Euro-Atlantic! think.act.lead. 3/2016 by GLOBSEC Academy Centre

3/2016

Interview with Štefan Füle Successes and Failures of Civil Society Building in Moldova by Jana Zˇilková Nagorno Karabakh: Forgotten, Not Frozen Conflict by Ján Cingel Speakers´ Corner - EU Enlargement: Myth or Reality?

in this issue 4

interview with Štefan Füle

in depth

Belarus between Elections: Lukashenka Limited

Ukraine Watch

Nagorno Karabakh: Forgotten, Not Frozen Conflict

Successes and Failures of Civil Society Building in Moldova by Jana Žilková Belarus between Elections: Lukashenka Limited by Balázs Jarábik & Alena Kudzko

Ukraine Watch

on the map Nagorno Karabakh: Forgotten, Not Frozen Conflict by Ján Cingel

op-ed Small in Size, Big in Influence: The Baltic States’ Role in Shaping the EU’s Eastern Partnership Policy by Dovilė Šukytė

Speakers´ Corner EU Enlargement: Myth or Reality?

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22 EU Enlargement: Myth or Reality?

editorial

Katarína Schwertnerová Editor-in-Chief In the deeply interconnected world of today, the developments in any corner of our planet could potentially bring serious consequences to other regions. The EU is, of course, no exception to this. Currently, we are witnessing it first hand in large numbers of people fleeing their home countries outside Europe and heading directly for the old continent. Moreover, the crisis in Ukraine is a no less worrisome situation right on the EU´s border. Time and again, looking inwards proves to be a mistake, and so the EU has to fully assume the responsibility for the state of its neighbours.

The need to take care of and engage in our neighbourhood has probably never been clearer than nowadays. First launched in 2003, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was reviewed in 2011 in order to take into account the developments connected to the Arab spring. However, since then, many more major challenges have occurred in the neighbouring countries - this time mainly to the east of the EU. That is why another review was initiated in 2015, resulting in the new concept of the policy – one, which would be more flexible while at the same time closely fitting for the EU´s partners. Arguably, the Union wants to be more realistic in what it can achieve in the neighbourhood, as well as in what are its partners actually capable of and interested in achieving themselves. The ENP is seemingly closely related to one of the trademark policies of the EU - the enlargement policy. However, in recent years this process has been put, at least partially, on hold for several reasons. This apparent lack of political will towards the enlargement could also have motivated the shift of focus to the ENP. As not all of the neighbours aspire to become members of the EU and several are still far from fulfilling the conditions, the distinction between the ENP and the enlargement policy becomes more visible. Furthermore, the enlargement policy can do only so much for the countries surrounding the EU. Some of them may require much more profound and thorough transformation over a very long period of time. Here, the ENP is twice as relevant. Lastly, I think we can all agree that the enlargement cannot contin-

ue indefinitely. Regardless of the point at which it should stop growing in the future, the EU will always necessarily have some neighbours. It is therefore only advisable that we start taking care of their condition already. The ENP thus sets out on a separate course, which does not necessarily have to culminate in any given country’s membership in the EU. Consequently, it might seem like the ENP requires less commitment on the EU´s side, which is probably one of the reasons why the ENP, contrary to the enlargement policy, still enjoys quite a wide support among the member states and the EU leaders. Finally, as any foreign policy of any state starts first on its own borders, concerning itself with the relationship to its own neighbours, so does the ENP form an essential aspect of the foreign policy of the EU. Without it, the EU cannot think itself to be a truly global leader. Dear readers, I am happy to welcome you back on the pages of the last issue of our magazine before the summer break. This issue will hopefully be even more engaging for you thanks to the special column, where four young professionals present their take on the issue of the EU enlargement and on whether we can still talk about it as a real option, or merely as a hypothetical scenario. The editorial board of the Euro-Atlantic magazine hopes that the articles will be an enriching read for you. We will be back with a new issue in the autumn. Until then, keep in touch with us on Facebook and Twitter at @EuroAtlanticMag.

interview

ŠTEFAN FÜLE: FIXING OUR GAZE INWARDS IS TRULY DANGEROUS interviewed by Katarína Schwertnerová

The EU faces challenges in its internal cohesion largely due to the instability of its neighbourhood. In what way have the Ukrainian and migration crises boosted EU’s interest in the ENP, which is a crucial part of addressing the root causes of these crises? The crises and challenges we face in the EU are not the direct consequence of what is going on in our neighbourhood. I think both the crisis in Ukraine and migration crisis have exposed certain weaknesses of the EU. These are mainly in the area of crisis management, particularly in terms of shared responsibility between the member states and the EU institutions. Fixing our gaze inwards is truly dangerous here, as both crises highlighted the link between the internal and external developments. We should not forget about that. It is just about time that the politicians in the EU understood that without paying attention to the roots outside our territory, we will not be able to efficiently deal with challenges we face. I hope that this growing political attention to the neighbourhood will benefit us all in the EU. The ENP has recently undergone revisions. What major lessons were learned that transformed into this revised concept of the policy? Are there any strengths and weaknesses that have been identified so far? If so, what knowledge of them can the EU apply in future?

The ability to reflect on feedback and lessons learned

combined with the ability to adjust as we go is one of the key strengths of the EU policies as a whole. Looking at what is happening around us, the first such lesson is that while taking care of our own neighbourhood, we also have to count in the neighbours

we have agreed upon. They fully rely on the European External Action Service, which, together with the Commission, were created precisely to this end. We do need to use them to the maximum and make sure there is synergy among them. However, without continued involvement of the member states and strengthening the sense of the ownership over the Policy (not only on the political level but also during its implementation), we will never be able to fully deliver on it. The third element is concern about stability and the need to go beyond the classic expression of the soft power of the EU. Here I am talking about European security and defence missions as well as the assistance in reforming the security sectors of our partners. And I am also talking about attention to the protracted conflicts and the territorial disputes, because they are poisoning not only the countries involved, but also destabilizing the broader region.

“We want to help our neighbourhood to be equipped to face the challenges of today together with us.” of our neighbours. Consensual and ambitious policy towards our neighbourhood should not stop on the borders of our neighbours, it should extend beyond. The second lesson concerns involvement of the member states. It seems to me that to a large extent the member states and their politicians have somehow resigned on their involvement in external policy capacities and on implementing external policies

There are number of other lessons learned, such as the need for more differentiation among our partners and for developing a capacity to match their aspirations and ambitions. Talking about the increased involvement of the member states, do you think the Central Europe lacks ownership over the neighbourhood agenda while it seems like it

is mainly these countries who should drive the ENP? The ENP has an Eastern and Southern dimension and I have always been hesitant about the ownership of a group of certain member states over certain region. There is no division of labour between the dimensions and we cannot favour one region over the other. I do wish to see the countries of the Central Europe investing more energy into this policy. But in a way, there already is a number of programs run by the V4 countries in the Eastern Partnership countries and I hope the number will increase. But I also hope our strengths will not only be seen through separate policy initiatives of the Central Europe vis à vis the Eastern partners, but also in Brussels, in our ability to persuade other member states and the EU institutions to pay more attention to the East in order to overcome the challenges we face together. So the ENP should be a united initiative of all the EU member states rather than just one fuelled by regional preference? Yes. There is no such thing as one-to-one relations between single countries and their partners anymore. We have created institutions and instruments of much broader scope and importance meant to interact with whole regions of our partners. We need to keep these projects and initiatives political and not bureaucratic (as we sometimes tend to understand similar efforts). We can use different platforms and dialogue to make our concerns here in Central Europe heard in Brussels. The new concept of the ENP aims to address concrete needs and ambitions of every country and to come up with individual action plans. It may, however, seem like the key priorities of the EU are less clear. What should then be an overall strategy of the ENP? This issue has been debated since the beginning of the ENP. There has been a debate

about what links the South and the East, and to what extent it can be covered by an overall strategy. The ENP does not impose the same instruments and ambitions on all of our partners. It is a set of clearly defined principles and a long list of instruments devised to deliver on those principles. There

and the East, the root cause must reside with the EU. But it is not that simple, we are not the only player in the neighbourhood. We usually seek cooperation with other players in the region but sometimes they have different vision from ours. We should be steady and stick to the principles and

“Our partners are very much welcome to remind us if we do not deliver.” are, however, number of things which unite our partners. Most importantly, our ambition is to have more peaceful, safer, and more stable neighbourhood with shared norms and values, while respecting each other and maintaining mutually beneficial cooperation. We want to see our partners develop their own regional cooperation. We want to help our neighbourhood to be equipped to face the challenges of today together with us. So we do actually have an overall goal. But then, of course, we have specific policies best described by the principle “more for more”. The more the partners want to align with the EU and its policies, the more support we will provide to them. But it is not the only angle from which we look at our partners. We also take into account whether a partner is moving in the right direction towards the dignity of its people, the rule of law, and higher level of democracy, while keeping in mind the legitimate needs of the people of those countries. The current neighbourhood policy concept has been elaborated in such a way that it not only creates the right conditions, but also encourages the EU to diversify the policies for its partners. With the EU having separate action plans for different neighbours, how can we measure the progress of the ENP as a whole and evaluate whether it is working well? This is a crucial question because of very common simplifications. Many politicians say that with so much turmoil in the South

values we once agreed on when facing difficulties. It is indeed an extremely complex job and the interconnectedness of the world has made it even more complicated. But if we sit on our hands and do nothing because we might be afraid of possible negative consequences of our initiatives, the cost of that will be much higher. We have to keep trying, and yes, inevitably we will make mistakes because we are still humans, but we continue reflecting on our mistakes in order to improve our policies. We have the instruments and structure for maintaining relations with our neighbours in which we are able to politically steer their course, and we can also evaluate where we are and where we are headed. We do it not only on the executive level but also on the level of legislative branch, as well as on the level of civil society. After all, we are not building relations only between political elites - more importantly, we are building them between civil societies. We have a multifaceted approach to assessing the extent to which we are able to fulfil the given action plan on both sides. This is a two-way street based on mutual respect which means we do not only present a ‘to-do list’ to our partner, but also follow objectives on our side, and our partners are very much welcome to remind us if we do not deliver. That closely relates to the credibility of the EU in the eyes of our neighbours. Some countries might feel like they do not see any tangible results from the EU. Can the EU be credible enough to motivate any further progress especially considering

the lack of political will towards enlargement? Furthermore, signals such as the Dutch referendum on the Association Agreement with Ukraine may indicate to our neighbours that the EU is not in fact all that interested in progress of its neighbours. With regards to the Dutch referendum, I fully respect the laws on referenda of each member state - but should we start to run our foreign or trade policies based on local referenda throughout the EU, we would indeed jeopardise our credibility as a partner, and our flexibility in changing environments. Additionally, the Association Agreement does not impose any additional obligations on the EU which would go beyond what has already been adopted in the treaties. Neither is it about reforming the EU, but rather about reforming the partner country in question. To take away from our partners the possibility to reform themselves for reasons that hide behind agreements achieved via referenda is something I would consider deeply illogical. The question about credibility is legitimate. It is also about remaining attractive for our partners in order to motivate them to reform and align with the EU policies. Furthermore, apart from the commitment of the politicians in the partner countries, it is crucial to keep a track record of how these commitments are being put into practice. No country has ever made it closer to the EU with words only. This must be done via deeply rooted reforms and transformation of the country. Unless we strike a balance between the

credibility, attractiveness and the ability of our partners to deliver on their promises, we will never be able to achieve our common ambitions. Sometimes the EU is accused of being the only reason for the turmoil in our neighbourhood, causing revolutions by exporting democracy. That is one of the myths that needs to be rebuked. We do not run colour revolutions because we do not have the ability to do so. We had not foreseen

