, so has practice. The example of war on land in World War I shows that while good theory will not guarantee good generalship, bad theory will certainly guarantee the reverse . 22 The practical application of operational art has preceded the theory; theory has then paved the way for further practical application of operational art. A theory divorced from operational realities cannot lead to successful application of its tenets. Focusing exclusively on either theory or practice will invariably result in the general weakening of knowledge and understanding of both.

The value of the theoretical aspects of operational art cannot be over emphasized. Theory is critical to refining and improving the existing methods of combat force employment for accomplishing strategic or operational objectives and developing new ones, as well as for developing new methods of operational command and control, operational fires, operational protection, and logistical support and sustainment. Operational warfare can be truly understood only after years of reading and study. Theory must deal with each war and each age on its own terms, and theory must always accommodate itself to change. Among other things, theory also improves precision in using various key operational terms, greatly facilitating communication between theoreticians and practitioners. The purpose of theory is to educate the mind of the future operational commander. Afterward, critical analysis tempered with the "theoretical truths" should enable the careful student to recreate, as far as possible, the commander's thinking process preceding a given action. Carl von Clausewitz wrote that theory should not be a manual for action. Theory is most valuable when it is used to analyze and critically assess all the components and elements of warfare. It then becomes a guide for anyone who wants to read about war. The primary purpose of any theory is to clarify concepts and ideas. Theory prevents one from having to start afresh each time, plowing through material, and then sorting out the pertinent details. 24 Theory of operational art provides both framework and direction for the development of service and joint operational doctrine. Neglecting or ignoring theoretical aspects of operational warfare will invariably result in lost time and, more importantly, unnecessarily lost personnel and materiel. Theoretical knowledge and understanding of a given aspect of warfare makes improvisation easier in wartime, when both time and resources are in short supply. The U.S. Navy failed to achieve and maintain that knowledge and understanding regarding mine warfare before and after both world conflicts. The U.S. Navy played a pivotal role in the defeat of the German U-boats in World War I, but paid scant attention to the task of protection and defense of maritime trade in the interwar years. Although the U.S. Navy took part in an undeclared war against the German U-boats in 1940-1941, it was unprepared for the task when the Germans unleashed their U-boats against U.S. shipping off the East Coast in January 1942. The coastal convoy system was not introduced until six months after the United States entered the war. It took several more months to establish a convoying system along the Gulf Coast, and not until September 1942 was the complex, but highly effective, Interlocking Convoy System finally in place. The U.S. Navy's failure was due more to the lack of organization and inadequacy of doctrine, than to shortage of escorts. The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) made a similar mistake by neglecting the less glamorous but highly important areas of the defense and protection of shipping. 26 The study of military history has an inestimable value when used to develop sound theories with which to practically apply operational art. British Field Marshal Earl Wavell said that the real way to get value from the study of military history is to take particular situations and, as far possible, get inside the skin of the man who made a decision and then see in what way you could have improved upon it. 27 Despite its great value, drawing historical lessons from past major operations or campaigns is full of dangers and pitfalls. The lessons of history can be learned and mislearned as well. The Chief of the German General Staff, Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen was a devoted

student of history. However, despite his great intellect and erudition he committed fatal errors in interpreting the lessons of military history. He became fixated on a single solution to a complex strategic problem defeat of France in one fell swoop. Von Schlieffen considered the example of the envelopment maneuver at Cannae in 216 B.C. as the main tenet of transforming one's own strategic inferiority into relative operational superiority at a decisive point. His biggest mistake was to elevate tactical combat experience to the level of a strategic concept. He applied the experiences of pre-industrial wars (the Punic wars, the Seven-Years' War, and the Napoleonic Wars) to fighting large wars in the industrial era. Von Schlieffen and most of his contemporaries failed to properly analyze the experiences and lessons of the American Civil War and the RussoJapanese War. Another error was Von Schlieffen's application of historical examples as the basis for justifying his own firmly held beliefs and as a tool for critical analysis. 29 The Royal Navy in the interwar years learned the correct lessons of the Battle of Jutland, which led to great improvements in its doctrine for surface warfare . 3° This proved crucial in many surface engagements with the German and Italian fleets during World War 11. The French drew the wrong lessons from their experiences in land warfare in World War 1. They became quite convinced of the superiority of defensive fire. French theoreticians and practitioners in the interwar years failed to take into account the experiences of the last phase of war in the Balkans, characterized by several major operations (similar to those applied by the Germans in World War II). 31 This firm belief in the superiority of fire over movement was applied in the dogmatic defense doctrine incorporated in the Maginot Line concept . 32 In the aftermath of World War 1, the British devoted a great deal of attention to the experiences of the Gallipoli landings. Yet, the more they studied, the less optimistic they become about amphibious landings. They assumed (as it turned out, wrongly) that future amphibious landings have to be smaller and simpler and must take place only after dark or at dawn. Moreover, they concluded that the advent of aircraft, modern artillery, and machine guns made opposed landings impossible. 33 In contrast, the U.S. Marine Corps, studying the same operation, concluded that the amphibious landing operation could be successful if the fleet and the troops cooperated closely. The U.S. Marines also studied in detail the successful German landing at the Bay of Riga in October 1917 (Operation Albion). The British recognized in the interwar years the value of convoys in protecting maritime trade. However, the Royal Navy wrongly thought that because its own submarines had difficulties in coordinating their attacks, it was unlikely that the potential opponent would use submarine screens in attacks against merchant shipping. It also dismissed the possibility of submarine actions on the surface against merchant ships. 35 Theory based on the poor reading or total neglect of military history will invariably result in faulty doctrine. The Italian General Giulio Douhet had a firm and rather dogmatic view of the value of air power. He insisted that an invention as radical as the airplane must change everything about war. His theories, while bold and innovative, were based on his superficial analysis of the experiences of World War 1. Among other things, Douhet believed that defense on the ground would be so much superior form of combat to the offense that lines would become static, even if the defender's army is greatly inferior to the attacker. 36 Thus, the only way to overcome these defenses was to use air power on a massive scale and against the main sources of the enemy's power in his rear. Douhet's views on strategic bombing influenced many air power advocates in

the United States and Great Britain, which in turn led to wildly exaggerated claims about the role and influence of air power in war. Components: Operational art encompasses a number of areas or fields of study and practice, arbitrarily called "components." No component is more important than the another. There is no universally accepted list of these components among theoreticians of operational art. Nevertheless, there is little disagreement that main "components" of operational art are as follows: operational factors, operational functions, stages and elements of operational warfare, principles of operational warfare, methods of combat force employment, operational planning, operational leadership, and operational training and education. Components of operational art should not be considered something rigid and unchangeable. It is the task of theory, taking full account of new technological advances and changes in character of warfare, to analyze, refine, and further develop these components and revise or create new concepts for their practical application. The field of theoretical study and practical application of operational art is too large and too diverse to be neatly arranged into a "system" of thinking. Nor is there any particular order or sequence in which these components should be studied or applied. The various "elements" that comprise any given "component" of operational art are grouped together because they are related to each other, and that makes it easier to discuss them and develop theory. Characteristics: The principal characteristics of operational warfare, as compared with tactical actions, are larger dimensions of forces, time, and space. Because of the much longer distances involved, the operational commander needs a clear understanding of the relationships among the factors of space, time, and forces. Major operations and campaigns are conducted in an area of operations and theater of operations, respectively, while battles or engagements take place in the respective combat sector or zone -a much smaller part of a given theater. The Japanese Operation MI (the Battle of Midway) in June 1942 encompassed a major part of the Northern and a smaller part of the Central Pacific. The North African Campaign of 1940-1943 stretched from Egypt to Morocco and included adjacent parts of the Mediterranean Sea. Major operations and campaigns require much more time to plan, prepare, execute, and complete than do tactical actions. A battle or engagement can be concluded in a matter of hours, while a major operation is conducted over several days or even weeks. The Allied landing at Leyte (Operation King II) and naval and air actions in its support lasted about ten days (17-26 October 1944). The major ground-air operation in the Gulf War of 1990-1991 (Desert Shield/Desert Storm) lasted only four days. Duration of a typical campaign varies greatly, from several months to a year or even longer. The Philippines Campaign lasted more than nine months (October 1944-July 1945) and the Central Pacific Campaign about eleven months (November 1943-September 1944). The New Guinea (Papuan) Campaign lasted about twenty-seven months (June 1942September 1944). The Gulf War of 1991 was an exception; it lasted about seven months, of which the offensive phase (Desert Storm) lasted only forty-two days (17 January-28 February). The accomplishment of operational or strategic objectives requires the employment of larger and more diverse forces than does the accomplishment of tactical objectives. In the past, large forces (numbered and theater armies, fleets, and air fleets), conducted independent or joint/combined major operations. Yet, many examples of small 10

forces accomplishing operational and strategic results can be found as well. General Wellington's Peninsular Campaign in Spain (1809) and General Winfield Scott's expedition against Mexico (1847) were both conducted by small forces that accomplished strategic results.37 In World War 11, in several instances, forces no larger than an army corps conducted major operations. Just before their invasion of France in May 1940, the Germans formed their first armored operational-tactical force, Panzergruppe von Kleist. It was composed of two panzer corps, one motorized infantry corps (totaling seven panzer and three motorized infantry divisions), and one air defense corps capable of conducting, in cooperation with the Luftwaffe, major air-land operations. This force was the key factor in the successful German penetration of the French defenses at Sedan and in the subsequent advance to the Channel coast that eventually cut off the major part of the French and the British troops in northwestern France. The Japanese 25th Army, with only three divisions, totaling only 35,000 men but strongly supported by air and naval forces, conquered Malaya in only three months (8 December 1941-15 February 1942). From the initial British force of some 70,000 troops (plus 15,000 administrative and unarmed personnel), 62,000 British, Indian, and Australian troops unconditionally surrendered to the Japanese after the fall of Singapore. 38 Likewise, the Japanese assigned the Southern Army, composed of only two infantry divisions (the 16th and 48th), plus supporting troops consisting of seven regiments (four of which were combat troops) and six battalions, to conduct a campaign to seize the Philippines. 39 The forces employed in the ill-fated German attempt to interrupt British shipping in the Atlantic north of the equator in May 1941 (Operation Rheinuebung) were organized into combat group Bismarck, composed of a single 45,000-ton battleship, Bismarck, and the heavy cruiser, Prinz Eugen. 40 This group was supported by six tankers and one supply ship, deployed in advance to the Arctic Ocean and the North and Central Atlantic. Likewise, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 was carried out by four fleet carriers with accompanying screen. This relatively small force was intended to accomplish an operational objective-the destruction of a major part of the U.S. Pacific Fleet-and thereby ensure protection of the Japanese forces invading the Philippines. The application of operational art is predominantly a joint, and often combined, activity, which is not the case with tactics. A mission for a major operation or campaign is stated in broad terms and is accomplished in several stages rather than in a single step. The operational commanders in contrast to the tactical commanders must make planning assumptions on multiple aspects of the situation in the theater, projecting several weeks or even months into the future. With this larger perspective and increased uncertainty comes an increase in the risks the operational commanders and their staffs must take. Planning for major operations and especially campaigns usually involves not only military, but also nonmilitary sources of national power. Because of the increased scope of military objectives to be accomplished and the consequently larger force involved, planning for major operations and campaigns is far more complicated and it obviously requires more time than planning for a battle or engagement. Major operations and campaigns are planned by "regressive" methods, in which the ultimate (strategic or operational) objective is determined first, and from that a series of intermediate military objectives (operational or major tactical) is determined. In

contrast, battles or engagements are planned by using a forward, or "progressive," method in which only the next or immediate major or minor tactical objective is assigned. The deployment of forces taking part in a major operation or campaign encompasses much larger physical space and requires much more time to complete than those in a deployment for a battle or engagement. More important, the errors in deploying one's forces into a theater could fatally affect the initial phase and even the outcome of a major operation or campaign. Force deployment forms the very heart of a plan for a major operation or campaign; it not only directly influences the plans for accomplishing the next operational objective but also the subsequent decisions made in combat. Because of the long duration of major operations and campaigns, and the diversity of forces participating, logistical support and sustainment are more complex to organize and execute than those for battles or engagements The operational commander is normally vested with the responsibility for organizing and controlling logistical support and sustainment, while a tactical commander uses logistics but does not control it. Conclusion: Sound sequencing and synchronization of all military and nonmilitary sources of power are necessary to accomplish strategic or operational objectives in a given theater through major operations and campaigns. Operational art is the only means of orchestrating and tying together tactical actions within a larger design that directly contributes to the objectives set by strategy. A tactical concept for the employment of one's forces cannot lead to victory if it is not an integral part of a broader operational concept. Sound application of operational art is the key to winning decisively in the shortest time and with the least loss of men and materiel. All past wars were won or lost at the strategic and operational level, not at the tactical level. In a war between two similar opponents, victory will go to the side that thinks better and acts faster and with greater determination. Although this does not negate the need for more advanced weapons and equipment, it cannot be sufficiently stressed that superior thinking is far more critical than technology. Balance is the key. History of past wars has shown that neither superior technology nor superior tactics can, by themselves, ensure victory in the field. An exclusive focus on technology or tactics is likely to result in time-consuming and costly attritional warfare against a strong and resilient opponent. Moreover, relying solely on better technology would rob warfare of its "art." It would make one's forces vulnerable to an opponent who, while technologically inferior, thinks better and faster and uses his smaller forces more creatively, perhaps asymmetrically.

Notes 1. The term "operation" itself was used first by Heinrich yon Buelow, a German military theoretician, in his work Spirit of the New War System [Geist des neuren Kriegssystems] published in 1799. He defined an operation as any movement of the army directly related to the enemy. Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, Sr., is the first credited to have discussed the term "operation" [ Operation] in relation to strategy and tactics. He also used the term "operational" [operativ]. Some theoreticians argue that von Moltke Sr. did not elevate the "operation" to a third component of military art, but rather considered it a part of lower spectrum of strategy. Also, von Moltke Sr. used the term operation almost exclusively in discussing the movement of troops on the battlefield and the means to concentrate forces for a decisive battle. Nevertheless, by the end of the nineteenth century, "operations" emerged as an intermediate area of study and practice in the German military; N. Hanisch, Untersuchen Sic die operatives Ideen Mansteins hinsichilich Schwerpunktbildung, Ueberraschung, Initiative and Handlungsf~eiheit an den Beispielen Westf ldzug 1940 (Sichelschnitt-Plan) and Operation Zitadelle (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 15 January 1988), p. 4; Roland G. Foerster, "Das operative Denken Moltkes des Aeltern and die Folgen," in Hans-Martin Ottmer and Heiger Ostertag, editors, Ausgewaehfe Operationen and ihre militaerhistorischen Grundlagen (Herford/Bonn: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn GmbH, 1993), pp. 254-5. 2. The term "operational art" is a direct translation of a Russian term coined by the former tsarist general and the Soviet military theoretician Aleksandr' A. Svechin in his book Strategy, published in 1927. Since then, the Soviets and all the militaries in the former and current communist countries used the same term. Interestingly enough, the same term,"operational art" (Operationskunst), was also used in the Austrian military in the latter part of the nineteenth century; K. von Zerboni, Die Elemente Militaerwesen (Vienna, 1870), pp. 40-4. 3. A. Svechin in his Strategy observed, "only in very infrequent cases could one rely on achieving ultimate goal of combat operations in a single battle. Normally this path ... is broken down into series of operations separated by more or less lengthy pauses which take place in different areas in a theater and differ significantly from one another due to the differences between the immediate goals one's forces temporarily strive for. On the basis of the goal of an operation, operational art sets a whole series of tactical missions and a number of logistical requirements. Operational art also dictates the basic line of conduct of an operation, depending on the material available, the time which may be allotted to the handling of different tactical missions, the forces which may be deployed for battle on a certain front, and finally on the nature of operation itself"; Aleksandr' A. Svechin, Strateg y, edited by Kent D. Lee (Minneapolis, MN: East View Publications, 1992), pp. 68-9. 4. Stephen E. Runals, "A Different Approach," Military Review 10 (October 1987), p. 47. 5. Scott A. Marcy, "Operational Art: Getting Started," Military Review 9 (September 1990), p. 107. 6. "Science" is the possession of knowledge through study, while "art" is the performance of actions acquired by experience, study, or observations; Webster's Third New International Dictionary , (Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster, 1981), p. 2032. Von Clausewitz wrote that the object of science is knowledge, the object of art is creative ability; Carl yon Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 122; J.F.C. Fuller wrote in 1926 that to deny a science of war and then to theorize on war as an art is pure military alchemy, a process of reasoning that for thousands of years has blinded the soldier to the realities of war and will continue to blind him until he creates a science of war upon which to have his art; J.F.C. Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War (London: Curtis Brown, 1926), p. 21. 7. D. Holger Mueller, The Character of Manoevre at the Operational Level (Toronto: Advanced Military Studies Course, the Canadian Forces College, 1999), p. 3. 8. Joint Pub 3-0: Doctrine f)r Joint Operations ( Washington, D.C.: 1 February 1995), pp. 11-2 and I1-3; ibid., Revision First Draft 30 March 1999, pp. 11-3 and 11-4.

9. In U.S. terms this is called "military operations other than war" (MOOTW)-operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. The military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. JP 1-02 also .1P 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations, Revision First Draft (30 March 1999), p. GL-18. 10. Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, "Operative Leitlinie fuer die Fuehrung von Landstreitkraeften" (October 1993), Arbeitspapier, "Operative Fuehrung" (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, August 1992), p. 1. 1 1. Runals, "A Different Approach," p. 47. 1 2. David Jablonsky, "Strategy and the Operational Level of War," The Operational Art of'Warfare Across the Spectrum of Conflict (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1987), p. 14. 13. Ibid., "Strategy and the Operational Level of War: Part l," parameters (Spring 1987), p. 70. 14. Ibid., p. 73. 15. Mcinhard Glanz, Rommels Entschluss zum Angrif attf Alexandria (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 1963), p. 5; Jablonsky, "Strategy and the Operational Level of War: Part I," p. 74. 16. Ibid., p. 71. 17. Arbeitspapier, "Operative Fuehrung" (1992), pp. 17-8. 18. Juergen Bassenge, Zur Zielsetzung der Deutschen Angrife in Frankreich, Fruehjahr bis Sommer 1918. Ueberlegungen zum Problem des Kulminationspunktes (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 1964), pp. 19-20. 1 9. Ludwig Beck, Studien, edited by Hans Spcidel (Stuttgart: K.F. Koehlers Verlag, 1955), p. 79. Arbeitspapier, Operative Fuehrung (1992), p. 15. Jablonsky, "Strategy and the Operational Level of War: Part I," p. 73. 20. In U.S. terms, joint operational art focuses on the fundamental methods and issues associated with the synchronization of air, land, sea, space, and special forces; JP 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations (Draft 1 999), p. II-4. 21. The Soviets believed there was only a single military strategy, while each service developed and practiced its own operational art. They started to develop naval operational art as a separate part of their naval art in the mid-1920s and it was fully developed by the mid-1930s. The Russians today define naval operational art as the science of preparing and conducting naval operations; V.D. Dotsenko, Istoriya Voenno-morskogo Iskusstvo, Vol. 1: Istoriya teorii strate ii, operativnogo iskusstva i taktiki voennomorsko og flota (Saint Petersburg: Sudostroenie, 1999), pp. 229, 237-8. 22. Bernard Brodie, "Strategy as an Art and Science," Naval War College Review 1 ( Winter 1998) (reprint of the article published in February 1959), p. 27. 23. Jay Luvaas, "Thinking at the Operational Level," parameters 1 (Spring 1986), p. 34. 24. Carl von Clausewitz, On War , edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 132, 141. 25. Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes. The Anatomy of Failure in War (New York: Vintage Books, i st ed., 1991), p. 63.

26. David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun. Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy 1887-1941 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997), p. 110. 27. Luvaas, "Thinking at the Operational Level," p. 6. 28. Karl-Heinz Frieser, Blitzkrie ~Legende. Der Westfeldzug 1940 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1995), p. 416. Lothar Burchardt, "Operatives Denken and Planen yon Schlieffen his zum Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges," in Horst Boog, et al., Operatives Denken and Handeln in deutschen Streitkraeften im 19. and 20. Jahrhundert (Herford/Bonn: Verlag E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1988), pp. 52-3. 29. Martin Kutz, Operative Fuehrung als Denkfzgure and Handlungskonzept der Heeresfuehrung der Bundeswehr. Politische, strategische and militaerische Implikationen und Gefahren der aktuellen Diskussion (Hamburg: Fachgruppe Sozialwissenschaften, Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 1989), p. 9. 30. David MacGregor, "The Use, Misuse, and Non-Use of History: The Royal Navy and the Operational Lessons of the First World War," The Journal of'Military History 56 (October 1992), pp. 608, 610. 31. Major Aigurperse, Einfluesse des ersten Weltkrieges auf die operatives and taktischen Vorstellungen der fi°anzoesischen militaerrischen Fuehrung zwischen 1919 and 1939 (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 1965), p. 3. 32. Ibid., p. 4. 33. MacGregor, "The Use, Misuse, and Non-Use of History: The Royal Navy and the Operational Lessons of the First World War," pp. 608, 610. 34. Cohen and Gooch, Military Misfortunes. The Anatomy of Failure in War , p. 63. 35. MacGregor, "The Use, Misuse, and Non-Use of History: The Royal Navy and the Operational Lessons of the First World War," p. 605. 36. Brodie, "Strategy as an Art and Science," p. 31. 37. Dwight L. Adams and Clayton R. Newell, "Operational Art in the Joint and Combined Arenas," Parameters (June 1988), p. 35. 38. I.C.B. Dear, et al., editors, The Oxford Companion To World War II (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 1009-10. 39. Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, United States Army in World War 11, The War in the Pacific (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1953), p. 59. 40. Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs. 1939-1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990), p. 201.

LEVELS OF COMMAND AND LEVELS OF WAR A level of war refers to the employment of military and nonmilitary sources of power to accomplish assigned military objectives in a specific part of the theater or the theater as whole in time of low-intensity conflict or war. The higher the level of war, the larger the objective. Each level of war is closely related to the respective component of military art. However, no clear line separates one level of war from another. They are all interrelated and affect each other, sometimes profoundly. Levels of war deal exclusively with practical application of military and nonmilitary sources of power. The size of the physical space in which a certain level of war is conducted is directly related to the military objectives. The objective in turn determines the size and mix of combat forces and the required level of combat support. The responsibility for the employment of military and nonmilitary sources of power to accomplish objectives in both peacetime and wartime belongs to the respective levels of command. Therefore, the term "level of war" should be used only in the case of actual employment of military and nonmilitary sources of power by the respective command echelon to accomplish military objective across the operational continuum, from low-intensity conflict to war. Levels of Command versus Levels of War: Levels of command are distinguished by their vertical separation from each other. Three basic levels of command could be established in peacetime or in time of war: strategic, operational, and tactical. For large countries-such as the United States, China, Russia, and India-that deploy forces in several theaters or project power far from their shore, strategic level of command encompasses two sublevels: national-strategic and theater-strategic. The compression of the factor of space has further resulted in the two other sublevels of command: operational-strategic and operational-tactical. The higher the level of command, the larger the size of the physical space in which combat and non-combat activities take place. Levels of war are determined by the scope and nature of the military objective(s) to be accomplished in a given theater or part of the theater. In war or low-intensity conflict, sources of power are applied across the command echelons, from tactical all the way up to national or alliance/coalition strategic.' They are "levels" because of the different objective to be accomplished and therefore different command echelons that have the responsibility to use sources of power to accomplish assigned objectives. In a physical sense, there are of course no "levels," but only different sizes of physical space and mediums in which military forces operate. Whether the military and nonmilitary sources of power will be used across the entire spectrum or only by certain command echelons would depend on the scope of the objective to be accomplished and character of conflict. The hierarchy of levels of command is vertically linear only in the sense that each level of command is directly related to a corresponding size of the physical space in which one's forces operate or carry out combat actions. A level of command is responsible in peacetime with a number of major tasks aimed to prepare subordinate forces for combat. The higher the level of command, the larger and the more numerous the tasks. The scope of combat activity of a given command echelon depends on the scale and nature of the military objective, the size and shape of the physical space in which military actions are taking place, and the size and density of forces engaged. 17

National-Strategic Level (of War): National-strategic level of command has the exclusive responsibility for command and control of the country's armed forces in peacetime and in time of war. The armed forces are only one among many instruments of national power. Their employment is based exclusively on legitimate decisions made by the country's highest political leaders. The political leadership determines the use of military force based not only on the political objectives, but also the effect the military action would have on political opinion. In World War 11, the U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, his closest advisors, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) were chiefly responsible for determining strategy, providing strategic direction and sufficient personnel and materiel, and coordinating the strategic actions in multiple theaters of war. Their counterparts in Great Britain, were Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, the War Council, and the British Chiefs of Staff. The U.S. and British Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS). In Germany, Adolf Hitler and his Supreme Command of Wehrmacht and Josef Stalin and the Soviet High Command operated at the national-strategic level. In the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the U.S. national command authorities (NCA), the President's national security advisors, and the JCS operated at the national-strategic level. In the Kosovo Conflict of 1999, NATO's heads of state with their chiefs of staff and national security advisors, and the North Atlantic Council in Brussels represented NATO's strategic level of command. The range of activities at the national-strategic level varies greatly depending on the country's size and its military strength, on whether its vital interests are closer to home or far away. Among the most important responsibilities at the national-strategic level is to develop and apply national strategy and national military strategy. These in turn must be linked with policy; otherwise, the result will be flawed strategy. This level of command is responsible for determining national strategic and military strategic objectives. It establishes the political framework for the employment of military and nonmilitary sources of power in the accomplishment of the national and military strategic objectives. The national-strategic level of command provides strategic direction for the accomplishment of national security interests and objectives. In peacetime, this level is responsible for the development and maintenance of the industrial base and allocation of resources to the armed forces as a whole. Force development is another major responsibility of the national-strategic level of command. Specifically, this task includes planning and providing necessary resources to develop, structure, and field military forces to accomplish national (and alliance) security and military strategic objectives. The national-strategic level of command is responsible for the establishment of national military organization, overall military research and development (R&D), and establishment of military education and training infrastructure. It determines distribution of armed forces and individual services among the theaters. In peacetime and wartime, the national-strategic level of command bears the principal responsibility for building and maintaining alliance or coalitions. It is primarily responsible for establishment and maintenance of the nationwide strategic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in peacetime. Major powers need to possess a global system to collect information on the strategic situation worldwide. Strategic intelligence provides worldwide national strategic indications and warning. It provides general military intelligence to national strategic planners and decision-makers. The national-strategic level of command of a major power

is also responsible for providing national space capabilities, including space support, space control, and space force enhancement. It conducts strategic information warfare in both peacetime and in time of war. For a major power, the national-strategic level of command coordinates forward presence of forces among several theaters by organizing, among other things, periodic deployments, port visits, and military contacts. It also coordinates conduct and support of peace operations. The national-strategic command echelon has the responsibility to negotiate new or renegotiate existing host-nation support (HNS) agreements and provide support to the theater-strategic commanders to obtain agreements for periodic access to one's own personnel and units and for the permanent stationing ashore or afloat of selected weapons and equipment. This also involves collaboration with other ministries or departments of the government, government agencies, the country's legislative bodies, and foreign governments to negotiate treaties, executive agreements, and memorandums of understanding with host nations and international organizations. National-strategic level of command also coordinates multinational exercises. The national-strategic level of command bears sole responsibility for crisis prevention and management and the employment of the country's armed forces in lowintensity conflict and war. It determines where, when, and how the country's armed forces should be employed to achieve national security objectives. It coordinates and oversees the conduct of war in multiple theaters. Mobilization of armed forces and the country as a whole for war is one of the critical tasks of the national-strategic level of command. This task encompasses expansion of the mobilization stations, logistic support, health service support, transportation system, and maintaining and expanding the industrial base. The national-strategic level of command is responsible for strategic deployment of ground, sea, and air forces to the specific theater and their strategic redeployment after the end of hostilities. This responsibility includes, among other things, the tasks of determining transportation infrastructure and resources, and matching transportation resources with requirements. For a major power with global responsibilities, strategic deployment of forces requires obtaining diplomatic clearance and overflight rights negotiated or arranged by a number of friendly countries. The national-strategic level of command determines timing and conditions for conflict or war termination. It also has the overall responsibility for demobilization and reconstitution of the armed forces and the country's industrial base. The national-strategic command level is responsible for ensuring protection of strategic forces and assets, the civilian population, and the country's industrial capacity, and for avoiding or minimizing the effect of the enemy's strategic actions. It is also responsible for establishing and maintaining strategic air defense, strategic ballistic missile defense, strategic operational security, and for protecting national strategic information systems. Another major responsibility of the national-strategic level of command is to coordinate interagency and multinational cooperation. This includes providing security and other forms of assistance to friendly nations, supporting peace operations, providing foreign humanitarian and civic assistance, and cooperating with nongovernmental (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs). Theater-Strategic Level (of War): A large country facing two or more large land or maritime theaters, each containing several potential strategic objectives, would normally have already created in peacetime theater-strategic commands. In time of war, such a 19

command would be responsible for the employment of all military and nonmilitary sources of power in the respective theater of war. The highest politico-military leadership would assign to each theater-strategic commander a single national or alliance/coalition strategic objective. The theater-strategic commander would then translate that objective into several theater-strategic objectives, and take appropriate actions and measures to accomplish them. In World War II, the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater, the Pacific Ocean Area (POA), and Southwest Pacific Area (SOWESPAC), represented in today's understanding of the term, theater-strategic levels of war. During the United States' involvement in Vietnam (1965-1975), the Pacific Command (PACOM) in Hawaii was the theater-strategic level command. In the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the theater-strategic level of command was the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) with the main headquarters in Tampa, Florida. In the Kosovo Conflict (1999), the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) together with NATO's Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium comprised a theater-strategic level command. A country with a single potential theater of war would normally not establish theater-strategic level of command but that responsibility would belong to the national politico-military leadership. In all three Arab-Israeli wars and the Iran-Iraq War (19801988), none of the belligerents had theater-strategic level of command. In peacetime, the theater-strategic level of command bears responsibility for the development of theater strategy. It conducts strategic estimates, prepares theater strategic concepts, and drafts series of operation plans ranging from low-intensity conflict to war. Theater-strategic commanders advise the highest national or alliance/coalition politicalmilitary leadership as to deterrence, crisis management, crisis resolution, use or non-use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and conflict termination. Theater-strategic command and control include establishing and maintaining theater-wide communications and information systems, providing strategic direction to theater forces, coordinating theater-wide information warfare, and conducting public affairs in theater. One of the major responsibilities of the theater-strategic level of command is to establish theater force requirements and readiness. The theater-strategic level of command must provide operational training of subordinate forces through service, joint, and combined exercises and conduct of war games. The theater-strategic level of command is responsible for establishing and maintaining strategic intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance to provide the intelligence for the development and execution of theater strategy, and the employment of the theater forces across the entire operational continuum. It is also responsible for the establishment and maintenance of the theater-strategic protection aimed to provide full force protection and protection of other military and nonmilitary forces and assets in the theater in peacetime and in war. Among other things, this encompasses theater-wide airspace control, theater ballistic missile defense, and defense against WMD. In peacetime, the theater-strategic level of command is also responsible for maintaining alliance and regional relations by promoting regional security and establishing a multinational intelligence- and information-sharing structure. It provides security assistance to friendly nations in the area. It is responsible for the conduct and support of peace operations in the theater. It also provides foreign disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and conduct of civil affairs in the theater. Furthermore, the

theater-strategic level of command provides necessary support to other government and nongovernment agencies and organizations in the theater. In case of general war, the theater-strategic level of command will be responsible for planning, preparing, and executing several campaigns in the respective theater of war; each aimed to accomplish a single theater-strategic objective. In low-intensity conflict, the theater-strategic level could be tasked to plan and execute counter-insurgency, counter-drug, or counter-terrorism campaigns or other actions in support of national objectives in the respective theater. Specifically, this level of command issues strategic direction and planning guidance to subordinate levels of command. It is principally responsible for planning and executing strategic (or intertheater) deployment of one's forces. This task includes receiving deploying units, personnel, and their weapons and equipment in theater and their subsequent operational (or intratheater) deployment. Theater-strategic level of command also plans and executes strategic concentration and maneuver. In low-intensity conflict or regional conflict in a part of the theater, lethal and non-lethal theater-strategic fires could be applied throughout the theater in support of campaigns to accomplish the theater strategic objectives. One of the major responsibilities of the theater-strategic level of command is to create and maintain theater-strategic logistical support in peacetime and time of war. Redeployment and reconstitution of theater forces is another major responsibility of theater-strategic level of command. This level also has a major role in cooperation with other government and nongovernment agencies in planning and executing post-hostilities actions. Operational Level (of War): The operational level of command is normally established only in time of regional conflict. This level of war is conducted in a given theater of operations. 2 It focuses on the employment of military forces to achieve theater-strategic objectives through the planning, preparation, and execution of a single campaign. Sometimes, the same objective could be accomplished by conducting a major joint or combined operation. In some situations, the operational level command might be responsible for planning and conduct of a counter-insurgency campaign. The operational level of war was conducted in northern, central, and southern Pacific Ocean Areas in World War It. Likewise, the operational level of war took place in New Guinea (Papua) and adjacent areas in 1942-1944, and in the Philippines in 1944-1945. In a more recent example, the operational level of war was conducted by both sides in the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict of 1982, and in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO) in the Gulf War of 1990-1991. The operational level of war also took place in the larger part of NATO's Allied Force South (AFSOUTH) area of responsibility during the Kosovo Conflict of 1999. The operational commander translates a given theater-strategic objective into a series of operational objectives accomplished through a series of major operations as a part of a single campaign. Sometimes, a major joint/combined operation can also be conducted to accomplish a theater-strategic objective. These actions will require sequenced and synchronized employment of military (land, sea, and air/space) and nonmilitary sources of national power in a given theater of operations. Optimally, the national strategic leadership and theater-strategic level of command, after making a decision, should leave the application of combat forces to the operational level commander. This will become increasingly more difficult to avoid as new information technologies allow the higher command echelon to obtain a more complete picture of the 21

events in a given theater of operations than was possible in the past. Nevertheless, the temptation to intercede, no matter how great, should be avoided. Too much interference by the strategic level of command into the actions of the operational command echelon often does more harm than good. The operational level of command is responsible for planning, preparation, and execution of a single campaign in case of regional conflict or general war. Therefore, all the attention and effort should be directed to the proper sequencing and synchronization of land, air, and sea forces in the accomplishment of the assigned military or theaterstrategic objective. This must be done within the framework of the other national elements of power. 3 Therefore, this level of command must be well aware of the activities of other elements of national power, while being focused on the use of military force in the accomplishment of the assigned military objectives. In contrast to the nationalstrategic and theater-strategic command echelons, the operational level of command does not, for the most part, directly influence the employment of nonmilitary sources of national power. Normally, this level of command should not be simultaneously concerned with deterrence and preparation for combat. 4 The operational level of command issues operational direction and planning guidance for the next lower levels of command. It must provide adequate means to subordinate component commanders commensurate with acceptable levels of risk. If an appropriate level of resources is not available, this situation must be communicated to the theater- or national-strategic leadership. The decision to limit the ends must be made at the strategic level where the national leadership can consider all the elements of national power. In addition, the operational command echelon must communicate, in a timely manner, to the theater- (or national-) strategic leadership progress toward accomplishing the assigned military objectives and actual or projected needs for additional forces and resources within the theater . 5 In crisis or regional conflict the operational level of command is directly responsible for planning and conduct of operational deployment and redeployment of one's forces in the respective theater of operations. The major responsibility of the operational level of command is sequencing and synchronization of operational functions. Operational command and control is exercised through authority over subordinate forces and theater-wide infrastructure in planning, preparing, and employing military and nonmilitary sources of power for the accomplishment of the assigned military objectives. The operational level of command employs operational command and control warfare (C2W) in peacetime and in war. The operational level of command plans and conducts operational surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence in support of a campaign or a major operation. In addition, intelligence support must be provided for planning and conduct of all other operational functions. This task also includes providing intelligence support to other friendly countries in the theater. The operational level of command plans operational fires, both lethal and non-lethal, in support of a campaign or major operation. Another task of the operational level of command is planning and executing operational logistic support and sustainment. This responsibility includes identification of logistic requirements and establishment of priorities, and ensuring that the operations are sustained resulting in the desired operational tempo. This level of command is responsible for the development of the theater sustainment base. Logistic support and

sustainment must also be coordinated in combination with one's government agencies and friendly countries in the area. Because conflict at the operational level is by definition larger and more complex than at the tactical level, campaigns and major operations are normally much more constrained by logistics than the battles and engagements. Therefore, the operational level of command must avoid an exclusive focus on combat operations to the neglect of logistic support and sustainment and other supporting functions. The operational level of command plans and executes theater-wide or operational protection of one's forces, infrastructure, and civilian population from enemy actions on the ground, sea, air, or space, natural occurrences, and terrorist acts. Operational level of command is not directly concerned with conflict or war termination, but it provides input to the theater-strategic or national-strategic level of command on this critically important issue. It also advises the next higher level of command as to use or non-use of WMD and recommends conditions for conflict or war termination. The operational level of command plays a major role in planning and use of military forces in the post-hostilities phase. It also coordinates and integrates interagency support and support of host nations and other friendly nations in the area of conflict. Tactical Level (of War): The tactical level of command is established to ensure successful employment of military forces to accomplish assigned tactical objectives as part of a major operation or campaign. Therefore, the tactical level of command is almost exclusively focused on physical combat applying military force to achieve a series of specific tactical objectives. 6 The tactical level of war is conducted in a much smaller area than the operational level, ranging from a combat zone or sector to an area of operations. In the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the tactical level of war took place on the land area of Kuwait and the border area between Iraq and Saudi Arabia, the northern part of the Arabian Gulf, and in the airspace over these land and sea areas. In the Kosovo Conflict of 1999, the tactical level of war from the air was conducted in several separate combat zones: the southern Adriatic, Kosovo Province, the area between 44° North parallel and the Sava River to the north, and Vojvodina Province north of the capital of Belgrade. The perspective of the tactical level of command is necessarily much narrower than other levels of command. This level is concerned with purely military objectives that is, to destroy or neutralize enemy forces or seize, control, and defend specific physical objectives. Except in low-intensity conflict, the tactical level of command is not concerned with the employment of nonmilitary sources of national power. Thus, this level of command should have adequate forces and assets available to accomplish assigned military objectives. This also means that one of the tasks of the higher level of command is not to unnecessarily limit the tactical level in the use of their forces. Among other things, the tactical level of command is concerned with planning, preparing, and conducting tactical deployment and redeployment, concentration and maneuver, intelligence, exercising tactical command and control, fires, and force protection. In contrast to the operational and higher levels of command, the tactical level requests and uses logistics but does not have authority over logistics. Conclusion: Full understanding and knowledge of the activities and actions at each command echelon and level of war is prerequisite to understanding the full complexity of relationships among strategy, tactics, and operational art. No mastery of operational art is 23

possible without understanding each level of war and its interfaces. Because of the difference in the scope of the military objectives to be accomplished, each level of command and level of war requires commanders and their staff to have a different perspective. The higher the level of command, the broader that perspective is. The narrowest perspective is at the tactical level both in terms of physical space and the elements of the situation. This, in turn, determines that normally only military sources of power are used to accomplish a tactical objective. At each level above the tactical level, the perspective becomes progressively larger and more complex. At the national- and theater-strategic levels, the accomplishment of military strategic objectives requires the employment of all available military and nonmilitary sources of power over time. Normally, levels of command are clearly delineated from each other while levels of war are not. The reason is that the outcome of combat actions often has effects beyond the boundaries of a particular level of war. A major tactical defeat can result in the failure of a major operation and thereby adversely affect the situation at the operational level, and in some cases even at the strategic level. The boundaries between individual levels of war are often not constant, but they might overlap, sometimes considerably.

Notes l. In the U.S. military, all the services-with the sole exception of the U.S. Navy-in their doctrinal documents recognize three levels of war: strategic, operational, and tactical; the U.S. Navy's doctrinal publications recognize only strategic and tactical levels, and only imply the existence of the operational level of war; William F. Crain, The Heart of Operational Art. Translating Strategic Objectives into Tactical Missions (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1990), p. 26. 2. Headquarters, U.S. Army, FM 100-5: Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1982) associated the operational level with the theater of war; second edition of the same manual published in 1986 added theater of operations but did not clearly explain which of them represents the operational level of war; Dwight L. Adams and Clayton R. Newell, "Operational Art in the Joint and Combined Arenas," Military Review 6 (June 1988), pp. 35-6. 3. Dwight L. Adams and Clayton R. Newell, "Levels of War" Army 6 (June 1988), p. 28. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid., p. 29. 6. Clayton R. Newell, "What is Operational Art?" Military Review 9 (September 1990), p. 4.

Part II: OPERATIONAL FACTORS

OPERATIONAL FACTORS The art of warfare at all levels is to obtain and maintain freedom of action-the ability to carry out critically important, multiple, and diverse decisions to accomplish assigned military objectives. This is accomplished by limiting or, if possible, completely denying the enemy the ability to act, while keeping one's options open to accomplish the assigned military objective(s). All great military leaders had an uncommon ability to evaluate the factor of space, the strengths and weaknesses of their own forces, and the speed of their movement. At any level of war, freedom of action is achieved primarily by properly balancing the factors of space, time, and forces.' These factors and increasingly information are decisive for making decisions at all levels (see Figure 3). The higher the level of war, the more critical these factors. The term operational factors refer to factors of space, time, and force in a given theater of operations. Figure 3: OPERATIONAL FACTORS

In practice, operational factors will rarely be completely, or even approximately, in harmony with each other or with the assigned operational or strategic objectives. Therefore, it is the task of the operational commander to evaluate each individual operational factor and to arrange their mutual relationship so that they collectively enhance his ability to act freely within political, diplomatic, legal, or other restraints and constraints. All considerations must start from measurable factors-that is, space and time.'` The factor of time is more dynamic and changeable than the factor of space, and over the years has been gradually compressed, while the factor of space has steadily expanded . 3 Normally, the factors of space and time can be calculated with high degree of precision. However, this is not the case with the factor of force because the true strength of the armed forces as a whole or individual services encompasses so many unquantifiable elements that are difficult if not impossible to evaluate with any degree of certainty. The operational commanders must

also fully observe the complexity of information relationships and their effect on each of the traditional operational factors. 4 A significant change in any of these factors will invariably disturb the overall balance and require their reassessment.

Notes 1. Erich H. Koenen, Die operativen Ideen Mansteins hinsichtlich Nuetzung des Raumes, Gewinnen der Initiative, Schaffen von Handlungsfi^eiheit and Wahl zwischen offensivem and defensivem Vorgehen. Eine Untersuchung anhand der Beispiele `Rochade' and Schlacht bei Kharkow des Winterfeldzuges 1942143 (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, November 1988), p. 2; Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, "Operative Leitlinie fuer die Fuehrung von Landstreitkraeften" (October 1993), Arbeitspapier Operative Fuehrung (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, August 1992), p. 19. 2. Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, "Operative Leitlinie fuer die Fuehrung von Landstreitkraeften," October 1993, Arbeitspapier, Operative Fuehrung (August 1992), p. 2. 3. Werner Lange, Raum, Zeit and Mittel als Faktoren sirategischer Zielsetzung. Ueberlegungen zu Napoleons Feldzug in Russland 1812 (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, November 1964), p. 1. 4. Ajay Singh, "Time: The New Dimension of Warfare," Joint Force Quarterly (Winter 1995-96), p. 56.

THE FACTOR OF SPACE Those who do not know the conditions of mountains and forests, hazardous defiles, marshes and swamps, cannot conduct the march of an army. Sun Tzu Physical space encompasses land, sea, and airspace, including outer space, with all their features, which influence employment and effectiveness of land, sea, and air forces. In addition, legal, political, ethnic, or religious conditions considerably influence the use of physical space. The factor of space significantly affects the combat employment of forces of both sides.' Military history is replete with examples of campaigns and major operations that failed because the factor of space was either neglected or unrealistically assessed. Space in itself is both a means and an objective. It is the means because sufficient space is needed to successfully conduct military operations; it is the objective because to conduct military operations it is necessary to control the space. The forces required to accomplish operational or strategic objectives must have sufficient space to deploy, concentrate, maneuver, and fight. This also implies the existence of sufficient space for the theater-wide infrastructure necessary to support the conduct of major operations and campaigns. The factor of space must be controlled to such a degree that the assigned military objectives can be achieved . 3 Operating in small space deals only with tactical considerations. Whenever large space is used, the operational commander's perspective in contrast to that of the tactical commander must be much broader. Therefore, the commander and his staff must consider the entire space in which a major operation or campaign will be conducted, advantages and disadvantages of larger versus smaller space, dynamic factors influencing the factor of space, distances from the basing or deployment area to the area where combat actions will occur, geostrategic positions, the operational features of the physical environment, and the theater's geometry. Larp-e versus Small Space: Wide or narrow space and long or short distances influence warfare considerably. One of the main prerequisites for the successful application of operational art is to have sufficient space for deployment, concentration, maneuver, and redeployment of large forces. Without the ability to conduct large-scale movements on land, at sea, and in the air, operational warfare is an empty concept. The success of any major operation or campaign depends on the free movement of one's forces in the theater. In the era of million-man or mass armies, it was difficult to outflank or outmaneuver a strong opponent on land .6 The Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 was the first conflict in which the fighting took place along an almost continuous front. After the failure of the Schlieffen Plan in August 1914, the only space open to free movement was on the German right flank; the left flank became fixed because it was adjacent to neutral Switzerland and did not allow for any outflanking of the French front. After the Battle of

the Mame in September 1914, the German Army High Command had essentially two options: to operate freely on the right flank or to order a large-scale withdrawal and thereby obtain freedom of action in general. By the fall of 1914 the Germans apparently thought that the battle in Flanders could lead to a war of movement. As that proved impossible, they limited their offensive to the destruction of the French left flank. In the end, the Germans laid their hopes that the Allies could be chased away from the Channel coast. Instead, as more and more forces were thrown into combat on both sides, the size of space to operate freely was drastically reduced to a long thin line. The intention of both the Germans and the Allies was to build a continuous front whereby they could control the entire space, thus preventing the envelopment of their forces. 8 This, in turn, required a larger force to be deployed throughout the length and width of the space. For the next three years of the war, huge forces were expended on both sides to carry out frontal assaults, which had little effect on the operational or strategic situation. Whether the frontline moved forward or back did not matter because neither side could achieve a decisive advantage. 9 In land warfare, armies usually deploy and concentrate in physical space they control. This is normally not the case with the employment of naval and air forces, which maneuver in space that is either controlled by the enemy or control is in dispute. In the attack, a large space allows sufficient area to conduct wide-ranging movements, thereby providing the operational commander more options for employing forces to achieve the greatest possible effect. ° An attack into the enemy's depth, threatening his lines of supply, will usually lead to dramatic results.' The farther the attacker advances into the enemy's territory, the more the defender will have to shift to a defensive posture temporarily or permanently-and by smaller or larger withdrawals preserve his freedom of action. 1 2 Having too much space usually makes it more difficult to seek a decision for both sides. In World War I, the front in the West became a great battle of attrition, while in the East, maneuvering space was so vast that neither the Germans and their Austro Hungarian allies nor the Russians were able to force a decision. 13 A large space can also put certain limitations on the commander's freedom of action. The need to protect everlengthening flanks and lines of communications requires increasingly larger forces to secure the rear area and to control a hostile populace, thereby reducing the attacker's striking power. In Napoleon I's invasion of Russia in 1812, the French logisticians could not keep up with the advances of the French troops because of the ever-extending lines of communications. The space factor, with its effects on time and forces, resulted in Napoleon I's inability to maintain the "operational tempo" necessary to bring the Russians to a decision. 1 4 A large space on land offers many advantages to the defense. This is especially true of countries that encompass enormous landmasses, as for example, Russia, China, the United States, or Brazil. These countries essentially can only be conquered if the regime or the government in power collapses under the weight of its own contradictions. A vast maritime space cannot be successfully defended against a strong opponent at sea. This fact became painfully clear in the modern era after the advent of submarines and aircraft. The area in which Japan conducted active operations in 1941 stretched about 4,000 miles north to south, from the Aleutian Islands to Australia, and about 5,000 miles

east to west, from the Andamans in the Bay of Bengal to the Hawaiian Islands." By mid1942, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) lacked sufficient naval and air strength to effectively control that huge area against the attacks of the Allied fast carrier forces, landbased aircraft, and submarines (see Map A-1). Distances: The distance between one's bases and the potential employment area are closely related to the factor of time. It is also a critical aspect of the factor of space. Long distances between various points within a given theater imply large physical space and thereby allow employment of large forces. Short distances in contrast imply a small employment area and, hence, present great difficulties for the movements of large forces. In both world conflicts, the principal characteristic of the war on the Eastern Front was the enormous size of the area in which combat was conducted. In World War 1, the German border with Russia extended over 620 miles of open terrain. 1 6 In their invasion of Soviet Russia in June 1941, the Germans faced a much larger problem in seizing and then controlling an enormous land area of European Russia. From the German starting position on the Bug River, it was about 300 miles to the Orsha Corridor, and an additional 700 miles to the Volga River." Between the fall of 1941 and the fall of 1943, the German front was never less than 2,400 miles long, and for a time in 1942 it reached 3,045 miles. The German armies penetrated 1,180 miles into Russia and withdrew 1,490 miles back to Berlin. 1 8 Maritime campaigns usually encompass vast areas of the oceans and adjacent seas. The German attack on the Allied maritime trade and the Allied campaign to defend it in World War II encompassed the entire northern and much of the central and southern Atlantic, part of the Indian Ocean, and most of the adjacent sea areas, such as the Mediterranean, the North Sea, and the Caribbean. In addition, part of the Arctic Ocean and its marginal seas also became the scene of actions for both sides, as did the entire Pacific Ocean, with the exception of its southeastern part. War in enclosed and semi-enclosed seas differs considerably from that on the open ocean as a result of, among other things, their generally smaller size. The distances between various points in such areas are relatively short. In the Baltic Sea, the distance between Kiel and Helsinki is about 625 nautical miles; the port of Tallinn lies only about 220 nautical miles from Stockholm; and about 230 nautical miles separate Copenhagen and Rostock. In the North Sea, the British port of Hull is only about 280 nautical miles from the German port of Emden, while the Belgian ports of Ostend and Zeebrugge lie 207 and 205 nautical miles, respectively, from Hull. From Heligoland to Hull there are about 300 nautical miles of sea surface to transit. The German base at Cuxhaven lies about 420 nautical miles from Firth of Forth. The distance from the Shetlands to the Norwegian port of Haugesund is only about 200 nautical miles. For a country that needs to project its power far from its shore, distances from home bases to the forward-deployed areas greatly affect its ability to influence events overseas. Obviously, the longer the distance, the more complicated and time-consuming the projection of power. In World War II, the Western Allies' problems of supplying Russia were difficult to resolve because of a combination of long distances, prevailing weather conditions, and the strength of the Axis forces. The routes that offered the shortest transit time were also the most dangerous. Shipping from the U.S. East Coast

ports to the Persian Gulf port of Basra (from which Russia could be reached by land) had to go via the Cape of Good Hope until July 1943 when the Mediterranean route was opened. The length of that route was about 14,500 miles and required seventy-six transit days. In contrast, the convoy voyages from the Icelandic ports to Murmansk and Archangel'sk were ten and twelve days, respectively. l9 In the war in the Mediterranean, the Axis control of both shores of the Central Mediterranean forced the British to use a much longer sea route, around the Cape, to supply their forces in Malta-some 12,000 miles, versus 2,400 miles via Gibraltar. However, by July 1943, the Axis position in the Mediterranean had collapsed, thereby allowing the British to save some five million tons of shipping space by shortening the distance to the Middle East . 2° The Korean War (1950-1953), the Vietnam War (1965-1975), and the Gulf War of 1990-1991 all posed considerable problems for the employment and sustainment of U.S. and Coalition forces because of the distances between the sources of power and the employment area. The average sea distance from Norfolk, Virginia, via the Cape of Good Hope to Kuwait is about 11,900 nautical miles, or about 8,610 nautical miles via the Strait of Gibraltar and the Suez Canal. Dynamics of Space: Space is a highly dynamic factor once the hostilities start. The changes in size of area controlled by both sides are often rapid. Gaining space is a prerequisite for the successful conduct of war, especially when a campaign is not completed quickly and one's space is too small . 21 However, gaining space offers both advantages and disadvantages. By gaining space the movement of supplies over evergreater distances requires steadily larger forces and means. If a decision is not reached and the attack continues, the attacker will most likely overshoot his culmination point. The more the attacker approaches the limit of his combat power, the more likely the defender is to counterattack. 22 Additional space can be gained by offensive actions against enemy-controlled territory, or by conducting deployment and concentration in greater than normal depth into one's rear areas. It can also be gained by establishing an alliance or coalition that effectively enlarges the area for military actions. Any space gained should be militarily organized to facilitate planning, preparation, and conduct of major operations or campaigns. Supplies have to be moved and distributed over ever-longer distances, which, in turn, requires larger forces and more time. 23 The farther the attacker advances into the defender's controlled territory, the more he deprives the defender of the means of conducting the war-which one then can use for his own benefit . 24 The situation is more complicated in a war between two strong opponents at sea. Enemy aircraft, submarines, or mines can effectively dispute or even deny control of an ocean, sea, or air area to one's forces. A very large country could lose or abandon a large part of its space to the enemy without lasting damages for the overall effort as did, for example, Soviet Russia in World War II in its war with Nazi Germany. In contrast, giving up space by a small country like Israel could be fatal to its very survival. In addition, the factor of time also works against it. 25 In the Yom Kippur (Ramadan) War, the Israeli situation was highly unfavorable because of the shallow operational depth of the country's defenses. In the Golan Heights that depth was only about ten miles, and in the south only about forty-five miles (the distance from the Suez

Canal to the Mitla and Gidi Passes). The Golan Heights front stretched over thirty-seven miles or one third of the frontline on the Suez Canal . 26 Loss of space is generally a great disadvantage in preparing a counteroffensive. A side that has lost space must accept certain restrictions in movement of its forces. 27 Normally, a loss of space diminishes one's morale and enhances the opponent's morale. However, this is not always the case. Russia's loss of the Russian territory to Napoleon I in 1812 was not as great a problem as it might have been because the territory was so sparsely populated. On the other hand, for the French, the gain in space proved to be a decisive disadvantage . 2s They suffered increasingly heavy losses from severe weather as they advanced deeper into Russia's territory. The size of space available for military operations can be reduced for both the potential attacker and defender by delineating spheres of influence in peacetime. Russia and England agreed in 1907 to have a sixty-two to ninety-three mile wide zone to avoid direct conflict of their financial, trade, and administrative interests in Afghanistan. 2' The Yalta Agreement of 1945, by delineating spheres of influence between the Sovietdominated communist bloc and Western democracies, resulted in a large gain of space for any potential offensive action by the Soviet armed forces against Western Europe. Neutral zones can play a significant role for both offense and defense either by restricting or by allowing the deployment of forces. They can encompass a part of the territory of both belligerents and the entire area of a third country. An alternative to a neutralized zone is to divide the entire area through military occupation, thereby enhancing political influence and control of the area by both sides in a conflict. 3o Neutralized zones are usually established in an area where the conflict is in transition from high tension to an understanding between the parties. They, in effect, reduce the space for the potential attacker and result in a gain of space for the defender. The stability of a neutralized area or zone depends on the balance of forces between the potential opponents. Where the sides are approximately equal in strength, any advantage one side tries to obtain will be neutralized through the counteraction of the other side. The greater the symmetry, the longer the tradition of stability must be if a neutralized zone is to be protected or observed by both sides. And the opposite is equally true." In some cases, a given area or zone must be neutralized because its possession or control by either side would provide a decisive advantage to one side only. Then, the danger of instability can be reduced by destroying or neutralizing the value of the territory in question. Emperor Napoleon III abandoned the French claim to Luxembourg in 1866. Subsequently, the fortifications of the city of Luxembourg were razed and the Duchy was neutralized. The reason for this action was that in a war between France and Prussia, control of the fortifications would have given a decisive strategic advantage for only one side. 32 The most elementary factor in the stability of a neutralized zone in war is the symmetry in advantages both sides draw from its existence. One of the sides in a conflict will respect a neutralized zone as long as the advantages of its use are at least as great as its disadvantages. In World War I both Britain and Germany had equal interest in maintaining Norwegian neutrality. The British used the coastal waters off northern Norway to supply its Russian ally, while the Germans used the Inner Leads for transport

of Swedish iron ore from Narvik. This situation changed in the initial phase of World War II, when Russia was not a belligerent and Germany had taken advantage of Norway's neutrality by using its coastal waters for transporting Swedish iron ore. 33 A conflict between two or more countries can indirectly involve a third country which is not interested in the outcome of the conflict but wants to remain on friendly terms with both sides . 34 Space for the employment of forces of both sides is reduced by the existence of the diplomatically neutral countries or territories. All acts of hostility in neutral territory, waters, or airspace are prohibited. 35 Belligerent warships are limited as to the amount of time they can stay in a neutral port or anchorage. However, these third states or "neutrals" might reduce the space for the attacker and thereby, benefit the side on the defensive. When one side knows that the neutralized area has limited value for the other, then it can be confident that the other will not try to change the status quo. If a neutralized zone has relatively small military, political, or economic importance, the more likely it is that its neutrality will be preserved . 36 Switzerland and Sweden were formally neutral in both world conflicts and never became involved in hostilities. Potential aggressors did not consider their territories vitally important in connection with the invasion of third countries in the area. One of the reasons was that both countries maintained a strong military establishment to preserve their neutrality. In contrast, Germany violated the formal neutrality of Belgium and Luxembourg in 1914 and 1940, because their territories were a gateway for her invasion of France. Once the hostilities start, the territories or spaces of neutral countries can be violated by one or both sides. Various neutral or exclusion zones, which in effect reduce space for military actions, may be declared by one or both belligerents, or by third parties. Generally, space becomes progressively larger as important neutrals are drawn into a conflict. The military need for space can become so critical that limitations to the conduct of operations cease to be persuasive or politically important. 37 Space for military actions can also be reduced by the existence of countries or territories in a state of non-belligerency. This was the situation in Europe in World War I when, among others, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the Scandinavian countries all declared their neutrality in the conflict between Central Powers and the Entente. In the early stage of World War II, neutrality of Iceland and Portugal (with its strategically located Azores Islands) enormously complicated the Allied efforts to protect and defend their maritime trade in the Atlantic. This led the British to land troops in Iceland in May 1940 to preempt a possible German move to seize that strategically important island. By July 1941, Iceland had come under U.S. protection. The Allies did not obtain access to the Azores until October 1943 when the British successfully negotiated the use of the airfields, making Portugal a co-belligerent (although it continued to maintain outwardly its neutrality in some other respects). This made an almost immediate and dramatic change in the situation in the Battle for the Atlantic. In contrast, the Allies were unable to use the Canary Islands as a base, because Spain was de facto an ally of Nazi Germany. In a maritime context, a neutral country can insulate itself from a conflict by declaring a neutrality zone. Such a zone can be effective if the diplomatic situation forces each side in a conflict to placate neutrals. This happened with the South American Neutrality Zone declared in Panama in October 1939. The zone encompassed all the

countries of South and North America (with the exception of Canada) plus the 300-milewide sea/ocean area off their coasts . 38 In the past, blockade and counter blockade were used to deny space, at least in legal terms, to an opponent at sea. 39 The aim in establishing a blockade was to deny the enemy the space in which to use his own (or neutral) vessels or aircraft to transport personnel and goods to or from enemy territory. The Entente Powers conducted a distant naval blockade of the Central Powers in World War 1. Great Britain declared a blockade of Germany in September 1939, and by late November of the same year it reasserted the principle of a distant blockade. The neutral Scandinavian countries protested the British action, but their protests became muted after Germany invaded Norway in April 1940. 4° In June 1940, the British blockade was extended to Italy and its possessions. Since 1945, the most prevalent method of preserving space for one's forces and denying space to the opponent at sea has been to declare various exclusion zones. The effective enforcement of an exclusion zone requires the proper balancing of forces in terms of space and time. Otherwise, the side that declared the exclusion zone is forced to conduct random searches or attacks in the hope of deterring the enemy's ships or aircraft from entering and operating within the zone. In the Iran-Iraq War, both sides declared exclusion zones in the Arabian (Persian) Gulf shortly after the outbreak of hostilities in September 1980. Iraq declared a prohibited war zone in the northern part of the Gulf on 12 August 1982. This zone was extended in February 1984 to include an area fifty miles in radius from Kharg Island . 41 However, neither Iraq nor Iran had forces to enforce their respective exclusion zones. On 12 April 1982, in the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict, the British declared a 200-nautical-mile maritime exclusion zone (MEZ) around the geographic center of the Falklands. Only the Argentinean warships and naval auxiliaries found within the zone were liable to attack. On 30 April this zone was expanded to a total exclusion zone (TEZ), which was applied to every ship and aircraft, whether military or civil, operating in support of the illegal occupation of the Falklands Islands. 4' The Argentineans, in turn, declared a South Atlantic War Zone on 1 I May 1982. Geostrategic Position: One of the main prerequisites for a country or group of countries is a favorable geostrategic position for the employment of military forces as a whole. In general, in relation to the adjacent sea and land area, a country may occupy central, semicentral, peninsular, and insular positions. When a country or territory does not border the sea or ocean, as for example, Afghanistan, Switzerland, or Hungary, then it is said to occupy a central position. If a country is located on the rim of a continental landmass and borders, the sea or the ocean, it is said to occupy a semicentral position. Germany occupies such a geostrategic position in regard to the North Sea and the Baltic Sea. Russia occupies a central geostrategic position on land but semicentral position in regard to the surrounding seas and oceans. It stretches for about 8,000 miles and eleven time zones across the two continents, and its seaboard encompasses four regions, each widely separated from the others. This forces Russia to maintain a fleet in each of these four far-flung maritime theaters. Tsarist Russia and its successor, the Soviet Union, tried repeatedly (and unsuccessfully) to overcome natural disadvantages in their maritime position by obtaining access to the warm waters of the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. Today, the access of the Russian home-based fleets to the waters of the North

Atlantic from the Barents Sea in wartime is difficult, because potentially hostile powers control the stretch of water from Greenland to Norway. In contrast, Russia's access to the open ocean in the Far Eastern theater is relatively more favorable because the Kamchatka Peninsula borders with the open ocean. However, the peninsula with its naval and air bases lacks well-developed road and railroad links with the mainland and is for all practical purposes an island, with all the inherent advantages and disadvantages accruing from such a position. A territory having longer frontier on the sea than on the land is said to occupy a semi-isolated or peninsular position. Denmark occupies a favorable position at sea because it controls the only exit from the Baltic, the Danish Straits (Skagerrak and Kattegat). The Korean Peninsula occupies a dominant geostrategic position in northeast Asia, because it dominates all sea and air routes between Japan and Manchuria, and sea routes from the Yellow Sea to and from the Sea of Japan. Within the Mediterranean, Italy's mainland enjoys a commanding geostrategic position in the Central Mediterranean. One leg of the Apennine Peninsula faces the Messina Strait, while the other leg borders the Strait of Otranto, the only exit from the Adriatic Sea. A country on a large island or several large islands occupies an insular position. England probably provides the best example of the advantage that accrues from occupying an insular position. The British Isles form a 600-mile-long barrier off the coast of Western Europe and border on the open waters of the North Atlantic and three narrow seas, the North Sea, the English Channel, and the Irish Sea. Japan occupies a similar position in respect to Asia's adjacent landmass. Japan's mainland stretches across four large islands whose shores are washed by the waters of the Pacific and two narrow seas: the Sea of Japan and the Inland Sea. A power that controls both shores of an international strait, as Turkey does, lies both astride and flanks sea lines of communications to the respective enclosed or semienclosed sea. A country controlling only one shore of a strait important for international trade-in the case of Oman or Iran with respect to the Strait of Hormuz, or Malaysia with regard to the Malacca Strait-also flanks the routes of its potential adversaries at sea. However, such a country normally does not possess absolute local command, because another power controls the other shore of the respective strait. A country or group of countries could acquire a strategically more favorable position by building an alliance or coalition, as the United States has in Europe because of its leading role within the NATO Alliance. Likewise, the geostrategic position of the former USSR in Europe was immeasurably improved between 1945 and 1991 by its control of a string of communist-ruled East European countries. Since the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the breakup of the Soviet Union, the depth of space between the German and Russian border has been reduced to about 810 miles. A country's geostrategic position can be enhanced by obtaining additional territory through a diplomatically negotiated settlement. Sometimes, this is not possible, as evidenced by Germany's failure to reach a political agreement with Denmark in World War I in an effort to secure a Baltic exit route for its naval forces deployed in the Baltic Sea. An example of the acquisition of a much better strategic position through conquest was Germany's seizure of Norway in April through June 1940. Norway had many good natural harbors, and the adjacent waters were deep and mostly unsuitable for mining. The

nearest British base, in the Shetlands, was 170 miles from Bergen, while Scapa Flow was 240 miles from Stavanger. German aircraft, coastal guns, and naval forces protected the route through and along the Norwegian Leads. At the same time, German opportunities to raid Allied shipping in the North Atlantic and the Barents Sea were greatly enhanced. Northern Norway's fjords provided bases for highly successful attacks by the Luftwaffe, the U-boats, and surface ships against convoys bound for Russia in 1941-1942. The Uboats operated freely in the North Atlantic from elaborately constructed pens at Trondheim and Bergen. Shape: The country's shape can sometimes considerably affect a country's geostrategic position when other factors are taken into account. The compact, elongated, and prompt shape of a country can be differentiated. A country is said to have a compact shape when all the points of its boundary lie at the same distance from the country's geometrical center. Germany, the People's Republic of China (PRC), Poland, and Belgium all seem to have nearly round or rectangular boundaries. A country with a large and compact shape, such as Poland, offers the shortest possible boundary in the view of the area enclosed. Also, because such a country does not have peninsulas, large islands, or other protruding parts, the establishment of the communications network is generally easier. A country or territory that is at least six times longer it is wide, such as Chile and Norway, is said to have an elongated (or attenuated) shape. The land frontiers of a country with elongated shape, in combination with the narrowness of the land area, make defense against enemy invasion difficult. When a country or territory, as for example Thailand or Croatia, is compact in shape but in the form of a "corridor" leading away from its main body, it is said to have a prorupt .shape. These countries generally have a long seaboard and narrow coastal area and are highly vulnerable to an attack from the sea or land. Whenever a country stretches across a land area, either on the rim of a continent or an island, it is said to be physically concentrated. This position is normally favorable for defense against external attack. A country is physically concentrated even if it extends across two or even more islands, provided that each is separated from the other by a relatively narrow channel or strait, as is the case of British Isles. Denmark enjoys a high physical concentration because its 600 odd islands are near the 210-mile-long Jutland Peninsula, and each other. To the east is Bornholm, the only large island of note that lies relatively far away, some eighty miles from Sjaelland. However, if a country or territory spreads over too many widely separated islands, as is the case of Greece, Indonesia, and the Philippines, such a country lacks physical concentration; it is physically fragmented. The Philippines extends for about 1,150 miles from north to south, and for about 700 miles from east to west. The archipelago encompasses about 7,100 islands of which only 460 are larger than one square mile. Indonesia with its 13,700 islands and islets spread over 3,200 miles of sea is even more physically fragmented than the Philippines. Concept of Cyberspace: Since the early 1980s the concept of space has been vastly expanded by dramatic changes in the use of computer-based information systems and in particular the Internet. The term "cyberspace" has been introduced . 4s It is a metaphor for describing non-physical terrain created by computer systems. Online systems create cyberspace within which people can communicate with one another via e-mail, do research, 41

or simply window shop. The unique characteristics of cyberspace are that it lacks geographic or theoretical boundaries and physical presence. There is no formal division between government and privately used cyberspace. Because there is no clear-cut frontline, the origin of the "cyber attack" is extremely difficult to identify. Also, there is no discernible line of defense. Like physical space, cyberspace contains objects (files, mail messages, graphics, etc.) and different modes of transportation and delivery. However, unlike real space, exploring cyberspace does not require any physical movement other than pressing keys on a keyboard or moving a mouse. 46 Cyberspace and traditional physical space have some things in common, but there are also considerable differences. Cyberspace is not physically limited as the traditional physical environment is. It is practically limitless and without fixed boundaries. A Web page posted anywhere in the world is available to everyone else in the world. When an email message is transmitted, it can be retransmitted to anyone in the world with access to the Web. Thus, traditional borders and distances have little relevance. However, there are some physical limitations in the use of cyberspace for both sides in a conflict. In cyberspace, the defensive mechanism of information systems that protect against unauthorized entry form a border that physically prevents others from entering. If one has adequate system security, then a physical border exists; a password system is one example. A second border is found in the legal consequences attached to activities in cyberspace. If a particular act is prohibited, and if there are effective sanctions for violators, the law also serves as a border. Physical space and cyberspace are mutually related because the ground elements of cyberspace are distributed both in a physical space where combat takes place, and many hundreds and even thousand of miles away. This, in turn, has enormous consequences because the very outcome of a campaign or major operation might depend on offensive and defensive actions conducted far beyond the theater's boundaries. Conclusion: The main characteristic of modern warfare is the continuous expansion of space in which military movements and combat action took place. Combat actions have extended to encompass not only a ground and sea/ocean surface, but also subsurface and the air. However, in terms of time, "space" has steadily shrunk because of the advent of the aircraft, missiles, and new means of surveillance. The importance of the factor of space in planning, conducting, and sustaining major operations and campaigns cannot be overstated. Many military enterprises ultimately failed, or the effort required too much time and too many resources to reach a successful outcome, because the factor of space was either neglected or some of its key elements were improperly analyzed and hence led to a flawed operational scheme. Despite all the technological advances, physical space still counts and cannot be wished away as some argue. Large force needs larger space to move and maneuver. Space with its distances and physical features remain a critical factor in the employment of forces for both sides in a conflict. The emerging cyberspace does not diminish, but rather complements the importance of physical space. It expands the factor of space into the fourth dimension and thereby requires new force capabilities. While in the past forces were essentially limited within the boundaries of a given theater, today many elements of the enemy's military and non-military sources of power are located farther away. The significance of the "space" should not be stressed too much, because its overall effect considerably depends on the factors time and forces.

Notes 1. Space in geographic terms is a part of the Earth's surface whose size is limited, but is greater than a place or location or strip; Franz Werb, Raum-Zeit-Mittel als Faktoren Strategischer Zielsetzung (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, February 1965), pp. 2-3. The term "space" implies that it has a virtually infinite extension; it connotes the idea of free movement; and it implies idea of geometrydistances, directions, and dimensions. 2. Gustav Daeniker, Raum, Kraft and Zeit in der Militaerischen Kriegfuehrung (Frauenfeld: Verlag von Huber & Co. Aktiengesellschaft, 1944), p. 13. 3. Lothar Rendulic, Grundlag_en militaerischer Fuehrung (Herford/Bonn:Maximilian Verlag, 1967), p. 22. 4. Arbeitspapier, "Operative Fuehrung" (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, August 1992), p. 14. 5. Daeniker, Raum, Kraft Und Zeit In Der Militaerischen KLegfuehrung , p. 29. 6. Center for Military History, U.S. Army, CMH Pub 104-5: Terrain Factors in the Russian Campaign (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, first printing July 195 1, facsimile edition 1986), p. 1. 7. Daeniker, Raum, Kraft and Zeit in der Militaerischen Kriegffuehrung p. 27. 8. Rendulic, "Operative Beherrschung des Raumes," 1 964), p. 83.

Wehrwissenschaftlichen Rundschau

1 (January

9. Daeniker, Raum, Kraft and Zeit in der Militaerischen Kriegfuehrung, p. 20. 1 0. Harmut Behrendt, Die Handlungsfreiheit der militaerischen FuehrungJ Moeglichkeiten and Grenzen aufkrund des heutigen Kriegsbildes (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, January 1968), p. 6. 11. Erich Koenen, Die operatives Ideen Mansteins hinsichtlich Nuetzung des Raumes, Gewinnen der Initiative, Schaffen von Handlungsfreiheit and Wahl zwischen offensivem and defensivem Vorgehen. Eine Untersuchung anhand der Beispiele `Rochade' and Schlacht bei Kharkow des Winterfeldzuges 1942143 (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, August 1992), p. 4. 1 2. Daeniker, Raum, Kraft and Zeit in der Militaerischen Kriegfuehrung , p. 11. 13. Martin Blumenson and James L. Stokesbury, Masters of the Art of Command (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1975), pp. 25-6. 14. Wemer Lange, Raum, Zeit and Mittel als Faktoren strategischer Zielsetzung. Ueberlegungen zu Napoleons Felck:ug in Russland 1812 (Hamburg: Fuebrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, November 1964), p. 16. 15. Ministry of Defence (NAVY), War With Japan , Vol. 1: Background to the War (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1995), p. 1. 16. Rudolf Heinstein, Zur Strategie des Mehrfrontenkrieges. Das Problem der "inneren and auesseren Linie" dargestellt am Beispiel des Ersten Weltkrieges (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 10 November 1975), p. 14. 17. CMH 104-5: Terrain Factors in the Russian Campaign, pp. 6-7. 18. Earl F. Ziemke, "The German Defeat in the East, 1942-45," Military Review 5 (May 1965), p. 33.

1 9. Samuel E. Morison, The Battle of the Atlantic, September 1939-May 1943 Vol. I, History of United States Naval Operations in World War 11 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, reprint 1984), p. 159. 20. Anthony E. Sokol, "Seapower in the Mediterranean 1940 to 1943," Military Review 8 (August 1960), pp. 16-7. 21. Daeniker, Raum, Kraft and Zeit in der Militaerischen Krieefuehrung , p. 14. 22. Lange, Raum, 7-eit and Mittel als Faktoren strategischer Zielsetzung. Ueberlegungen zu Napoleons Feldzug in Russland 1812, p. 2. 23. Ibid., p. 2. 24. Friedrich yon Bernhardi, On War of To-Day , Vol. 11: Combat and Conduct of War, translated by Karl Donat (London: Hugh Rees Ltd., 1913), p. 243. 25. Daeniker, Rauin, Kraft and Zeit in der Militaerischen Kriegfuehrung, p. 12. 26. Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes. The Anatomy of Failure in War (New York, NY: Vintage Books, l st ed., 1991), p. 103. 27. Von Bernhardi, On War of To-Day, Vol. II, p. 319. 28. Ibid., p. 244. 29. Daniel Frei, "Neutral isierte Zonen: Versuch einer Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau 1 2 (December 1969), p. 666.

strategisch-machtpolitischen

Theorie,"

30. Ibid., pp. 666-7. 31. Ibid., pp. 671-3. 32. Ibid., p. 673. 33. Ibid., pp. 669-70. 34. Mark W. Janis, "Neutrality," The Law of Naval Operations, Horace B. Robertson, Jr., editor (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1991), p. 148. 35. Neutral internal waters encompass those waters of a neutral nation that are landward of the baseline from which the territorial sea is measured; a neutral territorial sea is like neutral land, because it cannot be used by any belligerent either as a sanctuary or as a base of operations; belligerents are also obliged to refrain from all hostile acts; "The Law of Neutrality," The Law of Naval Operations , p. 460; belligerents are not allowed to move troops, war material, or supplies across neutral territory; troops that enter neutral territory must be disarmed and interned until the end of the conflict; neutral nations can, but are not obliged to, close their ports and roadsteads to belligerents; ibid., p. 458. 36. Frei, "Neutralisierte Zonen: Versuch einer strategisch-machtpolitischen Theorie." pp. 671-3. 37. D.P. O'Connell, The Influence of Law on Sea Power (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1975), p. 51. 38. Ibid., pp. 162, 28.

39. A blockade is a hostile act intended to prevent ships or aircraft of any nation, enemy or neutral, from entering or exiting specified ports, airfields, or coastal areas belonging to, occupied by, or under the control of the enemy nation. 40. I.F.E. Goldie, "Maritime War Zones & Exclusion Zones," in The Law of Naval Operations , Horace B. Robertson, Jr., editor, p. 169. 41. Ibid., p. 175. 42. Ibid., p. 173. 43. Christian Millotat, "Operative Ueberlegungen fuer das deutsche Heer in der gegenwaertigen Sicherheitslage," Oesterreichische Militaerische Zeitschrift 1 (January-February 1996), p. 60. 44. T.K. Derry, The Campaign in Norway (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1952), p. 229. 45. The term "cyberspace" was coined by science fiction author William Gibson to describe his vision of a global computer network, linking all people, machines, and sources of information in the world, and through which one could move or "navigate" as through a virtual space; the word "cyber" derives from the Greek verb Kubernao which means "to steer"; it connotes the idea of navigation through a space of electronic data. The related term "cybernetics" (Greek kybernetes-steersman) was first introduced by the mathematician Norbert Wiener, as the science of communications and control in animals and the machine. This term defines itself as a science of information and communications. 46. http://aol.pcwebodia.com/TERMc/cvberspace.btm l 47. Arthur K. Cebrowski, "Sea, Space, Cyberspace: Borderless Domains," speech to a lawyers' association, Honolulu, Hawaii, 26 February 1999, p. 4.

THE FACTOR OF TIME Ask me for anything but time. Napoleon I To His Marshals Time is the essence in war, and while a defeat may be balanced by a battle won, days and hours-even minutes frittered away, can never be regained. S. B. Griffith 11, Brigadier General, USMC Any military action during war or peace requires the most serious consideration of the factor of time. Time is one of the most precious commodities in the conduct of warfare and is closely related to the factor of space. Large forces do not just suddenly appear in a theater. They sometimes need several days or even weeks to move from one area to another. Strategy and operational art are concerned with greater spans of space and time than are tactics. Compared with time, space is static and unchangeable, while time is dynamic and variable. I Time lost can never be recovered, while space lost can be regained. Any military action requires a certain amount of time to plan, prepare, conduct, and sustain. Both space and time must be taken as rather fixed conditions that cannot be readily made to conform to the operational commander's intentions. When combined with the movement of one's forces and the speed of executing actions, time can considerably increase the freedom of action for the operational commander. Even a single, unforeseen incident in the course of combat can derail the entire sequencing or synchronization schedule, and thereby adversely affect the outcome of a major operation or even a campaign. Time lost or wasted in conducting daily routine activities can sometimes indirectly influence, to a great degree, the outcome of a combat action. The relative value of the factor of time has gradually changed. In the era of twodimensional wars, the actions took place over a much smaller space and at a relatively slower pace, allowing the commander much more time to prepare for combat or react to unforeseen events. However, the rapid technological advances in the past century have significantly reduced the amount of time required to obtain information, make a sound decision, and act. At the same time, the size of the battlefield has steadily expanded. Some theoreticians believe that if this trend continues, it may lead to a state of "seamless" space where the factor of time will become a decisive factor of war. The superiority of attack over defense depends greatly on the time required for the attacking side to carry out its offensive. For the attacker it is critically important that his actions be as short as possible. A quick victory by the attacker would usually prevent the defender from conducting an orderly withdrawal. Otherwise, the attacker might overshoot his point of culmination. 3 The defeated side's morale is reduced much more if the victorious side attained victory rapidly. In general, the attacker should try to achieve a decision quickly so to release his forces for new or emerging tasks. For the attacker, time

is needed to consolidate his gains of space. Among other things, this includes the time required to secure control of the newly acquired areas and to militarily organize the space . 4 The defender, in contrast, should delay the decision as long as possible and then try to assume the counteroffensive to defeat the attacker . 5 He can gain time by conducting a delaying defense until reinforcements are brought in, thereby creating the conditions for eventual victory. At this point, time can be gained by extending the duration of the actions fought with the enemy, or by retrograde movements if necessary. In the AustroPrussian War of 1866, the longer the Austrians fought, the more likely French intervention on their behalf became. Likewise, in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, the protracted popular resistance in Paris was critical for the French to realize their hopes that other European powers eventually intervene in the conflict on their side. Normally, the operational commander and staff cannot influence those elements of the factor of time that are the responsibility of the national-strategic command echelon (e.g., time for preparing the country's armed forces for war, establishing the industrial base or mobilization, warning time, etc.). However, the factor of time dealing with operational decisions, operational planning, preparation, and conduct of a campaign or major operation are directly influenced by the actions of the operational commander's staff and actions, or lack of actions, by the subordinate commanders. One of the essential prerequisites for success in war is to adopt a sound and accurate vision as to the character and probable duration of a future war. Failure to correctly develop this vision in peacetime invariably has serious consequences on force planning, development of service and joint doctrine, and the outcome of the war itself. A realistic picture of the general character and duration of future war helps the national leaders to create or expand the existing industrial base and establish the forces necessary to accomplish the national objectives. The more time available for preparing for war, the more thorough and thereby more successful, these preparations will be. This is especially important for organizing mobilization and the national logistics system. Correctly estimating the duration of a war is also critical to anticipating the extent and type of vulnerabilities of one's country or of the alliance or coalition as a whole. Normally, a short war only draws upon ready stockpiles, and therefore the destruction of manufacturing facilities does not affect its outcome. A long war, in contrast, would require a significant increase in the country's manufacturing capacity and also conversion of some facilities and construction of new ones. All this requires a relatively long time. The expansion of war-waging capacity competes with current peacetime production for manpower, materials, and physical plants and machinery. 8 Most military leaders and diplomats before 1914 thought that the next war would be short. Chief of the German General Staff, Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen was well aware that Germany would not be able to withstand a long two-front war because of its inferior military, economic, and financial potential and possible internal unrest. Consequently, the German General Staff focused on the quick destruction of enemy armies. The Germans thought that war would end after four to six months and the planned campaign against France would last from eight to ten weeks. 9 As it turned out, the war went on for more than four years at horrendous losses in personnel and materiel on both sides. During the 1930s, the French and British, based on their experience in World War 1, mistakenly believed that the next war would be as protracted as the last conflict. Thus,

in contrast to the Germans, they prepared for a positional war instead of a war of movement. The French vision of future war was deeply flawed because it was based on three false readings of military developments at the time: the exaggerated destructiveness of firepower, the dominant role of the defense, and the superiority of the so-called methodically fought battle.' ° During the nineteenth century and the first decade of this century, one of the main challenges for the top leadership of great powers was the shortening of the time between the formal declaration of war and the actual opening of hostilities. This, in turn, depended on the speed of mobilization and movement of troops from their mobilization posts to the area of concentration. Some sixteen days passed between the French declaration of war against Prussia and the first combat in 1870. 11 By August 1914, time to react had been reduced to only a few days. Since World War II, most major conflicts started before the formal declaration of war. Thus, the victims of aggression either did not have sufficient time to prepare their defense, the signals of war were lost in a maze of conflicting information, or the attacker achieved a strategic surprise, as did the Japanese in their attack on Pearl Harbor in December 194 1. All the major regional conflicts fought after 1945, as for example the Korean War of 1950-1953, four Arab-Israeli Wars of 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973, the Iran-Iraq Conflict of 1980-1988, the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict of 1982, and the Gulf War of 1990--1991 started without a formal declaration war. The factor of time must be taken into account by the national-strategic or alliance/coalition leadership during their deliberations on whether to go to war. The British and French political leaders seriously miscalculated the factor of time in their attack on Egypt in 1956. The entire operation started and proceeded slowly, and thereby enough time had passed for world opinion to mobilize against Britain and France before the operation had been completed. The planners clearly did not appreciate the need for quick action to bring about a fait accompli before any outside interference. In contrast, the Israeli attack on Egypt and Jordan in October 1967 was carried out swiftly and all military objectives were accomplished within six days-one day longer than the planners envisaged. Reportedly, the Israelis had factored in "reserve" time in case their objectives were not accomplished according to the planned timetable. If the attack had taken any more time the Israelis would have been denied complete victory, as happened in 1956. 12 Among many other things, the U.S. intervention in Vietnam failed by not appreciating the factor of time. The U.S. decision-makers apparently believed in 1965 that the rapid introduction of combat troops would quickly defeat the communist insurgency. Afterward, civilian and military leaders repeatedly misled the U.S. public by promises that victory was just around the corner. The United States did not appreciate the difficulties of fighting well-trained and motivated insurgents. The intervention turned out to be a strategic blunder of the greatest magnitude.' 3 Generally, the greater the time for preparation, the higher the probability of success. Adequate preparation time is critical for alerting, mobilization, pre-deployment, deployment, and combat employment of one's forces. The aim should be to prevent the potential enemy from having sufficient time to complete his preparation. Otherwise, the duration of the conflict would invariably be longer than planned or necessary. The German Army's General Staff, in its planning for the invasion of the former Yugoslavia, decided to initiate hostilities on 6 April 1941 and stagger the entire attack over seven days without waiting for all German divisions to concentrate in their staging areas. The

aim was to prevent the Yugoslavs from completing mobilization of an additional 500,000 14 troops and to act before the arrival of more British troops to Greece. Preparation time depends not only on purely military measures, but also the work of diplomacy. The United States and NATO Alliance made a serious mistake by not reacting forcefully to the Serbian massacre of forty-five ethnic Albanians near the village of Racak in mid-January 1999. A decision was made to give more time for diplomacy, so that by the time the military action was taken on 24 March, the Serbs significantly reinforced their troops inside Kosovo, prepared defenses against an eventual bombing, and dispersed their aircraft. 1 5 This was one of the factors that unduly prolonged the air offensive against Serbia. Attacks with little preparation, or unplanned attacks are usually not profitable. Therefore, intensive planning and preparation should precede deliberate attacks. 1 6 Hitler wanted to invade the Benelux countries and France in October 1939, but a series of events forced him to wait until May 1940. These delays allowed not only more time for preparation, but also accidentally led to a revised and, what proved to be a much better, operations plan. The British Eighth Army spent three months getting ready for the second Battle of El Alamein in November 1942. 1 However, there have been exceptions when a major invasion launched with little or no preparation proved to be quite successful, as was the case with the German invasion of Yugoslavia in April 1941. The Germans attacked while many of their ground troops were being deployed to their staging areas in southern Austria and southwestern part of Hungary. 1 8 A favorable geostrategic position of a country or groups of countries can considerably extend the warning time of an impending enemy attack. In the modern era, time for the defender can be gained through an effective and long-range early warning system. 19 An attacker always needs a certain amount of time to start the deployment and build up his forces in an area of concentration, and then for their movement to attacking positions. Before the beginning of the hostilities in the Yom Kippur/Ramadan War, the Israeli planners wrongly thought that they would have about two days' warning time, that is, sufficient time to mobilize reserve forces and strike a preemptive blow. 20 The warning ti me for NATO forces in Central Europe during the Cold War was measured in hours and days. However, after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, NATO obtained a security zone of about 310 miles deep in Central Europe. Only at the Northern flank are NATO and Russian forces deployed opposite each other. The previous frontal defense zone in Germany has gained in depth, so that its least width today is about 250 miles . 21 Germany has today an estimated warning time of at least twelve months, and militarily useful warning time anywhere from six to ten months in case of any attack from the East . 22 The smallness of physical space might preclude or completely eliminate adequate warning time. In 1973, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) required, at minimum, two days' warning for mobilization, but it faced the situation in which no warning time was available. 23 In other situations, the warning time was reduced to hours or even minutes, as will probably be the case of any massive and surprise attack by the North Korean forces against the U.S./ROK's forces south of the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Closely related to warning time is the reaction time to the enemy's attack or unforeseen action. Obviously, the reaction time is shorter if one's forces are on full alert or at a higher state of combat readiness. Once the hostilities begin, the reaction time,

among other things, is a function of the decision-making cycle, command and control process, and theater-wide communications. The side that reacts faster than its opponent will usually enhance its chances of accomplishing its assigned military objectives. One of the most serious Allied weaknesses in the defense of France in 1940 was the inability to react to the fast-changing situation on the ground and in the air. The theater command proved unable either to generate quick and effective orders or to rapidly commit reinforcements. The operational commanders lost touch with both superiors and subordinates. 24 Reaction time can be shortened, especially in a crisis or the sudden outbreak of hostilities by deploying one's forces in forward areas or in the areas of potential trouble. This is one of the reasons why the U.S. Navy has permanently deployed the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, the Seventh Fleet in the Western Pacific, and the Fifth Fleet in the Arabian Gulf/Gulf of Oman and part of the Indian Ocean. On several occasions, in recent years, the fighter and heavy bomber squadrons of the U.S. Air Force were also deployed to an area of potential crisis or conflict. Pre-positioning of weapons and equipment at various strategic locations worldwide also significantly reduces the time needed to react to any major or minor contingency requiring the employment of military forces. In general, the decision-making cycle at the operational and strategic level should be as short as possible. This is accomplished by having a simple command and control structure with a fast and reliable C2 supporting system; relevant, accurate, and above all timely intelligence information; and fast and reliable communications. Human factors, especially the character traits of the operational commander, also play a critical role in making sound decisions quickly. The decision cycle is highly dependent on the number and efficiency of each segment in a decision loop. The more elements the decision cycle has, the slower and less effective the entire decision-making process will be. The speed of making a decision depends on the speed of the slowest element in the cycle. The aim of any attacker today is to render the defender unable to respond to his actions in timely fashion. The U.S.-led Coalition forces reportedly neutralized the Iraqi decision-making in the first hours after the start of air offensive on 17 January 1991. The top Iraqi leadership could not respond in any meaningful time frame to these massive air attacks, although other components of the Iraqi military power had not yet been destroyed or neutralized. To be useful, the intelligence must be not only accurate and relevant, but also timely. In recent years, the greatest impact on intelligence has been the huge increase in volume and diversity of information. Although the processing and evaluation time has been considerably reduced, the sheer amount of information far exceeds the ability to process, evaluate, and distribute. This, in turn, makes it hard, if not impossible, to distinguish accurate and relevant information from inaccurate and nonessential information. The heavy reliance on computerized processing today creates potentially serious vulnerabilities that can be exploited by a resourceful opponent. The expansion of the battlefield/battlespace in the future will put a premium on obtaining and distributing highly accurate and timely information. However, information is worthless if it is irrelevant to the task on hand. It is too often forgotten, that information is merely a means to an end, and not an end in itself. Potentially fatal are poor intelligence or miscalculation on the part of the operational commander and staff in regard to the probable rate of advance of enemy forces or time needed to mount an attack. In 1940, the French Supreme Command

calculated that a German attack through the Ardennes would require at least five, and most likely nine, days. Yet, the German panzers reached the River Meuse within two and a half days after crossing the border from Belgium and Luxembourg. Still thinking in terms of World War I, the French mistakenly believed that the Germans, after reaching the Meuse, would need about seven days to mount an attack across the river (because of the need to bring up guns, ammunition, etc.). To the great surprise of the French, the Germans attacked only a day later. Planning time is another element that affects the success of a major operation or campaign. The more time available for planning, preparation, and conduct of a major operation or campaign, the more likely it is that one's forces will initiate their movement when intended. The larger the objectives to be accomplished, the larger the scale of combat actions that must be envisaged, and, consequently, the more time required for planning, preparation, and execution. The planning time is shortened if the process is conducted concurrently rather than sequentially. Simplicity of the planning process also enhances its speed. The more experienced the operational commanders and planners, the faster they will be at improvising and preparing operation plans. However, today's trend of increasing reliance on computers as aids to planning is fraught with potential dangers. While the network of computers can considerably reduce the time needed to carry out routine planning tasks, they cannot replace the human mind and the skills and experience of the operational commanders and their planners. Moreover, computers are technically prone to breakdowns and are not immune to penetration by computer "hackers" or other hostile actions. A plan for a major operation or campaign should be flexible enough to provide sufficient reserve time in case something goes wrong or the action takes more time than anticipated. In planning a major operation or campaign, the more objectives or tasks assigned, the more time is required to accomplish them. Therefore, it is critical to focus on the most essential objectives or tasks that will cumulatively ensure the accomplishment of the ultimate operational or strategic objective. In a major operation or campaign, it is often inadvisable to add auxiliary tasks to the main task. The Japanese, in the execution of Operation MO, which led to the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942, made what appeared to be a harmless decision that turned out to have operational consequences. The order to the Japanese fast carrier force to embark a small number of Zero fighters to be ferried to the naval base Rabaul, New Britain, derailed the entire timetable. Because of the bad weather, these aircraft were launched after two unsuccessful attempts. The result was that two Japanese fast carriers with their escorts were delayed for two days, so that on 4 May they were too far away to counterattack the U.S. carrier force. Normally, in peacetime a major operation is conducted without the need to resort mobilization. However, the conduct of a campaign almost invariably requires largeto scale mobilization of forces of all services, and often the forces of the allies or coalition partners as well. Obviously, the time for mobilization should be as short as possible to enhance the chances of acting before the opponent is ready. The amount of warning time is closely related to the timely mobilization of one's forces. Among other things, the mobilization time will depend on the size of the objective to be accomplished, the size and type of forces to be mobilized, and the diversity, mode, and overall efficiency of the transportation system.

The time for deployment of one's forces at the operational or strategic level is much longer than at the tactical level. The longer the distance to the employment area, the longer it will take to complete the transit to the assigned areas of concentration or combat. The time needed to deploy forces to conduct a major operation or campaign will depend on many factors, but primarily on the distance from the home base or current operating area to the deployment area, the size and mobility of one's forces, and the mode of transportation used. In the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the U.S. and Coalition forces had about five and a half months for the deployment of their ground forces, a situation not likely to be repeated in the future. However, the situation was stabilized early on because of the forward-deployed carrier groups and rapid deployment of U.S. Air Force squadrons into the area. In a war it is necessary to calculate, as precisely as possible, how long a certain action or event will take. Duration of a major operation or campaign is, among other things, directly dependent on the scope of the objective, the size and mix of one's forces, the methods of applying combat power, and the physical characteristics of the area of employment. Obviously, the larger an enemy force, the more likely it is to offer a stronger defense, which will, in turn, result in a longer major operation or campaign. A plan for a major operation or campaign focused on the wrong center of gravity will most likely result in the entire effort lasting much longer than anticipated (with concurrently higher than expected losses in personnel and materiel) or even in failure of the entire expedition. Also, if one confuses the objectives with the enemy's center of gravity, the time to accomplish the ultimate operational or strategic objectives will be unduly long. The ability to predict the probable duration of war is a critical factor in planning for a major operation or campaign. In the past, too many of the highest political and military leaders committed grave errors in predicting whether or when the hostilities would start. The lack of realistic appreciation of the strategic situation often led political and military leaders to plan for a short conflict, instead of a longer one. Hitler expected to defeat the Soviets in only eight to twelve weeks. 28 However, the war lasted almost four years and ended with a catastrophic defeat for Nazi Germany. Before the Yom Kippur/Ramadan War, most of the Israeli and U.S. decision makers thought that war would not come to the Middle East in 1973 or if it did, it would last about a week. Yet, the war not only broke out but lasted two and a half weeks. 29 At the beginning of the Kosovo Conflict of 1999, NATO leaders strongly believed that the Serbian strongman Mr. Milosevic would capitulate after few days or two weeks at most. 3° This belief was not based on the realities of the situation. As it turned out, NATO carried out a major air operation for seventy-eight days before Milosevic accepted NATO's demands. Duration of a major operation or campaign depends on the number and length of operational pauses. These, in turn, depend primarily on the number of intermediate (operational or tactical) objectives to be accomplished. The larger the number of intermediate objectives, the more likely the need to slow the actions of the force elements to regenerate one's combat power. The longer each operational pause, the more opportunity there is for the enemy to recover from his losses and regenerate his own combat power. In May 1940, after the first great battles on the Franco-German border, the Germans were forced to halt their advance for about ten days on the Somme River. 31 This could have been sufficient time for a more agile opponent than the British or French of 1940 to mount a counterattack and achieve more than a local success.

Optimally, the time between consecutive major operations or campaigns should be short so that a high operational tempo is maintained. The time to mount a consecutive major operation or campaign depends, among other things, on the forces available, the attrition rate of one's forces, quality and sufficiency of logistical sustainment, and effectiveness of operational command and control. The time to commit operational reserves is a critical factor in land warfare. The more mobile and smaller, but combat ready, operational reserve, the shorter the time needed to commit it at the point of main attack (or defense). Also, the distance to the employment area, the transportation network, and the terrain features considerably affect the time required for the commitment of an operational reserve in a major operation or campaign. In the unsuccessful German offensive in France in March 1918, the German planners were surprised that the Allies committed their reserves much earlier than they anticipated. Often political leaders and, sometimes, even operational planners do not appreciate the need to have sufficient time to master new weapons and equipment acquired during hostilities. The British Prime Minister Winston Churchill constantly urged the British CINCs in North Africa in 1942-1943 to go on the attack because a large shipment of weapons had become available. However, he overlooked the simple fact that time was needed to unload the equipment, carry out local modifications, distribute it to units in the fields, and train the units in its technical and tactical use. Today, the time needed for training in handling and tactical use of new, advanced weapons and equipment is much longer than it was before World War II or, for that matter, as recently as twenty or thirty years ago. Timin : Timing is related to time, but is of a different quality because an operational commander can control it. Timing essentially consists of selecting the right moment to do something or issue some pronouncement. It is associated with a specific decision and not a lengthy procedure. Timing is less a matter of routine, and more one of skilled judgment. The main characteristic of timing is that it requires a great deal of foresight. At the national-strategic level, timing as to when a major operation or campaign is to start can sometimes have a decisive influence on the outcome of the entire military enterprise. Napoleon I Bonaparte postponed his invasion of Russia until summer, overlooking the fact that the Russian summer is short. 33 The Germans were forced to delay the original date for their invasion of Soviet Russia from mid-May to 22 June 1941. This change in timing of the campaign incurred significant costs for the Germans, because it shortened the time when the employment of their ground forces was the most advantageous. The operationally favorable time in Russia was from May until October. The muddy season in the spring and the fall, with its effect on the ground surface and unpaved roads made the German operations more difficult. 34 Sometimes political and military considerations dictate that a campaign starts before the arrival of all or part of major forces to the staging areas. The German campaign against the former Yugoslavia on 6 April 1941 started before the forces to launch an invasion from southern Austria and southwestern Hungary completed operational deployment. The German preparations started on 27 March and the planners had only about ten days available between the start of the deployment of forces to Austria, Hungary, and Romania and redeployment of those forces already in Bulgaria and the start of the invasion of the Former Yugoslavia. 35 54

The start of the Allied Solomons Campaign in August 1942 was dictated primarily by the need to consolidate and exploit the Allied operational success in the Battle of Midway on 4-6 June. By 2 July, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs General George Marshall, and Admiral Ernest J. King, after a resolution of numerous disagreements, ordered that an offensive in southern Pacific be mounted at once." The first major operation, in what became the Solomons Campaign was amphibious landing on Guadalcanal (Operational Watchtower) on 7 August. The timing of an amphibious landing operation is usually based on the calculation of the weather at the particular time of the year or month, the time of day, high tides, and phase of the moon. The Allies in planning the invasion of Normandy (Operation Neptune) had great difficulties in timing the landing. The earlier the landing took place the longer period of good weather would be available for the subsequent operations on the continent. The early attack would also provide an advantage in that the Germans would not complete strengthening of the coastal defenses. May was the earliest date that a landing could be successfully carried out. The first favorable combination of tides and sunrise occurred early in that month; hence, May was initially selected by the Allied Supreme Commander, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, as tentative target date for the l anding. That date was later shifted to June because it was decided that the landing be on much larger scale than initially planned. This, in turn, required much larger number of landing craft than originally planned. Another factor was the need to give more time to the Air Force to shape the battlefield in Normandy and the adjacent area in France. The improved weather conditions anticipated for the month of May would also allow higher effectiveness in the employment of land-based bombers in hindering the movement of German reserves and destroying German defenses on the coast. The next best combination of moon, tides, and time of sunrise was on 5, 6, and 7 June. The Allied planners wanted the convoys to transit the Channel during the night. A favorable phase of moon was critical for the success of the planned airborne landings. The sea landing had to take place at low tide so that the German beach defenses could be uncovered and then destroyed. However, the most decisive element in timing turned out to be weather. If these three favorable days were lost because of the bad weather, the potential consequences for the entire operation would be potentially catastrophic. The secrecy would be lost and the morale of some two million Allied troops assembled in England would suffer greatly. A delay in the date of landing of fourteen and possibly twenty-eight days would further reduce the favorable time left for campaigning and Germans defenses in Normandy would be even stronger. At a conference on 4 June, the tentative date for landing was set for 4:00 A.M. on 5 June. However, by then the weather conditions worsened considerably so that the landing had to be delayed, although some elements of the landing force were already at sea. Although the prospects for improved weather were not good, at 4:15 A.M. on 5 June, General Eisenhower made a bold decision to go ahead with the attack on 6 June. 37 Conclusion: The factor of time is the most critical and precious factor in the conduct of warfare. It is one of those rare commodities that once lost cannot be recovered. The higher the level of war, the more critical the factor of time becomes. At the nationalstrategic level, time is a vital factor for establishing and developing armed forces, a defense industrial base, and mobilization. The military theoreticians and their civilian counterparts should develop as accurate a vision of the character and duration of a future 55

war as possible. The operational commander and his staff can most directly influence the time required for planning, preparation, and conduct of a major operation or campaign. In general, there is a great, and sometimes decisive, advantage to act and react faster than the opponent. Disadvantages of space and inferiority in forces can sometimes be remedied by acting faster and accomplishing the assigned objectives within a given period. In the past, the pace of warfare changed slowly; hence, there was no drastic compression of the factor time. Today new technologies will enlarge the area of combat even more and shrink the factor of time even further.

Notes 1. Werner Lange, Raum, Zeit and Mittel als Faktoren strategischer Zielsetzung. Ueberlegungen zu Napoleons Feldzug in Russland 1812 (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, November 1964), p. 1. 2. Ajay Singh, "Time: The New Dimension of Warfare," Joint Force Quarterly ( Winter 1995-96), p. 59. 3. Lange, Raum, Zeit and Mittel als Faktoren strategischer Zielsetzung..., p. 2. 4. Harry Marx, Raum-Zeit-Mittel als Faktoren strategischer Zielsetzung. Ueberlegungen zu Napoleons Feldzug in Russland 1812 (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 1964), p. 11. 5. Friedrich von Bernhardi, Conduct of War To-Day, Vol. 11: Combat and Conduct of War (London: Hugh Rees Ltd., 1913), pp. 242, 232. 6. Ibid., Vol. 11, pp. 224, 229. 7. Charles T. Stewart, Jr. "Time As A Concept In Military Strategy," Military Review 4 (April 1959), p. 3; Bernard Brodie, "Implications for Military Policy," The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (New Haven: Yale Institute of International Studies, 1946), p. 79; T. F. Walkowicz, "Strategic Concepts for the Nuclear Age," Annals American Academy for Political and Social Science (May 1955), p. 12 1. 8. Stewart, "Time As a Concept In Military Strategy," p. 6. 9. Christian Mueller, "Anmerkungen zur Entwicklung von Kriegsbild and operativ-strategischem Szenario im preussisch-deutschen Heer vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg," Militaergeschichtliche Mitteilungen 57 (1998), p. 412. 10. Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes. The Anatomy of Failure in War (New York: Vintage Books, 1st ed., 1991), p. 215. 11. Wittigo von Dobschuetz, "Der Faktor Zeit in der Lagebeurteilung," Wehrkunde 11 (November 1970), p. 58 1. 12. Ibid., p. 582. 13. Ibid., p. 582. 14. Martin Seifert, Der Balkanfeldzug 1941. Beispiel einer Offensive aus der Bewegung ohne vorbereitenden Aufmarsch (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, March 1963), p. 14; Herbert Dehen, Der Balkanfeldzug 1941. Beispiel einer Offensive aus der Bewegung ohne vorbereitenden Aufmarsch (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 15 January 1963), p. 14. 15. William Drozdiak, "War Effort Restrained By Politics, Clark," The Washington Post (July 20, 1999), p. A14. 16. Philip Massel, "Speed vs. Haste," The Fighting Forces, August 1947, reprinted in Military Review 9 (September 1948), p. 93. 17. Ibid., p. 93. 18. Seifert, Der Balkanfeldzug 1941. Beispiel einer Offensive aus der Bewegung ohne vorbereitenden Aufmarsch, p. 1. 19. Hans-Joachim Schubert, "Mehr Raum, weniger Zeit and Kraefte," Truppenpraxis 5 (May 1995), p. 328. 20. Cohen and Gooch, Military Misfortunes. The Anatomy of Failure in War, p. 102.

21. Juergen Rieger, Dos Konzept der vorneverteidigung-eine Bewertung der operatives Faktoren Raum, der konventionallen Beruecksichtigung moeglicher Entwicklungen Zeit and Kraefte unter Ruestungskontrolle and der Strukturen der NATO-Landstreitkraefte (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademic der

Bundeswchr, January 1991), p. 18. 22. Christian Millotat, "Operative Ucberlegungen fuer das deutsche Heer in der gegenwaertigen Sicherheitslage," Oesterreichischc Militaerische Zeitschriti 1 (January-February 1996), p. 59. 23. David Jablonsky, "Strategy and the Operational Level of War: Part I," Parameters (Spring 1987), p. 69. 24. Cohen and Gooch, Military Misfortunes. The Anatomy of Failure in War , p. 209. 25. Singh, "Time: The New Dimension of Warfare," p. 59. 26. Karl-Heinz Frieser, Blitzkrieg_-Legende. Der Westfeldzug -1940 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1995), pp. 166-7. 27. Samuel E. Morison, The Two-Ocean War. A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1963), p. 143. 28. Charles T. Crenshaw, Distinctions Between Tactical and Operational Level of War-Are Some More Important Than Others? (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 27 May 1986), p. 19. 29. Cohen and Gooch, Military Misfortunes. The Anatomy of Failure in War , p. 95. 30. No H. Daalder and Michael E. O'Hanlon, WinningUgly. NATO's War to Save Kosovo (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2000), pp. 92-3. 31. Center for Military History, CMH Pub 104-5; Terrain Factors in the Russian Campaign ( Washington, DC: Center for Military History, United States Army, 1 st ed., July 1951, facsimile edit. 1986), p. 7. 32. Jehuda L. Wallach, The Dogyma of the Battle of Annihilation. The Theories of Clausewitz and Schlieffen and Their Impact on the German Conduct of Two World Wars (Westport, CT/London: Greenwood Press, 1986), p. 191. 33. CMH 104-5: Terrain Factors in the Russian Campaign (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, United States Army, 1st ed., July 1951, facsimile edit. 1986), p. 58. 34. Alfred Philippi and Ferdinand Heim, Der Feldzug Ge eg n Sowjetrussland 1941 bis 1945. Ein operatives Ueberblick (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1962), p. 35. 35. Seifert, Der Balkanfeldzug 1941. Beispiel einer Offensive aus der Bewegung ohne vorbereitenden Aufmarsch, p. 9. 36. John Miller, Jr., Guadalcanal: The First Offensive United State Army in World War 11. The War in the Pacific ( Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1st printed 1949, reprinted 1989), pp. 16-7. 37. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York, NY: DaCapo, 3rd printing, July, 1986), pp. 229-31,239,249-50.

THE FACTOR OF FORCE In war, the moral is to the physical as three to one. Napoleon I In peace, the moral element seldom comes to be of value; in war, it forms the preconditions of every victory, the true value of a unit. Helmuth von Moltke, Sr. The factor of force plays a critical role in the accomplishment of military objectives at any level of war. It is evaluated at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The higher the level of war, the more fixed the factor of force becomes, and the opposite is equally true. The commander can make small changes to the force available to him at the operational level and very little at the theater- or national-strategic level. The factor of force can be changed at the tactical or operational-tactical levels because the additional forces can be drawn from the higher level of command. The terms "force" and "means" are often used alternatively, although they do not mean the same thing. The main source of military power of a state are its "armed forces"-a force created and maintained by the state for protection of its way of life, its existence, and its territory. I In the strict definition of the term, "force" refers to military sources of power. Properly understood, however, the factor of "force" consists not only of the "troops," "naval forces," or "air forces" but also forces of all services with their required logistical support. The term "means," in the military sense, is all the means of personnel or materiel required for the accomplishment of a certain objective. This term is sometimes used in national strategic terms to refer to not only armed forces, but also political and economic resources of the entire state or group of states. 2 The factor of force at the operational level pertains to those forces of individual services and nonmilitary sources of power that take part in a campaign or major operation. The operational commanders and their staffs must evaluate the factor force not only before the start, but also during the course of a major operation or campaign. The factor of force by itself is not tied to a given physical space or locality. At the national-strategic level, the greater the superiority of the factor of force relative to the opponent, the more freedom of action the country's top politico-military leadership has for conducting strategy and policy and in determining national strategic objectives. 3 Likewise, the greater the factor of force at the operational level, the greater the freedom to act for the operational commander. Both quantifiable and immeasurable elements exist side by side in a "force" assigned to accomplish a given objective. The factor of force encompasses a number of elements that are physical in character, such as the number of personnel and weapons and equipment, physical mobility, firepower, command organization, logistics, and quality of weapons and equipment. These elements are for the most part easily measurable. Some elements of the 59

factor of force, specifically training and combat readiness may be quantified somewhat, but not as easily as purely physical elements. Human elements of a force, specifically leadership, morale and discipline, small-unit cohesion, combat motivation, and doctrine are, in contrast, extremely difficult to quantify with any degree of confidence. Also difficult to evaluate is the degree and effectiveness of cooperation among services or "jointness" or "comb] nedness" in multinational employment of forces. In a campaign, the high degree of jointness is often critical for success. Another hard-to-quantify element is the degree of cooperation among combat arms or combined arms tactics that are critical for the success of a major operation conducted by a single service or single-type forces of several services. The effectiveness in using military force is also influenced by the overall posture offensive or defensive effects of physical environment, weather, and seasonal factors. Because of so many unquantifiable elements of the factor of force at any level, often too much emphasis is given to simple tabulation of forces and weapons and equipment. However, the operational commanders and their staffs should do everything necessary to properly and realistically evaluate the factors of force in planning for, and during the execution of, a campaign or major operation. Combat Potential versus Combat Power: Several terms are used loosely and interchangeably in referring to military aspects of the factor of force. The term combat power is used regardless whether forces are in combat or not. However, in military theory two distinct yet related terms are used to evaluate the factor of force: combat potential and combat power. Combat potential pertains to the assumed, not real, potential of a military force to accomplish the assigned mission. Theory differentiates between designed and available combat potential. Designed combat potential is the theoretical capability of a force to accomplish assigned missions against a designed threat . 4 It is based on the standardized table of organization and equipment (TO&E) and doctrine. The available combat potential is that part of designed combat potential actually available to the commander in combat. It is normally less than designed combat potential due to differences between prescribed and actual TO&E. It includes all the elements that could enhance or reduce combat potential, such as leadership, manning, training, morale and discipline, weapons and equipment, tactics, and doctrine. The higher the quality of forces in these and similar categories, the higher the available combat potential. Because of many intangible elements, it is extremely difficult to evaluate available combat potential with any degree of confidence. Available combat power is also affected by the characteristics of the physical environment where a given force is employed, such as the size and shape of the theater, relevant distances, military positions, terrain, weather and climate, and oceanography, to name just a few. Once combat starts, one's (and the enemy's) available combat potential is being gradually converted into combat power (see Figure 4). Whether that process is completed, depends on many factors, including duration of combat, attrition, and friction caused by the unfavorable physical environment. In practice, however, the entire available combat potential of a given force is rarely transformed into combat powers

Combat power is the real capability of a force generated in the course of mission accomplishment against a given enemy force and in a specific combat environment. 6 Many factors influence conversion of available combat potential into combat power. Rough terrain, bad visibility, or seasonal characteristics can significantly diminish effectiveness of weapons and troops. Combat power includes unquantifiable elements such as leadership, morale and discipline, small-unit cohesion, combat motivation, training, and doctrine. These elements of combat power significantly, if not decisively, affect the overall performance of force, service, and armed forces as a whole. The characteristics of natural elements, specifically terrain, weather, and climate could be foreseen to some extent, but their effect cannot be measured with any degree of precision. All these factors could greatly reduce the effective combat power activated from available combat potential. Most important for combat power on both sides is friction and fog of war. Carl von Clausewitz's concept of friction is composed of the infinite number of unforeseen things, large and small, that interfere with all activities in war. 7 Friction is the main reason that the execution of a military action differs from the one planned. The more complex the plan, the more friction during its execution. The principal causes of friction are the enemy's actions, human errors, fatigue, terrain, weather, inadequate or inaccurate information, and pure luck and chance. A source of friction could be also one's unclear and ambiguous orders or clear orders misinterpreted by the subordinates or superiors. Other factors that contribute to friction in combat are mistakenly selected or multiple objectives, wrongly identified centers of gravity or decisive points, inadequate logistical support and sustainment, poorly protected lines of supplies, and personal animosity between one's commanders causing them to cooperate poorly or not at all. Modern information technologies can reduce but never eliminate friction. Friction is inherent in

combat at any level. Hence, it should be accepted as a fact, while at the same time the commanders should try to master and overcome its effects. Because combat is a clash of wills, uncertainties and unknowns abound. When combined with friction, they create ambiguity, or what yon Clausewitz called the fog of war in which a commander must make his decisions. This fog of war presents both opportunities and dangers. Chances of achieving surprise and deception increase as the fog of war increases. The overall effectiveness of a force is reduced when decisions are made on imperfect, incomplete, or even false information, as often they are. The fog of war is the main factor that makes some commanders willing to take high risks, while others are extremely cautious in making their decisions. Physical Elements: The numerical size of personnel strength and number of weapons and equipment, must be analyzed and evaluated separately and then collectively to draw tentative conclusions on the factor of force in terms of numbers. Force numerical strength is probably most often used to evaluate probable performance of forces on both sides. The size of the armies, navies, or air forces employed is certainly one of the most decisive elements in war as a whole. It is always a great advantage to be numerically stronger than your opponent is. Nowhere is this truer than at the operational and strategic levels of war. The larger the numbers, the higher the probability of a successful major operation or campaign. At some point, sheer numbers are simply overwhelming, no matter what the level of skills, morale and discipline, or training and soundness of doctrine of the opposing force. In many examples a numerically superior force was a decisive factor in achieving a victory over a better armed, trained, and led, but numerically smaller force. Because of the great numerical inferiority of his forces, a decisive victory eluded Napoleon I at Leipzig ("Battle of the Nations") in October 1813 where he had 160,000 men against 280,000 men for the Allies. 8 Likewise, the Japanese failed to achieve decisive victories quickly on the ground in their war with Russia in 1904-1905 because of their inferiority in numbers of troops. They were always too weak in proportion to the tactical difficulties they had to overcome, and hence unable to concentrate adequate forces to achieve quick victories. 9 In the last two years of World War 11, the German predicament on the Eastern Front was that the Soviet superiority in numbers of divisions, tanks, and guns simply overwhelmed the Germans. In the great Soviet offensive in 22 June-18 July 1944 (Operation Bagration) the Soviets massed 166 divisions (of which 124 took part in fighting) with some 1.2 million men (not including administrative troops of the rear services), 4,000 tanks, 24,400 guns and mortars 5,200 tanks and assault guns, and 5,300 aircraft. In addition, about 1.3 million men were held back by the Soviet High Command before the start of the operation. The Soviet superiority in tanks was estimated at ten to one and in aircraft, seven to one. In contrast, the German Army Group Center had about 700,000 men or one to three ratio in favor of the Soviets. 1 ° For all its value, the importance of numerical superiority should never be overrated. In fact, in many cases, superior numbers were of no avail." Inferior forces often defeated a much larger force because of the better quality of their leaders and the better training, morale, and discipline of their troops. During the Seven-Year War, Frederick the Great, with 41,000 men, defeated 64,000 Austro-French troops (20,000 were not engaged) in the Battle at Rossbach in November, and at Leuthen in December 1757, with an army of 30,000 men, he defeated some 80,000 Austrians. 1 2 In the American Civil War, General Robert E. Lee with fewer than 50,000 men successfully 62

repulsed an attack by some 90,000 men of the Union Army in the Antietam (Sharpsburg) campaign in September 1862. 1 3 In the German invasion of the Benelux countries and France in May 1940, better leadership and training-not better weapons-were the principal reason for their success despite numerical inferiority. 1 4 A much weaker U.S. carrier force won operational victory against much stronger Japanese force in the Battle of the Coral Sea on 7-8 May 1942. The U.S. Navy achieved even greater victory against the much more powerful Japanese Combined Fleet in the critical Battle of Midway on 46 June 1942 which turned the tide of war in the Pacific. The size of the country's armed forces or specific services directly affects the availability of one's forces for providing sufficient troops for campaigns and major operations. Numerical strength of the armed forces as a whole in peacetime is highly dependent on the size and characteristics of physical environment in which combat takes place, and the potential or real threat posed by the country's enemies. In general, the higher the physical mobility of a force, the less need it has to maintain numerical strength in peacetime. In addition, the longer the warning time, the more time for mobilization, and therefore, a smaller force is needed in peacetime. Armies are usually larger in terms of personnel than other services. However, their peacetime strength could be only a small fraction of their strength during full-scale hostilities. A large peacetime army provides a larger pool of experienced officers and non-commissioned officers, thereby facilitating its rapid expansion in time of war. In addition, training and exercises of large formations are possible only if adequate forces exist in peacetime. In contrast to the armies, navies and air forces normally maintain their full strength in peacetime, with a relatively small fraction of total numbers of ships and aircraft maintained in reserve. Highly industrialized countries with an excellent transportation network generally require less time to mobilize, and therefore might not need to maintain large force in time of peace. Forward deployment of forces and prepositioning of weapons and equipment reduces the need for initial movement of large quantities of weapons and equipment into the respective theater. In a high-intensity and prolonged conflict, the strength of the country's armed forces is determined not only by its peacetime military strength, but the country's overall manpower potential to be mobilized for war. During World War 1, the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey) mobilized 22.8 million men, while the Entente and Associated Powers mobilized about 42.2 million men. 1 5 The German problem on the Eastern Front in World War II was the growing disparity in number of troops compared with the Soviet Army. By the end of 1943, the Germans had only 198 divisions with 2.8 million men, while the Soviet Army and Air Force had then combined about 6.5 million men organized into 530 rifle division equivalents. In addition, the Soviets had in their inventories 90,000 guns and mortars, 5,600 tanks, and 8,800 aircraft. They were able to maintain such large forces despite the fact that by then, they had some five million prisoners of war in Germany, and huge numbers of killed and missing in action. 1 6 During the war, Germany mobilized about ten million men, while Soviet Russia raised an army twice that size. 1 7 Mobilization of the armed forces in time of national emergency and war is more effective if there is a large pool of reserve officers. Also, a larger-than-needed number of officers in active service who can take over officers' duties greatly facilitate the expansion of a peacetime army.

Once hostilities start, the numerical strength changes for the armed forces both as a whole and in the individual services. The longer the conflict lasts, the greater the effect of these changes. For the attacker, the overall numerical strength of an army or the navy is usually reduced because of the need to defend the homeland from attacks by the enemy coalition in other theaters, thereby, sometimes significantly, reducing the available strength in the theater of main effort. For the attacker, a large gain of space poses numerous problems in how best to distribute his forces and still accomplish military objectives. In World War 11, the Wehrmacht faced considerable problems in distributing its forces among multiple theaters. At the beginning of the invasion of Soviet Russia, from a total 3.8 million in the German field army, about 3.2 million men or 84 percent of total were deployed on the Eastern Front. Specifically, the German Army had some 145 divisions available along the entire front. Out of the remaining sixty divisions, some thirty-eight divisions were deployed in the occupied part of Western Europe, eight in Norway, seven in the Balkans, four in North Africa, and three in Finland. 1 8 In a war, a force might suffer more losses than expected and in a shorter span of me than anticipated; thereby, sometimes causing large reduction in the quality of force. ti The quality of factor of force is reduced in the offensive force because usually the best and most daring men will be among the first casualties. Nominally increasing the numbers to replace combat losses, but sacrificing quality, rarely represents the actual increase in combat strength. On the other hand, the longer the war, the more experienced that force is. This, in turn, sometimes can make up for deficiencies in peacetime training. 1 9 In a campaign, higher than expected losses could be remedied by a sufficient pool of military-age manpower at home. However, sometimes this is not possible as the German example on the Eastern front in World War II shows. In their invasion of Soviet Russia in 1941, the Germans had only about 400,000 men available as replacements . 20 This problem was aggravated due to the high losses in personnel they suffered in the first few weeks of the campaign in Russia. By the end of August, the Wehrmacht had some 440,000 casualties, including 94,000 men killed. By then, only 217,000 men had been allotted as replacements. In the twelve months between November 1942 and October 1943 the Germans lost 1,686,000 men on the Eastern Front, and only 1,260,000 men were replaced. Although in 1943 the Wehrmacht had about nine million men in uniform, replacements were hard to find . 21 Military theoreticians often cite a force ratio of three to one between the attacker and the defender as an indicator of success in an offensive. Too often these and similar force ratios have been applied to overall strength of forces on both sides. However, many times, the attacker was successful despite a slight margin of overall numerical superiority or even being numerically inferior to the defender. In the West in May 1940, the ratio of the attacker to the defender was 0.7 to 1.0, or 3,740,000 Allied soldiers (including 2,240,000 French troops) facing 2,760,000 Germans. The Allies had a three-to-two superiority in artillery pieces. However, France had only three (plus one more created during the campaign) armored divisions against Germany's ten panzer divisions. 22 The Germans in their major airborne operation against Crete in May 1941 (Operation Merkur) were successful although they had only slightly over half the troops the Allies had on the island . 23 In the operation, the Germans used about 19,000 troops, while the British and

Commonwealth contingents totaled 32,000 troops. The Germans had a decisive superiority in the air, while the Royal Navy was dominant at sea. Both sides suffered high casualties. The Germans, despite a spectacular victory, came very close to failure. 24 In many major operations on the Eastern Front in World War II, the Wehrmacht was successful although the Soviets possessed a ten-to-one superiority. 25 The lessons of history clearly show that what matters most is superiority in numbers at really vital or main points of attack (or defense). Von Clausewitz observed that to achieve strength at the decisive point depends on the strength of the army and on the skill with which this strength is employed. The aim will then be to take the field in the greatest possible strength, either to get the upper hand or to at least make sure the enemy does not. 26 One of the reasons for the German success in their invasion of France in May 1940 was that they concentrated in their sector of main effort forty-two divisions against only nine poorly equipped and trained French divisions in the Ardennes. The number of weapons-especially heavy weapons such as tanks and largecaliber guns, combat aircraft, and large surface combatants is another measurable element of combat potential and combat power. The larger the number in the main categories of weapons and equipment, the higher the chances of success, provided, of course, that other elements of power are approximately equal. However, often a major operation or campaign could be successful despite numerical inferiority of weapons, because one's forces possess superior weapons, training, and leadership. In addition, sometimes it is more important to possess superiority in a selected category of weapons and inferiority in others to still be ultimately successful, as was true of the Germans in their offensive in the West in May 1940. The Germans were inferior in numbers of battle tanks to the Allies-3,254 Allied tanks versus 2,754 German tanks. However, they enjoyed marked superiority in the number of modern aircraft-3,500 versus 1,090 French aircraft-and in the strength of air defenses of their fielded forces. 28 The Soviet Navy in March 1985 was estimated to have about 275 submarines and 2,320 surface ships. However, from the latter's total about 1,090 were coastal combatants and 785 were auxiliary ships and craft. The Soviet naval air strength was estimated at 1,635 aircraft, but this number included only 375 strike aircraftibombers and 135 fighter/fighter-bombers. 29 The Soviet naval strength was even less impressive than the number alone indicated. Because the country's unfavorable maritime position forced division of the fleet into four parts, each deployed in widely separated geographic areas, thereby further diluting the Soviet naval strength. Physical mobility of a force is one of the main prerequisites for rapid action. In general, physical mobility is the capability of a force to move effectively (by foot, vehicle, ship, aircraft, or any other means) before, during, and after combat in relation to or in comparison with a hostile force. Thus, mobility is always relative. Speed is often confused with mobility, and mobility with maneuver. An ingredient of mobility is speed, but speed of movement alone is rarely sufficient to achieve the full advantages of mobility. To constitute mobility, speed must be associated with direction of advance or speed of advance relative to the enemy, surprise, timing, and deception. In a maneuver it is not as important that movement be carried out at a given maximum speed, but rather that it be faster than the movements of the enemy and that it results in bringing a preponderance of force to bear relative to the enemy's resistance. Momentum is a product

of mass and velocity. So long as both mass and velocity are preserved, momentum is maintained; mobility usually preserves both. The lack of tactical mobility can prevent a numerically larger force from prevailing over a hostile force that is smaller but more mobile and tactically better organized. In the invasion of France in May 1940, the German panzers possessed higher mobility than the French tanks. At the speed of 25 to 30 miles per hour with effective range from 75 to 125 miles, they were about twice as fast and had twice the range of their French counterparts. The false vision of the future war had made the French emphasize firepower and protection over speed and range of their tanks. Mobility is also a function of logistics. Logistical requirements of mechanized forces are enormous and without adequate logistical support and sustainment physical mobility means little. The Germans significantly increased the mobility of their fast moving panzer and motorized infantry divisions by excellent logistical support and sustainment. Before their offensive in the West in May 1940, they significantly increased mobility of these divisions by loading all their panzers and armored vehicles to their full capacity with fuel and ammunition. For support the Panzer Group von Kleist was assigned three motorized transport detachments with loading capacity of 4,800 tons. Along the route of advance were a number of en route fuel depots [Marschtanklager], and near the border with Luxembourg and Belgium, large-capacity supply depots. The Germans also prepared a large supply base with all necessary fuel, foodstuffs, and ammunition to be shifted to Luxembourg as soon as the offensive began. The Germans made maximum use of captured and civilian POL. Motorized unit trains and resupply columns were used extensively and effectively. 33 Physical mobility directly affects the deployment capability of a force. This is especially critical when the distances from the basing or staging area are large and the force must be deployed at short notice. Mobility and firepower are interrelated and significantly affect each other. The availability of highly mobile and effective means of firepower enhances the movement capabilities of one's forces, while at the same time it can inhibit the movement capabilities of the hostile forces. The number of firing platforms and fire volume alone is insufficient to evaluate firepower of one's forces without knowing the circumstances and the ways it is used .35 Mobility also means communications. Without reliable and continuous communications throughout the chain of command, firepower and speed of movement mean little. In 1940, the German panzer leaders usually controlled their units from forward deployed command vehicles (panzers or half-tracked vehicles) specially equipped with radio. From the top down, German command and control was flexible and positive. Wide latitude to exercise initiative was allowed and encouraged through the issuance of the task-oriented orders. The French tank units in contrast could not communicate with each other by radio because their intended role was to support infantry attack. They also lacked the speed of reaction and flexibility necessary for mobile operations. French commanders were allowed little or no leeway for flexibility and initiative. Withdrawals were allowed and attacks were called off for insufficient reasons. 36 Other tangible factors that considerably affect combat potential and its conversion into combat power are command organization and regeneration, and reconstitution of combat power. One of the factors that contributed to the defeat of the French Army in 1940 was the failure to properly integrate tanks into the command structure. The French

tanks were substantially superior in armor and armament to the German panzers, except in speed and range. In contrast to the Germans, who organized their tanks into panzer divisions, the French split about 2,400 tanks among fifty-four battalions. Half of these were organized in separate battalions and assigned to infantry divisions for close support of assaulting infantry. The remaining 1,000 tanks were, in early 1940, belatedly organized into armored divisions. However, the newly organized forces lacked sound doctrine and they had little time to train together before the Germans attacked. The Germans created Panzer Corps and before the invasion, they created the Panzer Group von Kleist, composed of two Panzer Corps and one motorized infantry corps supported by one air defense corps. This formation was larger than a corps and smaller than an army, but was capable of conducting a major operation independently. The early successes of the German Luftwaffe were also due to organization superior to their Allied counterparts. In February 1939, the then existing Luftwaffe's group commands and air command for the former Austria were dissolved and transformed into four air fleets . 38 [Luf flotte], each intended to support an army group Each air fleet represented a small air' force because it contained bomber, fighter, reconnaissance, and transport squadrons plus all ground-based defenses. Fast carrier groups created in both the Japanese and the U.S. navies in the interwar years also represent an example of how mobility and firepower can lead to qualitatively new capabilities through innovative command organization. Carrier groups were capable of theater-wide or operational employment. Not only the number of weapons and equipment but, more important, their quality considerably affects the overall combat potential and combat power of a force. 39 In some major operations or campaigns, better weapons were one of the major contributing factors to the final success, while in others, the success was ephemeral and ultimately the entire effort failed. The RAF's Spitfire fighter was superior to the Luftwaffe's Me-109 in the Battle of Britain in the summer of 1940. The early Japanese successes in the Pacific War had much to do with the superior quality of their Zero fighters and Kate torpedo bombers. Eventually, the United States produced not only more, but also higherperformance carrier aircraft than the Japanese did. The Japanese battleships were generally faster than their U.S. counterparts. The Japanese greatest technical advantage was in torpedoes. Their oxygen-powered 24-inch Type 95 Mod. 2 and Type 93 Mod. l torpedoes were superb in terms of effective range, speed, and warhead size. In contrast, the U.S. Navy not only had low-performance torpedoes but also, because of a false economy in peacetime, did not resolve problems with their warheads and exploders until many months into the war. The Japanese were also superior to the United States in optics and pyrotechnics. High quality of weapons and equipment in itself is often not enough to achieve victory if other elements of combat power are inadequate. In the initial phase of the Russo-German War in 1941, the German Army's panzer and motorized infantry divisions had better tanks and assault guns than their Soviet counterparts. The German anti-tank guns were simple in design but of high quality. 41 The 88-mm gun was used in both an AA and an anti-tank role and proved one of the best guns of World War 11. The Soviets over-produced tanks before the war, and by the beginning of the war most of their tanks were obsolete. By mid-June, their best tanks, the famous T-34 and KV l, numbered fewer than 1,000 and 500, respectively. The Soviet guns and mortars were superior, and their small arms were comparable to their German counterparts. The German combat

aircraft were of excellent design. The Germans produced fewer models of aircraft that were easily modified to perform different roles. The Soviet Air Force, in contrast, was large, but some 80 percent of its frontline aircraft were obsolete. The Soviets lacked radar and radio direction aids. 42 The design and combat performance of the German U-boats, torpedoes, and mines was far more advanced than that of their Allied counterparts, but ultimately it was insufficient to win the victory in the Battle for Atlantic in World War II. Human Elements: The problem in estimating the actual combat performance of a force is the presence of many unquantifiable elements that fall within the scope of combat potential and combat power. Although these include both natural and human elements, the human element and its associated manifestations are the most important in evaluating the factor of force. The German army performed superbly in both world wars because its leadership made a conscious decision to focus on the critical and decisive importance of fighting. Moreover, the Germans realized that the human factor is most critical for success. Therefore, they built an organization around the social and psychological needs of the individual fighting men. They emphasized mutual trust and willingness to assume responsibility, and the right and duty to subordinate commanders at all levels to make independent decisions and carry them out. This was the true secret of the German Army's fighting power. 43 In the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict of 1982, almost every element was weighed in the equation except for the human element. Conclusions were made based on probable outcomes of opposing numbers and technical capabilities: opposing number of troops; the advantages of coastal defense versus amphibious landing; quality of aircraft on both sides; weather; and isolation of apparent nature of key terrain. However, the decisive factor in that war was the British leadership, qualities of the individual British soldiers, and their organization and unit cohesion. The Argentines lacked the will to prevail that is characteristic of cohesive well-led units. 44 The psychological element of power is perhaps the most important in combat. Any fighting is essentially a test of physical and psychological endurance. Von Clausewitz observed that psychological forces exert a decisive influence on the elements involved in war. Superior numbers can be neutralized by superior military and moral worth of the numerically weaker party. Morale factors permeate war as a whole . 45 The most difficult to quantify is the moral strength of an army or a nation. Morale of a force depends on many imponderable factors, which makes it extremely difficult to assess the quality of a force. They include small-unit cohesion, discipline, training, leadership, ideology, and combat motivation. Morale is linked to discipline. They are opposite sides of the same coin. Instilling these things in a military force depends upon the leadership's understanding of the nature of human relationships. 47 In addition to issuing training schedules and operational directives, the general aim of regulations is to set an overall standard of conduct and work required for all concerned. The level of discipline should at all times be gauged to what elicits the best results from the majority of dutiful individuals. Discipline destroys the spirit and working loyalty of the general force when it is pitched to the majority of discontented, undutiful men within the organization, whether to punish or to appease them. Setting an example is far more effective than the written or spoken word. As the soldier sees his superiors obey, so does he always follow their lead . 48 Sometimes morale may be high and discipline poor, but a force may still perform efficiently in combat. In World War II, the Soviet Army was an efficient force despite its 68

primitiveness and frequent lack of discipline. The lowest soldier could criticize his superior at the communist party meetings. Standards of discipline varied greatly from unit to unit. The most common problem was drunkenness, apathy, and absence. Soviet officers had a difficult time controlling their drunken men, while they themselves were liable to quick punishment for drunken behavior. Political unreliability was punished severely, as was misuse or loss of government property. Discipline was enforced by draconian measures. There was the physical threat to their families at home and the threat of being shot by the political commissars. These and similar disciplinary measures both dispelled apathy and infused a surprising measure of energy and efficiency. At the tactical level, success in combat is highly dependent on the degree of morale, discipline, and cohesion of individual units. Small-unit cohesion is probably the most important factor. The higher the cohesion of the tactical units, the higher the cohesion of large forces and formations employed in a campaign or major operation. Military cohesion, in general, is defined as the bonding together of members of an organization or unit to sustain their will and commitment to each other, their units, and their mission . 5° Unit cohesion is one morale factor the commander can influence. It is the bonds of trust among individual service members that make the combat effectiveness of a military unit greater than the sum of the combat effectiveness of the individual unit members. Therefore, the armed forces and individual services maintain personnel policies that exclude persons whose presence in the armed forces would create an unacceptable risk to their high standards of morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military capability. In general, cohesion consists of two components-social cohesion and task cohesion. Social or group cohesion refers to the nature and quality of the emotional bonds of friendship, liking, caring, and closeness among group members. A group displays social cohesion to the extent that its members like each other's company, prefer to spend their social time together, and feel emotionally close to one another. Task cohesion refers to the shared commitment among members to achieve a goal that requires the collective efforts of the group. A group with a high level of task cohesion is composed of members who share a common goal and who are motivated to coordinate their efforts as a team to achieve that goal. Social and task cohesion are part of the same whole. The weakening of one component invariably leads to the weakening of the other. Optimally, both social and task cohesion of a force as a whole should be at a high level for success in combat. Adverse influences on unit cohesion include: inequitable leadership and discipline, favoritism, fraternization, harassment of certain groups because of their nationality, class, origin, or gender, isolation or segregation of distinct groups, or some other reason. During the Vietnam War, the U.S. Army's practice to frequently rotating officers, rather than entire units, adversely affected unit cohesion-in tactical units, it was virtually every man for himsel£ 51 The unit rotational system is much better than individual replacements because it enhances personnel stability within a unit, and, in turn, a large force or formation as a whole. The commanders influence unit cohesion in their everyday activities through work assignments, training, and all aspects of their presence. In combat, unit cohesion is also influenced through the flow of information and interpersonal communications. At the tactical level, the physical environment can

adversely affect unit morale. By maintaining unit cohesion, commanders can mitigate the effects of the battlefield environment. In multi-ethnic countries, such as the former Soviet Union and Russia today or the former Yugoslavia, unit cohesion suffered because of the different cultures and social values among the rank and file. Despite all the communist regime's efforts to reduce these differences by encouraging ideological fervor, imposing atheism, and appealing to "brotherhood and unity" (as in the former Yugoslav People's Army), the underlying animosity, and all too often open hostility among various ethnic groups remained unresolved. Austria-Hungary tried to defuse ethnic tensions in the army by creating units based exclusively on a single nationality. However, this attempt did not withstand the stresses of war when many non-German army units collapsed or mutinied, especially in the turbulent days of November 1918. Combat motivation is a combination of morale and discipline, small-unit cohesion, and training, tempered by the combat environment. At any level, one of the principal tasks of the commanders is to strengthen morale factors while mitigating the adverse effects of the environment. The commander must identify those elements of morale that he can influence and develop. 52 The effects of the environment can be mitigated by small-unit cohesion, strict and realistic training, and informing subordinates on actions planned or taken in a timely manner. For the armed forces as a whole, and for the individual services, combat motivation is significantly affected by several other factors, notably, the character of the war, justness of the cause, the war's legitimacy, ideology, patriotism, and a sense of national honor. Combat motivation of a force as a whole, is also heavily influenced by the nature and legal aspects of the conflict. An army defending home territory is usually more highly motivated than the invading force. However, if the regime is oppressive either to its own population or to national minorities, then combat motivation may be low or even nonexistent. The German troops found little resistance during their brief campaign in the former Yugoslavia in April 1941. Most of the non-Serbs did not respond to mobilization and those who were in the army either left their posts, surrendered without a fight or even mutinied against their Serbian commanders. The Yugoslav 4th Army in Zagreb stopped fighting on 10 April, four days after the German invasion began. Many non-Serb soldiers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and officers in the 1st and 7th Armies and divisions deployed in the littoral area defected or mutinied. The Soviet troops performed very poorly in the war against Finland 1940, but fought stubbornly and courageously against the invading German armies in 1941 and until the end of war. If the majority of the population perceives the war to be just and legitimate, then combat motivation is usually higher than if the war is considered unjust and illegitimate. Combat motivation of the British, U.S., and other Allied armies in World War 11 was generally high, both because of the sustained support from home and the strong and widespread belief in the justness of the Allied cause. However, sometimes the degree of demoralization and defeatism before a war is so high, as in France in 1940, that although the cause was undoubtedly just and the war legitimate, the will to fight was sorely lacking. The side that initiated a war of aggression could still motivate the armed forces to fight well because of highly successful propaganda, ideology, and survival instincts among the majority of population. Combat motivation of the Wehrmacht as a whole was uniformly high during World War 11, both in victories and defeats. The German troops

were well led and highly disciplined. It is generally accepted that human relations were better in the Wehrmacht than in the German armies of 1870 or 1914. Despite great losses, the German U-boat crews and Luftwaffe fighter pilots retained remarkable combat motivation until the very end of World War 11. 54 When survival is at stake, coercion is usually not required, as most of the soldiers feel that they have to join the struggle because it is a matter of life or death. In World War 11, one of strong motivations for the Soviets to fight was the struggle for their very survival. Ideological motivation, as in the Viet Minh and Viet Cong force in the Indochina wars, can sometimes be the predominant factor in combat motivation. In other situations, such as the Soviet resistance to the German invaders in 1941-1945, nationalism and survival could be more important to generate a will to fight than ideology. The atrocities committed by one side in a conflict invariably strengthen the will to fight of the other side. Combat motivation is higher when the military is convinced that it has strong and continuous support on the home front, as the British forces deployed to the Falklands in 1982 firmly believed. In contrast, combat motivation of U.S. troops in Vietnam was low because of the increasing lack of public support for war after 1967. Operational leadership is almost an entirely intangible element of combat potential or combat power. However, great generalships are of decisive importance and can make up for greatly superior numbers of the enemy. In World War 11, the Soviet leadership at the highest level made many costly mistakes. However, on balance it proved to be much better than the German High Command in making sound strategic decisions and preparing detailed plans. The Germans' biggest strength was in their tactical and operational leadership, especially from corps level downward. In contrast, the Soviet leadership at the tactical and operational levels was poor. The Soviet commanders lacked initiative, training, and experience. 56 Combat potential and combat power of a force in a major operation or campaign depends not only on combined arms tactics, but also on the degree of multi-service cooperation or jointness. Jointness pertains to the employment of two or more services across the full range of operational continuum-from the routine peacetime tasks to the accomplishment of the assigned military objectives. In peacetime, a high degree of jointness can be achieved through a joint command organization that ensures joint planning and training, and joint education. In time of regional conflict or war, jointness is ensured through application of tenets of operational art in planning, preparing, and executing major operations and campaigns. A high degree of jointness offers operational commander multi-dimensional capabilities-land, sea, air, space, and special forceswhich are inherently more effective than single-service forces. True jointness also considerably enhances unity of effort. Training is another and perhaps the most critical element of the factor of force. A force could be numerically larger and excellently armed and equipped, but still be ineffective because of the training deficiencies. Whether training is high, moderate, or low can be easily evaluated. However, it is difficult to measure in any meaningful way the impact of training on the anticipated performance of a force in combat. Training also affects motivation for combat. 57 There should be no lowering of standards, regardless of the cost. It is better to have smaller but excellently trained forces, than much larger but poorly trained forces. Normally, the more highly trained the forces, the higher their motivation for combat. Uniformly high standards of training are the chief distinction

between regular forces and elite forces such as marines (or naval infantry), airborne units, or special forces. Submarine forces are normally a highly trained component of any navy. The extremely high performance of the German U-boats in both world wars was due to their high standards of training. In their war with Finland in 1939-1940, some Soviet units were highly trained and some were composed of raw and ignorant draftees. 58 One of the perennial problems for the Soviets during the subsequent war with Nazi Germany was poor to mediocre training of most of the army units. This problem could be remedied only with mobilizing ever larger numbers of available manpower to replace huge losses inflicted by the smaller but much more effective German Army. Training is largely conducted during peacetime, which makes it difficult to ascertain shortcomings and take timely corrective action before the opening of the hostilities. Ironically, long spell of peace compounds these problems. The U.S. Navy entered the Pacific War in December 1941 with poor torpedo tactics and lack of skill for night fighting. These deficiencies were not corrected until well into the war. The Japanese Navy in general maintained a very high level of training for all its forces. Their exercises were held in cold and remote areas and under realistic conditions. Meanwhile, the U.S. Navy had exercised in warm waters of the southern seas or where good weather prevailed, taking all precautions to avoid casualties and subsequent bad publicity. 59 Also, the U.S. Navy's training was not uniformly high; for example, surface forces were not as well trained as naval aviation. The performance of U.S. carrier pilots steadily increased during the war because of consistently high standards in training. By late 1944, every U.S. naval aviator had about two years of training and some 300 hours of flying time before being considered fit to fly from a carrier. In contrast, the quality of Japanese naval pilots steadily deteriorated after the Battle for Midway. In the Battle for Leyte in October 1944, Japanese carrier pilots had only two to six months of training. b° These problems were caused by the perennial shortage of fuel and horrendous losses, which forced the Japanese to retain and not rotate their frontline squadrons until they were severely attrited. Doctrine is a critical element of the factor of force. Without soundly written and skillfully applied doctrine, major operations and campaigns are likely to fail. Doctrine and training are interrelated and affect each other in many ways. A doctrine is understood as the set of officially approved views and fundamental principles on the missions, roles, methods, and procedures of employment of forces and assets in both wartime and peacetime. A soundly written doctrine should allow a great deal of flexibility in its application. It should be revised as circumstances change, new weapons are introduced, or accumulated experiences and lessons learned in peacetime and in combat require new solutions. Doctrine should provide a common baseline for the employment of one's forces. Its greatest value is in providing common techniques and procedures to solve military problems. In this way, it greatly improves training of the entire force. A sound doctrine should encourage and develop mental agility of the commanders at all levels. The commanders should display drive, energy, flexibility, and willingness to seize the initiative and make quick decisions. Mental agility is determined by the intellectual flexibility of leadership, and the speed of individual commander's and staffs decisions and the staff system's responsiveness to them. 61 Tactical doctrine is the basis for service and joint doctrine. Poorly written or applied tactical doctrine would result in the battles or engagements lost, and thereby lead to a failed

major operation. Japan's superior tactics, combined with better torpedoes were the main reason behind a series of the U.S. Navy's defeats and heavy losses suffered in the struggle for Guadalcanal in the summer and fall of 1942. The German success in the initial phase of World War 11 was due, not to larger numbers and better tanks and aircraft, but to superior concepts for their employment and the creative application of operational art. The German Wehrmacht integrated tanks, infantry, and artillery into the panzer divisions and provided them with close air support. The result of integrating existing technologies with a new approach to organization was the birth of what was euphemistically called the "Blitzkrieg." 62 The defeat of France in 1940 was due to military doctrine that failed to keep pace with changing conditions, but, above all, to obsolete habits of thought and the perpetuation of the slow-motion methods of World War 1. The French were blinded to the realities and potentialities of modern warfare with modern materiel because of their general success in 1914-1.918. At the beginning of World War 11, they focused on what had brought them success in the previous war, and refined that doctrine, organization, and materiel. This called for strong defensive positions in depth, supported by quantities of 63 artillery, which meant ponderous movement of guns and huge stocks of ammunition. Conclusion: The importance of properly evaluating the factor of force in planning for, and conducting a campaign or major operation cannot be adequately emphasized. Yet, no task is more difficult than correctly evaluating the capabilities of one's forces, both before and during combat. Gross numbers, whether of personnel or weapons and equipment and their quality, is inadequate to realistically evaluate the factor of forces. Things are more complex than they often appear. The difficulties are due to many hardto-measure or impossible-to-measure elements of combat potential or combat power. Human elements of power specifically morale and discipline, small-unit cohesion, combat motivation, leadership, doctrine, and training-cannot be precisely evaluated. This requires operational commanders and their staffs to make approximate judgments about the true capabilities of their forces, which, in turn, means that they must use very good judgment and experience in assessing their own and friendly forces. In doing so there is no place for falsified data, political judgments, or unfounded optimism. The operational commanders and their staffs should always face the realities no matter how unpleasant; otherwise, the planned campaign or major operation is bound to fail.

Notes 1. J. Beck, Schlagkraf-ein Schlagwort? Zur Problematik der Erfassung and Bewertung militaerischer Leistungsfaeihigkeit (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 30 October 1978), p. 1. 2. Werner Lange, Raum, Zeit and Mittel als Faktoren strategischer Zielsetzung. Ueberlegungen zu Napoleons Feldzug in Russland 1812 (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, November 1964), p. 1. 3. Harry Marx, Raum-Zeit-Mittel als Faktoren strategischer Zielsetzung. Ueberlegungen zu Napoleons Feldzug in Russland 1812 (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 1964), p. 9. 4. DuBois, Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., and Lawrence J. Low, A Concise Theory of Combat ( Monterey, CA: Institute for Joint Warfare Analysis, 2nd printing, October 1998), 74. 5. Ibid., p. 74. 6. Ibid., p. 71. 7. Charles D. Franklin, Time, Space, and Mass at the Operational Level of'War: The Dynamics of'the Culminating Point (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 28 April 1988), p. 9. 8. Carl yon Clausewitz, On War . Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 195. 9. Friedrich von Bernhardi, On War of To-Day, Vol. 11: Combat and Conduct of War, translated by Karl Donat (London: Hugh Rees Ltd., 1913), p. 234. 10. Albert Seaton, The Russo-German War 1941-45 , p. 436; Earl F. Ziemke, Stalingrad To Berlin: The German Defeat in the East ( Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, l st printed 1968, reprinted 1987), p. 315. 11. Friedrich von Bernhardi, On War of To-Day, Vol. 1: Principles and Elements of Modern War, translated by Karl von Donat (New York, NY: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1914), pp. 80, 82-3. 12. R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 B.C. to the Present (New York, NY: Harper & Row, Publishers, 2nd rev. edition, 1986), pp. 669-71. 13. Ibid., p. 879. 14. The Allies had then 3,740,000 soldiers, versus 2,760,000 Germans; the French had 3,254 tanks but only three armored divisions, while the Germans had organized their 2,574 tanks in ten panzer divisions. In contrast, the balance in the air did not favor the Allies. The French had only 1,090 modern aircraft (including 610 fighters, 130 bombers, and 350 reconnaissance aircraft); the British provided, in addition, a total of 160 fighters and 272 bombers. The Germans had available some 3,500 aircraft; Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes, The Anatomy of Failure in War (New York: Vintage Books, 1st ed., 1991), pp. 201, 206. 15. Karl-Volker Neugebauer, editor, Grundzuege der deutschen Militaerge- schichte , Vol. 1: Historischer Ueberblick (Freiburg, i.Br.: Rombach Verlag, 1993), p. 264. 16. Seaton, The Russo-German War 1941-45 , p. 400. 17. Center for Military History, U.S. Army, CMH Pub 104-5: Terrain Factors in the Russian Campaign ( Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1st printed July 1951, facsimile printing 1982, 1986), p. 7.

18. This included 102 infantry divisions, 19 panzer divisions, 14 motorized infantry divisions, one cavalry division, and nine security divisions supported with army troops, heavy artillery, combat engineers, AA troops, etc.; Alfred Philippi and Ferdinand Heim, Der Feldzug Ge eon Sowjetrussland 1941 bis 1945. Ein operatives Ueberblick (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1962), p. 36. 19. Von Bernhardi, On War of To-Day, Vol. I, pp. 89, 82. 20. Philippi and Heim, Der Feldzug Gegen Sowjetrussland 1941 bis 1945. Ein operatives Ueberblick, p. 37. 21. Seaton, The Russo-German War 1941-45 , pp. 171, 397. 22. Cohen and Gooch, Military Misfortunes. The Anatomy of Failures in War , p. 201 23. H. Ritter, Bei allen Ueberlegungen zur Gefechtsfuehrung gilt das Dogma, dass der Angreifer dem Verteidiger 3.1 an Kraefen ueberlegen sein muss, um mit hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit Erfolg zu haben. Beurteilen Sic these Behauptung vor dem Hintergrund kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele fuer die Divisionebene (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, October 1983), p. 2. 24. I.S.O. Playfair, et al., The Mediterranean and Middle East , Vol. 1: The Germans Come to the Help of their Ally (1941) (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), pp. 129, 147-8. 25. M. Fretter-Pico, Verlassen von den Sieges Goettern ( Wiesbaden, 1969), p. 75; Dankmut Schinzer, "Verteidigung gegen sowjetische Angriffe," Truppenpraxis 1 (January 1980), p. 23. 26. Von Clausewitz, On War (1976), pp. 195-6. 27. Cohen and Gooch, Military, Misfortunes. The Anatomy of Failures in War , p. 201. 28. Ibid., pp. 201, 206. 29. Appendix: "Soviet Navy Order of Battle, March 1985," in James L. George, The Soviet and Other Communist Navies: The View from the Mid-1980s (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986), pp. 423-6. 30. Von Bernhardi, On War of To-Day , Vol. 1, p. 83. 31. Historical Evaluation and Research Organization (HERO), Developing a Methodology to Describe the Relationship of Mobility to Combat Effectiveness (Fairfax, VA: HERO, A Report prepared for Research Analysis Organization under Subcontract FY 67-ARD1-1-2, 27 December 1966), pp. 30-1, 57. 32. Karl-Heinz Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende. Der Westfeldzug 1940 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1995), p. 123. 33. HERO, Developing a Methodology to Describe the Relationship of Mobility to Combat Effectiveness, p. 56. 34. Ibid., p. 45. 35. T.N. Dupuy, Numbers, Predictions and War: Using History to Evaluate Combat Factors and Predict the Outcome of Battles (Fairfax, VA: Hero Books, rev. edition, 1985), p. 13. 36. HERO, Developing a Methodology to Describe the Relationship of Mobility to Combat Effectiveness, p. 60. 37. Ibid., p. 59. 38. Neugebauer, editor, et al., Grundzuege der deutschen Militaergeschichte , Vol. l: Historischer Ueberblick , p. 370.

39. Cohen and Gooch, Military Misfortunes. The Anatomy of Failure in War , p. 8. 40. Samuel E. Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931-April 1942 , Vol. III': History of United States Naval Operations in World War 11 (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1959), p. 23. 41. Seaton, The Russo-German War 1941-45 , pp. 70-6. 42. Ibid., pp. 93, 90. 86-7. 43. Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power. German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), pp. 164-5. 44. William D. Headerson, Cohesion. The Human Element In Combat. Leadership and Societal Influence in the Armies of the Soviet Union, the United States, North Vietnam, and Israel ( Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1985), p. 3. 45. Von Clausewitz, On War . (1976), pp. 127, 184. 46. Marx, Raum-Zeit-Mittel als Faktoren strategischer Zielsetzung, p. 1 6. 47. S.L.A. Marshall, The Officer as a Leader (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1st ed., April 1966), p. 139. 48. Colmar yon der Goltz, The Nation In Arms. A Treatise on Modern Military Systems and the Conduct of War. Translated by Philip A. Ashworth (London: Hugh Rees, Ltd., 5th German edition, 1906), pp. 162-3. 49. Seaton, The Russo-German War 1941-45 , pp. 89, 97. 50. John J. Johns, et al., Cohesion in the US Military. Defense Management Study Group On Military Cohesion (Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC: National University Press, 1984), p. 4. 51. Anthony Kellett, Combat Motivation (Ottawa, Canada: Department of Defence, November 1980), p. 129. 52. John M. Spiszer, "Leadership and Combat Motivation: The Critical Task," Military Review 3 (MayJune 1999), p. 66. 53. Detlef Vogel, "Das Eingreifen Deutschlands auf dem Balkan," in Gerhard Schreiber, et al., Der Mittelmeerraum Und Suedosteuropa. Von der "non belligerenza" Italiens bis zum Kriegseintritt der Vereinigten Staaten, Vol. 3, Das Deutsche Reich Und Der Zweite Weltkrieg (Stuttgart: Deutsche VerlagsAnstalt, 1984), p. 480. 54. Dirk W. Oetting, Motivation and Gefechtswert. Vom Verhalten des Soldaten im Kriege (Frankfurt, a. M/Bonn: Report Verlag, 1988), pp. 55, 42. 55. Von Bernhardi, On War of To-Day , Vol. 1, p. 90. 56. Seaton, The Russo-German War 1941-45, p. 85. 57. Oetting, Motivation and Gefechtswert. Vom Verhalten des Soldaten im Kriege , p. 185. 58. William R. Trotter, Frozen Hell. The Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939-40 (Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin Books, 2000), p. 36-7. 59. Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931-April 1942 , p. 25.

60. Ibid., The Two-Ocean War. A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company, 1963), p. 334. 61. HERO, Developing a Methodology to Describe the Relationship of Mobility to Combat Effectiveness, pp. 58, 44. 62. W. Semiamow, The Revolution in Military Affairs: All That Glitters Is Not Gold (Advanced Military Studies Course, Canadian Defence College, 1998), p. 3. 63. HERO, Developing a Methodology to Describe the Relationship of Mobility to Combat Effectiveness, pp. 54, 59.

THE FACTORS OF SPACE, TIME, AND FORCE Strategy is the art of making use of time and space. 1 am less in charge of the latter than the former. Space we can recover, lost time never. Napoleon I Space, time, and force are closely and dynamically interrelated. An operational commander must often take high risks in emphasizing one of these operational factors over another. Overcoming space always entails costs in time and force; conversely, giving up space can save time and force. Hence, balancing the operational factors in combination is an extremely complicated problem. Space-Force: Physical space is the area in which one's and enemy forces are engaged in combat. Overcoming the factor of space involves movement of forces, effects of fires, and transmittal of messages and orders. I Technological advances have provided better and more effective means to overcome the factor of space. Yet, if the defender has the same or similar forces, then the time the attacker needs to overcome the factor of space will be much longer. 2 In 1812, it took Napoleon I eighty-three days to reach Moscow, or 8.5 miles per day. Overcoming that distance with internal combustion engines proved to be false expectation in Russia in 1941. Heat, dust, poor roads, marshy terrain, and too few stops for repairs wreaked much havoc with German armor and motorized equipment. The German army equipment was much too heavy for warfare in Russian terrain. The Germans needed 167 days to reach the outskirts of Moscow, or a rate of advance of 4.6 miles per day. In contrast, the Germans fought their way from the Ardennes to the English Channel-over 230 miles in just twelve days, or nineteen miles per day. 3 The factor of space must be controlled with the given forces to such a degree that the operation's objectives are accomplished. The more distant the physical strategic objective in space, the larger will be the combat and noncombat sources of national power required to accomplish it. While a gain or loss of space, in and of itself is not inherently a disadvantage or advantage, often it is the relationship between space and force that proves most decisive in determining the success of a military efforts The factors of space and force have become increasingly intertwined with each other in the evolution of warfare. History abundantly shows how important the relationship is between the size of the employment area and the strength of one's forces operating there-and here "strength" is less a matter of numbers than it is available combat potential or combat power. A sound force-to-space ratio is one of the most critical factors in planning a major operation or campaign. This relationship becomes increasingly more important the longer the hostilities last, the greater the expanse of space involved, and the more stringent the limitations on resources. The force-to-space ratio is changeable and is highly dependent on, among other things: the quality of the leaders; training of one's forces; the quality of weapons, equipment, and doctrine; s air superiority; the characteristics of the terrain; and security in the rear operating area.

Space available for operations may be too wide, too deep, or too high for the organized forces; then the space must be divided into smaller areas. Proper spatial division of the theater of operations is envisaged when the large space is organized so the distant effect of one's forces on the theater will have a direct influence on another. The smaller the forces, the smaller the space that will be selected and the smaller the physical objectives to be accomplished. 9 In the German invasion of Poland in September 1939, the initial exterior geostrategic position was highly advantageous for the Germans. The theater of operations was in the form of an irregular triangle extending some 310 miles along the north-south axis, potentially allowing the Germans to conduct a series of enveloping concentric operations. However, the entire space was too wide for the German forces used in the campaign. Because of the relatively large distances, the tactical actions in a given location would not necessarily have the desired synchronized effect on the events in other areas of the theater. The Germans divided the available space between the two army groups totaling five armies. The rapid advance of the Tenth Army from Silesia toward Warsaw in only eight days split the theater into two parts. The panzer and motorized infantry divisions of the Fourth Army moving from Pomerania reached the Vistula River at Graudenz [ Grudziadz] in a few days. The purpose of this thrust was to cut off the corridor areas from the "Congress Poland" (the Kingdom of Poland established in 1815) and to further divide the theater into several areas of operations. The swift division of the theater prevented the Polish forces-some fifteen divisions in Posen [ Poznan l-from avoiding encirclement and withdrawing to the east. The shallow depth of the Polish territory prevented the remaining Polish forces from withdrawing too far because Soviet troops had been deployed on Poland's eastern borders to advance as anticipated by the secret clauses of the Soviet-Nazi Pact of August 1939. The Germans also carried out the second envelopment in which one panzer group of the Third Army in Eastern Prussia advanced southeast to meet the Fourteenth Army on the Vistula River near Cracow (Krakow). Thus, the German forces advancing from the south to north isolated the Polish capital of Warsaw from the east and sealed its fate. t o Terrain, climate, and weather all considerably affect the movement, combat employment, support, and protection of large forces involved in major operations and campaigns." A movement of forces cannot be based on a simple computation of space and distance to be traversed. The effect of the peculiar characteristics of terrain or water surface over which they move must be evaluated as well. Each must be considered individually and in combination. Terrain also considerably affects the size of force required to accomplish a given objective. In general, the more difficult the terrain, the larger the attacking force that is required. Conversely, difficult terrain facilitates the defender's task. In the Winter War of 1939-1940 the Russo-Finnish border stretched for about 1,000 miles. The biggest stretch, from the Lake Ladoga's northern shore to the Arctic Ocean was quite impenetrable, except for a few roads. This allowed the Finns to concentrate their strongest forces on the Karelian Isthmus and in the area immediately north of Ladoga to prevent the outflanking of the Mannerheim Line. iz In land warfare, the space-to-force ratio in a given theater can be determined by: the number of one's forces in the particular theater, the number of combat troops deployed along the frontline, the troop density or the number of tanks or guns per mile or kilometer of the front, and the ratio of combat to noncombat troops. The Navy and Air Force face increasing challenges of assessment ratios because of the very different

characteristics of forces and platforms and the way they project their combat power. Mechanically applying the ratio of forces to space and comparing them against the enemy's can result in serious misjudgments. The factor of force is inherently difficult to calculate precisely because so many unmeasurable factors-such as morale, training, and leadership-fall within its scope. However, large numbers of troops or other forces always have their own qualities and should not be dismissed outright. In general, the size of forces should be roughly in proportion to the space they must control or obtain. A mismatch between size of physical space and strength of forces is almost always fatal. A given space must be controlled so that the principal purpose of a major operation or campaign is accomplished. The successful campaign or major operation always results in enlarging the existing space for subsequent operations. Most often the greater the force-to-space ratio, the smaller the space available to an enemy for recovery after combat action. However, sometimes, a small but highly mobile force with high combat potential can operate in a large space and defeat a numerically superior force. In the ancient era, small and mobile armies operated successfully over large spaces and eventually controlled larger territories. Alexander the Great had fewer than 40,000 men in his campaign against Persia in 334 B.C. Hannibal at Cannae in 216 B.C. had approximately 50,000 men in the field. Frederick the Great deployed an army of about 100,000 men. It was not until the nineteenth century that 500,000-man armies operated in a theater.' 3 In the past few decades, the trend has been toward steadily smaller armies. Likewise, the navies and the air forces are much smaller today than they were in World War II and in the first two decades after 1945. Napoleon I's campaign in Russia in 1812 is a classic example of a mismatch between the size of the space and available forces. 1 4 At the beginning of the campaign in June, some 443,000 French troops, 182,000 horses, and some 1,370 guns crossed the Niemen River and began to advance into Russian territory. The Russian forces, totaling 420,000 men, were dispersed over such a large territory that only 180,000 troops were in direct opposition to the French army. ' 5 The disparity between the French forces available for combat and those required for protection of supplies and territorial gains grew as Napoleon I advanced deeper into Russia. In six weeks he advanced about 235 miles, and extended his frontline about 620 miles from Riga via Vitebsk to the Rokitno Marshes. Napoleon I's losses from combat and lack of food amounted to about one third of his initial strength. After three and a half months of fighting, Napoleon I's main force numbered 115,000 men. Meanwhile, the troops assigned to protect the single line of communications totaled 118,000 men. 1 6 Napoleon I seized control of 100,400 square miles of Russia's territory, an area too small to endanger the Russian Empire but too large to be controlled by his own forces. By September, the French had to defend a 560mile supply line from Russian attack on all sides. Only 30,000 French troops were available in Riga and on the upper Dvina to protect the 550- to 620-mile-long flanks. These troops faced 98,000 men under General Count Ludwig Adolf Wittgenstein in the north and the 48,000 men of General Karl Philip Schwarzenberg in the south. 1 7 After the bloody battle of Borodino on 7 September, Napoleon I had only 95,000 men left in his army. Despite his victory, the state of his troops did not allow him to resume fighting, and he ordered a general withdrawal from Russia on 18 October. By 26-28 November when Napoleon I crossed the Berezina River (in Belarus) he had only 37,000 exhausted

men facing 144,000 Russians. l s By early December, when he reached Vilnius, he had only 4,300 men in his army! 1 9 The Soviets in their war with Finland in 1939-1940 wrongly believed that they had a favorable space-to-force ratio. The 920-mile-long Russo-Finnish border was defended by only nine Finnish divisions, with 175,000 men and sixty obsolescent tanks. The Soviets massed four armies, with twenty-six to twenty-eight divisions of 1.0 million men (of the fully mobilized Leningrad Military District) and about 1,000 tanks. They also had 800 aircraft versus only 150 Finnish aircraft. 2° The first phase of war, in the winter of 1 939, was nonetheless a colossal failure for the Soviets due to, among other things, extremely difficult Finnish terrain, bad leadership, insufficient mobility of their forces, and unsuitable tactics and equipment for combat in woods and in winter conditions .2 Neither did the Japanese fully consider the factor of space in planning their invasion of China in 1937. They erroneously viewed China as encompassing only the area from Peking (Beijing) to the Yellow River and from Shanghai to Nanking, instead of the entire Chinese territory. The Japanese objective was to seize control of the five provinces in northern China through the employment of fifteen divisions, each of about 20,000 men. Initially committing too few forces for the task at hand, they could not achieve a quick and decisive victory despite eventually deploying twice that number of forces into China.' The result was that Japan was drawn into a war of attrition with no end in sight. If the Japanese had properly calculated the factor of space and planned their forces correspondingly, the war in China would have probably taken a more favorable turn for them. Historically, the force-to-space ratio in land warfare has undergone many changes. In the first three years of the American Civil War, a nominal number of 12,000 fighting men were used to hold a Confederate defensive position around Richmond. As methods of defense improved, this figure dropped to about 5,000 men holding a mile of front against an enemy with double that strength. In World War I, because of greatly improved methods of defense, the force-to-space ratio was still lower. The Germans in 1915 had a nominal ratio of one division for every five miles of front (or 3,500 men to a mile), while along the main part of the front the ratio was about 6,000 men to a mile. By 1916 the Allies had deployed 160 divisions along the Western Front, while the Germans had 120; a year later, the ratio was 180 to 140 divisions, respectively. Nevertheless, all attempts by the Allies to penetrate the German lines failed and resulted in great Allied losses . 23 In World War 11, the force-to-space ratio varied from theater to theater. In May 1940 the Allies defended some 400 miles of front in France with 111 divisions, or approximately one division to three and a half miles of front. The Germans had an extremely favorable space-to-force ratio where it counted most, in the sector of main effort and the selected point of main attack-the area between Sedan and Dinant. In the German sector of main effort, the French deployed twenty-nine divisions to hold nearly one hundred miles of front, while the Germans deployed forty-two divisions of their crack Army Group A. 24 In the Second Battle of El Alamein in November 1942, Field Marshal Rommel defended some forty miles of front with 27,000 German and 50,000 Italian soldiers, or a ratio of 2,000 men to a mile. General Montgomery attacked this force with a superiority of eight-to-one. Despite this enormous superiority, it took Allied troops some thirteen

days of heavy fighting to break through the Axis lines. In the process, the Allies lost three times as many tanks as the defending Germans. In the battle for Normandy in the summer of 1944, the Germans stopped the Allied advance despite their huge inferiority in numbers. On the ten-mile front of the U.S. breakout at Avranches, the Germans had deployed only one depleted division. For most of the time during this defensive fighting, the Germans held the eighty-mile stretch of Normandy with the equivalent of only one division to each eight miles of the front. The U.S. forces made a breakout in late July after eight weeks of heavy fighting. 26 A highly unfavorable force-to-space ratio probably doomed the German campaign in Russia from its very beginning. The German high command never did an estimate of the situation for the entire German armed forces, nor did they seriously consider the factors of space, time, and force in their long-range planning. 27 In June 1941, the Germans deployed 130 divisions with about 1,300,000 men, 600,000 vehicles of all kinds, and a similar number of horses, along 435 miles of front. The Germans accepted these disadvantages, despite the fact that the risk was bound to increase as the space they progressively filled became larger and the number of troops was reduced. By the end of 1941, the German forces had advanced more than 620 miles into the depth of the enemy territory, increasing the frontage to about 1,120 miles. By then the Germans had suffered numerous combat casualties, with no significant replacements forthcoming. Their average infantry division was down to sixty-five percent of its original strength; the infantry strength of a panzer division was down to fifty percent, with losses in materiel between sixty-five and seventy-five percent. The German overall strength was about eighty-three division-equivalents-a reduction of forty-seven divisions from the beginning of the campaign. 28 This huge difference between space and forces was one of the main reasons behind the German failure to regain the initiative in the summer of 1942. This problem was compounded by Hitler's tendency to waste away the German advantages in forces by trying to seize or hold too large an area. Hitler's directive in the summer of 1942-to seize the Caucasian oilfields and Stalingrad-resulted in changing the shape of the frontline in the south from a 375- to 435-mile-long line to a 1,245-mile forward-protruding salient. 29 The German problem of force-space was further complicated because their Italian, Romanian, and Hungarian allies were poorly equipped and trained for combat on the Eastern Front. 30 In both world conflicts, the principal characteristic of the war on the Eastern Front was the enormous size of the area in which combat was conducted. In their invasion of Russia in 1941, the Germans faced the problem of the enormous distances to be seized and controlled. The distance from the German starting positions on the Bug River to the Orsha Corridor (some sixty-eight miles southwest of Smolensk) was about 300 miles, while to the Volga it was about 1,100 miles. 31 From the fall of 1941 to the fall of 1943, the German front was never less than 2,400 miles long, and for a time in 1942, it reached 3,045 miles. 32 After 1943, the Germans tried to resolve the problem of space-force in Soviet Russia by improving their defensive methods and techniques. However, this proved insufficient to counterbalance the growing space-to-force disparity. By 1944, the frontage of a German infantry division has increased to thirty miles, or one defender for every thirty yards. The terrain features and a succession of river obstacles favored the Germans during their withdrawal from Russia in 1943-1944. However, the Germans were unable to use these advantages because the ratio of troops to space became too

unfavorable. 33 The longer the war lasted and the casualties mounted, the fewer welltrained, professional soldiers the German army could deploy on the Eastern Front. The mismatch between the factors of space and force were exacerbated for the Germans in World War 11 because they had to deploy forces along almost the entire rim of the European continent, from northern Norway to Greece against possible Allied invasion or large-scale raids. Before the Allied Normandy invasion in June 1944, the Germans had in the West only sixty divisions of varied quality. 34 The "Atlantic Wall" defenses extended from the eastern tip of the Netherlands about 1,245 miles to the Pyrenees; thus the German defense line in the West extended for some 3,050 miles (not including the 1,245 miles of Norwegian coastline and 250 miles of Danish coast). The Allies had an overall unfavorable space-force ratio during their campaign in Italy in 1943-1945. The Italian theater of operations extended for about 745 miles along its north-south axis and the Allies employed, at most, fifteen to twenty divisions, while the Germans used only sixteen divisions (another ten divisions were tied to the Balkans). The Germans offered stubborn resistance until the very end of the war. The combination of the high quality of the German troops and unfavorable terrain for offensive operations denied the Allies a quick and decisive victory in Italy. Given commitments elsewhere, the Allies never assigned enough forces to the Italian theater to ensure a speedy victory. 36 Another element in calculating the force-to-space ratio is the ratio between combat and noncombat troops. The smaller this ratio is, the more unfavorable the situation in a given space. At the beginning of the German campaign against Russia in June 1941, there were three noncombatants to ten fighting men. By October 1942 this ratio had changed within each armored or infantry division to one to one. 37 As the war continued, the ratio of fighters to noncombatants became progressively more unfavorable for the Germans. Even if the attacker succeeds in seizing an entire space and neutralizing the defending army, it is questionable whether the additional space can be fully controlled. The subjugated population might resort to widespread acts of civil disobedience, thereby complicating the attacker's problem in controlling the newly acquired space. On the other hand, the defender must calculate how much space he can safely give up without jeopardizing the inner stability. Moreover, the enemy populace might rise up against the occupier and conduct protracted guerrilla war. 39 This has happened to many occupying armies, as, for example, the French in Spain in 1808-1814 and the Austro-Hungarian army after its occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878. The German Wehrmacht found itself involved in extensive actions against the insurgents in the Balkans and in Poland, and against "partisans" (guerrillas) in Soviet Russia. Likewise, the Japanese forces, after occupying a fairly large part of China after 1937, had continual difficulty in controlling the space because of widespread guerrilla activities. In World War II, control of the rear became even more critical, because of the need to protect airfields, air facilities, and installations. Additionally, the greatly increased consumption of ammunition, fuel, and other means of support required full operational control of rear areas. The German problems in their invasion of Soviet Russia in 1941-1944 were more severe because of the much larger disconnect between the factors of force and space. The large occupied area of the European Russia required additional German forces to ensure a secure link between the front and the homeland from the attacks of the Soviet "partisans." The occupied area required administration and

monitoring, and agricultural and industrial sources had to be secured . 4° The Germans assigned only a few poor-quality forces for rear area security in Soviet Russia. This was especially surprising given the size of the operational area and the multiplicity of duties. A single security division [Sicherung Division] covered 250 miles of the main railroad in White Russia. Most of the duties for rear security were assigned security divisions and the units of SS and police. Initially, the Germans faced the threat of perhaps 30,000 Soviet "partisans" in their rear zone and the Germans were generally successful in maintaining rear area security in Soviet Russia. The number steadily grew and by 1943 there were an estimated 400,000 to 500,000 "partisans," or two to four percent of the total Soviet manpower. Compare this to the 200,000 to 250,000 troops the Germans employed on security duties (and of that total only half were German troops) . 42 German Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, CINC of Army Group South, faced a severe crisis in southern Russia in February 1943, because of a massive Soviet offensive in the aftermath of the German defeat at Stalingrad. The Soviet advance toward the Sea of Azov threatened all German forces deployed in southern Russia and the Caucasus. Von Manstein realized the mismatch between his objectives and available forces, and decided to trade space for force. First, he shortened the front of his Army Group by some 125 miles by ordering a gradual withdrawal of German forces to the sector on the MiusLower Donets Rivers. He also created a new mobile and powerful 4th Panzer Army to be used as operational reserve in his subsequently highly successful counteroffensive against the Soviet forces threatening to cut off his lines of retreat. The 4th Panzer Army was redeployed in a "leapfrogging" movement [Rochade] from Rostov to the Lower Donets River. 43 Space-Time: The commanders should evaluate the theater in terms of space and the time necessary to defeat the enemy force and accomplish the assigned objective. The factor of time is related to the battlefield area and is a first consideration so commanders can direct their reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition resources to identify targets and threats. 44 The factors of space and time form another framework within which the commander directs the movement of his forces . 45 Any military action consists of deployment and then maneuver of forces into a space. Combat itself ends when the enemy is destroyed or neutralized in a given area. The movement of forces in space is either free or forced by the opponent and takes place within a longer or shorter time. 46 While space and time must be in harmony with the objectives, space and time are not always subject to the commander's wi11. 47 Despite advances in technology, space and time factors remain today as valid as they were in the past. For the attacker, the objective is to gain space as quickly as possible, while the defender tries to keep control over space and delay or deny the attacker's objective. Therefore, any gain of time is to the advantage of the defender, because the attacker's combat power will likely diminish over time. For a small country, giving up space would not bring any advantage. However, any gain in space would be equal to a gain in time. 48 Napoleon I's difficulties in his invasion of Russia in 1812 were largely due to an extremely unfavorable space-time ratio. In Russia, the influence of the factor of time was felt through the influence of climate and seasons on the time required to complete a campaign. Shortly after the start of the invasion, the rainy period transformed the land into a morass, portending slow advances . 49 The problems of timely coordination of troops 85

over long distances were felt shortly after the start of the campaign in Russia. Napoleon I's orders took several days to arrive. He never really knew where his subordinates were, and he could not influence them directly. After Russian Generals Pyotr Bagration and Barclay de Tolly combined their efforts, a large part of the French operations plan was doomed to failure. Physical and climatological characteristics of space, combined with time significantly affect the employment of forces on both sides (for details see the chapter "Theater Physical Features"). A winter environment significantly increases the time required for all tasks, from constructing defensive positions and obstacles, movement of forces, and maintenance and repair. The movement of units on foot in severe cold can take five times the normal time. A large armored or mechanized force requires less time to transit a given space in a dry and open terrain than in mountainous terrain. Several days or heavy rain or heavy snowfall also reduces the trafficability. Drainage and soil characteristics all affect mobility of one's forces. A well-established road and railroad network generally facilitates the movement of large forces and, therefore, decreases the factor of time. The factors of time and surprise are critically important for the attacker; the less time available for the defender's mobilization, deployment, and concentration, the more likely the attacker is to catch the defender unprepared. Another advantage of starting early is that by seizing or controlling a certain area, one can steadily reduce the defender's area of operations and his freedom of maneuver-and thereby control the environments' Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, Sr. repeatedly demonstrated his superior appreciation of the space-to-time factors. The timely concentration of the Prussian armies in the attack directed from Upper Silesia to Vienna was the most decisive element in the Prussian success against the Austrians in July 1866. 53 Von Moltke, Sr. believed that the Prussian deployment into Upper Silesia would take so long that the Austrians would complete their movements in Bohemia, removing any chance of Prussian success. His solution was to mobilize the entire Prussian army at the beginning of the conflict. He divided his forces into three field armies that marched separately, but were concentrated on the battlefield . 54 In land warfare, moving forces early is usually fraught with danger. If both sides start to move troops simultaneously, or nearly simultaneously, as far forward as possible just before or after the start of the hostilities, there will not be enough space left between them. Thus, it would be difficult to concentrate forces to initiate a campaign or major operation. If both sides are approximately equally prepared for war, and their transportation system is similar, mobilization and concentration will be affected at an approximately equal rate. Therefore, an advantage may turn into a disadvantage for forces less favorably concentrated. The enemy force should be attacked before it completes its preparations. However, these advantages only weigh as such if the concentration of one's forces have been completed .55 Any movement in space requires time, as discussed. The longer the distance, the more time is required to overcome the factor of space. Also, the greater the speed and mobility, the shorter the transit time. This is especially true with regard to the effect of climate and weather in conjunction with the terrain. In his invasion of Russia in 1812, Napoleon I did not reach his objectives before the onset of a harsh continental winter. 56 The average advance per day of the French troops in Russia was twelve and a half miles.

The distance from Vilnius to the Russian border was sixty-two miles and some 340 miles separated Vilnius from Smolensk. To traverse that distance the French required about two months. An orderly retreat required the same or even more time. By late October the troops had to go into winter quarters, which meant that Napoleon I had to accomplish his operational objectives before reaching Smolensk. 57 Likewise, the Germans failed to reach their principal operational objectives in the fall of 1941 in Russia before the onset of the muddy season, followed by extremely harsh winter. The distance between Germany's border and the Dnepr (Dnieper) River was about 310 miles and to Smolensk another 300 miles. 58 The direct result of this combination of events was the failure of the German offensive against Moscow in December 1941. The early victories in 1941-1942 gave the Germans control over a huge territory in Russia. After the turn of the tide in the winter of 1942-1943, Hitler still had an enormous amount of space to trade for time. However, for economic, political, and psychological reasons, he opted to hold the ground at any cost. This resulted in devastating German defeats at the operational and, ultimately, the strategic level. 59 Time-Force: Among other things, the attributes that affect the timely availability of forces include the type and size of forces and their organization, the distance to the employment area, the transportation mode, and the infrastructure in the employment area. 60 Sometimes the factor of distance and time available makes it impossible for a numerically stronger belligerent to concentrate superior masses in time to prevent defeat, as happened to the Imperial Russian army in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. A force defending a large space can trade space for time. Normally, the time factor will not be an advantage for the attacker, but it will benefit the defender who gives up space. If the defender is not decisively beaten, he may retain sufficient space to withstand the enemy's attack until the attacking force reaches its culminating point. That is what the Russians did in their defense against Napoleon I's invasion in 1812, and again in the German invasion in 1941. The defender must also calculate how much space he can safely give up without jeopardizing internal stability and thereby undermining one's will to fight. In general, trading space for time does not offer a significant advantage for a small country on the defensive, such as Denmark confronting a German invasion in 1940. For Napoleon I, available time and means determined the limit of his campaign to Smolensk and Minsk in terms of the strategic objectives. Afterward, the campaign in Russia overshot its culmination point. The lack of means and underestimation of the factor of time led to the defeat of the Grande Armee. 63 In another example, the Austrians in June 1866 operated in a confined space that prevented them from conducting a deployment and forced them to accept battle in a place the Prussians had chosen. The Prussian First Army and the Elbe Army, by starting their movement early, penetrated Bohemia without being disturbed and thereby found sufficient space to concentrate on the battlefield . 64 Space-Time-Force: The most complex relationship to assess, especially at the national and theater-strategic levels is that of space-time-force, which is the essence of operational art. A clear understanding of available means and their relationship to time and space is key in determining strategic objectives. 65 In modern times, the factor of forces has gained in significance while the factors of space and time have become relatively less important. 87

Forces can overcome space rather quickly today. However, if the opponent has the same forces, then the time necessary to overcome a given space is more costly. b6 At the strategic level, in facing a prospect of a war in two widely separated theaters, it is crucial to calculate the time factor required to deploy forces from their home base of operations or from one theater to another. A major decision concerns which theater should be declared the primary theater of war and which should be secondary in importance, again relating forces to space and time. A decision must be made as to whether the strategic offensive or defensive should be taken, and when a shift from defense to counteroffensive is to take place. The larger the distances involved in moving and deploying one's forces, the more critical the factor of time is. Also, the larger the prospective theater is, the larger the force required to accomplish the assigned strategic objectives. A country fighting a two-front war must balance the factors of space and time by proper sequencing of campaigns in various theaters to preserve economy of force and freedom of action. An example of the difficulties of balancing the factors of space, time, and forces is Napoleon I's dilemma in 1812. Napoleon I recognized that he did not have sufficient means to attack, simultaneously, in Spain and Russia. The intervening space between these countries was too large to allow French forces in one theater to be redeployed quickly enough to meet an emergency in the other theater. He was forced to concentrate either in Spain or Russia and to beat Britain and Russia sequentially. His subsequent decision to attack Russia was based on his hope of concentrating French forces in a limited area and of seeking a decision quickly, after which he would turn against Spain . 68 After one month, Napoleon I advanced 280 miles deep into the Russian territory, but the Russian army remained undefeated and stood concentrated at Smolensk; a decisive battle did not take place, and the Tsar was unwilling to end the war despite Napoleon I's peace offers. By the time Napoleon I entered Smolensk, his losses had mounted to 130,000 men and 80,000 horses, while the Russians had lost only 10,000 men and twenty guns. Japan, in its plans for war against the Western powers in 1941, also needed to properly balance the factors of space, forces, and time. The war's objective was to make Japan self-sufficient by obtaining permanent control of the sources of raw materials for the country's economy. The Japanese main objective to conquer the "Southern Resources Area" (Malaya, Borneo, and the Netherlands East Indies, including Timor) would be accomplished in a series of almost simultaneous major operations against the British, Dutch, and U.S. forces in the Far East. The key prerequisite for success was the destruction or immobilization of a major part of the U.S. Pacific Fleet in Hawaii, and the U.S. Army Air Forces in the Philippines. The Japanese were successful in this dual objective of preventing U.S. forces from interfering with their operations in seizing the Southern Resources Area. Only six hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese invaded Malaya, Siam, and Hong Kong, launched their first attack on Singapore, and struck the U.S. Army Air Force in the Philippines. By April 1942, the Japanese controlled a major part of the Far East and a vast area of the Pacific. However, the great and growing disparity between space, forces, and time made it difficult for the Japanese to have effective control over the newly conquered area, which ultimately led to Japan's defeat. Conclusion: Control of space, time, and force, and their interrelationship is the chief prerequisite for success in the planning and execution of any military action; their 88

balancing is the core of operational warfare. The higher the level of war, the more critical it is to have the factors of space, time, and force in harmony because the consequences of failure at the operational and strategic levels are far more serious than at the tactical level. Space and forces are relatively fixed, especially at the operational and strategic level; the commander can do little to change them. However, the time factor is variable and changeable. It is also perhaps the most critical factor of the three: time lost can never be recovered, but space lost can be regained, and forces and assets lost can be regenerated or reconstituted. Any major mismatch between the space to be gained and controlled and the forces available will require the operational commander to take greater risks. If the duration of a major operation or campaign is longer than anticipated, operational factors of space, time, and force will reassert themselves; this, in turn, will almost invariably lead to fatal consequences. Full knowledge and understanding of operational factors are necessary to plan and conduct major operations or campaigns successfully. Operational commanders and their planners must evaluate the situation in a given theater or area of operations in its entirety. They must discern trends in the operational situation weeks or months in advance. The greatest danger is to focus too much on the battlefield area-that is, to have only a tactical perspective of the situation. If that happens, it is a recipe for failure at the operational level of war-a timeless lesson.

Notes l. Hermann Foertsch, Kriq,,skunst heute and morg (Berlin: Zeitgeschichte-Verlag Wilhelm Andermann, 1939), p. 50. 2. Harry Marx, Raum-Zeit-Mittel als Faktoren strategischer Zielsetzung. Ueberlegungen zu Napoleon Is Feldzug in Russland 1812 (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 1964), p. 13. 3. T.N. Dupuy, Numbers, Predictions and War: Using History to Evaluate Combat Factors and Predict the Outcome of Battles (Fairfax, VA: Hero Books, rev. edition, 1985), pp. 13, 16. 4. Lothar Rendulic, Grundlagen militaeriscber Fuehrung (Herford/Bonn: Maximilian Verlag, 1967), p. 22. 5. Friedrich von Bernhardi, On War of To-Day . Vol. 11: Combat and Conduct of War, translated by Karl Donat (London: Hugh Rees, Ltd., 1913), p. 245. 6. Gustav Daeniker, Raum, Kraft and Zeit in der Militaerischen Kriegfuehrung (Frauenfeld: Verlag von Huber & Co. Aktiengesellschaft, 1944), p. 10. 7. Kurt Zeitzler, "Men and Space in War. A German Problem in World War 11," Military Review 4 (April 1962), p. 87. 8. L.D. Holder, "A New Day for Operational Art," Army 3 (March 1985), p. 44. 9. Daeniker, Raum, Kraft and Zeit in der Militaerischen Kriegfuehrung , p. 34. 10. Ibid., p. 36. 11. Alexander LaRoque, "The Role of Geography in Military Planning," Canadian Army Journal, July 1955. Reprinted in Military Review 2 (February 1956), p. 96. 12. William R. Trotter, Frozen Hell. The Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939-40 (Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin Books, 2000), p. 43. 13. Daeniker, Raum, Kraft and Zeit in der Militaerischen Kriegfuehrung , p. 9. 14. Lothar Rendulic, "Operative Beherrschung des Raumes," Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau i (January 1964), p. 82. 15. Harry Marx, Raum-Zeit-Mittel als Faktoren strategischer Zielsetzung. Ueberlegungen zu Napoleon Is Feldzug in Russland 1812 (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 1964), p. 16 16. Von Tschischwitz, "Der Kulminationspunkt des Angriffes i m Landkrieg," 1st part, Militaerwissenschafiliche Rundschau (Berlin), Vol. 7, No 4, 1942, p. 342-3; ibid., "Der Kulminationspunkt des Angriffes im Landkrieg," 2nd part, Militaerwissenschaftliche Rundschau, Vol. 8, No 1, 1943, p. 23-4. 17. Franz Werb, Raum-Zeit-Mittel als Faktoren Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, February 1965), p. 20.

