in this issue 4
headlines
6
interview with Jason Stanley
8
in depth
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In the information age we live nowadays, the computers are becoming new weapons. (Octav Ganea/Mediafax via AP)
NATO Strategic Communications: Staying Relevant in the New Information Wars by Mark Laity
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face2face Public Diplomacy versus Propaganda: Who Is Winning the War?
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EU insight Brexit: Some Advice to David Cameron by Charles Grant
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TATRA Summit
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visegrad news
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on the map Are There Any Perspectives To Solve Crimean Problem? by Andrey Zubov
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leadership
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The Union flag and the European Union flag fly outside Europe House, The European Commission Representation in London. (AP Photo/Kirsty Wigglesworth)
Vice-President of the European Commission, Maroš Šefčovič, during his keynote speech at TATRA Summit 2014.
GLOBSEC 10 Years One Phenomenon
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op-eds
37
quiz
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calendar
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A rally marking the one year anniversary of the referendum in Crimea that supported its secession from Ukraine, in Simferopol, Crimea. (AP Photo/Mikhail Mordasov)
editorial
Mikuláš Virág Editor-in-Chief George Orwell once wrote that “One of the most horrible features of war is that all the war-propaganda, all the screaming and lies and hatred, comes invariably from people who are not fighting.” In propaganda the truth becomes a lie, lies become the truth, and black passes off as white. Quarter of a century since the Cold War had ended the Russian propaganda makes its comeback, and it’s more fit than ever. After the Crimea annexation, it was expected that Russia would make an attempt to justify its move. However, the hybrid warfare it unleashed in the Ukraine and the massive propaganda which accompanies it in the cyber-space has grown to take up unpreceded dimensions. Today it is safe to say that the wave of Russian propaganda we have been witnessing recently has by large surpassed its Soviet predecessor. Having changed its strategy, the focus is no longer on the glorification of the leader and the system. Its core lies in criticizing the West as an evil, hypocritical, decadent establishment, which is bound to collapse on itself. Every day, millions of people are confronted with misinformation and twisted history produced in
the pro-Russian troll factories. All that while the West idly rests in a complacent paralysis, unable to give a proper response. This is deeply troubling. None of us truly believe that the current government in Kiev is nothing but an ensemble of covert fascist figureheads appointed to office by the dissolute western powers that be. Yet if this is what people hear every day on a long term basis, it will gradually become less and less suspicious. Should people – no matter if it is in Russia, Ukraine or Germany – learn to believe what propaganda tells them to, they will not unlearn that easily, and they will act accordingly. It is also crucial to remember that young people too perceive these events sensitively. Many of the future active citizens are especially susceptible to this kind of aggressive discourse. It is right in front of our very eyes that history is being twisted, yet response is scarce. If we defer setting things right now, can we really expect the future generations to learn from the mistakes of the past? That the Russian propaganda shies away from nothing can be witnessed in the new government-funded documentary on the Warsaw Pact, featuring the occupation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in 1968, which aired a few days ago on the Russian channel Rossiya 1. Here the invasion is depicted as an act of “brotherly aid”, intervening against the threat of fascist NATO forces. This is particularly surprising considering that in 2006, Vladimir Putin himself officially apologized for the occupation during his visit to the Czech Republic, where he claimed Russia’s “moral responsibility” for the soviet invasion. That the West is seemingly comfortable with such rewriting of the history unveils a great vulnerability and incapability of taking action on its part. Several days after the broadcast, Róbert Fico, the Slovak Prime Minister, paid a visit to Kremlin.
The history-staining propagandistic documentary as well as the memory of over one hundred victims killed during the invasion were passed over in silence. We are facing a simple question, which, however, lacks a simple answer. How do we react to the pro-Russian propaganda? The simplest - but obviously misguided – answer would be contra-propaganda. That won’t do. The first thing to really do here is to counter the misinformation and conspiracies with reason, engaging and giving space to the reliable: scholars, experts, credible politicians. At the same time, it is necessary to provide an alternative source of information to the Russian citizens and to the citizens of other Russian-speaking countries. As Ed Lucas recently remarked, it won’t be possible to penetrate Russia’s media bubble via terrestrial broadcasting – we need to focus on the Internet. With this in mind, we would like to appreciate the suggestion put forward by European Endowment for Democracy at this year’s Eastern Partnership Media Conference in Riga to establish a russophone media club, which would, inter alia, provide basis for independent newscast in Russian language. Even though this suggestion comes perhaps a little late, it is by all means a positive impulse: one which could steer the future development the right way. In any case, let us not ignore the fact that the propaganda is here, and that we have the duty not to let the truth become a lie, lies the truth, and black pass off as white. Dear readers, I am glad you found your way back to the pages of our webzine and wish that you enjoy reading the articles the editorial board of Euro-Atlantic! think.act.lead. has prepared for you. If you would like to contribute to the webzine yourself, do not hesitate to contact us. You can now also follow us on twitter @EuroAtlanticMag. Stay tuned in!
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headlines Severe Migrant M a c e d o n i a Duda Edged Komorowski in POland’s Crisis Erupted Caught In Deep Presidential Election
Conservative challenger Andrzej Duda, before election an unknown candidate, has unseated the incumbent Polish president Bronisław Komorowski backed by the governing Civic Platform party. Duda, a right-wing member of the European Parliament, won in the second round with 51.55 percent of the vote. The turnout was 55.34 percent. Observers have noticed that Duda’s voters main motivation was seeking for a change after eight years of the rule of Civic Platform. The changing political mood could signal a return to power of Duda’s conservative Law and Justice party in parliamentary elections this autumn. The election figures have also cemented discrepancy between electorate in big cities (53% for Komorowski), and in the rural areas, which largely supported Duda (62%) as well as a sharp difference between the Eastern Poland, with Duda’s victory, and the West, where Komorowski was still the winner. Furthermore, 60 percent of voters between 19-29 years chose Duda, a higher proportion than for any other age group. The rise of Duda, a 43-year-old lawyer, have been considered as a generational shift in Polish politics. He would be the sixth president since the fall of communism in 1989, but the first who is too young to have been a major participant in the 1980s struggle between communist authorities and the Solidarity opposition movement. Whilst in the campaign Duda mostly focused on domestic issues, more visible changes are to be expected in the foreign policy sphere. His presidency is likely to be more pro-American, not putting special attention to the relationship with Germany. Duda strongly opposes joining the eurozone and, generally, follows a sceptical stance of his party towards the EU. On the other hand, in accordance with Komorowski, Duda will probably continue in pushing for a more robust response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine. Interestingly, he will be the host of NATO’s biennial summit to be held in Warsaw in 2016.
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inSoutheast Asia Political Crisis Southeast Asia has experienced the biggest influx of migrants since the end of the Vietnam War after up to 10,000 refugees, many from Myanmar’s Rohingya minority group, were being abandoned by smugglers in open sea waters near the coast of Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia. Malaysia’s Prime Minister Najib Razak described the wave of people fleeing on boats to Southeast Asia as a humanitarian catastrophe. Myanmar’s treatment of marginalised Muslim Rohingya community is seen as one of the root causes of the surge in migrants making the perilous journey across the Bay of Bengal. Facing persecution, an estimated 120,000 Rohingya have attempted to escape from the country since 2012, often by paying human traffickers to help them. In addition, the current crisis is believed to stem from a recent crackdown on such human trafficking in Thailand, a common transit point for the migrants. Fearing arrest, some traffickers have left their human cargo in the middle of the ocean. Meanwhile, countries affected by the crisis agreed at a special meeting in Bangkok to set up an anti-trafficking task force, and they also made a commitment to address the “root causes” of the migration, including improving living conditions of those fleeing. At the session, Volker Turk, assistant commissioner for the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, called for the solving of the Rohingya citizenship issue. “Among other things, this will require the full assumption of responsibility by Myanmar to all its people. Granting citizenship is the ultimate goal,” he said. Htin Linn, the acting director of Myanmar’s Foreign Affairs Ministry, countered the remarks, claiming Yangon’s sovereign right to deal with internal challenges. With regard to the topic, Aung San Suu Kyi, Burmese democracy icon and the Nobel Peace Prize laureate, has come under increasing criticism for failing to speak out for the Rohingya. By many, her silence is put into the context of the upcoming parliamentary election as her party, the National League for Democracy, could risk losing the support of the country’s majority-Buddhist voters.
The European Union diplomacy has been involved in mediation talks between main two political parties in Macedonia since the country has been recently rocked by violence and anti-government demonstrations, amid accusations that Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski is becoming an authoritarian leader. One of the major negotiators, EU Enlargement Commissioner Johannes Hahn, stressed the particular importance of agreement on snap elections (as a part of any final deal). In his words, they must take place by April 2016 – in order to “keep the European, Euro-Atlantic perspective alive”. Macedonia has been in a decade-long stalemate in the process of accession to both the European Union and NATO due to a veto by Greece. Athens denies its neighbour the use of name Macedonia, claiming to have a historical right on it. The ongoing crisis was sparked by covert recordings which appear to show ministers plotting vote-rigging and the cover-up of a murder. Adding to the instability, eight police officers and 14 ethnic Albanian fighters were killed in clashes in the town of Kumanovo. Not to mention the chronic economic malaise underlying acute political crisis. Around a third of the Macedonian workforce is unemployed, the second highest rate in Europe after Kosovo. Zoran Zaev, the leader of Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM), has been releasing a steady stream of recordings since February, calling for the government accountability owing to wiretapping 20,000 people, including politicians, journalists and religious leaders. Opposition parties have been boycotting parliament, accusing the governing coalition of fraud in the April 2014 election. However, long-serving Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, who has won successive elections since 2006, has repeatedly rejected all the allegations. The conservative government, in return, has filed charges against Zaev accusing him of attempts to “destabilise country while conspiring with a foreign spy service to topple the government”. This alternative narrative has been echoed by Russia that is trying to persuade Macedonian political leaders to join its new pipeline project (for more on this issue see the headline on next page).
by daniel tichý
Greece Supported Egyptian Court Cyber Attack Hit the Extension of Sought Death Millions of U.S. Turkish Stream Penalty for Mursi Federal Workers When it comes to the geopolitical aspects of energy security for EU, nothing has presumably embodied the geopolitics-energy nexus better than several projects of pipelines intended to bring natural gas to Europe. Most recently, the major attention has been given to the extension of the Turkish Stream project. The pipeline, conceived as a replacement for the abandoned South Stream, will run from Russia through the Black Sea to the Greece-Turkey border, from where it is planned to continue to the Balkan Peninsula. The pipeline is projected to have an annual capacity of some 63 billion cubic meters. While 16 bcm of it is designated for Turkey’s domestic use, the remaining 47 bcm can continue to flow to the European market via Greece, Macedonia, Serbia and Hungary, ending in the Baumgarten gas hub in Austria. Greek government representatives have already expressed the country’s willingness to participate in the project with the final deal to be signed by the end of June. Similarly to the Syrizia’s leaders enthusiasm about the new pipeline, its construction was also welcomed by the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. As for Serbia and Macedonia, both countries have been so far commenting the project in a cautious way. In what have many experts labelled as a geopolitical battlefield between the West and Russia, the US-EU objective is to gain the Western Balkans support for progressing on the Southern Gas Corridor, chiefly its part called the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). The rival pipeline project aims at transporting natural gas from the Caspian Sea and the Middle East to Europe – so as to decrease the EU’s dependence on Russia. The European Commission recently reaffirmed its commitment to that project in a strategy paper on the EU’s energy policy. In addition, another option has been put on the table by Slovak PM Robert Fico, who has introduced a gas pipeline project involving Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary. Known under the name “Eastring”, the pipeline would allow for gas to flow in two directions, i.e. from the western gas hubs to the Balkans, but also allow the transport of Caspian and Russian gas ( just from Turkish Stream) to Central Europe.
An Egyptian court sought the death penalty for former president Mohamed Mursi and 106 supporters of his Muslim Brotherhood in connection with a mass jail break in 2011. Mursi and his fellow defendants were convicted for killing and kidnapping policemen, attacking police facilities and breaking out of jail during the uprising against Hosni Mubarak whom Mursi replaced as the head of the state. The Guardian has described the later downfall of Egypt’s first freely-elected president to be very fitting in terms of telling the story of the country’s chaos since the beginning of the so-called Arab spring. BBC has added that during his twelve months in power, Mursi was seen by many Egyptians as preoccupied with establishing political control rather than tackling economic and social problems. Should the conviction eventually stand, Mursi would become the world’s first ex-president to be executed since Saddam Hussein in 2006. However, as he can appeal the verdict, it is not unreasonable to expect that the process might take years before passing a final judgement. Mursi is already serving 20 years for ordering the arrest and torture of protesters during his own time in power. Top Brotherhood leaders Mohamed Badie and Mohamed el-Beltagy were among those also given death penalties. Like all capital sentences in Egypt, these sentences will be referred to its top religious authority, the Grand Mufti, for a non-binding opinion. The court decision has been condemned by the Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan. His governing AK Party has close ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. “Egypt is turning into old Egypt. The West, unfortunately, is still turning a blind eye to Sisi’s coup,” noted Erdogan. Mursi said the court was not legitimate, describing legal proceedings against him as part of a coup by former army chief Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in 2013. On the contrary, Sisi, now president, repeatedly warned that the Brotherhood poses a grave threat to national security. According to rights groups, security forces have killed about 1,000 Brotherhood supporters on the streets and jailed thousands of others in the past two years.
The United States has voiced an increasingly strident tone about cyber-attacks in recent months. The latest case was revealed when Washington admitted hackers accessed the personal data of at least four million current and former federal employees, in a vast cyber-attack suspected to have originated in China. Reportedly, the goal behind the attack was to build a database of federal employees so as to use the stolen personal information to impersonate government workers. By revealing who has security clearances and at what level, the Chinese may now be able to identify, expose and blackmail U.S. government officials around the world, the experts added. The government’s personnel department – the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) – handles hundreds of thousands of sensitive security clearances and background investigations on prospective employees each year. OPM detected new malicious activity affecting its information systems in April and the Department of Homeland Security said it concluded at the beginning of May that the agency’s data had been compromised and about 4 million workers may have been affected. The agencies involved did not specify exactly what kind of information was accessed. The FBI and Department of Homeland Security are said to be leading the investigation. Law enforcement officials also claimed that the hack appears to have been carried out by the same Chinese hackers who attacked Anthem Insurance earlier this year, in which information on tens of millions of customers was stolen. China has denied involvement in what could be the biggest cyber attack in U.S. history. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei pointed out that such accusations had been frequent of late. Zhu Haiquan, a spokesperson for the Chinese embassy in Washington called allegations “not responsible and counterproductive.” “Cyber attacks conducted across countries are hard to track and therefore the source of attacks is difficult to identify. Without first thoroughly investigating, always saying that ‘it’s possible’, this is irresponsible and unscientific,” he stated.
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interview JASON STANLEY: Propaganda Is Characteristically Part of the Mechanism by Which People Become Deceived interviewed by About How Best to Realize Their Goals Katarína Schwertnerová One of Russia´s great successes in its campaign around Ukraine has been, what Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss call, its weaponization of information. How does propaganda machine works? Is there a scheme which is followed while implementing propaganda? Is it obvious in current Russian propaganda in Europe? The method Russia seems to be employing is the systematic undermining of trust, together with a crafting of an alternative reality of Russian empire. They create a media environment in which the presuppositions are that everyone is creating realities for the purposes of national ideologies. For this reason, it’s no surprise that Russia is supporting far-right nationalist groups in Europe (beyond the obvious point that such groups undermine the EU). And they want to suggest that liberal democracy is just another ideology, hypocritically wielded to support particular nation-states marketing themselves as empires. Sadly, the US propaganda machine has fed into this, because of recent wars that do not seem to have anything to do with “spreading democracy”, being marketed under that label. The West has some complicity in its representation by Russian media. Russian propaganda is not too far off from the American Republican strategist Karl Rove’s famous comment, “We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality.”
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How can we, particularly Central European governments, effectively face Kremlin´s propaganda machinery and adopt our own counter-narratives? Is it possible to fight propaganda without using counter-propaganda?
Liberal democracies should not employ counter-propaganda. It is counter-productive to use counter-propaganda against Russia, because they represent liberal democracies as hypocritical, states that engage in empire building under the façade of liberal democratic ideals. If liberal democratic states start employing propaganda to market liberal democracy, whose ideals include free and open thought, and media transparency and honesty, that just feeds into the Russian critique of the hypocritical and indeed propagandistic employment by liberal democratic states of notions like freedom, openness,
and tolerance. So hard as it may seem, liberal democracy needs to follow its own ideals in response to the propaganda attack. And this is a great thing about liberal democracy. Our ideals, in the abstract, are actually pretty amazing. When conflict in the world forces a liberal democracy to embrace its ideals in the face of bad publicity, as happened during the Civil Rights era in the United States, then we get improvement in such states. Liberal democratic states should and will find it impossible to respond to the charge that their media is just producing self-serving propaganda by producing self-serving propaganda. Either you are a liberal democratic state or you are not. One of the main sessions at the GLOBSEC Forum this year is entitled: “Propaganda: Exploiting the Underbelly of Democracy”. What is the relationship between propaganda and participatory democracy? Are democracy and pluralism more fragile when it comes to unwanted propaganda than authoritative regimes? If so, how can these flaws be redeemed? The most basic problem for democracy raised by propaganda is the possibility that the vocabulary of liberal democracy is used to mask an undemocratic reality. If so, there could be a state that appeared to be a liberal democracy. It would be a state the citizens of which believed was a liberal
democracy. But the appearance of liberal democracy would be merely the outer trappings of an illiberal, undemocratic reality. There is no corresponding existential threat for authoritarian regimes. It is utterly standard to mask the nature of an authoritarian regime with the use, for example, of revolutionary or socialist vocabulary. This is not a threat to the authoritarian nature of the regime. In contrast, masking the undemocratic nature of a state with democratic vocabulary is an existential threat to a democratic regime. But propaganda poses more specific threats to all varieties of democracies. There are distinct conceptions of liberal democracy, which correspond to distinct conceptions of liberty. For example, according to the economic theory of democracy, a policy is genuinely democratic if it is voted on by majority vote by fully rational agents who are wholly self-interested. This is supposed to be the most realistic conception of democratic legitimacy. This model presupposes that people have reliable access to their interests. But propaganda is characteristically part of the mechanism by which people become deceived about how best to realize their goals, and hence deceived from seeing what is in their own best interests. Propaganda short-circuits “economic” rationality. It is utterly common for authoritarian states to have a ministry of propaganda that is even called by that name. No democratic country has an official
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ministry of propaganda, at least by that name. That tells you right away that there is a huge tension between liberal democracy and propaganda. Are there any preventive measures to be taken? Which aspects of society do we need to pay more attention to in order to prevent the public from succumbing to propaganda? Most obviously, we need schools that provide every citizen with a liberal education, the tools to make their own decisions about policy. Citizens need to be able to think about the perspectives of citizens from different backgrounds, and have
ideology arises that provides a seductive way of making sense of these gaps. And that gives rise to nationalist propaganda. You have just mentioned your recently published book entitled “How propaganda works”. What is the main message of your book? What would you recommend to the young professionals, civic organisations and also general public in order to help them distinguish between propaganda and factbased information and play a role in fighting propaganda? The main message of my book is that certain kinds of propaganda are an existential threat
“So hard as it may seem, liberal democracy needs to follow its own ideals in response to the propaganda attack.” those perspectives represented as legitimate ones in their background education. We need a press that is free, open, and devoted to the ideal of truth. We need norms that punish media when it engages in propaganda, because essentially Russian propaganda suggests that liberal democratic states are being hypocritical and dishonest. And finally, I argue in my book How Propaganda Works, that liberal democratic states also need equality, both political equality and material equality. When large divisions arise in society, when the gap in life-prospects between men and women, native-born and immigrant, start to grow, then
ason Stanley is Professor of Philosophy at Yale University. Before coming to Yale in 2013, he was Distinguished Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Rutgers University between 2012 and 2013. He has also been a Professor at the University of Michigan (2000 - 2004) and Cornell University (1995 - 2000). His PhD was earned in 1995 at the Department of Linguistics and Philosophy at MIT (Robert Stalnaker, chair), and he received his BA from the State University of New York at Stony Brook in 1990. Professor Stanley has published four books, two in epistemology, one in philosophy of language and semantics, and one in social
to liberal democracy. I explain the nature of that threat, and identify what makes a state susceptible to the sort of propaganda that makes it a liberal democratic state in name only. We need institutions, principally schools and the media, to be responsible; they are not representatives of the ruling elite or even of the current government. They are representatives of the ideals of liberal democracy. A liberal democratic culture is one that holds our institutions responsible to these ideals. Our greatest hope against the threat we face is to make our commitment to liberal democratic ideals much more explicit and ultimately impossible to delegitimize.
and political philosophy. His first book is Knowledge and Practical Interests published in 2005 by Oxford University Press (OUP). It was the winner of the 2007 American Philosophical Association book prize. Professor Stanley’s second book, Language in Context, also OUP, was published in 2007. This is a collection of his papers in semantics published between 2000 and 2007 on the topic of linguistic communication and context. His third book, Know How, was published in 2011, also with OUP. Professor Stanley’s fourth book, How Propaganda Works, has just come out with Princeton University Press in May 2015.
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in depth NATO Strategic Communications: Staying Relevant in the New Information Wars
Mark Laity: Chief Strategic Communications, NATO Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, Casteau, Belgium
“We will ensure that NATO is able to effectively address the specific challenges posed by hybrid warfare threats.... This will also include enhancing strategic communications.” Wales Summit Declaration, NATO, 4-5 September 2014 It is now stating the obvious to say the information campaign is fundamental to success in today’s conflicts and integral to an effective security strategy. At the last NATO summit the Alliance’s leaders noted both its centrality and want NATO to do better on its Strategic Communications (StratCom). This is not to say NATO has done badly but in the new security environment what we have done so far is not enough. In talking about Information Warfare we also need to address the issue of so-called ‘hybrid warfare’ of which it is a part of, and which is described in the same summit declaration as when “a wide range of overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures are employed in a highly integrated design.” Of course combining military and non-military factors to achieve effects is not in itself new. In strategic thinking the DIME approach, integrating the Diplomatic: Information: Military: Economic, has been around for years. The EU and NATO have both embraced the so-called Comprehensive Approach, a ‘whole of government’ approach taking in political, civilian and military 8
In the information age we live nowadays, the computers are becoming new weapons. (AP Photo/Octav Ganea)
instruments, with military means, although essential, not being enough on their own. Neither is the information weapon in conflict anything new – it was Napoleon who said, “Four hostile newspapers are more to be feared than a thousand bayonets.” In the Cold War the West had bodies like Britain’s Information Research Department designed to counter Soviet propaganda. Nor should we ignore today’s Russian government is using some old Soviet playbooks. For instance in its invasion of Finland in 1940 the Soviet Union claimed one of its border posts had been shelled
the Baltic states were forced to give up their independence at the point of a tank gun after a variety of fake claims about ‘provocations’ that provided the pretext for the final ultimatums. In 1968 the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was justified by a supposed (and unsigned) request for military assistance by the Czech leadership. In Crimea the Russian initial claims they were responding to calls for help from within Crimea have now been undermined by later admissions from the Russian leadership themselves - admitting that right from the start President Putin was looking to annex Crimea.
“While information has always mattered we are now in the Information Age, where the sheer power of information itself is transformational and revolutionary.” by Finland when in fact it was the NKVD (predecessor of the KGB) that did the shelling to provide the pretext. In 1940
What followed was an information campaign to seek to legitimise the illegitimate annexation and prevent the international
So what is actually new? community reacting decisively. ut simply, while information has always mattered we are now in the Information Age, where the sheer power of information itself is transformational and revolutionary. Where once information was a part of the mix it now increasingly dominates, forcing us to significantly re-evaluate and revise tactics, strategies, training, organisation, and doctrines. However, enduring principles remain valid – but we need to understand this new landscape and then apply them in a fresh and appropriate way. In that respect the Russians have done their homework. As noted above the broad outlines of much of their information approach and broader strategy can be seen in earlier decades. Using information for deception (maskirovka in operations), fabrication and disinformation, is not new. They have always been organised for information warfare, devoted resources to it, combined propaganda with so-called ‘active measures’, and applied and integrated the I in DIME. What is different is they have studied how to apply all this to the new information environment. So for instance the old TASS has become the new Sputnik, hundreds of millions of Euros have been spent on Russia Today (now RT), and troll farms to saturate the internet have been created.