“We should be steady and stick to the principles and values we once agreed on when facing difficulties.” what was coming in the Ukraine or the Jasmine revolution in Tunisia and the subsequent wave of changes which later swept through the whole region. We could help the people of those countries but they are the only owners of their fate. Talking about the revolutions which ensued, do you think they may have been a factor in deterring some of the EU countries and their leaders from getting further involved in the ENP? Could they cause the policy to be less ambitious, denouncing the aim to change the countries in favour of accepting the status quo and resigning on their fate? I recall that years ago some of the politicians were saying that we need to shape our neighbourhood or otherwise we will be shaped by it. In my experience, we do not impose the changes on our

Füle currently serves as a Special Envoy for ŠMrtefan the OSCE and the Western Balkans. Previously, Füle served as European Commissioner for En-

largement and Neighbourhood Policy between 2010 and 2014. Until then, in 2009, he served as the Minister for European Affairs in the Czech government. Ambassador Füle graduated from Moscow State Institute of International Relations. He started his professional career at the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1987 and since then has held many important positions at the Ministry, Czech embassies abroad, as well as in international organizations such as UN or NATO. In 1990 - 1995

partners, we help them become better. Every country has its own aspirations. We were always in the business of empowering them to deliver on those expectations. In certain regions it did cause turmoil but does it mean that we would want to return the Southern neighbourhood to the state it was in seven years ago? We do want the stability but not the kind which is based on questionable deals with autocratic regimes. The only long-term and sustainable stability

is based on the democracy. That is also one extremely important lesson to be learned. We should also not ignore the relationship between our values and interests and not separate them from each other. I have always tried to align the interests with the values because it is the only way to make the policies predictable and successful, although in the short run, it might not seem so. However, I think current politicians cannot fully assess whether our policy has had a positive impact in the long run. I wonder what analyses will historians put forth looking back ten, fifteen, or twenty years from now, and how they will answer the question whether these policies were successful after all, that is, whether they managed to instigate the fundamental changes for the people to enjoy peace, stability and prosperity in the European neighbourhood.

he served in the UN structures as the First Secretary of the Czechoslovak (later Czech) Permanent Delegation at the UN, and later as a Member and Alternate Representative to the UN Security Council. After that he directed the United Nations Department (1995 - 1996) and Security Policy Department (1996 - 1998) at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1998 he was appointed Czech Ambassador to Lithuania and in 2003 became Ambassador to the UK. In 2005 he became Permanent Representative to NATO of the Czech Republic and remained in function until 2009.

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in depth Successes and Failures of Civil Society Building in Moldova M Jana Žilková: Research Fellow, GLOBSEC Policy Institute, Slovakia

oldova, an Eastern European country sandwiched between Romania and Ukraine, and a former Soviet republic, was called an exceptional model for other Eastern Partnership countries only two years ago. After the parliamentary elections in April 2009, the so called ‘Twitter Revolution’ has spread all over the country and mobilised thousands of citizens, who were dissatisfied with the foreign policy direction their leaders were taking. Since then, the small country has seen itself as a part of the Eastern Partnership initiative, implementing necessary European integration reforms in order to reach its commitments towards the EU. At the EU summit on 27 June 2014, Moldova and the European Union signed the Association Agreement, including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Prime Minister Pavel Filip is the head of a pro-European government in Moldova. Trade Area (DCFTA). However, (AP Photo/Roveliu Buga) the times of stability eventually shifted towards political turmoil, unstable government, rising cor- whether the position and reputaruption, and protests of frustrat- tion of civil society organisations ed citizens. The country experi- have reached sufficient levels so enced a bank fraud scandal when as to challenge current political $1 billion suddenly disappeared forces on the one hand and to from 3 Moldovan banks and the gain the trust of citizens on the tension has eventually escalated other. into dozens of smaller and bigger protests against the government, its foreign policy, and the overall current state of the poorest country in Europe. The ivil society organisacivil society organisations (CSOs) tions represent non-state, have also played an undoubtedly non-profit voluntary organsignificant role in the recent his- isations formed by people in sotory of Moldova. However, de- cial sphere, separated from both spite the considerable amount of the state and the market. Accordresources (i.e. human capital and ing to the Freedom House, civil finances), it is highly doubtful society has slightly improved its

State of CSOs in Moldova

democratic progress since 2007. However, the development of the civil society sector has been stagnating since 2011 due to the several reasons. The whole democratic development of Moldova has been on hold as the country has been put under pressure by its unstable government, frustrated citizens and impatient international partners (the EU, US, IMF). Trust in the state institutions has fallen below 7 percent , which is also reinforced by a worsening economic situation, insufficient reforms in the judicial sector, increasing Russian propaganda and the accumulation of even more power in the hands of Moldovan oligarchs. Even though the number of CSOs has been growing and has reached more than 10,500 registered organizations in 2016, the number of functioning and active ones is much smaller. Their (in)activity depends mostly on the different ways of funding as the non-governmental organisations are predominantly funded from abroad, namely from the US and the EU. The CSOs usually do not receive any support from the government or respective ministries (e.g. financial aid or capacity-building support). Although the state provides them with some tax benefits (such as income tax exemption) in order to ease the financial difficulties which these organizations can experience, they are often unable to ensure their financial sustainability and are fully dependent on the donors from abroad. Due to this fact, many CSOs find themselves in the situation where

their initiatives represent the will and ambitions of the donors, rather than the interests of Moldovan citizens. Furthermore, the non-governmental organisations receive very little support from the companies which are unwilling to be associated with the organisations that publicly criticize the government or some particular business subjects in Moldova. Finally, CSOs do not get any support from individual citizens who are more keen to financially support charities or church-related activities. Besides not receiving any financial contributions from the citizens, the civil society organisations face lack of trust among the public in general. NGOs are after the government, parliament, political parties, justice system, and police perceived one of the most untrustworthy groups in the country. Organisations are often linked to particular political parties or oligarchs who try to attack their rivals through seemingly independent

regions where the attitudes are still more traditional. The two biggest financial contributors, the EU and the US have so far failed in approaching the Church, which is among the most influential groups in the Moldovan society. Moreover, the CSOs have a quite poor media profile, where strident oligarchization and politicization remain a major problem. Media are often owned by politicians, oligarchs and influential representatives of the society. Except for some local and regional newspapers, media usually do not pay any attention to NGOs as it is not in their interest to promote civil society activities and opinions, which often oppose their owners. Additionally, the NGOs which primarily focus on Moldova’s European integration do not even get any recognition in the Russian-language newspapers, TVs or radios as it is not their intention to spread the knowledge on EU integration process. Finally, the promotion of

“Without a stable government and functioning state institutions, civil society in Moldova will never fully develop.” NGOs and their analyses and reports. The citizens are largely put off as they are not sure about any given organisations’ political motives. Additionally to the lack of interest from the citizens, the NGOs are insufficiently engaged with citizens on the local level. Undoubtedly, the highest number of CSOs is centralised in Chisinau and is not really active in the regions where their support is needed the most. Due to this fact, the NGOs create a picture of a ‘Chisinau society’ living above all other regions with no interest in the problems of the rest of Moldova. Another important factor playing a role in civil society building is history. The most trusted institutions are the army and the church, while the NGOs still have not found a legitimate and fitting place in the society. It is even more difficult for local NGOs to implement their projects and stay active in the

NGOs reaches quite a poor level – many of them are not present on Facebook, Twitter or other social media, have vague and uninteresting websites and do not inform about their activities regularly.

Time for a New Paradigm

espite all the obstacles, civil society organisations in Moldova also bring new ideas and innovative perspectives to the society, while representing the interests of particular groups of citizens. In case of general dissatisfaction with the government, more people are willing to participate in public demonstrations, sign petitions or question the authorities. These new civil voices use public space and mass campaign strategies in order to impact the society. All in all, they are more influential than the traditional NGOs. Though

The NGOs still have not found a legitimate and fitting place in the society which is still more traditional. (AP Photo/John McConnico)

the number of active CSOs is relatively stable with the substantial resources coming from the western donors, their impact is now more significant than a decade ago. But without a stable government and functioning state institutions, civil society in Moldova will never fully develop. In order to create a sustainable “third sector”, along with the government and business, all sectors need to be actively involved. The government should hold regular and goal-oriented meetings with the representatives of civil society and stay open-minded. The government and ministries could also create a specialized organisation with an aim to provide trainings and seminars for CSOs. Civil society organisations represent a crucial cornerstone: hence their performance, promotion and achievements are equally important to both the government and the citizens.

1 Freedom House, Nations in Transit, 2016. 2 State register of non-profit organisations, June 2016.

in depth

Belarus between Elections:

Lukashenka Limited Balázs Jarábik: Associate Fellow, GLOBSEC Policy Institute & Non-Resident Scholar, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Slovakia

Alena Kudzko: Research Fellow, GLOBSEC Policy Institute, Slovakia

not sacrifice democracy for the sake of security, but the former should be viewed as an endgame instead of an ultimatum defining the entire relationship.

