The corruption notebooks 2009 by Solutionet

2009

THE CORRUPTION NOTEBOOKS

2009

Edited by Hazel Feigenblatt and Global Integrity

THE CORRUPTION NOTEBOOKS

THE CORRUPTION NOTEBOOKS 2009. Copyright ÂŠ 2010 by Global Integrity. All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this book may be used or reproduced without written permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews. For information contact Global Integrity, 1029 Vermont Ave, N.W. Suite 600. Washington, DC 20005 USA. Phone: +1 (202) 449-4100 Email: info@globalintegrity.org Web: www.globalintegrity.org Global Integrity books may be purchased for educational, business or sales promotional use. For information please contact Global Integrity.

FIRST EDITION (1.020)

ISBN Pending

2009

THE CORRUPTION NOTEBOOKS

2009

Authors Shain Abbasov Anas Anas Edik Baghdasaryan Afsana Rashid Bhat Silver Bugingo Lena Cali Camilo de Castro Kalkali Elhadi Siri Gedde-Dahl Ignacio Gómez Zaklina Hadzi-Zaﬁrova Andreas Harsono Stefan Hudec Charlie Hughes Dino Jahic Azhar Kalamujic John Kollie Nick Langer

Vlad Lavrov Njabulo Ncube Nicholas Noe Kepher Otieno Djordje Padejski Frank Phiri Surendra Phuyal Kejin Qian Nguyen Qui Duc Kris Rampersad Leonarda Reyes Siri Schubert Michael Shanahan Marcelo Soares Mikaili Sseppuya Carlos Subero Olgha Tsiskarishvili-Soselia

THE CORRUPTION NOTEBOOKS

Editors Hazel Feigenblatt, Media Projects Director Jennifer Frazier, Managing Editor Elizabeth Brown Thomas BurchďŹ eld Alicia Eckley Sinziana Demian Kathleen McNamera Angela Persaud Christopher Drosner JR Lind

Researchers Raymond June Norah Mallaney

Global Integrity Nathaniel Heller, Managing Director Jonathan Eyler-Werve, Director of Operations The Corruption Notebooks is the printed compilation of journalistic reporting that comprises part of the annual Global Integrity Report, a collection of national-level assessments of anti-corruption and accountability worldwide. The Global Integrity Report is available free online (report.globalintegrity.org).

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Contents 1

Introduction Nathaniel Heller, Hazel Feigenblatt

Part I Corruption and Personal Life 9

Armenia: Corruption as a Lifestyle Edik Baghdasaryan

Azerbaijan: Making Fun of the Law Shahin Abbasov

Georgia: Kicking Corruption Out of School Olgha Tsiskarishvili

Germany: A Kickback per Prescription Siri Schubert

Ghana: Bribe as You Go Anas Aremeyaw Anas

Jordan: A Nightmare Begins Nick Langer

Macedonia: Corruption Starts at Birth Zaklina Hadzi-Zaﬁrova

Malawi: It’s Our Turn to Eat Frank Phiri

Mexico: Tithes and Punishment Leonarda Reyes

Nepal: Corrupt People Are Never Frowned Upon Surendra Phuyal

Vietnam: A Life of Envelopes Nguyen Qui Duc

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Contents Part II Anti-Corruption Agencies, the Judiciary, and Police 107

China: Money and Greed, Today’s Religion Xiao Chin An

115

Kenya: Who Will Follow the Law if the Leaders Don’t? Kepher Otieno

125

Indonesia: The Gecko vs. the Crocodile Andreas Harsono

133

Rwanda: A Blow to the “Untouchable Syndrome” Bugingo Silver

141

Sierra Leone: New Broom, Same Old Dirt Charlie J. Hughes

149

Trinidad & Tobago: Missing Mandates and Misleading Reports Kris Rampersad

157

Ukraine: Judges Who Should Take the Defendant’s Seat Vlad Lavrov

Part III Weak Institutions, Strong Corruption 167

Algeria: The Story of a Small Battle in a Big War Kalkali El-Hadi

175

Bosnia: The Rule of Patronage Dino Mikaili and Azhar Kalamujiü

185

Brazil: Pizza, the Solution to Any Scandal Marcelo Soares

195

Colombia: Family Ties Ignacio Gómez

2009

203

India: A Crooked Reward System Afsana Rashid

213

Kosovo: A Young Democracy and a Thousand-Year-Old Enemy Lena Cali

221

Lebanon: Armed ConďŹ&#x201A;ict, Religion and Corruption: The Perfect Storm Nicholas Noe

231

Liberia: Corruptionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Legacy John O. Kollie

239

Nicaragua: $Q (OHFWRUDO )UDXG WKH 3ULFH IRU )UHHLQJ $OH PDQ Camilo de Castro

247

Serbia: Slight Improvements, Major Setbacks 'MRUGMH 3DGHMVNL

255

Slovakia: Communist Instinct and a Bottle of Cognac Ĺ tefan Hudec

263

Uganda: Land of the Corrupt Heroes Mikaili SSeppuya

269

Venezuela: Between Corruption and Protests Carlos Cubero

279

Zimbabwe: 5RWWLQJ )URP WKH +HDG 'RZQ Njabulo Ncube

Part IV Corruption Is Not a Development Issue 291

Norway: Trouble in Paradise 6LUL *HGGH 'DKO

299

United States: Transparency in the Obama Administration 0LFKDHO 6KDQDKDQ

THE CORRUPTION NOTEBOOKS

2009

Edited by Hazel Feigenblatt and Global Integrity

THE CORRUPTION NOTEBOOKS

2009

Introduction

A question we’re often asked when people ﬁrst learn about the work we do here at Global Integrity is, “So, is corruption getting better or worse globally?” While the question seems obvious enough, we think it misses a bigger point. First, it’s impossible to know — whether through data or journalistic reporting — if “the world” is doing better at ﬁghting corruption year to year. It’s simply not knowable (regardless of what a statistician might tell you otherwise). Second, it doesn’t really matter. What matters instead is that people’s lives on the ground in countries are improving — or not — because progress has been made in curbing corruption and encouraging accountable, transparent government. It’s those people we care about and on whom the Reporter’s Notebooks that comprise this volume focus. Instead of talking about international treaties or high-level conferences that debate the issues from an academic perspective,

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the journalistic reporting that you will read in the following pages describes in vivid detail the progress and challenges with corruption at the country and local levels that actually affect people’s lives. This is the real stuff, the gritty reality of daily life in so many countries where corruption has become the rule, not the exception. In “Part I: Corruption and Personal Life,” the notebooks remind us that “accountability” needs to go beyond the passing of new laws and instead needs to include a careful approach to culture and personal relationships in order to gradually, over time, motivate both public officials and citizens to reject the notion that graft and bribery are acceptable behaviors. These notebooks show how corruption can reach and invade the most vulnerable moments of daily life, from receiving a vaccination — which might be painful or not, depending on whether the nurse is paid extra cash — to the life or death of children during a fire at a daycare center certified as safe despite its lack of fire exits and alarms. “Part II: Anti-Corruption Agencies, the Judiciary, and Police” paints a somewhat discouraging picture about the very government agencies that are ostensibly tasked with curbing, preventing, and punishing corruption. As the reporters in this section point out, so many of these agencies often perform little more than bureaucratic paper pushing and can at times become corrupt agents themselves, pursuing politically motivated investigations at the behest of the government in power. Stories about judges who should be sitting on the de-

2009

fendant’s seat rather than on the bench, and policemen open to anything as long as it’s over dinner at a fine restaurant, remind us that even internal watchdogs need to be watched, and that paper-only reforms do little to break the cycles of patronage and bribery. In “Part III: Weak Institutions, Strong Corruption,” the reporters take us on a world tour of political corruption scandals. Some scandals caused public outrage but led to little or no institutional reform. Others were well-covered by the media as they unfolded, but coverage failed to lead to lasting reform as the institutional weaknesses in government were so pervasive. One such case is that of an opposition party choosing to remain silent about an electoral fraud benefiting the ruling party in exchange for securing the annulment of the jail sentence of its leader, who had been convicted of theft of public resources. Such a negotiation shows what can happen when patronage overwhelms a sense of the public interest and reminds us that sometimes the fight against corruption in certain countries can only be advanced by rebuilding key institutions entirely. Incremental reforms may not always be successful. Finally, “Part IV: Corruption is not a Development Issue” serves as a reminder that corruption is not a “poor country” problem alone. It is just as prevalent in the wealthy, more developed countries, although it tends to take slightly more sophisticated forms. The fact that so many courageous and gifted journalists remain passionate about these issues and are willing to collaborate with us (some at significant personal and professional risk) speaks volumes to the fact that public interest

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journalism remains one of the most powerful anti-corruption weapons in our collective arsenal. It’s why we remain committed to these Notebooks, year after year, as a way of telling the stories of so many around the world who suffer unjustly at the hands of incompetent and corrupt governments. We hope The Corruption Notebooks 2009 contributes to a richer, more nuanced understanding of our Integrity Indicators for each country (available at http://report.globalintegrity.org), data gathered by other in-country experts that quantitatively assess the existence and effectiveness of many of the same institutions you’ll read about in the following pages. Our approach of combining journalism with social science research is a call to generate new, innovative anticorruption strategies that match the complexities of the real world. It’s a call we hope you will respond to. Nathaniel Heller

Hazel Feigenblatt

Managing Director

Media ProjectsDirector

2009

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2009

Part I — Corruption and Personal Life

“They (the nurses) make it painful for you. You pay, and the nurses will give you shots without hurting you…” —Reporter’s Notebook, Vietnam

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ARMENIA

2009

Armenia:

Corruption as a Lifestyle By Edik Baghdasaryan

Anoush Muradyan (the name has been changed to protect the source’s identity) is expecting her ﬁrst child. Her family’s joy is tempered, however, with concerns regarding the expenses they will incur for the delivery procedure. “Once you set foot in a hospital you have to start paying people; from the doctor down to the cleaning attendant,” says 21-year-old Anoush. “They talk about free child delivery but nothing is free when you are pregnant. Periodic testing costs 15,000-20,000 Armenian drams (US$40-53) and I’ve been

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told that the physician alone performing the delivery wants AMD 70,000 (US$185) up front. Then too, you have to pay the attending nurses, and for miscellaneous services.”

What does “free” child delivery actually cost? Over a year has passed since the Armenian Government began to tout the claim that child delivery is free. The media even periodically report that the sector has improved. The waiting room at the National Center of Perinatology, Obstetrics and Gynecology (PMGHK— ɣʗʂʞɸʖʓʃʓɽʂɸʌʂ, ʋɸʞʆɸɹɸʗʈʓʙʀʌɸʞʞ ɽʂʞɼʆʓʃʓ ɽ ʂɸʌʂ ʇɸʞʗɸʑɼʖɸ ʆɸʍ ʆɼʞ ʖʗʓʞ) in Armenia’s capital of Yerevan is almost always crowded. On the right as you enter is the office of the Chief Obstetrician/Gynecologist. You will always find expectant mothers milling about the office in addition to the occasional reporter. I arrived there for an interview an hour early and bided my time in the general waiting room. The walls were affixed with notices regarding the free maternity services offered by the government. There I met grandma Armik (the name has been changed to protect the source’s identity), a 66-year-old woman who pleaded with the waiting room attendant to see her pregnant daughter-in-law. The attendant, seemingly oblivious to the woman’s pleas, responded only by pointing to the notices on the wall. One notice stated: “The hospital administration allows for one free visit to each patient for about one hour between 5:00 and 7:00 p.m.” Another notice next to it stated that patient visits could be made at all hours of the day for a fee of 2,000 AMD (US$5.30).

2009

Grandma Armik felt compelled to bring her daughterin-law to Yerevan from the town of Vardenis, 170 kilometers away, due to recommendations by local doctors, given that the pregnancy had been a difficult one. Because they had the Medical Care State Certificate, which allows expectant mothers free-of-charge healthcare, they didn’t anticipate to be charged any further payments by the hospital administration. Other notices on the walls listed the “free” maternity services offered by the government to patients who had brought with them the necessary certificates. These services cover the range of necessary child delivery procedures — from medicines and medical equipment and necessary mediyounger staff members, plus other procedures. “It’s outright banditry and they claim it’s all free,” grandma Armik says angrily. “The room costs money and so do the visits; the sanitary attendant must be paid in addition to the nurses and cleaners. I’m on a pension and my son works as a guard receiving the minimum wage. A young man came through the door leading to the maternity wards and approached the waiting room attendant. He pulled out a 20,000 AMD (US$52) bill and asked the attendant for change in 1,000 AMD (US$2.6) notes. Everyone in the waiting room knew he needed the change to pay off the nurses inside to “take good care” of his wife. As I listened to grandma Armik’s complaints, the attendant gave permission to two individuals to visit a patient at the same time. This was in violation of a notice on the wall

ARMENIA

cal and diagnostic testing to medical care by physicians and

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that prohibited more than one visitor at a time. On top of the 4,000 AMD (US$10) that was required for a two-person visit, the individuals placed an extra 1,000 AMD (US$2.5) on the attendant’s table. The amount was sufﬁcient for the attendant to disregard enforcement of the notice.

Anoush’s experience Anoush Muradyan was registered as an expectant mom at the Research Center for Mother and Child Healthcare (MMAPGK—ɝʏʗ ɼʃ ʋɸʍʆɸʍ ɸʓʏʉʒʏʃʀʌʍ ʑɸʇʑʍʍʋɸʍ ɺʂʖɸʇɼʖɸɽʏʖɸʆʍʍ ʆɼʍʖʗʏʍ) in Yerevan. Anoush says, “Right off the bat I paid 60,000 AMD (US$160) for various tests and analyses. During my first visit, one of the nurses who was taking me to the analysis room pulled me aside and directly told me, ‘Dear girl, you’re new here and probably don’t know it but you have to pay me 1,000 AMD (US$2.6) as well.’ You have to pay the nurse for escorting you and the nurse for taking your blood. But none of these payments are registered. The cash quietly goes straight into their pocket.” When these charges are added up, Anoush has up to now paid about 200,000 AMD (US$530) to the hospital staff to receive their “free” services during her pregnancy. She expects to pay at minimum another 150,000 AMD (US$398) for the actual delivery of her child. As of July 1, 2008, the State Certificate Program to Assist Childbirths was established in Armenia. This certificate officially states that medical care and services associated with pregnancy and child delivery are to be conducted free of charge. When the certificate program was launched, the Health

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Minister, Harutyun Koushkyan, asserted that all maternity-related issues would be addressed and resolved at the highest level. He was stating his conviction that birthrates would rise concurrently with the country’s development and improvements in Armenia’s quality of life. According to Minister Koushkyan, certificates would not only spur rising birthrates but also assist the anti-corruption campaign that is being waged in the health field. “The inclusion of certificates was a revolutionary step for our country. Truly, our expectant mothers receive no-charge care. That is, the medical institution is paid by the government. But it is regarded as free service for our citizens,” says Razmik Abrahamyan, chief obstetrician with the Ministry of Health, ARMENIA

who has headed the PMGHKfor the past 20 years. However, the concept of “free service” does not correspond to reality in this case. Even if we calculate the minimum costs for an expectant mother at an average, nonspecialized medical center, without undue complications and additional visits, patients will still incur costs of 120,000150,000 AMD (US$318-397) for necessary maternity medical care and oversight.

“Supplemental revenue” for healthcare employees Ministry of Health Press Spokesperson, Rouslana Gevorgyan, states that minister Koushkyan personally pays close attention to the “State Certiﬁcate Program to Assist Childbirths.” The Health Ministry also claims that the huge amount of work that has been done in regard to public information and monitoring has produced signiﬁcant results. When the

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certificate program was first launched, complaints concerning non-official maternity costs amounted to 48 percent of the total complaints received by the ministry. Three months later, these complaints dropped to eight percent; five months later the number dropped to zero, according to the ministry. The inclusion of the certificate program also encouraged directors of maternity wards to create favorable conditions. The more deliveries a medical institution performs, the more bonuses it receives and the better conditions it can offer to attract more patients. Nurse Mariam Hakobyan complains that physicians receive hefty bonuses while the bonus amounts for mid-level employees like her are a mere pittance. Thus, their only alternative is to devise sources of “additional revenue.” On paper at least, the Ministry states that the wage regulations for maternity sector employees are the same for all; however, of the actual wages depend on the number of child births and the number of employees in each hospital. The certificate program allows the pregnant patient to choose her doctor. The patient is therefore permitted to summon a physician who works at another hospital. The government has set a bonus of 6,000-8,000 AMD (US$1621) to be paid to outside physician referrals. “Even relatives of the expectant mother realize that the doctor is looking to pocket more than 8,000 AMD (US$21) for responding to the call,” says one of the physicians at the MMAPGK. Razmik Abrahamyan, chief obstetrician-gynecologist

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of the Ministry of Healthcare, claims that “supplemental revenues” is a characteristic way for Armenians to express their thanks for a job well done. “Back in the Soviet era, people would make a present of flowers, a bottle of cognac or cash,” Mr. Abrahamyan argues. “The custom has been passed down. Certain doctors would create such a situation where the pregnant woman or her relatives would certainly have to respond in kind to the medical staff. It is something that cannot be corrected overnight. Corruption, however, is another matter entirely and has no connection with receiving revenue on the side”, he says. According to Transparency International (TI), corruption is defined as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. lic opinion polls) shows that 43 percent of survey respondents in Armenia have paid bribes during the past year, and that nine percent of all respondents paid bribes when they made use of the health sector. No specific studies examining corruption levels in the health sector have been conducted from July 2008 till the present. Because of this, there is no public or private agency that can competently gauge either the increase or decrease in corruption levels that have taken place in the country during the past two years. Numerous oversight agencies have been created and various anti-corruption projects have been launched by local and international organizations. Despite these efforts, Armenian citizens encounter corruption in all its diverse forms at every turn in their daily lives.

ARMENIA

TI’s 2009 Global Corruption Barometer (based on pub-

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Contrary to the government’s claims that its health sector reform package has taken root and produced results in the ﬁght against corruption, the Armenian public has yet to experience the full impact of these reforms. * Edik Baghdasaryan is the founder and head of the organization Investigative Journalists of Armenia and editor in-chief of the newspaper “Hetq.” He received the Global Shining Light Award in 2008, and the United States Embassy in Armenia presented him with the Armenian Freedom Defender Award in 2009.

2009

AZERBAIJAN

Azerbaijan :

Making Fun of the Law By Shahin Abbasov

Elshan Aydinov, a 30-year-old Baku resident, decided to take part in a municipal auction of land so he could buy a plot of his own in the town of Xirdalan. The State Committee for Land (SCL — '|YO W 7RUSDT .RPLW VL) told him that the municipality was obliged by law to show him the land to be auctioned. However, Eldar Ahmadov, chairman of Xirdalan municipality, refused to do so. The municipal chief privately explained to Elshan that there was not one single hectare of free land in Xirdalan, and that this auction was a mere formality. “He told me that the law requires sale of land at auctions. However, all

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The Global Integrity Index: How effective are Azerbaijan’s anti-corruption safeguards? OVERALL RATING

Weak (64 out of 100 +/-0.77) CATEGORY RATINGS

1) Civil Society, Public Information & Media — Weak (66) 2) Elections — Weak (63) 3) Government Accountability — Very Weak (50) 4) Administration & Civil Service — Weak (62) 5) Oversight & Regulation — Moderate (75) 6) Anti-Corruption & Rule of Law — Weak (69)

(Scores range from 0 to 100)

The overwhelming power of the executive branch in Azerbaijan relative to the rest of government impacts almost all government regulatory agencies. The budget approval process, judicial decisions, police investigations, regulation of state-owned enterprises, internal government auditing, and the ombudsman are all heavily inﬂuenced by the executive. The same is true for the Azerbaijan anti-corruption agency, where, as Global Integrity’s lead researcher writes, “if there is no approval [from the top] the Commission on Combating Corruption keeps silent.”

2009

pieces of land had already been sold illegally in advance, and this farce they called an ‘auction’ was held only to legalize the actual deals,” Elshan said. Elshan feels it is absurd to participate in an auction if you have not seen the lot you intend to buy, and then hear from an involved ofﬁcial that the auction is just a show. His complaints to the State Committee for Land, the Ministry of Justice’s Center of Local Government, and to the AntiCorruption Department at the Prosecutor’s General Ofﬁce (ACD — %Dú 3URNXURUOXT Q ]ULQG .RUUXSVL\D LO 0 EDUL]

'HSDUWDPHQWL), were in vain. Hence, Elshan boycotted the auction, where only three offers were eventually made. One 400-square-meter lot was sold initial price, while its real market value was several times higher. “Everything happened as the municipal chief told me it would — the land was bought by a man who had used it for several years already, but failed to privatize it before,” said Elshan. Rovshan Agayev, deputy chairman of the non-governmental Center to Support Economic Initiatives (CSEI — øTWLVDGL

7 ú EE VO U <DUGLP 0 UN ]L), believes that the new procedural reform of 2009, which abolished direct sales of municipal lands and introduced the auctions, failed to meet the expectations that it would lead to fairer competition. “At four auctions that have been conducted since January, land was sold at a price much lower than its market value,” he says. As a result of the monitoring performed by his group, he concludes that allegations of widespread bribery at such auctions are true. As a possible remedy, he suggests that

AZERBAIJAN

for 1,400 manats (US$1,473), only 100 manats more than the

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residents of villages where the lands are being auctioned should be allowed to participate in the process. Furthermore, the auctions should be conducted in the neighborhood where the lot is located, instead of at regional administrative centers, as is done now.

Corruption in other areas Government measures to fight corruption in municipalities highlight the poor image of locally elected authorities. In March 2009, Zafar Mammadov, chairman of Xocasan village municipality, was arrested on charges relating to illegal land sales. In June, the Office of Prosecutor General (OPG — %Dú 3URNXURUROXT) launched a criminal investigation against Ahmad Huseynov, the chairman of Baku’s Sabail District Municipality. Huseynov was arrested and charged with abuse of power regarding land sales. Monitoring of municipal activity from January to June 2009 by the Ministry of Justice revealed alleged violations of the law in the work of 15 municipalities. These violations resulted in losses of $12.4 million dollars to the state. According to Kamran Aliyev, chief of the ACD at the Prosecutor General, 55 criminal cases related to corruption have been launched between January and June 2009. He said areas such as municipalities, education, healthcare and social protection suffered most from corruption. So far, however, only low- and mid-level bureaucrats have faced corruption charges. In August 2008, a group of high-ranking officials of the Anti-Monopoly Department under the Ministry of Eco-

2009

nomic Development (AMD MED — øTWLVDGL øQNLúDI 1D]LUOL\L

1 ]QLQG $QWL øQKLVDU 'HSDUWDPHQWL), including its head, Samir Dadashov, were arrested for alleged bribery. In the end, all of them suffered little punishment. Dadashov was soon released and the criminal case against him was terminated. Three other officials, including Dadashov’s deputy, were sentenced to two years of conditional term, which allowed them to be released a month later with restrictions on travel and election participation. Meanwhile, in 2007, Mushfiq Huseynov, a journalist for the newspaper Bizim Yol, was sentenced to five years imprisonment for bribery.

How far does it go? ducted in November-December 2008 by the non-governmental Center for Economic and Political Research (FAR Center — øTWLVDGL Y 6L\DVL $UDúG"UPDODU 0 UN ]L), corruption in Azerbaijan is endemic and widespread, while the ﬁght against it is weak. The corruption reaches into such areas as protectionism, bribery, abuse of power in government procurement, and the bureaucrats’ involvement in private business. Independent experts doubt that the government makes efﬁcient use of its funds. “There is no transparency in the distribution of budgetary funds. Oil revenue allows the government to spend huge resources on public investment projects with almost no accountability,” CESI’s Rovshan Agayev said. The ongoing construction of the Oguz-Qabala-Baku water pipeline is one example. The project turned into a protracted construction that was funded by the State Oil Fund

AZERBAIJAN

According to the results of an expert opinion poll con-

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of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ — $] UED\FDQ 5HVSXEOLNDV" '|YO W

1HIW )RQGX). Initially, the whole construction project was projected to cost $598 million dollars and be completed in 14 months. It began in March 2007, but is still unﬁnished. In March 2009, the project received an additional $125 million dollars from SOFAZ. No ofﬁcial reasons for the delay and rising costs have been presented to the public. A journalistic investigation of subcontracting for this project also revealed a lack of transparency and any relevant tenders. According to Zohrab Ismayil, chairman of Public Association for Assistance to Free Economy (PAAFE — Azad 0qtisadiyyata Yardim 0ctimai Birliyi), in 2005 the construction costs of 208 kilometers of the Baku-Russian border highway were estimated at 312 million dollars. “Now, according to the Ministry of Transport, the expenses for the same road have already exceeded 1 billion dollars and will reach 1.2 billion dollars by the end of year,” Ismayil said. Ismayil cited a dearth of transparency in the government purchase of city buses. The Ministry of Transport bought them from private companies without proper tenders. Questionable pricing of the buses is also a matter of concern. “MAN” buses that were imported from Germany in 2008 had been cleared at customs for an average cost of US$34,500 per bus. But according to the Ministry of Transport, each bus cost US$150,000. Zohrab Ismayil believes that import prices had been intentionally lowered to decrease budget taxes. Alimamed Nuriyev, coordinator of the NGO AntiCorruption Network (ACN — AQWL .RUUXSVL\D ù E N VL) agrees that the transport sector is one of the most corrupt in

2009

the country, and the problems are not limited to those who are in authority. However, Nuriyev notes that the government has taken some positive measures to deal with corrupt practices in other areas, for example the issuing of passports for foreign travel. Police continue to handle the issuing of foreign passports, but the system now is more sophisticated and people don’t need to pay bribes to speed up the process.

Fighting corruption: just the beginning On June 22, 2009, President Ilham Aliyev signed a decree titled On Strengthening of the Fight against Corruption in the Areas of State and Municipal Property and Funds Management. The decree orders more state control Regarding another important measure that was presented in 2009, the State Customs Committee (SCC — '|YO W

*|PU N .RPLW Vi) introduced a “one window” system at the border to facilitate the processing of documentation. Also in 2009, the parliament approved the law called On the Fight against Money Laundering and Terrorism Finance.” According to the law, the State Financial Monitoring Center (SFMC — '|YO W 0DOL\\ 0RQLWRULQT 0 UN ]i) is being established under the authority of the Central Bank. The parliament also amended the legislation on ethical standards for the bureaucracy. Experts say that implementation of legislation is still a problem. “For example, the law on freedom of information is not being implemented properly. In addition, we sent an ofﬁcial inquiry concerning the use of budget funds by the

AZERBAIJAN

in the areas of government efﬁciency and municipal funds.

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Interior Ministry to its deputy minister. The deputy minister replied that they cannot disclose such information to the public,” Rashid Hajily, director of the non-governmental Media Rights Institute (MRI — Media Hüquqlar1 0nstitutu) said. Despite some formal measures to reduce corruption, there have been no breakthroughs. If anything, an annual public opinion poll conducted by Puls-R Company in January and February 2009 shows that, for the ﬁrst time, respondents have named corruption as one of the top three most important problems in Azerbaijan, behind the Nagorno-Karabakh conﬂict and poverty. *Shahin Abbasov is the freelance correspondent of Eurasianet (wwww.eurasianet.org) in Azerbaijan and also a Board Member of the Open Society Institute — Azerbaijan. He is a former deputy Editor-in-Chief of Echo and Zerkalo Baku-based daily newspapers. In 2003-2004, he was the Reagan-Fascel Democracy Research Fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy in Washington DC, as well as the CDDRL Fellow at Standord University in California in 2008.

2009

GEORGIA

Georgia:

Kicking Corruption Out of School By Olgha Tsiskarishvili

University admissions in Georgia have always provided an opportunity for bribery, as corrupt ofﬁcials routinely take bribes from students who don’t meet the proper requirements but were admitted anyway with the offer of enough money. The government was the ﬁrst to acknowledge corruption in higher education was rampant, and it intended to tackle the problem with in-depth education reform, which included mandatory standardized entrance examinations.

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The Global Integrity Index: How effective are Georgia’s anti-corruption safeguards? OVERALL RATING

Moderate (73 out of 100 +/-4.10) CATEGORY RATINGS

1) Civil Society, Public Information & Media — Strong (81) 2) Elections — Moderate (79) 3) Government Accountability —Weak (65) 4) Administration & Civil Service — Moderate (75) 5) Oversight & Regulation — Weak (68) 6) Anti-Corruption & Rule of Law — Moderate (73)

(Scores range from 0 to 100)

Although partisan politics continue to inﬂuence the make-up and function of government in Georgia, there have been improvements in the responsiveness of government agencies to citizen concerns. Most government documents can be accessed within a reasonable amount of time and cost. With the help of new whistle-blower protections, the ombudsman’s ofﬁce has built a reputation with the public for its responsiveness, “even though the government is reluctant to cooperate with it.”

2009

“The era of corruption in the educational system of Georgia is over,” said President Mikheil Saakashvili in July 2005, when the examinations were applied for the first time to over 31,000 students. He might have celebrated a little too early. Today, as the margin to manipulate the examinations has been practically eliminated, corruption in Georgian higher education might have decreased, but it has also proved to be far from over. In a 2008 survey in Telavi State University, students were asked whether they had ever bribed teachers. One-fifth answered affirmatively. Also, more than 60 percent of the students responded that it is “very easy” or “sufficiently easy” to pay bribes to The detention of deputy rector of the Tbilisi Business and Law International University, David Katamadze, for the alleged creation of false documentation, is a clear reminder that corruption persists. Katamadze is undergoing investigation after the police found false diplomas and other documents in his possession. Corruption extends to secondary education as well. “My child failed to pass an exam in order to graduate that semester. As a result, I had to pay a bribe so he could graduate,” says a parent who whishes to remain anonymous. He added that when he was asked for a notification for absence — a document explaining why his son missed a class — he could buy it for 6 GEL (US$3.50). All fingers point to low salaries as a major cause of corruption. Teaching is not a prestigious occupation and

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achieve high scores in the university.

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salaries in the sector are way below the national average of 368 GEL (US$220) per month. “Gardeners receive 300 GEL (US$180) more than teachers,” Zviad Miminoshvili, an expert at the Accreditation National Center Program, recently told Georgia Today. Rusiko Kvashilava, a 54-year-old physics teacher, says that with her low salary she’s hardly able to afford textbooks for her 10-year-old son. “Last year I borrowed textbooks in Russian from my neighbor,” she told the same publication. The Ministry of Education increased salaries on September 2009 and announced that increases will continue on an annual basis. “Salaries for teachers deﬁne teaching quality,” said Minister Nika Gvaramia.

Perception and efforts As in the education sector, the Georgian government has maintained its interest in enforcing the Anti-Corruption Operational Plan launched in 2005, which proposes a set of ambitious reforms it calls “radical.” It later created an anticorruption board tasked with renovating the plan. Anti-corruption movements are nowadays among the most important topics in Georgia, even more so than delicate topics such as the August 2008 Georgia-Russia war. According to the Global Corruption Barometer 2009, 57 percent of the citizens consider the government’s actions either “very effective” or “somewhat effective,” and only 2 percent of respondents report having had to pay a bribe. Almost 40 percent conﬁrmed they’re willing to pay a premium to support transparent and ethical business practices.

2009

However, the judiciary continues to be perceived by citizens as the most corrupt institution, as it did in 2005 and 2007. Other institutions poorly ranked, from least trusted to most trusted, are: the civil service (seen as vastly corrupt by 21 percent of the respondents), Parliament (16 percent), political parties (12 percent), private sector (9 percent), and media (6 percent). In fact, Georgia ranked ﬁfth among the worst European and Central Asian countries in judiciary corruption. Tamuna Karosanidze, executive director of Transparency International Georgia, said the lack of public conﬁdence puts the sustainability of the anti-corruption results achieved, and the prospect of Georgia’s democratic transiShe says Georgian citizens strongly support anti-corruption campaigns, but they don’t trust the courts. This causes a dilemma that reaches into the anti-corruption movements and the country’s efforts to build a democracy. “Reforming the judiciary must become a real priority of the Georgian state, and whether or not it is successful should be assessed based on how people’s attitudes change toward it,” Karosanidze says.

Key weaknesses Georgia’s governance system continues to have key weaknesses, as illustrated in the 2008 Global Integrity Report. Government accountability is weak, as accountability mechanisms and processes to keep executive and judicial power in check are limited and poor.

GEORGIA

tion at risk.

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The chief executive rarely gives reasons for policy decisions because “there is no formal necessity for explanation and, due to the lack of freedom of media, it is rather difficult to get any information other than governmentproduced propaganda.” Georgia also suffers from deep problems within its administration and civil service. For instance, there are no regulations governing conflicts of interest for government officials involved in privatization. Deputy Public Defender Giorgi Chkheidze thinks the current anti-corruption strategy is a step in the right direction. The government concurs that it needs a systematic approach to these problems. For Aleksi Aleksishvili, former minister of finance, abolishing corruption requires the overall regulation of financial services. Per Eklund, representative of the European Commission, says there has been noticeable progress in the judicial, educational and economic sectors, and freedom of speech should be protected. “The year 2008 was quite difficult. We had two elections and a war. Now we are looking forward to democratic reforms,” he said.

Steps forward The reforms implemented so far may not have succeeded at eradicating corruption, but they have created some improvement and have shown there is cause for optimism. Before the education reform, students were required to

2009

memorize material in order to obtain good scores. With the current methodology, independent analytical thinking is promoted. Teacher Kvashilava says she can see that students are already taking individual approaches to subjects. “The tenth grade made a presentation about the solar system and it was very interesting for me, as I saw so much individualism in what they knew. Although my salary is extremely low, I am very satisﬁed with my profession,” she said with a smile. * Olgha Tsiskarishvili is publishing editor at the agency Fact and published the book “My Exhausted Town” and the documentary “Western European Eldorado.” She has almost migration and corruption and was editor in chief at “Pakti, Azri, Komentari” and publishing editor at GHN.

GEORGIA

20 years of experience working on issues such as trafﬁcking,

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2009

GERMANY

Germany:

A Kickback per Prescription By Siri Schubert

A prosecutor, nine policemen and three IRS agents entered the Aachen ofﬁces of Trommsdorff, one of the oldest German pharmaceutical companies, on June 25, 2008. They were looking for evidence in a criminal investigation that could spell the end of a common corrupt practice in Germany’s health care sector. The investigators soon found what they were looking for: more than 10,000 drug-use study questionnaires for Emestar, a blood pressure medication that produced more

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than US$10 million in revenue for Trommsdorff in 2007. The studies, along with internal documents and e-mails, provided ample material for investigators, who were acting on an anonymous tip. The most telling detail was the drug-study cover sheet. On it, physicians could choose from what seemed to be a selection of kickbacks after prescribing Emestar to a certain number of patients. For five patients, a doctor could claim either a 17-inch flat-screen monitor or an iPod; 14 patients would bring in a car GPS system or a DVD recorder, while 18 patients would imply a laptop or PC with printer as rewards. Doctors not into electronic toys were offered money as an alternative. “It was a real catalog with compensations for prescriptions,” says Robert Deller, the prosecutor in charge of the case. The rewards weren’t the only evidence that led prosecutors to believe the study was a disguise for illicit payments. Several of the questionnaires were filled out by Trommsdorff representatives with fictional data after doctors had returned blank surveys. The questionnaires also didn’t seem to be used in any study; instead, they were stored in Trommsdorff’s offices. This led to investigations of 480 physicians and 86 pharmaceutical sales representatives working for Trommsdorff all over Germany; legal proceedings have been initiated against close to 200 medical doctors. “What we found looks like a systematic approach to handing out and taking kickbacks that must have been known to the responsible people at Trommsdorff, the pharma reps and the doctors,” says prosecutor Deller.

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Common form of vorruption Drug-use studies have come under intense criticism by anti-corruption organizations such as Transparency International and I Will Pay for My Meal (MEZIS — Mein Essen Zahl Icht

Selbst), a small organization focused on eliminating corruption and questionable business practices in doctors’ offices. This is one of the most common forms of corruption in the medical system,” says Christiane Fischer MD, a spokesperson for MEZIS. So common, in fact, that these studies are known as “fireplace studies,” because they are not filled out in doctors’ offices but in doctors’ homes, in front of the fireplace, with no patients involved. “They have no scientific value or application, and most studies are not transparent or uncontrolled, and therefore not evidence based.” Pharmacology professor Peter Schoenhoefer, co-publisher of the independent medical newsletter Arznei-Telegramm, which has more than 30,000 subscribers, believes that the pharmaceutical industry spent about 1 billion euros (US$1.5 billion) in Germany in 2007 for gratuitous drug-use studies. “The money is nothing more than a bounty paid for each patient,” he says.

