An introduction to metacognition by smfleming

An introduction to metacognition

Steve Fleming Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, UCL stephen.fleming@ucl.ac.uk

metacoglab.org

Outline of the course 1. Introduction to metacognition: theory and measurement

2. Origins of metacognition in evolution and development

3. Neural architecture of metacognition

4. Functional roles of metacognition in behavioural control (Rouault)

Being aware of being aware? “Being aware of being aware of being… In other words, if I not only know that I am, but also know that I know it, then I belong to the human species. All the rest follows - the glory of thought, poetry, a vision of the universe. In that respect the gap between ape and man is immeasurably greater than one between amoeba and ape.” Vladimir Nabokov, Strong Opinions “In an important sense, consciousness is knowing that you know while you know” Thomas Metzinger, The Ego Tunnel

Know thyself

â&#x20AC;&#x153;I am not yet able, as the Delphic inscription has it, to know myself; so it seems to me ridiculous, when I do not yet know that, to investigate irrelevant things." (Plato, Phaedrus)

Defining metacognition

• “cognition about cognitive phenomena...” (Flavell, 1979)

• “Metacognition research concerns the processes by which people self-reflect on their own cognitive and memory processes (monitoring) and how they put their metaknowledge to use in regulating their information processing and behaviour (control)” (Koriat, 2007)

Monitoring / introspection “Meta-level” cognition Metacognition Language

Decisionmaking

Metacognition Memory

Perception

Emotion

Control

= reflecting on and controlling other cognitive processes

“Object-level” cognition

Nelson & Narens (1990)

Daily examples of metacognition Will I be able to learn this topic? How confident am I in my decision? I canâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t remember it now, but I know it when I see it Iâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;m driving too fast, I feel out of control Did I really speak to my wife last night or was I dreaming?

Functional role of metacognition in control

1) Control of learning 2) Control of reasoning and decision-making 3) Control of â&#x20AC;&#x153;offloadingâ&#x20AC;? behaviour 4) For sharing and collaboration in social groups

Using metacognition for control Metacognitive monitoring

Learning

Nelson & Narens, 1990

Causal role for metacognition in control of study 176 METCALFE AND FINN

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Manipulate metacognitive judgments and ask what happens to subjects’ control of study

Subjects learnt a list of word pairs (e.g. duck - carrot), and on each trial judged their confidence that they would be able to remember the pair (a “judgment of learning”, JOL)

When JOL is boosted (via illusion due to repetition), subjects are less likely to choose to study it again

Proportion

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Using metacognition for control

? Metacognitive monitoring

Decisionmaking

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Absence of immediate feedback, opportunity for changes of mind

Using metacognition for control “What was the name of the first emperor of Rome?” Should you answer, or not? Phase 2

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heavily on one's confidence in the correctness o f that answer. Across all participants and conditions, items that were volunteered in Phase 2 had a mean assessed probability of .89 in Phase 1, compared with .29 for items that were withheld. In addition, the relationship between confidence and volunteering was calculated using both g a m m a and A N D I , and by both measures it was found to be exceedingly strong: G a m m a averaged .97 for recall participants (range = .89-1.0) and .93 for recognition (range = .68-1.0 ). Similarly, A N D I (the proportion of explained variance) averaged .79 for recall (range = .52-1.0) and .67 for recognition (range = . 3 9 - . 9 3 ) . The difference between recall and recognition was relatively small but significant for both measures, t(69) = 3.23, p < .0005, and t(69) = 4.17, p < .0001, respectively. Note that the confidence-volunteering correlations reported here were higher than the confidence-correctness correlations reported earlier. For example, whereas the g a m m a correlations between confidence and the decision to volunteer an answer averaged .97 and .93 for recall and recognition, respectively, the corresponding g a m m a s for the confidence-correctness Koriat & Goldsmith relation(1996)

Volunteered items, confidence = 0.89 Withheld items, confidence = 0.29 Report accuracy = 76.4%

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used equivalent response criteria for both types of items ( F < 1 ). The effect of phase order, however, was significant, F ( 1, 28) = 4.53, p < .05, as was the interaction, F ( 1 , 2 8 ) = 5.58, p < .05: Across both subtests, participants in the forced-free condition used a higher criterion (.75) than did free-forced participants (.56), although the difference was significant only for the deceptive subtest (.79 vs..47, respectively), not for the standard subtest (.71 vs..65, respectively). Thus, although there was no systematic difference in the criterion levels adopted for the standard and deceptive items, giving participants the option of free report after the forced-report phase may have elicited a somewhat greater tendency for selective reporting than when free reporting preceded forced.