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NATO has to face challenges posed by hybrid warfare which information war is part of. (AP Photo/Evgeniy Maloletka)
gy against Ukraine. What is said and done is also consciously and carefully aligned to particular narratives that are tailored to resonate with different audiences, for instance patriotism for Russians, or anti-Americanism for other audiences, or economic concerns. Part of that aim is to drive wedges between EU and NATO nations in order to undermine any united response to their actions in Ukraine. Of course there are very real debates over the appropriate response to what Russia has done, but Russian information tactics are also clear.
now possibly the dominant feature of modern warfare but that it also straddles the line between peace and war. That ambiguity is part of the challenge NATO now faces with hybrid warfare. But what are the lessons – if any – from the Russian approach? There are some we definitely should not learn or apply (and do not), for instance using fabrication or disinformation. Some say the Russians have an advantage because they don’t care about the truth and this is undoubtedly so, but the main advantage is not their lies, but the fact those lies – however amoral – are not random but professionally and effectively in“Part of that aim is to drive wedges between EU tegrated into their overall effort. and NATO nations in order to undermine any united Thus, understanding narrative, culture and differing auresponse to their actions in Ukraine.” diences, applying resources, But beyond using those inThe importance Russia adapting to the impact of the struments they are not just ran- places on what it calls ‘Informa- information age, integration of domly making up lies and other tion Confrontation’ is fairly open. information into strategy are all assorted rubbish, as the content Lectures and articles by the Rus- part and parcel of an effective of what they say is an integral sian Chief of the General Staff information campaign. part of their overarching strate- state both that information is 9
in depth This is what NATO is doing now, both using what we already have but also building on it and thinking afresh to adapt to the new reality with its new information environment.
but communicating capability and resolve through increased air policing, temporary deployments of troops and an increased exercise tempo. Thus in June this year we will see the
a significant increase in socalled ‘snapex’s’, no-notice snap exercises which are the reverse of confidence-building. And of course the Russian military build-up on the border of
June 2015, Lithuania, German soldiers attend the annual multinational military exercise “Saber Strike 2015” with the participation of 13 NATO member and partner states. (AP Photo/Mindaugas Kulbis)
So the last year has been unprecedentedly busy. Ukraine highlighted like nothing else could that NATO is still needed. But, as the Alliance’s leaders said in Wales, NATO needs to adapt to the challenges, hence the Readiness Action Plan, to review and evolve for Hybrid Warfare as well as more traditional threats. Developing StratCom will be part of that, but it is also a task for NATO’s nations. As the Russians have shown it needs resources and fresh thinking. In the meantime our information effort has been primarily on supporting assurance to NATO members. This has not been just words 10
extensive ‘Allied Shield’ series of training exercises, largely in the Baltics and involving many nations operating on air, land and sea. Part of ‘Allied Shield’ will be the next stage of preparing NATO’s new interim very high readiness force. Even here though, we see a big difference between Russia’s and NATO’s exercises. NATO’s meet the criteria of confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs) in that they are extremely transparent, defensive in character, and signalled well in advance. Russia’s unfortunately often do not. The last few years have for instance seen
Ukraine was described by the Russian government as summer exercises, but proved to be cover for incursions of Russian troops into Ukraine, and cross-border artillery fire. Again, hardly confidence-building. Russia has taken to criticising NATO exercises but looking at the differences tells its own story. There are two other features that characterise NATO’s StratCom effort, teamwork and credibility. NATO is the guarantor of the security of its members but is just one part of a multinational response to Russia’s actions in Ukraine. In that area one of the Alliance’s key efforts has been on exposing
the level of Russian intervention inside Ukraine, and that requires maintaining our credibility. Throughout the crisis in Ukraine the Russian Federation has consistently denied its active role. In Crimea, the early denials have been replaced by admissions of the deception but in Eastern Ukraine the denials
that when we do present evidence it is factually accurate and can be relied upon. Gaining and maintaining this credibility is a serious task. Not only is getting the information difficult in itself, but we live in a sceptical age, when publics have reduced faith in government and institutions.
NATO has to think afresh to adapt to new information environment. (Octav Ganea/Mediafax via AP)
still continue. NATO, often through SHAPE, has at times played a major role in exposing evidence of an active Russian military intervention. Although controversial when first released, it is noteworthy how more and more highly credible evidence of Russia’s actions in Eastern Ukraine has recently been published by independent media. For SHAPE and NATO our task has been to demonstrate
As journalist and author Peter Pomerantsev has so effectively argued, the Russian information machine consciously plays upon this, “The aim seems less to establish alternative truths than to spread confusion about the status of truth.” This idea is perhaps best exemplified by the now famous (or notorious) remark of Margarit Simonyan, the head of the Kremlin’s TV network, RT, “There is no objectivity – only
approximations of the truth by as many different voices as possible” This cynicism was perhaps best demonstrated by the number of often ludicrous and contradictory stories rapidly and continually propagated by Russia about the shooting down of the MH17 airliner last year. Given the evidence shows the missile that destroyed MH17 was fired from territory controlled by Russian-backed separatists then the aim seems to have been too muddy the waters. And the point of spreading confusion is that of course it makes for indecision, and indecision about a response was what was wanted. I started my life as a journalist, so debates about objectivity were the stuff of lively argument from the day I started. We all knew our backgrounds and cultures could never be totally overcome in our work, but we knew we could much reduce bias if we tried. The output of someone trying to be objective was very different – and far more trustworthy – than someone who did not care or did not try. We also knew those who said there was no such thing as objectivity soon became careless when it came to both fairness and facts. The rejoinder to the saying, “There is no objectivity.” Is another saying, “Everyone has the right to their own opinion but no-one has the right to their own facts.” We will continue to use the facts so as to be credible, and leave the cynicism to others. The author is writing in a personal capacity, and the views expressed in this article are those of the author alone. They do not represent an official position of NATO.
“Our task has been to demonstrate that when we do present evidence it is factually accurate and can be relied upon. Gaining and maintaining this credibility is a serious task.” 11
face2face Public Diplomacy Versus Propaganda:
Who Is Winning the War? Nicholas J. Cull: Professor of Public Diplomacy at the University of Southern California, United States of America
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arly in Shakespeare’s tragedy ‘Macbeth’ the protagonist remarks: ‘nothing is but what is not.’ His companion – Banquo – has already noted that even accurate information may be misleading, observing: ‘And oftentimes, to win us to our harm, The instruments of darkness tell us truths, Win us with honest trifles, to betray ’s In deepest consequence.’ The feeling that the only reality is unreality of various kinds and that truth may prove treacherous is much abroad in our own time. One cannot open, tune in or log-on to the news without encountering some sort of claim and diametrically opposed counterclaim with massive political implications. These claims turn not just on nuance or opinion but on an issues of fact: there are either Russian regular troops in Ukraine or there are not; the Obama administration either lied about the details of the killing of Osama bin Laden or it did not; the Syrian government is either gassing its own people or it is not. Perhaps it was ever thus. Back in 1916 British observers noted that in wartime truth is the first casualty, and German folk culture has long had it that: ‘“Kommt der Krieg ins Land/Gibt Lügen wie Sand.” (When war comes to the land/ the lies [pile up] like sand). But there is something new in the media space today at home and abroad. It is as if the excesses of invention and distortion which characterized the Great War are back but pumped up with the steroids of the electronic age. In the century since the Great Powers traded blows and
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atrocity stories in the opening rounds of the First World War political communication has evolved. While there is still a practice that we can readily recognize as propaganda -mass political persuasion, with a familiar range of tactics including 1914’s repertoire of big lies, demonizing the enemy, glorifying the leader and censoring the free circulation of opposing ideas -- in the intervening years the democracies have sought to develop the alternative approach now known as public diplomacy. Initially it began in the mid1960s as a good old American exercise in re-branding. If the US
exchanges and dialogue. Propaganda is seldom two-way. Public diplomacy is based on listening. The public diplomat listens before, during and after contact with the foreign public. Propagandists conceive of listening only to better target their one-way communication. Public diplomacy is a two-way street and as such can change both the recipient society and the sending society too. Propaganda is intended to change only the target society. Public diplomacy is flexible. Propaganda has a tight agenda. Public diplomacy is at its heart respectful of others. Propaganda
„It is as if the excesses of invention and distortion, which characterised the Great War, are back but pumped with steroids of the electronic age.“ and its allies claimed to conduct ‘public diplomacy’ that left the term propaganda free to be thrown back at the Communist Bloc. In time their empty term public diplomacy developed a benign substance and emerged as a distinct approach to advance the ends of foreign policy by engaging international opinion but without counter-productive crosscurrents and closure to dialogue that inevitably attend the use of propaganda. The nature of public diplomacy and propaganda emerge from direct comparison. Public diplomacy is based firmly on truth even when the truth is complex or uncomfortable. Propaganda is selective in its use of the truth. Public diplomacy is often two-way, working through
assumes others are ignorant or wrong. Public diplomacy is open. Propaganda is closed. Public diplomacy is ethical. Propaganda can be unethical. Considering these distinctions it is plain that public diplomacy is perpetually in danger of deteriorating into propaganda, whenever practitioners or their political masters choose to place their need to sell a point of view above the quest to identify mutual benefit and develop a genuine relationship with their interlocutor. Some US observers long ago concluded that Congress only ever wants propaganda and hence still sees public diplomacy as merely a convenient euphemism. What then should public diplomacy do when confronted
President Barack Obama speaks during Catholic Hospital Association Conference in Washington on Tuesday, June 9, 2015. Obama defended the health care overhaul just days ahead of an anticipated decision by the Supreme Court that could eliminate health care for millions of people. (AP Photo/Jose Luis Magana)
by propaganda? This has always been a problem -- analogous to the challenge of persistent violence to nonviolent resistance tactics. The temptation to give as good as the enemy and trade lie for lie can be overwhelming, but must be resisted. One interesting model for a response may be found in the responses which American social scientists working for the US Office of War Information (OWI) devised to cope with propaganda based on outrageous rumors circulated within the United States by enemies (foreign. domestic and some unwitting) during World War Two. These scholars soon recognized it was not wise to repeat and rumor and then deny it, as this often simply introduced the rumor to an even wider audience. They learned to map and track rumors carefully, collecting them systematically from those people most exposed to idle chat -- teachers, barbers, beauticians were favorite sources – and they used the information to establish what needed to be said to the public in overt and truthful government
communication. Rumors were only directly engaged in the communities where they had already become well known. OWI established a network of rumor clinics to research and counter rumors. The director of the Boston office -- Professor Robert Knapp -- published his findings in 1944, (Robert H. Knapp, ‘A Psychology of Rumor’, p.35-37) including a list of six directives for effective rumor control; 1. Assure good faith in the regular media of communication 2. Develop maximum confidence in leaders 3. Issue as much news as possible, as quickly as possible 4. Make information as accessible as possible 5. Prevent idleness, monotony, and personal disorganization 6. Campaign deliberately against rumor mongering. When combined with local rebuttal, these directives still make a lot of sense. It is however hard to see how Knapp’s proscription could be implemented today. Each
element of his recommendations flies in the face of contemporary trends. How can public diplomacy or counter propaganda prosper at a time when domestic political processes routinely 1) undermine our own media, 2) challenge the competence of leaders and institutions and leave public diplomacy so underfunded as to be unable to adequately deliver information with the 3) speed and 4) transparency required? How can it flourish when aspects of our modern life seem tailor made to promote 5) idleness and disorganization and our social media rewards rather than discourages 6) rumor mongering? This suggests that we live at an optimal moment for propaganda to flourish. For democracies the road back must begin with sustained discussion of this challenge and of the best way to rebuild a public diplomacy capacity capable of making a difference. The alternative path – inaction or simply contributing our own propaganda to the battle – is the road to a collective tragedy of Shakespearian dimensions.
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face2face Public Diplomacy Versus Propaganda:
Who Is Winning the War?
Pavel Andreev Founder of the Center for Global Strategies and Communications and a Member of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Moscow
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casual discussion of public diplomacy and propaganda usually means a notion of positive engagement and dialogue, on one side, and a connotation with brainwashing of a target audience with lies, on the other. This simplification is also very suiting from the politicians’ point of view, as they tend to call what they do an exercise in public diplomacy, while the counteractions are invariably qualified as propaganda. However, in all fairness, we have to remember, that in essence we are talking about two sides of one coin – use of people, culture and information to influence public opinion and, subsequently, policies of other states. The question today is not whether it is public diplomacy or propaganda winning, but who is winning from the current state of public diplomacy/propaganda. Recent revolutionary development of the media and communication environment – conduits of communications, technology of content production, consumption patterns of the publics – made it possible for the public diplomacy to blossom. One no longer needed to travel to New York and London to watch the Met Opera or a play by the Royal National Theatre – they were available live in local cinemas and online worldwide. With the means of social networks people-to-people exchanges beyond national borders became more active than ever. Books, pamphlets and news were reaching the audiences around the world instantly. The world became so
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connected – or hyperconnected, citing Tom Friedman – that at some point it appeared that the publics, cultures and civilizations had nowhere to run from each other. Thus a dialogue, positive engagement and value creation were expected to be the centerpiece of the global public and media landscape. Yet, this was never destined
2000s, has been applying to create well-functioning international broadcasting structures. It is also a recognition that domestic consolidation of the Russian society around its values and apprehension of the national interests produces more international appeal than disintegrated narrative of the post-Soviet Russia. And most
„The opportunities for a compromise wane and with them wave the options of public diplomacy style engagement.“ to happen. As the world has never become a place of peace, mutual trust and positive cooperation, so the means of trust and confidence-building have had to succumb to demonization and delegitimisation of the opponents. The stand-off between the West and Russia has been quite exemplary in that sense. The sense of confrontation had been growing well before the crisis in Ukraine, but it was since its President Viktor Yanukovich declined to sign a deal with the European Union in autumn 2013 and subsequent events in Kyiv and Crimea that the outright information warfare was unleashed between the West and Russia. It has been claimed by the US and European officials and some in the expert community that Russia has waged a successful propaganda campaign against the West. It is indeed a recognition of the effort which Russia, following the shortcomings of the information campaigns of the 1990s and
importantly it is a recognition that in the light of the above the West’s own propaganda has been seen by the publics as much less convincing, despite the grandstanding of the politicians and the mighty power of the mainstream media. Indeed, Russia has been merely trading a blow for blow. Since 2013 the share of negative articles on Russia in the leading media in the United States increased by three-fold, in Germany – by 2,5 times, in the UK – by two-fold. Little room has remained for neutral or middleground opinion. Selective reporting, lack of fact-checking and outright labeling of Russia and its leadership have become a norm (some objective news pieces which have been done by the foreign correspondents are noted with appreciation, but they are unfortunately too few and far between to change the overall picture). One does not need to be reminded of the front pages of Western media outlets ahead of any investigation directly
Russian President, Vladimir Putin, speaks during a presentation ceremony of state awards marking the Day of Russia in the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia, Friday, June 12, 2015. (AP Photo/Pavel Golovkin) SITA
implying the Russian President´s guilt in MH-17 tragedy. Astonishingly, a terrible death of a Russian opposition figure Boris Nemtsov has received incomparably more coverage in the Western media, than similarly tragic and brutal killings of a Ukrainian writer and opposition journalist Oles Buzina or a former Rada deputy Oleg Kalashnikov. The Russian government effort to put under control the operations of foreign and foreign-sponsored Russian NGO’s are well in focus of the Western media, whereas illegal activities of the web-site Mirotvorec (Peacemaker), which designated publicly all “enemies” of the new Ukrainian state, have been kept out of the loop. One may continue, yet the outcome is clear – the political class has been locking itself in a narrowing pathway to a vicious circle of accusations and sabrerattling. The opportunities for a compromise wane and with them wane the options of public diplomacy style engagement. People instead of seeking a dialogue become “sofa-warriors” and contribute – most often unknowingly – to the war of words through dissemination of myths and lies of the socialmedia environment. Culture,
instead of searching creative synergies, turns to be a handy tool for defining the Other. Media, instead of educating and informing, becomes the launchpad of ideological missiles. It is not the end of the world of course – at least until public diplomacy and propaganda are substituted with guns and tanks – but it severely damages the potential of both the West and Russia to contribute to the international security. Both have much to loose, but the West is loosing more, as it has many more problems on the plate than Russia. In probably the most dangerous development of today ISIS has been using its public diplomacy/propaganda to recruit new fighters from around the world (with some from Russia, but many more from the UK, France, Germany, etc). Viral videos, social network groups and thousands of tweets are paving the way to war, deaths and sorrow. These people will come back one day and may well be bringing all of the above home. Yet the West has all the strength of its propaganda directed at Russia. China has been tremendously active in its public
diplomacy effort around the world. Russia has seen its people, business, academics increasingly engaged to find mutually beneficial solutions in projects launched by Beijing. But it is the allies of the West who feel unease about the rising might of China in the Asia Pacific. And even at home the polarization of societies in Europe and the US, rise of the left and right parties, disenchantment with liberal democratic model have also been in part an unintended outcome of the stand-off with Russia (although, of course, the primary source of these lies with domestic economic, immigration, social policies). There is little hope that this tide could be turned. Too much political capital in the West has been burnt on demonizing Vladimir Putin and restoring the image of Russia as the Other. Being a tool of policymakers, public diplomacy and propaganda also have a backlash on policy-makers, limiting their further actions to the embedded narrative. It is usually easier to go with the narrative’s flow, but sometimes it is more costly than to change its course.
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face2face
Response:
Nicholas J. Cull “Be it thy course to busy giddy minds With foreign quarrels; that action, hence borne out, May waste the memory of the former days.” While I do not feel that public diplomacy and propaganda have to be ‘two sides of the same coin’ I share Mr. Andreev’s recognition that there is much unnecessary demonization going on these days and that many governments around the world seem all too happy to busy giddy minds with foreign quarrels’ and media -- even when free to dissent -- seems happy to fall into line. I hold few media institutions as blameless in this regard and certainly feel that Hollywood has been too eager to fall into a revival of the Cold War mentality. To dip into specifics for a moment, did the space accident in Gravity HAVE to be caused by a Russian satellite? No. A rock would have done the job just as well. Did the conspiracy to bring a Wall Street collapse in Jack Ryan Shadow Re16
FACE 2 FACE
cruit HAVE to run from Moscow? No. We know that Wall Street is quite capable of collapsing itself. Our stories have consequences and for my part prefer to see media working to put us in other’s shoes. Mr. Andreev suggests that ISIS might be the real threat that we need to work against. I am not wholly convinced that -- brutal as they are -- ISIS are not an inconvenient distraction. ISIS strike me as a symptom of deeper problems that we all face: problems of inequality, exclusion, instability and climate change which make the religious and political extremes offered by ISIS and the current crop of nationalists around the world plausible. I hope that beneath the ‘sound and fury’ of contemporary mutual stereotyping, insults and propaganda it may still be possible to maintain dialogue and cooperation to address the problems we share, and that we can -- through the channels of public diplomacy exchange -do more and be more than we have been in past. One can but hope.
Pavel Andreev Mr Cull’s piece is an article of a distinguished scholar of public diplomacy - weighted, balanced, caring for his dearest subject. It is hard to disagree with anything that he writes. Even more so with a subdued conclusion that implies a grave threat of a failure of the forces of good from the forces of evil. As a practitioner who has devoted a great part of life to public diplomacy, I would have loved to support Mr Cull’s division of public diplomacy and propaganda. Yet my experience proves it wrong. Just when you think you run a very smart and two-way and ethical public diplomacy exercise there will be opponents who’d call it propaganda. And vice versa - their own very selective and ignorant and deceitful propaganda will be called public diplomacy. Let’s face it: both - public diplomacy and propaganda - can be smart and can be stupid, but they serve one purpose - winning hearts and minds of the target audience. Everyone does it. What matters is where it leads.
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EU INSIGHT
Brexit: Some Advice for David Cameron
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Charles Grant: Director, Centre for European Reform, London
avid Cameron’s Conservative government is committed to a referendum on EU membership in 2016 or 2017, after negotiating a package of reforms to the Union. How can Cameron maximise his chances of winning? And what obstacles lie in his path?
The Union flag and the European Union flag fly outside Europe House, The European Commission Representation in London (AP Photo/Kirsty Wigglesworth)
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ere are five pieces of advice for Cameron. First, do not ask for the unobtainable. Many Conservatives will urge him to achieve big changes to the way the EU works. But Britain’s partners have no appetite for a new treaty, which would need ratification in 28 member-states, in some of them by referendum. Most capitals, including Berlin, view the lengthy process of changing the treaties as opening Pandora’s box. The best that Cameron can hope for is an agreement on minor treaty changes, to be ratified at some
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point in the future. Second, start making the case for EU membership. Britain’s partners will not take Cameron seriously until he is willing to sell the EU to the British people. And that means making enemies in his own party. Third, take initiatives in the EU and seek to lead in areas where Britain has expertise. One reason why Britain’s influence has waned in recent years is that it has often sat on the sidelines and encouraged others to lead. Britain’s partners would treat it with more respect if it made
concrete proposals in areas such as foreign and defence policy, climate and energy, or trade and the single market. Fourth, work harder to build alliances in the EU. Cameron has few good friends; on a good day, Angela Merkel counts as one, but she and he are prone to misunderstand each other. Other leaders sometimes complain that Cameron is a very transactional politician who does not invest sufficient time in building relationships. Britain’s ties to the Central Europeans have frayed in recent years, partly
because of the Conservatives’ anti-immigration rhetoric. Fifth and final(or last), remember that clubs have not only rules but also mores. British politicians tend to forget that their rambunctious style of domestic politics – involving confrontation, bluntness and a win-or-lose psychology – goes down badly in Brussels. The EU works through long negotiations
Cameron. True, they hope Britain stays in the EU. But Cameron has nothing to offer them in exchange for their concessions. Several governments have indicated that they will not agree to his probable demands and that if the British choose to leave, that is their problem. The third worry is that a flaming row over migration during the renegotiation may
pro-Europeans may mismanage the keep-Britain-in campaign. In Britain, as in much of Europe, the EU is disliked because it is seen as a project of the rich, successful, cosmopolitan and well-travelled elite. Pro-EU forces must marshal arguments that appeal to people who never went to university. A top-down, ‘we know what is good for you’ campaign could easily fail. But if Cameron keeps
“Several governments have indicated that they will not agree to his probable demands and that if the British choose to leave, that is their problem.” and compromises that end in everyone feeling that they have got something. If Cameron banged the table and threatened to campaign for withdrawal, unless he got what he wanted, he would alienate potential allies. Cameron is an intelligent, successful and – so far – lucky politician, who will probably get some of these things right. But as the last few decades of European history show, governments often lose control during referendum
energise the No campaign. For Cameron, and many Britons, the priority will be to restrict EU immigrants’ access to in-work and out-of-work benefits. But this objective challenges the fundamental EU principle of nondiscrimination. Britain’s partners are in no mood to indulge Britain by changing the treaties on this issue. The danger is that Cameron raises the expectations of the British people and then disappoints them. A fourth risk is that the
his demands modest, works on his relationships with other leaders and uses his fine skills as a salesman to make the case for the EU, the referendum is winnable.