Traditionalist Revolution: Institutional Stability By lifting most of its sanctions against Belarus following the release of political prisoners and violence-free elections, the EU tacitly confirmed Lukashenka’s claim that Belarus is no longer the last dictatorship in Europe. What is particularly relevant for the EU is that Belarus is the only remaining country of the Eastern Partnership still holding onto its territorial integrity. The conflict in Ukraine and a rePresident of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko greets Russian President Vladimir Putin on surgent Russia put Belarus’ capahis visit to Belarus to discuss economic and trade ties between the ex-Soviet neighbours ble, albeit repressive, state under and allies on June 8, 2016. new light. Given the political tur(Mikhail Klimentyev/ Kremlin Pool Photo via AP) bulence in Ukraine and Moldova, Belarus may also now be the only ver the past twenty years, Brussels hopes to minimize the Eastern Partnership country withBelarus has developed potential of another conflict out political prisoners. a reputation as the last emerging. Lukashenka’s political lonThe notion of cement- gevity and ability to exercise dictatorship of Europe with Lukashenka holding unlimited ing Belarus as an area of local effective control has stemmed power. Today, due to growing stability might be more wishful from two sources: institutional tensions in its Eastern neighbour- thinking than reality though if stability and at least an a la carte hood, the EU seems more willing geopolitics continues to heat up. friendship with Russia. Brussels to accept this level of vexation: Without a finessed approach in has learned to despise and apalbeit authoritarian, Belarus has the West, Lukashenka, always a preciate both. both a functional state and so- deft maneuverer, might not be Democratically elected with ciety. By providing small carrots able to continue to resist falling over 80% of the vote in 1994, Lu(e.g. cooperation with Belarus) under the spell of Russia’s in- kashenka lived up to his electoral for the regime`s good behaviour, fluence. The EU`s policy should pledge to reinstall a centralized

system that in some policies, procedures and – particularly - symbols resembles the former Soviet Union. Given that Lukashenka was campaigning against the incumbent regime in 1994, his victory was akin to an electoral revolution - but one imitating the past rather than creating a new system of governance. Most importantly, he pursued consolidation of political power under the position of the president, a system familiar to the ruling elites at the time. The liaison - partially out-of-necessity - between Soviet-era bureaucrats and powerhungry new supporters of the Belarusian president produced a mix of centralized public institutions, through which they have both managed Belarus. They have run the country in a stable manner and relatively successfully as it relates to governance, the economy, and their compliance with a viable social contract. This consolidated backbone of the state has served Lukashenka well, one of the reasons the centralized structure has proven difficult to challenge both internally and externally. An additional factor strengthening the stability of the state has been the use of nation-building narratives, including the notion of the supremacy of national sovereignty and peace. These ideas have been carefully reiterated through references to centuryold wars on the territory of the country and by constantly reviving the experiences of WWII. Fortified by Lukashenka’s personal skill in making Russia pay for Belarus’ posturing as Russia’s only “genuine” post-Soviet ally, the seemingly impenetrable country frustrated the EU’s end-of-history-style one-fits-all democratization effort. In the

into its hands. The infamous power vertical might now be causing Russia more annoyance than the EU. The “satisfaction” of seeing Russia irritated by its own allies and the previous please-bothsides achievements of Lukashenka should not lull the EU into

“Belarus is a country where Russia`s soft power functions in an effective manner” complacency. Two major factors should be taken into consideration in developing a more individually tailored policy: Russia’s acute sense of vulnerability and internal challenges to Lukashenka’s power. The former is well-noted but is rarely applied in the Belarusian context. The latter is overlooked due to the EU’s preoccupation with more urgent priorities. Although there is a low level of propensity for a coup, yet alone a revolution, matters might be quietly turning messy in Belarus, too.

Russia and Belarus: Mutual Vulnerability Using Russia’s vulnerability towards the West to raise the price of his at least lukewarm allegiance is a balancing act mastered by Lukashenka. But his ability to hold off the advances of his envious partner might be compromised now. Belarus is a country where Russia`s soft power functions in an effective manner. A common media and cultural sphere, the predominance of Russian language, the membership of half

Lukashenka’s political longevity and ability to exercise effective control has stemmed from two sources: institutional stability and at least an a la carte friendship with Russia. changing geopolitical environment, however, the source of the EU’s prior frustration now plays

between the secret services, law enforcement agencies, and the military, almost total energy dependency, and open borders between Russia and Belarus are not new factors that Minsk has had to encounter. But Moscow`s feeling of existential threat, its potential overconfidence following its mil-

of the population to the Russian church, a significant presence of Russian banks, deep connections

itary campaigns in Ukraine and Syria, its steadfast reliance on the media to convey its message or destroy trust, and the reinvigorated promotion of the “Russian world” do represent new variables with which to cope. Speculations that Russia might be losing patience and crafting new moves can hardly be dismissed as paranoia. Previously more concerned with their own vulnerabilities towards Russia, the Baltic countries have been receiving more and more reasons to worry about the impregnability of Belarus. Lithuania’s latest threat assessment, for example, repeatedly mentions Belarus, whereas in the 2014 edition, Belarus was barely mentioned at all. Russia recently announced deployment of three new divisions alongside its western and southern borders. They are to be placed in relatively remote locations, away from the Russia-Baltic borders. One of the divisions is to be deployed to the East at the border with Belarus (two others are to be stationed in the South circumscribing the borders with Ukraine: one in Voronezh, another deeper in the south in Rostov-na-Donu). Despite taking new loans from Russia and publicly expressing brotherly love between the two countries, Lukashenka is growing more anxious. Always sensitive about his country’s – and his own – independence, Lukashenka has repeatedly announced plans for the modernization of the Belarusian military, though the country lacks funds to accomplish this goal.

in depth Belarus is officially in a Union State with Russia, placing defence, use of military infrastructure, and development of military forces into shared competencies. Furthermore, the countries have a joint air defence system, developed in the 1990s and formalized in 2009. Both countries are also members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. However, these formal agreements do not reflect the reality that Belarus has, in fact, gradually separated its military from the interconnected mechanisms set up by the Soviet Union. With regard to joint defence needs, Belarus has routinely requested “contributions” to its army, including particularly air defence forces. The Russian contributions of military equipment are, however, either regularly delayed, or arrive in the form of outdated models. With Putin being obviously not interested in strengthening the independent capabilities of the Belarusian army, the much heralded Russian military air base was quietly fended off. One of the reasons this was possible owes to the fact that there are also now clearer NATO plans for its Eastern Flank. Minsk is likely to be able to hold off Russia`s plan to build a base unless plans are introduced for a permanent NATO base in the Baltics or Poland to which Moscow perceives it would need to respond. Meanwhile, with hopes for sustained cooperation with Russia in the military industry receding, Belarus has even launched attempts at establishing “strategic” military cooperation with China and, with the help of China and – allegedly - Ukraine, produced its own advanced surfaceto-air missile system Polonaise. In February 2016 the Belarusian government updated its military doctrine dating back to 2001. The new doctrine reflects the regional zeitgeist: It’s not a conventional war that Belarus is

concerned about, but rather a combination of hybrid war comprising terrorist and (political) extremist activities. Despite having always been worried about a “colour revolution”, Minsk is aware that the West would prefer not to have any revolutions in the neighbourhood at this point. While Minsk recognizes that the main threats are no longer coming from the West, the country still cannot afford to engage in a political shift away from Russia though.

Controlled Capitalism: Institutional Instability Lukashenka’s reign has been based on an effective and repressive power hierarchy and relative economic stability. Both are under duress today. The Belarusian economy has been struggling for years, with inflation rising and real incomes plummeting. New taxes are constantly being approved, which are then enforced fervently by state servants, the form of which have reached absurd heights – one example being a tax on “social parasitism / unemployment”. These policies fail at generating necessary revenues, ignoring the elephant (state owned enterprises) in the room, and antagonize the population instead. The country has a beleaguered political opposition. With only four months remaining until the parliamentary elections, the factionalized opposition – scourged by the individual ambitions of its own less and less popular but still uncooperative members – has managed to produce only several badly coordinated lists of candidates. Instead, the current tactics of the opposition seem to be focused on testing authorities` relative tolerance to dissent by organizing unsanctioned rallies. A more potent challenge to the regime and its attempt to

introduce reforms is posed internally by the “siloviki”, the security services and law enforcement. The economic re-shuffle prepared by a handful of reformers in the government aims to move the country from a system based on state control and a planned economy to one based on regulation and a more stable legal and business environment. Even such gradual changes would, nevertheless, deprive the law enforcement structure of its veto power, and target arbitrary state management, a change impossible to imagine for many in Belarus` neo-Soviet power hierarchy. A murky episode involving the recent arrest of businessman and Lukashenka friend Yury Chyzh underlines the potential of internal struggle. Chyzh’s financial problems can hardly support one version of the story, popular among Belarusians, emphasizing the government’s dire need to raise money. According to others, this arrest, and the KGB involvement in it, rather indicates that the power mechanisms in the country might be less stable and less centrally controlled than commonly deemed by outsiders. Additional speculation is focused on the narrative that Chyzh bankrupted a company of which Lukashenka`s family were informal shareholders, highlighting the gradual transition between (state) power and wealth in Belarus. Regardless of the true explanation, the opaque and generally informal and arbitrary rules underscore the fact that reforms are not in the interest of the West but of Belarus.

Doomed to Dialogue The West is inclined to be more lenient towards what previously was considered unacceptable undemocratic behaviour. Brussels is demonstrating a willingness to offer concessions in the hope that there will be minor improvements in human rights, economic reforms, and most of

Alexander Lukashenko attends the meeting of the leaders of Russia, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, the members of the Eurasian Economic Union in Astana, Kazakhstan on May 31, 2016. (Alexei Druzhinin/ Kremlin Pool Photo via AP)

all continued geopolitical stability. At the same time, Brussels is threading carefully with an understanding that relations with Belarus that are too friendly might augment Russia’s perception of existential threat. As much as the idea of a permanent NATO base might be attractive to the Baltic countries, it would likely push Russia to exert greater pressure on Belarus to accept a Russian military base on its territory. This outcome would not help achieve deterrence but

larus has been slowly turning towards the West. The technology trigger for supporting necessary economic modernization, for example, is in the West, not Russia. Compared to Ukraine, Belarus has maintained its state capacity. Consequently, there is something to reform and capacities to implement it. As events over the past two decades should have demonstrated, liberal democracy with proper respect for human rights cannot be established by external pressure alone.

