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DECEMBER 2021

Human Geopolitics: States,

Emigrants, and the Rise of Diaspora Institutions by Alan Gamlen By Dr Tan Chee-Beng*

ased on a largescale comparative study, ‘Human Geopolitics’ argues that ‘the evolution of a global migration regime has driven the recent rise of diaspora institutions, and that this in turn has helped unleash a new wave of human geopolitics around the world’. Human geopolitics refers to ‘the competition for population rather than territory’ and diaspora institutions are formal state offices that engage with emigrants and their descendants. The rise of diaspora institutions in three phases is described in Chapter 2. Phase 1 was the period of the consolidation of nation-states following the fragmentation of European empires. Phase 2 from the mid-1990s to the mid2000s saw the emergence of diaspora institutions within regional groupings such as the European Union. Since then, diaspora institutions have become a standard form of migration management and most states have at least one, either in the foreign ministry or as a separate ministry. The rise of diasporas in the first stage is covered well in Chapter 3, which describes the role of diaspora institutions (especially the Jewish Agency) in the development of Israel, the rise of diaspora institutions following the formation of

nation-states in Europe, the break-up of the Soviet Union, and the formation of post-colonial states. The author traces the earliest rise of diaspora institutions to Europe following the defeat of colonialism, imperialism and fascism around World War II. The author points out that as early as 1936 the Foreign Ministry of Albania took on the functions of a diaspora institution in relation to Albanians abroad. The temporal classification provides a convenient framework from the first phase to the formation of regional groupings spearheaded by the European Union (diasporas in a world of regions) and the greater involvement of the United Nations (diasporas in a global world) in trying to create global migration governance. However, the temporal classification can also, perhaps more accurately, be an analysis of the development of diaspora institutions from the formation of nationstates to the present, the impact of the formation of regional groupings, and the role of the United Nations. Chapter 4 provides details from interviews with senior policy makers in India (e.g., Salman Kurshid, Minister of the Ministry of External Affairs), Mexico (e.g. Carlos Gonzalez Gutierrez, Executive Director of the Institute for Mexicans Abroad) and Eritrea (e.g. Hanna Simon, Ambassador

to France and former Director General for the Department of Eritreans Abroad). The concept of regime shocks, i.e. ‘moments of questioning and revising dominant modes of citizenship, sovereignty and territory in a place’, is used to account for the emergence of diaspora institutions as states seek to regain control of their people overseas (such as India monitoring Sikh separatists overseas). This concept is also used to describe, in Chapter 5, the export of labour from countries such as the Philippines, Bangladesh and Pakistan. However, when almost all major political events can be described as regime shocks, its use to explain the rise of diaspora institutions becomes problematic. Yes, authoritarian regimes relied on ‘safety-valve emigration’ to maintain power and help bring in much needed money for the government, but to attribute the export of cheap labor from the Philippines or South Asia mainly to regime shocks masks the significant influence of the globalisation processes since the 1990s. Phase 2 is described in detail in Chapter 6 in relation to regional groupings, such as the European Union and the African Union, and the management of intercultural borders between member states.

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Geopolitics in the Black Sea and beyond follows in Chapter 7, which deals with the competition for control of ‘compatriots’ between Russia and the EU. Chapter 8 on global diaspora engagement describes the increasing involvement of the UN and, in particular, the role of its former Secretary Kofi Annan. The terrorist attacks on the USA on September 11, 2001 prompted rethinking of the global governance of migration, which included calls to reform the UN to have global control of the movement and activities of terrorists. The following chapter discusses the role of international organisations such as the World Bank and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Through the use of donor menus (lists of potential policy projects), ‘models’ and ‘best practices’ were adopted, which also cater to the state interests of powerful donors. The USA, for instance, has great influence on donor institutions such as the World Bank and the US promotes its interests through diaspora engagement consultancies such as the Migration Policy Institute and Diaspora Matters which organise forums and provide advice in line with US interests. This is further described in Chapter 10 which discusses the exchange of diaspora CONTD. ON PG 3

DECEMBER 2021

EDITORIAL PAGE

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Human Geopolitics: States, Emigrants... CONTD. FROM PG 2 policies between states and the standardisation of diaspora institutions around the world. Chapter 11 concludes the study, showing the rise of diaspora institutions as states competed to claim diaspora populations. It highlights the new concepts used, and concludes with an account of human geopolitics in 2018: the poisoning of the Russian emigrant Skripal family in Britain, the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul, and China’s hunting down of corruption suspects in many countries, among others. ‘Human Geopolitics’ focuses its analysis on Europe and Israel, thus giving the impression that it is largely from a European perspective. This is not surprising as the modern nationstates first emerged in Europe. India, Mexico and Eritrea are selected for analysis under the theme of ‘regime shocks’, while the Philippines and South Asian countries are described under labor exports, followed by ‘diaspora engagement goes global’. While China is included in the study, it is mentioned briefly only as an example of ‘regime shock’ which shaped its diaspora institutions, and in relation to its extension of authoritarian diaspora measures overseas. The period of Deng Xiaoping’s opening up of the economy is briefly mentioned as a regime shock (hence the role of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau), but it would be more accurately described as a recovery from the shock of the Cultural Revolution. China has a long history of migration overseas, and a greater focus on it (or a separate study) could reveal its own processes of developing diaspora institutions in response to changing domestic and international scenarios. The development of diaspora institutions from the early twentieth century (the Chinese Affairs Council established by the Republican government in 1926 and Yan’an Overseas Chinese Office established by the Chinese Communist Party in 1937) to the present Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau (OCAB) of the State Council have their own trajectories that cannot be glossed over with the

While China is included in the study, it is mentioned briefly only as an example of ‘regime shock’ which shaped its diaspora institutions, and in relation to its extension of authoritarian diaspora measures overseas. Photo-Meta

concept of regime shocks. Competition over diaspora populations and how it has contributed to the rise of diaspora institution is relevant to China too: it was because of the Dutch colonial regimes’ intended claim over the Chinese in Netherlands East Indies as protected subjects that the Qing imperial government finally paid attention to the Chinese diaspora, leading to the proclamation of its Nationality Law in 1909. The changing roles of the OCAB over time illustrates very well the ‘tapping’ (with regards to states pursuing national economic and political interests), and ‘embracing’ (with regards to states’ security and foreign policy

interests)—perspectives that the author mentions in Chapter 1. The USA is not listed as a country studied, although its influential role in geopolitics is obvious in the analysis in Chapter 9 on ‘orchestrating a migration regime’. Perhaps the USA is so powerful it does not need a separate diaspora institution to deal with its diasporas, but the author should explain this. The lack of critical views on US roles in geopolitics gives the impression that while this study is critical of Russia, China, and some other authoritarian countries’ geopolitics strategies, it is not critical of the USA’s roles in, for instance, the

Middle East and Africa, in causing mass migration and even encouraging Islamic terrorists to go to Afghanistan and Syria. The significance of diaspora institutions to the creation and development of Israel is well described, but the book is silent on the Palestinian people and their migration. While Palestine is not yet a recognised state and it is not listed in the study, it is strange that a description of the establishment of Israel does not mention the Palestine people at all. In fact, the Palestine Liberation Organization, which was established in the diaspora in 1964, can be seen as functioning as a diaspora institution

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which organised resistance against the state of Israel. In his study of diaspora institutions worldwide, the author finds ‘no evidence whatsoever of corruption in or around any states or international organizations involved in promoting diaspora engagement’. Perhaps this is because his study is based on statistical analysis and interviews with major policy makers, which is less likely to reveal corrupt practices. It is perhaps only through specific study of countries involving interviews with NGOs and ordinary people that corruption, if any, can be revealed. For example, it would be interesting to study the roles of the Malaysian government and government-linked companies in relation to their encouragement and management of cheap labor migration, for only then evidence of cronyism and corruption can be revealed. Overall, this is an admirable study. It is a successful attempt to study diaspora institutions worldwide by relating the study to geopolitics. Students of migration study and geopolitics will find this book useful to understand the development of diaspora institutions and for doing further study, either globally or on a specific country. The book is also of interest to specialists for reflection on this important topic of migration governance at the national, regional and global levels. • Adjunct Professor, The Chinese University of Hong Kong. Source- Melbourne Asia Review

COVER STORY

South Asia Times

DECEMBER 2021

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Omicron: Ominous outcome of vaccine grab The new COVID-19 variant is the result of vaccine inequality and the race for profit by big pharma companies through patent monopoly. By Richa Chintan

concrete is yet known about its transmissibility rate compared to other variants, like Delta, or its potential to cause more severe diseases. Epidemiological studies are still under way to assess whether the increase in the number of positive cases in South Africa are due to Omicron or other factors.

he discovery of the COVID-19 variant Omicron in South Africa shows that humans cannot afford to promote the interests of one section of the population at the cost of others. The continuous evolution and mutation of SARS-CoV-2, which could lead to deadlier variants, is the result of the large unvaccinated populations in poor countries and the marginalised in rich nations. The pursuit of profit by big pharma companies through patent monopoly and the vaccine grab by rich countries goes against the logic of experts that vaccination must be extended to all if the world intends to defeat the virus. In his recent address at a COVID-19 information session for member states, World Health Organization (WHO) director-general Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus remarked that “the longer we allow the pandemic to drag on—by

failing to address vaccine inequity or to implement public health and social measures in a tailored and consistent way—the more opportunity we give this virus to mutate in ways we

cannot predict or prevent”. In a statement on November 26, WHO informed that the B.1.1.529 variant (Omicron) has a large number of mutations some of which are

concerning. Preliminary evidence suggests an increased risk of reinfection with this variant as compared to other variants of concern. The variant is still under study and nothing

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STARK VACCINE INEQUITY PERSISTS Even after repeated appeals by the WHO, the starkly gross iniquitous distribution of COVID-19 vaccines persists. Figure 1 shows the proportion of population fully vaccinated populations across countries. While rich countries, like Canada, France, the United Kingdom and Germany, have managed to fully vaccinate about 70% of their populations, Africa is languishing with a meagre 7.2%. Shockingly, some African countries like Mali and Ethiopia have only 1.5% and 1.2% of their populations respectively fully vaccinated. CONTD. ON PG 5

COVER STORY

DECEMBER 2021

South Asia Times

Omicron: Ominous outcome... CONTD. FROM PG 4 figure1 Dr Satyajit Rath, immunologist, Indian Institute of Science Education and Research, Pune, told Newsclick, “While mutations in the virus will keep arising and being selected under appropriate circumstances, the unconscionable vaccine inequity has indeed contributed to the persistence of a large size of the virus pool.” According to Rath, this is, in part, “driven by a global manufacturing shortfall and by vaccine nationalism, leading to inequitable global vaccine supply. The first is driven, in part, by forprofit considerations while the second is driven by xenophobic ideologies”. SOUTH AFRICA PUNISHED FOR OMICRON DISCOVERY Several countries have imposed travel restrictions on South Africa and countries surrounding, like

Botswana, Namibia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Eswatini, Malawi, Zambia and Angola. The South African government has called these restrictions “misguided” and “draconian”. “We feel that it’s a wrong approach. It is misdirected and goes against the norms as advised by the WHO. We just feel that some of the leaderships of (these) countries are finding scapegoats to deal with what is a worldwide problem,” South African

health minister Joe Phaahla has said. In a statement, South Africa’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation said that these restrictions are “akin to punishing South Africa for its advanced genomic sequencing and the ability to detect new variants quicker. Excellent science should be applauded and not punished”. Tedros has supported South Africa and expressed concern over the restrictions.