“The best Cameron can hope is an agreement on minor treaty changes, to be ratified at some point in the future.” campaigns. Here are five things that could go wrong. First, Britain’s highlycharged debate on Europe may damage the already tarnished British brand. In recent years, for example, sometimes hysterical press reports on EU immigrants have led many people on the continent to view Britain as a nasty country. The worse Britain’s reputation, the less likely are other governments – who all have their own domestic politics to worry about – to give Cameron what he wants. The second reason to worry is that other EU leaders may not make significant efforts to help
euro crisis turns nasty. Despite the eurozone economy’s modest improvement this year, Greece’s place in the currency union remains precarious. A Grexit could trigger panic in the financial markets and thus the need for emergency summits and improvised institutional repairs. If eurozone leaders – who are the same as EU leaders – are once again seen as economically incompetent, the EU’s image in Britain will suffer. A new eurozone crisis would also divert leaders’ time and energy from addressing British concerns. A final risk is that Britain’s
Britain’s Prime Minister David Cameron gestures as he unveils the Conservative party manifesto. (Peter Macdiarmid, Pool Photo via AP)
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TATRA SUMMIT
PREMIER EUROPEAN FORUM
IN CENTRAL EUROPE T
ATRA SUMMIT is a prominent annual conference on the most pressing European political, economic and financial issues with an ambitious goal – to shape the future of Europe. Founded in Bratislava four years ago, TATRA SUMMIT has made a contribution to defining challenges, solutions and actions of the regional and wider European agenda and became an indispensable meeting place of relevant EU stakeholders. Hundreds of influential po-
litical, business and academic personalities will gather to exchange views and engage in a debates that have real impact on the current European agenda. Over time, the top-guest list has already included representatives such as Gunter Verheugen, Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, Robert Fico, Enrico Letta, Maroš Šefčovič, Gordon Bajnai, JeanClaude Piris, Vitor Constancio, Lászlo Baranyay, Jorg Asmussen, Peter Kažimír, Carsten Pillath, Mateusz Szczurek, An-
ders Borg, Andrej Babiš, Daniel Křetínský and others. TATRA SUMMIT is hosted by the Centre for European Affairs (CEA), member of the Central European Strategy Council, with the support of its strategic partners - Ministry of Finance of the Slovak Republic, Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic and Brussels-based think-tank BRUEGEL. TATRA SUMMIT 2015 will take place 4 – 6 November, 2015 in Bratislava, Slovakia.
TATRA SUMMIT 2015 HIGHLIGHTS
• Positioned just one year ahead of the Slovak EU Presidency, TATRA SUMMIT aspires to be the key platform for pre-Presidency debates in the run up to the SK PRES in 2016; • Following the last year’s success of the TATRA SUMMIT Investment Forum, this format continues in 2015 to engage European investment community to the TATRA SUMMIT in a more proactive way; • Side events: the programme also includes closed Policy Session, roundtable debates, expert working group meetings, Young Leaders Forum, the Major Speech on Europe and many social and networking events; • Attendance of top leaders: Prime Ministers, Finance and Foreign Affairs Ministers, State Secretaries, heads of the EU institutions and top level representatives of economic and financial institutions, think-tanks and business from the whole Europe.
Vice-President of the European Commission, Maroš Šefčovič, during his keynote speech at TATRA SUMMIT 2014.
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Ambassador Ivan Korčok, Permanent Representative of the Slovak Republic to the EU, giving welcome address at TATRA SUMMIT 2014.
Peter Kažimír, Minister of FInance of the Slovak Republic and Andrej Babiš, Minister fo Finance of the Czech Republic with Róbert Vass, Executive Vice-President and CEO of Central European Strategy Council at the TATRA SUMMIT Investment Forum 2014.
“TATRA SUMMIT has proven of real added value to interchanging disciplines and cross-sector perspectives on the future of Europe. We need these exchanges more than ever as the pace of change related to the economic and geopolitical situation is accelerating.’’ Maroš Šefčovič, Vice-President, European Commission
TOPICAL FRAMEWORK
As for the dominants of the TATRA SUMMIT 2015 agenda, key emphasis will be put on the assessment and perspective of the EU’s strategic agenda implementation, just one year after the new EU political cycle got its mandate. Debates will focus on fundamental pillars of this agenda – Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, Harald Waiglein, Jörg Asmussen, Enrico the Energy Union, Digital Single Market, genuine Letta, Carsten Pillath join the panel on divergent views on growth in the EU chaired by Karel Lannoo. EMU and Investment Plan for Europe.
1. BREXIT & GREXIT | New
political cycle declared to find the recipe for not loosing EU and restore EU citizens‘ already fragile trust. BREXIT & GREXIT are often considered as a crossroads to the future of the EU integration process. TATRA SUMMIT will therefore seek to provide a strategic outlook on future (dis)integration process.
4. ENERGY UNION: BOOSTING ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PROTECTING EU’S INTEREST | The Energy
Union means making energy more secure, affordable and sustainable. Costly and politically risky, the EU is re-thinking its energy policy in a very accurate timing, by introducing the Energy Union initiative. To this European debate, TATRA SUMMIT will contribute with the answers how we 2. UPCOMING PRESIDENCY TRIO: PRIORITIES – as a Europe with so various national interests, boost the growth and protect our strategic OUTLOOK | The 2015 edition of TATRA SUMMIT can interest at the same time. is unique as it is held only one year before the Slovak EU Presidency in 2016 and the debate on the possible programme has already been in full 5. DIGITAL SINGLE MARKET: TURNING EUROPE swing. Furthermore, the upcoming EU Presidency DIGITAL | Claims like “the new digital revolution” TRIO will unveil its political priorities, which will or “risk of changes in social structure, as after the play a role for the EU decisions for an 18 months invention of the printing press” has accompaperspective. Placing special emphasis on the re- nied the Digital Single Market project unveiling gion of Central Europe, the debate will explore in May 2015. TATRA SUMMIT will seek to provide the regional interests against the TRIO priorities, concrete proposals, how to make from Europe and how Slovakia can better support the region- a world leader in information and communicaal interests. tion technology, how to succeed in global digital economy and society, facing one of the most 3. UNFINISHED BUSINESS IN ECONOMIC AND ambitious integration plans in Europe. MONETARY UNION | After the Four Presidents’ “diagnosis” of the EMU has been presented in 6. INVESTMENT PLAN FOR EUROPE | Successful 2012, though important progress has been made European investment strategy is the right way to in some areas, however, unfinished business still put Europe firmly on the path towards the ecoremains in other. TATRA SUMMIT will examine nomic recovery, and its formation should, first whether we are courageous enough for further and foremost, focus on the active involvement of steps towards a genuine economic coordination. the promoters, strategic project developers and Given the specific position of Slovakia as the only key decision-makers. Following the lines of the Eurozone member in Visegrad Group, TATRA European innovative approach towards the inSUMMIT will zoom in on the future of Eurozone vestment strategies, TATRA SUMMIT will engage as the view from the Central Europe – Eurozone European investment community to address for „ins“ and „outs“. the state of implementation of this strategic investment projects in Europe and debates will examine how the new financial instruments are addressing market gaps and mobilising private investments. 21
visegrad news Czech Republic Referendum on Euro Set for 2017
hungary A Retrial of Communist-Era War Crimes Convict
The Czech Finance minister Andrej Babis speaking on the topic of financing the economic growth at the Tatra Summit. Bratislava 9. November 2014. (Foto: SITA/Jozef Jakubčo)
Former Hungarian interior minister in the communist-era Bela Biszku sits in the courtroom in Budapest, Hungary, Monday, June 1, 2015. ( Tamas Kovacs/MTI via AP)
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Source: nasdaq.com
Source: www.jurist.org
“Finance Minister Andrej Babis said he proposes holding a nonbinding public referendum in 2017 on whether to adopt the euro.”
“Biszku is the only high-ranking communist leader convicted since Hungary’s 1990 return to democracy.”
he Czech Finance Minister proposed letting the public have a say in whether the country should adopt the euro through a nonbinding referendum. The proposal caused disagreement in the cabinet of the Czech Republic. Roughly two-thirds of the population in this EU country are against giving up the national currency, the koruna. After meeting the Prime Minister, the Governor of the central bank and the country’s President at a special gathering to discuss the Czech position toward Europe’s common currency, Finance Minister Andrej Babis said he proposes holding a nonbinding public referendum in 2017 on whether to adopt the euro. The purpose of holding a referendum would be “so that citizens can express themselves, like they’ve done in Sweden,” said Mr. Babis, who himself hasn’t yet taken a position on the currency issue and is widely considered a top candidate for the Premier’s post after the next elections. Such a referendum in the Czech Republic wouldn’t break treaties but would serve as a gauge of public opinion before politicians embark on the potentially treacherous task of surrendering the national currency. Some politicians have expressed doubts about the relevancy of such a referendum, due to the fact that one of the admission conditions is the introduction of the common currency.
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he Hungarian appeals court has ordered the retrial of the communist-era official convicted of war crimes related to reprisals against civilians after the anti-Soviet revolution of 1956. Bela Biszku was sentenced to five years and six months in prison in May 2014. Prosecutors appealed the sentence, asking for life in prison for the 93-yearold former interior minister, while Biszku’s defense sought the dismissal of the charges. Biszku is the only high-ranking communist leader convicted since Hungary’s 1990 return to democracy. Biszku was in the Communist Party’s ruling interim executive committee after the 1956 uprising was defeated by Soviet forces. The committee created armed militias to carry out repression, including firing indiscriminately into crowds at protests and Biszku was convicted for his responsibility in nearly 50 deaths. The Budapest Appeals Court, however, declared the ruling of the lower court void and called for a retrial with a new set of judges. Biszku proclaimed his innocence when questioned by prosecutors before the initial trial but did not testify in court. He suffers from several illnesses, sat in a wheelchair during the proceedings and appeared unfazed by the ruling. The court has also stated that it would seek the help of historians to solve some of the key questions regarding the trial.
Slovakia Poland Slovakian Borders Will Be New President May Change the Helo Deal slovakia Immovable
Slovak Foreign Minister Miroslav Lajcak, left, and his garian counterpart Peter Szijjarto, shake hands during press conference in the Foreign Ministry in Budapest, gary, Monday, March 30, 2015. (AP Photo/MTI, Lajos
Huntheir HunSoos)
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he state borders with Hungary and the Czech Republic will be immovable along entire stretches where they are formed by rivers, the Government agreed at its session on 3 June. The measure is part of respective international agreement proposals. An immovable state border means that the border will not have to be adjusted to match the natural course of the riverbed, the TASR newswire quoted the government decision. This is expected to be of economic and technical importance, says the Interior Ministry. The border between Slovakia and Hungary is currently movable on sections where it is formed by rivers. The Czech and Slovak border is movable only along a short stretch at the confluence of the Morava and Dyje rivers where Slovakia, Austria and the Czech Republic meet. While the alteration in the character of borders between Slovakia and Hungary will be approved by parliament as a constitutional law, the change involving the border point between Slovakia, Austria and the Czech Republic is set to be debated in parliament and later ratified by President Andrej Kiska. When Czechoslovakia split in 1993, Slovakia definitely lost 16 hectares to the Czech Republic in a border area with Austria. Slovakia will soon make similar settlements on making the borders immovable with Austria and Poland.
Poland’s President-elect Andrzej Duda attends a state ceremony confirming his electoral win at the Wilanow Palace in Warsaw on 29 May 2015. (AP Photo/Czarek Sokolowski)
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he largely unexpected victory by opposition candidate Andrzej Duda in the second round of Poland’s recent presidential elections could shift the country’s military priorities and create more friction with Russia. Duda is set to replace incumbent President Bronislaw Komorowski from the ruling Civic Platform Party in August. Duda’s Law and Justice (PiS) Party is seen by many analysts as staunchly anti-Russian and pro-US. Duda is a promoter of a stronger NATO, and he also supports the presence of the alliance within the territory of Poland. During his campaign, Duda criticized Komorowski and his party’s government for its recent decision to award Poland’s multibillion-dollar military helicopter deal to Airbus Helicopters. He is known as being an advocate of the modernization of the Polish Army. In April the Ministry of Defense announced it selected the Caracal EC725 to replace the Polish military’s Soviet-designed Mil Mi-8, Mi-14 and Mi-17 helicopters. However, according to Duda, Poland should instead opt for Sikorsky’s Black Hawk or AgustaWestland’s AW149, as both manufacturers operate Poland-based subsidiaries — PZL Mielec and PZL Swidnik, respectively — and employ local workers. The helo procurement is estimated to be worth up to 10 billion zloty (US $2.8 billion).
Source: spectator.sme.sk
Source: defensenews.com
“An immovable state border means that the border will not have to be adjusted to match the natural course of the riverbed.”
“According to Duda, Poland should instead opt for Sikorsky’s Black Hawk or AgustaWestland’s AW149, as both manufacturers operate Poland-based subsidiaries.”
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ON the map
Are There Any Prospects for Solving Crimea?
Andrey Zubov: Professor of History, Columnist, Novaya Gazeta, Moscow
I
n early March 2014, Russian society and the Crimean people rejoiced, and the Russian President, Mr Putin said pompous words about the Crimean ship that has forever returned to the Russian harbour. “Crimea has always been, and once again became Russian” - these words were repeated countless times, almost like a mantra. But over the past year it has become clear, that the Crimean problem was not only solved by that quick annexation, but, on the contrary, has become an instrument of destruction of the entire system of international relations in Europe and throughout the world. The world took the annexation of Crimea by Russia as an act of unprovoked and unjustifiable aggression. “Crimea should go back to Ukraine” - Ukraine itself insists, as well as all the zealots of international law. Thus, an overwhelming majority of UN General Assembly supports it. But residents of Crimea are far from being unanimous on this issue. Some of them, mainly the Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians – are for the return to Ukraine, the majority of the population - against. Is it possible to decide the fate of the land without conforming the will of its inhabitants? We have two types of arguments in front of us: first, historical - “Crimea has always been Russian”; secondly, socio-political - most of the current residents of Crimea want the land on which they live, to be part of the Russian Federation. Let’s try to sort these arguments out. Let’s start with history. In ancient and medieval times the Crimean peninsula was owned by many states and many nations gave way to others. But Russia
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Andrei Zubov, a history professor who was fired from one of Moscow’s most prestigious universities last month after criticizing Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula.
was still non-existent, and if Ruses and Slavs appeared in the Crimea at all, it happened in very small quantities. Yes, in the 11th Century, in Taman (now Kuban), there was the Tmutarakan Principality, which was ruled by the Rurik dynasty. It possessed apparently some part of eastern Crimea and was a vassal of Constantinople. But if the records of law and history from the 11th century are consulted, they show more in favour of Kiev than Moscow. Indeed, while the 11th Century Moscow was not in sight (the first mention recorded in the
middle of the 12th Century), Kiev was the “mother of Russian cities” and the supreme throne of the Rurik dynasty was in Kyiv. First Crimea had been seized by the Roman Empire (Byzantium), then the Mongols and then the Golden Horde. In the second half of the 13th century, the southern coast of Crimea relinquished to the Genoese who created a Gothic captaincy. In the summer of 1475, the Ottoman Empire conquered Crimea. In the steppe part of the peninsula, in the Sea of Azov, the Ottomans preserved their vassal
“We must clearly understand that the Russian Empire in the 18th and 19th Century and the modern Russian Federation are not the same state.”
Crimean Khanate ruled by a kind of Gira and incorporated the southern coast directly into their possession. The population of Crimea, at the time, was very colourful, there were lots of Greeks, Italians, Armenians, Jews, Slavs, Polovtsian, descendants of the Khazars and Normans. The steppe population was predominantly Mongoloid and the mountain and seaside Caucasoid on racial grounds. Lingua franca has gradually become a kind of
to the desert lands of the northern Black Sea coast. Many of them did not want to leave their land and converted to Islam in order to avoid deportation. Even in the 1930’s many Crimean Tatar settlements had two cemeteries, the current Muslim and a closed Christian cemetery. Young and old explained that it is necessary to take care of both, as the Christian buried there had been “our ancestors”. Russian rule in Crimea was
Crimean Tatar language, Polovtsian basically, but with many words borrowed from Turkish, Greek and Italian. Muslims, Christians of various denominations and Jews lived side by side on the peninsula. But Crimea was not Russian until the April of 1783. The annexation of Crimea by the Russian empire was without observance of legal international procedures. The conquest of the Crimean Khanate by Russia was treacherous and bloody. The indigenous population of Crimea, most of which migrated to Turkey due to religious differences and cruelty of the new government, fell five times in the late 18th Century. Russia had obtained the right to defend Orthodox Christians in Crimea, as a part of the Kuchuk Kaynarca agreement with Turkey in 1774 and forced Christians to move
by no means a blessing for the indigenous population. The Muslim Jamaat community have lost ownership of water and land, which passed to the Russian nobility or the state. From owners, the indigenous people have become tenants. The best way to evaluate the quality of governance is to track the movements of the population. When the country is free and the life in it is good, you try to get into it, not run from it. From Crimea, during a hundred years of Russian rule, from Catherine II to Alexander II, about 900-thousands of local Muslims have left. To replace the Muslims, Christian Greeks, Bulgarians and Armenians came to the vacant land. They also came from Russia and directly from Germany and Austria as colonists. Ukrainian farmers and peasants had to move to the Greatempty lands of their landlords. The
“So from all the countries controlling Crimea throughout history, the Russian Federation was the briefest owner of the territory, and so has the weakest claim to it.”
Crimean Tatars, in 1795, accounted for 87 percent of the population. In 1897 only for 35, in 1920 the number decreased to 25 and in1939 only 19 percent were left. A very similar situation played out in Abkhazia and on the Caucasian coast of the contemporary Russian Federation, where in the 19th Century, the Muslim population suffering from confessional oppression and lack of freedom, was leaving en masse to the Ottoman Empire. They were replaced by multi-tribal Christian, partly coming from Turkish Anatolia and the Balkans and in part from other provinces of the Russian Empire. At the same time, we must clearly understand that the Russian Empire in the 18th and 19th Century and the modern Russian Federation are not the same state. It was a part of the Empire, not only the current territory of the Russian Federation, but also the most of the post-Soviet space incorporating Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Caucasus, the Baltic states, Poland and Finland. All these nations have equal right to reclaim the land of Crimea, as they doused the soil with their sweat and blood. During the Crimean War of 1853-56, almost half of the Russian Crimean army consisted of Ukrainians, Belarusians, Georgians, East-of-the-ZeyaGermans, Armenians and Poles. Not only Russian blood poured from the redoubts of Sevastopol. The Russian Empire was a country of many peoples and the modern Russian Federation cannot claim any land on the grounds that it once was a part of the Romanov Empire. The Bolsheviks renounced succession to the Russian Empire, declared that they are “building a new state of workers and peasants”. They divided the territory conquered by the former Russian empire into several formally independent states, united, allegedly, in a voluntary union. The boundaries between these states have changed repeatedly, creating the new and erasing the old. The RSFSR expelled Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan from the structures, and later Karelia gave Belarus the Vitebsk and Mogilev regions. Later, Karelia was again included in the composition,
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and Crimea, on the contrary, was given to Ukraine in 1954. All these
from a different world, but even in this other world, the Ottoman
Crimean Tatars, one holding Tatar flag, attend a rally inside ATR TV station, the first-ever channel dedicated to the Crimean Tatars in Simferopol, Crimea. (AP Photo/Alexander Polegenko)
manipulations formally claimed legitimacy, but, of course did not take into account the will of the people who inhabited the land. And the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine wasn’t any more legitimate than the rest of the actions of the Bolsheviks on the spaces they conquered. But these are not significant territorial manipulation of the Bolsheviks, and other border republics of the USSR, however conventional they may be,
Empire controlled the Crimea three centuries, and Russian only 134 years. The RSFSR, which the modern Russian Federation declared itself to be the successor of, held Crimea from November 1920 to May 1954, that is 33.5 years The Ukrainian SSR including the present Ukraine, owned Crimea for 60 years, from 1954 to 2014. So from all countries controlling Crimea throughout history, the Russian Federation was the briefest owner of the territory
“the Russian Empire was a country of many peoples and the modern Russian Federation cannot claim any land on the grounds that it once was a part of the Romanov Empire.� confirmed international treaties after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the independence of the Russian Federation, Ukraine and other post-Soviet states in December 1991. These treaties, like the Belovezhskoe agreement, the Grand Treaty with Ukraine and the Russian Federation, signed in 1997 and recognized all around the world, made the borders inviolable and left the Crimea to Ukraine. As for the number of years of formal ownership, the Russian and the Ottoman Empires were
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and so has the weakest claim to it. But even during this short tenure of Soviet power over Crimea, they managed to commit many crimes against the indigenous Crimean Tatar people and against all the other peoples of the peninsula, including Russians. When Crimea was captured in November 1920 by the Bolsheviks, they immediately staged a massacre of the opposing forces of General Wrangel and the White Guards, who made their last stand of the bloody civil war there. After the opposition was dead, they
killed about 60 thousand civilians. Caused by the Bolsheviks, the famine of 1921 and 1922 had cost the lives of around 80-thousand people, in large part the lives of Crimean Tatars. The forceful collectivization led to the deaths and deportation of several tens of thousands of people of all nationalities. In August 1941, 61-thousand Germans were forcibly evicted from the Crimea, in January and February 1942 400 Italians followed, who were the descendants of the medieval Genoese. In May and August 1944 all the Crimean Tatars (195,000), Greeks (14 300), Bulgarians (12 100), Armenians (10,000), Turks and Persians (3500) were forcefully evicted from Crimea. Nearly half evicts died during the transit or died due to the intolerable conditions in the places of their new settlement. It was a real genocide, much like the Ottoman genocide of Armenians in 1915. The population of Crimea had reduced three times. In 1939, 1.1 million people lived on the peninsula, in September 1944 only 379-thousand were left, mostly Russians, Ukrainians (21%) and Belarusians. Crimea became populated again by the relocation of war veterans, demobilized officers of the Soviet Army, the NKVD and political prisoners. The composition of the population of Crimea changed dramatically. All its historical ethnic groups have disappeared from the peninsula. Only in the 1980s the return of exile-survivors began, although they were mostly their children and grandchildren. But their homes were inhabited by strangers, the land belonged to other owners. As elsewhere, violent conflicts between returnees and zaselentsami erupted. One can only wonder about the fact that in these circumstances, almost half of the Crimean Tatars and a number of exiles from other nations, had the courage to return to their home, which has become so bitter. The annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in March 2014 made the problems worse. It transferred what was local, to the international and even global level. Without a solution to the problem of the Crimea, there is no guarantee that Europe remains stable. But is it
even possible to solve this problem? Yes, there is a solution. But it requires the rejection of unfounded claims on foreign land and the return to the sole will of the people, which ultimately determines the fate of the earth. After all that happened in 2014 and 2015, you cannot just go back to the status quo ante bellum. Crimea cannot be simply returned to Ukraine as a bag of stolen potatoes. We are talking not so much about the land but about people. Stolen potatoes can and should just return to the owner but the stolen lover only in accordance with her wishes. It is very possible that she prefers the father over the ardent friend. In Crimea, there was a referendum in March, but the form of the referendum and its results, and the political context in which it was implemented, are more than doubtful. And from the point of view of the theory of the electoral results, the Crimean referendum was very improbable, if not impossible. Such figures simply do not happen. But the fact remains that a large part of the population of Crimea, like in March 2014, wanted to become a part of the Russian Federation. But which part? To find out the real will of the people of Crimea, we need a new referendum under strict international control, respectable, not hasty but slowly and carefully prepared for several years. It should incorporate the right for all those who lived in Crimea at the beginning of the conflict, that
brutal deportation of people, with
A protester stands near to a banner with the image of Russian President Vladimir Putin, during a rally marking the one year anniversary of the referendum in Crimea. (AP Photo/Mikhail Mordasov)
all recognizable signs of genocide, a “fait accompli” and to put an end to it. It is necessary to correct the consequences of past crimes and make it impossible for them to recur in the future. Whatever the outcome of the referendum, the descendants of the deportees should be given the right of repatriation and be provided the appropriate support, both financial and legal, to settle them into their places of origin. And the children of those who moved into the abandoned Crimean houses in the late 1940s, the descendants of those who lost their paternal homes because of the arbitrary power of the Russian Federation, shall be equal in the determining their destiny.
