IF I SERVE NIGERIA

A Blue Print for National Development

Hector Chime Anoruo, PhD

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Contents CHAPTER ONE Nigeria in Context 1.

Introduction 2.

The Question of Nigeria as a failed state 3.

Nigeria’s History—Foundations for Failure 4.

The Nascent State (1960–99) I. Nnamdi Azikiwe II. Maj Gen Yakubu Gowon III. Brig Gen Murtala Muhammad IV. Lt Gen Olusegun Obasanjo V. Maj Gen Muhammadu Buhari VI. General Ibrahim Babangida VII. Sani Abacha VIII. Shehu Mus Yar’Adua.

IX. Dr. Goodluck Jonathan 5.

I. II. III. IV. V. VI.

The Nigerian State Today The Social Schisms of Nigeria Demographic Fissures The Rise of Information Corruption and Criminality Petro-Culture Collapse Clash of Haves and Have-Nots

6. i. ii. iii. iv. v.

Nigeria's Military Coup Culture The Constitutional Debate Speech of Major Nzeogwu -Declaration of Martial Law in Northern Nigeria, January 15, 1966 Major-General Aguiy Ironsi inaugural speech as head of state, January 16, 1966 president Azikiwe' s statement to the press: reaction to Nigeria’s first military coup, January 1966 Inaugural speech of lt-colonel Yakubu Gowon as head of state, august 1, 1966

CHAPTER TWO Nigerian Politics 2.1 Governmental Framework i.

Political Parties ii.

Legitimacy iii.

Governance iv.

The Politics of Diversifying the Economy v.

Political Summary 2.2 Nigeria’s Economy i.

Significant Economic Problems ii.

Positive Economic Trends iii.

Nigeria’s Economic Landscape iv.

Will Nigeria Become a Top 20 Economy? v.

A Positive Energy Outlook vi.

A Widening North-South Gap vii.

A History of Violence viii.

Plummeting Fossil Fuel Prices ix.

Economic Summary 2.3 Military Vectors i.

Military Reforms ii.

Security and Counterterrorism Efforts iii.

Non-military Technologies iv.

Military Coup v.

Civil War vi.

Military Summary 2.4 Exploitation of Ethnicity i.

Religious bigotry ii.

The unification of the tribes of Nigeria CHAPTER THREE Ideal society 3.1 Aristotle i.

Origin and Nature of the State:

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ii.

What then is a Constitution? iii.

Types of State: iv.

The Best State: v.

Pattern of Constitutional Machinery: 3.2 Marcus Cicero i.

On Law and Its Source: 3.3 St. Thomas Aquinas 3.4 Thomas More i.

Doctrine: Ideal Political Society 3.5 Niccolo Machiavelli i. On republics ii. On principalities 3.6 Mao Tsetung i. Towards socialism/communism ii. The Elements of the New Democracy 3.7 Leopold Sedar Senghor i. The Viable Political System for Africa: 3.8 Obafemi Awolowo i.

On Political Constitution ii.

The good establishment of the three organs of government 3.9 Idealism, Democracy and nation-building I. Idealism II. Politics III. Nation building IV. What Is Democracy? a.

A multi-party system does not make for instant democracy b.

The multi-party system is only a means to an end: democracy is the aim c.

Democracy for what? It is a question of dignity! d.

What urges people to suffer and die for democracy? e.

Democracy as a dynamic Utopia f.

An Obstacle to Democracy: The Love of Power g.

The love of power leads rulers to try to control all sources of power h.

The love of power can kill i.

A Strategy for Democracy j.

Nigerians Economic recession k.

State of any nation’s economy 3.10 Adam Smith Theory of Growth assessment of Nigerian Economy CHAPTER FOUR 1.

Political Ideal for Nigeria 2.

Dangers of False Electoral Promises 3.

Development planning in a Presidential Democracy 4.

Blueprint to the Nigerian Revolution 5.

Blueprint for National Development 6.

Oil and Economic Development 7.

Political Reform 8.

The National Question vii.

Communication and Public Utilities viii.

Health-Care Services ix.

Technology and Infrastructural Development x.

Failed Development Vision, Political Leadership and Nigeria’s Underdevelopment xi.

Electoral reforms and democratic sustainability in Nigeria (1999 till date) 4.9 Public service reform i.

History of public service reformed ii.

Reforms in the civil service iii.

The Reform of Local Government, 1976. iv.

Reform of largely Parastatals, 1986- 1993. v.

Necessity of public service reform in Nigeria vi.

The Civil Service and the Ideas of Reform and Professionalism", vii.

The SERVICOM Initiative in Perspective 4.10 1999 Constitution and the Privatisation Orgy a) State and local governments and economic planning b) Education and the federal government CHAPTER FIVE Nigeria in 2040: Paths to Implosion 5.1 Cascading failure of the Nigerian state (2008–2030) i.

Crosscutters ii.

Culture and Ethnicity iii.

Religion iv.

The Influence of Technology v.

International Terrorism vi.

Criminality

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vii.

Corruption

5.2 The State of the Society i.

Health Care and Medicine ii.

Population and the Youth Bulge iii.

Infrastructure iv.

Economics v.

The Nigerian Economy vi.

The Single Commodity vii.

Industrial Diversification 5.3 The Government i.

Internal Security ii.

Governance and Legitimacy iii.

Military iv.

Outside Influences v.

The Players vi.

Donor Fatigue 5.4 The Failed State of Nigeria i.

The Present Situation is Dire and Unsustainable ii.

A New Thinking and Approach is required iii.

The Problem is Structural! iv.

Over centralisation is stifling 5.5. Solving Nigeria Power problem 5.6 Technology and Failed State 2030 i.

Options to Restore the Peace ii.

To Engage or Not to Engage iii.

US Response to Nigeria’s 2030 Failure iv.

Detect, Understand, Deploy, Engage and Survive to Operate v.

Technology Summary 5.7 Definitions of Failed or Weakened States i.

Nigerian Military Forces ii.

Nigerian Air Force Order of Battle1 iii.

Nigerian Army Order of Battle2 iv.

Nigerian Army Major Equipment v.

Artillery vi.

Air Defence Weapons CHAPTER SIX Insurgency in Nigeria 6.1 Addressing the causes as part of the solution i.

Nigeria on the brink 6.2 Indicia of instability in Nigeria i.

Political Violence ii.

Corruption, nepotism and tribalism iii.

Ill-discipline and related crimes iv.

Terrorism and insurgency 6.2 History of insurgency in Nigeria i.

Declaration of Niger Delta Republic ii.

Nigerian civil war iii.

Movement for the emancipation of the Niger Delta and related insurgencies iv.

Oodua People’s Congress v.

Northern Arewa groups vi.

Jama’atu Ahlil Sunna Lidawati wal Jihad (Boko Haram) vii.

Jama’atu Ansaril Muslimina fi Biladis Sudan (Ansaru) viii.

Causative factors behind insurgency in Nigeria 6.3 Land use and proprietary rights i.

Growth of social class awareness and desire for equality ii.

Discrimination iii.

Poverty iv.

Unemployment v.

Political alienation vi.

Religious and ideological discontent vii.

Conclusion: Nigeria beyond the brink Proposals 1.

Implement Policies that Encourage Economic Growth 2.

Change the Education System 3.

Encourage Society to Value Hard Work 4.

Solving the problem of Unemployment 5.

Unlocking the political potentials of the Nigerian youth i.

A cursory look at youth and political leadership in Nigeria ii.

The Nigerian youth in politics, 1980 –date iii.

Young leaders in politics across the globe iv.

Youth absence in Nigerian politics v.

Not too young to run

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vi. vii.

Age-long youth exclusion strategy but the political class Dangers/negative effects of youth exclusion

viii.

Youth exclusion by youth

ix.

Youth inclusion: a collective responsibility

6.

Principles of Government

DEDICATION

To Nelson Mandela He taught the world what activism really is: with no fear in his heart,Mandela stood up to those who sought to oppress others.

To Barack Obamahe Won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2009 “for his extraordinary efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between peoples�

To Obafemi Awolowoforintroducing and successfully implemented the first Free Primary Education for all and free health care for children programme in Africa.

To Nnamdi Azikiwefor realizing thatNation building involves a lot of sacrifice and a sustained process of ethnic and cultural integration through deliberate policies of inclusion, social justice, mutual respect, equality, fraternity, indoctrination and even spread of development and opportunities amongst other pragmatic initiatives.

To Julius Nyererefor Putting unfortunate personal prejudices and ignorance aside and taking the emancipation of the African seriously, deserves the pedestal on which he has been placed by Tanzanians and Africa as a whole.

To Chinua Achebefor provided a "blueprint" for African writers of succeeding generationsHe published a book called The Trouble with Nigeria to coincide with the upcoming elections. On the first page, Achebe says bluntly: "the Nigerian problem is the unwillingness or inability of its leaders to rise to the responsibility and to the challenge of personal example which are the hallmarks of true leadership.

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ACKNOWLEGEMENTS

I have taken efforts in this project. However, it would not have been possible without the kind support and help of many individuals and organizations. I would like to extend my sincere thanks to all of them.

My profound gratitude goes to my dear wife Mrs. Perpetua Hector Anoruo for her tireless supports.

I am highly indebted to Prof. Rev. Fr. Izu M. Onyeocha for his guidance and constant supervision as well as for providing necessary information regarding the project & also for his support in completing the project.

I would like to express my gratitude towards my teachers and colleagues and all teaching and non-teaching staffs of philosophy department Imo state University Owerri for their kind co-operation and encouragement.

I would like to express my special gratitude and thanks to the Sole Creation team for giving me such attention and time. My thanks and appreciations also go to everyone who has willingly helped me out with their abilities.

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FOREWARD Prof. Rev Fr. Izu M.Onyeocha The science or art of politics is the science or art of how society is organized or run. It is thus a normative science which treats of government i.e., it treats of the organization of the affairs of state and the organization and distribution of social goods. Aristotle considers politics as "the most sovereign and most comprehensive master of the universe and is not an alien or a mere creature of chance. Since the science." From a practical point of view, it seems that the one who holds political power holds sway over everyone and everything else ; society. Thus it is the politicians that control policies on education, health, family, defence, research, entertainment, .the economy, peace and war, and even religion, on the concept of politics in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Martin Ostwald gives an etymology of the term by referring to the root word politike which is the science of the city state or their members. In the present context, no city-state is involved. What concerns the present discussion is the political entity called Nigeria, and its citizens or members who can be referred to by extension as a polis.

In Aristotle's assessment, the comprehensive character of politics lies in its characteristic of determining which sciences ought to exist in states, what kind of sciences each group of citizens must learn, and what degree of proficiency each must attain. It is the normative science which treats of the organization of social goods. From this he concludes that the end of politics is the good for humans -individuals as well as the state.

Thus it follows that the end of politics is the good for man. For even if the good is the same for the individual and the state, the good of the state clearly is the greater and more perfect thing to attain and to safeguard. The attainment of the good for one man alone is, to be sure, a source of satisfaction; yet to secure it for a nation and for states is nobler and more divine.35 Political theory is concerned with the formulation of the ends and limits of state authority.

The crudity of action and abuse of power that is often associated with certain classes of politicians is an aberration rather than an integral element in politics. In politics what is of utmost important is the good of the citizens and not the might of the state. In so far as politics is for the good of humans, its end is achieved. In order to be able to achieve its end the activity of politics should include among its concerns an analysis of government, its structure, limits, policies and practices to see if they are conducive to human good. Any policy or practice that goes against the good of humans must be discounted. The role of politics is therefore to organize humans to live in harmony with one another in such a way as to facilitate progress for the individual and the society at large.

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In daily language, critics of politics and politicians abound and often speak dismissively of politics as 'dirty' and politicians as 'liars'. A mechanic friend was so blunt in his assessment of politics and politicians: The only difference between a politician and a crook is in the spelling. Politician and crook are spelt differently, but they mean exactly the same thing. They tell you one thing and mean the very opposite.

This assessment finds an echo in the thoughts of the famous Russian philosopher Nicolai Bedyaev when he said concerning politics: In politics falsehood plays a great role, and small place is left tor truth. States have been built on lies and on lies have they been demolished .And it is often said that without lies everything would perish and complete anarchy would cover the world... And there has never been a revolution against the unlimited power of politics, for the sake of man and humanness.

It would be both unfair and misleading to conceive of politics in this vulgarized, all-negative way as though its very nature were nothing but a travesty of values where practitioners quibble with words and ideas. Good politics does exist, and so do good policies and honest politicians. The politics referred to inthis study is genuine politics that has to do with how the state and society are to be successfully organized and run for the benefit of all. The politician who lies and deceives is an aberration from the noble science and practice of politics. Such a one should not claim to represent politics but should be denounced. In this sense aberrations are out of the picture.

From politics proper one turns the mind to political philosophy. Political philosophy is that branch of philosophy which deals with political life, NATION-BUILDING especially with the essence, origin and value of the state. The state is not ordered to mere activity of life, but to activity of life according to the highest virtues. Its end is the common good of its members, i.e., the good of the virtues both speculative and moral, and of the arts.37 The author in this book has attempted to draw a blue print for nation building in all aspect of constitutional democracy. The concept of nation-building instinctively paints a picture of some kind of building with real brick and mortar the edifice this time being the nation. One often hears the expression that "Rome was not built in a day." This expression does little to remove the idea of nation-building from the activities of mason with regard to an edifice. A man watched a group of tourist’s admiring the grandeur of the Sears Building in Carnage.

He stepped up to them and said: "Do you know what? I built that building!" Yes indeed, for he was one of the workmen. With that imagery the implications of nation building could be seen to be that all citizens work together to achieve a common ideal of temporal well-being for all citizens. The people adopt the appropriate means to maintain an internal order as they pursue their ideal; and take appropriate measures to safeguard the community from attacks by non-members.

Nation-building also involves the general co-operation that is needed in a country to develop higher education on a large scale. It also involves 'raising the level and standard of life, increasing social interaction, maintaining postal services and communications, and coordinating economic activities. Nation-building demands that the people should be recognized in their own right and the authority also recognized in its own right. Authority should be entitled to all the powers it needs to promote the general good.

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Nation-building also involves a mutual understanding between the people and the leadership. With this understanding the leadership will be expected to face up to its responsibilities on behalf of the people. It should be careful to recognize, operate within, and never seek to exceed the limits of its powers. It must therefore respect the functions and operation of other agencies beyond its jurisdiction. These agencies and societies include the family, the group and the Church. These spheres that do not come under association for the common good.

The people should also face up to their own responsibilities for national upliftment, development and prosperity. They must be forthcoming with idea. Dispositions and commitments relevant for promoting national goals. They must readily perform their civic duties of paying their tax, maintaining a clean environment, and upholding the rule of law.It is quite an interesting speculative question whether at all it is possible to foster democratic principles in Nigeria. The question is pertinent for the fact that Nigeria is really a very diverse type of community with diverse tendencies among diverse peoples. In other words, what appears democratic from one point of view might appear antidemocratic from another.

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Synopsis The rationale for this book draws on the findings that leadership is the foundation for everything a nation can boast of, like a poor foundation, once leadership is rickety, everything collapses. That has been the bane of the Nigerian state since independence; we have seen several years of misguided leadership of misplaced priorities. We agree with our sages who have noted before now that Nigerian’s problem is leadership. From our findings, it appears that Nigeria’s political elite have shown the worst possible traits in almost every index of measurement and yet the system has not collapsed on its head. It is therefore not surprising that it takes the elasticity of people’s tolerance for granted.

This is rooted in the assumption that ours is a deformed democratizing process which is held hostage by venal ruling elite, most of whom are undemocratic in value and anti-democratic in practice. More than a decade of civil rule, Nigeria’s democratic project has suffered an arrested development, simply because the inheriting elite have no intentions other than the submerging the content of democracy. We thus propose to investigate whether the absence of value, moral and duty which have become the venal conduct and template for the elite across the board have affected the new generation of youths the leaders of tomorrow.

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CHAPTER ONE

Nigeria in Perspective

Each of our three regions is vastly different in many respects, but each has this in common: that despite variety of languages and customs or difference in climate, all form part of one country which has existed as a political and social entity for fifty years. That is why we believe that the political union of Nigeria is destined to be perpetual and indestructible.

Nnamdi Azikiwe.

Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are no ‘Nigerians’ in the same sense as there are ‘English, ‘Welsh,’ or ‘French’ The word Nigeria is a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the boundaries of Nigeria and those who do not.

Obafemi Awolowo.

Since 1914 the British Government has been trying to make Nigeria into one country, but the Nigerian people themselves are historically different in their backgrounds, in their religious beliefs and customs and do not show themselves any sign of willingness to unite, Nigeria unity is only British intention for the country.

Sir Abubakar Tafawa Belewa.

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1. Introduction The last 100 years was a century notable for its global strife, which in the wake of two world wars saw the collapse of the Soviet Union and the birth of many new nations. While some were viable, many began with few resources and poor capital reserves. They were and are still at risk of failure. Although not possessing nuclear weapons, Nigeria has the potential to dramatically affect the United States and the global economy if it fails. Africans are fond of saying: As Nigeria goes, so goes Africa. Nigeria’s geographic and political position in Africa, its single-commodity and soon-to-be-top-20 oil-rich economy, extraordinarily complex demographics, culture of corruption, poor and failing national and human infrastructure, long history of dangerously destabilizing religious and ethnic violence, repeated and potential for future military coups d’état, endemic disease, and its growing importance to the global and US economy present researchers with a myriad of vexing and intractable problems and challenges.

What happens when a modern nation-state fails? Does a single catastrophic event herald a nation’s collapse, or is it the result of a series of failures in critical areas? Does each failure in a series produce a torrent that becomes a cascade resulting in rapid failure, or is it something that happens so slowly that few notice the failure until it is too late? What impact does the failure of an individual state have on other nations in the region or the world? More importantly, what will be required of other nations to respond to the failure of a nation-state now and in the future? If nations choose to respond, what characteristics of a failed state would compel the United States to respond?

Nigeria with its vast oil wealth, already large and growing population, religious and cultural diversity, history of weak governance, endemic corruption, poor health care and education 12 | P a g e

systems, failing human service and industrial infrastructure, rising criminality, importance in West Africa and African security, and potential to disproportionately impact the global economy is a clear example of a nation at risk of failure with an ensuing major impact on the rest of the world. It is a challenging case study candidate. In a foreshadowing of what could happen to Nigeria within the next two decades, Nigeria is currently experiencing tremendous political instability and religious violence.

These significant events mask the grinding poverty and institutional corruption that is destroying the social contract between Nigeria’s government and its 135 million people. With critical reforms on hold or in jeopardy, Nigeria’s future is uncertain at best. This book posits the conditions leading to the collapse of Nigerian governance and the rapid failure of the state in the year 2030. Its intent is descriptive rather than prescriptive, defining a failed state and then briefly examines Nigeria’s history, culture, politics, governance, and military. This book then explores the various interconnected paths and conditions that cause Nigeria, when stressed and declining, to fail and shatter in 2030 as it begins its inexorable slide into civil war.

2. The Question of Nigeria as a failed state A state fails when it suffers “the loss of physical control of its territory; its monopoly on the legitimate use of force; the erosion of its legitimate authority to make collective decisions; an inability to provide reasonable public services; and the inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community.”1 The 2007 Failed State Index, compiled by the Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy magazine, identified these indicators of a failed state and then ranked the nations of the world from those most to least likely to fail based on institutional corruption, criminality, the ability of a government to regulate the economy and collect taxes, internal displacement of citizens, sharp economic decline, group grievances, institutional discrimination, the emigration of the intelligentsia, and the state of the ecology.2 Nigeria, an oil-rich country with the largest population in Africa and a top-20 economy, was ranked 17th most likely to fail on the list of 148 countries studied for the 2007 Failed State Index. The areas of greatest concern for Nigeria included uneven economic and social development, a failure to address group grievances as manifested through an active insurgency, and a perceived lack of government legitimacy. While its oil wealth holds promise for the future of its people, Nigeria’s potential failure holds danger for the global economy and could threaten the vital interests of many nations.

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The Failed State Index researchers conclude that state failure, such as that considered possible in Nigeria, can be catastrophic based on a single incident or may be the result of a long period of decline in which the government can no longer govern or provide for its people. Even worse, states that do fail take a long time to recover. The World Bank surveyed states identified as failed in 1980 and found that they are still failed 28 years later.

In fact, statistical analyses suggest that most of these states will likely require another 28 years, for a total of 56 years to fully recover.3 According to the United States Commission on National Security, state failure results in “an increase in the rise of suppressed nationalisms, ethnic or religious violence, humanitarian disasters, major catalytic regional crises, and the spread of dangerous weapons.”4 In short, failed states are a danger not only to their own people but also to their regional neighbours, and in a highly globalized world, they are a probable danger to the world economy and the vital interests of other nations.

3. Nigeria’s History—Foundations for Failure Nation-states can fail for a myriad of reasons: cultural or religious conflict, a broken social contract between the government and the governed, a catastrophic natural disaster, financial collapse, war and so forth. Nigeria with its vast oil wealth, large population, and strategic position in Africa and the global economy can, if it fails disproportionately affect the global economy. Nigeria, like many nations in Africa, gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1960. It is the most populous country in Africa and will have nearly 250 million people by 2030.

In its relatively short modern history, Nigeria has survived five military coups as well as separatist and religious wars, is mired in an active armed insurgency, is suffering from disastrous ecological conditions in its Niger Delta region, and is fighting one of the modern world’s worst legacies of political and economic corruption. A nation with more than 350 ethnic groups, 250 languages, and three distinct religious affiliations Christian, Islamic, and animist, Nigeria’s 135 million people today are anything but homogenous.

Of Nigeria’s 36 states, 12 are Islamic and under the strong and growing influence of the Sokoto caliphate. While religious and ethnic violence are commonplace, the federal government has managed to strike a tenuous balance among the disparate religious and ethnic factions. With such demographics, Nigeria’s failure would be akin to a piece of fine china dropped on a tile floor it would simply shatter into potentially hundreds of pieces. Poor investment in the nation’s critical infrastructure and underinvestment in health care, education, science, and technology are all leading to a “brain drain” in which Nigeria’s most

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talented and educated citizens are leaving the country. This will leave a future Nigeria even poorer.

Nascent attempts to address electoral and governmental corruption are meeting with some success and hold promise for the future. Recent meetings between the presidency and insurgent groups may, over time, help resolve some of Nigeria’s most intractable and dangerous internal conflicts. The population’s disappointment in its government has not appreciably shaken its faith in democracy. Elections are and will likely remain an important part of Nigerian life as they, despite the odds, provide the people hope that they can make a difference as Nigeria struggles to succeed. Nigeria becoming a failed state is not a foregone conclusion. However, should the oil-rich state of Nigeria, a nation likely to provide up to 25 percent of US light, sweet crude oil imports by 2030, fail, then the effect on the United States and the world economy would be too great to ignore. The threat that failure poses to a quarter billion Nigerians in terms of livelihood, security, and general way of life could quickly spread and cause a humanitarian disaster of previously unimagined proportions.

Although not possessing nuclear weapons, Nigeria has the potential to dramatically affect Africa and the global economy if it fails. Africans are fond of saying: “As Nigeria goes, so goes Africa.” Nigeria’s geographic and political position in Africa, its single-commodity and soon-to-be-top-20 oil-rich economy, extraordinarily complex demographics, culture of corruption, poor and failing national and human infrastructure, long history of dangerously destabilizing religious and ethnic violence, repeated and potential for future military coups d’état, endemic disease, and its growing importance to the global economy present researchers with a myriad of vexing and intractable problems and challenges.

Further complicating Nigeria’s current history is the Issues about Buhari’s failing health and its attendant consequences have dominated the political circles as well as the country’s administration with more people expressing worry that he may have lost grip of critical matters of policy articulation and decision making that could engender efficient governance.

Since January 2017 when he made his last medical trip to the United Kingdom and spent almost two months before his return, issues about his health have day to day remained a consistent national discourse in the country. And the concerns are growing daily.

For the growing legion of persons who have expressed worry about Buhari’s health condition, they have consistently argued that governance was suffering and the economy, which signposts the health of the country, is believed to be held under siege.

President Buhari has not disguised the status of his health, even as his aides make spirited efforts to reduce it to a non-issue. In the last couple of months, he has been in and out of the hospital and his condition seems so critical that he has had to be out of the country to seek 15 | P a g e

medical attention, at least on three occasions. In January, he declared he was going on a 10-day medical vacation and, in line with the dictates of the 1999 Constitution, wrote the Senate to transmit power to the Vice President, Yemi Osinbajo.

But he couldn’t return on the expiration of his initial 10-day vacation. He spent 51 days and although the president gave indication that he might again return to the UK to continue his treatment, he has remained holed up in his official residence with frightening signs that he is in dire need of medical help to stabilise his health and physical strength. Since Buhari came into office, he has embarked on medical related trips thrice outside the shores of Nigeria, raising further questions as to the state of our health care systems and indeed the sustainability of the President’s action. These concerns may be coming amidst huge budgetary allocations to the health sector on annual basis. Stakeholders as well as the international community have had to also raise concerns about how Buhari can sustain reform programmes already initiated and its implication for the recession hit economy.

The frosty relationship between the Executive and the National Assembly, where the over N7trillion budget for 2017 has remained stocked in the lockers may also call to question the fate of the economy for the current fiscal year. Other issues such as the anti-corruption war where the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) has recovered large sums of cash through the whistle blowing policy and the seemingly intractable opposition to the EFCC Acting Chairman, Ibrahim Magu by the Senate accounts for factors also bedevilling the country. Diplomatic and government sources have argued that the condition of the President may be slowing down the pace of economic reforms advanced since May 2015 when the government came on board.

In all these, a public affairs analyst, Adetokunbo Pearse, who featured on Channels TV programme, Sunrise Daily, believes the country is being short-changed in terms of proper governance. He argued that the President’s incapacitation may also be sending a wrong signal to the international community, some of which may be holding back their investments owing to the political uncertainties. To the Presidency and lieutenants of President Buhari, however, there is no cause for alarm.

While each African nation is important, none likely has the potential to dramatically alter the strategic environment both in Africa and the world. Thus, Nigeria is a tantalizing research challenge. What happens when a modern nation-state fails? Does a single catastrophic event herald a nation’s collapse, or is it the result of a series of failures in critical areas?

Does each failure in a series produce a torrent that becomes a cascade resulting in rapid failure, or is it something that happens so slowly that few notice the failure until it is too late?

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What impact does the failure of an individual state have on other nations in the region or the world? More importantly, what will be required of other nations to respond to the failure of a nation-state now and in the future? If nations choose to respond, what characteristics of a failed state would compel the United States to respond? Nigeria with its vast oil wealth, already large and growing population, religious and cultural diversity, history of weak governance, endemic corruption, poor health care and education systems, failing human service and industrial infrastructure, rising criminality, importance in West Africa and African security, and potential to disproportionately impact the global economy is a clear example of a nation at risk of failure with an ensuing major impact on the rest of the world.

It is a challenging case study candidate. In a foreshadowing of what could happen to Nigeria within the next two decades, Nigeria is currently experiencing tremendous political instability and religious violence However, some experts have continued to insist, with cautious optimism though, that there is light at the end of the tunnel. But given the palpable tension that the president’s condition has generated in the corridors of power since the past months, it is evident that the country has suffered hiccups both from the political and economic fronts.

Prices of essential food item and drugs, two critical basic needs for the survival of the common man and his health stability, have in the past six months maintained a steady rise, in response to the rising level of inflation, which stood at 18.7% in the first quarter of 2017 rising from 16.5% in June 2016. Survey across some markets in Lagos, Ibadan, Abuja, Kaduna, Kano, Owerri and Port Harcourt revealed that the prices of staple food have continued to soar in the market, even with reported rise in the value of the Naira to a Dollar.

Food items like semovita, vegetable oil, palm oil, fish, spaghetti, macaroni, rice, beans and garri, including pepper have increased dramatically in the last couple of months. Traders maintained that prices have remained since the market surge in the 2016 Christmas season.

It was observed that the prices of 500g packs of spaghetti and macaroni had increased from N120 to N180, which is about 70 per cent rise in price from N200 for the 1kg bag, to N340; while a 1kg bag of processed wheat has doubled to N280 from N140 at the beginning of the year; garri has also recorded 100 per cent increase within the same period.

Following the same trend, the price of the 100kg bag of red beans has increased from N20,300 to N23,000; while a 50kg bag of rice recorded about 40 per cent price hike from N10,300 to N16,000.For imported vegetable oil, a 25-litre container of the product imported from Malaysia was being sold for N10,000 instead of N6,200 in January, while 25 litres of palm attracted N9,000 instead of N6,000.A carton of Alaska brand of fish cost N11,300, a 22 per cent price increase from N9,300 that it sold for in February.

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Apart from the attendant heated polity which has brought some aspects of government activities into a halt, the capital market is not left out in the raging inferno. For instance, the stock market reports for Q1 2017 had given the indices of the upset that the country’s economy had witnessed in the heat of the confusion over the president’s health. The stock market had reported a huge loss, and this is happening also at a period in which the country was still struggling to crawl out of recession since the third quarter of 2016.Stocks listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) had received a beating from investors in the first quarter (Q1) of 2017, with the value of listed equities dropping by a whopping N418 billion within the period.

Indexes revealed that activities, which opened the year at N9.246 trillion in market capitalisation and 26.874.62 in index at the beginning of trading on January 2017, closed the first quarter of the year on March 31, 2017 at N8.828 trillion and 25,516.34 index points.

Hence, it has earned a year to date loss of about N418 billion or 5.05 per cent year to date.

4. The Nascent State (1960–99) Britain granted Nigeria independence in 1960 after a set of parliamentary elections in late 1959. In this vote, the parties representing the Muslim north earned 142 seats in the 312-seat twelve federal states of Nigeria. A historical map of Nigeria showing 12 federal states created by federal military government on the eve of civil war.5

Figure 1. States of Nigeria. A historical map of Nigeria showing 36 federal states created by a series of federal military governments through military decrees. (from Association of Nigerian Scholars for Dialogue, Wilberforce Conference on Nigerian Federalism 1997, ed. Peter P. Ekeh, www.waado.org/nigerian_scholars/ archive/pubs/wilber8.html.).

I.

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Nnamdi Azikiwe

As the British departed, this newly elected parliament was in place, as was its newly elected leader Nnamdi Azikiwe. Azikiwe became president, replacing the colonial governor. As none of the parties had a majority, the federal legislature was run by a coalition government of Muslims and Christians. Almost immediately, however, periodic crises and charges of corruption were levied at politicians of various factions.6 This mistrust grew and led to a series of challenges, the most serious being challenges to the 1963 national census.

The census would have been used to craft election laws and, more importantly, determine how revenues would be distributed throughout the country. The first postindependence elections in 1964 led to continued charges of political unfairness and boycotts of the electoral process by provinces in the east. Even after a second set of elections was held in those regions which initially boycotted the electoral process, the major governing parties were barely speaking to each other. The army launched a coup d’état in early 1966, assassinating key party leaders in all sectors of the nation.

This revolution, which failed, saw theemergence of Major General AguiyiIronsi who reigned till 291h July 1966.He was not given some time to prove himself beforebeing butcheredwith his host Adekunle Fajuyiby counter coup plotters. The second military dictatorship was more or less the nemesis of Nigeria. The military leader, General Yakubu Gowon out of administrative naivety and tactlessness plunged the nation into a civil war in which lives were lost. These events created the two factions that led to the civil war of 1967—a war in which up to 100,000 died in combat and up to one million more died of starvation. 28 In the end, Maj Gen Yakubu Gowon, the military leader, assumed control of Nigeria in late 1969.

II.

Maj Gen Yakubu Gowon

For a time, General Gowon was able to run the country, but as political restrictions were lifted, demonstrations increased, and political activists began to incite unrest. His attempt to update the 1963 census in 1973 was unsuccessful, as most ethnic groups were fearful of the results and battled census workers to ensure it was not completed fairly.7 Corruption became endemic, which generated inefficiencies in the economy. At one point, the Port of Lagos was clogged with ships filled with goods to unload; the backlog to unload some of these ships stretched to 15 months. As the country descended once more toward chaos, General Gowon was deposed in a bloodless coup d’état in 1975.

III.

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Brig Gen Murtala Muhammad

General Gowon was replaced by Brig Gen Murtala Muhammad, whose first actions were to dismiss 10,000 governmental civil servants for inefficiency and corruption and demobilize 100,000 from the military ranks. General Muhammad scrapped the 1973 census, deeming it an abject failure, leaving the 1963 population count as the official survey used for determining national assembly and senate apportionment. He reset the transition to civilian government with a target date of early 1976, which earned him respect among the people. However, his reign was short-lived. He was assassinated in February of that year, after only seven months in office.

IV.

Lt Gen Olusegun Obasanjo

Military leader Lt Gen Olusegun Obasanjo assumed the national leadership in the intervening years leading up to the 1979 elections. General Obasanjo presided over a period of relative economic prosperity, partly due to increased oil revenues, and led the nation back toward democracy.8Nigeria adopted a constitution based closely on that of the United States. Nigeria elected a new president, a house of representatives, and a senate, all of which took office on 1 October 1979.

These elections, like those of the 1960s, led to a coalition government, as no party garnered a majority of the vote. Disagreements between the parties were substantial. In order to placate party opponents, massive spending on federal projects ensued, which increased the Nigerian national debt and drove down the value of the Nigerian currency.

As a result of its devalued currency, Nigeria’s economy began to decline. A drop in oil prices added to the misery.9By the time the next round of elections occurred in 1983, corruption and a blatant disregard for democratic processes were corrosively endemic in the federal government, and political unrest was growing.10 Despite presiding over a precipitous decline in the Nigerian economy and being highly unpopular, the ruling party claimed nearly three-quarters of the seats in the house and senate, all but confirming a rigged vote count.

V.

Maj Gen Muhammadu Buhari

The military seized power again in 1983 as there was no domestic confidence in the civilian leadership. The new leader was Maj Gen Muhammadu Buhari, who worked to purge the government of corruption, bring federal spending back under control, and stabilize the value of the Nigerian currency, which was plummeting on international markets. General Buhari’s austerity programs to curtail Nigerian debt were unpopular, and many believed he was out of touch.11In the end, Maj Gen Ibrahim Babangida overthrew General Buhari in a coup d’état in 1985.

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VI.

General Ibrahim Babangida

The Babangida regime was faced with the same economic crisis that made the Buhari leadership unpopular. Austerity measures were necessary to entice the International Monetary Fund to offer a bailout plan worth $4.3 billion. In addition to beginning to restructure the economy, General Babangida appointed a commission in 1986 to direct the transition back to civilian rule. Although he did not agree with many of the commission’s recommendations, he implemented them, including a commission recommendation of the further division of Nigeria, creating two more states in 1987.

However, General Babangida wanted to retain his power. While the initial timetable called for new elections before 1990, General Babangida postponed them until 1992.

When the presidential election was held, confusion on the date of voting led to an unusually low participation rate of around 30 percent. The results were nullified by General Babangida, who sought to remain in power as interim president until a new president could be named via yet another set of elections. The combination of these events led to public dissatisfaction. As a result, he was overthrown by yet another coup d’état, which brought Chief Ernest Shonekan to power. After two months, the chief stepped aside.

VII. Sani Abacha Abacha immediately dissolved all organizations of state governance and installed his own regime. He ruled as a corrupt tyrant, often killing political opponents and pocketing national oil revenues. By the time he died in office, some estimates indicate he may have stolen over $3 billion. In fact, Abacha has been listed as the fourth most corrupt leader in world history.Abacha remained president until his 1998 death due to a possible heart attack. As an autopsy was never performed, it is unknown whether the death was by natural causes or assassination by his military advisors in order to effect another coup d’état.

In the wake of Abacha’s death, army general Abdulsalami Abubakar assumed the role of head of state. He immediately freed one past leader, General Obasanjo, from prison and scheduled new national elections. General Obasanjo won the election in 1999 and remained president until April 2007.While president, Obasanjo campaigned for a constitutional amendment to run for a third term; the amendment was never passed, so he stepped down after eight years as president.

VIII.

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Shehu Mus Yar’Adua

Despite a questionable election in 2007, President Yar’Adua rapidly implemented his reform initiatives. These include developing sufficient and adequate power and energy supplies, improving food security and agricultural production, and diversifying the economy. The industrial-based economy emphasizes creating wealth, improving the transportation sector by building modern road and rail networks, promoting land reforms that will make unused land productive for commercial farming, protecting national security, and emphasizing security in the Niger Delta region. Another initiative is investing in twofold reforms in the educational sector to raise Nigeria to the minimum acceptable international standards of education for all by developing a plan for teaching science and technology skills.12 In 2008 Nigerians began to see some results in land reform, but they appear to reserve judgment on how well the reforms will work. In October 2009, President Yar’Adua met with the leader of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) a representatives of insurgent groups within Nigeria in an effort to make good on his promise to improve security in the Niger Delta region.40 President Yar’Adua’s benchmark for assessing the effectiveness of his seven reforms. Yar’Adua Meets with MEND’s Aaron Team,” Times of Nigeria.

This meeting included President Yar’Adua, Nobel Laureate Professor Wole Soyinka, Henry Okah, presumed leader of MEND; and others comprising “the Aaron Team.” The Aaron Team is a group of negotiators established by MEND and led by the former chief of general staff, Vice Adm Mike Akhigbe. Its purpose is to establish a dialogue with the government and work to bring the Niger Delta crisis to a mutually acceptable end. Based on a statement released by MEND confirming the meeting, the group heralded the meeting as “the beginning of serious, meaningful dialogue between MEND and the Nigerian government to deal with and resolve root issues that have long been swept under the carpet” 13 IX.

Dr. Goodluck Jonathan

In accordance with the order of succession in the Nigerian constitution following President Umaru Yar'Adua's death on 5 May 2010, Vice-President Goodluck Jonathan was sworn in as the Acting President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria on 6 May 2010, becoming Nigeria's 14th Head of State. He cited anti-corruption, power and electoral reforms as focuses of his administration. He stated that he came to office under "very sad and unusual circumstances" On 18 May 2010, the National Assembly approved Jonathan's nomination of former Kaduna State governor, Namadi Sambo, for the position of Vice-President.

On 15 September 2010, Jonathan announced on Facebook that he had decided to run for public office on his own for the first time, in the race for the presidency of Nigeria in 22 | P a g e

2011.In the contest for the People’s Democratic Party nomination, Goodluck Jonathan was up against the former vice-president Atiku Abubakar and Mrs. Sarah Jubril. On 13 January 2011 the primary election results were announced in Eagle Square, Abuja.

Jonathan was declared winner with a victory in two-thirds of the states of the Federation counted.

For the general election in 2011, Jonathan and Vice-President Sambo attended political events and travelled the country to campaign for the nation's highest office. Jonathan won the general election against General Muhammadu Buhari and his running mate Pastor Tunde Bakare with 59% of the votes. On 18 April, Jonathan was declared the winner of the election. On 2 August 2010, Jonathan launched his 'Roadmap for Power Sector Reform ‘. Its primary goal was to achieve stable electricity supply in Nigeria.

Historically, the Nigerian Power Sector has been plagued by blackouts. Economists estimate that power outages have cost Nigeria, Africa's biggest economy, billions of dollars in imported diesel for generators and lost output. In a study conducted by the World Bank, a lack of access to financing and electricity were cited as Nigeria's main obstacles to development, surpassing corruption.

President Jonathan has overseen the privatisation of Nigeria's power sector with the end goal being the establishment of an efficient and reliable power supply infrastructure for the Nigerian population. The Power Holding Company of Nigeria, which acted as the nation's electricity provider, has been broken up into 15 firms, with Nigeria handing over control of state electricity assets to 15 private bidding companies. The Nigerian government contracted for the services of CPCS Transcom Limited, a Canada-based consulting firm specialising in transportation and energy infrastructure projects, to act as the transaction adviser for the handover of state electricity assets.

President Jonathan launched the Youth Enterprise with Innovation in Nigeria (YOUWIN) Initiative which he stated would be an innovative business plan competition that harnesses the creative energies of young people between the ages of 18 and 35. The YOUWIN Initiative is expected to create between 40,000 and 50,000 sustainable jobs by 2014. In 2011, President Jonathan launched the Transformation Agenda.

The Agenda is based on a summary of how the Federal Government hopes to deliver projects, programmes, and key priority policies from 2011 to 2015, coordinated by the National Planning Commission (NPC). On 11 September 2013, President Jonathan sacked the creator and coordinator of the Transformation Agenda, Shamsudeen Usman, the Minister of National Planning, along with eight other cabinet ministers amid a rift in the People's Democratic Party (PDP).

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According to President Jonathan, Nigeria's foreign policy was reviewed to reflect a "citizenfocused" approach, designed to "accord this vision of defending the dignity of humanity the highest priority" and connect foreign policy to domestic policy, while placing a greater emphasis on economic diplomacy. On 31 March 2015, Jonathan conceded the election to challenger Muhammadu Buhari, who was sworn in to succeed him on 29 May 2015.

Jonathan said in a statement he issued on 31 March 2015 that "Nobody’s ambition is worth the blood of any Nigerian."

5. The Nigerian State Today This early history of Nigeria tells much about the nation’s stability, its culture, and its corruption. These are crucial to understanding how Nigeria may evolve over the next two to three decades. This timeline shows that there is almost no history or tradition of continuity of leadership in Nigeria. Further, nearly every regime in the country’s history has been, by Western standards, corrupt. Money is siphoned from major industries by those in power, sometimes at the rate of hundreds of millions of dollars per year. The inability of the Nigerian government to agree on a census for over 40 years undermines the legitimacy of the electoral process and thus the legitimacy of Nigerian governance.

In short, Nigeria is a country that has been governmentally unstable. Ruled by corrupt elites who have shown an enormous reluctance to relinquish power, sometimes unto death, it has no history of majority governance or even national agreement on any major issue.

Analogous to a plate of china, Nigeria remains crisscrossed by a myriad of stress cracks and fissures that are the result of the ethnic and religious cleavages spanning the country. If sufficiently stressed, this china plate will split or even shatter. What is frightening is that, stressed in the wrong manner, Nigeria is a nation-state which could conceivably splinter into dozens or even hundreds of independent pieces.14 I.

The Social Schisms of Nigeria Nigeria is a mosaic of dramatic demographic forces fused together by the early twentieth century machinations of the British Empire. Brought under colonial rule in the late nineteenth century, Nigeria relished the independence it received in 1960.

Invigorated by the discovery of oil in 1956, the fledgling nation hoped for a bright future. Instead, the young state fractured through corruption and took the next half century to achieve some semblance of stable self-governance.

II.

Demographic Fissures Nigeria is comprised of approximately 350 ethnic groups, more than any other nation on the vast African continent.1 Four main groups make up the majority of this

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population: Hausa and Fulani (29 percent), Yoruba (21 percent), and Igbo (18 percent) These and the next eight significant population groups of Kanuri, Ibibio, Tiv, Ijaw, Nupe, Anang, Efik, and Kalbari bring with them distinct languages. While English stands as Nigeria’s official language, three other market languages—Yoruba, Igbo, and Hausa—also tie the people together politically and economically.15 Thrown into this linguistic milieu is a mix of ethnic, geographical, and historical diversity that has often boiled over into open, genocidal conflict. This was particularly evident in the Igbo uprising of the late 1960s, a civil war that cost roughly 1.1 million Nigerian lives.16as recently as the year 2000, more than 1,900 Nigerians died in clashes between Muslims and Christians in the seam states. This highlights a deep religious divide that continues to trouble Nigeria.

Religion is often the primary defining factor in Nigeria for economic, social justice, and political reasons. Nigeria has the greatest number of people in any single African nation, as well as the continent’s largest and the world’s sixth largest Muslim population. Most of Nigeria’s Muslims, who currently account for roughly 50 percent (and rapidly growing) of the population, live in the 14 northern states; nearly 40 percent of Nigerians profess the Christian faith and dwell in the 22 southern states; and the last 10 percent of the population professes syncretism or other indigenous (animist) beliefs and are scattered across Nigeria. Consider the vastness of the country nearly one out of every four sub-Saharan Africans is Nigerian. According to a recent report from the Washington, DC–based Centre for New American Security, violent civil conflict remains a significant possibility in Nigeria.

Religion is a key factor worthy of attention by the international community and the US government in particular. Culture is also a strong force in Nigerian life. “For most Nigerians, social life unfolds within an ethnic context, and this tie to one’s group is manifest in a proliferation of ethnic states, politic parties, demands for teaching in local languages and various otherethnic-cultural organizations.”17 Nigeria experiences ongoing communal violence between Christians and Muslims and among its various ethnic groups. At least 800,000 people have been driven from their homes since 2003 because of these clashes. Some of the most violent disputes have been between Muslim ethnic Fulani herders and Christian ethnic Mambila farmers over grazing lands in the eastern part of the country. A similar conflict brewed at a lower level in the north between farmers and herders of different religions, several were killed, prompting the dispatch of hundreds of police officers to the area.

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In the Niger Delta region, insurgent conflict persists over resource allocation and oil profits such conflict is defined as criminality by the Nigerian government.

AsariDokubo, leader of the Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force, was arrested in September 2004 after he called for the disintegration of the Nigerian state. His detainment brought a temporary moratorium to all insurgency activities in the Delta but indicated strong civil sentiment with respect to control of oil resources and selfdetermination. Intercommunal violence provoked a military crackdown that destroyed the Rivers State town of Odiama in the Niger Delta. Ethnic, regional, and community ties also define politics in Nigeria.

Patronage is a strong dynamic in the culture, where candidates who “buy off” the most constituents generally win elections.18this perversion of governance flows from Nigeria’s corrupt society, culture, and precolonial history. It also inflames growing ethnic nationalism across the across the country. American anthropologist and author Daniel Jordan Smith postulates, “The prominence of corruption as both a justification for nationalist movements and a critique to undermine them illustrates both the extent of discontent about corruption and Nigerians’ cynicism that anyone can rise above it.”19 Nigerians are a proud people whose nationalism runs as deep as the corruption woven in the fabric of their living and trade. Driving this rampant corruption is a petroleum-based economy, a combination which affords wealth to the few in power, namely the oligarchs. Even as annual petroleum revenues exceed $90 billion, the vast majority of Nigerians live on less than two dollars a day, with many surviving on less than one dollar a day.20 Tribal and especially political-based patronage networks providing power to chosen “haves” exacerbate economic disparity.21 Alongside religious beliefs, patronage networks driven by a culture of corruption define the way of life for the vast majority of Nigerians and are a pretext for internal conflict.

III.

The Rise of Information Enter the twenty-first century with the sprawl of information and the spread of information technologies. Africa, with its lack of infrastructure, is ripe for growth in an industry that constantly seeks new markets. One-hundred-dollar laptops, wireless cell phones, and the Internet will grant access to seemingly bottomless wells of digital information to anyone on the network.22 Thomas Freidman describes this phenomenon simply by the title of his 2005 book, The World Is Flat. Information technology was, is, and will likely remain a key flattening force but only in the context of conveniently aligned events in the

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developed world. Among these were the fall of the Berlin Wall, huge intellectual capital investments within the population of India, and the global fibre optic networks laid during the “dot-com” period of the late 1990s.23 But the present-day surge in information technology alone does not create vast social and cultural change in all countries. It operates primarily in societies that are poised for that change. Lacking a robust communications hardware infrastructure, Nigeria is ripe for the revolution that this wireless generation of information technology promises.

This rise of information is also taking on the traditional power of the media once governed by states. Internet blogs such as Global Voices Online offer dialogue and expression and were an open forum for many Nigerians in last year’s elections. “New information and communication tools such as wikis, blogs, ‘tweets,’ podcasts, and social networking sites have the potential to transform election reporting, campaigning, monitoring, and political discussions all over the world.”24 Nigeria provides a unique cyberspace outlet in this global market of information and ideas in Africa. The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) administrator Kemal Dervis stated, “Globalization has fundamentally altered the world economy, creating winners and losers.

Reducing inequalities both within and between countries, and building a more inclusive globalization is the most important development challenge of our time.”25 Information technology is both a powerful flattener and a effective means to unravel the inequalities that create social disparity in Nigeria. But it also is a double-edged sword. Knowledge gained through information technology brings power to the people, the power of transparency, and has the potential to generate unrest among unequal’s that compete for an interest in Nigeria’s IV.

Corruption and Criminality Corruption holds a prominent place in Nigerian trade and daily living. With respect to Nigeria’s culture of corruption, Smith states, “Discontent about corruption, frustration over perceived marginalization, and aspirations for a more equal and just society are expressed in religious language. This is among the most significant and potentially explosive trends in contemporary Nigerian society,”26 and leaves the general population “interpreting corruption and inequality in a language that highlights ethnic discrimination.”27 More than anything, corruption drives a criminal element prominent in Nigeria’s lucrative oil industry. A militant sector classified as “criminality” by the government emerged in the Niger Delta region with an agenda to highlight environmental abuses

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in the Delta.40 MEND, a growing and powerful opposition force to Nigeria’s military since 2005, is the most prominent among these groups. MEND is credited for reducing Nigeria’s oil production by as much as 25 percent in recent years and by 50 percent capacity for brief periods in 2009.28 The combined effort of criminality in the Delta and piracy in the Gulf of Guinea has led to the loss of 10 percent of Nigeria’s $92 billion oil industry as of 2007; oil business revenues in mid-2009 were running at around $40 billion per year.29These revenues undoubtedly strengthen forces both inside and outside Nigeria that keep the state and region unstable. In addition, unregulated oil production in the Delta has led to a local ecological crisis of acid rain, air pollution, and fouled waters that has limited the Niger Delta population’s access to clean drinking water and stable fishing stocks.30 Corruption in Nigeria is not just a domestic issue. Transnational crime has germinated in Nigeria over the past four decades. Louise Shelley argues that “the growth of transnational crime is inevitable because of the rise in regional conflicts, decline in border controls, greater international mobility of goods and people, and the growing economic disparities between developed and developing countries.”

31

These forces of instability declining oil production, endemic corruption, and rising criminality plague Nigeria and could define a path to state failure. The corruption in Nigeria reaches to the highest levels of government and has the potential to be a major catalyst in state failure.

The Nigerian government initiated efforts to create a perception that it is addressing this corruption. It established the Nigerian Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). The EFCC has the reputation of being the president’s storefront in that it serves to protect his financial exploits and target people of interest.32 This reputation undermines government legitimacy. An Internet poll conducted by The Fund for Peace asked what single factor causes state failure. The overwhelming response was “corruption,” appearing three times more often than that of the next category, “lack 28 of basic education.”33 Corruption challenges any notion of sound governance, effectively undermining public trust and confidence. Nigeria’s persistent poverty points to a fundamental failure in national and local governance and exposes the corruption that defines Nigerian life. The World Bank lists Nigeria as a less than a 25th percentile nation for government effectiveness, as shown in figure 7.47 Criminality is undoubtedly a critical driver in Nigeria’s poor performance in governance.34

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V.

Petro-Culture Collapse Oil drives the Nigerian power brokers and energizes nationalist sentiments and even transnational forces to bring conflict to the country. The global economy in 2009 heavily depends on Nigeria’s oil resources, but the rise of new energy technologies in the twenty-first century threatens the importance of Nigeria’s dominant industry in the next 20 years. Traditional energy suppliers face shifting markets driven by the national security interests of competing global powers. Nations built and dependent on oil commodities face dramatic change, including loss of revenue and possible chaos as governments find themselves unable to pay for vital social services for their populations.

A possible future decline in the world’s oil demand driven by new types of energy bodes ill for Nigeria. A weakened petrol-based economy, combined with a large socially oppressed and possibly radicalized youth population and a corrupt and illegitimate government, has the potential to shatter Nigerian society. Civil clashesare certain to worsen following such a collapse. The failure of central and local governments to create the institutions and infrastructure that normally foster prosperity, support education, andpromote equity will foreclose options for dealing with this impending social and economic crisis.

VI.

Clash of Haves and Have-Nots The youth bulge exacerbates Nigeria’s imbalance in resource distribution. The country’s transportation infrastructure, left undeveloped, makes efficient transport of goods virtually impossible and subject to exploitation by the MEND’s roving gangs.

Nigeria’s growing population is expected to climb to 225 million by 2030. Marked by near 6 percent unemployment in 2007,49 the youth bulge will result in dismal employment prospects for restless workers who will find little hope for work in the nation’s weak industrial sector. Despite Nigeria’s strong progress in food security, the UN Food and Agriculture Organization posits that Nigeria may suffer future water shortages in the agrarian north. This region borders the Sahel and the Sahara, an area known as a training ground for international terrorist groups. Complicating economic development in the north is the suffocating cloak of Sharia law, which prevents women from gaining an education or achieving equality in the workplace, effectively eliminating half the potential of Nigeria’s northern states. This latter dynamic is taking place in the region where birth rates are the highest in the country.35

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Over time, this will further widen the economic disparity that defines the rift between north and south. The effects of climate change may adversely affect the whole of the country. The story of global climate change has gained traction, as evidenced by the US decision at the late 2007 global summit in Bali to implement and enforce initiatives to bring its domestic industry into tighter compliance with rules regulating harmful emissions.36 The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in Copenhagen, Denmark, in December 2009 produced some additional momentum.

Regardless of severity, climate change potentially threatens to impact global demographics, especially in states that have enormous investment and dependency on industries operating near the coasts and those with large population concentrations located near ocean or desert areas.37 While the Sahara Desert may expand more rapidly into the northern agrarian regions, a rise in the sea level may affect the coastal south. In short, global changes in climate could displace people and disrupt economic activities in coastal centres such as Lagos or the Niger Delta.38 Internal displacement or forced migration of populations from these threatened regions only exacerbates current ethnic tensions.

As a result of the influences of culture, climate change, and governmental corruption, an economic schism is developing across Nigeria, and this divide is likely to worsen.

As noted earlier, Nigeria’s south is receiving a disproportionately large fraction of the infrastructure development for the purpose of bringing goods and services to the major seaports. These advances are not likely in the north where its leaders and social structure tend to stifle education, restrict global and national engagement, and restrain economic opportunity.

As the Muslim population in the north grows, the combination of traditional values will keep the restive youth in the conservative north primed for conflict against the more liberal south. These northern “have-nots,� possibly radicalized and angry, will likely foment the rise of civil conflict in years ahead. Ocean levels in areas near sea level, like the Niger Delta, could force the migration of millions of people. 39 6. Nigeria's Military Coup Culture In the assessment of military government that has taken the bulk of the years since the existence of Nigeria as a nation, the first strike by the revolutionaries showed that it was welcomed across the sections of the country. Not until it was dawn of the botched revolution of 15th January 1966 that tribalism came to work with the agenda of exterminating the Igbo race. A roll call of the coup plotters were peopled mostly by Igbo population but the feeling that greeted the purge in the first republic was solidarity greetings and happiness across the 30 | P a g e

country, from students in the Universities to the Labour leadersThis revolution, which failed, saw the emergence of Major General AguiyiIronsi who reigned till 29th July 1966.He was not given some time to prove himself beforebeing butcheredwith his host Adekunle Fajuyi by counter coup plotters.

Colonel Adebayo had ordered a search for their bodies, which were eventually discovered by the police. The Inspector-General of Police Kam Selem would have been informed when his men discovered the bodies. Although Ojukwu was several hundred miles away in the Eastern Region when Aguiyi- Ironsi and Fajuyi were murdered, the story of their death likely would have been relayed to him by Aguiyi- Ironsi's air force ADC Lieutenant Andrew Nwankwo who was captured along with Aguiyi-Ironsi and Fajuyi but managed to escape moments before they were shot. Commodore Wey admitted that all the debaters already knew what happened to Aguiyi-Ironsi. Ojukwu simply wanted Gowon to publicly acknowledge what the SMC members already knew: that Aguiyi-Ironsi was dead. Ojukwu later confirmed that; "I heard the rumour that he [Ironsi] had been assassinated, so I began making contacts because I wanted to force them out in the open so that we could start dealing with the real situation." Gowon agreed to make a public announcement, and Kam Selem concurred, although he counselled that "the statement should be made in Nigeria so that the necessary honor can be given."40 After the soldiers agreed to make a public statement formally announcing AguiyiIronsi's death, the microphones were switched off and the civilians were asked to leave the room.

Ankrah left the Nigerian officers alone in the inner chamber to discuss Aguiyi-Ironsi's fate.

Gowon then narrated the grisly tale of how Aguiyi-lronsi and Fajuyi were abducted from State House in Ibadan by junior Northern soldiers (including Gowon's ADC Lieutenant Walbe), driven out to an isolated bush outside Ibadan and shot there. The corpses of AguiyiIronsi and Fajuyi were exhumed twice. Firstly the bodies were recovered from the shallow graves they were buried in along Iwo road just outside Ibadan. Then they were reburied in the Ibadan military cemetery where they remained for six months before being exhumed again, this time for fitting burials with full military honors. Aguiyi-Ironsi was finally laid to rest in Umuahia and Fajuyi in Ado-Ekiti. The head of the navy, Commodore Wey, represented the federal government at AguiyiIronsi's funeral along with Lt-Colonel David Ejoor, the military governor of the Mid-West Region.

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They were the only SMC members to attend the funeral. Wey and Ejoor, along with Kam Selem, the Inspector-General of Police; Major Mobolaji Johnson, the military governor of Lagos; and Fajuyi's successor, Colonel Robert Adebayo, also attended Fajuyi's funeral at Uberry Stadium Ibadan, where the funeral service was conducted by the army's chaplain, Reverend Father Pedro Martins. Fajuyi's widow Eunice is still alive. His son Dayo was the chairman of Ado-Ekiti Local Government Area and was also given the traditional title EzigboEnyi Ndigbo by the Igbo National Council.

When Ojukwu expressed his disgust over the murder of Igbo army officers by their Northern colleagues in July 1966, Lt-Colonel Katsina interjected by asking Ojukwu why he had not reacted with the same revulsion when senior Northern military officers were murdered by Igbo soldiers seven months earlier. Ojukwu reasoned that, in January 1966, soldiers from every region of the federation (Nzeogwu: Mid-West, Ifeajuna: Eastern, Ademoyega: Western, Kpera: Northern) had staged a coup in which soldiers and politicians from every region of the federation (Akintola: Western, Balewa: Northern, Unegbe: Eastern, Okotie-Eboh: MidWestern) were also killed. When Northern soldiers staged a revenge coup in July, soldiers from one region only (North: Danjuma, Murtala, Martin Adamu et al) singled out soldiers from one other region in the federation as their targets (Eastern: Okoro, Aguiyi-Ironsi, (Vanguard, 17 November 2003 etc.). Katsina took this opportunity to remind Ojukwu of the effort he had made to prevent the murder of Igbos.Katsina said to Ojukwu, "If you know how much wehave tried to counsel the people to stop all these movements and mass killings, you will give me and others a medal tonight."41 The second military dictatorship was more or less the nemesis of Nigeria. The military leader, General Yakubu Gowonout of administrative naivety and tactlessness plunged the nation into a civil war in which lives were lost. Millions perished in this struggle. Apart from soldierswho died in trenches and fronts in their hundreds of thousands, many civilians died during air raids and starvation.

Ankrah's opening remarks were met with applause by the Nigerians. Gowon spoke first and proposed that the meeting should not have a chairman as each of them was a joint chairman, in his opinion. His proposal was unanimously accepted. Although Commodore Wey

played

an

avuncular

role,

the

discussion

revolved

around

the

younger

Colonels:Adebayo, Ejoor, Katsina, Ojukwu and Gowan. Ojukwu showed from the beginning that he was prepared for serious business. He arrived at the conference armed with notes and secretaries. He gave the other debaters copies of documents which enunciated his ideas. Given his preparedness, the other debaters should have realized that some serious bargaining was going to occur.

32 | P a g e

Despite the grave nature of the issues at hand, the last vestiges of the officers' brotherly Sandhurst code of honour, with emphasis on orderly comportment, was still evident. The jocular back slapping mess camaraderie of the pre-coup days briefly returned. After the hostility and bitterness that preceded the Aburi meeting, the civilian observers were stunned.

The debaters threw off formality and addressed each other by their first names: "Emeka," "Bolaji,""Jack" (nickname of Lt-Colonel Gowon) were thrown around as if addressing each other in at a social gathering. Mixed in with the good natured banter and humour were solemn requests by the FMG delegation for Ojukwu to attend future SMC meetings. Ojukwu was repeatedly assured of his safety by Gowon, Wey, Katsina and Selem.

At one point Wey emotionally declared to Ojukwu, "I am going to offer my life to you so that if you lose yours, you can take mine." Gowon turned to Wey and comically told him, "Your life is older than his!" (a comment which was met with laughter by the other officers). With Ojukwu continuing to insist that he would not attend SMC meetings in any place where Northern soldiers were present, Selem and Katsina offered to host SMC meetings in their hometowns (Gombe and Katsina respectively) as there were no army units there. Ojukwu upped the humour ante by inviting them to his own hometown of Nnewi, since there were no army units there either. Again, the soldiers descended into hearty laughter.

One of Ojukwu's secretaries was amazed to observe that: the meeting went on in a mostfriendly and cordial atmosphere which made us, the non-military advisers, develop a genuine respect and admiration for the military men and their sense of comradeship. The meeting continued so smoothly and ended so successfully ... that I, for one, was convinced that among themselves, the military had their own methods.42 Ojukwu decided to show his good faith, and to test the good faith of the others, by asking all present to renounce the use of force to settle the crisis. Ojukwu's motion was accepted without objection. While this request by Ojukwu may sound very noble, he was in fact a cunning soldier-politician. Ojukwu (despite his boasts of the Eastern Region's military prowess) realized that he could not succeed in a military conflict against the far more heavily armed FMG. By getting them to renounce the use of force, Ojukwu was trying to negate the FMG's military advantage. For he knew that if the political situation eventually got out of control, the FMG would find it difficult to resort to a military campaign having already given an assurance that they would not use force. This may have been an influential factor in Gowon's subsequent reluctance to engage the Eastern Region in a fully-fledged war.

The stage of Aburi was tailor made for Ojukwu, who is a born orator. It was his finest hour.

As has been pointed out elsewhere, "Ojukwu is a born talker. He loves words, their sound, articulation and infinite subtleties of meaning."' It was obvious to the non-military observers 33 | P a g e

of the Aburi conference that Ojukwu "was clearly the star performer. Everyone wanted to please and concede to him." On the federal side only the military governor of the Northern Region, Lt-Colonel Katsina, seemed to realize the significance of what was going on.

Anxious not to allow Ojukwu’s control of the proceedings to continue for too long, he at one point dared Ojukwu to "secede, and let the three of us (West, North, Mid-West) join together." Alarmed by talk of a possible break-up of Nigeria, Ankrah quickly interjected and told his guests that "There is no question of secession when you come here [to Ghana]." A though the FMG delegation were keen to mollify and make concessions to Ojukwu LtColonel Katsina was more blunt than his colleagues. He declared matter-of-fact to Ojukwu: "You command the east; if you want to come into Nigeria, come into Nigeria and that is that."43 I.

The Constitutional Debate

The debate regarding Nigeria's future constitutional structure also exposed the cynicism of Nigeria's geo-political groups. At the Aburi conference, the Northern lee FMG advocated a strong central government, while the Eastern Region advocated; weaker central government with devolution of power to each regional government This was an almost comical reversal of each side's position a few months earlier Northerners had been so opposed to a strong federal government only a few months! Earlier that they carried out mass pogroms against Igbos in revolt against a deem passed by an Igbo head of state that sought to fortify the powers of the federal government. Now that a Northerner was head of state, the Northern Region sudden!) Found the concept of a strong central government attractive.

Conversely, the main Igbo Eastern Region had long advocated concentrating stronger powers in the central government. Now that the central government was no longer headed by an Igbo the Eastern Region was arguing for the dilution of the central government’spower Each side's voice face is an instructive lesson in how seemingly ideological political positions in Nigeria are often guided by geographic and ethnic sentiment.

Using his "skilful histrionics and superior intellectual adroitness,"Ojukwu managed to get the other Colonels to understand, and share his reasoning that in order to keep Nigeria together as one nation, its constituent regions first had to move a little further apart from each other.

Ojukwu used a metaphor or to explain his reasoning:"it’s better that we move slightly apart and survive, it is much worse that we move closer and perish in the collision."44 This may have been a paradox, but the Colonels accepted the logic of Ojukwu'sargument.

Amazingly Gowon accepted Ojukwu's thesis without really understanding the constitutional implications of what he was agreeing to. Gowon was effectively sanctioning measures that would paralyze his own powers. Lt-Colonel Katsina and Colonel Adebayo also agreed and 34 | P a g e

were attracted to the concept of regional autonomy. Adebayo agreed so enthusiastically that he advocated a "repeal [of) those Decrees that were passed after 1st January, 1966 but I think we should revert to what the country was as at 14th January, 1966, that is regionalAutonomy."45 Ojukwu envisaged a titular head of state that would act only with the concurrence of the various regional governments: "What I envisage is that whoever isat the top is a constitutional chap -constitutional within the context of the military government. That is, he is a titular head, but he would only act where, say when we have met and taken a decision."

Having got what, he wanted, Ojukwu was not content with the agreement to be an oral one (even though it had been taped).

He insisted that "we must write it down in our decisions quite categorically that the legislative and executive authority of the Federal Military Government shall be vested in the Supreme Military Council because previously it had been vested in the Supreme Commander." By vesting official authority in the SMC (of which Ojukwu was a member) rather than the Supreme Commander Gowon, Ojukwu could ensure that no meaningful governmental decisions would be taken without his consent. To signify the limited powers that would be exercised by the head of state envisaged.

There were many positives in the accords, the best perhaps being the implicit concept of regional autonomy skilfully negotiated by Ojukwu. Under this proposal no significant decisions affecting a region could be taken without its consent. The failure to implement this part of the accord has enabled the FMG to time and time again, impose its will on the regions, even when the federal will isopposed by that region.

The Aburi failure was the beginning of the end of the concept of regional autonomy and selfsufficiency in Nigeria. The clash, and ill-defined relationship between Nigeria's central and regional governments, has been the greatest source of political bloodletting in the country's history. It is the source of the current armed conflict in the Niger Delta.

The discovery of large deposits of lucrative crude oil in Ojukwu's Eastern Region reinforced federal desire to maintain a united Nigeria, and to strengthen the powers of the central government in order to obtain and maintain control of earnings from crude oil exports.

Permitting regional autonomy and control over natural resources would have led to a spectacular wealth disparity between the Eastern Region and the other regions.

The presence of massive deposits of crude oil in the southern minority areas subsequently encouraged the increasing concentration of economic and executive power in the FMG rather than in state governments. This was not due tounitary idealism, but to the desire of 35 | P a g e

Nigeria's non-oil producing regions to gain access, the diluted phrase "Commander-in-Chief" should be used to address the head of state as opposed to "Supreme Commander." The title "Commander-in-Chief" has been employed by every Nigerian head of state subsequent to Aburi. Although this suited Ojukwu's objectives and protected his vulnerable position, from the FMG's perspective it came with the hidden danger that its decisions could be held hostage by one rogue region or military governor.

While the other delegates arrived at Aburi with a simple, but unformulated idea that somehow, Nigeria must stay together, Ojukwu arrived with a well prepared vision of his desired outcome and convinced his colleagues in the SMC to accept resolutions that if implemented, would have turned Nigeria into a glorified tax and currency union. Ojukwu managed to get virtually everything he wanted, and was so pleased by his success that he even declared that he would serve under Gowon if he (Gowon) kept to the agreements reached. At that point, Gowon arose from his table position and embraced Ojukwu. Ankrah drove Ojukwu and Gowon back to the airÂŹ port in his car, with Gowon and Ojukwu either side of him.

The fulcrum of the agreement at Aburi was that each region would be responsible for its own affairs, and that the FMG would be responsible for matters that affected the entire country.

Afterwards the officers toasted their reconciliation and agreement with champagne. The federal delegation's jubilation was such that on his plane flight home, Ojukwu asked one of his secretaries whether the federal delegation had fully understood the implications of what had been agreed. Hindsight tells us that no one at Aburi (other than Ojukwu) really understood the constitutional implications of what was agreed. Ojukwu was obviously delighted with this -that is why he was in such a hurry to implement the decisions taken, and why the FMG had to renege on them.

The Aburi accords were never implemented to a number of reasons. When Gowon returned to Lagos, his civil servants were aghast at the depth of his concessions to Ojukwu. They regarded the accord as unworkable.

Table 1: Nigerian Military High Command as of January 14, 1966

Name

Position

Background

Major Gen. Johnson

East: Igbo

UmunakweAguyi-

General

Ironsi

Commanding Nigerian Army

36 | P a g e

Officer (GOC)

-

Commodore Joseph Commanding EdetAkinwale Wey Brigadier

Officer

Mixed Yoruba Eastern Minority

Nigerian Navy Lagos

Samuel Commander,

1

Brigade West: Yoruba

AdesujoAdemulegun -Kaduna Brigadier

Commander.2 Brigade

ZakariyaMaimalari

Lagos

Brigadier

Overseas in London

Kanuri: North West: Yoruba

BabafemiOlatunde A. Ogundipe Commanding Colonel W.Timming Brigadier

officer, German Expatriate officer

Nigerian Air Force-Kaduna

M.R. Commandant,

Varma

Defense

Nigerian Indian expatriate officer

Academy

-

Kaduna Col

Robert Attending imperial defence West: Yoruba

Adeyinka Adebayo

college in London

Col Kur Mohammed

(Acting) Chief of staff at North: Kanuri Army Headquarters-Lagos

Col. RaphAdetunji

Deputy

Commandant West: Yoruba

Nigerian DefenceAcademy and

Nigerian

Military

college Kaduna Lt.

Col.

David Commanding

AkpodeEjoor

Battalion Enugu

Lt.Col. Hilary Njoku

Commanding

Officer

1st Mid- West: Urhobo

officer

2nd East: Igbo

officer

3rd East: Ijaw

Battalion Lagos Lt.

Col.

George Commanding

Kurubo

Battalion-Kaduna

Lt.col.

Commanding

AbogoLargema

battalion -Ibadan

Lt.col.

Commanding

37 | P a g e

officer Officer

4th North: Kanuri 5th East Igbo

Chukwuemeka

Battalion-Kanu

Odimegwu Ojukwu Lt.

Col.

James Adjutant

Yakubu Pam Lt.

general

of

the North: Birom

Nigerian Army-Lagos

Col.

Arthur Quarter master-General of East:Igbo

ChinyeluUnegbe

the Nigerian Army-Lagos

Lt. Col. OgereUmo Commanding officer-Lagos East: Igbo Imo

Garrison (Abatri Barracks)

Major.

Hassan Commanding

Usman Katsina

Officer, North: Fulani

st

1 Reconnaisance squadron-Kaduna

Major.John

Commanding

Officer, Mid-West : Igbo

Ikechukwu Obienu

2ndReconnaisance squadron-Abeokuta

Lt.