Thanking Botswana and South Africa for rapidly detecting, sequencing and reporting Omicron, he said, “It is deeply concerning to me that those countries are now being penalised by others for doing the right thing.” He also expressed concern over the “blunt, blanket measures that are not evidence-based or effective on their own and which will only worsen inequities”. Chandrakant Lahariya, an epidemiologist and public health systems expert, argues, “The reality is that there is low coverage of COVID vaccination in Africa. On the other hand, rich countries have stockpiled vaccines and started providing booster shots.” From the public health and epidemiological perspective, “as long as a virus has a human host which is susceptible and does not have protective immunity, there is a risk of the emergence of new variants and this is the risk that has been probably translated into

the Omicron variant. Hence, vaccine inequity needs to be addressed before anything else. It must be noted that South Africa has a very good quality genome sequencing capacity and that is why they could detect it”, Lahariya added. The same countries have been opposing the TRIPS waiver proposal of South Africa and India, which would have helped tackle the vaccine inequity and helped to deal with the pandemic better, for more than a year. Dr. Shahid Jameel, a leading virologist and Fellow at OCIS and Green Templeton College, University of Oxford, says, “Regions of the world that are poorly vaccinated are likely breeding grounds for newer variants. Countries without the required resources should be supported. The world needs better vaccine access and equity. It should be a wake-up call for the world, especially the developed nations.” Source- newsclick.in, 2 December 2021.

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of COVID-19 vaccine, as part of their initial course. A third COVID-19 vaccine dose is different from COVID-19 booster dose. Booster doses are not currently recommended for people who are severely immunocompromised and who have had a three-dose primary course of the COVID-19 vaccination.

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COMMUNITY

South Asia Times

DECEMBER 2021

Indian origin physicist Prof. Chennupati Jagdish to be the President of Australian Academy of Science By SAT News Desk

in 2005 and received the Academy’s Thomas Ranken Lyle Medal in 2019 for his outstanding contributions to physics, just two of many accolades received throughout his career.

ELBOURNE, 25 November 2021: Nanotechnology pioneer Distinguished Professor Chennupati Jagadish AC FAA FTSE will become the next President of Australia’s premier science organisation, the Australian Academy of Science. Professor Jagadish said he was humbled by the opportunity to lead the Academy. He is the first Australian of Indian heritage to take on the role. “I never imagined when I came to Australia with a twomonth-old baby and two-year contract thirty-one years ago, that one day I’d be elected a Fellow of the Academy and then go on to lead the organisation,” said Professor Jagadish. “The Academy plays an important role providing independent, authoritative and influential scientific advice to the Australian Parliament. I look forward to leading that work and being a champion for the cause of science and scientific excellence. “As a nation, we must adequately invest in research and development to meet national and global challenges, such as climate change and future pandemics. “We also need to transition from a resource-based economy to a knowledge and technology-based economy.” Professor Jagadish said nurturing the next generation

of young scientists will also be one of his priorities. “Creating a sense of hope for the younger generation is crucially important at a time when the number of positions in the university research sector is limited and the research funding success rate is also low.” Throughout his career Professor Jagadish has supervised 65 PhD students, is currently supervising a further 12 PhD students and has mentored 50 postdoctoral and other fellows, with many of them now in leading research institutions across the world. About his research One of the world’s leading physicists, Professor Jagadish’s expertise is in the field of nanotechnology, the science of extremely small things. He arrived in Australia in 1990 to take up a role as a research scientist at the Australian

National University and now leads its Semiconductor Optoelectronics and Nanotechnology Group. Professor Jagadish helps develop semi-conductors used in LED lights and has designed and developed some of the world’s smallest lasers. Approximately 20-30 of these lasers can fit within the width of a single human hair. His research has also been applied to make lightweight flexible solar cells, to split water to create hydrogen as a pure energy source and to manipulate neurons to treat people living with dementia. Professor Jagadish has also pioneered the creation of high-performance next generation optical devices, which have huge potential in the field of communications and data storage. He holds six US patents and has published more than 700 international journal papers. Professor Jagadish was elected to the Academy

Life growing up Born in India, Professor Jagadish grew up without electricity and studied in front of a kerosene lamp until his first year of high school, before coming under the tutelage of maths teacher, Chaganti Sambi Reddy. Seeing the young student’s potential, Reddy invited Jagadish to live with his family, so he didn’t have to walk six kilometres each day to attend high school. Reddy said he was not surprised to hear of his protégé’s election to President of the Academy. “Jagadish has been the most successful among the thousands of students I have taught during my 40-year career as maths teacher and headmaster of many high schools. “We are delighted and proud of Jagadish and wish him well in this important leadership role at the Australian Academy of Science.” Accolades from colleagues Outgoing Academy President Professor John Shine AC PresAA FAHMS(Hon) FRS said he was delighted Professor Jagadish had been elected as the next President of the Academy.

“Professor Jagadish is highly regarded as a scientist and understands the importance of Australia’s international scientific engagement, having research collaborations in 30 countries around the world himself,” said Professor Shine. “Professor Jagadish will also be a strong voice for our emerging scientists and young researchers who are Australia’s future science leaders. They have been severely impacted by COVID-19, as highlighted in a report published by the Academy’s EMCR Forum last year.” Professor Jagadish will be the 20th President of the Academy since its founding President, Sir Marcus Oliphant AC KBE FAA FRS FTSE was elected in 1954. The President of the Academy is elected by its Fellows for a four-year term. Other Fellows elected to the Academy’s Council who will also commence their roles alongside the new President in May 2022 include: Professor Frances Separovic AO – Foreign Secretary Professor Lyn Beazley AO – Secretary Education and Public Awareness Professor Colin Raston AO – Ordinary Member (Physical Sciences) Professor Julian Gale – Ordinary Member (Physical Sciences) Professor David Bowtell – Ordinary Member (Biological Sciences) Source- science.org.au

Melbourne Jayanti screening a success By SAT News Desk

ELBOURNE, 29 November 2021: The Jayanti (Marathi) with English subtitles directed by Shailesh Baliram Narwade and starring Ruturaj Wankhede, Titeeksha Tawde and Milind Shinde, has been successfully running in India. The theme of the movie is what makes it different from the regular films and its exclusive show here on 27 November generated keen interest. The major chunk of the Bollywood movies focus on money generation and box office movies depict the core idea of

entertainment and stories unconnected to peoples issues. But Jayanti makes a break from the routine and takes up the journey of a young misled goon becoming a learned and socially responsible person to bring change in himself and the society. This reflects the radical transforming the passive subjectivity attached to Dalit-Bahujan characters. The Bahujan protagonist wages a tough struggle against well entrenched class and political elite. This gives the movie a Dalit empowerment color, laying the foundation of upcoming Dalit cinema. The audience watching

Jayanti in Melbourne connected well with the progressive ideas of the movie and it’s liberating

message. This was Jayanti’s first international screening which educated, enriched

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and entertained the select audience. One hopes the movie gets a regular release in Australia.

DECEMBER 2021

PHOTO PAGE/ART

More Buliding Blocks - Charlotte Mackie

What Do You See - Emma Winkler

MADA NOW - Monash University’s Faculty of Art, Design and Architecture has recently awarded several significant prizes at its annual graduate show, MADA Now, showcases the work of over 750 graduating artists, curators, designers and architects in an online exhibition at - monash.edu/ mada/now. A physical exhibition is also open at Caulfield campus until Dec 3. Celebrating the next generation of Melbourne’s creative community is particularly important this year as the sector has faced ongoing uncertainty through extended lockdowns. Check out the MADA Now online exhibition: monash.edu/mada/now.

Joanne Ching

Lime Studies www.southasiatimes.com.au - 0421 677 082

South Asia Times

INTERVIEW/DIASPORA

DECEMBER 2021

Transnational connectivity is here to stay. How we understand and deal with it is crucial

lobalisation is a defining feature of the modern world. Although somewhat disrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic and public health responses, globalisation has resulted in new forms of connectivity across national borders via flows of people, ideas, money and goods. This connectivity is creating groups of people who are dispersed across the world but remain connected to their country of origin—the new diasporas that are globally mobile and transnationally networked. Fazal Rizvi is an Emeritus Professor of Global Studies in Education at the University of Melbourne and an internationally recognised authority on globalisation and educational policy and has in recent years examined the emerging theories of transnationalism, diaspora and higher education. He spoke about transnational mobility, diaspora and higher education in Asia and Australia with Melbourne Asia Review’s Managing Editor, Cathy Harper. Q: You were the lead author of a key report on Asian diaspora in Australia which explores the potential of diasporas in Australia to deepen economic links with Asia, especially China and India. You used the concept of diasporas and suggested that it better describes the contemporary forms of migration and multicultural societies. What do you define as ‘diaspora’? A: The idea of diaspora has traditionally been thought of as referring to groups of people in exile who wish eventually to go back to their own community. It is an idea associated with memory and nostalgia. This is not the case with the contemporary diaspora. Contemporary diaspora keep links with their country of origin but often cultivate those links in relation to the benefits that be can be derived from transnational networks and connections. In this way, the contemporary concept of diaspora is much broader than the notion of migration, which refers to resettlement, of arrivals and departures. It’s also broader than the notion of the exilic condition with which the idea of diaspora was traditionally associated. In the context of transnationalism, its scope has broadened a great deal, perhaps so much so that it is now very difficult to tell who does not belong to a diaspora community. That’s where the challenge lies analytically and empirically with the uses of the idea of diaspora. Analytically, it is a challenge because it raises questions about our definition of something that is dynamic and constantly