“The EU’s policy towards Belarus already includes increased collaboration with the government.” rather would increase the risk of conflict and subdue Belarus to an overpowering Russia. Relations with Belarus, particularly for Poland and Lithuania, should be a higher foreign policy priority – more than currently demonstrated by the still general tendency to dismiss the country. In this regard, the trip of Polish Foreign Minister Waszczykowskyi is a step in the right direction. Integration is not supported by either side (the EU or Minsk) and the majority of the Belarusian population further show no desire to be integrated into the EU. But official rhetoric aside, Be-

As there are still no major carrots being offered by the West though and given the big stick that Russia carries - following its annexation of Crimea - the EU is largely doomed to the fate of dialogue. Western policy towards the country should be put into this context. After 20 years of opposing Belarus, the West should most of all build trust based on common interests in order to reduce resistance to reforms. The EU’s policy towards Belarus already includes increased collaboration with the government. Exercised with caution, this cooperation has the long-term

potential to help make Belarus` notorious informal decision-making process more transparent. The EU is already strengthening its focus on education. It should also emphasise the careful promotion of structural reforms, without imposing the standard neoliberal package with a poor track record of success. Instead, the emphasis should be on addressing the country’s actual needs, taking into consideration the principles of its social economy and the general aim to modernize local industries. While such dialogue may ensure a relationship built on common interests, concern for democratic elections should not be neglected. The West should be mistaken to expect, yet alone request the regime, opposition candidates to be in the parliament. Instead, it should push for normal process and a fair vote count, given the opposition shenanigans. However, as the list of new deputies has likely been prepared by the ideology departments for the September 11 parliamentary elections, the West should keep the Spanish transition in mind: democracy can be the end result, not necessarily the beginning of a successful transition process. Russia’s perception of any increased encroachment from the West could spiral out of control, particularly in the presence of any dramatic events, as it did with the case of Ukraine. Given the geopolitical sensitivity of Moscow towards Belarus as its last ally and a territory linking it to Kaliningrad, such an event may not even need to be as significant as the Maidan in Ukraine. Lukashenka will play his part in keeping both sides mildly satisfied, but even his manoeuvring power is limited, given domestic economic challenges, resistance toward reforms, and Russia`s strong influence. It is now up to the EU to demonstrate normative finesse in developing its relations with the country, both for the sake of democracy and stability. 1 Full version of the article with references available here: http://www.cepolicy.org/publications/belarus-between-elections-lukashenka-limited

Ukraine Watch: May 2016 Aliaksei Kazharski: Researcher, Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences, Comenius University, Slovakia GLOBSEC Policy Institute’s monthly digest of news and analysis regarding Ukraine provides insights on political developments as well as energy, security and other important issues affecting the country. Join hundreds of policymakers, diplomats, experts, business people, and academic researchers to stay informed!

more, Russia has been shipping ammunition into East Ukraine via Ilovaysk and Debaltseve railway stations, Ukrainian intelligence reports. With a total 30,903 casualties in the conflict area from April 2014, “the situation in the east of Ukraine remains volatile and may develop into a ‘frozen conflict’” with dangers of escalation and “a protracted environment of insecurity and instability” , a report recently issued by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights admonishes.

Implementation of Minsk Agreements limited by diverging interests, Western sanctions against Russia may be extended:

Soldiers lay flowers at the WWII memorial in Ukraine’s capital Kiev on Victory Day, (AP Photo/Efrem Lukatsky)

East Ukraine remains a dangerous deadlock, UN warns of protracted insecurity environment: The situation in East Ukraine has remained a dangerous deadlock. Kyiv complains about regular breaching of the Minsk Agreements. The militants have been firing at Ukrainian lines using the forbidden mortars Ukrainian law enforcement spokesman claims. The presence of tanks and other heavy armament in Donetsk during the May 9th Victory Day parade organized by the separatists was also in violation of the Minsk Agreements, OSCE representatives note. Further-

Implementation of the Minsk Agreements remains limited by diverging interests and conflicting interpretations of the parties involved. Kyiv clings to its “security first” approach, meaning that the political part of the agreements cannot be implemented until a full ceasefire is established and Russian military support for the guerillas in East Ukraine is effectively cut off. According to Poroshenko’s recent statements, there cannot be elections in the Donbas without an armed OSCE police mission that should function as a security provider. The Russian side has been reluctant to give in on this option and leaders of East Ukraine militants were vocally against it. Negotiations on re-

representatives in the Minsk trilateral contact group complain that militants have conditioned the release of Ukrainian prisoners held in captivity in the occupied regions on Kyiv granting amnesty to all conflict participants. The prisoners are also denied visits by the experts of the International Committee of the Red Cross, Ukrainian side reports. Some Ukrainian political observers suggest that the only side with a genuine interest to implement the agreements is currently the West. While there have been indications of support for Ukraine’s “security first” stance coming from places like US Department of State, for the present Western incumbents any success – however illusionary - will do in resolving the “Ukraine crisis” will do in boosting their ratings of approval. For Ukrainian authorities implementing the political part of the agreements is likely to fall into the category of unpopular decisions, as, apparently, Ukrainian public opinion is not too keen on ideas like providing the occupied regions with a “special status” or granting amnesty to the militants. With his own rate of approval shrinking President Poroshenko thus seems to be caught between two political games. He cannot ignore international pressure to continue with the track of conflict resolution set by the Minsk Agreements as long as the danger of lifting of Western sanctions against Russia and diminishing of Western support for Ukraine remains real.

“Financial support from the West hinges on Ukraine’s progress in reform and here much of the difficult homework still lies ahead.” solving the deadlock step by step has been difficult, as the militants and Russia have been interpreting the existing agreements to their own advantage. Ukraine’s

Russia, on the other hand, may be simply bidding its time in anticipation of the new election cycle in the West which may bring forth politicians who are more

companied by a swift change in authorities towards individuals laws allowing candidates without detained in connection with the previous experience in the Gen- armed conflict. eral Prosecutor’s Office to run it. Lutsenko’s appointment failed to Nadiya Savchenko released from win any support with some parliamentary political groups in the Russian captivity, plans to engage pro-Western coalition such as in “serious politics”: Samopomich. As Poroshenko’s Ukrainian military pilot Nadiya “The situation in East Ukraine has remained a dangerous Savchenko returns home after deadlock. Kyiv complains about regular breaching of the two years in Russian captivity. In Russia Savchenko was charged Minsk Agreements.“ with complicity in murdering cilaxed, but only conditional on a own involvement in the Panama vilians and sentenced to twengradual progress in the Minsk offshore scandal continues to be ty-two years in prison, but was Agreements. There have been debated domestically, and some subsequently pardoned by Putin. indications that some EU mem- deputies have recently even ad- Savchenko’s homecoming was ber-states are warming up to this opted the rhetoric of impeach- synched with the release of two approach. Following the April an- ment, the true scale of corrup- Russian military men, previously ti-sanctions démarche of the low- tion in the Ukrainian political taken prisoner in Ukraine, and er house of parliament, France’s system may yet be revealed. The was negotiated in the Normandy senate now adopted a resolution National Anti-Corruption Bureau format with the participation of calling for easing of sanctions. has recently received a package French and German leaders. The Just like the recent resolution of of evidence from a former dep- captured pilot’s case drew sharp the Veneto regional parliament uty chief of state security (SBU). attention internationally. While in Italy, justifying Russia’s annex- He claims the package contains in prison Savchenko was elected ation of Crimea, this document shadow financial records of the member of Ukrainian parliament is not legally binding. Yet, such Yanukovych’s Party of regions and was also sent as a delegate instances may be indicative of that provide proof of massive to the Parliamentary Assembly of the change in political moods in political corruption with the to- the Council of Europe. Her courathe West, as well as the Kremlin’s tal bribes allegedly amounting to geous and defiant attitude in Rusdegree of success in securing at as much as $2 bn. If confirmed, sian captivity earned her someleast some European sympathy this evidence is also likely to what of a medialized “Joan of Arc” implicate many of the present image. Her symbolic capital of a towards its position. Ukrainian officials and politicians. war hero and uncompromising IMF reports partial progress in Ukraine thus remains in need of stance led some to believe that institutional reform, and not only she may become a game changUkraine; difficult homework stands when it comes to anti-corruption er in Ukrainian politics, using her measures. The United Nations charisma to challenge its cyniunfinished: Subcommittee for Prevention of cal and corrupt establishment. The recent International Mon- Torture recently suspended the Savchenko partially confirmed etary Fund mission to Ukraine visit of its delegation to Ukraine. this theory by stating that she was complimented the authorities Its delegation representatives planning to engage in some “seon recovering economic sta- were denied entry to those fa- rious political work”. Yet, others bility but stressed the necessi- cilities where - as they suspected have also wondered whether she ty of structural and institution- - Ukraine’s state security service possessed the necessary politial reform and anti-corruption (SBU) may have been holding cal and managerial skills to hold measures. The outcomes of the people in illegal detention. The a top political office, should she mission will be crucial to the pro- recent report by the Office of the ever decide to run for one. cess of reviewing the Fund’s ar- United Nations High Commisrangement with Ukraine which sioner for Human Rights claims is anticipated in July. Financial that torture and other instru1 Full version of the article with references support from the West hinges on ments violating human rights available here: Ukraine’s progress in reform and have been used not only by milhttp://www.cepolicy.org/publications/ here much of the difficult home- itants in the occupied Eastern ukraine-watch-may-2016 work still lies ahead. The reform regions but also by Ukrainian process, and the political decisions that accompany it, have been contested. The appointment by Peter Poroshenko of his close associate Yuri Lutsenko as General Prosecutor was acsympathetic with the Kremlin’s stance on Ukraine. This gave Ukrainian observers grounds to suggest that the sanctions would be extended as some Western leaders had already declared. Germany’s Foreign Minister Steinmeier, on the other hand, admitted sanctions could be re-

on the map

Nagorno Karabakh: Forgotten, Not Frozen Conflict Ján Cingel, Research Fellow, GLOBSEC Policy Institute, Slovakia Many pundits over the years have classified the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh as an example of a frozen conflict in the post-Soviet area. However, the conflict has been anything but frozen - it has been simmering and boiling for over 20 years with eruptions of open and sudden violence accompanied by loss of lives on both sides and short periods of relative calmness. But since this conflict usually did not make it to the world’s news on regular basis (especially in Europe or in the West), we tend to forget about it. Therefore, I believe it is more precise to talk about this conflict as forgotten, not frozen. It is a matter of fact that there are very few independent journalists in the region, only 6 OSCE (unarmed) observers, and two adversaries, who tend to use this information vacuum as their weapon in the information warfare against each other. On April 2, 2016 the conflict over Nagorno Karabakh sprung back to world’s attention – this time more bloodily than ever since the shaky cease-fire signed in 1994. The roots of the conflict over Nagorno Karabakh are quite difficult to trace – both sides claim the territory is theirs. The seed of trouble was very probably planted during the Soviet Union times, when the territory of mostly Armenian populated Nagorno Karabakh was given to the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic. When the Soviet Union crumbled at the end of 80s, so did its 16