“the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine wasn’t any more legitimate than the rest of the actions of the Bolsheviks on the spaces they conquered.” is, on February 27, 2014, to attend, but it is impossible to restrict any newcomers. Also, all descendants of residents of Crimea, forcibly evicted during the 1940’s, wherever they live, if they wish so, should be able to take part in this referendum. One cannot simply call the violent and
At the time of preparation and holding of the plebiscite in Crimea, as it was with the Treaty of Versailles, plebiscite territories should be put under international control of the United Nations. All the law enforcement agencies of the Russian Federation in Crimea
should be abolished and Ukrainian ones should not be re-established. Control of the area should be provided by special international forces that are neutral to the conflict, that is, for example, the OSCE, Council of Europe or the UN. In international legal terms, Crimea should continue to be considered as a territory of Ukraine. All acts of 2014 and 2015, designed as a section of Crimea and the joining of the peninsula to the Russian Federation must be considered null and void from the beginning. The answers to the plebiscite should be three: do you want Crimea to remain a part of Ukraine; would like Crimea to be incorporated into Russia; and do you want to live in an independent Crimean state. So it was in 1955, when Saarland decided and even more recently also in Scotland. This will be an honest and constructive approach, which will not put geopolitical interests and hysterical claims of mingled nations on the top. The will of ordinary people and their right to elect their own destiny in their native land will decide the final outcome.
ON the map 27
leadership
Phenomenal GLOBSEC Journey Dear readers and the GLOBSEC Forum participants, on occasion of the landmark of the 10th anniversary of the Forum, we, the youth team, would like to share its story with you. We will introduce you to the foundations of the project and guide you through the most important moments from the very beginning. Let us reveal the background of the long journey that the founders, the followers and many others have undertaken to get here. Ján Hajdúk: Euro-Atlantic! think.act.lead.
WHY?
Let us rewind the clock and go back in time to a country in the heart of Europe, to a period of change, hope and idealism, but also of many challenges ahead. This country is Slovakia back in the 1990’s, after the fall of the Iron Curtain, after the nations of Central Europe were freed of the plight of totalitarian rule. Our nation had great hopes and enthusiastic ambitions, but not everything proved to have a happy ending, due to the ill will of a few powerful individuals. It was a sad period in our history, when Slovakia, steadily progressing on the path of integration into the democratic structures, lost its way and got rejected from them. And only then a few accomplished personalities had the courage to say enough. They decided to bring Slovakia back on track, bring life to reforms that the country needed the most and uncover the great potential of this country and its peoples. They did succeed and as a result we finally joined the “democratic club” in 2004 when we became a member of the NATO and the EU. As a result the importance of youth was recognised as a source of dynamism and innovative thinking. Young people are the future as they have the potential
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to bring on a change. Some of those who were determined and confident that Slovakia can do much more in the international affairs was Róbert, the founder of the GLOBSEC Forum, and his friends. He once said “As a high school student, I have sent out only a single university application because I knew that it was what I wanted to do.’ And it was not always an easy path and there were a lot of bumps along the way. Nevertheless, there were always many who were extremely enthusiastic about the project. Those who were ready to commit their energy and time to advance their vision. A vision of putting Slovakia back where it always belonged, into the heart of Europe and the European and transatlantic discussion, back on the map of the strategic policy making. They wanted to prove that our country is able to punch above its own weight. But they
HOW?
his vision into a reality by establishing this conference at the age of 21. The conference gradually evolved from a small project of a few young ambitious students to the leading annual forum on security and foreign policy in the region of Central Europe. It has become a phenomenon, which moves the region from the periphery to the core of transatlantic policy shaping, giving Central Europe a respected voice in the creation of transatlantic agenda. Lacking major funding, institutional cover or support from above, the young founders were successful to realise their plans thanks to their vision, dedication and commitment. The first
“Leadership in today’s world requires courage and guts combined with the ability to take things into perspective and have a long term vision of what you want to achieve.” did not stop there, they wanted to make the world aware of the Central European region and to strengthen its active participation in the process of shaping of the global environment. While still being a student, Róbert started to convert
conference took place at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic in October 2005 and hosted about 100 guests mostly from Slovakia and surrounding countries. The conference’s 9th edition last year, hosted over 800 participants
WHAT LIES AHEAD? Photo from one of the first GLOBSEC editions back in 2007.
from 65 countries. During 10 years of the Forum’s existence it hosted a total of 3, 333 participants and 564 speakers. Although it was not always easy to find the optimal balance between the youth energy and the guidance of the seasoned experts, this combination has yet proved to be a reason for success. An irreplaceable personality behind the GLOBSEC Forum journey and the Slovak Atlantic Commission is Ambassador Rastislav Káčer, who has been a vital part of the Slovak Atlantic Commission at the very beginning and still has a major positive influence on all members of our team. As he once said, when he first met Róbert, he saw his potential, the will to go far beyond than what was expected of him and the vision, not only for today or tomorrow, but for years and decades to come. When they started to work together, their first task was to find a productive balance between the youth dynamism and the lessons of wisdom. To quote Ambassador Káčer “The seasoned veteran knows where the danger is and what can be hurtful, but the youth says I want to go there, and this is where you find a synergy which leads to a dynamic and productive alliance.” The result of this partnership was spectacular and laid the foundation of many accomplishments. It did not only help to develop a wide variety of projects and initiatives but also gathered hundreds of passionate young people under the label of GLOBSEC. It all
serve as a testimony that young generation can be the driving force of a change. As Róbert once said: “There are people who just go along with the current and try not to think about what may or may not come and there are people who have a vision and do everything they can to make this vision come true”. Róbert also stands out from the crowd in the way how he runs his non-governmental organisation. He oversees the organisation as if it was an enterprise that aims for a dynamic innovation and a constant growth. His management skills were recognised and rewarded with a nomination for the TREND magazine’s “Manager of the Year Award” last year. As Ambassador Káčer once noted “Leadership in today’s world requires courage and guts combined with the ability to take things into perspective and have a long term vision of what you want to achieve.” Róbert saw that mathematics do not apply in international relations and that one plus one does not always equal two, but it multiplies. The energy spent by one individual is multiplied by the energy of his team and partners. And after each conference, we ask ourselves if this year was better than the last, we attempt to stay cautious, not to become stagnant and we always look for improvements. The values of freedom and democracy are being severely tested these days. They are
not to be taken for granted even in the transatlantic family where we encounter a rise of populism and a decline of public trust in elites. Tensions in the Balkans, the expansion of terrorist groups and emergence of war conflicts in the EU’s direct neighbourhood make GLOBSEC a very up-to-date and needed platform. The 2015 Forum will be even more important than the previous ones. The European and transatlantic order has been under attack simultaneously from East and South as never before and Central Europe is facing an unprecedented challenge to its stability and security since the fall of Communism. GLOBSEC will focus on a number of issues pivotal to the region, the EU and the transatlantic community, including: • Responding to Russia & Helping Ukraine • Tackling the Challenge of Radical Islamists and Terrorism • Run-Up to Warsaw: Adapting Nato and European Security • Empowering Europe The SAC staff permanently introduces innovations and new formats which make GLOBSEC an exceptionally complex and multidimensional event. Today, it has progressed towards its own online television – GLOBSEC TV, its own English language daily newspaper published during the conference GLOBSEC Daily, and it runs a media centre with TV studios and satellite transmission vehicles for more than 150 journalists from all over the world. According to Róbert, there is always room to make something better, to invent something new, to better ourselves and to bring You,
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our participants and honoured guests a pleasant and innovative experience. This jubilee tenth edition promises to be another milestone and we are already looking forward what another decade with the GLOBSEC Forum brings us. We would not have gotten nearly this far on our GLOBSEC journey without the support of You, our dearest participants, partners, speakers and supporters. When we see you return to the Forum, all the hard work has paid off. We are pleased to celebrate our 10th Years Anniversary and look forward to many more in the future. Archive photo of the project team from the GLOBSEC Forum 2011.
Without you, none of this would be possible - Thank you!
THEY SAID ABOUT GLOBSEC:
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski: “In its scale, in its ambition, in its organisation, literally, a first-class global-type operation.” General John Allen: “I think that the GLOBSEC Conference is very important to this particular moment in history.” Edward Lucas: “The most important security conference in the region. It’s where you get the decision makers, the movers and shakers from all over Western and Eastern Europe and outside of Europe and from North America, discussing the way in which the European security order is under threat as never before.” Damon Wilson: ”The team that puts this together … are people that helped lead the transformation of their country and of Central Europe. They define
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Project team of the GLOBSEC Forum 2014.
the debate within Slovakia and they define the debate about where their country will find its home in Europe.” Tim Judah: “The ideal conference is valuable for two reasons. Interesting panels with people with interesting ideas and for what those same people have to say in private. My experience from Globsec is that it fulfils both criteria so I am delighted to be
invited.” General Jiří Šedivý: “GLOBSEC has developed into the most important, most interesting forum of its kind in Central Europe. There is no other opportunity in our region to have this kind of discussions with incredibly wide number of excellent experts.”
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op-eds
The Return of the King:
Monarchism as a Security Maker
in the Post-Arab Season Realm Tiago Ferreira Lopes: Researcher, Euro-Atlantic Diplomacy Association, Portugal
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et me begin this article by stating my position on this issue: I am a Monarchist. I believe in the intrinsic value of Monarchies as regimes able to merge Modernity and Tradition. I stand for Constitutional Monarchies with democratically elected parliaments from where steams the authority of governments fully responsible for Executive powers. I have no problem however in acknowledging that probably to some countries (like the United States of America, Finland, Latvia, Azerbaijan or Belarus) Monarchies have little reason to
are the safest and least uncertain path to stabilize the sociopolitical hecatomb that succeeded to the media praised social movements usually known as “Arab Season”. The self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi on 18 December 2010 in Tunisia ignited a fire that would spread from Tunisia, to Egypt, Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain and to a lesser extent to Oman, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. The mere fact that from the six most impacted countries with the Arab Season only one is a monarchy (Bahrain) already
The “Arab Spring” is an evidence that the huddled masses of the Middle East, like people everywhere, are simply yearning to be free.
regimes do not allow any sort of space to the emergence of a vibrant and engaging civil society. If it’s true that civil liberties are limited in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia it is also true that they were limited in Mubarak’s Egypt and Gadhafi’s Libya (both Republics) and that didn’t hold back the protestors that took consistently the streets by the thousands. More interesting is the fact that protestors and governments of Monarchic countries were able to negotiate and implement reforms to stabilize the political landscape and please the masses. In Bahrain King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa launched the Independent Commission of Inquiry (June 2011), the From left to right, Saudi Prince Salman bin Abdul Aziz Al Saud, Kuwait´s Emir Sheik Bahrain National Dialogue (July Sabah Al Ahmad Al Sabah, and Bahrain´s King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa. 2011) and also increased social spending. Protests continued exist. says something and it’s not for some more weeks but their I will go straight to the necessarily, as some would like strength was greatly diminished. point: monarchic institutions to think, that those Monarchic Sultan Qaboos, of Oman, 32
reshuffled the government, increased social spending and established by royal decree the first Islamic Bank in Oman and the second public University. The protestors were greatly pleased and the revolutionary wave faded out. In Kuwait the electoral law was reformed, the prime-minister forced to resign and the parliament dissolved. Sabah Al-Sabah, Emir of Kuwait, avoided the “autocratic trap” during the protests of 20112012. In Jordan, King Abdullah II was quick to draft a plan of reforms to strengthen democracy: the Public Gathering Law was transformed not to curb freedom of expression and; the Electoral Law is under revision and King Abdullah II abdicated of his right to appoint Prime-Ministers and
In these cases, a Monarchic Head of State ensures not only the protection of tradition but more importantly it grants that the Head of State will stand above the “interests’ game” that creates friction amongst the different clans. A monarchic Head of State, limited by a Constitution to avoid autocracy and tyranny, is more capable to foster inter-clan dialogue and to bridge different visions for the upcoming future. One of the main problems with Yemen, Syria and Libya right now is that the Presidents are always seen as members of this or that clan; promoting this or that agenda. A Monarchic Head of State in these cases has proven to be the best solution. The Monarch, constitutionally limited, will
Crown Prince of Bahrain Salman bin Hamad Al-Khalifa.
simply the country descended to a path of civil war (Libya and Syria). Constitutional monarchies by themselves will not be the magical wand that will solve all problems opened and/ or deepened with the “Arab Season”. The installation of constitutional monarchies in the region will have to be followed
“A monarchic Head of State, limited by a Constitution to avoid autocracy and tyranny, is more capable to bridge different visions for the upcoming future.” cabinet members, giving that power to the parliament elected by the citizens. So why were Monarchies more able to avoid the corrosive effects of the Arab Season? It all comes down to social composition. Republics are more fitting to sociopolitical spaces in which individualism is the norm. If the basic cell of social organization is the “I” and not the “We” the idea of having a temporary-not-unbiased Head of State has lower chances to raise uncertainty and instability. Uncertainty reduction is the basic reason why we created States in the first place. However, in societies where the “We” is stronger, the idea of a temporary-notunbiased Head of State might be disruptive and potentially corrosive. Societies across the Maghreb and Middle East are still highly familiar and clan based rendering less importance to the idea of “I” and more relevant the idea of “We”.
act as a keeper of Tradition; defender of the Nation and grant of the country’s Continuity minimizing any feelings of uncertainty that generates insecurity. The management of the State is fully entrusted on the government, support by a Parliament elected by free and fair popular vote. In this manner, in case of stalemate between political actors the Monarch can intervene on a swifter and less-biased way reinstating stability by preventing the fermentation of nefarious and harmful uncertainty. This was, of course not always perfectly, what we witnessed during the Arab Season. Monarchs on Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain and even Saudi Arabia were able to introduce stability and to craft enlarged agreements to diminish uncertainty and prospects of insecurity; while Presidents were elected only to be deposed (like in Egypt), or overthrown (like in Yemen) or
by a round of negotiations to redraw borders and if necessary to give “birth” to new states. The new monarchs will have to stand committed to the principles of transparency and will have to stand against corruption and nepotism. The installation of new constitutional monarchies, able to diminish uncertainty, to introduce stability and consequently to minimize the sources for insecurity does not even go against the principles of democracy espoused by NATO and the EU. After all the Global Democracy Ranking has two Monarchies on its top-3 of most democratic countries in 2014 (1st Norway, 3rd Sweden) and four Monarchies on its top6 (1st Norway, 3rd Sweden, 5th Denmark, 6th Netherlands). And curiously there are only Republics on the bottom-5 (that is the less democratic countries) of the same Global Democracy Ranking. 33
op-eds
Digital Subversion: Fusing Cyberspace and Subversion Milan Hanko: Military Analyst, Institute for Security and Defence Studies at the Armed Forces Academy of the Slovak Republic
T
his paper reviews how cyberspace and subversion, two vital elements of modern hybrid warfare, have fused together to provide a potent weapon in current and future international conflicts. Whereas subversion represents a tactics that has been known and used for a long time, cyberspace can be seen as a relatively new phenomenon. As NATO General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg recently stated, “hybrid warfare combines different types of threats, including conventional, subversion and cyber threats”. An interesting question to ask is how much, or more precisely to what extent, subversion fuses with cyberspace, and what the implications are for political and military strategy. Subversion from Ancient Rome to the Arab Spring
To understand subversion means to identify past events in which it was applied and to appreciate the broader or the strategy that framed its use. Subversion itself is defined as “actions designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a governing authority”. Over the course of history subversion has almost always constituted an inseparable part of the strategy of any resistance movement, which is “an organised effort by some portion of the civil population
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of a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability”. History is replete with examples in relation to both resistance and subversion. From the resisting slaves in ancient Rome led by the famous gladiator Spartacus all the way to World War II, which featured subversion as a vital part of resistance movements in countries as diverse as the Netherlands, France, Poland, Slovakia or Yugoslavia. These historical examples suggest that subversion was very often a precondition or facilitator for future political change, which overthrew governments, defeated occupying powers, or won a war. A new era of subversion dawned with the Arab Spring. It now continues with Russia’s efforts to restore its geopolitical power as well as with the actions of the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS), a movement that is willing to engage in the most brutal and sordid forms of violence. The principles and operating concepts applied in ancient resistance and subversion activity very much resemble what we are observing today. However, the real game-changer came with the development of cyberspace. All of the actors mentioned above have heavily utilised online technologies for subversion.
A new concept The development of cyberspace is giving rise to a new concept, that of “digital subversion”. Cyberspace is more than the internet; this multi-faceted domain includes not only hardware, software and information systems, but also people and their interaction within these networks. Most recent observations of subversion strategies indicate that coverage of the broad masses is most effectively done through cyberspace. Cyberspace has become a prerequisite for successful subversion. However, one remark must be made to preface further thought. Subversion should be seen as a vehicle for the deployment and achievement of other elements, tools and objectives of hybrid warfare; these include information
Cyberspace combined with subversion became new field of war. (AP Photo/David Becker, File)
war, propaganda, sabotage, conventional warfare, and efforts to undermine the economy, weaken the government and the political system at large and dismay the population. Subversion cannot substitute for any of these efforts; rather, it functions as their enabler. Modern subversion as digital subversion If it strives to be successful, modern resistance movement and subversion must be able to leverage as much as possible with the digital media, social media and cyberspace operations. It would be too simplistic to see cyberspace operations as an exclusively military affair. According to Adm. Michael Rogers, director of the National Security Agency and head of the U.S. Cyber Command, “the source of a cyber attack can easily be disguised, and the capability to do significant damage is possessed not only by nation states but by criminal groups and individuals”. The Russians and the IS gave a new dimension to subversion in applying several lessons learned from the Arab Spring, where cyberspace had been used as a tool to help overthrow dictators. As a result, they started to use digital and proxy subversion combined. If we can assume that Russia’s strategic aim in Ukraine is to achieve political and possibly geographical dominance over the country in order to support a higher strategy (which does not necessarily have to be limited to Ukraine’s territory) then this represents the first difference to the traditional conception of subversion as exemplified in World War II. The main point is that in the Ukraine crisis, the opposing actors are states. This observation slightly derails the established formula that it is the domestic population, dissatisfied with its own government or an occupying force, who usually stands behind subversions. In other words, there are not so many Ukrainians who would be really willing to lead
Fending off cyber attacks is also part of the exercises at the United States Military Academy in West Point, NY. (AP Photo/Mel Evans)
an active resistance against their own government. This indicates another point. The Russian strategists cannot simply rely on popular discontent with the Ukrainian government. In this situation, they have two options. First, creating ambiguity and an uncertain civil environment. Second, and probably ideally, paralysing the opponent’s ability to react effectively.
its digital subversion strategy. In the digital media category, it is the satellite newscaster Russia Today (RT), which runs cable and satellite television channels as well as websites directed at audiences outside the Russian Federation. RT serves as an excellent tool for disseminating propaganda, claiming a worldwide audience of 700 million. Another important tool
“Subversion should be seen as a vehicle for the deployment and achievement of other elements, tools and objectives of hybrid warfare.” Without greater support from the Ukrainian population there is only one way ¬– using digital subversion. As already indicated, we can also call this proxy subversion. The element that has enabled proxy subversion in the 21st century is cyberspace and its online tools. Tools and elements of digital subversion Let us present a closer look at how digital subversion is used on the ground. Internet trolling provides the necessary manpower for digital subversion. Russian trolls have proven to be super proficient when it comes to the filling of digital and social media with pro-Kremlin content. Russia uses many online tools for
is the social media, which in comparison to digital media requires information that is more adjusted and stratified to the target audience. Social media is a perfect tool for digital subversion as it provides a direct cross link to social networking within the populace. On certain occasions, the situation may simply require more traditional solutions. Traditional mobile phones, used in almost every family from teenagers to pensioners, seem to be quite suitable for digital subversion. Examples from the Russian-Ukrainian conflict are revealing. Text messages have been sent to residents in Western Ukraine containing false information about the losses
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of the Ukrainian army, which is fighting against Kremlin-backed insurgents in the East, seeking to sow fear, hate, and panic.
Alongside conventional battle, the IS has used digital subversion conducted through social and digital media and (to a marginal
“Social media is a perfect tool for digital subversion as it provides a direct cross link to social networking within the populace.” Most likely, these messages have come from Russian servers. A slightly different case is the Islamic State. If we suppose that the targets of IS activity relate to the long list of its enemies (the United States and its allies, the Shiites, the Salafis, the Arab oil sheiks, the governments of Iran, Iraq and Syria and their militaries, Hamas, Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda), then the use of subversion, and digital subversion in particular, can be very convenient. In this way, the IS can infiltrate its enemies without a need to have its own jihadists present on enemy ground. For example, videos and images of the sect’s barbaric psychopathic violence that leads to the ultimate destruction of physical infrastructure and humiliates the populations are well-suited for the political objectives of subversion, which is to undermine the strength or morale of the adversary.
extent) through operations.
cyberspace
How to counter digital subversion It is more difficult to defend against digital subversion than to implement it. In order to counter digital subversion it is not sufficient to look at the strategy purely through the prism of counter-intelligence operations. Given the complexity, the West needs to rethink its approach to security, as internal vulnerabilities come to the fore as a major concern. This adds urgency to inter-agency collaboration at home and inter-institutional cooperation globally. Both NATO and the EU stand on a weak footing as regards the territory of their member states. NATO has limited remit and tools for police, intelligence and other civilian agencies’ operational
Fending off cyber attacks is also part of the exercises at the United States Military Academy in West Point, NY. (AP Photo/Mel Evans)
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cooperation. The EU, for its part, has no remit for military operations on the territory of its members and faces severe inter-institutional issues when it comes to combining civilian and military efforts. Making matters even worse, NATO-EU collaboration at the political level has been blocked for years now. Conclusion First, as described in this paper, current subversion techniques, embedded with cyberspace, are clearly different from what they used to be. Therefore it is high time to recast their definition as “digital subversion”, which better describes the content, possibilities and impact. Digital subversion may be defined as “actions carried out through the proxy means of cyberspace designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a governing authority without the need of having immediate support from the population of and physical presence in the assaulted target (state)”. However, this does not mean that subversion cannot be performed without the use of cyberspace. Second, successful digital subversion strategy does not rely on a single digital tool. Using a multitude of channels, it oversaturates the target with orchestrated information based on the same narratives. Such orchestrated campaigns create the desired result in the minds of the audience. Third, cyberspace is already regarded as a valuable wartime resource. One day, it may be used for total war. Nevertheless, recent examples provide clear indication of how cyberspace can be used and abused as an essential vehicle for digital subversion and as one of the vital elements of hybrid warfare.
quiz 1. The Winner of Poland’s Presidential Election became 44-year-old conservative _______. He was a member of the Law and Justice party, which ruled from 2005 to 2007 in a coalition with nationalists and populists.
4. UK election results, with all 650 seats declared, the Conservatives have ended up with _______ seats in the House of Commons.
7. The African Development Bank (AfDB), the biggest financier of infrastructure in Africa, appointed _______ as its new president.
a) 322 b) 348 c) 331 d) 376
a) Cape Verde’s Cristina Duarte b) Nigeria’s Akinwumi Adesina c) Rwanda’s Donald Kaberuka d) Zimbabwe’s Thomas Sakala
2. In April 2015, _______’s state-owned electric company announced that the country had gone 75 straight days using only renewable energy sources. This country is the first in the world to power itself for so long without the use of fossil fuels. It gets most of its electricity from hydroelectric plants, though it also uses geothermal plants, wind turbines, and solar power plants.
5. Iran, Iraq and Venezuela expressed their objections and called on the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to reduce production by at least 5% to boost prices that have collapsed since last summer. _______ and OPEC chief Abdalla Salem el-Badri have said they would consider a production cut if non-OPEC producers like the U.S. and Russia also turned down the spigots.
8. The Colombian government and leftist FARC guerrillas will set up a truth commission once Latin America’s longest war is over, ending the more than _______ of conflict. Negotiators reached agreement despite a recent escalation of violence that has threatened the country’s peace talks, taking place in Cuba.
a) Finland b) Norway c) Costa Rica d) Panama
a) Saudi Arabia b) Libya c) United Arab Emirates d) Quatar
3. According to The Global Competitiveness Report 2014 - 2015, after the first Switzerland and the second Singapore, the third place belongs to _______.
6. The leaders of the G7, met in _______ for our annual summit on 7 and 8 June 2015.
a) Bronisław Komorowski b) Andrzej Duda c) Paweł Kukiz d) Grzegorz Schetyna
a) Japan b) Germany c) Finland d) USA
a) 20 years b) 30 years c) 40 years d) 50 years 9. In May 2015, army coup d’etat was launched in _______ to try to overthrow President Pierre Nkurunziza. His bid to be re-elected to a third term caused unrest. Thousands of people celebrated the announcement by Major General Godefroid Niyombare. However, the attempted coup “failed”.
a) Berlin b) Riga c) Elmau d) Lyon
a) Tanzania b) Chad c) Rwanda d) Burundi 10. Asia’s third-largest economy grew _______ in the three months ending in March 2015, higher than the previous quarter and above expectations.