Other cases of alleged fraud While the Trommsdorff case is going on in the Western region of Germany, a similar case in the South, in Ulm, resulted in the ﬁrst penalty orders. Approximately 2,800 physicians are still under investigation for receiving kickbacks for prescribing medications made by Germany’s third

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doctors are well aware of that,” says Fischer. “The drug-use

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largest pharmaceutical company, Ratiopharm, which sells 750 different generic drugs ranging from antibiotics to cancer medications. The kickbacks amounted to between 2 and 8 percent of the sales price and were often disguised as payments for consulting or educational services. “Drug-use studies and consulting services should be declared illegal when they are used as sales incentives and to pay off doctors,” says Professor Schoenhoefer.

Not punishable under the law So far, payments for these studies, as well as other thinly disguised bribery payments, exist in a legal gray zone. For decades they weren’t prosecuted because they were not considered punishable under German law. A first change came about when a young lawyer in Hamburg, Oliver Pragal, argued in a 2005 paper that doctors contracting with public health insurance companies were public officials and could thus be criminally prosecuted for bribery. He also argued that doctors acting as trustees for private health insurance companies could be punished under existing German criminal law. His interpretation is the foundation for the recent cases involving Trommsdorff and Ratiopharm. But until the highest appeals court in Germany (the Bundesgerichtshof) has ruled on one of these cases, legal questions remain. This is why Alexander Badle, special prosecutor for fraud and corruption in health care for the state of Hessen, who opened 350 new investigations in the first six months of 2009 alone, has dismissed the 100 Ratiopharm cases that occurred in his jurisdiction.

2009

“The marketing methods that occurred in this case are fairly common in Germany. There is no question that they are unethical, but we want the lawmakers to clearly deﬁne whether they are illegal or not,” he says. Although experts agree that these cases are likely to be settled out of court, a deﬁnite ruling could stop the unethical marketing practices for good. “The outcome is relevant not only for Trommsdorff or Ratiopharm but for every German pharmaceutical company. The outcome has implications on a market with a billiondollar volume. If the highest court in Germany concludes that these practices are illegal, the whole pharmaceutical distribution system has to be changed,” says Frankfurt prosGERMANY

ecutor Alexander Badle.

Unethical practices hurt citizens While legal discussion continues, these unethical practices continue to raise the cost of health services for all citizens. Transparency International estimates that the loss due to corruption in the German health care system amounts to between 6 and 20 billion Euros (US$8.8 billion and US$29 billion) annually. But the ﬁnancial burden is not the only cause for concern. “The victims are the patients because the focus is on making money and not on whether the medication is affordable and effective,” says Schoenhoefer. He believes that many drugs that are unnecessary or outright harmful are prescribed. The fact that several prominent cases of corruption in the health care system involve pharmaceutical companies

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does not surprise prosecutor Badle. “In Germany, more money is spent on pharmaceuticals than on treatment by physicians. This is why this area is especially vulnerable for corruption and other kinds of criminal activity.”

Not just pharmaceutical companies However, that doesn’t mean pharmaceutical companies hold the monopoly on questionable practices. In December 2008, a regional ofﬁce of health insurer AOK rewarded 2000 doctors with 100 Euros (US$147) travel certiﬁcates for being part of a disease-management program for chronic patients. Having more AOK-contracted doctors enrolled in the program could result in more money from a special state risk fund for the company. “The doctors were basically paid to classify more patients as chronically ill so the insurance company could get a larger share of the state-run risk adjustment fund,” Schoenhoefer explains. However, AOK claims that it paid only 2.57 Euros (US$3.77) per doctor and thus stayed within the legal maximum for advertising expenses (the rest, AOK says, was provided by the travel agency). The insurance company also insists that it was not granting any undue advantages to the doctors. Unconvinced, Transparency International has informed the state and federal health departments about the case. It is unclear whether the complaint will result in any further action. “The extent of corruption in the German health care system has increased over the years,” says Schoenhoefer, “but awareness [of it] within society is still very low,” he says.

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Because Germany has had several large corporate corruption cases in the past few years — involving companies like engineering giant Siemens and microchip manufacturer Inﬁneon — it is likely that awareness about corruption will increase. And it’s not just big businesses that are involved in corruption. In Hannover, a 53-year-old professor was sentenced to three years in prison in 2008 after pocketing more than 150,000 Euros (US$220,000) for helping doctoral candidates obtain their degrees. This case led to investigations of 100 other professors suspected of taking bribes. In Cologne, the former mayor was sentenced to 3.5 years in prison for receiving 75,000 Euros (US$110,000) in political contributions in exchange for an expected positive vote on privatization of GERMANY

municipal garbage disposal operations. Despite all this, there are positive signs. In its latest report, Transparency International named Germany as one of the four countries that fulﬁlled the requirements of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) anti-bribery convention. And prosecutor Badle thinks there will be positive developments in the health care sector in the future. “Patients have to become more watchful, but at least health insurance companies are paying more attention,” he says. And that, he hopes, will lead to more cases being solved and, in the long run, to signiﬁcant changes toward a more honest and transparent system. *Siri Schubert is a freelance journalist in Richmond, California, and a reporter for the PBS Frontline/World website “The business of bribes”. She is a former fellow with the

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Investigative Reporting Program at UC Berkeley. Her work has been published in the New York Times, Fortune International and magazines and newspapers in her native Germany.

2009

GHANA

Ghana:

Bribe as You Go By Anas Aremeyaw Anas

In Ghana, the powers that be are quick to say that road checkpoints are few along the nation’s borders. But these trading route checkpoints, which aid in corruption, have caused unnecessary hurdles. When ofﬁcials hear this, they respond by issuing statements that downplay the phenomenon. The Economic Committee of West African States (ECOWAS) Treaty, signed by all West African countries, is supposed to allow the free movement of goods and services across the West African region. The delays and extortion

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The Global Integrity Index: How effective are Ghana’s anti-corruption safeguards? OVERALL RATING

Weak (65 out of 100 +/0-.15) CATEGORY RATINGS

1) Civil Society, Public Information & Media — Weak (63) 2) Elections — Weak (60) 3) Government Accountability —Very Weak (50) 4) Administration & Civil Service — Very Weak (59) 5) Oversight & Regulation — Strong (81) 6) Anti-Corruption & Rule of Law — Moderate (75)

(Scores range from 0 to 100)

The lack of effective conflicts of interest regulations covering government officials opens the door to potential abuses of power in Ghana. For example, the Ghanaian president is immune from prosecution, there is no internal disciplinary agency within the judicial branch, and new regulations governing gifts and hospitality to public officials are merely “guidelines” lacking an enforcement mechanism. While some government officials are required to file asset disclosures, there is little followthrough in the auditing or review of those disclosures. The Attorney General has suggested that the public be allowed access to officials’ asset disclosures, but the Ghanaian Parliament remains reluctant to grant that access.

2009

from traders; however, are passed on directly to consumers, making prices of goods and services that should have been cheap more expensive. The New Crusading Guide, a daily newspaper in Ghana, decided to tour the borders to document all acts of corruption and related practices, such as bribery (extortion) and road delays that hamper the smooth trade operations along the Tema (Ghana)-Ouagadougou (Burkina-Faso) corridors. Reporters wanted to ﬁnd out: How many checkpoints, both legal and illegal, exist along trading routes? How long does it take to move goods from one point to the other? How much is paid in cash as bribes (extortion) by the drivers on the roads? The investigation focused on the activities of the Ghana Police Service, the Customs Excise and Preventive Services GHANA

(CEPS), and the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) and how they affect trading activities along the borders. Tema, Ghana’s leading port and an industrial hub, serves as the transit point for most commercial crossborder activities in the country. Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso, also serves as one of the largest centers of commerce in West Africa. The route between the two cities covers a distance of 992 km (616 miles), including 808 km (502 miles) in Ghana and 184 km (114 miles) in Burkina Faso. There were over 30 checkpoints on this route and Ghanaian CEPS ofﬁcials at every one of them charged a ﬁxed bribery rate of 3 Ghana cedis (US$2.09). The police also charged 2 Ghana cedis (US$1.40). The investigation exposed that there were more stops in Ghana than there were in Burkina Faso. Aside from the

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usual bribery and delays, some security officials slept while the reporters walked by. The hidden cameras of the investigative team also captured video evidence of policemen (after the Kunbungu first checkpoint in Ghana) sharing bribe money extorted from traders, while they still demanded more money from drivers. These practices have become very common, to the extent that most drivers reserve extra money for bribes to border security officials because those who refuse payment are refused further movement. The reporters were charged 10 Ghana cedis (US$7) each before they could finally get into Burkina Faso. Usually, travelers with passports are made to pay bribes of 5 Ghana cedis (US$3.50) before their passports are stamped, and those with ID cards are also asked to pay a similar sum. “Our master gives us 100,000 Burkina-Faso CFA (US$2,138). With it, we buy our food and also pay bribes for the total journey. We are not happy about this, but we have no choice,” Osei Nimo, a driver, told the reporters.

The Gold Coast and the gold fraud Known as the Gold Coast in the colonial days, Ghana is known for having large deposits of gold across the length and breadth of the country. Multinational corporations like Anglogold Ashanti and Newmont Ghana, Ltd. have big mining concessions in Ghana and mine gold daily. Small-scale miners also operate in Ghana, performing illegal mining, popularly referred to as “galamsey.” For the past four years, unsuspecting investors have been lured into the gold business only to be swindled and ﬂeeced out of millions of dollars.

2009

There have been at least 15 media reports in 2009 alone about gold scams, despite persistent advice from the organized crime unit of the Ghana police to the effect that any investor who wishes to enter into the gold business must deal only with state-approved organizations like the Ministry for Mines and Energy or the Precious Minerals Marketing Commission (PMMC). This reporter has been investigating an attempted 8.2 million Ghana cedis (US$5.7 million) gold fraud scheme, where the suspects managed to get 2.7 million Ghana cedis (US$1.9 million) from investors without producing gold. The suspects allegedly distributed the money among themselves and engaged in proﬂigate expenditures. During the investigation, one of their masterminds, Mubaric Siedu, told GHANA

this reporter how he has been bribing the police and the judiciary anytime he swindles investors. Siedu also alleged that Mohammed Hafix, chief executive of Hafred Security and Touchouse Productions in Ghana, is connected to the scheme. Siedu’s confession was videotaped and later submitted to the Criminal Investigations Department (CID) of the Ghana police, leading to his arrest in Nima, a suburb of Accra. At the time of filing this report, Siedu had been before the court along with Hafix. The suspects had allegedly spent most of the 2.7 million Ghana cedis (US$1.9 million) they had received from investors, and the police froze the remaining 435,000 Ghana cedis (US$300,000 dollars) sitting in the bank, while they continued with the court case.

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The British bribery scandal Civil society in Ghana has shown a lot of interest in unraveling the mystery surrounding a British construction firm, Mabey & Johnson, which pleaded guilty to charges of corruption and violating sanctions in a London court in September 2009. The company acknowledged it had paid Ghanaian government officials a total of £470,000 (US$761,725) in bribes during the 1980s and 1990s. It first started paying “backhanders” in Jamaica in 1993 and continued that “culture” with other countries, including Madagascar, Angola, Mozambique, and Bangladesh. People are curious as to why full-blooded Ghanaian nationals, who swore an oath before the nation to serve the people in accordance with the laws of the country, betray the public’s trust by taking bribes. As part of the Mabey & Johnson scandal, two ministers of state in Ghana, Dr. George Sipa Yankey, Minister of Health, and Amadu Seidu, Minister of State, had to resign. And other politicians (who had no public positions when the scandal started) were mentioned in relation to the case. Despite the resignations of the two ministers, the government has been under serious pressure from Ghanians to do more. In response, the president of Ghana ordered the Attorney General Betty Mould Iddrisu to go to London to look into the details of the case. The president also invited the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) to look into the matter. CHRAJ says it has delivered letters to some of the implicated public officials as a first step towards a full-scale inves-

2009

tigation. Emile Short, the CHRAJ’s commissioner, said that a preliminary investigation was underway to gather evidence to determine whether there was substance in the allegations. “If satisfied, we shall conduct a full investigation that would involve setting up a panel to investigate the allegations,” he told the national newspaper, the Daily Graphic. Meanwhile, members of the opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) have accused the ruling party of benefiting from the bribes, even though they have provided no evidence to back their allegations. The ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC) has vehemently denied knowledge of the Mabey & Johnson bribes to party officials. The denial was contained in press statement signed by the party’s national chairman, Kwabena Adjei, and GHANA

said, “Records available to the party do not reveal receipts of any such funds from the said company or its agents.” Musah Mohammed, a diehard NPP supporter with no ofﬁcial position in the party, said in an interview, “The ruling party should sack all those mischievous individuals who devised tricks to get rich quick in this Mabey & Johnson case. The perpetrators of this heinous crime against mother Ghana should bow their heads in shame for taking those bribes, (and) they must ask for forgiveness for their disgraceful and humiliating conduct which is now tarnishing the image (of) mother Ghana.” Kojo Mawuto, an NDC member, said, “President Mill’s intervention and the promptness with which he waded into the scandal shows his commitment to rid corruption in Ghana. The government has put the national interest ﬁrst. Members

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of the opposition should channel their energies into something better than criticizing government,” he said in anger.

Under pressure During his swearing-in on January 2009, President John Atta Mills promised to keep his government free of corruption, but has been under pressure over the corruption allegations against his newly appointed ministers. The first to be hit was his minister of foreign affairs, Alhaji Muhammad Mumuni, after an audit report determined he had received unapproved payments. The allegations against him came up during his vetting hearings, prompting the opposition to stage a walkout. However, Parliament ended up approving his appointment with the justification that the audit report’s findings aren’t equivalent to those of a court of law, and his lawyers were already challenging the report in court. He had also sued a newspaper for alleged defamation after it published the report’s findings, but lost the case after the court said there was basis for further questioning. Even though the president invited the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) to investigate the matter, after the resignation of the ministers of health and state, over the Mabey & Johnson scandal, the debate is still on whether or not President Mills’ government is honoring his campaign promises. While some applaud him for inviting CHRAJ into these cases, others say he was slow in acting and should have sacked the ministers instead of accepting their resignations.

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* Anas Aremeyaw Anas is an undercover journalist working with the New Crusading Guide daily newspaper in Ghana. He has gone undercover to expose several trafďŹ cking rings in Africa and has won several local and international awards. In 2009, he was mentioned by President Barack Obama as a courageous journalist who risks his life to tell the truth.

GHANA

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2009

JORDAN

Jordan:

A Nightmare Begins By Nick Langer

The day starts very early for Abu Abdullah, a 39-yearold Jordanian of Palestinian origin. As the dawn tears the veil of the dark night on this dull, dirty and over-populated Baqaa refugee camp, the skinny, pint-sized man leaves home in search of a job at a square in a nearby town. Abdullah wraps a traditional kefﬁyeh around his stooping shoulders to protect him from the desert’s lashing cold wind and walks down the ﬁlthy alleys of the camp. He cruises past strewn garbage with its pungent smell — a wake-up call for school students and workers as they begin their day.

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The Global Integrity Index: How effective are Jordan’s anti-corruption safeguards? OVERALL RATING

Very Weak (55 out of 100 +/-0.82) CATEGORY RATINGS

Category Ratings 1) Civil Society, Public Information & Media — Weak (62) 2) Elections — Very Weak (34) 3) Government Accountability —Very Weak (39) 4) Administration & Civil Service — Very Weak (55) 5) Oversight & Regulation — Very Weak (59) 6) Anti-Corruption & Rule of Law — Strong (82)

(Scores range from 0 to 100)

A number of key agencies contributing to Jordan’s national anti-corruption framework have been redesigned during the past few years with mixed results. For example, an ombudsman’s ofﬁce was established in 2008; however, it has only taken on low-level cases to date. Fearful of political interference after the head of the Audit Bureau was recently removed from ofﬁce, the newly created anti-corruption commission has been slow to act or issue reports.

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A nightmare begins Abdullah recently woke up to live a nightmare come true. His Jordanian national number, which identiﬁes Jordanians from foreigners, was “illegally” and “unconstitutionally” revoked, a move political analysts say is unconstitutional and smacks of racism against Palestinians. The declared reason by authorities to revoke the yellow card, which equals citizenship, is Abdullah’s failure to renew a residency card in the West Bank, in what constitutes abuse of power by authorities by denying a large group of citizens their basic human rights, which violates their constitutional right that secures their citizenship. It happened when he attempted to renew his Jordanian government employee, Abdullah and his children changed from Jordanian citizens to alien residents, only allowed to stay courtesy of temporary passports. A week later he was ﬁred from his job because his position required him to be a Jordanian citizen, a privilege he no longer enjoys. Now living in a squalid refugee camp, job security is Abdullah’s top priority, so he can feed his family. In a country already grappling with soaring unemployment and poverty, Abdullah found himself competing with an army of foreign expatriates for a job. A typical working day involves chasing potential customers near a bustling square to move their homes, build or break a wall, or any type of manual work. “I always felt more privileged as a Palestinian refugee with a Jordanian passport because it allowed me to freely

JORDAN

passport a year ago. With the stroke of a pen from a mid-level

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work and travel. They condemned my family to (an) uncertain future,” he says. Privileges that accompany the Jordanian national number include a ﬁve-year passport offered to trans-Jordanians, unhindered access to most job opportunities, freedom of travel, and education. Now Abdullah has no access to public health institutions or national aid. “My life has been turned upside-down. The law is being twisted for political reasons and interpreted according to the whims of ofﬁcials at the Ministry of Interior.”

Without a homeland During the 1967 war, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians ﬂed to Jordan at gunpoint. Known as the nakbeh, or “catastrophe,” it was the second defeat after the 1948 war. A green card is granted to Palestinians living in the occupied West Bank to cross into Jordan. A yellow card, which has many more privileges, allows Jordanians of Palestinian origin to enter the West Bank, Gaza, or Jerusalem. About 300,000 individuals from the West Bank are holders of Jordanian green and yellow cards. When yellow-card holders fail to have the cards renewed when they are outside the West Bank and are unable to return for some reason, they are condemned to green cards and granted temporary travel documents. In practical terms, this means withholding all civil rights that Jordanian nationals have, including voting in the parliamentary elections. “The only crime I have done,” Abdullah says, “is being born as a son of a Palestinian refugee who crossed the Jordan River six decades ago.”

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Another heart-wrenching and equally provoking story belongs to A.D., who gained Jordanian citizenship in 1977 and has lived in the country ever since. But A.D. has maintained a link to his roots. He was imprisoned in Jordan for two years for a felony he committed. While in prison he couldn’t renew his yellow card. This allowed Israel to revoke his residency in the West Bank and to bar him from entering, while Jordan took away his national number. Now, A.D., a former Jordanian citizen, is a jobless expatriate in his own country, struggling to regain his nationality with little hope, knowing most cases are rejected by the higher court of justice.

The revoking of citizenship drew wide condemnation from legal experts who viewed it as a ﬂagrant violation to the Constitution and international treaties because it “breaches the Constitution.” “The power of revoking citizenship is granted to mid-level government employees who act unprofessionally and according to their mood,” said political analyst Helmi al Asmar. Former President of the Jordan Bar Association, Saleh Armouti, slammed the practice as a “disregard to human rights and international agreements.” Legal experts say Jordan is the only country to revoke nationality of its citizens. The government insists its actions are legally sound and politically justiﬁed as they attempt to avoid “emptying the Palestinian lands from people under Israeli pressure,” according to Minister of Interior Nayef al Qadi. The decisions are based on the 1988 disengagement

JORDAN

A country that revokes the nationality of its own citizens?

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agreement between Jordan and Yasser Arafat, leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), to pave the way for peace talks with Israel in what lead to the 1993 Oslo Accords and the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Unity between the West Bank and Jordan was established in the early 1950s after the 1948 War, allowing Jordan to grant citizenship to more than a million Palestinian refugees. But Jordanian authorities have excluded Palestinians from public posts, such as those for security apparatus and government posts, for six decades, fearing Palestinian domination. “Revoking citizenship of yellow-card holders is, in fact, an embodiment to the type of discrimination practiced against Palestinians for decades,” according to a political analyst who preferred to be unnamed due to the sensitivity of the issue. He said, “even rich Palestinian businessmen don’t feel safe, as they do not have the political clout needed to protect their interests from poachers within Jordanian conservative circles.” Interior Minister Qadi rejects allegations of systematic disposition to citizenship, insisting rule of law and the Constitution are respected. “We are deﬁnitely not carrying out a certain agenda. This is a routine work to rectify legal status of the Palestinians,” said Qadi, noting 500 individuals lost their citizenship in the past two decades. But according to sources, in the year 2007 alone, 700 citizenships were revoked. Authorities are sifting through records of 300,000 Jordanian Palestinians to make a decision about their national numbers. Marwan Dudein, a former

2009

minister of Palestinian affairs, admitted “mid-level government employees, often driven by their mood, hold sway over the fate of hundreds of thousands.” Dudein is a member of the Senate. Members are handpicked by the king to serve as guardians over the sanctity of the Constitution. While insisting such measures are necessary to protect the Palestinian cause, Dudein admitted that even his daughter, born in Bethlehem, was subjected to “ill treatment from officials at the passport department,” and almost lost her national number. With the final solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict under the spotlight, conservative Jordanians are sounding the alarm of a swelling fear that Jordan will end up an alternative JORDAN

homeland to 3.5 million Palestinians. An analyst fears the move is to marginalize Palestinians and create a state of fear and a sense of vulnerability among Palestinians. Abu Abdullah says a national number will not make him lose his eternal right to his Palestine homeland, but it will help him raise his children with dignity. * Nick Langer is a reporter based in Jordan.

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2009

MACEDONIA

Macedonia:

Corruption Starts at Birth By Zaklina Hadzi-Zaﬁrova

With tears in her eyes, 30-year-old Ana (the name has been changed to protect the source) waits to see the newborn baby she had just given birth to at the gynecological hospital of her 50,000-resident town in southeastern Macedonia. But before she could see her baby, she had to take care of something. According to town tradition, after delivering a child a mother must feast the doctors and medical personnel so she and her newborn will receive more attention than other patients. This birth tariff is 3,000 denars (US$75) for doctors and 1,000 denars (US$25) for each attendant.

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The Global Integrity Index: How effective are Macedonia’s anti-corruption safeguards? OVERALL RATING

Moderate (77 out of 100 +/-2.46) CATEGORY RATINGS

Category Ratings 1) Civil Society, Public Information & Media — Moderate (78) 2) Elections — Moderate (77) 3) Government Accountability — Moderate (75) 4) Administration & Civil Service — Moderate (75) 5) Oversight & Regulation — Strong (84) 6) Anti-Corruption & Rule of Law — Moderate (76)

(Scores range from 0 to 100)

Macedonia continues to earn healthy ratings on several important dimensions of governance and anti-corruption. The country’s overall regulatory and oversight framework is strong and robust, with the national ombudsman, internal audit agency, and taxes and customs agencies performing well. In addition, Macedonia enjoys a strong anti-corruption legal framework, election monitoring systems and executive accountability are robust, and civil society organizations are effective in playing a watchdog role on corruption issues. Nevertheless, the country faces ongoing problems with legislative accountability and civil service regulations.

2009

This abuse has received no attention because the mothers have nowhere to turn: They are scared because they live in a small city where everyone knows one another. Corruption is also rampant in other areas of Macedonian society, which can’t free itself from various forms of abuses and quid pro quos, despite some government efforts to stop criminal activities. This year cameras were placed in health care institutions to prevent abuses. But the program had no better outcome than other government projects, which failed because they contradicted other laws or the Constitution. In this case, some of the cameras were removed because they contravened laws protecting personal information. Along with the removal of the camera, went the chance that many criminal or Another case of abuse involved 49-year-old Milan A: He wandered through state bueaucracy for ﬁve years hoping to adopt a child. He says there seems to be no end to the corruption that has overtaken state institutions related to labor and social programs. “Starting in 2004, every year they told me that my documents had become out of date, which cost me money and nerves. During these ﬁve years, not once have I received a written response,” he explains, expressing disappointment with the behavior of the state institutions. Because of those practices, time went by and he passed the maximum age limit, losing the right to adopt a baby. He says he will sue.

High-level corruption The goverment has proclaimed a ﬁght against corrup-

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corruptive actions would be revealed.

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tion, and in 2008 there were several public arrests, but most citizens say they don’t feel any real results from that struggle, except in cases that are covered by the media. “By the end of 2008, 27 verdicts in cases of high-level corruption were brought, and more than 100 persons were sanctioned, most for misuse of their official positions and for taking bribes,” Macedonian Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski stated in June 2009 while attending the Regional Conference for Europe and Central Asia organized by the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Transparency International. “With this, the Republic of Macedonia has shown that the laws are equal for everyone.” He pointed out that the government is continuously improving the fight against corruption and said that in only two years, Macedonia went from 105th place to 72nd place in Transparency International’s index. In the 2009 index, it ranked 71st among 180 countries, which caused criticism that the fight against corruption is not progressing. The prime minister’s statement about equal application of law turns out to not include his closest collaborators: government ministers. In May 2009, the opposition alleged that for four months, Minister for Justice Mihajlo Manevski, a member of the prime minister’s ruling party, VMRO-DPMNE, received pension and salary at the same time, which he later confirmed. The case raised questions about the government’s fight against corruption when, several months after the case was discovered, the prosecutor’s office investigated the case but did not press charges because the money had been returned and, in its view, that eliminated any damage that could have been caused. The Helsinski Commit-

2009

tee for Human Rights in Macedonia asked for Manevski’s resignation, but to no avail. Manevski’s case, however, lead investigators to ﬁnd that 148 state ofﬁcials and individuals also had received a pension on irregular conditions. The charges resulted in the July 2009 arrest of six employees in the Fund for Pension and Invalid Insurance. They were accused of misusing 13 million denars (US$325,000). “Manevski’s case is an embarrassment,” said Branko Gerovski, editor-in-chief of the weekly Sega. “I would accept the excuse that it was not his own mistake that he received a pension and a salary at the same time. But still, he is the minister for justice, so he should be the public face for justice. The fact that he did not resign means that he has no sense of MACEDONIA

responsibility,” he adds. Gerovski, also the government controller since May 2008, is a member of the non-governmental organization Platforma. Connected to the opposition Social-Democratic Party (SDSM), Platforma accuses the government of exercising pressure against those who express different opinions and spreading fear in the media and the population. Manevski did not leave the government in July 2009, as did several other ministers who mysteriously resigned or were removed from ofﬁce by the Prime Minister. In one day, the Vice Prime Minister for Economy and three other ministers (Education and Science, Finance and Agriculture) left Gruevski’s government without explanation. The Vice Prime Minister for Eurointegration, Ivica Bocevski, had also left the government. His resignation came only two weeks before the European Comission’s (EC) recommendation to liberalize visa

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regulations, so that starting Dec 2009, Macedonian citizens are no longer required a visa to enter European countries. In the case of Minister for Education and Science, Pero Stojanovski of the State Audit Ofﬁce (DZR — Dr’aven zavod za revizija) announced in November 2008 that he had unlawfully taken 155 thousand denars (US$3,875) as a commission member in the Ministry for Assignments, a position that was part of his regular duties as a state secretary in the Ministry. He and 90 other Ministry employees took a total of 14 million denars (US$350,000).

Public arrests continue, but corruption still exists Last year’s public arrests for corruption and crime continued this year but on a much smaller scale. One of last year’s biggest arrests was that of the tobacco “boss” from Kumanovo, Bajrus Sejdiu, and at least 29 of his collaborators in October 2008. The group was arrested in a police action called Ashes (Pepel) for illegaly producing and smuggling well-known brands of cigarettes, as well as for corruption and not paying taxes. Sejdiu owned several firms and was known as a wealthy man. The government’s campaign for fighting corruption, together with campaigns for education and the promotion of Macedonian products, cost the state 270 million denars (US$6.5 million) in 2007, the State Audit Office (SAO) revealed. Still, experts think this has not decreased the level of corruption or citizens’ perception about it, according to the Transparency International’s 2009 Global Barometer for Corruption survey. According to the survey, published in June 2009, more than half

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of Macedonian citizens believe that the judiciary is extremely corrupt, while more than 80 percent think there is corruption in public administration. However, despite this negative perception about corruption, 65 percent of citizens say that the government is fighting corruption efficiently. “Like last year, this year the government continues to project the image of fighting corruption, but the results are worse than last year,” explains Saso Ordanovski, director of the television station ALSAT-M and president of the board of Transparency Macedonia (Transparentnost Makedonija). “The SAO reports show troubling situations in the way public money is spent and that the state is becoming less transparent in this area.” He also announced that the state anti-corrupMACEDONIA

tion commission is under government control.

Citizens’ hopes rise with expected EU membership Good news for Macedonian citizens came in October 2009, when, after four years of EU candidate status, the European Commission recommended the start of the negotiations with Macedonia for EU membership. It pointed out that more progress needs to be visible in judicial reforms, the strengthening of the administration and the ﬁght against corruption. In December 2009, the Council of Ministers of the EU prolonged the decision about the start of negotiations. The main obstacle is the dispute with Greece over Macedonia’s name (Greece opposes the term “Macedonia” as the constitutional name of the country, because there is a Greek region called Macedonia, among other reasons), which the European Commission has said needs to be resolved before

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the negotiations can start. The Commission also said the country needs to make additional efforts to fight corruption and to have an independent judiciary. Other obstacles include concerns from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe about voters’ lists in the last presidential election, as well as local elections held this spring. They wonder how it is possible for a country of two million people to have 1.8 million voters, but experts doubt that it will be possible to find the answer in a country where information released by public institutions is limited and strictly controlled. * Zaklina Hadzi-Zafirova is an investigative journalist at the political section of the Macedonian daily “Utrinski Vesnik.” She also is the Macedonian coordinator for the Network of Investigative Journalists in East and Southeastern Europe.

2009

Malawi: MALAWI

It’s Our Turn to Eat By Frank Phiri

On May 10, at 9:30 a.m., the sleek, big, black Hummer swerves left, leaving the main road. It drives in the direction of a sign marked “The High Court of Malawi.” The main road is the Masauko Chipembere Highway, the only divided highway in Blantyre, Malawi’s commercial capital. This highway is one of the recent bitumen roads to be rehabilitated under the administration of President Bingu wa Mutharika. Its recent upgrading has helped ease trafﬁc congestions that hitherto made driving in the commercial city and the adjoining retail town of Limbe a nightmare. Ten years ago, this road, like many others across the poor Southern African country of about 13 million, could not

THE CORRUPTION NOTEBOOKS

The Global Integrity Index: How effective are Malawai’s anti-corruption safeguards? OVERALL RATING

Moderate (73 out of 100 +/-1.08) CATEGORY RATINGS

Category Ratings 1) Civil Society, Public Information & Media — Moderate (72) 2) Elections — Very Weak (58) 3) Government Accountability — Weak (66) 4) Administration & Civil Service — Moderate (74) 5) Oversight & Regulation — Strong (84) 6) Anti-Corruption & Rule of Law — Strong (85)

(Scores range from 0 to 100)

Malawi boasts strong scores for voter participation and election integrity, but the election monitoring agency struggles to control the influence of money in politics. There are no controls or transparency over the funding of parties and candidates in Malawi, allowing the ruling party to funnel state resources to support friendly candidates’ campaigns. A lack of post-government employment restrictions for members of the executive and judicial branches, combined with tax and customs exemptions granted to those same officials, provides ample room for senior officials to use their public positions for private gain.

2009

have easily materialized due to incredible levels of red tape and acts of corruption. It would not have mattered that the money for the project came from a donor country, Japan. Today the Hummer, a product of U.S. automaker General Motors (GM), which distinguishes Africa’s penniless from the “monied,” cruises around the city with so much ease thanks to the divided road. Even the passenger in the polished black Hummer, former President Bakili Muluzi, appears to enjoy his ride. For Muluzi, however, the question is how long this seemingly jolly ride will last. This morning, the former president is on a routine appearance before the High Court, where he stands accused funds meant for the Government Consolidated Account into his personal accounts. Muluzi was initially charged with 86 counts of fraud, which have now been synthesized into six. Prosecutors have included a former Malawi ambassador to Japan, James John Chikago, and a former personal assistant, Lyness Whiskey, as Muluzi’s accomplices in the case. The US$12 million in question represents a third of the total budget for managing Malawi’s HIV/Aids pandemic. At least 10 people die from AIDS-related illnesses every hour in Malawi.

Little progress The probe against Muluzi is only one of a few highproﬁle cases of corruption being pursued by the AntiCorruption Bureau (ACB). On April 8, 2008, a Magistrate’s

MALAWI

of diverting 1.7 billion kwacha (US$12 million) of donor

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Court in Lilongwe convicted and sentenced to six years former Education Minister Sam Mpasu for complicity in a textbook deal involving the UK firm Fieldyork International. The case, which has come to be known as the “Fieldyork Scandal”, also implicated Muluzi and some of his former cabinet ministers. Mpasu’s appeal earlier this year was thrown out by the High Court in Blantyre, an emphatic victory for the anti-corruption war front. There are 488 cases under investigation by the ACB, of which 106 are already in the courts. According to ACB Director Alexious Nampota, the bureau has recommended 58 cases for prosecution, closed 139 and secured two convictions as well as two acquittals. In recent years, the ACB has had to improve its image, ostensibly to render credence to its efforts in the fight against corruption. The ACB now boasts an interactive website. It is also a regular advertiser on radio and television, where it runs thematic media campaigns to sensitize the public to the evils of corruption. To improve whistleblowing mechanisms, the bureau has established a toll-free line through which alerts and complaints are reported. The effect of these public relations tactics is noted in the quality of corruption-related complaints that the ACB is receiving. “We (ACB) note that there are more complaints to do with corruption, unlike in the past when the bureau registered more complaints that had nothing to do with corruption,” said Public Relations Officer Egrita Ndala. Malawi’s public procurement departments and quasigovernment institutions top the rogue list of the “fat cats.”

2009

The ACB is making deliberate efforts to reach out to these entities. Among other initiatives, the bureau has entered into agreements providing for joint implementation of fraud-prevention efforts. Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) for these joint initiatives have so far been signed with the Electricity Supply Corporation of Malawi (Escom), a state-owned electricity provider, and the Immigration Department. The 2005 Malawi Governance and Corruption Baseline Survey Report listed the Immigration Department as one of the fertile grounds for corruption in the Malawi public sector. The department issues passports and residency or work permits. For its part, the state-owned power utility company is a daily newspapers. Kandi, the company’s former CEO, stood trial after he was accused of unilaterally awarding contracts to dubious companies and bypassing proper procedures. He was acquitted, but the ACB appealed. At present, Escom is under the ACB’s probe after its management allegedly squandered 80 million kwacha (US$552,000) on a Christmas party and gifts in December 2008. Many staff members at Escom do not remember being invited to said party. “We just read it in the papers. It’s scandalous,” said one technician, speaking on condition of anonymity. To the chagrin of the public, Escom’s performance is appalling. Unable to meet the country’s electricity demand due to inadequate generation capacity, both industrial and residential consumers have to endure prolonged hours of power rationing. Local newspapers seem to be proﬁting

MALAWI

staple diet for banner headlines on fraud and corruption in the

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from the situation because they run full-page advertisements featuring an endless outpouring of apologies, along with “load-shedding” timetables. Irked with the pathetic state of affairs, the Consumers of Malawi (Cama), a consumerrights watchdog, sued Escom, calling on the utility to change its slogan of “Power all day, every day.” The company ended up changing its logo.

Questions and doubts linger Malawians went to the fourth multi-party general elections on May 19, 2009. President Bingu wa Mutharika won 2.7 million votes, more than twice as many as his main challenger, John Tembo. Former President Bakili Muluzi, who had been expected to pose the greatest challenge to Mutharika, was barred by the High Court from contesting three days before polling day. Analysts attributed Mutharika’s landslide victory to his tough anti-corruption stance. They also noted that during his first five-year term starting in 2004, he pushed through a number of reforms that restored donor confidence and persuaded the G8 to cancel the bulk of the country’s foreign debt of US$1.7 billion. On Feb. 5, 2009, Mutharika led the country in unveiling a new graft-busting blueprint, the National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS). Crafters of the strategy, which include a crosssection of stakeholders from government, business, media and civil society, lauded it as a holistic tool for combating corruption. However, these efforts seem not to have had the desired effect of staving off what appears to be a growing wave of sophisticated corruption in Mutharika’s own administration.

2009

Malawi’s corruption perception ratings have not improved much, according to Transparency International (TI). TI’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranks Malawi at 115 in 2008, up from 90 in 2004. The 2008 rating is a slight improvement from 118 the previous year. These ratings have been a source of anger by the president, who in 2007 spewed venom on TI by accusing the Berlin-based independent corruption watchdog of “cooking up” its ﬁgures. But Mutharika now seems to have reversed that view. On Aug. 26, 2009, he publicly admitted that corruption had become rampant in the country and looked askance at his own inner circle, which he suspects of corrupt dealings. The president warned that he would “not protect” any of his MALAWI

ministers from prosecution. “I am aware that some of you think of nothing but to get money which you’re not entitled to ... All those that use corrupt contractors to get commissions, I will prosecute, jail and ﬁre you,” he said at the opening of a minister’s orientation workshop in the administrative capital, Lilongwe.