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Given the similar control policies but the different monitoring effectiveness exhibited for the standard and deceptive subtests, what are the implications for actual memory performance? The memory performance measures for the two conditions are presented in Table 3. The results for the standard subtest disclose a pattern very similar to that obtained in Experiment h The option of free report allowed participants to increase their accuracy performance substantially compared with their performance on forced report, F ( 1, 28) = 106.76, p < .0001, and this improvement was achieved at a small cost in quantity performance, F ( 1, 28) = 25.22, p < .0001. Indeed, the free-report accuracy obtained on the standard subtest (75.0%) was virtually identical to that demonstrated by the moderate-incentive recall participants of Experiment 1 (76.4%). In contrast, for the deceptive, poor-monitoring items, participants were able to achieve on the average no better than 21% accuracy when given the option of free report! (Recall that according to the payoff scheme, participants needed to achieve at least 50% accuracy just to break even.) This level of free-report accuracy was only slightly better than forced-report accuracy, F ( 1, 28) = 11.08, p < .005. Furthermore, as predicted, the quantity-accuracy tradeoff was far more severe under conditions of poor monitoring: Koriat & Goldsmith (1996) Psych Whereas the accuracy improvement for the standard subtest

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Review

Conclusion: Assessing confidence is critical for knowing whether to volunteer or withhold information

Until 2016, the U.S. Scholastic Aptitude Test contained a penalty for wrong answers; no penalty if the answer was skipped - implicitly testing for metacognition!

Key Figure

Using metacognition for offloading A Metacognitive Model of Cognitive Offloading Lower-level cogni!ve processes (e.g., memory)

(C)

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Risko & Gilbert (2016) TICS

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Individuals with lower for (domain-general) confidence more reminders, after Figure 1. Paradigms Investigating Cognitive Ofﬂoading. (A) In theset external normalization paradigm [9]even participants readfor arraysobjective of words that are presented in upright or rotated orientations. When faced with rotated words, participants can controlling ability align them using internal cognitive processes (‘internal normalization’) or physical action (‘external normalization’). (B) In the

Gilbert (2015) Consciousness & Cognition

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How do we measure metacognition?

BEHAVIOUR E.g. answer to exam question

SECOND-ORDER REPORT E.g. confidence in getting the answer right

Types of second-order report

Judgment of learning Feeling of knowing Confidence

Error monitoring Post-decision wager

Explanation Timing Will you be able to Prospective recall this item in the future? Will you be able to Prospective recognise the right answer?

Domain Memory

How confident are Retrospective you in your answer? Did you make an Retrospective error? How much would Retrospective you bet that your decision is correct?

Decision-making/ memory

Memory

Decision-making/ memory Decision-making/ memory

Not possible to assess metacognition from a single judgment Need multiple judgments over time, examine statistical association between behaviour and metacognitive judgments

Subjective confidence

YES, CORRECT!

UNSURE..

Objective performance

CORRECT

â&#x20AC;Ś

Time

A metacognitive ruler

BEHAVIOUR

SECOND-ORDER REPORT

High confidence Correct A Incorrect C

Low confidence B D

Two dimensions of metacognition

Most of us are somewhat overconfident (e.g. Svenson 1981) but can also monitor our mistakes (e.g. Rabbitt, 1966)

METACOGNITIVE BIAS “Overconfidence”

METACOGNITIVE SENSITIVITY “Local” monitoring

Metacognitive bias and sensitivity Metacognitive bias

Bias

Confidence in behaviour Incorrect

Correct

Metacognitive sensitivity Low

Confidence

High

Other terminology in the literature: Bias: calibration, confidence level, self-perceived ability, self-beliefâ&#x20AC;Ś Sensitivity: discrimination, resolution, metacognitive awareness, insightâ&#x20AC;Ś

Fleming & Lau, 2014 Frontiers in Neuroscience

“Type 2” signal detection theory

Second-order sensitivity

Confidence

DISCRIMINATING BETWEEN CORRECT AND INCORRECT D

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Type 1 d’

