Orde Wingate, Unconventional Warrior: From the 1920s to the Twenty-‐First Century, Simon Anglim, Pen & Sword Military, 2014 (252 pages). Major General Orde Wingate (1903-‐1944) the creator of the famous ‘Chindit’ units which served in Burma during the Second World War, but whose military career was more extensive than the general public, or even some historians or military analysts may be aware, was an excellent choice for investigation by author Simon Anglim. Fittingly, Anglim’s excellent choice of subject is covered by a genuinely excellent, complex, analytical, but nonetheless thoroughly readable and well-‐structured book, which works as a biography, as a history, as historiography, and also an indication of how Wingate’s military experience is still relevant. The complexity and thoroughness of this book, together with its analytical and provocative approach, is apparent to the reader from its introduction. Anglim opens by painting a good in-‐depth portrait of Wingate, which clearly indicates that he was and still is seen as a controversial figure. The introductory section also assists the reader by outlining the general structure that the book follows by outlining the three main operations involving Wingate that it covers. These were his involvement in counter-‐insurgency in Palestine between 1937 and 1939, his work to stimulate guerrilla resistance to Italian rule in Ethiopia during 1940-‐1941, and, most famously, Wingate’s role in overseeing Chindit operations in Burma between 1942 and 1944. From the perspective of a modern reader, perhaps the most vital question that Anglim asks during the book’s st introduction, is why anybody should still be interested in Orde Wingate in the current 21 Century context. From the outset, Anglim clearly indicates that, in his view, Wingate is still worth considering because some of the methods that he pioneered have been utilised in much more recent operations. Anglim cites the Special Night Squads (SNS) used in a counter-‐insurgency role in Palestine during the 1930s, and compares their modus operandi and ethos with that of Allied Tier One Special Forces in Iraq between 2007 and 2010, and in Afghanistan during the 2011-‐2013 period. Anglim also highlights the fact that, as long ago as 1942, Wingate argued that paramilitary operations were “the wave of the future”, and in doing this advocated what modern military personnel refer to ‘manoeuvre warfare’, which is executed by a combination of specialist regular st troops, local irregulars, and air support. Such operations have taken place in the 21 Century. The example cited by Anglim in this introductory section is that of how, in 2001, a combination of US Special Forces, Northern Alliance fighters and US airpower, defeated the Afghan Taliban regime in a matter of weeks. Therefore, the book clearly sticks to its remit to examine Wingate’s ideas in a modern context from the very start. Another perennially relevant issue highlighted during the introduction, and revisited later in the book, is that of alleged excessive brutality during counter-‐insurgency operations, and the treatment of detainees. Allegations made by, among others, the Israeli journalist Tom Segev, hold that Wingate and others acting under his authority mistreated captured or suspected insurgents. By citing these allegations, both here and later in the book, and drawing parallels between these and more recent allegations, such as those against US and Allied forces in Iraq following the 2003 invasion, and also against Israeli forces, the author successfully follows the book’s objective of examining why Wingate’s military career is still relevant. Following the introduction, the author examines why Wingate is a controversial figure, and how this controversy arose. It is this second section of the book’s opening, titled Genius or Madman, which most clearly demonstrates that Anglim is not simply setting out to write a history of Orde Wingate’s military career, but is also aiming to examine the historiography surrounding it, which he does in a straightforward, concise and structured manner. Anglim notes that senior Allied officers who served in Burma during the Second World War held differing opinions of Wingate whilst the conflict was still ongoing. In seeking to locate the root of post-‐war criticism of Wingate, Anglim argues that two books, Volume III of the British Government’s Official History of the War against Japan, largely written by Major General S. Woodburn Kilby, and Defeat into Victory, the personal memoir of Field Marshal Lord Slim. Anglim argues that Slim is the only senior British commander of the Second World War who has not been subject to a critical reappraisal, meaning that his criticisms of Wingate have become historical orthodoxy.