Selective prosecution? The President’s outbursts follow accusations from the opposition that he is shielding some corrupt cabinet ministers from prosecution. In particular, the opposition has queried why the ACB has failed to formally charge outspoken Children and Women Affairs Minister, Patricia Kaliati, accused of receiving “gratification” from a United Arab Emirates firm that allegedly sought her influence to award it a tourism concession at a picturesque plateau in Northern Malawi.

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The opposition has also questioned the President’s decision to reinstate Clerk of Parliament Matilda Katopola, despite an audit report revealing she had written a check to herself to supply stationary services to Parliament. Question marks also hang on the source of funding for a mansion the president is building on his reclusive Ndata farm, in the tea growing district of Thyolo in Southern Malawi. The Portuguese company Mota-Engil is constructing the mansion in the vicinity of the spot where the late former first lady Ethel Mutharika is buried. She died in May, 2007. The ACB blames the slow process for prosecuting corruption on inadequate human capacity. Currently, the bureau has 25 investigators handling 500 cases every month. The anti-corruption director Nampota, a lawyer by profession, openly voiced his frustration over the insecurity of tenure for the director of ACB and has asked Parliament to find a permanent solution. The position of the ACB director is crucial in the fight against corruption in Malawi because he is the only one mandated to give consent to investigate or prosecute such cases. As someone with institutional memory, having been a one-time deputy director of ACB, Nampota’s fears are well-founded. For three years, the ACB had no permanent director. Two of Nampota’s predecessors, Gustav Kaliwo and the late Tumalisye Ndovi, left office under a political cloud. Kaliwo was fired for allegedly defying Mutharika’s order not to arrest Muluzi on July 18, 2006, while Ndovi, despite blessings of the president who nominated him, was twice rejected by the then authoritative, opposition-led Public Appointments Com-

2009

mittee (PAC) of Parliament. Afterwards, ﬁlling the vacancy for the post of director became a precondition for continued aid to Malawi by Britain, one of the country’s major donors.

Media muzzled The media have been instrumental in investigating and exposing corrupt dealings in Malawi. While the National Anti-Corruption Strategy recognizes the media as one of the pillars in the ﬁght against corruption, the law does not. Since 2003, the National Media Institute of Southern Africa (NAMISA), a local media freedom watchdog, has been pushing for the enactment of its draft of the Access to Information Bill into law, without success. Without this piece of vital information, a situation that tends to limit their accuracy and put them at risk for lawsuits. “Without this law, our ability to probe and expose corruption is limited and we often ﬁnd our freedoms threatened,” said Brian Ligomeka, the chairperson of NAMISA. He suspects that ruling DPP legislators, who now enjoy a majority representation in the 193-seat Malawi Parliament, are reluctant to pass the bill for fear of being exposed. “At present, the MPs have declared their assets to the speaker. Ironically, we’re not allowed to get or use this information for public consumption. There’s the ‘it’s our time to eat’ attitude in the current Parliament. The proposed law would smash all that,” he said, referring to journalist Michela Wrong’s book that exposes Kenya’s patronage system and use of the state as a source of loot.

MALAWI

legislation, journalists have to circumvent red tape to access

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*Frank Phiri is a public relations strategist with ZK Advertising & Public Relations, a pan-African media agency, and a ﬁnancial freelance journalist. He writes for Reuters from Blantyre and has corresponded for Inter Press Service (IPS) and was a business editor at Blantyre Newspapers Limited, Malawi’s largest print media house. He was named Business & Economics Journalist of the Year by the National Media Institute of Southern Africa in 2006 and was nominated for the IPS’ Richard de Zoysa Award for Excellence in Independent Journalism in 2004.

2009

MEXICO

Mexico:

Tithes and Punishment By Leonarda Reyes

The fire and smoke coming from the daycare center could be seen blocks away. Desperate mothers jammed through the center’s entrance gate, knowing their children were inside. The daycare center was, in fact, actually a warehouse. Minimal health and safety modifications had been made to the building to allow for the care of children. The center lacked fire exits, fire equipment and fire alarms. Still, local health and federal officials had approved it as a safe place. That afternoon 29 children died in Hermosillo, the capital of the northern state of Sonora, some of them while sleeping

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The Global Integrity Index: How effective are Mexico’s anti-corruption safeguards? OVERALL RATING

Moderate (72 out of 100 +/-4.62) CATEGORY RATINGS

Category Ratings 1) Civil Society, Public Information & Media — Strong (82) 2) Elections — Strong (84) 3) Government Accountability — Weak (60) 4) Administration & Civil Service — Weak (63) 5) Oversight & Regulation — Moderate (77) 6) Anti-Corruption & Rule of Law — Moderate (70)

(Scores range from 0 to 100)

Mexico continues to wrestle with a number of significant weaknesses in its public integrity system. For instance, the public has no access to the asset disclosure records of executive, legislative, or judicial branch officials. In addition, the media climate is among the most challenging in the world. Citizens face significant barriers when attempting to establish broadcast media entities, including arbitrary and opaque decision-making procedures on the part of the government agency charged with granting broadcast licenses.

2009

during their afternoon naps. Within days, the number of children killed from complications from the blaze increased to 49. Days of outrage followed. Parents led protests after they learned that one of the center’s owners was related to the governor and the president’s wife. Relatives of the governor owned a dozen daycare centers authorized by the national health care system (IMSS — Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social). For the parents, it did not matter at which government level the connections took place, both local and federal politicians were thought to be corrupt and guilty. Some parents however, blamed themselves. “I am guilty of trusting, of paying my taxes, of voting for them. I am responsible for the death of my son,” said “It is not you, it is them, the corrupt ones.” In a way, Zavala described the type of corruption to which Mexicans are exposed these days. While there is a general feeling that petty corruption has been decreasing — there is no need to pay a bribe to get a legitimate driver’s license, a passport or other similar services — the hidden, difﬁcult-to-detect corruption, as well as legal and grand corruption, is rampant coast to coast in the country. A classic form of corruption in Mexico is called diezmo (tithe) in the state of Guanajuato, a highly religious state. If a bridge, a road or a school is built or a permit is issued, the contractor must pay about 10 percent in bribe to compete for a small contract. Only the contractors who lose the bids might complain, and oftentimes only in private and in the hope that the next contract will go to them.

MEXICO

Roberto Zavala, a young father. Other voices corrected him:

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Diezmos are not an act of the contractor’s generosity. Diezmos are paid to ofﬁcials to award a public contract to a bidder or company. It works this way: the companies participating in a bid are very careful to quote the right quality and not to overprice, but when the company wins the bid and gets the contract, the original amount can be increased up to 25 percent, with the expectation that those additions will deﬁnitely be approved. This form of corruption is widespread at every level of government, be it federal, state or municipal. Pemex, the Mexican state-owned oil company, the 11th biggest in the world, is a good example. “The government has fought corruption at the low levels inside Pemex, but (as they) pressed the balloon below it got bigger at the upper levels. The corruption is up high now and it’s the big corporations and big contracts where it shows,” said Armando Etcheverry, an oil expert and former Pemex employee. The bribes are usually paid in cash and in different percentages, depending on how much money is involved in the contract. Sometimes the money is deposited in off-shore bank accounts.

Impunity granted The Federal Prosecution Ofﬁce (PGR — Procuraduría General de la República) investigates federal corruption with the head prosecutor reporting to the president. This means that any federal ofﬁcer, low-level or high-level, is investigated by his or her own boss. Therefore, the political motives very often taint the investigations. The same is true in the states and municipalities.

2009

The judicial system also has its own corruption problems, but most of them originate during the investigation stage. Investigators are not part of the judicial system in Mexico, they are part of the zdministration and report to the Federal Prosecution Office, whose head reports to the president. The same model applies to states. Although judges, courts and the Supreme Court (judicial system) are widely perceived as corrupt, judges rely on the investigations, and often times these investigations have been tainted during the process. “In my experience as a lawyer, judges are doing their job. The problem is that they trust the Ministerio Público, (the prosecution’s branch in charge of the investigations) and are incompetent, not well trained or (they don’t) get well paid. Yes, the officer who serves notifications asks for bribes. It is because they have a lot of work and if you want it fast, you pay, but the real problems start with the investigation,” said Jorge Arana, who has been practicing law for 15 years. His experience is supported by academic research. Petty thieves who cannot bribe the investigators or hire expensive lawyers are put behind bars. Jails in Mexico are full of them.

Some revenge Late on Sunday July 5, 2009, the reports were stunning. It was the night of the federal election of the House of Representatives and for the Industrial Revolutionary Party leaders (PRI — Partido Revolucionario Institucional), the results were favorable beyond belief.

MEXICO

the investigators are clumsy, the evidence altered because they

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PRI had held power in Mexico for seven decades until 2000 when the conservative party, the National Action Party (PAN — Partido Acción Nacional), won the presidency. But on the morning after the 2009 election, the dinosaur — as PRI is often called — emerged awake and in good health. PRI came out of the election as the most powerful force in the House. For PAN, the president’s party, it was a catastrophic loss. PAN leaders, still in shock, established a commission to understand the reasons for their defeat. Voters understood well the reasons for the change in power: They had expected corruption to decrease and for the economic situation to improve under PAN. Instead, citizens only saw a change in style. In the past, corrupt PRI politicians would deny any wrongdoing. They would try to disguise and hide evidence of misconduct. Eventually someone would be ﬁred. The PAN style, instead, was up front: wrongdoing and morally questionable acts were defended as correct, despite all evidence to the contrary. For example, in late August, 2009, one departing PAN legislator, Gerardo Priego, received a check for more than one million pesos (US$75,000) from the House-contracted travel agency for tickets he had not used. Priego returned the money, but the PAN national leader, César Nava, instead of calling on his fellow party members to do the same in light of the enormous economic global crisis that has hit Mexico particularly hard, insisted that, “it is not an obligation or a must-do.” Fraud? Who says it is corrupt for a politician to keep unspent public money?

2009

A new breed Economic insecurity and narcotics traffic have created a new breed of corruption in Mexico. During the past five years, the drug cartels have expanded massively, promoting a war that has killed thousands of people. The drug cartels corrupt everyone, whether they want to be corrupted or not, by fear, by money or by both. “We were intercepted by several men in different vehicles. They forced us out of the patrol cars, threatening us with gun machines. They said they were the cartel and did not want us to interfere with their activities. They also said they knew where we and our families lived,” said a police officer in a deposition published by Proceso magazine. She MEXICO

and her partner looked the other way from that day on and started getting small bribes every month. She was charged with conspiracy, along with 17 other police officers. With an increasing understanding of how the political system works, the cartels’ strategies to control the government have become more sophisticated. Newly elected mayors of the main three political parties were “invited” to attend a meeting in the state of Michoacán, on the Pacific, a drug transport area and home of a cartel. The mayors were forced into a ballroom surrounded by armed men. There they were threatened and informed by the drug lords that the cartel was going to appoint the police chiefs in every municipality. A dozen mayors, police chiefs and other officials were charged for conspiracy in May 2009.

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Sick and tired Millions in Mexico are sick and ashamed of corruption. Any crime that goes unpunished, any misconduct, or any abuse of power is automatically attributed to corruption. Exactly how tired are Mexicans of corruption and corrupt politicians? Prior to the July 2009 election, activists launched an Internet campaign, which garnered great media attention. It called on citizens to cast voided ballots in order to express disgust for the corrupt politicians and, in general, for the political system that allows it. When the votes were counted, close to six percent were voided. That is 1.7 million ballots, not a huge number, but it represents active and informed voters and not passive citizens. There also are examples of people taking justice into their own hands. In the past, groups of citizens have detained robbers, alleged kidnappers and rapists and handed them to the police. Now, businessmen and other professionals, tired of impunity, have hired “para-police,” a clandestine group that seeks “justice” when the government does not. The group beats and kills when necessary, according the chief commander, who was interviewed by Milenio newspaper. The group has existed for 12 years. Vigilante justice will never succeed, nor will it be enough to rid the country of corruption and impunity. Such action is the result of desperation, just as desperation caused activists to void their voting ballots, despite the fact that they knew it would not change much. What such behavior makes clear, however, is that Mexicans, by the millions, are ready to take action. Whether it is effective or not is still left to be seen.

2009

* Leonarda Reyes worked 11 years for ReformaEl Norte group in Mexico. Investigations she conducted revealed widespread electoral fraud and corruption involving public contracts. Reyes also covered the U.S. invasion of Panama and Mexico’s relations with Cuba. She later became Reforma’s national assignment editor and went on to work for three years as managing editor for TV Azteca News. Later, she was appointed director of production for its nationwide afﬁliates. Reyes was a 1990 Knight Fellow at Stanford University, founded the Center for Journalism and Public Ethics in Mexico in 2003, and was its director until February, 2009.

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Nepal: NEPAL

Are Corrupt People Never Frowned Upon? By Surendra Phuyal

That question is asked by all in the Himalayan nation — everyone from international visitors, who have to deal with bribe-taking ofﬁcials right at Kathmandu’s international airport, to the hapless citizens of this country of approximately 30 million. In July 2009, Nepal’s anti-graft body, the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA), came up with a smart idea to discourage staff at Kathmandu’s international airport from taking bribes. CIAA suggested top ofﬁcials at the Civil Aviation Authority of Nepal (CAAN) make “pocketless” pants mandatory for all staff.

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The Global Integrity Index: How effective are Nepal’s anti-corruption safeguards? OVERALL RATING

Weak (67 out of 100 +/-1.77) CATEGORY RATINGS

Category Ratings 1) Civil Society, Public Information & Media — Strong (80) 2) Elections — Very Weak (58) 3) Government Accountability — Very Weak (57) 4) Administration & Civil Service — Weak (63) 5) Oversight & Regulation — Moderate (75) 6) Anti-Corruption & Rule of Law — Weak (68)

(Scores range from 0 to 100)

Nepal’s network of anti-corruption agencies “lacks consistency in approach and clear areas of jurisdiction, resulting in frequently overlapping functions.” While many corruption-related legal reforms were adopted in 2007, their implementation has been stalled as the government’s focus “shifted to peace building, conflict resolution, social inclusion and elections.” Following this, Constituent Assembly elections were held in 2008 for the first time in six years. Monitoring of those elections was more effective than ever before despite the election monitoring agency’s lack of staff and electronic voting technology being limited to the Kathmandu district. Nepali voters elected representatives from 25 different opposition parties into office.

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The suggestion came after widespread reports and complaints by airline passengers about petty corruption, such as bribery and theft, by staff of CAAN, various airlines, customs and immigration, and even by security personnel posted at the airport. CIAA’s pitch made international headlines, but it seems the plan served only to make a mockery of Nepal’s corrupt ofﬁcialdom. The suggestion even prompted CAAN ofﬁcials to discuss the idea, but they failed to come up with a concrete plan of action. The result: The “pocketless” pants are nowhere to be seen, complaints from airline passengers haven’t stopped and bribery continues at the Kathmandu airport, if reports in local media are accurate. NEPAL

Pervasive corruption Nepal has the dubious distinction of being one of the most corrupt countries in the world. Corruption — from petty to grand — is endemic here. In recent years, Nepal has fared terribly in global indexes of transparency, accountability and corruption. For instance, in Transparency International’s (TI) 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index, Nepal scored 2.5 out of 10 (down from 2.7 the previous year). Like the Kathmandu airport, customs, immigration, land-revenue, transportation management and police departments across the country continue to have a bad reputation. They are considered hotbeds of often petty — and at times heavy — corruption. TI’s 2008 index ranked Nepal as the country with the fourth highest level of corruption among the eight members

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of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Overall, Nepal ranked 124th out of 180 countries included in the report. Bribery and corruption have been thriving for years in key ofﬁces responsible for Nepal’s public service. And that culture is showing no signs of changing for the better, despite the ground-breaking “revolution” and political changes that have swept Nepal in recent years. After rebel Maoists joined the 2006 peace process, a 601-member Constituent Assembly (CA) was elected in May 2008. The CA, which doubles as parliament, abolished the centuries-old monarchy: The kingdom was gone and the Federal Democratic Republic was born. The CA is currently working to prepare the new constitution of “New Nepal.”

Transitional lethargy Many experts following Nepal’s on-again-off-again anti-corruption drive think the country’s transitional issues and never-ending political instability have sidelined the drive against corruption. In the words of Aashis Thapa, executive director at TI Nepal, “The messy transition has put the drive to ﬁght corruption on the back-burner. It’s a classic example of transitional lethargy.” That’s the main reason why, many experts agree, Nepal has neither improved its corrupt image nor prospered on other socioeconomic development and transformation fronts in recent times. “As far as an anti-corruption drive is concerned,” says Kedar Khadka, director of the Good Governance Project at Pro-Public, a Kathmandu-based non-

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governmental organization, “political will is lacking and the progress made so far is very discouraging.” Other pundits point out that politicians, including CA members, have shown “absolute insensitivity” to the drive against corruption, and haven’t even talked about signing the United Nation’s Anti-Corruption Convention.

Some action CIAA officials say things are improving when it comes to fighting petty corruption in government offices and to investigating irregularities in major construction projects. Bed Prakash Siwakoti, a commissioner, says that since the CIAA has warned everyone against corruption, things are gradually changing. NEPAL

“People think twice before taking bribes these days,” he boasts, giving examples of ongoing investigations into several suspected cases of financial irregularities or lack of accountability in government offices. This year alone, CIAA says it has initiated legal action against 1,000 civil servants as well as senior Nepal army and police officials who failed to submit their personal property details by the stipulated deadline. CIAA adds that it has also exposed several cases of irregularities in a number of ongoing infrastructure development and construction projects. Since 2002 and 2003, CIAA has brought about 600 cases against corrupt politicians, officials and businessmen, Commissioner Siwakoti says. Those charged in recent times include former Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala, who,

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CIAA claims, had a role in a notorious airplane leasing deal for the state-run airlines. The deal was hammered out almost a decade ago. Two years ago, a special court acquitted him. Many big shots, or so-called “tall figures,” in Nepalese politics, including Vice President Paramanda Jha, a former judge, have faced corruption charges in the past. But few have received legal punishment. CIAA officials claim they have succeeded in about 85 percent of the corruption charges filed in the special anticorruption court. But Pro-Public’s Khadka challenges the claims, saying that CIAA has succeeded in a much lower number of cases. “In most cases, CIAA has lost; it’s a pathetic situation,” he says.

Waning faith Experts and ofﬁcials watching the country’s anti-corruption drive blame the culture of impunity and widespread politicization as the major factors weakening Nepal’s ﬁght against corruption. “In a country where corruption is culture, corrupt people are never frowned upon or boycotted by society. What can you expect?” asks Bikash Thapa, a journalist covering development and infrastructure. That Nepal’s politicians and rulers have ignored the anti-corruption drive becomes clear from the state of the CIAA, which has remained without a chief commissioner for a long time. That attitude, experts think, is one reason why CIAA has faced so many humiliating losses in the special court. “The situation has gotten so bad that few people

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have faith in CIAA or its anti-corruption drive today,” says Pro-Public’s Khadka. Nepal’s drive against corruption took an interesting turn recently. On July 31, 2009, Prakash Tibrewala, considered one of the biggest defaulters on the country’s foreignexchange laws, was arrested in a village near Kathmandu. Three years ago the District Court found him guilty of misappropriating US$600,000 while procuring medical equipment from abroad, but he ﬂed and hasn’t been punished. Given corruption in virtually every sector of Nepal society, that’s an unusual case, experts say, but they add that the government needs to do much more to crack down on corruption. As TI’s latest study points out, the dealings of most of the political parties in Nepal are not transparent. NEPAL

Even the former rebel CPN-Maoist party, the largest party in the CA, has failed to maintain a clean image when it comes to ﬁnancial discipline, transparency and accountability. The party faces accusations of using dozens of cars and SUVs allegedly stolen by thieves in neighboring India. Maoist leaders deny the charges. But several Indian media reports suggest that hundreds of cars stolen in India were, and still are, being sent to Nepal using various covert roadways. The worst news, perhaps, is this: The CA — which is drafting the country’s new Constitution — is trying to rid the CIAA of its constitutional status and to reduce it to a mere department, requiring it to be accountable and answerable to the Auditor General before bringing any case against anyone in the special anti-corruption court. Dismayed by that development, a former CIAA commis-

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sioner, Surya Nath Upadhyay, wrote in a recent issue of the Republica newspaper, “The forerunners of the anti-corruption movement were hoping that some improvements would be made in the new Constitution, but their hopes have been completely dashed. If the CA members want to reduce the CIAA to an investigative department of the police … better do away with it. Now you can have a free ride. Congratulations.” *Surendra Phuyal is a Kathmandu-based reporter who contributes daily news and analyses to international news organizations, including columns for The Kathmandu Post newspaper in Nepal. He was an Alfred Friendly Press Fellow in 2003 and a Spring Jefferson Fellow in 2007.

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VIETNAM

Vietnam:

A Life of Envelopes By Nguyen Qui Duc

Take one taxi ride and you’ll hear all sorts of stories about the greasing of palms both on the streets of Hanoi and outside the capital. One of the most frequent complaints is about policemen who take bribes instead of issuing tickets for traffic violations. “It happens to me every few weeks,” says taxi driver Nguyen Hiep. Traffic offenses, such as speeding or riding a motorcycle without a helmet or a driver’s license, are easily fixed by slipping a policeman anywhere between 50,000 and 500,000 Vietnamese dong (US$3-US$30), depending on what you drive and what your offense is.

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The Global Integrity Index: How effective are Vietnam’s anti-corruption safeguards? OVERALL RATING

Very Weak (44 out of 100 +/-0.92) CATEGORY RATINGS

1) Civil Society, Public Information & Media — Very Weak (22) 2) Elections — Very Weak (43) 3) Government Accountability — Very Weak (33) 4) Administration & Civil Service — Very Weak (42) 5) Oversight & Regulation — Weak (60) 6) Anti-Corruption & Rule of Law — Weak (65)

(Scores range from 0 to 100)

The blurry (and often non-existent) lines between ruling party and the state in Vietnam continue to pose structural challenges to the country’s governance reform agenda. Vietnam unfortunately boasts some of the world’s most explicit restrictions on freedom of speech and freedom of expression, and the arrests of bloggers have provided a chilling reminder to those who choose to speak out against the government that they put themselves at personal risk. Independent media is virtually non-existent, with all media outlets being state-run. To even register a new media outlet requires purchasing the right to obtain a license from an existing state-run organization, a dubious gray market few in Vietnam discuss.

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Policemen have ample opportunities to earn extra cash. As Vietnam develops, urbanization and increasing wealth mean more cars and motorcycles. Laws are multiplying too, but people are still used to old habits: traffic-fine negotiations take place between drivers and police while red lights and laws are ignored. Park your bike on the sidewalk at the wrong time while you get a cup of coffee, and the cops will put it on their truck and take it to the station. The café owner will have to pay a “fine” of about US$5 to get it back, since in Vietnam shop and café owners are responsible for keeping their customers’ motorcycles safe and unharmed, as well as responsible for keeping sidewalks in front of their shops clear. “It’s VIETNAM

the cost of doing business,” one café owner says.

Vicious corruption circles What most of us in Vietnam tend to forget is that policemen are also frequent victims of corruption. Getting a job issuing trafﬁc tickets can be lucrative, but to get this job a cop needs to have connections and pay some dues. He also has to share what he takes with his superiors and colleagues. The policeman, just like any other average person, also pays bribes for any number of things in daily life. To get a child into a good school, one has to pay the school administrators somewhere between 5 and 8 million dong (US$300-US$480). It’s not always about money. At the immigration ofﬁce, I witnessed a woman trying to obtain visas for foreign colleagues. She was an administrator at a small, private inter-

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national school. The immigration clerk asked her to take a seat. A few moments later, he sat next to her and said, “I have a child. I am sure you can help me.” Neither he nor she seemed bothered that there were plenty of people around as they negotiated. It’s always about “doing a favor” for someone. That’s part of the cultural tradition. But it translates into corruption and abuse of power, and it’s accepted as a part of life. Most people will tell you that because salaries are so low, corruption is natural — and aside from the disdain reserved for cops on the take, it is seen as a convenient way to get things done.

As painful as it can get The situation in hospitals can be galling: nurses will arbitrarily write anything on your admittance sheet: heart rate, pulse, blood pressure. They will only take your pulse and blood pressure and record them in your patient’s intake form only if you pay. “They make it painful for you,” says Nghiem Thi Thu, a woman in her late 40s who works as a caregiver. “You pay, and the nurses will give you shots without hurting you.” Indeed, it is a frequent complaint that otherwise the nurses make it physically painful. Within my ﬁrst year of living here, I fell and cut myself deeply. At the hospital, I sat in the emergency room for more than an hour before a visiting neighbor asked, “Did you give them an envelope?” That’s when I learned that in an emergency, you pack envelopes to take with you to the hospital.

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You put a few bills inside and hand them to intake clerks, nurses and doctors if you want to get any service. Visiting a friend in a hospital recently, I saw a short woman getting in and out of bed every few minutes to pace, stepping over and around the mass of people in the room. These people from the countryside had come into Hanoi seeking better reproductive health care. The woman was cursing out the nurses, the doctors and her husband in turn. “I’m just a second-class citizen,” she said. “It’s been five hours and they won’t give me my shots.” The room had four beds — two patients per bed — and scores of relatives acting as caregivers. Several people kept reminding her to hand over an envelope. She refused, and kept pacing the room and cursing. Someone would open the bathroom door, and the smell of urine and blood was horrific. There were water puddles on the floor, and people would wipe their plastic sandals on a towel that looked like it had been soaked in engine oil. That demonstrated people’s limit: the patients and their families didn’t want to bribe janitorial staff for service. When I visited the next day, nothing had been cleaned. Downstairs I saw lines of women sitting on benches on the verandah, all waiting for an abortion. Several were whispering about the amount needed to get a doctor to perform the procedure. I found out they had paid all the necessary fees: about US$100 for the operation and related costs. But to actually get an abortion, they need to pay the nurses and the doctors an extra US$70 dollars “under the table.”

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everyone else received their shots and medicines. Alone, she

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One woman told me, referring to one doctor: “Ten to 12 abortions a day, at a million dong (US$56) each. He’s raking it in.”

Pervasive corruption Twenty years after promulgating a policy of reform called Doi Moi (renovation), Vietnam’s government has moved from a socialist “command” economy to a market economy. People are freer and conditions have improved. But the policy has not meant full reforms, as much as the government and party officials continue to proclaim that fighting corruption is a top priority. To the average Vietnamese, living with corruption is unavoidable. It’s about who you know. A business owner’s visit to the tax office will be smoother and faster if it’s accompanied by someone who can guide you to a connection — an official who will “sort things out” for you after receiving an envelope. Sometimes an envelope is handed over with a discreet muttering about a “gift” to the children. Other times, prices and “fees” are discussed directly, in the open. No matter what, you can expect to pay lower taxes if you know the right people and offer the right amount. State utility employees will change your wires or fix your power meter after you make an initial “investment” of about US$60, but your monthly bill will be a third of what it was before. If you wish to keep your shop open past official business closing hours, or if you want to use the sidewalk to

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park customers’ scooters, a few envelopes passed into the right hands will do the trick. An itinerant judge I met two years ago told me, “I could be living very well.” He travels from village to village, presiding over temporary courtrooms where there normally aren’t any. When he returns to Hanoi, he lives with his wife in one room with a sofa and a double bed. There is a fridge and a cupboard in one corner. Their son studies at a small table in an adjacent space that doubles as the kitchen and dining area. The judge’s wife works as an accountant, but their combined salaries don’t allow for better conditions. I am made to understand that the only way this living situation could be changed is if he took bribes. VIETNAM

Big fish As I am writing this, an architect visits. He has a hangover. The night before, he’d taken two police officials out for a visit to a “massage” parlor, followed by a drinking session. “I spent 4 million dong (US$220) entertaining these guys,” he says. The deal they were discussing was for the architect to develop a plan for “remodeling” a regional police office. The officials he was entertaining offered him 10 million dong (US$560) in cash for the plan, which they would then give to higher ranking officials for approval — and the remodeling job would be his. Naturally, all costs involved would be inflated. The officials would pocket all profits from the inflated costs of buying materials (bricks, cement, construction equipment, electrical wiring, etc.).

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“The guy’s a major in the police force,” says the architect, “but he talks like a gangster.” The construction would involve lining the office walls with expensive wood confiscated from lumber smugglers. The architect says the major wanted his office to look like a cabinet minister’s office. “Working with me,” the official reportedly told the architect, “is like working with a king’s man: I’ll cover for you if you know how to treat me right.” “You can’t do an honest job in this country,” says the architect. “They’re all gangsters.” This sort of situation has earned Vietnam a bad name abroad. A former member of Parliament, ambassador and de-facto face of Vietnam, Mrs. Ton-Nu-Thi Ninh says Vietnam must combat the image of corruption. “The amount of money spent on marketing our image abroad is nothing compared to corruption and waste,” she said. Ask any average citizen and he or she will complain about high-ranking officials making mammoth deals from selling land, awarding business contracts or facilitating major construction. They will talk about big companies siphoning off money rather than buying adequate construction equipment and materials. “Bridges collapse; highways are left unfinished,” says a journalist friend. Some of these corruption cases receive public exposure. “But just for show,” my journalist friend says. Exposure is often due to competition among factions in the government or within the ruling Communist Party.

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“It’s the big guys jostling for power,” says a former businessman turned photographer. He had worked in the oil industry and witnessed how corruption works behind closed doors. “Most of us just live with a broken system in our daily life,” he says. Citizen complaints have sometimes led to clean-up efforts — but everyone I talk to tells me it’s a temporary situation. With low salaries, an entrenched “tradition” and an ineffective or unwilling government, corruption will continue to rule people’s daily lives. * Nguyen Qui Duc is an accomplished reporter who has twice received awards from the Overseas Press Club of well as a joint Peabody Award for coverage of Asian Americans. As host of the national public radio program “Paciﬁc Time,” he covered the Asia-Paciﬁc region and its connections to North America. In 2006, he received the Distinguished Service Award for his contributions to journalism from the California Society of Professional Journalists.

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America for his documentaries from Viet Nam and China, as

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Part II — Anti-Corruption Agencies, the Judiciary, and Police

“We have as many corrupted judges as stray dogs.” —Reporter’s Notebook, Ukraine

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China: CHINA

Money and Greed, Today’s Religion By Xiao Chin An Wang Li embezzled 3,000 yuan (US$439) when she worked for Blue Moon, a Guangzhou-based chemical company. Her husband, Hong Bo, says Guangzhou police detained her in her home in Xingtai, Hebei province, at the end of April 2009. Hong, a man in his thirties, went to Guangzhou in early May to ask lawyer Li Sheng for advice. “You probably need to pay them 20,000 yuan (US$2,929),” Li told Hong, referring to how much money Hong should pay to bribe the policeman in charge of his wife’s case. But things did not turn out quite as badly as Li predicted. When Hong invited the policeman who detained Wang

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The Global Integrity Index: How effective are China’s anti-corruption safeguards? OVERALL RATING

Weak (60 out of 100 +/-1.08) CATEGORY RATINGS

1) Civil Society, Public Information & Media — Very Weak (55) 2) Elections — Very Weak (44) 3) Government Accountability — Very Weak (46) 4) Administration & Civil Service — Moderate (71) 5) Oversight & Regulation — Moderate (76) 6) Anti-Corruption & Rule of Law — Moderate (70)

(Scores range from 0 to 100)

Political interference in anti-corruption efforts is an overarching concern in China’s one-party state. There is little separation between the ruling political party and government functions as can be seen in the lack of conflicts of interest regulations across government branches. There is no auditing of public officials’ asset disclosures while disclosure forms submitted by political candidates are “untouchable.” State contributions to political candidates are fixed but may be increased for influential leaders’ “pet” candidates.

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to have dinner and “a talk,” the policeman replied, “OK. Don’t worry; your wife will be released if you return the money to the company. We will be in a better mood to have a meal after her release.” A week later, Wang was released, even though Hong had not repaid the embezzled funds. Hong, Wang, their friend Zhang Chong and three policemen sat together in a fancy restaurant and had a “very happy talk.” After the meal, each of the three police officers was given ten packages of cigarettes as “small gifts of appreciation.” “I spent a total of 2,500 yuan (US$366) tonight,” Hong told Zhang. “These policemen are very nice men. It is true that Wang Li’s wrongdoing is too minor for her to be jailed for, but if the police make trouble for me, I am afraid Li had said was required to save Wang Li.” “Don’t you think the police were being corrupt by attending the dinner and taking the cigarettes?” Zhang asked. “Maybe,” Hong said, “but look, this is China, a corrupt country. I would say they are very clean when compared to the police in my hometown.” Hong added that a policeman in his home city, who helped Guangzhou police find Wang Li, had asked for a payment of 600 yuan (US$88) before he would give Hong the Guangzhou police department’s telephone number. “So you can see, Guangzhou police are clean and I am lucky,” Hong said. “Actually, I was prepared to pay 20,000 yuan (US$2,929) to them but finally it came to only 2,500 yuan (US$366).”

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I will have to pay 20,000 yuan (US$2,929), the amount that

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“Hong Bo is lucky,” says Qian Yun, a woman in her forties from Hunan province who works in Guangzhou as a nanny, after hearing the above story. “His wife did something wrong and he spent just 2,500 yuan (US$366). But, you know, the police took more than 4,500 yuan (US$659) from my cousin when he was only watching other people gamble. The police said they were raiding the gambling house and did not return the money to my cousin until he agreed that they could keep 3,000 yuan (US$439). In fact, the police were not conducting a gambling raid at all. They were just grabbing money. Everybody knows that every police ofﬁcer, every ofﬁcial, only cares about money, money, money!”

Money: today’s religion “Money, money and money — that is all the officials and government are about,” says Feng Gui, a staff member of the Shenzhen government. “There is no religion in today’s China; money is their religion.” Feng argues that no social value system, political system or court system exists to restrain people’s greed. Everybody in China uses any chance they get to grab money. It is no surprise that so many officials, police officers and businessmen are corrupt: They have power without any checks or balances on it. The Chinese government, which usually plays down “negative information” and plays up “good things,” does not deny the existence of corruption. Indeed, in a speech at a session of the National People’s Congress in March 2009, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao said: “Corruption remains a

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serious problem in some localities, departments and areas. We will resolutely investigate and prosecute corruption cases and punish corrupt people in accordance with the law.” “But the prime minister doesn’t dare admit to corruption in the military,” says Ge Fei, a scholar in a military academy in Nanjing. Ge thinks the military is one of the most corrupt areas. In fact, many people argue that corruption costs trillions of yuan every year. “But that is just an estimate,” says Cheng Hao, a scholar from Tsinghua University. “The only thing we can be sure of is that the corruption is very serious.” According to the report of China’s Supreme People’s Procuratorate, which was released in March 2009, a total of 2,687 Chinese ofﬁcials above the county level were punished It does seem that the anti-corruption movement in China was still strong in 2009. In April, Chen Shaoji, the previous head of police and the legal system of Guangdong province, was investigated and dismissed for corrupt activities. Two months later, Xu Zongheng, the mayor of Shenzhen city, fell for the same reason. Given their positions and the economic status of Guangdong and Shenzhen, the fall of these two ofﬁcials was branded by the media as the “anti-corruption storm.” Many people see it as the sign of government’s determination to root out corruption.

Politics as usual disguised as anti-corruption “But the fact is that the fall of Chen and Xu is more the result of an internal political ﬁght than the result of an

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for corruption in 2008, including four ministers.

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anti-corruption campaign,” Feng Gui says. “Xu and his men are not the only corrupt officials in Shenzhen, and if someone really wants to get rid of the dirt here, almost no high-ranking official could avoid punishment. The higherlevel government and central government knew very clearly, before the ‘anti-corruption storm,’ who should be punished and who should be protected. It is all about politics.” Wang Hua, a county-level official in Anhui province, agrees. “The whole system is rotten. I don’t know who can save it. Maybe a violent revolution can,” he says. He also believes that he has to perform corrupt acts sometimes to “save face” and because of “family relationships or friendship.” Wang thinks the Communist Party is part of the problem, but that culture is also a reason. “We emphasize family and friendship too much. I sometimes think perhaps that only revolution can clean this society.” Hong Ming, a professor at Shanghai Normal University, disagrees. “The problem of corruption in China is a problem of the political system, nothing else,” he says. “Under the one-party totalitarian system, no power is checked. Fallen high-ranking officials fell because they lost political fights. Few of them lost political fights because of their corrupt activities.” Hong Ming argues that culture or tradition should not be the scapegoats when people talk about reasons for corruption. “Think about Singapore, Hong Kong or even Taiwan, all of which are Chinese societies and all of which are far less corrupt than mainland China. Why? Because they are democratic and the rule of law is respected.”