changing. Diaspora communities are forever being created as people view themselves as coming in and out of the diasporic condition. Estimates of the number of Chinese and Indian diaspora in Australia are somewhere between 1.2-1.6 million for the Chinese and probably around one million for the Indians. But these numbers, while they are clearly increasing, are very difficult to establish with any confidence. Here again, the analytical problem is evident: do you include the people who have been in Australia for five generations, such as the Sikhs in Woolgoolga in northern New South Wales? They are Australians and their links with India are remote. Do you include people from Fiji of Indian background as Indian diaspora? Do you include people from Pakistan, for example, who until 1947 were officially Indians? That was the problem we had in doing our research because we wanted to give quantitative data that could be regarded as relatively reliable, but if the analytical categories are so unstable and difficult to establish then you can’t do that. All you can do is to talk about the processes of ‘diasporisation’, how groups of people begin to regard themselves as diaspora, and with what purpose. In other words, how people retain links and regard these links is significant, but how they define themselves is also important. These qualitative aspects become part of the definition. Diasporas are only diasporas in so far as they have some kind of affective bond with their country of origin or their cultural or religious traditions. But exactly how far you go back into their origins becomes an interesting, but complex, question. Tangentially, we might also ask why is it that we don’t talk about the British diaspora in Australia in the same way we talk about, for example, the Chinese diaspora in Australia. That reveals something about Australia’s idea of itself as a white or Anglo-Celtic nation in which only those people who are not British can be called diaspora. So, the question of who is referred to as a diaspora—and also why and how groups of people need to regard themselves as diaspora— involves issues of power and various assumptions about national belonging. Q: You’ve found that the Asian diaspora in Australia is being under-utilised, despite being highly educated, motivated and globally networked and with the potential to develop Australia’s economy through greater engagement with Asia. How can this resource be better utilised?

A: Some 15 years ago, a Harvard University communication theorist called Yochai Benkler wrote an interesting book called The Wealth of Networks, in which he argued that in a globalising economy, transnational networks across cultural and national boundaries really matter. Networks are often the ways in which trade links are made; and the ways in which enterprise and entrepreneurialism are exercised. He argued if you want to expand capital markets then networks play a really important role. So, it is not only the linguistic and cultural knowledge and intercultural skills that the diaspora has, but also their networks that are really decisive in growing trade links. For example, how can people utilise their diaspora networks so that they can reliably invest their money in India or China, without fearing that it will be lost in the complex processes of bureaucracy? How can they be confident in addressing all kinds of problems and challenges that invariably emerge in the complexities of international trade? This is where diaspora networks can be useful. Not only do they have knowledge of the markets, but also emotional bonds. Asian diaspora in Australia people are highly talented, highly educated and highly motivated, with deep transnational networks and the capacity to take advantage of them in the globalised economy. Many of the Indian and Chinese businesspeople we interviewed felt that the potential for Australia was huge and that this fact remains recognised. In this sense, we should note that the contemporary notion of diaspora that I’m describing is linked to our understanding of the processes of globalisation and transnational links to which it has given rise. The contemporary idea of diaspora may have itself emerged out of our understanding of the global processes, how capital and knowledge circulate in transnational spaces, in which diaspora groups

have become major cultural intermediaries. Q: Why are diaspora in Australia being under-utilised, especially the Indian and Chinese diaspora? A: Perhaps because the understanding of global processes, and the associated idea of diaspora, is not adequately appreciated. Policymakers find it difficult to get their heads around this new understanding of diaspora and the ways in which transnational networks represent a space in which an increasing amount of economic activity now takes place. Their understanding of concepts such as citizenship, migration, international students, tourists and other mobile people is often very static. The notion of the diaspora we presented is more dynamic. It involves the dynamic processes of diasporisation through which affective bonds and networks are cultivated. It is difficult for most people to get their heads around this, and it is very difficult to communicate these ideas. Until we better understand the changing nature of the global economy and appreciate how in this economy diaspora communities are an important resource for the nation, because of their transnationality we will not be able to take advantage of the resources that they bring. This does not mean that governments, institutions and corporations should simply use the knowledge, cultural and other resources that the diaspora communities bring to Australia instrumentally. Diaspora communities should not only be brought in at the level of planning and decision-making when it’s convenient and useful but then discarded when they are not. Instead, they should be involved in decision-making processes at every level. Many of the interviewees in our research felt that this was not happening. Q: What about Australians

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overseas? Australia doesn’t currently have a diaspora policy relating to this group. Should it? A: Most of the countries that have developed diaspora policies receive large remittances from their diaspora and their economies are often quite dependent on this source of income. For example, the Philippines, Turkey, Jamaica and Sri Lanka have diaspora policies and perhaps they’ve had to because they get so much money from them. Australia doesn’t get huge remittances and as a result, there is no economic imperative to have a policy in relation to the Australians overseas. In fact, it is widely believed that more money goes out of Australia than comes in, although this is something that is contested by sociologists at the RMIT Univerity such as Supriya Singh. But the perception in government circles is that we don’t need a diaspora policy, that we are fine with these things to develop organically and we will see where it all goes; that there is no problem to be solved. Furthermore, there does not yet appear to be any politically mobilised pressure on governments. I have a different view. I believe that public policies should have an educative function—to get the community to think about the importance of diaspora, as well as the processes of ‘diasporisation’ in Australian society and its considerable potential, both economically and culturally. Q: Are businesses perhaps better placed than governments to devise and implement their own diaspora policy? A: Yes, I think they are and some businesses have already begun to think about it. However, there is still some difficulty in moving beyond the logic of migration to a broader understanding of the processes of diaspora formation and their potential benefits. Businesses have begun to appreciate the economic role that the ethnic communities play, but do not always grasp the importance of the transnationallyconstituted diaspora networks. So, in many ways, the hurdle is analytic rather than practical or political because until we understand the role of diasporas in global trade, we will continue to view them as consumer groups rather than major drivers of economic exchange and productivity. We will continue to say that since ’x per cent of the Australian population is of Asian background’ they need to be represented on the boards etc in similar proportions but will fail to appreciate fully how better representation of transnationally networked people can make a difference in international trade in a rapidly globalising economy. CONTD. ON PG 9

DECEMBER 2021

INTERVIEW/DIASPORA

South Asia Times

Transnational connectivity... CONTD. FROM PG 8

Q: Are there elements of other countries’ diaspora policies that would work in Australia that we should consider adopting? A: The country that we could look at more closely is Singapore which has begun to consider how to take advantage of approximately 10 percent of the Singaporean residents who are not Singaporean citizens. Singapore has begun to ask how it can support them and how it can take advantage of their links to their countries of origin, even if they are not migrants or citizens. Singapore has begun to ask: ‘how can we value the contribution of those diaspora communities of other countries, including Australians, who are living in our midst?’. In Australia, discussions of diaspora policy have largely been about the question of how to support Australians who are living abroad, and not also on how to work with those transient communities who live in Australia and can potentially make a major contribution, more than filling the gaps in the labour market. Q: Turning to higher education, what’s your analysis of the global alumni strategies of universities in Australia? A: These strategies represent one way of capturing the continuing emotional bond that many of the alumni of Australian universities understandably have with Australia, after spending three to eight years here. Many of these alumni are ‘flexible citizens’, as the anthropologist, Aihwa Ong, called them some two decades ago. Some of them have taken out Australian citizenship and settled in Australia, others have gone to another country, while some have returned to their country of origin. A large number of Asian alumni of Australian universities are now living in Europe or the United States studying for their PhD or have a job and have settled there. Just the same, they have a great fondness for Australia. Global alumni strategies are designed to ensure that the universities do not lose contact with these people, many of them retain close links with Australia, as well as their country of origin and their new country of residence. In this way, they are transnationally connected, capable of forging highly productive networks transnationally. The alumni strategies can therefore be most helpful, but the universities have yet to determine how and to what ends. Q: How have the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the current bilateral tensions between Australia and China affected your thinking in relation to the arguments you’ve been articulating? A: I think we are in a tough place in relation to China. Exactly how China-Australia trade relations are going to develop over the next ten years or so is very difficult to predict. I am not sure how, and the extent to which, the recent announcement about the AUKUS alliance and Australia’s intended acquisition of nuclear submarines might damage our relations with China. Unfortunately, many of such macro-level policies affect the relationships between people to people at a very micro level. For example, conscious of the tensions, individual bureaucrats in China might delay giving you the licence that is needed to engage in trade because they consider Australia to be an unfriendly country. Geopolitical tensions also have the potential to prevent good relations from developing, when Chinese-Australians, for example, become fearful about pursuing trade relations through their transnational networks, or Australians might decline an invitation to visit China. Such macro-level geopolitical tensions affect individuals making decisions at a very micro level. Effective transnational relations in trade require confidence in the agencies of the state, but geopolitical tensions make this difficult. When we were researching the 2016 report on Asian diaspora in Australia there were a few interviewees who alerted us to such the thenemerging problems, but most were confident that they would be able to overcome the

difficulties. They were reasonably hopeful that the relationship between China and Australia would get better. It has not. If we went back and interviewed the same people now I am sure we would not get such enthusiastic and positive perceptions of Australia-China relations. They would not be so confident about building transnational networks for economic, political and cultural exchange. Even Australian schools that were planning to develop a relationship with Chinese schools are now somewhat hesitant. The potential of public diplomacy has always been affected by government-to-government relations. It becomes much more complex, difficult and challenging when there are broader tensions between nation-states. The extent to which the current geopolitical tensions will affect the number of university students from China is not clear. And yet Australian universities have become absolutely reliant on this source of income. The planning processes at many universities have long factored in continuing growth in student numbers from China. Some had invested in capital and other works on the assumption that there would be a two percent increase every year for the foreseeable future. They might have even taken out loans on the basis of this assumption. If this assumption cannot be taken for granted, then I have no idea what implications this will have for their financial planning. I am not a university financial planner, but I know enough to be able to say that bilateral tensions between Australia and China are not a good thing for Australian universities. Q: Where do you see the higher education sector in Australia, especially those universities very exposed to the international student market, in the short to medium term, say in three to five years’ time? A: The consumer research conducted over the past 18 months shows very clearly that the interest that students and their parents in China and India have to send their children to Australia remains high. It may have even grown, as many Chinese and Indians try to position themselves in the rapidly changing world differently. International education could be viewed as a possible ticket out of India or China, or other countries. In this sense, there are reasons for optimism. The other ways of looking at the student market point in a different direction. It will depend on whether mobility across borders will even be possible; whether Australian higher education will remain as strong as it has been; or whether everything is going to be affected by cost-cutting, making Australia a less attractive study destination. There is already some evidence that many students are wondering whether Australia remains the best option for them. The stories about racism directed against Asian students in Australia have clearly not been helpful, because they shape the imagination of the people of what life in Australia is like. Those are some factors that are also going to discourage potential students from coming to Australia, including perceptions of declining quality and policy uncertainty. Australian universities and the Australian government will have to think very seriously about these issues, but I am not sure that there is much imaginative policy work being done. For example, the government might have to consider the possibility of offering permanent citizenship to international students sooner, rather than making them wait for two or more years to apply and then go through a complex process that takes 18 months or more and costs a huge amount of money. In other words, the government might have to incentivise potential students with the ‘carrot’ of migration, not as a possibility but as a direct outcome of higher education in Australia. I don’t think the Australian Government, or the Australian community, is going to like that idea. But I am saying that these are the kind of policy considerations that are necessary for