Stimulus

Figure 1. The binary Type 2 task as an extension of the fundamental detection problem. During the Type 1 observation interval, there occurs either the signal event (S ) or the noise event (N ), along with a value, x, of the evidence variable, X. In the Type 1 decision interval, the observer must respond either “Yes, a signal occurred” or “No, a signal did not occur.” The observation and decision intervals for the Type 1 task together become the observation interval for the Type 2 task, because one of the events correct (C ) or incorrect (I ) occurs when the observer makes the Type 1 decision and the same value of the evidence, x, is used to evaluate whether the Type 1 decision was correct. The observer states either “Yes, it was correct” or “No, it was not correct” during the

Galvin et al. (2003) Psych Bull Rev

section (rostral). C there Can h be b correlation l i with i h more subtle b l changes h i the in h organization i i off the h brain b i in i normal subjects? Quantifying metacognitive Here, subjects engage in a difficult psychophysicalsensitivity task (detecting a patch of a slightly hi h contrast higher t t between b t 2 screens ). ) This task is maintained close to the threshold to ensure an overall success rate of 71%. After each trial, participants report their degree of confidence in their first response .

Quantifying metacognitive sensitivity Confidence

Performance

Individual differences

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Subjects Fleming*, Weil* et al. (2010) Science

AnHow old questionâ&#x20AC;Ś do we compute confidence? Peirce & Jastrow, 1884:

Selective failures of metacognition?

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Inaccurate metacognitive knowledge of cognitive and physical impairments is common in psychiatric and neurological disorders and healthy aging

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Are such changes independent of changes in (first-order) cognition?

Dissociating metacognition from changes in performance Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learnins, Memory, and Cognition 1986, Vol. 12, No. 3, 452-460

Memory and Metamemory: A Study of the Feeling-of-Knowing Phenomenon in Amnesic Patients Arthur P. Shimamura and Larry R. Squire Veterans Administration Medical Center, San Diego and Department of Psychiatry, University of California, San Diego, School of Medicine Accuracy of the feeling of knowing was tested in patients with Korsakoff's syndrome, patients prescribed electroconvulsive therapy, four other cases of amnesia, and control subjects. In Experiment 1, we tested feeling-of-knowing accuracy for the answers to general information questions that could not be recalled. Subjects were asked to rank nonrecalled questions in terms of how likely they thought they would be able to recognize the answers and were then given a recognition test for these items. Only patients with Korsakoff's syndrome were impaired in making feeling-of-knowing predictions. The other amnesic patients were as accurate as control subjects in their feeling-of-knowing predictions. In Experiment 2, we replicated these findings in a sentence memory paradigm that tested newly learned information. The results showed that impaired metamemory is not an obligatory feature of amnesia, because amnesia can occur without detectable metamemory deficits. The impaired metamemory exhibited by patients with Korsakoff's syndrome reflects a cognitive impairment that is not typically observed in other forms of amnesia.

Four groups: healthy controls, alcoholic controls, Korsakoffâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s syndrome patients, amnesic patients

LEARN SENTENCES

FEELING OF KNOWING?

Often one experiences a sense or feeling of knowing some information without being able to recall it. In its most frustrating form the information seems to be on the "tip of the tongue." These experiences illustrate that we have knowledge about what we know, even when complete recall is not possible. Knowledge about one's memory capabilities and knowledge about strategies that can aid memory are termed metamemory (Brown,

RECOGNITION TEST

effects (Diamond & Rozin, 1984; Graf, Squire, & Mandler, 1984; Jacoby & Witherspoon, 1982; Shimamura & Squire, 1984; Squire, Shimamura, & Graf, 1985; for review, see Shimamura, in press). One possibility is that deficits in metamemory contribute to or cause amnesia. That is, lack of conscious knowledge about what is stored in memory and a lack of awareness about strate-

Importance of controlling for performance Possibly spurious difference in metacognition

