Monitor magazine issue 2 by SIRS Consultancy Ltd

MONITOR SECURITY INTELLIGENCE RESILIENCE STRATEGY

EDITORIAL Dear Reader, Recent events in late 2014 and the first few months of 2015 have made clear the extent of the terrorist threat that several nations currently face from Islamist extremists. The deadliest European manifestation of this threat occurred in Paris during a three day period in January 2015 which saw attacks on the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, police personnel, and a kosher supermarket. These attacks resulted in 17 fatalities. Prior to this, the deaths of two hostages held in a Sydney café by Man Haron Monis, who sought to align himself with the extremist group Islamic State, in December 2014, and the subsequent attacks on a Copenhagen café and synagogue in February 2015, which resulted in two deaths, further demonstrate the ongoing threat of Islamist terrorist attacks. Other recent incidents which help to confirm this increased threat include the running down by car of two Canadian soldiers, one of whom died, in Quebec by an individual described by police as a ‘homegrown radical’ in October 2014, and the subsequent shooting, two days later of another soldier at the Canadian National War Memorial, together with an attack on the country’s parliament. The use of firearms by two individuals who had recently returned from Syria, during a counter-terrorism raid in the Belgian town of Verviers in January 2015, and the alleged foiling of an Islamic State-linked plot by Australian police the following month, serve to reinforce the reality of the ongoing threat, as does the conviction, in February 2015, of a British teenager for plotting to behead a soldier in London. Governments are understandably taking the ongoing threat extremely seriously. Following the spate of attacks which began with the assault on the Charlie Hebdo offices in Paris, the French authorities deployed 10,000 troops and almost 5,000 extra police to guard sensitive sites. It is arguable that in doing this, France was following the lead of the United States, which increased security at government sites across the country following the October 2014 attack on the Canadian parliament. Responding to the more general threat of terrorist attacks with links to Islamic State, GCHQ, the UK’s communications intelligence agency, deployed armed police guards outside its Cheltenham headquarters for the first time. Although the individuals arrested by Australian police in February 2015 were not known to the authorities, the perpetrator of the Copenhagen attacks was, due to previous violence and gang activity. Although it is claimed that he served his time in prison alongside a Muslim radical, and that prison officials voiced their concerns regarding the individual in question, named as Omar Abdel Hamid El-Hussain, Danish intelligence services did not consider him a threat. Also, Cherif Kouachi, one of the Paris attackers, was known to French authorities, as he had served an 18-month sentence after being convicted of criminal association linked to a terrorist enterprise in 2005. These examples raise questions about how the authorities respond to warnings that individuals may become radicalised, and also how to monitor people that have had previous links to terrorist groups, but whose current intentions are unknown.

Despite the aforementioned tragic events in Australia, Canada and Europe, it must be remembered that Islamist terrorist groups operate in other parts of the world, and it is in these areas that the greatest recent casualties have been inflicted. Responsibility for the March 2015 suicide attacks against two Yemeni mosques which resulted in 137 deaths has been claimed by Islamic State. Africa is also witnessing an alarming rise in operations by Islamist extremists. For example, in early 2015, Islamic State militants increased their activities in Libya. Also, an attack by Islamist gunmen against the Bardo National Museum in Tunis in March 2013 killed 21 people, most of whom were foreign tourists. One further individual subsequently died of their injuries in late March. Although Islamic State militants claimed responsibility for the strike, social media accounts linked to an al-Qaeda affiliate in Tunisia published alleged details of the attack. It should be noted that the Tunisian Government has identified the involvement of members of the al-Qaeda-linked Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade in the attack. Earlier in the same month, a pledge of loyalty to Islamic State by the Nigerian Islamist group Boko Haram was accepted. The Islamist terrorist threat in Africa, more particularly the ongoing activities of Al-Shabaab within Somalia, provide the focus of an excellent article in this edition of ‘Monitor’. Al-Shabaab’s operations outside Somalia, and especially the killing of nearly 150 people at Garissa University College in Kenya, demonstrate the extent of the regional threat that this Al-Qaeda affiliates poses. Other articles examine the background to the ongoing events in Syria, together with more recent developments, and the role of ‘influencing’ activities within counter-insurgency campaigns. There is also an in-depth review of the excellent Orde Wingate, Unconventional Warrior: From the 1920s to the Twenty-First Century by Simon Anglim, which analyses how lessons or ‘messages’ from Wingate’s career are still relevant to the prosecution of military operations. I hope that you enjoy the magazine. Jonathan Lautier, Co-Editor

SOMALIA : THE STATE OF THE COUNTER-INSURGENCY CAMPAIGN HERMES ASSOCIATES

WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE SYRIAN CRISIS BY VOJTECH VOHANKA & JONATHAN LAUTIER

INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES IN AN IRREGULAR TAPESTRY BY BRYAN DORN

BOOK REVIEW : ORDE WINGATE, UNCONVENTIONAL WARRIOR: FROM THE 1920S TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

SOMALIA : THE STATE OF THE COUNTER-INSURGENCY CAMPAIGN BACKGROUND Somalia experienced significant changes during the period 2006-2014. This period saw governments dominated by Islamists rise to power, before being replaced by an internationally supported Federal Government. A constant through this period has been Al-Shabaab). From their humble beginnings as a subgroup within the Islamic Courts Union Government, the group rose to prominence with its seizure of vast swathes of southern Somalia in 2007-2008. At its pinnacle in 2010 Al-Shabaab controlled more territory in Somalia than any other single government since the fall of the Siad Barre regime in 1991. The military campaign against Al-Shabaab has slowly eroded the area under Al-Shabaabâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s control and recent victories leave Al-Shabaab in what appears to be a weakened position. However appearances can be- and often are- deceptive. Far from being defeated- Al-Shabaab remains a threat to the stability of Somalia and the wider Horn of Africa. Indeed in many ways Al-Shabaab has seen an increase in operational capability and lethality, even while its territorial control of south and central Somalia has diminished. This article explores the recent impact of military action on Al-Shabaab and outlines why repeated offensives by the African Union Peacekeeping Forces (AMISOM) and the Somali National Army (SNA) have not removed the threat of Al-Shabaab and have- to an extent- aided the group. Finally we examine the current counter-insurgency campaign and outline several of its weaknesses and also look at solutions which could bring peace to Somalia.

Map 1 : Regions Of Somalia - Awdal - Woqooyi Galbeed - Togdheer (Disputed with Khatumo State and Puntland) - Sanaag (Disputed with Khatumo State and Puntland) - Sool (Disputed with Khatumo State and Puntland) - Bari - Nugaal - Mudug- parts of - Togdheer (Disputed with Khatumo State and Puntland) - Sanaag (Disputed with Khatumo State and Puntland) - Sool (Disputed with Khatumo State and Puntland) - Mudug - Galgaduud -Hiraan - Middle Shabelle - Lower Shabelle - Bay - Bakool - Lower Juba - Middle Juba - Gedo