Col.Yakubu Preparing

‘Jack’ Gowon

to

command

take

of

over North: Angas 2nd

the

battalion from lt. Col. Hilary Njoku Major.Donatus

Commander

Okafor

Guards

Federal East: Igbo Lagos(Dodan

Barracks) Lt. Col. Victor Banjo

Director,

Electrical

and West: Yoruba

Mechanical Engineers Lt.

Col.

Rudolph Director

of

Trimnell

Transport

Lt. Col. Philip Efiong

Director

Signals

of

and Mid-West:Itsekiri

Ordinance East: Ibibio

Services Lt.

Col.

Conrad Nigerian Military attaché in Mid-West: Igbo

Nwawo

London

Col. Austen Peters

Director, Medical Corps

West: Yoruba

Nigerian Police Hierarchy as of January 14, 1966 Name

Position

Louis Edet

Inspector

38 | P a g e

Background General

of East: Efik

Police(on leave) Alhaji Kam Selem

(Acting) Inspector General of North Police

Hamman Maiduguri

Commissioner

of

Police- North

of

Police- North: Fulani

Lagos Alhaji

Mohammed

Dikko Commissioner

Yusuf

Northern Region

Patrick Okeke

Commissioner of Police – East: Igbo Eastern Region

Timothy Omo Bare

Commissioner of Police Mid- Mid-West Edo Western Region

Odofin Bello

II.

Commissioner of Police

West: Yoruba

Speech of Major Nzeogwu -Declaration of Martial Law in Northern Nigeria, January 15, 1966

In the name of the Supreme Council of the Revolution of the Nigerian armed forces, I declare martial law over the northern provinces of Nigeria. The Constitution is suspended and the regional government and elected assemblies are hereby dissolved. All political, cultural, tribal and trade union activities, together with all demonstrations and unauthorized gatherings, excluding religious worship, arebanned until further notice. The aim of the Revolutionary Council is to establish a strong united and prosperous nation, free from corruption and internal strife. Our method of achieving this is strictly military but we have no doubt that every Nigerian will give us maximum cooperation by assisting the regime and not disturbing the peace during the slight changes that are taking place. I am to assure all foreigners living and working in this part of Nigeria that their rights will continue to be respected. All treaty obligations previously entered into with any foreign nation will be respected and we hope that such nations will respect our country's territorial integrity and will avoid taking sides with enemies of the revolution and enemies of the people.

My dear countrymen, you willhear,and probably see a lot being done by certain bodies charged by the Supreme Council with the dutiesof national integration, supreme justice, general security and property recovery. As an interim measure all permanent secretaries, corporation chairmen and senior heads of departments are allowed to make decisions until the new organs are functioning, so long as such decisions are not contrary to the aims and wishes of the Supreme Council. No Minister or Parliamentary Secretary possesses 39 | P a g e

administrative or other forms of control over any Ministry, even if they are not considered too dangerous to be arrested. This is not a time for long speech-making and so let me acquaint you with ten proclamations in the Extraordinary Orders of the Day which the Supreme Council has promulgated. These will be modified as the situation improves.

You are hereby warned that looting, arson, homosexuality, rape,embezzlement, bribery or corruption, obstruction of the revolution, sabotage, subversion, falsealarms and assistance to foreign invaders, are all offenses punishable by death sentence.Demonstrations and unauthorized assembly, non-cooperation with revolutionary troops are punishable in grave manner up to death.

Refusal or neglect to perform normal duties or any task that may of necessity be ordered by local military commanders in support of the change will be punishable by a sentence imposed by the local military commander. Spying, harmful or injurious publications, and broadcasts of troop movements or actions, will be punished by any suitable sentence deemed fit by the local military commander.

Shouting of slogans, loitering and rowdy behaviour will be rectified by any sentence of incarceration, or any more severe punishment deemed fit by the local military commander.Doubtful loyalty will be penalized by imprisonment or any more severe sentence.Illegal possession or carrying of firearms, smuggling or trying to escape with documents, valuables, including money or other assets vital to the running of any establishment will be punished by death sentence.

Wavering or sitting on the fence and failing to declare open loyalty with the revolution will be regarded as an act of hostility punishable by any sentence deemed suitable by the local military commander.Tearing down an order of the day or proclamation or other authorized noticeswillbe penalized by death.This isthe end of the Extraordinary Order of the Day which you will soon begin to see displayed in public.

My dear countrymen, no citizen should have anything to fear, so long as that citizen is law abiding and if that citizen has religiously obeyed the native laws of the country and those set down in every heart and conscience since 1stt October, 1960. Our enemies are the political profiteers, the swindlers, the men in high and low places that seek bribes and demand 10 percent, those that seek to keep the country divided permanently so that they can remain in office as ministers or VIPs at least, the tribalists, the nepotists, those that make the country look big for nothing before international circles, those that have corrupted our society and put the Nigerian political calendar back by their words and deeds. Like good soldiers we are not promising anything miraculous or spectacular. But what we do promise every law abiding citizen is freedom from fear and all forms of oppression, freedom from general 40 | P a g e

inefficiency and freedom to live and strive in every field of human endeavour, both nationally and internationally. We promise that you will no more be ashamed to say that you are a Nigerian.

I leave you with a message of good wishes and ask for your support at all times, so that our land, watered by the Niger and Benue, between the sandy wastes and Gulf of Guinea, washed in salt by the mighty Atlantic, shall not detract Nigeria from gaining sway in any great aspect of international endeavour.My dear countrymen, this is the end of this speech. I wish you all good luck and I hope you will cooperate to the fullest in this job which we have set for ourselves of establishing a prosperous nation and achieving solidarity.

Thank you very much and goodbye for now.46 I Broadcast on Radio Kaduna, January 15, 1966.

III.

Major-General Aguiyi Ironsi inaugural speech as head of state, January 16, 1966

Suspension of Certain Parts of the Constitution the Federal Military Government hereby decrees: a)

the suspension of the provisions of the Constitution of the Federation relating to the office of President, the establishment of Parliament, and of the office of Prime Minister;

b)

the suspension of the provisions of the Constitutions of the Regions relating to the establishment of the offices of Regional Governors, Regional Premiers and Executive Councils, and Regionallegislatures.

Appointment of regional military governors The Federal Military Government further decrees: a. that there shall be appointed a military governor in each Region of the Federation, who shall be directly responsible to the Federal Military Government for the good government of the Region; b. the appointment as adviser to the military governor of the Region, of the last person to hold the office of Governor of the Region under the suspended provisions of the Constitution.

The Judiciary, The Civil Service and the Police the Federal Military Government further decrees: 41 | P a g e

a. that the Chief Justice and all other holders of judicial appointments within the Federation shall continue in their appointments, and that the judiciary generally shall continue to function under their existing statutes; b. that all holders of appointments in the Civil Service of the Federation and of the Regions shall continue to hold their appointments and to carry out their duties in the normal way, and that similarly the Nigeria Police Force and the c. Nigeria Special Constabulary shall continue to exercise their functions in the normal way; d. That all local Government Police Forces and Native Authority Police Forces shall be placed under the overall command of the Inspector-General.

Internal Affairs Policy a. The Federal Military Government announces, in connection with the internal affairs of the Federation: b. That it is determined to suppress the current disorder in the Western Region and in the Tiv area of the Northern Region; c. That it will declare martial law in any area of the Federation in which disturbances continue;that it is its intention to maintain law and order in the Federation until such time as a new Constitution for the Federation, prepared in accordance with the wishes of the people, is brought into being. d. External Affairs Policy e. The Federal Military Government announces, in connection with the external affairs of the country: f.

that it isdesirous of maintaining the existing diplomatic relations with other States; and

g. That it is its intention to honour all treaty obligations and all financial agreements and obligations entered into by the previous government.

Citizens to Co-Operate The Federal Military Government calls upon all citizens of the Federation to exÂŹ tend their fullco-operation to the government intheurgent task of restoring law and order in the present crisis, and to continue in their normal occupations.

IV.

President Azikiwe’s statement to the press: reaction to Nigeria’s first military coup, January 1966

Violence has never been an instrument used by us, as founding fathers of the Nigerian Republic, to solve political problems. In the British tradition, we talked the Colonial Office 42 | P a g e

into accepting our challenges for the demerits and merits of our case for self-government.

After six constitutional conferences in 1953, 1954, 1957, 1958, 1959, and 1960, Great Britain conceded to us the right to assert our political independence as ÂŁram October 1, 1960.

None of the Nigerian political parties ever adopted violent means to gain our political freedom and we are happy to claim that not a drop of British or Nigerian blood was shed in the course of our national struggle for our place in the sun. This historical fact enabled me to state publicly in Nigeria that Her Majesty's Government has presented self-government to us on a platter of gold. Of course, my contemporaries scorned at me, but the facts of history are irrefutable.

I consider it most unfortunate that our young Turks' decided to introduce the element of violent revolution into Nigerian politics. No matter how they and our general public might have been provoked by obstinate and perhaps grasping politicians, it is an unwise policy. I have contacted General Aguiyi- Ironsi, General Officer Commanding the Nigerian armed forces, who I understand, has now assumedthe reins of the Federal Government. I offered my services for any peace overtures to stop further bloodshed, to placate the mutinous officers,and to restore law and order. As soon as I hear from him, I shall make arrangements to return home. As far as I am concerned, I regard the killings of our political and militaryleaders as a national calamity.

V.

Inaugural speech of Lt-colonel Yakubu Gowon as head of state, august 1, 1966

This is Lt-Colonel Y. Gowon,Army Chief of Staff, speaking to you.

My fellow countrymen, the year 1966 has certainly been a fateful year for our beloved country, Nigeria. I have been brought to the position today of having to shoulder the great responsibilities of this country and the armed forces with the consent of the majority of the members of the Supreme Military Council as a result of the unfortunate incident that occurred on the early morning of 29thJuly l966.

However, before I dwell on the sad issue of 29th July 1966, I would like to recall to you the sad and unfortunate incidents of 15th January 1966 which bear relevance. According to certain well-known facts, which have so far not been disclosed to the nation and the world, the country was plunged into a national disaster by the grave and unfortunate action taken by a section of the army against the public. By this I mean that a group of officers, in conjunction with certain civilians, decided to overthrow the legal government of the day. But their efforts were thwarted by the inscrutable discipline and loyalty of the great majority of the army and the other members of the armed forces and the police.

43 | P a g e

The army was called upon to take up the reins of government until such time that law and order had been restored. The attempt to overthrow the government of the day was done by eliminating political leaders and high-ranking army officers, a majority ofwho came from a particular section of the country The Prime Minister lost his life during this uprising. But for the outstanding discipline and loyalty of the members of the army who are most affected, and the other members of the armed forces and the police, the situation probably could have degenerated into a civil war.

There followed a period of determined effort of reconstruction ably shouldered by MajorGeneral. T. U. Aguiyi-Ironsi but, unfortunately, certain parties caused suspicion and grave doubts of the government's sincerity in several quarters. Thus, coupled with the already unpleasant experience of the 15th January still fresh in the minds of the majority of the people, certain parts of the country decided to agitate against the military regime which ad hitherto enjoyed country-wide support. It was, unfortunately, followed by serious rioting and bloodshed in many cities and towns in the north.

There followed a period of uneasy calm until the early hours of 29Th July 1966 when the country was once again plunged into another very serious and grave situation, the second in seven months. The position on the early morning of 29th July was a report from Abeokuta garrison, that there was a mutiny and that two senior and one junior officer from a particular section of the country were killed This soon spread to Ibadan and Ikeja.

More casualties were reported in these places. The Supreme Commander was by this time at Ibadan attending the natural rulers' conference and was due to return on the afternoon of 29th July. The government lodge was reported attacked and the last report was that he and the West military governor were both kidnapped by some soldiers. Up till now, there is no confirmation of their whereabouts.

The situation was soon brought under control in these places. Very shortly afterward, at about the same time, there was a report that there were similar disturbances among the troops in the north, and that a section of the troops had taken control of all military stations in the north as well. The units of Enugu and the garrison at Benin were not involved. All is now quiet and I can assure the public that I shall do all in my power to stop any further bloodshed and to restore law, order and confidence in all parts of the country with your cooperation and goodwill.

I have now come to the most difficult pan, or the most important part, of this statement. I am doing it, conscious of the great disappointment and heartbreak it will cause all true and sincere lovers of Nigeria and of Nigerian unity both at home and abroad, especially our brothers inthe Commonwealth. As a result of the recent events and the other previous 44 | P a g e

similar ones, I have come to strongly believe that we cannot honestly and sincerely continue in this wise, as the basis of trust and confidence: in our unitary system of government has not been able to stand the test of time.

I have already remarked on the issues in question. Suffice: to say that, putting all considerations to test-political, economic, as well as social-the base for unity is not there or isso badly rocked, not only once but several times. I therefore feel that we should review the issue of our national standing and see if we can help stop the country form drifting away into utter destruction. With the general consensus of opinion of all the military governors and other members of the Supreme and Executive Council, a Decree will soonbe issued to lay a firm foundation of this objective.

Notes 1.

David Levinson, Ethnic Groups Worldwide, Phoenix: Oryx Press, 1998.p. 156.

2.

Failed States Index,” Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy. August 2007.

3.

Failed States Index,” Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy.2007.

4.

Lauren Ploch, Africa Command,Congressional Research Services, (Seam states are those bordering Nigeria’s 12Northern Islamic states).2010, p.12.

5.

Wilberforce Conference on Nigerian Federalism, ed. Peter P. Ekeh.1997.p.17

6.

Levinson David, Ethnic Groups Worldwide: A Ready Reference Handbook. Phoenix, AZ: Oryx Press, 1998. p.157.

7.

CIA, “Nigeria Country Page,” World Factbook. The factbook

8.

Levinson, Ethnic Groups Worldwide, p.159.

45 | P a g e

9.

Levinson, Ethnic Groups Worldwide, p.1.

10. Failed States Index 2007,” Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy.p.119 11. Failed States Index 2007,” Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy. 193 12. Goings, Stella A. J., M.D. “Nigeria: Socio-Economic Factors.” Briefing. US Agency for International Development, Washington DC, 18 September 2007.

13. Daniel J. Smith, A Culture of Corruption, Woodstock: Princeton University Press, 2007. p.136.

14. Smith, Daniel Jordan,A Culture of Corruption: Everyday Deception and Popular Discontent in Nigeria. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007.119.

15. Levinson, Ethnic Groups Worldwide,p.159.

16. Smith, A Culture of Corruption, p.118.

17. Thompson, “Give Me Rice, but Give Me a Laptop Too,” BBC News 11Dec 2007.

18. Smith, A Culture of Corruption. 119 19. Smith, A Culture of Corruption. P.193 20. Goings, “Nigeria: Socio-Economic Factors 2007.”

21. Smith, A Culture of Corruption, p.136 22. Thompson, “Give Me Rice, but Give Me a Laptop Too,” BBC News 23. Friedman, Thomas,The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century. New York, NY: Farrar,Stras, and Giroux, 2007. p.3.

24. Global

Voices

Online.

“Sub-Saharan

Africa.”

http://globalvoicesonline.org/-/world/sub-

saharan-africa/ (accessed 12 September2017).

25. Goings, “Nigeria: Socio-Economic Factors 2007.”

26. USDepartmentofState“BackgroundNote:Nigeria.http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2836.htm (accessed 22 August 2007). “US Energy Bill Good for Biofuels; Refiners, Automakers Hit.” CNNMoney,14December2007.http://money.cnn.com/news/newsfeeds/articles/djf500/20071214 1715DOWJONESDJONLINE000961_FORTUNE5.htm (accessed 19 March 2017).

27. USDepartmentofState. “Background Note: Nigeria.”http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2836.htm (accessed 22 August 2017).

28. “Nigeria Oil Production Drops to 50 Percent of Capacity as Fighting Continues, “Ghana Business

News,

22

May

2009,

http://ghanabusinessnews.com/2009/05/22/nigeria-oil-

production-drops-to-50-of-capacity-as-fighting-continues (accessed 20 June2017 29. Ploch, Lauren. Africa Command: US Strategic Interests and the Role of the US Military in Africa. CRS Report RL34003. Washington, DC: CRS, 6 July 2007.p. 15 30. Ploch, Nigeria: Current Issues, p.15 31. Louis Shelley, “Unravelling the New Criminal Nexus, Routledge: Journal of International Affairs 2006. p.1.

32. Ploch, Nigeria: Current Issues, p.7 33. Fund for Peace and Foreign Policy, Web Survey 34. UN Human Development Report 2007/2008,Fighting Climate change: Human Solidarity in a DividedWorld.NewYork,NY:UNDevelopmentProgramme,2007.http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hd r_2007200p.pdf (accessed 19 March2009).

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35. CIA, “Nigeria Country Page,” World Factbook 36. BBC, “US Sets Terms for Climate Talks.”

37. CNA, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change 38. Levinson, Ethnic Groups Worldwide, p.158.

39. Levinson, Ethnic Groups Worldwide, p.158.

40. Max Siollun, Oil politics and violence, Nigeria Military Coup Culture, New York:Algora Publishing, 2009.p. 219 41. Max Siollun, 2009.p. 219 42. Max Siollun, 2009.p. 220 43. Max Siollun, 2009.p. 223 44. Max Siollun, 2009.p. 231 45. Max Siollun, 2009.p. 238 46. Max Siollun, 2009.p. 243 47. Max Siollun, 2009.p. 219

CHAPTER TWO Nigerian Politics By nature, man is a political animal. Hence men have a desire for life together, even when they have no need to seek each other’s help. Nevertheless, common interest too is a factor in bringing them together, in so far as it contributes to the good life of each. The good life is indeed their chief end, both communally and individually; but they form and continue to maintain a political association for the sake of life itself. Perhaps we may say that there is an element of good even in mere living, provided that life is not excessively beset with troubles.

Certainly most men, in their desire to keep alive, are prepared to face a great deal of suffering, as if finding in life itself a certain well-being and a natural sweetness.

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Aristotle

2.1 Nigerian Politics According to the CIA’s World Fact book, “Nigeria is a federalized constitutional democracy which boasts a gross domestic product of over $165 billion (2009 est. official exchange rate).”1 Yet despite this outward appearance of a representative democracy with a robust growing economy, between 52 and 72 percent of Nigerians live on less than one dollar per day. The most prominent reason for this seeming paradox is the corruption pervading Nigerian society. Past leaders have been more concerned with lining their own pockets than with providing Nigeria’s populace with good governance and basic human services. Nigeria is also a very diverse and complex society. Governing this country of nearly 135 million people, at least 350 different ethnicities, and numerous languages is no easy task.

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A failure to properly govern this diverse country may lead to its collapse. Should that occur, the seams that currently define Nigeria’s individual cultures could shatter, threatening not only the survival of the nation’s large population but, because of its contribution to Western oil supplies, the economies of Europe and North America as well.

I.

Governmental Framework

The president of Nigeria is the head of state; his service is limited to two four-year terms.

Like the United States, Nigeria is a three branched federal republic with executive power held at the presidential level. Unlike the United States, the Nigerian constitution also requires the cabinet to be representative of the various regions of the country, with at least one cabinet member required from each of Nigeria’s 36 states. The legislative branch is the National Assembly.

The National Assembly consists of a 109-member senate and a 360-member house of representatives. Each state is equally represented with three senators in the senate, plus one senator from the capital city of Abuja. In the House of Representatives, the members are allocated based on population. The judicial branch consists of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal, and the Federal High Court. Supreme Court members are appointed by the president and confirmed by the senate. “Power sharing” in Nigeria is not constitutionally mandated.

However, in the most recent elections, the main political parties have presented a Muslim and a Christian combination on the ballot to gain diverse support in an equally split country.

For example, Nigeria’s current vice president, Yemi Osinbanjo, a Christian, is from the South West. He is the elected balance to President Muhammadu Buhari, a Muslim from the northern Katsina State. Beneath the federal level of government lie the 36 states.

Each state has an elected governor who is also limited to two four-year terms. Each state also has an assembly based on population and a judicial high court. Nigeria is further divided into 774 local governmental areas. The local-level government councils are responsible for providing basic governmental needs and services and are dependent on the federal government for funding. The federal government’s job is to provide national services and funding to the lower echelons of government. In turn, the local governments are responsible for basic services such as police, health care, and education.

II. Political Parties There are several political parties in Nigeria. The All Progressive Congress (APC) is the current ruling party. As of 2015, it holds the presidency, the Senate, and the House. The closest opposition party is the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) who have held on to power 49 | P a g e

for 16 years. Buhari set a new precedent in Nigeria for a leader of a party not in power, becoming the winner of 2015 general election as opposition candidate. In an amazing precedent, despite the very questionable legitimacy of the 2007 election, Jonathan congratulated Buhari and commanded his followers not to take to the streets. The other main political party is the All Progressive Grand Alliance (APGA). Officially, there are 51 registered political parties in Nigeria. To qualify as an official political party, its leadership must show that it has officers in at least two-thirds of the 36 states. Even though there are 51 officially registered political parties in Nigeria, the top three parties represent 97 percent of the Nigerian electorate.2

III.

Legitimacy

One of the main issues affecting the current political control of the Third Republic is legitimacy. Specifically, the elections of 1999, 2003, and 2007 were steeped in violence and fraud. International observers of the 2007 election, such as former US president Jimmy Carter, were invited with the intent of gaining international legitimacy. Yet, even with these observers present, voting boxes were stolen; many districts reported more votes than they had registered voters; and there was rampant vote buying, ballot box stuffing, and voter intimidation.

Nonetheless, the 2007 elections produced a nationally respected leader who has no apparent public ties to corruption. Many feared that Yar’Adua was simply a front man for Obasanjo, the leader under whom he served as vice president. Yet Yar’Adua enhanced his legitimacy by upholding the rulings of the state high courts that addressed the election irregularities, removing several of his party from power; he subsequently distanced himself from Obasanjo by reversing several of his policies and by appointing a well-regarded, highlevel commission to again overhaul the electoral system.3 IV.

Governance

With limited industrial development and oil production consigned mainly to the southern states, 90 percent of funding to the states and localities is provided by the Nigerian federal government, largely from oil export revenues. Much of this funding is provided through complex federal oil wealth-sharing program in which each of the 36 states has calculated shares. These shares are based on a formula which includes population, level of development, and sources of oil revenues.4 However, the state governors are given the budgeting and distributing powers for this money, and as a result, much of the oil wealth has flowed to the members of the 50 | P a g e

predominant political party. Thus, defections from one political party to the one currently in power are not uncommon.5 By the time the money flows through the political system, there is normally little left for the local governments to provide required basic human services.

Nigeria is progressing in making the entire revenue system more transparent. Three years into his administration, President Obasanjo initiated the Nigerian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) and began publishing revenue transfers between the federal, state, and local governments. NEITI is mandated by law to promote transparency and accountability in the management of Nigeria’s oil, gas, and mining revenues.

President Yar’Adua pledges to uphold this transparency and serves as minister of energy to oversee this vital area.6this new level of transparency revealed that the national government failed to provide the country with basic human services, transportation, and industrial infrastructure. As a result, Nigeria is fraught with substandard roads and rails. The national power grid is just as bad, leaving most Nigerians with little or inconsistent electrical power.

Telecommunications have improved but still provide only 16 million fixed and mobile phones for a population of 135 million. Additionally, airline service is limited to the major cities.

President Yar’Adua’s seven-point plan concentrates on exactly what previous national Nigerian governments failed to provide for the Nigerian people: power/energy, food security, wealth creation, a transport sector, land reforms, security, and education.

The president’s overall governing intent is “to deepen democracy and the rule of law; build an economy driven primarily by the private sector, not the government; display zero tolerance for corruption in all its forms; and finally, restructure and staff government to ensure efficiency and good governance.”7 V.

The Politics of Diversifying the Economy

Between 90 and 95 percent of Nigeria’s current export earnings are from oil and other petroleum products. In turn, the oil exports are 80 percent of the government’s revenues.8 Oil has become almost the singular export product due to the collapse of the northern textile and manufacturing industries. These industries failed as financiers shifted their investment capital to the oil sector and to other regions in Africa and Southeast Asia. The northern economy remains based on agriculture and suffers from a lack of infrastructure, as does the south.

While the oil industry provides the lion’s share of wealth to Nigeria, it only employs an estimated 35,000 people, or less than 6 percent of the population.9 the current government agenda should urgently call for industrial diversification, and the government has to make positive improvements in this area. Non-oil growth accounted for 8.9 percent in 2016 and 51 | P a g e

was estimated to reach 10.4 percent by 2019. this diversification may expand if the government not only modernizes the oil industry but also leverages advances in commercial farming and excavation of solid minerals. Nigeria boasts large deposits of bitumen, columbite, tin, and kaolin. Further, Nigeria possesses large natural resources of developable coal, gold, diamonds, bauxite, gypsum, barite, zinc, aluminium, copper, and salt.

The oil revenue-sharing program provides little incentive for the states to produce anything else. Prior to independence, states were able to keep all of the revenues that were gained within their state. with the oil boom and strict adherence to federalism, Nigeria started the revenue-sharing program. While revenue sharing provided much needed government funding to the no lucrative agrarian north, it also intensified ethnic tension with the oil producing south, which appears to resent the transfer of wealth. This resentment gave birth to an active insurgency in the Niger Delta region which now threatens oil production throughout the south.

VI.

Political Summary

Nigeria is stepping into the twenty-first century with hope, a growing economy, and a strong leader heading its national government. Nigerians appear to be working to turn this hope into action. Their governmental leaders have shown strength and appear to have the moral courage to counter corruption with new tools such as the EFCC, NEITI, ICPC and the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). These tools have been forged from the dismal failures of the 37 previous regimes and are strengthened with the promise of transparency and accountability at the highest levels. Yet Nigeria must leverage its lucrative oil economy to diversify a very narrow economy rather than merely reap monetary benefits from a finite, non-renewable resource.

Consequently, the main variable in Nigeria’s future that will determine if the country succeeds as a democracy or fails as a state is the government’s ability to provide good governance. If Nigeria uses its national treasures and oil wealth properly, its people and institutions may yet prosper. Yet reduced oil prices and the global recession of 2016–20 will likely delay universal prosperity in the difficult years ahead. Nigeria’s future will be shaped by the ability and willingness of elected officials and their supporters to provide professional governance and security to Nigeria’s people while building solid infrastructure and diversifying the economy. Nigeria’s political success could be a model for all future democracies desiring to leave their corrupt civil-military dictatorships behind. Political success creates conditions for economic progress. In Nigeria’s case, its failure could affect the entire world.

2.2Nigeria’s Economy 52 | P a g e

Nigeria has been called the best example of the “paradox of plenty.” Its natural resources, especially its light “sweet” crude oil, create great wealth that begets “extravagant corruption, deep poverty, polarized income distributions, and poor economic performance.”10 Largely because of this paradox, Nigeria has not achieved its economic potential. Instead of capitalizing the revenue from its oil sales to grow into a strong, stable, and democratic country, Nigeria has instead become infamous for its numerous military coups, lawlessness, rampant corruption, extreme poverty, and ubiquitous 419 fraud schemes.11 The US State Department views Nigeria’s lack of economic development as a result of “decades of unaccountable rule.”12 Consequently, frustration runs high, thus contributing to Nigeria’s many internal conflicts. While some have been ethno-religious and community conflicts, the primary underlying source of tension in the country is the uneven distribution of wealth from oil revenue.

The International Crisis Group (ICG) notes the flow of money is going to a small fraction of the populace, and, as a result, the majority of Nigerians have only two options: “fatalistic resignation or greater identification with alternative hierarchies based on ethnicity, religion, or other factional identities.”13 Nigeria’s Economic Landscape Today at the macro level is problematic. Poverty levels are high, and individual and national prosperity has been hindered by rampant corruption, underdeveloped and insufficient human services and industrial infrastructure, overreliance on a single commodity (oil), a poor education system, and an ever-growing youth bulge. On a positive note, the government has instituted an improved economic policy framework, and the economy has seen robust growth, low inflation, and better investor confidence. In addition, record-high oil prices have, in the past, generated greater-than-expected revenues.

I.

Significant Economic Problems

Poverty in Nigeria is a major problem and the cause of internal tension. Average Nigerian per capita income is $1,149 per year, an astonishing figure considering the approximately $45 billion the country receives in annual oil revenues. Again, Nigeria is not a homogeneous nation, so its poverty is not affecting the entire population equally. Thus, it is important to consider poverty statistics at the regional and sub-regional level. The Central Bank of Nigeria reports that northern Nigeria has higher poverty levels than the rest of the country. 14 While the poverty gap between north and south had almost closed in the early 1990s, the gap has widened again this century. Nigeria’s Central Bank has determined that elevated poverty rates are highly correlated with literacy rates, the average size of the household, and “orientation to private-sector led wealth creation as opposed to dependence on 53 | P a g e

government assistance.”15 In other words, higher poverty rates were found in regions where dependence on government was greatest.

A 2007 University of Oxford study concluded that economic inequalities in Nigeria are also due to discriminatory allocation of government projects, different access to key sectors of the economy, as well as unintended consequences of macroeconomic policies.16 As researchers conducting field studies with the local population found, perceptions among the Nigerian people, regardless of ethnicity, are really more important than actual statistics.

It is interesting to note that although southern Nigerians are much less poverty-stricken than their northern brethren, they view themselves as less well-off These perceived and actual poverty rates have directly led to rising tension and conflict, particularly in the oil-producing regions in the south. The recurring insurgency, now led by MEND in the Niger Delta region in southern Nigeria, has received the most recent attention. First organized in 2005, MEND appears to be an umbrella group for a number of indigenous rebel groups in the Niger Delta region.

Labelled as a criminal organization by the Nigerian government, MEND is composed mostly of disaffected unemployed youth in the Delta region. Young people from other areas of the country are drawn to the group, as tales of their exploits are made known through the press and by word of mouth.17 The group appears to use attacks on critical oil infrastructure, kidnapping or murder of oil personnel in the region, and attacks on offshore oil platforms in the Gulf of Guinea to disrupt oil production. Their actions are designed to create price spikes in the international oil market14 and perhaps even induce an artificial Hubert peak.18 MEND seeks redress for the environmental degradation caused by oil production in the Niger Delta region. It also intends to force the Nigerian government to return a greater share of the nation’s oil profits to the region. The cumulative effects of numerous oil spills (reports indicate up to 2.5 million barrels spilled between 1986 and 1996) have limited clean water access for the people of the Delta region and have depleted most of their fishing stocks.19 Further, while the oil producing states receive one-third of the oil derivation funds, the amount of money making its way down to the local populace is minimal due to corruption and mismanagement. In fact, one recent estimate indicates the Nigerian government is losing $14 billion a year in oil revenues as a result of corruption and crime. In an attempt to force the government to address these twin problems, the insurgency has targeted Nigerian military forces, oil company personnel, and oil facilities and related critical infrastructure. At times insurgents have successfully reduced oil production capacity by up to one-third. The insurgency funds its arms and sustainment mostly through the sale of “bunkered” oil it steals from Nigeria’s largely unguarded pipelines.

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Nigeria’s economic success has been limited by rampant corruption and a culture of impunity where anything goes. Nigeria’s grossly underdeveloped infrastructure, particularly its electricity capacity, is a major limiting factor for growth due to both a lack of production capability and transmission capacity. For comparison, Nigeria’s per capita power output is estimated at 82 kilowatts (kW) annually compared with an average of 456kW in other subSaharan African countries and 3,793kW in South Africa. This is a considerable factor in the lack of economic development and high levels of poverty, which trigger conflicts throughout Africa’s most populous country.

Late President Yar’Adua acknowledged this problem, stating that “our abysmal infrastructural challenge remains the greatest impediment to economic growth” and has caused “higher costs of doing business, declining rates of capacity utilization, and lower quality of life for a majority of our population.”20 The late president’s assessment was borne out by the UNDP Human Development Index (HDI), which ranks Nigeria 159th of 177 surveyed countries.21 Most troubling for Nigeria’s future is the education system, which is in a state of collapse.

The annual federal government spending on health and education is only 1 and 3 percent of expenditures, respectively. The responsibility for both programs now lies with local officials who have demonstrated an inability to improve the situation. The net result is high disease mortality rates and a “top 20” economy with a societal literacy rate of only 57 percent. With disproportionate population growth in the Islamic north, the youth bulge, high unemployment, and economic disparity are likely to worsen in the future.

A final and perhaps paramount weakness in Nigeria’s current economy is its overreliance on a single commodity—petroleum. As the world’s eighth largest oil exporter, with oil accounting for over 80 percent of federal government income, 52 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP), and up to 95 percent of export earnings, high oil prices generate ample revenue for Nigeria, but its economy depends so heavily on its oil sector that any disruption to this revenue stream will almost always have significant ramifications. ICG notes that a failure to diversify the economy, widely fluctuating oil prices with prices spiking to over $147 a barrel in July 2008 followed by a rapid decline to under $50 per barrel in 2009, and corruption all have firmly placed Nigeria into “a development trap.”22 II.

Positive Economic Trends

Even with these weaknesses and ongoing issues, Nigeria’s economy has enjoyed some positive developments and trends over the last five years. Implementation of an improved policy framework and new policies is leading to steady growth, low inflation, and better investor confidence. From 2002 to 2008, GDP growth ranged between 3.8 and 6.5 percent, 55 | P a g e

inflation dropped from 18 to 11 percent (2009), and the population increased (a key ingredient for economic growth) from 130 to nearly 140 million.33 In 2009 Nigeria’s economy slowed considerably as the global recession substantially reduced the price of oil GDP growth was a relatively an emic 1.9 percent.23 Overall though, this performance has emboldened the Nigerian leadership to trumpet “Nigerian Vision 20: 2020,” in which Nigeria is to become a top 20 global economy by the year 2020.35 This vision links up well with the Bank of Nigeria’s position that “sound economics is excellent politics,” with prosperity required to establish an enduring democracy and a per capita income of $1,000 as the threshold.24 To continue this positive momentum, President Buhari has announced his reform priorities, several of which, if successful, will improve the economy.

The most critical of these is improving electric power generation and distribution and winning the fight against corruption. President Buhari stated that Nigeria would require an estimated annual infrastructure investment of $6–9 billion per year.25 While Nigeria’s fight against corruption to date has resulted in 130 convictions for fraud and the arrest of over 2,000 others responsible for illegal scams, it is clear the problem needs continued attention if it is to be decidedly reduced.

The 2008 high oil prices were a major boon for Nigeria’s economy. With prices rising to more than $147 per barrel in July 2008, the influx of oil profits quickly improved government revenues. Nigeria created the Petroleum Equalization Fund to properly invest its oil windfall, most notably to finance the budget deficit and increase savings. Nigeria also implemented an oil-price-based fiscal rule, basing government expenditures on a conservative oil price benchmark to diminish the impact of significant oil-price fluctuations on the domestic economy. In fact, despite rising oil prices, Nigeria’s 2017 budget was based on $40 per barrel.26 Although oil prices briefly retreated below $50 per barrel in early 2009, the long-term outlook for continued high oil profits is positive, as demand will generally continue to climb while Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and non-OPEC marginal producer sources of supply decrease. Properly invested, excess funds can be used to improve infrastructure, provide better services for the Nigerian people, strengthen education and health care, and even diversify the economy.

President Buhari’s priority of fighting corruption is a continuation of an effort initiated by his predecessors. Government activities to stem corruption appear to have yielded some positive results as there has been a measurable decrease in the percentage of firms reporting high bribery activities in the important taxation, procurement, and judiciary sectors.

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Although corruption is rampant throughout Nigerian society, there is still much to do before the government can claim victory.

III.

Nigeria’s Economic Landscape

As addressed above, Nigeria’s social and development problems have stunted its economic growth. The good news for Nigeria is that, over the next 20–25 years, the confluence of increasing demand for oil and other natural resources and greater globalization will create a strategic environment favorable for Nigeria to realize its potential and become a global economic power. At the macro or global level, the World Bank projects that economic integration through globalization will continue through the year 2030 with global GDP increasing 2.9 percent annually and developing countries, such as Nigeria, experiencing the greatest economic growth.

In spite of the global recession which hit hard in 2008 and 2009, the World Bank notes that the region’s projected growth over the next few decades and implications for global poverty reduction are “nothing short of astounding,” with the total number of people living in poverty being cut in half, despite continuing population growth.27 IV.

Will Nigeria Become a Top 20 Economy?

This positive attitude extends to Nigeria’s economic growth. Goldman Sachs, the global investment bank which projected the economic rise of Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC), has identified 11 additional countries with great potential to emerge as economic forces—Nigeria is one of these 11 countries.28 In its December 2005 update to the original BRIC assessment, Goldman-Sachs provided an in-depth analysis of Nigeria’s potential for rapid economic growth and the difficulties Nigeria may experience in achieving and sustaining the prerequisite conditions permitting the growth to happen.

To make its assessment, Goldman-Sachs modelled projections of GDP, real GDP growth, income per capita, incremental demand, and exchange rate paths. The results of the model predict that Nigeria has the potential to become the 20th largest economy in the world by 2025 and the 12th largest by 2050. In terms of real GDP, Goldman-Sachs projects growth to accelerate between 2005 and 2030 from an average of 5 percent per year, over the next five years, to 6.6 percent per year between 2025 and 2030. This would increase Nigeria’s GDP from $94 billion today to $556 billion in 2030. Even with its rapid population growth, GDP per capita has the potential to more than triple between 2005 and 2030, from $733 to $2,405.51 these positive numbers provide a basis for the Nigerian government’s economic optimism.

However, Goldman-Sachs also assessed the conditions of each of the Next Eleven (N-11) 57 | P a g e

countries necessary to achieve and sustain solid economic growth. Goldman-Sachs developed a growth environment score (GES) to summarize the overall economic environment, based on the notion that “strong growth is best achieved with a stable and open economy, healthy investment, high rates of technology adoption, a healthy and welleducated workforce, and a secure and rule-based political environment.”29 Goldman-Sachs considers five basic areas: macroeconomic stability, macroeconomic conditions, technical capabilities, human capital, and political conditions. Of the 15 emerging countries, Nigeria was dead last with a GES index of 2.6 out of seven. The mean score was 3.8.54 A closer look at the GES scores reveals Nigeria scored close to the mean for macroeconomic stability and conditions but scored at the bottom or next to last in technological capabilities (integration of personal computers, telephones, and Internet), human capital (education and life expectancy), and political conditions (political stability, rule of law, and corruption).55 Successful implementation of President Buhari’s priorities for battling corruption and upgrading the nation’s electrical power production and transmission grid will likely improve the political conditions and it is for Nigeria to address each of these issues now in order to secure for a positive future.

V.

A Positive Energy Outlook

Focusing on demand first, both Exxon Mobil (the world’s largest oil company) and the US Department of Energy (DOE) agree that world energy consumption is projected to grow by approximately 43 percent between 2006 and 2030. The global energy mix is not expected to change significantly over the technological capabilities of Nigeria. However, because of the lack of diversity in the Nigerian economy, these and other gains rely completely on Nigeria’s oil and gas revenues.

One important lesson from the Goldman-Sachs study is how to create next few decades, with oil, gas, and coal continuing as the predominant sources of energy. This increase in demand will occur even with high oil and natural gas prices—prices that are likely to increase beyond their 2008 peak in the mid and long term.30Like other members of the OPEC cartel, Nigeria is one of the world’s largest producers of light sweet crude oil. Because of its lower sulfur and hydrogen content, sweet crude oil is much easier and cheaper to refine into gasoline and other high-demand petroleum products than heavier “sour” crude oil. Thus, Nigerian oil is very much in demand by most of the world’s advanced economies, including the United States.

With the stage set for global energy demand to increase over the long run, Nigeria is poised to reap the economic benefits. Some of the world’s other major oil producers have started to see their “wells run dry.” According to the DOE, Europe’s primary oil producing countries 58 | P a g e

(Norway and the United Kingdom) have already experienced production peaks, with their combined outputs dropping to less than a third of their peak outputs by 2030. In fact, utilizing the reserve-to-production ratios in the DOE’s 2007 International Energy Outlook, the following countries may no longer be producing oil in large quantities by the year 2030: Russia, United States, China, Mexico, Algeria, Brazil, Canada, Angola, Indonesia, Oman, Malaysia, Argentina, Kazakhstan, and India.31 This means the world’s major oil producers in 20 years may be limited to Nigeria, Venezuela, Libya, and the Middle East countries of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Qatar. A report by the National Petroleum Council (NPC), an oil and natural gas advisory committee to the US Secretary of Energy, states, “In addition to projected Saudi Arabian production, significant conventional oil production increases from Iraq, Iran, Venezuela, and Nigeria will be needed to meet projected global demand in 2030.”32 As a producer of light sweet crude oil, Nigeria recognizes this opportunity and is targeting an increase in its current proven reserves and production capacity from 35.9 billion barrels per day (MBPD) to 40 billion barrels and four MBPD, respectively, by 2010.

In a longer-term outlook, growth in Nigerian oil production has been estimated to increase to as much as five MBPD by 2020.33 From the US perspectives, oil imports from Nigeria and its West African neighbours could rise from 15 percent of all oil imports to 25 percent by 2015.

This is due in part to three facts: oil from the Nigeria region is high-quality sweet crude, so it is easier to “crack” and distil than heavier sour crude; it takes one third the time to reach the American market compared to oil from the Middle East; and Nigeria’s oil offers better potential for stability vis-à-vis the Middle East. While oil is the main focus of the energy market now, natural gas is quickly gaining in importance.

The advances made in the ability to produce and transport liquefied natural gas (LNG) have made it a more viable energy source. Demand is expected to increase to 50 percent of total gas trade by 2030. Nigeria is already the world’s seventh largest LNG exporter,34 and it is expected to increase its natural gas output by approximately 50 percent by 2011.69 With a projected 60 percent increase in energy demand by 2030, the next major question for Nigeria is what the price of oil and natural gas will be over that time frame.

While speculation, energy usage, stockpiles and reserves, the strength of the US dollar, and economic growth drive great volatility in the fossil fuel markets, most analysts expect rising prices over the long term. As previously mentioned, the decline of oil production in a number of countries will increase the share coming from the OPEC nations of the Middle East.70 In this case, OPEC could wield unprecedented power, which will likely not only cause prices to escalate but also increase price instability in the future.35 59 | P a g e

In addition, the dwindling oil sources mean transoceanic oil flows will more than double by 2030 (reaching 65 MBPD), thereby increasing transport costs and concomitantly the risk of disruption at major maritime chokepoints and even piracy on the high seas.36Country Watch forecasts oil prices to be as high as $130 a barrel in 2030.37The DOE notes that rising oil prices will, in turn, increase the demand for and eventually the price of natural gas, as it replaces liquid fuels in the industrial and electrical power sectors.

The projected rise of fossil fuel demand and the corresponding increase in prices, combined with Nigeria’s production output growth, will increase available revenues for Nigeria to use in achieving President Yar’Adua’s reform priorities. President Yar’Adua stated that Nigerians “are totally committed to transforming Nigeria into one of the world’s 20 largest economies by 2020!” While this may not be achievable (President Yar’Adua acknowledges this requires a minimum average growth rate of 15 percent while the best economic rate Nigeria has achieved in recent history is 10 percent), growth rates anywhere near 15 percent will allow him to accelerate his reform priority of infrastructure improvement.This will then lay the foundation

for

economic

diversification,

since

Nigeria’s

lack

of

infrastructure

is

acknowledged by global economists to be one of the main impediments to economic growth outside the oil and gas industries.

VI.

A Widening North-South Gap

As Nigeria’s economy grows, there will be several factors that widen the previously discussed poverty gap. The first is education. The USAID reports the northern states are providing little in the way of formal schooling for their children. The agency’s statistics show the percentage of the population in the three northern regions having no education at all ranges from 40 to 70 percent, with only 10 to 15 percent having completed primary school.

Conversely, the southern states are educating about 80 percent of the population, with over 20 percent completing primary school and half of those going on to complete secondary education.38while the South’s education is poor compared to Western standards, it far exceeds the north. Combined with disproportionate population growth in northern states and a worsening national youth bulge,

39

a growing segment of the North’s population will be

young unskilled workers. As the World Bank points out, “Even though wages of unskilled workers in virtually all countries have risen as productivity has increased with globalization, the unskilled have received wage increases that are lower than those for skilled workers and they have experienced greater difficulty in sustaining their employment.”40 Thus, the economic disparities between Nigeria’s north and south, particularly in employment opportunities, are likely to worsen in the future.

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A History of Violence

As Nigerian history has proven, differences (actual or perceived) in economic and social development between the north and south can be the catalyst for conflict. These differences have directly led to fighting resulting in over 12,000 casualties and 3 million displaced people since 1999. The ICG asserts this bloody history has left Nigerians concerned that future factional violence will cause the state to fail. Similarly, any future lengthy and significant reduction in the price of oil is of great concern for Nigeria as it becomes increasingly dependent on oil revenue and the pressure to spend revenue to improve overall economic growth and employment rises.

Falling oil prices proved to be the fatal catalyst for the 1982 collapse of Nigeria’s government.

The drop in revenue caused government services to deteriorate, and the overall economy worsened to the point that a military-led coup was carried out.41 Nigerians have already experienced several government failures based on economics. Economic fault lines remain and grow deeper as corruption and widely fluctuating oil prices siphon off resources needed to improve human service and industrial infrastructure, fund human services and education, and diversify the economy.

VIII.

Plummeting Fossil Fuel Prices

The collapse of oil prices, and to a lesser degree gas prices, is a key factor in Nigeria’s boom-to-recession scenarios. While global demand and regional instability, some driven by MEND actions, may force prices up, there are factors such as the growing concern over climate change and new renewable energy technologies that may work to constrain the rise in oil prices over the long term. Additionally, global recessions, like the one experienced between 2008 and 2010, may further suppress oil prices. How these forces interact will determine the market value for fossil fuels and will, in a single commodity economy, largely dictate Nigeria’s economic and political future.

Many of the renewable energy sources in use or under development throughout the world today were born out of the energy crises in the early and late 1970s. While the last three decades have yielded only modest investments and fielding of these technologies, the record-setting prices over the last four years have again put these technologies back under the spotlight. Political will notwithstanding, one of the biggest obstacles to renewable energy has simply been development and implementation costs as long as oil remained relatively inexpensive, there was little incentive for industry and consumers to pay higher prices for non-fossil-fuel energy and its associated technologies. In May 2009, the DOE projected oil prices could begin rising again soon, reaching prices potentially as high as $200 per barrel (constant year dollars) in 2030.42

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Even with today’s relatively high cost of fuel and widely fluctuating prices with moderate relief in sight, the DOE predicts renewable energy sources will only capture an additional 1 percent of the overall market (increasing its share from 7 to 8 percent) by 2030. Studies by ExxonMobil and the NPC also show only a small market share for renewable energy sources. However, these analyses appear to have three notable flaws. First, most studies only evaluate the renewable penetration into markets as a function of a void filler where renewables are used to supplement fossil fuels when oil and gas cannot meet energy demands.

The second flaw is that estimates are using linear methods for predicting the introduction and use of new technology and are thus underestimating the likely exponential rate of technology development. Finally, both ExxonMobil and the NPC are heavily invested in the oil economy and stand to profit from any rise in oil prices; thus, any analyses they sponsor about alternative energy is arguably suspect.

The truth is that global growth in renewable energy investment and fielding indicates alternative energy technologies are becoming viable alternatives to fossil fuels, not just supplemental energy sources. Excluding large hydropower projects, renewable energy facilities generated 15 percent more electricity than in 2007; wind energy is currently growing at 25–30 percent annually with an 11- fold capacity increase over the last decade; and solarphotovoltaic generated electricity (grid tied) grows 50–60 percent each year.

Ray Kurzweil, a renowned futurist, notes that solar power alone “has the potential to provide the bulk of our future energy needs in a completely renewable, emission free, and distributed manner” by the year 2030.43 In 2005 Kurzweil stated that the energy sector will “become governed by the law of accelerating returns,” where the pace of technology changes exponentially, not linearly. Echoing Kurzweil, the investment bank Jefferies Group expects short-term solar panel production to double in 2008 and double again in 2009.

The final major problem of fossil fuels is the growing concern it is having on climate change.

The DOE projects a 59 percent increase in carbon dioxide emissions between 2004 and 2030.

Lobbying by environmental groups has successfully attributed climate change to melting polar ice caps, severe droughts, desertification, and destructive deadly storms. The emission of greenhouse gasses as fossil fuels are burned is increasingly a political concern, driving world leaders to seek solutions to this problem, with an emphasis on renewable or clean energy sources. Some see renewable energy as the primary economic path for the future. In December 2007, over 200 nations attended the UN Climate Change Conference in Bali, Indonesia, and developed the “Bali Roadmap” as a path to addressclimate change, calling it “the defining human development challenge of the twenty-first century.”44 Two years 62 | P a g e

later, almost 200 nations attended the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, Denmark, in an effort to establish carbon emission limits and an international fund to help developing nations curb their carbon and other greenhouse gas emissions.

A new US presidential administration and Congress have increased political rhetoric and could successfully enact new policies and laws to encourage the use of alternative sources of energy, especially renewable sources. Deutsche Bank predicts government efforts to reduce climate change will become a catalyst for creating a “megatrend” investment opportunity. In fact, renewable energy investment likely exceeded $100 billion globally in 2007, and global financiers began “the shift away from a carbon-based economy”; renewable energy is a “megatrend that will shape the asset management industry for many years.”45 IX.

Economic Summary

Over the next 20 years, Nigeria’s economy could well grow to be among the world’s 20 largest. This success will be built on the export of oil and gas and the development of sufficient infrastructure to allow a slow, but steady growth in economic diversification. The non-fossil economy will be almost entirely based in the more prosperous southern states, while the northern states will continue to depend on government assistance. By the year 2030, global use of renewable energy sources may cut demand for oil and natural gas, forcing a large price drop in Nigeria’s main export and, in turn, reducing government revenues. This will widen the existing north-south economic gap, exacerbate tensions in the Niger Delta region, and serve as a catalyst for violence that may once again make a civil war imminent unless the Nigerian military maintains a state of readiness to forestall such an outcome.

2.2Military Vectors President Obasanjo published Nigeria’s first defence policy in 1979. At that time he tasked the Nigerian military with four primary functions: preserving Nigeria’s territorial integrity, contributing to national emergencies and security, promoting collective security in Africa while furthering Nigerian foreign policy, and contributing to global security.46 Thirty years later, the responsibilities of the current Nigerian military remain the same as iterated in President Obasanjo’s 1979 national defence policy Consistent with its prescribed responsibilities, Nigerian military forces have operated outside the country only in support of peacekeeping efforts. These efforts began nearly simultaneously with independence, with Nigerian peacekeepers assisting in the Congo in 19603 and Tanzania in 1963.

The Economic Community of West African States Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) formed under Nigerian leadership in 1990. Since then, ECOMOG’s efforts have helped end 63 | P a g e

the Liberian civil war, with Nigeria providing about 6,000 peacekeepers. Through ECOMOG, Nigeria also committed nearly 3,000 peacekeepers to stabilize Sierra Leone in the wake of its 1997 civil war. Nigeria’s resolve to lead and participate in peacekeeping efforts in Africa continues today, with nearly 2,000 troops committed to international efforts in Liberia, another 2,000 troops operating since 2004 in Sudan, and another 850 pledged to support African Union efforts in Somalia.47 While Nigerian forces have performed acceptably during these peacekeeping operations, years of military rule have paradoxically not equipped the country with a capable military. By the time of President Obasanjo’s election in 1999, the Nigerian military was widely blamed for the country’s economic and social problems. Military facilities had decayed considerably with corresponding declines in morale and discipline.

President Obasanjo began efforts to reform leadership in the military soon after taking office in 1999. He retired 150 military officers with strong political ties, published plans to downsize the armed forces by 40 percent, and promised to restructure military spending to about 3 percent of GDP, which would bring Nigeria closer to the world average of about 2.5 percent.

However, nationwide unrest and the operations tempo of Nigerian peacekeeping efforts led President Obasanjo to put military reform plans on hold in 2001.48 Suspension of these reform efforts left little room for military improvement. At the time of President Obasanjo’s re-election in 2003, estimates indicated that 78 percent of Nigerian army equipment was not operational and training had virtually ceased. More recent studies also conclude that Nigerian military units are plagued by an inadequate technical ability, poor discipline, and a lack of training. However, new acquisition efforts are promising a reformed capability. The president of Nigeria is also the commander in chief of Nigeria’s military forces. He decides when and how to employ the armed forces. Day-to-day military operations are managed by the Ministry of Defence.

The chief of the Defence Staff, the three service chiefs, and the national security advisor are all appointed by the president. Each service leader’s responsibilities are proscribed in Section 18(3) of the Armed Forces Act CAP A20 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004.49 These responsibilities include “command, direction, and general superintendence” as well as the organizing and training of the forces.The Nigerian army, with almost 60,000 troops, commands the largest share of the military budget and resources. The Nigerian navy and air force represent about 7,000 and 9,000 personnel, respectively, of the overall military strength of about 76,000.50 Much of the military budget during the past several years was used to upgrade air force and navy equipment.16 For the navy, this means refurbished frigates and coastal patrol boats, 64 | P a g e

which it primarily uses to enforce security in Nigeria’s offshore oil regions, a difficult challenge in light of increasing MEND attacks on offshore oil infrastructure and piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.

The air force used funds to support navy maritime patrol efforts by purchasing aircraft equipped with surveillance radar and electro optical tracking systems. Funds have also contributed to some improvement in aircraft serviceability. Other air force acquisitions focus on training aircraft, helicopters, and air defence fighter aircraft, although these systems are not yet in the Nigerian inventory.

The Nigerian army constitutes the bulk of service personnel with nearly 60,000 troops spread across five divisions. Much of the army’s share of the defence budget has been spent on renovation of military facilities and in support of its internal security and foreign peacekeeping deployments.20however, the army has also taken steps to modernize equipment by coordinating with Pakistan for upgraded main battle tanks.

I.

Military Reforms

To better support the military’s constitutional tasks, the Nigerian army chief of staff under President Yar’Adua, Maj Gen OwoyeAzazi, established a 10-year modernization and reform plan. His plan is designed to improve the military’s professionalism and reputation while developing “a lighter, yet lethal, sustainable and more rapidly deployable and responsible force, better able to meet the diverse challenges now and of the future.”51 The chief of staff also intends to reduce the Nigerian army from five to four divisions “with a level of decentralization enabling divisions and brigades to plan operations and carry them out independently of Army Headquarters.”52 Nigerian efforts to modernize and adapt their military coincide with increasing international efforts to support stability in the West Africa region and represent a desire by Nigeria’s political leaders to prevent future Nigerian military intervention in politics.

II.

Security and Counterterrorism Efforts

With global demand for energy potentially increasing over 60 percent by 2030,23 the United States as well as the international community has recognized the strategic importance of sweet crude oil production in the Gulf of Guinea off the west coast of central Africa. This focuses considerable attention on Nigeria since it controls approximately 60 percent of the proven reserves in the region. Insurgent and terrorist groups like MEND and transnational criminal enterprises recognize western dependence on Nigerian oil and appear to have stepped up their attacks on oil infrastructure. They have also increased their theft of oil in

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order to bring western pressure on the Nigerian government to resolve grievances and to profit from sales of stolen bunkered oil.

The Nigerian military and internal security forces have struggled to deter attacks and root out both violent groups and criminal enterprises. Attacks by groups affiliated with MEND have succeeded in reducing oil production in Nigeria by almost 25 percent since 2006.

Several oil companies have approached the US military for assistance, stating that they fear the Nigerian government can no longer provide adequate security. Beginning in 2005, the US Navy increased its patrols in the waters off Nigeria in an effort to bolster security in the region, and plans are currently underway to implement a 10-year security and training initiative known as the Gulf of Guinea Guard. The purpose of this force is to protect offshore oil production and trans load infrastructure from attack by modern pirates and MEND forces.

This guard force will eventually include several West African nation navies, including Nigeria’s, working in concert with the US Navy and Britain’s Royal Navy. Several multinational maritime security and training deployments occurred in 2005, with maritime security conferences occurring in 2006. In late 2007, the US Navy deployed assets to the region for six months of security patrols, training, and infrastructure evaluation and improvement. The United States and Britain are also conducting joint training efforts in the Gulf of Guinea. These efforts also include equipment and training improvements for three Nigerian amphibious brigades in the Niger Delta.

Ultimately, US forces are attempting to establish a permanent local presence, possibly with a base facility and airfield on the island nation of São Tomé e Príncipe in the Gulf of Guinea.

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks of 2001, the United States is combating terrorism in West Africa. This effort began with the Pan-Sahel initiative in 2002, in which special operations forces deployed to the region to train local militaries in counterterrorism operations.

Recognizing the strategic importance of the Gulf of Guinea region, this effort has expanded to include Algeria and Nigeria under the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI).

The TSCTI effort is programmed to receive $100 million each year through 2011.32 For Nigeria specifically, American military forces are deployed to train and assist national forces in monitoring and securing Nigeria’s northern border.54 III.

Non-military Technologies

According to a recent study by the RAND Corporation, there are “technology applications” that, based on global demand and technical feasibility, will most likely be available for implementation in 2020.55 Although the RAND study does not address Nigeria specifically, it indicates that countries in western Africa would most likely be able to acquire only the first

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five technology applications: cheap solar energy, rural wireless communications, ubiquitous information access, genetically modified crops, and rapid bioassays.

The RAND study differentiates between a country’s ability to acquire a potential technology and its ability to implement it. In the case of countries in western Africa, RAND rates their overall ability to implement these relevant technologies as low. The interests of the United States and the Nigerian government

represent concerted efforts to improve both

governance and human services while reducing crime and securing Nigerian national resources. These efforts increase the likelihood that technologies which impact these areas may be acquired and used, including technologies that are not in the RAND top five list, as part of international assistance efforts in Nigeria and other nations in West Africa. For example, pervasive sensors would greatly enhance energy security and counterterrorism efforts while immunotherapy, number 34 on the RAND list due to uncertain technological progress, would facilitate HIV/AIDS and other pandemic treatment efforts.

IV.

Military Coup

Nigeria endured several military coups from the 1960s through the 1990s. There are at least three indicators that typically precede a military coup. These include civilian dependence on the military due to either immediate or long-term crisis, dependence upon the military for political survival, and public dissatisfaction with the federal government.56Afrobarometer data from 2005 suggest Nigeria may have already started down the path towards another military coup since the population’s satisfaction rating with the current and previous civilian government was dropping below the level recorded with the previous military regime. The Afrobarometer data from 2008 was no better, with nearly 89 percent of the Nigerian people perceiving government officials are corrupt and fewer than 30 percent believing their electoral process was fair.

Likewise, with areas in the Niger Delta largely ungovernable, no end to ethnic unrest in sight, and a shaky amnesty and mediation effort to forestall MEND attacks against oil infrastructure and workers ready to fail, the Nigerian government remains dependent on the military for internal security and stability. The third indicator, political survival, is not currently a significant threat for Nigeria since the country has taken care, through its participation in intra-African organizations like the African Union and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to help stabilize the West African region.

Conditions in Nigeria have not resulted in a coup in several years. Much like anticipating successful democracy in Nigeria, Afrobarometer data may well be the leading indicator of conditions forming for a potential coup. Declines in corruption and human development indices will likely alleviate some public dissatisfaction, thereby reducing the possibility of a 67 | P a g e

coup. However, avoiding yet another coup is not a sufficient or reliable measure of Nigeria’s political situation, internal stability and security, or the strength of the nation. It is not a guarantee that Nigeria will be a successful democracy or remain a viable state.

V. Civil War Prior to 1960, the British recognized that the different ethnic regions of Nigeria might not be governable as a single unified nation. Although somewhat tolerant of the limited autonomy granted during the long years of British rule, the fiercely independent Biafra tribe rebelled against the central government; ethnic tensions eventually erupted in the 1967 Biafra civil war. Even in 2009, little has changed for Nigeria in this regard.

According to Karl Maier, author of This House Has Fallen: Midnight in Nigeria, “Nigerians from all walks of life are openly questioning whether their country should remain as one entity or discard the colonial borders and break apart into several different states. Ethnic and religious prejudices have found fertile ground in Nigeria, where there is neither a national consensus nor a binding ideology.”57 While reform efforts might improve conditions in Nigeria, it is unlikely any effort currently envisioned will make the population any less polarized in one generation, especially those from the proud Igbo, Hausa, or Yoruba tribes, who have a fierce loyalty to their respective tribes and traditions.

Militant groups often form to protect specific geographic areas or communities or to press grievances for indigenous people when governments fail to provide expected services and security. The conditions for these scenarios are already present in Nigeria, with poverty levels in the northern areas nearly double those in the southern regions. Any downturn in the Nigerian economy, particularly if regionally focused, has the potential to escalate into civil war. Given that development generally progresses more rapidly where infrastructure already exists, overall economic improvement in Nigeria may be seen as favouring the southern region.

V.

Military Summary

Whether Nigerian governance will continue to deteriorate and lead the country inexorably toward a military coup and, perhaps, civil war is unknown. Where Nigeria falls within the “spectrum of failure” will determine if the reforms implemented by the previous minister of defence, General Azazi, take hold or if the military remains marginally capable as it has for the last few decades. With reductions in corruption and criminality and with strategic investments to diversify the economy and meet basic human needs, Nigeria could slowly improve, thereby reducing the possibility of failure.

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Should the people gain confidence in Nigerian governance, then the Nigerian military might receive the resources and support it needs to reform and function as a force promoting internal security and regional stability without threatening the political process. If the people lose faith in their current democratically elected civilian government, it is then possible that a weakened military might feel emboldened to attempt a coup and, if successful, would likely fare no better than it has on the previous five occasions where it seized and controlled the government.

Long-term international interest in the region will provide the Nigerian military opportunities for increased professionalism and new capabilities. While this does not guarantee success, recent cooperation with the British and United States has made noticeable improvements. In almost any scenario, the Nigerian military will, with government and international support, continue to acquire new capabilities as they have in the past.

Nigeria’s army, air force, and navy will continue to be characterized by relatively common, ubiquitous, although dated, military equipment. Access to advanced technology and better military equipment is desired by Nigeria’s military and could, with proper training and care, enhance the Nigerian military’s status in its traditional internal security and peacekeeping roles. In particular, surveillance and situational awareness technologies will strengthen the Nigerian military’s ability to provide security for its populace.

It is unlikely, however, that even continuous national growth in a failed-state scenario will produce significant gains in Nigerian power projection capability. Other than prestige, there are currently no threats or significant or vital interests outside Nigeria’s borders that would drive Nigerian forces to involve themselves beyond their current peacekeeping efforts.

Alternately, civil war in Nigeria would almost certainly erupt along the ethnic and religious divides between the northern and southern regions of the country it would, in effect, shatter the country. Military forces involved in this type of civil conflict would normally be expected to fight for their country with perceived moral justification, employing any and all means to achieve their goals.

Given 350 different ethnicities and a large population whose loyalties to tribe and religion are often stronger than national loyalties, the Nigerian military may find these same loyalties overwhelming any moral justification and rapidly thinning its ranks. Expecting technologically advanced international involvement, opposing forces might also adopt violent, “neoabsolutist” techniques, where the government exercises complete and absolute power to defeat the will of its enemy using any means.58such techniques can only be employed if the forces are sufficiently strong to use them.

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Initial capability of forces involved in civil wars would depend on how far Nigeria had progressed, or failed to progress, in reforming its military prior to the nation shattering and devolving into civil war. Even from a state of relative governmental and military disarray, however, forces would normally be expected to recruit new forces and rapidly develop better capabilities. During the 1967 Biafran conflict, Nigerian federal forces grew from about 15,000 at the start of the war to a total of nearly 250,000.

Both sides of the conflict were able to obtain various levels of international support, while indigenously producing some limited weaponry. However, in this case, only one region was in rebellion against the larger state. In a situation where multiple ethnicities and religious groups are fighting each other, it is possible the military may not be able to recruit people, build its forces, secure the country, and restore the state.

A civilian government in charge of a functioning state who harbours doubts about the loyalties of its military may limit military reforms to equipping its forces with modern weapons and providing it with a training system that promotes professionalism, inspires a degree of loyalty to the state, and enhances readiness. Given Nigeria’s relatively recent history of military coups, it is likely most civilian governments will be reticent to make the military too powerful. However, these same civilian governments recognize Nigeria must have a competent, credible force in order to protect the nation’s oil infrastructure and ensure the survival of its single commodity economy.

Insurgent attacks and anything else threatening oil production reduce revenues that can be used to “buy” political loyalty and reform the military. A professional military is necessary to help preserve order within Nigeria’s 36 disparate states. Whether the current military reforms take hold and Nigeria’s armed forces prove equal to the daunting and difficult challenges the nation faces remain to be seen.

General Babangida presided the affairs of the Nigerian nation as a military dictator while he was surrounded by duly elected local

government

Chairmen

and

Governors. The

Military President as he [IBB] wished to be addressed annulled the final election that was supposed to produce the Executive President. Nevertheless, he yielded to the pressure of the people and stepped out of [Aso Rock Villa] Nigeria's seat of power and appointed Chief Ernest Shonekan to run a caretaker administration. The caretaker ship of Chief Shonekan, a former UAC boss was terminated in a palace coup on 17thNov 1993.

The Nigerian leadership without being told is a parable of sufferings. From the military to their civilian products, it is the same story. Forty-three years of independence has been like a great trek from a Gethsemane to a political Golgotha. The bane of Nigeria has been bad leadership from its independent era, the meaning of NigerianLeadershipportents negativity.

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It is evident that good leadership qualitieshave been lacking in Nigerian Readers since the eclipse of the colonial rule. Few who are able to steer the ship forward are either hijacked or have the tenure terminated unceremoniously. Nigerians see more of dictators and imposed administrators than leaders and thus what they got in return is a continuous government of hardship.

The Nigerian leadership is really a restricted sector meant for a class in the society. We were mean t to believe that there are factors that produce a leader or yardstick that leads to leadership. But in Nigeria, the case is very different. The same clique of looters and maladministrators has occupied the leadership of this nation from inception. In the north where the oligarchy holds sway, there is a sharp social stratification. The north is not united as other sections of the country feel. It is evident and has been proofed that the politicians of the first republic and their trainees are still in charge of the core north.

Because the emirs who are more of political than spiritual leaders back them, they [northern leaders] have held sway over a peasant class who find it difficult to have two square meals and basic amenities. It is in the northern section of Nigeria that one will see a preserved begging class who are placed beyond the pauper realm. This same people who cannot be given due economic and statutory citizen's right are forced to pay tax and coerced into submission with the holy book of Koran and Islam.

These leaders and spiritual guardians who preach the virtues work of Prophet Mohammed eat on their head and squander allocations meant to take care of them. The only good thing, which they could not fail to perform, is erecting magnificent mosques where every one of them worships. Have you ever inquired how the funds of this mosque are disbursed? In the north, there is a class which leadership has become their birth right. You do not come out to lead unless the oligarchy or that clique backs you. Appointments, which are meant for the north, go to the families of this class of people.

Government benefits reach members of this ruling class before it proceeds to their proletariats. At the inception of the uniform tagged

vehicle

identification

scheme, Sokoto State

their l and as "Born to Rule''. The annoyance of some Nigerians about that

inscription is the height of arrogance exhibited by these same self-imposed rulers of the core north. It even took the criticisms of their fellow northerners before it was re- written to "Seat of the Caliph ate." Statistics has shown that apart from the current leader of Nigeria who is not a northerner, the on l y two civilian presidents Nigena has ever produced hail from the north and belong to the same caucus.

As prime minister, Tafawa Balewa served in the capacity of an Executive President. He served in the first republic when Shehu Shagari was a Federal Commissioner. He was more 71 | P a g e

or less a trainee of the oligarchy political process. As a matter of fact, the same Federal Northern Lords recycled their leadership and control over from the first to second republic.

After the snuffing out of life of the” power watchdogs in the first republic, the oligarch y bounced back with the counter-coup of 1966 with which they held

power till one of their

own took charge as a democratically elected executive president and that was Shehu Shagari.

Throughout the post first republic era, they made sure that any leader is of their own orloyal to their whims and caprices. Even at the end of the second republic, they were still exchanging their children and loyalties took tum in the leadership of the country. The worst thing is that these class of leaders sent their children abroad and use military formations to perpetuate oligarchic intentions. As they flourish, their people perish in starvation and want.

The north is not together as widelybelieved because there isa wide socio-political and economic stratification.

The Yorubas are not left out in the business of recycling leaders. The adherents of the chief Obafemi Awolowoschool ofthought have always been in charge since the infamous cross carpeting in

the Western Region House of Assembly. The attempted thwarting

of

Awo’s leadership by LadokeAkintola caused and engulfed the nation into crisis. The death of Akintola during the Nzeogwu’s led coup calmed the weird Wild West, which could have spread to the rest of the nations.

Obafemi Awolowo and his political school of thought have maintained hold on Yoruba land.

Most of thesuccessors have continued to dominate the polity of the south western section of the country. They hold sway in the Economic cum political angle. The "Awoists" as they prefer to be called have continued to lay down structures, which enhance them to effectively checkmate any political incursion in to Yorubaland by an alien method. They even extended their sphere of" influence in the federal bureaucratic formation.

They [Awoists] believe that Yoruba leadership belongs to their class or anointees not minding their ages. Most Yoruba leaders find it difficult to hand over power to the young ones, that is why you see a seventy-year-old man still battling it out in an election. He hardly finds time to give the youths. They equally believe that they have political ideology unlike the upcoming youths. Most of them are direct apostles of Obafemi Awolowo right from the first republic. Some of their political platform like National Democratic Coalition [NADECO] and Afenifere were moulded towards their political father, Awolowo. A cursory look will show you that many Western Nigerians are really suffering from lack of necessary amenities.

While these same old men keep recycling themselves even at old age, the un fortunate thing is thatthese men impose themselves with the name of Awolowo whom the west 72 | P a g e

admire because of his interest i n the welfare and progress of his people. Due to the fact that they are always changing their faces through political affiliations and new messages, they kept deceiving the people. Their case goes with the adage of "An old wine in a new wine skin."

Ndigbo has been one of the few Nigerian tribes that pushes hard to stop the business of the recycling leaders but the vice is gradually becoming a permanent scourge. As republicans who do not centralize much power in a common front, the Igbos have continued to fight recycling leaders to no avail. Most of these leaders who have been in the corridor of power since independence had amassed wealth meant for their people. It is this wealth that they used to intimidatethe average man. Amenities, favours and contracts that will develop their constituencies are awarded to them as men who hold the keys to the people's heart. This deceitful business has continued to impoverish the people and their various communities while those old fashion leaders continue to progress, economically and otherwise. Most contracts are either not executed or done haphazardly whereas funds meant for them are paid tothem.