Metacognitive accuracy

First-order performance

B True difference in metacognition

Metacognitive accuracy

First-order performance

memory performance as the Korsakoff patients. In fact, the feeling-of-knowing performance of the four (non-Korsakoff) amnesic patients was somewhat above the level obtained by delayed subjects. Patients with Korsakoff's syndrome, however, Planned comparisons showed that delayed control subjects performed more poorly than the delayed control subjects. Thus, Journal of Experimental Psychology: Copyright 1986 by the American PsychologicalAs.u~afion, Inc. and the four amnesic patients exhibited better feeling-of-knowLearnins, Memory, and Cognition 0278-7393/86/$00.75 Korsakoff patients appear to have a particular deficit in meta1986, Vol. 12, No. 3, 452-460 ing accuracy than patients with Korsakoff's syndrome, ts(13) > memory that cannot be explained as a result of their memory 2.2, p < .05. The difference between theand delayed alcoholic sub-A Study impairment. The finding that the four individual amnesic subMemory Metamemory: of the Feeling-of-Knowing jects and the patients with Korsakoff's syndrome approached jects performed on average somewhat above the expected level Phenomenon in Amnesic Patients statistical significance, t(17) = 1.82, p = .08. Thus, despite the suggests that the metamemory demands for a normal subject fact that both groups of amnesic patients and both groups of tested a long delay may be more difficult than the demands Arthur P. Shimamura and Larryafter R. Squire Veterans Administration Medical Center, San Diego and Department of Psychiatry, University delayed subjects were matched on recognition memory for nonfor an amnesic patient tested after a short delay. Despite this of California, San Diego, School of Medicine recalled items, feeling-of-knowing accuracy differed among the possible advantage in the case of some amnesic patients, pagroups. The four amnesic cases showed good Accuracy of thefeeling-of-knowfeeling of knowing was tested in patients with Korsakoff's syndrome,R. patients pre458 ARTHUR P. SHIMAMURA AND LARRY SQUIRE scribed electroconvulsive therapy, four other cases of amnesia, and control subjects. In Experiment ing accuracy, given their level of memory performance, but the 1, we tested feeling-of-knowing accuracy for the answers to general information questions that could not be recalled. Subjects were asked to rank of how likely they thoughtF E E L I N G - O F - K N O W I N G patients with Korsakoff's impaired. Indeed, thenonrecalled questions ina terms R E C O syndrome G N I T I O N OFwere NONRECALLED they would be able to recognize the answers and were then given recognitionperformance test for these items. of other amnesic patients--patients pre knowing PERFORMANC E SENTENCES Only patients with Korsakoff's syndrome were impaired in making feeling-of-knowing predictions. four amnesic somewhat better than .80 80 patients actually performed The other amnesic patients were as accurate as control subjects in their feeling-of-knowing predicscribed bilateral ECT, three patients with amnesia as a resul the two delayed groups, though thesetions. differences marginIn Experimentwere 2, we replicated these findings in a sentence memory paradigm that tested learned information. The results showed that impaired obligatory ofmetamemory an .70 anoxic ischemic episode, and patient N. A.--was a - is not anor ally significant, ts(l 4) < 2.0, ps > .07. newly 70 feature of amnesia, because amnesia can occur without detectable metamemory deficits. The imasa cognitive that of control subjects whose recall and recognition paired metamemory exhibited by patients syndrome reflects impairTable 2 shows recognition performance of nonrecalled sen-with Korsakoff'saccurate ment that is not typically observed in other forms of amnesia. . 6 0 memory performance was matched to the performance of the tences across the four feeling-of-knowing rating categories. Table 2 also shows the average number of nonrecalled sentences amnesic patients. These findings demonstrate that memory and ,50 z 50 one experiences a sense category. or feeling of knowing some effects (Diamond & Rozin, 1984; Squire, & Mandler, that were feeling-of-knowing All subC9 placed in each Often metamemory areGraf,not inextricably linked: Impaired feelin I information without being able to recall it. In its most frustrat1984; Jacoby ,Â˘ & Witherspoon, 1982; Shimamura & Squire, ject groups, except patients with Korsakoff's syndrome, showed of tu,_1knowing is not anreview, obligatory component of anterograd .40 ing form the information seems to be on the "tip of the tongue." 1984; Squire, Shimamura, & Graf, 1985; for see Shima,,, 4 0 nÂ° These experiences performance illustrate that we haveas knowledge what mura, in press). a general decrease in recognition they about rated n,amnesia. we know, even when complete recall is not possible. Knowledge One possibility is that deficits in metamemory contribute to items from of knowing pure guess. Thus, asstratein - is, lack of conscious knowledge about one's memoryto capabilities and knowledge about ,,z, 3ohigh feelingabout 8 or cause amnesia. The.30That feeling-of-knowing impairment exhibited by patient that can aid memory aresyndrome termed metamemory (Brown, what is stored in memory and a lack of awareness about strateExperiment 1, patients gies with Korsakoff's exhibited with Korsakoff's syndrome spanned premorbid semantic mem 1978; Flavell & Wellman, 1977; Gruneberg, 1983). One manigies to aid memory contribute to poor performance on .20could impaired judgments when the judg~- feeling-of-knowing 20 festation of metamemory iseven the feeling-of-knowing phenommemory tests. By this view, amnesic patients should have ory and newly learned (episodic) memory. Because these pa n o n - t h e ability to judge the probability of future success in difficulty in tasks that assess metamemory just as they have ments were based on ane absolute rating technique. ~hance mean.)