THE CONTINUING AL-SHABAAB THREAT The reversals of 2011 to 2014 have reduced Al-Shabaab’s territorial footprint, yet in practical terms they have not diminished the threat that the group poses. While there have been changes to the composition of Al-Shabaab and their tactics, they retain a unifying ideology and, more importantly, support among the population. Structurally, the fact that Al-Shabaab is not- and never has been- an entirely homogenous organisation, is often overlooked. While there is a solid jihadist core with a pan-Islamist outlook- including numerous foreign fighters- this core is allied to groups with different interests, including clannists and nationalists. During the course of Al-Shabaab’s war, it sometimes haemorrhaged elements and at other times absorbed external groups. Former elements often compete against Al-Shabaab following their departure, either due to territorial or ideological reasons. The Ras Kamboni militia, who now form the Independent Juba Administration, are a case in point. Despite the loss of allies, Al-Shabaab manages to weather these setbacks because it retains a core of ideologically committed jihadists that provide the group with continuity. During 2013 the clannist and nationalist factions lost considerable influence following the removal of a number of Al-Shabaab leaders opposed to the pan-Islamic jihad espoused by the Emir of Al-Shabaab Abu Zubeyr “Godane” and the pretence of the Shura comprised of senior Al-Shabaab leaders governing the group and left Godane solely in charge, surrounded by a coterie of- publicly at least- loyal advisors. The solidity and resilience of Al-Shabaab has been proven again and again even the loss of the group’s leaderGodane- in a targeted drone strike in August 2014 failed to have the predicted effect of splitting Al-Shabaab. In the aftermath of Godane’s death the Federal Government initiated an amnesty for Al-Shabaab rank and file. At the end of this amnesty the Federal Government stated that over 800 Al-Shabaab members had taken advantage of the offer and surrendered. However, this reduction in manpower was matched by a spike in Al-Shabaab’s attacks, including in Mogadishu. One concern with the figure provided by the Federal Government is the uncertainty over the actual size of Al-Shabaab. There is a figure of 5,000 that has been quoted repeatedly, however even this is not concrete. Reports obtained by Hermes Associates would suggest the true figure of those that have some form of link to Al-Shabaab is actually higher than 5,000. However, this in all probability includes allied militias who support Al-Shabaab when convenient to do so as opposed to being true believers. But if the membership of Al-Shabaab is much higher than thought, is the loss of 800 less-committed members actually a success? It should be remembered that a side using asymmetric warfare doesn’t require large forces to be effective. Therefore even if the total membership of Al-Shabaab is low the loss of fighters as a result of the amnesty does not represent a death knell for the group. The period 2011 to 2014 saw Al-Shabaab lose much of the territory that it captured early in its existence. However, the fact that has been overlooked is that the territorial losses of 2014- heralded as being due to the defeat of Al-Shabaab- have been because Al-Shabaab has chosen to give up territory. The loss of territory in reality- as we will explain in the second part of this article- has been limited to population centres. Al-Shabaab retains a position of dominance in rural areas. Additionally the loss of territory has not been accompanied by a loss of personnel because, rather than stay and fight, Al-Shabaab has withdrawn from population centres and fought delaying actions as it evacuates. Operationally at least Al-Shabaab is now more dangerous than ever and retains considerable offensive capability. Prior to 2014 Al-Shabaab was forced to devote much of its strength to holding territory reducing the forces it had available to conduct offensive action. The loss of territory by Al-Shabaab has allowed the group to regain the flexibility it lost when trying to hold all the territory it had captured. The loss of population centres that has resulted from the Federal Governments campaign actually plays to Al-Shabaab’s strengths. If we look at Al-Shabaab’s history it is clear that their military success has never been due to openly fighting their enemies, but rather through raiding and covert action. Although they have a large militia armthe Jabhan- this is more of a raiding group with light equipment as opposed to a force capable of meeting conventional opponents head on.

The current primary striking arm of Al-Shabaab is the Amniyat and the capability of this force should not be underestimated- though it should not be overestimated either. The Amniyat is a curious beast and performs a number of functions within Al-Shabaab; it provides intelligence, internal security and covert operations. Members are recruited from the most ideologically committed Al-Shabaab members and attend extensive training courses, during which they are schooled by experienced Al-Shabaab instructors. Amniyat training courses tend to be small- average size of 20 students- with a high instructor / student ratio. It is notable that the majority of Amniyat instructors are foreign jihadists and Hermes Associates have identified Pakistani, Chechen and Arab jihadists among them. Following training Amniyat personnel operate in cells spread across much of Somalia and according to internal Al-Shabaab discussions increasing numbers of Amniyat personnel are being trained to replace those dispatched to neighbouring countries that form part of AMISOMincluding Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda and Djibouti. The Amniyat operates as both an intelligence and covert striking arm and is responsible for many of the most high profile attacks conducted by Al-Shabaab in recent years. There is evidence of Amniyat involvement in the Westgate Mall Attack in September 2013 and nearly all attacks in Mogadishu- including multiple assassinations and Improvised Explosive Attacks. The Amniyat is effective, but its effectiveness is sometimes overestimated. As an organization its manpower is limited and its members cannot be everywhere, but the fear of the Amniyat has just as much effect as its strikes. The conventional forces of Al-Shabaab- the Jabhan- form a potent raiding force as mentioned above and are currently used to provide a recruiting ground for Amniyat members and to conduct overt operations in areas under Al-Shabaab control. The Jabhan provide the forces engaged in blockading Federal Government towns, ambushes on convoys and also the muscle behind Al-Shabaab’s tax collection. However, they are limited to operating within Al-Shabaab’s own zones of control and at present- aside from raids- do not operate behind enemy lines. I have mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the Jabhan support Al-Shabaab’s taxation. The financial system of Al-Shabaab will ensure it remains a potent force into the future. Currently Al-Shabaab has two main sources of income, taxes and fines levied on all commercial activity conducted within Al-Shabaab’s territory, including taxes on businesses, road transport and even illegal activity- such as charcoal and ivory smuggling. Map 2: Political and Insurgent Control of Somalia

THE COUNTER-INSURGENCY CAMPAIGN There is a prophetic quotation, “Those who forget the past are doomed to repeat it” that just about sums up Somalia on many things, not least that lessons learned in other counter-insurgency campaigns against jihadist groups seem to have been forgotten in AMISOM and SNA planning and operations. While on the surface Operation Eagle and Operation Indian Ocean have had a dramatic impact- with Al-Shabaab suffering reversals and losing town after town- generally this success is deceiving and in years to come the operations could well be seen as failed counter-insurgency campaigns, potentially ranking alongside the Soviet or even the post 9/11 intervention in Afghanistan. The complete defeat of Al-Shabaab will elude the Federal Government into the future, because the war is being fought without a clear aim, the end state that needs to exist for victory to be declared has not been enunciated and therefore there is no defined road map to reach a suitable end state. Indeed the focus on defeating Al-Shabaab throughout Somalia and only a passing nod to stabilization efforts actually contributes to the group’s continued existence. Indeed an overlooked point is that Al-Shabaab is itself a symptom of the Somalia Civil War that started in 1991 with the collapse of the Siad Barre regime and not a cause. The civil war in Somalia saw a succession of different transitional and clan-based governments take power in Somalia, some of these controlled large regions- such as the Isaaq in Somaliland- others controlled little more than a city- such as the Hawiye in Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab- like the Islamic Courts Union Government that preceded it- grew as a group to restore some semblance of law and order and stability in Somalia. Liberating areas from Al-Shabaab does nothing to fix the root causes of Somalia’s current predicament. Even in areas that have been liberated, Al-Shabaab retains grassroots support because it has proven more able to govern than other regimes since the fall of Siad Barre. Despite the Federal Government being formed with supposedly the best of intentions, it is clear that the social inequalities and threats that led to the rise of Al-Shabaab- corruption, a lack of democracy and inadequate justice provision remain, along with clan tensions that have been exacerbated by the rise of clan-based Federalism. The Federalism process which- it is hoped- will result in a number of semi-autonomous Federal Member States is designed to bring national unity. But the process has been hijacked by competing clans, leading to an increased risk of open clan fighting over power and control of proposed Federal Member States. While the eventual aim of the Federal Government and International Community maybe to create a society that is free, fair and inclusive, that aim is nowhere in sight and until it is, Al-Shabaab will retain support. While Al-Shabaab was in no way the best government for Somalia, it did achieve a semblance of governance that fostered clan cooperation and provided a tangible level of security and stability in the regions it controlled. It is notable that before Al-Shabaab's expansion across southern Somalia in 2007 and 2008, areas under Transitional Federal Government control were subject to the predations of unpaid, internationally trained SNP and SNA forces along with militias and unfortunately similar events are reoccurring. Al-Shabaab gained support precisely because it prevented this and in areas it controlled it provided a rule of law that was lacking under the Transitional Federal Government. The ongoing corruption within the Federal Government and continued predations of militias and unpaid security personnel do nothing to demonstrate the moral superiority of the Federal Government. While combat operations- led by AMISOM- are an undeniable success, the current campaign plan contributes nothing to ensuring the success of stabilization efforts in liberated areas. While the victories of 2014 are positive developments, they are in reality hollow and do nothing to curtail Al-Shabaab, because they ignore the realities of the socio-political environment in Somalia. Somalia combines vast rural areas with developing towns, but the economy is strictly agricultural and lacks industrialization. As such urban centres contribute very little to the nation. Wealth- and by extension political power- is created in rural areas and flows into urban areas. This contrasts with industrial societies where wealth is created in urban areas and flows into the countryside. To effectively control Somalia the rural areas need to be controlled and then towns can be liberated. Operation Eagle and Indian Ocean have both concentrated on urban centres and because of this Al-Shabaab continues to have free reign outside these areas. The activity by AMISOM and the SNA has created a network of