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What the future looks like According to the 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index released by Transparency International, of among 180 countries and areas that were surveyed, Singapore was the least corrupt of the Chinese cultures, ranking fourth. Hong Kong ranked No. 12, Taiwan ranked No. 39 and China ranked No. 72. “If China becomes a democratic and multi-party country, I think it will be cleaner,” Hong Ming says. He is frustrated because he thinks the majority of people don’t realize this and that many foolishly still place their hope in the decisions of the central government and the party. Yang You, a Beijing-based scholar, says China will take a long time to become a democratic country, but he thinks the party-controlled government can do something now if it CHINA

really wants to eradicate corruption. First, the government should let nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have more room to operate. Second, the Communist Party should not restrain the media so tightly. But there is no sign that the government is interested in taking such steps. In July 2009, Gongmeng (Open Constitution Initiative), an inﬂuential human rights NGO in Beijing, was investigated for “tax evasion” and its head, Xu Zhiyong, was detained by the police. “The action against this prominent young man means that the Communist Party is not going to lose any rights,” Yang says. “It still wants to control everything.” As for the media, Guangzhou-based journalist Deng Xin says, “The control is tighter and tighter in recent years.” “Things will deteriorate year by year if the Communist

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Party remains in power,” Yang worries. “Nobody could be optimistic about the future except those who don’t know the real situation.” * Xiao Chi An is a journalist based in Guangzhou, China.

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KENYA

Kenya:

Who Will Follow the Law if the Leaders Don’t? By Kepher Otieno

The incessant battle to end corruption in Kenya is far from over. Every day, media headlines report stories about graft. Kenyans point ﬁngers at the Grand Coalition government, which, they say, tolerates vice. The war against corruption seems to be slipping out of the hands of those who are ﬁghting it. The main anti-corruption crusaders see no light at the end of the tunnel. “The leaders have simply failed. They can’t

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The Global Integrity Index: How effective are Kenya’s anti-corruption safeguards? OVERALL RATING

Weak (69 out of 100 +/-0.51) CATEGORY RATINGS

1) Civil Society, Public Information & Media — Weak (61) 2) Elections — Weak (61) 3) Government Accountability — Very Weak (54) 4) Administration & Civil Service — Moderate (77) 5) Oversight & Regulation — Moderate (79) 6) Anti-Corruption & Rule of Law — Strong (81)

(Scores range from 0 to 100)

Positive steps toward real governance reform in Kenya following the postelection violence in 2007 have been slow to come. The overall health of the country’s transparency and accountability institutions and mechanisms remains poor. In the area of political ﬁnancing, there are no limitations on individual and corporate donations to political candidates, and there is no agency responsible for monitoring such donations. Procedures for selecting key members of the judiciary are at the discretion of the president with little input from the public or professional bodies.

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stop stealing themselves,” said Mwalimu Mati, who heads the Mars Group, an anti-graft watchdog group in Kenya. Many Kenyans now fear that their country may go into economic receivership. They say that the country’s executive branch has been making unilateral decisions in violation of Kenyan laws, even though it is this very branch that claims to be ﬁghting fraud. After a disputed 2007 presidential election, which saw an outbreak of riots and bloodshed, President Mwai Kibaki and Prime Minister Raila Odinga formed a unity government to end the worst civil unrest since Kenya achieved independence in 1963. Even though it was able to end the violence, which killed at least 1,300 people and displaced 300,000 others, the coalition government has done little KENYA

since then to bring those accused of corruption to justice. The government has failed to push forward with political reforms or ease worsening economic hardships suffered by Kenya’s citizens, analysts say. One recent example of a controversial action was the reappointment by President Kibaki of anti-corruption director Justice Aaron Ringera to be director of the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC). In addition, one of Ringera’s assistants, Fatuma Sichale, was to serve as assistant director of Legal Services while another, Smokin Wanjala, was to serve as head of Preventive Services at the Integrity House. The president’s pronouncement of Ringera’s reappointment sparked a great public outcry. Eventually, Ringera, Sichale and Wanjala resigned after public and parliamentary pressure.

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Who will follow the law if the leaders don’t? Ordinary Kenyans now wonder what viable options or solutions remain to salvage the country from past economic turmoil if their own leaders don’t follow the laws. Many of them feel that the executive branch is responsible for ensuring the proper management of the country while following the country’s laws. Yet, the leaders actually do just the opposite, says Kaleb Onyango, a Kenyan trader. He is not the only one who feels this way. Ayub Hassan, a taxi operator in Nairobi, echoed similar concerns: “Who will follow the law if the executive cannot uphold it?”

What makes ordinary Kenyans feel this way? For example, the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act of 2003 clearly speciﬁed a string of procedures for appointing the head of the country’s anti-corruption commission and its civil servants. The act gives an advisory board, not the president, the power to recommend a commission director, said Aggrey Mwamu, vice chairman of the Law Society of Kenya (LSK). Nominees must be approved by Parliament. Only after that part of the process does the president become involved. “The law says that the president is supposed to make the ofﬁcial announcement of KACC directors only after this rigorous process,” Mwamu explained. Therefore, by reappointing Ringera and his team, President Kibaki did not follow the law. Instead, he began taking steps toward leadership with impunity and showed no sense of regret for his decision, Mwamu said.

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In response, Parliament exercised its autonomy. House Speaker Kenneth Marende rejected the reappointments and declared the process to be deeply flawed. Dr. George Ojwang, a political scientist, argues that this tough and credible decision resonated well with the majority of Kenyans who had been angrily accusing the government of exercising autocratic rule. They were furious about Ringera’s team, accusing them of doing very little actual work during their time of service on the anti-corruption commission. Ringera was the highest paid civil servant in Kenya, earning even more than the country’s president. But many wonder if he actually did any work to earn his salary, considering that so little was accomplished during his five years in office. Ringera defended the lack of actions by the commission KENYA

by claiming that he does not have the power to prosecute those individuals accused of corruption and saying that he managed to send over 500 corruption cases — involving ministers, members of Parlament and permanent secretaries — for prosecution to the attorney general’s ofﬁce.

Corruption in all areas The highlights of the coalition government’s ﬁrst year in power have included a succession of corruption scandals. These scandals have led the government into a quagmire that pits the president and prime minister against each other. Parliament has played a role at the center of these scandals. In its bid to exercise its oversight mandate, it has instituted censure motions against two cabinet ministers who have been implicated in graft.

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While the long-serving Attorney General Amos Wako blames the general delay in most prosecutions in the country on discrepancies in the law, Kenyans respond that Wako has failed in his role as well. “[Wako] should honorably resign to pave the way for reforms in the central government,” said John Olago Aluoch, Minister of Parliament (MP) for Kisumu Town West. MPs John Mbadi, Jakoyo Midiwo and John Pesa, who have been ardent crusaders for reforms, echoed similar sentiments. “While Wako has served for decades, no major public figure who has been indicted for graft has ever been arraigned in court. This demonstrates the level of incompetence in our judicial system,” MP Mbadi said. For the MPs, the only legitimate way to reverse poor governance in Kenya is to overhaul the constitution. All other efforts are secondary. Kenya’s judicial branch is also not immune from charges of corruption. Recently, the Law Society of Kenya (LSK) petitioned the president to set up a tribunal to investigate a chief justice, alleging he was “inaccessible” and failed to implement recommendations by various commissions of enquiry to reform the judiciary. But the president stood by the justice, said Benson Amollo, a law student. “This confirms how the appointing authority abuses its constitutional powers,” Amollo said. “A country can’t afford to have a bench be so incompetent and complicit in defiance of justice and fairness.”

A mistrust of institutions An opinion poll on national corruption recently released by Transparency International-Kenya (TI-Kenya)

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indicates that about eight of every 10 Kenyans believe that although Kibaki and Raila have the power and ability, they lack the will to tackle the country’s corruption problem. “The entire state has been captured to a certain extent by corrupt interests. Nearly every institution of governance and service delivery is working in the interest of a small group of people who proﬁt from it,” said Job Ogonda, executive director of TI-Kenya. The poll also reveals that the abuse of executive power is not the only issue that Kenyans are concerned about. In fact, Parliament ranks high in the public’s estimation as an institution that has contributed the most to the failure of the war against graft. Respondents ranked the following public institutions as against corruption: Parliament (25.6 percent), the judiciary (24.5 percent), the executive (17.9 percent), the Constitution (there is a structural problem related to discrepancies that allow room for corruption) (14.8 percent) and the KACC (13.4 percent). Asked which actions they want taken against corruption, 51 percent of respondents said they want more prosecution of individuals who are suspected of corruption, while 32 percent wanted new elections. About 11 percent called for a cabinet reshufﬂe, while 6 percent wanted mass action (boycotting work and demonstrating in the streets to stress a point of dissatisfaction with the country’s administration or wrongdoings). TI-Kenya is urging the government to issue a constitutional exemption that allows for independent oversight of key government institutions that would facilitate transpar-

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the ones that are most responsible for the failure of the war

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ency and accountability, as outlined in the coalition’s Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Monitoring Project.

A chance for change While many questions remain on the future of Kenya’s fight against corruption, some actions are being taken now. Although public institutions don’t measure up to citizens’ expectations, according to Owigo Olang, former assistant to the constitutional affairs minister, crusaders for change will eventually give voice to Kenyans’ desire for strong action against corruption. “I am glad that the Shadow People’s government (a program by the civil society organization Kenyans for Justice and Development created to closely follow up on every branch of the executive and the Parliament) has emerged and intends to act as an opposition to the Grand Coalition government,” he said. Three cases are already under way in the country’s highest court. These include a petition that challenges the constitutionality of the parliamentary service commission; a petition that challenges President Kibaki’s actions relating to the reappointment of Justice Ringera; and a petition that was filed against Kingori Mwangi, a Western Provincial Police Officer (PPO), for killing and maiming innocent citizens during the 2007 post-election violence. Mwalimu Mati, of the Mars Group, claimed that Kenyans’ disgust with their government has peaked to dangerous levels. “There is a revolutionary feeling among the public,” he says. “Now it is no longer a tribal issue. People

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are starting to talk in class terms ... I am hearing people say that they want to have a ‘barefoot president.’ Anyone but the one they have now.” The pressures that are now building are especially dangerous given the lean economic times. And citizens are taking notice. “The government is broke. Right now, the cost of living has soared due to the post-election upheavals, and the state is showing little commitment to reverse the trend. It’s terrible,” said Jane Anyango, a 68-year-old vendor of vegetables at the Kibuye market in Kisumu. Analysts say that the global recession is hitting Kenya on the international front. Foreign credit is harder to get, and donors are increasingly reluctant to give budget support — or even famine relief — with so many signs of corruption. KENYA

The situation is exacerbated by the cost of a bloated cabinet and the negative economic impact caused by last year’s violence. Citizens and businesses paid less tax, as many segments of the economy were not functioning. Mati says one way that might help would be to hold a new election before the scheduled 2012 election. Mati urged post-election crisis mediator and former U.N. Secretary General Koﬁ Annan to pressure the coalition government into taking that route. “Nobody trusts our government with money or grain anymore,” Mati said. When U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Kenya recently, she said the solution lies with the country. Kenya, Clinton said, must change by implementing important reforms. Previous experts have said the same thing, but little in the way of action is assured.

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* Kepher Otieno is a senior investigative reporter with The Standard Media Group in Kenya and a media consultant. He also is the coordinator of the African Journalistâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Disaster Risks Network in Kenya and the Nyanza Chapter Chairman of African Journalists Health Network.

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Indonesia:

The Gecko vs. the Crocodile By Andreas Harsono

When Antasari Azhar, a senior government prosecutor, was applying to be one of ﬁve commissioners of Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK — Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi), he lobbied a number of politicians. In December 2007, Azhar ﬁnally won not only the seat, but he also secured the most votes in the House of Representatives to be the KPK chairman. His selection as chairman, however, raised some eyebrows. Azhar was an “old guard” prosecutor among Indo-

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The Global Integrity Index: How effective are Indonesia’s anti-corruption safeguards? OVERALL RATING

Moderate (74 out of 100 +/-4.15) CATEGORY RATINGS

1) Civil Society, Public Information & Media — Weak (60) 2) Elections — Moderate (73) 3) Government Accountability — Weak (68) 4) Administration & Civil Service — Strong (80) 5) Oversight & Regulation — Strong (84) 6) Anti-Corruption & Rule of Law — Moderate (77)

(Scores range from 0 to 100)

Indonesia’s overall performance on key dimensions of anti-corruption and good governance remains similar to last year. The anti-corruption agency, ombudsman, and audit agency earned strong to very strong ratings. The voting and tax systems are relatively effective, while a new (and potentially important) public access to information law will be implemented in 2010. Nevertheless, there are areas of growing concern and weakness.

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nesia’s successful prosecutors, and was, for the most part, perceived as a corrupt person by the population. Activists said his selection might undermine the KPK’s credibility. When Azhar was the province’s chief prosecutor, he failed to implement jail sentences against 35 West Sumatra councilors whom the Supreme Court had found guilty of corruption charges. Azhar also was blamed for not imprisoning former President Soeharto’s son, Hutomo Mandala Putra, on time, allowing Putra to go into hiding. Azhar firmly denied the allegations. Interestingly, in the first year of his chairmanship, the KPK made some big-time arrests and convictions, including the Attorney General Office Senior Prosecutor Urip Tri INDONESIA

Gunawan, politically connected businesswoman Artalyta Suryani, the former central banker Burhanuddin Abdullah and several lawmakers.

The most popular man in Indonesia Azhar soon gained wide publicity. He sang with Slank, one of Indonesia’s most popular rock bands. He traded jokes with comedian Thukul in a late-night television show. He dominated the KPK’s news conferences, winning the title of “anti-corruption tsar.” Jimly Asshiddiqie, then-chairman of the Constitutional Court — another powerful institution established after the fall of Soeharto in 1998 — once introduced Azhar as “the most popular man” in Indonesia. But it did not last long. In May 2009, the Jakarta police suddenly arrested Azhar, declaring that he was involved in the gang-style murder of businessman Nasruddin Zulkar-

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nain near a golf course in a Jakarta suburb on March 14, 2009. Azhar was allegedly involved in a love affair with Zulkarnain’s mistress, 22-year-old Rani Julianti, who used to be a caddy at the golf course. According to the police, Zulkarnain used the affair to blackmail Azhar. When negotiations failed, Azhar contacted several hit men to kill Zulkarnain. Police also arrested a media publisher and a police inspector who helped recruit the hit men. Both are Azhar’s close friends. Azhar, who is now facing trial, has repeatedly denied the allegations and contends that they are product of a conspiracy against him. But KPK witnesses admitted that Azhar had ordered the KPK to tap Zulkarnain’s telephone. Outside the KPK ofﬁces, Azhar also met with witnesses of cases his ofﬁce was investigating. He also met with a corruption suspect, businessman Anggoro Widjaja, without the prior knowledge of other KPK commissioners. Bibit Samad Rianto, another KPK commissioner, told Tempo magazine that Azhar had actually helped weaken the KPK. “We only knew later that he had met Anggoro Widjaja,” said Rianto. “He also recorded his conversation with Anggoro in Singapore. Why didn’t he discuss it with other KPK commissioners? Anggoro reportedly feared being killed. Why doesn’t he talk openly?”

Impact of Azhar’s arrest Azhar’s arrest drastically changed the public opinion. It was a huge blow to the KPK. It created the impression that

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the KPK is “doing business as usual,” and it’s no different than other Indonesian law enforcement institutions: the police, the prosecutors, the judges and the prison guards. In 2002, the House of Representatives passed the KPK Law, creating a legal basis for the establishment of the powerful anti-corruption body. Its duty is to confront the endemic corruption in Indonesia, a legacy of President Soeharto’s 33-year-long kleptocracy. The anti-corruption body is independent and led by five commissioners. Its most effective tool is the authority to tap telephones without a court permit. Since the start of operations in late 2003 until Azhar’s arrest in May 2009, the KPK investigated, prosecuted and achieved a 100-percent procurement and budget. Naturally, it also created enemies within the other law enforcement offices, as well as among Jakarta’s politicians. Azhar’s arrest opened up an opportunity to attack the KPK and Susno Duadji, an Indonesian police chief detective, who was one of the men aware of that opportunity. Angry that the KPK tapped his phone while investigating Widjaja’s corruption case, the media reported that Duadji said in June 2009 that the KPK is comparable to a gecko fighting a crocodile, the latter being the police. “How could a gecko win? It is illogical!” Duadji managed to secure a hand-written testimony from Azhar accusing two other KPK commissioners, Rianto and Chandra Hamzah, to have extorted money from Widjaja. Azhar wrote that he had recommended Widjaja use

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conviction rate in 86 corruption cases related to government

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middlemen to hand over 3.5 billion rupiah (US$369,588) to the two commissioners and their subordinates. The two men denied the charges and said they were being framed to weaken the KPK. The police began to question Rianto and Hamzah in July 2009. Unexpectedly, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono issued a decree, temporarily dismissing Rianto and Hamzah and asking a presidential team to recommend new commissioners. His decision angered anti-corruption activists, like those of the Indonesian Corruption Watch and Transparency International. They suspected there was a conspiracy to weaken the KPK. In September, the police arrested Rianto and Hamzah on charges of extortion and bribery. Their arrest, unlike Azhar’s, triggered a huge protest in Jakarta and some other major cities. There was a support campaign on Facebook with one million supporters. Artists painted gecko-versuscrocodile grafﬁti on the walls, including the famous “Saya Cicak” or “I Gecko” grafﬁti at the entrance of the House of Representatives’ complex. Famous Indonesian singer Slank organized a street concert to support Rianto and Hamzah, while the accused men challenged the presidential decree in the Constitutional Court.

A need for reform On Nov. 2, 2009, President Yudhoyono established a fact-ﬁnding team to look into the allegations about extortion against Widjaja. The following day, during a hearing at the Constitutional Court, tapes were played of bugged

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phone conversations. The tapes centered on Anggodo Widjaja, the brother of Anggoro, who talked with his lawyers as well as prosecutors and police officers. The tapes created the impression that a conspiracy was made to undermine the KPK. Duadji’s name was mentioned repeatedly. The four-hour tape recording was broadcasted live by some TV and radio stations. It created a public uproar. Rianto and Hamzah were released later that day. Adnan Buyung Nasution, a veteran lawyer and a presidential advisor, led the fact-finding team to work for two weeks in November. The team interviewed KPK commissioners, detective Duadji and attorney general office prosecutors, among others. Nasution concluded that it was a to be pursued in a court, recommending that President Yudhoyono dismiss the case. But he also said that the KPK is no angel and advised the president to reform Indonesia’s law enforcement agencies. Yudhoyono responded in late November 2009. He ordered the police and the prosecutors to settle the case out of court, but did not call for the case to be dropped. He also said there was need for reforms within the police, the attorney general office and the KPK. It was clear that the president wanted the two men to be released and the case to be stopped. While the case of Rianto and Hamzah does not directly relate to the murder case involving Azhar, both episodes show that it is simply not easy, if not extremely difficult, for Indonesia, one of the world’s most corrupt countries, to deal with its chronic corruption. Yudhoyono, Nasution, Duadji,

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legally complex case, and that the KPK case lacked evidence

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the KPK men, legislators, prosecutors, judges and activists — all of them say they want to fight corruption. But it is much easier said than done. In the KPK case shown, it is not easy to find the truth about who is doing what. In early December 2009, the Attorney General’s Office officially dropped the case against Rianto and Hamzah, and the two men are to return to their KPK jobs. As of January 2010, the trial against Azar was still ongoing. It was a tough campaign for the KPK, and now fewer candidates apply for KPK jobs. As one KPK staff member quipped, “Now only the toughest ones will work here.” * Andreas Harsono is a consultant for Human Rights Watch on Indonesia and a former Nieman Fellow at Harvard University. He helped set up Jakarta’s Alliance of Independent Journalists, the Institute for the Studies on Free Flow of Information and the Bangkok-based Southeast Asia Press Alliance.

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RWANDA

Rwanda:

A Blow to the “Untouchable Syndrome” By Bugingo Silver Janvier Karekezi, 53, is a former director of pensions at the National Social Security Fund in Rwanda. “I’m losing trust in the justice system here,” he laments. “My employment contract was illegally terminated in early 2006. The employer owed me two months’ wages. I challenged them in courts of law and won the case at the ﬁrst instance.” “The respondents appealed the decision to the high court, which reversed the decision in favor of the employer on ﬂimsy procedural grounds. I have no doubt whatsoever that the judge was bribed,” Karekezi emphasized.

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The Global Integrity Index: How effective are Rwanda’s anti-corruption safeguards? OVERALL RATING

Moderate (71 out of 100 +/-6.15) CATEGORY RATINGS

1) Civil Society, Public Information & Media — Weak (63) 2) Elections — Very Weak (57) 3) Government Accountability — Very Weak (56) 4) Administration & Civil Service — Strong (80) 5) Oversight & Regulation — Strong (88) 6) Anti-Corruption & Rule of Law — Strong (81)

(Scores range from 0 to 100)

Foreign investment in post-genocide Rwanda has helped to create strong oversight institutions such as an effective ombudsman and auditor general. In 2008, the ombudsman took a first step toward addressing the lack of conflicts of interest regulations for elected officials by proposing a code of ethics for the judicial branch, which has been widely perceived as Rwanda’s most corrupt government institution. Meanwhile, the Kagame administration remains focused on building the country’s infrastructure and business climate to attract high levels of foreign aid and direct investment.

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Jean Claude Karenzi, a former employee at the Rwanda Privatization Secretariat, expresses a similar frustration. “I was involved in a motor accident and sustained a serious injury while on duty. Following the accident, I was sent on unpaid sick leave. Two months later, after I recovered, I repeatedly sought restitution for lost wages, but my efforts were in vain. As a last resort, I ﬁled a lawsuit in March 2007.” “Despite all the documentary evidence, including a valid contract, a letter granting my sick leave and accompanying medical documents, the court ruled in favor of my employer. I was shocked. I appealed the decision in March of this year (2009), but the court hearing is not scheduled to take place until March of next year. It’s really unfair RWANDA

because justice delayed is justice denied,” he said. “The traffic rules and regulations in this country are unrealistic,” says Innocent Kaganga, a taxi driver in Nyagatare, in Rwanda’s eastern province. “The slightest error, real or imaginary, can result in a huge fine. Can you imagine? For example, a charge of excessive speed — whether real or imaginary — by traffic police can result in a fine of 150,000 Rwanda francs (US$264).” “Here in the countryside, it can take over three weeks to raise that amount of money. On the other hand, if you can persuasively plead with the traffic constable on duty, he may accept a token fine of, say, 40,000 francs (US$70). That’s better,” the driver shyly confesses.

2008 annual report on corruption in Rwanda The 2008 Annual Report on corruption, presented to

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the Rwandan Parliament by Chief Ombudsman Tito Rutaremara PhD, exposes the injustices, corruption and related malpractices committed by public officials. The report of the injustice and anti-corruption watchdog revealed that traffic police and the judiciary were the first and second most corrupt public institutions in the country, respectively. Almost half (47 percent) of the petitions made by citizens to the Ombudsman were about unjust decisions made by local government authorities. The report also revealed that 40.2 percent of the valid complaints were related to definitive court decisions that were not enforced — the ombudsman later requested that public court bailiffs execute the decisions without fear or favor. The ombudsman’s report garnered a lot of criticism, especially from the institutional authorities who were implicated. Critics claimed that the report was “unscientific.” In response to these claims, Ombudsman Rutaremara says: “Their arguments are baseless. We asked specialists to conduct a survey about how citizens perceive governmental organizations. This survey only reports their perceptions.” Rutaremara also says that his office lacks the capacity to monitor and expose corruption: The 6-year-old institution has a workforce of only 38 employees who are responsible for investigating all Rwandan institutions. Rutaremara cites a weakness in the law that prevents his office from divulging the names of individuals accused of corruption unless they have been convicted in court. “We have requested that there be a new law that would

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allow us to publicly report current documented cases of corruption,” he adds.

Cases of fraud The 2008 Auditor General Report, presented to parliament in mid-2009, states that public institutions failed to account for more than 6.5 billion Rwanda francs (US$11.5 million). “Public financial management and accounting procedures require that all expenditures be sufficiently supported by valid documents, purchase orders, payment vouchers, third-party receipt acknowledgements. Contrary to the procedures, some of the entities that were audited claimed expenditures that were not supported by verifiable docuRWANDA

ments,” the report states. The report also discloses that some tenders totaling 2.1 billion Rwanda francs (US$3.1 million), were awarded without providing evidence that they had been approved by competent internal tender committees. Evelyn Kamagaju, Auditor General, admits: “There are still a lot of challenges. An assessment of previous audit recommendations shows that signiﬁcant irregularities still persist.” “I believe that enactment of an accounting law will contribute to the establishment of professional norms and standards for the auditing and accounting profession in Rwanda,” she declares. She proposes the establishment of a public accounts committee in the legislature to enhance the committee’s oversight role. Parliament has yet to summon the executive arm to debate the validity of the alleged irregularities (regarding the unveriﬁed

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expenditures) revealed by the Auditor General’s ofﬁce, and to explain what punitive measures are being taken. However, reliable information indicates that most of the alleged offenders are either on trial in the courts or in pretrial detention.

Human rights violations and the “untouchable syndrome” Expressing a similar concern, the National Human Rights Commission 2008 annual report accused public security forces of committing human rights abuses in the form of illegal arrests and detention. The report was presented to parliament in September 2009. “Leaders in a dozen African states have knowingly provided protection to a class of individuals that presumes itself to be above the law,” notes Arthur Asiimwe, a former Reuters correspondent in Kigali. He is an editor and political analyst with The New Times, Rwanda’s only daily newspaper. “This presumption comes because they are close to the President, the ruling political party or strong rankand-ﬁle members of the security forces,” he adds. So it surprised many observers when President Kagame sacked Deputy Ministers of Education Theoneste Mutsindashyaka and Dapherose Gahakwa PhD, among other members of the ruling party, Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF). He also demoted other ministers from key positions in local government and agriculture to what is perceived as “weaker” cabinet portfolios. Other RPF members and former ministers — Patricia Hajabakiga, Angelina Muganza, Sam Nkusi, Patrick Habamenshi and Nshiti Manasseh — had previously been relieved of their duties.

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“The dismissal by President Paul Kagame of those who wield a lot of political clout has demonstrated progress against the existence in African politics of what is called the “untouchable syndrome,” Asiimwe says.

President Kagame’s campaign The president did not mince words on the issue of accountability after he reshuffled his cabinet in August 2009. “Like I have said before, I intend to be and have always been very demanding when it comes to the issue of accountability. I intend to achieve fruitful results,” he said. During a press conference the same month, he warned the national police and judiciary officials to shift their eftheir tarnished image. Kagame emphasized that the findings stated by the Ombudsman’ office and Auditor General’s office reports were not surprising because corruption had already been reported in most of the implicated government departments and agencies. Regarding the high numbers of resignations and recent arrests of district mayors and other local government officials on allegations of embezzlement and abuse of authority, the president said it demonstrates that disgraced officials have failed to take personal responsibility. “I’m not worried. People who embezzle public funds must be held accountable and refund the money they have taken,” he insisted. A countrywide tour by this reporter reveals that more than 20 provincial and district officials and their accom-

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forts from “blaming and ﬁnger-pointing” toward cleaning

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plices in the private sector are currently in jail on embezzlement and tendering scam charges, pending adjudication in the relevant courts. *Bugingo Silver is political editor of the Rwanda News Agency and previously worked for The New Times, Rwandaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s only English daily. He is also a special correspondent for Global Policy.

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SIERRA LEONE

Sierre Leone:

New Broom, Same Old Dirt By Charlie J. Hughes

In his presidential inauguration speech in September 2007, Ernest Koroma pledged “zero tolerance” toward corruption in Sierra Leone. President Koroma’s appointment of a relatively young, unblemished international career lawyer as the new boss of the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) was largely welcomed as a ﬁne start. While leading the All People’s Congress (APC) party in opposition, Koroma used every opportunity to lambaste corruption in the then-ruling Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) government. Whether it has been perceived or real, corruption has been one recurrent explanation as to why the SLPP lost the 2007 general elections. (The United Kingdom’s

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The Global Integrity Index: How effective are Sierra Leone’s anti-corruption safeguards? OVERALL RATING

Moderate (69 out of 100 +/-0.82) CATEGORY RATINGS

1) Civil Society, Public Information & Media — Weak (64) 2) Elections — Weak (64) 3) Government Accountability — Very Weak (58) 4) Administration & Civil Service — Moderate (77) 5) Oversight & Regulation — Moderate (73) 6) Anti-Corruption & Rule of Law — Moderate (78)

(Scores range from 0 to 100)

Sierra Leone has demonstrated modest improvement in its overall governance and anti-corruption performance during the past year. Notably, strengthened whistle-blower protection laws now protect private sector employees from recrimination, and a recently established internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption is now in place within the civil service. In addition, new legal measures have been implemented to protect the anti-corruption agency from political inﬂuence. These promising developments, however, are tempered by ongoing and deep-seated problems with accountability and transparency across all levels of government.

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Department for International Development had discontinued support to the ACC at the end of 2006, saying that the SLPPled government was not serious about fighting corruption.) Since the new government took power, certain things have indeed changed in the fight against corruption. One of the first acts of the ACC has been to secure stronger powers for itself. In a new anti-corruption law enacted in 2008, the ACC now shares powers with the attorney general and minister of justice to directly prosecute corruption cases. Several times the media suggested that the attorney general and minister of justice sometimes misused their powers to prosecute by selectively refusing to prosecute certain corruption cases for political reasons. The Act has also and has given more powers to the ACC to initiate criminal investigations of corruption cases. A local newspaper says, “No one accuses the Anti-Corruption Commission of being a toothless bulldog any longer.”

The national anti-corruption strategy In the new National Anti-Corruption Strategy campaign, the ACC is seeking to reinforce procedures in government offices in order to eliminate loopholes that facilitate corruption. In addition, all employees in the public service sector are now required to annually declare their assets. Before now, only the president, cabinet ministers, heads of public corporations and other categories of high-ranking officials were required to declare assets and only at the time they took office. Blowing the whistle on corruption

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increased the number of corrupt offences from nine to 29

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is nowadays considered to be more than simply a patriotic act (as the ACC used to implore Sierra Leoneans). The ACC now declares that whistle-blowers will be rewarded with 10 percent of the proceeds that are recovered from corruption cases that they report. In an interview for this article, the press secretary to the president says that results in stopping corruption by using these new approaches have already become evident in the prosecutions of some “big fish.” For example, in February 2009, the ACC announced the prosecution of a former establishment secretary, a former permanent secretary, and a magistrate on charges of misappropriation of public funds. A month later, the chief clerk of immigration was found guilty on two counts of soliciting and accepting the sum of 347,700 Sierra Leones (US$100) to help a woman secure a Sierra Leone passport. Among the high-profile cases have been the conviction of both the head and the accountant of the government-owned Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service (SLBS). Both were found guilty by the High Court of misappropriating the sum of 77,189,400 SLL (US$22,200), money that was paid by the British Broadcasting Service for the rent of facilities that are owned by the SLBS. Perhaps two of the biggest corruption stories have been the arrest of a judge of the High Court in his chambers and the conviction of Sierra Leone’s first ombudsman in June 2009. The judge was arrested in his chambers while allegedly accepting a bribe from a litigant in a matter before him. The 65-year-old former ombudsman was found guilty of 164 out of 168 counts of misappropriation of public funds

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while he was serving in office (2000 to 2007). In discussing the conviction of these officials, the deputy leader of the opposition SLPP says that these cases are not extraordinary. “Ministers, judges, and civil servants were all prosecuted by the ACC during our time in office,” she said. Civil society leaders largely agree with the assessment that the most extraordinary events are yet to happen. “These offices and the crimes are quite familiar to Sierra Leoneans,” Valnora Edwin of the Campaign for Good Governance says. “Corruption as we have known it for the past years is still here,” adds the head of the National Accountability Group.

Paying for “Free” Services people that bail is free. Nevertheless, human rights groups continue to draw attention to the fact that people still pay illegal fees every day to court officials to secure bail. I myself learned recently that it is a common practice in the Magistrates Court for clerks and police prosecutors to encourage a defendant in minor cases to plead guilty at the start of their trial. One lawyer told me that the defendant can then negotiate and secure a lighter punishment by illegally paying a fee to the court officials. In cases of corruption at government hospitals, nurses’ handbags are used as illegal pharmacies from where prescription drugs are sold to patients. An extra payment to officials at relevant government departments will lead to faster processing of an application for various services including passports, drivers’ licenses, property title registrations or utilities.

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In Sierra Leonean courtrooms there are posters that remind

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People have little option but to pay incentives to public officials in order to secure faster processing of an application for most public services. This is because there is no functioning complaint and redress mechanism to discourage officials from delaying or refusing to process an application for a public service without being paid a bribe. As we wait to see how the new government attacks corruption, there may be some reduction of incidents of public officials cheating the ordinary man. The World Bank’s Doing Business Report 2009 has showed progress regarding drastic cuts in the time and costs that are required for starting a business in Sierra Leone. This news strongly indicates that such obstacles as having to bribe officials when starting a business also have been seriously reduced.

Small victories, but big problems remain Sadly, the reduction of illegal payments that people have to make when they start a business is only a small portion of the corruption that the new government has to ﬁght. A young man to whom I provided ﬁnancial help with his studies reminded me of the magnitude of the problems that confront Sierra Leoneans. Although he is now looking for a job, when he hears about an advertisement for an opening that matches his credentials, he refuses to take it seriously. As he said recently, “When did you last get a job in this country by responding to a job advertisement in a newspaper?” I realized then how right he was. The truth is that even I have never taken seriously any advertisements for jobs that match my own credentials! Sierra Leoneans seem to be

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resigned to the fact that media advertisements for job openings exist only to meet ofďŹ cial audit requirements. The reality is that the jobs have already been awarded long before the advertisements even appear in public. * Charlie J. Hughes is a governance and media consultant based in Freetown, Sierra Leone. He has authored chapters in a number of publications including the chapter on Sierra Leone in the Encyclopedia of Global Perspectives on the United States and is co-author of Go Beyond First Aid: Democracy Assistance and the Challenges of Institution-Building in Post-conďŹ&#x201A;ict Sierra Leone. In 2002, he was a Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow at the National SIERRA LEONE

Endowment for Democracy, in the United States.

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TRINIDAD & TOBAGO

Trinidad & Tobago:

Missing Mandates and Misleading Reports By Kris Rampersad

John Uff is chairman of the beleaguered public Commission of Enquiry (COE), a commission created by the government to investigate corruption in Trinidad and Tobago’s construction sector and the state-owned Urban Development Corporation (UDeCOTT). One day, he said he wonders how the work of that Commission might answer potential questions on the mind of any man “on an omnibus to (the city of) Laventille.” Jocularly, UDeCOTT’s Counsel Andrew Goddard responded: “I am told there isn’t an omnibus up to Laventille!”

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Among the COE’s investigations were concerns about the lockout from the multi-million Government Plaza project, alleged to have delayed construction and increased the foundation costs of a stadium being erected on “sapotay clay” (soil that swells and shrinks as it gets wet or dry, and can cause buildings to fall down) in Central Trinidad. Another unsolved mystery is why the home fax number of UDeCOTT Chairman Calder Hart is printed on the official letterhead of successful bidder Sunway Construction Caribbean Ltd. (previously CH Development and Construction Ltd.). The name Laventille again provokes laughter when Uff asks the obvious question and wonders if the premature termination of a housing project there, also under COE investigation, might have been caused by the inability to hire laborers because of its “remote” location. The response: it’s well known that Laventille location, “right outside” Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago’s capital, makes it difficult to find people willing to work there and much less live there, as any pre-construction risk assessment would show. Laventille, a town that has been immortalized as the birthplace of the steel pan musical instrument, is gang-ridden. It is also the historical base of the ruling People’s National Movement (PNM) and, in a country where politics is polarized by ethnic differences, it is the symbolic counterpoint to the city of Caroni in Central Trinidad (which is the support base of the opposition United National Congress, UNC).

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Manifold facets of corruption Laventille, like Caroni, is an emblem of the symptoms and causes of corruption in Trinidad and Tobago (T&T) and could be the focus of many corruption probes. The social consequences of corruption in a country of 1.3 million people, an eight percent growth rate and a per capita GDP of US$24,000 is its inability to provide essential services to improve the lives of its youth. Many of Laventille’s young people are more likely than not to have their lives violently ended before age 30. Sadly, this COE is unlikely to matter much to John Uff’s symbolic “man from Laventille”, or to the farmer lookof them would quickly dismiss the COE investigation as irrelevant or wasteful and would likely react the same way to previous Commissions of Enquiry, which reports have yet to be made public. They would know that, even though this enquiry is receiving full coverage with televised live hearings and accessible online transcripts, COEs fail to ﬁnd solutions to minimize the effects of the political forces that exploit the fundamental ﬂaws in the democratic system and provide T&T with a climate ripe for corruption. Corruption in T&T is not grey; in fact, it is extremely colorful, as kaleidoscopic as T&T’s renowned carnival. Corruption thrives in this small country with its bountiful energy resources. T&T’s environment allows nepotism, “constitutional dictatorship” and political interference that violate the constitutional separation of powers, not only

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ing at the sapotay soil on which the stadium is built. Both

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among the executive, legislative and judiciary branches, but also among the private sector and the media. Even if the current administration appears to respond positively to calls for transparency in government procurement and other areas by creating a fully publicized COE, the reality is that it counts on the unwavering support of voters primarily motivated by their ethnicity. It also knows the opposition is fragmented by inﬁghting, whistle-blowers often motivated by thwarted political ambitions, and the appropriation of powers through the withholding of appointments to key government oversight posts is effective.