Strategischer

Zielsetzung

(Hamburg:

18. Dupuy, Ernest and Dupuy, Trevor N., The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 B.C. to the Present (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1986, 2nd rev. edition), pp. 758-9. 19. Werb, Raum-Zeit-Mittel als Faktoren Strategischer Zielsetzung, pp. 14-5, 17.

20. Juergen-Hans Schmidt, "Der Einfluss des Gelaendes auf die Durchfuehrung von Operationen der Landstreitkraefte," Part 1, Wehrwissenschafiliche Rundschau 2 (February 1970), pp. 96-7. 21. Ibid., "Der Einfluss des Gelaendes auf die Durchfuehrung von Operationen der Landstreitkraefte," Part 2, Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau 3 (March 1970), p. 154. 22. Wolf Schenke, "Der Raum als Waffe," Zeitschrift .fuer Geopolitik 9 (September 1938), pp. 705-6. 23. B.H. Liddell Hart, "The Ratio of Troops to Space," Armor 3 (May-June 1960), p. 25. 24. These forces were supported with about 1,500 aircraft (including 600 bombers, 250 ground attack aircraft, and 620 fighters) and one Air Defense Corps of the Luftwaffe; ibid., pp. 25-6; Karl-Heinz Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Le_gende. Der Westfeldzug 1940 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag), pp. 119, 194, 105-6. 25. Liddell Hart, "The Ratio of Troops to Space," p. 27. 26. Ibid., p. 27. 27. Wolf Weth, "Fuehrungsgrundlagen and ihre Bedeutung. Betrachtung ueber einige historische Ereignisse and die moegliche Nutzanwendung der dabei gewonnen Erkentnisse," Wehrkunde 2 (February 1967), p. 67. 28. Zeitzler, "Men and Space in War. A German Problem in World War II," pp. 87-8. 29. Ibid., "Mensch and Raum im Kriege (Ein deutsches Problem im zweiten Weltkrieg)," Wehrkunde 11 (November 1961), p. 565. 30. Ibid., p. 565. 31. Center for Military History, U.S. Army, CMH Pub 104-5: Terrain Factors in the Russian Campaign ( Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1st printed July 1951, facsimile printing 1982, 1986), pp. 6-7. 32. Earl F. Ziemke, "The German Defeat in the East, 1942-45," Military Review 5 (May 1965), p. 33. 33. CMH Pub 104-5: Terrain Factors in the Russian Campaign, pp. 24-5. 34. Neefs, "The German Command on the Western Front in 1944," L'Armee-La Nation, 1 August 1953. Reprinted in Military Review 6 (June 1954), p. 93. 35. Zeitzler, "Men and Space in War. A German Problem in World War II" p. 89. 36. The Germans suffered 250,000 casualties during the fighting; Martin Blumenson, "Sicily and Italy. Why and What for?" Military Review 2 (February 1966), p. 67. 37. Zeitzler, "Men and Space in War. A German Problem in World War II," p. 92. 38. Ibid., "Mensch and Raum im Kriege (Ein deutsches Problem im Zweiten Weltkrieg)," p. 568. 39. Marx, Raum-Zeit-Mittel als Faktoren strategischer Zielsetzung. Ueberlegungen zu Napoleon Is Feldzug in Russland 1812, p. 11.

40. Zeitzler, "Mensch and Raum im Kriege (Ein deutsches Problem im Zweiten Weltkrieg)," p. 569.

41. Keith Simpson, "The German Experience of Rear Area Security on the Eastern Front 1941-45," R. U.S. I. Journal ( London), December 1976, pp. 41-2. 42. Ibid., pp. 44-5. 43. Wilhelm Hauck, "Der Gegenangriff der Hecresgruppe Sued im Fruehjahr 1943," Part 11, Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 9 (September 1962), p. 535; Othmar Hackl, "Operative Fuehrungsproblems der Heeresgruppe Don bzw. Sued bei den Verteidigungsoperationen zwischen Donez and Dnepr im Februar and Maerz 1943," Truppenpraxis 3 (March 1982), p. 198. 44. Headquarters, Department of the Army and the Air Force, FM 34-81: Weather Support For Army Tactical Operations ( Washington, DC: 31 August 1989), p. 4. 45. Hennann Foertsch, The Art of Modern Warfare ; translated by Theodore W. Knauth (New York: Veritas Press, 1940), p. 40. 46. Daeniker, Raum, Kraft and Zeit in der Militaerischen Kriegfuehrung , p. 7. 47. N.

Hanisch, Untersuchen Sic die operatives Ideen Mansteins hinsichtlich Schwerpunktbildting, Ueberraschung, Initiative and IIandlungsfreiheit as den Beispielen Westfeldzug 1940 (Sichelschnitt-Plan) and Operation Zitadelle (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, January 1988), p. 5. 48. Werner Lange, Raum, Zeit and Mittel als Faktoren strategischer Zielsetzung. Ueherlegunges zu Napoleon Is Feldzug is Russland 1812 (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, November 1964), p. 2. 49. Daeniker, Raum, Kraft and Zeit in der Militaerischen Krieafuehrung, p.19. 50. Werb, Raum-Zeit-Mittel als Faktoren Strategischer Zielsetzung, p. 20. 51. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-5 Operations (Washington, DC, 5 May 1986), p. 85. 52. Adapted from Friedrich von Bernhardi, On War of To-Dav , Vol. 11, pp. 224-5. 53. Hans Hannesen, "Militaergeographie," Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau 3 (March 1965), p. 147. 54. Ibid., p. 147; Liddell Hart, "The Ratio of Troops to Space," p. 24. 55. Von Bernhardi, On Conduct of War To-Dav , Vol. 11, p. 365. 56. Wittigo V. Dobschuetz, "Der Faktor Zeit in der Lagebeurteilung," Wehrkunde 11 (November 1970), p. 5 80. 57. Werb, Raw-n- Zeit-Mittel als Faktoren Strategischer Zielsetzung, p. 22. 58. Alfred Philippi and Ferdinand Heim, Der Feldzug Ge en Sowjetrussland 1941 bin 1945. Fin operativer Ueberblick (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1962), p. 34. 59. David Jablonsky, "Strategy and the Operational Level of War: Part I," Parameters, Spring 1987, p. 69. 60. Von Bernhardi, On War To-Dav, Vol. 11, p. 246; Hans-Joachim Schubert, "Mehr Raum, weniger Zeit and Kraefte," Truppenpraxis 5 (May 1995), p. 328. 61. Lange, Raum, Zeit usd Mittel als Faktoren strategischer Zielsetzung. Ueberlegungen zu Napoleon Is Feldzug is Russland 1812, p. 2. 62. Ibid., p. 2.

63. Werb, Raum-Zeit--Mittel als Faktoren Strategischer Zielsetzung, p. 24. 64. Von Bernhardi, On War of To-Day , Vol. 11, pp. 225-6.

Lange, Raum, Zeit and Mittel als Faktoren strategischer Zielsetzung. Ueberlegungen zu Napoleon Is Feldzug in Russland 1812, p. 2. 65.

66. Marx, Raum-Zeit-Mittel als Faktoren strategischer Zielsetzung. Ueberlegungen zu Napoleon Is Feldzug

in Russland 1812, p. 1 3.

67. Daeniker, Raum Kraft and Zeit in der Militaerischen Kriegfuehrung , p.12. 68.

Lange, Raum, Zeit and Mittel als Faktoren strategischer Zielsetzung. Ueberlegungen zu Napoleon Is

Feldzug in Russland 1812, pp. 5-7. 69. Marx, Raum-Zeii-Mittel als Faktoren .strategischer Zielsetzung. Ueberlegungen zu Napoleon Is Feldzug

in Russland 1812, pp. 15-6.

INFORMATION AND OPERATIONAL FACTORS By the word `information' we denote all the knowledge which we have of the enemy and his country, therefore, it is in part the foundation of all our ideas and actions. The commander ... finds himself in a constant whirlpool of false and true information... . Carl von Clausewitz The enormous advances in information technology in recent years have elevated information as a common link among the factors of space, time, and force. The Gulf War of 1 991 is considered to be the first conflict in which information became an operationally significant factor.' Some military theoreticians and practitioners go even further and claim that information has emerged as a fourth factor in addition to the three traditional operational factors. They assert that the exclusive focus on the traditional factors of space, time, and force cannot be justified in the light of new conditions since non-military factors will steadily influence military planning, decision-making, and course and evaluation of military actions. They also believe that information will heavily influence military command and control so that it could be considered the fourth operational factor. There is no argument that information is becoming increasingly critical in the employment of the armed forces as a whole and individual services. It also has a growing role in the relations between armed forces and the public. However, despite its importance, information is not in the same category as the factors of space, time, and force. Modern reconnaissance technology, electronic media, worldwide communications all contribute to the veritable flood of information. 6 The volume of information received cannot be regulated nor can one compensate for the lack of information. Information is also essentially undefinable in any meaningful way, unlike traditional operational factors. Fundamentally, the concept of operational factors rests on the commander's ability to bring into rough balance the definable factors of space, time, and force versus the assigned operational or strategic objective. The balancing means that shortcomings or deficiencies in a factor of space, time, or force is countered by advantages or surplus value of another factor so that the assigned objective can be accomplished. While not a part of the operational factor trinity, information increasingly and profoundly affects the factors of space, time, and force, both individually and in combination. Information is in fact an integral part of each of them because the proper evaluation of forces, space, and time is possible only if based on precise information. 7 On Information: Information is data collected from the environment, processed, and put into a context. Data are facts in a raw state, generated by experience; they become information through filtering or exclusion and the arbitrary drawing of boundaries.

Otherwise, a piece of data is essentially meaningless. Military, business, and personal information differ from one another. Military information deals with actual military developments, intelligence, correspondence, and general activities. In military terms, the main purpose of information is to facilitate the commanders' and their staffs' timely and sound decisions for the employment of one's forces or for use of non-military sources of power. Information is also one of the essential elements of operational command and control and thereby it affects all other operational functions. Operational intelligence is an exception, because information is converted into intelligence after it is collected, processed, integrated, analyzed, evaluated, and interpreted. In general, information must satisfy several requirements to have any value. It is accurate when it depicts a true picture of the situation. It is relevant when applies to the mission, task, or situation at hand. It is timely when it is available in time to make decisions. It is usable when provided in common, easily understood formats and displays. It is complete when all information the decisions-maker needs is presented. Information is precise when it contains the required level of detail. First and foremost, information should be accurate and relevant. Then it should be timely and usable; and finally it should be complete and precise. It is better to have incomplete or imprecise information than none; untimely or unusable information is worthless; and false or irrelevant information is worse than not having any. With the global information network today, almost any information can be transmitted almost instantaneously and at very little cost. The sheer volume of information available makes it extremely hard to distinguish the accurate from the false. Information is voluminous and that volume can fluctuate greatly. Information is received, evaluated, and transmitted to the users. However, the enemy can also take it away without the commander's knowing. It is extremely difficult to know what the enemy knows and when he obtained that knowledge. Information has temporary value and is highly perishable. It can become irrelevant or inaccurate because of events that occurred between the time it was acquired and the time the decision was made. In combat, much information is contradictory or false, and by far the greatest part is of doubtful value. It is difficult to see things correctly because all too often, more credibility is given to bad news than to good news or to what is trivial rather than essential. This, in turn, is one of the greatest sources of friction in war. Information could be good or bad. It could be also obvious but wrong. Bad information is insidious because it looks so much like good information. It is not acquired by an accident, but is usually planted. Moreover, the sources of bad information are increasingly sophisticated, and hard to combat. In science, any claim must be subjected to rigorous and repeated tests to be accepted as the fact. No scientific claim is considered valid simply because it was made by some well-known and respected scientist. However, military information must usually be accepted or rejected without the luxury of time to prove or disprove it. Another problem is that information might contain some accurate data concurrently with misleading or false data. Even worse is information that contains some accurate data, but omits, partially or entirely, other data. This method of presenting information is designed to disguise or obscure a larger truth by partial disclosure. Information could be an assertion based on an opinion, not facts. The information age

could leave us with no information at all but assertions backed with data, but without being properly interpreted and put into context. There is a significant difference between information and knowledge, but very often the two are confused. Knowledge is information after it has been subjected to analysis, generalization, and utilization by application and abstraction. Sometimes, what is knowledge is not informative and what is informative is not knowledge. The real danger is to focus on knowledge as a commodity instead of as a dynamic phenomenon to be improved. People obsessed with facts and figures assume that knowledge can be somehow put in the form of a slide show; they neglect the more subtle but vitally important forms of tacit knowledge in general and collective tacit knowledge, in particular. Information has always been a source of power, but the information age is making it increasingly a source of confusion. The greatest problem today is not the shortage of knowledge, but orientation. We are often confused today, not necessarily ignorant. In the information era, new facts are constantly discovered. Because of the pressure of technology, there is a tendency to consider all problems as problems of not knowing. However, the meaningful questions cannot be answered with information. To use more and more knowledge means to collect more and more information. The result will be to have too much information, poorly integrated or not integrated at all. The more information, the less its acceptance. The veritable flood of information today increases one's uncertainty about one's own opinion. 8 There is also a big difference between beliefs and knowledge. Untested beliefs, even when commonly held, differ from facts and are, in essence, opinions that may prove to be wrong. Decisions based upon beliefs instead of facts are always risky. Understanding is achieved by using judgment to give knowledge relevance within a specific situational context. The more nebulous and difficult transformation of knowledge into wisdom comes from a deep understanding of concepts and systems, relationships, interactions, and their integration. Information and the Factor of Space: The factor of space was expanded by the full emergence of the fourth dimension cyberspace. The operational commander today can reliably, and when necessary continuously, communicate with increasingly dispersed forces in the theater. Information could be transmitted and received globally not only within a given theater or area of operations but also hundreds and thousands of miles outside the boundaries where one's own and enemy forces are in contact. News of military actions are broadcast in real time, or near-real time, to friends, neutrals, and enemies alike. The global information environment already had, and will continue to have, a profound impact on geopolitics, economics and military activities in general and operations. Numerous sources of information generated not only by government, but also non-government organizations and private volunteer groups are available in huge quantities. The more the country relies on information, the more vulnerable is its economy and society to disruption, or even paralysis by actions of hostile governments or groups harboring grievances or outright hostility to one's way of life. The huge increase not only in volume, but also in accuracy and speed of information on all the aspects of the situation in the theater has great potential for policymakers and operational commanders in both crisis prevention and armed conflict. It is always critical to have a clear, timely, comprehensive, and accurate picture of the key 97

elements of the situation in the theater, specifically, as to society, economy, infrastructure, civilian information systems, and transportation network and traffic. Information could facilitate the task of the political leadership to prevent crises and be used for preventive political and diplomatic activities. 9 New information technologies allow operational commanders and their staffs to have much more detailed and accurate information on all aspects of the physical space than they had in the past. This is a critical element in the commander's estimate, planning, and execution of a campaign or major operation. Full knowledge of climate and weather is critical for the employment of precise ammunition. Knowledge of weather is also essential for the timing of the start of a campaign or major operation. In the past, effective reconnaissance and surveillance depended on clear weather. Now, new precision munitions can be used in all kinds of weather, and reconnaissance and surveillance can be conducted through clouds and in darkness. 1° However, as the example of the Kosovo Conflict of 1999 shows, advanced weather forecasting techniques are of little use if the commanders and their staff do not pay attention to all aspects of weather and climate in planning and executing a campaign or major operation. Planning and conducting major operations, and campaigns in particular, is considerably affected by non-military aspects of space, specifically foreign and domestic politics, diplomacy, economic activity, society, and other types of human activity. Information has an increasingly greater influence on forming public opinion in open societies. Oppressive governments cannot ensure control of the flow of information. This gives their domestic or external opponents greater opportunities to undermine their control over the population. However, in the recent past, dictatorial or authoritarian regimes were quite successful in ensuring their stay in power by controlling the flow and content of information among the populace. In many poor countries, the majority of the population, especially in the countryside, relies on radio or TV as their main source of information. Until his defeat in the September 2000 elections, Mr. Milosevic and his regime ensured support of the majority of the Serbian population through their almost total control of the electronic media. Western governments falsely believed that Mr. Milosevic's days in power were numbered because they gave too much credence to his opponents among the intelligentsia in the capital of Belgrade and other big cities. However, his major source of support was the poorly educated population living in small towns and villages. Public perception of an operation may matter more than the correlation of forces on the ground, as the examples of Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia show. In a media-intense environment, politicians and the public have become very unforgiving of even minor mistakes and transgressions; therefore even the smallest aspect of military operations must now be planned with sensitivity to the public perception of the situation.'' Information has great potential to transform society by affecting the forms of commercial organization and social control, and generating wealth. Information is also becoming increasingly critical for the country's economic competitiveness. Instantaneous global communications and rapid, cheap transportation are creating less hierarchical, more flexible commercial organizations. The emerging networked organizations possess significant advantages over more traditional hierarchical forms of organizations. They are generally less vulnerable to hostile, disabling attacks intended to seriously disrupt their functioning or even make them completely useless. Lack of central control nodes in

networked organizations, as well as their physical dispersion and numerous interconnections, makes these organizations very difficult to destroy. At the same time, new communications technologies will allow these organizations to coordinate actions successfully over vast distances. 1 2 In contrast, traditional organizations are incapable of quick, flexible responses because of their high degree of centralized decision-making. Information and the Factor of Time: The rapid development of technology has considerably increased the significance of the factor of time and information. The side that wins the struggle for time and has an information advantage and reaction dominance would be in a situation to surprise the enemy and to obtain the initiative. Information dominance is the principal aim to ensure advantage in terms of time and achieving freedom of action. 1 3 New information technologies allow a significant and, in some cases drastic reduction of time needed to plan, prepare, and execute military actions. Time to respond to aggression, to alert one's forces and move them to their deployment or concentration area, is also much compressed. However, what is technologically possible it is not necessarily applied in practice. The political leadership might vacillate, delay, and restrict the employment of one's forces, as NATO's leadership did in the Kosovo Conflict of 1999, so that the operational commanders cannot act quickly and decisively, despite the availability of modern information technologies. Information allows a dramatic reduction of time in making decisions and time required for planning. The time it takes to recognize and understand a situation or change in the situation, and to identify and evaluate various courses of action is also potentially reduced. The time necessary to establish and equip one's forces is generally shorter today than it was in the past, because modern information systems can rapidly read the enemy's force deployments and movements. 1 4 The commanders have the ability to operate in real or near-real time. In the Gulf War of 1990-1991, General Norman Schwarzkopf, the U.S. Central Command CINC, reportedly was able to observe in near-real time, orient in minutes, decide in hours, and act the same day. 1 5 The ever-greater speed of acquiring and transmitting information will tighten decision cycles and dramatically accelerate the tempo of combat. A message that took more than an hour to send in 1991 takes less than a second to send today. 16 Until the late 1980s, reconnaissance was conducted by manned aircraft or ground patrols. Their data were plotted on maps for intelligence experts' analysis. Hours at best, more likely days or weeks, could elapse before critical information was sufficiently processed to be forwarded to aircraft in the air or soldiers in the field; this did not substantially change until 1989. 1 Five days before the Iraqi probing attack at Al-Khafji on 30 January 1991, an experimental U.S. Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (J-STARS) aircraft and various unmanned aerial vehicles detected two Iraqi divisions when they were some fifty miles north of the Kuwaiti border. Their information was passed to AWACS aircraft, which afterward used J-STARS for targeting information. Coalition aircraft were called in and destroyed fifty-eight of seventy-one Iraqi armored vehicles. 19 This success highlighted the role of information warfare. These systems existed before but had never before been so effectively networked and used to such devastating effect. 20 Today, the fusion of all-source intelligence with the integration of sensors, platforms, command organizations, and logistic support centers potentially allows more tasks to be accomplished faster.

In conduct of information operations, one of the key prerequisites for achieving information dominance is to always have the initiative and react swiftly to any information the adversary might try to use to influence public opinion at home and abroad. During the recent Kosovo Conflict, NATO's information superiority was more myth than reality. Reportedly, NATO's information processing was too slow to take the full advantage of advanced airborne surveillance and reconnaissance sensors to strike mobile targets. The time for transmitting information from EC-130 aircraft to NATO's Combined Air Operations Center at Vicenza, Italy was too long. Also, NATO was constantly on the defensive in the war for public opinion partly because of its rigid adherence to the daily briefing held every day at 1500 at SHAPE in Mons. This rigidity gave unnecessarily great advantage in time to Serbian officials who usually told their side of the story at 0600 each morning. 22 Information and the Factor of Force: Information obtained from the military information infrastructure (MII) is an integral part of the factor force. However, the operational commander also uses non-military information acquired from the global information infrastructure (GII). Information includes not only intelligence and reconnaissance but also diverse information, such as media, that affect morale, discipline, unit cohesion, and combat motivation. Information also affects morale of the population and hence, the country's will to fight. These directly or indirectly influence political leadership and the operational commander. Thereby, information is always present as one of the most important considerations in making strategic or operational decisions. Only with better and more timely information is it possible for the operational commander to make sound decisions in combat. More capable systems for command and control allow one to obtain, transmit, evaluate, and present actual information faster. The struggle for the information advantage is a problem, not only of relations with the media, but also of obtaining and then maintaining information dominance over the adversary. The information age allows the commanders at all levels to obtain diverse information unprecedented in quantity and quality. The operational commander by using a mix of military and commercial information technologies can acquire an accurate and timely picture of the situation in the theater and thereby obtain a decisive advantage over his opponent. The more accurate the picture, the smaller the likelihood that the enemy can achieve surprise. The operational commander's decision timelines are also increased . 23 Modern information technology has also greatly improved the operational commander's knowledge about locations and the movements of his own and enemy forces. Information plays an essential role in command and control of forces. Once hostilities start, the commanders must be able to adjust their plans, exploiting opportunities and limiting vulnerabilities. 24 Modern information technologies considerably improve the operational commander's ability to command and control. The beginnings of what is called the common operating picture for the commanders at all levels of command are becoming a reality. Wide-area communications are greatly improved; garbled or incomplete information is being replaced by standardized message sets that offer less chance for confusion or ambiguity. 25 Information is generated in the course of reducing uncertainty so that decisions can be made. Information allows the commander's decision execution cycle to function and gives direction to the forces' actions to accomplish their mission. Without accurate, 100

relevant, and timely information, it is difficult to make a sound decision. Despite all the technological advances at the disposal of military commanders, the danger of being ignorant of the actions of one's own and enemy forces are still considerable. The aim of commanders at all levels is to shorten their own decision cycle to such a degree that the enemy does not act but is always forced to react or not to react at all. The essential factor is speed, and higher speed is not only a matter of technology but also of the operational commander's mental agility and ability to act decisively and boldly. Operational commanders must be able to properly estimate the situation in a given theater and make timely decisions about how and where to best use the forces available. Once these choices have been made, directives are issued. The value of wide-area surveillance capabilities is apparent. 26 The operational commander must evaluate the use of information not only as a receiver, but also in terms of an achievable objective. Information probably has the greatest single effect on the deployment and logistics of one's forces. More accurate and timely information allows the operational commander to plan, prepare, and execute much more effective phasing of one's forces in the theater than in the past. The real or near-real time knowledge of the status of all aspects of logistics in the theater greatly facilitates planning and execution of logistics support and sustainment. Massive amounts of supplies of all kinds are required to fight high-intensity conflicts with multiservice or multinational forces. The commercial techniques and procedures could be used for the real-time knowledge of positions and destination of critical supplies . 27 Modern information technology can provide deploying units access to the latest intelligence and information in the theater and the logistics data for follow-on units. During the planning and execution of the operation, selection of forces and assets to be employed must be evaluated, not only in terms of their military suitability and purposefulness, but also in terms of the possible political consequences. Sometimes, a tactical success accomplished with unsuitable forces in a sensitive area or at a wrong time can endanger or even doom the accomplishment of entire major operation. 29 Potential adverse effects of NATO peacekeeping forces in Bosnia on local and international public opinion led NATO and the U.S. Army to establish a joint information bureau at the outset of the peacekeeping operation to coordinate their response to breaking events and to counter misinformation. The bureau provides daily advice to the division commander and works closely with the operations, intelligence, and civil affairs elements . 29 During the Kosovo Conflict of 1999, NATO performed poorly in conduct of information operations. Despite so much vaunted information superiority on the part of the Allies, the Serbs were reportedly able to use civilian telephone links and radio links to pass military information. However, the problem was not as much as technology, but the human element. There was a limited pool of some key personnel, specifically specialists for intelligence analysis, targeting, and language translators. Intelligence analysis was inadequate, resulting in a poorer than expected intelligence picture of the battlefield. NATO's battlefield awareness was manipulated by the Serbs all too often. This resulted in poor targeting, air strikes wasted and inadequate battle damage assessment (BDA). 3o In mobile warfare, it is critically important to deny the enemy an accurate picture of the situation in the theater. Improved information capabilities increase the operational commander's ability to know the location and movement of the enemy's force. These capabilities could provide vital clues about the enemy commander's intent. While

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space-based sensors can provide nearly constant coverage of many of the military activities of potential opponents, this capability is still not perfect . 3 1 The operational commander's knowledge about the enemy's dispositions could greatly help in selecting the appropriate course of action. Similarly, knowing where the enemy will attack allows the operational commander to carry out timely strikes against the enemy's forces or prepare timely counter-concentration or counter-maneuver in the concentration area. Information on the disposition of one's forces will be rapidly and accurately disseminated and portrayed through the use of digital technology reporting, voice, data, i magery-and potentially could provide reliable signal support and accurate and timely collection, processing, dissemination, and display of one's own and enemy situations. This will allow the operational commander to see and communicate throughout the battlefield or battlespace; the commander will be able to clearly communicate his intent and concept of operations throughout the chain of command. Targeting information extends beyond the theater and involves more than just attacking the enemy's flow of information while protecting one's own. It requires an awareness of, and sensitivity to, non-military sources of information. Non-military sources can provide tactical level information in near-real time to worldwide audiences. 32 Another aspect of information is cooperation with the media. Military leaders at all levels must be aware that in the information age, all military events and actions are exposed through the media and could considerably affect both public opinion and the employment of forces. Conclusion: Information increasingly affects, sometimes profoundly, all three traditional operational factors. Its effect on the factor of space is growing, particularly on the political, diplomatic, economic, and social aspects of the situation. This has already had some significant consequences on the use of military forces for the accomplishment of operational and strategic objectives in the theater. Information not only affects, but also is an integral part of the factor of space. It is there where the greatest changes are occurring today. Not only the military but also the global information infrastructure is a source of information for the operational commander. The significant potential of modern information technologies is to provide the operational commander with an accurate, relevant, and timely picture of the situation, regardless of the time of the day or the weather. Modern information technologies are quite an advantage in obtaining information on the physical aspects of the situation in the theater. However, what really counts the most at the operational and strategic levels, is to have accurate, relevant, and timely information on the unquantifiable aspects of the situation. Specifically, the operational commander cannot make a sound decision without knowledge of the skills and personality traits of his counterpart, his intentions and possible reactions, morale and discipline, unit cohesion, state of training, and soundness of doctrine. Information technologies obtain this information in only a limited way. Even with a totally accurate picture of the theater, that advantage rapidly dissipates once the forces are in combat. There are always differences, sometimes quite significant ones, between expectations and reality; things rarely develop as planned. The Clausewitizian concept of the fog of war and friction will complicate the operational commander's ability to have a clear and accurate picture of the theater at all times. There will always be areas of uncertainty, not only on the enemy's but also on one's forces. The operational commander and his subordinates might be too optimistic or too pessimistic in their 102

assessment of the situations. This, in turn, would lead to unsound decisions. Uncertainties and ambiguities always tend to exaggerate one's own problems. One's forces are rarely as strong in reality as they are in the commander's mind. There are always difficulties in keeping one's forces supplied. Today, a military action could be militarily sound but politically unacceptable because of the real or imagined pressure of the public opinion. Thus, some actions planned or in progress could be abruptly abandoned, causing delays or confusion in the ranks. Friction is also caused by the accumulation of chance errors, unexpected difficulties of all kinds, fear, misinterpretation of clearly written orders or unclear and ambiguous orders, and plain incompetence. Friction could be overcome somewhat by making decisions without waiting for complete information; otherwise the opportunity might be lost. The value of information should not be underestimated, but it should also not be exaggerated either. The sheer complexity and volume of information relationships are increasing and will have a decisive impact on the outcome of a campaign or major operation. Yet, information should properly be considered as an aid to, not the master of, the operational commanders and their staffs. As in the past, the human element will dominate the conduct of war as long as the war is the clash of human wills.

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Notes 1. Juergen Weigt, "Gezeitenwechsel. Kriegfuehrung an der Schweelle zum 21. Jahrhundert," Truppenpraxis/Wehrausbildung 1 (January 1995), p. 7. 2. Christian Millotat, "Operative Ueberlegungen fuer das deutsche Heer in der gegenwaertigen Sicherheitslage," Oestcrreichische Militaerische Zeitschrift 1 (January February 1996), p. 59. 3. Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, "Operative Leitlinie fuer die Fuehrung von Landstreitkraeften," October 1993, Arbeitspapier "Operative Fuehrung" (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, August 1992), p. 3. 4. Peter Kraska, "Operative Leitlinie 1994," Trupenpraxis 5 (May 1994), p. 416. 5. Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, Arbeitspapier "Operative Fuehrung" (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, August 1992), p. 3. 6. Kraska, "Operative Leitlinie 1994," p. 416. 7. Inspector General, Operative Leitlinie fuer Einsaetze der Streitkraefte (OpLESK) Bundesministerium der Bundeswehr, 20 August 1999), p. 7.

(Bonn:

8. Norbert Bolz, "Wirklichkeit Ohne Gewaehr," Der Spiegel, 26 June 2000, pp. 130-1. 9. Karl Ernst Strachwitz, "Wissen ist Macht," Truppenpraxis/Wehraubildung 9 (September 1996), pp. 581-2. 10. Edward Harschberger and David Ochmanek, "Information and Warfare: New Opportunities for U.S. Military Forces," Zalmay M. Khalilzad and John P. White, editors, Strategic Appraisal. The Changing Role of Information in Warfare (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1999), p. 168. 11. Jeremy Shapiro, "Information and War: Is It a Revolution?" Zalmay M. Khalilzad and John P. White, editors, Strategic Appraisal. The Changing Role of Information in Warfare (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1999), pp. 124-5. 12. Ibid., p. 119. 13. Reimar Scherz and Theodor Hodouschek, "Kampf um Zeit and Information. Die Digitalisierung des Gefechtsraumes-Der Ansatz des deutschen Heeres," Truppenpraxis/Wehrausbildung 11 (November 1999), p. 75 1. 14. Stuart E. Johnson, "DBK: Opportunity and Challenges," in ibid., and Martin C. Libicki, editors, Dominant Battlespace Knowledge ( Washington, DC: National Defense University, rev. ed., April 1996), p. 19. 15. Michael D. Starry, "FM 100-6: Information Operations," Military Review 4 (November-December 1996), p. 3. 16. Jim Katzman, "Short Path to the Future," Air Force News Service, 1 3 September 1996. 17. Ryan Henry and C. Edward Peartree, "Military Theory and Information Warfare," Parameters, Autumn 1998, p. 128. 18. Shapiro, "Information and War: Is It a Revolution?" p. 113.

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19. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The General's War. The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), p. 267. 20. Shapiro, "Information and War: Is It a Revolution?" p. 113. 21. Timothy L. Thomas, "Kosovo and the Current Myth of Information Superiority," Parameters, Spring 2000, p. 15. 22.

Klaus Naumann, "Der Gewalt nicht nacbgeben. Erfahrungen aus dem Kosovo-Einsatz,"

Truppenpraxis/Wehrausbildung 11 (November 1999), p. 74 1.

23. Harschberger and Ocbmanek, "Information and Warfare: New Opportunities for U.S. Military Forces," p. 165. 24. Manuel W. Wik, "Mobilization for a new era," Information Warfare Conference, Royal Danish Defence College, 16 November 1998, p. 8. 25. Harschberger and Ochmanek, "Information and Warfare: New Opportunities for U.S. Military Forces," p. 167. 26. Ibid., p. 168. 27. Ibid., pp. 166-7. 28. Kraska, "Operative Leitlinie 1994," p. 416. 29. Shapiro, "Information and War: Is It a Revolution?" p. 125. 30. Thomas, "Kosovo and the Current Myth of Information Superiority," pp. 13, 15. 31. Harschberger and Ochmanek, "Information and Warfare: New Opportunities for U.S. Military Forces," pp. 163-11. 32. Starry, "FM 100-6: Information Operations," pp. 4-5. 33. Inspector General, Operative Leitlinie fuer Einsaetze der Streitkraefte (OpLESK), p. 8.

10 5

Part III: THE THEATER

THEATER ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE A given space must be militarily organized to ensure the most favorable conditions for the employment of one's forces across the entire spectrum of conflict, from peacetime competition to high-intensity war. Military organization of space is primarily based on the objectives to be accomplished in time of hostility. The size and mix of forces and assets required to accomplish the largest military objective in time of war dictates the size and predominant physical features of a theater in which combat would take place. The structure of a conventional three-dimensional theater, to which the new fourth dimension-cyberspace-must be added, consists of theaters of operations, areas of operations, and combat zones or sectors (see Figure 5). The larger the assigned military objectives, the larger the force, and, therefore, the larger the physical environment required to deploy, concentrate, and maneuver the force, and the larger the infrastructure needed to support the employment of one's forces. The theater and its subdivisions are the very basis for establishing and maintaining tactical, operational, and strategic levels of command or command echelons. The battlefield is part of the conventional three-dimensional space, while the new and increasingly used term, battlespace, also includes cyberspace. However, both of these terms pertain to the tactical level of war and are not subdivisions of the militarily organized space.

Origins: The concept of theater evolved in the nineteenth century with the introduction of general conscription, the advent of mass armies, and the cumulative effects of technological advances (steam engine, railway, undersea cable, telephone, wireless radio, etc.). Consequently, the command organization had to encompass an ever-larger part of the theater. General Baron Henri Antoine de Jomini was one of the first theoreticians who defined the then emerging concepts of the theater of war and theater of operations. , The theater-like commands were established by both sides in all but name during the American Civil War (1861-1865) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). In World War I, Germany and the Allies established what amounted to rudimentary theater commands on the Western and Eastern fronts, respectively. In the late nineteenth century, the German and Austrian theoreticians considered theater of war [Kriegstheater] to encompass the entire geographic space in which armies of the countries in war could face each other. In case of alliances, the theater of war extended to the territories of all the members. 2 A theater of war was divided by terrain into several theaters of operations [Kriegschauplaetz]. Each of the latter, if divided by terrain and running parallel to each other, consisted of several areas of operations [ Operationsschauplatz]. These, in turn, were divided into two parts through natural obstacles-sea, mountains, rivers, or boundaries of neutral states. 3 Each area of operations, when cut perpendicularly by terrain, encompassed a field of operations [Operationsfeld] or a combat zone (or sector) in today's terms.4 Before the outbreak of World War 11, major armies and navies used the theater of war and associated terms extensively. However, there was no commonly accepted definition of the theater (of war). The establishment of the theaters of war was envisaged in case of a general conflict. The Germans in the late 1930s defined theater of operations as the area in which a campaign is conducted. The prevalent view in the German military was that the theater commands should be established only in wartime, because it is not possible to envisage the scope and course of a war in peacetime. In the U.S. military, the terms theater of war and theater of operations were widely understood and used in war planning before the outbreak of World War 11. Some of the definitions used were too broad and imprecise to be of any practical value' World War 11 and Its Aftermath: During World War 11, the major belligerents established a number of land or maritime theater commands. The only exception was Japan, where the area armies and the separate area fleets were the principal command echelons operating in a major part of the theater. The British proposed, on 28 December 1 941, the establishment of the first combined theater in World War II. The draft of the proposed Allied organization envisaged the establishment of the southwestern Pacific theater (of war) to be designated the Far Eastern Command. It provisionally encompassed Malaya and Burma in the west, to the Philippines in the east and southward to the necessary supply bases (principally Port Darwin, Australia) and supply lines in northern Australia. The British General Earl Wavell was designated Supreme Commander with headquarters in Surabaya (later at Lembang), Java. Initially, this command was subdivided into five subordinate areas (Burma, Singapore and Malaya, Netherlands East Indies, Philippines, and the Southern Communications (via the South Pacific and North Australia), each headed by a Commander in Chief. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and the British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill approved the British draft proposal on 1 January 1942. The final boundaries of the Far Eastern Command, later changed to 110

ABDA (American-British-Dutch-Australian) Command, were finally settled at the first Washington Conference (Arcadia) in January 1942. The new boundaries encompassed a large area of the Pacific and the ABDA Area Command was activated on 15 January, but disbanded on 25 February because of the rapid advance of the Japanese into the area. The Japanese advance in the Pacific and South Asia area led the U.S. and the British Chiefs of Staffs to redistribute their strategic areas of responsibility in early 1942. The British were responsible for defending the Indian Ocean, India, Burma, the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, Libya, and the Mediterranean. The entire Pacific Ocean was declared the U.S. strategic responsibility on 4 April 1942. 9 In August 1943 the British divided their East Indies Command into two separate theaters, India and the Southeast Asia Command (SEAC). The latter theater encompassed Burma, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), the Malay Peninsula, and Sumatra (see Map A-2).'o The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) was directed to divide the Pacific theater in two-what, in practical terms, comprisedtheaters of war: the Pacific Ocean Area (POA), commanded by Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, and the Southwest Pacific Area (SOWESPAC), led by General Douglas MacArthur (see Map A-3)." In contrast, in an effort to better coordinate military efforts to neutralize the German threat to their maritime trade, the Allies did not agree to formally establish a supreme commander for the entire Atlantic Ocean. The Atlantic area remained divided into two ocean areas (theaters of operations in today's terms): Western Approaches, Northwest Atlantic Command controlled by British and Canadian commanders, respectively. In addition, the U.S. Tenth Fleet was established to conduct convoy escort duties.' The German Wehrmacht never established anything similar to the Allied theater structure, and their highest commands underwent great and frequent changes during the war. A number of supreme commanders (or CINCs) were appointed in all secondary theaters and based in a specific geographic area (e.g., Supreme Commander West, South, and Southeast, etc., or specific occupied country or group of countries). After 1942, the German Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht issued orders to theater commanders. The exception was the Eastern Front, where the High Command of the Army retained responsibility. Hitler, who wanted to be in charge of running the war alone, never appointed a supreme commander for that principal theater of war.' 3 The concept of the theater of operations also evolved in the nineteenth century. Baron de Jomim defined a theater of operations as ".. . all the territory upon which the parties may assail each other, whether it belong to themselves, their allies, or to weaker states that may embrace both hemispheres." He thought that the "theater of war could be undefined, and must not be confounded with the theater of operations of one or the other army ."' 4 In the American Civil War, both the Union and Confederate forces established what amounted to theaters of operations almost from the outset of the hostilities. The Union forces were usually organized into a number of "departments" encompassing territories of a given state. As the war progressed, new departments were created and the old ones dissolved or combined into a single department. A separate command was established in March 1862 encompassing army troops of Ohio, Kansas, and Missouri departments with headquarters at St. Louis. The unified command of the West was established in October 1863 when the departments of Ohio, Tennessee, Cumberland, and Arkansas were merged into the Military Divisions of the Mississippi under General Ulysses Grant. This command was abolished at the end of June 1865.' 5 Confederate

I ll

troops were organized into "districts" or "armies," raised on the territorial basis. The Georgia District, established in May 1862, encompassed departments of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. The Gulf District, created in July 1862, encompassed all the territory east of Pearl River to the Appalachiola and as far north as 32°. ' 6 In World War II, theaters of operations were established in almost all theaters as part of the respective theaters of war. The JCS, on 30 March 1942, directed that the Pacific Ocean be subdivided into four "areas" (theaters of operations today): the Southern, Southeastern, Central, and Northern Area. In each of these areas there was a single strategic objective to be accomplished. Initially, Admiral Nimitz controlled the Northern, Central, and Southern Pacific Areas. Later the JCS directed him to appoint a separate commander for Southern Pacific Area (SOPAC). Likewise, the Allies divided the "Atlantic & European Theater" (of war) into the European and the Mediterranean theaters of operations. A major part of eastern part of the Southern Atlantic and a major part of Africa were part of the Middle East & Central Africa Theater. 1 7 In the aftermath of World War II, the Allies dissolved most of the then existing theaters of war and theaters of operations. The United States retained the theater structure in peacetime to facilitate preparation and transition to war if it breaks out. The U.S. outline command plan of 1946, put into effect a year later, envisaged the establishment of six theater commands: Far East (FECOM), Pacific (PACOM), Alaskan (ALCOM), Northeast (NELM), Caribbean (CARIBCOM), and European Command (EUCOM). 1 8 Since then, some geographically based theater commands have been dissolved, others transformed, and their boundaries redrawn. The principle of establishing theater command in peacetime, instead in the event of national emergency or war, has been maintained by the U.S. military ever since the end of World War It. During the Cold War, the Soviets developed a highly structured view of military organization of space. They created a number of military theaters (TVs) or in generic terms theaters of war, each consisting of several theaters of'military actions (TVD) or theaters of operations (see Map A-4). A TVD was defined as the land area of a continent (plus its marginal seas, its enclosed seas, and the airspace above them) or the area of an ocean (plus its islands, its coastal areas, and the airspace above them) within whose boundaries military actions could be carried out by "groupings" of armed forces. The boundaries of a TVD were determined by the country's military-political leadership or the leadership of a state coalition. 1 9 Theater (of War): A theater is a geographic area of significant size that contains several potential strategic objectives. In case of a war or national emergency, the theater would be transformed into a theater of war. The national or alliance political-military leadership normally determines the boundaries of the theater. An area of influence is an undefined area of land and sea or ocean, and the airspace above them that extends beyond the boundaries of a given theater, but in which the commander can directly influence actions by using maneuver or fires. That area would vary depending on the capabilities of his forces, principally their mobility and the effective range at which they project fires. In addition, the area of interest (AI) encompasses adjacent geographic areas where political, military, economic, or other developments have an effect within a given theater. It might also extend to the areas enemy forces occupy that may endanger the accomplishment of one's mission. In practical terms, the area of interest determines the maximum scope of

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intelligence-gathering activities for the theater command. Today, a theater (of war) also encompasses the pertinent parts of the cyberspace. Continental and maritime theaters of war are differentiated by their predominant physical features. In each type of theater, all services may be employed; therefore, the theater commands are inherently joint in character, and often combined. A continental or laud theater is usually established to control a major part of the continental landmass and its associated airspace; it is considered vital to a nation or group of nations. Military actions in a land theater of war may range from the defense of another nation-state against subversion, lawlessness, or insurgency to the major operations and campaigns aimed at the destruction of an enemy's armed forces . 2° A subset of continental theaters are littoral theaters-areas along large peninsulas requiring integrated and synchronized operations of land, sea, and air forces. An example of such a theater, was the Arabian Peninsula during the Gulf War of 1990-1991. A maritime theater encompasses the entire surface of a given ocean or sea, including the subsurface area, adjacent littoral areas, islands, archipelagoes, and the airspace above. It is established to ensure free use of the seas and the associated airspace both for the forward defense of the nation and for strategic reach to resources, friends, and enemies. Military actions in a maritime theater may vary from limited use of forces for peacekeeping and nation-assistance, to major operations meant to destroy or neutralize an enemy's naval forces, to major joint operations to control the principal land areas. 21 In a general conflict, or in the case of two or more local conflicts, one theater of war will be selected as the primary theater of war, while all others will be secondary. Normally, the primary theater of war is also called the "theater of main effort." 22 Such a theater will receive the highest priority in regard to the assignment of forces and resources while a secondary theater of war will get lower priority. 23 In World War 11, for Western Allies the European Theater was the primary theater of war, while the Pacific was the secondary theater. For the Germans, the Eastern Front was the primary theater after June 1941, while all other theaters were secondary in terms of forces employed and other resources. Based on the extent and capabilities of the supporting infrastructure, theaters are differentiated as developed or undeveloped. As the term implies, a developed (or mature) theater has infrastructure fully prepared to support one's forces operating within its boundaries. A mature theater can sustain the initial phase of anticipated combat actions, involving generally: sophisticated enemy ground, air, and air-defense threats; forwarddeployed forces; an extensive transportation infrastructure; and significant host-nation support. An undeveloped (or immature) theater has inadequate infrastructure to provide the support required by combat forces deployed there. Such a theater cannot sustain the initial phase of anticipated major operations or campaigns because of: limited, or no forward-deployed forces; limited transportation infrastructure; and inadequate host-nation support. Theater of Operations: In generic terms, a theater of operations (TOO) is a land or sea area and the airspace above it established to employ one's forces to neutralize a strategic threat to the national or alliance/coalition interests. The nation's highest politico-military leadership and the respective theater (of war) commander would designate a part of the theater as the theater of operations in case of a major regional conflict, while the other 1 13

parts of the theater remain in a peacetime status, as was the case in the Gulf War of 1990-1991. In a national emergency or general conflict, a theater of war could be subdivided into several theaters of operations. The principal reason for that division would be a strategic threat for national or alliance interests in a given theater. The theater of operations could also be established in case of a major counter-insurgency effort. Boundaries of a theater of operations are arbitrarily determined and expressed in terms of longitude and latitude or some distinctive geographic feature of the area. In contrast to a theater of war, the boundaries of a theater of operations are not identical for both sides in a conflict. A given theater of operations must be of such a size as to allow deployment and maneuver of one's forces and to accommodate a sufficiently large base of operations and supporting infrastructure to accomplish the assigned strategic objective. Therefore, the size of a theater of operations may vary greatly. In a potential conflict on the Korean Peninsula, the United States and its allies would probably declare the entire peninsula with the adjacent waters, Japan home islands, and possibly the Ryukyus, as a theater of operations. The rest of the Pacific Command (PACOM) would most likely remain in a peacetime status. Sometimes, declared boundaries of a theater of operations differ from those in practice due to political considerations, as was the case in the Gulf War of 1990-1991.24 In practice, the area from which combat actions originated or were conducted encompassed almost the entire Arabian Peninsula with the adjacent seas and part of the Indian Ocean, Iraq, and part of Turkey and the eastern part of the Mediterranean (these two last areas were formally a part of the EUCOM), while the rest of the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) was unchanged. In the Kosovo Conflict of 1999, NATO decided, probably due to political considerations, not to declare Serbia and adjacent land and sea area and associated airspace, a theater of operations. Area of Operations: Based on the physical objectives or geographic features of the area, a theater of operations can be further formally subdivided into several areas of operations (AOs). Normally, a higher commander assigns an area of operations to a subordinate commander. AO is the conventional three-dimensional volume of physical space with clearly delineated boundaries. In generic terms, an AO contains a single physical operational objective whose accomplishment would usually require the employment of several combat arms of a single or several services. The size of an AO varies, but must be large enough for the subordinate commander to accomplish his mission and to protect his forces. 25 An AO has designated lateral and rear boundaries. On land, boundaries of an area of operations might require frequent adjustments based on actual and projected rate of maneuver and the operational environment. Sometimes, boundaries of an area of operations might be informally drawn. In a major operation, most combat usually takes place in a given area of operations, while forces are deployed and redeployed over a large part of the theater. In the Battle of Midway on 4-6 June 1942, almost all combat took place within the 700-mile circle (range of U.S. air patrols) around the island of Midway. However, deployment of the Japanese and the U.S. naval forces encompassed a large part of the Northern Pacific, including the Japanese Home Islands, the Kurils, the Marianas, Wake Island, Johnston Island, Hawaii, and the U.S. West Coast. In generic terms, land, maritime, and air area of operations are differentiated. A land area of operations normally encompasses part of the theater in which a major land operation is conducted. Normandy in June 1944 could be considered as land area of 1 14

operations for the Allied forces. A maritime area of 'operations includes a sea or ocean area with the adjacent coastal area and islands, and airspace above it in which a major naval operation is conducted. Such an area could also be established for routine patrols and other tactical actions in wartime and aimed to protect and defend a certain part of the coast and its seaward approaches. The Japanese Southwest Area Fleet, with headquarters in Manila, the Philippines, assigned in May 1942 to its three Expeditionary Fleets a separate maritime area of operations to defend. A maritime area of operations could also be established by declaring a blockading zone, as the Iraqis and the Iranians did in their war in 1980-1988. It could, de facto, exist if one or both sides in a conflict formally declare a maritime exclusion zone (MEZ) or total exclusion zone (TEZ), expressed in miles from a certain geographic reference point; the British and the Argentines did this during the Falklands/Malvinas conflict of 1982. In other cases, one or the other side in a conflict may declare a war zone at sea or ocean, within which any enemy vessel is liable to attack; the Israelis and the Egyptians and Syrians did this in the eastern part of the Mediterranean in October 1973. Each of these areas was delineated by a longitude, latitude, and part of the coastline and could be considered, in generic terms, a maritime area of operations. An air area of operations can be declared to coincide with land or maritime area of operations. The areas of operations for the German 1 st, 6th, and 4th Air Fleets in 1942 roughly coincided with boundaries on the ground between Army Group North, Center, and South, respectively. If the air force is given a more or less independent mission from other services, then a separate air area of operations could be established. The German Luftaffe's 2nd Air Fleet was assigned a large part of the Mediterranean as its own area of operations in 1942. Likewise, the 5th Air Fleet deployed in Norway and the 3rd Air Fleet i n France were assigned similar, but overlapping area of operations encompassing respective parts of Western Europe, the British Isles, and parts of the North Atlantic. During the Korean War (1950-1953), the U.S. Far Eastern Air Force (FEAF), with headquarters in Tokyo, Japan, assigned separate air area of operations to the 5th Air Force encompassing Japan's home islands and South Korea and the adjacent sea area. Areas of operations for two subordinate component commands, the 20th Air Force on Guam encompassed the Marianas, Iwo .lima, Formosa, and Okinawa, while the 13th Air Force was responsible for the Philippine Archipelago and its sea approaches, respectively. Even in World War II it was rare that a single service operated alone in part of the theater. Major operations on land or at sea almost invariably were conducted by two or more services. Today, a joint operations area (JOA) can be declared when two or more services act jointly to accomplish an operational, or sometimes even a strategic, objective in a certain part of the theater in a situation short of war. A JOA encompasses land and adjacent sea and ocean areas and airspace above them. In the Leyte Operation in October 1944, the central Philippines with adjacent sea area and associated airspace constituted in practical terms a joint area of operations. In U.S. terms, a joint area of operations is usually established for short-term operations of joint forces, as during U.S. invasion of Panama in December 1989 (Operation Just Cause). The JOA can be delineated like a theater of operations, but it would also contain directions or axes, physical objectives, phase lines (PLs), and special areas of operations (e.g., air defense area, airspace control area, etc.). 26 A joint special operations area (JSOA) is an area of land, sea, and airspace

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that could be established for short- or long-term actions of special operations when conducted independently of conventional operations. The theater commander may delineate a JSOA (as in the capture of the terrorists of the Achille Lauro in the Mediterranean in 1987) to facilitate coordination between special forces and conventional operations. A Joint rear area (JRA) can be established in peacetime or in a major regional or general conflict to facilitate the protection and operation of installations, facilities, and forces, and to provide a secure environment for host-nation support (HNS) infrastructure in a given area of responsibility or the theater. The communications zone (COMMZ) encompasses those parts of the theater infrastructure and lines of communications (LOCs) and other agencies required to support one's forces in the field. This zone usually encompasses the rear portion of a given theater of operations and might extend to another theater. 27 Combat Zone (Sector): In generic terms, each area of operations can arbitrarily be subdivided into combat sectors or zones. They are usually established to delineate the employment of single-service tactical-size forces. Therefore, land, maritime, and air combat sectors or zones can be differentiated. Combat sectors or zones might not always be precise, but a major or minor tactical objective and the need to employ tacticalsize forces to accomplish it imply their existence. In the Allied landing at Leyte on 20 October 1944, landing beaches including the city of Tacloban and the area inland within the effective range of naval gunfire could be considered a combat zone or sector. In the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the tactical actions conducted by the U.S.-led Coalition forces in the western, central, and eastern part of the Saudi-Iraqi-Kuwaiti border could each be considered a combat zone or sector. Area of Interest: Each area of operations or combat zone/sector also encompasses a part of adjacent three-dimensional physical space called area of interest. In military terms, an AI encompasses an area in which the environment and potential hostile actions would have significant influence on one's forces current and future operations. In practical terms, the outward boundaries of Al determine the size of the physical space for intelligence gathering by one's forces. For tactical and operational tactical commanders, AI is normally larger than an area of operations or combat sector/zone. Each operationaltactical and tactical commander determines his own Al. 29 Fluid Physical Space: Any military action requires physical space in which one's forces could move, maneuver, and effectively use their weapons and sensors. The larger the objective, the larger the forces required to accomplish it. Thus, battles, engagements, and other tactical actions are conducted in smaller parts of the theater than major operations. The older term battlefield and the increasingly used new term battlespace, properly understood, pertain to that part of physical space in which a major tactical action is conducted. The less used term, operational space, refers to the size of the physical space in which a major operation takes place. Once a tactical action or major operation ends, another part of the theater becomes a battlefield or battlespace or operational space. These areas are not a part of the permanent or semi-permanent theater structure and hence they are not directly linked to any specific level of command. Their size in all dimensions varies greatly and is not constant; it can be expanded or contracted depending on the dynamics of combat. They are also not fixed in space, but movable. 116

In the proper meaning of the term, battlefield refers to a part of theater in which battles, engagements, and other tactical actions are planned or conducted. Until the end of the nineteenth century the battlefield was single-dimensional. It was a place where decisive battle took place. However, the advent of mass armies and the steady increase in the effective range, lethality, and precision of weapons have progressively enlarged the size of the battlefield. The advent of submarine and aircraft added two new dimensions to the battlefield: subsurface and airspace. Traditionally, a battlefield is considered equal in . 3° Among other things, size of the physical size to an area of operations (see Figure 6) Figure 6: CONCEPT OF BATTLEFIELD IN LAND WARFARE

battlefield depends on the size and mix of one's forces, one's own and enemy's surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, effective range of weapons and sensors, geographic features of the theater, duration of the mission, and intensity of combat. A term battlespace, introduced in the early 1990s in the U.S. military, is i ncreasingly replacing the term battlefield. The term for a conventional three-dimensional battlefield was inadequate because it does not imply the existence of the fourth dimension, cyberspace . 31 I n generic terms, battlespace pertains to a three-dimensional physical space, plus corresponding part of cyberspace in which a tactical commander sets the term of a battle or the engagement. Normally, a battlespace is larger than an area of operations and could overlap the battlespace of other friendly commanders. It expands and contracts depending on the dynamics of the battle or engagement and capabilities of forces on both sides. The term operational space emerged in the late nineteenth century, coinciding with the wide acceptance of the term operation. It referred to a part of the theater in which an operation took place. The size of an operational space was not constant but depended on the size of forces employed in an operation. Its boundaries were determined largely by rivers, mountain chains, or strong points. Operational space was not fixed, but moved in the direction the operation progressed. 32 After World War 1, subsurface and

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airspace became an integral part of the operational space. The operational space in each major operation conducted during World War 11 encompassed large parts of land, air, or maritime theater. In the Levte Operation, each of the U.S. fleets, the Allied forces on the ground, and the FEAF had their own operational space that often overlapped the operational space of other forces. For the U.S. Third Fleet, Luzon and adjacent sea surface, subsurface, and airspace area comprised operational space between 17 and 26 October. Today, the operational space encompasses all four dimensions in which a major operation takes place. In the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the operational space for the Coalition ground forces encompassed the land area extending from the Saudi-Kuwaiti and Iraqi-Saudi borders all the way north to the Euphrates River. During the Kosovo Conflict of 1999 (Operation Allied Force), the operational space for NATO forces included those parts of the Balkans and the adjacent land, sea, and airspace used by NATO land-based aircraft and sea forces for surveillance and reconnaissance and strikes against targets in Serbia proper, Montenegro, and Kosovo Province. Its physical size contracted and expanded depending on the intensity of attacks and strikes NATO aircraft carried out. The fourth dimension-cyberspace-during Operation Allied Force extended to the large part of the European Command (EUCOM) and the former Atlantic Command (ACOM) and the Continental United States (CONUS). Conclusion: The military organization of space is closely linked to the determination of the military objectives and the command echelons to be established. Without a proper understanding of the concept of the theater and its structure, it is difficult to comprehend the concept of levels of war, methods of combat forces employment, and various elements and principles of operational warfare. The concept of the theater of war and theater of operations emerged because of the need to employ large forces most effectively to accomplish operational or strategic objectives. Concurrently, the subdivisions of the theater also emerged. This, in turn, led to the establishment of several command echelons in a given theater. Therefore, the establishment of command echelons and command relationships is related to the theater structure. The theater structure is also critical to the understanding of the concept of levels of war, determination of proper military objectives, and the methods to employ combat forces to accomplish these objectives. The new and increasingly used term battle space in the U.S. military does not clarify, but unnecessarily obscures the commonly accepted concept of the theater and its structure. The conventional three-dimensional concept of the theater provided its practical value over many decades and is still a valid concept. In contrast to conventional three-dimensional space, the concept of battlespace is not based on the military objectives in a certain part of the theater, but rather on one's forces' capabilities and actions in combat. Thus, the physical size of the battlespace varies greatly. The need for theaterwide functions, such as intelligence, logistics, or protection in determining the size of the battlespace is apparently not considered. In addition, the term battlespace itself implies a tactical, not operational or strategic, level of war. The existence and growing significance of cyberspace is a fact and hence this new dimension of warfare must be accepted. Conventional three-dimensional theater structure is flexible enough to incorporate and integrate cyberspace. The terms battlefield and battlespace are purely tactical and too general. They do not make the necessary link between military objectives and the necessary size of the physical environment. A more serious problem is that the use of 1 18

similar terms reinforces the false notion that war essentially is the matter of tactics alone, not strategy and operational art and tactics. The theater of war and theater of operations are linked to the command echelon, while battlespace and operational space are fluid and ever changing. They do not exist once the mission is completed.

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Notes 1. Jomini defined the theater of war as "...comprising all the territory upon which the parties may assail each other, whether it belong to themselves, their allies, or to weaker states who may be drawn into the war through fear or interest;" Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, The Art of War (London: Greenhill Books and Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1992), p. 74. 2. J. Neumann, Grundzuege der Strategic. Fin Leitfaden fuer das Studium der Kriegsgeschichte (Vienna, 1870), p. 6. 3. Carl von Egger, Die Strategic. Mit Beruecksichtigung Schweighauserische Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1870), p. 42.

der neuen

Krie gsmittel

(Basel:

4. Neumann, Grundzuege der Strategic , p. 7. 5. Fritz Eberhardt, Militaerischer Woerterbuch (Stuttgart: Alfred Kroener Verlag, 1940), p. 231. 6. The U.S. Navy in the 1920s defined a theater of war as an "extensive geographical area, generally an ocean or part of an ocean, in which contact with the enemy is to be anticipated"; FTP-43 "War Instructions United States Navy 1924," p. 1; Box 108, World War 11, Command File, CNO Fleet Tactical Pubs, FTP 142-FTP 155, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C. 7. J. M. Gwyer, Grand Strategy, Vol. 3: June 1941-August 1942, Part 1 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1964), pp. 370-1, 373. 8. The ABDA area extended on the north, to the boundary between India and Burma, thence eastward along the Chinese frontier and coastline to the latitude of 30° North, thence along the parallel of 30° North to the 140° East latitude (excluding Indochina and Thailand); on the east, the boundary ran by the 140° east, thence south to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea on the south coast, thence east along the southern New Guinea coast to the latitude 143° East, thence along 143° East latitude to the coast of Australia; on the south the boundary ran by the northern coast of Australia from the latitude 143° East, westward to the 114 0 East, thence northwestward to latitude 15° south, longitude 93° East; on the west the boundary ran along the latitude 93° East; J. M. Gwyer, Grand Strategy, Vol. 3, Part 1, p. 374; C.B. Dear and M.R. D. Foot, editors, The Oxford Companion to World War 11 (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 1. 9. J.R.M. Butler, Grand Strategy, Vol. 3: June 1941-August 1942 Part 2 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1964), pp. 471-2. 10. John Ehrman, Grand Strategy, Vol. 5: August 1943-September 1944 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), p. 135. 11. Jerry W. McElwee, Principles for Organization of Joint and Combined Staffs (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, April 1986), p. 15. 12. Stephen W. Roskill, War at Sea, 1939-1945, Vol. 2: The Period of Balance (London: Her Majesty Stationary Office, 1956), pp. 358, 361-2. 13. "The Unification Problem. Some Lessons from the German Experience"; comments by General Walter Warlimont, Vol. 6: Part 3: Command Structures, Continued, in Donald S. Detwiler, editor and Charles B. Burdick and Juergen Rohwer, World War Il German Military Studies, 24 Vols. (New York/London: Garland Publishing Inc., 1979), p. 37. 14. De Jomini, The Art of War, p. 74.

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15. Mark M. Boatner III, The Civil War Dictionary (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1959), p. 555. 16. William F. Amann, Personnel of the Civil War Vol. l: The Confederate Armies (New York/London: Thomas Yoseloff, 1961), p. 182. 17. McElwee, Principles, for Organization ofJoint and Combined Staffs, pp. 19-20. 18. Peter M. Schwartz, et al., Drawing Lines in the Sea: The U.S. Navy Confronts the Unified Command Plan (UCP), 1946-99 (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, CRM 99-3.09, January 1999), pp. 74, 79. 1 9. "Teatr voyennykh deystviy" ["Theater of Military Actions"], Voyenno Entsiklopedicheskiy Slovar' [Military Encyclopedic Dictionary], (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1 st ed., 1983), pp. 723-33; P.A. Grishchuk, Rear Admiral, et al., eds., Voyenno-Morskoy Slovar' dlya Yunoshchestva [ Naval Dictionary .for Youth] (Moscow: DOSAAF Press, 2d ed., 1988), p. 446; A.M. Plekhov, comp., Slovar' Voyennykh Terminov [ Dictionary of Military Terms] (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1988), p. 293; V. Chernavin, et al., eds, VoyennoMorskoy Slovar' [Naval Dictionary] ( Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1990), p. 424. 20. Department of the Army, FM 100-7: Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations ( Washington, DC: U.S. Army, May 1995), pp. 2-17 and 2-18. 21. Ibid., p. 2-18. 22. "Theater of focus" in U.S. terms. 23. "Economy of force" theater in U.S. terms. A "deferred theater," in contrast, receives the least priority for assigned forces and resources based on its associated risk level and potential for conflict. 24. Formally, the KTO was defined as an area north of the Saudi Arabian border, south of latitude 31 ° North, west of the Arabian Gulf and the Iran-Iraq border, and east of longitude 45° East; Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey: SummaU Report ( Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 12 25. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 71-100: Division Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 28 August 1996), p. 2-10; Joint Pub 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, t February 1995), p. 1I-19. 26. Ibid., pp. 2-20 and 2-21; Joint Pub 3-0, pp. 11-1 7 and I1-18. 27. Ibid., pp. II-19 and II-20. 28. In U.S. Army terms, a combat zone might be further subdivided into forward and rear combat zones. The main battle area (MBA) is that part of a battlefield in which the decisive battle is fought to defeat the enemy; FM 100-7: Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations, p. 2-21. 29. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 71-100: Division Operations ( Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 28 August 1996), p. 2-10. 30. Ibid., FM 34-3: Intelligence Analysis (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 15 March 1990), p. 1-4. 31. The U.S. services do not agree on the exact meaning of the new term, nor is there agreement within the services; the U.S. Navy defines battlespace as "all aspects of air, surface and subsurface, land, space, and the electromagnetic spectrum that encompass the area of influence and area of interest"; Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) 1: Naval Warfare ( Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1994), p. 72. In physical terms, electromagnetic spectrum-cyberspace-transcends the boundaries of any theater and is truly global in scope. The U.S. Army's FM 71-100 defines battlespace as the volume in which a

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commander sets to dominate the enemy; a commander's battlespace expands and contract in relation to the ability to acquire and engage the enemy; it is influenced by time, depth, and synchronization; it is not assigned by the higher commander; it is not depicted on a map or on a computer monitor; it usually extends beyond the commander's area of operations and may overlap with the battlespace of other commanders; at the tactical level the area in which a commander dominates an enemy, his battlespace, is normally smaller than his area of interest; Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 71-100: Division Operations, p. 2-11. To complicate the problem, the latest U.S. joint definition of a battlespace is even more ambiguous than the one used by the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Army. 32. Wilhelm Stanger, Grundzuege der Lehre von der Strategic. Studienbe hl f fuer die K.K. Kriegsschule , Vol. 1: Theorie mit Kurzeren Beispielen (Vienna: Verlag der K.K. Kriegsschule, 1884), p. 95.

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THEATER PHYSICAL FEATURES The physical features of a theater are an integral part of the factor of space. Terrain, vegetation, cultivation, natural resources, population density, urbanization, natural and human-made obstacles, hydrography and oceanography, weather and climate, and other natural and artificial characteristics must be considered in planning the employment of one's combat forces.' At each level of command, characteristics of physical space must be evaluated differently. Analysis of the physical environment at all command echelons involves not only the area in which combat is to take place, but also the area in which the enemy forces move or conduct actions that directly or indirectly affect the course or outcome of one's actions. Tactical commanders are concerned with those aspects of the physical environment that influence the course and the outcome of battles and engagements. In terms of space, their analysis encompasses a combat zone or sector and sometimes area of operations plus adjacent area of interest. In general, they are interested in those aspects of physical environment that affect the employment of individual weapons platforms, tactical-size units, and single-service combat arms or branches. They analyze detailed physical features of terrain such as hills, mountain passes, valleys, swamps, marshes, streams and rivers, and road and railroad junctions. They are concerned with the prevailing weather conditions, not climate. A naval tactical commander evaluates physical environment in terms of oceanographic conditions, characteristics of the immediate coastal area, and the weather. An air tactical commander is likewise interested in details of terrain, vegetation, and surface hydrographic and oceanographic features and characteristics of weather. Because of the much larger factors of space, time, and forces, operational commanders and their planners must evaluate the effects of the physical environment from a broader perspective than tactical commanders. They focus on the employment of several service or functional components. In terms of space, operational commanders are concerned with the general features of an area of operations to a theater of operations plus its area of interest. They evaluate those features of the physical environment that considerably affect movement, deployment, and maneuver of large forces. In practice this means features of the physical medium that influence the deployment and employment of services and combat arms as they accomplish their principal tasks in fundamental warfare areas. Specifically, operational commanders evaluate major elements of physical space in a given theater, such as mountain ranges, flatlands, desert areas, jungle environment, coastal plains, major rivers, lakes, swamps, deltas, natural resources, transportation networks, urban areas, and prevailing climatological factors. At the strategic level, the analysis of physical environment encompasses both tactical and operational considerations. Theater or military strategic commanders focus on the analysis of advantages and disadvantages of defending or seizing a major part of the theater. Landform and relief are perhaps the dominant features of the factor of space. Any military appreciation of landform should include analysis of its size, shape, arrangement, configuration, and relationship to the surrounding area. The common types of landforms are flat terrain, plains (plateaus), rolling hills, and mountains. In addition, each of these

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encompasses smaller surface areas such as flat lowlands and valleys. Jungles, deserts, cold regions, and urban areas are considered special types of physical environment for the employment of combat forces. Terrain: Flat terrain allows the use of any type of force regardless of its size. The movement of forces is generally easy in all directions. Depending on the state of roads and railroads, rate of advance can be quite high for armored and mechanized forces. Reconnaissance on the ground and from the air or space is usually very effective, making cover and concealment difficult. Combat can take place over a relatively large area of the theater, and large forces can be used with few or no restrictions. Lack of natural obstacles generally facilitates command, control, and communications. Protection from enemy attack is extremely difficult in flatlands, such as the steppes of southern Russia. Mountains offer both advantages and disadvantages in the employment of one's own and enemy forces. The critical terrain features in mountains are heights that dominate the valleys and lines of communications. Combat revolves around seizing and holding mountain passes, dominating heights, trails, and gorges. Terrain features cause combat to occur piecemeal. Switching efforts from one axis to another is difficult. The compartmentalized nature of the terrain leads to isolated encounters difficult for the higher commanders to control. Major engagements typically occur at the entrance or exit of mountain passes. Coordination among combat arms is substantially more difficult than in flat or hilly terrain. Communications in mountainous terrain is difficult due to shorter range of conventional radio sets and radio signals are often lost between forces operating behind the hills or mountains. Light forces can operate more effectively than heavy forces because their movement is less limited by terrain. Constant reconnaissance is required to ensure that the ground lines of communications remain open and protected. The capture of roads, bridges, and tunnels assumes paramount importance for keeping the supply line flowing smoothly and safe from interdiction. ] In mountainous areas, steep slopes make cross-country vehicular movement difficult or impossible. Movement is further impeded by the scarcity of roads and railroads and generally poor off-road trafficability. Existing roads and trails are normally few and primitive. Difficult mountainous terrain combined with sudden and often unexpected weather changes, affects movement of all ground units . 4 Mountainous terrain restricts rapid movement and may hinder concentration of forces. Moreover, road traffic may be hindered by mining important road junctions, tunnels, or overpasses. Crosscountry movement while not impossible, requires considerable time. These difficulties can often be overcome by rotary aircraft. Movements in mountains can be carried out with a greater degree of covertness than in other types of terrain. In mountainous terrain, deployment is restricted to a few roads. The existing roads are usually narrow, making two-way traffic difficult. Because of the general lack of lateral roads, reserves must be deployed well in the rear to have the desired degree of flexibility. The importance of indirect fire is reduced, and ranges for direct-fire weapons are few. Supporting fires can be organized only where valleys and ridges run parallel and close together. Normal supply, evacuation, and transportation in mountainous terrain is also more difficult than for combat conducted in the open terrain. Mechanized equipment breaks down much more often in the mountains than on the flat terrain. The rugged nature of the terrain multiplies required amounts of ammunition, fuel, food, water, and spare parts. Much of the standard equipment used in flat areas is essentially useless in 1 24

mountains, so there are significant obstacles to providing engineering support. Vehicles consume more fuel and lubricants, and engine power is reduced by four to six percent per 3,000 feet above sea level. Additional difficulties are evacuating the wounded, and the possible need for special types of medicine and better field sanitation. 5 Mountain terrain favors the defender, who can exploit the rugged terrain and hold key areas with relatively small forces, while limiting the effects of heavy weapons. Mountainous terrain allows the defender to frustrate enemy movements. It is difficult to organize a continuous front line in mountainous areas. Delaying actions are particularly effective and can be accomplished by smaller-than-ordinary forces. 6 The configuration and physical features of the coast and littoral area have a significant effect on both offensive and defensive employment of one's combat forces. Numerous islands generally enhance the defensive value of the coast. They allow greater depth of defenses against attacks from across the sea or from the air. They greatly ease the problem of basing naval forces. When islands parallel the mainland coast in several rows, they facilitate surveillance of the adjacent coastal waters by one's own or friendly forces. They also simplify control and protection of one's shipping. If the islands stretch transversely to the coast, the channels separating the adjacent islands are often wide and deep, thereby allowing quick, concealed, and relatively easy deployment and redeployment of one's ships. At the same time, the enemy has a greater chance of penetrating the outer defense and attacking targets along the mainland coast. The archipelago-type of coast allows greater flexibility in the selection of lines of operations and easy and secure "leap-frogging" of naval forces. It also offers excellent chances to use mines to protect naval bases, commercial ports, and sea traffic. A long coast without offshore islands is especially vulnerable to enemy attack from across the sea. In contrast, a coast fronted with numerous islands is usually easier to defend. A larger number of the offshore islands facilitate basing. Surface warships and especially combat craft, could change their bases or anchorages in a matter of hours. The more offshore islands, the more difficult it is to detect combat craft from the air. In addition, aircraft must fly more sorties to sweep along an open coast in an enclosed or semienclosed sea than they do on the open ocean. A flat coast with few or no offshore islands complicates the defender's problem in repulsing enemy amphibious assaults. The high and rocky coast offers, in contrast, few if any places for the enemy landings. Coral reefs and shallow waters favor defense against conventional amphibious landings. Swamps and marshes in the coastal area can significantly inhibit vehicular traffic, especially the movement of heavy armor. Steep, rocky, and highly indented coasts and fiords separated by rocky headlands and numerous rivers make longitudinal communications difficult. The lack of beaches impedes conventional large-scale amphibious landings. Vegetation: Vegetation can considerably affect employment of ground forces and aircraft. Military movements on land are generally difficult in a heavily wooded or forested area. The larger force employed, the more these difficulties assert themselves. Trees are the principal obstacles to movement. Nearly all forests slow movement; temperate zone forests tend to channel forces, since the roads, trails, and firebreaks through them offer the only means for rapid movement. Reinforcing obstacles readily strengthens the defensive value of woods.

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The combination of hilly terrain and large dense forested area present a difficult environment. In the American Civil War (1861-1865), the nature of the northeasttrending Blue Ridge Mountains provided General Robert E. Lee both concealment and opportunity for long marches in his 1862 and 1863 invasions of Maryland and Pennsylvania. 8 The Ardennes area of Belgium and Luxembourg has always represented a significant obstacle for the attacker and has provided the defender potentially great advantages. It is heavily forested (mostly deciduous and conifer trees). The Ardennes extends from the Rhine River westward for about one hundred miles, from the Eiffel on the German side of the border with Luxembourg, through the northern part of Luxembourg and southern part of Belgium to the Meuse River. The German border is only about sixty miles from the Meuse River. The highest point in the Ardennes is less than 2,500 feet. The seven-mile-wide Losheimer Ditch, between Germany and Belgium, is a natural corridor of advance for any attacker. The only navigable river is the Meuse, which joins the Sombre at Namur. 9 Roads do not follow the valleys but are laid across the top of the hills. They are usually narrow and sharply curved, for the most part conforming to winding shallow streams, and can be easily blocked. Railroads are few and limited capacity. Topography and the road system tend to channel traffic to the southwest. An added obstacle is the existence of villages and towns at almost every intersection. They are built in small areas and afford little space for movement and maneuver of motorized forces. The only cities of any importance are Luxembourg and Arlon. The Ardennes played a significant role in the Franco-Prussian War of 18701871; the German attack on France in 1914 and 1940; and the German offensive against Allied forces in December 1944. Yet, the defender, whether the French or the Allies, never learned to properly evaluate the military significance of the Ardennes. The experiences of World War 1 did not show how the terrain in the Ardennes could be used to slow or halt the enemy advance, but it did demonstrate that the area can be used for the movement of large military forces. In that war, four German armies operated through or in part of the Ardennes. In the 1930s, the French military assured politicians that the Ardennes were impenetrable. They believed that felling trees and blowing craters in roads would be enough to secure it against any serious attack. Unfortunately the Belgians felled too few trees, blew too few craters, or failed to stay behind and defend the area. Before World War 11, the French envisaged that the German attack would come through Belgium, the main thrust through the Belgian Plain north of the Ardennes. They did not believe that armor could operate in dense forests of the Ardennes. Thus, the French deployed at Sedan-Dinant sector second-line infantry divisions composed of elderly reservists who lacked modern training and equipment. 1° To their great surprise, the German sector of main effort and point of main attack in May 1940 was just the Ardennes. Scrubs include a variety of trees whose growth is stunted by soil or climatic conditions. In preparation for the Normandy invasion (Operation Neptune), the trees, heath, and scrub of Hampshire and Dorset (England) provided excellent cover for the Allied pre-invasion activity. The Allied planners properly analyzed the operational characteristics of the terrain in the amphibious objective area, but failed to correctly evaluate the effect of the hedgerow [bocage] terrain and the large marshes on the Carentan Plain in France.' These terrain features considerably restricted the mobility of

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the U.S. forces, while greatly favoring the German defenders. In the east, the combination of the hedgerow and nucleated villages greatly hindered General Bernard Montgomery's efforts to break out of the Normandy beachhead. Allied tanks trying to penetrate hedgerows had to climb almost vertically and were exposed to the German anti-tank guns and grenade launchers. Allied infantry also suffered great loses from the German machine guns hidden in hedgerows. The solution to this problem was not found by higher headquarters, but by a simple invention of an U.S. sergeant who added a simple bladelike device to tanks so that they were able to overcome their high vulnerability when operating in the hedgerow country. 1 2 Shrubs comprise the undergrowth in open forests. In arid and semiarid areas, they are usually the dominant vegetation. They are normally not a serious obstacle to movement and provide good concealment from ground observation. However, they may restrict fields of fire. Grass often improves the trafficability of soils. Very tall (more than three feet high) grass may conceal troops. Foot movement in savanna grasslands is slow and tiring, while vehicular movement is usually easy. In addition, observation of military movement from the air is easy in a savanna. 1 3 Soil type, drainage characteristics, and moisture content affect road construction, materiel location, and trafficability. Soils vary in their ability to bear weight, withstand vehicle passes, and easiness of digging. Some soils gain strength under traffic while other loses it. Soil moisture, due to the effects of weather or drainage on the water table, significantly affects the load-bearing capacity of fine-grained soils such as clay, loam, and silt. Artificially produced high-water tables make obstacles of large meadows or paddy fields. The long-term use of manure for fertilizers adds organic material that reduces soil trafficability when wet. The combination of soft or slippery soils, and even slight slopes will stop many vehicles.' 4 Field crops constitute the predominant class of cultivated vegetation. Some crops, such as grain generally improve trafficability of soils. Orchards offer better trafficability than vineyards. Rice fields make movement by vehicles difficult. Concealment is poor in rice paddies, being limited to the dikes and then only from ground fire. On the other hand, observation and fields of fire are excellent in rice fields. Foot movement is poor when the fields are wet because soldiers must wade through one-half- to two-feet-deep water and soft mud. When the fields are dry, foot movement becomes easier and the sixto nine-feet-tall dikes are the only obstacles. 1 5 Drainage: Drainage features include rivers, streams, canals, lakes, ponds, marshes, swamps, and bogs. They are obstacles whenever the water becomes deep or turbulent enough to threaten the safety of soldiers and the operation of vehicles. Swamps, marshes, bogs, and the like could make soil conditions impassable to cross-country movement. Drainage also influences the orientation of the road network and direction of movement in a given combat area. The destruction of few selected bridges can force cross-country movement or long detours. The Allied planners for the amphibious landing at Anzio (Operation Shingle) i n January 1944 correctly evaluated oceanographic and shore-zone elements. However, they failed to properly assess the characteristics of the inland terrain, specifically the natural and artificial drainage features. This added to the immediate difficulties to the movement of the numerically weak Allied forces after the landing. 1 6 Every river is a potential military obstacle that exercises some degree of influence on offensive as well as defensive operations. Wide, deep rivers whose valleys offer 127

concealment may provide a satisfactory defense while also posing a formidable obstacle to offensive movement. Large, unfordable rivers are great obstacles to military movement because they must be crossed by tactical bridging, swimming, ferrying, or special deep fording. Ease of crossing these rivers is determined by the width, depth, velocity, turbulence, bank and bottom conditions, existing bridges, and rapid tactical bridging.' Minor fordable rivers, streams, and canals are more numerous than major rivers, and their tactical value as obstacles should not be overlooked. Watercourses often constitute elongated obstacles in terrain, which may otherwise be excellent for movement. In World War II, the river system in European Russia represented a formidable obstacle for any attacker advancing from the west. The streams and rivers (which usually flow from north to south), pose a double obstacle because many swamplands are a part of the river system. Before World War II, the Russian rivers, with few exceptions, were not regulated thereby providing the attacker with an advantage for river crossings. Dense vegetation on the near shore facilitated the approach to the watercourse proper, provided concealment, and allowed surprise of the enemy whose visibility and fields of fire were limited. ' s Streams are usually small and slow during periods of low precipitation, and large and rapid during periods of high precipitation. Melting snow may cause high water downstream even in regions where rainfall is high. Continuous below-freezing weather can reduce stream flow although precipitation may be high. During floods, minor rivers and streams can become major obstacles. They can cause conditions that extend the obstacle effect for a considerable period by damaging temporary bridges, and by deepening the original channel of the river or stream, thus making access or egress difficult or impossible.' Swamps are wetlands characterized by mineral soils with poor drainage, and plant life dominated by trees. After the invasion of Normandy in June 1944, the terrain in Carentan Peninsula posed great difficulties for the Allied armies. The main features of terrain were large swamps and marshes, sometimes below sea level, open spaces, and breaks in the hedgerow country. Five major swamps and many smaller marshes encompassed almost half the area. In the summer of 1944, most of the marshland was covered with water, because rainfall had been abundant and the Germans had flooded the area. The insular and peninsular character of the corridors of advance was thereby intensified . 2° Marshes in contrast to swamps consist largely of grasses. Rivers in mature valleys often have extensive marshes and swamps along their banks. Bogs are a type of wetland system characterized by wet, spongy, and poorly drained peaty soil. Bogs cover vast areas of tundra and boreal forest regions of Canada, northern Europe, and Russia. Small lakes in glaciated regions also often develop in bogs. In general, swamps, marshes, and bogs severely restrict mobility and channel vehicular movement onto causeways, greatly increasing vulnerability to attacks from the air, artillery, or direct-fire weapons. Marshand boglands favor defense but are unsuitable for cross-country movement. Lakes are often large and make excellent obstacles for any surface movement. They are usually unfordable and cannot be bridged; they must be bypassed. Smaller lakes and ponds in themselves are not difficult to bypass, but when connected by streams, they are easily integrated as part of an obstacle system. However, frozen lakes lose their value as military obstacles. 21

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Swamps when combined with numerous lakes make significant obstacles for the movement and maneuver of ground forces, especially heavy vehicles. Some thirty-five percent of Finland's surface is covered by moors and marshes (oser). About 35,000 large and small lakes extend predominantly northwest to southeast. In southern and central Karelia, these lakes are linked with short streams. Because of the numerous moors, swamps, lakes, and forested and hilly areas, much of Finland is an obstacle for the movement of armored and mechanized forces in all seasons except in winter months when the surface freezes. Large areas of swamps and forests often pose a difficult problem for the employment of ground forces, and armored and mechanized forces in particular. They can create great difficulties in coordinating large formations, and they can fragment command and control in a large part of the theater. Central and northern European Russia abounds with swamps, which merge with extensive woodlands. The 375-mile-long and 125-mile-wide Pripyat Marshes area forms a natural barrier between White Russia (Belarus) and Ukraine. Two strips of marshland adjoin this area in the north: a western strip extends from Minsk through Lake Peypus, while the eastern strip stretches from Velizh through Velikiye Luki to Lakes Ilmen (II'men') and Ladoga. The Germans never controlled the eastern strip, which had serious consequences on their efforts to seize Leningrad (St. Petersburg). Any attacker from the west must split his forces, thereby effectively dividing the theater of war into two theaters of operations. The swampland prevented physical coordination between the Army Group Center and the Army Group North from the very beginning of the German offensive. This enforced division of forces proved to be virtually insolvable for the Germans throughout the war, but was especially 23 vexing in the first few weeks of the invasion. In the Russo-Finnish War of 1939-1940, the Finns were extremely skillful in using the country's terrain in defense against the much larger and better-equipped Soviet forces. Finland has about 70,000 lakes encompassing 12,355 square miles, or ten percent of the country's surface, while forests cover 97,300 square miles, or seventy percent of the entire country. These features of the terrain, combined with thick snow cover, represented great obstacles to the employment of the Soviet armored and mechanized forces. Water Resources: Operational commanders and their staffs must also properly evaluate water resources. Among other things, they are concerned with the flow and channel characteristics of surface water and their effect on the employment of combat forces. They must know the width and depth of streams and canals, the velocity and discharge of streams, which areas are subject to flooding or are permanently wet, densely ditched or canalized, the location of dams, ete. 25 Water presents obstacles to cross-country movement or, if frozen, it may facilitate movement; water also affects the type of equipment to be used. The control of, and access to water, is also critical for drinking, sanitation, construction, and the use of military vehicles. Water that is not properly treated can spread disease and thereby lower combat effectiveness of troops. Planners favor areas with the highest possibilities for locating usable ground water. Water quantity depends on climate. Plains, hills, and vegetation are good indicators of water resources. Plains and plateaus in arid climates generally yield small quantities of highly mineralized ground water. In semiarid climates, following a severe drought, an apparently dry streambed frequently may yield considerable amounts of excellent subsurface water. 129

Ground water is usually abundant in plains of humid tropical regions, but is often polluted or non-potable. In arctic and subarctic plains, wells and springs fed by ground water above the permafrost are dependable only in summer; some of sources freeze in winter and the location of subterranean channels and outlets may shift. Wells that penetrate aquifers within or below the permafrost are good sources of a perennial supply. Adequate supplies of ground water are hard to obtain in hills and mountains composed of gneiss, granite, and granite-like rock, but they may contain springs and shallow wells that yield water in small amounts. 26 Oceanotraphy: Oceanographic characteristics of a given maritime theater or its part considerably influence the employment of maritime forces and aircraft. Operational features of the sea or ocean area are derived from the detailed or tactical analysis of the water's depth, the character of the seabed, the tides, and the water transparency. The water depth determines the optimal size of surface ships and submarines to be employed and the ships' speed of advance. This is not a factor on the open ocean, where the water is deep. However, the water depth has significant influence on the optimal size of ships and use of their weapons and sensors in most enclosed and semi-enclosed seas. Very shallow waters restrict or even preclude the employment of major surface ships and submarines, except for combat craft, landing craft, and small submarines. They also influence the speed of large ships because of the proximity of the seabed, which reflects the waves, hindering a ship's movement. In contrast to the open ocean where the water's depth, salinity, and temperature are the principal factors determining the propagation of underwater sound, in a semienclosed and enclosed sea, dominant roles are played by shallowness of water, changing character of the seabed, and the proximity and configuration of the coast. The most significant difference between the propagation of sound in the open ocean and in shallow waters is its refraction from the seabed because of the water shallowness. The performance of sonar is greatly influenced by both bottom bounce and absorption of sound waves from the bottom. Sound transmission loss is least over a smooth sandy bottom, and greatest over soft mud, which is a good absorber of acoustic energy. A rocky bottom causes great scattering of sound waves, resulting in strong bottom reverberations. The transmission of sound over all types of seabed generally depends upon the water thermal gradient. Poor sonar conditions prevail in a negative thermal gradient because of downward refraction over a muddy bottom. Sound propagation is generally poorer at depths of water from about 600 to 1,200 feet than in depths from 60 to 600 feet. In water that is at least fifty-five feet deep, and in the presence of downward refraction, the "sound" transmission anomalies increase with range. Good sonar conditions occur where there is a sandy seabed, and whenever the water is well mixed with a nearly isothermal overlayer. A negative thermal gradient, if it exists above a hard and smooth bottom, may form a sound channel (or duct) in the same manner as is created in very shallow waters where a positive thermal gradient is present in a mixed surface layer. In both cases, sound is trapped between the sea surface and the bottom. Such a sound channel may extend all the way to the sea surface. It can also occur even when there is no appreciable amount of sound refraction. Then the sound propagation losses are considerable, due to great scattering of sound. A so-called bottom effect also normally occurs in waters less than ninety feet deep and over a smooth seabed. Then a sound beam bends down from the sea surface and bounces from the bottom, which acts as a mirror. 130

Thereby spaces empty of sound-so-called skip distances occur, through which a submarine can pass undetected by a shipborne sonar. Sonar performance in enclosed or semi-enclosed seas is influenced by the ambient noise level, which is considerably higher than in the open ocean. The abundance of marine life in a certain sea area could greatly influence shipborne sonar's performance. Human-made noise is caused by ship traffic in harbors and their approaches, busy shipping lanes, and coastal settlement activities. Hence, an indented coast fronted by numerous islands and islets makes classification of sonar contacts extremely difficult. A hard, smooth bottom is very favorable for laying ground-type mines. In contrast, a seabed composed of soft mud may bury these types of mines over time, and thus decrease the effectiveness of their firing mechanism. A smooth, sandy bottom allows a conventional submarine to lie down, especially if there are wrecks nearby, to avoid attack by surface ships and aircraft. A hard, smooth bottom is generally favorable for laying ground-type mines, while a seabed composed of soft mud may bury these types of mines after a period, and thus decrease the effectiveness of their firing mechanism. A smooth, sandy bottom allows a submarine to lie down, especially if there are wrecks nearby, to avoid attack by surface ships and aircraft. The main prerequisite for success in a major amphibious landing is that the characteristics of the ocean or sea area in the landing zone be properly analyzed in both the planning and execution of the operation. The most important characteristics to be taken into account are such variables as waves, surf conditions, offshore currents, and characteristics of the sea bottom and landing beaches. In addition, the time of sunrise and sunset and phases of the moon must be considered in determining the landing area and timing of the planned operation. The number and size of the beach exit and the nature of the terrain inland, the space available for movement of the landing force and logistical buildup, ports and anchorages in the area, and road and railroad networks are critical to planning a major amphibious landing operation. Tactical characteristics of the landing area, such as the presence or absence of dunes, affect trafficability. Steep beaches composed of coarse sand and gravel generally offer low trafficability, while flat, moist, fine-sand beaches usually facilitate the movement of vehicles. These and similar factors significantly affect the outcome of any amphibious landing. The gravel beach seriously hindered the movement of the Allied troops in their ill-fated raid at Dieppe in August 1942 (Operation Jubilee). The prevalent volcanic sand at Iwo Jima (Volcano Islands) greatly hampered the movement of the U.S. wheeled and tracked vehicles in the assault phase of the landing on 19 February 1945. The Allied landings at Tarawa (Gilbert Islands) in November 1943 and at Anzio in January 1944 were profoundly affected by a host of shore-zone conditions including tides, storms, beach material, and the coastal topography .2' Climate: The analysis of weather and climate varies in scope, depth, and time depending on the command echelon. In land warfare, a corps commander must know weather effects on the combat employment of his own forces during the next seventy-two hours. He also needs to know current weather conditions and forecasts for his area of interest for as long as ninety-six hours to evaluate weather effects on the enemy's plans and movements and combat employment of his forces. Command echelons higher than an army corps need to know current and forecasted weather conditions, effects, and impacts in their area of 131

operations, area of interest, and logistical points of embarkation and debarkation. Napoleon 1, in his ill-fated invasion of Russia in 1812, lost thousands of soldiers due to a severe winter. He failed to properly evaluate the influence of the Russian climate on his projected campaign. The French troops did not have winter clothing during their retreat from Moscow and consequently thousands died from frostbite and cold. 2S Climate and weather both considerably affect cross-country movement. Severe climatological conditions affect soil moisture and thereby soil strength. They also determine basic river and stream characteristics. Some easily overlooked direct effects, like fog and haze, significantly affect use of weapons. They can delay or prevent surface movement and significantly impede flying conditions. Dust storms and snowstorms have the similar effect on the movement of forces. 29 Operational commanders and their staff are also concerned with the effects of weather during the planning and execution of major operations and campaigns. This is especially crucial in deciding where and when to initiate a major operation or campaign. The Allies in planning the date and timing of their Normandy invasion in June 1944 had to take several oceanographic and weather conditions into account to allow for optimal use of their sea and air forces. All the preparations for the landing were made on overly optimistic, long-range forecasts of the weather of the senior meteorologist for Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF). The weather on 5 June turned out to be overcast and stormy with a cloud base of zero to 500 feet. This turn of events endangered the employment of air forces, on which the very success of the entire operation depended. By the evening of 4 June the weather had changed markedly; a front over the planned landing area cleared and these conditions lasted until the morning of 6 June. The winds moderated. Cloud conditions were to allow use of heavy bombers during the night of 5 June and until the next morning. The predicted cloud base for the morning of 6 June was to be just enough to allow effective use of naval gunfire against German defenders on the coast. While the improvement in the weather was good news, the conditions for the landing were far from ideal. This situation led Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight Eisenhower to make some tough decisions. A decision to postpone the landing would require disembarkation of troops already embarked, compromise the operation's security, and demoralize the Allied troops. The next favorable date for the invasion in terms of tides and currents was 19 June. However, that date was moonless and hence would greatly complicate the planned airborne landing in Normandy. In addition, such a delay would reduce the time of good weather available for Allied operations after they landed in Normandy. Despite some disagreement among his subordinate commanders, On 4 June, General Eisenhower ordered the landing to take place in the early morning hours of 6 June. ;° Weather conditions can greatly influence the performance of soldiers, sailors, and aviators in combat. They also considerably affect the features of terrain in which combat takes place. Cloud cover, wind, visibility, fog, temperature extremes, rain, snow, dust, light conditions-all in their own way considerably affect the use of weapons and equipment. Weather can seriously affect the outcome of a major operation or even a campaign.' Winter in the Ardennes is harsh. Dense mists often do not clear before noon, and high winds sweep the plateaus. Snow sometimes accumulates to a depth of a foot. The heaviest rains come in late summer and fall (rainfall averages thirty-five to forty

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i nches annually). Then, soil might be so saturated that the movement off roads, even on foot is difficult.` The German counter-offensive in the Ardennes in December 1944 was possible only because Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt used the cover provided by bad weather to move and concentrate his forces for the attack. The rain and mud of spring and fall have had a decisive effect on military operations in European Russia. The spring muddy season lasts from four to six weeks and ends when the ground is sufficiently thawed to absorb melted snow. The fall muddy season starts in early October and lasts about four weeks. In northern and central areas of European Russia, the melting snow, often accompanied by heavy rainfall, begins between the end of March and the middle of April. Recurrent cold spells with frost or snow are likely, followed by quickly rising temperatures which rapidly melt the snow. Spring floods swell the streams; the rivers increase to as much as ten times their normal width, and floating ice collapses or threatens bridges. All river traffic is suspended while rivers are at flood stage. The excess water flows off in comparatively short time and leaves the countryside an ocean of mud. Paved roads give way and motor vehicles become hopelessly stuck. Ice may be strong enough to support vehicles, and then instead of being obstacles, they might be preferred for movement. Movement on ice is risky because of the weaknesses caused by in-flowing springs and other areas of swiftly moving water. 34 After the German and the Finnish troops had almost completely besieged Leningrad in September 1941, the situation for the defenders became harder and the fall of the city seemed imminent. The population was near starvation. The only link between Leningrad and the country's interior was across Lake Ladoga. A large quantity of food supplies was being held in transshipment at the railway station at Voybokalo. However, ice prevented the boats from transporting these supplies to Leningrad. Not until 18 November, when the lake solidly froze over, was it possible to transport the food with motor lorries over the lake. Four days later, the first convoys of food arrived in Leningrad. This transport route saved the city from starvation during the extremely harsh winter of 1941-1942. 35 The Soviets used boats across water and motor lorries across the frozen lake to bring in supplies and military equipment and evacuate the sick and wounded. Lake Ladoga remained the only lifeline for Leningrad's defenders and civilian population until March 1943. Even on otherwise trafficable terrain, accumulation of snow three feet deep becomes a major obstacle to personnel and vehicles, snow less than three feet deep is a less effective obstacle but may hide rocks, ditches, small streams and fallen trees. Snow creates a special cross-country movement problem related to soil. Snow in the spring or fall may occur over saturated, untrafficable ground. It is more of a hindrance and hazard to wheeled vehicles. Most of them will be immobilized when the depth of the snow reaches one third of the tire's diameter. The climate in the Pacific Theater is predominantly tropical, monotonously hot, and with negligible variation in temperature throughout the year. The high temperatures, coupled with high humidity, adversely affected the fighting on the ground in New Guinea and the Solomons during World War 11. In the southwest Pacific, there is no difference between the seasons except that more rain falls from November to March than in other months. In the central Pacific, despite generally good weather, climatic conditions are unpredictable, making even routine actions sometimes dangerous. Southwestern monsoons in Southeast Asia blow from mid-May to mid-October.

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During these five months of rainfall, road surfaces puddle, pothole, rut, and often become untrafficable. Streams leave their banks and inundate large areas. Wooden bridges are swept away; streams are no longer fordable; and rice fields are so muddy that even foot soldiers would find cross-country movement through them unprofitable or extremely difficult. 37 In war at sea, climatological factors specifically, winds, waves, precipitation, ice, cloudiness, currents, and air temperature-greatly affect the employment of ships, aircraft, and their sensors and weapons. The high sea states in general influence the speed of all surface ships, affect comfort, and cause crew fatigue. This is especially true for combat craft and amphibious craft. In the Baltic, the employment of small surface combatants is seriously hampered on an average of sixty days per year because of strong winds and high seas, rather than ice. Combat employment of conventional-hulled combat craft becomes very difficult, or even impossible at Sea State five and higher. The North Sea is also characterized by violent northwestern storms in winter that endanger navigation along southeastern coast, and especially along the Jutland Peninsula. Rain and fog are frequent in all seasons in the Baltic and the North Sea. In contrast, enclosed or semi-enclosed seas at lower latitudes, such as the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea, are more favorable to employment of small surface ships because of their generally less extreme weather conditions. In the Arabian Gulf, thunderstorms and fogs are rare, although dust storms and haze occur frequently in summer. The most common and strongest wind, the shamal, that blows from northwest to west-northwest seldom reaches force six and rarely force eight. Ice-covered waters can pose a significant obstacle to navigation even in ordinary winters in many enclosed and semi-enclosed seas at higher latitudes. Ice conditions also greatly affect the performance of sonars and other acoustic sensors. The noise produced in ice-covered waters is notably different from that produced under ice-free conditions, which significantly affects the performance of sonar. In waters covered with ice, the intensity level and character of ambient noise is highly variable due to changes in wind speed, snow cover, and air temperature. Under rising temperatures, a continuous shorefast ice cover has a very low noise level. Wind speed, through its own turbulence and the motion of drifting granular snow, impinging upon the rough sea surface, causes a high level of noise. Wind noise is more prominent under a non-continuous ice cover, when the noise level is independent of wind speed. Another source of noise is the bumping and scraping together of ice floes in a non-continuous ice cover. Sonar performance in icecovered waters is greatly affected because ice makes the already-difficult problem of classifying contacts even harder to resolve. The geographic position and latitude generally determine the type of climate prevailing and the length of its nights. At high altitudes, the long hours of darkness in the winter coupled with the short distance between the opposite shores offer very favorable conditions for the employment of surface ships, particularly for a force inferior in the air. The opposite is true, however, in the summer. In June, the duration of the nights at 54° North is about five hours; at 60° North, it is only one hour, and twilight lasts the entire night, while at 66° North the sun is continuously above the horizon. Thus, in the summer, the employment of naval forces would necessitate reliable air cover, because most of the missions would take place during the daylight hours or twilight.

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Special Environments: Jungles, deserts, and cold regions pose special environmental problems for combat forces. The jungle terrain presents a large problem for both the attacker and the defender. Jungles vary from tropical rain forests and secondary growth forests to swamps and tropical savannas. The dominating features of jungles are thick vegetation, constant high temperature, heavy rainfall, and humidity. These features restrict movements, observation, fields of fire, communications, battlefield surveillance, and target surveillance. At the same time jungle terrain provides excellent cover and concealment. Jungles generally lack roads, and the large areas are impassable to vehicles. Movement of military units is difficult. Combat usually consists of isolated small-scale actions between infantry units. Jungle areas are ideal for infiltration and infiltration is usually difficult to control. Large forces in jungles usually operate along roads or natural avenues of movement. Roads, rivers and streams, fording sites, and landing zones are more likely to be essential terrain features. Short field of observation and fire and thick vegetation make maintaining contact with the enemy extremely difficult. The same factors reduce the effectiveness of indirect fire. Combat is decentralized because of the high density of the jungle terrain. The thick foliage allows commanders to control only a part of their units. It also makes ambush a constant danger. Fires must be planned along the attack route so they can be delivered in the shortest time. Support by air and mechanized forces can be decisive in jungle battles or engagements, but they might not always be available or effective. Jungle normally provides good concealment from the air. Thickly vegetated areas increase the effectiveness of passive air defense measures such as camouflage and dispersion. The jungle concealment decreases the likelihood that enemy air would attack a maneuvering force. Heat, thick vegetation, and rugged terrain tire troops quickly, especially those carrying heavy weapons and equipment. 38 The jungle climatic conditions reduce the effective range of conventional radio sets both for intercept jamming and for communications. Furthermore, the thick jungle foliage and heavy monsoon rains often weaken radio signals, making communications difficult. The jungle coastal or delta areas are land environments dominated by water routes. There may be one or more major waterways and an extensive network of smaller waterways. Usable roads are rare and cross-country movement difficult. The headwaters of a waterway are generally formed in a mountainous terrain. Usually there are many large and small tidal streams and channels, whose currents may change speed or reverse with the tide in a predictable manner. The bottom of the tributaries normally slopes to a crest or bar at the river's mouth. In some cases, only watercraft with a draft of three to six feet can cross the crest or bar at high tide. This requires specialized naval craft to operate in jungle. The heavy vegetation along the banks of inland waterways offers excellent concealment and enhances the effectiveness of ambushes against watercraft. Intelligence is critical along jungle waterways-not only from the air but supplemented by reconnaissance by boat-especially in areas where tributaries are overgrown by vegetation. Mangrove swamps are found in coastal areas wherever tides influence water flow. The mangrove trees have tangled root systems both above and below the water level, which restricts movement to foot or small boats. Observation in mangrove swamps, both on the ground and from the air, is poor and therefore concealment is excellent. Palm swamps exist in both salt and fresh water areas. Like movement in the mangrove swamps, movement through palm swamps is mostly restricted to foot and

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sometimes small boats. Vehicular traffic is nearly impossible without extensive road construction by engineers; observation and field of fire are very limited. Concealment from both air and ground observation is excellent. Savanna is broad, open jungle grassland in which trees are scarce. The thick grass is broad-bladed and grows three to fifteen feet high. Movement in the savanna is generally easier than in other types of jungle, especially for vehicles. However, the sharp edged dense grass and extreme heat make foot movement slow and tiring. Ground observation may vary from poor to good. Concealment from air observation is poor both for troops and vehicles. 39 The desert terrain consists of sandy plains and mountainous areas with barren, rocks, sculptured by wind erosion. The mountains are cut by canyons obstructed by boulders. Depressions may be filled with brackish mud and flat stony hard-surfaced areas stretching in vast plains broken with sandy areas. Vegetation is sparse or absent. Along the desert boundaries are semi-desert zones with intermittent stretches covered with vegetation .4° Soil is sandy and soft or exceedingly rocky. The desert is neutral and affects both sides equally; the side whose personnel are best prepared for desert operations has a distinct advantage. Deserts provide both advantages and disadvantages for the movement and employment of large ground forces. All type of forces can operate in deserts, but especially armored and mechanized forces. Because of the vastness of space and the nature of terrain, a large area of desert could be controlled by seizing key points of terrain. The advantage is usually with the more maneuverable and faster side, both in attack and defense. 4 1 Operations in the desert are characterized by rapid movement of armored and mechanized forces, good observation and fields of fires, and relative lack of key terrain in the traditional sense. The lack of prominent terrain features complicates land navigation and requires the use of dead reckoning and advanced technology navigation devices. Movement in a desert at night or during sandstorms while maintaining strict operations security assumes significant importance in positioning units. Fire engagements are often fought at long ranges. Small indentations and folds in the ground can provide cover for small units and individual vehicles . 42 Flat desert areas do not canalize larger forces; thus, concentrated use of mines and obstacles is necessary. Before the advent of satellite navigation, the lack of prominent features complicated land navigation in desert areas. In most deserts, roads and trails are rare. Ancient road systems are supplemented by routes joining oil or other mineral deposits to collection outlet points. Some surface, such as lava beds or salt marshes, precludes any form of routine vehicular movement, but generally, ground movement is possible in all directions. Speed of movement varies depending on surface texture. Minor caravans and nomadic tribesmen use rudimentary trails with wells or oases approximately every twenty to forty miles. Some stretches for more than one hundred miles are waterless. Trails vary in width from a few feet to more than 2,000 feet. If the desert floor cannot support wheeled vehicle traffic, the few roads and desert tracks become key terrain. Crossroads are vital because they dominate large areas of desert. Desert warfare often revolves around control of lines of communications: the side that can protect its own lines of communications while interdicting those of the enemy usually prevails. Defiles play an important role, where they exist. In the North Africa Campaign of 1940-1943, the Western Desert of Libya, an escarpment that

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paralleled the coast, was a barrier to movement except through a few passes; control of these passes was vital. Similar escarpments are found in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. 44 Wadis (dried watercourses) can provide cover from ground observation and camouflage from visual air reconnaissance. The threat of flash floods after heavy rain poses a significant danger to troops and equipment downstream. Salt marsh terrain is impassable for tracks and wheels when wet. When dry they have a brittle, crusty surface, negotiable by light vehicles only. In some deserts, such as the Libyan Desert or the Egyptian Desert, the ruins of civilization are often located along important avenues of approach and might dominate the only available passes in difficult terrain. Control of such points is often critical for any force intending to dominate the immediate area. Oil wells, pipelines, refineries, quarries, and crushing plants may be of great importance in the desert. Pipelines are often raised three to four feet off the ground and therefore inhibit movement. Subsurface pipelines can also be an obstacle because they are often buried at such a shallow depth that heavy vehicles traversing them could damage them. If a pipeline is ruptured, not only is the spill of oil a consideration, but hazardous fumes, and potential explosion and fire as well. Deserts are areas of high barometric pressure. The skies are predominantly clear and there is nothing to oppose the sun's heat. There are considerable differences between the temperatures of the day and the night, and between summer and winter months. In deserts, temperatures vary according to latitude and season, from more than 136°F in the deserts off Mexico and Libya to the bitter cold of winter in the Gobi Desert. In some deserts, day-to-night temperature fluctuation exceeds 70°F. In all deserts, rapid temperature changes invariably follow strong winds. Even without the wind, the telltale clouds raised by wheels, tracks, and marching troops give away movement. As the day gets warmer, the wind increases and the dust signatures of vehicles may drift downwind for several hundred meters. In the evening, the wind usually settles down. In many deserts, a prevailing wind blows steadily from one cardinal direction for most of the year, and then switches to another direction for the remaining months. Gales and sandstorms in winter can be bitterly cold. Desert winds can achieve speeds of near hurricane force. The Sahara Khamsen normally occurs in the spring and summer and can last for days at a time. The deserts of Iran are well known for the "wind of 120 days" with sand blowing almost constantly from the north at wind speeds of as much as seventy-five miles per hour. The wind can be as physically demanding as the heat, burning the face, arms, and any other exposed skin with blown sand; sand gets into eyes, nose, mouth, throat, lungs, ears, and hair. Continual exposure to blown sand is exhausting and demoralizing. The dry air, winds, and clear sky can offer bone-chilling discomfort and even injury. A general lowering of the body temperature can result in hypothermia; and local freezing of body tissues can lead to frostbite . 48 The extreme heat of the desert can cause heat exhaustion and heatstroke and put troops are risk of degraded performance. For optimum mental and physical performance, body temperature must be maintained within narrow limits. In a desert environment, heat, wind, and dry air combine to produce a higher individual water requirement, primarily through loss of body water as sweat. Sweat rates can be high even when skin looks and feel dry. Deserts have debilitating effect on soldiers who are not properly trained and acclimated. They induce mental fatigue,

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impaired perception, and possibly depression that can overwhelm unprepared soldiers. Significant acclimatization can be attained in four to five days, but full acclimatization takes one to two weeks, with two to three hours per day of exercise in the heat. Successful desert operations require adaptation to the environment and the li mitations its terrain and climate impose. Equipment and tactics must be modified and adapted to a dusty and rugged landscape where temperatures vary from extreme highs to freezing and where visibility may change from thirty miles to thirty feet in a matter of minutes. 49 All equipment in the desert suffers from the environment; dust, sand, and high temperatures take their toll, especially on electronic and communications equipment. It is important to keep POL pure and equipment free of dust. Vehicles operating at some distance from maintenance areas must be capable of self-recovery. Radio communications are occasionally degraded due to thermal heating and dead spots. At night, radio communications and intercept are excellent, but there is also more communications traffic. Jamming is more effective in the desert, where the terrain usually does not provide a masking effect. Visual and thermal imaging systems are used to their maximum range in the desert. However, all of them could be greatly degraded or rendered useless by strong dust storms. Visual systems are affected by mirages. Thermal systems perform exceptionally well at night when there are extreme differences between targets and background temperatures. Rains in deserts are rare, but sometimes they can be torrential. These sudden rains cannot penetrate the soil, and they flow off. Wadis that are dry nearly the entire year are transformed in a few hours into violent torrents, which become lost in the sand or in some salt marsh. Rainfall in a desert varies from one day in the year to intermittent showers throughout the winter. Severe thunderstorms bring heavy rain, and usually far too much rain too quickly to organize collection. The water soon soaks into the ground or may result in flash floods. In some cases the rain binds the sand much like a beach after the tide ebbs, allowing easy maneuver. However, it also turns loam into an impassable quagmire. Rainstorms tend to be localized, affecting only a few square kilometers at a time. Whenever a storm approaches, vehicles should move to rocky areas or high ground to avoid flash floods and becoming mired. Scarcity of water limits military operations in a typical desert. Water sources are vital, especially if a force is incapable of long-distance resupply of water. Normally, soldiers require one to one and half gallons of water per day because of the excessive heat. This in turn fatigues the stomach and liver. Intense perspiration combined with sand can cause sores that could become infected. 50 In the cold regions, extreme temperatures and precipitation greatly affect the employment and combat effectiveness of forces on both sides. Severe winter conditions prevail in approximately forty-five percent of North America and some two-third of Eurasia. Fighting under these weather conditions has always been difficult and has resulted in severe losses for forces that were not properly equipped or trained for winter warfare. Tundras and taigas are typical representatives of the terrain in which cold weather conditions prevail. Tundras are cold dry areas covering about one fifth of the Earth's land surface. The northern fringes of North America from the Arctic Circle northward to about the 75th parallel lies within the outer zone of control of arctic air masses. In the tundra, even l ocal movements require instantaneous fire support by weapons heavier than those that

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can be hand-carried. In the winter, rivers and lakes become "frozen highways," and marshes become passable and may even be traveled with sleds, as the Chinese did while crossing the Yalu River during the Korean War (1950-1953). The snow blanket of winter vastly increases the ability to conduct movements. During the summer, operations must be conducted over the few passable routes available. Every ground action requires many vehicles for the transport of heavy weapons, ammunition, and supplies of all kinds . 5 1 The tundra climate is characterized by a very short, cool summer and a long severe winter. No more the 188 days per year, and sometimes as few as fifty-five, have a mean temperature higher than 32°F. The warmest temperature is about 50°F and the coldest is -10°F. Mean annual temperatures for a typical tundra are roughly at the freezing point. The freezing temperatures leave the deeper layer of soil, called permafi-ost, frozen throughout most of the year. Only the layer on the surface thaws in summer conditions. Because of intense cold, trees cannot grow. Annual precipitation is light, often less than eight inches, but because potential evaporation is also very low, the climate is humid. The taiga or northern forest extends about 4,000 miles across North America and 5,000 miles across Europe and Asia. Taigas are northern forest belts of Eurasia, bordered on the north by the treeless tundra and on the south by the steppe. Approximately sixty percent of Canada and forty percent of Russia are covered by taigas. These forests are primarily coniferous and pose a formidable challenge to ground operations. The terrain is generally flat, with relatively slight differences in elevation. Lakes and streams are numerous and swamps and marshes cover six to ten percent of the total area, and may cover as much as fifty percent in some regions. Movement in the taiga is severely restricted. Roads are generally few and usually constructed of dirt or gravel, and sometimes cobblestone. During the spring thaws and summer rains, the roads are almost unusable. In the winter the roadbeds are firm, but snow and ice may limit their use. Yet, in extremely cold conditions, experienced personnel may extend the existing communications by using frozen waterways and the snow-covered surface. 52 In the taigas, the average temperature is below freezing for six months of the year. Winters are cold with some rainfall, while summers are rainy, warm, and humid. Most of the precipitation comes in the summer months. In general, climate in northern regions is characterized by the long hours of daylight and dusk of summer, the long nights and extreme cold of winter, and the mud and morass of the transition periods of spring and autumn. 53 Summer is characterized by an abundance of open lakes, streams, and swamps, which impede movement. Extensive overland movement is difficult during the summer because the underlying permafrost prevents effective drainage, and extensive swampy areas result. Waterways may be used for military movement if equipment or improvised rafts are available. During the spring breakup, when river ice begins to thaw, the surrounding country may be flooded or impassable. The breakup is characterized by massive ice jams. Then vehicles carry reduced load. Traffic is conducted only during the night when temperatures are below freezing. Unpaved roads thaw during summer, and in fall rain creates deep mud. Ruts made in the mud during the day freeze on cold nights and make vehicular movement difficult. 54 Military operations with limited objectives are feasible in spring because the daytime thaw and nighttime freeze leave only a thin layer of mud on deeply frozen ground. From the end off the breakup season through fall, operations can be resumed

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only after the ground has dried sufficiently to allow cross-country movement. Severe cold adversely affects the capabilities of units to accomplish their mission. Units are less maneuverable in ice or deep snow. Motorized units are restricted exclusively to roads. Ammunition requirements increase in cold weather because low temperatures adversely affect firing, responsiveness, effectiveness, and accuracy of artillery. An inadequate transportation network inhibits ground mobility. During winter, low temperatures, snow and ice, and the difficulties of constructing roads and trails hinder movement. Snow affects mobility of ground troops, and heavy snow cover impedes movement either cross-country or on roads. Snow also blankets many terrain features. On roads and runways, snow increases maintenance requirements because it requires removal and compaction. Traction on compacted snow is generally better during extremely cold weather. 56 The physical strength required to overcome the resistance of snow generally decreases as temperature decreases. Very often movement across a snow-covered area impassable during the day may become passable during the night after a sharp drop in temperatures. Because the depth and characteristics of snow cover can vary greatly within short distances and short spaces of time, up-to-date reconnaissance of snow conditions is essential to the planning of overland movement. In the Russo-Finnish War 1939-1940 the Soviet troops, in contrast to the Finns, were poorly prepared for winter combat, and their commanders were too slow to act in the Nordic terrain and climate, with the predictable catastrophic results. 57 The German attack on Moscow in December 1941 failed in large part because the German troops were not equipped for winter warfare. The Germans also faced unprecedented problems because of the "muddy" season, which occurs twice in the western part of Russia in the course of every year: before the onset of winter and again in early spring. Rain and thaw soften the soil. The roads become bottomless, and the countryside turns into a morass. In some areas, a boat rather than a horse-drawn cart (panje) became the means of travel from village to village. The Germans were taken completely by surprise by the first muddy season in 1941. Many of the German troops' operations were delayed or aborted. In late October 1941, on the highway between Smolensk and Vyazma, some 6,000 German supply trucks "bottlenecked," most of them loaded with ammunition, rations, and fuel for the forces advancing to Moscow. The same climatic conditions greatly impeded the Soviet troops as well, with the exception that they were much better prepared than the Germans. In 1941, the German troops were inadequately clothed for the Russian winter. In every village, lengthy warming halts were necessary. Approximately two days were needed to cover a distance of twelve miles. In the Smolensk-Vitebsk area in Russia, noon temperatures are below freezing even during average winters. The Pripyat Marshes usually freeze in winter, and only during exceptionally mild winters, or in case of an early snow cover, large patches of the Pripyat remain unfrozen and impassable. A war of movement is difficult in deep snow. Foot marches in twenty-inch-deep snow are slow, and in depths larger than that, exhausting. Normally infantry cannot attack in deep snow because every movement would have to be made in the open exposed to enemy fire. Without adequate snow removal equipment, infantry movement during or after a snowstorm is difficult. In deep snow it is often impossible for infantry to take full

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advantage of artillery preparation because it could not move forward fast enough. Also, the effectiveness of small caliber guns in deep snow is much reduced. In fall 1941, only one German tank in ten survived the muddy season in central Russia. In addition, those still available could not move through the snow because of their narrow tracks. They often sank deep into the snow, and because of their limited ground clearance, became stuck. In contrast, the Soviet tanks drove through deep snow because of their good ground clearance and wide tracks, and therein lay their special effectiveness in winter warfare. Maintenance of weapons and equipment is difficult in winter. The need for spare motor vehicles and tank parts increases at low temperatures. When the temperature remains below zero for an extended period, troops require special clothing, larger than usual rations, and more rest. They must be trained and acclimated to move, fight, and maintain themselves and their equipment in a hostile environment. Frozen ground and water can improve trafficability in winter. However, vehicles require special care to remain in operation. Weapons need special attention and maintenance. Forces fighting in extreme winter conditions must learn special techniques of camouflage. They must always be well prepared for night operations because winter days are short. Air support is affected by icing conditions. Terrain conditions vary widely in winter operations, requiring tactics to be adjusted accordingly. In open terrain, armored and mechanized forces will be effective. However, their maneuverability might be impeded by icy conditions, weather effects on their fire control equipment, and difficulties in maintenance and supply. In broken terrain, forests, and mountains, light forces will predominate. However, they must be equipped for cross-country mobility over ice and snow. Their movement rates are slower than in warmer conditions. 62 Artificial Features: Operational commanders and planners also must properly evaluate the effect of various artificial features in a theater, specifically, built-up areas, obstacles, and transportation system. In land and amphibious warfare, built-up areas play a significant role in planning and executing major operations or campaigns. The built-up area consists of a concentration of structures, facilities, and population, which form the economic and cultural focus for the surrounding area. Large cities, small cities, towns, and villages are the principal categories of built-up areas. A special type of built-up area, called a strip area, links villages and towns. Strip areas are usually found along roads or railroads leading to large population centers; hence, their long, thin, linear pattern . 63 In the past several decades, many natural features of the terrain have been changed beyond recognition because of the new and ever expanding urban areas and other built-up areas. Urban areas are potentially great obstacles for all surface movements. Operational commanders and planners must consider the location, physical size, population, and relative economic and political importance of an urban area in the country's structure. The use of military forces is greatly affected by the physical composition, productive capacity, accessibility, and vulnerability of a given urban center. In addition, certain cultural features such as settlements, cemeteries, stone fences, and road networks affect ground combat. Closely spaced villages provide favorable places for the employment of small force of infantry, artillery, and a few tanks. The urban area is a difficult environment for the use of military forces. The operational commanders and their staff should know both advantages and disadvantages of the urban areas for the conduct of defense and offense. An urban area may be a center of political power, transportation, population, service, cultural, or scientific center. The 1 41

capture or successful defense of a major urban center, especially if it is the country's capital usually has great political and psychological effect on both sides in conflict. Actions in the urban area usually result in large-scale destruction of property and great military losses. Urban areas are generally more favorable for the defender than the attacker. Attack on large cities is usually time-consuming and also results in great losses for the attacker. The German experience in trying to seize Stalingrad and Leningrad in World War 11, and the Soviets' very high losses in their attempt to seize well-defended Budapest and Berlin in 1944 and 1945, respectively, illustrate the difficulties in fighting in urban areas. This was also shown in the Russian experience in the struggle to seize Grozny, Chechnya, in 1994 and 1999-2000. Likewise, the Serbian attack on the Croatian city of Vukovar (Eastern Slavonia) in October November 1991 resulted in extremely high losses for the attacker-reportedly several thousand dead and about 200 tanks destroyed-from some 2,000 Croatian defenders. 64 Although the Serbs eventually seized the city, the striking power of the former Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) was broken, and the planned offensive to seize the rest of eastern Slovenia and advance to Croatia's capital of Zagreb was abandoned. In general, the attack or defense of a built-up area should be conducted only when chances of obtaining significant tactical or operational advantage are great. The attacker should, if possible, bypass large urban areas to maintain the tempo of his advance. However, the difficulties in avoiding or bypassing large urban areas are increasing because of ever expanding urbanization of many areas, especially in the littorals. The defender should integrate the urban areas in his overall plan of defense and find ways to slow, block, or channelize the attacker's advance and thereby increase the effectiveness of his forces. Artificial structures in urban areas, such as buildings, streets, and avenues, tend to canalize the attacker's actions. The employment of armored and mechanized forces is especially difficult in large urban centers. The observation and movement is obstructed, while concealment and cover is greatly facilitated. Except for the use of mortars and small arms, the effectiveness of fires is greatly reduced in large urban centers. Command and control of one's forces might be completely fragmented and, because of the dispersion imposed by the layout of streets, command and control . 65 In addition, concentration and use of combat power is difficult. In large cities, the advantages and disadvantages in the areas of mobility, cover, and observation tend to be equal for the attacker and the defender. However, initially, at least, the defender has a significant tactical advantage over the attacker because of his knowledge of the terrain. The urban battlefield is composed of a constantly changing mix of natural and artificial features. Often the commander of a large force will have units fighting on open terrain, one terrain with built-up areas, and one complex where these two distinct terrain forms merge. The dominant role of armor and mechanized infantry on open terrain is changed in the urban areas, where the role of infantry supported by other arms is predominant. Effective communications within large cities are difficult to maintain. Combat tends to be reduced to the actions of small units operating more or less independently. Hence, much greater reliance is put on the initiative, skills, and endurance of the small-unit commanders and even individual soldiers. Combat is conducted almost continuously and at close range. This results in high casualty rates, fatigue, and psychological strain for the attacking troops. Various artificial features in the cities are

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randomly dispersed. They generally provide good cover and concealment, and limit observation and the fields of fire. They are at the same time obstacles for movement, favoring the defender over the attacker . 66 Combat in the urban areas, and especially in large cities, is also complicated because of the presence of large numbers of civilians. The need to protect civilian populations and to feed them can seriously restrict options available to the attacker. The analysis of the theater is incomplete if the operational commanders and their staff fail to evaluate the impact of various obstacles in a given theater. Obstacles can be natural, such as rivers, mountains, or lakes, or they can be human-made such as built-up areas, cemeteries, and minefields. Reinforcing obstacles are erected or built to reinforce existing features of the terrain that slow, stop, or canalize the opposing force. Artificial terrain features that limit mobility or reinforce existing features that man has enhanced to use as obstacles-such as gentle slopes reinforced by tank ditches, pikes, or revetments -limit mobility of maneuver umts. 67 The combined effect of natural and artificial features is greater than their effect individually. Steep slopes, when combined with hardto-negotiate vegetation or difficult soil conditions might affect the terrain trafficability much more than any of these features alone. b s Some of the most important natural obstacles are escarpments and depressions. Escarpments are sharp drops in a terrain with cliffs and ridges. They represent great obstacles to the movement of vehicles and even troops. Depressions are low points, pits or sinkholes surrounded by higher ground. They are also great obstacles to vehicular movement because their slopes often exceed forty-five percent. Embankments are artificial obstacles made of earth or gravel erected above natural ground surfaces, such as dikes and seawalls. Escarpments and embankments could be reinforced as obstacles by mining, thereby impeding or completely precluding, road, railroad, or cross-country movements. In addition, other artificial obstacles-such as railroad and road cuts and fills-can significantly restrict military movement. 69 In the coastal area, various obstacles could be erected in front of the landing beaches and on the coast to prevent the approach of enemy landing craft and vehicular movement of forces after they land ashore. Before the Allied invasion of Normandy, the Germans built an extensive defense belt from the sea approaches to the landing beaches, on the beaches, and farther inland. Field Marshal Rommel, commander of the Army Group B planned to establish defense as far as 3.1 to 3.7 miles inland. Besides infantry troops and artillery, Rommel planned to erect a huge number of the new ingenious antitank obstacles called "hedgehogs," and tetrahedrons inland . 7(' They were supplemented by the anti-tank barricade-like gates, called Belgian Gates, and stakes slanted seaward. The German aim was to cover every possible landing beach between high- and low-water marks with obstacles so staggered as to not leave a free channel for any flat-bottomed craft to reach the beach. All the obstacles would be mined. The Germans assumed that the Allies would land at high tide to reduce the distance and time for the landing craft to be under fire from the German gun batteries. Thus, Rommel's plan was to erect underwater obstacles at the high-water line, extending seaward in several belts. The Germans supplemented these defenses with sixteen minefields in front off the Channel coast from Boulogne to Cherbourg. Each of these minefields was approximately five miles long and was laid between August 1943 and January 1944. In addition, Rommel

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decided to stake and mine all possible landing sites for the Allied airborne gliders in Normandy. 71 The operational commanders and their staffs must also fully consider the effect of the transportation network i n a given theater on the planning and execution of major operations and campaigns. A theater with a well-developed and diverse transportation system is highly favorable for both the attacker and the defender. In contrast, a theater with railroads and criss-crossed with canals, but with few roads represents an obstacle for vehicular traffic. It also restricts the maneuver of armored and mechanized forces. The transportation network of an area on land consists of all highways, railways, and waterways over which troops or supplies can be moved. The importance of each area depends on the nature of the combat actions involved . 73 All-weather, hard-surface highways are slightly affected by rain, frost, thaw, and heat. They are passable throughout the year and the traffic volume is never appreciably less than their maximum dry-weather capacity. They are also never closed because of weather conditions other than temporary snow or flood blockage. All-weather, loose-surface highways are, in contrast, considerably affected by rain, frost, or thaw. Heavy use of roads during adverse weather conditions may cause complete collapse of the traffic. Fair-weather, loosesurface highways are quickly made impassable in bad weather. All associated structures and facilities necessary for movement and for protection of the routes-such as bridges, ferries, tunnels, and fords is an integral part of the road network. Railroads often follow rivers, to take advantage of the normal gradual gradient of the valley. In contrast to roads, railroad lines extend usually in a straight line. A railroad system is a network of railroads operated by a single management entity. Fixed railroad installations include service yards, freight or loading yards, passenger stations, and freight stations. A segment is a part of the railroad route characterized by uniform loadbearing traffic capacity and operating characteristics. The endpoints of a segment are defined by nodes along the route at which the number of tracks or the gauge of the track changes. They include change of a route or system terminal or a terminal or junction where rail traffic may be diverted onto another route, change in load-bearing capacity, speed, or traffic capacity; a point where electrification starts and ends, or method of power transfer is changed; or a point where a change in traffic control methods occurs, such as international boundary crossings. Railroad bridges are vulnerable points on a line of communications. They can be either fixed or movable. All bridges present a potential restriction to traffic. A tunnel is an underground section of the route that has been bored or made by cut-and-cover as route passage. Galleries and snow-heads are protective structures built in rugged, mountainous terrain. Galleries offer protection against snow and rock avalanches, while snow-heads offer protection against snow accumulations and slides on exposed sections of the permanent way. 14 Navigable waterways include natural rivers, canalized rivers, lakes, and inland artificial canals. Natural rivers are made navigable by dredging and bank protection. Navigation on natural rivers is subject to some seasonal restrictions such as drought or floods and ice. Many rivers must be regulated by constructing locks to make them fully navigable. These canalized rivers allow vessels to proceed from one water level to another through the series of locks. Navigation on artificial canals can depart from the

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natural valleys and pass through hills and watersheds, crossing valleys and streams along an artificial channel. Navigable waterways are subject to various geographic and physical restrictions that influence not only their construction but also their maintenance and operations. In contrast to roads, railways, or pipelines-which are easily adaptable to irregular natural features-waterways are confined to moderate gradients. The carrying capacity of ships and barges is larger than that of railroads and roads. They also require port facilities for smooth operations. Fog and ice substantially reduce the total traffic-moving capacity and increase the hazards for waterborne traffic. The operational commanders and their staffs must also evaluate the effect of seaborne transportation system in a theater on the planning and the execution of a major operation or campaign. Specifically, a seaborne transportation system consists of shipping, ports, harbors, anchorages, cargo handling and storage facilities, marshalling areas, and shipbuilding and ship repair facilities. Ports can be large, moderate, or limited in their capacity to accommodate merchant vessels. The analysis also includes the number and location of ports and harbors, their oceanographic characteristics, and the ability to shelter vessels. Shipping traffic is analyzed based on the type of ships used in a certain sea or ocean area, shipping density per square mile, number of ships using certain sea area, especially ship traffic in the straits or narrows, etc. All the elements of the air transportation system in a given theater must be evaluated as well. Among other things, this includes type and size of aircraft, number, location and size of airports and airstrips, number and size of air corridors, and their traffic densities. Conclusion: The operational commanders and their staffs must evaluate all aspects of the factor of space. As in other aspects of their work, their perspective is necessarily broader in terms of space and time. In contrast to tactical commanders who focus on the employment of forces in a battle, or engagements in a given combat zone or sector or area of operations, the operational commanders must properly evaluate the effect of both natural and artificial features of the physical space on the planning and execution of a major operation or campaign in a given theater of operations. Hence, in terms of forces, they evaluate the effect of theater features on the employment of multiservice forces. The component commanders on their part focus on the effect of the physical space on the employment of respective service forces in planning and conducting a major operation. The operational commanders and their staffs must know and understand tactical characteristics of the physical space as well, because they are the basis for deriving those aspects of space that affect the employment of combat forces in a major operation or campaign. The analysis of the operational features of the terrain is reflected in the quality of the plans and orders for a major operation or campaign. The consequences of ignoring or neglecting proper evaluation of the effect of physical features of the theater in the planning, preparation, and execution of major operations or campaigns are invariably serious, and sometime fatal.

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Notes 1. Hermann Foertsch, The Art of Modern Warfare, translated by Theodore W. Knauth (New York: Veritas Press, 1940), p. 40. 2. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual FM 5-33: Terrain Analysis ( Washington, DC: 1 1 July 1990), p. 1-1. 3. John E. Sray, Mountain Warfare: The Russian Perspective (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, March 1994), pp. 4-5, 9; Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-5: Operations ( Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 5 May 1986), p. 82. 4. Sray, Mountain Warfare. The Russian Perspective, p. 2. 5. Marcus L. Powell, "Mountain Operations," Military Review 1 (January 1953), pp. 6-7, 10; Sray, Mountain Warfare: The Russian Perspective, pp. 6, 8. 6. Sray, Mountain Warfare: The Russian Perspective, pp. 2, 5; Headquarters, U.S. Army, FM 100-5: Operations (1986), p. 82. 7. Friedrich von Bernhardi, On War of To-Day, Vol. 2, Combat and Conduct of War (New York, NY: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1914), p. 261; Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 5-101: Mohilitv ( Washington, DC, January 1985), pp. 5, 9. 8. Harold A. Winters, et al., Battling the Elements. Weather and Terrain in the Conduct of War (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1998), p. 3. 9. Charles B. MacDonald, "The Neglected Ardennes," Military Review 4 (April 1963), pp. 75-76, 78. 10. Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes. The Anatomy of Failures in War (New York: Vintage Books, 1st ed., 1991), pp. 202-3. 11. Martin Blumenson, "Beyond the Beaches," Military Review, 9 (September 1962), p. 72. The hedgerow is a fence, half earth, and half hedge. The wall at the base is a dirt parapet varying in thickness from one to four or more feet and in height from three to twelve feet. Growing out of the wall is a hedge of hawthorn, brambles, vines, and trees, in thickness from one to three feet, in height from three to fifteen feet. 12. Device consisted of two steel blades fastened to the front of a tank and acting like a scythe; so equipped tanks cut through the bank of earth and hedges allowing them to penetrate obstacles on an even keel and with their guns firing; Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York, NY: DaCapo, 1986), pp. 269. 13. FM 5-33: Terrain Analysis (1990), p. 1-2. 14. Ibid., p. 1-4; Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 5-102: Countermobilitv ( Washington, DC: 14 March 1985), p. 7. 1 5. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 90-5: Jungle Operations ( Washington, DC: 16 August 1 982), p. 6. 1 6. FMS-33: Terrain Analysis, p. 1-12; Winters, et al., Battling the Elements , p. 3. 17. FM 5-102: Countermobility , p. 4.

14 6

18. Center for Military History, U.S. Army, CMH Pub 104-5: Terrain Factors in the Russian Campaign ( Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1st printed July 1951, facsimile printing 1982, 1986), pp. 2-3, 16. 19. FM 5-102: Countermobility, pp. 4-6. 20. Blumenson, "Beyond the Beaches," pp. 72-3. 21. FM 5-102: Countermobility, p. 7. 22. Frank Didwiszus, Der Einfluss des Gelaendes auf die Durchfuehrung von Operationen der Landstreitkraefe. Eine Untersuchung am Beispiel des finnisch-russichen Winterkrieges 1939140 and der deutschen Ardennenoffensive 1944145 (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, December 1968), pp. 2-4. 23. Alfred Philippi and Ferdinand Heim, Der Feldzug_Gegen Sowietrussland 1941 bis 1945 (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1962), p. 33; Bryan T. Fugate, Operation Barbarossa, Strategy and Tactics on the Eastern Front, 1941 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1984), p. 65; CMH Pub 104-5: Terrain Factors in the Russian Campaign, p. 31 24. Juergen-Hans Schmidt, "Der Einfluss des Gelaendes auf die Durchfuehrung von Operationen der Landstreitkraefte," Wehrwissenschafiliche Rundschau 3 (March 1970), p. 146. 25. FM 5-33: Terrain Analysis, p. 1-12 26. Ibid. pp. 1-9 and 1-10. 27. Winters, et al., Battling the Elements , pp. 192-3. 28. Franz Werb, Raum-Zeit-Mittel als Faktoren Strategischer Zielsetzung (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, February 1965), p. 21. 29. FM 5-102: Countermobility, p. 10. 30. Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, United States Army in World War 11. The European Theater of Operations ( Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1989), pp. 272-4. 31. Climate refers to the average and range of meteorological conditions over an extended period. Weather refers to meteorological conditions at a given time or during a short period (such as temperature, wind, and precipitation). 32. M.P. Srivistava, "Weather and War," Indian Air Force Quarterly (January 1951), reprinted Military Review 9 (September 1951), p. 105; Charles B. MacDonald, "The Neglected Ardennes," Military Review 4 (April 1963), p. 78. 33. CMH Pub 104-6: Effects ol'Climate on Combat in European Russia ( Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, replaced DA Pam 20-291, February 1952), p. 29. 34. FM 5-102: Countermobility, p. 5; FM 5-101: Mobility, p. 5. 35. Albert Seaton, The Russo-German War 1941-45 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1971), p. 199. 36. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 5-101: Mobility ( Washington, DC, January 1985), pp. 4--5; FM 5-102: Countermobility, pp. 7-8. 37. Harlan G. Koch, "Monsoons and Military Operations," Military Review 6 (June 1965), pp. 27-8.

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38. FM 1 00-5 Operations (1986), p. 83; FM 90-5: Jungle Operations, p. 2. 39. Mangrove is a shrub-like tree that grows three to sixteen feet high; FM 90-5: Jungle Operations, pp. 5--6. 40. Andre Gimond, "Desert Warfare," L'Armee Fran(aise (October and November 1 947). Translated and published in Military Review 8 (August 1 948), p. 73. 41. Ibid., pp. 74, 77. 42. FM 1 00-5 Operations (1986), p. 84.

43. FM 1 00-5 Operations (1986), p. 84. 44. Headquarters, Department of the Army and the Marine Corps, FM ( Washington, DC: 24 August 1 993), pp. 5, 2.

90-3: Desert Operations

45. Ibid, p. 5. 46. Ibid, pp. 6-7. 47. Ibid, pp. 8, 18. 48. Ibid., p. 23. 49. Ibid., pp, 1 5-6; l , 17. 50. Gimond, "Desert Warfare," p. 74; FM 90-3: Desert Operations, p. 10. 51. Hermann Hoelter, "Significance of Roads in Impassable Terrain," Wehrkunde 2 (February 1 957); reprinted Military Review 9 (September 1 957), p. 86. 52. Raymond L.V. Pearson, "Operations in the Taiga," Military Review 4 (April 1 957), pp. 41-2. 53. Northern operations in U.S. terms arc those northern areas of the northern hemisphere that lie north of the temperate zone where environmental conditions require the application of special techniques and equipment that normally are not required for operations in more temperate zones; Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 31-71: Northern Operations ( Washington, DC: 21 June 1 971), p. 2. 54. Ibid., pp. 9--10. 55. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 31-71: Northern Operations, p. 8; Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 9-207: Operations and Maintenance of Ordnance Materiel in Cold Weather ( Washington, DC: 20 March 1 998), p. 5. 56. FM 31-71: Northern Operations, p. 9. 57. Ibid., p. 9; Schmidt, "Der Einfluss des Gelaendes auf die Durchfuehrung von Operationen der Landstreitkraefte," Part 2, p. 153; Didwiszus, Der Einfluss des Gelaendes auf die Durchfuehrung von Operationen der Landstreitkraefte. Eine Untersuchung am Beispiel des,finnisch-russichen Winterkrieges 1939140 rrnd der deutschen Ardennen-offensive 1944/45, pp. 3, 11. 58. CMH 104-5: Terrain Factors in the Russian Campaign, pp. 9-11. 59. CMH Pub 1 04-6:E/fects of Climate on Combat in European Russia, pp. 5, 3.

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60. [bid., pp. 8, 10. 61. CMH Pub 104-6: Effects q,/'Climate on Combat in European Russia, pp. 4, 11, 19. 62. FM 100-5: Operations (1986), p. 84-5. 63. Large cities have a population greater than 100,000; towns and small cities, 3,000-100,000; villages, fewer than 3,000; Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 90-10: Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOOT) ( Washington, DC: 15 August 1979), pp. 2-3. 63. Marcus Tanner, Croatia. A Nation Forged in War (New Haven, CT/London: Yale University Press, 1 997), p. 267. 64. Eduardo de Ory, "Defense of Built-Up Areas," Ejercito (December 1947); reprinted in Military Review 7 (July 1948), pp. 106-7. 65. FM 90-10:Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT), p. 7. 66. To be an obstacle for military movement such features must be at least one and a half feet high and 820 feet long and have a slope greater than 45 percent that military vehicles are unable to negotiate; FM 5-33: Terrain Analysis, p. 1-15 67. FM 5-102: Countermobilitv, p.11. 68. Cuty are thoroughfares or passages constructed through high area; fills are surfaces that have been built up or raised to bring a low area to the same level as the surrounding surface; FM 5-33: Terrain Analysis, p. 1-15. 69. Tetrahedron, also called "Rommel's Asparagus," were pyramid-shaped clusters of angle iron that resembled black cruciform flowers. 70. Hedgehogs were erected in several rows at the depth between twelve and seventeen feet above the low tide mark; they were designed to rip through the bottom of the tanks as they move toward the beach; Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, United States Army in World War 11, the European Theater of Operations (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1989), pp. 249-50. 71. FM 5-33: Terrain Analysis, p. 2-3. 72. Ibid. 73. Ibid., pp. 2-12 and 2-13, 2-15.

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THEATER GEOMETRY It is a power plus position that constitutes an advantage over power without a position, or more instructively equations of force are composed of power and position in varying degrees, surplus in one tending to compensatefor deficiency in the other. Alfred T. Mahan An army ought only to have one line of operations. This should be preserved with care, and never abandoned but in the last extremity. Napoleon I Any theater contains a large number of seemingly random natural and artificial features that significantly affect the planning and execution of military action at any level of war. The main elements of any theater are positions, distances, base of operations, physical objectives, decisive points, lines of operations, lines of retreat, and lines of communications. They may have tactical, operational, or strategic significance. A key to evaluating the military importance of these features is not only their number and characteristics, but also their relative position and distance from each other-the geometry of the situation. Therefore, it is critically important that the operational commanders and their staffs know and understand the advantages and disadvantages of these elements to ensure the most effective employment of their own and the enemy forces. Positions: Despite technological advances, geography still considerably influences the employment of forces on both sides. Any theater always contains a number of militarily i mportant geographic positions that are, or could be, used for offense or defense. Obviously, the higher the military value of a position, the more critical it is to defend, control, or neutralize it. For the attacker, it is of utmost importance to seize or neutralize early on a few controlling positions in a part of the theater controlled by the defender. Not only the number but also their distance and directional orientation of positions in the theater as a whole or its parts are determining factors in evaluating their value for either side. War on land, at sea, or in the air is greatly influenced by the overall geostrategic positions of both sides. Germany's geostrategic position on land was more favorable in both world wars than any of its neighbors. In World War 1, however, Germany's maritime position in the North Sea was very unfavorable because the Royal Navy controlled both the sea's northern and southern exit (see Map A-5). In World War I, the Royal Navy dominated the German exit to the open ocean through the northern passage between

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Scotland and Norway. The Royal Navy, based at Scapa Flow (Scotland), was only 575 miles from the main base of the German High Seas Fleet in Jade Bay. This distance equaled the maximum cruising radius of the High Seas Fleet. In contrast, the German geostrategic position inside the Baltic in 1914 was far more favorable because the narrowness of the Danish Straits, combined with control of the Kiel Canal, prevented the British from sending any reinforcements to their embattled ally, Tsarist Russia. Compared with what it had been before 1914, Russia's position in the Baltic was seriously weakened in the aftermath of the Bolshevik takeover of power in November 1917. Between 1918 and 1939, the Soviets controlled only Leningrad and its immediate surroundings in the Gulf of Finland. This situation changed in June 1940, when Soviet troops invaded the Baltic States and obtained the use of a number of bases for the Soviet Baltic Fleet. The Soviets further improved their naval position in the Baltic in the aftermath of World War II by virtue of their control over Poland and East Germany. However, after the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Navy had left its naval base on the island of Ruegen (East Germany) and at Swinioujscie (Stettin) in Poland. By then, the three formerly Soviet Baltic Republics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) had obtained their independence and denied the use of their ports to the new Russian Navy, and of their airfields to Russian land-based aircraft. Before the opening of hostilities with Italy in June 1940, France possessed a strong maritime position in the western part of the Mediterranean by having a large naval base at Toulon and numerous airfields on the coast of Provence and at the Rhone estuary. The most important route between Marseilles and Algiers was covered eastward partially by the island of Corsica and its naval base at Ajaccio. In the southern part of the Mediterranean, France controlled the entire coast of North Africa with its important and well-equipped naval bases and airfields: Bizerte, Bone, Phillipeville, Algiers, and Oran. In the eastern Mediterranean, French control was limited to its protectorate in Syria, where Beirut on the Lebanese coast was used as a fleet base, and aircraft were based in the interior of the country. Britain's largest and best-equipped base in the area was at Alexandria. Numerous airfields in the Nile Valley and elsewhere in Egypt secured airspace to the Libyan border and allowed the Allies to check the Italian base in Tobruk with relative ease. The British also controlled the Suez Canal and possessed naval bases and airfields in Palestine and Cyprus, thereby covering their traffic routes along the eastern Mediterranean. The value of a maritime position is greatly improved if one's naval forces and aircraft can strike the enemy's sea communications from short range. Its value is even higher if it lies near several crisscrossing shipping routes. After the fall of France in June 1940, the Germans acquired naval and air bases that flanked the British Isles. This not only complicated the British home defense, but also greatly weakened British control of the approaches to the North Atlantic. The occupation of France allowed German surface forces and aircraft to use bases a few hundred miles or less from the Allied main trade routes. This also saved the German U-boats a 1,500-mile passage each way. Not only was Allied shipping in the English and Bristol Channels constantly subjected to Luftwaffe's attacks, but also the usefulness of the main English dockyards in Portsmouth and Plymouth was much diminished. By controlling the French coast, the Germans had also i mproved the chances of their heavy ships' successfully striking Allied shipping in the

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open ocean. With Germans possessing bases in the Bay of Biscay, practically all hope of interception (once the initial breakout from the North Sea had succeeded) was gone. If British forces had been allowed to use a harbor in southwestern Ireland, equipped and defended as a fleet base, Britain's naval position would have been greatly enhanced to intercept German surface raiders and fighting U-boats. One British advantage was that the only major dockyard available to the Germans in southwestern approaches, at Brest, was well within range of British bombers.' Sometimes a poorly selected geostrategic position acquired in peacetime proved a source of weakness, and not of strength, as had been expected. In Russia's war with Japan in 1904-1905, the two territories involved in Russia's dispute with Japan, the Liaotung Peninsula (Liaodong Bandao) and Korea, were isolated at the end of primitive lines of communications. The two largest Russian naval bases in the Far East-Port Arthur (Lushun) and Vladivostok-were not only beyond mutual supporting distance, but their link across the sea was tenuous at best because the Japanese controlled the Strait of Korea. For both the Russians and the Japanese, success depended upon command of the Yellow Sea during the early stages of war, when Japan could be expected to land its armies in Korea and on the Liaotung Peninsula. In the long run, command of the Sea of Japan was a prerequisite if Russia were to send its armies across the sea to Japan's home islands . 2 A position represented by a large island or several islands near each other has always been one of the main elements of control of the adjacent sea or ocean area. The geographic position of the British Isles allowed the Royal Navy to operate offensively in the narrow seas fronting Western Europe, while the vast open spaces of the Atlantic Ocean protected the country's rear. In World War 1, the main British trade routes in the Atlantic were beyond easy reach of the German fleet deployed in the North Sea. In contrast, the German routes could be easily cut off either in the English Channel or off Scotland. To defend the country's position at sea, the Royal Navy did not have to operate offensively, as did the German Navy. 3 The fifteen-mile-long island of Malta has played a vital role in British strategy for the Mediterranean ever since its capture in September 1800. Its great military strategic importance was due largely to its commanding position in the approaches to the western and eastern Mediterranean. Malta lies near the midpoint of the Mediterranean, about 820 miles from Alexandria and 990 miles from Gibraltar. The island was only fifty nautical miles away from Sicily, 190 nautical miles from the Libyan coast, and 175 nautical miles from Cape Bon (Tunisia). Malta's importance was shown most dramatically in World War II when it served as an air and naval base from which the Italian convoys to Libya were attacked. The 775-mile-long and the 120-mile wide island of Cuba occupies the key strategic position in the Caribbean. It lies astride the sea communications to and from the Gulf of Mexico and the Panama Canal. It also lies near the route to and from the Central and South Atlantic and the U.S. East Coast. Cuba holds the key to and from the entrance to the Straits of Florida, the Yucatan Channel, the Windward Passage, and Mona Passage. Jamaica, one-fifth the size of Cuba lies almost equidistant between Colon (Panama Canal) and Key West. Forces operating from Jamaica flank all the routes to the southern

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approaches to Cuba and those from the Gulf of Mexico to Colon or passing through the Windward Passage to Colon. The strategic importance of international straits, especially those offering the sole exit from an enclosed sea, was demonstrated repeatedly throughout recorded history. A power that controlled one and especially both shores of certain straits used for international trade in an enclosed sea enjoys an almost unassailable strategic position. The Strait of Gibraltar is the only passageway between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. The strait is about forty miles long and from eight to twenty-four miles wide. On the Atlantic side, the access to the Strait of Gibraltar is triangular, running from the Cape of Saint Vincent to Rota to Tarifa and Ceuta. On the Mediterranean side, the approaches to the strait encompass sea area between Cartagena, Melilla, Tarifa, and Ceuta, while the Alboran and the Balearic Islands lie in the background . 4 Control of the sea's only exit is insufficient in itself to prevent the weaker fleet from having freedom of action in some areas of a given enclosed or semi-enclosed sea. Thus, in addition to the sea's only exit, full or partial control of operationally significant positions must be maintained as well. In the Mediterranean, the Sicilian Narrows, the Messina Strait, and the Strait of Otranto all have operational significance. The seventymile-wide Sicilian Narrows are the natural passage between the eastern and western basin of the Mediterranean. The Messina Strait separates Sicily from the Italy's mainland, while the forty-mile-wide Strait of Otranto separates Albania's and Italy's coast, and is the only exit and entrance of the Adriatic Sea. The strategic importance of the sea's exit is also enhanced by the existence of a number of operationally significant island positions guarding its approaches from the open ocean. The strategic value of the Strait of Gibraltar could have been much greater if the British had also controlled the island of Madeira some 620 miles to the west and the Azores an additional 520 miles to the west. Likewise, the strategic value of a sea's exit is greater if the same power also controls a number of operationally important positions in its relative proximity and within a given narrow sea. In the case of Gibraltar, it was critically important for the British to control the island of Alboran some 130 miles to the east and the Balearics about 520 miles to northeast in the western part of the Mediterranean. Central versus Exterior Position: The relative position of the base of operations of the two opposing forces often plays an important role in the outcome of military actions. Whenever a force occupies a position interposed between two or more enemy forces, it is said to occupy a central (or interior) position. Such a position offers some advantages in both offense and defense. A force operating from a central position enjoys shorter lines of operations and thereby could concentrate more quickly at a selected point within its effective striking range than a hostile force moving along the periphery. Operating from a central position has the additional advantage that the enemy cannot easily concentrate its forces. 5 The enemy could be decisively beaten by obtaining local superiority before other forces can intervene at the threatened area. Germany occupies a central strategic position on land, while Great Britain holds a central position in respect to the West European landmass, and the Atlantic Ocean and adjacent seas. In World War II, the German Army

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and the Luftwaffe operated from a central position against their enemies on the eastern and western front. Among the disadvantages of operating from a central position is that one's forces on land would have great difficulty in forcing a decision, especially when the theater is large, as the German experiences in Russia in both world conflicts illustrates: the farther one pushes one's enemy back, the more difficult is to surround and destroy him.' If a force occupying a central position is attacked simultaneously from several directions, its forces could be fragmented. x A force operating from a central position has a difficult task ensuring the security of lines of supply once hostilities start. The problem of ensuring adequate supplies could only be resolved if additional adjacent land or maritime area, gained by conquest, can provide sufficient resources to continue the work of the wartime economy. Britain essentially cut off Germany's maritime trade with overseas markets in September 1939, at the outset of World War II, without firing a shot. 9 During World War I, the Royal Navy, by concentrating superior forces in home waters, controlled the oceanic supply lines to and from the northern and western coast of Europe. At the operational level, the British Grand Fleet, by its disposition in the Firth of Forth, occupied a central position in respect to the German High Seas Fleet and its bases had the latter moved either to the northern exit or south past the Texel-Yarmouth line. Likewise, the High Seas Fleet, by occupying a central position between the North Sea and the Baltic, precluded the Grand Fleet from operating in the Baltic Sea. Japan occupies a central position in respect to the adjacent Asian landmass and any hostile force approaching from across the Pacific. In World War II, the Japanesecontrolled Philippines and Netherlands East Indies (NEI) also occupied a central position in the western Pacific. Because of its size and central position, the island of Luzon dominated the sea and air routes to and from the South China Sea northward toward Formosa and Japan. Likewise, the Japanese control of the islands of Java, Timor, and Sumatra provided them a strong central position to use their air and naval forces against any Allied force approaching the archipelago from the south or the west. A side occupies an exterior (or flanking) position when it lies along the periphery of the enemy's center. A force operating from such a position could move against one or both of the enemy's flanks. In an offensive, a force operating from the exterior position could carry out single-sided envelopment or wide movement. l ° It can also threaten or carry out surprise attacks from multiple directions against diverse points on the enemy's periphery. The exterior position allows one's forces to draw the opposing force away from its assigned physical objective. However, to ensure success, one's forces should be more numerous and more mobile than hostile forces operating from the central position. Because of the short distances involved, exterior positions are relatively more valuable in a semi-enclosed or enclosed sea than on the open ocean. The effect of the German occupation of France in 1940 on the British shipping routes in their own home waters was considerable because the German naval and air bases "flanked" the British routes in the English Channel and along the country's eastern coast. The British could no longer use the Channel, except for a trickle of coastal trade. Likewise, the Axis' landbased aircraft and light forces based on Sicily and Sardinia and in Libya enjoyed a great advantage of position by flanking the Allied shipping route between Malta and Gibraltar. In World War II, the Allied forces operated strategically from the exterior position for

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most of the war in the Pacific. Operationally, the Japanese Combined Fleet moved from the exterior position stretching in an arc from their home islands, the Ryukyus, Formosa, and Singapore toward the Philippines. In operational terms, NATO's air and sea forces also operated from the exterior position in the Kosovo Conflict of 1999. At the strategic level, the country's (or group of countries'), strategic position dictates whether the armed forces as a whole would occupy a central or exterior position in respect to the enemy forces deployed in the adjacent land and sea areas and airspace. That relationship could change only little or with great difficulty in the course of a war. l However, in operational and tactical terms, whether a force operates from the central or the exterior position depends on the characteristics of the physical space (land, sea, or airspace) in which it operates. Nazi Germany occupied a central geostrategic position on land. However, the German Army and the Luftwaffe operated from the exterior position in their invasion of Poland in September 1939 and the former Yugoslavia in April 1941. In some situations, forces on land might operate from a central position, while land-based aircraft operate from the exterior position. In the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the Coalition land forces and land-based aircraft based in Saudi Arabia operated from a central position while the land-based aircraft deployed in Turkey and naval forces deployed in the Arabian Gulf, Eastern Mediterranean, and the Red Sea operated from the exterior position. A force that changes its medium in the course of a major operation also changes its position in respect to a hostile force. A unique feature of all amphibious and airborne landings is a major shift in relative position of a landing force, from the initial exterior position to a central position. Bases: Any major operation or campaign, regardless of its purpose, must use a certain physical space from where one's forces start to move toward their respective physical objectives, or find a refuge if forced to retreat or withdraw. Therefore, one of the principal tasks of national and military strategy in peacetime is to build and develop or acquire a sufficient number of army posts (garrisons), supply depots and facilities, naval bases and anchorages, and airfields on the home territory and often also overseas. Optimally, a theater should have a fully developed system of army posts, naval bases, and airfields in peacetime. The operational commander should also plan actions and measures required to expand the existing bases and to establish new ones. The number, size, and type of bases are directly related to the size and mix of forces and assets deployed (or to be deployed) in a given theater of operations. Political, diplomatic, economic, and, increasingly, environmental considerations greatly affect basing at the theater-strategic and operational level. Options range from permanent bases and facilities to temporary facilities in time of crisis. Bases in forward areas are usually within the operational reach of the potential opponents. Such areas should have an infrastructure in place that will support the operational and sustaining requirements of deployed forces. The infrastructure should also provide some degree of protection from enemy attack. In general, the main purpose of a base is to act as a focus of power as close to the potential enemy as possible. Bases can serve for offense, defense, and offense-defense. They can be permanent or temporary, major or minor. Permanent bases are built on one's territory or sometimes on the territory of a friendly country. Bases should be established

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in the theater so that advantageous lines can be established relative to objectives; bases will exert great influence on lines of operations and objectives." The military value of a base depends greatly on the adequacy of its resources and surrounding territory. The more abundant the resources, the greater its military value. The possession of large number of bases offers significant advantages for deployment, maneuver, and redeployment of one's forces and for the use of the most suitable bases for their deployment and redeployment. Relying on a single major base in wartime is invariably a detriment, because one's forces must use the same line of operation for both attack and retreat. This, in turn would resolve the enemy's problem in monitoring movements of one's forces. A base should not be too far from its basic sources of supply. It should have good communications with the interior of the country or territory. It should be protected from attack from the land, from the sea, and especially from the air. Optimally, the most important bases should be beyond effective range of enemy aircraft. A base connected with its sources of supply by several railroad tracks and roads is generally superior to one with weak or nonexistent links to the country's interior. A balance must be found between selecting a base that is close to the prospective theater of operations and the one that is farther away but more secure from enemy attack. A force should operate along short lines of operations, and that means that its base should not be too far away. The greater the distance, the longer the lines of operations along which a force must move to reach its assigned physical objective; the longer the lines of supply, the larger the forces that must be assigned to protect them. Base of Operations: A base of operations consists of two or more bases linked with an imaginary line, thereby encompassing a land or coastal area in which one's forces are assembled, and then sustained in the course of a combat action. 1 2 In the broadest understanding of the term, the entire country's territory with all its resources could be considered a base of operations. In a maritime theater, the command of the sea allows the superior sea power to expand the width of the base of operations for its army, stretching from the home base to the enemy-controlled coastline. The British achieved this in the Peninsular War (in Spain) in 1809, as did the Allies in the invasion of Normandy in June 1944. In land warfare, a defensive line is often confused with a base of operations; an area seized by one's forces after the completion of a major operation is sometimes confused with a base of operations. In the past, a base of operations was understood as a geographical line whose possession was secured through fortresses. Major operations in a land campaign were aimed to seize a base of operations for the next campaign. 13 A base of operations for an army is established in a part of the theater controlled by one's forces and containing all sources of power from which an army draws supplies, ammunition, personnel, weapons, and equipment. The wider the base is, the freer the army to conduct its movements. However, the more distant the army is from its base, the more difficult it is to retain striking power and the more vulnerable are its extended lines of communications to enemy attack. This, in turn, requires increasingly more forces to protect the army's lines of communications with its base of operations. In the era of preNapoleonic wars, when the armies were small, it was sufficient to possess several fortresses and supply depots to serve as the base of operations. However, with the advent

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of general conscription during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, armies became progressively larger and this required ever larger quantities of supplies to maintain the armies in the field. In 1806 Napoleon I used a base of operations extending in a large arc from Passau, Germany, to the lower part of the Rhine River; this allowed Napoleon I to strike in the flank of the advancing Prussian army without endangering his rear lines of supply. Secure and efficient rear links with the base of operations is the main prerequisite for maintaining an army's striking power. Otherwise, its striking power declines rapidly. Among other things, inadequate security of his rear lines of communications forced Napoleon I to withdraw from Moscow in 1812. Overly long and inadequate lines of supplies significantly limited the effectiveness of the Russian army in Manchuria in 1904. 14 A good base of operations on land should provide a favorable position for the conduct of the forthcoming operations. It should have good and reliable communications with the hinterland and with the army in the field. One of the most important conditions for a base of operations is to ensure reliable and secure supply lines, thereby allowing sufficient freedom of movement for one's forces. It is always an advantage on land when a base is connected with, or lies near several important rail lines and roads. A favorable base of operations should possess a certain depth to facilitate defense from attack on land or from the air. When the theater borders with the sea, the fleet forces could protect a base of operations for ground forces. In the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 1895, the Japanese Army crossed the Yalu River and advanced into Manchuria, steadily extending the distance from its base of operations in Korea. The Japanese fleet supported the army by seizing Port Arthur and later Wei-hai-Wei. A favorable base of operations should provide multiple and short lines of operations. It must allow for several operational directions thereby allowing greater freedom of action.' 5 It should also provide a secure and uninterrupted links with the country's interior. In generic terms, main and intermediate bases of operations on land can be differentiated. The main base of operations is usually located on one's territory and is used by the army to start its operations toward accomplishing the principal physical objective in a theater. An intermediate base of operations is established or is obtained during the course of a major operation or campaign (see Figure 7). When an offensive major operation or campaign is extended at great distance, it is advantageous to establish an intermediate base of operations to facilitate logistical support and sustainment. Moreover, such a base allows the use of shorter lines of operations for the next phase of a major operation or campaign. It also greatly facilitates protection of one's lines of operations and lines of supply. The main factors in evaluating the importance of a base of operations are its length, shape or configuration, maneuvering space, force's size and mix, number of lines of operations and lines of supply, distance to the enemy's base of operations, and degree of protection offered to one's forces based there. The longer base of operations is normally preferred over the shorter base, because it offers multiple lines of supply. It offers greater maneuvering space for the movement of one's forces, because a force can use, simultaneously or sequentially, a larger number of lines of operations. It allows deployment of a larger force and selection of a larger number of physical objectives, and hinders envelopment of one's forces during their movement toward the assigned

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objective. A force possessing a longer base of operations can shift its lines of operations and turn the flanks of the enemy's position without sacrificing the security of its lines of Figure 7: MAIN AND INTERMEDIATE BASE OF OPERATIONS

supply. It also can always seek safety either from damages or destruction by retreating along one of the adjacent lines of operations, assuming it has air superiority in the area. However, a long base of operations requires relatively large forces for defense, and the coordination of movements of one's forces is difficult. A longer base of operations is usually more advantageous for offense than a shorter base. Generally, such a base of operations allows use of larger number of lines of operations. By using several lines of operations, the attacker is less in danger of a sudden raid in his rear that might paralyze his operations. The attacker also has greater freedom of moving forward. The longer base of operations forces the defender to divide his forces because he is not sure which line of operations the attacker is going to use. An extended base that presents a reentrant angle to the enemy is more advantageous to an invading army than a straight line, because the lines of operations are shorter and can be more easily protected if the army is compelled to shift its line of operations. 16 In a maritime theater, a string of naval and air bases along the eastern coast of England and Scotland from the Strait of Dover to Scapa Flow formed a long base of operations in both world conflicts. In World War 11, the German Kriegsmarine enjoyed the advantages of a long base of operations stretching from the North Cape to the southern part of the French Atlantic coast. The German U-boats, heavy surface ships, and land-based aircraft had almost unhindered access to the open waters of the Atlantic, while the British naval position was in danger of being enveloped from both the north and south. Likewise, the Germans enjoyed a long base of operations in the Baltic in 1939 where they controlled some 745 miles of the coast, while their potential opponent, Soviet Russia, controlled only a 125-mile stretch of coastline in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland. 1 7 In the aftermath of World War 11, the former Soviet Navy and Air Force enjoyed the advantage of operating from a long base of operations stretching from the

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Gulf of Finland and along the coasts of the three former Soviet Baltic Republics, Poland, and the former East Germany. A short base of operations is formed when the angle at which lines of operations and the objective meet is acute. A short base of operations usually does not require a large force for its defense, and coordination of movements of one's forces is relatively simple. The shorter the base, the smaller the basing area and the easier it is for the enemy force to envelop it. Such a base also has fewer, but more closely spaced lines of operations. i s A short base of operations restricts maneuvering area, placing one's forces in danger of being enveloped or cut off from their supplies. The German High Seas Fleet was restricted in projecting its power beyond the confines of the North Sea in World War I because of its short base of operations and the fact that Entente's forces controlled both sea's exits. In other words, the High Seas Fleet was able to operate tactically, but not operationally, against the Entente's maritime trade in the Atlantic. The Russian Baltic Fleet today operates from a very short base of operations in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland and from the even shorter base of operations in the Kaliningrad District enclave, squeezed between Lithuania and Poland. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) also operate from a short base of operations because of the country's short length and even shorter width. The shape or configuration of a base of operations still affects the employment of naval forces and aircraft of both sides in a conflict. Army supply bases and facilities usually do not have a distinctive shape, because they are located randomly throughout the theater. Sometimes airfields are concentrated in a certain part of the theater, forming airfield complexes or clusters. The shape of a base of operations for maritime forces is by contrast very distinctive because of the length of coastline and offshore islands and their directional orientation. In generic terms, a base of operations can extend in a straight line, broken line, angular line, curved line, and triangle. A base of operations roughly extending in a straight line generally offers no advantage from its configuration (see Figure 8). Such a base can run parallel, athwart, or at some angle to the enemy's base of operations. A force, operating from a base of operations that lies parallel to that of the enemy, can relatively easily strike at the enemy's lines of advance and retreat. A straight base of operations extending at an angle or oblique to the enemy's base of operations allows one's forces to threaten the enemy's flanks and sea lines of communications. A centrally located base of operations offers shorter and more secure lines of operations than one on the enemy's flanks. However, these long lines of operations are more vulnerable to enemy attack and make covert movement more difficult. If the imaginary lines that connect the adjacent naval bases successively run at an angle with respect to the enemy's base of operations, that base of operations is said to extend in a broken line. A good example of such a base of operations was the string of former Soviet-Warsaw Pact naval bases and airfields along the eastern coast of the Baltic. The German Navy occupied a similar position in the Baltic during 1941-1944. A base of operations extending in a broken line offers similar advantages and disadvantages as an oblique base of operations. If the route from one base to another runs between offshore islands or an archipelago, it offers greater security than a base of operations extending along a uniform and exposed coast, but does not necessarily affect speed of advance.

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The angular (or salient) base of operations projects toward the opposing coast. Such a base of operations consists of the two sides or.flanks and an apex. The smaller the angle at the apex, the longer the lines of operations used by naval forces. A salient base allows a massed force to operate from interior and short lines. In addition, the enemy may be uncertain as to whether the main thrust will come from the salient's apex or the flanks. A salient base of operations confers power to the offensive and usually offers only a few lines of operations. Therefore, it is generally ill suited for defense. If a base of operations runs in a curved line, but away from the enemy's coast as for example, the southern coast of the Baltic and the Chinese coast fronting the Yellow Sea it is said to have reentrant shape. Such a base of operations affords the choice of several lines of operations. More advantageous is a base of operations that extends in two different directions with two sides almost perpendicular to each other, and protruding to the enemy base. Then, a double have of operations exists. Control of both sides is secured, forming two widely separated lines of retreat. In general, a reentrant base of operations makes it easier for one's forces to change their lines of operations from one area of operations to another (referred to as castling or leal?fi-ogging of' forces). In addition, a force operating from such a base of operations can carry out attacks against the enemy's maritime trade, while protecting one's maritime trade. The inherent advantage of

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the reentrant-like base of operations accrues only if used with initiative and determination. Bases situated on a relatively small peninsula or within a large river estuary fronted with one or several large islands create a triangle-like base of operations. Such a base of operations usually offers a single line of operations and line of retreat. The triangle-like base generally favors defense from an attack from across the sea and from the air. However, its disadvantages far surpass its advantages. The German Navy's base of operations in the North Sea in World War I was limited to the triangle-like base of operations made up of the estuaries of the Jade, the Weser, and the Elbe Rivers and the island of Heligoland, which contained only three naval bases of significance: Wilhelmshaven, Cuxhaven, and Heligoland. A base of operations must be preserved as long as the major operation is in progress. A shift of base of'operations in the course of a major operation is very difficult. In land warfare, a base of operations should not be changed until the new base has been obtained or created. Great military leaders have always recognized the necessity of maintaining a favorable relationship between operations and a well-equipped and secure base of operations as a prerequisite for success. However, sometimes the situation dictates that one's forces continue for some time with their offensive actions without establishing a new base of operations. In the summer 1864, the Union Army's 100,000 men under General William T. Sherman marched through the heart of the Confederacy from Chattanooga to Atlanta, from Atlanta to Savannah, and then farther through South and North Carolina to Goldsboro and Raleigh without creating a new base of operations. 1 9 This feat was possible because General Sherman had organized large field transportation and supply system and incorporated some features of a modified "flying column" to sustain the advance of his army. General Sherman, in contrast to the Confederate army, was ruthless in foraging from local resources for his troops. 20 In World War 1, the British Army shifted its base of operations from the home islands to the Channel coast in August 1914. Likewise, the Allies shifted their base of operations from England and across the English Channel to the coast of Normandy in the aftermath of their landing in June 1944. Change of base of operations also occurs in the course of an amphibious landing operation. A change of base of operations results in shorter lines of operations for one's forces in the next phase of a major operation or campaign. In the course of the Solomons Campaign, the Allied forces seized operationally significant positions in succession specifically Guadalcanal, New Georgia, and Bougainville which, in turn, allowed them to extend the effective range of land-based aircraft and eventually close the ring from the southeast around the Japanese main naval and air base at Rabaul, New Britain. Land-based aircraft can shift their base of operations because of the change in the weight of effort from one part of the theater to another. Then, entire air units can be moved from their primary airfields either simultaneously or in sequence. In anticipation of the Allied landings in North Africa in November 1942, the Germans drastically increased their air strength in the central Mediterranean. In early November they had some 400 aircraft deployed in Sicily and Sardinia, and about 375 aircraft in Cyrenaica, Libya. On 2 November, the Luftwaffe ordered four air groups of about 150 long-range bombers to move from northern Norway to Catania and Comiso airfields in Sicily and

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Grosseto airfield in mainland Italy. This change of air base of operations took from five to nine days. (One air squadron completed the transfer within forty-eight hours.) In addition, two more air groups were transferred on 6-7 November from Greece and Crete to Sicily. After the Allied landings on 8 November, parts of two other air groups changed their bases from Greece and Crete to Sicily. Simultaneously, the Germans began to move 100125 aircraft, mostly fighters, from Sicily to Tunisia, despite the lack of adequate protection on the ground. A day after the Allied landings, they moved one group of divebombers and two groups of single-engine fighters from Sicily and Sardinia. Four days later one group of single-engine fighters moved from Orel, Russia, to Bizerte, Algeria, and by 15 November, one group, and a squadron of single-engine fighters and one air reconnaissance squadron moved from Sicily to Tunisia. The perceived threat of the Allied landing in southern France led the Germans to move around 16 November some 250 aircraft from their bases in Holland, Belgium, northern France, and Germany to eight airfields in southern France. 21 A change of an air base of operations can also coincide with the change of base for the advancing troops. An air base of operations can also be changed because of the threat on the ground or from the air. The United States moved significant forces into Saudi Arabia and its adjacent sea area within days after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990. The first on scene were one U.S. Navy carrier battle group with carrier air wing, one U.S. Air Force tactical fighter wing, AWACS aircraft deployed from the continental United States (CONUS), and reconnaissance aircraft from Europe. By the end of August, the United States had increased its air strength in the theater to fourteen tactical fighter squadrons, one heavy bomber squadron, four tactical airlift squadrons, and three carrier battle groups. In addition, the British Royal Air Force (RAF) had deployed two fighter squadrons with accompanying tanker and maritime patrol aircraft to the area. 22 Physical Obiectives: Any theater regardless of its size and shape, contains many physical objectives to be seized, held, controlled, or neutralized in case of hostilities. Tactical, operational, and strategic objectives could be differentiated in respect to the effect they would have on the change of military situation in a given theater or its parts after they are accomplished. The larger the scope of physical objectives, the fewer they are. In any theater, there are many tactical objectives, a few operational objectives, and only a single strategic objective to be accomplished in course of a campaign. It is the scope of the objective that determines the size of the physical space (and hence, levels of command to be established) in which one's forces are to be employed, not vice versa. In general, the accomplishment of a tactical, operational, or strategic objective should result in a drastic or radical effect on the next higher military objective and thereby its effect would be felt in a larger area than where a particular combat action took place. Physical objectives could be some geographic feature or a force. They should never be considered in isolation from the other non-military aspects of the situation. Any objective encompasses a range of elements, from purely physical (or tangible) to abstract (or intangible). The higher the level of war, the more complex the objectives are. At the tactical and operational level in conventional war, the respective objectives are usually predominantly physical in character. This is less so at the national-strategic level, where the objectives contain both tangible and intangible elements. In addition to military

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objectives, they include political, diplomatic, economic, informational, legal, environmental, and other aspects. At the tactical level of war, the use of military force aims to accomplish minor or major tactical objectives. Differences between these two are often difficult to determine precisely, usually being only a matter of the commander's judgment and experience. The accomplishment of a major tactical objective would result in a drastic change of the situation in a given area of operations. Examples of major tactical objectives would be the destruction of a carrier battle group, amphibious task force or large convoy, and seizing or holding a large naval base or port or airfield complex. In war on land, a major tactical objective might be the destroying or neutralizing a major element of the enemy division or seizing or successfully defending a large city, critical major road junction or mountain pass, or some controlling heights. In an amphibious operation, major tactical objectives could consist of capturing a beachhead or some important island facing the main landing beach, or seizing control of an important airfield inland. U.S. Rangers landed on the northern tip of the Dinagat Island, Suluan Island, and Homonhan Island on 17-18 October as a preliminary to the main landing of the Allied forces at Leyte on 20 October. These three positions controlled the approaches to Leyte Gulf and collectively constituted a major tactical objective. Subsequently, the Allied landing at Tacloban and seizing the airfield there could also be considered as a major tactical objective. The accomplishment of a minor tactical objective would result in drastic change of a situation in a given combat zone or sector and would most directly contribute to the accomplishment of a major tactical objective The examples of minor tactical objectives is seizure or defense of some key natural or human-made feature such as the hill, valley, river crossing, port/anchorage, village/town, road junction, etc. It also includes destruction or neutralization of force elements such as an army company or battalion, and single or group of ships or aircraft. An operational objective is larger in scope than a tactical objective and hence normally requires a larger force and more time to accomplish. Its accomplishment should have a significant effect on the next higher physical objective and lead to a drastic change of the situation in a given theater of operations. In contrast to a strategic physical objective, an operational objective could be fixed or mobile. In a land theater, an operational objective could be a larger city or industrial basin, an oil-producing area or an oil refinery complex. In the German invasion of Soviet Russia in 1941, capture of Leningrad, Kiev, and Moscow are examples of operational objectives in the purely physical sense. Likewise, the German seizure of the industrial Donbas Basin and the Crimea Peninsula in Ukraine, and their attempted capture of the Caucasian oilfields were each operational objective. For the Allied bombing offensive against Germany, destruction of the industrial Ruhr area, especially the ball-bearing plants and synthetic fuel plants, and the Ploesti oil-producing area in Romania could each be considered an operational objective. In a maritime theater, examples of such objectives are seizing control or successfully defending a large island or archipelago, straits or narrows, a large naval base or commercial port, a large base or airfield complex; or destroying or neutralizing an enemy task force or large convoy. In the Allied Solomons Campaign of 1942-1943, the ultimate theater-strategic objective was accomplished through sequential capture of three

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operational objectives-the islands of Guadalcanal, Bougainville, and New Georgia-and the neutralization of the Japanese naval and air complex at Rabaul, New Britain (see Map A-6). Within the same campaign, the Allied effort to obtain and maintain control of the adjacent sea area and airspace were integral parts of each of these three operational objectives. Sometimes successful attack or defense of a major convoy could also constitute an operational objective. The German destruction of the Allied convoy PQ-17 in July 1942 led to the suspension of all convoy traffic to Russia until November 1943, and thereby the Germans accomplished their operational objective in the Arctic theater. 23 Likewise, the Allies accomplished their operational objective in keeping Malta as a submarine and air base in the central Mediterranean despite great losses suffered by a large convoy (Operation Pedestal) in August 1942 from the Axis aircraft, submarines, and small surface combatants. Sufficient amounts of fuel and other supplies arrived at Malta to keep the base active until the Allied victory in the second battle at El Alamein in November that year, which completely transformed the strategic situation in the Mediterranean theater of operations. The accomplishment of a strategic objective should result in a drastic effect in the situation within a given theater of war. Examples of strategic objectives are destruction or neutralization of the entire enemy fleet or the seizing or holding or defending of a large part of a coast or large archipelago. The Allied and U.S. national-strategic objective in the Pacific was to defeat Japan. The other such objective-in the European Theater-was to defeat Nazi Germany. By the spring of 1942 there were four theater-strategic objectives in the Pacific: three in the Pacific Ocean Area (POA) defense of Alaska and the Aleutians; defense of the U.S. West Coast, Hawaii, and Midway; and defense of island positions and sea routes from the U.S. West Coast and Hawaii to Australia and New Zealand via the southern Pacific-and one in the Southwest Pacific Area (SOWESPAC)-the defense of Australia/New Zealand. The first offensive theater-strategic objective was identified in the summer of 1942, when the Allies decided to initiate a campaign aimed at seizing control of the Solomons Archipelago. In the Philippines Campaign of 1944-1945, the physical theater-strategic objective included control of the Philippines, destruction of the Japanese ground, air, and naval forces deployed there, and cutting off lines of supplies between the vital "Southern Resources Area" and the Japanese home islands. Sometimes several theater strategic objectives can be located near each other. This situation might occur when the attacker, due to the military weakness or lack of unity among his opponents, opts to seize a very large land or maritime area. For the Japanese, in their successful invasion of South East Asia in December 1941-April 1942, the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, Burma, and the Philippines each constituted a theaterstrategic objective. The territory of the enemy's country or groups of enemy countries with their associated sea and ocean area and airspace, and including all the military and non-military resources within that territory, comprises a national (or alliance%oalition) strategic objective. The accomplishment of a national or alliance/coalition strategic objective should result in ending the enemy's organized resistance and the hostilities in a given theater of war . 24 I n World War 11, the U.S. national and coalition strategic objective in the Pacific Theater was defeat of Japan, while in the European Theater it was defeat of Nazi

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Germany and its allies. In the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the U.S./Coalition physical strategic objective was the complete withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Decisive Points: Any theater contains many geographic or human-made features, arbitrarily called decisive points, whose control or defense would give a marked advantage over the opponent. 25 Jomini was the first to use the term decisive point of the theater of war. He claimed that not all decisive points in a theater could be the objective of operations. Jomini differentiated among strategic, geographical, and accidental decisive points. He defined a strategic decisive point as all those points capable of exercising a marked influence upon either the outcome of a campaign or a single military enterprise .26 He considered the capitals to be such points, not because they were centers of communications, but because they were also seats of power and government. Other military theoreticians of that era also considered the capitals, especially if located at i mportant road junctions, as the most decisive strategic point of a state. Seizing the enemy capital would not only inflict devastating losses that would be felt throughout the enemy state, but would also significantly influence public opinion. Thus, the enemy capital was considered the place where the main "weight of effort" [Schwerpunkt] should be directed. A "line of weight of effort" [Schwerpunktlinie] was the direct and shortest line between one's own and the enemy capital along which one's army is expected to operate decisively and reach its objective faster under the same general conditions. 27 Jomini defined decisive geographic points and lines as those having permanent importance and a consequence on the country's configuration. Large rivers and valleys were examples of such points. In addition, he considered as decisive geographic points possession of points that control the junction of several valleys and the center of the main line of communications. Accidental decisive points of maneuver resulted from the relative positions of the troops of both sides in a conflict. In Jomini's view, decisive points of maneuver were those on the enemy's flank. The decisive point in general depended on the terrain features of the battlefield, the relation of these features to the ultimate strategic objective, and the positions held by the two sides in conflict. 2s The Jominian concept of decisive point is still viable today, but must be expanded and refined. Therefore, in generic terms, a decisive point can be understood as a geographic location or source of military or non-military power whose destruction or capture, control or defense, or continuous surveillance and monitoring would give an immediate and marked advantage over the opponent in accomplishing one's military objective. Determination of what constitutes a decisive point should be based primarily on the scope and character of the physical objective, the physical characteristics of the theater and their relation to the physical objective, the characteristics of forces in conflict, and their mutual position. A decisive point is usually located in relative physical proximity of the physical objectives, but sometimes it may be located at a considerable distance from it. What is for a planning echelon a decisive point, becomes for the next lower echelon an objective (emphasis added) to be seized, controlled, defended, or neutralized. Decisive points may be permanent or provisional (or transitory). Traditionally, they may be terrain (geographic) or force-oriented or a combination of these. The geographically oriented decisive points are of more enduring importance because they

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are fixed in place. They may be natural or artificial. The military value of geographically oriented decisive points often depends directly on the factor of force. Location means little if no force is defending it. At the tactical or operational level, some key mountain passes, straits, narrows, islands, or landing beaches represent geographically oriented decisive points. Sometimes lines of operations pass through selected geographically oriented decisive points, such as straits or narrows. In the Leyte Operation, San Bernardino Strait and Surigao Strait were such decisive points for the Japanese heavy surface forces during their intended advance to the Leyte Gulf. Naval bases and ports, airfields, villages and towns or cities, bridges, tunnels, road junctions, supply depots, or railroad marshalling yards are other examples of decisive points. Force-oriented decisive points are usually maneuverable, but they could also be fixed. In both instances, their military importance in a given situation is usually transitory. Their military value primarily depends on the relative position to the physical objective to be accomplished. Examples of maneuverable decisive points on land are SAM or AAA batteries defending field forces or naval bases or ports and airfields, or mobile elements of the logistical support and sustainment system. At sea, examples of mobile decisive points are the screens of a convoy or major naval formation or underway replenishment ships. In the information age, a new type of force-oriented decisive point, arbitrarily called cybernetic decisive point, has emerged. Because modern military forces rely increasingly on various computer-based systems for information and communications, the opponent will actively try to penetrate, disrupt, degrade, and decapitate various elements of these systems both within the theater and many hundreds or thousands of miles away or in outer space. Line of Operations: A line of operation (LOO) is an imaginary line along which a ./brce moves fom its base of operations toward a given physical objective(s). Z9 Jomini was the 30 first theoretician to introduce this term into military theory. Lines of operations are closely related to and mutually dependent on the position a force and its base of operations occupy. They are as important as bases of operations. Their selection is often decisive for the outcome of a major operation or the entire campaign. Lines of operations used for the initial major operations retain their value for the successive major operations. They are critical to reaching the assigned physical objective and in the event of withdrawal or retreat. They should not be confused with lines of supplies. A line of operations determines the directional orientation of the force in terms of a mistake to consider lines of time and space relative to a hostile force.' However, operations in purely geometric terms, as lines drawn on the map or chart along which a force moves. These "lines" have a certain width relative to the objective and the required size and mix of forces. This is more true in war on land than at sea or in the air because many troops and their equipment move along a given line of operations. In land warfare, lines of operations usually pass through selected decisive points. The choice of a line of operations is one of a commander's fundamental tasks in planning a military action at any level of war. The commander needs to select lines of operations in reference to the base of operations and movement of forces so as to seize

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the enemy's communications without imperiling his own. 32 Once the assigned physical objectives are seized, they serve as a new base of operations from which new lines of operations are selected. The larger the distance between a base of operations and the physical objective, the longer the lines of operations and the lines of supplies. Thus, the more vulnerable these lines, the more force that will be required for their protection. Lines of operations should be flexible so they can be closed together for mutual support as soon as the enemy force renders it necessary. Alternatively, they can be opened out to meet at a point beyond the originally intended physical objective . 33 In general, a line of operations to be used by one's forces must be accessible and well protected. On land, such a line of operations should allow easy and fast movement of troops and materiel. Navigable rivers, canals, and railroads provide great advantages because they make it easier to maintain links with a base of operations and move additional troops and equipment. In addition, it is usually an advantage when an army has one flank protected by a large river or sea. In the 1805 campaign, the Danube River protected the left flank of Napoleon I's army, while for the protection of the right flank, Napoleon I deployed Marshal Michel Ney against Tyrol and Jean Baptiste J. Bernadotte (later Charles XIV of Sweden) against Salzburg. 34 In terms of purpose, main lines of operations differ from secondary lines of operations (see Figure 9). The main (or principal) line of operations leads from the base of operations to the main physical objective. The secondary (or ancillary) line of operations is directed toward a secondary physical objective. In the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, the Austrian Northern Army used the Vienna-Bruenn-Zwittau-ReichenbergGoerlitz-Berlin road as a main line of operations, because that road was the shortest route between the two capitals. The secondary line of operations in the same campaign was the line between Bruenn and Olmuetz and across the Neisse River at Breslau. 35 Provisional (or transitory) lines of operations are those that do not coincide with the main line of operations. They lead through intermediate objectives and hence their value is provisional. In the 1805 Campaign, Napoleon I used provisional lines of operations in his advance to Ulm. After forcing the 30,000-man Austrian army to surrender at Ulm, he continued his advance toward Vienna along the main line of operations. Provisional lines of operations are usually used in offensive operations. A force can move from its base of operations toward the assigned physical objective along short or long lines of operations. To reach the objective quickly, the shorter line of operations is better than the longer line. A force operating along shorter and multiple lines of operations has a distinct advantage over the opposing force moving along longer and fewer lines of operations. Operating along short lines of operations requires fewer forces for their protection. It also greatly simplifies the problem of logistical support and sustainment. In contrast, long lines of operations must be made secure, and that requires the use of additional forces and assets. The longer the line of operations, the more the intermediate base of operations is needed. The longer line of operations on land also requires a higher degree of sustainment if enemy action has closed important roads and railroads. Lines of operations on the open ocean are usually long and multiple, and offer greater flexibility in selecting or changing them in the course of combat. In contrast, lines of operations in enclosed and semi-enclosed seas are much

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shorter, fewer, and more rigidly laid out than those on the open ocean. They can be circuitous if the coast is fronted by a large number of islands. The mutual position, the distance separating the base of operations and the physical objective, and the characteristics of intervening physical space determines the number of available lines of operations. A force could move along single, double, or multiple lines of operations (see Figure 10). A single line of operations allows the entire strength of a given force to be concentrated. In land warfare, an army moves along a single line of operations if its major part uses a string of parallel roads. Such a line of operations facilitates supply and sustainment of a force during its advance. A single line of operations also allows simplicity of control. Among its disadvantages is a force's vulnerability to enemy attack as it moves in a physically restricted area. Moreover, the force's real physical objective is usually obvious to the enemy. Therefore, a force moving along a single line of operations could find itself cut off from its base and defeated in detail. On land, a single line of operations usually requires extensive measures to protect lines of supplies. In the Austro-Prussian War of 1866, the Austrian Northern Army operated along single line of operations, while the Prussian Army from Lausitz and Silesia moved along double and converging lines of operations. I n war at sea, a single line of operations is particularly vulnerable if it passes through a restricted area, such as a strait or narrows. In the Leyte Operation, the Japanese First Diversionary Attack Force operated along a single line of operations during its approach to the Leyte Gulf from the western entrance to the Sibuyan Sea to San Bernardino Strait. Likewise, Force C of the First Diversionary Attack Force and Second

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Diversionary Attack Force operated along a single line of operations once they entered the Bohol Sea between the islands of Negros and Mindanao toward Surigao Strait on the way to their assigned objective in the Leyte Gulf. Terrain obstacles on land such as mountain chains or river valleys often limit the movement of force along a single line of operations. Likewise, a coast fronted with several island chains extending parallel to it, like the coast of the eastern Adriatic or of Sweden, offer ships a single line of operations. Long and narrow straits, such as the Turkish Straits, also restrict naval forces to a single line of operations. Double lines of operations are those used by two major parts of a single force or two independent forces, but which are widely separated in distance or in time. They are more advantageous than a single line because they allow more room for movement of one's forces, and they offer some advantages in countering a numerically stronger force. They also increase the enemy's difficulty in discerning the real physical objective assigned to one's force. A force moving along a double line of operations on land might be physically separated by intervening terrain features such as a high mountain or large river. This, in turn, would make coordination of their movement and mutual support more difficult or even impossible. A force operating along a double line could also be intercepted or enveloped by a strong and agile opponent and defeated in detail, especially if two separate elements move beyond mutually supporting distances or some physical obstacle prevents them from timely aid of each other. A force moving along double lines

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of operations also requires precise synchronization of its elements than the movement along a single line. Multiple lines of operations have advantages and disadvantages similar to double lines of operations. They offer several options against the enemy forces. They are more advantageous than double lines. However, moving along multiple lines is justified only when one's forces use short lines and are more mobile than the enemy force. Sometimes, the defender occupying a central position is forced to operate along multiple lines of operations, as Nazi Germany did in 1944-1945 when facing the threat from several directions. Movement of forces along multiple lines of operations is more difficult to coordinate than forces moving along a single or double line. However, if force elements move within the mutual supporting distance of each other, their protection is significantly enhanced. Establishment of lines of movement beyond mutually supporting distances is advisable only if each prong is stronger in available combat potential and mobility than that of its opponent, or if the factors of space and time are extremely favorable for one's forces. The Prussian armies moved along multiple lines of operations in their invasion of Bohemia in 1866, which subsequently led to a decisive battle of Koenigraetz (Sadowa) on 3 July. Another example of the successful use of multiple lines of operations at sea was the Imperial Japanese Navy's support and covering actions during the invasion of the Netherlands East Indies in 1941-1942. Normally, it is a serious error to simultaneously use several lines of operations, between which there is an intervening impassable obstacle. The use of several lines of operations exposes one's force to the danger of being defeated in detail should the enemy advance more rapidly than expected. 37 The directional orientation of lines of operations is influenced primarily by the length and configuration of one's base of operations, the number and location of decisive points, the distance to the assigned physical objective, intervening physical obstacles between one's base of operations and the objective, and the force size and mix of friendly forces. Double and multiple lines may be parallel, converging, and diverging. Parallel lines of operation originate at different points but remain separated by roughly the same lateral distances as the force approaches its objective. They usually facilitate synchronization of movement of one's forces. Multiple and parallel lines of operations facilitate rapid shifting of the direction of movement in the course of combat from one line to another making it difficult for a hostile force to cut off the attacker's line of retreat. A naval force exiting or entering long and wide narrows moves along parallel lines of operations. Converging (or concentric) lines of operations start from widely separated points, their spatial separation being steadily reduced as they approach a given physical objective. These lines facilitate the actions aimed at cutting off the enemy lines of retreat. Forces operating along converging lines of operations cover one's sea lines of communications. However, the defender can concentrate the mass of his force sequentially on parts of the converging force and defeat it in detail . 38 The chief disadvantage of operating on converging lines of operations lies in the difficulties of synchronizing the movement of one's forces. The enemy can easily deduce the opposing forces' ultimate objective as they approach it. In addition, the converging forces must concentrate before the hostile force can strike each of one's force separately. The Germans in their invasion of Poland in September 1939, and the former Yugoslavia in

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April 1941, successfully used multiple converging lines for movement of their panzers and infantry. The Japanese naval and air forces in their invasion of the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies in December 1941 moved along multiple converging lines of operations. The Japanese Combined Fleet operated along converging and multiple lines during its approach to the Philippines 18-24 October 1944, which led to the Battle of Leyte. The Israeli aircraft flew along converging and multiple lines of operations during their massive strikes against the Egyptian airfields and other installations in the opening hours of the Six-Day War in October 1967. In the Kosovo Conflict of 1999, NATO's aircraft based in Italy, Hungary, Turkey, and the southern Adriatic operated along relatively short and converging lines of operations in striking their targets in Serbia and Montenegro and the Kosovo Province. Divergent or eccentric lines of operations originate from a central position or a relatively short base of operations. The distance between adjacent lines widens steadily as one's force approaches its assigned physical objective. A force moving on divergent lines makes it more difficult for the enemy to determine its final objective. Divergent lines offer some advantages if the enemy's forces are widely separated. They can be used by a force starting from a given base of operations and moving eccentrically to divide and separately destroy a hostile force moving along exterior lines. However, the mutual support among forces moving simultaneously along divergent lines is complicated to plan and execute. There are also considerable difficulties in organizing command and control, forces' synchronization, and logistical support. The Japanese land-based naval and army aircraft based on Luzon operated along multiple and diverging lines of operations during the Leyte Operation in October 1944. Shifting a line of operations in the midst of a major operation is a delicate step that should be avoided if possible. When the original base of operations is still used, shifting a line of operations is usually not risky. However, if lines of operations are shifted before the new base of operations is established, the risk is rather high. By shifting a line of operations, one's forces change their relative position to the enemy force. The shift of a line of operations might be undertaken by a conscious decision to surprise the enemy and obtain a more favorable position for the next phase of a major operation or campaign. It might also be forced upon the commander if his force is in danger of being enveloped because of poor protection of the existing lines of operations. In land warfare, sometimes the existing lines of operations must be abandoned. One's army must have sufficient strength to break any enemy resistance and soon establish a new base of operations from which more favorable lines of operations can be selected. An army can change lines of operations during a campaign or major operation by starting to move along a single line and later from double or multiple lines or vice versa. In 1866, the Prussian Army in Bohemia initially moved along triple converging lines of operations and then after being united with the Elbe Army and the Army of Prince Friedrich Carl moved along double lines. After the Battle of Gitschin, the First and Second Prussian Army were united only at the Battle of Koenigraetz on 3 July. After that, the Prussian armies operated along diverging and multiple lines of operations. 39 Interior versus Exterior Lines: A force moves along interior lines between the enemy's lines of operation S.40 Interior lines are those within a given area that is completely or

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partially enveloped by the enemy (see Figure 11). The opposing force then operates along the exterior lines. Interior lines always originate from a central position. They are much shorter than those the opposing force uses when moving on the periphery. They can be used effectively in both offense and defense. Interior lines enhance the ability to concentrate one's forces against either of the two parts of the opposing force while a much inferior force holds the other part in check. They allow simultaneous concentric actions from many directions against the enemy's center. 42 The effect of interior lines is more pronounced if the physical features of the theater itself separate the enemy force. Interior lines generally facilitate shifting forces to meet an external threat while maintaining communications and covering distances to approach the enemy's force. One feature of interior lines is their eccentricity. Eccentric action means concentrating combat power at the center and then applying it toward a point on the circumference. Subordinate force elements can be concentrated and firmly controlled, and the enemy forces can be defeated piecemeal. Requirements for success in operations on interior lines are superiority in command and control, superior firepower, and great mobility. A force operating along interior lines can act before the enemy can act, thereby preventing the enemy from concentrating his forces. The effective use of i nterior lines requires precise calculation of the factors of space and time . 43 The conditions for the success of operations on interior lines are: sufficient space for one's forces movement, ability to rapidly move one's forces, and security of lines of supplies. 44 Von Clausewitz wrote that interior lines offer the advantage of greater concentration and shorter interior lines; they have been shown to be decisive and often more effective than the convergent form of attack. The weaker party gains strength by concentrating strong forces toward decisive points in the attacker's dispersed deployment. However, in many situations, despite the assumed advantages of operating on interior

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lines, the defender finds himself encircled and is eventually crushed under the attacker's overwhelming weight. Frederick the Great and Napoleon I often used interior lines. Frederick the Great's wars lasted many years despite his success of operating on interior lines. He was eventually victorious only because of changes in the composition of the hostile coalition. Napoleon I's major defeats were twice caused when he himself operated on interior lines. He lost the Battle of Leipzig in October 1813 and the Battle of Waterloo in June 1815-all conducted on interior lines. 46 In 1866, the Austrian Northern Army, by moving to the Elbe and Iser Rivers, operated from interior lines against both parts of the Prussian Army, and was eventually defeated at Koenigraetz. In contrast, Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, Sr.'s great victories in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 were achieved when operating on exterior lines. Fighting from interior lines is more effective when the space separating parts of the enemy forces is wide. Then, the shorter communications lines in the center can offset the disadvantages of possible enemy's attack. Interior lines allow easier concentration of forces and short deployment routes and supply lines. They facilitate decision making through faster redeployment of one's troops. Also, it is possible to achieve local superiority despite general inferiority. The enemy could be forced to fragment his strength and be beaten in detail. 47 However, interior lines should not be abused by extending them too far, so as to neutralize the inherent advantages for both offense and defense by an extremely unfavorable relationship of the factors of space and force. To maximize the advantages of interior lines, the operational commander must thoroughly grasp the geography and the terrain, and how they affect the movement of large forces. In defense, the main disadvantage of interior lines is that the attacker operating on exterior lines can force the defender to maintain a defense along the entire periphery. In this situation, virtually the entire theater is involved in combat, thereby endangering the defender's external lines of supply. A force operating on interior lines can be enveloped on the flanks. The enemy force can threaten lines of retreat and lines of supply. In the end, a force operating on interior lines can be confined to a narrow physical space and then overwhelmed by a stronger hostile force . 4s The choice of operating on interior lines should not be considered the solution to all problems associated with a numerically inferior force. Interior lines, by themselves, do not confer a marked advantage. A force is said to operate along exterior lines when its lines of movement are separated by those of the enemy. These lines are longer than the shortest line the enemy force could use. Exterior lines originate from the exterior position. In the Leyte Operation, the Japanese First and Second Diversionary Attack Force and the Mobile Force (Main Body) started their movement toward the Philippines from the exterior positions. Similarly, the U.S. TF-38 carrier force operated from the exterior position in regard to its targets on Luzon and the central Philippines and adjacent sea areas. The Allied amphibious force that landed at Leyte also operated from the exterior position during their transit and approach phase. Exterior lines have the opposite advantages and disadvantages of interior lines. Aggressiveness, independent actions, and common training in peacetime are especially necessary for success in using exterior lines. The aim should be to concentrate forces and defeat enemies in succession. Only great speed of movement and short but devastating strikes will lead to success; when one has inferior forces he cannot do better than

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skillfully striking the enemy who is not yet concentrated. Then, speed of movement could be used to remedy deficiency in numbers. 49 The chief requirements for operating on exterior lines are: superiority in numbers or available combat potential; fast, secure, and above all reliable communications between the individual parts of the force; and great speed in executing the movements. A force moving along exterior lines can select the point of attack along the enemy's periphery. The inherent advantage of a force moving along exterior lines is that it can threaten the enemy with envelopment. However, such a force moves along longer lines of operations than its opponent does. The longer the distance between the base of operations and the attack objective, the longer the lines of supply. Hence, the logistical support and sustainment of the force is more complex. There is also the constant danger of one's force being defeated in detail, unless each force element is stronger than the enemy force opposed to it. The primary aim in the conduct of operations on exterior lines is to expand the initial superiority and the advantages of the initiative, force the enemy into a passive posture, conduct a centripetal operation, and hold and destroy the enemy from the perimeter. Forces operating on exterior lines should not neglect concentration of combat potential. When combat power is dispersed on exterior lines separated by terrain that prevents cooperation, one must not fall into the bad practice of overlooking tactical opportunities to consolidate combat power. 50 Lines of Retreat: In land warfare, the term line of retreat is used to make a clear distinction between attack or advance, and withdrawal or retreat. These lines start near the enemy's objective and end at one's base of operations (see Figure 12). In land warfare, lines of operations directed backward are called lines of retreat. Then, lines of supply are usually used as lines of retreat. The selection of lines of retreat differs from those which are directed offensively. An army that cannot offer resistance and seeks to withdraw will select its lines of supply as lines of retreat in order to cover its base of operations. 51 Lines of retreat can be as varied as lines of operations, but their advantages and disadvantages differ greatly. Normally a large force uses a single line of retreat, either from necessity or because it offers better force protection. Double or multiple lines favor rapid retreat of a large force, but ensuring adequate force protection is more complicated in terms of both forces and assets required and organization. Land forces can use convergent or divergent lines of retreat. Converging lines allow separate columns to steadily narrow their spatial separation as they approach their base of operations. This greatly eases the problem of force protection from the enemy attack against its own flanks. The disadvantage of such lines could be greatly reduced if the troops use rapid lateral communications such as railways. Divergent lines have sometimes suffered a decisive defeat and individual force elements try as rapidly as possible to leave the scene of action and reach their base of operations to reconstitute their group. Lines of Communications: Any theater contains a number of lines of communicationsdesignated lines of movement between two points over which troops and materiel are transported. Land, sea, and air lines of communications differ. They are called lines of supply or simply routes when used for carrying commercial cargo in peacetime and in

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time of war. A route is designated to provide the optimum way to move traffic from point of origin to destination. Land lines of communications (LLOCs) are the link between a base of operations and an army in the field. An army covers its links with the rear as it advances into the enemy's territory or withdraws or is forced to retreat. An attack at the enemy's communications requires movement around the enemy's flank and away from one's true line of advance. In doing so, the tendency is to uncover one's communications. In defense, movements in force against the attacker's lines of supply would often lead to his retreat because an army cannot operate if the links with its base are severed. For an army, lines of supply could be roads, railroads, navigable rivers and canals, and pipelines. It is always a great advantage to have a well-developed and, above all, diverse transportation network. Thus, different modes of transport should be used to minimize the effect of any enemy action against one's landlines of communications. Roads arc the safest lines of communications on land. However, their capacity is relatively small, and numerous vehicles are required to carry supplies or transport of troops and reinforcements to the front. The roads offer some important advantages over railroads and navigable waterways. The enemy can disturb, interdict, or even destroy part of the traffic, but it cannot completely prevent the use of roads. If one road cannot be used, other roads are usually open for traffic or the main road could be reached by detours. The roads are more flexible than other modes of transportation if there is need to shift a base of operations or change direction of lines of supplies. The roads usually extend in a meandering line. The roads that ran perpendicular to lines of operations link individual parts of the army. If they are behind defensive lines, such as rivers or mountain, and can be shifted, they are called castling (or leap-frogging) lines. 52 Railroads are one of the most effective modes of transport. They are fast and not influenced by the weather. They are the best means of transporting large volumes of bulk

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cargo over long distances. Railroads often follow rivers, to take advantage of the normal gradual gradient of the valley. In contrast to roads, railroad tracks usually extend in a straight line. In a land theater, the armies could be supplied and sustained by using inland waterways. For military purposes, navigable waterways are suitable for transport of bulk cargo, heavy weapons and equipment, and troops. They include natural rivers, canalized rivers, lakes, and inland artificial canals. In contrast to roads, railways, or pipelines, which are easily adaptable to irregular natural features, navigable waterways are more or less fixed. Unlike roads, navigable waterways seldom offer alternate routes. Enemy action could render any navigable waterway, especially a canalized river or artificial canal, useless for some time. Pipelines are often used for a single cargo like water, oil, gas, and natural gas for the needs of the troops at the front. Air lines of communications (ALOCs) are extensively used for fast transport of troops and specialized cargo. The established routes are called airways and are defined by a particular width and flight altitude. Air transport provides not only speed, but also flexibility. Shifting air lines of communications is generally easier than for other modes of military transportation. Air transport is unsuitable for heavy equipment and bulk cargo. It is also the most expensive mode of transport, and it requires extensive ground support. The longer the distance, the more intermediate stops must be available for the aircraft. The free use of air lines of communications is also often subject to various political and legal limitations. For long distance routes, the approval of the host country for overflight rights and the use of ground facilities are required. The term sea line of communications (SLOCs) refers to routes used for both commercial trade and transporting troops and materiel. The most important oceanic routes and some routes in enclosed or semi-enclosed seas are identical for all the belligerents and neutrals, and they may be near each other. In general, any sea route consists of two ends (a port of departure and port of destination), the middle, and the flanks. Often, a port of departure also serves as a destination for ships on their return voyage. As the ships approach their destination port, their routes tend to converge in a terminal area. A focal area is an area through which shipping must pass without actually going into a port. They are usually created off a cape, strait or narrows, international canals, or a large island. It is there where major maritime routes converge. In the Mediterranean, the most important focal points of shipping arc the Strait of Gibraltar, Sicilian Narrows, the Turkish Straits, and the Suez Canal. Within the same area, there are also a number of focal points of local importance for maritime trade (see Map A-7). Some international straits, notably the Strait of Hormuz, Bab-el-Mandeb, and the Strait of Malacca are critically important for the uninterrupted flow of oil traffic to major industrial countries of the world. The Strait of Malacca and the Indonesian straits also play an extraordinary role ill the. flow of the world's shipping. The economic vitality of Japan, Australia, Arid ih - nations in Southeast Asia depends on free access to these straits. ,l i f (~f 1-I~llacca is close(], :ill ; ltel`nate ? -Outs: to the South China Sea through Selat S1?tl(ill, SChil l otnhok. ;ali(l the Makassar Strait can be usc(l. In tcrnls of , distance, thcsc (lct;surs ;lrc 1 ~F1iilicatlt. A li2ty to ,"<1' can i.'mer~-c :)s ill(_' 1'('.<;L?1? t)f 1i ells_?-JIV', 'W;10ll i)1' O threat ()f cat.li()ii ... ,. of .. \ ,.. 1 1, od

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posed, Great Britain moved all trade to northern and western ports where trade was more protected, but the situation created an excessive load on rail and road transportation. It also created a new focal point of trade at the northwest approaches to the British Isles. Sea lines of communications can ran across an ocean or follow a coastline. Thus, oceanic or transoceanic and coastal sea lines of communications are differentiated. Routes on the open ocean are usually numerous, long, broad, and crisscross each other. They are also vulnerable and require relatively large forces for protection against the enemy's attack. In contrast, the routes in an enclosed sea are usually much shorter, less numerous, and more channelized, especially along a coast fronted with numerous islands and islets. In many ways they resemble those on land because they are more or less fixed and rigidly laid. There are also few, if any, alternate routes available. However, coastal sea routes are relatively more secure than those on the open ocean. Short lines of communications are generally preferred to long ones; multiple lines to single ones; central lines to those in the rear or the flanks of one's forces (see Figure 13). The longer the lines of communications, the more difficult they are to protect and the more vulnerable they become. The failure of an entire campaign or major operation has often been caused by the excessive length and inadequate security of lines of communications, as for example, France in Russia in 1812 and Nazi Germany in Soviet Russia in 1941-1945. Therefore, the aim should be, especially in a war on land, to operate along short lines of operations, which in turn result in short lines of supply. Short lines of communications allow faster turnaround time in transport of troops and materiel. They also require fewer forces for protection. Multiple lines of communications are preferred to single ones because they are inherently more flexible and secure. At the same time, these routes require larger forces for their protection. The larger the army, the more intense is traffic to its rear, and the more numerous lines of communications there should be. Longitudinal and lateral lines of communications can be differentiated by their directional orientation. Longitudinal lines extend along the length of a given theater. They are usually long and potentially vulnerable to enemy attack along their entire length. They require a longer time for transit, so more merchant vessels on a given route are required. They also require larger forces for their protection. Lateral lines cut across the longitudinal lines. They provide greater flexibility in supply and sustainment of the army. They also greatly facilitate the problem of shifting a base of operation in the course of a major operation or campaign. Shifting lines of communications in combat should be generally avoided. Such a step is not only difficult and time-consuming, but also invariably increases the danger for one's forces. The transportation system must be drastically altered or sometimes completely reorganized. Different modes of transport could be required. Protection and defense of the new lines of communications might become more difficult and larger forces might be required to do the job. Conclusion: The natural and artificial features of a theater play a significant and sometimes critical role in the employment of forces on both sides. The operational commander and the planners must take differences in the effect these features might have on forces of each service fully into account, so as to ensure optimum conditions for the employment of subordinate force elements. Sound analysis should always point out both

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advantages and disadvantages of a particular natural or man-made feature. The importance of the physical features of a theater should never be considered as absolute. While geography has always affected planning and execution of major operations and campaigns, it is only one element for operational commanders and their planners to consider. Warfare was, and will continue to be, a complex interplay of human decisions and actions, where natural or man-made physical elements will play a subordinate role.