A new major factor that is trying hard to dislodge them InIgboland is the "money This class of

money

bags who emerge withvirtually no trace of hard

work

bags."

pass with

their financial muscle, they are gradually bulldozing their way to the leadership corridor or aligning with the powers for recognition inorder to protect their economy. In the absence of an elective position, every transition leaders

walk

their

way

through sycophantic

method to the heart of every government. They are called "Any Government In Power [AGIP]. Under appointment, they still claim to be representing the people who thirst and hunger to death. Most of these self-acclaimed leaders are hated like criminals in their towns and villages because of their diabolic nature and ideologies.

In Igboland some ofthese unproductive leaders have continued to repackage themselves in a new fashion each time opportunity comes up. In Imo state to be precise, a certain diabolic man has represented a senatorial district since the second republic. The implication of it is that this evil man has no proof of which he has done for his people except enriching his bank accounts.

The national policies and recycling business of Nigerian leadership.

The South-south

geopolitical zone, which forms the major parts of the Niger Delta, parades like other zones this national leadership scourge. Most of their leaders now are old faces, which were repackaged for fresh activity. From the Senators, Governors, Ministers and other elected officers, they are old wines. They control the money and favours accruing from their God given natural resources with approximately very little benefits left for the people who suffer 73 | P a g e

depression, This system of recycling leadership has become so thorny for the nation because of certain factors, which form their instrument of administration. From the period of independence to date, these same rulers have used the same style of administration to hold on the populace.

2.3 Exploitation of Ethnicity The dominance of one ethnic group in

Nigeria is an

attestation

of

Nigerian leaders. The ethnic card has always worked out in Nigeria due

the tr1bal trait to the

in

mutual

suspicion and the tribalconspiracies among ethnic groups. Ethnicity in Nigeria has been entrenched that any Nigerian leader, whether civilian or Military does not trust most of his aides than-his kinsmen. Juicy ministerial and parastatal position are reserved for his tribal relations who offer him more security than others.

During the military regimes, their highest law making body was

peopled mostly by one

section of the country. As a result of this, appointments do not represent the federal character requirements as being preached around by the government. Thus projects elude some major sections of the country because a particularethnic group is in power.

As a desperate plot to hang on to power, these old leaders fan the embers of tribalism, they preach the supremacy of their tribe, raise the consciousness and make it an ideology. In return, the people easily entrust him a mandate to represent them with the hope of electing a worthy son. Unfortunately, these men go and amass wealth in the pretence of representing their people.

Most of this leaders have continued representing badly his

people’s interest with the slogan of tribalism as their campaign issue.

I.

Religious Bigotry

Asan issue in Nigerian leadership, religious bigotry was laid to a solid foundation during the imperial rule. Sincethen,religious belief as an instrument of politics in the Nigerian leadership race as remain a factor. In other to remain in power in every dispensationwhether military or civilian, these men incite peaceful citizens with negative utterances bordering religion. There have been many demonstrations in Nigeria especially in the northern section of the country, which was caused by religious differences. These leaders have exploited this avenue to the detriment of other tribes in particular and the nation in general. A clear case of this is the introduction ofthe Sharia Penal Code, which almost engulfed the entire

nation in crises.

The attempt to Islamise Nigeria began many years back.

In fact, in November 1989, delegates of 24 countries in Africa gathered Abuja to form what they called the Islam in African Organization (IAO]. Gen. Ibrahim Babangida wasthe Head of

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state in Nigeria and the com m unique issued at the end of the conference commended him for the billionslives and properties.59 II.

The method of carrot and stick

The military governments are experts in using the carrot and stick method in handling their subjects especially opinion leaders who are opposed to their regimes. This method is dangling juicy appointments and favours, which lure his opponents or men of integ1ity to his leadership in order to gain the grass root support of the people. This carrot and stickremain an enigma because they [evil leaders] have paralyzed the economy and made it prostrate.

This hardship makes it possible for people to take peanuts as incentive from government in order to render support to them.

No sooner than later, the appointees are dealt with or dumped. Intimidation

remains a

very important instrument of revolutionaries, one of the cardinal points why they struck was the fraudulent nature and the corruption that has pervaded the system. From the first republic till this dispensation, Nigerian leaders have exported trillions of dollars outside the shores of this nation. These same leaders and their top aides who always form the government whether military or civilian are the main cause of the sluggish economy as a result of fraud in the 'business as usual' system of governance. These selfish leaders in a hurry toget rich quick, engage in some other illegal activities such as counterfeiting, smuggling, drug trafficking, armed robbery, cheating, embezzlement and whatever illegal and immoral activities one can think of.

As the united press international put it in the Dallas times Herald of July 25, 1984, "Counterfeiting of the Nigerian currency, the Naira, and the U.S. dollar is widespread in Nigeria, once Black Africa’s richest nation." Yes, we were once Africa's richest nation, now we areone of the poorest.

As a matter of truth, both civilian and military administration exploiting power to the maximum by using sheer force and intimidation in the course of leadership. Most times, the people's wishes are not sought for before implementation of policies and law enforcement agents are also instructed to pounce on them to submission if their rejection tend to pose on obstacle to them. In Nigeria, these leaders have continued to intimidate the masses especially those who are not from their ethnic group in other to hang on to power. Statistics in Nigeria's electioneering process shows that these recycled leaders always use intimidation to manoeuvre elections and impose themselves with their cronies.

III. 75 | P a g e

Embezzlement and Fraud

Another hallmark or trademark of Nigeria’s leaders is embezzlement and fraud.

Since the attainment of independence on 1st October 1960, Nigeria has gone from one fraudulent hand to another. By the interruption of the first republic by the military it is unfortunate that any new government does not bring new hope for Nigerians, as it is business as usual. A weekly magazine in the United States once carried a news report that about $ 50 billion in the Swiss banks belonged to people without any name. In other words, the amount was in unnamed accounts. The report further stated that most

of

the

owners

of

the

accounts

were

leaders

of

some

"impoverished African nations". There is no doubt that Nigerians would be among those people. In the list of Nigerian's wealthy men, this business as usual leaders top the chart with their liquid and material assets, which were looted from government coffers.

IV.

Youth Exclusion

It is not only in the political parties that the misrepresentation occurs, it is the Nigerian culture that cut across all centres of policy formulation that affect its citizens.

Social in quests and findings showed that the stinking corruption in the land makes it possible to see a family man of 50 - 60 years as a youth leader. Furthermore, the investigations reveal that his fellow criminal administrators or ten percenters in order to help him economically and douse all youthful

and revolutionary suggestion

to

conservative and selfish policies put him there.

Apart from the imposed youth leaders which the so called elders have imposed on the young, there are many other ageing men who occupy various offices from commissioners of youth, ministers and advisers in affairs relating to the young.

Fortunately, it has become imperative to expose the Nigerian youths since these misplaced

appointments

and govern mental policies have decided to keep the

real youths under the doldrums of low public life.

In the present age of rapid globalization, the Nigerian youth is that group of citizens which has been the most down trodden and frustrated out of the lot. The real youths are found in the secondary schools, tertiary institutions, streets and motor parks where hawking of goods and touting are their jobs. There has arisen the assassins and thug class since democracy started thriving as a business. There are also the exclusive class, those, whose parents and guardians share the national cake or have access to it.

Most members of this young bourgeoisie class

are in institutions of higher learning

across the Atlantic [Abroad]. In fact, the youth constitute about 60% of Nigerians 76 | P a g e

population and equally finds themselves in different shades. In comparing the roles of the present day Nigerian youth to those of the pre independence era or even before the advent of the colonialist, you will not fail to observe the loss of focus or the tactical scheming out of the young in national affairs. The Nigerian youth, though talented and energetic is not involved in the process of nation building as was the case in numerous ancient kingdoms that surrounded the Niger River. Tracing the role of the youth before the amalgamation of 1914, which set the colonial administration on smooth pace.

All the kingdom that diffused to become Nigeria, name them: The Oyo empire, Benin, Sokoto caliphate and its emirates, the Arochukwu kingdom, Tivland, the Jukun, vassal states of the Niger Delta, Idoma, Egbaland and many other stateless independent clans in Igboland. These historic kingdoms and clans had and provided tailored function for their youths. To say that the strength of these powerful states laid on the primordial Nigerian youths is not an understatement.

Let me give an instance by exposing the role of youths in primordial Igbo political setting. Yes! The Igbo precolonial society lack monarchical settings and authority, but it was not stated that they were a disorganised sect. Though their republican nature abhors the concentration of power or legitimacy on a stool occupied by one single person, it rather made them true and full-fledged democrats.

The youths in there-colonial Igbo setting occupied a very important role unlike now they carry utter neglect at their various backs. During those old periods, the youths engage in very sensitive and important works in the land under the auspices of age grades. Aside the maintenance of order and law, protection of territorial integrity and many social works, the youths were part of the Umunna [male] powerful class that contribute to decide policies that will administer their local community. During this era under review, by the mere fact that you are a man, the Igbo custom accords you the legitimate rights to contribution in the scheme of thing and shares in village allocations be it palm trees, pal m wine, landed properties etc.

In the time of communal war, the combatants are mostly able-bodied youths who will do the land proud. The female folk are not equally left out in the primordial process of nation building. They maintain the cleanliness of the habitat, help in the local manufacture and contribute pieces of advice when issues are hot in the land. Then the female folk also squeal to the community leaders on negative information bordering on the l and, be it invasion, land dispute or any other matter that concerns the economic, socio-cultural and security of their independent clan. As it is in the 77 | P a g e

Igbo independent stateless clans, so it was in m any other kingdoms which had a high sense of order, law, organization and general political heritage.

With these style of effective

youth participation in the governance of these ancient

kingdoms, the threshold of the 2011 century prepared a lot in stock for the emerging new class of Nigerian youth. Although, the tough battle to curb the incursion of Europeans into the interiors for beyond humanitarian work could not meet a successful end, it did not stop the pre independence Nigerian young from laying a solid foundation for themselves in preparation for the task of nation building.

The youth’s involvement in pre independence political war with the white man was their continued determination to protect the integrity of their fatherland. As a matter of truth, some youths went in search of wisdom to continue their constitutional roles of providing political and socio-economic security far Nigeria. Their various academic pursuits climaxed in the beginning of nationalism that ushered independence in Nigeria. Beside the Nigerian story, youths held sway in other parts of Africa and the globe.

Two native foreigners were among the early founders of modern Nigeria which these youths anchored. Both men had links with Liberia and Nigeria, one the late Edward Wilmot Blyden spent little of his life in Nigeria but the impact of his writings and speeches triggered off nationalist spirit among the youths.60 Edward Blyden who traced his native descent to Igboland was helped in this youth reorientation by John Payne Jackson, a Liberian. John Payne spent twenty-eight years in Lagos where his early writings together with Blyden nurtured latter-day nationalist ideology.

Jackson emphasized more on political nationalism while Blyden dwelt on cultural nationalism. The fi repower that were contained in the hands and wisdom of these men and their contemporaries created a new nationalist thought and activity of involvement in the policy making to develop their fatherland. In search of a proper platform to involve them in the policy formulation being meted on their people by the British, Nigerian youths abroad joined some pre-world war organisations, which brought them in close contact with external students who belonged to the same school of thought. One of such organizations was the West African Students Union which was replaced in 1925.

The pioneer founders of this union were mostly Nigerians who were studying in the United Stated of America and the United Kingdom. London was sort of their converging ground being the seat of the most thirsting nation for colonial empire.

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Nnamdi Azikiwe confirmed the above statement in his impressions of London. Hear Zik: "Meeting with my old friends was a tonic in itself, and seeing Ernest N. Egbuna, Ekundayo Ajayi, E.S Ajayi, H.O Davies Akintola Adeshigbin, Louis N. Mbanefo, O. Taiwo Jibowu, FelaSowande, and many others, reawakened my love for the homeland [Nigeria]. The WASU Hostel at 62 Camden Road, NW/, was the headquarters of most West African Students in London, where we congregated and devoured West African Newspapers. I also had the pleasure of giving a series of talks to the students. The West African Students Union helped immensely in arousing racial and political consciousness among Nigerians especially those who had direct contact with it. J.W. de Graft Johnson, a WASU leader had this description of the hope of the African Nay-Nigerian youth."...The great yearning for freedom, for emancipation from the yoke of centuries. The youth of Africa everywhere is assailed by the alluring thoughts of a free Africa, of an Africa owing no foreign burden, but stepping into her rightful place as a unit in the powerful army of the human family. "61

Solanke, another youth leader at the WASU who was of Nigeria descent made another statement eulogizing Marcus Garvey and the influence of Garveyism on the African youth and Negro Renaissance. Solanke further glorified African history and blamed the underdevelopment of Africa [Nigeria] to the exportation of her youths to Europe and America. Read: "...For about 500 years she was slowly, systematically and completely ruined, Europe and America robbed her to improve and enrich themselves...while Africa had retrogressed almost to the primitive stage ...,62 With the eclipse of the Second World War and the total paralyses of the Axis of Evil, most Nigerian students added salt to the nationalist agitations during the period under review. With the co-operations of their Indian and African counterpart coupled with the declaration of the Atlantic charter, which formed the bedrock of a new global unity -THE UNITED NATION. Thus the youths of Nigeria too numerous to mention set a new threshold for history.

These youths did not actually start as old men who have occupied every section of the polity today, including youth leadership seats? It is evident that the pre independence nationalists started the struggle for the political emancipation of 79 | P a g e

Nigerian at an early stage unlike the 21st century ageing youths of this nation who are still battling with their tertiary education or struggling to discover themselves through illegal ways. During that harsh colonial era, though their contributions and, opinions were not welcomed or met with

rebuffs, but

like intellectual

titans, they

refused to be intimidated out of the system.

To buttress the role of Nigeriayouths of this era, Coleman pointed the distinguished and historical input of two nationalists, Nnamdi Azikiwe and H.O Davies. Mr. Davies, fresh from the London school of economics where he had been an apostle of socialism, shared a roommate2f in Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya’s President at independence. Davies, a dominant and outstanding pillar of the Nigerian youth movement had his ideology in the Nigerian national ism based in the inseparable unity of Nigeria, in one of his speeches, he said: "We can never split no, never. We are not a party; we are a national government whose mission is the regeneration of our fatherland “63 On Azikiwe's second coming to Nigeria after he sailed to the United States for further studies, in which he finally settled to continue from where he stopped at Mr. Ocansey's African morning post. After setting up his West African Pilot, Zik did not hesitate to fulfil his youthful goal, which is to start the emancipation of his people.

Nnamdi Azikiwe as a youthful nationalist brought three important characteristics to the Nigerian Independence struggle when he enlisted with

the Nigerian Youth

Movement in 1938.

Azikiwe, brought in an expanding sense of nationalist press, a large number of educated Nigerians previously excluded or immobilized and a militant racial consciousness. These gifted youth’s conscientized as if it has never been done before and awakened slumbed and feeble minded colleagues to the realities of nationalism and involvement in the process of nation building. Rejuvenated with men of candour and integrity and confident with success, the Nigeria Youth Movement in 1938 published the Nigerian Youth Charter, which put forth the aims of the more strengthened organization. The aims include: a. The education of public opinion to a higher moral and intellectual level , so that national consciousness could be developed and the common ideal. b. The unification of the tribes of Nigeria through the encouragement of better understanding and cooperation.

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Notes 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

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Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). “Nigeria Country Page.” The World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworldfactbook/geos/ni.html(accessed 19 March 2017).

Ploch, Nigeria: Current Issues, 12.

Nigeria: Failed Elections, Failing State? Africa Report no. 126. Brussels, Belgium: ICG, 30 May 2007. p.9.

Soludo, Chukwuma C., Governor, Central Bank of Nigeria. “Nigerian Economy: Can We Achieve the Vision 20: 2020?” Briefing Central Bank of Nigeria, Abuja, Nigeria, 8 January 2007.

Soludo, “Nigerian Economy.”

Soludo, “Nigerian Economy.”

Nigeria Country Report, Generated on July 1st 2017 economics intelligent Unit, London. P.5.

Nigeria: Want in the Midst, International Crisis Group Africa Report, no 113, 19th July 2006. p.1.

Wikipedia, The Hubbert peak oil theory was posited by American Geophysicist M. KingHubbert.

Nigeria: Want in the Midst, ICG, p.21.

419 Fraud or 419, as the Nigerians refer to it, is a sub classification of Nigeria’s advance fee fraud law. It is an organized attempt to solicit advance fees from unsuspecting people via fax, letter, or e-mail by promising them a remittance for their assistance in moving large sums of money, normally from a Nigerian bank.

Ploch, Nigeria: Current Issues, p.12.

Nigeria: Want in the Midst, ICG, p. 1.

Soludo, “Nigerian Economy.”

Armin Langer, Mustapha, and Stewart, Horizontal Inequalities in Nigeria, Department of International Development, Oxford University, 2007. p. 9.

African Reports, Fuelling the Niger Delta Crisis, ICG, p.6.

Wikipedia, “Hubbert peak theory.”

Ploch, Nigeria: Current Issues, p.17.

Yar’Adua, Umara Musa, Nigerian president,Inaugural address. Abuja, Nigeria, 29 May 2007.

Ploch, Nigeria: Current Issues, p. 11.

Nigeria: Want in the Midst, ICG, p.1.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

41.

42.

43.

44.

45.

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Export Development Canada. Nigeria—EDC Economics.November2009. http://www.edc.ca/english/docs/gnigeria_e.pdf (accessed16 December 2009).

Soludo, “Nigerian Economy,” Okonjo-Iweala, Ngozi, and Philip Osafo-Kwaako,Nigeria’s Economic Reforms: Progress and Challenges, Washington DC: Brookings Institution, March 2007. p.10.

Nigerian government,Authorities’ Letter, Policy Statement, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding, 28 May 2007.

World Bank. Global Economic Prospects: Managing the Next Wave of Globalization. Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2007. p.3.

O’Neil, Jim, Dominic Wilson, Roopa Purushothaman, and Anna Stupnytska. How Solid Are the BRICS? Global Economics Paper no. 134. New York, NY: Goldman Sachs Economic Research Group, 1 December 2005. p.7.

O’Neil, How Solid Are the BRICS? p.20.

US DOE, International Energy Outlook 2009, 7.

US DOE, International Energy Outlook 2009, 38 NPC, Hard Truths, Facing the Hard Truths about Energy, Washington, DC: NPC, 18 July 2007. http://www.npchardtruthsreport.org/ (accessed 19 March 2017).

Lubeck, Paul M., Michael J. Watts, and Ronnie Lipschutz. Convergent Interests: U.S. Energy Security and the ‘Securing’ of Nigerian Democracy, International Policy Report. Washington, DC: Center for International Policy, February 2007. http://www.ciponline.org (accessed 19 March 2009) Heinrigs, Philipp,“Oil and Gas.” In Atlas on Regional Integration in West Africa.

Paris: Economic Community of West African States, April 2007.p.5 Braml, Josef. “Can the United States Shed Its Oil Addiction?”Washington Quarterly 30, no. 4 (Autumn 2007): p.117 Braml, Josef. “Can the United States Shed Its Oil Addiction? “Washington Quarterly 30, no. 4 (Autumn 2007): p.30.

Country Watch. Country Review: Nigeria, 17 October 2007. http://www.countrywatch.com (accessed 19 March 2009). World Economic Summary.CountryWatch,31January2009.http://www.countrywatch.com/facts/facts _default.aspx ?type=text&topic=SEGLO (accessed 18 March 2009).

USAID, “Socio-Economic Factors,” p.7.

US Census Bureau. “Midyear Population, by Age and Sex.” International Database Table094,19September 2007. www.census .gov/ipc/www/idb/country/niportal.html (accessed 19 March 2017).

World Bank. Global Economic Prospects: Managing the Next Wave of Globalization. Washington, DC: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2007. “Nigeria.” World Bank Group. http://worldbank.org/nigerian (accessed 17 March 2017).

Nigeria: Want in the Midst, ICG, 19.

The US DOE has three forecasts for 2030 a low end, midrange, and upper end forecast national Energy Outlook 2009, 24.

Kurzweil, Ray. The Singularity Is Near. When Humans Transcend Biology. New York: Penguin Books, 2006., p. 248.

Witoelar, Rachmat, president, UN Framework Climate Change Conference.

Address. UN Climate Change Conference, Bali, Indonesia, 15 December 2007.

Reuters, “Major Bank Says Climate Change Is Investment,” What effect the global recession of 2008 through 2010 will have can only be surmised as of publication.,

46.

47.

48.

49.

50.

51.

52.

53.

54.

55.

56.

57.

58.

59.

60.

61.

62.

63.

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Peters, Jimi. The Nigerian Military and the State. New York, NY: Tauris Academic Studies, 1997.p. 176.

Jane’s Information Group, “World Armies, Nigeria.

Jane’s Information Group, “World Armies, Nigeria NigerianarmyWebsite,http://www.nigerianarmy.org/index.php?option=com_conte nt&task=view&id=19&Itemid=30 (accessed 22 July 2017).

USDepartmentofState.“BackgroundNote:Nigeria.”http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn /2836.htm (accessed 22 August 2007). “US Energy Bill Good for Biofuels; Refiners, AutomakersHit.”CNNMoney,14December2007.http://money.cnn.com/news/newsf eeds/articles/djf500/200712141715DOWJONESDJONLINE000961_FORTUNE5.ht m (accessed 19 March 2017).

“Gen O. A. Azazi (Nigerian chief of defence staff),” p. 14.

Gen O. A. Azazi (Nigerian chief of defence staff),” p.19 Nigeria/AfricaMasterwebNewsReport,ChronologyofNigeriaMilitants’Attacks,2008, http://www.africamasterweb.com/AdSense/NigerianMilitants07Chronology.html (accessed 28 June 2017).

Lubeck, Paul M., Michael J. Watts, and Ronnie Lipschutz. ConvergentInterests: U.S. Energy Security and the ‘Securing’ of Nigerian Democracy. International Policy Report. Washington, DC: Centre for International Policy, February 2007. http://www.ciponline.org (accessed 19 March 2017).

Silberglitt, Richard, Philip S. Anton, David R. Howell, and Amy Wong. The Global Technology Revolution 2020, In-Depth Analysis. Washington, DC: RAND Corp, National Security Research Division, 2006.

Peters, Jimi,The Nigerian Military and the State, New York, NY:Tauris Academic Studies, 1997.p. 12.

Maier, Karl,This House Has Fallen: Midnight in Nigeria. New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2000.p.93 Lonsdale, David J. The Nature of War in the Information Age. New York, NY: Cass, 2004.p.75.

Jane’s Information Group. “Disarray among Nigeria’s ArmedMilitants.

“Jane’sIntelligenceDigest,10August2007.http://www8.janes.com/Search/document View.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/mags/jid/history/jid2007/jid70174.htm@curren t&pageSelected=allJanes&keyword=disarraypercent20amongpercent20Nigeria’s percent20armedpercent20militants&backPath=http://search.janes.com/Search&P rod_Name=JID&(accessed 17 October 2017).

Jane’s Information Group, “World Armies, Nigeria.”

Maier, This House Has Fallen. p. 291.

Maier, This House Has Fallen. p. 261.

James Coleman, Nigeria: Background to Nationalism, Benin city, Broburg and wins/om 1986 p.204

CHAPTER THREE

Ideal Society During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to this struggle of the African people. I have fought against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is an ideal for which I am prepared to die.

Nelson Mandela

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3.1 Aristotle “Man is a political animal,” Aristotle observes; human beings are creatures of flesh and blood, rubbing shoulders with each other in cities and communities.1 like his work in zoology, Aristotle’s political studies combine observation and theory. He and his students documented the constitutions of 158 states one of which, The Constitution of Athens, has survived on papyrus. The aim of the Politics, Aristotle says, is to investigate, on the basis of the constitutions collected, what makes for good government and what makes for bad government and to identify the factors favourable or unfavourable to the preservation of a constitution.

Aristotle asserts that all communities aim at some good. The state (polis), by which he means a city-state such as Athens, is the highest kind of community, aiming at the highest of goods. The most primitive communities are families of men and women, masters and slaves. Families combine to make a village, and several villages combine to make a state, which is the first self-sufficient community. The state is no less natural than the family; this is proved by the fact that human beings have the power of speech, the purpose of which is “to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and the unjust.”2 The foundation of the state was the greatest of benefactions, because only within a state can human beings fulfil their potential.

I.

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Origin and Nature of the State

A state is a form of political association, and political association is itself only one form of human association. Other associations range from clubs to business enterprises to churches. Human beings relate to one another, however, not only in associations but also in other collective arrangements, such as families, neighbourhoods, cities, religions, cultures, societies, and nations. The state is not the only form of political association. Other examples of political associations include townships,

counties,

provinces,

condominiums,

territories,

confederations,

international organizations (such as the UN) and supranational organizations (such as the EU).

To define the state is to account for the kind of political association it is, and to describe its relation to other forms of human association, and other kinds of human collectivity more generally. This is no easy matter for a number of reasons. First, the state is a form of association with a history, so the entity that is to be described is one that has evolved or developed and, thus, cannot readily be captured in a snapshot. Second, the concept of the state itself has a history, so any invocation of the term will have to deal with the fact that it has been used in subtly different ways.

Third, not all the entities that claim to be, or are recognized as, states are the same kinds of entity, since they vary in size, longevity, power, political organization and legitimacy. Fourth, because the state is a political entity, any account of it must deploy normative concepts such as legitimacy that are themselves as contentious as the notion of the state. Although the state is not uniquely difficult to define, these problems need to be acknowledged.

II.

What then is a Constitution?

The classification of the constitutions is not a modern idea. There are different bases on which the constitutions are classified. Aristotle for the first time adopted a scientific method to classify the constitution. His classification is based on the study of 158 constitutions of the ancient world. He has classified the constitution on the basis of location of sovereign power and end or purpose towards which the power was directed. States which seed the good life of all are true or normal states. Those which deviate from that end are perverted states. His classification is illustrated by the following table.

Monarchy is the government by one in the interest of common welfare. When it degenerates into selfish rule of monarch it becomes tyranny. When few people rule for common Good it is aristocracy.But when they rule in their self-interest, ignoring the common good, aristocracy is perverted into oligarchy. Policy is the government 86 | P a g e

by many when it is just and works for the welfare of all. But when they rule for their own class interest, it becomes democracy or adhocracy. Aristotle also referred to the cycle according to which the government changes. When monarchy became perverted, it degenerated into tyranny, which was replaced by aristocracy.

Aristocracy also degenerated into oligarchy, which was replaced by polity degenerated into democracy, which was set aside by monarchy. In this way the government continued.

Though the classification given by Aristotle is more realistic and scientific, it does not provide a clear picture. Critics point out that Aristotle's classification is not sound because it does not rest upon any scientific principle by which government can be distinguished from another.It is arithmetical rather than organic, quantitative rather than qualitative in character. Aristotle gave a wrong meaning to the term democracy.

Sir John Seely criticized it on the ground that it was not applicable to the modern governments. He pointed out that Aristotle knew only city-states and they were not like the 'country-states' of modern times.In Aristotle's classifications there is no place for limited monarchy, a presidential form of government, a parliamentary form of government, a unitary government and federal government. There is no guarantee that governments change in order indicated by Aristotle.After Aristotle several other political thinkers have tried to classify the constitution. Among them the most scientific and acceptable to modern states is that of Leacock.

Modern constitutions are classified in the following manner. a. Evolved and enacted constitutions. b. Written and unwritten constitutions. c. Rigid and flexible constitutions.

III. The concept of the state A state is a form of political association or polity that is distinguished by the fact that it is not itself incorporated into any other political associations, though it may incorporate other such associations. The state is thus a supreme corporate entity because it is not incorporated into any other entity, even though it might be subordinate to other powers (such as another state or an empire). One state is distinguished from another by its having its own independent structure of political authority, and an attachment to separate physical territories. The state is itself a political community, though not all political communities are states. A state is not a 87 | P a g e

nation, or a people, though it may contain a single nation, parts of different nations, or a number of entire nations.

A state arises out of society, but it does not contain or subsume society. A state will have a government, but the state is not simply a government, for there exist many more governments than there are states. The state is a modern political construction that emerged in early modern Europe, but has been replicated in all other parts of the world. The most important aspect of the state that makes it a distinctive and new form of political association is its most abstract quality: it is a corporate entity.

To understand this formulation of the idea of a state we need to understand the meaning of the other terms that have been used to identify it, and to distinguish it from other entities. The state is a political association. An association is a collectivity of persons joined for the purpose for carrying out some action or actions. An association thus has the capacity for action or agency, and because it is a collectivity it must therefore also have some structure of authority through which one course of action or another can be determined.

Since authority is a relation that exists only among agents, an association is a collectivity of agents. Other collectivises of persons, such as classes or crowds or neighbourhoods or categories (like bachelors or smokers or amputees) are not associations, for they do not have the capacity for agency and have no structures of authority to make decisions. A mob is not an association: even though it appears to act, it is no more an agent than is a herd.

On this understanding, society is not itself an association, for it is not an agent. It may be made up of or contain a multiplicity of associations and individual agents, but it is not an association or agent. Unless, that is, it is constituted as one by an act or process of incorporation. So, for example, Californian society is not an association, but the state of California is: for while a society is not, a polity is an association a political association.

In pre-civil war America, the southern states were a society, since they amounted to a union of groups and communities living under common laws some of which sharply distinguished it from the North but they did not form a single (political) association until they constituted themselves as the Confederacy. A society is a collectivity of people who belong to different communities or associations that are geographically contiguous.

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The boundaries of a society are not easy to specify, since the contiguity of societies makes it hard to say why one society has been left and another entered. One way of drawing the distinction would be to say that, since all societies are governed by law, a move from one legal jurisdiction to another is a move from one society to another.

But this has to be qualified because law is not always confined by geography, and people moving from one region to another may still be bound by laws from their places of origin or membership. Furthermore, some law deals with relations between people from different jurisdictions. That being true, however, a society could be said to exist when there is some established set of customs or conventions or legal arrangements specifying how laws apply to persons whether they stay put or move from one jurisdiction to another. (Thus there was not much of a society among the different highland peoples of New guinea when they lived in isolation from one another, though there was a society in Medieval Spain when Jews, Muslims and Christians coexisted under elaborate legal arrangements specifying rights and duties individuals had within their own communities and as outsiders when in others.)

A society is different, however, from a community, which is in turn different from an association. A community is a collectivity of people who share some common interest and who therefore are united by bonds of commitment to that interest. Those bonds may be relatively weak, but they are enough to distinguish communities from mere aggregates or classes of person. However, communities are not agents and thus are not associations: they are marked by shared understandings but not by shared structures of authority. At the core of that shared understanding is an understanding of what issues or matters are of public concern to the collectivity and what matters are private.

Though other theories of community have held that a community depends for its existence on a common locality (Robert McIver) or ties of blood kinship (Ferdinand Tonnies), this account of community allows for the possibility of communities that cross geographical boundaries. Thus, while it makes perfect sense to talk of a village or a neighbourhood as a community, it makes no less sense to talk about, say, the university community, or the scholarly community, or the religious community.

One of the important features of a community is the fact that its members draw from it elements that make up their identities though the fact that individuals usually belong to a number of communities means that it is highly unlikely (if not impossible) that an identity would be constituted entirely by membership of one community. For

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this reason, almost all communities are partial communities rather than allencompassing or constitutive communities.

An important question, then, is whether there can be such a thing as a political community, and whether the state is such a community. On this account of community, there can be a political community, which is defined as a collectivity of individuals who share an understanding of what is public and what is private within that polity. Whether or not a state is a political community will depend, however, on the nature of the state in question. States that are divided societies are not political communities. Iraq after the second Gulf War, and Sri Lanka since the civil war (and arguably earlier), are not political communities because there is serious disagreement over what comprises the public. Arguably, Belgium is no longer a political community, thought it remains a state.

Now, there is one philosopher who has denied that a political society or a state—or at least, ‘a well-ordered democratic society’ can be a community. According to John Rawls, such a society is neither an association nor a community. A community, he argues, is ‘a society governed by a shared comprehensive, religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine.’3 Once we recognize the fact of pluralism, Rawls maintains, we must abandon hope of political community unless we are prepared to countenance the oppressive use of state power to secure it.4 However, this view rests on a very narrow understanding of community as a collectivity united in affirming the same comprehensive doctrine. It would make it impossible to recognize as communities a range of collectivises commonly regarded as communities, including neighbourhoods and townships. While some common understanding is undoubtedly necessary, it is too much to ask that communities share as much as a ‘comprehensive doctrine.’ On a broader understanding of community, a state can be a political community.

However, it should be noted that on this account political community is a much less substantial thing than many might argue. It is no more than a ‘partial community’, being only one of many possible communities to which individuals might belong.

Though a state may be a political community, it need not be. Yet it must always be an association: a collectivity with a structure of authority and a capacity for agency.

What usually gives expression to that capacity is the state’s government.

Government and the state are not however, the same thing. States can exist without governments and frequently exist with many governments. Not all governments have

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states. Australia, for example, has one federal government, six state governments, two territorial governments, and numerous local governments.

The United States, Canada, Germany, Malaysia and India are just a few of the many countries with many governments. States that have, for at least a time, operated without governments (or at least a central government) include Somalia from 1991 to 2000 (de facto, 2002), Iraq from 2003 to 2004, and Japan from 1945 to 1952 (when the post-war Allied occupation came to an end). Many governments are clearly governments of units within federal states. But there can also be governments where there are no states: the Palestinian Authority is one example.

Government is an institution whose existence precedes that of the state. A government is a person or group of persons who rule or administer (or govern) a political community or a state. For government to come into being there must exist a public. Ruling within a household is not government. Government exists when people accept (willingly or not) the authority of some person or persons to address matters of public concern: the provision of non-excludable good, the administration of justice, and defence against external enemies being typical examples of such matters. Until the emergence of the state, however, government did not attend to the interests of a corporate entity but administered the affairs of less clearly defined or demarcated publics. With the advent of the state, however, government became the established administrative element of a corporate entity.

The question now is: what does it mean to say that a state is a corporate entity? The state is a corporation in the way that a people or a public cannot be. It is a corporation because it is, in effect and in fact, a legal person. As a legal person a corporation not only has the capacity to act but also a liability to be held responsible.

Furthermore, a corporation is able to hold property. This is true for incorporated commercial enterprises, for institutions like universities and churches, and for the state. A corporation cannot exist without the natural persons who comprise it— and there must be more than one, for a single individual cannot be a corporation. But the corporation is also a person separate from the persons who comprise it.

Thus a public company has an existence because of its shareholders, its agents and their employees, but its rights and duties, powers and liabilities, are not reducible to, or definable in terms of, those of such natural persons. A church or a university has an existence because of the officers who run them and the members who give them their point, but the property of such an entity does not belong to any of these individuals. The state is a corporation in the same way that these other entities are: it 91 | P a g e

is a legal person with rights and duties, powers and liabilities, and holds property that accrues to no other agents than itself. The question in political theory has always been not whether such an entity can come into existence (since it plainly has) but how it does so. This is, in a part, a question of whether its existence is legitimate.

The state is not, however, the only possible political corporation. Provinces, counties, townships, and districts, as well as condominiums (such as Andorra), some international organizations, and supranational organizations are also political corporations but not states. A state is a supreme form of political corporation because it is able to incorporate within its structure of authority other political corporations (such as provinces and townships) but is not subject to incorporation by others (such as supranational organizations).

Political corporations the state is unable to incorporate are themselves therefore states. Any state incorporated by any other political corporation thereby ceases to be a state. By this account, prior to the American Civil War, the various states of the Union were not provinces of the United States but fully independent states. After the war, to the extent that the war established that no state could properly secede or cease to be incorporated into the one national state, the United States became a fully independent state and not a supranational organization.

The significance of the capacity for political corporations to hold property ought to be noted. Of critical importance is the fact that this property does not accrue to individual persons. Revenues raised by such corporations by the levying of taxes, or the imposition of tariffs or licensing fees, or by any other means, become the property of the corporation not of particular governments, or officials, or monarchs, or any other natural person who is able to exercise authority in the name of the corporation. The political corporation, being an abstract entity, cannot enjoy the use of its property only redistribute it among the agents through whom it exercises power and among others whom those agents are able, or obliged, to favour. The state is not the only political corporation capable of raising revenue and acquiring property, though it will generally be the most voracious in its appetite.

One question that arises is whether the best way to describe the state is as a sovereign power. The answer depends on how one understands sovereignty. If sovereignty means ‘supreme authority within a territory’ (Philpot SEP 2003), it is not clear that sovereignty captures the nature of all states. In the United States, the American state incorporates the 50 states of the union, so those states are not at liberty to withdraw from the union. However, authority of the various states and state 92 | P a g e

governments does limit the authority of the American state, which is unable to act unilaterally on a range of issues.

To take just one example, it cannot amend the Constitution without the agreement of two-thirds of the states. Indeed, many national states find themselves constrained not just because they exist as federated polities but because their membership of other organizations and associations, as well as their treaty commitments, limit what they can legally do within their own territorial boundaries. Sovereignty could, on the other hand, be taken to be a matter of degree; but this would suggest that it is of limited use in capturing the nature of states and distinguishing them from other political corporations.

One aspect of being a state that is sometimes considered best identified by the concept of sovereignty is its territoriality. People belong to a state by virtue of their residence within borders, and states, it is argued, exercise authority over those within its geographical bounds. While it is important to recognize that states must possess territory in order to exist, they are not unique in having geographical extension.

Provinces, townships, and supranational entities such as the EU, are also defined by their territories. Moreover, residence within certain borders does not make people members of that state any more than it removes them from the authority of another under whose passport they might travel. Nor is the state’s capacity to control the movement of people within or across its territory essential to its being a state, for many states have relinquished that right to some degree by membership of other associations. Citizens of the EU have the right to travel to and reside in other member states.

To exist, states must have territory; but not entire control over such territory. Weber’s well-known definition of the state as a body having a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force in a given territory is also inadequate. The extent of a state’s control, including its control of the means of using violence, varies considerably with the state, not only legally but also in fact.

Though they are supreme corporate entities, states do not always exist in isolation, and usually stand in some relation to other forms of political association beyond their territorial borders. States may belong to international organizations such as the United Nations or alliances such as NATO. They may be a part of supranational associations that are loosely integrated defence and trading blocs (such as ASEAN) or more substantially integrated governmental associations (such as the EU). They might be members of international regimes, such as the International Refugee 93 | P a g e

Convention, as a result of agreements they have entered into. States might also be parts of empires, or operate under the sphere of influence of another more powerful state. States might exist as associated states—as was the case with the Philippines, which was from 1935-46 the first associated state of the United States.

The Filipino state was responsible for domestic affairs, but the US handled foreign and military matters. Even today, though in different circumstances, the foreign relations of a number of states are handled by other states Spain and France are responsible for Andorra, the Switzerland for Liechtenstein, France for Monaco, and India for Bhutan. States can also bear responsibility for territories with the right to become states but which have not yet (and may never) become states. Puerto Rico, for example, is an unincorporated territory of the United States, whose residents are unenfranchised American citizens, enjoying limited social security benefits, but not subject to Federal income tax; it is unlikely to become an independent state.

The state is, in the end, only one form of political association. Indeed, the range of different forms of political association and government even in recent history is astonishing. The reason for paying the state as much attention as it is given is that it is, in spite of the variety of other political forms, the most significant type of human collectivity at work in the world today.

A good government governs for the common good of the people, but in a bad one, the rulers govern for their own private gain. The ideal among these three according to him, is aristocracy - the state governed by the best few who are for the interest of all. Bu t because the ideal 'is difficult to realize, there is need to adopt a mixed form of government, or 'polity' constitutional government in which every citizen governs and is also governed (constitutionalism) In the Aristotelian Polity, or the constitutional government, "the citizens at large administer the state for the common interest; the government is called by the generic name, a constitution."5 In the polity, power is concentrated in the offices as a rule of law. The power of those in office should be controlled by the law, since good laws are supreme in the state. Govern men t in the polity should be more lasting From his basic ethical principle, that the happiest life is the virtuous life, life in the mean, life attainable by everyone he establishes that the best polity is that characterized by

the

principle of the mean as the virtuous. He approaches this from the economic point of view. a. the very rich class b. the very poor class 94 | P a g e

c. the class in the mean The last class is characterized by moderation, it comes between the first and the second and it is the best class since those who belong here are more likely to follow rational principle and rule, and not be overambitious. They stand in between the very rich, ambitious, less submissive, luxury minded and the very poor, degraded, unknowledgeable people. The best state should be small number of the middle class, and the other dominant class (es) tend to overrule.

In the best stable government therefore, one has to promote the middle class to outnumber one or both of the other classes. "The legislative should always include the middle-class in the government." In a middle class dominated government, stability is assured, since there would be no fear that the rich will ever collaborate with the poor against the rulers. This foregoing view of Aristotle, I think is almost a gratuitous belief, since it is known that the rich could influence the poor to revolt against their rulers.

IV. The Best State: A theory of the state According to Martin Van Creveld, the state emerged because of the limitations of the innumerable forms of political organization that existed before it.6 The crucial innovation that made for development of the state was the idea of the corporation as a legal person, and thus of the state as a legal person. In enabled the emergence of a political entity whose existence was not tied to the existence of particular persons such as chiefs, lords and kings or particular group such as clans, tribes, and dynasties. The state was an entity that was more durable. Whether or not this advantage was what caused the state to emerge, it seems clear enough that such an entity did come into being. The modern state represents a different form of governance than was found under European feudalism, or in the Roman Empire, or in the Greek city-states.

Having accounted for the concept of the state, however, we now need to consider what kind of theory of the state best might account for the nature of this entity. Ever since the state came into existence, political philosophers have been preoccupied with the problem of giving an account of its moral standing. To be sure, philosophers had always asked why individuals should obey the law, or what, if anything, could justify rebellion against a king or prince. But the emergence of the state gave rise to a host of new theories that have tried to explain what relationship people could have, not to particular persons or groups of persons with power or authority over them, but to a different kind of entity.

To explain the emergence of the state in Europe from the 13th to the 19th centuries would require an account of many things, from the decline of the power of the church against 95 | P a g e

kingdoms and principalities to the development of new political power structures with the transformation and eventual disappearance of the Holy Roman Empire; from the disappearance of towns and city-states, and extended associations like the Hanseatic League, to the rise of movements of national unification.

Attempts by theorists to describe the state that was emerging are as much a part of the history of the state as are the political changes and legal innovations. Bodin, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Montequieu, Hume, Rousseau, Madison, Kant, Bentham, Mill, Hegel, Tocqueville, and Marx were among the most insightful thinkers to offer theories of the state during the course of its emergence, though theorizing went on well into the 20th century in the thought of Max Weber, the English pluralists, various American democratic theorists, and Michael Oakeshott. They offered theories of the state in the sense that they tried to explain what it was that gave the state its point: how it was that the existence of the state made sense. To some, this meant also justifying the state, though for the most part this was not the central philosophical concern. (Normative theory, so called, is probably a relatively recent invention.)

The question, however, remains: what theory best accounts for the state? Since there is time and space only for some suggestions rather than for a full-scale defence of a new theory of the state, I shall come to the point. The theorist who gives us the best theory of the state we have so far is Hume, and any advance we might make should build on Hume’s insights. To appreciate what Hume has to offer, we should consider briefly what the main alternatives are, before turning again to Hume.

We might usefully do this by posing the question in a way that Hume would have appreciated: what interest does the state serve? Among the first answers to be offered was that presented, with different reasoning, by Bodin and Hobbes: the interest of everyone in peace or stability or order. Each developed this answer in politically similar circumstances: religious wars that reflected the declining power of a church trying to hold on to political influence. Both thinkers defended conceptions of the state as absolutist (or at least highly authoritarian) to make clear that the point of the state was to preserve order in the face of challenges to the peace posed by the Church or by proponents of group rights such as the Monarchomachs.

The state was best understood as the realm of order, to be contrasted with the state of war signified by its absence and threatened by its dereliction. Crucially, for both thinkers, the state had to be conceived as a single sovereign entity, whose powers were not divided or to be shared either by different branches of government or by different elements in a mixed

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constitution. Among the problems with this view is that it is not clear that the state is needed to secure order, nor plausible to think that divided government is impossible.

The conception of the state as condition in which order is possible looks unlikely not only because the state may sometimes act in ways that are destructive of order (and even selfdestructive) but also because order has existed without states. Indeed, one of the problems for Hobbes’s social theory in particular is explaining how the state could come into being if it really is the result of agreement voluntarily to transfer power to a corporate agent since the state of war is not conducive to making or keeping agreements. It does not look as if the point of the state is to serve our interest in order even if that were our sole or primary interest.

Another view of the point of the state is that it serves our interest in freedom. Two theories of this kind were offered by Rousseau and Kant. In Rousseau’s account, the emerges of society brings with it the loss of a kind of freedom as natural man is transformed into a social being ruled directly and indirectly by others. The recovery of this freedom is not entirely possible, but freedom of a kind is possible in the state, which is the embodiment of the general will. Living in such a state we can be free as beings who are, ultimately, subject not to others but to laws we give ourselves. Drawing inspiration from Rousseau’s conception of freedom, Kant presents a slightly different contractarian story, but one with a similarly happy ending.

The antithesis of the state is the state of nature, which is a state of lawless freedom. In that condition, all are morally obliged to contract with one another to leave that state to enter a juridical realm in which freedom is regulated by justice so that the freedom each can be compatible with the freedom of all. The state serves our interest in freedom by first serving our interest in justice. If Hobbes thought that whatever the state decreed was, eo ipso, just; Kant held that justice presupposed the existence of the state. What’s difficult to see in Kant’s account is why there is any obligation for everyone in the state of nature to enter a single juridical realm, rather than simply to agree to abide by the requirements of morality or form different ethical communities.

Why should freedom require the creation of a single juridical order? It is no less difficult to see why the state might solve the problem of freedom in Rousseau’s account. If, in reality, there is a conflict between different interests, and some can prevail only at the expense of others, it seems no better than a cover-up to suggest that all interests are served equally well since all are free when governed by laws that reflect the general will. If this is the case, the state serves our interest in freedom only by feeding us the illusion that we are free when in fact we are subordinated to others.

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Hegel also thinks that our deepest interest is in freedom, but for him it can only be fully enjoyed when we live in a community in which the exercise of that freedom reflects not simply the capacity of particular wills to secure their particular interest but the existence of an ethical life in which conflicts of interest are properly mediated and reconciled.

The institution that achieves this is the state, which takes us out of the realm of particularity into the realm of concrete universality: a realm in which freedom is given full expression because, for the first time, people are able to relate to one another as individuals. This is possible because the state brings into existence something that eluded people in society before the state came into being: a form of ethical life in which, at last, people can feel at home in the world.

The most serious challenge to Hegel’s view is that offered by Marx. The state might appear to be the structure within which conflicts of interest were overcome as government by the universal class Hegel’s state bureaucracy acted to serve only the universal interest, but in reality the state did no more than masquerade as the defender of the universal interest. The very existence of the state, Marx argued, was evidence that particularity had not been eliminated, and discrete interests remained in destructive competition with one another.

More specifically, this conflict remained manifest in the class divisions in society, and the state could never amount to more than a vehicle for the interests of the ruling class.

Freedom would be achieved not when the state was fulfilled but when it was superseded.

What is present in Marx but missing in the previously criticized theories is a keen sense that the state might not so much serve human interests in general as serve particular interests that have managed to capture it for their own purposes. This is why, for Marx, social transformation requires, first, the capture by the working class of the apparatus of the state.

The cause of human freedom would be served, however, only when the conditions that made the state inevitable were overcome: scarcity and the division of labour, which brought with them alienation, competition and class conflict.

What is most persuasive in Marx’s analysis is his account of the state as an institution that embodies the conflict of interest found in the world rather than as one that reconciles competing interests. What is less convincing, however, is the expectation that particular interests will one day be eradicated. What is missing is any sense that the state itself has its own interests, as well as being the site through which a diverse range of interests compete to secure their own advantage. To gain an appreciation of these dimensions of the state, we need to turn, at least initially, to Hume.

Hume’s theory of the state does not appear conveniently in any one part of his political writings, which address a variety of issues but not this one directly. His analysis is to be 98 | P a g e

found in part in his Treatise, in an even smaller part of his second Enquiry, in his Essays, and in his multi-volume History of England. What can be gleaned from these writings is Hume’s view of the state as an entity that emerged in history, in part because the logic of the human condition demanded it, in part because the nature of strategic interactions between individuals made it probable, and finally because accidents of history pushed the process in one way or another.

The first step in Hume’s analysis is to explain how society is possible, given that the facts of human moral psychology suggest cooperation is unprofitable. The answer is that repeated interactions reveal to individuals the advantage of cooperating with potential future cooperators and out of this understanding conventions are born. The emergence of society means the simultaneous emergence therefore of two other institutions without which the idea of society is meaningless: justice and property. Society, justice and property co-exist, for no one of them can have any meaning without the other two. What these institutions serve is human interests in prospering in a world of moderate scarcity.

Interest accounts for the emergence of other institutions, such as law, and government, though in these cases there is an element of contingency. Government arises because war as eminent soldiers come to command authority among their men and then extent that authority to their groups more broadly. Law develops in part as custom becomes entrenched and is then further established when authorities in power formalize it, and judges and magistrates regularize it by setting the power of precedent. In the course of time, people become attached to the laws, and even more attached to particular authorities, both of which come to acquire lives of their own. A sense of allegiance is born.

Of crucial importance in Hume’s social theory is his understanding of human institutions as capable of having lives of their own. They come into the world without human design, and they develop not at the whim of any individual or by the wish of any collective. Law, once in place, is a ‘hardy plant’ that will survive even if abused or neglected. Government, once in place, will evolve as it responds to the interests than shape and try to control it. The entire edifice of society will reflect not any collective purpose or intention but the interplay of interests that contend for pre-eminence.

The state, in this analysis, is not the construction of human reason rooted in individual consent to a political settlement; nor a product of the decrees of divine providence, even if the construction appears ever so perfect. It is simply the residue of what might (anachronistically) be called a Darwinian struggle. What survives is what is most fit to do so.

The state in this story is the product of chance: it is nothing more than the way political interests have settled for now the question of how power should be allocated and exercised.

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It would be a mistake to think that they could do this simply as they pleased, as if on a whim.

The facts of human psychology and the logic of strategic relations will constrain action, just as will the prevailing balance of power. But chance events can bring about dramatic and unexpected changes. The important thing, however, is that for Hume the state cannot be accounted for by referring to any deeper moral interest that humans have be that in justice, or freedom, or reconciliation with their fellows. The state, like all institutions, is an evolutionary product. Evolution has no purpose, no end, and no prospect of being controlled.

Hume’s theory of the state is, in the end, born of a deeply pluralistic outlook. Hume was very much alive to the fact of human diversity of customs, laws, and political systems. He was also very much aware of the extent to which human society was marked by conflicts among contending interests. The human condition was always going to be one of interest conflict, and this condition was capable of palliation but resistant to cure.

All human institutions had to be understood as the outcome of conflict and efforts at palliation, but not as resolutions of anything. If there are two general tendencies we might observe, Hume suggests, they are the tendency to authority and the tendency to liberty.

Both elements are there at the heart of the human predicament: authority is needed to make society possible, and liberty to make it perfect. But there is no particular balance to be struck, for every point on the scale is a possible equilibrium point, each with its own advantages and disadvantages. To understand the state is to recognize that we are in this predicament and that there is no final resolution.

Hume’s theory of the state, as I have presented, in some ways recalls the theory offered by Michael Oakeshott, which presents the modern European state as shifting uneasily between two competing tendencies. One tendency is towards what he called society as an enterprise association: a conception of the role of the state as having a purposive character, its purpose being to achieve some particular goal or goals such as producing more economic growth and raising levels of happiness. The other tendency is towards the idea of society as a civil association: a conception of the state as having not particular purpose beyond making possible its member’s pursuit of their own separate ends.

The state’s historical character is of an institution that has oscillated between these two tendencies, never at any time being of either one kind or the other. Hume’s theory of the state shares with Oakeshott’s account this unwillingness to set down in definitive or snapshot form a picture or description of something that embodies important contradictions.

Even if it seems not particularly satisfying, I suspect it’s about as satisfying a portrait of the state as we can hope to get.

3. 2 Marcus Tullius Cicero 100 | P a g e

On Law and Its Source:Cicero advocated that the natural law of reason is the basis of other laws and that its source is divine Wisdom and Reason directs the entire universe. Even the rules nations which demand righteousness and deterfrom doing evil, and

also other

particular laws written and unwritten draw their power from the law greater and older than the nations and the states themselves, that is from power coeval with God who directs all things. Cicero applied to particular rules and particular laws and is the divine right reason of supreme Jupiter.7 3.3 St. Thomas Aquinas For Aquinas the object of justice is right.8 what then is justice? Justice like other virtues, as a habit that is the principle of a good needs be defined by the means of the good. justice consist s of the things that have to do with our relationship with other men. Therefore. St. Thomas concludes that justice means "rendering to each one his right", since according to St. Isadore, "a man is said to be just because he respects the right (jus) of others."9 Later in the cited portion of the Summa Theologica, Aquinas explains the doctrine of the common good by making distinction between justice as applied to the particular and to the general.

The first pertains to one’s relations to particular individuals and the second pertains to one's relations to others in general as to members of a community.

This second one applies to every member of a community in his relationship to that community as a part to the whole. In this way the particular good of the individual members is related to the good of the entire community. Such that "Whatever is the good of the part can be directed to the good of the whole." But since the good of all virtues w het her in relation to oneself or in relation to others is always referable to common good, and justice directs man to the common good, therefore all acts of virtue direct one to the common good.

Just ice actually is a general virtue in relation to other virtues. But since law directs to the common good, this general justice is legal justice. Legal justice directs man to the common good immediately, but to the good of the individual immediately. The good of the particular or the individual is not divorced from the general good.

Aquinas following the thought is

of Aristotle

makes a distinction between community

injustice which directs the relation of one individual with another in mutual callings; as a part , and distributing just ice which directs the relation of the community to the individual person . Distributive justice assures that common good is shared proportionately .10

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3.4 St. Thomas More I. Doctrine: Ideal Political Society In his major political work: Utopia (DeoptimoReipublicaestatu), he gave an account of anideal

common

wealth

the

utopia.11 As

the

title

of

his

work

suggests:

De

OptimoReipublicaeStatu he best order of society More like Plato, who influenced him extensively, considers the republic or the state as it should be -an ideal society. Actually Thomas More, took over some of Plato's principles and teachings; For instance, the followingare common to both of them: dialogic farm of discourse, communism, the idea of extra good education for leaders to be scholar governors like Plato's philosopher kings, equality among all even between men and women, the necessity of religion etc. Like Plato, More emphasizes these as the qualities that should accompany an ideal society. But More stresses the place of the family against Plato's own view.

In the Utopia, More started his presentation of what the ideal should be, to him the goods of life food, shelter, education and so on,should be shared by all. Among other outstanding teachings of Thomas More are: that the exchange method of productsshould be by barter no money to be used; there should be no capita l punishment; wars are inhuman and should be avoided; religion is important in the stale such that those who deny immortality of the soul, eternal reward or eternal punish men t should not be given public office. They are inferior men, therefore tolerance should be upheld.

All this point one could note that although Thomas More did not write sufficiently to promote his theory of the ideal common wealth, actually his communism found a good testimony in his life and his defence of the civil justice, the cause of which he sacrificed his life. The influence of his teachings continued even into the next two and half centuries after his murder. This is reflected in the writings of Tommaso Campanella( 1568-1.639) on Universal equality.

3.5 Niccolo Machiavelli Niccolo Machiavelli was a renowned Renaissance political theorist from Florence in Italy.

He was an active secretary to the second Chancery (the department of war and of interior security). Thus he had chance of active political life at that early age of twenty five . He markedthe dawn of the modern period of political philosophy actually the period of Renaissance and the period of Reformation ( the attempts al the purification of Christianity from some corruptive elements). His major political works are: a. Discourses on The First Decade on Titus Livinus b. The Prince 102 | P a g e

With these works Machiavelli became the first political theorist solely earthly and not heavenly. It is in the achievement of power, greatness and fame, and immortalizing fame.

Man has no supernatural end. There is therefore no divine law. Virtue is the ability to attain power and fame. Man does not attain goodness only by being subject to law. Man’s life and history is determined by fate and virtue. Man can mould his fate working and intervening in the course of life and history. And comes through this intervention. The ability of man to make this intervention and achieve the greatness of power and fame is virtue.

Machiavelli does not see the need for the Aristotelian type of the division of government into three good forms and three bad forms. A good form of government to him constitutes the mixture of oligarchy, monarchy, and democracy. Mixture supported by adequate representation. For Machiavelli political dissention and opposition are necessary elements to preserve liberty in the state.12 But the rule of law supersedes factions and private vengeance.Thus a constitution should defend against usurpation of power. Power rather should be distributed giving good opportunity to impeach any person in the service of the state, no matter the position, when necessary .13 Between Republics and Principalities, For Machiavelli, all the states and powers under which men have been governed are either Republics or Principalities; I. On Republics In the Discourses on the First Decade of Titus Livinus, he explains that republics are Free states as different from principalities which are not Free states. The republics rank higher in their organization and structuring than the principalities. They bear higher advantages also with a people of higher degree of Virtue can form a true republic this implies

constitution, a

self-government (not merely representable democracy) unlike principality here a prince or tyrant must subtle the people because they lack virtue and cannot govern themselves.

In the republics, the people have the freedom to rule themselves. Actually the people, according to Machiavelli, are more prudent and stable than the princes. The people can judge better; they are less influenced by external forces of corrupt judgement than the princes. In their election they make better choice. Than princes

would be easily lured to

choose dubious characters. Even on the,question of law, although the prince could make better laws, institutions, statutes etc., but the people would keep them better. Thus the virtue of a good people is always higher than that of the prince. They are free.14 According to Machiavelli it is freedom that makes a state a republic. It is the virtue of the people that make them free. Freedom of the slate therefore means not only independence from externaldomination. It involves also the internal freedom of the people. The ancient 103 | P a g e

Roman Republic was earlier a free state but later became unfree when the emperors and Caesars started to concentrate political powers into their hands and discarded the people's constitution. (On the other hand, the freedom of state is not a mere liberality.

It is rather in the people's self-government; which self -government is not simply representative democracy but the people accepting with virtue the challenges of guiding their lives according to legal and institutional structure of the state. They would freely and spontaneously, without compulsion keep order.

Actually it is virtue that makes a people a free state. It is this power (virtu) that is the ability with which man can challenge fortune which confronts his effort towards order in life. Virtue therefore is displayed in the power or ability to resist the natural force that tend to lure men to believe "that human affairs are so governed by fortune and by God, that men cannot alter them by any prudence of theirs, and indeed .have no remedy against them."15 It is therefore this ability or power of a people to control the force that governs the universe (which force is believed to be fortune), that makes them conform to law and institutions, that builds up for them a constitutional system a republic. This ability which achieved many a people as a free state aims at two ends: a. to expand their state always and b. to protect their liberties Common Good in the Republic Another characteristic that differentiates the Republics from the Principalities is that of the commonwills good. The common good isonly respected in the republics not in the principalities, because the prince is prone to protect the private interest of the few when it conflicts with that of the generality of the people. And this makes always the principalities less prosperous in wealth and power. In Machiavelli'sown words, "it is not individual prosperity, but the general good, that makes cities great; and certainly the general good is regarded in nowhere but in Republic...."

III.

On the Principalities

There are two types of Principalities - 'hereditary' and 'new; new in the sense that it is formed either entirely new or members are annexed to the hereditary state of the prince.

Machiavelli holds that although in human history men acknowledge and praise honest princes who keep their power by law, but the successful princes are the crafty ones who adopt force. (There are two ways of contesting for power: by law which is appropriate to man, and by force which belongs to the beast). For a prince therefore to be successful, he has to adopt the way of the beast and better still he has to adopt the fox to know the snares and the lion to frighten the wolves. In this way the prince can keep his power although thatwould 104 | P a g e

be wrong if men -were entirely good. In order to keep faith to his power, the sovereign can also deceive men. Machiavelli cites that the success of Alexander VI was because he was the greatest deceiver ever. He believes that: A prince, therefore, needs not necessarily have all the good qualities but he should certainly appear to have them if he has these qualities and always behaves accordingly he will find them harmful, if he only appears to have them they will render him service. He should appear to be compassionate, faithful to his word, kind, guiltless, and devout. And indeed he should be so. But h is disposition should be such that,if he needs to be the opposite, he knows how .16 The prince should avoid being despised.17 According to Machiavelli in order to win the favour of the people, the prince must avoid those things that would make people hate him or treat him with contempt, such as being greedy or grasping, violating Other people's rights. This will endear him to many people. He would have only the task to fight ambitious people. He must also avoid appearing fickle, frivolous, cowardly irresolute or effeminate since these would make him contemptible. He should show courage, greatnessand fortitude."When settling disputes between his subjects, he should ensure that his judgement is irrevocable; and he should be so regarded that no one ever dreams of trying to deceive or trick him."18 This assures him of his place and power. His external security is consolidated by arming himself well and by good allies, while internal security is assured by his observance of the afore mentioned attitudes which will frighten his enemies.

Also the way the prince relates with the noble and the common people could breed contempt and disfavour from either side. Therefore, good institutions are needed to take care of both the nobles and the common people. Machiavelli for this reason praised the French kingdom of his time as the best ordered and governed kingdom, since it established a parliament to permit the nobles to contribute their authority and an arbiter to take away the reproach the king would incur from the noble if he favoured the people against the wish of the nobles, or the nobles against the wish of the people.

This means "that princes should delegate to others the enactment of unpopular measures and keep in their own hands the distribution of favours ... that a prince should value the nobles, but not make himself hated by the people."19It is understandable here that the affairs of enactment of judgement be separated from the office of the sovereign. Such shouldbe the case of the judiciary

in any state.

Such an institution should carry out its duty

dispassionately whether a noble is involved or a commoner. Even the 'grace' of pardon or acquittal reserved to the sovereign in special cases should be sparingly used only in extreme cases.

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3.6 Mao Tsetung Mao was an outstanding Chinese socio-political tinker and revolutionary leader; converted to Marxism in 1920; started his revolutionary venture as the Chairman of the new Soviet republic in Kiangsi m 1930. He became the founder of the Communist People's Republic of China and its first Chairman in 1949. At the beginning he adopted Sovietism in socio-political and economic notions especially in centralized planning and collect agroeconomy.

As the leader of the Chinese Communist Party, Tsetung undertook the peculiar application of Marxism to China’s situation. One remembers here the 1942 Rectification Campaign at which he insisted on the avoidance of an unreflect adoptionof Soviet methods. In 1958 the policy of the 'great Leap Forward, which was meant to involve all the people in planned labour m small social organisms called communes, ushered in China's leap for independence from Sovietism.

Although Mao was attackedfor the policy of the 'Great Leap Forward' his failure to scuffle all elements of bureaucracy in the Communist Party, he promoted the revolutionary tendencies of the youthful masses through another policy of (the 'Cultural Revolution ' directed through the instrumentality of the Redurds: This orientation of Mao brought a lot of uncertainties in the socio political life of China ever until his death in 1976. However, he was highly respected and worshipped even at his death.

Mao in his major doctrines attempted to apply Marxism to the problems and situation of China. This made his views assume some peculiarity both in theory and in practice. His application of Marxist theory of class struggle to an orientation of a non-antagonistic struggle between the bourgeoisie and the peasantry I proletariat is unique. His adoption of the major socio economic policies namely, 'The Five Year Plan (1953); 'The Great L Forward' (1958); 'Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution' (1966) follow the same line. All these together in summary characterize the foundation principles and method of the Sino-Socialism /Communism according to Mao. I. Towards Sino-Socialism /Communism In the pursuit of Chinese form of socialism, Mao considered the traditional conditions

Marxist

with peculiar originality. For Marx, some conditions in the material process

of history lead to the emergence of socialism. The ripening of the capitalist structure which bears within itself the seed of its own dissolution, is the most determinant of the conditions,

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and

its overthrow

ushers in socialism

Mao sees the viability

of

this

orientation

but

believes in a modification directed according to the situation and

problems of China.

II.The Elements of the New Democracy In 1940 in his work On New Democracy, Mao urged for a new politics following the spirit of Chinese resolution earlier inaugurated: the politics of New Democracy! with new economy and new culture. Itis the bourgeois -democratic revolution not a proletarian socialist revolution: Mao believes that this revolution has started a century ago but still remains uncompleted; and although it bears link to the old bourgeoisie revolution has assumed a new nature. "this is no longer a revolution led by the bourgeoisie with the aim of establishing a pariah society and a state under bourgeois dictatorship".20 although it furthers the development of capitalism. The New Democracy, belongs to the new type of revolution led by the prolet who the aim, in the first stage, of establishing a new democratic society and a state under the joint dictatorship of all the revolutionary classes. Thus this revolution actually serves the purpose of clearing a still wider path for the development of The politics of New Democracy according to Mao Tsetung is constituted by 'the stale system, a joint dictatorship of all the revolutionary classes and the system of government, democratic centralism.' Put simply it is the politics characterized by the a. Concentration of the political powers in the centre made up of the joint revolutionary classes. b. The economy of New Democracy will control all the big and monopolistic enterprises owned by foreign or private Chinese management. It is aimed at making private capital “not dominate the livelihood of the people." But the private enterprises that do not constitutethe danger of dominating the people. c. People’s livelihood is to be left free. Land will be confiscated and Distributed to the peasants for use. Feudal relations in the rural areas will be abolished to. Uphold peasants' ownership of land. The leading policy of the economy of New Democracy then is the, Equalization of land ownership" (land to the tiller) and the "regulation of capital.

Since the culture of any society is the ecological reflection The politics and economics of that society culture of Democracy must be the ideological reflection of the politics and economics of the New Democratic republic. Mao believes that the Chinese culture embodies imperialist ideology slave ideology, from the imperialist culture and the semi-feudal culture.

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This must be wiped off to build up the new democratic culture, these three revolutionary forces of New Democracy are to oppose and wipe away the old politics, old economy and culture. They will continue the ongoing revolutionary process in the history of Chinese revolution.

3.7 Leopold Sedar Senghor Dominating the entire Negro-African cultural system. The cultural structures are informed by consciousness activated and sustained by emotion. This emotion emerges from the underÂŹ standing that the "natural factors and more especially the social factors, are not object"dead object but are potent with cosmic life.They are factors filled with rhythm and life; imbued more with spiritual sense; they involve the natural and the supernatural in a type of communion. Religion is already at the door; one cannot evade it. The apprehension of the immensity of the natural reality with its supernatural forces enwraps the subject (the African) in a conscious and sentient sway of life which moves him to communion with the other. He is moved by its profound reality.

This is what Senghor means by emotion as an instrumen.t that determines the Negro-African culture. He accentuates that "it is their emotive attitude towards the world which explains the cultural values of the African ... their religion and social structure, their art and literature, above all the genius of their languages."21 a. The social - The family is considered the centre of the social structure in Negritude. Man as a person realizes his being and meaning in the family structure of the society. It is the "microcosm "-the determinant cell of all other levels of society. In Negritude, all social forms are off-shoots of the extended family as the extended brotherhood. In Senghor’s Negritude the family is "the sum of all persons living and dead, who acknowledge a common ancestor... the ancestral lineage continues to God."22 This defines what society is for Senghor. Society has meaning from what the family is. It embraces both the living and the dead. It extends lo the ancestral lineage which culminates in God. Religion is at the base of this meaning of society. b. The economic - Senghor explains that in traditional African society there exist no 'property' in the European sense of the term as "objects which can be used and abused, destroyed or sold." He exemplifies with the question of land which is the population. Land as wealth is not owned by the individual as property since it is considered as a force or a spirit. There is always a pact made by the the ancestors, the first occupiers of the land with the god 108 | P a g e

(goddess) or spirit. Such facts are made on behalf of the entire community including the ancestors and future progenies. Thus land cannot be owned as property by any individual. real ownership belongs to the 'earth spirit.' The "Unsatisfactory owner-ship" belongs to the community and is inalienable since one cannot alienate what does not really belong to him. c. Senghor points out that in Negritude, labour is often collective. But this does not diminish the person. Labour is free and the individual person is fulfilled through it. d. The political aspect of Senghorian Negritude is much enveloped in an active humanism and his federal democracy.

I. The Viable Political System for Africa Viable political system rooted in African culture according to Senghor, would be a federal democracy which will allow the Negro-African to realize himself. After all, democracy is the traditional form of African societies. "23 This can be argued from the fact of the absence of classes in the traditional African society before colonialism.24 The structure of the federal democracy as advocated by Senghor is a type of "unitary, decentralized state", where "The majority party will have the political Conception and direction. The federal assembly will direct foreign affairs."25 In federal democracy, individual states of the federation with their assemblies and their governments will direct their local welfare. But all this will be done according to the will and interest of the people. In this way the economic and political responsibilities can come closer lo them through the decentralization of power.

2.8 Obafemi Awolowo It is notable that the major part of Awolowo's political writing is his attempt to apply his political convictions to African situationand problems. At

the conclusion of his famous

Nkrumah Memorial Lectures in 1976 in Ghana, he succinctly outlined what he considered as the basic social, economic and political problems of Africa. They include: I. The problem of under development, which comprises: a. economic underdevelopment; poor health and sanitation; internal and external economic exploitation; and underdeveloped "subjective phase of the mind", that is, the educable part of the h u man mind. The latter is not biological inferiority. It rather involves the potentials of man in interpretation, recollection, conception, imagination, reasoning, volition, affection, etc.

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b. The problem of individual freedom and sovereignty; basic individual freedoms or rights, e.g. of conscience, expression, assembly, of association, religion etc. assure the people's sovereignty. c. The problem of constitution-making; African States are multi ethnic and therefore to keep them in harmony, realistic constitutions are needed. d. The problem of African Unity; so far Organization of African Unity has not stimulated the people to their common bond according to Awolowo.

For him the solution to these problems entails the generation and adoption of a new social, political and economic orientation. The question then is: What ideology or ideologies are appropriate to tackle the above enunciated problems?

There are two major possibilities - two major competing ideologies - capitalism and socialism.

Other ideologies are merely varieties of these; The prime mover in every economy" the initiator, producer, consumer, distributor, etc.

.

a. Man's central problem is economic; all others are ancillary. Actually it is to provide for the economic needs that the State is founded. "The compelling motivation is economic." b. The origin of every multi-ethnic or multi-nation state is by coercion or colonization not by voluntary agreement. "Every multi-ethnic State in Black Africa today is the creation of one colonial power or another."26 There is need always for a good constitution to take care of ethnic affinities.

Coming back to the question: Between capitalism and socialism which one is more appropriate for Africa? From his critique of the political systems, Awolowo finds socialism more promising for Africa. He rejects capitalism, evincing that: For Africa in particular, the adoption of capitalism can only perpetuate, albeit in subtle disguises, the dehumanization, heartless exploitation and division into antagonistic camps, which Africans had- suffered during the periods of slavery and colonization. 27 He opts for socialism for Africa; Socialism, he argues, is the most appropriate ideology to take care of the four basic problems of Africa (underdevelopment, individual freedom, constitution-making, and African unity).