us to think about in relation to the recovery of student numbers. Yet there does not appear to be any indication that these policy issues are being examined in any systematic or creative manner. What kind of creative thinking do you think universities should be undertaking? To begin with, they should be trying to understand how a transnational public space has already emerged and consider what are its opportunities and what challenges it presents. We live in an interconnected world, and, beyond the commercial aspects of internationalisation, we should examine what new forms of transnational connectivity mean for universities, their curriculum and their pedagogic approaches. For example, issues such as the global environmental crisis, the global mobility of people and refugees raise questions about the shifting nature of our inter-connectivity. Such questions demand us to consider what kind of education is appropriate for students experiencing what is called a ‘risk society’. The pandemic has highlighted the importance of these issues. An emphasis on the recovery of student numbers is important, but there are more fundamental educational questions about our interconnectivity and interdependence. I know that universities have many new challenges and they are inevitably shell-shocked, but I do not think that the broader questions about the core purposes of higher education, and its governance, can be set aside. Q: Perhaps you could reflect more on the broad trends of transnationalism and diasporic communities shaping higher education in the context of Australia. How do you see them playing out? A: I want to say again that global interconnectivity is here to stay. The rates of global mobility may be declined as a result of COVID-19, but the mobility of ideas and culture

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have not—they have produced new forms of inter-connectivity. We may be in a very different global terrain. While the mobility of people has gone down significantly, the mobility of information and ideas has intensified, through online learning, online seminars and other modes of communication across borders. In my view, the importance of sharing of knowledge and ideas has never been greater. I have great faith in the potential of higher education being able to do all kinds of exciting things in terms of global inter-connectivity, transnational conversations, exploration of ideas, creativity and innovation. My fear is that this potential might be not be realised because of the excessive reliance on the market model of international education, and the managerialism that has become so ubiquitous in higher education systems in Australia and elsewhere. We need to abandon the narrow instrumentalism that now dominates the thinking about higher education. Exactly how all this will turn out remains to be seen. My suspicion is that universities may become highly differentiated, with some leading boutique universities doing certain kinds of knowledge work while the rest become sites of mass teaching. Transnational connectivity is going to remain part of how we understand the nature of the global economy and the globalising culture. In the shifting constitution of societies, I have no doubt, the diaspora communities will play a major role. Higher education will be a site where these diasporas are forged and cultivated. The connections that international students make at universities both within and beyond Australia have the potential to transform the character of our communities, but also of the countries of their origin. Source- Melbourne Asia Review (Under Creative Commons Licence)

south asia

SOUTH ASIA SOUTH ASIA

South Asia Times

DECEMBER 2021

Abortion in India: Bridging the gap between progressive legislation and implementation

By Seerat Chabba

medical practitioner takes the decision based on good faith, it is completely dependent on the attitude of the doctor. In many cases, pregnant women are asked for proof of identity or even marriage certificates before the doctor signs off on the procedure. There are no safeguards to prevent exploitation. "A great opportunity to craft a truly progressive, rights-based abortion law for the country has been missed," the Pratigya coalition said.

EW DELHI, 18 November 2021: When India first passed its abortion legislation in 1971, it was one of the most progressive laws in the world. Fifty years and an amendment later, the country is struggling to offer rights-based abortion care. Shilpa (name changed) found out she was pregnant at the age of 21. She had just enrolled herself into graduate school in India's commercial capital of Mumbai. Distraught and alone in a big city, she took an autorickshaw to the nearest hospital and got an appointment with a gynecologist. Braving judgmental glances, the first question that she had to answer was: "Are you married?" In many parts of India, this question is asked when the doctor wants to know whether the person has been sexually active. Premarital sex remains taboo. Eight months after medically terminating her pregnancy, Shilpa moved to Bangalore for her first job. A few weeks later, she began receiving calls from odd numbers. Multiple men called her at different times — day and night — and asked her questions like "Did you kill your child?" "Do you have a husband?" "Are you sleeping with other men?" Her contact details had been leaked, either from the first hospital she visited or the gynecologist's clinic. But no one took responsibility for the harassment she faced. Finally, she blocked all unknown callers and changed her phone number. India has some of the most progressive legislation when it comes to reproductive rights. However, the social stigma attached to abortion, in conjunction with a lack of knowledge about a woman's rights, leads to several harrowing incidents like the one Shilpa had to face. What are the changes? In order to provide comprehensive abortion care to all in need, the government of India recently amended the Medical Termination of Pregnancy (MTP) Act 1971. The new legislation means the upper gestation limit for several categories — including survivors of rape, victims of incest and other vulnerable women — has been increased from 20 weeks to 24 weeks.

Under the penal code it’s a crime to get an abortion, but with the MTP in place, exceptions are permitted in such instances. Others can also get the procedure if they have the consent of the doctor before 20 weeks. This limit does not apply to cases of substantial fetal abnormalities diagnosed by a medical board. In addition to this, the opinion of two health care providers is required for the termination between 20-24 weeks. Before this period, only one provider's opinion is required. Finally, the bill introduced a confidentiality clause, under which the name and other particulars of women cannot be revealed except to a person who has been authorized by law. The new rules aim to extend MTP services to unmarried

women under the failure of contraceptive clause, providing access to safe abortion by choice and not marital status. "This is a win for the collective wish of women in India. The amendments have increased the ambit and access of women to safe and legal abortion services," Dr. Sumita Ghosh, additional commissioner at the Comprehensive Abortion Care, Child Health and Adolescent Health, on behalf of the Indian government, said in a statement. But reproductive rights organizations say legislation is just the first step in the right direction. Legality vs. practice While India's abortion laws were not rights-based, at the time the MTP Act was passed, in 1971, it was one of the most progressive pieces of legislation

on reproductive rights in the world. Fifty years later, the basic purpose of the law remains the same: to protect providers as abortion remains a crime under the Indian Penal Code, according to the Pratigya Campaign, a network of individuals and organizations working towards protecting and advancing women's rights and their access to safe abortion care in India. "In spite of the amendments passed, it is still not legislation that advances women's rights or ensures dignity and justice. Women and girls will continue to face significant barriers in accessing safe abortion in India," the Pratigya Campaign network said. The biggest barrier remains the "failure of contraception" clause. While this is often seen as a free pass where the

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Beating the stigma For a country that claims to have progressive abortion laws, India also sees unsafe abortions as the third-leading cause of maternal deaths. Close to 80% of Indian women have no idea that abortion within 20 weeks can be legal. The concept of choice remains a precarious one in the Indian setting. "In a country of 1.36 billion, there are only around 50,00070,000 OB-GYNs (obstetriciangynecologists)," Dr. Suchitra Dalvie, a gynecologist and co-founder of the Asia Safe Abortion Partnership, told DW. "Most of these are based in cities or towns, and not all of them are either pro-choice or undertaking abortion provision." Referring to the amendments as a story of missed opportunities, she outlined some major themes that she says were missed, including the shift of power from the health care providers to the individual who did not want to continue the pregnancy. In addition to not changing the language to reflect "pregnant persons" and not women, which Dalvie says would have made the law trans-inclusive, the amendments do not increase the pregnant person's autonomy and agency or take a step towards decriminalizing abortions. The amendments also cannot ensure that no one is turned away or forced into an unsafe abortion, or provide for better access to medical abortion pills. "I come from a position of privilege but that didn't stop someone from harassing me over my choice," Shilpa told DW. "For millions of women who don't have access to legal recourse, abortion care remains a distant dream." Edited by: John Silk Source- dw.com

VIEWPOINT

DECEMBER 2021

South Asia Times

Farmers win on many fronts, media fails on all By P. Sainath

he repeal of the three farm laws came about not because the PM failed to ‘persuade’ some farmers, but because many farmers stood resolute, even as a craven media devalued their struggle and strength. What the media can never openly admit is that the largest peaceful democratic protest the world has seen in years – certainly the greatest organised at the height of the pandemic – has won a mighty victory. A victory that carries forward a legacy. Farmers of all kinds, men and women – including from Adivasi and Dalit communities – played a crucial role in this country’s struggle for freedom. And in the 75th year of our Independence, the farmers at Delhi’s gates reiterated the spirit of that great struggle. Prime Minister Modi has announced he is backing off and repealing the farm laws in the upcoming winter session of Parliament starting on the 29th of this month. He says he is doing so after failing to persuade ‘a section of farmers despite best efforts’. Just a section, mind you, that he could not convince to accept that the three discredited farm laws were really good for them. Not a word on, or for, the over 600 farmers who have died in the course of this historic struggle. His failure, he makes it clear, is only in his skills of persuasion, in not getting that ‘section of farmers’ to see the light. No failure attaches to the laws themselves or to how his government rammed them through right in the middle of a pandemic. Well, the Khalistanis, antinationals, bogus activists masquerading as farmers, have graduated to being ‘a section of farmers’ who declined to be persuaded by Mr. Modi’s chilling charms. Refused to be persuaded? What was the manner and method of persuasion? By denying them entry to the capital city to explain their grievances? By blocking them with trenches and barbed wire? By hitting them with water cannons? By converting their camps into little gulags? By having crony media vilify the farmers every day? By running them over with vehicles – allegedly owned by a union minister or his son? That’s this government’s idea of persuasion? If those were its ‘best efforts’ we’d hate to see its worst ones. The Prime Minister made at least seven visits overseas this year alone (like the latest one for CoP26). But never once found