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Notes 1. John Creswell, Sea Warfare 1941-1945 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, rev. cd., 1967), p. 50. 2. Donald Macintyre, Sea Power in the Pacific. History from the Sixteenth Century to the Present Day (London: The Military Book Society, 1972), pp. 130-1. 3. Wolfgang Wegener, The Naval Strategy of the World War , translated by Holger Herwig (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989), pp. 16-8. 4. Vicente Blay Biosca, "Defending the Strait of Gibraltar. Spain's Role Is Vital," International Defknsc Review (September 1985), p. 1401. 5. Rudolf Heinstein, Zur Strategic des Mehrfi-ontenkrieges. Das Problem der ìnneren and ausseren Linien' dargestellt am Beispiel des Ersten Weltkrieges (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 10 November 1975), p. 6; Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, The Art of War (London: Greenhill Books, reprinted 1992), p. 33 I. 6. Heinstein, Zur Strategic des Mchrfronlenkrieges. Das Problem der ìnneren and ausseren Linien' dargestellt am Beispiel de.s Ersterr Weltkrieges, p. 6. 7. Alfred H. Burne, "Global Strategy in the Pacific," Marine Corps Gazette 4 (April 1948), p. 21. 8. Heinstein, Zur Strategic des Mehrfi°ontenkrieges. Das Problem der ìnneren and ausser0z Linien' dargestellt am Beispiel des Ersten Weltkrieges, p. 5. 9. Ibid., p. 5; Rudolf Boehmer, Die Massnahmen des Dezaschen Reichcs vor and )vaehrend des zu , eiten Weltkrieges fuer Schuetz and Kontrolle der Deutschen Handelsschiffahrt (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, September 1973), pp. 14-5, 21. 10. Heinstein, Zur Strategic de.s Mehrfi-owenkrieges. Das Problem der 'inneren wzd ausseren Linien' dargestellt am Beispiel des Ersten Weltkrieges, p. 5. 1 1. Robert T. Dail, Does the U.S. Armv Rcallv Understand Operational War? A Logistics Pcr.spective (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2 May 1988), p. 11 --2. 1 2. In the nineteenth century, the term "operations-subject" was used when referring to a base 01' Supplies. They collectively comprised what is today called base of operations in the narrow definition of the term; ,1. Neumann, Grundzuege der Strategic. Gin Leittaden fuer das Stadium d er Krie~-, sgeschichte ( Vienna, 1870), p. 9. 1 3. Colmar von der Goltz, Kri c-fuchrunrr. K urze_L ehre i hrer w ichtigsten Grundsaetze and Formen (Berlin: R.v. Decker's Verlag, 1895), p. 64. 1 4. Ilermann Franke, editor, Flan _dbuch der 1 )etrrcitl_ieh_cn_W ehiwr sse nschaften, Vol. I: NVch rpo~ litik uin_d Krieg,,fuehrum, ( Berlin/l-cipAg. lkalter de Gruyter &- Co, 1936), P. 205. 1 5. Von der Goltz. Krr~ l -(rf~htw>g._Kuizc l chre ihrer w_ichtr,u)sten Orundsirc tzc and Forine n, pp. 70, 64. 1 6. G.J. Fiebcocr_ I1 cmcnt ol sii:rt,,YY~ t\des( Point. 11': tlilitcd States _Military Academy Press. 1910), pp. 1 2- -d. 1 7. Dieter 5eehefis_ (w,w,,//, :,.'!f, 1939(IIam1:)l11',: 1 "i_~

. lr;a.i.~rrl7l;c'f7 Hi i~ p l _f... l ilcr a'ir7(' i1C :Tjllchrlln , ill (1l ° l' Osiv,c t d:r'tJ Ill, \uorltit i 't ' r I ?ti t).~13-

1 8. Colmar von der Goltz, The Conduct of War. A Short Treatise on its Most Important Branches and Guiding Rules, translated by G.F. Leverson (London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, Truebner & Co. Ltd., 1908), p. 106. 1 9. Von der Goltz, Kriegfuehrung. Kurze Lehre ihrer wichtigsten Grundsaetze and Formen , pp. 65, 71. 20. Edward Hagerman, The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare. Ideas, Organization, and Field Command (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1992), pp. 276, 279. 21. These airfields were as follows: Avignon, Cognac, Istres, Lesignan, Marseilles, Montpelier, Toulon, and Toulouse; W.H. Tantum IV and E.J. Hoffschmidt, editors, The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force. History of the Luftwaffe in WW2 (Old Greenwhich, CT: WE Inc., 1969), pp. 146-7. 22. Thomas A. Kenney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report ( Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 3-4. 23. Samuel E. Morison, The Atlantic Battle Won, May 1943-May 1945 . History of United States Naval Operations in World War 11, Vol. 10 (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1956), p. 237. 24. In the nineteenth century, the term operations-object was used in referring to the objective of an operation. The most important operations-object was the enemy army. Strategic points could serve as the operations-object only if they were to create favorable conditions for the next operations or their seizure, because of their political significance would result in peace; the seizure or occupation of the enemy capital was considered the main operation-object to which all operations were directed; Neumann, Grundzuege der Strate ie, p. 11. 25. Von Clausewitz used the same term "decisive point" [entscheidende Punkt] i n section "Superiority of Numbers," Book 3 of his On War , but in a different context; Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (Bonn: Ferdinand Duemmler, 16th edition, 1952), p. 272. 26. Antoine H. de Jomini, The Art of War ( Westport, CT: 1997), pp. 86. 27. Neumann, Grundzuege der Stratcgie , p. 8. 28. Jomini, The Art of War, pp. 86-8. 29. Colmar von der Goltz, Kriegfuehrung. Kurze Lehre ihrer wichtigsten Grundsaetze and Formen (Berlin: R.v. Decker's Verlag, 1895), p. 74. 30. Franke, Handbuch der neuzeitlichen Wehrwissenschaften , Vol. 1, p. 205. 31. JP 3-0: Doctrinefi)i°Joint Operations, Revision First Draft 30 March 1999, p. 111-23. 32. Joseph Rodriguez, Jr., Hon, to Maximize the Advantages of lntcrior Lines at the Operational Level (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1987), p. 8. 33. Von der Goltz, The Conduct of War. A Short Treatise on its Most Important Branches and Guiding Rules , p. 1 10. 34. Carl von Egger, Dic Strategic. mit Beruccksichtigung der neuen Krie rsrnittel (Base): Schweighauserische Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1870), p. 53. 35. Neumann, Grundzuege der Stratcgie , p. 13.

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36. Ibid., p. 16. 37. Von der Goltz, The Conduct of War. A Short Treatise on its Most Important Branches and Guiding Rules (1908), pp. 1 10-1. 38. Heinstein, Zur Strategic des Mehr/rontenkrieges. Das Problem der "inneren and aeusseren Linie" dargestellt am Beispiel des Ersten Weltkrieges, p. 5. 39. Von Egger, Die Strategic. Mit Beruecksichtigung der neuen Krie sg mittel , p. 62. 40. Jomini wrote that interior lines are those lines adopted by one of two armies to oppose several hostile bodies, and having such a direction that the general can concentrate the masses and maneuver his force in a shorter period of time than would be required for the enemy to oppose them. Jomini, The Art of War, p. 102. 41. Franke, editor, Handbuch der neuzeitlichen Wehrwissenschaften , Vol. 1, p. 206. 42. Rodriguez, Jr. How to Maximize the Advantages ofInterior Lines at the Operational Level, p. 5. 43. Wilhelm Stanger, Grundzuege der Lehre von der Strategic. Studienbehelf fuer die K.K. Krieusschule , Vol. 1: Theorie mit Kurzeren Beispielen (Vienna: Verlag der K.K. Kriegsschule, 1884), p. 79. 44. Franke, editor, Handbuch der neuzeitlichen Wehrwissenschaftem, Vol. 1, p. 206. 45. Jehuda L. Wallach, The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation. The Theories of Clausewitz and Schlieffen and Their Impact on the German Conduct of Two World Wars (Westport, CT/London, England: Greenwood Press, 1986), p. 20. 46. Ibid., pp. 46-7. 47. Heinstein, Zur Strategie des Mehrtrontenkrieges. Das Problem der° "inneren and aeusseren Linie" dargestellt am Beispiel des Ersten Weltkrieges, pp. 6-7. 48. Ibid., p. 6; Friedrich von Bernhardi, On War of Today , Vol. 2: Combat and Conduct of War , translated by Karl Donat (London: Hugh Rees Ltd., 1913), p. 91. 49. Franke, editor, Handbuch der neuzeitlichen Wehrwissenschaften , Vol. l, p. 206. 50. Board for Study of Principles of War, Principles of War; translated by Dr. Joseph West (Tokyo: Ground Self-Defense Force Staff College, January 1969; reprinted by Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS., July 1983), p. 35. 51. Von der Goltz, Kricgfuehrung. Kurze Lehre ihrer wichtigsten Grundsaetze and Forrrien , p. 83. 52. Neumann, Grundzucge de rS trategic , p. 18. 53. Julian S. Corbett, Fngl and in the Seven Year War. A Study in Combined Strata ( London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1918), Vol. I, p. 309. 54. John H. Noer, Southeast Asian Chokepoints. Kcepin`, Lines o/ Communications Open ( Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Strategic Studies, December 1996), p. 1.

1 8 2)

Part IV: OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS

OPERATIONAL FUNCTIONS Successful employment of combat forces across the operational continuum requires the existence and an effective organization of functions in support of the employment of combat forces. These functions are theater-wide; hence, the term operational functions. Some functions are essentially processes, while others include both processes and the employment of combat forces. The processes provide an overarching structure in which various systems operate. The operational commander applies operational art to the planning and execution of a campaign or major operation, not only by sequencing and synchronizing joint forces in combat but also by sequencing and synchronizing many operational-level activities. Traditionally, command and control (C2), intelligence, fires, logistics, and protection are considered operational functions. However, command and control warfare (C2W), currently considered a military subset of information warfare, is also an operational function, and one that is becoming increasingly important (see Figure 14). Operational maneuver and movement cannot be considered operational functions. Operational maneuver is one of the most critical elements of operational warfare, not a supporting function such as operational command and control, operational fires, or operational intelligence. Also, regardless of its scale, a movement is not a function but an integral part of any maneuver or deployment or redeployment.

OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL Theater-wide or operational command and control (C2) is the principal means by which a theater commander sequences and synchronizes joint force activities in peacetime and orchestrates the use of military and non-military sources of power to accomplish assigned strategic objectives. It binds together all other functions with the joint forces and assets deployed in a given theater. A sound C2 ensures that the operational commander continuously can monitor the situation in the theater and supervise the actions of his subordinates, but without interfering in their work. It should ensure rapid communication of directives in a clear and concise manner. Tenets: Sound command and control should ensure unity of effort, provide for centralized direction and decentralized execution, provide an environment for applying common doctrine, and ensure interoperability. Unity of'effort is one of the main prerequisites of successful performance by a command. At the operational level and higher, success is difficult to achieve without having unity of effort through unity of command. Unity of command means having a single commander control all the forces assigned to a particular mission. It is achieved principally by establishing clear-cut division of responsibility, inter- and intea-service integration, cooperation, and interoperability. Unity of command is usually applied in command and control of national forces operating on a permanent or semi-permanent basis in a relatively large part of the theater, with service-based forces and functionally organized multiservice or joint forces. A divided command invariably has been a source of great weakness, often yielding fatal consequences. One of the factors contributing to the Japanese success in the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was the lack of a U.S. Joint force commander in Hawaii. There was little coordination and no integration of Army and Navy facilities and efforts in the defense of Hawaii. Air reconnaissance was divided among three Navy flag officers and two Army generals . 3 The Germans, in their campaign against Allied maritime trade in the Atlantic in 1939-1945, would have been more successful if there had been a theater command created to integrate efforts of the Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe; the Luftwaffe assigned only a few of its high-performance aircraft to the direct control of the Kriegsmarine. In World War It, the Japanese command organization was usually divided, with a few notable exceptions. In their defense of the Philippines in the fall of 1944, the Japanese never appointed a single commander to control all forces in the theater. For the Japanese naval forces involved in the operation, the chain of command ran from the Navy Section of the Imperial General Staff to CINC Combined Fleet. In addition, command relationships were poorly defined, except for Army and Navy land-based aircraft. Admiral Saemu Toyoda's headquarters were in Tokyo, some 1,700 miles from Manila. The Japanese also had trouble controlling their far-flung forces due to poor communications and the long distances involved. In the Battle of Britain in 1940-1941, the German Luftwaffe suffered from a divided command. The air offensive was mainly conducted by the Second Air Fleet, which operated from northeastern France and the Low Countries, and by the Third Air Fleet, based in northwestern France. Each air fleet drafted its own operations plans and submitted them independently for approval to the CINC of the Luftwaffe, Reichsmarshal

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Hermann Goering. 4 Before the Allied invasion of Normandy in June 1944, the German command organization lacked unity of command at the theater level in addition to being extremely fragmented. Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, the most senior commander in the theater, did not have full control over all the German forces deployed in France. He shared responsibility with one of his subordinates: Field Marshal Rommel, who commanded Army Group B (the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Armies), usually bypassed von Rundstedt and dealt directly with Hitler. 5 To make matters worse, Hitler had a direct operational control over the three panzer divisions held in reserve in the Paris area. The Luftwaffe controlled all coastal antiaircraft batteries and airborne units. The Kriegsmarine, for its part, controlled all the naval forces, coastal artillery, and shore installations, and the SS retained administrative and disciplinary powers over its forces in France. This highly fragmented command organization led to confusion and contradictory orders at critical times before and in the aftermath of the Allied landing in Normandy. 6 In coalition warfare, unity of effort is usually achieved through cooperation, and only in special cases through unity of command. Political sensibilities, differences in military culture, psychological considerations, and even the personalities of the coalition commanders in most cases do not allow the establishment of an organization based on unity of command. For most of World War 1, the Allies did not have unified command on the Western front. This problem was only partially solved in the spring of 1918 when the French General Ferdinand Foch was appointed supreme commander. However, he did not have the authority to issue binding orders to the British General Alexander M. Haig and the U.S. General John J. Pershing, but had to rely on their cooperation. The problem was further complicated by the lack of a single coalition body on the political level to deal with questions of strategy and policy. The Allies apparently learned that lesson of World War I and significantly i mproved their unity of effort in the next war. In January 1942, the United States and Britain created the Combined Chiefs of Staffs (CCS) to direct the U.S.-British common effort against the Axis powers. Despite a great deal of friction, the CSS proved highly successful. Far less successful, however, was the short-lived ABDA (American, British, Dutch, Australian) Command for defense of the Netherlands East Indies (NEI), created on 3 January 1942. A more serious problem was with the German and Italian command organization in the Mediterranean in 1940-1943. They never established any comparable theater-level, combined command organization, but essentially maintained two chains of operational command and control, one for the Italians and the other for the Germans, with little or no cooperation. This organization was so fragmented that it was extremely slow to react in any crisis. In contrast, on the Eastern Front, the Rumanian, Hungarian, and Italian armies operated under overall German command, but had considerable freedom of action in day-to-day activities. 8 In the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the coalition partners never established a fully i ntegrated command structure. The Commander of the Central Command (CINCCENT), General Norman Schwarzkopf, commanded all U.S. forces, while his counterpart, Saudi General Khalid bin Sultan, commanded the Joint Force/Theater of Operations Command, consisting of the Saudi Arabian Armed Forces, the Saudi National Guard, and the Arab/Islamic Corps (two Egyptian and one Syrian divisions and all other Arab forces). The French forces operated initially under the operational control of General Khalid and

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then under CINCCENT. The British forces were under the operational control of General Schwarzkopf. 9 The only integrated combined structure was the Coalition Coordination, Communication, and Integration Center (C3IC), established in mid-August 1990 and used mainly to coordinate training, logistics, frequency management, and intelligence sharing. Unity of effort can be achieved through cooperation in command and control of national forces that lack unity of command at the highest level among the services. In the German invasion of Norway in April 1940, General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst was only nominally in charge of the campaign, because in practice the Luftwaffe and the Navy were controlled by their respective CINCs. Nevertheless, the Germans were highly successful because of the excellent cooperation between the mid- and lower-level commanders in the field. Centralized direction and decentralized execution are two of the key prerequisites of successful command and control of combat forces. Centralized direction is provided by national leadership at the national-strategic level, and by higher commanders from the theater to the tactical level. To enhance coordination and control over subordinate forces, information gathering and decision making must be centralized. Centralized direction limits the freedom of action of subordinate commanders to some extent, but the result is improved command performance. Centralized operational C2 is formal and highly structured. It allows the operational commander to make better decisions based on more complete information, obtained from multiple sources. The operational commander can better supervise the actions of subordinate commanders, ensuring that their actions are in consonance with his intent and directives.' () Centralized command C2 maximizes efficiency through the extensive use of information technologies as a means of eliminating uncertainty. The operational commander uses planning or personal direction as the method of command. Orders and plans are detailed and explicit, and their successful execution requires strict obedience and minimizes subordinate decision making and initiative. A centralized command organization emphasizes top-down information flow. The main deficiency of the centralized command organization is its vulnerability to the enemy's preemptive attack, which can considerably degrade or even decapitate many of its command, control, communications, and computers (C4) elements and thereby lead to a breakdown of the entire command organization. In addition, centralized command organization inherently constrains subordinate commanders by its rigid planning and operational procedures. This in turn makes it very likely that subordinate commanders will not take advantage of acting independently to exploit unforeseen opportunities once the major operation or campaign starts. In a centralized command organization, the process moves slowly and ponderously. Information must be fed up the chain of command to where sole decisionmaking authority resides, and orders must filter to the lowest command echelon to be executed. Such a command organization does not react well to a rapidly changing situation. It also does not function well when the vertical flow of information is disrupted. The operational commander is focused on doing everything possible to prevent subordinate commanders from making a mistake. A rather large volume of information in a centralized command organization must be processed, evaluated, and transmitted up and down the chain of command. This flow

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of information increases the risk of overloading the communication channels during a time of peak demand. Moreover, the operational commanders might easily be overwhelmed by the amount of information they are receiving. This problem can be alleviated if irrelevant information is removed from the system. With a lengthened system-response time and a corresponding reduction in the quality of information reaching the commander, the result will be a slow and inflexible command and control process in which decisions are often based on outdated information. Decentralized execution is closely linked to the principle of centralized direction. It implies that a higher commander, in issuing guidance or orders, should specify only the objectives or tasks to be accomplished and the time, leaving to subordinates how to accomplish them. Joint force organization allows maximum freedom of action for subordinate commanders to carry out directives and plans. To provide maximum freedom of action without sacrificing the higher commander's responsibilities, he must delegate authority to subordinate commanders to the maximum extent possible. Because of the greater delegation of authority, dependency on communications is considerably reduced. Reaction time is also greatly shortened, because subordinate commanders are allowed to act without constantly asking for advice and consent from their superiors. In case of a heavy overload or even a total breakdown of communications, lower-command echelons are better prepared to act on their own initiative. The planning process is usually less cumbersome and rigid, and more flexible operational procedures are in place. Speed of action is essential for success, and this, in turn, often demands a conscious sacrifice of precision. This can only be achieved when a decentralized decision-making process exists. The best method of achieving this is by issuing and transmitting German-style, task-oriented orders [Auftragstaktik] that tell a subordinate commander what to do but not how to do it. This method allows subordinate commanders substantial freedom of action and thereby requires them to act with a greater degree of initiative. Discipline at the top is replaced by self-discipline throughout the organization.'' Task-oriented command and control is essentially informal and flexible. Orders and plans are brief and simple. This method is also less vulnerable to a disruption of information flow than is centralized execution. 1 ' A shortcoming of decentralized execution is that a subordinate commander making a decision can sometimes cause an unwanted escalation of the situation. In addition, lower decision-making thresholds and highly diffuse centers of authority make coordination among command elements more difficult, thereby increasing the risk of loss of control by the operational commander. Common doctrine is the essential element for the successful and smooth employment of multiservice and multinational forces. The effective employment of multiservice forces requires the maximum degree of interoperability, the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and use those services to enable them to operate effectively together. Interoperability is achieved by developing and applying joint doctrine, tactics and techniques, plans, training, and material and fielding processes. Optimally, all the hardware should be fully compatible with and complementary to systems of all services. The forces developed and trained to perfonn the primary functions assigned to one service will be employed by a joint force commander to support and supplement the other components of the joint force in order to increase effectiveness and contribute to the accomplishment of military objectives.

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Theater Organization: In general, command organization is intended to ensure the most effective employment of one's forces for accomplishing the assigned military objective(s). Command organization greatly influences planning, preparation, and execution of any military action and the use of nonmilitary sources of power. Once established, it should not be changed just before or, even worse, during the course of a major operation. The only exception is when one's forces have been so attrited that they must be reconstituted. Optimally, the theater command organization should integrate components of two or more services into effective teams. However, organizational integrity of service components should be maintained as far as possible to use their unique capabilities. The main considerations in creating a theater command organization are military objectives, geographic features of the areas, size and capabilities of the forces of the potential enemies, and time available. Any command organization reflects the ways the commander who established command intended to accomplish assigned missions, and the type and mix of forces assigned. The area or geographic basis of command organization is most often used in establishing theater command. This type of command organization enhances integrated employment of the service components and provides centralized direction of the forces operating within a certain geographic area. It clarifies responsibilities for routine and continuing operations and affects coordination of logistical support and sustainment. There should always be flexibility in the employment of one's forces in situations that require their transit from one theater to another. In other words, regardless of the geographic boundaries, the theater commanders should be able to operate their forces to accomplish their assigned tasks. The advantages of an area-based command organization include full control over logistical support and sustainment, and familiarity of the commander and his staff with geographic, demographic, political, economic, and military aspects of the situation in the region. The theater structure can be fully developed based on long-range plans and requirements, and it can be refined based on the lessons learned in peacetime. Such a theater organization allows for the optimal employment of joint and combined forces across the spectrum of conflict. The main disadvantage of an area-based organization is that it requires large staffs and C4 systems. The long distances between headquarters and forwardly deployed forces complicate command and control. Operations security (OPSEC) is complicated because of the large and complex C4 systems and the need to "harden" many of their elements. Optimally, internal politics and service parochialism should not be factors in establishing a theater command; otherwise, the result might be an artificial division of the theater into two coequal commands, as happened in the Pacific Theater in World War 11. Throughout World War II in the Pacific, the U.S. and Allied forces had no single commander for the theater. Instead, for political reasons, two de facto theaters of war were established: Pacific Ocean Areas, under Admiral Chester W. Nimitz in Hawaii, and Southwest Pacific Area (SOWESPAC), under General Douglas MacArthur, initially in Brisbane, Australia. On 8 May 1942, Admiral Nimitz was appointed CINC of the Pacific Ocean Area (CINCPOA) in addition to his command of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. He was in command of all land, sea, and air forces in the Pacific Ocean Areas except for the land defense of New Zealand. On 18 April 1942, General MacArthur became the Supreme Commander of COMSOWESPAC. Both Nimitz and MacArthur recruited their staff predominantly from their own services. This solution was a compromise, because the

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U.S. Navy refused to place the Pacific Fleet under the command of anyone but a naval officer. With two commands in the Pacific, the control of the entire theater was vested in the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The result was that no single individual was able to resolve conflicting claims for troops and supplies, assign priorities, shift forces between commands, or concentrate the resources of both commands on a single strategic objective. Not surprisingly, the result was almost continuous and keen competition for resources, frequent need for the JCS to resolve disputes, and at times even the President's intervention.' 3 As CINCPAA, Admiral Nimitz exercised considerably greater direct control over his forces than did General MacArthur in his theater. As the Pacific Fleet commander (CINCPACFLT), Admiral Nimitz was responsible for administration as well as operations. Throughout the war, there was frequent confusion as to whether Admiral Nimitz was acting as the area commander, fleet commander, or theater commander responsible to the JCS. 14 Some argue that this division of responsibility, in fact, weakened U.S. efforts and unnecessarily endangered them. 1 5 The German Wehrmacht established a number of area-based commands in World War 11, but none of them was truly joint. Formally, the German theater commanders were in control of forces of all three services, yet they never had sufficient authority over the Navy's and the Luftwaffe's units in their area of responsibility. Neither did the Operations Section of the German Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht exercise sufficient control over operational and strategic employment of the Navy and the Luftwaffe. 1 6 One of the reasons for the disastrous U.S. experience in Vietnam was a faulty theater command organization. The Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (COMUSMACV) was responsible only for military operations within the boundaries of South Vietnam. The actions of Task Force 77 (TF-77) in the Tonkin Gulf were directed by the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) to whom COMUSMACV reported. CINCPAC had only nominal control over B-52 strategic bombers employed in Vietnam. U.S. Marine Corps aircraft operated virtually independently of the U.S. Air Force until 1 968, when they were placed under control of the Deputy to COMUSMACV. 1 7 CINCPAC believed that the war in North Vietnam should be fought by his two components, while the war in South Vietnam should be fought by forces assigned to MACV and supported by the Pacific Fleet and Pacific Air Forces. Many organizations, both military and civilian and all the forces of Vietnam, were not under COMUSMACV. This greatly complicated the unity of effort. Moreover, the political leadership in Washington, DC, dealt directly with COMUSMACV, effectively cutting CINCPAC and sometimes even the JCS out of the picture. 1 8 A better solution would have been to have the CINCPAC establish a theater of operations encompassing Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, and the adjacent sea and ocean areas and airspace above and under a single joint/combined commander directly responsible to him. Theater command organization should be simple and flexible. Simplicity requires the chain of command to be clear and straightforward. The responsibilities and authority of the operational commander and subordinate commanders should be clearly delineated. There should be no overlapping responsibilities or authority. No subordinate should be responsible to more than one higher commander at any given time. A command organization is flexible when it can expand or contract with changing conditions without serious loss of effectiveness. Organizational flexibility is achieved by

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decentralizing C2, delegating specific and well-defined functions and responsibilities, and rapidly deploying forces to meet specific situations. Without decentralization of control, it is difficult for a force to be effective when it is faced with a situation demanding a quick and timely action. Too-rigid command and control limits the freedom of action of the operational commander. In May 1940, the French had such an overly rigid command structure; they emphasized authority and strict obedience to orders at all command echelons. Thus, lower-level commanders had little chance to exercise initiative, which proved to be a fatal flaw in combat. Moreover, the French commanders were inflexible and slow to react to rapid changes in the situation on the battlefield. In a theater command organization, the responsibilities between the operational and administrative chains of command must be clearly defined. Each service's capabilities should be integrated to accomplish a common objective without degrading the combat effectiveness of service tactical elements. Elements: The essential elements of any command organization are span of control, command echelons, information flow, communications, integration, and coordination. In generic terms, span of control refers to the number of persons or functions administered or supervised by a single person. Clearly, the number of subordinates within a staff, or subordinate commanders in a theater organization, that a commander can effectively control is limited. The complexity of relationships increases rapidly with each additional force element added to the theater organization. The number of subordinate commanders directly controlled increases in arithmetic progression, while their cross-relationships increase geometrically. Thus, the addition of a single subordinate commander, regardless of the size of organizational structure, roughly doubles the number of command relationships. The number of subordinate commanders to be supervised depends on many factors, but primarily on the personal characteristics and abilities of the operational commander, the quality and nature of the functions being performed, and the skills and effectiveness of subordinate commanders. If they act, or are allowed to act, with initiative, and there are few cross-relationships, the span of control of the immediate higher commander can be wide. This is one of the reasons why decentralized execution and task-oriented orders should be applied whenever possible. In practice, the span of control for combat units should be limited to a maximum of five. Within this situationdependent range, the greater the number of moving parts, the greater the flexibility. The clearer the theater organization and the more comprehensive the delineation of responsibilities, the more units and functions a single operational commander can supervise directly. And the opposite is also true: the more numerous the interrelationships among subordinate commanders, the more complicated and difficult is the task of supervision. In general, narrowing the span of control means deepening the theater organization by adding new layers of command. However, the more layers of command, the slower the information flow, and the slower and less responsive the organization becomes. The only way to narrow the span of control is to entirely relieve the operational commander of responsibility for certain functions, or of direct contact with pertinent subordinates, by interposing another command echelon between him and those subordinates. This, in turn, leaves the theater organization susceptible to delay and to the cumbersome relations that can result from a lengthened chain of command. 1 93

Reducing the number of subordinate commanders increases the number of commanders to be directly controlled. Deepening the chain of command leads to more demands on the controlling elements and the number of staffs, while the size of each staff is reduced. At the same time, the degree of control of subordinates is increased, but the ti me needed to communicate lengthens and results in general bureaucratization of the organization. Widening or flattening the organizational structure causes the opposite effect. This is accomplished by eliminating levels of control and increasing the number of elements, controlling bodies, and staffs. In addition, the size of the staffs is generally increased. The number of command echelons in a theater organization is directly related to span of control. Normally, narrowing the span of control results in more command echelons, while widening it produces fewer. A sound theater organization should not have too many or too few command echelons. Intermediate levels of command have always been critical for optimal command performance. One factor in establishing intermediate command echelons is the distance between the highest commander or command authority and the forces involved in combat. The number of command echelons also depends on the information volume. The higher the information volume, the greater the need to establish intermediate levels of control to collect, process, evaluate, and transmit accurate, timely, and, above all, relevant intelligence to the lower command echelons. Logistical support and sustainment, and force protection are also considerably enhanced by having an intermediate command echelon responsible for sequencing and synchronizing these functions. This is especially critical at the operational-tactical and higher levels of war. Command organization in general should have a small number of subordinate command echelons, which reduces the time required to make decisions and to enhance the effectiveness of reporting systems and communications networks. However, for each military objective to be accomplished, a corresponding command echelon should be established. Otherwise, serious problems may arise because a commander cannot be close to the scene of action. The lack of an intermediate operational level of command was one of the main reasons for the Germans' poor command performance in the execution of the von Schlieffen Plan in August-September 1914. The Germans used seven armies totaling 3.1 million men in the West, of which five, with 1.5 million men, crossed the borders on 6 August into Belgium and France. 1 9 However, no intermediate level of command was established between the Army's High Command and the armies in the field. In contrast, for their great offensive in the West in March 1918, the Germans organized their thirteen armies into five army groups. Army Group Crown Prince Ruprecht and Army Group Deutsches Kronprinz [ German Crown Prince], with four armies each, were deployed on the front. Three other army groups, with two armies each, covered the area from Bastogne, Belgium, to the Swiss border. Although the offensive ultimately failed, the German Army's High Command had much better control over the operations because of these intermediate headquarters. 20 The Allies did not establish a joint commander for the Southern Pacific Ocean Area (SOPAC) in time for the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942. The nearest operational commander was Admiral Nimitz in Pearl Harbor, more than 4,000 nautical miles away. The Allies' lack of an intermediate command echelon between the tactical

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commander in the Coral Sea and the theater-strategic commander affected their preparation for, and conduct of, the Battle in the Coral Sea. Organization applies not only to people and equipment but also to information flow. Command organization provides standard channels, following the lines created by the established command and support relationships by which most information flows; it also provides alarm channels reserved for the transmission of urgent, time-sensitive information. 21 Normally, information flows vertically within the chain of command, but it should not be restricted by the chain of command. These informal channels provide an important redundancy and are especially important in team building. Information also flows laterally or horizontally between adjacent units, or even diagonally, through supporting units outside of a given chain of command. In general, the fewer the command echelons, the faster the vertical information flow. Likewise, the narrower the span of control, the faster the horizontal information flow. The speed of information flow is also affected by the number and size of the adjacent and supporting command structures. In a centralized command and control arrangement, a large volume of information must be processed, evaluated, and transmitted up and down the chain of command. This flow of information increases the risk of overloading the communication channels during peak demand. Moreover, the commander might easily be overwhelmed by the amount of information he is receiving. This problem can be alleviated considerably if irrelevant information is removed from the information flow, difficult though this is to do. With a lengthened system-response time and a corresponding reduction in the quality of information reaching the commander, the result will be a slow and inflexible command and control process, in which decisions are often based on outdated information. A sound theater command organization should provide for integration throughout the chain of command. Lack of integration of subordinate command elements at the operational level is invariably a source of great weakness in a command's performance. A fragmented operational command and control structure considerably slows the decision-making cycle and often causes confusion. This is an especially great problem when the information reporting and command system cannot keep pace with the fastchanging situation on the battlefield. Integration in a theater organization should be vertical, so that it is fully responsive to the operational commander's will. It must also be integrated laterally, so that the actions of individual command elements can be synchronized. The operational commander should provide for a coordinating body that ensures smooth and effective coordination among command elements throughout the entire force. In the initial phase of the Korean War (1950-1953), the UN forces conducted two separate major air offensives because the Navy and the Air Force did not integrate their efforts. This, in turn, prevented the most effective use of air power, delayed the start of a comprehensive air-interdiction program for more than a month, and caused confusion and loss of effectiveness at a time when every single aircraft sortie was vital to the survival of the Eighth Army. 23 The Air Force commander proposed a centralized control over all air assets in the theater. He asked for operational control over naval aircraft operating over Korea, though not control of aircraft when they were engaged in Navy tasks at sea. Yet the Navy strenuously opposed the idea. The result was a compromise, worked out on 11 July 1950, by which the air component commander received coordinating authority.

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However, this fell far short of having operational control over all air elements in the Korean Theater. Coordination-an orderly arrangement of group effort to provide unity of action in the accomplishment of a common purpose is always one of the internal objectives of an organization (as distinct from the external objective, the overall mission). Coordination control is the necessary direction of separate units to ensure adequately integrated relationships between them, and to provide for orderly and complete support of the operating forces. Formal, or vertical, coordination is closely linked with the chain of command and is accomplished through each command echelon. Line organization is an optimal way to ensure vertical integration. Sound vertical coordination implies that established lines of communications are observed and that the higher commanders in the chain of command do not, as a matter of practice, bypass subordinates and communicate with persons further down in the organization. It also means that subordinates do not bypass their immediate superior to deal directly with commanders at the higher levels. Vertical coordination is essential for obtaining authoritative decisions and direction and for keeping higher commanders advised of general progress and the performance of the force as a whole. The top level can become overloaded, and bottlenecks may develop to a serious degree if coordination between various force elements can be effected only through the formal communications flow. Coordination through formal or official channels should be supplemented by the informal relationships within an organization, commonly called horizontal coordination. Horizontal coordination allows subordinate command echelons to expeditiously resolve problems of mutual concern. It also does not require going up and down the chain of command, with the attendant delays and, often, confusion. C3 Systems: Operational C2 cannot be successful without a well-developed, highly efficient, and survivable theater-wide command, control, and communications (C3) system. A C3 system is vital to successful planning, preparing, conducting, and sustaining major operations or campaigns. Intelligence, fires, logistics, and protection all depend on responsive C3. The theater-wide C3 binds all the elements of the theater organization together. The terms C2 system and C3 system imply the supporting systems that include both the C2 systems and the communications systems required to implement the C2 process. C2 systems generally support the C2 process, while C3 supports not only the C2 process, but also common-user and certain special-purpose systems (communications, information, and management) and functions. C3 systems must provide the timely and adequate data and information to plan, direct, and control activities at subordinate command echelons, including administration, intelligence, logistics, personnel, planning, and operations. A theater-wide C3 system consists of the facilities, equipment, communications, procedures, and personnel essential for the respective theater commander to plan, direct, and control forces in accordance with his assigned missions. These systems extend to operational forces that, because of the nature of their employment in combat, must remain immediately responsive to the theater commander or designated subordinate component commanders. The specific composition of the theater C3 system depends on the missions of the command, its organization, the types of forces assigned, and the alliance or coalition relationships. The theater C3 system should provide rapid, reliable, and secure information interchange throughout the chain of command. The combat forces, when engaged in joint 196

operations, must be able to coordinate their combined power to achieve maximum effectiveness. The exchange of information should be continuous from the recognition of the threat through the assignment of the mission to the force, the commander's operational concept, plan, execution, consolidation, reorganization, continuation, and termination of the operation. A theater commander should integrate both military- and nonmilitary-related communications systems and organized organic and component tactical communications systems into interoperable and compatible networks. The introduction of automated information systems equipment and procedures into C2 has increased the need for compatibility of equipment and standardized procedures. Automated information systems within the theater must be capable of exchanging information among all elements of a joint force. The need for interoperability cannot be overstated. A C3 system facilitates the execution of command and control and its supporting functions. Therefore, it must be capable of providing rapid, reliable, and secure information interchange throughout the chain of command. The command authority can only be received and information conveyed to and from a commander by using communications. Therefore, communications not only are conduits for information, but also bind all the elements of a force together in a cohesive whole. They typically parallel the lines of hierarchy in a given theater. 25 Communications are critically important for ensuring reliable, continuous, and, above all, timely information exchange between the command echelons in a given theater. Thus, an unbroken chain of communications should extend from the national-strategic level, to theater-strategic, operational, operational-tactical, and tactical commanders. Poor and unreliable communications were often the main reason that the higher headquarters misread or were ignorant of the true operational situation, as happened to the German Army's High Command during the First Battle of the Marne. In the frontier battles in August 1914, the German Army's High Command Headquarters in Koblenz had a poor overview of the operational situation because of the lack of reliable, fast, and timely operations with the German left wing and the armies in the center. Communications with the armies on the right wing were conducted via radio -a very unreliable means of communication at that time. 26 In late August General Helmuth von Moltke, Jr., the chief of the German General Staff, moved his headquarters to Luxembourg, some 170 miles from General Alexander von Kluck's First Army. However, this move did not greatly improve communications. There were no telephone communications to army commands, because the French and Belgians had destroyed civilian lines. Telegrams often arrived twenty-four hours late and had to be decoded. Aerial delivery was confused and uncertain. Motorcycle and automobile service was slow and sometimes dangerous . 27 The first telephone communications between General von Kluck and General Karl von Buelow, Commander of the Second Army, were established on 9 September, some thirty minutes after the First Army commenced its retreat. Another of von Moltke, Jr.'s errors was that during the most critical time at the front, between 5 and 9 September, he did not issue any directive to his two army commanders in the field .2 ' The primary reason for these deficiencies was that the Germans, in contrast to the very precise and detailed planning of the movements of their armies, had never prepared a communications plan. The deployment area of the German troops did not have a communications network. The Army's High Command also declined to establish centralized lines of communications. 29

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One of the main causes of the Allied defeat in France in 1940 was poor intelligence and communications. The French neither interconnected their main headquarters by teletype nor linked it to armies in the field. The telephone system was unreliable, and the telegram message delivery was chronically late. The French high command soon became divorced from the reality of the situation, and conditions were no better at the tactical level. Deficiencies in communications, interservice coordination, and Allied liaison arrangements resulted in unsynchronized actions that dissipated Allied effectiveness; the resulting fragmented counterattacks posed no serious threat to the German advance. 30 The British, because of their doctrinal (and, as it turned out, wrong) belief that the next war would be positional, largely relied on wired communications. This equipment became useless once the campaign entered a mobile phase. The unexpected increase in signal traffic, especially encrypted messages, soon outstripped the capacity of the system to handle it, and, therefore, intolerable delays in communications were created. 3 In contrast, the Germans had much more modern communications equipment that was fully adaptable to the fluid conditions on the battlefield. In the Battle of Midway in June 1942, both the United States and Japan suffered from poor communications. Tactical communications between Admiral Nimitz's headquarters and the fleet at sea were never good. However, the U.S. fleet had the advantage of operating close to its base and having the undersea cable between Hawaii and Midway. In the Levte Operation, Allied communications were satisfactory overall. However, an unprecedented volume of urgent and operational-priority messages caused considerable delays in the transmission at critical moments during the operation. The commander of the Seventh Fleet, Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, had to issue an order prohibiting administrative radio traffic and requiring such traffic to be sent by air mail. Because of atmospheric conditions and the long distances involved, there were considerable difficulties in the reception of major Third Fleet broadcasts in the west and southwest Pacific. An analysis of dispatches for 17-23 October showed, on average, thirty minutes to one hour for delivery to the addressee. If the messages were long and an intermediate station had to be used, urgent messages required about three hours for delivery. 33 Conclusion: Operational command and control is perhaps the most critical and at the same time all-encompassing of all operational functions. It is the principal means by which the operational commander sequences and synchronizes the actions and activities of both military and non-military sources of national power in a given theater. Sound theater-wide command and control should be simple and flexible enough to allow for the full application of the principle of centralized control and decentralized execution. It should provide for unity of effort through unity of command. It should allow for the application of the principles of objective and mass when needed. The responsibilities of each command echelon should be clearly established and delineated. There is no greater error for a higher commander than unduly interfering with the actions and decisions of a subordinate commander. Technological advances in mobility, range, lethality, and information gathering of military forces continue to compress time and space, requiring higher operating tempos and creating a greater demand for information. The operational commanders control multiservice or multinational forces that operate in all mediums: surface, subsurface, land, air, and space. Each of these mediums has distinctive operational characteristics and 1 98

environmental constraints, which, in turn, complicate effective C2. In combat, the everpresent threat from the air requires that one's forces on land or at sea are dispersed over a large part of the theater to reduce their vulnerability to the enemy attack. This, especially i n a maritime theater, leads to a greatly increased area in which combat actions take place. The increasing lethality and range of weapons over time made it necessary for military forces to disperse to survive. This in turn further stretches the limits of command and control. Joint forces are not necessarily bigger than in the past, but they have many moving parts and a greater variety of specialized organizations and weapon systems. Thus, they require greater amounts of information. Service and joint forces can move more quickly over greater distances than ever before. They can also engage the enemy forces at greater ranges than ever before. The consequence of all this is a fluid, rapidly changing operational situation. The more quickly the situation changes, the greater the need for continuously updated information, and the greater the strain on command and control. When employed jointly, combat forces must be able to coordinate their movements and actions to achieve combat power higher than if they are employed independently. This coordination is facilitated by an appropriate exchange of information. The exchange of information should be continuous, from the recognition of the threat through the assignment of the mission to the force, to the commander's concept, the plan, execution, consolidation, reorganization, continuation, and termination of the operation. History is replete with examples in which a poor or unsound command and control were the principal reasons for the lack of unity of effort both within a service and among the services or multinational forces. These difficulties were sometimes so severe that they led to failure at the operational and strategic levels of war. New technologies offer both promise and a potential problem. The higher commanders and politico-military leadership should not be tempted into believing that technology can or will ever satisfactorily resolve all the problems associated with operational C2.

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Notes 1. The terms C2 and command, control, and communications (C3) and their combinations are often used alternatively and interchangeably. However, there are some significant differences in the meanings of these terms. The term command and control refers not to a system, but to the process of planning, preparing, directing, and controlling one's forces to accomplish the assigned mission. The term command refers to the authority that a commander legally exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. It encompasses the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. In addition, command authority includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel. Control enables leaders to establish limits, focus effort, and provide command structure. Senior commanders must balance their level of command versus control so that their subordinates can exploit opportunities and properly react to the vulnerabilities and uncertainties associated with the use of military power. 2. Joint Pub 3-56, Command and Control Doctrine, for Joint Operations (Third Draft, 3 May 1995), p. I-1; Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, C4I Division, Command and Control. A U.S. Marine Corps Concept Paper (24 February 1994), p. 83. 3. Samuel E. Morison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931-April 194 2, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. III (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1st published 1948, reprinted 1959), p. 134. 4. Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, Command and Control, p. 36. 5. Martin Blumenson and James L. Stokesbury, Masters of Art of Command (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1975), p. 337. 6. Ibid., p. 337. 7. Ibid., p. 306. 8. Ibid., p. 65. 9. Douglas W. Craft, An Operational Analysis of the Persian Gulf War ( Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992), pp. 23-4. 10. Paul B. Stares, Command Performance. The Neylected Dimension of European Security (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1981), p. 67. 11. Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, Command and Control, p. 63. 12. Ibid., p. 64. 13. Ibid., p. 15. 14. Louis Morton, Strategy and Command: The First Two Years, United States Army in World War 11: The War in the Pacific ( Washington, DC: Center for Military History, United States Army, 1st printing 1962, reprint 1989), p. 256. 15. Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, Command and Control, p. 63. 16. Walter Warlimont, "The Unification Problem. Some Lessons from the German Experience," Vol. 6: Part 3: Command Structures, Continued, in Donald S. Detwiler, editor and Charles B. Burdick and Juergen Rohwer, World War II German Military Studies, 24 Vols. (New York/London: Garland Publishing, 1979), p. 37.

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17. Stares, Command Performance. The Neglected Dimension of European Security, pp. 63-4. 18. Bruce Palmer, Jr., The 25-Year War. America's Role in Vietnam (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1 984), pp. 29-39. 1 9. B.H. Liddell Hart, The Real War 1914-1918 (Boston/New York/Toronto/London: lst published 1930, rev. ed. 1964), p. 54; Correlli Barnett, The Swordbearers. Supreme Command in the First World War (Bloomington, IN/London: Indiana University Press, 1963), pp. 26-7. 20. Karl-Volker Neugebauer, Grundzuege der deutschen Militaergeschichte , Vol. 1: Historisches Ueberblick (Freiburg, i.Br: Rombach Verlag, 1993), p. 247. 21. Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, Command and Control, p. 72. 22. Stares, Command Performance. The Neglected Dimension of European Security , p. 61. 23. Ibid., p. 63. 24. Thomas A. Cardwell 111, Command Structure, for Theater Warfare. The Quest for Unity of Command ( Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, September 1984), p. 15. 25. Stares, Command Performance. The Neglected Dimension of European Security, pp. 19-20. 26. Wolf Weth, "Fuebrungsgrundlagen and ihre Bedeutung. Betrachtung ueber einige historische Ereignisse and die moegliche Nutzanwendung der dabei gewonnen Erkentnisse," Wehrkundc, 2 (February 1 967), p. 157. 27. Robert B. Asprey, The German High Command at War. Hindenburg and Ludendorff Conduct of World War I (New York: Quill William Murrow, 1991), pp. 100-1. 28. Holger H. Herwig, The First World War. Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918 (London: Arnold, 1 997), pp. 101, 103. 29. Stefan Kaufmann, Kommunikationstechnik and Kriegfuehrung 1815-1945. Stufen telemedialer RueStUng ( Munich: Fink, 1995), pp. 150-1. 30. Stares, Command Performance. The Neglected Dimension of European Security, pp. 28, 31. 31. Ibid., p. 29. 32. Ibid., p. 41. 33. Allied Communications Arrangement, CINCPOA, COMSOWESPAC, COMTHIRDFLT, and COMSEVENTHFLT, Record Group 23, Special Projects Department, Naval Historical Collection Division, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI.

20 1

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Know the enemy and know yourself: in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. Sun Tsu Operational intelligence is one of the most critical functions supporting planning, preparations, and execution of a major operation or campaign. Without timely and relevant intelligence, no operations plan could be successful. For the operational commander, it is of the utmost importance to possess accurate, reliable, and, perhaps most important of all, relevant and timely intelligence. It is also essential that the operational commander integrate intelligence into the other operational functions. There are some significant and some subtle differences among tactical, strategic, and operational intelligence. However, these distinctions are often not well understood. Tactical intelligence focuses on much smaller physical space and deals almost exclusively with physical or tangible factors of the military situation. The tactical commander can react quickly to unanticipated shifts in the course of a battle or an engagement. In contrast, a theater commander has to deal with larger factors of space, time, and forces. Operational intelligence is directed at collection, analysis, and evaluation of information dealing with all aspects of the situation in a given theater of operations plus adjacent areas of interest. Not only must physical factors personnel, weapons, and equipment be analyzed, but so must hard-to-quantify or unquantifiable factors: enemy forces' morale and discipline, doctrine, training; the enemy commanders' strengths and weaknesses. In contrast to a tactical commander, who must think in terms of hours or perhaps days, an operational commander's knowledge and understanding of the situation must extend several weeks or even months into the future Intelligence is defined as the product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information on the potential opponents or enemies. It can also be defined as knowledge about the enemy obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. I The primary purpose of intelligence is to enable well-informed decisions based on an accurate understanding of the situation. Its very essence is to collect, analyze, and present information the commander requests. Intelligence helps reduce uncertainty for the commander by screening out information that is not relevant to his decision-making process. Intelligence focuses on assessing one's vulnerabilities, understanding the enemy, conducting intelligence preparation of the battlefield or theater, and assessing battle damages. It helps produce a common, current, and relevant picture of the situation that reduces uncertainty and shortens the commander's decision-making cycle. It also provides the commander with an accurate understanding of the threat situation as it relates to current and future operations. Sources of information are imperfect and susceptible to distortion and deception. Hence, the commanders and planners should always carefully evaluate the sources and quality of the information. In general, the main attributes of intelligence are timeliness, relevancy, accuracy, objectivity, usability, and completeness. Intelligence must be timely

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so that the commander can make decisions with a high degree of confidence and act faster than the enemy. Intelligence is relevant when it significantly affects, contributes to, or is related to the execution of the assigned mission, task, or situation. Accurate intelligence lacks factual errors and mistakes; it represents the true situation. Without accurate intelligence, planning is unfocused and wasteful, and the execution might result in defeat. Moral courage is required to remain intellectually honest and to resist the pressure to reach intelligence conclusions that are not supported by the facts. Intelligence is objective when it is unbiased, undistorted, and free from political influences or limitations. The form in which intelligence is provided to the commander must be suitable for application upon receipt without additional analysis. If the intelligence is not tailored to the commander's needs, it does not have usability and does not contribute to the planning process. Intelligence is complete when it is comprehensive, contains the required level of detail, is factually correct, and has all the information the commander requires. In addition to being timely and accurate, intelligence should be relevant. 2 No matter how accurate or timely intelligence is, it is essentially useless if it lacks relevancy. Note that relevancy is relative: highly relevant intelligence at one level of military activity may be of limited relevance at another level. The sources of intelligence are the means and ways used to observe, sense, and transmit information on the quantifiable and unquantifiable elements of the situation of interest to commanders so they can make sound decisions and prepare and execute plans. Sources of intelligence range from open sources to highly classified information obtained clandestinely. The higher the level of war, the more diverse and usable the open sources that are available. The means of collecting intelligence range from the human sources to highly specialized technical systems. Specifically, the principal intelligence sources are: human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), open sources intelligence (OSINT), technical intelligence (TECHINT), and counterintelligence (CI). 3 Each of these means in turn encompasses several subcategories of intelligence sources. Intelligence Cycle: Information is not intelligence, as is all too often assumed. To become intelligence, information must pass through several phases or cycles and must be made available to the users. In the simplest way, there are five distinctive steps in the intelligence cycle: planning and direction, collection, processing, production, and dissemination. In practice, these steps often overlap and the distinction among them in terms of time is not clear. In generic terms, the first phase consists of establishing the intelligence objectives for the forthcoming combat action. This phase includes a number of tasks, specifically identifying intelligence requirements and their priority, preparing a collection plan, and establishing or arranging relationships among various intelligence elements within a given command echelon and other commands or organizations. The collection phase includes obtaining information and its transmittal to other intelligence elements for processing. Collection of information should be based on a comprehensive and detailed collection plan. It should be synchronized by all the elements involved in the process. Intelligence collection should include all information obtained from all possible (and multiple) sources. The processing phase is aimed at converting information obtained from single or multiple sources to intelligence elements that can be readily used in the next phase, production. One of the main tasks in the production phase is to produce finished intelligence from more than one source. This process should result in an accurate 204

and complete picture of what is known about some activity. In the absence of fused intelligence, products are single-dimensional, and often of little relevancy or usability. Fused intelligence is critical to obtaining in-depth understanding of a given problem. Finished intelligence results from a fusion of information from all sources, and from all three levels of command or war. The last phase, dissemination of the intelligence, is 4 designed to transmit finished intelligence products to the users . Scale: For each level of command there is a corresponding intelligence organization: tactical, operational, and strategic (see Figure 15). Each of them supports the respective command echelon for planning, preparing, and executing orders to accomplish assigned military objectives. Optimally, intelligence at any command echelon should cover the respective spectrum of possible employment of combat forces and, at the higher levels, also nonmilitary sources of power.

Tactical intelligence is conducted for planning, preparation, and execution of battles, engagements, strikes, and other tactical actions. It is critical to the success of a battle or engagement. It focuses on the combat zone or sector and sometimes on an area of operations plus an area of interest. The national- or theater-strategic level of command organizes strategic intelligence. It is intended to support the national-military leadership or theater-strategic commander. It provides input for the formulation of national policy, national security, and military strategy or theater strategy . 5 It is conducted in a given or multiple theaters of war plus adjacent areas of interest. In the Battle of Britain in the summer of 1940, the constant German handicap was poor strategic intelligence. The Germans greatly underestimated British aircraft production. They estimated that the British produced 180-300 aircraft per month, instead of the 460-500 Hurricanes and Spitfires they actually produced in both August and September.

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At the strategic level, U.S. intelligence failed to anticipate the possible communist Chinese reaction to the UN force's advance to the Yalu. 7 The United States was surprised by the Chinese intervention in November-December 1950, although a number of signals warned that it would happen. The U.S. government misjudged Chinese willingness to fight a large war to prevent unification of Korea. 8 Operational intelligence is aimed to support planning, preparation, and execution of a major operation or campaign. 9 It is conducted in a given theater of operations plus adjacent areas of interest. Because of the much larger forces involved, operational intelligence is more critical than tactical intelligence. While the tactical commander can relatively quickly adjust his course of action to unanticipated changes on the battlefield, the operational commander cannot, without major loss of time and great risk, change the employment of his own forces once a major operation or campaign is underway. Operational intelligence must foresee events several weeks or even months ahead, whereas tactical commanders are concerned with the events that take place over a day, or several days at most. Operational intelligence does not exist by itself, but is normally a composite of tactical and strategic intelligence. 1 0 Therefore, the fusion of strategic and tactical intelligence is used to obtain the picture of the operational situation in a given theater of operations. Allied strategic intelligence repeatedly broke the German "Ultra" naval codes, which played a vital role in defeating the German U-boats in the Atlantic and in defeating Field Marshal Erwin Rommel in North Africa. Ultra was also decisive in the battle of Avranches, Normandy, in July 1944, because the Allies were able to decipher Hitler's order to Field Marshal Guenther von Kluge, CINC of the West, to deploy four panzer divisions in defense of that sector, and thereby to repulse the planned German attack."i The Allies received the hint of the pending German counteroffensive in the Ardennes in December 1944 by decoding a message from the Japanese ambassador to Germany, Lieutenant General Baron Hiroshi Oshima, concerning future German intentions on the Western front. He met with Hitler and was told that once the replenishment of German forces was complete, sometime after 1 November 1944, a large-scale offensive would be conducted in the West. Baron Oshima immediately reported this information via diplomatic channels. The message was intercepted by "Magic" (a system the Allies used to decode Japanese messages) and passed to Washington. Ultra also revealed the westward movement of a large number of German aircraft, beginning around 8 November 1944. 2 The Germans successfully used their strategic intelligence for operational purposes in North Africa in 1942. They deciphered the daily messages the U.S. Defense attache sent from Cairo to Washington, DC, on the plans of the British Eighth Army. These interceptions were subsequently given to Field Marshal Rommel, who made good use of them in planning actions of his Africa Korps. However, British intelligence at Bletchley Park (near London) learned from an intercepted German message that the U.S. defense attache was the source and in June 1942, requested his dismissal from the post. Afterward, the Germans were unable to decode any message from the Eighth Army.' 3 Before the German attack in the West in May 1940, French intelligence accurately estimated the total number of German divisions in the West: 110-115 infantry divisions and ten to twelve panzer divisions. The actual figures were 117 and 10, respectively. However, the French grossly exaggerated the number of tanks available to the Germans.

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Just before the German attack, French intelligence estimated that the Germans had deployed 4,700 tanks. This number was raised on 15 May to between 7,000 and 7,500, or three times their real number (2,574 tanks). 1 4 Relationships: Like levels of war, all three levels of intelligence are intertwined and mutually dependent. They also affect each other, sometimes profoundly. Poor or inadequate tactical intelligence affects the planning for a major operation or campaign. Lack of timely and relevant information from strategic intelligence would invariably affect the operational intelligence ability to support a major operation or campaign. In addition, deficiencies in information collection at the tactical level would affect not only operational but strategic intelligence as well. Poor tactical intelligence was one of the reasons for the failure of the German air offensive against Britain in the summer of 1940, just when the Luftwaffe was on the verge of success. Among other things, German intelligence incorrectly estimated the losses and status of the remaining Fighter Command aircraft on 13 August. The Germans thought that the British had lost that day some 300 fighters, reducing their frontline fighter strength to about 200 machines. In fact, the British still had about 600 fighter aircraft in service. Both sides overestimated their successes, but the Germans were worse in their estimates of the British losses and remaining air strength. This led Reichsmarshal Goering to force air battles between the German and British fighters by sending a small force of bombers with relatively large escort forces to attack targets the British were likely to defend, such as airfields. The remaining German bombers concentrated on unescorted night attacks to stretch British air defenses. This change of German tactics proved to be more effective, although Goering's decision was based on a false premise. In the next few weeks, British losses approached German losses. However, the Germans changed their tactics again on 7 September by shifting their attacks to population centers such as London. They mistakenly believed that this would break the strength of the Fighter Command. In the preliminary phase of the planned invasion, the Germans lost almost 1,300 aircraft, while the British lost about 790. 15 On 17 September Hitler ordered the indefinite postponement of the planned invasion of England (Operation Sea Lion). In the U.S. amphibious landing on Tarawa, in the Gilberts, in November 1943 (Operation Galvanic), poor tactical intelligence almost led to a costly operational setback. The U.S. photo reconnaissance of Betio Island was very good; an estimated 90 percent of all Japanese defensive positions were pinpointed before the landing, on 20 November. However, hydrographic data, specifically tide tables and reef soundings, were lacking, and that complicated the planning for the landing. The charts of the island and its approaches were a century old. The general pattern of tides for the area was known, but detailed information was lacking. The planning was also complicated by inadequate numbers of amphibious tractors. The planners were faced with a problem whether either to delay landing for a month and land at spring tide, or on the basis of inadequate information to land on the scheduled date when the neap tide coincided with the scheduled hour of landing. To delay the landing a month would derail the entire Central Pacific Campaign schedule and would give the Japanese additional time to fortify the islands. Thus, that option was rejected. The planners decided that landing in late November was feasible. That decision was correct, but was based on faulty and inaccurate information on the tides and reefs fronting Betio Island. 1 6 This tactical piece of intelligence proved to have almost fatal consequences for the Marines when they landed 207

on Betio Island on 20 November. As it happened, on that day a highly irregular low "dodging" tide occurred. A high dodging tide would have allowed sufficient depth for the landing craft to negotiate the reefs fronting the landing beaches. To make the situation worse, there was no way to predict whether the tide would be high or low in the next six hours. Rear Admiral R.K. Turner, commander of the U.S. amphibious forces, refused to postpone the landing until 22 November, when the irregular tides would have passed. This decision led to great losses on D-Day because two assault waves were unable to negotiate the reef. Some 1,500 Marines died that day, although about 5,000 successfully landed. Before the beginning of the Operation Crusader in North Africa in November 1941, the British regularly broke the Luftwaffe's "Enigma" codes and had good knowledge of the Axis forces. They knew about the arrival of the German 90th Light Division, supply difficulties, and the location of Rommel's main formations. Although, tactical intelligence provided exact knowledge about Rommel's imminent raid, that did not influence the British dispositions. Yet no information was available about Rommel's intention to retreat and his conduct during retreat. The lack of tactical intelligence was the main cause for the heavy British losses during the last phase of the operation, and their final inability to attack." In planning the UN amphibious landing at Inchon (Operation Chromite), the tactical intelligence picture was appallingly inadequate. Although in the aftermath of World War 11 U.S. forces had occupied South Korea, and Inchon had been one of the main harbors, information regarding the harbor was almost totally lacking. Pictures were poor, maps were entirely inadequate, and there was little information on the condition of the mud flats, the height of seawalls, and the tractional qualities and the gradient of the mud flats. 19 UN intelligence in the Korean War suffered from many deficiencies, which contributed to the UN troops' less-than-splendid performance on the ground. The UN forces underestimated the value of the intelligence obtained from the Chinese and North Korean prisoners of war (POWs). In November 1950, just before the Chinese counteroffensive in November 1950, the UN did not conduct photo reconnaissance of the Chinese-border areas. The Chinese started in July 1950 to concentrate their Fourth Field Army near the border, and Chinese infantry divisions began crossing the Yalu on 14 October. By the beginning of November some 180,000 Chinese troops were ready for action, two-thirds of them deployed north of the Yalu and about five infantry divisions on the North Korean side of the border. Despite evidence obtained from the Chinese POWs, General MacArthur was so focused on plans to advance to the Yalu and the prospects of final victory that he dismissed any suggestion that the Chinese might actually go on a counteroffensive. The view at his headquarters was that the Chinese crossing of the Yalu was a face-saving effort and that the Chinese would not cross the river in large numbers and risk defeat. These problems were compounded by delays as long as ten days between intelligence requested from the Eighth Army and receipt of the request at General MacArthur's headquarters. The UN command also grossly underestimated the Chinese divisional strength and completely failed to predict that the Chinese would prefer offensive operation S.20 The errors made at the operational level of intelligence invariably have negative consequences at the tactical level of execution. In the Gulf War of 1990-1991, U.S.

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operational intelligence obtained accurate information on the Iraqi army and the forces' dispositions and intentions in the Kuwait. It accurately deduced that Iraqi forces shifted to defense and that the less capable Iraqi forces were deployed near the Kuwaiti-Saudi border. It also properly deduced that the more capable Republican Guards were kept as a strategic reserve (actually an operational reserve) . 21 However, U.S. intelligence had far less reliable and accurate information on the total number of men and equipment in the Iraqi forces deployed in the KTO. The U.S. estimates were based on the wrong assumption that the Iraqi forces were fully manned. This had the practical consequence that the Iraqi forces were considerably overestimated. The Coalition planners originally estimated 540,000 Iraqi troops in the theater just before air offensive on 17 January 1991, and about 450,000 when the ground offensive began on 24 February. However, U.S. Army intelligence estimated that the Iraqi front-line and second-echelon forces were manned at no more than 80 percent of their full strength, and in some instances at only 50 percent. 22 U.S. intelligence also estimated that the Iraqis had some 4,300 tanks and 3,100 guns at the beginning of the air offensive. Information later obtained from Iraqi POWs and defectors cast doubt on these estimates, but U.S. intelligence did not scale down their original claims. The overestimate in the numerical strength of the Iraqi ground troops in the KTO had unintended consequences on theater targeting, because these estimates were used as a basis to prepare the battlefield. The U.S. and Coalition commanders measured success in terms of percentage of weapons and equipment destroyed, and on that desired result they based the number of sorties to be carried out to achieve it. The analysis after the war ended revealed that Iraq actually had 800 fewer tanks than estimated. This meant that to attain the stated measure of effectiveness of 50 percent destruction before the start of the ground offensive would require that 62 percent of the total number of Iraqi tanks be destroyed. A failure of strategic intelligence invariably has dramatic consequences at the operational and tactical levels. Before the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950, all U.S. government agencies utterly failed to predict the course of events. Some reports sent from Korea to Washington, DC, indicated the possibility of attack. However, none of them was urgent, and their faulty evaluation and dissemination resulted in these reports never reaching the right people in the proper form. The basic reason for this failure was the U.S. policy toward South Korea. The United States did not include South Korea in its defense plans for the Far East. Hence, not enough attention was given at the strategic level to developments on the Korean Peninsula. The North Korean invasion took the U.S. political and military leaders by surprise. In the months preceding the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the U.S. strategic intelligence failed to comprehend the scope of Iraqi deception of their nuclear research program. After the end of hostilities, it was learned that the Iraqis had a far more extensive and dispersed program than U.S. intelligence had estimated . 25 This faulty intelligence resulted in inadequate preparation of the battlefield and, hence, deficiencies in operational intelligence. Information obtained by strategic intelligence is often used directly for planning or execution of a major operation or campaign. Through the Lucy spy ring in Berlin, the Soviets learned about German plans in May 1943, more than two months before the German counteroffensive at Kursk (Operation Zitadelle [Citadel]). The Germans, in contrast, had no knowledge of the Soviet plans. 26

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Scope: The scope of operational intelligence in terms of space, time, and force is considerably larger and more complex than that of tactical intelligence. Operational intelligence collects, analyzes, processes, and disseminates information on all aspects of the situation in a given theater of operations plus adjacent areas of interests. Specifically, operational intelligence is concerned with both tactical and operational characteristics of physical space in all its dimensions and aspects. The Allied planners for the landing in Normandy in June 1944 failed to fully take into account the operational difficulties posed by the hedgerow type of terrain (described elsewhere). This, in turn, caused the Allied troops great difficulties in the phase of establishing the lodgment on the continent. Because operational reconnaissance and intelligence deals with future enemy actions, it must assist the operational commander to visualize possible developments in the situation several weeks or months ahead. It must analyze the capabilities of forces currently in combat but also those that might be fielded or introduced into the theater several weeks or even months in the future. The operational commanders must understand both the enemy and one's own capabilities and vulnerabilities across the spectrum of conflict. Intelligence must provide the commander timely, accurate, and relevant information about the enemy forces' composition (OOB) and capabilities, and the enemy's critical strengths and weaknesses. Operational intelligence must focus also on patterns of deployment of the enemy's forces in a given theater and their probable trends for several weeks or months in the future. It must identify and recommend the enemy's critical vulnerabilities that could be attacked directly or indirectly and thereby neutralize, destroy, or degrade the enemy's operational or strategic center of gravity. Operational intelligence must focus on the enemy's information systems (INFOSYS) and its human element. In contrast to tactical intelligence, whose focus is the physical or tangible aspects of the enemy's situation, operational intelligence is focused on obtaining information on the enemy's operational commander and his subordinate component commanders, doctrine, degree of jointness/ combinedness, cohesion of large forces, morale and discipline, combat readiness, effectiveness, and other hard-to-quantify and evaluate factors of force. Intelligence officers usually have great difficulty evaluating the soundness of the enemy's service or joint doctrine. Ironically, what turned out to be the Germans' greatest single advantage in the first few years of World War II-the air-land combined arms concept-was perceived by many in the West as unworkable. In the 1930s, French intelligence mistakenly believed that the German style of mechanized warfare might actually play into French hands. 28 The operational commander must have information on the personal traits of the opposing commander, his leadership skills and experience, and his relations with subordinate and higher commanders. In contrast to the tactical commander, the operational commander should consider the degree of cohesion of the enemy alliance or coalition. Operational intelligence also must determine and identify ways the operational commander could get inside the enemy's decision-making cycle. The operational commander must know how his enemy counterpart sees the theater, what courses of action are open to him, and which of these he is most likely to adopt. As opposed to tactical intelligence, which is concerned primarily with immediate and near-term enemy capabilities, operational intelligence must focus on the enemy's intentions over time.

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Because war is a contest between two sides, the enemy's actions influence and shape our own actions or reactions, and operational intelligence must in contrast to tactical intelligence-view and analyze the situation in broader context and for longer periods and consider how they affect the enemy's future decisions. Political, economic, informational, social, religious, legal, environmental, and other factors could considerably affect the enemy's operational decisions; hence, the operational commander must have such information to make his own decisions. This information is most often provided only through strategic intelligence. Responsibilities and Tasks: The principal tasks of operational intelligence in peacetime and in war can arbitrarily be called intelligence preparation of the theater (IPT)." This process consists of sequential and simultaneous actions to analyze the operational situation continuously and define options for the commander. Operational intelligence helps the commander and the staff determine the objectives and tasks. It prepares threat area evaluation and analysis. It is responsible for identifying and determining the enemy's critical factors and operational and strategic centers of gravity (COG). Another related task is determining the enemy's possible actions against one's centers of gravity, and thereby helping the commander to find the best way to protect these centers of gravity. Operational intelligence provides adequate indications and warning (I&W) of the potential enemy's hostile action. It collects information from multiple sources on the enemy's options and intentions about terminating the conflict or war. Operational intelligence is also responsible for providing battle damage assessments (BDA). Accomplishing this task allows the commander to adjust future efforts to maximize effects in the employment of subordinate forces. Among other things, BDA is used to confirm or deny previous intelligence estimates of the enemy's forces after the completion of some major task or the entire major operation or campaign. It is also used to update pertinent parts of the IPT. BDA not only is concerned with hard evidence of the damage inflicted on the enemy forces, but also tries to obtain information that shows presence or absence of certain activities and deduces probable trends or patterns of future enemy actions. It is also responsible for collecting information and analyzing collateral damage inflicted on the enemy's civilian infrastructure that might require revision or alteration of plans for the employment of one's forces. In a campaign or major operation, subordinate component commanders should receive all necessary intelligence resources to plan for the employment of their forces and execution of their assigned missions. Their intelligence organization provides comprehensive support to the respective component commanders in the execution of the assigned missions. Among other things, their responsibilities include providing intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB); tactical indication and warning; threat assessment and estimates; maintaining intelligence databases; defense and penetration analysis; target development, vulnerability analysis, and weaponeering support; combat evaluation; evasion and escape; and dissemination of intelligence to higher, adjacent, and lower force elements. At the operational level, war is usually conducted with alliance or coalition partners, which often considerably complicates operations security (OPSEC). Normally, strategic collection means are among the most sensitive of national assets, and providing such information to alliance or coalition partners may risk loss of the source. Sanitized strategic intelligence can reduce this problem but never completely eliminate it. 21 1

Prerequisites: The success of operational intelligence in support of a major operation or campaigns depends on several prerequisites. In peacetime, a theater-wide intelligence organization must already be in place. Optimally, multisource intelligence, ranging from technical means to agents, should be in place. Joint doctrine for the use of intelligence must be written and must be understood by the commanders and their staffs. Interagency agreements should be worked out and procedures established before the start of hostilities. The operational commander should have the assurance that he will be supported by all the necessary intelligence agencies and assets. 30 Operational intelligence cannot be successful without an operational perspective on the part of intelligence officers, commanders, and their staffs. Their counterparts at the strategic and tactical levels must also understand this. Such a perspective must be developed well before one's forces became involved in hostilities. 31 The operational intelligence perspective must include a different appreciation for the physical environment than that found at either the strategic or the tactical level. Planning a major operation and campaign, in particular, depends on climatic conditions in the theater. These considerations are important at all levels of war, but at the operational level they may decide whether the campaign will succeed or fail. Both strategic and tactical intelligence is required to generate accurate and timely operational intelligence. Before the Battle of Midway in June 1942, U.S. strategic intelligence provided a vital contribution by breaking the Japanese codes. Decoded communications interceptions, in turn, produced accurate details of the Japanese operational intentions and order of battle. However, on the eve of the battle the U.S. fleet was still in the dark as to the precise movements of the Japanese fleet because of inadequate tactical intelligence. 32 Despite all that, Admiral Nimitz not only accepted the intelligence picture but also acted upon it at once. 33 Without reading the Japanese naval codes, Admiral Nimitz would have been unable to concentrate the meager U.S. Navy's forces in time to meet the much-superior Japanese forces. To be effective, all intelligence efforts in a given theater of operations must be highly centralized. One of the perennial U.S. problems in the Vietnam War was that little, if any, central direction was given to the intelligence effort. 34 Operational intelligence must also be conducted continuously both in peacetime and in war. It is usually too late to collect and evaluate data on a theater just before the start of a major operation or campaign. The quality of intelligence obtained by operational commanders is closely linked with the prevalent view of the character of the future war. One of the reasons French and British intelligence failed in 1940 was an incorrect prediction as to the character of the next war. British and French experiences in World War I had led them to believe that the next big war would be positional; hence, their intelligence was unprepared to deal with the fast-moving and highly dynamic warfare of 1940. 35 For successful operational intelligence, adequate forces and assets must be available. Moreover, adequate and constant attention must be given by the operational commanders and their superiors to intelligence both in peacetime and in war. Too much emphasis on the offensive aspect of warfare is invariably detrimental to achieving the necessary level of proficiency in intelligence gathering and evaluation. The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) gave little emphasis to aerial reconnaissance; that task was considered too "defensive." The result was that the IJN suffered throughout the war from

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a shortage of reconnaissance aircraft and trained observers. It had only two reconnaissance squadrons, both land-based. All photographic reconnaissance was conducted by these two squadrons, although their pilots did not have any special training in photography. The U.S. fast carrier forces repeatedly delivered successful strikes before and in the course of the Leyte Operation because of the Japanese failure to maintain a regular and thorough air search and reconnaissance. 36 For the operational commander, it is of the utmost importance to possess accurate, reliable, and perhaps most important of all, relevant and timely intelligence. Before their advance with heavy forces through the Ardennes in May 1940, the German tactical reconnaissance and intelligence were excellent. The Germans determined that the Ardennes were passable for the panzers and motorized infantry. Their intelligence collection was well organized, and the Germans obtained complete information on roads, bridges, POL stocks, terrain, and other aspects of the Ardennes. 37 They had an accurate assessment of the Allied dispositions, which helped them select the correct point for the main attack, and hence to build up forces there. They also deduced that the Allies would advance to the Dyle River line when the attack began. This reduced their anxiety that the French would launch a flank attack against the German main thrust. 38 To be effective, operational intelligence must be believed, specifically by the operational commander and staff. This means that the preconceived ideas of commanders, their staffs, and intelligence officers must be overcome. Sometimes the biggest problem is the operational commander who wants to be his own intelligence officer. He might feel more comfortable with his own experiences, ignoring changes in the situation that might make that experience irrelevant. Alternatively, he might have strong cultural or political biases causing him to reject accurate intelligence presented by the intelligence officer. He might also choose to ignore valuable intelligence or accept such intelligence too late. Other causes of failure have been politicization of intelligence agencies, ambiguous assessments (due to bureaucratic reluctance to accept risks), and users' resistance to accept intelligence warnings. Leadership should always be ready to accept legitimate differences of interpretation of any information and intelligence received .3y Optimally, operational intelligence should see a given theater of operations through the eyes of the enemy's operational commander, visualize which courses of action are open to him, and predict the one he is most likely to adopt. However, the operational commander, when possible, should generally rely on what the enemy is physically capable of doing, not on his intentions. Reliance on assessments of the enemy's intentions instead of his physical capabilities has probably led to more major military failures than any other intelligence deficiency. Unfortunately, one's limited resources frequently drive planning toward what the enemy is most likely to do. The British intelligence service in late January 1940 made a classic bad evaluation of the enemy's intentions regarding the possible German landing in Norway. The British correctly estimated that the Germans had about 400 transport aircraft in the northeastern part of the country and could assemble, on short notice, about 1,000 machines capable of carrying about 10,000 men. However, British intelligence firmly believed that the Germans would not intervene in Scandinavia as long as their iron ore import was not endangered or the Allies did not establish a naval base on the Norwegian coast. 40 An operational commander can rely on the enemy's intentions only when he possesses reliable information as to what the enemy commander intends to do or is in

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possession of the enemy's operational plans. The Allies obtained this type of information from the Ultra and Magic intercepts. Pearl Harbor is a case in which repeated intelligence warning indicators were ignored because of a rigid belief that events would occur otherwise. There was a clear and gross underestimation of the Japanese ability and willingness to execute such an attack, and of their taking the risk to do so. 41 In the Leyte Operation, the Allied naval commander did not believe that major elements of the Japanese fleet would oppose an Allied landing at Leyte. COMSOWESPAC and the commander of Allied Air Forces, SOWESPAC, shared this view. The Allied commanders thought in terms of the enemy intentions, not capabilities. The Japanese reacted with their entire fleet and major elements of their air force, and made an eastward entry into the Philippine theater .42 In the spring of 1944, the Gennans based their plans for defense against the Allied invasion of France on the belief that the Allies would land at Pas de Calais and not at Normandy. They relied, in fact, on indications of intentions, not the hard intelligence that would have told them Normandy was the only possible invasion site. 43 Reasons for Failure: The lack of key data, incorrect analysis of sound information, or ignoring sound intelligence can cause intelligence failures in planning and conducting a major operation or campaign. In 1914, the German failure at the outbreak of hostilities was due, among other things, to decision makers ignoring the sound intelligence they had. The German General Staff believed in August 1914 that Belgium would not fight and add her six divisions to the French forces. The Germans also assumed that Russia could not mobilize and launch a major offensive capable of influencing the German attack on France in less than six weeks. 44 The French, for their part, did not believe that the Germans would use reservists as active troops to strengthen their right wing. 45 In the Battle of the Mame in August September 1914, the Germans misinterpreted intelligence and prematurely moved troops to their left wing. The Chief of the General Staff, General Helmuth von Moltke, Jr., and his army commanders were convinced that the French were beaten, even though they had not captured large numbers of enemy troops. They were unwilling to heed contrary, noncongenial intelligence warnings . 46 The Army's High Command lacked confirmation about a great victory in the West. In fact, local victories did not result in numerous prisoners taken or large quantities of materiel captured. The Second Army Command reported on 26 August only 4,000 prisoners and thirty-five guns captured; yet the Army's High Command was overly optimistic and enthusiastic about the information. 47 In the post-Stalingrad offensive in February 1943, Soviet intelligence analysis apparently did not consider the full range of German capabilities and allowed subjective elements to drive analysis that confirmed the preconceived ideas of Soviet military leaders, from Stalin on down. The Soviets relied too heavily on information received from their spy ring within the German Supreme Command of the Wehnuacht; they apparently forgot, however, that their spies did not have access to the planning in Army Group Don, under Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, which was actually in charge of the operation (the German counteroffensive in southern Russia in February March 1943 that led to the recapture of Kharkov). 48 Another cause of operational intelligence failure that has often led to operational setbacks is overconfidence and the belief in the superiority of one's own culture over another . 49 The Germans in August 1914 were well aware of the British pledge to fight if 214

Belgium was invaded. However, they did not believe it, showing a surprising lack of judgment. 50 In another example, prior to May 1940 the British and French intelligence services had collected a significant amount of information about a German attack to take place in the Ardennes. Because this information did not conform to their expectations, they ignored it. As the German offensive unfolded, French military intelligence had difficulty deducing not only the extent of the German gains, but also the whereabouts of their own forces. This was mainly due to a shortage of reconnaissance assets, which were being progressively destroyed by the Germans. 5 1 The Allies failed to anticipate or discover the German buildup in the Ardennes before May 1940. Likewise, Allied intelligence possessed information of the impending German attack in the Ardennes in December 1944, but failed to interpret signs of it correctly. The prevalent view was that the fighting spirit of the Germans was so low that no offensive could be expected . 52 The Allies expected that Ultra would tell them why Hitler was shifting fighter aircraft westward and building up large reserve with SS panzer divisions at its core. However, they failed to penetrate Hitler's masterful deception to parade the assembly of the Sixth Panzer Army in the north while secretly preparing to attack in the Ardennes . 53 Conclusion: Operational intelligence differs considerably in terms of scope and time from strategic and tactical intelligence. As in other aspects of operational warfare, it is all a matter of perspective. Operational perspective is inherently larger and broader than tactical perspective but smaller and narrower than the strategic perspective. Its purpose is to support major operations or campaigns, while tactical intelligence supports battles or engagements. In contrast to tactical intelligence, operational intelligence must evaluate both military and nonmilitary aspects of the situation in a given theater. It also tries to predict probable development and trends in the situation several weeks or even months into the future. It is focused on more unquantifiable elements of the enemy's combat potential and combat power. Hence, its estimates and conclusions are riskier because they inherently rest on assumptions rather than hard evidence. This is one reason the operational commander operates in an area full of uncertainty and high risks and must make decisions based on less complete, and sometimes even less accurate, information than those made by a tactical commander. Operational intelligence represents a fusion of national- and theater-strategic intelligence with tactical intelligence to provide accurate, comprehensive, relevant, and, perhaps most important of all, timely depiction of the military and nonmilitary situation in a given theater or area of operations. Good strategic intelligence is of little use if tactical intelligence is poor or inadequate. The opposite is equally true. Operational intelligence, in contrast to tactical intelligence, operates more in the realm of uncertainties and assumptions because it deals with much larger factors of space, time, and forces. While not neglecting the quantifiable elements of the enemy's situation, operational intelligence is focused on such hard-to-quantify elements of the enemy's situation as personalities and peculiarities of the enemy's operational commanders and their subordinate component commanders, their skills and experience, the enemy's decision-making cycle and its exploitable vulnerabilities, service/joint doctrine, morale and discipline, and quality of training. Yet, precisely these elements of the enemy's situation are hardest to obtain and properly evaluate and analyze. The new information technologies are no great help on the matter. While they have greatly improved and will 215

continue to improve the operational cornmander's knowledge and understanding of the physical aspects of the theater, not much progress is being made on improving his knowledge on intangible elements of the situation in a theater. It is difficult to see how technology, no matter how advanced, can ever resolve the problem of "fog of war" and friction. There is no substitute for a human element, in both intelligence collection and analysis in the near future, to resolve this critical and integral part of war at any level.

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Notes l . Joint Pub 2-0: Joint Doctrine, for Intelligence Support to Operations ( Washington, DC: 5 May 1995), p. GL-8. 2. Adopted from Joint Pub 2-0: Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations, pp. IV-14 through IV-16. 3. Ibid., p. II-1. 4. Ibid., pp. II-2 through II-8. 5. Ibid., p. II-1. 6. B.H. Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1970), p. 94. 7. Fielding L. Greaves, "Intelligence. Key to Victory," Military Review 9 (September 1965), p. 36. 8. Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes. The Anatomy of Failure in War (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1 st ed., 1991), p. 173. 9. Joint Pub 2-0: Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations, p. II-1. 10. Lanning M. Porter, Preconceptions, Predilections, and Experience: Problems for Operational Level Intelligence and Decisionmaking (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 12 May 1986), p. 5. 11. Juergen Rohwer and Eberhard Jaeckel, Die Funkautklaerung and ihre Rolle im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Stuttgart: Motorbuch Verlag, 1979), p. 39. 12. Ronald L. Burgess, Operational Intelligence. Is It a Panacea? (Fort. Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 21 April 1987), p. 18; Charles B. MacDonald, A Time for Trumpets (New York: Bantam Books, 1985), pp. 66-7. 13. Erich Huettenhain, "Erfolge and Misserfolge der deutschen Chiffrierdienste im Zweiten Weltkrieg," in Juergen Rohwer and Eberhard Jaeckel, Die Funkautklaerung and ihre Rolle im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Stuttgart: Motorbuch Verlag, 1979), p. 108. 14. Cohen and Gooch, Military Misfortunes. The Anatomy of Failure in War , p. 218. 15. I.C.B. Dear, editor, et al., The Oxford Companion to World War 1 (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 161-3. 16. Jeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious War. Its Theory, and its Practice in the Pacific (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1951), pp. 207-8, 211. 17. Samuel E. Morison, Aleutians, Gilberts and Marshalls, June 1942-April 1944, Vol. VIII, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1951, reprinted May 1984), pp. 151-2, 168. 1 8. Hans-Peter yon Kirchbach, Clausewitz and the Culmination Point of Victory (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 15 March 1989), p. 31-2. 1 9. Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, The Sea War in Korea (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1957), pp. 87, 105.

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20. James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year, United States Army in the Korean War ( Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1990), pp. 233-4; Cohen and Gooch, pp. 180-1. 21. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Summary Report ( Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 125. 22. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The General's War. The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston/New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), p. 185. 23. Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Summary Report, pp. 126, 128. 24. James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year, United States Army in the Korean War ( Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1990), p. 62. 25. Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Summary Report, p. 123. 26. Porter, Preconceptions, Predilections, and Experience. Problems . for Operational Level Intelligence and Decisionmaking, p. 15. 27. Ibid., p. 29. 28. Cohen and Gooch, Military Misfortunes. The Anatomy of Failure in War , p. 217. 29. The term "intelligence preparation of the battlefield" is essentially tactical; hence, it is not appropriate to use that term to refer to operational-level intelligence. 30. Porter, Preconceptions, Predilections, and Experience. Problems./or Operational Level Intelligence and Decisionmaking, p. 28. 31. Ibid., pp. 8-9. 32. Paul Stares, Command Performance. The Neglected Dimension of European Security ( Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1981), pp. 36, 39. 33. Gordon W. Prange, Miracle at Midway (New York, 1982), p. 393. 34. Stares, Command Performance. The Neglected Dimension of European Security , pp. 22-3. 35. Ibid., p. 24. 36. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific), Japanese Military and Naval Intelligence Division. Japanese Intelligence Section G-2, Dates of Survey: 1 November 1945 through 1 February 1946, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 24-5, 46. 37. Historical Evaluation and Research Organization (HERO), Developing a Methodology to Describe the Relationship of Mobility to Combat Effectiveness (Fairfax, VA: HERO, a Report prepared for Research Analysis Organization under Subcontract FY 67-ARDI-l-2, 27 December 1966), p. 61. 38. Stares, Command Performance. The Neglected Dimension of European Security , p. 25; Joseph A. Bolick, The Influence and Reasons,fbr Acceptance or Rejection of Operational Level Intelligence During the 1914 Marne and 1943 Kursk Campaigns (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1988), p. 26.

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39. Ibid., p. 5; Ronald L. Burgess, Operational Intelligence. Is It a Panacea? (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 21 April 1987), p. 26. 40. MI 2 Section of British intelligence stated: "There is no reason to expect them to be more successful than we have been in the past. There is no reason to believe that the Germans will be able to land and maintain forces more rapidly than we can so long as our communications through Trondheim are not destroyed. The Germans, of course, have a much greater military on which to draw." General Ironside stated at a meeting of the chiefs of staff in the first week of April 1940 that ".... it was unnecessary to prepare a large force for Scandinavia at present. The Germans were ready to launch an attack in the West. Any diversion to Scandinavia would be to their serious disadvantage and was therefore in his opinion most unlikely." The MI 4 Section thought, "From the point of view of the German order of battle, the disposition of German forces does not, at the moment, support any probability of Scandinavian invasion. Eight nonactive divisions are strung along the coast.... There is, therefore, at present no concentration of troops in the area which could readily be made available for such a project but troops could be moved from central Germany fairly rapidly and we might get little notice of such moves"; Olivier Desarzens, Nachrichtendienstliche Aspekte der "Weseruebung" 1940 (Osnabrueck: Biblio Verlag, 1988), pp. 79, 89, 91. 41. Burgess, Operational Intelligence. Is It a Panacea? p. 25. 42. The intelligence summary for SOWESPAC on 15 October stated that "As to the Navy, while it may move in strength in and out of protected stations in home and adjacent waters, it is doubtful if it will seek any issue beyond the cover of land-based airplanes." The Allied commander also did not expect the Japanese to receive air reinforcements from Japan, East Indies, Hainan, or French Indo-China, nor did he expect any air attack from Japanese carrier aircraft; Richard W. Bates, et al., The Battle for Leyte Gulf, October 1944. Strategical and Tactical Analysis, Vol. 1: Preliminary Operations until 0719 October 17th, 1944 Including Battle For Formosa (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 1953), p. 23. 43. Porter, Preconceptions, Predilections, and Experience: Problems for Operational Level Intelligence and Decisionmaking, p. 10. 44. Bolick, The Influence and Reasons for Acceptance or Rejection of Operational Level Intelligence During the 1914 Marne and 1943 Kursk Campaigns, pp. 10-1. 45. The French intelligence in 1913 had correctly assumed that the Germans would in fact use their reserve as active troops, but the General Staff ignored the evidence. It did not want to be convinced; it constantly rejected any evidence that argued in favor of a defensive battle. The members of the General Staff convinced themselves that the Germans would use their reserves only to guard communications lines and passive fronts, and as siege and occupation troops; ibid., p. 13. 46. Ibid., p. 32. 47. Wolf Weth, "Fuehrungsgrundlagen and ihre Bedeutung. Betrachtung ueber einige historische Erreignisse and die moegliche Nutzanwendung der dabei gewonnen Erkentnisse," Wehrkunde 2 (February 1967), p. 157. 48. Porter, Preconceptions, Predilections, and Experience: Problems for Operational Level Intelligence and Decisionmaking, pp. 1 3-4. 49. Burgess, Operational Intelligence. Is It a Panacea? p. 28. 50. Bolick, The Influence and Reasons fbr Acceptance or Rejection of Operational Level Intelligence During the 1914 Marne and 1943 Kursk Campaigns, p. 34. 51. Stares, Command Performance. The Neglected Dimension of European Security, p. 23.

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52. Greaves, "Intelligence. Key to Victory," p. 35. 53. McDonald, A Time for Trumpets, p. 78.

OPERATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE The concept of operational command and control warfare (C2W)I is not new; it has existed in various forms and applications since the beginning of warfare. However, in recent years, the capabilities to conduct C2W have grown significantly because of the ever-greater advances in weapons, sensors, and communications. C2W is the military application of information warfare (IW). At the same time, C2W is one of the most i mportant functions at all levels of war. It is conducted both in peacetime and in time of crisis and war, and across the entire operational continuum. Many theoreticians exaggerate in claiming that IW constitutes an entirely new area of warfare that transcends all other warfare areas in importance. While increasingly more important in peacetime and in war, IW cannot be considered something so new that it is used outside the traditional methods of warfare. It is the physical force-not the nonmilitary sources of power--of which IW is a part that determines the outcome of war. Today's almost exclusive focus on IW in general, and its soft-kill application in particular, is hard to justify in view of the fact that C2W plays the most important part in shaping the battlefield/battlespace both before and during a campaign or major operation. IW is defined as actions aimed at achieving information superiority by denying, exploiting, corrupting, or destroying the enemy's information and information functions, while protecting one's information and information functions against enemy attack. Operational commanders try to acquire the best possible picture of the situation in their respective theater by exploiting both military and nonmilitary information systems (INFOSYS). 2 C2W is understood as the integrated use of operations security, military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and physical destruction, all mutually supported by intelligence to influence, degrade, deny information, or destroy adversary command and control capabilities, while protecting one's C2 capabilities against such actions. It is applicable across the entire spectrum of conflict. 3 C2W could be offensive (C2-Attack) or defensive (C2-Protect), and the two are often conducted concurrently (see Figure 16). To be fully effective, C2W must be fully integrated into the commander's concept of operations and synchronized with other actions. Scale: The scale of effort and command echelon differs according to the objective. The tactical command echelon is responsible for planning and executing C2W in support of battles, engagements, and other tactical actions. Strategic C2 W is planned and conducted by the national or alliance/coalition and military-strategic command echelons in support of the national and military strategic objectives in peacetime or in war. Operational C2W is planned and conducted by the theater commanders in support of a campaign or major operation. Therefore, it is inherently a joint and sometimes a combined activity. Among other things, the operational C2W aims at disrupting the enemy's decision cycle and, if possible, decapitating the enemy's C2 structure from the main body of his large combat forces in field. It is also intended to prevent the enemy from observing one's forces and thereby preventing him from deducing one's forces' real intentions. C2W is especially important at the operational level because of the ability it gives the operational commander to synchronize the forces and assets of several services in the use of information for both offensive and defensive purposes. One of the main advantages of 221

operational C2W is that it provides great flexibility selecting courses of action early in a crisis or war. Once the plan of C2W is put into action, it enables timely calibration of the application of forces depending on the changing situation. Components: Regardless of scale or purpose, C2W encompasses five key components: psychological operations, military deception, operations security, electronic warfare, and physical destruction. Each of these components is supported by intelligence. Physical destruction could be part of lethal operational fires, while when used offensively other components could be part of nonlethal operational fires. Operations security, defensive elements of electronic warfare, psychological operations, and deception are at the same time integral parts of another function operational protection. Each component of C2W could be used to supplement the effect achieved by using other elements. However, proper planning of C2W entails considerable difficulty because the use of one component is often in conflict with the use of other components. Psychological operations (PSYOP) are an essential component of both offensive and defensive C2W. They are aimed at enhancing actual and perceived mission, intent, and combat power of the joint force to appropriate foreign audiences. PSYOP can multiply the effects of deception, reinforce apparent perceptions, plant seeds of doubt about the enemy leadership, proliferate discreet messages to enemy C3 and intelligence collectors, and enhance and combine live-fire demonstrations with surrender appeals-all

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to magnify one's superiority and to encourage the enemy to give up the fight. PSYOP can damage the enemy C2 by lowering morale, instilling fear, and breeding confusion. They also could provide insights into the enemy's reactions and can be used to direct other C2W activities, such as deception, into areas where they are most likely to succeed. PSYOP are coordinated at the strategic level to ensure the proper sequencing and timing of all elements of operations. They require extensive intelligence information. A variety of actions are used, such as political and diplomatic communiques, leaflet drops, loudspeaker broadcasts, and various other means of transmitting information. In addition, a strong psychological impact can be derived from various military activities in peacetime, such as moving large forces or holding large exercises or maneuvers. 4 Military deception ( MILDEC) is conducted at all levels of war. At the operational level, deception is normally an integral part of a plan for a major operation, while at the strategic level, deception is planned for the initial phase of a campaign. (For details, see the chapter "Operational/Strategic Deception"). In a theoretical sense, operational deception is part of the offensive operational C2W, but in practice, its planning and execution transcend purely C2W boundaries. The main objective of military deception, regardless of scale, is to surprise, maintain security, increase freedom of one's action, or mislead the enemy and induce him to act to his disadvantage and then exploit the situation for the advantage of one's forces. Another objective is to give the enemy false ideas about the activities and intentions of one's forces. A prerequisite for success is having effective counter-surveillance aimed at preventing the enemy from observing indications of one's forces' genuine activity. Successful deception multiplies force effectiveness; reduces the expenditures of time, effort, and resources; and can have farreaching psychological effects. Offensive deception involves the active dissemination of false information to mislead the enemy about intentions. It is usually an element of the operational idea (scheme) in planning a campaign or major operation. Defensive deception (or counter-deception), in contrast, tries to provide false information to deceive or mislead the enemy who has the initiative. The defensive component of operational C2W encompasses operations security (OPSEC). At the operational level, OPSEC is aimed at denying the enemy's operational commander information on one's capabilities, intentions, and vulnerabilities. Its task is to identify which actions enemy intelligence collection systems can observe, and which indicators of one's actions could be interpreted or pieced together to ascertain one's intent. The next task is to develop and employ selected measures to eliminate or reduce one's vulnerabilities to such actions. It is also an excellent means of achieving surprise. In the Gulf War of 1990-1991, OPSEC combined with the other elements of C2W plus strikes from the air allowed, virtually undetected, the movement of more than 270,000 Coalition troops in preparation for the ground offensive. In peacetime, the main tasks of OPSEC are to determine indicators and vulnerabilities, protect confidential information, ensure physical security of facilities and personnel, apply information security, protect the commander's decisions, and keep the enemy from planning and conducting deception and effectively using his counterintelligence. In a crisis the tasks include assessing indicators and vulnerabilities, camouflage, delaying information necessary to make decisions, ensuring surprise, degrading enemy decisions, employing effective radio procedures, applying information security, and employing counterintelligence. In war, OPSEC is focused on assessing

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indicators and vulnerabilities, denying enemy knowledge of critical nodes and one's intentions, ensuring dispersal of enemy intelligence, applying information security, and employing counterintelligence. OPSEC encompasses passive and active measures aimed at denying the enemy knowledge of the disposition, capabilities, and intentions of one's own and enemy forces. It focuses on identifying and protecting those aspects of an operation plan considered vital to success, notwithstanding the impossibility, in practice, of protecting every aspect of the operations plan. Therefore, the operational commander must choose which parts of the plan to protect. Focus is usually given to those parts of the plan that could provide early indications of impending action or reveal one's vulnerabilities. The OPSEC assessment should be conducted from the enemy's viewpoint. The key to identifying critical information is to determine what can be deduced from a particular event or piece of information-hence the importance of protecting essential elements of one's own intelligence. OPSEC must identify critical elements of one's intelligence that the enemy could use to disrupt or even cause a failure of a campaign or major operation. These efforts must be coordinated at the highest level. OPSEC is the essential C2W element for hiding one's vital information from the enemy. PSYOP and deception augment the effort by i nfluencing the enemy in such a way that he will not look for the vital truth one's forces seek to hide. If the enemy focus is manipulated away from the truth, he may overlook it. By using jamming, communications security, and associated security disciplines, EW has a vital role in concealing information. Physical destruction can ensure denial of information by removing the enemy's physical assets for obtaining information. 6 The planners first identify critical information, activities, or indicators that will reveal one's intention or course of action. When collected and analyzed by enemy intelligence, these elements of critical information could reveal one's plans. The planners must develop a thorough understanding of the enemy's intelligence capabilities, including his means of collecting information and his ability to analyze and disseminate it. In the next step, the analysts determine whether the enemy has the ability to collect one's elements of critical information. Then, the operational commander must decide what actions to take to conceal his critical information or, conversely, accept the risk of doing nothing at all. Afterward, the planners recommend the appropriate countermeasures. 7 The news media portrayals of military activities before a conflict can possibly prevent hostilities or can build support for use of one's military forces. The presence of the media can also be a valuable source of information to the enemy. Also, modern TV and wire services can transmit information in near real time. Electronic warfare (EW) is aimed at degrading the performance of the enemy's electronics and weapons systems, provide warning of enemy action, and locating and identifying enemy sensors, thereby reducing their effectiveness against one's forces. It plays a significant role in the process of information degradation or destruction because information transmitted by electromagnetic means is extremely vulnerable to electromagnetic or high-energy weapons. EW in support of operational C2W consists of three main components: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. Electronic attack (EA) is aimed to deny the enemy's operational commander the use of his electronic spectrum needed for effective command and control of his forces. It encompasses jamming,

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electronic deception, and directed energy (DE) to degrade, exploit, or destroy the enemy's electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). It is aimed at denying the enemy operational commander use of the EMS to effectively command and control his forces. Electronic protection (EP), in contrast, aims to ensure that the operational commander can use the EMS for command and control. It protects one's forces against both the enemy uses of electromagnetic spectrum and undesirable effects of one's use. Electronic support (ES) involves actions and measures to search, intercept, identify, and locate the enemy's sources of intentional or unintentional energy and detect immediate threats. It could provide the real-time information required to locate and identify the enemy's C3 nodes and supporting systems during EA missions. When successful, ES enhances the accuracy of the operational commander's estimate of the situation. It can provide timely intelligence about the enemy C2 capabilities and limitations that can be used to update previously known information. This information can then be used to plan C2 attacks or to provide battle damage assessment (BDA). Physical destruction involves the employment of weapons systems and their associated sensors to seek, identify, and disable or destroy the enemy's sensors, communications, and C3 nodes and thereby either delay or deny information to the enemy. The use of "hard-kill" weapons against designated targets as part of an integrated C2W effort includes direct or indirect fires from ground, sea, and air forces. In many cases, Special Forces teams could be used to destroy or neutralize specific elements of the enemy's command and control. This does not necessarily mean that the targets of attack must be physically destroyed; fire demonstrations and weapons effects and selective degradation of certain parts of the enemy's C2 are examples of alternatives to complete destruction. Destruction can also be inflicted upon elements of the enemy force that support C3 nodes. 8 Destruction means that the enemy's C3 node or some other elements of his C2 cannot perform, either permanently or temporarily. Essentially, any weapon could be used to target enemy C2, including Special Forces. Long-term advantage of the destruction of the enemy's C3 nodes cannot be assumed. The timing of the application of physical destruction is critical to ensure that the subsequent action to exploit short-term effects is successful. In peacetime, the task is to identify targets, determine feasibility of attack, and plan for redundancy and damage control. In conflict the task is to degrade, neutralize, or destroy the enemy's C3 nodes, while protecting one's own from the enemy's attack. The long-term effects of these attacks are generally limited.9 Physical destruction is often the operational commander's only available choice. However, in cyber-attacks, it is often more advantageous to leave many vital parts of the enemy's C2 functioning rather than destroy or neutralize them. Offensive C2W: Offensive C2W aims to disrupt the enemy's decision-making and planning process by denying information to the enemy operational commander so that he cannot obtain an accurate picture of the situation. This would have the greatest effect on his estimate of the situation. The objective is to disrupt the enemy's commander decision cycle and thereby slow the enemy's tempo of operations. Offensive C2W is also aimed to disrupt and optimally to sever the connection between the operational commander and his subordinates. EW is a crucial tool for degrading the enemy's key points for C2, while physical destruction severs those links more permanently. Offensive C2W is useless unless it supports the operational commander's plan. Offensive C2W, properly planned

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and executed, should force the enemy to be reactive and induce the enemy's operational commander to generate combat power at the wrong time and place. Planning offensive C2W is based on the assigned mission, the commander's intent and concept of operations, and synchronization with the plan for a campaign or major operation. The aim is to seize and maintain the initiative by degrading the enemy's informational systems and forcing the enemy to react. Offensive C2W is difficult to plan because of the need to soundly balance and integrate the use of each of its components. The planners must also consider the effect degradation of the enemy C2 may have on the ongoing efforts to influence the actions of the enemy's operational commander. Sometimes, too severe degradation of the enemy C3 links may adversely affect these efforts. t o To attack the enemy C3 system planners must understand how the nodes within that system fit together to make the system work. Within a C3 system, one or more nodes may be of such importance that their destruction immediately degrades the functioning of the entire system. To provide a viable target, the C3 node must be not only critical, but also vulnerable; it must be susceptible to degradation or have an exploitable weakness. It must be accessible-there must be some way to reach it-and it must be feasible to degrade the node; optimally, targeted C3 nodes are both critical and vulnerable. Very often, the avenue of vulnerability to a critical node is through the limited nodes within a system. PSYOP played a key role in the Gulf War of 1990-1991. Among other things, the objective of the Coalition's PSYOP was to gain support for the war; to encourage Iraqi dissatisfaction, alienation, defection, and loss of confidence; to create doubts in Iraqi leadership; to encourage noncooperation and resistance; to strengthen the Coalition partners' determination; and to enhance the deterrent role of the U.S. forces. Focus was on breaking the Iraqis' will to resist and on increasing Iraqi soldiers' fear. U.S. forces used old-fashioned methods of psychological warfare, such as dropping leaflets, to exploit the success of the B-52 area bombing sorties. Broadcasts supplemented leaflet drops. The U.S. Air Force EC-130, volant Solo, aircraft specially equipped with radio transmitters, was used for this purpose. In addition, three ground radio stations and a joint U.S. and Saudi TV station broadcasts supplemented these efforts. Many Iraqi prisoners testified that PSYOP efforts were factors in convincing them to surrender. 1 2 In contrast to the Gulf War, the U.S. and NATO PSYOP during the Kosovo Conflict of 1999 were poorly planned and largely ineffective. The U.S. information warfare seemed incoherent and amateurish despite the large resources the U.S. military invested in the area. For all the resources available, NATO used some very old methods. Starting on 16 April leaflets dropped over Belgrade urged the population to stop their support of Mr. Slobodan Milosevic because of his criminal actions against the Albanian population, while those dropped by F-16s over Kosovo warned the Serbian units to abandon their weapons and equipment to prevent being continuously bombed. Reportedly, the leaflets were poorly worded and grammatically incorrect. 1 3 The majority of the Serbian population, regardless of their dislike of Milosevic and his regime, simply did not care about the fate of the ethnic Albanians, nor did they think Serbian actions were criminal. Hence, the effect of the leaflets on the Serbian population and the military in Kosovo was minimal. During the Kosovo Conflict, the U.S. forces also used the EC130E, Commando Solo, aircraft for airborne psychological operations, to broadcast in the

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standard AM/FM/HF bands and color TV. Despite their indisputably great capabilities, the aircraft were unable to affect the Serbian state media because NATO's officials were unwilling to let a slow-flying plane fly close to Belgrade for fear of its being shot down. 14 This, in turn, allowed Milosevic to maintain information superiority over his people. Both NATO and the Serbs used media and especially TV images extensively to manipulate public opinion. Yet NATO was unable to successfully counter Mr. Milosevic's state-controlled media and his attempts to gain international sympathy. Although the Serbian forces killed thousands and expelled several hundreds of thousands more ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, it was NATO, not Mr. Milosevic's regime, that was almost daily forced to explain civilian casualties caused by NATO's bombs. In many ways, the Western press became an asymmetric asset for the Serbs.' 5 Deception, when part of offensive C2W, has potentially positive effects on the conduct of OPSEC. It could influence the enemy not to collect certain information or to underestimate the capabilities of one's OPSEC. It could contribute to the success of PSYOP by providing information that is in harmony with the main PSYOP theme. It could enhance the effectiveness of one's EW by influencing the enemy to have false perceptions of EA/ES capabilities or to defend wrong elements of his own C2 structure. Deception must be carefully planned and executed, because its requirements often conflict with the requirements for other elements of the offensive operational C2W. The deception story could restrict the course of action in conducting PSYOP because it might require that information needed for developing PSYOP themes is limited or not revealed at all. On the other hand, a deception story might adversely affect OPSEC because it requires revealing some information that should be guarded. Deception also could limit the use of EMS in conducting EA because some elements of the enemy C2 structure might have to continue to function so that the deception story does not lose its plausibility. Likewise, a deception story might require that some elements of the enemy C2 structure not be physically destroyed or damaged. The OPSEC requirements support military deception by concealing observable parts of one's forces. However, it often may limit information that can be used to enhance the success of the deception story. OPSEC supports PSYOP by concealing competing information but also may limit information that can be used to develop themes for conduct of PSYOP. It supports physical destruction by concealing forces and means for C2 attack and denying the enemy information about the true nature of one's capability to physically destroy his C3 systems. It supports EW by denying the enemy information on one's EA and ES capabilities. In the Gulf War of 1990-1991, OPSEC aimed to prevent compromising the plan and execution of the Coalition's ground offensive. Because of OPSEC considerations General Schwarzkopf stopped an early buildup of the Coalition forces in the west. Most of the Coalition's forces were deployed to base camps in eastern Saudi Arabia and then moved to attack positions under cover of the air offensive. He also vetoed a proposal to begin a near-term buildup of supplies at King Khalid Military City in preparation for the ground offensive. By General Schwarzkopf's direction, the Iraqi forces deployed in the western part of the front were targeted just before the start of the ground offensive. Because of the success of air strikes, the Coalition forces prevented the Iraqi reconnaissance from obtaining knowledge of the Coalition forces' true attack direction. In addition, by effectively "blinding" the Iraqis, some 270,000 troops were covertly

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redeployed from the eastern to the western part of the front over the three-week period. Some units were moved over a distance of more than 260 miles. The entire divisions and their support moved for several hundred miles undetected by the Iraqis. 1 6 EW plays an extremely large role in offensive C2W. Both traditional methods in attacking enemy C2, such as jamming, and new methods, such as cyber-attacks, are used in conducting EA today. EW supports many other elements in offensive C2W. It enhances the effectiveness of the OPSEC by neutralizing the enemy's reconnaissance and surveillance. EA and ES are extensively used to conduct military deception. EW supports PSYOP by making it difficult or impossible for the enemy to observe and report conflicting information. ES provides information on the enemy's C3 nodes and other targets for physical destruction. EA could possibly limit one's option to deceive the enemy by denying or degrading the use of certain parts of the enemy's C3 systems. The PSYOP could be even more complicated because EA might deny the use of certain of the enemy's frequencies and thereby restrict one's ability to target or reach the audience to convey the PSYOP themes. Likewise, EA could limit the application of available combat potential against enemy C2 because of the need to leave some enemy systems operable so that PSYOP themes could be conveyed. In the Gulf War 1990-1991, the Coalition's electronic warfare completely disrupted Iraq's C3 system by severing the command links from Baghdad to the field forces. The greatest contribution was in suppressing the Iraqi air defenses. Iraq used 1 7,000 SAMs, nearly 10,000 antiaircraft (AA) guns, and a variety of sophisticated communications links. The Coalition aircraft suffered minimal losses because the Iraqis did not invest much in EW technology. For electronic support, the U.S. Air Force RC135s and the U-2R aircraft collected communications intelligence, in some cases relaying intercepted data in real time through a wideband satellite link. The British EW aircraft and the U.S. Navy EW aircraft worked to refine the electronic order of battle before the conflict started. The U.S. Special Forces teams used ground and air assets to conduct signal monitoring and RDF during the early stages of the defensive phase of the war. The U.S. Army used both fixed-wing planes and helicopters for EW-provided intelligence vital to the rapid outflanking movements of the ground offensive. Eight U.S. SSNs used ES to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance and to provide indications and warning for carrier battle groups. 1 7 The U.S. space-based systems were also used for ES. The U.S. ELINT satellites provided information directly to commanders with unprecedented ti meliness; improved connectivity between U.S.-based processing facilities and theater headquarters made it possible. Ground-based FLINT sites supporting Coalition efforts were located in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, British stations in Cyprus and Oman, and French facilities in Djibouti. In addition, the U.S. Army used very effectively its combat electronic warfare and intelligence (CEWI) battalions attached to U.S. heavy divisions. 1 8 Cyber-attacks were carried out with great effect in the Gulf War when the U.S. forces reportedly dumped bogus data into Iraq's air defense system. Similar actions were taken against the Serbian air defenses in the Operation Allied Force. 1 9 However, NATO could never neutralize completely the Serbian integrated air defenses because the Serbian radar operators did not turn on their systems, thereby making it difficult to effectively use traditional means of electronic attack by using jammers and antiradiation missiles. That made it more important for NATO to penetrate Serbian air defense computers. U.S.

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military hackers invaded the computers that integrated the Yugoslav air defense system, but poor planning prevented NATO from attacking Yugoslav computer systems before two aircraft were lost. Afterward, the U.S. computer hackers were reportedly successful . 2° in inserting false messages and targets to protect NATO aircraft The effectiveness of NATO's cyber-attacks against Serbian computers is hard to assess because of the damage done by attacks against Serbian underground command posts and communications . 2 1 NATO also had problems with Serbian computer hackers who flooded NATO's Web site 22 with viruses and overloaded its servers with thousands of junk E-mail messages. Physical destruction in offensive C2W is aimed at destroying enemy sensors, human and automated data storage and analysis, communications, and command posts. The enemy's information capabilities can be neutralized or destroyed by physical destruction of nodes and links. This method is most effective when the enemy operational commander relies on certain C2 functions or when the focus is on resource-intensive and hard-to-constitute targets. Physical destruction supports OPSEC by degrading or neutralizing the enemy's reconnaissance and surveillance against one's forces. In the execution of military deception, very often some elements of the enemy's force must be physically destroyed or the enemy's ability to observe and report severely degraded or completely prevented. Physical destruction could possibly separate the enemy's operational commander from his forces in the field at critical times and thereby enhance the chances of deception. Likewise, physical destruction enhances PSYOP chances by degrading or neutralizing the enemy's ability to evaluate the situation or by isolating the targeted enemy's audience from other conflicting information. Physical destruction could limit options in using EA and ES because denying or degrading elements of the enemy C2 is achieved through disruption or severance of the communications links among C3 nodes. The physical destruction method was used extensively in the Gulf War of 19901991. In the planning phase, after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, U.S. CENTCOM revised its target list by increasing the number of C3 sites from nineteen in August 1990 to thirty by December 1991, while targets dealing with the Iraqi leadership were increased from five to twenty-seven over the same period. Coalition attacks against leadership and command and control were intended to have both political and military dimensions. The planners hoped that by separating the country's leadership in Baghdad from the military forces in the field, the Coalition would delay coordination of military operations while at the same time showing the Iraqi forces the powerlessness of their leaders. They also hoped that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein would not be able to communicate with his people and thereby mobilize them against the United States and its partners or gain support in world public opinion. Thus, the target list included radio and TV transmitters, relay stations, telephone and telegraph facilities, and military command posts. The planners also included in the list of targets the facilities that might house Saddam Hussein, such as the buildings of the Ministry of Defense, Baath (Rebirth) Party's Headquarters, and similar sites. The CENTAF's operations order of 1 September 1990 stated that the result of Phase I would be progressive and systematic collapse of Saddam Hussein's entire war machine and regime. The air force planners thought the Iraqi people would rise and overthrow the regime, and the new government in Baghdad would be more amenable to the Coalition's demands. This highly unrealistic expectation was not, however, included in the CENTCOM's final plan issued in January 1991. 23

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The Iraqi C3 nodes were the principal targets of the Coalition aircraft's attacks in the first two days after the start of the air offensive on 17 January 1991. These attacks were so destructive that Iraq never recovered. The air attacks on several leadership facilities forced Saddam Hussein and other key leaders to hide and to move frequently, thereby greatly reducing their ability to communicate with subordinate leaders and military forces in the field . 24 Relatively significant numbers of strikes were carried out for most of the first week of the war. In the second and third weeks, leadership targets received less emphasis. The C3, by contrast, received a small but steady number of precision strikes over the first three weeks. The level of these strikes against C3 was increased during the fourth week, only to be followed by a more sporadic pattern for the rest of the conflict. The peak effort against leadership-related targets came toward the end of the fourth week. The strikes that inflicted the major part of the physical damage to the C3 target sets involved precision munitions. Because of the high degree of hardness, small size, and urban location of many of the C3 targets, the primary platform used was the F-I 17 stealth fighter armed with the GBU-27 smart bombs. The Iraqi fiber-optic stations could be destroyed only by precision-guided weapons. During the first ten days of the air offensive, U.S. aircraft flew more than 1,000 sorties and fired some 600 high-speed antiradiation missiles (HARMs). Indirect fire focused on destroying C3I and different support capabilities of the first-echelon Iraqi divisions. 26 The Coalition's forces also used laser-guided artillery, rounds, Hellfires, and ATACMS to strike Iraqi ground force headquarters, conduct counter-battery, and suppress air defenses. Yet, by the end of the war on 28 February, despite all efforts, Saddam Hussein was still alive and his regime firmly in power. The Iraqis launched All Hussein (Scud) missiles until the end of war. The link with the army in the field had been greatly reduced, but the regime in Baghdad retained some means to communicate with the forces in the field. This included orders to withdraw and some redeployment to protect troops during their retreat. The effectiveness of these attacks clearly fell short of what was planned. In the Kosovo Conflict of 1999, NATO forces were not as successful in destroying the Serbian command and control as the Coalition forces had been in the Gulf War. This was partly the result of the planners' focusing more on the destruction of the air defenses than on C3 infrastructure. Another reason for the relative lack of success was that the Serbs were more effective than the Iraqis in concealment and camouflage. The Serbian C3 system was hardened and redundant. Many of the most important headquarters and command posts were buried underground, and the communications links were hard to destroy or neutralize because of the high degree of redundancy. The Serbs' communications consisted of the cable links, commercial telephone, fiber optics, high-frequency communications, and microwave communications. All this was interconnected. There were more than one hundred radio relay sites around the country, and everything was wired for dual use. Most of the commercial system served the military, and since the military system can also be put to use for the commercial system, there was no distinction between the two, other than a few private radio stations that had been built over the previous ten years. 28 NATO's plan, developed in the fall of 1998, envisaged three phases of war against Serbia. In the first phase, focus was primarily on attacking the Serbian integrated air defenses and to a lesser extent command and control and other military targets. 29

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Specifically, targets attacked included national C3 structure, Special Police and Ministry of Interior (MUP) facilities in downtown Belgrade, the headquarters of the Yugoslav I st, 2nd, and 3rd Armies, Air Defense headquarters and command posts, Special Unit Corps, and an airborne unit headquarters. In addition, Serbian intelligence facilities and communications facilities were attacked . 3° Many strikes were carried out against the Third Army, whose units were deployed in Kosovo. By late April, the target list had been expanded to include the Serbian C3 nodes; an underground command post used by Milosevic on the Avala Mountain, near Belgrade; major security forces' facilities and headquarters; and dual-use radio, TV, microwave, and telephone links. On 22 April, NATO's aircraft also struck a 23-story office tower that housed the Serbian Socialist Party's Headquarters and several radio and TV stations. A day later, four cruise missiles fired from U.S. warships in the Adriatic hit one of Milosevic's residences in Belgrade. 31 However, NATO failed to silence Milosevic. Belgrade's TV station was again on air soon after the attack. The Serbs had a contingency plan for getting back on the air, and used mobile transmitters . 32 In the Gulf War, the Coalition aircraft bombed flat the Iraqi telecommunications system, including the urban telephone exchanges located in post offices. 33 In contrast, the Serbian telecommunications fabric remained intact during NATO's bombing in 1999. Reportedly, only three nodes (in Pristina, Kraguievac, and Uzice) of about thirty telephone system nodes were attacked. However, none of the three network control stations that supported the cell-phone system were bombed. Serbian civilian and military personnel were able to pass military information over civilian telephones and radio links, which were intact. 34 Reportedly, Yugoslav sympathizers called in when NATO aircraft were taking off from bases in Italy. That the telephone system was not bombed suggests that it was useful for NATO for other purposes, such as intelligence gathering and computer attack. Throughout the war, Serbian Internet operators maintained a high level of activity, and international telephone calls went through without interruption. The reason so many Serbian telephone links and computers were not attacked was probably the U.S. intention to make it easier to alter or insert false data. 35 Defensive C2W (C2-Protect): Defensive C2W is intended to maintain effective C2 or neutralize the enemy's efforts to deny information to, or to influence, degrade, or destroy, one's C2. Failure to adequately protect one's C2 means losing freedom to act, losing the initiative, and perhaps in the end a doomed military enterprise. Defensive C2W is also a part of operational protection because it is used to protect one's information. Despite the term "defensive," this component of C2W contains both offensive and defensive components. Offensive actions usually protect four elements of offensive C2W, while defensive actions and measures are aimed to reduce the vulnerabilities of one's C2 from the enemy attack. The main purpose of protection of one's C2 is to gain C2 superiority by ensuring the unhindered collection, processing, and evaluation of information; obtaining an accurate picture of the operational or strategic situation; and maintaining continuous and reliable communications between operational commanders and subordinate commanders. This is achieved by drastically or completely reducing the enemy's ability to carry out attack against one's C2. Defensive C2W also must be able to reduce one's C2 vulnerabilities by applying various protective measures. Another objective is to reduce

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interference of one's C2 systems throughout the EMS by proper coordination and deconfliction of their work. OPSEC is an essential element for protection of one's command and control. It must function continuously. Not only must it protect current locations of C2 elements, but also techniques and procedures of informational systems and their employment must be protected as well. The OPSEC can help identify those decisions critical to one's operations and initiate appropriate measures to minimize the enemy's ability to recognize them and react preemptively. PSYOP is used to influence the enemy forces not to use or to use improperly their counter-C2 measures. In offensive C2W, the main objective is to counter the enemy's hostile propaganda by discrediting the source of media attacks, and maintaining favorable worldwide public opinion. EW in defensive C2W is used to degrade and destroy the enemy informational systems. Signal intelligence (SIGINT) data, in the form of signal security monitoring to identify potential sources of information for an enemy about friendly C2 systems, can be used when enemy attack on one's C3 nodes is impending. In the Gulf War of 1990-1991, Coalition aircraft had difficulty maintaining effective electronic discipline, while the Iraqis extensively and for the most part effectively used emission control (EMCON) by minimizing their use of radio and air defense radars. They controlled radar emissions from their missile sites until the attack was imminent and then switched to the less accurate but safer optical guidance mode for their SAMs and AAAs. However, this method was not very effective. 36 Deception is used to neutralize or exploit the enemy's counter-C2 by misleading the enemy's operational commander about one's capabilities or limitations and thereby causing him to misallocate his forces and resources. 37 Deception in defensive C2W is designed to give the enemy commander a false picture and thereby degrade his ability to make appropriate command decisions. One of the most effective methods of protecting one's C2 system is to use cover and concealment. The Serbs were especially effective in using decoys and various camouflage measures to protect their fielded forces and their communications links from NATO's air attacks. They used natural camouflage features, buildings, and tunnels to make it difficult to locate various elements of their forces. 38 Physical destruction in defensive C2W involves the enemy's means of affecting one's C2. It requires targeting units, weapons systems, reconnaissance elements, and intelligence collection. 39 Targeting enemy counter-C2 directly enhances survivability of one's command and control. Intelligence Support: One of the prerequisites for effective operational C2W is timely and accurate intelligence. Intelligence support of C2W analyzes the enemy command and control structure and determines enemy C2W capabilities . 4° Therefore, it is critical to the planning and execution of C2W. Intelligence supports C2W through collection, evaluation, analysis, and integration of all available information concerning the enemy's capabilities. Capabilities to collect, evaluate, analyze, and transmit intelligence information have increased exponentially with the development of surveillance sensors, computers, and communications. Space-based systems and other national intelligence resources provide a far more accurate picture of the enemy than was ever possible before. The overall effectiveness of intelligence support is heavily dependent on all-source, timely, and relevant intelligence. SIGINT is perhaps the most important source of information on the enemy's electronic order of battle.

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Intelligence support depends on how quickly collection, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information that concerns one or more aspects of foreign nations or areas can be adapted to changing situations. It provides assessment of the potential enemies' C2 capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses. The intelligence assessment should include the functions of the enemy C2 for each phase of the forthcoming campaign or major operation. It should provide details on enemy communications, organizational structure, connectivity, and procedures and deployment schedule. Counterintelligence supports C2W by conducting investigations, operations, collection, analysis, and production of foreign intelligence. It also evaluates the enemy's vulnerabilities to military deception. Intelligence is also responsible for disentangling intelligence from CI operations, because simultaneous or sequential activities can interfere with one's C2W efforts. Intelligence supports each element of C2W. The same type of intelligence that supports PSYOP also supports military deception. Intelligence support of OPSEC provides information about the enemy's intelligence objectives and his systems for collecting, processing, and analyzing information. Effective OPSEC depends on detailed knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of the enemy's intelligence collection system. It also includes the vulnerability assessment for one's C2, identification of enemy C2W threat, and revaluation of deception efforts. 41 The effectiveness of OPSEC is ascertained by counterintelligence reporting. Intelligence support in PSYOP focuses on the enemy's C3 infrastructure, including telephone and facsimile numbers of key command and control C3 nodes and network addressees. It provides the basic area studies of foreign cultures and the target groups. 42 It also identifies the enemy perceptions, strengths and vulnerabilities, and order of battle, including key commands and their associated support systems. 43 Intelligence support for EW includes identifying and locating the enemy C3 nodes and links. Good intelligence is also the most important prerequisite for the success of the actions aimed to physically destroy elements of the enemy C2 structure. Intelligence support for military deception identifies and analyzes the enemy's response to one's deception efforts and provides planners with a way to evaluate the success of the deception effort. Intelligence requirements for deception are analysis of the enemy leaders; the country studies that include detailed information on cultural, religious, social, and political peculiarities of the country or the regions; sources of military, economic, or political support; and analysis of the enemy's decision-making patterns and biases. In addition, it includes current intelligence on the enemy's perception of the military situation, assessments of the capabilities and limitations of the enemy intelligence systems, the enemy's electronic order of battle, and capabilities and limitations of the enemy counterintelligence. Conclusion: C2W is one of the oldest forms of warfare. Over past two or three decades, and especially in recent years, the significant increase in the capabilities of reconnaissance and surveillance sensors, computers, and precision munitions has brought about qualitatively new capabilities of attacking enemy C2 and protecting one's own. Command and control warfare is clearly becoming an increasingly critical part of military action at all levels of war. The higher the level, the more important and potentially more decisive C2W is. At the operational level, C2W is conducted with forces and assets of several services, and often with services of other armed forces. The 233

operational commander is the only one who can properly sequence and synchronize use of C2W in support of a campaign or major operation. C2W could also be quite effective in operations short of war and in time of crisis. One of C2W's greatest advantages is its diversity and flexibility compared with the use of physical force. Any of five components of C2W could be used individually or in combination depending on the assigned objectives and the situation. Each of them could supplement the effect of other elements, but could also be in conflict with each other. Therefore, the employment of several components of C2W in support of a campaign or major operation would require judicious balancing of frequently contradictory requirements. Planning of C2W and its incorporation into plans for a campaign or major operation are extremely complex and require the highest degree of professional knowledge and skills on the part of the operational commanders and their staffs. In terms of the effect on the enemy C2, the most important elements of C2W are physical destruction and EW. However, it is very difficult to disentangle the contradictory requirements for these two elements, especially when employed in offensive C2W. Increasingly critical roles in EA have various methods of attacking enemy computer networks and communications. In general, the effectiveness of PSYOP is much greater in conduct of defensive than offensive C2W. The potential effectiveness of the PSYOP to influence enemy leadership and the population as a whole is all too often greatly exaggerated, resulting in unrealistic expectations. To be truly effective, PSYOP must be skillfully conducted. Among other things, the knowledge and understanding of the enemy's culture, social traditions, religions, and, last but not least, language are the prerequisites for success. More advanced technology does not necessarily mean that PSYOP are more effective. Operational deception is one of the most effective elements of C2W but also an integral part of any operational scheme for a campaign or major operation. Very often, it incorporates all other four components of C2W. Thus, it belongs in a category of its own. In defensive C2W, cover and concealment play a relatively larger role than deception. OPSEC is the defensive element of C2W, but critical for success of both offensive and defensive C2W. Intelligence support is the very basis for all the planning and execution of C2W at any level.

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Notes l. Formerly "Command, Control, and Communications Countermeasures (C3CM)." For details on U.S. doctrinal views see Joint Pub 3-13.1: Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W) ( Washington, DC: 7 February 1996). 2. In generic terms, global, national, and military information infrastructure (or environment) is differentiated. The global information infrastructure (Gil) encompasses all worldwide-interconnected communications networks, computers, and consumer electronics that make vast amounts of information available to users. Specifically, the GII includes international economies, governments, international organizations, international electronic and printed media (newspapers, radio and TV, the Internet), and private and volunteer organizations. The national information infrastructure (NII) encompasses all the interconnected communications networks and computers, and consumer electronics in a specific country. The military information infrastructure (MII) consists of shared or interconnected systems of computers, communications, and data applications security controlled by the country's armed forces. 3. Joint Pub 3-13.1: Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2 W) ( Washington, DC: 7 February 1996), p. I-4. 4. Ibid., pp. 11-3 and II-4. 5. Elizabeth A. Hurst, Shaping the Battlefield With Command and Control Warfare (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 7 June 1996), pp. 26--8. 6. Ibid., pp. 22-3. 7. Ibid., p. 27. 8. Joint Pub 3-13.1: Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare, p. I1-7. 9. Hurst, Shaping the Battlefield With Command and Control Warfare, p. 41. 10. Ibid., pp. 22-3. 1 1. Ibid., pp. 20--1. 12. Ibid., pp. 60-2. 13. William M. Arkin, "NATO Info Strategy Bomb," The Washington Post, April 26, 1999. 1 4. Timothy L. Thomas, "Kosovo and the Current Myth of Information Superiority," Parameters, Spring 2000, pp. 23-4. 15. Ibid., p. 23. 16. Hurst, Shaping the Battlefield With Command and Control Warfare, pp. 59-60. 17. Ibid., pp. 62-4. 1 8. Ibid., p. 66. 19. Bruce D. Berkowitz, "War Logs On. Girding America for Computer Combat," Foreign Affairs, May/June 2000, p. 9.

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20. David A. Fulgham, "Telecom Links Provide Cyber-Attack Route,"Aviation Week & Space Technology, November 8, 1999, pp. 81-2. 21. William M. Arkin, "The Cyber Bomb in Yugoslavia," The Washington Post, October 25, 1999. 22. Andrew Flynn, "War in cyberspace the real thing," Tech News Internet, April 15, 1999. 23. Thomas A. Kenney and Eliot A. Cohen, editors, et al., Gulf War Air Power Survey. Summary Report ( Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), pp. 42, 44-5. 24. Hurst, Shaping the Battlefield With Command and Control Warfarc, p. 70. 25. Kenney and Cohen, editors, et al., Gulf War Air Power Survey. Summary Report pp. 67-8. 26. Hurst, Shaping the Battlefield With Command and Control Warfare, pp. 67-8, 70-1. 27. Kenney and Cohen, editors, et al., Gulf War Air Power Survey. Summary Report p. 70. 28. Anthony H. Cordesman, The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile War in Kosovo. Charts, Maps, and Figures (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, revised August 6, 1999), p. 106. 29. No Daalder and Michael O'Hanlon, Winning Ugly. NATO's War to Save Kosovo ( Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p. 117. 30. Cordesman, The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile War in Kosovo. Charts, Maps, and Figures, p. 105. 31. Steven Lee Myers, "Pentagon Says It's Succeeding in Demoralizing Serbian Forces," The New York Times, April 23, 1999. 32. "Propaganda wars in Kosovo and Chechnya," BBC News, 5 January 2000, 20:40 GMT. 33. David A. Fulgham, "Telecom Links Provide Cyber-Attack Route," Aviation Week & Space Technology, November 8, 1999, p. 83. 34. Thomas, "Kosovo and the Current Myth of Information Superiority," p. 15. 35. Fulgham, "Telecom Links Provide Cyber-Attack Route," p. 83. 36. Hurst, Shaping the Battlefield With Command and Control Warfare, pp. 24, 69. 37. Joint Pub 3-13.1 Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare, p. 1I-5. 38. Cordesman, The Lessons and Non-Lessons o_f the Air and Missile War in Kosovo. Charts, Maps, and Figures, p. 128. 39. Hurst, Shaping the Battlefield With Command and Control Warfare, p. 40. 40. Ibid., p. vi. 41. Norman B. Hutcherson, Command & Control Warfare: Putting Another Tool in the Warfighter s Data Base (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1994), p. 30.

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42. Hurst, Shaping the Battlefield With Command and Control Warfare, pp. 42-3. 43. Hutcherson, Command & Control Warfare: Putting Another Tool in the Warfighter's Data Base, p. 43.

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OPERATIONAL FIRES The ability to deliver combat power quickly and at the decisive place and time is key to the success of any military action. Concentrated fires can overwhelm the enemy's ability to concentrate maneuvering forces. Operational fires represent one of the most important operational functions. To be fully effective they must be sequenced and synchronized with other operational functions in particular, intelligence and logistics. Operational maneuver is designed in part to exploit the effects of operational fires. Operational fires were used for the first time in World War 11, when great increases in the range, speed, and payload of land- and carrier-based aircraft allowed joint commanders to hit targets deep in the enemy's operational or even strategic depth. They were planned and conducted in several conflicts fought since 1945, most recently in the Gulf War of 1990-1991. However, their theoretical underpinnings and practical utility have not always been well understood. In the U.S. military, a major problem in understanding what constitutes operational fires is the lack of common terminology. I Type of Fires: In generic terms, tactical, strategic, and operational fires are differentiated. The most important difference between various fires is their ultimate purpose. Tactical fires are intended to support maneuver forces in direct contact with the enemy force by suppressing or destroying the enemy's direct and indirect fire systems and air defenses. They are designed to have a decisive impact on the outcome of an engagement or battle. They are planned and conducted by tactical commanders, and they usually take place within a given area of operations or combat zone or sector. 3 Tactical fires normally take place concurrently with, or shortly before, a battle or engagement. They are aimed to hit targets in the tactical depth of the enemy's or one's own defenses. The main methods of providing tactical fires are direct fire support 4 (including naval surface fire support [NSF S]),5 and indirect or air-delivered fires, such as close air support (CAS) . 6 Normally, these fires are intended to accomplish tactical objectives. However, occasionally tactical fires can significantly affect the outcome of a major operation. Historic examples include the Allied landings on Sicily (Operation Husky) in July 1943, at Salerno (Operation Avalanche) in September 1943, and the breakthrough at Avranches, Normandy, in late July 1944 (Operation Cobra). Strategic fires are designed to have a major effect on the course and outcome of a campaign or, in some cases, even a war as a whole. They are planned by theater-strategic commanders and their staff. They usually take place outside the boundaries of a given theater of operations where a major operation or campaign is to begin or is underway. One example of strategic fires was the Allied Oil Plan, undertaken as a complement to the landing in Normandy (Operation Neptune), aimed to shut down the German war economy and war efforts The German industrial capacity was heavily damaged, although the Allies suffered severe losses in the air. 9 The Oil Plan was entirely strategic in concept. However, it had an operational effect, while a competing British proposal, known as the Transportation Plan, was purely operational in nature. Operational fcres are the application of firepower to achieve a decisive impact on the outcome of a campaign or major operation. They represent an inherently joint function. They are not fire support and, hence, the success of operational maneuver is not necessarily dependent on these fires. However, operational fires can affect an operational 239

maneuver. 1 0 They are conducted in the operational and strategic depth of the enemy's defenses." Operational fires should not be confused with strategic bombing aimed to weaken the enemy's military-economic potential in general. In U.S. terms, suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) and offensive counterair (OCA) are sometimes considered operational fires. However, this is not necessarily the case. SEAD or OCA can encompass the entire theater or a major part of the theater of operations, and these tasks are conducted from the beginning to the end of the hostilities. Interdiction and especially deep interdiction can be among the purposes for using operational fires. However, operational fires have multiple purposes and therefore are much broader in concept. In contrast to tactical fires, operational fires are planned to accomplish operational objectives. However, sometimes the intention is to force the enemy commander to react operationally, for example, forcing him to commit his operational reserves earlier than planned or deceiving him as to the point of the main attack of one's forces. The intensity of fires might even lead the enemy to misinterpret events and mistakenly react on the strategic level, as the Japanese did in October 1944. The intensity of attacks and strikes by Task Force 38 (TF-38) of the U.S. Third Fleet against the Japanese airfields and other air installations, ports, shipping, and warships on Formosa and in the Ryukyus were a direct cause of the Japanese decision on 10 October to issue alert orders for the defense of Formosa (Sho-2 Plan) and the Philippines (Sho-1 Plan). These orders, in turn, led to a decision to transfer aircraft from four carriers and the two half-converted battleship carriers to land bases. ' Z Lethal versus Nonlethal Fires: In theory, there are two principal types of operational fires: lethal and nonlethal (see Figure 17). Lethal fires are designed to delay, disrupt, destroy, or degrade enemy operational forces or critical functions and facilities. They can be conventional or unconventional, and missiles, bombs, and guns could be used. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) biological, nuclear, or chemical-can be used to strike targets in the enemy's operational and strategic depth. However, the practical utility of such fires is minimal because in addition to the threat they pose to one's forces, numerous political, military, legal, and ethical factors severely limit their use. Nonlethal fires are intended to impair, disrupt, or delay the performance of enemy operational forces, functions, and facilities. They can require more time and effort to be effective than lethal fires. They are also rather diffuse in character and difficult to concentrate on a specific enemy force or asset. Thus, nonlethal fires are usually not used in isolation from lethal fires but are complementary to them. The two most important types of nonlethal fires are electronic warfare (EW) and psychological operations (PSYOP). Theater-wide EW can deceive the enemy as to the impending actions of one's forces, destroy or neutralize enemy electronic sensors and facilities, locate his forces and assets, intercept enemy communications, or disrupt enemy command and control. Aspects of EW not directly linked with destruction of electronic equipment or personnel are considered nonlethal fires. PSYOP aim at degrading the morale of enemy troops and influencing the enemy operational commander's decision-making process over time. They can be used in a theater as part of an integrated plan for lethal and nonlethal operational fires. PSYOP may include, among other things, distribution of leaflets, loudspeaker broadcasts, and other means of encouraging enemy forces to defect, desert, flee, or surrender. The operational commanders are responsible for selecting operational objectives for the 240

conduct of PSYOP employing joint forces and assets. Ground PSYOP units are equipped, trained, and organized to plan and conduct PSYOP, but air assets are needed to deliver materials and products deep into hostile, politically sensitive, or denied areas. Delivery Modes and Weapons: Operational fires are differentiated, according to their delivery mode, as ground-, air-, space-, and sea-based. Identical weapons platforms can be used for operational and tactical fires; however, the longer the range and the more destructive the weapons platform, the more suitable it is for operational fires. Air-based operational fires are designed to destroy, suppress, or neutralize enemy operational targets. Air-based fires not only offer longer range than other types of fire but also are highly lethal and precise. Sea-based operational fires enable hitting targets in the enemy's operational depth. Aircraft carrier groups and submarines are capable of sustained employment throughout the depth of a maritime theater. Groups of surface combatants and submarines armed with long-range land-attack cruise missiles can deliver operational fires to destroy or neutralize targets in the operational depth of the enemy's defenses. In addition, offensive mining aimed at preventing the movement of enemy naval forces, troop reinforcements, or material to a given maritime area of operations is considered a form of operational fire. Ground-based weapons platforms must have longer range or be able to maneuver quickly and continuously if they are to stay within range of operationally significant targets. 1 3 Ground surface systems usually do not have the required range and lethality to strike targets far enough outside the boundaries of a land area of operations to be employed as operational fires. In the past, heavy-caliber howitzers and long-range field guns were sometimes used for attacking targets in the enemy operational depth. However, prospective advances in heavy artillery, multiple-launch rocket systems (MRLS), helicopter gunships, and tactical surface-to-surface missiles allow the ground commander

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to attack operationally significant targets in the enemy's depth. Additionally, Special Forces teams can be effectively used in direct action (DA) to destroy or neutralize operationally significant targets. Area and Timing: Operational fires are normally conducted outside a defined (or undefined) area of operations in which a major operation or new campaign is planned or conducted. However, in case of major amphibious operations, operational fires are conducted outside the assigned amphibious objective area (AOA), which is usually smaller than an area of operations. ' 4 Tactical fires, in contrast, are conducted within the declared (or undeclared) boundaries of a given area of operations or AOA. Operational fires are most often conducted well before the beginning of a major operation or the opening of a new campaign. They are usually a part of the preparations or preliminaries of a major operation or campaign. Once a major operation or campaign is underway, operational fires are combined with tactical fires. Tactical fires, in contrast, begin only shortly before the start of a major operation and reach their full intensity as the major operation unfolds. (In World War II in the Pacific in 1943-1945, U.S. fast carrier forces and Army land-based air often conducted operational fires for several weeks, sometimes months, before the start of a major naval operation or maritime campaign.) To complicate matters, tactical fires can be conducted considerably before a major operation starts. 1 5 In some cases, there is no clear distinction between operational and tactical fires in terms of timing and forces employed, because the same forces can conduct operational and tactical fires in the same period. In terms of duration, however, operational fires are normally conducted for a much longer period than tactical fires. Planning Process: In contrast to tactical fires, operational fires are planned and executed by the operational, or sometimes the operational-tactical, command echelon. Tactical fires are planned "top-down" and can be executed both "bottom-up" and top-down. They can be planned and executed as part of the overall tactical plan; additionally, the capability to apply tactical fires in response to bottom-up requests can also be included as part of the plan. Bottom-up requests originate at lower command echelons and are sent up through successive echelons for consideration and approval by the higher tactical commander. In contrast, only the top-down approach is used in operational fires: the operational commander and his staff plan operational fires as part of the overall plan for a campaign or major operation (see Figure 18). The operational commander determines objectives, designates targets, and assigns command echelons to carry out strikes. Afterward, subordinate air, sea, ground, and special force commanders execute the operational commander's plan through their respective tactical command echelons.' 6 Bottom-up requests are usually not used in planning and conducting operational fires. Methods: The methods of combat force employment in conducting operational and tactical fires differ from each other. A series of related attacks and strikes meant to accomplish a tactical objective comprise tactical fires, whereas a series of related tactical actions predominantly air and naval strikes and engagements aimed at an operational objective over a period of time comprise operational fires. They can be planned (or seen in retrospect) as a major naval or air operation. This is usually the case when operational fires are used in opening a new front or a new campaign, as evident in the Normandy invasion in June 1944 and the landing at Leyte in October of that year. Constituting both

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a preliminary major naval operation (in the then newly opened Philippines campaign) and operational fires was TF-38's series of strikes against the Japanese airfields, air facilities, ports, and shipping in the Ryukyus, on Formosa, and on Luzon prior to the landing at Leyte. From 27 October to 27 November, TF-38 also delivered operational fires in support of the Leyte Operation, attacking Japanese airfields and shipping on the island of Luzon. Likewise, on 12 October (A-9 Day), the U.S. Fifth Air Force started operational fires by striking targets on the Western Visayas and Mindanao in the Philippines. These actions, in combination with strikes against Japanese air and naval facilities in northeastern Borneo and the Sulu Archipelago, amounted to a preliminary major air operation." Requirements: To be decisive, operational fires must meet a number of requirements. The operational commander should be able to orchestrate the actions of subordinate ground, air, sea, and Special Force elements to generate a synergistic effect. All resources available should be combined to generate maximum combat power at the decisive place and time. To apply firepower successfully at the operational level, the commander should initially guide allocation of forces and assets, assign priority to objectives or tasks, and establish authority to execute effective fires. 1 8 The operational commander should, among other things, establish techniques and procedures that promote unity of effort. To ensure the effective use of intelligence and increase the timeliness of engagement of targets, he should continually reassess priorities and the effectiveness of fires. Command relationships should be clearly defined and understood by all service components. These arrangements should facilitate the engagement of targets, prevent duplication of effort, and allow for continuous coordination among all involved command echelons. An effective information system and related procedures must be in place to ensure that accurate, timely, and relevant information on targets is available for operational fires. National intelligence resources are usually needed for initial information, but only tactical intelligence can give detailed data on target location and movement and battle damage

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assessment (BDA). Thus, effective intelligence for operational fires results from fusion of strategic and tactical intelligence. Lethal operational fires are more effective if the disparity of combat strength favors one's forces. Their impact is bound to be more decisive if the enemy possesses few critical functions and facilities and has limited ability to reestablish them or absorb damage. 1 9 They are not likely to be very effective in low-intensity conflict, unless the enemy possesses critical facilities whose destruction would decisively inhibit his ability to continue to fight. Purposes: Operational fires can be used for accomplishing a single or several purposes. Optimally, the planners should always focus on a certain purpose to be achieved by conducting operational fires within a given time frame. In general, operational fires can be planned and conducted to accomplish one or more of the following purposes: • • • • • • • • • • •

Isolate or shape the battlefield/battlespace Facilitate one's operational maneuver Prevent the enemy's operational maneuver Interdict the enemy's uncommitted forces Destroy or neutralize the enemy's critical functions and facilities Disrupt or cut off the enemy's logistical support and sustainment Deceive the enemy as to place and time of major operation or campaign Diminish the enemy's morale Protect one's area of operations Protect development of new bases (in a maritime theater) Prevent the enemy's retreat or withdrawal

The above list should not be considered all-inclusive, because operational fires have been used or can be effectively used in the future in other areas of military effort. Perhaps one of the most common purposes of operational fires is to isolate or "shape" the battlefield1battlespace by preventing the arrival or slowing down the movement of the enemy troop, air, or naval reinforcements or operational reserves into the area where one's major operation or campaign is to be conducted or is already in progress. This can be accomplished by denying, disrupting, or depleting the enemy's uncommitted forces. This task is often combined with others to accomplish operationally significant objectives . 2° In the preliminaries for the Allied landing on Sicily (Operation Husky) in the last two weeks of June 1943, Allied heavy and medium bombers carried out heavy attacks on various targets along Italy's western coast and on Sicily to prevent movement of troop reinforcements and supplies to Sicily. 21 Most of the Allied attention was focused on the port of Messina, which served as the main terminal for the Axis's troop reinforcements and supplies from the mainland. These attacks were complemented by attacks on Reggio di Calabria and San Giovanni, across the strait of Messina. In addition, between 12 June and 2 July Allied bombers attacked a wide range of targets on the mainland between Naples and Leghorn on Italy's western coast, and on Sardinia. 22 In planning the invasion of Normandy the Allies prepared two plans: the Oil Plan, favored by the Americans, and the Transportation Plan, propounded by the British. The Allied Supreme Commander, General Dwight Fisenhower, approved execution of the

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Transportation Plan first and then the Oil Plan. The Transportation Plan, put in effect from January to May 1944, aimed to isolate the Normandy area of operations by destroying transportation infrastructure in northern and western France and thereby inhibiting German ability to react to the Allied invasion. 23 The Germans could attempt reinforcement in Normandy on three axes: from the northeast and across the Seine River; from the south, by crossing the 125-mile-long Loire River; and from the east, by passing through the gap between Orleans and Paris. Specifically, the Allied objective was to isolate the Normandy beachhead from German reinforcements and to disrupt the movements of the Seventh Army. 25 The attack against the rail system in France began three months before the landing (D-90). About 2,500 heavy bombers dropped thousands of tons of explosives, while 7,800 fighters and fighter-bombers pulverized German forces in northern France. 26 By D-30, the priority was destruction of the rail and road bridges over the Seine River from Le Havre to Paris. By mid-May rail traffic in France had been reduced by thirty percent from what it had been in January, and by early June it had dropped another thirty percent. 27 By 6 June 1944, rail traffic in eastern, northern, and western France was completely paralyzed. Therefore, German troop reinforcements did not arrive in time to take part in the battle on the beachhead . 28 To protect the deception plan concerning the actual landing sites, attacks on the bridges over the Loire were delayed until D-Day. With air superiority obtained and the invasion underway, Allied air forces then attacked marshaling yards, the rail system, German troop concentrations, and bridges within the Paris-Orleans gap and across the Loire River. 29 Operational fires to isolate an amphibious objective area were extensively used by the Allies in the Pacific in 1943-1945. Before the invasion of the Marianas in June 1944 (Operation Forager), U.S. land-based bombers from three commands attacked a variety of targets in the Carolines from March through June 1944. Allied planners considered three possible routes for air Japanese reinforcements: from Japanese home islands via Marcus Island to Wake, and from there to attack the Allied supply routes; from the home islands to the Bonins and then to the Marianas, to attack U.S. forces directly; and from the Philippines and Netherlands East Indies through the Palaus and western Carolmes (Yap and Woleai) and Truk, to endanger Allied routes from the south .3° From 15 March to 15 September the primary mission of the heavy bombardment groups of the Seventh and Thirteenth Air Forces was neutralization of the enemy bases in the Carolines. 3 1 Starting on 11 June, pre-assault air strikes (tactical fires) were conducted by four fast carrier groups of TF-58 of the U.S. Fifth Fleet against the Japanese airfields on Guam, Saipan, and Tinian. 32 Operational fires to isolate Leyte started about seven weeks before the invasion of the island. Four carrier groups of TF-38 of the U.S. Third Fleet carried out a series of attacks against the Japanese targets along Indochina's coast from Saigon in the south to Quinho in the north, attacking Japanese naval vessels and merchant ships off the coast and in Cam Ranh Bay between 9 and 11 September. 33 TF-38 carriers continued their attacks against ports and shipping at Hong Kong, Canton, Hainan Island, and Formosa between 15 and 17 September. 34 On 21-22 September, TF-38's aircraft attacked Japanese airfields on Formosa, the Pescadores, Sakishima Gunto, and Ryukyus (Nansei Shoto). Also, U.S. aircraft attacked Japanese shipping in three Formosan ports. 35

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The Allied efforts to isolate the Philippines before landing at Leyte were greatly expanded and intensified in October 1944. In addition to the fast carrier groups, the Allies employed extensively their land-based heavy and medium bombers from four theater commands to isolate the central Philippines in particular, the island of Leyte. Allied air power in essence blockaded all air and sea approaches to the Philippines. The U.S. Third Fleet's task was to prevent the arrival of Japanese air reinforcements from the home islands, the Ryukyus, Formosa, or mainland China. 36 On 10 October, TF-38 attacked the island of Okinawa and the rest of the Ryukyus. 31 Carrier groups attacked Formosa from 12 to 14 October to prevent the Japanese from using the island as a staging base for their air reinforcements to the Philippines. The main targets were Formosan airfields and shipping. 38 On the second day, sorties were again flown against Japanese airfields on Formosa and were supplemented by 109 B-29s of the Army XX Bomber Command in China attacking the Takao area. 39 The XIV Army Air Force agreed to bomb Japanese air installations within 1,000 miles of Kunming; these included Hong Kong, Hainan, and those in the Gulf of Tonkin. 40 In addition, fifty B-24s and B-25s of the XVI Army Air Force, based in China, struck shipping and waterfront installations in the Hong Kong area on 16 October.' The first waves of aircraft rocketed, bombed, and strafed three airfields in the Ryukyus, merchant shipping, and harbor facilities on 17 October (see Map A-8). 42 The FEAF, based on Morotai, Biak, and New Guinea, helped prepare for the Leyte Operation with attacks on Japanese airfields on Mindanao. In addition, numerous attacks were made almost daily against various ports and oil installations in the NEI. These attacks were aimed to prevent the use of the NEI as a staging area against Allied forces operating in the Philippines after the landing at Leyte, and to cripple Japanese oil industries in the area. The North Pacific Forces of the Pacific Ocean Area carried out attacks against the Kuriles. 44 At the same time, the bombers of the Northern Solomons air command, based at Torokina in Bougainville and Emirau in the St. Matthias group, attacked isolated Japanese garrisons on Truk and other islands in the Central Carolines. About 1,000 sorties of fighter planes and medium bombers were flown in October to attack these targets. Farther east, Central Pacific Air Forces attacked Japanese airfields in the Marshall Islands . 45 On 8-10 October, land-based Army aircraft from the Marianas attacked the Japanese-controlled Volcano and Bonin Islands. 46 The North Pacific Forces carried out attacks against the Kuriles themselves. Another Allied theater command, the Southeast Asia Command, provided support to the Leyte Operation by intensifying its ground and air operations in Burma beginning on 5 October. Between 15 and 25 October, Bangkok and Rangoon were attacked from the air . 47 The joint effort of TF-38 aircraft, Seventh Fleet escort carriers, and Army land-based aircraft led to the attainment of almost complete air supremacy over the Philippines by the time the landing at Leyte took place. 48 In the Gulf War 1990-1991, the U.S. and Coalition forces used their considerable airpower to shape and isolate the battlefield between 17 January 1991, when the air offensive started, and 23 February, when the ground offensive began. One of the main objectives of the air interdiction effort was to stop the movement of the Iraqi forces and cut off the flow of supplies into the KTO. 49 Operational fires can be used to facilitate the operational maneuver of one's forces. The timing of fires should roughly coincide with the movement of forces from their concentration or staging areas toward their assigned operational objectives. Long-

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range land-based bombers facilitated the maneuver of the Allied amphibious forces to land on the Gilberts on 20 November 1943. The operational fires started on 13 November, or seven days prior to the landing, when eighteen B-24s of the Eleventh Group of the U.S. Seventh Air Force, based on Funafuti Atoll (Tuvalu, some 450 miles northwest of Western Samoa), bombed a variety of targets in the Marshalls. The Japanese bases there posed a threat to the Allied forces approaching Tarawa and Makin in the Gilberts. The following day the U.S. heavy bombers hit Jaluit, and on 15 November (D5) they struck Mille; a day later, Kwajalein and Maloelap. Tarawa and Mille were again bombarded on 18 November (D-3) when bad weather forced bombers headed for Wotje to drop their loads on these islands. 50 Operational fires can be conducted independently of the operational maneuver by one's forces, the objective being to destroy, delay, or disrupt uncommitted enemy forces. They can also be effectively used to deceive the enemy as to the real sector of the main effort or the main point of attack of one's forces. The Allies in their landing in Normandy in June 1944 tried to focus German activity in the Pas de Calais area by conducting some forty percent of their bombing missions there on D-3 and D-2. The main targets of these attacks were the German coastal defenses and road and rail communications in the area. 5 1 In the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the U.S. planners targeted the Iraqi operational reserve (four regular infantry divisions and seven divisions of the Republican Guards) deployed in the southern part of Iraq and adjacent to the Kuwait-Iraq border. The bulk of the Iraqi forces-forty-three divisions-were deployed along the 280-mile-long frontline to the depth of about ninety-five miles. 52 The third phase of the Coalition air offensive focused on the destruction of the Iraqi troops in the KTO. In the third and fourth week of the offensive, forty to sixty percent of all air strikes were carried out against these troops. Operational fires are also designed to destroy or neutralize the enemy's principal forces, usually those having longer reach and being more lethal, such as air assets and associated facilities. In the final phase of preparations for Operation Husky, starting on 2 July, the enemy airfields on Sicily, Sardinia, and southern Italy were attacked intensively. The attacks against the Sicilian airfields continued throughout the three final days before the landing (see Map A-9). 54 Between 17 and 23 July the Twelfth Air Force attacked airfields in southern Italy around the clock. The major part of the Axis bombers were at the time based in Foggia, while the remainder were deployed at Grottaglie and San Pancrazio in Apulia, and Viterbo and Ciampino near Rome. Most of the Axis singleengine fighters and fighter-bombers were based at Apulia and Calabria; the twin-engine fighters were at Naples. Targets in the Naples area and Grosseto, halfway between Pisa and Rome, were also attacked, to reduce Axis air strength. During the last three weeks of Operation Husky, attacks of the Allied bombers were directed against airfields from which the enemy fighters and bombers might reach Sicily and Allied communications in the central Mediterranean (see Map A-10). 56 The Allied landing at Salerno was preceded by intensive bombing of German troop concentrations in southern Italy and airfields in the central part of Italy. During the last two weeks of August, aircraft of the Northwest African Air Force (NAAF) flew more than 2,400 sorties. 57 Allied strategic bombers attacked the Axis airfields south of Rome even before Sicily was seized. On 2 September Allied aircraft struck targets throughout a large area, to avoid premature disclosure of the invasion plan . 59 By 18 August, all the important airfields in southern Italy had been neutralized, with the exception of Foggia

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and its satellites. 60 Between 3 and 6 September Allied bombing focused on the airfields in the Naples area, and on Viterbo. Shortly afterward and just before landing at Salerno, the Allied attacks spread south of Foggia and Salerno. On 8 September, about 130 B-l7s attacked Frascati, a town fifteen miles southeast of Rome and headquarters of the German Command South. 61 In preparing the invasion of Normandy (Operation Neptune), the Allies planned, among other things, to cripple the German ability to operate in the air by destroying airfields both near the beaches and farther outside the landing area. The plan for the operation envisaged the use of Allied bombers to reduce German air combat strength, specifically their air fighter strength, and to provide the maximum possible assistance to the ground forces preparatory to the actual assault, particularly affecting the enemy's movements and troop concentrations . 62 There were approximately one hundred German airfields within 310 miles of the landing beaches. By the beginning of May 1944, Allied bombing planners envisaged attacks on some forty German airfields within a 130-mile radius from Caen. The RAF, the Allied Expeditionary Air Force, and the U.S. Eighth Air Force carried out these attacks. The second area encompassed fifty-nine airfields and extended about 350 miles from Caen, reaching into Germany and the Netherlands. The U.S. Eighth Air Force and the Fifteenth Air Force, based in Italy, attacked these airfields. Not all the airfields in the second area were attacked. 64 Most of the German airfields in France were significantly damaged by the time the landing in Normandy took place. 65 The air component plan for Operation Neptune also involved destruction of enemy radar installations between Ostend and the Channel Islands to deny their use in support of German night fighters and coastal guns and ships. 66 In the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the U.S. planners focused on using airpower to destroy the Iraqi critical facilities, specifically the electricity grid and oil industry. However, the concern to minimize long-term damage to Iraq's economic infrastructure forced the planners to select targets that could be relatively easily repaired, which caused them to avoid attacks on the most significant targets. Most of the attacks from the air were focused on transformers and switching yards and control buildings rather than generator halls, boilers, and turbines. 67 Coalition aircraft carried out 890 strikes against electric power and oil installations. About sixty percent of all strikes were conducted in the first eleven days of the air offensive; the attacks against the Iraqi oil industry peaked in the middle of the offensive. The Coalition effort was highly successful because the generation and distribution of commercial electric power throughout most of Iraq was shut down. Ultimately almost eighty-eight percent of Iraq's installed generation capacity was sufficiently damaged or destroyed by air attack. Operational fires usually continue after a new major operation or campaign starts. One of the principal objectives is then to prevent the possible movement of the enemy troop reinforcements and supplies into the area of operations. Interdiction of logistical sustainment can disrupt the enemy's actions and hasten his arrival at the culminating point. After the landing on Sicily, Allied heavy and medium bombers were used to attack railroad junctions and facilities in the Rome and Naples area. All rail traffic between northern and southern Italy, with the exception of that routed from Bologna to Foggia and Bari, passed through Rome. 69 Between 8 and 15 August, Allied strategic bombers conducted strikes against the Axis lines of communications and airfields in Italy, specifically in the Naples area, along the Tyrrhenian coast, in Rome, and in Bologna. 70

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In the preliminaries for landing at Salerno, Allied heavy and medium bombers attacked the Axis rail lines and marshaling yards in the central part of Italy. The most effective were the Allied air attacks on the Foggia marshaling yards on 19 and 25 August. The intensity of bombing was increased in the last week of August, and it was extended to northern Italy as far as Pisa (see Map A-1 1). Since the Allies had severely curtailed coastal shipping, the main targets of attack were railway junctions, because the railways were the main means of transportation between Germany and Italy. 71 Thus, the Strategic Air Force made almost all its attacks on marshaling yards in southern Italy. Heavy bombers attacked targets north of the Sapri-Trebisace line, while the Ninth Air Force attacked targets in Apulia and tactical aircraft attacked targets in Calabria. From 18 August to 2 September, the NAAF's heavy bombers flew almost 1,000 sorties, and its medium bombers flew nearly 2,000 sorties, against the enemy lines of communications. Allied bombers attacked yards along Italy's east coast from Bari to Pescara and to the north, including Pisa and Bologna. However, the greatest success was achieved on 2 September, when the Allies cut off the main communications line from Germany to the Trento Valley via the Brenner Pass. 74 Just prior to the landing at Salerno, the Allied attacks spread south of Foggia and Salerno. Heavy bombers attacked railroad bridges, tracks, and roads at Minturno and the yards at Metaponto. In the night of 8-9 September the attacks concentrated on the roads and bases handling enemy supplies and reinforcements . 75 Air interdiction conducted before the Normandy landing on 6 June 1944 was largely successful in delaying the movement of German operational reserves toward the landing beaches. The destruction of the rail system west of Paris and of the bridges across the Seine and Loire Rivers forced the Germans to make long marches, with many detours, under continuous aerial attack. The Germans virtually abandoned daylight road movement, and their night movements were restricted by the short (six-hour) summer nights. This greatly inhibited their ability to concentrate enough combat power to destroy the Allied bridgehead in Normandy. 76 During Desert Storm, after destruction of the Iraqi C3 nodes and the attainment of air superiority, the attacks shifted to militarily important infrastructure in Iraq, troop concentrations in the KTO, and supply lines. Around-the-clock attacks were carried out to isolate the Iraqi forces in Kuwait by cutting off the flow of supplies from Iraq into the KTO. The principal lines of communications between Baghdad and the theater often followed or crossed the rivers, so the road and rail bridges became the essential targets to be destroyed throughout the air offensive. 77 On 7 February, thirty-eight bridges over the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers were attacked, and thirty-one of them were destroyed. As a result, the supplies to the Iraqi troops were reduced to only ten percent of the required amount. 78 Follow-on attacks were conducted throughout the war to keep bridges out of operation. By the end of the war on 28 February, of fifty-four fixed bridges across these two rivers, forty were unusable, ten were damaged, and three had been purposely left undamaged. In addition, thirty-two pontoon bridges constructed to divert traffic were also destroyed . 79 Also, all the main communications routes from Baghdad to the south, with the exception of Route 6 (Baghdad-Basra) and Route 8 (Baghdad-As Samawah) were effectively closed. The Baghdad-Basra rail line was completely shut down because of the damaged bridges. This loss had significant consequences for the Iraqis, because railways were the principal means of transporting armor and self-propelled (SP) artillery from

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central Iraq to the Kuwaiti theater. It forced the Iraqis to use highways. By the third week in February, resupply movements were largely restricted to nighttime, when the Iraqis used their vehicular traffic. In addition, to make movement of supplies more difficult to detect by Coalition aircraft, the Iraqis began to use single trucks instead of multivehicle convoys. Hence, total supply volume reaching the Iraqi troops in the KTO per day was significantly reduced .s° As a result of the destruction of bridges and pontoons, the Iraqi army in the KTO could not conduct offensive action after ten days and could not conduct any effective combat action after three weeks. s1 Operational fires could be intended as part of a plan to deceive the enemy as to place and time of a new major operation or campaign. Because of the long operational reach of land-based bombers, carrier groups, and submarines, it is possible to attack a large number of targets within a given theater of operations and thereby make it difficult for the defender to correctly deduce the time and place of a major operation or campaign. In World War 11, Allied air forces were used on many occasions to attack a variety of targets over a large part of a theater as part of the deception effort. One of the most successful uses of operational fires in a deception plan (Fortitude) preceded the invasion of Normandy. For several weeks before the landing, Allied air forces carried out intensive strikes on rail networks in the area east and north of the Seine River. The destruction of the bridges across the Seine west of Paris convinced the Germans that the Allies wanted to cut off supplies toward the Pas de Calais area, where they expected the landing to take place. Operational fires can be effective in protecting newly acquired naval bases and airfields or their development. In the aftermath of Operation Galvanic, during the remainder of November and most of December 1943, Seventh Air Force bombers staging through Baker and Nanomea Island (Tuvalu) from their bases at Canton and in the Ellices continued to bomb Nauru, Mille, Jaluit, and Maloelap in the Marshalls. These attacks were intended to protect the base development in the Gilberts and to prepare for the landing on Eniwetok. 82 Operational fires can also be conducted to prevent the enemy forces from leaving the theater. This usually occurs after the major ground operation starts, as in Operation Desert Storm. Because the major part of the Iraqi ground forces was deployed in the KTO, the Coalition task was not so much to prevent the arrival of reinforcements as to prevent the Iraqis from withdrawing their forces once the Coalition ground operation began. 83 The general retreat of the Iraqis from the KTO started in the evening on 25 February (two days after ground offensive started). Coalition airpower was used to interdict retreating columns of Iraqi forces moving on the roads in trucks, cars, or any means available. Iraqi forces deployed in the northern part of the KTO had the best chances of escape. Other retreating forces had to slow their movement as they moved northward and reached the key road junctions. One of the major choke points was the Mutla Pass (west of Kuwait City and just north of the city of A1 Jahra), through which a major road to Basra passed. The traffic through this ridge became very congested because of converging columns of fleeing troops from the southeastern part of Kuwait and from Kuwait City. Throughout the evening of 25 February, after air attacks had halted the forward elements, Coalition aircraft attacked the remaining several miles of vehicles. For some two miles, part of the road (called "Highway of Death") was crowded with about 1,400 burning vehicles . 84 A second choke point for the retreating Iraqi forces was a

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causeway over the lakes and marshlands at Hawr al Hammar, northwest of Basra. Coalition aircraft damaged this multilane causeway several times during the war. By the evening of 26 February, damaged vehicles blocked the traffic over the causeway. Air strikes continued the next day, and eventually an estimated 550-600 vehicles were abandoned. 8-' However, the Coalition forces failed to prevent the escape of the bulk of the Iraqi crack divisions from southern Iraq and Kuwait. The remnants of three infantry divisions and one armored division escaped, in addition to the entire first-rate Hammurabi and Medinah armored divisions and parts of five infantry divisions of the Republican Guards, with 845 tanks (a quarter of all the tanks in the theater) and 1,412 armored vehicles (or half of all such vehicles in the theater). In the end, about seventy percent of the Republican Guards escaped destruction by Coalition forces. 8b Conclusion: Operational fires are an important means by which operational commanders enhance the chances for the successful outcome of a major operation or campaign. Yet by themselves operational fires cannot ensure success in a major operation or campaign. They differ considerably from other fires in terms of their main purpose, timing, duration, the area in which they are conducted, and the command echelon that plans and conducts them. They are intended to have an operational or even strategic impact on the enemy. Tactical fires, in contrast, are planned to accomplish tactical objectives, although, depending on the situation, they can have a decisive effect on the outcome of a major operation. Normally, lethal operational fires are conducted outside the boundaries of an area of operations where a major operation or campaign is to start or is underway. Operational fires can be conducted well before the start of a major operation or campaign, while tactical fires are conducted shortly before and during the course of a major operation. Another important distinction between tactical and operational fires is who controls them and who plans their use. Tactical fires are usually planned and conducted by higher tactical commanders, while operational fires are invariably planned by the operational commander and his staff. Only the operational commander can properly plan and execute operational fires, because only he controls diverse platforms and weapons of several services. Obviously, lethal fires should be the primary means for conducting operational fires. Nonlethal fires are difficult to use because they cover a much larger space and are harder to focus on the most important targets. Therefore, they are most suitable for lowintensity conflict; in a war, their role is supplementary. To achieve maximum impact on the enemy, their use should always be synchronized with lethal fires in planning a major operation or campaign. The increased range, accuracy, and lethality of modern weapons offer a corresponding increase in their operational employment. As the range of weapons used to support tactical maneuver increases, weapons are bound to play a more important role in the delivery of operational fires. The biggest changes in terms of capability can be expected in ground-delivered lethal fires. Hence, the diversity of weapons systems capable of delivering operational fires will continue to increase, allowing the operational commander more options in planning and executing operational fires.