liberated urban areas connected by roads that are prone to attack. An easy visualisation would be a fizzy drink. The bubbles represent towns under government control and the liquid represents rural areas in which Al-Shabaab retains the initiative. Indeed the lack of governmental control of rural areas and an insecure road network has led to a humanitarian disaster, the repercussions of which continue to be felt. Although several major towns were liberated from Al-Shabaab, accessibility for the maintenance of food supplies was not secured. Al-Shabaab has purposefully withdrawn in the face of AMISOM and SNA advances, yet once a town is liberated they impose a blockade, isolating the town and preventing aid from entering. AMISOM and the SNA have been forced in many of the liberated towns to deliver aid using air transport which is limited due to the lack of usable airframes. In another place the isolation of government forces would be no more than an inconvenience, however the social structure of Somalia- an agrarian clan system- requires that counter-insurgency solutions must focus on the people as a prize and controlling towns fails on this count. The unfortunate fact is that although the loss of towns has diminished Al-Shabaabâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s financial resources- particularly its ability to raise funds by taxes- it has freed up their forces that were holding towns across southern Somalia. In effect the recent AMISOM and SNA campaigns have failed as counter-insurgency efforts and by taking towns they have reduced their available manpower, while gifting Al-Shabaab the initiative.

An AMISOM Surge The AMISOM and SNA counter-insurgency campaign is in some ways in a similar position to that of the Coalition Forces prior to the surges in Iraq (2007) and Afghanistan (2011). While towns can be liberated, unless troops remain there they do not stay liberated and movement between towns and bases cannot be conducted without force. Al-Shabaab are now in the position of the Taliban in early 2002. They have lost ground and will suffer more reverses in the short term, but provided they can weather the storm- and their ideology is a strong unifying factor- they will ultimately be able to continue the war into the future. While the Federal Government pays lip service to stabilisation, the ineffectual efforts so far to improve liberated areas will- if anything- benefit Al-Shabaab. In order to secure victory several changes needed to be made both in terms of objectives, as well as the composition of the forces arrayed against Al-Shabaab. The people are the prize is a statement repeated in counter-insurgency theory, but the effort against Al-Shabaab has failed to incorporate this into its campaign plan. AMISOM and the SNA have both been accused of preying on the people they are charged with protecting and have even surrendered towns that they have liberated, allowing Al-Shabaab to return and intimidate the populace once more. A wholesale change towards respect for human rights and protecting the civilian population at all costs is needed to strip away support for Al-Shabaab. Earlier on in the article, I outlined that the fact that Al-Shabaab brings a semblance of stability and justice to an area was- and still isone of the reasons for their support. To defeat Al-Shabaab this factor which garners support for the group must be removed. This means that the corruption and predations carried out on civilians by AMISOM and SNA troops- even the setting up of illegal checkpoints and the charging of tolls by unpaid SNA troops- need to stop. Equally, security and justice must be implemented in a transparent manner. In recent months journalists have been arrested and harassed by the Federal Government. The destruction of the free media undermines accountability and transparency, thus allowing abuses to take place. Indeed the justice system remains flawed. Al-Shabaab suspects are tried and convicted by military courts and the civilian justice system has never been fully operational. The Federal Government needs to review how it is going about implementing the Federal Constitution. There are significant portions of the document that have not been implemented and this weakens the legitimacy of the Government. In addition to shortcomings in Somaliaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s justice system, there have been no clear moves toward establishing the upper house of parliament or even towards free and fair elections. Equally, where the Federal Government has aimed to implement sections of the Constitution, it has done so in a poorly advised manner. Such an example is Federalism, the process of creating Federal member states in accordance with the Constitution which should allow more relevant governance in Somalia.

However the process has become subverted by clan-linked Federal Member State initiatives that capitalize on pre-existing clan tensions. At present, the Federal Government should focus more on the basics, for example security and ensuring continual food supplies as opposed to complex political evolutions that inevitably create tension. The implementation of security will be the foundation of any future progress in efforts to defeat Al-Shabaab. At present the implementation of security is a sticking point. While additional troops and resources would increase the cost of the counter-insurgency mission, the reality is that AMISOM and the SNA are undermanned and underequipped for the mission. Equipment wise AMISOM has a relatively large number of MRAPs, but has deficiencies in aerial assets, often relying on the limited number of helicopters provided by the United Nations to support its operations. The SNA lacks armoured vehicles and instead uses converted civilian vehicles, such as pickup trucks. Manpower is a particularly significant issue. At present AMISOM has approximately 25,000 personnel and the SNA has-in theory- more, but of these the vast majority are clan-aligned militias working under the SNA banner and lack professional training and organization. This lack of deployable manpower limits how much AMISOM and the SNA can actually achieve in providing security, so much so that compromises must be sought and there have been a number of occasions where a town has been liberated only for the troops to then be withdrawn and the town recaptured by Al-Shabaab. The failure to retain control of towns undermines confidence in the military forces. While increased training is needed, large numbers of additional troops would be potentially more beneficial. This would allow for an increased AMISOM and SNA presence in at-risk areas, thus potentially limiting Al-Shabaabâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s freedom of movement. With changes to the professionalism and conduct of AMISOM and the SNA, increased numbers of troops and better implementation of the Constitution, the Federal Government would at least be in a better position to seek social solutions to the Al-Shabaab problem. If the campaign against Al-Shabaab remains dominated by purely military efforts, without the creation of political solutions, it will continue to be unsuccessful. As of now Al-Shabaab may not directly control urban areas, but with its domination of the rural environment it retains operational freedom and the ability- and willingness- to continue a long-term terrorist campaign, attempting to wear down the Federal Government over a period of years. More worryingly, is that even when Al-Shabaab does not directly control territory, it retains the support of people who see it as a means of security- especially minor clans who lack the influence and power of the most powerful clans. By establishing a fair and inclusive democratic system of government and also a transparent justice system- supported by a robust security sector- the Federal Government would be in a stronger position to entice support away from Al-Shabaab.

Conclusion Ultimately the military campaign against Al-Shabaab has led to victories in battle and has resulted in the group suffering reverses. However, Al-Shabaab is far from defeated. The Federal Government must seek means to provide political and social solutions that fix the root causes of support for Al-Shabaab, while at the same time providing a secure environment for these solutions to flourish in. Without this dual strategy the campaign is doomed to continue for many years and eventually fail. However, the status quo is not fully conducive to fostering political and social cooperation between rival clans, a situation made worse by the Federal Government acting without considering the consequences of its decisions. In order to provide a stable environment that allows political and social advances which reduce the root causes of conflict, the Federal Government needs to demonstrate better judgement in implementing political solutions. In reality the creation of a secure environment that will allow political and social solutions requires an expansion of the campaign. A considerable increase in trained and neutral troops and greater funding is needed. Until such time as these materialise, we could see the war against Al-Shabaab continue.