Socialism, according to him, would be able to take care of the economic underdevelopment in Africa, through "the full development and full employment of every African - man or woman, child or adolescent" tackle the: 110 | P a g e

28

Put more elaborately, it will

a.

Under-development of the subjective mind, typified by

ignorance,

illiteracy

and

deficiency

in

techniques

and

organization; b.

Underdevelopment of the body, typified by disease,

bad Water, bad housing and filthy environment; c.Under-development

of

agriculture

and

excessive

underemployment of rural population, typified by lack of savings and of capital formation." 29 To tackle these, socialism would provide free education for all at all level; free health services for all, employment for every African. Education, especially free education at all levels should be given priority in African programs. Phenomenal rise from underdevelopment to a developed status for African states depends on education.

The cases of U.S.A., Japan, and U.S.S.R. should teach us. Under socialism, agriculture will receive a better attention and planning. The development of agriculture in Africa is vital because so far 80 percent of the Africans depends on it for a living. Agriculture should be mechanized.

The problem of individual freedom finds answer in the liberal and democratic recognition of sovereignty of the people and the governments’ respect of the basic freedoms as declared universally by the United Nations. This must include free and fair election, restoration of civil rights.

About the problem of Constitution-making, Awolowo attests that there are as yet no permanent and realistic constitutions in Africa. What we have so far are bills of convenience, to serve the ease of those in power at the time. Suitable constitutions must serve the permanent needs of multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, and multi-national characters of the African States. He gives this problem of Constitution-making an elaborate attention in most of his writings. We shall give it then a more elaborate study as a subtitle.

II.

On Political Constitution

.

In The People's Republic, Awolowo gives the meaning of a political constitution as "30. According to him there are three 'e Unitary, the Federal and Confederal. He accepts and pays good attention to the first and the Federal. Confedralism according to him lead to failure." A State has a Unitary Constitution if it Authority in which supreme legislative power is posit State made up of constituent States, with regional Authorities respectively, if the supreme power is divided between the Central Authority as a union, and the Regional Authorities of the state in the form that they 111 | P a g e

co-ordinate and still are one another in discharging their function He clearly advocates that African States should adopt Federal Constitutions, since they are constituted by multi-lingual communities.

On a more concrete level, heapplies his principleson the Nigerian Constitution. He first highlights the weak points and then moves to explain the basic structure of a workable constitution. He adumbrates that the fundamental weak points of Nigerian Constitution are: a. the imbalance in the constituent units of the Federation; b. the moral and intellectual incapacityof the leader; c. the lack of ideological orientation and good leadership; d. Wanton persistence in office by leaders.

These aberrations could be corrected through the following principles: III. The good establishment of the three organs of government: the executive, the judiciary and the legislative.

Within the executive, Awolowo advocates that there be the office of the Head of State (the President) separate from that of the Head of Government (Prime Minister or Vice-President).

He argues that the office of the Head of Government is such that to be efficient and active the functions of the Head of State should be separated from it. The latter cannot be active politician. He should undertake affairs of international relations, diplomaticmissions, and state ceremonies. Appoint also efficient and qualified personnel whether administrative, executive or clerical.

The judicature, put concretely the Court, according to Awolowo is an organ of the State sui generis. He affirms: a. It is the citizen’s bulwark of last resort against the tyranny and unconstitutionality of the Executive and Legislative, and against illegitimate invasion of, or arbitrary threat to, his rights, liberty, property and life, from any quarter whatsoever. Those who are posted Lo protect this bulwark against violation must possess the finest intellectual and moral equipments.31 b. The status of judgeship should command general respect of the people, such that those appointed to the position should be qualified and sufficiently experienced in legal practice. The Bench must be as strong as possible in good reputation.

To assure a good legislature, equality of franchise or suffrage must be maintained; a good census enumeration and reasonable period of time between elections (e.g. five years) are 112 | P a g e

necessary. Frequent elections and electioneering would not be to the general progress of the people.

The second way to correct the weak points mentioned above in the Constitution is the balanced creation of the Constituent States of the Federation. Federalism is imperative for Nigeria, therefore the establishment of the criteria for the carving out of the constituent states is a sine qua non. Awolowo advocates for the creation of States under linguistic or ethnic criteria. That, he warns, should not be mistaken as tribalism and regionalism.

He denounces tribalism and regionalism as derogatorily understood as discriminatory or anti-unity. Actually the term tribe, is basically derogatory. In the English Language, it means "a group of barbarous clans under recognized chief."32 The term should not be applied to African linguistic or ethnic groups, as it does not apply to those of Europe, Asia or USSR etc.

The term nations as Wales, Scotland England, Bengali, The Ewe, Ukrainia, etc, are rich potential groups that should be respected and appreciated, not signs of disunity. They are no tribes. They are nations.

For Awolowo, socialism is the solution the answer to Africa's basic socio-economic and political problems. But care must be taken not to adopt blindly all the characteristic principles of scientific socialism that would not help Africa. For him, although war, dictatorship of the proletariat and the extermination of the bourgeoisie, are basic characteristics of socialism, they are not inseparable concomitants of socialism for Black Africa. Africa needs not pass through them to establish a workable socialism.USSR, Eastern Europe, and China needed them, because of their extreme capitalist economic culture. Africa needs democratic methods to socialism. It has the potentials.

IV. The Case of Africa I. Idealism Idealism is both a philosophical trend and a mental attitude. Used philosophically, the term idealism is determined more by the ordinary meaning of the word idea than ideal.33 Idealism thus asserts that reality consists of ideas, thoughts, minds, or selves rather than of material heels and forces. This emphasizes the mind as in some sense linked to matter. Hence Plato the philosopher could talk of the world of ideas as the real world. As a mental attitude, the term idealism is often pejorative.

It is often useddismissively torefer toa grandiose,impractical approach to things. An idealistic approach to things is often not true to life, and not easy to implement. The idealist in this impractical sense is thus one who perceives the world and reality in terms of lofty moral,social,aesthetic, and religious standards.

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The term idealist can also have a positive connotation when it is applied to a person of vision -one who is able to visualize, and who advocates, some plan or programme that does not yet exist. Most theorists of society like Plato,Aristotle, Hegel,Marx, are idealists inthat they conceive and promote a certain idea as best for running or organizing society. Social reformers and inventors can bedescribed as idealists in this sense, Ideals must be freeflowing and flexible. They must always be tempered to meet the real world as it is. Ironically, idealists are often dogged in their views, and would hardly let anyone else sway them from them. Because they are people of vision, they often see themselves at the cutting edge of ideas, and would not be distracted by others whom they tacitly consider to be less visionary than themselves.

Most theorists of society are idealists in that they sponsor a certain idea as best for running or organizing society. Plato promoted the idea ofthe Philosopher King, Rousseau's Magistrate was awesome, Marx's proletariat was supreme. What is highest in spirit is also deepest in nature. Thus ideals which are highest in the human spirit are also deepest in the nature of things. The human being is at home in the universe and is not an alien or a mere creature of chance. Since the science." From a practical point of view, it seems that the universe is in some sense a logical and a spiritual system that is reflected in the search by humans for the true, the good, and the beautiful.

At times the concepts of idea and ideal coalesce. Harry K. Girvetz points this out in discussing 'the idea of democracy: "One cannot understand the ideaof democracy apart from its functioning as an ideal, i.e., apart from reference to the purposes which the idea of democracy was intended to serve."34 Since the universe has a meaning and purpose of which the development of people is an aspect, the idealist believes that there is a kind of inner harmony between the rest of the world and humans. Inconnection with nation-building, the usual ideas that come to mind include a democratic process, freedom, equality, fraternity and toleration.

Closely related to these ideas is a project or programme of human development and human promotion. Human development and human promotion are often achieved in the process of a well thought-out programme ofeducation designed to prepare the minds of citizens first to understand the principles of democracy, the rights and obligations of citizenship. Then they would beencouraged to reposethemselves to make these principles bear fruit in the society as citizens, statesmen and women.

II. Politics The science or art of politics is the science or art of how society is organized or run. It is thus a normative science which treats of government i.e., it treats of the organization of the 114 | P a g e

affairs of state and the organization and distribution of social goods. Aristotle considers politics as "the most sovereign and most comprehensive master of the universe and is not an alien or a mere creature of chance. Since the science." From a practical point of view, it seems that the one who holds political power holds sway over everyone and everything else; society.

Thus it is the politicians that control policies on education, health, family, defence, research, entertainment, the economy, peace and war, and even religion, on the concept of politics in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Martin Ostwald gives an etymology of the term by referring to the root word politikewhich is the science of the city state or their members. In the present context, no city-state is involved. What concerns the present discussion is the political entity called Nigeria, and its citizens or members who can be referred to by extension as a polis.

In Aristotle's assessment, the comprehensive character of politics lies in its characteristic of determining which sciences ought to exist in states, what kind of sciences each group of citizens must learn, and what degree of proficiency each must attain. It is the normative science which treats ofthe organization of social goods. From this he concludes that the end of politics is the good for humans -individuals as well as the state.

Thus it follows that the end of politics is the good for man. For even if the good is the same for the individual and the state, the good of the state clearly is the greater and more perfect thing to attain and to safeguard. The attainment of the good for one man alone is, to be sure, a source of satisfaction; yet to secure it for a nation and for states is nobler and more divine.35 Political theory is concerned with the formulation of the ends and limits of state authority.

The crudity of action and abuse of power that is often associated withcertainclasses of politicians isanaberration rather than an integral element inpolitics. In politics what isof utmost important is the good of the citizens and not the might of the state. In so far as politics is for the good of humans, its end is achieved. In order to be able to achieve its end the activity of politics should include among its concerns an analysis ofgovernment, its structure, limits, policies and practices to see if they are conducive to human good. Any policy or practice that goes against the good of humans must be discounted. Therole of politics is therefore to organize humans to live in harmony with one another insuch a way as to facilitate progress for the individual and the society at large.

Indaily language, critics of politics and politicians abound and often speak dismissively of politics as 'dirty' and politicians as 'liars'. A mechanic friend was so blunt in his assessment of politics and politicians, The only difference between a politician and a crook is in the spelling. Politician and crook are spelt differently, but they mean exactly the same thing.

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They tell you one thing and mean the very opposite. This assessment finds an echo inthe thoughts of the famous Russian philosopher Nicolai Bedyaev when he said concerning politics: In politics falsehood plays a great role, and small place is left tor truth. States have been built on lies and on lies have they been demolished.And it is often said that without lies everything would perish and complete anarchy would cover the world... And there has never been a revolution against the unlimited power of politics, for the sake of man and humanness.36 It would be both unfair and misleading to conceive of politics in this vulgarized, all-negative way as though its very nature were nothing but a travesty of values where practitioners quibble with words and ideas. Good politics does exist, and so do good policies and honest politicians. The politics referred to inthis study is genuine politics that has to dowith how the state and society are to be successfully organized and run for the benefit of all. The politician who lies and deceives is an aberration from the noble science and practice of politics. Such a one should not claim to represent politics but should be denounced. In this sense aberrations are out of the picture.

From politics proper one turns the mindto political philosophy.Political philosophy is that branch of philosophy which deals with political life, NATION-BUILDING especially with the essence, origin and value of the state. The state is not ordered to mere activity of life, but to activity of life according to the highest virtues. Its end is the common good of its members, i.e., the good of the virtues both speculative and moral, and of the arts.37 III.

Nation-Building

The concept of nation-building instinctively paints a picture of some

kind of building with

real brick and mortar -the edifice this time being the nation. One often hears the expression that "Rome was not built in a day." This expression does little to remove the idea of nationbuilding from the activities of mason with regard to an edifice. A man watched a groupoftourists admiringthegrandeur of the Sears Building in Carnage. He stepped up to them and said: "Do you know what? I built that building!" Yes, indeed,for hewas one ofthe workmen. With that imagery the implications of nation building could be seen to be that all citizens work together to achieve a common idealof temporal well-being for all citizens. The people adopt the appropriate means to maintain an internal order as they pursue their ideal; and take appropriate measures to safeguard the community from attacks by non-members.38 Nation-building also involves the general co-operation that is needed in a country to develop higher education on a large scale. It also involves 'raising the level and standard of life, 116 | P a g e

increasing social interaction, maintaining postal services and communications, and coordinating

economic

activities.

Nation-building

demands

that

the

peopleshouldberecognized intheir own right and the authority also recognized in its own right. Authority should be entitled to all the powers it needs to promote the general good.

Nation-building also involves a mutual understanding between the people and the leadership. With this understanding the leadership will be expected to face up to its responsibilities on behalf of the people. It should be careful to recognize,operate within, and never seek to exceed the limits of its powers. It must therefore respect the functions and operation of otheragencies beyond its jurisdiction.These agencies and societies include the family, the group and the Church.These spheres that do not come under association for the common good.

The people should also face up to their own responsibilities for national upliftment, development and prosperity. They must be forthcoming with idea. Dispositions and commitments.relevant for promoting national goals. They must readily perform their civic duties of paying their tax, maintaining a clean environment, and upholding the rule of law.It is quite an interesting speculative question whether at all it is possible to foster democratic principles in Nigeria.

The question is pertinent for the fact that Nigeria is really a very diverse type of community with diverse tendencies among diverse peoples. In other words, what appears democratic from one point of view might appear antidemocratic from another. A scenario will illustrate this point clearly. Let us assume,that itis possible toconsider the three largest ethnic groups -Hausa/Fulani,Yoruba, and Igbo-as representative groups in Nigeria's political landscape.

Let us first, consider the Emir as the supreme head, with everyone else in the community willingly subservient to him. The politicalstructure under which this type of situation would thrive -an emirate would be downright aristocratic and naturally conservative. Democracy undersuchasystem would be perceived along conservative lines in terms of a dynastic ruling class. The political system that could easily fit such a situation would be an executive presidency or perhaps a monarchy, if this were possible. In terms of parties, a single party system can expect little or no difficulty.

Next, consider the Yoruba Oba with an array of suffragans and all kinds of officials working with him. These serve as intermediate authorities between rum and the people. Democracy under such a system would be closer to the parliamentary system than to a presidential or any other form of government. Here a multi-party arrangement is not only possible but natural. The leader under such an arranging could be a prime minister, a constitutional monarch asobtains in Britain, or a ceremonial president as Nigeria had in the person of Dr 117 | P a g e

Nnamdi Azikiwe. By way of ideology, the social democratic party would be a natural choice in such a system.

Now, consider the lgbos, with an unbending reputation for republicanism. This trait makes the lgbos almost impossible to rule for they seem by instinct to be self-governing. Thus, anyone who comes to rule them has a near-impossible task. Such a one must first win them over by persuasion. Nevertheless, anyone who manifests credible leadership qualities can have a field day with them. There is a saying that Igbo amaghieze i.e., the Igbos are neither overawed nor excited by royalty or inherited status.39Igbo amaghieze must not be construed to mean that the Igbos are anarchical and respect no one.

On the contrary, they produce and relish leadership. Whenever there is a task in hand, there always emerges a leader to take care of things. Such a leader is fully backed until the task is accomplished, but he is not thereby anointed for life. As soon as his job is done, he is expected to kwanyereonweyaugwu, i.e., respect himself and leave the scene. They would always come for him whenever they need him, but he should never impose his presence. If he or she tried to impose himself or herself, they wouldwaste no time in telling him or her to go sit down.

Among the lgbos, even though traditional rulers, the Ezes are in place, they do not really exercise much coercive authority or influence over the lives of the people. The people respect the Eze provided that he keeps his place and never becomes either meddlesome or overreaching. In any case, they never fear him.They would both detest and despise any leader who wants to be feared.

The style of democracy to go successfully with the Igbo type of approach would be direct and republican - liberal democracy perhaps. The type of relationships likely tothriveamong them would be lateral rather than pyramidal or concentric. Individual success would be highly prized over group loyalty. Personal initiative would be more treasured than government monopoly of power or government monopoly of the distribution of goods. The Igbos stand in sharp contrast to their Hausa/Fulani and Yoruba counterparts. 

Unlike the gbos, the Hausa/Fulani are at home will situation where the government enjoys a monopoly of politics and coercive power;and the Yorubas have little or no problem with a centralized distribution of goods.



Unlike the Hausa/Fulaniand the Yoruba, the natural political tendency of the Igbos would be centrifugal and individualistic rather than centripetal or socialistic.

Ideologically, Igbos arequite naturally amenable toa federal or confederal system of government. They can also tolerate parliamentary system but they would be quite 118 | P a g e

adversarial to either an overly centralized system or any version of the federal system where the central government dwarfs the component states.

Any ideology that would place a premium on competitive spirit and individual enterprise would be for the Igbos a natural choice merely waiting to be made.From this point of view, it is not surprising that the lgbos seem to exhibit a greater affinity to the elements of free enterprise represented in the conservative republican tendencies of the Hausa/Fulani in the North than to the socialized tendencies of the Yoruba in the West.

Unlike the Hausa/Fulani North, however, their preferred brand of democracy would be liberal democracy with less emphasis on government and more emphasis on individualeffort.

It is thus clear that there is a world of difference between the three main geopolitical areas.

Nothing could be more naive than to conclude that for the fact that the Western and Eastern parts of Nigeria constitute the so-called Southern Nigeria, there must be a kinship or automatic correspondence of views. In the wake of the annulled elections of 1993, what began as a Southern solidarity slowly evaporated as the differences in perception and vision began to emerge. The way forward is not one of a merger or of subsumption of one into another; it is by a federation of views and ideas that is based on mutual respect to differences that are not necessarily in conflict with one another.

As to the types of leadership that would suit the various groups, the Hausa/Fulani model would thrive in a very strong central government and very weak components, a monarchy perhaps. The Yoruba model would suggest a parliamentary parity of powers between the centre and the components, while the republican model of the Igbos would admit equally of a complete parity of powers among the components with a more or less weak centre. They would also accept a strong centre, which grants considerable autonomy to the components.

The leader under a weak centre would be a non-executive, ceremonial president, whose role would consist mainly in chairing the deliberations of parliament and signing decisions into law. A leader of a weak centre would operate a government with powers thoroughly devolved.

Much as this type of arrangement would suit the natural inclinations and yearnings of some interest groups, a weak centre is likely to be vulnerable to the manipulatory whims and centrifugal tendencies of some powerful components, some of which would, in due course, become arrogant, or superficial, or condescending in considering matters of a national character. Besides, it is rendered chronically incapable of presenting astrong and effective leadership ininternational issues. On the other hand, if the central government is sufficiently strong, as it should be, then it can appropriate to itself such exclusive powers as would make national government easier.

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When all this is translated into a national issue for Nigeria, which one would become most suitable? The Igbo might consider the conservative pyramidal structure of the Hausa/Fulani overbearing and anti-democratic, and the Yoruba social democracy out of focus for the individual. The Yoruba might consider the power exercised bythe leader under the Hausa/Fulani model as disproportionate and absolutist, and the Igbo propensity towards individualism anarchical. The Hausa/Fulani might consider the Yoruba social democracy as eccentric and the lgbo republicanism headstrong.

The Hausa/Fulani leader might be expecting too much to think that Igbos would spontaneously bow and do obeisance in the presence of their leader. He might also consider the IgboEze to be too weak if he does not try to insist on certain expectations on his part from those under his domain. Could he call his people his subjects? Both the Yoruba Oba and Hausa/Fulani Emir might be irked by the apparent goÂŹ it-alone attitude of the Igbos in dealing with issues, and their apparent lack ofenthusiasm with anything that might suggest dependency on the centre, or that might reduce them to a crowd, the type that Plato dismissed in democracy.

For his part, the Igbo leader informed by the fact that his own Igbos tend to take life rather too seriously would consider the spontaneous obsequy that the Hausa/Fulani pay to their leader to be somewhat incoherent, and the easy grace which the Yorubas manifest towards their leaders to be somewhat overplayed. How then would it be possible to strike a common ground, i.e. to arrive at a democratic process which is recognizable as such by all and sundry? An honest and realistic answer to this question is crucial for any kind of mutual confidence to be possible in Nigeria.

3.9 What Is Democracy?

I. A multi-party system does not make for instant democracy I am extremely surprised to see that many people identify democracy with multi-party elections. When you read the declarations of some would-be party founders, you have the impression that for them the important thing is to have free elections contested by several parties, giving people the possibility to choose between two or three slips of paper to drop in the ballot box.

It is accepted that free elections can give people a nice feeling, expressed through an explosion of popular rejoicing. People go into the streets, weep for joy, sing, and hug one another, as happened in Haiti, Brazil, Argentina, Nicaragua, the Ukraine, Poland and Yugoslavia. But... after elections, food was as difficultto get as before in the Ukraine and the number of jobless people increased in Poland. The army soon overthrew President Aristide 120 | P a g e

in Haiti. In Nicaragua, Misikito Indians refused to be forcibly re-grouped in villages by the Ortega government that had been freely elected. They joined the famous Contras, a guerrilla movement supplied with arms by the USA to overÂŹ throw the first freely elected government in that country.

According toFr Joseph Comblin, a well-known theologian and sociologist teaching in Brazil, more peasant leaders, trade union representatives, lawyers and priests were killed in Brazil after 1986 under the democratically-elected regime, than under the military junta of the fifties.

Argentina overthrew the military junta of General Vitela after the Falklands War, but known killers are still at large and operating under the democratically-elected government of President Menem, who at one time was put in jail by the junta.

Yugoslavia erupted into racial warfare. Zaire is plunged into insecurity. President Eyedema of Togo had the newly elected Prime Minister, Jospeh Koku Koffigoh, rendered powerless by the army. To put it briefly: a multi-party system and free elections do not necessarily make for instant freedom, instant democracy, instant dignity and instant happiness.

On the other hand, Senegal has always had a multi-party system and President Diouf was re-elected by a comfortable majority of votes. The Ivory Coast had free elections in 1991.

Opposition parties were extremely active during a fairly free election campaign. All the same, President Houphouet-Boigny and his party won 81.7% of the votes. President Bongo of Gabon, who had been violently attacked by opposition parties, was nevertheless re-elected.

In Tanzania, CCM, the party which had ruled the country for more than thirty years, won the first multi-party elections hands down. If we analyse what has happened in 1996 in Africa, we can conclude that a multi-party system and free elections do not necessarily mean anarchy or a change in politics.

We may even have the impression that sometimes free elections do not bring any change and can make the situation worse. Many Russians believed this and voted for the communist candidate against Boris Yeltsin. The same thing happened in Poland. Lesh Walesa, the charismatic leader of the Solidarity rebellion, which introduced the first wedge in the communist block and led it to its collapse, was democratically defeated by a former communist civil servant. Russia and Poland sent a clear message: democracy, yes, but step by step, slowly and prudently. The task at hand is how to build a multi-party system that will give positive results.

A multi-party system is often considered best by people who are after political power. It gives them more opportunities. A multi-party system can be used and manipulated for many ends. Once more, we ask ourselves: A multi-party system, yes. But what for? The answer is: for the sake of democracy.

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II. A multi-party system does not make for instant democracy It is generally expected that a multi-party system will have positive results. But this does not necessarily happen. The first question is: A multi-party system? Yes! But what for and for whom? For A multi-party system and free elections do not make for instant democracy, instant dignity and instant happiness.

If politicians who have left a ruling party want to get back in the saddle, a multi-party system obviously appears better to them. We can safely assume as well that this will offer opportunities for bright young men and women. In a one party system, these young people have to keep quiet an agree with their elders, whatever they think of their decisions. If they are not happy, they have no choice but to leave the political scene.A political party can tolerate only a very limited number of "mavericks", that is, straying and outspoken young politicians.

With a multi-party system, these dissatisfied young people can cross over to another party or create one of their own. In the early nineties we saw some members of the Kenyan government leaving the ruling party to start one of their own. In Tanzania some bright, energetic young candidates who wanted to run for election under the colours of CCM could not do so because the post they coveted was occupied by an older member. They ran under the colours of opposition parties, NCCR Mageuzi or CHADEMA, and were elected. The son of Mwalimu Nyerere.

In 1973 some nine million Tanzanian peasants had to leave their homesteads and their fields to go and build new houses in development villages, at a place chosen by the government.

It was one of the largest population movements in the world. Some farmers who had to move from a fertile valley to a village on top of a hill found it hard to walk six kilometres every day to and from their fields on the riverside in the valley.

In a democratic regime, they would have been allowed to start discussing the village law that prevented them from building a little kibanda, a grass hut, on the riverside. They would have looked for procedures to change the village law; they would have visited officials in the district, seen their Member of Parliament, discussed the issue with people from other villages, started a movement to return mahameni, that it to say, to the fields where their ancestors lived. They would have organised the movement at the district, regional and national levels, until the law was officially changed. They would really have had the possibility to influence decisions that had been taken without their being consulted. The multi-party system is only a means to an end: democracy is the aim.

III. Democracy for what? It is a question of dignity!

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I think that, for those who suffer and even die for democracy is a question of dignity. I feel strongly that the power to influence ‘the decisionsthat concern us is a question of dignity, the dignity to control our own lives, to make our own decisions, to be held responsiblefor them and to run the risk of being blamed for them.

I think that this definition explains the adamant refusal of Mwalimu Nyerere to bow down and accept the conditions imposed by the IMF as long as he was the President of the United Republic of Tanzania. He told visiting President Podgorny of the USSR: "We are passionately nonaligned." I suggest that he really meant: "We want to take our own decisions, we do not want the IMF and the World Bank to decide what is good for us!" I think that for Mwalimu it was a question of dignity. At this level dignity and freedom mean: "We will take our own decisions about our own country. Wewill not allow anybody to dictate to us what we have to do."40 I feel that Mwalimu Nyerere is quite right when he tells us that freedom to makes one's own decisions is a question of dignity for nations. I think that the same thing applies to people as well and that what is said of the dignity and freedom of a nation can be said of the dignity and freedom of each single person.

In the same way, in most capital cities young jobless people try to sell peanuts, clothing and fruits along the streets and at street corners. They are repeatedly chased by the police. Of course they have no chance and do not pay taxes. But their trade allows them to survive from day to day; thanks to their little businesses they manage to maintain their families.

They feel the dignity of "going to work" every morning, instead ofstaying at home idle. Where is their dignity, if they constantly have fear, with one eye on customers and the other on the police, who can take away their wares without compensation? With whom can they discuss their situation and find a way of surviving within the law, when no employment is open to them?

From this perspective, the multi-party system debate is the visible sign of a deeper debate on how to create a political environment in which human beings can feel really free and live in dignity. I believe that the real debate is or should be about human dignity and freedom.

The multi-party system is just one way, one means, among others to create such an environment: Democracy for what? It is a question of dignity!

Ifvillagers who want to build a small grass hut in their fields are put in jail when they start agitating for a change of the law, if their shelters along the river are burned by militia, if they cannot discuss the matter with local leaders,we can say that they do not live in a democratic system, because they cannot influence decisions which were taken from above without their being consulted.

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Why do people want democracy? Why do they want to have a say in political decisionsthat concern them? Why do they want to have a minimum of control over the politicians that govern them? After all, m a traditional family it is the father who decides what should be done. He does not discuss his plans with young people.

True. But it is a fact that some people are ready to die for democracy, like the Chinese students who were killed on Tiananmen Square in Beijing in 1989; like the victims of General Pinochet in Chile or General Vitela in Argentina: in both cases people were arrested and were not seen again. We know now that quite a few of them were thrown out of a plane into the sea where they drowned. Another person who died for democracy was Fr J Polieluszko, murdered by the communist police in Poland. Others are ready to suffer for democracy, ikung San Su Kyi, the Nobel peace prize winner who spent years in jail as a political opponent of an oppressive regime.41 IV. Democracy as a dynamic Utopia Any global development project, such as building a democratic society, is based on the will to change the present society into a new one which is considered better. This new society exists only inour minds. It is an image, a vision, a dream; I prefer to call it a dynamic Utopia.

A dream will fade when we wake up, while a Utopia is a vision, a dream which we want to bring to reality.

A Utopia has two qualities: a. It is dynamic, it inspires the lives of people and directs their decisions and actions. They are ready to suffer persecution and die for it. b. On the other hand, we know that we will never be able to build the ideal society we dream of We are always striving to build it, but we know all the time that we will never succeed in building it completely according to our dream and vision.

A Utopia is like the Northern Star on which sailors can always depend to take their bearings, and yet they know that it will always be beyond them. In the same way, a Utopian vision of a new society inspires the decisions and actions of many people, but they know that they will never manage to build it to be as beautiful as they imagine it.

Some people are not interested in influencing decisions that concern them; they are happy to leave it to their leaders. Some others are prevented from playing their part, as is often the case for women and the youth, who are not allowed to speak during a palaver that concerns them. And yet, this Utopian vision can inspire us to try to build a new society with a multiparty system.

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V. An Obstacle to Democracy: a. The Love of Power The first one of these may be the excessive love of power that makes leaders to carry on being involved in politics despite the tremendous burden it represents for them. I will spend a lot of time describing the negative effects of this love of power. I believe that we cannot understand politics without a clear knowledge of the effects of that love of power.

We first come across a contradiction: we need politicians who love service, justice and peace. But often politicians are people who love power and are the very ones who can be an obstacle to the rise of democracy. Human beings live in society. A minimum of organization and authority is necessary. We need rulers. But the position of a political ruler entails very hard and dangerous work. Let us explain first how hard it is. Just look at politicians and members of government. They are so busy going from one meeting to another that they have very little time to be with their families and look after their children.

Politics is a dangerous job. When you are running for a seat, your life is scrutinized and you may be exposed to calumny or slander.Just look at the way candidates running for parliament accuse one another of misconduct, and how many reputations are lost! The life of politicians is often in danger. Political leaders need bodyguards who follow them everywhere to protect them. And even then, they are not always safe. Just remember African leaders who have been murdered, from Patrice Lumumba to President Olympia.

Remember President Sadat, Captain Sankara and all those political opponents that had "car accidents" in so many countries. Being a politician is hard and dangerous work. b. The love of power has no limits People who get on in politics often are motivated by the love of power, which keeps them going. This love can be a real, consuming passion. I suggest that there are two great driving forces in people, one is sexuality, which influences the lives of most people, the otheris the love of power which influences the lives of the few who seek positions of leadership. c. The love of power leads rulers to try to control all sources of power People driven by this passion continually strive to extend their sphere of power, to stay at the top at all costs. Let us look at two well-known examples. First, Napoleon, the French Emperor and dictator. He tried to conquer the -Whole of Europe, starting with Italy, Holland, Germany, then Spain, and Russia, where he was defeated.

In our century in Germany, Hitler was driven by the same force. He took over Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, France, Denmark, Norway, Italy, Sicily, Greece, Yugoslavia, Lybia 125 | P a g e

and part of Egypt. Like Napoleon, he failed to invade Britain and to conquer Russia. Both these men were never satisfied with what they had conquered and hoped to rule the whole of Europe until their death. They were responsible for the deaths of millions of people. The love of power drives political rulers to covet more and more power. They want to control all sources of influence. The history of modern Africa is full of such power-hungry people. d. The love of power can kill When African states became independent between 1958 and 1965, they all had a multi-party system built on the Westminster or the Paris model. Within a few years all had a presidential regime with a oneÂŹ party system or a military ruler, except Senegal and Botswana. Lots of arguments have been brought forward to justify this change. The main one was that a oneparty system was the best way to prevent the formation of ethnic parties and to prevent the state from breaking up. But in practice the one-party system can very easily work along tribal lines. Once there is a one-party system, the leaders try to control the whole population. They disband youth movements, trade unions and even co-operatives. They create their own organizations.

For instance, in Tanzania, after TANU had won the elections by a landslide in 1961and came into power, it took over almost all the organizations that had some influence in the country: the trade unions, the schools, the parents' associations, the co-operatives and private medicine. Ithad already created its own Youth Organization, Vijana, and Women's association, UWT, before independence. TANU was declared supreme at Musoma. It merged with the ASP of Zanzibar to become a single party, CCM, controlling Zanzibar very closely. The government and the party controlled practically everything up to 1984 when the process of economic liberalisation started.

In the early sixties several villages of the Ruvuma Valley joined together to elaborate their own system of self-reliance. They had their own production plans and co-operatives, their own distribution system, transport and workshops, and their own school system to teach their children self-reliance. It is thought that Mwalimu Nyerere spent some time in these villages when he wrote his book Education TowardsSelf-reliance, which seems to have been strongly influenced by the Ruvuma experiment. A few weeks after the publication of the book, the Village Association was dissolved by government order. They were accused of creating too much trouble for the local authorities at district and regional level.

The latter wanted the villages to implement the development plans made at the top by the government and party. The villagers wanted to go on with their own plans or at least to be involved in the drawing up of the plans that affected them. Local rulers, at the district and regional levels, resented very much this group of villagers that did not follow their directives 126 | P a g e

without questioning and that did not welcome them with applause, food and beer when they visited them. The Ruvuma Valley VillageAssociation, the most striking and most successful example of self-reliance and Ujamaa in Tanzania and possibly in Africa, was wiped out.

Mwalimu Nyerere was interviewed by a Norwegian TV journalist a short time before he retired from the presidency. When he was asked, "Mr President, what is the biggest mistake you think you made during your presidency?" he answered immediately: "Suppressing the co-operatives." They have now been revived.42 I think that the suppression of the Ruvuma Valley Village Association was a typical decision inspired by the dynamics of power, the urge to control all sources of influence, and to neutralize any parallel power. The love of power drives rulers to eliminate all those who could threaten their authority and other ambitious individuals who strive to take their place.

History books are full of such coups d'etat. The Bible is one of the oldest books we have. It tells us the history of the ascent and fall of the Kings of Israel some 2,500 years ago.

The first King of Israel was Saul. One of his generals, David, received a tremendous welcome from the population when he came back after having defeated the Philistines. Saul became jealous and tried to kill him (1 Sam 18:8-9). David ran away. Saul heard that David had been helped in his flight by the priests of Nob. He had them killed (1 Sam 22:12). After Saul had committed suicide, a long war started between the house of Saul and the house of David (2 Sam 3:1-2). David won and became king. Seven sons of Saul were slaughtered (2 Sam 21). Absalom, David's son, tried to kill his father and take his kingdom over but he was speared to death (2 Sam 15- 18).43 The kingdom of David was later split into two parts, the Kingdom of Israel and the Kingdom of Judah The prophet Elisha anointed Jehu as king and ordered him to unite again the two kingdoms. Jehu immediately ordered the arrest of the seventy sons of Akhab, the king of Israel, and had their throats cut. Their heads were sent to Jehu in a basket (2 Kg 10). Then he ordered the massacre of the family of the king of Judah, forty-two men all together. None of them escaped. Thepriests of Baal had supported Akhab. Jehu invited them to a religious feast. They came from all over the country. Once they had gathered in the banquet house, Jehu sent in his soldiers who killed them all. The story of the people of Israel is full of the evils that love of power brings about.

We also see love of power at work in the New Testament. When Jesus was born, King Herod heard from the three Wise Men coming from the East that a child had been born and would become King of Israel. He was afraid of losing his throne and ordered his soldiers to kill all the young children in the Bethlehem area. We commemorate this massacre of the Holy Innocents a few days after Christmas (Mt 2:1-22). Christ challenged the economic 127 | P a g e

power of the family of the High Priests by chasing the traders from the Temple; he challenged their political power by attracting large crowds of listeners who cheered him publicly on Palm Sunday. The rulers immediately met to decide how to counter this threat to their power. In a few days they have Jesus arrested, sentenced to death and crucified (Jn 11:45-54).44 We find a similar situation in Islam. The third caliph, or successor of Mohammed, Uthman, was murdered. Ali, the son-in-law of Mohammed, was the fourth caliph. His power was contested by Mu'awiya, of the Umayyade family. Ali was defeated at the battle of Siffen and accepted a truce. The majority of his followers accepted the truce and formed the Shiite sect in Islam.

If we turn to Africa, we see that Chaka, the famous founder of the Zulu kingdom, was murdered by his own brother. In Chad war has been going on for years, between the North and the South first, but later between leaders of the North, from the same ethnic group, apparently as a murderousstruggle for power. The struggle for power has been at its bloodiest in Liberia and in Somalia. Uganda lost hundreds of thousands of people under Idi Amin and Obote who were ready to take the bloodiest measures to stay in power.

The love of power inspires a constant struggle for leadership within liberation movements, the amazing vitality of the love of power is very visible in liberation movements. Apparently all these movements have the same ideal, the samegoal, thesame hope:the liberation of their country. But they have no official constitution. Power belongs to those who can take it.

They have no system of checks and balances to offset the love of power of the leaders whoare often locked ina private internal power struggle, while going on with the liberation struggle itself.

The members of their factions live in constant danger of being arrested but they spend a lot of energy fighting and even killing one another.They split into rival groups, which become rival movements which attack and sometimes kill one another. There are two liberation movements in Southern Sudan and therewere two in Tigre and Eritrea and in Angola. Once liberation was achieved in Angola, there was a new split between MPLA and UNITA, leading to a war that has been going on for years with tens of thousands of victims.

We find the same kind of power struggle in liberation movements all over the world. Nelson Mandela and Chief Buthelezi were both members of theANC youth branch at the same time in South Africa. We hear every day of people, especially ANC members, being killed by the Freedom Party of Chief Buthelezi. Apparently the latter does not want to be a mere cog or just a minister in the coalition government of the new nation. He wants to be leader of his ethnic group in a confederation. We remember as well how some of the founders of SWAPO 128 | P a g e

were eliminated by younger members. They were not killed but put in jail first in Zambia, then in Dar es Salaam and finally they were allowed to migrate to Sweden, under the protection of Amnesty International.

We remember how Mr Babu, the founder of a liberation movement in Zanzibar, was sentenced to death by President Karume. We have watched the long struggle between President Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo to take over the leadership of free Zimbabwe. The fact that both of them are now members of the same government shows how the love of power may sometimes be toned down and lead to a compromise. e. The love of power ignites a constant struggle for leadership within political parties Political parties are formed by the love of power...has to be people who have, or should have, controlled, challenged and used

same ideal, the same aims, the for the common

good...'same hopes. In fact, they specula of energy fighting other get of poem within their party most spectacular public infilling is evident in the primaries in the USA, before the election campaign for the presidency. Each party is expected to select only one presidential candidate.Aspiring candidatesfight one another and sling mud at one another with the greatest abandon so as to be chosen as leader. Their followers spend a lot of energy fighting one another. You sometimes wonder how they can have any energy left to fight the other party.

This description of the negative effects of power may seem gloomy and even frightening.

But these negative aspects can be offset. We have examples of leaders such as Leopold Senghor and Julius Nyerere who decided not to run once again for the presidency while their followers were urging them to do so. It does not mean that they have lost their influence. Men like Churchill and de Gaulle certainly loved power, but their love of their country and of democracy was still greater. Millions of French men and women urged de Gaulle to overthrow the Fourth Republic in 1958 and to become the permanent Saviour of the Nation. He refused to take power illegally. He spent the last years of his life in retirement in a small village in the countryside. We are faced with a real problem: how can a society train leader to put the service of the nation first as de Gaulle and Churchill did? f.

The key issue to building a democratic society is to check this love of power

If we believe that our aim is democracy for dignity, our most urgent task is to find ways and means to check and balance the negative effects of the love of power, which can lead to dictatorship or anarchy. We absolutely need a strategy to do so.

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I suggest a very simple strategy. I am convinced that best way is to create and develop "checks and balances “groups, "checks and balances" forces that will create a strong and dynamic civic society. These checks and balances forces constitute technically the civic society.Their members are involved in decision-making. They are independent of governments and are called Non-Governmental organization (NGOs) Checks and balances groups are the way.

Let us take the case of Wildlife Conservation Societies that exist all over the world and have branches in East Africa. Their members have one common interest and aim: the conservation of our natural heritage. Among other things they are against is the wanton killing of elephants for their ivory.

3.10 Adam Smith Theory of Growth assessment of Nigerian Economy According to Adam Smith, the key sources of growth include growth of labour force and capital stock, advancement of the effectiveness of capital employed in labour via technological progress and increased division of labour, and foreign trade promotion, that broadens the market and strengthens the above two sources. Smith stated that income level and capital accumulation rate tend to increase in a developing economy.

Consequently, capital stock increases in consecutive periods due to continuous increase in investments. In addition, increased division of labour leads to increased productivity.

According to smith, productivity of each person is greater among people working in a group in comparison to those working independently. As a result, general productivity increases leading to increased economic growth. Also, the extent of division of labour is regulated by the size of the market. i.e. Large markets have high productivity and division of labour, in comparison to growing markets, which have growing productivity and rising division of labour.

The rate of profit is an important strategic factor in the process of economic growth.

However, the rate at which economic growth rises is dependent on the increase of the rate of investment. Rates of investments and savings, according to smith, depend on the socioeconomic framework within a country i.e. Institutions which offer solutions to economic growth problems. He strongly opposed any government intervention, as well as plans of economic development. Instead, he favoured free trade policy.

Smith asserted that growth is deeply rooted in division of labour, which relates to the specialization of labour force i.e. the breaking down of big jobs into numerous smaller components. When labour is divided, every employee specializes in one area of production,

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which increases his or her efficiency. According to smith, the fact that workers do not change jobs in the course of the day helps to save both money and time.45 The state of any nation’s economy is a result of several variables. They include time, context, actors and even what happens beyond the shores of the country, that is, the international political economy. Currently, four challenges largely prevail. They include moving away from an oil-revenue economy for our public expenditure and foreign exchange earnings, transiting from the current subsistence farming to technology-driven agriculture, implementing consistent policies that make it easy to do business in the country and doing something urgent about the unemployed population of Nigerian youths.

Our economic challenges are multifaceted and cannot be assessed independent of governance variables – systems, structures and democratic processes – which are still struggling to gain identity and function appropriately. The subsisting political process makes it difficult for credible and honest people to offer themselves for public office. In addition to the process, we also have structural deficiencies of weakened governance institutions as a consequence of the personification of structures. Of equal importance is the responsibility of the citizens to hold officeholders accountable.

However, smith’s theory has its limitations. He pointed out that although division of labour increases efficiency, workers tend to get bored repeating the same tasks every day, which consequently results in ignorant and dissatisfied personnel. For this reason, he suggested that governments should educate workers and help them develop new skills, as well as distract them from the boring factory life. In addition, smith failed to apply his division of labour analysis to global trade, where the concept would have offered great support for his policies on free trade. His critics have argued that he placed too much significance on the division of labour inside a factory/ industry, and neglected division of labour amongst industries, which is more significant.

Adam smith is considered the father of economics. His introduction of concepts such as "freedom of trade", "division of labour" and "pursuit of self-interest" greatly contributed to the development of the principle of free market in the modern world. His famous book wealth of nations is considered to be among the initial modern works in economics field, especially among those defending capitalism. In fact, his book is the earliest comprehensive effort towards the study of industry development, the nature of capital, and effects of extensive commerce.

His insights in economics revealed the significance of pricing mechanisms in market economies as a way of coordinating a multifaceted society, which could not be coordinated only with benevolence. Though some of his ideas, such as the labor theory, are flawed, they, 131 | P a g e

however, gave a foundation for economics and were vital for advancing industrialization and capitalism. It can be said that without ideas of Adam smith, economic advancement of the ancient times would have been diminished greatly.46 His other ideas that have greatly been admired to date include his belief that it is part of man’s responsibility to make an effort to improve economic growth. He strongly opposed government intervention unless it was protecting the society from violence, injustice, or providing the needed public amenities. In addition, he opposed inequality and maintained that there is no society that can be happy and flourishing with a majority of its members miserable and poor. He also opposed flat tax and instead supported a gradual tax structure, in which people are taxed based on their respective abilities. This clearly shows how considerate to the poor he was, but at the same time he did not encourage laziness. He believed in the importance of hard work for improvement of the economy.

Smith’s belief in a moral society and an upright conduct of human affairs has greatly shaped the character of various nations around the globe. Today’s failings in financial and business models, conformity to business malpractices for the sake of personal interest, as well as the selfishness that allows greed to overpower reason, all have eroded the character that we need as a nation to set a good example for future generations. In addition, character of an individual person is very important according to smith; it is the man in us, our conscience, reason, principle and great judge of our behaviour that makes us who we are.

His thoughts on entrepreneurship, which he termed as the search for satisfaction of greatness and wealth, seemed to have predicted how the modern world would grow. Finally, smith was a free trader and praised the global trade and markets that exist today an ideal economic blueprint should challenge the conventional theory by recognising sustainable economic ideas that equitably meet human needs. The key is to subject our policies to thorough and rigorous thinking based on our sociological environment, having consistency in implementation, regardless of government. We have witnessed policy reversals that have set us back for decades in terms of development. But the most important thing is for us to learn from past mistakes and apply learnt lessons to move forward.

The way forward is creating institutions of state, properly balanced in their authority and scope, so that we can ensure good governance. All thriving economies have the following similar traits: strong and effective institutions backed by legal frameworks that guarantee rule of law. Yinka Oyinlola (CEO, Nigeria Leadership Initiative) The big challenge the administration of President Muhammadu Buhari faces is how to meet the expectations that are inspired by its “change” mantra. In every sphere that the promised change was supposed to apply, the government has fallen short. Most confounding is President Buhari’s 132 | P a g e

shortcoming in the fight against corruption. His anti-corruption agenda blatantly glosses over some alleged cases of graft by his party men and government officials while hounding political opponents. With that, we see the President betray those who trust him to provide the moral authority to galvanise the country.

The economy is doing very badly because President Buhari’s initial policies were antibusiness. His many bloopers include the sterilisation of public sector funds through wholesale Treasury Single Account implementation. He even held business leaders in contempt and has not had any meaningful interaction with them till date.

Even after

delaying on several governance decisions, which included the appointment of ministers, he has continued to implement poor economic policies. This is the circumstance under which the subsisting low oil prices have seriously dragged down the entire economy. Some people have committed suicide because of the grim economic conditions.

The administration obviously doesn’t have a blueprint of its own. I believe it should enact policies that would have medium and long-term positive implications on the economy. The way to do that is through massive investment in education to transform the country to a knowledge-based society. On a short-term plan, President Buhari has to build the confidence of investors. One way to do that is to constitute an economic management team that includes technocrats. He would also need to replace ministers whose profiles and performances so far have actually done the opposite of inspiring confidence. I also think that the chief executives of government agencies appointed in acting capacities should become substantive heads without further delay. No serious investor (local or foreign) would stake much in a discussion with an acting chief executive.

I think the blueprint should focus on industrialisation through small and medium enterprises.

I think the government is already focussing on agriculture. The government appears to have considered agriculture as an avenue to boost the economy and create jobs. I think we need to look deep to see if there is an economic policy at all. It is when you have an economic policy that you could think of an economic blueprint. What I see is that the government is looking at boosting agriculture.

The logic is that agriculture would boost the economy and improve the lives of rural dwellers.

We need to diversify foreign exchange earnings. Agriculture is the highest contributor to our Gross Domestic Product. It is also the highest employer of labour. I am sure these are the justifications for the promotion programme on agriculture which was unveiled recently. Much as we appreciate what the government is doing, there is the need for a master plan. The question is where do we want to be by the year 2020? Are the relevant stakeholders aware

133 | P a g e

of the roles they need to play? If we are looking for long-term finance, which areas are we targeting – insurance or pensions fund? These are the sources of long-term funds.

If you are looking at these areas, what incentives have you put in place to develop the sectors? Where there is a negative regulation in an area we want to generate funds for national development, there would be problems in achieving our goals. People in different sectors must know the roles they should play. You also need to clarify the risk management strategy you intend to put in place to support an essential sector such as agriculture.

The country is in a recession. There is no doubt about that. The government must come up with a good economic blueprint that can give relief to Nigerians. If I would make a recommendation, I would want the government to address the challenges in the agricultural sector in a more proactive manner. Agriculture needs to be developed and modernised to attract young graduates to the sector. The government also needs to lift the ban on the importation of essential commodities and this should be properly monitored. Rice is a staple food in Nigeria, imposing a total ban on its importation is not good for the country. Local production of rice should have been developed to a certain level before the government stopped its importation. Also, the government needs to introduce programmes that would cushion the effects of recession and invest heavily in infrastructure. Youth development should be part of the government’s economic blueprint.

An economic blueprint of a country should encompass the various policies and programmes of activities intended to stimulate the economy into optimal performance. The goal is to improve the quality of lives of the citizenry. Diversification of the economy, job creation and promotion of home-made goods should be the priority of the country’s economic agenda.

Any economic programme that would not boost jobs is not what the country needs at this critical time.

Having analysed more than 16-month-old administration of President Muhammadu Buhari, I have come to the bitter conclusion that the administration lacks an economic blueprint.

There are no articulate macroeconomic policies to stabilise the economy and boost investment. This fact makes it difficult to draw a basis to assess the government’s performance.

The only area that one could score the administration high is the fight against corruption. But the anti-corruption campaign itself is taking too much attention, thereby neglecting serious economic programmes that should get government’s attention. Macroeconomic policies are poor. For instance, the Treasury Single Account policy introduced to block the diversion of government funds has ended up reducing money supply and shrinking the economy. The fact is that the reduction in money supply is capable of reducing consumption, investment 134 | P a g e

and employment. The government did not make policy options for the problems facing the economy. It is not surprising to see that many banks do not have much money to lend to the private sector.

Notes 1.

Aristotle, The politics, trans. By T.A Sinclair, Middlesex: Penguin books revised edition 1981.p.29

2.

Aristotle, The politics, 1981, P.1299

3.

John Rawls, Political Liberalism,New York: Columbia University Press, second 146n.

4.

John Rawls Rawls, Political Liberalism,New York: Columbia University Press, second ed.1996), 42.

5.

Aristotle, The politics, 1981. P.3445

6.

Van Crewel, The Rise and Decline of the State, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, P.52-8.

135 | P a g e

7.

Cicero, The Republic, p.39

8.

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Prima Parte Quest 90

9.

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Article 1

10.

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Prima Parte Quest 61

11.

Thomas More; utopia is from Greek words OU=Notes and Topes=place meaning without place.

12.

Niccollo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. G. Bull, Middlesex: Penguin books, 1981 Chapter 1

13.

Roger Scruton, a history of political Thought, New York: Harper and Row, 1982.

P.280

14.

Machiavelli, The first Decade of Titus Livinus, Middlesex: Penguin books, p.58

15.

Machiavelli, The Prince, p.100

16.

Niccollo Machiavelli, The prince, p. 101

17.

Niccollo Machiavelli, The prince, p.102

18.

Niccollo Machiavelli The prince, p.102

19.

Niccollo Machiavelli The prince, p.106

20.

Mao Tsetung, On Coalition Government, in selected works, Pekin; Languages Press vol. 3, p. 229

21.

Leopold Sedar Senghor, On African Socialism, trans, M. Cook, New York: F.A. Praeger,1964, p.9

22.

Sedar Senghor, On African Socialism, p.13

23.

Sedar Senghor, On African Socialism, p.32

24.

Sedar Senghor, On African Socialism, p.13

25.

Sedar Senghor, On African Socialism, p.33

26.

Obafemi Awolowo, The Problems of Africa, The need for Ideological Reappraisal, London: MacMillan education ltd. 1978, p.54

27.

Obafemi Awolowo, The Problems of Africa, p.159

28.

Obafemi Awolowo, The Peoples Republic, Ibadan: Oxford University Press, 1968, p.83

29.

Obafemi Awolowo, The Problems of Africa, p.55.

30.

Obafemi Awolowo, The Problems of Africa, p.159

31.

Obefemi Awolowo,The Peoples Republic, p.168

32.

Obafemi Awolowo, The Problems of Africa. p.64

33.

Harold H. Titus, Living in Philosophy, New York: American Book Company, 1964.

P. 225.

34.

HARRY k. Girvetsz, The Democratic Idea, A Liberal Approach, Pacific Philosophy Forum, Volume 2 Number 1, September 1963, p.16.

35.

Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1094a27, translated with Introduction by Martin Ostwald, New York: The Macmillan Publishing Company, 1987.

36.

Izu M. Onyeocha, Idealism, Politics and Nation Building, The councillor for Research in Values and Philosophy: Washington D.C.1994.p.11

37.

136 | P a g e

Izu M. Onyeocha, Idealism, Politics and Nation Building. p. 12

38.

The Catholic Church in an Independent Nigeria, A joint Pastoral Letter of the Nigerian Hierarchy, October 1st,1960. p.5

39.

Izu M. Onyeocha, Idealism, Politics and Nation Building, The councillor for Research in Values and Philosophy: Washington D.C.1994.p.21

40.

Bernard Joinet, Step by Step Towards Democracy, Pauline Publication Africa, Nairobi:1997. p. 14

41.

Bernard Joinet, Step by Step Towards Democracy, Pauline Publication Africa, Nairobi:1997. p. 14

42.

Bernard Joinet, Step by Step Towards Democracy, P.4

43.

The Holy Bible 2 Sam 15- 18

44.

The Holy Bible John 11:45-54).

45.

Adam Smith, Wealth of Nation, London: W. Strahan retrieved 10th March 2017

46.

Adam smith, Wealth of Nation, London: W. Strahan retrieved 10th March 2017

CHAPTER FOUR 137 | P a g e

Political Ideal for Nigeria We need to reject any politics that targets people because of race or religion.

This isn't a matter of political correctness. It's a matter of understanding what makes us strong. The world respects us not just for our arsenal; it respects us for our diversity and our openness and the way we respect every faith.

Barack Obama

4.1 Political Ideal for Nigeria This topic does not lie in any prospects of this book as an answer to the question of the ideal political philosophy for Nigeria. It lies, firstly, in the focus it brings to the question of Nigeria's current political philosophy. Secondly, some of us are inclined to think that this is the historical moment for the development of political theory for the Nigerian political system.

The history of political philosophy, beginning with

ancient Greece, shows that there is always an upsurge of political theory, sequel to major political upheavals, such as the defeat of Athens in the 5th century B. C., by Sparta.

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Such political ideals as liberty, justice , democracy, and the rule of law, emanated from the reflections of Greek philosophers at that time. I do hope that the traumas of the unsuccessful First Republic, the Civil War and thirteen year military intervention, will jolt Nigerian thinkers into reflecting on the right ideals of our society so as to evolve political theories for the state. I also hope that this book will prove a catalyst to the anticipated upsurge. George H. Sabine, in his A History of Political Theory, says that “both political institutions and political theory are part of culture; they are extensions of man, the physical entity.

Groups of humans create

institutions and practices whether political philosophers arc there to philosophise or not ..." 1 In short, every group of humans that have created political institutions and practices must have political ideals "certain conceptions of what the institutions ought to embody, to which the institutions ought to be instrumental. The institutions are, at least in part, in furtherance of the ideals of the political group". Prior to the British intervention in African history, a heterogeneity of states and cultures occupied what is today known as Nigeria? These states represented a variety of systems and structures of government. One might therefore talk of a Nigerian pristine political philosophy only to the extent that there existed, prior to 1900, a complex of political philosophical abstractions that were common to all, or a majority of these states. Or alternatively, one might look at the complex as comprising the various discernible political ideals to which the different political structures and institutions were instrumental.

I am not aware that much work has been done on the subject of theorising on Nigerian pristine political philosophy. Perhaps the wide spectrum of types of governments ranging from egalitarian, ultra-republican democracies, to totalitarian feudal empires, might have dissuaded political thinkers from delving into the subject.

Such works, in my view, are. Fundamental to the synthesis of an ideal political philosophy for Nigeria. In Bertrand Russell's view, transplanted ideas are, seldom as successful in the new environment as they were in their native soils, principally because "practice inspires theory" in the native soils while "in the other, word theory inspires practice".2 For the structures to be meaningful, they have to be instrumental to the realisation of idea accepted by the society. It is my humble view that a majority of Nigerians are more acquainted with our pristine political philosophy than they are with Western political theory. It is only by defining our pristine political philosophy, coupled with an

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eclectic adaptation of these and other philosophies to such political structures as will enhance our ideals that we can see as ideal political philosophy for Nigeria.

G. H. Sabine has persuasively argued, political theory may show what a practice means or what it ought to mean and can thereby alter what it is. A classic example of this influence is the writings of the French philosopher, Montesquieu, who saw the British Government of his time in terms of separation of powers. His theories were to influence the founding fathers of the United States of America in the drafting of their constitution, a constitution which we in Nigeria felt proud to blindly copy two hundred years after.

Let us glimpse into our political history to see if there is some explanation for the slow development of political philosophy in. The imposition of British rule in 1900 meant that the citizens of the various Nigerian states became subject peoples within a bigger state. Any discussion of the ideal political philosophy take

for Nigeria must

info cognisance the psychological impact of this phenomenon Of subjecting-

the governmental institutions of this conglomeration to the interest and whims of an alien people and culture.

Because, where efforts were made to retain existing

political’ structures, they became instrumental to the interest given the colonising power rather than to the ideals of the political life of the people.

Thus some indigenous political institutions ceased to be part of the people’s culture, the extension of their physical entities, and became instruments for their subjugation and control At the same time as the British were subverting the political institutions of the various states within the geographical entity now called Nigeria, they were, for administrative and economic reasons, trying to amalgamate the conglomeration into a nation state.Thus as the people were being alienated from their political institutions, efforts were being made to create for them, a new structure to which, understandably, they have found difficulty in relating. ‘Government’ and 'the rule of law' as concepts, cannot connote the same thing for a subject people as for a free people.

The struggle for independence was an elite movement led principally

by

thosewhose innate desires for freedom and democracy

by

their

exposure

to

were sharpened

western political philosophy. Through formal education and

exposure to the media, government had not only destroyed and compromised the existing political structures, but had also imposed a new one incorporating all the existing nationalities, the independence struggle had to be within the context of the new nation, rather than the restoration of autonomy for the colonised states.

Unfortunately, all the efforts to draw up a fundamental operational code (constitution) 140 | P a g e

for the newly-created state, were not necessarily directed at creating institutions which would best enhance or reconcile the varied and sometimes conflicting philosophies of the composite nationalities. Rather each of the major nationalities concentrated their efforts upon seeking structures that would confer on them, advantages and security within the imposed new political structure.

Another point worth emphasising is colonisation. The colonial imposition of a suprastate, and the subsequent struggle for independence were processes which alienated "Nigerian;" from the "Nigerian" state and particularly from the Nigerian government. In short, the Nigerian government evolved as an imposed coercive force, inimical to the status quo, interests, and aspirations of the people. Perhaps, there was an intrinsic acceptance by the people of Nigeria of the theory of social contract. Rousseau's Social Contract (published in 1762) had argued that the reason for a government was the "general will".

Neither the "Nigerian state" nor the"

Nigerian government" emerged by a "general will" and consequently. Neither of them enjoyed the reciprocal confidence and loyalty or either individuals or smaller societies that made up the state.3 Independence came as a change - of guards.

Leaders. Who are democratically

elected, took over the same alien structures and machinery of government from the colonizers who operated them. It is still arguable, two decades after independence, whether there has been any substantial shift in the Nigerian's conception of government as an extraneous agency, an alien institution, and imposed coercive force. His efforts for nearly a century to co-exist with this extraneous force which he cannot repel should make interesting study.

For the Greek, for example, the city state proffered a Live-Common for all guiding ideal of Greek political thought as to achieve a harmonious common life in which the joy of every citizen was to contribute to government. "An Athenian does not neglect the state because he takes care of his own household ......" Perhaps, we in today's Nigeria can say that a Nigerian involves himself in Nigerian affairs in order to take care of his own household, and he at times have times have conflicting philosophies of the composite nationalities. One may be honoured by his kindred group for, transferring the state treasury into his personal coffers because his action is seen in terms of his outwitting an alien institution What is important is that our philosophers must examine all of them in relation to our pristine political philosophies; and select what appears to be best suited to our worldview. From the theory of the city state, represented by Plato and Aristotle, and 141 | P a g e

the theory of the universal community, represented by St. Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, to the theory of the nation state, espoused by Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Burke, John Stuart Mill, Hegel, Marx, and Franz Fanon, we must apply the philosophy of eclecticism by drawing from each doctrine, what is best suited to us. This will, of course, entail a modification of our present political structures to what is capable of being instrumental to the realisation of our ideals.

Having stated that the ideal political philosophy for Nigeria must be rooted in our pristine political philosophy, may I reflect very briefly on a few issues of the Nigerian political environment. I will begin by citing the immortal words of Karl Marx: in the social production which men carry on, they enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will, these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material powers of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society the real foundation, on which the legal and political super-structures and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual processes of life.

Let us consider the social production system as it operates in Nigeria. On the lowest rung of the production ladder are the peasant’s eking out their livelihood at subsistence level by their sweated labour. They provide for the material sustenance of the bulk of the population.

They reside in the rural areas, enjoy no modern

conveniences such as potable water, electricity or good roads. They have no hospitals, or supermarkets, the few schools available to them are built by their own sweat. They get nothing back in return for their contribution except a very occasional extension of some basic social amenity such as a postal agency, for which they are made to feel grateful. Most 50 percent of the population of Nigeria belong to this class.

Next to the peasants are the proletariat who are obliged to offer their labour in return for wages. One peculiarity of the Nigerian proletariat is that its typical member is not landless. He is either a peasant or the off-spring of a peasant who has escaped from the drudgery of rural peasant life and enjoys fringe benefits of city life. His roots are in the rural community to which he aspires to return a bourgeois .I estimate that the proletariat make up about 5.0% of the population of the country with a majority of them employed by the state. This class does not include the political leaderÂŹ ship, senior civil servants, and government officials.

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Nor does it include the top

managerial group in the private sector who, although they offer their labour for wages, use such relationÂŹ ship merely as a camouflage. This group ma y be classified as either the compradors, or the comprador bourgeoisie because their wealth and influence are not derived from their wages. I use the term compradors in the classical sense to include all those who operate as middlemen or work on a commission or as agents of foreign concerns, either in the professions or in distributive trade. They make up about 17.5% of the population, while at the apex are the bourgeoisie and the comprador bourgeoisie who constitute about 2.5%.

Let us reflect on the source of Nigeria's wealth. In 1958, the Minerals Ordnances was enacted Section 3 (1) Chap, 121 of that Ordinance states as follows. 'The entire property in and control of all minerals, and mineral oils, in, under, or upon any lands in Nigeria, and of all rivers, streams, and water courses throughout Nigeria, is and shall be vested in the Crown, save in so far as such rights may, in any case, have been limited by any express grant made before the commencement of this Ordinance. (In 1981, Mineral Oil Revenue accounted for about 79.6% of total government revenue). From 1971 to March 1981, government wasresponsible, on the average, for 84.3% of all new money created in the economy, according to the Federal government directorof budget Mr. T. A. Akinyele. All public utilities in Nigeria are government own the state owns majority shares in all banks anddominates the controlling of the economy, we may, therefore, safely conclude that the major means of domestic production of goods and services to that of oil extraction is extremely low.

Let us pause here for few maxims of the traditional Nigerian society. Nigeria ns believe that a ma n is entitled to the fruits of his honest labour, hence the strong belief in the sanctity of property, to the extent that, traditionally, the death penalty was not considered excessive for theft. Wealth is generally regarded as either the reward of hard work or as a divine favour bestowed as a reward of good deeds.

Thus, wealth is equated with success and a wealthy man evokes admiration.

Children are considered the highest divine blessing and the upbringing of a large family of virile and hardworking children is an out ward sign of the highest form of inward grace. In an agricultural economy, subject to the vagaries of nature wealth accumulation is regarded as a necessary insurance for one and one's children.

Although these beliefs give each person the right to private property, the overall philosophy in which these rights are entrenched is socialistic. Socialism in this context entails the theory that ajust society is one in which the wealth of the community is fairly distributed, everyone is given an equal opportunity to develop his

143 | P a g e

talents, and the basic means of production, distribution and exchange are publicly owned and controlled.

What we seem to have inadvertently done is to pool the resources and wealth of the nation and place them under the control of the political class and technocrats without developing any clearly defined and accepted ideology for re-distribution. Not surprisingly, the usurpers nowhand out what by right belongs to all the people to clients and henchmen who help to perpetuate their hold on power and wealth. The peasants who toil day and night do not understand the source and nature of this new power. They still believe in labour as the only possible and legitimate source of wealth and consequently, that wealth is a reward for hard work. Since they do not understand their rights to the mineral wealth of the nation, they do not feel much personal loss over the wanton exploitation that goes on. The proletariat are very few and their aspirations are not directed at effecting a fairer distribution of wealth, but at obtaining a share of the loot.

Given this situation and the persistence within the bigger society of political structures akin to the Greek city states, there is an absence of thorough-going class conflicts as would be expected from the wealth distribution pattern. I agree with Karl Marx that: At a certain stage of their development, the material sources of production in society come in conflict with the existing relations of production.4 But I do not share the optimism of Nigerian Marxists that such a situation is about to arisein Nigeria. Such conflict may have to first await the maturation of the present comprador bourgeoisie, into local bourgeoisie, capable of employing the capital they are currently accumulating, to exploit labour, in a future industrialised Nigeria.

I am emboldened to hold this view because, according to Karl Marx; no social order ever disappears before all the productive forces, for which there is room, it have been merely observingthat the present social Oder may still subsist for a while unless there is a change in political philosophy or an acceleration of the development of the human factor of production. If we therefore mean to build a just society, we must either adopt a deliberate policy of speedy reform or allow ourselves to be swept away by the blind forces of dialectal change. Indicated earlier that the Nigerian traditional society is in a sense welfarist. But welfarism is based on the humane and moral sentiments of those who wield power.

On the 12th of January 1981, the then President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Alhaji Shehu Shagari, in a ceremony reminiscent of the military, speaking before a joint session of the National Assembly reviewed the achievements of the Third 144 | P a g e

National Development plan, and gave the high lights of a new five-year plan, which he believed, "will provide the much needed catalyst for us to re-dedicate ourselves to the task of making this nation economically self-reliant and truly great."

That was the formal launching of the Fourth. National Development plan, which had been deferred for some months to enable the new civilian government put their imprint on it. This plan, which covers the period 1981 - 1985, envisages an investment expenditure of N82 billion, N70.5 billion of which will be accounted for by the various governments of the Federation and their agencies.

It is pertinent for the purposes of this exercise to point out that Mr. President came to the National Assembly, not to present the Fourth plan for the consideration of the National Assembly, but merely to launch the programme. He was only exercising his rights under Section 63 of the constitution, which entitles him to attend any joint meeting of the National Assembly, to deliver an address on national affairs. In short, the National Assembly was merely used as a forum for addressing the nation. The significance

of

this will be elaborated upon later, as a major flaw in the Fourth

National Development Plan.

Let the media help by focusing attention on, and popularising, Nigerian system of government based on our accepted ideals. Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay, and many others did this for the American constitution. The sophists played this role for ancient Greece.

In short, the desire for security and inherent insecurity in the fear of insecurity drive men into a perpetual quest for more power and more wealth at the expense of others.

Mayer raise these few questions? a.

Since we have already placed the sources of wealth

under state control and have consequently allowed a situation where a few accumulate the bulk of it in their perpetual quest for personal and family security may we not limit this acquisitive tendency by limiting what can he bequeathed to or inherited by a Nigerian? ‘Thus helped substantially in developing the philosophies of ancient Greece. more voices on this issue.

Let us hear

It is the only way to BUILD a

nation. b.

In a society where the national government is seen as

extraneous, where it has been shown that otherwise publicspirited individuals who are prepared to make sacrifices for 145 | P a g e

their smaller communities, feel no pangs in embezzling government funds, would it not be more appropriate to redistribute the wealth of the nation in such a way that the bulk of it is managed at thecommunity level? c.Given the traditional strong attachment to property, should effort not be directed at building a state which guarantees a fair distribution of wealth and equal opportunity to all, while at the same time allowing private enterprise within specified limits?

Let me say from the onset, that I intend to treat this subject principally from a political perspective, since a lot has already been said, particularly by traditional praise singers about the economic aspect. Development planning, as we know it today, is a product of socialism.

As the control over the means of production changed hands

from a few powerful individuals to thestate machinery, it became not only possible, but also necessary and desirable, to evolve central planning, in order to influence the

pattern

and

direction

of development. Their economies were, therefore,

referred to as planned economies. Long and medium term development planning thus became a tool for not only economic, but also political and social engineering.

As third world countries gained political independence, they found that only the statepossessed enough resources to exert any meaningful impact on the development of the commanding heights of their economies. Where some private interests seemed capableof performingthis role, those interests were invariably foreign, and were, in fact, the same very interests from whom political control was wrested.The dominant role of the state machinery in the control of the means of production and distribution, led a good number of third world countries into central medium term planning, otherwise known as National Development planning.

As I pointed out in my contributions to the 1981 Budget debates, we have adopted a political system which is alien to development planning, as we know it. In the presidential system, as practised in the United States, there is no such thing as a National Development Plan The United States Federal Budget is a mere 22% of the gross national product of that country and although, the congressional budget office prepares five year budget projections, these cost estimate are advisory and Congress does not enforce its budget decision’s against authorisation bills based on these cost estimates. In Nigeria, however, a five-year Development Plan is the blue print for all subsequent government development efforts.

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4.2 Dangers of False Electoral Promises Every responsible, Nigerian who leads or aspires to lead whether in politics, business, religion or the professions, should seriously address his mind toit should be of interest to every Nigerian to whom stability and good governance in the post-military era are important.

People are being led to believe that all their problem s will be over on October 1, 1979. By that date every school child not only hopes for free tuition, boarding, textbooks, equipment and uniform, but also for an end to all examinations and all striving worker thinks it is a matter of months before thewage freeze is over and better housing provided for him free. He believes that promotions will come easy and fast. Every farmer looks forward to October 1st for Government and bank assistance, for an end to the hoe and knife era, for paved country roads, pipe-borne water and electric power, free medical attention, as well as increased farm earnings. Nigerian citizens have not only been promised these things but they have alsobeen made tobelieve that they have no obligations and no limitation to their wishes. “Just

press your thumb on the ballot paper and heaven will be yours" seems to be the

magic formula.5 The hard facts are that the current hard times are going to be with us for still a while. The world-wide inflation will not disappear on October 1, 1979. Our problems of balance of payments, trade deficits, unemployment and low productivity will need time, our best brains, our best efforts, and our best sacrifices to contain them. Our economic situation today (characterised by inflation, high unemployment, low external assets, very low internal production, and equally low productivity) calls for very serious reflections.

J. F.

Kennedy, then a Senator, once told his fellow Senators. "A political convalescence

has no durability unless it is invigorated by economic therapy". We are yet to leave our political sick-bed, and instead of those who aspire to lead searching for the appropriate economic invigorating tonic, they are busy dreaming up Eldorado that will be ours for merely casting a vote.