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Notes 1. The U.S. doctrinal documents, with rare exceptions, do not define operational fires but discuss the issue in broad terms, such as "fires," "fire support," or simply "firepower." The U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5 Operations (1986) states that fires can support operational maneuver by destroying key enemy forces or facilities, disrupting enemy movement schedules, complicating an adversary's command and control of combat forces, and degrading air defense, artillery, and air capabilities. Headquarters, U.S. Army, FM 100-5 Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1986), p. 13. The current FM 100-5 (1993) does not clearly differentiate between tactical and operational fires. Instead, the term "fire support" (which is essentially a tactical term) is used in discussing both tactical and operational fires. It defines "fire support" as the collective and coordinated employment of the fires of armed aircraft, land-, and sea-based indirect fire systems, and electronic warfare systems against ground targets to support land combat operations at both the operational and tactical levels. FM 100-5 (1993) further explains that the focus of fire support at these levels of war is on the synchronization of the full range of fires provided by all friendly forces; the integration of artillery, armed aircraft, non-line-of-sight fires, naval gunfire, close air support, interdiction, and electronic countermeasures requires the development of full understanding of and rigid adherence to a common set of fire control measures; Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-5 Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1993), pp. 2-13, 5-4. Large Unit Operations (Draft), FM 100-6, describes operational fires as those l ethal and nonlethal fires that have a decisive impact in the conduct of a campaign or major operation; it associates operational fires with deep operations, implying that depth, precision, and weapon effectiveness are the critical qualifiers for operational fires. FM 100-6 (Draft) argues that operational fires are largely a product of air power; Large Unit Operations (Draft), FM 100-6 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1987), pp. 3-7 and 3-17; see also Decisive Force. The Army in Theater Operations, FM 100-7, pp. 4-3 through 5-9. The U.S. Air Force manual AFM 1-1, Basic Airspace Doctrine of the Air Force, 2 Vols. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1992) makes no mention of operational fires or even operational art; the dominant approach is to link strategic goals through tactics; Jerry D. Garrett, Strategic Airpower as Operational Fires. Integrating Long-Range Bombers into Campaign Design (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, May 1991), p. 12. To further complicate issues, these terms are often discussed in the same context as deep interdiction or even direct fires. Interdiction is defined in Joint Pubs 1-02 and 3-0 as "an action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy's surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces"; Joint Pub 1-02, p. 192; Joint Pub 3-0, p. GL-7. "Interdiction" is too broad and imprecise a term; it does not adequately convey the true meaning and purpose of operational fires. 2. Leonard G. Tokar, US. Doctrine for Command and Control of Operational Fires (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, April 1996), p. 8. 3. U.S. joint doctrine stipulates that the joint force commander (JFC) will define areas of operations (AOs) for land and naval forces. Within each of these areas, respective subordinate force commanders are responsible for synchronization of maneuver, fires, and interdiction. They also designate the priority of targets to be attacked and ti ming of interdiction efforts within their respective AO; David M. Annen, Joint Interdiction. The Gray Area (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1996), p. 3. 4. Fire support is a collective term for the coordinated use of target acquisition data, indirect-fire weapons, armed aircraft, and other lethal and nonlethal means against ground targets in support of maneuver; Headquarters, Department of the Army, Blueprint of the Battlefield, TRADOC Pamphlet 11-9 (Fort Monroe, VA: 27 April 1990), p. 23. 5. Formerly, naval gunfire support (NGFS). 6. Indirect fire support differs from direct fires in three ways: commanders can use these fires independently of platform-to-target lines of sight; they are highly adaptable to wide variations of terrain; and they can generate mass effect from delivery platforms that are widely dispersed; Thomas A. Kolditz, Exploring the Conditions fbr Decisive Operational Fires (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Command and General Staff College, June 1993), p. 5; in U.S. terms, close air support (CAS) is normally carried out from the

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forward line of troops (FLOT) to the fire support coordination line (FSCL). These lines are established and adjusted by the respective land or amphibious force commanders within their boundaries. Forces attacking targets beyond the FSCL must inform all supported and supporting commanders in sufficient time to allow reaction necessary to avoid fratricide. It should not be considered as a boundary. Synchronization of operations on either side of the FSCL is the responsibility of the establishing commander out to the limits of the land or amphibious force boundary; Annen, Joint Interdiction: The Gray Area, pp. 4-5. 7. Tokar, U.S. Doctrine .for Command and Control of Operational Fires, pp. 8-9. 8. The execution started in May 1944, and the plan proved to be highly successful. Because the very survival of Germany was at stake, the Luftwaffe was forced to keep back a major part of its fighter strength for the defense of the homeland instead of carrying out counterattacks in Normandy; William J. Rice, Operational Fires: What's in a Name? (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, June 1990), pp. 18-20. 9. The Allied air forces had lost 2,000 aircraft and 12,000 airmen in the two months preceding D-Day. Russell F. Weigley, Eisenhower's Lieutenants (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1981), p. 94. 1 0. Kolditz, Exploring the Conditions, for Decisive Operational Fires, p. 3; Blueprint of the Battlefield, TRADOC Pamphlet 11-9, p. 13. 11. Ralph G. Reece, Operational Fires (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air War College, 1989), pp. 7, 10. In another definition of the term, operational fires are understood as "the application of firepower, often the product of coordinated joint and/or combined effort directed by the operational commander as a fully integrated component of his campaign plan (operational concept), with design and intent to achieve a specified high-impact, operationally significant result through focused intelligence and targeting and effective massed and/or precision fires"; Rice, Operational Fires: What's in a Name? p. 38. 1 2. Samuel Eliot Morison, Leyte. June 1944-January 1945, History of United States Naval Operations in World War 11, Vol. XII (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, reprint 1984), p. 91. 13. Reece, Operational Fires, p. 9. 14. In U.S. terms, this area must be positively defined in terms of sea, air, and land space. The size of an AOA varies; it must be sufficient to ensure the accomplishment of the mission by the respective amphibious task force (ATF), as well as to provide sufficient area for the necessary air, land, and sea operation. Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, Joint Pub 3-02 (8 October 1992), p. 11-8. 15. In the preliminaries to the amphibious landing on the Gilberts (Operation Galvanic), U.S. carriers conducted strikes against Tarawa, Makin, and Apamama on 18 September; the next day, twenty B-24s based on Canton and Funafuti attacked the same targets; Philip A. Crowl and Edmund G. Love, Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, United States Army in World War 11. The War in the Pacific. Vol. 3 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1989), p. 54. These attacks took place almost two months before the actual landing. 16. Rice, Operational Fires: What's in a Name? p. 39 Garrett, Strategic Airpower as Operational Fires, pp. 1011; Reece, Operational Fires, pp. 9-10; Tokar, U.S. Doctrine fbr Command and Control of Operational Fires, p. 1 0; Charles O. Hammond, Operational Fires and Unity of Command (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1990), p. 5. 17. "5th USAAF Letter of Instruction, No. 6," 29 September 1944; Naval War College Archives, Record Group 23: Battle Evaluation Group (BEG), Box 56, Folder L; Fifth, Thirteenth Air Force, OP-INST/LOI. 1 8. Rice, Operational Fires: What's in a Name? p. 38.

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1 9. Kolditz, Exploring the Conditions, for Decisive Operational Fires, p. 40. 20. In generic terms, interdiction aims to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy surface potential before it can be used effectively against one's forces; Annen, Joint Interdiction: The Gray Area, p. 6. 21. Between 18 and 30 June the Northwest African Air Force (NAAF) flew 317 heavy and 566 medium bomber sorties, with the help of 107 sorties by the Ninth Bomber Command, attacking key supply points, terminal ports, and marshaling yards along Italy's western coast, and also smaller Sicily's ports. Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, Europe: Torch to Pointblank , Vol. 2: The Army Air Forces in World War II (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1949), p. 435. 22. Craven and Cate, Europe: Torch to Pointblank , p. 437. 23. Rice, Operational Fires. What's in a Name? p. 21. 24. Ralph F. Stearley, Robert M. Lee, and James C. McGehee, Air Power in the European Theater of Operations, Study No. 56 (The General Board, United States Forces, European Theater, 1946), p. 12. 25. The Allied bombing plan called for the destruction of all highway and railway bridges between the Seine and Meuse rivers from Paris to Le Havre. The bombing offensive would last up to the end of August. These attacks would be supplemented by the attacks on bridges over the Loire River, and the systematic strafing of trains, tracks, and secondary railway stations. Claude Postel, "The Air Attacks on Communications 6 March to 6 June 1 944," Revue Historique de l'Armee (France), nos. 1 and 2, 1950; translated and digested by Military Review 1 (January 1951), p. 78. 26. Douglas A. McGregor, "Future Battle: The Merging Levels of War," Parameters, Winter 1992-1993, p. 39. 27. Between 1 March and 6 June, thirty-six marshaling yards in Belgium and northern France were attacked 139 times; Garrett, Strategic Airpower as Operational Fires, p. 1 8. In March 1944 the Allies started a massive air offensive, using 4,200 heavy bombers, 1,100 medium bombers and light bombers, and 2,000 escorting fighters to cripple the French railway system. By 6 March the bombing of the large railway centers had begun. By the end of April, all rail traffic stopped on the Paris-Calais, ParisBrussels, and Paris-Soisson lines. However, despite massive air attacks the Germans continued to transport troops, even though civilian freight and passenger service was reduced by 34 percent. By 7 May the Allied heavy bombers started to hit railway bridges across the Seine, Oise, and Loire Rivers and the railway bridges on the Paris-Etampes-Orleans line. Beginning 20 May, the Allies began attacks on trains and small railway lines; on 7 May, Allied aircraft attacked bridges at Mantes, Marines, Oissel, Orival, Serqueux, and Vernon. These attacks increased during the rest of May. A few days before the Normandy invasion, French rail traffic was almost completely paralyzed north of Loire. The Germans planned to have seventy-two trains per day between Paris and northern France; as a result of the Allied bombing attacks, the Germans were able to move only thirty trains daily, of which twenty were troop transports and the rest were coal trains between Sarre and Paris. Postel, "The Air Attacks on Communications 6 March to 6 June 1944," pp. 75, 77-8. 28. Ibid., p. 78. However, other sources claim that the entire effort was not very successful, because transportation infrastructure was not reduced below the level that allowed adequate residual capability to support German requirements; Rice, Operational Fires: What's in a Name? p. 1 9. 29. Omar N. Bradley, Effect of Air Power on Military Operations in Western Europe (Air Effects Committee Twelfth Army Group, August 1945), pp. 59-60. 30. Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan. August 1942 to July 1944 , The Army Air Forces in World War 11 (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1950), pp. 677-8. 31. These two commands coordinated their actions with those of forces controlled by Admiral Nimitz in Hawaii. The B-24s, B-25s, and fighters of the Central Pacific Force also delivered operational fires, striking Jaluit,

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Wotje, and Ponape in May 1944, while the B-25s of the Forty-first Bombardment Group (Seventh Air Force) hit the targets in the Marshalls still controlled by the Japanese; from 15 March to 15 September the primary mission of the heavy bombardment groups of the Seventh and Thirteenth Air Forces was neutralization of the enemy bases in the Carolines. These two commands coordinated their actions with those of forces controlled by Admiral Nimitz in Hawaii. The B-24s, B-25s, and fighters of the Central Pacific Force also delivered operational fires, striking Jaluit, Wotje, and Ponape in May 1944, while the B-25s of the Forty-first Bombardment Group (Seventh Air Force) hit the targets in the Marshalls still controlled by the Japanese; ibid., p. 686. 32. Starting on 11 June, pre-assault air strikes (tactical fires) were conducted by four fast carrier groups of TF-58 of the U.S. Fifth Fleet against the Japanese airfields on Guam, Saipan, and Tinian; the B-24s of the Seventh Army Air Force, based in the Gilberts, attacked Dublon and Eren Islands on 16 March. Afterward, the bombers of South Pacific Forces (AIRSOL) attacked Truk on 29 and 30 March. The Kwajalein-based bombers attacked Truk on four consecutive nights, from 29 March through 1 April. On 3 June 1944, land-based bombers based in the Southwest Pacific struck targets on Palau, in the western Carolines. Strikes by Army Air Forces aimed at neutralizing Japanese airfields on Peleliu, Woleai, and Yap started on 9 June. Routine interdiction missions by land-based Army aircraft were flown against Truk, Pulawat, and Satawan. Samuel E. Morison, New Guinea and the Marianas, March 1944-August 1944 , Vol. VIII, History of United States Naval Operations in World War 11 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1953), pp. 156-7, 174. 33. A total of 686 sorties were flown; the Japanese were caught by surprise and offered little air opposition. About 100 Japanese aircraft were destroyed in the air and on the ground. U.S. carrier aircraft attacked the Japanese shipping at Cam Ranh Bay and several convoys off Vietnam's coast; a total of twenty-three aircraft were lost in these attacks. U.S. aircraft sank twelve tankers and twenty-one cargo and passenger ships, totaling 142,235 tons, while numerous other ships were damaged; the Japanese also lost one training cruiser and seven escorts. Ministry of Defence (NAVY), War with Japan, Vol. 6, The Advance to Japan (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1995), pp. 134-5. 34. One Japanese destroyer and one high-speed transport were sunk at Takao, Formosa, and one destroyer at Bako; only one merchant ship-a 10,000-ton tanker-was sunk; ibid., p. 135. There were fewer targets than anticipated, and the American aircraft encountered surprisingly intense and accurate antiaircraft (AA) fire. The U.S. carriers lost sixty-one aircraft in two days, of which thirty-one were operational losses; only three Japanese tankers and two cargo ships (three of them larger than 10,000 tons) were sunk; ibid., p. 136. 35. These attacks resulted in about 100 Japanese aircraft destroyed; Japanese shipping was attacked in the ports of Takao, Toshien, and Keelung; six tankers (two of 10,000 tons), four cargo vessels, and one tank landing ship were sunk; ibid., p. 137. 36. By late summer 1944, Formosan airfields normally held 300 aircraft and were capable of rapid reinforcements; in China, Hainan, and North Indochina there were an estimated 500 aircraft; in south Indochina, Burma, and Siam about 170 aircraft; and in the Netherlands East Indies some 280 aircraft; ibid., p. 133. 37. TF-38 then consisted of nine large aircraft carriers, five fast battleships, eight escort carriers, four heavy cruisers, seven light cruisers, three AA cruisers, and fifty-eight destroyers. Roy E. Appleman, James M. Burns, Russell A. Gugeler, and John Stevens, Okinawa: The Last Battle , Vol. 2, Part 2, The War in the Pacific, United States Army in World War II (Washington, DC: Historical Divisions Department of the Army, 1948), p. 44. 38. Morison, Leyte. June 1944-January 1945 , Vol. XII, pp. 92-3. 39. Ibid., p. 94; in three days, more than 500 Japanese planes were destroyed and an enormous amount of damage was inflicted on ammunition dumps, hangars, barracks, ships, and industrial plants; ibid., pp. 94-5. Between 10 and 18 October, TF-38 destroyed 655 aircraft in the air and 465 aircraft on the ground. The Japanese admitted the loss of 650 aircraft. TF-38 lost seventy-six aircraft, while two cruisers were damaged. Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945, Vol. 5, The Army Air Forces in World War II (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 355. 40. Ibid., p. 350.

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41. The Twentieth Bomber Command's B-29s made 232 sorties against shipping, aircraft assembly plants, and airfields on Formosa between 14 and 17 October, dropping 1,290 tons of bombs. Morison, Leyte. June 1944 January 1945 , p. 105. 42. A total of 1,356 sorties were flown, 541 tons of bombs were dropped, and 652 rockets fired. These attacks resulted in the sinking of twenty cargo ships, forty-five smaller vessels, four midget submarines, one submarine tender, and one minesweeper. Some twenty-three Japanese aircraft were shot down, and eightyeight more were destroyed on the ground. Roy E. Appleman, et al., Okinawa: The Last Battle, p. 44-5. During 6 days of attacks, fast carriers of TF-38s carried out 1,987 combat sorties against Formosa, 152 against Luzon, and twenty-six against Nansei Shoto; 421 sorties against Japanese shipping; and 291 sorties for interception. A total of 76 aircraft were lost in combat and 13 from other reasons, while air cover losses amounted to 64 aircraft. Ministry of Defence, Naval Historical Branch, War with Japan, Vol. 6: The Advance to Japan, p. 61. 43. Allied land-based bombers and fighters conducted strikes against Halmahera, Ambon, Ceram, Geelvink Bay, and the Vogelkop, oil centers at Balikpapan on Borneo, and Makassar, Celebes; Flores, Timor, Tanimbar, and the Aroe Islands in the Arafura Sea; and Palawan, Cebu, and Negros in the Philippines. On 3 October, 321 B-24s of the Fifth and Thirteenth Air Forces dropped 433 tons of bombs on oil refineries and other installations in the Balikpapan area; Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945, p. 322. On 18 September, Allied land-based aircraft attacked the Japanese oil storage tanks at Davao and other installations in the area; ibid., p. 352. 44. Ibid., p. 350. 45. Morison, Leyte. June 1944-January 1945, p. 107. 46. Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki, June 1944 to August 1945 , p. 350. 47. Ibid., p. 350. 48. Ministry of Defence, Naval Historical Branch, War with Japan, Vol. 6: The Advance to Japan, pp. 60-2. 49. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, editors, Gulf War Air Power Survey: Summary Report (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 92. 50. Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saipan. August 1942 to July 1944, p. 300. These attacks were carried out under great difficulties because of the remoteness of the area from the Allied bases (the maximum round trip for B-24 bombers was 2,408 nautical miles), few if any landmarks, and often very poor visibility over the target area; ibid., p. 301. 51. Garrett, Strategic Airpower as Operational Fires, p. 1 8. 52. Hartmut Zehrer, editor, Der Golfkonflikt. Dokumentation, Analyse and Bewertung aus militaerischer Sight (Herford/Bonn: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1992), p. 89. 53. Ibid., p. 156. 54. On 2 July, 91 B-24s of the Ninth Air Force attacked airfields at Grottaglie, San Pancrazio, and Lecce in Apulia. The next day the Northwest African Strategic Air Forces (NASAF) hit advance landing grounds on Sardinia. For the next three days NASAF and Ninth Air Force heavy bombers attacked the fields of eastern Sicily, while the medium bombers of the Northwest African Tactical Air Force (NATAF) attacked fields in the western and central part of the island. The Wellingtons operated at night against the Sardinian airfields; Craven and Cate, Europe: Torch to Pointblank, p. 439. 55. Ibid., p. 465.

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56. Ibid., p. 475. 57. This included 736 heavy bombers, 1,696 medium bombers, 88 light bombers, and 1,009 fighter-bomber sorties. Dennis Richards and Hilary St. George Saunders, Royal Air Force 1939-1945, Vol. 2, The Fight Avails (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1954), p. 327. 58. By the end of the fighting on Sicily the Germans and Italians had removed all their aircraft from all major airfields in southern Italy, except from Foggia's complex on the east coast. The Axis had available 670 aircraft, including 380 fighters. They were spread over mainland Italy, Sardinia, Sicily, Corsica, and southern France. The Italian aircraft were of little value; also, many Germans aircraft were nonoperational, because of a shortage of spare parts. The Allies then had about 1,500 aircraft; NAAF could use 350 heavy bombers, almost 400 medium day bombers, 120 medium night bombers, and 670 fighters. Martin Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, The Mediterranean Theater of Operations, Vol. 11, United States Army in World War 11 (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army; Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 51-2. 59. Ibid., p. 51. 60. Craven and Cate, Europe: Torch to Pointblank, p. 504. 61. Ibid., p. 517. 62. "Directive 17 April 1944, Supreme Commander to U.S.S.T.A.F. and Bomber Command for support of Overlord during the preparatory period": Sir Charles Webster, The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany 1939-1945, Vol. 4 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1961), p. 167-8. 63. Rice, Operational Fires: What's in a Name? p. 1 9. 64. A total of about 6,700 tons of bombs were dropped. Karl Gundelach, "Drohende Gefahr West," Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 6 (June 1959), p. 316. 65. Rice, Operational Fires: What's in a Name? p. 1 9. 66. Ibid., p. 19. 67. Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey: Summary Report, p. 71. The target list contained twenty-five major power stations; and more than 140 transformer stations. The Iraqi prewar electricity output was estimated at 9,500 megawatts (MW), but the country generally used about 5,000 MW. Iraq produced some 580,000 barrels of oil per day, or twice the amount needed to service domestic civilian and military needs; ibid., pp. 72-3. 68. Ibid., p. 73. 69. On 17 July the principal targets were Naples and Rome. The B-24s of the Ninth Air Force attacked Naples; 97 B-17s and 179 B-26s of the Twelfth Air Force, escorted by 164 P-38 fighters, dropped 650 tons of bombs; Craven and Cate, Europe: Torch to Pointblank, p. 463. 70. The most significant were attacks on Rome on 13 August, when 274 heavy bombers and 135 fighters hit rolling stock, yards, and airfields at Littorio; ibid., p. 474. 71. By 27 August 1943, 1,542 tons of bombs had been dropped at Battipaglia, Salerno, Bagnoli, Tarnato, Villa Latemo, Aversa, and Torre Annunziata and on the airfields at Foggia, Capua, and Grazzanise. Richards and Saunders, Royal Air Force 1939-1945, Vol. 2, The Fight Avails, p. 327.

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72. South of Naples there were only ten yards (excluding those in Calabria) and only four shops for repair and maintenance of locomotives. The greater part of the supplies originated in the northern part of the country; some 95 percent of oil and 80 percent of the coal came from the Po Valley; about three-quarters of the Italian industrial installations were in the same area. Supplies moving south passed through three staging areas: Rome, Naples, and Foggia; Craven and Cate, Europe: Torch to Pointblank, p. 504. 73. At the time of the landing at Salerno the NAAF flew 4,500 sorties and dropped 6,500 tons of bombs. Ibid., p. 504. 74. Ibid., p. 506. 75. Ibid., p. 517. 76. Madden, A Thousand Points of Light.- Integrating Operational Fires into Campaign Design, pp. 15-6. 77. There were a total of 126 highway bridges and nine railway bridges south of Baghdad; additionally, seven railyards in Iraq were also targeted as transportation choke points; Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey: Summary Report p. 92. 78. Zehrer, Der Gollkonflikt. Dokumentation Analyse and Bewertung aus militaerischer Sicht pp. 162-3. 79. Fred Frostic, Air Campaign Against the Iraqi Army in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1994), p. 6. Approximately two-thirds of these bridges lay on the lines of communications from Baghdad to the theater. Most of the bridges that were damaged or destroyed were in the vicinity of As Samawah, An Nasiriyah, and Basra; Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey: Summary Report, p. 93. 80. Ibid., pp. 96-7. 81. Frostic, Air Campaign Against the Iraqi Army in the Kuwaiti Theater of operations, p. 21. 82. Craven and Cate, The Pacific: Guadalcanal to Saran. August 1942 to July 1944 , p. 303. 83. Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary Report p. 92. 84. Including only fourteen tanks and fourteen other armored vehicles; ibid., p. 113. 85. Including only ten to twenty armored vehicles; ibid., p. 115. 86. The Iraqi forces escaped because 101st U.S. Airborne Division did not block the causeway over Hawr al Hammar northwest of Basra and the Twenty-fourth U.S. Infantry Division did not advance closer than eighteen miles south of Basra; Zehrer, Der Golflconflikt. Dokumentation Analyse and Bewertun aus militaerischer Sicht, p. 111; at least 365 T-72s modern tanks, or half the tanks with the Republican Guards, escaped (they started war with 786 tanks); Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals' War. The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), p. 429.

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OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS Gentlemen, the officer who doesn't know his communications and supply as well as his tactics is totally useless. General George S. Patton During the last war, eighty percent of our problems were of logistical nature. Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery Logistics is one of the most important operational functions. Without theater-wide l ogistical infrastructure, it is extremely difficult to conduct a campaign or major operation. The planning and conduct of major operations and campaigns are more constrained by logistics than by purely operational requirements. In the course of a campaign or major operation, adequate sustainment is crucial to preserving and regenerating one's combat power so that the point of culmination is not reached or crossed before the assigned operational or strategic objective has been accomplished. However, sustainment is directly linked to operational logistics; without a well-developed logistics infrastructure, combat forces cannot be continuously and adequately sustained. Logistics must always be fully integrated into the plan of a campaign or major operation. At the same time, too much focus on logistics could unduly restrict courses of actions open to the operational commander; hence, a proper balance must be found between the requirements for adequate logistical support and sustainment and purely operational needs. Logistics is the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces.' In general, logistics encompasses those aspects of military operations that deal with design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and acquisition of or provision of service. The principal task of logistics is to get the necessary forces, materiel, and support to the right place at the right time. In general, the main objective of logistics effort is the establishment and sustained support of combat forces. 2 Scale: Tactical, strategic, and operational logistical support and sustainment can be differentiated by the scale of military action (see Figure 19). Tactical logistics is responsible for planning and providing support to sustain battles, engagements, and other tactical actions. Strategic logistics is responsible for planning and providing resources in support of the country's armed forces as a whole. Specifically, it provides logistical support to industrial base mobilization, installation base support, consumer logistics, inter-theater strategic concentration, and acquisitions and construction of facilities, services, and host nations support. 3 It is the bridge between the national economy and the combat forces. Strategic logistics plans for and provides military forces. It also supplies the 259

national means to support the forces and their operations. The national capability to provide adequate logistical support for the armed forces is the most critical element in generating and maintaining the combat power necessary to prosecute a war. Opcrational logistics extends from the theater's sustaining base or bases to the forward combat service support units and facilities organic to major tactical forces. Therefore, it links strategic logistics to tactical logistics. Its main purpose is to ensure that one's actions are continuous through all phases of a major operation or campaign. Without adequate support and sustainment, a major operation or campaign may reach its culminating point before accomplishing its operational or strategic objectives. Thus, effective operational logistics must balance current consumption with the need to build up logistics support for subsequent operations. It must provide for lengthening the lines of communications and staging logistics support forward to maintain the desired operational tempo. Although operational logistics and sustainment are among the most critical factors for successful conduct of operational warfare, not all armed forces or services have given sufficient attention to them. The German Reichswehr and Wehrmacht did not pay adequate attention to logistics because they overemphasized operations. This cost Germany dearly in World War II when many of their major operations were stopped prematurely because, despite provisioning of supplies in the homeland, supplies did not reach the troops at the front in time. The main reason was the inadequate transportation network, destruction of railroads, inadequate security in the rear, and unfavorable weather conditions. 4 The first phase of the German invasion of Soviet Russia failed in good part because of inadequate operational logistics. In contrast, the United States and the British emphasized logistics too much. In World War 11, logistics was greatly responsible for the U.S. preference for a cross-channel attack rather than a Mediterranean attack. Logistics dominated the determination of the objectives, the choice of landing sites, the size of the

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assault forces, and plans for building up initial forces and the subsequent push inland . 5 Likewise, the Allied landing on Sicily in July 1943 was planned almost predominantly according to logistical considerations and the need to capture large ports first. In both Normandy and Sicily, the Allied overemphasis on logistics was a main reason it took longer to defeat the German Army than was necessary. General Douglas MacArthur, in planning an amphibious landing at Inchon, was well aware of the importance of logistics for the North Korean forces. He correctly anticipated that seizing Inchon and Seoul would cut the enemy supply line and seal off the entire southern peninsula. 6 After landing at Inchon, liberating Seoul, and linking with General Walker's forces south of the 38th Parallel, General MacArthur did not plan for or execute an operational pause to allow his forces to refit, reorganize, or build up supply bases for a possible attack north. No plans were made for the establishment of mutually supportable lines of operations and for seizing subsequent logistics bases in the north. After rapid advance in October and November, the UN forces were stretched to the limit. Their lines of communications were overly long, and their forces were not mutually supportable because of terrain, limited operational mobility, and the austere logistics infrastructure. This led to the crushing defeat of the UN forces by the poorly armed and trained Chinese forces in November-December 1950. 7 General MacArthur evidently forgot the central role of logistics in planning and conducting major operations. Inadequate operational logistics was the main reason that the Japanese Combined Fleet divided forces in its plan to defend the Philippines in October 1944. Because the fuel inventories in the home waters were too low, it was necessary to base the principal heavy surface ships of the Combined Fleet at Lingga Anchorage (near Singapore), where oil was abundant. However, the Japanese were forced to keep their carrier forces in the Inland Sea because that area offered better conditions for training pilots and obtaining replacement aircraft. Carrier forces were to join the remainder of the fleet once the pilots had been trained. Logistics played a critical role in the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict of 1982. This was especially true for the British, who faced the almost insurmountable problems of covering a huge sea distance between the home base in the United Kingdom and the Falklands/Malvinas and South Georgia Islands. Furthermore, a logistical infrastructure in the Southern Atlantic theater of operations was completely lacking. Nevertheless, the British were highly successful. They achieved smooth cooperation and synchronization between the services and industry, selected a proper staging area at Ascension, and properly used logistics intelligence. 8 Without adequate logistical support and sustainment, the British recapture of the Falklands would not have been possible. In the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the U.S. logistical effort was substantial. The United States and its coalition partners had the luxury of almost six months for logistical buildup. In addition, the logistical infrastructure in Saudi Arabia was well developed. A total of 9.3 million tons of equipment and materiel were shipped, including some six million tons of petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL). The ordnance accounted for a fair proportion of the other 3.3 million tons. 9 By 14 March 1991, nearly 550,000 tons of materiel had been airlifted in, while almost six million tons of cargo and six million of fuel had been sealifted in.' 0 Operational Reach: Logistics determines the operational reach of combat forces-the distance over which military power can be concentrated and employed decisively. This 261

goes beyond merely conducting reconnaissance or strike operations at a distance. Operational reach is affected by, among other things, the effective range and endurance of one's combat forces, and the length and degree of protection of one's lines of supplies. Operational reach is influenced by the intervening physical environment separating the two sides in a conflict. In general, it can be extended by establishing new bases and deploying one's forces into forward areas, increasing the effective range of weapon systems, extending the operational range and endurance of combat and combat support forces, improving the effectiveness of lines of communications, and improving the transportation network. Operational logistics also dictates characteristics of operational reach, including the size of combat forces, depth of attack, and speed of advance. It has a finite range beyond which a logistics system cannot support forces; at that point, the offensive becomes logistically overextended -a force reaches culmination point. I I Command and Control: Operational logistics is inherently a multiservice and often a multinational effort. Thus, operational commanders and their staffs bear the prime responsibility for all aspects of logistical support and sustainment of their subordinate forces in a theater. Yet, all too often, operational commanders and their staffs think that their supply officer or logistician is alone responsible for logistics. Such an attitude is exemplified by Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, probably the best operational thinker and practitioner in the entire Wehrmacht: During a discussion with General Wolfram von Richthoffen, the Fourth Air Fleet Commander, von Manstein reportedly said that he was primarily responsible for conducting (major) operations, while logistics was the responsibility of his supply officer. 1 2 Operational logistics remains one of the operational commander's major responsibilities, both in peacetime and in combat. He has sole responsibility for the logistical support and sustainment of all subordinate forces. Logistics is a function of command. For each level of command, there is a respective level of logistical support in peacetime and in time of war. Normally, joint force commanders are in charge of strategic- and operational-level logistics, while the respective service components manage tactical-level logistics. All logistical levels are interrelated, and shortcomings at any level invariably affect logistics at other levels. Unity of command is essential to seamless linkage between operational logistics and strategic and tactical logistics. It also allows the operational commander to sequence and synchronize all logistical elements in the theater. Optimally, logistical organization should be well established in the theater before the hostilities start. In the Vietnam War, the United States did not have a theater logistical command. This resulted from a decision to put troops in the field quickly, without waiting for a logistics buildup or deployment of logistical personnel in sufficient numbers to cope with the ammunition supply on the ground. 1 3 Logistical responsibilities and authority should be clearly defined, and a simple chain of command should be established. A simplified logistics structure is more focused, efficient, effective, and flexible. Centralized logistics usually ensures proper selection of logistics priorities and the most efficient use of transportation network. However, a highly centralized logistics organization could become too rigid and therefore unresponsive to the needs of combat forces. In contrast, multiple logistics command organization in a theater inherently detracts from effectively achieving unity of effort. The existence of several separate logistics organizations in the Gulf War of 1990-1991 resulted in great deal of overlap and inefficient use of available resources. The 262

intelligence about the Iraqis was imperfect and resulted in far greater quantities of ammunition being shipped than was necessary. Each U.S. service combat commander procured enough antitank ammunition and bombs to destroy Iraqi tank forces with their own combat forces. The U.S. Air Force used only 69,000 tons of the 350,000 tons of ammunition actually shipped. 1 4 Synchronization: Synchronization between operations and logistics is important, as is synchronization within the logistical infrastructure. It requires adequate access to information; cooperation built on mutual understanding, respect, and adequate communications channels; joint education and training; and standardization of methods and materials. 1 5 Logistics must be synchronized with combat force synchronization. Using force at the decisive place and time also places maximum demands on logistics. Without synchronization, sustainment resources needed to schedule, arrange, transport, and distribute supplies may not be available or could be obstructed by the proximity of combat. Therefore, lack of synchronization may bring combat forces to their culmination point before the logistics system can resupply them. Coordinating logistics with the movement of forces is extremely difficult, and the stakes are high. Combat forces that do not receive the right support at the right place may be placed in grave danger. 1 6 Field Marshal Rommel, when conducting his campaign in North Africa, showed repeatedly that he had no concept of synchronization and the sequencing of actions with the establishment of a logistical base and lines of operations. He also did not have a concept of avoiding culmination and planning for operational pauses. Rommel did not understand that the sequencing of battles and engagements is tied to shifting bases of operations, thereby ensuring short lines of operations to prevent Axis forces from reaching a culminating point.' 7 The Axis offensive should have started only after adequate fuel supplies had been secured and rear communications adequately protected; for that, sufficient control of the central Mediterranean, and especially Malta, was mandatory. To generate the greatest possible combat power with the resources available, operational commanders and their staffs must balance the needs of logistics and combat forces. They must determine a proper balance based on the differences between various logistics and operations concepts. 1 8 The principal decisions the operational commander and his staff must make during preparation for a campaign or major operation is selection of lines of support, staging, altering lines of communications, sustainment priorities, and force expansion. Lines of support link the sustainment base to forward tactical units, and proper staging is critical to maintain momentum. Before combat starts, the operational commander should have decided when and where in the theater to move the support base if lines of communications become overextended. Altering one's lines of communications in combat is a delicate task, because combat forces must be simultaneously, continuously, and adequately supported. Sustainment priorities must be established to make the most efficient use of the limited logistical resources. Force expansion should take place at a balanced rate, and their effectiveness in combat is maximized when there is a proper mix of combat forces and their support. 1 9 Tenets: Properly organized, operational logistics should exhibit to a high degree adequacy, responsiveness, anticipation, integration, flexibility, continuity, simplicity, and protection. 20 Adequacy is the ability to provide minimum essential supplies and services required to begin combat operations. Logistics must be responsive and capable of quickly 263

satisfying, in a crisis or some unexpected opportunity, the requirements to deliver the right support to the right place at the right time. Multiple bases of supplies generally reduce responsiveness, because the system becomes sluggish and cannot adapt to unforeseen circumstances. Responsiveness requires a degree of mental agility that can be provided only by careful logistics planning. The logisticians must be able to i maginatively meet unexpected requirements, using all available resources. 21 In planning their invasion of Greece in early 1941, the Germans were faced with the unexpected coup d'etat in Belgrade on 27 March that overthrew a pro-German government. Hitler almost immediately decided to invade the former Yugoslavia concurrently with the campaign against Greece. However, the German 12th Army had to use less capable rail lines through Hungary and Romania. Before Belgrade's coup, the Germans were negotiating with the Yugoslav government to use the Belgrade-NisSalonika rail line for their invasion of Greece. However, that option ended with the change of the government in Belgrade. Likewise, the Germans could not count on the i mmediate use of the Danube River to move supplies in support of their forces in the former Yugoslavia; this forced the Germans to improvise in very short time, since the scheduled attack date was 6 April. As a first step, the Germans sent one large motorized truck convoy to Romania from the Army's Command's Reserve. In addition, one ship with 10,000 tons of fuel, ammunition, and other supplies was placed on standby in the Romanian port of Constanta to sail toward Greece as soon as the 12th Army created the necessary conditions; in Vienna, one tanker and 10,000 tons of supplies were assembled; and another 16,000 tons of ammunition and supplies were made ready in the area of Regensburg-Vienna on the Danube River. These ships were to sail out as soon as the Danube became free for ship traffic. The greatest concern was the state of the medical supplies for the 2nd Army, which was in the process of deployment in southern Austria and Hungary. However, the proximity of Vienna as a supply base greatly lessened these concerns. Properly organized logistics should anticipate the needs of combat forces during any phase of a campaign or major operation. Anticipation means accumulating and maintaining the necessary logistical forces and assets at the decisive time and place. This requires sustainment planners to visualize the entire course of a major operation or campaign. 23 Large and numerous stockpiles of supplies must be distributed throughout the theater to meet any contingency. However, in practice, this is probably the most difficult task for logistics planners sometimes a conflict breaks out suddenly and in an area where no logistical preparations of any kind have been made. At the beginning of the Korean War in 1950, the United States had prepared no plan for logistical support and sustainment. The planning began after the decision to commit troops, but it would have been better if a plan had already existed: Logistics and operational schemes were uncoordinated rather than anticipatory . _'4 Logistics must be integrated into every phase of a major operation or campaign. In addition, national and theater logistical efforts must be integrated . 25 However, logistics should not be allowed to unduly restrict the commander's ability to employ his forces decisively. The principle of economy of effort is also applicable to logistics. This means providing logistical support at the least cost. Hence, logistics should be focused on providing support and sustainment to forces in the main sector of effort.

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Flexibility is the ability to adapt logistics structures and procedures to changing situations, missions, and the concept of operations. Theater-wide logistical infrastructure must be flexible. The operational commander should sequence logistics resources in relation to emerging priorities. 26 This means he should have the ability to shift lines of communications on short notice. If not properly planned and executed, this shifting can result in a dangerous interruption of support during a campaign or major operation, so any decision to shift lines of communications must be weighed in view of the operations i n progress, the overall sustainment posture, and the operational objectives. Obviously, shifting lines of communications is facilitated by a well-developed and diverse transportation network in the theater. For shifting lines of communications, access to many longitudinal and lateral roads and railways is a definite advantage. The logistical system should be capable of providing continuous supply and service support to combat forces so that they can sustain their combat power in the course of the campaign or major operation. This requires the use of diverse methods and procedures, and the availability of diverse transport modes and lines of communications. Seamlessly nesting logistical responsibilities and efforts will generate continuity in support of forces operating in the sector of main effort. An overly complex logistical structure does not foster efficiency, while a simple one might. Task-oriented orders and standardized procedures contribute to simplicity. Logistics is also simplified by establishing priorities in providing supplies and services. 27 Simplicity is enhanced by having a common, clear understanding of the purpose of the forthcoming operation-the fewer the unnecessary changes made, the more efficient and responsive the logistical system will be . 2 s Logistical structure is normally highly vulnerable and must be adequately protected. This is facilitated by closely coordinating operations and logistics. Both active and passive measures should be used to enhance protection of the most important elements of logistics in a theater. One method of enhancing survivability of logistics is to li mit logistics assets in the forward area. Decentralized logistics organization and physical dispersal of various elements of logistics infrastructure also enhance their survivability, but the requirements of protection are often in conflict. The requirements should be balanced between the need to protect the system and the need for logistics to remain highly responsive to the combat forces . 29 In his invasion of Russia in 1812, Napoleon I knew that the deployment area had no agricultural surplus that his army could use, so he ordered the establishment of a comprehensive depot system and various additional depots before starting the campaign. Additional depots were built randomly in the course of the campaign, but they were usually far apart and difficult to protect. The French lines of communications were continuously harassed or interdicted by Cossack raids. The deeper his advance into Russia, the longer the lines of supplies and hence the more French troops required for their protection. After Napoleon I reached Moscow, his lines of supplies extended some 560 miles. 30 Logistics Functions: The principal functions of logistics are to provide a supply system, maintenance, transportation, general engineering, health services, and other services. 3 1 The supply system acquires, manages, receives, stores, and issues materiel to the operating forces during deployment, combat employment, and redeployment. Maintenance is intended to keep materiel in serviceable condition, to return it to service, or to update and upgrade it. Transportation is the movement of units, personnel, 265

equipment, and supplies from point of origin to final destination. General engineering provides the construction, repair, and operation and maintenance of facilities or logistics enhancements. It also provides shelter, warehousing, hospitals, water and sewage treatment, and water and fuel distribution. Health services include evacuation, hospitalization, medical logistics, medical laboratory service, vector control, and preventive medicine service. Sustainment: Operational sustainment is required to support combat forces throughout all phases of a major operation or campaign. Depending on the location of the theater of operations, this may require simultaneous employment of land, air, and sea lines of communications. Then the primary limiting factors on the operational commander's freedom of action are the availability of transportation assets and his ability to protect these lines of communication from enemy action. The adequacy of operational logistics is measured in terms of its ability to perform its sustainment function and distribution supplies inherent with those functions: sustainment is achieved through manning, arming, fueling, fixing, transporting, and protecting. 31 Sustainability is the measure of the ability to maintain logistics support for all users throughout the theater for the duration of the operations; long-term support is the logisticians' great challenge. 33 Sustainment is pivotal to operational logistics. Sustaining troops in forcible entry operations into immature theaters is usually fraught with great difficulties. Light forces with limited supplies are inserted initially, but their success often depends on the prompt arrival of properly balanced combat and support forces. In an immature theater, logistics intelligence is required to determine the extent of in-country resources. If host nation support is lacking or inadequate, logisticians must develop an infrastructure to support the forces, and they must be flexible and balance many issues. 34 Elements: In generic terms, the essential elements of logistics in a theater are bases of operations, theater transportation networks, and lines of communications. The availability of diverse bases theater-wide is critical to the application of combat power. The theater commander is responsible for establishing a base for the accomplishment of the mission .35 Base availability directly affects the number of sorties and the rate of resupply. The geometric arrangement and successive positioning of bases directly influence one's ability to defend and conduct offensive actions against the enemy. A main base of operation is usually located on home territory, but sometimes it can be located on the territory of a friendly country. It encompasses a number of ports and airfields or airports, supply depots, hospitals, and repair workshops. It serves as an entry and exit point for all personnel and materiel to be transported by ships, aircraft, or railways and trucks forward to the combat area. An intermediate base of operations (or theater sustainment base) is established between the main base of operations and the combat logistics area and, if possible, beyond the effective range of the enemy's long-range artillery. On land, the intermediate base of operations is located near a railhead, to save time when loading and unloading personnel and supplies. It serves as a distribution point for resupply of forces in the combat zone. Those stocks, tied directly to support of combat units on the front, are assembled in the combat logistical area. 36 In planning for the invasion of Soviet Russia, logistics influenced how deeply the German forces could advance before they had to stop 266

and build a new supply base. Generally the German planners recognized that the Soviets had to be defeated within the first 310 miles of advance. The German Army's General Staff Army envisaged that the advance to the Dvina-Smolensk-Dnieper line could be covered in a single "hop," to be followed by an operational pause so that the railways carrying supplies could catch up.37 During the preparation and execution of the Normandy landing, England served as the main base of operations, while the continent initially became an intermediate base of operations. After the Allied armies broke out from Normandy in late July and advanced toward the German border, the ports, airfields, and depots in Normandy became the main base of operations. The landing in Normandy was planned in painstaking detail: the loading of supplies in British ports and their unloading in France were arranged. British and U.S. logisticians planned and constructed two large artificial floating ports. More than one and a half million tons of material went into the construction of the U.S. port, Mulberry A. However, both artificial ports were destroyed in a severe storm on 19-22 June, delaying operations on the coast. In addition, the port of Cherbourg was not captured until 27 June, two weeks behind schedule, and the Germans had so heavily damaged the harbor and its facilities that it was not open for another three weeks. Logistical supplies were unloaded directly on Omaha and Utah beaches. During June and July, more than 800,000 long tons were delivered over these two beaches, and more than 900,000 men and 315,000 vehicles were landed. Almost all the U.S. Army supplies went over these two beaches until the breakthrough at St. Lo on 27 July. 38 A theater of operations should be logistically self-sufficient, with a sustaining base adequate for contemplated operations. Once a sustaining base is established in the theater, its expansion, defense, and protection are the operational commander's responsibility. The operational commander must have a secure flow of logistical requirements, regardless of changing priorities and conditions, throughout the course of a major operation or campaign. Therefore, the operational commander should designate a service component commander as the joint commander responsible for the establishment and protection of the sustaining base. In preparation for their invasion of Soviet Russia in June 1941, the Germans created supply depots near Warsaw. Stockpiling commenced in late March, and the German armies established their own forward supply points. The original plans called for Army Group Center to pause for three weeks near Minsk to allow the resupply of combat units and then to seize Moscow before winter set in. 39 Geographic or other conditions in the theater may preclude the initial establishment of an in-theater sustaining base. Thus, the initial major operations may have to be sustained from bases external to the theater or from offshore. This was true in all the campaigns or major operations conducted on the opposed shores in the Pacific and the European theater in World War 11. In the Normandy landing (June 1944), logistics played the most critical role. The base buildup was intended to accumulate sufficient logistical resources on the coast so the forces could break out. General Eisenhower's concept of phasing indicated that his sequencing was connected to the concept of basing. The landing, establishment of a theater logistics base, and envelopment of the Ruhr were all heavily influenced by logistics. The effects of logistics were evident in watercraft availability and turnaround time, beach sustainability, port availability, and shipping. Logistics determined the troop dispositions and missions. The decision to deploy the U.S. troops in the hedgerow country and the British troops near Caen was made to facilitate

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maintaining direct lines of operations from the respective basing areas in England. Another consideration was ensuring that the force with the most infantry and replacements, that of the United States, was deployed in the terrain that allowed the best conditions for its employment . 41 As it turned out, the planners made a serious error-the hedgerow terrain proved to be just the opposite of what they had anticipated. Logistical bases outside the theater impose severe restrictions on the commander's freedom of action and the conduct of a major operation or campaign. This is especially true in an undeveloped theater. Logistical limitations were one of the main reasons the Allies were unable to resume their offensive in the southern Pacific after the end of the struggle for control of Guadalcanal. Between January and June 1943 the Allies mounted no major actions in the area. The buildup of supplies in New Caledonia, Espiritu Santo, and Guadalcanal took more than a year. The landings on New Georgia in June were followed by the seizure of Vella Lavella and Treasury Islands and the establishment of the Bougainville beachhead. The newly captured areas were then used for the development of air bases for an eventual assault on Rabaul, New Britain. As the Allies advanced in southeastern New Guinea, new bases were developed in Milne Bay and Finschafen, and supplies were concentrated there. 42 The U.S. forces greatly extended their operational reach by seizing the Japanesecontrolled Gilbert Islands in November 1943. By late 1943, the U.S. operational logistics in the Pacific Ocean Area (POA) extended all the way from the Solomons in the southern Pacific to the Gilberts in the central Pacific and, via Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, to the U.S. West Coast. The main logistics center was in the San Francisco area, with warehouses in Alameda and Oakland. The largest storage depot was built at Clearfield, Utah. The distance between Pearl Harbor and the Gilberts was about 2,000 miles -a 4,000-mile round trip for supply ships. Advanced bases were established to store supplies for the fleet. Some of these bases were indispensable, but the war in the Pacific could not have been won without mobile logistical support. A major innovation came shortly before the amphibious landing on the Gilberts (Operation Galvanic), when a floating or mobile supply base, Service Squadron 4, was created. This mobile base was composed of a motley collection of tenders, repair tugs, fuel barges, general stores barges, and lighters. The fuel needs for some 200 combatant ships taking part in that operation were satisfied by Service Squadron 8. A group of two or three oilers escorted by destroyers was devoted to refueling. In Operation Galvanic, about thirteen fleet oilers were used to support the Fifth Fleet; the number was increased to twenty-eight for the invasion of the Marshalls. In addition, nine commercial tankers were used to bring some 600,000 barrels of fuel per month to the nearest bases. Another group of commercial tankers regularly supplied the huge underground fuel depot at Oahu, Hawaii. A division of escort carriers was also assigned to the defense of fleet oilers . 43 Logistics for the Leyte, Mindoro, and Lingayen Operations in 1944-1945 were divided between the Seventh and Third Fleets, while the Army and part of the Seventh Fleet used the normal logistics channels of the Southwest Pacific Area (SOWESPAC). When the decision to land at Leyte was made in mid-September 1944, the logistical planning for the Third and Seventh Fleets was thrown off balance. In the Leyte Operation, the Service Force Pacific Fleet was responsible for providing support to the Southern Attack Force and all the vessels of the Pacific Fleet temporarily under Seventh Fleet operational command. The logistics support base for the Third Fleet was moved to Ulithi,

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while the Seventh Fleet's remained at Manus, in the Admiralties. The base for fast carriers was shifted from Seadler Harbor to Ulithi. Petroleum products were carried in commercial tankers from the West Coast, the Netherlands West Indies, and the ninemillion-barrel fuel depot at Pearl Harbor. When Eniwetok was abandoned as an advance fleet anchorage in favor of Ulithi on 1 October 1944, some 1,400 miles in each direction were added to the voyage of each commercial tanker, and turnaround time slowed accordingly. The Mobile Service Base (Service Squadron 10) was moved from Eniwetok to Ulithi during the first two weeks of October. Six to eight obsolete tankers were moved there to serve as floating fuel reserves, each tanker having a 60,000- to 100,000-barrel capacity. This was considered more practical than constructing fuel tanks ashore. Moreover, tankers could be moved to a new location (and were actually moved to Leyte in mid-May 1945). 4 The Seventh Fleet relied on Australia as the main base for provisions. However, Australia became inadequate as a base for the Leyte Operation, because the operation required much larger quantities of supplies than had been needed in the past. Fresh and frozen provisions had to be supplemented from the United States. One-third of the load the three Seventh Fleet reefers procured came from the West Coast, while the rest came from Australia. These three reefers provided the initial supply of the Northern Attack Force transports and amphibious craft; one of them was always at Manus to replenish the larger units of the Seventh Fleet when their provisions dwindled. LSTs and smaller vessels at Leyte Gulf were supplied from the large ships. Fuel, oil, gasoline, and lubricants (POL) for the Seventh Fleet came largely from Aruba in the West Indies and from the West Coast; some oil came from the Persian Gulf. Commercial tankers carried petroleum products to Australia, Manus, and Hollandia, where the shore and floating storage capacities were used to capacity to facilitate quick turnaround of the fast fleet oilers. Ammunition for the Seventh Fleet was shipped directly from the United States in converted hictorv ships to depots in Australia, Manus, and Hollandia; from there it was sent to forward areas. Because of the decision to land at Leyte, the logistical situation at Manus became complicated by the diversion of merchant ships, carrying integral cargoes for both fleets, to Ulithi, where they were partially unloaded. 45 When the movement of forces to Leyte began, three oilers preceded the combat ships to about 150 miles west of the Palaus to underway refuel all minecraft, fire support ships, and units of the Dinagat Attack Group as they passed. Then the oilers rendezvoused with LSTs of the Southern Attack Forces and refueled them. Afterward, these oilers ran a shuttle service between Kossol Passage, where a commercial tanker was always held in readiness for replenishment, and a convenient point for fire support ships wanting fuel-about one hundred miles east of Leyte Gulf. A reserve of 500,000 barrels of black oil was kept afloat at Manus for replenishment and borrowed fueling units. Resupply echelons were operated by the Seventh Fleet Service Force's pool of five ammunition ships, three cargo ships for dry provisions, two cargo ships for general issue stores, three fleet oilers, two Australian Navy oilers, four auxiliary oilers, and a number of gasoline and diesel tankers. An echelon was selected to be included in each regular follow-up convoy that departed Hollandia, Manus, and Biak every six days for Leyte Gulf.4h The transportation network is another vital element of the logistical infrastructure. The more straightforward and unified the transportation, the greater its effectiveness.

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Determining factors include size and quality of means of transports; number, effectiveness, and security of transport routes; quality of services; ability of transport organization; and weather and climatological conditions . 47 A well-developed theater usually possesses large, efficient, and diverse systems of rail and road communications, inland waterways, seagoing ships, and air transport. Not only should the basic modes of transport be in place, but also within each transport mode a variety of means should be available to augment or supplement each other. Roads, canals, rail lines, and air routes must be kept open to allow movement. Failure to keep routes open reduces sustainment of the forces. 48 German logisticians realized that the planned invasion of Soviet Russia in 1941 would be logistically very difficult because of the long distances from the starting points and the inadequate rail and road network in Russia. The number of troops involved some 3.5 million-was more than five times the size of the French Army that invaded Russia in 1812. The German strategic objectives were from north to south, 600, 700, and 900 miles from the starting points. The Russian roads were few and low-capacity. All Russian railroads had to be converted to standard gauge before they could be used. Most of the rail lines ran from Warsaw toward Moscow. Normally, rail lines would be an important consideration in the selection of the sector of main effort. However, Hitler essentially ignored logistics and decided that economics was more important. This was why, in the initial phase of the campaign, the main thrust was not in the direction of Moscow but to the south: Ukraine, Crimea, and the Caucasian oilfelds. 49 The German forces had great shortages of some key logistical items. Fuel reserves were sufficient for only three months, and diesel oil for only one month. The Germans hoped that Romanian oil fields would deliver fuel directly to the armies in Russia. The captured Russian fuel had a low octane content and the German vehicles could use it only after adding benzyl, which took time. The German logistical system's biggest problem was the great increase in the size of the army after the end of the campaign in the West. The number of panzer divisions increased from ten to nineteen, and other divisions from 120 to 180 and later to 207. The Germans lacked standardized equipment; they used no fewer than 2,000 different types of vehicles, and tires and spare parts were in short supply. Supplying their armies with enough ammunition also challenged the Germans. Ammunition requirements were estimated in terms of what could be carried rather than what was required. Instead of having ammunition reserves for twelve months of fighting, as requested by the commander of the replacement army, the German divisions crossed the Russian border with only two to three basic loads of ammunition plus an unspecified reserve of ammunition for twenty divisions. The solution to all these problems was to scale down the objectives and extend the time line for the duration of the campaign. However, the Germans apparently concluded that their original estimate was not optimistic enough. Thus, they changed the time for the completion of the Barbarossa from the original estimate of five month to four months to, eventually, one month . 50 I n Korea in 1950, the U.S. Eighth Army's shortage of ammunition was more a problem of distribution than an actual shortage of stock. By November 1950, huge quantities of ammunition had been amassed, but the facilities could not handle them . 5 1 An unusually large quantity of fire was required to offset the enemy's numerical superiority. The ammunition was stocked in the United States, but the problem was in shipping ammunition to the theater. In addition, the real shortages were in the Army's

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total ammunition stocks compared with its worldwide commitments. In the UN offensive against the Chinese in May 1951, transportation was the limiting factor. Additional troops for the U.S. X Corps could not be supported because of inadequate transportation. For major supply shipments, the UN forces had to rely on North Korean railways, supplemented to some extent by highway transportation. Delivery to forward units was mostly by truck and, in rough terrain, even hand-carried by the local Korean Service Corps. Perhaps the most serious continuing bottleneck was moving goods out of the port areas. This was aggravated by concentration of depots in the Pusan area, near the port facilities. While air transport was negligible in Korea, it did deliver small quantities of essential cargo quickly, and it played a particularly important role in the evacuation of casualties.5 Selection of lines of communications is one of the critical tasks in planning for operational commanders and their staffs. Lines of communications were critical in the German failure in the first phase of the Barbarossa Campaign in 1941. The German i nability to move stocks by rail increased delays and subsequent supply difficulties during the attack on Moscow. Interior lines of communications became a problem with the expansion of front as the Germans approached Smolensk. The situation required flexible use of the lines of communications. However, that was not possible because of the difficult terrain and poor transportation network. Additional trucks would not have resolved the problem, because the Germans lacked sufficient fuel. The ability to create alternate lines of communications was not contemplated except for some very limited aerial resupply. Forward staging of supplies was planned, but failed to reach acceptable proportions because of the lack of movement along lines of communications. 53 _Logistics Intelligence: Intelligence has a critical role in the logistical preparation of the theater. Operational logistics intelligence can be defined as that information necessary to plan and conduct the deployment and sustainment of military forces during a major operation or campaign in a theater. 54 Among other things, it includes the detailed analysis of terrain, number and characteristics of ports and airports and airfields, status and capacity of seagoing and air traffic, road and railway networks, inland waterways, and pipelines. Logistics intelligence also evaluates geography, efficiency of transportation, throughput capacity and enhancements, infrastructure protection, echelonment of support, and assignment of responsibilities. Throughput capacity is the ability of area infrastructure to receive, store, and distribute personnel and resources; it requires an evaluation of transshipment and warehouse capacities. Throughput enhancements include the availability of local resources, labor, materiel-handling equipment, airfield parking aprons, and high-capacity ports . 55 Echelonment of support is intended to meet the logistics needs of forward combat forces. After obtaining appropriate fintelligence, logistics planners develop a concept of logistical support for the operation. In preparing the landing in Normandy, the U.S. Headquarters, Service of Supply published in July 1943 criteria for logistics and intelligence planners. They included estimates, expressed in percentages, of troop bases by major types of units, rate of troop buildup on the continent, and rate of troop inflow to the United Kingdom; number and characteristics of lines of communications and motor transport required; number of major and minor ports to be rehabilitated; airfield construction and number of aircraft to be supported; authorized level of supply on the continent; and the enemy demolition of 271

ports, bridges, rail equipment, and signal communications. 57 Logistical planners require detailed intelligence of logistics infrastructure in the theater of operations in seven categories ports, railway, roads, pipelines, inland waterways, utilities system, and general requirements, such as hospital construction. 58 These requirements for establishing logistical infrastructure on the continent drove the entire logistics and intelligence planning. In planning the UN landing at Inchon, despite the short time available, the U.S. intelligence assessment proceeded rapidly. By 28 June, Naval Intelligence prepared a report, Port Logistics Summary, Korea, which described all ports in detail and in military terms; they were generally adequate. They also produced a detailed study of the infrastructure in the Inchon-Seoul area. 60 Conclusion: Logistics is one of the most important operational functions in support of a major operation or campaign. Its ultimate purpose is to extend operational reach for one's forces or to prevent the adversary from extending operational reach for his own forces. Many major operations and even campaigns have failed because of inadequate or poor logistical support and sustainment. Operational commanders are solely responsible for the smooth and effective functioning of logistics in the theater. They must have full authority over logistics for their subordinate forces; otherwise, it is difficult to synchronize various logistical functions with operations during the planning, preparation, and execution phase of a campaign or major operation. Hence, a theater's logistics organization should be simple, but effective. Once hostilities start, the operational commander must ensure responsiveness, continuity, simplicity, flexibility, economy of effort, and security. Logistics plans should be coordinated and fully integrated with the plans for all phases of the operation. However, operational commanders must avoid the danger of allowing logistical considerations to predominate or dictate the operational scheme. While logistics is vital for success, it can also be an obstacle. Logistics intelligence is the essential element in sound logistics planning. The main prerequisite for successful intelligence support of the operational logistics is to create and maintain in peacetime database on all aspects of the physical environment and transportation system in a prospective theater. Once a campaign or major operation is underway, the operational commander must carefully consider when and where to establish an intermediate base of operations to ensure continuity in logistical support and sustainment of subordinate forces. Diverse modes and means for carrying personnel and supplies should be used whenever possible. The transportation network and lines of communications should be well developed and adequately protected.

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Notes 1. The term logistics appeared for the first time in 1800, but with a different meaning than today; Hans Kettgen, "Gedanken ueber Logistik in Theorie and Praxis," Part 1, Wehrkund 8 (August 1964), p. 3; Jomini was the first important military theoretician to deal with logistics. He considered it as one of the components of military art. He defined logistics as the art of moving armies. It comprises the order and details of marches and camps, and of quartering and supplying troops. In a word, it is the execution of strategical and tactical enterprises; Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, The Art of War (London: Greenhill Books/Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1992), p. 69. 2. Henry E. Eccles, Logistics in the National Defense , with introduction and comments by Captain John E. Jackson (Newport, R1: Naval War College Press, 1 st printed 1959, reprinted 1997), p. 42. 3. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-16: Army Operational Support (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1995), p. 3-6. 4. Ihno Krumpelt, "Die Bedeutung des Transportwesen fuer den Schlachterfolg," Wehrkunde 5 (May 1 965), p. 466. 5. James A. Huston, The Sinews of War: Army Logistics 1775-1953 ( Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 523. 6. D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur , Vol. 111: 1945-1964 (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1959), p. 470. 7. Robert T. Dail, Does the U.S. Army Really Understand Operational War? A Logistics Perspective (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2 May 1988), pp. 26-9. 8. Yves J. Fontaine, Operational Sustainment in an Immature Theater (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Second Term AY 89/90), pp. 21-2. 9. D.A. Schrady, Combatant Logistics Command and Control for the Joint Forces Commander (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, January 1998), p. 14. 1 0. Martin Brown, "Planung and Verlauf der allierten streitkraefte gemeinsamen Landkriegsoperation," in Hartmut Zehrer, editor, Der Golfkonflikt. Dokumentation, Analyse and Bewertung aus militaerischer Sicht (Munich: E. S. Mittler & Sohn, 1992), p. 112. 11. Kevin R. Wheelock, "Review Criteria for the Logistic Plan," Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1997, pp. 131 2. 1 2. Klaus A. Friedrich Schueler, Logistik im Russlandfeldzug. Die Rolle der Eisenbahn bei Planung, Vorbereitung and Durchfuehrung_des deutschen Angriffs auf die Sowietunion bis zur Krise vor Moskau im Winter 1941/42 (Frankfurt a.M: Peter Lang Verlag, 1987), pp. 37-8. 13. John R. Tibbets, Power Projection Logistics: What Theater Support (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 19 May 1995), p. 22. 14. Schrady, Combatant Logistics Command and Control for the Joint Forces Commander, p. 14. 15. Fontaine, Operational Sustainment in an Immature Theater, p. 43. 16. Wheelock, "Review Criteria for the Logistic Plan," p. 131.

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17. Dail, Does the U.S. Armv Really Understand Operational War? A Logistics Perspective, pp. 16-7. 18. Joint Pub 4-0: Doctrine ,for Logistic Support ofJoint Operations ( Washington, DC: 27 January 1 995), p. I1-5. 19. Department of the Army, FM (00-5: Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1986), pp. 65-71. 20. Carleton M. Smith, Logistics Principles in Third Wave Warfare (Carlisle, PA: Army War College, 1999), p. 20. 21. FM 100-5: Operations (1986), pp. 62-3. 22. Herbert Dehen, Der Balkanfeldzug 1941. Beispiel einer Offensive aus der Betivegarng ohne vorbereitenden Aufmarsch (Hamburg: Fuehrugsakademie der Bundeswehr, 15 January 1963), p. 13. 23. FM 100-5: Operations (1986), p. 62. 24. Tibbets, Power Projection Logistics. What Theater Support, pp. 1 7-8. 25. Joint Pub 4-0: Doctrine for Logistic Support ofJoint Operations, p. II-1. 26. Smith, Logistics Principles in Third Wave Warfare, p. 26. 27. Joint Pub 4-0: Doctrine, for Logistic Support of Joint Operations, p. II-1. 28. Smith, Logistics Principles in Third Wave Warfare, p. 29. 29. Ibid., p. 28. 30. Franz Werb, Raunz-Zeit-Mittel als Faktoren Strategischer Zielsetzung (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie d. Bundeswehr, February 1965), p. 19. 31. Joint Pub 4-0: Doctrine, for Logistic Support ofJoint Operations, p. 1-3. 32. Ted O. Kostich, Operational Sustainment in an Immature Theater. Considerations lbr Planning and Sustaining a Campaign in a Mid- to High-intensity Conflict (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1990), p. 4. 33. Joint Pub 4-0: Doctrine, for Logistic Support ofJoint Operations, p. 11-2. 34. Wheelock, "Review Criteria for the Logistic Plan," p. 131. 35. Joint Pub 4-0: Doctrine .for Logistic Support gf.Joint Operations, p. I-10. 36. P.D. Foxton, Powering War. Modern Land Force Logistics (London/New York: Brassey's, 1994), p. 7. 37. Martin van Creveld, Supplying War. Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: University Press, 1 st published 1977, reprinted 1984), pp. 152-3. 38. Center for Military History, Logistics in World War II. Final Report of the Army Service Forces ( Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1 st printing CMH Pub 70-29, 1948, reprinted 1993), p. 161. 39. Howard V. Nichols, Operational Level Logistics: An Examination of U.S. Army Logistical Doctrine,for the Operational Level of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 16 May 1986), pp. 7-8.

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40. Dail, Does the U.S. Army Really Understand Operational War? A Logistics Perspective, pp. 21-2. 41. William R. Betson, Centers of Gravity, Lines of Operations, and the Normandy Campaign (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, June 1987), p. 39. 42. Center for Military History, Logistics in World War 11. Final Report of the Army Service Forces ( Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 1 st printing CMH Pub 70-29, 1948, reprinted 1993), p. 50. 43. Samuel E. Morison, Aleutians, Gilberts, and Marshalls, June 1942-April 1944 , Vol. VII, History of United States Naval Operations in World War 11: (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, and Company, 1951, reprint 1984), pp. 107-8. 44. Ibid., Leyte. June 1944-January 1945, Vol. XII: History of United States Naval Operations in World War 11 (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1 st printed 1958, reprinted July 1984), pp. 74-5. 45. Ibid., pp. 81-3. 46. Ibid. 47. Krumpelt, "Die Bedeutung des Transportwesen fuer den Schlachterfolg," p. 466. 48. Nichols, Operational Level Logistics: An Examination of U.S. Army Logistical Doctrine for the Operational Level of War, p. 3. 49. Van Creveld, Supplying War. Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton , pp. 148-50. 50. Ibid, p. 150-1. 51. Tibbets, Power Projection Logistics: What Theater Support, p. 18 52. James A. Huston, "Korea and Logistics," Military Review 2 (February 1957), pp. 20-1. 53. Nichols, Operational Level Logistics: An Examination of' U.S. Army Logistical Doctrine fbr the Operational Level of War, p. 9. 54. Moore, Logistics Intelligence: The First Step in Operational Sustainment, p. 1 2. 55. Ibid., pp. 32-3. 56. Ibid., p. 34. 57. War Department, Theater General Board, USFET Study 128-Logistical Build up in the British Isles (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945), pp. 18-9. 58. Theater General Board, U.S. Forces, European Theater, Organization and Operation of the Theater Intelligence Services in the European Theater of Operations (Theater General Board, U.S. Forces European Theater, February 1947), pp. 22--4. 59. Moore, Logistics Intelligence: The First Step in Operational Sustainment, p. 1 9. 60. Ibid., pp. 24-5.

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OPERATIONAL PROTECTION Protecting one's forces and assets from a wide range of threats in peacetime, crisis, and war is one of the most important responsibilities of any commander. The higher the level of command, however, the more critical and complex the task. While at the tactical level the commander focuses almost entirely on force protection, at the strategic and operational levels the commander must include protection of not only military but also nonmilitary sources of power. Space and time for organizing protection at tactical and higher levels of command also differ significantly. The tactical commander's area of responsibility is a combat zone or sector that sometimes may encompass an area of operations. Operational commanders are responsible for a much larger physical space, from an area of operations to a theater that might encompass several theaters of operations. Operational commanders also must organize protection over many months or even years, while tactical commanders are concerned with protecting their forces for several days or weeks at a time. The range of possible threats, especially in a developed theater, is large, while one's forces and assets to provide full protection are limited. Therefore, operational commanders must make hard choices in determining which forces and which part of the theater infrastructure need more protection than others. The problem becomes more complicated when one's forces are deployed in a theater far away from home bases. In the broad definition, the term operational protection pertains to a series of actions and measures conducted in peacetime, crisis, and war, and designed to preserve effectiveness and survivability of one's military and nonmilitary sources of power deployed within the boundaries of a given theater. Operational protection is organized only in the case of regional conflict or general war when theaters of operations would be established. Strategic protection is organized in a given theater of war (theater-strategic level) or for the country as a whole (national-strategic level). Regardless of these distinctions, important as they are, operational protection specifically aims to protect, and to impede the enemy from using his firepower or other nonconventional sources of power to destroy, neutralize, or degrade the physical and moral capabilities of one's forces and nonmilitary sources of power. The range and type of threats depend on the predominant physical features of a theater and whether the theater is developed or undeveloped. In an undeveloped theater, the focus is predominantly on force protection; in a developed theater, the theater commander must also protect the most important elements of theater infrastructure, and population. However, sometimes national political leadership might decide that force protection is the most important task, regardless of whether a theater is developed or undeveloped. Optimally, operational protection in a land theater in time of crisis or war includes the following: collecting intelligence for indications and warning (I&W); air defense; airspace control; force protection; protection of information systems; protection of logistics infrastructure; defense against weapons of mass destruction; rear area defense and air-base ground defense; operations security and physical security; and defense against terrorist acts. In a maritime theater, elements of operational protection also include sea-based air defense, antisubmarine warfare (ASW), defense of the coast and

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coastal waters, anticombat craft defense; defensive mining, and mine countermeasures (MCM). No component of operational protection stands alone; each must be fully integrated with other elements to be fully effective. Therefore, there is no clear boundary between them, and they overlap considerably. Operations security is an integral part of all components of operational protection, as is physical security. Likewise, protection of information systems is organized theater-wide, but is also an integral part of air defense, airspace control, and many other components. In peacetime, the threats to one's forces tend to come from terrorist groups and to be more nonconventional, such as acts against military personnel or civilians, attacks on informational systems, and use of biological or chemical or possibly even nuclear weapons. In crisis and war, threats to one's forces would multiply because the enemy would use both conventional and nonconventional means against one's forces deployed in the theater, the civilian population, and important military-economic installations/facilities. The intelligence element of protection is obviously conducted continuously in peacetime and in crisis and war. Collecting intelligence for indications and warning (I&W) is aimed at analyzing and integrating information concerning the probability of hostile acts or actions. An effective MW should provide timely warning so that a theater commander has sufficient time to preempt, counter, and neutralize these threats. I&W primarily deals with the enemy's situation in a theater that might signal more drastic changes in the near future, namely capabilities and intentions to commit hostile acts; mobilization preparations and status; changes in combat readiness and deployment patterns; and deductions regarding changes in political, diplomatic, economic, and other aspects. To be fully effective, I&W intelligence must be shared among levels of command, from tactical to national-strategic. U.S. all-source intelligence played a great role in providing I&W before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. Strong signs that Iraq was preparing much more than just a show of force to intimidate Kuwaitis included their buildup of armor and artillery, call-up of reservists, and logistical preparations. The air defense component of operational protection is conducted theater-wide, so the term operational air defense is often used. It encompasses the protection of forces and assets from air attack (including attack from or through space), through both direct defense and the destruction of the enemy's air-attack capability in the air or, if possible, on the ground. It is primarily concerned with protecting critical points and facilities in the communications zone and one's forces deployed there. It is also aimed at protecting operational-size formations during their movement to concentration areas or during an operational maneuver. The theater commander integrates both ground- and air-based air defense forces into his concept of theater-wide air defense. When appropriate, sea-based air defense is also fully integrated with ground-based and air-based air defenses. Theater missile defense (TMD) could be considered an integral part of operational air defense. Its primary aim is to protect population centers, military and economic assets, and mobile forces against the enemy's theater ballistic missiles. Effective TMD is not only operationally important but can be one of the key elements of regional stability. I This task is too complex to be resolved by a single service. Active defense measures are aimed at destroying the enemy's ballistic missiles in various phases of flight. Passive measures are designed to minimize effects of the enemy attack with ballistic missiles and to reduce vulnerability to such attack of one's forces, theater infrastructure, and civilian population. Offensive actions are conducted to destroy the enemy's research centers and

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ballistic missile production facilities, and their launchers with associated sensors and supporting structures. The Gulf War of 1990-1991 was the first conflict that showed the magnitude of the threat to one's forces posed by crude and inaccurate ballistic missiles, even in the hands of a third-rate military power, especially if the enemy possesses weapons of mass destruction. In that conflict, the Iraqis fired eighty-eight Scud missiles-forty against Israel, forty-seven against Saudi Arabia, and one into Bahrain. Because all services and often multinational forces use airspace, there should be theater-wide airspace control to ensure close coordination among airspace control, air traffic control, and air defense elements. Airspace control must be integrated throughout the chain of command to be truly effective. Its objective is to ensure combat effectiveness of ground, air, and maritime forces in the course of the preparation and conduct of major operations and campaigns. Another objective is to eliminate (or at least reduce) the chance of fratricide during the employment of one's forces and assets. Combat airspace control's requirements must be identical to those of air defense for identification of friend or foe. Accordingly, combat airspace control, air defense, and supporting C4 systems must have a high degree of interoperability and must be mutually supporting. Force protection focuses on protecting large service or functionally based forces and formations, not individual platforms or units, which are the responsibility of force protection at the tactical level. It is aimed at protecting large forces and formations from enemy attacks from the air (or through space), on the ground, or across the sea; protection from various hazards in the battlefield; and survivability of personnel and their weapons and equipment, and their health. It also encompasses, among other things, a buildup of fortified areas, and the use of defensive aspects of EW, operations security, defense against weapons of mass destruction (WMD), physical security, and defense against terrorist acts. The greatest emphasis in force protection during preparation and conduct of a campaign or major operation should always be on protecting one's center of gravity. Logistics installations are high-value targets and must be protected at all times. This protection is achieved by assigning adequate forces for theater-wide protection of one's key elements of logistical support and sustainment, specifically main and intermediate bases of operations, supply depots and distribution points, transportation nodes, and lines of communications. Passive measures of protection include decentralization of logistical infrastructure and dispersal of logistical installations and facilities; cover, concealment, and deception (CCD); and physical protection of personnel and equipment. In war, the theater commander is responsible for establishing and maintaining security in the rear, so combat forces can be secure while preparing and conducting campaigns and major operations. The objective of rear area defense is to create a secure environment for movements of combat forces and their logistical support and sustainment. Another aim is to ensure smooth and uninterrupted functioning of the economy and other activities for the needs of one's forces and the civilian population. The theater commander is usually responsible for defense of all air, army, and naval bases/ports within his area of responsibility. The respective tactical commanders are responsible for defense of individual bases or several bases in their area of responsibility. Theater commanders are responsible for integrating the defense of all naval bases/ports, air bases, and army posts in their theater. Because resources are finite, not all bases can be defended equally well. Therefore, the theater commander needs to determine

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which basing area must be better protected than another. One way of integrating defense and security measures is to divide the entire rear areas into several clearly delineated rear areas of operations, with a single commander who bears responsibility for all security measures. The theater commander establishes command relationships and, if necessary, liaison officers between one's commanders and the host-nation military and civilian authorities. Military forces and infrastructure are increasingly vulnerable to hostile actions against their informational systems (INFOSYS) across the operational continuum. The theater commander is responsible for employing defensive information warfare (IW-D) against asymmetrical attacks on information systems, infrastructure, and other critical areas vulnerable to nontraditional means of attack or disruption within his area of responsibility. The main functions of IW-D are to provide tactical warning, attack assessment, emergency response, and infrastructure restoration. Threats to the theaterwide information infrastructure are worldwide in origin and know no spatial or geographic boundaries. The globalization of networked communications resulted in vulnerabilities from the increased access to one's information infrastructure from points around the world. Threats to military and civilian computers, computer systems, and networks vary by the level of hostility, by technical capabilities, and by motivation. The types of attacks against elements of informational infrastructure can vary from unauthorized access to physical destruction. Unauthorized access can be aimed either at gaining information or at inserting false or misleading information. Malicious software might be inserted to cause a computer to operate differently than its user i ntended. Various viruses can be inserted to alter or corrupt data or to make them misleading or useless. Some viruses are designed to bypass protective programs. Other types of hostile attacks against information systems include collecting intelligence, jamming, and broadcasting false signals, or generating electromagnetic pulse (EMP). Jamming and deceptive transmission can be used to attack commercial communications systems. Physical destruction can be used as a method to degrade or destroy military communications and control networks or civilian systems. The well-planned and coordinated infrastructure attack can be serious. However, this requires an adversary with seriousness of purpose and with some sophistication and organization. Informational attacks, even when they consist of nothing more than isolated incidents, create a perception of vulnerability. Their impact is usually far greater than the actual damage inflicted. They do not need to completely destroy the computer system. All that is needed is to disrupt the work of a given system and thereby create a perception of failure and loss of confidence in the reliability of the system. Redundancies in the informational systems are only a partial solution to this growing problem. The attackers may use simple and relatively cheap and easy-to-acquire technology. Any country or several countries, group of persons, or even a single individual could be a potential threat. Individuals or groups can be motivated by political, social, military, ethnic, or religious goals, personal gain, or simply to make a mischief. Unauthorized users such as "hackers" are responsible for most attacks against one's informational infrastructure in peacetime, and the threat they pose to computers and computer networks is growing. Another source is insiders, who, because they have legitimate access, are difficult to cope with. Individual terrorists and terrorist groups use unauthorized access and direct physical access against various elements of informational

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systems. Terrorists today can do more damage by disabling or manipulating computer networks than their physical attacks could in the past. Other, more serious sources of attacks are nonstate groups, state-sponsored groups, or hostile intelligence and military entities. Nonstate and state-sponsored groups can do increasingly great harm to informational systems because they are more sophisticated, and the technologies they can use cost less. The worldwide-automated information nets are difficult to protect. Many elements of computer networks that serve theater-wide military functions are physically located beyond the boundaries of the given theater. Thus, they cannot be easily, if at all, protected by forces and assets deployed within the theater. Hostile intelligence and military are the most difficult sources of attack against one's informational systems because, depending on the country's strength, they have the necessary resources and personnel to carry out massive and sustained attack against one's informational i nfrastructure in time of crisis and war. Operations security (OPSEC) in the broadest sense is established and applied on a theater-wide basis. When employed as a component of C2W, its focus is much narrower. OPSEC is defined as the process of identifying critical information and then analyzing one's actions so they can be protected from the anticipated hostile actions and measures. This process includes three main steps: identifying one's forces' actions that the enemy can observe; determining indicators that the enemy can interpret these actions; and deciding which measures are needed to reduce or eliminate one's vulnerabilities to the enemy's actions. Those actions that are considered most likely to be observed by the enemy are better protected than others are. OPSEC is not a system but rather a process. It is applied to planning, preparing, and conducting military actions at any level. One of the most critical tasks is to obtain and maintain the highest degree of secrecy about capabilities and intentions of one's forces. As part of operational protection, OPSEC must look at the enemy's deployments from a broader perspective of space and time than at the tactical level. It is concerned not only with the enemy's current dispositions but also with those several weeks or months in the future. To be successful, OPSEC measures must be applied equally to all operational functions within a given area or theater of operations. No major operation or campaign can ultimately be successful without an appropriate, effective, and soundly executed OPSEC. The Russians' poor OPSEC was one of the main reasons for the German victory in the Battle at Tannenberg, Eastern Prussia, in late August 1914. Because the Russians were careless, the Germans intercepted a plain-language message that told them the Russian armies at Gumbinnen in the north would advance only slowly; this allowed the new Commander of the German Eighth Army, General Paul von Hindenburg, and his chief of staff General Erich Ludendorff to concentrate on the destruction of the Russian armies in the south. Another message gave the Germans a detailed report on the situation from the view of the Russian army in the south and precise employment plans for all its army corps. The Russian defeat at Tannenberg was the beginning of their slide into chaos and revolution . 3 One of the essential reasons for the success of the German invasion of Norway in 1940 was their strict OPSEC. The German staff for planning the invasion initially had only one officer from each service, and none of the experts for Norway took part in the planning. 4 General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst, the nominal commander of the invasion

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forces, had on 22 February 1940 only five staff officers involved in the planning. s Commanders of companies of the troops on board the ships were not informed about the targets of their attack until they had embarked. Even Hermann Goering as CINC of the Luftwaffe was not officially informed about the forthcoming operation until 3 April 1940. I n the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the U.S.-led Coalition forces used deception and OPSEC with great success during the offensive phase of the campaign. OPSEC measures were aimed to convince Iraqis that the main attack would come against Iraqi troops deployed in Kuwait, and not in the Western Desert. Hence, the Iraqis were allowed to collect intelligence about the final Coalition preparation for supporting the attack into Kuwait. These measures were combined with a feint by the 13th MEU (SOC) on 25 February, deployed near the Kuwaiti coast, which also conducted OPSEC. 7 Defense against weapons of mass destruction poses unique problems for theater commanders and is difficult to organize on a theater-wide basis. Passive and active measures of avoidance are one of the main principles in defense against WMD. Passive measures include dispersion, hardening, and cover and concealment. Warning, detection of contamination, and reporting are main active measures of avoidance. Protection of personnel includes special clothing, protective masks, collective protection shelters, and medical treatments. After the use of WMD, various decontamination methods restore combat power and prevent additional casualties. In today's environment, terrorist acts are a constant threat to one's forces, facilities, and civilian populace. The problem is further complicated because terrorist acts could be directed against military installations, personnel, and their dependents located far beyond the boundaries of a given theater. The theater commander should presume that civil authorities and host governments will take a major part of the responsibilities for antiterrorist actions and measures; however, the commander is usually responsible for coordinating those measures aimed specifically at protecting military facilities, equipment, personnel, and family members. Service component commanders are responsible for publishing the theater commander's rules of engagement and ensuring that they are followed to provide a flexible self-defense and deterrent posture. Tactical commanders organize security against enemy maneuver, maintain camouflage discipline, fortify fighting positions, conduct rapid movements, suppress enemy weapons, organize air defense, conceal their own positions, deceive the enemy, and take other measures to prevent unnecessary combat losses. Operational commanders take similar measures, but in the theater as a whole. They protect their own force from the enemy's operational maneuver and air strikes. Air superiority operations, theater-wide air defense systems, and protection of air bases are important activities associated with maximizing combat power at the operational level. Conclusion: Operational protection is inherently a joint responsibility. It is organized, planned, and conducted by the respective theater commander. This, in turn, requires an operational rather than tactical perspective on the part of the operational commander and staff. Optimally, all the sources of power, both military and nonmilitary, should be fully protected on a theater-wide basis. However, realistically this is impossible, even in a developed theater: Because one's resources are limited, the theater commander cannot adequately protect all forces under his command on a theater-wide basis. Therefore, he must find the delicate balance between what is necessary and what is possible. Most 282

often, protection of military forces in a given theater is given higher priority than protection of nonmilitary assets. A growing problem for a theater commander is how to effectively protect the informational infrastructure in his theater. This highly complicated issue defies easy, fast, or cheap solutions. The problem is further complicated when some critical elements of informational infrastructure are physically located not in a given theater but hundreds or even thousands of miles away. The theater commander, in planning a major operation or campaign, is often faced with difficult choices because of competing demands between force protection in the theater and protecting his operational center of gravity. This problem must be resolved. No theater commander can go wrong if he decides to fully protect his center of gravity while temporarily weakening the protection of the other forces deployed in the theater. To do otherwise means taking inordinately high risks that might, in the end, doom the entire major operation or even the campaign.

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Notes 1. Willard G. Fallon, "Combating the Ballistic Missile Threat," Proceedings 7 (July 1994), p. 33; Dennis McDowall, "Theater Missile Defense," Joint Force Quarterly, Winter 1993-94, p. 82. 2. Scott T. Hutchinson, "Army and Navy Theater Missile Defense," Military Review 2 ( March-April 1995), p. 51. 3. David Kahn, "Femmeldewesen, Chiffrertechniken and Nachrichtenautklaerung in den Kriegen des 20. Jahrhunderts," in Juergen Rohwer and Eberhard Jaeckel, Die Funkautklaerung and ihre Rolle im Zweiten Weltkrie (Stuttgart: Motorbuch Verlag, 1979), p. 19. 4. Olivier Desarzens, Nachrichtendienstliche Aspekte der "Weseruebung" 1940 ( Osnabrueck: Biblio Verlag, 1988), p. 145. 5. Ibid., p. 146. 6. Ibid., p. 148. 7. Joint Pub 3-13: Joint Doctrine .for Information Operations ( Washington, DC: 9 October 1 998), p. 11-3; Edward J. Marolda and Robert J. Schneller Jr., Shield and Sword. The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf War (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1 998), p. 278.

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Part V: STAGES AND ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL WARFARE

STAGES AND ELEMENTS OF OPERATIONAL WARFARE Combat forces are employed across the entire operational continuum, ranging from peacetime competition to war. The scope and intensity of their employment depends on a number of factors, primarily the assigned military objectives, the relative combat potential (transformed into combat power once the combat action starts) between one's own forces and the enemy's forces, the size of the area in which military actions are to take place, and the method of combat force employment used. Any employment of combat forces will encompass a series of major stages that follow or overlap each other. Planners use stages to break their tasks into more manageable parts.' The principal stages in the employment of combat forces at the operational level are mobilization, predeployment, deployment, combat employment and sustainment, post-hostilities actions, redeployment, demobilization, and reconstitution. A new campaign would most likely encompass all of these stages. The separation between various stages is not always clear-cut. A major operation as part of a campaign would normally encompass only three main stages: deployment, employment and sustainment, and redeployment. One with a strategic objective would also include a post-hostilities stage. Warfare at any level is composed of actions and measures that arbitrarily can be called elements, which are an integral part of planning and execution. In the combat employment and sustainment stage, the principal elements of warfare at any level are critical factors, concentration and counter-concentration, maneuver and counter-maneuver, culmination point, combat success, pursuit and counter-pursuit, and regeneration of combat power (see Figure 20). The higher the level of war, the more critical and complex these elements become. The time-space-force factors affect the elements of warfare both qualitatively and quantitatively; hence, there are considerable differences in how the various elements are applied at each level of war. Success in combat cannot be achieved unless these elements of warfare are conceptually understood and then practically applied.

FORCE DEPLOYMENT The first task of strategy is the final assembly of the fighting forces, the first deployment of the Army. Here, multifarious political, geographic, and national considerations come into question. A mistake in the original assembly of the army can scarcely be corrected in the entire course of the campaign. Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke Sr. Force does not exist for mobility but mobility for force. It is of no use to get there first unless, when the enemy arrives, you have also the most men-the greater force. Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan Deployment is the single most important stage in the employment of combat forces. This is no truer than at the operational and strategic levels. Rapid and timely deployment of combat forces and their subsequent support and sustainment are the keys to successful execution of a plan for a campaign or major operation. The result of the initial major operations or major battles is often the decisive influence in the outcome of the entire campaign or major operation. Hence, because of the size of forces involved, errors in deployment in a campaign or major operation cannot be corrected easily, if at all, once hostilities start. In general, combat force deployment can be understood as a combination of the movement and mobility aimed to bring one's forces into the area where a combat action is planned. Despite clear and obvious differences, all too often deployment is confused with maneuver. The main purpose of deployment is to move forces from their home or intermediate base into a theater or part of the theater where they will be concentrated or will start a maneuver. Maneuver, in contrast, is directed against the enemy's center of gravity or his logistical supply lines. Deployment normally precedes maneuver, and depending on the scale of military effort, it can continue after part of the force has begun a maneuver. A deployment consists of several distinct time- and space-related segments, each encompassing several phases. In contrast, a maneuver is planned and conducted continuously (unless disruptions are caused by the enemy's action). Forces during deployment move along lines of communications, while forces conducting maneuver move along their respective lines of operations. During the deployment a force usually moves over the space controlled by one's forces, while maneuver is conducted in the space normally controlled by the enemy forces. The exception is deployment of naval forces and aircraft, which often takes place over space disputed by the enemy forces. Normally, deployment is not integrated with fires. Forces conducting deployment are largely self-sustained and require only routine, nonorganic sustainment assets. In

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contrast, the success of a maneuver, especially on land, is heavily dependent on nonorganic logistical sustainment. Scale: In contrast to other aspects of operational warfare, deployment is defined as tactical, strategic, and operational, not in terms of the objective but of the distances separating the current bases and the deployment area. Tactical deployment involves the movement of tactical-size forces from their initial or new combat zone (sector) to another zone (sector) within a given area of operations (see Figure 21). The aim is usually to concentrate forces or obtain a position for conducting a tactical maneuver.

Strategic (or inter-theater) deployment is planned and conducted to move the entire combat force from their home bases in one theater (of war) to another theater (of war). In the nineteenth century, strategic deployment was defined as the movement of the armed forces of a state to the threatened border area. ] Today, a strategic deployment is usually conducted over long distances and entails the movement of large and multiservice forces. It is the most complex and critical of all operational undertakings and is related directly to strategic mobility. An example of strategic deployment was the movement of the German forces in the spring of 1941 from France, Germany, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria to their assembly areas in occupied Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania in preparation for the invasion of Soviet Russia. During the Campaign in the West in June 1940, the Germans had only one infantry and four territorial protection divisions deployed in the East. Nine additional divisions of the Army's Reserve were undergoing training in German-occupied areas in the East; however, seven of these divisions were redeployed to France in late June 1940. 2 By July 1940, the Soviets had deployed 113 divisions and twenty-eight motorized brigades in areas close to their border with Germany. The Germans then had only seven security divisions, while their Romanian allies had twenty-seven regular divisions. The Germans began to move additional forces to the East in July 1940. At the same time, the 290

Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht started studying the deployment to the East. The Luftwaffe also started in early August to prepare for the deployment of its forces to the East. These two actions laid the basis for deployment and training for a possible conflict with the Soviet Union. On 30 August the German Army's CINC, Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, ordered redeployment of the Army Group B and two other divisions from high headquarters. These forces totaled thirty-five divisions, of which thirty were deployed to East Prussia. The deployment started on 12 September and was completed on 29 October. In addition, the First Air Fleet headquarters was redeployed from Berlin to Koenigsberg (Kaliningrad today). On 20 September, Army Group B took over the responsibility for the Protection in the East from the 18th Army (AOK 18). 3 Concurrently with these preparations plans were made for a possible war with Soviet Russia, and on 5 December Hitler signed Directive Nr. 21 (Case Barbarossa). The General Staff of the Army issued the Deployment Directive (Aufinarschweisung) for the Deployment East on 1 February 1941. On 25 March this directive was modified because of the situation in the Balkans. The subsequent attack on Greece and Yugoslavia reportedly delayed by about five weeks the assembly of the German forces for the campaign against Soviet Russia scheduled to start in mid-May 1941. 4 Deployment of German forces by rail had already started in January with five echelons, totaling 17,000 trains. To conceal offensive intent as long as possible, the Germans planned to reach the highest intensity of traffic in May and June. By the end of February they had deployed twenty-five divisions in the assembly areas. In March they added seven divisions, in April thirteen divisions, and in May and June fifty-one divisions. By 22 June when the invasion of Soviet Russia started, the Germans had in the assembly areas a total of 126 divisions plus Army support troops, Luftwaffe ground units, and logistical troops. The remaining nineteen divisions of the reserves of the Army's High Command were deployed in July. All forces to take part in the invasion were debarked west of the Radom-Warsaw-Neidenburg line. They did not start movement under cover of darkness to the border area until the last ten days in May. 5 The German panzer and motorized forces did not begin their movements until four nights before the invasion began; some German infantry divisions had to traverse 500 miles on foot. The flying units of the Luftwaffe did not begin their deployment until 10 June, while the forces of the German Kriegsmarine were concentrated in Baltic ports and bases and laid down the first defensive mine barriers in mid-June 1941. The movement of U.S. and Canadian troops from the U.S. East Coast and Canada across the Atlantic to England in 1943-1944 for the buildup of the Allied forces before the amphibious landing in Normandy is an example of strategic deployment for a campaign, as was the deployment of the U.S., British, and French forces from CONUS and Germany, and United Kingdom and France, respectively in August 1990-January 1991. Two days after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, on 4 August, the United States ordered deployment of two carrier battle groups to the area. On 7 August, the movement of the two maritime pre-positioning squadrons (MPS-2 and MPS-3) based at Diego Garcia and Guam started. A day later, the first F-15 aircraft of the 1st Tactical Air Wing were sent to Saudi Arabia. These were followed by the deployment of the 82nd Airborne Division and 24th Infantry Division. The aim of these deployments was to deter Saddam Hussein from any further move against Saudi Arabia or other Gulf States. Deployment of

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the French ground forces to Saudi Arabia began on 15 September, and the British forces on 10 October 1990. In November President George Bush ordered the deployment of additional follow-on forces-three more divisions from CONUS, VII U.S. Army Corps from Germany, with combat support and combat support service troops totaling 71,000 men, three additional carrier battle groups, one battleship, Amphibious Groups with 5th MEF, 11 MEF, and 410 aircraft of the U.S. Air Force. It took about forty-five days to deploy the VII Corps. The movement of the British task force from its bases in the United Kingdom to the Falklands/Malvinas area in April-May 1982 was an example of strategic deployment in a major joint operation with a strategic objective. The movements of U.S. Air Force squadrons to Italy and United Kingdom in March-May 1999 to participate in the Operation Allied Force was also a strategic deployment. Operational (or intra-theater) deployment is planned and conducted to move a military force from its current area of operations to another area of operations, usually within the boundaries of a given theater of operations. Such deployment is aimed to obtain a position or area to start operational maneuver before a major operation or campaign begins. The movement of U.S. and Coalition ground forces from their ports of debarkation in Saudi Arabia to the northern part of the country is an example of operational deployment. The operational deployment of U.S. and Coalition forces to the northern part of Saudi Arabia was slow. The first partial deployment of some 230,000 troops was concluded on 7 October, and an additional 310,000 men were deployed by mid-January 1991. Types: Deployment is normally conducted into the deployment area under full control of one's forces. Then troops and their weapons and equipment are moved by surface transport, specifically railroads, roads, or internal waterways. When forces are deployed from bases outside a given theater of operations, troops are usually moved by air, while the weapons and equipment are moved by surface transport, mostly by sea. Deploying force is usually separated into deploying troops and deploying weapons and equipment. Normally, the force commanders retain command but do not exercise control over parts of units moving by different transport modes. Various force elements of the deploying forces arriving in the theater must reach specific locations and reassemble into tactical units before force commanders can reestablish control. In power projection, a deployment could take place in permissive, hostile, or uncertain environments. In a permissive environment, a host country has full control and the ability to assist one's forces in the deployment. The situation is different in a hostile environment, when a host government lacks the ability to protect deploying forces. The hostile forces control all or a large part of the deployment area and can effectively oppose or react to actions of one's forces. In such a situation, the deploying force must conduct forcible entry to secure a lodgment for deployment of the joint force to ensure the continuous landing of forces and materiel and provide space for subsequent operations. 9 In an uncertain environment, a host government does not have full control of its territory and population. The entry operations are generally unopposed, but could be opposed at any point during the deployment. ° Such a situation frequently arises when local insurgents control or threaten an area to which one's forces are deployed.

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Prerequisites: Success of deployment for a campaign or major operation depends on a number of factors. The most important prerequisites are a favorable geostrategic position, sufficient size of the deployment area, adequate theater transportation structure, diversity of transport modes, and relatively short distances between the home bases and the deployment area. The geostrategic position from which a force deploys considerably influences the time, transport modes, and sequence of deployment. In general, a central position offers shorter lines of communications, and hence less time is required to deploy forces from one part of the theater to another or between theaters. This was one of the great advantages for the Germans in both World War I and World War II. A central position is usually not an advantage for deployment of combat forces if the resulting physical space is too small or transportation assets are inadequate to use the advantages offered by such a position. A geostrategic exterior position offers the opposite advantages and disadvantages from a central position for deployment of combat forces. The deployment area should be large enough to accommodate the movement and arrival of large forces, and its size should be proportionate to the size of the force to be deployed. It should facilitate access to the enemy's vital areas, have direct links with one's base of operations, offer use of the best and most direct line of operations, and have sufficient communications for rapid movement and supply of troops." Having a large number of parallel communications is always advantageous, especially railroads and highways, complemented with sea communications and inland waterways-the more numerous the routes for movement, the better. In the offensive, it is easier to deceive and surprise the enemy when using multiple lines of communications for the deployment of combat forces. The deployment area containing a single line or few lines of movement is always at a great disadvantage because the enemy is never in doubt as to one's forces' intentions. In planning their campaign in the West in 1940, the German Army Group A assigned only four roads through the Ardennes to Panzer Group von Kleist. This decision was hard to understand because this force was too large-some 41,400 vehicles including 1,222 panners and 545 tracked vehicles to complete timely movement to the attacking positions on the right bank of the Meuse River. The effect was that the Panzer Group von Kleist moved some 250 miles on four roads under threat of enemy air attack. General von Kleist's request to use another road for his forces was rejected. iz Theater transportation infrastructure must be adequate to support deployment of combat forces. It consists of organizational structure, physical infrastructure, and physical capabilities. Organizational structure deals with theater-wide elements of the transportation system and logistics that support deployment. Physical capabilities are ports, airports, rail system, highway and road networks, inland waterways, and pipelines. Physical infrastructure consists of the transportation nodes and available modes of transportation. A transportation node is a location in a mobility system where a movement requirement originates, is processed for onward movement, or terminates. Nodes include airports, seaports, river terminals, in-stream off-load, railheads, and staging areas. 1 3 Each node consists of several terminals-any facility, regardless of size and complexity, at which cargo or personnel are loaded and handled in transit between elements of various transportation modes. Terminals are established at points of origins, destinations, and in-transit transfer points. The planners must give close attention to the availability of seaports and airports in the theater of operations and transportation

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networks that link them. The throughput capacities of seaports and airports considerably affect the type of forces and units to be deployed through them, and the speed and sequence of deployment. 1 4 The principal transport modes are air and surface. Air transport today is one of the most essential elements of the transportation system. It provides rapid and flexible movement of cargo, passengers, and equipment without regard to terrain restrictions.' 5 Air transport could move troops to pre-positioned equipment and carry other cargo and supplies to threatened regions. It provides the ability to respond rapidly with minimal warning. It can move directly to deep inland locations, even if ground and sea lines of communications are not available. 1 6 For a major country projecting power far from its shore, airlift can move forces rapidly to a deployment area. It is highly suitable for transport of light early-entry forces, or for the movement of troops relying on prepositioned stocks or equipment transported by sea. The disadvantages of air transport are considerable. It is expensive per unit of cargo. 1 7 Unlike mechanized forces, its capacity is limited as to size and weight of cargo, such as fuel. It requires secure airfields large enough to handle diverse aircraft as well as secure air lines of communications. Airlift also requires specialized material-handling equipment that must be brought wherever the aircraft will be loading or offloading. 1 s Moreover, bad weather can severely restrict air transport. During the Gulf War of 19901991, practically all U.S. military personnel traveled by air, as well as fifteen percent of all dry cargo, while sealift moved eighty-five percent of all dry cargo to the Arabian (Persian) Gulf. 1 9 Surface transport is conducted by sea, rail, highways, inland waterways, coastal waterways, and pipelines. Sea transport could be oceangoing or coastal. Sealift is the most economical and flexible means of moving bulk goods and heavy equipment; the ships can be redirected to widely separated ports of embarkation or debarkation at short notice. However, it is much slower than airlift. 2° Its greatest advantage is its ability to move outsize and heavy volumes of cargo over great distances. Rail is an excellent mode of transport for heavy bulk supplies such as . 21 Rail allows ammunition. It allows deployment over a large space and in a short time fast movement of troops and materiel at long distances. The military importance of railroads depends on the number of trains per day, their capacity in tons or troops transported, and the number of tracks. Railroads are especially valuable for a side operating along interior lines for rapid redeployment of forces from one front to another. They are also used for evacuation of the wounded, prisoners of war, and civilians. Railroads are more easily destroyed but more easily repaired than roads. A small crew can transport hundreds of tons of supplies, thus freeing manpower for other functions. In addition, rail cars serve as temporary storage platforms for parked equipment and supplies awaiting delivery to the combat zone . 22 Deployment of combat forces could be significantly sped up by having prepositioned heavy weapons and equipment and supplies ashore or afloat in the area of possible conflict before the actual crisis or conflict. Prepositioning allows heavy equipment to be kept in-theater near the area where it would be needed. The advantage of prepositioning is quick response to a crisis. In a crisis, troops can be flown to marry up with the equipment. It reduces reliance on strategic sealift and airlift and also sends a strong political message about one's commitment to defend the country's interests in the

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area. However, prepositioning is less flexible than airlift or sealift. Moving prepositioned equipment to a different region tends to undermine the confidence of the host country because it is visible sign of commitment and it is difficult to remove prepositioned equipment and supplies. Another disadvantage is that it may require duplicate sets of unit equipment. The ability to preposition equipment depends on a favorable political climate in the wider deployment area. 23 Prepositioning ashore is expensive to maintain. It also requires host nation cooperation and may generate, not lessen, tension in the area of possible conflict. Prepositioned weapons, equipment, and supplies are also difficult to protect from various terrorist threats. In contrast, prepositioning afloat provides critical sustained combat power in theaters lacking a forward presence or prepositioned stockpiles ashore. It also offers more flexibility, because ships with prepositioned equipment and supplies could be moved to other crisis or conflict areas in an emergency. Another important advantage is that, compared to prepositioning ashore, it is easier to obtain host nation support. Also, prepositioning afloat does not generate tensions in the region and is easier to protect from terrorist acts. However, prepositioning afloat is expensive and entails a loss of capability during periodic maintenance of prepositioning ships. Prepositioning ashore and afloat should be combined to provide optimal capabilities and ensure flexibility; together they could significantly reduce the need for heavy lift assets during the most critical earlyentry phase of power projection . 24 Requirements: Deployment should be planned and executed by a single operational commander. There is no greater error than having several commanders and their staffs plan deployment, especially when headquarters are physically separated by large distances. Only the operational commander can properly plan and execute deployment for a campaign or major operation. Because he controls diverse and complementary modes of transport he can adjust deployment flow based on the resources available and control movements of personnel and materiel in a theater or area of operations. Force integrity is another requirement for sound planning and deployment of combat forces. Moving force elements by the same transport mode provides distinct advantages for the unit and force closure process. In general, it leverages strength in the chain of command, simplifies force tracking, and increases training opportunities. Maintaining unit integrity during strategic lift also simplifies the problem of incrementally building combat power. Deployment is heavily dependent on large modern ports and airports; modern informational systems and a rich menu of technology and informational concepts are essential to timely, seamless flow. Intelligence preparation of the theater is critical for successful deployment planning. Focus in intelligence collection is on the theater, the enemy, and developing one's own courses of action. Segments: Any deployment consists of three main segments: planning, preparation, and execution. Each segment affects the others, and successful deployment requires smooth implementation of each segment and seamless transitions among segments. 26 Depending on the combat readiness of a force and its location, not all of the above-listed deployment phases will be needed. If ground forces are already deployed in a theater, deployment will consist of only one or two phases, that is, in-theater reception and theater onward movement. While deployment phases may overlap each other, many steps in each phase will occur concurrently and be repeated throughout the deployment. 295

The deployment concept for a campaign or major operation, developed during the operational commander's estimate of the situation, serves as the basis for deployment planning. The commander's decision lays out in some detail the joint and combined forces' deployment sequence. The operational planners then develop a detailed plan of deployment by fully considering the adequacy of transportation infrastructure and transportation assets, deployment sequence, the time required to complete deployment, the timing of the deployment, force protection, and logistical sustainment requirements. The biggest problem for the operational commander and his staff is how to balance competing requirements (for details, see the chapter "Operational Planning"). 27 Preparation for deployment consists of a series of activities collectively called predeployment, aimed to ensure that deploying forces reach the intended combat readiness and capability in the shortest possible time consistent with the planned deployment . 2a The most encompassing and complex predeployment activities are conducted by ground forces. The problem is less complex for naval forces and fixed-wing aircraft because they are almost entirely self-deployable. For ground forces, predeployment includes activities at the home station or point of origin to prepare individuals, forces, units, and their materiel for deployment. The commanders of individual forces are directed to revise the plans for the movement of their forces in accordance with the weapons and equipment to be deployed. Predeployment activities and mobilization generally occur simultaneously. Predeployment requires a high degree of coordination among various command echelons. Predeployment activities of forces and individual units encompass changes in task organization, echeloning, tailoring, and routine collective deployment training. A deploying force would normally require some changes in its organization to be suitable for deployment. The scale of these changes would depend on whether a force is designed for the initial entry or as a follow-on force into the theater. The deploying force should optimally have some self-sustainment capabilities. A deploying force also must be adequately logistically supported and sustained with nonorganic forces and assets. Logistical task organization depends on the size of the deploying force, maturity of the logistical infrastructure in the deployment area, host nation support capabilities, the availability of in-theater stockage, and the availability (or lack) of prepositioned weapons and equipment ashore or afloat. Echeloning is organizing and assigning priority to forces and units for movement. In deploying ground forces, echelons are divided into elements advance parties, initial combat forces, follow-on forces, and closure forces. Each echelon is led by a commander . 29 The likelihood of combat is the primary consideration for conducting taskorganizing and the echelonment of forces. Tailoring is the process of configuring or adjusting a force or unit to meet the conditions for deployment. Then, some elements of a force might be taken away or some added. Degree of tailoring is highly dependent on the situation. It is based on the proper evaluation of the initial strategic lift, existence or lack of pre-positioned weapons and equipment in the deployment area or its proximity, and degree of host nation support . 3o In generic terms, the execution segment for ground forces could encompass four main phases: strategic airlift, theater reception, staging, and onward movement. Naval forces and fixed-wing aircraft usually self-deploy from their bases, or sometimes they

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may be already deployed within a given theater of operations. Hence, their deployment encompasses fewer phases than the ground forces. Strategic airlift is usually conducted in a single phase when a major joint operation is executed, whereas in a campaign, forces are deployed in several major phases. Strategic airlift starts with the movement of forces from their home base outside the deployment area to the assigned ports of embarkation (POEs) and ends with their arrival at the ports of debarkation (PODs). In the predeployment phase of strategic movement, the operational commander should inform subordinate commanders to be ready to initiate movement. For movement to the ports of embarkation, surface schedules are based on the operational commander's movement requirements. Sealift scheduling involves arranging sealift assets to support the operational commander's requirements by reconfirming the schedule, assigning carrier(s) (commercial or government), and notifying the carrier(s) and the force to be moved of the schedule. The movement of ground forces and units is coordinated to designated ports and airports. All ports must receive necessary direction to allow the rapid movement and loading of live ammunition onto aircraft and ships. Based on the movement directive, the commanders of deploying forces plan backward from the time to start the movement and reach their designated ports or airports of embarkation in the time designated. Unit loads are configured for combat contingencies. At the same time, such a configuration should allow unit loads to be redirected while en route in case of a change of plans. Resupply and follow-on logistics may be configured for administrative loading. Normally, wheeled and tracked vehicles are moved by rail if the distance is longer than one driving day from the designated ports of embarkation. 3 1 Rotary-wing aircraft fly to the port of embarkation. Ground troops are usually moved to their respective POEs by using either road march or convoy. A road march is conducted when the unit moves itself to the port of embarkation. Other units move via convoy using installation transportation support, in unit transporters, and commercial transportation. Upon arrival at the seaport of embarkation, unit cargo is placed in a marshaling yard where the port operator and deploying forces transportation representative inspect it. Minor maintenance, resupply, and equipment modifications can be performed while awaiting shipment. During strategic deployment, forces and their equipment are moved from their POE outside the theater to ports of debarkation within the theater. Normally, strategic lift moves by air or sea. During the Gulf War of 1990-1991, sealift transported about 85 percent of the equipment and supplies to Southwest Asia, and airlift (C-5, C-141, KC-10, and CRAF) carried 99 percent of the personnel. In the early days of that deployment, all supplies and equipment (except for that prepositioned on ships in the region) arrived by air. 32 In the first phase of strategic deployment, the early deployers, usually the most mobile forces with the greatest combat potential, are phased into theater, followed by heavier forces, such as armored and mechanized forces and infantry. The USCENTCOM planners, immediately after the outbreak of the August 1990 crisis, identified the initial deployment requirement of eleven tactical fighter squadrons, one B-52 squadron, two carrier battle groups, the 82d Airborne Division, a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), one Ranger Regiment, and a Special Forces Group. A second major deployment was scheduled to begin three to four weeks later; this plan included five fighter squadrons, two additional carrier groups, and two battleship groups. The initial ground force strength

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was to be augmented by an Army Aviation Brigade, the 101st Air Assault Division, a mechanized infantry brigade, and two MEBs. In the first phase (7 August-7 November 1990), the United States deployed sufficient forces to deter Iraqi aggression, prepare for defense, and conduct combined training and exercises. By 30 September 1990, some 72,000 troops of the XVIII Airborne Corps were in theater. One month later, most of the elements of that corps had arrived. The total lift to theater was 250,000 tons of equipment and 97,000 troops . 33 Approximately 300,000 military personnel and 1,000 aircraft arrived in theater during the first three months. However, it took over one and a half months to get the first heavy division-the 24th Division (Mechanized) to the Gulf even though it was favorably located for quick deployment near the port of Savannah, Georgia. 34 The second phase of strategic lift started on 8 November 1990 when President George Bush announced the increase of forces to 200,000 personnel. By 15 January 1991, the total number of U.S. forces deployed in the theater had more than doubled. For strategic deployment of ground forces two basic transport modes are used: airlift and sealift. If the deploying area is within effective range of fixed-wing aircraft, they normally fly without stop to the designated airfields. Otherwise, host nation support is needed en route to either allow stops at intermediate bases or to use one's tankers for in-flight refueling. Airlift is a quantitatively limited national asset not equally suited to transporting all unit types. Therefore, airlift may not always be the mode of choice, especially for moving heavy units. Normally, military and civilian personnel and time-sensitive cargo will be moved by airlift, while heavy cargo will go by sealift. In conducting strategic deployment by air, planners must fully consider the entire airlift system. Nonproductive ground time must be minimized. Necessary equipment and trained personnel must be always on hand to load and unload passengers and cargo. For strategic airlift, adequate basing is necessary. Basing consists not only of the runways worldwide, but also base infrastructures to service lift aircraft and personnel. Because of the very long inter-theater distances, strategic airlift relies heavily on the availability of intermediate bases en route between the ports of embarkation and ports of debarkation. In the initial phase of Operation Desert Shield, a lack of intermediate staging bases led to delays and constrained throughput at the four main debarkation bases. Hence, the system became quickly overwhelmed. Despite all these difficulties, the strategic lift was highly successful. In the defensive phase of the Gulf War, between August and midNovember 1990, the U.S. Army moved four divisions and one armored cavalry regiment (ACR) by strategic lift into the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations. 35 During the entire conflict, in addition to 501,000 passengers, strategic airlift delivered 544,000 tons of cargo of the approximately 3.5 million tons of dry cargo delivered into the theater by all modes during the deployment phase of Desert Shield. 36 Between 7 August 1990 and 17 January 1991, the strategic lift fleet of C-5s, C-141s, KC-10s, and CRAF aircraft moved more than 325,000 tons and 400,000 troops from CONUS to Southwest Asia an average distance of 7,500 miles. 37 By 10 March 1991, strategic airlift had moved approximately 500,000 persons and 540,000 tons of cargo. At the height of the Desert Shield airlift, MAC's cargo movement averaged 17 million ton-miles per day. With regard to sealift, during Desert Shield and Desert Storm the MSC secured U.S.-flag shipping to provide the nucleus sealift capability. In addition, there was a 600-

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ship NATO pool managed by the NATO National Shipping Authority to allocate vessels to specific requirements. Another source was the "effective U.S.-controlled fleet" (EUSC) owned by U.S. corporations but registered in the flag of countries of convenience. 38 Between August and November 1990, the MSC moved more than four Army divisions with their sustainment. By September 1990, 100 MSC-controlled ships had delivered equipment and sustainment for the 100,000 military personnel who had been deployed to the theater. A total of approximately 1.18 million short tons of cargo and 2.0 million short tons of fuel were carried by MSC-provided ships over an average sea lane distance from CONUS to Southwest Asia of 8,700 miles in support of Desert Shield.39 Eight fast sealift support (FSS) ships performed particularly well in both surge and resupply transport. However, certain sealift assets proved unreliable, especially those obtained from the National Defense Reserve Fleet (NRDF). 4o The theater reception phase of the deployment begins with the arrival of forces and sustainment at the port of debarkation in the theater and ends with their departure. The arrival of a force at its debarkation destination does not equate to being combat-ready or in combat. In many cases, a force arriving at its destination still must be combat organized and further transshipped some distance before coming into contact with the opposing force. Reception is the process of unloading personnel and materiel from strategic transport, marshaling the deploying units, transporting them to staging areas, if required, and providing life support to deploying personnel. Reception can determine success or failure of an entire operation. It must be thoroughly planned and carefully executed. Reception from strategic lift is implemented at or near designated airports and seaports. It is often the interface between the strategic and operational levels; staging and onward movement are normally within the operational level; integration represents the interface between the operational and tactical levels of war. 41 Successful reception requires the availability of enough seaports and airports to accommodate the arriving forces and their equipment and supplies. In the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the Saudi port in the Gulf, Port Dammam, had thirty-three berths, but no more than seventeen were available because the others were used by Saudi commerce. Reception capacity depends on port and airfield characteristics; availability of labor and port services; offloading and holding space; conditions and capacity of exit routes; and efficiency of movement control systems. 43 Lack of airports is usually more of a problem than lack of aircraft. Airports serve as the primary port of entry for all deploying personnel. Planners must evaluate the capacity of available airfields and ports within the area as well as transportation networks linking them. After arrival at ports of debarkation, loads are placed into port marshaling yards so that the appropriate movement control authority can begin moving the loads forward to staging areas within the theater. Once the loads have been consolidated, they are moved out of the marshaling yards as expeditiously as possible to make room for arriving cargo. Failure to keep cargo moving results in backlogs that impede port throughput. Ideally, combat forces should not arrive in-theater before sufficient combat support service (CSS) forces have deployed to establish the capabilities for onward movement. This was not the case in Desert Shield/Desert Storm, where combat forces arrived before adequate CSS onward movement capability had been established. The system did not cope well with the doubling of the force structure in the theater. 44 For most U.S. resources, Ad Dammam and Al Jubayl were assigned as seaports of debarkation, while

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Dhahran was the aerial port of debarkation for Army troops deploying specifically to Saudi Arabia. Staging is the process of assembling, holding, and organizing arriving personnel and equipment into units and forces, incrementally building combat power and preparing units for onward movement, and providing life support for personnel until the unit becomes self-sustaining. 46 An area for staging should be selected near seaports and airports of debarkation. Other factors in its selection are geographic location, terrain, and availability of organic host nation support. Multiple staging bases are usually required in highly urbanized areas such as Europe. Multiple theater-staging bases increase support requirements. Movement control and communications are especially important because of the increased complexity of synchronization between the ports of debarkation and the theater staging bases, among the theater staging bases themselves, and between the theater staging bases and the tactical assembly areas. In the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the staging process was inefficient because U.S. personnel arrived before their equipment. There were delays in matching troops with their equipment. Therefore, the time required to reach force closure exceeded 200 days. Some units, including about 20,000 troops, were still staging when the ground offensive started. Onward movement applies normally to ground forces. This phase of deployment is the logical continuation of strategic deployment. In generic terms, it corresponds to operational deployment for forces that are already in the theater of operations. Onward movement is the process of moving units and accompanying materiel from reception facilities and staging areas to tactical assembly areas (TAAs) or other theater destinations, moving arriving nonunit personnel to gaining commands, and moving arriving sustainment material from reception facilities to distribution sites . 48 This phase of deployment begins with the personnel and equipment link-up, reconfiguration of forces, sustainment, and receipt of prepositioned supplies. It ends with the arrival at the respective TAAs . 49 Supplies must flow before or concurrently with the arrival of forces and units. Increased forces result in increased supply requirements. Sustainment supplies do not always follow the prescribed lines of communications; some supplies, like POL and ammunition, require special facilities and cannot be offloaded at the same port without significant disruption of port activities. 50 The supply and supplying requirement of deploying units consist of two major categories: unit-related supplies and equipment, and non-unit-related supplies and equipment. Unit-related include a unit's organic equipment, basic load, and accompanying supplies. Non-unit-related include all supply sustainment support requirements that are not identified for a specific unit. Distances from ports of debarkation to tactical assembly areas should not be overly long. Otherwise, intratheater movement requires excessive transit times, and increased air and surface transportation assets. In the Gulf War of 1990-1991, relatively long distances were involved in theater surface movement. The distance from the ports of debarkation at Ad Dammam and Al Jubayl to the first staging area was about 600 miles. From there to the assembly and operating areas for the attack were another 300 to 485 miles . 51 The Coalition forces had a sophisticated railroad system until 435 miles from their ports of disembarkation. From there, massive road convoys were used instead trains. 52 Tactical airlift is used for most personnel and time-sensitive cargo once delivered to the theater. Depending on the scale of military action, this might require considerable

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resources and time to accomplish. In the Gulf War of 1990-1991, about 20 percent of resupply cargo was moved by tactical airlift from aerial ports of debarkation to staging areas. Sea/air interface was required for five percent of cargo arriving via seaports of debarkation. Theater airlift in Desert Shield moved 142,000 short tons of cargo and 134,000 passengers, thus satisfying more than 3,500 airlift requests from units in the theater. During Desert Storm, a total of 159,000 cargo short tons and 184,000 passengers were carried in 13,000 sorties. Moving personnel and equipment from the ports of debarkation in the theater to the many airfields and staging areas required almost 17,000 C-130 tactical airlift sorties. By the end of December 1990, the Army support command had received 221,000 troops in theater with 769,000 short tons of equipment. This included 6,000 tracked vehicles and more than 59,000 other vehicles. Host nation support (HNS) contracts were a significant component of the surface transport effort. As a general planning factor, resupply cargo must be moved primarily by surface transportation from debarkation ports to staging areas. Vehicles must be obtained from multiple sources, including home station, war reserves, and the host nation. During the war, the U.S. armed services rented thousands of heavy trucks and employed more than 2,000 host nation civilian drivers. The principal factors for successful onward movement is adequate transportation infrastructure and a high degree of security and protection against enemy action. Efficient movement control allows the theater commander to redirect forces and rapidly overcome disruptions in the lines of communications. Total transportation infrastructure, modes, routes, control factors, host nation assistance, and specialized handling requirements must be coordinated to maximize speed of movement. Transportation network capabilities must be balanced against movement requirements so that modes and routes are neither saturated nor underused. Security and enemy interdiction is always a problem. Multiple lines of communications, alternative modes of movement, and alternative routes should be used whenever possible; waterways could be used as a substitute for ground movement. The enemy usually has numerous opportunities to inflict serious losses by asymmetrical attacks. Air defense deployed at critical choke points, such as bridges and causeways, ferries, and rail yards, is one of the prerequisites for protection of movement of one's forces during onward movement. Conclusion: No campaign or major operation could be successful if one's forces were not deployed opportunely and in proper sequence. Mistakes in deployment, and especially in strategic deployment, cannot be easily corrected, if at all, once a campaign or major operation starts. The outcome depends heavily on the outcomes of the initial major operations or major battles because they set the stage for the successive major operations or battles. The operational commanders and their staffs are solely responsible for the planning and execution of deployment. The commander's estimate of the situation and consequent decision must result in a sound deployment concept for all subordinate forces. The most complex part of planning deals with deployment of ground forces, while naval forces and land-based aircraft are generally self-deployed. Time and speed are critical factors in the successful deployment. This is largely dependent on the distances and mobility of one's forces. Transportation infrastructure in the theater must be adequate to support deployment of multiservice and often multinational forces. The theater must have numerous and diverse lines of communications linking various transportation modes. The 301

throughput capacity of seaports and airports, rail and road networks, internal waterways, and pipelines significantly affect the success of deployment, especially in the deployment area. The operational commander's entire operational idea hinges on the timely phasing of multiservice forces in the theater. For strategic deployment, the airlift and sealift capabilities must be adequate so that one's forces could be brought into the deployment area in a timely fashion. Prepositioning of weapons, equipment, and supplies could lessen to some extent the need for strategic lift. However, prepositioning that is too inflexible or is too affected by the prevalent political conditions in the area is not a real substitute for robust and long-range strategic lift capabilities. Operational deployment is conducted by forces in the theater before hostilities start. Their deployment to the assigned tactical assembly areas is usually less time-consuming and complex than that of forces that arrive in the theater by strategic lift. Operational deployment for these forces requires meticulous planning because forces arriving by strategic lift are not combat ready. Hence, the critical role of theater reception, staging, and integration before the onward movement can be initiated. All segments of deployment and phases within each should be seamlessly executed, and that cannot be accomplished without detailed and proficient deployment planning.

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Notes 1. E. Hartmann, Kurzg>efasstes Military-Hand-Woerterbuch fuer An -nee and Marine (Leipzig: Verlag von George Lang, 1896), p. 31. 2. Walter Post, Unternehmen Barbarossa Deutsche and sowjetische An r-i ffsplaene 1940/41 (Hamburg/Berlin/Bonn: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1995), p. 207. 3. Ibid., pp. 208-9. 4. Alfred Philippi and Ferdinand Heim, Der Feldzug Ge~jetrussland e 1941 bis 1945. Ein Operativer Ueberblick (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1962), p. 49. 5. Ibid., p. 52. 6. Martin Braun, "Planung and Verlauf der allierten streitkraeftegemeinsamen Landkriegsoperation," in Hartmut Zehrer, editor, Der Golfkonflikt. Dokumentation, Analyse and Bewertung aus militaerischer Sicht (Herford/Bonn: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1992), pp. 94-5. 7. Ibid., p. 95. 8. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-17-3:

Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and

Integration ( Washington, DC: 17 March 1999), p. 1-7.

9. Joint Publication 3-35: Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations (Washington, DC, 7 September 1999), pp. I-10 and I-11. 1 0. Ibid., p. I-10. 11. Wilhelm Stanger, Grundzuege der Lehre von der Strategic. Studienbehelf fuer die K.K. Kriegsschule , Vol. 1: Theorie mit Kurzeren Beispielen (Vienna: Verlag der K.K. Kriegsschule, 1884), p. 98. 1 2. Karl-Heinz Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende. Der Westfeldzug 1940 ( Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1995), pp. 125-6. 13. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-17-3:

Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and

Integration ( Washington, DC: 17 March 1999), p. 1-13.

14. Ibid., p. 3-9. 1 5. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-16: Army Operational Support ( Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1995), p. 5-7. 1 6. Mark Pires, Strategic Lift: Can the United States Conduct Two Nearly Simultaneous Major Regional Contingencies (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Command and General Staff College, 1995), p. 19. 17. FM 100-17-3: Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration, p. 1-4. 18. Pires, Strategic Lift: Can the United States Conduct Two Nearly Simultaneous Major Regional Contingencies, p. 1 9. 19. Ibid., p. 16. 20. FM 100-17-3: Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration, pp. 1-13 and 1-4.

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21. Ihno Krumpelt, "Die Bedeutung des Transportwesen fuer den Schlachterfolg," Wehrkunde 5 ( May 1965), p. 465. 22. P.D. Foxton, Powering War: Modern Land Force Logistics (London: Brassey's, 1994), p. 50. 23. Pires, Strategic Lift: Can the United States Conduct Two Nearly Simultaneous Major Regional Contingencies, pp. 29-31. 24. FM 1 00-17-3: Reception, Staging Onward Movement, and Integration, p. 1-5. 25. Hans-Werner Fritz, Die Planung, Vorbereitung and Durchfuehrung grosser Truppenbewegungen. Lehren aus dem 2. Weltkrieg dargestellt anhand eines ausgewaehlten Beispiels (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, January 1 987), p. 2. 26. FM 100-17-3: Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration, p. 1-2 27. Ibid., p. 1-7. 28. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-17: Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization ( Washington, DC: October 1 992), p. 4-9. 29. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 71-100: Division Operations ( Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 28 August 1996), p. 2-3. 30. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 1 00-15: Corps Operations ( Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 29 October 1996), p. 3-6. 31. Ibid., p. 3-8. 32. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, editors. Gulf War Air Power Survey. Summary Report . ( Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 4. 33. Eliot A. Cohen, et al., Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol. 1: Planning and Command and Control . ( Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 128; Eliot A. Cohen, et al., Gulf War Air Po wer Survey, Vol. III: Logistics and Support , p. 86. William G. Pagonis, "Good Logistics Is Combat Power: The Logistics Sustainment of Operation Desert Storm," Military Review 9 (September 1991), p. 31. 34. Review Essay: "Strategic Mobility's Stem," reviewed by Colonel Kenneth L. Privratsky, U.S. Army, Military Review, 4 (July-August 1995), pp. 103-4. 35. FM 100-15: Corps Operations, p. 3-1. 36. Philip A. Bossert, Strategic Airlift Inefficiencies From Desert Shield To Vigilant Warrior (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1995), p. 32. 37. Hartmut Zehrer, ed., Der Gollkonflikt. Dokumentation Analyse and Bewertung aus militaerischer Sicht (Herford/Bonn: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1 992), p. 166; Eliot A. Cohen, et al., Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol. III: Logistics and Support, p. 141; Bill Ewing and John Walker, Eight Months of DESERT SHIELD/STORM (Scott AFB, IL: Military Airlift Command, HQ MAC/XP, June 1 991), p. 6; John W. Leland, Air Mobility in Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM: An Assessment (Scott AFB, IL: Air Mobility Command, 1993), p. 2. A typical C-5 or C-141 mission started at Westover AFB, Massachusetts, or MacGuire AFB, New Jersey, flew to a CONUS onload location, and then to Europe; from there the aircraft would get a new crew, a full load of fuel, any maintenance required, and depart to Turkey, Egypt, or Israel; Bossert, Strategic Airlift Ine ciencies From Desert Shield To Vigilant Warrior, p. 39.

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38. Cohen, et al., Gulf War Air Power Survey , Vol. III: Logistics and Support , pp. 41-2; Zehrer, ed., Der Gollkonflikt. Dokumentation, Analyse and Bewertung aus militaerischer Sicht, p. 191. 39. Ibid., p. 191; Joint Pub 4-01.2: Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Sealift Support to Joint Operations (Washington, DC: 9 October 1996), p. 1-5. 40. Cohen, et al., Gulf War Air Power Survey , Vol. III: Logistics and Support, p. 64. 41. FM 100-17-3: Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration, pp. I-6 and. 1-3. 42. Ibid., p. 3-1. 43. Ibid., p. 3-4. 44. Cohen, et al., Gulf War Air Power Survey , Vol. III: Logistics and Support , p. 6. 45. Pagonis, "Good Logistics Is Combat Power: The Logistics Sustainment of Operation Desert Storm," p. 29. 46. FM 100-17-3: Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration, p. 1-6. 47. Ibid., p. 4-1. 48. Ibid., p. 1-6. 49. FM 100-17: Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization, pp. 4-17 and 4-18. 50. Ibid., p. 4-17. 51. "An Operational Analysis of the Persian Gulf War" - Studie des U.S. Army War College zum Golfkrieg II, Oesterreichische Militaerische Zetschrift (Vienna) 3 (May-June 1993), p. 269. 52. P.D. Foxton, Powering War: Modern Land Force Logistics (London: Brassey's, 1994), p. 50. 53. Ibid., p. 153. Keaney and Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey. Summary Report , p. 4. 54. Pagonis, "Good Logistics Is Combat Power: The Logistics Sustainment of Operation Desert Storm," p. 32; Cohen, et al., Gulf War Air Power Survey , Vol. 111: Logistics and Support, pp. 63-4, 144.

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CRITICAL FACTORS AND CENTER OF GRAVITY Critical factors and center of gravity are essential elements of warfare at any level. The higher the level, the more important it is to properly evaluate one's own and the enemy's strengths and weaknesses and to properly determine the respective centers of gravity. Deployment, concentration, and maneuver of one's forces are planned and conducted to ultimately destroy, annihilate, or neutralize the enemy's center of gravity. Failure to determine the enemy's proper center of gravity would result in a deeply flawed plan for a major operation or campaign. The operational commanders and their staffs must find the most effective method of applying combat potential to degrade, destroy, or neutralize the enemy's center of gravity while protecting their own. Despite the significance of the concept, many commanders pay inadequate attention to the theoretical underpinnings of center of gravity. The enemy's critical weaknesses and vulnerabilities, and even decisive points are often considered centers of gravity. Although these concepts are closely related to center of gravity, they are not the same. Worse yet, some theoreticians and practitioners doubt the practical use of this concept in the planning and executing a campaign or major operation despite all evidence to the contrary. Critical Factors: The identification of a center of gravity should start with identification and analysis of the critical factors, both individually and collectively. The term critical factors is a collective term referring to critical strengths and critical weaknesses of a military force or nonmilitary source of power. They can be physical or abstract in character. They exist at each level of war.' At the strategic and operational levels of war, tangible critical factors range from those geographic in nature (positions, number, and length of lines of operations or lines of communications, etc.) to those purely military. Critical factors are relative in terms of time and space. They are also constantly subject to changes resulting from the actions of one's forces or of the enemy's actions and measures-hence the vital role of intelligence to monitor these changes on the opposing side and to provide planners with timely information. Lack of realism, overconfidence, or an exaggerated sense of superiority could prevent sound evaluation of the real capabilities of one's forces. Critical strengths are those capabilities considered vital for the accomplishment of a given or assumed military objective (see Figure 22). Examples are the armed forces as a whole, individual services or major parts of combat forces, air defenses, and nonmilitary sources of power (heavy industry, agriculture, mineral resources, banking, finances, etc.). Intangible critical factors encompass such factors as soundness of doctrine, quality and skill of commanders or political leaders, will to fight, cohesion of an alliance or coalition, public support, logistical support and sustainment, etc. Critical weaknesses are those sources of power that, while considered essential for the accomplishment of the assigned military objective, are grossly inadequate to perform their intended function or task. Those critical weaknesses or their elements that are especially vulnerable to physical attack or other actions diplomatic, informational, economic, etc. will become critical vulnerabilities. To complicate the matter, sometimes a critical strength might become a critical vulnerability if it lacks adequate protection or support and therefore is open to enemy attack (e.g., elements of logistical support and sustainment, some elements of C3 nodes, or key elements of one's information system).

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Weight of Effort: Any sound plan for the employment of combat forces at any level of war essentially hinges on the proper determination of a center of gravity for both one's own and the enemy's side . 2 However, there is a great deal of discussion and confusion as to what actually constitutes a center of gravity. Most theoreticians attribute the concept of center of gravity to the writings of the famous Prussian philosopher of war, General Carl von Clausewitz. While the concept itself is sound and has proved extremely useful, its theoretical underpinnings are somewhat problematic. Clausewitz in his seminal work On War wrote: "One must keep the dominant characteristics of both states in mind. Out of these characteristics a certain Schwerpunkt develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed. !t represents concentration of'the enemy strength most vital to him in the accomplishment of his aim. If you could knock it out directly, it would be the most valuable target, for your blows" (emphasis added). Clausewitz might have thought in terms of "center of gravity" as we understand it today, but he used a uniquely German term, Schwerpunkt. The meaning of that term has4 changed considerably since Clausewitz's days and today is used for many purposes . Schwerpunkt, when properly translated, refers to the "weight of effort" (or literally the "point of main emphasis"), not "center of gravity." 5 In German military theory and practice, the Schwerpunkt has a much broader meaning than what we call today a center of gravity. In military terms, Schwerpunkt designates a theater or area (or place) in which one's combat forces are massed to seek a decision or where the commander expects a decision. The main factors in selecting a Schwerpunkt include the situation, the terrain, and the commander's intent. In German theory and practice, each commander was responsible for concentrating his forces in the sector of weight of effort 308

[Schwerpunktbildung]. When appropriate, a commander would designate a weight of effort for his subordinate commanders. A change in the situation would require a change or shift in the weight of effort [Schwerpunktverlegung]. 6 The same term is often used for a variety of military situations (including force planning) to describe where the focus of effort is, or will be. (It is also often used in terms of politics, diplomacy, and other nonmilitary areas of activity.) Center of Gravity: In generic terms, a center of gravity (COG) is that source of massed strengthphysical or moral, or a source of' leverage-whose serious degradation, dislocation, neutralization, or destruction would have the most decisive impact on the enemy's or one's own ability to accomplish a given military objective. However, the concept of "mass" should not be taken too literally, because what counts most is the "massed effect," not whether available combat potential (prior to combat) or combat power (in combat) is physically concentrated in a certain area. Because of their weapons' long range, lethality, and accuracy, centers of gravity in air or naval warfare do not necessarily have to be massed in a specific area, but may be dispersed throughout a large part of a theater or area of operations. In contrast, ground forces must usually be massed in a relatively small physical space to be effective. However, even in land warfare, increases in the speed and range of various platforms allow forming of mass in a larger area of the theater than was possible in World War II. A center of gravity can be also a source of leverage. In a hostage-taking situation, the hostages themselves, not the terrorists or the state holding them, would be considered the enemy's center of gravity. It is they who are the source of strength or leverage for a terrorist group or a rogue state. A center of gravity provides a locus toward which all sources of power combat and noncombat should be directed. It considerably facilitates making a sound and rational decision on the employment of one's forces. $ A properly identified center of gravity creates prerequisites for selecting a method of application of power that will result in a much quicker and more decisive employment of one's forces and resources. Furthermore, the focus on the destruction or neutralization of the enemy's, and protection of one's own center of gravity significantly facilitates future operations. All too often, the center of gravity is understood as being one of the enemy's vulnerabilities. On the contrary, a center of gravity is found invariably among critical strengths-never critical weaknesses or critical vulnerabilities. The U.S. services, with the sole exception of the U.S. Army, erroneously believe that centers of gravity are identical to critical vulnerabilities or synonymous with the targets to be attacked and destroyed. Often a center of gravity is confused with the military objective. However, experience clearly shows that focusing on the objective without identifying and attacking the enemy's center of gravity will invariably result in unnecessary losses in personnel, materiel, and time, even when one possesses overwhelming strength in all key aspects of combat potential. Another error is to confuse a decisive point with the center of gravity. Although closely related, decisive points are not necessarily sources of strength; they could be found among critical weaknesses. These weaknesses are only relevant if they are open to attack and facilitate an attack on the enemy center of gravity. Once the center of gravity is determined, decisive points are identified and targeted. 9 An attack on enemy vulnerabilities will not cause the deteriorating effect desired unless it influences the center of gravity.' ° 309

Composition: A massed effect of military or nonmilitary power is an essential ingredient for a center of gravity at any level of war. The larger and more diverse the source of power, the more potential it has for a center of gravity. Military sources of power clearly predominate at the operational and tactical level, while nonmilitary aspects of power are most strongly felt at the national- and theater-strategic levels. Obviously, the military source of power, as represented by the available combat potential or combat power of the entire force or some part thereof, is the most critical element of a center of gravity. In generic terms, available combat potential or combat power consists of an inner core and an outer core (see Figure 23). The inner core encompasses firepower, maneuver, information, and leadership. This part is where virtually the entire "mass" is physically concentrated. However, the inner core cannot properly function without elements that provide support, protection, and integration arbitrarily grouped in the outer core. It is in the outer core that critical weaknesses and vulnerabilities can lead to exploitation of the center of gravity by the enemy's indirect attacks. Protection encompasses, among other things, air (space) defense, fire support, and operational security. Supporting elements (sustainers) are intelligence and logistics. II The integration elements (connectors) link leadership with all other elements of combat power. In the Axis offensive in North Africa in the spring of 1942, the operational center of gravity (the German panzer divisions) would have been ineffective if not for the Luftwaffe's support in neutralizing the British air and naval strength on Malta, allowing supplies to reach Rommel's forces in March and April. The German success during the British offensive in May-June 1942 (Operation Cauldron) would not have been possible without the flank protection of the panzer divisions provided by the Italian XXI and X Corps at the battle of the Gazala-Bir Hacheim line. 1 2 Figure 23: CENTER OF GRAVITY AND ITS ELEMENTS

Any center of gravity encompasses both tangible and intangible elements. In land warfare, tangible centers of gravity can range from an armored or mechanized battalion

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or regiment to the ground forces as a whole. In naval warfare, a center of gravity can be a direct screen of a convoy, a surface strike group, a carrier battle group, or a major part of surface fleet, if concentrated in a specific sea or ocean area, etc. In air warfare, a center of gravity can be that element of a force of combat aircraft having the highest combat potential, such as a fighter or bomber squadron in a fighter/bomber wing, or the entire force of fighters and ground-based air defenses or bombers. The intangible elements of a center of gravity includes such unquantifiable elements as political leadership, the military commanders and their staffs, soundness of doctrine, combat motivation, unit cohesion, jointness/combinedness, and morale and discipline. The higher the level of war, the more intangible the elements, fall within the scope of a given center of gravity. Thus, they range from leadership of a tactical-size force to such factors as national or alliance/coalition leadership and the national will to fight. In an alliance or coalition, the center of gravity might consist of the community of interests or common desires that hold the members together. 1 3 The U.S.-led Coalition's cohesion was (from the Iraqi perspective) an intangible element of the strategic center of gravity, while Saddam Hussein and his inner circle had the same role for the Coalition in the Gulf War of 1990-1991. However, there are instances when the strategic center of gravity can be composed almost entirely of physical elements. This situation may occur in an immature theater of operations, one that lacks a population base and economic infrastructure to generate intangible elements. In 1942-1943, during the Solomons Campaign, the Japanese ground, naval, and air forces deployed in the Solomons were collectively just such a strategic center of gravity. The centers of gravity at the operational and tactical levels of war are invariably the mass of the enemy force with the highest mobility and combat power. Operational centers of gravity for both the Allies and the Axis in the North African Campaign, 19401943, were the opposing armored forces. The Germans' biggest ,strength was their better tactical doctrine, greater combat experience, better leadership, and superior equipment. The British advantages included larger number of tanks, air support, better Allies, and shorter and better-protected lines of supplies. The principal British weaknesses were inexperience in armored warfare and weak and rigid leadership. 1 4 Specifically, for the Allies, the enemy's operational center of gravity was not the entire Panzergruppe Afrika led by Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, but its German Afrika Korps (I 5th and 21 st Panzer Division, and the Afrika Division-later re-designated as the 90th Light Division) . 1 5 In war, intangible elements of a center of gravity are present at all levels, but especially at the national- and theater-strategic levels. In a low-intensity conflict, in contrast, they play a major role even at the lowest, tactical level. In an insurgency, rarely do the antigovernment forces mass enough forces to constitute a tangible operational center of gravity. Then, the rebel leadership, legitimacy of the government, and public opinion are most likely to be a strategic center of gravity, while the individual rebel groups in the countryside could constitute tactical centers of gravity. During the insurgency in El Salvador in the 1980s, the strategic center of gravity for the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) rebel coalition was the legitimacy of the government itself. 1 6 I n Somalia, the United States allowed itself to be in a situation where its vital interests were not at stake, but the very survival of the Somalian clan leader Mohamed Farah Aideed was. This dangerously asymmetrical situation allowed Aideed to indirectly attack the U.S. strategic center of gravity-will to fight by exploiting the

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well-known U.S. critical vulnerability, an aversion to suffering casualties. With no survival at stake, the United States could not protect and sustain popular and political support, while Aideed's desire for independent power could be sustained indefinitely. 1 7 Features: Military objectives and centers of gravity are inseparable. However, it is the objective that dominates, not the other way around. For each objective, a corresponding center of gravity must be identified. Both the objective and the center of gravity must be in harmony; otherwise, either the objective must be scaled down or the new center of gravity must be identified. The neutralization, serious degradation, or defeat of a center of gravity at a lower level of war will necessarily result in a general weakening of the center of gravity at the next higher level. The loss of personnel and materiel will generally degrade the enemy's ability to create or strengthen his emerging operational center of gravity. Defeats in the field invariably have a negative effect on the enemy's will to fight. Destruction or neutralization of the Iraqi Republican Guards generated severe weakening of both tangible and intangible elements of the Iraqi strategic center of gravity. Likewise, successive defeats of an enemy's tactical centers of gravity will degrade his operational center of gravity, and by neutralizing or destroying the latter, the ultimate result will be the defeat of his strategic center of gravity. Any change of the objective at the higher level should invariably lead to a change of the corresponding center of gravity. Rapidly changing operational objectives can cause a loss of focus on the center of gravity, as the example of the U.S. defense of the Philippines in December 1941 shows. War Plan Orange (WPO-3) envisaged a six-month defense to delay the Japanese, followed by a withdrawal to Bataan. A potential operational center of gravity for the U.S. forces was the Japanese invasion force (ground, air, and naval components); however, the focus should have been on the Japanese ground forces once they landed. The buildup of U.S. forces in the Philippines in the fall 1941 led both General Douglas MacArthur and the planners in Washington, DC, to change the defense methods; the citadel-type defenses would be abandoned in favor of active defenses of all the Philippine islands and adjoining waters. General MacArthur would defend all the Philippine islands and the adjacent waters and would cooperate with the Navy in raids against Japanese sea lines of communications, conducting air raids and assisting in the defense of the territories of the Associated Powers. These were considerably different objectives than those initially assigned and required a shift in focus and way of conducting a defense of the Philippines. Moreover, another center of gravity aligned with the newer objective should have been selected. 1 8 In physical terms, a center of gravity is often located in the relative proximity of the respective physical objective. This is often the case in war on land at the tactical and operational level. In war in the air, and often in war at sea, a center of gravity is usually dispersed over a relatively large part of the theater. Sometimes, an operational center of gravity may be located beyond the boundaries of a theater of operations in which a new campaign is to begin. The Japanese plan for the invasion of the Philippines in December 1941 envisaged destruction or neutralization of the major part of the U.S. Pacific Fleetoperational center of gravity for the Japanese based in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, prior to the attack on the Philippines itself. The Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in the early hours of 7 December, and the Philippines' U.S. air and naval bases one day later. An important characteristic of an enemy center of gravity, especially at the operational and tactical levels, is that it can physically endanger one's own center of 312

gravity. This is not a feature of an objective, a decisive point, or a critical weakness or vulnerability. In addition, any tangible element of an enemy strategic center of gravity represents a potential threat to one's strategic center of gravity. The number of centers of gravity is directly related to the number of military objectives to be accomplished in terms of time and space. Thus, the higher the level of war, the fewer potential centers of gravity there will be. A large theater of war will usually contain several theater-strategic centers of gravity, and for each of them a theater of operations will be established. By definition, the higher the level of war, the more severe the consequences of misidentifying the enemy's or one's center of gravity will be for the operational commander and his staff. The national-strategic level has a single strategic center of gravity. The Axis's will to fight and their overall source of power, i.e., the armed forces and their military-economic underpinnings, can be considered the enemy's strategic center of gravity for the anti-Axis coalition in World War II. The number of operational centers of gravity in a given theater of operations depends on the number of operational objectives to be accomplished in terms of time and space. For each operational objective to be accomplished, a corresponding operational center of gravity must be identified. Depending on one's own or the enemy's military strength, these centers of gravity can exist in each medium, that is, on the ground, in the air, and at sea. Sequencing of the accomplishment of the operational objectives determines the order in which corresponding operational centers of gravity will be attacked or protected. The concept of a center of gravity is more complicated at the tactical level because diverse and multiple centers of gravity exist at any given time for the forces fighting on the ground, in the air, and at sea. This can be attributed to the relative ease with which either side in a conflict can form centers of gravity at the tactical level as compared with the operational and strategic levels of war. Because of the potential for multiple centers of gravity, the utility of this concept at the tactical level of war is somewhat suspect. The higher the level of war, the more "fixed" or unchangeable a given center of gravity is because of the dynamics of the factors of space, time, and force. A strategic center of gravity is a relatively fixed entity throughout the duration of the conflict, and will change only if the leadership is changed or removed from authority or a major part of the military or nonmilitary source of power drastically changes, so the force reemerges as a completely different entity. 1 9 If an authoritarian ruler is assassinated or overthrown in a coup, the new ruler or group of rulers will emerge as a part of the new strategic center of gravity. The enemy might continue the fight or they might sue for a compromise peace or surrender. Likewise, the strategic center of gravity will shift or change its character if one or more members of an alliance or coalition leave the war or change sides. In a campaign, several operational centers of gravity normally exist, separated in space and time, while a single operational center of gravity will exist in a major operation. Depending on their number, operational centers of gravity in a campaign must be attacked simultaneously or sequentially to defeat or neutralize a given theater-strategic or military-strategic center of gravity. Normally, before the start of a ground offensive in a land campaign, air or naval forces must accomplish a number of operational objectives in their own medium. The primary task of air forces will be to obtain and then maintain air superiority, which, in turn, will require the neutralization or destruction of the enemy

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fighter aircraft strength usually his operational center of gravity in the initial phase of war in the air. Naval forces, for their part, will be tasked to obtain sea control within the entire or part of a maritime theater, and for them the enemy's operational center of gravity is the striking force of the enemy fleet. In the planned German campaign to invade Britain (Operation Seeloewe [Sea Lion]), the Luftwaffe's opposing operational center of gravity was the Royal Air Force's Fighter Command. Had the amphibious landing taken place, the Luftwaffe's focus would have shifted to the British armored and mechanized forces defending the beaches or held in operational reserve. In the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the operational objectives for the U.S.-led Coalition forces were obtaining air superiority in the theater, obtaining sea control in the northern part of the Arabian Gulf, and the destruction of the Iraqi ground forces in the southern part of Iraq and in Kuwait. Hence, the corresponding operational centers of gravity were the Iraqi fighters and ground-based air defenses-Iraqi missile-armed surface combatants. Because the outcome of a land campaign hinges on the fate of ground forces, the most important operational center of gravity in a campaign is the one that encompasses the most mobile and powerful enemy force on the ground. That center of gravity must be neutralized or destroyed by the efforts of two or more services. The Iraqi Republican Guards represented the most important operational center of gravity for all U.S. and Coalition forces in the offensive phase of the Gulf War of 1990-1991. In a campaign, normally a single operational center of gravity exists in each medium at a given time. For each successive operational objective the enemy would usually "mass" (not always in the literal meaning of the term) his combat potential and form a new operational center of gravity in defense of the next operational objective. If the U.S. and Coalition forces had, after a short pause, continued their advance into Iraq, a new operational center of gravity would probably have been the remaining Republican Guard divisions and the other divisions deployed in the Basra-Baghdad area. Mass vs. Dispersal: If the enemy's center of gravity is physically concentrated, as were the Iraqi Republican Guards in the Gulf War of 1990-1991, it is relatively easy to identify. It however, in some warfare areas, one's forces will require a longer time to accomplish the ultimate military objective because the enemy's operational center of gravity has not yet been formed. There, multiple tactical centers of gravity must be defeated or neutralized over time to ultimately defeat the enemy's strategic center of gravity. This situation arises in trade warfare (e.g., attack against the enemy's and protection of one's shipping), where the escort forces, as a whole, represent the enemy's operational center of gravity. These forces are never massed in a certain sea or ocean area but are necessarily divided to protect a given convoy or several convoys. The attacker must wear down the defender's center of gravity over time. A similar situation usually exists when fighting insurgents. Forces opposed to the government normally operate in small groups and use hit-and-run tactics. Since they normally do not operate in large formations, they seldom offer the government forces the opportunity to destroy or neutralize them, unless they make the mistake of prematurely operating in larger formations, as the Yugoslav Partisans (guerrillas) did in late 1942. The communist leader Josip Broz-Tito gave the order to change tactics from small-scale attacks to large-scale operations conducted by eight newly established, so-called "shock" divisions. The Germans took advantage of Tito's error, and trapped and decimated four of Tito's divisions and two brigades in the Battle of Sutjeska in the southeastern part of 314

Herzegovina in May 1943 (Operation Schwarz [Black]). This operation was also aimed to destroy a large force of the Royalist Chetniks in northwestern Montenegro. 20 Changes of COG: Operational commanders should always be aware of the everchanging nature of relative strengths and weaknesses of the opposing forces. The operational center of gravity is more dynamic than the strategic center of gravity. The objective can change from phase to phase of a major operation or campaign. There might be a significant shift in capabilities of one's own or enemy forces due to the introduction of some highly advanced weapons or some new major force into the theater.' A force different from the one that had been the enemy center of gravity at the beginning of the hostilities or military action can emerge as the center of gravity because of the result of one's success in combat. Higher-than-expected attrition, a poor state of morale and training, and a general inability to regenerate combat power might also lead to a shift of the enemy's center of gravity to another type of force. Once the plan is executed, the situation must be closely monitored and reassessed to detect potential changes or shifts in the enemy center of gravity. 22 In the Leyte Operation, the Commander of the U.S. Third Fleet, Admiral William F. Halsey, apparently thought the most serious threat (the enemy's center of gravity) was posed by Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa's Main Body (fast carrier force), not Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita's heavy ships of the First Diversionary Attack Force. One can argue that Admiral Halsey's obsession to fight a decisive naval battle against the Japanese aircraft carriers, coupled with purposefully vague orders from Admiral Nimitz, clouded his judgment. Nevertheless, it seems clear that Admiral Halsey did not sufficiently account for the declining performance of Japanese pilots after the Battle of Midway. By October 1944, the Japanese carriers did not represent as large a threat to U.S. forces at Leyte as did Vice Admiral Kurita's heavy surface force. Shift in COG: The enemy's center of gravity can also shift from one type of force to another concurrently with the change of the phase of a major operation or campaign, although the objective remains unchanged. This situation usually exists when a phase changes in response to a change in the medium in which a force moves or combat is to take place, e.g., from the sea to the shore or from the air to the ground. In an amphibious landing operation, the enemy's center of gravity for the defender will be in most cases the attacker's enemy naval task force (i.e., the surface ships with the highest combat power, usually the carrier attack force) assigned as operational cover and support. If the attacker lacks sufficient strength at sea, then the operational center of gravity might be represented by the land-based fighter aircraft providing cover to the amphibious forces at sea. In the German invasion of Norway and Denmark in April 1940, the Luftwaffe's fighters were the proper operational center of gravity for the Allies, not the German heavy surface forces. The amphibious task force at sea cannot threaten an enemy's operational center of gravity on land, but the operational cover force can. Thus, for the defender the primary objective initially is to destroy or neutralize the attacker's distant cover and support, as the Allies did in the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942. However, once the amphibious force succeeds in landing ashore, the center of gravity shifts and the attacker's ground forces become the enemy's center of gravity for the defender. In the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict of 1982, the proper operational center of gravity for the Argentines, before the British landing on the Falklands, was the two 315

British carrier forces. Without these carriers, the British could not have landed. While the loss of the 15,000-GRT transport Atlantic Conveyor on 25 May, with its embarked equipment, was a serious blow to the British effort, that ship was not a center of gravity for the Argentines, but one of the British critical vulnerabilities. The troops and equipment could be replaced relatively quickly, but not the aircraft carriers. After the landing, the British 3 Commando Brigade was the operational center of gravity for the Argentine defenders. For the British, the enemy's operational center of gravity was not the Argentine carrier group, but the land-based fighter-bombers armed with the Exocet missiles. After the landing, the operational center of gravity for the British forces shifted to the Argentine troops defending Port Stanley. In a major airborne operation, such as was the German invasion of Crete (Operation Merkur) in May 1944 or the Allied airborne landing at Arnhem (Operation Market Garden) in September 1944, a similar shift of center of gravity occurred as in amphibious landing operations. The only difference is that the escorting fighters represented the operational center of gravity before the arrival at the landing zone; after the paratroops drop or the helicopters land, the airborne troops on the ground become the operational center of gravity. Conclusion: Operational commanders and their staffs should know and fully understand the concept of critical factors and the analytical process used to identify a proper center of gravity for both the enemy and one's own forces. The concept of a center of gravity is, along with the identification of the objective, the most critical part of any military planning process. Both the objective and its corresponding center of gravity must be properly determined. The higher the level of war, the more important it is to properly identify both the enemy's and one's center of gravity. It can be costly to consider an enemy's vulnerability or decisive point to be a center of gravity. The best analytical approach is to use the concept of critical factors to identify the critical strengths and weaknesses of both sides. Afterward, the center of gravity should be determined from among the enemy's and one's critical strengths. Critical vulnerabilities are found among the critical weaknesses or even critical strengths if they are open to attack. A plan for a major operation or campaign should be clearly focused on the destruction or neutralization of the enemy's center of gravity, while adequately protecting one's own; otherwise, the ultimate operational or strategic objectives will require far more time and resources than envisaged or can even be fatal for the outcome of the entire expedition.

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Notes l. Recently, the term "critical requirements"-essential conditions, resources, or means for a critical capability to be fully operational-has been used in conjunction with the term "critical factors"; Joe Strange, Centers of Gravity and Critical Vulnerabilities (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Foundation, 2nd ed., 1996), p. ix. 2. In the strict definition of the term, a center of gravity is defined as "that point of an object around which its weight is evenly distributed or balanced; center of mass; point of equilibrium"; Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language, College Edition (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1960), p. 237. 3. Carl von Clausewitz, On War ; edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, 8th printing 1984), pp. 595-6. 4. Timothy J. Keppler, The Center of Gravity Concept. A Knowledge Engineering Approach to Improved Understanding and Application (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, June 1995), p. 15. 5. Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege , 1 6th edition, with critical comments by Dr. Werner Hallweg (Bonn: Ferdinand Duemmlers Verlag, 1952), p. 874. 6. "Schwerpunkt," HDv 100/900 VS-NfD, Fuehrungsbegriff (TFIB) (Bonn: Ministry of Defense, February 1990), p. Sch-SEA; other related terms include "area of the point of main decision" [Schwerpunktrarrm], "point of main decision in an attack" [Schwerpunkt des Angri fs], etc. Huerth, USNfD. Miftaerisches Studienglossary Englisch, Vol. 2/3 (Bonn: Bundessprachenamt, January 1993), p. 1060; "Schwerpunkt," Hermann Franke, editor, Handbuch der neuzeitlichen Wehrwisenschaften, Vol. 1: Wehrpolitik and Kriegfuehrung_ (Berlin/Leipzig: Verlag von Walter de Grunter & Co., 1936), p. 649. 7. Today the German Bundeswehr uses a different term-center of force deployment and ability to act [Zentrum der Kraefenentfaltung and Handlungsfaehigkeit]-those areas whose destruction, annihilation, control, or use are critical for the accomplishment of the desired end state; Inspector of Bundeswehr, Operative Leitlinie fuer Einsaetze der streitkraeifte (OpLESK) (Bonn: Bundesministerium der Vcrteidiging, 20 August 1999), p. 22. 8. Keppler, The Center of Gravity Concept. A Knowledge Engineering Approach to Improved Understanding and Application, pp. 1 8-9. 9. Bruce L. Kidder, Center of Gravity: Dispelling the Myths (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1996), p. 12. 10. Phillip Kevin Giles and Thomas P. Galvin, Center of Gravitv: Determination, Analysis, and Application (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, 31 January 1996), p. 19. 11. Collin A. Agee, Peeling the Onion. The Iraqi Center of 'Gravity in Desert Storm (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, May 1992), p. 35. 12. Thomas M. Kriwanek, The Operational Center of Gravity (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, May 1986), p. 13. 13. Clausewitz, On War (1984), p. 596. 14. Kriwanek, The Operational Center of Gravitv, p. 11-2.

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1 5. The Italian element consisted of the XXI Corps (five infantry divisions) and the Italian Armored Corps ( Ariete armored division and Trieste motorized division): Myron J. Griswold, Considerations in Identifying and Attacking the Enemy's Center of Gravity ( Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command General Staff College, 14 May 1986), pp. 10-1. 16. Max G. Manwaring and Court Prisk, A Strategic View of Insurgencies: Insights, from El Salvador, McNair Papers 4 (Washington, DC: The Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1995), p. 18. 17. Keppler, The Center- of Gravity Concept: A Knowledge Engineering Approach to Improved Understanding and Application, pp. 6-7. 18. Ibid., p. 8. 1 9. Giles and Galvin, Center of Gravity: Determination, Analysis, and Application, pp. 1 7-8. 20. Stephen Clissold, Djilas. The Progress of a Revolutionary (New York: Universe Books, 1983), pp. 956; Center for Military History, German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans (1941-1944) ( Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, Istprinted August 1954, facsimile edition 1989), pp. 36-7. 21. Giles and Galvin, Center of'Gravity. Determination, Analysis, and Application, p. 1 7. 22. Ibid., p. 15.

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OPERATIONAL MANEUVER Maneuver of combat forces to obtain a positional advantage over the opposing force is essential for success at tactical and operational levels of war. An operational maneuver is usually directed against the enemy's operational center of gravity and sometimes at cutting off the enemy's lines of supplies at the operational depth. The success of a major operation or campaign depends to a very large degree on the planning and skillful execution of the operational maneuver and fires. Types: A maneuver is predominantly used by the attacker to seize the initiative, set the terms for battles or major operations, or exploit earlier success of battles or major operations. In the defense, a counter-maneuver could be conducted to counteract the enemy maneuver underway or the one planned by the enemy. Distinctions are drawn between tactical, operational, and strategic maneuver by the qualitative differences of purposes to be accomplished and, thereby, size of forces employed and the time and space factors involved. A tactical maneuver seeks to gain a decisive advantage through a more favorable position before a tactical action (battle, engagement, strike, or attack). It may be planned to attack selected critical vulnerabilities in the enemy's tactical depth, thereby forcing him to react tactically and sometimes even operationally. It can also be used to build capabilities in areas where it had been impossible to carry out one's concept of operations according to a previous plan.' A tactical maneuver is a combination of tactical movement and tactical mobility and is usually conducted within a given combat zone or sector. In contrast to operational and strategic maneuver, tactical maneuver can be conducted using fires only. Then individual platforms or their groups shift their fire from one target or group of targets to another, but with little or no change in their positions. A strategic maneuver is intended to move sufficient forces into a theater and obtain a favorable position to defeat the major part of the opposing force and thereby reach a strategic decision in the war as a whole. Such a maneuver normally involves the movement of a large field army within a given theater of war or sometimes a theater of operations. It is characterized by movement of very large forces into the enemy's strategic depth. The Schlieffen Plan of 1905 (in fact a memo by the German Chief of General Staff, Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen, to his successor) can be considered a form of strategic maneuver. Von Schlieffen envisaged the German Army of ninety-six divisions in the West. Out of that total, eighty-two divisions (seventy infantry and twelve reserve divisions) would compose a mobile force on the right wing of the planned strategic maneuver, while eight divisions would be deployed as a fixing force south of Metz in Lorraine. An additional ten divisions would be deployed in Eastern Prussia to guard against possible attack by Russia . 2 The objective was for the German right wing to conduct a gigantic, wide, sickle-cut movement through Belgium to a position west of Paris to be traversed in forty days. 3 The pivot of the maneuver was the area between Diedenhofen (Thionville) and Metz. Afterward, the German armies would swing around Paris and continue their advance northeast, thereby pushing the major part of the French army against the German fortified positions in Alsace-Lorraine, or driving the French army into Switzerland and internment.4 Von Schlieffen also planned a feint, followed by withdrawal in the Alsace-Lorraine area, to prompt the French to initiate a premature 319

offensive there. The length of the envisaged movement around Paris calculated from the Meuse River was about 250 miles, while the distance from Paris to the Swiss border was about 235 miles. Von Schlieffen thought the French anticipated the German attack south of the Meuse-Sambre rivers but not north of that line. 5 The German Army never reached the strength envisioned in von Schlieffen's plan. There were only sixty-two divisions actually available in the West in 1905-1906 and seventy-nine regular and six and a half reserve divisions in 1914. Von Schlieffen's plan was drastically changed in 1909 by his less capable successor, General Helmuth von Moltke, Jr. Among other things, Moltke reduced the number of divisions to be employed on the right wing to fifty-four, but increased the number of divisions to sixteen in AlsaceLorraine. An additional nine divisions were deployed in Eastern Prussia. This change in effect reduced the ratio between mobile force and fixing force from seven to one envisaged in the Schlieffen plan, to three to one. In the course of the execution of this plan in August 1914, the German strength was frittered away on secondary tasks until it had shrunk to eight divisions on the Ourcq River during the most critical phase of the maneuver. Ultimately, the German offensive failed in its main purpose, which was to inflict a fatal blow to the French army and achieve the end of the war in a single, powerful blow. Operational maneuver is conducted within a given theater of operations and is aimed at having a decisive impact on the outcome of a major operation or campaign, either by securing the advantage of a position before attacking the enemy's operational center of gravity or by striking at some critical vulnerability, such as logistical supply lines deep in the enemy defenses. In either case, the aim is to force the enemy to react operationally or even strategically. This is achieved by conducting one's operational maneuver in the enemy's operational depth. There are fundamental differences between operational maneuvers conducted on land and those conducted at sea or in the air. An operational maneuver on land is supported not only with tactical fires but also with operational fires. In land warfare, an operational maneuver is normally conducted in the part of the theater largely controlled by one's forces, while such a maneuver at sea or in the air usually takes place within a space that is either disputed or controlled by the enemy forces. A ground force conducting maneuver moves from its base of operations along several lines of operations, via selected geographic decisive points, to obtain a favorable position or area from which to attack the enemy's center of gravity or some critical vulnerability. An operational maneuver on land consists of a series of successive tactical maneuvers and movements, with some breaks. An operational maneuver at sea or in the air is, in contrast, conducted almost uninterruptedly and with little or no enemy opposition until a position or area is reached from which the final assault can be launched. The latter phase involves tactical maneuver. In the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the Japanese fast attack carrier forces conducted an operational maneuver from Etorofu (Kuriles) across the North Pacific to a point between 200 and 230 nautical miles north of Pearl Harbor. 8 The flight of the carrier aircraft from that position to their target area on Oahu constituted a tactical maneuver. Likewise, in an amphibious landing operation, the movement of amphibious forces and forces of close and distant (operational) cover from the staging areas to the line or area from which landing craft or helicopters would move inland is an example of an operational maneuver at sea.

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Penetration: Regardless of the objectives to be accomplished and forces involved, there are three basic forms of maneuver: penetration, envelopment, and encirclement. Each of these in turn could be conducted in several variations (see Figures 24 and 25). In a penetration maneuver, the attacker seeks to break up or penetrate a selected sector of the defender's main position and move into his rear, thereby preventing the movement of the defender's reserves or reinforcements to the main defensive line or position. The attacker then operates along interior lines of operations. 9 Secondary attacks are conducted along the entire front of the defender, while the most powerful coordinated assaults are directed against a section of the front offering the most favorable conditions for success. Once the penetration is made, the gap should be widened to seize the objective and to defeat the shattered elements of the enemy force in detail.' °

A penetration maneuver is used when the enemy's flanks are not assailable. The aim is to mass sufficient combat potential at the point of penetration to overwhelm the enemy forces. The point of attack is usually selected where the enemy's forces are least densely deployed." When penetrations develop from frontal assaults, they are called penetrations of opportunity. A penetration requires a stronger force than a flanking maneuver. If successful, a penetration maneuver allows the attacker not only to envelop the defender's broken front but also to seriously threaten the defender's lines of supply. It also may compel the defender to change his front to oppose the attacker's penetrating force. The change of front in such a situation is difficult, and it is always liable to the danger of local defeat. 'z The defender could theoretically counteract the attacker's attempt at penetration by quickly moving his forces from other parts of the front to the

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area of penetration, closing the breach or enveloping the attacking forces, abandoning the existing front, or withdrawing to a new defensive position. In land warfare, penetration maneuvers have often been very successful. In the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese achieved a complete victory in the Battle of Mukden, fought between 21 February and 10 March 1905. In World War I, several attempts at operational penetration were tried, but only two were successful. The Austro-German penetration of the Polish-Galician salient at Gorlice-Tamow on 2-9 May 1915 resulted in considerable operational success. After a four-hour heavy bombardment with about 700 guns, the German 11th Army and Austro-Hungarian 2nd Army, with six army corps, broke through the Russian lines along the twenty-eight-mile front to a depth of fifty miles, causing the collapse of the entire Russian front. The Russians lost 210,000 men (including 140,000 captured) of some 250,000 men in the area of penetration, along with vast quantities of weapons and equipment. 1 3 This action greatly facilitated a 300-mile advance, and by mid-September, German troops occupied Vilnius, Lithuania. Another successful operational penetration in World War I was conducted by the Austro-Hungarian and German troops at Tolmein (Tolmino) on the Austro-Italian front in 1917. The newly formed Austro-Hungarian 14th Army, under German command, achieved operational penetration in the Tolmein-Caporetto-Plezza sector during the Battle of Caporetto (12th Battle of Isonzo) between 24 October and 12 November. Two other Austro-Hungarian armies supported the main effort. By the time the AustroGerman offensive ended, the Italians had suffered a catastrophic defeat: 40,000 men

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killed and wounded; 275,000 men captured; and some 2,500 guns and huge quantities of 14 ammunition lost, while their opponents lost only about 20,000 men killed or wounded. The Allied attempt to effect operational penetration in the so-called Second Battle of the Aisne, conducted between 16 and 20 April 1917, failed. The plan called for a coordinated attack by the British on the Arras front to be followed by the French main attack on the Aisne, pinching off the German salient. About 1.2 million men and 7,000 guns were available for this offensive. However, before the British attack began, the Germans evacuated the threatened salient and withdrew to the newly fortified Hindenburg Line. This allowed the Germans to bring in additional reinforcements, derail initial Allied plans, and restrict the Allied attacks to the flanks of the devastated area. The French attack, known as the Nivelle Offensive, was as equally fruitless as the British one. This attack, launched after ten days of artillery preparation, saw the Germans eventually engage forty-eight French divisions with forty of their own; the Allies failed to break through the German front. Although losses were not excessive by World War I standards (totaling 120,000 men, with the German losses much smaller), the failure of the offensive had catastrophic psychological results on the public. 1 5 In the modern era, the armor and mechanized forces, supported by ground attack aircraft, allow the attacker to penetrate the defender's front at several places and then advance to reach selected operational objectives. The attacker usually operates from exterior lines, as the Germans did in their invasions of Poland in September 1939 and the former Yugoslavia in April 1941. The defender operates from interior lines, but mistakenly chooses to defend the entire border area without a weight of effort given to defense of a certain part of its territory. This, in turn, allows the attacker to use tactical penetrations at several carefully selected places and then quickly advance with his mobile forces into the operational depth of the defender. The Germans used this method successfully in the first few days of their invasion of Soviet Russia in June 1941, but then they operated along interior and diverging lines of operations. The German panzer and infantry divisions, strongly supported by the Luftwaffe, spearheaded multiple thrusts by penetrating the entire Soviet front and then moved quickly to destroy and encircle the Soviet forces at the border and reach their objectives in the rear. When an envelopment is not possible because of terrain or the situation in general, then one method to reach the decision is a breakthrough, a logical extension of the penetration. While penetration disrupts the continuity of the defender's front, a breakthrough seeks to envelop the defender from within. The broader the penetration, the deeper the penetration wedge that can be driven. The deeper the attacker penetrates the defender's front, the more effectively he can envelop and frustrate the defender's attempts to close his front by withdrawing into the rear. When the penetration is exploited to the maximum, a breakthrough follows. The aim is to penetrate the fragmented defender's front and, with deep thrusts diverting to the sides, open the way into the enemy flanks and rear. 1 6 The attacking force should try to reduce the defender's individual positions by encircling and isolating them. The breakthrough is not considered fully successful until the attacker overcomes the defender's artillery positions and his reserves "roll up" the defenders from the newly created fronts. Napoleon I at Austerlitz in November 1805 and the Germans at Sedan in May 1940 used penetration to create interior flanks, which were then enveloped. 1 7

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Envelopment: Envelopment maneuver, or , flanking attack, is directed against the enemy's flanks or rear to outflank, oust, or trap enemy forces possibly against some geographic feature. 1 8 Field Marshal von Schlieffen thought the flank attack was the "gist of the entire history of war." 1 9 The envelopment is aimed at overlapping one of the defender's flanks, thereby completely changing his front. It potentially threatens the defender's ability to use his lines of retreat. The attacker could concentrate his forces and bring them simultaneously into action, while the defender has no option but to use his forces sequentially. Envelopment maneuver is conducted by operating from exterior lines of operations . 2° This form of operational maneuver offers greater chances of success than a frontal attack. It also requires a smaller force and less time and, when directed at a decisive place of the enemy's defense, may lead to the enemy's encirclement, withdrawal, or redeployment. In land warfare, a flank that could be enveloped is called an assailable or tactical flank. When a force has positioned its flank against an obstruction, such as an unfordable river or an impassable swamp, and has thus protected itself from significant assault, that flank is unassailable, and the force is said to have refused a flank. A force conducting an envelopment maneuver would force the opposing force to fight in two or more directions to meet the converging efforts of the attack. In general, the success of an envelopment maneuver depends largely on the degree of surprise achieved and on the ability of the supporting attack to contain the bulk of the enemy forces. An advantage of the operational envelopment is that the attacker, by striking at the flank and the rear, could interdict or even cut off the defender's lines of supplies, thereby forcing him to abandon his main defensive positions. One disadvantage of the envelopment is that if the attacker fails, his lines of supplies would be open to attack or he could be altogether driven away from his own original line of advance. The success of the envelopment maneuver also depends on achieving surprise. The greater the surprise, the less time is left to the defender to prepare and conduct a counter-envelopment maneuver. Surprise is achieved by secrecy of planning, the high tactical mobility and covertness of movement, deception, containing the defender's forces at the front, and superior combat power. 23 Superior mobility of the attacking force greatly increases the chances of success. 24 This form of maneuver, when successful, achieves both a psychological and a physical effect by preventing the arrival of the enemy reinforcements and resupply and by cutting off the enemy lines of retreat. The success is greatly enhanced if the attacker deceives the defender as to his point of main attack, as the Germans did at Sedan in May 1940. However, deception is difficult to achieve under modern conditions when large forces must be moved, because such movement is difficult to conceal. An important prerequisite for the success of the envelopment is determining the distribution of forces between the mobile force and the fixing force. To do that properly is an art of leadership. 25 Even the brilliant Napoleon 1 made a mistake in the Battle at Eylau against the Prussians on 7 February 1807 by assigning too much force on fruitless frontal attack, leaving an inadequate force for the decisive envelopment maneuver. 26 In the conduct of the envelopment, a supporting attack is usually necessary to fix the defender's force so that he cannot maneuver. Such an attack can also be used to deceive the opposing force regarding the form of maneuver being employed . 27 To enhance the elements of surprise, the fixing force should attack first, followed some time later by the

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thrust of the mobile forces into the flanks of the defender's defenses. A fixing force could greatly complicate and even endanger the success of an envelopment maneuver if, instead of tying down the defender's forces, it acts too aggressively and penetrates the enemy line and even starts advancing into the depth of the defender. The deeper the fixing force advances, the greater its negative impact on the movement of the mobile forces. In the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the U.S. Marine/Join t Forces Command-East (JFCE) force deployed south of Kuwait had the role of the fixing force. On the first day of the ground offensive, 24 February, the U.S. Marines (MARCENT/JFCE), to their surprise, broke though the Iraqi defenses and started a speedy advance toward the city of Kuwait. General Schwarzkopf s plan of the single-sided envelopment maneuver in the Western Desert envisaged the attack by the mobile force (XIII Airborne Corps and VII Army Corps) to start on the morning of 25 February, or one day after the MARCENT/JFCE deployment . 2s The continued MARCENT/JFCE advance would push the Iraqis too far north and jeopardize General Schwarzkopf s entire plan to close the net behind the Iraqi Republican Guards from the west and into their rear. In addition, the left flank of the MARCENT/JFCE force was unprotected as they continued their advance into Kuwait. General Schwarzkopf resolved this increasingly serious problem by advancing the time of the mobile forces' attack to 3:00 P.M. on 24 February. The MARCENT/JFCE force also halted the advance by nightfall and took defensive positions. 29 The maneuver in the Western Desert, dubbed "Hail Mary," was partially successful. Most of the fortythree Iraqi divisions deployed along the 280-mile-long Iraqi border with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were trapped, but three infantry and one armored division escaped. In addition, an entire armored division and parts of four to five infantry divisions (equivalent to one and a half divisions) of the elite Republican Guards, with some 800 tanks and 1,000 armored vehicles, avoided destruction. However, some 70,000 Iraqis were taken prisoner. 30 In land warfare, an envelopment maneuver is especially advantageous if the base of the enveloping force can be transferred to its change of front. It is also an advantage if the envelopment maneuver is conducted using a lateral base of operations. If the attacker is forced to redeploy his forces from the defense of the front to take part in the envelopment maneuver, than his front might, in turn, be penetrated by an agile and aggressive defender. The longer the attacker's front line, the greater the danger of this happening, because the weaker the effects of the envelopment on any given sector of the front, the less compelling it becomes for the defender to send reinforcements to that threatened point. 3 1 The defender's options to counteract the envelopment include counterenvelopment, extraction or diversion of the attacker's strength from another part of the front, attacking the envelopment's axis, and bringing additional reinforcements and supplies by air. 32 The defender also could bend the threatened wing back to form a new defensive flank with reserves, thus creating a fresh front to the enemy envelopment. 33 Von Schlieffen argued the attacker must recognize the possibility that the defender would avoid envelopment and then immediately start pursuit. 34 An envelopment maneuver can be conducted by concentrating one's forces either off or on the battlefield. The first method of concentration was used in the German attack on France in May 1940, and in the failed German offensive in the same area in December

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1944 that led to the so-called Battle of the Bulge. Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, Sr. preferred envelopment by concentrating forces on the battlefield, as he demonstrated in the battle at Koeniggraetz in July 1866. General Paul von Hindenburg and his Eighth Army also used such a method at the Battle of Tannenberg in August 1914. Von Hindenburg planned to envelop the Russian forces in southern Poland in 1914. However, Austro-Hungarian Chief of the General Staff General Conrad von Hoetzendorf was unwilling to use his forces in that manner, and the plan was not executed . 35 The Russians used the envelopment maneuver by concentrating on the battlefield in the Battle of Gumbinnen (Gusev), East Prussia, on 19-20 August 1914. The Russian First Army (six and a half divisions and five cavalry divisions) crossed the East Prussian border and forced the German Eighth Army (seven divisions and one cavalry division) to retreat at Gumbinnen. The Russian Second Army (ten infantry divisions and three cavalry divisions), separated from the First Army by a forty-six-mile-wide lake, crossed the southern border of East Prussia, which was defended with only three divisions, into the rear of the German Eighth Army. The Russian maneuver was so successful that the German Eighth Army commander General Max von Prittwitz briefly considered withdrawing his forces all the way back to behind the Vistula River. 36 An envelopment maneuver can be conducted along one or two axes. In the singlesided envelopment on land, the attacker uses a single axis and usually limits the defender's opportunity to avoid maneuver, either by placing strong holding or fixing forces on one or both flanks, or by restricting the defender's option by trying to reach some objective on the enemy's coast, as the Germans did in Flanders in May 1940. Such a maneuver is designed to act as a "revolving door" against the enemy force. It has a pivot, usually a strong point, around which the forces taking part revolve, either clockwise or counterclockwise. The German so-called Sickle Cut maneuver (as British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill called it) in May 1940 envisaged a holding or fixing force on both German wings (Army Group B, with two armies in the north, and Army Group C, with two armies in the south), and an envelopment maneuver following operational penetration with the Panzer Group von Kleist (two panzer corps and one motorized infantry corps) of Army Group A (four armies) between Sedan and Dinant, with the subsequent advance to the English Channel coast. 37 The pivot of the maneuver was east of Luxembourg. The farther the Allied forces advanced into Belgium in accordance with their Dyle Plan, the easier it was for the German panzer forces to thrust all the way to the Channel behind them. This maneuver, conducted in counterclockwise direction, took ten days and covered a distance of about 210 miles. 38 The Germans also planned to conduct a single-sided operational envelopment maneuver in their Watch on the Rhine [Watht am Rhein] Operation of December 1944. They selected the area between Monschau and Echternach as the point of main attack. The German Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh armies would move in a clockwise direction all the way to the port of Antwerp (see Map A-12). 39 Another, more recent example was the maneuver executed by the Coalition forces in the Western Desert during the ground phase of the Gulf War of 1990-1991 (Operation Desert Storm). The pivot point of the maneuver was west of Wadi al Batin. The U.S.-led Coalition forces of XVIII Airborne Corps (four U.S. and one French division) and VII Corps (four U.S. and one U.K. division) were envisaged to advance toward the Euphrates River valley in the sector between As Samawah and An Nasiriyah, with their spearhead directed at Basra.