Article Overview / Source Attribution / Graphics This article seeks to answer the question of how much of a threat Al-Shabaab still poses, how effective have efforts to hinder its activities been, and what operational or other improvements, if any, could be made to these efforts? All research and sources are drawn from Hermes Associates who provide risk consulting services for government and commercial clients currently- or interested in- operating in Somalia. Graphics are created by Hermes Associates. For further information on our services please do not hesitate to discuss Email; Alasdair@hermes-associates.net

WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE SYRIAN CRISIS BY VOJTECH VOHANKA & JONATHAN LAUTIER

Security is a broad and complicated field. State security has generally been the main issue when analysing security at the international level. Security can be defined here as the summary of security-related aspects which are jointly understood as ‘overall security’. For instance, Richmond (2007: 462 as cited in Kerkkänen, 2014: 10) emphasises that “without a civil peace and human security, an institutional and constitutional place is unlikely to be legitimate and the resulting focus on a victor’s peace will merely resemble a postcolonial praxis of intervention. Without legitimacy and consensus via social contract, the liberal peace veers towards the unsustainable conservative end of the spectrum where place is top down based upon coercion of force and focuses on constraints rather than emancipation.” The principal argument of this article is that ‘human security ethics’ can be a fundamental basis for state security with the possibility of ‘preventing, mitigating and remedying’ security matters which could cause social unrest possibly leading to violence within a country. This article maintains that the rebuilding of security spheres has to be dependent on human security principles, not just in Syria but anywhere in the Middle East (Kerkkänen, 2014: 3).

The Syrian crisis was sparked by demonstrations in mid-March 2011, demanding the freedom of political prisoners. State security forces were heavy-handed, using severe violence when reacting to what at first were peaceful protests. During the ongoing crisis, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has rejected calls from the international community to end the fighting and carry out political reforms. However it is worth noting that, in February 2015, the Syrian Government did state that it was willing to suspend its artillery and air bombardment of Aleppo, so that a local ceasefire could be tested. According to Staffan de Mistura, a United Nations (UN) mediator in Syria, if this planned freeze in the fighting holds, attempts will be made to replicate it elsewhere. The citizens of Syria have also suffered brutality at the hands of the Shabiha, a heavily armed militia loyal to the Assad regime who fight side by side with security forces. Assad systematically refused accountability for these crimes, blaming armed bodies and terrorists and refusing external access to citizens, and oversight regarding their treatment. To compound the problem, a lack of support from the UN and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) has meant that basic human needs can no longer be met, leaving the population facing shortages of water, food and healthcare (ICRtoP, 2014). The continuing threat of violence (and a growing humanitarian crisis) prompted various disparate opposition groups to unite in November 2012, resulting in the formation of two large bodies: the Syrian National Council, made up of Syrian refugees, and the Free Syrian Army (FSA), an armed component mainly consisting of Syrian deserters and rebels. Despite internal divisions over ideology, the frustration of opposition groups with the lack of progress on reforms forced them to put their differences aside, at least temporarily, and demand Assad’s resignation, starting in the autumn of 2011. In August 2011, the FSA started attacking Syrian troops – the first time the opposition had resorted to violence in order to destroy the regime and end its attack on Syria’s citizens. Unfortunately, immediately after this retaliation, reports emerged that opposition forces had also committed human rights violations (ICRtoP, 2014). Although the Syrian Government enforced censorship in March 2011, the situation in the country has become very complicated; the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) set up an autonomous International Commission of Inquiry in September 2011 to observe the apparent human rights breaches. The Commission has, as of 5th February 2015, created nine reports and determined that the Syrian Government and Shabiha perpetrated crimes against humanity and, in addition, anti-government bodies have been held accountable for the same acts (ICRtoP, 2014).

However, in November 2012, anti-government groups established a new body to be more comprehensive and representative of the Syrian opposition. The new group was called the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Force and has slowly obtained international credit as the authentic representative of the Syrians. In December 2012, the United States (US) joined Britain, France Turkey and a number of Gulf countries in recognising the National Coalition as “the legitimate representative” of the Syrian population. Unfortunately, the Coalition has experienced numerous resignations and became incapable of maintaining full control over rebel forces. During a shake-up in July 2013, its leadership fell under the control of candidates with ties to the Saudi government. The National Coalition was racked by threatened resignations during February 2014, when more than 30 of its 121 members claimed that they would stand down. According to senior members of the National Coalition, around four resignations were accepted. By this time, the anti-government forces had already been split by ideological obstacles between non-religious and Islamic factions. In April 2013, Al Qaeda declared its loyalty to the rebel forces and extremist non-Syrian combatants entered the conflict in growing numbers (ICRtoP, 2014). Currently, the two key Islamist bodies are the Al-Nusra Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). An attack by ISIL on the FSA in September 2013 signalled the start of rebel-on-rebel conflicts. Since January 2014, the FSA and Al-Nusra have been counterattacking against ISIL. In February 2014, Al-Qaeda distanced itself from ISIL after declining to accept a coalition of that body with the Al-Nusra Front. In March 2014, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights announced that the death toll in Syria had exceeded 140,000. By February 2015, according to a further estimate by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, the overall death toll since 2011 was 210,060, with nearly half of these fatalities being civilians.

On 27th April 2011, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, B.L. Pascoe notified the UN Security Council that reports had been received about “the use of artillery fire against unarmed civilians, door to door arrest campaigns, the shooting of medical personnel who attempt to aid the wounded, raids against hospitals, clinics and

mosques and the purposeful destruction of medical supplies and arrest of medical personnel” (ICRtoP, 2014: 2). Attacks by armed government forces had also become more frequent and concentrated, resulting in heavy casualties. The situation deteriorated, becoming ever more volatile, due to the use of cluster bombs which are banned in many countries worldwide (ICRtoP, 2014). In 2014, it was also estimated that 20,000 civilians had been executed by the Syrian Government. 1,600 of these were killed in Aleppo in March 2014 (ICRtoP, 2014). Additionally, Amnesty International has announced the Assad Regime was deliberately starving the Syrian people as part of its strategy. In March 2014, the UNHCR stated that 9 million Syrians had been displaced. This is equivalent to half the total number of Syria’s population. For this reason, nearby states such as Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey encountered massive difficulties. Despite this fact, on 18th March 2014, the UN recognised the pressure on the countries bordering Syria but they still forced them to open their borders for displaced people (ICRtoP, 2014). More recently, it has been estimated by the UN that since 2011, 3.73 million Syrians have fled the country and been officially registered abroad as refugees.

Similarly, various NGOs have repeatedly mentioned that the Syrian Government deployed and possessed an arsenal of chemical weapons. In August 2013, a number of different sources inside Syria pointed out that a new chemical weapons attack had caused the deaths of between 500 and 1,400 in rebel-held territory around Damascus in “the world’s most lethal chemical weapons attack since the 1980s” (ICRtoP, 2014: 2). Tragically, closed-circuit television system footage from Ghouta appears to show many children among the casualties (ICRtoP, 2014). Whilst a number of NGOs have claimed that the Ghouta attack was carried out by Syrian Government forces, it should be noted that in September 2013 UN weapons inspectors, when delivering their report on the attack, did not explicitly allocate responsibility for it. As a result, various other elements within Syria stated that the international community and the Syrian Government had together neglected their responsibility to keep Syrians safe. Several countries were certain that Assad’s regime had perpetrated crimes against humanity. On 14th September 2013, Russia and the US reached an agreement to eliminate and remove Syria’s chemical weapons by June 2014. Liquidation of Syria’s chemical weapons started on 6th October 2013. The majority of facilities for making chemical weapons were effectively destroyed by November 2013. In June 2014 wit was announced by a joint OPCW Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-UN mission that the removal of Syria’s chemical weapons material was complete, that Syria had destroyed all declared production capability, together with mixing and filling equipment, and stocks of chemical munitions. Despite this, the Syrian Government has other means of causing mass casualties. In 2014, it was estimated that the Syrian Government had apparently used between 5,000 and 6,000 barrel bombs since the crisis started.

There have been various international responses to the Syrian Crisis. For instance, the European Union (EU) applied economic sanctions, consisting of “an arms embargo, visa ban and asset freeze” against the Syrian Government in May 2011 and has increased the sanctions on a regular basis since then. In November 2012, the EU considered the National Coalition of the Syrian Opposition as the genuine representative of the Syrians and later, in January 2013, issued a decree demanding that Assad resign, to pave the way for political change. On 28th May 2013, the EU successfully removed the arms embargo on the Syrian opposition, and decided to arm anti-government rebels while maintaining the arms embargo on the Assad regime (ICRtoP, 2014: 3-4). However, it should also be noted in addition to this that, although US officials have stated that there will be no change in their policy towards the Assad regime, and whilst Britain and France have rejected suggestions that communications with it need to be restored, several countries have suggested that this is a potential course of action. Calls for discussions with the Assad regime have come from EU member states including Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Romania and Spain, together with the non-EU states of Norway and Switzerland. According to a February 2015 Reuters report, one unnamed diplomat has indicated that a key reason for interest in renewed communication with the Assad regime is concern regarding the terrorist threat posed by jihadists with combat experience returning to Europe from Syria.