In the first sub-‐section of this chapter, Prosecution-‐Wingate the Charlatan, Anglim argues that assessments of Wingate can be divided into pre and post-‐Kirby work. Therefore, Anglim strives to provide a framework regarding the historiography surrounding Wingate, and uses this as a starting point to explore the work of other historians’ views of Wingate, and why these emerged. For example, Anglim notes that Wilfred Burchett, the writer of Wingate’s Phantom Army¸ was influenced by his own radical left-‐wing politics which led to him portraying Wingate as an anti-‐imperialist and quasi-‐revolutionary. In the second sub-‐section of this chapter, Wingate the Genius, Anglim takes great pains to outline how pro-‐Wingate historians and writers have come to influence the historical dialogue concerning Wingate, thereby further fuelling the controversy surrounding him. Looming large in this section is the figure of Mike Calvert, who served directly under Wingate in Burma as his subordinate commander, as well as being a close friend. Continuing with his comprehensive examination of the historiography concerning Wingate, Anglim cites the work of the David Rooney, Calvert’s biographer, who has written that in 1947, during a staff posting, Calvert saw a British Army memo slating Wingate as a “divisive influence”. From this starting point, Calvert developed a belief that an anti-‐Wingate conspiracy had existed within the British Army. This, combined with the fact that, as Anglim indicates, most post-‐1945 writers on Wingate consulted Calvert, has only added to the controversy surrounding this unconventional figure. In short, the book’s examination of the how Wingate has been viewed by historians and writers is concise but very thorough. Throughout the remainder of the book, although there are arguably minor instances that contradict this notion, Anglim does a very good job in demonstrating that, far from being a ‘maverick’, the tactics and doctrines developed by Wingate more often than not placed him firmly within British military orthodoxy. This first becomes apparent in the second main chapter of the book, Winning Small Wars-‐Wingate’s Army. This chapter opens with an overview of how, at the time that Wingate was commissioned into the British Army in 1922, the Army was revering to its pre-‐1914 role as a colonial police force. Crucial in setting the scene for the later examination of Wingate’s counter-‐insurgency work in Palestine is the author’s explanation of the Cardwell System of military unit rotation within the British Empire, which meant that individual army battalions would almost certainly be posted to areas which experienced what would now be termed ‘insurgency’. Therefore, counter-‐insurgency was already an established part of British Army operations long before Wingate’s arrival in Palestine. In keeping with Anglim’s emphasis on how Wingate’s military experience is still relevant to current operations, the opening of this chapter makes a key point which should be borne in mind by those seeking to ‘learn from the past’. Wingate and his colleagues operated prior to the 1950s, since when analysts and other figures have come to view counter-‐insurgency as more complex than ‘war’, meaning that insurgency requires a more ‘sophisticated’ solution than simply defeating the enemy. Whereas British colonial authorities might have been willing to try and address legitimate grievances, they had no qualms regarding the meeting of armed revolt or civil disorder with force. Anglim makes the key point that, even after the 1919 Amritsar Massacre, Wingate and many others within the British Army took this view. Wingate’s aggressive deployment of SNS units in Palestine was therefore most likely, in part at least, driven by prevailing British Army orthodoxy, rather than any significantly unconventional views of his own. This second chapter of the book also provides a good, brief overview of how British Army counter-‐insurgency th tactics evolved during the first half of the 20 Century, and how they reinforce the notion that Wingate was militarily orthodox, rather than being a military maverick. For example, the author notes that in 1931, over a decade before Wingate proposed a similar concept, Major L.V.S. Blacker argued that army columns operating on the Northwest Frontier of India could be supplied by either airdrops or air landings. Similarly, with regard to counter-‐insurgency as opposed to long-‐range penetration (LRP) operations, the Corps of Gurkha Scouts, formed in 1919 and designed to carry out nocturnal ambushes in the same area, may be seen as the forerunners of the SNS in Palestine. These and other examples that Anglim utilises only help to support the proposal that Wingate, far from being a maverick, fitted in well with wider British military thinking.