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tients were the only ones who exhibited amnesia for general se mantic facts, the finding of impaired feeling of knowing in Ex periment 1 could have been attributed to their memory impairment rather than to a specific impairment of meta memory. In Experiment 2, however, we assessed feeling o knowing for newly learned information, and in this case the Figure 4. Recognition memory (seven-alternative, forced-choice) for patients with Korsakoff's syndrome were still the only ones to Metacognition (performance-confidence nonrecalled sentence Task information. (CON = healthy control subjects; exhibit impaired metamemory. This occurred despite the fac performance whether or not the answer to a nonrecalled question would subALC = alcoholic subjects; KOR = patients with Korsakoff's syndrome; correlation) that other amnesic patients studied were just as impaired in sequently be recognized on a multiple-choice test. Feeling-ofa memory test. Here we investigated the accuracy of the feelingof-knowing experience in amnesic patients. The study of amnesia could help in explaining the relation between metamemory and memory. Amnesic patients exhibit General Discussion severe recall and CON ALC impairments KOR 4 on tests of CON ALCrecognition--they have deficits inCASES the ability to store, organize, and consciously recollect events that occurred since the onset of amnesia (for Patients with Korsakoff's syndrome impaired mak} 5 min I were L_.1-7 d a y l &in reviews, see Cermak, 1982; Hirst, 1982; Squire Cohen, 1984; delay 1982). ~ this delay ~ informaWeiskrantz, Yet .in about spite of impairment in new learning feeling-of-knowing judgments both general ing capacity (i.e., anterograde amnesia), amnesic patients can tion facts and about newly learned material. andSpecifically, pa-in learn and retain perceptual-motor cognitive skills, often normal fashion (Cohen, 1984; Cohen & Squire, Corkin, tients with Korsakoff's syndrome were unable to 1980; predict 1968; Milner, 1962); and they can demonstrate normal priming

.10 - memory tests. Alternatively, the prodifficulty on conventional cesses and brain systems that contribute to metamemory may be independent of the processes and brain systems required to 0establish memory itself. By this view, metamemory could be CON ALC C O N A Labilities C KOR N unaffected in amnesia and metamemory may AbeMpresent whenever amnesic patients perform above chance on a conventional memory test. Finally, only some forms t it~ may 5 be thatrain I ~_1--7 day.~ of amnesia affect metamemory, whereas other forms of amnesia delay - - delay - produce a selective deficit of memory, leaving metamemory abilities intact. Figure 5 Feeling-of-knowing performance for each subject g r o u p Hirst (1982) suggested that metamemory may be impaired in (CONwith = Korsakoff's healthy control A L C = the alcoholic subjects; K O R = patients syndrome. subjects; Korsakoff's syndrome, best studied form amnesia, occurs as a result of chronic alco- = four other amnesic papatients withof KorsakofFs syndrome; 4 cases hol abuse and nutritional deficiency and is marked by severe tients; bars show _ standard error of the mean.) anterograde amnesia as well as extensive loss of memory for

“Double dissociation” of metacognition and performance Memory performance

Metacognition

Classical amnesia Korsakoff’s syndrome Prefrontal lesions

Shimamura & Squire (1986) JEP:LMC; Janowsky, Shimamura & Squire (1989) Psychobiology