Q U I Z
a) 7,5% b) 6,8% c) 5,9% d) 7,8
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correct answers: 1B, 2C, 3D, 4C, 5A, 6C, 7B, 8D, 9D, 10A
CALENDAR June 26
The United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture
July 1
Luxemburg Presidency of the Council of the European Union
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Commemoration 600 Years Since the Burning of Jan Hus 2015 is the year of Jan Hus, 600 years ago on 6 July 1415 he was burned at the stake. Jan Hus was a key contributor to Protestantism, whose teachings had a strong influence on the states of Europe on John Calvin and Martin Luther himself.
9-12
The European Conference on Sustainability, Energy and the Environment, Brighton, United Kingdom
10
75th Anniversary of the Battle of Britain The Battle of Britain Anniversary commemorates the 75th anniversary of the aerial battle that proved a strategic turning point in the Second World War.
11
20th Anniversary of the Srebrenica Massacre This year the twentieth anniversary of the massacre in Srebrenica is being observed. On 11 July, a huge spectacle will take place at the Srebrenica Memorial centre specially constructed for that purpose. It will feature the presence of most of the rather insignificant individuals purporting to be political leaders in the region and the Western-dominated world.
24-25
Euro-Asia Forum in Politics, Economics and Business 2015, Istanbul, Turkey
August 6-9
70th Anniversary of Hiroshima and Nagasaki On 6 August 1945, an atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima by US air forces. This was the first time a nuclear weapon had ever been used. It killed up to 180,000 people and destroyed 13 square kilometres of the city. Three days later, a second atomic bomb was dropped on the city of Nagasaki, killing between 50,000 and 100,000 people.
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European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism 38
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS I SECURITY AND DEFENCE
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Mikuláš Virág Radka Čížová ‘Katarína Schwertnerová Tomáš Grenzner, Aneta Timoranská Adam Cisár SITA, TASR
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Issue 3/2015 Publication date: 16 June, 2015 The responsibility for opinions expressed in signed articles, studies and other contributions rests solely with their authors, and their publication does not constitute an endorsement by the Euro-Atlantic! think.act.lead. The editorial board of the Euro-Atlantic! think.act.lead. reserves the right to shorten and revise articles when necessary.
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GLOBSEC
POLICY PAPERS
A Net Assessment of Europe by George Friedman Russia and the West: Sketching Possible Scenarios by Joerg Forbrig Towards a Renaissance of the West by Roland Freudenstein Anatomy of an Info-War by Ben Nimmo What Future for Visegrad Cooperation? by Jiří Schneider From Wales to Warsaw: NATO’s Radically Adapted Posture – or Lost in Between? by Dániel Bartha, Jakub Kufčák, Marian Majer and Mário Nicolini
in this issue 4
A Net Assessment of Europe by George Friedman
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Russia and the West: Sketching Possible Scenarios by Joerg Forbrig
8
Ukraine after Riga Summit: Small Steps toward “Victories” by Balázs Jarábik
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Towards a Renaissance of the West by Roland Freudenstein
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Anatomy of an Info-War by Ben Nimmo
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How Can NATO Mitigate the Effect of Russian Propaganda? by NATO STRATCOM Centre of Excellence
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What Future for Visegrad Cooperation? by Jiří Schneider
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From Wales to Warsaw: NATO’s Radically Adapted Posture – or Lost in Between? by Dániel Bartha, Jakub Kufčák, Marian Majer and Mário Nicolini
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NATO’s Response to ISIL: Containing the Salafist Impulse by Selim Koru
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EU Energy Union: A Firm Anchor for Future Storms by Karel Hirman
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The Problems Foreign Powers Find in the Balkans by Stratfor
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Four Priorities for the Visegrad Four’s Digital Agenda by Dániel Bartha, Milan Nič, Maria Staszkiewicz, Milan Zubíček, Marian Majer
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Debunking Lies and Stopping Fakes: Lessons from the Frontline by Yevhen Fedchenko
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GLOBSEC
POLICY PAPERS
POLICY PAPER GLOBSEC Policy Papers The series of GLOBSEC Policy Papers aims to stimulate debate at the Forum by presenting fresh perspectives and concrete policy recommendations, while also promoting public discussion and diplomacy.
About CEPI The Central European Policy Institute, member of the Strategy Council, is a Bratislava-based regional think tank, which links top research institutions and experts from across Central Europe. CEPI is devoted to improving the quality of the region’s contributions to European and transatlantic debates on today’s key challenges. We believe that Central Europe should take on more responsibility in the EU and NATO for issues ranging from defence, energy and the digital agenda to the continuation of the enlargement process in Europe’s neighbourhood.
Editorial Team Mário Nicolini, Milan Nič, Marian Majer, Milan Šuplata, Andrej Chovan
A Net Assessment of Europe George Friedman
Europe is undergoing two interconnected crises. The first is the crisis of the European Union. The bloc began as a system of economic integration, but it was also intended to be more than that: It was to be an institution that would create Europeans. The EU project did not intend to abolish Europe’s nations; the distinctions and tensions were too deep. Rather it was intended to overlay national identities with a European identity. That European identity would both create a common culture and diminish the particularity of states. The inducement to all of Europe was prosperity and peace. The European Union would create ongoing prosperity, which would eliminate the danger of conflict. The challenge to Europe in this sense was that prosperity is at best cyclical, and it is regional. Europe is struggling with integration because without general prosperity, the seduction of Europeans away from the parochial allure of nations will fail. The second crisis rests in the strategic structure of Europe and is less tractable than the first. The Continent’s primordial issue is the relationship between the largely unified but poorer mainland, dominated by Russia, and the wealthier but much more fragmented peninsula. Between Russia and the peninsula lies a borderland that at times has been under the control of Russia or a peninsular power or, more often, divided. This borderland is occasionally independent and sovereign, but this is rare. More often, even in sovereignty, it is embedded in the spheres of influence of other countries. The borderland has two tiers: the first and furthest east is Belarus, Ukraine and portions of the Balkans, while the second consists of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the second tier countries became sovereign, and the two peninsular institutions, the European Union and NATO, absorbed the second tier. As this happened, and the Baltics were included with the second tier, Belarus and particularly Ukraine became the dividing line and buffer. Two things must be noted here. First, in the years after Soviet collapse, the Europe-
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an Union was dynamic and seemed destined to unite the peninsula. As Soviet power collapsed and European power seemed to expand, the European Union provided a united framework for expansion and an attractive option for newly sovereign nations in the borderland. Second, Russia was in a state of systemic shock in the 1990s. It was a period of chaos, characterized by the complete loss of both controls and plans. It was almost as though Russia was unconscious. From the European and American points of view, this was the new normal in Russia. In fact, it was inevitable that this was merely a transitory state. When the first shock of collapse passed, the security apparatus that historically had held Russia together would reassert itself and stabilize Russia. It was not the personality of Vladimir Putin that mattered; if not for him, another leader would have emerged and halted the disintegration of the Russian economy and polity. This process inevitably led Russia to restructure itself, within the limits of its diminished power. The effort included an attempt to both stabilize the country’s economy and reassert its geopolitical interests, first in the Caucasus and then in Ukraine. Without a buffer in the eastern peninsula, Russia lacks strategic depth, and it has only been this strategic depth that has saved it from peninsular invasions in the past. The European Union’s position was that the Continent’s growing integration was completely benign. That might well have been the subjective intention of the Europeans, but the Russians saw something they had never seen before: integrated institutions, with ambitions among some members to become a federation of nation-states that might go well beyond economics. There had been sufficiently ample discussion of European defense systems and federation to cause concern in Moscow. Without buffers, a united Europe with a shifted intent might well pose an existential threat to Russia. This was particularly the case because the United States held a vague alliance with the Europeans and shared the fear of Russia’s power re-emerging.
Russia’s Resurgence and Europe’s Crisis
A Continent Divided
In 2008, two critical things happened. First, and less important, was the Russian war with Georgia that demonstrated the re-emergence of Russia as a significant and capable regional power. Second, and more important, the economic crisis triggered by the American sub-prime mortgage crisis led to the gradual fragmentation of European unity, causing a massive divergence of interests. The eastern movement of European influence, supported by the United States, continued in spite of the crisis. The Russians were forced to counter and were less concerned about the consequences. Due to the crisis, the interests of the European Peninsula diverged into four parts: those of Germanic Europe (Germany, Austria and, to some extent, the Czech Republic); Mediterranean Europe; the eastern frontier of the European Union; and the rest of northern Europe. Germany has an overwhelming interest in the European Union and its free trade zone. It is an inherently weak nation, as are all countries that are dependent on exports. If blocked by an economic downturn among its customers or political impediments to exports, Germany faces a declining economy that can create domestic social crises. Germany must do everything it can to discipline the European Union without motivating its members to leave. Thus Germanic Europe is walking a fine line. It is an economic engine of Europe, but also extremely insecure. Given the fragmentation in the European Union, it must reach out to others, particularly Russia, for alternatives. Russia is not an alternative in itself, but in a bad situation it could be part of a solution if Germany could craft one. This is, of course, a worst-case scenario, but the worst case is often the reality in Europe in the long run. Southern Europe is seeking a path that will allow it to escape catastrophic austerity in a Europe that seems unable to generate significant economic growth. If that does not save Southern European nations, they must decide, in simplest terms, whether they are better off defaulting on debt than paying it. This is the fundamental reality of Europe: Germany wants to save the free trade zone, but without absorbing Europe’s bad debts. Southern Europe needs to shift its burden and will eventually reconsider the viability of free trade, though it has not yet done so. Central and Eastern European countries are in a complex position with the European Union, since they are generally members that are not in the eurozone. But for most of them, the question of Russia’s power and intentions is more important than the Greek crisis. For the east, there is an awareness that Europe never did progress to a common foreign and defense policy and that the European Union cannot defend them against Russia. They are also aware that NATO cannot defend them, except with American involvement, which is coming in very measured and slow increases. Then there is the fourth part of Europe, particularly France, which is supposed to be Germany’s equal in the European Union but has fallen behind in recent decades, as it did in the 19th century. France is as much part of Southern Europe as Greece, along with high unemployment in the south. And along with the Southern Europeans, France is not drawn east, nor is it comfortable with German policies, but it is being drawn in multiple directions on economic and strategic issues.
A continent drawn in multiple directions is the best description of the European Union, and one that gives the Russians some relief. The collapse of oil prices and Russia’s inability to turn oil income into a diverse and sustainable economy are inherently limiting factors on Russia’s power. In Ukraine, the Russians are experiencing the twin problems of a failure of intelligence and the limits of their military forces. Their intelligence failed to detect or manage events in Ukraine, from anticipating the fall of the government to understanding that there would be no general uprising in eastern Ukraine. Russia’s military never invaded anything, albeit that Russia controlled and, to some degree, still controls warring militias. Russia was present in Crimea by treaty, and its minimal forces and operations in the east revealed both its aggressive intent and the limits of its power. The Russians did not do well in that campaign, nor in my view could they mount a successful invasion of Ukraine as a whole, given their limits on logistics and other capabilities. But the Russians were saved by the fragmentation of the peninsula. The eastern Europeans wanted some definitive action from Europe. None came. Sanctions created pain, but they did not define Russia’s strategic policy. Thus, to the extent that the borderland has a patron, it is not Europe but the United States. The Germans have no desire to fundamentally alienate Russia over Ukraine. The French are torn in multiple directions and the Southern Europeans have no interest in non-EU issues aside from Muslim immigration. The Net Assessment of Europe is that the Continent’s basic geographical split remains in place, and Russia still holds the weaker position. However, its relative strength has increased with the rise of divergent interests within the European Union, and its primary concern regarding the Continent is not Europe but the United States. Therefore, the crisis in the European Union will define the broader situation in Russia, and that fundamental crisis appears insoluble within the current framework of discussion. The discussion will move from debt and repayment to the creation of a sustainable European Union in which Germany may not get to export all it wants but must accept limits on its prosperity relative to its partners. Since politics makes that unlikely, the fragmentation of the peninsula will increase, and with it, Russia’s relative power will rise, drawing in the United States.
George Friedman is the Chairman of Stratfor, a company he founded in 1996 that is now a leader in the field of global intelligence. Stratfor is a partner of the GLOBSEC 2015 Bratislava Global Security Forum. This paper summarizes the main points of a larger study published by Stratfor.
Central European Policy Institute
Klariská 14, 811 03 Bratislava, Slovak Republic | +421254410609 info@cepolicy.org | www.cepolicy.org | www.globsec.org
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POLICY PAPER GLOBSEC Policy Papers The series of GLOBSEC Policy Papers aims to stimulate debate at the Forum by presenting fresh perspectives and concrete policy recommendations, while also promoting public discussion and diplomacy.
About CEPI The Central European Policy Institute, member of the Strategy Council, is a Bratislava-based regional think tank, which links top research institutions and experts from across Central Europe. CEPI is devoted to improving the quality of the region’s contributions to European and transatlantic debates on today’s key challenges. We believe that Central Europe should take on more responsibility in the EU and NATO for issues ranging from defence, energy and the digital agenda to the continuation of the enlargement process in Europe’s neighbourhood.
Russia and the West: Sketching Possible Scenarios Joerg Forbrig It is now acknowledged by most that the post-Cold War order was buried when Russia annexed Crimea and the Kremlin waged war in Eastern Ukraine. However, few in Europe or the U.S. have taken a deeper look at the potential contours of a new European order, or of the relationship between the West and Russia that lies at its heart. A useful point of departure can be found in a remarkable dual development of the last year. The West has responded to Russian aggression against Ukraine with hitherto unthinkable political and economic sanctions, hoping these can undermine the Putin regime and change its policies. At the same time, Russia has revealed shocking reach into European societies through business ties, political sponsorship and a strong media presence, all of which the Kremlin uses to manipulate Western debate and decision-making. Each side takes aim at weakening the other’s cohesion, the key requisite for effective action by any government.
Editorial Team
Four Scenarios
Mário Nicolini, Milan Nič, Marian Majer, Milan Šuplata, Andrej Chovan
This conflict will be shaped by the degrees to which both sides are able to maintain their internal cohesion. It may become a race against time, with both sides banking on the cohesion of the other fading before their own ranks break apart. This basic fault line can serve to model a number of scenarios. Scenario 1 – Standoff. In what is effectively the status quo, both Russia and the West retain their cohesion. Russia’s open challenge to the West further boosts Putin’s standing among Russians, criticism from within remains manageable, the costs incurred continue to be absorbed, state propaganda permanently feeds a nationalist frenzy. The West regains its composure after initial surprise and while its responses may be insufficient, they are still unexpected in both unity and strength. With cohesion prevailing on either side, a protracted war of attrition is indicated. Russia can be expected to be proactive and regularly seek the offensive. It will pres-
6
sure those neighbours that remain outside Western institutions, and seek to puncture these institutions, by threatening countries that are most exposed militarily or by enticing those economically weakest. The West will likely be more reactive and defensive. Its focus will be on increasing its own resilience, with a limit largely to current EU and NATO members, and reducing vulnerabilities to Russian influences. Toward Ukraine and other Eastern neighbours, it will remain halfhearted, responding to particularly egregious actions by the Kremlin, but mindful to avoid direct confrontation. Scenario 2 – Western decline. Under Russian assault, the fragile unity among Western nations falters. The EU fails to muster the consensus needed to extend political and economic sanctions against Russia. This establishes a dangerous precedent, making any resolute EU response to Russian aggression near-impossible, rendering a common EU foreign policy an illusion, and sacrificing transatlantic unity. Russian triumph over the EU will only embolden the Kremlin to test NATO, which is poorly prepared to ensure the territorial integrity of its Eastern periphery. A lack of clarity towards hybrid warfare, defence cuts and fragmented political will in Europe all undermine Article 5 obligations. In its immediate neighbourhood, this gives Moscow a free hand to re-establish its hegemony over former satellites, and to build the regional sphere of influence it believes it needs to qualify as a global power. A less integrated and principled Europe will provide fertile ground for advancing Russian political and economic interests in a traditional divide-and-conquer manner. Vis-à-vis the U.S., Russia feels that it levels the playing field, stripping the U.S. of its European allies and questioning its global leadership. Scenario 3 – Russian decline. Conversely, it could well be Russian internal cohesion that withers. Russia has long faced formidable structural problems, dysfunctionalities, and centrifugal tendencies, but was able to mask these with plentiful revenues from energy exports. A lasting drop
in oil prices and the inevitable costs of Western sanctions close out this option and drive Russia into prolonged economic agony. In response, the Putin administration prioritises investments in the military and security apparatus over those in the social welfare system and economic modernisation. This may prompt a response among technocrats and the urban middle class who lose out. The Duma election is coming up in late 2016 and, if generating momentum, modernisers might take aim at the 2018 presidential elections. However, indications are that System Putin will be able to handle this whether by marginalisation, suppression or absorption. Prolonged economic stagnation will fuel infighting among key elements of the state apparatus, put into question elite loyalties and lead Russia’s peripheries to question their relationship to the political center. In order to postpone and prevent Russia’s eventual implosion, the Kremlin will be tempted to seek external conflicts as valves to release growing internal pressure.
key global player and advocate of strong international cooperation, and that does not presume Russian decline (plausibly a long shot). When the current regime in Russia eventually lapses, the consequences and uncertainties will be comparable to those of the breakdown of the Soviet Union. Managing the potential fallout will require a united and capable Western community and institutions. Until then, the West had better prepare itself for years of stalemate. 2. Accommodation is risky for the West and Russia
Seasoned Western Russia watchers have repeatedly called for the new grand bargain with Russia over the last year. Whatever its exact form and content such an accommodation is fraught with risks for both sides. For the Russian leadership, the concessions necessary for such an accord would run counter to its ideologised claim to superiority and its challenge to the West; that might be read as a weakness the Kremlin can ill-afford. For the West, concessions would almost certainly compromise key Western values such as the inviolability and sovereignty of European states. Thus, neither of the diametrically opposed sides can really afford accommodation without the risk of ushering in its own decline.
Scenario 4 – Chaos. The worst possible scenario sees internal cohesion wane in both Russia and the West. Dual collapse has dramatic consequences for the entire Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space, and for the globe. It ends seven decades of Western integration that resulted in the single-most advanced model of international cooperation in history. The EU retreats from foreign policy, its integration loosens and further enlargement is halted. NATO will have proven ineffective in guaranteeing the territorial integrity of its members, thus depriving Western integration of its security dimension. In sum, the West will cease to be a credible actor that can project a vision of a cooperative world order, whether in its immediate vicinity or further afield.
3. Reinforcing Western unity is paramount
In order to withstand Russia’s assault on the West, it will be key for the U.S. and its European allies to fortify their cohesion. This requires clear commitment to the norms underlying the European order as it has developed over the last decades. Ongoing and future violations of these principles by Russia must be punished more resolutely than so far, both to limit damage and to weaken the culprit. In turn, the West needs to boost its own resilience and that of Russia’s neighbours to the economic and energy pressures, political meddling, propaganda and military threats launched by the Kremlin. Across these areas, lowest common denominators and introversion will not suffice. Instead, the EU and U.S. should demonstrate their ambitious and proactive unity aimed at the longterm integration of all of Europe.
This lack of an able West will be felt most strongly in Eurasia. Absent the stabilising and modernising effects from the West, Russia will be unable to stem its decline and sink into economic and political upheaval. Its direct neighbours, dependent on Russia, will become de-stabilised and experience state failure, civil strife and poverty. Knock-on effects will quickly reach the EU and NATO’s Eastern-most members and unable to absorb these pressures, they will turn to an EU whose capacity to assist, political will and sense of solidarity are greatly weakened. As a result, instability returns to large swathes of the European continent.
4. U.S. and German leadership are indispensable
Responsibility for ensuring Western unity and for facing up to Russia rests primarily with the U.S. and Germany. The former has to acknowledge that it is the ultimate addressee of Kremlin policy, whose end goal it is to curtail U.S. leadership in global affairs. Consequently, Washington should re-prioritise Russia, re-engage with its European allies and strengthen its presence as a key guarantor of security in Europe. Germany, in turn, is central to cohesion among EU members. Berlin will have to take the concerns of those EU members and neighbours that are particularly exposed to Russian pressures more seriously and to formulate its position accordingly and unambiguously. Enhanced shuttle diplomacy and a focus on Russia as the EU’s key foreign policy challenge will have to be ingredients of German leadership, as will stronger political, financial and military commitment to securing the EU and NATO’s Eastern flank.
Recommendations None of these scenarios is bright, least of all given the hopes and efforts invested by the West in the transformation of Europe, and Russia, over the last 25 years. Yet each of these trajectories seems possible and can be substantiated with evidence. This not only highlights the extent to which the West and Russia find themselves at a turning point, but also speaks to the critical long-term consequences of any political decisions made by the West and Russia in the short term. In this spirit, a number of recommendations can be derived for Western policy. 1. The current standoff with Russia as the best of a bad lot
It may sound counterintuitive for Western politics and publics, which became accustomed to a difficult but rarely belligerent Russia, but the current standoff is the far preferable scenario to any other. It is the only trajectory that keeps the West intact as a
Joerg Forbrig is Transatlantic Fellow for Central and Eastern Europe at the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). This policy brief is a summary of a forthcoming GMF Europe Paper. Central European Policy Institute
Klariská 14, 811 03 Bratislava, Slovak Republic | +421254410609 info@cepolicy.org | www.cepolicy.org | www.globsec.org
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POLICY PAPER GLOBSEC Policy Papers The series of GLOBSEC Policy Papers aims to stimulate debate at the Forum by presenting fresh perspectives and concrete policy recommendations, while also promoting public discussion and diplomacy.
About CEPI The Central European Policy Institute, member of the Strategy Council, is a Bratislava-based regional think tank, which links top research institutions and experts from across Central Europe. CEPI is devoted to improving the quality of the region’s contributions to European and transatlantic debates on today’s key challenges. We believe that Central Europe should take on more responsibility in the EU and NATO for issues ranging from defence, energy and the digital agenda to the continuation of the enlargement process in Europe’s neighbourhood.