the time to just drive down a few kilometres from his residence to visit tens of thousands of farmers at Delhi’s gates, whose agony touched so many people everywhere in the country. Would that not have been a genuine effort at persuasion? From the first month of the present protests, I was barraged with questions from media and others about how long could they possibly hold out ? The farmers have answered that question. But they also know that this fantastic victory of theirs is a first step. That the repeal means getting the corporate foot off the cultivator’s neck for now – but a raft of other problems from MSP and procurement, to much larger issues of economic policies, still demand resolution. The anchors on television tell us – as if it is a stunning revelation – that this backing off by the government must have something to do with the upcoming Assembly elections in five states next February. The same media failed to tell you anything about the significance of the bypoll results in 29 Assembly and 3 Parliamentary constituencies announced on November 3. Read the editorials around that time – see what passed for analysis on television. They spoke of ruling parties usually winning bypolls, of some anger locally – and not just with the BJP and more such blah. Few editorials had a word to say about two factors influencing those poll results – the farmers’ protests and Covid-19 mismanagement. Mr. Modi’s announcement

today shows that he at least, and at last, has wisely understood the importance of both those factors. He knows that some huge defeats have taken place in states where the farmers’ agitation is intense. States like Rajasthan and Himachal – but which a media, parroting to its audiences that it was all Punjab and Haryana, could not factor into their analyses. When last did we see the BJP or any sangh parivar formation come third and fourth in two constituencies in Rajasthan? Or take the pasting they got in Himachal where they lost all three Assembly and one Parliament seat? In Haryana, as the protestors put it, “the entire government from CM to DM” was there campaigning for the BJP; where the Congress foolishly put up a candidate against Abhay Chautala, who had resigned on the farmers’ issue; where union ministers pitched in with great strength – the BJP still lost. The Congress candidate lost his deposit but managed to shave a bit off Chautala’s margin – he still won by over 6,000 votes. All three states felt the impact of the farmers’ protests – and unlike the corpo-crawlers, the Prime Minister has understood that. With the impact of those protests in western Uttar Pradesh, to which was added the self-inflicted damage of the appalling murders at Lakhimpur Kheri, and with elections to come in that state in perhaps 90 days from now, he saw the light. In three months’ time, the BJP government will have to answer the question – if the opposition has the sense to raise

it – of whatever happened to the doubling of farmers’ incomes by 2022? The 77th round of the NSS (National Sample Survey, 201819) shows a fall in the share of income from crop cultivation for farmers – forget a doubling of farmer incomes overall. It also shows an absolute decline in real income from crop cultivation. The farmers have actually done much more than achieve that resolute demand for the repeal of the laws. Their struggle has profoundly impacted the politics of this country. As did their distress in the 2004 general elections. This is not at all the end of the agrarian crisis. It is the beginning of a new phase of the battle on the larger issues of that crisis. Farmer protests have been on for a long time now. And particularly strongly since 2018, when the Adivasi farmers of Maharashtra electrified the nation with their astonishing 182-km march on foot from Nashik to Mumbai. Then too, it began with their being dismissed as ‘urban naxals’, as not real farmers, and the rest of the blah. Their march routed their vilifiers. There are many victories here today. Not the least of which is the one the farmers have scored over corporate media. On the farm issue (as on so many others), that media functioned as extra power AAA batteries (Amplifying Ambani Adani +). Between December and next April, we will mark 200 years of the launch of two great journals (both by Raja Rammohan Roy) that could be said to have been the beginning of a truly Indian (owned and felt) press. One of which – Mirat-ul-Akhbar – brilliantly exposed the angrezi administration over the killing of Pratap Narayan Das from a whipping ordered by a judge in Comilla (now in Chittagong, Bangladesh). Roy’s powerful editorial resulted in the judge being hauled up and tried by the highest court of the time. The Governor General reacted to this by terrorising the press. Promulgating a draconian new Press Ordinance, he sought to bring them to heel. Refusing to submit to this, Roy announced he was shutting down Miratul-Akhbar rather than submit to what he called degrading and humiliating laws and circumstances. (And went on to take his battle to and through other journals!) That was journalism of courage. Not the journalism of crony courage and capitulation we’ve seen on the farm issue. Pursued with a veneer of ‘concern’ for the farmers in unsigned editorials while

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slamming them on the oped pages as wealthy farmers ‘seeking socialism for the rich.’ The Indian Express , the Times of India , almost the whole spectrum of newspapers – would say, essentially, that these were rural yokels who only needed to be spoken to sweetly. The edits invariably ended on the appeal: but do not withdraw these laws, they’re really good. Ditto for much of the rest of the media. Did any of these publications once tell their readers – on the standoff between farmers and corporates – that Mukesh Ambani’s personal wealth of 84.5 billion dollars ( Forbes 2021) was closing in very fast on the GSDP of the state of Punjab (about 85.5 billion)? Did they once tell you that the wealth of Ambani and Adani (who clocked $50.5 billion) together was greater than the GSDP of either Punjab or Haryana? Well, there are extenuating circumstances. Ambani is the biggest owner of media in India. And in those media that he does not own, probably the greatest advertiser. The wealth of these two corporate barons can be and is often written about – generally in a celebratory tone. This is the journalism of corpocrawl. Already there is bleating about how this cunning strategy – the backing off – will have significant impact in the Punjab Assembly polls. That Amarinder Singh has projected this as a victory he engineered by resigning from the Congress and negotiating with Modi. That this will alter the poll picture there. But the hundreds of thousands of people in that state who have participated in that struggle know whose victory it is. The hearts of the people of Punjab are with those in the protest camps who have endured one of Delhi’s worst winters in decades, a scorching summer, rains thereafter, and miserable treatment from Mr. Modi and his captive media. And perhaps the most important thing the protestors have achieved is this: to inspire resistance in other spheres as well, to a government that simply throws its detractors into prison or otherwise hounds and harasses them. That freely arrests citizens, including journalists, under the UAPA, and cracks down on independent media for ‘economic offences’. This day isn’t just a win for the farmers. It’s a win for the battle for civil liberties and human rights. A win for Indian democracy. Source- ruralindiaonline.org, Nov 20, 2021

ENVIRONMENT

South Asia Times

DECEMBER 2021

Coal: The end is neigh – or is it? By P. K. Ranmachandaran

mid a worldwide energy crisis, global coal power emissions are surging to pre-pandemic highs, especially in China and India. Rising oil and gas prices and the onset of winter have conspired with the energy needs of rebounding post-COVID economies to increase coal demand after a long decline. The renaissance of the most carbon intensive fossil fuel was further reinforced when a commitment to a coal "phase-out" in the Glasgow Climate Pact was weakened to a "phase-down." Going into COP26, the UK president of the conference Alok Sharma said he hoped the summit would "consign coal power to history" in a bid to keep global heating to around 1.5 degrees Celsius (2.7 Fahrenheit). That didn't quite happen. "A green light for more coal production," was how former Australian resources minister, Matt Canavan, responded to the lastminute diluting of the plan to exit coal. "The countries in our region, like India, like China, like Southeast Asia, are growing and developing their industries, and their demand for coal almost has no limit," he said in a television interview. Experts admit that the weakened language in the Glasgow agreement could muddy the broader momentum towards a coal phase-out by 2030 or 2040 at the latest. But the current spike in coal demand will be a "short-term phenomenon"

linked to a strong postlockdown economic rebound, believes Catharina Hillenbrand von der Neyen, head of research at climate think tank, Carbon Tracker. "I would strongly caution against any view that this is the revival of coal." Revival unlikely to last Neyen expects coal to revert to its pre-COVID slide driven by cheaper renewables — including in China, which generated over half of the world's coal-fired power in 2020. "The structural trend is for steeply falling load factors," she said, meaning that with competition from renewables, coal plants aren't running at full capacity, rendering them unprofitable. While new coal power plants are being built, they contribute to an oversupply that only exacerbates the

problem. As a result, 27% of the global coal fleet has become unviable, according to Carbon Tracker. "If I could put all my eggs into the coal basket again, you might find they drop onto the floor quite quickly," said Hillenbrand von der Neyen of coal's precipitous long-term outlook. Gaurav Ganti, a researcher with Berlinbased think tank Climate Analytics, agrees. "This short-lived renaissance is unlikely to persist, given strong headwinds from lowcost renewables," he said. Even as China and India power their COVID recovery with coal, the fact remains that the number of planned new coal power plants has declined by 76% since 2015 when the Paris Agreement was signed, according to climate change think tank E3G. This is equivalent to China's whole coal capacity. 'No room for complacency' China provided about 75% of global coal investment in 2020. However, its decision in September to end funding of coal projects beyond its shores, and to peak its own coal use by 2025 as part of its 2060 net-zero emissions plan, is a further signal of coal's inevitable demise, said Ganti. "However, there is no room for complacency," he added — even despite the broader commitment by 47 countries at COP26 to phase out coal via the Global Coal to Clean Power Transition Statement. "Our work indicates that keeping to 1.5 C, the warming limit of the Paris Agreement,

requires coal-fired power to be phased out by 2030 in developed economies, and 2040 globally. Developing countries will require substantial international support for ditching coal." And despite the Glasgow conference backing away from firm language on ending coal, individual countries are bringing their phase-out deadlines forward. Germany's new governing coalition — comprising Social Democrats (SDP), Greens and Free Democrats (FDP) — is aiming for a 2030 coal exit, eight years ahead of the country's previous schedule. Germany is Europe's second largest coal consumer and producer, but even amid a nuclear energy phase-out, it already managed to halve coal power consumption between 2010 and 2020. And while it's true that coal energy demand has also spiked in Germany in 2021, this was due in part to unusually poor weather conditions for wind and solar. Financing a global coal phase-out Along with other EU nations and the US, Germany is also helping to finance a coal phaseout in South Africa, which produces 90% of its energy from coal and is the biggest emitter of the fossil fuel in Africa. Germany's thenenvironment minister described the $8.5 billion (€7.3 billion) initiative agreed to in Glasgow to fund the shift from coal to clean energy as a potential "blueprint" for other regions. Meanwhile, Portugal this

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week completely stopped burning coal for energy, two years ahead of a planned phase-out. Fossil fuel powerhouse Ukraine has also committed to ending coal-power generation by 2035, or 2040 at the latest. At COP26, the country joined the Powering Past Coal Alliance (PPCA), a coalition of national governments, businesses and organizations committed to an accelerated coal exit. Stranded coal assets Researchers are warning that governments who stick with coal could be set to lose billions in stranded assets — as well as hundreds of thousands of jobs — as the world decarbonizes to limit heating to below 2 degrees Celsius. A stranded asset is something that had value or generated income but no longer does. According to a June 2021 report, one-third of coal mines in Europe, North America and Australia will become stranded assets by 2040 if countries meet their climate targets. Australia, for example, could lose $25 billion (€22 billion) per year in this scenario. Globally, 2.2 million jobs could be at risk unless countries act quickly to transition to a cleaner energy system. But economics is not the only motivation to get out of coal. "Governments face a choice here," said Gaurav Ganti. "Invest in the fossil fuels of yesterday and risk stranded assets, or invest in renewable energy to get us on a 1.5 C pathway." Edited by Ruby Russell/ Jennifer Collins Source- dw.com