Explicit vs. implicit metacognition TICS-1294; No. of Pages 8

â&#x20AC;˘ Not all monitoring and control is necessarily consciousOpinion

â&#x20AC;˘ Metacognitive information such as decision uncertainty is used to modulate ongoing thought and behaviour in the absence of awareness

Trends in Cognitive Sciences xxx xxxx

Communication of system 2 metacognitive representations Metacognitive representations

Metacognitive representations

System 2

Sensory input

â&#x20AC;˘ When metacognitive representations become explicit (conscious), they can be readily used in communication and collaboration

Action

System 1

Action

TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences

Figure 2. System 2 metacognition for cognitive control across two agents. System 2 metacognitive representations are derived from information in system a form available for verbal report. For example, the reliability of a sensory signal can be reported in terms of confidence. When agents are cooperating, th used to optimise control by, for example, giving more weight to the more confident observer [32]. Via system 2, verbal reports can also have long-te functioning of system 1 [57].

relevant metacognitive representations within system 1 processes in each agent are selected for broadcast to the other agent, so that decisions about which sensorimotor processes to deploy can be taken in a space of shared metacognitive information. This, we suggest, is the distinc-

metacognitive representations when they ar cally coordinating complex actions (e.g., com about confidence used in team sports) [35,3 metacognition can also be used diachronically, Sheaforetpeople al. (2014) TICS to discuss how m making it possible

Unconscious monitoring and control P[ Fourneret and M[ Jeannerod:Limited conscious monitoring

0024

Fig[ 0[ Experimental setup*upper part] the output of the graphic tablet\ displayed on the computer screen\ is seen by the subject through the mirror placed above his:her hand^ lower part] subject|s view of the computer screen seen in the mirror[ The subject moves the stylus from the starting point to Fourneret the target[ & Jeannerod (1998) Neuropsychologia

Unconscious monitoring and control P[ Fourneret and M[ Jeannerod:Limited conscious monitoring

Chris Frith: “Indeed this is so easy that, unless the distortion is very great, you don’t even know that you’re making the deviant movement”

c representation of one perturbed trial[ Heavy line] visual rea}erence as seen by the subject[ Dashed line] direction plitude "09># of bias[ Light line] trajectory of the hand!held stylus on the tablet\ unseen by the subject[ Note direction e bias[ Scale on left shows distance between starting point and target "111 mm# and onset of bias "at 46 mm from starting point#[

Fourneret & Jeannerod (1998) Neuropsychologia

Error Corrected

Proportion Experiencing Illus

Mean IKSI in ms/lett

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tion two, which was open-ended, in question three, which addressed inserted errors, and in question four, which addressed corrected errors) in the 50-, 100-, and 600-word groups and in experiment two. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals for the proportions calculated from the binomial distribution. Explicit (judgment)

Mean IKSI in ms/letter

ey- A B Correct/Error ec1 rial 700 1), 600 0.8 nd 500 ror 0.6 Error nd 400 ed Corrected 300 Error 0.4 in Inserted Correct 200 aid Correct 0.2 re100 in0 0 ect Correct Error Inserted Corrected E–1 Error E+1 E+2 ver Response Type ate ls based on Fisher’s least significant difference test calculated from the interaction between response type and error position. (B) Mean g correct or error for correct responses (correct), actual errors (error), inserted errors (inserted), and corrected errors (corrected). Logan & Crump (2010) Science

A note on terminology • Several authors make a distinction between implicit and explicit metacognition, but use diﬀerent terminology

• Proust - proposes a distinction between procedural (implicit) vs. conceptual (explicit) metacognition

• Carruthers - denies implicit monitoring and control qualifies as metacognition because it does not invoke metarepresentation

• Perner - accepts primacy of explicit metarepresentation as a starting point for thinking about metacognition, but proposes a gradation of mental processes that are intermediate in level between object-level cognition and full-blown, explicit metacognition

Explicit vs. implicit metacognition TICS-1294; No. of Pages 8

â&#x20AC;˘ Not all monitoring and control is necessarily consciousOpinion

â&#x20AC;˘ Metacognitive information such as decision uncertainty is used to modulate ongoing thought and behaviour in the absence of awareness

Trends in Cognitive Sciences xxx xxxx

Communication of system 2 metacognitive representations Metacognitive representations