On the other hand, the UN Security Council was critized for neglecting to deal with the crisis for over five months after demonstrations had started and its subsequent failure to arrive at an agreement on how to proceed. The Council started with a careful approach not wishing to contravene UN law and support a civil war. However, as the crisis worsened, attempts to end the conflict were, in February 2012, rejected by China and Russia. In October 2012, the Security Council expressed condemnation for the terrorist attacks in Aleppo, urging all involved groups to observe a truce in honour of Eid al-Adha. Since then, the Security Council has faced increasing calls to refer the case in Syria to the International Criminal Court (ICC) (ICRtoP, 2014). In May 2014, a total of 58 countries issued a statement calling for the UN Security Council to adopt a French-proposed resolution to refer the situation in Syria to the ICC, and pressed other UN members to officially endorse the resolution. However, a UN resolution designed to facilitate the referral of the Syrian situation to the ICC was vetoed by China and Russia, both permanent members of the UN Security Council, on 22nd May 2014.

On 20th December 2013, UN Joint Special Envoy Brahimi requested the participation of 30 countries in a peace conference to take place in Geneva in January 2014. Before and during discussions, both the UN’s Joint Special Envoy and the aforementioned group of countries sought to strengthen their position with a view to the negotiations. However, on 31st January 2014, both sides decided not to go ahead with a third round of discussions. Instead, the crisis continued into a third year. Unfortunately, at this time, the tide seemed to be turning back in Assad’s favour.

On 16th March 2014, the Syrian Government took back the town of Yabround from the opposition, thus securing the former’s control of the main territories between Syria and Lebanon (ICRtoP, 2014). Following this, in May 2014, rebels evacuated their last stronghold in the city of Homs. In early 2015, it was reported that the Syrian Army, together with militia allies, had captured several villages near Aleppo, during operations designed to encircle the city and cut off insurgent supply lines. Therefore, the latest information provides evidence that the balance of control is shifting back to the Syrian Army. It should also be noted that external military operations targeting Islamist groups in Syria have intensified, and that between 30 January and Feb 20 2015, a total of 31 ISIL targets were attacked. This can only help to further weaken armed opposition to the Assad regime. If President Bashar al-Assad is not deposed, it is likely that Damascus will be forced to develop closer ties with Iran and Russia. However, these two countries themselves are facing an uncertain economic future, given sanctions enforced by the West. The main question that remains in the long term is to what degree Iran and Russia can help support Syria’s damaged economy (Alavi, 2014).

It seems that the power of an authoritarian government and its known security needs and styles are inconsistent with the fundamental laws concerned with the safety and security of citizens, namely: human rights and legitimacy. By using force, the government generates dissatisfaction, causing disorder and insecurity, and sparking opposition. In essence, Syria, throughout its recent history, has provided an example of how the lack of specific, human security principles can be an important factor in the failure of the entire security model. Hence, it can be concluded that re-establishing the security system on the foundation of human security standards is vital not just in Syria but also anywhere in the Arab World (Kerkk채nen, 2014).

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INFLUENCE ACTIVITIES IN AN IRREGULAR TAPESTRY My previous submission to SAGE International (10/10/12) included an analysis of the New Zealand Army experience in irregular warfare – from our New Zealand War’s, all the way through to modern operations in Afghanistan with the Provincial Reconstruction Team. The paper also touched on our influence operations in Malaya, Vietnam, East Timor and in other peace support operations. A constant theme emerged in our experience; the New Zealanders did not shy from the application of force and sought to closely weave this into the fabric of influence with other softer applications of power.

have gained renewed flavour. The purpose of this short piece is to propose new ideas for the application of ‘influence activities’ and the necessity for a holistic approach in the application of power to generate influence. Influence, it will be shown, is not so much a physical capability restricted to the occasional media article or public relations broadcast, but is the very essence of how soft and hard power is applied. ‘Influence’ is technically everything we do. It is not resigned to one particular operating system or a supporting element, but is literally the engine room behind every action we undertake, whether that be kinetic or non-kinetic in nature.

THE NEED FOR INFLUENCE PROFICIENCY

This was particularly prevalent during the Malayan Emergency where the New Zealand military, and most notably the Special Air Service, effectively made life unbearable for the irregulars, subsequently forcing them from their jungle sanctuaries to engage with Government – to be in-effect, politically neutralised. Force was a staple of our modus operandi and when used in close co-operation with the pen, was very effective. These skills and techniques have long been the domain of classical counter-insurgency operations which, with operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,

Much has been written about the future littoral, congested and interconnected mission space with a multitude of actors, both state and non-state, with exceptional access to sophisticated weaponry, tactics and ideas. This cannot be argued with. The future of conflict is certain to be a highly congested and convoluted affair, with confusing boundaries of responsibilities in part a result of the geography and social nature of future conflicts, but also as a natural defence against the technological advantage of Western militaries. If the future is to be a tapestry of actors with varying degrees of influence, motives and lethality, then intervening forces will need to reassess their application of influence and, most importantly, the process of determining when to apply force. Violence will certainly be required, but in such a congested, media- heavy environment, force for the sake of it will cause more harm than good; but if used accurately and in conjunction with other elements of power, provide a powerful influence tool. In this environment, Western militaries will need to seriously reconsider how to apply influence in the irregular tapestry of future conflict as so frequently commented on by modern writers and thinkers. David Kilcullen, among other highly distinguished and respectable authors, have written on the future of conflict and the irregular ‘ecosystem’, as some like to describe it. This author does not seek to criticise any of their work for their experience in various conflict situations is indisputable, however, one does get a sense of ‘what next’? Future conflicts will become highly confused, cluttered and intentionally convoluted affairs, blurring the lines between state and non-state

ctors and drastically undermining our Cold War preference for conflicts that can be easily disassembled into counter-insurgency, peace support or interstate doctrinal definitions. The future, as numerous authors testify, will be incredibly dark and fought in the shadows. We are left with the fundamental question: how on earth are we to operate in this matrix of intentional confusion and what does this mean for the application of influence, when popular perception and persuasion is as important, sometimes even more crucial, than hard force.

A NEW PARADIGM FOR INFLUENCE Intervening forces need to develop a new paradigm for influence that does not relegate ‘influence activities’ to a supporting element, but recognise them as the very essence of what is trying to be achieved. Information operations has taken the limelight for the production of effectively marketing material to sway local perception, however, this in itself is not influence. Influence is a combination of tools – both kinetic and non-kinetic – to project a particular theme. In short, true influence is the orchestration of effects to project a message; it is not merely a public relations exercise or misguided humanitarian projects. Every action we take will have to be designed to gain influence over an opponent that may not be easily defined, and will subsequently change and adapt

as our ‘message’ changes the composition of the target. Our actions, both the hard application of force and soft power techniques, will need to be woven together to deliver a theme to the world stage and the target audience in particular. Such a theme of grand-strategic relationship management will require a true strategic leader, part diplomat, soldier, businessman and most importantly, a master of reading energy and how actions have implications for the broader security system. We need not necessarily look to more modern works to understand the fundamentals of future conflict. Clausewitz said it best when he stated, “war is an extension of politics by other means”.