Missing mandates Prime Minister Patrick Manning’s eagerness to hold this COE seemed related to the fact that Keith Rowley, a PNM MP and a rival for the party’s leadership, was allegedly linked to the disappearance of evidence about irregularities in a housing development in Landate. The development was built on lands owned by Keith Rowley’s wife, and there are allegations that $10 million went missing on another housing project in Cleaver Heights while Rowley was minister. However, it is beyond the COE’s mandate to gather evidence of the causes of corruption, such as political interference in the police, the courts and other independent public ofﬁces, and it is not their duty to investigate whether state organizations are guilty of escalating crime rates, discriminating in state appointments, allowing police corruption, censoring the media, and expressing disregard for civil society and court orders.

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Even as the COE investigating Trinidad and Tobago’s construction sector alleged cost overruns, it is not supposed to probe the runaway costs of state-induced inflation. (The rate was 15% at the time of the formation of the COE and was attributed to rapid increases in infrastructure costs and to recurrent state spending maintained despite warnings by experts.) Furthermore, this COE has no mandate to investigate possible corruption regarding issues directly or peripherally associated with the enquiry; for example, resignations, rejections of demands to resign, return to office following an individual’s resignation, and calls for resignations of all major public figures, including the President, Prime Minister, two and the resignation of two of the four COE commissioners as the COE was about to resume its fourth session. As of the end of 2009, the investigation remains in noman’s land. Among other issues still unresolved are queries about how UDeCOTT Chairman, Calder Hart, managed to receive five salaries and the award of a contract to Sunway Construction Caribbean Limited, a company with whose principals Hart’s wife, Sherri Lee Hart, is related.

Misleading reports As UDeCOTT continues its public work with the vocal support of the prime minister —even while the COE concerning its activities was in session—, it is unlikely that issues such as the government’s failure to ﬁll vacancies in its oversight institutions would be reﬂected in the COE report and may never surface at all.

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attorney generals, two successive Integrity Commissions,

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This would not be unusual, as T&T routinely submits opaque performance reports to international organizations such as the Organization of American States’ Committee of Experts of the Mechanism for Follow-up on the Implementation of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption (OAS and MESICIC, respectively). For instance, in its latest report to MESICIC, T&T checks off most of the relevant boxes regarding questions about its existing anti-corruption mechanisms; but when it comes to assessments of actual performance in this area, it invariably and obliquely responds: “No data is available at this time.” It is MESICIC policy to promote properly resourced, equipped and functioning oversight mechanisms; decentralization and citizen participation in decision making; and laws that protect whistle-blowers as instruments to strengthen democracy. Nevertheless, as T&T was hosting 33 continent leaders at the OAS Summit in 2009, several contradictory realities coexisted in the country. There was no sitting Integrity Commission. • More than seven key posts demanded by the T&T Constitution remained vacant. • An amendment to the Integrity in Public Life Act that implicitly discourages whistle blowing was being piloted through parliament. • Local government elections were postponed for a third consecutive year as the local government minister — the prime minister’s wife — pushed legislation to effectively shift more authority to the central government.

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• The prime minister championed a new draft constitution which threatens to further contain the democratic spread of power and subsume oversight commissions’ functions to the Attorney General (AG). • Media and labor sectors faced the threat of legislation that would limit free expression. As T&T prepared to host 53 states at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in 2009, where removing corruption through decentralization, citizen participation, transparency and accountability are high on its democratic agenda, the following developments took place: • T&T citizens await an accounting of how the ready overspent the US$503 million budget for both summits by five million on the OAS Summit alone. • Local government elections have been postponed for a fourth consecutive year; • Appointments to the Integrity Commission and the constitutionally established bodies remain vacant; • The prime minister has called for the offices of the Chief Justice and others to be brought under more direct political control of the AG’s office, while proposing changes to the country’s Constitution so that the task of hiring, firing and disciplining are removed from the constitutionally independent police, Teaching Public Service Commission and other government ministries. Local and international agencies tend to focus their anti-corruption efforts on audits, procurement policies, legislation, treaties, conventions, oversight mechanisms such as

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CHOGM is being funded, as the government al-

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COEs and transparency organizations. The T&T experience proves that the absence of a culture of integrity and effective checks on power seem to negate these efforts. Indeed, if COEs were the answer to holding decision makers accountable, the sitting Prime Minister (a geologist himself) would have already learned — from the costly case of an industrial plant built on unstable soil of the Pitch Lake, two decades ago — that poor geological estimates could also be poor political ones. There would also be something to learn for the still-sitting opposition leader, a former prime minister charged with corruption following another COE, and voters in Lavendille and Caroni would realize that voting for ethnic reasons doesn’t necessarily mean voting to ﬁght corruption. * Kris Rampersad is a media, cultural and literary consultant living in Trinidad and Tobago. She researches, writers and designs creative products for print, video and electronic media as well as communications strategy, policy critique, reports, presentations and proposals.

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UKRAINE

Ukraine:

Judges Who Should Take the Defendant’s Seat By Vlad Lavrov

“I meant to give it to the church, but I didn’t have enough time to do it.” These were the now legendary words of Ihor Zvarych, head of the Lviv Administrative Appellate Court, on December 2008, when the Security Service of Ukraine seized almost 10 million hryvnas (US$1.25 million) from his ofﬁce. “People would come and wish good luck at the new ofﬁce building by giving coins and throwing money to the

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The Global Integrity Index: How effective are Ukraine’s anti-corruption safeguards? OVERALL RATING

Very Weak (58 out of 100 +/-1.64) CATEGORY RATINGS

1) Civil Society, Public Information & Media — Moderate (78) 2) Elections — Weak (64) 3) Government Accountability — Very Weak (46) 4) Administration & Civil Service — Very Weak (28) 5) Oversight & Regulation — Moderate (70) 6) Anti-Corruption & Rule of Law — Weak (61)

(Scores range from 0 to 100)

Ukraine continues to struggle to live up to the democratic promises of the 2004 Orange Revolution. The effectiveness of the anti-corruption agency has deteriorated, while appointments to the agency continue to be heavily politicized. The national judiciary also finds its independence eroding, with the judiciary “under constant threat from individual high-ranking public officials and state bodies.” Legal measures to protect whistle-blowers in the public and private sectors are non-existent. Accountability remains very weak across all levels of government, including poorly enforced conflicts of interest regulations for members of the executive, judiciary, and legislature.

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floor … I don’t know exactly how much money was there,” continued Zvarych in his infamous explanation, adding that about 8 million hryvnas (US$1 million) found at his office were “borrowed,” while another 83,000 hryvnas (US$10,400) found in his wallet and pockets were collected and given to him by colleagues “to repair the court’s offices.” Zvarych’s case certainly stands out. According to the deputy general prosecutor of the Ukraine, Renat Kuzmin, in Zvarych’s office, in addition to large amounts of cash, they found evidence of sexual orgies filmed with a surveillance camera. Yet the results of the US Aid and Millennium Challenge Corporation’s recent “Study of Corruption in the Court System of Ukraine” produced no less shocking results. UKRAINE

In that survey, lawyers and prosecutors were asked to give their assessment of how extensive corruption is in the different branches of the Ukrainian court system. Almost 80 percent of the lawyers considered the administrative courts (which deal with cases involving private individuals or companies suing the state or government) corrupt, and 86 percent considered the lowest the commercial and civil courts corrupt as well. Among the prosecutors, the highest scores were for the criminal courts (65 percent considered them corrupt) while the civil courts again qualiﬁed as the dirtiest, with 83 percent of the prosecutors characterizing them as corrupt.

Court decisions and questions of bribery Well-known Ukrainian lawyer Tetyana Montyan puts it in simple terms: “We have as many corrupted judges as stray

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dogs.” From her experience, being appointed as the head or deputy head of commercial or appellate courts in large cities of the Ukraine would require a bribe of several million dollars. “And the money breaks even immediately. It takes just several court cases,” she concludes. Her colleague, Andriy Fedur, agrees, “You can make a phone call to a court, give money and get any kind of court decision that you want.” The fact that even insiders of the legal system view it as corrupt could not possibly have remained unnoticed by regular Ukrainians, as revealed by the same survey. More than 90 percent of the people chose the answer “all corrupt” when referring to judges, the court’s administrative workers, prosecutors, lawyers and court heads. During recent parliamentary hearings by the state on the court system in the Ukraine, the head of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), Valentyn Nalyvaychenko, highlighted Zvarych’s case as one of his agency’s biggest successes in ﬁghting corruption in the courts. According to Nalyvaychenko, a total of eight judges of the Lviv Administrative Court were involved in 37 instances of taking bribes, with a single bribe ranging from several thousands to several hundred thousands of dollars. In total, during the preliminary investigation, over 23.1 million hryvnas (US$2.9 million) were conﬁscated. According to the SBU, as of April 1, 2009, a total of 24 criminal cases against judges were opened. Both the gloomy statistics of the highly negative public perception and the details of the Zvarych case leave little reason for Kateryna Tarasova, head of the Foundation of Assistance to Justice, a Kyiv-based NGO, to be optimistic.

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She insists that this case is an exception, but notes that “exceptions” like that can be found in any law-enforcement branch or governmental power in the Ukraine. “There is not much good that I can say in this situation … This person disgraced himself and his colleagues,” says Tarasova. Yet she adds that it would be a mistake to blame only the judges for all the problems regarding controversial court decisions. Tarasova explains that after reviewing all the complaints on presumably unfair judgments that her agency receives, often the problem is low professionalism by the attorneys, who fail to defend their clients properly, or in the clients themselves, who fail to present their cases clearly.

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Changes needed in the Court system “When a side loses the case, their ﬁrst reaction is that the winner bribed the judge,” asserts Tarasova. But she acknowledges that changes to the way the court functions are necessary, particularly in the way the judges are selected and in their responsibility for unlawful decisions. “Currently, any judge at any stage can avoid responsibility for the decisions that he or she has made,” Tarasova says. She explains that there is no clear law or procedure to decide when a judge can be prosecuted, and the existent legislation is often confusing and complicated. Therefore, in many cases, judges can make opposite rulings and still stay within the limits of law, which leads to subsequent conﬂicts. The appointment of judges, which currently lacks transparency, must be improved, because, in her view, the court system is mainly about human factors.

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“Unfortunately, in our country there is corruption everywhere — in courts, prosecutors’ offices, police and legal firms — therefore, selecting judges should be as strict as possible. No matter what reforms are done to the system, we will not make it automatic as a factory,” she says. Political analyst Dmytro Potekhin thinks that in order to combat corruption in the legal system there needs to be a mechanism that protects whistle-blowers, so that judges, lawyers, prosecutors or regular citizens willing to testify about corruption get the necessary protection, legal assistance, and the possibility to stay anonymous throughout the court hearings. Potekhin notes that due to the lack of such a mechanism, whistle-blowing in the Ukraine is currently non-existent. He claims that a series of successful and highly publicized cases of exposing corruption with information provided by insiders will make corrupt transactions more risky and, as a result, make a fair and transparent judgment perceived as the “cheaper alternative.” Ironically, the infamous Judge Zvarych might become the first whistle blower in the history of the Ukrainian legal system. According to the Segodnya newspaper, quoting sources within the General Prosecutor’s Office that is investigating the case, Zvarych actively named his colleagues who gave and received bribes from him for getting certain potentially lucrative cases. “Zvarych’s case could become the second Nuremberg process, with the number of accused being as high as 20 people,” quotes Segodnya, a member of the investigation brigade.

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* Vlad Lavrov is a business editor at Korrespondent, Ukraine’s leading weekly news magazine and has participated in several international investigative journalism projects, including the award-winning “Tobacco Underground” organized by the International Consortium of Independent Journalism, and other projects of similar relevance by the Bosnian Center for Investigative Journalism and the Danish Association of Investigative Journalism.

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Part III — Weak Institutions, Strong Corruption

“The PLC was using its leverage to achieve a more important goal: the acquittal by the Supreme Court of former President Arnold Aleman (1997-2002), who in 2003 was found guilty of diverting more than US$100 million in public funds.” —Reporter’s Notebook, Nicaragua

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ÂŠ Jam-L

ALGERIA

Algeria:

The Story of a Small Battle in a Big War By Kalkali El-Hadi

In June 2009, the Algerian judiciary conducted a trial on the embezzlement of about 32 billion dinars (US$450 million) from the National Bank of Algeria. The actual amount embezzled is still unknown, but a ďŹ nal court decision in this case describes it as the second largest corruption

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The Global Integrity Index: How effective are Algeria’s anti-corruption safeguards? OVERALL RATING

Very Weak (55 out of 100 +/-5.23) CATEGORY RATINGS

1) Civil Society, Public Information & Media — Very Weak (47) 2) Elections — Weak (60) 3) Government Accountability — Very Weak (54) 4) Administration & Civil Service — Very Weak (53)) 5) Oversight & Regulation — Very Weak (51) 6) Anti-Corruption & Rule of Law — Weak (67)

(Scores range from 0 to 100)

Weak conﬂicts of interest regulations and a lack of citizen access to information in Algeria create a scenario where there is little oversight of government activity. Gift giving is a common practice for those who wish to inﬂuence members of the executive and judicial branches. Legislators are often involved in business projects that leverage their political connections. In addition, asset disclosure requirements go unenforced across all branches of government, and due to partisan appointments in the supreme audit institution, government auditing is rarely completed. Citizens are unable to participate in budget debates and cannot access many key budget documents necessary to monitor public expenditures.

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case in Algeria’s history as an independent country (after the Khalifa case, investigated in 2007). The National Bank trial followed a two-year judicial investigation of the main defendant, Algerian businessman Achour Abdel Rahman, who was tried together with his wife, his brother-in-law and 29 other defendants. (Three of the defendants have fled the country and an international warrant has been issued for their arrest.) The National Bank trial took place under very difficult political conditions, among them the spread of corruption within the administration. Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika waged a war against corruption as a major part of his political agenda during the last electoral campaign. ALGERIA

Corruption in Algeria has grown to frightening and dangerous levels. Amounts from the misappropriation of public funds are alleged to have exceeded 15 billion dinar (US$209 million) for May and June 2009 alone. The funds were allegedly taken not only from banks, social security funds and agricultural cooperatives, but also from Algerian cultural and scientiﬁc institutions.

How it all began The Abdel Rahman case is only one of a series of scandals that have revealed the fragile state of the ﬁnancial regulatory system in the face of what can be called “instructions from the top.” The scandal began in 2005 when the General Directorate of the National Bank of Algeria (NBA) received an anonymous letter. The letter claimed there was illegal conduct

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regarding the handling of bank checks. The allegation led authorities to file charges against a “businessman” known in the casino and gambling world of Monaco as “The Little Prince.” The warrant finally led to Abdel Rahman’s deportation from Morocco to Algeria in 2007. The trial began on June 15, 2009, in Algiers Criminal Court in room No. 5 of the Palace of Justice in a very dramatic atmosphere. It lasted 12 days. More than 40 witnesses testified, in addition to experts in finance, accounting and the inspectors who uncovered the financial gaps in the NBA. At the end, an 83-page referral decision was issued and described the main suspect’s dealings with several agencies of the bank. Abdel Rahman, 44, came from a simple Algerian family. Despite his humble background, in the short time between 2001 and 2005 he built an empire of more than 30 companies. These companies were active in many areas, including food industries, contracting industries and quarry mining. Abdel Rahman started to accumulate his wealth by obtaining a loan from the NBA. Before he even paid off this first loan, he was able to access other loans. He accomplished this with the complicity of managers of some of the NBA’s agencies. His most notable help came from the director of the bank’s agency in Bouzereah, who is currently an international fugitive.

Defense and ambiguities The National Bank claimed in its defense that only one of its agencies was fully responsible for the theft of 32 billion dinar (US$450 million).

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The trial presented conflicting figures regarding the amount of money that was embezzled from the bank, the Bouzereah agency and two other agencies (Cherchel and Colea), which has raised many questions about how much money was actually misappropriated. For example, reports by the security services that conducted the initial investigations estimated that 15 billion dinar (US$209) had been embezzled. The judicial investigation claimed the amount reached 32 billion dinars (US$450 million). This last amount was cited by judicial services and the media, but the report finally adopted by the Judicial Court set the amount at 21 billion dinar (US$287 million). In his own defense, Achour Abdel Rahman questioned report and adopted by the court. He denied responsibility for the large-scale embezzlements, and even claimed that the Algerian National Bank was the one responsible. The defendant also claimed that the charges against him were “well fabricated” and amounted to a form of retaliation. He claimed that the charges were an attempt by some parties (that he refused to name) to cover up a huge financial gap of 40 billion dinar (US$548 million) that was reported in 1990 by the National Bank. He also claimed that many people were looking for someone to blame for this particular financial scandal. “I refuse to be a scapegoat,” he told the judge, “for whatever it was,” he added. Abdel Rahman was convicted on charges of malfeasance, embezzlement, fraud and others. Criminal Court Judge Bakherchi Omar sentenced him to 18 years in prison

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the validity of the facts and ﬁgures presented by the judicial

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and ordered the seizure of all of his properties. Some of the other defendants received prison sentences ranging from one to 18 years. Four of the defendants were acquitted, including the former director of the NBA and the bank’s financial governors. Another defendant, a fugitive, was sentenced in absentia to 20 years in prison and to pay a fine of one million dinar (US$13,933). In total, the court imposed fines that amounted to 21 billion dinar (US$287 million).

Public reaction Despite the heavy penalties, the Algerian public did not react positively to the verdict because of ambiguities in the case. They perceived a lack of evidence of involvement by the defendants and the obvious discrepancies in the embezzled amounts presented by the National Bank of Algeria, all of which raised questions about the trial’s integrity. The trial is only one more battle in Algeria’s overall war against corruption, a war that threatens the political survival of the Algerian state and its national security, as the Algerian state has been inﬁltrated by organized crime networks that dominate the Algerian economy, as has been reported by the daily Elkhabar. These networks use Algeria as a conduit to smuggle billions in foreign currency, which has been facilitated by recent economic policies, the vulnerability of controlling institutions and the imbalances in the legal system. Oftentimes, these crimes take place with the overt complicity of Algerian authorities and ofﬁcials.

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* Kalkali Elhadi is an Algerian journalist who has worked in media since 1996 with local and foreign organizations. He is actually the General Manager of the Algerian Economic News Network (AENN) in Algeria. He is also, professor of political science and international relations in Khemiss- Miliana University, in Algeria.

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BOSNIA

Bosnia:

The Rule of Patronage By Dino Mikaili and Azhar Kalamuji Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) remains a failed state that has yet to apply the rule of law to a corrupt political system whose members act with impunity. Yet 2009 brought some hope for the future. Government agencies made some progress bringing charges against a few high ofﬁcials, and several anti-corruption investigations were initiated. The Serb Republic (RS — Republika Srpska), the Bosnian Serb political-territorial division of BiH, remains the most problematic part of the country. Acting as the private posse of Prime Minister Milorad Dodik, the RS government continues to be thoroughly corrupt, non-transparent and generally combative toward both the international commu-

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The Global Integrity Index: How effective are Bosnia’s and Herzegovina’s anti-corruption safeguards? OVERALL RATING

Weak (63 out of 100 +/-1.33) CATEGORY RATINGS

1) Civil Society, Public Information & Media — Weak (65) 2) Elections — Moderate (77) 3) Government Accountability — Very Weak (56) 4) Administration & Civil Service — Very Weak (44) 5) Oversight & Regulation — Weak (68) 6) Anti-Corruption & Rule of Law — Weak (67)

(Scores range from 0 to 100)

The backlog of cases in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s courts has negatively impacted the efficiency of the government’s network of anti-corruption agencies including the independent redress mechanisms for the police and the civil service. Political concerns curb the independence of many government agencies including the newly decentralized ombudsman office, the supreme audit institution, and the police. Low levels of political will have also stalled the development of a central anti-corruption agency, which was formally established in April 2009. A lack of conflicts of interest regulations for elected officials means that asset disclosures are not audited in any branch of government.

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nity and its fellow political-territorial entity, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH). The political situation remains complex and some levels of government are hardly functioning, but the public has become more vocal in pushing for change.

Corruption in all spheres of society The country still hasnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t progressed much in the ďŹ ght against corruption, according to research carried out within Transparency International BiHâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s (TI BiH) project Promoting Anti-Corruption Reforms. The study also found that what anti-corruption activities do exist are uncoordinated and lack any genuine political will or a systematic approach. corruption reforms and, according to our surveys, is unfortunately perceived as the most corrupt country in the region,â&#x20AC;? says Emir Ă?ikiĂź head of TI BiHâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s board of directors. BiH is also well behind in its bid to join the European Union (EU). The country has failed to implement many of the legislative changes designed to conform to EU standards, some of which relate to corruption efforts, and it has not made signiďŹ cant progress implementing its own National Anti-Corruption Strategy and its 2006 Action Plan. Citizens agree that BiH is corrupt. Other surveys by TI show that people believe corruption is most present in the privatization process and within political parties. Respondents said they were most often asked for bribes by doctors or medical personal, the police and university professors. A survey conducted by another nongovernmental orga-

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â&#x20AC;&#x153;BiH has not made any progress implementing anti-

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nization, the Center for Civil Initiatives (CCI), also indicates that people believe a high level of corruption exists, especially in the health and education sectors. Nearly half of respondents said they had witnessed corruption in the health sector. “The analysis shows that corruption is becoming a model of behavior that is treated as though it weren’t a social evil but rather a fact,” says Majda Behram Stojanov, CCI spokesperson. “Through corruption, one can obtain certain privileges and a better position in society.”

Massive patronage system At the heart of corruption in BiH lies a massive patronage system, which is orchestrated by the leading political parties and controls most aspects of governmental life. Municipal and state-level patronage involves governmental, state and even private businesses. Whether it’s business permits, privatization, tenders or building permits, the patronage system allows political bodies to extend favors and earn money. Private citizens not connected with a local ruling party must use bribery to access the system. Because the system operates at such a local level, efforts to curb the patronage system by the international community have been largely irrelevant. BiH has done little to nothing to reign in corrupt public officials. Election law does not provide adequate mechanisms to determine whether elected officials acquired their wealth illegally, and the Conflict of Interest Law allows officials who break this law to complete their term in office. Asset-reporting laws are regularly ignored without any penalty.

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Government agencies also have been inefficient in fighting corruption. The last study conducted by the Global Corruption Barometer evaluated BiH as among the countries with the most corrupt political parties in southeastern Europe. Legislation, the economy, media, education, the judiciary, the health sector, police and the tax office were described as very corrupt. According to this study, BiH legislative power, media and police are the most corrupt among the same segments in southeast European countries.

Politicized media Most mass media are owned or strongly influenced by politicians, political parties, wealthy businessmen or organized Exceptions do exist, but media face significant problems. Journalists who report on sensitive issues are pressured by both threats and physical assault. Reporters also face difficulties obtaining information about politicians and large companies, especially in the Serb Republic. Despite a freedom of information law, the RS government has systematically ignored public-records requests with impunity. The government considered amending the Freedom of Access to Information Act in 2009 to include a fine — ranging from 1,000 to 15,000 KM (US$732 to US$10,980) — if agencies ignore requests. Responsible employees would be fined between 200 and 5,000 KM (US$146 and US$3,660). Whether this amendment will pass and lead to improved information availability is not clear. Many agencies are likely to continue to deny information to journalists.

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crime ﬁgures, which limits media organizations’ effectiveness.

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Despite the many problems they face, journalists have reported on important corruption issues. Among other things, reporters discovered that millions of convertible marka from the RS credit program, which was set up to help develop the local economy and create new jobs, ended up with foreign companies in offshore accounts. Some of the biggest loans, amounting to 5 million KM (US$3.7 million), were given to companies with strong political connections. RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik played an important role.

Positive efforts to fight corruption There were some significant efforts to fight corruption in 2009. In the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, financial police filed a criminal report with the Canton Sarajevo Prosecutor’s Office about officials from the FBiH Development Bank, including Ramiz Džaferoviü, the politically connected director. Police allege that bank officials misused their authority by granting loans in a dubious manner, even to companies that did not meet all the requirements. Police also allege that bank officials embezzled bank funds and that some employees benefited financially from the banks’ actions. For example, loan applicants were asked to provide audited accounts with their application. In a great number of cases, they used a private audit house owned by Džaferoviü. Prosecutors have yet to take any action. (In 2000, the High Representative for BiH, Wolfgang Petritsch, had removed Džaferoviü from the head post at the FBiH Tax Office and from the board of directors of the Payment Bureau for unprofessional conduct, tax evasion

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and other charges. He was banned from public office. He became the director of the Development Bank after the ban was lifted in 2006.) Even in the RS there have been partial successes. The RS Special Prosecutor’s Office brought charges against nine persons who played a key role in the privatization of 72 companies. Among other things, prosecutors determined that the privatizations were fixed, that privileged bidders ended up buying the companies and that people from the privatization audit commission were involved in these irregularities. However, the court issued a legally binding decision that no crime was committed. Another case got a lot of public attention in February when the State Investigation and Protection Agency BiH filed BOSNIA

a report with the State Prosecutor’s Office against Milorad Dodik, RS prime minister. The investigation started in 2008 after auditors alleged misuse of procedures in granting contracts for the construction of government buildings and a highway, and special treatment of Integral Inženjering, a company close to Milorad Dodik. As another bidder’s complaint alleged, Integral Inženjering failed to meet all the requirements of the tender because the company had never built a highway. Indeed, the company has not only missed all major deadlines but costs have skyrocketed, making the new highway one of the most expensive in Europe. The report accuses officials of fixing tenders and charges Dodik and others with misuse of official position or authority. The report also challenged the process that led to high prices being paid for furnishings — including $1,200

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garbage bins, $800 ashtrays and a $32,000 conference table â&#x20AC;&#x201D; for the RS Administration Center, the new government ediďŹ ce built by Dodikâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s administration. Another positive step in the ďŹ ght against corruption was taken in April when charges were brought against former FBiH Prime Minister Edhem %LĂžDNĂžLĂź (1996-2001) and his deputy Dragan Ă˝RYLĂź. The two were charged with conspiracy to use taxpayersâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; money to provide housing for their colleagues and political associates. According to the indictment, %LĂžDNĂžLĂź Ă˝RYLĂź and others secretly approved a 7.8 million KM (US$5.7 million) budget expenditure to buy or renovate 64 expensive private houses and apartments. They then gave the residences to their political associates, some of whom privatized them and paid for them with worthless or nearly worthless vouchers. Even NedĹžad BranNRYLĂź, FBiH prime minister from 2007-2009, was charged with buying an apartment on Ciglane with vouchers whose market value amounted to only 900 KM (US$660). Whether %LĂžDNĂžLĂź DQG Ă˝RYLĂź will be convicted is not clear. Few major politicians have been. * Azhar KalamujiĂź has 13 years of experience in journalism and was an award-winning reporter for Oslobo enje in Sarajevo. He also reported for Voice of America and Radio France Internationale, and wrote for Reporter in Banka Luka. He specializes in reporting corruption in institutions and public companies, organized crime and customs and border offenses.

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* Dino Jahi端 joined Center for Investigative Reporting in February 2008 after two years of working for a tv station in a program about organized and street crime. He is one of the founders and editors of the news and culture magazine, Eho. He has covered different topics including trade and abuse of drugs, frauds with science grants, corruption in soccer and counterfeited documents.

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BRAZIL

Brazil:

Pizza, the Solution to Any Scandal By Marcelo Soares

Walter Taverna, 75, a cantina owner and a native of São Paulo’s Italian hub, straps his red apron around his waist. In a pizza pan, he sketches a caricature of José Sarney, the head of the Senate, using cheese, slices of red pepper and some strips of anchovies. “This is the only way I can protest against the things they get away with,” he says. On August 18, 2009, he sold 40 pizzas that were illustrated with this caricature to students who were protesting the dismissal of charges made against Sarney by the Senate’s

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The Global Integrity Index: How effective are Brazil’s anti-corruption safeguards? OVERALL RATING

Moderate (76 out of 100 +/-1.74) CATEGORY RATINGS

1) Civil Society, Public Information & Media — Moderate (75) 2) Elections — Strong (84) 3) Government Accountability — Moderate (77) 4) Administration & Civil Service —Weak (69) 5) Oversight & Regulation — Moderate (71) 6) Anti-Corruption & Rule of Law — Strong (82)

(Scores range from 0 to 100)

Brazil’s performance on key governance and anti-corruption measures continues to serve up a mixed picture. The country earns strong ratings in the areas of civil society, voting and elections, privatization, and anti-corruption legal regulations. The Brazilian Court of Audit is very active in opening investigations into ﬁnancial irregularities, with “all proceedings, minutes, and questions… published on [its] website.” Unfortunately, there are several dimensions of governance that remain in need of signiﬁcant improvement. While a constitutional right to access government information exists, no law or instutitional mechanism is in place in Brazil to operationalize that right in practice.

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Ethics Council. Since the former president was chosen as the head of the Senate in March of 2009, allegations of many irregular practices have been made — a common occurrence in a country where information that should be public is hidden to avoid the potential embarrassment the revelations would cause or to use it as a political weapon. (Two drafts of Freedom of Information bills are stalled in Congress — and the electoral year of 2010 will leave little time to vote on them.) In Brazilian political slang, a scandal is said to “end in pizza” as in “discussed over drinks” when charges against the alleged perpetrators are dropped by agreement. This tradition started in the 1950s when the board of a soccer club formed by Italians who were living in São Paulo solved their disputes ever since the first big wave of political scandals that took place after the restoration of democracy in Brazil, in 1985. Sarney, a long-time influential politician in one of the poorest states in Brazil, Maranhão, became the first civilian president to take office after 21 years of military dictatorship. He had supported the dictatorship as member of Congress and leader of the Arena party (the political party of the military government) and, initially elected vice-president, he became president because the elected president, Tancredo Neves, died before taking office. During Sarney’s five-year term as President, Brazil got a new constitution (1988) and elected its first president by popular vote in three decades (1989). That president, Fernando Collor de Mello, was later impeached following

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by dining out together. The term started to be used in politics

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corruption charges. The phrase “this cannot end in pizza” resurfaced during the de Mello investigation, and has since remained part of popular slang.

The scandal One of the allegations that have arisen from the recent Sarney scandal involves plane tickets paid for by Brazilian taxpayers and used by Sarney’s daughter, current Maranhão state governor and former Senator Roseana Sarney, to fly business class to meetings in Brasilia (public-paid tickets can only be used by senators and deputies, not their relatives). Other allegations involve Agaciel Maia, a powerful bureaucrat who was in charge of distributing jobs in the Senate for political appointees — among them, the boyfriend of Sarney’s granddaughter, as revealed in transcripts of a wiretap leak published by newspaper O Estado de S.Paulo and banned from publication by a Brasília court. Allegedly, Maia kept a secret garçonnière (a place for sexual encounters) inside Congress and even bought a mansion for his own personal use. Among his other questionable hires were 181 directors for 81 senators, including one to manage the parking lot and another to manage speedy airport check-ins. Even more importantly, there were charges that secret official acts were passed to create jobs and raise benefits: These charges remained unpublicized until the scandal became public. Maia is alleged to have enacted more than 1,000 of these acts. Nearly 200 of them were revalidated by Congress in mid-2009, with no opposition protests. Sarney, who hired Maia when he became chairperson

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of the Senate in the 1990s, defended himself in June 2009. “No one can charge me, because all my life I’ve been praising and serving the legislative institution,” he said. “What they say about the Congress here they also say in Spain, in England, in Argentina, and everywhere.” (Days before, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown reacted differently to a similar scandal: “We cannot move our country forward unless we break with the old practices and the old ways. Each of us has a part to play in the hard task of regaining the country’s trust.”)

The price of democracy Since 2007, Transparencia Brasil has been assessing the cost of the Brazilian Legislatures and making public around US$1.5 billion. It costs US$18.5 million to support the structure for the mandate of each Senator. Related to GDP per capita, it’d be expected that the Brazilian Senate costs each citizen less than its counterpart in the US or the UK, but it costs each citizen 5.4 times as much as the British Parliament and 5.7 times as much as the US Senate. When Transparencia published their ﬁrst study, Brazilian senators responded by saying, in effect: “Democracy has no price.” Claudio Abramo, Transparencia’s director, published an article comparing the Senate to cars: The Senate costs as much as a Ferrari, but performs like an old Volkswagen Beetle — and when the motor has a funny noise, the technical assistance (in this case, the Ethics Council, composed by Senate peers mirroring partisan alliances) refuses

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how expensive the Brazilian Senate is. Its budget for 2009 is

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to even “look under the hood.” Scandals in 2009 contributed to a loss of credibility in the Senate of 44 percent of Brazilians and almost led to the slump of the House’s chairman. Many cases of undue expenditures were also revealed at the House, including the case of a Congressman who took a famous TV celebrity for a leisure trip in Miami at the expense of the taxpayer. However, no politician in a position of responsibility felt forced to step down. No politician involved vowed to do anything to regain the respect of voters. One of them even said that he “didn’t care” about public opinion.

High level cover-ups In the article mentioned above, Abramo referred to a previous 2007 scandal involving Renan Calheiros, then the head of the Senate. He was accused of having a lobbyist for a federal contractor pay the alimony of a daughter he conceived out of wedlock. The Ethics Council saw no reason to investigate him, and Calheiros resigned his spotlight position. Since then, Calheiros has become a major political broker who aggressively defends Sarney, articulates support from other politicians and supports the Government in a congressional investigation of Petrobras, the state-owned oil giant — which also ended in pizza. In the Calheiros and Sarney cases, the Ethics Council (controlled by Lula’s majority coalition in the Senate) declined to investigate the charges. In both cases, President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva came to the rescue — in regard

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to Sarney, Lula even said he “has enough history to not be treated as a common person.” Lula perceives the attacks against his allies as attacks aimed at him — this perception may have some truth, but it does not justify allowing serious cases to remain uninvestigated. In a country with 27 political parties, 13 of them represented in the Senate, coalitions are essential to achieve so-called “governability,” a term that is a buzzword among Lula’s supporters. Sarney and Calheiros’s PMDB party (Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro, or Brazilian Democratic Movement Party) has the largest number of members serving in Congress; it holds 22 percent of the seats in the Senate and 19 percent of seats in the House. The result is that every administration seeks out their support TV during electoral campaigns). The PMDB has found it proﬁtable to support governments in power and allegedly reaps some of the 30,000 federal positions. (These positions are said to be distributed by the executive according to political criteria.) The party is also alleged to receive a more generous slice of the money that is distributed in pork-barrel budget amendments. Calheiros, Sarney and the PMDB had also been instrumental in the election of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2002), who preceded Lula in power and whose government Lula’s PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores, or Worker’s Party) opposed. The fact that the PMDB politicians know what the current opposition did during previous years keeps opponents from doing anything more than making rhetorical

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(and welcomes the PMDB’s taxpayer-funded advertising on

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protests. Some of the secrets allegedly involve the nepotism and favoritism in hiring of staff, along with other increased benefits that made everyone happy. According to Transparencia Brasil’s Excelencias database, 36 percent of senators have pending lawsuits filed against them. One-third of them are PMDB party members. In their defense, party members claim the cases are currently under appeal and, therefore, the charges remain unproven. In Brazil, it is nearly impossible for a politician to receive a prison sentence. Federal authorities can only be tried at the Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal, or STF), which rarely sentences politicians to prison. Thanks to delays and the many appeals that are granted by law, many cases lapse before they reach trial. Good attorneys can always have evidence dismissed — as happened with former President Fernando Collor de Mello (now a senator and prominent Lula supporter); De Mello was temporarily stripped of his political rights by the Senate but later acquitted by the Supreme Court after the strongest evidence against him was declared to be illegal. There are also cases where the court claims there is no reason to files charges against politicians. For example, on August 27, 2009, former Finance Minister Antonio Palocci was acquitted of charges that he participated in a breach of banking secrecy involving a janitor named Francenildo Santos Costa. During a 2006 congressional investigation regarding political bribery, Costa testified that while he was working in a mansion in Brasilia, he witnessed Palocci holding meetings with lobbyists, call girls and politicians.

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With the ensuing crisis, governists suspected he had been bribed by opposition politicians to testify against Palocci. Allegedly, after Palocci learned that US$20,000 had been deposited in Costa’s account at Caixa, a federally owned bank, Jorge Mattoso, the bank’s chairman, produced a bank statement showing the deposit. This private information was then leaked to Época magazine. Palocci was said to be the sole beneficiary of the exposure of the janitor’s bank statement, which was later revealed to have been compensation paid to Costa by his own estranged father. But the Supreme Court, in a 5-to-4 vote, only ruled against Mattoso, the subordinate who produced the statement. Dissenting Justice Marco Aurelio de Mello said: “As usual, the rope snapped on the weakest side.” (Mattoso racy.) Now acquitted, Palocci is a likely candidate for office in São Paulo’s government as a member of Lula’s party. Meanwhile, since the scandal became public in 2006, Francenildo Santos Costa has not been able to find a steady job.