Metacognitive representations

System 2

Sensory input

â&#x20AC;˘ When metacognitive representations become explicit (conscious), they can be readily used in communication and collaboration

Action

System 1

Action

TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences

feedback alone would not be sufficient for achiev-

sitivity did not exceed that of the more sensi

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which probability correct is communicated / combined in Bayesian manner

Fig. 3. Results of experiment 2. (A) Ratio of the dyad slope to the maximum individual slope for the three noise conditions (equal, unequal, and none; see main text). The line at sdyad /smax = 1 corresponds to the case in which the dyad is performing exactly as well as the more sensitive member. Values above and below the line correspond to benefit and loss due to communication, respectively. ns, not significant. (B) Ratio of the dyad slope to et al. (2010) Science the slope predicted by the WCS model, the latter denoted sWCS. ThisBahrami ratio was not significantly different fr iencemag.org on October 25, 2012

from previous ng without feedpt that nothing oses med, but that pairs o-trial he feedback, eventually Fethey behavior and us l was motivated ective decisions dent g group memback about â&#x20AC;&#x153;the rs wer) is available k, here for the ward e,ywhich we deedprobability of d [the weighted d(9). Finally, the ns an and standard m-to the stimulus

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the slope s. Theobservers slopeobserver provided an4A, estimate of senwere thendecision. shared,Subsequently, and if participants disagreed, dWhereas More sensitive were, by definition, both participants were in- tivity). prob[Fig. red bar; t(13) = 0.18, p = 0 ing collective benefit. more reliable in their estimates of contrast. formedthe of matter the correct choice (with the exception ifferentthey sensory sitivity (the steeper the slope, the higher the sensidiscussed until they reached a joint ue Experiment 3 tested this prediction using the paired t test], as predicted by the BF model. M an individualâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s dyad sensitivity was significantly lo same paradigmwere as experiment 1, modified that important, Moresosensitive observers were, by definition, in- tivity). b- decision. Subsequently, both participants ch distributions the upper bound predicted by the WCS mo participants were now not allowed to communimore reliable in theirthan estimates of contrast. ypersonformed or what of the correct choice (with the exception â&#x20AC;&#x2122;s mmunicated. To models ns (9), each types of inforat s, each quantitaof which followed very similar of experiment 4 in which no feedback was given). , and dures. Initially, each participant chose the Individual and dyad psychometric functions (Fig. To ofal those models that they thought contained the target, 1B, left and middle panels) were fit with a cumuvisual decisionh consulting ut the other. Individual decisions lative Gaussian function, from which we extracted then shared, and if participants disagreed, the slope s. The slope provided an estimate of senriscussed the matter nothing except until they reached a joint sitivity (the steeper the slope, the higher the sensiaon. Subsequently, mulus is com-both participants were in- tivity). More sensitive observers were, by definition, d of the correct choice (with the exception more reliable in their estimates of contrast. ls sagreement, the a coin flip (CF nBest fitting model is one in

Conclusions • Metacognition refers to the ability to reflect on and control other cognitive processes • Effective monitoring is important for the control of learning, for modulating decision-making and for adaptive offloading to the environment • We can quantify metacognition as the statistical association between behaviour and self-evaluation • Metacognitive monitoring and control can occur implicitly (without awareness) • Some parts of metacognition are “explicit” - accompanied by conscious metarepresentation, can be communicated to others • Next time - origins of metacognition in evolution and development

Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B | vol. 367 no. 1594 pp. 1279–1438 | 19 May 2012

ISSN 0962-8436

volume 367

number 1594

pages 1279–1438

In this Issue

Metacognition: computation, neurobiology and function Papers of a Theme Issue organized and edited by Stephen M. Fleming, Raymond J. Dolan, Christopher D. Frith

org

y, AG

Metacognition: computation, neurobiology and function

The world’s first science journal

19 May 2012

Thank you

metacoglab.org

ROC analysis / meta-d’ Type 2 ROC

Type 1 SDT parameters

meta-d’ (fitted to type 2 ROC) compared to observed d’

p(confidence|correct)

Incorrect

p(confidence|incorrect)

Observed confidence distributions

Low

Correct

Confidence

High

Gaussian noise added to confidence ratings

Maniscalco & Lau (2012); Fleming (2017) Neuroscience of Consciousness