Destroyed houses during the fighting at Martakert province in the separatist region of Nagorno-Karabakh on April 4, 2016. Azerbaijan said it lost three of its troops while inflicting heavy casualties on Armenian forces. The Armenian president warning that the hostilities could slide into a full-scale war. (Davit Abrahamyan/PAN Photo via AP)

control over the two republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan, which gained independence at the beginning of the 90s. After a series of violent ethnic clashes, the region found itself in open and bloody war that lasted until the mentioned cease-fire in 1994,

leaving tens of thousands dead and hundreds of thousands displaced. Armenian forces managed to fight back Azerbaijan forces and establish a control over the whole region of Nagorno Karabakh as well as other 7 Azerbaijani regions, which

they have called “buffer zones” since. On this territory was declared the Armenian-populated Nagorno Karabakh Republic, which is not recognized by any country in the world, not even by Armenia itself. The cease-fire in 1994 should have led to a peace treaty, but it never came to that

modern weapons - mostly from Russia. Armenia was also buying weapons from its “strategic ally” Russia (at a discount price) and kept strengthening its political and security ties with the Russian Federation through its membership in the CSTO pact, and was forced into the Eurasian Economic Union.

“The Minsk group’s main task was envisaged to be the “conflict resolution”, but what it really does now, is more likely the “conflict management. ” point, because both sides had very different views on how the conflict should be settled. Azerbaijan does not accept any other solution than the restoration of full control over the whole territory of the Nagorno Karabakh, whereas Armenia is backing its brethren’s de facto independence. The OSCE has established the so-called “Minsk Group”, with the aim to assist in finding a solution to the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. The group consists of countries that have the highest stakes in the conflict and is chaired by the US, Russia and France. The Minsk group’s main task was envisaged to be the “conflict resolution”, but what it really does at this point is more similar to “conflict management”. As mentioned, the ceaseﬁre fell apart again on April 2, 2016 in what was the bloodiest and most intense fighting since 1994. Not only dozens (some reports say hundreds) of lives were lost on both sides, it also came to an unprecedented employment of heavy military hardware, including tanks. The most likely cause of the clashes was that the Azeri side was testing the Armenian defences and tried to force them to negotiate from a weaker position in case they lost some of the controlled territories. For the last 20 years, Azerbaijan has been issuing threats to retake the “lost” territory by force and invested billions of dollars of its oil and gas wealth to buy huge arsenal of

Yet Azerbaijan had more reasons to break the ceasefire – in the 90s it lost its territory to Armenia, and they know that one of its few tools to pressure the Armenians is to violate the ceasefire and remind them that the status quo can be shaken. At the same time these ceasefire breaches remind the international community that this is not a frozen conflict and that Azerbaijan strives hard not to make it forgotten either. Current status quo does not play into their hands. It does, however, work just fine for Armenia (as well as for the Nagorno Karabakh Republic), giving their

side less of a motive to try their luck with renewed fighting against the militarily superior enemy. The renewed conflict in April this year also had domestic implications – with the annexation of Crimea leading to Putin’s increase in approval ratings among the Russians, the Azerbaijani regime probably hoped to override bad news (falling oil prices, numerous depreciations of the national currency “manat”, and tight grip over political opposition) with nationalistic pride over “restored territorial integrity”. The military gains after 4 days of fighting were however insignificant – with the Azerbaijani taking over a small territory controlled by Armenians at the cost of unknown number of lives and military equipment. But Armenia was caught red-handed too. Much praised territorial defence found itself in a very unfavourable situation during the first days of fighting. What’s more, the omnipresent corruption in Armenia does not avoid the vital security sector either, the ineffective state of which was exposed. One of the conclusions that Armenia drew here was that it needs to cooperate more

Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov shake hands in Baku, Azerbaijan on April 7, 2016. The foreign ministers of Russia and Iran joined efforts to prevent a new war between Azerbaijani and Armenian forces over Nagorno-Karabakh. (AP Photo)

on the map closely with the NATO (perhaps paradoxically) in order to make its defence forces better-prepared and more combat-effective. Following up on that, the second lesson learned was that Armenia cannot truly rely much on its great ally, Russia. When clashes along the contact line erupted in April, Russia found itself in a very strange position: It had no control over the situation on the ground; the hostilities were developing and all Russia could do was what the EU is usually reduced to doing in similar cases: call for “both sides to stop the use of force” and express “really strong concerns over the escalation”. Finally, the hostilities ceased on April 5, thanks to political pressure of both Russia and the international community; but especially due to Armenian dissatisfac-

tion with the little help they got from their great CSTO ally, Russia. The problem is that Russia has simultaneously mediated and destabilized the conﬂict by selling weapons to both sides. Additionally, it was very popular to describe the Armenia – Azerbaijan conflict as a “proxy war” between now belligerent Russia

far too thin all the way from Ukraine to Syria, that all that Russia could do in April was watch the situation spin out of control. This can end up being the most dangerous outcome of the recent clashes: Azerbaijan may become encouraged by Russia’s inactivity, and try to test the limits of Armenia’s defences again and again in the near future, which could lead to very dangerous security situation in the whole South Cauand Turkey, which is also not the casus. We have already seen case. Turkey supports its ethnic the possible consequences of cousins – the Azerbaijani - po- that in the 90s ethnic conflict litically, diplomatically as well as accompanied by ethnic cleanswith weapons, but like Russia, it ings. The whole international does not control the situation community should therefore on the ground and can hardly pay closer attention to this “forinfluence it, especially when it gotten conflict” and try to presescalates into an open conflict. sure both sides to come up with Perhaps it is due to a real and peaceful solution. having its resources stretched

“Turkey supports its ethnic cousins - Azerbaijan politically, diplomatically and also with weapons, but does not control the situation on the ground and can hardly influence it. “

Armenian soldiers patrol on a tank near the village of Madaghis in Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan while fears raise of a new all-out war between Azerbaijani and Armenian forces. (Karo Sahakyan/PAN Photo via AP)

op-ed

Small in Size, Big in Influence:

The Baltic States’ Role in Shaping the EU’s Eastern Partnership Policy Dovilė Šukytė: Policy Analyst, Eastern Europe Studies Centre, Lithuania

irtually since its creation, the EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative has been dogged by skeptics who question the six countries’ determination to implement democratic reforms and to independently choose their geopolitical orientation. Some argue that before the EaP policy the region was more stable. Others conclude from the Dutch referendum that EU as well as EaP countries’ voters have lost their trust in the EaP governments’ ability to succeed with the reforms. Furthermore, none of the strategic documents, including the

recent European Neighborhood Policy review, provide a convincing answer to what will follow if the AA/DCFTA are implemented. The only assurance being offered is that the EU’s doors remain open. But no one is quick to believe this, especially when the EU has failed to grant a visa-free regime to Georgia and Ukraine even after both countries fulfilled all the EU’s technical conditions. In the best-case scenario, the EU’s EaP policy is the work of careful compromise among all the EU member states. Yet reality often shows that a part of the European community has

neither the interest nor the ability to decide upon EaP-related matters. While the vacuum of expertise can be easily filled, getting all EU countries to prioritize common European values and principles over individual economic and security gains is more challenging. Established by joint Swedish and Polish action, the EaP initiative has long had the support of the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), as evidenced in part by the fact that two out of the four EaP Summits to date took place in Baltic capitals.

European Council President Donald Tusk with European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and Latvian Prime Minister Laimdota Straujuma during the Eastern Partnership summit in Riga, Latvia in May 2015. (AP Photo/Mindaugas Kulbis)

op-ed The main strengths of the Baltic solidarity with the EaP countries are following:

European Union foreign ministers and Eastern Partnership foreign ministers at the EU Council building in Brussels on May 23, 2016. (AP Photo/Virginia Mayo)

• The Baltics and the EaP countries have a joint history and feeling of community that far predates the Soviet era. Back in the Middle Ages the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and later the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth encompassed parts of modern-day Belarus and Ukraine. • Though term Homo Sovieticus was used ironically to describe ordinary citizens of the Soviet Union, in many cases a (post)Soviet mentality prevails, and EaP citizens find it easier to relate to those who have undergone a similar transition process. • As they seek to implement the AA/DCFTA, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine face tasks in many ways similar to those overcome by the Baltic States themselves. EU integration required persistence, patience, and sacrifice. The Baltics are able to provide a vision for enacting reform based on their own experi-

ence; in such a manner, motivation and belief in positive change can be sustained within the EaP societies. • The Baltics were the first ones to choose a return back to Europe, while some of the EaP countries still hope to maneuver between the EU and Russia. By supporting the EaP region, the Baltics seek to extend democratic borders of Europe further east. Moreover, common challenges from the Russian side—including propaganda, hybrid warfare, cyber threats, and energy dependence—require joint solutions and sharing of best practices. • The Baltic States carry expertise on how to integrate Russian speakers into society. • For societies that prefer to rely on the rule of the strong, it is not easy to become accustomed to participatory democracy. Such adaptation is continuing in the

Baltics; the knowledge acquired during this process, including education about democratic values, can be applied in the EaP countries. • All above-mentioned points are based on common understanding through similar experiences. Another quality of the Baltics is a good knowledge of Russian language, which in the EaP region remains in wide use either as a native or primary foreign language. Despite existing similarities, approach towards the EaP countries should not be based solely only on the examples of the Baltic States or indeed any other countries. Compared to the Baltics, which started their democratic transition soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the EaP has lost two decades, encountering new challenges as a result.

Some of the differences include: • Many geopolitical decisions, including EU enlargement, require good timing. After Russia’s re-emergence as a regional power, self-determination of the EaP countries strongly depends on Russia’s willingness to comply with - and the EU member states’ willingness to defend - the international order. • None of the Baltic States faced such massive capture by so-called oligarchs.