Increasing responsibility Scandals have a positive side: They force accountability, in the absence of Freedom of Information law. In 2004, O Globo newspaper investigated how wealthy state legislators achieved their power. Two years later, in 2006, the electoral authority began publishing the assets data of all candidates on their website. When it was revealed in 2007 that Calheiros used his peers’ expense data to pressure them into voting against his ousting, the Senate decided to publish

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may be sentenced to deliver lectures on the values of democ-

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the data on a monthly basis. In 2009, when it became known that House Member Edmar Moreira used his expenses to pay his own security company, the House decided to publish details regarding each payment. This was an improvement on their ﬁve-year practice of publishing only their expense totals. Thanks to wider Internet access and a constant supply of scandals that keeps Brazilian society interested in politics, the demand for accountability is growing. At his cantina in São Paulo, Walter Taverna recalls how he campaigned for inclusion in the Guinness Book of Records for making the biggest pizza in the world (1,489 feet long). But, he jokes, he suspects that Brazilian politicians will keep trying to beat his record. * Marcelo Soares is a freelance reporter specialized in Brazilian news. He’s a politics columnist and blogger for MTV Brasil, stringer for the LA Times, guest reporter for the Center for Public Integrity, collaborator for the Knight Center for Journalism in the Americas and a Computer Assisted Reporting trainer.

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Colombia:

Family Ties By Ignacio Gómez

At the beginning of President Alvaro Uribe’s second term in 2006, the government launched a non-refundable subsidies program for farmers, known as “Ingreso Agro Seguro” (Guaranteed Agro Income). To promote it, TV commercials portrayed humble, peasant families who would supposedly beneﬁt from it. In the years since, however, the families who have actually beneﬁted from the subsidies couldn’t be more different from those who were portrayed in the commercials. Instead,

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The Global Integrity Index: How effective are Colombia’s anti-corruption safeguards? OVERALL RATING

Weak (68 out of 100 +/-1.03) CATEGORY RATINGS

1) Civil Society, Public Information & Media — Weak (67) 2) Elections — Weak (66) 3) Government Accountability — Weak (60) 4) Administration & Civil Service —Weak (65) 5) Oversight & Regulation — Moderate (77) 6) Anti-Corruption & Rule of Law — Moderate (75)

(Scores range from 0 to 100)

The rule of law in Colombia has deteriorated as political influence has negatively impacted the appointment, tenure, and decision-making of justice officials. Citizens who “blow the whistle” are not protected by law and are likely to face retaliation. Similarly, journalists face pressure to self-censor not only from government but also from powerful paramilitary groups and drug traffickers. A new political party law was implemented to curb the influence of drug money in politics with mixed results. Reporters who have reported corruption in the past year have been accused of “lacking patriotism” by the government. Good news can be found in the extension of the Colombian access to information laws to cover military abuse cases.

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at least CP25 million (US$12.5 million) of this program wound up in the hands of members of three influential families who were both donors to Uribe’s political campaign and local leaders of a campaign to collect signatures in favor of his re-election. This was revealed in 2009 by the TV show Noticias Uno, which utilized old pictures of the three families (one of each family) to illustrate the story. As it listed the names of the individuals who received funds from the subsidies, the show pointed out who each individual was in the pictures. Practically all the people appearing in the three pictures had received funds, and they are not the only ones alleged to have improperly benefitted. received another CP3 million (US$1.5 million). Even beauty queens and extradited criminals have received government money. The first individual to be exposed as being involved in this matter was Dany Alirio Villamizar, the son of the president of Congress, who recently led the majority coalition to approve a constitutional reform to allow Uribe to run for a third term as president of Colombia. The president’s coalition in Congress has reformed the Constitution twice in order to allow Alvaro Uribe to be re-elected. Seventy-eight members of this coalition are now under investigation or serving jail sentences for their collaboration with right-wing paramilitary bands on what is called the “parapolitics” scandal. Uribe’s first intelligence chief is on trial for killing unionists and for “having put the DAS (Security Administrative Department) in the service of paramilitaries.”

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For example, the relatives of Banco Agrario’s president

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Three other members of the Uribe coalition are under investigation for their alleged involvement with illegal wiretaps on judges, opposition leaders and journalists, and two of their cabinet members are under investigation for arranging beneﬁts for people in Congress for the ﬁrst re-election approval process.

Still favored Despite all this controversy, Uribe is still the favorite to win a third term as Colombia’s president. In the midst of the Ingreso Agro Seguro scandal, his favorable rating in opinion polls has risen to 70 percent. In October 2009, noted columnist Miguel Angel Bastenier wrote an op-ed in the daily El País in Spain, describing how Colombia seems to have ignored the “horrors museum” of Uribe’s second term. Bastenier diagnosed the country as suffering from Dorian Gray’s Syndrome: a fear of looking at itself in the mirror. Coincidentally, the day after the Bastenier op-ed was published, the daily El Tiempo, previously run by Uribe’s vice President Francisco Santos, ﬁred one of its most popular columnists. Claudia López, an authority on the “parapolitics,” issue said the newspaper focused the discussion on its online opinion forum of the Guaranteed Agro Income scandal against the former Agriculture Minister Andrés Felipe Arias, who is now a presidential pre-candidate, and in favor of Juan Manuel Santos, a former defense minister who is also a pre-candidate and a member of a family of shareholders of El Tiempo.

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Opposition leader Jorge Robledo calls this “plutocracy,” a rule that empowers the wealthiest, but he excuses it is as necessary for generating employment. The government claims that its policy is an investment that is necessary for a “process of transition that requires profound changes to take full advantage of the international trade scenario.” Its program Familias en Acción (Families in Action), which aims to give funds to three million of Colombia’s poorest families, mutes the plutocracy accusation. There are, in fact, poor people who have really been helped by Alvaro Uribe’s government, but there are also many sad stories. Take, for example, Isabel Martínez’s. Decades ago, Martinez formed the Society for Options with than 60 other single mothers like her, picking up soda cans, paper, metal and glass in the streets of Bogotá, Colombia’s capital. She became a prominent leader of Bogotá’s Association of Recyclers (ARB). This association was, until 2008, certiﬁed to bid for the recycling administration contract in Bogotá, a city of 8 million inhabitants. The last push in favor of their project took place in 2005 during an episode of “Community Council,” the 10-hour TV show the president presents on Saturdays (with daily broadcasts of previews and reruns). President Uribe was promoting the Entrepreneur Training Program of National Learning Service (SENA), which gives subsidies to displaced persons and single lonely mothers. The city’s Environment Department and the Chamber of Commerce provided training and internationalcooperation agencies offered economic and institutional support.

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Dignity for Women (Asodig) and generated jobs for more

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Limited resources The women of Asodig owned no more than four vans. They rented storage space for their recycling program and worked with only their own hands and few tools, but their efforts satisfied their most demanding client: the duty-free area of Bogotá, a 10-acre multinational compound located less than two miles from El Dorado, the biggest airport in Los Andes. Then, in 2005, the client received a proposal from Tomás Uribe, who was a newcomer in the recycling business but turned out to be a very desirable partner. No one in the recycling business knew of Tomás Uribe during this time (20052008). He had started his own company, Residuos Ecoeficiencia (Ecoefficiency Residues), with US$500 in 2003 during his second year of college “as an answer to the industry’s search for a standardized strategic partner to handle recyclable waste,” according to the corporation’s website. In fact, “standardization” was a term first introduced in 2005, when Isabel Martinez’s organization finished its accreditation for the city’s bidding process. In 2007, this concept became an obstacle to Asodig’s ability to stay in business when Congress created new regulations for recycling. Martinez understands the client’s decision to fire her and her team. Beyond offering a solution to garbage problems, Residuos Ecoeficiencia’s proposal was new, twice as large and closer to the airport and duty-free areas. But, as it turned out, Residuos’ owner, Tomás Uribe, was also the Colombian president’s oldest son.

Claims of farmers returning President Uribe’s TV show promotes the idea of “invest-

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ment confidence” as a pillar of the American government advised and financed “democratic security,” program, which has allowed the Colombian people to return to the farms they had been driven from due to paramilitary violence. As evidence of this outside influence, the regular TV schedule was interrupted for live broadcasts of the official welcome of Microsoft’s Bill Gates, Jordan’s Queen Noor and other prominent visitors. President Uribe went so far as to personally welcome Graham Mackay, CEO of the major beer brewer SABMiller. “You are partners in Colombian prosperity… This country had lost the faith about our ability to produce barley, but you have brought hopes to our farmers,” Uribe said to Mackay during the opening of a But there are no new barley farms in Colombia, no meaningful barley harvests and no money from the Ingreso Agro Seguro program aimed at growing barley. In fact, the first step that SABMiller took, when they opened a plant in Colombia in 2005, was to sell the old barley farms. Coincidentally, some farms around the airport were even closer than the duty-free area where Isabel Martinez used to clean and Residuos Ecoeficiencia bought these parcels in 2006, three years after the company started. Bought for US$16,000, they were valued at US$1.6 million in 2008. Purchased by the acre, the land is now being sold by square meters, with all of the sales income exempt from local and national taxes. The roads running through the area were refurbished, and the property later received official recognition as an industrial

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brewery that was located in the duty-free area.

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development area. A city license was then obtained to qualify it as a “big area” (meaning where commercial or industrial development is allowed) and by December 2008, the land received duty-free status, which was approved by two ministers and two other presidential advisors. This occurred just two days after President Uribe sanctioned a law that made it illegal for anyone, other than those connected with official dumps and “big areas,” such as duty-free zones, to pick up garbage from the streets. Meanwhile, the price of the land increases. Tomás Uribe was shown on an official video attending a meeting where authorities discussed a new metro train that will cross a corner of an old barley farm sold off by SABMiller. Isabel Martinez and her 60 associates have no farms; most of them were forced to abandon them because of acts of violence committed by right-wing paramilitary and guerrilla factions. Now they have lost the safety net that the agroincome program was supposed to offer them. Instead, the president’s family and friends and the members of the government coalition in Congress seemed to have made the program into their own profit center. * Ignacio “Nacho” Gómez is the deputy director of TV news show Noticias Uno and the president of the Press Freedom Foundation in Colombia. His investigations about the Colombian war and its international ties have been published by Libetarion, Der Spiegel, The Guardian and other major media. He is a recipient of the New Ibero American Journalism Award (México, 2009), the International Press Freedom Award (2002), and Nieman Fellowship at Harvard University.

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ÂŠ Mckaysavage

INDIA

India:

A Crooked Reward System By Afsana Rashid Each and every section of society, be it politics, bureaucracy, police, judiciary or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are affected by corruption in India.

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The Global Integrity Index: How effective are India’s anti-corruption safeguards? OVERALL RATING

Moderate (70 out of 100 +/-2.00) CATEGORY RATINGS

1) Civil Society, Public Information & Media — Moderate (72) 2) Elections — Moderate (70) 3) Government Accountability — Very Weak (59) 4) Administration & Civil Service —Weak (66) 5) Oversight & Regulation — Strong (80) 6) Anti-Corruption & Rule of Law — Moderate (71)

(Scores range from 0 to 100)

Certain public sector anti-corruption safeguards in India perform very well while others do not. Good news can be found in robust public access to government information, high levels of public participation in elections, and a relatively strong anti-corruption legal framework. Furthermore, India’s functional equivalent of an ombudsman mechanism — the Central Vigilance Commission — is quite effective. Despite strong performance in these areas, the country struggles with promoting transparency and accountability in the ﬁnancing of political parties and candidates.

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“India’s problem isn’t poverty; it’s corruption,” says a political commentator in Bangalore, who asked to remain anonymous. “Infrastructure here is poor, not because we don’t have money for projects, but because it’s eaten away,” he adds. Malik Jehangir, a senior journalist in Jammu and Kashmir, says, “In the past, bribes were paid for getting wrong things done, but now bribes are paid for accomplishing right jobs.” Whether they are ministers, senior police officers or other government officials, indicted suspects are all able to enjoy the comforts of life despite their alleged involvement in murder, molestation and embezzlement cases. In July 2008, The Washington Times reported that nearly one fourth of 540 Indian Parliament members faced criminal charges, including human trafficking, immigration INDIA

rackets, embezzlement, rape and murder. Bashir Ahmad Malla, retired deputy inspector general of police in Kashmir, says: “Government rewards corrupt officers and transfers or demotes honest and upright officials.” In the Jan. 16, 2009 India Abroad article, “Corruption in India like Africa: WB official,” managing editor Aziz Haniffa quotes former bank auditor Steve Berkman, who says that barring IT giants Satyam and Wipro from World Bank projects is only the tip of the iceberg, compared to the kickbacks and commissions that go to government officials for approval of bank projects.

Corruption hits the poor The India Corruption Study 2007 by Transparency International India and the Centre for Media Studies high-

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lights that corruption is rampant, even in issuing below-poverty-line (BPL) status to households living in rural states. According to the study, one third of Indian households below poverty line paid 8,830 rupees (US$191) as bribes to government officials for various public services. Poor households also either pay bribes or use political influence to get benefits from the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, which was started by the government to provide time-specific employment. The All India Council of Technical Education (AICTE) monitors and regulates approximately 15,500 professional institutes across the country, but it has been facing charges of corruption and unethical business conduct, including the approval of professional colleges that don’t meet necessary requirements. Such institutes are only adding numbers, as they don’t churn out talented professionals. In June 2009, the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) conducted raids across Indian cities, including Delhi and Hyderabad, and arrested AICTE officials. K. Narayan Rao, member secretary of AICTE, was caught red-handed on June 16 accepting bribes. He was arrested along with commission agent, S.B. Subba Rao, for receiving a bribe of 500,000 rupees (US$10,827). The bribe in question was given by an individual who runs his own engineering college in the state of Andhra Pradesh. The member secretary had asked for a bribe in lieu of inspection and approval of the college. According to Harsh Bhal, a spokesman for the CBI, the agency raided offices across India and seized incriminat-

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ing documents. Bhal added that the CBI has filed corruption charges against AICTE Chairman R.A. Yadav, Advisor H.C. Rai, Deputy Director Robinder Randhawa and Regional Officer Sriom Dalal. According to Bhal, these senior officials were charged for demanding bribes to increase the number of students in engineering colleges in Faridabad, Haryana. The question is: Can the government show the will to get rid of these corrupt officials, who are no more than a blot on the education system? Considering the government’s past record, we can predict that these corrupt officials will resume their duties in due time, because bureaucrats and politicians are hand in glove, and they do their best to save each other. Corruption and lack of accountability can be vividly seen INDIA

in public affair dealings, leading to hardships for the masses. Dr. Abdul Rashid Malik, former deputy director of health services at Sher-i-Kashmir Institute of Medical Sciences, one of the premier medical institutions in India, says doctors take commissions from pharmaceutical companies if they prescribe medicines from those companies only. “Doctors, in general, receive commissions from diagnostic and investigation centers, and that’s the worst form of corruption,” says Malik. Diagnostic tools and other machines are deliberately made to be dysfunctional in hospitals and other health institutions, forcing patients to have tests done at private diagnostic centers, when they could have been easily carried out in government hospitals at lower prices, according to Malik.

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The Judiciary System The India Political Blog accuses some judges of deciding cases based on external factors and of misusing money. The blog quotes an example where the CBI unearthed shocking details about how the pension funds of employees of Ghaziabad courts were illegally spent on furniture, crockery, mobiles, gadgets, laptops, rail tickets and other luxury items for judges. Inaction by the judiciary and the police in, for instance, the murder case of Aarushi Talwar, a 15-year-old girl whose throat was slit in her own bed in 2008, is causing people to lose faith in the judiciary and the police. Danishta Hassan, a counselor with a nongovernmental organization in Western India, says that direct engagement of suspicious characters in corrupt practices within the Indian judiciary causes enormous delays in delivering justice. In addition, thousands of habeas corpus petitions are pending in courts in Jammu and Kashmir, according to a study by the South Asia Forum for Human Rights and the Centre for Law and Development. In India, it is exceedingly hard to remove a sitting judge, especially in higher courts. The case involving Justice Ramaswamy was the ďŹ rst of such kind that reached Parliament in 1990. Parliament ultimately didnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t vote to impeach him, because members of Parliament decided to abstain.

Police and the army G.P. Joshi, program coordinator of the Indian branch of the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative in New

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Delhi, says the main issue concerning police violence is the lack of accountability. “Tortures lead to deaths in custody,” says Gagan Lepang, a human rights activist in northeast India. Police often torture innocent people in a bid to shield inﬂuential and wealthy offenders.” Referring to the annual report of the comptroller and auditor general of India, news reports say the army is purchasing faulty boots. According to these reports, the army has been purchasing faulty boots since 2002 from an Italian ﬁrm. These boots don’t work when temperatures plummet below negative 15 degrees Celsius, and temperatures can go down to negative 50 degrees Celsius. The report also says the army continues to procure INDIA

boots from this same company, and it blames corruption in general for the death of 328 army soldiers in Siachen. Details on how corruption was a factor in those deaths were not available to the public as of the writing of this notebook. The report also found that one brigadier of the Indian army was sending water in the place of petrol to soldiers based at Siachen.

Public hearings reveal more corruption Public hearings, known as Jan Sunwai, are designed to allow citizens to question their government representatives, and they have been used to publicly highlight various corrupt practices. A public hearing organized by Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan at Janwaad-Rajasthan found that many people

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who came to work every day were marked absent and were paid lesser wages, unearthing a scam worth 40 million rupees (US$866.175). Similarly, a social audit was conducted by the citizen’s initiative, Parivartan, along with local residents of two resettlement colonies of northeast Delhi, Sundernagri and New Seemapuri. The audit looked at work performed by the engineering department of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, and it found misappropriation of funds. Out of 68 works audited and discussed in public hearings, it is estimated that in 64 works, 13 million rupees (US$281,507) was misappropriated. Within these projects, the total embezzled amount found on accounts of missing items or works is approximately 7 million rupees (US$151,580). Corruption has also crept into religious institutions, as some church members are allegedly making money by selling baptism certiﬁcates, and Imams (Muslim clerics) have been accused of taking bribes to issue random decrees. “Too many loopholes let ofﬁcials and politicians get away with corruption, even if there are investigations,” says Inder Singh, a resident of Chandigarh. It’s hard to trace money given directly to politicians, as they keep their assets in the name of other people.” A social activist in Gujarat says that corruption leads to criminalization of politics, with people getting fed up with politicians and the system. Ashutosh Sharma, a postgraduate student in political science at Madhya Pradesh Bhoj Open University at Bhopal,

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says, “People should have a right to recall elected representatives if they see them becoming indifferent to the electorate.”

Fixing corruption The former president of India, Dr. Avul Pakir Jainulabideen Abdul Kalam, believes that a strong youth movement can remove corruption in India. However, a researcher in North India, who asked to remain anonymous, believes that corruption, deceit and falsehood in India have cultural roots. “It’s impossible to root out corruption in a hierarchical unequal society where corruption is institutionalized,” the researcher says. P. Rajan, director of Arogya Agam, a Tamil Nadu-based never go away because people want to become rich overnight. “If this continues, [the] oppressed and marginalized will become poorer and [the] rich richer,” says Rajan. Mehfuz Ali, a resident of Pune, thinks that it may not be possible to wipe out corruption completely. “But its level can be brought down by roping in honest and dedicated persons and controlling electoral expenses,” he says. * Afsana Rashid is correspondent with the Tribune, one of the largest circulated English newspapers in India and Milli Gazette, New Delhibased English fortnightly. She is the author of the book “Waiting for justice: widows and halfwidows” and a recipient of the Sanjoy Ghose Humanitarian Award, the Sanjoy Ghose Media fellowship (2006-2007) by

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NGO that ﬁghts corruption, believes that corruption will

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Charkha Communication Development Network — New Delhi, the UN Population Fund-Laadli Media Award and the Grass-root Innovation Augmentation Network (GIAN) — Media Awards-2007.

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ÂŠ Cuito Cuanavale

2009

Kosovo:

A Young Democracy and a Thousand-Year-Old Enemy By Lena Cali

Shyqyri Haxha, a Kosovo-Albanian by origin, received his PhD from City University London in 2004, and that same year joined the electronics department at the University of Kent in Canterbury as a lecturer. Four years later, in December 2008, he was appointed CEO of the Post and Telecommunications of Kosovo (PTK) in a unanimous vote by its board of directors.

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The Global Integrity Index: How effective are Kosovo’s anti-corruption safeguards? OVERALL RATING

Weak (67 out of 100 +/-2.92) CATEGORY RATINGS

1) Civil Society, Public Information & Media — Moderate (74) 2) Elections — Weak (69) 3) Government Accountability — Very Weak (46) 4) Administration & Civil Service —Weak (63) 5) Oversight & Regulation — Strong (80) 6) Anti-Corruption & Rule of Law — Moderate (73)

(Scores range from 0 to 100)

One year after it declared independence from Serbia, the Republic of Kosovo is a fragile democracy that suffers from weak government accountability and transparency. Most notable are significant weaknesses in all levels of government accountability and political financing. Members of the executive and legislature are immune from criminal prosecution and citizens have limited access to officials’ asset disclosure records . Moreover, conflicts of interest regulations for the national-level judiciary remain weak. In more positive news, the effectiveness of civil society groups working on governance reform efforts is relatively strong but their impact on actual policy changes remains decidedly mixed.

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It only took a few months for the leading Kosovo daily, Koha Ditore, to discover a major scandal in PTK. According to the newspaper, the new CEO sent 40 PTK employees to Kent University for three weeks of training, at a cost of 400,000 euros (US$596,000). Based on the Public Procurement and Regulatory Commission report, the newspaper indicated that PTK committed a series of violations of Public Procurement Law, because the tender procedure never took place, and the process leading to the agreement with Kent University was not carried out in accordance to the appropriate regulations and procedures. In May 2009, the Public Procurement and Regulatory Commission also discovered that PTK purchased a the new CEO. Haxha ﬁled a complaint to the Press Council of Kosovo against the newspaper, alleging that its articles diminished his public image, but the council ruled in favor of the newspaper.

Public perception of corruption These cases illustrate well enough why the Early Warning Reports, a survey by the United National Development Program (UNDP) Kosovo, regularly places publicly-owned enterprises at the top of the list of institutions where the population perceives “large-scale corruption”. This perception was recorded for the ﬁrst time in June 2007, and it hasn’t changed since. According to these quarterly surveys, 50 percent of the Kosovo population believes that corruption is rampant in

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luxurious BMW, worth 70,000 euros (US$104,000), for

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the Kosovo Energy Corporation; 45 percent of respondents think there is corruption in the Kosovo Trust Agency that manages the privatization process; and around 40 percent suspect corruption in the PTK, general administration, courts and customs. Kosovo was an international protectorate under the United Nations’ Security Council Resolution 1244 between June 1999 and February 2008, when it declared its independence from Serbia. All of its public assets and enterprises were internationally managed until 2007, when the transfer of competences from international to local management was completed. While under international management, PTK’s market stand suffered. The global recession, the raising competition on Kosovo’s telecommunication market and the appearance of a new private mobile and Internet provider contributed to the decrease of PTK revenues. In 2008, the company registered a 26-percent drop in profits, and by the first quarter of 2009 it had lost an additional 15 percent. Still, PTK remains powerful. It has three major business units: Post of Kosovo, Telecom of Kosovo, and Vala 900 mobile network operator. The Vala 900 unit alone is worth between 700 and 800 million euros (about US$1.2 billion), according to government estimates. PTK also is a public enterprise and one of the biggest employers in Kosovo, providing jobs for more than 2,700 people, in a country where almost half of two million inhabitants are unemployed, according to the Kosovo Statistic Office. Also, 37 percent of people live in poverty and 15.2 percent live in extreme poverty, according to the World Bank.

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The Organization for Democracy, Anti-corruption and Dignity (COHU, in Kosovo), the leading public oversight entity in the country, says that the politicization and corruption in the public sector remain the main characteristics of Kosovo’s fragile economy and public enterprises. COHU points out that certain appointments are conﬂicts of interest, such as the appointment of telecommunications businessman Dino Asanaj to the board of Kosovo Trust Agency (KTA).This agency is responsible for the privatization and the development of policies for the public mobile operator Vala 900 (one of PTK’s three divisions), but according to the COHU, Asanaj is a stakeholder in a PTK competitor, the private mobile operator IPKO (Internet Projinterest, COHU concludes.

Corruption in land administration Corruption is also a major issue in the land management administration sector of the country. According to a study by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the illegal occupation of property remains rampant, property rights records have become unreliable, the illegal construction and informal settlements have exploded, and informal illegal transactions continue unabated. Before the war, about 40,000 Serbs lived in Prishtina (today, it is believed there are only about 140 left) and Slavica Milunovic was one of them. A Serb from Prishtina, she currently lives and works in Smederevska Palanka, a town 60 kilometers south-east of Belgrade. She moved there

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ect Kosovo). Therefore, his appointment is a clear conﬂict of

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in the summer of 1999, after the end of the NATO bombing, when most of the 250,000 Serbs fled Kosovo (the number is still debatable in Kosovo). It took her eight years to recover ownership of her apartment in Prishtina. In almost a decade-long struggle for her property rights, Slavica faced many obstacles. Her flat was sold to another person without her consent, her husband’s signature was falsified in the contract, and the false contract was certified by the Municipal Court of Mitrovica. Back in 2005, she was informed by the Housing and Property Directorate (HPD) that her claim was suspended from procedure. “We received a copy of the contract of sale from the people who were occupying our flat. The paper shows that we, apparently, sold our apartment for 20,000 euros (US$29,500), four times less than the real estate market price. But we never sold the house. It appears that the signature of my husband was falsified,” Slavica says. Her case is not the only one. An OSCE report on the Civil Justice System in Kosovo emphasizes that forged authorization of property transactions is a “widespread pattern”. “Many individuals are using the current circumstances of displacement and non-communication between Kosovo and Serbian institutions to commit property fraud, using falsified documents issued in Serbia and Montenegro,” the report reveals. Lawyer Zivojin Jokanovic has become a living legend among property claimers in Kosovo. Still active in his mid-70s, Jokanovic runs an office in Prishtina that is visited by both Albanians and Serbs. Over the past eight years, he has dealt with

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more than 350 civic property lawsuits. Jokanovic says forged documents are a common feature in property transactions. “By the legal procedures of Kosovo, anybody can get an authorization to someone’s property by simply going to court,” he explains. “In cases where the party to the property transaction is not the person signing the contract, the signatory must possess written legal authorization certified by the court. Usually people who have some connections in courts are getting authorization by showing false identifications or false signatures. Often, these identifications belong to dead people or even non-existing people,” Jokanovic says. He adds that a ‘connection’ inside the court means a friendly judge or clerk. KOSOVO

Jokanovic says that “when the seller is represented by a third person, a court ofﬁcial must verify that the third person signatory is legally authorized.” But, in Jokanovic’s experience, more than 30 percent of the lawyers in Kosovo are involved in those kinds of transactions. “I cannot blame my colleagues. It is the legal system that allows them,” Jokanovic says. Rame Gashi, president of the Lawyers’ Chamber of Kosovo, an organization with 500 members, conﬁrms Jokanovic’s allegations. “Neither the chamber, nor me have the exact data on how many lawyers are involved in illegal property transaction. But I do know that some of my colleagues cannot be proud of what they did,” he says. “One day, the state and the police will have to deal with this problem,” he adds. The 2008 report of the Kosovo agency against cor-

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ruption listed courts and other judicial institutions as the second highest in the number of cases of suspected corruption, following the Kosovo government itself.

European perspective The report Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges for Kosovo for 2009, by the European Commission (EC), clearly indicates that corruption is a key problem for the young Kosovo democracy. “Corruption is prevalent in many areas and effects the everyday life of citizens and the business environment. Areas that require particular attention include public procurement and privatization, the judiciary, the financing of political parties and transparency in public administration and government,” the report states. It also highlights that Kosovo’s European future depends on the progress of the fight against corruption. Avni Zogian, the head of COHU, has no illusions about the extent of corruption in Kosovo and about the kind of consequences it has on the European future of the youngest country in the world. “Corruption in Kosovo is a child delivered by two parents: the Kosovo government and internationals actors. We are too big a problem for the EU and the region, but we will continue to fight,” he says. * Lena Cali is a reporter based in Kosovo.

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LEBANON

Lebanon:

Armed Conﬂict, Religion and Corruption: The Perfect Storm By Nicholas Noe

Beset by a legacy of underdevelopment (nearly 30 percent of the country is deﬁned as poor by regional standards) and its unfortunate status as a small country in one of the most conﬂictprone neighborhoods in the world, Lebanon — perhaps understandably — has long provided fertile ground for corruption. Add to that the bloody 15-year Civil War (1975-1990) and two graft-ridden, decades-long occupations each by Israel and Syria, which only ended in 2000 and 2005 respectively,

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The Global Integrity Index: How effective are Lebanon’s anti-corruption safeguards? OVERALL RATING

Very Weak (53 out of 100 +/-2.15) CATEGORY RATINGS

1) Civil Society, Public Information & Media — Very Weak (50) 2) Elections — Weak (68) 3) Government Accountability —Weak (62) 4) Administration & Civil Service —Very Weak (33) 5) Oversight & Regulation — Very Weak (48) 6) Anti-Corruption & Rule of Law — Very Weak (55)

(Scores range from 0 to 100)

Lebanon’s signing of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption in October 2008 has pushed the government to begin to create a network of anti-corruption oversight bodies. Draft legislation for a freedom of information act, an anti-corruption agency, and an Ombudsman’s ofﬁce are all currently awaiting legislative debate and approval. The newly established election monitoring agency has received positive reviews from the European Union, with a related recommendation that the agency’s powers to prosecute be expanded in the future. The agency is currently evaluating campaign expenditures by individual candidates from the 2008 elections based on new, but admittedly weak, political ﬁnancing regulations. Despite these potential gains, Lebanon still has sizable gaps in its governance framework.

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and a thoughtful observer could understand the application of a diagnostic framework that is also appropriate to a number of other countries in roughly similar post-conflict situations. However, as local and international observers involved in the fight against corruption are quick to note, Lebanon is burdened by an additional factor that sets it somewhat apart from other nations: an extensive, de facto and de jure system of power that is anchored in individual religious affiliation (a “confessional” system). This system “is perceived as the main cause of corruption in Lebanon,” wrote American University of Beirut Professor Randa Antoun in a March 2009 report co-sponsored by the United Nations. clusively, through one’s religious community and its attendant socio-political leadership, rather than through a state where citizens can claim equal rights and responsibilities, the system constantly “reinforces confessionalism and corruption . . . leaving little or no room for democratic succession in office or participation in the decision-making process.” “As long as we are linked to this confessional structure, resulting from the power-sharing formula on which Lebanon is based, corruption is prone to keep on going,” agrees Gaelle Kibranian, program director at the Lebanese Transparency Association.

The 2009 elections: free & fair? Perhaps nowhere was the axiomatic role played by confessionalism in the perpetuation of corruption more evident

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Since power is mediated and legitimated, sometimes ex-

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than in the June 2009 Parliamentary elections. By any standard, the amount of money that reportedly greased the polls in a country of only four million was extraordinary. According to one widely circulated report published in Newsweek magazine, the Saudi backers of the pro-government alliance (known as March 14) openly bragged that they alone had spent more than US$715 million to inﬂuence the outcome.

But this was only part of the story. Since the confessional system places an overriding premium on the interests and rights of one’s own religious grouping — and also on whatever loyalty one may have to a particular confessional boss (known as the Za’im) — all parties, even those committed to ﬁghting anti-corruption and promoting reform, are reported to have actively and sometimes unabashedly participated in what turned into a deluge of pre-election vote-buying among constituents, project and employment favoritism, ofﬁcial intimidation and the provision of expensive perks such as free travel. “It is undeniable that the election was the scene of remarkable spending that exceeded the ceiling of expenditures determined by law for each candidate,” charged one report in the July 2009 edition of The Monthly, a leading statistical periodical published in Beirut by Information International. According to one study carried out by The Monthly, in part with the help of documents anonymously supplied by the Ministry of the Displaced, a small village in the Northern battleground district of Koura, for example, saw

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“outright vote-buying done by both parties, with March 14 buying around US$150,000 worth of votes and March 8 [the opposition party] spending approximately US$25,000 on votes [emphasis added].” “There was a huge amount of corruption in the last election; you could see it with your own eyes,” explains Joulia Bou Karroum, program director at the Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections (LADE). “But one of the major problems was validating the incidents of corruption. For example, we were barred from taking pictures inside polling stations by the police, though we succeeded (in documenting corruption) in many other cases,” she says. However, the wave of international observers who were LEBANON

sent to monitor the June polls seemed to reach the opposite conclusion. In some cases, they generally lauded the elections in preliminary reports issued over the summer and bemoaned the lack of concrete evidence as far as electoral fraud was concerned. “While not without flaws,” said one such report from the partly U.S. government-funded National Democratic Institute, “Lebanon’s June 7 election was fundamentally peaceful and well administered and should provide the basis for confidence in the electoral process and, by extension, the formation of the new government.” “When you see the international reports on monitoring the elections, you sometimes can’t believe it,” as one senior civil society activist put it (on condition of anonymity because of fear that any criticism would jeopardize the flow of international funds to non-government organizations [NGOs]).

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“It is not easy for the local NGOs to work, to compile information about corruption, especially when it comes to elections,” the activist continues. “We have faced intimidation in the past, but international organizations, some of which are affiliated in one way or another with foreign interests, sometimes make our job even harder when they pronounce an election essentially free and fair after the local observation is that corruption was widespread. Verification is “hard, yes. And they say we don’t see proof,” says Jawad Adra, managing partner at Information International. “But if I were them, I would go to the Ministry of the Displaced and demand to see how much money the ministry spent two months before the elections. We got files that show how, in just one village, families who had already been compensated received an additional US$5,000.”

The fight to date: “marginal improvements,” sizeable obstacles Of course, the 2009 elections provide only one, although significant, example of the scale of corruption that most observers seem to agree is not only widespread, but has also deepened over the past three years of almost constant civil unrest, increased confessional agitation and the literal paralysis of nearly all state institutions, including the Parliament, which was shut down by the opposition for more than a year and a half. “The scale of corruption in the electricity sector is of course huge,” notes Toufic Gaspard, an economist who estimates that the public subsidy to cover operating losses

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by the state electric company exceeds US$1.4 billion a year. (According to one 2008 World Bank report, there are “multiple beneﬁciaries of the dysfunctional status quo in the sector, ranging from corruption in payments ﬂows or procurement, to buying of voters through free electricity…”). “But this is only the most blatant example. The real game is in the monetary sector, particularly in interest rate policy that resulted in an ‘unheard of’ $38 billion in interest payments by the government between 1993 and 2008, even though only $12 billion have been utilized in public sector investments,” Gaspard continues. The result: by 2009, the Central Bank announced that the country’s debt-to-GDP ratio was a whopping 162 perrate owned by politically connected Lebanese banks. According to Fadi Abboud, the head of the Lebanese Industrialists’ Association, matters have reached a point where small- to medium-sized Lebanese companies can attribute 2-3 percent of their turnover directly to corruption. “This is extremely high and we are just talking about day-to-day corruption, not the indirect costs of corruption in general,” says Abboud. Member of Parliament Ghassan Moukheibar acknowledges the scale of the problem and describes a grim scene of “corrupt politicians all across the board,” an ineffective judiciary where corruption is both widespread and accepted and the almost total lack of parliamentary or civil society tools (such as an ombudsman, a whistle-blower law, public access to information law etc.).

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cent ($47.2 billion), with more than half of the high interest

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But at the same time, Moukheibar points to several of what he calls modest improvements: “We have created the preparatory steps for action. And we ratiﬁed the UN Convention against Corruption last year, implemented some of the electoral reforms recommended by the Butros Commission and convened the Constitutional Council overseeing the elections for the ﬁrst time in years.” Nevertheless, he quickly adds, the Parliament has not taken steps to actually implement the UN convention, and the Constitutional Council will likely not be able to overturn even the most blatant cases of electoral fraud “because the evidentiary standards are so high” and, when it comes to changing the way elections are held, “we [the MPs] failed to curb the extreme situation of bribery. So, in practice, even the limited reforms of the electoral law have failed to be implemented and respected.”