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Single-sided envelopment maneuvers are also conducted in naval and air warfare. In contrast to such maneuvers on land, there is usually no clearly recognizable fixing force (the enemy's forces are usually tied to a specific area by the threat of one's action, or through operational deception). Amphibious landings intended to accomplish objectives within the operational depth of the enemy constitute a form of single-sided envelopment maneuver. In addition, an amphibious feint could be used as part of a fixing force in the course of a single-sided envelopment operational maneuver by ground forces. Such was the role of the U.S. 4th and 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) during the ground offensive in the Gulf War of 1990-1991. This force was deployed off the Kuwaiti coast and conducted two amphibious demonstrations on 25 and 26 February. Deployment and actions of the 4th MEB, supported by two battleships (Missouri and Wisconsin), tied down probably two Iraqi divisions on the coast and defenses along the 185-mile coast, thereby preventing their counter-attack on U.S. Marines penetrating Iraqi defenses along the Kuwaiti-Saudi border. 41 A two-.sided (or double) envelopment (also called a pincer movement) is an offensive maneuver along two axes, in which the main attack passes around or over the 42 enemy's primary defensive positions to secure objectives to the enemy rear. In the attack, one method of effecting double envelopment is for the maneuvering force to bypass both of the defender's flanks. In the second method, the maneuvering force conducts a supporting attack in the center to fix the defender, while the wings attack the flanks and rear to envelop the defender. Double envelopment is intended to force the defender either to abandon his objectives or to execute a general withdrawal. It is usually a prelude to an encirclement and destruction of the trapped forces. In defense, such a maneuver can be conducted by having the forces defending the central part of a front fall back to create a pocket, while the wings remain static (as in the Battle of Cannae in 216 BC). As the attacker continues his attack, the static wings envelop the flanks of the advancing force, resulting in a double envelopment. In both the single and double envelopment on land, it is essential that a secondary frontal attack contain as much of the defender's force as possible, to hinder his countermeasures. The appearance of the attacking force in the defender's rear would normally prevent the defender from reinforcing his forward defense line, and his lines of supplies could be interdicted or even cut off. The losses for the attacking forces are reduced because their attacks are directed against less prepared and less capable secondechelon forces. 44 Because the double envelopment aims to encircle the enemy forces, this 45 maneuver is potentially more decisive than a single envelopment. The German and Soviet experience in World War 11 showed that because of the open terrain and slow movement of infantry, it was often necessary to plan and execute two-sided envelopments by using armored and mechanized forces as a spearhead. A single-sided envelopment alone did not allow for the encirclement and destruction of large enemy forces on the open terrain in western Russia. German forces conducted several highly successful operational double-envelopment maneuvers in the initial phase of their invasion of Soviet Russia in 1941. The German double envelopment of the Soviet Second and Sixth Armies at Kiev ended on 26 September 1941, after only a week of fighting, with the destruction of four Soviet armies (forty-five divisions), the partial destruction of two others, and the taking of 650,000 prisoners. This operation also led to a 185-mile-wide gap in the Soviet defenses. The Kiev pocket was initially some 130 miles

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in width and depth. In the double envelopment by the German 3rd and 4th Panzer Group, the greater part of four Soviet armies had been encircled by 7 October west of Vyasma. In the Bryansk pocket, two Soviet armies and fifteen other units were encircled on 20 October. The Russians conducted several double-envelopment maneuvers against the German forces during their great offensives in 1944. The Soviet summer offensive started on 22 June 1944 along the 620-mile front of the German Army Group Center. The Soviet forces composed of four Fronts (Army Groups in western terms) with 140 divisions and forty-three tanks and mechanized units faced only twenty-eight German divisions. By 27 June the Soviet 1st Baltic and 3rd Belorussian Fronts had encircled two corps of the German 3rd Panzer Army at Vitebsk, while the 1st Belorussian Front encircled the bulk of the German Ninth Army with about 100,000 men at Bobruisk, east of Minsk. 48 The Soviets destroyed one German corps of 35,000 men in the Vitebsk pocket . 49 By 8 July the Soviets destroyed the German forces at Bobruisk and took some 57,000 prisoners. In naval or air warfare, double envelopment maneuvers at the operational level are rare. The Japanese apparently had a penchant for such maneuvers, as evidenced by their invasion of the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) and the attempted double envelopment by the Japanese First and Second Diversionary Attack Forces in the Battle for Leyte in October 1944. With the advent of airborne forces and helicopters, a vertical envelopment -a maneuver against the flank or rear of an enemy force from above became possible. The "encircling" forces can be delivered by air, through the use of parachutes, gliders, or helicopters. Such a maneuver encompasses the elements of horizontal envelopment. Examples at the operational level are the airborne part of the German invasion of Norway in April 1940, the German airborne assault on Crete in May 1941 (Operation Merkur [Mercury]), and the Allied assault on Arnhem (Operation Market Garden) in September 1944. A wide envelopment (or turning maneuver) is intended to pass around the enemy's main forces to strike at some vital point deep in the rear, preferably beyond the operational depth of the enemy's defenses. Its purpose is to indirectly attack the enemy's operational center of gravity by threatening his lines of supplies in the operational depth. The defender could relatively easily avoid the attacker's envelopment, but not the turning movement. This is especially true if the defender is forced to fight with a reverse front and his lines of supplies are shifted . 5 1 Among other things, the success of wide movement depends on the speed of movement of one's forces and the strength of the enemy flank to be turned. In the modern era, rail networks were the strategic means of achieving this purpose. 52 In contrast to envelopment, the main attack and supporting attack forces in a turning movement usually operate beyond their mutual supporting distance. Deception, secrecy, and high mobility are vital to successful execution of a turning movement. 53 In envelopment, the intent is to hold the enemy in position while attacking his center of gravity through the flank or rear, while in the turning movement, the intent is to force the defender to an untenable position by cutting off his supply lines or forcing him to reverse his front. In a turning maneuver, the enemy may be fixed by a supporting attack, as in an envelopment, but the maneuvering and fixing forces will be out of mutual-support distance . 54 Thus, it is easier for the defender to avoid envelopment than a turning

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maneuver, especially if the defender is forced to fight with a reverse front and his lines of supply are shifted or cut off. 55 In addition, operational fires (discussed elsewhere) are more important in the protection of a force conducting a turning maneuver than in other forms of maneuver. Napoleon 1 used an operational turning maneuver that ended in the surrender of the Austrian General K. Mack, with 30,000 men and sixty guns, at Ulm on 17 October 1805. He abandoned his plans to invade England and gave orders on 26 August to move the 200,000 men of his newly designated Grand Armee into Bavaria to face the Austrians and Russians. The French moved seven corps from the arc-like base of operations stretching from Brest to the Rhine River and to Hannover. The French columns averaged nineteen miles per day, and every French corps was within forty-eight hours' distance from at least two adjacent corps. In the era of million-man armies, wide movement required many days and even weeks to complete, giving the defender more than enough time to stiffen his resistance and ultimately prevent the attacker from accomplishing his objectives. The French and the British suffered tremendous losses in the first few weeks of the German offensive in the West in August 1914, but in the end forced the Germans to stop their advance in the First Battle of the Marne on 5-9 September 1914. In fact, there was never really a Battle of the Marne, but a battle of attrition along the entire front. General von Moltke, Jr., misjudged the entire situation at the front, and his loss of nerve led to a fatal decision to break off attacks and order a general withdrawal to a more favorable position for defense. However, in these few days, each side lost about 250,000 men. 57 If a turning maneuver achieves strategic results leading to the general withdrawal of the enemy forces along the entire front, than it is called a strategic envelopment. An example of such a successful turning movement was the landing of the U.S. X Corps of some 70,000 men (including 9,000 South Koreans) at Inchon on 15 September 1950 (Operation Chromite), which turned the North Korean position on the Pusan Perimeter. Inchon was the principal port on the western coast of Korea, some eighteen miles from the capital of Seoul, which served as the hub of the North Korean communications lines. The capture of Inchon and Seoul would result in the disruption of the North Korean forces' rear area and at the same time provide UN forces a valuable staging and supply point for further offensive operations. The landing took place approximately 150 miles behind the main enemy lines (see Map A-13). 59 Penetration-Envelopment: Sometimes, the best way to obtain a quick decision is to effect a penetration maneuver followed by a single-sided envelopment. One of the prerequisites for the successful outcome of the penetration-envelopment maneuver is to obtain timely, accurate, and relevant intelligence on the defender's forces at the front and then select a point of main attack in the sector where the defender has the least capable forces. The attacker must be able to deceive the defender as to his selected sector of main effort and point of main attack. This could be accomplished through an elaborate operational deception. Deception, if successful, should allow the attacker to covertly move and concentrate his forces to the point of main attack. In the first phase of their campaign in the West in May 1940, the Germans used combined penetration and singlesided envelopment maneuver to cut off and destroy the major part of the Allied forces deployed in northern France and Belgium. It was General von Manstein's idea to combine single-sided envelopment with penetration, a form of maneuver von Schlieffen 329

emphatically rejected during his time as Chief of the German General Staff. Von Manstein selected the Sedan-Dinant sector to be the point for frontal attack followed by a penetration maneuver. This would be followed by a single-sided envelopment maneuver all the way to the Channel coast. The aim was to avoid a frontal attack on the Allied forces as they moved into Belgium, but to cut them off in the rear of the Somme River. Von Manstein's idea was unconventional: he suggested that panzers advance by thrusting deep into the enemy's rear, without regard to their open flanks. 61 The Germans assigned their newly created Panzer Group von Kleist to spearhead the attack in the West. The German offensive in the West opened on 10 May, and three days later, to the great surprise of the Allies, the German XIX Panzer Corps led by General Heinz Guderian began to cross the Meuse River at Sedan. The Allies fully expected the Germans would use a revised version of the von Schlieffen Plan, not a new and bold plan. They were also greatly surprised that the Germans concentrated seven of their ten panzer divisions at a narrow front in the Ardennes, an area the French considered impassable for heavy and mobile forces. The entire Ardennes area was weakly defended by the Allies, the area at Sedan in particular. The decisive impact on the success of the entire operation rested on crossing the Meuse River at Sedan on 14 May. The Luftwaffe carried out 1,215 divebomber and heavy bomber attacks on the 1.9-mile-wide front at Sedan. A few days later, other divisions of Panzer Group von Kleist and the XV Panzer Corps (with two panzer divisions) crossed the Meuse River on a wide front, from Sedan in the south to Dinant in the north, and began their drive toward the Channel coast. The subsequent envelopment maneuver ended on 20 May at Abbeville on the French Channel coast. The lines of retreat to the south were cut off for about 1.5 million of the Allied troops. 64 In a war at sea, it is sometimes possible to conduct a penetration followed by an envelopment maneuver. In the Operation Rolls of Drums [Paukenschlag] in February 1942, the German U-boats deployed off the U.S./Canada East Coast conducted an operational maneuver that included penetration of the Allied defenses in the Bay of Biscay. A penetration maneuver can also occur during the course of an operational envelopment. The Bismarck "combat group" [Kampfgruppe] initiated its operational maneuver from a base in Norway and then penetrated the British defenses in the Strait of Denmark before reaching its assigned operating area in the central Atlantic. Likewise, in the Battle for Leyte, the Japanese First and Second Diversionary Attack Forces had to penetrate successive Allied tactical defensive positions before reaching their planned attack area in the Tacloban anchorage. In an amphibious landing, operational envelopment is normally conducted first, followed by the tactical penetration of the enemy's defenses on the beaches. Sometimes such a maneuver can be combined with an operational penetration maneuver on the land front. This was the intention of the Allied planners for the landing at Anzio (Operation Shingle) in January 1944. The UN amphibious landing operation at Inchon was also a turning movement combined with a penetration maneuver from inside the Pusan Perimeter; both forces were linked just south of Seoul by 26 September, thereby cutting off the escape of a major part of eight North Korean divisions. Encirclement: An encirclement maneuver is a logical extension of double envelopment. It also usually takes place when one's forces conducting a double envelopment meet in the rear of the opposing force. In encirclement, the attacking force must engage every section of the perimeter, preferably simultaneously, with the aim of capturing a large part 330

of the enemy force. It can also result from penetrations, turning movements, infiltrations, and single-sided envelopments. 6s In conducting this form of operational maneuver, the attacker must be aware of the risk of finding his forces being enveloped by the defender, who might decide to counterattack or even to counter-encircle. Single- and doubleencirclement maneuvers are differentiated. Single encirclement is the most common variant, wherein only an inner front, facing the enemy's troops, is created. In this case, if the encircled forces are strong, they may be able to break out; if they do, encircling forces could find themselves attacked from the rear. To prevent this, the attacker might establish a second, wider encirclement to prevent other enemy forces from reaching the encircled forces, thus creating a double encirclement with both an inner front facing the encircled enemy and an outer front. 66 If the encircled force is unable to withdraw or no reinforcements and supplies can be brought in, then the defender is "completely encircled." In that case, the attacker does not need to surround the defending force with an unbroken cordon of troops. Cutting off the defender's lines of retreat and supply is sufficient to finish off the encircled force. In the Franco-Prussian War, the Prussians encircled Marshal Achille (-Francois) Bazaine at the fortress Metz in October 1870. They divided the main body of their troops in three parts to counter any attempt by the French to break out of the encirclement. On 27 October, after nine days of siege, Marshal Bazaine surrendered with about 173,000 troops. 67 Complete encirclement of large forces occurred on several occasions in World War II, and on a smaller scale in the Korean War. In late June 1941, the advancing Germans encircled some twenty Soviet divisions in the area between Byalistok and Minsk.68 By early July, the Germans had encircled three out of ten Soviet armies in the area and a large part of a reinforcing army. Twenty-two divisions and seven tank, and six divisions and six mechanized brigades, were destroyed, and 290,000 men taken prisoner. The Soviets enveloped the German 1 st Panzer Army in the Kaments-Podolsk area (Ukraine) on 24 March 1944. However, three days later, the Germans initiated a breakout, and by 6 April the entire 1st Panzer Army had established contact with reinforcing units at Buczacz (Buchach) and established a new front from the Dniester River to Brody. 7° The Soviets mounted one of their largest offensives in mid-July 1944 against the German North Ukraina Army Group. The Soviet 1st Ukrainian Front of some eighty divisions (including six cavalry divisions), ten tank or mechanized corps, and a number of brigades, with 840,000 men, 14,000 guns, 1,600 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 2,800 aircraft attacked the 1st and 4th Panzer Army along the broad front . 71 This operation resulted in the encirclement of the German XIII Corps with 40,000 men at Brody. 72 After very heavy fighting, part of the German troops escaped through the Soviet lines, but 25,000 men were killed and another 17,000 were taken prisoner. 73 To complete the destruction of the encircled forces, the attacker needs to completely isolate the area on land, in the air, and sometimes from the sea. The Germans achieved great operational success by cutting off the Allied forces in northern France and Belgium in May 1940. However, they failed to achieve strategic success because they did not succeed in destroying or capturing the major part of the Allied forces bottled up in the Dunkirk bridgehead. After reaching the Channel coast, the German forces continued their advance northward and seized all the French ports except Dunkirk. It was only matter of

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days before about 1.5 million Allied soldiers were completely encircled and forced to surrender. However, Hitler, on the advice of some of his senior army commanders, halted the German advance on 24 May, when the panzers were only about nine miles from Dunkirk. He directed the Luftwaffe to complete the destruction of the Allied forces. The Allied forces on the beaches at Dunkirk were negligible at the time the German stopped their advance. This situation began to change quickly, and by the time the Luftwaffe resumed its attacks on 27 May, many of the British and French troops had reached Dunkirk. The Germans inexplicably failed to close a corridor for the encircled Allied troops at Lille, allowing four British and several French divisions to escape. 75 The British started evacuation of the Allied troops from the Dunkirk bridgehead (Operation Dynamo) on 26 May. They thought they had only two days left to complete it and that only about 45,000 men could be saved. However, by the time the evacuation ended on 4 June, some 370,000 Allied troops (including 123,000 French soldiers) were brought to safety in England. Some 80,000 French soldiers went into German captivity. 76 The Allies had to abandon their heavy weapons and equipment and huge quantities of small arms and ammunition. Their total losses during the evacuation were 272 ships and small craft, including thirteen destroyers and 177 aircraft. The Allied success in evacuating so many troops from a seemingly hopeless situation was largely due to Hitler's decision to leave it to the Luftwaffe to reduce and destroy the Allied forces on the beaches, combined with German inferiority at sea. This, in turn, allowed the Royal Navy unhindered access (except for the Luftwaffe's attacks) to the beaches around Dunkirk. The Allied failure to encircle and completely destroy the trapped German Fifth and Seventh Armies in the Falaise Gap in August 1944 was not only an operational failure, it also had strategic implications. It probably prolonged the Allied campaign in France for several months. In the aftermath of the Normandy invasion, the Allies planned to secure lodgment in the part of France between the Seine and the Loire rivers. The initial plan called for General George Patton's Third Army to seize Brittany and its ports while General Courtney Hodges' First Army protected the Third Army's flank and then moved to the southeast and finally eastward with the British and Canadian armies toward the Seine River. However, on 3 August the Allies changed their plans. A decision was made to clear Brittany with only one army corps, while the rest of the forces would advance toward the Seine River. The U.S. XV Army Corps initiated a sweep around the German positions toward the Laval-Le Mans line. 78 On the left flank, the British 21st Army Group under General Bernard L. Montgomery thought, wrongly as it turned out, that the Germans facing the encirclement would try to escape by pivoting around Caen because they had no alternative. 79 The Allied overall objective was to push the Germans against the lower part of the Seine and, by cutting off their lines of retreat, to encircle and destroy them. $° General Montgomery directed the First Canadian Army on the left wing to attack due south on a line from Caen to Falaise to interdict the movement of the German forces and make withdrawal difficult, if not impossible, as soon as possible but not later than 8 August. However, to the great surprise of the Allied commanders, the Germans did not withdraw, but counterattacked on 7 August. Despite initial successes at Mortain, the German thrust toward Avranches was halted by stiff Allied resistance on the ground and attacks from the air . 8 ' The Canadian attack bogged down on 9 August, only a day after it started. By 13 August, the Germans' heavy resistance slowed the Allied

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advance. The Germans had in the Falaise pocket two field armies with more than 100,000 men; the U.S. and Canadian troops were separated by some twenty-five miles of open space between Argentan and Falaise. The advance of the Third Army was stopped, and the great opportunity to destroy two German armies had been lost before the gap was closed on 19 August. Most of the encircled German troops escaped, including many panzer units. 82 By then, other Allied troops had reached the Seine, encircling the German troops on the lower part of the river. However, the failure to close the Argentan-Falaise pocket quickly enough resulted in more Allied casualties than would have been necessary. The Germans conducted an orderly withdrawal from the pocket despite the limited road network and the huge Allied superiority on the ground and in the air. 83 The best-known example of the double encirclement in modern military history was the Soviet encirclement of some twenty-two Axis divisions, including six panzer and motorized divisions, with about 284,000 troops at Stalingrad in late November 1942. x4 This included the entire Sixth German Army, about one-third of the 4th Panzer Army, about half of the Romanian forces on the Don, and about one-fifth of the Romanian forces deployed south of Stalingrad. One of the Germans' main objectives in their great summer offensive in southern Russia was to seize Stalingrad and then extend the German front down the Volga River to Astrakhan. This task was entrusted to General Friedrich von Paulus' Sixth Army and General Hermann Hoth's 4th Panzer Army, both a part of Army Group B. The successful capture of these two objectives would protect the left flank of Army Group A, then advancing toward three Caucasian oilfields. However, the Germans greatly underestimated the difficulties in seizing a large urban center, as well as the Soviet ability to mount a successful counteroffensive. The battle for Stalingrad started on 9 September; three days later the first German troops entered the city. The stiffening of the Soviet resistance prevented the Germans from consolidating their gains in the city until late November. However, the Soviets successfully massed forces of three Fronts (Stalingrad, Don, and Southwest) 1,0 15,000 men and ninety-two and a half divisions along a 530-mile-long front. xs The first Soviet counteroffensive (Operation Uranus), conducted between 18 and 23 November, trapped the Sixth Army and major parts of the 4th Panzer Army in a thirty-seven- by twentyeight-mile Stalingrad pocket. The Soviets exploited the weaknesses in the Axis's deployments around Stalingrad by driving a northern pincer from Serafimovich toward Kalach, through the positions of the poorly trained and equipped troops of the Third Romanian Army protecting the left flank of the Sixth Army. The Romanian forces quickly collapsed under a massive Soviet onslaught, and after a single day practically ceased to exist as a fighting force. 86 The Soviet southern pincer from Abganerovo toward Sovetsky split the 4th Panzer Army; the major part of the German contingent was trapped inside the pocket (IV Army Corps and 29 th Motorized Infantry Division), while Headquarters, Rumanian Fourth Army, Rumanian VI and VII Corps, and the 16th Infantry Division escaped entrapment. The 4th Panzer Army was unable to stop the Soviet advance around Stalingrad or southwestwards along the left bank of the Don River. x' The Soviet counteroffensive completely changed the situation for the Germans in southern Russia. The consequences of the possible loss of a large army were incalculable. However, Hitler refused to give the order to withdraw while the Sixth Army still had sufficient combat strength to do so. Instead, Hitler ordered that a relief effort be mounted

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to save the encircled German forces in Stalingrad. He appointed Field Marshal von Manstein as the commander of the newly created Army Group Don, activated on 27 November. This force was initially composed of only two panzer divisions, one infantry division, the headquarters of the 4th Panzer Army, and the remnants of the Romanian Fourth Army. Hitler's decision to stand fast in Stalingrad was also influenced by Reichsmarshal Goering's assurance on 23 November that the Luftwaffe would be able to deliver 350 tons of supplies per day (versus the 500-600 tons actually needed)."' However, to mount a successful airlift, it was necessary to use over 1,000 Ju-52 aircraft. The success also depended on an adequate number of airfields inside the pocket, good ground maintenance and repair organization, secure airspace, good flying weather, and a short distance from the airfields in the rear to the Stalingrad pocket.~ 9 Von Manstein's effort to reach Stalingrad (Operation Wintergewitter [Winter Storm]) was planned to start after 2 December with three divisions of the XXXV l t Panzer Corps. After ten days' delay, von Manstein was left with only two divisions to mount a relief effort. Von Manstein's forces were about seventy miles from the Stalingrad pocket. After some initial successes, the operation ran its course, and because of the stiffening Soviet resistance, the entire relief effort faltered after General Hoth's panzers reached Mishkova, some thirty-five miles from the pocket. 9° The Army Group Don failed to create a permanent corridor for the troops encircled in the Stalingrad pocket. For von Manstein, the only hope for the Sixth Army was to try to break out of the pocket (Operation Donnersehlag [Thunderbolt]). However, neither von Manstein or von Paulus had the authority to order it, and Hitler refused to the end to authorize such a course of action. Despite all the Luftwaffe's efforts, only about ninety tons of supplies, fuel, and ammunition on average were delivered per day to the encircled forces in the pocket. 91 After the failure of the relief effort, Army Group Don's situation became very vulnerable because of the continuing buildup of the Soviet forces on its left flank. 92 The Italian Eighth Army and the Hungarian Second Army were deployed in the critical 200 mile-long sector of the front on the Don River between Voronezh and Veshenskaya. Neither army was a better fighting force than the Romanians. 93 The very survival of Army Group A and Army Group Don depended on the few rail lines and crossings on the Donets, Dnepr, and Don rivers. This situation was of course obvious to the Soviet High Command. A larger Soviet major operation (Operation Saturn), planned to start on 10 December, intended to create a second ring around the trapped Sixth Army by encircling the Italian Eighth Army and the elements of Army Group Don inside the Don Bend and seizing Rostov and the lower Don to cut off the 4th Panzer Army and Army Group A . 94 Stalin also made a decision on 4 December to complete the destruction of the Sixth Army (Operation Koltso [Ring]). However, the Soviet plans were delayed because of the German relief effort by the Army Group Don. Eventually, the Soviets decided to reduce the scope of their offensive. The new offensive (Operation Maly Saturn [Little Saturn]), with forces of two Fronts, finally started on 16 December; its principal aim was to destroy the Italian Eighth Army protecting the left flank of Army Group Don. 95 This second encirclement consisted of the northern pincer in the direction of the Don-Donets corridor and then a link-up on the Chir River with the left pincer advancing from Kalach. The Italian Eighth Army and the Romanian Third Army offered little resistance, after only four days of fighting, and the Soviets streamed southward through an open 100mile-wide front. 96 This Soviet advance created fresh problems for Army Group Don,

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which from then on and until the end of the Stalingrad operation had to fight for its own survival. The situation for the encircled German troops in the Stalingrad pocket grew worse by the day. The Sixth Army's effective front-line infantry strength was reduced from 66,500 men in mid-October to only 25,000 men by 21 December. However, a total of some 246,000 men were trapped in the pocket in mid-December. 97 Hitler, continuing his deliriously unrealistic hope of saving the Sixth Army, planned a second relief effort. By the end of December, the Soviet's second encirclement was essentially complete and the fate of the German forces inside the Stalingrad pocket was sealed. The Soviet massive attack on the Stalingrad pocket started on 10 January with the forces of the Don Front and massive bombardment from the air and artillery. By then German combat strength had been reduced to only 117 battalions. In contrast, the Soviet Don Front had about 212,000 men organized in thirty-nine rifle divisions (not all up to full strength), seven air divisions, ten rifle and naval infantry brigades, five tank brigades and fourteen tank regiments, plus seventeen AA regiments, and some forty-five mortar and artillery regiments. 98 I n January, the size of the Stalingrad pocket was roughly the same as it was in November. Hitler directed the Luftwaffe to intensify its airlift to the pocket, but it was too late. The final phase of the Soviet attack on the pocket started on 22 January. Field Marshal von Paulus (promoted by Hitler on 30 January) surrendered on 31 January; the second pocket fell into Soviet hands two days later. German losses during the Battle of Stalingrad were never determined. The Soviets claimed that 91,000 Germans were taken prisoner and 147,000 died on the battlefield; this did not include some 30,000 wounded who were evacuated during the battle. The Soviet losses were never published, but they are believed to have been very heavy. 99 Conclusion: An operational maneuver is a critical element of any major operation or campaign. Hence, terms of the purpose, forces, size of area, and complexity differ significantly between an operational and tactical maneuver. Also, there are some significant differences between operational maneuver conducted on land, at sea, or in the air. Each form of operational maneuver offers distinctive advantages and disadvantages. The commanders and staffs must fully understand all these complexities to make the best decision as to which form of maneuver to apply. Any maneuver, and operational maneuver in particular, is a complex undertaking that requires meticulous planning, preparation, and execution. Any failure to properly plan and carry out an operational maneuver will result in the failure of a major operation or even campaign.

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Notes 1. Joseph Schroedel, The Art and Science of Operational Maneuver (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Command and General Staff College, 18 May 1988), pp. 4-5. 2. General Erich yon Ludendorf who was the Head of the Deployment Section [Auinarschabteilung] of the German General Staff in 1908-1912 claimed that von Schlieffen in his memorandum envisaged the employment of eight infantry divisions and sixteen reserve divisions while in 1905 only seventy-two i nfantry divisions were available and there was a shortage of sixteen reserve divisions; Terence Zuber, "The Schelieffen plan Reconsidered," War in History 6 (3) (July 1999), p. 266. 3. R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia o 'Military Histol°t , fi°om 3500 BC to the Present (New York, NY: Harper & Row Publishers, 1986), p. 93; Holger Herwig, The First World War. Germany and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918 (London: Arnold, the Hodder Headline Group, 1997), p. 100. 4. Von Mantey, "Umfassung, Umgehung and Durchbruch. Fine Schlieffen Studie," Wehr and Wissen 10 (October 1931), p. 5 77. 5. Ibid., pp. 577-8. 6. Terrence Zuber, "The Schlieffen Plan Reconsidered," p. 266. 7. Charles A. Willoughby, Maneuver in War (Harrisburg, PA: The Military Service Publishing Co., 1939, reprinted by Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 17 March 1986), p. 124. 8. Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, The Pearl Harbor Papers. Inside the Japanese Plans ( Washington, DC/New York/London: Brassey's, 1993), p. 100. 9. Hermann Franke, editor, Handbuch der neuzeitlichen Wehrwissenschaften , Vol. 1: Wehrpolitik and Kriegfuehrung (Berlin/Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter & Co, 1936), p. 206. 10. R. Ernest Dupuy, Trevor N. Dupuy, and Paul F. Braim, Military Heritage of America, Vol. 1 (McLean, VA/ Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 3rd edition, 1992), p. 17. 11. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-5: Operations ( Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), pp. 7-12. 1 2. Friedrich yon Bernhardi, On War of To-Day, translated by Karl Donat, Vol. 2: Combat and Conduct of War (London: Hugh Rees, Ltd., 1913), pp. 77-8. 1 3. Manfred Rauchensteiner, Der Tod des Doppeladlers. Oesterreich-Ungarn and der Erste Weltkrieg , (Graz/Vienna/Cologne: Verlag Styria, 1993), pp. 213-4; Willoughby, Maneuver in War , p. 93. 1 4. Dupuy and Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 BC to the Present , p. 971. 1 5. Willoughby, Maneuver in War, pp. 94-5; Dupuy and Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 BC to the Present, p. 966. 16. Franke, editor, Handbuch der neuzeitlichen Wehrwissenschaften , Vol. 1, p. 15. 17. Historical Evaluation and Research Organization (HERO), Developing a Methodology to Describe the Relationship of Mobility to Combat Effectiveness (Fairfax, VA: HERO, A Report prepared for Research Analysis Organization under Subcontract FY 67-ARD1-1-2, 27 December 1966), p. 37.

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18. Chief of the General Staff, Design for Military Operations. The British Military Doctrine (London: Ministry of Defense, 1989), p. 76. 19. Militaergeschichtliches Forschungsamt (MGFA), Development, Planning and Realization of Operational Conceptions in World War I and 11 (Herford/Bonn: E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1989), p. 9. 20. Franke, editor, Handbuch der neuzeitlichen Wehrwissenschaften Vol. 1, p. 206. 21. Von Bernhardi, On War of Today, Vol. 2, pp. 79-80. 22. Franke, editor, Handbuch der neuzeitlichen Wehrwissenschaften, Vol. 1, p. 15. 23. Board for Study of Principles of War, Principles of War; translated by Dr. Joseph West (Tokyo: Ground Self-Defense Force Staff College, January 1969; reprinted by Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, July 1983), pp. 40-1. 24. Dupuy, Dupuy, and Braim, Military Heritage of America Vol. 1, p. 16. 25. Franke, editor, Handbuch der neuzeitlichen Wehrwissenschaften, Vol. 1, p. 15. 26. Ibid., p. 15. 27. Von Mantey, "Umfassung, Umgehung and Durchbruch. Fine Schlieffen Studie," p. 575. 28. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals' War. The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), p. 376. 29. Ibid., pp. 361-3. 30. Martin Braun, "Planung and Verlauf der allierten streitkraeftegemeinsamen Landkriegsoperation," in Hartmut Zehrer, editor, Der Golfkonflikt. Dokumentation, Analyse and Bewertung aus militaerischer Sicht (Herford/Bonn: E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1992), pp. 89, 111. 31. Christopher Bellamy, The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare. Theory and Practice , (London/New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 67, 71; yon Bernhardi, On War of To-Day, translated by Karl Donat, Vol. 2, p. 68. 32. Board for Study of Principles of War, Principles of Way; p. 40. 33. Bellamy, The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare. Theory and Practice, pp. 67, 71; yon Bernhardi, On War of Today , Vol. 2, p. 68. 34. Von Mantey, "Umfassung, Umgehung and Durchbruch. Fine Schlieffen Studie," p. 574. 35. Ibid., p. 573. 36. B.H. Liddell Hart, The Real War 1914-1918 (Boston/New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1st published 1930, reprinted 1964), pp. 70-71; Von Mantey, "Umfassung, Umgehung and Durchbruch. Fine Schlieffen Studie," p. 573. 37. Karl Heinz-Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende. Der Westfeldzug 1940 ( Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1995), pp. 82, 118. 38. Paul Stuart, Operational Maneuver. Creator of the Decisive Point (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, May 1987), p. 17.

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39. MGFA, Development, Planning and Realization of Operational Conceptions in World War I and 11, p. 80. 40. Gordon and Trainor, pp. 376-8; Ferdinand R. Kautz, Tannenberg, Operation Desert StormlEin Verglcich operativer Elemente der Schlacht an/angs and ausgangs des 20ten Jahrhundertes (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 1994), p. 10. 41. Roy Byrd, "Rolle and Beitrag des US Marine Corps," in Hartmut Zehrer, publisher, Der Konflikt. Dokumentation, Analyse and Bewertung aus militacrischer Sicht (Herford/Bonn: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1992), pp. 226-8. 42. Headquarters of the U.S. Army, FM 100-5.1: Operations Terms and Graphics ( Washington, DC: U.S. Army, 21 October 1985), p. 1-60. 43. Bellamy, The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare. Theory and Practice, p. 18. 44. Robert G. Fix, Operational Encirclement. Quick Decisive Victory or a Bridge Too Far? (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Command and General Staff College, Second Term 1993), p. 6. 45. Dupuy, Dupuy, and Braim, Military Heritage of America Vol. 1, pp. 16-7. 46. Philippi, Alfred and Ferdinand Heim, Der FeldzugGegen Sowjetrussland 1941 bis 1945. Ein operativer Ueberblick (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1962), p. 78; Albert Seaton, The Russo-German War 194145 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1971), p. 147. 47. Philippi and Heim, Der Fetdzug- Ge eg n Sowjetrussland 1941 bis 1945. Fin operativer Ueberblick, p. 86. 48. Ibid., p. 247. 49. Seaton, The Russo-German War 1941-45 , p. 439. 50. Ibid., p. 442. 51. Von Mantey, "Umfassung, Umgehung and Durchbruch. Fine Schlieffen Studie," p. 577. 52. Paul T. DeVries, "Maneuver and the Operational Level of War," Military Review 2 (February 1983), p. 25. 53. Ibid., p. 17. 54. Von Mantey, "Umfassung, Umgehung and Durchbruch. Eine Schlieffen Studie," p. 577. 55. MGFA, Development, Planning and Realization of Operational Conceptions in World War I and 11, p. 25. 56. David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1966), pp. 391, 396, 402; Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1978), p. 46 57. Holger Herwig, The First World War. Gennan and Austria-Hungary 1914-1918 (London: Arnold, the Hodder Headline Group, 1997), p. 105. 58. Wilson A. Heefner, "The Inchon Landing," Military Review 2 (March-April 1995), pp. 69-70. 59. Lynn Montross, "The Inchon Landing Victory over Time and Tide, " Marine Corps Gazette 7 (July 1951), p. 27; Malcolm W. Cagle, "Inchon. -The Analysis of a Gamble," Proceedings 1 (January 1954), p. 49.

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60. Guenter Roth, "Operatives Denken bei Schlieffen and Manstein," in Hans-Martin Ottmer and Heiger Ostertag, editors, Ausgewaehlte Operationen and ihre militaerhistorischen Grundlagen (Herford/Bonn: E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1993), pp. 292-3. 61. Ibid., p. 293. 62. Ibid., p. 293. 63. Karl-Heinz Frieser, "Der Westfeldzug and die `Blitzkrieg-Legende," in Hans-Martin Ottmer and Heiger Ostertag, editors, Ausgewaehlte Operationen and ihre militaerhistorischen Grundlagen (Herford/Bonn: E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1993), p. 394. 64. Ibid., p. 391. 65. Rick Gutwald, The Effkcts of Operational Encirclement (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Command and General Staff College, 1987), p. 2. 66. Fix, Operational Encirclement: Quick Decisive Victory or a Bridge Too Far? p. 7. 67. Henry D. Lind, "Break-Out From Encirclement," Military Review 6 (June 1951), p. 50. 68. Seaton, The Russo-German War 1941-45 , p. 123. 69. Ibid., p. 125. 70. Lind, "Break-Out from Encirclement," pp. 52-3. 71. Seaton, The Russo-German War 1941-45 , p. 446. 72. Philippi and Heim, Der Feldzug Gegen Sowjetrussland 1941 his 1945. Ein operative- Ueberblick, p. 252; Seaton, The Russo-German War 1941-45, p. 447. 73. Ibid., p. 449. 74. Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Le,gende. Der Westfeldzug 1940, p. 363. 75. Ibid., p. 376. 76. Ibid., pp. 376-7. 77. The British Expeditionary Force (BEF) lost 63,000 vehicles, 20,000 motor bikes, 475 tanks and armored vehicles, and 2,400 guns; ibid., p. 379. 78. Martin Blumenson, "General Bradley's Decision at Argentan (13 August 1944)," in Kent Roberts Greenfield, editor, Command Decisions ( Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1990), pp. 402-3. 79. Ibid., p. 404. 80. Ibid., p. 402. 81. Ibid., p. 404. 82. Ibid., p. 405; Fix, Operational Encirclement: Quick Decisive Victory or a Bridge Too Far? p. 1 9.

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83. Blumenson, "General Bradley's Decision at Argentan (13 August 1944)," p. 415. 84. This number included twenty German and two Romanian divisions and a number of Russian auxiliaries; the Germans had 1,800 guns, 10,000 motor vehicles, and 8,000 horses; Seaton, The RussoGerman War 1941-45 , p. 321. 85. Bernd Wegner, "Der Krieg Gegen Die Sowjetunion 1942/43," Horst Boog, et al., editors, Vol. 6: Der Globale Krieg. Die Ausweitung zum Weltkriegund der Wechsel der Initiative, Das Deutsche Reich and der Zweite Weltkrieg (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1990), p. 1000-1. Reportedly this force included more than four tanks and three mechanized corps, fourteen tank brigades, and a number of independent tank regiments; these three fronts were supported with some 13,500 guns and mortars, and more than 100 multiple rocket launchers [Katyushas]; Seaton, The Russo-German War 1941-45, p. 307. 86. Earl F. Ziemke and Magna E. Bauer, Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the East ( Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1987), p. 468. 87. Ibid., p. 471. 88. Wegner, "Der Krieg Gegen Die Sowjetunion 1942/43," p. 1044; other sources claim that the actual requirements were 750 tons per day; Seaton, The Russo-German War 1941-45 , p. 321. 89. There were seven airfields inside the pocket; six of them were in fact airstrips and only one, Pitomnik, could be used at night; ibid., p. 321. 90. Ziemke and Bauer, Moscow to Stalin,grad: Decision in the East, p. 482. 91. The best day was 19 December, when 290 tons were airlifted to the pocket; Seaton, The Russo-German War 1941-45 , p. 322. 92. Ziemke and Bauer, Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the East, p. 482. 93. Ibid., p. 483. 94. Ibid., p. 484. 95. Wegner, "Der Krieg Gegen Die Sowjetunion 1942/43," pp. 1050-1. 96. Ziemke and Bauer, Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the East, p. 486. 97. This number included 13,000 Romanians, 19,300 Russian auxiliaries, and 6,000 wounded; ibid., p. 489. 98. Wegner, "Der Krieg Gegen Die Sowjetunion 1942/43," p. 1055. Other sources cited Soviet strength at 281,000; Ziemke and Bauer, Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the East, p. 496. 99. Ibid., p. 501.

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CONCEPT OF CULMINATING POINT The true art of operational leadership is to correctly anticipate or sense the arrival of "a culminating point," or "culmination." The ability to prevent one's own culmination while causing the enemy to reach his is one of the prerequisites for the successful outcome of a major operation or campaign. There is probably no aspect of operational art as complex as the concept of culmination. Commanders and their staff must consider multiple aspects of operational art to properly plan for and then anticipate the point of culmination in the execution phase of a major operation or campaign. The inherent uncertainty of war due to friction and "fog of war" further complicates this problem. Term Defined: The concept of a culminating point is closely identified with Carl von Clausewitz, who was the first to identify it in his classical work On War. He defined the culminating point [Kulminationspunkt] as "the point where the remaining strength is just enough to maintain a defense and wait for peace." He also implied that once the culminating point had passed, the chance of victory was foreclosed unless the enemy yielded from fear without engaging in decisive combat. If the enemy chose to fight it out, he would prevai1. 2 A well-known U.S. strategist, Bernard Brodie, wrote that unless an offensive results in the defender's complete collapse, there would be a culminating point at which the attacker is about to lose effective superiority. He also observed that to push beyond this point without a good chance of an imminent favorable decision is dangerous.3 In generic terms, a culmination can be defined as: a point in terms of time and space reached by the attacker or the defender after which their respective .stated objectives cannot he accomplished and continued effort to reach them would significantly heighten the chances of failure or even defeat. A culminating point is reached when the relative combat power' shifts between two sides. 4 It is the point beyond which the loss of relative combat power begins to decrease rapidly. -' Theory does not say that a commander should not go beyond the culminating point. It only warns that the risks of setback and even defeat are very high. The commander might well gamble and continue his attack or offensive beyond the point of culmination after weighing all the pertinent elements in the situation, and be ultimately successful in reaching the assigned military objective. Obviously, if the commander goes beyond the culminating point and suffers unacceptable losses and even defeat, then he has gambled too much. Sometimes the concept of culminating point is misunderstood, and any defeat of one's own or enemy forces is attributed to overshooting a point of culmination. This is not always the case. In fact, in many instances the attacker won a decisive victory, or the defender decisively beat the attacker, without approaching or arriving at their respective culminating points. Features: The concept of culmination applies to both the attacker and the defender. Von Clausewitz in his On War focused predominantly on what he called the "culminating point of attack." He also asserted that the defense is intrinsically stronger than the offense because it is easier to hold ground than to take it. Therefore, it follows that defense is easier than attack, assuming both sides have equal means. The superiority of defense rests on the utilization of terrain; the possession of an organized theater of war: and often, but not always, support by the population. The defense has a passive purpose-----preservation, 341

and attack an active (or positive) one conquest. Von Clausewitz wrote that defense should be used only so long as weakness compels, and should be abandoned as soon as the defender is strong enough to pursue a positive object. He also observed that pure defense would be contrary to the very idea of war, because then only side would wage it. The principal advantage of defense over attack is that of waiting. The defender also enjoys all the benefits from any error or mistake the attacker makes. However, the defender should not be passive but should do everything possible to wear down the attacker by carrying out counterattacks. Victory normally results from the superiority of one side-that is, from a greater aggregate of physical and psychological strength. As a war unfolds, armies are constantly faced with some factors that increase their strength and with others that reduce it. In general, every reduction in strength on one side can be considered an increase on the other. 6 The concept of culmination applies to combat on land, at sea, and in the air. However, its full complexity could be demonstrated primarily in land warfare. In terms of time, a culmination point is usually not the same for the attacker as for the defender. An attacker who can no longer continue with his attack or offensive is culminated, but not necessarily the defender. The opposite is also true. Because of the fog of war and friction, the arrival time of the culminating point is extremely difficult to determine precisely. It usually takes some time before one or both sides in a conflict realize the shift in relative combat power and the approach of culmination. Sometimes culmination is a matter of the commander's judgment or imagination and therefore might not be actually reached or exceeded. A culminating point is not a point but rather a broad area arbitrarily called the area of uncertainty or nonrecognition (see Figure 26). The higher the level of war, the larger the area of uncertainty; hence the more difficult it is to anticipate or sense its arrival. One reason for this is the extreme complexity of the change in balance of combat power because so many intangible or unquantifiable elements comprise combat power. Also, the mutual relationship of elements of combat power is highly dynamic and is impossible to quantify with any degree of certainty. Thus, in any major operation or campaign this area is at the heart of what von Clausewitz called equilibrium of the combat power of both sides in a conflict. It is an intangible point at which the attacker could still revert to defense to protect his gains and regenerate his combat power. When equilibrium exists, theoretically, a determined and agile defender could take the advantage and go on counterattack or counteroffensive. A culminating point can be shifted in time by the attacker's or the defender's actions. To prevent the culminating point from arriving too early, the attacker must maintain higher combat power over the defender in both current and future combat actions. At the same time, one's own forces must be protected while the enemy's forces are subjected to danger. This, among other things, can be achieved through properly assigning forces to echelons to maintain operational momentum, and through adequate sustainment. x Attacker's Culmination: The attacker's culmination is the point in time and space when the attacker's combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender (see Figure 27). The relative reduction of the attacker's strength over time and space is the fundamental cause of his arrival at the point of culmination. 9 The attacker's culmination could be reached because the momentum is being lost or because of losses inflicted by the defender. 342

Figure 26: THEORY OF CULMINATING POINT

FACTOR OF SPACE EQUILIBRIUM OF RELATIVE COMBATPOWER

ATTACKER

CULMINATING POINT

COMBAT POWER W

LL LL

DEFENDER'S

0 0

OBJECTIVE

---------0f--~O

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- ~ -0'0

ATTACKER'S OBJECTIVE

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O AREA OF UNCERTAINTY

COMBAT POWER DEFEND

FACTOR OF TIME

However, that does not mean that the defender could take the advantage and go on the counteroffensive. Culmination occurs when and where the attacker must stop and defend his gains if he wishes to avoid losing them. Von Clausewitz wrote that the force of attack diminishes over time, while that of the defense increases. The attacker must not only overcome the effects of friction but also move against an enemy who can use terrain and can strike when and where the attacking force has exposed itself. The attacker must act with greater strength and urgency than the defender, who, as Clausewitz noted, gains relative strength with the passage of time. Thus, the art of attack at all levels is to accomplish the assigned objective before reaching culmination.' () To be successful, the attacker must at least initially possess sufficient strength to impose his will on the defender. He needs to have superiority of combat power not in the entire theater or area of operations but in a sector of main effort or point of main attack. In land warfare, the strength of the attacker diminishes as the attacker advances deeper into the enemy's territory. His lines of supplies become progressively longer and more vulnerable to enemy counterattacks unless he assigns adequate forces to protect them. Another disadvantage for the attacker is the steady increase in the distance from his base of operations as he continues to advance in the depth of the defender's territory. Among other things the attacker needs to detach relatively large forces to protect links with his homeland. Also, the longer the distance from the base of operations, the longer the time the attacker needs for bringing up the supplies and reinforcements. This, in turn, requires either additional forces or assigning part of the existing forces to these tasks. Napoleon I in his invasion of Russia in 1812 had about 95,000 men after reaching Moscow, but he had to use an additional 118,000 troops to protect his rear and lines of supplies. I I

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Figure 27: ATTACKER'S CULMINATION START OF OFFENSIVE

OFFENSIVE STALLED

FACTOR OF SPACE

%.0

I STALEMATE I I I

SPACE GAINED CANNOT BE HELD

LLI ()

CULMINATING POINT OF OFFENSIVE (ATTACK)

/ I LINES OF SUPPLIES > O '>-------------- --•ATTACKER'S y4 1 OBJECTIVE O U.

Q r. u_ u.

FEN FINE °

I I I I I

I NCREASING' S-VRENGIH

START OF ATTACK

FACTOR OF TIME

I I I I I I I

ATTACK STALLED

The attacker must also neutralize the bypassed enemy forces and strong points. His strength could be further reduced if his policies lead to an open and mass uprising of the enemy's population; this was clearly shown by Napoleon I's experience in Spain in 1809-1814, and the German difficulties in maintaining control of the rear in Poland, Soviet Russia, and the Balkans in World War 11. Also, the defender's efforts are increased as danger of his defeat increases, while the lessening threat to the attacker usually causes his efforts to slacken. 'z The defender could increase his use of relative combat power as long as he avoids combat and his sources of power in the rear area are secure. In contrast, for the attacker, any pause in fighting to regenerate his combat power means an advantage for the defender. Additionally, the defender could regenerate his combat power faster than the attacker. If the attacker approaches the point of culmination before reaching his objective, the best he can do is to revert to defense before suffering a major setback or even being forced to retreat and surrender his gains. Otherwise, he might overshoot his point of culmination by a large margin that could lead to hasty retreat and even defeat. Von Clausewitz was certain that at the culminating point of attack, the initial superiority of an attack is expended and a ratio of strength between the opponents is reached, leaving the attacker with enough strength to conduct a successful defense.' 3 However, political or diplomatic considerations sometimes influence a decision not to revert to defense after reaching or overshooting one's own operational culmination. Napoleon I in his ill-fated i nvasion of Russia in 1812 passed his culmination point of attack, not in the Battle of Borodino (7 September) but most likely at Smolensk (7 August), where he still had about 154,000 men and was strong enough to regroup and meet any Russian attack. However, Napoleon I was well aware that stopping the advance to Moscow would almost certainly lead to a weakening of French control on subject nations in Europe, and that was unacceptable to him. This led him to continue his advance to Moscow. Ultimately, 344

Napoleon I overshot his culmination point by about 250 miles in terms of space and about thirty days in terms of time, without achieving a decisive victory while suffering further losses in manpower and materiel. 1 4 However, the Russians probably also reached their point of culmination. They were too weak to take advantage of Napoleon I's predicament even if they realized that he had passed his point of culmination. In the end, Napoleon I was defeated by a combination of severe weather, sicknesses among his troops, and constant Russian harassment during his long retreat. By the end of November, when he finally reached the Berezina River, the once mighty Grand Armee totaled only about 37,000 men. 1 5 An example of where the attacker overshot his point of culmination and suffered a significant defeat at the hands of numerically inferior but much better led and trained forces was the Soviet failure in the major offensive in southern Russia in January-March 1943. After the end of the Battle of Stalingrad, a 200-mile gap had been opened in the German lines as a result of the disintegration of Romanian, Italian, and Hungarian formations. 1 6 The Soviets planned two simultaneous major operations (Gallop and Star) aimed to drive the Germans into the Sea of Azov, to begin on 29 January and 2 February, respectively. For this double major operation, the Soviets committed four armies (6th Army, 1st Guards Army, 3rd Guards Army, 5th Tank Army), and Mobile Group Popov, totaling forty-two rifle divisions and 100 brigades, to the Southern Front and Southwestern Front, deployed along the 155-mile-long front from south of Kharkov along the Dnieper River to south of Voroshilovgrad. 1 7 The Soviets' ultimate operational objective was to cut off and destroy some seventy-five of the Axis's divisions then deployed in southern Russia and the Caucasus. 1 8 The Southwestern Front, led by General N. F. Vatutin, was tasked to seize the Donbas area and drive the German forces across the Dnieper River by executing a gigantic single-sided envelopment maneuver. The German forces in southern Russia were then led by one of the ablest operational commanders on either side in World War II, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein. They consisted of Army Group Don (after 14 February, Army Group South), consisting of twenty-two divisions (including seven panzer, ten infantry, and two motorized infantry divisions) defending some 435 miles of front. Like their Soviet counterparts, the German forces had been engaged in heavy combat since November 1942. They were especially weak in armor, having not more than twenty to forty panzers per division. 19 In the course of their offensive, the Soviets advanced to a point only sixty miles from von Manstein's headquarters in Zaporozhye. The seriousness of the situation facing Army Group Don so soon after the destruction of the Sixth Army at Stalingrad finally convinced Hitler to approve von Manstein's plan for a counteroffensive on 6 February. Von Manstein's idea for a counteroffensive was relatively simple in design but extremely difficult to execute. His plan was based on the premise that the Soviets would extend themselves to the point where he could then unleash his decisive counterstroke. By trading space for time, he caused extensive delays in the Soviet plan. He also traded space for force by shortening the front line from 250 miles to about 112 miles on the Mius River to better defend his right flank. The 1 st Panzer Army was ordered to "tie down" the Soviet 1 st Guards Army and then advance to the Kharkov-Sumy area. Detachment Hollidt, with three corps, had to defend against attacks by six Soviet armies on the Mius River. By ordering a "leapfrogging" movement (Rochade) of the 4th Panzer

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Army on 8-9 February from Rostov-on-Don to the middle Don on his left flank, he created a force to serve as an operational reserve where none existed. 2° The German counteroffensive started on 20 February; two days later, the right flank of the Soviet 6th Army was cut off and the Soviet center began to crumble. By 23 February the Germans had cut off the escape route of the Soviet forces and subsequently counterattacked and defeated the widely dispersed Soviet thrusts in detail. A day later General Vatutin issued an order to suspend all operations and to revert to defense. However, the Soviet forces had already exceeded their culminating point. The Soviet offensive ended after twenty-one days, paying a heavy price in personnel and materiel . 21 By 24 March the Germans had recaptured Kharkov. The Germans destroyed Mobile Group Popov, while four armies of the Soviet Southwestern Front suffered such losses that they were incapable of further combat. 22 This significant operational success was accomplished by only 160,000 German troops and about 100 tanks. 23 In the process, von Manstein not only saved the German forces from being cut off in the Caucasus, but also stabilized the entire southern part of the German front. The success of von Manstein's counteroffensive in southern Russia also probably saved the Germans from losing the war on the eastern front in 1943 or 1944. Another example of the attacker overshooting his point of culmination was the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) in its invasion of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in June 1950. In a swift advance across the border, the North Koreans seized the capital Seoul and pushed the UN forces to a narrow perimeter around the port of Pusan in the southeastern part of the country. The commander of UN forces, U.S. General Douglas MacArthur, conceived a bold and risky plan to land about 70,000 UN troops at Inchon on 15 September 1950. General Walton H. Walker, commander of the U.S. Eighth Army within the perimeter, would make a holding attack, while the X Corps would make a turning movement. After seizing objectives in the Seoul area, the X Corps would deploy south and act as a blocking force, while the Eighth Army would break out from the Pusan Perimeter. A prompt link-up with the X Corps along the Tajeon-Suwon axis was a prerequisite for cutting off a large force of North Koreans in the southern part of the peninsula. General Walker planned that the Eighth Army attack not begin until the day after the Inchon landing. U.S. intelligence estimated that the North Korean forces deployed around the perimeter totaled some 101,500 men; however, their real strength did not exceed 70,000 men, and their situation was in fact much worse than the numbers alone might indicate: By the first half of September, the North Koreans probably did not have more than fifty percent of their original equipment, and their morale was rather low. No more than thirty percent of the original troops of the divisions remained. Most of the recruits in the North Korean Army were forcibly drafted South Koreans who did not show strong desire to fight. Food in the NKPA was scarce, and undernourishment was the most frequent cause of low morale. 24 Total strength of UN forces in the Pusan Perimeter was about 159,000 men. The UN breakout from the Pusan Perimeter started on 16 September, and the North Korean forces, having their lines of supplies cut off and threatened simultaneously from both south and north, literally collapsed. By 26 September Seoul was liberated and the UN forces took some 125,000 prisoners, together with most of the North Korean weapons and equipment. During their hasty retreat from the southern part of the Korean Peninsula to the 38th Parallel, the NKPA lost probably

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more weapons and equipment than the ROK lost during its retreat from Seoul to the Pusan Perimeter. 26 Defender's Culmination: A defender reaches culmination when he can no longer go on the counteroffensive or defend successfully (see Figure 28). 27 However, if the defender's objective is to go on the offensive, then the culminating point is where the defender must revert to a holding action and await reinforcements. If the defender's objective is to retain terrain, the culminating point is where the defender must withdraw, delay, or retreat. 28 The art of the defense is to draw the attacker to his culmination and then strike when he has exhausted his resources and is ill-disposed to defend successfully. 29 In general, the attacker would suffer greater losses than the defender in taking a prepared defense. As the attacker advances deeper into the enemy's territory, his power declines as he moves away from his base of operations. Thus, the strength of the defender increases relative to that of the attacker. 30 As long as the attacker's strength is being reduced at a rate faster than the defender's, it is to the defender's advantage to wait. However, the point of culmination will necessarily be reached when the defender must decide to act, after the advantages of waiting have been completely exhausted . 31 The defender's best chances for a successful counterattack occur when the attacker has reached or exceeded his culminating point. In southern Russia in February 1943, Field Marshal von Manstein counterattacked when the Soviets approached the Dnepr River; that is, only after the Soviet forces passed their point of culmination. 32 The transition from defense to attack is one of the most difficult tasks for any commander. Figure 28: DEFENDER'S CULMINATION

In October 1944, in the naval action known as the Battle for Leyte, the Japanese First Diversionary Attack Force probably reached its tactical culminating point during or in the aftermath of the Battle in the Sibuyan Sea on 24 October, not, as is commonly held, during the Battle of Samar on the morning of 25 October. Vice Admiral Takeo Kunta made a fateful decision to turn north and away from his intended objective in the Leyte Gulf just when his forces were at the brink of victory over much weaker U.S. forces of escort carriers and their escorts. In retrospect, there were several reasons for Admiral Kurita's decision. Perhaps the most important were the heavy losses inflicted by U.S. submarines off Palawan Passage, and rather severe losses and damages inflicted by U.S. carrier aircraft in the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea on the preceding day. Admiral Kurita's sheer physical exhaustion and lack of persistence were most likely another factor in his decision, which ended any prospect of inflicting humiliating defeat on the U.S. Navy and perhaps slowing down Allied operational tempo in the Pacific. Tactical culmination may also occur as a result of either operational or strategic decisions, as the example of General Patton's Third Army operations in Lorraine in October 1944 illustrates. The Supreme Allied Commander, General Dwight Eisenhower, made a deliberate decision on 22 September to allocate most of the then-scarce logistical resources to General Bernard Montgomery's 21st Army Group's drive in the north. He specifically instructed the 12th Army Group that the Third Army and the newly created Ninth Army were to take "no more aggressive action than is permitted by the maintenance situation after the full requirements of the main effort had been met." General Patton, irritated by the orders to revert to the defensive, persuaded his immediate superior, 12th Army Group commander General Omar Bradley, to let him continue local attacks to adjust his front line. He also continued his advance, with the ultimate result that some of his frontline units ran out of fuel. 4o

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may occur in the course of a major operation or campaign. A culmination in a major operation usually occurs only once, while in a campaign several operational culminating points can occur in sequence or almost simultaneously. An example of operational culmination occurred in Burma in the early spring of 1944. By the end of 1943 the Japanese counteroffensive in Burma culminated. However, the Japanese continued to threaten Imphal and Kohima. These two positions in Japanese hands were to serve as springboards for the final destruction of the British forces. General William Slim, commander of the 14th Army, concentrated four corps in the Imphal Plain and fought the decisive battle there on ground of his own choosing. His plan was based on the enemy offensive beginning in mid-March 1944. However, the British were surprised, because the Japanese attacked one week earlier. Nevertheless, General Slim's basic plan still worked. The Japanese attacked against the concentrated power of the 14th Army at Imphal and Kohima, but failed to reach their objectives. General Slim counterattacked in May and advanced to the Irrawady River before ordering an operational pause. 41 In another example, the German Army Group Center overshot its point of culmination during the first phase of the German campaign against Soviet Russia. This army group, directed in early October 1941 to seize Moscow (Operation Taifun), in retrospect clearly did not have sufficient combat potential to do so. The early onset of the muddy season in Russia turned the ground into a sea of mud, considerably slowing the movement of German mechanized forces. 42 This, in turn, and not surprisingly, enormously complicated the German efforts to complete the operation speedily. The Germans' greatest obstacles became the weather and Russia's poorly built and inadequate roads. General fatigue and weariness affected the entire German front. 43 The combat efficiency of the German infantry divisions had dropped by thirty-five percent, armored divisions by forty to fifty percent, and the panzer attrition rate varied from sixty-five to seventy-five percent. There was also a high percentage of officer losses in combat. The flow of supplies was disrupted, and only the most urgently needed rations, ammunition, and gasoline could be moved forward-and then only with difficulty. There was practically no winter clothing, and equipment for army units would not become available before early January 1942. 44 The Soviets sensed that the Germans had reached their point of culmination and prepared a counteroffensive. 45 The German offensive on Moscow finally stopped on 4 December, after its momentum has been lost. Hitler ordered a shift to defensive in his directive Nr. 39 issued on 8 December. The Army Group Center had then to defend a front line of 620 miles with sixty-seven heavily attrited divisions and no reserves. 46 In their subsequent counteroffensive, the Soviets forced the Germans to retreat. However, after large territorial gains in the central part of the front, and after inflicting on the Germans some 376,000 battle casualties (increased to about 900,000 due to illnesses caused by severe weather), the Soviet offensive petered out by the end of January 1942 and came to a complete stop in early March. Nevertheless, the Germans suffered a significant setback and were forced to revert to the defensive, not only in front of Moscow but also along the entire front line from Finland to the Crimea. The Soviets made deep penetrations of the German front in many places, but especially in front of Moscow. The German failure was primarily due to severe weather conditions, inadequate logistical preparations, and inability to replace ever-increasing losses in manpower and Operational culmination

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equipment. On their part, the Soviets overreached themselves and eventually suffered great losses in February and March 1942. The Soviet High Command overestimated the successes of their winter offensive and greatly underestimated the resilience and fighting qualities of the German soldiers. Stalin was primarily responsible for ordering numerous offensives in all parts of the fronts, which ultimately led to dissipation of effort and large and unnecessary Soviet losses. The Germans reached several successive operational culminations in the series of major operations between March and July 1918. The peak of fighting was the Second Battle of the Marne, 15-17 July, in which the Germans failed to reach their stated objectives after initial successes. Afterward, the First Quartermaster-General, General Erich Ludendorff, admitted defeat and ordered general withdrawal. In the five months of heavy fighting the Germans had half a million casualties, but the Allied losses were larger. Yet the Allied forces were reinforced by fresh American troops arriving at the rate of 300,000 men per month . 48 The turn of the tide in the West came with the Allied AisneMarne offensive (18 July-5 August), after which the Allies gained the strategic initiative that ultimately led to Armistice on I 1 November and the German defeat. The Germans reached several operational culminating points during the first phase of their campaign in Soviet Russia, which started on 22 June 1941. They divided the entire theater of war into what amounted in today's terms to three theaters of operations. By the end of October the German offensive in the central part of the front was losing its momentum. The Germans gained some ground in the fighting around Tula and in the direction of Kalinin, but their war of rapid movement had clearly ended at the gates of Moscow in early December 1941. In the northern theater of operations, the German Army Group North had progressed little since September. Leningrad was not seized, and the planned link-up with the Finns did not materialize. In the southern part of the front, Army Group South had made large gains. By the first week of November the Germans had already reached the Kursk-Stalino-Taganrog line and the Eleventh Army had crossed the Perekop Isthmus and advanced into the Crimea. However, despite these gains the German forces were stretched to the limit. The Soviets offered stubborn defense and began to prepare a counteroffensive. The German advance in the south came almost to a halt, partly because of the bad weather, but mainly from the troops' sheer exhaustion. The German drive toward Rostov lost speed and strength. By 22 November the Germans entered Rostov, only to be forced to retreat a few days later. At the same time the Soviets opened an offensive from the northwest against the German forces in the Donets Basin. Within the next fortnight, the forward elements of Army Group South were in a general retreat toward the Stalino-Mariupol line. This was a local setback no more: The German offensive had reached its culminating point, not only in the south, but also on the entire Eastern Front. 49 Strategic culmination occurs in the course of a war as a whole, fought in a single or multiple theaters, and can be reached only once in the course of a conflict. The culmination point of victory is a point in terms of space and time at which the ratio of military and nonmilitary sources of power has drastically diminished so that the chances of winning a war are foreclosed and the attacker must go on the defensive or risk ultimate defeat. In a strategic culminating point, focus is on the forces, mobilization, and replacements available in the future and their training, not those available immediately or in the short term . 50

35 1

In referring to what is today commonly understood as strategic culmination, von Clausewitz asserted that as the attacker's strength is reduced, a moment comes when both forces are roughly in balance and "...the remaining force is just enough to maintain a defense and wait for peace." If the attacker proceeds beyond this moment, then the defender's moral and physical strength becomes superior to the attacker's. Von Clausewitz saw that there were times when the superiority of the attacker was not sufficient to defeat the opposing army. In such instances, the attacker conducts war to acquire certain advantages over the defender. These advantages may even be psychological. The key consideration in such wars is that the attacker does not have the strength to destroy the opposing army, but could achieve and maintain the political advantage and equilibrium. This moment of equilibrium is called the "culminating point of victory." Si If one were to go beyond that point, it would not merely be a useless effort that could not add to success; it would be a damaging one that would lead to a reaction; and experience shows that such reactions usually have a completely disproportionate effect. To expand the Clausewitzian concept further, it is obvious that culmination points of defeat also exist for a nation or alliance or coalition on strategic defensive, dealing with military and nonmilitary resources available over long periods, as well as being closely linked to military strategy and national policy and strategy. 53 Relationships: Culminating points affect each other sometimes in the most profound way. A culmination at the lower level of war almost invariably affects culmination at the next higher level. Sometimes a culminating point at the tactical or operational level may have operational or even strategic implications or consequences. The First Battle of Ypres, 22-23 October 1914, is an example of a tactical culmination that had operational consequences. The German objective in the major operation later known as the "race to the sea" was to seize the port of Calais on the French coast. The German Fourth Army was pitted against the British Expeditionary Forces (BEF), the Belgian Army, and the French Territorials. The Germans had substantial numerical superiority-426 battalions against 263 Allied battalions. The Germans decided on a determined effort to seize the bridges across the River Yser, enabling the Fourth Army to secure Calais. The effort miscarried, however, and the Germans and Allies became involved in a two-month-long struggle for control of the area. The Allies made better use of terrain and carried out almost continuous counterattacks. The most decisive was two days' fighting on 31 October and 11 November, after which the Germans never regained the initiative. It was the stubborn resistance of the British and the timely arrival of French reinforcements that prevented the Germans from breaking the Allied lines and thereby stabilizing the front. However, the Allied success was primarily due to the leadership at the divisional level the higher commanders had failed to grasp the severity of the situation . 54 The Germans' ultimate failure in their all-or-nothing counteroffensive in the Ardennes in December 1944 (Operation Wacht am Rhein) had far-reaching and adverse consequences at the strategic level. The German operational objective in that operation was to seize the port of Antwerp by splitting and then destroying Allied armies in the northern and southern sectors of the Ardennes. Specifically, the Germans planned to use their 6th SS Panzer Army and 5th Panzer Army with twenty-eight to thirty divisions (including twelve Panzer and Panzer Grenadier divisions) in a surprise move toward the Meuse River, and then without delay continue their advance toward Antwerp. They hoped to split the First U.S. Army and the British 21st Army Group and destroy them in 352

the Antwerp-Brussels area. 55 Hitler wanted to derail the timetable for the Allied thrust into Germany to allow the bulk of the German forces in the west to move to the east to be used against the advancing Soviet armies. The German offensive started on 6 December and achieved some local tactical gains. However, the offensive began to lose momentum because of ammunition and especially fuel shortages. Because German losses steadily increased, Hitler finally admitted on 8 January that the offensive had failed. In the process the Germans lost 100,000 men, 800 tanks, and 1,000 aircraft that they could not replace. These losses opened the door for the final Allied push into Germany. Had Hitler listened to his field commanders, either before or during the Ardennes offensive, the Germans might have been able to stabilize the front in the west, thereby allowing an effective defense against the greatest threat to the Reich in the east-the advancing Soviet armies. 56 Another example of the attacker's operational culmination that had strategic consequences was the failure of the North Korean offensive against South Korea in JuneSeptember 1950. The UN amphibious landing at Inchon (Operation Chromite) on 15 September 1950 was aimed to cut off the lines of supplies to the North Korean divisions besieging the UN forces in the Pusan Perimeter. By landing some 70,000 troops far behind the North Korean frontline troops, General MacArthur set the stage for the rapid culmination of the North Korean forces by requiring them to fight UN forces in two directions. 57 This action allowed the UN forces to begin a counteroffensive across the 38th Parallel and eventually all the way to the Yalu River along the border with mainland China. The attacker or the defender can arrive at or overshoot a culmination point at the higher level of war by inflicting a major defeat on the enemy's forces at the next lower level. This situation is likely to occur if the lost battle results in significant losses in the principal elements of offensive power, thereby considerably weakening gains of the previous major operation or campaign. The Battle of Midway (Operation MI for the Japanese), 4-6 June 1942, was an operational victory for the Allies and an operational defeat with strategic consequences for the Japanese. The Japanese lost four large carriers and 332 aircraft (including 280 aircraft lost when carriers went down) . 58 Perhaps the most serious loss for the Japanese was not the carriers, but the fact that their best frontline pilots were lost as well. From then on, the strategic initiative shifted steadily to the Allies, and the Japanese never regained it through the end of the war in August 1945. Causes: The arrival at the point of culmination could be caused by a variety of factors. At the tactical level, an attack or defense can be temporarily overextended by the commander's and his forces' sheer fatigue or exhaustion, or by depletion of supplies of all kinds -a problem that could be resolved by simply replacing the commander or entire units, sending reinforcements, or rushing in supplies . 59 One of the common causes of culmination at the operational level is the pursuit of multiple objectives without due regard to the factors of space, time, and force. Hitler's decision on 23 July 1942 to pursue three operational objectives simultaneously and in three divergent directions in Southern Russia-one along the eastern coast of the Black Sea, one toward the Caucasian oil fields, and the third toward Stalingrad-led to multiple culminating points. None of these thrusts was mutually supporting. 60 This decision was the principal reason for the German defeat at Stalingrad and the subsequent turning point of the war on the Eastern Front . 61 Hitler specified that the primary tasks of Army Group 353

A (Seventeenth Army and 1st Panzer Army) were to encircle and destroy the Soviet forces in the area southwest of Rostov-on-Don, seize the entire eastern coast of the Black Sea, and take out the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. Simultaneously, considerable and fast units would protect flanks eastward, seize the area around Grozny, and, with part of the forces, block Ossetian and Georgia's roads. Finally, Army Group A was to sweep along the Caspian Sea shores and seize the area of Baku. Army Group B (Sixth Army and the weakened 4th Panzer Army) had the task of building up defense on the Don River and thrusting toward Stalingrad to destroy Soviet forces deployed there, seizing the city itself and crossings on the rivers Don and Volga, and blocking the river traffic. Other fast German units would advance to Astrakhan to block the main waterway on the Volga River .62 The Germans concentrated the entire Army Group A at one point Rostov. Thus, they missed the chance of encircling the still-remaining strong Soviet forces behind the Don River. In addition, other factors, such as terrain conditions, unfavorable weather, and shortages of fuel, all worked against tasks given to Army Group A. By 1 August the 4th Panzer Army, with two German and one Romanian Corps, totaling eight divisions, were assigned to support the Sixth Army's drive toward Stalingrad. The planned offensive toward Stalingrad would last a little more than three weeks. The Army Group A was directed to concentrate its remaining motorized units under the 1 st Panzer Army for a drive in the direction of Maikop. 63 Hitler overestimated the results of the German summer offensive in southern Russia and subsequently became preoccupied with seizing Caucasian oil fields and neglected the operational thrust toward Stalingrad.64 The expansion of the initially assigned operational objective could also be a significant cause of offensive culmination. Stalin and the Stavka made such a blunder in their planning for the new offensive following the Soviet victory at Stalingrad in January 1943. They thought it would be possible to achieve a strategic victory and end the war in a single blow by carrying a new offensive against the German forces deployed in southern Russia and the Caucasus. Hence, Stalin altered objectives of the Soviet offensive from crossings over the Donets River to the encirclement of the German forces at Rostov, then to Zhdanov, and then to Zaporozhye. 65 Physical characteristics of the terrain can considerably affect culmination. The defender can usually use terrain to attrite advancing forces. One method for the attacker to overcome the factor of terrain is by operating at high speed and intensity. The nature of terrain and distance are principal elements of tempo. However, operating at higher tempo creates other effects that degrade attacking forces. In the Soviet offensive in southern Russia in January February 1943, numerous unfrozen rivers delayed the Soviet advance by canalizing their attacks. The mobile units lacked trucks and tanks to continue their advance. Intermittent thaws turned parts of the countryside into quagmires, bogging down all means of transport, which exacerbated the already tenuous supply situation. 66 Meanwhile, the small villages in the area provided excellent defensive positions for the Germans. The factor of distance poses a major challenge in both offense and defense. The width and depth of the theater or area in which combat takes place necessarily cause the dispersal of combat power, which is an especially great problem for the attacker. In their massive offensive in southern Russia in January February 1943, the Soviets pursued defeated German troops uninterruptedly along a 750-mile-long front that in the south attained a depth of 435 miles. The Soviet spearheads became thinner and thinner, and

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eventually their advance came to a halt. Overextension and weakening of the Soviet combat power was the main reason for the Germans' successful counteroffensive. 67 Likewise, the British in their offensive in North Africa in November 1942 (Operation Crusader) suffered the steady weakening of their army because of the increased distances from its base of operations. Time is another major factor of culmination. Von Clausewitz observed that both sides need time, and the question is only which of the two is in a situation to derive special advantage from it. 6' The failure to use available time is unforgiving. Once lost, the time can never be recovered . 69 Time in general favors the defender; the defender seeks to delay the decision and use time to increase relative advantage, while the attacker must move to hasten the decision since the passage of time accrues to the benefit of the defender . 70 Causes of culmination intensify over time and space. These factors interact on the attacking force to bring it eventually to the point of culmination. 71 Very often one of the major contributing factors for culmination is the great reduction of combat power through attrition. Combat power of the attacker normally decreases faster than that of the defender and becomes equal to, or lower than, that of the defender. Decreases of combat power could be caused by fatigue, disadvantageous position, or difficult terrain or weather. The Soviet High Command ordered a major offensive in the aftermath of the Battle of Stalingrad although the Soviet troops had been in almost continuous combat for nearly two and half months. The Soviet infantry and armored units were short of men and machines. The Soviet 6th Army had only forty tanks, and Mobile Group Popov only 212. These two armies were expected to conduct the 185-mile-deep operation with uncertain supply lines. Also, their supply bases were far in the rear, and there was a shortage of trucks and horses to transport necessary supplies over the bad roads. The culminating point is affected by a force's ability to concentrate in the critical area to gain the advantage of surprise and psychological shock and momentum. Another factor is the inability to protect one's own forces. If superior mass is dissipated prior to attaining the objective, the principle of the offensive-which means retaining the initiative is foreclosed. It is not numerical superiority itself that is essential for success, but rather the application of superior combat power at the decisive place and time. 73 Hitler grossly violated the principle of mass and dissipated German power in ordering three almost simultaneous and divergent thrusts in southern Russia (described elsewhere) in the summer of 1942. Likewise, Stalin dissipated Soviet strength by ordering a series of offensive thrusts along the entire front in the winter 1941-1942. The Soviets again violated the principle of mass in their offensive in southern Russia in January-February 1943 by advancing over a broad front in multiple directions and trying to seize their objectives almost simultaneously. The abilities of the opposing commanders and their forces, in addition to logistics, often cause one's force to reach the culminating point. 74 The commanders might be overly optimistic or pessimistic in their assessment of the operational or strategic situation. Their perception of the enemy commander's abilities or intentions might be off the mark by a wide margin. Or they might have unrealistic expectations of their subordinate commanders and the capabilities of their own or friendly forces. Each of these and similar errors might be a significant factor in reaching or overshooting one's own culminating point.

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Sometimes the attacker might mistakenly believe that his forces have reached or are about to overshoot a point of culmination and decide to stop his offensive. This happened in the German offensive in the west in August-September 1914. The German Army's High Command ordered general withdrawal after the Battle of the Marne (5-10 September) although German forces were not significantly attrited and logistical support was still adequate. The German offensive in the west had started on 3 August 1914; Belgium and northern France were overrun. Four French armies were forced to retreat, suffering some 800,000 casualties. However, the French got the opportunity to strike back at the German flanks and temporarily halted the German advance on 27 August. The German First Army commander, General Alexander von Kluck, shifted the direction of his advance to the southeast, thereby passing east of Paris, not south as envisaged in the Schlieffen Plan. By 2 September von Kluck's forces reached the rivers Marne and Oise. In the meantime, the German Chief of the General Staff, General Helmuth von Moltke, Jr., moved his headquarters to Luxembourg, or about 170 miles away from the German First Army. The move did not improve von Moltke's ability to control the movements of subordinate army commanders, and there were no telephone communications to army commands because the French and the Belgians had destroyed commercial lines. Telegrams often arrived at the German Army's High Command twenty-four hours late and had to be decoded. Aerial delivery was confused and uncertain. Motorcycle and automobile service was slow and sometimes hazardous. General Joseph J.C. Joffre, commanding the French armies, ordered his Sixth Army to complete its concentration in the Paris area while continuing general withdrawal elsewhere until the Fifth Army was safely out of danger of being enveloped by the advancing Germans. In the most critical time, between 30 August and 4 September, von Moltke, Jr., made a series of costly errors, mainly due to his lack of knowledge of the extent and speed of advance of von Kluck's First Army and poor communications between the Army's High Command Headquarters and the armies in the field . 76 As a result of miscommunication, von Kluck, instead of halting his advance, continued southward across the Marne and thereby opened his right flank to the French counterattack. The German Army's High Command was confused with poor intelligence received from other parts of the front. Von Moltke, Jr., received news that additional British troops had landed at Ostend on 30 August. The rumors subsequently proved false-were that this force was a vanguard for 80,000 Russians. At the height of the Battle of the Marne on 8 September, General von Moltke, Jr., sent a general staff officer, Lieutenant Colonel Richard Hentsch, to assess the situation at the subordinate army headquarters. Colonel Hentsch, who had only oral orders, approved the planned withdrawal of General Karl von Buelow's Second Army that day, and von Kluck's army a day later. Contributing to this decision was the Belgian one-day sortie from Antwerp, which had all the incalculable psychological effect of bad news at a critical moment in the crisis. 78 Von Moltke, Jr., realizing that the offensive failed, ordered the general withdrawal of all German armies to new positions behind the Marne River. 79 However, the Allied troops were too exhausted to pursue the retreating Germans. The Germans lost the Battle of the Marne mainly because of the ineptness of the Chief of the General Staff, poor intelligence and communications, and superior leadership by General Joffre.

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The unfounded optimism and overconfidence of Stalin, Stavka, and the front commanders before and throughout most of the offensive in southern Russia in JanuaryFebruary 1943 were among the major reasons the Soviets overshot their operational culmination and suffered a huge setback. This optimism was based in part on the fall of Stalingrad and the destruction of the Italian 8th and Hungarian 2nd Armies. The Soviets also misunderstood German intentions and underestimated German capabilities. A more serious error perhaps was that the Soviet High Command overestimated the capabilities of its own forces, which led it to issue unrealistic directives. This, in turn, resulted in heavy Soviet casualties. None of the Soviet bigh-ranking generals accurately perceived the operational situation; forces with barely enough combat power to defend were ordered to attack. Communications between higher headquarters and subordinate commanders were generally poor, and the commanders' intent was unknown except by the members of the staff whose commander issued it. Also, the operational objectives were changed without indicating where subordinates were to accept risk. ° Lack of adequate logistical support is probably one of the most frequent causes of culmination. Poor organization of the forward movement of supplies and lack of transportation assets, ammunition, fuel, or food are but a few examples of such factors. 81 Constant combat and overextension of lines of supplies, combined with lack of coordination and shortages of vital supplies such as fuel, water, and ammunition, considerably affect the arrival at the point of culmination. During the Allied offensive in November 1941 (Operation Crusader), Rommel experienced great logistical difficulties. About ten percent of his fuel was expended to transport the other ninety percent. The fuel for his panzers was only one third of the total requirement. Between thirty and fifty percent of all the fuel shipped to Libya was wasted between Tripoli and the front. Aviation fuel became so scarce that the German aircraft were limited to one sortie per day. In addition, there were heavy losses of supplies across the Mediterranean and also on land. The supplies were carried on the truck columns only during the night hours. 12 Only four hours after the start of counteroffensive on 21 January 1942, the German 15th Panzer Division was out of fuel and incapable of pursuing British forces. This situation was compounded for the Germans by the British destruction of Allied fuel stores as they retreated under pressure of the Afrika Korps. 83 The ever-expanding length of supply lines and corresponding sustainment difficulties were the principal reason for Rommel's failure to continue his offensive past El Alamein in 1942. 4 Rommel's drive into Egypt did not culminate at El Alamein in November but in late June, because of exhaustion after almost five weeks of continued combat that had begun at Gazala. By 3 July his forces were woefully short of personnel, especially infantry. The Afrika Korps lines of supplies were some 1,600 miles long, while the Allied lines of supplies from Egypt to the front line were only about 100 miles long. 85 The distance between Alexandria and El Alamein was only about sixty miles. A single 1,200-mile-long road was available for moving supplies between Tripoli and the front line. The intermediate port of Benghazi, only 300 miles from the Egyptian border, was theoretically capable of handling 2,700 tons of supplies per day; however, the constant harassment by the Royal Air Force (RAF) limited the supplies to no more than 700-800 tons per day. 86 To compound the Axis's difficulties, everything the Afrika Korps needed had to be transported from Italy across the central Mediterranean and then offloaded in a few, inadequate Libyan ports. Afterward, all supplies had to be transported hundreds of

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miles across the desert in truck convoys, always in short supply. 87 About one-third of the Afrika Korps' supplies were still hundreds of miles to the rear awaiting transportation to the front. Furthermore, too few tanks remained in the panzer divisions." In their great offensive in southern Russia in January-February 1943, the Soviets lost more tanks to mechanical breakdown than to enemy fire. The Soviet High Command failed to take into account fatigue of troops. Resupply was delayed by bad roads, and stocks rapidly became depleted. The Soviet units were committed without fuel or ammunition, and local labor could not resupply the fast-moving mechanized forces. When Mobile Group Popov started its attack on 29 January, it was short of fuel and ammunition and its combat power was reduced by the need to leave forces behind to guard supply trains and lines of communications. 89 The logistical difficulties were the main reason that forced the Allied armies to pause in late September and October 1944. The Allies had the great shortage of gasoline, ammunition, and transportation to support the operations of several armies along the entire front. The Allied hopes of mounting an advance on a broad front into the heart of Germany were dashed because their armies could not be sustained without first seizing the port of Antwerp for Allied traffic. 9° Specifically, Patton's Third Army's rapid advance across France culminated in Lorraine in the late summer of 1944 for lack of supplies. By 31 August the Third Army's advance into northeastern France stopped for lack of fuel for its tanks. The day before, the Third Army had received only 32,000 gallons of fuel instead of its normal requirements of 400,000 gallons, and no new fuel supplies were promised until 2 September. Two days later, after the Allied capture of Antwerp, the Third Army received an equal share of supplies with the First Army. General Patton resumed his advance, but by then the Germans had considerably stiffened their resistance, and the Third Anny was stopped on the Meuse River. 9 1 Intelligence is often one of the major reasons for the attacker's or the defender's culmination: The attacker and the defender could reach their respective culminating points because of lack of adequate intelligence support. 92 In the First Battle of El Alamein in July 1942, Field Marshal Rommel lost intelligence assets in combat, thus making it even more difficult for him to accurately determine the situation. 93 The attacker's culmination can occur because the attacking forces move faster than its intelligence can support. The commander with barely adequate forces might then take unnecessary risks or suffer losses and endanger his success. Sometimes the commander and his staff might draw the wrong operational conclusions although otherwise they are in possession of good intelligence, as Rommel's experience in North Africa in January 1941 showed. Rommel's decision to launch a counteroffensive was based on his intelligence officer's wrong assessment of the situation. His intelligence officer told Rommel that at least for the new two weeks, the German forces would be much better supplied than the British forces facing them, and that now would be the best time to attack. 94 Rommel also received radio intercept intelligence that the British were experiencing supply difficulties. 95 For their part, the British also had inaccurate intelligence on the German forces. Among other things, they thought Rommel's divisions existed in name only. The Germans were disorganized, short of senior officers, short of materiel, and tired by continued pressure. Information from German prisoners of war indicated that German morale was low and losses in recent fighting high. Also, there was dissatisfaction with Rommel's leadership. 96 The British

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CINC in the Middle East, General Earl Wavell, made the same mistake in April 1941 by concluding that Rommel would not be strong enough to launch an attack before May. 97 The Soviet High Command made similar errors before and during their offensive in southern Russia in the winter of 1943. The Stavka and Soviet front commanders completely misread German intentions and capabilities, and the air of overconfidence affected the intelligence assessment of the Soviet field commanders." On 19 and 20 February, Soviet air reconnaissance observed large German panzer concentrations near Krasnograd, identified forward movement of German equipment from Dnepropetrovsk, and detected a regrouping of panzer forces from the east toward Krasnoarmeyskoye. 99 However, the Soviets misunderstood these movements, assessing them instead to be part of a general withdrawal of German forces from the Donets Basin. To subsequent Soviet dismay, these movements proved to be preparation for a German counteroffensive that would destroy Mobile Group Popov and a major part of the Southwest Front.' 00 In contrast, von Manstein knew the conditions of the Soviet armies better than the Soviet High Command did. He monitored radio traffic of all key units because his signal corps had broken Soviet codes. And he was aware of everything his Soviet counterpart General Nikolai Vatutin was doing.' () ' The premature arrival and overshooting of one's own culmination point is rarely a result of a single factor, no matter how important or dominant it may be. Rather, a combination of factors usually causes culmination. In the Battle of Borodino on 7 September 1812, Napoleon I carried out a frontal attack and inflicted heavy losses on the Russians. Russian General Mikhail 1. Kutuzov lost some 52,000 men and was pursued by some 28,000 greatly weakened French soldiers. A week later Napoleon I entered Moscow at the head of a 95,000-man army. However, he recognized the weakness of his position he was about 560 miles away from his main base on the Niemen River, and General Kutuzov threatened the security of the French single line of supplies from Moscow to Kaluga. After signing a peace treaty with Turkey in late September, the Russians released additional forces against Napoleon 1. General Tchitchagov, with 64,000 men in Volhynia, threatened the French from the south; and Corps Schwarzenberg, with 34,000 in the north, represented an additional threat to Napoleon I's line of supplies. In addition, General Wittgenstein, with 40,000 men, advanced to the Dvina River from the north. Napoleon I's efforts to negotiate with the Tsar were unsuccessful. A combination of lack of supplies, the Russian threat to his lines of supplies, and increasing problems with poor morale and discipline in his troops led Napoleon I to order the retreat from Moscow on 19 October. ' 02 In another example, the first of three great German offensives on the Western Front that started on 20 March 1918 reached its point of culmination by a combination of logistical difficulties, lack of mobility to consolidate gains on the ground, and timely countermeasures by the Allies at the most threatened parts of the front. Despite some brilliant tactics, the German offensive was an operational failure. The German objective was to achieve penetration in three sequential operations (Michel-I/-II/-III) and reach the Le F6re-Ham-Peronne line, to be expanded in the area of Arras a few days later by two further operations (Mars and Erzengel). 1 03 The Germans eventually gained a forty-mile salient and penetrated the Allied front at three places. However, their attempt to straighten out and shorten their front line failed, their drive petered out, and the offensive halted on 5 April. 1 04 The Allies suffered some 240,000 casualties during the offensive,

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but the German losses were similarly high. One reason for the Gennan setback was the lack of adequate logistical support after German troops penetrated the Allied lines. The Germans were unable to keep up the required level of ammunition, food, and other supplies to their advancing troops. They did not have fast-moving troops to exploit their tactical successes. Also, the establishment of the Allied unified command under General Ferdinand Foch on 26 March allowed the Allies for the first time to have unity of command in the west. During the most critical phase of the German offensive, General Foch was able to commit Allied reserves in a timely manner. 1 °5 Rommel's counteroffensive in North Africa in November 1941 suffered because of the lack of replacements in both personnel and equipment, overextended supply lines, and continued weakening of his forces. 1 06 The British offensive in Libya in January 1942 reached its operational culmination due to extended supply lines, low morale among the troops, high attrition, and inadequate training. 1°7 Before the First Battle of El Alamein, Rommel put himself in an impossible situation: either to stand still or to continue to advance. He decided to continue pursuit and attack the British Eighth Army. He thought wrongly, as it turned out-that the British were on the run and that they should not be given time to prepare their defenses. The ensuing battle, which started on 30 JuneI July, was a close call, but in the end Rommel failed to achieve a decision and was forced to revert to defense. By 4 July a combination of inadequate logistics, troop exhaustion, and stiffening of the Allied resistance forced Rommel to stop his advance. In retrospect, the first battle of El Alamein signaled that Rommel overshot his operational culminating point. 108 In another example, the Soviets overshot their point of culmination during their offensive in January-February 1943 in southern Russia because of a combination of logistical difficulties, use of attrited troops and materiel, lack of operational reserves, poor intelligence, and lack of appreciation of one's own capabilities. Stalin and the Stavka were too sure of success. A poorly prepared and broad linear offensive along a 750-mile front in southern Russia was planned. No operational reserves existed or were created to influence the operation. In fact, the Soviets were forced to pull divisions out of line, thus making new sectors vulnerable to German attack. The Soviet commanders also failed to mass whatever combat strength they had, thereby limiting their offensive potential. The armies allowed depleted divisions to continue to fight ineffectively instead of regrouping the remaining tanks, artillery, and soldiers into fewer but stronger forces. The higher headquarters constantly pressured subordinates to maintain the momentum and to accomplish assigned missions. They allowed units to be bogged down attempting tasks for which they were no longer capable. Several times Mobile Group Popov's tanks had to rescue infantry, causing them to fall further behind in their schedule to accomplish assigned missions. Mobile Group Popov had to protect its flanks against counterattacking Germans, thereby even further weakening its main effort. The Soviets also wrongly assumed that the Germans were retreating. Otherwise, they might have been able to recognize their forces' arrival at the point of culmination. 109 Methods: The culminating point has the same significance for the attacker and the defender. Therefore, the problem for the attacker is to delay the culmination as long as possible, while the defender must find ways to hasten the attacker's culmination. One's actions to postpone or prevent culmination would result in moving that point further away in time and space. Both sides in a conflict would then try to obtain their respective 360

objectives before reaching their respective culmination.' 'o Some methods of overcoming a culminating point are similar, but their purpose and procedures differ greatly. Among other things, the attacker can delay the arrival or overshooting of his point of culmination by better force protection, which would lower the rate of attrition, by maintaining the initiative and high operational tempo, and by ensuring timely arrival of reinforcements or commitment of his reserves. He can also delay the arrival at the point of culmination by properly sequencing major operations or campaigns, sound planning of tactical and operational fires, and planning or executing operational pauses. In addition, by applying the principles of unity of effort, simplicity, and security he can delay the approaching point of culmination. An offensive culmination can be prevented or at least delayed by the proper synchronization of one's logistics. In that way, the commander can control the tempo of his actions. This is far more important at the operational level than at the tactical level because of much larger factors of space, time, and forces and correspondingly direr consequences if logistical sustainment proves inadequate. Logistics should provide sufficient resources to allow the commander to achieve his operational or strategic objectives before the onset of culmination.''' A commander might intentionally decide to temporarily overextend his forces to reach a decision, but there is always a rather large risk in doing so. Therefore, a prudent operational commander should carefully weigh all the factors to measure the importance of the success he might achieve against the possibility of failure. 112 The defender's task is to hasten the attacker's arrival at his point of culmination before he reaches his stated objective. Actions designed to drive the attacking force to early culmination, or the defending commander who recognizes an attack that has passed its culmination point should then shift to counterattack or counteroffensive. The attacker then must go on the defense, but without gaining its inherent advantages.'' 3 Among other things, the defender could greatly speed the attacker's arrival at a point of culmination by inflicting excessive attrition through combined air and ground attacks. He could significantly derail the attacker's timetable by offering unexpectedly strong resistance on some selected strong points. The defender could also try to interdict or cut off the attacker's lines of supplies. The most profitable methods are often strikes on the selected road or railroad junctions, supply depots, or major bridges or causeways whose destruction or neutralization might cause a ripple effect through the entire logistical support and sustainment infrastructure. In his counteroffensive in southern Russia in February-March 1943, Field Marshal von Manstein sped up the Soviet arrival at their culminating point by using the Luftwaffe to destroy the Soviet supply depots and transportation network. During the counteroffensive, the German units carried out a special operation to destroy supply lines within the battle area.' 4 Given the advantage of waiting, the defender may reduce the attacker's strength faster than his own is worn down, while protecting his main source of power. Eventually, however, he will approach a defensive culminating point. By then he will no longer benefit from waiting, and his own losses will no longer yield an increase in relative advantage over the attacker. However, there is no guarantee that the defender will be successful unless he obtains a safe margin of relative combat power over the attacker. Therefore, the defender should, if possible, direct combat power not only against the enemy's force but also against elements of his logistical supply and sustainment. The essence of General MacArthur's plan to land some 150 miles behind the North Korean

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forces besieging the Pusan Perimeter was to cut off their lines of supplies and bring the arrival of their operational culmination much faster than by simply attritting them over ti me. The U.S. X Corps not only cut off the enemy lines of supplies but also forced North Koreans to face the threat from two directions. Synchronized with the X Corps' landing, the Eighth Army launched an offensive to break out of the Pusan Perimeter. The psychological effect of the Inchon landing caused the rapid disintegration of the North Korean Army, and by 26 September the lead divisions of the Eighth Army had linked up with the X Corps at Seoul.'" Another option is to trade space for time and thereby preserve combat power while lengthening the enemy's lines of supply. As these lines become longer, they become more vulnerable to attack, forcing the enemy to assign more resources to defense and thereby weakening his ability to continue his advance. By inflicting attrition on the attacker's combat force and interdicting his lines of supply, the defender can cause the attacker to arrive at or exceed his culminating point.' 16 One method of speeding the enemy's arrival at his point of culmination is to attack selected modes of transport or force him to carry supplies and bring reinforcements by using other more cumbersome, ti me-consuming, or vulnerable modes of transport. During the Soviet offensive in southern Russia in January-February 1943, the Germans focused their attacks on the Soviet railroad system, which forced the Soviets to use less adequate and more timeconsuming motor vehicle and horse transport.' 7 The defender can also hasten the attacker's arrival at the point of a culmination by properly sequencing tactical actions or major operations. Conclusion: The Clausewitzian concept of a culminating point remains relevant and viable today despite the passage of time. But while the theoretical underpinnings of the concept remain essentially the same as von Clausewitz postulated, its content has significantly changed. Since the early nineteenth century, the operational level of war and several sublevels of war have emerged. The factors affecting culmination today are also much more diverse and difficult to quantify than they were in the past, making the application of concept more difficult. This is especially true in low-intensity conflict, where the linkage between strategic and tactical levels is much closer than in highintensity conventional war. Also, the factors affecting culmination at the operational and strategic levels are predominantly unquantifiable in character. To successfully anticipate and plan for the arrival at the culminating point, it is critical to fully comprehend the theory. Theory can show the way but cannot guarantee success. Historic examples can only illustrate certain aspects or problems with theory; it cannot show the path in the future. But without those examples it is difficult to see how the theory could be properly understood. Application of the concept of culmination requires the highest degree of skill on the part of the commanders and their staffs. This is even more critical at the operational and strategic levels of war, because the consequences of premature culmination or failure to take advantage of the enemy's culmination are far more severe and more durable than at the tactical level. Factors affecting culmination should be understood. While many factors cause culmination, probably the three single most important factors are logistics, intelligence, and force protection. The operational commanders and their principal staff officers should identify the various factors that cause one's own and enemy forces to reach culmination and then plan action to prevent one's own or speed up the occurrence 362

of the enemy's point of culmination. Among other things, these factors include logistical support and sustamment, protection of one's lines of supply, weather and terrain, attrition, replacement of troops and equipment, and the relationships of the factors of time, space, and force. Operational planners should identify actions that will lead the opposing force to culminate prematurely. It should be emphasized that intangible elements of combat power specifically, leadership, morale and discipline, doctrine, and training-are as critical to success as they were in the past. Therefore, while always paying close attention to tangible elements of combat power that affect or cause culmination, operational commanders should perhaps focus even more on those unquantifiable elements that significantly or even decisively affect culmination.

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Notes 1. In the U.S. military, the concept of culmination was not given its due until the revival of operational art in the late 1970s and early 1980s; since then, the U.S. Army has paid more attention than any other service to this important element of operational warfare. The first edition of the Field Manual (FM) 100-5: Operations, published in 1986, defined the term "culminating point ... where the strength of the attacker no longer significantly exceeds that of the defender, and beyond which continued offensive operations therefore risk overextension, counterattack, and defeat"; Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 1005: Operations ( Washington, DC: June 1986), p.181. The latest edition of the same manual replaced the previous term with a new term "culmination," defined as "the point in time and space when the attacker's combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender or when the defender no longer has the capability to defend successfully"; ibid., FM 100-5: Operations ( Washington, DC: June 1993), p. GL-2. U.S. Arm y FM 1 00-7 defines the culminating point as the juncture in time and space at which the offensive becomes overextended and the offensive combat power no longer sufficiently exceeds that of the defender to allow successful continuation of the offensive; ibid., FM 100-7: Decisive Force. Army in Theater Operations (Washington, DC: May 1995), p. 3-1. 2. Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege (Bonn: Ferdinand Duemmlers Verlag, 16th edition, 1952), p. 777. 3. Carl von Clausewitz, On War , edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, 8th printing, 1984), p. 528; Leonard Roger Ashley, A Short Guide to Clausewitz On War (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1 st American edition, 1967), p. 698. 4. Frank T. Taddonio, The Concept of the Culminating Point ofAttack (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 16 May 1986), p. 18. 5. Stephen C. Duncan, Intelligence and Defensive Culminating Point-Piercing the Fog (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 1995), p. 4. 6. Von Clausewitz, On War (1984), pp. 357-8, 571, 566. 7. Von Clausewitz also noted that because so many factors contribute to an equation of force, it is difficult to determine which side has the upper hand; "often it is entirely a matter of imagination"; ibid., pp. 528, 571. 8. David Benjamin, Prerequisite for Victory: The Discovery of the Culminating Point (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 13 May 1986), p. 23. 9. Hans-Peter von Kirchbach, Clausewitz and the Culmination Point of Victory (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 15 March 1989), p. 26; Daniel J. Rob, Operational Pause vs. Offensive Culmination. Lessons in Eisenhower's Broad Front Strategy (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 26 April 1988), pp. 8-9; Von Clausewitz, On War (1984), p. 527; FM 100-5: Operations (1993), pp. 6-8; Charles D. Franklin, Time, Space, and Mass at the Operational Level of War.- The Dynamics of the Culminating Point (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 28 April 1988), p. 13. 10. FM 100-5: Operations (1993), pp. 6-8. 11. Von Tschischwitz, "Der Kulminationspunkt des Angriffs im Landkriege," Part 1: Militaerwissenschaftliche Rundschau (Berlin), 4 (1942), p. 344.

12. Franklin, Time, Space, and Mass at the Operational Level of War. - The Dynamics of the Culminating Point, p. 1 3.

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13. Von Clausewitz, On War (1984), p. 572; von Kirchbach, Clausewitz and the Culmination Point of Victory, p. 6. 1 4. Von Tschischwitz, "Der Kulminationspunkt des Angriffs im Landkriege," Part 1, pp. 345-6. 15. R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 B.C. to the Present (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1986, 2nd rev. edition), p. 759. 1 6. Paul Carell, Scorched Earth ( New York: Ballantine Books, 1973), pp. 189-190; Taddonio, The Concept of the Culminating Point of'Attack, pp. 6-7; Albert Seaton, The Russo-German War 1941-45 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1971), p. 344. 17. The Soviet forces were weak both in armor and personnel. For example, the rifle division strength varied from 10,000 to 6,000 to 8,000 men. A tank corps had only thirty to fifty tanks out of 168 authorized tanks, and it had only 50 percent authorized personnel strength; David M. Glantz, From the Don to the Dnepr: A Study of Soviet Offensive Operations, Dec 1942-Aug 1943 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1985), p. 108. The Soviets possessed 2-to-1 superiority in infantry and 4-to-1 in tanks. However, the Soviet advantage in tanks was quickly reduced due to lack of fuel and mechanical losses; Taddonio, The Concept of the Culminating Point of Attack, pp. 7-8; Friedrich Wilhelm Hauck, "Der Gegenangriff der Heeresgruppe Sued im Fruehjahr 1943," Part 1, Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau, 8 (August 1962), p. 460. 18. Benjamin, Prerequisite for Victory: The Discovery of the Culminating Point, p. 8. 19. Glantz, From the Don to the Dnepr: A Study of Soviet Offensive Operations, Dec 1942-Aug 1943, p. 109; Hauck, "Der Gegenangriff der Heeresgruppe Sued im Fruehjahr 1943," Part 1, p. 460. 20. Othmar Hack], "Operative Fuehrungsproblems der Heeresgruppe Don bzw. Sued bei den Verteidigungsoperationen zwischen Donez and Dnepr im Februar and Maerz 1943," Truppenpraxis 3 ( March 1982), p. 197; James D. Coomler, The Operational Culminating Point. Can You See It Coming? (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 16 May 1986), p. 17; Hauck, "Der Gegenangriff der Heeresgruppe Sued im Fruehjahr 1943," Part 1, pp. 463-4; Erich von Manstein, Verlorene Siege, Errinerungen 1939-1944 (Bonn: Bernard & Graefe Verlag, 13th and 14th eds., 1993), pp. 437-42. Taddonio, The Concept of the Culminating Point of Attack, pp. 9-10. 21. Ibid., p. l l . 22. Von Manstein claimed that his forces completely destroyed the Soviet 25th Tank Corps and three rifle divisions, while an additional three tank corps, one independent tank brigade, one mechanized brigade, one rifle division, and one ski brigade were defeated; heavy losses were inflicted on the tank guard and tank corps, six rifle divisions, and two ski brigades; in the areas between the Don and the Dnepr the Soviets left 23,000 dead, 615 tanks, 354 guns, 69 AA guns, and large quantities of machine guns and grenade launchers; von Manstein, p. 463. Other sources claim that the Soviet losses were 40,000 troops, 600 tanks, and 500 guns; Seaton, The Russo-German War 1941-45 p. 350. 23. The Popov Group consisted of the X Tank Corps and 1V Guard Tank Corps, with 55,000 men and 212 tanks, and the Southwestern Front of 65th, 1 st Guards, 3rd Guards, and 5th Tank armies, with 325,000 men and 362 tanks; Militaergeschichtliches Forschungsamt (MGFA), Development, Planning and Realization of Operational Conceptions in World Wars I and 11 (Herford/Bonn: E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1989), pp. 29-34; Bruce L. Meisner, The Culminating Point-A Viable Operational Concept or Some Theoretical Nonsense? (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, March 1986), pp. 11-6.

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24. Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong North to the Yalu (June-November 1950 , United States Army in the Korean War (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1992), pp. 543-6. 25. Including 84,500 of the Eighth Army, 72,730 of the ROK Army, and the British contingent of 1,700 men; ibid., p. 547. 26. Ibid., p. 601; Dupuy and Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 B.C. to the Present , p. 1243. 27. Von Clausewitz, On War (1984), pp. 357, 383; Barry D. Fulbright, The Effects of Airpower on the Offensive Culminating Point (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 25 April 1988), p. 3; FM 100-5: Operations (1993), pp. 6-8. 28. FM 100-7: Decisive Force. The Army in Theater Operations, p. 3-1. 29. FM 100-5: Operations (1993), pp. 6-8. 30. William W. Hamilton, Defensive Culmination-When Does the Tactical Commander Counterattack? (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1991), p. 4. 31. Mark J. Redlinger, Hans Delbrueck and Clausewitz 's Culminating Points (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, May 1988), p. 9. 32. Franklin, Time, Space, and Mass at the Operational Level of War. The Dynamics of'the Culminating Point, p. 21; Taddonio, The Concept of the Culminating Point of Attack, p. 27; Benjamin, Prerequisite,for Victory. The Discoverv of'the Culminating Point, p. 1 4. 33. Duncan, Intelligence and Defensive Culminating Point-Piercing the Fog, pp. 6-7; von Kirchbach, Clausewitz and the Culmination Point of Victory, pp. 24, 26; J.M.A. Gwyer, Grand Strategy, Vol. 3, Part 1: June 1941-August 1942 , History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series, edited by J.R.M. Butler (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1964), p. 171. 34. Duncan, Intelligence and Defensive Culminating Point-Piercing the Fog, pp. 7-8. 35. The U.S. Army view is that tactical culmination is less a matter of culmination than a temporary exhaustion or depletion of resources. Reinforcement, resupply, or unit substitution in a short period of time can remedy this problem. FM 100-5: Operations (1993), p. 6-8. 36. David B. Flanigan, The Culminating Point and U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1992), p. 14. 37. Colonel Chamberlain's regiment of less than 400 men faced elements of a Confederate division consisting of over 1,000 men; by the end of the day Chamberlain had lost more than one third of his regiment, but he captured over 4,000 and killed or wounded 150 of the Confederate forces; Michael T. Flynn, Climax or Conclusion. Culmination in Defense (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1994), pp. 19, 22, 31; James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom. The Civil War Era (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 659-60. 38. Ibid., p. 664. 39. Hugh M. Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, United States Army, 1984), pp. 256-7, 259. 40. Flanigan, The Culminating Point and U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, p. 15.

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41. William J. Slim, Defeat into Victory (London: Macmillan, 1956), pp. 290-1, 347-369. 42. Earl F. Ziemke and Magna E. Bauer, Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the East ( Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1st printing, 1987), p. 61; Center for Military History, The German Campaign in Russia. Planning and Operations (1940-1942), (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, United States Army, CMH Pub 104-21, 1988, 1 st edition, March 1955), p. 80. 43. Alfred Philippi and Ferdinand Heim, Der Feldzug Gegen Sowjetrussland 1941 his 1945. Ein operatives Ueberblick (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1962), pp. 90-1. 44. The German Campaign in Russia. Planning and Operations (1940-1942), p. 83. 45. Ziemke and Bauer, Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the East, p. 61. 46. Philippi and Heim, Der Feldzug Gegen Sowietrussland 1941 his 1945. Ein operatives Ueberblick, pp. 98-9. 47. Seaton, The Russo-German War 194145, pp. 238-40. 48. Dupuy and Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 B.C. to the Present, pp. 978-81. 49. Gwyer, Grand Strategy Vol. 3, Part 1: June 1941-August 1942, pp. 194-7. 50. Von Kirchbach, Clausewitz and the Culmination Point of Victory, p. 9. 51. Redlinger, Flans Delhrueck and Clausewitz's Culminating Points, pp. 10- 1. 52. Von Clausewitz, On War (1984), p. 570. 53. Von Kirchbach, Clausewitz and the Culmination Point of Victory, p. 9. 54. B.H. Liddell Hart, The Real War 1914-1918 (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co., reissued 1964), p. 68; Flynn, Climax or Conclusion: Culmination in Defense, pp. 23-6. 55. Heribert Goettelmann, Die deutschen Angrijfe im FruehjahrlSommer 1918 in Frankreich zrnd die Ardennen-Offensive 1944145. Vergleich von Zielsetzung-Durehfuehrzrng-Ergebnis (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 1 December 1968), p. 7. 56. Coomler, The Operational Culminating Point. Can You See It Coming? pp. 18-9. 57. Franklin, Time, Space, and Mass at the Operational Level of War: The Dynamics of the Culminating Point, p. 36. 58. Mitsuo Fuchida and Masatake Okumiya, Midway. The Battle that Doomed Japan (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute, 1955), p. 250. 59. FM 100-5: Operations (1993), pp. 6-8. 60. Franz Uhle-Wettler, Hoehe- and Wendepunkte Deutscher Militaer Geschichte (Mainz: v. Hase & Koehler, 1984), p. 309. 61. The German Campaign. Planning and Operations (1940-1942), p. 1 53. 62. "Weisung Nr. 45 fuer die Fortsetzung der Operation 'Braunschweig' 23 July 1942," in Walther Hubatsch, Hitlers Weisunggen fuer die Kriegsfuehrung 1939-1945. Dokumente des Oberkommandos der

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Wehrmacht ( Koblenz: Bernard & Graefe Verlag, 1983), pp. 197-8; Dankmut Schinzer, "Vom Niedergang der operativen Fuehrung: Die Mahnung Stalingrads," Truppenpraxis 4 (April 1987), p. 395. 63. The German Campaign in Russia. Planning and Operations (1940-1942), p. 157. 64. Philippi and Heim, Der Feldzu

Ge egn Sowjetrussland 1941 bis 1945. Ein operativer Ueberblick , p. 138.

65. Benjamin, Prerequisite for Victory: The Discovery of the Culminating Point, p. 8; David M. Glantz, The Great Patriotic War and the Maturation of the Operational Art: 1941-1945 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1985), pp. 5-6, 5-17. 66. Franklin, Time, Space, and Mass at the Operational Level of War: The Dynamics of the Culminating Point, p. 1 5; Glantz, from the Don to the Dnepr: A Study of Soviet Offensive Operations, Dec 1942 Aug 1943, pp. 1 07-110, 165-6; Meisner, The Culminating Point-A Viable Operational Concept or Some Theoretical Nonsense? p. 18. 67. Ibid., p. 20. 68. Von Clausewitz, On War (1984), p. 597. 69. The Principles gf Strategy (Fort Leavenworth, KS: The Command and General Staff School, 1936), p. 36. 70. Franklin, Time, Space, and Mass at the Operational Level of War: The Dynamics of the Culminating Point, p. 1 6. 71. Ibid., p. 17. 72. Lanning M. Porter, Preconceptions, Predilections, and Experience: Problems, for Operational Level Intelligence and Decisionmaking (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 12 May 1986), p. 11. 73. Taddonio, The Concept of the Culminating Point of Attack, p. 24; George M. Hall, "Culminating Points," Military Review 7 (July 1989), p. 84; Franklin, Time, Space, and Mass at the Operational Level of War: The Dynamics of the Culminating Point, p. 1 7. 74. Taddonio, The Concept of the Culminating Point gf'Attack, p. 24. 75. Robert B. Asprey, The German High Command at War. Hindenburg and Ludendorff Conduct of World War I (New York: Quill William Murrow, 1991), pp. 99-101. 76. Dupuy and Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 B.C. to the Present , pp. 937--8. 77. Asprey, The German High Command at War. Hindenburg and Ludendorff Conduct of World War 1, p. 101. 78. Liddell Hart, The Real War 1914-1918, pp. 84-5. 79. Asprey, The German High Command at War. Hindenburg and Ludendorff Conduct of World War I , p. 106. 80. Benjamin, Prerequisite for Victory .- The Discovery of the Culminating Point, p. 1 3; Glantz, From the Don to the Dnepr: A Study of Soviet Offnsive Operations, Dec 1942 Aug 1943, pp. 1 43, 165, 239-41; Taddonio, The Concept of the Culminating Point of Attack, p. 1 9. 81. Ibid., pp. 6-8. 82. Martin van Creveld, Supplying War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 190.

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83. Meisner, The Culminating Point --A Viable Operational Concept or Some Theoretical Nonsense? p. 1 7. 84. Barry Fulbright, The Effects of Airpower on the Offensive Culminating Point, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 25 April 1988), p. 5. 85. David Irving, The Trail of the Fox (New York: Avon Books, 1977), p. 232. 86. Fulbright, The Effects of Airpower on the Offensive Culminating Point, p. 9. 87. Van Creveld, Supplying War , pp. 181-4. 88. Coomler, The Operational Culminating Point. Can You See It Coming? p. 9. 89. Glantz, From the Don to the Dnepr. A Study of Soviet Offensive Operations, Dec 1942 Aug 1943, pp. 157, 165, 237; Coomler, The Operational Culminating Point. Can You See It Coming? p. 1 4. 90. Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, p. 256. 91. B.H. Liddell Hart, "How the Allies let Victory Slip in 1944," Marine Corps Gazette 7 (July 1957), p. 29. 92. FM 100-5: Operations (1993), pp. 6-8. 93. Irving, The Trail of the Fox, pp. 230-35. 94. Barie Pitt, The Crucible of War. Western Desert 1941 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1980), p. 7. 95. Irving, The Trail of the Fox, p. 185. 96. Pitt, The Crucible of War. Western Desert 1941 , pp. 8-9. 97. Von Kirchbach, Clausewitz and the Culmination Point of Victory, p. 21. 98. Taddonio, The Concept of the Culminating Point ofAttack, p. 19. 99. Glantz, From the Don to the Dnepr. A Study ofSoviet Offensive Operations, Dec 1942 Aug 1943, p. 142. 100. Meisner, The Culminating Point A Viable Operational Concept or Some Theoretical Nonsense? p. 1 6. 101. Carell, Scorched Earth, pp. 209-210. 1 02. Von Tschischwitz, "Der Kulminationspunkt des Angriffs im Landkriege," Part 1, p. 337. 1 03. Goettelmann, Die deutschen Angriffe im FruehjahrlSommer 1918 in Frankreich and die ArdennenOffensive 1944145. Vergleich von Zielsetzung-Durchfuehrung-Ergebnis, p. 5. 104. Ibid., p. 20. 105. Dupuy and Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 B.C. to the Present , p. 979. 1 06. Goettelmann, Die deutschen Angriffe im FruehjahrlSommer 1918 in Frankreich and die ArdennenOffensive 1944145. Vergleich von Zielsetzung-Durchfuehrung-Ergebnis, p. 20. 107. Meisner, The Culminating Point--A Viable Operational Concept or Some Theoretical Nonsense? p. 4. 1 08. Coomler, The Operational Culminating Point. Can You See It Coming? pp. 7-10.

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109. Ibid., pp. 15-6. 110. Flanigan, The Culminating Point and U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine, p. 12. 111. FM 100-5: Operations (1993), pp. 6-9. 112. Taddonio, The Concept of the Culminating Point of Attack, p. 25. 1 13. Franklin, Time, Space, and Mass at the Operational Level of War: The Dynamics of the Culminating Point, p. 21. 114. Coomler, The Operational Culminating Point. Can You See It Coming? pp. 17-8. 115. Franklin, Time, Space, and Mass at the Operational Level of War: The Dynamics o/ the Culminating Point, p. 36. 116. Fulbright, The Effects of Airpower on the Offensive Culminating Point, p. 4. 117. Meisner, The Culminating Point--A Viable Operational Concept or Some Theoretical Nonsense? p. 18.

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Part VI: METHODS OF COMBAT FORCE EMPLOYMENT

METHODS OF COMBAT FORCE EMPLOYMENT Tactical actions, major operations, and campaigns are the main methods of combat force employment. They are differentiated by their military objectives and the corresponding command echelon responsible for their planning and execution. The larger the military objective, the larger and more diverse the forces usually employed to accomplish them. Thus, the size and mix of combat forces and the time needed to accomplish objectives vary considerably. The operational and strategic objectives are principally accomplished by conducting major operations and campaigns, respectively. Tactical actions are also important for operational theory and practice because they are an essential part of major operations. Tactical Actions: Tactical actions are planned and conducted to accomplish major or minor tactical objectives in a combat zone or sector, and sometimes in an area of operations. When conducted over time, tactical actions can cumulatively accomplish operational objective(s) in a given theater of operations. They can be either offensive or defensive in nature and are differentiated by the physical environment in which they occur: land, sea, or air (or space). They are normally conducted with forces of a single service and as a part of a joint major operation or campaign. The principal methods of tactical employment today are attacks, strikes, engagements, and battles (see Figure 30). The term attack has a different meaning in land warfare than in naval or air warfare. In land warfare, the term is used to describe actions aimed to accomplish a wide range of objectives, from minor tactical to operational. The term is also used to refer to

single platform, or several platforms of a single type, to accomplish minor tactical objectives. Attacks are normally integral parts of engagements or strikes. A strike consists of a series of related swift attacks carried out simultaneously or almost simultaneously by a single or several platforms to accomplish a minor or major tactical objective. The introduction of ever-longer-range, more precise, and more lethal missiles and torpedoes has made it possible for strikes to destroy or annihilate a variety of types of targets, ranging from tactical to strategic. In the past, a strike was considered a part of an engagement or battle; today, however, its importance approximates that of a battle. An engagement consists of a series of related attacks, strikes, and smaller tactical actions, by a single or several combat arms, aimed to achieve a major tactical objective. It is normally an integral part of a battle. A hattle in turn consists of a series of related engagements, strikes, and attacks, conducted by several combat arms and coordinated in ti me and place, to accomplish a major tactical or sometimes even operational objective in a given area of operations. A battle is normally planned, but it can be fought without a plan having been drawn in advance. Maior Operations: The principal method of accomplishing an operational (and sometimes strategic) objective is a major operation-a series of related battles, engagements, strikes, attacks, and other tactical actions. Diverse combat arms of one or more services conduct these actions concurrently or sequentially, coordinated in time and place in accordance with a common plan, and controlled by a single commander. By the middle and late nineteenth century, enormous advances in technology, coupled with the advent of mass armies, had led to new methods of combat force employment. The first rudiments of modern "major operations" emerged in the American Civil War (1861-1865) and the Wars of German Unification (1864-1871). The American Civil War was characterized by extensive use of railways and the telegraph, which, in turn, led to the development of "deep raiding operations" designed to sever or interdict communications deep in the enemy's rear. Although the effects of such raids were transitory, they nevertheless had great military, political, and psychological impact on both sides. A "decisive" battle increasingly became an anachronism, ultimately replaced by the "operation" ("major operation" in today's terms). An operation was the minor subdivision of a campaign. A war was made up of campaigns, and- a campaign was made up of operations. I The Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) was the first conflict in which fighting on land and at sea was almost continuous. That war also signaled the final demise of the "decisive" battle on land and the "general fleet action" at sea. The Russians tried unsuccessfully to defeat the Japanese in a single decisive battle, not grasping that the large increase in the size of armies and their almost total dependence on logistics made that task next to impossible. Then, the battles broke up into a series of engagements fought along an extended front over many days or weeks. These individually small-scale actions were not sporadic or random but were linked to each other by a common purpose-an operational objective. By the eve of World War 1, all the potential opponents in Europe had large standing armies which could be vastly expanded through mass mobilization. Mobility was greatly increased, and with it the speed of deployment and concentration. The i ntroduction of the longer-range and more precise and lethal weapons, coupled with the 374

growing distance at which one's forces could be effectively controlled, caused a steady expansion of the potential battlefield. Early in the war it became clear that the existence of million-man armies and large navies precluded their defeat in a single battle or even several large ones. These forces not only were too large to be destroyed by a single blow, they were also deployed over a large part of the land or maritime theater. Therefore, to accomplish operational or strategic results it was necessary to fight a series of smaller, related battles and engagements coordinated in time, place, and objective and controlled by a single commander. Several major operations were conducted on land in World War 1. The German execution of the Schlieffen Plan in August 1914 consisted in fact of seven major land operations, each conducted by an army. The German defense of East Prussia, which led to the Battle of Tannenberg in August 1914; the Austro-German three-day operational penetration at Gorlice-Tarnow; and the subsequent pursuit of Russian forces, May-September 1915, were also major land operations. Also, the first major naval operations emerged during World War I: the Austro-Hungarian fleet's attack on the Italian Adriatic coast in May 1915; the Battle of Jutland in 1916; the amphibious landing at Gallipoli in 1915; the German landing in the Bay of Riga in October 1917 (Operation Albion); and others. In the 1920s and 1930s the Soviets developed theories of "successive operations," "deep battle," and "deep operations," while in the West the concept of combined arms operations was elaborated. Also, the first of the theoretical foundations was laid for conducting diverse types of major naval and air operations. In World War 11, numerous major joint and combined operations were conducted on land, at sea, and in the air in all war theaters. They were usually fought as part of land and maritime campaigns. Tactical actions became more diverse and complex and were conducted with combat arms of several services. Since the end of World War II, Western military have conducted few major operations and even fewer campaigns. In the Korean War (1950--1953), both the communists and the UN forces conducted a campaign and several major air and land operations. The UN forces also conducted several major naval and air operations. Major air and land operations were conducted in the Arab-Israeli Wars of 1956 and 1967, especially by the Israelis. In the Yom Kippur (Ramadan) War, both the Israelis and the Arabs planned and conducted several offensive and defensive major joint (air-land) operations and major air operations. In the Falklands/Malv1nas Conflict of 1982, the British planned and executed a major joint naval operation with a strategic objective. U.S. forces conducted a major joint operation in their invasion of Grenada in 1982 (Operation Urgent Fury) and the invasion of Panama in 1989 (Operation Just Cause). The U.S.-led Coalition forces conducted a land campaign in the Gulf War of 1990-1991 (Operation Desert Shicld/Desert Storm). The Croatian offensive (Operation Oluj(u [Storm]) to liberate the Serb-controlled Krajiua region in August 1995 was an example of air and l and major operations conducted by a minor military power. NATO forces conducted a major joint and combined air offensive operation in the Kosovo Conflict of 1999. Today, a major operation is conducted independently or as an integral part of a campaign. It normally encompasses a given area of operations, but often combat takes place over a much larger part of a given theater of operations. Sometimes deployment of forces in a major operation can even include parts of the adjacent theaters of operations. With respect to purpose, a major operation can be offensive ` or defensive (see Figure 3 l).

Ground (or land), naval (or maritime), and air (space) major operations are differentiated with regard to the physical environment in which the preponderance of the operation is conducted and with respect to the scope of service involvement. Campaigns: To eliminate or neutralize a major strategic threat or accomplish strategic objective(s) in a given theater requires planning, preparation, and execution of a Figure 31: MAJOR OPERATIONS

campaign. The large scope and complexity of the strategic objective requires sequenced and synchronized use of both military and nonmilitary sources of power. Thus, today, no single service or single type of force can accomplish a properly defined and articulated strategic objective by employing its forces alone. This is especially true in a developed theater. Therefore, campaigns today are inherently joint and often combined efforts and fought in two or more physical media. However, the term campaign is overused today, all too often without regard to its true meaning. Sometimes any large military effort is defined as a campaign instead of as a major operation or even as a battle or engagement .z For most of recorded military history, wars as a whole were won or lost by conducting a campaign, each consisting of a number of battles and attacks. The origins of campaigns can be traced back to wars of the Ancient Era. Alexander the Great's conquest of Asia Minor and Persia and his advance to the Indus in 336-323 B.C. were campaigns. Julius Caesar's conquest of Gaul and England in 58-51 B.C. were land campaigns in the modern understanding of the term, as was Genghis Khan's conquest of Central Asia in A.D.1215-1220. Prior to the French Revolutionary Wars, a campaign was defined by season more than geography. In the Napoleonic Wars, introduction of divisions and army corps provided a more flexible organizational structure, while theater-wide logistical systems allowed more mobility to large formations. The principal methods of combat force employment for Napoleon 1 were tactical actions coordinated within a campaign. A particular area of the study of tactics was a decisive battle-a series of related attacks and 376

engagements fought in a relatively limited area over several days. The objective was to destroy a major part of the enemy's army or fleet and thereby decisively influence the outcome of a campaign or even the war as a whole. Strategy was then primarily concerned with planning and conducting land campaigns. The term campaign was applied to all movements and combat of an army during a calendar year. The armies played the principal role, while the navies were employed in a supporting role (amphibious landings, bombardment of forts or ports, support for the army on the coast, etc.). The French Army under Napoleon I conducted separate campaigns fought under different generals or marshals in geographically dispersed areas, and in some instances fighting continued through the winter. 3 Campaigns were often named after the year in which they were conducted (i.e., campaign of 1797, 1800, 1805, etc.) or by the principal events (e.g., the Ulm Campaign, the Austerlitz Campaign, the Russian Campaign, etc.). After the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815, the term campaign referred to movements of forces and combat actions linked to some important event in the conduct of war. In the American Civil War, a number of campaigns were fought, each named after some decisive battle (Manassas, Vicksburg, Antietam, Gettysburg, Chancel lorsville, etc.) or, in some cases, the geographic area (the Peninsula Campaign, Shenandoah Campaign, etc.). 4 The navies played a critical role in supporting the land campaigns during the Crimean War (1853-1856) and the American Civil War. In today's terms, a campaign in a conventional war consists of a series of major operations sequenced and synchronized in time and place and aimed to accomplish a military strategic or theater-strategic objective. In contrast to a major operation, a campaign poses a multidimensional threat to the enemy; on the ground, from the air, and from the sea. In a conventional war, each campaign, whether it succeeds or fails, represents a distinctive phase of war. A campaign can be conducted across the entire operational continuum, from lowintensity conflict to high-intensity conventional war. Normally, a campaign is conducted according to a campaign plan and controlled by a single joint/combined commander. In contrast, a campaign conducted in a low-intensity conflict consists largely of a series of related minor, and sometimes major, tactical actions, rather than major operations, coordinated in space and time to accomplish national strategic objectives. In addition, nonmilitary sources of power might be predominantly used in some types of lowintensity conflict, while military forces are predominantly used in a supporting effort. Depending on the predominant nature of the physical space or physical "medium" i n which combat takes place, land (continental) and maritime campaigns are differentiated (see Figure 32). A land campaign consists of a series of related land (ground) and airspace major operations, while a maritime campaign consists mostly of naval and airspace major operations. A blue-water navy or coastal navy bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea will be involved in conducting major operations or tactical actions as a part of a land campaign, as was the case with the German and Soviet navies in the Baltic and Black Seas in World War II. In addition, Allied navies took part in a land campaign fought in Italy in 1943-1945. The apparent nonrecognition of the air campaign has to do with the fact that a campaign can take place predominantly on land or in a maritime theater. In each case, the third dimension-airspace-and, increasingly, the fourth dimension-cyberspace-is an integral and indelible part of a land or maritime

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campaign. The air elements are the most mobile and flexible instruments, and flexibility and mobility are essential to successful campaigning. 5

Military or theater-strategic objectives, especially in a mature theater, encompass not only military but also political, diplomatic, economic, social, environmental, informational, and often ethnic, religious, and other elements. Therefore, no single service or single-type force of several services could accomplish all the aspects of the military or theater-strategic objective; a concerted effort of several services is required. Depending on the strength and capabilities of the adversary, sometimes a single service or single-type force of several services could considerably or even predominantly contribute to the successful outcome of a campaign. In the offensive phase of the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the U.S. Air Force, together with carrier-based aircraft and the air forces of other Coalition partners, made a major, and possibly decisive, contribution to the strategic objectives in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO). Despite the claims of the air power advocates, the U.S. Air Force did not conduct an "air campaign" in the strict definition of the term; rather, it carried out a series of offensive and defensive major air operations that formed an integral part of the land campaign planned and conducted by the theater commander (General Norman Schwarzkopf). NATO's actions against the rump state of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) (Operation Allied Force) in March-June 1999 was not an air campaign, as officially and unofficially claimed, but rather a single major combined air offensive operation aimed to accomplish a partial strategic objective. NATO's land-based and carrier-based aircraft conducted series of strikes against targets in Serbia and Kosovo Province. No several major air operations were planned or executed. The ground option was contemplated later in the operation, but never took place. In the end, a partial strategic objective was accomplished because Slobodan Milosevic's regime acceded to NATO's demands. It was a close call, however, 378

and if Milosevic had not yielded, NATO would have been forced to mount a ground offensive to accomplish its ultimate theater-strategic objective. Normally, each military or theater-strategic objective would require planning and execution of a single campaign in a given theater of operations. In general conflict, two or more campaigns could be waged sequentially or almost simultaneously in a given theater of war. The Allies started the Central Pacific Campaign in November 1943, while the Solomons Campaign was then almost completed in the Southern Pacific Area (SOPAC). Depending on the nature of the military or theater-strategic objective, a campaign can be offensive or defensive. The Germans conducted an offensive campaign in their invasion of Norway in April-June 1940 and the Benelux Countries and France in May June 1940. Poland conducted a defensive campaign against German invaders in September-October 1939. Defense of Alaska and the Aleutians in 1941-1943 was a defensive campaign conducted by the United States. The Germans conducted an offensive campaign aimed at cutting off Allied trade in the Atlantic in 1939-1945, while the Allies conducted a defensive campaign. A campaign could encompass an initial defensive phase followed by an offensive phase. For the U.S.-led coalition, the Gulf War of 1990-1991 consisted of the Desert Shield defensive phase (3 August 1990-16 January 1991) followed by the Desert Storm offensive phase (17 January-28 February 1991). The main objective of a campaign depends on whether it is conducted in a war or in peacetime. In a war, a land campaign can be aimed either to defend one's territory or to seize control of the enemy's territory. A maritime campaign can be fought with the main objective of destroying enemy or protecting one's sea-based strategic forces; seizing an enemy-held large island or archipelago chain; or attacking the enemy or protecting and defending one's maritime trade. In a low-intensity conflict, insurgency, counterinsurgency, counterdrug, and counterterrorism campaigns are differentiated. In general, a campaign requires much more time to complete than a major operation. Duration of a campaign depends on many factors, but principally on the scope and complexity of the strategic objective, the factors of space-time-force, and the enemy's will to fight. A campaign on land in a developed theater normally lasts longer than one in an undeveloped theater. The initial campaigns usually last longer than those i n the final phases of a war. The Allied New Guinea (Papuan) Campaign lasted some twenty-seven months (June 1942-September 1944), while the Philippine Campaign l asted only about ten months (October 1944-August 1945). The defensive and offensive phase of the Allied North African Campaign lasted almost three years (June 1940-May 1 943). The German campaign in Norway in 1940 lasted only three months (April-June), and the one in the West slightly more than one month (10 May-17 June). The lengths of the defensive and offensive phases of a campaign vary. The defensive phase (Desert Shield) of the Gulf War of 1991 lasted about five and a half months (3 August 1990-17 January 1991), while the offensive phase (Desert Storm) lasted only about six weeks (17 January-28 February 1991). Maritime campaigns to attack enemy or protect one's trade are conducted for the duration of the war; hence, they could be quite long. The German attack on Allied trade in the Atlantic and the Allied protection of their trade lasted more than five and a half years.

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Campaigns in low-intensity conflict usually last much longer than campaigns in a war. The reason for this is that strategic objectives, especially those where military sources of power do not predominate, such as counterterrorism or counterdrug, can take many years to achieve. Campaigns in low-intensity conflict are conducted in a much more restrictive political and legal environment than those in a war, and therefore they are less likely to be waged in a decisive manner. Land campaigns are normally planned. However, if the national or alliance/coalition strategy suffers from a lack of focus and military strategic objectives are poorly determined, then a campaign might be seen as such only in retrospect. A classic case of ad hoc strategy was the Allied performance in the Italian Theater in World War It. After the defeat of the Axis forces in North Africa, the invasion of Sicily (Operation Husky) was the next Allied objective. The Allies had, as events proved, high and unrealistic expectations that seizing Italy would accomplish the main strategic objective of the war in the Mediterranean-the overthrow of the Fascist regime and Italy's change of sides in the war. As it happened, the Allied invasion of Sicily led to an operational, not a strategic, success. Italy's dictator, Benito Mussolini, was overthrown, and Italy sided with the Allies, but that did not end the war in the Mediterranean. Instead, German troops poured into Italy. The invasion of Sicily was followed by the Allied landing in Calabria (Operation Baytown) and at Salerno (Operation Avalanche) in September 1943. Afterward, the German forces offered stubborn resistance and did not capitulate until May 1945. The main reasons for this course of events was that the Allies never had a campaign plan for the Italian Theater, but improvised a series of operational objectives until the final strategic objective was achieved. Maritime campaigns intended to defend or seize control of an enemy-held large island archipelago are also usually planned. The Allies planned campaigns to seize the Solomons, New Guinea (Papua), the central Pacific, and the Philippines in World War II i n the Pacific. However, a maritime campaign can also be seen as such only in retrospect. This usually happens when a stronger sea power declares a naval blockade to which the weaker opponent responds with a counterblockade; if the resulting conflict at sea becomes protracted, the actions of both sides can be seen in retrospect to have been maritime campaigns. An example of such a campaign was the German effort to cut off Allied maritime trade in the Atlantic (and adjacent sea areas) in 1939-1945, while the Allies conducted a defensive campaign aimed at protecting their maritime trade. Both sides conducted numerous tactical actions of varying intensity throughout the theater; a relatively small number of major operations were conducted. The most notable exceptions were the Allied convoys to northern Russia in 1942-1943 and the large convoy operations in 1940-1942 to relieve the British-held island of Malta in the Mediterranean. The Germans also conducted several major operations with their heavy surface ships and U-boat screens in the North and Central Atlantic. Campaigns are the most complex of all methods of combat force employment. Any campaign encompasses the entire spectrum of methods of combat force employment, ranging from the smallest tactical action, such as ambush or raid, to a major joint or combined operation. They are always intended to accomplish a military or theater-strategic objective. Any campaign requires the employment of multiservice and often multinational forces. Because of the large scope and complexity of strategic objectives in a mature theater, no single service can accomplish campaign objectives by

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its efforts alone. Yet this does not mean that each service would make the same contribution in the conduct of a campaign. Also, it is quite possible that the new technological advances will allow a single service or single-type force, specifically air forces, to accomplish national or alliance/coalition military strategic objectives in a given theater. Conclusion: Despite their importance, the true meanings of the terms "battle," "operation," and "campaign" are often not well understood. The terms are often used interchangeably. Each service can define various methods of combat force employment differently (even differently from joint doctrine), or the definitions are service-specific, or they are not defined at all. More often than not, terms are used haphazardly without regard to their real meaning or commonly accepted definition. However, to employ combat forces properly, methods of accomplishing respective military objectives must be fully understood. The operational commanders and planners should know and understand the key distinctions among various methods of combat forces' employment. There is significant difference in planning, preparing and conducting a battle or engagement and major operation; likewise, differences in what constitutes a major operation and campaign are real, not cosmetics. As long as there are differences in the scale of the assigned military objectives, different methods of combat force employment must be devised and applied to accomplish them. These methods differ considerably in terms of space, force, and time. The larger the objective, the larger the force and, hence, larger space and longer time are involved. It is therefore incumbent upon planners and commanders to know and understand the purpose and basic features of each. Theoretical knowledge and understanding is the key for applying the existing, and developing new, methods of combat force employment.

38 1

Notes 1. J. Fiebeger, Elements of Strategy ( West Point, NY: United States Military Academy Press, 1910), p. 67. 2. Most U.S. joint and service doctrinal publications define what constitutes a campaign, but these definitions are often imprecise or even contradictory. Joint Pub 1-02 defines a campaign as "a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space;" Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms ( Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1994), p. 60; Joint Pub 5-0: Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations (13 April 1995), in contrast, describes a campaign as a series of related joint major operations that arrange tactical, operational, and strategic actions to accomplish strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space; Joint Pub 5-0, p. II-18. A slightly different definition provided by Joint Pub 3-0 (1 February 1995) defines a campaign as a series of related major operations that arrange tactical, operational, and strategic actions to accomplish strategic and operational objectives; Joint Pub 3-0: Doctrine. 1br Joint Operations (1 February 1995), p. Ill-4. The revised JP 3-0 defines a campaign as a series of related major operations that arrange tactical, operational, and strategic actions to accomplish strategic and operational objectives; campaigns are joint in nature; they serve as the focus for the conduct of war-a wartime campaign is the synchronization and integration of any necessary air, land, sea, space, and special operations-as well as interagency and multinational operations-in harmony with diplomatic, economic, and information efforts to attain national and multinational objectives; within a campaign, major operations consist of coordinated actions in a single phase of a campaign and usually decide the course of the campaign; JP 3-0: Doctrine fbr Joint Operations, Revision First Draft 30 March 1999, p. 111-7. The U.S. Army defines a campaign as "a series of related military operations designed to achieve one or more strategic objectives within a given time and space"; FM 100-5: Operations ( Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 6-3. The U.S. Navy's basic doctrinal publication, NDP-1: Naval Warfare (1994), does not provide any definition of what constitutes a campaign in a maritime theater. The U.S. Marine Corps, in contrast, defines campaign, but too narrowly; in its doctrinal document, FMFM 1-1: Campaigning, a campaign is described as "a series of related military actions undertaken over a period of time to achieve a specific objective within a given region; campaigning reflects the operational level of war, at which the results of individual tactical actions are combined to fulfill the needs of strategy"; FMFM I -1: Campaigning ( Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 3. The most recent Marine Corps doctrinal documents, MDCP 1-1: Strategy (1997) and MDCP l: Warfighting (1997), does not define what constitutes a campaign. The U.S. Air Force uses the term "air campaign" for what is in fact a major air operation or a series of major air operations in a single campaign. It defines an air campaign as "a connected series of operations conducted by air forces to achieve joint force objectives within a given time and area of operations"; U.S. Air Force, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, AFM 1-1, Vol. Il (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1992), p. 270. 3. Martin Dunn, "Levels of War: Just Set of Labels?" Research and Analysis: Newsletter of the Directorate of Armv Research and Analysis 10 (October 1996), p. 2; L.D. Holder, "A New Day for Operational Art," Army 3 (March 1985), pp. 4-7. 4. Fiebeger, Elements of Strategy, p. 67. 5. Ash Irwin, The Levels of War, Operational Art and Campaign Planning (Camberley, Surrey, England: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, Occasional paper, No. 5, 1993), p. 8.

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NAVAL TACTICAL ACTIONS Naval tactical actions are a generic and cumulative term for actions of naval forces ranging from patrolling and surveillance to a combined-arms naval battle. The objective to be accomplished differentiates the descriptive terms, the composition of the forces, and the size of the area in which a tactical action is fought. Tactical actions are normally conducted in a combat zone or sector, but sometimes they can encompass an entire or major part of a maritime area of operations. As the term implies, they are normally intended to accomplish tactical objectives. Occasionally, a battle or even a small action such as a raid can make the opponent react operationally or even strategically. Some tactical actions, such as the attack on or defense of merchant shipping, might result in accomplishing an operational objective when conducted over a period of a time. Naval tactical actions can be conducted as a part of a major naval operation or fought independently. They can be conducted on the open ocean or in coastal waters. In terms of their basic purpose, offensive and defensive naval tactical actions are differentiated. They can be conducted with or without weapons. The principal methods of tactical employment of naval forces with the use of weapons are attacks, strikes, raids, engagements, and battles. Tactical naval actions can be planned and conducted at any time, regardless of the ratio of forces in a given theater, and they require a shorter preparation time and smaller forces. They are also simpler to execute than a major naval operation. In contrast to a major naval operation, there is no clear break in fighting during a naval battle or engagement. It may encompass several phases, but any interruption in combat is short, and each phase usually overlaps the preceding phase. Naval tactical actions are much shorter than major naval operations, ranging from a few minutes for a strike to several hours for a naval battle. Attack: The most frequently conducted tactical action using weapons is a naval attack, a combination of tactical maneuver and weapons used to accomplish a minor tactical objective. A naval attack can be conducted by a single or multiple types and numbers of platforms and is intended to destroy or neutralize a single enemy platform or its tactical groups or a target ashore. Attacks can be distinguished by the type of weapons usedmissile, gun, torpedo, bomb, or a combination thereof.' A naval attack can be fought independently or as part of a strike or raid. The success of an attack depends largely on the surprise effect achieved, the degree of skill in maneuvering the platform (or groups) to obtain positional advantage, and the range, lethality, and precision of the weapons used. The sinking or damaging of a naval vessel or merchant ship by a single platform is the simplest example of a naval attack. An example of a naval attack was the action by the U.S. submarines Darter and Dace on 23 October 1944 during the opening phase of the Battle for Leyte. This attack resulted in sinking two Japanese heavy cruisers (Atago and Takao). 2 The actions of U.S. motor torpedo boats (MTBs) and destroyers in the Battle of Surigao Strait on the night of 24-25 October are examples of naval attacks conducted by single-type platforms. In the Battle of Samar on 25 October, U.S. destroyers conducted torpedo counterattacks against Japanese heavy-surface ships of the First Diversionary Attack Force.

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A naval attack encompasses "closing" the target, obtaining favorable firing position, firing weapons, and disengaging to obtain a new position for successive weapons employment. It can be conducted from one or more directions. An attack from one direction is relatively easy to plan and execute. A strongly armed or well-defended target can concentrate all its weapons on the incoming attacking platforms and hence i nflict large losses on the attacker. Attacks from a single direction are most successful when conducted by small surface combatants from an ambush position in the archipelago type of coast. An attack from two directions makes it more difficult for the target to avoid the attacking platforms. It also increases the chance of hitting and destroying the target. Such an attack normally reduces the losses for the attacking force, because the target must divide its fire between two incoming platforms. An attack from three or more directions considerably reduces the target's ability to avoid the attack, especially if the attackers converge simultaneously. However, such an attack requires an exceptional degree of tactical skill on the part of individual ship commanders. In terms of timing, attacks may be simultaneous or successive. A simultaneous attack ensures the strongest effect on the enemy. It allows the attacking platforms to accomplish the assigned task in the shortest time. Conditions for the success of such an attack are skillful and bold maneuvering; rapid closing and approach maneuver to the firing position; full use of the combat capabilities of ships, weapons, and their associated sensors; and surprise. An attack in succession (or echeloned attack) is conducted by multiple types of platforms attacking several targets or a single well-defended target. Single or multiple types of weapons can be used against the same or different targets. In this type of attack, each surface combatant attacks before or after the attacks by other platforms. An attack in succession would generally result in more losses of the attacking platforms than in a simultaneous attack, because the defender deals with fewer attackers each time. To be effective, an attack in succession must be so timed as not to allow the target to recover from the previous attacks. Strike: A naval strike is probably the most important method in use today of employing naval forces to accomplish tactical objectives. It gradually emerged as a method of combat employment since the late 1950s because of the introduction of longer-range, highly precise, and more lethal weapons, such as antiship cruise missiles and "smart" bombs.3 A naval strike consists of several simultaneous or sequential attacks, conducted by a single or multiple platforms, and coordinated in time and place, to accomplish tactical and sometimes an operational objective. It can be either defensive or offensive in purpose. A strike usually consists of several simultaneous attacks or attacks in quick succession between the attacking platforms. A well-prepared strike is difficult to repulse. By using longer-range, more lethal weapons, success can be achieved without significant losses to the attacking forces. 4 A strike consists of several simultaneous or sequential attacks from one or more sectors carried out by a single or several weapons platforms or tactical units and aimed to destroy a given target. Depending on the target to be destroyed or neutralized, tactical, operational, and strategic strikes can be differentiated. A strike is usually conducted by a small number of platforms of a single-type force, e.g., missile craft, submarines, or attack aircraft (helicopters). In the archipelago-type coast, missile- or torpedo-armed surface

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combatants can conduct strikes from an ambushing position against a much stronger hostile force. A strike could be conducted by using conventional weapons or weapons of mass destruction (WMD). A conventional strike is carried out using missiles, torpedoes, guns, bombs, or their combination. In a combined strike, the longer-range weapons are used first to weaken the enemy's defenses, followed by short-range weapons to finish off the target. In general, a strike can be conducted by two methods: maneuver of platform or maneuver of fire. In the maneuver of platform, the attacking ship or aircraft conducts the two-phase tactical maneuver-closing in and approaching until it reaches the firing position. Maneuver of fire is usually conducted with the platform armed with longerrange weapons, such as cruise or antiship missiles. Then the attacking platform can shift the fire of its weapons from one target to another by acquiring target movement data from some other platform or sensors. This type of strike is especially suitable for hitting targets ashore with land-attack cruise missiles. The main features of a well-planned and -conducted strike are high intensity and shortness of action-often measured in minutes-swift and skillful maneuvering of platforms, and almost simultaneous employment of weapons, specifically missiles or torpedoes, against the weaknesses in the target defenses. The success of a strike can be anticipated with a higher degree of certainty than the outcome of a naval battle. In a wellprepared and skillfully executed strike, one's force can inflict a decisive defeat on the enemy in the shortest time possible. Because of the introduction of long-range, highly precise, and destructive weapons, a strike today is far more effective than in the past and its importance approximates that of a battle. In the Leyte Operation, the U.S. carrier-based aircraft carried out multiple strikes during the air and sea battle in the Sibuyan Sea on 24 October. The U.S. aircraft of the Task Force 38 (TF-38) carried out numerous strikes against the heavy ships of the Japanese First Diversionary Attack Force (Vice Admiral Kurita), resulting in the sinking of one super-dreadnought ( Musashi) and the damaging of two older battleships. Naval strikes were conducted by several small navies in a number of regional conflicts at sea. The Israeli Navy during the Yom Kippur (Ramadan) War conducted several successful strikes against Syrian ships at sea. A force of five Israeli missile craft struck a group of Syrian ships off Latakia on the night of 6-7 October 1973, sinking three Syrian missile craft, one torpedo boat, and a minesweeper. 6 A more recent example of an independently conducted strike was the action of U.S. attack aircraft on 30 January 1991 in the northern Arabian Gulf against a force of eight Iraqi combat craft, including some Osa-class missile craft. Four Iraqi craft were sunk and three damaged. Raid: A broader form of strike is a naval raid-conducted by a single or several naval combat arms to accomplish a tactical objective. The aim is usually to temporarily deny some position, or capture or destroy an enemy force or coastal installations or facilities. The weaker side usually conducts raids at sea. 8 Temporary or even local control of the sea is not a prerequisite for the success of these actions. The stronger fleet also can conduct raids to divert the enemy's attention or force the enemy to react in the sector of secondary effort. A raid is usually conducted against an objective that the enemy considers so

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valuable that its loss or serious degradation cannot be ignored. A larger purpose of a naval raid is to achieve some temporary advantage but at the same time pose the threat of future repetition. Besides purely physical objectives, a raid can be conducted to enhance one's own morale or diminish that of the enemy. A naval raid can range in scale from an action of a very small force to a large tactical action and can have many features of a major naval operation. In the Gulf War of 1990-1991, a landing party from a U.S. frigate) seized Jazirat Qurah Island in the northern part of the Arabian Gul£ 9 A day later, a landing party and helicopter from another U.S. frigate captured the oil platforms in the Durah oil field. 1 0 In contrast, the Allied Dieppe raid (Operation Jubilee), conducted on 19 August 1942, could be considered a significant military effort. The main purpose of the Dieppe raid was to test German coastal defenses. After heavy fighting in which the Allies, especially Canadian troops suffered heavy casualties (about 3,400 killed), the operation was abandoned as a disaster.' 1 In general, the force conducting a raid should be stronger than a force immediately available to the enemy in the area of action. The attacking forces should move covertly and rapidly toward their assigned objectives. The support of a larger force in the area is often required to ensure the success of a raid. The size of forces assigned to carry out a raid should not be so large as to weaken forces assigned to the sector of main effort. The chances of success are greatly enhanced if alternate objectives and multiple lines of operations for both advance and retreat are selected. The effect of a raid, like that of surprise, is transitory. However, depending on the enemy's reaction to it, the consequences of a well-executed raid can be much greater than initially intended. The raid on Tokyo carried out by sixteen B-25 medium bombers launched from the carrier Hornet (CV-8) of U.S. Task Force 16 (TF-16), popularly known as the Doolittle Raid, on 1 8 April 1942 was an example of a naval raid that resulted in strategic consequences. ' 2 It was launched about 670 miles from Tokyo, had tremendous psychological impact on the Japanese, and greatly lifted American morale. A more important consequence of the raid was that the Japanese Navy won the internal Japanese debate on whether to expand their defense perimeter in the Pacific.' 3 This led to the Japanese decision to initiate a new campaign in the central Pacific, of which Operation MI was the initial major operation. In the end, the Japanese suffered a disastrous defeat in the Battle of Midway in early June 1942, which, in retrospect, was a turning point in the war in the Pacific. Engagement: The term engagement is widely used, but usually its meaning is not well defined or understood. In U.S. military parlance, it is used interchangeably with the terms encounter and attack. A naval engagement is a clash of opposing forces, larger than an attack and smaller than a battle but an integral part of naval battle. In the strict definition of the term, an engagement consists of a series of related strikes and counterstrikes and attacks and counterattacks by one or several combat arms aimed at accomplishing the principal tactical objective in a naval battle. In practical terms, a naval engagement is planned to destroy or neutralize the main enemy force and is fought in the sector of main effort. The attacks of the U.S. and Japanese aircraft against each other's fast carrier forces in the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942 and in the Battle of Midway in June 1942 are examples of naval engagements that decided the outcome of the respective naval battles.

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In a more recent example, the U.S. Navy and the navies of other coalition members destroyed, in a series of strikes and attacks, most of the Iraqi forces in the northern part of the Arabian Gulf between 22 and 24 January 1991. Then, two minelayers, one oiler (acting as scouting ship), two patrol craft, and one hovercraft were destroyed from the air. On 29 January, in a strike off Bubayan Island, U.S. and British helicopters and ground attack aircraft destroyed four Iraqi patrol craft and ran another fourteen aground. In a separate incident, a British helicopter destroyed a large patrol craft . 1 4 A day later, the coalition air forces attacked a force of one former Kuwaiti patrol craft, three Iraqi amphibious craft, and one minesweeper, inflicting damage to all the ships. 1 5 Battle: A naval battle is the most complex of all tactical actions. It consists of a series of related attacks, counterattacks, strikes and counterstrikes, and defensive measures coordinated in time and place to accomplish a major tactical objective(s). In some unforeseen circumstances, a naval battle can accomplish operational objectives. A naval battle can occur in the open sea or ocean or in coastal waters. It is characterized by a relatively long duration-several hours or sometimes even days-and a large spatial scope of actions. 1 6 It can be fought as part of a major naval operation or independently. A naval battle is fought with the participation of several naval combat arms and often combat arms of other services (air force, troops defending the coast). In enclosed and semi-enclosed seas, combat arms of ground forces and coastal defense forces normally take part in a naval battle. A naval battle could be fought exclusively on the surface or it could encompass subsurface and airspace areas. A single commander normally plans, prepares, and executes it. A naval battle could, however, be fought without a plan drawn in advance. In the Leyte Operation in October 1944, the Allies planned the Battle of Surigao Strait, while the other three battles in the Sibuyan Sea, off Samar, and off Cape Engano-were seen as naval battles only in retrospect. A decisive defeat of the enemy fleet in a naval battle can sometimes lead not only to an operational victory, but also to strategic victory. To complicate the matter, a naval battle can be tactically won but may represent an operational (or even strategic) failure. In the aftermath of the decisive battle off Heligoland on 9 May 1864, the Danish fleet withdrew into its coastal waters, thereby opening the Elbe estuary and the German ports in the North Sea to maritime traffic. 17 The Battle of Lissa on 20 July 1866 decided the question of command in the Adriatic. Then the Austrian fleet under Admiral Wilhelm von Tegetthoff inflicted a decisive defeat on a larger but poorly led Italian fleet. On the same day an armistice ended the fighting between Austria and Prussia. Austria completed its withdrawal to the Isonzo River, leaving Venice in Italian hands. France and Prussia pressured Italy to conclude an armistice on its own with Austria. The Italian Prime Minister, Baron Bettino Ricasoli, refused the call and insisted on obtaining "natural" frontiers for Italy. These included direct cession of Venice and the South Tirol and a guarantee that Italian interests in Istria be respected. However, Ricasoli completely i gnored the fact that the Austrians had won command of the sea and that the AustroPrussian armistice had strengthened Vienna's hand. The Italian fleet was unable to challenge its Austrian counterpart. In the end, the Italians signed the armistice with Austria on unfavorable terms for themselves. i s

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In other examples, the Battle of Balikpapan, 23-24 January 1942, was a tactical success but an operational failure for the Allied forces, because it did not stop the Japanese invasion of Borneo. The Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942 (Operation MO for the Japanese) was tactically a draw, but there was no doubt that the Allies achieved their operational objective because the Japanese abandoned their attempt to seize Port Moresby by assault from the sea. 1 9 In the Battle of Savo Island on 9 August 1942, the Japanese admiral Gunichi Mikawa inflicted a tactical defeat on the Allied force but failed to accomplish his major tactical objective destruction of U.S. amphibious forces at the Lunga Point anchorage which would have had operational consequences. Likewise, in the Battle of Cape Esperance on the night of 11-12 October 1942, the Americans achieved a tactical victory but failed to prevent the Japanese from landing fresh troops from two seaplane tenders. In contrast, the battle off Guadalcanal in November 1942 was tactically decisive, because it forced the Japanese troops on the island to the defensive. These troops were supplied sporadically by Japanese destroyers, while the Americans successfully brought in two fresh regiments of Marines and one infantry division. One month later the Japanese abandoned hope of recapturing Guadalcanal and began preparations for withdrawal. Afterward, the Americans went on the offensive to seize successive positions up the Solomons chain. A naval battle that had operational consequences was the battle off Samar on 24 October 1944. By the skillful and heroic actions of Rear Admiral Clifton A.F. Sprague's TF-77.4.3 (Taffy 3), with six escort carriers and three destroyers and destroyer escorts each against the far superior First Diversionary Attack Force, the Japanese were forced to turn north and withdraw when they stood on the verge of a great victory. And with that, by default, Taffy 3 accomplished an operational objective: the Japanese heavy-surface force turned away from proceeding on a southerly course and breaking into the undefended Tacloban anchorage in Leyte Gulf. A small but excellently led navy can obtain relatively quick local sea control even against a stronger combination of opponents by conducting a series of decisive tactical actions. This was accomplished by the Israeli Navy during the 19-day Yom Kippur (Ramadan) War of 1973 with Egypt and Syria. A naval battle between six Israeli Saarclass missile craft and Egyptian Osa-class missile craft took place off the Egyptian coast on the night of 8-9 October. In the ensuing exchange, the Israelis sank three Egyptian missile craft, while one was heavily damaged and subsequently destroyed by artillery fire. 21 These victories drastically changed the operational situation at sea to the Israeli advantage. 22 Protection of Basing/Deployment Area: In a typical enclosed or semi-enclosed sea, diverse tactical actions and measures could be conducted to ensure protection of one's own basing and deployment areas . 23 One of their objectives is to prevent operational or strategic surprise, and also to put the enemy under constant pressure and tie his forces in a certain sea area, thereby creating conditions to change the operational situation to one's advantage. Additionally, a number of protective measures are prepared and conducted to enhance security and survivability of one's own forces and coastal installations and facilities. Cumulatively, these actions are intended to accomplish an operational objective

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over time. They are planned and conducted both in peacetime and in national emergency and war. They are also normally an integral part of a plan for a major naval operation. Defensive tactical actions include reconnaissance and patrolling or surveillance in one's coastal waters, air defense, ASW, and defense against enemy combat craft, combat swimmers, and commandos. Defensive mining and mine counter-measures (MCM) in coastal waters are important parts of these actions. Offensive actions encompass strikes or attacks against enemy surface combatants threatening one's bases and ports, naval and air bases and ports, and other installations and facilities on the coast. Protection of one's basing and deployment areas is significantly enhanced by conducting diverse passive and active measures, specifically, electronic warfare, countering enemy reconnaissance or surveillance, and cover and concealment. Conclusion: Methods of combat force employment at sea are a product of both practice and theory. Some tactical actions, such as naval attack, remain the simplest and most often used by all naval platforms. Naval tactical actions are an integral part of major naval operations and, by extension, maritime campaigns. The advent of aircraft and submarines, but especially the introduction of antiship missiles and land-attack cruise missiles, led to the emergence of strike as one of the most effective methods in the tactical employment of submarines, ships, and aircraft. The importance of a strike is likely to increase as new longer-range, more precise, and more lethal weapons are introduced. A strike will most likely replace the naval battle as the principal method of employment of coastal navies for accomplishing major tactical objectives. A naval battle remains, for the near future, the most important method of combat force employment for accomplishing major tactical and sometimes operational objectives. The scope of the area in which a naval battle takes place is greatly increased in comparison with the ones fought in World War 11. A naval battle today will be fought with fewer but vastly more capable platforms. A battle fought in littoral waters involves combat arms of other services and hence is complicated to plan, prepare, and execute. Another trend today is that naval engagements are not so clearly distinguished as a part of a naval battle as they were in the past. The actions of opposing sides in a naval battle today consist of multiple strikes and attacks across the length and breadth of a maritime area of operations. As in the past, new weapons and sensors continue to affect the methods and procedures in employing naval forces and aircraft to accomplish tactical objectives in war at sea. Thus, the existing tactical methods will be steadily refined or even dramatically changed, and completely new tactical methods, unknown today, will emerge.

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Notes 1. H. Tietze, "Zu einigen Kategorien der Theorie der Taktik der Seestreitkraefte," Militaerwesen (East Berlin), 3 (March 1983), p. 48. 2. Samuel Eliot Morison, Leyte, June 1944-January 1945 History of United States Naval Operations in World War 11, Vol. 12 (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, reprint 1984), p. 170. 3. Joint Pub 1-02 defines a strike as "an attack, which is intended to inflict damage on, scize, or destroy an objective"; Joint Pub 1-02: Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms ( Washington, DC: 23 March 1 994), p. 365. 4. Tietze, "Zu einigen Kategorien der Theorie der Taktik der Seestreitkraefte," p. 48. 5. The first strike of 21 fighters, 12 dive bombers, and 12 torpedo bombers (from the carriers Intrepid and Cabot) was launched at 0910 and attacked the Japanese ships at 1026; the second strike of equal strength was launched at 1045 and attacked at 1245; the third of 16 fighters, 12 VSBs, and 3 VTBs was launched at 1 350 and attacked at 1550. Lexington l aunched a strike consisting of 8 Hellcats, 5 Helldivers, and 11 Avengers and a smaller group of aircraft from Essex at 1050, and attacked at 1330. Another carrier group launched a strike of 21 Hellcats, 21 Helldivers, and 18 Avengers at 1313 and hit the targets at 1415; Morison, Leyte, June 1944-January 1945 , p. 184. 6. Walter Jablonsky, "Die Seekriegfuehrung im vierten Nahostkrieg," Marine Rundschau 11 (November 1 974), p. 654. 7. Albert Lord and Klaus Toppeser, "Rolle and Beitrag der Seestreitkraefte," in Hartmut Zehrer, editor, Der Gollkonllikt. Dokumentation, Analyse and Bewertun~-, aus militaerischer Sicht (Herford/Bonn: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1992), pp. 197-8. 8. Joint Pub 1-02 in contrast defines raid as "an operation, usually small scale, involving a swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or to destroy installations; it ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission"; Joint Pub 1-02: Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (1994), p. 313. 9. Lord and Toppeser, "Rolle and Beitrag der Seestreitkraefte," in Zehrer, editor, Der Goltkonflikt. Dokumentation, Analyse and Bewertung aus militaerischer Sicht p. 197. 1 0. Stanley R. Arthur and Marvin Pokrant, "Desert Storm at Sea," Proceedings/Naval Review (1991), p. 86. 11. About 5,000 Canadian troops, 1,075 British personnel, and 50 U.S. Rangers, organized in 13 groups and transported in 237 ships and landing craft, including eight destroyers, landed on a 10-mile-wide front near the German-controlled French port of Dieppe in the English Channel; "Dieppe Raid," I.C.B. Dear, editor, The Oxford Companion to World War 11 (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 298-9. 1 2. TF-16, under the command of Vice Admiral William F. Halsey, consisted of two aircraft carriers (Enterprise and Hornet), with their air complement, plus Army Air Corps' 16 B-25 bombers on board, 4

cruisers, 8 destroyers, and 2 oilers; Morison, The Rising, Sun in the Pacific, Vol. 3, pp. 392-3. 1 3. Ibid., pp. 394, 398. 14. Lord and Toppeser, "Rolle and Beitrag der Seestreitkraefte," p. 197.

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1 5. Ibid., pp. 197-8. 1 6. Tietze, "Zu einigen Kategorien der Theorie der Taktik der Seestreitkraefte," p. 49. 17. Hans Hugo Sokol, Des Kaisers Seemacht. Die k.k. oesterreichischen Kriegsmarine 1848 bis 1914 (Vienna/Munich: Amalthea Verlag, 1980), p. 69. 1 8. Lawrence Sondhaus, The Habsburg Empire and the Sea ( West Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1 989), p. 257. 19. Stephen W. Roskill, War at Sea 1939-1945 , Vol. 2: The Period of Balance (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), p. 36. 20. Donald Macyntire, Sea Power in the Pacific (London: The Military Book Society, 1972), p. 225. 21. Benyamin Telem, "Die israelischen FK-Schnellboote im Yom-Kippur-Krieg," Marine Rundschau, 10 (October 1978), p. 640. 22. Between 6 and 22 October the Israeli missile craft sank 7 Syrian and 5 Egyptian missile craft, l Syrian torpedo craft and minesweeper each, and 2 Egyptian patrol craft; Jablonsky, "Die Seekriegfuehrung im vierten Nahostkrieg," pp. 654, 662-3. In the Red Sea, the Egyptian Navy lost 23 ships (2 missile craft, 3 patrol craft, and 14 armed fishing craft), while 4 combat craft (2 torpedo craft and 2 light patrol craft) were captured in Port of Adabia. 23. The Soviets/Russians use the term "systematic combat actions" [systematichiskiye boyeviye devstviy] aimed to obtain and maintain (what they call) "favorable operational regime."

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MAJOR NAVAL OPERATIONS Major naval operations are the principal methods of employing the fleet to attain operational and sometimes strategic objectives in a maritime theater. Often, the terms naval battle and naval operation are used interchangeably when referring to a major naval operation.' The lack of understanding and knowledge of what constitutes a major naval operation, and why it must be planned and conducted, has adversely affected the U.S. Navy's and joint operational planning. Planning and conducting major naval operations is the most effective means of accomplishing the operational or strategic objectives in a given maritime theater. In generic terms, a major naval operation could be described as a series of related battles, engagements, strikes, and other tactical actions conducted by diverse naval and combat arms of other services, in terms of time and place, to accomplish an operational objective in a given maritime theater of operations. Major naval operations require larger forces than a single battle or engagement, and they are planned and conducted in accordance with the tenets of operational art. They require meticulous planning and preparation and are difficult to execute. Any major naval operation encompasses a full spectrum of tactical actions, from surveillance to a series of naval battles to patrolling and surveillance. Objective: A major naval operation is conducted as an integral part of a maritime, and sometimes a land, campaign. It is normally planned to bring about a drastic change of the operational situation in a given maritime theater of operations. Such drastic changes can be achieved, for example, by destroying a major part of the enemy fleet at sea or in its bases; by destroying a major convoy or by successfully protecting one's major convoy or by seizing or defending a major island or a choke point. A major naval operation could also have strategic consequences, although its main objective is operational in scope. This usually occurs when a surprise attack on a major part of the enemy's fleet is carried out at the very onset of hostilities to ensure the accomplishment of a strategic objective in a principal theater of operations. The operational objective of the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 (Operation Hawaii) was to destroy the major part of the U.S. Pacific Fleet to prevent it from interfering with the Japanese invasion of the Philippines. However, the unintended consequence of the attack on Pearl Harbor was that U.S. public opinion shifted from isolationism to unequivocal support for the war until complete victory over Japan. A major naval operation could also be planned to accomplish a strategic objective in the first phase of a new campaign by opening a new front, as did the Allied amphibious landing in Normandy (Operation Neptune). In more recent history, the British recapture of the Falklands/Malvinas in April-June 1982 was a major joint maritime operation with a strategic objective, as was the U.S. liberation of Grenada (Operation Urgent Fury) in November 1983. Major naval operations are normally planned and conducted when decisive results must be accomplished in the shortest time possible and with the least loss of one's forces. They are the most effective way to avoid attrition warfare at the operational level. Attrition warfare not only results in much higher losses in terms of human lives and materiel but also is inherently protracted: One's forces are tied down as long as a given 393

operational objective has not been accomplished and, therefore, cannot be employed for other urgent tasks in another ocean or sea area. This happened to the Allies in the struggle for Guadalcanal between August 1942 and February 1943. The initial Allied major operation (the amphibious landing on Guadalcanal) was very successful. Afterward, however, the Allies became progressively involved in a series of small but costly actions with Japanese forces on land, at sea, and in the air. This attrition phase lasted for almost seven months before the Japanese decided to give up their attempts to regain control of Guadalcanal. By then, the protracted struggle had considerably slowed the Allied operational tempo. No further major landings up the Solomons chain were possible until Guadalcanal was secure. A good argument can be made that had the Allies conducted a faster-paced series of consecutive major naval or air operations, the struggle for Guadalcanal would have ended much earlier and at far lower Allied losses in ships, aircraft, and personnel. Purpose: In terms of their principal purposes, major naval operations can be offensive or defensive. An offensive major naval operation is designed to expand the area under permanent control of one's forces and thereby reduce the area under enemy control. It is planned and conducted in a place and at a time of one's choosing. The Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and the major operation in defense of the Philippines were offensive in their main purpose. Major naval operations against enemy maritime trade and amphibious landing operations are inherently offensive in their goals. A defensive major naval operation is planned and conducted when an uninterrupted offensive is not possible or when one's forces need an operational pause after the completion of an offensive operation. Also, an inferior fleet can take a defensive posture from the very outset of the hostilities. A major naval operation meant to protect one's maritime trade or to defend a part of the coast against an enemy amphibious landing is, by its very nature, defensive. Service Participation: Major naval operations can be differentiated by the degree of service part] cipation independent, joint (multiservice), or combined (multinational). An independent major naval operation is conducted predominantly by the navy, though air force or even ground forces can take part as well. Typical examples are the British carrier attack on the Italian main naval base of Tarent (Taranto) in the night of 11-12 November 1 940 (Operation Judgment); the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor; and the series of strikes and attacks by Admiral William F. Halsey's Task Force 38 (TF-38) against airfields, shipping, and shore installations in the Ryukyus and on Formosa and Luzon between 10 and 14 October 1944. A major joint naval operation is planned and conducted by forces of the Navy and one or more other services and, often, services of allies or coalition partners. In a maritime theater encompassing a large ocean or sea area, major naval operations will be conducted with significant participation by the air force, and ground forces may also be involved. In contrast, major naval operations in littoral waters are likely to be conducted with the participation of the combat arms of all three services. Examples of major joint naval operations are the U.S. amphibious landings on Guadalcanal (Operation Watchtower) in August 1942 and in the Gilbert Islands (Operation Galvanic) i n November 1943; and the German attack on the Allied convoy PQ-17 to Russia in July

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1942 (Operation Roesselsprung [Knight's Gambit]), planned by the navy and carried out by the Luftwaffe, surface ships, and U-boats. A major combined naval operation is conducted with two or more navies or services of the armed forces. Today, combined major operations constitute a frequent method of employing naval forces in a low-intensity conflict. In fact, because of downsizing of most navies, such major naval operations might well become routine for major regional contingencies or general conflict. A major amphibious landing operation is sometimes combined, as were the invasion of Sicily in July 1943 (Operation Husky), the landing at Salerno in September 1943 (Operation Avalanche), and the landing in Normandy in June 1944 (Operation Neptune). Such an operation can be combined without being joint, as was the naval enforcement of the UN sanctions against Iraq in 1990-199 1. Sequence and Timing: Sometimes several major operations take place in a single maritime theater of operations. In such cases, one of the operations is the main or principal operation and the others are supporting (ancillary) operations. The Allied amphibious landing at Leyte on 20 October 1944 was the main or principal major combined naval operation. The U.S. TF-38's actions as operational cover and support between 17 October and 27 November were a supporting major naval operation. In terms of timing or sequencing, initial, successive, and preliminary major naval operations can be distinguished. The Japanese Operation MI (Battle of Midway) was the initial major naval operation in a projected Japanese maritime campaign in the central Pacific. The Allied invasion of the Gilberts in November 1943 (Operation Galvanic) was the initial major operation in a series of major operations within the Central Pacific campaign. A successive or consecutive major operation normally starts during or shortly after the completion of the initial major operation. Its objective is to consolidate or expand the gains accomplished in the preceding major operations. The U.S. invasions of the Marshalls (Operations Flintlock and Catchpole) and the Marianas (Operation Forager) are examples of successive major naval operations. The TF-38's series of air strikes and other actions against the Ryukyus, Formosa, and Luzon between 10 and 17 October 1944 was a preliminary major operation for the invasion of Leyte. Sea/Ocean Area: Major naval operations can be conducted on the open ocean, on marginal seas of an ocean, or in littoral waters. Major naval operations on the open ocean have been rare in practice. During World War II, even in the maritime theaters, most naval actions took place fairly close to some large archipelago or continental landmass. Numerous major naval operations have taken place in semi-enclosed seas, such as the North Sea, or larger enclosed seas, such as the Mediterranean, but not in small enclosed seas, like the Baltic or the Black Sea. Today, because of enormous advances in range and lethality of weapons, even coastal navies composed of small surface ships, submarines, and land-based aircraft could conduct major naval operations. Such operations will be generally more complicated to prepare and execute than those on the open ocean because they will involve diverse forces and assets of all services of the country's armed forces. They will also differ from major naval operations on the open ocean because of the much smaller operational space involved and the smaller number of forces used. Interior versus Exterior Lines: A major naval operation can be conducted along interior or exterior lines of operations. One's forces, moving on interior lines, can be interposed 395

between two or more parts of the enemy force, which would contain a part of the enemy force in a secondary sector. A major part of one's force would then seek to concentrate as quickly as possible in the sector of main effort to destroy the bulk of the enemy force. A major naval operation conducted along exterior or converging lines consists of concentric advances from several sea/ocean areas toward common physical objectives. Not only must a force operating along exterior lines move faster than its opponent moving along interior lines, but also its adjacent elements must keep within mutual supporting distance if it is to avoid being defeated in detail. Such a major naval operation also requires precise synchronization of movement and actions of one's forces. This is difficult to do, especially when the distance between one's base of operations and the physical objective is great. Once the forces start to move, the operational commander has to rely on decentralized command and control. Prerequisites : A major naval operation with an offensive aim is usually planned and conducted when one's forces possess, at a minimum, temporary sea control in a given maritime area of operations. Yet, the fact that the enemy possesses control of the sea and air does not necessarily prevent the inferior side from mounting a major offensive naval operation. During World War lI in the Pacific, most Allied amphibious landings were conducted after obtaining merely temporary sea control in a given area of operations, as was the case with the Allied landing on Guadalcanal in August 1942. In contrast, major naval operations in enclosed and semi-enclosed seas can be conducted within either a strategically offensive or defensive framework. For either one, limited, temporary sea control should be obtained first. Major operations aimed at protecting maritime trade can be conducted even when command of the sea is in dispute. The key to success in such operations is to ensure at least control of the sea, the subsurface, and the air in the proximity of a large convoy. The Royal Navy mounted several major operations in 19411 942 (Operations HarpoonlVigorous, Pedestal, etc.) to supply the besieged island of Malta, although Axis forces possessed overwhelming strength in the air. It is also possible to conduct a major naval operation when friendly forces control only the air, as the German Navy did in the invasion of Norway in April-June 1940. A major naval operation should not be planned in the absence of the means to accomplish that end. In addition, a major operation should not be conducted if forces are insufficient to conduct a required consecutive major operation after accomplishing the initial operational objective, as happened in the Allied landing on Guadalcanal in August 1942. Normally, the success of a major naval operation cannot be ensured without adequate theater-wide C2 structure, intelligence, logistics, and force protection. Operational intelligence may be the most important prerequisite for the success of any major naval operation. The operational commander can make a sound decision only with a comprehensive and realistic picture of the operational situation. The covert preparations of one's forces for action must be ensured. To deceive the enemy as to what the main physical objectives of an operation are, operational intelligence efforts must appear to be routine. Another essential element for success of a major naval operation is operational protection, particularly for one's center of gravity. One of the major reasons for the high losses the Japanese First Diversionary Attack Force suffered in the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea on 24 October 1944 was the almost total lack of air cover by land-based aircraft. Basing and deployment areas must be fully protected. This, in turn, is accomplished by 396

both offensive and defensive tactical actions, such as surveillance of coastal waters, defensive minefields, air defense of naval bases and anchorages, attacks against enemy forces threatening one's fleet forces, etc. The ultimate objective of these actions is to establish and maintain a favorable operational situation in the naval basing and deployment areas. Characteristics: The main features of a modern major naval operation are decisiveness of action, large scope, intense combat, participation of diverse forces, massed employment of forces, and complex organization of all types of combat support. Major naval operations are characterized by sequenced and synchronized employment of several naval combat arms and by extensive use of electronic warfare techniques . 4 Major naval operations are normally planned and conducted by the operational commanders and their staffs. However, sometimes an operational-tactical commander and his staff plan and conduct a major joint naval operation. In contrast to a tactical commander, the operational commander can sequence and synchronize actions of all the services and elements under his command, and he has the overall responsibility for logistical support and sustainment. Major naval operations differ considerably from tactical actions with regard to the size of the area in which combat takes place, duration, size and mix of the forces, intensity of combat, and logistical requirements. They are conducted in a maritime area of operations, while tactical actions take place in a naval combat zone or sector. The German Operation Rheinuebung (popularly referred to as the Bismarck Chase) encompassed a large part of the North Atlantic and part of the central Atlantic theater of operations. The forces that took part in the Battle of Midway operated in the area between the Japanese home islands and the U.S. West Coast, and from the Aleutians to the central Pacific. The Battle for Leyte was fought in an area covering some 432,000 square miles (including the 85,000 square miles of the Philippines) and encompassed a major part of the western Pacific and parts of the central, southern, and southwestern Pacific. The water area in which actual fighting occurred encompassed only about 110,000 square miles. 5 Major naval operations conducted in enclosed and semi-enclosed seas differ from those on the open ocean in respect not only to the smaller space involved, but also to the smaller size of the force employed and the correspondingly smaller physical objectives. The operational space encompasses high seas and littoral regions and includes islands and the mainland coast. The accomplishment of operational or strategic objectives usually requires larger forces. In Operation MI, the Japanese Combined Fleet was organized into four separate groups with 165 warships. The U.S. forces that took part in the Battle of Midway consisted of seventy-six warships and about 110 land-based Army, Navy, and Marine aircraft based on the island of Midway. By comparison, some major naval operations conducted in World War II involved fewer ships and aircraft. In Operation Rheinuebung, the Germans employed the Bismarck combat group (a battleship, Bismarck, and a heavy cruiser, Prinz Eugen), six escort tankers, and one supply ship. Additionally, three destroyers, two patrol ships, two blockade-breakers [Sperrbrecher], one minesweeper flotilla, thirteen U-boats, one Italian submarine, and three Luftwaffe air groups were used in support of the operationa x In the same operation the Royal Navy employed four battleships, three battle cruisers, three aircraft carriers, fourteen cruisers, and twentyseven destroyers to defeat the Germans. 397

The enormous increases in force mobility and in the range and lethality of modern weapons allows operational objectives to be accomplished with smaller forces than would have been possible thirty or forty years ago. Today's major blue-water navies possess far fewer ships than they did during World War II or the early 1950s. Almost any major naval operation designed to enforce UN Security Council sanctions will be a multinational effort, and hence numerous small ships will be involved. Such was the case in the Coalition's enforcement of UN sanctions against Iraq in 1990--1991. Similarly, major naval operations in littoral waters will include more small ships and land-based aircraft than would operations conducted on the open ocean. A major naval operation lasts considerably longer than a naval tactical action. While a naval battle or engagement is fought for several hours or less, a major naval operation can last a week or more sometimes even months. This is primarily the result of the greater physical objectives involved and the larger area in which combat actions take place. A major naval operation in support of the landing on Leyte (Operation King Ir) lasted about eleven days, whereas the Battle in the Sibuyan Sea was over in about seven hours, and the Battle of the Surigao Strait lasted five and a half hours. Not surprisingly, major naval operations last longer when indecisiveness is brought on by a combination of large distances between the base of operations and physical objectives, an unfavorable ratio of forces, logistical constraints, or a lack of operational thinking. Major Operations in Wartime: Major naval operations could be conducted in peacetime (operations other than war) and in wartime. There are significant differences in terms of their main purpose, forces employed, and duration. A major naval operation will be the principal method of accomplishing operational objectives in a major regional conflict at sea. Most of these operations will be joint or sometimes combined, and relatively few will be conducted either largely or exclusively with naval forces. In generic terms, the main purposes of a major naval operation today could be to accomplish the following: • • • • • • • • •

Destroy the enemy fleet at sea or at its bases Conduct an amphibious landing on the opposed shore Destroy enemy coastal installations and facilities I nterrupt or cut off enemy maritime trade Protect one's maritime trade Conduct a naval blockade or counterblockade Destroy enemy sea-based strategic nuclear forces Protect one's sea-based strategic nuclear forces Support one's ground forces on the coast.

A major operation aimed at destroying an enemy fleet at sea or at its base is the quickest and the most effective-but also the most difficult way to establish sea control in a given maritime area of operations. These operations can be conducted on the open ocean or in narrow seas. Historically, the preferred method has been to destroy an enemy fleet at sea or in its bases at or shortly before the outbreak of hostilities. However, the instances of such major naval operations were few. In practice, most fleet-on-fleet encounters in World War II took place when one fleet provided a distant cover and support of a major amphibious landing, as happened in the Leyte Operation in October 1944; or when the superior fleet 398

tried to use the landing to lure an inferior force into a "decisive" battle, as the Japanese Combined Fleet attempted in Operation MI, which led to the Battle of Midway in June 1942. Major operations in distant ocean areas are not likely to be conducted in the near future, because there no longer are two or more major opponents at sea. A more likely scenario is a conflict between the navies of riparian states in an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea, or between a blue-water navy and one whose nation borders an enclosed or semienclosed sea. Hence, attacks on naval bases or anchorages combined with attacks at sea seem to be the most likely method open to a superior force to destroy or neutralize an inferior fleet. A prerequisite for success in a major naval operation to destroy the enemy fleet in its bases is to obtain local, temporary sea control in the given sea or ocean area. However, this is not necessarily always the case, as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor showed. In the past, the best results were achieved by striking from beyond the effective range of the enemy's defenses. Today, nuclear-powered attack submarines and modern diesel-electric submarines, land- and carrier-based aircraft, and surface ships armed with long-range cruise missiles are the most effective platforms for destroying enemy ships in their bases. Attack submarines armed with antiship missiles or land-attack cruise missiles can successfully strike the enemy naval bases from distances of several hundred nautical miles. In the first few days after the start of the air offensive against Iraq on 17 January 1991, U.S. carrier-based aircraft and attack submarines deployed in the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea repeatedly struck Iraqi naval installations near Umm Qasr and Basra with smart bombs and Tomahawk missiles. lo Air strikes against the enemy naval bases in an enclosed sea, such as the Arabian Gulf, can be far more effective than strikes mounted from the open ocean because of the much shorter distances and the larger number of land-based aircraft that can be used. These strikes can be conducted at high intensity and repeated at short intervals. In some instances, not only fixed-wing aircraft but also missile-armed helicopters can be effectively employed. Amphibious landing operations are the most effective method of projecting power on the enemy shore. They are also extremely complex to plan and execute. They are inherently joint in character, regardless of their purpose or the size of forces involved. Amphibious assault landings within an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea take place across much shorter distances and are normally smaller than those mounted against coasts bordering an open ocean. Sometimes, however, an invasion mounted across a narrow sea can exert a strategic influence, as was true of the Normandy invasion of June 1944 and the landing at Inchon in September 1950. Today, a large-scale amphibious landing in an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea would be difficult to execute if the defender effectively used land-based aircraft, submarines, and combat craft in combination. Amphibious landings are aimed at seizing an area of enemy-controlled coast that gives access to a military operational objective inland; speeding the advance of one's troops along the coast, or helping speed the end of war itself, eliminating or taking control of a large naval base or port; preventing the adversary from seizing a base or large port of one's own; cutting off an enemy army's avenue of escape; and countering enemy evacuation efforts across the sea. A credible amphibious capability also may help to tie a sizable enemy force to the defense of a large stretch of his own mainland coast or offshore islands.

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A major naval operation aimed to destroy the enemy coastal installations and facilities can be conducted as a preliminary to an amphibious landing or as an integral part of a naval blockade. These operations can be conducted either with naval or air forces or with these two services jointly. The main purpose of TF-38's attacks in midOctober 1944 was to destroy Japanese ports, shipyards, and airfields in the Ryukyus and on Formosa and Luzon. Today, longer-range and more capable carrier- and land-based aircraft, armed with cruise missiles and smart bombs, make it possible to attack the enemy coastal installation and facilities along a large part of the enemy coast and far into the depth of his defenses. Major navies today have a much greater ability than in the past to attack a variety of targets deep in the enemy's operational and even strategic depth. Major naval operations on the open ocean and in littoral waters are conducted to interrupt or cut off enemy maritime trade or to protect one's maritime trade. l These operations are inherently attritional, because maritime trade is almost continuous, and each convoy or independent sailing ship represents only a fraction of the traffic volume in a theater during a given time. Correspondingly, most naval actions in attacking the enemy's or protecting one's or friendly maritime trade will be tactical in character. Major operations will be conducted occasionally and only in certain sea or ocean areas. When a major effort must be mounted to attack or protect a large convoy, it would result in the accomplishment of an operational objective. To be effective, actions against the enemy's military-economic potential must be conducted systematically over a relatively large area, and against all the elements of the enemy's maritime trade. Specifically, this includes attacks against enemy convoys, independent sailing ships, ports, and cargo loading and offloading facilities; rail and road junctions in the littoral area; shipyards and ship-repair facilities; and shipping-related industries. In enclosed seas, attacks on the enemy and to protect one's maritime trade will usually be conducted with the full participation of not only naval forces but also landbased air and, in some cases, coastal defense forces and ground forces. Naval blockade and counterblockade are traditional terms rarely used these days. 1 2 However, it is very likely that a formal naval blockade and counterblockade will be declared in case of a high-intensity conflict. In the past, the stronger fleet usually declared a naval blockade at the outset of the hostilities, while the inferior fleet responded by a counterblockade. The principal purpose of both was to interrupt or cut off the enemy's maritime trade. However, the stronger fleet always tried to neutralize or, if the opportunity presented itself, destroy the inferior fleet at sea and at its bases. Both blockade and counterblockade are inherently attritional in nature; hence, the majority of actions are tactical in character. Because of the advent of submarines, aircraft, torpedoes, and mines, a close blockade was replaced in World War I with a distant blockade. This, in turn, forces a superior force, while exercising overall control in a given maritime theater, to allow a certain degree of tactical freedom of action to the inferior force: no complete and permanent control of the surface, subsurface, and air is ever possible, as long as the enemy fleet has not been destroyed. Thus, a superior force might occasionally conduct a major naval operation if the inferior fleet dared to challenge its control of the sea or interfere with maritime trade or amphibious landing. Likewise, the inferior fleet could plan and prepare a major naval operation to accomplish these very aims. Often naval blockade and counterblockade operations evolve into what is usually seen only in retrospect as a maritime campaign. Such was the case, for example, with the

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British and (later) Allied blockade of Germany in World War 11 and the German counterblockade in the same conflict. The Allies conducted a defensive campaign to protect their maritime trade, while the Germans conducted an offensive campaign against Allied maritime trade. Only large navies have the capability to mount major operations aimed at destroying the enemy's sea-based strategic nuclear forces, that is, ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs) and their supporting elements. Such operations might be focused on destroying enemy SSBNs either at their basing areas, during their transit to or from them, or in their patrol zones. Likewise, a major naval operation to protect one's sea-based strategic nuclear .forces might be conducted. Such major operations most likely will be carried out by predominantly naval forces, specifically nuclear-powered attack submarines and patrol aircraft in and over the open ocean. However, in areas closer to one's or the enemy's coast, the character of such operations will probably be more joint, because air forces will be expected to take part. Major naval operations in support of ground .forces on the coast are conducted both in marginal seas of oceans and in semi-enclosed or enclosed seas. However, they may become most frequent in the seas bordering the coasts of continents (e.g., the Black Sea, the Baltic, and the Arabian Gulf). Tactical actions are a dominant method for fleet forces and aviation to support ground forces on the coast. However, major naval operations could be planned to destroy an enemy's fleet that is threatening one's troops operating along the coast; to seize, by an amphibious landing, a major island or strait or part of the enemy-held coast; to defend one's coast against an enemy amphibious landing; to attack the enemy or protect one's maritime trade; to conduct a large-scale evacuation of troops or civilians; etc. Operations in Peacetime: Crisis prevention, management, or resolution and lowintensity conflict pose more difficult problems for the effective use of military forces. For one thing, political, economic, social, and other goals are often much more important that the military objectives. Hence, the application of military sources of power is more complicated. Determination of military strategic objectives in a low-intensity conflict is more difficult than in a regional conflict or global war. Because of the much more restrictive political environment and various legal constraints, the use of military force is more restrictive and less decisive than in a high-intensity conflict. A campaign in a lowintensity conflict would predominantly consist of a series of related and smaller tactical actions. Because of great difficulty in determining operational objectives, major land operations are rarely conducted. The only exception to this is in the use of naval and air forces in peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations. Naval forces are better suited than other forces for crisis prevention and peace operations, and also for such less complicated tasks as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and search and rescue. Naval forces might be involved in planning and conducting major operations as part of conflict prevention, protection of one's shipping, enforcement of freedom of navigation and overflight, and peace operations. 1 3 Conflict prevention includes diverse military activities conducted either unilaterally or collectively under Chapter VI of the UN Charter and aimed at preventing the escalation of disputes into armed conflict or at facilitating resolution of armed violence. These actions range from diplomatic initiatives to preventive deployment of naval forces. The main purpose of the forward presence of U.S. naval forces in the 401

western Pacific, the Arabian Sea and Arabian Gulf, and the Mediterranean is to prevent the outbreak of large-scale hostilities that might affect U.S. national interests and those of our allies or friends. Naval forces deployed in forward areas should be of sufficient size and combat power to defeat opposing forces quickly and decisively. Optimally, conflict prevention under the UN Charter should be conducted with strict impartiality, because all sides in a dispute have to agree to involve other countries as mediators. Naval forces can be deployed in the proximity of a country where hostilities threaten to break out. Naval forces, especially aircraft carriers and amphibious forces, have more chance for success in disputes between nation-states than in ethnic conflict or civil war. To be effective, such an action must be accompanied by a clear willingness on the part of the international community to use overwhelming force if necessary. Otherwise, preventive deployment of naval forces, regardless of their size and capability, will rarely produce the desired effect. A state or territory ruled or controlled by a radical regime and situated close to maritime trade choke points might attempt to harass shipping, requiring the response of naval forces. Protection of shipping requires coordinated employment of surface, air, and subsurface forces, as well as a suitable C41 structure both ashore and afloat. In general, protection of shipping should envisage preemptive or retaliatory strikes or raids against selected targets at sea or ashore. A major operation in protection of shipping would require the execution of a variety of tasks to protect merchant vessels from unlawful attack in international waters. This broad task is accomplished through, among other things, the escort of merchant ships (sometimes of individual ships, for a specific purpose), coastal sea control, harbor defense, and mine countermeasures (MCM). Operation Earnest Will in the Arabian Gulf in 1987-1988 was such a major naval operation. A major naval operation to ensure teedom of navigation and overffight is intended to assert rights to navigate sea or air routes. , Normally, a riparian state may exercise jurisdiction and control within its territorial sea; international law, however, establishes the right of "innocent passage" by ships of other nations through a state's territorial waters. Passage is considered innocent as long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal nation. In addition, freedom of navigation by aircraft through international airspace is a well-established principle of international law. Threats to aircraft through the extension, whether by nations or groups, of airspace control zones beyond international norms can be expected to result in measures acceptable under international law to rectify the situation. 1 4 The U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force conducted such a major operation (El Dorado Canyon) i n the Gulf of Sidra in April 1986. 1 5 Naval forces are most extensively used in various peace operations (PO) military operations to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. These actions are conducted in conjunction with diplomacy as necessary to negotiate a truce and resolve a conflict. Peace operations are tailored to each situation and may be initiated in support of diplomatic activities before, during, or after the conflict. 1 6 Peacekeeping and peace enforcement are the principal types of peace operations. Peacekeeping operations (PKO) are designed to contain, moderate, or terminate hostilities between or within states, using international or impartial military forces and civilians to complement political conflict-resolution efforts and restore and maintain

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peace. These actions take place after the sides in a conflict agree to cease hostilities; impartial observers are normally sent to verify implementation of the cease-fire or monitor the separation of forces. Peace-enforcement operations (PEO) involve diverse tasks as authorized by Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The objective is to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions that have been adopted to maintain or restore peace or order. The tasks of peace enforcement include implementation of sanctions, establishment and supervision of exclusion zones, intervention to restore order, and forcible separation of belligerents. The aim is to establish an environment for a truce or cease-fire. In contrast to peacekeeping, peace-enforcement operations do not require the consent of the warring factions in a conflict. 1 7 When used for peace enforcement, maritime forces should have at least limited power-projection capabilities and be ready to engage in combat if necessary. Exclusion zones, in the air, at sea, or on land, are often required in peacekeeping operations. ' s The objective is to persuade a nation or group to change its behavior to meet the desires of the sanctioning body, rather than face continued sanctions or force. The sanctions are meant to create economic, political, military, or other conditions to that end. An exclusion zone is usually imposed by the UN or some other international body, but it may be applied even by individual countries. As part of peacekeeping operations, NATO navies took part in the enforcement of the "no-fly zone" (NFZ) (Operation Deny Flight) in 1993-1995." Maritime intercept operations (MIO) for sanction enforcement employ naval forces, but often with participation of land-based aircraft. These actions normally use coercive measures to interdict the movement of designated items into or out of a nation or specific sea or ocean area. The political objective is to compel a country or group of countries to conform to the objectives of the initiating body. The military aim is to establish a selective barrier, i.e., allowing only authorized goods to pass. Enforcement of sanctions normally requires action by some combination of surface and air forces. Peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations (PKO/PEO) are difficult to plan separately; the practice so far shows that they are usually combined. The activity of NATO and West European Union (WEU) forces in support of UN forces in Bosnia prior to the Dayton Agreement of 1995 was a combination of both peacekeeping and peace m enforcement. Naval forces may also be involved in expanded peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations. These operations are larger than peacekeeping, involving perhaps 20,000 men or more. The consent of the sides in conflict is usually nominal, i ncomplete, or nonexistent. These operations include more assertive mandates and rules of engagement (ROE), including the use of force under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. 22 Expanded PKO and PEO are conducted with strictly limited objectives, such as protecting safe-flight or no-fly zones, or relief deliveries. If too intrusive, they are likely to draw multinational forces into open hostilities; the naval forces would then either have to be pulled out or committed to full-scale combat . 23 Since December 1995, NATO forces, including maritime elements, have been involved in expanded PKO and PEO i n Bosnia and Herzegovina (Operation Joint Endeavor). Conclusion: A major naval operation is the principal method of accomplishing operational objectives in a maritime theater. It can be the most effective way to achieve decisive results within a given time frame, bringing about a drastic change in the situation 403

in a specific theater of operations. Otherwise, the only method of achieving the same results is attrition warfare, which should be avoided even when the operational commander enjoys quantitative superiority. Major naval operations are an area of study of operational art that most Western naval theoreticians and planners continue to neglect. Too much emphasis is given instead to tactical actions and campaigns and peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations. The real danger is the creation of the impression that major naval operations will not be conducted for the foreseeable future; this could not be more wrong. The absence of any serious threat at sea today should not delude anyone into believing that naval forces will never be required to plan and conduct major operations in the future. Also, any regional conflict may require that the navy plan for and execute a major naval operation. Threats to national interests at sea tend to come suddenly and without much warning. Fleets are not built and maintained only to conduct low-intensity conflict but to wage war, whether regional or global. The types of major naval operations are most directly related to their main purpose, the predominant sea or ocean areas in which they are conducted, timing, and degree of participation by other services. Various types of major naval operations have resulted from advances in naval technology and the evolution of warfare in a maritime theater. While naval forces will always play the most critical role in the accomplishment of operational or strategic objectives, other services and their combat arms will increasingly participate. This will be especially true in littoral waters, because the proximity and influence of a landmass will allow not only land-based aircraft but also ground forces to take part in major naval operations. Therefore, not only amphibious l andings but also major naval operations against the enemy maritime trade or the protection of one's maritime trade will become an increasingly joint or even combined activity. The focus of theory should be on the type of major naval operations most likely to be conducted at the present or in the near future. However, this does not mean the other types of major naval operations should be neglected or ignored. For example, because of the absence of major naval opponents at the present, major naval operations to destroy the enemy fleet at sea are not likely to occur in the near future. Nevertheless, it will be very wrong for theoreticians not to pay attention to such a type of major naval operations. Likewise, a blue-water navy, while focusing on major naval operations in the littoral waters, should not neglect the possibility of a fighting fleet or encounters on the open ocean.

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Notes 1. The U.S. Navy does not define a major naval operation in any of its doctrinal documents. Instead, it frequently uses a much broader and more imprecise term, naval operation. It defines naval operation as a naval action or the performance of naval missions, which may be strategical, tactical, logistical, or training. It is also the process of carrying out or training for naval combat to gain the objective of any battle or campaign. An operation or a connected series of operations conducted essentially by naval forces including all surface, subsurface, and amphibious troops for the purpose of gaining, extending, or maintaining control of the sea; naval operations are dictated by distance, time, and force; they are a blend of logistics and tactical actions to attain a strategic purpose. The logistic action must precede the tactical action; Joint Pub l, pp. 223-4. The issue is further complicated by the fact that neither joint doctrine nor the doctrinal publications of the other services satisfactorily address this critically important area of operational theory. Joint Pub 1-02 defines naval operation as a "naval action, or the performance of a naval mission which may be strategic, operational, tactical, logistic, or training"; Joint Pub 1-02, p. 256; this definition is so broad and imprecise that it can be applied to almost any naval action, no matter how small. The problem is further complicated by the fact that a "naval campaign" is referred to as "an operation or a connected series of operations conducted essentially by naval forces, including all surface, subsurface, air, and amphibious troops, for the purpose of gaining, extending, or maintaining control of the sea"; ibid., p. 257. This definition implies that a naval campaign is conducted to accomplish a strategic objective. The U.S. Marine Corps also apparently does not recognize major operations as a method of combat force employment and uses the term "strategic action" instead. The latter is described as bearing "... directly on strategic objectives, although their size and duration are less than of a campaign"; FMFM I-1, p. 27. Hence, Operation Urgent Fury is termed as a "strategic action" rather than a major joint operation with a strategic objective to accomplish. 2. H. Engelmann, "Die Sicherstellung von Seeoperationen" [Support of Naval Operations], Militaerwesen (East Berlin) 3 (March 1980), p. 69; S. Filonov, "Morskaya Operatsiya" [A Naval Operation], Morskoy Shornik ( Moscow) 10 (October 1977), p. 24. 3. Engelmann, "Die Sicherstellung von Seeoperationen," p. 70. 4. Ibid., p. 71; P. Navoytsev, "Zakonomernosti, Soderzhaniye I Kharaktemye Cherty Sovremennykh Morskikh Operatsii" [Regularities, Content, and Characteristics of Modern Naval Operations], Morskoy Sbornik7 (July 1986), pp. 22-3. 5. Giuseppe Fioravanzo, A History of Naval Tactical Thought (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1970), p. 203. 6. Including 11 battleships, 4 large and 4 light aircraft carriers, 4 seaplane tenders, 18 heavy and 8 light cruisers, 55 destroyers, 23 transports with 6,500 landing troops embarked, 13 tankers, 20 submarines, several smaller vessels, and about 250 carrier-based aircraft. 7. Including three fleet carriers with about 250 embarked aircraft, 4 heavy cruisers, 15 destroyers, 2 oilers, and 19 submarines; Samuel E. Morison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. 4: Coral Sea, Midway, and Submarine Actions, May 1942-August 1942 (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, reprint 1984), p. 76. 8. Juergen Rohwer and Gerhard Huemmelchen, Chronology of the War at Sea 1939-1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2nd edition, 1992), p. 63. 9. Bolfek, "Pomorske Operacije-oblik borbenih dejstava nase Ratne momarice" [Naval Operations-the Form of Combat Actions of Our Navy], Mornaricki Glasnik (Belgrade) 5 (September October 1977), pp. 765-6. 10. Edward J. Marolda and Robert J. Schneller, Shield and Sword. The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf War (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1998), pp. 181-2.

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11. The term "maritime trade" is used instead of the more widely used term "sea lines of communications" (SLOC) and associated terms anti-SLOC and pro-SLOC because it accurately describes the real purpose of such major naval operations, i.e. destruction or neutralization or protection of all elements of maritime trade, not only the merchant ships at sea. The teen SLOG, in contrast, implies abstractions-imaginary lines along which the shipping moves. 1 2. Modern terms used are "maritime exclusion zone" (MEZ) and "total exclusion zone" (TEZ). The U.S. Navy used the more benign term "quarantine" during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. 1 3. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters United States Marine Corps, Naval Doctrine Publication 1: Naval Warfare ( Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, March 1994), p. 23. 1 4. Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine, for Military Operations Other Than War ( Washington, DC: 16 June 1 995), p. 111-4. 1 5. About 14,700 men in two aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBGs), comprising 155 aircraft and 17 surface ships, took part in that operation, while the U.S. Air Force contributed 32 bombers and 70 support aircraft; Anthony H. Cordesman, "After the Raid: The Emerging Lessons from the U.S. Attack on Libya," Armed Forces 8 (August 1986), p. XX. 1 6. Joint Pub 3-07: Joint Doctrine, for Military Operations Other Than War (1995), p. 111-12. 1 7. Ibid., p. 111-13. 1 8. Ibid., p. 111-4. 1 9. Operation Den v Flight started on 12 April 1993 and ended on 20 December 1995. About 4,500 personnel from 12 NATO countries took part, operating from fourteen air bases in Italy, France, and Germany. Also, one U.S. aircraft carrier was deployed in the Adriatic, as were from time to time one French and one British aircraft carrier each. 20. Joint Pub 3-07: Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, pp. III-3 and 111-4. 21. The activities of NATO ships in the Adriatic were referred to as Operation Maritime Guard, and those controlled by the WEU were Operation Sharp Fence. The WEU force operated south of a line between Bari, Italy, and Bar, Montenegro, while the NATO Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) operated north of it (formally established on 30 April 1992); each force received intelligence and surveillance data from maritime patrol aircraft (MPA). In late November 1992 Operations Maritime Monitor and Sharp Vigilance were extended to include the enforcement of UN resolutions and were incorporated into Maritime Guard and Sharp Fence, respectively. By 8 June 1993 NATO and the WEU established a unified command under the name Operation Sharp Guard; "WEU Head on Ships' Duties," Dailv Report East Europe (FBISEEUR-92-135, 14 July 1992), pp. 2-3; Michael Chichester, "Maastricht, the Adriatic and the Future of European Defence," Navv International (November-December 1992), p. 361 (formally dissolved in mid-June 1996); "Die Uneinigkeit der NATO belasted das Treffen der Aussenminister in Athena," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 9 (June 1993), p. 4; "USS Kauffinau sails in Adriatic Operation," Daily Report West Europe (FBIS-WEU-93-109, 9 June 1993), p. 1; "Further on Arrangements," Dailv Report East Europe (FBIS-EEUR, 13 July 1992), pp. 2-3; "French Vessel Joins Operation," Daily Report East Europe (FBIS-EEUR-92-135, 14 July 1992), p. 2; "Stapske vjezbe it i blokada obale" [Staffs Exercises of Blockade of the Coast], Novi hjesnik (Zagreb) (15 July 1992), p. 25A; "WEU Chief on NATO Coordination," Daily Report East Europe (FBIS-EEUR, 14 July 1992), p. 2. 22. Hans Binnendejk, ed., Strategic Assessment 1996 ( Washington, D.C: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1996), p. 135. 23. Ibid., p. 138.