Editorial Team Mário Nicolini, Milan Nič, Marian Majer, Milan Šuplata, Andrej Chovan
Ukraine after Riga Summit: Small Steps toward “Victories” Balázs Jarábik
More than a year has passed since Petro Poroshenko was ushered in as President, and some positive news is coming from Kiev: political legitimacy and central authority have been strengthened, civil society is highly engaged in accountability, and there are (some) efforts being taken towards reform. Yet, while Maidan brought down Viktor Yanukovych (and the central authority with him), the previous oligarch-based system of governance has more or less been restored. Active citizens’ participation in politics and their mobilisation for a Ukrainian identity, partly in reaction to Russian aggression, have created a framework for more substantial and systemic changes. However, the on-going modernisation of the Ukrainian state is a painfully slow process. Ukraine’s main challenges are still corruption and the urgency of victory, not to mention the associated political rhetoric. Resistance to reforms is structural: it seems that the Ukrainian political elite will carry out reforms only as long as these do not disrupt their own core political and economic interests. Concrete efforts correlate with the desire to secure re-election votes as well as continued rent-seeking mechanisms. This in turn creates an awkward situation where the government wastes precious time touting populist rhetoric and measures, while society is becoming increasingly radicalised due to, among other factors, the lack of reforms. For many Ukraine observers this is reminiscent of the situation following the Orange Revolution, however this time the consequences are 8
more far-reaching both locally and globally. Instead of pushing for substantial guarantees from the EU, which could be sold to the public as “victories”, Kiev should be taking more decisive baby steps toward European integration. Honest talk instead of populist rhetoric would be a healthy dose of change on behalf of Ukraine’s current leadership. A good example is visa liberalisation: the EU cannot lift the visa regime until technical requirements are met by the Ukrainian side. Subsequently, any further direct economic aid to Ukraine’s government in addition to the IMF rescue package, should continue to be conditioned by the delivery of key reforms. While the West is now increasing its level of support and engagement with Ukraine, expectations should be managed by the assumption that any structural changes will entail a slow and painful process for all actors. Ukraine’s fronts are numerous: the pause in fighting in the Donbass after the Minsk agreements should be used to modernise state institutions, boost the economy, reduce endemic corruption and launch a realistic and inclusive decentralisation process that would further tame separatists’ efforts, and may eventually bring the separatist-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk back to Ukraine. These are tremendous tasks for a bureaucracy used to looking after its own interests. The role of external actors, such as the direct military involvement of Russia, but also political, economic, and (to a lesser extent) security support
from the West, remain crucial factors influencing developments on the ground in eastern Ukraine. For now, the contact line between government forces and the separatists is being formed amid ongoing skirmishes and shootouts. Neither Ukraine nor Russia have shown any willingness to provide economic and financial aid to the Donbass. Kiev may believe that the second Minsk agreement has put Ukraine in a worse situation than it had been after the first round of talks. It appears that the main contest between Russia and Ukraine is over who should not have the “separatist” parts of the Donbass. It is mostly on external actors to push both sides to limit violence, allowing more intrusive OSCE inspections, and to further encourage the political process. The unwillingness to implement the Minsk agreements’ political dimension, means that both sides should be the main focus of external actors. Beefing up the OSCE capacity may be the key in order to ensure proper monitoring and conflict prevention – yet this does not mean only an increase in numbers and equipment, but also to allow unimpeded access for the monitors. In order to move forward with the political dimension, representatives who can speak with a degree of legitimacy on behalf of the Donbass should be found and included in on-going talks, which will not be possible without inclusive elections throughout separatist territories.
be to reduce red tape and improve the business environment, including reforms in the banking sector and allowing home-grown businesses to flourish. « Corruption remains the major obstacle to reforms. The role of oligarchs in Ukraine is unlikely to be eliminated in the near future, but the ambition to make the business environment and their role in it more transparent and their monopolies targeted, by improving the investment climate and rule of law, should be followed through by more concrete action from the government. « Undoubtedly the greatest motivation to reform lies within Ukraine’s civil society, not its vast bureaucracy. However, the main issue is not the number of bureaucrats, but their attention (individual interest) and efficiency (serving citizens’ interests). Ukraine cannot make reforms without civil servants; therefore the key is for the state’s management and administration to be streamlined, and to have its expertise/capacity developed so that civil servants can work more efficiently and engage with outside stakeholders such as civil society or interest-based groups. « Finally, the EU should consider improving coordination among its mechanisms, institutions, and member states. Communication is also hampered by the (cacophony of) “statements diplomacy”, while it is increasingly unclear who is speaking on behalf of the EU when it comes to Ukraine.
Policy Recommendations « Instead of demanding a new Marshall Plan from the West, the Kiev government should make the best out of what is available. Resistance is high: Ukrainian businesses’ reluctance to switch to new standards is also an overlooked factor, for example. Reform related communication should be taken much more seriously given that it is still largely missing. « Although the EU’s efforts in Ukraine are challenged by Russian propaganda, which is questioning Europe’s ability to help Ukraine - the real challenge is Ukraine’s weak state capacity and its lack of political will. More visible European assistance in areas where citizens feel a direct impact on their lives is important, yet cannot substitute local capacity and political will.
This paper has been adapted from the most recent Ukraine Reality Check findings discussed at the meeting in Riga in April 2015 under the auspices of the Latvian EU Presidency. The Reality Check project is a policy review process on the EU’s Eastern partnership countries developed by the Central European Policy Institute (CEPI) with assistance of Lithuania’s EESC gathering top analysts, observers, and practitioners to provide evidence-based analysis and policy advice. See also CEPI’s regular monitoring digest Ukraine Watch.
« After the winter, one of the key reform priorities of Ukraine should be to improve energy efficiency by smart energy use and further diversification of its energy imports. Economically, Kiev’s main focus should
Balázs Jarábik is an Associate Fellow at CEPI, and a non-resident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace focusing on Ukraine and Eastern Europe. He is the co-founder of the Reality Check review process.
Central European Policy Institute
Klariská 14, 811 03 Bratislava, Slovak Republic | +421254410609 info@cepolicy.org | www.cepolicy.org | www.globsec.org
9
POLICY PAPER GLOBSEC Policy Papers The series of GLOBSEC Policy Papers aims to stimulate debate at the Forum by presenting fresh perspectives and concrete policy recommendations, while also promoting public discussion and diplomacy.
About CEPI The Central European Policy Institute, member of the Strategy Council, is a Bratislava-based regional think tank, which links top research institutions and experts from across Central Europe. CEPI is devoted to improving the quality of the region’s contributions to European and transatlantic debates on today’s key challenges. We believe that Central Europe should take on more responsibility in the EU and NATO for issues ranging from defence, energy and the digital agenda to the continuation of the enlargement process in Europe’s neighbourhood.
Editorial Team Mário Nicolini, Milan Nič, Marian Majer, Milan Šuplata, Andrej Chovan This paper is part of a series of activities by the Central European Strategy Council whose aim is to contribute to a positive change in public perceptions of NATO and the European Union, while at the same time increasing the resilience of society against discourse that undermines the anchoring of our nations in the family of liberal democracies. We do this by promoting open debate, objective information, institution building and civic activism.
Towards a Renaissance of the West Roland Freudenstein Let’s not deceive ourselves: This confrontation will last a long time, and it is arguably the most serious challenge to the West since the end of the Cold War. Even compared with jihadist terrorism in Europe and America, to the spreading chaos in the Middle East and North Africa and to the long shadow of China’s authoritarian capitalism, this is the most comprehensively political call to action most of us have seen in our lifetimes. Putin’s Russia threatens the global liberal order as well as its political underpinnings; it has put military conflict back on the agenda in Europe itself, and it reaches deep into our own democracies, with its propaganda and support for radical and authoritarian parties. But beyond Putin himself, this is about whether the West will be able to cope with the other challenges. In other words, in shaping up through confronting Putin’s Russia, the West can become a better place. But we are not there yet. In fact, in looking at the past year and a half, the jury is still out on whether we have really risen to the challenge. There are some reasons to worry: Most Western countries have been painfully slow in realising how existential, and how political, Putin’s threat is. There are numerous ways in which Russia can still manage to exploit differences between the member states of NATO and the EU. It may still succeed in spreading instability and authoritarianism in our Eastern neighbourhood. But on the other hand, Putin did not 10
expect the EU’s move to real economic sanctions in summer 2014 and it has left him puzzled about what to do next in Ukraine and beyond. He’s now clearly playing for time, and has for the moment put further military aggression on the back burner. And while Ukraine and the other countries of the Eastern partnership could do with a clearer EU commitment to accept them sometime in the future, the West’s willingness to help Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova in their transformation efforts has been remarkable. NATO’s decision to bolster deterrence on its Eastern flank by infrastructure and new force structures is equally positive, and may well have surprised Putin, too. But if we want historians of the 21st century to look back on its second decade as a time of the reassertion of the West, we have to get our act together with more determination than hitherto. Here are five decisive steps we need to take: « The EU needs to get its own house in order. That begins with more economic competitiveness: Completing the Single Market, cutting red tape, and boosting international trade – and therefore growth and jobs – through meaningful trade agreements. TTIP is only one of them. The Eurozone must be held together, and Britain should not leave the EU unless we want to strategically weaken our Union in a moment of existential
threat. Decreasing our energy dependency on Russia is another important step.
in political parties, NGOs, foundations, think tanks, and networks of individuals. Governments and EU institutions should not hire people, they should fund projects. That includes better journalistic standards, systematically exposing Russian financing of media and political parties in the West, and a new focus by Western media on Russian-speakers in the West – both expats and minorities – but also in the Eastern Partnership countries, as well as in Russia itself.
« NATO has to go beyond Wales. In a way, the West has to relearn deterrence in the face of naked aggression. This refers to conventional, nuclear and hybrid threats. In all fields, we have to do more for defence. Deterrence rests on three principles: The ability to defend ourselves, the willingness to do so, and communicating both to the regime that has obviously decided to be our enemy. NATO-EU cooperation must urgently be improved.
Ultimately, the renaissance of the West depends on its citizens. We all need to understand that we are in a long-lasting conflict with Putin’s Russia. We must never accept the Kremlin’s claim to a sphere of influence, and we must be ready to use armed force to defend ourselves and the fundamental principles of modernity. We have all chances to win this conflict. And win it we must, because if Putin wins it, even temporarily, that will mean the end of NATO, the EU and Europe as we know it.
« Transatlantic relations need a relaunch. TTIP has a highly political significance in this process, going far beyond the economic sphere. Generally, burden sharing needs to be urgently improved between Europe and America. And instead of the US ‘rebalancing’ to the Pacific, we should pivot together, mindful of our common values that are still the ties that bind a unique community of democracies. « We need to strengthen our efforts to help our Eastern partners. The EU’s Eastern Partnership needs an overhaul, differentiating much more between the individual partners, and placing a much greater emphasis on civil society, including independent media and political parties. But above all, we need to get completely rid of a ‘Russia First’ mentality that, under colourful labels such as ‘shared neighbourhood’ or ‘neighbours of neighbours’ still tends to give Russia a de facto veto over our relations with those countries in the Eastern neighbourhood that stand for democratic values. They want nothing less and nothing more for their countries than to exert their free choice of political system and international alliances, regardless of where they are located geographically. « We must respond more decisively to Russian propaganda and influence in our countries, in the Eastern neighbourhood and in Russia itself. This response cannot be based on the same top-down approach that the Kremlin has taken. It actually has to be bottom-up, rooted
Roland Freudenstein is Deputy Director and Head of Research of the Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies. The Martens Centre is a partner of the GLOBSEC 2015 Bratislava Global Security Forum. Central European Policy Institute
Klariská 14, 811 03 Bratislava, Slovak Republic | +421254410609 info@cepolicy.org | www.cepolicy.org | www.globsec.org
11
POLICY PAPER GLOBSEC Policy Papers The series of GLOBSEC Policy Papers aims to stimulate debate at the Forum by presenting fresh perspectives and concrete policy recommendations, while also promoting public discussion and diplomacy.
About CEPI The Central European Policy Institute, member of the Strategy Council, is a Bratislava-based regional think tank, which links top research institutions and experts from across Central Europe. CEPI is devoted to improving the quality of the region’s contributions to European and transatlantic debates on today’s key challenges. We believe that Central Europe should take on more responsibility in the EU and NATO for issues ranging from defence, energy and the digital agenda to the continuation of the enlargement process in Europe’s neighbourhood.
Editorial Team Mário Nicolini, Milan Nič, Marian Majer, Milan Šuplata, Andrej Chovan
This paper is part of a series of activities by the Central European Strategy Council whose aim is to contribute to a positive change in public perceptions of NATO and the European Union, while at the same time increasing the resilience of society against discourse that undermines the anchoring of our nations in the family of liberal democracies. We do this by promoting open debate, objective information, institution building and civic activism.
Anatomy of an Info-War Ben Nimmo One of Russia’s great successes in its campaign around Ukraine has been what Peter Pomerantsev and Michael Weiss call its weaponization of information. It uses a network of officials, journalists, sympathetic commentators and internet trolls to create an alternative reality in which all truth is relative, and no information can be trusted. The effects of this campaign are already distorting Western perceptions of the conflict. Claims that NATO promised not to expand into Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) after German reunification, and that Russia’s fear of that enlargement is justifiable, have entered the mainstream media, creating the impression that the West is to blame for Russia’s direct assault on Ukraine. However, while Russia’s propaganda network is sophisticated, its messages are not. They are repetitive and predictable, and therein lies their weakness. Russia’s narrative is based upon the thesis that the United States is trying to encircle and destroy Russia through ever-greater engagement in CEE and the “near-abroad”. This narrative has become a litany of paranoia in which any Western initiative there is taken as a threat, regardless of the extent to which it actually impacts on Russia. Thus NATO’s missile defence system and the European Union’s Eastern Partnership are both portrayed as anti-Russian plots, abetted by “hysterical” CEE governments. Russian officials have used the same narrative to justify the annexation of Crimea, attack EU foreign policy, explain the fall in world oil prices and dismiss Russia’s credit downgrade. The narrative is simple, striking, emotional and effective. So far, Western governments and organisations have 12
not articulated a compelling counter-narrative, but the opportunity is there to be taken. CEE nations are ideally placed to do so, drawing on their personal experience of the fight for democracy and freedom. To counter Western criticisms, Russian communicators use four main techniques: dismiss the critic, distort the facts, distract from the main issue and dismay the audience. Thus, individuals who criticise Russian policies become the targets for personal abuse, while organisations which question Russian methods are dismissed as biased or incompetent. Russian commentators also regularly use distorted reporting to undermine their opponents. For example, in late March Russian media reported heavily on a “wave” of protests sweeping across the Czech Republic in response to the U.S. “Dragoon Ride”, a parade of armored vehicles passing through the country en route to Germany. The coverage completely obscured the much more substantial welcomes the U.S. troops received - misrepresenting the Czechs as NATO opponents in Central Europe. If Russia is accused of a specific violation, Russian officials and commentators will come out with a host of counter-accusations whose effect is to distract the viewer from the key point. For example, in 2007, Putin enlivened an otherwise anodyne summit with European Union leaders in Portugal by claiming that the missile-defense plans of then-U.S. President George W. Bush in Poland and the Czech Republic were “very similar” to the Soviet stationing of nuclear missiles on Cuba in 1962. The analogy was misleading at best, but the effect was to put the rhetorical pressure on Washington, Warsaw and
Prague. To forestall potentially dangerous actions by their opponents, Russian officials use more or less veiled warnings, including of nuclear response - provoking dismay and hampering decision-making. The final link in the chain is Russia’s use of the Kremlin-controlled media, and paid or sympathetic commentators in the West, to pass its messages. Officials, journalists and apparently independent pundits act as a team, amplifying and validating one another’s statements in support of the overall narrative of war.
3. Predict attack In parallel, governments should pay more attention to the limited tactics used by Russian commentators and predict how they will be applied to their own communications. Internal communications plans dealing with Russian issues should address the likely responses from the Russian side, based on Russia’s 4D approach. A spokesperson who knows, for example, that a particular accusation is likely to be answered with an inappropriate parallel from history will be better placed to debunk the answer with the minimum delay.
Recommendations
4. Name the speakers
Some steps to respond to this disinformation flow have already been taken, including the incubation of an EU outreach program to Russian speakers. However, such initiatives provide a channel for communication; they do not in themselves define what those channels should say. It is the message, more than the messenger, which will be crucial to success. When it comes to what should be said, four key lines of effort are needed:
Finally, the West should expose the Kremlin’s media and supportive commentators for the propaganda mouthpieces they are. This is an area in which both governmental and non-governmental actors in CEE can play a role. One step would be to analyse and publish the ties linking allegedly independent commentators to Russia. Such ties can be hard to pin down, but the effort would be repaid by making clear to Western audiences how dependent on Russian backing the allegedly “independent” commentators are. Another would be to compare the Kremlin media’s coverage with the coverage of the same issues by genuinely independent and professional media. This would be a simple way to highlight their lack of editorial standards and defiance of balanced reporting.
1. Tell the story First, the West needs a visceral, captivating storyline that appeals to the senses more than to common-sense. This is an area in which the states of CEE should play a leading role. Because of the history of their own fight for freedom, they have a unique perspective on the clash of values which underpins the Ukraine conflict: the desire of the Ukrainian people for European integration, and the determination of the Russian elite to prevent it. They can articulate the narrative of democracy and freedom as an immediate and personal story. This is far more powerful than any nuanced political declaration.
In all this, the focus should be on educating and informing as broad an audience as possible, and then allowing them to decide for themselves what sources are credible and which reporting can be believed. Russia’s great victory in the conflict has been to turn information into an invisible weapon. The best way to counter it will be to make that weapon visible.
2. Expose the tactics Rather than dealing piecemeal with each Russian accusation, the West should name them for what they are: tactics to dismiss, distort, distract and dismay. The most effective way to do this would be through public analysis and dissection of Russia’s communications techniques. There is an urgent need for both governmental and non-governmental organisations to expose the methodology of Russian propaganda, to promote understanding of the techniques which underpin it.
Ben Nimmo is a UK-based analyst and writer on European security issues. He formerly worked as a journalist in the Baltic States and Brussels, and as a NATO press officer. This paper summarises the main points of a larger study entitled “Anatomy of an Info-War: How Russia’s Propaganda Machine Works, and How to Counter It”, out now on www. cepolicy.org. Central European Policy Institute
Klariská 14, 811 03 Bratislava, Slovak Republic | +421254410609 info@cepolicy.org | www.cepolicy.org | www.globsec.org
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POLICY PAPER GLOBSEC Policy Papers The series of GLOBSEC Policy Papers aims to stimulate debate at the Forum by presenting fresh perspectives and concrete policy recommendations, while also promoting public discussion and diplomacy.
About CEPI The Central European Policy Institute, member of the Strategy Council, is a Bratislava-based regional think tank, which links top research institutions and experts from across Central Europe. CEPI is devoted to improving the quality of the region’s contributions to European and transatlantic debates on today’s key challenges. We believe that Central Europe should take on more responsibility in the EU and NATO for issues ranging from defence, energy and the digital agenda to the continuation of the enlargement process in Europe’s neighbourhood.
Editorial Team Mário Nicolini, Milan Nič, Marian Majer, Milan Šuplata, Andrej Chovan
This paper is part of a series of activities by the Central European Strategy Council whose aim is to contribute to a positive change in public perceptions of NATO and the European Union, while at the same time increasing the resilience of society against discourse that undermines the anchoring of our nations in the family of liberal democracies. We do this by promoting open debate, objective information, institution building and civic activism.
How can NATO mitigate the effect of Russian propaganda? NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence The collapse of the Iron Wall created conditions for the establishment of a new, liberal international system based on Immanuel Kant’s 1795 essay on “Global peace” (Zum ewigen Frieden) in which he listed common values, cooperation between states, and the idea of confederation of republics where peace is cherished and organisations with similar values rule state interests. Today the United Nation is considered as the organisation which is best suited to advocate and encourage consensus over the majority of state players. However, consensus building is challenging when one of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council is the aggressor against neighbouring nations. The annexation of Crimea seriously challenged the existing international system. The polarisation of the world where states are choosing sides is a reality. The Principles of Westphalia, where national independence and territorial sovereignty are honoured, is challenged by annexation of Crimea and with Russia’s support to separatists in eastern Ukraine. The information campaign launched to hide that conflict creates confusion among international and internal communities. Messages targeting the Crimean people encouraged them to separate – other messaging denied the presence of Russian military forces which opens the say-do gap even further. Words and deeds were not aligned. ‘Hybrid warfare’ is the new ‘term’ which includes this gap between words and deeds, though it really is not a new ‘phenomenon’. European nations again face a situation where one state aggressively exploits oppor14
tunities for regional domination, enforcing its own rules over international law. Time is the test of truth. Beliefs that have survived over time become part of our basic values. Honesty, justice and hope for a better future are powerful tools in a democratic system. For a long time the media has been considered the fourth pillar of the democratic system with the task to inform, educate and entertain. This is now challenged as certain media outlets advocate in their reports that everybody lies, or there is no truth, or information can always be challenged. Propagandists now use media as instruments to influence an audience with partial information -- presenting facts selectively -- or using selected messages to produce an emotional rather than a rational response to the information presented. The Kremlin’s propaganda tells the world that nothing is truth and that anything is possible. For internal audiences it is building a picture of Russian people as victims of imperialistic conspiracies obliterating any hope for any other possible alternative. The militarisation of the society has brought the violent rhetoric of war into their leaders’ speeches, misleading people and detracting them from real problems by setting up phantom ones. In hybrid war information attacks are delivered through propaganda methods. Lies mixed with facts, simple historical misrepresentations, and continuous exercise of conspiracy theories are creating environments where it is complicated to orient. What can we do when the West wants peace but the other side desires victory? Is strategic patience the right approach or do we need fast action?
Are situations where rules are violated and agreements do not count the new reality? Listed below are some proposals to be considered in order to overcome challenges that hybrid warfare creates in the information domain.
Recommendations First is raising awareness. Share information and educate people to think critically, to verify sources and compare information coming from different sources. Freedom of expression, critical thinking, and multiplicity of sources all will help to develop a clearer picture. Learn from history. Sun Tzu wisdom is as valid today as it was 2000 years ago. The newly discovered is often the forgotten old. Current events are often similar to those of the past. The past often predicts the future. Care about truth. Our basic value is to honour the truth. Reveal lies. Invest in capabilities which help you to do that. Lies are misleading and dangerous; do not allow them to stand without response. Care about media quality. Support professionalism of media. With new communications platforms (social media) where news and ideas are exchanged much faster, the lies also are spread much quicker. How can audiences maintain the trust in media? Educate news consumers to think critically. There is requirement to find a balance between reactive and proactive media. And last, tell your own story. Communicate your own narrative and counter erroneous reporting whether it is deliberate or not. Do not allow misleading stories to dominate the media landscape. Hope for a better future and justice are the driving factors of humans. Stay engaged and be active; our values need to be defended and promoted. The battle for minds will continue. President Putin will challenge the West as long he is in power. He was not stopped in Georgia, nor in Crimea. His ambitions are growing and will continue to grow if left unimpeded -- if we don’t do anything. Economic sanctions are serving that purpose but they should be supported by other means. Means that help people to understand and make up their own minds. In the end it is all about people and their perceptions.
This discussion paper was prepared by the team of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Riga, Latvia, to support discussions at the GLOBSEC Global Security Forum.
Central European Policy Institute
KlariskĂĄ 14, 811 03 Bratislava, Slovak Republic | +421254410609 info@cepolicy.org | www.cepolicy.org | www.globsec.org
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POLICY PAPER GLOBSEC Policy Papers The series of GLOBSEC Policy Papers aims to stimulate debate at the Forum by presenting fresh perspectives and concrete policy recommendations, while also promoting public discussion and diplomacy.
About CEPI The Central European Policy Institute, member of the Strategy Council, is a Bratislava-based regional think tank, which links top research institutions and experts from across Central Europe. CEPI is devoted to improving the quality of the region’s contributions to European and transatlantic debates on today’s key challenges. We believe that Central Europe should take on more responsibility in the EU and NATO for issues ranging from defence, energy and the digital agenda to the continuation of the enlargement process in Europe’s neighbourhood.
Editorial Team Mário Nicolini, Milan Nič, Marian Majer, Milan Šuplata, Andrej Chovan
What Future for Visegrad Cooperation? Jiří Schneider A decade ago, the accession of the countries of Central Europe to the European Union engendered the most favourable circumstances for unleashing their potential through regional cooperation within the common European legal space. This created an unprecedented opportunity in the modern history of Central Europe. If we had no regional cooperation framework, we would have to invent it. That is why Visegrad cooperation (between the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) is here to stay. Make no mistake: Visegrad cooperation was not “a permanent waiting room for integration” imposed upon the candidates for Euro-Atlantic integration by the unwilling West – as many feared in the 90s. Nor was it just an expression of a wide coincidence of interests among its members – then Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. It was conceived in an effort to remove geopolitics from Central Europe – by the swift withdrawal of Soviet troops, by the dissolution of Comecon and the Warsaw Pact, and by anchoring the Visegrad countries institutionally in the West. The intention was to transform the region from a passive object to an active subject of European politics. Having joined NATO and the EU, the Visegrad countries (V4) have a shared interest in keeping them well-functioning and relevant. Central Europe is now enjoying the most favourable geopolitical circumstances it has ever had. It is no longer divided; it does not belong to the Soviet sphere of influence. Together with Germany – now united and democratic – the region is embedded in the West. Maintaining the post-Cold War status quo is clearly in the common interest not only of the 16
Visegrad countries, but of Central Europe more broadly. Is this enough? Or should the V4 aim higher? Some would like to see the Visegrad countries pursuing convergent or even identical policies within the EU. They seem to be surprised that, in reality, their national interests differ. The Czech, Hungarian, Slovak, and Polish governments often do not seek optimal results through cooperation, but compete for resources, attention or prestige (such as EU funds, infrastructure projects or foreign direct investment – FDI). Sometimes they exploit the historical, geographic and political differences rooted in deeper layers of each nation’s historical experience rather than the shared experience of communist regimes. Nevertheless, only superficial historicist analysis could claim that Visegrad cooperation is “fiction”. If it were just an “illusion”, why would the V4 governments use every opportunity to seek mutual endorsement in various agendas? Several reasons stand out. First, amplifying each nation’s voice through cooperation is the most effective way to gain attention and influence in Brussels. Second, the V4 has become an “established trademark” and in many agendas it works and delivers. Third, the V4 potentially strengthens the leverage of Central European states in coalition building within the EU (e.g. in negotiations on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020). Fourth, the V4 increases the visibility of contributions in specific policy areas (e.g. in defence – the V4 Battlegroup 2016 in the EU’s CSDP and regional cooperation in NATO). In recent decades, the V4 has matured into a multi-layer regional coop-
Visegrad cooperation has become an established format for consultation within the EU. Its future depends on whether its stakeholders are prepared to
eration scheme among various branches of government, complemented by a dense web of connections between stakeholders in the private and non-governmental sectors. It has developed solid foundations and is now a point of reference in Central Europe.