The next government of this country, therefore, have no options than to tackle with all seriousness our gigantic economic problems. It cannot hope to score any successes without the people appreciating the real situation, without the people realizing the necessity for sacrifices, for increased productivity, for self-reliance, and for abhorrence of excessive consumption.

Instead of preparing our peoples' minds for the final and decisive economic battle that must be fought before we can catch a glimpse of the new economic horizons in the 80s, we are 147 | P a g e

leading them in to false hopes and false expectations. Are we not men enough to tell ourselves the truth as it is; that October 1979 is not the end of the journey but only the beginning; that the answer to better life is harder work; that the only road to greatness is sacrifice; that NOTHING IN LIFE IS FREE? Ifa man provides you something with your own money and has the impudence to tell you it is free, he is insulting your intelligence.

Every responsible Nigerian should now wake up and help shake up our already hypnotized people. The message be that it is only from our own sweat shall we eat bread, build our own

roads and schools

own our own rice and strengthen our economy , find full

employment for all our people, and build a healthy, better Nigeria. The dangers of the present euphoria are too real to be ignored. Disillusionment and disenchantment with the leadership which will follow, will surely breed- instability, and this, Nigeria cannot afford.

4.2.

Development planning in a Presidential Democracy

Within the plan period. The emphasis placed on this document is such that no projects outside those articulated in the plan can receive government attention and budgetary support within the plan period, except as a result of a comprehensive revision. But because we based our Constitution on the United States model, which puts little or no emphasis on development planning, no specific status was given to this all important exercise in our Constitution. The development plan is, in fact, so important that the annual budget within the plan period are considered as components of the plan. Thus, while section 75(l) of the constitution makes it mandatory for the president to cause to be prepared, and laid before each House of the National Assembly at any time of each financial year, the annual budget for the next following financial year, there is no such stipulations for the development plan.

The question, however, is whether the executive arm of government can treat the development plan as its internal affairs as it has currently done. Section 74(1) of the constitution says that all revenues or other moneys raised or received by the Federation shall be paid into and form one consolidated revenue fund of the Federation. Section 74(4) Says that no money shall be withdrawn from the consolidated revenue fund or any other public fund of the federation, except in the manner prescribed by the National Assembly. A situation is hereby created, where the executive arm of government has announced a programme for the investment expenditure of N70.5 billion between 1981 and 1985 without seeking the concurrence of those who control the purse.

The validity of the Fourth plan as a national plan is therefore, in question and one may, in fact, assert that what has been launched is an executive proposal for the national plan.

There is a strong possibility that the National Assembly may not appropriate funds for some of title projects in the plan, and if the Legislature develops strong opposition to some 148 | P a g e

significant sections of the plan, the document will lose its value as the blueprint for national development.

4.4 Blueprint to the Nigerian Revolution Earlier in the year, an American non-government agency, the United States National Intelligence Council predicted that Nigeria may break up in 15 years creating instability in the entire West African region. This report was dismissed by some Nigerians as suspicious and should be ignored. Arguments were made that it along with the closure of Embassies in Lagos were designed to show that Nigeria was not stable enough to get a permanent seat at the UN security council or to pressure Nigeria to hand over Charles Taylor which President Obasanjo has rightly refused to do despite pressure from the US congress because it was an agreement reached with the American blessing to stop the war in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Some tried to link it to Nigeria’s quest for debt reduction. Right or wrong, one can understand that all these highlight the mistrust people now have of the American government underscored by the pew study showing that even communist China is now more favoured than America around the world. I thought that the report had to do with the fact America did not want Nigeria, with its oil to become a failed state because it will be a haven for terrorist where they will be forced to take action which they might not be ready for.

Also the immigration problem that will come about will be enormous for the west.

However, one takes the report by this intelligent council, it will be a gross mistake to ignore it.

We have to accept the message regardless of the messenger. Like Gen Buhari (Fmr) said then, the report was accurate and that the Nigerian elites have to be blamed. The report is merely stating the obvious, which is what some of us have been saying for years. There is a huge disenchantment and dissatisfaction with Nigeria by Nigerians. There is too much suffering (with smiling). Too many people go hungry every day. The middle class is gone, the rich get richer (of course usually by crooked ways) while the poor get poorer. People are marginalized and the elites with money run everything. There is too much corruption, Nigeria is one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Everyone wants to get rich quick just so they can join the powerful because the culture is now so messed up that that is the only way one gets respect. Everyone wants to be called a chief.

The culture of hard work and honesty is gone even though we have more churches per capita than probably any country in the world. The pursuit of luxury and privilege usually without the hard work is dizzying. A look at who owns most of the oil blocks and who gets most of the contracts and a look at a list of the richest people in Nigeria will show cronyism and nepotism at work. Look at what part of the country is developed and which part is ignored. There is a huge disparity in infrastructure between the north and south. The 149 | P a g e

conditions of the roads in the South East and South South zones are deplorable. Even Lagos that used to be the pride of Africa is now so ignored by the federal government that it now looks like a big ghetto or slum. To make it worse, the federal government withheld their local government funds despite court rulings. The schools are failing and in some cases falling apart literally. Some people think that they own the country and believe that only they have the right run it.

Because of all this, people have been calling for restructuring of the country and some even calling for secession and others calling for outright dissolution. Some people like Alhaji Dokubo and the youths of the Niger Delta region have threatened to use violent means to reach their goal of equity and fairness. Only the rich and the powerful along with the northern elites and those with the aspirations, chance and hope of getting there want to maintain the status quo.

In my opinion, Nigeria needs a serious restructuring and a new beginning. We have to look at some other countries only to see what they have done and see how they suit our situation.

It is wrong and a bad idea however to just copy other people's system or constitution because it never works for anyone and has never worked for us. The Philippines for example are now calling for a new constitution, one that will change from American style democracy to one that will fit their own reality better, and they are calling for a federal system with a weaker centre and a parliamentary system. Same as Iraq even though there is a lot of foreign interference in their own case. The Philippines also has corruption problem.

First we have to look at America and their revolution and the French revolution as well. We also have to look at Malaysia and Ghana and at our own history especially during Mohammed and Buhari eras. I don't care that they were military regimes because those were only when there was discipline with minimal corruption and things worked showing that we can actually do it. The French situation was the most similar to what we have now. Borne out of the enlightenment era in Europe at the time led by French thinkers. The so-called enlightenment apostles like Voltaire who attacked the church and absolutism, thus the separation of church and state, Denis Diderot and the Encyclopaedia advocated social utility and attacked tradition; the baron de Montesquieu made English constitutionalism fashionable, an idea from the English Magna Carta of the 13th century, and the marquis de Condorcet who preached his faith in progress. Most direct in his influence on Revolutionary thought was J. J. Rousseau, especially through his dogma of popular sovereignty, also from the Magna Carta.

Economic reform, advocated by the physiocrats and attempted (1774-76) by A. R. J. Turgot, was thwarted by the unwillingness of privileged groups to sacrifice any privileges and by the 150 | P a g e

king's failure to support strong measures according to the encyclopedia. First they created the culture that produced an enlightened populace especially middle class in France and Europe in general. The French revolution, which followed from this era and has been hailed as the first and a model for revolutions in the world simply took power from their elites (king Louis XIV) and put it in the peoples' hands. The culture of the enlightenment era also resulted in the industrial revolution.

In much the same way, the American Revolution was borne out of the enlightenment, to revolt from the English crown and drive for independence from England. Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson who were two of the leaders of the movement had spent a lot of time in France and can be associated with the enlightenment philosophers mentioned above.

They brought their enlightened and worldly views to the conference while the home grown delegates tried to preserve their own reality. An example, the home grown delegates wanted to acknowledge God the creator while the enlightened thinkers had taken God out of governments, the two forces argued it out and reached what became their declaration of independence. For example, in the declaration of independence, the French philosophy, 'life, liberty and pursuit of pleasure was replaced with ' life, liberty and pursuit of happiness' to make it not as ungodly as in Secular France. The point is that the genius of the American founding fathers is that what they came up with reflected their times, in this case the enlightenment era as it would fit their own reality.

The other cases that I will like us to look are Malaysia and Ghana, both of which the BBC did a study of. Both countries got independence in the same year, 1957 from Britain.

According to BBC, British colonial records show that in the early 1950s, Ghana and Malaysia were on an economic par - equally poor and equally dependent on the export of raw materials. Today, Ghanaians get by on an average of about $300 per year, while Malaysians earn over $3,000.

Ghana is still exporting raw products like cocoa and gold, Malaysia makes its own cars and boasts skyscrapers that rival anything in New York or London. In fact, Malaysia has the tallest building in the world. The BBC tried to find out why Malaysia had advanced far better than Ghana. Malaysia - which imported its first palm oil trees from Nigeria in the 1950s - has not only become the largest palm oil producer in the world, but has also developed a hightech industry which makes sophisticated chemicals and food additives from the raw berries according to the BBC. What they came up with was stability in government with strong leadership.

The main architect of the economic boom years for Malaysia - the 1970s and 80s - was the recently retired Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir Mohammad. According to him, "Political stability 151 | P a g e

is extremely important, without political stability there can be no economic development.

People are not going to put money into a place where there is no certainty". There was purpose, vision and direction that was all internal in the leadership. The Malaysian state had established a solid framework of laws that allowed entrepreneurs to flourish. The comparison with Ghana could not be starker. In 1966, just nine years after independence, there was the first of a series of military coups, which plunged the country into two decades of instability, according to the BBC. Even today, Ghana is better than Nigeria even without oil because of the Rawlings revolution, which tried to bring strong leadership with discipline, vision, purpose and direction without regard for what foreign powers had to say just like Malaysia.

So what do we do? What should be done? Is a revolution needed to fix the situation? A revolution could mean various things including violent mass movement, military interventions to topple the government or worse, civil war. I am not advocating Rawlings or Nzeogwu or Buhari type of revolution. A coup is a revolution and there has never been any that Nigerians did not welcome and celebrate but the problem is that their agenda, whether noble or not is not by the people and they tend to become dictatorial to maintain power. I hope and pray that it doesn't come down to another civil war because we will not survive it.

What I am talking about here is starting with a peaceful revolution. The type that has actually been in progress for a while. It started after the attempted military coup by Orkar, which failed.

The call for something like the Sovereign National Conference has been going on in Nigeria since the 1990's. The one that private citizen Obasanjo and subsequently Jonathan supported back then but as president opposes along with the elites especially the northern elites either because as the president he is part of the elites or because he doesn't want to offend them since they put him in power. He instead settled for a compromise which he called a dialogue, the National Political Reform Conference (NPRC) or confab. Some delegates ended up walking out and called it a failure while some like Umaru Dikko thought it was a huge success. I think it was successful for a different reason. People got to talk and brought their issues to the front pages. The problem with the confab in my opinion was not that they did not reach agreement on resource control or the tenure of the president.

Obasanjo can accept the 17% suggested and present it to the house for approval. It is an increase from 1, 1.5 or 2% of the past and 13 % we have now but short of the 25% to 50% the south south zone wanted. He could then have also made a proposal to the house to set aside extra 8% for a ten year development plan for the areas that produce oil and that brings it up to the 25%. The federal Government will have direct control of the fund, using only local

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people to clean the place up, create alternative means of livelihood of even relocate the affected people and build the infrastructure needed for the development of the area. This will develop the affected areas while creating jobs for the people helping the economy to grow.

The problem with the confab was that it was a government's and not peoples' conference.

Most delegates were government appointed and given areas to discourse with 'no go areas'.

It was top down and not the way it should be and the outcome was not what the people can defend as their own. Problem was that the elites were protecting their selfish interests, and this includes the states governors. That is why I support the SNC as the best option for the people and by the people.

A lot has been written or talked about in this regard. There have been discussions among Nigerians at home and abroad since the beginning of this period about how to fix the Nigerian problem. I have read several interesting articles by some of these Nigerians and there have been some good and even brilliant ideas. Some have been calling for real fiscal and political federal system, autonomous regions (confederation) and even dissolution, some are even very sophisticated but there are some that have some flawed logic or selfish reasoning. There are silly ones like the ones calling for American government or the congress to intervene in Nigeria. There are a couple that make exact same points that I am trying to make here but I am adding a few more things. I think that everyone that takes time to write or even read these articles or even discuss Nigerian problem honestly has the interest of Nigeria at heart and is encouraged.

First, in a type of referendum, we have to decide if we want to stay together as one country, say the majority like me say yes, and then it will be considered given. Then, next will be what kind of structure, confederation, a federal system, unitary system, how much power at the federal level. What will be the federating units, current states, zones, original regions or what? I think the wants a federal system with the zones as the federating units. What systems of government do we need, democracy, communism, monarchy or military? I will say democracy and I think I am in the majority on this because it will fit our composition the best and not because someone imposes it and we have to have our own style of democracy.

The people have to decide. There will be no 'no go areas' as in Obasanjo's confab because nothing is already given. The Nigerian people, both home and abroad, elites and the common men, the enlightened and others will have to work out the constitution which will not be imposed by anyone, not by foreign powers nor by the elites and not by the government. This is the only way to form a constitution and a country that will be ours and will be defended patriotically as ours by the people because they came up with it.

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When it comes down to the constitution, I have a few things to suggest but unlike some of the things I read, I have no selfish interests to protect except a country that will work for everyone. First is that we need a parliamentary system of government. The reason is that it is cheaper to operate and it fits us better. Some people have advocated for this but the elites and the governors oppose it just to protect their powers and ambitions. Also from what I have read, most people want a rotational presidency. Rotational presidency will bring about mediocrity in the leadership. Parliamentary system will also take care of that. The president only needs to be strong and respected. The president will not just be ceremonial, the power rests with him. The president will be elected from the zone whose turn it is assuming we go with the six zones.

Say it is the turn of the North Central, all the parties will present candidates from that zone and the people vote. The president, who is the head of state will have a one six-year term and will appoint a prime minister to head his government. The prime minister could be from any part of the country and will have certain qualifications and be subject to confirmation by the house for a two-year term and a maximum of three terms. For example, the North central president can appoint the best person that they can find from anywhere in the country, like somebody with qualities and qualifications of Mrs Ngozi Iweala as prime minister. The prime minister forms a government, appoints the other ministers and runs the government ministries and parastatals. The president will entrust the prime minister to manage the fiscal policy of the country but can fire them and dissolve the government when they are not performing, or for some reason the people call for them to go. The house can also move to dissolve the government if the people demand it for any reason but by at least a 2/3 majority. The presidency will include council of chiefs from all over the country and the chief of defense staff and this is very important because it will get the military represented and involved. The president should stay above politics.6 Whether the rotation goes around the zones or between North and South is really a nonissue because we can decide that it be say, South East, then North West, then South South and then North Central etc. I will suggest that we have one house of parliament, thirty or so from each of the recognized six zones that we have today to make sure every tribe and area is well represented. The other constitutional issue I want to touch on is the contentious issue of derivation and resource control because a lot has been debated on this. I have read and heard a lot on this, some good, some flawed and some selfish. Everyone has to sit down and negotiate on this issue. Nothing here is given. Some have called for a return to the 1950's and 1960's. Somebody said that what we have now is illegal because it was by decree of the military.

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We all have to remember that 100% and 50% we had in the 50's and 60's were negotiated in forming the independent federation. The regions came together and brought along with them their resources and agreed on how much to give to the federal government. What we have now is not a federal system like back then regardless of what it is called. The military decrees and constitutions also created the states and the zones including the South South zone that we have now and made all resources that of the federal government. The federal government also sponsored the exploration of oil. That does not mean that we can ignore the consequence to the areas affected. The south south has to also recognize that it is not the same as the Niger delta area. So everyone should sit down and negotiate reasonably.

If the people recognize and accept the six zones to replace the 3 or 4 regions that originally formed the union in the federal structure, I suggest that each zone gets 20% or so from the resource discovered in their zone, whatever the resource is, because that will encourage other zones to get back to other resources in their zone. In addition, I suggest that the federal government set aside additional 5% from its own share to compensate any area not zone that has any mineral that devastates the area like oil does. Someone also mentioned that the United Nations had decided that each state had the right to the resources on their territory. The state as used by the UN is country like Nigeria and not Abia state for example.

The North has to sit down and negotiate on this because they have the most to lose and right now they are not contributing much.

Another issue is that the zones become federating units with almost autonomous powers in handling their own affairs as it fits them so they can develop at their own pace. They can create as many states as they see fit with each state creating as many local governments as they want. The resources will have to be shared according to the population of each zone and not how many local governments one has. Lagos Islands of Lagos, Ikoyi and Victoria Island along with Apapa and Port Harcourt should remain federal capital territories along with Abuja as was proposed by Murtalala Muhammed. The federal government will handle security, military and immigration and customs while the zones handle their own local laws and their economies. The federal government has to however make sure human rights and freedom of religion are protected everywhere. The experts can work out other details of who handles what. The federal government should be weaker than it is now while the zones get more power. Another issue is that of citizenship or residency.

I suggest that according to our customs and traditions, everyone is from his or her father's ancestral home. However, residency is determined by where one is born or where one has lived for five years or more and not both, for purpose of elections and rights. One chooses which one it is and will be eligible to vote and be voted for there except as the president

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which will be based on origin. One can only contest for the president in his or her own place of origin. The constitution must also preserve and protect Nigeria's sovereignty and territorial integrity like the Philippines forbid all foreign troops on its soil or like the Pakistan's that also forbids foreign troops as well intelligent agents from operating on its soil. All agreements entered by our government must be of mutual benefit and respects our sovereignty. The government should encourage independent think tanks to study and help formulate policies.

If the people write the constitution, then dissolution or secession will be voted on by everyone, preferably by a 2/3 majority. Abolition of godfatherism should be enshrined in the constitution as well.

One of the brilliant articles I read mentioned that a revolution would be meaningless if there is no agenda or something to achieve already by the people. I agree with that but I say that we already have an agenda. If this works out then it becomes for us something that we are fighting for like the rose or velvet revolutions of the former Soviet Republics and Syria. Only thing here is that this should be devoid of foreign interference.

Like Malaysia, the key here is that we need a strong leadership with vision, focus and purpose not dictatorial or autocratic and we need stability in government and there will be stability if there is a good, strong and fair constitution by the people in place, one that the people will defend and there will be no need for military interventions.

Like in the French and the American experiences, we the people have the cause and ideas, we should come together and put them together and then we take it from there. In looking at others, we take the what we need as it fits us and leave out the rest just like the Igbos in America always say in libations or breaking of kola nuts. Like in the American Revolution, the people with the world views will put their ideas on the table and the people that know the realities will debate and iron out what will work for us and what will not. I know that there will be resistance from the ossified in the country and that's where like in those other countries the revolution comes about. We take it to the streets and march and bring everything to a standstill until we get their attention. If it is not done that way, no one will like the alternative because everyone will lose and the American report will come true. Nigeria is our country so let's build it and make it work. After studying the cases mentioned above, I think we can do it.

I hope that this ideagets around, maybe someone with influence in Nigeria can actually use it and make the same arguments for it to come to fruition.

4.5 Blueprint for National Development

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For many years Nigeria has been referred to as the Sleeping Giant of Africa. This derogatory reference has gained some legitimacy over the past decade due to the progressive decay of the nation's infrastructural base and the crumbling of its once booming economy. With a population of close to 120 million people, Nigeria enjoys the singular honor of being the most densely populated setting of black people in the world. Its multi-cultural and multi-ethnic groups have generated comparison to the United States of America. Indeed, with nearly 250 different ethnic groups, Nigeria is one of the most multi ethnic nations in the world. It is a country that is so immensely endowed with oil and other natural resources, that it is literally the envy of much of the world.

Nigeria also boasts of one of the most educated and active intelligentsia of any nation.

Unfortunately, despite its natural and human endowments, corrupt and inept leadership has plagued Nigeria for many years. Despite enormous earnings from vast holdings in oil and other natural resources, Nigeria has witnessed an unprecedented decline in quality of life and an infrastructural decay over the past 15 years as its economic lifeblood is literally sucked away by a corrupt and greedy upper-class.

Up until June of 1998, Nigeria was widely viewed as a failed promise and a lost hope. We were the laughing stock of the entire world. Our economy was in shambles, and hopelessness was in the air. Average Nigerians seemed to live in a state of resignation. A widely criticized and dubious transition program was in progress amidst a tenuous and volatile political climate. A paralytic fear of civil unrest all but halted economic activity and commerce.

As unfortunate or fortunate as it was, the sudden death of General Sani Abacha opened a wide vista of new opportunities for Nigeria. Perhaps, the hand of fate has delivered Nigeria from the abyss of collapse and disintegration. As we match into a new democratic dispensation, we should demand nothing short of a disciplined approach to leadership with a commitment to probity, national reconciliation, political reform, freedom of the press and the rule of law. A new vibrancy has been restored to the national psyche. Hope abounds not only in Nigeria but also on the entire continent. It seems, the sleeping giant is awakening and is now ready to take its position among the League of Nations. The signals look good and after a long dark period, the future looks bright. The fog has been lifted and we as a nation can see the road ahead, the road we must travel. We now seem to know where we are headed, but he journey is neither going to be smooth nor short. This may be a long and arduous journey to national reconstruction and fulfilment.

All hands must be on deck and all eyes watchful if we desire to move this nation, our nation forward. All respectable and patriotic Nigerians must get on board this ship and help steer 157 | P a g e

the nation in the right direction. We cannot afford to do otherwise. No matter how committed or well intentioned, General Obasanjo's government cannot succeed if his efforts are undermined or if we all become complacent and allow those that have denied us an opportunity for success and greatness to once again seize the moment and propel us all to damnation. We all have much at stake, a lot to lose. We must not fail. In the quest to move the nation forward, we must address certain specifics in the reconstruction process.

4.6 Oil and Economic Development For many years, there has been great concern regarding accountability and probity in the oil sector. While the gross revenue from oil sales is estimated at several billion dollars annually, there is a sense of deprivation in the country and particularly in the oil producing zones of the country. This feeling of neglect and deprivation has generated enormous tensions within the country for some years. Stories abound of ill-gotten wealth associated with positions of power in the oil industry. The oil ministry as presently constituted has failed to protect the interest of Nigeria and should be replaced with a free standing Oil directorate to be administered by Technocrats reporting to a Community Board made up of representatives from the oil producing regions. This board, in turn should be accountable to the National Assembly. We also believe that in line with this approach, greater accountability will follow.

The Oil Industries must in addition be held accountable for their activities particularly in relation to Oil spills, market practices, and environmental degradation. Compensation and benefit structures for local employees must be at par with expatriate workers or at the very least compatible to the benefit structure provided to their workers in western countries.

The current formula for allocation of revenues to states and regions need to be reviewed.

The review should create a stable balance between productivity, needs and demands.

States should be encouraged to take a more pro-active role in commerce and revenue generation. While a strong centre is essential for national stability, a culture of dependency on the Federal government to solve all problems should be discouraged. One way to achieve this would be to grant guarded autonomy to the states in several avenues of industrial/ economic developments and income generation.

It is also time for Nigeria to diversify its economic base. A broad based economic diversification program aimed at moving the country from an oil-based economy to a multiproduct based economy must commence. As beneficial as the oil boom of the 70's was to Nigeria, it also remains the bane of the society and is probably largely responsible for the neglect and disintegration of other sectors of a once vibrant economy. We must all support genuine efforts to revitalize other sectors of the economy. Agricultural development is one such aspect of our economy that could potentially enhance economic growth.

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If revenue generation from other sectors of the economy is augmented, then the relative importance of oil will be diminished and hence the dependency on oil will be curtailed. There is no doubt that once this happens the corruption and conflict associated with the oil trade will be reduced. To yield any dividend, the efforts toward economic development and diversification must be sustained. It must be understood that the benefits of this approach will take several years to materialize and will very much depend on the abilities, discipline and commitment of the incoming democratic government.

To encourage economic growth, we support all efforts to liberalize economic policies and remove bureaucratic bottlenecks that inhibit economic activities. The lifeblood of any economy rests on the individual investors. Economic policies must be made attractive to the individual Investors. The current drive towards privatization of government parastatals is a step in the right direction but needs to proceed in a more studied pace. We believe that restoring confidence in Individual investments will greatly spur economic activities.

The current government has already begun a process of reconciliation with regional and western governments. The good will so far generated can no doubt be parlayed into beneficial cooperative arrangements with these governments. Nigeria is ideally positioned to benefit from Regional commercial arrangements. Because of its unique strengths, Nigeria is looked upon to provide leadership in the region.

4.7 Political Reform We have just witnessed the first credible even if imperfect political transition process in the country since the collapse of the second republic nearly 15 years ago. The political transition program of General Abacha was seen as fatally flawed and designed to perpetuate selfsuccession. General Abubakar made a courageous and appropriate decision to dismantle that process and replace it with a more genuine and credible transition program. The decision to have a fully autonomous and independent electoral body ensured some degree of integrity in the process and removed the specter of overt government manipulation or interference. Equally appropriate was the decision not to fund political parties. We believe that political parties should largely be self-sustaining to be viable. Lack of government funding also removes the potential for governmental influence, manipulation or control.

We also believe that there should be a limit on individual monetary or financial contributions to political parties. Parties should be for the people and not instruments of a few wealthy and oftentimes corrupt professional political class. Limiting the amount of individual monetary contributions will help eliminate or at least minimize the culture of political party ownership by an affluent minority that have often used their ill-gotten wealth and affluence to corrupt

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and manipulate the political process. A strong and well defined campaign and political finance law is required and should be strictly and rigorously enforced.

Credence and legitimacy should be conferred on political parties on the basis of numerical strength and diverse regional representation, rather than on the basis of conglomeration of so called "political heavyweights". The current rules from the Independent Electoral Commission requiring broad based representations as one of the pre-requisites to political party registration is laudable and recognizes the need for parties of national Unity as opposed regional political groupings with solely ethnic agendas. Electoral laws should also govern the election of individuals to party positions and should indeed address the usurping of party positions by wealthy individuals in complete disregard to democratic principles.

In line with efforts to refine the political process, discipline, responsibility and probity in public life must be seriously addressed. Several unconfirmed reports both in local and foreign press have alluded to wide-scale corruption and looting of public treasury by some elements of previous administrations. The appropriate authorities should investigate these reports and if confirmed, individuals involved should be prosecuted under the rule of law.

Those found guilty should be punished, but those that are found not guilty should be publicly exonerated. We believe that integrity in the process will be enhanced if the vigour in condemning the guilty is matched with equal vigor in exonerating the innocent.

Contrary to popular belief, we do not affirm nor subscribe to the notion that all public figures are corrupt. Examples abound of patriotic individuals that have served the nation selflessly and responsibly without blemish. There is currently a deal of schism and distrust between the civilian population and the military in Nigeria. It is widely believed and sometimes for good measure that most retired and serving military personnel have financially exploited the system. This is an issue the Military establishment must have to confront and deal with in its own fashion. Ignoring this perception will only serve to further erode the respect and trust of the Military and could potential undermine National Security.

While there may be some justification for these assumptions, it is patently naive and disingenuous to blame the Military for all of the ills of the Nigerian society. There is enough blame to go around and it is not our intent to share or apportion blames. Inherent in some of the accusations of excesses against the Military is also the perception and the fear among southerners of northern domination of military and political power.

The power tussle between Chief M.K.O Abiola and General Abacha (both deceased) and the eventual outcome only perpetuated this perception. We also believe that the current clamour by a largely southern group of politicians for decentralized and regional Armed Forces has its origins in these perceptions. We do not subscribe to these demands and do 160 | P a g e

not support the call for Regional Armed Forces particularly in a nation still in search of its soul and survival. Regional Armies are expensive to maintain, difficult to control and could potentially threaten the very fabric of National Unity. We do however, believe in multi-ethnic and regional balance and representation in all National Institutions and all aspects of National life. There needs to be a greater sensitivity and recognition of the needs and aspirations of multi-ethnic and diverse groups within the country, particularly the ethnic minorities. We ask all patriotic and well-meaning Nigerians to come on board in the process of Reconciliation and Nation building.

4.8 The National Question The national definition of ethnicity and state of origin is probably one of the most ridiculous impediments to national unity and identity. Residency status and all rights accruing from it should be solely dependent on residence and contribution to society and nothing more. It is extremely disruptive to deny residency rights to individuals solely because of their parentage.

When individuals have residency status, they tend to identify more with the society as well as see the need to protect their stake in society. Otherwise, there is the reluctance to get fully immersed or involved in the affairs of the community. A person of Yoruba descent born in Enugu and continuously residing in Enugu for 5 years must be seen as an Enugu indigene with equal rights and privileges under the law. On the other an individual of Enugu parentage who has so resided in Kogi state should demand and be offered the same rights, privileges and protection as any other Kogi resident. Strict and uniform guidelines for residency should be adopted. Democratic principles require a guarantee of equal opportunity and representation to every resident irrespective of parentage.

I. Communication and Public Utilities Communication is one of the most effective engines that drive commerce and economic development. The recent push to privatize NITEL should ensure greater efficiency in its operation. While desirable however, privatization should proceed cautiously with proper valuation of parastatals and recognition of the overriding need to protect the consumers as well as national interest. The field of communication should also be open to competition based on market forces. Of course, given the potential for a breach in security with high tech communication gears, there should be adequate governmental oversight without censorship.

In line with this argument is also the need to privatize NIPOST as well as end its long held monopoly on the industry. Monopoly has never been a tool of growth or progress. Rather, monopoly especially when subsidized by the government as in the case of NIPOST tends to breed inefficiency, corruption and complacency. Improvement in telecommunication and the

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postal industry should be complemented by aggressive drive to refurbish all means of transportation to encourage commerce.

The renovation of the nation's railway system started by the Abacha government needs to be continued and indeed connecting all major cities by rail will in the end be a worthwhile investment. Rail travel is not only safe and convenient but also inexpensive. Re-introduction of an efficient rail service will not only promote interstate commerce, but will of necessity, decongest our poorly maintained roads that have become killing fields over the past 20 years. In this time of national reconstruction, we must borrow a leaf from the new deal era of Franklin D. Roosevelt of the USA and create an efficient network of roads to crisscross the entire country. Efficient means of communication and transport will promote geographical mobility and reduce costs associated with trade. The outcome will be easy access to both human and material resources at affordable prices. Exchange of ideas and cooperative trade arrangements will be enhanced.

NEPA is another public utility that has been somewhat of an underachiever of the past several years. We believe that this agency should be privatized and it's operation taken over by individual investors with profit motive. Government bureaucrats have thus far failed to make this a viable operation. Being such a necessary utility, the prospects for a profitable operation are quite bright in capable hands.

II. Health-Care Services Over the past 20 years, Nigeria has experienced an unprecedented brain drain in the Health Care Industry. Once thriving and respectable Medical Institutions have become shadows of their past from years of neglect. The health of a nation directly impacts on its economic growth. The time has come to address the Health care needs of the nation. We encourage the Government to work with health care groups to set clear guidelines on the establishment and management of health care facilities. While we believe that the Government should, as is the custom in many other countries, subsidize health care establishments, there should be clearly defined guidelines as well as independent audit of these institutions. The idea of Government ownership of health care establishments except on a limited scale seems counterproductive.

Individual entrepreneurs should be encouraged to get into hospital ownership and management but under very strict governmental oversight. To achieve this goal, existing regulatory agencies should be adequately financed and given autonomy to monitor the activities of Health Institutions. Proliferation of hospitals as is the current practice should be 162 | P a g e

discouraged and those hospitals failing to meet minimum standards should be shut down.

While there is obviously the need to get health care to a great majority of our citizens, the answer is not in the proliferation of multiple ill-equipped and ill-staffed hospitals that are frankly no better than hospices. These so-called hospitals abound all over the country and have become more of a menace and fraud and serve no useful purpose. To encourage individual participation in establishment of properly equipped and staffed non-profit hospitals, the Government can help by providing reasonable tax incentives and discounted rates on utility services from government agencies.

Preventable illnesses and Heart diseases pose great threat to Nigeria as well as other developing countries. Most of these illnesses are readily addressed by application of simple measures. Several privately funded agencies now exist that are dedicated to redressing these problems. They should be given all necessary support and encouragement. Another area of extreme importance in addressing the health care needs of the country is in the leadership of medical institutions. The University Teaching Hospitals remain the seats of excellence in Medicine but unfortunately are also fully run by the Government. The Teaching Hospitals are looked upon to provide leadership and set standards for other smaller hospitals. It is therefore imperative that appointments to positions of leadership in these institutions are made solely on merit and with transparent evidence of proven excellence in academics and research and not based on political connections or patronage. The trend of political appointments of Professorships and Deanships over the past 15 years has brought into serious questions the independence and the integrity of the process.

Finally, the scourge of fake drugs must be forcefully addressed by the responsible agencies.

We believe that there is no crime more malicious than the wilful manufacture, distribution and sale of fake or adulterated pharmaceutical products or medications. We believe that such offences should be prosecuted as vigorously as murder or manslaughter and if found guilty, perpetrators should be appropriately and promptly punished. We believe that only such an approach will provide enough deterrent effect. Many lives have already been lost because of this crime. We can't afford more.

III. Technology and Infrastructural Development Democracy cannot be sustained in a vacuum. The government must embark on a process of appropriate technology transfer. Over the past several years, a lot of waste has been created by both the private and public sectors through the introduction of poorly maintained foreign technologies that are often inappropriate for our environment. Technology holds the lifeblood of any nation especially in today’s market-based economies. For our national productivity to improve and for our products to achieve the level of quality necessary to 163 | P a g e

compete in global markets, we must have a national plan and strategy on technology. There was a time when Japan was known for producing poor quality products.

In fact, the Toyota Motor Company of Japan was known then to make inferior and sometimes defective cars whose door handles will occasionally come off while opening or in some cases, the door might not open or will fail to close once opened. Today, however, Japanese companies including Toyota Motor Company are known for their excellence and top quality products. They achieved this by learning from their past experiences, adapting technology to suit their needs and training and motivating their citizens to work within their unique cultural framework.

In today’s competitive environment, time waits for no one. As Nigeria embarks on a diversified economic program, it is timed to initiate technology policies that should not focus entirely on hardware importation and foreign technology transfer but also on software development and culturally sensitive indigenous technology development. People are the most important asset of any organization and indeed, of any nation. If we cannot train and motivate our people to work with our imported technologies and adapt them to our unique conditions, then technology transfer has failed. Failures of technology transfers in both the public and private sector have dire consequences on the national economy. They lead to lower productivity, unemployment, and lack of competitiveness, low foreign currency generation, and dependence on expatriate services.7 As we embark on this road towards reconstruction, we must encourage development of indigenous technology and also start refurbishing our infrastructural base. Most of our roads, schools, industries, national monuments etc. are in need of repair. Because of years of neglect, this effort will require time and commitment but must be sustained to be viable. We must develop a maintenance culture. It is more efficient and less expensive. We are a nation with a lot of resources and we should use our vast resources to develop credible technology policies that will guide us through the next millennium.

IV. Failed Development Vision, Political Leadership and Nigeria’s Underdevelopment Nigeria’s underdevelopment is more of poor implementation than lack of development visions and programmes. Policy summersault and development projects abandonment are common. Political leaders need to be sensitized on putting society interest first and committing to development visions and programmes. Nigerians need to be sensitized on holding political leaders accountable to campaign promises and development programmes.

Using the critical research method of analysing available secondary information, this study reviews continual ineffective implementation of development visions and projects. Individual

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and corporate commitment to the banishment of corruption is recommended for way forward in the country’s development.

Nigeria, which accounts for one-fifth of the population of the African continent, is very critical to Africa’s business and development. Hence, this critique focuses on Nigeria’s underdevelopment arising from failed development vision and programmes. Where there is no vision, the people perish is an aphorism that has become common knowledge among the Nigerian political leaders, who often articulate visions in colourful and expensive development plans, policies, programmes, etc., but mostly for chanting. They are chickenhearted in the implementation of these plans, except to enrich cronies, political stooges and royal choristers or sycophants.

At the end of the tenure, no actualization of the vision and no regrets for the failure; no review and no direction. Yet, such a non-performing leader often aspires to continue in office even after his tenure has expired. If and when, he leaves or steps aside or is forced out of office, the successor jettisons some of the visions of the previous leader(s), adds to the list and repeats the circle of chanting vision slogans for inaction. He may even abandon all the programmes of the previous leaders for his new ones, or panel-beat them to feign some air of originality, ingenuity and sagacity.

Although, Nigeria is the second African exporter of crude petroleum oil and the sixth in the world, the nation’s underdevelopment is associated with weak management and corruption.

Nigeria has been overtaken in development by the middle 1990s by some other developing countries that were worse than the country in the 1960s. These countries include Malaysia, Indonesia and Venezuela. Nigeria lags behind many sub-Saharan African countries, including Cameroon, Zambia, Senegal, Ghana, Togo and Benin in GNP per capita. The income of the average Nigerian declined by 10% from 1993 to 1994, when the GNP per capita dwindled from $310 to $280. There was further decline to $260 in 1995. The country abounds with abandoned projects and policy summersaults. The words of the political leaders are not their bonds, nor do people hold them accountable to their promises. 8 This study was undertaken to sensitise both the political leader and the led on the evils of development project abandonment and policy summersault resulting from corruption in high places. Information is power. A sensitized political leader is likely to take development visions more seriously and will insist on their good implementation. A sensitised people will hold the political leader accountable to his development promises.

The research looked at some of Nigeria’s development visions, policies, projects, programmes and plans from 1970 to date vis-à-vis the country’s underdevelopment consequent upon their poor implementation. Nigeria is awash with captivating development 165 | P a g e

visions, policies and plans, but corruption-induced failure of implementation of development projects on the part of the political leaders is responsible for underdevelopment in the country. In spite of numerous and sound development visions, policies and programmes articulated in colourful and expensive development plans, why are there poor implementation of development projects and underdevelopment in Nigeria?

The study used the critical research method of identifying and analysing available secondary data and information to review the recurring occurrence of ineffective implementation of development visions and government projects in Nigeria and made recommendations as to the way forward in the country’s development.

According to Oji (1997), the social contract theory postulates that each man in the society surrenders all his rights to the community; the community is therefore sovereign and its power absolute. However, it is the act of the people that establishes Government People enter into social contract among themselves and between them and Government whereby they agree to surrender certain rights to the state in return for security and the protection of their inalienable rights. These rights include the right to life, property and liberty.

All men are born with these rights equally and the Government must protect them. Where the Government fails to do so, the citizens reserve the right to challenge its authority and if necessary, overthrow it. Thus, the citizens retain the supreme power to hire and fire.9 The legitimacy of a Government and its power to govern a people depends on their consent.

Therefore, it is the responsibility of the Government to perform for the people, much as it is the responsibility of the people to monitor the activities of the political leaders with a view to renewing their mandate for good performance or using constitutional provisions to fire them for non-performance. A development project is a subset of a programme, which is a longterm development plan (five, ten years). A project is an activity sometimes within a programme directed towards the achievement of given objectives. 10 To avoid failure arising from deviation and human error element and to ensure the realization of project objectives, monitoring and evaluation are undertaken. It involves coordination and efficient use of resources for the attainment of stated objectives.

Monitoring assesses the quantity as well as the quality of the activities and output. It is mostly concerned with the delivery process. The exercise leads to the discovery of difficulties that were not foreseen before the commencement of the work. Amendments may thus be recommended. Monitoring precedes evaluation and is used to ensure progress towards expected outcomes. Evaluation usually comes at the end of a project or programme.

There could be midterm evaluation to know the impact of a programme on the people.11

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IV.

Political leadership and Nigeria’s underdevelopment

Immediately after the Nigerian civil war in January 1970, the Gowon-led federal government (1966-1975) came up with the vision of the 3Rs: Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction, as part of a follow-up development plan to the No victor, no vanquished declaration to end that war. Till date, marginalization, which led to the war, has not become anachronistic in Nigeria. Rather, ethnic militia and insecurity are tools for resisting continued grave marginalization of some sections of the country, which unarguably account for the human and material resources of the nation. In burgeoning poverty, the people are far from being rehabilitated and the economy has degenerated overmuch from the pre-war situation of the early 1960s, when the Eastern Nigeria’s economy, for instance, was adjudged one of the fastest growing economies in the world.12 The Gowon administration also launched the Second National Development Plan with 5 main goals of building: (1) A free and democratic society, (2) a just and egalitarian society, (3) a united, strong and self-reliant economy, (4) a great and dynamic economy and (5) a land full of bright opportunities for all citizens. 13 Over 37 years after the Plan was launched in 1970, none of its 5 goals has been achieved.

Instead of a free and democratic society, we have a militarized Nigerian society, with a great havoc done to the psyche of the citizenry. For a just and an egalitarian society, we have injustice and insecurity conundrum characterized by child abuse, ritual murder and extrajudicial killing, cultism, hostage-taking, ethnic and religious riots. Far from being united, strong and self-reliant, the Nigerian nation is divided along tribal and religious lines.

Patriotism is a stranger to an average Nigerian’s lexicon, the federal character and Nigerian factor having replaced merit and rights. Rather than offer bright opportunities for all citizens, Nigeria is a land of failed people, with corruption, kleptocracy and unemployment characterizing the country’s political leadership. Wrong reactions or responses to this ugly situation include brain-drain.14 Under the cover of addressing poverty and the food needs of the nation, the same administration also came up in 1972 with many programmes, including the Import Substitution Programme, the National Accelerated Food Production Programme and the Nigerian Agricultural and Co-operative Bank. But, today, the country is worse off with import dependency and food insecurity.15 similarly, the Obasanjo-led federal government of 19761979 introduced the operation feed the nation. The Shagari government of 1979-1983 came up with the green revolution. The Buhari/Idiagbon administration 1983-1985 introduced the war against indiscipline, to which the Abacha government added corruption, to get war against indiscipline and corruption. The Abacha-led government also baptized the 167 | P a g e

Babangida’s Better Life Programme to obtain the Family Economic Advancement Programme and introduced the Vision 2010. The Babangida-led government of 1985-1993, known for political Maradonaism and self-styled evil genius, had the longest list of development visions and programmes, including the National Directorate of Employment, the Directorate for Foods, Roads and Rural Infrastructure, the Better Life Programme, Peoples Bank, Community Bank and the National Economic Reconstruction Fund. The Obasanjo led Third Republic of 1999-2007 came up with the National Poverty Eradication Programme, National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (NEEDS), the sectoral reform agenda and mentioned the Vision 2020.16 These development visions, policies and programmes are often paraded alongside the international goals, treaties, conventions, protocols, etc., which the political leaders merely parrot. Usually, the National Planning Commission (NPC) goes into elaborate packaging of the visions, programmes or policies. For example, the NEEDS was so well packaged to the point of having blueprints for the State level programme State Economic Empowerment and Development Strategies (SEEDS); the local government level programme Local Economic Empowerment and Development Strategies (LEEDS) and the community level programme Community Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy (CEEDS).

The present Yar’Adua-led federal government has a 7-point agenda of power and energy, agriculture and food security, wealth creation and employment generation, qualitative and functional education, the Niger Delta, mass transportation and land reforms (Newswatch, 2008). Within 16 months, it has been white-washed or modified to: electoral reform, rule of law, the Niger Delta, power and energy sector, rebuilding human capital, accelerating economic reforms and security.17 Yet, neither the first nor the second version can be distinguished from the NEEDS, the Phase I (2004-2007) of which has been adjudged a failure. But, they are being given flesh and articulated as fresh vision documents. Most policies in Nigeria are wonderful, but ultimate summersault, abandonment or failure awaits them. Nigeria is replete with brilliant, impeccable and well written policies. The problem is implementation. The logical and expensively produced policies often end there as policies. Weak efforts at implementation often rubbish them through corruption. Thus, NEEDS have failed to sort out our needs.18 Onah opines that all development visions and programmes fail in Nigeria because of poor handling by corrupt and poor/hungry politicians/bureaucrats, leading to growing poverty symptoms, including electoral frauds; untrue and inefficient representatives; violence: religious crises, crises in Middle belt and Niger Delta regions, hostage taking and cult; food insecurity; low agricultural production; illiteracy (that also weakens democracy); crime; high 168 | P a g e

mortality and morbidity rates; prostitution and poor health and national image; low GDP and GNP and high unemployment rate.

Reacting to a report, Aniekpon challenged Nigerian leaders, rulers and political heavyweights to think of where Nigeria was heading for if an individual could burn a whopping sum of N270 million and gather only the ash for a fetish deal, in a country of grinding poverty where many homes cannot solve even problems that may require just N100.19 Nigeria dropped in global economic ranking to 101st position out of 125 nations studied and the economy is still burdened with double-digit inflation, estimated at 13% and deteriorating infrastructure. Nigeria was placed 159th out of 177 countries of the world examined for the human development. Nigeria also lost 34 places (falling to rank 112) in the basic requirements sub-index, which highlights the fundamentals for achieving sustainable growth, namely

strong

institutions,

adequate

infrastructure,

a

supportive

macro-economic

environment and good basic health and education.20 The World Bank estimated that 50% of the federal roads have deteriorated in the last 6 years to the extent that it costs more to send goods from Lagos to Maiduguri than to send them to Europe. Due to the poor conditions of the roads, 33,600 people died in road accidents from year 2001 to 2005, while 34,200 people sustained various degrees of injuries during the period. The power sector is in perpetual crisis and cannot drive meaningful development.21 Although, there is an overdose of natural water in Nigeria, citizens groan daily under the weight of lack of safe domestic water. The average urban resident, who cannot afford to sink a borehole, resort to fetching water for domestic purposes from shallow wells or from streams up to 3-hour walking distances away. At the current estimated 5.3% rate, urbanization in Nigeria is among the highest in the world, occasioning overcrowding and its attendant socio-economic problems, including environmental degradation.22 Graduate unemployment has occasioned sophisticated crimes and social vices of alarming dimensions, leading to palpable security conundrum, manifested in youth restiveness, cultism in schools, unprecedented wave of armed robbery, drug addiction and the attendant mental derangement, etc. Lack of jobs is pushing increasing number of Nigerian youth into the commercial auto bikes transport business, where a regrettable number of them encounter road mishaps on daily basis.23 The incidence of street children, hazardous and exploitative child labour, child unemployment, poor nutrition and health, commercial sexual exploitation, girl prostitution, 169 | P a g e

sexually transmitted diseases, juvenile abortion and wastage/spilling of human lives/blood, teenage motherhood and child abandonment and dumping on the street, stunting and wasting (among under-five children), child begging, youth drug addiction, delinquency and crimes with the danger of the children becoming hardened criminals and various other vicious means of livelihood, as well as various harmful traditional practices against women remain nagging symptoms of underdevelopment and deepening poverty in Nigeria. With the Nigerian population quite young (47% under-18 and 20% under-5), it is quite worrisome that about 570,000 Nigerians were infected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) in 1999.24 As Agbase noted, Nigeria remains the most populous black nation in the world, rich in human and vast mineral, natural and agricultural resources, with great scholars and dazzling footballers and has the most vibrant, irresponsible and iconoclastic press in Africa, nay the third world. It mints more billionaires in a year than all other African countries put together can come close to in a decade. Its democracy is a government of contracts and contractors by the few and for the few while the people wallow in poverty and misery in the midst of plenty.25 Abu opines that corruption is Nigeria’s number one enemy. It is responsible for nearly all the pains that we now experience as a nation and as individual Nigerians. Corruption has crippled our economy, ruined our roads, health and educational institutions. It has put so much money in the pockets of a few privileged people and rendered the vast majority of the people poor. The level of impoverishment is getting more acute and the pains of the ever growing legion of the poor has become very unbearable.26 Amid corruption in Nigeria, vision, policy, plan, politics, principle, conscience, wealth, commerce, pleasure, sports, knowledge, science, worship and morality are all corrupt. In its eight years of existence, the Independent Corrupt Practices (and other related offences) Commission, ICPC, has remained a toothless bulldog, having very little to show as evidence of its success in the war against corruption. It almost watches like a spectator in the war against corruption. On the other hand, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, EFCC, another anti-graft agency, faces enormous challenges from indicted former public office holders, who use their loots to buy their ways to freedom.27 As the erstwhile Minister of National Planning confirmed, the circumstances are still so devastating for the vast majority of Nigerians in spite of the nation’s enormous endowments, because we have no serious intention to turn things around or lack the capacity to face the challenges or are still searching for the right strategies to tackle the core issues of true development.28 170 | P a g e

Proffering a solution, Nwosu urges the policy makers and implementers in the democratic Nigeria to pay attention to the battered, dehumanized, deprived and neglected Nigerian citizenry. Democracy without improved quality of life for the generality of the citizenry is useless, nonsensical, empty, unsustainable and an unforgiveable insult to the people’s intelligence. More than 95% of the 140 million Nigerians (FRN, 2007) are traumatized and dying of extreme poverty and hunger, while a 5% privileged few have by fair or foul means cornered and monopolized Nigeria’s economic, political, health and socio-cultural common wealth.29 Failed development visions, abandoned development programmes and policy summersault are common problems that militate against development in Nigeria. They are products of corruption and political leadership ineptitude that characterize the country. These factors combine to mastermind underdevelopment and a failed Nigerian state, in spite of abundant natural and human resources in the country. Corruption in Nigeria rubbishes good development dreams, visions, policies and plans and keeps development crawling.

Therefore, for any meaningful development to take place and root in Nigeria, corruption must first be fired by the political leadership who initiates, breads and perpetuates it.

This has serious implications for African business and development because Nigeria accounts for one-fifth of the population of the African continent and is more endowed with human and natural resources than most African countries. Therefore, many other African countries look up to Nigeria for business and development.

VI.

Electoral reforms and democratic sustainability in Nigeria (1999 till date)

The golden pages of the New World Order bears that good governance and development are the desiderata of every state, which according to Western scholars can exclusively be achieved by upholding the tenets of democracy to which election remains it central nexus.

As rightly noted by Gesset “the health of any democracy, no matter its type or status, depends on a small technical detail: the conduct of elections. Everything else is secondary.”29 Universally, elections are litmus tests of any democratic political system. In fact, democracies are all founded upon election, for it is the process that confers legitimacy upon power. Scholars are however quick to note that, not just elections but credible elections not only confer legitimacy on political leadership, it provides citizens with the freedom to choose their rulers and to decide on public policy and also crucial to the sustenance of democratic order. Under any democratic system, citizens who are legally qualified to exercise franchise are provided with opportunity to choose political alternatives and to make decisions that

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expresses their preferences. In a multi-party dispensation, this choice is made out of the several parties and candidates competing in the electoral market.30 Like all channels of political communications, elections are a ‘two-way street’ that provides the government and the people, the elite and the masses with the opportunity to influence one another. Be that as it may, it is therefore important to acknowledge that in all democracies, elections perform legions of functions which can be summarized as follows; recruiting

politicians

representation,

and

public

decision-making,

influencing

policy

decisions,

making

educating

governments,

voters;

building

providing legitimacy;

strengthening elites, providing succession in leadership and extension of participation to many people.31 Probing further on the concept of election, Dahl espoused that there are three essential conditions before any election can be worthy exercise which includes: competition among individuals and political groups (political parties); inclusive system of leadership recruitment; and existence of a regime’s civil political rights. These conditions underscore the importance of elections both as a regime legitimizer and as a guarantor of citizen’s participation in governance which is central to the political stability of the polity. However, the extent to which election advances democratic order depends largely on the existing electoral system, its nature and its acceptance by the stakeholders in the electoral process.32 From the foregoing, it is obvious that not just elections but credible, free and fair elections represent the lifeblood of modern democracy and an important feature in consolidating democracy. It is within this premise that the crux of the polity in Nigeria has been the quest for transparent, credible, accountable and legitimate elections since independence to ensure that the best candidate emerge the winner. However, experiences have shown that in most new states like African states, election managers usually substitute meritocracy with mediocrity by way of perpetrating electoral fraud, in this case, rigging.

A case in point is the various elections held in Nigeria. Unlike the 1959, 1979, 1993, 2003 and 2007 elections organized by incumbent civilian governments were marred by serious electoral fraud/corruption such as ballot stuffing, multiple voting, thuggery abduction of contestants, disappearance of ballot boxes and electoral officers, rigging and the list is inexhaustible. Thus there is no gain saying that the history of elections and electoral politics in Nigeria has been a conquered one as it has suffered from both institutional and experimental deficits.

As rightly noted, if the institutions saddled with the responsibility of managing the electoral system in consonance with its statutory obligations, does not handle the issue of elections with sincerity and patriotism, it could generate animosity which in few case has instigated 172 | P a g e

military incursion into political governance most notably in 1966 and 1983 and in most cases, it has threatened the corporate existence of the country. This exposition will be suicidal without mentioning the violence that attended Nigeria’s most historic election that was annulled- the June 12, 1993 Presidential election as it remains a veritable case in point.33 Moreso, it should be borne in mind that there are other structural institutional and psychocultural factors which have combined to make open, competitive and meaningful electoral politics elusive. These factors includes but not restricted to; the dependent and underdeveloped nature of the Nigerian economy; the limited autonomy of various electoral bodies; excessive monetization of politics in general’ a “winner take all” philosophy embedded in the First Past-the Post system operative in Nigeria; religious bigotry and to some extent ethnic chauvinism and the most central being ‘politics’).The fall out of this, has been the public outcry and the quest to change the tide by democratic forces and patriots (like the coalition of Democratic for Electoral Reforms (CODER)) to mobilize our people to ensure electoral reforms which will serve as the basis of recreating, re-building and sustaining our democratic heritage.

It is against this backdrop that several administrations in Nigeria’s fourth republic have embarked on several electoral reforms which have metamorphosed into Electoral laws and Acts. One of such reform is that drafted by the Electoral Reform Committee (ERC) instituted by the Yaradua/Jonathan administration in 2008 which was indeed an important milestone in consolidating democracy in Nigeria.

It is evident in Nigeria that the problematic nature of elections which is usually accompanied with various degrees of electoral malpractices has been a recurring decimal in politics with dire consequences in the polity both in retrospect and contemporary. In order not to allow history to repeat itself, statesmen thought it wise to work out modalities on how to improve elections and electoral system devoid of irregularities towards a better Nigeria. This was however done in the form of a reform usually tagged ‘electoral reforms’ which has become a front burner issue in Nigeria’s political discourse. This issue of electoral reform therefore becomes a matter for research in order to determine how it has contributed to ensuring legitimacy and democratic sustainability in Nigeria.

4.9 Public service reform I. History of public service reformed It is both a truism that no nation develops beyond the capacity of its public service, and there is broad consensus amongst Nigerians that our public service is broken and 173 | P a g e

dysfunctional. The quality of public servants and the services they provide to our nation are both below expectations. From the glorious days at independence when the best and brightest graduates competed to join the administrative service up until 1970s, our public service is now seen as employer of the dull, the lazy and the venal. We need to retrieve our old public service effective, well paid and largely meritocratic, attracting bright people imbibed with a spirit of promoting public good.

The Nigerian civil service evolved from the colonial service with its historical British roots of independent, non-political and meritocratic administrative machinery for governing the country. Each region then had its civil service in addition to the federal service. What is the public service? How did our public evolve from inception to excellence and now its current abysmal state of ineffectiveness? How can the public service be reformed, re-skilled and right-sized to provide the basic social services that will earn the trust of Nigerians and foreigners alike?

In generic terms, the civil service is an employment system that is based on hiring, retaining and promoting employees on their qualifications and ability to the work. According to Encarta World English Dictionary civil service constitute all government departments of a state and the people who work in them.34 Specifically, civil service has been described as an institution which has the pivotal role of carrying out (and advising on) government policies.35 The civil service in the words of Emeka Emmanuel Okafor is also seen as that apparatus of government designed to implement the decision of political leaders. Political leaders make policy, the civil service executes it and if the civil service lacks the capacity to implement the policies of the political leadership, those policies, however well intended will not be implemented in an effective manner.36 The civil Service Hand book is more emphatic. It describes civil service as a body or organ which enjoys continuity of existence. Its members are not limited to a short term of office.

When a civil servant relinquishes his office for whatever reason his place is taken by another person who similarly enjoys security of employment. Civil servants according to the Handbook command a pool of experience and know-how for implementing government policies. It recognises that while the civil service is the instrument of the government of the day, the service and its members are not permitted under the law to be partisan of any political party. The civil servant is also required to assist in formulating and implementing the policies approved by the government irrespective of its personal or private opinions or attitudes towards such policies. Another feature of civil service is that it is indispensable irrespective of the type of government in power (whether military or democratic regime) 37

174 | P a g e

The Nigerian Civil Service

consists of employees in Nigerian government agencies other

than the military. Most employees are career civil servants in the Nigerian ministries, progressing based on qualifications and seniority. Recently the head of the service has been introducing measures to make the ministries more efficient and responsive to the public. Public sector reforms are usually challenging to implement, particularly in countries with limited political will

for reform. This has been highlighted in various literatures. An

interesting paper by Geoffrey Shepherd titled Civil Service Reform in Developing Countries: Why Is It Going Badly? Critically analyses the 'universal approach to civil service reforms (merit based reforms) and acknowledges the difficulties it faces. It also makes some useful recommendations on how Civil Service Reforms (CSR) can be made more successful.

Though written I0 years ago, and focused on the core civil service’. many of the issues presented in the paper are still relevant today and are useful for wider pub Ii c sector reforms.

II.

Reforms in the civil service

The Nigerian Civil Service has its origins in organizations established by the British i n colonial times. Nigeria gained full independence in October 1960 under a constitution that provided for a parliamentary government and a substantial measure of self-government for the country's three regions. Since then, various panels have studied and made recommendations for reforming of the Civil Service, including the Margan Commission of 1963, the Adebo Commission of 1971 and the Udoji Commission of 1972-74. A major change occurred with theadoption in 1979 of a constitution modelled on that of the United States. The Dotun Philips Panel of 1985 attempted to reform to the Civil Service.

The 1988 Civil Service Reorganization Decree promulgated by General Ibrahim Babangida had a major impact on the structure and efficiency of the Civil Service. The later report of the Ayida Panel made recommendations to reverse some of the past innovations and to return to the more efficient Civil Service of earlier years. The Civil Service has been undergoing in gradual and systematic reforms and restructuring since May 29, 1999 after decades of military rule. However, the civil service is still considered stagnant and inefficient, and the attempts made in the past by panels have had little effect. ln August 2009 the Head of the Civil Service, StephenOsagiedeOronsaye, proposed reforms where permanent secretaries and directors would spend a maximum of eight years i n office.

The reform. Approved by President Umar Yar’Adua. would result in massive retirement of Permanent Secretaries and Directors, many of whom are from

the North. Stephen

Oronsaye has said that his goal is for the , Nigerian civil service to be among the best 175 | P a g e

organized and managed in the world. Oronsaye retired in November 2010 at the statutory age of 60 and was succeeded by Oladapo Afolabi. Organization The civil service is mainly organized around the federal ministries, headed by a minister appointed by the President of Nigeria, who must include at least one member of each of the 36 states in his cabinet. The President's appointments are confirmed by the Senate of Nigeria. There are less than 36 ministries. In some cases, a Federal minister is responsible for more than one ministry (e.g.

Environment and Housing may

be combined) and a

minister may be assisted by one or more ministers of State. Each ministry also has a Permanent Secretary, who is a senior civil servant. The ministries are responsible for various parastatals (government-owned corporations) such as universities (Education), National

Broadcasting

Commission

Information

and

Nigerian

National

Petroleum

Corporation. Other parastatals are the responsibility of the Office of the Presidency, such as the Independent National Electoral Commission, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission and the Federal Civil Service Commission. The service has six additional units which provide services to all departments on the Civil Service: Establishments & Record Office (E&RO) Career Management Office (CMO) Manpower Development Office (MOO) •

Management Services Office (IVISO) Common Services Office (CSO)

•

Bureau of Public Service Reforms (BPSR)

The civil service has under gone several reforms from the period of colonialism through military regimes up to the current democratic administration in Nigeria. Some of the reforms include: Tudor Davis and Harragin commission of 1945 & 1946 which reviewed the wages and general condition of service in the civil service.

The Corsuch Commission of 1951 which was charged with enquiring into the structure and remuneration of the public service. The Udoji Public Service Review Commission of 1975 which introduced the unified Grading and Salary structure in the Service. The civil service reform of 1988 through Decree No 43 of 1988. Among all the reforms, the 1988 reform was the most elaborate. It was meant to achieve the following objectives: •

Enhance professionalism, decentralisation and delegation of functions,

•

Institute checks and balances

•

Promote general modernisation

•

Enhance the combination of responsibility with authority

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•

Align the civil service with the spirit of Executive Presidentialism

•

Enhance efficiency, effectiveness and speed of operations

On the other hand, the Nigerian reform efforts have been vitiated or undermined by lack of strong concurrence between the desire to reform and those charged with the governance of the country. This then makes the issue of political configurations critical.

The reforms have sought to improve the performance of the civil service through managerial and structural reforms by exploring ways of making them catalysts of change. They include: III. The Public Service Reform of 1974/75 This was perhaps the first reform of the whole of the Nigerian public service (the civil service, parastatals, local governments). First, it harmonised and unified job grading and salary scales throughout the public service. Instead of the multitude of grading and salary systems, it replaced these with a 17- step Unified Grading and Salary Structure (UGSS). Second, it fixed a minimum pay for all public officers, with the results that public servants’ salaries were substantially upgraded to keep pace with inflation. Thirdly, it made a strong case for introducing private sector management methods into the public service as a way of introducing a new approach to management in the public sector.

The most important among these methods were management by objectives (MBO), Project Management (PM), Plans, Programme and Budgeting System (PPBS) and the Open Reporting System to replace the confidential reporting system in use up till that time. It made a strong case for the creation of a senior management group within the civil service which should be the focus and chief promoter of these changes, and see policy making and the management of change as its primary responsibilities. Fourthly, the reform made a case for the introduction of a new code of conduct for all public officers and instituted the public complaints commission and the anti-corruption bureau. Finally, in order to ensure that new management orientations were inculcated by all line and staff, a very elaborate programme of training and retraining was put in place.

The reform was quite ambitious both in terms of coverage and the substance and range of the measures it canvassed.

IV. The Reform of Local Government, 1976 Local government was one of the institutions included in the 1974/75 public service reform.

The government then embarked on a global and comprehensive reform of local governments. The reform re-defined local governments and changed their orientation from field administrations of the state governments to being semi-autonomous local government 177 | P a g e

structures that were responsible to their local electorate. Increasingly, local governments.

Both under civilians and military administrations were largely appointed by state or federal government. Some state governments cancelled or took over local government revenues or denied them their entitlements. The local government units have therefore been as distant and artificial as the state or national government units.

V. Reform of largely Parastatals, 1986- 1993 Local government was one of the institutions included in the 1974/75 public service reform.

The government then embarked on a global and comprehensive reform of local governments. The reform re-defined local governments and changed their orientation from field administrations of the state governments to being semi-autonomous local government structures that were responsible to their local electorate. Increasingly, local governments.

Both under civilians and military administrations were largely appointed by state or federal government. Some state governments cancelled or took over local government revenues or denied them their entitlements. The local government units have therefore been as distant and artificial as the state or national government units.

VI. Necessity of public service reform in Nigeria On the face of it, public administration is usually taken to mean "the planning, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling of government operations." This conception would very often direct and tend to limit attention to the institutions of public administration vis-a-vis their design, structure, managers and their capacity to do what they are designed to do.

But a much more robust view of the concept would also involve the context, or what could be variously described as the ecology, within which those activities referred to as public administration take place for this determines to a far greater extent the success or failure of public administration. This perhaps makes the discourse more relevant to Nigeria which is the focus of the book under review, Public Administration and Civil Service Reforms in Nigeria, written by Dr Tunji Olaopa.

The context of public administration would quickly shift emphasis on to the time honoured but infamous realm of politics and the state. Certainly, and in accordance with the pluralist argument, the state is not the only realm where politics takes place. However, notwithstanding the objection of the pluralists, the state remains the quintessential realm within which the distinguishing feature, specific to the political, can be best apprehended.

The book delves into the theories of public administration, and to what extent these have shaped its practice in Nigeria, and how and why the practice of public administration in the country have brought about the need for reforms of the civil service.

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VII. The Civil Service and the Ideas of Reform and Professionalism This narrows the focus a little to the civil service and the idea of professionalism. Here, the book explores how the concept of civil service came about, and how civil servants came to be conceived as professionals with the attendant ethos and values that go with it. There is also a brief look at various liberal economic theories of civil service as they evolved to be the driving forces for continuous administrative reforms up to the emergence of the NPM, which is a more radical departure from what is generally conceived to be the normal, continuous administrative reforms that bureaucracies constantly embark upon.38 A focus on the NPM as the current global reform blueprint is a connecting theme of the first two chapters.

"Survey of the Development of Public Administration in Nigeria", traces three phases of administrative development in Nigeria vis-a-vis the era of colonial tutelage, the era of institutional transfer, and the period of home rule. Here, an insight is also provided into the contributions of scholars. Professionals, professional bodies, and training institutions to the development of public administration in the country. Evolution of the Nigerian Civil Service and Reform Initiatives", sheds light on the origin of the Nigerian civil service. It traces its history to its colonial origin as an institution that was modelled on the British civil service as part of the "migrated social structures"39 from metropolitan Europe.

It also follows the course of its development from the Lyttleton Constitution of 1954, which effectively established regional civil services in the country, to the acceleration of Nigerianization, through the short-lived First Republic, to the beginning of military rule in 1966. The chapter highlights the fact that the military began to tinker with the civil service right from the start, as witnessed by the promulgation of Decree 34 in May 1966 by the Aguiyilronsi regime, which unified the hitherto regional civil service structure. This was followed later by reform commissions Adebo and Udoji commissions - set up under the Yakubu Gowon government.

There was also the 1988 civil service reform of General Ibrahim Babangida, and the 1995 Ayida Reform Panel constituted by the Sani Abacha regime. It has been the case that virtually every military regime in Nigeria, except th9se whose stay in power was too brief, tinkered with the civil service in one way or the other in the name of reform, with the attendance consequences many of which are unwholesome to the performance capacity of the service. The chapter closes with a chronicle of some of these negative impacts of military rule on the civil service in the country.

The emphasis on the state in the reform process is particularly pertinent as the relevance of the state to its citizens is defined by the competency, effectiveness, and efficiency of its public administration apparatuses, just as the latter are affected and indeed determined by 179 | P a g e

the nature and character of the state. In this regard. The chapter raises quite appropriate and intriguing questions as to the kind of state that is promotive of development.

Using Nigeria as its focal point, the author goes on to shed light on the character of the Nigerian state and the consequential impact of this upon the public administration institutions. He then goes on to emphasize the importance of building a capable state in Nigeria while also noting the crucial role of political leadership in that enterprise.

'The Obasanjo Civil Service Renewal Programme, 1999-2007", examines the rather comprehensive civil service reform of the Olusegun Obasanjo civilian regime. The Obasanjo government came to power against the background of Nigeria's emergence from years of destructive military rule, severe economic depression, serious crisis in governance and public administration, international isolation, and the spreading wave of democratizationcum market economy accompanied by the NPM revolution. The preceding 15 years of military rule had wreaked so much havoc on virtually all the facets of the country's public life that Nigeria required a root and branch transformation to get back in shape. This is the context that set the Obasanjo government on the path of reform. The chapter surveys the background to the reform, digging into the monumental challenges that confronted the regime and the vision of the leadership for lifting the country out of the doldrums and taking it to its El-Dorado. Highlighting the NEEDS implementation framework for the reform, it provides elucidation on the various components of the reform plan, and concludes with a detailed critique of the reform strategy and programme.40 VIII. The SERVICOM Initiative in Perspective "The SERVICOM Initiative in Perspective", puts the SERVICOM initiative in perspective - a very important NPM element of the Obasanjo renewal reform - and plunges into its nittygritty as a service delivery initiative. It offers an exposition on the SERVICOM structure, on its use as a performance measurement index with details on how the measurement is done.41 it also touches on the achievements of SERVICOM and its challenges with a lot more details than can be justifiably dealt with in a few pages of review.

As a follow-on from the Obasanjo reform, the Yar'Adua government adopts a 7-point Agenda as a fulcrum around which its reform would revolve. This chapter thus explores the continued emphasis of the government on building a capable and viable civil service towards achieving the goal of development. It is acknowledged that being only two years in office; it would be difficult to assess conclusively the reform measures put in place by the administration. Nonetheless, Dr Olaopa takes up some of the steps that the administration had already instituted, especially in view of the president's commitment to the principle of "rule of law" and "servant-leadership".42 180 | P a g e

Within the context of the NPM this chapter addresses itself well to the crucial role of the permanent secretary as a manager/chief executive in ensuring an effective civil service in the country and addresses the important structural and behavioural issues that need to be taken on board in redefining the Federal Civil Service for enhanced performance. These structural and behavioural issues are embodied in what the author calls the Optimal System Model. The elements of the Model which he recommends are: a. changing the cadre or pools system to functional fields of specialization; b. establishment workforce control and management of growth of the service; c. establishment of professional and ethical values in the conduct of government business; d. installation of integrated public service human resources information system; e. professionalization of personnel administration function at the centre and line ministries level; f.

new training policy and leadership development;

g. institution of a new career/professional development scheme; h. institution of a new system of performance management/staff appraisal and promotion systems; i.

new pay, compensations and incentive system;

j.

abolition of the executive cadre and limiting of career protection to senior posts;

k. Creation of a senior executive service; and l.

modernization of systems and processes using e-government solutions.

The structural and behavioural issues are useful and appropriate as they are in keeping with public sector reforms being undertaken in other African countries. They are also in tune with current trends in countries like the United Kingdom, United States and Canada.

Overall, this discussion offers a robust exploration, on the one hand, of the problems and challenges of public administration, and on the other, the problems and prospects of reform.

This chapter could be said to contain the two key elements in confronting the issues of public administration: the technical/organizational dimension, and the ecological/political dimension. While the first four chapters deal exhaustively with the first dimension, chapters five to eight address the latter dimension.

Using Nigeria as a case study, the sections on the state and public administration, the Obasanjo renewal programme, the SERVICOM initiative, and the Yar'Adua administration put the issue of public administration reform in their proper political and leadership context.

They establish a connection between the state, visionary and good leadership, effective 181 | P a g e

public administration institutions, satisfactory service delivery, and legitimacy, thus situating the whole reform project within their proper democratic governance context. Hence, the book provides a very rich material on public administration and reform especially with particular reference to Nigeria.

Public Administration and Civil Service Reforms in Nigeria is not only rich in pointing out the weaknesses of prevailing reform programmes, but also comes up with alternatives. Where necessary, and ways of fixing the weaknesses identified. Thus its closing chapter offers an optimal public administrative model for the civil service in Nigeria. It does not only put forward the model, but gives a careful. Step-by-step account of how the model is to be incorporated into the Nigerian system.

