PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS: LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE OMAR GARCÍA HARFUCH (OGH) AMBUSH

A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS: LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE OMAR GARCÍA HARFUCH (OGH) AMBUSH

The Site and the Timeline

On June 26th, 2020, at 6:35 AM, Mexico City Police Chief Omar García Harfuch was ambushed in his armored Suburban. The ambush occurred at the intersection of Monte Blanco and Av. Paseo de la Reforma. The attackers drove a large truck followed by a Suburban, out of AV. Monte Blanco and blocked the intersection as García Harfuch was driving on towards AV. Monte Blanco. From 4:00 AM, four cells of seven attackers each waited for Omar García Harfuch. They were stationed at various locations along the route.

The attack started at 6:35 AM. The attacking team was parked at the ambush site for two and a half hours.

Three seconds into the attack, the intersection was blocked by a large truck containing 7 to 8 armed gunmen.

Nine to ten seconds into the attack, they started shooting at Omar García Harfuch’s Suburban.

From the time the truck stopped, it took 2 to 2.5 seconds for the shooting to start.

Forensics indicates that García Harfuch’s Suburban was stopped 20 Meters – 66 Feet away from the blocking truck.

The shooting stopped 6:37:52 AM. The shooting lasted approximately two and a half minutes.

As a point of interest, at the 6:35:58 AM mark, approximately a minute after they pulled out, you can hear police sirens. Omar García Harfuch’s security team immediately sent a message for help. (opinion – the reaction time is impressive)

Shortly after the sirens are heard some of the attackers pile into the Suburban and leave the attack site.

The attackers that are in the truck bed leave the truck and flee into the neighborhood. The police were able to apprehend most.

A significant component of the analysis is the Decision Site

Distance (DSD). Where on Av. Paseo de la Reform could the driver have first seen the ambush developing? From that location – How much time and distance did they have to work with?

Attack Site

This was an example of the attack team doing their homework. They picked a location where the vehicle could have some reasonable speed, which, in turn, increased their rate into the kill zone. The attack location was a classic danger zone. The vehicle was moving around a curve that offers limited sight distance. There were trees on the left side of the vehicle. On the vehicle’s right-hand side were some homes and trees that would block the driver’s view of a vehicle entering the intersection.

When applied to the science of driving, the numbers related to all of the above create a vehicle ambush algorithm.

The Omar García Harfuch’s (OGH) Ambush, although complex and spectacular, it is no different than other attacks. As with all vehicle attacks, no matter how simple or complex, they are an exercise in the laws of physics. No matter the scenario - the vehicle driver combination and the given environment must operate within the laws of physics. Also, vehicle attacks are a time distance relationship - how much time and distance did OGH’s driver have to avoid the problem.

Forensic Analysis and Lessons Learned

We have used forensic science and engineering principles to determine the cause of a vehicle ambush in the past. The analysis is based on a rigorous, disciplined approach to identify the problem that causes the event. We test all scenarios for accuracy.

We measure maximum speed, the path the vehicle takes, vehicle performance, sight distance and come up with the cause of the event followed by lessons learned.

From the OGH forensic analysis, we developed a hypothesis from which we created nine data points. At each data point, data is collected, analyzed, and a hypothesis created. Vehicle Dynamics Institute team conducted tests to determine the accuracy of the data and from that data, we developed lessons learned, operational suggestions and follow it up with training points.

The following is a preliminary analysis. This preliminary analysis is just a snapshot of the Challenges faced by the Security Driver and Executive Protection that did not exist as little as 10 to 15 years ago.

Data Points

ISDA collected Data covering nine test points. All nine points will be covered in the complete report, which will be available to ISDA Members.

Data Point 1 – Radius - To determine the vehicle’s speed as it entered to Decision Site Point.

Data Point 2- Determine De-

cision Sight Distance – Determine the location on the Av. Paseo de la Reforma, where the decision-making process began.