« avoid cycles of unrealistic expectations and complacency (taking the V4 for granted) and work on practical cooperation leading to concrete results;
This does not mean that high-level political cooperation in the V4 format should be taken for granted. Far from it! In order to maintain a cooperative political foundation in Central Europe, the V4 needs to
« steadily invest in mutual trust, partnership and a common sense of strategic direction.
« broaden its political base through parliamentary contacts – building a multi-party consensus within and between parliaments; « manage expectations – to ask of the V4 more than it could deliver would be a recipe for disillusionment and disappointment. Geographically, the Visegrad region forms a connection between the Baltic area and the Balkans. Its strategic importance has mounted as the North-South vector has become more important not only to Central Europe but to the whole belt of “Eastern frontline” states from Estonia to Bulgaria. North-South energy and transport infrastructure connections strengthen the whole EU’s competitiveness and resilience to external shocks. Within Central Europe, connecting people and societies through vibrant institutional and market infrastructure is even more important than connecting via roads and grids. All this has already been on the V4 agenda for some time. The Visegrad states should remain inclusive in dealing with regional (V4+) and global partners (e.g. cooperation on specific projects between the International Visegrad Fund and third countries) while not confusing their distinctive brand with other regional cooperation formats. Regarding the EU’s policy towards its Eastern neighbours and Russia, the V4 and other Central European countries should « stick to their agreed positions in terms of Russia’s behaviour towards its neighbours and its energy policy;
Jiří Schneider is Senior Fellow and Director of Special Projects at the Prague Security Studies Institute (PSSI). He is also a member of the Central European Strategy Council’s International Advisory Board.
« maintain EU unity and avoid a ‘beauty contest’ in relations with Russia.
Central European Policy Institute
Klariská 14, 811 03 Bratislava, Slovak Republic | +421254410609 info@cepolicy.org | www.cepolicy.org | www.globsec.org
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POLICY PAPER GLOBSEC Policy Papers The series of GLOBSEC Policy Papers aims to stimulate debate at the Forum by presenting fresh perspectives and concrete policy recommendations, while also promoting public discussion and diplomacy.
About CEPI The Central European Policy Institute, member of the Strategy Council, is a Bratislava-based regional think tank, which links top research institutions and experts from across Central Europe. CEPI is devoted to improving the quality of the region’s contributions to European and transatlantic debates on today’s key challenges. We believe that Central Europe should take on more responsibility in the EU and NATO for issues ranging from defence, energy and the digital agenda to the continuation of the enlargement process in Europe’s neighbourhood.
Editorial Team Mário Nicolini, Milan Nič, Marian Majer, Milan Šuplata, Andrej Chovan This paper is part of a series of activities by the Central European Strategy Council whose aim is to contribute to a positive change in public perceptions of NATO and the European Union, while at the same time increasing the resilience of society against discourse that undermines the anchoring of our nations in the family of liberal democracies. We do this by promoting open debate, objective information, institution building and civic activism.
From Wales to Warsaw: NATO’s Radically Adapted Posture – or Lost in Between? Dániel Bartha, Jakub Kufčák, Marian Majer, Mário Nicolini One year before NATO meets at its next summit in Warsaw is a good moment to take stock of the Alliance’s adaptation to a dramatically altered security environment. Last September in Wales, NATO leaders agreed a number of concrete measures aimed at strengthening collective defence and deterrence. In reality, however, as time passes, NATO seems to be getting back to its old routines and the Wales commitments are slowly being pushed to the backburner. This is shocking, given that Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine continues unabated. Most Western European forecasters still consider President Putin’s behaviour as a temporary spell of bad weather rather than climate change.
A unifying threat? Western unity on Russia, trumpeted around the Wales Summit, has in fact never existed. While it is true that the Wales initiatives continue to command broad support among Allies, and that a handful of nations have indeed acted on the gravity of the Russian threat, a substantial number of others continue to preoccupy themselves with different issues. The recent decision to start planning for a new EU naval mission in the Mediterranean to stem the ongoing refugee crisis, coupled with existing engagements in the anti-ISIS coalition, is likely to result in South European NATO members focusing almost solely on this dimension. These and other new security commitments are likely to further decrease the credibility of NATO’s measures.
A Rather Adequate Posture? While solidarity persists on maintaining sanctions against Russia, serious questions remain as to whether the same principle also applies to the deployment and development of defence capabilities. The backbone of the Alliance’s response is the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) which
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has been communicated as the most extensive transformation of the Alliance’s posture since the end of the Cold War. While NATO’s military advantage over Russia is clear in the aggregate, the RAP does not seem to sufficiently address the conventional military advantage Russia continues to enjoy over its smaller neighbours. The RAP-mandated persistent, or “rotating”, presence of NATO troops on the territory of its Eastern members, combined with the creation of a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) and the setting up of NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs), have so far failed to reassure NATO’s Eastern members. Taken together, the RAP does raise the political and military costs for any potential aggressor and does bring benefits in terms of flexible response in both strategic directions – South and East. But the question of an adequate posture, in particular relating to the rapidity of NATO’s response, remains unanswered. Indeed, Russian snap exercises in the Western region have shown that within 24 hours’ notice, Russia can muster anywhere between 65,000 and 155,000 troops, a capability that seriously impressed NATO commanders. The current context puts additional pressure on countries such as Germany which have been wary of approving the permanent basing of NATO troops on the territory of its Eastern members, pointing towards pledges to this effect in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. Therefore, the Warsaw summit will have first and foremost to tackle these intertwined issues. Have we come to the point where maintaining the moral high ground starts jeopardising our security?
Defence budgets Unfortunately, an interim assessment of budgetary trends suggests that the promises on defence spending made in Wales have slim chances of being honoured. Only Estonia, among European Allies, will meet the 2%
Facilitate regional cooperation and Smart Defence to support the measures. « Approve the permanent basing of multinational NATO forces on the territory of NATO’s Eastern members, e.g. by creating a “trip-wire” force in the region. Based on the concept that the current security situation was not foreseeable in 1997 and therefore this does not constitute a violation of the Founding Act. « Consider increasing the size of the Spearhead Force and the number of NFIUs, including the option of setting up force integration elements in every frontline state. « Ensure that NATO nations have the full range of defensive capabilities in the collective inventory they can draw on for the entire spectrum of conflict, in particular for all-out war if such a conflict is initiated by Russia. « Boost capacity to identify and counter Russia-instigated hybrid warfare in NATO’s most exposed areas, focusing on the Baltics, especially through targeted exercises involving the North Atlantic Council. Set up a Centre of Excellence for Hybrid Warfare based in Germany. « NATO members of the EU should spearhead the Union’s adaptation to hybrid warfare and promote NATO-EU synergies in this field. « Invest substantially in strategic communications; develop and confidently communicate narratives for the European project and the transatlantic community based on truth, values, achievement and vision. « Ramp up bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation with Ukraine, including the provision of lethal weaponry as needed. « Deepen integration of nations such as Finland and Sweden in all aspects of NATO planning. Initiate discussions on their potential membership as soon as these nations express an interest in doing so. « Invite Montenegro for membership by the Warsaw summit and reconfirm the Euro-Atlantic perspective for Ukraine and Georgia.
of GDP target in 2015, while the rest of the member states more or less gave up on this “benchmark”. Defence expenditure did increase in Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway and Romania – the leading responders to the Russian threat. In contrast, Canada, the United Kingdom, Italy and – most importantly – Germany, significantly reduced their military budgets. The latter trend is also apparent in Central Europe, particularly in Hungary and Bulgaria, creating a negative balance overall within NATO and raising further doubts in the United States about Europe’s willingness to defend itself.
Hybrid war The authors of this paper believe that pulling the carpet from under NATO’s collective defense pledge is President Putin’s end-game. NATO’s planning must be attuned to the nature of the threat. President Putin knows that direct military confrontation with NATO could be suicidal. He also knows the particular vulnerability of NATO in the Baltics which is due to insufficient strategic depth but also to the large Russian minorities in the region. After two decades of waging asymmetric “operations other than war” far from NATO territory, today’s motto may well be “in area or out of business”. Accordingly, NATO must plan and exercise for scenarios of hybrid war, starting with the most difficult bit – reaching political consensus. This must not remain a Brussels-based exercise, as it relies heavily on NATO nations. The conflict may go through several stages before reaching the threshold of military action and Article 5. Early warning and a political decision by national authorities that the nation is at war will be crucial. If the behaviour of some leaders in Central Europe vis-a-vis Russia provides any indication, this in itself may be a daunting task, especially when coupled with the public’s generalised obliviousness to security issues.
Partnerships and civ-mil synergies The prospect of hybrid warfare, where internal vulnerabilities come to the fore, adds urgency to inter-agency collaboration at home and inter-institutional cooperation at the international level. In fact, it has warranted complete strategic reviews in several NATO nations of the concept of security as such. NATO has included civilian input into long-term capability development, but has limited tools as regards police, intelligence and other civilian agencies’ operational cooperation. NATO will have to draw up new strategies in Warsaw, which should include a bolder approach to partnership, outreach and enlargement. Covering these issues is beyond the remit of this paper. However, it is clear that NATO’s productive relations with countries ranging from Scandinavia to the Balkans, including their deeper integration into NATO’s plans and operations, will condition not only these nations’ security, but also the Alliance’s ability to provide for the security of its members and the entire Euro-Atlantic area.
The Alliance has to speed up its adaptation to the new strategic environment. NATO must, above all, be seen as having started implementing all commitments from Wales well before the Warsaw summit. Only then should the presidents and prime ministers bring fresh impulses and task further measures to complete NATO’s transformation to a new age of confrontation; an age in which fast action and public impact will be decisive. Two years of slow discussions and incremental implementation between Wales and Warsaw will have contributed little to NATO’s deterrence. Losing time is losing credibility. A weak Russia could still deal a fatal blow to a strong NATO.
Recommendations
Dániel Bartha is the Executive Director of the Centre for Euro-Atlantic Integration and Democracy, Budapest; Jakub Kufčák is a Research Fellow of the Association for International Affairs, Prague; Marian Majer is the Head of the Security and Defence Programme at the Central European Policy Institute, Bratislava; Mário Nicolini is an Advisor at the Central European Strategy Council, Bratislava.
« Start fulfilling pledges on increased defence investment and modernisation. « Implement the Readiness Action Plan, including by better communicating these measures to publics and parliaments.
Central European Policy Institute
Klariská 14, 811 03 Bratislava, Slovak Republic | +421254410609 info@cepolicy.org | www.cepolicy.org | www.globsec.org
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POLICY PAPER GLOBSEC Policy Papers The series of GLOBSEC Policy Papers aims to stimulate debate at the Forum by presenting fresh perspectives and concrete policy recommendations, while also promoting public discussion and diplomacy.
About CEPI The Central European Policy Institute, member of the Strategy Council, is a Bratislava-based regional think tank, which links top research institutions and experts from across Central Europe. CEPI is devoted to improving the quality of the region’s contributions to European and transatlantic debates on today’s key challenges. We believe that Central Europe should take on more responsibility in the EU and NATO for issues ranging from defence, energy and the digital agenda to the continuation of the enlargement process in Europe’s neighbourhood.
Editorial Team Mário Nicolini, Milan Nič, Marian Majer, Milan Šuplata, Andrej Chovan
NATO’s Response to ISIL: Containing the Salafist Impulse Selim Koru
Over the past few years the self-proclaimed “Islamic State” (hereinafter “ISIL”) has erupted onto the international scene. It adheres to the Salafi tradition of Sunni Islam, a literalist interpretation with practices considered extreme for the standards of modern society, committing acts such as slavery or the mutilation of criminals. As NATO leaders assemble a global coalition to defeat the group, the biggest obstacle it faces may not be ISIL fighters themselves, but regional rivalries.
The Salafi Art of Making Enemies The forces assembling against ISIL are not the first to fight expansionist Salafist militants. When the Ottoman Empire was weakening in the 19th century, a Salafist insurrection began to raid villages in Arabia. Like ISIL fighters today, the socalled Ikhwan (no relation to the Egyptian group of the same name) killed on the pretext that anyone not of the Salafist creed was non-Muslim, and hence their “life and property was halal (religiously forfeit)”. The group took over large swaths of Arabia, including the Holy City of Mecca in 1803. The worst of the violence was reserved for Shia settlements in Iraq, where they massacred women and children and destroyed shrines. The Ottoman regime quashed the rebellion in 1812 and publicly executed its leader in Istanbul. The movement resurfaced when in 1914, the “Sick Man of Europe” went into war on the side of Germany. The Allies found that supporting the Salafist tribes was a good way of pulling the Arab Peninsula from under the Empire’s feet. Abdulaziz Ibn Saud, the group’s leader at
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the time, rose to power on the back of a newly formed Ikhwan. However, his elite soldiers soon objected to the corrupting influence of oil wealth and launched a rebellion against their ruler. Ibn Saud fought them in a bloody civil war, and eventually cut them down with machine guns he obtained from European allies. His country, Saudi Arabia, has since become a luxurious petrostate. ISIL is the ideological descendent of the Ikhwan, the sword of Salafism. It is made up of a core of ruthlessly pragmatic operatives - many of them former Iraqi Baathist soldiers - who have more than a decade of insurgency experience under their belts. Unlike previous Salafi organisations such as al-Qaeda, ISIL captures and holds territory. This however has been problematic for ISIL, just as it was for the Ikhwan, as both groups’ unique mixture of biblical brutality and accusing other Muslims of apostasy makes them deeply unpopular with their neighbours and subjects. Yet ISIL is more powerful than its previous incarnations. The group has now taken control of the majority of Syria and Iraq and established its capital in Raqqa. It bears all the hallmarks of a state, with its own economic policy, judiciary, healthcare service and propaganda machine. It collects taxes and sells oil, as well as whatever historical artifacts it does not demolish. Furthermore, unlike their regional counterparts, ISIL soldiers are well paid and receive periodic leave to be with their families. NATO should be concerned about the long-term threat of ISIL. The group frequently makes statements suggesting that it will turn towards enemies abroad once it has consolidated its hold over its
tailed step-by-step programme, made public and with as wide a backing as possible, including from Iran. Though this will not entirely settle the proxy-war surrounding ISIL dominated regions, it will partially channel it from conflict into diplomacy.
chosen territories in Syria and Iraq. Its wide network of international fighters and experienced insurgents means that it has most likely the capability to launch lethal assaults on major soft targets in the West, most of all Turkey, with which it shares a wide and relatively unpoliced border.
The Response
«
The Global Coalition to Counter ISIL was formed in late 2014 and has more than 60 members, 9 of whom are NATO countries. So far, the group has primarily engaged ISIL from the air, with limited support missions on land. Much of the remaining efforts have gone into training and equipping local forces as well as humanitarian aid. The Coalition is in principle a global effort that derives its legitimacy from international human rights. In practice however, it is a deal between the NATO-led West and Middle Eastern countries. The West promises to do the heavy lifting, while the regional Muslim-majority countries lend it political legitimacy. This is why despite significant contributions from countries including Jordan and Saudi Arabia, the US-led NATO effort still carries out by far the largest number of strikes and undertakes the most strategic missions. The matter is complicated by the presence of a third front: Iran. The Islamic Republic supports Shia militias in Iraq, as well as the Assad regime and Hezbollah in Syria. This increasingly makes the fight into a rivalry between Sunni and Shia-majority countries for control of the region now occupied by ISIL. This is why some members of the Coalition, most notably Saudi Arabia, see the fight against ISIL as a secondary priority. The effects of such incoherence have been felt strongly in the Coalition’s Iraq policy. While the US is buttressing the government in Baghdad, the Saudis see it as an Iranian puppet regime, and would see it weakened. The NATO core of the Coalition therefore faces a dilemma. On the one hand, the Alliance wants local actors to take ultimate responsibility for the destruction of ISIL. It is aware that current disorder in Syria and Iraq are partly the result of imperialist designs a century ago, and does not want to expose itself to the same responsibility. On the other hand, NATO does not want the fight to develop into a proxy conflict between Sunni and Shia powers, since this would have disastrous consequences for regional stability.
Developing a rehabilitation programme. In order to avoid future sectarian violence, the region will need to find a way to re-integrate fighters from all sides of today’s conflict. NATO should work with regional actors of various religious sects to develop a programme to this end. Turkey, a long-time member state known for its moderate strand of Sunni Islam, could be a valuable asset in this task.
Meanwhile, NATO must fulfill its core responsibility of safeguarding its citizens. It can do so using the principles of containment: «
Deterrence. NATO should make clear through its actions and rhetoric that any attacks on members will result in painful retaliation against ISIL. Considering ISIL’s history of strategic decision making, this method will most likely protect soft targets in NATO members from terrorist attacks.
« Territorial Containment. The alliance must work with ISIL’s surrounding countries to seal their borders as much as possible. This has been done fairly efficiently on the Syria-Jordan border, but less so on ISIL’s northern frontier with Turkey. NATO should maintain pressure on the fringes of ISIL territory by continuing to arm and train friendly local forces. As continually emphasised by General John Allen, US envoy to the anti-ISIL coalition, the fight against ISIL is a multifaceted struggle. The group will not be truly defeated until the idea of violent Salafism has been discredited, a task that falls primarily on the shoulders of countries surrounding the territory in question. NATO can help by focusing this effort and steering it away from regional rivalries. In the meantime, NATO should focus on containing ISIL’s offensive actions to ensure the safety of its members.
Recommendations The problem in the fight against ISIL is not the motivation of countries to fight the group, but to have them to do so via a common approach. The Coalition can do so by:
Selim Koru is a Research Associate at the Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey (TEPAV). His paper represents a contribution by the GLOBSEC Young Leaders’ Forum (GYLF) to the discussions at the GLOBSEC Forum.
« Preparing a post-ISIL plan. This should be a de-
Central European Policy Institute
Klariská 14, 811 03 Bratislava, Slovak Republic | +421254410609 info@cepolicy.org | www.cepolicy.org | www.globsec.org
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POLICY PAPER GLOBSEC Policy Papers The series of GLOBSEC Policy Papers aims to stimulate debate at the Forum by presenting fresh perspectives and concrete policy recommendations, while also promoting public discussion and diplomacy.
About CEPI The Central European Policy Institute, member of the Strategy Council, is a Bratislava-based regional think tank, which links top research institutions and experts from across Central Europe. CEPI is devoted to improving the quality of the region’s contributions to European and transatlantic debates on today’s key challenges. We believe that Central Europe should take on more responsibility in the EU and NATO for issues ranging from defence, energy and the digital agenda to the continuation of the enlargement process in Europe’s neighbourhood.
Editorial Team Mário Nicolini, Milan Nič, Marian Majer, Milan Šuplata, Andrej Chovan
EU Energy Union: A Firm Anchor for Future Storms Karel Hirman
The presented concept of the EU’s Energy Union is a logical continuation of the trends established by the adoption and implementation of the European Commission’s three energy legislation packages. These have enabled the EU to initiate a process of liberalisation and demonopolisation, eliminating or at least restraining the traditional national monopolies, and have created conditions for technical and commercial linkages between the energy systems of individual states and regions within the EU. This legislation introduces transparency into the transport, distribution and trading of energies. Deepening of the integration of energy markets within the EU must form the main and enduring priority of the Energy Union. The most concrete indicators of the Energy Union’s benefits will come in the near future with new and functional interconnections between energy infrastructures. The process of integrating internal markets takes place in the context of the EU’s increasing dependence on the import of primary energy resources. The turbulent international developments of the last decade have had a notable impact upon energy security. This vulnerability, accompanied by unstable fossil fuel prices, can be experienced by citizens and firms across the EU. Together with climate change, this represents a common challenge for the Union as a whole, for all industrial sectors and for all its citizens. 22
If the EU, which is the largest single market in the world, intends to secure sufficient energy resources in order to avoid being politically and economically held to ransom, then joint action on real measures is required. When presenting the concept of the Energy Union, the Slovak as well as the European media have predominantly focused on gas. This is logical given the continued gas crisis and tensions to which the Union has been exposed as a result of the actions of one of its key suppliers. The end of the EU’s strategic partnership with Russia, in which energy was meant to be the core, represents another reason why the establishment of the Energy Union should be accelerated. It is in regards to gas that this factor has played a particular role. The Russian producer has de facto forced its customers to make a decision: if Europe wants to at least maintain the current share of gas in its energy mix, it needs to act fast to find other reliable suppliers, establish new routes and import capacities, and interconnect the existing networks. A good example of this can be the proposal by the Slovak operator Eustream concerning the construction of a gas pipeline entitled Eastring which would very effectively connect the Balkan markets to the Central and North-Western part of the EU. For all customers from these parts of the EU, this would represent a realistic transportation route connecting gas supplies from the North Sea and
Russia, gas deliveries coming from the Caspian, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, and the LNG terminals located on the coast of these seas. Simultaneously, this would also strengthen the connection between Ukraine’s gas pipelines with those of the EU. With regard to the enduring crisis of gas supplies as well as the vulnerability of many countries and regions, it would be appropriate to consider the adoption of mechanisms that have been successfully used for decades as a tool for the emergency management and storage of oil and oil products. The proposal contained in the Energy Union package for the central control of contracts on gas purchases provoked substantial debate. If this should (in any form) materialise, the focus should be on promoting greater activity and stronger jurisdiction of the EU regulator, ACER, and anti-trust bodies. The same rules should also be applied to other energy commodities and to the development of energy facilities whose significance in terms of production or security extends the boundaries of member states. This concerns mainly the infrastructure for the import of energy related raw materials and the development of nuclear facilities. Without any doubt, one of the main tools that can help Europeans to face security and climate challenges in energy, is a greater and more efficient use of renewable energy resources. Nevertheless, before making any further investments into renewables, the Union should learn from its past mistakes. The reason why the use of renewables has run into severe problems in many EU countries lies in the lack of advanced technologies not only for efficient production, but also for the transportation and storage of electricity. In Slovakia and several other countries, the use of renewables has proven to be particularly efficient and economically interesting for the customer in central heating systems in towns and villages. The utilisation of biomass made from local wood and agricultural products for a combined production of heat and electric energy is often competitive even without the application of specific grant schemes, and in doing so delivers heat that is cheaper than that created from traditional fossil fuels. In this regard it is important to emphasise that however well the strategic frameworks may be formulated on the EU level, bad decisions and opportunistic implementation by national governments and regulators can limit or even counter their positive effects. The current support system for the production of electricity
from renewables that exists in many member states represents a negative example. To successfully deal with the challenges associated with the EU’s growing dependence on fossil fuels, a diversification of suppliers and routes, or a greater control of contracts will not be of much assistance if applied in isolation. These are defensive measures that can only mitigate or delay the real impact of threats. Although they are unavoidable and essential right at this point in time, they cannot represent viable long-term solutions. Even in the short-run, it seems necessary to simultaneously supplement them with economically sustainable measures focused on efficiency and savings. In this area, the entire EU (including Slovakia) has much to improve even when it comes to already accessible technological solutions. The often-cited thesis that the cheapest energy is the energy that does not have to be produced is not completely true, because the costs of achieving such savings are not always reasonable. Nevertheless, if Europe wants to plan energy resources that would last for decades, it needs to address saving measures along the same time frame. Only then will we be able to gain an unbiased perspective of what is truly necessary, economically justifiable and beneficial. It is probable that we find ourselves at the beginning of the end of the fossil fuels era. The energy sector will have to deal with the kind of changes that the telecommunications sector has been undergoing in recent decades. This will involve and require innovation and massive investment. The EU Energy Union’s main task will be to lead the EU member states, but also its neighbours and suppliers, through this complex period of transition. We cannot expose our energy sector and its customers – firms and households – to experiments that take away our jobs, worsen our living standards and weaken our security, and in the end fail to have a lasting positive impact on the environment. It will be much easier for European nations to face these challenges collectively within the Union than to look for solutions individually or at the expense of others.