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Part VII: OPERATIONAL PLANNING

OPERATIONAL PLANNING No plan of operations extends with certainty beyond the first encounter with the enemy's main strength. Only the layman sees in the course of a campaign a consistent execution of a preconceived and highly detailed original concept pursued consistently to the end. Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, Sr. Operational decision-making and planning represents the synthesis of all the aspects of operational theory and practice. It is perhaps the single most important component of operational art. Without sound and detailed plans for campaigns or major operations the objectives set by strategy cannot be accomplished efficiently and with the fewest losses in personnel, materiel, and time. Plans and orders are the principal tools by which the operational commanders communicate their strategic or operational vision. They are based on the requirements and input from national strategy and military or theater strategy. Major operations and campaigns are planned, prepared, and executed by a single commander who has the necessary authority to sequence and synchronize the employment and sustainment of national multiservice or multinational forces. The theater commanders also have the authority to use key nonmilitary sources of power within their respective theaters. Like national or military strategy, the operational planning process must be conducted continuously in peacetime and in war. It must encompass the entire spectrum of possible situations where military forces could be employed to accomplish national or alliance/coalition strategy objectives. At all command echelons, a thorough approach to planning in peacetime is a prerequisite for success in wartime. Strategic Framework: Strategy provides both the framework and direction for operational planning. The basis of all plans is political and military strategic objectives laid down by the national or alliance/coalition leadership. A strategy can be defined in the simplest and broadest terms as the process of interrelating and harmonizing the ends and the means. A sound strategy should not have a serious mismatch or disconnect between the ends to be achieved and the means available; otherwise the entire effort, regardless of performance at the operational and tactical levels, will end in failure and could even be fatal. The articulation of national interests, objectives, policies, and commitments linked to use of the instruments of national power is called, in generic terms, national strategy (sometimes referred to as grand strategy). In war, national strategy focuses on those instruments of national power that achieve its political ends or objectives as articulated by political leadership. Diplomatic, economic, military, and informational actions are linked through supporting strategies that contribute to attaining the objectives of national strategy. Military strategy uses or threatens to use the military instruments of national power to accomplish the political objectives of the national strategy.' To be successful, military strategy should not developed in isolation from the other instruments of national

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power; it must be in consonance with diplomatic, political, economic, informational, and other aspects of the national strategy. If a nation has vital interests to preserve or defend in several theaters, then, in each theater, strategy must be developed and applied in both peacetime and in time of war. The theater strategy is subordinate to national or alliance/coalition strategy. National-strategic objectives should always dominate theater-strategic objectives. The theater strategy provides a framework for operational planning. It is described as the art and science of developing integrated strategic concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and alliance/coalition policy and strategy by the use of force, threatened use of force, or operations not involving the use of force within a theater. 2 Theater-strategic objectives are accomplished by major operations or campaigns, that is, by practical application of operational art. Military or theater strategy can be offensive or defensive in its main purpose. In an offensive strategy, the aim could be to seek to drastically change the balance of the power, either regionally or globally. The attacker can also try to make some modest adjustment of balance of power. The defender usually wants to preserve the status quo, that is, to maintain his relative position in the existing system. The initial strategic posture is usually difficult to change in the course of war. The ultimate purpose of military (or theater) strategy could be the enemy's destruction, annihilation, or weakening of his power over time. The first, arbitrarily called strategy of'annihilation, aims to overwhelm the enemy and make him unable to resist one's demands. It is viable only if one's power is overwhelming; otherwise the conflict would be protracted, requiring such a commitment of resources that one or both sides in conflict would find themselves exhausted before their opponent is defeated. A strategy of attrition (or erosion), in contrast, aims to convince the enemy that settling the political dispute will be easier and the outcome more attractive than continued conflict. It is intended to erode or wear down the enemy's strength and thereby weaken his will to fight, rather than to destroy his ability to resist. 3 Military (or theater) strategy can be symmetrical and asymmetrical. In a symmetric strategy, a country or group of countries would try to match their superior strength against the same or similar enemy's strength to which he is unable to adequately respond in kind Asymmetric strategy aims to counter the enemy's strengths and to accentuate and exploit his weaknesses and vulnerabilities by applying nonconventional means. One of the principal tasks of any strategy is to determine the objective-a mission, aim, or purpose of one's efforts. The single most important decision of the national or alliance/coalition political leadership is determine the political objective for the planned use of military and nonmilitary sources of power. The objective should be articulated clearly, concisely, and unambiguously. The political purpose of using military and nonmilitary sources of power must be clearly defined and must be attainable with the means available. This seems to be a relatively easy task for decision-makers; yet, all too often political objectives are ambiguous, poorly defined and articulated, thereby making it difficult to derive proper military strategic objectives. The process of determining political objectives often involves simultaneous pursuit of several conflicting ends that makes their integration very difficult. The political purpose of a war can range from preserving or restoring national territorial integrity and political sovereignty to preserving

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one's alliance/coalition, to breaking up the opposing alliance/coalition. Ideally, the political objectives of a war should be definite, focused, clearly stated, and attainable with the means available or becoming available. Political objectives can be limited or unlimited. The first range from the threat of use of force to a change in the enemy's behavior or policy on a certain issue. The unlimited political objective in contrast is aimed to remove the enemy's leadership or even overthrow the enemy's social system. A regime can be removed, but afterward given back to the people, or a new constitution can be imposed, as the Western Allies did in the aftermath of World War 11 in Japan and their zone of occupation in Germany. In contrast, in the aftermath of the defeat of Nazi Germany, the Soviets imposed their style of government and social system throughout Eastern Europe where their troops were stationed. Unlimited objectives can also include conquest of the entire country or groups of countries, or even extermination of the entire population of the hostile state. 5 In going to war, determination of political objectives must at least establish a definition for survival and victory. Political leadership should clearly state whether the intention is to pursue a limited or unlimited political objectives. The identification of the nature of the political objective is essential to ensuring the right match between political and military strategic objectives. Political objectives are the starting point for the development of military strategy. The first and most important step in the process is to determine military strategic objectives that would lead to the accomplishment of the political strategic objectives (see Figure 33). Political strategic objectives and military strategic objectives are significantly different. The first tells us what is the ultimate purpose of the entire effort. The second defines what must be done in military terms to accomplish the ultimate purpose. If the political objectives are unlimited, then so are the military objectives. In contrast, a limited political objective does not necessarily mean a limited military objective. Both the political purpose of a war and the military strategic objectives must be in consonance. Yet, that does not mean that political considerations should dictate operational or, even worse, tactical objectives. Properly determined military strategic objectives should achieve, or help to achieve, political objectives, while avoiding unintended and undesirable political results. 6 The choice of military strategic objectives seems simple, but is not always so. There is a great danger of determining military strategic objectives that are inappropriate for the accomplishment of the political objectives. A selected military strategic objective might have unintended consequences or effects on the enemy, as the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 illustrates. This is especially true where a delicate balance of power is in place; achieving given military objectives may alter that balance of power in such a way that the resulting political situation is actually less favorable to the victors. Another danger is that the selected military strategic objective would not result in the accomplishment of the political purpose. History is replete with examples of military victories that did not lead to attainment of the object of policy. ? Sometimes too much emphasis on political aspects of the situation might lead to selection of a political strategic objective that, while highly desirable, is clearly unattainable with the military means at hand. The result can be a strategic blunder of the first magnitude resulting in the dispersal of sorely needed military resources. A military enterprise undertaken primarily on political grounds might end in catastrophe, as did the ill-fated Allied expedition into

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Norway in April 1940 and into Greece in the spring of 1941. A military strategic objective can be offensive, defensive, or a combination of the two. A military strategic objective should be determined by fully considering strategic factors of space, time, and force at the strategic level. A serious mismatch or disconnenct between the objective and these factors is invariably fatal, regardless whether similar relationships at the operational and tactical levels are in harmony. A country or coalition that possesses superior military strength will usually determine a series of offensive, strategic, and military objectives. Whether limited or unlimited objectives are chosen would depend on whether a strategy of annihilation or a strategy of attrition is selected. Probably there is no greater mistake than formulating and pursuing simultaneously or almost concurrently several military strategic objectives. Such a course of action could be taken only if one's forces possess overwhelming strength against any conceivable combination of the opponent's forces. Hitler's Germany in World War 11 pursued several strategic objectives, some of them simultaneously, even though it clearly did not possess sufficient military or industrial strength to achieve them against the overwhelming combined strength of its opponents. Hitler also committed many similar mistakes at the operational level, especially in the war against Russia in 1941-1942. PlanninI4 Authority and Responsibility: The highest political leadership is responsible for planning use of military and nonmilitary sources of national power across the operational continuum. In peacetime, the strategic land theater commanders prepare a

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series of plans for various contingencies. In a regional or general conflict, the country's military strategic leadership or the theater-strategic commanders prepare and execute one or more campaign plans, while each theater of operations commanders is responsible for planning and execution of a single campaign. In a campaign, subordinate component commanders plan and conduct major operations. None of the services alone can plan a campaign. In a situation short of war, the operational-tactical commanders and their staffs might be directed to prepare and execute a major joint/combined operation with a strategic objective. They do not plan or execute a campaign in the strict definition of that term, despite claims to the contrary. This level of command simply does not have sufficient forces, assets, or authority over logistical support and sustainment to plan and conduct several consecutive or simultaneous major operations-that is, a campaign. Planning a major operation or campaign should be conducted at a single headquarters whenever possible. If, for whatever reasons, several headquarters take part in the planning, then they should be within easy distance of each other to ensure effective coordination among the planning staff elements. The operational commanders should be deeply involved into the planning process; otherwise, they would not have the benefit of knowing the evolution of the course of action adopted and alternative courses available. Subordinate component commanders' views should receive a proper hearing during the planning of a major operation or campaign. Differences of opinion should never be allowed to paralyze the entire planning process or lead to the change of plans based solely on the views of a certain subordinate component commander. The commanders and their staffs involved in operational planning should be the same as those who will execute the plans. Making a Decision: In generic terms, the operational planning consists of three distinctive and related phases: commander's estimate of the situation and the decision planning, and issuing and transmitting directives (plans and orders). The theater commander and subordinate component commanders make a decision by estimating the operational or strategic situation (sometimes called a long-range estimate of the situation). Their estimate must consider larger factors of space, time, and force. In terms of time alone, the estimate must envisage the changes in the situation over several weeks or even months; not hours or, at most, days as when planning a battle or engagement. The theater commander must also evaluate and analyze the use and effect of nonmilitary sources of power. Subordinate component commanders also consider these factors, but not to the extent the theater commander does. Unlike an estimate at the tactical level, for the estimate of the situation for a campaign or major operation, the staff integrates the commander's estimate with the estimate of the various staff sections (personnel, intelligence, logistics, etc.). The final estimate of the situation reflects the commander's best assessment of the strategic or operational reality at the time of the plan's execution. The result of the estimate is a decision to guide the staff in planning a campaign, and to guide subordinate component commanders to estimate the situation to plan their respective major operations. The first and the most critical step in the commander's estimate of the situation is the mission analysis. The theater commander receives a mission from the highest national or alliance/coalition political leadership or higher military authority. Strategic guidance is the basic document for a theater commander in conducting the estimate of the situation. Sometimes, strategic guidance is issued to the operational-tactical commander, as did the 413

British Government in the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict, tasked to plan and execute a major joint or combined operation with a strategic objective. Among other things, strategic guidance should spell out clearly the political and military strategic objectives that will, when accomplished, allow the strategic vision to become a reality. $ It should specify which military and nonmilitary sources of power are available or will become available, limitations (constraints and restraints) 9 in regard to geographic areas where one's forces can be employed or cannot be used, use or nonuse of certain weapons, rules of engagement (ROE), and what constitutes a victory. Ideally, strategic guidance should provide a balance among ends (objectives), ways (methods), and means (resources). 10 Property balancing these highly dynamic elements is difficult. The theater commander and his staff should continuously examine the probable effect of imposed political and other constraints and restrictions on the accomplishment of the assigned military objectives. Where the political limitations seriously threaten the success of a campaign or major operation, the theater commander should urge the political leadership to relax or adjust, amend or alter them. The basis for the estimate of the situation of subordinate component commanders is operational guidance issued by their respective theater commander. This document usually addresses military aspects of the mission, notably it defines the operational objective, forces and assets available or becoming available, and restraints and constraints in the employment of one's forces. Perhaps the most critical step in mission analysis is deducing from the guidance the physical strategic or operational objectives in the envisaged campaign or major operation. Without a clearly stated and attainable objective, the entire military effort becomes pointless. i f Once the objective has been stated, the problem becomes greatly simplified. However, determining the objective is usually the most difficult part of any planning. 1 2 For a campaign or major operation intended to end hostilities, the commander must also analyze conditions for conflict or war termination. 13 Planning assumptions are the essential element for drafting a sound plan for a campaign or major operation. They are used to address the - most likely enemy action, the use or nonuse of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the availability or non availability of host-nation support (overflight rights, use of ports and airheads, etc.). They should be limited to the boundaries of a given theater or area of operations, plus any area of interest. The scope and significance of planning assumptions in a long-range estimate differ greatly from those made in the commander's estimate at the tactical level. They encompass a much longer span of time and a larger space. Therefore, they deal with a wider range of uncertainties than the assumptions made in planning a battle or an engagement. Both extremes-the worst or the best case scenario-for obvious reasons should be avoided in making planning assumptions. The operational commander and his staff must analyze and evaluate the factors of space, time, and force. The purpose is to balance each of these factors with others and all of them in combination in respect to the assigned strategic or operational objective. The operational commander also needs to make some tentative conclusions as to whether ends and means are matched. If there is a mismatch between the ends and the means, the higher political authorities or theater commander should be alerted in time to be able to either scale down the ends or increase the means to accomplish the assigned strategic or operational objective.

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In conducting the estimate of the situation, the operational commander and his staff should develop their own course of action encompassing all the stages of the envisaged campaign or major operation. One of the most critical tasks in the estimate process is to tentatively identify critical factors, and the center of gravity, in particular, for both one's own and the enemy's forces. The development of the enemy's course of actions should focus on the enemy's capabilities, not their intentions. The exception is if the enemy's intentions are known and based on reliable and accurate intelligence. The enemy's ability to change his doctrinal methods and practices because of lessons learned should be considered as well. In developing one's own courses of actions, the operational commander should realistically anticipate major changes in the strength of both his own and friendly forces and the enemy's forces which may take place over time. For each of one's own courses of action, the operational scheme is developed and clearly focused on the destruction or neutralization of the enemy's operational or strategic center of gravity. A course of action should be expressed in broad terms stating concisely and clearly what each service component (for a campaign) or combat arm (for a major operation) has to do to accomplish the stated military objective. In contrast to the tactical estimate, the operational commander and his staff develops during the estimate of the situation concepts of deployment, command (or task) organization, and logistics for each of one's own course of action. The most critical for the success of a campaign or major operation is the deployment concept. 1 4 Deployment of forces for the initial major operations of a campaign or initial battles and engagement in a major operation must be properly planned; the provisional deployment concept serves as the basis for subsequent detailed planning for strategic and operational deployment of one's forces. Any error in deployment is difficult to correct once the campaign or major operation starts. All too often this point is not well understood by theater commanders and their staffs. Deployment is often designed only to quickly insert forces into the theater or area of operations without regard for what they will have to do when they arrive at their assigned assembly areas. In addition, deployment is sometimes planned and almost exclusively focused on the opening tactical actions, instead of the major operation as whole. This is too narrow a view, which cannot but adversely affect the planning of branches and sequels. The commanders' and their staffs' operational perspective is essential to sound deployment planning. Otherwise, near- and long-term operational requirements will not be properly balanced and will result in a mismatch between combat and sustaining resources that may cause a campaign or major operation to culminate before the assigned objectives have been reached. The operational commander and his staff also develop a provisional organizational concept during the estimation process. This includes, among other things, the proposed boundaries of the theater and its subdivisions, command relationships, and forces' subordination. Optimally, the operational commander delegates authority and responsibilities to subordinate component commanders so they can exercise sufficient freedom of action. The logistical concept is a vital element for the successful outcome of any major operation or campaign. Logistics, perhaps more than any other functional concern, can dictate what is operationally feasible. 1 5 Timely logistic support for the deployment of one's forces into the theater is essential for the success of a campaign or major operations. Concurrently and in coordination with the commander's development of an

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operational scheme is the development of a concept of sustainment with input and in coordination with the subordinate component commanders. The commanders and their planners must consider numerous sustainment factors that affect the ability of combat forces to successfully conduct operations. Regardless of the estimate format, the operational commander and his staff need to analyze and compare both the enemy's and their own courses of actions in a dynamic setting. This part of the estimate is complex because so many unquantifiable elements on both sides fall within the scope of analysis. The commander's judgment and experience is critical in selecting, which course of action is to be retained and which discarded. Key to making this determination is reliable and thorough knowledge of both the enemy's and one's capabilities in terms of such factors as leadership, soundness of doctrine, morale and discipline, and degree of jointness/combinedness. If necessary, the interaction between one's own courses of actions and the enemy's courses of actions must be evaluated in terms of war termination issues. The estimate of the situation should result in at least three courses of action. The best one serves as the basis for the decision, and the second best is the basis for alternate plan of a campaign or major operation. The decision is the final and most important step in the commander's estimate of the situation. It reflects the personality and leadership qualities of the operational commander. The decision statement expresses in broad terms what the force as a whole has to do and why. It should be written clearly, concisely, and in the commonly accepted operational terms. The provisional operational idea or scheme 6 is an integral part of the decision. It follows the decision statement and explains in detail what, when, and where each service or functional component (for a campaign) or combat arm (for a major operation) is to be employed to accomplish the mission (see Figure 34). It should contain sufficient detail to allow the planners to develop the plan, but not so much detail as to limit exploration of possible options during the subsequent planning process. The operational idea for a major operation or campaign should be innovative and bold; thereby making it difficult for the enemy to predict how the actions of one's forces will unfold. It should ensure speed of execution and make full use of the joint or combined force capabilities to deceive and mislead the enemy. Optimally, the enemy should be presented with credible threats on the ground, in the air, and at sea. A sound operational scheme should provide for actions to isolate and shape the battlefield/battlespace aimed to systematically prevent arrival of enemy reinforcements and supplies into the theater. Another part of the decision is the operational commander's intent-a direct statement that describes what the operational commander wants to see in military terms after the assigned operational or strategic objectives are accomplished. The commander's intent establishes the framework for the initial planning for the staff and subordinate commanders, two command echelons down. Planning: In the planning phase, the operational commander and his staff refine his decision. Major operations and campaigns are planned by using the so-called regressive or inverse method. The ultimate-strategic (for a campaign) or operational objective (for a major operation) is determined first, followed by the selection of a series of operational or major tactical objectives. Development of the plan for a campaign or major have some commonalties, but also differ significantly because of differences in the ultimate objectives to be accomplished and hence, different factors of space, time, and force (see Figures 35 & 36). A plan for a major operation or campaign is based on a number of considerations, collectively called operational design. (For details see the 416

chapters "Campaign Design" and "Major Operation Design.") A sound operational design should ensure that one's forces are employed in a coherent manner and focused on the assigned operational or strategic objectives. It should envisage several time- and space-related phases. It should firmly lay down required forces and assets and direct these toward the accomplishment of the assigned ultimate objectives. 17 The basic plan for a campaign or major operation contains in rudimentary form only the most important elements of operational design. Other elements of operational design are provided in detail in the annexes to the basic operation plan and the plans of subordinate component (land, sea, airspace, and special forces) commanders. The design of a major operation or campaign should envisage all the actions and measures required for the deployment, combat employment, and redeployment of one's forces. During the planning process, the provisionally drafted operational idea in the operational commander's decision is refined and if necessary modified to satisfy possible changes in the strategic or operational situation. Plannintl Considerations: The operational commander must take into account a number of considerations in planning a campaign or major operation. First, the employment of military forces in support of national policy requires a thorough appreciation of the operational factors of space-time-force. In planning a campaign and major operation with the strategic objective, the effect of employing one's forces on the political, diplomatic, economic, environmental, and informational aspects of the situation in the theater should be thoroughly evaluated and then corresponding actions taken. The public's perceptions are often much more important than reality. The same action could be considered a success in the eyes of the military, but a failure in the eyes of the public. The theater commander should pay continuous attention to these elements of the situation and adjust his plans accordingly so that the maximum effect is achieved in military, political,

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diplomatic, and informational terms. The effect of using certain types of weapons and forces on the environment is another factor of space that must be properly addressed and incorporated into the plan. Legal aspects of the use of force are also critical for eventual success. Thus, the national political leadership should resolve the issue of how one's forces can be most effectively employed, while observing international law and the law of armed conflict. Rules of engagement (ROE) should be carefully and opportunely drafted to guide the operational commander and his staff during the planning and execution of a campaign or major operation. Relations with the media are another important area that requires urgent and continuous attention of the operational commander and subordinate commanders and their staffs.

In coalition warfare, the first and the most important problem is agreement at the highest political level on the common objectives of the forthcoming campaign or major operation. If members of a coalition have different strategic objectives, then they will have a different perception of what must be accomplished. Other areas that require great attention during planning are the method of achieving unity of effort, coordination of logistics, communications, relations with the media, and treatment of the enemy prisoners of war (EPW). The decision-making process in a coalition, and less so in an alliance, is complex because of greater differences in military culture, doctrine, planning procedures, protection measures, and interoperability of weapons and systems. Intelligence sharing, especially in a coalition, is very complicated because of associated security problems. The operational commanders and the planners must also address the way to sequence and synchronize theater-wide functions, specifically in support of a campaign or major operation. No plan of a campaign or major operation today is complete without a detailed course of action for conducting operational command and control warfare (C2W). Properly planned and executed it should deliver a decisive blow against the enemy's information structure at the outset of a campaign or major operation. C2W plays an essential role in the targeting process for the entire force. This theater-wide function should be employed early on to significantly degrade and, if possible, eliminate the enemy's informational structure. Intelligence preparation of the theater, electronic warfare, and psychological operations consume much time and resources, so preparations for C2W must start well ahead of the beginning of the planned campaign or major operation. Operational intelligence supports all aspects of operational planning. Without good and reliable intelligence support, it is not possible to develop sound supporting plans for mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment. Intelligence plays an especially critical role in the preparation of the strategic and operational deception plans. Intelligence support should be continuous during the entire planning process. Plans for a campaign or major operation must envisage timely and effective intelligence preparation of the theater and efficient dissemination of intelligence throughout the chain of command. In a major operation or campaign, the rapid and systematic exchange of intelligence information is essential. Normally, the intelligence capability of a single service is insufficient to depict the entire theater of operations. Therefore, joint (and sometimes multinational) efforts in gathering and evaluating intelligence information are necessary. Plans for a campaign or major operation usually provide a separate scheme for conducting operational fires, which are designed to have a major impact on the accomplishment of the main operational or strategic objective. The main value of operational fires is in establishing favorable terms for a campaign or major operation before the opening major operations or battles/engagements. Properly planned, operational fires can have a devastating effect on enemy forces. These fires are one of the best means available to the operational commander to define and shape the battlefield/battlespace. A failure of operational fires will invariably require readjustments or even alterations of a plan for a campaign. The operation plan should provide for proper sequencing and synchronization of operational and tactical fires. To be successful, the operational level of command should coordinate operational fires. This means that systems and procedures for allocating target priorities must be

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firmly in place. Operational intelligence plays a critical role in selecting these targets. Plans for operational fires should be detailed and integrated with those for ground or amphibious maneuvers. Otherwise, the entire effort will most likely be both a waste of time and sorely needed resources, as happened with the Allied Operation Strangle on the Italian front in the spring of 1944. The operation was planned and executed solely by the Allied air forces, which made no attempt to coordinate it with the plans of ground forces. The main purpose of this four-week effort was to render the committed German forces combat-ineffective and cause them to withdraw by reducing their flow of men, materiel, and supplies. Allied aircraft struck the German supply infrastructure; rail capacity fell from 80,000 tons per day to 4,000, well below what the Germans required to conduct intensive combat. However, the Allied planners' original objective proved overly optimistic. As it turned out, the Germans were quite capable of surviving on 4,000 tons of supplies per day, provided there was no active combat on the front-as, in fact, there was not. 1 8 To have a decisive impact, air attacks must be carried out in conjunction with ground maneuvers. The Allied operation Diadem, which started on 11 May 1944, caused great problems for the German troops deployed along the Gustav Line almost from the start. The Germans could not quickly shift their forces laterally behind the front line. The damage Allied aircraft inflicted on the rail system placed much greater demand on motorized transport which was normally used to provide tactical mobility for German combat troops. Allied aircraft attacked convoys with impunity, forcing the Germans to move supplies mostly at night; hence, fewer and fewer supplies reached the front. In the end, the combined pressure from air interdiction and ground exploitation forced the Germans to abandon their defensive positions on the Gustav Line and withdraw towards Rome. During the Korean War, the U.S. Air Force apparently forgot the lessons of World War 11. The Far East Air Force (FEAF) tried to isolate the communist troops on the front line from their supplies by carrying out massed air attacks between August 1951 and May 1952 (Operation Strangle). Air Force planners believed that air attacks would so weaken the enemy that the Eighth Army ground offensive could easily rout him, or he would be forced to shorten his supply lines. However, the FEAF demonstrated lack of understanding of interdiction by not combining its effort with maneuvers on the ground. The first phase of the effort (Operation Strangle I) was intended to halt communist highway traffic south of the 39th Parallel. The second phase (Operation Strangle II), which began in mid-August, was designed to cripple the rail system north of the 39th parallel. Both operations involved Air Force and Marine aircraft and carrier aircraft from TF-77. Initially, the main targets of U.S. attacks were rail bridges, but later they included rail yards, airfields, and supply centers. Operation Strangle was successful in interdicting retreating communist forces in June 1951. Shortly afterward, however, the attacks began to yield diminishing returns as communist forces reorganized their combat units and resupplied them. Ultimately, the entire effort proved a failure. 20 To be successful, the delivery of operational fires must be synchronized. This requires that operational commanders and their planners have a comprehensive knowledge of each service's capabilities and limitations, doctrine, and planning processes and procedures. 21 Plans for operational fires must be flexible by having a list of alternate targets for each fire platform or system. Operational fires are ideal for applying the principle of centralized planning and decentralized execution through issuing task-

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oriented orders. Centralized direction and planning is necessary to ensure the most effective use of all available forces and assets, and, perhaps above all, the synchronization of operational fires. Decentralized execution throughout the chain of command allows tactical commanders a great degree of flexibility in employing individual weapons systems and thereby also reduces vulnerability to enemy countermeasures for the force as a whole . 22 The firing platforms should be complementary to allow one's advantages to be pitted against the enemy's vulnerabilities. Success against some enemy vulnerability will allow success of a complementary weapons system in its attack of a secondary enemy vulnerability. 23 Plan's Features: The plan for a campaign or major operation should ensure the proper sequencing of objectives or tasks and synchronize the employment of all military and nonmilitary sources of power, but particularly of actions by land, sea, air or space, and special force elements. Most important of all, the plan should be clearly focused on the enemy's operational or strategic center of gravity. The plan should highlight the ultimate objective. It should describe in some detail the overall concept and intent of the campaign or major operation, a tentative sequence of phases and operational objectives that would lead to success, and general concepts for key supporting functions, especially a logistical concept that would sustain the force for the duration. 24 The plan should be as complete as possible; otherwise its execution would invariably end as a series of improvisations and cause significant loss of time and resources. The German plan for invasion of Soviet Russia in 1941 did not have broad strategic outlines, as did the campaign plan for the invasion of the Benelux countries and France in 1940. Hitler apparently believed that the Soviet regime would collapse soon after the start of hostilities. The German planning never progressed beyond the first projected advance after the great battles at the frontiers. The Army Group South was to advance to the lower Dnieper River and seize industries and raw materials there. Army Group Center was to occupy the western half of the Moscow-Smolensk Ridge. Army Group North was to advance along the Baltic coast and seize Leningrad. The rest of the plan was an improvisation without a defined objective. 25 The plan should encompass all stages of the projected campaign or major operation. The reverse planning process should always be applied; otherwise, the execution phase will be incoherent and without a well-thought-out road map toward the ultimate objective. The Allied operational planning in the Mediterranean in 1943-1944 was highly improvised. The Allies never developed a campaign plan for the next phase of the war in the Mediterranean Theater after they destroyed the Axis' forces in North Africa in May 1943. The Allies instead focused on the next operational objective, unrealistically expecting its accomplishment to lead to the end of war in the area. They repeatedly underestimated the German will to fight. The Allies, strangely, failed to grasp that it was Germany's, not Italy's, power that had to be broken to end the war in the Mediterranean on Allied terms. The Allies invaded Sicily in July 1943 hoping to eliminate Italy as a belligerent. When that did not happen, they began to search for alternative courses of action and chose to invade southern Italy in September 1943. The Germans offered stiff resistance until May 1945 when German forces surrendered on all fronts. The main reason for the Allied difficulties in the Mediterranean was the lack of a well-prepared and executed campaign plan. Instead, the Allies planned one or two major

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operations at a time, and each successive phase was dictated by political and military developments as they arose. Operation Plan: In generic terms, the planning process ends with the completion of the basic operation plan (OPLAN). The basic operation plan contains a number of planning assumptions. Despite all the new information technologies and vastly improved intelligence capabilities, there will always be aspects of the situation in a theater that are only partially known or not known at all. Because a campaign or major operation might require several weeks or months to complete, sound planning should envisage possible changes in the situation on both sides within such a time frame. The further ahead one projects, the less certain and detailed a plan will be. Therefore, the plan describes the initial phases of a campaign or major operation with some certainty, but the succeeding phases are less detailed and could be described only in the form of contingencies or outlines. In contrast, the final phase of a campaign, which accomplishes the ultimate objective, should be clearly envisioned and described in the plan. The main body of the plan should be written clearly and concisely, but at the same time providing a sufficient detail for subordinate component commanders to write their own plans. The basic operation plan also contains many annexes to deal with specific parts of the plan that require elaboration (task organization, operations, intelligence, C2W, logistics, personnel, public affairs, civil affairs, etc.). For the first phase of a campaign or major operation, an operation order (OPORD) is written; for subsequent phases, operation plans, outline plans, and concept summaries are developed. In contrast to the operation plan, the operation order does not contain planning assumptions; it should be based on the facts of the situation. Because the ultimate objective should always be clear, an outline plan should be prepared for the last phase of a campaign or major operation. Task Organization: During the planning phase, the provisional concept of task organization is further refined and included as an annex to the OPLAN. Task organization should be developed from the bottom up, not vice versa, as is often the case in practice. The first and foremost task is to analyze physical objectives and then to carefully determine the size, type, and force mix required to accomplish these objectives. One of the most important factors is the tentative sequence of accomplishing physical military objectives. The total size of one's forces is heavily dependent on these considerations. The type of the forces' subordination (organic, assigned, allocated, etc.) and command relationships, chain of command, and other related matters are determined only after the problem of forces has been resolved. Determination of task organization depends on many factors but principally on the responsibilities and missions assigned to the force; the nature and scope of the military and, often nonmilitary, actions; the geographic characteristics of the area; the assigned forces-one's and those of the potential opponents; and the time available. Task organization should seldom be changed during a major operation or the first phased of a campaign. The only exception is when one's forces have been so attrited that they must be reconstituted. Deployment Plan: Planning for force deployment requires the determination of main and intermediate locations, and precise times for force arrival into the theater. After determining the point of final destination and the required arrival time for each force

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element, the operational planners plan regressively to determine preceding points and times in the movement chain required to reach the desired final destination at the desired time. The point of origin is the beginning point for a deployment move. Active component forces move from point of origin to port of embarkation (POE). Reserve component forces usually assemble at a home location (or mobilization point), then move to a point of origin or directly to a POE. Transportation to a POE is the responsibility of the individual service. Strategic airlift or sealift starts at the POE. The force is moved by strategic lift (or by organic means if a unit is so equipped) to a port of debarkation (POD)-the airport or seaport within a given theater of operations where strategic lift ends and theater movement begins. The POD may be identical to the final destination. A Port of support (POS) is usually within a theater of operations; it defines where strategic transportation ends for air-transported supplies, resupply, and replacement personnel; sea-transported ammunition, supplies; petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL); and resupply. In most cases, intratheater transportation is required from the port of support to in-theater distribution points. The movement of a force might require additional stops at intermediate locations (ILOCs) to change modes of transport, handle cargo, accomplish training, or combine forces and equipment transported in several shipments (split shipments). Intermediate points might exist between point of origin and port of embarkation, ports of embarkation and debarkation, and port of debarkation and final destination. A marshaling area is where personnel are matched with pre-positioned stocks of equipment and supplies. Forces must be deployed in a timely manner so that the enemy cannot disrupt them. The course of the entire campaign or major operation is profoundly affected by the initial deployment of forces. The strategic deployment concept must ensure that forces arrive in sequence for integration. The operational commander requires a forecast of units scheduled to arrive in-theater and their projected integration dates. 26 In operational deployment, forces and units are fully combat ready by the time they start their movement to the jump-off positions for operational maneuver. In the German attack through the Ardennes in May 1940, General von Kleist proposed that his forces advance in two groups: XIX Panzer Corps (General Guderian) on the southern flank using two roads and advancing toward Sedan; and the northern flank also with two roads used by XXXI Panzer Corps (General Reinhardt) advancing toward Montherme. The XIV Motorized Infantry Corps (General von Wietersheim) was a second echelon and was to advance behind both panzer corps using all four roads. However, Army Group A directed that the entire Panzer Group von Kleist be divided into three echelons: the first echelon was XIX Panzer Corps using all four roads; the second was XXXI Panzer Corps using three roads; and the third was XV Motorized Infantry Corps using two roads. The distance between the first and second echelon would be 112 miles, and the third echelon would follow at a distance of about 205 miles from the most forward elements of XIX Panzer Corps. The planners must set priorities and coordinate the flow of deploying forces to ensure effective reception of forces and units into the theater. The arrival of troops must match the arrival of weapons, equipment, and supplies. The planners must define the infrastructure required to meet the overall force closure requirement of the anticipated flow of major units into the theater and at the time they require . 2s The operational commander's problem is to balance the need for early deployment against the requirement

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to deploy tailored logistical units that maximize throughput of sustainable combat forces; the key to this is understanding the flow. 29 The relationships between throughput volume and transportation infrastructure in the deployment area are critical if the operational commander is to optimize force closure capability. Deploying additional forces from outside the theater always affects airlift and sealift space in strategic lift. Therefore, a proper balance is critical to maximizing the ability to throughput forces and ultimately improving force closure times. 30 Force closure is the principal purpose of operational deployment. It directly affects the operational commander's ability to implement his operational idea. Time is a critical factor in deployment planning. Normally, airlift can respond on short notice at a cost in efficiency. Sealift in contrast, requires a long lead time, and usually cannot respond to sudden changes in the situation. A force displaced by a change in the movement schedule might not be moved on the next available lift, thereby incurring delay and disrupting the planned deployment sequence. Total time required for deployment depends on many factors but primarily on the transportation infrastructure and the distance to the deployment area. It is also dependent on the table of equipment and organization (TO&E) of one's forces, the effectiveness of the mobilization system, capacity and availability of road and railroad networks, sealift and airlift capabilities, size and character of the environment in which deployment takes place, and the enemy's counteractions. Additionally, political considerations may affect the type and tempo of deployment . 31 In the Gulf War of 1990-1991, despite shortcomings in the deployment planning, it was possible to deploy the first units ten days after the political decision was made thanks to the existing the computer-assisted database. Deployment was greatly facilitated by the excellent transportation infrastructure in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states . 32 The deployment of U.S. and Coalition forces lasted about five months. Deployment should be conducted without the need to move ground troops over long distances, allowing quick transition from deployment to maneuver. Time for deployment could be significantly reduced by having prepositioning forces and their weapons and equipment near the potential area of combat. Combat forces with their associated equipment and supplies must be brought into a theater on the dates stated in the operational commander's concept of operations. Deployment planners calculate the arrival window at the port of debarkation by determining the time to complete each link in the theater transportation system. Beginning with the required deployment date, the planners must determine the time required for a transit from the port of debarkation to the final destination both to match with split-shipped or pre-positioned equipment and to complete necessary assembly. In theory, subtracting the time to complete strategic lift between port of embarkation and port of debarkation from those dates would result in a deadline required to complete assembly at the home site, point of origin, or port of embarkation for onward movement. 33 Another planning consideration is the selection of the time when deployment will be initiated. In general, a force should not be deployed in the theater too early or too late. Deployment of joint and combined forces must be protected because the enemy might try to disrupt their movement. Protection is enhanced by selecting proper lines of operations. During deployment one's units are very vulnerable. Large concentration of forces and assets in the assembly areas are potential targets for the enemy attack,

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especially from the air. Vulnerability of one's forces can be reduced by coordinating unit elements arriving by airlift, with weapons and equipment arriving with sealift. Units should not remain static in their assembly areas and thereby vulnerable to enemy attack . 34 Sound deployment planning should ensure the optimal logistical footprint. Defining the logistic structure required and sizing the logistic footprint to deploying forces is essential to overall effectiveness. This requires avoiding burdening strategic lift, streamlining support, and deploying the minimum assets necessary. The size of logistical footprints might be increased to reduce the vulnerability of the deploying forces. Supporting assets should be deployed in properly timed sequences. 35 During planning, the availability of transportation resources at various intermediate locations along the route, materiel handling, and materiel storage capabilities at ports of embarkation, debarkation, and all intermediate points along the movement route must be properly evaluated. In addition, the time required for transit between ports of embarkation and final destinations must be considered. Among other things, force component planners must determine anticipated combat forces' size and mix, with associated equipment and non-unit supplies. The operational commander should decide how to divide available lift resources among subordinate commanders. The operational commander and his staff should develop a force list and identify and resolve force shortfalls. The planners also should determine the gross transportation feasibility of the plan for a campaign or major operation. Today, computer simulations could be used to evaluate whether the operation plan is feasible for the available transportation by using simulated movements of air, land, and sea forces and their associated support requirements from points of origin to ports of embarkation, and from there to ports of debarkation. A completed plan for deployment must fully consider competing demands for limited airlift and sealift resources and mobility support facilities, as well as the operational commander's priorities for his concept of operations. To resolve transportation shortfalls, the planners may have to change priorities in the movement of forces and assets, or adjust ports of embarkation and debarkation, routing arrangements, and timing in force movements. They might also make adjustments in the pre-positioned forces and assets, or change the sources and modes of strategic lift. Other options for the planners include improving lift capabilities, obtaining new assets, making new arrangements with host nations, or concluding contractual agreements or interservice support agreements. Deployment planners must identify shortfalls that could be resolved by either early action by higher command echelons, or mutual agreement between the operational commanders and subordinate component commanders. However, if the shortfalls cannot be resolved, then the entire operational idea must be redefined, modified, or altered. Strategic or operational deployment of combat forces is normally an integral part of a plan for a campaign or major operation. However, sometimes political and military considerations dictate that a campaign start before the arrival of major forces into the staging areas. The German attack on Yugoslavia on 6 April 1941 started before the operational deployment of all German forces had been completed. The German forces that invaded northwestern Yugoslavia were moved from various parts of Germany and occupied France and went into combat without having time to concentrate and start maneuver. The German preparations for an attack on Yugoslavia started on 27 March, the

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day a coup d'etat in Belgrade overthrew the pro-German government. This led Hitler to order preparation of plans to invade the country despite protestations of the new regime in Belgrade that it would abide by the terms of the Tripartite Pact to which the country was admitted on 25 March. The German planners had only about ten days between the start of deployment and the attack . 37 The biggest problem for the planners was to determine the force necessary to attack from southern part of Austria and southwestern Hungary. Besides the 12th Army deployed in the Balkans, and ten infantry divisions in Denmark and Norway, by March 1941 some thirty-four divisions (including three panzer divisions) were deployed in the border area with the Soviet Russia. At the same time the Germans had sixty-two divisions in the West (including two panzer and four motorized divisions) and a considerable number of them were in the process of being deployed to the East. Divisions deployed in Germany were either being reorganized or reconstituted or were envisaged to be deployed in the West to replace those being ordered to take part in the Eastern campaign. With the exception of infantry divisions, most of these divisions especially nine panzer and six motorized divisions-were not combat ready. 38 Hence, the Germans were forced to move on a short notice large number of divisions from their deployment areas in the East to southern Austria and southwestern Hungary. Logistics Plan: A plan for a campaign cannot succeed if it is not accompanied by a soundly based plan of logistical support and sustainment. In planning logistical support and sustainment, operational commanders and their staffs must consider a number of factors, but principally geography, transportation networks, available theater infrastructure, availability of host nation support (HNS), establishment of the sustainment base, and ability to support five basic logistics functions. 39 Additionally, a proper ratio must be maintained among combat, combat support, and combat service support forces. Combat units should not exceed the logistical system's capacity for support. Logistical assets must be integrated into force buildup. As the force expands, support infrastructure, stockage, services, assigned missions, and the terrain requirements of logistical units must expand accordingly. Staging is another consideration. It consists of the movement and massing of support in forward areas when lines of communications become overextended during the campaign. The movement forward of the sustainment structure may require construction, movement control, and detailed planning to include decisions on how close to the front the forward bases should be located . 4° This includes relationships amongst the time factor, combat potential, and lines of support. The logistics plan should assign sufficient time for logistical buildup for the campaign or major operation to start and be adequately sustained. It should also designate priorities among subordinate commands and provide for the establishment, development, and protection of major lines of communications within the theater. At the operational level, sustainability is often the dominant factor in determining the nature and tempo of operations. The logistical concept is a vital element for the successful outcome of a campaign or major operation. Logistics, perhaps more than any other functional concern, dictates what is operationally feasible. 41 As the commander develops an operational concept, a concurrent development of a concept of sustainment in coordination with the component commanders takes place. The commander and his staff must consider numerous sustainment factors that affect the ability of combat forces to conduct operations.

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Logistics planning must be integrated with plans for a campaign or major operation. It must define the logistics concept sufficiently to allow detailed support planning. Normally, subordinate service commanders provide logistic resources. However, the theater commander is primarily responsible for developing the plan to use these resources to support the operational scheme. In addition, the theater commander coordinates the logistic part of the plan with the international and national organizations, service components, and other commands supporting the campaign or major operation. The logistics plan should be flexible and make provisions for the anticipated changes. Otherwise, improvisations must be made, which are always costly in terms of time and which disrupt the work of subordinate commanders and their staffs. Logistics planners should not focus only on the deployment stage, but should also make plans for support and sustainment for all anticipated stages of a campaign or major operation. Deception Plan: The deception plan is an integral part of the plan for a campaign or major operation and requires much thought and effort. Successful deception requires early and detailed planning. Deception planning must focus on developing a plausible, realistic plan within the resources available. It should outline the methods selected for conveying the deception story to the target and ensure that all means are considered . 4z Sometimes, a deception plan may be drafted in the course of a campaign or major operation. That task is much easier if the operational commander and his staff believe in the value of deception and are proficient in deception planning (For details see the Chapter, "Deception Planning"). Conclusion: Operational planning is based on requirements set by national and military strategy. It is perhaps the most important responsibility for the operational commanders and their staffs in peacetime. Strategic objectives should be clearly defined and achievable with resources on hand or becoming available. They should not be changed unless the strategic or operational situation changes so drastically that existing objectives must be abandoned or altered. In the formulation of strategic objectives, overly broad ambiguous terms should not be used and there should always be complete harmony between ends and means. In the absence of harmony, either the objective must be changed or scaled down, or additional forces must be assigned. Normally, no military action should be planned, much less initiated, if available forces are insufficient to accomplish the assigned strategic or operational objectives. The highest political-military leadership must be aware that various political constraints cannot be simply added without taking fully into account what their consequences would be on planning and the effective use of military power. These constraints might cumulatively and seriously undermine the ability of the operational commanders to properly and effectively use their forces to accomplish assigned strategic objectives. If political limitations are too severe, then strategic objectives must either be reduced in scope, or the time for their accomplishment must be extended, or limitations on the use of military power loosened. Planning is a tedious, complex, and time-consuming process, but it is critical for the success in the execution of a campaign or major operation. The more detailed the planning and the more proficient the commanders and their staffs, the easier it is to improvise during hostilities. While knowledge and understanding of tactics are essential, operational commanders and their staffs must have a broader perspective than tactical commanders. They must be able to view the theater in all its complexities, and then 427

properly sequence and synchronize use of military and nonmilitary sources of power to accomplish strategic objectives determined by the political leadership. The planning process for campaigns and major operations follows the same logic as for battles or engagements. However, the two differ significantly because of the larger objectives and the consequently larger factors of space, time, and force. Because of the much longer duration and scale of a campaign, it is very difficult to assess the situation in a given theater with any degree of certainty; nor is it possible to anticipate the course of events. A much higher level of risk and uncertainty must be accepted in planning a campaign than in planning battles or engagements. Making a decision is the first and most critical element in developing a plan for a campaign or major operation. This is one of the most important responsibilities of the theater commander. The staff serves only to help the commander make a decision. New information technologies can greatly speed the decision process, but they cannot replace the human element. A sound decision is the product of many factors, but primarily depends on the theater commander's judgment, experience, common sense, and willingness to take risks in the face of uncertainties and incomplete or untimely information. Planning for a major operation or campaign should result in having built-in flexibility in the respective plans. The initial clash with the enemy forces could invariably force the operational commander to adjust, modify, or completely rewrite his plan. The enemy cannot be forced to conform to one's will, at least not initially. This fact combined with the inherent problems of execution of any major operation or campaign would result in continuous fog of war and friction until the assigned operational or strategic objectives are accomplished. Hence, the operational planning process does not end with writing a plan and issuing the orders to subordinate commanders. The operational commander must continuously monitor the situation and adjust his plans and orders accordingly. He must continue to shape the situation through the actions of his own and friendly forces. Frequent changes of plans should be avoided. More important, the principle of unity of command should be fully observed. Simplicity requires one to avoid the complex, complicated, and intricate; the plan should proceed in the most direct and natural manner for the attainment of the assigned operational or strategic objective. Other factors being equal, the simplest plan executed promptly is preferred over the complex plan executed later.

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Notes l. Department of the Navy, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, MCDP 1-1: ( Washington, DC: 12 November 1997), p. 41.

Strategy

2. Joint Pub 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms ( Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1994), p. 385. 3. MCDP 1-l : Strategy, p. 55. 4. Ibid., p. 66. 5. Ibid., pp. 44-5. 6. Ibid., p. 83. 7. Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, Operative Leitlinie fuer die Fuehrung von Landstreitkraefen, October 1993, Arbeitspapier Operative Fuehrung (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, August 1992), p. 2. 8. Bruce B.G. Clarke, "Conflict Termination: What Does It Mean to Win?" (November 1992), p. 85.

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9. A restraint prohibits or restricts certain military actions. It may be constant, as the laws of warfare, or situational, as are rules of engagement (ROE). A constraint, on the other hand, obligates the operational commander to follow a certain military course 'of actions. 10. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-5: Operations ( Washington, DC: August 1982, rev. ed., May 1986), p. 9; David Jablonsky, "Strategy and the Operational Art," Part I, parameters, Spring 1 987, p. 66. 1 1. C.R. Brown, "The Principles of War," Proceedings 6 (June 1949), p. 624. 12. The objective, as a principle of war, should not be confused with the term "physical objective" as is often the case. The physical objective is the point upon which the aim or goal is directed; Richard L. Connolly, "The Principles of War," Proceedings 1 (January 1953), p. 3. It can also be defined as that "concrete thing in possession of the enemy against which our effort is to be directed "Principles of War and Their Application to Naval Warfare," July 1925, p. 5; Record Group 4, Box 23, Folder 1018A, Naval War College Archives, Newport RI; U.S. Naval War College. 13. Joint Pub 3-0: Doctrine,fin-,Joint Operations ( Washington, DC: 1 February 1995), p. B-1. 14. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, FMFM 1-1: Campaigning ( Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 50. 15. Joint Pub 3-0: Doctrine lor.loint Operations (1995), p. B-3. 1 6. The term "scheme of maneuver" is sometimes used as well; operational idea or scheme is in essence similar to the "concept of operations" (CONOPS) used in generic terms for any actions envisaging the use of combat forces; the distinction is made to make clear that it refers to the employment of combat forces in a campaign or major operation. 1 7. Operative Leitlinie .fter die Fuehrung von Landstreitkraefen (October 1993), p. 2. 1 8. Robert W. Madden, A Thousand Points of Light: Integrating Operational Fires into Campaign Design

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(Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, May 1990), pp. 13-4. 19. Ibid., p. 14. 20. The North Koreans were extremely adaptable and could withstand high degree of deprivation of their supplies; also, the lack of action on the ground reduced the enemy's requirements for fuel and lubricants and allowed more time to repair equipment. The North Koreans built multiple bypass routes to decrease the effectiveness of U.S. attacks against bridges. They repaired destroyed bridges in an average of two days. Also, underwater bridges and removable bridge spans could not be detected from the air. The North Korean convoys were reduced to four or five vehicles, moving primarily at night. Thus, the North Koreans and Chinese were able to move covertly at least small quantities of supplies to the front line. Such enemy countermeasures were largely responsible for the abandonment of the entire effort; Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953 ( Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, rev. ed., 1983) pp. 440-1; Charles O. Hammond, Operational Fires and Unity of Command (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1990), pp. 12-3; Gregory A. Carter, Some Historical Notes on Air Interdiction in Korea (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, September 1966), pp. 13-4, 16; Madden, A Thousand Points of Light. Integrating Operational Fires into Campaign Design, p. 24. 21. Thomas A. Kolditz, Exploring the Conditions for Decisive Operational Fires (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Command and General Staff College, June 1993), p. 43. 22. Ibid., pp. 39, 44. 23. Ibid., p. 42. 24. FMFM 1: Campaigning, p. 50. 25. CMH 104-5: Terrain Factors in the Russian Campaign (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, United States Army, facsimile edit. 1986, 1 st edition July 1951), p. 8. 26. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-17-3: Reception, Staging Onward Movement, and Integration (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 17 March 1999), p. 1-14. 27.' Karl-Heinz Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende. Der Westfeldzug 1940 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1 995), pp. 126-7. 28. FM 100-17-3: Reception, Staging Onward Movement, and Integration, p. 1-11. 29. Ibid., p. 1-14. 30. Ibid., p. 1-15. 31. Ludwig Beck, Studien , Hans Speidel, editor (Stuttgart: K.F. Koehlers Verlag, 1955), p. 79. 32. Martin Braun, "Planung and Verlauf der allierten streitkraeftegemeinsamen Landkriegsoperation," in Hartmut Zehrer, editor, Der Gollkonflikt: Dokumentation, Analyse and Bewertung aus militacrischer Sicht (Herford/Bonn: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1992), p. 94. 33. Armed Forces Staff College, AFSC Pub l: The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1997 (Norfolk, VA: Armed Forces Staff College, 1997), 6-51 and 6-58. 34. FM 100-17-3: Reception, Staging Onward Movement, and Integration, p. 1-l 1.

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35. Ibid., pp. 1-6 and 1-7. 36. AFSC Pub I (1997), pp. 6-66 and 6-67. 37. Martin Seifert, Der Balkanfeldzug 194: Beispiel einer Offensive aus der Bewegung ohne vorbereitenden Aufmarsch (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, March 1963), p. 9. 38. Ibid., p. 10. 39. T.D. Moore, Logistics Intelligence: The First Step in Operational Sustainment (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1990), p. 9. 40. Howard V. Nichols Howard, Operational Level Logistics: An Examination of U.S. Army Logistical Doctrine for the Operational Level of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 16 May 1986), pp. 6, 4. 41. Joint Pub 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations (1995), p. B-3. 42. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 90-2: Battlefield Deception ( Washington, DC: 3 October 1988), p. 4-14.

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CAMPAIGN DESIGN A campaign plan should be designed by taking into consideration a number of elements that ensure firm focus on the ultimate objective and corresponding center of gravity, and sound sequencing and synchronizing of all available military and nonmilitary sources of power. The key elements of a campaign design are: desired end-state, objectives, required forces and assets, identification of the enemy's critical factors, interior versus exterior geostrategic position, strategic/operational direction, and operational idea. Because of the much larger scope of the objective to be accomplished in a campaign, these elements are larger in terms of factors of space, time, and forces than those considered in planning a major operation. Desired End-State: A campaign planned to end hostilities requires a clear statement of the desired end-state; those political, diplomatic, military, economic, social, ethnic, humanitarian, and other conditions or the "landscape" highest political leadership wants to exist after the end of the hostilities.' Desired end-state is normally a part of the strategic guidance (see Figure 37). The theater commander should be consulted on military aspects of the desired end-state. Properly defined and understood, the desired end-state would help the theater commander avoid wasting sorely needed resources and reduce the risk to one's forces. When the political leadership focuses exclusively or predominantly on the strategic objectives, and poorly articulates, or, even worse, does not provide the theater commander the desired end-state, the ultimate strategic objective will be only partially achieved. The result is an ambiguous and contradictory situation that could perpetuate or even worsen the conditions that led to the conflict. This, in turn, might require, as the Gulf War of 1990-1991 illustrates, that one's forces are required to remain in the area and intermittently engage in combat, to ensure that the minimal national or alliance/coalition objectives are preserved in the post-hostilities phase. The examples of properly articulated and achieved desired end-states are few. It can be argued that, with probable exception of the defeat of Nazi Germany and Japan in World War 11, none of the conventional campaigns fought since 1939 ensured the fruits of strategic victories. The situation in the aftermath of the Gulf War of 1990-1991 is perhaps the best example of the consequences when the desired end-state is only partially accomplished. A military aspect of the desired end-state includes the conditions that, when reached, would allow other sources of national or alliance/coalition power to accomplish other aspects of the desired end-state. These conditions range from the threat of use of military force to complete physical destruction of the enemy's means to fight. In war, where military factors predominate, national or alliance/coalition political objectives are translated into the use of military force to destroy the enemy's armed forces and seize the enemy's territory, including overthrowing the enemy's system of government. A properly determined and articulated desired end-state is a prerequisite to determining the method, duration, and intensity of applying combat power to accomplish a given military or theater-strategic objective. The Allied plan for the Normandy Campaign lacked a clearly stated military aspect of the desired end-state. After the first phase establishing the lodgment on the continent-the second phase of the campaign-

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In general, the more ambitious the desired end-state, the more resources and time will be required to accomplish it. In the Gulf War of 1990-1991, if the U.S.-led Coalition's desired end-state was intended to drastically tilt the balance of power in the region toward Iran, it would have been necessary to go all the way to Baghdad and overthrow Saddam Hussein and his regime. The theater commander and his staff should also consider what actions and measures must be taken to end the hostilities and what situation is to exist in the post-hostilities phase. 4 Objective: The next step in the campaign design is determination of the ultimate, military strategic or theater-strategic objective. The objective dominates all the aspects of planning and execution. The objective for a campaign or subordinate major operation is not the target list as is increasingly thought and practiced. A military objective, regardless of its scope, consists of a number of tasks, and each of them includes a number of targets to be destroyed or neutralized. The list of targets can vary, and it can be increased or reduced. As long as the assigned objective is not accomplished, it really does not matter what and how many targets were struck, destroyed, or neutralized, or how many sorties were flown and bombs dropped or missiles fired. There is nothing worse than drawing the list of targets first and then turning the entire process upside down and searching for possible objectives-not an uncommon practice today. The more developed the theater, the more complex and hence the more difficult it is to accomplish all aspects of a given strategic objective. Whenever the conditions in the theater change, the selected or assigned strategic objective should be modified, altered,

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changed, or even abandoned. This is the only way to ensure that the military forces are successful and not employed to seek militarily unachievable objectives. The strategic objective should be attainable with the forces at hand, achievable in a reasonable amount of time for military as well as humanitarian reasons, and at the least possible cost in lives and materiel. There is always a great danger of not deciding on the objectives before the campaign starts, leaving that decision contingent on the enemy actions or resistance. Another danger is to rigidly adhere to the objective during planning regardless of indications that it was improperly selected or mistakenly determined. Very often, military effort is wasted because the political objectives were set too high, clearly beyond the ability of one's forces to accomplish them. While the political aspect of a strategic objective might be the most important, it should never become the sole reason for planning a campaign. This is especially true if the main objective is to preserve a political alliance or coalition. While such an objective might be politically justifiable, or even necessary, it often could be a strategic blunder leading to the waste of sorely needed forces and unnecessary losses. The theater commander should normally aim to accomplish the ultimate strategic objective of the campaign through the destruction of enemy forces. If a campaign is intended primarily at seizing some geographic area because of the political, economic, or logistics significance and not the enemy forces, then the entire effort would lack unity of purpose, splinter attempts, and waste time and resources. In planning for the invasion of Normandy, the Allies almost exclusively focused on the lodgment on the continent from which further offensive operations could be conducted. A major flaw of the entire plan was that it focused on seizing and controlling terrain-oriented objectives-the ports. Not until follow-on operations did the German forces become the Allies' objective. Sometimes the political leadership wants to accomplish a strategic objective quickly and decisively, but at the same time wants to avoid one's losses or even the enemy's losses. These and similar objectives are contradictory and thereby unachievable. Such a campaign will be invariably prolonged, and ironically might result in higher than acceptable losses to the political leadership and public opinion. The military strategic objective must be clearly stated, otherwise the entire effort might end in failure. The objective given to General Dwight Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces, prior to the landing at Normandy was clearly and consisely stated. In contrast, the Allies embarked after May 1943 on a series of major operations and ultimately a campaign in Italy without a clear strategic objective. Theater planning in the Mediterranean was then primarily influenced by three factors: the inability of the Allies to mount a major cross-Channel effort and the need to tie the Axis forces somewhere; the need to reduce the Soviet political pressure for opening a second front; and the need to obtain additional air bases within effective range of the Allied bombers for conducting the strategic bombing of Germany. In a general conflict, a theater-strategic commander is assigned a national or alliance/coalition strategic objective. The theater-strategic objective in the Solomons Campaign (1942-1943) was to obtain control of the Solomons Archipelago to prevent the Japanese from further expansion in the South Pacific. In the Allied Central Pacific Campaign, the theater-strategic objective was to seize physical control of the key

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archipelagoes in the area and seize the positions within striking distance of the Japaneseoccupied Philippines. Theater-strategic objectives in the offensive part (Operation Desert Storm) of the Gulf War, as stated in General Schwarzkopf's operation orders were: attack Iraqi political/military leadership and command and control; gain and maintain air superiority; sever Iraqi supply lines; destroy chemical, biological, and nuclear capability; destroy Republican Guard forces; and liberate Kuwait City. 7 After the ultimate objective of a campaign is determined, the theater commander and his staff use regressive planning and determine a series of intermediate objectives. These objectives are normally exclusively or predominantly physical in nature. The accomplishment of each intermediate objective normally requires the planning and conduct of a major operation. Operational objectives on land could be some major industrial or political center, major part of the enemy forces, or expressed in the form of a certain phaseline (PL) to be reached. In war at sea, the operational objective is usually accomplished by obtaining or maintaining control of a certain sea or ocean area, destruction or neutralization of major part of the enemy fleet, or cutting off flow of maritime trade or its successful defense. In air warfare, an operational objective would be: obtaining or maintaining superiority in the air in a given area or joint area of operations; destroying the major part of the enemy air force; or preventing the enemy strikes from the air or through airspace in a given area of operations. In their invasion of Norway and Denmark in April 1940, the Germans had several operational objectives on the ground seizing control of the Jutland Peninsula and the adjacent major islands (Sjaelland, Fuenen); southern Norway; central Norway; and northern Norway. The Luftwaffe's operational objectives were to successively obtain air superiority over: the Jutland Peninsula and the Danish Straits, southern Norway, central Norway, and northern Norway. Because of the superiority of the Royal Navy in the theater, the German Navy was not specifically tasked to accomplish operational objectives in terms of obtaining or maintaining control of part of the Norwegian Sea or western approaches to the Danish Straits; these tasks were clearly beyond its capability. For the Allies, the planned occupation of the Narvik Kiruna-Gallivare Lulea area could be considered an operational objective. The Allied plan to seize control of Trondheim, Bergen, and Stavanger was an operational objective as well. Similarly, cutting off the iron ore route from Narvik to Germany would have been an operational objective, with possible strategic consequences. In the offensive phase of the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the U.S.-led Coalition forces had several operational objectives: obtaining and then maintaining air superiority in the KTO, obtaining and then maintaining sea control of northern part of the Arabian (Persian) Gulf, and degrading and ultimately destroying the bulk of the Iraqi ground forces deployed in Kuwait and north of the Iraqi border with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Collectively, the accomplishment of all operational objectives resulted in the achievement of the theater-strategic objective. In land warfare, the planners must take into account the factor of distance in selecting intermediate objectives. The longer the distance between the two successive operational objectives on land, the longer are the lines of operations and lines of supplies.

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The larger the number of these objectives (given the distance does not change), the shorter the lines of operations; hence, the shorter the lines of supplies, and the larger the number of intermediate objectives, the slower the operational tempo. On the other hand, too few operational objectives would result in taking on too much of the enemy's strength and, unless the sequencing schedule is changed, risk failure of the subordinate major operation. Initially, the Allied planners for the Solomons Campaign determined three intermediate operational objectives (then called "Tasks")-Task 1: seize Guadalcanal; Task 2: capture the remainder of the Solomons, Lae, and Salamau, and the northeast coast of New Guinea; and Task 3: seize Rabaul and adjacent positions. The first operational objective was accomplished on 7 August 1942 after the Allies landed on Guadalcanal and seized Tulagi. However, the strong Japanese resistance on land, at sea, and in the air prevented the Allies from consolidating their operational success until the end of January 1943 when the Japanese evacuated their last troops from Guadalcanal. In the course of the struggle for Guadalcanal, the Allied planners changed their original schedule. The capture of Lae, Salamau, and the northeast coast of New Guinea became part of SOWESPAC's New Guinea (Papua) Campaign, and the Solomons Campaign became the exclusive responsibility of SOPAC. After Guadalcanal was secured, and before reaching Rabaul, New Britain (which was neutralized jointly with the forces of SOWESPAC and SOPAC), two intermediate operational objectives had to be accomplished: seizing the islands of New Georgia and Bougainville and their adjacent positions. x In selecting intermediate operational objectives, the theater commander and planners should be innovative and avoid the pitfalls of being too rigid or too predictable, both of which facilitate the defender's problem of taking timely counteraction. The Allied operational objectives in the Mediterranean Theater in 1943-1944 were invariably selected to be within the effective range of Allied fighter aircraft. Thus, the Germans were largely successful in predicting where the Allies would land next. Normally, intermediate operational objectives in a given physical space should not be pursued simultaneously; otherwise, the campaign would be unnecessarily prolonged, or such a course of action could be fatal for the entire effort. The exception is when the attacker possesses overwhelming superiority as the Japanese had in their almost simultaneous conquest of Malaya, Singapore, the Philippines, and the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) in December 1941-April 1942. In the initial phase of their campaign in Soviet Russia, the Germans tried to accomplish several operational objectives simultaneously. Perhaps the most fatal error was Hitler's decision, during the German summer offensive of 1942, to seize the remaining part of the Soviet-held Black Sea coast, the oilfields in the Caucasus, and Stalingrad. 9 This led directly to Germany's greatest military defeat of the war: the encirclement and the destruction of some 250,000 men of the Sixth Army at Stalingrad in November 1942-January 1943. 1 0 In their invasion of mainland Italy in September 1943, the Allies fragmented their strength by selecting, in essence, three operational objectives to be accomplished sequentially: Calabria, Apulia, and the Salerno-Naples area. Each of these required not only considerable forces, but also time. In selecting an operational or strategic objective, the influence of operational factors must be carefully weighed and fully taken into account. Any large imbalance

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between the objective and the space-time-force factors will endanger the success of a campaign itself. In their final plan to invade Soviet Russia in June 1941, the Germans did not properly determine initial intermediate operational objectives in terms of these factors. The plan envisaged three army groups advancing along three divergent axes and beyond mutual supporting distances." In preparing to invade mainland Italy in the summer of 1943, the Allied commanders and their planners were clearly aware of the potential impact the factors of space and forces might have in mounting major operations to seize Sardinia, Corsica, and southern France. They were also fully cognizant of the difficulties to accomplish vital objectives in launching a campaign in the Balkans. However, they apparently underestimated the factor of time and the factor of force in conducting a campaign in Italy where the peninsular shape of the country and the rugged terrain, combined with climate and weather and the skillful defense of the Germans resulted in a slow and costly advance along the entire length of the peninsula. This happened despite the overwhelming superiority the Allies had in the air and at sea. Forces and Assets Required: Any objective, regardless of its scope, must be determined with due consideration of the forces available. 1 2 The larger the objective, the more "massed" combat potential (not necessarily numerically larger force), must be available or become available to accomplish it. Similarly, the more encompassing the strategic objective, the larger the force that must be available to accomplish it., 3 How much and what kind of force is required to accomplish the ultimate strategic objective and each of intermediate operational objectives of a campaign is dependent on many factors, including the past combat performance of both sides, quality of the theater commander and his subordinate commanders, combat motivation of a force as a whole, terrain, and climate and weather. This part of the planning process is more of an art than a science, yet, it is critical that there be no disconnect or mismatch between the ends and the means; otherwise, the ultimate or intermediate objectives of a campaign might not be attained. Identification of Critical Factors and Centers of Gravity: One of the essential steps in planning a campaign is to identify the enemy's critical factors, and in particular his strategic COG (see Figure 38). The theater commander and his planners must identify a corresponding and proper COG for each objective determined in the previous step of the process. Whenever a strategic objective is modified or changed, a new COG must be determined. Determining the enemy's center of gravity is a vital element for establishing clarity of purpose, focusing effort, and ultimately, generating synergistic effects in the employment of one's forces. Therefore, a great deal of thought and discussion must take place before the theater commander and his staff can determine proper centers of gravity with any degree of confidence. Identification of the enemy's proper strategic center of gravity for a campaign is a difficult task indeed because there are a number of unquantifiable or hard-to-measure elements. The enemy's "will to fight" as a strategic center of gravity is too broad and imprecise, while the leader's or the ruling elite's will to fight is more tangible. Another perennial problem is a strong tendency to mirror image the enemy. The reasons for this could be many, but they include neglect, willful ignorance, inability to learn from past mistakes, or simply intellectual arrogance when it comes to knowing and understanding other people's culture, society, traditions, and values. What might be a critical strength 438

for one's forces, might be less so, or not important at all, for the enemy. One should be extremely wary of being misled by ethnocentric views of other culture and societies. One should never assume that the enemy thinks and acts like one does. 1 4 The enemy's perceptions of the reality as much as his value system must always be taken into account in the process of identifying his center of gravity. This means that what might influence the enemy to abandon or change his strategic objective must be fully understood. In physical terms, the enemy's armed forces as a whole and his military-economic potential are an integral part of his strategic COG. The more capable and sophisticated the enemy force, the more difficult it is to determine a proper enemy's strategic COG. The

reason is that the enemy possesses a large number of critical strengths, often equal or approximately equal in combat potential. In identifying the physical aspects of the enemy's strategic COG, not only raw combat potential, but also those elements that protect, sustain, or integrate various elements of combat potential must be taken into full consideration. The consequences of a wrongly determined strategic COG can be severe and often fatal. This is especially true when the attacker has a small margin of superiority. In other instances, the victory was ultimately won but at great cost and with the loss of precious time. Of course, the enemy might make a bigger mistake than one does; but a prudent theater commander should not rely on such unforeseen events, or pure luck, in designing a campaign. The theater commander and the planners also need to identify operational centers of gravity for each of the previously determined operational objectives. If the enemy is strong, several operational centers of gravity must be defeated sequentially or simultaneously before the ultimate strategic objective can be accomplished. However, not all operational centers of gravity are equally important. Because the outcome of a campaign is decided on land, the enemy's operational COG on the ground is usually more important than those in the air or at sea. In the Gulf Conflict of 1990-1991, the Iraqi operational COG-the Republican Guards divisions-was more critical for the successful

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outcome than the other two operational centers of gravity in the offensive phase of the conflict the Iraqi fighter aircraft and the associated structure in the ground or Iraqi missile-armed surface combatants at sea. A common mistake is confusing the objective with the enemy's COG. Focus on the objectives instead of on the enemy's center of gravity will invariably result in unnecessary losses in personnel, materiel, and time. The attacker possessing superior combat potential should focus all his efforts on directly or indirectly destroying, neutralizing, or significantly damaging the enemy's strategic COG. However, if the attacker is inferior in some critical aspect of military power, he might, of necessity, focus his initial efforts on seizing physical objectives before being able to attack the enemy's center of gravity directly or indirectly. Initially, the Germans directed their attacks in planning their invasion of Norway [Case Weseruebung] i n April 1940 to capture selected decisive points-major ports and airfields before attacking the Norwegian strategic and operational COGs forces defending the capital of Oslo and the country's main population and industrial centers. The reason for such an operational scheme was the German's sound appreciation that their Navy's inferiority robbed them of any chance of defeating the Allied operational center of gravity-the British heavy surface forces before the landing. Before final determination of the enemy's center of gravity as the focus of planning, tests for validity should be conducted. The first question is whether destroying, neutralizing, or substantially weakening or degrading the enemy's potential COG will result in progressive deterioration of the enemy's morale, cohesion, and will to fight. The second question is whether one's forces and assets are adequate to destroy or neutralize the enemy's strategic COG, given existing political and other limitations on the use of one's forces. Both questions must be answered in the affirmative; otherwise previously identified critical factors must be reviewed and different strategic and subordinate operational COG determined. 1 5 Interior versus Exterior Geostrategic Position: The initial geostrategic position used by one's forces usually has a significant effect on their employment during the campaign. Therefore, the theater commander and the planners must also evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of the geostrategic position occupied by one's forces and the enemy's positions. Depending on whether a campaign is offensive or defensive, what the ratio of forces is on both sides, and theater-wide supporting structure, the theater commander should decide how to maximize advantages of the position his forces occupy, and minimize or drastically reduce the value of the position the enemy forces occupy. The position for one's forces should be improved in geostrategic terms after the completion of each campaign phase. In any case, one's geostrategic position should improve considerably after the completion of the campaign. Strategic/Operational Direction: A direction or axis is a swath of physical space of certain length and depth extending from one's base of operations to the ultimate physical objective via selected intermediate points. Depending on the initial position, a campaign can be conducted along a single axis called a strategic axis, several operational axes, or a combination of a single strategic and several operational axes. A strategic axis extends from one's base of operations to the final operational objective. The great advantage of 440

using a single strategic axis of advance is that it facilitates synchronization of actions by one's forces and operational functions in particular. A disadvantage is that the enemy could easily discern the path of advance toward the ultimate objective and, thereby, prepare and carry out timely counteractions. The Allied campaigns in the Pacific in World War 11 were all conducted along a single strategic axis. In the Central Pacific Campaign, November 1943-September 1944, the line of advance extended from the main base of operations in Hawaii to the Western Carolines via four intermediate operational objectives: the Gilbert Islands, the Marshalls, the Marianas, and the Central Carolines. Operational axes roughly coincided with the general line of advance and extended from one to another successive intermediate operational objective. In the Solomons Campaign of 1942-1943, the Allied strategic axis extended from the base of operations in Fiji and New Caledonia through the Solomons chain-New Britain-New Ireland. It consisted of four consecutive operational axes: Fiji and New Caledonia to Guadalcanal, and from there to New Georgia, to Bougainville, and finally to New Britain-New Ireland. Sometimes a campaign is conducted by using multiple operational axes of advance, and without clear distinction among individual axes in terms of forces and support. This makes it more difficult for the enemy to determine from whence the next blow would come. Multiple operational thrusts that are mutually enhancing increase the speed and decisiveness of actions by one's forces. The longer the base of operations, the more operational axes are available. In general, the exterior geostrategic position offers a longer base of operations than the central one. The German campaign plan for the invasion of Poland in September 1939 and the former Yugoslavia in April 1941 envisaged a series of deep thrusts carried out from an arc-like base of operations surrounding the respective country. To invade Poland, the Germans advanced along several broadly dispersed thrusts with a common general axis, each aimed at destroying cohesion of the Polish defenses. 1 6 To invade the former Yugoslavia, the Axis forces advanced along several operational axes toward the capital of Belgrade. However, the most important operational thrust was from Bulgaria toward Skopje, aimed to cut off any possible linking of the Greek and British forces and the withdrawal of Yugoslav troops. A campaign conducted along several operational axes by forces occupying a central position is usually not decisive and allows the defender an orderly retreat to the successive defensive positions. The Allied campaign in France in the late summer and fall of 1944 was conducted on a broad front all the way to the Franco-German border with the British 21st Army Group and the U.S. 12th U.S. Army Group in which each army had its own operational axis of advance. General Bernard Montgomery was not satisfied with the slow pace of advance and in August 1944 proposed a bold plan to advance to the Rhine either north or south of the Ruhr-the industrial heart of Germany, or the area between Frankfurt and Karlsruhe. In either case, a strategic axis of advance would be created where all the Allied forces would be under a single command and the major part of logistical resources would be assigned. The acceptance of General Montgomery's plan by General Dwight Eisenhower would mean slowing down or even halting the advance of U.S. armies deployed on the right flank of the 21st Army Group. In addition, General Eisenhower was not as sure as General Montgomery, that the Germans were near collapse and the concentrated push toward the Ruhr would end the war quickly. He thought that

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the better solution to the logistical bottlenecks was to expand the capacity of the newly liberated ports on the Channel coast as fast as possible and to advance on a broad front toward the Rhine River. He was also concerned that by giving General Montgomery sole command of land operations (not envisaged in the original plan for the Normandy Campaign), General George Patton's U.S. 3rd Army would be halted and armies advancing from southern France would essentially have nothing to do. All this would aggravate already strained relations among Allied commanders. General Eisenhower rejected General Montgomery's proposal on 27 August. 1 7 (A few days later, Eisenhower took direct command over all army groups and Montgomery was promoted to Field Marshal). Sometimes a campaign is conducted along one strategic and several operational axes as was the German campaign in the West in May-June 1940. The largest German army group, Army Group A moved along the strategic axis from Germany's border with Luxembourg through the Ardennes and across the Meuse River to the Somme River and the French Channel coast. Army Group B in the north deployed into Belgium and northern France, and Army Group C deployed south of Army Group A, advanced along separate operational axes. In the first phase of the invasion of Soviet Russia in June 1941, the German strategic axis of advance was from the Soviet-Polish border to Moscow via Smolensk where the strongest of the army groups was deployed: Army Group Center. Two other Army groups of almost identical strength, Army Group North and Army Group South, operated along the operational axis of advance. Operational Idea: The operational idea or scheme for a campaign is a part of the theater commander's decision further refined during the planning process It should describe in broad terms, concisely, and clearly what each service or multinational force will do to accomplish the ultimate campaign objective. The operational idea represents the theater commander's vision of what he intends to do and how he intends to accomplish the assigned strategic objective. ' 8 The operational idea should be focused on the first phase of the planned campaign. The initial operational idea should be reviewed and if necessary modified or altered if the changes in the strategic situation warrant. The operational idea for a campaign should contain the sequence of major events and actions of the principal subordinate forces. It should be detailed enough to allow subordinate component commanders to draw their operational scheme for their respective forces. A sound operational idea should present the enemy with multidimensional threats which he would have little or no chance of countering successfully. It should avoid traditional patterns, be ambiguous, bold, and innovative, and provide for speedy execution. It should surprise and deceive the enemy, thereby making it difficult to counter one's actions. Most important of all, it should be directed at the destruction or neutralization of the enemy's strategic COG.' 9 The German plan to invade Denmark and Norway envisaged the simultaneous crossing of the Danish border with landings in Norway on 6 April 1940. The German occupation of Denmark [Case Weseruebung-Sued] was carried out primarily by army forces crossing the German-Danish border and then quickly advancing northward to seize the Jutland Peninsula and Skagen and spreading eastward to the islands of Fuenen and Sjoelland. The German Navy would provide forces to secure the Nyborg-Korsor link and

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swiftly capture Little Belt Bridge. The Luftwaffe's main task was to show force and drop leaflets over selected Danish cities and towns. 20 The occupation of Norway [Case Weseruebung-Nord] was far more riskier for the Germans because of the distance involved and the German inferiority at sea. Hence, the Germans decided to occupy a large part of southern and central part of Norway by landing troops carried on board naval and commercial vessels-at selected points on the coast and using their airborne troops to quickly seize selected airfields in Norway's interior. The key role for the Luftwaffe in the plan was to neutralize the threat Allied naval and air forces posed to invasion troops. The German operational scheme was innovative because never before had anyone attempted to seize positions separated by a wide sea area without obtaining command of the sea first. The German plan envisaged simultaneous and multiple thrusts by sea, air, and ground elements to quickly seize the southern part of Norway and then move northward under the protective shield of the Luftwaffe. The German operational idea was also bold because the Germans took rather high risks to mount such a large-scale effort in the face of the Allied superiority at sea and their ability to react quickly to any German landing in Norway. The Germans' simultaneous, multiple attacks had another advantage in that they allowed for the possibility of failure of the offensive at one or more points without prejudicing the general success of the campaign. In contrast, the German operational idea for their ill-fated invasion of the Soviet Russia in 1941 was too traditional and predictable. It was heavily influenced by the vastness of the physical space and the Pripyat Marshes' division of the theater into two parts. The operational idea was neither innovative nor bold: three army groups were to advance toward their initial operational objectives on a broad front. It also lacked completeness because it did not encompass all the phases of the projected campaign. In geographic terms, the German planning did not progress beyond the lower part of the Dnepr's River, the area west of Smolensk, and the Leningrad area; in the actual course of events, the Germans afterward engaged in a series of improvisations born on the spur of the moment without being fitted into a coherent operational scheme. 21 The U.S. operational idea for the offensive phase of the Gulf War of 1990-1991 was both innovative and bold. Not surprisingly, it was highly successful in its execution. The U.S. scheme envisaged three main stages for the employment of U.S. and Coalition forces: carry out massive and systematic air offensive by using precision munitions aimed to reduce Iraq's national and operational leadership ability to act, to obtain air superiority, and to decimate Iraqi combat potential; prepare a ground offensive by conducting continuous attacks from the air aimed to reduce Iraqi combat power; isolate Iraqi operational reserves in the Basra province from Kuwait by destroying connecting roads and bridges. Simultaneously, by using a feint from the sea and land to deceive the Iraqis as to the time of the ground offensive and the point of main attack; and to mount a ground offensive by conducting a single-sided envelopment maneuver in the Western Desert, combined with a frontal attack on the Iraqi positions in Kuwait, and by massive support of ground troops by air forces. 22 A soundly conceived operational idea for a campaign should include, among other things, selected principles of war, a method for defeating the enemy, application of military and nonmilitary sources of power, the sectors of effort, the point of main attack (or defense), concentration in the sector of main effort, operational maneuver, protection

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of one's center of gravity, anticipation of point of culmination, strategic and operational deception, sequencing, synchronization, phasing, strategic and operational reserves, reconstitution, and coordination (see Figure 39). Rather than a simple checklist, these broad categories should be addressed during the planning process. Any operational idea should provide for the application of the selected principles

of war. Often one of the most demanding tasks is how to ensure operational or strategic surprise in the planning of a major operation or campaign. The German invasion of France was highly successful in part because the operational idea sought the application of the principle of objective, mass, surprise, and security. Sometimes, even tactical surprises, such as the German airborne attack on the Eben Emael fortress in Belgium in May 1940, can unintentionally enhance the success of the entire operational idea. That highly innovative attack diverted the Allied attention from the intended direction of the German main effort and drew their forces into Belgium where they were subsequently surrounded. Some operational ideas were highly successful despite violating important principles of war. The German invasion of Norway in April 1940 violated every principle of war except for surprise and security. The invasion, while not totally unexpected in terms of objectives, found the British and the French unprepared in terms of time, and more important, the method used by the Germans. The Germans moved rapidly and occupied key points on the coast and the interior of Norway by a simultaneous use of naval, air, and ground elements. Their plan was detailed, the date of attack was unexpected, the selected axis of attack was unexpected, and operational concept was highly novel in fact, it had

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never been tried before. At the same time, the Germans maintained a high degree of operational security, using deception and camouflage. 24 Likewise, the Japanese, in their campaign to seize Southeast Asia in December 1941-April 1942, violated the principle of mass and simplicity, but observed the principles of offensive, surprise, and security. In their Solomons and New Guinea campaigns the Allies were highly successful because they applied the principle of surprise. The Allied forces selected the key operational positions in the area as the target of attack, leaving the Japanese strong points in the rear of their thrusts. Moreover, the Japanese rarely guessed correctly the real target of the next Allied move. This "leapfrogging" method was exemplified by the Allied isolation of Rabaul, New Britain, while seizing key points elsewhere in the area. In the Hollandia operation, the Japanese did not have a clear idea where the next Allied blow would fall. Moreover, their strength was too small to enable them adequately to defend more than one or two places. They had expected that Wewak would be one of the sites selected by the Allies for an assault from the sea. The Japanese garrison in the proximity of Wewak was some fifteen thousand men strong. However, the Allied attack objective was Aitape and Humboldt Bay, where the Japanese kept only a small force. Thus, the much stronger garrison at Wewak found itself bypassed . 2s The operational idea for a campaign should broadly describe methods for defeating the enemy. Throughout the planned campaign, the theater commander should focus on actions aimed at defeating or neutralizing the enemy's strategic center of gravity, while subordinate commanders focus on the destruction or neutralization of the enemy's operational center of gravity in their plans for the respective major operations. The theater commander should make sure the subordinate operational schemes in each phase of a campaign are in consonance with his own operational idea. When the theater commander has overwhelming force at his disposal, the best approach is to employ his forces directly against the bulk of the enemy's forces to destroy them quickly and decisively (see Figure 40). However, strategic guidance issued by the highest political leadership may limit the use of one's forces by excluding other options, such as prohibiting preemptive attack or seizing an important geographic area or position. Thus, most often, the best method of defeating the enemy's strategic center of gravity is indirect, by exploiting the enemy's critical vulnerabilities at the strategic level. The enemy's will to fight might be undermined by depriving him of his allies or friends, or weakening the cohesion of his alliance or coalition. In the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the Iraqis tried, but failed, to undermine the cohesion of the U.S.-led Coalition by launching massive Scud missile attacks against Israel, hoping that Israelis would retaliate, and thereby forcing some Arab countries to abandon the coalition. Another option for the theater commander is mounting a concerted and massive attack against the enemy's informational structure in the theater. Then, the cyberoriented decisive points must be timely identified and attacked. Not only military, but also nonmilitary elements of the enemy's information systems banking, trade, transportation, and the media-should be destroyed or neutralized. Public support could also be weakened through the destruction of the installations and facilities necessary for normal everyday life, such as energy plants, electricity grids, and transportation systems. However, these and similar actions to weaken the enemy's will to fight take a relatively long time to be effective. In addition, oppressive governments are usually skillful at

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manipulating the population to endure protracted punishment, as the examples of the Nazi Germany and Japan in World War II illustrate. In a representative form of government public opinion plays a great, sometimes even decisive role in the decisions of the highest political leadership. Then, the weaker side could undermine the stronger opponent's will to fight by inflicting local tactical defeats and conducting diverse actions aimed to deceive or manipulate media. A totalitarian or authoritarian government is not easily influenced by public opinion, as is a democratic government. Thus, the theater commander should plan actions primarily aimed against the enemy's ruler and his inner circle. Frequently, the dictators and their regimes are quite oblivious to the suffering of their people. Hence, punitive measures, such as economic sanctions aimed to influence them, are usually ineffective. One option that could be more effective, but is politically and legally too sensitive to consider, is to pose a direct physical threat to such authoritarian or totalitarian rulers and their inner circle. Regardless of the form of government, weakening the will to fight is invariably the best method to force the enemy to abandon his objectives; one way to do this is to inflict a series of decisive defeats in the field at operational level. Therefore, the theater commander must plan to defeat or neutralize a series of the enemy's operational COG as the actions and measures aimed to degrade or neutralize the enemy's strategic COG are in progress. Other, more direct actions the theater commander could plan may include: sequencing major operations in such a way as to force the enemy to divide his forces; destroying the enemy's strategic or operational reserves or elements of his base of operations; or preventing or hindering the deployment of the enemy's major forces or reinforcements into the theater.

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The theater commander should consider several aspects of the situation in applying military and nonmilitary sources of power. One's sources of power can be applied symmetrically, asymmetrically, or a combination of the two. The chances of success are generally greater by acting against an enemy's vulnerability rather than against his strength. Also, it is usually far more cost effective to employ one's forces asymmetrically, instead of symmetrically. Asymmetric application generally aims at avoiding the enemy's strength, while attacking his vulnerabilities. They are difficult to counter by the enemy and require more of his time and resources. In the Korean War (1950-1953) the communist Chinese troops succeeded in neutralizing much of the U.S. air superiority in Korea by operating off the roads, at night, under cover, using short lines of supplies, and fighting UN forces close in. 26 Today, the asymmetric response by the weaker side in conflict might significantly complicate the stronger side's ability to apply its available power in the most effective and decisive way. In fact, by using sophisticated and widespread cyber-attacks against the informational infrastructure or threatening to use weapons of mass destruction, the weaker side could achieve disproportionate results, far exceeding its overall combat potential in the conventional categories of power. Incremental use of power has proven invariably detrimental, regardless whether it is used against a strong or an inferior enemy. Such an approach always gives the resourceful enemy time to recover from one's blows. It invariably prolongs the campaign and results in unnecessary losses of personnel and materiel. Perhaps nowhere is that more obvious than in air power: it is a blunt instrument that achieves the best results when employed massively from the outset to stun the enemy and make him physically and psychologically unable to resist for too long. Such use of air power by U.S.-led Coalition forces in the Gulf War of 1990-1991 proved to be extremely effective and was probably the single most important factor in the subsequent defeat of the Iraqi forces on the ground. A campaign to be successful also must envisage the use of political, diplomatic, economic, and informational sources of power to accomplish the ultimate strategic objective. In designing a campaign, the theater commander should early on decide which part of the theater or area of operations will be the sector of main effort (thrust) and which will be sectors of secondary effort. This important decision determines where the strongest force would be deployed and concentrated. A sector of'secondary effort is, as the term implies, a sector (or sectors) whose importance is subsidiary to the main effort. It is characterized by lesser operational depth 27 and the assignment of forces with less firepower, fewer reserves, and more limited objectives. In the simplest terms, an operational idea should clearly spell out for the planners and subordinate commanders where is what the Germans call the planned "weight of effort" [Schwerpunkt]. In German military, the commanders at all command echelons were responsible for selecting their own weight of effort. 28 The purpose of an attack is to destroy the enemy force, and that requires numerical, materiel, or moral superiority at the decisive place. Because of the strength of the defenses, this rules out an attack on a wide front, where the attacker must penetrate the defenses at a few places and then use all his strength to expand the success. Factors for successful penetration of the enemy defenses depend on the nature of the terrain, the enemy's disposition, and the effective employment of one's forces .29 Terrain that allows covert and concealed movement is

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more favorable for the weight of effort. Properly selected weight of effort is characterized by a narrow sector or zone, allowing the attack to be carried out from one's depth, assigning the best-armed and equipped forces, and deployment of reserves. 30 In terms of space, the sector of main effort is where, as the term implies, the major part of the force is concentrated to carry out the principal attack (or defense) in a campaign. The smaller one's force compared with the enemy force, the more necessary it is to weaken other sectors to create a distinct sector of main effort. In the process, the attacker on land has to assume prepared defense or even delaying defense in other sectors of the front. Among other things, selection of the sector of main effort is based on the deployment of enemy forces. Optimally, the sector of one's main effort for a given phase of a campaign should be where the defender's secondary sector of effort is. For this, intelligence must provide accurate and reliable information on the enemy's deployments. A danger for the attacker is that the defender might discern the buildup of forces in the sector of main effort, redeploy his force, and take prompt countermeasures. This could be prevented if the attacker achieves operational surprise. Prerequisites to success are acting suddenly and moving one's forces swiftly, while preserving secrecy and deceiving the defender. 31 In a land campaign, the boundaries between the mobile and fixing force and supporting air forces usually coincide with the sectors of main effort and sectors of the secondary effort. However, in some cases the air force's sector of main effort might be temporarily over the sector of secondary effort on the ground if the aim is to deceive the defender as to where the main offensive thrust will follow. In planning their offensive in the West in 1940, the Germans conducted diverse and ultimately highly successful efforts to deceive the Allies on their planned advance by Army Group A through the Ardennes and across the Meuse River into France. Part of the German operational deception plan was to employ in the sector of secondary effort in the north (German Army Group B), the Luftwaffe's bombers and the much feared Stuka dive bombers in the first three days after the start of their offensive on 10 May. These aircraft attacked targets in northern Belgium, the Netherlands, and the interior of France. In the Ardennes, only relatively few Luftwaffe's fighters were employed, mostly against Allied reconnaissance aircraft. Another event, which greatly helped the German deception, was the German paratroopers' spectacular action in storming the Eben Emael fortress on 10 May. This, combined with purely tactical employment of the Luftwaffe in the north, led to the fatal Allied operational decision to move their best troops into Belgium. The Allies remained as though hypnotized by the German actions in northern Belgium and Netherlands, while neglecting the mortal threat on their right flank: the German advance through the Ardennes and to the Meuse River. 32 In a maritime campaign, the sector of main effort and secondary efforts are less clearly delineated from those on land. They also differ in space, time, and forces. In a campaign aimed to cut off or interdict an enemy's maritime trade, the sector of main effort can encompass a large or small part of an ocean or adjacent sea area where the bulk of one's forces is employed over a relatively long time. The traffic volume and importance of sea lines of communication for the enemy's economy or war effort is the principal factor in selecting which sea or ocean area will be a sector of main and which will be sectors of secondary effort. Normally, the most important sea or ocean routes are

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also the best protected by the defender. Therefore, the attacker has no choice but to use his forces in less decisive ways to wear down the enemy's defenses over time. In a campaign to attack or defend maritime trade, sectors of main effort are usually identical for both sides, as was the North Atlantic in the Battle for the Atlantic in 1940-1943. The designation of a sector of main effort is critical for focusing one's efforts against the enemy's center of gravity. 33 It also ensures the principle of unity of effort by massing forces and assets to accomplish desired effects. 34 By designating the sector of main effort, the theater commander directs his planners which of one's own force would receive the greatest attention in planning operational and tactical fires and logistical sustainment. Also, planning the initial main and supporting major operations in a campaign is directly related to the designation of the sector of main effort and the sectors of secondary efforts. Any error in determining the proper enemy's center of gravity would invariably result in a wrongly selected sector of main effort. If the error is corrected in time, the theater commander should shift the sector- of main effort to another part of the theater to compensate for the previous errors. This shift might also be caused by a change of plans. The Germans drew four "deployment directives" [Aufmarschanweisung] in planning their offensive in the West in 1939-1940. In the first variant of plan, issued on 19 October 1939, the "weight of effort" or main thrust was on their right flank (Army Group B). This was changed, in a new variant of the directive on 29 October, to two main thrusts (Army Groups B and A). The third variant, issued on 30 January 1940, had three main thrusts (two in the Army Group B sector and one in the Army Group A sector). In the final variant of the plan, issued on 24 February 1940, which was executed in May 1940, the weight of effort was shifted from the right flank to the central part (Army Group A) of the front. In selecting the new sector of main effort, the Germans balanced the disadvantages of using relatively few and unfavorable lines of communication in the area with the advantages of achieving operational surprise. 35 In all cases, a shift in the sector of main effort would require change in support priorities among one's forces. Thus, flexibility in shifting the main effort must be an integral part of the campaign design. 36 The second step is to select one's forces to be deployed in the sector of main effort. The single greatest problem is finding a balance between the forces deployed in the sector of main effort and those deployed in the sectors of secondary effort. This is more an art than a science, and calls for the theater commander's good judgment and experience. A more mobile and lethal force allows more flexibility in shifting the sector of main effort. Allocation of one's combat forces and their support between the sector of main effort and sectors of secondary effort is an integral part of the staff estimate process. 37 In general, the forces' size and mix and its mobility depends on many factors, but primarily on the combat potential of the enemy's forces deployed in front of one's sector of main effort; the characteristics of the physical space; and the weather or climate and time of year. The width and the depth of the sector of main effort affect the forces' density. Given a constant number of forces, the smaller the frontage, the higher the forces' density. The sector of main effort should contain multiple lines of operations and adequate lines of communications. 38 The Germans, after shifting their sector of main effort from the Army Group B to Army Group A in January 1940, also changed force size and mix among their three army groups. In the first deployment directive, issued on 19

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October 1939, force ratio between Army Group B and Army Group A was thirty-seven to twenty-six divisions. By the time the offensive started on 10 May 1940, this force ratio changed to twenty-nine to forty-five divisions in favor of Army Group A. However, a more important change was that the Germans assigned seven of their ten panzer divisions to the Army Group A. In addition, most of the Germans' forty-two reserve divisions were deployed as reinforcements to Army Group A. The ratio of forces in the north (Army Group B) was sixty to twenty-nine divisions in favor of the Allies, while in the southern part of the front, in the sector from Namur to Longwy on Luxembourg's border (Army Group C), the ratio was forty-five German to eighteen Allied divisions. 39 The operational idea for a campaign must also provide for quick and, if possible, concentration of one's forces in a sector of main effort. The importance of correct concentration grows in proportion to the number of combatants. A faulty concentration results in one's forces not being where they subsequently will be most needed. When both sides are equal in strength, such errors usually decide whether one advances or retreats . 4o A force is said to be concentrated when all its units are within supporting distance of each other, or in other words, when adjacent elements of the force can apply their full strength in coordination, against respective parts of the enemy force. 41 A counter-concentration is the massing of significant military forces at a particular time and place with sufficient military capability to counter the attacker's force concentration. 42 It is conducted by the defender to neutralize the effects of the attacker's future or ongoing concentration. Concealed and rapid concentration is a critical factor for the successful employment of a numerically inferior force. Despite its obvious advantages, however, concentration makes one's forces vulnerable to enemy fires. This, it turn, might require dispersal . 43 The concept of concentration should not be interpreted literally. Today, with the probable exception of land warfare, one's forces do not necessarily need to be physically massed in a certain area to be "concentrated." The high speed, precision, and ever longer range of weapons and surveillance sensors allow a force today to be "massed" even when its various parts are dispersed over a large part of the theater. What counts most is not the "mass" but the "massed effect," and that can be achieved, especially for naval and air forces, through maneuver with fires. In a campaign, concentration of forces in general is primarily affected by the country's geostrategic position, the length and shape of the country's frontiers, the communications network, and the distribution of one's forces before the beginning of a campaign. Other factors that influence concentration are the position of the enemy's defenses, assumed or actual enemy deployment, and assumed enemy intentions. By evaluating these factors, the theater commander determines in which way the offensive or defense will be carried out. This, in turn, will affect the concentration of one's forces, the direction, and the rate of their movements. 44 Concentration of ground forces is normally conducted in the area under control of one's forces; in contrast, naval and air forces often concentrate in areas wide open to enemy attack or in areas where control is in dispute . 4s Regardless of scope, one's forces can be concentrated on or off the battlefield. When one's forces assigned to the sector of main effort are brought within supporting distance-and before arriving in the sector of main effort-it is said to be concentrated off the battlefield. Concentration off the battlefield is often the ultimate purpose of operational deployment of ground forces. Most land campaigns were planned to concentrate one's

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forces off the battlefield. The Germans concentrated their forces off the battlefield before their invasion of the Benelux countries and France in May 1940, and again before their invasion of Soviet Russia in June 1941. The Iraqi forces concentrated off the battlefield for their invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, as did the U.S.-led Coalition's forces for their counteroffensive of February 1991. Concentration on the battlefield involves movement of large forces, usually along converging lines of operations, to their common employment area. Normally, the forces do not reach their positions within mutual supporting distances until they reach the area of combat. Concentration on the battlefield enhances the factor of surprise, and also makes it difficult for the enemy to deduce where the next blow will come from until it is too late to react. The concentration on the battlefield requires meticulous planning and coordination. In addition, an enemy operating from a central position has the opportunity to defeat the converging forces in detail, especially when timing, bad weather, or some other factor delays the advance of some elements of the converging forces. Some of the great military commanders, notably Napoleon I and Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, Sr., concentrated their forces on the battlefield. Napoleon I's movement to Ulm in September October 1805 is one example. He moved some 200,000 troops from their encampment in Boulogne over a distance of 300 miles in a wide envelopment along multiple lines of operations, across Western Europe to converge on the Austrian army at UIm. 46 Yet, despite his success at Ulm, Napoleon I also reportedly said that the commander should not combine two parts of his forces on the battlefield . 47 In contrast, von Moltke, Sr.'s greatest victories were achieved by concentrating his armies on the battlefield. In war against Austria in 1866, he planned a concentration of the three Prussian armies somewhere in Bohemia, largely depending upon the eventual location of the Austrian concentration. Despite high risks of moving large parts of his forces beyond mutual supporting distances, von Moltke, Sr., successfully concentrated the Prussian armies on the battlefield prior to the battle of Koenigratz on 3 July 1866, which ended in the defeat of the Austrian army. In a maritime campaign, the Japanese also applied concentration on the battlefield in their highly successful invasions of the Philippines, Malaya, and the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) in December 1941-April 1942. The next step in campaign planning is to determine in which part of the sector of main effort the major part of available combat potential will be concentrated to have the best chance of achieving decisive success in the initial phase of a campaign. The theater commander and planners should keep in mind the characteristics the point of'main attack (or defense) might assume. It may have readily identifiable physical features or abstract features such as the cohesion of an alliance, or the psychological and mental state of the enemy commander, to name a few. 49 The main point of attack (or defense) is usually found among decisive points offering an indirect approach for attacking the enemy's center of gravity. 5° By properly selecting the point of main attack, the attacker (or defender) can obtain relative superiority over his opponent, even if the overall ratio of forces in the theater is unfavorable. Detailed, reliable, and above all timely operational intelligence is critical in the selection of the main point of attack. Effective employment at the point of main attack also requires that operational deception be planned and prepared in detail. The determination of an incorrect point of main attack (defense) is

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usually fatal to the execution of a campaign plan, although the enemy's center of gravity might have been properly determined. In land warfare, the point of main attack is selected from among the geographic or force-oriented (or their combination) decisive points within a sector of main effort; it is where the enemy's forces are weakest or least densely deployed. The German plan for the offensive in the West in May 1940 envisaged a point of main attack on the Meuse River in the sector between Sedan and Dinant. The French deployed two armies behind the Meuse and Chiers Rivers, but only seven, mostly second-rate divisions covered the crucial sector between Sedan and Dinant. The Belgians deployed only two divisions in the Ardennes . 51 The penetration and subsequent breakthrough at Sedan and Dinant led to a single-sided, operational-envelopment maneuver by fast-moving German armored and mechanized forces supported by the Luftwaffe all the way to Abbeville on the French Channel coast. In one's attack on the enemy maritime trade in a given maritime theater of operations, the point of attack is usually a focal area of shipping or chokepoint, specifically, approaches to larger ports, channels, narrows, and international straits or canals. Likewise, in protecting one's maritime trade, main points of defense are also focal areas or chokepoints. In the German campaign to cut off Allied trade in the Atlantic in 1939-1945, points of main attack for their U-boats included the English Channel and its approaches, the Bristol Channel, and the Strait of Gibraltar. The theater commander also must plan the operational maneuver for the initial phase of a campaign. This is one of the most critical elements of plan for a land campaign. The outcome of the entire campaign depends on the success or failure of the operational maneuver for the main initial major operation. The outcome of the German campaign in the West in May 1940 depended on the success of the combined operational penetration-envelopment maneuver from Sedan-Dinant to the French Channel coast conducted by the Panzer Group von Kleist. Likewise, the success of the U.S.-led Coalition forces during the offensive phase of the Gulf War of 1990-1991 depended on the success of the single-sided operational maneuver in the Western Desert. Normally, subordinate commanders are responsible for planning and executing the operational maneuver when it is an integral part of their respective major operation. In planning a campaign, the theater commander must recognize and analyze the critical vulnerabilities not only of his military but also of his nonmilitary sources of power in a given theater. Specifically, in determining his own strategic center of gravity, the theater commander must know the enemy's perspective of what that center of gravity is. The enemy might use a different approach and methods in determining the center of gravity. 52 Moreover, he will most likely try to influence one's strategic center of gravity based on his own assessment of critical strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities. The theater commander should do everything possible to provide sufficient protection to one's own strategic center of'gravity. 53 This protection largely pertains to physical elements of one's strategic center of gravity not the "will to fight" or cohesion of an alliance/coalition in a given theater of operations. The theater commander could do the best to protect these intangible elements by successful conduct of the planned campaign. Today, not only must the strongest force taking part in the planned campaign be fully protected, but also selected parts of military and nonmilitary elements in a theater-the informational structure in

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particular must be protected as well. The effectiveness of these measures could be significantly enhanced by conducting diverse deception measures at the strategic level designed to make it more difficult for the enemy to correctly identify one's strategic center of gravity. The theater commander should possess sufficient forces to ensure full protection of all the forces deployed in the theater. Because resources are finite, this is difficult. Therefore, the theater commander should balance between the competing demands for resources to accomplish the principal objectives while also having sufficient forces to conduct operational fires and provide for operational protection. In providing operational protection, the theater commander should assign adequate forces and assets to ensure full protection of one's strategic center of gravity. A campaign plan that does not envisage effective protection of its own center of gravity is often a failed plan. No campaign plan is complete without preparing a plan of strategic and operational deception. (For details see the chapter, "Operational and Strategic Deception.) The chances of the success of a campaign are significantly enhanced by having a realistic and comprehensive strategic deception plan. Its main purpose is to have a strategic effect by presenting a false picture of reality, by concealing one's actions and intentions until it is too late for the enemy's high command to react strategically. Plan of operational deception is an integral plan of strategic deception and is normally prepared for each phase of a given campaign. To be successful, a campaign plan must properly sequence component major operations in time and space so that the ultimate strategic objective is accomplished in the shortest time and with the fewest losses. (For details see the chapter, "Operational Sequencing.") The theater commander also must sequence the employment of operational functions and nonmilitary sources of power in support of the entire campaign and its individual phases. Synchronization is another crucial element in designing a campaign. (For details see the chapter, "Operational Synchronization.") Without proper synchronization in the employment of individual services and often multinational forces, it is hard to achieve success at the operational level. In addition, operational functions, especially logistics and intelligence must be synchronized with the actions of combat forces. Synchronization of nonmilitary with military sources of power is ideal, but in practice is difficult to achieve. The theater commander should never be tied to a single course of action in planning for a campaign. Sufficient flexibility should be built into the campaign plan to preserve one's freedom of action. This is accomplished by planning and anticipating branches and sequels (see Figure 41). As conditions change, the theater commander must be prepared to maintain the continuity of the campaign by regrouping major forces in the theater and preventing his forces from being stopped at an inopportune time. Branches and sequels should ensure that the enemy is denied the time and space to recover by facilitating the concentration of force at decisive points. 54 Branches are options built into the basic operation plan for a campaign. They may include a shift in priority, change of command organization and command relationships, or changes in the direction of movement, and the acceptance or refusal of combat. They allow the theater commander to anticipate future enemy actions that might lead him to drastically modify or alter his basic campaign plan. Such a situation could arise from.

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unexpected action by the enemy, non-availability of one's forces, or even a change in the weather or season within the operational area. 55 Branches allow the theater commander to act faster than his enemy and to conduct his campaign flexibly on his own terms. The theater commander needs to plan new major operations arbitrarily called sequels-after the preceding major operations have been completed. Sequels are based on the possible outcomes of the preceding major operations. They are prepared in a rudimentary form usually as an outline-in advance so that subordinate commanders are fully familiar with them. The forces that will carry out a sequel should be identified and its objective clearly determined. Individual campaign phases can be viewed as sequels to the basic campaign plan. 56 The planning of branches and sequels is a continuous process. Optimally, theater commanders should anticipate several options to actions planned or in progress. Both branches and sequels are directly related to phasing. They accelerate the operational-level decision-making cycle, provide flexibility, and anticipate courses of action. 57 The ultimate strategic objective of a campaign cannot normally be accomplished in a single major operation. Thus, the theater commander and the planners should plan a number of related phases in time and space (see Figure 42). They might be planned to take place simultaneously or sequentially, their purpose being to stagger the entire campaign into manageable parts and avoid reaching a point of culmination before the assigned strategic objective has been accomplished. In a campaign, each phase represents a single or several major operations and can last several weeks or even months.

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In the final plan for the German offensive in the west in 1940, General von Manstein envisaged a two-phase campaign. The first phase (Case Gelb [Yellow]) was to cut off and destroy the Allied forces in northern Belgium and France, and on the Somme River. The second phase (Case Rot [Red]) was aimed to consolidate and build up the operational success of the first phase by resuming German advance southward and destroying the remnants of the Allied forces deployed behind the Somme-Sedan line . 5s In the plan's execution phase, the initial major operations prematurely ended on 24 May when Hitler stopped the advance of the German panzer and motorized force in northern France without waiting for the destruction of the encircled Allied troops in the Dunkirk pocket. The first phase of the campaign ended on 5 June when the Germans resumed the advance south to defeat the remnants of the French army. Operational planners should not arbitrarily break down a campaign into artificial phases; that invariably slows the operational tempo of a campaign. Distinctions between consecutive phases are made by their separation in time or space, by a difference in the objectives to be accomplished, or by the forces assigned. Hence, each phase should aim at some intermediate objective that is necessary to achieve the ultimate objective. In the Allied Central Pacific Campaign, the first phase, between the end of seizing the Gilbert Islands (Operation Galvanic) and the start of the next major joint operation to seize the Marshalls (Operation FlintlocklCatchpole), lasted from 28 November 1943 to 31 January 1944. The second phase, between the end of the operations to seize the Marshalls to the invasion of the Marianas (Operation Forager), lasted from 23 February to 15 June; and the third and final phase, from the capture of the Marianas to the invasion of the Western Carolines (Operations Stalemate-1 and -II), lasted from 10 August to 15 September 1944. The description of each phase should identify operational tasks and provide the theater commander's concept of how and when they need to be accomplished. For each

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phase of a campaign, the theater commander must estimate the force requirements and supporting actions needed from his subordinate component commanders. Each phase of a campaign should ideally set the stage for the subsequent phase. It is simply wrong to devise a sequence of operational phases without a clear vision of what the ultimate strategic objective is. , In a campaign, each phase may consist of a single major operation. Phases are planned by identifying transition points between successive major operations or by identifying changes in tempo within a particular major operation. Phases may occur simultaneously as well as sequentially. In a campaign, combat actions cannot be conducted continuously because one's materiel and human resources are limited. Hence, periodic slackening, or even stopping one's forces called operational pauses should be part of a sound campaign plan. Pauses are extremely useful for arranging proper sequencing and synchronization of major operations within a campaign. They may be required when a campaign temporarily cannot continue because it lacks adequate logistical sustainment, increasing difficulties with terrain and climate, the enemy's resistance stiffens unexpectedly, or any combination of these factors. The theater commander can also plan an operational pause to shift forces to another sector of effort. If his forces are on the defensive, he may order an operational pause to allow his forces to shift so they can operate along a more favorable line of operations elsewhere. The theater commander might intentionally and temporarily cede the initiative to the enemy to prepare a major operation in some other part of the theater or to deceive the enemy about his real intentions. An operational pause should be planned by taking into account the anticipated point of culmination so that the enemy cannot seriously threaten one's forces while they temporally reduce the intensity of their actions. Among other things, the theater commander could use an operational pause to regroup or redeploy, or simply to provide rest for his forces. The effect of operational pauses caused by factors outside the control of a theater commander should not be ignored. He should do everything to minimize the effect of pauses caused by terrain, weather or climate, plan adjustments necessitated by political considerations, and so forth. Operational pauses may become necessary when a force is approaching its culminating point and the theater commander has control over what his concept and objectives will be in relation to that point. He must then either orchestrate his forces' actions to accomplish his objectives before reaching a point of culmination, or schedule pauses to maintain a relationship to that point which leaves him with relative combat power advantage over the enemy." To have any utility, the operational pause must give the commander a tool to avoid consequences of culmination. The main purpose is to regenerate combat potential without losing the initiative. In the spring of 1944, the Allies faced the formidable defense of the Gustav Line in Italy; it was the Allies' third attempt to break through the lines at Monte Cairo-Monte Cassino-Gari and Rapido Rivers and Liri Valley. The Allied ground offensive was exhausted and the point of culmination was approaching. On 19 March, General Harold R. Alexander ordered the Allied Mediterranean Tactical Air Force to start a major effort to interdict the German rail, road, and sea traffic from the Pisa-Rimini Line to the Gustav Line (Operation Strangle). This effort was designed to prevent the Germans from reinforcing their forces

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at the frontline in sufficient strength. Practically all rail lines running through Rome were cut off, rail traffic was generally stopped 125 miles north of Rome, and road traffic was reduced to nighttime only. The Allied forces paused almost two months for air interdiction before the ground offensive was launched (Operation Diadcm). That time was used to regenerate the Allied combat power on the ground . 62 This is an excellent example where one service component paused while another service component went on the offensive. Logistical sustainment is perhaps the most important attribute of the operational pause. However, it is often extremely complicated to provide one's forces with adequate time and supplies to regenerate combat power during a lull in fighting. An operational pause offers an advantage only if the combat power of one's forces can be regenerated faster than that of the opponent. This also means that logisticians must be closely involved in determining when and for how long an operational pause should occur. In planning for a campaign, the theater commanders and their staffs should analyze all pertinent factors relating to the arrival at the culminating point before the assigned objectives are accomplished. The theater commanders and planners must pay close attention to the logistic sustainability of forces, their morale and physical condition, and the limits of their combat power. For the attacker, attrition of combat power and extension of lines of communications may eventually reduce momentum so that a pause is necessary to consolidate and reconstitute. For the defender, a point may come when failure to attack will forever forfeit the opportunity. Either situation requires a radical reorientation of operations. Properly designed, a campaign plan addresses culminating points. The theater commander's ability to assess combat potential is directly related to his ability to visualize the situation and trends in relative combat potential several weeks or even months ahead of time. The higher the level of command, the broader the commander's perspective must be to properly assess the combat potential of one's own and enemy forces. Without the ability to think ahead and evaluate all the military and nonmilitary aspects of the situation, the theater commander cannot properly plan for culmination of his own and friendly forces. The planners need to focus on those elements of operational design that most directly affect the arrival at the culminating point. Specifically, they include determination of objectives, sequencing, phasing, and protection of one's center of gravity, reserves, surprise, and deception. A culminating point could be prevented by determining the proper number and scale of intermediate objectives and their sound sequencing. The operational tempo is directly related to the number of intermediate objectives. The higher the number of the objectives, the slower the operational tempo becomes. Hence, one's culminating point could be prevented by planning an operational pause after a given intermediate objective has been accomplished but before starting actions to accomplish the next intermediate objective. Timely and relevant operational intelligence is vitally important for planning a point of culmination for one's forces. Reliable and continuous sustainment is another critical factor if the effects of culmination are to be overcome. The logisticians must accurately predict one's support and supply requirements in conjunction with the effects caused by combat losses, time and distance factors, status of lines of communications,

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weather and terrain, and repair and replacement capabilities. With the assistance of intelligence officers, logisticians can provide valuable information that will help targeting the enemy's critical logistics elements, which may cause an enemy offensive to reach a culminating point before reaching its objectives. A sound campaign plan should provide for conduct of tactical and operational fires. Diverse actions and measures to protect one's forces should be considered during planning. Initially the plan must avoid the enemy's strengths. Hence, every possible enemy action should be considered during the planning phase. 63 Optimally, an offensive campaign should maintain a fast pace, called operational momentum, so that one's forces obtain all the advantages that accrue from combining speed and mass. The higher the speed and the larger the forces, the higher the momentum of a campaign as a whole. High speed of advance allows rapid concentration, surprise, and the exploitation of the physical mass or massed effect. The operational momentum in a campaign also depends on the length of individual phase and pauses. To achieve success in a campaign, it is necessary to obtain and maintain the initiative. The initiative is largely the product of maintaining a high operational tempo, or rate of progress toward the completion of the assigned objective. The higher the operational tempo, the better is the chance of maintaining one's initiative. The fewer pauses that are planned and executed, the higher the operational tempo. Tempo can be measured only in relative terms. A force that acts slowly, but at a rate higher than the enemy, operates at the higher tempo. Tempo is a combination of mobility; quality and reliability of intelligence; command, control, and communications; and combat service support. The longer the operational pause, the lower the operational tempo will be and vice versa. The theater commander's task is to find that fine balance between the requirement to slow or stop the actions of one's forces and the maintenance of a high operational tempo. A faster tempo in a campaign is achieved by proper sequencing of intermediate operational objectives. The fewer intermediate objectives, the higher the tempo of a campaign as a whole will be. Also, the weaker the enemy resistance, the higher the tempo will be. Tempo incorporates the capacity of the force to transition from one operational posture to another. By increasing and varying the tempo, the theater commander could present threats to which the enemy cannot opportunely and successfully react. High operational tempo is also achieved by having a faster decision-action cycle than the enemy. While dictating the tempo, the theater commander must be sure that it can be maintained. An essential factor in maintaining a fast operational tempo is operational agilitythe ability of one's forces to act or react faster than the enemy. Agility depends on the speed of the decision-making cycle. It can also be enhanced by spatially dislocating the enemy's forces, either through maneuver or feint. A high operational tempo can be achieved by conducting major operations simultaneously, rather than conducting them in sequence. In addition, operational tempo is greatly increased by decentralized execution through task-oriented orders. Operational tempo further depends on the ability of a part of one's forces to operate at high intensity, while the remainder of the forces are regenerating their combat power.

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In generic terms, a reserve is a force of a certain size and composition designed to have a decisive effect or impact on the outcome of a given combat action . 65 Tactical, strategic, and operational reserve is differentiated. Tactical reserve should have a decisive effect on the outcome of a battle or engagement. A strategic reserve is intended to have a decisive influence on the outcome of a single or several campaigns in a theater of war. Strategic reserve can also be created by reducing commitments or changing strategic priorities in a given theater. A strategic reserve is controlled by national-strategic authorities but might be controlled by the respective theater-strategic commander. The theater of operations commanders and their staffs do not create or control strategic reserve, but they should anticipate the employment of strategic reserve in the course of their planned campaign. An operational reserve is a force of such size and combat potential as to have a decisive impact on the outcome of a major operation. It is usually composed of the most mobile and combat-ready combined-arms force, prepared and ready to be employed at short notice on the order of the theater commander. In general, the theater commander should use every opportunity that can be anticipated or created to withhold major combat resources in anticipation of delivering a decisive blow to the enemy. For each phase of a campaign, an operational reserve should be identified. In a land campaign, an operational reserve is most often a one-time-use force. It is normally deployed in one's operational depth, but within striking range of the enemy force to be attacked or of one's force to be defended. It can be composed of a single army or sometimes even an army corps. In the invasion of the Benelux countries and France in May 1940, the Germans held back one army (Second Army) as an operational reserve. At the beginning of the invasion of Soviet Russia in June 1941, the Germans had what proved later to be insufficient forces in reserve for a campaign of that size. Forces in reserve were divided into two categories: the divisions under control of the Army High Command, and those directly subordinate to the respective army group commanders. The Army Group North had-of a total of twenty-one divisions-three divisions in reserve plus two divisions in the Army High Command's reserve. The strongest force, the Army Group Center, with a total of forty-six divisions, had only one division in reserve plus six divisions in the Army High Command's reserve, as had the Army Group South which had a total of thirty divisions. 67 In an attack, an operational reserve can be used to strengthen the attack in the main sector at the most decisive time, ward off enemy counterstrikes, or meet other unanticipated contingencies. 68 The defender cannot concentrate his forces before he recognizes the attacker's main direction of attack. Therefore, he needs to keep certain forces in hand to engage them at the decisive point. 69 The main role of an operational reserve in defense is to reinforce the fighting line where the main attack is made, a location that may not be known in advance; to protect one's flanks against envelopment; and to be able to assume the offensive at the appropriate moment . 7° In a campaign, an operational reserve may consist of forces available at the outset or those that became available in the course of a campaign. The following can be used to create an operational reserve: • •

Forces allocated or assigned in the basic or modified plan of a campaign Redeploying forces from one theater to another

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• • • •

Scaling down or abandoning original objectives and thereby generating additional forces Changing or abandoning hitherto held positions or areas (trading space for force) Reducing the forces assigned for operational protection Reducing the forces envisaged for delivering operational fires, etc.

Once the operational reserve is committed, the theater commander should make every effort to regenerate its combat power, or if necessary, to reconstitute it. Therefore, in both an offense and defense, the theater commander should have freedom of action in committing the operational reserve; otherwise his ability to influence the major operation would be greatly reduced and might result in the failure of a major operation or even campaign. On the eve of the Allied invasion of Normandy on 6 June 1944 the German CINC of the West, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, did not have control over the operational reserve deployed in his theater. Hitler and nominally the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht had a reserve composed of the Panzer Group West with I SSPanzerkorps composed of two SS-Panzer divisions and one SS-Panzer Grenadier division plus one excellent panzer training division (Panzerlehr Division) . 71 No campaign can be successfully conducted without adequate, reliable, and timely operational sustainment of forces in combat. In general, sustainment is the extension of logistical support once the combat action starts and until the assigned military objective has been completed. In a campaign, sustainment encompasses direction for procuring national resources from the sustaining bases, establishing forward bases of operations, and providing an intermediate base of operations to support phasing. The operational scheme for a campaign should allow sufficient time for logistical buildup. It must also set priorities among subordinate commands and provide for the establishment, development, and protection of major lines of communication within the theater. The logistical sustainment depends on, among other things, the number of axes of advance (or defense) and the density and quality of the available transportation network. The Germans had severe problems sustaining their forces from the very outset of their invasion of Soviet Russia. The combination of long distances, inadequate logistical resources, poor transportation networks in European Russia, and the early onset of the muddy season were the main reasons for the Germans' almost continuous sustainment difficulties in 1941-1942. The distances from the Germans' initial base of operations to Donets Basin was some 930 miles, to Moscow 745 miles, and to Leningrad 560 miles. Each of the three army groups had an assigned 20,000-ton cargo capacity. In addition, each also had a 10,000-ton capacity carried by motorized transport. The original plan for Barbarossa called for the campaign to be completed within three months. The Germans, based on their experiences in campaigns in France and the Balkans, calculated their logistics requirements. Logistical support was sufficient to 310 miles from the initial starting position. After that, it was necessary to completely replenish the troops. The Germans had little use of Russian railways. In the fall of 1941, the Warsaw-MinskSmolensk railway line was insufficient to supply troops before the start of the offensive against Moscow. After the great German success at Vyasma in early October, the offensive slowed because of the early onset of the muddy season between 15 and 20 October. The German troops became immobile. They also did not have winter clothing which led to extraordinarily high German losses.

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In the fall of 1944, the Allied advance stopped on the German border because logistics was unable to keep up. Despite great effectiveness of the air transport, the ground transportation system could not bring sufficient supplies to the front in time. 73 The focus of the campaign plan is the extension of the theater commander's operational reach, and the denial of the same to the enemy. While major operations are in progress, the theater commander should continuously balance current consumption of materiel with the need to build up support for subsequent actions. The ever-longer lines of operations in an offensive campaign will invariably reduce sustainability and dictate the staging of support forward. Carefully planned and executed forward staging will allow the theater commander to maintain the desired operational tempo. On the other hand, failure to plan for logistical sustainment will invite premature culmination. Overwhelming power can be generated and applied only if the campaign plan envisages the establishment, buildup, and sequencing of bases; efficient lines of operations and communications; and selection of decisive points on which to focus one's forces to cause the enemy to culminate first. Ill planning the Normandy invasion, one consideration of the Allies was the position of the objective in relation to their base. Southern England offered landing points that provided the most desirable correlation of forces. The Allies selected among alternative points on the coast, none of which would have taxed Allied lines of communications and lines of operations. 76 The success of the Normandy Campaign depended on the Allied ability to sustain their forces at a greater rate than the enemy. The plan was primarily driven by logistical considerations. 77 The Allies were so focused on logistical objectives that they neglected their main objective which was the destruction of the German Army. They had 150 percent of the transport capacity needed to sustain the force, but lack of roads and vehicle maintenance soon depleted this overabundance; rail transportation was available, but the distance to the front was too short; sufficient quantities of all supplies were available on the beaches, but not the means to distribute them. Sustamment may also be a key restraint by limiting the theater commander's options for conducting operational maneuver. Thus, early identification of critical logistical constraints associated with planned major operations is indispensable for a strategic success. The theater commander must ensure that adequate logistical support is available to sustain the firepower required at each level. Logistically, the mobile force must be as self-contained as possible. Choices of logistics base sites and lines of communications are crucial decisions which must be made by the theater commander in relation to the decisive points. Lack of sustainment or improperly sited bases and lines of communication can cause operational pauses that destroy the continuity of maneuver. A campaign cannot be successful without full cooperation arbitrarily called coordination between the theater commander and adjacent theater commanders and other military and nonmilitary organizations. Coordination essentially involves actions aimed at harmonizing political and military objectives, national and alliance/coalition political authorities, and actions between ambassadors in theater and host-nation authorities in support of the planned campaign. Finally, coordination of the theater campaign concept with national or alliance/coalition strategy and resource availability, and coordination with adjacent theater commanders and supporting commanders is an obvious necessity. In

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addition, the theater commander must plan for coordination with various non-government and private volunteer organizations, especially in situations short of war. A design for a campaign should include ways and procedures to reconstitute one's forces once the campaign is completed. However, reconstitution could take place between the two consecutive campaign phases if forces suffered more losses than anticipated. Conclusion: A campaign can succeed only if the theater commanders and their staffs are fully trained and educated in operational planning in peacetime. Elements of operational design are also difficult to apply in practice for many reasons. A plan for a campaign must be based on the proper determination of the ultimate and intermediate objectives. The theater commander and the planners should never lose sight of the ultimate strategic objective. Selection of multiple intermediate operational objectives should be avoided even when one's forces are superior to those of the opponent. The time factor cannot be accurately predicted. Hence, the accomplishment of multiple objectives usually requires a much longer time than originally anticipated. This, in turn, can derail the entire schedule of a campaign, and in the end slow the operational tempo or even court disaster from a stronger and more agile opponent. The campaign design should focus on the enemy's operational or strategic center of gravity. The determination of the wrong center of gravity will invariably lead to more losses and the need for additional time to defeat the enemy, and in some cases it can be fatal. Generally, the smaller the margin of superiority, the more important it is to properly determine the enemy's center of gravity, so as to defeat the enemy quickly, decisively, and with the fewest losses of one's forces. Otherwise, the campaign pace will invariably degenerate into attrition warfare which is neither militarily nor politically acceptable. It is also critical to determine the center of gravity of one's forces in order to take measures and actions to protect them from enemy action. Strategic and operational deployment is key to the success of any plan for a campaign. In deploying one's forces, one cannot easily, if at all, correct errors in the forces' size, mix, and time once the hostilities start. The outcome of the initial clashes will have a critical role for the overall success of a campaign because they will determine the conditions for successive combat. The operational idea is the very essence of any operational design. The larger the military objective, the broader will be the operational perspective. Hence, the scope of the operational idea for a campaign and the one for a major operation are different in terms of space-time-force factors. The operational idea for a campaign is written first, because the strategic objective always dominates the operational objectives. It provides a framework for the operational idea of each subordinate major operation. Regardless of its purpose, an operational idea should be written concisely and clearly, but at the same time should ensure the accomplishment of the assigned military objectives. Ideally, it should surprise the enemy and impose one's will and initiative. The first employment of forces in a campaign is usually the most decisive. The theater commander and his planners should make judicious choices among all possible elements that will become part of the scheme. The fewer elements an operational idea has, the less complicated and the quicker it can be executed. However, none of the elements should be discarded without due analysis of the operational situation.

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Warfare, by its very nature, is a series of tradeoffs. In each instance, the theater commander and staff must properly balance competing demands for scarce resources while still accomplishing assigned operational or strategic objectives. Designing a campaign is not a simple job amenable to a few hours of discussion. It requires time, imagination, hard work, and, above all, sound military thinking and common sense on the part of both theater commanders and their staffs. The main purpose of operational design is to make this exhaustive effort a coherent one.

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Notes 1. Despite some similarities, desired end-state is not identical with the commander's intent, which refers exclusively to the military end-state the commander wants after a certain mission is accomplished. It is issued by the commander at each command echelon to subordinate commanders to two levels down. The commander's intent is the elaboration of the higher commander's mission and is intended to provide subordinate commanders direction for what their superior wants them to accomplish in case they are in doubt or are unable to communicate. 2. Joint Pub 3-0: Doctrine.for Joint Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1995), p.11-2. 3. Robert G. Fix, Operational Encirclement.- Quick Decisive Victory or a Bridge Too Far? (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Command and General Staff College, 1993), p. 21. 4. Joint Pub 3-0: Doctrine fbr Joint Operations, p. 11I-2. 5. Fix, Operational Encirclement. - Quick Decisive Victory or a Bridge Too Far? p. 21. 6. "You will enter the Continent of Europe and, in conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces": Frank H. Skelly, "The Principles of War," Military Review 8 (August 1949), p. 16. 7. Thomas A. Kenney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Summary Report ( Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 39. 8. John Miller, Jr., Guadalcanal: The First Offensive, United States Army in World War 11, The War in the Pacific (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1st printed 1949, reprinted 1989), pp. 16-7. 9. Earl F. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin. The German Defeat in the East ( Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1987), p. 39. 10. Ibid., p. 79. 11. Kenneth Macksey, Why the Germans Lose at War. The Myth of German Military Superiority (London: Greenhill Books; Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1996), p. 136. 1 2. Gustav Daeniker, Raum, Kraft and Zeit in der Militaerischen Kriegsfuehrung (Frauenfeld: Verlag yon Huber & Co., 1944), p. 2. 13. Center for Military History, U.S. Anny, CMH Pub 104-5: Terrain Factors in the Russian Campaign, ( Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), p. 6. 14. John A. Warden 111, The Air Campaign. Planning for Combat (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1988), pp. 58--9. 15. William W. Mendel and Lamar Tooke, "Operation Logic: Selecting the Center of Gravity," Military Review 6 (June 1993), p. 6. 16. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, FMFM 1-1: Campaigning ( Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 50. 17. John Ehnnan, Grand Strategy , Vol. V: August 1943-September 1944, History of the Second World War (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), pp. 379-81.

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1 8. Clayton R. Newell, "What is Operational Art?" Military Review 9 (September 1990), p. 9 19. Walter A. Vanderbeek, The Decisive Point. The Key to Victory (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, April 1988), p. 39. 20. Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs 1939-1945 , with a foreword by Jak P. Mallmann Showell, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990), p. 83-4. 21. CM H Pub 104-5: Terrain Factors in the Russian Campaign, p. 8. 22. Rainer Brinkman, "Das Konfliktszenarion: politische and militaerstrategische Ziele and Interessen der Konfliktparteien," in Hartmut Zehrer, editor, Der Gollkongflikt. Dokumentaiton, Analyse and Bewertung aus militaerischer Sicht (Herford/Bonn: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1992), p. 42. 23. H.R. Kurz, "The Eben Emael Operation," Allgemeine Schweizerische Militaerzeitschrift, May June 1 949, reprinted in Military Review 3 (March 1950), p. 91. 24. Olivier Desarzens, Nachrichtendienstliche Aspekte der "Weseruebung 1940 (Osnabrueck: Biblio Verlag, 1988), p. 173; T.K. Derry, The Campaign in Norway (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1952), p. 232. 25. Stephen W. Roskill, The War at Sea 1939-1945 Vol. 111, The Offensive, Part 1, 1st June-31 st May 1944 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1960), p. 341. 26. Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes. The Anatomy of Failures in War (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1991), pp. 179-80. 27. Operational depth is that area beyond the opponent's tactical defenses wherein both the attacker and the defender can achieve freedom of action. 28. "Mittel and Wege der Schwerpunktbildung," Military-Wochenblatt 6 (11 August 1931), p. 210. 29. Ibid., p. 207. 30. Ibid., p. 210. 31. Hermann Franke, editor, Handbuch der neuzeitlichen Wehrwissenschaften, Vol. 1: Wehrpolitik and Kriegffuehrun (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1936), pp. 212-3. 32. Karl-Heinz Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende. Der Westfeldzug (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1995), p. 104. 33. Peter J. Palmer, Operational Main Effort and Campaign Planning (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1991), p. 7. 34. John W. Foss, "Command," Military Review 5 (May 1990), p. 4; Palmer, Operational Main Effort and Campaign Planning, p. 8. 35. Ibid., p. 18. 36. Ibid., pp. 9-10. 37. Foss, "Command," Military Review, p. 4; Palmer, Operational Main Effort and Campaign Planning, p. 8. 38. Ibid., p. 12.

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39. Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende. Der Westfeldzug 1 940, pp. 72-3. 40. Colmar von der Goltz, The Nation in Arms A Treatise on Modern Militarj, Systems and the Conduct of War (London: Hugh Rees, Ltd., 1906), pp. 169-70. 41. R. Ernest Dupuy, Trevor N. Dupuy and Paul F. Braim, Military Heritage of America, Vol. 1 (McLean, VA: The Dupuy Institute/Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Company, 3rd edition, 1992), p. 15. 42. Christian Millotat, "Operative Ueberlegungen fuer das deutsche Heer in der gegenwaertigen Sicherheitslage," Oesterreichische Militaerische Zeitschrift 1 (January February 1996), p. 59. 43. Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, FMFM 1: Warfighting (Washington, DC: 6 March 1989), p. 31. 44. Friedrich Von Bernhardi, On War of To-Day , Vol. 11: Combat and Conduct of War, translated by Karl von Donat (London: Hugh Rees, Ltd., 1913), p. 320. 45. Ibid., pp. 361-2. 46. Douglas A. MacGregor, "Future Battle: The Merging Levels of War," Parameters, Winter 1992-93, p. 34. 47. Alfred H. Burne, "Global Strategy in the Pacific," Marine Corps Gazette 4 (April 1948), p. 24. 48. Charles A. Willoughby, Maneuver in War (Harrisburg, PA: The Military Service Publishing Co., 1939, reprinted by the Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 17 March 1986), p. 118. 49. Clayton R. Newell, "What is Operational Art?" Military Review 9 ( September 1990), p. 9. 50. This is in fact what the Germans call Schwerpunkt or "weight of effort. " 51. Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende. Der Westfeldzu,g 1940 , p. 106. 52. Phillip Kevin Giles and Thomas P. Galvin, Center of Gravity: Determination, Analysis, and Application (Carlisle Barracks: Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, 31 January 1996), p. 19. 53. Myron J. Griswold, Considerations in Identifying and Attacking the Enemy's Center of Gravity, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 14 May 1986), p. 28. 54. Ibid., pp. 14-5. 55. JP 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations (1999), p. 111-28. 56. FM 100-5: Operations (1993), pp. 6-9, 4-5; JP 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations (1999), p. 111-28; L.D. Holder, "A New Day for Operational Art," Army 3 (March 1985), pp. 4-5. 57. During the Desert Storm ground offensive in 1991, U.S. VII Corps envisioned a combination of seven branches and sequels, called fragmentary plans (FRAGOs). 58. Guenter Roth, "Operatives Denken bei Schlieffen and Manstein," in Hans-Martin Ottmer and Heiger Ostertag, editors, Ausgeewaehlte Operationen and ihre militaerhistorischen Grundlagen (Herford/Bonn: E.S.Mittler & Sohn, 1993), p. 292. 59. FMFM 1-1: Campaigning, pp. 45-6.

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60. David M. Cowan, The Utility of the Operational Pause in Sequencing Battles to Achieve an Operational Advantage (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1987), p. 22. 61. Donald C. McGraw, Operational Pause: Minimizing the Effects of'Culmination in Joint Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 1991), p. 15. 62. Ibid., pp. 23-4. 63. David J. Benjamin, Prerequisite for Victory: The Discovery of the Culminating Point (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 13 May 1986), pp. 26-7. 64. Ibid., pp. 25, 27; Bruce L. Meisner, The Culminating Point-A Viable Operational Concept or Some Theoretical Nonsense? (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, March 1986), p. 25. 65. A reserve should not be confused with a reinforcement or replacement. The purpose, size, and composition and the time and place where a reserve is employed differ significantly. Reinforcements are usually brought in small numbers and piecemeal with the purpose of reinforcing certain parts of the front line. Replacements are intended to replace the units destroyed or withdrawn from the front line to be reconstituted. Both reinforcements and replacements are not necessarily composed of one's best-trained, mobile, and equipped forces. 66. Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende. Der Westfeldzug 1940 , p. 82. 67. Rolf Dieter-Mueller, "Von der Wirtschaftsallianz zum kolonialen Ausbeutungskrieg," in Das Deutsche Reich and der Zweite Weltkrie , Vol. 4: Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion (Stuttgart: Deutsche VerlagsAnstalt, 1983), pp. 186-7. 68. Von Bernhardi, On War of To-Day , Vol. 11, p. 288. 69. Ibid., pp. 287-8. 70. Ibid., p. 287. 71. Dieter Ose, Entscheidung im Westen 1944. Der Oberbefehlshaber West and die Abwehr der allierten Invasion (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1982), p. 95. 72. Ihno Krumpelt, "Die Bedeutung des Transportwesen fuer den Schlachterfolg," Wehrkunde 5 (May 1965), pp. 467-8. 73. Ibid., p. 466. 74. "Operational reach is the distance over which military power can be concentrated and employed decisively." Joint Pub 4-0: Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations ( Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 27 January 1995), p. IV-6. 75. Robert T. Dail, Does the U.S. Army Really Understand Operational War? A Logistics Perspective (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2 May 1988), p. 33. 76. Ibid., p. 23.

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77. Ted O. Kostich, Operational Sustainment in an Immature Theater: Considerations Ibr Planning and Sustaining a Campaign in a Mid- to High-intensity Conflict (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1990), p. 26. 78. Ibid., p. 29. 79. Schroedel, The Art and Science of Operational Maneuver, p. 14.

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MAJOR OPERATION DESIGN Major operations are usually an integral part of a land or maritime campaign. Therefore, campaign design shapes the scope of design for the component major operations. Because of the smaller objective, factors of space, time, and forces apply differently in designing major operations than in campaigns. In addition, some elements of the operational idea for a campaign are not applied in a design for major operation. In general, the principal components of operational design for a major operation are objective, identification of the enemy's critical factors and operational center of gravity, operational/tactical direction (axis), interior versus exterior lines of operations, and the operational idea. When a major operation is planned to accomplish a strategic objective, the desired end-state is also a part of the operational design. Desired End-State: A major operation normally does not end the hostilities, but is a subordinate part of a land or maritime campaign. However, desired end state should be part of any strategic guidance when, a major joint or combined operation is planned to achieve a partial, non-conventional, and highly ambiguous strategic objective, as was NATO's Operation Allied Force in 1999. Desired end state should be also stated in a strategic guidance for a major joint operation that aims to accomplish a limited strategic objective in a an immature theater and in a situation short of war such as was the U.S. invasion of Grenada in November 1983 (Operation Urgent Fury) or its invasion of Panama in December 1990 (Operation Just Cause). Objective: A major operation as a part of campaign aims to accomplish one of the theater commander specific operational objectives as laid down in his campaign plan. Afterward, a subordinate component commander and his staff determine a series of major tactical objectives that collectively accomplish the operational objective. In contrast to strategic objectives, which contain both military and nonmilitary elements, operational objectives are usually physical in their nature. An operational objective can range from a part of the physical space (land, airspace, or sea/ocean), large city, economic area (oilfields, mineral resources, or agrarian production area) to a major part of the enemy force. Normally, the objective of a major operation should be clearly focused on the destruction, annihilation, or neutralization of the enemy combat forces. Logistics, the need for intermediate base of operations, or purely political or economic considerations should not dominate the determination of the ultimate objective for a major operation. In the Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943 Sicily (Operation Husky), the British Eighth and the U.S. Seventh Army landed at two different sectors at the southeastern part of the island. Their initial objectives after landing were to seize certain airfields and the ports of Syracuse and Licate, then to capture the ports of Augusta and Catania and the airfield complex at Gerbini. , However, the real objective for both armies should have been the destruction of the Axis ground forces on Sicily, not the capture of ports and airfields. The Allies determined Anzio as their landing place in January 1944, primarily because of political considerations and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill's personal interference in the theater planning process. This proved to be a poor decision for a number of reasons. The plan envisaged landing only two divisions in the rear of the

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front with the aim of cutting off the German lines of communications and threatening the rear of the German XIX Corps. Churchill thought landing at Anzio would speed the advance of the U.S. Fifth Army toward Rome, and moreover, that the capture of Rome was desirable at almost any cost. During planning, the initial problem was further compounded when the Anzio landing was transformed from a subsidiary attack on the left flank of the Fifth Army, to a main attack into the German rear. Although the original force envisaged for the operation was increased from 24,000 to more than 110,000 troops, this did not lead to the accomplishment of the changed objective. 2 It is invariably a bad thing to design a major operation without both the main and an alternate objective. In their plan for Operation Watht am Rhein [Watch on the Rhine], which led to the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944, the Germans determined a single operational objective-to capture the large port of Antwerp and in the process destroy twenty to thirty of the seventy Allied divisions deployed in the area. 3 However, no alternate objective had been assigned in case the Allies frustrated their plans, as actually happened. Likewise, one of the major flaws of the naval component of the Japanese Sho-1 Plan for the defense of the Philippines was that Vice Admiral Kurita's First Diversionary Attack Force was assigned a single main objective-to break into the Leyte Gulf and destroy U.S forces defending the area and their transports. He never received an alternate objective in the event the main objective could not be accomplished. This was perhaps one of the reasons that he turned north at the verge of his victory against the much weaker U.S. force of escort carriers in the Battle of Samar on the morning of 25 October. By then, most U.S. transports had left the Leyte Gulf; only one attack cargo vessel, twenty-three LSTs, two LCMs, and twenty-eight Liberty ships remained in the gulf. However, even these ships were worth attacking. In addition, the landing beaches were piled high with food, ammunition, and other supplies, and much equipment was stored at the Tacloban airfield .5 In contrast, the main operational objective of the Japanese land-based aircraft in Luzon was to destroy the U.S. fast carriers; their secondary operational objective was to destroy the Allied amphibious shipping in the Leyte Gulf and the U.S. army force ashore. In a situation short of war and in a relatively undeveloped theater, a single major joint operation could be conducted independently and aimed to accomplish a strategic objective that encompasses predominantly intangible aspects of the situation. In such a case, the enemy presents a minor threat to one's forces, and the operation's main objective is to restore peace and stability, the country's prestige and influence in the area, etc. U.S. intervention, both in Grenada in October 1983 and Panama in December 1989, was a major joint operation with a strategic objective. Sometimes, a partial strategic objective could be accomplished by employing multiservice or multinational (but singletype) forces, as NATO's action against Serbia in March-June 1999 (Operation Allied Force) illustrates. At the beginning of the air offensive, the United States publicly stated that objectives of NATO's action against Serbia were: to demonstrate the "seriousness" of NATO's opposition to Belgrade's policies in the Balkans; to deter Slobodan Milosevic from continuing and escalating his attacks on civilians and creating conditions to reverse his ethnic cleansing; and to damage Serbia's capacity to wage war against Kosovo in the future or to spread the war to neighbors by diminishing or degrading its ability to wage military operations. Initially, NATO stated that its military action was directed toward halting the Yugoslav Army's (VJ) and the Ministry of Interior's (MUP) attacks and

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disrupting their ability to conduct future attacks against Kosovo, thereby supporting international efforts to secure Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) agreement to an interim political settlement. By mid-April, the U.S. Department of Defense stated that the military strategic objective was "to degrade and damage the military and security structure that President Milosevic has used to depopulate and destroy the Albanian majority in Kosovo."9 The term "demonstrate the seriousness" was so broad and ambiguous that it meant little in practical terms. Likewise, the terms "damage" or "degrade" are essentially useless to planners because any damage or degradation inflicted on the opposing force or the enemy's infrastructure would satisfy the objectives set by the highest politico-military leadership. The ultimate objective for a major operation should be evaluated by fully considering the factors of space, time, and force. Otherwise, one's forces assigned may be insufficient to accomplish the stated objective. The Allied objective for the landing at Anzio on 22 January 1944 was selected without due regard to the factor of space, and particularly the factor of force. The objective of the amphibious landing required the Allied force to be large enough to cause the Germans to react operationally, and also to be able to sustain itself until the expected linkup with the forces of the U.S. Fifth Army troops advancing northward after the German withdrawal from the Gustav Line. The Allied VI Corps initial force was set at two divisions, three Ranger battalions, two Commando battalions, a parachute regiment, and an additional parachute battalion, plus some supporting units. Afterward, one armored division (minus an infantry regimental combat team) was added. The size and composition of the landing force was determined, not by the objective, but by the availability of troops and landing craft. l° However, the initial force size and composition was insufficient for the objectives, a major factor in the operation's failure. After determining the ultimate objective, the next step is to select several intermediate, usually major tactical objectives. The Allied planners for the amphibious landing on Guadalcanal on 7 August 1942 (Operation Watchtower) determined three major tactical objectives: seizing the beachhead and the adjacent airfield (later renamed Henderson Field); obtaining control of airspace over Guadalcanal and adjacent positions; and control of the sea around Guadalcanal and the adjacent sea area. For each of these objectives there were several minor objectives. For the amphibious forces, minor tactical objectives were the capture of the adjacent islands of Tulagi and Ndem, in the Santa Cruz Islands. In the UN landing at Inchon (Operation Chromite) on 15 September 1950, the major tactical objectives were to capture the port of Inchon, to seize Kimpo airfield (some 16 miles from the beachhead), then, crossing the Han River, to advance to the South Korean capital of Seoul.'' Each of these objectives required the accomplishment of several minor tactical objectives. Identification of the Enemy's Critical Factors and Operational Center of Gravity: The next step in designing a major operation is to identify critical factors and operational center of gravity. Because a major operation is normally aimed at accomplishing a single operational objective, only one operational center of gravity exists. The more capable the enemy force, the harder it is to identify the enemy operational center of gravity. The problem is more manageable if the enemy possesses smaller and less sophisticated forces, or if one part of his forces is much better equipped and trained than the others are. By mid-January 1991, the Iraqis had deployed in KTO some forty-two to forty-three 471

divisions of about 336,000 poorly trained men. In addition, seven highly mobile, much better trained, and well equipped Republican Guard divisions, kept as operational reserve, were deployed in the Shaibah area.' 2 U.S. planners correctly identified the latter divisions as the Iraqi operational center of gravity for the Coalition ground forces. In coalition warfare, the operational center of gravity is usually found among the critical strengths of the partner that has the best trained and equipped forces. In World War 11, whenever German and Italian forces were employed in the same area, it was invariably German panzer and panzer-grenadier divisions that comprised a real operational center of gravity for the Allied planners. In the Leyte Operation, the Japanese correctly determined the Allied operational center of gravity at sea to be the fast carrier force of the U.S. Third Fleet, deployed east of Luzon. In the original plan, the primary task of the Japanese land-based aircraft, the First Air Fleet, was to carry out massive and concerted attacks against U.S. fast carrier forces two days (X-2) before Vice Admiral Kurita's force arrived at Leyte Gulf, while the Second Air Fleet, also based in Luzon, would employ its main strength strength against the U.S. TF-38 carrier force on 24 October (later changed to 25 October). The Japanese '3 believed that these combined actions would ensure Kurita's entry into the Leyte Gulf. For the U.S. Third Fleet, the proper Japanese operational center of gravity was the force that represented the greatest threat to the U.S. amphibious shipping and troops ashore in the Leyte Gulf-the Japanese First Diversionary Attack Force, initially composed of two super-dreadnoughts, five old battleships, eleven heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and nineteen destroyers. The TF-38's carrier aircraft attacked this force in the Sibuyan Sea on 24 October. The First Diversionary Attack Force suffered some losses, but it still represented the single greatest threat to U.S. forces after it continued to sail through San Bernardino Strait and then southward toward the Leyte Gulf. However, the Third Fleet Commander, Admiral William F. Halsey, and his staff apparently considered the Japanese Mobile Forces and their carriers approaching the Philippines from the Inland Sea as the greatest threat to U.S. forces; or in operational terms today, the Japanese operational center of gravity. Yet, the Japanese fast carriers ceased to be a viable threat to U.S. forces after the Battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944 when the Japanese lost most of their frontline carrier pilots. Admiral Halsey's decision to destroy the Japanese carriers, instead of providing distant cover and support to the U.S. forces that landed at Leyte Gulf, was a major mistake. The proper course of action was to guard the entrance of San Bernardino Strait and then complete destruction of the First Diversionary Attack Force. In general, operational commanders and their planners should pay attention to the changing situation in the theater over time. What used to be the enemy's center of gravity could shift over time, either because of one's successes or the arrival of a new force with different capabilities. German Field Marshal Erich von Manstein properly identified the Soviet operational center of gravity in his major operation (Operation Trappenjagd [Bustard Hunt]) against the Soviet Crimea front (44th, 47th, and 51 st Armies), conducted from 8-15 May 1942. The front stalemated along the Parpach Isthmus on 11 April 1942. Von Manstein identified the Soviet 51st and 47th Armies as the enemy's operational center of gravity. These two Soviet armies were deployed along the narrow Parpach Isthmus, and the geography made it impossible for the Soviet commander to simultaneously employ the bulk of his forces. Hence, von Manstein decided that these two armies must be destroyed first to

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secure his operational objective. 1 4 His opponent, Lieutenant General D.T. Kozlov, in contrast, never recovered from selecting a wrong center of gravity-the XXXII and VII Romanian Corps. A common error is to confuse operational objectives with the corresponding center of gravity. The result is a flawed plan that leads to the waste of resources and time, even when one's forces enjoy superiority over the enemy forces. Focus on the objectives instead of on the enemy's operational center of gravity will invariably result in unnecessary losses in personnel, materiel, and time. The Allied planners in the European Theater in World War II repeatedly confused physical objectives, specifically ports or large cities, with the enemy's operational center of gravity. The results were inconclusive victories and unnecessary losses of personnel and time. The Allies won in the end largely because of their overwhelming superiority in the air and on land and their materiel superiority. In planning the amphibious landing at Anzio, the Allied planners identified the wrong operational center of gravity: the city of Rome, not the German XIV Army with headquarters in Rome, which acted as operational reserve of Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, the German CINC of the South. The German X Army was deployed along the front with the U.S. Fifth and the British Eighth Armies. Churchill and his advisors mistakenly believed that the two-division landing force plus some paratroops, by cutting off the lines of communications of the German X Army, would force the Germans to withdraw their troops from the front or force them to immediately retreat. 1 5 However, the landing force of only two divisions was clearly inadequate to achieve that effect, regardless how aggressive the commander. In Normandy, the Allied commanders and the planners were preparing their plans for the breakout from the Caen area in July 1944 (Operation Cobra). Rather than taking advantage of superior mobility and mastery in the air to encircle and destroy the German forces, they focused all their attention on Brittany's ports, as mandated by the Overlord Plan. 16 The operation was ultimately successful and the Cotentin Peninsula was cleared of the mobile German forces, although a rather large number of the Germans escaped the Allied trap and withdrew north of the Seine River. In the Kosovo Conflict of 1999, NATO's planners correctly identified Milosevic and his inner circle and armed forces and the country's military-economic potential as a whole as a strategic center of gravity. They also properly chose the Yugoslav fighter aircraft and associated air defenses as the operational center of gravity for accomplishing the first operational objective in the operation-obtaining air superiority. NATO's planners wrongly assumed that the 52nd Pristina Corps was the operational center of ground in the Kosovo area of operations. That would normally be true if NATO planned to mount a ground invasion of Kosovo. However, one of NATO's stated objectives was to prevent Serbian actions against the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Therefore, the proper center of gravity on the ground was the Serbian security and paramilitary forces involved in the ethnic cleansing. To complicate the situation for the planners, these forces were deployed in small, mobile, and widely dispersed groups, making them very hard to destroy from the air. Interior versus Exterior Lines: In contrast to a campaign, the operational design for a major operation does not deal with geostrategic position, but the selection of the lines of operations one's forces will use in the accomplishment of the assigned ultimate objective. The initial position of one's forces determines whether the planned major operation will 473

be conducted using interior or exterior lines of operations. Each option has some advantages and some disadvantages, and they must be properly evaluated so that the operational idea maximizes the advantages and minimizes the disadvantages. The major offensive operation conducted from the interior lines normally aims to concentrate one's forces and then to defeat the enemy forces in succession. Then, great speed of movement and short but devastating strikes could ensure success. When one's forces are inferior, the best course of action is, as early as possible, to strike the enemy force in the process of concentration. Sometimes, the speed of action could make up for the lack of numbers. Optimally, one's forces should operate along relatively short, multiple, and interior lines. Such lines generally favor a smaller but highly mobile attacking (or defending) forces. Therefore, it is often extremely advantageous to occupy a central position, either before the start of the hostilities or to obtain it during the course of combat. A wide movement on land is best conducted from interior lines. Exterior lines of operations require the employment of larger forces and facilitate an enveloping maneuver, but they demand the operational commander's greater speed of movement and agility. Using the exterior lines has opposite advantages and disadvantages from operating along the interior lines. Such operations require, among other things, that the commanders act with initiative and aggressively. 1 7 Most of the amphibious landing operations are conducted by operating along exterior lines of operations. The operational commander's ability to protect his lines of communications and resupply his forces depends on his selection of initial bases and his choice of lines of operation. Extended lines of communication can reduce tempo, which then can result in failure to achieve leverage." Favorable lines of operations and communications facilitate protection of one's forces' operational center of gravity. Operational/Tactical Direction/Axis: If a major operation is part of a campaign, its operational design includes an operational direction or axis. Sometimes, operational axes run in the same general direction, and are, in fact, the individual segments of the strategic axis for a campaign. A design for a major air operation could provide several tactical axes. In Operation Allied Force, NATO's aircraft were initially at great disadvantage because they used a few tactical axes covering only the western and southern approaches to their targets in Serbia and Kosovo. Most air strikes were conducted from Italy's air base Aviano then across Slovenia's and Croatia's airspace. U.S. carrier-based aircraft flying from the Ionian Sea via Albania's territory to targets in Kosovo and Serbia proper used another tactical axis. This made NATO's strikes predictable in the first few weeks of the conflict. Not until the second week of May, when Bulgaria and Romania gave permission for overflights, was NATO finally able to launch air strikes from Hungary and Turkey. A major joint operation on land mounted from an exterior position could be conducted along several mutually supporting tactical thrusts aimed to split the enemy's space into several isolated parts. In the major joint operation to liberate the Krajina area (Operation Oluja [Storm]), which began on 4 August 1995, the Croatian ground forces, supported by air forces, attacked along eighteen tactical axes over an arc of some 435 miles of the front. The Serbian rebel positions were penetrated at some thirty places on the first day of the offensive and the Croatian forces accomplished all their objectives within three days after the start of the operation. In addition to their 80,000-man active 474

army, the Croats employed an additional 120,000 mobilized troops against some 50,000 Serbian rebels (including only 5,000-10,000 active troops). Another factor in the Serbian defeat was that the Croatian forces operated from the exterior position that surrounded the Serbian-controlled territory of Krajina. Operational Idea: A plan for a major operation consists of a single operational idea or scheme from which subordinate tactical commanders draw tactical schemes for their subordinate force elements. Many of its elements resemble or are identical to those for a campaign. However, the difference in the ultimate objective to be accomplished results in different qualities of the factors of space, time, and force. Among other things, an operational idea for a major operation is focused on methods of defeating the enemy's operational, not strategic center of gravity and normally deals with application of available combat potential not military and nonmilitary sources of power. Also, forces taking part in a major operation regenerate combat potential and normally do not need to be reconstituted. Additionally, unless a major operation is planned to achieve a strategic objective, nonmilitary aspects of the situation play a relatively small role and hence there is no need to arrange for coordination between the operational commander and civilian authorities in the area (see Figure 43). The Coalition ground offensive in the Gulf War of 1990-1991 is an example of an innovative operational idea that was highly successful in practice. The plan envisaged the use of deception to mask a frontal attack by MARCENT and the Arab forces between Minagish and the coast, and the short-range envelopment maneuver of the U.S. Ist Cavalry Division in the west along Wadi al Batin. Both actions were aimed at tying down the Iraqi forces in Kuwait, while a massive and wide-ranging envelopment maneuver by land and from the air was underway by the U.S. XVIII Corps and VII Corps. The main thrust of attack along the line Raffia-Hafar al Batin toward northeast of the Euphrates River was aimed to seize and hold the crossings between Al Samawah and An Nasiryah. Other Coalition forces were tasked to protect the flanks to the west and north so that the attacking force can turn eastward and destroy Iraqi operational reserves deployed between Basra and Kuwait City and then encircle the rest of the Iraqi forces .2° In the Leyte Operation, the Japanese operational idea for the naval defense of the Philippines was innovative but extremely complicated. The final plan envisaged concerted employment of land-based aircraft, surface forces, and submarines against the Allied forces in the Leyte Gulf and sea approaches to Luzon and the Visayas. Three naval task forces based at the Lingga Archipelago, the Inland Sea, and the Ryukyus would converge almost simultaneously toward the Philippine waters. The First Diversionary Attack Force would sortie from the Brunei Bay on 22 October and then split into two task forces, Force A and B. Comprising the northern part of the planned double envelopment pincer movement, these two forces, as a single formation, would sail north of Palawan, pass south of Mindoro through the Tablas Strait into the Sibuyan Sea, and then enter the Philippine Sea via San Bernardino Strait. Afterward, this force would engage the U.S. forces in a night action in the waters east of Samar and, after destroying them, break into the Tacloban area on 24 October (later changed to a day later) . 21 Force C, together with Second Diversionary Attack Force advancing from the Ryukyus via Formosa, would approach Leyte Gulf from the south via Surigao Strait and attack Allied shipping there. The Japanese naval and army land-based aircraft would carry out concerted strikes against four U.S. carrier forces of TF-38 deployed in the waters east of Luzon starting 475

two days before the scheduled entrance of the First Diversionary Attack Force into Leyte Gul£ 22 The Mobile Force (including one large and three light carriers) would advance from the Inland Sea through the Bungo Suido (Strait) and southward, coordinating its movements with the First Diversionary Attack Force, lure away U.S. TF-38 from its position east of Luzon, and thereby allowing the First Diversionary Attack Force to break into the Leyte Gulf. 23 Advance Expeditionary Forces (submarines) with about a dozen boats would be deployed in a wide arc from San Bernardino Strait to Mindanao to intercept U.S. forces before they reached the landing area in the Leyte Gul£ 24 The operational idea for NATO's air offensive against Serbia in March 1999 (Operation Allied Force) followed a traditional and therefore predictable pattern. Moreover, it presented the defender with a single-dimensional threat. NATO envisaged only the use air power, and no ground option was planned before the opening of the hostilities. Worse, the U.S. and other NATO political and military leaders said publicly and repeatedly that no use of NATO ground troops was planned or contemplated. The lack of a ground option greatly eased problems for the Serbs who freely used their regular troops to support actions of their security forces and paramilitaries in Kosovo, instead of being forced to dig in and fortify border areas to defend against a possible NATO invasion. Mainly for political reasons, the operational scheme did not envisage optimal use of air power-that is, in mass to overwhelm and shock the opponent early in the operation. Initially, NATO did not have an all-encompassing plan to prepare and "shape" the Kosovo area of operations by simultaneously cutting off the potential flow of reinforcements and supplies over land routes and establishing a sea blockade of the Montenegrin coast to cut off import of oil.

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The operational idea for a major operation should envisage application of selected principles of war to enhance the chances of success. While some principles of war might be violated with impunity, others must be fully observed. The principle of objective is the single most important of all; its violation more often than not leads to failure of the entire operation. The Japanese Combined Fleet CINC, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, failed to observe the principle of objective by trying to accomplish several operational objectives simultaneously in Operation MI (Battle of Midway) in June 1942. He also violated the principle of mass and economy of effort. Despite superiority over the much smaller U.S. force, Japan suffered a devastating defeat that, in retrospect, signaled the turn of the Pacific War. Likewise, Admiral Halsey violated the principles of objective, economy of effort and security in his handling of TF-38 in the Battle for Leyte; but he applied too literally the principle of mass. This was the main reason Admiral Kurita, to his great surprise, had free passage to the Leyte Gulf Only Kurita's subsequent decision to turn away in the midst of the Battle off Samar saved the Allies from suffering a humiliating defeat at the hands of a much weaker force. One of the main prerequisites of attaining surprise is accurate, reliable, and above all timely intelligence on the enemy's intentions, plans, dispositions, and capabilities. In most military expeditions intelligence makes the difference between success and failure, For example, there is little doubt that the Germans achieved strategic surprise in their invasion of Norway, thanks largely to their excellent operational intelligence and reconnaissance. Lack of intelligence led the Royal Navy not to sail out and strike German transports while they were proceeding across the Skagerrak to southern Norway. The British were taken by surprise not only by the German plans and the efficiency of their execution but on matters of topography and local practice, about which they had had ample opportunity to acquire information. There was also sheer miscalculation by the British. The likelihood that the Germans would use their heavy ships as they did was not foreseen. The daring and performance of Germans of all three services was underestimated, and that of the British forces overestimated. The Allied landing in southern France on 15 August 1944 (Operation Dragoon) was highly successful because the Germans were surprised both in terms and place of the operation. They had expected the Allied invasion to take place near Genoa, not on the Provence coast, in August 1944. They were surprised both by the time and place of the operation. 25 The UN forces' landing at Inchon, Korea, in September 1950 (Operation Chromite) was also an example of operational surprise. General Douglas MacArthur had only thirty days to plan this complex and highly risky operation. The landing was a complete success, and it led to the march to the Yalu River. 26 The principle of unity of effort was one the main reasons for the success of the escape of two German battle cruisers (Scharnhorst and Gneisenau) and one heavy cruiser (Prinz Eugen) through the English Channel in February 1942 (Operation Cerberus). The Kriegsmarine and the Luftwaffe cooperated smoothly and almost flawlessly. The British overestimated the flexibility of their air power while they underestimated the effect of German air power. The Royal Navy virtually left the entire operation to the R.A.F., and the warships they provided were quite incapable of stopping the German ships. Moreover, the cooperation among Bomber, Fighter, and Coastal Commands of the R.A.F. was quite poor.

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The operational idea for a major operation should envisage either direct or indirect action to destroy or neutralize the enemy's operational center of gravity (see Figure 44). However, in most cases, the enemy's center of gravity is difficult to attack directly, either because it is strong, its essential elements are well protected or concealed, or its principal strengths are intangible. Indirect methods of destroying or neutralizing the enemy's center of gravity aim to identify and then exploit the enemy's critical weaknesses and vulnerabilities and, sometimes, even critical strengths. An enemy vulnerability is most valuable when it contributes to the elimination or serious degradation of the enemy's center of gravity. 27 Indirect attacks on the enemy's center of gravity may include cutting off or interdicting the enemy's lines of communications or his line of retreat; attacking defense plants, repair facilities, and ammunition or fuel dumps; and striking other critical capabilities (intelligence nodes, air defense elements, C3 nodes, EW capabilities, logistics, etc.).

The enemy's operational center of gravity could be defeated or neutralized by exploiting the enemy's vulnerabilities that are open to attack by one's forces. Planners consider these vulnerabilities to be decisive points. Hence, a series of decisive points must be identified in the process of devising how to attack the enemy's center of gravity. They are the keys to unlocking the enemy's center of gravity. Several decisive points attacked (or defended) either simultaneously or sequentially can synergistically exert leverage upon the enemy's center of gravity, separating the mass of his forces from their C3 nodes, critical supply lines, or reinforcements. 28 Additionally, if the enemy relies extensively on computerized systems for command and control, intelligence, or airspace control, it is possible to indirectly attack the enemy's center of gravity through an attack against his cybernetic-oriented decisive points. The operational commander should study and analyze all potential decisive points and determine those that offer the best opportunities for indirect attack.

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The operational commanders and the planners also must select lines of operations for the movement of their own forces from their base of operations to a given physical objective via the enemy's operational center of gravity. In general, lines of operations that offer multiple choices should be selected for one's forces. In land warfare, lines of operations often pass through selected decisive points from which the enemy operational center of gravity can be attacked or defended. The main purpose of selecting lines of operations is to construct a path to the enemy's center of gravity and to ensure that events flow in a logical sequence. If decisive points are physical in character, a line of operations can be defined in physical terms, connecting the force with its base of operations. However, if these points are intangible, their identification and utilization are much more difficult. This is especially so when an informational attack (or defense) is employed. In such instances, not only is the action protracted, but the result is hard to determine with precision and confidence. The operational idea for a major operation should envisage whether available combat potential will be applied in terms or time sequentially, simultaneously or combination of these two. Which method will be applied depends on the nature of the ultimate operational objective and the political limitations imposed on the use of military force. The most decisive results are achieved by simultaneous application of overwhelming force. This is especially true in case of modern air power. However, political limitations might dictate, as in the Kosovo Conflict of 1999, that air power be used sequentially and inconsistently. NATO's major error in that conflict was the unfounded belief that the conflict would be brief, perhaps lasting no longer than several days. This was compounded by a slow-moving air offensive. This gradualist approach proved ineffective in both military and political terms. It gave the Serbs enough time to disperse their forces in the field, making them less vulnerable to NATO's air strikes. The incremental use of air power also failed to have a strong psychological effect on Milosevic and his supporters; and the Serbs became accustomed to NATO's bombing of military and civilian infrastructure. Not until the third week in April, about four weeks after the air offensive started, did NATO realize that the operational tempo must be increased. The eighty missions per twenty-four hours quickly neared 600. 29 In the next seven weeks until the end of the conflict the range of targets was widened, but the Serbian fielded forces in Kosovo Province were not attacked until late May. Despite claims of great success, air power alone was insufficient to force Milosevic to back down when he did because his main sources of power were not sufficiently weakened. The use of force would have been far more effective if, as many unsuccessfully urged, air power had been unleashed early and against the Serbian strategic center of gravity, primarily Serbian leadership and Milosevic's means of controlling the police force, military, and media. The planners also must determine whether to apply one's combat potential symmetrically or asymmetrically. Each method has its advantages and disadvantages. The asymmetric application of available combat potential offers the best opportunity to achieve quick and decisive results even when the stronger side uses it. The inferior enemy is usually more prone to respond asymmetrically. By doing so, a weaker and less sophisticated opponent can considerably complicate the attacker's problems in achieving its objectives quickly even when it possesses huge superiority in the main categories of power. In the Pacific War in 1943-1944, the Japanese, by closely observing and

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analyzing the U.S. amphibious landings, changed their method of conducting antiamphibious defense from the defense of the beaches to digging in and establishing several defensive lines farther from the beaches. In that way, the Japanese countered the superior U.S. firepower and maximized their advantages. After the U.S. troops landed on Okinawa in April 1945 (Operation Iceberg), the Japanese offered stubborn resistance in the interior of the island. By the time the last resistance on the island ended in late June 1945, the Japanese had lost 110,000 men in combat, but they inflicted very heavy losses on the attacker: the U.S. battle casualties were about 49,000, including some 12,500 men killed or missing. 30 In the Kosovo Conflict of 1999, the Serbs preserved most of their combat potential in Kosovo by conceding NATO's superiority in the air, but dispersing widely and digging in their ground troops and aircraft. They extensively used some simple but very effective methods of camouflage and decoys, and other asymmetric measures to neutralize NATO's preponderance in the air. 31 The operational idea for a major operation must include a sector of main effort and sectors of secondary efforts. In the German offensive in the West in May 1940, the stretch of the Meuse River between Sedan and Dinant was the sector of main effort for Panzer Group von Kleist. In an amphibious landing operation, the sector of main effort is usually part of an island or a stretch of the coast where the main operational objective is located. In most instances this requirement is observed, but sometimes not. The operational scheme for the Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943 contained, in fact, two sectors of main effort in the southeastern part of the island. The British Eighth Army's sector encompassed beaches fronting the Gulf of Noto, south of the port of Syracuse, while the U.S. Seventh Army's sector stretched some seventy miles along the Gulf of Gela.32 Yet, for some reason, the planners did not designate one the sector of main effort and the other the sector of secondary effort. Consequently, neither army was given priority in terms of combat support and logistics. Thus, each army conducted initial and successive major operations in its own sector along the coast and in the interior of the island. Likewise, the Allied landing in Normandy in June 1944 lacked clear distinction between the sector of main effort and sectors of secondary effort. The Allies' primary objective after the landing was to create sufficiently large lodgment on the continent and then that required capturing a number of ports in Brittany. Sometimes the operational objective was properly selected, but distribution of forces in the major operation was not. In the Japanese major naval operation that led to the Battle of Midway on 4-6 June 1942 (Operation MI), the sector of main effort was a rather large part of the surface, subsurface, and airspace areas around the island of Midway, while the Aleutians (Operation AL) represented the sector of secondary effort. However, the Japanese made a mistake by assigning too large a force for a diversionary effort in the north, instead of strengthening their forces in a sector of main effort at Midway. In other cases, there is a disconnect between stated objectives and objectives actually pursued in the course of a major operation. NATO's sector of main effort in its air offensive against Serbia in March-June 1999 was clearly Serbia's proper north of 44th parallel, while the Kosovo area of operations was a sector of secondary effort until almost the very end of the operation. Based on NATO's stated objectives for the operation, the proper sector of main effort should have been Kosovo Province.

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The concept of the point of main attack (or defense) in a major operation is similar to that in the operational idea for a campaign. The single biggest difference is that in a major operation the area is physically much smaller. A major part of the force assigned to accomplish the most important major tactical objective of the entire operation will be concentrated there. In general, the point of main attack is selected where the enemy's defenses are considered the weakest; it allows the most direct route for advance into the depth of the enemy's defenses, and surrounding terrain allows covert approach and deep echeloning of one's forces. In the German attack through the Ardennes in May 1940 Panzer Group von Kleist, with the support of the Luftwaffe, carried out a major airland operation-the first such operation in history. For the point of main attack, Sedan was selected. Before attack, there was a difference of opinion between General von Kleist and General Guderian as to where would be the best sector of the French defenses to penetrate. Von Kleist argued that the Meuse River should be crossed at Flize, eight miles west of the Ardennes Canal. In that way, the German forces would avoid a double watercrossing, first southward across the Meuse River and then westward across the Ardennes Canal. In addition, a point of main attack at Flize was consonant with the main operational thrust in the direction of Rethel. Another advantage of Flize was that it was opposite the boundary between the French 2nd and 9th Armies. However, General Guderian considered the area west of Sedan open to French observation and flanking fires of the fortress guns at Charleville and Mezieres. Also, extending their combat sector west would reduce the concentration density of German forces. Another strong reason not to change the point of main attack from Sedan to Flize was that Guderian's Panzer Corps had rehearsed the entire plan of attack for months during various planning games [Planspiels], and a plan of fire was already arranged with the Luftwaffe. To change the point of main attack in the last moment would disrupt all of Guderian's Panzer Corps' preparations for the Meuse River crossings. Ultimately, Guderian's arguments did not persuade General von Kleist. In his directive issued on 18 April, he repeated unmistakably that the point of main attack must be west of the Ardennes Canal. However, Guderian shifted the advance of his corps through the Ardennes south toward Sedan, violating the order of his superior commander, General von Kleist. His decision proved to be tactically correct, although von Kleist's arguments to shift the point of main attack westward from Sedan were probably operationally more valid. The two generals also disagreed on the intended depth of the bridgehead after the crossing of the Meuse River. While von Kleist wanted the bridgehead to be only 3.7-5.0 miles deep, Guderian argued for a much larger depth, some 12.5 miles, including the hills at Stonne. He ignored orders of his superior in this instance as well, but later events proved him right. 33 General Guderian's XIX Panzer Corps, with 60,000 men and 22,000 vehicles, carried out the main penetration of the Allied defenses on the Meuse River at Sedan starting on 13 May. The point of main attack was in the 6.2-mile-wide sector between the Ardennes Canal and Noyers-Pont Maugis where Guderian employed his three panzer divisions. He also selected the 3.1-mile-wide sector between Donchery and Wadelincourt as the main weight of effort for his 1st Panzer Division. 34 The Germans also shifted the main effort of their Luftwaffe from the northern part of Belgium to the Sedan sector. A total of 1,500 aircraft, including 600 bombers and 250 Stukas, were assigned to support Panzer Group von Kleist. In support of Guderian's XIX Panzer Corps, 310 bombers, 200 Stukas, and 300 fighter aircraft conducted "rolling barrage" attacks before and during the

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crossing of the Meuse River. Their main point of attack was the 2.5-mile sector north and south of Sedan. In an unprecedented display of air power for that time, some 750 bombers and Stukas attacked the French positions at Sedan in the ninety minutes before the crossing of the Meuse River on 13 May. 35 In land warfare, a point of main attack for a major operation might be the area separating the enemy's major forces. In the plan for the Operation Wacht am Rhein [ Watch on the Rhine], which led to the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944, the Germans selected as their point of main attack the sixty-two-mile-wide stretch of the front between Monschau and Echtemach (total length of the frontline was then about 500 miles) between the boundaries of the U.S. 12th Army Group and the British 21st Army Group. In that area, the Allies had deployed only three infantry and one armored division. 36 The Germans used in the initial attack eighteen divisions, including seven panzer divisions. Their plan was to penetrate the front, cross the Meuse River, attack rear supply lines of the 1st U.S. Army and 21st Army Group, and seize Antwerp, cutting off twenty-five to thirty Allied divisions. 37 Points of main attack or defense in the operational idea for a major naval or air operation cannot always be clearly designated. The problem lies in the inherent fluidity and fast changes in the air or naval situation. In a given sector of the main effort, points of main attack or defense could change rapidly. The exception is an amphibious landing operation where a sector of the beach allowing the most favorable conditions to indirectly attack the enemy's center of gravity, or sometimes a port whose capture is critical for logistical sustainment is selected as the point of main attack for the landing force. In trade warfare, selection of the point of main attack is usually influenced exclusively by the shipping density in a certain sea or ocean area. In other cases, large ports or shipyards and ship-repair facilities whose destruction would cripple maritime trade in a certain area could be selected as points of main attack. For the defender, such points should obviously be considered as main points of defense. As in a campaign, the operational idea for a major operation should envisage concentration of one's forces at the point of main attack (defense). The success of the entire major operation hinges on how quickly and covertly one's forces are concentrated at the point of main attack or defense. Successful concentration requires several major considerations: maneuver, flexibility, secrecy, security, rate of concentration, sequence of movement, and control of the movements . 3s Scheme of maneuver is probably the most important factor in planning concentration of combat forces. Once the scheme of maneuver is determined, mass of one's forces is concentrated to facilitate the execution of the subsequent operation. Command and control must be flexible during the movement to the concentration area. Intelligence is the key for success. Alternate plans for the movement should be prepared in a timely manner. Secrecy is perhaps the most critical because if the enemy becomes aware of one's concentration he could deduce the subsequent scheme of maneuver. The principal means to enhance secrecy in planning and execution of concentration are operational deception, camouflage measures, and obtaining local air superiority. Security means, in essence, protecting one's command and control. Rate of concentration greatly influences the success of the forthcoming operation. A side that completes concentration first will have an advantage before the start of a major operation. 39 In general, the rate of concentration must be faster than the enemy's ability to counter it. Thus, the factor of time is critical for success. However, this factor should not

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lead to the faulty disposition of forces in the concentration area. Any such error would necessarily require shifting one's forces to a new area, thereby possibly nullifying any gain of time. However, the rate of concentration should not be so high as to cause confusion or chaos in one's rear. Sequence of movement is closely related to rate of concentration. It entails such factors as which forces are to arrive into the area first, what mode of transportation is to be used, and what supplies are available or can be brought into the concentration area. The operational commander must not lose sight of the logistical implications in the concentration of his forces. 40 Movement of troops and supplies relies on a good and reliable transportation network. This problem is complicated in land warfare by the fact that movement on highways and railroads is almost constantly under threat of the enemy attack from the air. A classic case of a highly successful concentration at the point of main attack was the German breakthrough in the Ardennes in May 1940. In preparation for their campaign in the West in May 1940 the main German forces to break through the Belgian and French defense in the Ardennes was Panzer Group von Kleist. From the German border to the Meuse River was about 105 miles-the German columns were to move along narrow and curving roads: thirty-one miles through Luxembourg, sixty-two miles through Belgium, and from 6.2 to 12.4 miles through French territory to the Meuse River. The Germans planned to reach the Meuse in three days and to cross it a day later. 41 Panzer Group von Kleist was divided into three echelons: Panzer Corps Guderian (four panzer divisions); Panzer Corps Reinhardt (one panzer and two motorized infantry divisions, corps troops, and logistics for the first echelon); and Motorized Infantry Corps von Wietersheim (one panzer division and one motorized infantry division with logistics for second echelon). The first two echelons used four roads during their movement to the Meuse River, while the third echelon was allowed only two other roads; two others were reserved for the movement of German Twelfth and Sixteenth Army. The plan was that all three echelons would move smoothly from their assembly areas behind the German border and cross the distance of about ninety-three miles to the Meuse River within ten hours. Everything depended on each echelon starting on time and moving to their "jumping-off' position on the northern bank of the Meuse River as planned. However, the execution phase of concentration for Panzer Group von Kleist did not go as smoothly as has often been thought or portrayed. On the first day of the offensive (10 May), the first echelon was about ten hours behind when the second echelon began to move. By noon of 10 May, Guderian's three panzer divisions were already in combat in Belgium, while the major part of Panzer Corps Reinhardt was still east of the Rhine River, and Motorized Infantry Corps von Wietersheim was in its assembly areas in Marburg and Giessen (in Germany) . 42 This chaotic situation forced von Kleist to free one road assigned to Guderian's corps, for Reinhardt's corps so that all forces could reach the Meuse River area in time. The German forces moved slowly through the Ardennes because of the back-up of all kinds vehicles. To make the situation worse, some infantry units used wider roads exclusively reserved for panzer divisions. While Guderian's corps advanced through the Ardennes. Reinhardt's corps was stuck in place behind the German border for two days. Because of the failure of Army Group A to assign more roads, on 13 May the columns on the right flank of the Panzer Group von Kleist stretched some 155 miles from the banks of the Meuse River to the rear areas behind the Rhine. Only the

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inactivity of Allied aircraft saved the German panzers in the Ardennes from disaster . 43 In the end, the Germans were successful in concentrating their most combat effective force at the point of main attack at Sedan and Dinant. The rest is history. The operational idea for a major operation normally includes operational maneuver focused directly or indirectly against the enemy's operational center of gravity. A major operation does not always include an operational maneuver as part of the operational idea. The operational objectives could be accomplished by planning and carrying out a series of mutually supporting tactical thrusts with forces operating along converging lines of operations, as the German experience in Poland in September 1939 illustrates. Likewise, NATO's aircraft conducted tactical maneuvers along converging lines of operations during major combined air operation against Serbia in March-June 1999. One's forces conducting an operational maneuver should possess a high degree of mobility and firepower. The greater maneuverability of modern forces and their capabilities for long-range surveillance and fires allow for far more flexible dispositions in the conduct of an operational maneuver than was possible in the past. This is especially true in the case of naval and air elements. A smaller force is usually more mobile than a larger one; however, a small force might not have the necessary combat potential to have an operational impact. Conversely, a large force is usually more powerful but less mobile. Also, if a mobile force is large it requires a larger supporting force to protect it. This is particularly true if a force must move great distances. 4 In planning operational maneuver, the relationship of one's bases and lines of operations and communications to the assigned physical objective must be properly evaluated . 45 In conducting an operational maneuver on land, the fewer lines of operations, the greater the density of forces using them. An important consideration for planning an operational maneuver is the force-to-space ratio. The greater this ratio, the smaller the space the enemy will have in which to recover. Also, the greater the ability of the enemy to recover, the more temporary are the effects of operational maneuver. Then, given time or space, the enemy commander can avoid a decisive encounter. To synchronize forces in time and space, planners must select points that are potentially decisive for the defeat or neutralization of the enemy center of gravity or cutting-off logistical support and sustainment. In practical terms, the selection of decisive points enables the operational commander to determine the type, size and mix, and physical arrangement of forces required. Coordination of forces in relation to decisive points, in turn, produces the leverage. 46 In planning an operational maneuver, it is critical to select the most favorable lines of operations. The fewer the lines of operations used by a mobile force, the smaller the spatial distance among force elements will be. While a few lines of operations enhance the security and mutual support, they also increase the vulnerability of the force to the enemy attack from the air. In the German offensive in the West in May 1940, Panzer Group von Kleist composed of 41,140 vehicles, including 1,222 tanks and 545 half-tracks-conducted the operational maneuver. The theoretical length of its columns was some 960 miles. However, Army Group A assigned to von Kleist's forces only four roads, totaling in length about 250 miles during the deployment phase. Request for use of at least one more road was denied.

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Fires are significant elements in planning for an operational maneuver. They facilitate maneuver by fixing the enemy forces, and, when necessary, destroying them. Tactical fires are used to disrupt enemy movement, and neutralize enemy fire support, command and control, and sources of logistical sustainment in the part of the theater in which one's forces conduct operational maneuver. 48 One of the prerequisites for planning an operational maneuver is accurate, comprehensive and, above all, timely intelligence on all aspects of the enemy forces in a given theater or area of operations. If operational intelligence is inadequate, the chances for success in conducting an operational maneuver will be considerably diminished. Nevertheless, gaps or even serious flaws in operational intelligence can be compensated for by providing branches to the basic operation plan. The operational commander must ensure that adequate logistical support is available to sustain the firepower required at each level. Logistically, the mobile force should be self-supporting as far as possible. Critical decisions for the operational commander to make deals with selection of logistics base sites and lines of communication. Lack of sustainment or improperly sited bases and lines of communication can cause operational pauses that destroy the continuity of maneuver. One of the most critical tasks is to provide adequate and continuous protection of one's operational center of gravity during preparation and execution of a major operation. This requires a sound distribution and assignment of forces between those required to accomplish the principal objectives and those needed for protection. However, there is also a danger of overprotecting the wrong center of gravity for one's forces. In contrast to a campaign, protection of the operational center of gravity is mostly a problem of assigning forces available for force protection. Normally, planning for a major operation, even one with a strategic objective does not include measures and actions of protecting one's strategic center of gravity. Without taking proper and timely measures to protect one's operational center of gravity, the risk of reaching a point of culmination is quite high. Whenever the operational commander and the planners included protection of one's center of gravity as part of the operational idea, the major operation has usually been successful. The operational commander should also not just provide adequate protection for his own center of gravity but should try to make it difficult for the enemy to deduce what one's real center of gravity is. During the German offensive on the Crimea in May 1942 (Operation Trappenjagd [Bustard Hunt]), Field Marshal von Manstein took extensive measures to make it more difficult for his Soviet counterpart to identify his proper operational center of gravity: the XXX Army Corps (composed of five divisions). Prior to the offensive, in April and early May, both XXXII and VII Romanian Corps conducted deception actions and measures along their sectors of the front to reinforce the Soviet belief that the attack would come against the bulge on the northern flank of the Parpach line. The Germans also used false wireless messages and fake reconnaissance attacks, convincing the Soviets to keep substantial reserves in the north until it was too late for them to move. In contrast, the Soviets could not adequately protect their own center of gravity: the Luftwaffe gained air superiority, and the German VII Air Corps damaged or destroyed many camouflaged and hardened Soviet command posts, thereby disrupting communications and hampering the ability of the Commander of the Crimea Front,

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Lieutenant General Kozlov to launch a counterattack against the German XXX Army Corps. The air attacks caused so much confusion among the Soviets that by late evening on 8 May every Soviet formation was engaged in combat, with the exception of one rifle and one cavalry division. 5 1 Many major operations failed or were only partially successful because the commander paid inadequate attention or took too great a risk to pursue the beaten enemy force. During the British major offensive operation in North Africa in November-December 1941 (Operation Crusader), the Luftwaffe could not protect the center of gravity-the Axis armored and mechanized forces. Because of unrelenting R.A.F. strikes, the German strength on the ground was considerably weakened and Field Marshal Rommel had no choice but to order a general withdrawal from the Tobruk area on 7 December 1941. 52 In preparing for what is popularly called the Battle for Leyte, the Japanese planners apparently paid scant attention to a vitally important task-protecting one's operational center of gravity, the First Diversionary Attack Force. All efforts should have been made to protect that force, as it advanced from Brunei through the confined waters of the Philippines archipelago on its way to San Bernardino Strait. No provision was made, however, to provide reliable and continuous air cover for Kurita's or other surface forces operating in the Philippines area, allegedly because of the shortage in fighter aircraft. Moreover, Kurita neither asked nor expected support from army land-based aircraft. This showed how poor cooperation was among Japanese naval combat arms for this critically important major operation. 53 A sound operational idea for a major operation should incorporate the concept for operational deception. (For details see the chapter, "Operational and Strategic Deception.") In a major operation, tactical deception must be coordinated with the plan for operational deception; any disconnect between these two levels of deception is bound to create difficulties in their execution, and sometimes even endanger the success of the entire operation. The branches and sequels for a major operation are essentially identical in concept as those for a campaign. However, because a major operation consists of a series of battles and engagements and other smaller tactical actions, they differ in scope from those applied for a campaign (see Figure 45). A plan for a major operation should properly sequence major tactical objectives or tasks in terms of time and space and thereby set the stage for synchronized employment of one's forces. Normally, a major operation as a part of campaign requires sequence in the employment of combat forces and the parts of the respective operational functions. (For details see the chapter, "Operational Sequencing.") A major operation cannot be very successful without a sound plan for operational synchronization. The traditional commander's intent or operational scheme is not sufficient to ensure the required degree of synchronization. A plan for synchronization that is simple and flexible should be developed during the planning process to ensure the synergistic effect in the employment of military sources of power in a major operation. (For details see the chapter, "Operational Synchronization.") Like a campaign, a major operation is rarely completed in a single phase. Hence, the planners need to plan for several related phases; each separated in terms of space and time (see Figure 46). In a major operation, phases can be planned to coincide with the anticipated accomplishment of each of intermediate major tactical objectives. The higher

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the tempo and the less the anticipated attrition of one's forces, the less the need to divide a major operation into several phases. One of the characteristics of major operations today is that they are conducted at very high intensity; hence, they might not need to be phased. In the Gulf War of 1990-1991, the Coalition forces conducted a major ground operation at high tempo and intensity and the operation was stopped after only about 100 hours after it started on 24 February 1991. There were no distinguishable phases in that operation. Likewise, the Croatian major operation in Krajina ended some seventy-two hours of almost continuous fighting after it started on 4 August 1995. Planners can plan several operational pauses during a major operation to regenerate combat potential. If the logistics requirements are inadequate, or attrition is expected to be significant, then a pause must be planned to prevent a major operation from approaching a point of culmination. A major operation might not continue for other reasons as well, such as fatigue of personnel, or terrain and weather difficulties. An operational pause in a major operation could also be planned to shift one's forces from one sector of effort to another. The operational idea for a major operation also must address the problem of potential culmination before the assigned operational objective is reached or accomplished. Higher than anticipated attrition, inadequate logistics, extension of lines of communications, poor or inadequate intelligence, and the commander's overconfidence or lack of realistic assessment of the capabilities of one's own and the enemy's forces are perhaps among the most common cause of culmination in a major operation. The chances of success of a major land operation are significantly higher when the commander has assigned forces as an operational reserve. Their purpose is similar, although their size is smaller than for an operational reserve in a campaign. A prudent operational 487

commander should do everything possible to create reserves from forces available or becoming available. This, in turn, significantly expands his freedom to act; otherwise, his chances of success are considerably narrowed. In March 1944, the Allied force that landed at Anzio was under heavy German pressure and unable to expand the beachhead. The only option to relieve the German pressure was to mount attacks in other sectors of the front. However, the Allies did not have any reserve left on the Italian front. Some twenty Allied divisions were engaged with the Germans along the main front. The Germans, in contrast, had twelve divisions deployed along the Gustav Line and five divisions at Anzio, while eight divisions were in operational reserve. The operational idea for a major amphibious landing might envisage part of the landing force to serve as reserve after the first wave troops has landed. The size of reserve varies, but is generally much smaller than an operational reserve for a major land operation. However, it is not the size but the potential impact on the outcome of the landing operation that determines the force's size. In some Allied landings in World War II, reserves were the size of one reinforced division. Some forces were embarked on the ships in the proximity of the landing beaches and some were on-call reserve assembled at some distance from the landing area. In the Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943, both the British Eighth and the U.S. Seventh Army had what is normally in land warfare considered tactical reserve of troops. The U.S. Seventh Army's reserve consisted of four distinct and widely separated parts: 2nd Armored Division (minus Combat Command A), reinforced by the 18th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) of the I st Division, and deployed with amphibious forces; 82nd Airborne Division on-call after H-Hour; 39th RCT of the 9th Division, plus the 9th Division Artillery in North Africa, but ready to move at any time after D-Day; and the remainder of the 9th Division . 55

48 8

Operational sustainment is one of the most critical factors for the successful outcome of a major operation as it is for a campaign. A campaign itself cannot be successful if its component major operations fail because of inadequate sustainment. The logistical planners can deduce sustainment requirements from the planned sequencing of objective or tasks, phasing, operational tempo, distances between base of operations and the ultimate physical objective and among successive intermediate objectives, and other factors. An incomplete operational idea would make it difficult to properly evaluate sustainment requirements and that in turn would have negative effects during the execution of a major operation. The U.S. Navy had an excellent system of logistical support and sustainment for its striking forces in the Pacific after 1943. By 1944, the U.S. Navy's logistical sustainment capabilities were such that the fast carrier groups operated at sea for many weeks without the need to return to their bases. Operational sustainment for the Third or Fifth Fleets was the responsibility of the At-Sea Logistics Service Group-composed in October 1944 of thirty-four fleet oilers, eleven escort carriers, nineteen destroyers, twenty-six destroyer escorts, and a number of seagoing tugs. This force was divided into ten to twelve task units to fuel the fleet in echelons. A group of nine to twelve tankers was deployed near the Third Fleet's TF-38, refueling one carrier group after another. About every three or four days a task unit of three oilers with escorts joined this refueling group to relieve those that were almost empty. These tankers then transferred the remainder of their oil to other tankers that were partly full and returned to Ulithi to take new fuel loads from the commercial tankers. Each of these groups was accompanied by an escort carrier carrying replacement aircraft and pilots from Eniwetok, Guam, and Manus. Combat Air Patrol and A/S patrols for the oiler groups were conducted with a group of eight escort carriers with their escorts. Rescue of damaged ships was the responsibility of two fleet tugs accompanying each refueling group. 56 The TF-38 composed of four carrier groups with nine heavy and eight light carriers, six battleships, three heavy and six light cruisers, three AA light cruisers, and fifty-eight destroyerswere regularly replenished at sea by TF-30 logistics ships. 57 Fast carrier forces were at sea for thirteen of sixteen weeks; this was possible only because of excellent logistical organization. 58 A design for a major operation should include ways and procedures to regenerate one's forces' combat potential. Phasing and operational pauses are primarily used to plan for sufficient time to regenerate combat power. After evaluating the opponent's strength, the operational commander can determine his relative combat power and calculate where his forces are in relationship to their culminating point. This information can be used in sequencing tactical actions in pausing at the most opportune time, or, when on the defense, in designing actions that will lead to the opponent s culmination . 59 The theater commander normally organizes coordination, while subordinate component commanders in planning their respective major operations are more concerned with fighting. However, in a major operation with a strategic objective the operational commander must plan for coordination with other government agencies and nongovernment organization, and host-nation authorities. Conclusion: Design for major operations is sometimes given a short shrift because almost all attention is given to design for a campaign. However, a campaign cannot be successful if subordinate major operations are improperly designed. In addition, without 489

it, tactical employment of forces cannot be effective. The importance of major operations is likely to increase in the future, as new technologies will allow smaller forces to accomplish operational and even strategic objectives. Many elements in the design for a major operation are similar to those for a campaign, with some significant differences because of distinctions in the scale of the objectives. A design for a major operation should invariably focus on the accomplishment of the assigned operational objective through the destruction of the enemy forces. The operational idea should be simple, innovative, and bold and should ensure decisive employment of one's forces. It should present the enemy with multiple threats, which he cannot successfully counter. The operational idea for major operations in a campaign should be in harmony with each other; otherwise no real synergy and, hence, the most effective employment of one's forces is possible. No operational idea needs to incorporate all, or even most elements, postulated in theory. The operational commander and his staff should explore possible elements of the operational idea, and then select only those that would ensure quickly success and with the least losses for his forces.