• The EaP public remains receptive to anti-Western propaganda and support for the EU is fluctuating. • The political will to implement reforms is lacking in the EaP capitals. • The EaP countries were not as fortunate in cultivating their independence during the interwar period as the Baltic States. Twenty years of freedom

“The EaP citizens find it easier to relate with those who underwent a similar transition process.”

were enough to develop identity and institutions, which after the collapse of the Soviet Union provided resources and memory for rebuilding the state. It is this uneasy past, together with the conviction that their success can be repeated, which makes the Baltics strong supporters of the EaP initiative. They are both criticized for a strong stance against Russia’s ambitions to dominate the former Soviet states, and praised for their loudness. The silence usually happens when someone ceases to exist or when all problems are solved; the latter should be the case of the EaP region.

Lithuania celebrated the 26th anniversary of its declaration of independence from the Soviet Union in March 2016, recalling the seminal events that set the Baltic nation on a path to freedom and helped lead to the collapse of the U.S.S.R. (AP Photo/Mindaugas Kulbis)

Speakers´ Corner

EU Enlargement: Myth or Reality? Frantisek Markovic: Founder and Blogger, EuropeanPublicAffairs.eu, Belgium

udging by its history, there are two ineluctable facts about the EU: first, its intrinsic need for a perpetual and incessant change and second, its commitment to enlargement and to incorporating more and more countries into its structures.

“Even if the EU were to re-discover its lost love for enlargement, it would still be confronted with external realities beyond its imminent control.”

Due to absence of leadership the pendulum of change is swinging from the EU’s integrationist past to its disintegrationist future. (AP Photo/Virginia Mayo, File)

As far as the former goes, lurching from crisis to crisis, the EU of today is more than ever in desperate need of change; a change it needs and change it does but not quite in the direction destined to make the situation better. Due to absence of 22

leadership and, unlike in previous decades, the pendulum of change is swinging from the EU’s integrationist past to its disintegrationist future. But while change remains, albeit in its less desired manifestation, the inevitabil-

ity of the EU’s appetite for an ever-present enlargement has waned. What once presented itself as an absolute has become contentious. The EU and its predecessors have always pioneered a successful expansionist pol-

icy that has over time ushered countries into what has now become a bloc of 28 Member States. What’s more, there are currently five candidate countries – including Serbia and Turkey – negotiating their accession to the EU. In theory, all five should in due course become full members. In practice, nevertheless, there is a little to no appetite among the Europe’s citizens (and some political elites) for yet another wave of enlargement. With the public opinions growing wearier and wearier, politically speaking, the EU’s enlargement efforts have hit a seemingly insuperable wall. There are a number of reasons why the enlargement has lost its steam. While not in themselves scholarly scrutinised contentions, a concoction

lished members. For their part, however, the older Member States have projected their deep-rooted tradition of distrust for “Brussels” into their numerous nationalist and often extremist movements. This has further undermined the EU’s appetite for expansion. But every wall has two sides. Even if the EU were to re-discover its lost love for enlargement, it would still be confronted with external realities beyond its imminent control. Be it the countries of North Africa and the Middle East that are embroiled in security challenges of the likes of ISIS; Turkey that has everything but abandoned its effort to democratise; or countries such as The enlargement policy is grossly insuffiUkraine, Georgia and Moldova cient as a consistent foreign policy tool. (AP Photo/Burhan) which have become trapped

“The truth about the enlargement policy is simple: it works for some countries some of the time.” of some of the most obvious ones can be found both within the EU and without. Zooming in on the internal reasons first; economically speaking, the previous EU enlargements have been a success. Notwithstanding the number of global and local economic crises over the years, Europe has become the largest single market on earth. That is all true except, I would argue, economics is not everything. When we take stock of the recent developments in some of the newer EU Member States, notably the Visegrad Four, one can see that while the economies have done remarkably well in that Single Market, an erosion, nevertheless, of some of the EU’s fundamental values has inexorably led to undermining the practice of liberal democracy. The apparent pushback on democratic values in this part of Europe has trickled down to the level of suspicion from some of the more estab-

between their right to sovereignty and Russia’s own ambitions; enlargement has, on this side of the rope, either become undesirable or impossible. The EU’s enlargement policy is being rejected at home and it has become toothless in light of the current external challenges. This epiphany has not gone unnoticed. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), originally moulded along the enlargement policy lines, has taken a step back from its bygone counterpart and a step forward towards a fully-fledged foreign policy. The recent ENP review has proposed a departure from its buoyant, righteous but in effect weaker whilom self to a more realistic tool. The truth about the enlargement policy, inconvenient as it may be is simple: it works for some countries some of the time. And therefore, on its own it is grossly insufficient as a consistent foreign policy tool. That does not mean that

it should be scrapped altogether. After all, relations between the enlargement policy and the ENP (or the EU’s foreign policy at general) should not be defined as a zero sum game. In fact, the former could and should – where useful – complement the latter. Nevertheless, understanding where the limits of the EU’s enlargement policy lie and that by itself it cannot deliver on the EU’s ambitions represents a step forward. It is an opportunity for the EU to focus on developing policy tools that will be more suitable for this day and age. Of course, acknowledging a policy to be a myth is not enough. It is one thing to know something is not working, quite another to come up with a more pragmatic alternative. But ridding ourselves of dogmas which have a lot more to say about our past than our future, I would argue, is a starting point worth exploring. 23

Speakers´ Corner

EU Enlargement: Myth or Reality?

Igor Merheim-Eyre: Doctoral Researcher, University of Kent, United Kingdom

Confusing desperation with interests:

Is a visa-free regime with Turkey an insult to the EU’s eastern neighbours?

n 8 March 2016 European leaders met for one of multiple European Council meetings hoping to find a solution to the uncontrolled migratory flows facing Europe. While the Czech Prime Minister and some others declared the Western Balkans route officially ‘closed’, Angela Merkel and the EC President Juncker were less optimistic. However, the presence of the then-Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu at the meeting highlighted the central role that the European Union (EU) leaders see Turkey play in halting the masses of migrants seeking to reach the promised land of Europe – a view that has only been further reaffirmed as the controversial EU-Turkey Deal is slowly being implemented. Turkey’s political leadership has sought to capitalise on the situation. Aware of the EU leaders’ desperation in getting to grips with the migrant and refugee crisis, the former Turkish PM was not afraid to present a new set of demands, which include more finances and a speedy visa-free travel for the Turks travelling to the EU. In fact, the Turkish proposals already stipulated visa-free travel by June 2016, which the European Council endorsed on 18 March. 24

Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and European Union Council President Donald Tusk who along with EU Commission Vice President Frans Timmermans and German Chancellor Angela Merkel toured a refugee camp in southeastern Turkey. (AP Photo/Lefteris Pitarakis)

European leaders, who have been sleep-walking through most of the crisis, were taken aback by Turkey’s bargaining – but unlike European holiday-makers unaccustomed to haggling in the bazaars of Bodrum, the European leaders at least tried to postpone their decision (as they so often do, hoping for the problem to solve itself or go away). Nevertheless, given the EU’s traditional attachment of human rights conditions to visa liberalisation for any third world country, the question of quickened visa-free regime for Turkish citizens has created a lot of

contestation both within and beyond the Council. Under the EU-Turkey Visa Liberalisation Dialogue signed in 2013, fundamental rights form one of five blocks of conditions that include questions of document security, migration management, public order and security, and readmission of irregular migrants. This, of course is nothing new: the conditions are the same for all countries seeking visa-free travel with the EU, including the Western Balkans as well as countries in the Eastern Partnership (EaP), such as Armenia,

Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Crucially, that the EU is preparing to grant the Turks a visa-free travel is now a foregone conclusion, despite the attempts at postponing the process until after the UK-EU Referendum, in purview of which the Turkish EU membership and visa-free travel have become particularly contested topics. Nevertheless, the Union’s approach to addressing the question of conditionality is one worth noting. In the second report by the European Commission on Turkey’s implementation of the Visa Liberalisation Roadmap, the best ‘recommendations’ the rapporteurs could think of included for Turkey to revise its terrorism legislation, improve the situ ation of Turkish Roma, and - to bewilderment

deadline (4 May) this number significantly rose to 62 out of 72! However, while the EU may think that remaining silent on the more challenging issues might be a price worth paying for resolving the migrant crisis, it really seems to reflect the bloc’s desperation, rather than the pursuit of its interests. In fact, such ‘neutralised’ assessment merely discredits the EU’s wider foreign policy agenda, particularly in the eastern neighbourhood. If one were to be more dramatic, it could be even claimed that it is insulting to countries such as Georgia or Ukraine who have so far been denied EU visa-free travel due to on-going minor disparities with EU fundamental rights’ principles, and despite their continuous efforts to reform. For example, prior to the

sue has nothing to do with visa liberalisation (as another EU official noted), then it should remove such criteria altogether, rather than be selective about their importance, which, above all, undermines EU efforts to promote reforms in the neighbourhood. In the case of Ukraine, the EU is critical of the country’s ‘copy and paste’ attitude to its reform catechism; but a signal by the EU that their conditions apply to some but not others is self-defeating. Even more so, one may argue that it is insulting to those countries who have invested a lot of time and administrative capacity to implement the EU-set agenda. In fact, the efforts to upgrade border management capacities of these countries (another condition of EU visa liberalisation) are increasingly paying off. In 2015

“The question of quickened visa-free regime for Turkish citizens has created a lot of contestation within the Council, but also beyond.“ of those accusing the Turkish government of waging a war on free speech and its Kurdish population - to take mere ‘inspiration’ from the EU acquis on equal treatment of people. Even more interesting has been the almost miraculous pace of reform implementation on the Turkish side. Where Moldova has taken almost six years to implement EU’s conditions, the Commission reported at the end of March that Turkey has already met 36 out of 72 conditions, and two days before the

granting of Moldova’s visa-free regime in 2014, the EU obsessed about issues of gay rights. When asked about visa-free travel for the citizens of Belarus and Azerbaijan, one EU official noted to the author that such move would merely discredit EU ‘methodology’ because of their human rights abuses. In this case though, it seems as if ignoring the methodology was somehow justified. Unfortunately, that misses the point. If the EU believes that gay rights or the Roma is-

Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, Turkey’s EU Minister Volkan Bozkir, European Union’s Foreign Policy Chief Federica Mogherini and EU Commissioner for Enlargement Johannes Hahn speak to the media after talks in Ankara, Turkey. (AP Photo/ Burhan Ozbilici)

there were merely 1,920 illegal border crossings from Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine into the EU, while in Turkey 69,000 people illegally crossed the border (continuing into the EU via the Balkans route) in January 2016 alone. Therefore, if the EU wants to continue with its successes (which is clearly in its interest), it must stop acting like a desperate European tourist trying to escape the haggling of the bazaar, and be firm on its agenda – not merely in terms of what it wants to achieve but crucially also in terms of how it wants to do so. While the EU may be wishing to score a quick victory in the migrant crisis, it might, in fact, end up retreating on those fronts where it had previously advanced.