Data Point.3 - Computing Braking Distance and Rate of

Deceleration - Determining the braking distance needed to stop the Armored B6 suburban and the driver’s options.

Data Point 4 - Night Driving

Distance - ascertain the effect of low light conditions on the ambush’s outcome.

Data Point 5 - Reversing - Preliminary analysts discovered anomalies with the placement of the Suburban

Data. Point 6 - Run flats - the effect of runlats on the outcome of the ambush

Data Point 7 - Armored Vehi-

cles - determining the armored vehicle’s role in the ambush

Data Point 8 -The Attack Site - Analyzing the design and selection of the site of the attack

Data Point 9 - Surveillance

Detection – Examining the role of Surveillance Detection in the outcome of the ambush

Attackers shot at the seams and gaps of the armored Suburban.

While testing the hypothesis of these three Data Points, the Vehicle Dynamics Institute team produced information concerning operational procedures, training and personal safety, and security that were of significant importance.

We thought we had to share it with the community.

Data Point 3 - Computing Braking Distance and Rate of the Deceleration

Braking techniques played an essential role in the ambush. The Analysis and VDI testing concluded that the outcome would have been different. Different defined as, although two bodyguards did not survive the incident, the principal did survive. If a different braking technique were used, the outcome would have been substantially different.

Our findings

A VDI level 5 test driver* (Highest level of experience and skill) with years of experience instructing students to use threshold braking with an ABS vehicle drove an armored B6 into a recreation of the OGH ambush. Using the threshold method of braking (With a vehicle equipped with ABS brakes), the Level 5 driver required 160 Feet or 48.8 Meters to stop the vehicle.

In the same vehicle, the same level 5 driver, driving into the same scenario, braking hard with no threshold, used 94 Feet or 28.7 Meters to stop the vehicle.

Using threshold breaking with an ABS vehicle required an extra 66 Feet or 20 Meters to stop the vehicle representing an increase of 70% of the distance needed to stop.

Applying these numbers to the OGH ambush, it would have been the difference between stopping 20 Feet/ 6 Meters in front of the attacker’s vehicle with the result of the principle remaining alive versus using threshold breaking with ABS with the result of the Suburban drive under the truck more than likely killing the principal.

Consider that most accidents and vehicle attacks require hard braking - the use of threshold breaking with an ABS car is not just a security issue. It is also a safety issue.

Braking Distance - Lesson Points and Recommendations

As a trainer, do not teach threshold breaking with an ABS vehicle - and we cannot imagine an executive vehicle that does not have ABS brakes.

As a potential student or purchaser of protective driving training, we suggest you ensure that you or your employee is not attending a program that instructs students to threshold brake with an ABS vehicle.

The entrance speed into all braking exercises must be measured accurately; a computer or radar gun is a must. For example, with the level 5 driver, if the speed were increased 10%, which would bring it up to 44 MPH or 71KPH, the stopping distance would increase by 20% to 113 Feet or 34.5 Meters which would have produced an entirely different result.

This is an issue that can create liability problems. The training provider is training you or employees to NOT USE an ADAS system proven to prevent accidents and save lives.

Training needs to change to adapt to vehicle technology - On most all executive vehicles, some computers and algorithms will limit the driver’s ability to stop the car and turn the car - driver training needs to reflect the increased use of computers and executive vehicles.

If you’re driving in an armored vehicle, determine the vehicle’s stopping distance - this needs to be done by testing the vehicle.

The time to know that you need 90 Feet/27.4 Meters to stop your armored vehicle is before there is a truck blocking the intersection 80 Feet/24.4 Meters in front of you.