Whilst we write and preach as though we understand and conform to this idea, we continually detach the application of force towards a broader political end-state. If we are doing one thing with the fist of state power, and saying another with the pen of diplomacy and cultural engagement, then our entire strategic theme is confusing and open to ridicule with the tools of Facebook, YouTube and Twitter proving to be just as influential in swaying popular perception as hard power. Let there be no doubt that the application of force has and will always remain a crucial part of future conflicts. The complication emerges when determining the right time to employ force and how this is orchestrated within the broader strategy. This is not an issue of modern day commanders but has urely influenced the fundamentals of warfare for centuries. The complications emerge when physical destruction and the resulting collateral damage, which is sure to follow, is manipulated for strategic gain. Of course, this is not to say that field commanders are required to sit and contemplate the strategic repercussions of their actions when engulfed in a firefight. During such moments it is merely a matter of survival. However, in more prepared engagements, social perception and strategic utilisation of information and perception can and should be considered when planning operations. If employed appropriately, ‘influence activities’ can shape perception such that the application of force maybe even greater than previous. ‘Influence activities’ may be used to almost prepare the battlefield, if you will, to unleash substantial firepower if that is deemed appropriate. Rather than viewing influence activities as divorced from the overall campaign strategy, it needs to be viewed as an enabler that can literally allow intervention forces to conduct operations it may not have previously been able to. ‘Influence activities’ is literally the oil in the engine of conflict; it is not a separate component but the very basis for a successful operation.

GRAND STRATEGY & INFLUENCE ‘Influence’ is commonly restricted to counterinsurgency and other irregular conflicts against non-state actors. In a highly interconnected community with unparalleled media access and online scrutiny, inter-state conflict will certainly continue though shrouded in political manipulation and influence. The fundamental principles of coercion and influence are (and are currently) being employed by powerful state actors.

The probability of state-vs.-state warfare has not necessarily reduced, however, the advent of open large scale state-vs.-state warfare with a clear open declaration of war has certainly diminished. Certainly this argument has been recited for some time and constantly been proven wrong; but with the advent of such intense media scrutiny the ability to openly go to war with another state and not be chastised as the destabiliser to regional peace is certainly problematic. One could assume the global community that has prospered so much from the Western-based international system, would certainly have something to say to any destabilising actions that threatened its economic viability. However, a 20-30 year campaign of social integration, cultural exchanges, port facility development and ‘humanitarian assistance’ can certainly shape one’s perception and potentially achieve the same strategic objective without a single shot having been fired. Which is more preferable – open war and a wicked backlash from the international system, or the slow and subtle art of influence were all avenues of national power are employed to effectively make any peer competitors irrelevant?

end-state, and that challenge rests primarily on the leaders’ ability to read the irregular tapestry, the energy flows within it, and where and how to act.

Views expressed in this article are not necessarily those of SAGE International

CONCLUSION: THE ART OF INFLUENCE This opinion piece has sought to inject a new perspective on the nature of ‘influence operations’ in the future irregular tapestry. There are countless pieces of brilliant work on counterinsurgency that all offer rich insights on countering irregulars. All publications offer a similar perspective; combating future irregulars, whether they are state or non-state based, will be as much about influence as pure military force. Whilst this has commonly been captured in counterinsurgency terminology as ‘hearts and minds’ and the necessity for ‘full spectrum operations’, it still comes down to ‘influence’ at its core basic tenants and identifying the correct tool for the correct effect. The key point this piece has sought to project is that ‘influence’ is the end state, not a supporting element to enable kinetic operations (for example). If we are to operate in the highly congested irregular environment most strategic thinkers anticipate, then we must firmly grasp what exactly we mean by ‘influence activities’ and its position in our thinking. A 5.56mm that eliminates a particularly unpleasant individual, restoring security to a community, can be just as influential on the local populace and the irregular system, as undertaking a reconstruction project. Neither is superior to the other. Our challenge is trying to determine what tool, whether that be force or non-kinetic to achieve a desired

BOOK REVIEW : ORDE WINGATE, UNCONVENTIONAL WARRIOR : FROM THE 1920S TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY SIMON ANGLIM, PEN & SWORD MILITARY, 2014 (252 PAGES).

Major General Orde Wingate (1903-1944) the creator of the famous ‘Chindit’ units which served in Burma during the Second World War, but whose military career was more extensive than the general public, or even some historians or military analysts may be aware, was an excellent choice for investigation by author Simon Anglim. Fittingly, Anglim’s excellent choice of subject is covered by a genuinely excellent, complex, analytical, but nonetheless thoroughly readable and well-structured book, which works as a biography, as a history, as historiography, and also an indication of how Wingate’s military experience is still relevant. The complexity and thoroughness of this book, together with its analytical and provocative approach, is apparent to the reader from its introduction. Anglim opens by painting a good in-depth portrait of Wingate, which clearly indicates that he was and still is seen as a controversial figure. The introductory section also assists the reader by outlining the general structure that the book follows by outlining the three main operations involving Wingate that it covers. These were his involvement in counter-insurgency in Palestine between 1937 and 1939, his work to stimulate guerrilla resistance to Italian rule in Ethiopia during 1940-1941, and, most famously, Wingate’s role in overseeing Chindit operations in Burma between 1942 and 1944. From the perspective of a modern reader, perhaps the most vital question that Anglim asks during the book’s introduction, is why anybody should still be interested in Orde Wingate in the current 21st Century context. From the outset, Anglim clearly indicates that, in his view, Wingate is still worth considering because some of the methods that he pioneered have been utilised in much more recent operations. Anglim cites the Special Night Squads (SNS) used in a counter-insurgency role in Palestine during the 1930s, and compares their modus operandi and ethos with that of Allied Tier One Special Forces in Iraq between 2007 and 2010, and in Afghanistan during the 2011-2013 period. Anglim also highlights the fact that, as long ago as 1942, Wingate argued that paramilitary operations were “the wave of the future”, and in doing this advocated what modern military personnel refer to ‘manoeuvre warfare’, which is executed by a combination of specialist regular troops, local irregulars, and air support. Such operations have taken place in the 21st Century. The example cited by Anglim in this introductory section is that of how, in 2001, a combination of US Special Forces, Northern Alliance fighters and US airpower, defeated the Afghan Taliban regime in a matter of weeks. Therefore, the book clearly sticks to its remit to examine Wingate’s ideas in a modern context from the very start. Another perennially relevant issue highlighted during the introduction, and revisited later in the book, is that of alleged excessive brutality during counter-insurgency operations, and the treatment of detainees. Allegations made by, among others, the Israeli journalist Tom Segev, hold that Wingate and others acting under his authority mistreated captured or suspected insurgents. By citing these allegations, both here and later in the book, and drawing parallels between these and more recent allegations, such as those against US and Allied forces in Iraq following the 2003 invasion, and also against Israeli forces, the author successfully follows the book’s objective of examining why Wingate’s military career is still relevant. Following the introduction, the author examines why Wingate is a controversial figure, and how this controversy arose. It is this second section of the book’s opening, titled Genius or Madman, which most clearly demonstrates that Anglim is not simply setting out to write a history of Orde Wingate’s military career, but is also aiming to examine the historiography surrounding it, which he does in a straightforward, concise and structured manner. Anglim notes that senior Allied officers who served in Burma during the Second World War held differing opinions of Wingate whilst the conflict was still ongoing. In seeking to locate the root of post-war criticism of Wingate, Anglim argues that two books, Volume III of the British Government’s Official History of the War against Japan, largely written by Major General S. Woodburn Kilby, and Defeat into Victory, the personal memoir of Field Marshal Lord Slim. Anglim argues that Slim is the only senior British commander of the Second World War who has not been subject to a critical reappraisal, meaning that his criticisms of Wingate have become historical orthodoxy.