1 Original version of this article was originally published in the EurActiv 06/05/2016

SpeakersÂ´ Corner

EU Enlargement: Myth or Reality? Rusudan Zabakhidze: Intern, GLOBSEC Policy Institute, Slovakia

Georgians wave with giant EU flag during an opposition rally in Tbilisi, Georgia. (AP Photo/Shakh Aivazov)

hile Georgian citizens have been excited about the possible benefits of the visa free regime with the EU Schengen Area countries for the last few months, the governments of Germany, France and Italy have raised concerns about the increasing crime rates committed by Georgian migrants on their territories, resulting in their objection to visa liberalization. Therefore, the initial excitement has turned into disappointment for many Georgians and this action has proved one more time that the EU decisions are mostly dependent on the political will of its Member States, rather than the rewards for actually fulfilling stated criteria. Since the issue of releasing visa

free regime has become such a controversial matter within the EU, can we actually talk about EU Enlargement and especially towards its Eastern neighbourhood? There is no question that the road towards Europe is challenging and requires the commitment of significant effort, political will and resources from both sides. Therefore, it is interesting to discuss how EUâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s enlargement is perceived by Georgian society and how realistic these expectations can be considering the current events taking place in the neighbourhood as well as within the EU itself. Georgia has already started to benefit and get tangible outcomes from the European

integration process, where the signing the Association Agreement including DCFTA represented one of the most important milestones demonstrating the EUâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s political will to further integrate Georgia and support its political and economic development. The Agreement has put pressure on the Georgian government as well as on the public to gradually follow the steps in order to fully enjoy the benefits of enhanced living standards, new economic opportunities and modernized public service. Nowadays, Georgian politicians proudly say that following the path towards European integration is a strategic choice made by the Georgian society. Signing Association Agreement

German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Georgian Prime Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili brief the media after talks at the chancellery in Berlin on June 15, 2016. (AP Photo/ Markus Schreiber)

on June 27, 2014, definitely gave high hopes to some representatives of the Georgian public regarding the full membership of the European Union.

integrity, while 52% also consider the territorial conflicts as the major challenge to acquire the final membership. Regardless of the increas-

year period. To this end, mere 18% still expected EU accession within 5 years (Europe Foundation, 2015). Regardless of the short period considered by Georgian society as a necessary for full accession, it is noteworthy to take into account current events facing the European Union and its neighbourhood in order to create a more realistic picture for any possible future integration. The EU’s struggle to respond effectively to the large migration flows, Brexit, an on-going economic crisis in some of the member states, and the current conflict in eastern Ukraine, are but some of the events that are shifting the Union’s attention towards overcoming existing challenges rather than to deal with the effects of any future accession. Consequently, Georgia still has a long way ahead to

“Georgia’s progress and the possibility of changing European political-economic agenda still leave the room for the hope that Georgia’s membership can be considered as a reality.” Even though the Agreement does not state anything about the future possibilities of accession, the government perceives this new level of communication as an effective platform to move forward on the European way. The public support for the integration process has varied during the past years but has remained an increasing pattern. In the poll carried out by the International Republican Institute in 2015, 62% of the Georgian population ‘fully’ and 23% ‘rather’ supported the possibility of Georgia’s EU membership. The question remains regarding the extent of the awareness about the EU and its relations with Georgia. Majority of the public perceives integration in the EU as a way to develop economically, achieve higher living standards, and enjoy the benefits of new studying opportunities abroad. Quite substantial part of the society also considers EU as a guarantor to the restoration of the territorial

ing number of information campaigns from non-governmental organizations, as well as from the state institutions, misperceptions and myths about the EU are still well-rooted in the public, especially in the rural areas. Most commonly expressed concerns regarding the European integration include the fear that the EU endangers Georgian traditions, and is therefore dangerous for the national identity. It is also interesting to note the changing public perception about the possible membership. In 2009, about 30% of the respondents believed that Georgia could become a member within the next 5 years or even less. 7 years have passed and the country still stands quite far behind in the line without any substantial sign of even to be recognized as a potential member state. In 2015, the majority of Georgians could name the specific time, but only 19% still believed that membership is realistic in the following 10-

successfully implement the AA and to solve its territorial disputes. Considering these two factors in addition to the Russian interests in the post-Soviet space and internal problems of the Union itself, realistically, membership perspective can only be perceived as a myth in the near future. However, Georgia’s progress and the possibility of changing European political-economic agenda still leave the room for the hope that Georgia’s membership can be considered as a reality in the long-term perspective. 1 International Republican Institute. 2015. Public Opinion Survey Residents of Georgia. Internet: http://www.iri.org/ sites/default/files/wysiwyg/iri_georgia_ public_2015_final_0.pdf. Last visited: 13 June, 2016. 2 Europe Foundation. 2015. Knowledge and Attitudes towards the EU in Georgia: Trends and Variations 2009 – 2015. Internet: http://www.epfound.ge/files/ eu_attitudes_survey_eng_nov_24_1.pdf last visited: 12 June, 2016

Speakers´ Corner

EU Enlargement: Myth or Reality? Nikolina Šćepanović: Member of YATA Montenegro

oday, one of the most powerful policies of the European Union is the European enlargement policy. Any European state, which is based on the principles of liberty, equality, democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law and minority rights is able to submit application for membership in the European Union. A state that has submitted an application for candidacy goes through complex procedure, including complicated requirements such as accepting the entire existing law and fulfilling political criteria (stability of institutions, guaranteeing democracy, respect human rights and minority rights, the rule of law), economic criteria (the existence of a functioning market economy and the ability of market factors to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union), legal criteria (acceptance of the existing law and entire acquis communautaire). To that end, there is implementation and enforcement of entire acquis communautaire through appropriate administrative structure. From the beginning, enlargement of the EU by accepting new members was only one of the two dimensions of the advancement of the integration process. The second one being deepening of the integration between existing member states. However, each new candidate country has its

own political, economic and cultural features that may potentially carry some problems. The EU is a community of interests and, as such, it brings

Ensuring and increasing security and prosperity on the continent is the main mission of the European Union. However, the EU is facing great

“Ensuring and increasing security and prosperity on the continent is the main mission of the European Union.” numerous benefits to its potential new accession countries which have to undergo serious reforms.

challenges nowadays. Problem regarding enlargement began coming to light as the EU expanded towards the economi-

Kosovo President Atifete Jahjaga meets EU Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy & Enlargement Negotiations Johannes Hahn in capital Pristina on November 6, 2015. Hahn has warned Kosovo opposition members that blocking Parliament will hamper the country’s further integration into the 28-nation bloc. (AP Photo/Visar Kryeziu)

cally less developed countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The desire for accession to the EU has helped these countries to be transformed into modern and functional democracies and, to that end, one can see enlargement as one of the most important instruments of the EU foreign policy. Nevertheless, this also has negative consequences, as more members means more heterogeneity of interests and difficulty in decision-making. However, for now, this process very slowly goes on. Based on experience, the European Union has over the years expanded the criteria for membership. As for the countries of Western Balkans, their geopolitical position was probably the decisive factor in the process of including this region within EU. The Union has decided to make efforts to establish peace, stability and democracy in the region and has launched stabilization and association process to prepare the countries in the region for full membership in the European Union, whereby they offer generous financial aid. These years, all eyes are on the EU and its ability and capacity to face geopolitical challenges as violence, political turmoil and insecurity is threatening world, now especially Ukraine, Iraq/Syria and Gaza. Troubling neighbourhood is merely affecting the

Leaders from Serbia, Montenegro, Slovenia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Italy, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania and Kosovo during Brdo Brijuni process meeting in Sarajevo, Bosnia. The Brdo Brijuni is an initiative generated by Slovenia and Croatia with political dialogue and regional cooperation for smooth integration with European Union for the Eastern Europe countries. (AP Photo/Amel Emric)

Europeanization process affects countries’ policy and politics altogether. Moreover, the case of the WB region is even more challenging as the process of accession in CEE has been on-going for the past 20 years, combined with EU’s attempts to stabilize the post-conflict countries after the dissolution of Yugoslavia. In the period 2000 to 2008, the EU engaged intensively with these countries, but it ended with a slowdown of the process due to both economic crises and candidate countries’ structural dysfunctional aspect. In the following years

a wide range of areas such as political reforms, foreign policy dialogue, mobility and migration, energy, trade, fight against terrorism and participation in many EU programs and projects. Stabilizing the countries politically, promoting regional cooperation and encouraging transition to a market economy are three strategic aims of the process. Enlargement is one of the most contested and yet perhaps most successful EU policies in the last decade as the policy has both an inter-governmental and community feature. Wider Europe

“Leaked Commission plans showed that EU enlargement portfolio was to be completely dropped off. Nevertheless, the EU has continued to encourage Western Balkan countries to continue with the accession process.” EU’s ability to deliver peace and maintain stability. Further, leaked Commission plans showed that EU enlargement portfolio was to be completely dropped off. Nevertheless, the EU has continued to encourage Western Balkan countries to continue with the accession process and, in that way, also encourage reforms and foster Europeanization within these countries.

the most effective instrument became the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP), which should finally pave the way for all the countries to full membership. SAP sets out common political and economic goals while progress evaluation is based on the countries’ own ability to enact reforms. The enlargement agenda includes

needs the EU to continue promoting democracy, human rights and rule of law and all of that through the possibility of membership for its neighbourhood. Regional stability is not going to be maintained by itself, and without it neither would peace be established in Europe.

leadership

GYLF: Cultivating

Leaders of Tomorrow

GLOBSEC Young Leaders´ Forum (GYLF) is an annual gathering of young leaders and the next generation of decision-makers. Since 2013, Bratislava becomes the centre of the young transatlantic leadership. As top leaders, presidents, ministers, EU and NATO officials gather at the annual GLOBSEC Bratislava Global Security Forum, young leaders engage in discussions and jointly contribute and influence foreign and security policies. GLOBSEC Young Leaders’ Forum gives participants an opportunity not only to improve their policy making and negotiating skills, but also to engage in constructive discussions with senior policy makers. GYLF is also a platform for establishing

new contacts and over the past years it has established a strong GLOBSEC Young Leaders´ Forum network. GLOBSEC Young Leaders´ Forum is organised in parallel with the main GLOBSEC Bratislava Global Security Forum, allowing future decision-makers to participate in the core debates. The Forum offers several kinds of sessions. The most prominent one is the off-the-record debate, an in-depth, hard-hitting moderated discussion with respected personalities in a closed intimate setting. Apart from offthe-record debates, participants also join the main Forum by participating in the conference’s main sessions and GLOBSEC City Talks. Apart from attending numerous debates, GYLF 2016

members participated in quiz sessions, treasure hunting in the historical centre of Bratislava and attended a lunch hosted by J. Liam Wasley, Chargé d’Affaires at the US Embassy in Bratislava. Over the years, GYLF’s guest list has included: General John Allen, Senator John McCain, Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović, Alexander Vershbow, Lord John Reid, Ivan Krastev, Heather Grabbe and others. The young leaders will also further cooperate with the GLOBSEC Academy Centre, a new educational platform established jointly by GLOBSEC and the Faculty of Political Science and International Relations of the Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica, Slovakia.