* Driver Levels 5 Extremely High: Military/Law enforcement, Military/Civilian overseas deployments, Driver training in Armored Vehicles, 4 High, 3 Medium, 2 Low, 1 None

Data Point 5 – Reversing

Our forensic analysis indicated that the driver attempted to back out of the Kill Zone. A video and photos showed that the vehicle initially stopped 20 Feet/ 6Meters in front of the attacker’s truck. Other images and videos show that the Suburban’s final resting place was 66 Feet/ 20 Meters back from the truck, which indicates that the driver moved 46 Fee/14 Meters . in reverse Before the vehicle stopped at its final resting place. This also suggests that, at that time, the driver was still capable of putting the car in reverse and backing up.

Further analysis indicated that the Suburban remained stationary at the 20 Foot/ 6Meters mark for 2 to 2 1/2 seconds before attempting to reverse.

The VDI test team recreated this scenario matching the dimensions developed in our analysis – in the process of conducting the tests, they discovered a vehicle characteristic that explains our hypothesis of why the driver seemed to have sat there 20 Feet/ 6Meters from the vehicle for approximately 2 seconds before moving the vehicle or trying to move the vehicle.

Test Procedures

The VDI team had drivers with varying levels of *experience and skill drive into the OGH ambush recreation. Using a target speed of **40 MPH/64.4 KPH and reaction times of .5, .7, and 1.2, seconds had the driver brake hard to a complete stop and get the Suburban moving in reverse as quickly as possible.

They found that the average amount of time it took for a driver to put the vehicle into reverse was about 2 seconds. The testing indicated at best, the quickest a highly skilled driver could get the car into reverse would have been 1.13 seconds and that the average driver needed approximately 2.5 seconds.

This proves the hypothesis the two seconds to 2 1/2 seconds after the barrage of fire into the suburban - the driver we’re still able to put the car in reverse and back up - the delay in backing up can be explained from the data collected by the VDI team. This is a testament to the capability of the armored car. We will discuss the armored vehicle in the complete report.

Note: 40 MPH/64.4 KPH is the speed determine from data point two to be the Suburban’s speed entering the kill zone.

The VDI team that the two-second delay was caused due to the vehicle’s ADAS Transmission Control Module (TCM) system.

VDI discovered that if a driver releases the brake before/as shifting to reverse, allowing the vehicle to roll forward will cause a delayed engagement of reverse gear due to the Transmission Control Module (TCM) functionality.

The TCM systems can create a severe issue with backing out of the kill zone; hence the VDI team spent a significant amount of time ensuring that they recreated the scenario accurately, tested it under various environmental conditions, and drivers of varying levels of experience.

Even if the driver tried to back up, the chances are very high that due to the ADAS systems, there was a significant delay from the time the car was put into reverse to the time they backed up.

Reversing Lessons and Recommendations

Training providers need to determine if the student’s operational vehicle the Transmission Control Module. If they do, they need to discuss the effects of TCM on reversing.

Those who train students working in a high-risk environment need to examine the reversing characteristics of the operational vehicles the student will be driving and the environment that they will be driving in.

Security drivers need to know the characteristics of the vehicle while driving in reverse.

Keep in mind that all new vehicles have speed limiters, preventing the vehicle from reversing quickly.

Training to reverse the vehicle out of a dangerous scenario cannot start with the vehicle stopped - the training exercise has to start with the student driving into the backing exercise at a predetermined speed.

Test your vehicle reversing characteristics. The time to know that there is a limiter on the vehicle that prevents you from going faster than ten mph or worse yet that there is an ADAS system that delays the vehicle transmission from shifting into reverse is not when you are facing a problem.

Since backing out of the kill zone is one of the necessary skills necessary required for a security driver, it is mandatory that the driver find a safe place they can drive their operational vehicle At a speed that fits the environment that they drive in and stop it quickly put the vehicle into reverse and experience the vehicles reversing characteristics.

This is another example but why protective driver training instructors must grasp the concept of ADAS in the vehicle algorithms.

There very well could be a time when the vehicle’s algorithm is deciding to maximize safety; it may be putting the security of the principal and the driver in harm’s way - that is the difference between a security driver and a chauffeur.

Training needs to train students to work with the vehicle’s algorithm to maximize the performance of the vehicle.