Karel Hirman is an energy analyst based in Košice, Slovakia. This paper was published in partnership with CEPI’s newly launched Energy Programme. Central European Policy Institute
Klariská 14, 811 03 Bratislava, Slovak Republic | +421254410609 info@cepolicy.org | www.cepolicy.org | www.globsec.org
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POLICY PAPER GLOBSEC Policy Papers The series of GLOBSEC Policy Papers aims to stimulate debate at the Forum by presenting fresh perspectives and concrete policy recommendations, while also promoting public discussion and diplomacy.
About CEPI The Central European Policy Institute, member of the Strategy Council, is a Bratislava-based regional think tank, which links top research institutions and experts from across Central Europe. CEPI is devoted to improving the quality of the region’s contributions to European and transatlantic debates on today’s key challenges. We believe that Central Europe should take on more responsibility in the EU and NATO for issues ranging from defence, energy and the digital agenda to the continuation of the enlargement process in Europe’s neighbourhood.
Editorial Team Mário Nicolini, Milan Nič, Marian Majer, Milan Šuplata, Andrej Chovan
The Problems Foreign Powers Find in the Balkans Stratfor Regional and world powers have paid an inordinate amount of attention to Balkan countries lately. Western governments have two major goals in the Balkans: to maintain stability in the western part of the region and to minimize Russian influence. To that end, the United States and the European Union have been involved in the internal politics of the Balkans since NATO committed troops in the aftermath of the Bosnian war and the conflict in Kosovo in the 1990s. The European Union has used considerable amounts of resources and political capital to bring reform and economic development to the region, but with mixed results. The West has the advantage of access to ample development and defense funds that can be divided out among countries hungry for economic growth. Countries such as Serbia and Macedonia are unlikely to join the European Union in the next decade; they are held back by internal divisions and face resistance from current EU members. Yet they still have access to the economic benefits that come from close ties with Europe. Between 2014 and 2020, the European Union plans to grant 1.5 billion euros (around $1.7 billion) to Serbia, a prospective EU member, and 11.4 billion euros to Bulgaria, a current EU member. In addition, there is significant defense assistance coming into Bulgaria as part of an effort to strengthen NATO members along the Russian borderlands. The Ukraine crisis galvanized the United States into boosting defenses along NATO’s eastern edge. NATO has enlarged its multinational response force, created a new spearhead force that can mobilize quickly and established a chain of outposts in the eastern Balkans called force integration units, which could serve as command centers during a conflict. At the same time, fighting in Ukraine prompted the European Union to prioritize its Southern Corridor natural gas project, which would bypass Russian energy giant Gazprom in the European energy market and reduce Europe’s reliance on Russia. In addition, the West strongly discouraged Bulgaria from participating in Russia’s South Stream project.
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Russia Counters the West For its part, Russia has used its influence in the Balkans, where it has close historical and cultural ties with countries such as Serbia and Greece, to threaten Western interests. However, the Kremlin’s interest in the region in the past year stems in large part from its deteriorating relationship with the West. Russia’s goal in the Balkans is to prevent the expansion of Western troops and military infrastructure in the region while maintaining sufficient strength to implement strategic energy infrastructure projects. Although the West has greater resources to invest in the Balkans, Russia owns several regional energy assets and holds a number of outstanding loans to Balkan governments. In 2008, Gazprom bought a majority stake in Serbian oil firm NIS. Like the European Union, Russia has provided funding to Serbia – about $1.5 billion in over the past two years. The Kremlin also sealed energy and loan deals with the Republika Srpska, the ethnic Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Western pressure may have ended the South Stream project, but the pipeline Russia plans to build in its place, Turkish Stream, could help Gazprom counter European energy diversification efforts. The pipeline would bring natural gas across the Black Sea to the Turkey-Greek border. To help Gazprom reach Central European markets, Russia has advocated the construction of a pipeline that would run from Greece to Macedonia, Serbia and Hungary. In addition to Turkey, these four countries are at the center of a Russian diplomatic offensive. Nevertheless, with Russia struggling to manage internal financial and political challenges, its leverage in the Balkans is relatively limited.
Turkish Interests Turkey has its own cultural links and economic interests in the Balkans, but it currently lacks the resources and military power to rival Russia or the West. One of Turkey’s strategic objectives is to maintain influence in the Black Sea. This objective
entails managing relations with other Black Sea states in the Balkans. But Turkey is also attempting to grow closer to Bosnia-Herzegovina through cultural and historical ties. These connections are important: Muslim Bosniaks started migrating to Turkey in the 17th century, and a few million Turkish citizens claim Bosniak roots today. This ethnic affinity has prompted popular government initiatives to invest in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Turkey cannot match the level of financial investment Western powers and Russia commit to the Balkans. But as the gatekeeper to the Black Sea and as a NATO member, Turkey plays a significant role in Bulgarian and Romanian efforts to boost defense cooperation in response to the crisis in Ukraine. Moreover, Turkey has been able to use financial and political tools to curry favor with Bosnia. Turkish officials claim that Turkey has invested $1.1 billion in Bosnia since 1995 – a significant sum for a country with a gross domestic product of about $18 billion. The Turkish Stream pipeline, if built, would no doubt empower Turkey. Ankara would play a central role in its construction, and it would use that role to improve its relationships with countries that would receive Turkish Stream natural gas, including Macedonia and Serbia.
Violence in Macedonia Despite the attention they command from larger powers, the Balkans are often unstable, and their instability can impede the influence of foreign powers. For example, deadly violence erupted in Macedonia on May 9, when Interior Ministry personnel cracked down on alleged ethnic Albanian militants in Kumanovo. The Macedonian government argued that its operation in the town was to prevent militants from carrying out planned terror attacks inside the country. However, the timing of the operation led many to believe the crackdown was politically motivated – a distraction that could divert attention from a recently discovered illegal government wiretapping program. The bloodshed in Kumanovo, coupled with revelations of the illegal acquisition of information of citizens, further undermines the credibility of a government that is already distrusted by its people. On May 17, tens of thousands of protesters gathered in Macedonia’s capital city, Skopje. Western-sponsored talks the following day failed to bring about a compromise between the government and opposition parties, and the government’s hold on power remains tenuous. Russia is counting on running its extension of Turkish Stream through Macedonia into Central Europe, but the country’s instability threatens to derail these plans at a time when countries along alternative routes are not receptive to Russian proposals. The incumbent Bulgarian government, under pressure from the United States and the European Union, is opposed to participation in a Russia-led energy project, while Albania retains a pro-Western foreign policy orientation. With so much at stake, the Russian Foreign Ministry came out forcefully in support of the Macedonian government in response to the protests. Macedonia’s incumbent government is nominally in favor of NATO and EU accession but has been open to Russia’s Turkish Stream proposals. A weak government, as well as growing instability in Macedonia, is preventing the country from becoming a staunch Western ally or a reliable partner for Russia.
A Broader Regional Challenge Clashes in Macedonia raise the specter of renewed ethnic tension and violence in the Balkans, where political borders do not coincide with ethnic boundaries. Since 1999, Western governments have worked to stabilize Kosovo and the surrounding area through the presence of peacekeepers and large-scale development programs. Brussels is also pressuring Serbia to normalize relations with Kosovo as a precondition for EU accession. A potential increase in militancy along the Kosovo-Macedonia border would threaten this stability and undermine the West’s long-standing efforts in the region. Ultimately, no matter how much time and external political power is invested in the Balkans, success depends on the presence of strong, stable governance. But Balkan governments are notoriously weak. In Bulgaria, social unrest in 2013 forced the government to resign. Since then, the country has gone through several weak, short-lived governments that have been beset by internal disputes. Meanwhile in Bosnia-Herzegovina, political paralysis has prevented the introduction of much-needed economic and political reform. Protests over corruption in 2014 highlighted the Bosnian political system’s inability to address the country’s inherent problems. The tumult of Balkan politics enables foreign powers to make certain inroads, boosting their influence through financial and political support for local governments. But the fragility of Balkan states prevents them from swinging decisively toward one outside power. Like other nations in Europe’s borderlands, many of the Balkan countries have attempted to retain a degree of neutrality. A balancing strategy means that Balkan governments can access advantageous economic agreements, financial assistance packages and political support from multiple external powers. Geopolitical rivalries and local disputes in the region have historically formed an explosive combination, fueling military conflicts like World War I as well as numerous Balkan armed struggles. Today, a more nuanced competition is taking place as foreign powers use economic influence, defense cooperation, and political support to further their goals in the region. The conflict in Macedonia – and the potential it has to upset Russia’s plans in the region – embodies the problems foreign powers find in the Balkans. While the West, Russia and Turkey are all eager to pump capital into the region for their own betterment, weak governments will continue balancing among outside powers.
Stratfor, a geopolitical intelligence firm that provides strategic analysis and forecasting to individuals and organizations around the world, is a partner of the GLOBSEC 2015 Bratislava Global Security Forum. This paper summarizes the main points of a larger study published by Stratfor.
Central European Policy Institute
Klariská 14, 811 03 Bratislava, Slovak Republic | +421254410609 info@cepolicy.org | www.cepolicy.org | www.globsec.org
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POLICY PAPER GLOBSEC Policy Papers The series of GLOBSEC Policy Papers aims to stimulate debate at the Forum by presenting fresh perspectives and concrete policy recommendations, while also promoting public discussion and diplomacy.
About CEPI The Central European Policy Institute, member of the Strategy Council, is a Bratislava-based regional think tank, which links top research institutions and experts from across Central Europe. CEPI is devoted to improving the quality of the region’s contributions to European and transatlantic debates on today’s key challenges. We believe that Central Europe should take on more responsibility in the EU and NATO for issues ranging from defence, energy and the digital agenda to the continuation of the enlargement process in Europe’s neighbourhood.
Editorial Team Mário Nicolini, Milan Nič, Marian Majer, Milan Šuplata, Andrej Chovan
Four Priorities for the Visegrad Four’s Digital Agenda Dániel Bartha, Milan Nič, Maria Staszkiewicz, Milan Zubíček, Marian Majer The Digital Single Market (DSM) strategy introduced in early May 2015 is one of the most important elements of the Juncker Commission’s program. It recognizes the fact that the internet is now a key driver of economic growth and a platform for innovation. The transition to a digital economy is believed to be paramount in pushing Europe further along the path of economic recovery, fiscal stability and growth. In a global marketplace, the Visegrad Group countries – the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia – are very small markets. But taken together, they present an interesting, underdeveloped market of over 65 million customers in four countries whose digital economic potential is only starting to be exploited. In parallel to policymaking on the national level, the outgoing Slovak (2014 – 2015) and forthcoming Czech EU Presidencies (from 1 July 2015) have invested time and diplomatic capital into crafting a joint regional agenda on the digital economy. The V4 countries published their position paper on regional DSM priorities in March 2015. Before the European Commission came
out with the DSM package, our NGO consortium discussed regional aspects of the digital agenda with groups of stake-holders in Prague, Bratislava, and Budapest. Our Prague workshop on 26 April 2015 featured the State Secretaries for EU Affairs from the Slovakia and Czech Republic, Peter Javorčík and Tomáš Prouza, and discussed the state of play of regional dialogue and future prospects for joint action in the V4 digital agenda. This paper looks at what has been achieved so far, and proposes four priority areas that could benefit regional coordination: cross-border e-commerce, cybersecurity, e-learning and digital skills, and support for startups.
Development of cross-border e-commerce If EU countries are united in one question regarding the digital agenda, it is most likely the question of supporting cross-border e-commerce. The fragmentation of the market is the clear reason why the EU is lagging behind other markets. According to the Eurostat and the Digital Agenda Scoreboard of the
Czech Hungary Slovakia Poland EU28 Rep.value value value value value 2014 2014 2014 2014 2014 Households with broadband subscription(in % households) 76 74 76 71 78 Internet users going on-‐line weekly (in % of individ.) 76 75 76 63 75 Internet users on a daily basis (in % of individuals) 60 66 62 51 65 Individuals -‐ never used the internet (in % of individ.) 16 22 15 28 18 Mobile broadband take-‐up (Subscriptions /100 ppl) 62 32 57 81 67 Ordering goods or services online (in % of individuals) 43 32 48 34 50 Cross-‐border e-‐Commerce (in % of individuals) 7 8 20 4 15 Enterprises selling online-‐ Large enterprises(in % ) 43 27 25 30 35 Enterprises selling online -‐ SMEs (in % of enterprises) 26 10 11 9 15 Citizens’ use of eGov services (in % individ.) 37 49 57 27 47 Source: Eurostat and EC Digital Agenda Scoreboard. Green areas: above the EU average
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EC, the V4 is doing worse than the EU average as a result of numerous factors, including administrative barriers to doing business, the cost of administration in these rather small markets (except Poland), and higher delivery costs than in Western Europe. In our consultations, simplification of procedures on VAT registration among the V4 countries came out as an urgent issue to be dealt with. Adaptation of the mini-one-stop shop for VAT registration is not in itself enough to boost regional cross-border e-commerce on the V4 level. V4 governments should push for harmonising e-commerce rules on the EU level. This would not only help key companies from our region which already do business in other EU member states, but would also enable smaller ones to access larger EU markets.
The number of unfilled vacancies requiring digital skills is already high in the V4 states. The lack of an EU integrated strategy creates an opportunity to provide region-specific solutions, combining digital literacy with other problematic areas such as entrepreneurship or language skills. Special focus should also be devoted to promoting e-skills among public administration at all levels as well as teachers (primary, secondary and tertiary). V4 countries need to share best practices, publish comparative ratings and opening available data on education and e-skills.
Start-up support: The black sheep of DSM or the Holy Grail of Visegrad? While the Visegrad Group did most of its expert coordination work in this field in the past year, the EU Commission hardly mentions start-ups in the DSM strategy. This competence is left to the national level. According to many statements by V4 governments, the obstacles Visegrad countries would like to eliminate to support the growth of start-ups are rather general, such as administrative and legislative changes, or would be (more) useful for the whole digital economy, such as changes in VAT legislation (one-stop shop for VAT) or improving financing conditions. The recent Open letter of 15 EU Start-up associations to Commission VP Andrus Ansip mentions several areas needed for the V4 start-ups to be competitive, among them: consumer rights, data protection, copyright, tax and company law, including the introduction of a simple, single and online process for web-domain registration, paying VAT and managing small equity investments. The V4 governments recognized that access to international markets, support in marketing and PR can be effectively supported on the regional level. Their diplomats could help to create a V4-level internet economy and start-up entrepreneur platforms to represent region’s interest in Brussels. Finally, holding joint business events and international conferences presenting innovative companies from the V4 countries could attract new investors into this region.
Cyber security: The merits of regional cooperation Cyber threats are at the core of the current EU and NATO security debates. Both organizations are urging their members to reform their institutions to better protect them against cyber threats and to take part of the responsibility for an active cyber security policy. Although the V4 countries share similar strategic thinking and threat perceptions, their capabilities in cyber security differ significantly. While the Czech Republic and Poland have progressed substantially in last the modernisation efforts of recent years, Hungary has lost the momentum. In the case of Slovakia, a strategic debate on cyber security has only begun. Enhanced cooperation and coordination of approaches would enable to mitigate these differences and yield additional political significance for the whole Visegrad region. V4 countries could reinforce sharing data on cyber attacks, as well as the tools for revealing and tackling them. They could also increase coordination both in their participation in international cyber exercises, and in common production of lessons learned for jointly prepared strategies.
E-learning, digital skills in schools: what can we do in cooperation?
This paper was prepared as part of the “Creating a digital agenda for Visegrad” project funded by the International Visegrad Fund.
Although the DSM Strategy recognises the importance of developing digital skills, education is now provided either at the member state level or by private companies. The European Commission has not recommended a joint approach in the DSM Strategy, referring to the national responsibility for adapting curricula. If the EC commitment to supporting member states’ efforts is matched by financial instruments, the existing structures of regional cooperation can provide a real advantage for Visegrad cooperation.
Dániel Bartha is Director of the Centre for Euro-Atlantic Integration and Democracy, Budapest. Milan Nič is Director and Marian Majer is Head of Security and Defence Program at the Central European Policy Institute (CEPI), Bratislava. Maria Staszkiewicz is Deputy-Director and Milan Zubíček is Program Manager at the Aspen Institute Prague. Central European Policy Institute
Klariská 14, 811 03 Bratislava, Slovak Republic | +421254410609 info@cepolicy.org | www.cepolicy.org | www.globsec.org
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POLICY PAPER GLOBSEC Policy Papers The series of GLOBSEC Policy Papers aims to stimulate debate at the Forum by presenting fresh perspectives and concrete policy recommendations, while also promoting public discussion and diplomacy.
About CEPI The Central European Policy Institute, member of the Strategy Council, is a Bratislava-based regional think tank, which links top research institutions and experts from across Central Europe. CEPI is devoted to improving the quality of the region’s contributions to European and transatlantic debates on today’s key challenges. We believe that Central Europe should take on more responsibility in the EU and NATO for issues ranging from defence, energy and the digital agenda to the continuation of the enlargement process in Europe’s neighbourhood.
Editorial Team Mário Nicolini, Milan Nič, Marian Majer, Milan Šuplata, Andrej Chovan
Debunking Lies and Stopping Fakes: Lessons from the Frontline Yevhen Fedchenko For the Kremlin, propaganda has become an integral part of information warfare. Throughout the past decade the Russian propaganda machine has been structured and effectively implemented, reaching a climax during the occupation of Crimea and the subsequent devastating war in Eastern Ukraine. It started in 2005 with the creation of Russia Today (subsequently RT) and every year more “media” outlets are added to this global network. Almost every week another propaganda outlet, Sputnik International, opens a new bureau somewhere in the world, hiring qualified local journalists and producing radio and multimedia content in almost 30 languages. According to their website, “Sputnik points the way to a multipolar world that respects every country’s national interests, culture, history and traditions”. This is just one of the many examples of media outlet double-speak. In reality, their aim is to influence global public opinion, distort reality and act as a mouthpiece for the Kremlin. From the very beginning, Russia’s propaganda machine was designed to target a much wider audience than Ukraine or Russia’s other neighbours. The real aspiration is to achieve global media dominance. General Breedlove, NATO’s top commander in Europe, recently said that this “is not just about Ukraine. Russian activities are destabilising neighbouring states, and the region as a whole”. While he was referring primarily to the military aspect of the Russian-Ukrainian war, propaganda remains an integral part of this war, a global war of meanings, concepts, and values. Paul Goble suggested that our under-
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standing of national security must not be limited to military force. In this sense the Russian propaganda apparatus is a threat to global security. Not only does it distort reality to breed hatred and manipulate the political and historical context in Russia itself, setting it on an anti-Western course and inflaming warmongering attitudes towards Ukraine, but it is also used as a powerful weapon against core human values on a global scale. One of the central premises of the contemporary Russian agitprop is to deny that democracy in general, with free media or free elections, actually exists anywhere in the world. The core of the Kremlin’s propaganda, both inside and outside Russia, is a post-modernist denial of everything. The contemporary Russian propaganda system is often compared to that of the Soviets during the Cold War. Of course, it does borrow techniques from the KGB playbook; many terms are easily recognisable, from the “puppeteers from Washington” to “foreign agents”, yet it is fundamentally different. Ideology was a central element in the propaganda of the Soviet Union, which clashed against values-based counter-propaganda coming from the West. The central role played by the communist ideology ultimately made Soviet propaganda weak and ineffective; such ideological narratives only appealed to specific (left-leaning) political groups or countries. There is no new ideology contained in current Russian propaganda, because Russia does not have one ideology. Instead, it borrows a little from everything. In this way, the system can produce a large number of “small propagandas”, each of them targeting a specific audi-
ence. The more messages the better; this multiplies the confusion. To paraphrase Peter Pomerantsev, one could argue that the aim is not to provide a sole narrative, but to create clashes of narratives in order to confuse different audiences with different messages. Of course, one can easily identify some grand narratives: that Ukraine is a fascist state created by a corrupt US government that is killing their own people in Ferguson; that Ukraine is a collapsing state; or even that it is the US/NATO who are fighting in Ukraine – and that, of course, there are no Russian forces on the ground. As one browses the StopFake.org website, produced by a team at Kiev’s Mohyla School of Journalism, it is easy to identify a disproportionate number of absurd and utterly nonsensical “news” stories. One of the most noticeable fakes is that of a 3-year-old boy in Slaviansk who was allegedly crucified by Ukrainian soldiers. Produced by the government-owned ORT television for prime-time “news”, this outrageous lie was based on a single witness who, as it appeared later, had never visited the place and was also the wife of a former Ukrainian police officer who had changed his loyalty and deserted to Russia after the occupation of Crimea. This “crucifixion” plot can be traced back to WWI when it was first used, and to the Games of Thrones where it was referenced most recently. However, the most epitomic is the explanation as to why this story appeared on television at all. When confronted directly, the anchor Irada Zeynalova answered: “It’s not the journalists who should prove this event happened; it’s for all of you to prove that it did not happen”. StopFake.org has researched and debunked scores of other outlandish stories including “HIV dispersed by Ukrainian military jets over Donbas to punish the local population” (to encourage locals to flee the territory), “President Obama bans the use of balalaikas in the US until 2020” (to inflate anti-American sentiments among Russians) or “Two slaves and plot of land to Ukrainian soldiers fighting in Donbas” (to show the alleged barbarism of the Ukrainian army). Looking at them separately, and using an elementary level of critical thinking and media literacy (while not being subjected to constant propaganda bombardment from all sides), most people would find them amusing and not very newsworthy. However, this approach has proved to be effective. It is aimed at producing absurd stories based on belief not fact, rumors not knowledge, and then extensively multiplying them via television and social media. This makes the fabricated information popular (even viral), arguably very influential, and hard to debunk. It is particularly difficult to disparage conspiracy theories. The consumers of conspiracy are already inclined to believe that there can be no coincidence: someone is definitely behind the curtain, masterminding the realm of politics and the
media, war and peace, elections and trade. In this shady world, “Blame the Other” and “whataboutism” are substitutes for facts and rational decisions. This is what makes audiences happy with Russian propaganda and receptive to it. In many corners of the world, people are relieved to know that someone else can be blamed for their own problems. Exploiting irrational and delusional thinking – that is what truly sets contemporary Russian propaganda apart from its Soviet predecessor, and makes it so effective and dangerous.
Recommendations What can be done to limit the impact of Russian agitprop outlets? • Elevate global awareness of Russian propaganda and its consequences for different countries. • Understanding the manipulative nature of their reporting, policymakers and journalists should stop considering these media as serious and legitimate. • Outlets representing agitprop should be delegitimised and stripped of any journalistic rights and privileges, such as access to information, granting interviews, invitations to be part of debates and discussions, participation in professional media associations, reception of awards, etc. • National governments should carefully scrutinise these outlet’s access to new markets, licensing and financing of their activities. • A “Nemtsov List” should be implemented to include the so-called “journalists”, individuals who must bear personal responsibility for their reporting and face the imposition of travel bans, visa restrictions and personal sanctions affecting bank accounts and property abroad. “The problem of the Western media is that it chooses fairness over truth,” observed Edward Lucas. It should finally become clear that, far from representing a “second opinion”, the Kremlin’s propaganda outlets have rudely hijacked one of modern journalism’s sacred concepts in order to exploit it to their own benefit.
Yevhen Fedchenko is Director of the Mohyla School of Journalism in Kyiv, Ukraine, and Co-Founder of the verification website StopFake.org. @StopFakingNews @yevhenfedchenko Central European Policy Institute
Klariská 14, 811 03 Bratislava, Slovak Republic | +421254410609 info@cepolicy.org | www.cepolicy.org | www.globsec.org
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