A Unique “GYLFie” Experience GLOBSEC Young Leaders´ Forum is a cutting-edge programme which offers a great opportunity for highly qualified participants to enter into polemics, to argument their views and to debate on important regional, European and global issues. It is an ideal place for breaking through the personal limits, for developing socio-cultural knowledge and for making new friendships with people from different backgrounds. (Daniel Trenchov, Chief of Staff, National Security Authority of the Republic of Macedonia, GYLF 2014) GYLF is by far among the best programs for young professionals, giving the chance to access a panorama of the current strategic and security issues with the world’s leading experts. In addition, the diversity of the profiles of young leaders allows very rich exchanges and to build an international network of high level profiles with the GYLF Alumni community. This highly valuable experience is only possible with the truly unique GYLF program that enriches young leaders with the security challenges of the 21st century. (François GIBELLI, Civil Servant, French Ministry of Energy, GYLF 2016) GYLF is unique forum which gathers on the same place high governmental officials, policy makers and young professionals. It is a great place to discuss the hot issues of today with the people who make the future. GYLF broads my mind and gives me new prospects. (Georgi Michev, Chairman of the Executive Board, Global Organization for Development, GYLF 2015) GYLF is a truly invaluable platform, which exposes young professionals to distinguished policy luminaries in the security arena and enables to discuss the most pressing challenges of our time. It sows the seeds of friendship among securi-

ty-minded leaders for future cooperation. (Jakub Tomášek, Fellow and Project Coordinator, Prague Security Studies Institute, GYLF 2015) I consider GYLF a unique gathering of inspiring people from all over the world, a place, where the differences meet to discuss most heated issues of today. The debates however were

not the most beneficial part of it, it was the people themselves. GYLF provided me with possibility to meet leading personalities from security and politics, but foremost young leaders full of enthusiasm and commitment. (Zuzana Mjartanová, SK PRES Coordinator for Energy, Ministry of Economy of the Slovak Republic, GYLF 2016)

visegrad news Hungary Poland Hungary suspends the ap- Poland participates plication of EU asylum rules in Anaconda

Hungarian police officers watch migrants behind a temporary protective fence at the border between Hungary and Serbia near Morahalom. (Zoltan Gergely Kelemen/MTI via AP)

NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, left, and Polish President, Andrzej Duda shake hands after a press conference in Warsaw. (AP Photo/Alik Keplicz

Source: euractiv.com

Source: thenews.pl

n 23 June, Hungary indefinitely suspended the application of EU asylum rules in order to “protect Hungarian interests”, prompting Brussels to seek immediate clarification. The rule requires a migrant’s claim to be processed in the first EU country they arrive in, as noted by government spokesman Zoltán Kovács. In 2014 Hungary received more asylum-seekers per capita than any other EU country apart from Sweden: up to 43,000 (rising from mere 2,000 in 2012). So far, about 60,000 migrants have entered Hungary this year - most of them, according to government figures, via Serbia. Many of them are from Kosovo and are in fact economic migrants. But among them there are also asylum-seekers from Syria and other, more distant countries, who have entered the European continent through Greece and Macedonia. Hungary claims it has now “exhausted the resources at its disposal” to accept further asylum-seekers, and the government has toughened its anti-immigration rhetoric. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán also sparked controversy when he announced that Hungary was building a four-meter high fence on its border with Serbia to keep the migrants out. The EU urged late on Tuesday that Budapest clarify its suspension of the so-called Dublin III regulation.

bout 12,000 Polish soldiers took part in NATO’s 2016 Anaconda exercise, the biggest Alliance military training operation in the CEE region, involving close to 31,000 troops, altogether. “The reception by the people of Poland in every town I’ve been has been very welcoming and we want to retain their trust, their confidence,” said General Ben Hodges, Commander of US Forces in Europe. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, who visited Poland on 30 May, announced that four multinational battalions will be deployed on a rotational basis in Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The measures are intended to assure the four allies that NATO is capable of deterring neighbouring Russia from repeating the Crimea scenario in Russian-speaking areas of these countries. Poland is still calling for NATO to station an intelligence centre linking allied military deployments in the region within its borders. To show support for strengthening not only the Eastern, but also the Southern flank, Poland’s defence minister said his country is prepared to deploy four F-16 fighters in a NATO reconnaissance mission against the Islamic State in the Middle East. It would be Poland’s first contribution to the effort, though they would not take part in combat.

Slovakia

Czech Republic Slovakia announces its EU Kremlin Propaganda In Council Presidency agenda slovakia Czech Republic

Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker participate in a media conference about EU presidency. (AP Photo/Virginia Mayo)

Russian President Vladimir Putin chairs a Security Council meeting in the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia. ( (Mikhail Klimentyev/Kremlin Pool Photo via AP)

Source: theparliamentmagazine.eu

Source: rferl.org

n 1 July, for the first time since its accession into the EU in 2004, Slovakia overtook the rotating presidency previously held by the Netherlands. Migration is expected to feature highly on the agenda for Slovakia’s Presidency, says Slovak foreign minister Miroslav Lajčák. He said that the mandatory quotas proposed by the European Commission as a part of the reform of EU’s asylum system are only “one element of a very wide process and reform.” The minister further claimed that the Slovak EU Council presidency will seek to play the role of an honest broker, aiming to find consensus and achieve agreements both within the Council and the European Parliament. The briefing heard that besides implementing the priorities in the EU presidency trio program, Slovakia will also have to deal with many internal and external challenges related to migration and refugee crisis, such as revising the Dublin regulations and fighting terrorism following the Brussels and Paris attacks, while paying equal attention to the annual EU budget for 2017, as well as the mid-term review of the Union’s multi-annual financial framework 2014-2020. After the outcome of the UK referendum on 23 June, the Slovak presidency might also have to play a key role in starting the process of Britain’s potential exit from the EU.

owing distrust and disbelief in Europe and its institutions is the main aim of Russian propaganda in the Czech Republic, according to a new study by two researchers at the Masaryk University in Brno, who maintain that Moscow is playing a sophisticated long-term game in the country. Ad hominem attacks, finger-pointing, and outright fabrications are all elements in the propaganda spread by Czech pro-Kremlin news websites. The study looked at four news websites, which the authors of the study identified as disseminating the most pro-Kremlin news: the Czech version of Sputnik (a Kremlin-controlled news service operating in several countries); two openly pro-Russian sites AC24 and Svět kolem nás (‘The World around Us’); and Parlamentní listy (‘The Parliament Papers’). The study focused specifically on how these sites covered the migrant crisis in Europe, as well as the conflicts in Syria and Ukraine. The study concludes that Russian propaganda is exploiting the migrant crisis in hopes of sowing distrust in European institutions and its elites, while at the same time, the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria - where Russian actions are said to be fuelling the tensions - are construed so as to minimize such perceptions.

calendar JULY 1 Slovakia assumes the presidency of the Council of the EU For this first time since the accession in 2004, Slovakia takes over the presidency of the Council of the European Union. Slovakia belongs to the presidency trio of the Netherlands, as its predecessor, and Malta which will succeed Slovakia at the end of this year. 8–9 NATO Summit in Warsaw Heads of State and Government of 28 members of the Alliance met in Warsaw, Poland at the summit hosted by the President of Poland, Andrzej Duda. The leaders, including US President Barack Obama, German Chancellor Angela Merkel or British Prime Minister David Cameron gathered to discuss the need to face the threats from the East as well as the South of the Alliance and strengthening the military presence on the Eastern flank. The summit also marked the first time that Montenegro, currently in the ratification process of its accession, participated at the official meeting of NATO. 12 Court Ruling on South China Sea Disputes International arbitrary court in The Hague will issue a landmark ruling in a case initiated by the Philippines in 2013 when this country filed a complaint against China after the Chinese took control of a reef about 140 miles off the Philippines´ coast. The Philippines also demanded the court to reject the Chinese historical claim of sovereignty over the majority of the South China Sea. 15 – 16 Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Mongolia will host the 11th Asia-Europe Meeting in Ulaanbaatar under the topic “20 years of ASEM: partnership for the future through connectivity”. Biannual summit will gather 50 heads of State and Government from Europe and Asia including the leaders of the EU to review the progress over the past 20 years and set the goals for the upcoming decade of cooperation.

AUGUST 14 75th Anniversary of the Atlantic Charter In 1941, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and US President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued the first document outlining the post-war vision for the world. The Atlantic Charter soon became of the cornerstones of nowadays´ United Nations and inspiration for many international agreements in the post-war international relations.

SEPTEMBER 1–2 Ministerial Conference on Ocean Economy and Climate Change in Mauricius Building on the commitments under the Sustainable Development Goals and COP21 in Paris, the World Bank aims to further built political leadership regarding these issues. That is why its Africa Climate Business Plan and Climate Change Action Plan aim to point out the interconnectedness of the ocean economy and climate change goals. 4–5 G20 Summit in China The 11th G20 Summit will be held in Hangzhou, capital of east China´s Zhejiang province. The meeting of 20 major economies representing 90% the world´s gross national product will try to tackle the most pressing issues of current world economy. China has set the agenda under the topic of innovative, invigorated, interconnected and inclusive world economy.

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