The economic philosophy of the present Federal Government is hinged on the market: "that government has no business in business". Therefore, all the existing government projects, plants, enterprises, refineries and shareholdings in industries. Trade, banking, finance and agriculture must be privatised and sold, so that government, particularly the Federal Government, can concentrate on governance, forgetting that a government that cannot run an industry successfully cannot govern efficiently. So, the Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE) has been very active, since the present regime came on board on May 29, 2015, in selling off enterprises, including houses and other landed properties owned by the Government. Such a philosophy violates the Nigerian Constitution not only by abandoning the control of the major sectors of the Nigerian economy but also by offering Nigeria for sale to domestic and foreign private interests and concerns.

4.10. 1999 Constitution and the Privatisation Orgy I.

Chapter 1, Part 1, Article 3, of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria provides that, if other law is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution, the Constitution shall prevail, and that law shall to the extent of the inconsistency be void.

II. Chapter II of the Constitution contains the fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy III. Article 16(1) of Chapter II provides that, "The state shall, within the context of the ideals and objectives for which provisions are made in this Constitution"16 (1) a. "harness the resources of the nation and promote national prosperity and an efficient, a dynamic and self-reliant economy"

182 | P a g e

b."Control the national economy in such a manner as to secure the maximum welfare, freedom and happiness of every citizen on the basis of social justice and equality of status and opportunity". c."without prejudice to its right to operate or participate in areas of the economy, other than the major sectors of the economy, the state shall manage and operate the

major

sectors of the economy". d. "Without prejudice to the right of any person to participate in areas of the economy within the major sectors of the economy, the state shall protect the right of every citizen to engage in any economic activities outside the major sectors of the economy".

The State shall direct its policy towards ensuring; a. "the promotion of

a

planned and balanced

economic development". There is

no planned economic development today of 4-year, 5-year - 10-year or 25-year Development Plan, as was the case between 1946 and 1985. Planning the economy of Nigeria ceased when the Babangida Regime introduced the IMF-World Bank imposed Structural AdjustmentProgramme (SAP)in 1986. Economic painlessness’ has been more greatly emphasised, since 1999, in deregulation, privatisation, downsizing of the public service and reform agenda of the Obasanjo regime. The present regime seeks to ensure the continuation of painlessness’ on the nation through a succeeding surrogate regime by getting the APC be re-elected at all costs in the general elections of 2019.

Article 16(b) of the 1999 Constitution provides also: that, "the material resources of the nation are harnessed and distributed as best as possible to serve the common good", while Article 16(c) provides that, "the economic system is not operated in such a manner as to permit the concentration of wealth or the means of production and exchange in the hands of a few individuals or of a group".

The on-going privatisation of public enterprises and their sale to a few privileged Nigerians and foreigners are violations of these noble and unambiguous provisions of the 1999 Constitution. The destruction of the houses of Nigerians in the Federal. Capital Territory, Abuja, and the sale of the Federal Government houses, nationwide, in which many civil servants, parliamentarians and other Nigerian citizens live, without providing the affected citizens with alternative accommodation is also a violation of the provision of Article 16, Section 2(d) of Nigeria's Constitution, which provides that, “suitable and adequate shelter shall be provided for all citizens of Nigeria''.

Also, the reversal of the pension benefits of public servants and the deduction from their monthly wages for pensions, in place of the earlier non-contributory pensions; the non183 | P a g e

payment of pensions and gratuities , as and when due; the retrenchment and retirement of public servants; the non-creation of employment opportunities and the non-payment of unemployment

benefits to those forced into unemployment, are violations of the same

Article 16, Section 2(d) of the Constitution, which further provides that, "suitable and adequate food, reasonable national minimum living wage, old age care and pensions and employment benefits, sick benefits, and welfare of the disabled shall be provided for all citizens of Nigeria. The enforcement of contributory pension scheme on public servants already in the public service, in the name of pension reform, is a violation of Article 173 of the Constitution, which protects the existing pension rights of public servants’ dereliction of responsibility by the national assembly. Since 1999, with respect to the economic welfare of Nigerians.

In order to protect the economy from being operated against the collective interest of Nigerians, by a dominant minority, Section 4 of Article 16 of the Constitution provides that." the major sectors of the economy, to be managed by the State, shall be construed as reference to such economic activities as may, from time to time be declared by a resolution of each house of the national assembly to be managed and operated exclusively by the government of the federation, and until are solution to the contrary is made by the national assembly , economic activities being operated exclusively by the government of the federation on the date immediately preceding the day when this section comes into force, whether directly or through the agencies of a statutory or other corporation or company, shall be deemed to be the major sectors of the economy".

It is obvious that the on-going privatisation of the enterprises of government also violates this provision, since neither or both of the Houses of the Nigerian National Assembly have acted in consonance with this section, in spite of the BPE Act No. 4, enacted by the National Assembly in 2002. Nigerians should continue to shout that the on-going privatisation policy of the Federal Government is a violation of all the relevant provisions of the 1999 Constitution, with respect to the management and control of the Nigerian Economy.

V. State and local governments and economic planning In order to ensure that not only the National Assembly but also the States Houses of Assembly and the Local Government Councils participate in the planning and in the control of the nation's economy , Article 7(3) of the 1999 Constitution (on Local Government system) provides that, " it shall be the duty of a Local Government Council within the State to participate in economic planning and development of the area, and to this end an economic planning board shall be established by a Law enacted by the House of Assembly of the State". No Local Government Council in Nigeria, since 1999, to my knowledge, has 184 | P a g e

established a Planning Board or has participated in economic planning of its State! Also, no State House of Assembly has enacted any law for that purpose. On the other hand, all that we are fed with daily by the reformist Federal Government is that government has no role in the economy and that rather than plan, it is the market and the private enterprises that should plan and develop the Nigerian economy and grow it to become one of the largest 20 economies in the world by 2020!

VI. Education and the federal government The disregard of the Nigerian Constitution is not only with respect to the physical economy but also with respect to the education sphere. Article 18 of the Constitution provides for the Educational Objectives of the country. In this regard, Article 18, Section 3, provides that, Government shall strive to eradicate illiteracy and to this end, Government shall, as and when practicable, provide: a. Free compulsory and universal primary education b. Free secondary education

Note

1.

George H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory, New York: Holt and company. P.797

2.

A key Note address delivered at a symposium organised by the Philosophy students Association,University of Lagos, June 3, 1982

3.

Rousseau's Social Contract, New York; Mentor Books, 1762.p.228

4.

Karl Marx, selected writings, Oxford:1977. p.109

5.

A statement issued during the 1979 electioneering campaign s and published by the (Daily Star, April 18, 1979

6.

Onyenekenwa Cyprian Eneh,.Failed Development Vision, Political Leadership and Nigeria’s Underdevelopment: A Critique. Asian Journal of Rural Development,2011. p.69.

7.

Onyenekenwa Cyprian Eneh,. Failed Development Vision, Political Leadership and Nigeria’s Underdevelopment: A Critique,2011. p. 63

185 | P a g e

8.

Eneh, O.C.,A Tear for the Nigerian Child, Enugu: WIPRO International.2000 p.15

9.

Oji, R.O.,An Introduction to Political Science, Enugu: Marydan Publishers, 1997

10. Onah, G., 33,600 Die in road accidents in four years. Saturday Vanguard, December 2006, p. 11.

11. Jhingan,

M.L.,

The

Economics

of

Development

and

Planning,39th

Edn.,

VrindaPublications Ltd., Delhi. 2007.p.39 12. Eneh, O.C., Small and Medium Enterprises in Southeast Nigeria: Problems and Solutions, Enugu: WIPRO International. 2005 13. (Eneh,;Onah, The national development goals-where stands Nigeria. 2008.p.157.

14. Eneh, O.C., 2008. The national development goals-where stands Nigeria. Knowledge Rev., 16: 14615. Eneh,The national development goals-where stands Nigeria 2008.p.158 16. Abdulhamid,Y.,Nigeria:Vision2020andNPC,2008dailytrust.http://allafrica.com/stories/2 00808050705.html 17. Daily Times, 2008. 1st October Special Independence Anniversary Publication, http://www.1stoctober.com/home/.

18. Ebigbo, P.O.,Appraising the impact of economic reform programme on micro, small and medium scale enterprises. A Paper Delivered at the 19th Enugu International Trade Fair Colloquium, April 15.2008.

19. Aniekpon, D., Letters. Newswatch Magazine, November 3, 2008. pp: 6.

20. Famakinwa, S., Nigeria falls in competitiveness ranking. This Day Newspaper, September 27, 2006. p: 8.

21. Onah, G., 2006. 33,600 Die in road accidents in four years. Saturday Vanguard, December 2, pp: 11.

22. United Nations Systems in Nigeria, 2001. Nigeria: Common Country Assessment (CCA). United Nations Development Group, USA., p.222.

23. Eneh, O.C.,The national development goals-where stands Nigeria. Knowledge Rev., 16: 146-2008p.146 24. FOS and United Nations Children's Fund, 1999. Nigeria multiple indicator cluster survey 1999. FOS/UNICEF, Abuja 25. Agbase, D. The right to know. Newswatch Magazine, November 3, 2008 p. 7.

26. Abu, B.D., From the editorial suite. Newswatch Magazine, November 3, 2008. P.13.

27. Akintunde, K., A war in chains.Newswatch Magazine, November 3, 2008 p.14.

28. Dagash,

M.S.,

2008.

Nigeria:

Vision

2020

and

NPC,

daily

trust.

http://allafrica.com/stories/200808050705.html.

29. Federal Register Notices 2009 http://www.regulations.gov 30. Federal Register Notices 2009 http://www.regulations.gov 31. The Nations, 23 Jan 2010. p.59).

32. Dahl Robert, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy, New Haven: Yale University Publication 1984.p.53 33. Thisday 4 June 2009.p.23 34. Encarta World English Dictionary (1999.349)

186 | P a g e

35. Tijjani Muhammed BandeThisday 28th September 2001.p.

36. Emeka Emmanuel Okafor, Globalization, changes and strategies for managing workers in Nigeria, Journal of Research in national Development, 2005 p.67 37. The civil Service Hand book, 1997.p.17 38. Tunji Olaopa, The Nigerian Civil Service of the Future, a prospective Analysis, http://newsdiaryonline.com/nigerian-civil-service-future-de-tunji-olaopa/

(Accessed

November 1st 2017) 39. Ekeh, Peter, Colonialism and Social Structure:

An Inaugural lecture delivered at

University of Ibadan on Thursdat 5th June 1980 40. Tunji Olaopa, The Nigerian Civil Service of the Future, a prospective Analysis,2014. p.

179 41. Tunji Olaopa, The Nigerian Civil Service of the Future, a prospective Analysis, 2014. p. 212 42. Tunji Olaopa, The Nigerian Civil Service of the Future, a prospective Analysis, 2014. p. 229

CHAPTER FIVE Nigeria in 2040: Paths to Implosion Well, Nigeria has played a constructive role in peacekeeping in various parts of West Africa. But unless and until Nigeria itself is democratic and respects human rights, it too may well be a source of much greater instability as political repression limits the ability of the people of Nigeria to achieve their full potential.

Susan Rice

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I am convinced that Nigeria would have been a more highly developed country without the oil. I wished we'd never smelled the fumes of petroleum.

Wole Soyinka

5.1 Nigeria in 2040: Paths to Implosion Once dubbed the Giant of Africa, Nigeria’s lack of unifying national identity, history of corrupt governance, religious and cultural schisms, and shifting demographics may cause the state, over time, to break apart.1 The factors discussed below describe current and potential deteriorating trends in cross-cutting human social issues. This chapter is not a specific prediction of the future or a depiction of a state of affairs that will and must occur. It is a discussion of how the trends occurring in Nigeria since its birth as a nation in 1960 could, under the right conditions, lead to its failure. The details underlying the various trends can be used to develop strategies or war games to avoid or test potential responses to the very calamity painted below.

These details also allow for a specific discussion of what types of resources are required to stabilize a failed state, in this case, Nigeria. In the sequence of events discussed below, Nigeria’s history, diverse culture, ethnicity, religion, and corruption combine to drain the

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national treasury. The empty treasury prevents the government from providing for people’s basic needs, as it blatantly diverts much of the nation’s oil treasure to buy support from criminal family enterprises and business oligarchs.

By 2030 the social contract between the weakened federal government and the Nigerian people is effectively broken. An attempt to restore confidence through a national election sweeps the electorally dominant Islamic political structure into power. Buoyed by its electoral success, the new government threatens to ruin family criminal enterprises and confiscate the wealth of the business oligarchs. Its ultimate end state is to rebrand Nigeria as an Islamic republic. The culmination of these negative trends and political actions sparks a violent reaction from the non-Islamic population, the criminal family enterprises, and the oligarchs. In this case, the state fails.

The disparities and traditions of Nigeria’s tribal and colonial past have created significant social tensions that have made establishing an integrated, coherent, and legitimate government difficult under the best of circumstances.2 By 2040 Nigeria’s endemic corruption and the predatory economic practices of the oligarchs and their associated enterprises may well deplete the financial refigure I. Cascading failure of the Nigerian state Sources for economic diversification and critical human and industrial infrastructure projects.

This depletion could result in a loss of confidence and a lack of capital investment from the World Bank and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). Under such circumstances, a devaluation of Nigeria’s credit rating by Goldman-Sachs and other credit-rating organizations is certain. Were Nigeria to default on its large and growing international debt, the resulting financial crisis would erode what little credibility the government has internally and threaten to destroy the federal system. These events would promote destabilizing rumours of a military coup d’état, as such crises have so often in Nigeria’s past. If this corruption cannot be noticeably reversed, the Nigerian government would likely lose legitimacy with its diverse people and, with the exception of the 12 Islamic-dominated states in the north, no longer function at the federal and state level. Between 2008 and 2030, tribal ties throughout the country will largely be supplanted by loyalty to Islam in the north and emerging predatory family enterprises in the south.3 Religious ideology and Sharia law in the north, combined with its as yet unflexed electoral power of its disproportionately large Islamic population and growing youth bulge, will prove stronger than any loyalty purchased for a price in the south.

By 2040 Nigeria’s robust population will have an average age of less than 20 years and a life expectancy of less than 60 years. As such, Nigeria will likely have many disaffected and 189 | P a g e

underemployed young people.4It already has the sixth largest Muslim population in the world, with a nearly equal balance of Muslims and Christians. This balance is currently at a tipping point because of the faster population growth in the Islamic north, which is ruled under Sharia law. By 2040 Nigeria’s Islamic population will comprise a majority of the federal electorate; this will precipitate a fundamental change in Nigeria’s domestic political situation.

In 2040, with a population of more than 225 million people, 350 ethnicities, and multiple languages, Nigeria’s negative social trends may become ever more destructive. What impact human and social factors have on the strength of any nation is largely determined by its own people. If the social contract between government and its people remains relatively strong where the government rules justly, invests in its people, and provides economic and political freedom national survival is reasonably assured. Such favourable conditions become paths for success. However, if the government fails to invest in its people and rules through fear and intimidation and corruption becomes corrosively endemic, the bonds of trust between the government and its people could become irreparably weak. These negative trends in crosscutting conditions then become the path to failure.

II.

Crosscutters, Culture and Ethnicity

The crosscutting issues are presented here in the context of what might happen in 2030 if current trends hold or Nigeria reverts to past practices. The examination and discussion herein are not prescriptive, but rather present a possible, plausible future history of Nigeria.Tribal culture and ethnicity are strong forces in Nigerian social life. Respect for elders, political affiliation, ethnicity, demands for educational systems that promote tribal language and history, and social welfare systems that operate within tribal familial or ethnic communal structures have long dominated modern Nigeria’s social construct.5Although 2003 proved to be a watershed year in the level of violence throughout Nigeria, explosive episodes of factional fighting will likely continue at a strong pace for at least another decade until reform measures instituted in 2008 begin to have a visible effect. Even then, strong tribal allegiances combined with exploitable ignorance and perceived wrongs will spawn episodic violence between ethnic groups well beyond 2040.

By 2020 the leaders of the moderate Sokoto caliphate will likely bring a firm sense of social order throughout the 12 Islamic-dominated states of the north. Over time, tribal culture in the north will be subsumed by the population’s growing devotion to the tenets of Islam and Sharia law. The thriving culture of the Sokoto caliphate could enjoy a renaissance by 2020, when it will likely become a major Islamic centre on the African continent one with great appeal to sub-Saharan Muslims.

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If successful, government reforms could result in a reverse diaspora with the return of a large number of educated Nigerians who long to return to their homeland. These people left the country of their own volition and most often took up residence in Europe and the United States. They will form the core of a new intelligentsia that will use advanced communications to champion democracy, social welfare, education, and the acceptance and integration of new technology, especially among the youth. Their strong influence will manifest itself, over time, in increased political factionalism and activism as the population seeks government redress for past perceived and real grievances. This influence will create tension with the Islamic north. By the time of the national election in 2027, these factions may become powerful enough to spark nationalistic tendencies in the north and the south that could rapidly debilitate the federal system.

If government reforms are not successful, violent attacks against critical petroleum and natural gas infrastructure by MEND and their supporters will likely continue. This, combined with the failure of the central government to meet the basic needs of its indigenous people, would intensify calls for new elections and the ouster of the national government. By 2040 these clarion calls will be carried throughout the country on advanced communication networks and amplified through social-networking systems, all of which would further erode tribal social cohesion and undermine the legitimacy of the elected government.

Either way, technology will transform the politics of business. By 2020 Next Generation Internet (NGI), cloud computing, and broadband cellular personal data systems will be extensively used by a class of technologically savvy oligarchs in the south. They will, through

their

various

(criminal)

enterprises,

control

the

service

sector

and

telecommunications industry not only in Nigeria but also throughout West Africa. Through payoffs and lucrative employment opportunities, they will garner the support of urban youths which, in turn, will further erode respect for ethnicity and tribal culture. By 2040 tribal identity and culture may denigrate to the status of gang affiliation.

III. Religion Throughout modern Nigeria’s history, religious fundamentalism has created fear and violent conflict. Although Islamic fundamentalism has threatened to supplant traditional Islam throughout theworld, Nigeria’s Sokoto caliphate will likely remain firmly opposed to any form of jihadist extremism that tries to establish itself in the region or challenge the caliphate’s growing influence. The caliphate’s arguably moderate interpretation and application of Sharia law in the 12 northern Nigerian states will likely prove a stabilizing force, bringing order and structure along the vast Sahel region of the southern Sahara Desert.6

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By contrast, Nigeria’s Christian south has both benefited from biblical morality and suffered from gang-like criminality as evidenced by the rise of secessionist group such as IPOD, who sought exact justice for real and perceived injustices.7 By 2020 the continued consolidation of wealth in the hands of a few southern oligarchs may succeed in “professionalizing” this quest. With religious passions contained and these criminal elements functioning as private commercial family enterprises, the likelihood for religious conflict between the Islamic north and the Christian/animist south will be reduced.

As the Muslim population is now the dominant population in Nigeria, the Sokoto caliphate will take pains to contain the passions of its youth by inculcating them with their interpretation ofthe basic tenets of Islam while commanding respect for Sharia law and Nigerian federal law. The result of the careful cultivation of their large and growing youth population is stability and religious homogeneity in the north. Based on the caliphate’s political calculus, this stability is necessary for the Islamic leaders to implement a new grand political-theocratic strategy, which will bring them full political power and the opportunity to establish an Islamic Republic in the scheduled 2031 elections.

Despite successful economic reform efforts begun in 2008, some religious and ethnic violence will continue to flare. Nigeria’s National Bureau of Statistics will track this violence and periodically report its findings to the UN. Although Nigerians will continue to question whether Nigeria should stay together as one country or be divided into separate nations along ethnic and religious lines.8 The government, with the support of the Sokoto caliphate and the southern oligarchs, will likely discourage calls for any referendum that divides Nigeria.

Public disaffection should abate as the Sokoto caliphate’s power and influence expand throughout Africa, especially if a more radical Middle East caliphate is established on the Arabian Peninsula. Should such an event occur, it may bring about an Islamic schism similar to the Protestant Reformation in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The Sokoto caliphate will seek to expand its power and influence throughout Africa by promoting its moderate religious theology and African virtues. Its rising influence should result in declining religious violence. This will give rise to a perception of internal security and harmony and, in turn, mitigate secessionist fervour throughout Nigeria.

The leaders of the Sokoto caliphate will maintain firm control of social welfare, education programs, and the legal system in northern Nigeria. Their power and influence will hold the passions of their rapidly growing and youthful Islamic population in check, easing religious and ethnic tensions. In the south, Christian faiths will still be practiced in various forms by approximately 30 percent of the population. Animism in the south may attract support from 192 | P a g e

violent eco-terror groups such as the Earth Liberation Front, who may actively support MEND with money and training.

While it is likely other ethnic, religious, and environmental insurgent groups in Nigeria will attempt to form between 2008 and 2040, these groups will, in most cases, fail after inception; some could be annihilated or subsumed by MEND, while the remainder may be defeated by the Nigerian army. In the event amnesty programs fail and the government fails to live up to promises made to address grievances, MEND will resort to violence to press its claims for economic fairness and remediation of the ecologically damaged areas in the Niger Delta.

IV. The Influence of Technology With the addition of almost 600 million people9 since 2005, Africa will prove itself a lucrative market for industries that offer inexpensive computer systems, quantum computing, virtually, wireless broadband cell and satellite phones, cloud computing, and NGI systems. By 2040 social networking will be a part of daily life in Nigeria, particularly among the large youth population. Its popularity will be regularly exploited by the major business owners, mainly the southern oligarchs who, through their family and criminal enterprises, will come to dominate all advanced communication and computing technologies in West Africa and perhaps on the African continent.

These commercial communications enterprises will invest heavily in technologies that protect their ability to control cyberspace, while denying its use to others. These enterprises will have an incentive to quietly recruit and support an organized community of hackers and their own version of cyber warriors. such forces could launch cyber-attacks against any national or international organization that may threaten their criminal and business interests.

In addition, by 2020 such cyber capabilities could be used to probe international oil consortia in a bid to gain insider information so as to better manipulate the price of oil and maximize profits.

These likely investments in advanced telecommunications will create a regional hub for modern services that the southern oligarchs will control. They will have the ability to develop a pool of labour resources, which will give them advantages in protecting their regional market and helping their enterprises grow. By 2040 Nigeria could become a centre of the telecommunications revolution in Africa and one of the leading information societies in the world. Easy information access and social networking will undercut the power of traditional news media, including those outlets controlled by the central government. The popularity of social networking sites and Internet blogs such as Global Voices Online will help the oligarchs in the south and the caliphate in the north preserve their respective holds on power and expand their influence.

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Eventually, these will likely lead to a clash of power bases between the Christian southern oligarchs and the northern Islamic caliphate. Here, the clash will be one based on a quest for political and financial power; moral and religious issues will be used to stimulate the passions of their respective followers. Nigeria’s southern state politicians and politically powerful families have historically retained a disproportionate share of the oil wealth. This entrenched graft and corruption mean that the leaders in the south have a strong disincentive to relinquish power to those who would reward them less well.

Medical technology, power generation equipment, water treatment materials and techniques, and even weaponry will also prove to be lucrative ways of making money. Since 2009 the United States and the United Kingdom have transferred older vessels from their respective fleets, while providing training and equipment from their own navies, to Nigeria. Nigeria’s newly refurbished frigates and coastal patrol boats will be easily integrated into the US Navy’s Sea basing Joint Integrating Concept, which stresses forward deployment of US naval forces to support national objectives in areas where the American forces are denied basing or access.10 This operating concept stresses the importance of establishing habitual working relationships with the navies of nations in the deployed region to control unstable areas that are home to critical national resources; this has often been described by the US Navy as the 1,000-ship navy. Although they routinely patrol the Gulf of Guinea with the navies of the United States and the United Kingdom, after years of support, the Nigerian navy should be postured and provisioned to lead security enforcement operations in Nigeria’s offshore oil regions by 2015. The Nigerian air force will use its funds to support navy maritime patrol efforts, purchasing aircraft equipped with surveillance radar and electro-optical tracking systems. Although expensive, these systems will perform well as long as funds are available to purchase new equipment, improve aircraft serviceability, and train crews.11 without these funds, mission-capable rates for the Nigerian air forces’ current fleet of advanced aircraft systems will likely decline after 2020, which will then require greater effort on the part of Nigerian surface forces.

V. International Terrorism As noted by the ICG in 2007, the sub-Saharan region of Africa is not guaranteed to become an area of widespread terrorist activity.12 In fact, institution of the Sokoto caliphate’s moderate interpretation of Shar’ia law in the northern Nigerian states which border the Sahel could make this region safer than the areas in and around the Niger Delta. By 2020 the Niger Delta region may become the cause célèbre for international environmental groups, given the extraordinary level of ecological damage. Radical environmental groups operating 194 | P a g e

through social networking may funnel money and weapons to MEND forces to help them recruit new followers to take direct action against petroleum facilities and infrastructure.

The power of social networking by 2040 will likely enhance the visibility of MEND issues and actions. The more spectacular the attacks, the greater the international focus on MEND and, in turn, the easier it is for outside groups to raise funds and garner support for MEND’s causes and actions. Having successfully reduced oil production by

25

percent since 2008,

MEND has proven that it is a force to be reckoned with. It is likely that the government will attempt to undertake some reforms to address some of the grievances of the affected tribes in the Niger Delta region, which may, over time, serve to undermine MEND’s appeal.

However, the reduced resources available for these reforms, combined with Nigeria’s culture of institutional corruption, could limit progress on these issues.

This is especially true should the southern oligarchs be successful in consolidating their power behind a slate of national leaders they control. To maintain their hold on power, the oligarchs may use oil profits to “buy off” MEND with tribute payments rather than investing in technology and infrastructure to remediate the ecology and address grievances. Although tribute payments from the central government may temporarily reduce MEND actions, such payments will, in the long term, provoke greater demands for more money and increased calls for greater government action to address grievances. These will become the price of MEND’s forbearance. In response, the southern oligarchs who provide tribute payments will demand additional resources from the elected government. By 2025 the government will be forced to source these funds from other areas of the government and the economy, including funds dedicated to infrastructure and human services. Failure to pay will be punctuated by a series of small yet potent attacks on critical oil infrastructure in an attempt to produce a significant oil shock and bring international pressure on Nigeria’s government.

Any attempted inroads into West Africa by al-Qaeda or similar jihadist Salafist groups will likely be successfully thwarted by a resurgent Sokoto caliphate which may issue fatwas rejecting the violent jihadist ideology of these outsiders. The caliphate may go so far as to brand any attempt by al-Qaeda to either sanction attacks or destroy Nigeria’s oil production capacity as an attack on the Islamic people of northern Nigeria, since the north will continue to depend on oil revenues for basic goods and services beyond 2040. Because of its interest in maintaining a stable Nigeria and its need for Nigerian oil, the United States will continue aggressive measures to combat terrorism in West Africa and in the Pan-Sahel region. The TSCTI will continue to receive more than $100 million each year well beyond 2020. Any attempt by a corrupt government to siphon these funds off for tribute or loyalty payments will likely result in funding being curtailed or stopped.13

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VI. Criminality Criminality has long been institutionalized in Nigeria, even before its founding. Criminality experienced tremendous growth between 1993 and 2009, especially in the Niger Delta region and in Lagos, Nigeria’s largest city. Attempts to steal oil and refined gasoline directly from pipelines and storage tanks still result in extensive damage to oil infrastructure and large loss of life among the poor and add to the ecological disaster in the Niger Delta region.

Escalations in local and international criminal activity make the entire region, including offshore facilities, ungovernable for brief periods of time. Even in 2030, several major oil companies will fear losing their ability to operate in the area. Despite tribute payments, MEND conducts armed attacks and kidnappings to achieve their goal of cutting Nigerian oil production and creating periodic oil shocks for greater gain.

Generous donations of money, training, social networking support, weapons, and support equipment provided by groups like the Earth Liberation Front will likely keep MEND viable.

By 2030 MEND should be able to maintain a well-trained force of up to 10,000 fighters who will conduct raids against national oil infrastructure, both on and offshore. They will likely prove more than equal to Nigerian forces stationed in the region. Nigeria continues to brand MEND a criminal element; thus, the Nigerian army, with the help of the Nigerian air force, stations up to 15,000 troops to combat MEND forces in the Niger Delta region. Any interruption in funding for training Nigerian troops or a decision by the central government to keep Nigerian forces in a weakened state to prevent them from seizing power from a corrupt government will harm the army’s ability to recruit, train, and retain forces in the region.

Any move by MEND or other militia forces in the country to launch an all-out attack against an untrained, underpaid, and weakened Nigerian military, particularly in 2040, will likely result in Nigerian troops abandoning their positions and re-joining their tribes and families. In many cases, these disaffected troops will join family, tribal, or religious militias and could turn against the central government. In the face of a growing criminal militia movement and with oil profits threatened by growing demands for tribute, increased corruption, and declining oil revenues, the Nigerian government may seek assistance from ECOWAS and the Organization of African Unity. While these organizations may offer moral support, the difficult logistics posed by the region and the uncertainty generated by the 350 ethnicities and multiple religious’ beliefs may drive the central government to seek support and assistance through the UN and other international organizations. These organizations may offer monetary assistance and could seek a negotiated settlement.

Such a move on the part of the central government will likely be viewed as a weakness and could embolden various militias and MEND to go on the offensive. Ill-equipped to deal with 196 | P a g e

the well-financed and trained MEND forces, the government could call for an early election in the hope it would present a new opportunity to negotiate a compromise, maintain territorial integrity, and restore a strong central government to power.

VII.

Corruption

Like criminality, corruption at all levels has frustrated the reform efforts of Nigerian leaders since 1960. Bribes, kickbacks, favouritism, nepotism, and other similar corruptive influences and practices will continue to permeate all personal, business, and government transactions.

These act as a hidden tax that robs the Nigerian people of resources to improve their health, education, and quality of life. The national security apparatus is similarly corrupt. Federal and state police forces continue to extract patronage or bribes from the Nigerian citizenry and even tourists. Poor pay, lack of education, and limited training for security forces to accomplish their job will remain the proximate cause and exacerbate corruption.

These problems are expected to continue well beyond 2040. The INEC, NEITI, and EFCC combined with strong use of 419 provisions and a more transparent distribution of resources throughout Nigeria provided teeth and structure for leaders to implement anticorruption measures in 2008.But given Nigeria’s intractable historic penchant for corruption, it is likely the efforts of these organizations will meet with very limited success. By 2030, even with consistent determination by potentially five successive Nigerian governments producing a measurable decline in institutional and client-patronage corruption at the local level will still erode a significant measureable percentage of national GDP each year.14 Rapid population growth will likely be matched by growth in International criminal activities as internal anticorruption measures drive the oligarchs to look elsewhere.

By 2040 even the so called constructive political opposition will openly court influence among international conglomerates and Nigeria’s industrial tycoons—the oligarchs. Political parties, with the active yet quiet support of the oligarchs and even the caliphate, will buy off constituents who will turn out in huge numbers to support their slate of candidates. In the face of increasing corruption in federal and state institutions, it is possible the caliphate will restrict efforts by Islamic political leaders to gain power for a time, in order to highlight the corruption of the southern leadership. Its intent will likely be to allow these non-Islamic leaders to continue to abuse their power so that they discredit themselves in the eyes of Nigerians and in front of international financial and good-governance institutions like Transparency International.

By 2040, with criminality and corruption permeating all facets of government at levels unimaginable by today’s standards, the people will lose faith in their government. This could stoke ethnic nationalism across the country, particularly in the Islamic north. With discontent 197 | P a g e

among the then-Islamic majority reaching a fever pitch, the stage will be set for wholesale political change.

5.2 The State of the Society The UN Development Program’s HDI, which considers relative levels of health, education, and standards of living, will be among the first to note the reversal of anticorruption measures.14 Declines in federal government spending on health care and education will likely be the result of diversion of funds through client patronage from federal programs. The impact of this loss of funds in social programs will be most directly felt by the poor and the large youth population, especially in urban areas in the south and to a lesser extent in the north. Poor health-care funding with a breakdown in electrical, sewage, and water-treatment services will lead to increased disease incidence, particularly in the cities. Squalor in highdensity population areas like Lagos will increase, as will social disorder.

I. Health Care and Medicine The WHO monitors disease morbidity, mortality, and the state of national health-care programs available to serve the population. Nigeria achieved a low point in 2006 when it was found to be one of 30 countries across the globe with critical shortages of health service providers.15 Reforms imposed in 2008 brought some new emphasis on improving health care in Nigeria. This increased emphasis could bring limited improvements in infant mortality rates, although they will remain high in the south-eastern part of the country, in large measure, because of very poor health services and the disastrous state of the ecology in the Niger Delta region. Multiple disease vectors including poor water quality, uncontrolled insect populations, petrochemical contamination, and pollution of all sorts will continue to plague this ecologically devastated region.

These issues, in combination with the rise in criminality in the south and a large disenfranchised urban youth population, will likely result in an increased incidence of drug and other addictions. To stem these problems, the Nigerian central government will continue to make limited investments in health and education services. With WHO and other assistance, it is possible the HIV infection rates may be held to a maximum 5 percent prevalence, with AIDS cases peaking before 2020 and then slowly declining. HIV infection rates and prevalence could be arrested by the introduction of new retroviral drugs.

Tuberculosis rates of infection should remain in line with other states in West Africa since these nations do benefit from UN and US support for antimalarial programs. As in 2009, drug-resistant strains of the disease will still be found in densely populated urban areas.

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Malaria treatment in the form of new drugs and other intervention methods including mosquito netting and insecticide spraying could bring down infection rates. Given that malaria is endemic to the region, any precipitous decline in health-care funding will immediately reverse any improvements. Any decline in health-care funding could also restart a “brain drain” of doctors and nurses, including those with paediatric and epidemiological specialties.

More troubling is that international donations of vaccines against diseases like cholera, typhoid, tuberculosis, and HIV as well as medicine and equipment normally provided by intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGO) may face major distribution delays caused by poor roads and a lack of basic human services including electricity, water, and sewage treatment. In addition, distribution of health care will be affected by corruption, especially in the south, where graft will siphon resources away from these programs. Further, MEND’s growing influence may preclude distribution in some areas due to conflict or the confiscation of medical resources. In the Islamic north, healthcare delivery is likely to be stronger since the Sokoto caliphate exerts a strong central influence over social welfare programs in the 12 Islamic states.

By 2040 the education of young girls should be routine throughout the country, with most receiving a primary school education. Secondary education of girls will be more common throughout the south. The Islamic north will likely provide men their education through religious schools controlled by the caliphate. Access to secondary and higher education will remain much more accessible for men than women. Leaders will likely allow a select, though small, number of women to pursue secondary and higher education in Islamic studies.

NGOs will attempt to fill gaps and will try to help the central government establish and enforce national education standards and deliver standardized curricula.

Literacy rates throughout the country should rise by 2040, although it will likely be measurably lower in the Islamic north where women will continue to lag behind men.

Religious instruction will form the core of the curricula in the Islamic states. The caliphate will impose restrictions on what can be read the Koran and the Syrah hand taught in Islamic schools. As it did in 2002, the Central Bank will continue to warn that any reduction in education funding and standards will elevate poverty rates. The failure to fund schools could cause them to close. A lack of education in the large youth population in 2040 could drive them to other outlets criminality, drugs, and violence.

II.

Population and the Youth Bulge

By 2030 Nigeria’s population will reach 225 million people, with much of the growth in the Islamic north. Nigeria will likely be the sixth most populous country in the world.16 the 199 | P a g e

population of the entire African continent will grow to approximately 1.5 billion people. By 2030 the Islamic north could account for almost 65 percent of Nigeria’s population. The voting-age population in the North is expected to comprise more than 50 percent of the national electorate. Nigeria’s population will be increasingly urban. In the largely Christian south, urbanization will continue to rise, particularly in Abuja and Lagos.

By 2030 roughly two-thirds of the population will live in urban centres, a number that may rise to 83 percent by 2050. By 2040, Lagos could be the 11th largest city in the world and, according to the UN, could become the seventh largest city by 2050. Other cities throughout the country have seen their populations grow exponentially as tribal ties for the young give way to the popular appeal of modern technology and the need for work. Uncontrolled growth in urban areas will likely outpace the government’s ability to provide basic electrical, water, and sewage services.

This will exacerbate development problems as well as health issues. The youth bulge will dominate population demographics particularly in urban areas of Nigeria. By 2030 the average age in Nigeria will be less than 20 years, and life expectancy could increase by an average of 10 years. These two factors will increase the working age population, which will stress Nigeria’s ability to provide basic human services, health care, and employment for large segments of its youth. As a result, this large, young, mostly urbanized, and unemployed population will create a pool of disaffected youth who will be easily recruited by antisocial groups with a propensity for criminality and violence.

International criminal enterprises owned mostly by the southern business oligarchs will recruit many of these young people. By 2040 these enterprises will establish an international transhipment point in Lagos for illicit drugs, precious gems, endangered species, weapons, and human traffic. The client-patronage networks required to sustain these operations will further weaken the central government’s hold on power and infect most local governments.

III.

Infrastructure

In 2008 President Yar’Adua’s seven-point plan concentrated on resources to solve infrastructure problems that have limited Nigeria’s development as a modern nation.

Recognizing the need to provide basic human service infrastructure such as electricity, sewage and water treatment, and transportation for farming and commerce, the Nigerian government will try to establish a stronger relationship with the World Bank and venture capitalists to secure funding for improving Nigerian human and industrial service sectors.

By 2040 most of the current infrastructure and the construction companies necessary to build new infrastructure will be controlled by criminal enterprises or various oligarchs. Through 200 | P a g e

client patronage, they will rig bids for the contracts while siphoning off government investment. While family enterprises will build partnerships with the government to create jobs and some services, they will also fill their own coffers with oil profits. The result will be a slower infrastructure improvement process. Power and Energy. Electrical power remains an essential element of any modern state. With electricity, a nation has the ability to operate oil refineries, provide clean water, treat sewage, build a modern service-based society, diversify the industrial base, make significant advancements in science and technology, and provide modern telecommunication services.

As discovered during Phase IV operations in post-war Iraq in 2003, a nationwide failure of electrical power makes it extraordinarily difficult to provide basic human services.17 Nigeria’s reform movement could result in new national development funds for electricity, sewage, water, and other basic human services. However, endemic corruption will slow the development of a robust national power grid, while also allowing the oligarchs controlling the installation of the new infrastructure to gain greater influence with local and regional governmental leaders.18 By 2020 Nigeria will likely have some new power plants fuelled by oil and natural gas and a power grid augmented by experimental solar and wind farms and tidal generators. However, it is also probable by 2030 that corrupt officials and enterprises will divert the funds needed to maintain a stable national electrical grid for their own purposes. Under these conditions, rolling brownouts will be the norm, especially in large urban areas, with occurrences peaking during the hot Nigerian summers. Without stable power, other essential human services will suffer, creating vectors for increased incidences of water-borne disease with all its attendant consequences. This, in turn, will spark social unrest and increase doubt about the government’s ability to provide basic services. Water and Other Basic Services.

In the north, rainfall is seasonal and is becoming increasingly uncertain in areas bordering the expanding Sahara Desert. Lake Chad, a shallow lake that was once the source of much of the water for irrigated fields in the north, is all but dry because of overuse. Continued draining of wells which tap the aquifers under much of sub-Saharan West Africa will likely increase the incidence of transnational migration of nomadic tribes in the Sahel. It could also lead to an increase in the number of internally displaced people in the north who may abandon villages as lack of water may eventually make farming impossible.

By 2030 internal displacement in the Niger Delta region and southeast Nigeria will rise because of MEND violence, the contamination of most surface water supplies with carcinogens and petrochemicals, and the lack of fresh-water wells. Without consistent funding and dedicated government action, remediation efforts in the Niger Delta region will 201 | P a g e

fail. Saltwater and contaminates from the oil industry will likely intrude into coastal aquifers.

Without reliable clean water in 2030, waterborne disease morbidity will rise throughout the country with increased death among the very young and old alike.

Popular discontent will rise as the lack of services and the perception of government favouritism of one ethnic group over another increase. Episodic violence and unremitting protests against local and national governments will likely follow, further eroding confidence in the Nigerian government. Transportation. Nigeria’s road networks are extensive but relatively poor approximately 165,000 kilometres (km) of Nigeria’s194,000 km (85 percent) of roadways were either unpaved or were merely unimproved trails in 2009. Without new investment, there will be little change in the ratio of unpaved to paved roads by 2030.

Investments by the World Bank, China, and the United States have resulted in the roads in oil-producing areas receiving the most attention. This disparity has been noticed. If the government committed itself to provide either improved gravel or a paved road within a mile of every Nigerian farm, such an investment could enhance not only food security for the people but also the financial prospects of those living in the largely agrarian north and help diversify the economy. If, however, the road-paving industry becomes co-opted by the same graft and corruption as have other areas of government, then the north and the poor will remain mostly separated and isolated from more prosperous areas.

Other investments could improve the very small rail service (approximately 3,500 km) and air service (70 airfields) throughout the large country. Roads connecting major urban centres will likely be paved only with the assistance of international NGOs and oil and mining conglomerates. Investors in Nigeria’s strategic mineral mines will likely pave and widen existing roads to facilitate the transport of goods and services for mining of raw materials and expanding Nigeria’s oil infrastructure. Investment capital for improved transport may be generated by the sale of government bonds and with loans from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, if Nigeria’s bond rating can remain investment grade.

Otherwise, government expansion of transport services in the Niger Delta will be limited to developing roads to facilitate transportation of oil-related materials and using the Nigerian army to help control this volatile region. The government will restrict development in areas of known or suspected MEND activity in order to contain and limit the movement of insurgent forces. Paradoxically, this could reinforce perceptions that the government is unwilling or incapable of addressing local grievances.

As in the human service areas, corruption could disrupt or halt all investments in road, rail, and airport development, especially if it is bad enough to cause Nigeria to default on repayment of loans and bonds. Monsoons and other environmental factors unique to sub202 | P a g e

Saharan Africa along with MEND attacks in the south could rapidly degrade any improvements made. The quality of the road network will affect agricultural production in the north as farmers may be unable to move their crops to market. Mining interests will also falter as they lose reliable transportation modes to key production and port facilities.

Declining food production combined with poor transportation infrastructure will take its toll on the poorest members of the population. Without food security, riots and thefts of food from storage facilities and granaries will become more commonplace and produce the same effect as bunkering oil. Without reliable transportation, industrial diversification efforts will cease. Telecommunications. With a disproportionately large youth population accounting for more than 50 percent of the population, Nigeria will continue to buy into anything related to telecommunications. Ironically, telecommunications will prove a double-edged sword for the government, the oligarchs, and criminality in Nigeria. By 2040 the oligarchs may form a strong telecommunications alliance or cartel that will likely lock out competition from nonAfrican companies.

Given Nigeria’s proximity to the equator, it will continue to serve as a critical link for satellite communications. The oligarchs will control analogue and digital radio stations; analogue, high definition, and cable television; direct satellite broadcasts; broadband cellular; and NGI. Through broadband cellular, the family enterprises will circumvent government restrictions on public protests and can easily communicate with criminal elements throughout Africa and the world. They will also likely pioneer new security measures for industry that also serve to protect their interests, especially their criminal activities.

Through their dominance of the public airways, these family enterprises could control advertisement about goods and services, becoming the greatest beneficiaries of the public’s insatiable appetite for new technology, goods, and services. The government will earn fees through auctions of the electromagnetic spectrum, telecommunication fees, and taxes.

Through patronage, the oligarchs will likely win each auction and pay virtually no taxes. The oligarchs will then use their dominance of television and radio to help elect and re-elect their candidates to public office.

MEND and the Sokoto caliphate will avail themselves of the same technology to recruit followers and spread their message throughout the world. Communication towers, normally tempting targets for any insurgency, will remain relatively unaffected since both MEND and criminal enterprises will depend on them. While helping them exert influence and control among their own followers, they will, with the assistance of international civil society groups, undermine the government’s legitimacy.

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Food Security. Although a largely agrarian nation, Nigerian farming contributes little to the GDP. With appropriate government investments in water and road projects, agriculture may increase its contribution to the GDP by 2030. Distribution could be enhanced by new efficiencies in transportation using barges, rail, and trucking. With easy access to the modern Internet and the cloud, farmers will be able to create and use up-to-date weather, imagery, entomology, transportation, hydrology, and other farm-related data and information to improve crop yields and profits.

Any increased wealth in the north will provide the Sokoto caliphate additional funds that it would then likely use to meet the health care, education, political, and spiritual needs of its people. The caliphate will also invest in infrastructure projects, particularly wells and irrigation systems, to ensure its people have reliable access to water for crop irrigation even during periods of drought. It will also provide its people safe drinking water as surface contamination from fertilizers and industrial pollutants spills into rivers and lakes. Such assistance to the local populace will solidify political support for caliphate-selected leaders.

Although Lake Chad remains a relatively safe source of water for Nigeria, the encroaching Sahara Desert and overuse will further reduce its surface area by more than 50 percent and reduce available water supplies for Niger, Chad, Nigeria, and Cameroon.19 This, in turn, will likely increase tension between the countries and could spark periodic clashes With poor quality surface water sources in the south for farming and drinking, the industrial south will depend more and more on the agrarian north for its food supply. Due to the corruption mentioned above, while the Sokoto caliphate may invest in agriculture, underinvestment in agricultural infrastructure by the central Nigerian government will decrease crop yields, thus increasing food prices throughout the country. This, in turn, will hurt the poorest people in the urban centres the most.

Overpriced food and shortages of food staples will spark social unrest and further harm the relationship between the government and the people. It may also be used by a corrupt government to spark nationalism if it chooses to blame foreign governments, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other international organizations for its own planning and development failures.

Environment. The ecological devastation in the Niger Delta cannot be overstated.

Millions of barrels of spilled oil, the clear-cutting of jungles, and the ravages of violent conflict will only compound the problem, destroying virtually all surface water supplies in the Niger Delta. Saltwater inundation and the carcinogens from the oil 204 | P a g e

industry will contaminate the vital southern aquifer and fishing areas. Fish stocks in rivers, lakes, and immediately offshore in the Gulf of Guinea will likely fall through 2030 unless immediate steps are taken to remediate the Niger Delta region and establish farming guidelines in the north.20 The lack of government action to remediate the Niger Delta will create conditions for active insurgencies. MEND and other groups will attract funds from groups like Earth Liberation Front and, with a large youth population, will find it relatively easy to recruit new members. Tribute payments to MEND and other similar groups will only encourage violence over the long term. By 2030 they will have more capabilities to attack the oil infrastructure and oligarch-controlled businesses in the south.

IV.

The Nigerian Economy

The Nigerian economy has long been considered one of the strongest in Africa, largely because of oil revenues and conservative budgeting by the central government. With virtually no debt in 2008 and with global demand for oil, its dominant commodity, increasing, Sachs projected growth from 2005 to 2030 (the 2008–2017 global recession notwithstanding) in five-year intervals to be 5.0, 5.5, 5.7, 6.1, and 6.6 percent. If realized, Nigeria’s $94 billion (US dollars) economy in 2020 could grow to $556 billion by 2030.

If sustained, government reforms through 2030 could help Nigeria develop what it arguably needs most a large middle class in order to sustain economic growth, improve per capita income, and preserve internal harmony. A healthy middle class would form an important tax base to help Nigeria diversify its economy, provide some stability to the budgeting process, and attract outside investment for new economic areas outside its oil industry.

Given volatility in the oil markets and Nigeria’s current oil-based budgeting process, the Nigerian government may seek long-term, fix-priced oil contracts with the United States, China, and the European Union to bring predictability to their annual budget process. With declining institutional corruption, these long-term contracts could allow the Nigerian government to prioritize investments in infrastructure, especially power and oil production, enhanced recovery systems, and some other limited industrial diversification. However, by 2030 a failure to address corruption will hinder investments to grow a middle class, harm Nigeria’s credit rating, force early

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termination of oil contracts, and result in slower economic growth, thereby eliminating Nigeria as a top-20 world economy.

Nigeria could also see peak oil production before 2030, as oil companies cease exploration and oil drilling in Nigeria in favour of exploration and production in less volatile and potentially more lucrative regions of the world. In combination with each other, these factors would lead to an increased probability of instability and perhaps government failure.

V.

The Single Commodity

Nigeria’s current economy is largely built around a single commodity light sweet crude oil. Although currently demonized for pollution, climate change, and other environmental and health related problems, light sweet crude oil will remain in great demand beyond 2030 because it is relatively easy to distil and produces many useful types of petroleum products such as gasoline, plastics, and polymers. Declining oil production and violence in other petroleum-producing regions will help Nigeria improve its relative position as an oil producer. With proper investment in infrastructure and without production interruptions caused by violence, Nigeria’s oil profits could rise to over 85 percent of federal government income, 91 percent of export earnings, and more than 60 percent of overall GDP by 2030.21 While high oil prices currently provide the potential for assured growth for Nigeria’s economy, they could prove unsustainable over the long term as importing nations seek alternative and more reliable sources of energy.

Energy and industrial diversification could raise agricultural and mining contributions to the overall GDP. However, as in other industries, institutional corruption could reverse these gains and spark greater levels of malfeasance in the form of taxes and fees as the government seeks to make up these losses. The oligarchs will still hold a disproportionately large stake in the energy sector, but government reforms could initially reduce their share of oil profits from their current 80 percent level. However, the oligarchs will invest in new enterprises to assure their profits in many areas of the economy. The ICG’s 2005 warnings about “a development trap” could prove prescient by 2030 should Nigeria fail to diversify its economy as wild fluctuations in oil prices and institutional corruption increase.22 Nigeria’s complex national oil-revenue sharing plan will also be threatened.58 Loss of these revenues will be felt most acutely in the north which, in turn, will harden the 206 | P a g e

Sokoto caliphate’s resolve to “depose through democracy” the corrupt government.

Attempts to conduct a national census will continue to be opposed by the people of the Niger Delta region as a systematic attempt to steal oil wealth by the increasingly populous north.

As a result of these trends, the most likely outcome appears to be that the Niger Delta will continue as the heart of Nigeria’s oil production, yet its share of global oil revenues will continue to decline from its peak of 13 percent of the value it produces.

This decline will continue as funds are siphoned off for MEND tribute payments and institutional corruption. These all result in disincentives for oil companies to invest further in the area. By 2030 oil production will fall below current rates as these dynamics take their toll?

VI.

Industrial Diversification

In order to create a more diversified economy, government reform efforts must be sustained for more than 10 years to create the needed confidence to attract investment by venture capital fund organizations. Such investment would have the effect of attracting multinational conglomerates like Bechtel Corporation to establish mining and production facilities in Nigeria. Nigeria has resources beyond oil, and with the proper investment, production of strategic materials required for aerospace and telecommunications, such as bauxite, aluminium, and gold, could see significant growth. Copper, tin, and other ores will likely not be as well developed but could help with economic diversification.

Early reform efforts to diversify the economy would include improvements to major port facilities like Lagos, which, in turn, will help the country develop new air, road, and

rail

services.

Capital

investments

into

the

energy,

services,

and

telecommunication sectors would also be key to sparking job growth in these new economic areas.In addition, the emphasis on education reforms would also need to be continued. The efforts begun in 2007, if they take hold, could measurably increase literacy rates before 2020.

This growing, educated workforce would attract new investment in Nigeria. The challenge with this, however, is that the southern oligarchs will use their influence to attempt to control as much of this industry as possible. Further, the graft and corruption endemic to the central government mean that the needed reforms in the north will have to come from indigenous nonoil sources rather than revenue sharing.

Lastly, the historic diversion of education funding for political purposes will continue, as it has in the past, to harm wealth creation by constraining growth of a middle class, 207 | P a g e

increasing youth unemployment, ensconcing power in the hands of the oligarchs, and potentially threatening Nigeria’s free enterprise system. In such an event, social disruptions and internal instability will increase.

5.3

The Government and Internal Security

Although religious and criminal violence is dropping throughout Nigeria, a further reduction depends on multiple factors: a. the success of reforms in government, education, and the economy; b.strong leadership provided by the Sokoto caliphate in the north; c.the success of the southern oligarchs in “professionalizing” criminal elements; d. the failure of MEND to mount a sustained successful insurgency; and e. successful revenue sharing and payoffs to extremist groups in the Niger Delta region. A failure in any of these areas could increase violence between religious and ethnic groups and further threaten the social contract between the government and the people.

The collapse of Nigeria’s economy could create challenges in maintaining order throughout the country. In the south, the oligarchs will help maintain order by developing their own security forces, likely professionalized criminal groups, to help “supplement” Nigeria’s already corrupt law enforcement. The protection of critical oil infrastructure and the need to hold MEND forces at bay will require a major Nigerian military presence. In the north, the Sokoto caliphate will grow its own militia and paid religious police. If the economy fails to grow, these three forces—military, southern security forces, and an Islamic militia—will likely work to maintain internal security in their respective areas of interest. However, the disparate philosophical views of these groups suggest that conflict between them is possible. Should the people lose confidence in the government, rumours of a coup d’état by the Nigerian military could spark increased internal conflict.

I.

Governance and Legitimacy

Nigerian “power sharing” at the federal level is still not constitutionally mandated.

While Christians will represent the majority of the electorate through the mid-2030s, the Islamic electorate, by sheer population growth, will likely compose the majority before 2040. Christian-led governments will continue to follow the Nigerian 208 | P a g e

constitution and appoint people from each of Nigeria’s 36 states to serve as ministers and to key positions in each ministry. However, client patronage and other forms of corruption will likely continue unabated throughout the federal, state, and local governmental systems. The Sokoto caliphate will win a majority election late in this time frame. When its majority is sufficiently robust, it will seek to enshrine elements of the Islamic judicial code into law. As justification for its actions, it will point to a long and tarnished history of corrupt Christian-led rule.

There is no question that the caliphate will maintain a strong political base and hold on to the 12 northern Islamic-dominated states. To the extent it can under the existing system of graft and corruption, it will use limited monetary resources to expand its agricultural infrastructure and distribute revenues to provide for development, social welfare, education, and health-care needs. In the south, the oligarchs and their enterprises become conduits for federal monies that they will use to attempt to “buy” loyalty. While this may work for a time, this corrupt practice to maintain power will eventually become clearly visible as communications expand.

While government deals may go to the highest bidder for a time, eventually the corruption will spark a general disdain for the federal government.

The corruption in the south will be a marked contrast from the governance in the north, which, regardless of religious overtones, will appear more responsive to the people than a national government beholden to client patronage. The likely result is that the Islamic leaders will, in time, be confident of their numerical majority and moral superiority. When this occurs, an election result that ostensibly rejects the corruption of the past will bring into power a government supportive of Islamic reforms that will purify the corrupt state. This could lead to a nationwide establishment of Islamic schools and a gradual transformation of Nigeria and the Sokoto caliphate into the centre of sub- Saharan Islam. Such a government would likely attempt rapid reform by eradicating previous administrations’ graft and corruption. Such actions could include seizing assets of those deemed most corrupt, particularly the southern oligarchs, and the government officials they supported.

The oligarchs professionalized security forces would react quickly to any threat to their livelihood, including striking hard against government forces and the Islamic militia. Similarly, MEND forces would likely view such actions unfavourably. As it has since 2005, MEND may strike hard at oil centres in the south and attempt attacks on oil platforms, transhipment loading terminals, and pipelines in the Gulf of Guinea. Its goal would likely be to force the new government to address its grievances before

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allowing the new government to consolidate its gains. As such, internal conflict throughout the southern part of Nigeria is likely, as the oligarchs, MEND, and the former leaders will all have strong financial incentives to retain their financial or government powers. The resultant nationwide violence could very plausibly lead to the collapse of law and order in urban areas. The Nigerian armed forces, weakened by decades of graft and siphoning off of funds, even with the help of Islamic militias, would likely be unable to contain the violence. The government would be in grave danger of collapse.

If this violence continued even for a short time, oil production would rapidly drop, causing a significant loss of government revenue. This, in turn, could cause a collapse of the currency on international markets and a concomitant collapse of the government’s ability to maintain economic order at home. The nation would be on the verge of shattering.

II.

Military

The Nigerian military has been active in preserving Nigeria as an independent entity since 1960. It still functions to preserve Nigeria’s territorial integrity, contribute to national emergencies and security, promote collective security in Africa while furthering Nigerian foreign policy, and contribute to global security.23It has ruled the state on five occasions, the last time being in 1993. Since then, presidents have worked to maintain it as a credible force but one too weak to seize power without assistance from non-military elements. Unfortunately, this also has meant that it is too weak to fully stop the destruction of the oil infrastructure by MEND and other insurgents.

As an institution, the Nigerian military will likely remain a marginally capable force between 2009 and 2030. It should be able to continue supporting the Organization of African Unity and UN peacekeeping efforts throughout Africa. However, without adequate funding for training, professionalism will continue to be an issue whenever the force deploys as well as for domestic operations. Attempts by the government to reform the military and its leadership will remain sporadic and underfunded. Existing plans will downsize the armed forces by 40 percent and limit military spending to 3 percent of the GDP.60 Modernization efforts will also be limited. The Nigerian military will occasionally purchase new aircraft and army equipment.

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Training programs instituted through TSCTI will help professionalize the officer and non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps but will not eliminate institutional corruption.

Indeed, a continuation of corrupt presidential administrations will both distrust the military and infect the institution with its own supporters. A continued diversion of funds from operations, maintenance, equipment, and, most importantly, training accounts will atrophy the military to a point that it is unable to threaten the central government. By 2030 the military will likely be unable to quell violence. In fact, the announced 2008 reorganization leaves the military with only three divisions. Further, as the Sokoto caliphate seeks to establish its own internal professional police force and militia, it is likely that many Islamic officers and NCOs will resign their commissions in Nigeria’s armed forces and return north to serve in the Islamic militia.

In recent years, the United States has assisted the Nigerian military in maintaining its own sovereignty over its territory. Since 2005, the US Navy has increased its patrols in Nigerian waters. In 2008 the Gulf of Guinea Guard was formed with the help of the United States and Britain with assistance from Angola, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and São Tomé e Principe. Even then, MEND’s counter oil operations have not been slowed. When the electoral shift between Christian and Muslim leadership occurs, the Nigerian military will likely be unable to provide internal security and ironically will still be viewed with suspicion.

The army will lack the resources to secure the country, resulting in a demoralized force with large-scale desertions by soldiers who leave the service to protect their own families. Yet, in spite of this, the army’s past history will almost certainly spark rumors of coups d’état as the central government faces a legitimacy crisis.

The hollow nature of the army will be known. Its inability to defend the oil-producing infrastructure from MEND, combined with desertions, will only empower and encourage other groups to attempt to seize some measure of control. Localized professional militias, Islamic militant forces, and MEND will have little reason to fear direct action from the Nigerian military, resulting in what may become a multipartite civil crisis. The state may, quite literally, be incapable of protecting itself, and the resultant breakup may be as violent as the shattering of a piece of plate glass when dropped upon a tile floor.

III.

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Outside Influences and The Players

In 2030 the United States probably will still be Nigeria’s largest trading partner, with China holding the number two position. China’s successful experiment with capitalism has opened many diplomatic doors across Africa, Nigeria included. As China seeks assured access to the resources it needs to sustain economic growth to maintain “internal harmony,” it is likely to support stabilization efforts to protect critical resources and infrastructure.

Since 2008, China has invested heavily in Nigeria’s oil sector to secure it as a reliable energy source for its rapidly growing economy. With the United States providing security in the Gulf of Guinea region, China will remain focused on infrastructure development rather than physical security through its paramilitary private military organizations. Both China and the United States will seek long-term energy contracts with Nigeria to help ensure predictable energy prices. These energy contracts could lock the United States into receiving up to 25 percent of its oil imports from Nigeria by 2025.

While the United States and China are generally viewed favourably within Nigeria, potential tensions may arise between the United States and the Sokoto caliphate over US military action inother Islamic countries. These tensions will be exacerbated

by US demands for the accountability of money invested by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the MCC in developing nations. If Nigeria’s anticorruption measures fail, or elections are disputed, it is likely that the US Congress may sequester assistance funds and cancel loans to the Nigerian government. This could briefly spark nationalistic fervour within Nigeria as the federal government attempts to enhance its legitimacy by blaming “outsiders” for Nigeria’s failing economy and lack of basic human services.

This could create a conundrum for the international community as any attempt by outsiders to intervene to stabilize the country, no matter how benevolent their intent, could spark a backlash. This is a situation not unlike Iraq, where various ethnic groups initially viewed the intervention by the United States quite differently. Outside influence is unlikely to unite the Nigerian people into a single nation, and any show or even perception of favouritism towards any ethnicity or group will be poorly received.

IV.

Donor Fatigue

Donor nations joke about how their money is spent in Nigeria today. Despite the best efforts of donors to account for the money they spend, institutional corruption, in the 212 | P a g e

form of NGO entrepreneurs, only serves to undermine government legitimacy. As a result, donor nations and even large international NGOs like the Red Cross will gradually demand greater transparency and accountability. Failing this, they will withdraw their support for large projects and focus on election monitoring and the most basic human needs such as disease mitigation and feeding hungry people. The long decline of human services in Nigeria is generally viewed as one caused by the government and sustained by an unremitting culture of corruption. After 70 years of trying, donor fatigue has set in. If law and order break down in Nigeria, the donor fatigue already resident may cause many NGOs to withdraw.

5.4 The Bodged State of Nigeria In 2030, in the transition between the leadership of the extant corrupt regime and some form of Islamic replacement, the country will probably experience an episode of significant violence. Any attempt by an Islamic-led government to establish laws based on Islamic jurisprudence or to declare Nigeria as an Islamic republic will be rejected by the large Christian minority. Attempts to remove corrupt influences from governance will be fought by those who have historically benefited from these arrangements, namely the criminal family enterprises and the business oligarchs.

Business leaders, who have historically held great power, will not willingly allow their influence to be diluted. Conflict between security forces for criminal enterprises, various militias, insurgents, and the Nigerian military will erupt. Each of these entities will strive to protect their respective interests. The result will be a combination of religious and ethnic violence, which will almost certainly overstretch the mechanisms of the government to maintain control. When this occurs, it is likely the country will shatter along religious and ethnic lines, and civil war, probably multipartite, will ensue.24 The Nigeria of the distant future will likely succumb to a variety of ills—corruption, weak government institutions, failure to meet the social welfare needs of its people, unchecked criminality, crumbling infrastructure, growing insurgency in the Niger Delta region, and loss of confidence by international investors, among many others.

In the early 2030 elections, the people of the Islamic-dominated north will successfully exercise their democratic vote and succeed in electorally deposing the previous government and, in the process, will likely trigger the collapse of their own country.

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The aftermath of this election may cause vital interests of many of the world’s powers to be threatened. A Nigeria in turmoil cannot produce oil, and up to 25 percent of US oil imports will be at risk. Global oil prices will skyrocket, threatening the world with serious economic turmoil. This will be a crisis few can ignore. Yet it also promises to be a crisis few can fathom. With conflict nationwide, the flow of goods and services, including food, will be jeopardized. As galvanizing as the starvation in Darfur was in the late 2000s, a humanitarian crisis in a country with 225 million people threatens to be more than 100 times worse both in terms of the number of mouths to be fed and the potential spread of death and disease.

Further, Darfur was a conflict between two major factions; a fragmented Nigeria could break into as many as eight or more. Peace-making is a must, as is restoring the oil flow; yet the problem at hand will be much more complex than the operations in Iraq or Afghanistan and will involve more than 10 times the number of people. It will demand a force structure more than an order of magnitude larger than any operation the United States has conducted in recent history, and it will likely come at a time when that force structure will not be resident among either the active duty or reserves. This will be a crisis that will take the concerted and integrated cooperation of much of the global community, or the global economy may fail.

I.

The Present Situation is Dire and Unsustainable

The reasons may not be far-fetched, considering the unwholesome combination of internal and external factors at play. The price effect of the drastic fall in global oil prices, coupled with the drop in export volume from the pipelines bombing campaign of the Niger Delta Avengers, depleted Nigeria's foreign exchange earnings. The fallout has been the massive devaluation of our currency, increase in unemployment rate, inflationary pressure (at 16.5%), increase in interest rate (the yield on FGN Treasury Bills - risk free instruments - was 21% on 15/08/16!) and general downturn in other economic and social indices. Expectedly, being a mono-cultural economy, the collapse in oil prices has had disastrous impact on governance at all levels, as the Nigerian economy is not insulated from the global economic crises.

Some state governments find it extremely difficult to pay staff salaries and associated pension contributions, with no immediate solution in sight. The nation's woes is further compounded by growing restiveness and ethnic agitations, among which is the Boko Haram insurgency (which is now abating), the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPoB) agitation for the actualisation of Biafra, and the endless conflict 214 | P a g e

between herdsmen and farmers in various parts of the country, with the attendant implications for agricultural output reduction. Further delay in arresting the present trend could lead to serious political and social instability.

II.

A New Thinking and Approach is required

Our problems are multi-faceted, covering economic, political and social, and the solution must be multi-dimensional in approach. Clearly, it cannot be business as usual anymore as concerted efforts must now be made to appropriately diagnose the problems and proffer workable solutions in order to avoid plunging our economy into full depression. Pertinent questions must be asked... Where did we go wrong? How did we arrive here? How did we move from one of the fastest growing economy to an economy on the brink of recession? How can we navigate our way out of the present quagmire? And more importantly, how do we comprehensively restructure Nigeria in a way that will support our aspiration for a productive and egalitarian economy, a stable polity, and a fairer society.

There is a need for reality check by all tiers of government in Nigeria (Particularly the Federal Government of Nigeria). Perhaps, in the process of conducting a reality check, we might just be able to retrace our steps by embarking on a far reaching and comprehensive restructuring beyond the cosmetic approach that the nation has been accustomed to over the decades.

The reality check by the federal government must start with asking the following questions: a. Is it realistic to increase the size of the projected federal budget from N4.49 trillion in 2015 to N6.1 trillion in 2016 in the face of dwindling oil price and production cuts from militants' bombing campaign? b. Is it realistic to increase budgeted non-oil receipts from N800 billion in 2015 to N1.5 trillion in 2016 without a corresponding structure to drive the increase?

Are non-oil earnings capable of 88% elasticity in the face of limited investments and government incentives? c. Is it realistic to project external sources of financing a N2.3 trillion deficits in the 2016 budget when there is global recession and a downgrade of the country's rating? d. Is it realistic to project N1.5 trillion for debt servicing when capital expenditure is a meagre N1.6 trillion?

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e. Is it sustainable for the federal government to continue to hold on to over 50% of the revenue of the nation, only to spend it on debt servicing, recurrent expenditure and subsidising the foreign exchange market, the natural gas market, the electricity transmission sector and downstream petroleum sector?

III.

The Problem is Structural!

The direction of the on-going debate on the restructuring of Nigeria has been skewed towards yet another political restructuring. Nigeria, since independence, has undergone series of political restructuring programmes from creation of states at different times, to the complete change in the political system from parliamentary to presidential, to revenue mobilisation and allocation restructuring, and other forms of adjustments that are political in nature. It is as if every government at the federal level wants to conduct its own political/constitutional conference to restructure Nigeria.

The fact that all the political restructuring initiatives to date have not addressed Nigeria's problems is evidence that the problems are structural (and substantially economic). While the nation has carried out different political reforms, the only period that Nigeria can be said to have had serious economic reforms that had significant effects on the structure of the Nigerian economy were the reforms of 1985 to 1992 that divested government interests in various business concerns; and the reforms of 2002 to 2015 that restructured some of the commanding heights of the economy banking, insurance, telecommunications, power among others. It is therefore clear that the solution to solving our structural economic problems must commence with the dismantling of the structural rigidities that have held the country down economically for decades.

IV. Over centralisation is stifling The advent of the military in governance created a highly centralised political and economic system, with enormous power and resources concentrated at the centre.

Instead of using the resources to build a solid economic base for Nigeria, a regime of over-bloated federal recurrent expenditure (almost 80% of budget year-on-year, subsidised government owned monopolies (Nitel; Nepa; Nigerian Railway; Nigerian Airways; NNPC; Nigerian Gas Company etc) with huge unfunded pension funds were foisted on the nation. Now that reality has dawned and the federal government's revenue profile has reduced, the federal government cannot carry on 216 | P a g e

with the existing administrative structure. The time to take the bitter pill is now.

Accordingly, the federal government should carry out the following reforms: 

Prune the existing structure and divest itself of some unwarranted administrative responsibilities.



Reduce ministries, merge functions and devolve more responsibilities to states.



Hand over intra-state roads to states while keeping only interstate highways to itself to connect the vast and scattered communities in Nigeria.



Give more autonomy to states with respect to control of inland water ways.



Hands off control of lottery business in states.



Limit the responsibilities of the Ministry of Solid Minerals at the federal level to regulation and cede control of solid minerals to states.



Divest itself from involvement in distribution of VAT (sales taxes).



Abolish the law that vests all mineral resources under the soil of Nigeria in the federal government. This will allow states to partner with the private sector to exploit mineral resources and pay agreed derivation to the federal government.



Review mechanism for administration of PAYEE, to give the states more control.



Reduce taxes for companies and entrepreneur.



Allow more private sector involvement in the economy.



Divest from the natural gas infrastructure of Nigeria (including removal of subsidies) in order to create a competitive gas sector that will attract private investments and support the economy.



Divest from the Transmission Company of Nigeria and break the national grid to regional grids. This will allow private sector investments and eliminate the subsidy distortions.



Fully deregulate the downstream oil sector.



Abolish all forms of subsidy intervention in the foreign exchange market so the market can operate competitively and allocate resources appropriately.

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

Diversify earning capacity of the federal government to increase revenue. Access to increase in revenue may lead to increased

government

spending,

which

may

alter

the

recession narratives, provided the right policies prevail without the usual leakages.

For instance, we have an abysmally low level of tax revenue to GDP (estimated at 1.6% in 2012 and currently 7%) compared to other African countries. Ghana's tax revenue as a percentage of GDP is 14.9%, Kenya - 15.9%, South Africa - 25.5%, Egypt - 12.5% while Nigeria stands at 1.6% From the available statistics, anything less than 200% increase in tax revenue, in the first instance, will still be sub-optimal.

To effectively close the gap in the above table, there is the urgent need to come up with effective tax reforms. Another low hanging fruit for the diversification of revenue is the natural resources that abound in various states of the federation, this will engender the much desired fiscal federalism and put states in a position to invest in the solid mineral sector.

Kogi State, for instance, has tantalite deposits. Tantalite is used in the electronics industry for capacitors and high power resistors. It is also used to make alloys to increase strength, ductility and corrosion resistance. In the international commodity market, tantalite traded above USD250/kg which has now fallen to USD132/kg compared to crude oil price at below USD50 per barrel. However, this precious metal has remained buried under the ground.

Approximately 70% of our population engages in agricultural production at a subsistence level. The sector could boast of about a quarter of our GDP, yet we have not been able to achieve self-sufficiency in food production. We spend about $11billion importing food each year, including wheat, rice, sugar and fish. A swift correction of this menace is bound to create thousands of jobs, less pressure on our foreign exchange and indeed a positive narrative for our food security. We have no business importing food but rather we should be exporting food to other countries.