DECEMBER 2021

SPORTS/CRICKET

South Asia Times

ICC strategy for Global Growth strengthen, grow, and protect Cricket By Sreelata S. Yellamrazu

he International Cricket Council today unveiled its global growth strategy which places women’s cricket firmly at the heart of its long-term ambitions. The strategy which has been developed in partnership with ICC Members is aimed at strengthening, growing, and protecting the game with the vision of more players, more fans and more nations enjoying cricket. The strategic pillars of strengthen, grow, and protect will be underpinned by digital transformation of the sport to support Members to connect directly with fans and build capacity. ICC CEO Geoff Allardice said: “Our strategy is focused on more players, more fans and more nations enjoying cricket and we believe by working closely with Members we can build on the strength of what we already have but also grow the game in new markets. “I am particularly excited by the commitment of everyone in the sport to investing in and growing the women’s game. Over the last four years we have invested in ICC women’s events and witnessed 86,174 people in the MCG to watch the final of the ICC Women’s T20 World Cup 2020 which is the best illustration yet of our research that tells us that two thirds of cricket’s 1 billion plus fans want to see more women’s cricket “Digital transformation will play a crucial role in delivering the success of our strategy as we look to attract and engage more fans and build digital platforms that enable our Members to create direct relationships with 300 million fans by 2032.”

more people and more places, the ICC will focus on getting more people playing and engaging with cricket through its criiio entry level programme and enhanced education programmes for coaches, officials, and

curators. Female participation will be prioritised as will key identified new markets to drive targeted growth, the first of which will be the USA. Olympic inclusion is also considered a central plank of growing cricket globally.

Protect Protecting the integrity of the sport and inspiring trust among fans is the third pillar of the strategic framework. Providing an environment that is safe for all participants

Strengthen To strengthen the sport and drive greater engagement from what already exists, the ICC will deliver competitive cricket with context for all Members, invest in and grow women’s cricket, build cricket among Associate Members and deepen fans’ connection through digital transformation, including the ongoing development of ICC. tv, the direct to fan platform and with the development of a mobile game. Grow To grow the sport through www.southasiatimes.com.au - 0421 677 082

and brings to life the spirit of cricket will be a key area of focus along with the continued commitment to leading the way in delivering a corruption free sport. Additionally, the ICC Cricket 4 Good programme will be developed to harness the power of more than one billion fans to build a better future. In addition to the framework, six strategic priority projects have been highlighted in the strategy as the sport looks to build and consolidate on recent success. ICC Chair Greg Barclay said: “This strategy is for the whole sport, and it will enable us to strengthen what we currently have, particularly around the women’s game and ensuring we’re delivering competitive cricket with context for all our Members. It also provides us with the opportunity to look at growing the game and getting more people playing and engaging with cricket through new markets and Olympic inclusion. “Finally, it identifies the importance of protecting the integrity of our game and inspiring trust among fans and using the power of cricket to build a better future. This framework is something on which the whole sport is aligned and I’m looking forward to working in partnership with our Members to create a successful and sustainable future for cricket.”

South Asia Times

AUSTRALIA

DECEMBER 2021

The Jenkins review has 28 recommendations to fix parliament’s toxic culture – will our leaders listen? parliamentary health and well-being service.

By Sonia Palmieri*

n the wake of Brittany Higgins’ shocking allegations about being raped in a ministers’ office by a colleague, Prime Minister Scott Morrison initiated multiple inquiries. Arguably, the most significant was the independent review into parliamentary workplaces, headed up by Sex Discrimination Commissioner Kate Jenkins and supported by Labor and the crossbench. The review has been underway since March, speaking to current and former MPs and employees at parliament house and its associated workplaces - such as electorate offices and the press gallery. On Tuesday, the 450-page report, Set the Standard, was released. As Jenkins observed, parliament house should be something “Australians look to with pride”. This report represents a wholesale change strategy, and calls for leadership and accountability across a diverse parliamentary “ecosystem”. This new roadmap is grounded in the testimony and experiences of more than 1,700 contributors, including 147 former and current parliamentarians. What did the report find? The report included a survey of current parliamentarians and people currently working at parliament house (such as staffers, journalists and public servants). More than 900 people responded. It found more than 37% of people currently in parliamentary workplaces have personally experienced bullying in a parliamentary workplace. As one interviewee noted: Frequently, like at least every week, the advice was go and cry in the toilet so that nobody can see you, because that’s what it’s like up here. It also found 33% of people currently in parliamentary workplaces have personally experienced sexual harassment in a parliamentary workplace. As one interviewee reported: Aspiring male politicians who thought nothing of, in one case, picking you up, kissing you on the lips, lifting you up, touching you, pats on the bottom, comments about appearance, you know, the usual. The point I make with that… was the culture allowed it, encouraged it. The report notes a devastating impact on people as a result of these experiences. This included an impact on their mental and physical health, confidence and ability to do their job, as well as their future career, “these experiences also caused significant distress and shame”.

The drivers behind this behaviour A critical part of the report looks at the drivers which contribute to misconduct in parliamentary workplaces. Participants also described risk factors which interact with these drivers to endanger their workplaces.

dynamics, a “win at all costs” and high-pressure and high-stakes environment social conditions of work, including “significant” alcohol use and a “work hard, play hard” culture. employment structures and systems, such as a lack of transparent and merit-based recruitment.

The drivers include: Power imbalances, where participants described a focus on the pursuit and exercise of power as well as insecure employment and high levels of power and discretion in relation to employment gender inequality, including a lack of women in senior roles lack of accountability, including limited recourse for those who experience misconduct entitlement and exclusion, or “a male, stale and pale monopoly on power in [the] building”

Recommendations

The risk factors include: Unclear standards of behaviour, leading to confusion about the standards that apply a leadership deficit, such as a prioritisation of political gain over people management workplace

There are 28 recommendations in the report. They include a statement of acknowledgement from parliamentary leaders, recognising people’s experiences of bullying, sexual harassment and sexual assault in parliamentary workplaces, targets to increase gender balance among parliamentarians and a new office of parliament staffing and culture. The report also wants to see the professionalisation of management practices for parliamentary staff and a code of conduct for parliamentarians and their staff. An independent commission would enforce these standards. The report also calls for a new

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Where to from here Two key press conferences – from Morrison and Jenkins – accompanied the release of the Set the Standard report. But the change expected by the report requires much more than words – it requires concerted action. Parliament now needs to endorse and implement a number of key accountability mechanisms to ensure that, as an institution, it ensures all building occupants are safe and respected at work. These include the office on parliamentary staffing and culture and independent parliamentary standards commission. In addition, the report calls on the parliament itself to continue reflecting and thinking through appropriate changes. For example, the parliamentary work schedule is shown to drive a workplace culture that values “presence and endurance” over remote working and flexibility. Sitting in the chamber at 9pm does not necessarily equal productivity, particularly when it is propped up – among political staffers – with alcohol. There is no simple solution here. Some argue long hours in parliament house mean longer periods away from parliament, in the electorate, with families. Others argue the work day should end – as it does in other workplaces – before dinner. Jenkins recommends parliament does its own review of the sitting schedule. Hopefully this will create “buy in” from parliamentarians, but reviews like this have been undertaken before (and have not led to cultural change). For this report to lead to meaningful change, everyone in all the many, varied parliamentary workplaces has to take responsibility for the systemic inequality that drives toxic workplace behaviour in the building. Responsibility is not equally distributed though. Morrison may call for a bipartisan approach, but he currently leads the government responsible for instigating the inquiry and implementing its recommendations. His challenge will be in convincing the electorate he means it when he says he wants to fix this “very, very serious problem”. If you or someone you know is impacted by sexual assault, family or domestic violence, call 1800RESPECT on 1800 737 732 or visit www.1800RESPECT.org.au. In an emergency, call 000. International helplines can be found via www. befrienders.org. • Gender Policy Fellow, Australian National University Source- The Conversation, November 30, 2021 (Under Creative Commons Licence)

book review

DECEMBER 2021

South Asia Times

Book on Bhil rebels offers other side of history, neglected by 'nationalist' historians By Vidya Bhushan Rawat*

prisoners out of 232 who died during a journey to Khandesh, which reflects upon the behaviour of the police towards them.

ne of the major accusations against Indian historians is that of neglecting and ignoring the role of the marginalised in the freedom struggle. Most of the time, we are ‘informed’ that there were some ‘heroes’ and ‘villains’ of the freedom movement, all of them belonging to the same stock of caste as well as ‘power’ positions as their opponents. In the process, Dalits and Adivasis have been relegated to the back pages of history, one reason why narratives and issues found in folklores and live stories become an important tool to understand them. Keeping this in view, Subhash Chandra Kushwaha, an important chronicler of history, has studied the Bhil tribe in his book ‘Bhil Vidroh: Sangharsh Ke Sava Sau Saal’ ( Bhil Revolt: One Hundred Twenty Five years of Struggle, published). Published by Hind Yugm and in Hindi, the study is based on historical documents in various archives both in India as well as abroad. Kushwaha has covered the period from 1800 to 1925, when international newspapers would report events in India, as well as various documents available in various archives. It is not that the history of Bhils has not ‘existed’ prior to this, but documentation pertaining to this period has till now not been explored in the archives. He also analyses folklores, spoken to people and visited places, including monuments and structures, listening to traditional songs and understanding the Bhils’ celebrations or festivities. The Bhils have been victims of our hierarchical caste system and were brutalised and criminalised by the kingly clans of Rajputs prior to arrival of the British, explains the author. Bhils were the owners of Khandesh as well as Central India, but were pushed to the forests by the ‘Rajput invaders’, as suggested by by Captain E Barnes and Thomas Emily Young in ‘The Journal of Society of Art’ on February 8, 1907. Quoting Barnes and Young, Kushwaha says that Jhabua till 1550 was a Bhil kingdom and was passed on to the Rajputs by Akbar. Kushwaha has built his