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Notes 1. C.J.C. Molony, et al., The Mediterranean and Middle East , Vol. V., History of Second World War (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1973), pp. 28-9. 2. Martin Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, The Mediterranean Theater of Operations, United States Army in World War lI ( Washington, DC: Center for Military History, United States Army, 1st printed 1969, CMH Pub 6-3, reprinted 1988), pp. 301, 303, 353. 3. Juergen-Hans Schmidt, "Der Einfluss des Gelaendes auf die Durchfuehrung yon Operationen der Landstreitkraefte," Part 2, Wehrwissenchaftliche Rundschau 3 (March 1970), p. 155. 4. "Excerpts From Battle Summary of First Diversion Attack Force in Operation `Sho,' " The Campaigns of the Pacific War, pp. 297-8; Adrian Stewart, The Battle of Leyte Gulf (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1980), p. 29; James A. Field, The Japanese at Leyte Gulf. The Sho Operation (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1947), p. 31. 5. Tomijii Koyonagi, "With Kurita in the Battle for Leyte Gulf," Proceedings 2 (February 1953), p. 361. "Excerpts From First Mobile Fleet-Report of Sho Operations Air Strength of CarDiv 3 at Time of Sortie (for Sho Operation)," The Campaigns of the Pacific War, p. 309. Stewart, The Battle of Le, e Gulf, pp. 31-2. 6. Interrogation of Commander Yamaguchi and Vice Admiral Fukudome on 26 October 1945. Interrogation NAV No. 44 , United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS) No. 193, p. 179. 7. President Clinton's press statement, 24 March 1999; "Cohen, Shelton Joint Statement on Kosovo After Action Review," NATO Security Digest, No. 198: October 14, 1999, p. 6 8. NATO Press Release, 23 March 1999. 9. From prepared statement of William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 15 April 1999. 10. Martin Blumenson, "General Lucas at Anzio," in Kent Roberts Greenfield, et al., Command Decisions (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1990), pp. 328-9. 11. Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June-November 1950), United States Army in the Korean War ( Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, l st printed 1961-CMH Pub 20-2, reprinted 1992), pp. 499-500. 12. Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War. Air Power Survey Summary Red (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 9-10; Rainer Brinkman, "Die Beispiel fuer Krisenmanagement," in Hartmut Zehrer, editor, Der Golflconflikt. Dokumentation, Analyse and Bewertung aus militaerischer Sight (Herford/Bonn: E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1992), p. 89. 13. Stewart, The Battle of Leyte Gulf, p. 18. 14. Myron J. Griswold, Considerations in Identifying and Attacking the Enemy's Center of Gravity (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1 4 May 1986), p. 22. 15. Carlo D'Este, Fatal Decision. Anzo and the Battle for Rome (New York, NY: Harper Perennial, 1 st ed., 1992), p. 77. 16. Martin Blumenson, Breakout and Pursuit, The European Theater of Operations, United States Army in World War II (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1 st printed 1961-CMH

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Pub 7-5, reprinted 1989), p. 197; Carlo D'Este, Decision in Normandy (New York, NY: E.P. Dutton, Inc., 1983), p. 347. 17. Hermann Franke, editor, Handbuch der neuzeitlichen Wehrwissenschaften , Vol. I: WehrRolitik and Kriegfuehrung (Berlin/Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter & Co, 1936), p. 206. 18. Walter A. Vanderbeek, The Decisive Point. The Key for Victory (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, April 1988), p. 10. 19. "NATO to hit Serbs from 2 more sides," The New York Times, May 11, 1999. 20. Martin Braun, "Planting and Verlauf der allierten streitkraeftegemeinsamen Landkriegsoperation," in Hartmut Zehrer, editor, Der Gollkonflikt. Dokumentation, Analyse and Bewertung aus militaerischer Sight (Herford/Bonn: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1992), pp. 97-8. 21. Samuel E. Morison, Leyte, June 1944-January 1945 , History of United States Naval Operations in World War 11, Vol. 12: (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1 st printed 1958, reprinted July 1984), p. 1 62. 22. Stewart, The Battle of LeyL Gulf, p. 18. Interrogation of Commander Yamaguchi and Vice Admiral Fukudome on 26 October 1945. Interrogation NAV No. 44 , USSBS No. 193, p. 179. 23. Masanori Ito, The End of the Imperial Japanese Navy p. 116; John P. Kennedy, Japanese Maritime Campaign Planning Considerations Leading to the Battle of Leyte Gulf (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College, 1986), p. 6. 24. Field, The Japanese at Leyte Gulf. The Sho Operation , p. 37; Morison, Leyte. June 1944-January 1945 , p. 164. 25. Friedrich Ruge, The Soviets as Naval Opponents 1941-1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1979), p. 61; Raymond De Belot, The Struggle for the Mediterranean 1939-1945 translated by James A. Field Jr. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 259. 26. R. Betts, "Strategic Surprise for War Termination: Inchon, Dienbienphu and Tet" in Klaus Knorr, editor, Strategic Military Surprise. Incentives and Opportunities (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1983), p. 153. 27. U.K. Army Doctrine, Operations (Pre-Publication copy, 1989), p. 3-12. 28. Ibid. 29. John Keegan, "It was a very strange war. In the aftermath of Kosovo, Britons are asking for explanation," National Post, July 14, 1999. 30. Roy Appleman, James M., Burns, Russell A. Guegler, and John Stevens, The War in the Pacific. Okinawa: The Last Battle, United States Army in World War II (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, United States Army, first printed 1948, CMH Pub 5-11, reprinted 1991), p. 473; some sources cited put U.S. casualties at 65,631 killed or wounded, while the Japanese lost 70,000 men, and an equal number of civilians; Robert H. Scales, Jr., "Adaptable Enemies. Achieving Victory by Avoiding Defeat" Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn/Winter 1999-2000, p. 8. 31. Ibid., p. 12. 32. Albert N. Garland, et al., Sicily and The Surrender of Italy, The Mediterranean Theater of Operations, United States Army in World War lI (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1st printed 19654-CMH Pub 6-2, reprinted 1986), p. 89.

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33. Karl-Heinz Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende. Der Westfeldzug 1940 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1995), pp. 189-90. 34. Ibid., p. 19 1. 35.Ibid., pp. 194-5. 36. Juergen-Hans Schmidt, "Der Einfluss des Gelaendes auf die Durchfuehrung von Operationen der Landstreitkraefte," Part 2, Wehrwissesnchaftliche Rundschau 3 (March 1970), p. 155. 37. Frank Didwiszus, Der Einfluss des Gelaendes auf die Durchfuehrung von Operationen der Landstreitkraefte. Eine Untersuchung am Beispiel des finnisch-russichen Winterkrieges 1939140 and der deutschen Ardennenoffensive 1944145 (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, December 1968), p. 15. 38. M.A. Solomon, "Concentration of Force," Military Review 8 (August 1948), p. 36. 39. Colmar von der Goltz, The Nation in Arms. A Treatise on Modern Military Systems and the Conduct of War (London: Hugh Rees, Ltd., 1906), p. 175. 40. Solomon, "Concentration of Force," pp. 37-8. 41. Frieser, Blitzkrieg- Legende. Der Westfeldzug 1940 , p. 128. 42. Ibid., pp. 130-1. 43. Ibid., p. 135. 44. Vanderbeek, The Decisive Point. The Key to Victory, pp. 9-10. 45. Joseph Schroedel, The Art and Science of Operational Maneuver (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Command and General Staff College, 18 May 1988), p. 17. 46. Ibid. 47. Frieser, Blitzkrieg-Legende. Der Westfeldzug1940 , pp. 125-6. 48. Vanderbeek, The Decisive Point. The Key to Victory, pp. 1 3-4. 49. Clayton R. Newell, "What is Operational Art?" Military Review 9 (September 1990), p. 11 50. Phillip Kevin Giles and Thomas P. Galvin, Center of Gravity. Determination, Analysis, and Application, (Carlisle Barracks: Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, 31 January 1996), p. 19. 51. Ibid., pp. 23-4. 52. Ibid., p. 19. 53. David C. Evans, editor, The Japanese Navy in World War II , Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, p. 314. Interrogation of Commander Yamaguchi and Vice Admiral Fukudome on 26 October 1945; Interrogation NAV No. 44 , USSBS No. 193, p. 179; Interrogation NAV No. 55 , USSBS No. 227, p. 222; Adrian Stewart, The Battle of LeyL Gulf, p. 62. 54. S.E. Morison, Sicily-Salerno-Anzio. January 1943-June 1944 , Vol. IX, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1984), p. 374. 55. Garland, et al., Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, pp. 97-8.

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56. Morison, Leyte. June 1944-January 1945 , p. 76. 57. Worrall Reed Carter, Beans, Bullets, and Black Oil ( Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1953), p. 249. 58. Morison, Leyte. June 1944-January 1945 , pp. 74-5. 59. David M. Cowan, The Utility of the Operational Pause in Sequencing Battles to Achieve an Operational Advantage (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1987), p. 24.

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OPERATIONAL AND STRATEGIC DECEPTION All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive, when we are near, we must make the enemy believe that we are far away; when we are .far away, we must make him believe that we are near. Hold out bait to entice the enemy. Feign disorder and crush him. If he is superior in strength, evade him. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. If his forces are united, separate them. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected. These military devices leading to victory, must not be divulged beforehand

Sun Tzu Although deceit is detestable in all other things, yet in the conduct of war it is laudable and honorable; and a commander who vanquishes an enemy by stratagem is equally praised with one who gains victory by force.

Niccolo Machiavelli Deception is as old as warfare and its great advantages have been proven beyond any doubt in almost all conflicts. Most surprises have been achieved through deception. In the great majority of attacks since 1914, tactical warning was opportunely provided. Yet, the attacker achieved surprise because deception had been used successfully. Deception could be conducted at any level of war, but nowhere is its value so critical as at the strategic and operational levels. A sound plan for a campaign or major operation should include a corresponding deception plan to enhance its successful execution. Deception is also one of the most important components of C2W. Deception could be conducted in peacetime as well as in time of crisis and war. However, in practice it is an integral part of operational planning and therefore it is closely tied to the plan for a campaign or major operation. For all its proven value, there is generally little interest in deception. A rather widely held view today is that, in the information era, deception is not needed because a strong and sophisticated opponent cannot be deceived. Yet information technologies offer more, not fewer, opportunities for successful deception. Another problem is that often the commanders are not willing to devote the necessary planning effort and resources for deception. More pernicious, and hence more difficult, is the lack of interest in deception 495

in peacetime. It is often too late to start thinking about deception after a conflict breaks out; then, deception plans and techniques must be learned by trial and error, often at great cost. Deception is an action or series of actions designed to mislead the enemy by distorting, manipulating, or falsifying information available to him and thereby inducing him to do something that is contrary to his interests. 2 It aims to deceive the enemy about one's real intentions, decisions, and courses of action. Deception could have several major purposes. It could be aimed to deceive the enemy about the time and place where the attack will occur and thereby achieve surprise. The great German offensive in March 1918, their invasion of Soviet Russia in June 1941, and their counteroffensive in the Ardennes in December 1944 were all results of deliberate deception. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 achieved strategic and operational surprise primarily because of a series of deception measures. Deception could be intended to create an illusion of one's strength where weakness exists or the paint the picture of one's weakness where strength exists. It could also be intended to overload the enemy's collection and analytical capabilities or to deny him information, thereby preventing him from having an accurate and timely picture of operational or strategic situation. Scale: Deception efforts differ in terms of the objective and size of physical space in which the deception will take place, its duration, and forces and assets involved. Therefore, differences are considerable between deception efforts at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels (see Figure 47). Tactical deception is intended to deceive the enemy in terms of time, place, and details of the planned battle or engagement. Strategic deception is planned and conducted at the national or alliance/coalition level. Deception at the national strategic level is primarily intended to hide one's

intentions from the enemy on whether to fight or not to fight, and when and where to open hostilities. It is also planned to deceive the enemy about the time and place of a new campaign. Political and diplomatic actions and misinformation are the primary tools of strategic deception and are used in peacetime as well as in wartime. In January 1944, the Allies, in planning the cross-Channel invasion, adopted a master strategic plan code named Bodyguard aimed to deceive Hitler and the German Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht about the place and time of the planned invasion. The Bodyguard Plan, encompassing three subordinate deception plans, was coordinated by the British Chiefs of Staff. The heart of the deception effort was Plan Fortitude aimed to pose the threat of the Allied landing from the French Atlantic coast to northern Norway (see Map A-14). The planning and execution of Fortitude was the responsibility of General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Plan Zeppelin was intended to ensure the success of the Normandy landing by preventing Germans from moving timely reinforcements from the Eastern Mediterranean to northern France. Specifically, it was designed to induce the Germans to believe that the Allies would attack Crete and/or western Greece and the Dalmatian coast and also carry out further landings on the Greek mainland. To ensure success of the plan, the Allied strength in the Mediterranean was to be greatly exaggerated . 3 The Soviets agreed to support this effort by mounting a notional amphibious operation against the Bulgarian base of Varna in the Black Sea. The Soviets also planned actual attack against the German forces deployed on the Kola Peninsula to reinforce the effect of the Allied deception plan against Norway. The Allies also prepared two deception plans for the Western Mediterranean, code-named Vendetta and Ferdinand. Plan Vendetta was aimed to tie German forces in southern France by presenting a plausible threat of the Allied landing there shortly after the Normandy landing. In contrast, plan Ferdinand was aimed to convince the Germans that the Allies would not land in southern France, as they actually intended to do on 15 August 1944. Hence, the threat of an Allied landing was posed against the northwestern part of Italy's coast with a dual aim: reduce readiness of German forces deployed along southern coast of France and draw German forces away from the central part of their frontline along the Gothic Line. 5 The Allies also prepared Copperhead plan, a notional trip by General Bernard Montgomery to Algiers shortly before the Normandy landing to convince the Germans that there was no immediate threat of invasion of northwestern France. To convince the Germans, the Allies also prepared plan Ironside for a fictional attack against the Bordeaux area on the French Biscay coast. The aim was to support both the Normandy landing and the landing in southern France by tying German troops in southwestern France. This plan was executed, but it was a complete failure because forces involved in the effort were so small that the Germans did not believe the Allied story. Plan Bodyguard was also designed to induce the Germans to believe that shortage of manpower had forced the British Army to resort to cannibalization because several of their large formations lacked administrative and supply units. It was also aimed to convince the Germans that the Allied divisions were fewer than indicated; that the U.S. divisions arriving to the United Kingdom had not yet completed their training; and that personnel of some British divisions in the Mediterranean were relieved by fresh troops from the United States. Another objective was to convince the Germans that there was a shortage of landing craft because of the Pacific operations and that the required number

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of landing craft could not be made available from home produced until summer 1944. The Allied deception planners also wanted the Germans to believe that the Allied forces in the Mediterranean, and especially in eastern Mediterranean, were larger than they were; that the French forces were taking over the responsibility to defend North Africa, thereby freeing Anglo-American forces for operations elsewhere in the spring of 1944; and that certain British divisions and landing craft were being transferred from India to the Middle East, while fresh divisions from the United States were expected to arrive in the Mediterranean. s The Allies prepared a series of diplomatic deceptions in support of Bodyguard's subordinate deception plans. They tried to exploit German fears that some of the neutral countries, specifically Sweden, Spain, and Turkey might change sides and start cooperating with the Allies. Plan Graffham was designed to make Germans think that Sweden was about to join the Allied cause. The Allied ploy was to use Sweden to convince Hitler and the German Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht that the Allies were to attack Norway. The Swedish government would be confronted with series of demands, such as the right for the Allied aircraft to operate over Sweden's territory or to land there. Plan Royal Flush was another diplomatic deception plan intended to induce Germans by using leading neutrals, Sweden, Turkey, and Spain into believing that the Allied would not follow certain courses of action opened to them. Specifically, the Allies would not pressure Sweden to reduce its ore shipments to Germany, and Spain's overland shipments of wolfram would not be stopped by the Allies, thereby trying to convince the Germans that the Allied invasion of the continent was not imminent. It was believed that after the Allies secured firm lodgment on the continent, these neutrals would have little to fear from the Germans reprisals and might even take some action in support of the Allied cause. The Allies planned and conducted several strategic deception plans in the Pacific Theater in World War 11. At their meeting in Quebec, Canada (the Quadrant Conference), in September 1943, the Allies agreed to prepare a master strategic deception plan against Japan. The plan included an estimate of the situation from the Japanese point of view for the central and northern Pacific, SOWESPAC, and Southeast Asia. The basic objective of that plan was to lead the Japanese to deploy their forces in a manner favorable to Allied plans. The general deception story would be conveyed to the Japanese high command. Therefore, an outline of strategic deception objectives in each of the Pacific theaters was prepared as part of implementing the overall plan. 1 ° Theater-strategic deception is a subset of national-strategic deception and is developed for each theater of war. It is aimed to deceive the enemy commander on the objectives, place, and time of an initial major operation in a new campaign. Deception is usually conducted in two or more theater of operations or a major part of the theater of war. The Allies prepared what could be considered today a theater-strategic plan for the opening of new campaign in Northern Africa (Operation Torch). The British prepared three deception plans (Solo I, Solo 11, and Overthrow) in support of forces that sailed from the United Kingdom, while the United States prepared three plans (Hotstuff, Quickfire, and Quickfire-II) in support of forces sailing from the United States (see Map A-15). However, no general deception plan had been outlined to coordinate the British and the U.S. deception plans.'

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The Allies planned to convince the Germans that an amphibious assault would be carried out against Norway; to indicate plans for a fictional assault for the cross-Channel assault; and to indicate that amphibious training would take place in Haiti. Deception planners also wanted the German and the Italian leaders to believe that the Allied forces in the Middle East were being built up. Therefore, the objective was to convince Germans and the Italians that all Allied assault convoys would proceed to the Middle East via the Cape of Good Hope; and to indicate that the island of Malta would be reinforced, and that the Allies would reestablish their lines of communications in the Mediterranean.' 2 Specifically, the British plan Solo I was designed to contain German troops in Norway by indicating that the Allies would land in November 1942. A shipping feint from the Orkneys in October was intended to alert the Germans to the embarkation of the Allied assault forces for Norway. Plan Solo II was designed to divert German attention from the Allies' real objectives in North Africa and, at the same time, enhance cover for the movement of the Allied forces from British ports to their assigned objective areas. The deception story for Solo II was that amphibious forces from the United Kingdom were proceeding to the Middle East via the Cape of Good Hope; the Allied aircraft were being deployed to the Middle East; the Allied forces sailing to Gibraltar would form a headquarters and supply base there; and the Allied forces sailing from the United States were actually destined for the Middle East via Cape. Plan Overthrow was intended to contain German troops in northern France by indicating that there would be an assault there during the first week of November in 1942. In addition, plan Sweater was prepared as a cover plan designed to conceal the destination of the amphibious forces assembled on the Atlantic seaboard for Operation Torch.' 3 The U.S. deception Plan Quickfire was intended to induce the Germans and Italians to think that U.S. forces would occupy Syria and the Dodecanese Islands, relieving British forces in Syria to prepare for further operations. However, this plan became useless once U.S. forces landed in North Africa, so the planners were directed to prepare a new deception plan code-named Quickfire II. This plan envisaged tactical and logistical requirements for an occupation of Syria only with forces other than those designated for Operation Torch. Plan Hotstuff was designed to indicate the passage of the U.S. task force from Norfolk to Syria via Trinidad, Recife, Capetown, Madagascar, and Aden. The deception story also included arrangements for the U.S. aircraft to be refueled at Recife.' 4 The execution of the British and the U.S. deception plans was highly successful, although the lack of an overall outline plan for deception was felt. The cooperation between two allies was good. Each side exchanged its deception plans. Special means and radio deception were used in coordination with the buildup and training of forces in England. In October, U.S. ships supported Plan Solo I with a feint from the Orkneys. To deceive the Germans and the Italians, it was publicly announced that Malta would be reinforced. A tactical ruse was used one day before the main landings in North Africa; messages indicating that an Allied task force was headed to Sardinia were ostensibly inadvertently released. The Allied convoy routes were laid so as to conceal their ultimate destinations and to imply that Dakar was their objective. The Germans were surprised by the Allied landings on 8 November 1942; both tactical and operational surprise had been achieved.' 5

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In the spring of 1944, the Allied theater-strategic Plan Fortitude aimed to induce the German High Command into making faulty strategic dispositions in northwestern Europe before the Normandy invasion by presenting military threats to Norway and the Pas de Calais area in France. 1 6 The main objective of Fortitude was to pin German forces as far as possible from the Overlord area and to induce the Germans to believe that the invasion would not start until late summer. 1 7 In terms of scope, it encompassed de facto the West European and Northern theater of operations, respectively (see Map A-] 4). Plan Fortitude consisted of two subordinate deception plans, Fortitude North and Fortitude South. The deception plan for Fortitude North was that the Allies planned to attack southern Norway on 1 May 1944. Two weeks later, the Allies would attack northern Norway in conjunction with a Soviet attack. As soon as the Allies were established in southern Norway, an assault would be launched in Denmark. 1 s Specifically, Fortitude North envisioned simultaneous landing in northern Norway with assault forces notionally held in readiness in Scotland, Iceland, and Northern Ireland. In the northern assault, two divisions were to land at Narvik and advance along the rail line to Gallivare in Sweden where they would link with the Soviet forces advancing overland from Petsamo. A southern assault near Stavanger would be made with one infantry division, supported by airborne troops. After consolidating their positions, these forces would advance toward Oslo, Bergen, and Trondheim by conducting a series of mutually supporting amphibious landings. Once Norway had been secured and basing rights obtained from Sweden, the Allies would land in Denmark, thereby threatening Germany from the north. 1 9 Simultaneously with Plan Fortitude North, the Allies increased their notional threat in the Pas de Calais area where the German Fifteenth Army was deployed. The intent was to tie down that army before and after the Allied landing in Normandy. The deception story for Fortitude South was that the Allied main landing would be in the Pas de Calais area forty-five days after the Normandy landing, which was merely a diversion to draw German reserves from the adjacent area. Once these reserves were committed, about fifty Allied divisions would launch the main allied attack on the Pas de Calais. The Allied deception plan was highly successful. The fictional order of battle contributed materially to the establishment of the Allied bridgehead on the continent. The German Fifteenth Army remained in the Pas de Calais area from D-Day (6 June) until late July. Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt could not believe that the Allies were to land only south of the Seine. Not until 25 July did the first divisions of the Fifteenth Army start to move southward in a belated attempt to reinforce the crumbling Normandy front. 21 The Germans were paralyzed by the purported existence of the Fortitude South Army, believing that it could invade the Pas de Calais area. 22 The Allies devised a theater-strategic plan for the Pacific in the fall of 1943 aimed to induce the Japanese to send troop reinforcements to the Kuriles and not to the central Pacific, where a new Allied campaign was to start in November. Until then, Japanese attention was principally directed to the Allied advance in the SOWESPAC area. The Allies then were in the course of their preparation to start a new campaign in the central Pacific. The Japanese failed to hold their positions in the Aleutians, seized in June 1942, and evacuated the remaining troops in August 1943. However, they remained very concerned with any Allied activity near the Kuriles. The task of the Allied planners was to further increase Japanese apprehensions in that area. This resulted in the origin of the

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deception plan code-named Wedlock which was developed based on the overall deception plan for the Pacific (see Map A-16). As part of that deception effort, the Allies announced a conference to be held at between Admiral Nimitz and General Simon B. Buckner, Commanding General (CG) of Alaska at San Francisco, on 14 March 1944. Another piece of evidence, in support of the deception story was conveyed to Tokyo by "intelligence channels" and special "related" means, namely information that the new, l 7th Naval District which included the Aleutians, had been created. All troops embarking from Seattle were issued arctic clothing and equipment. The Navy built a full-fledged dummy air base at Holtz Bay in the westernmost island of Attu, and appropriate activities were carried out at the base. There were planned leaks of selected information to personnel embarking on westbound ships. The planners also arranged for newspaper and magazine articles on Alaska and the Aleutians. Starting in the fall of 1943, intelligence channels leading to Tokyo were progressively fed selected parts of inferential details of the deception story . 23 Special means and planned leaks relayed the "postponement" and then "abandonment" of the fictional landing plan Wedlock. However, the Allies continued to maintain their fictional threat to the Kuriles until April 1945. For that purpose, a series of small-scale deception plans, code-named Husband and Bambino were prepared to exaggerate the U.S. strength in the Aleutians. Plan Husband was activated in late June 1944 and ended on 30 October, corresponding roughly with the Allied invasion of Leyte. This plan was succeeded by plan Bambino that ended in January 1945, coinciding with the Allied landing on Luzon. 24 Plan Wedlock was successful in deceiving the Japanese about the real threat they faced in Northern Pacific. Before the deception started in January 1944, the real Japanese strength in Kuriles was 25,000 troops and 38 aircraft, while the Allied strength in the Aleutians was about 100,000 men and 347 aircraft. By June 1944 when the Allied invasion of the Marianas took place (Operation Forager), the Japanese increased their strength in the Kuriles to 70,000 men and some 590 aircraft, while the Allies reduced their troop strength in the Aleutians to 64,000 men and air strength was only slightly reduced (to 373 aircraft). More important was the Japanese estimate of the Allied strength in the Aleutians because that influenced their decisions whether or not to reinforce their own strength in the Kuriles. In January 1944 the Japanese estimated the Allied strength at 100,000 men and 330 aircraft- a pretty accurate assessment. However, due to the Allied deception effort, the Japanese were wide off the mark in their estimate of the Allied strength in June 1944. They thought that the Allies then had some 400,000 men and 700 aircraft in the Aleutians. By the time of the Allied landing at Leyte in October, the Japanese still had in the Kuriles 80,000 troops, while U.S. forces had deployed only 58,000 troops in the Aleutians. The Japanese retained that number of troops until the spring of 1945, while U.S. strength was progressively reduced to about 38,000 men. 25 The Allies prepared a deception plan code-named Bluebird to deceive the Japanese about the planned amphibious landing on Iwo Jima (Operation Detachment) planned for 20 January 1945 and the landing on Okinawa (Operation Iceberg) originally scheduled for l March. The deception objective was to convince the Japanese that the Allies intended to invade Formosa and the South China coast opposite Formosa and Hainan in spring 1945, and to continue that threat through the summer of 1945 if necessary (see Map A-17). 26 Admiral Nimitz selected Formosa and southern China's

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coast, and the JCS approved Plan Bluebird in December 1944 with a target date for the deception objectives of 20 April 1945. 27 The Allies also prepared a smaller deception plan code-named Valentine in support of Plan Bluebird. This plan was aimed to exaggerate Allied strength in the Aleutians and thereby preventing the Japanese from reducing their strength in the Kuriles. Plan Valentine was activated in January 1945 and ended in April 1945, shortly after the Allied landing on Okinawa. 28 Major assumptions for Bluebird were that the Allied projected operations to the end of January 1945 would be satisfactorily completed. The planners also assumed that the Japanese were more likely to believe that an Allied landing on Formosa and the South China coast was more likely than on the Home Islands. The assumption was that Japan would continue to send air and ground strength into China and Formosa as long as these areas remained under threat. After the Allied operations then in progress were completed, the few Japanese fleet units remaining would be withdrawn to the Empire and would sortie only in case of a direct threat to the Home Islands; the Japanese bomber forces would be concentrated in southern Japan and the Formosa-South China area. From these assumptions, the mission derived for the Bluebird was to induce the Japanese to send reinforcements to the Formosa-South China area rather than the Ryukyus. 29 Plan Bluebird contained an outline of implementation tasks for all three services. Later, the plan was supported by SOWESPAC's resources. Nurturing the deception story was the responsibility of the JCS. Preliminary bits of intelligence evidence in support of the deception story started in Tokyo in November 1944. The JCS was also responsible for coordinating activities involving governmental actions and movements of forces, as well as conferences and announcements by important officials. The deception planners integrated actions by U.S. Third Fleet and Far Eastern Air Forces (FEAF) then involved in supporting the Philippines Campaign into Plan Bluebird. In January 1945, the Third Fleet launched a series of strikes against the Formosa and Hong Kong area. After consolidation on Luzon, the Army's land-based bombers and the Navy's patrol aircraft launched attacks on Formosa and the South China coast in accordance with the schedule of operations contained in Bluebird. These strikes served not only to keep pressure against the arrival of the Japanese air reinforcements to the area, but also tried to distract the Japanese attention from the carrier strikes by the U.S. Fifth Fleet (Third Fleet became Fifth Fleet in February 1945 after Admiral Spruance's turn came to take over the command from Admiral Halsey) further north. In addition, Naval Group China arranged for an increase in guerrilla activities along the South China coast. CINCPOA requested an early survey by the Naval Group China of South China's coast from the island of Hainan to Amoy. The aim was to obtain intelligence on the beaches and coastal defense installations in case the decision was reached to land on the South China coast. At the same time, the planners hoped that the Japanese would observe these activities. These actions started in mid-February and continued until the first week of April 1945. 3 1 Plan Bluebird also included a communications deception plan that started in December and was intensified in January 1945. The aim was to indicate to the Japanese that the central Pacific and SOWESPAC had a joint interest in the South China coast and Formosa. 32 The conference between Admiral Nimitz and other high-ranking commanders in the Pacific was announced on 5 March, notice of it being sent through intelligence channels to Tokyo. Japanese intelligence concluded that either Formosa or the South

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China coast would be the next Allied objective, probably one month after the conference. In January 1945, the Japanese High Command concluded that the Allies would advance to the China coast before the invasion of the Home Islands. By the end of February, intelligence reaching Tokyo from Europe and China continued to confirm Allied intentions to land on the South China coast or Formosa: However, there was a large difference of opinion between the Japanese Army and the Navy. In the end, the Army's view that Formosa would be the next target prevailed and an army general became the commander of the Japanese forces on Formosa. The administrative and training units on Formosa were reorganized into field divisions; several combat divisions were deployed to Formosa, while other divisions were redeployed from central and northern China to the South China coast. However, there was no change in Japanese troop deployment in the Ryukyus. In mid-March, the Japanese Army was less certain as to what the next Allied objective would be. Nevertheless, the Japanese doubled the number of aircraft on Formosa to 200, while the best and largest squadrons remained in reserve on Kyushu. Little or no air strength was deployed on the Ryukyus. 34 The results of deception Plan Bluebird were highly beneficial to the Allies because the Japanese gradually misdeployed their forces in the Far East. At the beginning of deception, the Japanese deployed in South China about 67,000 men, 85,000 men on Formosa, and 70,000 men on Okinawa. This changed at the time of the Allied invasion of Okinawa to 161,000, 240,000, and 70,000 men, respectively. Operational deception in the strict definition of the term pertains to actions and measures to deceive the enemy as to time, place, and details of the planned major operation conducted as a part of a campaign or independently. A successful operational deception should protect the operational commander's intent from the enemy's intelligence-gathering sources and reinforce the enemy's expectations and preconceptions about one's force. The deception plans for a major operation or campaign are normally multiservice and sometimes require the use of multinational forces and assets. Operational deception is more likely to succeed when the plan seeks to confirm rather than alter the enemy's predispositions. Sometimes operational deception must be maintained after the initial major operation in a new campaign has been executed, but one's forces are still threatened by enemy forces that are within striking distance. Then, the initial deception plan must be modified or completely rewritten. The Allies were faced with such a situation after their landing in Normandy on 6 June 1944. Because of stiff German resistance, the lodgment on the continent was tenuously held for several weeks after the landing. The Allies activated deception plan Fortitude South-II aimed to induce Hitler and the German theater commander, Field Marshal von Rundstedt, to believe that there was a continuing threat to the Pas de Calais area. The threat to the Pas de Calais area was maintained by a large notional force in the eastern and southeastern coast of England, composed of the First U.S. Army Group and U.S. XIX Tactical Air Command. The threat was substantiated by considerable radio activity and some 250 LCT dummies in the harbors and estuaries of east and southeastern England . 36 Plan Fortitude South-II used forces of similar size to those used in Fortitude South. However, the big difference was that fictional forces were used instead of real ones. The fresh U.S. troops had to be sent as reinforcements to Normandy. Thus, notional forces were supposedly composed of two

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divisions from the 14th U.S. Army and one division from the British 4th Army. These notional assault formations also "underwent" intensive amphibious exercises. 37 In planning the major combined amphibious landing in Normandy (Operation Neptune), the 21st Army Group prepared a series of tactical deception plans aimed to ensure the success of the initial landing. A total of three naval and four airborne diversions were planned and executed; all of them were integrated with the overall Fortitude South deception plan (see Map A-18). Plan Big Drum involved four small ships to divert German coastal radar and batteries near Cherbourg away from the assault convoys. Plan Taxable envisaged a fictional landing off Cap D'Antifer, just north of Le Havre. The force for this diversionary attack consisted of eighteen small ships and twelve aircraft. Each ship towed low-flying balloons with radar reflectors. Plan Glimmer i nvolved a force of six small ships and twelve aircraft to conduct a diversion similar to Taxable, but further north, off Pas de Calais. However, the Germans mistook this force for a real assault when it approached Boulogne, and opened fire from their coastal batteries. Simultaneously with Taxable and Glimmer„ twenty-nine Lancaster bombers flew continuously back and forth between these two locations for four hours, jamming German radars. The German night fighters were diverted from the Normandy areas toward the simulated invasion to the north at the time when the Allied troop carriers and gliders went into action over the Normandy area. 38 The Allied planners also prepared four tactical deception plans in support of the Normandy landing. These diversions, dropping dummies and some Special Air Service (SAS) teams, code-named Operation Titanic, were to divert German attention from the real airborne drops in the Normandy area on the night of the invasion. Two airborne drops-(Titanic-1 and Titanic-2) north of the Seine and inland of Cap D'Antifer, and at Dives-sur-Mer (northeast of Caen)-were intended to draw German reserves away from the Allied assault objectives or delay their westward movement, respectively. A third drop (Titanic-3) coincided with the actual drop of the 6th Airborne Divisions to divert the German counterattack to the south and west of Caen. The fourth drop (Titanic-4) in the St. Lo area coincided with the actual drop of 101st Airborne Division to the north of St. Lo. 39 In planning a major naval operation, the Japanese invariably included an elaborate deception scheme; their plan for defense of the Philippines (Sho-1) that led to the Battle for Leyte was no exception. The success of Vice Admiral Kurita's heavy surface forces depended on deceiving U.S. operational commanders regarding his true physical objective. Vice Admiral Ozawa's Mobile Forces had a central role in luring TF-38 northeast of Luzon and away from San Bernardino Strait and thereby allow the First Diversionary Attack Force to reach the Tacloban Anchorage in the Leyte Gulf. Subsequently the Mobile Force would join other Japanese forces by attacking the "flank of the enemy task force." 4° The Japanese were optimistic in the success of their deception plan because of Admiral Halsey's well-known propensity to act rashly and aggressively. 41 The Japanese also planned that the Mobile Force maintain radio silence until it approaches Luzon and then start to use dummy radio messages to tempt TF-38 to turn northward and away from the First Diversionary Attack Force approaching San Bernardino Strait from the west. The Japanese deception worked as planned. Relationships: Deception efforts are complementary; the success or failure of one affects the other. For optimal success, the main and subordinate deception plans should 504

accomplish their assigned objectives. A failure at the strategic level usually dooms all subordinate plans. Tactical or sometimes even operational deception plans could fail, but success might still be achieved if the strategic deception influences the enemy's strategic leadership to conform to one's expectations. The Allied deception efforts in the spring 1943 to deceive the Axis about the time and place of a new campaign in the Mediterranean were highly successful. The Allies deceived Hitler and the German Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht, although their efforts at the operational level were not as successful. The main deception plan, code-named Mincemeat, was developed by British intelligence in London. It was designed to deceive the German Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht that the next Allied objectives in the area were Sardinia and the Peloponnesus rather than Sicily. This plan was not only simple but highly imaginative. A counterfeit letter from a fictional "Archie Nye" of the British War Office was drawn up and addressed to General Alexander, the Allied commander in the Mediterranean. The letter indicated that forces moving against Sicily would be a feint, and that the real attack objective would be Sardinia. To cover the real attack against Peloponnesus, the letter also suggested that the British forces in the Middle East would conduct a feint against the Dodecanese Islands. The problem was how to get a copy of that letter into German hands without raising suspicion about its authenticity. The solution was to find a body of a serviceman with a fictional name "Major Martin" of the Royal Marines carrying a letter in a sealed container. The body and container were dumped from a British submarine in the water less than a mile from the coast near the Spanish port of Huelva on the Mediterranean coast on the night of 30 April . 43 As the planners expected, the Germans got the fake letter from their Spanish sympathizers and sent it to the German Supreme Command. The letter was accepted as authentic, and the German Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht directed on 12 May 1943 that the defense measures on Sardinia and the Peloponnesus take priority over any others. 44 Afterward, the Germans moved reinforcements to Rhodes, Crete, the Peloponnesus, and Corsica. The deception plan in support of the Allied landing on Sicily was code-named Barclay, and its success depended on the execution of Plan Mincemeat. This plan was agreed on between British and U.S. planners, but actual planning was vested in the British "Force A" in Cairo. A team from "Force A" was sent to General Eisenhower's headquarters in Algiers to serve as a deception planning staff. 46 The general intent of Plan Barclay was to induce the Germans and the Italians to give priority to maintaining and reinforcing sizeable forces in the Balkans and in southern France, thereby limiting German ability to reinforce Sicily. 47 The original broad outline of that plan envisaged fictional attacks between 26 May and 6 June by the notional British 12th Army on western Crete, the Peloponnesus, and the islands of Pantelleria and Lampedusa, and by the U.S. Seventh Army forces on Sardinia, Corsica, and southern France. Force A, which was in charge of Plan Barclay, decided on 15 May to postpone all these fictional assaults, leak that news to the Germans and the Italians in late May, and revive all these threats two months later. The revised Plan Barclay envisaged the same sequence of events, but these attacks would peak some twelve days after the actual landing on Sicily (10 July), and eleven days afterward, the fictional assault on southern France would take place. 48 The Allies also planned a naval feint, code-named Operation Fracture, as part of the overall deception effort for the landing on Sicily. This action was planned for the early morning on D-2 and in the night on between D-2 and D-3 in the area of Marsala-

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Mazzara. Forces assigned for Operation Fracture included one cruiser and battleship division each, and a force of coastal craft. Their task was to present the defender with the threat of landing by bombarding the town of Marsala and the island of Marettimo, and conduct a demonstration with coastal forces off Marsala. 49 The Germans were led to believe that a landing on Sicily was merely preliminary and a subordinate part of a major operation that included the capture of Sardinia and Corsica and the invasion of the southern Balkans. German troop dispositions were deployed based on that belle f.5() The Germans sent substantial forces to the Balkans and their forces were divided among Sardinia, Sicily, Corsica, and the mainland of Italy. However, not all Axis commanders were deceived, because there were sufficient signssuch as concentration of the Allied landing craft and ground troops in North African ports, and increased air activity-that unmistakably pointed out that the next Allied objective was Sicily. 51 Italian intelligence was accurate in its assessment on 24 June that the Allied exercise near Oran was a rehearsal for a paratroop drop on Sicily. A week later another intelligence report accurately pointed out that the next Allied objective would be Sardinia or Sicily, and most likely Sicily. Apparently, the higher authorities in Rome and Berlin did not believe these reports. The Allied landing on Sicily achieved complete surprise. Naval tactical feints kept some Axis forces away from the landing beaches on Sicily. The Allies were also successful in deceiving the defenders that their amphibious convoys were moving toward Greece because their routes converged in the general area of Malta and then the direction of their movement was changed and they approached Sicily under cover of darkness. Scope and Duration: The physical space in which deception efforts are conducted range from an area of operations for tactical deception to two or more theaters of war at the national and alliance/coalition levels. Operational deception encompasses a large part or the entire theater of operations. Tactical deception is sustained over a relatively short period. If not coordinated, tactical deception often can disrupt the plan for a major operation or campaign plan. Operational deception must be maintained over a longer period with a consequent greater risk of discovery by the enemy. This risk may require a high degree of security to facilitate the deception of the friendly forces involved. There are many commonalties between operational and tactical deception and significant differences in terms of timing, scale, and intelligence . 53 Methods: The larger the deception objective, the more diverse the methods that must be used to achieve success. In tactical deception, a ruse or feint could be sufficient to deceive the enemy. At the operational level, not only military but also nonmilitary actions and measures must be used to accomplish the deception objective. Deception methods range from spreading rumors and feeding false information to actual combat actions of one's forces. At the highest level, diplomatic, political, economic, and informational instruments of national power are used to ensure success of strategic deception. Information plants and use of controlled enemy agents are often employed to sell the deception story. Feints, demonstrations, and ruses are used to tie down enemy forces in a certain area and thereby enhance the success in the sector of the main effort. Rumors are often spread to support the deception story, falsely indicating one's strength in a certain area or movements of one's forces. They are also used to deny certain rumors. Rumors are usually rampant among civilians and military personnel 506

before the start of a major operation or campaign. They serve principally to confuse friend and enemy alike, but are of little use for supporting the deception story. However, the deliberate planting of rumors can assist in pointing toward a specific cover objective and time. This requires careful handling, especially as to origin and timing; no rumors should be initiated except in accordance with an approved plan. Another often-used method is to either minimize or exaggerate the actual strength of one's forces. This is usually done by creating a notional order of battle. At the strategic level, it is difficult to deceive the enemy at the beginning of the war because both sides have an accurate picture of the other's overall strength. The extensive exaggeration of strength in individual theaters of operation might easily indicate to the enemy the deceptive nature of these exaggerations .55 A different situation could exist during a war because of the lack of information on the real strength of forces in conflict. The key to success is to deny the enemy information on what is occurring on one's side. The Allies succeeded in creating notional forces during the preparation for the Normandy landing and in many major operations conducted in the Mediterranean because the Germans had little or no capability to obtain or confirm the accurate picture of the situation. Command and Control: Planning and execution of deception is a command responsibility. Operational and strategic deception is invariably planned by the joint or combined force commander. Tactical deception can be sometimes planned and conducted without a specific order from the operational commander. The operations officer has the staff responsibility for the overall coordination of deception. The personnel officer is especially interested in deception as it pertains to the civilian population. The intelligence officer works closely with the operations officer in developing deception plans. He is not only responsible for providing intelligence input, but is also concerned with counterintelligence activities and the ability of the enemy to obtain accurate intelligence. The logistics officer assists deception plans by advice on supply, evacuation, hospitalization, and transportation. Operational deception must carefully target the enemy commander who has the authority, forces, and assets to react in the desired manner. Deception, to be successful, must reach the enemy through his own sources of information, his intelligence system. One's plans must be so designed that the enemy will collect carefully planted information, some false, some true, which appears logical to him and causes him to reach the conclusion we desire him to. 56 Deception efforts cannot be successful without properly developed theory and doctrine. Preparation of personnel, forces, and assets to be used for deception must start in peacetime and must be continuous. Deception demands significant planning effort on the part of the commander and his staff. A high degree of centralized command and control is also required. The planning effort must be directed through a single organization for planning and supervision. Any system of deception from which one may expect successful results requires the existence of an organization which not only plans the operation but also directs its implementation as a whole and sees that all measures are coordinated with each other and directed toward the common goal. In World War 11, the British had primary strategic responsibility for Allied cover and deception in the European Theater. Coordination was effected by a small interservice agency called the London Controlling Section (LCS), composed of about eight officers and three liaison duty officers. For cover, this agency was placed under British 507

Staff planners. It had great influence on overall deception policy because it had direct access to the War Cabinet and the British Chiefs of Staff. Each British theater commander had a staff section, composed of about twelve officers with specialist training, responsible for the implementation of the overall theater deception plan. Each British Army Group had a full-time deception section of seven to ten officers, while other important British Army and Navy staffs had smaller deception sections. A total of about ninety officers specially trained in deception served in the theater staff sections. 57 In the Mediterranean, the British created a so-called "Force A" as a permanent deception planning staff at the Headquarters of the CINC Middle East in Cairo. It was controlled by the LCS in London. However, its main responsibility was to prepare and execute deception plans in support of the Allied commanders in North Africa and Italy. This organization was composed of about sixty officers and specialists. It was responsible for planning all operational deception plans, such as Barclay, as well as tactical deception plans. The United States paid almost no attention to the use of deception before the country entered World War II. Only afterward, and mostly at British instigation, did the U.S. military begin to include deception plans in its strategic plans for the European Theater and Pacific. A small office, called Joint Security Control, was created in Washington, D.C. and worked directly for the JCS. It was charged with coordination of cover and deception on the strategic level. In addition, implementing teams of Army and Navy personnel were attached to each U.S. command in the European Theater. 58 The Soviets traditionally paid extraordinary attention to all types of cover and deception. They also have a highly centralized approach to deception planning. The High Command (Stavka) usually prepared an overall deception plan and assigned deception tasks to subordinate headquarters. The Soviet Front (Army Group in Western terms) and Army commanders controlled deception efforts through the respective Chiefs of Staff. Each of the major headquarters had a small provisional planning group, mostly composed of specialists, to plan deception. All Soviet deception efforts were coordinated among several levels of command. The Germans practiced cover and deception extensively from the beginning of the war. Some of their most successful deceptions, notably the surprise offensive in the Ardennes in December 1944, resulted from Hitler's ideas or directives. These plans were usually tightly controlled, and many of them were successful, but some-like Plan Albion in 1941 failed. However, the German effort suffered because of the lack of an overall agency to coordinate all deception efforts at the strategic level. Not until 1 March 1945 was a central deception agency created . 59 Forces and Assets: Operational deception is normally a joint and often a combined effort. Relatively large forces and assets are required for any successful deception effort. The enemy must be convinced that large multiservice forces are arrayed against him in the theater. The requirement to portray in reality the activities of large forces-such as corps, armies, naval or air fleets, or task forces-could discourage initiation of the deception effort. Another factor is that one's forces are difficult to move covertly without the enemy learning about their existence and movements. One's forces and assets must be adequate for the task; otherwise, operational deception cannot be successful. Many excellently conceived deception efforts failed because too few forces and assets were assigned to make the deception story believable to the enemy. 508

Normally, the operational commander should not dedicate any part of his forces solely to deception. Also, a plan relying solely on deception is often a failed plan. The solution is to use real forces only temporarily as part of deception or establish notional headquarters and forces or use the real and notional forces in combination. A key prerequisite for success, then, is that the enemy does not have the capability to observe and evaluate the real situation on one's side. The Allied deception Plan Fortitude was successful because the Germans were convinced that the notional forces were real. Plan Fortitude North envisaged the creation of a notional British 4th Army in Scotland and the real U.S. forces deployed in Ireland and subordinate to that headquarters. The real training exercises by U.S. forces in Ireland were carried out to serve the deception purposes. Special British signal troops undertook training exercises, including notional assault training. In early May, the entire assault force presumably moved to the River Clyde area. Additionally, radio deception measures were conducted. Simultaneously, the Soviets made real preparations for a simulated assault in northern Norway, and conducted actual operations along the Kola Peninsula. 60 Fortitude North incorporated an elaborate fictional order of battle using as a base of expansion, real divisional units based in southern England. These units were made to appear to be under General George Patton, Commanding General (CG) of the First Army Group (FUSAG), who, in reality, had nothing but a staff. Radio traffic and amphibious exercises were carried out to indicate the assembly and training of these huge forces. Actual air activity and decoy landing craft supported this deception. For the actual invasion of Normandy, the Allied ground forces were organized into the 21st Army Group under General Eisenhower. The Germans were informed by various channels that the 21st Army Group consisted of British and U.S. troops and that two other forces were trained in amphibious warfare, the FUSAG and the British 4th Army. The First Army would be built in the German mind in the Pas de Calais area by a story that placed the First Canadian Army, actually concentrating in the Dover area, and the actual U.S. Third Army, and later the U.S. Ninth Army under FUSAG command. In reality, these would be committed to the Normandy area after the real landing took place. 61 Deception Plan Fortitude South-II was more elaborate than Fortitude North. A complete order of battle by an Army Group composed of one Canadian and one U.S. Army, totaling eighteen divisions, was established between Dover, London, and East Anglia. All formations represented real forces until the introduction of 37th U.S. Corps and the 59th U.S. Infantry Division, which were notional forces. The radio net established by the 3103rd Signal Service Battalion used the same radio operators so that the Germans could recognize them. The real forces assigned for the Fortitude South-II maintained radio silence. After D-Day, forces assigned to Fortitude South II net were removed in time to allow their notional movement from Fortitude South II area to the continent , 62 Intelligence Support: No deception effort could be successful without effective intelligence support. 63The deception planner relies heavily on intelligence to construct a plausible story aimed at taking advantage of the enemy commander's fears, assumptions, and preconceptions of one's forces and the situation. The theater must be seen through the eyes of the enemy operational commander. To be plausible, the deception story must be based on the thorough understanding of what the enemy operational commander really knows of one's forces and how he thinks one's forces are going to conduct the 509

forthcoming major operation or campaign. Intelligence is extensively used after the deception story has been developed. It is used to identify the parts of the enemy's collection and evaluation structure to which the story will be "sold." After certain parts of the deception story are leaked, intelligence is required to assess the effect of one's deception plan on the enemy. Perhaps the most critical part of that assessment is to predict how the enemy's commander is going to react. The planners then use intelligence input to adjust or modify both the operation and deception plans. A successful deception is simply not possible without intelligence support. Operational intelligence relies more on HUMINT and highly sophisticated SIGINT in their assessment of the enemy situation and intentions than on other sources. It is, in fact, by feeding certain signals to the enemy's HUMINT and SIGINT collectors that the deception story can be constructed for enemy consumption. By hiding the indicators of one's true disposition, strengths, etc., from the enemy's collectors, it is possible to deny the enemy commander knowledge of one's actual intentions. 64 The reason for the success of Allied deception efforts in the European theater in World War II was that the Allies broke the German codes and played on Axis fears and preconceptions of Allied intentions. The Allies followed the results of the notional stories the Germans were being fed. These successes were principally achieved through Allied cryptanalytic capabilities, as the primary means of gathering information and planting misinformation. The Allies monitored secret operational communications and determined German intentions and orders of battle, including disposition of forces, as well as monitored reports from intelligence stations using Enigma intercepts and compromised agents. This also allowed the Allies to properly assess the degree of Hitler's obsession with the purported Allied threat to Norway and the Balkans. Most of the Allied deception stories, which were highly successful, played on Hitler's fears about these two Germanoccupied areas. British intelligence used double agents, leaks to newspaper correspondents, rumors in diplomatic channels, communications deception, and false orders-of-battle to plant the deception stories. These methods were coupled with real units and equipment, and actual movements of ground, sea, and air forces. The British obtained accurate feedback reflected in the interception of the Enigma signals and through double agents. The key contribution of Allied intelligence was creating a false order-of-battle in preparing deception plans. Otherwise, the Allies could not cause the Germans to react operationally, because there were no actual forces available for such purposes. In fact, the success of operational deception cannot be achieved without convincing the enemy's operational commander that one's forces are larger than they actually are. To be successful, operational deception requires a complete understanding of the enemy's intelligence-gathering, decision cycle, preconceptions about one's intent and capabilities, and doctrine. Because one's deception efforts are portrayed to the enemy through its intelligence collection systems, identification of the enemy's modes of collection, timeliness of reporting, relative weight of information received through each system, and how it enters the enemy commander's decision cycle will ensure that the proper information is provided via the appropriate means and at the proper time for maximum effect on the enemy commander. Reasons for Failure: While many deception plans were successful, many also failed. One of the most common reasons for failure was lack of understanding of the enemy 510

commander's way of thinking and his possible reactions. Other common reasons were assigning inadequate forces and assets to the deception effort, or attempting the deception in spite of a great mismatch between the deception objectives and the resources available. Major breaches of operations security were often a reason for the deception failure. Reasons for failure also include incomplete or wrong understanding of the enemy's intelligence; inadequate or improper channels for conveying the deception story; or incomplete or inadequate control of important variables in the deception process. Sometimes the deception story was too sophisticated to be accepted or too simplistic to be believed by the enemy commander. The deception target might be unable to react in the anticipated manner although the deception was credible. Deception could also fail if ti me was insufficient for the deception process to run its course, and sometimes just plain bad luck caused detection of the deception story by the enemy. 65 The Allies' greatest deception failure of World War 11, Operation Cockade, was largely caused by a deception plan which was not plausible to the enemy. Conceived in early 1 943, Cockade's major objective was to conceal the weakness of the Allied forces then being assembled in England and to discourage transfer of the German forces to the Eastern Front. 66 The plan was divided into three components: Starkey, Tindall, and Wadham. The overall purpose was to relieve the Soviets and the Allied forces in North Africa by pinning down German forces in northwestern France and Norway and threatening to invade the continent. The plan's target date was September 1943. 67 Plan Starkey envisaged fourteen mutually supporting commando raids, code-named Forfar; aimed at inducing the Germans to believe that a large-scale invasion threatened the ,Pas de Calais area, thereby tying down their forces in northwestern France. Forfar included actual training exercise and actions by commando teams. The deception story implied a large-scale amphibious attack against the French coast to lure German Luftwaffe into a battle on Allied terms. The Forfar raids were intended to simulate intelligence-gathering missions in preparation for the notional imminent cross-Channel invasion. However, only eight raids were actually launched, and they failed to elicit any German reaction. 68 Plan Tindall was intended to portray an impending attack against Stavanger, Norway, with the objective of pinning down German forces in Scandinavia. This required considerable preparation in the display of physical resources. The British improved airfields and strengthened air defenses at several airfields in Scotland. In addition, a number of decoy bombers and troop-carrying gliders were displayed there . 69 The planners were concerned that Tindall, in combination with Starkey, was insufficiently credible because the Germans might not believe that the Allies had sufficient resources. Thus, the entire plan was executed in three phases. Unlike Starkey, forces for Tindall was entirely notional. However, the plan proved to be too ambitious. 70 Plan Wadham was entirely an U.S. effort. The objective was to pose a threat to Brest and tie down the German troops in that part of occupied France. The U.S. notional follow-up force would be landed there after sailing directly from the United States . 71 All three plans failed largely because they were totally implausible to the Germans. No credible threat of the Allied invasion of Europe existed at that stage of the war. 72 The Germans prepared strategic deception Plan Albion as a cover for their pending invasion of Soviet Russia in June 1 941. Two components of this plan were code-named Haifisch [Shark] and Harpune [Harpoon]. Plan Shark was intended to induce the British to believe that eight German divisions and one airborne unit would land on the

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southeastern coast of England to secure a beachhead and seize some airfields. Naval forces were to transport a landing force and clear the British minefields. This deception plan was initially planned for execution in March or April 1 941; however, planning was inordinately slow and ponderous. A greater failure was that only five landing barges and ten fishing vessels were available; hence, the deception was not believable for the British." Plan Harpoon was a cover for Plan Shark. It was designed to draw British forces away from the fictional assault area. The Germans planned two operations: Harpoon North simulating an attack from Norway and Denmark against the British North Sea coast between Tynemouth (north of Sunderland) and Berwick-upon-Tweed (south of Edinburgh); and Harpoon South to be launched from the Brittany peninsula against the southwest coast of England in the area of Lyme Bay (northwest of Weymouth). However, both deception plans failed, partly because Hitler wrongly believed that England was more vulnerable than it was, and partly because the Germans assigned inadequate forces and assets for the operation. 74 A deception plan invariably fails if the physical objective is too transparent to the enemy, either due to physical features of the theater or area of operations or because of a security leak or intelligence failure. In mounting major efforts to resupply Malta in 1941 1942, the British prepared deception plans for each major operation. Most of these plans failed because there was never any doubt what the ultimate destination of the Allied major convoys were Malta. Hence, the Axis was not deceived by the repeated British deception efforts. In planning a major convoy to resupply Malta from Gibraltar in August 1942 (Operation Pedestao, the British planned a diversion (Operation M. G.3.) in the eastern Mediterranean. A convoy of three merchant ships (M. W.12), under cover of a task force of two cruisers and five destroyers would sail from Port Said to a position some 100 miles west-southwest of Crete. Two British submarines would be deployed in the same area to prevent any intervention of Italian naval forces based at Taranto. Another British submarine would be deployed off Navarino (Pilos), Peloponnesus, to watch the movements of the Italian 8th Naval Division and disperse Italian strength, and one British submarine would debark commandos off Catania, Sicily, to carry out a raid against the nearby airfield. However, the Axis was not distracted by the British efforts to divert them from their principal objective destruction of the Allied convoy sailing from Gibraltar to Malta. Conclusion: Deception in general is one of the most neglected yet arguably most critical element in the employment of military forces at any level. It is a force multiplier and therefore should be part of any operations plan. Deception is a critical part of a campaign or major operation, and the operational commanders and their staffs must firmly believe in its importance in all their planning and preparations. The target of operational deception is always the enemy commander who has the authority and capability to act and react operationally or even strategically. Strategic deception invariably aims to influence decisions made, or to be made, by the highest national or alliance/coalition leadership. Because of the major objectives to be accomplished and correspondingly large forces involved, success or failure of strategic and operational deception could have a dramatic effect on the outcome of a campaign or major operation. Tactical, operational, and strategic deceptions are mutually supporting and complementary. The success or failure of tactical deception would have an immediate 51 2

effect on operational deception. The failure of deception at the national or theaterstrategic level usually nullifies the results of deception at the operational and tactical levels. Planning and execution of operational deception is the responsibility of the operational commanders and their staffs. They have the necessary authority and responsibility to centralize all the planning and resources of several services. Centralized direction is the key prerequisite for success of operational deception. Optimally, each staff throughout the chain of command should have a permanent deception cell composed of officers and civilians specialized in the art of deception. Adequate forces and assets must be available so that deception efforts can succeed. Many deception efforts ended in failure because the high command or operational commander assigned insufficient forces and assets for deception effort. Intelligence support for deception must be comprehensive and continuous. Without good and reliable intelligence at each stage of the deception effort, success will be elusive or impossible. Intelligence is essential for acquiring accurate, timely, and relevant information on the enemy commander's perceptions and possible reactions to one's actions. Information technology, no matter how advanced, cannot resolve this problem, but regional expertise and old-fashioned HUMINT could. However, this takes a long time to develop and mature. What counts most is the attitude toward deception. As new information technologies increase, rather than reducing opportunities for deception efforts, they will increase one's vulnerability to deception.

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Notes 1. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 90-2: Battlefield Deception ( Washington, DC: 3 October 1988), p. 1-l . 2. In another definition, a deception can be defined as the planned measures for revealing or conveying to the enemy true information or false information that could be evaluated as true regarding our strategic plans, strength, dispositions or tactics, with the purpose of causing him to reach false estimates and to act thereon; Part I-Introduction, p.1; Strategic Plans Division Branch, OP-607 Support Plans Branch (Series XXII), Box 531, Naval Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington, DC. 3. Charles Cruickshank, Deception in World War II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 146-7. 4. "Military Cover and Deception (Strategic)." Presentation prepared in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 5 August 1947, Strategic Plans Division Records, OP-607 Support Plans Branch (Series XXII), Box 530, Folder # 2, Naval Operational Archives, The Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC, p. 18. 5. Cruickshank, Deception in World War 11, pp. 160, 165. 6. Ibid., p. 96. 7. Ibid., pp. 158-60. 8. Combined Chiefs of Staff, "Plan Bodyguard," 20 January 1944, Strategic Plans Divisions Records, OP607 Support Plans Branch (Series XXII), Box 531, Naval Operational Archives, The Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC, pp. 7-8. 9. Cruickshank, Deception in World War 11 , pp. 125-7, 138-9. 10. "Military Cover and Deception (Strategic)." Presentation prepared in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 5 August 1947, Strategic Plans Division Records, OP-607 Support Plans Branch (Series XXII), Box 530, Folder # 2, Naval Operational Archives, The Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC, p. 6. 11. "Deception Operations in Support of the North African Landings," Strategic Plans Division Records, OP-607 Support Plans Branch, Box 530, p. 1. 12. Ibid., pp. 1-2. 13. Ibid., p. 2. 14. Ibid., p. 3. 15. "Deception Operations in Support of the North African Landings," Strategic Plans Division Records, OP-607 Support Plans Branch, Box 530, pp. 3-4. 16. Donald J. Sexton, "Phantoms of the North: British Deceptions in Scandinavia, 1941-1944," Military Affairs, October 1983, p. 1 12. 17. Cover & Deception Report ETO: "Cover & Deception, Synopsis of History," Strategic Plans Divisions Records, OP-607 Support Plans Branch (Series XXII), Box 549, Naval Operational Archives, The Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC, p. 6. 18. "Military Cover and Deception (Strategic)." Presentation prepared in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 5 August 1947, Strategic Plans Division Records, OP-607 Support Plans Branch (Series XXII), Box 530, Folder #2, Naval Operational Archives, The Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC, p. 20.

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19. Donald J. Sexton, "Phantoms of the North: British Deceptions in Scandinavia, 1941-1944," p. 112. 20. "Military Cover and Deception (Strategic)." Presentation prepared in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 5 August 1947, Strategic Plans Division Records, OP-607 Support Plans Branch (Series XXII), Box 530, Folder #2, Naval Operational Archives, The Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC, p. 21. 21. Ibid., p. 24. Cover & Deception Report ETO: "Cover & Deception, Synopsis of History," Strategic Plans Divisions Records, OP-607 Support Plans Branch (Series XXII), Box 549, Naval Operational Archives, The Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC., p. 8. 22. Ibid., p. 8. 23. "Military Cover and Deception (Strategic)." Presentation prepared in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 5 August 1947, Strategic Plans Division Records, OP-607 Support Plans Branch (Series XXII), Box 530, Folder # 2, Naval Operational Archives, The Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC, pp. 5-7. 24. "Summary of Activities by the U.S. Navy Cover and Deception Organization in World War II," 10 July 1946; Strategic Plans Division Records, OP-607 Support Plans Branch (Series XXII), Box 530, Folder #2, Naval Operational Archives, The Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC, p. 11. 25. "Military Cover and Deception (Strategic)," p. 9. 26. "Cover Plans for Detachment, Iceberg, and Subsequent Operations in the Pacific Ocean Areas During 1945," 21 November 1944, CINCPAC Command File, 20 November-15 December 1944, Command File World War II, Naval Operational Archives, the Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC, p. 1. 27. "Military Cover and Deception (Strategic)." Presentation prepared in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 5 August 1947, p. 11. 28. "Summary of Activities by the U.S. Navy Cover and Deception Organization in World War n," 10 July 1946; Strategic Plans Division Records, OP-607 Support Plans Branch (Series XXII), Box 530, Folder # 2, Naval Operational Archives, The Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC, p. 11. 29. "Military Cover and Deception (Strategic)," p. 11. 30. Ibid., p. 12. 31. Ibid., pp. 12-3. 32. Ibid., p. 13. 33. Ibid., pp. 13-4. 34. Ibid., p. 17. 35. Ibid., p. 17. 36. SHAEF, "Plan Fortitude South II, 19 July 1944"; Strategic Plans Divisions Records, OP-607 Support Plans Branch (Series XXII), Box 531, Naval Operational Archives, The Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC, p. 13. 37. Cover & Deception Report ETO: "Cover & Deception, Synopsis of History," p. 9.

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38. "Operational Deception," Presentation at the Naval War College, Newport, 7 March 1947, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, "Deception Evaluation Report Number Two," 30 April 1947, Command File, World War 11, pp. 15-7. 39. Ibid., pp. 17-9. 40. Adrian Stewart, The Battle of Leyte Gulf (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1980), p. 19. 41. Interrogation NAV No. 55 , USSBS No. 227, p. 221. 42. Albert N. Garland, et al., Sicily and the Surrende r of Italy, United States Army in World War 11. The Mediterranean Theater of Operations (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1 st printed 1965, reprinted 1986), p. 64. 43. "Operation Mincemeat," ADM 223/794, Public Records Office, London, p. 10. 44. Garland, et al., Sicily and the Surrender of Italy , p. 65. 45. Michael Howard, Grand Strategy, Vol. IV: August 1942-September 1943 , History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Series, edited by J.R.M. Butler (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1970), p. 370. 46. Cruickshank, Deception in World War II , p. 51. 47. Garland, et al., Sicily and the Surrender of Italy, p. 65. 48. Cruickshank, Deception in World War 11, pp. 51-2. 49. Memorandum "Operation Fracture," by Commander in Chief Mediterranean, 27 June 1943 Strategic Plans Division Records, OP-607 Support Plans Branch, Box 543, Naval Operational Archives, The Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC. 50. "Military Cover and Deception During World War II," Strategic Plans Divisions Records, OP-607 Support Plans Branch (Series XXII), Box 531, Naval Operational Archives, The Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC., pp. I- I 1 and I-12. 51. Garland, et al., Sicily and the Surrender of Italy , p. 65. 52. Cruickshank, Deception in World War 11 , p. 60. 53. Thomas A. Savoia, Deception at the Operational Level of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, May 1986), p. 6. 54. J.S.C. Memo #8: "Notes on Deception in a Theater of Operations," I September 1944, OP-607 Support Plans Branch, Box 533, Naval Operational Archives, The Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC, p. 13. 55. Ibid., p. 11. 56. Conference "Operational Deception," 21 August 1946, Strategic Plans Division Records, OP-607 Support Plans Branch (Series XXII), Box 546, Naval Operational Archives, The Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC, p. 1. 57. "Military Cover and Deception During World War 11," Strategic Plans Divisions Records, OP-607 Support Plans Branch (Series XXII), Box 531, Naval Operational Archives, The Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC., pp. I-9 and I-10.

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58. Ibid., pp. 1-10 and 1-11. 59. Ibid., p. 1-3. 60. "Military Cover and Deception (Strategic)," p. 21; Cover & Deception Report ETO: "Cover & Deception, Synopsis of History," p. 7. 61. "Military Cover and Deception (Strategic)," p. 21. 62. Cover & Deception Report ETO: "Cover & Deception, Synopsis of History," p. 7. 63. Savoia, Deception at the Operational Level of War, p. 4. 64. Ibid., p. 4. 65. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 90-2: Battlefield Deception ( Washington, DC: 3 October 1988), p. 1-17. 66. Ibid., p. 1-20. 67. Cover & Deception Report ETO: "Cover & Deception, Synopsis of History," p. 2. 68. FM 90-2: Battlefield Deception, pp. 1-20 and 1-21. 69. Ibid., p. 1-22. 70. Cruickshank, Deception in World War II , p. 77 71. Cover & Deception Report ETO: "Cover & Deception, Synopsis of History," Strategic Plans Divisions Records, OP-607 Support Plans Branch (Series XXII), Box 549, Naval Operational Archives, The Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC, p. 2; Cruickshank, Deception in World War II, pp. 61, 81. 72. Also, the Germans received the picture of the situation from too many sources; FM 90-2: Battlefield Deception, p. 1-23. 73. Ibid., p. 1-18. 74. Ibid., p. 1-18. 75. Ufficio Storico Della Marina Militare (USM), La Marina Italiana Nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale, Vol. V: Le Azioni Navali In Mediterraneo Dal l Aprile All 8 Settembro 1943 (Roma: Ufficio Storico Della Marina Militare, 1970), p. 356.

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DECEPTION PLANNING A deception plan originates by a directive from higher headquarters, or sometimes the operational commander decides to initiate deception planning based on his appreciation of the situation. The commander and the staff officers who take part in deception planning should also have comprehensive knowledge and understanding of the operational or strategic situation. They must know the enemy, his intelligence organization, and which sources of intelligence he trusts or does not trust. They must have a detailed and accurate personal profile of the enemy's commanders, their perceptions and biases, and their personal relationships. They also need to know-and this is probably the hardest part-what the enemy believes about one's strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities. Components: In generic terms, plausibility, security, and coordination are the key components of deception planning. Plausibility is perhaps the single most important factor in planning and executing successful deception. A deception plan cannot be successful if no one would believe the "story" on which it is predicated. The key factor is to convince the enemy that one's deception story is not a lie but a true story. To be plausible, the enemy must consider the deception story to be a logical course of action. Plausibility helps to preserve the integrity of the operation, despite possible breaches in security.' The planners must make sure that each element of the deception scheme fits logically into the overall operational or strategic situation. The "story" must be a realistic course of action; often the best alternative course of action in the commander's estimate of the situation could be used for that purpose. It should focus on the enemy's expectations, preconceptions, and fears. This is very difficult to achieve at the operational level because of the sheer size of forces involved and the large area in which combat takes place. However, these difficulties are not insurmountable, as illustrated by the Allied deception Plan Barclay in the invasion of Sicily in July 1943, and the German deception of their counteroffensive in the Ardennes in December 1944. The German success was attributable not only to the Allies' massive intelligence failure in interpreting indications and warnings but also to the Allied reliance on German intentions, not their capabilities. More important was the masterful deception inspired by Hitler. The Germans succeeded in painting for the Allies a different picture of the operational situation in the West. They spread half-truths about their actions in the weeks before starting their counteroffensive by openly propagating the story that Germany was greatly concerned that the Allied First and Ninth Armies would cross the Rhine and advance to the sector between Bonn and Cologne. Hitler decided to mass forces for a major counterattack northwest of Cologne while a secondary attack with weak divisions was being prepared in the Eiffel to contain the Allied right flank at the sector of penetration. 2 Plausibility of the deception story depends on many factors. Usually, the enemy commander will not accept deception quickly, and many signals might be required over ti me to convince him that his first impression was wrong. The deception story must be logical; otherwise the target will either not react or dismiss the story entirely. The enemy commander will probably accept the story if it conforms to his preconceptions, expectations, or biases. One reason the Allies were consistently successful against the Germans was that they had positive knowledge of Hitler's obsession with the possible 519

Allied landings in Norway or Denmark and in the Balkans. Likewise, the Allies in the Pacific were successful in their strategic deception because of their knowledge of the Japanese sensitivity to the threat posed to the Kuriles and their Home Islands. The deception story must closely or approximately correspond to the operational or strategic realities of the situation. 3 The most effective deception story is one that reinforces the enemy's belief in what he already expects to be true hence, the critical role of detailed and accurate knowledge of the enemy's perceptions and beliefs. The operational commander and the planners must place themselves into the enemy's situation and view the operational or strategic situation from the enemy's perspective. The deception story will fail if it only mirrors one's views on the situation in the theater. The enemy's past pattern of beliefs and actions, his doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures must be thoroughly understood. Very often, the most effective deception stories are those that do not cause the enemy to change anything he did in the past. Operations security is one of the key prerequisites for the success of the deception effort. It supports deception through passive measures designed to conceal one's plans, intentions, and activities. It is intended to protect from the enemy the real plan, that is, the existence of a deception effort and the elements of a deception plan. Operations security is, in fact, the defensive side of operational deception. 4 Generally, the larger the scale of the deception effort, the longer the duration and the more complex the plan. The operational commander must overcome or balance the factors of time and space because the supporting deception plan must be maintained for weeks or months. Because the risk of discovery becomes magnified with time, an increasing effort is needed to protect the deception plan from being compromised. The consequences of compromising a deception plan can be devastating. This is what happened to the Japanese in their Operation MI (which led to the Battle of Midway) when U.S. cryptographers succeeded in decoding the real purpose of the Japanese feint toward the Aleutians. Security of the deception plan is inherently enhanced with false information, selected leaks, half-truths, and misinterpretation. The greatest problem for the enemy represents the series of deliberate leaks that might be individually insignificant but whose true significance develops over time. Deliberate breaches of one's security and sometimes even unintentional leaks could increase ambiguity and cause confusion for the enemy. In the weeks preceding the German invasion of Soviet Russia in June 1941, a dozen security breaches on the part of the Germans revealed Hitler's intentions. Yet Stalin remained firmly convinced that German massive deployment in the East was in fact a cover for the invasion of England. He also wrongly believed that Hitler would not attack unless he first issued an ultimatum. At least that was Hitler's pattern until April 1941. Stalin also considered all the Allied warnings about the impending German attack as "provocation. "5 One of the essential methods of enhancing OPSEC is to strictly limit the number of personnel involved in the deception effort. Creating a highly specialized but small deception planning section within a large headquarters combined with centralized direction and execution of deception is perhaps the best way of enhancing the security of deception planning. Field Marshal Rommel was extremely conscious of the need for OPSEC. He usually kept his own council, informing neither his own staff nor the German

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Supreme Command about his intentions. He especially distrusted Italians because they were extremely loose with security. 6 The Germans, in planning their surprise counteroffensive in the Ardennes in December 1944, strictly limited the number of commanders who knew of the plan. Chiefs of Staff of two army groups whose forces were to take part in the offensive were obliged to sign a pledge of secrecy and were under penalty of being shot if they leaked the plan. Often, deception security is greatly enhanced by deceiving one's high commanders and their subordinates. Almost all successful deceptions were based on not informing one's forces of the deception efforts. This method enhances the chances of success of the entire plan because one's forces will better motivated for the forthcoming action. Before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Japanese Rear Admiral Ryunosuke Kusaka, the new Chief of Staff to Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo's Ist Air Fleet (fast carrier force), enhanced security by, rather than having the winter supplies sent directly to the ships, having the material loaded on a freighter that later secretly rendezvoused with the fleet. $ It is well known that one's forces will be far more inclined to prepare and carry out deception tasks in earnest if convinced that their efforts in fact do not serve that purpose but are aimed at some clear military objective. The Germans in their Ardennes counteroffensive in December 1944 went so far that their front commanders were convinced that massing of supplies and withdrawing of frontline divisions were intended to provide fresh troops for the defense of the Ruhr and the Palatinate. 9 One of the best methods of enhancing security of a deception plan is by surrounding it with the truth. The plausible, realistic deception plan can be its own best security. The Germans were completely surprised by the major Soviet offensive against their Army Group Center in June 1944 (Operation Bagration) because they firmly believed that the Soviet offensive would start in the southern part of the front. They "bought" the Soviet, deception story in its entirety, despite numerous warnings of the impending Soviet attack on the central part of their front. Security, while critical for the success of the deception effort, should not be applied to the extreme. Too-high security invariably hinders coordination. Thus, there should always be a balance between the effectiveness of the planned deception and security. The enemy is always alert for indications and warnings. Hence, there is no such a thing as perfect security. The operational commanders must be aware of the possibility that their deception plans could be compromised and try to use possible breaches in security to their own advantage. Operational commanders must reconcile possible differences in terms of deception objectives and methods recommended by their staffs. This is ensured through coordination of the deception effort throughout the chain of command and among various levels of command. Because deception planning is conducted concurrently and at various staff sections, there are invariably differences of approach and inconsistencies that must be resolved. The operational commanders must also be sure deception plans prepared by their superiors and subordinates do not conflict with their own plans. Sometimes, the strategic deception plan involves forces and assets assigned to an operational commander who is not aware of deception plan. To prevent conflict of deception plans at the operational and tactical levels, operational deception must be synchronized with tactical deception. The operational commander must coordinate his deception plan with subordinates because of the danger of deceiving his own or friendly forces. In addition,

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operational deception plans must be within the framework of a given plan for strategic deception. At the strategic and operational level, diplomatic, political, economic, and media must be coordinated to ensure success of operational deception. An operational deception plan never stands alone, but supports the plan of a campaign or major operation. Therefore, it is critical that both plans be coordinated because they are aimed to accomplish the same objective. Often, deception plans will use not only notional forces, but real forces as well. This might endanger the success of the real plan if these forces interfere with actions of forces in the sector of main effort or accidentally reveal the true objective of deception effort. Thus, it is necessary during the planning process to disentangle the deception from the real plan. These efforts should also continue in the course of a campaign or major operation. Operational deception often requires the movement of large and diverse forces. Because it is usually not possible to have separate forces for the execution of the real plan and deception plan, the solution is to execute both plans simultaneously or nearly simultaneously with the same forces. The congruence between the two plans is ensured through close coordination during the planning process. The operational commander should also be able to modify or even cancel the entire deception effort if the situation dictates without adverse effects on the accomplishment of his assigned principal objective. A large-scale deception cannot be limited to individual elements. All kinds of activity may in some way serve the purpose of deception, whether in the military, political, economic, or especially informational field. All must be brought into harmony with the overall situation in order to mislead the enemy. Therefore, the key to success lies in the coordination of all subsidiary elements of deception effort. t o The success of operational deception depends on sequenced and synchronized employment of large and diverse forces and assets controlled by the operational commander. Operational and strategic deception consists of diverse and mutually supporting measures and actions. They must be integrated, they must not conflict, and they must be synchronized in terms of time, space, forces, and objective.) i Planning Process: A deception plan is always one of the supporting plans; a real operational plan is never based on the success of a deception plan. Any deception plan contains a certain degree of risk for the success of the basic plan. Thus, the operational commander and his staff should properly evaluate the degree of that risk during the planning process. However, a sound deception plan should considerably help the execution and ultimate success of the basic plan. 1 2 Deception planners must consider not only how the major operation or campaign achieves the strategic or operational objective, but how the planned deception fits into the overall military, political, and diplomatic scheme as well. 1 3 The geographic area must be considered in planning cover and deception. Another factor is the physical separation of geographic area when an alternate plan is considered for implementation. The two areas must be separated far enough to increase plausibility and to decrease susceptibility to enemy counter-deception. The Allied strategic deception Plan Fortitude in 1944 encompassed two theaters of operations, Northern and Western Europe. Likewise, the real and fictional actions in the Allied Plan Bluebird in the Pacific in 1945 stretched from the Japanese Home Islands, to the Ryukyus, Formosa, and the South China coast from Hong Kong to Amoy (Xiamen). In contrast, the operational 522

deception plan for the Allied landing in Normandy (Operation Neptune) in June 1944 encompassed only the sea and coastal area from Pas de Calais in the north to Brest in the south. Likewise, operational deception plan for the Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943 encompassed the central Mediterranean and part of the western Mediterranean. One of the most critical factors for the success of operational deception is the factor of time. Sufficient time must be available not only for planning, but also for the manufactured "evidence" to be received, processed, and evaluated by the deception target. Then, there must be sufficient time for the target to make a decision and take the actions one wants him to. This is especially important if the deception plan envisages the movement of enemy forces from one area or location to another. Deception measures, real or fictional, that cannot be concealed, should be sequenced in such a way as to generate the enemy's estimate of one's capabilities and intentions that coincide with those in the deception plan. Deception efforts must be sufficiently secure from the enemy's detection.' 4 Timing of the two alternate deception stories must allow the desired actions to be initiated, transmitted to enemy intelligence, and analyzed by that system, before the enemy can react in the manner desired. Proper timing is probably one of the most difficult parts of any deception effort. Planning Steps: A deception plan results from a similar decision-making and planning process as the plan for a campaign or major operation. However, the different perspective in conducting the estimate process and planning causes some significant differences between these two. The real plan should always dominate the entire deception planning process. The higher commander issues the mission initiating the subordinate commander's decision-making process. Afterward, the operational commander and his staff conduct mission analysis, which results in a restated mission. The commander's planning guidance is intended to provide necessary direction to his staff and also to allow concurrent decision making and planning by the subordinate commanders. The initial planning guidance normally precedes the preparation of staff estimates. At that stage of the decision-making process, the staff should know whether the commander intends to include deception as part of the planning. Therefore, in developing initial planning guidance, the commander should determine whether deception is required to support the main objective. He also must determine, based on the intelligence input, whether the enemy is susceptible to deception. In addition, he evaluates how much and what type of force he needs to use for deception and evaluates whether these forces are required for the accomplishment of the real objective. If they are, then he must consider how much time will be required for these forces to be shifted from the deception effort to take part in the accomplishment of the main objective. Finally, the commander must determine whether deception is critical for the accomplishment of his main objective. After the staff receives the commander's planning guidance, it starts to evaluate all the factors that bear on the situation. The commander conducts his estimate for deception using procedures similar to those used in planning a campaign or major operation. The estimate of the enemy's strategic or operational situation and his possible course of action must be made from the enemy's point of view. Furthermore, estimating one's dispositions, capabilities, and intentions also must be evaluated from the enemy's point of view. Afterward, that analysis serves as the basis for selection of the deception 523

objective. In evaluating one's capabilities for deception against the objectives, a comprehensive analysis of the various actions and measures open to one's forces should be made. 1 5 The most emphasis in the estimate should be given to the enemy's estimate of his own situation and how he views one's courses of action. In general, deception should be considered for each one's course of action (COA), and for each of them a separate deception estimate should be prepared. In a deception estimate, the enemy's courses of action are those one anticipates the enemy would take in reaction to one's deception effort, while one's own courses of actions are deceptive courses. 1 6 All available intelligence should be used to obtain an accurate picture of the situation as viewed by the deception target. This is critical because it has a direct bearing on the deception story to be developed. What might be one's plausible course of action might not necessarily be considered so by the enemy. 1 7 During the deception estimate process, situation analysis is conducted and the deception objective is formulated. The situation analysis states the military objective the deception plan is intended to accomplish. Also stated are one's planning assumptions. Among other things, intelligence should provide information on the deployment of the enemy's forces, command and control procedures, order of battle, doctrine, historical patterns, and basic beliefs. It also must identify the deception target-the enemy's operational commander, his expectation about one's actions, his current perceptions based on what he knows and what he does not know. This step ends with the comparison of one's own and the enemy's future courses of action and a statement of the desired situation. Formulation of the deception objective is the most important part of the deception planning process. The deception objective must articulate one's view of what action or nonaction the deception target (the enemy's commander) must take to bring about the desired situation. It should be within the enemy estimate of one's capabilities and intentions. It should clearly and concisely state who the threat commander is; what, when, and where his actions will be carried out; and whom the threat commander's actions would affect. In contrast, the mission objective statement focuses on what one's forces must do to achieve the deception objective. In formulating the deception objective it is critical to know the time involved in running a deception operations; if there is not enough time, the process stops and an alternate deception objective must be selected. 1 9 In every detail the objective chosen must be within the bounds of potentiality. The military, naval, and air forces assigned to accomplish the deception objective must be able to reach that objective as readily as they can reach the actual objective to which they may be assigned. The deception objective should receive equal or greater preliminary attention than the actual objective before the initiation of any tactical phase of the real operation. 20 In the planning phase, the key to a successful deception is to focus the plan on the enemy commander with the authority to bring about the desired situation. In this phase, two steps are performed-the desired perception and the deception story. Desired perception focuses on the views the deception target must hold to execute the action stated in one's deception objective. Properly stated, desired perception answers who must hold the desired perception, what the perception is about, and when the perception must be held and for how long. This is normally driven by the deception objective. Perceptions are based on a certain view of reality, the situation, knowledge,

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and lifetime experience. One's perceptions of reality drive one's actions, which makes perception critical for the subsequent development of the deception story. To acquire accurate assessment of the deception target's perception, it is necessary to study and thoroughly understand the enemy's past actions and patterns of behavior. The evaluation of desired perception options should be on whether the target finds the deception believable-is it consistent with the target's military culture, cultural values, and political views? It should also answer whether a desired perception is a threat or opportunity to the target, how long one could maintain that perception, and whether one's actions will support or endanger the deception. 22 The deception story is that information which, when conveyed to the target, will cause him to form one's desired perception. To put it in other terms, it is the course of action intended to cause the target to react the way one wants him to. In practice, it consists of a series of actions and measures intended to manipulate the enemy's intelligence channels, so he will believe what one desires him to believe. These measures should always be innovative and limited only by the imagination and ingenuity of the planners to use both old and new methods that will have the desired effect on the enemy. 23 Building a deception story is one of the most complicated yet critical parts of deception planning. The staff's operations and intelligence officers have the key role in building the deception story. Operational functions, specifically operational C2, operational logistics and sustainment, and operational intelligence, operational C2W, and operational fires will often be used to support a plausible deception story. It is generally easier to induce the enemy to maintain his beliefs than to present notional evidence to change them. Hitler, and most of his military commanders, believed in June 1944 that the Allies would land in the Pas de Calais area, not in Normandy. The Allied task was much easier because of Ultra intercepts that told them exactly what Hitler's obsessions were. 24 The Germans carefully evaluated the pattern of the Allied landing before Normandy and concluded that the Allies would never launch a major landing without the prospect of good weather. The deception story for Plan Fortitude was that the Allied forces were ready to return to Western Europe as soon as the German were forces seriously weakened or withdrew. Such a major operation would be carried out in cooperation with the actions of the Soviet forces in the spring 1944. The Allies would not be able to attack in the spring, but because of the Soviet pressure to open a second front they had to mount two moderately scaled assaults against Norway in April and May. 26 The immediate Allied objective was to open a supply route through northern Norway to Sweden intended to actively enlist the support of Sweden to cover an assault on Denmark from the United Kingdom. In the late summer of 1944, a large-scale cross-Channel operation with a minimum force of fifty divisions, and shipping and landing craft capable of lifting twelve divisions would be carried out. The timing of the main cross-Channel operation would be in late summer and in the direction of Pas de Calais area. Specifically, the deception story for Fortitude North was to clear the Murmansk supply lines, attack southern Norway or Denmark (or both) to draw German forces there in preparation for later assault on France. 27 For Fortitude South the deception story was that a large concentration of Allied forces in southern England was in the process of training for a possible invasion of the continent if the Germans withdrew (Operation

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Rankin). After it became clear that that story could not be supported, the planners shifted to a new line: The Allies were planning a very large assault in two phases. The first and smaller would be mounted from southwest England and directed west of the Seine; when this assault had established itself, and enemy reserves were drawn from the Pas de Calais areas, the main assault would be launched from southeast England against the Pas de Calais. The first assault would be launched in July and the second as soon as practical . 28 The deception story for the successful deception plan Fortitude South II was that, because of the German success in containing the Allied forces i~n Normandy, General Eisenhower had been forced to divert Allied forces from Fortitude South to the beachhead; these forces were replaced by fresh troops from the United States. Because of his indiscretion, General Patton was relieved from First Army Group commander to Third Army commander and would serve directly under General Omar Bradley. The Fortitude South forces, still directed by the same Army Group, were ready to invade the Pas de Calais area. The date of invasion might be any day after 15 August and depended solely on General Eisenhower's decision. A new commander of the Army Group was selected to replace General Patton in command of Fortitude South (First U.S. Army Group) and a new 12th Army Group was formed on the continent. 29 In the Pacific, the deception story for Wedlock was that the Allies would assemble five Army divisions in the Aleutians with appropriate naval and air support to conduct an amphibious assault against the northern Kuriles, tentatively on 15 June 1944. Other details included establishing a joint Army-Navy communications network to simulate movement of five notional army divisions; increasing the tempo of aerial reconnaissance and bombing of the Kuriles; increasing submarine concentration around the Kuriles; and occasionally bombarding Japanese strongholds on the islands from surface ships. The deception story for Bluebird was that China was in desperate need of Allied help. Thus, the Allies intended to establish land, sea, and air bases on or near the Asian mainland that would be suitable for the pending operations against Japan. To relieve China and to secure the required bases, the Allies intended to invade Formosa and the coast of the South China Sea in the spring of 1945. The Japanese were to be convinced that the Allied strategy was to blockade Japan by air and sea; to allow long-range bombing of industrial Japan; to land sufficient troops to relieve the China coast from Hong Kong to Amoy to open a supply route to China; to cut off the supply lines between the South and East China Seas; to isolate Japanese forces in Burma, Indochina, and areas south of it; and to secure air bases on Hokkaido . 3 o A deception story can be "sold" by several means: one's agents who hold high positions; planned leaks such as physically planting material or "indiscreet" conversation; calculated breaches of security; issuing specifically misleading currency, models, maps; or actual or simulated use of one's forces. Very often, diplomatic actions, economic arrangements, planned movements, conferences, and announcements by important persons are also used. The final product is a deception plan. Like a real plan, a sound deception plan should include alternative courses of action. The adjustments for operation plans and orders (FRAGOs) require similar adjustments to corresponding deception plans. 32 Normally, the deception plan is an annex to the operation order. However, security requirements demand that judgment be used to limit the distribution and knowledge of deception plans to those whose duties absolutely require such information. Such an annex

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is often issued separately and by a prearranged schedule . 33 However, deception security could be in grave danger if the deception plan is attached to the operation plan or operation order because the latter is distributed to many people. A prudent operational commander should reduce the number of personnel under his command who have the knowledge of the deception plan details. Plans for operational and tactical deception are closely related. A tactical deception plan exploits the tactical situation and is a derivative of the operational deception plan. Neither is drafted outside the operational framework. Operational deception plans should contain deception tasks for tactical commands. Operational plans must ensure that there is no conflict between the real and deception plans. 34 The deception actions must appear normal to enemy intelligence. As the plan unfolds, all the actions must stand the scrutiny of possible enemy evaluation by means of radio interception and air and ground reconnaissance, and agents and potential agents. The actual implementation of the deception plan must be interwoven with the real actions in the field so that it will surprise not only enemy intelligence but also, as many of one's forces as possible. 3-5 Conclusion: Deception is one of most important support plans for a campaign or major operation. The operational commanders and their staffs need to devote considerable time and thought to how to deceive the enemy. This process starts well before the commander makes his decision to start planning for a particular deception. Successful deception is the result of many factors, but primarily of the commander's and his staff's comprehensive and accurate knowledge of the enemy and all the aspects of the operational or strategic situation. This knowledge and understanding cannot be obtained mechanically, but must be based on study and reflection over time. Of all the main components of any deception effort-plausibility, security, and coordination-the most critical for success is plausibility. The deception "story" must be plausible from the enemy's point of view, so the enemy will accept it as true and then act, or not act, as expected. Building a plausible deception story is probably the most difficult of all undertaking in planning deception at the operational and strategic level. Security to protect deception planning is another component that requires a high degree of attention, many resources, and continuous effort on the part of the operational commander and his staff. No security is perfect, and small or large breaches of security are inevitable, especially in open societies. However, knowledgeable, skillful, and imaginative planners could turn these breaches to one's advantage by increasing ambiguity and confusion on the enemy's side. The planning process for deception in support of a campaign or major operation runs concurrently with planning of the actual operations plan. The commander's estimate of the situation -a mental process-is used to formulate the deception objective or the mission. The difference is that such an estimate must be entirely conducted from the enemy's perspective. Otherwise, the resulting deception objective and course of action leading to a decision would most likely not result in a realistic, logical, and plausible deception "story." A deception effort in support of a campaign or major operation is complex and consists of many parts. It is the task of the operational commanders and their staffs to coordinate all the efforts both within headquarters and within and among those commands and agencies that are required to provide active support to the plan. No 527

deception plan can be allowed to conflict with the actual plan or another deception plan so that they undermine the success of each other. Deception actions and measures must also be properly sequenced and synchronized in terms of time, space, and real or notional forces and assets used; otherwise, the deception effort will fail, no matter how good the operational deception plan is.

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Notes 1. Thomas A. Savoia, Deception at the Operational Level of War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, May 1986), p. 19. 2. Hugh M. Cole, The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge , United States Army in World War 11. The European Theater of Operations (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1st printed 1965, reprinted 1988), p. 50. 3. Savoia, Deception at the Operational Level of War, pp. 30, 8. 4. Ibid., p. 15. 5. Ibid., p. 18. 6. Ibid., p. 15-6. 7. Cole, The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge , p. 21. 8. Savoia, Deception at the Operational Level of War, pp. 16-7. 9. Cole, The Ardennes: Battle of the Bulge , p. 49. 10. Hans Von Greiffenberg, Deception and Cover Plans (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, MSS OP-044A, 26 May 1952), p. 86. 11. Savoia, Deception at the Operational Level of'War, p. 20. 12. "Pamphlet on Tactical Deception," compiled by LtCol C.G. Simenson, 8 November 1950, Strategic Plans Division Branch, OP-607 Support Plans Branch (Series XXII), Box 546, Naval Operational Archives, The Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC, p. 1. 13. Savoia, Deception at the Operational Level of War, p. 5. 14. "Military Cover and Deception (Strategic)." Presentation prepared in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 5 August 1947, Strategic Plans Division Records, OP-607 Support Plans Branch (Series XXII), Box 530, Folder #2, Naval Operational Archives, The Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC, p. 26. 15. Ibid., p. 26. 16. "Pamphlet on Tactical Deception," compiled by LtCol C.G. Simenson, 8 November 1950, p. 7. 1 7. "Military Cover and Deception (Strategic)," p. 25. 18. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 90-2, Battlefield Deception (Washington, DC: 3 October 1988), p. 4-6 and 4-7. 19. Ibid., p. 4-8. 20. Cover and Deception Planning Handbook, Strategic Plans Division Records, OP-607 Support Plans Branch (Series XXII), Box 533, Naval Operational Archives, The Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC, 1 September 1944, p. 2. 21. FM 90-2: Battlefield Deception, p. 4-12 and 4-13.

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22. Ibid. p. 4-13. 23. "Pamphlet on Tactical Deception," compiled by LtCol. C.G. Simenson, p. 6. 24. FM 90-2: Battlefield Deception, p. 1-3. 25. Ibid., p. 1-6. 26. Cover & Deception Report ETO: "Cover & Deception, Synopsis of History," Strategic Plans Divisions Records, OP-607 Support Plans Branch (Series XXII), Box 549, Naval Operational Archives, The Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC, p. 6. 27. Ibid., p. 6. 28. Ibid., p. 6. 29. Ibid., pp. 8-9. 30. "Cover Plans for Detachment, Iceberg, and Subsequent Operations in the Pacific Ocean Areas during 1945," 21 November 1944, CINCPAC Command File, 20 November-15 December 1944, Command File World War 11, Naval Operational Archives, the Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC, pp. 2-3; "Military Cover and Deception (Strategic)," Presentation prepared in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 5 August 1947, p. 12. 31. Ibid., pp. 3-4. 32. FM 90-2: Battlefield Deception, p. 4-1. 33. "Pamphlet on Tactical Deception," compiled by LtCol C.G. Simenson, p. 7. 34. FM 90-2: Battlefield Deception, pp. 3-3 and 3-4. 35. Cover and Deception Planning Handbook, l September 1944, pp. 1-2.

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OPERATIONAL SEQUENCING A design for a major operation or campaign normally contains the order or sequence in which the "events," that is, the objectives or tasks, should be carried out to accomplish the ultimate operational or strategic objective. However, all too often the focus is almost entirely on operational synchronization, with little or no thought given to operational sequencing. Synchronization of military and nonmilitary sources of power and phasing of effort cannot properly be planned and executed without first determining the sequence of events or objectives and tasks. Compounding this problem is the frequent confusion between the term sequencing and the terms synchronization and phasing. Although related, the true meanings and the purposes of these terms differ considerably from each other. Purpose: The purpose of sequencing is to arrange events in such a progression that collectively they lead to the accomplishment of the assigned ultimate objectives in the shortest time possible and with the least loss of personnel and materiel. The events can be arranged to take place consecutively or simultaneously. Sequencing provides a framework within which synchronization of military and nonmilitary sources of power is planned and executed. Proper sequencing should ensure flexibility in the accomplishment of assigned military objectives. The key issues to be resolved in sequencing include relationships among ends, means, and ways. Ends and means must be in balance; otherwise, no sequencing schedule could be successfully implemented. Likewise, the ways must be in consonance with the ends to be accomplished and the means available. Both combat (land, sea, air, space, and special forces) and combat support forces need to be sequenced over time. Sequencing cannot be successful without effective and properly sequenced operational functions (command and control, intelligence C2W, fires, logistical support and sustainment, and protection). Scale: Sequencing addresses military actions and nonmilitary activities across the levels of war. At the tactical level, tactical sequencing is primarily planned for battles and engagements aimed at accomplishing major tactical objectives. Specifically, tactical sequencing determines the objectives and tasks to be accomplished by a single, or several combat arms of a single service, or sometimes several combat arms of two or more services. Strategic sequencing deals with sequencing campaigns or series of major operations as part of a campaign in progress in two or more theaters of operations, within a single theater of war or in adjacent, or in widely separated theaters of war. An example of strategic sequencing is a series of operations, code-named Cartwheel (formerly Elkton III), agreed on between General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of Southwest Pacific Area (SOWESPAC), and Admiral William F. Halsey, CINC of South Pacific Area (SOPAC). This plan, drafted in April 1943, envisaged the seizure and occupation of the Lae-Salamaua-Madang-Western New Britain-Solomons area by sequencing and synchronizing the employment of forces in the two adjacent theaters of operations-New Guinea (not formally declared a theater of operations) and SOPAC (see Figure 48). In the summer of 1943, U.S. planners drafted a tentative schedule of operations through the end of 1944 in three theaters of war: Pacific Ocean Area, SOWESPAC, and China, Burma, and India (CBI).' The Germans in planning their invasion of Denmark and Norway decided

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to start the campaign on 9 April so that it would not interfere with the timing of the much larger campaign against Benelux countries and France, planned to start on 10 May. Operational sequencing is intended to arrange the sequence of the accomplishment of major tactical or operational objectives or tasks in the course of a major operation or campaign. It could be planned for each stage of combat forces' employment, for example, from mobilization to strategic or operational deployment to forces' combat employment post-hostilities, redeployment and demobilization. However, the focus is normally on the sequencing of events during the combat employment of forces and the employment of all or selected operational functions in support of a major operation or campaign. Inadequacy of any element of operational functions, if left unresolved, can cause premature culmination, endangering the success of the entire major operation or campaign. Also, the work of other government organization (OGAs), nongovernment organizations (NGOs), and private volunteer organizations (PVOs) should be, if possible, sequenced during peacekeeping operations (PKO). The Allies applied operational sequencing in their plans for what later evolved into the Solomons Campaign and the New Guinea Campaign. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff made a strategic decision on 2 July 1942 to start a new offensive in the southern Pacific conducted by the two adjacent theaters, SOWESPAC and SOPAC. The initial operational objectives, misnamed "tasks," were: Task 1, seizure and occupation of the Santa Cruz Islands, Tulagi, and "adjacent positions"; Task 2, seizure and occupation of the remainder of the Solomons, of Lae, Salamaua, and the northwest coast of New Guinea; and Task 3, seizure and occupation of Rabaul and adjacent positions in the New Britain-New Ireland area. 3 The execution of Task 1 was assigned to SOPAC and the two

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remaining tasks to SOWESPAC. The initial boundary between these two theaters was changed on 1 August so as to place the entire area for Task 1 (Tulagi, Guadalcanal, Florida, the Russels, Malaita, and San Cristobal) within the SOPAC area. Another example of operational sequencing in a campaign was the Soviet series of major operations on the Eastern Front aimed at facilitating the success of the Allied landing in Normandy on 6 June 1944. Four days after the landing, the Soviets, with some 300 divisions facing 200 greatly weakened and understrength German divisions, initiated the first in a series of major offensive operations along the Eastern Front. The first major operation, started on the Leningrad front, was followed on 23 June by a major offensive on the central front in the Vitebsk-Mogilev-Zhlobin sector. In the second half of July, the Soviets opened a new offensive in the southern part of the front around Lvov. By the first half of August, the Germans had stabilized the front on the borders of East Prussia, on the Vistula River, and near Warsaw. 4 However, by then not only did they suffer high losses in manpower, but the Soviet troops lifted the siege of Leningrad, Finland left the war and joined the German enemies, and the Soviet armies stood at the borders of Poland and the former Czechoslovakia. Elements: The main elements of a sequencing plan are the objectives, tasks, and a time line. An objective, when accomplished, would result in a drastic change of the situation in a specific part of the theater. 5 In most instances, the enemy force must be destroyed, annihilated, or neutralized to accomplish the assigned objective. An objective, in turn, consists of number of tasks that are integral to the objective. The number and complexity of tasks are directly related to the size of the objective. The larger the objective, the more tasks would be required to accomplish it. Depending on the objective, tactical, operational, and strategic tasks can be differentiated. Tasks stated in the mission received from a higher commander are specified (or assigned) tasks. They are essential for the mission accomplishment. After identifying the specified tasks, additional major tasks or implied tasks necessary to accomplish the assigned mission are identified. Implied tasks do not include routine or standard operating procedures (SOP) or force protection measures, unless they require coordination or support by adjacent or other commanders. Sequencing is often arranged by providing a time line (TL) as to when a certain event is to start and end. These events are expressed, depending on their type and scale, in terms of hours, days, or even months. Number of days, not calendar dates, are used to ensure flexibility in the execution of the sequencing plan. Methods: In general, operational sequencing can be arranged by objectives, tasks, time, or a combination of these. Objective-oriented sequencing aims to selectively concentrate one's own and friendly forces in time and space, so as to create conditions that will translate operational and tactical success into operational or strategic advantage (see Figure 49). The planning should start with determining the ultimate objective and then identify the required series of intermediate objectives of a major operation or campaign. 7 In land warfare, intermediate objectives in a major operation or campaign can be some geographic feature, a major city or town, or an arbitrarily established phase line (PL). In a war at sea or in the air, intermediate objectives arc often the enemy force or force-related elements. The linkage between objectives and options to accomplish them provides a framework for planners to sequence a series of events that will accomplish the assigned

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operational or strategic objectives However, there is an inherent tension in trying to sequence events based on a complex interaction among operational factors (time-spaceforces) and the objectives. In determining intermediate objectives it is necessary to pay close attention to their number and the progression in which they must occur. In general, too many objectives require more time, larger forces, and more resources, which ultimately slows the operational tempo significantly. The opposite is also true. If planners select too few objectives, they must take greater risks, the ultimate objective might not be accomplished, and the resultant higher operational tempo might cause premature culmination for one's forces. Objective-oriented sequencing normally requires that for each objective a specific combat action be carried out. In a campaign, the accomplishment of each operational intermediate objective would usually require planning a major operation, while in a major operation, intermediate major tactical objectives would require planning a battle or engagement. A good example of objective-oriented operational sequencing was the German planning for occupation of Norway and Denmark in April 1940. As their initial objectives, the Germans decided to seize selected ports and airfields and obtain air superiority over the Skagerrak, Kattegat and southern Norway by simultaneously carrying out naval, air, and land major operations. Likewise, the Japanese in their invasion of the Netherlands East Indies (NEI) in December 1941 attacked simultaneously and consecutively selected major ports and airfields on the islands of Borneo, Sumatra, and Celebes as part of their preliminary moves to seize the island of Java. In a campaign, major operations could be carried out in a staggered sequence if the opponent must be deceived as to where the main blow will come or if political reasons dictate that the campaign must start without waiting for all the forces to arrive in

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the concentration areas and be ready to initiate their operations. The Germans in their invasion of Yugoslavia in late March 1941 had only about ten days for planning. They were in the midst of a strategic redeployment of their forces from Western Europe and Germany to the east in preparation for a campaign against Soviet Russia (initially planned for mid-May 1941). The military coup d'etat in Belgrade on 27 March led Hitler to decide to invade Yugoslavia in addition to Greece (Plan Marita). By then, the Germans had deployed most of their forces taking part in the invasion of Greece in neighboring Bulgaria. For German planners the major problem was assembling the newly created 2nd Army in southern Austria and southwestern Hungary in time for the planned attack date on 6 April against Yugoslavia. However, political and military reasons dictated that the campaign start as soon as possible. Hence, the German operational scheme envisaged three main thrusts against Yugoslavia and Greece to be carried out within seven days: for the 12th Army deployed in Bulgaria, the attack date was 6 April; for the newly created 1 st Panzer Group deployed in Bulgaria and XXXI Panzer Corps from Rumania, 8 April; and for the major part of the 2nd Army, 10 Apri1.9 The reason for this sequence of major operations was to prevent the Yugoslavs from completing their armed forces' deployment and reinforcement by some 500,000 troops (then in the process of being mobilized) and the further strengthening of the British forces in Greece. 10 Consecutive (or successive) major operations are planned as part of a campaign. Then, the objective could be either to consolidate the operational or strategic success gained in the initial major operation or to accomplish the next operational objective. Neglect or lack of resources to conduct a successive major operation almost invariably leads to loss of gains achieved in the initial major operations. The Allies in the Pacific were faced with a hard choice after the victory in the Battle of Midway in June 1942: either to wait until they had sufficient strength to open the offensive, or to act quickly to consolidate the operational success achieved at Midway and go on the strategic offensive in the Pacific theater. The decision was made to take the risk and invade Guadalcanal, an island in the Lower Solomons, as a first step in the projected Solomons Campaign. In retrospect, the Allied gamble, while justified, had perhaps too high a stake. The first operational objective, seizing Guadalcanal, was successfully accomplished in early August 1942. However, lack of resources prevented the Allies from consolidating these gains and eliminating the Japanese threat to U.S. defenders on Guadalcanal by conducting another Allied major operation. As a result, for the next seven months, the Allies became progressively involved in attrition warfare on the ground, at sea, and in the air. In a maritime campaign designed to seize a series of island or archipelago positions, sequencing is usually objective-oriented. The initial sequencing for the Solomons Campaign in the summer of 1942 was objective-oriented. General MacArthur used a similar sequencing method in the New Guinea Campaign, 1942-1944, as did Admiral Chester W. Nimitz in the Central Pacific Campaign, 1943-1944. The campaign Plan Granite, which Admiral Nimitz issued on 15 January 1944, included four major operations to be conducted by the Pacific Ocean Area (POA) forces. The tentative sequence and timing (later changed several times) of these operations was as follows: capture of Kwajalein, Marshalls (Operation Flintlock), 31 January; strikes on Truk, Carolines (Operation Hailstone), 24 March; capture of Eniwetok, Marshalls (Operation

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Catchpole), 1 May; capture Truk (Operation Gymkhama), 24 March; and capture of Tinian, Saipan, and Guam (Operation Forager), I November 1944. 11 Task-oriented operational sequencing is more flexible than the objective-oriented method (see Figure 50). The tasks can be modified or canceled if unanticipated events occur during the course of a major operation or campaign, but objectives remain until they have been accomplished or abandoned. A drawback of this method is its inherent complexity, because for each objective a number of tasks must be performed. The first step is to determine the ultimate objective, followed by the selection of a series of intermediate objectives. From these objectives, a number of tasks are deduced. As with the number of objectives in the objective-oriented sequencing, too many tasks will invariably lower operational tempo and possibly fragment efforts. On the other hand, too few tasks will not lead to the accomplishment of the assigned operational or strategic objective. Another critical factor is the proper balance between assigned and implied tasks. Too many implied tasks will require specific forces to be assigned with the corresponding proliferation of task organizations, increased logistical support and sustainment requirements, and, perhaps the most critical of all, waste of sorely needed time. Operational or strategic tasks should be sequenced in the order in which they must be initiated. 12 Initiating several specific tasks simultaneously in the face of the enemy's possibly strong reaction is often fraught with danger of fragmenting one's efforts, and thereby endangering the success of the entire major operation or campaign. Normally, i mplied tasks are conducted from the outset of a major operation or campaign until their completion. Specific tasks can be sequenced to follow each other in succession. Often, specified tasks overlap with each other, as the subsequent task is initiated before the preceding task has been accomplished. Sometimes, a defensive or an offensive phase of a campaign can be divided into several phases, each containing several operational tasks.

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Operational sequencing can also be predominantly time-oriented. The time line can be expressed in days, weeks, or even months. Logisticians prefer this method because it allows them to plan more comprehensively. However, the most prevalent method is a combination of objectives and tasks and a time line expressed in days and sometimes months. The plan for the offensive phase of the U.S.-led war against Iraq in 1991 (Operation Desert Storm) contained four overlapping operational tasks: air offensive, air superiority in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO), battlefield preparation, and the ground offensive. 1 3 The task of obtaining and maintaining air superiority was initiated simultaneously with the task of obtaining sea control in the Arabian Gulf (see Figure 51). The ground offensive did not start until 17 February 1991 and lasted only about 100 hours.

Sometimes the exclusive focus on tactics and weapons could lead the operational commanders and their staffs to overemphasize targets or groups of targets, neglecting objectives or tasks. A good example of such an improper planning method was sequencing for the NATO major offensive air operation dubbed Operation Allied Force, conducted between 24 March and 10 June 1999 against Serbia. The final plan for the Operation Allied Force envisaged three phases: Phase I-attack Yugoslav integrated air defense system (LADS) and command posts; Phase 11-strikes on the Yugoslav infrastructure south of the 44th parallel; and Phase III-attack, including Serbia's capital of Belgrade. 14 The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) report to Congress released in January 2000 provided a different account of operational sequencing. The plan encompassed the following five phases: Phase 0-deployment of air assets into the European theater; Phase 1-obtaining air superiority over Kosovo and degrading command and control over the entire Yugoslavia; Phase 2-establishing air superiority over Kosovo (creating a no-fly zone south of 44° N) and degrading command and control

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and integrated air defense system (IADS) over the entire Yugoslavia; Phase 3 expanding air operations against a wide range of important military and security force targets throughout Yugoslavia; and Phase 4-redeploy forces as required." NATO's sequencing for the major offensive air operation clearly violated key tenets of operational planning. NATO's planners focused on a group of targets to be destroyed instead of on operational objectives to be accomplished. 1 6 The lack of focus on the objectives, and the absence of any time line except for the first phase of bombing (to last two to three days), was one of the reasons Operation Allied Force went on for seventy-eight days before Milosevic acceded to NATO's demands. Tenets: A sound sequencing plan is based on the following tenets: focus on the objective; balance ends, means, and ways; and maintain flexibility, simplicity and adherence to the basic plan. The focus of military efforts is derived from the ultimate operational or strategic objectives. Optimally, for each basic objective, an alternate objective should be determined as well. The number of objectives or tasks should be kept to the minimum necessary to accomplish a given operational or strategic objective. Operational sequencing should not normally encompass tactical tasks because they will complicate the entire sequencing process. Moreover, they might actually appear to become more i mportant than is warranted, or even derail the entire sequencing timetable. This was a major reason for the Japanese failure in the Operation MO (which led to the Battle of the Coral Sea) in May 1942. The Japanese Striking Force was tasked to ferry eighteen Zero fighter aircraft from Truk to Rabaul. However, unforeseen events caused this simple additional task to disrupt the timetable for the entire operation. 17 The means must match the ends; otherwise, no objective or task can easily, if at all, be accomplished. By understanding mutual relationships between ends and means, planners can decide whether events should occur sequentially or simultaneously. 1 8 Also, the scale of the planned major operation or campaign must be in harmony with the means available. The basic sequencing plan should be adhered to unless some extraordinary event requires a change in the sequencing schedule. A change in the original timetable might be warranted if the enemy abandons his positions or areas; a new intelligence estimate shows a drastic change in the operational or strategic situation; the enemy's resistance is unexpectedly weak or unexpectedly strong; additional transportation assets became available; or attrition of one's forces is lower or higher than expected. General MacArthur decided to accelerate the tempo of his operations in SOWESPAC in the spring 1944 as a result of the unanticipated absence of the Japanese troops on the Admiralties. The approved plans called for simultaneous invasion of Kavieng (New Ireland) and Manus (the Admiralties) on 1 April 1944. However, after finding out from aerial intelligence that no Japanese troops remained on the Admiralties on 23 February, General MacArthur decided at once to send the elements of the lst Cavalry Division to Los Negros to conduct reconnaissance in force. Afterward, the rest of the division was deployed to capture the entire Admiralties group. Likewise, Admiral Nimitz's campaign Plan Granite H for the Central Pacific was accelerated after January 1944 because of the unexpected ease of seizing Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshalls, and the occupation of Majuro in the eastern archipelago without Japanese opposition. This, in turn, provided a surplus of uncommitted troops. Thus, Admiral Nimitz sped up the tempo of operations by invading Eniwetok on 17 February, two months ahead of schedule. 1 9 53 8

In another example, at the Second Quebec Conference, 11-16 September 1944, the Combined Chiefs of Staffs (CCS) changed the timetable for the Allied operations in the Pacific. General MacArthur would seize Morotai and Admiral Nimitz would capture Peleliu, the Carolines, in September. In October, Admiral Nimitz would seize Yap in the Western Carolines and Ulithi, and then move into Talaud, the Philippines. In November, MacArthur would seize Sarangani Bay, Mindanao, and in December, MacArthur and Nimitz would jointly seize Leyte, then land on Luzon or Formosa. 20 This schedule was drastically changed at the end of the conference because of the events in the Pacific. On 7 and 8 September aircraft from the U.S. Third Fleet struck Yap and the Palau Islands (Western Carolines), and for the next two days Mindanao. Admiral William F. Halsey, the Third Fleet Commander, reported to Admiral Nimitz that few serviceable Japanese aircraft were left in the Philippines; the bulk of the Japanese oil supplies had been destroyed; there was no shipping left to sink; and the area was wide open for the Allied attack. Admiral Halsey also informed Nimitz that one of his downed pilots had been told by his Filipino rescuers that no Japanese troops were deployed on Leyte. He recommended that the Peleliu, Morotai, Yap, and Mindanao operations be canceled and that the Pacific Fleet and the Seventh Fleet jointly assault Leyte on 20 October, two months ahead of schedule. Admiral Nimitz thought that the time had come to accelerate operations in the Pacific, and he strongly recommended that intermediate operations against Yap, Talaud, and Sarangani Bay be canceled. Leyte could be seized cheaply without any intermediate operation. The Third Fleet could cover the initial landing until land-based aircraft could be established. The force intended for the occupation of Yap could be made available to General MacArthur. 2 1 The JCS received MacArthur's consent to this acceleration of the schedule on the night of 15 September, and in one and a half hours they decided MacArthur and Nimitz would invade Leyte on 20 October, and Vice Admiral T.S. Wilkinson's amphibious force, already embarking to take Peleliu and Yap, would join them after taking Peleliu. 22 The sequencing plan for a major operation or campaign should be simple and flexible enough to accommodate unforeseen events during its execution. The sequence of events necessary to achieve the desired operational conditions should never be rigidly enforced. The operational commander should be prepared to change or adjust the sequence for accomplishing his principal tasks when necessary. However, the sequencing schedule should not be radically changed in response to some unforeseen but operationally unimportant event. Overreaction can lead to failure of the entire campaign or major operation, which is what happened to the German air offensive against Britain in the summer of 1940. The Luftwaffe's original plan for the air offensive against Britain in 1940 comprised three main sequences of events: destroying Chain Home Radar system, eliminating the Fighter Command Sector stations, and drawing RAF squadrons in operational reserve deployed in northern England into the fight. The objective was to achieve air superiority as a prerequisite for the planned invasion of England (Plan Seeloewe [Sea Lion]). However, the Germans allowed themselves to be distracted by the tactically insignificant RAF raid on Berlin on 25-26 August. As a result, they abandoned their planned operational sequencing and diverted scarce forces and resources to strengthen the defense of Berlin and to escort bombers attacking London-a new and irrelevant operational objective.

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Planning Considerations: In determining the optimal sequence for events, operational planners must take into account a number of considerations. The size and characteristics of the physical environment in which military events would take place always plays a significant role in determining the physical objectives. In turn, the number and size of objectives determines the forces' size and mix, mobility, etc. The planners must fully consider the required operational tempo to be maintained. They should plan the sequence of major tactical actions or major operations that will result in the desired optimal tempo for the eventual attainment of the assigned operational or strategic objective. The tempo depends on many factors, but primarily on the tactical rate of advance, quality of combat support, surprise, and friction. The tactical rate of advance of an operational-size force depends on the progress of the least mobile tactical unit. It also depends on force mobility and organization mobility. Fast means of transportation are critical for increasing force mobility. Combat service support allows a force to move and fight, and ensures that sufficient resources are available for forces engaged in combat. Surprise is related to tempo. It creates conditions that enhance the tactical rate of advance by confusing or slowing enemy reactions. It allows one's forces to move into the depth of the enemy defenses. In contrast, friction is a factor that can slow the overall operational tempo. Hence, the objective should always be to minimize the effects of friction on one's own forces while maximizing its effects on the enemy forces. 25 Characteristics of the physical environment are a significant factor in friction because they may affect the mobility of forces and their combat employment. Severe climatic conditions or heavy weather, in combination with difficult terrain or oceanographic conditions, among other things, considerably affect a force's mobility and observation and personnel's ability to perform duties in combat. However, enemy resistance is the largest source of friction, especially if the opponent is successful in concealing his true intentions and capabilities. Initiative is related to tempo. The higher the tempo, the more likely one is to obtain the initiative. Initiative requires constantly forcing the enemy to conform to one's own operational tempo, while retaining one's freedom of action. To gain and maintain the initiative, operational planners must consider the correlation of ends, ways, and means when sequencing the major operations in a campaign, or the tactical actions in a major operation. The effects of friction pose considerable dangers to maintaining the initiative. They often result in the total loss of the initiative and subsequent culmination. To prevent this from happening, planners must allow for operational pauses. The aim should be to deceive the enemy or ensure economy of force, and thereby prevent the enemy from taking advantage of any lull in the fighting. Depth is the extension of a major operation or campaign in terms of space and time. Operational planners should sequence events that will cumulatively result in the effective increase of the depth of one's own forces, thereby making it difficult (or impossible) for enemy forces to endanger friendly forces in the rear areas. 27 Agility is the ability of one's forces to act faster than the enemy . 28 Hence, planners should sequence major operations or major tactical actions to enhance the speed of one's own forces, making it difficult for the enemy to react in time. The initial major operation in a campaign or battle/engagement in a major operation is critical in creating the conditions for the successful outcome of subsequent major operations or battle/engagements. Besides the purely physical aspect of agility, planners should also

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focus on its mental aspects specifically, the speed of making operational decisions and of reacting to unforeseen actions by an opponent. Another important consideration for planners is to coordinate the sequencing schedule with the planned phases of a major operation or campaign. Collectively, the number and length of all the planned phases directly influence the sequencing timetable. Phasing also influences the number of objectives or tasks: the more phases planned, the more complicated sequencing becomes. Changes in a phase of a major operation or campaign usually occur during increased vulnerability because of the lower intensity in actions of one's forces. This can be avoided by careful planning of branches and sequels. 29 A new phase of a major operation or campaign also requires a change in the mission for subordinate forces and, possibly, corresponding changes in the task organization. Optimally, sequencing should be planned for the employment of combat forces, operational functions, OGAs, NGOs, and PVOs. However, in practice, coordination of activities with NGOs and PVOs is extremely difficult to organize and execute. These organizations often have different goals than one's military, and they often work at crosspurposes. Therefore, focus in planning should be on sequencing of combat forces and operational functions. Another problem in sequencing tasks of the OGAs, NGOs, and PVOs is the requirement to maintain the high degree of operations security (OPSEC) in the planning and execution of a major operation or campaign. Therefore, sequencing of tasks for these agencies and organizations is practicable in the post-hostilities stage but much less so in the deployment and combat employment stage. Conclusion: Sequencing is a key prerequisite of successful synchronization in planning and executing a major operation or campaign. The size and characteristics of the physical environment and the desired operational tempo are perhaps the two most important considerations in devising a sequencing schedule. Sequencing can be applied to all stages of combat force employment, but the focus should clearly be on combat employment. The operational commander must optimally sequence the use of both military and nonmilitary means to achieve decisive results. Any major error in operational sequencing cannot be overcome easily or quickly and will almost invariably lead to failure of the entire campaign or major operation. The sequencing plan should be simple, yet flexible enough to accommodate unforeseen changes in the operational or strategic situation. Planners should pay close attention and give much thought on how best to sequence events in a forthcoming major operation or campaign. A sequencing timetable that is not focused on the objective and does not balance the ends, means, and ways is deeply flawed. Moreover, it will invariably adversely affect both the planning and the execution of a plan in regard to synchronization and phasing. The cumulative result of these errors will be a failed operation plan.

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Notes 1. In generic terms, sequencing is the arrangement of events in terms of purpose and time to accomplish the assigned military objective(s). Synchronization, in contrast, is the arrangement of actions in terms of time, space, and purpose to produce the maximum relative power (combat or noncombat) at a decisive place and time. In military terms, a phase pertains to a span of time between two consecutive or concurrent events taking place in a given military action. In operational terms, a phase pertains to a drastic change of the situation in the course of a campaign or major operation that requires a considerable or even fundamental shift in the employment of one's own and friendly forces (e.g., shift from defense to offensive or vice versa, resumption of the offensive, etc.) or slowing down the actions by one's forces (a pause) after the accomplishment of a given operational or strategic objective in order to regenerate combat power. 2. Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1943-1944 The War Department , United States Army in World War II (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Anny, 1 959, reprinted 1973), pp. 206-207. 3. John Miller, Jr., Guadalcanal: The First Offensive , The War in the Pacific, United States Army in World War 11 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1st edition, 1949, reprint 1989), pp. 16-7. 4. John Ehrman, Grand Strategy, Vol. 5: August 1943-September 1944 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956), pp. 343-4. 5. An objective is something toward which all effort is directed; Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster, Inc. Publishers, 1985), p. 814. 6. John D. Johnson, Sequencing Operations. Considerations .fbr the Operational Planner (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 20 May 1991), p. 4. 7. Ibid., p. 4. 8. Richard J. Dixon, Operational Sequencing. The Tension between Simultaneous and Sequential Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Anny Command and General Staff College, 1994), p. 5. 9. Martin Seifert, Der Balkanfeldzug 1941. Beispiel einer Offensive aus der Bewegung ohne vorbereitenden Aufinarsch (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, March 1963), p. 14. 10. Herbert Dehen, Der Balkanfeldzug 1941. Beispiel einer Offensive aus der Bewegung ohne vorbereitenden Aufinarsch (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 15 January 1963), p. 14. 11. Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas, Campaign Plan Granite, 15 January 1944, Strategic Plans, Box 138, Naval Operational Archives, The Navy Historical Center, The Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC, p. 7. 12. Werner Fritsch, War Unternehmen Seeloewe Erfblgsversprechend (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 1963), p. 4. 1 3. Thomas A. Keeney and Eliot A. Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey: Summary Report ( Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 50. 14. "United NATO Front Was Divided Within," The Washington Post, September 21, 1999, p. Al. 1 5. DoD Press Release (14 October 1999); DoD Report to Congress, Kosovo/Operation Allied Force AferAction Report (31 January 2000), pp. 7-8.

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16. Reportedly, NATO planners used the following targets groups: (1) fuel, petroleum oil, and lubricants (POL); (2) lines of communications (LOCs) and supply routes; (3) command and control; (4) IADS; and (5) Serbian Army and Special Police; Anthony H. Cordesman, The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile War in Kosovo ( Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 8, 1999, revised July 20, 1999), pp. 22-7. 17. Richard Bates, et al, The Battle of'the Coral Sea. May 1 To May 11 Inclusive, 1942. Strategical And Tactical Analysis (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 1947), p. 15. Everything went according to the plan until 2 May when the Striking Force reached a position of about 240 miles northeast Rabaul. The Japanese commander tried that day and the next day to launch nine Zeros to Rabaul, but both attempts failed because of bad weather, which also prevented the Japanese carriers from refueling at sea. Thus, precious time was lost and the entire sequencing schedule was disrupted. Moreover, the Japanese carrier force could not be within range to protect Tulagi until 5 May, therefore, too late to have any real impact; John B. Lundstrom, The First South Pacific Campaign: Pacific Fleet Strategy, December 1941 June 1942 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1976), pp. 98-9. 18. Dixon, Operational Sequencing: The Tension between Simultaneous and Sequential Operations, p. 34. 19. Philip A. Crowl, Campaign in the Marianas, United States Army in World War 11, The War in the Pacific (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, first printed 1960, reprinted 1989), p. 15. 20. Samuel E. Morison, The Two Ocean War. A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1963), p. 422. 21. M. Hamlin Cannon, Levte: The Return to the Philippines , United States Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1954, reprinted 1 987), pp. 8-9. 22. Morison, The Two Ocean War. A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War , p. 423. 23. Klaus A. Maier and Hans Umbreit, "Direkte Strategic gegen England," in Klaus A. Maier, et al., Vol. 2: Die Errichtuny, der Hegemonie auf dem Europaeischen Kontinent. Das Deutsche Reich Und Der Zweite Weltkrieg (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1979), p. 386; Fritsch, p. 35. The Luftwaffe's full-scale attacks against London started on 5 September; Richard Hough and Denis Richards, The Battle of Britain: The Greatest Air Battle of World War II (New York/London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1989), p. 242; W.H. Tantum IV and E.J. Hoffschmidt, editors, The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force. History of the Luftwaffe in WW2 (Old Greenwich, CT: WE Inc., 1969), p. 91. 24. Johnson, Sequencing Operations: Considerations fnr the Operational Planner, p. 8. 25. Ibid., pp. 9-10. 26. Ibid., pp. 14-5. 27. Ibid., p. 15. 28. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-5: Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, June 1993), p. GL-1. 29. Ibid., pp. 6-9.

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OPERATIONAL SYNCHRONIZATION Synchronization is another critical element of the operational idea. Without synchronizing all the sources of power, both military and nonmilitary, it is difficult if not impossible to employ forces quickly and decisively in space, time, and purpose to achieve victory with minimum losses in personnel and materiel. Synchronization is both process-arranging, or initiating actions in space, time, and purpose-and effect(s) to generate maximum relative (combat or noncombat) power at a decisive place and time. It must ensure that all elements of force collectively generate effects that exceed the sum of their individual effects. A soundly conceived and well-executed synchronization plan may allow an inferior force to defeat a superior enemy force. The measure of effectiveness of synchronization is its impact on the enemy force. By the relative simultaneity of effects, synchronization should result in disrupting the enemy's tempo, cohesion, and morale. The aim should be to "desynchronize" the enemy's combat power in terms of time and space, and thereby gain the initiative. Ultimately, the enemy will be unable to react in a timely manner to one's actions. Synchronization can be planned and executed for the employment of both military and nonmilitary means. In general, military means encompass combat forces and their combat support, and supporting functions; synchronization of military means is organized among the combat arms (land, sea, air, space, and special forces) of a single service, combat arms of several services, or multinational forces. Elements: Conceptually, synchronization encompasses a number of elements that, when properly arranged and coordinated in time, space, and objectives, result in the desired effects in multiple mediums. The essential elements of synchronization are actions, coordination, effects, concentration, simultaneity, and synergy (see Figure 52). The synchronization process centers on the actions (or activities in case of nonmilitary means) ranging from those intended to affect the enemy's physical capabilities to ones affecting his economy, morale, and will to fight-all of which will depend on the scale of the synchronization effort. No action should ever be viewed in isolation, but as an integral part of the whole.3 Actions should focus on the use of one's strengths while taking advanta e of the enemy's weaknesses, so as to obtain freedom of action for future actions. In general, simultaneous actions are more effective, but they are also more complicated to organize and execute than those carried out in sequence. Sequential actions are often used in the employment of nonmilitary means. 5 Actions can be taken against similar or dissimilar forces. Symmetrical actions are those conducted by a certain type of one's forces against a similar hostile force, as, for example, surface force versus surface force, or armor versus armor, or fighter aircraft versus fighter aircraft. The enemy can successfully counter or neutralize them, unless one's forces are superior in mass or combat power. Asymmetrical action means employing one's force against a dissimilar hostile force, as, for example, naval versus air or land forces, or air forces versus naval forces. The objective then is to use the strengths of one's forces against enemy weaknesses. These actions usually generate disproportionate outcomes and thereby can potentially produce a quick and decisive victory with minimal losses. They are especially effective when applied against an

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enemy force being mobilized, in the process of deployment, or during an operational pause when they are in the process of regenerating their combat power. The essence of synchronization is not the action performed but the effect generated. 8 Military actions and their effects are directly related to the combat power of a given force. The key elements of combat power at all levels of war are maneuver, fires, leadership, information, integration, sustainment, protection, and support. At the operational and strategic levels of war, unquantifiable elements are larger and more complex in time and space than at the tactical level. Additionally, sources of power are not exclusive to the combat power of military forces, but include all available means, military and nonmilitary. 9 Coordination is an act or process of "orchestrating" the actions of all available means to produce an agreeable or harmonious effect. Unlike effects, coordination is neither time nor space dependent. Effective synchronization requires that actions or activities by diverse forces and means be closely coordinated. However, coordination in and of itself is no guarantee that synchronization will occur, nor will it necessarily result in synergistic effects.' () To ensure synchronization, a commander must first visualize the effects or, when nonmilitary means are used, consequences that need to be generated and then determine how best to sequence events to produce them.' 1 Concentration is probably the single most important element of the synchronization process. Generically, concentration can be defined as the convergence of overwhelming combat power at a decisive time and place. 1 2 However, if massive combat power is applied piecemeal in terms of space, it will not be overwhelming. Also, if the same massive power is applied over too great a span of time, it will be too dispersed and most likely ineffective. Hence, the key to success is to concentrate combat power simultaneously to generate the strongest effect at the decisive place and time. A

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numerically inferior force could achieve decisive local superiority through effective concentration of combat power. 1 3 The principal elements of concentration are mass and speed. Mass is dependent on, among other things, a force's size, lethality, mobility, effective range, and endurance. However, the term mass should not be taken literally, because a force can be physically dispersed and still generate a mass because of its firepower and long striking range. This is especially true with respect to modern air power and naval strike forces. In land warfare, massing of forces also implies their increased vulnerability. Therefore, a mass of ground forces (e.g., armored units) often must be dispersed after the mission is accomplished, and then massed again for a new mission. Speed is dependent on a force's mobility. High tempo and movement at great depth can enhance the effect of mass. 1 4 But higher tempo entails higher risk, because the shorter time does not allow for comprehensive planning. Whether the tempo is high or low depends on, the force's mobility; its tactical rate of advance; time to complete moves; command, control, communications, and computers (C4); quality of intelligence; patterns of combat support, quality of logistic support and sustainment; etc. 1 5 A low tempo allows more time to recover from one's errors or mistakes and to prepare a more comprehensive estimate of the operational situation. Although a higher tempo implies higher risk for one's forces, a delay in initiating combat actions might also result in higher risks due to unforeseen events or the enemy's having more time to regenerate one's combat power. Concentration of forces can be accomplished in terms of space by conducting a maneuver and in terms of time by simultaneity of actions. Speed is a prerequisite of maneuver and surprise but is not sufficient in itself; it is relative speed that matters the most. Superior speed allows one's forces to obtain the initiative, thereby taking away the enemy's ability to act first. A decisive blow should be carried out with the greatest possible combination of mass and speed. ' 6 Simultaneity is a process of generating simultaneous effects to create overwhelming and focused power relative to enemy sources of power. This also means attacking selected enemy forces and functions in such a way as to confuse and demoralize. Simultaneity implies dispersion in space of one's actions whose effects are concentrated to accomplish a specific aim. Synergy is the ultimate aim of all the synchronization efforts. Synergy (or synergism) is the cumulative effect or result of discrete acts that is greater than the sum of individual parts acting independently. In practice, it means integration and synchronization of actions aimed to shock, disrupt, and defeat the enemy force. Scale: Tactical, strategic, and operational synchronization differ according to scale. Tactical synchronization is applied in the planning and execution of battles, engagements, and smaller tactical actions. Specifically, it focuses on the synchronization of actions by combat arms of a single service or, sometimes, the combat arms of several services and even multinational forces during tactical deployment, combat employment, and redeployment. Tactical synchronization is also applied to battlefield "functions"; specifically, tactical command and control, intelligence, maneuver, firepower, protection, and combat support. Effective synchronization of forces and means at the tactical level is key to the success of synchronization at the higher levels of war. Strategic synchronization deals with the employment of military and nonmilitary sources of power at a theater-strategic or national-strategic level. The theater 547

commanders effect it when they conduct two or more campaigns in a given theater of war or two adjacent theaters of war. In World War 11, the Allies often synchronized their campaigns within a given theater of war or adjacent theaters of war. The Allied campaign in New Guinea was synchronized with the Solomons Campaign in 1942-1943, and subsequently with the Central Pacific Campaign in 1943-1944. Likewise, the Allied campaign in Western Europe in 1944-1945 was sometimes synchronized with the series of Soviet major operations on the Eastern Front. Operational synchronization pertains to arranging actions in time, space, and purpose for the planning and execution of major operations or campaigns. It involves synchronization of both military and nonmilitary sources of power. It is far more complex than tactical synchronization because a theater of operations is characterized by the more complicated relationships among the factors of space, time, and forces. The operational commander must synchronize many concurrent actions and activities at several levels of war. He also must synchronize operational functions during the major stages of combat force employment. However, the focus of operational synchronization is the synchronization of one's actions and activities throughout the entire combat employment stage of a major operation or campaign. The high consumption rates and long lines of communications that characterize major operations and campaigns can create critical vulnerabilities that the enemy could exploit. 1 8 Today, synchronization of actions at the operational level can be derailed in a matter of days or even hours before their full operational impact can be felt. The reason for this is the enormous influence of the media and public opinion images and propaganda at home and overseas could well erode public confidence and support. l 9 A probable reason for stopping short of completely routing the Iraqi forces in the final phase of the ground offensive in Desert Storm in February 1991 was the images of dead Iraqis and burnt vehicles on the "Highway of Death." Operational synchronization was applied in many of the major operations and campaigns conducted in World War 11. The German plan for the invasion of Norway and Denmark in April 1940 envisaged simultaneous employment of naval, sea, and ground forces to seize key positions in Norway and Denmark on the W(eser)-Day, 9 April. Sea landings were planned for seven ports in Norway (Narvik, Trondheim, Bergen, Egersund, Kristiansund, Arendal, and Oslo) and four ports in Denmark (Copenhagen, Middelfart, Esbjerg, and Tyboroen). Troops transported on board warships seized these ports. For that purpose eleven groups of the Warship-Group [Kriegsschiffgruppe] were organized. The Kriegsmarine also had the task of isolating the area of operations by laying mine barriers in the Skagerrak and Kattegat, thereby preventing any interference by British surface forces. The initial sea landings totaled 8,850 troops with no major reinforcements expected until contact was established with the forces advancing overland from the Oslo area. The main force of 2,000 men landed at Oslo on W-Day, followed by some 8,000 remaining troops within three days after the initial landing. A total of 16,700 men were brought in three sea transport echelons within a week after W-Day. Another 40,000 troops would be transported to Norway after the end of the first week . 2° The German plan for invasion of Norway and Denmark envisaged airborne landings on W-Day at four airfields (Oslo, Kristiansand, Stavanger, and Bergen) . 21 These landings were combined by employment of bombers, ground attack aircraft, fighters, and reconnaissance aircraft over Denmark and most of Norway tasked to destroy or neutralize

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the Norwegian and Danish Air Force and to defend the landing forces against possible British counterstrikes. The Luftwaffe was tasked to transport AA gun batteries to three airfields in southern Norway (Oslo, Stavanger, Bergen). After supplies had been secured in Trondheim and Narvik, two air squadrons froth Stavanger and Kristiansand were redeployed to these airfields. The Luftwaffe was also tasked to provide air reconnaissance over the Skagerrak and Kattegat, and southern Norway. One bomber squadron landed at Stavanger on W-Day; simultaneously two air groups conducted demonstrations over Oslo-one air group in the Kristiansand-Bergen area, one squadron over Stavanger, one group over Copenhagen-and one group was employed in support of the advance of the German ground troops in the Jutland. The aircraft used for these demonstrations were to support landings if necessary . 22 In Denmark, the principal German objective-the city of Aalborg with its two airfields -was secured within two hours after W-Hour. The drive overland was carried out by one infantry division and one motorized rifle brigade, while five warship groups staged landings on the west coast of Jutland and the Danish islands. 23 One motorized rifle brigade seized the bridges at Koersor and Gjedser, and additional ground forces were ferried to Zealand to advance to Copenhagen. One German transport ship carrying one reinforced infantry battalion was to enter the Copenhagen port. On W-Day a small airborne landing was to take place at Copenhagen. About six hours after the first landings, one group of Warship Echelon was to enter the port of Esbjerg, and by W+1 another group of ships was to enter Thyboroen. 24 In planning the invasion of Denmark and Norway, the Germans also synchronized political, diplomatic, propaganda, and economic measures with their military actions. Diplomatic moves were made simultaneously with the invasion. At 0500 on 9 April, the German ministers (plenipotentiaries of the German Reich) at Oslo and Copenhagen informed the local government about the German actions and asked for immediate submission to German demands. Additionally, an intensive radio and leaflet propaganda effort was aimed at the local population. '` 5 Another example of a successful operational synchronization plan was the Japanese two-phased campaign plan at the outbreak of the hostilities in December 1941. The plan was very complex, and it required precise coordination of the movements and actions of multiservice forces spread over an enormous area of the Pacific and the adjacent sea and land area. The Japanese plan called for simultaneous or almost simultaneous offensive moves against the U.S Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor and occupation of Malaya, Hong Kong, the Philippines, British Borneo, the Netherlands East Indies (NEI), Siam (Thailand), Burma, Guam, and the Bismarcks. Specifically, the landings in Malaya would be conducted at several places almost simultaneously after preliminary air strikes. On the same day, air strikes from Formosa and Palau would begin against U.S. forces and installations in the Philippines. By X-1 Day, amphibious landings would be carried out at Aparri, Vigan, Laoag, Legaspi, and Davao, followed by the occupation of the Jolo Island as rapidly as possible. 26 In the NEI, Japan's principal objective was to seize a series of islands near the main island of Java. The 16th Army was to land at Bandung, Batavia, Surabaya, Tarakan, Balikpapan, Banjermasin (Borneo), Ambon (Celebes), Kupang (Timor), and the key points on Banka Island and Palembang (Sumatra), while elements of the 25th Army were to land on Medan and occupy Achin

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and then Sabang (North Sumatra), while the Navy seized Menado (North Celebes) and Makassar. 27 A relatively recent example of an excellent synchronization plan was the U.S. action in Panama on 20 December 1989 (Operation Just Cause), when, in a single night, a force of 28,000 troops simultaneously and successfully attacked twenty-seven different targets during the hours of darkness . 28 The air offensive against Iraq in the Desert Storm phase of the Gulf War is another example of a superb synchronization plan executed by the joint and combined air forces of the Coalition. 29 The forty-two-day intensive and highly synchronized air offensive was followed by two major, mutually supporting offensive thrusts against the Iraqi forces in Kuwait. Simultaneously amphibious forces threatened an assault from the sea, creating confusion within the Iraqi leadership structure. As a result, several Iraqi divisions were diverted to face the possible amphibious landing; also, the Iraqis laid three mine barriers off the Kuwaiti coast as far as thirty miles offshore and deployed numerous antiship missile batteries along the Kuwaiti coast and on Faylaka Island. 3° This threat of an amphibious assault helped the Coalition forces advance into the heart of Kuwait. Concurrently, the Coalition aircraft continued to attack the Iraqi C3 nodes and the transportation infrastructure. 31 In each instance where a major operation or campaign failed to accomplish the stated objective, one of the main contributing factors was either a poorly conceived or a poorly executed synchronization plan. The Japanese synchronization plan for the Sho-1 Plan that led to the Battle of Leyte was deeply flawed. The Japanese planners envisaged the First Diversionary Attack Force sailing out from its advance bases in either Brunei or northeastern Philippines; advancing, via the San Bernardino Strait, toward Leyte Gulf while destroying any enemy surface forces opposing it; and then attacking the Allied transports in the Leyte Gulf. In coordination with this attack, the Mobile Force was to lure the enemy north and attack elements of the enemy forces at the most favorable opportunity. The Second Diversionary Attack Force would come under command of Southwest Area Fleet (with headquarters in Manila) and would cooperate with the Army in conducting counter-landings. The Base Air Force would concentrate in the Philippines for an all-out attack on the U.S. fast carrier groups. The Advance Force (submarines) would attack damaged enemy vessels and amphibious convoys with all the forces under its command. The First Diversionary Attack Force would execute its attack against the enemy invasion forces at the landing point on X-Day. The Mobile Force would advance to the area east of Luzon on X-1 or X-2 Day. The problem with the Japanese synchronization plan was that its success depended on precise coordination-a difficult thing to achieve even under the best of circumstances. It was essential that Admiral S. Toyoda, the CINC of the Combined Fleet, have information as to the movements of the Allied forces five to six days in advance, to have sufficient time to coordinate the movements of the Mobile Force and First Diversionary Attack Force. However, even this advance warning would not have been enough because by then the Allied transports would have been unloaded in the Tacloban anchorage. 33 Surprisingly, the Japanese did not station their submarines off the most likely departure points of the Allied ships from Manus and Hollandia, so they missed the opportunity to obtain additional warning time-these bases were inadequately reconnoitered by their land-based aircraft . 34

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In addition, the space factor adversely affected the Japanese synchronization plan. The distance between the Bungo Suido (southern exit of the Inland Sea) and Singapore is about 2,500 miles, and the Philippines lay approximately half the distance between these two points. Moreover, the Japanese should have known that their perennially poor communications did not allow Admiral Toyoda to synchronize the movement of his farflung forces. Clearly, the Japanese synchronization schedule was too rigid because it made no provision for unforeseen events, such as U.S. submarines or carrier aircraft attacks on the Japanese surface forces in Philippine waters. Vice Admiral Kurita's First Diversionary Attack Force lost about four and a half hours in avoiding U.S. carrier aircraft attacks in the Sibuyan Sea, which by itself derailed the initial synchronization schedule. Coordination of multiservice forces or their elements at the operational level might not result in synchronization if their actions are not coordinated in terms of time, space, and the objectives. The Allied landing on Sicily in July 1943 (Operation Husky) is an example of how joint forces can be coordinated but not synchronized. The Allied planners realized that the Germans would mount a delaying action near Mount Etna, but they made no provisions to prevent that from happening. Allied aircraft were employed in isolation from other forces, and despite large-scale pre-invasion bombardment, beach defenses and mobile Axis divisions deployed in the island's interior were not attacked. The Allied naval forces did nothing to prevent the escape of the German and Italian troops across the Strait of Messina in August 1943. They never tried to reduce the enemy air defenses to facilitate the Allied aircraft attacks, nor did they attack the Axis's shipping lanes across the strait. 35 The U.S. liberation of Grenada in November 1983 (Operation Urgent Fury) was also poorly planned and executed. Joint Task Force 120 (JTF-120) was assembled from units and staffs who had never trained together. Subordinate commanders planned for the operation in isolation from each other. Few staff officers understood how to plan and coordinate joint fire support for ground forces on the island, and many were unfamiliar with planning an airborne assault. A plan for joint logistics did not exist, and the logistical sustainment was not a priority. There was no plan for medical treatment or evacuation, nor for handling enemy prisoners of war (EPWs). 36 Command and control problems during the execution of the plan highlighted the lack of synchronization between the services. Navy strikes were delivered against Army positions. Army and Marine ground units in the same area were unable to talk to each other because of different radio frequencies; nor could Army units talk directly to Marine or Navy aircraft to direct air strikes in support of ground actions. The operation highlighted the problems of forcing an ad hoe joint staff to synchronize actions of joint forces under severe time constraints: Operational synchronization should focus on the defeat or neutralization of the enemy operational or strategic center of gravity. Therefore, a combination of sequential and simultaneous actions that generate synergistic effects to accomplish assigned objectives should be carried out. 3s Actions by individual land, sea, air, space, and special forces cannot be considered in isolation. Each element has unique capabilities that cannot be duplicated by other types of forces. Simultaneity of actions is designed to bring force to bear on the entire enemy structure in a nearly simultaneous manner to overwhelm and cripple enemy capabilities

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and the enemy's will to resist. It should contribute directly to the enemy's collapse by paralyzing his decision-making process and creating indecision. 39 The operational commander should fully integrate and synchronize the wide range of capabilities available to him in the accomplishment of the assigned operational or strategic objectives. Properly conceived, cumulative effects of synchronization should exceed the sum of the component effects. 4° General Patton was a master of synchronization in executing his operations. He understood, perhaps better than any contemporary Allied commander, the real essence of synchronizing maneuver, firepower, and all the related battlefield functions to achieve shock and gain the psychological advantage that would ultimately destroy the opposing force S.4 I In low-intensity conflict, the threats to the success of operational synchronization are relatively more diverse and unquantifiable than in war. They range from traditional problems of geography and terrain, to cultural differences and biases, to ethnicity, religion, and social issues. The operational commander should synchronize his efforts with those of the alliance or coalition members . 42 Massing combat potential, especially in a low-intensity conflict, might not be the sole measure of effectiveness; efforts must be synchronized with political and diplomatic actions in and out of the theater or area of operations. Sometimes a well-synchronized combination of diplomatic, financial, and economic pressure or inducements plus perception manipulation efforts might be more effective than the pure application of combat potential . 43 Prerequisites: The main prerequisites for successful synchronization include clear and attainable military objectives; clarity of commander's intent; sound command and control (C2) structure; proper command relationships; comprehensive intelligence; diverse forces and means; overwhelming combat power; and sufficient logistical support and sustainment. Unless the synchronized effort is focused on the objective, it is meaningless. Clarity of the commander's intent is important to ensure flexibility in applying the synchronization plan. This is especially critical in synchronizing the actions of multiservice and multinational forces and governmental and non-governmental agencies and organizations. Thus, it is critical in peacetime to instill into subordinate commanders the need to act with initiative without waiting for the superior's orders or approval, but always within the bounds of the commander's intent. A synchronization plan should be flexible, especially when the employment of naval or air forces is envisaged. The changes in the operational situation at sea or in the air are relatively more rapid and drastic than on land. A large margin for the unforeseen changes in the situation should be a part of any synchronization plan. One way to enhance flexibility is by planning branches and sequels. The failure of the Coalition forces to prevent the escape of as many as four and a half divisions of the Iraqi Republican Guards was largely due to a rigid synchronization plan. 45 Sound command and control is perhaps the most important factor for successful synchronization. The major challenge for the operational commander is how to retain the degree of control necessary for synchronization but at the same time allow sufficient freedom of action for the subordinate commanders. Thus, he must constantly balance demands for centralized versus decentralized command and control. The commander must realize that the loss of immediate control is preferable to inaction . 46 Command and control that is too rigid can result in the superior's loss of control and lead to subordinate forces conducting random actions that do not support the accomplishment of the assigned objectives. The requirement to synchronize actions can 552

actually reduce the ability of one's forces to quickly move deep behind enemy forces, cut off their retreat, and come at them through the "backdoor." Synchronized units can only move at the pace of the slowest unit; therefore, initiative and agility of the entire force will be affected . 47 Excessive centralization leads to the violation of one of the essential tenets of operational art freedom of action. Therefore, initiative requires the decentralization of decision authority to the lowest level of command. In Operation Desert Storm, the U.S. II Corps commander in Kuwait was reportedly so overwhelmed by various tasks from his superiors that his attention was distracted from the necessity of pursuing the enemy forces. 48 The German synchronization plan in the invasion of Norway and Denmark in April 1940 was successful, despite the lack of unity of command at the service level, because of the excellent cooperation between the two operational-tactical commanders of the Navy and the Luftwaffe and General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst, the nominal commander of the invading forces. Proper command relationships are key to successful synchronization of forces and means in any military action, regardless of their purpose and scale. Unity of command should be applied whenever possible at all command echelons. Perhaps equally detrimental to the success of a synchronization plan is a command and control structure that is too loose or fragmented at the operational level. Then, even a minimum level of coordination is difficult to achieve. A vital element of any successful synchronization is thorough and timely knowledge of the full spectrum of the enemy's capabilities. This in practice means having a full intelligence picture in a given area or theater of operations. The more comprehensive and accurate the picture, the greater the emphasis can be on unity of effort. 51 Selection of forces to participate in a major operation or campaign should be based on their utility; specifically, required skills, expertise, combat readiness, and functions . 5z The more diverse the forces, the more options the commander and his planners will have in organizing synchronization. Diverse forces also allow for a wider range of asymmetrical actions to be planned and executed. Operational synchronization could be planned for each of the major stages of forces' employment, from mobilization, predeployment, and deployment to combat employment and posthostilities. In the combat employment stage, the operational commander uses maneuver and fire support coordinating measures to facilitate effective employment of one's forces in accomplishing their assigned objectives. This includes, but is not limited to, establishing boundaries, phase lines (PLs), and objectives for ground forces; determining boundaries of submarine operating areas or the amphibious objective area; and air defense areas. An operational commander must also synchronize operational functions in support of major operations or a campaign. Specifically, this includes synchronization of command and control, C2W, intelligence, operational fires, logistical support and sustainment, and elements of operational protection. Many major operations and campaigns in the past either failed or experienced great difficulties in accomplishing their stated objectives because commanders and planners did not ensure or anticipate sufficient logistical support and sustainment. One of the major issues at the operational level is how to effectively coordinate and integrate one's operational functions with those of the alliance or coalition partners. This includes, among other things, coordination of

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operational aerospace defense and integration of the host-nation's security forces and means. 54 In multinational operations, it is necessary to coordinate with the alliance or coalition partners to the extent of the combined commander's authority over national logistics, infrastructure, and theater intelligence. To ensure unity of effort, other questions to be settled are rules of engagement (ROE), fratricide prevention, deception, electronic warfare (EW), communications, special weapons, creating and employing operational reserves, timing of operations, and so forth. Now to improve interoperability and to share information must be addressed early on . 55 Coalition warfare requires significant coordination and liaison because of differences in language, equipment, capabilities, doctrine, and procedures. Also, interoperability problems are usually significant, and resolving them mandates close coordination. Liaison is essential for maintaining unity of effort of coalition forces. Exchanges of officers among higher and subordinate command echelons should be carried out as we] 1.56 Conclusion: Synchronization is a vital part of any operational design. Its importance is perhaps greatest in the planning and execution of major land, naval, and air (space) operations. It is through a series of major operations that strategic objectives in a theater are accomplished. Synchronizing all available sources of power at the operational level promises the most effective employment of combat forces in accomplishing their assigned objectives. It allows a smaller but properly configured force to defeat a much superior enemy at the time and place of one's own choosing. The synchronization plan should be flexible enough to accommodate any unforeseen event, whether caused by actions of the enemy's or one's forces. This problem can often be resolved by planning branches and sequels. The commander's intent should be broad enough to allow subordinate commanders sufficient freedom of action. Flexibility of synchronization efforts is critical to the ultimate success of the entire plan of a major operation or campaign. This is particularly true in planning actions of naval and air elements, where the changes in the operational and tactical situations are much faster and more drastic then in the situation on the ground. Some critical voices argue that synchronization and task-oriented orders contradict each other. This is true only if the synchronization plan is too rigid and leaves subordinate commanders too little time or space for action. Synchronization should be applied in a similar way as doctrine, that is, with flexibility that allows for freedom of action through initiative. The synchronization plan of a major operation should be clearly focused on the destruction or neutralization of the enemy's operational center of gravity. Likewise, synchronization in a campaign must be focused on the enemy's strategic center of gravity in a given theater of operations. Success cannot be achieved by synchronizing only the elements of combat forces, but requires the synchronization of all operational functions. The synchronization effort will not be successful if the command and control structure and command relationships are too rigid or too loose. Excess in either case will doom any synchronization plan. It is crucial that a great deal of thought and effort be given to the determination of sound command and control and to the establishment of proper command relationships. Intelligence is also a critical part in the planning for synchronization at any level. Increasingly, nonmilitary sources of power-specifically political, diplomatic, financial, economic, and informational-are also used to support military actions at the 554

operational and strategic levels of war. These means must be properly synchronized to achieve operational or strategic objectives with the least losses of one's forces. These sources of power are especially important in low-intensity conflict. The synchronization process is very time-consuming and labor-intensive. It also requires much thought before, and constant attention during, the planning phase of a major operation or campaign by the operational commanders and their staffs.

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Notes 1. Joint Pub 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms ( Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 23 March 1994), p. 371; John V. Scudder, Talk'n Ain't Fight'n. Synchronization and the Joint Task Force Training Process (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, May 1994), p. l . The U.S. Army defines synchronization as "arranging activities in time and space to mass at the decisive point"; Headquarters, U.S. Army, FM 100-5: Operations (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 14 June 1993), pp. 2-8. 2. Joel J. Snow, "Airland Battle Doctrine Tenets in Opposition," Military Review 9 (October 1987), pp. 64-5. 3. Adopted from Joint Pub 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, DC: 1 February 1995), p.111-10. 4. Ibid., p. 111-14. 5. Ibid., p. III-10. 6. Ibid., p. 111-14. 7. Michael E. Boatner, Operational Synchronization-Maintaining the Decisive Advantage (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1994), pp. 32-3. 8. Timothy D. Lynch, Operational Synchronization: A Revised Doctrinal Perspective (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Anny Command and General Staff College, 18 May 1990), p. 6. The effects are defined as consequences, outcomes, results, or products; Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster Inc., Publishers, 1985), p. 397. They do not necessarily occur at the same time or in the same place as the forces or actions that generated them. They can change over time and move between mediums (land, sea, air, or space). Also, actions in one medium can generate effects in another medium; Lynch, Operational Synchronization: A Revised Doctrinal Perspective, p. 4. 9. Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-5: Operations (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1986), p. 11; Stephen M. Sittnick, Do the Operational Operating Systems (OOS) Offer an Adequate Framework .for the Synchronization of Combat Power at the Operational Level (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, May 1994), p. 5; U.S. Marine Corps, FMFM-1: Warfighting ( Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1989), p. 31. 10. Lynch, Operational Synchronization: A Revised Doctrinal Perspective, p. 5. 11. FM 100-5: Operations (1993), p. 2-8. 12. FMFM-1 Warfighting, p. 32; Rogers, "Synchronizing the Airland Battle," p. 0-17; Boatner, Operational Synchronization-Maintaining the Decisive Advantage, p. 11. 13. FMFM-1: Warfighting, p. 31. 14. Tempo is a rate of advance over distance (or depth) or time; tempo in combination with mass yields momentum. The latter, in turn, is mass times tempo (distance/time), while the leverage is produced as a result of mass time depth. Thus, the momentum is the rate of change of leverage. The shorter the combat action, the higher momentum; Boatner, Operational Synchronization-Maintaining the Decisive Advantage, p. 1 2. 15. Ibid., p. 16. 16. FMFM-1: Warfighting, p. 32.

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17. Joint Pub 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations (1995), p. III-11; Maxwell R. Thurman and William Hartzog, "Simultaneity. The Panama Case," Army 1 I (November 1993), p. 16. 18. Lynch, Operational Synchronization: A Revised Doctrinal Perspective, p. 8. 19. Boatner, Operational Synchronization-Maintaining the Decisive Advantage, p. 34. 20. Earl F. Ziemke, "The German Decision to Invade Norway and Denmark," Command Decisions , Kent Roberts Greenfield, editor et al. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 64. 21. Marine-Gruppenkommando Ost, "Befehl des Marinegruppenkommandos West fuer den Fall ` Weseruebung' " 13 March 1940, p. 3; Bundesarchiv-Militaerarchiv (BA-MA), Freiburg i. Br., RM 35 1/35; Center for Military History, U.S. Army, The German Northern Theater of Operations 1940-1945 (CMH Pub 104-23) (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), pp. 27-8. 22. Ibid., Marine-Gruppenkommando Ost, "Befehl des Marinegruppenkommandos West fuer den Fall ` Weseruebung,' " 13 March 1940, pp. 3-4; CMH Pub 104-23: The German Northern Theater of Operations 1940-1945, p. 37. 23. Ziemke, "The German Decision to Invade Norway and Denmark," p. 64. 24. Marine-Gruppenkommando Ost, "Befehl des Marinegruppenkommandos West fuer den Fall ` Weseruebung,' " 13 March 1940, p. 4. 25. CMH Pub 104-23: The German Northern Theater of Operations 1940-1945, pp. 38-9. 26. Ministry of Defence (NAVY), War with Japan, Vol. 1: Background to the War (London:- Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1995), pp. 135-6. 27. Ibid., p. 136. 28. Scudder, Talk'n Ain't Fight'n. Synchronization and the Joint Task Force Training Process, p. 10. 29. The plan called for simultaneous and continuous massive air attacks against a large number of targets throughout Iraq. CINCCENT's Air Component Commander General C. Horner and his staff determined the targets and wrote the operations orders. The key to the execution of the air offensive was a master air-attack plan from which the daily air tasking orders (ATO) were prepared. The initial air attack between 0239 and 0525 on 17 January 1991 was carried out by some 670 coalition aircraft. Tomahawk cruise missiles launched by U.S. surface ships and B-52 bombers were to reach their targets at roughly the same time as F-1 17 stealth aircraft were to drop their bombs on the targets. Simultaneously, Army attack helicopters, additional F-117s, tankers, and EW aircraft also took part in the initial assault. 30. Henry S. Larsen 111, U.S. Joint Doctrine and the Persian Gulf War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 26 May 1995), p. 15. 31. Joint Pub 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations( 1 995), p. III-11. 32. General Douglas MacArthur, Historical Report on Allied Operations in Southwest Pacific Area, Vol. 2: Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Areas, 8 December 1941 to 2 September 1945, Ch. 814, p. 340ff. 33. Richard W. Bates, et al, The Battle for Leyte Gulf, October 1944: Strategical and Tactical Analysis, Vol. 1: Preliminary Operations Until 0719 October 17th, 1944 Including Battle off Formosa (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1953), pp. 459-60.

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34. Ibid., p. 460. 35. Stephen J. Kirin, "Synchronization," Naval War College Review 4 (Autumn 1996), pp. 9-10. 36. Scudder, Talk'n Ain't Fight'n. Synchronization and the Joint Task Force Training Process, p. 7. 37. Ibid., pp. 7-8. 38. Lynch, Operational Synchronization. A Revised Doctrinal Perspective, p. 10. 39. Joint Pub 3-0: Doctrine, for Joint Operations (1995), p. III-11; Thurman and Hartzog, "Simultaneity. The Panama Case," p. 16. 40. Boatner, Operational Synchronization-Maintaining the Decisive Advantage, p. 32. 41. Rogers, "Synchronizing the AirLand Battle," p. 0-18. 42. Boatner, Operational Synchronization-Maintaining the Decisive Advantage, p. 39. 43. Adapted from ibid., p. 34. 44. Lynch, Operational Synchronization: A Revised Doctrinal Perspective, p. 11. 45. James G. Burton, "Pushing Them Out the Back Door," Proceedings 6 (June 1993), p. 40. 46. FM 100-5: Operations (1993), pp. 2--6. 47. Burton, "Pushing Them Out the Back Door," p. 37. 48. Kirin, "Synchronization," pp. 17-8. 49. Christian von Gyldenfeldt, Die Beurteilung des Lufiwaffeneinsatzes waehrend des Norwegen- and Frankreich-Feldzuges 1940 durch die Heeresfuehrung (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 12 August 1970), p. 70. 50. Mark D. Johnson, "Synchronization and the Corps," Marine Corps Gazette 11 (November 1994), p. 29. 51. David J. Lemelin, "Misunderstanding Synchronization: An Army Perspective," Marine Corps Gazette l 1 (November 1994), p. 27. 52. Joint Pub 3-0: Doctrine,forJoint Operations (1995), pp. 111-8 and 111-11. 53. Joint Pub 3-0: Doctrine forJoint Operations (1995), p. 111-33. 54. CJCSM 3500.04 Universal Joint Task List (Version 2.1, 15 May 1995), pp. 2-102 and 2-103, 2-105. 55. Joint Pub 3-0: Doctrine for Joint Operations (1995), p. VI-3. 56. Ibid., p. VI-8.

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Part VIII: OPERATIONAL LEADERSHIP

OPERATIONAL LEADERSHIP

Character is the bedrock on which the whole edifice of leadership rests. It is prime element _for which every profession, every corporation, every industry searches in evaluating a member of its organization. With it, the full worth of the individual can be developed. Without itparticularly in the military profession failure in peace, disaster in war, or, at best, mediocrity in both will result.

General Matthew B. Ridgway The term "operational leadership" pertains to those levels of command responsible for accomplishing political and military strategic objectives assigned by the national or alliance/coalition leadership through application of operational art. Operational leadership ranges from the lowest command echelon that practices operational art joint task force and army corps and their naval and air equivalents-to theater-strategic and military-strategic command echelons. When an army division commander or his naval and air equivalent is assigned an operational objective to accomplish, then he also could be a part of operational leadership. In generic terms, leadership can be divided into three basic levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. National-strategic leadership is the highest military leadership of a state, coalition, or alliance. Military-strategic leadership, as the highest operational level command, is responsible for the entirety of military actions by the forces under national, alliance, or coalition command. It transforms the strategic objectives determined by the national-strategic leadership into military strategic objectives. It provides the interface between national or alliance/coalition policy on one hand, and military strategy and tactics on the other. A qualitative feature of operational leadership is its ability to affect the military-strategic and political arena. It is the task of operational leadership to point out to the highest political leadership when certain military objectives cannot be accomplished with the forces available. The political leadership should then modify or alter its political and military-strategic objectives. The "operational commander" is a collective term for any commander of operational-level command echelon, while the term "theater commander" refers to both theater-strategic or theater of operational commanders (or CINCs). The ways the operational commanders plan, prepare, and employ their subordinate forces differ significantly from those of tactical commanders. Many brilliant tactical commanders have utterly failed as operational commanders because they never acquired that broad perspective necessary to effectively use forces under their command to accomplish operational and strategic objectives. The tactical commander's view is limited to planning and fighting battles and engagements, while the operational commanders plan and conduct major operations or campaigns. Personality: Successful commanders at any level possess certain character traits and professional knowledge and experience that distinguish them from less capable commanders. The commander is not only a leader; he is also an educator and instructor of

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his subordinates. The higher the rank, the more pronounced must be these qualities and personality traits to be truly a great leader. Warfighting is an art not a science. There are only a few true masters of operational art and only a few great teachers.' Successful commanders, regardless of their rank, have certain personality traits that set them apart. The operational commander must possess to the highest degree strength of character, high intellect, creativity, and boldness. These qualities are developed throughout his life, military career, and through self-study. The higher the level of command, however, the more critical it is that the commander have these and other traits in abundance. Success as a military leader becomes harder as the size and complexity of command increase. Some qualities required for successful execution of a tactical mission might not be so important in making operational decisions. Personality is the product of both heredity and the environment. Strong personality is exemplified by the ability to think clearly, speak forcibly, and act quickly. The personality of an operational commander is felt indirectly rather than directly, through the chain of command. He is expected to bring to bear all his skills and knowledge acquired over many years in the execution of his responsibilities in combat . 5 In general, the operational commander should have intellectual qualities that range from mastery of his profession to imagination and culture. He must know the basic technical aspects of warfare. 6 He should have an analytical mind and be able to solve the problems that he constantly faces. Von Clausewitz observed that average intelligence may recognize the truth occasionally, and exceptional courage may now and then retrieve a blunder, but usually intellectual inadequacy will be exhibited by indifferent achievements. 8 Hence, it is critical that future operational commanders be selected from officers of strong intellect. Operational commanders should be men of strong character since character is the bedrock on which the entire leadership rests. 9 Character is developed through tribulations and persistence; persistence means will power. A commander has strength of character when he sticks to his convictions, regardless of the consequences. The commander whose views change constantly is not a man of strong character.' ° Von Clausewitz warned that strength of character could degenerate into obstinacy. The line between these two is difficult to draw in practice, but not in theory. Obstinacy is not an intellectual defect, but a fault of temperament because it comes from reluctance to admit that one is wrong.'' Operational commanders should be men of high intelligence-with their energies engaged in solving problems. High intelligence is not necessarily linked to formal education. The higher the rank, the less stupidity can be tolerated and the more damaging is the lack of intelligence in the commander.'' Intelligence essentially consists of three elements: imagination, flexibility of mind, and judgment. The operational commander should be a person of thoughts, ideas, and imagination. However, imagination must lead to innovation; otherwise it is essentially useless. There is always a conflict between determination and flexibility. Imagination helps the commander to retain the balance; otherwise determination becomes obstinacy and flexibility becomes vacillation. ' 3 The operational commander should not have preconceived ideas of what the enemy is going to do. The Austrians were convinced in 1757 that Frederick the Great, surrounded by enemies, could do nothing but remain on the defensive; he did just the opposite he attacked and achieved a great victory in the Battle of Rossbach on 5 November. In 1805, the Austrian General Karl Mack von Leberich at Ulm thought that Napoleon I would

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attack him frontally from the west. However, he overlooked the possibility that his right flank could be turned until it was too late to prevent it. 1 4 Before the Battle for Leyte, General Douglas MacArthur and his naval and air component commanders relied on the Japanese intentions, not capabilities, and predicted that there would be no major opposition by the Japanese fleet to the Allied landing at Leyte. They thought the Japanese would not intervene because the Philippine waters were hazardous for the movement of major Japanese forces, or if they did move out in strength, they would do so only under protective cover of land-based aircraft. 1 5 Even on 21 October (the Sho-1 Plan had been activated four days earlier) when the Japanese forces were well underway toward the Leyte Gulf, SOWESPAC intelligence believed that the Japanese were defeated in the air and predicted that "harassment and limited defense only" remained a possibility, but no interference with the Allied landing was expected.' Creativity is an essential requirement for the commander. Creative intellect would allow the operational commander to surprise his enemy counterpart and thus render him i mpotent. 1 7 Flexibility of mind is the ability to change a mental outlook under pressure but without confusion of purpose. The operational commander must always be ready to act flexibly when the situation requires it. Changes in the situation might be sudden and rapid. The Japanese commanders in World War 11 were conspicuously inflexible. They would follow their plans even after changes in the situation had rendered these plans obsolete.' Judgment is the ability to soundly assess known data and decide on a practical course of action 1 9 and it is based on knowledge and experience. The commander must recognize and properly assess the relative importance and relative value of all the various elements of a situation. He must reject all irrelevant and unimportant matters and concentrate on the essentials. Good judgment must combine imagination, keen intelligence, and practical good sense. It must be exercised in such a way as not to dampen initiative, but temper and shape it so that is usable . 20 The operational commander must be a good judge of other people's character and abilities when choosing his subordinates and in evaluating their work. He must have good understanding of human nature. He should know how men would react in certain situations or conditions. This allows him to properly assess the morale and capabilities of his own forces . 21 The commander should have ambition to succeed and rise in his profession and in everything else he does. However, blind ambition coupled with unscrupulousness is dangerous. There should always be a moral basis for ambition. Great ambition displayed by Napoleon I was the main reason for his success, but his extreme egotism was one of the principal reasons for his loss of power. 22 An operational commander must have great personal integrity. The real test of leadership comes in adverse situations; failure of integrity at these times will result in the rapid loss of his men's confidence. Personal integrity means that the operational commander truthfully informs the higher headquarters about the situation in his area of responsibility in regard to both his own and enemy forces. Many major operations or campaigns encountered great difficulties during their execution or ended badly because the operational commanders' misleading reports made it impossible for their superiors to make sound decisions. Likewise, the operational commander should choose subordinates who have great personal integrity. He should serve as model for subordinates, peers, and

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superiors alike. He should exhibit high standards and ideals; a moral leader should punish those who break the rules; the moral leader builds trust in himself. 23 The operational commander must possess a sense of responsibility, and a willingness and even eagerness to accept responsibility. The commander should be loyal to his country, to his organization, to his superiors, and to his subordinates. Lack of loyalty will incapacitate a leader no matter how brilliant or how aggressive. It requires strength of character to refrain from backbiting and from undermining his subordinates. The operational commander must have a genuine interest in his people; if not, he will never have their confidence. 24 The operational commander should be both trustworthy and trusting, faithfully adhering to the superior commander's intent in exercising the freedom of action given. As a superior, trusting subordinates is required, allowing them as much freedom of action as possible and encouraging them to exercise initiative at their level . 25 In the Gulf War of 1990-1991, General Schwarzkopf trusted his subordinate Marine force commander General Walter Boomer a great deal. In contrast, his relations with his Army component commander, General John Yeosock, were odd. General Yeosock was not temperamentally suited to serve under Schwarzkopf and reportedly was intimidated by him. Schwarzkopf often bypassed General Yeosock and dealt directly with his two subordinate corps commanders. More problematic was the relationship between Schwarzkopf and Commander V11 Corps, General Frederick Franks. Schwarzkopf was extremely dissatisfied with the VII Corps' performance after the ground offensive started on 24 February. General Franks was, in Schwarzkopf s view, not aggressive enough and was too methodical; his attack against Iraqi Republican Guards progressed too slowly. General Schwarzkopf blamed General Franks for being too slow and letting too many Iraqis escape. Although this charge is not universally accepted, the fact is that while VII Corps destroyed some key elements of the Republican Guards, several divisions escaped . 26 Courage is another personality trait of a successful operational commander. Von Clausewitz differentiated between two kinds of courage: courage in the face of personal danger, and the courage to accept responsibility. Physical courage is a permanent condition and is a prerequisite for any military leader. Courage also can result from such positive motives as ambition, patriotism, or enthusiasm. In that case courage is a feeling, an emotion; not a permanent state. Determination is the sign of courage; courage to accept responsibility in the face of moral danger is an act of temperament. Intelligence alone is not courage. Often the most intelligent people are irresolute. In the rush of events, a man is governed by emotions. The intellect must arouse that quality of courage, which then supports and sustains it in action. 28 The commander who selflessly shares the danger of combat with his soldiers, as General Patton and Field Marshal Rommel did, will be held in high esteem by his subordinates . 29 Rommel was known for his physical courage. His lengthy and frequent visits to the front enabled him to make instant decisions. He believed that bold decisions gave the best promise of success. 30 However, even more important than sheer physical courage is intellectual courage; courage of the commander's convictions. 31 Moral courage means standing by his convictions and enforcing his decisions upon his subordinates. The commander must have the patience and determination that his orders will be carried through, as well as sufficient physical courage to keep himself informed by close contact as to the progress of battle and giving

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good example to subordinates. 32 There are many brave soldiers, but few bold and energetic generals. Courage cannot accomplish anything at the higher levels unless it is supported by strong intellect. Not all operational commanders have both physical and moral courage. Some of Napoleon's famous subordinates, namely Marshal Michel Ney and Marshal Joachim Murat, had great physical courage but lacked moral courage. 33 Closely related to courage, and essential for operational commanders who literally control lives of thousands of people, is presence of mind. The analytical and reasoning process cannot be lost in time of stress and adversity. 34 Von Clausewitz observed that presence of mind always played a great role in war. War consists of danger, exertion, uncertainty, chance, and resourcefulness in sudden danger, which above all call for steady nerves. 35 Frederick the Great and Robert E. Lee were known for their calmness, white Napoleon I was highly excitable. Boldness is the acceptance of calculated risks. It implies confidence in the success of an action about which others are uncertain, or willingness to take a calculated risk when others are less willing to do so. 37 Von Clausewitz asserted that a distinguished commander without boldness is unthinkable. This quality is the first prerequisite of a great military leader. Von Clausewitz observed that whenever boldness encounters timidity, it is likely that boldness will win. In his view, boldness will be at a disadvantage only in an encounter with deliberate caution, which may be considered bold in its own right, and is certainly just as powerful and effective. However, such instances are rare. Timidity would cause much more damage in war than boldness. The more experienced the commander, the more self-control he possesses, and the less likely that he will choose a calculated risk. However, the higher up the chain of command, the greater the need for boldness supported by a reflective mind, so that boldness does not degenerate into purposeless bursts of blind passion. Without boldness, the respect of subordinates cannot be retained for long. 38 However, the boldest operational commander is powerless if his army does not have the same spirit. Boldness invariably has a powerful psychological effect on the enemy. Frederick the Great's invasion of Bohemia in 1757 was for the Austrians an unexpected blow, throwing everything into confusion and terror. 39 Field Marshal Rommel was a very bold commander, but not rash . 4° General MacArthur's decision to land at Inchon is an example of the boldness required of the operational commander. Foresight is essential in a good operational commander. Without foresight, his actions will be limited to reacting to the enemy's actions. 41 The operational commander should be tough-minded and able to act decisively and independently in situations where contact with superiors is impractical or impossible. This, in turn, requires a high degree of moral courage, self-reliance, and self-confidence. It also involves a willingness to assume responsibility and to take risks to do the right thing at the right time. At the operational level, the risks are much higher, and the tactical propensity to charge ahead may result in catastrophic defeat. 42 Resolute action is the first requirement in war. Operational commanders who wait for orders cannot exploit sudden opportunities in combat. The failure to act can be as dangerous as it is unsound. Lack of decision has resulted in losses of battles and sometimes of campaigns. Any decision to act would have been better than none with the resulting paralysis and chaos deriving from a total lack of directives. 43 The skill to act quickly is best acquired by experience and preparation. Napoleon I was known for

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making quick decisions. He neither vacillated nor waited for further information to weigh his intentions . 44 Determination on the part of the commanders and the entire rank and file is a significant factor in war. It generally rests in the operational commander himself. However, the entire chain of command must be permeated with the same determination as the operational commander has. 45 The determination of U.S. General Walton H. Walker to defend the Pusan Perimeter at any cost was the key factor in preventing complete defeat of the UN forces in Korea in the summer of 1950. Strong will is one of the operational commander's most important prerequisites for success. Von Clausewitz wrote that a strong will overcomes friction and breaks down obstacles, but sometimes it breaks down the machine also. Willpower is based on moral courage, even more than physical courage. 47 The operational commander must impose his will not only on the enemy, but also on his own staff and subordinates, and that of his allies. Opposition from the allies is sometimes the worst of the three. Strength of will allows an operational commander to impart his vision upon subordinates and to ensure that they adopt his vision as their own. That vision must be transmitted through several command echelons. This can be accomplished only if the operational commander possesses the necessary strength to overcome all obstacles. It is often easy for a commander to lose touch with his original vision in the face of setbacks and losses; this is when the operational commander must make the utmost effort to maintain that vision and not allow his subordinates to lose hope. Inaction and omission are much worse than an error of judgment arising from a sincere effort to act decisively. Not to act is the very antithesis of good leadership. Although errors in judgment might lead to failure, the exercise of initiative on the part of a commander could ultimately carry the day and lead to final success. A successful operational commander must know how to articulate his plans and orders. He should use clear, concise language in drafting his plan and order. Command cannot be practiced in differential equations. In contacts with subordinates, he should be able to impress them of the plan's importance by words, manner, and acts of execution. He must be confident in manner and bearing. His exhortations must carry conviction . 48 Professional Knowledge: The operational commander must have a high degree of professional knowledge and experience and extraordinary physical and psychological sturdiness . 49 All great captains in history, from Julius Caesar to Napoleon 1, von Moltke, Sr., to Patton, were known for their constant work to improve their professional knowledge. Julius Caesar was known for his mastery of strategy and tactics. His desire to learn more and to rise one step higher was constant. He was never satisfied with one or two victories or achievements. Napoleon I was also was known for untiring study. He never failed to avail himself of an opportunity to perfect himself. 50 Field Marshal von Moltke, Sr. was extremely well-read in all aspects of military profession, and many consider him to be the "most incisive and important European writer" between the end of 1.51 General George Patton was the Napoleonic Era and the outbreak of World War highly regarded by his staff, as a leader who knew better than anyone else how to defeat the enemy. 52 The operational commander must also have broad knowledge of foreign policy, diplomacy, geopolitics, international economy, ethnicity, religions, and other issues that shape the situation in a given theater. Field Marshal von Moltke, Sr. had a vast 566

knowledge of natural sciences and philosophy. He read in several languages. He wrote extensively on various political and economic issues, such as the Belgian and Polish railways. His travel letters on his visits to Turkey, England, France, Russia, and Italy are considered to be the most read pieces of German prose. 53 It is understood that the operational commander must have thorough knowledge and understanding of theory and practice of operational art. 54 He also needs to have a keen understanding of the relationship between strategy and policy, on one hand, and operational art and strategy on the other. This consists of mastering all the aspects of the employment of large forces and formations to accomplish operational or strategic objectives in the theater. Success will come because of weighing, judging, and balancing ends, ways, and means. 55 The operational commander should have a solid knowledge and understanding of the tactics of his own and other services. He does not need to know in detail the tactics or all the specifics pertaining to the capabilities of weapons and equipment. Yet, he must know the technical capabilities of the equipment of his force to allow him to correctly evaluate his subordinate forces' abilities. The operational commander should not be fixated on the tactical level. He must synthesize the lessons he has learned at lower levels of command with ongoing studies of operations. Operational warfare is a war on the map. All successful operational commanders have had solid knowledge of geography and appreciation of the operational and tactical features of terrain Otherwise the operational commander cannot make an accurate estimate of the feasibility and risk involved in a particular operation. Von Clausewitz observed that the relationship of war to geography and terrain might be regarded, if not as the most important, at least as the most noticeable peculiarity of military activity. Napoleon I was once asked how he always divined the intentions of the enemy so accurately; he answered: "I did not know beforehand the mistakes the enemy would make which I took advantage of, I simply studied my map." He continuously studied the enemy's possibilities and limitations on the map more than the enemy did himself. Yet, the methods that brought Napoleon I his great success in central Europe failed him altogether in Russia in 1812 because in that instance he failed to properly evaluate the theater features. The British also failed to understand the geographic features of South Africa until the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) was well underway. 58 Field Marshal Rommel was known for his excellent knowledge of terrain and orientation. Often he would drive day and night through trackless desert without maps, using a compass to check the direction. 59 General MacArthur was also well known for his excellent knowledge of military geography which greatly helped him to properly evaluate factors of space, time, and forces in planning and executing his campaigns and major operations. The operational commander cannot be successful if he does not take time to know his opposite-the enemy commander; otherwise, he will likely misunderstand the enemy's intentions and may neglect intelligence indicators. 6() The operational commander should study the enemy's country in great depth, not only military but also nonmilitary matters, as General Patton did. One of the reasons for General Patton's great success as operational commander was that he studied the German military in the interwar years. He became impressed with the German military because of his studies of Prussian and modern German history. He also became convinced that there would be another war with

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Germany. Therefore, he read most of the World War I memoirs of German officers, such as Field Marshals Paul yon Hindenburg and Erich von Falkenhayn, when they become available in translation. He also read the works of Generals Hans von Seeckt and Erich Ludendorff. General Patton's studies were so comprehensive that he read memoirs of German politicians and works of German philosophers and listened to German music. 61 Command Style: Command style varies depending on the operational commander's personality. Commanders can lead by example, by directive, or both. The most effective leadership, however, is by example. Napoleon I said "you could not command an army from Tuilleries" (Palace in Paris). The operational commander must be close to where the combat is, and he should be seen in person as often as possible. It is difficult to motivate troops to make the ultimate sacrifice from a distant command post. The commander's presence on the scene has a powerful moral influence on the ultimate success of the operation. Field Marshal yon Moltke, Sr. was present during the Battle of Koeniggraetz in July 1866. He was also present during the battles of Sedan and Metz in September and October of 1870. His purpose was to be seen, and if necessary, to influence. The power of the operational commander's personality is a potent force-his character, his decisiveness, his boldness. Even if troops seldom see their general on the modern battlefield, he must not be a stranger to them. 63 General Patton in his instruction to the newly created Third Army in March 1944 urged his subordinate commanders among other things to lead in person, visit the front daily, observe but not meddle, make personal reconnaissance, and visit the wounded . 6a The operational commander is responsible for developing the leadership character qualities and the military skills of his subordinate commanders. He should teach them how to act on their own, and how to make quick, sound military decisions. The operational commander's duty should be to educate his subordinate commanders, with the aim of teaching them not only what to think but also how to think. An operational commander should spend as much time as possible with his staff and subordinate commanders during professional development, war games, and exercises to discuss various military problems. All officers, no matter the rank, should be encouraged to express their views frankly and without consequences. No organization can hope to continuously improve itself without this self-correcting mechanism. Moreover, an honest relationship between a commander and his subordinates cannot but help to improve the understanding of each other's thoughts and actions. It is then that subordinate commanders will better understand the operational commander's intent. This will allow the operational commander to determine with more certainty how much latitude to give the subordinate commanders. Operational Thinking: Strategy and operational art deal with broad objectives, and broad objectives require broad vision. 65 The operational commander must focus on broad military objectives that can range from the destruction of the enemy forces in the field to undermining public support for war or the enemy's will to fight. He must have in mind the entire spectrum of the future war and be able to draw the consequences in terms of visualizing the war, forms of organization, structures and equipment of the armed forces, and national and multinational command structures and crisis management . 66 To be successful, the operational commander must possess a strategic or operational perspective on all aspects of the situation in a given theater. He must be able to see the situation in its

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full complexity. He must understand how the actions at each level of war affect those at the others. Examples of victories not achieved because of operational commanders lacked what in theory is called "operational thinking" are numerous. Operational thinking is the key by which the commander acquires strategic or operational vision-the ability to discern how to accomplish ultimate strategic or operational objectives through the conduct of a campaign or major operation. A vision of the senior leader provides a military organization with a clear sense of direction, a sense of mission. It is critical that the operational commander impart to all his subordinates his personal vision of victory and the conditions and methods for obtaining it. The operational commander must be able to judge the true nature of the war and to link political objectives to military means at his disposal. General Dwight D. Eisenhower was selected as the Supreme Commander of the Allies Expeditionary Forces not because of his tactical and operational abilities, which were limited. He did not know how to manage a battlefield. However, he possessed strategic vision for victory and understood the importance of maintaining alliance. 67 But it is equally true that Eisenhower's lack of operational vision resulted in his lackluster performance in conducting the Normandy Campaign. The operational commanders at the highest level, especially when in command of the alliance or coalition forces, must possess both strategic and operational vision to be truly successful. Too many commanders in the past failed because they were unable or unwilling to raise their perspective above the tactical level. To think tactically is easy because this is an area in which all commanders feel most comfortable. There is no danger in looking downward. To broaden one's perspective requires considerable mental effort. The operational commanders must accept inherent features of operational warfare: ambiguities and uncertainties; considerable influence of political, diplomatic, economic, and other nonmilitary aspects of the situation on the employment of military forces; and the need to take some high risks. Operational thinking is not an innate trait, but must be acquired by the systematic and untiring efforts throughout the career of the future operational commander. The operational commander, in contrast to the tactical commander, must have an uncommon ability to calculate and balance the factors of space, time, and force several weeks or even months in advance. He must evaluate the physical environment in operational rather than tactical terms. Among other areas, this means that characteristics of terrain, hydrography, and oceanography are analyzed in terms of their effect on the course and outcome of major operations and campaigns, not battles and engagements. In addition, the operational commander is far more concerned with effects of climate than weather on the employment of joint or combined forces in a given theater. Napoleon I combined vivid imagination with the formidable capacity for calculating space in terms of time to predict outcomes beyond the individual battles. German Field Marshal Erich von Manstein believed that the army group commander should be able to predict the general way operations would proceed anywhere from four to six weeks ahead. All considerations of an operational nature are ultimately based, when the initiative has been lost, on appreciation or hypotheses regarding the courses of action the enemy may be expected to take. The greater one's sphere of command, of course, the further ahead one must think . 68

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The operational commander is constantly tempted to become engrossed in day-today tactical events as the U.S. commanders were in the Vietnam War. Predominant or, even worse, exclusive focus on tactics is bound to obscure the commander's operational vision. At the same time, the operational commander cannot be oblivious to, nor be ignorant of what is happening at the tactical level. His strategic or operational vision might be excellent, but that in itself would not lead to success if his forces suffer tactical defeats in the field. Clearly, the operational commander must find a balance between these two extremes; indeed, not an easy task. The penalties for lack of an operational perspective by the commander or his subordinates can lead to a huge waste of time and sorely needed resources. Often, an exclusive focus on tactics leads to defeat at the operational and strategic level. The Japanese Combined Fleet, led by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, suffered a decisive defeat in the Battle of Midway (Operation MI) in June 1942 despite its overwhelming strength over the U.S. Navy forces that took part in that battle. On 3 June, when the first contact was obtained, Admiral Yamamoto's forces were dispersed in ten groups in the central and northern Pacific. Two of his carriers that might have provided the margin needed for victory were sent north to attack Dutch Harbor and seize Attu and Adak in the Aleutians. The Japanese forces in the Midway area were beyond mutual supporting distances." The U.S. Navy would not have achieved that victory regardless of its full knowledge of Japanese intentions and brilliant handling of forces by Admiral Nimitz and his subordinate carrier group commanders if Admiral Yamamoto had kept his forces concentrated and not violated the principles of objectives, mass, and economy of effort. Admiral Yamamoto's perspective was clearly too tactical, and that was probably the single major reason for his defeat. In the Battle for Leyte in October 1944, the Allies came very close to a humiliating defeat at the hands of a much inferior Japanese naval force. Admiral William F. Halsey, commander of the U.S. Third Fleet, not only violated several principles of war, but also fought a battle that did not contribute to the success of a major operation as a whole. His perspective was tactical and hence too narrow. These two examples, each in its own way, illustrate how a superior force can be defeated by, or almost suffer a defeat at the hands of, a much weaker but more skillfully led force. In short, overwhelming superiority of forces can easily be squandered through inadequate knowledge and lack of understanding of operational warfare. The lack of operational thinking was the main reason for the Allied defeats in Norway and France in 1940, and in Southeast Asia in 1941-1942. Adolf Hitler's lack of operational thinking was evident in his constant effort to deal with purely tactical details. British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill had a similar tendency, but fortunately, his top military aids often frustrated or sabotaged various of the Prime Minister's harebrained schemes. A lack of operational thinking was apparent by many UN commanders during the Korean War in 1950-1953. The only exception was General MacArthur's boldly conceived and excellently executed amphibious landing at Inchon in September 1 950 (Operation Chromite). Likewise, the Vietnam War was conducted at the theaterstrategic and tactical level only; again, operational art was not applied. 70 In contrast, the U.S. performance in the invasion of Panama in December 1989 (Operation Just Cause) and the Gulf of War of 1990-1991 showed that the services learned from their neglect of operational art in the previous decades. Yet, only a few years later and despite ultimate success, NATO stumbled into a war of attrition at the operational level in its air offensive

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against Serbia in March-June 1999. This should serve as a wakeup call not to forget the lessons of the past and to more firmly embrace operational art as a guide in planning, preparing, and executing major operations or campaigns. Operational thinking can be acquired through practical experience in war or largescale exercises and maneuvers in peacetime. Another method is through operational and strategic war-gaming. Learning from personal experience is not only narrow, but also fraught with many dangers. Warfare does not have its logic but has its grammar, and the grammatical rules are deduced from studying military history. Because very few military commanders have the experience of commanding forces at the operational level, the best way to educate them to think operationally is through the study of the successes and failures of great military leaders. Napoleon I and Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke, Sr., were also great students of history. Operational commanders should be students of history, not historians -a big difference exists between these two. General Patton was also a great student of history who studied past major operations and campaigns in depth . 71 Great captains who were not the students of history, but possessed the intuitive gifts to be great captains, like Oliver Cromwell, have been rare indeed. The better educated the commander is, the more he understands the bigger picture and the better he will perform his functions. Conclusion: Several command echelons, from operational-tactical to military strategic, are involved to varying degree in planning, preparing, and conducting major operations and campaigns. The practical application of operational art requires that the commanders have broader perspective and the ability to visualize how various actions and activities contribute to the accomplishments of the assigned operational or strategic objectives. They command with large forces and thousands of soldiers, sailors, and airmen. Their responsibility also extends to the protection of civilian population and civilian-related installations and facilities. The failure of a single major operation and even more so, a campaign, could have an immediate and extremely adverse effect on the war as a whole. This means that only the commanders who exemplify the highest requirements should be selected for operational-level commands. The principal requirements for a successful operational leader are high intellect, strong personality, courage, boldness, and will to act, combined with extensive professional knowledge and experience. The operational commanders must have a solid knowledge and understanding of aspects of operational art. They must know and understand the relationship among all operational art, strategy, and tactics. They do not need to possess detailed tactical knowledge, but they do need to have solid knowledge of the tactical capabilities of their own and friendly forces. Operational commanders also must have broad knowledge of political issues, diplomacy, international economy, geopolitics, social issues, and other issues of importance in their respective theaters. The operational commander must think "operationally"; otherwise, he simply cannot succeed. The broader perspective is acquired by study of past major operations and campaigns and by experience. However, operational thinking is not inborn, but requires a great awareness, and then determination to acquire it. It requires constant effort on the part of operational commanders and their staffs to keep ultimate objectives always i n view as they plan and conduct major operations and campaigns. Many operational commanders have possessed the highest intellect, strength of character, courage, and boldness, but failed simply because they never raised their sights further than tactics. 571

Tactical excellence was not in the past, nor will it be in the future, a substitute for operational thinking.