Data. Point 6 - Run flats

The photo of the Omar García Harfuch that received most of the press about was that of the Suburban parked on Av. Paseo de la Reforma riddled with gunshots and sitting on four flat tires.

That photo created questions about whether the vehicle had run-flat tires. Run-flat tires should be on all armored vehicles, but in this scenario, it did not matter if they had run-flats or not. We’re not saying they shouldn’t have run-flat flats, but in this attack, it wouldn’t have made much of a difference.

As a note of reference, during my 46 years in the profession, I have tested many run-flat devices and tires, but never have I attempted to drive an armored vehicle with or without run-flats in reverse with one or more of the tires deflated.

We (ISDA and VDI) researched to find if there was any data available on vehicles driving in reverse with flat tires, with or without run-flats. We did not find any, which prompted the VDI team to do their own research.

The VDI team constructed a series of tests to determine the difficulty level and the time required to exit a Kill Zone with flat tires at different ends of the vehicle.

VDI Created three scenarios measuring the time and the level of difficulty

Distances

Split 1 The time it took to move the vehicle 0’ – 50 Feet/15.24 Meters in reverse

Split 2 The time it took to move the vehicle 50 Feet/15.24’ – 100 Feet/30.5 Meters’ in reverse

Split 3 The time it took to move the vehicle 100 Feet/30.5 Meters’ – 246 Feet/75 Meters in reverse

To reverse the vehicle from the 50 Feet/15.24 Meters mark to the 100 Feet/30.5 Meters’ mark required 1.75 Seconds. (Split 2)

To reverse the vehicle from the 100 Feet/30.5 Meters mark to the 246 Feet/75 Meters mark required 3.9 Seconds. (Split 2)

The total time to back the vehicle to the 246 Feet/75 Meters mark, which is the decision sight distance, was 9.12 seconds.

With all four tires deflated, it took a skilled driver 4.87 seconds to back up to the 50 Feet/15.24 Meters mark - those with lesser skills required 6.44 seconds to reach the 50 Feet/15.24 Meters mark.

Note: We mentioned this characteristic when we would covering reversing, but it bears repeating - Reverse speed limiter engages at 25 MPH/ 40.2KPH; in Iterations 1, 2, and 3, limiters would engage between 50/15.2 – 55/16.8 Feet/Meters from the start point

The reverse speed limiter is not always consistent - On some runs in iteration four, it wasn’t engaging until 80 Feet/24.4 Meters - 85 Feet/26 Meters; on others in this iteration, never engaged.

Run flats - Lessons and Recommendations

If an operational vehicle is equipped with run-flat tires, training programs need to consider an exercise, specifically a backing up exercise with one or more of the tires flat.

As VDI’s test discovered, driving in reverse with flat tires with or without a vehicle equipped with run-flat devices can be difficult and, at times, dangerous.

The testing concluded that the reverse limiter seems to vary when the tires are flat.

When conducting training in reverse, the driver needs to know at what speed does the reverse limiter engages - And how much time and distance will you use up getting to the point where the reverse limiter is engaged. When you consider that most paths of escape will be to the rear, knowledge and training needs to spend time untraining with these issues.

The assumption is that the reason you have run-flat tires is that you feel your tires may go flat - keeping that and mind makes sense that a training program should include driving on run-flat - the issue is the expense.

About the Author

For more than 46 years, Tony Scotti catered to the training needs of corporations and public service agencies. He trained governments, corporations, law enforcement agencies, and military organizations to avoid vehicle violence. For five decades, his training programs have been conducted in over 40 countries, students from seventy -four countries have attended his programs on five continents.

He combined his knowledge of science (He holds a B.S. in Engineering from Northeastern University) and vehicle dynamics with firsthand experience gained while conducting real-world security operations in moderate and high-risk locales worldwide. Tony used his skills and expertise in analyzing incidents to create a mathematical model for vehicle attacks.