Bhil revolts

narrative chronologically in order to help understand the areas where the Bhils lived. The chapter on the Bhils of Khandesh shows how both the Mughals as well as the Marathas fought to control the Bhils. With the ascendancy of Bajirao as Peshwa in 1798, Khandesh saw the downfall of various Bhil Jagirdars, and anarchy grew thereafter. The Peshwas reportedly were a brutal force who criminalised Bhils. Equally brutal were the Marathas. Discussing the Bhil-Rajput relationship, he statesthata ‘Bhilala’ community of Bhils emerged out of relationship between Rajputs men and Bhil women or vice versa. Bhilalas considered themselves superior to others – though the Bhils don’t think so. The British felt that the Brahmin rulers of western India made the Bhils what they had become at that time due to their brutalisation and criminalisation. By 1818, the anarchy reached its peak when the British took control of the Khandesh and had to face “80 notorious gangs” (as per the book) with over 5,000 followers. The British knew it well that it would be difficult to control the anarchy in Khandesh unless the Bhils were taken

into confidence. They realised that the chaos and anarchy in the Bhil zone is basically because of the criminalisation process started by the Peshwas and the Maratthas. Hence, the British focused on the ‘policy of reclamation’, not on the policy of extermination, as was during the previous regimes. By April 1827, the Khandesh Bhil Corp was born, as “peace” was allegedly restored in the region. Kushwaha dwells on the policy of the British in Central India, giving detailed examples of how robbery and looting in the region was rampant. The British felt that the Bhils could be useful for them as they were brave and loyal. The chapter on Bhil rebellion in Khandesh and Madhya Bharat gives the reasons why the Bhils turned into gangs of looters and rebelled, as the old kingdoms left them unattended during the time of massive drought and famine, killing hundreds of people, compelling them to fend for themselves. The Bhils became rebels because of their socioeconomic conditions and exploitation. They were widespread deaths, yet they never lost fighting honorably. In 1823, as many as 172 Bhil

The first Bhil revolt took place in 1804 against the Peshwas who had brutally criminalised the Bhils. Prior to the British takeover, the Bhils fought against the local chieftains and the caste prejudiced Rajas and Majarajas, who were exploiting them. The book documents important heroes of Bhil rebellion in the early 19th century such as Nadir Singh Bhil, Gumani Nayak, Cheel Nayak, Dasharath and Kania, Hiriya Bhil and Bhari Bhil. It details numerous stories ranging from the Mulher (Nasik, Maharastra) battle of 1825 to the rebillion of Kunwar Jeeva Vasava in 1846. It also explains how the English tried to divide Bhils on religious lines, as Muslim Bhils were found to be more aggressive and rebellious. The Adivasis were fighting to protect their own land from the outsiders, and for them whether it was Indian outsiders or the British, it did not matter. However, the fact is, the British too wanted to exploit their natural resources. The British wanted to exploit the forest resources and wanted to push their ‘citizenship agenda’ everywhere. The census operations started for the purpose of identifying people and resources, so that everything is documented. In 1852, land survey was ordered in the Jal Gaon area, as the East India Company wanted to push through its new revenue model, and the forest was an income generating or revenue generating model for them. Hence, there was massive revolt against the British in 1853 and 1858 against the exploitation of the local resources. The rest of India, too, witnessed revolt against British policies, but Adivasis and Dalits were also maltreated by those who were claiming discrimination from the British. Dalits and Adivasis were exploited by feudal lords, who treated them worse than the animals. Kushwaha has referred to this his two-

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landmark works, ‘Chauri Chaura Revolt and Freedom Movement’, now available in English, as also ‘Avadh Kisan Vidroh’ (in Hindi), both of which give the other side of the history which has been neglected by historians. All these movements subsided in the nationalist war cries of Gandhiji and the Congress, which assimilated them and converted the entire issue as the fight against the British Raj. Ignoring the local feudal caste culture was the biggest drawback of the national movement, though Gandhiji symbolically tried to address the issue of untouchability, albeit without attacking the caste system. The second part of the book focuses on Rajputana, Revakanta and Mahi Kanta agencies, giving us details about the geographical location of the region, followed with an analysis of Rajputs and the Bhils of Rajputana. Rajputs and Bhils had complex relationship, and perhaps historians can work further on the issue, particularly in Rajasthan, where the Rajputs are very particular about their historical heritage and mention Maharana Pratap as an extremely benevolent ruler and a friend of the Bhils. Revakanta was an agency in Gujarat, as was MahiKanta in Bombay Presidency, where the Bhils lived in large numbers and revolted against the British policy of acting against the Bhil Jagirdars. The British military action in 1820 hardly got any success. The rebellion could be contained only to some extent in December 1823. A separate chapter deals with the icons or heroes of the Rajputana, Revakanta and the Mahi Kanta Bhil revolt, beginning with the Baroda Bhil revolt in 1804. The first among the heroes was Jagga Rawat who rejected the domain of the Rajput kings and was arrested on February 27, 1826 and was kept in jail till 1830, though not much is known about his condition thereafter. Another interesting documentation is that of the Banswada rebellion (187275) led by Dalla, Deva, Onkar Rawat and Anupji Bhil. A pact in 1868 between the Banswada State and the British got the British the right to

suppress the Bhils and exploit the natural reserves in the area. There are interesting descriptions of the Mewar Bhil Revolt of 1881 and the heroic fight of Govind Guru at Mangarh Tekri in the Dungarpur province in 1913, and how the British finally neutralised the Bhils in the region. The Bhils rebelled against exploitation and refused to do slave labour. There was campaign against alcoholism as well as for vegetarianism, monogamy and against dowry.

Tantya Bhil

In the part third of the book, there is a biographical sketch of Tantya Bhil, who was referred to as the Great Indian Moonlighter by the foreign media. He was a rebel with a cause and his ferociousness got him the Robin Hood-type image. He was a messiah of the poor. Born in 1842, Tantya saw exploitation from the childhood, as his ancestral property was illegally grabbed by the local feudal lord whose caretaker was killed by Tantya. Tantya was arrested in 1873 and got one year imprisonment. He continued his fight against the exploiters and went in and came out of the jail many a time. From 1878 to 1888 Tantya had over 400 cases of dacoity against, him but he was never caught. Police always disturbed his relatives and other family members. Tantya was finally arrested on August 11, 1889. On October 19, 1889, Tantya was sentenced to death by sessions judge Lindse Niel in Jabalpur. On December 4, 1889 Tantya was hanged to death inside the jail. Kushwaha is writing a separate book on Tantya Bhil. Kushwaha, who has worked on Adivasi issues passionately and voluntarily for the last so many years, documenting things from various archives and libraries, can a starting point for the researchers in universities to follow it up and dig up the Adivasi history further. We need more such initiatives, particularly from the Adivasi communities and their scholars, to take this further towards a logical conclusion. Source- Counterview.net, November 29, 2021

CINEMA

South Asia Times

DECEMBER 2021

83 releasing

on December 24, 2021 This victory put India on the map again and provided the platform to make India the greatest cricketing nation in the world today. Armed with self-belief and conviction, one man guided the team to a historic victory.

By SAT News Desk

ELBOURNE: In Australia, 83 is a Christmas release, starring Ranveer Singh and Deepika Padukone and is in Hindi with English subtitles. The film is produced in 2D and 3D in 5 languages - Hindi, Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam and Kannada. On 25th of June 1983, the Lord’s Cricket Ground witnessed one of the biggest underdog stories in the history of sports. Fourteen inspired men fought against all odds and orchestrated India’s greatest sporting triumph by beating the twice over World Champions West Indies! This victory put India on the map again and provided the platform to make India the greatest cricketing nation in the world today. Armed with self-belief and conviction, one man guided the team to a historic victory. The movie is jointly

produced by Kabir Khan, Vishnuvardhan Induri, Deepika Padukone and Sajid Nadiadwala, Reliance Entertainment, Phantom Films and 83 Film Ltd. Others acting in the film include Pankaj Tripathi, Tahir Raj Bhasin, Jiiva, Saqib Saleem, Jatin Sarna, Chirag Patil, Dinker Sharma, Nishant Dahiya, Harrdy Sandhu, Sahil Khattar, Ammy Virk, Adinath Kothare, Dhairya Karwa and R Badree. Who plays who: Ranveer Singh (Kapil Dev), Pankaj Tripathi (Man Singh, Team Manager), JIiva (Krishnamachari Srikkanth), Ammy Virk (Balwinder Sandhu), Tahir Raj Bhasin (Sunil Gavaskar), Dhairya Karwa (Ravi Shasrtri), Chirag Patil (Sandeep Patil) and so on. The music is by Pritam with lyrics penned by Kaysar Munir, Prashant Ingole & Jaideep Sahni. Arijit Singh has crooned a song "India Jeetega" and also singer KK has crooned a song for the film.

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World Malaria Report 2021

DECEMBER 2021

South Asia Times

More malaria cases and deaths in 2020 linked to COVID-19 disruptions From WHO media team

investments. Innovation in new tools is also a critical strategy for accelerating progress. One important new prevention tool is RTS,S/AS01 (RTS,S), the first vaccine ever to be recommended by WHO against a human parasite. In October 2021, WHO recommended RTS,S for children living in subSaharan Africa and in other regions with moderate to high P. falciparum malaria transmission.

eneva, 6 December 2021 – New data from the World Health Organization reveal that the COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted malaria services, leading to a marked increase in cases and deaths. According to WHO’s latest World malaria report, there were an estimated 241 million malaria cases and 627 000 malaria deaths worldwide in 2020. This represents about 14 million more cases in 2020 compared to 2019, and 69 000 more deaths. Approximately two-thirds of these additional deaths (47 000) were linked to disruptions in the provision of malaria prevention, diagnosis and treatment during the pandemic. However, the situation could have been far worse. In the early days of pandemic, WHO had projected that – with severe service disruptions – malaria deaths in sub-Saharan Africa could potentially double in 2020. But many countries took urgent action to shore up their malaria programmes, averting this worst-case scenario. Sub-Saharan Africa continues to carry the heaviest malaria burden, accounting for about 95% of all malaria cases and 96% of all deaths in 2020. About 80% of deaths in the region are among children under 5 years of age. The pandemic struck at a point when global progress against malaria had already plateaued. By around 2017, there were signs that the phenomenal gains made since 2000—including a 27% reduction in global malaria case incidence and a nearly

51% reduction in the malaria mortality rate—were stalling. “Even before the COVID-19 pandemic struck, global gains against malaria had levelled off,” said Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, WHO DirectorGeneral. “Thanks to the hard work of public health agencies in malaria-affected countries, the worst projections of COVID's impact have not come to pass. Now, we need to harness that same energy and commitment to reverse the setbacks caused by the pandemic and step up the pace of progress against this disease.” Since 2015, the baseline date for WHO’s global malaria strategy, 24 countries have registered increases in malaria deaths. In the 11 countries that carry the highest burden of malaria worldwide, cases increased from 150 million in 2015 to 163 million cases in 2020, and malaria deaths increased from 390 000 to 444 600 over that same period. To get back on track, WHO and its partners recognize the need to ensure better and more equitable access to all health services – including malaria prevention, diagnosis and treatment – by strengthening primary health care and stepping up both domestic and international

Delivering malaria services against the odds Despite the challenges imposed by COVID-19, about three-quarters (72%) of insecticide-treated mosquito nets had been distributed in malaria-endemic countries as planned by the end of 2020. Thirteen countries in Africa’s Sahel subregion reached 11.8 million more children with preventive antimalarial medicines during the high-transmission rainy season in 2020 compared to 2019. Some countries, particularly with a low burden of malaria and relatively strong health systems, even registered gains against malaria during the pandemic. China and El Salvador were certified by WHO as malariafree in 2021, and the Islamic Republic of Iran attained 3 consecutive years of zero indigenous cases in 2020. The six countries of the Greater Mekong subregion continue to achieve impressive declines in their malaria caseload. By the end of 2020, there were approximately 82 000 cases of malaria in the subregion, down from a peak of 650 000 cases in 2012 and about 100 000 cases in 2019.