Although short, the next chapter, Before Palestine, 1923-‐36 is vital in helping to understand how Wingate developed his tactical ideas before his posting to Palestine, and in demonstrating tactical continuity. It highlights how, during his deployment to the Sudan and service with the Sudan Defence Force, Wingate regarded the Ethiopian frontier as a proving ground for his development of guerrilla tactics, which he was already working out at a theoretical level. One piece of evidence that Anglim uses to help confirm this is the testimony of Moshe Dayan, a protégé of Wingate’s in Palestine. Dayan argued that Wingate employed lessons learned during his service in the Sudan during his later Palestinian operations. During its focus on Wingate’s role in the Sudan, the book demonstrates the tactical continuity apparent throughout his career by stressing that the main security threat that Wingate faced, whilst primarily criminal rather than insurgent in nature, possessed a similar modus operandi. In order to deal with this problem of cross-‐border criminality, Wingate developed counter-‐insurgency methods that he would later utilise in Palestine, including concentrating forces on insurgent entry points and deception in order to achieve surprise. This focus on tactical continuity demonstrates that Anglim follows a coherent narrative path throughout the book. One fascinating historical aside that can be found in this chapter is a comparison of Wingate’s methods and tactical views, and those of his distant, and most likely more famous, relative, T.E. Lawrence (of Arabia). Whilst Anglim stresses that the two individuals held different views regarding irregular warfare, the possibility that Lawrence’s views influenced Wingate is also mooted, reinforcing the notion that rather than being a maverick, Wingate used the ideas of others in developing his own tactical outlook. Following its examination of Wingate’s operations in the Sudan, the book moves on to look at his counter-‐ insurgency work in Palestine between 1937 and 1939. Writing as he has a book that seeks to challenge orthodox views of Wingate, Anglim opens the chapter with a brief but telling overview of the popular image of Wingate in Palestine. The author states that virtually every previous account regarding Wingate in Palestine makes two main claims. These are that his actions stemmed from his “fanatical” Zionism, and that these led to him becoming a “pariah” within the British Army. Continuing with his examination of the historiography concerning Wingate, Anglim also quotes from a history of Special Forces, written in 2006, which repeats these ideas. Aside from its content, this chapter is very-‐user friendly for the reader, as it is divided into three main sections covering that Arab Revolt of 1936-‐1939, each one examining a distinct phase. This allows the reader to better understand how the Revolt broke out and evolved over time. This chapter provides a good narrative historical overview of the Arab Revolt, which outlines the context within which Wingate’s actions can be understood. Although this historical overview of the Revolt is narrative, it is also nuanced, detailed, and explains the complexities of situation. For example, Anglim, when examining phase one of the Revolt notes that the guerrilla groups that took part in it fell into two broad categories, the Mujahedeen, which carried out guerrilla strikes against Jewish settlements and road links, and Fedayeen, who were more covert in nature, often resorting to sabotage. Also, rather than being a widespread popular uprising as its title suggests, elements of the Revolt depended upon external volunteers. During the early phases of the revolt, the Mujahedeen relied upon Syrian and Iraqi volunteers. Also, apart from a brief period in late 1938, the local Arab population appear, according to contemporary British reports cited by Anglim, to have been largely law-‐abiding. Indeed, Anglim also notes that many actively worked with the British authorities, and even violently confronted the guerrillas during the Revolt’s later stages. As before, Anglim follows a coherent narrative regarding continuity in British counter-‐insurgency tactics. He refers to the fact that during the initial British military response to the Revolt, RAF aircraft carried out reconnaissance missions to ‘pin’ insurgents in villages whilst army columns closed in, and also provided close air support when need in response to radio messages from ground forces. That these tactics had already been refined by British forces during other counter-‐insurgency efforts demonstrates tactical continuity. Anglim elaborates on this during his overview of phase two of the Arab Revolt by citing the creation, in 1921, of the Palestine Gendarmerie, which included large numbers of former ‘Black and Tans’ personnel who had served in Ireland. Although this chapter is of course largely historical in scope, Anglim never forgets his aim of demonstrating not only tactical continuity, but also how similar situations can arise in counter-‐insurgency operations that take place decades apart. During the later stages of the Arab Revolt, factions headed by two rival Palestinian