In the first sub-section of this chapter, Prosecution-Wingate the Charlatan, Anglim argues that assessments of Wingate can be divided into pre and post-Kirby work. Therefore, Anglim strives to provide a framework regarding the historiography surrounding Wingate, and uses this as a starting point to explore the work of other historians’ views of Wingate, and why these emerged. For example, Anglim notes that Wilfred Burchett, the writer of Wingate’s Phantom Army¸ was influenced by his own radical left-wing politics which led to him portraying Wingate as an anti-imperialist and quasi-revolutionary. In the second sub-section of this chapter, Wingate the Genius, Anglim takes great pains to outline how pro-Wingate historians and writers have come to influence the historical dialogue concerning Wingate, thereby further fuelling the controversy surrounding him. Looming large in this section is the figure of Mike Calvert, who served directly under Wingate in Burma as his subordinate commander, as well as being a close friend. Continuing with his comprehensive examination of the historiography concerning Wingate, Anglim cites the work of the David Rooney, Calvert’s biographer, who has written that in 1947, during a staff posting, Calvert saw a British Army memo slating Wingate as a “divisive influence”. From this starting point, Calvert developed a belief that an anti-Wingate conspiracy had existed within the British Army. This, combined with the fact that, as Anglim indicates, most post-1945 writers on Wingate consulted Calvert, has only added to the controversy surrounding this unconventional figure. In short, the book’s examination of the how Wingate has been viewed by historians and writers is concise but very thorough. Throughout the remainder of the book, although there are arguably minor instances that contradict this notion, Anglim does a very good job in demonstrating that, far from being a ‘maverick’, the tactics and doctrines developed by Wingate more often than not placed him firmly within British military orthodoxy. This first becomes apparent in the second main chapter of the book, Winning Small Wars-Wingate’s Army. This chapter opens with an overview of how, at the time that Wingate was commissioned into the British Army in 1922, the Army was revering to its pre-1914 role as a colonial police force. Crucial in setting the scene for the later examination of Wingate’s counter-insurgency work in Palestine is the author’s explanation of the Cardwell System of military unit rotation within the British Empire, which meant that individual army battalions would almost certainly be posted to areas which experienced what would now be termed ‘insurgency’. Therefore, counter-insurgency was already an established part of British Army operations long before Wingate’s arrival in Palestine. In keeping with Anglim’s emphasis on how Wingate’s military experience is still relevant to current operations, the opening of this chapter makes a key point which should be borne in mind by those seeking to ‘learn from the past’. Wingate and his colleagues operated prior to the 1950s, since when analysts and other figures have come to view counter-insurgency as more complex than ‘war’, meaning that insurgency requires a more ‘sophisticated’ solution than simply defeating the enemy. Whereas British colonial authorities might have been willing to try and address legitimate grievances, they had no qualms regarding the meeting of armed revolt or civil disorder with force. Anglim makes the key point that, even after the 1919 Amritsar Massacre, Wingate and many others within the British Army took this view. Wingate’s aggressive deployment of SNS units in Palestine was therefore most likely, in part at least, driven by prevailing British Army orthodoxy, rather than any significantly unconventional views of his own. This second chapter of the book also provides a good, brief overview of how British Army counter-insurgency tactics evolved during the first half of the 20th Century, and how they reinforce the notion that Wingate was militarily orthodox, rather than being a military maverick. For example, the author notes that in 1931, over a decade before Wingate proposed a similar concept, Major L.V.S. Blacker argued that army columns operating on the Northwest Frontier of India could be supplied by either airdrops or air landings. Similarly, with regard to counter-insurgency as opposed to long-range penetration (LRP) operations, the Corps of Gurkha Scouts, formed in 1919 and designed to carry out nocturnal ambushes in the same area, may be seen as the forerunners of the SNS in Palestine. These and other examples that Anglim utilises only help to support the proposal that Wingate, far from being a maverick, fitted in well with wider British military thinking.

Although short, the next chapter, Before Palestine, 1923-36 is vital in helping to understand how Wingate developed his tactical ideas before his posting to Palestine, and in demonstrating tactical continuity. It highlights how, during his deployment to the Sudan and service with the Sudan Defence Force, Wingate regarded the Ethiopian frontier as a proving ground for his development of guerrilla tactics, which he was already working out at a theoretical level. One piece of evidence that Anglim uses to help confirm this is the testimony of Moshe Dayan, a protégé of Wingate’s in Palestine. Dayan argued that Wingate employed lessons learned during his service in the Sudan during his later Palestinian operations. During its focus on Wingate’s role in the Sudan, the book demonstrates the tactical continuity apparent throughout his career by stressing that the main security threat that Wingate faced, whilst primarily criminal rather than insurgent in nature, possessed a similar modus operandi. In order to deal with this problem of cross-border criminality, Wingate developed counter-insurgency methods that he would later utilise in Palestine, including concentrating forces on insurgent entry points and deception in order to achieve surprise. This focus on tactical continuity demonstrates that Anglim follows a coherent narrative path throughout the book. One fascinating historical aside that can be found in this chapter is a comparison of Wingate’s methods and tactical views, and those of his distant, and most likely more famous, relative, T.E. Lawrence (of Arabia). Whilst Anglim stresses that the two individuals held different views regarding irregular warfare, the possibility that Lawrence’s views influenced Wingate is also mooted, reinforcing the notion that rather than being a maverick, Wingate used the ideas of others in developing his own tactical outlook. Following its examination of Wingate’s operations in the Sudan, the book moves on to look at his counter-insurgency work in Palestine between 1937 and 1939. Writing as he has a book that seeks to challenge orthodox views of Wingate, Anglim opens the chapter with a brief but telling overview of the popular image of Wingate in Palestine. The author states that virtually every previous account regarding Wingate in Palestine makes two main claims. These are that his actions stemmed from his “fanatical” Zionism, and that these led to him becoming a “pariah” within the British Army. Continuing with his examination of the historiography concerning Wingate, Anglim also quotes from a history of Special Forces, written in 2006, which repeats these ideas. Aside from its content, this chapter is very-user friendly for the reader, as it is divided into three main sections covering that Arab Revolt of 1936-1939, each one examining a distinct phase. This allows the reader to better understand how the Revolt broke out and evolved over time. This chapter provides a good narrative historical overview of the Arab Revolt, which outlines the context within which Wingate’s actions can be understood. Although this historical overview of the Revolt is narrative, it is also nuanced, detailed, and explains the complexities of situation. For example, Anglim, when examining phase one of the Revolt notes that the guerrilla groups that took part in it fell into two broad categories, the Mujahedeen, which carried out guerrilla strikes against Jewish settlements and road links, and Fedayeen, who were more covert in nature, often resorting to sabotage. Also, rather than being a widespread popular uprising as its title suggests, elements of the Revolt depended upon external volunteers. During the early phases of the revolt, the Mujahedeen relied upon Syrian and Iraqi volunteers. Also, apart from a brief period in late 1938, the local Arab population appear, according to contemporary British reports cited by Anglim, to have been largely law-abiding. Indeed, Anglim also notes that many actively worked with the British authorities, and even violently confronted the guerrillas during the Revolt’s later stages. As before, Anglim follows a coherent narrative regarding continuity in British counter-insurgency tactics. He refers to the fact that during the initial British military response to the Revolt, RAF aircraft carried out reconnaissance missions to ‘pin’ insurgents in villages whilst army columns closed in, and also provided close air support when need in response to radio messages from ground forces. That these tactics had already been refined by British forces during other counter-insurgency efforts demonstrates tactical continuity. Anglim elaborates on this during his overview of phase two of the Arab Revolt by citing the creation, in 1921, of the Palestine Gendarmerie, which included large numbers of former ‘Black and Tans’ personnel who had served in Ireland. Although this chapter is of course largely historical in scope, Anglim never forgets his aim of demonstrating not only tactical continuity, but also how similar situations can arise in counter-insurgency operations that take place decades apart. During the later stages of the Arab Revolt, factions headed by two rival Palestinian