Which way forward? Given that a fundamental change in the confessional system appears far-off, to say the least, one critical question for local and international actors involved in the ﬁght against corruption centers on whether or not Lebanon has ﬁnally developed enough protections and capacity to more directly attack the problem. Ghada Id, for example, an advocate who strongly encourages a more aggressive approach, regularly exposes corruption committed by all political sides on a show she hosts via the independently-owned New TV station. “Civil society organizations working against corruption here must change,” she argues. “We want them to take

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a more active role . . . People trust my program because I name the corruptors and those who have made mistakes in government and at different levels,” she says. For MP Moukheibar, however, the choice need not be mutually exclusive. “You need multiple actors doing different things,” he says, pointing out that the lack of a strong, independent judiciary failed to protect Id when one judge ordered police to surround her station in an attempt to arrest her. “When you name and shame, you can be accused of having no effective follow-up, of having no due process and inadequate access to all the facts in a certain case. “That’s why we need several types of efforts — including Ghada’s — working together if we are going to ﬁnally LEBANON

turn all of our preparations into reality,” he says. * Nicholas Noe is the co-founder and editor-in-chief of Mideastwire.com, a Beirut-based news translation service. He has published op-eds in the New York Times, the Guardian and other major media on US policy in Lebanon.

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LIBERIA

Liberia:

Corruption’s Legacy By John O. Kollie

Liberia, a tiny but naturally rich West African country, is one of Africa’s oldest independent countries. Roughly the size of the US state of Tennessee, Liberia gained its independence on July 26, 1847 and has a population of 3.3 million. It has a literacy rate of approximately 58 percent. Despite its longevity, Liberia is one of the world’s least developed and most impoverished nations, even when compared to others on the continent. Eighty percent of Liberians live below the poverty line, and the unemployment rate is estimated at 85 percent.

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The Global Integrity Index: How effective are Liberia’s anti-corruption safeguards? OVERALL RATING

Very Weak (54 out of 100 +/-2.05) CATEGORY RATINGS

1) Civil Society, Public Information & Media — Very Weak (59) 2) Elections — Moderate (72) 3) Government Accountability —Very Weak (45) 4) Administration & Civil Service —Very Weak (24) 5) Oversight & Regulation — Very Weak (51) 6) Anti-Corruption & Rule of Law — Moderate (71)

(Scores range from 0 to 100)

While there has been a recent emergence of good governance civil society organizations in Liberia, their input into government policymaking has been “disorganized [and] reactive, not proactive.” Watchdog groups have tried to fill the gap left by the politically compromised election monitoring agency by publishing detailed election reports and pursuing electoral violations in court. Many of the country’s political financing regulations remain unenforced absent an effective oversight body. Elected officials and civil servants are required to file asset disclosure forms but those in power have actively resisted auditing and public access to those records.

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Liberia’s underdevelopment can be attributed to multiple factors, with corruption at the top of the list. Corruption in Liberia generally consists of bribery, extortion, nepotism and general dishonesty. Shady deals in Liberia are endemic or, in the words of President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, “systemic.” “Corruption in the country is a norm,” Sirleaf said in a series of interviews with journalists in the Liberian capital of Monrovia. “It comes from tolerance and impunity in successive regimes that have allowed this thing to go the way it has.” The history of systemic corruption in Liberia dates back as far as the First Republic, the era of the elite Americo-Liberians. The First Republic was between Liberia’s founding, in 1822, its declaration of independence in 1847 and the civil conﬂict in 1980, when a military coup led LIBERIA

by a group of native soldiers ousted the Americo-Liberian regime. Americo-Liberians were freed slaves sent from the US to the shores of Liberia under the American Colonization Society, who ruled the country for over a century and mistreated native Liberians. News reports linking public ofﬁcials and private citizens to embezzlement or bogus transactions are regularly published in the country. Information Minister Lawrence Bropleh says the Justice Ministry is currently probing more than 100 corruption-related cases. He adds that some of the alleged perpetrators reportedly “are ofﬁcials of President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf’s administration.” And the situation appears to be worsening despite the president’s verbal commitment to curbing corruption. Transparency International, a global civil society orga-

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nization leading the fight against corruption, ranked Liberia 138th among 180 countries surveyed in its 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). Based on “the degree to which corruption is perceived to exist among public officials and politicians,” Liberia received a weighted average of 2.4 on the scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly transparent). In other words, according to the findings, Liberia is one of the world’s most corrupt countries. The number of factors contributing to dishonesty in Liberia is vast, but some of the foremost causes are: a lack of accountability and transparency; a merit system that encourages nepotism and political patronage; and the low salaries paid to public servants, which are not proportionate to their qualifications and living expenses. Other key factors are a history of irregular payment to public servants, greed, and of cases not being investigated to the end. An overwhelmed and under-funded judicial system, coupled with the lack of “political will” on the part of national leaders, means most corruption cases in Liberia are never heard or adjudicated. Every Liberian leader, including President Sirleaf, has been limited and affected by the general culture of impunity, in which alleged perpetrators are not prosecuted, that permeates the country. Consider the Liberia Maritime Registry.

The beginning of gross, open corruption After World War II, Liberia’s ship-registering program was protected from mainstream corruption by being headquartered in New York City. The Liberian Ship Registry, conceived

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by the American government for Liberia, generates enough money — roughly $24 million a year — to make it worthwhile to have ships register under the Liberian flag, even if an entity has no other economic activities in the country. The Registry began in 1948 under President William V.S. Tubman. Then-Secretary of State Edward Stettinius created the Registered Agent Office in New York City to register ships and corporations under the Liberian flag. With time, the easy registration system made Liberia the numberone ship registry in the world, and Liberia’s government was the earliest to contract out its administration of a ship registry to a private company. During Liberia’s civil war, the country depended heavily on the maritime funds, which accounted for some government in 1997, President Charles Taylor signed a new contract with Liberian International Ship & Corporate Registry (LISCR), and the program remained one of the few legal sources of income for the regime. But the secrecy with which the registry was run led to investigations that revealed massive corruption. It was later proved that Benoni Urey, the Bureau of Maritime Affairs (BMA) chief and Taylor’s business crony and family friend, had personally received about 20 percent of the Registry’s annual income, according to United Nations reports on Liberia (1999-2003). Today Urey is the most extravagant and flamboyant millionaire in Liberia, and he’s dogged by a United Nations travel ban for alleged economic crimes.

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70 percent of government revenue. After taking over the

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In addition, Liberia’s Truth and Reconciliation report, released in June 2009, names Urey as the leading economic criminal to be prosecuted. Even though Urey is no longer at the BMA, operations are not transparent under President Sirleaf. Urey is believed to still wield influence with the BMA and, while President Sirleaf brags about fighting corruption in revenue collection, expenditures of this lucrative Registry remain questionable. In fact, in October 2009, President Sirleaf appointed Urey as mayor of the elite Americo-Liberian settlement of Careysburg, eight miles outside the capital, Monrovia. “This confirms the long-time suspicion that Benoni Urey is an integral part of the president’s cronyism, in spite of his alleged criminal record under Charles Taylor, something she condemned during her struggle for political power,” says Aloysius Toe, head of the Foundation for Human Rights and Dignity (FORHD). Corruption is glaringly rife here. For example, maritime revenue is not reflected in Liberia’s annual budget as it should be, and all transactions are secret. The BMA’s new chief, Beyan Kesselly, after long ignoring public outcry for accountability and openness in reporting the Registry’s revenue, told the media that releasing financial information was a security threat. Finance Minister Augustine Ngafuan concurred. Ngafuan has warned national legislators against publicly disclosing the contents of the maritime bureau’s contract and budget. He said in a legislative hearing on the draft budget for fiscal year 2009-10 that doing so would reveal Liberia’s maritime secrets to competitors and hurt the country.

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The minister’s warnings came after successful requests to exclude maritime revenues from the fiscal budget. President Sirleaf had promised to instruct BMA officials to release the budget, but that has never happened. “I want you, all members of the Ways and Means Committee, to get the information and to use it with the care it deserves. Otherwise, we shoot ourselves in the foot,” Ngafuan told legislators. He also specified that if legislators get the information, as required by law, they should keep it under lock and key so that the public, who they are paid to represent, is left in the dark. Don’t let them see it — it is for your eyes only, his words clearly indicate. that compels government officials to provide information upon request. But Article 15, Section C, of the Constitution clearly states: “In pursuance of this right (to inform or be informed), there shall be no limitation to the public right to be informed about the government and its functionaries.” So much for constitutionally-ensured basic freedoms… *John O. Kollie is founder and Executive Director of the Liberia Media Initiative for Peace Democracy and Development, he is a correspondent for Radio France International in West Africa and coordinated a team of reporters covering the trial of former Liberian president Charles Taylor for the BBC World Service Trust. He has received awards from the Press Union of Liberia and was a National Endowment for Democracy fellow in 2006.

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Liberia has no speciﬁc freedom of information law

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ÂŠ Alex Barth

2009

Nicaragua:

An Electoral Fraud, the Price for Freeing Aleman By Camilo de Castro

The morning of November 9, 2008, Gabriela Gutierrez left home before dawn. Along with her husband and her eldest child, she headed straight to her polling place, precinct number 5431. She wanted to vote early, avoiding the long lines. This time she was certain her candidate would win the election and become the next mayor of Managua. All around the capital people turned out to vote in large

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numbers, despite rumors that sympathizers of the governing political party, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN—Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional), planned to intimidate opposition supporters. The FSLN candidate, Alexis Arguello, was behind in the polls. For the ﬁrst time in 16 years, the Supreme Electoral Council had barred national electoral observers from entering polling places, raising concerns about the possibility of foul play. By the end of election day, those fears became a reality. Election ofﬁcials closed Elena Santo’s polling place early and hundreds of people were not able to vote. According to an independent audit of the municipal elections published in May 2009 by the Institute for Democracy and Development (IPADE — Instituto Para el Desarrollo y la Democracia), the FSLN claimed victory in 13 of the country’s most populous municipalities as a result of widespread fraud. A total of 34 municipalities reported serious anomalies on election day. In violation of the electoral law, the Supreme Electoral Council never published the result of 30 percent of the precincts in Managua. A year after the election, thousands of voters are still wondering why their votes were not counted. Gabriela Gutierrez is one of them. “I voted with my whole family,” Gutierrez complains angrily. “It is unjust that our vote wasn’t counted.” The electoral fraud sparked several days of protests on the streets of Nicaragua’s largest cities and unleashed months of political unrest, raising more doubts about the ability of the government to tackle rising unemployment and violent crime in the country.

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The conﬂicts generated by the electoral fraud only made a bad situation worse. The price of export commodities plummeted because of falling demand on the US market. Beef prices fell by 30 percent, while retail saw a drop in sales of 11 percent. In response to the growing crisis, the textiles sector shed 26,342 jobs since February 2008. Despite calls for the resignation of the Supreme Electoral Council, the government defended the election results. In the face of international pressure over the result of municipal elections, President and FSLN’s leader, Daniel Ortega, blamed the crisis on a conspiracy by the wealthy, backed by the United States government and the media establishment. NICARAGUA

The fallout from the electoral fraud In June 2009, the US State Department canceled the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), which planned to invest US$64 million in road repairs, and land entitlement programs designed to beneﬁt 120,000 families in the northern states of Leon and Chinandega. The ﬁnal approval of a US$130 million loan from the Central American Economic Integration Bank was also put on hold, despite the desperate appeal of agricultural producers who asked not to be punished for the mistakes made by the government. A resolution approved by the European Parliament in December 2008 condemned the violation of basic human rights in Nicaragua, and concluded that the November municipal elections lacked “all democratic legitimacy.” The European Union froze US$62.4 million in aid, forcing the government to make deep cuts in the national budget, at the

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same time the Central Revenue Ofﬁce reported a steep fall in tax revenues. In July 2009, the government was forced to cut US$109 million from the national budget for not receiving the foreign aid, reducing the funding available for health, education and infrastructure programs. The president’s advisors assured the public that health and education programs would be prioritized, but a closer analysis of the budget reforms reveals an increase in other less important expenditures. In a year without scheduled elections, the Supreme Electoral Council was assigned more money for cell phone use than the entire Health Ministry. Three of the most unpopular branches of government — the National Assembly, Supreme Court and Supreme Electoral Council — were assigned a budget for advertising that surpassed the Health Ministry’s budget for public health campaigns by 26 times.

The end of checks and balances The General Comptroller’s Office has waved public procurement procedures 653 times since 2007, giving the government officials in Ortega’s administration a blank check to spend some US$350 million in public funds. According to a report published by the Comptroller’s Office in March 2009, over the past 14 months the Comptroller had given the current administration the green light to spend US$173 million without completing procurement procedures, by far a much larger amount than any other previous administration. By comparison, the government of former President

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Enrique Bolaños (2001-2005) was given in ﬁve years permission to contract US$103 million dollars without procurement, a mere 23 percent of the amount approved in the last two-and-a-half years. After the electoral fraud in November, opposition parties in the National Assembly stalled the president’s legislative agenda in protest. For a brief moment, the Constitutional Liberal Party (PLC — Partido Liberal Constitucionalista), the second-largest party in the National Assembly, looked ready to punish the FSLN for the electoral fraud by voting to remove the government-backed president of the National Assembly. But in early January 2009, it became clear the PLC was using its leverage to achieve a more important goal: the acof the PLC Arnold Aleman (1997-2002), who in 2003 was found guilty of diverting more than US$100 million in public funds to banks in Panama, the US and offshore accounts in the Caribbean. Three days before the election of the new president of the National Assembly, the Supreme Court acquitted Aleman of all charges and the FSLN remained in control of the National Assembly. In a sordid replay of the electoral fraud carried out in November, political interests prevailed over the public good, annulling any real hope of making civil servants accountable for their actions.

Grand scale corruption On June 30, 2008, the National Assembly approved US$20 million for the Nicaraguan Electricity Company

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quittal by the Supreme Court of former President and leader

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(ENEL — Empresa Nicarguense de Electricidad). According to the emergency funds request made by President Ortega, the money was needed to cover debts acquired between the state-owned energy company and the state-owned petroleum company, Petronic, which supplied the Nicaraguan Electricity Company with fuel oil. However, media reports later revealed that the Nicaraguan Electricity Company was secretly diverting public funds to ALBA CARUNA, a private lending institution run by associates of the ruling government party. A handful of legislators called for an investigation into the diversion of public funds, but neither the National Assembly nor the Comptroller’s Ofﬁce made a serious effort to investigate. In an environment of growing corruption, the Nicaraguan Electricity Company acted with impunity. In October 2008, documents leaked to the media showed that the director of the state-owned electricity company, Ernesto Martínez-Tiffer, ordered the company’s administrator to buy airtime in media outlets run by the family of President Ortega. Each month, the administrator would buy exactly US$19,000 worth of airtime in radio and T.V. programs and make out a check to Publicity and Digital Productions S.A (Publicidad y Producciones Digitales S.A.), a publicity agency run by Rosa Maria Hernandez, the wife of the ﬁrst lady’s personal assistant. Dozens of documents and checks showed that between March 2007 and March 2008, more than US$200,000 were used to pay for radio and T.V. spots that were never aired. Martínez-Tiffer, however, continues to head the state-owned electricity company with the full support of President Ortega.

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The ruling party has also beneďŹ ted from energy agreements signed between Venezuela and Nicaragua. Some US$300 million are managed without any oversight each year, as a result of a scheme designed by the government to evade institutional controls. As a result, President Ortega and his associates have been involved in the acquisition of hotels, gas stations, power stations, health clinics and multi-million dollar houses. Ironically, the Nicaraguan Central Bank forecasts the economy will contract by 1 percent in 2009 and, according to the last CID Gallup poll published in June, 68 percent of Nicaraguans say they are worse off today than 12 months ago.

Repression now believe it is unsafe to speak out about political issues in public. Since April 2008, FSLN sympathizers have attacked opposition rallies and protests organized by civil society organizations more than a dozen times in an effort to silence critics of the government. A journalist was stabbed in November 2008 and dozens of citizen have been injured. Despite public protests, the police refuse to investigate the attacks, raising serious questions about the credibility of the police force. The government also has used its inďŹ&#x201A;uence in the judicial system to intimidate journalists and civil society leaders who have been subject to investigation without legal justiďŹ cation. * Camilo de Castro is an investigative reporter at Esta Semana, a weekly news magazine show in Nicaragua.

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According to the same poll, 58 percent of Nicaraguans

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A graduate of Columbia University, he has collaborated with the Miami Herald Tribune and Chicago Tribune and in 2007 won the “Pedro Joaquín Chamorro” Award for Excellence in Journalism. He’s investigations revealed an extortion ring linked to close associates of President Daniel Ortega, the courts and the political party Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional.

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2009

Serbia:

Slight Improvements, Major Setbacks By Djordje Padejski

No reporter in the world would neglect an opportunity to expose government attempts to restrict the freedom of the media. Filip Svarm, a long-time editor for the Serbian news magazine Vreme, found his own opportunity when the Serbian parliament adopted changes to Serbia’s Media Law. New regulations now restrict freedom of expression, establish huge ﬁnes for violations and permit the closing down of media outlets.

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The Global Integrity Index: How effective are Serbia’s anti-corruption safeguards? OVERALL RATING

Weak (63 out of 100 +/-2.46) CATEGORY RATINGS

1) Civil Society, Public Information & Media — Moderate (76) 2) Elections — Moderate (72) 3) Government Accountability —Very Weak (49) 4) Administration & Civil Service —Very Weak (43) 5) Oversight & Regulation — Weak (69) 6) Anti-Corruption & Rule of Law — Weak (69)

(Scores range from 0 to 100)

Ineffective anti-corruption safeguards and mechanisms stubbornly persist in Serbia. The most noticeable decline in the country since Global Integrity’s last assessment of Serbia has been in the area of rule of law, where there have been signiﬁcant delays in the enforcement of court decisions brought about by a bloated court management system and uneven workloads of courts and judges. Appointments to law enforcement agencies continue to be highly politicized, although there are some nascent regulatory reform efforts underway. Citizen access to public information, including access to asset disclosure records of government ofﬁcials and records of contributions to political parties, is generally poor.

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Once the Media Law had passed, Svarm realized that Serbian media no longer had the right to free expression. The government now had the power to threaten the work of independent reporters. The government had the same power to control and close down the media as it had in Milosevic’s time. “No independent Serbian media outlet will again make the mistake of supporting a democratic revolution, because the revolutionaries have now done just about the same things their predecessors did 10 years ago when those then in ofﬁce were losing their power — place restrictions on media freedom,” Svarm said during a public conference held in 2009.

Campaign ﬁnancing needs ﬁxing The Serbian democratic revolution also has failed to make SERBIA

any progress on the issue of campaign financing. The influx of corporate money into politics is rarely discussed in public. While political parties do submit official financial reports, none of these reports ever lists the names of any of the wellknown, wealthy businessmen who make political contributions. On the contrary, an unofficial agreement allegedly exists among all of the parties to keep accurate financial reports that list election campaign contributors hidden from the public. But in 2008, Tomislav Nikoliü, former deputy leader of Serbian Radical Party (SRS — Srpska Radikalna Stranka), admitted for the first time that his former party was accepting donations from tycoons, especially from Miroslav Miškoviü’s Delta Holdings and from Milan Beko, who is behind such major investment funds as Laderna, Worldfin, Salford and FPP Balkan Limited.

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These two oligarchs, popularly known as the “owners of Serbia,” were among those who were most commonly cited by unauthorized media sources as backers of all of Serbia’s largest political parties. Miškoviü’s Delta Holdings hasn’t given any explanation about Nikoliü’s claims regarding the contributions to the SRS. In addition, information was revealed about how radical followers of ultra-nationalist leader Vojislav Seselj were funding SRS activities. Seselj is the founder and president of the Serbian Radical Party and is now facing war crimes charges by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia [ICTY]. While these kinds of revelations are crucial for the public to know, they do not seem to be so crucial to the work of the Republic Election Committee (REC — RepubOLþ ka Izborna Komisija). Even though this committee’s main job is to collect ﬁnancial reports from the political parties, it has never investigated any information related to campaign ﬁnancing. This attitude is not surprising, considering the committee is staffed with highly placed representatives of the political parties and, therefore, is unable to act independently. Former deputy leader NikolLü, so called new star of Serbia’s politics, gained a positive public reputation from citizens who quickly forgot his ultrnationalist nature. He founded the Serbian Progressive Party (SPP — Srpska Napredna Stranka), a more moderate right-wing party. This new party, made up of ex-radicals, soon took second place among voters and party members became serious contenders for support from former radical voters.

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Cases of misconduct and bribes The crucial event that had many wonder about Serbia’s commitment to anti-corruption laws took place in April 2009, when the Anti-corruption Council (ACC — Savet za borbu protiv korupcije) announced preparations to move the Belgrade Port facilities to a new location. By purchasing the shares of the unsuccessful Belgrade Port, its new owners both own the buildings and have usage rights on the land under them. With the help of some state ofﬁcials who made the formal decision to move the port to a different location, those companies now have control over 200 hectares of the best land in the city. This action led to a loss of 2 billion euros (US$2.9 billion) to the city of Belgrade’s budget. SERBIA

The Serbian TV show Insider B92, a show that specializes in investigative journalism, broadcast a report about this decision and called it an alleged serious “malversation,” or misconduct by a public official. The news report revealed how the privatization processes, in regard to dismantled state-owned companies, became a system for buying cheap land. No charges were ever filed regarding the Belgrade Port case. Meanwhile, most of the public anger regarding political corruption was focused on another case. This one involved Goran KneževLü, the mayor of Zrenjanin, a city located in northern Serbia. KneževLü was accused of involvement with organized crime, abuse of his office and accepting and offering bribes that led to budget losses estimated at 1.6 million euros (US$ 2,293,040).

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Politics more powerful than institutions in ďŹ ghting corruption The case of KneĹževiĂź who had been a high-ranking Democratic Party (DS -) politician, is a perfect example of how politics plays a greater role in ďŹ ghting corruption in Serbia than does the existence of competent institutions, which have that mandate. KneĹževiĂź was arrested just a few days after President Boris Tadic, president of DS, informally announced at the session of the DS Main Committee that he would be arrested while KneĹžeYLĂź was also present. Many experts say that the ďŹ ght against corruption remains a local matter because no charges have yet been ďŹ led at the national level, even in the cases that stand out, like the Belgrade Port case. This fact reveals much about the power of the political parties in Serbia. Independent enforcement agencies, independent regulatory bodies and institutions whose job is to ďŹ ght corruption all seem to lack signiďŹ cant inďŹ&#x201A;uence. The State Audit Institution (SAI â&#x20AC;&#x201D; DrĹžavna revizorska institucija), for instance, has been unable to work on budget revisions since 2006. This is due to political maneuvering that denied the SAI the necessary resources to carry out its mandate, such as a business ofďŹ ce and sufďŹ cient staff. The Anti-Corruption Council (ACC â&#x20AC;&#x201D; Savet za borbu protiv korupcije) and the ConďŹ&#x201A;ict of Interest Committee (CIC â&#x20AC;&#x201D; Savet za VSUHĂžDYDQMH sukoba interesa) will be replaced by an Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA â&#x20AC;&#x201D; Agencija za borbu protiv korupcije). The ACA will have serious power only on conďŹ&#x201A;icts of interest.

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Verica Barac, head of the ACC, confirmed how the Commission for the Protection of Competition (CPC — Komisija za zaštitu konkurencije) was actually “taken off the case” after the discovery of an alleged illegal monopoly that involves Miskovic’s Delta Holdings. (According to the CPC report, Delta Holdings and its subdivisions owned approximately 70 percent of Belgrade retail chains.) Slobodan Milosavljevic, Minister of Trade and Services, claimed there was no monopoly in the retail market and that data from the Statistical Office of Serbia confirms this. He criticized the CPC for their “unprofessional work” and said the government would not take any action in response to the alleged “random assessments” in the CPC report. There have been examples of regulators standing up SERBIA

to politicians. Sasa Jankovic, the state ombudsman, forced Nebojsa Ciric, State Secretary for Economy, and Slobodan Homen, State Secretary for Justice, to withdraw a request for the commercial court to stop all court proceedings and freeze the executive court decisions regarding labor relations until the international financial crisis is over. Data from the Ministry of Justice from the last five years show how poor the Serbian judiciary is. Data show during this time period, 4,316 cases were declared obsolete and had to be dropped due to missed deadlines for starting or ending proceedings by the judges. In the last two years, 517 final verdicts were not carried out because, again, deadlines were missed. As a result, convicted criminals did not serve their jail sentences. But not all news is bad. The implementation of a law

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regarding property seizure may lead to the prosecution of high-level criminals in Serbia. In the first three months since the law came into effect in March 2009, about 100 cases were filed regarding the seizure of property that was obtained through criminal activities. An investigation was launched concerning the property of members of the Zemun Clan who were convicted for, among other crimes, the assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran ĈLQÿLü in 2003. (The Zemun Clan is also alleged to have committed political murders, kidnappings and terrorist attacks). Ministry of Justice estimates indicate that about 50 million euros (US$71.9 million) worth of property could be confiscated in Serbia this year alone by the simple application of this law. * Djordje Padejski is an award winning investigative reporter, director and editor-in-chief of the Center for Investigative Reporting of Serbia — CINS (www.cins.org.rs), a nonprofit and anticorruption media organization.

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SLOVAKIA

Slovakia:

Communist Instinct and a Bottle of Cognac By Štefan Hudec “Slovenskoooo, hey-ya Slovenskooo!” shouted Slovakian soccer fans around the country in October 2009 when the Slovak national team defeated Poland and qualiﬁed for the 2010 World Cup. Slovakia hadn’t achieved such an accomplishment since they gained independence from Czechoslovakia in 1993. Soccer may be the country’s most popular sport and a source of national pride, but even so, many Slovakians boycott the domestic matches because they perceive them as being rife with corruption. Many have even stopped going to the matches or following them on TV and in the news.

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“The selling of matches is a common practice in Slovak soccer, together with bribing the referees,” says 31-year-old football fan Martin Hanulík, who stopped watching the national league’s games in 2009 both because of the team’s inconsistent performance, and because of his suspicion that the results were manipulated. Martin points at the scandal in the Slovak Football Federation (SFZ) as an example. Slovakian soccer’s second-highest ofﬁcial, Vladimir Wänke, was arrested in March 2007 after accepting ¼332 (US$400) from the owner of the Eldus Moþenok soccer club in a player registration deal. According to the rules, the SFZ must follow a process to approve every transfer of a player in the league. Wänke requested the money in exchange for speeding up the registration. Prosecutors say Wänke regularly used his position to demand not only ﬁnancial bribes, but also payment in wine and apples. In April 2009, the Special Court for Combating Corruption in Pezinok sentenced him to three years in jail.

Growing corruption Twenty years after the Velvet Revolution, corruption is still a major problem in this Central European nation of 5.5 million people. Overpriced and questionably managed tenders, government contracts awarded to party supporters and nepotism are common characteristics of political life. Softer forms of corruption — bribes of expensive alcohol paid to doctors in exchange for special medical treatment; or to professors to gain admission to prominent universities — are part of daily life for many Slovaks.

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Slovakia has made enormous economic progress in the last decade, which brought the country the nickname “Tatra Tiger” (The Tatras is the biggest mountain range in the country). The country joined the European Union and NATO in 2004 and in 2007, the annual GPD growth reached 10.4 percent – the highest rate among the OECD members. Nevertheless, the nation still struggles with corruption and an ineffective judiciary. The situation has worsened since 2007 when it was ranked 49 on Transparency International (TI)’s world corruption list. In 2009, it was ranked 56, among the lowest of European Union members.

Communist instinct and a bottle of cognac that existed under communist rule (1948-1989) accustomed Slovaks to manipulating the system to receive benefits such as a flat, a new car, special medical treatment or a visa. “It was a part of people’s everyday life,” says political science professor and former dissident Miroslav Kusý. Even Prime Minister Robert Fico revealed that before the Velvet Revolution in 1989, he had given a bottle of cognac to a physician for treating his father. At a 2008 press conference, he claimed it was acceptable to use public funds to reward his supporters or sympathizers if their proposals conformed to the law and the rules. “We will not consider it unacceptable if, in the case of two equal projects of the same quality and the same final effect, a minister gives preference to a mayor who supports the ruling coalition,” said Fico, quoted by Slovak Spectator newspaper.

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Experts suggest that the widespread corrupt behavior

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According to Kusý, corruption boomed after the communist regime fell, and it is reaching enormous dimensions. “It’s not any more about a pack of cigarettes or small gifts like during the old times; now, it’s a matter of thousands, even million of Euros.” Almost every month a new scandal arises that involves government ofﬁcials. The biggest one concerns a mysterious U.S.-based company, Interblue Group, in a dream deal with the Slovak government. In November 2008, Slovakia sold its free carbon credits to Interblue far below the real market price. According to opposition parties and media reports, Slovakia could have sold the credits for up to ¼75 million (US$3.3 million). Interblue Group, a corporation created only a few weeks before the transaction, bought the emissions at a price of ¼5.05 (US$0.22) per tonne, while neighboring Hungary and the Czech Republic sold their extra carbon credits for at least ¼12 (US$0.52) a tonne. Astonishingly, Interblue’s headquarters are an ordinary house with a two-car garage near Snohomish, a small town in Washington State. Prime Minister Fico described the reports about the scandal as an “ungrounded attack on the government,” but nevertheless he sacked the Environment Minister, Jan Chrbet, who was politically responsible for the deal. The sale is still under investigation by the Slovak Anti-Corruption Ofﬁce. According to the SME Daily, the case has also drawn the attention of U.S. authorities, notably the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The sale of emission allowances could lead to a bizarre ending. Hospodárske Noviny, Slovakia’s leading economic

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daily, revealed that Interblue has connections to the firm R. F. Development, which was owned by Prime Minister Fico. He sold his shares in 2004, but his wife, Svetlana, was active in the firm until 2007. The Prime Minister’s office described this accusation as absurd, but the government has refused to explain how the price for the extra carbon credits was decided. Another major scandal involved the state-owned Slovak Land Fund. It started in 2007 when the private company GVM, closely tied to former Prime Minister and current co-leader of coalition government Vladimír Me iar, obtained a lucrative land deal in the Tatra Mountains, an area famous for its skiing. GVM contacted eight former landowners near the East Slovakian town of Michalovce whose property had been confiscated eligible for compensation as part of the restitution process. GVM promised some landowners that they would receive compensation from the Slovak Land Fund, under the condition that they would immediately sell the land to the corporation. The Slovak Land Fund eventually signed a contract to give land to the former landowners in the High Tatras. The owners then sold the land to GVM for only ¼391,000 (US$17,250). However, according to property experts, the real price should have been at least ¼45 million (US$1.99 million). A similar case occurred two years later, also involving GVM, and the new Slovak Land Fund’s management was fired again. The political dimension of the scandal was even greater, because the Prime Minister’s cousin, Jaroslav Rybanský, was head of the restitution and oversight department that oversaw the deal.

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during the communist era. Now older and retired, they became

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Where the money comes from . . . Corruption among government officials and politicians is already a hot topic in the June 2010 elections. Many officials own property with values that exceed their real income. The most visible example is the leader of extreme right Slovak National Party (SNS), Ján Slota. His official income should not exceed ¼583,300 (US$25,700), but his ostentatious lifestyle suggests otherwise. He regularly flies private jets, owns a yacht, a villa in Croatia and several luxurious cars. Before every election, the political parties promise to introduce a bill requiring individuals to prove their sources of income. After several failed attempts, Parliament adopted new legislation in March 2010. Any Slovak can now demand to know the source of any person’s assets over ¼450,000 (US$19,900); 1,500 times the country’s minimum wage). “It’s a law that will deal with cases where someone built an equity empire through criminal activities in five or 10 years,” said Prime Minister Fico, who promoted the bill. However, the former Minister of Justice and Member of the opposition Christian-Democrat Movement (KDH), Daniel Lipšic, described the law as toothless and very mild. He explained in a TASR news wire that the more sophisticated of corrupt politicians could easily bypass the law through various gifts, loans and fictitious purchases of shares offered at incredibly low prices. The current ruling parties — Smer, HZDS and SNS — are not the only parties with reputations for corruption. The first “victim” of this year’s election battle is former Prime Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda, who brought Slovakia into the European Union and NATO and is leader of the opposition

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Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (SDKU). He was forced to pull out from the June 2010 Parliamentary election over accusations of money laundering and non-transparent ﬁnancial operations of his party. The ﬁght against corruption promises to be a long one. Change must come not only from politicians, but from a change in the mindset of ordinary people. “Many Slovaks are themselves actively involved in corruption, so they excuse politicians or don’t report the faulty behaviors of their own,” claims Zuzana Wienk, an expert at the investigative watchdog group Fair-Play Alliance. In addition, many Slovaks are afraid to talk openly about corruption or report it to the authorities because of SLOVAKIA

fears of retribution. These fears are not unreasonable at all, as a group of employees at Lesy SR the state forest company found out when, in June 2009, they wrote a letter criticizing the non-transparent and ineffective handling of state property. Though there was a “management reshufﬂing” in response, the employees of the communication department, who helped prepare the letter, were ﬁred at the end of 2009 because the company was “being reorganized.” * Štefan Hudec writes about international news for the Foreign Desk of SME, a leading newspaper in Slovakia. His stories focus on European politics and countries struggling with human rights issues, such as Cuba, Burma and China. A graduate of Comenius University and the University of Limerick, he is working toward a PhD, studying the integration of Turkey into the E.U.

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ÂŠ Cristoffer Crusell

2009

Uganda: UGANDA

Land of the Corrupt Heroes By Mikaili SSeppuya

In a widely leaked forensic report about the National Social Security Fund (NSSF), the Inspector General of Government (IGG) revealed that suspended Managing Director David Chandi Jamwa charged personal expenditures for Shs72.9 million (US$37,000) to the Fund. Of that money, at least Shs15.9 million (US$8,000) was spent in Casinos in Las Vegas; Shs16.3 million (US$8,000) was spent on clothing and Shs471,625 (US$244) was spent in a gun shop, among other places. The report went on to say that by January 2008, Jamwa received salary advances for over Shs244 million (US$127,000) plus gratuities, all totalling Shs330.5 million (US$172,000),

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The Global Integrity Index: How effective are Uganda’s anti-corruption safeguards? OVERALL RATING

Weak (69 out of 100 +/-0.84) CATEGORY RATINGS

1) Civil Society, Public Information & Media — Weak (69) 2) Elections — Weak (61) 3) Government Accountability —Moderate (71) 4) Administration & Civil Service — Moderate (72) 5) Oversight & Regulation — Moderate (73) 6) Anti-Corruption & Rule of Law — Moderate (71)

(Scores range from 0 to 100)

The gap between the existence and actual implementation of key anticorruption safeguards in Uganda is one of the largest in the world. While the legal framework is strong on the books, in practice implementation falls short. Low levels of funding and insufficient capacity hinder almost all government oversight agencies including the Inspectorate General of Government (IGG). As a result, the IGG cannot effectively enforce existing conflicts of interest regulations. Recognizing the need to build capacity, new training requirements have been put in place for procurement officials.

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even though he was not supposed to receive such advances because he was not a contributor to the Fund. If that money was to be paid during the remaining part of his contract (valid until January 2010) at his basic salary rate of Shs18 million per month, he would have had to make payments of Shs8 million per month to the Fund, instead of it paying him. The NSSF, worth over four trillion Uganda shillings, has seen scandal after scandal in the last decade, as its top managers misuse it for purposes that do not seem to be in the interest of the workers. Last year, an IGG report to the president said that members were discouraged to continue remitting their money UGANDA

because of the rampant mismanagement of the Fund. The report itself was triggered by a previous scandal that involved an attempt to purchase several hundred acres in Temangalo. The land belonged to Security Minister Amama Mbabazi and some friends, who allegedly inﬂated the prices. The Cabinet exonerated Amama Mbabazi of any wrongdoing; however, the process ended in the investigations that revealed the foregoing scandals instead.

A long way to go Though President Yoweri Museveni has on several occasions declared “war” on corruption, it seems there is still a very long way to go before the ﬁght is won. “The war now is on corruption,” he said at a time when the country had been rated the third highest in corruption by an international body.

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The national integrity survey by the IGG in 2008 said the police and the judiciary were the most corrupt public institutions, and that the public glorified corruption. “More than eight out of 10 people named the police force as the most corrupt, followed by the Judiciary (79 percent), URA (77 percent), district service commissions (74 percent), Umeme (73 percent) and Public Pension Service (71 percent),” the report said. “Members of society known to have acquired their wealth through corrupt means are regarded as heroes,” said the report. “On the other hand, those with little wealth but with integrity are regarded as failures.” “This is the highest form of societal betrayal regarding building moral character, natural value and a just society,” the IGG said. The report was based on public surveys and said that most people were losing confidence in the bodies commissioned to fight corruption and nepotism, in large part because of perceived impunity.

A pervasive grid of bribes Bribery and corruption practices are highly pervasive and extend to the very top of many organisations. An example of this pervasiveness is the case of Umeme, the national power distributor. Almost everyone in the country has paid bribes to get connected to the national grid. In November 2008, the author was forced to pay Shs50,000 to a company ofﬁcial because the electrician who wired the house said that without the bribe, Umeme personnel

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would say “it was poorly wired” and the expensive application process would have to be redone from scratch. Because there is a shortage of electrical technicians and it takes so long for the Umeme personnel to connect people to the grid, there is practically no alternative. Everest Kayondo, a tour operator, says he paid Shs5,000 to Umeme ofﬁcials to ﬁx his meter, which seemed to be counting the units too fast, forcing him to pay too much. “I know the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority (PPDA) are waiting for me to pay a personal tip to one of them to do the work. Otherwise, why take so long over such a simple thing?” he said. The General Salim Saleh Committee investigating Umeme UGANDA

is also investigating reports that the meters are calibrated to trip at higher speeds than the industrial benchmarks, measuring more energy consumed than was actually used. So far, nothing has happened. Umeme recently announced it plans to give up wiring inspections to private operators because the consumer backlash experienced gives the company a bad name.