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Notes 1. Friedrich von Boetticher, "Feldherrnturm and Generalstab: Grundsaetze and Geist," Wehrkunde 9 (September 1964), p. 454. 2. Werner W. Banisch, "Leadership at the Operational Level," Army 8 (August 1987), p. 60. 3. Richard L. Connolly, "Exercise of Command," Naval War College Review 1 1 (November 1955), p. 3. 4. C.C. Carmine, "The Qualifications for Leadership," Proceedings 6 (June 1921), p. 862. 5. Banisch, "Leadership at the Operational Level," p. 52. 6. Ibid., 53. 7. J. Lawton Collins, "Leadership at Higher Echelons," Military Review 5 (May 1990), p. 37. 8. Von Clausewitz, On War; edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, 8th printing 1984), p. 101. 9. Banisch, "Leadership at the Operational Level," p. 53. 10. Von Clausewitz, On War (1984), p. 107. 11. Ibid., p. 108. 1 2. Connolly, "Exercise of Command," p. 8. 1 3. William Slim, "Higher Command in War," Royal Air Force Quarterly 2 (April 1953), p. 149. 14. Hugo von Freytag-Loringhoven, The Power of Personality in War, translated by the Historical Section, Army War College, September 1938, in Roots of Strategy , Book 3 (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1991), pp. 270-1. 15. Intelligence Summary, Headquarters Allied Air Forces SOWESPACAREA, Serial 245, October 15, 1944, paragraph 4. 16. Intelligence Summary No. 20, Periodic Summary of Enemy Trends, GHQ, SOWESPACAREA Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, October 21, 1944. 1 7. Mitchell M. Zais, Generalship and the Art of Senior Command. Historical and Scientific Perspectives (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, May 1985), p. 49. 18. Slim, "Higher Command in War," p. 148. 19. Phillip L. Brinkley, The Operational Commander's Will. An Intangible Element In Victory (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 16 May 1986), p. 5. 20. Connolly, "Exercise of Command," p. 8. 21. Gregory C. Gardner, Generalship in War. The Principles of Operational Command (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 4 May 1987), pp. 21-2.

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22. Von Freytag-Loringhoven, The Power of Personality, p. 299. 23. James E. Swartz, "Morality: A Leadership Imperative," Military Review 9 (September 1992), p. 79. 24. Connolly, "Exercise of Command," pp. 5-6; Collins, "Leadership at Higher Echelons," p. 34. 25. John T. Nelsen, Where To Go From Here? Considerations for The Formal Adoption Of Auftragstaktik By The US Army (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, December 1986), pp. 18-9. 26. Bernard E. Trainor, "Schwarzkopf and His Generals," Proceedings 6 (June 1994), pp. 45-7. 27. Edmund A. Gibson, "Leaders and Leadership," Proceedings 3 (March 1954), p. 304. 28. Von Clausewitz, On War, (1984), p. 102. 29. Banisch, "Leadership at the Operational Level," p. 52. 30. James M. Milano, "How Rommel Applied Lessons To His Afrika Korps Operations," Armor 5 (September October 1991), p. 28. 31. Collins, "Leadership at Higher Echelons," p. 37 32. Connolly, "Exercise of Command," p. 8. 33. Von Freytag-Loringhoven, The Power of Personality in War , pp. 219--20. 34. Zais, Generalship and the Art of Senior Command: Historical and Scientific Perspectives, p. 61 35. Von Clausewitz, On War (1984), pp. 104, 107. 36. Edmund A. Gibson, "Leaders and Leadership," Proceedings 3 ( March 1954), pp. 303-4. 37. Zais, Generalship and the Art ofSenior Command: Historical and Scientific Perspectives, p. 55. 38. Collins, "Leadership at Higher Echelons," p. 36. 39. Von Freytag-Loringhoven, The Power of Personality in War, p. 213. 40. Alfred Gause, "Command Techniques Employed by Field Marshal Rommel in Africa," Armor 4 (JulyAugust 1958), p. 24. 41. Connolly, "Exercise of Command," p. 7. 42. Robert T. Dail, Does the U.S. Army Really Understand Operational War? A Logistics Perspective (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2 May 1988), p. 31. 43. Connolly, "Exercise of Command," p. 5. 44. Carmine, "The Qualifications for Leadership," p. 864. 45. Mark H. Gerner, "Leadership at the Operational Level," Military Review 6 (June 1987), p. 31. 46. Von Freytag-Lori nghoven, The Power of Personality in War , p. 244.

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47. Slim, "Higher Command in War," p. 148. 48. Connolly, "Exercise of Command," p. 6. 49. Erich Vad, "Operative Fuehrung: Grundlagen, Merkmale and Perspektiven," Militaersiche Zeitschrift 2 (March April 1998), p. 130.

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50. Carmine, "The Qualifications for Leadership," pp. 858-9. 51. Daniel J. Hughes, editor, Moltke. On The Art of War. Selected Writings ; translated by Daniel J. Hughes and Harry Bell (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993), p. 1. 52. Martin Blumenson, "Essence of Command: Competence, Iron Soul," Armv 3 (March 1993), p. 42. 53. Roland G. Foerster, General feldmarschall von Moltke: Bedeutung and Wirkung (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1991), p. XI. 54. Slim, "Higher Command in War," p. 149. 55. Banisch, "Leadership at the Operational Level," p. 50. 56. Gardner, Generalship in War. - The Principles of Operational Command, p. 23. 57. Ibid., p. 24. 58. Von Freytag-Lori nghoven, The Power of Personality in War, pp. 290, 252. 59. Gause, "Command Techniques Employed by Field Marshal Rommel in Africa," p. 23. 60. Gardner, Generalship in War. The Principles of Operational Command, pp. 22-3 61. Roger H. Nye, "Whence Patton's Military Genius," Parameters, Winter 1991-92, p. 71. 62. Banisch, "Leadership at the Operational Level," p. 52. 63. Von Freytag-Loringhoven, The Power of Personality in War , p. 220. 64. Nye, "Whence Patton's Military Genius," p. 61. 65. David Jablonsky, "Strategy and the Operational Level of War: Part I," Parameters, Spring 1987, p. 71. 66. Vad, "Operative Fuehrung: Grundlagen, Merkmale and Perspektiven," p. 138. 67. Mitchell M. Zais, "Strategic Vision and Strength of Will: Initiatives for Theater Command," Parameters Vol. XV, No. 4, pp. 60-1. 68. Jablonski, "Strategy and the Operational Level of War," Part 1, p. 72; Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982), p. 409. 69. Richard G. Alexander, "Command and Decision," Lecture to Naval War College on 1 May 1962; Naval War College Review, June 1962, p. 31. 70. Edward N. Lutwak, "The Operational Level of War," International Security, Winter 1980/81, pp. 61-79. 71. Nye, "Whence Patton's Military Genius," p. 71.

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72. Herbert Richmond, National Policy and Naval Strength and Other Essays (London/New York/Toronto: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1934), p. 285, 288-9.

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EXERCISING OPERATIONAL LEADERSHIP Every level of ' command has its own intellectual standards, its own prerequisite for fame and honor.... There are Commanders-in-Chief who could not have led a cavalry regiment with distinction, and cavalry commanders who could have led armies. The higher is the military rank, the greater is the degree to which activity is governed by the mind, by intellect, by insightconsequently, boldness, which is a quality of temperament, will have to be held in check. This explains why it is so rare in the higher ranks, and why it is all the more admirable when found there. Carl von Clausewitz Operational commanders have a wide range of responsibilities in times of peace or war. Some of their responsibilities, like operational command and control, planning, and training are exercised continuously. However, the real test of operational leadership is during preparation and execution of major operations and campaigns. It is there that the operational commander and his staff must show a high degree of skills in the employment of military and nonmilitary sources of power to achieve assigned operational or strategic objectives. The commander obsessed with tactics and technology is unlikely to be successful. The operational perspective is necessary if one's forces are to be used effectively and decisively. Responsibilities in Peacetime: In peacetime, operational commanders have a wide range of responsibilities. Among other things, they should continually evaluate and appraise the objective factors peculiar to their area of responsibility or the theater. The theater environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences in the theater that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the operational chain of command. National and international security considerations across the range of military operations are especially important for operational commanders. They must continuously evaluate information received on the general situation in the theater through their own personal observations, and reports of their subordinate commanders. Additionally, they must uninterruptedly evaluate the theater strategy and any military actions in progress. They must keep an eye on any world situation that might affect the strategic situation within their area of responsibility or theater. Operational commanders have many responsibilities in a regional conflict or in a low-intensity conflict. Among other things, they must orchestrate major operations and campaign plans to combine, sequence, and synchronize the operations of the theater's

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assigned, attached, or supporting service forces. This includes the vertical integration of operational functions within each operating area and their horizontal integration in time and space to maximize and unify effort. If effectively executed, this will allow the operational commander to get inside the enemy commander's decision cycle and defeat even larger forces through operational synchronization of his combat forces. One of the operational commander's most important responsibilities in peacetime is to establish and employ operational command and control. Normally, operational commanders are responsible for: appointing subordinate component commanders, establishing area of responsibilities and operational boundaries, assigning missions to subordinate commanders, obtaining necessary forces and assets, and establishing command relationships. The operational commander should properly organize his forces and establish a simple and clear chain of command. Creating unnecessary command echelons complicates and delays issuance and transmittal of orders, instructions, and reports. The operational commander should avoid holding simultaneously a subordinate tactical command in addition to his primary duties. Otherwise, he could be involved in purely tactical decisions and will therefore be distracted from his primary responsibilities. He should avoid bypassing subordinate commanders because that undermines their initiative and morale. The operational commander should not fail to inform subordinate and adjacent commanders of his actions or intentions. One of the main problems facing any operational commander is how to balance the competing demands of centralized direction and decentralized execution in exercising operational command and control. The increased size of the area in which battles are fought, the numerous command elements, and the compression of time-space relationships favor decentralized execution at any level of command. However, the larger number of decision-making centers also considerably complicates coordination and mutual support among subordinate command elements. This trend clearly contradicts the requirements of unity of command, which is a cardinal principle of a sound military organization. Unity of command is ensured by having a single and unambiguous source of authority at the top. It requires that the authority vested in subordinate commanders to carry out component tasks be clearly defined and understood. Lack of unity of command often results in the fragmentation of authority and decision-making. Therefore, the operational commander, in setting up the theater command and control process, must avoid the pitfalls of ambiguity and overlapping authority. The tendency to over-centralize the decision-making process in the theater was evident not only during the Cold War, but also in many recent crises that had the potential for escalation into a regional conflict. The highest political and military leaders tried repeatedly to centralize control in their hands. This stemmed partly from concern that some of the tactical commanders' actions might escalate beyond control and partly because technological advances allowed political leaders to directly communicate with forces in any part of the globe. Therefore, finding a balance between centralization and decentralization of decision-making has become a perennial and not completely resolved problem for all military commanders in the modern era. Modern technology allows the operational commander to collect, evaluate, analyze, and transmit information more quickly in the form of intelligence to higher and lower command echelons. C4 systems today allow the operational commander to instantaneously communicate with his forces. However, modern technology can also

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considerably complicate the commander's work, because even unsophisticated enemies can acquire, with relative ease, the most advanced information-processing systems. The news media can transmit information around the globe to anyone with a radio or television. International businesses and industries are engaged around the world, providing products and services in the increasingly interdependent international economy. The truly massive volume of information transmitted by high-technology systems can significantly impede the operational commander's decision-making. 2 Before deploying forces, the operational commander should determine the information infrastructure of the area in which his forces will operate. He should anticipate the possibility that the enemy will use radio and TV to obtain a local information advantage over his own forces. The operational commander must also know the military information capabilities of his own forces, including command C41 systems and procedures, to plan for effective multinational operations. 3 Responsibilities in Combat: The true leadership qualities of the operational commanders are displayed in planning, preparing, and conducting campaigns and major operations. Operational commanders bear primary responsibility for the entire planning process. Specifically, they conduct the estimate of the situation and make decisions (for details see the chapter, "The Decisions"). During the planning phase, they are primarily responsible for determining the ultimate and intermediate objectives. Operational commanders are involved in identifying the enemy's critical factors-the operational and strategic center of gravity, in particular. They provide input to the highest political leadership of the desired end-state and conflict or war termination. They are also involved in the process of determining the method of defeating the opponent and in selecting the sector of main effort, the point of main attack, the form of operational maneuver, the integrated use of all available forces for operational deception, and the protection of one's own center of gravity. In determining phases of a major operation or campaign, the operational commander and the planners anticipate the culmination point of their own forces, determine operational sequencing, phasing, branches and sequels, and synchronization. The operational commander's intent provides operational vision and enables subordinate commanders to clearly understand what actions they must take in the accomplishment of the commander's overall objective. The commander's intent should always give subordinate commanders sufficient freedom of action in the accomplishment of their assigned missions. It is a critical factor for ensuring unity of effort. Likewise, in carrying out their assigned tasks, subordinate commanders should always keep in mind the superior commander's intent. In exercising initiative, subordinate commanders should act in consonance with the intent of the higher operational commander. The commander's freedom of action at the operational level is greatly enhanced through decentralized decision-making, based on a clear statement of his intent and his use of task-oriented orders. The operational commander should have a corresponding flexibility of mind and confidence in his tactical leaders. The operational commander will be, in many cases, far removed from those who will carry out his intent. The greater the separation, the greater the danger that his decisions will lose energy and that his intent will not be passed down through the lower levels of the chain of command. Field Marshal Von Moltke, Sr. observed that no plan of operation can be projected with confidence much beyond the first encounter with the enemy's main forces. 579

Very rarely will the enemy act according to one's expectations; war is too complex to be fought by the book of rules. The only guide could be general points of view and principles applied creatively and decisively. Von Moltke, Sr. stressed repeatedly the critical role the commander's estimate of the situation (Lagebeurteilung) has for the successful planning and combat employment of one's forces. The operational commander must expect and be mentally ready to modify, change, or even abandon his plan because of unexpected events after a major operation or campaign starts. He must retain operational flexibility, but at the same time not lose sight of the main objective. Von Moltke, Sr. observed that the advantages of the situation would never be fully utilized if subordinate commanders wait on orders. The employment of one's large forces can be successful only if the commanders at all levels are competent and accustomed to independent action. Therefore, the need to instill the habit of acting independently to subordinate commanders already in time of peace. Only then can the operational commander hope that his intent would be successfully carried out by subordinates. When in doubt, it is always more preferable to act, and obtain and maintain the initiative than to react to the enemy's actions .4 Shaping the Battlefield/Battlespace: The plan of a campaign or major operation cannot be successful without a series of well-integrated actions and measures to "shape" the battlefield/battlespace, conducted before and during the initial phase of combat. This is accomplished principally by destroying or degrading the enemy's critical capabilities; delaying or preventing deployment or advance of the enemy forces into the theater; manipulating the enemy's perceptions; degrading or neutralizing the enemy's ability to make decisions; and obtaining and maintaining one's freedom of action. Destruction or degradation of the enemy's critical capabilities can be accomplished by attacking a wide range of targets in the theater, such as C3 nodes, elements of logistical support and sustainment, tactical air support, and air defenses. C2W is perhaps the most important and potentially most effective way in shaping the battlefield/battlespace by destroying or neutralizing the enemy's ability to obtain accurate picture of the situation and make sound and timely decisions. Delaying the advance or movement of the enemy's forces into the area or theater of operations can be accomplished by conducting operational fires. The enemy commander's perceptions can be manipulated by successful use of operational and strategic deception. The ultimate purpose of deception is to deceive the enemy either as to one intentions or capabilities, or both. Execution of a Campaign/Major Operation: The main responsibilities of the operational commander in the course of a campaign or major operation are as follows: conduct the "running" estimate of the situation; supervise and influence subordinate commanders' actions; change intermediate objectives; change command relationships and forces' subordination; consolidate operational or strategic success; and prepare for the next phase of a campaign or major operation. After the beginning of a campaign or major operation, the operational commander and his staff must continuously monitor the strategic or operational situation by conducting a "running estimate" of the situation. Otherwise, the operational commander will be unable to quickly and flexibly respond to unanticipated changes of the situation and make appropriate operational, organizational, or informational decisions.

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The operational commander and his staff supervise the conduct of the campaign or major operation by continually assessing the situation and seeking information through direct observation and reports. The staff must have as complete a picture as possible of the entire strategic or operational situation. Ideally, the operational commander should provide only broad direction for action, leaving the detailed tactical employment of forces to subordinate commanders. Subordinate commanders, in turn, plan and execute the maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and the enemy to achieve assigned military objectives. The operational commander should interfere with the decisions of their subordinate commanders only when those decisions are unsound and could jeopardize the outcome of the entire mission. He should have great confidence in the skills and abilities of his subordinate operational-tactical and tactical commanders, since he is usually physically removed by hundreds, or even thousands, of miles from the scene of the potential action. The greater the distance, the higher the possibility that his decisions will reach subordinate commanders too late or that they will not correspond to a fast-moving situation. Therefore, he must act with speed and energy to make sure that his intent and orders are clearly understood and carried out. The operational commander should know what actions his subordinate commanders have taken and the results of those actions. He should try to visit his subordinate commanders in person as often as possible to obtain a first-hand account of the situation. The operational commander's intent is a critical factor for ensuring unity of effort. Therefore, in carrying out their assigned tasks, subordinate commanders should always keep the superior commander's intent in mind. The operational commander should always strive to direct and control the actions of his subordinates in such a manner as to encourage initiative and independent thinking. 5 Hence, he should not go into minute tactical details and interfere with the responsibilities of his subordinate tactical commanders. Too much involvement in tactical details is bound to impair the commander's operational vision, as happened to many high U.S. commanders in Vietnam. At the same time, there is great danger in going to the other extreme, i.e., having nothing to do with tactics. The commander's operational vision is then negatively affected by lack of appreciation for the situation and developments in the field. Under some circumstances a subordinate commander should be able to modify or even abandon the assigned task(s) if those actions would still satisfy the superior commander's intent. The subordinate commander should seek approval before such action, but if that is not possible, he should take full responsibility for his decision. In the absence of prior approval, the subordinate commander should explain and justify, to his higher commander's satisfaction, why he has taken such an action . 6 Subordinate commanders should make every effort to maintain contact with their operational commander. They should keep him fully informed of any significant change in the situation, while exercising initiative and energy in resolving problems within their area of responsibility. They should be encouraged to propose changes in orders and directives based on their assessment of the situation. The commander must never become a slave to the plan, but nevertheless should not change a plan with which all are familiar unless the changing situation creates problems or opportunities that cannot be overlooked. The operational commander must accept the inevitability of confusion and take advantage of it before the enemy

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commander does. When the situation demands, the operational commander may use a quick estimate for decision-making in the minute-to-minute, hour-to-hour conduct of operations. Besides conducting a running estimate of the situation, the operational commander influences his subordinate commanders' accomplishment of the mission by: changing their objectives and tasks, reallocating or reassigning combat forces and forces of support from one sector or area to another, reallocating and reassigning combat support forces, changing their responsibilities, or, if necessary, relieving subordinate commanders. In the course of a campaign or major operation, not only must the operational commander carefully and continuously monitor the actions underway, but he must also envision the situation and its changes several weeks or even months ahead. In sequencing the actions of one's forces, the operational commander should never foreclose future options. This is primarily a matter of having options built into the initial operation plan, but it can also result from having a running estimate of the situation. The operational commander should anticipate and orchestrate the actions that logically follow each other. He might conduct a withdrawal, followed by a shift to the defense and then to a counteroffensive, or vice versa. Contingency planning should be continuous. The operational commander should, whenever possible, try to impose his operational tempo on the enemy. In visualizing a sequence of operations, the operational commander should expect conditions in combat will change; then he must accommodate these changes by developing branches that address unlikely but possible enemy reactions. Likewise, plans should include sequels, ranked by priority, based on the probability of occurrence. One of the critical challenges for the operational commander is maintaining a steady focus on the ultimate objective. He should always do everything possible to accomplish the ultimate objective of a campaign or major operation, and that objective should not be changed until it has been accomplished. In the Battle of Britain in 1940, the German Luftwaffe was close of achieving its initial operational objective-winning air superiority over England. But, that objective was abandoned on 7 September when the Luftwaffe shifted its effort against the RAF's Fighter Command to attacking industrial targets in an effort to defeat the British will to fight. This change of objective allowed the RAF's Fighter Command to recover and eventually regain command of the air. 9 The operational or strategic situation might change because drastic changes in any factor of space, time, and force require reestablishing the balance or scaling down the objective. In some cases, the unexpectedly weak enemy's resistance might lead to reassessment of the original objective, resulting in selection of some other larger objective. Changing the objective should not be governed predominantly or exclusively by economic considerations. Hitler temporarily changed the operational objectives in the first phase of the invasion of Soviet Russia in the summer of 1941. He ordered Army Group Center, after reaching Smolensk, to consolidate its gains. This pause was necessary for logistic reasons: to rest panzer and mechanized forces, bring up replacements and supplies, and carry out maintenance. In the ensuing debate on the course of action to take, views between the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht and the Army's High Command diverged significantly. Hitler's Directive 33 (issued on 22 July 1941) directed Army Group Center to advance to Moscow with infantry, but without

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its two panzer groups.' () Hitler ordered the panzer groups to shift their operations from support of Army Group North toward Leningrad, to Army Group South to seize Ukraine, the Crimea, and the Donets Basin. Hitler rejected several proposals from General Fritz Halder, the Army's Chief of the General Staff, and in a new directive, issued on 21 August, ordered that the main objective before the onset of winter was not capturing Moscow, but the Crimea and the Donets Basin. Instead of taking Moscow in July or August, Hitler ordered the capture of Kiev, where four Soviet armies and parts of two others had been destroyed and 665,000 prisoners taken in late September. 1 1 When Hitler finally ordered the resumption of the offensive against Moscow (Directive Nr. 35 on 6 September), valuable time had been lost. The German offensive in the north stalled, and Leningrad was never captured. Likewise, the German thrust toward Moscow eventually failed in December 1941. The Soviet loss of the Leningrad industrial area and the Donets Basin would not have had a decisive and immediate effect on Soviet morale or economy, as would have the capture of Moscow. In fact, the capture of the Donets Basin proved to be of limited economic value for Germany's war effort. 1 2 Once the enemy center of'gravity is determined, it should be the centerpiece for selecting one's own courses of action, and it should be reassessed constantly throughout the campaign or major operation. 1 3 This evaluation should focus on significant changes in the strategic situation, such as new allies or coalition partners, or changes in phases of a campaign. The enemy's operational center of gravity must also be reevaluated as new forces enter the theater or new weapons are introduced. 1 4 Any change of the objective would require a change of the enemy's center of gravity. The operational commander should respond to unanticipated threats or opportunities by shifting forces from less threatened sectors to the new sector of effort. This could occur because intermediate objectives or their priorities have changed. Shift of the main sector of effort could result from entirely new objectives. The operational commander should carefully reevaluate the situation in the theater and avoid being fixated on some spectacular enemy's tactical actions, thereby missing larger trends in the situation as the Allies did in May 1940. The German airborne troops' surprise attack on the Eben Emauel fortress in Belgium misled the Allied commanders into moving their forces into Belgium where they would be surrounded, rather than shifting the sector of main effort from the north to the Ardennes. 1 s Phases of a campaign or major operation often vary from the plan both in time of occurrence and duration. Phases might change because the enemy offers stronger or weaker resistance, one's intermediate objectives change, additional forces become available, or the sector of main effort must be changed. In general, one of the operational commander's most difficult tasks is to predict and identify the culminating point and whether the latter has been exceeded or at least reached. Hence, it is crucial that the operational commander has the ability to timely and accurately sense the approach to, or arrival at, the point of culmination during a campaign or major operation so that the ultimate objective could be accomplished. Such a time- or force-sensitive decision creates a danger for a commander who cannot adequately balance ends and means because it will result in a mismatch between combat and sustaining resources that may force the campaign or major operation to culminate before the assigned objective is reached. 1 6 Without knowing the relative combat power, the operational commanders will usually fail to accomplish their assigned objective. 1 7

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A culmination point for one's forces in a campaign or major operation is extremely difficult to anticipate in practice, because so many factors affect its occurrence. To complicate the matter, culmination at the operational and strategic levels, in contrast to the tactical level, becomes apparent only some time after it has taken place, or is discerned only in retrospect. The operational commander's ability to prevent own culmination while causing the enemy to reach his is one of the keys to operational success. This can only be accomplished by having a clear and precise knowledge of one's and the enemy's combat power at all times. Operational commanders who become fixated on the current or the next immediate battle or engagement (in a major operation) or major operation (in a campaign) have great difficulties in recognizing the culmination of or combat power of their own forces in time. Therefore, the operational commander must think broadly and far beyond the current actions to visualize the actions required to obtain, or regain and then maintain, the initiative. In such a way he could anticipate strain and stress on his forces. The operational commander should constantly seek enemy weaknesses, bypass enemy strengths, and contain enemy forces with the fewer mobile forces. If the enemy reacts unexpectedly, one's plans must be changed to maintain initiative. 1 8 Intelligence is the key to identifying and properly evaluating indicators that would lead to premature culmination of a major operation or campaign. To be successful, intelligence should rely on diverse sources, ranging from technical intelligence to human intelligence. In southern Russia in February-March 1943, Field Marshal von Manstein used a variety of intelligence sources to obtain information on Soviet strengths and intentions. He obtained valuable information from communications interceptions, interrogation of prisoners of war, air reconnaissance, and agents behind the Soviet lines. Von Manstein completely accepted the work of his intelligence section and used it to make his operational decisions. 1 9 In contrast, his Soviet counterpart, General Vatutin, allowed his overconfidence and optimism to color intelligence provided by his division and army commanders. Despite repeated warnings from his commanders that troop fatigue, equipment shortages, and growing German strength made it impossible to conduct simultaneous attacks in all sectors of the front, he insisted on pressing the attack to encircle and destroy the entire German Army Group Don . 2° This was the principal reason behind von Manstein's success in destroying a major part of the Soviet forces and recaptured Kharkov in March 1 943. Among other things, during the execution phase of a major operation or campaign, one's C3 system should operate efficiently in conjunction with intelligence. The greatest challenge is the execution of maneuver and associated supporting fires. Logistics must continue to work; protection of the rear areas and services is vital for the success. 21 Force protection can be ensured by concealing operational units and hiding one's intentions. First and second echelon units and reserves should be fully protected. Sometimes, the combination of logistical difficulties and higher than expected attrition of one's forces might require the commander to stop his advance and temporarily revert to defense to regenerate combat power. In North Africa in January 1942, both the Axis and the Allies took the advantage of an operational pause to prepare their armies to continue an offensive. On 21 January, Rommel rapidly attacked on a narrow front, penetrating British covering forces and driving into the British rear. The British forces were forced to retreat, leaving behind large quantities of fuel and other stores. However, at Gazala,

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Rommel's attack was reaching the point where it could no longer be sustained, so he paused for four months before resuming his advance. Rommel planned to envelop the British left flank on the open desert while the Italians attacked, distracting British attention from the main attack. By the time the Italian force succeeded in breaking through the British line between Bir Hacheim and Gazala, the German panzer forces were running out of fuel. Rommel extended his point of culmination by establishing a forward base of supply within a British minefield. This provided him both the security and central location needed to replenish his armored forces. Finally, on 13 June, the British retreated to Egypt. 22 The operational commander's inability to foresee or anticipate the arrival or overshooting of his point of culmination has been a major reason for setbacks or even failure of an entire major operation. In the first battle of El Alamein, 2-18 July 1942, the Afrika Korps reached its operational culminating point, thereby paving the way for General Montgomery's counteroffensive in November 1942, and the Allies' eventual victory. However, neither Rommel nor the British Eighth Army commander, General Claude Auchinleck, foresaw or acknowledged the culminating point despite the presence of indicators. 23 Initially, Rommel apparently sensed that the tactical initiative had passed to the British. He had only twenty-six operational tanks, stretched supply lines, and exhausted troops and faced increasingly stiffer British resistance. By the end of the day on 3 July, Rommel admitted defeat and gave the order to dig in. For the next few days, the Afrika Korps repulsed repeated British attacks, but by the slightest of the margins. However, Rommel still did not acknowledge the passing of his operational culmination. After several days' rest he attacked again and was again repulsed. The men and materiel he unwisely expended would be critically needed at the second battle of El Alamein in November 1942. 24 In contrast, Rommel's nominal superior, Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, CINC South headquartered in Rome, correctly anticipated the arrival of operational culmination for the Afrika Korps. He predicted on 26 June (after the capture of Tobruk), that the Axis forces could not obtain decisive victory not only due to logistical difficulties, but also because the British would certainly bring in reinforcements from the Middle East to defend Egypt. In contrast, both Italian Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Baron Cavallero, and Rommel believed that the Axis forces could be in Cairo within ten days. 25 In the great British offensive in North Africa in November December 1941 aimed at seizing Tobruk and destroying German Afrika Korps, Field Marshal Rommel had pushed his forces beyond their culminating point. 26 The long, rapid drive by two German panzer divisions not only overextended their lines of support but also literally caused them to break down. At times, both divisions were cut off from support. The German soldiers were also weary. However, the British Commander of the Eighth Army, General Alan G. Cunningham, was incapable of looking ahead or anticipating when and where to strike Rommel decisively. He forgot that war is a contest of wills and failed to provide for any outcome but that for which he had planned. The British could have caused the Axis' culmination if they had focused their attacks on Rommel's logistics, but they engaged Rommel's panzers directly. The Germans were then far superior in both armored tactics and quality of materiel . 27 The British commander's cardinal mistake was attacking the enemy's center of gravity directly instead of attacking the enemy's critical vulnerabilities. Rommel, in contrast, accurately estimated his enemy and intentionally

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overextended his forces to achieve a decisive outcome. Although the Allied offensive succeeded in seizing Tobruk, Bardia, and Halfaya and inflicted heavy losses on the Axis forces in manpower and materiel, General Cunningham missed a golden opportunity to deal Rommel a crushing blow. 28 If he had been successful, probably the fighting in North Africa would have ended much sooner than it did . 2 `3 In the Battle of the Bulge, the Germans reached their operational culminating point in late December 1944. General George Patton, commander of U.S. Third Army, and Major General J. Lawton Collins, commander of VII Corps, anticipated early on that the Germans could not sustain their offensive and, with ever increasing Allied strength, planned the counteroffensive. They both understood the culminating point, if not by name, then by concept. In contrast, not until 28 January did Field Marshal General Montgomery allow his units to counterattack. By then, many German units had already escaped from potential double envelopment by Patton's forces in the south. Montgomery clearly did not recognize the Gennans' arrival at the point of culmination in time. 30 The defender should be alert to perceive an enemy's error in continuing to attack after having reached his culminating point, and then quickly exploit the situation to the fullest. If the defender does not sense that the enemy has reached his culminating point, he will miss opportunity to defeat him. In the Franco-Prussian War, the Germans actually reached the point of culmination twice without the French noticing it or taking advantage of the situation. The first occurred on 19 September 1870 when Germany reached its culminating point and the offensive stalled. By then, almost half of their army was tied down in the sieges of Paris and the fortress at Metz. About 150,000 German troops surrounded Paris, but the attack on the city was delayed because they had no siege equipment. At the same time, the Germans faced the threat of fresh French armies raised i n southern France to lift the siege of Paris. Miraculously, the Germans did not suffer any setback in the field because the French troops in Metz surrendered on 27 October and, shortly afterward, the Germans resumed their offensive. By mid-December, the Germans reached their culminating point for the second time; a rare event in military history. The great successes achieved by the two German armies on the Somme and Loire Rivers were not exploited because they lacked forces. The Germans were unable to seize Le Havre, Lille, and Bourges, so they instead captured militarily rather unimportant points, such as Chartres, Orleans, and Beauvais. 31 Yet, the French did not take advantage of the situation, and the war ultimately ended with the fall of Paris, and the German victory in war. The operational commander should take the initiative to force the enemy to conform to his own operational purpose and tempo while retaining his own freedom of action. One of the key elements in this is to organize and maintain operational reserves sufficient to influence the outcome of a major operation or even a campaign. If the enemy has the initiative, it is the task of the operational commander to shape the tactical actions or major operations in progress so that he can regain the initiative, enabling the conduct of future major operations or campaigns. A counterattack from the operational perspective should be designed to ultimately cause the opponent to lose his operational momentum. Once that occurs, the operational commander should expand his dominance of the theater (or area) of operations to retain the initiative. In this context, operational exploitation should ensure that individual tactical success(es) result in the accomplishment of an operational or strategic objective.

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The operational commander sometimes may have more combat forces and assets than available logistic resources can simultaneously support. This is especially true in major joint operations when the demands for logistic resources may be highly competitive. Operational logistics and sustainment is the responsibility of the theater commander. He applies logistic resources to generate, produce, and support theater combat power. Moreover, he must ensure that his plan integrates operation and logistics plans. In the Normandy Campaign, the Allies experienced considerable difficulties in supplying their armies after the lodgment on the continent was secured. The Allied lines of communications in western France could not be developed at the speed with which tanks and other combat vehicles could move; rail and pipelines cannot be pushed forward quickly. Motor transport facilities were strained to the breaking point to meet even the minimum needs of the armies. Only one major port-Cherbourg--was operational; none of the Brittany ports had been captured, and it was impossible to establish advance depots. The arrival at the Seine in early August marked the beginning of supply difficulties. The decision to cross the Seine and encircle Paris was operationally sound because the German forces were disintegrating. However, logistically this course of action was unsupportable. The Allied logistical system was already stretched and, in fact, was in great danger of a complete breakdown. The Allied advance continued in August and September. In the first week of September, Eisenhower decided to have two simultaneous drives, one at the Ruhr and one at the Saar. On 10 September, he authorized an advance across the West Wall (German defense line along the border with France and Belgium) by both U.S. armies. However, supply difficulties continue to mount: the First Army received 3,300 tons a day and the Third Army only 2,500 tons, or about one half of what they required. By 1 October, twenty-nine divisions in the U.S. 12th Army Group were to have arrived, but only twenty divisions could be logistically supported. In his overall concept, the theater commander establishes an interrelationship between operations and logistics. He does this by insisting on the close cooperation and exchange of information between operations and logistic planners. The theater commander must decide on the proper balance between centralization and decentralization of logistic functions and responsibilities in developing the concept of logistic support. Too much centralization can result in sluggish or rigid response. Too little can result in waste and inefficient use of critical resources. The theater commander is concerned not only with logistic support of the ongoing combat action, but also with future combat actions. He needs a clear and comprehensive assessment of logistic support to design or modify his concept of operations. His staff must assess how logistic support issues will affect the sequencing of operations. They must also recommend options to compensate for logistic shortfalls. The principal aim of the operational commander is to achieve unqualified operational or strategic success after the assigned operational or strategic objective has been reached. Afterward, he must consolidate that success; otherwise the victory will remain incomplete, and if the enemy is not decisively beaten, he might endanger the success achieved. The Germans achieved a spectacular victory in Flanders in May 1940. Some 1.5 million Allied soldiers were cut off in northern France and Belgium when General Gerd von Rundstedt, CINC of the Army Group A, stopped the panzers from crossing the Aa Canal on 24 May. Hitler, against the protests of the German Army CINC, General von Brauchitsch, confirmed this decision. The German decision to use the

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Luftwaffe instead of mobile ground forces to reduce the Allied pocket, allowed the British to organize and eventually evacuate some 338,000 British and French soldiers from the Dunkirk bridgehead between 29 May and 3 June (Operation Dynamo). 33 The Germans achieved and consolidated operational success, but failed to ensure strategic success at the end of the first phase of their campaign in the West. The complete defeat of the British army in France would most likely have had devastating political, military, and psychological consequences for Britain's ability and will to continue the war. Defeat of France was not sufficient in itself to force Britain to sue for peace. The Soviets, after achieving enormous victory by their encirclement and eventual destruction of the German Sixth Army at Stalingrad in November 1942-January 1943, tried to expand that operational success into a strategic success. In January 1943, they launched a large offensive with several divergent thrusts into southern Russia aimed at cutting off the retreat of Army Group B from the Caucasus and at destroying Army Group Don (then deployed between Donets and east of Rostov, to protect the rear of Army Group B). The strongest Soviet southward push came in late February. However, Field Marshal von Manstein, Commander of the Army Group South (renamed from Army Group Don on 13 February), in a brilliant move, counterattacked and destroyed a major part of the Soviet armies and recaptured Kharkov on 14 March 1943. The German front in the south stabilized until July 1943 when they lost a decisive battle at Kursk. If the Soviets had been successful in their offensive in southern Russia, the war on the Eastern Front would probably have ended earlier than it did. The Japanese, in their surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, inflicted heavy losses (five battleships sunk and three damaged, three light cruisers damaged, and three destroyers and several other ships sunk), but not a mortal blow on the U.S. Pacific Fleet, since by coincidence, two U.S. fast aircraft carriers plus seven cruisers, fourteen destroyers, and four submarines were at sea. In addition, two heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, twenty-four destroyers, four destroyer-minelayers, eight fast minesweepers, five submarines, and numerous auxiliary ships were undamaged. 34 Nevertheless, the Japanese achieved an operational success that allowed them to complete the conquest of the Philippines without interference from the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The U.S. Navy with its success in the Battle of Midway on 3-6 June 1942 achieved an operational success. However, that in itself, would not have been sufficient to reverse the tide in the Pacific had it not been followed by an offensive operation to consolidate success at Midway. Thus, after some debate between the U.S. Army and Navy, on 2 July 1942, the invasion of Guadalcanal (Operation Watchtower) began and with it the start of what later emerged as the Solomons Campaign . 3s Sometimes operational success cannot be obtained because the political leadership decides to end the war prematurely before the entire enemy forces have been destroyed, as happened in the Gulf War of 1990-1991. U.S. President George Bush and his advisors decided to announce a cease-fire after exactly 100 hours of ground offensive, although both escape routes for the fleeing Iraqi Republican Guards had not been closed. One of the reasons for that decision was that the United States did not want to be perceived by the world's opinion as callous killer of defenseless Iraqi troops. Another reason was poor battle damage assessment (BDA). Only after the war ended did the United States learn that only half the Republican Guards' equipment had been destroyed, and that most of the fleeing Iraqi troops were then south of Basra. U.S. decision-makers

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also feared that any prolongation of war could result in more U.S. losses. 36 After the war ended it became clear that 842 of 786 of the Iraqi armor escaped, including 365 T-72s and 1,412 (or half) of all Iraqi APCs in the theater. Also, seventy percent of one Republican Guard division escaped; the remainder of that elite force escaped in smaller units. In addition, a senior Iraqi headquarters escaped and later reconstituted the remnants of the Iraqi troops to crush the Shiite rebellion in the south. Only one senior Republican Guards officer was captured in the war. 37 Thus, despite considerable punishment inflicted on the Iraqi forces, the United States failed to consolidate operational success. This occurred because the enemy's operational center of gravity-the Republican Guardswas only partially destroyed, although the U.S. and the Coalition objectives of forcing the Iraqi forces out of Kuwait and restoring Kuwaiti territorial integrity and sovereignty were accomplished. Likewise, NATO achieved its objective of forcing Serbian forces out of Kosovo, but only partial victory was achieved. NATO used only air power; then political li mitations prevented NATO's inflicting punishing losses on the Serbian fielded forces, either in Kosovo or in Serbia proper. After seventy-eight days of bombing, only a handful of tanks, guns, and armored vehicles were destroyed. Moreover, the Serbian forces in the field suffered only light losses and left Kosovo almost intact and in good order. Thus, operational success was not consolidated because the enemy's center of gravity was not destroyed. The fact that NATO's forces are in Kosovo as peacekeepers today does not guarantee that the limited gains achieved by air power will be preserved. Conclusion: Operational commanders and their staffs exercise their responsibilities continuously in both peacetime and in conflict. Obviously, it is in war that their ability to apply tenets of operational warfare is most acutely needed. The operational commanders must have solid and thorough professional knowledge, great strength of character, and extensive experience to perform their duties well. However, no operational commander can be successful if the political leadership unduly constrains the freedom to act. Also, a mismatch or disconnect between the ends and means at the strategic level is bound to doom the entire war effort. The operational commanders must obtain a wide as possible freedom of action for themselves, and then provide their subordinate commanders with sufficient freedom to act. After issuing plans and orders the operational commander and his staff must conduct a "running estimate" of the situation; influence the mission accomplishment by making timely and sound operational, organizational, and informational decisions; and supervise actions of subordinate commanders. All this demands the highest degree of mental agility from the operational commanders and their staffs. In contrast to tactical commanders, the operational commanders must visualize the actions to be taken several weeks or even months ahead. They, of course, should not neglect in any way the actions in progress. In the course of a major operation or campaign, the major issues for the operational commanders and their staffs to resolve include: maintaining a firm focus on the assigned objective and reassessing the corresponding center of gravity, proper sequencing and synchronizing, phasing, and opportunely sensing the approach of one's or the enemy's point of culmination. The operational commander should not be satisfied by achieving partial operational or strategic success. The success in a major operation or campaign must be consolidated, otherwise the fruits of victory will either be temporary or ultimately lost. 589

Notes 1. Paul B. Stares, Command Performance. The Neglected Dimension of European Sccurity , ( Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1981), p. 61. 2. Joint Pub 3-56, Command and Control Doctrine, for Joint Operations (Third Draft, 3 May 1995), p. 11-3. 3. Ibid., p. 11-15. 4. Daniel J. Hughes, Moltke On The Art Of War. Selected Writings (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1993), pp. 132-3. 5. John T. Nelson, Where To Go From Here? Considerations, br the Formal Adoption gf Auftragtaktik by the US Army (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, December 1986.), pp. 10-1 . 6. Ibid., p. 10. 7. Ibid., p. 11. 8. British Army, Operations (Pre-Publication Edition), 1989, pp. 3-14 and 3-15. 9. Peter J. Palmer, Operational Main Effbrt and Campaign Planning (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1991), p. 35. 1 0. Kenneth Macksey, Why the Germans Lose at War: The Myth of German Military Superiority (London: Greenhill Books; Harribsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1996), p. 146. 11. Alfred Philippi and Ferdinand Heim, Der Feldzug Gegen Sowietrusland 1941 bis 1945: Fin operativer Ueberblick (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1962), pp. 67, 70, 78. 1 2. Albert Seaton, The Russo-German War 1941-45 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1971), pp. 216-7. 13. Phillip Kevin Giles and Thomas P. Galvin, Center of Gravity. Determination, Analvsis, and (Carlisle Barracks: Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, 31 January 1 996), p. 18.

Application,

1 4. Ibid., p. 16. 15. H. R. Kurz, "The Eben Emaul Operation," Allgemeine Schweizerische Militaerzeitschrif 3 (May-June 1 949), reprinted Military Review 3 (March) 1950, p. 91. 1 6. Henry S. Scharpenberg, U.S. Armed Forces and the Operational Level of War Are We Prepared to Win? p. 5: David, M. Cowan, The Utility of the Operational Pause in Sequencing Battles to Achieve and Operational Advantage, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, May 1987), p. 23. 1 7. David J. Benjamin, Prerequisite for Victory: The Discovery of the Culminating Point, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1 3 May 1986), p. 24. 1 8. Ibid., pp. 28-30. 1 9. U.S. Army War College, From the Don to the Dnepr. Soviet Offensive Operations-December 1942August 1943, 1 984 Art of War Symposium, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Center for Land Warfare, 1984), p. 190.

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20. Bruce L. Meisner, The Culminating Point--A Viable Operational Concept or Some Theoretical Nonsense? (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, March 1986), p. 24. 21. David J. Benjamin, Prerequisite, for Victory. The Discovery of the Culminating Point, p. 29. 22. Charles D. Franklin, Time, Space, and Mass at the Operational Level of War: The Dynamics of the Culminating Point, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 28 April 1988.), pp. 30-1. 23. James D. Coomler, The Operational Culminating Point. - Can You See It Coming? (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 16 May 1986), p. 5. 24. Ibid., pp. 111-1. 25. Albert Kesselring, Soldat Bis Zum Letzten Tai (Bonn: Athenaeum Verlag, 1953), p. 166. 26. General Auchinleck organized the British forces into the Eighth Army consisting of two corps with four divisions (including one armored division, two armored brigades, and one Guards brigade and was supported by Western Desert Force; the German forces consisted of the Afrika Korps (15`" and 21 st Panzer division, Aftika division-later called 90th light division, and Savanna division) and the Italian XXI corps with four divisions; Field Marshal Rommel controlled Italian XX Mobile Corps with two divisions; the British had rather large superiority in tanks (724 vs. 424) and aircraft (1,100 vs. 120 German and 200 Italian aircraft, respectively); Frank T. Taddonio, The Concept of the Culminating Point of Attack, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1 6 May 1986.), pp. 12-5, 22. 27. J.M.A. Gwyer, Grand Strategy , Vol. III: June 1941-August 1942 , Part 1 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1964), pp. 237-9. 28. The Axis losses were 24,500 killed and wounded and 36,500 captured and 386 tanks and 850 aircraft lost; the Allied losses totaled 18,000; Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 B.C. to the Present (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 2nd rev. edition, 1986), p. 1073. 29. Frank T. Taddonio, The Concept of the Culminating Point of Attack (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 16 May 1986), p. 28. 30. Ibid., p. 21. 31. Von Tschischwitz, "Der Kulminationspunkt des Angriffes im Landkrieg," 2nd part Militaerwissenschafiliche Rundschau (Berlin) 8, no. 1 (1943): pp. 22-3. 32. Roland G. Ruppenthal, "Logistics and the Broad-Front Strategy," in Kent Robert Greenfield, editor, et al., Command Decisions (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1st printed 1 960-CMH Pub 70-7, reprinted 1990), pp. 422-4. 33. I.C.B. Dear, editor, et al. The Oxford Companion to World War Il (Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 312-3. 34. Juergen Rohwer and Gerhard Huemmelchen, Chronology of the War at Sea 1939-1945. The Naval History of World War Two (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2nd and revised ed., 1992), p. 104. 35. John Miller, Guadalcanal: The First Offensive , United States Army in World War 11, The War in the Pacific (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1 st printed 1949-CMH Pub 5-3, reprinted 1989), pp. 16-7.

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36. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals' War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston/New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), pp. 423-5. 37. Ibid., p. 429.

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TENETS OF OPERATIONAL LEADERSHIP

Practical application of operational leadership is governed by a relatively few tenets or cardinal rules. The strict adherence to these tenets cannot guarantee success, but the penalties for not observing them are severe. There is no commonly accepted number of tenets of operational leadership. The neglect or violation of these tenets will almost invariably i mpede the accomplishment of the assigned military objectives and, more often than not, result in failure of a major operation or campaign. However, a tenet must never become a rule -a schematic form-which kills the spirit and thus becomes an obstacle to decisive action. Policy always dominates strategy. Policy determines the objectives of national or alliance/coalition strategy and military strategy. The highest politico-military authority should always assign the military strategic objective and define the desired strategic end state. Afterward, it must allocate adequate forces and assets for the accomplishment of the assigned strategic objectives. Policy also determines and defines political, diplomatic, legal, and other limitations on the combat employment of one's military forces. Therefore, the operational commander's freedom of action is inherently restricted. All subsequent military planning and actions can be carried out only within the framework established by policy and the national strategy. Nonetheless, the primacy of policy should not be carried to the extreme as was in Nazi Germany. Hitler was the only one who made all political and military decisions. Before the outbreak of war in September 1939, there was never an orderly estimate of the situation for the entire Wehrmacht and no long-range planning in which factual factors of space, time, and forces with their consequences were analyzed. , In determining the strategic objectives political leadership should always ask for advice of military leadership. At the same time, the military must have sufficient room to accomplish the strategic objectives determined by the political leadership. The military leadership has the responsibility to clearly and forcefully point out to the political leaders the possibilities, risks, boundaries, and consequences of proposed options for military action. 2 Military strategy sets the fundamental conditions of operations in war by setting objectives, describing concepts, applying military resources to achieve policy aims, and i mposing constraints on the use of force. The operational artist must be skillful in translating political direction into attainable strategic military objectives If the primacy of policy over the military is well established, military leadership essentially can act only within the framework determined by national strategy. The greater the limitations on the military leadership's freedom of action, the larger the forces and assets that will be required to accomplish the stated political objectives. Measures taken by military leadership are often compromises between purely military needs and political realities. The factors that limit military action are the will of the national politico-military leadership, public support, the cohesiveness of the alliance or coalition, international law, and the laws of armed conflict. The employment of military force must be well thought-out and integrated with all other elements of national power (political, diplomatic, economic, informational, etc.).4 The military and civilian leadership must work together to determine specific militarily achievable strategic objectives that contribute to the desired national goals. The responsibility of the military leaders at the strategic level is to make sure that the

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political decision-makers assign clear and realistic military strategic objectives-means and ends must be in harmony. Policy should never demand what is militarily impossible. s It is the duty of the highest operational leadership to point out to the political leadership when certain military strategic objectives cannot be accomplished with the forces and assets available. The political leadership should then modify or alter its political objectives. Focus on the assigned strategic objective or operational objective should befirm and unwavering. The properly determined military strategic objective should achieve or help to achieve the political objective, while avoiding unintended and undesirable political results. 6 A serious mismatch or disconnenct between the national strategic objective and the factors of space, time, and force is invariably fatal, regardless of whether similar relationships at the operational and tactical levels are in harmony. The pursuit of multiple objectives can often unhinge the entire balance of factors time, space, and forces. The objective, once selected, must be adhered to until attained or is reconized as unattainable. However, the initially selected main objective should not be adhered to if the situation has changed so that the objective can not be accomplished without putting the entire effort in jeopardy. Then, a secondary objective might become the principal objective. Secondary objectives could also be used to deceive or distract the enemy from one's main objective. There is probably no greater mistake than to formulate and pursue, simultaneously, the accomplishment of several operational or strategic objectives. Such a course of action can be taken only if one's forces possess overwhelming strength against any conceivable combination of the opponent's forces. Hitler's Germany in World War 11 pursued several strategic objectives, some of them simultaneously, even though it clearly did not possess sufficient military or industrial strength to achieve them against the overwhelming combined strength of her opponents. Hitler committed many similar mistakes at the operational level, especially in the war against Soviet Russia in 1941-1942. Ends, means, and ways must be balanced. There is no greater mistake than to have a mismatch or disconnect between ends and means. The same result can be expected when ends and means are potentially in harmony, but there is unwillingness to use the means available. Any mismatch or serious imbalance between the objective and the means assigned to accomplish it will invariably lead to failure. In the American Civil War, the South lost because its strategic means did not match its strategic ends. Hence, no amount of operational finesse could compensate for the North's superior industrial strength and manpower. The operational skills of their Confederate adversaries were rendered almost irrelevant. In World War 11, Germany was defeated primarily because Hitler's strategic objectives far exceeded the country's military capabilities. Obtaining and maintaining freedom of action, in general, means to act as freely as possible within a given framework determined by a given operational or strategic situation and using all the resources available. In operational terms, the commander's freedom to act in executing the assigned mission is framed by the boundaries established by national policy and strategy; these limitations (constraints and restraints) are the products of the given military (space, time, and force) and non-military factors (politics, diplomacy, economic conditions, social conditions, the law, etc.). In practice, freedom of action is not absolute; it is always subject to certain political, diplomatic, military, economic, social, legal, and today even environmental limitations. These limitations dictate whether the operational commander would have a larger or smaller

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area within which he can operate on his own independent will. The more limitations on the freedom of action for the operational commander the fewer the means and ways the national strategic leadership has to accomplish stated political objectives. The measures taken by the military leadership are often a compromise solution between military necessities and political aspects of the situation. The complexity of the international and national political environment often prevents an optimal strategy. The factors that limit military action are the will of national political leadership, degree of public support, cohesiveness of the alliance or coalition, international law, and the law of armed conflict. This, in turn, dictates the operational commander's freedom of action. 9 Freedom of action means that in accomplishing assigned tasks the operational commander can use both military and non-military sources of power at a place and time he has freely determined. The area of the operational commander's actions must be at least large enough to always give him several options from which to choose. Conversely, the operational commander should try to obtain and maintain freedom of action and reduce the enemy's freedom to act from the very outset and to derail enemy plans.' ° The commander, in exercising his freedom to act, must balance the given operational factors-space, time, and force. The assigned objectives or tasks are perhaps the most critical factors that determine the boundaries within which the operational commander is allowed to act freely. The more general the objective or task, the fewer the limitations the higher commander gives, and thereby the greater freedom of action the subordinate commanders have. Scaling down the original operational or strategic objective, or changing the sequence of objectives or tasks may result in greater freedom to act for the operational commander. The use of task-oriented vice directive orders to subordinate commanders will enlarge their freedom to act. The larger the space, the larger the freedom of action is because large space gives the commander the possibility to fully use the mobility, range, and lethal power of his forces. The factor of time also plays a great role. Freedom of action can be obtained primarily by surprise and buildup of operational reserves. Other methods are the planned and orderly withdrawal of forces from untenable positions so they can release or regroup forces, and purposeful use of the factor of space." Field Marshal Erich von Manstein obtained operational freedom of action prior to his brilliant counterstrike in southern Russian in February-March 1943 by an orderly withdrawal from the Donets River near Rostov to the lines behind the Mius River. That move shortened his front and freed the 1 st and 4th Panzer Armies for mobile operations. The 4th Panzer Army was then redeployed from the right flank of von Manstein's Army Group Don to the left flank. Not only was the new front line successfully defended, but von Manstein also inflicted a major defeat on the advancing and numerically superior Soviet forces, and retaking Kharkov in March 1943.' 2 Freedom of action is heavily dependent on the forces and assets available. Obviously, the larger and more capable forces at hand, the larger the space one can use to act freely and impose one's will on the enemy. Reinforcements or operational/strategic reserves, in general, expand freedom of action for one's forces. The operational commander always must be able to act-i.e. must have reserves available when he sees a threat to the accomplishment of his operational or strategic objectives. The operational commander must be able to act either to exploit opportunities or to meet threats and frictions that endanger the accomplishment of the

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operational objective. This requires applying the principle of economy of effort, and having reserves at all levels of war. 1 3 To allow freedom of action for subordinates, the operational commander must first obtain maximum freedom of action for himself from the national or alliance/coalition political leadership. His freedom to act is ultimately built upon the trust of the public and therefore the government. Diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts at the strategic level can greatly increase the resources combined with reasonable and clear limitations. Good operations security (OPSEC) also contributes to one's freedom of action at the operational level. Other elements, however, restrict the freedom of action. These include sophisticated information technology and the nature of modern war reporting, which make the task of ensuring OPSEC and surprise more difficult. Perhaps the greatest threat to freedom of action at the operational level is the capability, through information technology, to overcentralize operations by the strategic level of command. This tendency must be resisted to ensure that operational commanders maintain an appropriate degree of authority and flexibility to respond quickly to changing circumstances. Once the degree of freedom of action has been obtained, the commander must decide what degree of freedom of action subordinates can be allowed at various stages of the operation. Afterward, he must find the correct balance between centralization and decentralization; although modern technology allows a great degree of centralization throughout the chain of command, this should be avoided. Clear and simple orders combined with a clear understanding of the commander's intent enable subordinates to exercise initiative and flexibility while pursuing the commander's goals and priorities. How the enemy acts determines one's actions in terns of space, time, and force factors. This is especially true in the enemy's offensive action. The shorter the decision cycle, the more time available for the commander and his subordinates to act; technology can enlarge the freedom of action. The greater the range and the lethality of weapons, the greater the freedom to act is. However, technology can be also a limiting factor. Use of some weapons, while militarily effective (WMD, dumb land mines, napalm bombs, anti-personnel ammo, etc.), are likely to be politically and morally prohibitive. Sometimes, political l eadership retains tight control over even the use of very advanced conventional weapons which considerably reduces the operational commander's freedom of action. This happened in the Vietnam War and during NATO's action against Serbia in 1999. Command and control that is too rigid inherently reduces the commander's freedom to act, as do too many or too few command echelons. It is important to establish a command structure that clearly defines overall command responsibility, as well as command responsibility for each phase of a campaign or major operation. After defining the command structure, the commanders must give subordinates as much authority as they need to discharge their responsibilities. The type of command relationships and forces' subordination can either enlarge or reduce a subordinate commander's freedom to act. Accurate, and above all, relevant and well-timed intelligence is key to making a timely and sound decision. Intelligence also enlarges operational commander's freedom of action and creates prerequisites needed to exercise the initiative which, in turn, further expand his freedom to act. Inadequate logistical support and sustainment is probably one of the most critical factors that reduces the freedom to act. The need to provide for the theater-

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wide protection of military infrastructure and civilian population reduces the forces available for forces protection, and the protection of one's center of gravity in particular. Directive operational doctrine invariably limits the commander's freedom to act, whereas flexible doctrine enlarges it. The commanders throughout the chain of command must be able to make instantaneous decisions if they are to accomplish their assigned missions. Unnecessary requirements to consult with higher authorities relative to current actions stifle the commanders' ability to make timely on the scene decisions. Initiative is the operational commander's main tool to obtain and maintain freedom of action. Initiative is the ability to set or change the terms of combat through action; it requires that commanders maintain an aggressive spirit. It means that, when an opportunity presents itself, the commander may depart from planned actions to speed up mission accomplishment. To do this without jeopardizing the higher plan requires that the commander understands and acts within the intent of the commander two levels up. This implies both a degree of independence and risk. Field Marshal von Manstein observed that the operational commander should always conduct operations flexibly and resourcefully, and give all possible scope to the initiative and self-sufficiency of subordinate commanders at all levels. 1 4 Initiative includes, among other things, the ability to deploy reserves and to set priorities and assign tasks to naval, ground, air, space, and special forces. Criteria for the loss or gain of freedom of action are initiative, intelligence, and purposeful disposition of forces. 1 5 Initiative and freedom of action are inextricably linked. Freedom of action creates conditions for exercising initiative, while initiative enlarges one's freedom of action. The more freedom of action given to subordinate commanders, the more room they have to exercise initiative; and the more initiative exercised, the more freedom of action exists throughout the chain of command. Initiative is gained through the leadership's agility and mobility and the execution and energetic use of operational surprise. 1 6 Agility is the ability to think and act faster than the enemy. It involves mental, command and control, and organizational abilities to adjust rapidly and to use the situation, terrain, and weather to defeat the enemy. The plan must be simple, yet flexible enough for the commander to react when an opportunity presents itself. Agility is the first prerequisite for seizing and holding the initiative. High speed of action allows the rapid concentration of one's strength against enemy vulnerabilities. This must be done repeatedly so that by the time the enemy reacts to one action, another has already taken its place, disrupting his plans and leading to late, uncoordinated, and piecemeal enemy responses. It is this process of successive concentration against locally weaker or unprepared enemy forces that enables smaller forces to disorient, fragment, and eventually defeat a much larger hostile force. 17 Mobility, flexible task organization, timely intelligence, and rapid decision-making enable the commander to cause the enemy to react, setting the terms of the battle or major operation. Agility can also be attained by achieving surprise, having available or creating operational reserve, trading space for time, and operational employment of air power or naval forces. Operational commanders should issue task-oriented orders that give subordinate commanders the necessary flexibility to improvise, act aggressively to accomplish assigned missions, and to defeat the enemy. In addition to understanding the scope of their higher commander's intent, each commander must understand his unit's part in the commander's concept so that he may confidently and boldly exploit success.

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Seizing and maintaining initiative forces the enemy to comply with the commander's will. The operational commander will be able to foil the enemy's plans and force him to conform to his own plans. This, in turn, will force the enemy commander to react too late to one's actions. One of the operational commander's fundamental concerns is to seize the initiative, maintain it, and regain it if it is lost. Only by doing so can he hope to impose his will on the enemy. For the higher command echelon, the larger the area of uncertainty, the larger risks the commander must take. The consequences of a failure at the operational level are much more severe than at the tactical level, and they cannot be easily, if at all, overcome. However, the potential gain is at the same time much greater at the operational or strategic level of command than at the tactical level. The higher the level of war, the more likely the commander is to make decisions based on incomplete information. Despite all the advances in information technologies, there will always be a rather large area of uncertainty in any given operational or strategic situation. The operational commander will never have a complete knowledge of intangible factors in the situation. Moreover, very often he must make operational decisions without waiting for complete information. Operational decisionmaking is inherently based on taking high risks because there will always be many uncertainties in regard to the enemy's intentions.' 8 Without calculated risks based on the best available intelligence and estimates of one's capabilities and enemy intentions, the operational commander will rarely be able to apply combat potential as a coherent whole faster than the ability of the enemy to react. On the other hand, even if outnumbered and outgunned, by judiciously combining risk with flexibility and appropriate economy of effort, the operational commander can generate mass, momentum, and superiority at the decisive point and time. That knowledge, however, will be far from complete, since the operational commander normally must operate with uncertain vision. Barring some major intelligence successes, the operational commander can never realistically hope to operate completely inside his counterpart's decision-implementation process. If he waits for the complete picture of the situation, he will lose the opportunity to seize and maintain the initiative and, thereby, to dictate the direction and tempo of operations. The operational commander, in applying his combat potential or combat power, should avoid a frontal or direct attack on the enemy's center of gravity or his other critical strengths. The indirect approach attacking the enemy's vulnerabilities to destroy, neutralize, or degrade the enemy's center of gravity is often quickest and most effective way to accomplish assigned operational or strategic objective. One of the most critical elements in the employment of one's combat forces in a major operation or campaign is the selection of the proper sector of main effort and point of main attack. This task is the operational commander's main means of ensuring decisive action. Surprise is one of the most important factors in this regard.' 9 Concentration of forces in the sector of main effort and the point of main attack or defense is the most important, but also the most difficult, task. It requires the operational commander's willingness to take high risks to weaken forces in other sectors in favor of the sector of main effort and the point of main attack . 2° In planning and executing a major operation or campaign, overwhelming force should be used at a decisive place and time. There is no such thing as being too strong if the aim is

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to achieve quick and decisive victory. In practice, this means to "mass" one's forces in the sector of main effort and assign relatively weak forces in the sectors of secondary effort.2I Today, a force does not necessarily need to be physically "massed," but to have mass effect created at a decisive place and time. It is the application of overwhelming military force that will seize the initiative from the enemy and, when applied successfiilly, defeat him. Maximum combat potential or combat power at the decisive time and place can be achieved only with proper arrangement of actions by all available military sources of power. However, not only military but also non-military sources of national or alliance or coalition power should be synchronized to accomplish the assigned operational or strategic objectives. The operational commander should always be both bold and innovative; he should not use forces in a traditional manner. This means not being fixated on mechanical or schematic employment of one's combat forces. The operational commander must strive to achieve operational and tactical surprise to ensure success in the sector of main effort and the point of main attack (defense). He must be able to control space with inferior forces by flexible composition of mobile forces and concentration at, or shifting to, the sector of main effort or point of main attack (defense). He should change the pattern and the ways he employs his own and friendly forces. 22 It is rarely a good thing to always be on the offensive or always to aim to envelop the enemy's flanks. Then, the operational commander would always act too predictably. It stands to reason that in numerous instances the local and other advantages of the defensive are so great as to surpass those of attack, or when the frontal attack is more advantageous than envelopment . 23 Creative thinking and mental agility means the operational commander's ability to see the whole picture from its individual parts. This also requires mastery of combat with combined arms, exploitation of the possibilities of C2 W, and in multinational employment of forces, "comb inedness" knowledge of multinational structures and procedures, and understanding of other nations' culture, history, traditions, and society. 24 The operational commander should never act according to a stereotyped scheme .2' He should surprise the enemy. Nothing is more disconcerting for one than facing a situation for which there is no answer. Whenever possible, the operational commander should use his own forces asymmetrically and conduct operational deception. To preserve versatility and variability of decisions, the operational commander should never act according to conventional views and preconceived notions. The art of warfare rests on the freest application of its fundamentals under constantly changing conditions. In the modern era, operational or strategic objectives in a theater can normally be accomplished only by joint employment of combat arms of several services. However, forces should be selected because of their utility, required capabilities, expertise, combat readiness, and functions-not equity. For simplicity and economy, if a single service force or forces from a single military department is all that is required, only that force is employed. In addition, if detaching elements of a service force would disrupt the operational integrity of that force, the detachment should be avoided. The complexity of joint operations demands training forces jointly and, when practicable, rehearsing operational plans. Joint training and rehearsals are facilitated by organizing in peacetime for joint operations during war. Today, operational or strategic objectives in a theater can normally be accomplished only by joint employment of combat arms of several services or the country's armed forces.

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Conclusion: Tenets of operational leadership should not be applied like dogma. They are based on logic, common sense, and lessons learned. Because war is a political act, primacy of policy and strategy must be ensured. This should not lead to the imbalance where policy reigns absolute, making it very difficult or even impossible to use military forces effectively and decisively. The operational commander must at all times be focused firmly on the ultimate objective of the campaign or major operations. In determining the objective, the factors of space, time, and forces must be weighed and soundly balanced. At the same time, having constancy of purpose does not mean pursuing an objective that is clearly unattainable with the military means available, or becoming available. The means and the ends must be roughly in harmony; otherwise, no campaign or major operation can be successful. This is the continuous task for operational commanders and theirs staffs. As the situation changes some factors in the situation change as well. They must be brought in balance with other factors so that the assigned objectives can be accomplished. Operational commanders must first have as much freedom as possible to act from the political leadership. Afterward, they must obtain and then maintain and enlarge their freedom to act in the course of a campaign or major operation. This is principally accomplished when the operational commander and his subordinate commanders exercise the initiative. The operational commander's intent and task-oriented orders are the key for ensuring sufficient freedom of action for subordinate commanders who then use the initiative as the means of obtaining and enlarging their freedom to act. The result of this interplay increases freedom of actions throughout the chain of command. Proper selection of sector of main effort and point of main attack (defense) and concentration of combat forces are prerequisites for achieving operational or strategic success. Operational commanders must be ready to take great risks in planning and conducting a campaign or major operation. The best way to use military force is to use it overwhelmingly to crush the enemy. The operational commanders cannot be too strong to achieve their assigned objectives. They must be bold and innovative. Perhaps, the worst thing would be to act in a highly predictable and conventional way. Creativeness and innovation are not only desirable, but also necessary for the operational commander who wants to achieve swift and decisive victories. Finally, jointness must become second nature to the operational commanders. Today the complexity of strategic objectives requires the employment of forces of several services, and often services of other nations; armed forces. The enemy must be presented with threats in several dimensions simultaneously. Sister services are not competitors, but bring capabilities one's service lacks. Today, the true jointness is the key for winning quickly and decisively and with the fewest losses in manpower and materiel.

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Notes 1. Wolf Weth, "Fuehrungsgrundlagen and Ihre Bedeutung: Betrachtung ueber einige historische Ereignisse and die moegliche Nutzanwendung der dabei gewonnen Erkentnisses," Wehrkunde 2 (February 1967), p. 67. 2. Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, Arbeitspapier Operative Fuehrung (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, August 1992), p. 2. 3. William W. Mendel and Lamar Tooke, "Operation Logic: Selecting the Center of Gravity," Military Review 6 (June 1993), p. 3. 4. Clayton R. Newell, "What is Operational Art?" Military Review 9 (September 1990), p. 28. 5. Ash Irwin, The Levels ofWar, Operational Art and Campaign Planning (Camberley, Surrey, England: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, Occasional paper, no. 5, 1993), p. 6. 6. Department of the Navy, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, MCDP 1-1: Strategy (Washington, DC: 12 November 1997), p. 83. 7. David Jablonsky, "Strategy and the Operational Level of War: Part I," Parameters (Spring 1987), pp. 68, 66. 8. Eberhard Fuehr, Die Handlungsfreiheit der militaerischen Fuehrung-Moeglichkeiten and Grenzen aufgrund des heutigen Kriegshildes (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 16 February 1968), p. 3. 9. Irwin, The Levels of War, Operational Art and Campaign Planning, p. 5. 10. Arbeitspapier, Operative Fuehrung, p. 18. 1 1. lbid, p. 6; N. Hanisch, Untersuchen Sie die operativen Ideen Mansteins hinsichtlich Schwerpunktbildung, Ueberraschung, Initiative and Handlungsfreiheit an den Beispielen Westfeldzug 1940 (Sichelschnitt-Plan) and Operation Zitadelle (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, 15 January 1988), p. 29.

1 2. Roland G. Foerster, editor, Gezeitenwechsel im Zweiten Weltkrieg: Die Schlachten von Char'kov and Kursk im Fruehjahr and Sommer 1943 in operativer Anlage, Verlauf and politischer Bedeutung (Hamburg/Berlin/Bonn: Verlag E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1996), pp. 104-5; Erich von Manstein, Verlorene Siege , (Bonn: Bernard & Graefe, 13th-14th edition, 1983), pp. 460-1. 1 3. Arbeitspapier, Operative Fuehrung p. 18. 1 4. Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories , edited and translated by Anthony G. Powell (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982), p. 382. 15. Fuehr, Die Handlungsfreiheit der militaerischen Fuehrung-Moeglichkeiten and Grenzen aufgrund des heutigen Kriegsbildes, p. 6. 16. Hanisch,

Untersuchen Sie die operativen Ideen Mansteins hinsichtlich Schwerpunkt-bildung, Ueberraschung, Initiative and Handlungsfreiheit an den Beispielen Westfeldzug 1940 (Sichelschnitt-Plan) and Operations ZITADELLE, p. 29.

1 7. John T. Nelsen, Where to go from Here?: Considerations for the Formal Adoption of Auftragtaktik (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, December 1986), pp. 15-6. 1 8. Arbeitspapier, Operative Fuehrung, p. 18.

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19. Gustav Daeniker, Raum, Kraft Und Zeit In Der Militaerischen Kriegfuehrung (Frauenfeld, Verlag von Huber & Co, 1944), pp. 30-1. 20. Friedrich von Boetticher, "Feldhermturm and Generalstab: Grundsaetze and Geist," Wehrkunde 9 (September 1964), p. 455. 21. Arbeitspapier, Operative Fuehrung, p. 18. 22. Erich Vad, "Operative Fuehrung: Grundlagen, Merkmale and Perspektiven," Oesterreichischc Militaersiche Zeitschrift, no. 2 (March-April 1998), p. 132. 23. Friedrich Von Bernhardi, On War of To-Day, Vol 11: Combat and Conduct of War , translated by Karl von Donat (New York, NY: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1914), 413-4. 24. Erich Vad, "Operative Fuehrung: Grundlagen, Merkmale and Perspektiven," p. 132. 25. Arbeitspapier, Operative Fuehrung, p. 18. 26. Von Bernhardi, On War of To-Day, Vol 11, p. 413.

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THE DECISIONS The highest art of operational leadership is to make timely and sound decisions. The much larger perspective at the operational level requires a more complex and challenging decision-making process than at the tactical level. Operational commanders make decisions after detailed planning and discussion. Because major operations and campaigns are conducted over a much larger area and involve considerably larger and more diverse forces than battles or engagements, the operational commander must evaluate the situation in all its complexity several weeks or even months ahead. The resultant decision is often made on incomplete and false information and in a time-space window that is much different from that of the tactical commander. The operational commander must weigh several courses of action based on available information in the face of uncertainty about the events for several weeks or even months in the future. These decisions are more likely hypotheses because they are based on courses of action developed by using many assumptions. The outcome of one's own course of action also depends on the courses of action open to the enemy. A decision is a concise statement of what the command as a whole will do to accomplish the assigned mission. It provides the basis for the subsequent development of the operation plan or order. The act of exercising command consists of making decisions and ordering their execution.' Reportedly during his exile on St. Helena, Napoleon I said that nothing is more difficult and nothing is more costly than the ability to make a decision .2 In war, commanders are constantly faced with situations where great issues depend upon the action taken, so that their decisions. should be reached only after careful analysis and faultless logic. Complete information is always lacking, and suspicion is always deep that the enemy is manipulating the information acquired to deceive us. The enemy also usually tries to neutralize the effect of one's actions by countermeasures, or to deny one's courses of action by seizing the initiative. ] Commanders also make decisions while under great mental stress and physical fatigue. Prerequisites: The commander at any level who must make a sound decision must have relevant, accurate, and timely information and good judgment. Information is valuable insofar as it contributes to the commander's knowledge and understanding. Command and control effectiveness depends on the right person having the right information at the right time. As information is analyzed, the resulting intelligence increases the operational commander's understanding of the situation. The commanders and the planners receive information from a variety of sources which are grouped into three primary categories: friendly, adversarial, and neutral. Friendly sources include: operational commanders; subordinate component commanders; higher headquarters, including the national-strategic leadership; supporting commands; intelligence architecture; and allies or coalition partners. Adversaries are both willing and unwilling information sources. Neutral parties not directly involved in military operations may have information of value to the operational commander or may require information about joint force operations. Such sources include the news media, international governmental organizations, and domestic and international private volunteer organization S.5

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Despite the advances in technology, the information available to the operational commander is usually ambiguous, incomplete, or probably outright contradictory-often arriving late. Although uncertainties about the situation are generally reduced over time, the operational commander cannot wait, especially in combat, until the uncertainties have been clarified. He often must make many decisions in rapid sequence and make them quickly and timely. A judgment is a compound of many elements, prominent among which are knowledge and experience. It affects greatly the assumptions and deductions made in each step of the commander's reasoning process. A sound military decision requires that the operational commander have both solid technical knowledge and experience. In its broadest sense, technical judgment includes not only knowledge of the technology and tactical procedures of a given service or combat arm, but also solid and extensive knowledge and understanding of all aspects of operational art and strategy and their mutual interrelationship. In addition, operational commanders must have knowledge of diplomacy, politics, international economics, society, history, and many other aspects of the situation in a theater. Knowledge and experience cannot be viewed in isolation from each other; they are inextricably linked. Too much focus on academic study invariably overloads the intellect at the expense of will, and thereby undermine the essential quality of judgment in action. Knowledge must be fortified by training in its application practical experience-if sound judgment is to result. In addition, practical experience must be of a technical nature if technical judgement is to be acquired. Decision-Making Process: In contrast to the tactical commander, who is most intimately involved in all aspects of decision-making, the operational commander usually relies on the input of numerous staff officers and subordinate commanders in making his decisions. Information on the situation is acquired not only directly from combat, but also from other sources. This information might be imprecise or erroneous. Biases, i mpressions, and assumptions also play a great role in the commander's decision-making process. The evaluation of all that information is the responsibility of the staff, which also receives opinions and input from adjacent units and subordinates. Because of the imprecision and uncertainties and barely tangible elements the commander faces a difficult task when making a decision. Sometimes intuition plays the major, great role, sometimes experience. The proper estimate of the situation is the very basis of the art of leadership in combat. Only then it is possible for the commander's will to reach its heights The operational commander makes decisions based on his estimate of the situation which encompasses not only the current events but also trends in the situation that will evolve over several weeks or months. His expectations as to the own courses of action and their probable outcomes depend on too many factors to be projected into the future with any degree of certainty. Regardless of its format, any estimate of the situation focuses on three main areas: the situation of one's own forces, of friendly forces, and of the enemy's forces. Because of the larger factors of space, time, and forces, the operational commander will often not know the status of his own and friendly forces with the necessary degree of accuracy and at all times. This problem is more serious if subordinate commanders do not give the operational commander timely and accurately information about the true situation with their forces. Subordinate component commanders must have not only personal integrity, 604

but they must also be realistic in their own assessments of the situation; otherwise, the operational commander's decisions will be based on false or inaccurate assessments. Many aspects of the enemy's situation in combat are unknown, and at most can be determined only with a degree of probability, not certainty. Often significant parts of the situation are not available. Greatly complicating the operational commander's problems in making a sound decision are that few elements of the situation that must be properly evaluated are measurable, and many are inherently unquantifiable. The operational commander makes decisions in an environment full of uncertainty and unpredictability. War consists of surprises, frictions, and obstacles of all kinds. The only sure thing is change and uncertainty. 9 The operational commander must accept this uncertainty and be prepared to master it. Vital information on the enemy, environment, and one's situation is often unknown at the moment a commander must make a decision. Judgment invariably involves the acceptance and management of risk. This is inherent in war. The single biggest factor that influences differences between the plan and the reality of its execution is what von Clausewitz called "friction" and the "fog of war." Clausewitz's concept of friction is composed of the infinite number of unforeseen things, large and small, that interfere with all activities. ° Von Clausewitz observed that everything in war is simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and result in generating a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war. Countless minor incidents combine to lower the general level of performance, so that one always falls far short of the intended goal.' I Friction makes even the simplest thing difficult to achieve. It arises because no action is within the direct control of the commander. Factors generating friction are: enemy action, weather, complex terrain, chance, poor coordination, insufficient or inaccurate intelligence, human error, and fatigue. Yet, despite the gaps in his knowledge of the enemy's and one's situation, the operational commander must make a decision. 1 2 Uncertainty combines with friction to create ambiguity. The commander must make important decisions in somewhat of a fog. This fog of war presents opportunities for surprise and deception to increase relative combat strength, but it also increases the chances of making unsound decisions. This element of risk induced by fog is in itself a major cause of culmination. The necessity to make decisions based on imperfect or i ncomplete information reduces the efficiency with which the force is able to conduct operations. The fog of war is an element that causes commanders to be overly cautious in planning and conducting operations. It influences others to assume risks they do not truly appreciate and thus to drive beyond one's culmination point. The operational commander must base many decisions on estimates and anticipation of expected effects. Thus, the fog of war makes it difficult to distinguish when the culmination point is approaching and when its has in fact been crossed. Enemy deception and poor intelligence only make this task harder. 1 3 Time: Time is gained by thinking and acting faster than the enemy and by making sound decisions quickly. Accurate, relevant, and timely information would help the commander to mentally out-maneuver his opponent. In general, during combat, commanders at all levels rarely have enough time to make decisions as they did before the start of the operations. During combat, decisions are made in a short time. A decision reached too l ate may well be as futile as one that fails to address the conditions of the case. 1 4 Von 605

Clausewitz wrote that usually, during an operation, decisions have to be made at once. There may be no time to review the situation or even to think it through. New information will not deter a commander from his intentions; it would only call them into question. One can know more, but this makes one more, not less, uncertain. 1 5 The time available to a tactical commander to make a decision in combat is usually very short. In World War 11, the German divisions, corps, and army staffs were small and contained few decision-makers. The decision process was usually very fast and not characterized by exhaustive details and analyses by the staff and specialists. However, this was accompanied by very competent and detailed ongoing staff work and superb staff planning once a decision had been made. 16 Operational commanders, in contrast to tactical commanders, have more time to make decisions. Yet, today that time is much shorter than it was for operational commanders in World War 11 or the Korean War. Because of the steadily compressed time-space relationships, not only are operational decisions made in a very short time, but also their impact almost immediately affects the actions of one's forces over a major part of a given theater. Often the commander must base his decisions on his own instinctive judgment and without benefit of a careful analysis of the situation, weighing the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative course of action. Optimally, the operational commander should conduct a quick estimate of the situation, adopt a sound course of action, and execute it promptly and decisively. Speed is usually far more important than precision in making a decision. A good plan carried out immediately is superior to a superb plan carried out much later. 1 7 The need to act swiftly and decisively will, at times, require the operational commander to assume greater risks and to do it both willingly and enthusiastically. Decision: Making a decision is the exclusive provenance of the operational commander. The point in time when a decision is reached is called a decision poi nt. 1 8 This is perhaps the most critical part of the decision-making process at any command echelon. The operational commander must make a decision by relying on his judgment and experience and his trust in his staff and subordinate commanders. However, he should never make a decision by committee. 1 9 The operational commander's decision is usually made by considering political, diplomatic, informational, and other relevant elements of the situation. The Chief of Staff normally prepares a proposed course of actions for the operational commander based on the estimate of the situation. Other members of staff might brief the commander on some details within their area of expertise; however, and this cannot be adequately emphasized, it is the commander who makes a decision and is fully responsible for its consequences. Field Marshal von Moltke, Sr. stressed that a single will must direct operations. 20 A decision will rarely reflect an accurate picture of the operational or strategic situation in all its aspects. After the decision is reached, any further information on the situation must be quickly, and skillfully taken into consideration. Von Moltke, Sr. thought all actions must be simple, consequently carried out to reach the objective. 2 ' The operational commander should state his decision clearly and concisely. Timing of the operational commander's decision is another critical element in process. The enemy largely influences the time when decisions are made and the location where they will be executed. 222 General Patton said there is a right time to make every decision. Trying to select the right time is the most important factor for every decision. It 606

is a mistake to make a decision too early, and it is a mistake to make a decision too late .23 However, the military commanders usually cannot choose the time when to make a decision. In addition, the enemy has considerable influence on the commander's decisions. Most decisions at the operational level are made under conditions of great uncertainty. 24 Because each military situation is unique there will never be an ideal model solution for any given problem; therefore, one should not necessarily strive for one. The operational commander should not wait to collect more information to reach a perfect decision, or even the best possible decision. The time between when a decision is made and its execution should be as short as possible. A decision must be converted to a plan of action to cause the desired effect on the course of a major operation or campaign. In decentralized command and control, the highest political or military-strategic leadership should issue instructions, not detailed orders. Before 1945, the main method in the German Army for directing actions of army groups, armies, and independently operating formations, such as army corps and areawide operational reconnaissance, was through issuing instructions [ Weisungen]. Issued for operations lasting several days, these instructions allowed the greatest possible freedom of action for a subordinate operational commander within the framework of his assigned task. The main part of the instruction was the general concept in which the purpose of the forthcoming action within the framework of actions by a higher commander was emphasized. For task execution, the instruction by the higher commander contained only the main points; the way the task would be executed was left to subordinate commanders. The Germans were successful in conducting their campaigns and major operations in 1939-1942 due to reliance on instructions in command and control of their large forces. Afterward, the instructions, as a method for directing armies and army groups, were essentially abandoned, and large-scale defeats followed . 26 Through orders, the operational commander imposes his will on subordinate He should avoid issuing too detailed orders to his subordinate commanders. commanders. In the German Army, an order contained essentially the task for the next immediate objective. The reliance on detailed orders in directing actions of a large formation such as armies and corps usually limits the subordinate commanders' freedom to act. This method of command and control was largely responsible for the Allied armies' slow advance after the landing in Normandy in 1944. Despite enormous Allied superiority on the ground and in the air, the Allied armies did not reach the German border until November 1944, some five months after the landing. Not only logistical difficulties, but also command and control that was too methodical and relied on orders instead of instructions was to blame for this rather lackluster performance. 27 Type of a Decision: Operational commanders make three basic types of decisions: organizational, informational, and operational. The operational commander makes a series of organizational decisions intended to establish and maintain sound command organization, command relationships, and force subordination. They are also aimed at properly structuring the information flow, both vertically and horizontally within the chain of command and thereby ensuring that operational decisions are carried out quickly and effectively. Other important organizational decisions deal with the establishment and maintenance of other theater-wide functions (intelligence, C2W fires, logistics, and protection), determining the boundaries of subordinate commands, and appointing or relieving subordinate commanders. 607

Informational decisions are aimed at facilitating access to information resources required to support sound decision-making. The operational commander should identify sources of information and establish sound informational relationships. He should ensure that he receives a wide range of information from both internal and external sources. Making informational decisions is enhanced by properly organizing information flow, by i dentifying the organizations that obtain information, and by structuring the flow of information to and from the operational commander. Operational decisions are intended to have a major effect on a major operation or campaign during its planning, preparation, and execution phase. The commander's most i mportant operational decisions in the course of combat pertain to changes of the original objectives, shift in the sector of main effort or point of main attack (defense), concentration or counter-concentration, maneuver or counter-maneuver, use or non-use of tactical or operational fires, change in sequencing and synchronization, shift in phases, commitment of operational reserves, pursuit, shift from the offense to the defense, and consolidation of operational/strategic success. Other operational decisions are intended to change, alter, modify, or rescind decisions made by subordinate commanders. Decisions and Levels of Command: In terms of their consequences for the situation in a theater, strategic, tactical, and operational decisions are differentiated. The highest national or alliance/coalition leadership makes strategic decisions, which are intended to i nfluence the course and outcome of conflict or war as a whole. Decisions to open hostilities, go on the offensive or defense, sign a cease-fire, or stop fighting are examples of strategic decisions. Opening a new front or starting a new campaign also requires a decision by the highest strategic leadership. Sometimes a theater commander might make such decisions, but only with prior approval of the political authorities. The decision by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff on 2 July 1942 to land on Guadalcanal and thereby start what later emerged as the Solomons Campaign, and General MacArthur's decision on 15 September 1944, with the approval of the JCS, to land at Leyte on 20 October were each strategic decision in terms of their effect on the situation in the respective theaters of war. Tactical decisions are intended to make a major impact on planning, preparation, and conduct of battle, engagements, and other tactical actions. The nature of an operational decision does not change if the highest political or military strategic authorities make decisions that indirectly affect the planning or execution of a major operation or campaign. Optimally, no higher commander or political authority should make operational decisions except for the operational commander who is vested with the authority and responsibility to do so. No one is better positioned to make operational decisions than the operational commander on the scene. If the higher commander and political authority lack trust in him, they should relieve him from his responsibilities. The chain of command should be respected at all times and not violated at will. The higher commander should overrule the operational commander only if the latter's decision endangers the accomplishment of the assigned mission. The political l eadership could force another decision on the operational commander, but only if his decision threatens to undermine the entire military effort or could result in serious and unacceptable political consequences. Likewise, operational commanders should not make tactical decisions, which properly belong to their subordinate commanders. It is even worse if the operational commanders head tactical command echelons in addition to operational ones. 608

The political or military-strategic leadership should not make operational or, even worse, tactical decisions. However, in practice, operational or even the most basic tactical decisions are all too often made by the highest political or military-strategic leadership. Sometimes such decisions do not harm the major operation or campaign underway, but more often than not, they do a lot of damage. Even if such decisions prove to be sound, that does not justify forcing such decisions on the operational commander. Hitler was well known for his constant interference, not only in purely operational matters, but also in tactical decisions. This problem became increasingly more serious as the war went on. Hitler did not trust most of his generals and had an inordinately high opinion of himself as a military leader. He interfered frequently in both major and minor matters during the German offensive in the West in 1940. By the end of 1941, Hitler was effectively in charge of all theaters of operations through the Operations Department of the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht. The Army General Staff was obliged to get Hitler's concurrence for all its plans and orders. After dismissing Field Marshal von Brauchitsch in December 1941, Hitler took over command of the German Army on the Eastern Front. Afterward the Army General Staff served as Hitler's personal staff for all operations in the East, while he controlled all others theaters through the Supreme Command of the Wehrmacht. 28 Hitler was directly involved in changing the originally determined operational objectives and corresponding shifts in the sectors of main effort on the Eastern Front on too many occasions. Hitler's penchant for dispersing German strength by ordering eccentric major operations led invariably to great difficulties and often to great German defeats in the offensive phase of the invasion of Soviet Russia in 1941-1942. His most fateful decision was Instruction Nr. 41 (issued 5 April 1942), which directed that the principal operational objectives of the then planned German summer offensive were to destroy the Soviet forces on the Don River, capture oilfields in the Caucasus area, and cross the Caucasus, and the capture of Stalingrad. Instruction Nr. 45 (issued 23 July 1942) directed Army Group A that its main objective after destroying Soviet forces south of the Don was to seize the entire eastern coast of the Black Sea and eliminate the Soviet Black Sea Fleet. 29 The German thrust toward the Caucasus encountered increasing difficulties in late September and early October 1942. However, Hitler was unwilling to stop the offensive and order withdrawal. The reasons for this were Hitler's reluctance to abandon his main objective to seize the oilfields of Baku; his belief that the Soviet potential was exhausted and that the Wehrmacht could not be defeated; and his fear of the political consequences of a German withdrawal . 3° After the Sixth Army was encircled in Stalingrad, Hitler made an operational decision on 24 November to declare Stalingrad a "fortress" to be defended until other German forces came to Sixth Army's aid. He initially supported the proposal of General Kurt Zeitzler, Chief of the Army General Staff, to order withdrawal, but was persuaded by Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering, CINC of the Luftwaffe, who gave strong guarantees that the encircled Sixth Army could be supplied from the air. 31 This decision in effect doomed the Sixth Army and had farreaching strategic consequences because the tide of war on the Eastern Front began its irreversible turn against Germany after the fall of Stalingrad in January 1943. Soviet dictator Josef Stalin also repeatedly meddled in the work of his operational commanders with his ill-advised orders. Most of his decisions were poor ones, such as ordering an all-out offensive against the entire German front in January-April 1942 after

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the German failure to seize Moscow, and the Soviet's unsuccessful offensive in southern Russia in January-March 1943. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill also often interfered in the conduct of war by pressing various schemes, which proved to be unworkable, or forcing operational commanders to make unsound operational decisions. He was the principal architect of the Allied decision to land at Anzio in January 1944 (Operation Shingle). 32 That decision was made on the purely political grounds that Rome must be seized. Both General Eisenhower, CINC, Allied Force, and Harold R. Alexander, Deputy CINC, Allied Force and CINC, 18th Army Group, acquiesced to Churchill's arguments without ever understanding the problems associated with shipping and loading and putting the requisite forces ashore and sustaining them. Many senior officers openly disagreed with the whole idea. Yet, Churchill imposed his will and the landing was carried out as planned. After the operation failed, Churchill was the first to disavow it. 33 A more serious problem is when strategic leadership either directs or bypasses the operational commander and issues tactical decisions, grossly interfering with the responsibilities of subordinate tactical commanders and unnecessarily restricting the freedom to act throughout the chain of command. In the Falklands/Malvinas Conflict of 1 982, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and her cabinet made a number of decisions that were operational or even tactical in nature. On 20 March Thatcher made a tactical decision to send Endeavour to South Georgia. The War Cabinet made three other decisions that should have been made by the operational commander: to select San Carlos as the landing site and to land 3 Commando there (19 May); to attack Argentine forces at Goose Green (23 May); and not to risk LSDs or frigates in the reinforcement at Fitzroy (7 June). The British War Cabinet made a tactical decision on 2 May to sink the Argentine cruiser Belgrano outside of the British Maritime Exclusive Zone (MEZ). However, this decision was justifiable because Rear Admiral Sandy Woodward, Commander of the Task Group 317.8, requested a change of rules of engagement so that the CO of submarine Conqueror got authorization to attack and sink Belgrano. 34 The operational commander's decision may sometimes have unintended strategic consequences. This situation might occur if the national or coalition/strategic leadership does not pay necessary attention or is unwilling to impose necessary control over the decisions of the subordinate operational commander. The German-Italian Afrika Korps achieved a great operational success by seizing Tobruk on 21 June 1942. Then, the Axis forces captured some 33,000 Allied prisoners, 10,000 tons of fuel, and three months' supplies for 30,000 men. Field Marshal Rommel decided to continue his pursuit of the Allied forces to the Egyptian border. This tactical decision made by the operational commander had strategic consequences because Hitler decided to indefinitely delay the planned attack on Malta. Thereby, the Axis lost the opportunity to obtain control of the central Mediterranean. As it turned out, Rommel's advance toward Egypt was halted on 30 June some forty-three miles from Tobruk and sixty-two miles from Alexandria. Rommel suffered first a tactical and then an operational setback at Al Alamein. This led to a strategic defeat in the Mediterranean that ultimately led to the complete collapse of Italy's war effort. Rommel's decision to attack the Suez Canal was an example of a tactical decision that led to an operational objective and thereby affected strategic planning. 35

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The decision of Vice Admiral Frank J. Fletcher on 8 August 1942 (D+2 Day) during the invasion of Guadalcanal (Operation Watchtower) to withdraw his carrier force (then off the northwestern tip of San Cristobal to a distance of some 120 miles from Savo Island) beyond the supporting distance of the Marine forces on Guadalcanal, was a tactical decision with potential adverse consequences for the success of the entire major operation. This decision forced the amphibious force commander, Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, to choose between two bad alternatives: leaving the Marines ashore without food and ammunition, or risking an attack by the Japanese aircraft reinforced with heavy bombers based at Rekata (Rekata) Bay (Santa Isabel Island). 36 In effect, Admiral Fletcher's decision endangered the success of the entire amphibious operation. Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, Commander of Southern Pacific (COMSOPAC), did not reverse his decision. The same night a powerful Japanese surface force, under Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa, approached Guadalcanal. In the ensuing Battle of Savo Island, the Allied forces suffered heavy losses, although they prevented the Japanese from reaching the transports. 37 That the worst did not happen does not absolve Vice Admiral Fletcher from the blame for that fateful decision. Sometimes, a tactical decision by a tactical or operational commander can endanger or even end in the failure of the entire major operation. General Mark Clark, Commander of the U.S. Fifth Army, made a highly controversial decision to forgo a preliminary naval bombardment to achieve tactical surprise in the Allied landing at Salerno on 9 September 1943 (Operation Avalanche). This decision resulted in great losses for the landing troops because the Germans fought with great skill and tenacity on the beaches. For several days after the landing, it was uncertain whether the Allies would be able to hold the bridgehead. At some point General Clark even planned reembarkation of one of his two corps and their redeployment to another sector. The German hopes to throw the Allied troops back to the sea ended on 13 September. The Allies were saved from a catastrophic defeat only by the tenacity of their troops, superb naval gunfire support, and excellent fires of field gunners on the beaches. In the end, the Germans retreated in good order to the next defense positions. The Allied troops suffered great losses and were not in a condition to mount a vigorous pursuit of the retreating Germans. 38 In the Battle for Leyte in October 1944, Admiral William F. Halsey's decision, made shortly before 2000 on 24 October, to sail north with all four fast carrier groups of TF-38 to meet and attack the Japanese Mobile Force, left San Bernardino Strait unguarded. This allowed Vice Admiral Kurita's First Diversionary Attack Force to enter the Philippine Sea unobserved on its way south to the Leyte Gulf. Only Kurita's unexpected decision during the ensuing Battle off Samar to turn north instead of proceeding on the southerly course toward the Leyte Gulf prevented Admiral Halsey's decision from resulting in a humiliation and a disaster for the U.S. Navy. Admiral Halsey defended his decision by arguing that Ozawa's carriers represented a greater threat than either Kurita's heavy surface force or the Second Diversionary Attack Force. He believed that Kurita's force was so heavily damaged that it was not a viable force, and that Vice Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, Allied Naval Forces Commander, SOWESPAC and Commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, could contain it. He rejected,, for one reason or another, a course of action to either defend San Bernardino Strait entrance with his entire force or leave only TF-34 Battle Force, and chose a third course of action: to sail north

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with the entire force. In his view, that was the best solution because it ensured the principles of mass and surprise, and left the initiative in his hands. He apparently believed, based on what proved to be exaggerated reports of his pilots after the Battle of the Sibuyan Sea that day, that Kurita's force, even if it reached Leyte Gulf, could only hit and run and that Admiral Kinkaid had ample strength to deal with a threat. The main reason for Admiral Halsey's decision was his apparent misconception that his mission was offensive. He explained that his task was to gain air supremacy over the Philippines, to protect the landings, to maintain unremitting pressure against Japan, and to apply maximum attrition by all possible means in all other areas. 39 In fact, based on General MacArthur's written orders, Admiral Halsey's mission as the Commander of the U.S. Third Fleet was much narrower to provide distant cover and support to Leyte GulfSurigao Strait operations .4° Confusing the issue further, Admiral Halsey also received a mission from his superior Admiral Nimitz which not only directed him to cover and support forces of the Southwest Pacific Area, but also "in case opportunity for destruction of major portion of the enemy fleet offer or can be created, such destruction becomes the primary task . "41 This mission, in fact, was the key element in Admiral Halsey's decision to temporarily abandon his position. guarding San Bernardino Strait entrance and thereby jeopardize the success of the entire operation. Conclusion: Making sound decisions requires that the operational commander possess accurate, relevant, and timely information on all aspects of the strategic or operational situation. As the time-space relationships continue to compress and the volume of information expands exponentially, the tasks of the operational commander will become progressively more difficult to resolve. The operational commander's ability to "see" the theater will be greatly improved, but so will the enemy's ability to frustrate his plans and actions. The sheer volume of information to be collected, processed, evaluated, analyzed, and acted upon will overwhelm the abilities of even the ablest commander. New information technologies will reduce, perhaps dramatically, the uncertainties in regard to location, composition, movements, and actions of the enemy forces in a given theater. However, it is not likely that they will penetrate the thick veil surrounding the enemy's intentions and unquantifiable elements of the enemy's situation, such as quality of combat training and doctrine, morale and discipline, and small unit cohesion, any better than in the past. And it is in these essentially intangible elements of the situation that dictate the operational commander to rely on assumptions, not facts. The Clausewitzian concept of the fog of war and friction are as valid today as they were in the past. War is a clash of human wills and will remain so in the future. It is an environment full of uncertainties, dangers, chaos, and fear. The operational commander must possess good judgment to make sound decisions. This is a critical prerequisite for any commander, but is more important for operational commanders because the consequences of their decisions have wider and stronger impact than those made by tactical commanders. Good judgment is not acquired easily or quickly. It is a product of knowledge, especially technical knowledge, and experience. The estimate of the situation remains the bedrock on which the operational commander's decisions are made. The format of the estimate is not as important as its content. It does not guarantee a sound decision but it ensures that all elements of the situation are addressed and certain conclusions drawn. It is in the estimate process that 612

the operational commander must show his ability to think broadly and not be concerned with tactical details. The operational commander depends on the input of many staff officers and subordinates to obtain the best possible knowledge of the situation. This is why he must insist on qualities such as personal integrity and good judgment in selecting his chief of staff and subordinate commanders. Operational commanders usually have more time to make a decision than tactical commanders do. However, the time-window for making a decision is fast contracting due to advances of technology and correspondingly ever higher intensity of combat. Operational decisions must be made within a short period of time but their impact will often be felt immediately upon not only one's own but friendly, enemy, and neutral forces alike. Therefore, the operational commander's ability to make quick and sound decisions in the future will be even more important than it was in the past. In the near future, the operational commander will be able to know what is going on in the real or near-real time in the entire theater. This creates new opportunities, but also new dangers. The new information technologies will enable the operational commander to react much faster than in the past to alter, modify, or change the subordinate commanders' decisions if such decisions endanger the success of the entire major operation or campaign. However, the operational commander must still leave subordinate commanders enough freedom to act so that they can use initiative and energy in the accomplishment of their assigned tasks. Operational commanders should be allowed the greatest freedom to act within the given framework set up by the national or alliance/coalition leadership. The political and military-strategic leadership should avoid the temptation to unnecessarily interfere in the operational commander's decisions. There is nothing worse than showing open or hidden distrust or contempt for the operational commander by making operational decisions on his behalf. Higher commanders and political authorities must trust operational commanders, or the commanders must be quickly relieved from their duties. Likewise, operational commanders should not meddle in the decisions of their subordinate tactical commanders, except when the entire effort is jeopardized. Otherwise, the subordinate tactical commander's freedom of action will be unnecessarily restricted with all the attendant negative effects on his ability to properly plan, prepare, and execute the assigned task.

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Notes 1. Martin Blumenson, "Essence of Command: Competence, Iron Soul," Army 3 (March 1993), p. 42. 2. Lothar Rendulic, "Ueber den Entschluss," Wehrkunde 3 (March 1961), p. 13 1. 3. Dudley W. Knox, "Training for Higher Command in War" (Newport, RI: Naval War College, December 1919), p. 3.

4. Joint Pub 3-56, Command and Control Doctrine for Joint Operations ( Washington, DC: Third Draft, 3 May 1 995), pp. II-2 and 11-3. 5. Ibid., pp. 11-3 and II-4. 6. Dudley W. Knox, "Training for Higher Command in War" (Newport, RI: Naval War College, December 1919), pp. 5-6.

7. Rendulic, "Ueber den Entschluss," p. 132. 8. Hermann Franke, editor, Handbuch der neuzeitlichen Wehrwissenschaften , Vol. 1: Wehrpolitik and Krie fuehrung (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter & Co., 1 936), p. 198. 9. Ihno Krumpelt, "Die operative Versorgungsfuehrung," Wehrkunde 6 (June 1953), p. 22.

10. Charles D. Franklin, Time, Space, and Mass at the Operational Level of War: The Dynamics of the Culminating Point (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 28 April 1988), p. 9. 11. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 119-20. 1 2. Rendulic, "Ueber den Entschluss," p. 132. 13. Franklin, Time, Space, and Mass at the Operational Level of War: The Dynamics of the Culminating Point, pp. 10-11. 14. Knox, "Training for Higher Command in War," p. 4. 1 5. Von Clausewitz, On War (1984), p. 102. 16. Richard F. Timmons, "Lessons From the Past for NATO," The Parameters of War, Military History Journal of the U.S. Army War College, Vol. XIV, 3 (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1 987), p. 272. 17. John T. Nelsen, Where to go from Here? Considerations for the Adoption of Aufiragstaktik by the US Army (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, December 1986), pp. 7-8. 1 8. This term is often confused with the term "decisive point" which has a completely different meaning. 19. General F.C. Fuller observed that "The common deficiency in command is.. . calling conferences in order to pick the brains of subordinates and lack of originality which often leads to doing something which the enemy expects in place of what he does not look for; Design for Military Operations-The British Military Doctrine, Army Code No. 71451, prepared under the direction of the Chief of the General Staff, 1 989, p. 46.

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20. Franke, editor, Handbuch der neuzeitlichen Wehrwissenschaften , Vol. 1: Wehrpolitik and Kriegfuehrung , pp. 197-8. 21. Ibid., p. 198. 22. Theodor Busse, "Befehl and Weisung-Gedanken zur Befehlserteilung," Wehrkunde 9 (September 1954), p. 293. 23. Porter B. Williamson, Patton's Principles (Tucson, AR: Management and Systems Consultants, Inc., 1979), p. 116. 24. F. von Rabenau, Operative Entsschluesse gegen einen an Zahl ueberlegenen Gegner (Berlin: E.S. Mittler & Sohn, 1935), p. 3. 25. Design .for Military Operations-The British Military Doctrine, p. 43. 26. Busse, "Befehl and Weisung-Gedanken zur Befehlserteilung," pp. 293-4. 27. Ibid., p. 294. 28. Albert Seaton, The Russo-German War 1941-45 (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1971), p. 31. 29. Alfred Philippi and Ferdinand Heim, Der Feldzug Ge eg n Sowjetrussland 1941 bis 1945. Ein operativer Ueberblick (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1962), pp. 67, 143. 30. Ibid., p. 166. 31. Ibid., p. 183. 32. Samuel E. Morison, Sicily- Salerno-Anzio: January 1943-June 1944 , Vol. IX: History of United States Naval Operations in World War 11 (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1st printed 1954, reprinted 1984), p. 325. 33. Carlo D'Este, Fatal Decision: Anzio and the Battle for Rome (New York, NY: HarperPerennial, 1992), pp. 96-9. 34. Sandy Woodward with Patrick Robinson, One Hundred Days: The Memoirs of the Falklands Battle Groom Commander (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992), pp. 156-8. 35. Meinhard Glanz, Rommel's Entschluss zum Angriff auf Alexandria (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, February 1963), p. 20. 36. Samuel E. Morison, The Struggle for Guadalcanal, August 1942-February 1943 History of United States Naval Operations in World War 11, Vol. V. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1975), p. 31. 37. Ibid., pp. 27-8, 63. 38. D'Este, Fatal Decision: Anzio and the Battle for Rome, pp. 38-42. 39. William F. Halsey, "The Battle For Leyte Gulf," Proceedings 5 (May 1952), pp. 490, 487. 40. GHQ Operations Instructions. Number 70, 21 September 1944, General Headquarters Southwest Pacific Area, in Hamlin Cannon, Leyte: The Return to the Philippines , United States Army in World War 11, The War in the Pacific (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 1954, reprinted 1987), p. 371.

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41. Operation Plan, CINCPOA No. 8-44, 27 September 1944; Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, The Washington Yard, Washington, DC, Box 33.

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Part IX: THE FUTURE

THE FUTURE OF OPERATIONAL WARFARE

I shall proceed from the simple to the complex. But in war more than in any other subject we must begin by looking at the nature of the whole, fbr here more than elsewhere the part and the whole must always be thought of together. Carl von Clausewitz It will be better to offer certain considerations for reflection, rather than make sweeping dogmatic assertions. Alfred T. Mahan The future of operational warfare is closely related to the most likely trend in the nature and character of a war in the years ahead. Although operational warfare can be applied across the entire operational continuum, its full scope and advantages could be seen in a high-intensity conflict. Thus, the value of operational warfare primarily depends on the accurate vision of future war. Today, most theoreticians firmly believe that the world has irreversibly entered the era of smaller but more numerous and hard-to-resolve conflicts. (However, what might appear to be a dominant trend today could be seen in retrospect only as a fleeting occurrence.) For the near future, nationalism might become the principal cause of war between second and third-rate powers. Other sources of future conflict could be ideological, ethnic and religious hatred, weapons proliferation, struggles to control oil/gas and water resources, overpopulation, greed, revenge, and a combination of causes. The dominant view today is that wars between or among great powers are not likely to erupt in the near future. Yet, this is far from certain. In the 1920s and the early 1930s many observers similarly thought that large conflicts were the thing of the past. As long as human nature remains essentially unchanged, the prospects of large conventional, or even wars fought with the weapons of mass destruction cannot be excluded. One must be prepared for such an eventuality, even if it appears very remote today. To do otherwise is to take great and unnecessary risks for the country's security and may well repeat the mistakes of the past, but at a much heavier cost. The basic features of war are essentially unchangeable. Even the most profound changes in technology, thought, and doctrine will not change the true nature of war. War is always an instrument of policy; hence, political considerations dominate the use of military and nonmilitary sources of power. Also, the pervasiveness of moral elements remains constant in any war.' A war is a violent clash between opposing human wills consisting of a series of actions and counteractions between two independent and irreconcilable forces. The human element is the key in any war. General George Patton

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aptly observed that wars may be fought with weapons, but they are won by men. It is the spirit of the men who follow and of the man who leads that gains the victory. The Western approach to war has been heavily influenced by the essentially Newtonian view which believes that by identifying universal laws of combat all the problems could be resolved and the results of combat could be predicted. Thus, extensive efforts are made to quantify everything in war.2 In the Vietnam War, the U.S. relied on "body count" and other numerical indicators as measures of effectiveness, instead on strategic reasoning.3 Unsound strategy and lack of operational thinking were the main cause of the U.S.'s humiliating defeat in that conflict. The neo-Newtonians offer a neat, clean concept of war. They believe that war, like business, is highly rational, and a direct link can be established between cause and effect. Moreover, they believe that everything in war can be controlled. The neo-Newtonians view war as a well-functioning engine that if properly designed and maintained will ensure the final victory. They believe that war is a onesided problem that is liable to easy resolution just as an engineering problem or mathematical equation can be solved. In their vision of war, the enemy's actions or reactions can be disregarded. Moreover, because the enemy cannot be controlled, he is not considered as a factor at all. 5 Yet, war is never fought in a vacuum; the enemy is real, not abstract, and he acts on his own free will and often "irrationally," not what one expects him to do. While acknowledging that fog of war and friction existed in the past wars, the neo-Newtonians apparently believe that these phenomena were caused by the lack of what they call "battlespace awareness." The inability to use all available collective knowledge or the inability to collect information available, and acquire a common operating picture (COP) was, in their view, the principal cause of fog of war and friction.6 The neo-Newtonians apparently dismiss the importance of complexity theory. They believe that new technological advances can overcome complexity and then force the enemy to act in a desired direction. However, in practice war is nonlinear, highly dynamic, and in a state of constant flux. The effectiveness of one's forces in war cannot be solely measured by the number of targets destroyed and casualties inflicted on the enemy. 9 A war is shaped by human nature, the complexities of human behaviors, and the limitation of human and physical capabilities. Thus, the outcome of a war cannot be predicted with certainty because so many intangible elements are an integral part of it. For a victory to have true meaning, the enemy must be defeated in his own mind.' () Future war will be characterized, as in the past, by friction, uncertainty and the ensuing chaos. In a war, uncertainty is not result of the gaps in information as is often wrongly assumed, but is caused by what one does not comprehend in a given situation. Uncertainty is a fundamental and inevitable attribute of war, and no amount of information will eliminate it.'' In the future, the weaker side in war will most likely rely on asymmetrical responses to neutralize or nullify the advantages of much stronger opponents. The weaker opponents will probably not respond symmetrically as Iraq did in the Gulf War of 1990 1991 and consequently suffered a defeat. An inferior opponent could not only disperse but also camouflage some heavy weapons and equipment and harden many of his critical C3 nodes, supply dumps, and supply facilities. Facilities that cannot be dispersed could be buried below schools, hospitals, and similar facilities.' 2 In the Kosovo Conflict of

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1999, the Serbs largely avoided challenging NATO's aircraft and instead responded asymmetrically by dispersing their forces and extensively using camouflage and decoys. Many nations in the Third World will consider the moral, political, and cultural value of the West as asymmetries to be exploited whenever possible. One obvious option for third and fourth powers is to exploit the growing aversion of Western societies to casualties by acting brutally. 1 3 They might compensate for their lack of precision-guided weapons and standoff capability by having larger number of troops, extensive use of state-supported terrorism, and using weapons of mass destruction. In such a conflict, one's technological advantages might not be sufficient to ensure final victory. In the future, one's conventional forces will deal with the range of other threats, such as insurgency, urban terrorism, narco-trade, para-military groups, and civil disobedience. Boundaries between military and nonmilitary actions will be increasingly blurred. The traditional distinction between internal and external security will become increasingly more difficult to differentiate. In conducting information warfare, the weaker opponent will probably focus its efforts not against military informational systems which are relatively better protected, but highly vulnerable civilian informational and communal infrastructures. Many theoreticians assert that emerging technologies will drastically change the nature of war because they will allow one's forces to identify virtually everything of military significance, in real-time, in any kind of weather, at any time. One's forces will be able to defeat the enemies from a distance with no need to risk lives in brutal combat on the ground. NATO's bombing of Serbia, in which no Allied pilots were lost in combat, is thought to be forerunner of wars to come. This, however, ignores the fact that the essential nature of war has not changed despite all the technological advances over the past two centuries. Technology has always considerably affected the practical application of tactics and operational art. History shows that the advent of any radically new weapon led to the belief that all other weapons became obsolete. However, in each instance, whether it was introduction of longer-range guns, mines, torpedoes, submarines, aircrafts, or missiles, the changes in conduct of war were far less than their enthusiasts predicted. The idea of a technological breakthrough is largely a myth. The developments were evolutionary rather than revolutionary. In the past, the major increase in the capabilities usually came through the integration of several known and often rather mundane inventions. The extent of these new capabilities was rarely reflected in obvious physical changes. The advent of the dreadnought battleship in 1906 was the result not of any particularly new technology, but a successful integration of the existing technologies. In contrast to other battleships, the Dreadnought obtained greater combat power by a new mounting uniform 12-inches guns as the main armament combined with a state of the art fire control system, heavier armor with better protection against gun fire, torpedoes, and mines, and greatly improved watertight integrity. This first all-big gun ship was also the first battleship fitted with steam turbines providing top speed of 21 knots and longer endurance. The commissioning of the Dreadnought made all the other battleships in the Royal Navy, and other navies as well, obsolete. Too much focus on technology at the expense of operational thinking cannot ensure success against a strong opponent who, although not having the most advanced weapons and equipment, has developed superior operational concepts. To fully exploit the potential

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of new technological advances such as netting of forces, operational concepts incorporating and integrating the new technologies must be developed into coherent doctrines. The essence of the German victories in the West in 1940, was not better technology as often thought, but the innovative tactical and operational exploitation of systems common to both sides; the tank, airplane and radio; speed, surprise, and deception combined with superior tactical and operational performance. 14 Without soundly developed operational concepts, netted forces will not perform at the peak of the potential offered by new technological advances. The example of the dreadnought revolution prior to World War I when the concept remained purely tactical is a warning how the lack of operational thinking can largely invalidate the value of new technological advances. Thus, netting of forces cannot encompass only tactical-size forces, but must be applied to numbered and theater forces and multiservice forces. Proponents of information warfare believe that the compression of the factors of space and time has eliminated the clear separations among the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. 1 5 However, the levels of war exist because the accomplishment of tactical, operational, and strategic objectives requires different methods in the employment of one's combat forces. As long as distinctions among these objectives are not blurred or erased, corresponding levels of war will exist as well. The ever longer range, precision, and lethality of weapons, and the new information technologies, etc., are likely to bring about changes in the scope of actions conducted at a given level of war. These and similar developments will erode the current boundaries between the levels of war. Upper boundaries at the tactical level will be expanded in the future, encompassing a relatively large part of what is today considered the operational level, while the lower part of the theater-strategic level will probably embrace part of what is today operational level. The national-strategic level's lower end will encompass part of what is today theater-strategic level. Current clear lines between strategic and operational levels will be more difficult to differentiate in the future because of the increased precision and longer ranges gained in connection with complete networking. This will bring a significant increase in the combat effectiveness. Traditional factors of space, time, and force will retain their significance. However, because of the current and projected technological advances, the factor of space and time will be overcome faster than in the past. 1 7 Information will increasingly affect each of these factors both individually and in combination. Although information will not have the same quality as these three factors, its influence could be decisive for the success of a military effort at any level. Therefore, information must be fully considered by commanders at all levels. 1 8 The factor of space will encompass not only land, sea, and space, but also information space. 19 A physical space is occupied when it allows swift projection of forces and assets through information dominance. The human element of the physical space will change considerably in the years to come. By some estimates, about five billion or three-fifth of the world's population will live in urban areas in 2025, mostly in the Third World. Urban terrain is highly restrictive and has mitigating effect on the use of one's forces. This element alone significantly complicates the attacker's problems. Theaters of war and theaters of operations will remain the basic structure of the physical space at the operational and strategic level. Yet, the existence and increasing i mportance of fourth dimension-cyberspace will further blur the boundaries of the theater.

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Some vital elements of operational functions which rely on computer networks will be physically located many hundreds or thousands miles away, whether in outer space or on the ground. This, in turn, will make exceedingly difficult for the operational commanders and their staffs to ensure proper sequencing and synchronization of these functions in support of the campaigns and major operations. The future battlefield/battlespace will be increasingly complex and nonlinear. Physical space in which one's own and enemy forces move and maneuver will probably be much larger than it is today. The lines separating the rear zone and combat zone will be further blurred and increasingly difficult to differentiate. In the future, the factor of time will be further compressed. The combat actions and decision cycle will be steadily shorter than they are today. 21 Changes in dimensions of space and time will considerably increase the tempo of events. Information will reduce the need for time-consuming travel, whether local or long distance. 22 Tomorrow's forces will be probably much smaller, more lethal, and more maneuverable than those today. A trend toward increased volume and precision of fire will continue with the introduction of high-energy weapons, electromagnetic rail gun technology super-conductivity, and yet to be identified technologies. z3 The new technology will allow a shift from massing of forces to one based upon massing of effects. Sensors and shooters can now be in a position to engage many different targets without having to maneuver. 24 They will be geographically dispersed over large parts of the theater. They will be required to maneuver more quickly and communicate over long distances. 25 One's force effectiveness will depend not on numbers but on quality. Hence, in the future, the factor of force must be increasingly evaluated on qualitative factors. However, one should not have too much reliance on a single capability, but on diverse and cumulative capabilities of joint forces. In the future, the use of communications and information technologies and means of transportation will allow fast operations either in a region or globally. The importance of information will increase exponentially and will have a completely new quality and significantly change the traditional factors of space, time, and force. 27 Information is important, but all the information in the world is useless unless it contributes to effective decision making in combat. 28 Informational advances in computer processing, precise global positioning and telecommunications will provide the capability to determine accurate locations of one's own and enemy forces, as well as to collect, process, and distribute relevant data to thousands of locations. Simultaneously, the new information technologies will have the capability to absorb, evaluate, use, transmit, and exchange large volume of information at high speeds to multiple recipients, and multiple sources of data will be correlated faster than ever. Many theoreticians assert today that the information age will make the factor of distance less relevant because information and resulting decisions can travel almost instantaneously to the place where they are needed . 29 However, this is only partially true. Distances and geography still matter in the planning and application of military and nonmilitary sources of power. Combat forces must often traverse large distances during their deployment, maneuver, or redeployment. In a digitized battlefield there will be no shortage of information. However, one of the most difficult problems to resolve will be how to use the vast amount of available information. In the future, the danger of information overload will be dramatically increased. The main burden of integrating the information from disparate sources would

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fall on the commanders and their staff. Yet, without significant increase in the size of the staffs, it will be difficult or even impossible to obtain proper understanding of relationships, determine causality, and predict outcomes. In the future, military operations will be much more affected than they are today by the significant increase in the capabilities of the electronic media, especially TV. The new information technologies will allow news organizations to create huge interconnected databases; no significant details on the situation will escape their view. 30 This, in turn, will considerably affect the planning and conduct of military operations and relationships between the operational commanders and their staffs and the media. Proponents of the new technologies believe that a vast array of sensors and computers netted together will reduce friction from the military equation to manageable and controllable levels. They assert that mastery of information and information processes leads naturally to increases in precision and lethality. The quest for battlespace omniscience can improve tracking and targeting capabilities aggravating the enemy's problem of finding sanctuary. Nearly everything that is not hidden will be observed and therefore vulnerable to the attack by one's forces. 31 Information warfare enthusiasts assert that automatic recognition systems may eventually remove most of the intermediate levels in such an environment, directing long-range precision strikes as soon as information is received from the sensors. All this is to occur without human intervention. Yet, processing more information may as easily saturate commanders and their staffs with a flood of indigestible data. 32 Information dominance is expected to reduce reliance on the employment of physical force, especially at the strategic level . 33 However, this is unlikely to happen because even an opponent inferior in strength will not surrender easily or quickly. A physical force will remain, as it was in the past, the final arbiter in one's ability to force the enemy to bow to one's will. Traditional theater-wide functions will retain their importance in the future. The operational command echelons will be the most critical link for planning, preparing, executing, and sustaining major operations and campaigns. At the same time, technological dependence on modern C2 and information systems also creates vulnerabilities and sources of disruption. The new technological advances will significantly influence the way military forces are organized for combat. There is widely held belief that new information technologies would: (1) allow greater span of control for the commander and thereby eliminate the need for middle level command echelons; and (2) the tasks performed by these echelons will be relegated to the staffs or supporting organization or experts in the rear. However, flattening or widening of the organizational structure will be accomplished by eliminating levels of control resulting in the increase of controlling bodies and staffs. Yet, the staff does not reduce the amount of coordination to be performed by the chief of staff because coordination is increased in geometric proportion to the number of staff officers. 34 Technology alone should never be the sole or even dominant factor in determining the command structure. The number of intermediate command echelons should primarily be limited to those strictly needed to accomplish the assigned missions. Eliminating intermediate command echelons because technology allows larger span of control cannot be explained in terms of sound organization. Information technology cannot change the fact that the number of subordinate force elements grows arithmetically while the number of their relationships grows

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geometrically. Flattening of command structure by increasing the number of subordinate elements beyond what is traditionally thought (five to seven) to be effective is bound to result in an unbalanced and possibly ineffective command structure. Proponents of information warfare apparently ignore the fact that the commander's responsibilities are much broader-especially at the operational and strategic levels-than making decisions in combat or combat itself. An intermediate command echelon between tactical commanders and national or alliance/coalition and military strategic leadership is absolutely necessary to ensure uninterrupted planning in peacetime, crisis, and war. This level of command also establishes and maintains other operational functions, specifically intelligence, command and control warfare (C2W), operational fires, logistics, and protection. Synchronization of these functions must be planned and executed by the operational command echelon. The enormous increase in the volume of information should be focused on providing timely, accurate, and above all, relevant intelligence to the respective commanders. This means that an intermediate level of command must exist to filter information to subordinate command echelons; otherwise the commander's decision-making will be greatly complicated because of information overload. The new technological advances will substantially increase one's ability to obtain accurate, timely, and perhaps relevant intelligence regarding the enemy's tangible capabilities-both military and nonmilitary. However, one's ability to know, with any degree of certainty, the enemy's intentions or actions will not be improved any time soon. In the past, the increase in volume of information led to further decentralization of intelligence, because the lower command echelons do not have either the resources or time to digest the vast volume of information necessary for the commander to make decisions. The role and significance of command and control warfare (C2W) in support of campaign and major operations will be significantly enhanced in the future. The physical destruction component of C2W will probably remain the most critical for success, especially in the initial phase of a campaign or major operation. In the future, the greatly increased range, lethality, and precision of the variety of available weapon platforms will allow operational commanders to plan and more effectively use fires in shaping the battlefield/battlespace. Perhaps, the greatest increase in capabilities will occur in respect to ground-based fires because of the introduction of the new weapons with longer range, lethality, and precision. Tomorrow's operational commanders will have a greater number of options in terms of type of platforms in planning and conducting tactical and operational fires. Operational protection will require steadily larger forces and assets because of the need to protect not only military forces and facilities in a given theater, but also the civilian population. One of the increasingly difficult problems will be protection of information because the range of options and capabilities available to hostile states and groups, or even individuals, is bound to increase in the future. This problem is greatly complicated because the operational commander will find it extremely difficult to protect those elements of informational systems located at great distances from his theater. In the future, various stages of one's combat force employment will most likely become less clearly delineated than today. The time between the order for mobilization to predeployment and deployment will be further reduced. Combat forces will be more mobile than today, resulting in a shorter time line for force deployment. Strategic and

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operational deployment of ground forces will be much shorter than today because of the greatly increased speeds of aircraft and ships. The analysis of the enemy's and one's own critical factors will be more complex than today because of the expected increased diffusion of critical strengths and critical weaknesses among military and nonmilitary sources of power. In contrast to today, ground forces will be geographically dispersed. In addition to traditional centers of gravity, computer networks will probably emerge as the most important part of operational and tactical centers of gravity. At the strategic level, computer networks for banking, finance, and other sectors of economy will become a part of the strategic center of gravity. This evolution in the characteristics of the strategic center of gravity will create quite an anomalous situation in which one's center of gravity will be simultaneously both the single greatest source of critical strength and critical weakness. Thus, protection of one's strategic center of gravity will be a much more difficult task than it is today. At the same time, computer networks as centers of gravity do not have the ability to physically destroy or neutralize the enemy's strategic center of gravity. In the netted forces at the tactical and operational levels, computer networks might also become the respective center of gravity. However, the links connecting netted forces, unless well protected, could be opened to devastating enemy physical or electronic attack. The computer networks as operational centers of gravity are fundamentally different from the conventional centers of gravity because among other things they lack attributes of firepower and maneuver. In contrast to the conventional centers of gravity, the key components of a computer network will be highly vulnerable to a disabling attack. Operational maneuver will retain its importance also in the future. However, new technological advances will allow the preparation and execution of operational maneuver to be much shorter than today. In land warfare, maneuver of highly capable force elements will be increasingly conducted by air. Also, maneuver of one's forces over physical space will probably be less important than maneuver with fires. Technological advances will probably have the greatest effect on the methods of combat force employment. Longer range, more lethal, and highly precise weapons will further enhance the importance of strikes which will most likely replace battles or engagements as the principal methods of forces employment to accomplish major tactical and even operational objectives. Netting will allow one's forces to carry out a series of powerful strikes by geographically widely dispersed platforms and against the targets many hundred or even thousands of miles away. Strikes as a method of combat force employment will be used not only by air forces and naval forces but also by ground forces. Battles and engagements will most likely replace major operations as the main method for accomplishing operational and perhaps even strategic objectives. Such major operations will be normally joint and often combined efforts. Campaigns will be planned and conducted in a war between strong opponents. However, they might also be completed in shorter time than those conducted in the past. The decision cycles for the commanders at all levels will be further compressed and greatly speeded up. This, in turn, will significantly accelerate the tempo of fighting, and requiring more decentralized decision-making. However, highly integrative technologies and information gathering may create a false belief that centralized decision-making will result in greater effectiveness. 35 Such a trend needs to be avoided

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because highly centralized decision-making will unnecessarily restrict the freedom of action for operational commanders and their subordinate tactical commanders. An increase in the information volume was historically best resolved through decentralized, not centralized command and control. Some theoreticians assert that informational technologies will result in greatly . 36 reduced size of the staffs, while much of noise and human errors will be eliminated However, the size of the staffs needs to be increased, not reduced, if intermediate levels of command are abolished as information warfare enthusiasts predict. Operational commanders and planners will operate in an increasingly diverse and complex environment; the commander's freedom to act (and hence, the ability to exercise the initiative) will be reduced because of ever-expanding political, legal, and environmental limitations. The increased scope of the theater will make it more important than ever to make sound operational decisions. The effect of the operational commander's decision will be felt almost immediately over large parts of the theater. In the future, the greatest challenge for the operational commanders will be to make sound decisions quickly. The subordinate tactical commanders will have even less 37 ti me to make quick decisions based on the higher commander's intent. Decisions will be made by using ambiguous or even completely false information. The arguments of information warfare enthusiasts that technology will allow precision attacks with near perfect clarity of information does not rest on either scientific or historic foundations. 38 In the future, the problem of accurately evaluating intangible factors of the enemy's situation such as will to fight, combat motivation, unit cohesion, and morale and discipline are not likely to be resolved regardless of technological advances. The Clausewitzian fog of war and friction will remain the essential feature of any conflict for the foreseeable future. The computers, no matter how capable, will not be able to resolve all the uncertainties in the actions and interactions of either side in a conflict. Modern C2 and communications means do not make task-oriented orders obsolete; just the opposite. The enormous increase in the information volume make it necessary not to centralize, but to further decentralize command and control throughout the chain of command. Successful operational leadership will continue to depend on freedom of action, the moral courage to make decisions, and command and control through task-oriented orders . 39 In the future, shaping the theater in preparation for a campaign or major operation could become the most important task of the operational commander. This will be accomplished by influencing an enemy's capability or decision. Achieving one's 40 information dominance will become a major focus of the operational warfare. A trend toward increased jointness and combinedness will continue. The spacetime relationship will be further compressed. Thus, operational warfare will encompass larger areas of what today constitutes the tactical level of war; the importance of logistical support and sustainment will be further increased. In the future, the reduced size of the services and armed forces as a whole, increasing political constraints, and the pressure of public opinion will dictate avoidance of protracted conflicts and great losses-not only for one's own forces, but also for enemy forces. Only by sound application of operational warfare will be possible to avoid attritional warfare at the operational and strategic level. This can be avoided only by using overwhelming force decisively and quickly. The principal prerequisite for the effective conduct of operational

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warfare will remain the mastery of tactics. Finally, a broad or operational perspective and the ability to calculate and balance the factors of space, time, and force will remain the keys to success in planning and conducting major operations and campaigns. To sum up, the importance of operational warfare will increase in the future, both in preparing for and conducting war or operations other than war. Technology and societal changes will exert strong influences on the development of operational warfare. Superior technology and tactics alone will not be sufficient to ensure victory in a war. As in the past, wars will be lost or won at the operational and strategic levels, not at the tactical level. Tactical commanders will neither have the forces nor the ability to sequence and synchronize the diverse sources of power that are the key for success at the operational or strategic levels of war. Sound application of the tenets of operational warfare will ensure decisiveness in the conduct of campaigns or major operations. In contrast, exclusive focus on tactics, or even worse, on targeteering is certain to result in a ti me consuming and costly attritional warfare against a strong and agile opponent. Wars were and will remain for the foreseeable future essentially a clash of human wills. There will always be a rather large area of uncertainty where policy makers and operational commanders must take some high and calculated risks. Hence, fog of war and friction will remain an integral part of any conflict; the information revolution is not likely to alter these well-proven facts of warfare. There is probably nothing more false than to claim that tactics and technology determine whether wars are won or lost. While the war cannot be won by failing to achieve tactical victories, it is policy and strategy and operational warfare that spell the difference between victory and defeat. To believe otherwise is to ignore the lessons of military history. Operational thinking is the key prerequisite for the successful employment of one's combat forces to accomplish strategic or operational objectives. Tactics and high-tech weapons never did, nor ever will suffice to accomplish such objectives against a strong and resourceful opponent.

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Notes 1. Brian R. Reinwald, "Retaining the Moral Element of War," Military Review l (January February 1998), p. 69. 2. John F. Schmitt, "Command and (Out of) Control. The Military Implications of Complexity Theory," in David S. Alberts and Thomas J. Czerwinski, eds., Complexity Global Politics and National Security (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1 st printing, June 1997), p. 223. 3. Paul K. van Riper and Robert H. Scales, Jr., "Preparing for War in the 21 st Century," Autumn, 1997, p. 5.

Parameters,

4. Schmitt, "Command and (Out of) Control. The Military Implications of Complexity Theory," pp. 2234,228. 5. Ibid., p. 224. 6. David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, and Frederick P. Stein, Network-Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority ( Washington, DC: DoD C4ISR Cooperative Research Program, 2nd ed., revised, August 1999), p. 71. 7. Thomas P.M. Barnett, "The Seven Deadly Sins of Network-Centric Warfare," Proceedings 1 (January 1999), p. 38. 8. Schmitt, "Command and (Out of) Control: The Military Implications of Complexity Theory," p. 230. 9. Paul K. van Riper and Robert H. Scales, Jr., "Preparing for War in the 21st Century," Parameters, Autumn, 1997, p. 5. 10. Ibid., pp. 2, 5. 11. Paul K. van Riper, "Information Superiority," Statement before the Procurement Subcommittee and Research and Development Subcommittee of the House National Security Committee, 20 March 1997, pp. 2, 4. 12. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "21st Century Land Warfare: Four Dangerous Myths," Parameters, Autumn, 1997, p. 34. 13. Ibid., p. 29. 14. James R. Fitzsimonds and Jan M. Van Tol, "Revolutions in Military Affairs," Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1994, pp. 24-5. 15. Alberts, Garstka, and Stein, Network Centric Warfare. Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority , pp. 70, 88. 16. Fredi Buentemeyer, "Information als entscheidende Dimension der Auseinandersetzung im 21. Jahrhundert. Sicherheites- and militaerpolitische Auswirkungen moderner Informationstechnologies," Soldat and Technik 9 (September 1996), p. 558. Stockfisch, "Die moralischen Groessen-in Vergessenheit Wehrausbildung 11 (November 1997), p. 662. 17. Dieter

geraten,"

Truppenproxis/

18. Buentemeyer, "Information als entscheidende Dimension der Auseinandersetzung im 21. Jahrhundert. Sicherheites- and militaerpolitische Auswirkungen moderner Informationstechnologies," p. 558.

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19. Erich Vad, "Operative Fuehrung: Grundlagen, Merkmale and Perspektiven," Militaerische Zeitschrift 2 (March-April 1998), p. 138.

Oesterreichische

Marine Corps Concept Paper, Future Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 25 July 1997), p. 3. 20.

21. Buentemeyer, "Information als entscheidende Dimension der Auseinandersetzung im 21. Jahrhundert.

Sicherheites- and militaerpolitische Auswirkungen moderner Informationstechnologies," p. 558. 22. Alberts, Garstka, and Stein, Network Centric Warfare. Developing and Levering Information Superiority , p. 21. 23. Gordon R. Sullivan and James M. Dubik, "Land Warfare in the 21st Century," (September 1993), p. 23.

Military Review 9

24. Alberts, Garstka, and Stein, Network Centric Warfare. Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority, pp. 90-1. 25. Sullivan and Dubik, "Land Warfare in the 21 st Century," pp. 22-3. 26. Buentemeyer, "Information als entscheidende Dimension der Auseinandersetzung im 21. Jahrhundert. Sicherheites- and militaerpolitische Auswirkungen moderner Informationstechnologies," p. 558. 27. Ibid., p. 555. 28. Van Riper, "Information Superiority," p. 3. 29. Alberts, Garstka, and Stein, Network Centric Warfare. Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority, p. 21. 30. Dunlap, Jr., "21st-Century Land Warfare: Four Dangerous Myths," p. 32. 31. Henry Ryan and Edward C. Peartree, "Military Theory and Information Warfare," Parameters, Autumn 1 998, pp. 127-8. 32. Williamson Murray, "Clausewitz Out, Computers In. Military Culture and Technological Hubris," The National Interest, Summer, 1997, p. 63.

33. Buentemeyer, "Information als entscheidende Dimension der Auseinandersetzung im 21. Jahrhundert. Sicherheites- and militaerpolitische Auswirkungen moderner Informationstechnologies," p. 558. 34. Chief of Naval Operations, Naval Warfare Innovation Concept Team Reports (Newport, RI: Strategic Studies Group XVII, August 1998), pp. 20-1, 25. 35. Sullivan and Dubik, "Land Warfare in the 21 st Century," p. 26. 36. Ryan and Peartree, "Military Theory and Information Warfare," p. 128. 37. Sullivan and Dubik, "Land Warfare in the 21 st Century," p. 22-3. 38. Van Riper and Scales, Jr., "Preparing for War in the 21 st Century," p. 10. 39. Vad, "Operative Fuehrung: Grundlagen, Merkmale and Perspektiven," p. 138. 40. Fitzsimonds and van Tol, "Revolutions in Military Affairs," p. 27.

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GLOSSARY OF OPERATIONAL TERMS

GLOSSARY OF OPERATIONAL TERMS It is only when we have reached agreement on names and concepts that we can hope to progress with clearness and ease in the examination of the topic, and be assured of ,finding ourselves on the same platform with our readers. Carl von Clausewitz a ili

ability of one's forces to act faster than the enemy's forces.

area of influence undefined area of land, sea, or ocean, and airspace above it, that extends beyond the boundaries of a given theater, but in which the commander can directly influence actions by using maneuver or fires; its size varies depending on the capabilities of his forces, principally their mobility and the effective range at which they project fires. area of interest-adjacent geographic area where political, military, economic, or other developments have an effect within a given theater; it might also extend to the areas enemy forces occupy that may endanger the accomplishment of one's mission; in practical terms, the area of interest determines the maximum scope of intelligencegathering activities for the geographic combatant command; any theater (of war) also encompasses the pertinent parts of the cyberspace. area of operations -a part of the physical space containing normally a single operational objective; it is assigned to a subordinate commander by the next higher commander; each area of operations has designated lateral and rear boundaries; sometimes, boundaries of an area of operations might be informally drawn. available combat potential-a part of designed combat potential actually available to the commander; it is smaller than designed combat potential; it includes all the elements that could enhance or reduce combat potential, such as leadership, manning, training, morale and discipline, weapons and equipment, tactics, and doctrine. battle-a series of related engagements, strikes, and attacks conducted by two or more combat arms and coordinated in time and place to accomplish a major tactical (or sometimes an operational) objective in a given area of operations; a battle is normally planned, but it can be unplanned; depending on the nature of the physical medium and the forces taking part, land, naval, and airspace battles are differentiated. battlefieldpart of the physical space in which battles, engagements, and other tactical actions are planned or conducted; it consists of three dimensions surface, subsurface,

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and airspace; the size of the battlefield expands or contracts depending on the capabilities of the opposing side in terms of maneuver and fires, and their actions to dominate the area. battlespace-part of the physical space in which battles, engagements, and other tactical actions are conducted; it consists of four dimensions surface, subsurface, airspace, and cyberspace (electromagnetic spectrum); the size of the battlespace expands or contracts depending on the capabilities of the opposing sides in terms of maneuver and fires, and their actions to dominate the area. branches options built into the basic plan for a campaign or major operation; they may include a shift in priority, change of command organization and command relationships, or changes in the direction of movement, and the acceptance or refusal of combat. campaign a series of related major operations sequenced and synchronized in terms of time and place and aimed to accomplish a military or theater-strategic objective; it is conducted according to a common plan and controlled by a joint or combined force commander; it is inherently a multiservice and often a multinational effort; depending on the predominant characteristics of the medium, land and maritime campaigns are differentiated; in respect to their purpose, a campaign can be offensive or defensive; a campaign can be planned as such, or can be viewed as a campaign in retrospect; a campaign conducted in a low-intensity conflict (specifically insurgency, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, counterdrug campaign, etc.) consists largely of a series of related minor and sometimes major tactical actions, rather than major operations coordinated in terms of space and time to accomplish national strategic objectives. center of gravity-that source of massed strength--physical or moral, or a source of leverage-whose serious degradation, dislocation, neutralization, or destruction would have the most decisive impact on the enemy's or one's own ability to accomplish a given military objective. central (interior) position -a position occupied by a country or territory, or a force located or interposed between two or more countries or territories or hostile forces. combat potential -the assumed potential of a military force to accomplish the assigned mission; designed and available combat potential are differentiated. combat power-the actual capability of a force generated in the course of mission accomplishment against a given enemy force. combat success cumulative result of the entirety of actions by a military force in the course of a specific combat action; used as the key indicator of the degree of accomplishment of the assigned combat mission.

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combat zone (sector) -part of an area of operations in which single-service forces conduct tactical actions; the higher commander could formally delineate it or it could exist informally; land, maritime, and airspace combat zones (sectors) are differentiated. combined

employment of two services or the armed forces of two or more countries.

command-the authority a commander legally exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment; it encompasses the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources to plan the employment, organization, direction, coordination, and control of military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions; in addition, command authority includes responsibility for health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel. command and control-a process of planning, preparing, directing, and controlling one's forces to accomplish the assigned mission. concentration-the movement and assembly of men, equipment, and supplies into an area from which further action is to begin; concentration does not always require that individual parts of a force be physically massed; they could be physically supported but capable of generating a massed effect; during concentration each element of a force must be within mutually supporting distances from the other; tactical, operational, and strategic concentration are differentiated by the purpose and the scale; depending on where concentration takes place, concentration on the battlefield and concentration off the battlefield are differentiated. control refers to the commanders' authority to establish limits, focus effort, and provide command structure. counter-concentration-massing of significant military forces or massing of their effects at a particular time and place with sufficient military capability to counter the attacker's force concentration; it can be conducted by the defender to neutralize the effects of the attacker's ongoing or future concentration. counter-maneuver-action aimed to counteract the enemy movement in progress, or the expected maneuver of his forces; in respect to its purpose, strategic, operational, and tactical countermaneuvers are differentiated. coup de main an offensive action that uses surprise and simultaneity to achieve a significant success in one fell swoop. critical factors cumulative term for critical strengths and critical weaknesses of a military or nonmilitary source of power; they can be quantifiable (tangible) or unquantifiable (intangible); critical factors are present at each level of war; they require constant attention because they are relative and subject to changes resulting from the actions of one's forces or of the enemy's actions.

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critical strengths -those military and nonmilitary capabilities considered essential to the accomplishment of one's or the enemy's military objective(s); the most important among the critical factors of a force is the center of gravity (COG). critical vulnerabilities weaknesses (and sometimes strengths) that are open to the enemy's attack or can be exploited by the enemy. critical weaknesses military and nonmilitary capabilities considered essential to the accomplishment of one's or the enemy's military objectives, but are in terms of quantity or quality or both, insufficient to perform their intended functions; they may or may not be critical vulnerabilities. culmination point-a "point" in terms of time and space reached by the attacker or the defender, after which their stated objectives cannot be accomplished and continued effort to reach them would significantly heighten the chances of failure or even defeat; it is reached when the relative combat power begins to decrease rapidly for one side in combat; tactical, operational, and strategic culmination points are differentiated. decision concise statement by the commander of what the command as a whole will do to accomplish the assigned mission; it provides the basis for the subsequent development of the operation plan or order. decision point-point in time when a decision has been reached. decisive point-a geographic location or source of military or nonmilitary power whose destruction or capture, control or defense, or continuous surveillance and monitoring would give an immediate and marked advantage over the opponent in accomplishing one's military objective. Geographic, force, and cyber-oriented decisive points are differentiated; they exist at each level of war; the most important decisive points are those that lie in the physical proximity or allow access to the enemy's or one's own center of gravity. deployment movement of a force from an area within or outside a given theater to another area either to concentrate or to start a maneuver; during deployment, a force moves along lines of communications; deployment normally precedes concentration or maneuver and is conducted in the area controlled or disputed by one's forces; depending on the purpose and scale, tactical, operational, and strategic deployments are differentiated. designed combat potential theoretical capability of a force to accomplish assigned missions against a designed threat; it is based on the standardized table of organization and equipment (TO&E) and doctrine.

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desired end statebroadly expressed political, diplomatic, military, economic, social, ethnic, humanitarian, and other conditions that the highest political leadership of national or alliance/coalition forces wants in a given theater after the end of hostilities. direction (axis) -swath of physical space of a certain length and width extending from one's base of operations to the specific physical objective via selected intermediate points; tactical, operational, and strategic direction or axes are differentiated. engagement -series of related attacks, strikes, and smaller tactical actions conducted by a single or several combat arms and aimed to accomplish the most important major tactical objective in a battle. exterior line--a force operates along exterior lines when its lines of movement are separated by those of the enemy; these lines originate from the exterior position. exterior position -a series of points located along the periphery of the enemy's center; it is also called a flanking position. indirect approach an action or series of actions that seeks to attack the enemy through his vulnerabilities and avoiding his strengths. informational decision military commander's decision aimed at organizing and enhancing information flow, both vertically and horizontally within a command organization; it may also deal with flow of information between one's command organization and other commands and other sources of information. intelligence-product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information on potential opponents or enemies; also defined as knowledge about the enemy obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. interior line--a line that runs between the lines used by a hostile force; all lines originating from a central position are interior lines. intertheater -movement of a force between two or more theaters. intratheater-movement of a force within a given theater. ioint-employment of two or more services of the country's armed forces. level of war -a level at which specific military objectives are achieved in war or lowintensity conflict through the use of military and nonmilitary sources of power; strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war are differentiated; strategic level encompasses two sublevels: national or alliance/coalition and theater-strategic; each level of war is conducted by a corresponding level of command.

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line of communications -designated line of movement over which military force and materiel are moved; land, sea, and air lines of communications are differentiated; distinctions are made among short and long, longitudinal and lateral (transversal), single, double, and multiple, converging (concentric), and diverging (eccentric), and interior and exterior lines of communications. line of operation -imaginary line along which a force moves from its base of operations toward a given physical objective(s); short and long, single, double, and multiple, converging (concentric) and diverging (eccentric), and interior and exterior lines of operations are differentiated. line of retreat-line of movement of a force toward its base of operations after suffering a setback or defeat; short and long, single, double, and multiple, converging (concentric) and diverging (eccentric), and interior and exterior lines of retreat are differentiated. to istics science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of combat forces; it encompasses acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; and acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and acquisition or providing of service; depending on its scale, tactical, operational, and strategic logistics are differentiated. major operation-a series of related battles, engagements, strikes, attacks, and other tactical actions sequenced and synchronized in terms of time and place and aimed to accomplish an operational (and sometimes strategic) objective; it is conducted in accordance with a common plan and controlled by a single commander; it is normally an integral part of a campaign, but it could be conducted independently; with respect to purpose, a major operation can be offensive or defensive; ground (or land), naval (maritime), and air (space) major operations are differentiated with regard to the physical space in which the preponderance of actions is conducted; in respect to services' involvement, independent (conducted by a single or predominantly single service), joint (multiservice), and combined (multinational) major operations are differentiated. maior tactical objective object whose capture, destruction, control, or neutralization would drastically change the situation in a given area of operations. military deception passive and active measures and actions aimed to mislead the enemy as to one's military capabilities, intentions, and actions and inducing the enemy to take a wrong action at the wrong time and wrong place, thereby enhancing the success of one's action; it might be also designed to induce the enemy not to take a certain action; depending on the purpose and scale, tactical, operational, and strategic deception are differentiated. military objective tangible or intangible object of action to be taken and whose destruction, annihilation, neutralization, control, seizure, or holding is considered essential for the success of the assigned mission.

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military-strategic leadership highest level of command responsible for the entirety of military and nonmilitary actions by the forces under national, alliance, or coalition command; it translates strategic objectives determined by the national or alliance/coalition political leadership into military strategic objectives, which are then accomplished by the employment of military and nonmilitary sources of power. military strategy-art and science of employing armed forces of a nation or alliance to secure objectives of national or alliance/coalition policy by the use, or threat of use, of military force; strategy properly understood does not involve the actual employment of forces in combat; its primary areas of concern are as follows: determining national or coalition/alliance objectives in a single or multiple theaters (of war); translating national or coalition/alliance political objectives into a series of military strategic objectives; use or threat of use (deterrence) of force and nonmilitary sources of power against a potential opponent or several opponents; enhancing the country's or alliance/coalition geostrategic position in peacetime; providing a vision on the character and duration of the future war; determining whether the war will be primarily offensive or defensive or a combination of these two; determining which theater will be the theater of primary effort and which the theater of secondary effort; determining allocation and distribution of forces of various services and the armed forces as a whole among several theaters; providing strategic guidance to subordinate operational commanders; determining desired end state; and determining the conditions and timing of conflict/war termination. minor tactical objective -object whose capture, destruction, control, or neutralization would drastically change the situation in a given combat zone or sector. mobility physical or mental ability to shift forces and dispositions in response to changing conditions and situations; it encompasses organization, leadership, equipment, and other less quantifiable factors, such as direction, security, sustainment, firepower, intelligence, and movement support; tactical, operational, and strategic mobility are differentiated. movement motion in any direction, for any purpose, by a force of any size; in conducting a movement, the size of the force to be moved, the available means of movement, and the friction imposed by the medium of movement (land, sea, air) must be taken fully into account; the movements differ primarily in terms of scope, size of forces involved, distances, and mode of transportation; tactical, operational, and strategic movement of forces are differentiated. national interests-the ends a nation wants to achieve or is concerned with; traditionally, a nation or state is concerned with four broad but distinct areas: physical security and survival, political and territorial integrity, economic stability and well being, and domestic peace and stability; some of these interests are vital because a nation is usually not willing to compromise them and is ready to use force to preserve or defend them.

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national policy-broad statement on the course of action in pursuit of a specific national objective; in peacetime, national interests and objectives lead to specific policies and commitments. national-strategic leadership

highest leadership of a state.

national-strategic level (of war) -level of command with the exclusive responsibility for command and control of the country's armed forces in peacetime and in time of war. national strategy (grand strategy) -the art and science of applying the instruments of national power to achieve political ends or objectives as articulated by the national or alliance/coalition political leadership; it is implemented by supporting strategiespolitical, diplomatic, military, economic, informational, and others. objective

mission, aim, or purpose of one's efforts.

operational (1) any theoretical or practical aspect of operational warfare; (2) practical application of operational warfare in a given theater of operations. operational approach -a mutual position between the two sides in a conflict, length and shape of base of operations, and length and number of lines of operations used by one's forces. operational art component of military art principally concerned with theoretical and practical aspects of planning, preparing, conducting, and sustaining major operations and campaigns to accomplish operational or strategic objectives in a theater. operational capability ability of one's forces to react to the changing situation and external stimulation within the assigned mission; it primarily depends on the number and structure of subordinate elements and the general scheme connecting these elements. operational commander -a joint force or service component/functional commander who applies tenets of operational art in accomplishing assigned military objectives. operational deception passive and active measures and actions aimed to mislead the enemy's operational commander as to the capabilities, intentions, and actions of one's forces and thereby enhance or ensure the success of a major operation; it is conducted in a given theater of operations. operational decision -a decision made by the command authority aimed at having a major impact on the planning, preparation, and execution of a campaign or major operation; the most important operational decisions concern determining military objectives and the changes of these in the course of a major operation or campaign; the initial determination or shifting of the sector of main effort or point of main attack (defense), concentration or counter-concentration, maneuver or counter-maneuver, use or

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nonuse of tactical or operational fires, change in sequencing and synchronization, shift in phases, commitment of operational reserves, pursuit, shift from offensive to defense, and consolidation of operational/strategic success; other operational decisions are intended to change, alter, modify, or rescind decisions made by subordinate commanders. operational deployment movement of a force from one area of the given theater of operations to the area of concentration or the designated line/area from which to start the operational maneuver. operational depth -area between one's own or the enemy's tactical and strategic defenses; it should provide sufficient space for the conduct of one's operational maneuver and deployment and movement of operational reserves. operational design-the key considerations used as a framework in the course of planning for a campaign or major operation. operational direction (axis) -swath of physical space extending from one's base of operations to the assigned operational objective in a given theater (or area) of operations. operational factors -a cumulative term for the physical space, time, and forces in a given theater of operations; these factors are evaluated individually and in combination; they need to be roughly in balance; a deficiency in one factor should be balanced by the surplus in another factor; operational factors must always be evaluated in respect to the assigned operational or strategic objective; proper balancing of these factors with the objective would allow one's operational commander to enhance his freedom of action in planning and execution of a campaign or major operation; the factor of information increasingly affects each of the operational factors individually and collectively. operational fires -fires applied to achieve a decisive impact on the outcome of a campaign or major operation; they are normally conducted beyond the boundaries of the area of operations in which a major operation is conducted; lethal and nonlethal and conventional or nuclear/biological/chemical operational fires are differentiated; in terms of platforms, operational fires can be sea-, air (space)-, and ground-based. operational force protection actions and measures aimed at protecting large service or functionally based forces and formations from enemy attacks from the air (or through space), on the ground, or from across the sea; protection from various hazards, survivability of personnel and their weapons and equipment, and their health; it also encompasses a buildup of fortified areas and the use of defensive aspects of electronic warfare (EW), operations security, defense against weapons of mass destruction (WMD), physical security, and defense against terrorist acts. operational functions integrated technical systems, personnel, and processes deployed in a given theater of operations; they are established and maintained to provide a comprehensive support for planning, preparation, and execution of a campaign or major

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operation; the principal operational functions are operational command and control (C2), operational command and control warfare (C2W), operational intelligence, operational fires, operational logistics, and operational protection; the operational commander is responsible for the establishment and maintenance of operational functions in peacetime and in time of war. operational idea (scheme) overall concept for sequenced and synchronized employment for each service or functional component (for a campaign) or combined arms (for a major operation) to accomplish the assigned ultimate strategic or operational objective. operational intelligence intelligence intended to support planning, preparation, and execution of a major operation or campaign; it is conducted in a given theater of operations plus adjacent areas of interest; it is a fusion of strategic and tactical intelligence. operational leadership collective term for levels of command responsible for accomplishing political and military strategic objectives assigned by the national or alliance/coalition leadership through application of operational art; these levels of command encompass commanders of the joint task force and army corps (operationaltactical level) and their naval and air equivalents; commanders of the numbered and theater armies, fleets, and air forces; theater commanders and their subordinate component commanders; and military-strategic command; sometimes the commander of an army division or its naval and air equivalent could be a part of operational leadership. operational level (of war)-level at which military and nonmilitary sources of power are employed to accomplish military-strategic or theater-strategic objectives through the planning, preparation, and execution of a single campaign; sometimes the same objective could be accomplished by conducting a major joint or combined operation; this level of war is conducted in a given theater of operations. operational logistics extends from the theater's sustaining base or bases via intermediate bases to the forwardly deployed combat forces and service support units and facilities; it links strategic logistics to tactical logistics; its main purpose is to ensure that one's actions are continuous through all phases of a major operation or campaign. operational maneuver movement of one's forces to obtain a positional advantage for a subsequent attack on the operational enemy's center of gravity or some significant critical vulnerability in the operational depth of his defenses; successful operational maneuver should force the enemy to react operationally or even strategically; normally, operational maneuver is conducted within a given theater of operations. operational momentum-overall progress of a campaign or major operation over time; it is the product of the speed of advance and mass; the higher the speed and the larger the forces, the higher the momentum of a campaign as a whole; high speed of advance allows

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rapid concentration, surprise, and the exploitation of physical mass or massed effect; operational momentum also depends on the length of individual phases and pauses. operational objective-the one whose capture, destruction, control, or neutralization would result in a drastic change in the situation in a given theater of operations; normally physical in nature, it could be fixed or mobile. operational pause-slackening off or stopping actions of one's forces in a campaign or major campaign to regenerate combat potential of one's forces; it could be planned or i mposed by an enemy action or series of enemy actions, difficulties due to terrain or weather/climate, or deficiencies in some elements of one's forces' combat power. operational phase-total ti me passed between the accomplishment of one intermediate objective in a campaign or major operation and the beginning of the actions by a major part of one's forces to accomplish the next intermediate objective; the main purpose of phasing is to divide a campaign or major operation into manageable parts and avoid reaching a point of culmination before the assigned intermediate objective is accomplished; a phase can be planned or unplanned. operational protection -a series of actions and measures conducted in peacetime, crisis, and war, and designed to preserve effectiveness and survivability of one's military and nonmilitary sources of power deployed or located within the boundaries of a given theater of operations; it specifically aims to protect, and to impede the enemy from using his firepower or other nonconventional sources of power to destroy, neutralize, or degrade the physical and moral capabilities of one's forces and nonmilitary sources of power; the main components of operational protection are as follows: collecting intelligence for indications and warning (I&W); air defense; airspace control; force protection; protection of information systems; protection of logistics infrastructure; defense against weapons of mass destruction; rear area defense, air-based ground defense; operations security, physical security; and defense against terrorist acts; in a maritime theater, elements of operational protection also include sea-based air defense, antisubmarine warfare (ASW), defense of the coast and coastal waters, anticombat craft defense, defensive mining, and mine countermeasures (MCM). operational reach distance over which one's military power can be concentrated and employed decisively; it is affected by, among other things, the effective range and endurance of one's combat forces and the length and degree of protection of one's lines of supplies; it is influenced by the intervening physical environment separating the two sides in a conflict; it can be extended by establishing new bases in forward areas; deploying one's forces into forward areas; increasing the effective range of weapon systems; extending the operational range and endurance of combat and combat support forces and improving the effectiveness of lines of communications and the transportation network. operational reserve-a force capable of having a decisive impact on the outcome of a major operation or even campaign; it is normally composed of units with high mobility 643

and striking power; in land warfare, operational reserve is one-time use force and is deployed in one's operational depth, but within striking range of the enemy force to be attacked or of one's force to be defended. operational sequencing order, in terms of time, of the accomplishment of major tactical or operational objectives and tasks in the course of a major operation or campaign; it could also be planned for each stage of combat forces' employment, e.g., from mobilization and strategic or operational deployment, to forces' combat employment post-hostilities, and redeployment and demobilization. operational situation-the entirety of military and nonmilitary aspects of the situation that directly or indirectly affect planning, preparation, and conduct of a major operation or campaign in a given theater of operations. operational space-the three-dimensional physical space (surface, subsurface, and air) and pertinent parts of the cyberspace in which a major operation is conducted; its size depends on the capabilities of the opposing sides in terms of maneuver and fires and their actions to dominate the area; it is not a static entity but expands or contracts depending on the dynamics of combat. operational success-the overall result of actions by one's force after the accomplishment of the assigned operational objective. operational sustainment ability of operational logistics to uninterruptedly sustain one's forces in the course of a major operation or campaign. operational synchronization arrangement of actions of multiservice (and often multinational) forces and the use of nonmilitary sources of power in terms of time, space, and objective in a campaign or major operation. operational tempo-rate of progress toward the accomplishment of the assigned ultimate objective in a major operation or campaign; it depends primarily on mobility, quality, and reliability of intelligence, command and control, and combat service support; the fewer pauses that are planned and executed, the higher the operational tempo; the longer the operational pause, the lower the operational tempo. operational warfare-practical application of operational art in planning, preparing and conducting fundamental warfare areas on land, sea, and airspace. organizational decision decision aimed at establishing, maintaining, modifying, or changing one's boundaries of areas of responsibility and areas or interest, command organization, command relationships, and force subordination of forces and installations or facilities.

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point of main attack (defense) physical space within a given sector of main effort where the major part of one's forces is concentrated to accomplish the main objective in the forthcoming combat action; properly selected, it should facilitate one's forces to indirectly attack the enemy's center of gravity (or defend one's own). Rglicy (1) pattern(s) of actions designed to accomplish unspecified objectives; (2) a conscious effort by a distinctive political body to use power to accomplish a purpose. olitics-process of distributing power and influence in a society. raid broader form of a strike conducted by a single or several combat arms to accomplish a major tactical objective to temporarily deny some position, or capture or destroy an enemy force or installation or facility; it is aimed against an objective the enemy considers so valuable that he could not ignore its loss or serious degradation; a larger purpose of raid is to achieve some temporary advantage, but at the same time pose the threat of future repetition; a raid can also be conducted to enhance one's morale or diminish the enemy's morale. redeployment planned movement of one's force after the end of a combat employment stage to another area of employment or to the area where one's force needs to be reconstituted; it could also take place before combat when a force must be moved from one area to another within the same area of operations or theater of operations; depending on the purpose and scale, tactical, operational, and strategic redeployment is differentiated. regeneration of combat power restoration of the cohesion, discipline, and fighting effectiveness of one's force through large-scale replacement of personnel, equipment, and supplies; it also encompasses reestablishment of essential command and control, and conduct of mission-essential training. reserve-force of a certain size and composition designed to have a decisive effect on the outcome of a given combat action; it is usually composed of the most mobile and combatready force, prepared and ready to be employed at short notice on its commander's order; depending on their purpose, tactical, operational, and strategic reserves are differentiated. sector of main effort (thrust) -part of the theater (or area) of operations where a major part of one's forces and assets are deployed and employed to accomplish the primary objective(s) of a major operation or campaign; most of the firepower and reserves are assigned to that sector; the commander must ensure synchronized employment of all combat elements while leaving the greatest possible scope for initiative to subordinate commanders. sector of secondary effort (thrust)-area of the given theater (or area) of operations whose importance is subsidiary or ancillary to the sector of main effort; it is characterized by lack of operational depth, assignment of forces with smaller firepower, smaller

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reserves, and limited objectives; depending on the size of the area, there could be one or several sectors of secondary efforts. sequels subsequent combat actions based on the possible outcomes of a tactical action (in a major operation) or major operation (in a campaign) in progress; the beginning of each sequel signals the start of a new phase of a major operation or campaign. sequencing arrangement of events within a given combat action aimed to create overwhelming combat power that will most likely accomplish the assigned military objective; sequencing can be planned according to objectives, tasks, or their combination; in terms of the purpose, tactical, operational, and strategic sequencing are differentiated. strategic culmination is a point in terms of space and time at which the relative ratio of military and nonmilitary sources of power has drastically diminished so that the chances of winning a war are foreclosed and the attacker must go on the defensive or risk ultimate defeat; it can be reached only once in the course of a conflict; also called culminating point of victory (or defeat). strategic deceptionpassive and active measures and actions aimed to mislead the enemy's highest political and military-strategic leadership as to the place and time of the start of a new campaign; it is conducted by using both military and nonmilitary sources of national and/or alliance/coalition power in a given theater of war or two or more theaters of operations. strategic deployment movement of a force from the home base in a given theater (of operations) to the adjacent theater (of operations) for the purpose of initiating operational deployment. strategic depth-part of the defense of the theater beyond the boundaries of one's own or enemy operational depth in which the most vital elements of the national or alliance/coalition military and nonmilitary sources of power are physically located; strategic reserves are normally deployed in one's strategic depth. strategic direction (axis)-swath of physical space extending from one's base of operations to the assigned physical strategic objective via intermediate operational objectives in a given theater of operations. strategic fires-use of firepower designed to have a major effect on the course and outcome of a campaign or, in some cases, even a war as a whole; they are planned by theater-strategic commanders and their staffs and normally take place outside the boundaries of a given theater of operations where a major operation or campaign is to begin or is in progress. strategic intelligence intelligence in support of the national-military leadership or theater-strategic commander; it provides input for the formulation of national policy,

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national and military strategy, or theater strategy; it is conducted in a given theater of war plus corresponding areas of interest. strategic logistics planning and providing resources in support of the country's armed forces as a whole; it provides logistical support to industrial base mobilization, installation base support, consumer logistics, intratheater strategic concentration, acquisitions and construction of facilities, services, and host nations; it links the national economy and the combat forces. strategic maneuver movement of one's forces into a theater to obtain a favorable position to defeat a major part of the opposing force and thereby reach a strategic decision in the war as a whole; such a maneuver normally involves the movement of a large theater army within a given theater of war or sometimes a theater of operations; it is characterized by movement of very large forces into the enemy's strategic depth. strategic objective-the one whose capture, destruction, control, or neutralization should result in a drastic effect on the situation in a given theater of war and the war as a whole. strategic protection series of measures and actions aimed at hindering or preventing the enemy from applying his firepower or nonconventional sources of power to destroy, neutralize, or degrade the physical and moral capabilities of one's forces and nonmilitary sources of power; it is organized in a given theater of war (theater-strategic level) or for the country as a whole (national-strategic level). strategic reserve forces and assets under direct control of the highest military or theater-strategic commander intended to have a major impact on the course and outcome of war as a whole; it is normally deployed in one's strategic depth. strategic sequencing -order i n which strategic objectives/tasks are accomplished in two or more campaigns conducted in two or more adjacent or widely separated theaters. strategic situation -the entirety of military and nonmilitary aspects of the situation that directly or indirectly affect planning, preparation, and conduct of two or more campaigns in a given theater of war. strategic success cumulative result of actions by one's force as result of the accomplishment of the assigned strategic objective; normally, it should have a decisive impact on the course or outcome of the war as a whole. strategic sustainment-ability of strategic logistics to uninterruptedly sustain one's forces in the course of the war or low-intensity conflict as a whole. strategic synchronization arrangement in terms of time, place, and purpose of the accomplishment of the ultimate strategic objectives of two or more campaigns conducted in two or more adjacent or widely separated theaters.

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strate

-art and science of interrelating and harmonizing one's ends and means.

strike series of related short, powerful attacks carried out simultaneously or almost simultaneously from one or more sectors by a single or several weapons platforms or tactical units and aimed at destroying a given target; air (space), land, and naval strikes are differentiated; depending on the target to be destroyed or neutralized, tactical, operational, and strategic strikes can be differentiated; a strike could be conducted by using conventional weapons or weapons of mass destruction (WMD). sustain ment adequacy of logistics to sustain one's forces in combat; it is achieved by manning, arming, fueling, fixing, transporting, and protecting a force; depending on the purpose and scale, tactical, operational, and strategic sustainment is differentiated. synchronization process of arranging or initiating actions aimed at generating maximum relative (combat or noncombat) power at a decisive place and time; sound synchronization must ensure that all elements of one's force, collectively, generate synergistic effects that exceed the sum of their individual effects; depending on the purpose, tactical, operational, and strategic synchronization is differentiated. tactical actions collective term for diverse actions and measures aimed at accomplishing major or minor tactical objectives in a given combat zone or sector; land, naval, and airspace tactical actions are differentiated. tactical culmination -the point after which the attacker or the defenders cannot accomplish the assigned tactical objectives; it occurs in the course of a battle or engagement. tactical deceptionpassive and active measures and actions aimed to mislead the enemy's tactical commander as to the capabilities, intentions, and actions of one's forces and thereby enhance or ensure the success of a battle or engagement; it is conducted in a given area of operations. tactical depthpart of a given area of operations in which tactical-size forces are deployed and are in direct contact with the enemy; tactical reserves are deployed in the tactical depth of defenses. tactical direction (axis) -swath of physical space extending from one's base of operations to the assigned tactical objective in a given combat sector (zone). tactical fires -use of firepower to support one's maneuver forces in direct contact with the enemy force by suppressing or destroying the enemy's direct and indirect fire systems and air defenses; they are designed to have a decisive impact on the outcome of a battle or an engagement.

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tactical intelligence intelligence in support of planning, preparation, and execution of battles, engagements, and other tactical actions; collection is focused on the combat zone or sector and sometimes on an area of operations plus an area of interest. tactical level (of war)-the level at which tactical actions are planned, prepared, and conducted; this level of war is almost exclusively focused on physical combat-applying military force to achieve a series of specific tactical objectives. tactical logistics-planning and providing support to sustain battles, engagements, and other tactical actions. tactical maneuver movement of one's forces to obtain a decisive advantage through a more favorable position before a tactical action is fought; it may be intended to attack selected critical vulnerabilities in the enemy's tactical depth, thereby forcing him to react tactically and sometimes operationally. tactical reserve-force kept in readiness by the tactical commander to have a major impact on the outcome of a battle or engagement; normally, it is deployed in one's tactical depth. tactical sequencing-order of the accomplishment of the tactical objectives/tasks as a part of a battle or engagement or other tactical action. tactical situation -the entirety of the military and nonmilitary aspects of the situation that directly or indirectly affect planning, preparation, and conduct of a battle or engagement or other tactical action. tactical success-cumulative result of actions by one's force after the accomplishment of the assigned tactical objective. tactical sustainment ability of tactical logistics to uninterruptedly sustain one's forces in the course of a battle or engagement. tactical synchronization arrangement of one's actions in terms of time, space, and purpose in a battle or engagement or other tactical action; it involves two or more combat arms/branches of a single service. tactics-art and science of planning, preparing, and employing individual platforms, weapons and associated sensors, and combat arms to accomplish tactical and sometimes operational objectives. theater (of war) geographic area of significant size that contains several potential strategic objectives; in case of a war or national emergency, the theater would be transformed into a theater of war; the highest national or alliance/coalition politicalmilitary leadership normally determines the boundaries of the theater.

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theater commander-theater-strategic or theater of operations commander (CINC). theater of operations-a land or sea area, and the airspace above it, established to employ one's forces to neutralize a strategic threat to the national or alliance/coalition interests in regional or general conflict; it is a part of the theater (of war); normally, the nation's highest leadership and the respective theater (of war) commander would designate a part of the theater as the theater of operations in case of a major regional conflict or national emergency and general war; the theater of operations could also be established in case of a major counterinsurgency effort. theater-strategic level (of war) -the level at which one's combat forces and nonmilitary sources of power are employed in the accomplishment of the ultimate national-strategic objective through the accomplishment of several theater-strategic objectives; normally, the accomplishment of each theater-strategic objective would require the conduct of a campaign. theater strategy-art and science of developing integrated strategic concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and alliance/coalition policy and strategy by the use of force, threatened use of force, or operations not involving the use of force within a theater; it is unique to the countries facing a potential conflict requiring the threat or use of military force in multiple theaters; for medium and small powers situated within a single potential theater, only a national military strategy is applied. weight of effort [Schwerpunktl-German military term; theater or part of theater or area (or place) in which one's military and nonmilitary sources of power are focused or massed to seek a decision, or where the commander expects a decision; the main factors in selecting a military weight of effort include the situation, the terrain, the commander's intent, and the enemy forces; weight of effort is determined by each commander within his area of responsibility; when appropriate, a commander should designate a weight of effort for his subordinate commanders; change in the situation would require a change or shift of weight of effort.

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SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. DOCTRINAL DOCUMENTS Chief of the General Staff. Design for Military Operations. The British Military Doctrine (London: Ministry of Defense, 1989). Headquarters, Department of the Army. FM 5-33: Terrain Analysis (Washington, DC: 11 July 1990). Headquarters, Department of the Army. FM 5-101: Mobility (Washington, DC: January 1985). Headquarters, Department of the Army. FM 5-102: Countermobility (Washington, DC: 14 March 1985). Headquarters, Department of the Army. FM 34-81: Weather Support for Army Tactical Operations (Washington, DC: 31 August 1989). Headquarters, Department of the Army. FM 71-100: Division Operations (Washington, DC: 28 August 1996). Headquarters, Department of the Army. FM 90-2: Battlefield Deception (Washington, DC: 3 October 1988). Headquarters, Department of the Army. FM 90-5: Jungle Operations (Washington, DC: 16 August 1982). Headquarters, Department of the Army. FM 100-5: Operations ( Washington, DC: 1986). Headquarters, Department of the Army. FM 100-5: Operations (Washington, DC: June 1993). Headquarters, Department of the Army. FM 100-7: Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations (Washington, DC: May 1995). Headquarters, Department of the Army. FM 100-15: Corps Operations (Washington, DC: 29 October 1996). Headquarters, Department of the Army. FM 100-16: Army Operational Support (Washington, DC: 1995). Headquarters, Department of the Army. FM 100-17-3: Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (Washington, DC: 17 March 1999).

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Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr. "Operative Leitlinie fuer die Fuehrung von Landstreitkraeften (October 1993), Arbeitspapier Operative Fuehrung (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr, August 1992). Inspector General. Operative Leitlinie fuer Einsaetze der Streitkraefte (OpLESK) (Bonn: Bundesministerium der Bundeswehr, 20 August 1999). Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 1-02: Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1994). Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 3-07: Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (16 June 1995). Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 3-13: Joint Doctrine for Information Operations (Washington, DC: 9 October 1998). Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 3-13.1: Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W) (7 February 1996). Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Pub 4-0: Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations (Washington, DC: 27 January 1995). Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and Headquarters United States Marine Corps. Naval Doctrine Publication 1: Naval Warfare (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, March 1994).

B. BOOKS

Alger, John 1. The Quest for Victory: The History of the Principles of War (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982). Asprey, Robert B. The German High Command at War. Hindenburg and Ludendorff Conduct of World War I (New York: Quill William Murrow, 1991). Beck, Ludwig. Studien, edited by Hans Speidel (Stuttgart: K.F. Koehlers Verlag, 1955). Bellamy, Christopher. The Evolution of Modern Land Warfare. Theory and Practice (London/New York: Routledge, 1990). Bernhardi, Friedrich, Adam Julius, von. On War of To-Day. Translated by Karl von Donat, 2 vols. (New York, NY: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1914): Vol. 1: Principles and Elements of Modern War. Vol. 11: Combat and Conduct of War.

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Stanger, Wilhelm. Grundzuege der Lehre von der Strategic. Studienbehelf fuer die K.K. Kriegssschule . Vol. 1. Theori e mit Kurzeren Beispielen (Vienna: Verlag der K.K. Kriegsschule, 1884). Stares, Paul B. Command Performance. The Neglected Dimension of European Security (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1981). Svechin, Aleksandr A. Strategy . Edited by Kent D. Lee (Minneapolis, MN: East View Publications, 1992). Thompson, Julian. Lifeblood of War. Logistics in Armed Conflict (London: Brassey's, 1st published 1991, reprinted 1998). Triandifilov, Vladimir K. The Nature of the Operations of Modern Armies . Translated by William A. Burhans (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1994). Trotter, William R. Frozen Hell. The Russo-Finnish Winter War of 1939-40 (Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin Books, 2000). Uhle-Wettler, F. Hoehe- Und Wendepunkte Deutscher Military Geschichte (Mainz: v. Hase & Koehler, 1984). Van Creveld, 1. Martin. Fighting Power. German and U.S. Army Performance, 1939-1945 (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982). Van Creveld, Martin. Supplying War. Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 st published 1977, reprinted 1984). Wallach, Jehuda L. The Dogma of the Battle of Annihilation. The Theories of Clausewitz and Schlieffen and Their Impact on the German Conduct of Two World Wars (Westport, CT/London: Greenwood Press, 1986). Willoughby, Charles A. Maneuver in War (Harrisburg, PA: The Military Service Publishing Co., 1939, reprinted by Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 17 March 1986). Winters, Harold A., et al. Battling the Elements. Weather and Terrain in the Conduct of War (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1998). Ziemke, Earl F. Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1 st printed 1968, reprinted 1987). Ziemke, Earl F., and Bauer, Magna E. Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the East (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1987).

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C. MONOGRAPHS

Abt, Frederic E. The Operational End State. Cornerstone of 'the Operational Level of 'War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1988). Agee, Collin A. Peeling the Onion. The Iraqi Center of Gravity in Desert Storm (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, May 1992). Aigurperse. Major Eirnfluesse des ersten Weltkrieges auf' die operatives and taktischen Vorstellungen der franzoesischen militaerrischen Fuehrung zwischen 1919 and 1939 (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie d. Bundeswehr, 1965). Arbeitspapier. Operative Fuehrung (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie d. Bundeswehr, August 1992). Bailey, Don W. Operational Defense. Covering All the Bases (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1993). Barron, Michael J. Operational Level Command.- Who Is in Charge? (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1988). Barry 11, Robert F. Who's Zooming Who? Operational Fires and the FSCL (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1993). Bassenge, Juergen. Zur Zielsetzung der Deutschen Angrijje in Frankreich, Fruehjahr his Sommer 1918. Ueberlegungen zum Problem des Kulminationspunktes (Hamburg: Fuehrugsnakademie d. Bundeswehr, 1964). Batson, William R. Centers of 'Gravity, Lines of Operations, and the Normandy Campaign (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 4 May 1987). Beck, J. Schlagkraft-ein Schlagwort? Zur Problematik der Erfassung and Bewertung militaerischer Leistungsfaeihigkeit (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie d. Bundeswehr, 30 October 1978). Becker, Patrick J. What is an Adequate Decision Support System .for the Operational Level of War? (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1989). Behrendt Harmut. Die Handlungsfreiheit der militaerischen Fuehrung-Moeglichkeiten and Grenzen aufgrund des heutigen Kriegsbildes (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie d. Bundeswehr, January 1968).

660

Benjamin, David J. Prerequisite for Victory. The Discovery of the Culminating Point (Fort. Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 13 May 1986). Betson, William R. Centers of Gravity, Lines of Operations, and the Normandy Campaign (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, June 1987). Bitner, Teddy D. Kesselring: An Analysis of the German Commander at Anzio (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, June 1983). Bloechl, Timothy D. Operation Just Cause: An Application of Operational Art (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1993). Boatner, Michael E. Operational Synchronization Methodology (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1993). Bolick, Joseph A. The Influence and Reasons for Acceptance or Rejection of Operational Level Intelligence During the 1914 Marne and 1943 Kursk Campaigns (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1988). Bongi, David J. Operational Logic and Identifying Soviet Operational Centers of Gravity During Operation Barbarossa, 1941 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, May 1994). Boutwell, Brian. Some Planning Considerations for Joint Operations in a Maritime Theater (Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA: September 1989). Boyce, Earl, J. Cover and Deception in World War II-Its Lessons and Doctrine Implications (Maxwell AFB: Air Command and Staff College, 1982). Brinkley, Phillip L. The Operational Commander's Will: An Intangible Element in Victory (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, May 1986). Brisson, Douglas, D. Campaign Plans. Military Strategy, and Policy Objectives: The Imperative for Linkage in U.S. Defense Planning (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, May 1988). Browne, Joseph Edward. Deception and the Mediterranean Campaigns of 1943-1944 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1986). Burgdorf, Charles E. An Appreciation for Vulnerability to Deception at the Operational Level (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, May 1987).

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Burgess, Ronald L. Operational Intelligence. Is It a Panacea? (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 21 April 1987). Burton, Michael A. Rules of'Engagement.- What is the Relationship Between Rules of Engagement and the Design of 0perations? (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1987). Butler, William G. Operational Decisions: What Is the Nature of the Information Required? (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, May 1987). Cain, Francis M., 111. The Ardennes-1944: An Analysis of the Operational Defense (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, May 1986). Cardwell, Thomas A., 111. Command Structure .for Theater Warfare The Quest for Unity of Command (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, September 1984). Center for Military History, U.S. Army. CMH Pub 104-5: Terrain Factors in the Russian Campaign (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1st printed July 1951, facsimile printing 1982, 1986). Center for Military History, U.S. Army. Pub 104-6: Effects of Climate on Combat in European Russia (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, replaced DA Pam 20291, February 1952). Center for Military History, U.S. Army. The German Campaign in Russia. Planning and Operations (1940-1942) (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, United States Army, CMH Pub 104-21, 1988, 1st edition, March 1955). Cerami, Joseph R. Wresting the Initiative. Ridgway as Operational Commander in the Korea War, December 1950 to April 1951 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1988). Clark, Robert L., IV, The Essential Elements of Operational Surprise (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, May 1987). Coomler, James D. The Operational Culminating Point. Can You See It Coming? (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 16 May 1986). Cordesman, Anthony H. The Lessons and Non-Lessons of the Air and Missile War in Kosovo. Charts, Maps, and Figures (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, revised August 6, 1999).

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Cottrell, Scott B. From Cobra to the Seine, August 1944: A Microcosm of the Operational Art (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, May 1986). Cowan, David M. The Utility of the Operational Pause in Sequencing Battles to Achieve an Operational Advantage (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1987). Craft, Douglas W. An Operational Analysis of the Persian Gulf War (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992). Craft, Douglas W. Operational Art in the Western Desert Theater of 'Operations 1940-43 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, May 1987). Crenshaw, Charles T., III. Distinctions Between Tactical and Operational Levels of War Are Some More Important Than Others (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, May 1986). Dail, Robert T. Does the U.S. Army Really Understand Operational War? A Logistics Perspective (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2 May 1988). Davis, J. R., and T. J. Ebbert. The Aleutian Option (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1983). Didwiszus, Frank. Der Einfluss des Gelaendes auf die Durchfuehrung von Operationen der Landstreitkraefte. Eine Untersuchung am Beispiel des finnisch-russichen Winterkrieges 1939/40 and der deutschen Ardennen-offensive 1944/45 (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie d. Bundeswehr, December 1968). Dixon, Richard J. Operational Sequencing. The Tension between Simultaneous and Sequential Operations (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1994). Donohue, Kevin S. Dynamic Synchronization Matrix./or Campaign Planning (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1993). Dubois, Edmund L., Hughes, Wayne P., Jr., and Low, Lawrence J. A Concise Theory of Combat (Monterey, CA: Institute for Joint Warfare Analysis, 2nd printing, October 1998). Duncan, Stephen C. Intelligence and Defensive Culminating Point-Piercing the Fog (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1995).

663

Eberbach, Heinz-Eugen. Die Landung der Amerikaner in Marokko im November 1942, ihre allierte Vorbereitung and die militaerpolitische Bedeutung der allierten Landung in Nordafrika (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie d. Bundeswehr, 1959). Eikenberg, Bruno. Kriegserfahrung and Kriegsvorbereitung-Zur Entwicklung von Technik and Operationfuehrung and der Erziehung des militaerischen Fuehrernachwuchses im deutschen Heer zwischen den Weltkriegen (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie d. Bundeswehr, 1984). Ellermann, Werner. Die grundlegenden deutschen Ueberlegungen zur Abwehr einer Invasion in Frankreich (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie d. Bundeswehr, 1962). Ellison, Gregory W. Operational Art. The Missing Link in the Iran-Iraq War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, April 1988). Engelmann, Wolfgang. Luftaufklaerung im Kuestenvorfeld and ueber See durch Kuestenfliegerverbande im 2. Weltkrieg-Fine Untersuchung ihrer Fuehrung, ihres Einsatzes and ihrer Ausruestung anhand von Kriegstagebuechern der Seekriegsleitung (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie d. Bundeswehr, 1970). Englert, Bernd. Zur Operationsfuehrung eingeschlossener Grossverbaende vor and each der Brueckenkopfbildung; die franzoesischen Ueberlegungen zur Lage bei Duenkirchen 1940 (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie d. Bundeswehr, 1971). Enzenberger, Kurt. Die allierte and deutsche Luftwaffenfuehrung im 2. Weltkrieg-Gedanken zum Problem einheitlicher Fuehrung (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie d. Bundeswehr, 1964). Estorf, Wolfgang. Fuehrungsvorstellungen zur Abwehr einer invasion in Frankreich 1944Darstellung and Vergleich der Auffassungen Hiders, von Rundstedts and Rommels (Hamburg: Fuehrungsakademie d. Bundeswehr, 1967). Fastabend, David A. A Theory of Conflict and Operational Art (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Command and General Staff College, 1988). Filiberti, Edward J. Developing a Theory for Dynamic Campaign Planning (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Command and General Staff College, 1988). Fix, Robert G. Operational Encirclement.- Quick Decisive Victory or a Bridge Too Far? (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Command and General Staff College, 1993). Flanigan, David B. The Culminating Point and U.S. Army Tactical Doctrine (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1992). Flynn, Michael T. Climax or Conclusion. Culmination or Defense (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1994).

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Wehr-

Holder, L.D. "A New Day for Operational Art." Army 3 (March 1985). Holder, L.D. "Training for the Operational Level." Parameters, Spring 1986. Huston, James A. "Korea and Logistics." Military Review 2 (February 1957). Hutchinson, Scott T. "Army and Navy Theater Missile Defense." Military Review 2 (March-April 1995). Jablonsky, David. "Strategy and the Operational Level of War." Part I. Parameters (Spring 1987). Jablonsky, Walter. "Die Seekriegfuehrung im vierten Nahostkrieg." Marine Rundschau 11 (November 1974).

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Jacobs, Walter Darnell. "The Art of Operations: Soviet Theoreticians Have Wedged What They Call the Operational Art Between Tactics and Strategy but to Little Apparent Practical Purpose." Army 12 (November 1961). Jaroch, Roger M. "MAGTFs and the Operational Level of War." Marine Corps Gazette 7 (July 1989).

Jelden, Helmut. "Soldat and Raum." Zeitschrift fuer Geopolitik 7 (July 1941). Jenkins, Reuben E. "Operations Dragoon Planning and Landing Phase." Military Review 8 (August 1946). Johnson, Mark D. "Synchronization and the Corps." Marine Corps Gazette 11 (November 1 994). Kerr, Nick. "The Falklands Campaign." Naval War College Review 6 (November/December 1982). Killilae, Walter. "Joint Operation Aspects of the Okinawa Campaign." Military Review 6 (June 1947); 7 (July 1947); 8 (August 1947). Kindsvatter, Peter S. "Operational Maneuver: The Lessons of WWII." Army 8 (August 1986). Kirin, Stephen J. "Synchronization." Naval War College Review 4 (Autumn 1996). Kneifel, Robert. "Mobilmachung, Entwicklung, Systems, Vergleiche, aktuelle Probleme," Oesterreichische Militaerische Zeitschrift 2 (March 1975). Knox, Dudley W. "Training for Higher Command in War" (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 13 December 1919). Koch, Harlan G. "Monsoons and Military Operations." Military Review 6 (June 1965). Kraska, Peter. "Operative Leitlime 1994." Trupenpraxis 5 (May 1994). Krumpelt, Ihno. "Die Bedeutung des Transportwesen fuer den Schlachterfolg." Wehrkunde 5 (May 1965).

Kurz, H.R. "The Eben Emael Operation." Allgemeine Schweizerische Militaerzeitschrift, May-June 1949, reprinted in Military Review 3 (March 1950). Lang, Walter P., Jr., et al. "Jackson's Valley Campaign and the Operational Level of War." Parameters (Winter 1985).

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