Furthermore, we must discourage raw export of agricultural produce for value added purposes, which will in turn create jobs and more tax revenue. The menace of herdsmen must be curtailed in order not to deplete capacity in the agricultural sector.

Another key sector that seems to hold the ace for the Nigerian economy is the power sector. Relative stability in electricity supply will go a long way in boosting industrial productions and indeed SMEs, which will ultimately improve our GDP growth and youth employment. However, with less than 4,000MW power generation, Nigeria will 218 | P a g e

need a minimum of $20 billion investments to generate additional 20,000MW. Another $10 billion may be required as investments in the transmission and distribution value chain of the power sector.

While the generation and distribution have been privatised, the transmission still remain in the tight grip of the federal government. Beyond mere privatisation, what will ultimately unlock value and attract investors into the sector is full deregulation where states are supported to generate their own power through regional grid transmission structure or off-grid embedded power programmes. Yet, the federal government has continued to artificially fix the price for power as well as the feed stock, thus stifling the emergence of a competitive trading in bulk power where market forces determine price and allocation of power resources.

Still, there is the more fundamental issue of fiscal federalism. Over the years, our practice of fiscal federalism has run parallel to our model of market economy. In a market economy like ours, decisions on production and distribution activities are based on market forces in a free price system (or a guided market dynamic with minimal artificial intervention). However, while we profess a market economy, our practices and procedures largely have the semblance of a centrally planned economy, where government decisions drive most aspects of the country's economy, particularly the commanding heights that have the greatest multiplier effects. This comes at a very heavy price in form of inefficient allocation of resources and unsustainable pricing system.

The call for restructuring of the country is not entirely new. The National Democratic Conference (NADECO) headed by late Chief Anthony Enahoro called for a Sovereign National Conference in the 90s. The agitation was based on the fact that the 1999 constitution were foisted on the nation by past military regimes. The call gained more ground with the introduction of Sharia law in some parts of the north but was never heeded. Professor Tam David West later joined the fray to canvass for a National Conference to examine pertinent issues confronting the country, which decisions could be put to referendum.

Former Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo and Goodluck Jonathan convened National Conferences, which recommended the retention of a federal system of government, the core element of which shall be a federal (central) government with states as federating units. The conference did not foreclose the issue of a regional government, saying instead that each state that is regionally based should create a self-funding zonal commission to promote economic development, good governance, equity and 219 | P a g e

security in accordance with the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended).

In recent times, however, the likes of Soyinka and Abubakar Atiku have renewed the call for a restructuring on the basis that the current structure is heavily defective, as it does not provide the enabling environment for growth and progress among the 36 component states of the federation. Considering the fact that most economic decisions are taken in a political environment, there is also the need to restructure our constitution. The restructuring should focus on devolution of power and resources to the states and local governments while the federal government should concern itself with: 

Security (state policing?)



Foreign affairs



Economic wellbeing of Nigerians by implementing sustainable monetary and fiscal policies



Reduce its share of the financial resources of Nigeria. The country's current sharing formula gives the federal government 52.68%, states 26.72% and local government councils 20.60%. This has to be reviewed in favour of the states and local governments for sustainable development.

The present structure of governance, where petrodollar money is shared every month encourages no state to develop its resources. It should be noted that before the advent of oil in Nigeria, the various regions were encouraged to invest heavily in commodities like cocoa, groundnuts, coffee, palm oil, etc. But fiscal federalism was sacrificed at the altar of the oil-boom. Nevertheless, no political restructuring can move the nation forward without first dealing with the economic malfunction of the Nigerian fabric. It seems settled that regional autonomy belies the real economic independence for survival of the states. The time has come to refocus the restructuring debate on a workable model that advocates appropriate political and economic reforms that is complementary and reinforcing.

5.5 Solving Nigeria's Electricity Problem Electricity supply in Nigeria has always been on the low side ever since I became conscious as boy in my early years on earth. The euphoric exclamation of “up NEPA” that used to rent the air, back then, any time electricity supply was restored after a

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long period of non-supply is what my little boy at home still shouts whenever electricity is restored, this time around, days after a long absence of electricity.

It is always of concern to me that in the over 100 years of the existence of Nigeria, 57 out of those years, as an independent state, we are still struggling to solve our electricity supply issues! The speaker of the House of Representatives recently lamented over our spending of over N2.74 trillion on electricity over the past years with no headway in solving our electricity problem. This is mind boggling, to say the least! Nigeria has been hovering between about 3,000 Megawatts and 4,600 Megawatts electricity generation for some time now and this often drops to below 2,000 Megawatts!

South Africa currently generates about 34,000 Megawatts and hopes to continue to improve on that going forward.The long and short of this, is that Nigeria, with close to 200 million in population, has always fell far short of electricity supply to its populace and this carries a lot of negative consequences. Some of the consequences of inadequate supply of electricity to the Nigerian population is the high cost of manufactured goods in the country due to the high volume and cost of diesel required to run the generators that power the machines in the production processes in the absence of electricity supply from the national grid.25 There are even some machines that takes a whole day to heat up once power supply to them is disrupted, so, they rely solely on generators to power those machines due to the unreliable supply of electricity from the national grid. We have heard, in some cases, of the relocation of manufacturing industries from Nigeria to neighbouring countries such as Ghana where electricity seems to be more stable. Many jobs that are electricity-related that would have been created and taken up by the teaming unemployed in the country cannot also be created because of lack of electricity.

Technology and its variants of innovations, of which electricity is a major one, has come to make our daily living much easier. There is no doubt that the high unemployment rate we are presently facing in Nigeria can be drastically reduced with relatively stable supply of electricity.

Welding workshops, Barbing saloons, Hair dressing saloons, Internet CafĂŠ, Fashion designers, Cold room operators, etc., will all thrive if they have access to stable electricity to run their businesses seamlessly. Importantly too, manufacturing will once again boom in Nigeria as factories will be able to run their machines at cheaper electricity rates compared to the exorbitant cost of running them presently on diesel generators. This means that there will be a reduction in the cost of production. A 221 | P a g e

reduction in the cost of production will also drive the prices of produced goods down, thus, making them affordable to the average Nigerian.

Further benefits of fixing the electricity issues in Nigeria is that our products will be able to compete for export, especially in our immediate African market due to low cost of production. This can, indeed, be the beginning of Nigeria earning serious foreign exchange from exports. Exports earnings can improve the strength of the Naira against stronger currencies like the Dollar and save us from the present foreign exchange imbroglio we find ourselves. Nigerians can then start to breathe a sigh of relieve. The Disco's increased electricity tariff sometime last year, not because there was any marked improvement in the supply of electricity to the populace, and with the support of NERC and the Ministry of Power.

About a year down the line, supply of electricity is still abysmally low, although the Minister of Power recently said we should expect a lot of improvement in power supply very soon. Interestingly, Meters have not been supplied to the majority of users, whether prepaid or otherwise, to record the actual cost of their electricity consumption, yet, estimated monthly bills, (sometimes, crazy bills), are sent to them.

The bills are sent whether the users had electricity supply during the month in question or not! This area should be seriously looked into and checkmated for fair play, equity and justice to prevail in the sector.

One of the reasons adduced for the increase in tariff is that the Disco's need to gather more funds to invest in new equipment so that there will be an improvement in the supply of electricity in the country. The question is; have they bought that equipment and put them to use? I doubt this because we are yet to see any improvement after one year of the increase in tariff. The truth is that no nation can be truly economically viable if its electricity sector is in the kind of crisis that ours is in Nigeria.

The issue of alternative sources of electricity should also be continued until everywhere is lighted up in Nigeria as I see that the government is already supplying solar electricity to some communities. Technology has provided these other options and we should take advantage of them instead of relying g only on hydro and thermal. Earlier this month, the National Assembly organised a two-day stakeholder’s interactive dialogue on the power sector in Nigeria. We can, therefore, expect to see positive changes very soon in the direction of improving the supply of electricity in Nigeria from the result of the deliberations. Most importantly, prepaid meters should

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be provided to everyone connected to the Discos so that only electricity consumed will be paid for by the users. This will engender equity and fair play in the sector.

Practical solutions to Nigeria’s electricity crisis On July 24, 20167:55 Viewpoint Comments By Ikenna Ifedobi For the first time in the nation’s history, Nigeria, Africa’s most populous black nation and the bedrock of the west African regional economy, suffered a nationwide blackout as the national grid totally collapsed on March 31, 2016. It was an event unheard of in the nation’s history. While the nation has always been known for epileptic power supply, this unfortunate event marked the emergence of a new low in the country’s power supply matrix. Nigeria’s minster of power, Raji Fashola, acknowledged that the nation did not have enough power to go around, attributing the problem to vandals sabotaging pipelines.

How odd it is that the so called giant of Africa cannot power its country and economy, given the level of technology and resources available to the nation. The aim of this article is not to point fingers, but to analyse the problem, locate the root causes and in turn propose policy making initiatives that may help in addressing and rectifying the situation promptly and efficiently. Because Africa’s most populated country is also the foundation of the West African economy, and modern day mercantilism is wholly supported by electrical power, it is imperative that Nigeria solves her energy problems immediately. Bear in mind also that without the Nigerian economy operating at full potential, the West African and indeed the African economy will remain miniscule to its worldly counterparts.

This is the domino effect of the Nigerian energy crisis. Nigeria’s electric problem is not one dimensional, as over the years many factors have intermingled to impose a multidimensional burden on the country’s power generation and distribution potential.

In this day and age and with all the natural resources Nigeria is blessed with, it baffles the clear thinking individual why the country is still at the megawatts generation stage, and why it hasn’t entered the terawatts realm, or even into the business of selling electricity to other African nations? It appears that the vision of the country’s leadership is stuck in the 1970s mind frame, oblivious of the exponential increase in population and socio-economy.

The core of Nigeria’s problems stems from mainly poor policy initiatives over the years by the country’s governments with regards to expanding the sources of electricity from the age old Kainji dam and a few scattered power plants. Also, Poor town and urban planning makes it difficult to regulate power distribution and downstream activities thus overloading the current grid, a non-existing asset 223 | P a g e

protection mechanism for the safety of power generation/distribution equipment like pipelines and plants and finally a very poor maintenance culture. The combination of these factors has placed Nigeria at about zero grid capacity per capita.

To put it in perspective, according to online research, the average Nigerian uses only 136KW/h annually; consumes only 3% of the power of the average South African and 5% of the average Chinese citizen i.e. for every 24 hours of power they get, the average Nigerian gets only 1 hour or less! That is just appalling. How can the seventh most populated country in the world generate currently 1,580 MW and potentially 6 GW! Nigeria has the potential to generate hundreds of GW of power if the right minds apply themselves to the issue. It is an absolute disgrace for the statesmen of the country to operate under such circumstances and stand amongst their peers at international conventions.

Gravity of problem to begin to solve this problem in Nigeria, it is important to approach it from a multidimensional perspective. The federal government and the present minister of power must understand the gravity of the power crisis and how detrimental it is to the Nigerian and West African economy. The issues must be seen as the number one priority, simply because in the modern world, everything runs on electricity, and to have zero MW per capita simply means to have zero interest in foreign investment and frankly, to operate a dead domestic economy. Therefore, all government parastatals and divisions, from defence to trade to oil and gas, even state and local governments must join hands in carrying out a multi-faceted plan that will rectify the situation in less than a decade.

The monopoly of hydroelectric power generation in Nigeria must be phased out immediately. The hydroelectric means cannot be the primary source of a modern economy’s power supply bearing in mind that other countries along the line are using the same river, and in fact natural circumstances may possibly dry up the river! It is not that it should be phased out, but it shouldn’t be the sine qua non in the country’s power generation.

Take for example the USA, power generation is distributed thus: coal-39%, natural gas-27%, hydro-19%, wind, solar, others-7%. Over the decade the largest increases in US power generation came from natural gas (2014 generation was 412 billion KW greater than 2004), wind increased by 168 billion KWH and solar 18 billion.26 Excluding nuclear power, Nigeria is rich in all the other resources; natural gas, oil, solar, coal and wind, not excluding the good old hydro or river dam. What then stops

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the federal government from taking the bull by the horns and building wind turbines in the great expanse of land in the northern part and middle belt area of the country?

This area too is also very rich in sunlight and will generate a great amount of solar energy. Nigeria has one of the world’s largest deposits of natural gas. With only a handful of natural gas power plants built, one wonders why a country so blessed with this wonderful resource should wallow in darkness. There is no reason why Nigeria should not have at least 150 natural gas power plants, especially from independent power producers (IPP) and national integrated power projects (NIPP). This area will also generate a lot of jobs and improve unemployment. But the operation of this policy is grounded in the ability to protect the pipeline network necessary for the entire energy sector to thrive.

Without a functioning pipeline grid, it is impossible to operate upstream and downstream sections of the oil and gas field and also, maintain functional electric power distribution and generation. While the government has proposed drones to monitor pipelines, it appears laughable given the more sophisticated and efficient alternatives available. In one of my previous articles titled “Pipeline Protection and Industrial Security in Nigeria�, which can be found online at AllNewsandReports.com, I explained the Digital Acoustic System as the most efficient mode of monitoring pipelines, plus other dynamic perspectives regarding pipeline protection.

It is imperative if Nigeria is to have electricity, that her pipelines must be protected by the most technologically advanced means possible. The issue of urban expansion and town planning then comes to mind. A cursory observation of the urban areas in most Nigerian states shows a haphazard arrangement of buildings, devoid of planning. This makes it very difficult to monitor, maintain and regulate electric supply properly. It is high time that the federal government in conjunction with state governors embark on expanding the urban areas in Nigeria. More cities must spring up to lessen the load on the already overpopulated urban regions, some of which have not expanded since the seventies.

This will enable the power regulating bodies in conjunction with federal and state governments to create a proper grid for all sections of the country and be able to monitor power supply and consumption adequately. If the cities are not depopulated and expanded into an efficient grid system, monitoring electric consumption will be absolutely impossible.

This is an absolute necessity. Nigerian mentality finally, there is the issue of government policy and maintenance culture. The Nigerian mentality is not attuned to 225 | P a g e

maintenance. In the present administration, the first issue that can be observed is the lumping together of the ministries of works, housing and power into one office, headed by a lawyer! The ministry of works and housing alone is monumentally heavy, but to add power and electricity to it, is akin to that straw that broke the camel’s back.

There is no way one person can manage all three sectors lumped together on one desk and hope to be efficient. They must be stratified, and power/electricity given paramount attention. Also, government policy must address the possibility of scavenger industries sabotaging the progress. These industries make a living from the corruption and dysfunction of the system. For example, someone engaged in pipeline bunkering will not want to see national pipelines protected, someone that makes a living importing electric generators may not want to see the country enjoying uninterrupted power supply. This is just logical. The government when it decides to address the electricity crisis and the issue of pipeline protection, must also find a diplomatic solution to rectifying the issue of people making a living for decades from national dysfunction.

A diplomatic approach is essential, because these folks have made a lot of money from their activities and are powerful. Also many of them, like the armed militant groups are clamouring for state attention and support, and must be gainfully employed and properly neutralized to minimize collateral damage. It is like removing a bull from the china shop, it can’t be done by force, or else you risk losing all your merchandize. Diplomacy is key.

All in all, if the government can pump money into protecting the nation’s pipeline grid, which is the absolute foundation for the availability of electricity, while at the same time neutralize bunkering and militancy with diplomacy, If the government can invest heavily in natural gas power plants, and work with state governments in expanding the overpopulated urban areas so as to build a proper grid for power distribution and consumption, if they can take the time and effort to put aside party politics and political vendetta and remember that this portion of the earth is all they have as a collective whole irrespective of language or religious difference,. If they can buckle down and implement this simultaneous and multidimensional approach, then in less than 10 years, the issue of power outage in Nigeria will be a thing of the past.

5.6 Technology and Failed State 2030 For the purposes of this analysis, this research assumed the following:

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a. Oil, particularly light sweet crude, remains a vital United States and global interest; b. although declining, Nigerian oil imports may account for up to 25 percent of all US oil imports; and c. Nigeria is fragmenting and sliding into a multipartite civil war. Civil war in Nigeria could destabilize all of West Africa, leading to instability across sub-Saharan Africa; create sanctuaries for violent extremist and terrorist groups; create a humanitarian crisis of unprecedented size; and create the conditions for global economic collapse.

This research also assumed that; a. the UN has sanctioned action to restore order and create conditions for a political solution to the crisis—one that will ultimately restore the Federal Republic of Nigeria; b. African nations are not in a position to lead a response force; and c. the United States will respond using the resources necessary to conduct a peace enforcement operation in order to secure critical oil infrastructure, separate belligerents, and create conditions for a political solution.

In addition to peace enforcement, the United States must prepare to provide humanitarian relief, restore basic human services as required to directly support the mission, assist NGOs as they conduct relief operations, separate the warring parties, and protect and secure the critical resource and supporting infrastructure.

A final assumption is that no other African nation will attack Nigeria since the nations in West Africa lack the forces necessary to take and hold territory. None of the forces within Nigeria the Nigerian military, Islamic and tribal militias, the corporate security forces, and insurgent groups are able to establish control over Nigeria.

I.

Options to Restore the Peace

Peace enforcement falls under the larger construct of peace operations which is defined by the DOD as “multi-agency and multinational crisis response and limited contingency operations involving all instruments of national power with military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate governance. Peace operations include peacekeeping, peace enforcement, peace-making, peace building, and conflict prevention efforts” (emphasis added).27 Peace enforcement allows for the application of military force or the threat of its use.

According to the DOD, peace enforcement is “normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or 227 | P a g e

restore peace and order.”2 In this case, the UN will only authorize the use of force to restore order, provide sufficient stability for humanitarian relief operations, and create conditions for a political solution.

II.

To Engage or Not to Engage

So why engage at all? Responding to humanitarian disasters is a mission long undertaken by the United States regardless of a country’s strategic position or interest to the United States. War, especially civil war, is arguably an unmitigated humanitarian disaster in the making, one that will require and consume tremendous resources. A humanitarian response operation is a powerful soft power option that can, over time, improve long-term relations between countries and their respective people while promoting internal security and stability.

In this case, the researchers assume engagement is required because Nigeria occupies a strategic position in sub-Saharan Africa and West Africa and provides a critical commodity the United States needs and the global economy requires in 2030. Nigeria is one of the world’s largest producers of light sweet crude oil highly prized because of ease of refinement and the proportionally high number of useful products (aviation fuel and gasoline among others) that can be distilled from it. Its loss is arguably disproportionately disruptive to the United States and the global economy and similarly destabilizing across much of subSaharan Africa.

In this case, failing to engage at all entails the risk of potential serious disruption of oil supplies, which would directly and seriously harm the United States and the global economy.

Additionally, instability in Africa has traditionally sparked new wars, famines, and genocide across the continent all of these are extraordinarily difficult challenges. As it is, this scenario will create many of these challenges. Allowing it to fester could create an intractable problem, expanding the need for humanitarian relief across a large swath of Africa.28 There is also a significant moral element that should be considered based on recent failedstate experiences. Failed states of the past for example, Lebanon and Somalia— disintegrated into destructive, even genocidal, civil wars. Lebanon’s civil war lasted from 1975 through 1990; a political solution was finally agreed to but only after hundreds of thousands of people were killed or displaced. In the case of Somalia, which completely failed in 1991, attempts at a political solution, humanitarian relief, and peacekeeping operations have all largely failed. Hundreds of thousands have died in genocidal fighting; human trafficking, piracy, transnational terrorism, religious hatred, and famine have increased suffering and promoted instability in other areas of Africa and the Middle East.

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There is still no central government—political violence, clan warfare, and religious hatred will likely keep Somalia a failed state for at least two generations. Instability in Somalia has threatened to ignite wars in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. The world is also bearing witness to the slow failure of Yemen, which suffers from weak governance and an internal Shi’a insurgency and hosts numerous terror training camps. Somalia, Eritrea, and Yemen sit astride the Gulf of Aden, a critical waterway and strategic choke point for maritime commerce leading to the Suez Canal. It is only a matter of time before intervention of some kind, likely military, will be required to keep this critical waterway open.

In the near term, a decision to not intervene may save lives and money for the nations normally expected to respond. The long term costs of waiting until a failing nation erupts in civil war with its evil sisters, genocide, hunger, privation, and disease are incalculable. Delay brings the great risk of explosive costs to the international community as it potentially spends generations, irreplaceable lives, and national treasure to rehabilitate and recover from the consequences of a failed state.

III.

US Response to Nigeria’s 2030 Failure

US-led interventions, pursue a course of action designed to create conditions for a political solution. Under these circumstances, United States priorities are to prevent full-scale civil war in Nigeria, limit the spread of conflict beyond Nigeria’s borders, secure critical oil resource areas in order to limit damage to United States and global economy, relieve human suffering in all parts of the country, identify and separate belligerents, create conditions for a political solution between warring parties and foster national reconciliation, and transition from a US-led peace enforcement operation to a UN-led national recovery and peace building operation. Normally in any peace enforcement operation, the United States relies, at least in part, on airpower to address its priorities.

In this case, researchers assume the US Air Force will serve as the lead agent of a joint and international peace enforcement operation. In light of the current situation, the Air Force must be prepared to Detect—achieve full spectrum dominance (land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace) that allows US forces to rapidly identify belligerents, survey operating areas, quickly respond to threats, identify environmental and disease vectors that could threaten the mission, and synthesize all forms of intelligence to form an accurate composite picture of the battlespace. All source intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) will help build this picture. 

Understand; use a combination of technology and human sources to characterize the nature of threats posed by the belligerents, discriminate between friend and foe, find critical players and their supporters, discern

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potential vulnerabilities and opportunities, map human and communication networks, and identify opportunities to exploit the rapidly evolving situation to defuse tensions while creating conditions for a peaceful political settlement. 

Deploy; rapidly move forces, materiel, and supporting infrastructure into the region.

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Survive; integrate the use of technology and human networking to secure US operating areas in the failed state and enhance force protection efforts.



Engage; target and attack belligerents through multiple means.



Sustain; rapidly replenish forces and quickly restore operations in the wake of losses by attack or system failure.

Technologies in 2030 available to support a military response in a failed state, especially in the most stressing case where civil war is imminent or ongoing, will likely be highly accurate, precise, direct, and discrete capabilities that allow the application of minimum force to compel warring factions to cease their hostile actions and quickly seek a political solution. The researchers expect by 2030 that weapons and supporting systems (those designed to detect, understand, deploy, survive, engage, sustain, and assess) will be tied through the ubiquitous Global Information Grid (GIG) into an adaptable, flexible, and highly responsive “system of systems.”29 The GIG in 2030 will possibly be integrated within its own network cloud composed of sensors, databases, analysts, analysing technologies, automatic recognition and characterization, decision support, decision-making models, and users. In the researchers’ opinion, today’s kill chain—find, fix, track, target, analyse, engage, and assess remains a valid operative model for this peace enforcement operation.

Every land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace weapon platform and system during this time will function as a sensor by collecting and feeding data to and through the GIG and, in many cases, conducting rudimentary analysis. Platforms and systems will probably have routine seamless access to the GIG throughout their mission but will also have stand-alone features allowing mission completion should access to the GIG be severed or compromised. The technology available in 2030 will provide accurate automatic target recognition (ATR) at much greater distances through the useof onboard and off-board detection and assessment systems.

Weapon platforms and systems in 2030 will likely be programmed with the most current up-to-the-minute information prior to each mission; this data will be updated continuously during the entire mission with additional information provided via the GIG. 230 | P a g e

Some basic assumptions about technology in this timeframe include: a. many advanced technologies will be accessible and used by no state actors (e.g., groups and individuals) b. All sensors (electro-optical, infrared, radar [C-band, X-band, etc.], multispectral, hyper spectral, ultra-spectral, electronic detection, acoustic, listening, olfactory, cyber, etc.) will be much smaller, allowing platforms to carry multiple sensors in an integrated, multisensory suite on almost any platform; c. advanced sensing and detection technologies (air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace) will provide better discrimination of targets (e.g., location of an industrial plant, identification of effluents, resolution of specific chemical trace, etc.), which will allow discrete targeting of a particular section of a target; e. advanced sensing technology will allow increased probability of detecting moving targets and “targets of opportunity,” as well as an increased probability of detecting previously unknown targets; (5) systems will likely carry the maximum number of sensors they can based on mission design, platform capabilities, system power, and computational capabilities; and f. weapons and platforms (land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace) will have the capability and capacity to be loaded with information required to support their basic mission profile prior to mission start, receive “low probability of intercept “communications from other platforms on the same mission or operating in the same area, acquire mission information from databases and sensors outside the operating area, and assess new data and synthesize it with on board resident information to refine mission parameters.

It is assumed that, when programmed or allowed, systems will self-select targets, make engagement decisions, provide assessments to other platforms or systems, and conduct operations as determined by the designated controlling commander.

The system memory storage capacity within the network cloud will be virtually unlimited; bandwidth capacity in this timeframe will range from hundreds of megabits per second to hundreds of petabytes per second higher capacity to send and receive information, while desirable, should not be a disqualifier (e.g., microsystems, which are limited by the physical size of the communications apertures/pipes).

Weapons and platforms will be capable of autonomous operations to a level determined by the designated controlling commander (or in the case of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, the president). Weapons and 231 | P a g e

platforms will, in some cases, have the ability to complete their mission if they are disconnected from the GIG and their command and control elements, and they will be subject to physical attack from all domains land, sea, air, space, and cyber using systems that can disrupt, degrade, deny, delay, and destroy.

Thus, technology in this timeframe will potentially provide many useful platforms and systems that will enable the Air Force in 2030 to act as the lead force in responding to and resolving failed-state situations. For purposes of this examination and the failed-state scenario, emphasis is given to the following areas.

IV. Detect and Understand, Prior to engagement in any scenario, the response team requires access to air, space, cyberspace, human intelligence, and other resources to build a comprehensive picture of the battle space or operating environment. Response elements will likely require ISR capabilities that they can immediately task and, in many cases, control.

The response team will require a system of systems that integrates the tasking, controlling, and manipulation of intelligence products from electro-optical, electronic, radar (various wavelengths designed to image the surface and penetrate camouflage, buildings, soil, and water), communications, auditory, acoustical, spectral (multi, hyper, and ultra), biological, chemical, nuclear, network mapping (human, cyber, communications, etc.), and other varieties of active and passive sensing and tangent systems. These can operate in the air, space, near space, cyber, surface, and subsurface environments and provide planners and operators with vital information of a dynamic environment. Nanoscale sensors employed as smart dust or a cloud of micro electromechanical systems (MEMS), also known as motes, are deployed by blast, spraying, or other similar dispersion methods.

When dispersed in target areas, these sensors, when clustered together, can create a sensing network that is virtually undetectable by an adversary but can provide valuable information about an adversary’s movement and activities. These sensors and taggant systems can track individual movements, identify disease vectors, and detect dangerous gases or effluents. Fused with other sensor information, these sensors detect and build a comprehensive picture of the battle space.

Control systems should be easily portable by individuals an easily networked with and through the GIG. The software systems should automatically control all operations once the operator provides basic mission profile information. The control system’s logic matrix should prioritize all mission tasking in the region, assign and adjust priorities, control the handoff

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from one mission system to another as required, and recommend alternative courses of action to optimize persistence and ensure mission completion.

Passive systems are designed to provide early warning of possible threats. Advanced warning should allow for a greater variety of active defence and attack operations options.

Advanced detection capabilities and systems, combined with robust signature databases, will help the response force identify biological, chemical, and nuclear hazards.

Context is “job all.� In peace enforcement, a failure to understand the strategic, operational, and tactical situation in a fluid operating environment can lead to rapid escalation with its attendant tragic consequences, including collateral damage and mission failure. The ability to understand an evolving conflict situation is useful so that appropriate courses of action can be developed and contingencies anticipated. The better the information, the more refined the solution set will be and, potentially, the better the decision.

Using integrated, persistent ISR, advanced detection systems, indigenous human intelligence capabilities (recruited and friendly), and decision support systems, the response team can begin to bound the problem. Among the more vexing challenges for the team is understanding who the belligerents are and how they are linked to other factions in the conflict (shifting alliances that can either be exploited or that may threaten the response force); how these disparate factions operate and the depth of their passion for this or any conflict; what underlying problems are sparking the conflict; what the aggravating factors are cultural, ethnic, religious, language, historic animosities, special grievances, economic, social, tribal, and so forth; and what capabilities the various factions have to continue the conflict and what they can provide their own people.

The team must also look at what various belligerents value (axiological targeting); what the current status of critical infrastructure is economic, basic services, government, military, and so forth; what the people need to sustain them until the conflict is resolved; what gaps exist in its understanding so that detection capabilities can be tasked or its capabilities refined to compensate; and what infrastructure is available to receive, host, and sustain the forces flowing into the country.

With this basic understanding, the team can refine its response and make it more targeted and efficient. While there are many unknowns in a failed-state civil war, a well-informed response force that understands the situation on the ground can spend more of its energy and resources addressing real problems in discrete areas rather than husbanding resources to respond to all unknowns.

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In the face of belligerents taking advantage of the collapse of a central government and a nation’s disintegration, understanding who they are and, more importantly, what they value becomes critical in this fluid environment. Systems that map human and communication networks and identify key players among various factions make axiological or value targeting possible. Once the players are identified, it is then possible to identify what they value. With this information, the response force can take action compelling belligerents to cease or curtail their hostile or divisive activities and, perhaps, encourage them into a process that ends violence and creates conditions for a political solution and the possible restoration of the state.

Thus, persistent ISR, decision support systems, human and communications network mapping systems, reliable communications (radio, telecom, and computer), language and cultural competency, and knowledge of the conditions precipitating and aggravating the crisis are essential to understanding the situation in a failed state. It is especially important to be forearmed prior to deploying forces or taking actions to resolve seemingly intractable civil wars and even lower-level conflict. Current, actionable information presented in its proper context is a very powerful weapon.

V. Deploy Once a decision is made to conduct a peace enforcement operation in 2030, the ability to rapidly deploy forces, support, and humanitarian relief materiel will be critical. In a situation where a civil war is threatening, the shock effect generated by the quick deployment of a large number of forces arriving simultaneously and ready to engage can potentially slow down belligerent actions and give hope to innocent victims, while reassuring regional nations and global markets. The deployed force must arrive quickly, be large enough to be immediately visible to the populace, and robust enough to have an immediate impact on events.

In a nation with 10 times the people and more than twice the land area of Iraq, the number of forces and resources necessary will be quite large. Airborne delivery of personnel and equipment in such a situation must be rapid and highly efficient. Within hours of a direction to deploy to the affected area, air forces must load and deliver hundreds of thousands of pounds of personnel and materiel for an Air Force wing to conduct and sustain operations.

The scope of the humanitarian crisis may be hundreds of times larger than the Berlin Airlift.

The absence of surface infrastructure means much of this materiel will be delivered by air, as the road network will not be adequate to move goods from seaports to inland areas. The Air Force’s current lift capabilities are grossly inadequate for this scenario.

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For this task, Air Force lift capabilities must have unrefuelled global range and be able to use unimproved, even open, farm fields to deploy and receive military forces and equipment.

Given the shifting alliances and the multipartite aspect of Nigeria’s civil conflict, any local contracting will be seen as taking sides all operations will be done “in-house” or in conjunction with allies. In order to carry the quantity of materials to stem a humanitarian crisis involving a quarter of a billion people, size will be important. Some airlift aircraft will need the cargo capacity of modern sealift vessels and will need to be self-supporting. They must carry any required air and space ground and material handling equipment for loading, unloading, and relaunching the aircraft.

Once unloaded, these enormous airlifters should be rapidly configurable to move refugees or internally displaced persons, carry the wounded, move indigenous cargo for the local population or NGOs, conduct airdrops of food and critical equipment, and even act as an airborne command centre as the situation warrants. Some large airlifters may need to be configured as “hospital ships” like the US Navy Ships Mercy and Comfort.

Medium airlifters C-5, C-17, and C-130 aircraft and contracted cargo airlift—will be used in the failed-state scenario in 2030; however, their utility may be somewhat limited by access to airfields. As proven assets, they are useful for moving cargo from logistics hubs to forward operating locations and for conducting airdrop operations. Short haul airlift can be provided

by CV-22 and the Joint Cargo Aircraft. The inability of helicopters to self-deploy across the Atlantic means that vast quantities of lift, which may be needed for immediate humanitarian relief and stabilization, will be required to move these assets to theatre.

V.I. Survive to Operate Threats to deploying aircraft will normally be considered low for the 2030 timeframe.

However, in 2030 this means that, in addition to automatic weapons, handheld surface-to-air missiles such as the SA-7, SA-9, SA-16, SA-18, and SA-24 will likely be available on world arms markets and may be in the inventory of the oligarchs’ security forces and individuals.

As a result, aircraft operating in theater must be able to detect these threats at tactically significant ranges and successfully defend themselves, as even relief operations for opposing segments of the population may be seen as provocative, especially in the early phases.

Securing operating areas in a failed state with little more than what is deployed with the response force requires technologies that are simple to set up, integrate, operate, and employ in various scenarios. Generating power, treating water and sewage, controlling 235 | P a g e

disease vectors, and securing installations and facilities will be essential to mission success since these help promote a general sense of security among threatened populations.

Electrical power is essential to all modern military and civilian operations. Portable power stations, not the current diesel or gas generators, will be required in a failed-state scenario.

These power stations should make use of locally procured sources of fuel; waste materials (e.g., garbage, sewage, etc.) will likely be the easiest to obtain. Easily deployable and assembled alternative energy stations (e.g., solar, wind, etc.) can help augment power generation and mitigate shortages.

With assured power generation, the response force can make clean water, treat its sewage, provide lifesaving medical care, operate advanced communications, sustain command and control and military operations, power solid-state directed energy weapons and detection sensors for installation defence, and conduct other mission sustainment operations. An uninterruptable power source is also necessary to pump and distil oil, operate tank farms and hydrant fuel systems, fuel aircraft and vehicles, and operate other types of fuel and power systems.

Because of the logistical difficulties in providing sufficient aviation and motor vehicle gasoline in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, and other locations to sustain operations, Air Force systems should be configured as flex-fuel systems (microbial, synthetic gasoline, bio, etc.) or use alternative sources of energy that can be accessed and developed cheaply and easily on site.

Monitoring the spread of disease in the tropical developing world is also crucial. Here, swarms of unmanned systems, enabled by micro and nanotechnology, could be used to identify disease vectors throughout Nigeria, allowing the response force to bring appropriate medicines and material to treat disease and eradicate its source. Additionally, small MEMS vehicles could be used to inoculate populations in remote areas against endemic or epidemic disease. This would not only improve the health of the indigenous population but also protect the response force by slowing the spread of illnesses against which the response force may have limited immunity.

Force protection and installation security in a failed-state environment should be easily deployable, non–labour intensive, and effective (force protection “in a box�). Such protection systems could include defence systems that can sense incoming threats and use small nonlethal weapons such as a miniaturized active denial system against humans or a directed-energy-based defence system against incoming mortars or missiles. They should also include active detection and sensing systems designed to detect and defeat improvised explosive devices, both static and those rigged to people and animals.

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As this mission in Nigeria involves securing and repairing critical oil and gas production facilities and associated infrastructure, the ability to defend the restoration operations is essential. A combination of persistent ISR, advanced ATR, and passive and active defence measures on the various facilities are needed. Keeping the pipelines and pumping stations in operation, despite attacks, is also a required capability. As such, material advancements such as “spray on� ballistic jackets for pipelines, pumping stations, and trans loading facilities could mitigate attacks and assure global markets that the flow of oil and gas would continue. Once those facilities were protected, skilled oil technicians would be recruited and contracted to operate and maintain the existing infrastructure. They must be safely housed, fed, inoculated, and cared for.

The US Air Force has proven it is well versed in active engagement of targets. The recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated a need for identifying human networks, air vehicles capable of long loiter and persistence, developing weapons that are able to deliver greater precision in their destructive power (i.e., weapons that kill the target but leave the surrounding area unharmed), positive target identification, and better means for assessing the implications and the level of destruction. Collateral damage has inadvertently increased hostility against the United States and will continue to do so. If our ability to mitigate this damage remains unchanged, collateral damage has the potential to exacerbate insurgencies and push a future Nigeria over the brink into open civil war.

Feeding the GIG with advanced detection capabilities, the Air Force should be able to identify and track viable targets. Modern remotely piloted aircraft can track and target hostile elements, and air vehicle swarms and tangents can mark belligerents, thus making it easy to distinguish them from the nonviolent population. Directed energy weapons carried on aircraft and on ground vehicle scan be utilized to effectively target and eliminate belligerents with precision. Such weapons virtually eliminate the potential for collateral damage. Nonlethal weapons, including microwave, foam, and other effective crowd control weapons, can be employed with impunity from aircraft. Again, they minimize the possibility of collateral damage, which, in turn, discourages an active insurgency.

By 2030 many nations in the world will have the most modern advanced communications and will have citizens who actively use the NGI, cloud computing, and broadband communications. Computer savvy people operating alone or within a criminal enterprise may use cyberattacks to disrupt the actions and systems of a technologically advanced response force. Thus, the response force must be able to monitor its networks and aggressively seek out and neutralize any potential threats. In the event of a successful cyberattack, the response force must be able to instantly identify the attacker, take actions to neutralize the

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attack system, assess damage, and reconstitute its networks. Rapid reconstitution makes a powerful impression on belligerents and civil society alike.

While helping provide security and promoting stability, advanced technology weapons (lethal and nonlethal) may also attract support from various indigenous groups who might be impressed by the response force’s capabilities. This, in turn, helps separate belligerents from their base of support; response forces may then find it easier to create conditions for a political solution. However, such technologies must provide a visible “massing” of force and must be sustained.

Sustain in a failed-state scenario, the risk of loss of air and space assets is likely relatively low compared to a near-peer scenario. Most nations that are likely to fail do not normally possess robust integrated air defence or anti-satellite capabilities (the former Soviet Union being a notable exception). This in no way precludes them from acquiring such capabilities or engaging in various forms of hybrid warfare to strike critical terrestrial nodes.

Attacks through cyberspace and direct attacks against land based support infrastructure pose the greatest danger, especially for Air Force information and space systems. Airlift must be robust enough to provide an unbreakable supply chain to bring critical mission components and materiel into the country when and where it is needed.

Without forward basing or “lily pads” in the affected area, airlift capabilities must be able to reach any point on the earth quickly and effectively from continental US locations. Aircraft in flight and logistics nodes must be able to receive information from the frontline forces, even down to the individual, so that appropriate supplies can be quickly brought in to the country and forwarded to the location needed. Requests for supplies and assistance through the GIG are as important as the in-transit visibility it affords. Further, in a scenario as demanding as a failed Nigeria, forces will not have the luxury of delivering too many supplies to one location, as it will mean too few in another; this will permit lives to hang in the balance everywhere. Information assurance in a failed-state scenario such as this is essential, requiring the GIG and the network cloud to be adaptable and self-healing in the event of a cyberattack or the loss of a physical node.

VII. Technology Summary Failed states on the verge of civil war present innumerable and extraordinarily difficult challenges. In the case of Nigeria, a country with a vital resource for the United States and the rest of the modern world, its failure must be immediately addressed. While the US military likely possesses the means to get its forces to the region, how it will deal with various individuals (“Bubba Einstein”), groups, and factions possessing some of the 238 | P a g e

technological capabilities of modern states requires investments now in critical enabling technologies.

Early investment in technologies that should be available for use in 2030 will ensure they are ready and relatively easy to adapt into systems necessary to detect, understand, deploy, survive, engage, and sustain forces that can counter and respond to the surprises a future failed state will pose. This body of work, while focused on Nigeria, explores dynamics that exist in many other failed and failing states. This scenario could have just as easily been about a nuclear-armed Pakistan, which presents vexing and extraordinarily dangerous challenges. Whether these dynamics lead to the failure of any particular state has much to do with the quality of governance, the wisdom of national leaders, the assistance and support of other nations and international institutions, and a commitment by the people to secure for themselves and their posterity a life and nation they can be proud to call their own.

The history of any nation provides a context for examining the current state of affairs and then projecting possible and even probable outcomes or alternate futures. With history as a starting point, analysts can anticipate the possible choices that must be made in response to a failed state as it slips into civil war. More importantly, these analysts should identify the kinds of investments in technology that must be made now to help ensure success. In the case of Nigeria in 2030, its history of tribal and religious conflict, endemic corruption at all levels of government, poor national planning, uneven development, social disorder, rampant criminality, violent insurgency, and terminal weak governance provides an environment that could portend imminent collapse and failure.In the absence of a pandemic, oil spill, or earthquake, national collapse and state failure are often the result of a culmination or a cascade of failures in critical areas required to build and maintain a healthy nation. These paths are often intertwined; the loss of one or many can rob a nation of its identity and speed the process of failure.

Through the lens of history, this study’s authors envisioned the conditions that might cause Nigeria to fail in 2030. These same conditions could and do exist, to varying degrees, in other nation-states. In this 2030 case study, fragmentation of the Nigerian body politic could create conditions for a multipartite civil war, mirroring in some ways the events in Lebanon in 1975 and Somalia in 1991.However, Nigeria’s 250 million people, 350 different ethnicities, and religious differences can, under the right circumstances, cause the nation to shatter in an instant.

While Nigeria has experienced civil war in the past, the ramifications of one in the 2030 timeframe, given the importance of Nigerian oil to the world economy and easy access to advanced technology, would be much greater. One can only imagine the impact on the 239 | P a g e

world economy of the sixth most populated country on Earth—the most populous nation in Africa and a top 20 economy—suddenly collapsing and erupting into nationwide violence. In a highly globalized world, the failure of one nation can send out a potentially destructive shockwave rapidly destabilizing other nations, some in close proximity and others around the world.

There is a saying today that “as Nigeria goes, so goes the rest of Africa,” which illustrates the strategic influence Nigeria has on the African continent. By 2030 this influence will probably be much greater. This fact alone creates an imperative for deliberate and immediate action to halt conflict, relieve suffering, restore conditions for a political solution, reverse failure, and ultimately restore Nigeria as a functioning state. With its growing population and the importance of petroleum and natural gas to the world economy, Nigeria’s influence will only increase over the next few decades. Thus, a civil war, whether it occurs or not, could be devastating for Nigeria, West Africa in which Nigeria is the leading power, and Africa as a whole.

The ECOWAS has conducted a number of peacekeeping operations in Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, and Sierra Leone. However, it is dominated by Nigeria and would likely be incapable of dealing with Nigeria’s failure and a subsequent civil war. With war, millions of refugees would flee across Nigeria’s borders into Cameroon, Niger, and Benin, putting tremendous strain on their human services, local infrastructure, and national economies.

The more destructive the civil war, the greater the chance of genocide and other horrors that leave an indelible stain on human history.

On a larger scale, a failure of the Federal Republic of Nigeria or a state of similar influence would wreak havoc on the global economy. With continued globalization and Nigeria’s position as a major player in global economics now and in 2030, its collapse will have enormous wide-ranging impact. Even though demand for oil and gas may be declining in 2030, they will still be vital for most economies to function.When presented with any failedstate scenario, the United States and other world nations must decide whether intervention is required, and if so, when, where, why, and how to intervene. Intervention in any failed state in 2030 will potentially bring great economic and political costs. Thus, it is likely the United States will initially strive to build coalitions and assist NGOs operating in the region, rather than take on the challenge alone in the absence of assistance from other nations.

If the United States chooses to intervene, it must act quickly to address a myriad of practical infrastructure, governmental, and humanitarian problems. In most cases when employing military or “hard power,” the United States seeks to minimize its presence while using technology to maximize effect. By 2030 the US military’s ability to move resources and 240 | P a g e

create instant effects will probably still be unrivalled. The US Air Force in 2030 will still master and require systems and technologies to immediately detect and understand, rapidly deploy and engage, and sustain and quickly resupply itself for almost any military or peace operation.

Detection technologies which provide high-fidelity information that enable both skilled analysts and front-line troops to accurately assess, properly characterize, and understand the nature of the operating environment and the capabilities and threats posed by adversaries will be prized. These technologies must provide users with the forensic tools required to properly attribute attacks, discriminate between belligerents and non-combatants, and empower leaders to anticipate enemy actions while formulating appropriate responses to real threats and conditions, sometimes at machine speed. Systems allowing a force to survive in place by providing robust force protection and engaging adversaries before they pose a direct threat will reduce the “tail” while adding more war fighting “tooth.”

Advanced airlift systems, both manned and unmanned, in 2030 must be larger than today’s airlifters, have an unrefuelled global reach, be fast, be able to self-defend, and be more than capable of operating in austere environments with little support. The team able to arrive first and meet the needs of the people in a highly charged and confused civil war environment will likely stand the best chance of winning hearts and minds. This will help create conditions for disparate factions to work together to rebuild.

Under conditions of failure and multipartite civil war, sorting through the ethnic and cultural stew will be virtually impossible since most people will identify more with their tribe, religion, or culture than with their country. In the case of Nigeria or any nation, shifting allegiances will make the task of restoring a failed state extraordinarily difficult. In a globalized world with advanced communications technology available even to the most destitute, governance vacuums become more obvious to disenfranchised people. No doubt the same will be true of the Nigerian people in 2030. Today’s ubiquitous availability and popularity of technology such as cell phones, computers, television, personal data assistants, social networking, and the Internet create greater awareness and increase socialization. The African people are openly embracing these technologies. Without a basic understanding of the context of national history or a nation’s present circumstances, this new awareness and virtual socialization afforded by these technologies proliferate group grievances, which lead to greater mistrust of all institutions related to governance.

In a world of virtual social networks, facts can give way to rumour and innuendo, especially in a failing state; these rumours then begin to fill the leadership and information vacuum, as do “outsiders” with agendas of their own. In the absence of good governance, the people 241 | P a g e

supplant the existing social contract with one of their own making. The weight of this mass of disparate agendas and emerging social orders can fill the vacuum until it reaches a critical mass and then, in an instant explosion, rapidly collapses the existing order. What remains is anything but orderly.

Whether the US Air Force will be prepared with the right technologies and capabilities to respond to a failed state depends, in large measure, on prioritized technology investments today. A single gold-plated system likely has limited utility in a future failed state scenario since surprises and unanticipated challenges will abound. Thus, a variety of capabilities enhancing the US Air Force’s ability to detect, understand, deploy, survive, engage, and sustain forces while protecting those who can restore or rehabilitate a failed state and its critical industries are essential. The wisdom applied to these critical technology investment decisions, especially the game changing cyber, nano, and biotechnologies, will likely carry the US Air Force through many fights, including the all-important and arguably most stressing 2030 scenario—a failed state sliding into a protracted and bloody civil war.

5.7 Definitions of Failed or Weakened States US Agency for International Development (USAID). In the 2005 Fragile States Strategy, USAID uses the term “fragile states” to include those that fall along a spectrum of “failing, failed, and recovering from crisis.” The most severe form of fragile states is “crisis states,” where conflict is ongoing or “at great risk” of occurring, and the central government does not exert “effective control” over its territory, is “unable or unwilling to assure the provision of vital services to significant parts of its territory,” and holds “weak or non-existent legitimacy among its citizens.”30 National Intelligence Council (NIC). In Mapping the Global Future, the NIC describes “failed or failing states” as having “expanses of territory and populations devoid of effective government control” which are caused by internal conflicts. In this report, the NIC considers the terms “post-conflict” and “failed state” to be synonymous.

National Security Council (NSC). The NSC defines “weak states” as lacking the “capacity to fulfil their sovereign responsibilities” in the 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT). The strategy document also describes some weak states as lacking “law enforcement, intelligence, or military capabilities to assert effective control over their entire territory.” The NSC describes failing states in the 2006 NSCT as similar to “states emerging from conflict.”

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US Government Accountability Office (GAO). GAO, in its 2007 report Forces That Will Shape America’s Future, defines failed or failing states as “nations where governments effectively do not control their territory, citizens largely do not perceive the governments as legitimate, and citizens do not have basic public services or domestic security.”

US Interagency Working Group on International Crime. In the 2000 International Crime Threat Assessment report, an interagency working group created under the Clinton administration defines a failed state as “unwilling or unable” to meet “many of the accepted standards and responsibilities of sovereign control over its territory,” which may lead to “significant economic deterioration and political unrest that threatens both internal and regional stability.”

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, of which the United States is a member, defines fragile states as lacking “either the will or the capacity to engage productively with their cityLiana Sun Wyler, Weak and Failing States: Evolving Security Threats and U.S. citizens to ensure security, safeguard human rights, and provide the basic function for development.” They are further characterized as possessing “weak governance, limited administrative capacity, chronic humanitarian crisis, persistent social tensions, violence, or the legacy of civil war.”

Political Instability Task Force (PITF). Originally commissioned by the Central Intelligence Agency’s directorate of intelligence in 1994 and called the “State Failure Task Force,” PITF defines state failure as a “range of severe political conflicts and regime crises” which is characterized by a “total or near-collapse of central political authority.” The task force’s statistical methodology identifies instances of politicised, genocide, adverse regime changes, and ethnic and revolutionary wars as situations when total or partial state failure occur.

US Commission on Weak States. This bipartisan commission, sponsored by the Washington Think Tank Centre for Global Development, in its final 2003 report entitled On the Brink: Weak States and U.S. National Security, defines weak states as those with “governments unable to do the things that their own citizens and the international community expect from them: protecting people from internal and external threats, delivering basic health services and education, and providing institutions that respond to the legitimate demands and needs of the population.”31 World Bank. The World Bank’s Fragile States Initiative, previously called LowIncome Countries Under Stress (LICUS) Initiative, describes fragile states as often characterized by poor governance, internal conflicts or tenuous post conflict transitions, weak security, fractured societal relations, corruption, breakdowns in the rule of law, and insufficient mechanisms for generating legitimate power and 243 | P a g e

authority. All are low income, which is defined as countries with a 2006 gross national income per capita of $905 or less, calculated using the World Bank’s Atlas Method.

Notes 1.

Falola, Toyin, and Matthew M. Heaton. A History of Nigeria. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008 158.

2.

The author developed this figure to provide the reader with a quick-look synopsis of the multiple factors at work within Nigeria from 2008 to 2030

3.

.Library of Congress Federal Research Division. Country Profile: Nigeria.Washington, DC: Library of Congress, June 2006.http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/profiles/Nigeria.pdf (accessed 9 August 2017).

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4.

Goings, “Nigeria: Socio-Economic Factors 2007.” According to the CIA, World Fact book 2008, the youth population (under age 16) accounts for 41.7 percent of the total population

5.

The CIA’s World Factbook 2008 shows Nigeria to have approximately 146,255,000 people, of which half, or 73 million, are Muslim.

6.

This percentage is synthesized from research reports from the United Nations(UN) Development Program, the UN Population Program, and the World Bank;

7.

Goings, “Nigeria: Socio-Economic Factors 2007;” and statistical information found in The World Fact Book 2008.

8.

Ploch, Nigeria: Current Issues, p.12.

9.

In 2006 Nigeria’s National Population Commission attempted a new census, but the results of this effort are widely dismissed because of flawed collection and calculation methodologies and a failure to collect information about controversial demographics like religion.

10. Millennium Challenge Corporation. “Annual Scorecard of Policy Categories NigeriaFY07,”19March2008.http://www.mcc.gov/selection/scorecards/2007/lic/sco7_lic _nigeria.pdf(accessed 19 March 2017).

11. Ploch, Nigeria: Current Issues, p.6.

12. Schlisser, “Global War on Terrorism.” Although likely written after 2003, the presentation is based on the analysis of captured al-Qaeda documents in 2005 showing a well-constructed, seven-phase, 20-year strategy which began with the events of 9/11 13. Department of Defence (DOD).Sea basing Joint Integrating Concept 1.0. Washington, DC: DOD, 1 August 2005.

14. US Department of State, “Background Note: Nigeria,” 6.

15. Jane’s Information Group, “Procurement, Nigeria,”.

16. Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “World Population Prospects”; and UN, “World Urbanization Prospects 17. First-hand account of the deputy chief of plans for Task Force IV, the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, and the Coalition Provisional Authority during Operation Iraqi Freedom, January–June 2003.

18. This was practiced extensively in Iraq by Saddam Hussein and immediately after his overthrow in 2003 (author’s first-hand account, January–June 2003) against the Shi’a.

19. Gupta, Sanjay. “Climate Change and Diminishing Desert Resources.” CNN.com, 18 June

2007.

http://edition.cnn.com/HEALTH/blogs/paging.dr.gupta/2007/06/climate-

change-and-diminishing-desert.html (accessed 22 June 2009).

20. Ploch, Nigeria: Current Issues. p.17.

21. Ploch, Nigeria: Current Issues, p.12.

22. Nigeria: Want in the Midst, ICG, p. 1.

23. Peters, Nigerian Military and the State, 176.

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24. Jane’s Information Group, “World Armies, Nigeria,” 2–9.

25. Ifedobi is an economist and a consultant of the American Petroleum Institute (API), 26. http://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/07/practical-soutions-nigerias-electricity-crisis/ 27. Jane’s Information Group, “World Air Forces, Nigeria,” 2–7.

28. Bah, Abu Bakarr. “Approaches to Nation Building in Post-Colonia Nigeria.” Journal of Political and

Military Sociology, Summer 2004, 45–56.

29. Jane’s Information Group, “World Armies, Nigeria,” 2–9.

30. US Department of State, “Background Note: Nigeria 31. Department of Defense, Seabasing Joint Integrating Concept 1.0.

CHAPTER SIX

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Insurgency in Nigeria: "I never call it an insurgency. I call it terrorism."

Author: Hamid Karzai

6.1 Addressing the causes as part of the solution The one exception is the issue of insurgency, which is growing in strength and sophistication and becoming quite ominous for Nigeria. This chapter examines the growth of various insurgency movements in Nigeria, noting the strengths and impact 247 | P a g e

of each and their potential to destabilise the country to the point of state failure and possible disintegration. This chapter then addresses the causative factors of insurgency in Nigeria, including the religious and ideological discontent which appears to be propelling the current conflict in Northern Nigeria. The chapter then considers some of the policy options for addressing these causes and conflict and recommends, among other measures, the establishment of a constitutional body - a supreme council for interreligious conflict to function as a final arbiter in all interreligious conflicts that are potentially explosive conflicts.

I. Nigeria on the brink Nigeria is at a dreadful precipice. Observers of the country and everyone with any interest in it must be very concerned about what the fallout would be should it be unable to surmount its current problems. The problems are a complex blend of social, political, ethnic, legal and constitutional problems which now bedevil the country in proportions never before experienced in the turbulent and checkered history of this potentially great nation. There is now a dangerous escalation of terrorist campaigns with all the hallmarks of insurgency. Religion may well add to the unending list of Nigeria’s woes, as it appears to dominate the essential character of the current campaign of insurgency. Ironically, it could well portend a catastrophe, if not properly managed alongside other instruments of state policy.

Nigeria is at the moment at a crossroads. At the end of the day, given the dynamics of the turbulence in the polity, policy choices will certainly dictate whether Nigeria can survive as a state or fail and splinter into fledgling micro-mini states. The indicators are glaring, profuse and ominous.

Boko Haram insurgency, political violence,

corruption, nepotism, tribalism, indiscipline, abduction and kidnappings, armed robbery, murder and extortion, bombings of places of worship and innocent Nigerians are all the indicators of a failing state.

Nigeria is clearly a nation at war with itself. The path we are treading is a threat to the continued peace, unity and prosperity of this land we call our home .1 this is not the Nigeria we inherited from our predecessors, this is not the Nigeria we envisioned as young men. Favouritism, nepotism and tribal sentiments have made it impossible to run a merit driven system. Hard work, brilliance, honesty and integrity in our dealings are no longer rewarded. Rather we celebrate mediocrity soaked in the corruption we claim is our common enemy. I am scared and deeply worried. The situation is grave. Ultimately, the former Chief Justice emphasised, ‘these social

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upheavals clearly threaten the survival of the Nigerian nation and we all have a duty to rise and stem the tide’.2 From the above portrayal, it may not be wrong to conclude with the Chief Justice that Nigeria is a ‘failing’ or, indeed, a failed state. The situation in Nigeria now has been characterised as being worse than Mohammed Farrah Aidid’s Somalia or, indeed, Yugoslavia following the death of Marshal Tito. The problem is that, if the slide is not checked in good time, the fallout and trauma in the Nigerian case is likely to be worse than Yugoslavia and Somalia put together.

To understand what exactly Chief Justice Musdapher meant, it is instructive to understand and appreciate each of the phenomena the respected judge mentioned.

In the process, it will be necessary to answer the question whether, given a failure to abate or mitigate the dynamic interplay of the lethal factors prevailing in the state, Nigeria can survive or will break up as similarly situated countries have historically done. A further question is whether, if the probability of fragmentation is high, there are measures to prevent it from occurring.

2.2. Indicia of instability in Nigeria It is necessary to assess each of the indicators to know which, if any, standing alone or in concert with others, has the potential to deal a mortal blow to the continued existence of Nigeria.

I. Political violence Political violence is the use of lethal force or other debilitating means by a person or persons against others. In Africa, and particularly in Nigeria, political violence has often occurred in anticipation of, during or sometime after an election campaign. It has been a feature of Nigerian electoral history recorded as early as the preindependence elections in the 1950s. It is usually intended to eliminate, intimidate, or otherwise subdue political opponents so as to obtain an advantage in the political process. It may have attained its zenith in the early 1960s in the old Western regional elections. The violence in response to the 2011 federal elections, particularly in the northern states, may well be an indication of a resurgence of violence related to the political process in Nigeria. Some Nigerians have described the recent Boko Haram insurgency as primarily politically motivated, though with a religious and ideological colour.

Political violence has never contributed to the stability of the state or government. In fact, it is said to have contributed substantially to the failure of Nigerian’s First 249 | P a g e

Republic and the emergence of military politics in the country in 1966. For obvious reasons, it abated significantly during military governance but re-emerged with the inception of partisan politics in 1978. It died down again between 1984 and 1998, although there were allegations of political violence during the latter part of military rule from 1994 to 1998. There has been a visible resurgence since 1999, when the country began its current attempt to move toward democracy. The current spate of political violence is the fact that, in all estimations, the intensity and frequency of the violence since 1999 - including murder, kidnapping, extortion and communal violence - has reached alarming proportions requiring urgent attention.

II. Corruption, nepotism and tribalism The three closely-related phenomena of corruption, nepotism and tribalism are very deeply rooted in the Nigerian way of life. Corruption is any conduct, including verbal and non-verbal communication, which tends to compromise the integrity or to blemish the innocence of the parties involved. This definition, no doubt, raises subjective elements of moral, ethical and cultural context.4 Both nepotism and tribalism are primordial instincts and are corruptive in that they debase or deprecate the high moral and ethical values which sustain competition in society. They debase the very foundations of any merit system and destroy the competitive spirit and, indeed, do not assist the lofty dictates and aspirations of the work ethic.3 Nepotism involves acts of favouritism, especially relating to patronage or benevolence by public officials and is directed to various categories of relatives.

Such conduct confers advantages, often unmerited, and thereby defeats fair play and denies the competitive rights of similarly situated parties. The public officer’s conduct may be said to be monopolistic and thereby distorts competition, particularly when the beneficiary pays for the benefit. Morally and legally, it is a wrong, because it denies others the right to compete. Applied to employment opportunities, it distorts the labour market and thereby disturbs an otherwise even distribution of labour in the market and interferes with the employment of the right personnel for maximal efficiency and productivity.

A tribe is a cultural or ethnic group or sub-group with prominent, identifiable linguistic and other features, sometimes including prominent biophysical ones. Nigeria is reputed to have at least 250 tribes, with an even larger number of ethnic subdivisions, and over 500 languages and dialects. Tribalism is conduct, particularly of a public official, in a manner that favours inordinately persons or issues which relate to his tribal affiliation. Tribalism is closely related to nepotism in that their economic, 250 | P a g e

political and social outcomes are similar. Both are discriminatory and, therefore, legally unjustifiable as they debase the idea of equal opportunity.

Corruption, tribalism and nepotism are essentially inter-twined in that they evoke dysfunctional social, political, economic and organisational outcomes. Our capacity to investigate, arrest, prosecute and convict those found guilty of contravening our laws is evidently weak and compromised; yet no one is held responsible, If a person is accused of wrongdoing in Nigeria, his kinsmen are quick to relegate his clear transgressions to some kind of conspiracy against one of their own. Corruption and nepotism are supported and encouraged by its benefactors at the expense of all others. When a person occupies a position of authority, he is expected to help his own. The same people that complain about the impropriety of others become even more blatant when their so-called turn comes.

Corruption, nepotism and tribalism - an inseparable trio - have been with the Nigerian political system for a long time. Corruption has reached alarming proportions in recent times, but has earlier antecedents.4 The military cited corruption among the political elites as one of the primary reasons for the military coup d’état of 15 January 1966 that ended Nigeria’s First Republic.

The eradication of corruption was one of General Yakubu Gowon’s stated preconditions for the handover of power to civilian politicians in assuming the position of military head of state.5 the public policy of trying to curb corruption in the Nigerian system has been sustained since General Gowon’s regime. Several years later, Nigerians welcomed the creation of the Independent Corrupt Practices and Related Offences Commission in 2000, along with the subsequent establishment of its tribunal. Even so, Nigeria has recently been rated as one of the most highly corrupt nations in the world by Transparency International- an assessment shared by many Nigerians.6 III.

Ill-discipline and related crimes

Ill-discipline, abductions and kidnappings, armed robbery, murder and extortion as other grave problems facing Nigeria. All of these, except ill-discipline, are prohibited offences under the Nigerian Criminal Code, which has been in existence since 1943.

They are also included in the Nigerian Penal Code (for the north) which came into force in 1958. Ill-discipline is often associated with, or a precondition to, lawlessness.

Where it is pervasive, as is now the case in Nigeria, particularly as it concerns other criminal conduct, it is an indicator of a flagrant disregard for - or a failure of - the legal order, particularly the penal law. These can result in grave political and security 251 | P a g e

consequences. But the question remains: Can any of these alone, or in concert, threaten the existence of Nigeria? My hunch is to doubt that these alone could. Let us look at some of the others.

IV.

Terrorism and insurgency

Since 2010, or thereabouts, terrorist attacks in the form of bombings of religious and other targets has been increasing at an alarming rate.7 More than ever before in the history of Nigeria, the scourge of terrorism poses great challenges in the Nigerian state. Our slide into anarchy has assumed dangerous dimensions, perhaps beyond the capacity of our security agencies to deal with the menace effectively. Although terrorism is not easily defined, it may be said to be the use of force, usually violent, as a means of coercing a target population to submit to the will of the terrorists.

Terrorism is intended to elicit or maximise fear and publicity, making no distinction as to combatants and non-combatants in a conflict.

There is no legally agreed upon definition of the term ‘terrorism’, but a recent United Nations (UN) document describes it as any ‘act which is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organisation to do or abstain from doing any act’.8 The word ‘terrorism’ is both emotionally and politically laden, particularly as it imports issues of national liberation and self-determination.9 Terrorism takes many forms, including political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious and ecological issues. The taxonomy of terrorism, including precipitating motivations and considerations, is now a subject of intense study.10 Whether the Nigerian experience can be reduced to a type may be an interesting subject, but for purposes of this article, the primary concern is the threat of insurgency.11 Insurgency is one objective of organised terrorism, just as terrorism is one of several strategies of insurgency. Both terrorism and insurgency may be used by states in their internal and foreign policy operations. Terrorism and terrorist tactics constitute part of the strategies and tactics of insurgency. The operational tactics are essentially those of guerilla warfare. The object is to intimidate, frustrate and raise the feeling of uncertainty, imminent danger and the loss of hope, so as to cripple or limit all aspects of human activity and normal livelihoods.

Al Qaeda, Boko Haram, MEND and, lately, Jama’atuAhlissunnahLidda’anati Wal Jihad, are currently international and local Nigerian examples of terrorist networks.

Until recently, Nigerian terrorist activity was thought to be motivated by ethnocentric 252 | P a g e

considerations. Currently, there appears to be a pronounced religious content in the character of insurgency in Nigeria. A few of the earlier experiences merit examination here, as a guide in estimating the character, trend and intensity of the current campaign, as well as the dynamics and possible consequences.

6.3

History of insurgency in Nigeria

Previous insurgencies in Nigeria have varied in their scope, sophistication and intensity. There have been at least six instances. We need to briefly consider them in turn, based on a rough chronological order.

I.

Declaration of Niger Delta Republic

The first known insurgency or terrorism attempt in Nigeria may be credited to the movement to liberate the Niger Delta people led by Major Isaac Jasper AdakaBoro.

Major Boro belonged to the Ijaw ethnic extraction in the Niger Delta region and, at the time of his rebellion, was a student at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka. His complaint was against the exploitation of the oil and gas resources of the Niger Delta by both the federal and regional governments in total disregard of the citizens of the area. Boro formed the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), an armed military group composed of 150 of his kinsmen. He firmly believed that the people of the Niger Delta deserved a more equitable share of the wealth which accrued from oil. To press the point, on 23 February 1966, the NDVF declared the Niger Delta Republic.

The Republic lasted only 12 days before the federal military forces crushed the insurgency and arrested Boro. He and his followers were charged, tried and imprisoned for treason. However, on the eve of the Nigeria-Biafra war in July 1967, General Yakubu Gowon granted them amnesty. Boro enlisted in the federal forces in the war against the rebel Biafran forces of Odumegwu Ojukwu. He died a hero at Ogu, near Okrika in Rivers State, having participated in the successful liberation of the Niger Delta from the Biafran forces.12 From this episode of Nigerian history, we can identify a number of issues that continue to this day. First, the Niger Delta issue is not forgotten. It continues to be on the front burner in matters of security, insurgency and, indeed, the continued existence of Nigeria. Second, a resurgence of the threat of insurgency will likely reemerge, either as a response to similar threats elsewhere in Nigeria or where there is a lapse in the policy thrust to remedy the imbalances which caused the insurgency

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in the first place. This is the background to the emergence of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) which we discuss later in this section.

Third, it is noteworthy that the causative factors in this insurgency are still very much visible in the entire Niger Delta region, namely, extreme poverty in the midst of extreme affluence, degradation of the human living environment to levels requiring concerted humanitarian intervention, discriminatory public policies resulting in political alienation of the human population, unsustainable extractive economies and, finally, the absence of environmental remediation policies and activities. All these, and maybe more, are likely to fuel discontent and exacerbate future conflicts and insurgent tendencies.

II.

Nigerian civil war

The Nigerian civil war (sometimes called the Nigeria-Biafra War) was fought from 6 July 1967 to 15 January 1970. The war followed a coup d’état of 15 January 1966, led by military men of the Ibo-speaking ethnic group, and a counter-coup d’état of 29 July 1966, led by military men mostly of the Hausa-Fulani-speaking Northern region. A great social upheaval followed these coups, including the destruction of lives and property of persons from the southern part of the country, particularly those from Eastern Nigeria.

Their kinsmen had been identified as leaders of the first coup, which eliminated prominent leaders of the north, including Alhaji Tafawa Balewa, then Prime Minister of Nigeria, and Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, then Premier of Northern Nigeria. Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu declared independence from the Nigerian Federation on 27 May 1967, naming the new state the Republic of Biafra. The civil war that ensued was probably the most devastating that the African continent has ever witnessed.13 Even though the Nigerian civil war ended more than 42 years ago, there are still some critical, lingering issues and lessons that might be learnt from the war. First, the ethnocentric cum religious issues that were part of the driving force towards belligerent insurgency have not only not abated, but there is a visible crescendo in their intensity and complexity. The fraternity which seemed to be the fundamental objective in General Gowon’s pronouncement at the end of the war announcing a policy of ‘No victor no vanquished’ is still to be realised in many respects.

Second, more than anything else, the religious gap between the Christians and Muslims in the country is not narrowing. Rather, there has been a rise in the levels of distrust, mutual suspicion and antagonism that might well be making inroads into the 254 | P a g e

political class. It is there that the tragedy may lie. Third, notwithstanding their obvious successes in the professions, commerce, industry and government, the Ibos, who inhabit the major proportion of what was Biafra, do not feel fully integrated into the body politic of Nigeria, and this gives rise to a feeling of marginalisation and alienation. As the Ibo are a major tribe in the Nigerian demographic structure, such feelings could fan the desire to rekindle the Biafran flame with all the attendant consequences for security and stability of the polity. Fourth, the primary cause of the Nigeria-Biafra War was ethno-religious hegemony and the problem of the consequential control of economic resources. This factor is still very prominent in Nigerian politics and ethno-religious struggles for supremacy.

A final and related issue we should note in the Biafra saga is the continued insistence of the Ibos that their boundaries remain coterminous with those of the former eastern region of Nigeria, including the present Cross River, AkwaIbom, Rivers and Bayelsa States. This may have had a significant impact on the outcome of the civil war. While the minority tribes which constitute those four states - the Ijaws, Ibibios, Ogojas, Efiks and others - insist that they have nothing to do with Biafra, the Ibos insist that they do. This constitutes a serious conflict between the rights of the minorities, on the one hand, and the ambition of the Ibos, on the other. The truth is that, from the onset of the civil war, there has been and still continues to be a deepseated distrust between the minority tribes and the Ibos, and none of the two sides seems to be making any effort to assuage the other. This situation is a ticking time bomb.

III. Movement for the actualisation of the sovereign state of Biafra More than two decades after the end of the Nigerian civil war, there emerged the Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB). This movement is led by Mr Ralph Uwazurike, a lawyer by training. This movement has a firm root in the five South-East states of Nigeria that are home to the Ibo people.

MASSOB has been reported to be well armed and there have been reported cases of confrontation with the Nigerian police and military forces. MASSOB adopts the Biafran national flag and this can be seen displayed in the South-East political zone of the country. The conspicuous display of the Biafran flag in a territory that would otherwise be Nigerian sovereign territory suggests that a state of Biafra still exists at least in the minds of the Ibos.

MASSOB is obviously a logical follow-up to the failed activities of the Biafran belligerents. The agony of defeat, coupled with the unsettled issues that continue to 255 | P a g e

bedevil the Nigerian polity, naturally extends the erstwhile belligerent posturing into this new strategy in anticipation of better opportunities to resuscitate full-scale belligerency. MASSOB has so far never claimed responsibility for any terrorist act, nor has anyone been attributed to its activities so far. However, MASSOB has introduced and circulated Biafran currency notes as legal tender. It has also issued passports for citizens of Biafra. MASSOB issued an ‘official’ statement in 2009, predicting the collapse and disintegration of the Nigerian state. The statement said that six republics are likely to emerge after the disintegration of Nigeria, namely, Biafra Republic (Ibo East), Arewa Republic (Hausa-Fulani North) and Oodua Republic (Yoruba West), and three other unnamed republics.