Corruption in the Fourth Estate and beyond In my own experience as a journalist I have come across cases where those who do not give some sort of kickback to their superiors are deprived of assignments that have a travel element, even when the story falls within their beat. It is impossible to report such cases because the system emphasizes reporting to a superior who directly beneﬁts from these practices and who would call the reporter “uncooperative”

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— an euphemism for refusing to take part in a corrupt practice. Bodies that provide public service, including revenue collectors, are notorious for holding their clients at ransom. The Anti-Corruption Court, set up in May 2008, convicted four minor officials who had been involved in the Global Fund scandal, where millions of dollars meant to help AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria victims were misused. Ethics and Integrity Minister Dr. Nsaba Buturo said this was a measure of the government to get rid of corruption. But the Global Fund scandal took place in 2007, so it’s evident how slowly the wheels of justice grind in Uganda. Many people will remain skeptical until ministers who are allegedly involved in corruption schemes appear in court. Otherwise, it will be very difficult to have any reason to believe that the political will to fight corruption applies equally to all people. * Mikaili Sseppuya is a freelance reporter with the East African Business Week, a regional paper covering the countries of Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda. He formerly wrote for the Ugandan daily The New Vision and is a former Commonwealth and Foreign Office Fellowship award holder, studying cooperative development at the International Cooperative College, then at Stanford Hall, Loughborough, U.K.

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VENEZUELA

Venezuela:

Between Corruption and Protests By Carlos Cubero

Edgar G., a doctor who practices in Caracas, decides to pay 2,000 bolívares fuertes (US$930) to a “private agent” (a middleman used in some Latin American countries to handle bureaucracy) because it is the only way he knows to keep his medical practice going. “I am required to process a great quantity of documents and other requirements. I have only two weeks to accomplish all this work, which is not enough time, so I need to hire a middle man to meet these requirements”, he says. “The system is designed in a way that allows corruption to ﬂourish,” he adds.

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The Global Integrity Index: How effective are Venezuela’s anti-corruption safeguards? OVERALL RATING

Weak (61 out of 100 +/-2.31) CATEGORY RATINGS

1) Civil Society, Public Information & Media — Weak (61) 2) Elections — Very Weak (55) 3) Government Accountability — Weak (61) 4) Administration & Civil Service — Very Weak (53) 5) Oversight & Regulation — Weak (67) 6) Anti-Corruption & Rule of Law — Weak (69)

(Scores range from 0 to 100)

The effects of the consolidation of power in Venezuela’s executive branch are far-reaching and of pressing concern. Political pressure from the executive branch inﬂuences the effectiveness and independence of virtually all government oversight agencies including the ombudsman, the supreme audit institution, the police force, and the courts. The election monitoring agency is described as having “no teeth” when it comes to monitoring donations to political parties, as audits of those donations are rarely completed.

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Another example of corruption in Venezuela can be seen in the predicament of a Venezuelan businessman who is under investigation by the National district attorney’s office. Police officers from the Corporation of Scientific, Penal and Criminal Investigations (Cuerpo de Investigaciones Cientificas, Penales y Criminilasticas CICPC —) come to the businessman’s house, claiming they are there to search for evidence. Instead, they take the man into a back room, explain to him that he is “in trouble” and blackmail him into paying them 6,000 bolívares fuertes (US$2,970). The businessman consults with his attorney who recommends that he pay off the officers — otherwise, they will plant false evidence that could further damage his case. These victims may very well have committed the crimes they will never publicly denounce these blackmail schemes. These two cases serve as examples of the corruption that many Venezuelans face every day. Venezuelan people think that there is much corruption, but that’s not one of their main concerns. A 2006 survey of the Venezuelan Institute of Data Analysis (Instituto Venezolano de Datos IVAD —) says that 72 percent of the population believes there is much corruption in Venezuela. According to Felix Seijas, president of IVAD, his most recent surveys show similar perceptions. “The people don’t believe that corruption is one of their more serious problems, but a majority thinks that there is much more corruption in this government than in previous ones,” Seijas says. “The people think that this government will not be able to solve any insecurity or corruption problems,” he adds.

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for which they have been accused of. And for that very reason,

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Venezuelans are more worried these days about other issues: their personal security, the high cost of living and unemployment. The people worry more about a mugger attacking them at a subway station exit than they worry about those government officials who may be flaunting their wealthy lifestyles. Monthly surveys conducted by Datanálisis (February to May 2009) report that only less than 5 percent of Venezuelans state that corruption is the main problem that faces their country. But when they are asked what they believe are the possible causes of their personal insecurity, more than a fifth of Venezuelans blame the high level of police corruption. José Antonio Gil Yépes, president of the survey company Datanálisis, affirms that these recent findings provide no reason to think that the common practice of bribing government officials has diminished. “In the past, a public administrator may simply have been dishonest or greedy. But right now, our country is completely polarized by class hatred and Government officers usually ask for bribes and contractors must pay if they want the permits,” he says.

The institutional weakness The polarized environment that Gil Yépes mentions is characterized by a bitter political conﬂict where there is no negotiation between the battling elites. The middle and upper classes from the urban centers have been confronting President Hugo Chávez with street demonstrations (even though there are fewer of them now than there were in 2002 and 2003, which were periods of greater political instability).

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There are also growing protests by citizens, especially from lower and lower-middle classes, many of whom identify themselves as “chavistas” and center their attention on social rather than political issues, such as deficiencies in basic services, insecurity or labor issues. These include road blockings, demonstrations, strikes and other forms of protest, and corruption is often identified as one of the causes of the protest. The Venezuelan Program of Education-Action in Civil Rights (Programa Venezolano de Educacion-Accion en Derechos Humanos — PROVEA) reported that, between October 2008 and September 2009, there were 2,893 protests: 2,822 were peaceful and 71 violent protests. Though the opposition won half of the 10 most popuchavismo (Chávez supporters) won in 13 of the 14 states with smaller populations. These results confirm that people who live in the extremely poor neighborhoods and in the rural areas still support President Chávez. And the president takes advantage of his popularity in these areas by giving speeches against the oligarcas (oligarchy). As of 2009, Chávez has been in power for 10 years. Along with the chavismo, he has been in strong control of the country’s institutions and faces only a dozen or so opponents in the National Assembly (Asamblea Nacional AN — ) and Supreme Court (Tribunal Supremo de Justicia TSJ — ), whose membership was extended to 32members a few years ago when the revolutionary parties had a solid majority. After his victory in the referendum held on February 15, 2009, Chávez decided to intensify his revolution. He stifled

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lous states in the country in the November 2008 elections, the

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opposition leaders by taking away their government titles and anti-Chávez demonstrators were jailed. Both these actions were supported by the district attorney’s ofﬁce, the courts and the Assembly, which reformed the Electoral Law so it would favor Chávez’s majority. The government expanded private industry expropriations, which included such actions as the revocation of the broadcast licenses of 36 radio stations. But even with power so concentrated in Chávez’s government, the opposition still manages to ﬁnd opportunities to denounce the abusive use of the central government’s resources. One important form of opposition was the February 15, 2009, referendum to amend the Venezuelan Constitution. A contractor of transportation vehicles to the state-owned Venezuelan petroleum company, Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), the largest in the country, confesses that he got very little sleep in the days leading up to the vote. This was due to the enormous amount of time he spent moving activists from Chávez’s United Socialist Party of Venezuela (Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela PSUV — ) from one place to another, so they could vote yes on the referendum. “I passed all my invoices to Pdvsa for all these trips. Let’s see when they will pay me now,” he said. Not surprisingly, he does not want his name mentioned.

Chávez admits there is a corruption problem So far during 2009, no important chavistas leaders have been jailed for corruption. Yet, people are wondering about the guilt or innocence of three of Chavez’s most important enemies who are currently being prosecuted for administrative irregu-

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larities: Manuel Rosales, the opposition’s most powerful leader; former Defense Minister General Raúl Baduel, who is now in a military prison; and former governor Eduardo Manuitt. President Chávez has been talking about ﬁghting corruption these days — he is aware that its continued existence may damage the popularity of the revolution. During July 2009, he used his Sunday television appearances to launch attacks against corrupt public functionaries and threatened to get court authorization to tape their private telephone conversations. Chávez’s speeches galvanized the district attorney into announcing the launch of an upcoming anti-corruption campaign. This campaign is expected to begin with accusations ernors. (Venezuela is divided into 24 states and 335 counties.) Of those cases now open, all of which are under investigation right now, three of them involve directors of the PSUV and two involve members from the opposition. Among the former mayors who are facing these accusations, four of them belong to PSUV while another four are members of the opposition.

There Is no transparency Mercedes de Freitas, who represents the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Transparency, says: “The government makes little effort to generate information, process it, and make it available. Where it fails most is in making it accessible.” The Venezuelan government refuses to recognize Transparency because, it claims, the NGO’s actions and opinions may be inﬂuenced by the fact that it receives funds from abroad.

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against 30 former municipal mayors and 5 former state gov-

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However, this reporter has had his own experience with accessing public information. A request made to the National Electoral Council (Consejo Nacional Electoral CNE — ), in December 2008 for information regarding the campaign funds of the December 2, 2007 Referendum, has not been answered as of August 2009, even after four meetings and seven telephone calls. Venezuelan institutions are completely closed to giving information to the independent press. In addition, in April 2009, Julio Moreno, president of the Controller Commission, which investigates corruption in the National Assembly, was suddenly released from his post. No official reason was given, but Moreno was known for issuing public statements about corruption cases that were being pursued by his office. However, his successor, Representative Rafael Gil, does not hold press conferences because, he alleges, his office wants to protect the names of those under investigation.

News of corruption arrives from abroad News from other scandals also comes from abroad. In one instance, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) presented evidence that the Venezuelan government was directly related to a case containing US$800,000 (in cash) conﬁscated to Venezuelan-American businessman Antonini Wilson, in August 2007, in a Buenos Aires airport on a ﬂight coming from Caracas, Venezuela. Wilson was released after a while and he went back to Miami, where he contacted the FBI and explained that the money had been sent to the Argentinean government to cover costs for Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner’s campaign.

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At the time, she was the First Lady and a presidential candidate. She is now the president of Argentina. The FBI decided then to set up a trap and made Wilson send a letter to President Chávez demanding $2 million in exchange for remaining silent about the real destination of the money. Then the Venezuelan Government sent agents to Miami to meet with Wilson and agreed to pay him and provide him with legal help for a trial in Buenos Aires. Once these conversations were recorded in Miami, the FBI placed the Venezuelan agents under custody for acting without permission of the American government. They were later judged and sentenced by a Florida court. Chávez declared Antonini Wilson a “traitor to his counoriginal statement during his arrest in Buenos Aires, where he alleged that the 1,720,000 bolivares fuertes (US$800,000) belonged to him and not to the Venezuelan government. In another case, in December 2008, the German company Siemens settled with the U.S. Justice Department in a court in the District of Columbia and paid US$8 million in ﬁnes for committing acts of bribery and corruption involving many countries, including Venezuela, in relation to a project to build a suburban train system. The district attorney’s ofﬁce in Caracas announced its own investigation about these charges, but little news has been forthcoming since then. In conclusion, the situation seems to have changed quite a bit since 2004, when Global Integrity issued its last report on Venezuela.

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try.” The Venezuelan district attorney accepted as fact Wilson’s

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At that time, the intense debate about corruption that we have now didn’t exist, and there were not so many cases of corruption as there are now. At the beginning of 2010, there were corruption investigations in 9 percent of the majors’ ofﬁces of the country and in 21 percent of the state governments. Also, there weren’t international corruption scandals such as the $800,000 suitcase one. However, the weakness of the national institutions due to their strong Chávez inﬂuence, do not allow any of these cases to be faced or prosecuted. * Carlos Subero is a Venezuelan investigative reporter who specializes in precision journalism with more than 28 years of experience. As one of the top journalists in his country, he received a mention in the National Award of Journalism in 1989 and has given lectures about journalism and politics in Lima, Tokyo and Washington. He’s also a journalism teacher.

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ZIMBABWE

Zimbabwe:

Rotting From the Head Down By Njabulo Ncube

The stolen Zimbabwean presidential election ranks as the biggest corruption scandal to rock the crisis-riddled country in 2008. The March 29 election pitted incumbent President Robert Mugabe against his nemesis, opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai. It took more than a month for the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), the body charged with conducting all elections, to announce the election’s results. “No candidate has received a majority of the total number of valid votes cast,” Lovemore Sekeramayi, ZEC’s constituency ofﬁcer, told reporters at a press conference in

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The Global Integrity Index: How effective are Zimbabwe’s anti-corruption safeguards? OVERALL RATING

Very Weak (59 out of 100 +/-0.08) CATEGORY RATINGS

1) Civil Society, Public Information & Media — Very Weak (55) 2) Elections — Very Weak (53) 3) Government Accountability —Very Weak (45) 4) Administration & Civil Service —Weak (61) 5) Oversight & Regulation — Moderate (74) 6) Anti-Corruption & Rule of Law — Weak (68)

(Scores range from 0 to 100)

The 2008 elections gave Zimbabwe’s leading opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change, a majority in Parliament and a stake in the executive branch. However, the true gain in inﬂuence for the MDC has been small. The legislature’s role in policymaking is often bypassed through the use of executive orders, while policy explanations offered by the executive branch often go unquestioned by media. The 2008 political power sharing agreement (entitled the Global Political Agreement) has not led to increased accountability on the part of Zimbabwe’s extremely powerful executive. The courts have no power to review executive decisions and conﬂicts of interest regulations are absent. The president also enjoys the unchecked authority to appoint judges to the country’s highest court and the heads of the police force.

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Harare on May 2, 2008. “The provision of Section 110 (3) of the Electoral Act, Chapter 2:13, applies, and a second election shall be held on a date to be advised by the commission. According to Section 110 (4) of the Electoral Act, the two candidates who received the highest and second-highest numbers of valid votes cast shall be eligible to contest the second election. Accordingly, Tsvangirai and Mugabe are eligible to contest in the second election.” Now the prime minister in Mugabe’s coalition government, Tsvangirai, had outpolled Mugabe by more than 200,000 votes in the initial election. He attributes the delay in announcing the results to an attempt to tinker with the election’s outcome. ZIMBABWE

Marauding militia The run-up to the June 27, 2008 run-off sparked violence that led to Tsvangirai pulling out of the race. Mugabe deployed more than 200 senior army ofﬁcers to take charge of his violent campaign. They created no-go areas for Tsvangirai and his ofﬁcials, and Mugabe’s marauding militia killed more than 500 of Tsvangirai’s supporters in cold blood (the number is still debatable in Zimbabwe). Mugabe then proceeded to campaign in the one-man race. The outcome was declared a sham both regionally and internationally. The outcry forced the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the African Union (AU) and former South African President Thabo Mbeki to broker a shaky Government of National Unity (GNU), which was inaugurated on Feb. 2009, to accommodate the “winner.”

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“It’s one of the most gigantic electoral frauds in the history of Zimbabwe,” says Okay Machisa, director of ZimRights, a human rights watchdog based in the capital, Harare. “Nothing can surpass that stolen election. The country is in a crisis because of the systematic rigging, human rights abuses and violence that followed after Mugabe lost the initial presidential election to Tsvangirai.” The Zimbabwe African National Union — Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) and President Mugabe’s aids have continuously denied stealing the election, claiming that Tsvangirai failed to garner more than 51 percent of the votes cast. “That’s why we had a run-off which was overwhelmingly won by President Mugabe,” said Emmerson Mnangagwa, Mugabe’s chief campaign manager, when asked about the allegations. However, Tendai Biti, Tsvangirai’s secretary general and MDC chief negotiator in the coalition government, maintained that the elections were stolen through vote rigging and the use of violence allegedly by Mugabe’s agent provocateurs. Tsvangirai boycotted the run-off citing violence. “We won the elections. We have the true mandate of the people to form the new government. However, we have been forced into this animal called the GNU (Government of National Unity) to save lives as well as take this country forward. But if truth is told, Morgan Richard Tsvangirai and the MDC won the presidential and parliamentary elections. State security agents, the army and police were accomplices to the whole scandal,” said Biti. With the formation of the power-sharing government in February 2009 have come attempts to reform the electoral

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body. To avoid vote-rigging and other fraudulent activities that have plagued Zimbabwe’s electoral system, the Electoral Commission, previously packed with Mugabe’s sycophants, now includes members acceptable to civil society organizations and all three political parties in the coalition government.

Other areas of abuse John Maketo, a senior program officer with Transparency International Zimbabwe (TIZ), concurred that although corruption in Zimbabwe has manifested itself in various forms, the controversy surrounding Mugabe’s contentious re-election took center stage in 2008. “High-profile corruption cases ranged from politically mostly by people of influence and power,” Maketo says. “In June 2008, the nation witnessed electoral corruption at its peak, as the Zimbabwe African National Union — Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) used violence, intimidation and exclusion to entrench its position in power and government. The oneman election was widely condemned by local and international observers as a violation of people’s political rights to decide their governors. State resources, through the Farm Mechanization Program, were also abused on a massive scale in order to buy votes.” More than 10 legislators have appeared in the country’s courts for abusing the Farm Mechanization Program — the program Mugabe used as sweetener to buy votes. However, many cases involving ZANU PF legislators have inexplicably been dropped by the courts.

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motivated abuse of power to grand economic enrichment,

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“On the economic front, people of inﬂuence and power continued to massively loot national resources at the expense of ordinary people and national development,” Maketo added. Citing army generals’ looting of diamonds at the Chiadzwa Diamonds Fields in eastern Zimbabwe, in which more than 500 civilians were allegedly killed between 2008 and 2009 (the number is still debatable in Zimbabwe), Maketo says there was evidence that politicians and their associates enriched themselves by illegally extracting and smuggling the precious mineral out of the country before hiding the proceeds in off-shore accounts.

Illegal land-grabs The state of corruption in Zimbabwe cannot be fully exposed without mentioning various incidents of illegal landgrabbing by individuals of inﬂuence and power, despite the formation of the inclusive government. This tactic makes the land-grabbers owners of multiple farms while there are millions of landless Zimbabweans. At the time of this writing, about 300 out of 6,500 white farmers were under siege from raiding Mugabe hatchet men as they continued his policy to expropriate land, using the pretext that he is addressing a wrong left by colonial rule, which ended in 1980. A report released by the General Agriculture and Plantations Workers Union of Zimbabwe (GAPWUZ) in August 2009 reveals that more than 66,000 farm workers had been left homeless as a result of illegal land grabs. The report, entitled Fresh Invasions and Challenges Faced by Farm Workers in Zimbabwe, claims the land-grabbers hired armed police to force the farm workers off farms.

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“Farm workers have been turned into nomads,” reads part of the GAPWUZ report, which was presented to Prime Minister Tsvangirai. The “financial” or “cash” crisis in the banking sector also created an environment conducive to fortune-making by corrupt individuals who perpetuate the black market, making life very difficult for ordinary citizens. One of the most scandalous cases involved the controversial governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, Gideon Gono, who illegally withdrew money from the foreign-currency accounts of nongovernmental organizations, individuals, companies and embassies, allegedly to bankroll Mugabe’s electioneering as well as to fund his operations. Gono, who, rightly or wrongly, is also mentioned as one ted that the Central Bank raided accounts of nongovernmental organizations to the tune of about US$1 billion. In attempts to nip corruption in the bud, the coalition government has proposed setting up an independent anticorruption commission through the bicameral parliament, but doubts exist about whether it will be given arrest and prosecutorial powers. An anti-corruption commission set up in the previous Mugabe administration did not enjoy much success: it fingered only small-fry in corrupt activities instead of known senior politicians in the former ruling party, ZANU PF.

Vehement opposition to reforms Attempts by independent bodies and corruption watchdogs to rally Zimbabweans against corruption have met with vehement opposition from ZANU PF members and

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of the most corrupt individuals in Zimbabwe, publicly admit-

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other politicians who have benefited from Mugabe’s politics of patronage. Transparency International Zimbabwe (TIZ), a local corruption watchdog, established the Advocacy and Legal Advisory Center (ALAC) in January 2009 to keep track of vice and graft in Zimbabwe, but it has faced harassment and intimidation from politicians and people benefiting from corrupt activities. According to a report TIZ released on Aug. 28, 2009, the Zimbabwean public continues to complain about officials entrusted with public procurement who receive or solicit bribes in order to award tenders. “The distribution of farming equipment and farm implements, such as grinding mills, fuel and scotch carts, has largely been corrupt as responsible officials, like members of parliament, district administrators and agricultural extension officers, allegedly abused their offices to enrich themselves,” Mary-Jane Ncube, national director of TIZ, wrote in her monthly report on corruption trends in Zimbabwe. “According to TIZ ALAC Updates, published monthly since April 2009, the police force ranked high among other sectors as the most prone to corruption,” she wrote. “The private sector and the judiciary have also performed very badly, according to the updates.” Stung by ALAC’s success in urging Zimbabweans to report corrupt activities, Mugabe’s spin-doctors at the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) pulled a public awareness advertisement about corruption off the air on Aug. 26, 2009 — a month before the end of its scheduled run. The TIZ-sponsored and funded ad lamented the alarming

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levels of corruption in Zimbabwe and called on the public to report cases of graft to the organization’s ALAC. Happison Muchechetere, chief executive ofﬁcer of ZBC, said the ad was pulled because it propagated “an agenda of foreign powers that want to paint all Zimbabweans as corrupt.” He charged that corruption is an “imported Western idea and a debatable concept.” He argued that corruption is an abstract issue that is not a “priority in Zimbabwe right now.” Reverend Useni Sibanda, coordinator of the Christian Alliance of Zimbabwe, summed it up when he said: “A ﬁsh starts rotting from the head. Maybe that’s why corruption is on the rise because it stems from the head who stole the elections.”

cial Gazette in Zimbabwe and the national vice-chairperson of the Media Institute of Southern African Zimbabwe. He is a former Vice President of the Zimbabwe Union of Journalists and assisted in the establishment of a local association of investigative journalists in collaboration with Transparency International.

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* Njabulo Ncube is the Assistant Editor of The Finan-

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Part IV — Corruption Is Not a Development Issue

“They (White House ofﬁcials) don’t want to give away anything up front so they can withhold information later when they feel they need to…” —Reporter’s Notebook, United States

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NORWAY

Norway:

Trouble in Paradise By Siri Gedde-Dahl After a long time with few signs of corruption, Norway’s courts have experienced a rash of cases in recent years. One important reason for the recent spike in corruption convictions is a new corruption article placed in the Norwegian Penal Code that took effect in 2003. The article increased the prosecuting authority’s power to investigate and prosecute corruption cases. It raised the maximum sentence on conviction from six to 10 years. Corruption cases in both the private and public sectors now have equal status. It also makes it possible to charge and punish Norwegians who have

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committed bribery abroad. Previously, this was almost impossible due to the short statute of limitations in the old law. Some years ago, it was widely accepted that you “had to bribe abroad.” Norwegian companies were even allowed to deduct bribery expenses on their tax returns as late as 1996. The 2003 article introduced the word “corruption” into the Norwegian penal code for the first time and redefined its legal status. This, of course, has influenced what most people think is “above the limit.” Some business people argue that the new law is too strict. One much-debated example involved a civil servant who worked at a hospital and took pleasure trips with the hospital’s suppliers who paid his travel expenses. The civil servant was convicted of bribery in 2006. Since then, Norwegian companies have expressed far more reluctance in offering and paying for such trips. Another important reason for the recent escalation is that media have increased their efforts to reveal corruption. Consequently, several corruption cases have started out as media reports that revealed the misconduct up to a certain level before the police took over. In some cases, it seems quite certain that the police would not have started an investigation based on the same vague tips that triggered the media investigations.

Corruption exposed Norway is still one of the least corrupt countries on earth and ranks among the best countries in Transparency International’s yearly corruption index. Norway is a liberal democracy with fair elections and strict separation of pow-

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ers. Compared to many other countries, the administration and political institutions are transparent. Nevertheless, news of a handful of cases in the public sector has reminded Norwegians of the fact that corruption does exist even in their country. One case involved a tax official who received bribes for “fixing” the tax form. Examples can be found in the building and labor authorities of civil servants who have demanded bribes. Two policemen were paid by a jailed businessman for transporting him back and forth on illegal leaves from the prison where he was serving his sentence. In another case, a psychologist and a psychiatrist demanded bribes to issue false health certificates to prisoners who were attempttheir jail sentences. In four separate cases, civil servants who were responsible for the rehabilitation of public buildings received bribes. Typically, these cases involved a civil municipality servant, possibly a middle manager, who had influence on the procurement and tender processes. This official would violate public purchasing rules by colluding with friends in private enterprises who were, typically, suppliers of goods and services to the municipality. These friends received the contracts, submitted invoices far in excess of their services, and then shared the profits with their civil servant accomplice.

Largest corruption schemes The biggest corruption scandal in Norway to date involves the CEO of two public companies, Nedre Romerike

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ing to ﬁnd more comfortable surroundings in which to serve

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Vannverk AS (the waterworks) and AS Sentralrenseanlegget RA-2 (a sewage treatment plant). The scandal was revealed by the newspaper Aftenposten in 2005. The CEO had been abusing his position for decades. Through his son’s private companies and certain suppliers to the public companies, he managed to funnel more than 100 million Norwegian kroners (US$17.7 million) from both public companies into his private accounts. Among other things, he spent the public’s money to buy himself a private game farm in South Africa that was stocked with wild animals. In 2008, this CEO was convicted in District Court and sentenced to eight years in prison. His son and three suppliers, including the big Swedish construction company Peab, were convicted as well. Their appeal has yet to be heard in court. Norway’s huge oil industry often does business with countries where corruption is a serious problem. Statoil is Norway’s biggest oil company and is listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) with the Norwegian state as the major share holder. Its employees have been convicted of corruption five times since the mid-1990s. The most serious of these cases, the so-called Iran Horton case, was disclosed in 2003 and involved the top executives of Statoil. Between 2002 and 2003, Statoil bribed an Iranian government official to use his influence to assist Statoil in obtaining a contract to develop three phases of Iran’s South Pars oil and gas field. The Iranian official would also open doors to additional projects in the Iranian oil and gas exploration industry. Statoil agreed to pay him through a consulting contract with an intermediary company organized in the

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Turks and Caicos Islands, which were nominally owned by a third party that was located in London. The contract obligated Statoil to pay US$15 million over a period of 11 years. Statoil obtained the contract and made the initial payments to the Iranian ofﬁcial. According to an investigation by the U.S. Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), Statoil suspended payments under the contract in June 2003 when it came under criticism from the company’s internal auditors. When the newspaper Dagens Næringsliv pulished the Iran-Horton story in September 2003, the contract was still in force. In 2004, the Norwegian National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime (Økokrim) ﬁned Statoil 20 million NorweNORWAY

gian kroners (US$3.5 million) for bribery. Because Statoil is listed on the NYSE, American authorities launched their own investigation. In 2006, the U.S. SEC imposed a fine of US$10.5 million on Statoil. In order to avoid further litigation, Statoil entered a settlement with American authorities, which included an official statement admitting bribery and violation of the Foreign Corruption Practices Act. The CEO of Statoil at this time was never indicted, but the board of directors held him responsible for not intervening and he subsequently resigned. In 2004, an account manager in the Norwegian division of the German company Siemens discovered that his employer invoiced way too much for an IT delivery to the Norwegian army. He anonymously warned the executives in Germany. His Norwegian supervisors suspected him of being “the mole” and responded by harassing and finally firing

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him. In 2005, the whistle blower demanded compensation in court. In its ruling, the court declared that the complainant was a “loyal whistle blower” and that he had suffered undue harassment and dismissal. Siemens was ordered to pay compensation to the whistle blower. The ruling also stated that Siemens had probably invoiced too much. Later on, the company accepted the conviction, admitted they had over-billed and reimbursed the money. The resulting public scrutiny documented not only fraud, but a culture of corruption in the relations between Siemens and representatives from the Norwegian army and the Ministry of Defense, with Siemens paying for dinners, parties and travel. Three of Siemens’ executives and the company itself were indicted for corruption, but were acquitted in 2009. The fraud indictment against the company has yet to be heard in court. The Siemens case has attracted intense media attention, while the company claims to have signiﬁcantly improved its policies.

Limited corruption overall Despite these cases, Norway is not a very corrupt country. Most importantly, Norway has, so far, seen no incidents of bribery in the court system, and only very rarely and on a low level in the police. There is as yet no proof that top politicians have been involved in corruption. This does not, however, mean that Norway will not experience political corruption scandals in the future. Norway is extremely rich, with rapidly growing public and private spending. There is a growing group of so-called “business

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politicians,” individuals who leave politics to promptly take jobs with private consulting firms. This kind of activity is not illegal, though quarantine rules apply. But business politicians are highly debated and it seems like there is an increasing willingness and ability to pay consultants in order to influence political decisions. Anywhere you find large sums of money or concentrations of power, there is always danger of corruption. But, to this day, we have seen few signs of systemic corruption in Norway. * Siri Gedde-Dahl is an award winning reporter for Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten, she has revealed severin Norway” (2008), an account of all known corruption cases in the country in the last 20 years.

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al corruption cases and co-authored the book “Corruption

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United States:

Transparency in the Obama Administration By Michael Shanahan

When Barack Obama was elected, Americans demanding a more transparent US government cheered and broke out the champagne to celebrate. More than any other presidential candidate in modern times, Obama had pledged to communicate freely and honestly with the citizens he serves. On his ﬁrst full day in ofﬁce, Obama promised an “unprecedented level of openness” and announced an Open Government Project that would allow citizens the opportunity to express views online regarding a new policy of transparency.

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The Global Integrity Index: How effective are the United State’s anti-corruption safeguards? OVERALL RATING

Strong (85 out of 100 +/-2.87) CATEGORY RATINGS

1) Civil Society, Public Information & Media — Strong (86) 2) Elections — Strong (84) 3) Government Accountability — Strong (84) 4) Administration & Civil Service — Strong (84) 5) Oversight & Regulation — Strong (85) 6) Anti-Corruption & Rule of Law — Strong (86)

(Scores range from 0 to 100)

Despite having many world-class anti-corruption safeguards in place, such as a robust and independent media and civil society organizations that serve as effective anti-corruption watchdogs, the United States continues to struggle with controlling the corrupting inﬂuence of money in politics. With the average cost of running a national-level political campaign ranging from US$1-10 million (never mind the nearly US$1 billion spent by political parties in the last presidential election), the U.S. sets the standard globally for the volume of private money ﬂowing into the political process on an annual basis.

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As Obama approaches one year in ofﬁce, many transparency advocates are still glad he won. But for others, the champagne has gone ﬂat. “A lot of us have been disappointed and confused,” said Anne L. Weismann, chief counsel for Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW), which advocates for open government.

What is transparency? The new administration has adopted new technologies that will provide unprecedented access to information about how the government operates and spends its money. This is a stark contrast with the reflexive secrecy during former President Bush’s eight years in office. And the White House citizens to weigh in on administration policies as they are being formulated. This includes a review of ways to make the government more transparent. But in many areas, especially White House policy making and lingering battles over documents about Bush-era national security fights and human rights violations, Obama officials have fought tooth and nail to preserve a wall of secrecy that directly contradicts the new president’s campaign promises. “Some of the attitudes are mimicking the anti-transparency attitudes of the Bush administration,” said Weismann. Particularly at the Justice Department, she said, “This is a culture that has not changed in many ways.” Critics also cite initial refusal by the White House to reveal the identities of coal and health industry executives who met with White House officials about pending energy and

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is experimenting with new online technologies that allow

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health reform legislation. Only after transparency advocates went to court did the White House offer a partial list of the coal industry lobbyists, a list that critics said was inadequate. On September 4, 2009, Obama reversed course and announced that records of visitors to the White House would be made public unless identification threatened national security. But it took the legal challenge — settled out of court — from Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington to change the policy. Denying access to the identities of those who lobby the White House on politically tough issues like energy and health reform is particularly sensitive. The memory is still fresh of former Vice President Dick Cheney’s adamant refusal to disclose the names of energy industry lobbyists who met with him in the White House — a fight that went all the way to the Supreme Court. “What this tells me is that they (White House officials) don’t want to give away anything up front so they can withhold information later when they feel they need to,” said Meredith Fuchs, general counsel at the National Security Archive, a group that files lawsuits under the Freedom of Information Act to obtain federal documents. “There have been a series of incidents and decisions that have not been as transparent as we would have liked,” she said.

Information release Fuchs said lawyers in the Obama Justice Department also have ﬁercely battled efforts by transparency advocates to obtain the release of documents explaining the origins of

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the Bush administration’s warrantless wiretaps targeting US citizens. “We are asking for legal memos, but they weren’t willing to give them up,” she said. In yet another legal battle, Fuchs said her group is at odds with the Obama administration over release of information about the torture, seizure and delivery of alleged terrorists to other nations. Fuchs says the government argues the information about torture and the so-called rendition policy is so secret and potentially harmful to national security that those who were tortured should not be permitted to file lawsuits or go to court. In other words, not even a judge should be permitted to see the material. Another decision that stunned many Obama supportSecretary Robert Gates — to release additional photos of suspected Iraqi terrorists abused by US troops at the Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad. At the time, Obama said the release of the photos “would inflame anti-American opinion and allow our enemies to paint U.S. troops with a broad, damning and inaccurate brush, thereby endangering them in theaters of war.” That statement contrasted sharply with Obama’s release of four US Justice Department memos that provided the Bush administration’s previously secret legal rationale for harsh interrogation of terror suspects, as well as a decision to permit photographs at Dover Air Force Base in Delaware of the coffins of dead US soldiers returning from Iraq or Afghanistan. Shortly after Obama took office, Fuchs said, she and other lawyers filed a lawsuit asking for access to White House

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ers was Obama’s refusal — at the urging of US Defense

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e-mails from the Bush era, only to be stunned when Obama’s White House lawyers and the Justice Department asked a judge to dismiss the lawsuit. Obama advisers did not respond to requests for a response to this story, but White House spokesman Robert Gibbs has repeatedly dismissed criticisms that the president is not meeting his campaign promises. “I think the president underscored his commitment to transparency on his first day in office,” Gibbs said at a White House briefing in July 2009. One story about a federal grant to set up a website allowing citizens to track spending from Obama’s $787 billion stimulus bill is telling. Advocates filed a Freedom of Information Act request to get information about the company that won the contract to build the website (www.recovery.gov) and its accompanying search mechanism. That request was bounced to the federal General Services Administration, which, in turn, sent it to Smartronics Inc., the company that won the contract to set up the website. Company executives returned the documents that were requested, but blacked out nearly all the information on them, including the number of Americans who are expected to use the website. Gary Bass, executive director of OMB Watch, another transparency watchdog group, says it will take time for Obama to overcome a longtime pattern of secrecy that has been imbedded in the federal bureaucracy. “The culture in government is that you typically don’t give out information that you don’t have to,” Bass said. For example, the Associated Press reported in August 2009 that President Obama’s order to federal officials to

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publicly report contacts with lobbyists seeking funds from economic recovery projects has largely been ignored. Across the sprawling federal bureaucracy, ofﬁcials acknowledged just eight meetings with lobbyists seeking money from $88 billion in stimulus funds covered by the president’s order.

Use of technology These disputes often reflect sharp differences over what it means to be transparent. Advocates say Obama and his advisers believe that using online technologies to better communicate with the public and offer more participation in developing policy will make them transparent. “Obama is the first president to come to office in an era UNITED STATES

of online social media and real opportunities for manipulating and sharing huge databases full of government information,” said OMB Watch’s Bass. “He grew up with that,” Bass said, “and so expectations are extremely high. That is Obama’s pedigree. We haven’t had a president who understood the value of that approach.” But Fuchs, with the National Security Archive, said thinking of transparency in technological terms misses the point. “We can use all these technologies to better communicate with the public and that’s great, but that’s not really what transparency is all about,” she said. “Transparency is the ability to know who made the big decisions in government and what was the basis for making those decisions, and there is still a lot of resistance to that idea.” Some transparency advocates are optimistic that by the time Obama leaves ofﬁce, any fair judgment must recall the

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years of secrecy under Bush. “The administration has taken many of the right steps to make government more transparent and accountable,” said Daniel Schuman, policy counsel of the Sunlight Foundation. “They also have a long way to go, but this is night and day compared to Bush,” he said. * Michael Shanahan is an assistant director and assistant professor of journalism in the School of Media and Public Affairs at the George Washington University. He also spent 20 years in Washington as a political reporter for the Associated Press, McClatchy Newspapers and Newhouse Newspapers.

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