chieftains, Abdul Rahim al Haj Muhammad and Arif Abduk Razzik came close to fighting each other, apparently over controlling illegal activity such as hashish and weapons smuggling that was part-‐funding the Revolt. A further factional leader, Kamal Hussein, also, at times, smuggled weapons, drugs or Jewish illegal immigrants. This situation meant that the British forces in Palestine were faced with an insurgent movement which lacked centres of gravity against which they could concentrate their efforts. A similar scenario was encountered by British troops in Afghanistan and Iraq during the 2000s. Another example of recurring difficulties faced by British forces in different counter-‐insurgency scenarios is that the Palestine Police was largely ineffective due to bribery, corruption and intimidation, a situation similar to that which occurred in Afghanistan and Iraq during recent years. This example especially would seem to suggest that the British Army has, to an extent, failed to learn from the mistakes of previous counter-‐insurgency efforts. Crucially, this chapter highlights the fact that far from being a lone pro-‐Zionist voice within the British authorities in Palestine, Wingate was one of a number of senior figures who understood the potential of the Jewish Hagannah as a counter-‐insurgency force, thus refuting the claims of a number of subsequent historians. For example, Anglim cites Lieutenant Anthony Simonds, a critic of anti-‐Semitism in within the Palestine Police, who stated in 1934 that “My personal sympathies were with the Jews”. Additionally, in another prescient piece of analysis regarding the Arab Revolt, Anglim notes that concerns existed regarding the aggressive tactics employed by SNS units under Wingate’s direction, both within the British authorities, and also Jewish communities in Palestine. The latter, including officers of the Hagannah, feared that the methods employed by the SNS might damage relations with neighbouring Arab villages. This is relevant as concerns regarding the potential alienation of local populations during counter-‐insurgency efforts persists, and may be felt even more st acutely in the early 21 Century. When examining the Arab Revolt and Wingate’s role in countering it, Anglim successfully examines the work of previous historians of these matters, and manages to paint a much more nuanced picture than that which has previously been available. Anglim also highlights genuine tactical continuity and the need for militaries to learn from previous campaigns. Moving onto the next chapter, Wingate in Ethiopia 1940-‐41, Anglim again clearly indicates his intention to investigate the historiography surrounding Wingate, and the conclusions of previous historians. Anglim takes care to debunk ‘myths’ that have spread about Wingate, and which subsequently became the orthodox view of him. One such idea is Luigi Rosetto’s belief that Wingate’s tactical ideas were completely original. This idea is quickly refuted at length by Anglim, who provides a highly detailed overview of British covert warfare planning following the Allied withdrawal from Dunkirk in 1940, and by citing the existence of the (MI(R)) branch of the British War Office, whose role was to raise units to operate in enemy territory in conjunction with local partisan forces. Also, British forces had contacts with insurgent elements within Ethiopia as early as October 1939. These two pieces of evidence, along with several others cited in the book, indicate that the idea of behind the lines operations alongside local irregular forces, both generally and in Ethiopia specifically, preceded Wingate’s arrival in East Africa, thus helping to place him within the wider context of such British operations. An element of this chapter that should be required reading for military and intelligence personnel involved in stimulating guerrilla operations can be found on page 135, which states that Wingate understood the necessity for a “controlling element” to prevent “unintended consequences” following the stimulation of resistance movements. Anglim elaborates on this by citing the example of external support for the Afghan resistance following the 1979 Soviet Invasion, arguing that by helping to stimulate Sunni Muslim unity in the shape of an armed resistance against “Godless outsiders” without considering the longer-‐term consequences, the US helped to create modern Islamist extremism. Also, Anglim highlights that Wingate concluded, as a result of his operations in Ethiopia, that there is “no such thing as a regular patriot”, and that local groups should be assessed as to their combat ability, potential commitment, and whether they may have any ulterior motives for cooperating in operations, before they are engaged as operational partners. Anglim argues that Wingate would probably have opposed the “buying” of the Northern Alliance’s support in Afghanistan in 2001, and
been vindicated due to their apparent lack of aggression, which was only rectified by the payment of increasingly large bribes, and the deployment of US Special Forces in a supporting role. Anglim also uses an overview the doctrine employed in Ethiopia by the British Army and its insurgent partners during the Second World War to demonstrate the continual effectiveness of such an approach when it is utilised by terrorist and insurgent groups. Wingate’s belief in the usefulness of a committed core of insurgents, rather than an uncoordinated mass uprising has been confirmed by more recent examples, some of which are cited by Anglim. For instance, the strength of the Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland may, at one point, have been only 1,200 active members, and possibly as low as fifty, within a Northern Irish Catholic population of 600-‐750,000. The efficiency of such an approach, the utilisation of a committed