IV. Movement for the emancipation of the Niger Delta and related insurgencies More than 30 years after the demise of Major Isaac Jasper AdakaBoro, there was a resurgence of the armed protest against the federal government and the multinational companies engaged in the oil industry of the Niger Delta. Most of the armed groups were made up of raggedy, ill-equipped, restive youths, who are spread across the length and breadth of the Delta region. At its inception, this resurgence seemed to be decidedly unfocused as to who the target should be whether it should focus on the oil companies, the government, or the chieftains and their middlemen as the primary culprits in the perceived scheme of denials of benefits from oil operations and from the associated injuries to the people and their environment.

Initially, therefore, there was great infighting among these armed youths. This came to a head in the late 1990s, as the main communities in Warri, Delta State, went into an all-out armed conflict, one tribe against the other. The war was centred on who should control the oil benefits coming to Warri, a centre of oil production, next in importance only to Port Harcourt, Rivers State, in the West African oil industry.

The Ijaws, Itshekiri’s and the Urhobos fought a destructive war for the soul of Warri for more than five years, but somehow the realisation that the common enemy was the federal government and its foreign company partners changed the campaign focus from an internecine fratricide to a major campaign against the government. By this time, the restiveness of the youths had spread across the entire Niger Delta and was growing in sophistication.14 there are allegations that corrupt politicians may have unwittingly aided the process of militarisation of the Niger Delta for personal reasons, unmindful of the consequences of their activities.

Earlier on there had been various movements and activists who opposed the perceived injustice the Niger Delta people were forced to bear by the government 256 | P a g e

and its oil company partners. In most cases, including Umuechem and Ogoni in Rivers State, they were mostly non-violent.15However, when Ken Saro-Wiwa, a nonviolent environmental activist of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), was executed by the Nigerian government, this fuelled an insurgency across the Niger Delta.16 At the height of the Niger Delta insurgency, some of the groups had a very sophisticated arsenal that would have been the boast of any group in the history of guerilla warfare. Among these groups were Ateke Tom’s group and Alhaji MujaheedAsariDokubo’s Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force, both of which spread throughout the entire Niger Delta region. This period also saw the emergence of the group known as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). 17 MEND considers itself to be an umbrella group, co-ordinating a large number of groups of various sizes and lethal capacity that spread the entire length and breadth of the Niger Delta region, from the creeks of Ondo State in the west, to the mouth of the Cross River in the extreme east of Nigeria’s Atlantic coast and up north to the point of primary bifurcation of the river Niger, in that triangular fashion.18 The tactics used by MEND and its Niger Delta insurgent groups are largely those of guerilla warfare. Using speed boats and highly-sophisticated weapons, they often quickly out-maneuver and overrun elite security operatives hired to guard the oil operations in the creeks, swamps and offshore areas.

The insurgents completely shut down operational systems, and they also kill, maim and take hostages, demanding large sums of money in foreign currency for their release. There have been reported incidents of bombings attributed to MEND, including the incident in Abuja for which the leader of MEND, Henry Okah, was convicted in South Africa. Based on reported activities beyond the confines of the Niger Delta, MEND seems to have expanded beyond the Niger Delta region to become a virtually nation-wide insurgency.

IV.

Oodua People’s Congress

The Western states of Nigeria are home to the Yoruba and the theOodua People’s Congress (OPC), a nationalist Yoruba organisation formed in 1997. The founding head of the organisation is Dr Fredrick Fasheun, and its militant aspects are headed

by Ganiyu Adams. The organisation came about as a natural outcome of the massive Yoruba protests which followed the death of Chief MashoodAbiola, who was widely regarded as the winner of the later annulled presidential elections of 12 June 1993.

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Clashes between the OPC and law enforcement agencies, primarily the police, intensified the activity of a dissident group within the OPC, which ultimately broke away to form the Oodua Liberation Movement, sometimes also known by the name Revolutionary Council of Nigeria (RCN). This splinter group became far more militant in its operations. This group opposes Nigeria’s federal system of government and wants the Yoruba to secede from Nigeria and form a sovereign Oodua Republic.19 V. Northern Arewa groups We now turn to the northern part of the country known as Arewa. Until recently, the north had not seen any sustained terrorist attacks which could be characterised as approaching insurgency. There were, however, violent conflicts in the north in the late 1970s and 1980s. These were violent, intra-religious campaigns between different sects of Islam that resulted in the deaths of several thousand people. The Maitatsine sect led by Sheik MuhmmaduMaruwa fought mainstream Muslims who refused to accept its path in Islam. Coincidentally, there were frequent violent and bloody intra-religious clashes between members of Izalatubidi’atwaIkamatul Sunna (Izala) and the Tijaniyya Tariqa QuadriyyaTariqah (Tariqah) sects. The Izala, headed

by Shiekh Abubakar Muhammadu Gummi, regarded the Tariqah sect as un-Islamic and prevented them from leading Jumat prayers. This prohibition led to violence that erupted.20 Aside from the Izala and the Tariqah upheavals, there were hardly any serious conflicts in the north of a major dimension before the current Jos crisis. The Jos crisis involves issues similar to those facing the Warri in Delta State, including control of territory, ethnic hegemony and political, economic, socio-cultural rights. Religion is more prominent in the Jos crisis than it was in the Warri crisis and is crucial to a lasting solution in Jos. The Jos crisis has had a long gestation period and has simmered for a long time.

The sudden rupture and intensity of the conflict may not be entirely unconnected with recent changes in the Nigerian legal system, particularly constitutional issues relating to religion, local government and representation in the state and federal legislatures.

Jos offers the best example in the north of Nigeria where pre-colonial and colonial history have produced a fusion of ethnicity, religion, politics, law and economics which now produce upheavals that may last for a long time to come. It has been noted that the British colonial administrators put several non-Hausa enclaves under Fulani rule under the emirs during their rule of the north while, at the same time, the

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indigenes of these areas were being converted to Christianity and not Islam, the religion of the emirs.21 According to historian Oscar Farouk Ibrahim: The result was that most of them became Christians. Their journey to Christianity also ensured that they got Western education, and in the context of the modern Nigerian state, that translated to power through holding and state positions. These people now do not understand why some ‘foreigners’ should come and lord over them in their own land.22 Historian Peter Ekeh makes that same point rather emphatically, as follows: These non-Muslim areas have become the Christian north, one of the remarkable developments in Nigeria’s history. But Christian Northern Nigeria carries with it scars of its past wounds inflicted by Fulani slave raids. Christianity in the north has become much more than a mere profession of faith. It is a political statement of freedom from Fulani control.23 This ‘political statement’ is likely to be heard louder and louder as the Christian population grows in the north and the traditional Hausa-Fulani hegemony becomes increasingly challenged. This realisation may have informed the establishment of the Arewa People’s Congress. Even though the name ‘Arewa’ means ‘north’, a geographical description, the real focus may be northern elements of Hausa-Fulani extraction. The Arewa People’s Congress is a group established in Northern Nigeria in December 1999 to protect the interests of the Hausa-Fulani in Nigeria. It was probably established to counter the growing influence in the Western parts of Nigeria of the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC), which was reported to have been engaging in increasing confrontations with the Hausa-Fulani in the west.24 Not much is known of the activities of the OPC, and one can only speculate regarding the scope of interests of the Hausa-Fulani contemplated by the OPC and how it goes about meeting that pronounced objective. However, this is regarded as closely allied with the wider Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF), an umbrella sociocultural body in the north which also includes non-Hausa Fulani elements.25 V.

Jama’atuAhlilSunnaLidawatiwal Jihad (Boko Haram)

The latest upheaval in the north is Boko Haram which has, without a doubt, the character of an insurgency. The rise of the Boko Haram (meaning ‘Western education is sinful’) has brought about heightened tension, anxiety and a sense of insecurity hitherto unknown in any part of Nigeria except the Niger Delta region. The group has probably only existed for about three years. It is based in the northern 259 | P a g e

states of Nigeria and has attacked both the police and military, churches and other places of worship, schools, international agencies, market squares and other highlypublic targets.

Newspaper estimates place the number of casualties in the wake of the Boko Haram campaign in the hundreds of thousands, with many others maimed or wounded. The group’s weaponry includes bombs, arms and ammunitions of various degrees of lethal capacity. The government is probably doing its best to contain the insurgency, but it is very clear that the task of bringing back the peace and tranquillity that once characterised the northern states must be everybody’s concern.

VI.

Jama’atuAnsarilMusliminaBiladis Sudan (Ansaru)

Jama’atuAnsarilMusliminaBiladis Sudan, known as Ansaru (meaning ‘Vanguards for the protection of Muslims in black Africa’), is a self-proclaimed Islamist Jihadist militant group which is based in the north-eastern parts of Nigeria. It was founded in January 2012, when it broke away from Boko Haram. It is reputed to have a more international focus than Boko Haram. Ansaru’s motto is ‘Jihad fi Sabilillah’, which means ‘Struggle for the cause of Allah’. This group is still very new and secretive in its operation. It is alleged to have abducted a Briton and an Italian from Kebi State, a French national from Katsina State and, in February 2013, seven French citizens from Northern Cameroon.26 These kidnappings are the best known of this group’s activities in its barely two-year history. More time will be needed to make conclusions as to whether the group’s activities are escalating or de-escalating.

6.4

Causative factors behind insurgency in Nigeria

I. Land use and proprietary rights In discussing the rise of discontent and predicting the emergence of the Niger Delta insurgency, the author has asserted that opposing rights or claims to rights of any kind would invariably generate conflict. When parties assert their rights in a competing or boisterous way over a thing or situation, elements of conflict will arise, and if these do not abate in time, such conflicts are likely to mature into major confrontations.27Conflicting proprietary rights to land invariably degenerate into disputes. Nigeria practises a dual land tenure system, incorporating both customary and statutory land tenure. This implies that the proprietary rights of the various classes of owners, occupiers or tenants must relate to both systems.

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Customary tenancy is a traditional mode of holding land involving a grant by a landlord to another person, including a group, in consideration of the latter’s acknowledgment of the former’s title through payment of tributes. The grantor of the land is known as the overlord while the grantee is known as the customary tenant.

This customary tenancy is said to be wider than fee simply because it also connotes and retains reversionary interests.28 Land tenure and proprietary interests in land are a critical factor in the conflicts raging in the north and elsewhere in Nigeria. The mix of customary rights and statutory rights has made a clear-cut definition of rights a thorny issue all over Nigeria. It is at the root of the Niger Delta insurgency. It is also the basis of such conflicts as those between the Fulani and the Tivs of Benue State, the Fulani and the tribes of Jos and the Plateau State, the Tiv and the Jukun of Taraba State, and many others. Proprietary rights claims were behind the Kano KatinKwari Market killings of October 1982.29 In all of these incidents, the Nigerian Land Use Act of 1978 and other statutes now in force in Nigeria have not helped matters.30 The entire problem of the ‘indigene’ and ‘settler’ dichotomy in Plateau State revolves around conflicting land and proprietary rights. The distinction between indigenes and settlers that is the basis for the dichotomy is not helped by the lack of judicial decisions and case law that would settle the legal definition and property claims.

Here the issue of customary title is always in dispute between the older customary title owners among the indigenes and the more recent ‘settlers’ whose settlement may have been longstanding, spanning several decades or more. This is the problem with which the indigenes have had to contend through the centuries, as have groups elsewhere in Africa.31 Culturally speaking, and perhaps politically and legally speaking, the Fulani in West Africa claim, rightly or wrongly, a state in the strict Westphalian conception that is coterminous with the entire length and breadth of the sub-region extending from Nouakchott, Mauritania in the west, to Cameroon in the south, and thence toward North Africa, by way of Chad, Niger and Mali.32 That expanse of an otherwise ‘homogeneous’ breadth of land defining the conceived or extant state was, they might argue, only disrupted and carved into the present nations of West Africa which, to them, can be regarded as mere provinces of one indivisible ‘Fulani State’ or homeland. So conceived, grazing rights, shelter rights and a place of abode, even if only temporary on their nomadic march, are regarded by them as a common heritage of all citizens of West Africa. It probably was so even before Count Otto Eduard Leopold von Bismark’s conferences at Berlin in 1883 to

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1885. It is a complex matter with which Nigerian political thought has had to contend for several decades.

To a considerable extent, this broad and liberal philosophy of statehood and land tenure influenced the colonial Native Land Tenure of Northern Nigeria, which has been regarded as a parent of the Land Use Act of 1978.33 To the Fulani, the current states of West Africa can be viewed beneficially as provincial demarcations of one indivisible country with patches of foreign language influence. It has never been the tradition or practice of the Fulani to suppress a local language or impose the Fulani language wherever they may find themselves. Rather, as is most eminently demonstrated in the northern states of Nigeria, the Fulani would rather adopt, and masterfully so, the local language of the people they rule.

In the Niger Delta insurgency, the feeling of deprivation of land rights and other proprietary rights is further exacerbated by the impunity that is prevalent in the degradation of land, water and air resources of the people. This point has often been heard from the insurgents and other well-meaning local and international persons.34 II.

Growth of social class awareness and desire for equality

Social class awareness and consciousness have the potential for conflict generation.

A society where the middle class is small with an equally small or smaller upper class and a robust lower class is prone to dangerous conflict. Such a society is usually characterised by great instability. This is because the lower class looks at the upper class with envy. This feeling is pervasive in many parts of Nigeria. Inequality results in bitterness, and bitterness generates envy and hate. This is true across the entire political spectrum in Nigeria, at the national, state and local levels.

This expression of bitterness is quite a universal phenomenon for, as Aristotle put it, ‘it is the passion for equality which is thus at the root of sedition’.35 Indeed, when people are satisfied, as is often the case with professionals, they need not be very rich like the upper class. These are the middle class - a population which in every society attains a certain point of social contentment and thus indifference. The critical estimation of the upper class by the lower class is often occasioned by hardship, suffering and the desire to be upwardly mobile.36 Those who are worst afflicted with this type of feeling are those who have received some education and yet are bereft of a means of income.

The cure and prevention of the conflict that is occasioned by this feeling, Aristotle says, lies in ‘the quality of goodness and justice, in the particular form that suits the 262 | P a g e

nature of each constitution’.37 The theoretical basis and the practical outcomes envisioned by Aristotle apply to all societies and all periods of human history. What Aristotle wrote two and a half millennia ago is applicable in today’s world. Indeed, it is inevitable that there is bound to be an upheaval in any unequal social class structure.

Indeed, American civilisation, as has been emphasised by President Barack Obama in his recent presidential campaign, is a prime example of how the middle class is the bulwark for the survival of any liberal democracy. Without a robust middle class, there is a breeding ground for revolts, anarchy and revolution.

There is no African nation, let alone Nigeria, which does not have an urn-shaped class structure, meaning a social class structure in which the lower class is bloated, the middle class a mere shoestring and the upper class one big, fat head, figuratively speaking. The middle class in any society is usually the natural medium of effective communication, contact and information transmission between the lower and upper classes. Where this wire of transmission is too thin, fragile or non-existent, a given society is inviting turbulent mass action, a revolution.38The Niger Delta, the settler situations in Jos and, perhaps, the Boko Haram movement all evoke issues of inequality in Nigeria. The American political scientist and sociologist James Chowning Davies sums up the situation as follows:39 When Jefferson premised the argument in 1776 for independence from British rule with the statement that ‘all men are created equal’, he was making an assertion about man’s nature.

Men who have been denied equality have been highly responsive to the demand by their leaders for equality and have made revolutions to get it. Whether the language was Lutheran, Wesleyan Calvinist, Jeffersonian, Rousseauan, or Marxian, the frustrated expectation of equality has been a major factor in all major revolutionary upheavals since Luther posted his Ninety-five Theses on the Wittenberg church door. Indeed, since long before that.

III.

Discrimination

Discrimination comes in a variety of forms. One example is economic discrimination, which is defined as the systematic exclusion, whether prescriptive or de facto, of a person or group from participating in positions or activities of higher economic value, such as employment, trade or profession. Another form is political discrimination, which is defined as a systematic or perceivable pattern of limitations in the form, process, normative or practical outcome of the opportunities of groups to take part in political activities or to attain or keep elite positions of trust.

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There is also discrimination in the distribution of political and socio-economic goods to populations or segments of the population of a country. This type of discrimination often results in deprivation of basic infrastructural amenities and diminished opportunities for employment, particularly at the upper echelons of governance and economic activities. Ethnic minorities are often victims of this type of discrimination and it has often led to movements of terrorism and insurgency.

This type of discrimination was the primary motive force behind the realignment of the erstwhile warring forces of the Ijaw, Itselkiri and Urhobo in Warri, Delta State against the federal government in the Niger Delta insurgency and, according to MEND, the insurgency’s primary propellant. In the Niger Delta before the emergence of the insurgency, there was a widespread feeling of deprivation and discrimination, since the evidence showed that the rate of unemployment, the general standards of living and the rate of poverty in the region were clearly disproportionate to other parts of the country and clearly worse than the national average. This was reinforced by the fact that high positions of trust in the oil companies were filled by members of the majority tribes, some of whom were not necessarily more qualified than those who were unemployed.

IV.

Poverty

It has been noted elsewhere that ‘among several other ills, poverty breeds anger, hatred, envy and conflict’.40 Poverty is the cause of many of Nigeria’s problems. The phenomenon of poverty has been recognised from ancient times. Euripides recognised it in early Greek times. For Engels, the peasant war was the culmination of revolutionary trends which shaped much German social history from the seventeenth century forward, such that although local insurrections of peasants can be found in mediaeval times in large numbers, not one general national peasant revolt, least of all Germany, can be observed before the peasant war ... [which came about] ... when the lowest stratum of the population, the one exploited by all the rest, arose, namely, the plebeians and the peasants.41 The social conditions of sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe are applicable in present-day Nigeria. The same trend has manifested itself in regions as diverse as Asia, Latin America and elsewhere on the European and African continents. But this states a complex phenomenon rather too simplistically. We need to know what we mean by poverty. We need to understand the characteristics of poverty so as to

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appreciate the causal dynamics between it and the types of conflicts that may result in volatile social eruptions like terrorism and insurgency.

Although poverty is not easily amenable to precise definition, we may assume that it means a lack of command over basic consumption needs, resulting in a situation where a person’s basic needs far exceed the available means of meeting them.42 Basic needs include two components. First, they include the minimum requirements of an individual or family for the procurement of shelter, adequate food, clothing, furniture and other necessary household equipment such as cooking, eating and other utensils. Second, they include essential services provided by government for the community at large, such as sanitation, public transport, safe drinking water, health and educational facilities, employment and participation in the public decisionmaking processes of the community to which the individual belongs. According to the International Labour Organisation (ILO), just as there is relative poverty in comparison to the standard of living of others in the same society, there is also absolute poverty. Basic needs can be relative as well as absolute.

The more basic needs are not met, the more severe will be the level of poverty. This relative severity of poverty has a close correlation with the psychological basis of individual and group relations and conduct. It is this psychological basis of individual and group conduct that dictates, to a large extent, the character of response that defines the nature and the scope of conflicts that result from the social condition of poverty. In other words, the social response to poverty, by an individual or a group, is motivated by psychological factors - and these have long been recognised.43 Persistent poverty, particularly in the midst of economic growth and affluence of the upper class, will lead to feelings of frustration among the poor. It will also breed hatred, mistrust and anger. These psychological monsters lead to a loss of faith in the system, alienation and hopelessness. At the stage of hopelessness, there is a progressive, psychological diminution of the value of life, which eventually leads to a point of indifference between life and death. At this point, hostility, antagonistic conduct

and

indiscriminate

aggression

manifest

rather

spontaneously

automatically. Mailafia sums up the situation as follows: The prevalence of poverty makes it easier for extremist groups to mobilise disenchanted mobs in pursuit of their own political goals. In Northern Nigeria, where over 70 per cent of the population lives under the internationallydefined poverty line, it is easy to see how any demagogue or religious extremist can mobilise the poor and destitute 265 | P a g e

and

as instruments for his own political goals. There is the added factor of youth unemployment, especially within the growing stratum of university graduates. When people are pushed to the lowest levels of desperation and hopelessness, they can fall easy prey to religious demagogues who offer them a sense of belonging.44 From this description and many similar analyses of the Nigerian situation, we can categorically assert that poverty breeds conflict and induces susceptibility to terrorist activity in Nigeria. Poverty is based on the lack of basic needs, and the more this lack persists, the greater the likelihood that a situation of frustration will arise which, if not checked in time, will lead to aggression and revolutionary conduct.

V.

Unemployment

The national average of unemployment in Nigeria stands at 24 per cent, with an estimated 54 per cent of the youth population unemployed.45 An unemployed person, like a poor person, is usually unhappy. The idleness created by unemployment can lead to antisocial conduct to occupy time. Even if the person is educated and skilled, it can lead to frustration, aggression and serious conflict. In itself, unemployment is, of course, a very potent cause of poverty. This is why employment is a necessary component of a basic needs strategy of development, both as a means and also as an end. The benefits of employment are hardly contestable. Employment yields an output and provides an income to the employed, and it gives the employed person the recognition of being engaged in some occupation worth his while and dignity.

Mere employment does not, however, by itself satisfy all the requirements of the mind that would remove the psychological preconditions that lead to social unrest.

There needs to be improvements in the quality of employment or conditions of work.

Most persons would not consider themselves happily employed if the employment they are engaged in is demoralising, undignified, inconvenient, dangerous to health or to life, or indeed discriminatory as to gender, ethnicity, race, age, religion, and so forth.

VI.

Political alienation

Conflict and strife usually result where an individual is denied the freedom to participate in the political decision-making processes of the society. Man, being a political animal, always sees himself as such and as being free to engage in politics, formally or informally. Nonetheless, he may withdraw tactically, strategically or voluntarily for psychological or other reasons where the prevailing conditions are not

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conducive to his participation in the political process. In this latter circumstance of withdrawal, especially where it is involuntary, he is said to be politically alienated from society. Political alienation of the individual person or of a group or segment of society breeds conflict and unrest. Aristotle described well the contempt that characterises political alienation within political systems of oligarchy and democracy in observing: Contempt is a cause of faction and of actual attacks upon the government, for instance in oligarchies when those who have no share in the government are more numerous (for they think themselves the strong party), and in democracies when the rich have begun to feel contempt for the disorder and anarchy that prevails.46 Political alienation or contempt can be manifested by both the rich and the poor - in some instances, simultaneously. Situations of this type occur in the petroleumproducing regions and elsewhere in Nigeria. Indeed, the Ogoni situation, at the inception or formative period of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), is a prime example. It is reported that MOSOP was initially, and has in fact continued to be, a mass movement of the Ogoni People of the Niger Delta oilproducing area with a membership consisting of both the elite and the masses of the Ogoni people. Political alienation resulting in this type of unity of purpose and resolve between the rich and the poor becomes more formidable and intractable for any government, since it makes it more difficult for the government to penetrate the movement and possibly break the rank and file. This situation produced the Oodua People’s Congress that contributed substantially to the demise of military dictatorship in Nigeria.

Whichever way the government chooses to counter political alienation, one thing is clear: When an idea is class-neutral, that is, when it involves both the high and the low alike, particularly in countries like Nigeria where the middle class is both comparatively tiny and rather inconsequential, the dangers of conflict, dispute and revolutionary conduct are usually quite high. A major factor that leads to political alienation is discrimination in which, to use a popular Nigerian adage, ‘monkey de work and baboon de chop’, meaning that the monkey works and the baboon consumes. The situation presented itself classically in January 2012, when a mass action was organised to protest the petroleum subsidy programme and policy of the federal government. There were indeed clear and palpable signs of cracks - or at least, tremors - in the corridors of government power.

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VII.

Religious and ideological discontent

Both religion and ideology are closely-related concepts in the minds of individuals and social groups. In their pure form, they have universalistic attributes, appealing primarily to the primordial instincts. Thus, such epithets as ‘primitive’, ‘developed’, ‘civilised’, ‘traditional’ or ‘modern’ may not in reality be very relevant when used in relation to social groups and their attitudes towards religion and ideology. An ideology, like a religion, is a belief system containing a world view that is accepted as fact or truth by some groups. Ideology and religion are both evaluative, normative and ethical, as well as moral in tone and content.

The belief system will largely affect the social processes in the particular society and, indeed, institutions and human relations. Thus, the socialisation and social stratification process or a society’s ranking of individual members within the society, including issues of equality which relate to political participation, as well as production, distribution and consumption of wealth, is largely determined by the various and frequently-competing ideologies within a given society. For instance, it is asserted by no less an authority than Engels that the clergy were the ‘representatives of the ideology of mediaeval feudalism’, such that the religious precepts and attitudes of the day could not help but sustain the socio-political and economic practices of the period.

In the oil-producing areas of Nigeria we may perceive the same competition between religious and ideological forces as manifest elsewhere in the Nigerian state. Apart from Christianity and Islam, numerous other religions are practised in Nigeria, and these, as would be expected, permeate the prevailing ideological types which compete in the country with various degrees of fervour and levels of followership.

Conflict is bound to arise in the ensuing competition between religious and ideological types and their adherents. Thus, for example, in a community where the elders adhere to traditions and religious practices of the ancestors, any deviation by the youth from the norms prescribed by the community is likely to be a cause of conflict.

The elders frequently insist on preserving their traditional institutions, while the youth, distrusting the ‘old’ beliefs, want to do things differently. The contention might revolve around the appropriate approach to the resolution of an emergent conflict between the community and an outsider - for instance, a multinational oil company or a government agency. The entire dynamic is propelled by the innate qualities of

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religious symbolism, particularly its multivalence and capacity to reveal a perspective that can integrate diverse realities into a system.

We may be quick to add that ideology - almost invariably, but certainly impliedly benefits from this character of religion. This may be why both ideas always function side by side. In the Arab world, for instance, the ideology of nationalism has been closely identified with Islam.47 that is, the dominant religion is viewed as one and the same thing as the state, much as the Protestant ethic was said to be inseparable from public organisation and capitalism. The same applies to Judaism and the state of Israel, and numerous other examples. Without a stretch of the imagination, we may conclude that in a system with a multiplicity of religious experiences and a priori ideological leanings, there is bound to be serious conflict, particularly where the religious ideas and experiences are fundamentally different or contradictory.

Nigeria is a prime example in this type of conflict setting and the results have been typical. It is expected, for instance, that the more Christianity grows in the north, the greater the tension between the two dominant religious, both competing for supremacy or hegemony. Nonetheless, while the two most conspicuous and competing religions in Nigeria are Christianity and Islam, the country houses many other forms of religious experience.48 The range of religious and ideological pluralism inevitably propagates complex conflicts.

In a community in which elders adhere to the normative traditions of their ancestors, which may include elements of ancestral deification or paganism, any deviation from such norms by the youth and others acting under the influence of ‘alien’ ideals would usually be regarded as antagonistic to the established norms and order. The emerging conflict in such situations is usually profound and at times paradoxical. The conservative approach of the elders is viewed as benign negligence, even irresponsibility, especially in the face of problems that require urgent solutions, such as adopting appropriate strategies to determine proprietary rights, compensation and environmental remediation. The resulting conflict usually tends in the long run to deprive the community of the aggregate benefits which could have otherwise accrued to it.

As Gurr puts it, ‘religious cleavages are a chronic source of deprivation-inducing conflict’.49Gurr’s theory is quite applicable at the macro-economic levels, particularly in the insurgency that is now playing out in the Niger Delta and northern parts of Nigeria. In light of the above, it would be rather surprising to conclude that the mediating role of the chief priest and the shrine, or at least their proximity to the 269 | P a g e

events of 24 May 1995 at Gioko in Ogoni land in the conflict between the Ogonis and the oil giant Shell, was fortuitous.

In the Ogoni agitation that led to the mob action that resulted in the killing of prominent personalities of the Ogoni land (the oil-rich ethnic group which had a long history of violent protests against the dominant oil company there, namely, the Shell Petroleum Development Company), the chief priest of the ethnic group’s deity was reported to have played a significant role by protecting in the deity’s shrine certain of the prominent persons who were otherwise targeted for elimination for allegedly collaborating with the oil companies and the state. The incident occurred on 24 May 1995. This protective custody by the chief priest saved some of the targeted persons who would otherwise have been slaughtered.

Likewise, in Bayelsa and Delta States, two of the prominent oil-producing states of the Niger Delta region, a prominent deity called Egbesu is worshipped by believers (or cult members, some would say), mostly of the Izon (also called Ijaw tribe) was frequently used as a rallying point for intense and destructive protests against the state. It would be hardly surprising not to hear the crescendo of Egbesu religious chants and choruses during the effulgence of Izon nationalistic fervour and protests against the perceived ills perpetrated by the state and the oil operators in Izon land of the Niger Delta. In these cases, as has been evidenced elsewhere, religion was used not as an opiate, but rather as a motivation toward self-determination and nationalistic mobilisation, in this case, a fragmental variant that may be termed substate nationalism, a prominent example of political ideology.50 VIII.

Conclusion: Nigeria beyond the brink

When it comes to the problems of corruption, nepotism, bribery, murders, kidnapping, indiscipline and the like, we can conclude that, as much as these vices constitute a grave and present danger to the rapid development of a peaceful and great nation, none of them individually or even collectively can break up the country. However, the rapidly-growing problem of terrorism associated with insurgency, the country is in grave danger of becoming a failed state and thereby disintegrating.

Historically, insurgency in Nigeria has been localised or regionally based. However, if the present trend toward growing insurgency is allowed to continue unfettered, the regional basis of the scourge will become blurred with time and unpredictable in its potential to destroy the nation. The Nigeria-Biafra civil war was confined to the former eastern region, except for a very brief spill into parts of Delta and Edo States and the eastern periphery of current Ondo State. The Ogoni (MOSOP) upheaval has 270 | P a g e

always been confined to the four local government areas of Rivers State. The war for Warri was localised in the Warri area of Delta State.

The IPOB insurgency still claims the original boundaries of the former eastern region, but it is effectively localised in the current South-East geopolitical zone of Nigeria, containing Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo States, which are home to the Ibo people. The OPC insurgency is also localised in the Yoruba-speaking Western states of Lagos, Oyo, Ondo, Ogun, Osun and Ekiti. The Jos crisis is localised in the Jos metropolis and local government areas contiguous to it and parts of Plateau State.

The MEND groups were originally localised in the Niger Delta region but, as has been indicated earlier, there has since been visible evidence of its operations in the Abuja area, Lagos and off-shore.

The current Boko Haram and Ansaru insurgencies are localised in parts of the northern states, but they seem to have the potential of spreading to other parts of the sprawling territory of the north which would be a significant spread of that insurgency.

Depending on the public policy response these groups, individually or collectively, have the potential to spread beyond their region or locale of operations. It will be an unfortunate day for Nigeria if all four (Boko, MEND, OPC, MASSOB) major groups are allowed to have a nationwide spread at the same time because of a wrong, inadequate, ill-informed, ill-timed or superfluous policy response from the authorities.

As far as causative factors are concerned, we can safely conclude that, for Nigeria, there is sufficient potential for full-blown, nationwide terrorism and insurgency, since all causative factors, and possibly more, are eminently represented in the polity.

These causative factors, particularly ethnicity, are common to all previous and current insurgent campaigns, except for religion, which is pronounced as a factor only in the Boko Haram and Ansaru insurgencies. There are other causative factors which could not be discussed in the article because of space constraints. These include the gap between the elite and the masses; unfulfilled political and economic promises; income disparity; availability and use of information and communication technology; proliferation of arms; and others which are common to all the insurgent groups in Nigeria.

The presence of a religious element in an insurgency usually has significant implications for policy response. First, such causes are easily sustainable so long as there are adherents to that religion, and particularly if there are new converts. If religion is a way of life and the insurgency is sympathetic to sustaining that way of life, then the insurgency itself is easily sustainable. If an insurgency is easily 271 | P a g e

sustainable because of a belief system, then the basket of policy responses to the insurgency must go beyond the ordinary ones used to address the non-religious causative factors. There must be a special appeal to religious elements, such as peace and peaceful coexistence, a common heritage or fraternity and dialogue and diplomacy. Force, particularly military force, may miss the point as many historical examples outside Nigeria have seemed to indicate.

The most delicate of all the insurgencies currently active or simmering in Nigeria is the Niger Delta (MEND) insurgency. First, it embodies delicate economic implications for the survival of the nation as one entity. Second, if there should be a full-blown insurgency in Nigeria, involving all of the four previously mentioned groups in a freefor-all campaign, the main theatre will likely be the Niger Delta. The economic costs of this hopefully avoidable scenario would be catastrophic. None of the three regions - east, north or west - would like to see a disintegrated Nigeria without its controlling at least a significant portion of the Niger Delta oil.

As a matter of fact, for all intents and purposes, what holds Nigeria together for now is the continued existence of oil and gas in the Niger Delta. None of the regions wants another to break away with control over the Niger Delta, and none would want to break away alone without it. In particular, neither the Ibos in the east nor the Hausa-Fulani in the north want to be the land-locked countries; offspring of a disintegrated Nigeria. And we have seen, the level of suspicion between the north and the south regions captured well in the description of retired Chief Justice Musdapher. Thus, we may say that the Niger Delta oil is what holds Nigeria together.

The primary implication for policy of the foregoing analysis is that answering questions related to regionalism of insurgent movements in Nigeria may assist the design of public policy response to ethno-religious relations and security implications and responses to insurgency in Nigeria. Insurgency in Nigeria based on ethnoreligious factors will require extra attention, as it might be one of the most potentially devastating. This is based on a number of estimations. First, the growth and dynamism of Islam and Christianity, the two major competing religions in Nigeria, is astounding, particularly in the north. This growth of both religions in the northern states could lead to an outright inter-religious conflict, which might complicate an already complex situation. In the above context and, indeed, in government responses to insurgency in Nigeria, more generally, the legal, constitutional and regulatory mechanisms required for the management of conflict should be overhauled.

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Second, in the current insurgency that is associated with Boko Haram and Ansaru in the northern states, one of the problems in designing a response and negotiation strategy for conflict resolution is the lack of a clear statement of the objectives of the group. For example, does Boko Haram want a theocracy for Nigeria? Does it want all Nigerians to adopt Islam as their religion? How does it want to coexist with other religious groups in Nigeria? Should all secular educational systems in Nigeria be scrapped, including universities, colleges of education, and polytechnics and secondary schools? If there were a clearer articulation of the group’s objectives, it would be easier to design a policy response that could focus on ending the conflict peacefully and designing policies to move forward.

Finally, there are two factors that are likely to be issues in Nigerian politics for a long time to come. These are ethno-religiosity of polities and income disparities, both of which, as we have seen, are fuels for revolution. To address religious conflicts, in particular, provision should be made for the establishment of a body with constitutional powers composed of the top religious’ leaders of each of the competing religions in Nigeria and top politicians like state governors. The body should be chaired by a nominee of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria or the Vice-President. Such a body could be named the National Supreme Council on Religion. This body would be responsible for deciding all matters of an interreligious nature that may potentially instigate or breed conflict that might result in insurgency. The implementation of these recommendations would go a long way toward avoiding the cataclysmic projections of Chief Justice Musdapher.

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Endnotes 1.

DahiruMusdapher ‘Media and democracy’ National Mirror 21 December 2012 1-2.

2.

DahiruMusdapher ‘Media and democracy’ National Mirror 21 December 2012 1-2.

3.

Max Weber, The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism, trans T Parsons 1930. P.39

4.

Editorial ‘Corruption and leadership in 2013’ The Guardian 7 January 2013.

5.

Joseph.MOstheimer, Nigerian politics, New York: Harper, 1982, p. 137.

6.

Transparency International Annual Report, 2012

7.

DahiruMusdapher (n 1 above) 2.

8.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, Keynote Address, Closing Plenary of the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security, ‘A Global Strategy for Fighting Terrorism’ Madrid, Spain, 10 March 2005

9.

CFD Paniagua ‘Negotiating terrorism: The negotiation dynamics of four UN counter-terrorism treaties, 1997-2005 PhD thesis, City University of New York, 2008

10.

The Declaration on Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism annexed to UN General Assembly Resolution 49/60, Measure to Eliminate International Terrorism UN Doc A/Res/69/60, 9 December 1994. See also R Bailey ‘Earth liberation front terrorist gets 22 years in prison for anti-biotech arson’ Reason Magazine

http://reason.com/blog/2009/02/06/earth-liberation-front-terrori

(accessed 31 January 2014).

11.

Philip P. Purpura, Terrorism and homeland security: An introduction Butterworth Heinem Homeland security 2007.

12.

Odumegwu Ojukwu’ Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Odumegwu_Ojukwu (accessed 31 January 2014).

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13.

For good accounts of the Nigerian civil war, A Madiebo the Nigerian revolution and the Biafran war 1980; F Forsyth the Biafra story 1969; G Mwekikagile Ethnic politics in Kenya and Nigeria (2001).

14.

Brokering peace in the Warri conflict in Delta and the Okrika-Eleme conflict in Rivers State.

15.

A.O., Muzan, Conflicts, disputes and strife in the Niger Delta oil industry: A causal analysis, 4 Nigerian Journal of Jurisprudence and Contemporary Issues1999. 53.

16.

The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), which was headed by Ken Saro-Wiwa until his death, has continued to be a political, nonviolent movement which seeks to address the ills of oil operations in the environment of Ogoni land in Rivers State.

17.

MEND may have been a confederation of several groups

18.

Nigeria: Risky toughness’ The Economist 18 September 2008.

19.

Gani Adams, The Yoruba nation and self-determination’ text of a press conference,

Lagos,

Nigeria,

20

October

1999.

See

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oodua People’s Congress (accessed 23 March 2013).

See also ‘Oodua Peoples’ Congress (OPC)’ http://www.globalsecurity.org/ military/world/para/yoruba.htm (accessed 31 January 2017).

20.

O.F. Ibrahim ‘Religion and politics: A view from the north’ in L Diamond et al (eds) Transition without end - Nigerian political and civil society under Babangida 1996. p.51-521.

21.

The indigenes are the Hausas and other aboriginal tribes (not the Fulani settlers).

The Fulani are a primarily migrant or nomadic people who are regarded by the owners of the land as strangers or settlers. Historically, they have taken up permanent settlement only where they have sufficiently subjugated the aboriginals of the land that they settle.

22.

The indigenes are the Hausas and other aboriginal tribes (not the Fulani settlers).

The Fulani are a primarily migrant or nomadic people who are regarded by the owners of the land as strangers or settlers. Historically, they have taken up permanent settlement only where they have sufficiently subjugated the aboriginals of the land that they settle.

23.

P. Ekeh, Political minorities and historicity-dominant minorities in Nigerian history and politics’ in O Oyediran (ed) Governance and development in Nigeria: Essays in honour of Billy J Dudley 1996 p.52.

24.

S. I. Onimajesin, The OPC militancy in Nigeria, 1999-2003: Its implication and management’

University

of

Ilorin,

http://unilorin.edu.ng/publications/onima

jesin.htm (accessed 31 January 2017).

25.

Arewa People’s Congress’ Wikipedia http://en.wikpedia.org/wikip/Arewa People’s Congress (accessed 31 January 2017).

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26.

H. Idris, why we abducted French Nationals’ Daily Trust 19 March 2013 7. See also T Badawale ‘The rise of ethnic militias, de-legitimisation of the state, and the threat to Nigerian federalism’ 2001 3 West Africa Review 1-11

27.

David Muzan, Restoration of Ogoni Land, an analysis of the NGO Regulation Bill 2016.p.54-55

28.

Oshoddi v Balogun, 4 West African Court of Appeal WACA 7, 1936.

29.

These were not sustained conflicts, but they arose from a mix of cultural and religious deference existing between the indigenous Kano traders and nonindigenes, mostly Ibo, traders who had a common claim to market resources in Kano.

30.

The Petroleum Act of 1969 and related oil and gas industry laws, some in force since 1958; see BM Russett ‘Inequality and instability: The relations of land tenure to politics, 16 World Politics 1964 p.442

31.

The Masa of East, Africa.https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki.east_africa_community.

32.

In using the term ‘sub-region’, I mean to import the newer UN idea of regionalism rather than the older British or French conception of a political, economic, or geographically definable interest. For several decades, the reference to West Africa, velnon, simply meant British West Africa or French West Africa or the countries identified with these

33.

Abioye v Yakubu 1991 5 NWLR (Pt 190) 130 135, per Kawu JSC.

34.

In 2012, the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) submitted a confidential report to the President of Nigeria confirming the need for remediation of Ogoni land.

35.

Land and Native Rights Ordinance 1 of 1916, Cap 105 Law of Nigeria, superseded by the Land Use Act, Cap L5 LFN, 2004.

36.

David Muzan, Restoration of Ogoni Land, p.61.

37.

Aristotle, The politics of Aristotle, trans E. Barker 1958, p. 203, 204 and 36.

38.

For some classical works, see H Arndt On revolution 1963; G Simmel Conflict and the web of group affiliations trans KH Wolff & R Bendix 1955.

39.

JC Davies When men revolt and why 1971. p.7.

40.

David Muzan, Restoration of Ogoni Land, p.66. See also L Randell Political economy of Venezuelan oil 1987.

41.

Euripides ‘Suppliants’ in The tragedies of Euripides in English verse trans AS Way 1894. p.373.

42.

M Ravallion& B Bidani‘How robust is a poverty profile?’ (1994) 8 The World Bank Economic Review 75-102.See B See bohm Rowntree Poverty: A study of town life (1901); see also V Thomas ‘Spatial differences in poverty: The case of Peru’ (1980) 7 Journal of Development Economics 85-98; AB Atkinson ‘On the measurement of poverty’ (1987) 55 Econometric 749-764; J Dollard et al Frustration and aggression (1939) (1967). See also L Berkowitz (ed) Roots of

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aggression: A re-examination of the frustration-aggression hypothesis (1968): JC Davies ‘Towards a theory of revolution’ (1962) 27 American Sociological Review p.5-19 43.

Ted. Robert Gurr, Psychological factors in civil violence, 20 World Politics, 1968. p.254.

44.

O Mailafia ‘Conflict and insurgency in Nigeria’ PM News 26 September 2012.

45.

IBRD Nigeria, employment and growth study (2009).

46.

Aristotle,The Politics, trans H Rackham 1932 p.382. See E Burke Reflections on the revolution in France 1955.

47.

James M. Berger, The Arab world today p. 961. See also M Halpern The politics of social change in the Middle East and North Africa 1963.p.20

48.

G.T Stride & C. IfekaPeoples and empires of West Africa, 1971.p.321-345

49.

Ted.RGurr, ‘A causal model of civil strife: A comparative analysis using new indices, American Political Science Review, 1968. P.62

50.

R Bendix, The age of ideology: Persistence and changing, in DE Apter Ideology and discontent, 1964 294 ff. See also SP Huntington ‘Conservation as an ideology, American Political Science Review 454. 1957.p.51

Proposals 1. Implement Policies that Encourage Economic Growth Here are just a few national and state policy changes that would really help our generation out: i. Lower taxes: If you lower taxes for consumers, they will be able to buy more and that will encourage job growth. If you lower taxes for businesses, they will be able to produce more, innovate more, and hire more people. It’s that simple. ii. Stop playing favourites: The government needs to stop protecting rich and powerful industries at the expense of smaller endeavours. By subsidizing an industry to “save” it, the government takes money out of other areas of the economy that could have grown. Subsidies might look like they maintain and even create jobs in the short term, but they actually hinder job growth in the long term.

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iii. Stop

putting

money

into

unsustainable

programs

(i.e.

government health care, Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid): Young people have to pay into these programs to support the huge numbers of aging Baby Boomers. But by the time Millennials are old enough to benefit from these programs, the money will be long gone. iv. Stop over-regulating industries: Try starting your own business.

You’ll find that it’s really difficult to get anything off the ground due to the huge amounts of government regulations in many industries. Sometimes the regulations don’t even make sense—government just imposes them to protect other industries!

Youth unemployment isn’t the direct result of any one policy. But when the government tries to dictate the way the market works, the well-being of everyone—especially those launching their careers for the first time—is going to suffer.

2. Change the Education System It’s become an expectation that most respectable, intelligent young people are going to get a bachelor’s degree. And the smartest young people are going to get expensive bachelor’s degrees from prestigious schools. Today, everyone has bachelor’s degrees. So to stand out, the smart young people are also expected to get a master’s degree. The tough thing about this arrangement is that once people graduate, they are in tens of thousands of dollars of student debt. And they are not always ready to work. It is important to have an educated society, but what we are seeing today are many graduates who have partied their way through college, only to find themselves in debt and without the experience, knowledge, people skills, or adaptability that they need to land their first job.

Instead of having to get an expensive bachelor’s degree, people should have more options to go to vocational school, or get a combination of liberal arts and then on-the-job training (i.e. a year of the liberal arts, a year or two of vocational training, and then a year of internships). Even better, it would be great to see companies start adopting apprenticeship programs, teaching young professionals what they need to know on the job.

3. Encourage Society to Value Hard Work Many young people have grown up with the notion that to be successful, they have to have several degrees, work in an office, and be a “leader.” In fact, moving up in many organizations usually involves managing more people. “We need to stop assuming that 278 | P a g e

success means having a certain type of job.” The fact is, if you can find a job that brings you fulfilment without having to incur debt, you are luckier than most people. If you engage in manual labour that fills a need in the marketplace, you are doing just as well as the average person in an office. If you become really specialized in a certain task, but are wise enough to forgo the promotion because you know that you are not called to management, you’ve just made a successful career move.

Our society needs to stop valuing work because it is more “visible” or “comfortable” or “prestigious.” We need to stop assuming that success means having a certain type of job.

Rather, it’s meeting the needs of others, working hard and doing things excellently, and innovating to solve new problems—in whichever industry. Making young people aware of this truth would prevent much of the overcrowding that we see in certain professional industries today.

4. Solving the problem of Unemployment Unemployment is defined as the state of being without a paid job (Oxford Advanced Learners Dictionary, Fifth Edition). Unemployment occurs when people are without work and actively seeking for a job (International Labour Organization). It is a global issue as developed, developing, undeveloped and underdeveloped nations of the world are experiencing it. As evidence that even developed nations of the world are “combating” with unemployment, in December 2013, an estimate of 6.7 percent Americans was unemployed.

In the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the country has a large number of her population badly treated by unemployment. The quest for good leadership in solving unemployment in the country has made almost all that are affected by the menace show their reactions in one way or the other. The most pitiable of it is that most youths of the country are crying day and night because of the "wicked unemployment" in the country.

In 2012, International Labour Organization, an organization that takes statistics of both the employed and unemployed in the world, stated that about 6% of the world population were unemploy and that the most unemployed are the youths. According to the same organization, about 73.4 million youths were unemployed in 2013. A news publication company, Vanguard online news, reported on May 19, 2014, that estimate of 60 million Nigerians is unemployed. World Bank Data in 2010 put poverty level among Nigerian citizens as 46% of the nation’s population, and this can be caused by unemployment in the country.

Nigeria has a population of 168.8 million in 2012 (World Bank Data).

Many strategies are developed through which unemployment in Nigeria will be reduced.

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which unemployment in the country will be reduced. These solutions, when applied appropriately, will go further to reduce some challenges in Nigeria. When these unique and original ideas, are put into action, I firmly believe that the rate of unemployment in the country will be minimized. For years, unemployment has been growing like ‘grasses’ but with these strategies, the ‘grasses’ (unemployment), will face serious dry season which hence retards (hinders) the growth.

In the year 2016, the methodology through which unemployment is rated in the country changed. Notwithstanding the change, unemployment in the country was still high. In the year as well, the country experienced an economic recession. The rate of economic activities reduced, companies closed, and many workers lost their jobs. Nigerian Bureau Statistics in July 2016 stated that 13.3% Nigerians were unemployed. Underemployment was 19.3% and youth unemployment/underemployment was 49.5% when the record was taken.

What are the solutions to Nigeria unemployment? Agriculture as a Solution to Nigeria's Unemployment: I. Very Important Agricultural Mechanization and Enhancement: The reason why many citizens of Nigeria run away from agriculture as if Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) is after them is because an agricultural practice is stressful to them.

Agricultural practices in the country are mostly manual, that is by the use of manpower.

Many who even wanted to go into the practice grow cold minds when they discover that without machines there will be low agricultural output. The use of hoes and other crude equipment that have the metallic parts made through sand casting, investment casting or forging processes wastes time but agricultural mechanization makes farming easy and less stressful.

With the introduction of machines into agriculture, Nigerians will see agriculture as something interesting and start engaging in it. Advancing agriculture, like the new and improved system of farming and poultry, will propel many to pick such as means of employment for them. When they make the profit from the practice, they can enlarge and employ other persons to assist. The government should organize seminars where citizens will be taught on the new improved system of making living from agriculture. In the year 2014, His Excellency, Governor Willie Obiano of Anambra State empowered more than 100 citizens of the state on how to run modern agricultural practice. The training covered poultry and piggery. Many who participated have their own farms today.

II. Support Small and Medium Enterprises: The establishments made by private individuals contribute so much to the growth of manufacturing companies in Nigeria. When the Government provides more funds to support these SMEs, more employment will be 280 | P a g e

made and unemployment reduced to some extent. The Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) can empower the youths who work in those companies. There are many types of youth empowerment that can be offered to the youth workers as they work in the establishments. With the skills acquired, the workers can establish their own company and employ others also. It is not only the youths that are empowered in the companies but also the adult workers.

According to Nigerian Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Small and Medium Enterprises manufacture more than 90 percent of the products used in Nigeria. This shows that they play important role in the country. The Government should reduce the huge amount of charge on SMEs so that they can enlarge their coast. Those who are doing well in Small and Medium Enterprises should mentor others as mentoring is important.

III. Youth Empowerment as Solution to Nigeria's Unemployment Youth Empowerment on Creativity and Self-Discovery: There are many creative people in Nigeria but the problem is that they do not know they are creative. When seminars are organized for the youths on what is built in them that they have not discovered, those inbuilt talents in them will “erupt�. The seminars are to be sponsored by either governments or citizens that are up-and-doing or even both. The creative attitude in many Nigerians can be developed through mentoring. People especially the youths should have mentors who will direct them in certain things about life.

Self-discovery can make citizens of Nigeria to get jobs by being self-employed. In this case, they are the managers of their own company. Self-employment is important but in some cases and it calls for self-discovery. Self-discovery in this context is about finding out what you can do apart from your area of specialization or what you studied as a profession. There are many comedians in Nigeria today who make much money and live good by making people laugh and feel happy. Also, there are many actors and actresses in the country who have made it and some are still making it notwithstanding that theatre art was not what they studied in their different institutions.

NkemOwoh is popular Nigerian actor who has made so much money irrespective of the fact that he did not study theater art as a profession. He studied Engineering at the University of Ilorin, Nigeria (sourced from Wikipedia). Also, NkemOwoh studied Electrical Engineering in Institute of Management and Technology (IMT), Enugu, Nigeria. He is popularly referred to as Osuofia. He had a good self-discovery on his ability to act and that is how he found himself in the movie industry today. In 2008, NkemOwoh won the African Movie Academy Award of the year for Best Actor in a Leading Role. He acquired important skill acquisition on acting and then used it as a source of income.

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IV. Retiring the Old: There are lots of people who are occupying positions in offices that are too old to be there. One of the things that cause unemployment in Nigeria is that the old men and women that are in offices who are not supposed to be there again are still occupying the positions that others are to take. When you look very well into the mouths of many, you will observe that many of them cannot even chew cooked fish not even to talk of ground meat. This is no tall story (not a joke) and cannot be treated with kids’ glove. The retirement age of government and non-government workers should be reduced by the government so that graduates will have the positions where they will occupy. An active body should be set to investigate in different workplaces to fish-out the old who refuse to leave the positions for the younger to take charge. When the body work hard, more employment opportunities will be created for citizens of Nigeria.

V. Family Planning: In China for instance, due to the high increase in their population, a Law was passed on the number of children each parent is to have. When family planning is introduced and passed as a Law with implementation in Nigeria, parents will not “release� babies again as if they are urinating. Because of the plan, the created job opportunities will go to some extent and results to the reduction in the high unemployment rate in the country.

VI. Computer Skill Acquisition: We are in the age where computer plays important roles.

The truth is that the importance of computer cannot be overemphasized. Its usefulness is found in many departments of any establishment in the world of today. In production companies, banking sector, education, and even in agriculture, the computer has many roles to play. Unemployment among Nigerian graduates would have been reduced by equipping them with computer skills when they were still undergraduates. I believe in using what you have to get what you want in the positive sense of it because many undergraduates have computers. Many students in the institutions of higher learning in Nigeria can be taught on how to make money by the use of their computers. This can come in form of seminars sponsored by either the government of the country or the campuses.

When the students learn good skills acquisition on the computer, they can develop it to be a source of their income even in their institutions and after their graduation.

The means of making money from the computer which has become a source of employment to many include: writing online articles and getting paid by advertising network (blogging), application design, website design and others. The joy of blogging and application design is that the worker can work from home being self-employed and then get paid per day. Again, it is free and is being managed by Google and that is why it is called Google Blogger.

Blogging is simple to learn. What a blogger (one who writes online articles using a blog) needs to do to start earning is to monetize his or her articles using Google AdSense. He or

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she has to get approval from Google AdSense before earning any cash from AdSense.

People can sign up here on Hub pages and start making money through writing to minimize unemployment in Nigeria. The author can be contacted on Facebook for assistance There are many online article writers in Nigeria that have made a lot of money from blogging.

Initially, it was not easy for them but after they wrote a lot of articles online, their blogs or websites began to earn cash for them. Linda Ikeji is a young Nigerian lady and blogger who make more than 3 million naira per month in the country. She started from little but today she is popular due to hard work she put in blogging. When people are taught properly on blogging, they get employed and even make establishments where the unemployed in the society will be employed.

VII. Seminars on Change of Mind-set: There are a lot of people in tertiary institutions that are not versatile, and they have the mind-set that the only place they will work is in offices that are garnished with air-conditions and other good things that help life. Others have the mind-set that the places they will work are those that only relates to the area of their study.

This is one of the reasons why many male graduates are still wearing the trousers that their biological fathers discarded long time ago because of insufficient funds to purchase their own. When the mind-sets of many are changed to good by teaching them in seminars to acquire some other important skills apart from their area of specialization, the unemployment rate in my country, Nigeria, will be reduced.

VIII.

Industrial Development and Infrastructure: Construction of more industries in

Nigeria will go a long way to reducing unemployment in Nigeria. The Government of Nigeria should give more allocation to industrial development and infrastructure whenever they are making their yearly budget. Even if Nigerians do not know how to operate or manage the industries, some good citizens should be sent abroad to acquire the skills, come back and help the country. The skills they acquired will be developed by their headings in many industries in the country. That is the importance of training and development. That was what countries like Brazil and Indian did before they started advancing in technological development. Nigeria as a country that needs to grow in technology can still do the same.

IX. Bridging Foreign Contractors: Another problem that we have in this country, Nigeria, is: the opportunities Nigerians have been being handed over to foreigners. Nigerian government awards lots of construction works to foreigners with the mind-set that Nigerian engineers will not perform such function effectively. Not only that, the foreign contractors travel to their countries to bring artisans to Nigeria who will also perform the less technical work instead of choosing Nigerians for the work. When foreign contractors and their cobrothers are prevented from being awarded such contracts, Nigerians will take over the jobs.

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Embracing Practical in Institution: Less practical is one of the reasons why many Nigerian graduates are half-baked. They lack practical background during their study. It is a challenge in Nigerian education. When there are installations of machines and other equipment needed for their study, skills and practical knowledge will be acquired. With the acquired practical knowledge, Nigerian graduates can go into production and increase the employment rate.

Encouraging Schemes like YouWIN and NPOWER which is an initiative for Youth Enterprise with Innovative program. To assist Nigerian graduates with business ideas. The reason for initiation of this program is to increase employment and reduce unemployment. Establishing more of this kind of scheme by both government and individuals will go a long way to curb the menace-unemployment.

X.

Organizing Competition: It brings out the best in people. Organizing competitions

among students of various institutions tend to sharpen their brains and train them on what they can do. For instance, organizing essay competitions for students train them on how to write winning essays. This can train people on how to be good news reporters and areas related to article writing which in return can fetch a job for the person. In the other hand, organizing singing competitions train people on how to sing and can convert many to lifetime singers or musicians.

XI.

Skill before Tertiary Institution:Skill Acquisition is a Key Solution to Nigeria's

Unemployment, any person who gains admission into tertiary institutions without first acquiring skill or skills is like castings made through sand casting process with lots of defects in that casting. Any person that wants to enrol in any tertiary institution in Nigeria should first acquire skill in any area that can fetch money for him even before and after his graduation as Nigerian tertiary institutions are full theories with little or no practical backup.

This should be passed as a Law and should be implemented. Any person that is interesting in gaining admission into the universities or polytechnics in Nigeria must first be equipped skilfully. He or she must present the certificate that shows that he went to training for acquisition of skill before being admitted for any study in tertiary institutions. There is much importance of training for skill acquisition for both the small, young and the adult. According to Nigeria Statistics Bureau, NSB, over 200,000 graduates are graduated from Nigeria tertiary institutions each year. The question is: are all the graduates employable or skilful?

When one pass through training for about six months before being issued admission, he/she can be employed based on the skill he/she acquired before securing admission into the institution and even issue employment to the unemployed.

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XII. Salary Increase: When the president of USA, President Obama, was interviewed by the chairman of Cable News Network (CNN) on 30th January 2014, based on unemployment in the USA, the president said that he will raise the salary of government workers to $10.10 (ten dollars ten cents) per hour. Increasing the salaries of workers will make them generate more money and make small establishment where the unemployed will be employed.

Nobody in the Federal Republic of Nigeria should fold hands and expect the major pressing issue in the country, unemployment, to go overnight. Discussed are the strategies that are applicable to reduce unemployment challenge in Nigeria. It is important to know that unemployment cannot be wiped entirely from any nation but rather can be reduced. In the introduction of this article, a little overview was made on the unemployment issue in Nigeria.

In the body of this piece, the major strategies for minimizing unemployment in the country were discussed. In conclusion, with these strategies, there will be an effective reduction in Nigeria unemployment rate. The should seriously monitor the new Universal Basic Education of the country which encourages skill acquisition.

5. Unlocking the political potentials of the Nigerian youth Are the youths politically excluded as they claim? Are the youths correct in their contention?

Is political relevance/leadership given or taken? Are the youths ready to lead? Are the youths empowered to lead?

Whose responsibility is it to empower the youths towards

political relevance/leadership?

Politics and good governance are the key drivers of the economy and development in any nation lately, there has been so much focus on leadership, politics, the political process and good governance across the globe, there is also an increased global interest in youth participation in politics and development. In recognition of this, the African Union General Assembly declared 2009-2019 as Africa Decade for Youth. One of the cardinal significance of democracy is the right of citizens to freely express themselves and get involved in the democratic process with a view to shaping how society is governed. Thus, an all-inclusive civic participation that cuts across all eligible voting age is essential for the survival and growth of democracy in any clime, including Nigeria.

Therefore, no strata of the society should be excluded from this civic participation, including the youth. Given the fact that statistical research shows that the youth constitute more than 60% of Nigeria’s population of eligible voters and eligible office holders and has been rightly described by many as the real owners of the country. Regrettably, according to the Nigerian Youth Manifesto (2011), active and constructive youth participation in Nigerian political 285 | P a g e

process has gradually become non-existent over the years. This necessitates our enquiry on this theme; Between 1957 and 1970, Nigerian political landscape was majorly dominated by young people, The pre-independence struggle was led by young people like Dr. Herbert Macaulay, Ernest Ikoli, Chief H.O Davies, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe 27 years, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa and a host others, the post-independence era was also dominated by young military men like Major General Aguyi Ironsi, General Yakubu Gowon 32, General Chukwuemeka Odimegwu Ojukwu 33 and others.

I.

The Nigerian youth in politics, 1980 -date

From the 80 still date, the Nigerian youth has been seriously excluded from qualitative political participation. In the last 3 decades, Nigerian political elites have continuously seen and used our youth as necessary political tools to achieve their political interests. Nigerian youths are used as thugs and are only given trivial responsibilities like posting of posters, distribution of campaign materials, crowd mobilization etc. Conversely it is a widely accepted view that increased youth political participation in governance and decision making process is a clear indicator of a country’s democratic development.

II.

Young Leaders in Politics Across the Globe

Volodymyr Groysman, 39 JuriRatas, 38 Ukraine pm, 2016Estonia pm, 2016

Charles Michel, 38

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Youssef Chahed, 41

Belgian PM, 2016Tunisia PM, 2016

Emmanuel Macron, 39 French PM, 2017

Across the globe, what you see is an increased effort to allow the youth, who are full of blood and energy to lead.

III.

Youth Absence in Nigerian Politics

why are youth absent in Nigerian politics? Sit tight attitude of Nigerian politicians and continued effort to exclude the youth from politics. Youth are not prepared. Youth are not ready, Youth’s lack of believe, trust and support for each other and Believe in the old myth that associates wisdom with old age. Too young to run.

IV.

Not Too Young to Run

The #NotTooYoungToRun Bill seeks to alter the Section 65, 106, 131, 177 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) to reduce the age qualification for the office of the President from 40 years to 30 years; Governor 35 to 30, Senate 35 to 30, House of Representatives 30 to 25 and State House of Assembly 30 to 25. The Bill also seeks to mainstream independent candidacy into Nigeria’s electoral process. The campaign “Not too young to run” was launched as a global campaign at the United Nations in 2016

V.

VI.

Age-long Youth Exclusion strategy bt the political class 

Unemployment



Poverty



Reduced access to education –Education the greatest tool



Poor infrastructural development



No growth and development initiatives to equip the youth.

Dangers/negative effects of Youth Exclusion

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

It is a great disservice for any society to exclude the youth, the main stay of every society from the scheme of things. Below are a few negative effects:



It breeds unpatriotism and a sense of injustice in young people.



Aya Chebbi, Founding Chair of the African Youth Movement and a Mo Ibrahim Foundation Fellow, said: “It’s not being jobless that drives youth to terrorism. It’s the perception of injustice.”



Migration out of Nigeria as we are currently witnessing. On a daily basis, we are losing our best brains to migration. It’s unfortunate.



Increased extremism and violence in the form of militancy, terrorism, kidnapping, robbery, 419(yahoo yahoo)

Dr. Mo Ibrahim, once said: Young people in Africa are becoming disillusioned. What will happen if we do not provide jobs when the tsunami of young people currently in education start looking for work? We will see further migration out of Africa and an increased threat of extremism.

VII.

Youth exclusion by youth 

The youth are architects of their failure –No support for fellow youth



Self-destructive attitude. They are their own demons and destiny killers –How do you use your time and the important God-given tool, the social media.

What activities do you get engaged inPassive attitude towards politics



Complacency on the part of the youth. What can we do? Helplessness. Let’s keep managing.

VIII. 

Peace



Growth and development



Equity and equality



Social justice



Reduced cost of running government

IX.

Youth inclusion 

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Advantages of youth inclusion

Politics has been defined as a global driving force for social transformation



Politics are the actions or activities concerned with achieving and using power in a country or society–Collins Dictionary



This explains why Nigerian political leadership has been a recycling of same' old' stock politicians and their children.

X. Youth inclusion: a collective responsibility 

Some societies, especially the Nigerian society looks at young people through the lens of problem and liability rather than looking at them through the lens of assets –Darren Walker, President of Ford Foundation



The energy and ambition of Africa’s young people is our greatest resource and best hope for strengthening our continent’s progress. But their expectations could turn into frustration and anger unless they find a job and get a chance to influence their own future. Africa stands at a tipping point.

The decisions taken now will decide whether our continent continues to rise or falls back. More than ever, wise leadership and sound governance are key–Dr. Mo Ibrahim, Chair of the Mo Ibrahim Foundation.

XI. The role of the elders/existing political class To promote young people participation in politics, state actors should adopt the following a. Guarantee youth participation in governance and other decision making process. b. Facilitate platforms for youth participation in decision-making at all levels of governance. c. Ensure equal access to young men and women to participate. d. Give priority to marginalized youth. e. Make young people aware of their rights and of opportunities to participate. f.

Institute measures to professionalise youth work and provide training.

g. Help build the institutional capacity of youth organisations. h. Develop youth friendly tools for political participation i.

quickly pass the “Not too young to run” bill

j.

NASS to pass a bill that no one above 70 years should contest any political office

-Modified from Article 11, African Youth Charter

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XII. The role of the youth 

The bulk of the work is with the youth. Because it is all about you, your future and your destiny.



Matthew 11:12: From the days of John the Baptist until now, the kingdom of heaven suffereth violence and the violent take it by force



Nobody will throw power at you. You have to wrestle power from them.



Covey’s recommendation on acquiring power



Are leaders born or made?



Leaders are neither born nor made



Leaders choose to be leaders



So nobody gives power, you take it



The youth potential. The youth power. The youth advantage



Nigeria has a robust youth environment and increasing youth population, having one of the most youthful population in the world



More than 60% of eligible voters are youth. So by default, youth are the owners of the country.



This demographic dividend has continuously been squandered for many years. It has to stop.



The youth approach. The youth strategy. The youth decision



Politics is a global driving force for social transformation



Today, in our Nation, they youths seem to disagree with the age long statement that" the youths are leaders of tomorrow”. To their dismay, they contend

that

political

leadership

has

been

a

recycling

of

same'old'stockpoliticians.Theyclaimthatnobodyisgivingthemthechancetorule. 

The case should rather be that the youth, the real owners of the country should decide who should be in power and who shouldn’t



Only those below 45 should be voted into power.



We can at best, involve some of those 45 and above as advisers rather than those 60 and above appointing young people as advisers. It is a contradiction in terms.



Young people make up more than 60% of the population, therefore this country belongs to us and we have to determine how its going to run. Hence our decision:

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I am a youth, 18 years and above, I must immediately obtain a PVC



I will vote in every election.



I will vote for only credible people below 45 years



I will support the #Not too young to run bill



I will never accept to be used as political tools and thugs again



I will use our advantage, our power –the youth bulge to remove, recall or vote out anyone who fails to perform



I will effectively use social media for the good of the country.



So help me God.

Conclusion Nigeria is at a Tipping Point, we are at a defining moment in Nigeria’s political history, I therefore join the voices of so many great minds like: Martin Kobler, Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, said: “In mediation, we talk mostly to men above the age of 70. Youth is often totally detached from this process, but they are the majority of the population. They are not only the future of the country, they’re the present of the country.”

Voices for youth inclusion Amina J. Mohammed, Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations, called on young people to become more involved in the democratic process. “We need an inter-generational transition. I don’t think people over a certain age should be at the helm of affairs looking at the future for people who are 60 years younger.” I urge, encourage and remind you, the youth that your destiny is in your hands. Finally, The Mo Ibrahim Foundation’s 2017 Forum report, Africa at a Tipping Point finds the continent still making progress, but faced with a real risk off all going back. The future will depend, more than anything else, on Africa’s ability to harness the energy and meet the expectations of its young people.

6.Principles of Government 1. From all indications, the village is a dead hand on our development. So, no village or villager, which can be anybody from Head of Stateto the Clerk, fromthe Chairman of a multi-nat1onal to the peasant farmer, should be encouraged to believe that a modern nation can be run from the way they see things.

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2. We must seek to change the village, not to allow the village to change or retain us. To surrender to the village would be in the direction of retrogression, not to progress.

3. While the Nigerian village is not to be destroyed it is to be overcome. It is a major handicap and can only be a positive factor in our grow the process in an apparently undeserving amount of effort and resources are applied to it.

By the village is meant human beings and mentality, also a whole system of unscientific approach not only land, but geographical location.

4. At subsistence level a village may maintain itself and even contribute to the National economy. To force

it

to

operate

at higher than subsistence

level would be too disruptive. It would affect its peasant and small holding mentality and may even cause it to fall into despair.

5.

When we talk of rural development and checking urban drift, what we are saying, to be meaningful and affective, is that we want to urbanise the rural areas. This is being attempted in North Korea with some success. What is important is to ensure that by rural development the village is not deprived of the Little that it is doing to sustain itself. Government propanganda can render

thevillage more deprived, by raising expectations and not fulfilling

them thereby creating confusion.

6. As I said above: the village as an obstacle is to be overcome. The village as a possible instrument for development is to be redeemed through total education. What is by now obvious is that the work of education, redeeming and developing the village is a work for giants, not half baked part timers.

7. Ifthe village remains the way it is then we cannot be a civilised nation for what is wrong with most of our urban dwellers is that they are villagers.

8. A good system of government will operate on the principle that all men are equal. But most of those who repeat this truism do not even understand in what sense all men are equal.They therefore cause confusion in the system.

In fact, it were better if they set out to accept that all men are not equal for inequality is what the eye readily sees.

9. All men were not born equals; their opportunities are not equal; they are not equally endowed. That all men are equal is philosophical and requires thought. It is nonetheless real, but a difficult reality.

10. First, there is the fact of compensation. No man possesses everything, arid no man is so-self-sufficient in what he possesses that he does not need some other person. Everybody has his use in society. Those who are able to make a lot of money will need a large variety of other gifted persons to put this 292 | P a g e

money to purposes that will achieve their objectives. Likewise, men of intellect can lead us to many possibilities but they will need a long list of technical capabilities and entrepreneurs as back up to find fulfilment. So, it is a community in co-operation that we are talking about.

11. All men are equal before the law, largely because they are all equal in their weaknesses. Everybody is inclined towards wrong doing and anti-social behaviour. Therefore, the regulatory role of law must apply to everybody.

12. In a spiritual sense all men are equal before God, God sees all the compensating factors in a way 110 man sees them and sees above all, our pitiable choices and attachments as amounting to nothing much-no real advantage.

On

the

contrary,

most

choices

and

attachments

are

disadvantages.Stripped of all superfluity soul is equal to soul in every respect.

13. But a structure of government where it is embodied in a written constitution should be such as the best men can uphold, such can give hope and inspiration to good men and can provide adequate control on bad men. Since the vast majority of our citizens are bad men, the element of control must predominate.

14. The purpose of government is not to make society whole in its entirety, but to create an atmosphere in which good and bad men can co-exist. Goodness and badness are beside the law; they are not above or below it. Both can break certain laws. But the breaking of certain other

laws by bad men

predominates.

15. A bad man is not necessarily a criminal. So we are talking of two separate things-law and morality, and we must not confusethem. Legal or punishable crime andbadness relate, but they are not identical. Goodness itself is difficult to define, but easy to identify. In a society where there is a consensus on what constitutes goodness, the good man already receives his reward.

However, government endeavour to use good men for its functions.

16. We know that all men are born bad. Whether this is natu1al or inherited or the result ofthe world’simmanent stain, in other Words, a vitiated environment, does notmatter. The truth is that over all, man himself wishes he were better.

He recognises that wit out the forces of checkunrestraint, excesses and than the animal jungle.

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mediation

which dailyintervenesto

deviations human society would be worse

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