chieftains, Abdul Rahim al Haj Muhammad and Arif Abduk Razzik came close to fighting each other, apparently over controlling illegal activity such as hashish and weapons smuggling that was part-funding the Revolt. A further factional leader, Kamal Hussein, also, at times, smuggled weapons, drugs or Jewish illegal immigrants. This situation meant that the British forces in Palestine were faced with an insurgent movement which lacked centres of gravity against which they could concentrate their efforts. A similar scenario was encountered by British troops in Afghanistan and Iraq during the 2000s. Another example of recurring difficulties faced by British forces in different counter-insurgency scenarios is that the Palestine Police was largely ineffective due to bribery, corruption and intimidation, a situation similar to that which occurred in Afghanistan and Iraq during recent years. This example especially would seem to suggest that the British Army has, to an extent, failed to learn from the mistakes of previous counter-insurgency efforts. Crucially, this chapter highlights the fact that far from being a lone pro-Zionist voice within the British authorities in Palestine, Wingate was one of a number of senior figures who understood the potential of the Jewish Hagannah as a counter-insurgency force, thus refuting the claims of a number of subsequent historians. For example, Anglim cites Lieutenant Anthony Simonds, a critic of anti-Semitism in within the Palestine Police, who stated in 1934 that “My personal sympathies were with the Jews”. Additionally, in another prescient piece of analysis regarding the Arab Revolt, Anglim notes that concerns existed regarding the aggressive tactics employed by SNS units under Wingate’s direction, both within the British authorities, and also Jewish communities in Palestine. The latter, including officers of the Hagannah, feared that the methods employed by the SNS might damage relations with neighbouring Arab villages. This is relevant as concerns regarding the potential alienation of local populations during counter-insurgency efforts persists, and may be felt even more acutely in the early 21st Century. When examining the Arab Revolt and Wingate’s role in countering it, Anglim successfully examines the work of previous historians of these matters, and manages to paint a much more nuanced picture than that which has previously been available. Anglim also highlights genuine tactical continuity and the need for militaries to learn from previous campaigns. Moving onto the next chapter, Wingate in Ethiopia 1940-41, Anglim again clearly indicates his intention to investigate the historiography surrounding Wingate, and the conclusions of previous historians. Anglim takes care to debunk ‘myths’ that have spread about Wingate, and which subsequently became the orthodox view of him. One such idea is Luigi Rosetto’s belief that Wingate’s tactical ideas were completely original. This idea is quickly refuted at length by Anglim, who provides a highly detailed overview of British covert warfare planning following the Allied withdrawal from Dunkirk in 1940, and by citing the existence of the (MI(R)) branch of the British War Office, whose role was to raise units to operate in enemy territory in conjunction with local partisan forces. Also, British forces had contacts with insurgent elements within Ethiopia as early as October 1939. These two pieces of evidence, along with several others cited in the book, indicate that the idea of behind the lines operations alongside local irregular forces, both generally and in Ethiopia specifically, preceded Wingate’s arrival in East Africa, thus helping to place him within the wider context of such British operations. An element of this chapter that should be required reading for military and intelligence personnel involved in stimulating guerrilla operations can be found on page 135, which states that Wingate understood the necessity for a “controlling element” to prevent “unintended consequences” following the stimulation of resistance movements. Anglim elaborates on this by citing the example of external support for the Afghan resistance following the 1979 Soviet Invasion, arguing that by helping to stimulate Sunni Muslim unity in the shape of an armed resistance against “Godless outsiders” without considering the longer-term consequences, the US helped to create modern Islamist extremism. Also, Anglim highlights that Wingate concluded, as a result of his operations in Ethiopia, that there is “no such thing as a regular patriot”, and that local groups should be assessed as to their combat ability, potential commitment, and whether they may have any ulterior motives for cooperating in operations, before they are engaged as operational partners. Anglim argues that Wingate would probably have opposed the “buying” of the Northern Alliance’s support in Afghanistan in 2001, and been vindicated due to their apparent lack of aggression, which was only rectified by the payment of increasingly large bribes, and the deployment of US Special Forces in a supporting role.

Anglim also uses an overview the doctrine employed in Ethiopia by the British Army and its insurgent partners during the Second World War to demonstrate the continual effectiveness of such an approach when it is utilised by terrorist and insurgent groups. Wingate’s belief in the usefulness of a committed core of insurgents, rather than an uncoordinated mass uprising has been confirmed by more recent examples, some of which are cited by Anglim. For instance, the strength of the Provisional IRA in Northern Ireland may, at one point, have been only 1,200 active members, and possibly as low as fifty, within a Northern Irish Catholic population of 600-750,000. The efficiency of such an approach, the utilisation of a committed corps of individuals, rather than a mass uprising, was demonstrated, according to Anglim, by an ambush against a US Special Forces team in Afghanistan in 2006. During this incident, Taliban insurgents carefully prepared their positions and targeted the US team with a coordinated assortment of machine-guns, mortars and snipers. Anglim argues that this assault gives the impression of a well-trained, well-disciplined and professional insurgent force, of the type advocated by Wingate. Therefore, Anglim may be using these examples to reinforce the entirely accurate notion that counter-insurgency efforts must actively seek and target specific threats within a population, rather than relying on more general security practices. Wingate’s most famous military activities, namely his development and oversight of long-range penetration operations in Burma between 1942 and 1944, take up the majority of the second half of the book. Although this is too extensive to discuss in detail here, there are numerous elements that merit a mention as they highlight the continued excellence of the book. However, it must be noted that the chapters which focus on Wingate’s operations in Burma provide a very thorough narrative overview regarding the Second World War in Southeast Asia, which allows the reader to better appreciate the wider military context within which Wingate operated. Firstly, Anglim notes that Wingate tailored his operational proposals in Burma, as he had done in Palestine and Ethiopia, in order to take account of the perceived strengths, weaknesses, culture and ‘national characteristics’ of the enemy, in this case the Japanese Army. Not only does this indicate continuity regarding Wingate’s own modus operandi, but also a longer continuity within British military thought. According to the book’s second chapter, Winning Small Wars-Wingate’s Army, this continuity can be traced back to at least approximately 1896-1906, during which period three editions of Major General Charles Callwell’s Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice were published.

Further stressing continuity in British military though, as well as aiming to demonstrate that Wingate was not as great a ‘maverick’ as some have claimed, Anglim also discusses how unconventional warfare in Southeast Asia was already being advocated and discussed by elements within the British Army and intelligence community before Wingate’s arrival in this theatre of war, and indeed before the outbreak of hostilities. To support this, Anglim cites the example of Air Chief Marshall Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, Commander-in-Chief Far East, who wrote to the War Office in April 1941 advocating the creation of a contingency force of Chinese guerrillas, commanded by Indian Army officers and supported by specialist British demolition personnel. Also, following the outbreak of war in December 1941, GHQ India proposed the deployment of “small mobile guerrilla columns” to operate in Thailand if the need arose. Sticking with his remit to explore how Wingate’s campaign experiences are still relevant, Anglim notes that Wingate’s view regarding local guerrillas did not change during the early stages of his work in Burma. This view was that guerrilla forces could be useful against occupying armies who were wary of losses, restrained in their use of force and constrained by a moral view that prevented reprisals. Alternately, according to Wingate, guerrillas facing an army which had no compunction in killing prisoners or carrying out reprisals for resistance activity could be prevented from acting by emotional ties to the population in whose name they claim to be acting. Anglim argues that guerrilla warfare may have been a workable strategy for insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq, due to constraints placed on modern armies. One surprising comment in the Burma section of this book comes from Wingate himself, who is referenced as arguing that his long-range penetration groups were not ‘Special Forces’, and that he was sceptical of units which were designated as such, believing instead that existing units with an established espirit de corps and containing a number of specialists and trained personnel could quickly adapt in order to carry out

unconventional operations. As in the rest of the book, Anglim examines the historiography surrounding Wingate, and in this case examines how analysts saw Wingate shortly after his death in 1944. Anglim concludes the book by arguing that it may be more accurate to claim that there are potential ‘messages’ rather than ‘lessons’ from Wingate’s military career that modern military personnel should be aware of. This approach is a good deal more nuanced than the common dictum regarding the ‘lessons’ of history, as it concedes that, despite superficial similarities, no two situations are the same. This means that codified ‘lessons’ that were applicable in one situation may not be in another. Anglim also recaps on the issues, strategies and tactics that have been discussed in the book, and their continued relevance. There is so much from this excellent book that I wanted to discuss in this review, but was prevented from doing so by the limited space available. However, I can confidently say that this book is a must-read for those interested in warfare, both historic and modern, counter-insurgency strategies and the issues and controversies that can accompany them, military thought processes and, also the processes that helped create the modern Middle East.