corps of individuals, rather than a mass uprising, was demonstrated, according to Anglim, by an ambush against a US Special Forces team in Afghanistan in 2006. During this incident, Taliban insurgents carefully prepared their positions and targeted the US team with a coordinated assortment of machine-‐guns, mortars and snipers. Anglim argues that this assault gives the impression of a well-‐trained, well-‐disciplined and professional insurgent force, of the type advocated by Wingate. Therefore, Anglim may be using these examples to reinforce the entirely accurate notion that counter-‐insurgency efforts must actively seek and target specific threats within a population, rather than relying on more general security practices. Wingate’s most famous military activities, namely his development and oversight of long-‐range penetration operations in Burma between 1942 and 1944, take up the majority of the second half of the book. Although this is too extensive to discuss in detail here, there are numerous elements that merit a mention as they highlight the continued excellence of the book. However, it must be noted that the chapters which focus on Wingate’s operations in Burma provide a very thorough narrative overview regarding the Second World War in Southeast Asia, which allows the reader to better appreciate the wider military context within which Wingate operated. Firstly, Anglim notes that Wingate tailored his operational proposals in Burma, as he had done in Palestine and Ethiopia, in order to take account of the perceived strengths, weaknesses, culture and ‘national characteristics’ of the enemy, in this case the Japanese Army. Not only does this indicate continuity regarding Wingate’s own modus operandi, but also a longer continuity within British military thought. According to the book’s second chapter, Winning Small Wars-‐Wingate’s Army, this continuity can be traced back to at least approximately 1896-‐1906, during which period three editions of Major General Charles Callwell’s Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice were published. Further stressing continuity in British military though, as well as aiming to demonstrate that Wingate was not as great a ‘maverick’ as some have claimed, Anglim also discusses how unconventional warfare in Southeast Asia was already being advocated and discussed by elements within the British Army and intelligence community before Wingate’s arrival in this theatre of war, and indeed before the outbreak of hostilities. To support this, Anglim cites the example of Air Chief Marshall Sir Robert Brooke-‐Popham, Commander-‐in-‐Chief Far East, who wrote to the War Office in April 1941 advocating the creation of a contingency force of Chinese guerrillas, commanded by Indian Army officers and supported by specialist British demolition personnel. Also, following the outbreak of war in December 1941, GHQ India proposed the deployment of “small mobile guerrilla columns” to operate in Thailand if the need arose. Sticking with his remit to explore how Wingate’s campaign experiences are still relevant, Anglim notes that Wingate’s view regarding local guerrillas did not change during the early stages of his work in Burma. This view was that guerrilla forces could be useful against occupying armies who were wary of losses, restrained in their use of force and constrained by a moral view that prevented reprisals. Alternately, according to Wingate, guerrillas facing an army which had no compunction in killing prisoners or carrying out reprisals for resistance activity could be prevented from acting by emotional ties to the population in whose name they claim to be acting. Anglim argues that guerrilla warfare may have been a workable strategy for insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq, due to constraints placed on modern armies. One surprising comment in the Burma section of this book comes from Wingate himself, who is referenced as arguing that his long-‐range penetration groups were not ‘Special Forces’, and that he was sceptical of units which were designated as such, believing instead that existing units with an established espirit de corps and containing a number of specialists and trained personnel could quickly adapt in order to carry out
unconventional operations. As in the rest of the book, Anglim examines the historiography surrounding Wingate, and in this case examines how analysts saw Wingate shortly after his death in 1944. Anglim concludes the book by arguing that it may be more accurate to claim that there are potential ‘messages’ rather than ‘lessons’ from Wingate’s military career that modern military personnel should be aware of. This approach is a good deal more nuanced than the common dictum regarding the ‘lessons’ of history, as it concedes that, despite superficial similarities, no two situations are the same. This means that codified ‘lessons’ that were applicable in one situation may not be in another. Anglim also recaps on the issues, strategies and tactics that have been discussed in the book, and their continued relevance. There is so much from this excellent book that I wanted to discuss in this review, but was prevented from doing so by the limited space available. However, I can confidently say that this book is a must-‐read for those interested in warfare, both historic and modern, counter-‐insurgency strategies and the issues and controversies that can accompany them, military thought processes and, also the processes that helped create the modern Middle East.