Despite these achievements, the WHO African Region saw a 12% increase in malaria deaths in 2020 over the previous year, highlighting the consequences of even moderate service disruptions in a population at risk of malaria. “While African countries rallied to the challenge and averted the worst predictions of fallout from COVID-19, the pandemic’s knock-on effect still translates to thousands of lives lost to malaria,” said Dr Matshidiso Moeti, WHO Regional Director for Africa. “African governments and their partners need to intensify their efforts so that we do not lose even more ground to this preventable disease.” According to the report, 15 countries with a high burden of malaria reported reductions in malaria testing of more than 20% in April-June 2020 compared to the same period in 2019. National Malaria Programmes distributed about 48 million fewer courses of treatment in 2020 compared to the previous year. And, of the world’s 11 highest burden countries, only India registered progress against malaria. The 10 other countries, all in Africa, reported increases in cases and deaths. Meeting global targets According to the report, progress towards the 2020 milestones of the WHO global malaria strategy was substantially off track. In 2020, the global malaria case incidence rate was 59 cases per 1000 people at risk against a target of 35 — putting it off track by 40%. The global mortality rate was 15.3 deaths per 100 000 people at risk against a target of 8.9 — putting it off track by 44%.

Reaching the 2030 goals of the WHO malaria strategy, including a 90% reduction in global malaria incidence and mortality rates by 2030, will require new approaches, new tools and the better implementation of existing ones. WHO’s malaria strategy emphasizes the need to carefully tailor existing approaches to prevention, diagnosis and treatment to local contexts, and to strengthen health systems overall, with a view to achieving universal health coverage. Meeting global targets will also require robust funding. According to the report, current funding levels (estimated at US$3.3 billion in 2020) will need to more than triple, reaching US$ 10.3 billion per year by 2030. Applying a new methodology This year’s report applied a new WHO-wide statistical method to estimate the cause of death among children under five years of age for all major diseases, including malaria. The methodology was applied to 32 countries in sub-Saharan Africa that shoulder about 93% of all malaria deaths globally. Doing so revealed higher numbers of estimated deaths among young children every year since 2000. Even after applying the new methodology, the malaria death rate maintained an overall downward trend since 2000; globally, the malaria mortality rate (deaths per 100 000 population at risk) fell by 49% between 2000 and 2020. Between 2019 and 2020, the death rate increased for the first time since 2000 as a result of disruptions during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Become an infodemic manager!

he image here was a recent submission to the Lifeology scicomm challenge. It's a great reflection on how multilayered both the infodemic response, and the pandemic response needs to be. Having a quick and easy checklist to filter information through before sharing can help to identify misinformation and stop it in its tracks – making everyone an infodemic manager! The multilayered analogy is an important

and timely one. We have seen from recent rises in COVID-19 cases in countries with high rates of vaccination that vaccines alone are not enough; we need to continue to combine them with other public health and social measures. This week, WHO Member States convened at a special session of the World Health Assembly to discuss the start of negotiations for a pandemic preparedness treaty. In his address WHO Director-General

Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus said: Vaccines save lives, but they do not fully prevent infection or transmission. Until we reach high levels of vaccination in every country, suppressing transmission remains essential. We don’t mean lockdowns, which are a last resort in the most extreme circumstances. We mean a tailored and comprehensive package of measures that strike a balance between protecting the rights, freedoms and livelihoods of individuals, while

protecting the health and safety of the most vulnerable members of communities. The COVID-19 pandemic and the infodemic is still far from over and we must continue to identify and manage misinformation about COVID-19 vaccines, as well as the need for public health and safety measures. Image credit: Lifeology/ María Braeuner Source- WHO infodemic management, December 2, 2021.

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LAST PAGE

South Asia Times

DECEMBER 2021

GDP is like a heart rate monitor: it tells us about life, but not our lives By SAT News Desk

ow much cash would you need to be paid to agree to live without a smartphone for a year? If you are like the typical American, the answer is US$10,000 – which is far, far more than what we are actually charged for having and using smartphones. How much would you need to be paid to live without a computer? According to the same research, just published by Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, a typical American would want US$25,000 to live computer-free for a year. Become a monthly donor and support independent media today. For the GPS system that lets us map where we are on all our devices, the answer is US$3,000; for streaming services such as Netflix the answer is another US$3,000. For refrigeration the answer is US$10,000; for air conditioning, another US$10,000; and for running water US$50,000. The point of this study, by economist Tim Kane, is that if we add up the worth to us of everything the economy produces each year, we get much, much more than the gross domestic product – even though GDP is meant to be a summation of the prices paid each year. Not a day goes by when we don’t get astounding value for money: on Kane’s estimate, about 20 times what we pay.

GDP monitors changes, not our lives It’s a useful perspective to bear in mind ahead of the latest Australian gross domestic product figures, being released on Wednesday. Those figures will show Australia spent less, earned less and produced less in the lockdownaffected September quarter months of July, August and September than in the three months before – about 3% less on private estimates. It won’t be a “recession” because in Australia that’s generally taken to mean two consecutive quarters of those things going backwards. And we already know spending, earning

and production all started climbing as soon as the lockdowns ended at the beginning of the quarter we are in now. The GDP has the same relationship to life as a heart rate monitor has to health. How much cash would you need to be paid to agree to live without a smartphone for a year? If you are like the typical American, the answer is US$10,000 – which is far, far more than what we are actually charged for having and using smartphones. How much would you need to be paid to live without a computer? According to the same research, just published by Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, a typical American would want US$25,000 to live computer-free for a year. Become a monthly donor and support independent media today. For the GPS system that lets us map where we are on all our devices, the answer is US$3,000; for streaming services such as Netflix the answer is another US$3,000. For refrigeration the answer is US$10,000; for air conditioning, another US$10,000; and for running water US$50,000. The point of this study, by economist Tim Kane, is that if we add up the worth to us of everything the economy produces each year, we get much, much more than the gross domestic product – even though GDP is meant to be a summation of the prices paid each year. Not a day goes by when we don’t get astounding value for money: on Kane’s

estimate, about 20 times what we pay. GDP monitors changes, not our lives It’s a useful perspective to bear in mind ahead of the latest Australian gross domestic product figures, being released on Wednesday. Those figures will show Australia spent less, earned less and produced less in the lockdownaffected September quarter months of July, August and September than in the three months before – about 3% less on private estimates. It won’t be a “recession” because in Australia that’s generally taken to mean two consecutive quarters of those things going backwards. And we already know spending, earning and production all started climbing as soon as the lockdowns ended at the beginning of the quarter we are in now. The GDP has the same relationship to life as a heart rate monitor has to health. There’s more to GDP than you might think Behind the headline figure you hear about are actually three different measures. GDP(P) is a measure of everything that’s produced in the quarter. The Bureau of Statistics has the unenviable job of adding up most things that are produced at market prices (and having a stab at trying to infer market prices where they are not apparent) in industries as diverse as mining, financial services and education. It tries to count each thing only once, which is difficult because some

things are used as inputs to others. Its work is made harder by relying partly on surveys and partly on complete sets of data from organisations such as the Tax Office. Ask whether it uses guess work, you will be told it uses “informed judgement”. Read more: Four GDP graphs that show how well Australia was doing, before Delta GDP(E) is a totalling of government and household expenditure to buy those products. After adjusting for imports and exports it ought to equal GDP(P), but imperfections in measurement mean it usually doesn’t. Then there’s GDP(I), which is a measure of the income households and businesses get from working and selling those products. Again, it ought to equal the other two, but it usually doesn’t. After trying to get the three measures nearer each other (perhaps there was something somebody missed) the technicians in the bureau simply average the three, producing GDP(A). That’s what goes up on the ABS website at 11:30am AEDT Wednesday, followed by a Treasurer’s press conference and loads of analysis. It needn’t indicate an underlying condition Just as a heart rate monitor needn’t tell us much about health, because even in healthy people hearts beat slower while sleeping and faster while awake, GDP needn’t tell us that much about the condition of our lives. A lot of the economy went to sleep during this year’s and last year’s lockdowns and is now

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waking up. The GDP will show that, but at least on Wednesday it won’t tell us more than that. As it happens, economic growth has been weakening over time. Annual GDP growth is no longer the 3-4% it typically was between the early 1990s recession and the 2008 financial crisis. In the decade leading up to COVID it has been much lower, rarely touching 3%. Put starkly, for littleunderstood reasons unrelated to quarterly fluctuations or COVID, we are getting better off more slowly than we were. There are always people who say this doesn’t matter, we should be happy with what we had (and as I noted, much of what we’ve had isn’t counted in the GDP). There is an underlying condition nonetheless But it matters a good deal, because ever since economic growth took off in the 1870s we’ve grown used to things continually getting better, and have come to expect it. US economic historian Brad Delong uses an 1880s science fiction book to illustrate how much we’ve come to regard improving living standards as a birthright. In Looking Backward, Edward Bellamy purports to look back from the year 2000. At one point a hostess asks if he would like to hear some music. Instead of playing the piano, she merely touched one or two screws and “immediately the room was filled with the music of a grand organ”, one of four she could dial up by landline. It appeared to him that if we could have devised an arrangement for providing everybody with music in their homes, perfect in quality, unlimited in quantity, suited to every mood, and beginning and ceasing at will, we should have considered the limit of human felicity already attained, and ceased to strive for further improvements. He got it wrong. Source- The Conversation, November 30, 2021 (Under Creative Commons Licence)

South Asia Times - December 2021

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