Alexander's Cavalry Charge at Chaeronea, 338 BCE - Matthew A. Sears, Carolyn Willekes

Alexander’s Cavalry Charge at Chaeronea, 338 BCE 

Matthew A. Sears and Carolyn Willekes

Abstract The Battle of Chaeronea, fought in 338 BCE between Philip of Macedon and the Greek city-states, is known only from meager literary evidence and a few archaeological finds. For decades, scholars had reconstructed the battle to include a cavalry charge led by Philip’s eighteen-year-old son, the future Alexander the Great. More recently, this cavalry charge has been called into question, primarily because of the supposed maxim that cavalry will not trample disciplined infantry. A reconsideration of the evidence, however, including skeletal remains from the battle and studies of equine behavior, suggests that Alexander’s charge was feasible.

Introduction W. W. Tarn, writing of Alexander’s cavalry charge at the Battle of Issus in 333 BCE, said that “it was an axiom that cavalry could not make a frontal attack on an unbroken line of heavy-armed spearmen, as the Persians had learnt to their cost at Plataea.”1 This “axiom” has by now attained the status of common knowledge, due most of all to the hugely influential book of John Keegan, The Face of Battle.

1. W. W. Tarn, Alexander the Great, vol. 2, Sources and Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948), 181.

Matthew A. Sears is an Associate Professor of Classics & Ancient History at the University of New Brunswick. He received his Ph.D. from Cornell University, and is the author of Athens, Thrace, and the Shaping of Athenian Leadership (Cambridge, 2013), along with many articles and chapters on Greek history and ancient warfare.

Carolyn Willekes received her Ph.D. from the Department of Greek and Roman Studies at the University of Calgary. She is the author of From Bucephalus to the Hippodrome: The Horse in the Ancient World (I. B. Tauris, 2016) as well as several chapters and articles on horses and horse cultures in the ancient world. She is part of the Antiochia ad Cragum excavations in Turkey, and has lectured for the Archaelogical Institute of America.

The Journal of Military History 80 (October 2016): 1017-1035.

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In his treatment of the Battle of Waterloo, Keegan argues that a defining feature of the battle was the repeated repulse of French cavalry at the hands of British infantry squares. For Keegan, Waterloo demonstrated conclusively that a cavalry charge could not prevail against a disciplined infantry formation.2 The widespread acceptance of this axiom has been instrumental in several revisionist treatments of one of ancient Greek history’s most famous cavalry actions: the young Alexander the Great’s charge against the Theban Sacred Band, an elite unit of Greek hoplites, at the Battle of Chaeronea in 338 BCE. An interesting debate was sparked by Paul Rahe in 1981. Influenced by Keegan’s then recently published work, Rahe argued that since horses would not have charged into the Sacred Band, the most skilled and cohesive infantry unit among the Greek poleis, it is unlikely that the Macedonian cavalry played a large role in the battle.3 More recently, John Buckler and Hans Beck stated rather bluntly that “until someone offers a reasonable explanation for the way in which a frontal cavalry assault could have crushed the Theban formation, no one else need give any credence to the idea.”4 The most radical revision of the battle is offered by John Ma. Beyond removing Alexander’s cavalry charge, Ma changes the order of the two battle lines completely, suggesting that the Sacred Band actually fought on the left of the Greek line against Philip and his picked infantry troops, rather than on the right where scholars have traditionally positioned the Thebans, opposite Alexander.5 Yet, revisionist accounts of Chaeronea go too far in discounting and even disregarding the ancient literary evidence, sparse though it may be for this battle.

Comparative evidence and modern studies of equine behavior demonstrate that a frontal cavalry charge against a disciplined phalanx of heavy infantry was indeed a military possibility in antiquity, especially in the case of the Macedonian cavalry.

A cavalry charge led by Alexander against the Theban Sacred Band should remain integral to any modern reconstruction of the battle.

Sources and Reconstructions Though one of the world’s truly decisive battles—in which Philip of Macedon, Alexander’s father, crushed a coalition of Greek poleis led by Thebes and Athens in 338 BCE— Chaeronea suffers acutely from a lack of literary sources. Our main source, the first-century BCE universal historian Diodorus of Sicily (16.85–86), is vague.

From him we learn, apart from the numbers and composition of the respective forces, only that Philip stationed Alexander on one wing, along with Philip’s best generals, and Philip himself led from the other wing. According to Diodorus, the battle was 2. John Keegan, The Face of Battle (London: Penguin, 1978), 154–60.

3. Paul A. Rahe, “The Annihilation of the Sacred Band at Chaeronea,” American Journal of Archaeology 85 (1981): 84–87.

4. John Buckler and Hans Beck, Central Greece and the Politics of Power in the Fourth Century BC (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 256.

5. John Ma, “Chaironea 338: Topographies of Commemoration,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 128 (2008): 72–91.

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Figure 1: The Plain of Chaeronea. The trees in the left-center middle distance surround the Lion monument, while the clump of evergreens in the far distance marks the Macedonian polyandrion (mass grave). [Courtesy of C. Jacob Butera]

hard-fought; Alexander succeeded in being the first to break through the enemy’s line, and both Philip and Alexander strove to outshine all others in valor and tactical success. Diodorus’s account on its own hardly allows for a full battle reconstruction.

We do, however, get some help from scattered references here and there. The first- and second-century CE biographer Plutarch (Alex. 9.2) adds the detail that Alexander “plunged into [enseisai]” the Theban Sacred Band, an elite unit of 300 hoplites that trained continuously at state expense. Given that Philip likely led from the right—the place of the Macedonian king as shown by Alexander’s later battles—this means that Philip faced the Athenians on the Greek left, while from the Macedonian left Alexander attacked the Thebans on the Greek right. The last substantial clue from ancient literature as to how the battle progressed comes from Polyaenus (4.2.2), the second-century CE compiler of stratagems, who tells us that Philip ordered his infantry phalanx to feign retreat until, pursued by the jubilant Athenians, the Macedonians reached a favorable position on high ground and then attacked and broke the undisciplined Athenian infantry. Philip, then, led the Macedonian infantry, and through his superior generalship might have critically weakened the Greek line, both by enticing the Athenians to break formation and perhaps by stretching the Greek line to the point where vulnerable gaps opened up.6 [See Figure 1, above.]

6. N. G. L. Hammond (Studies in Greek History [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973], 546) argues that the most salient feature of the stratagem mentioned by Polyaenus was the likely opening of a gap between Greek contingents, particularly between the Thebans and the rest of MILITARY HISTORY

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Since Diodorus says that there were 2,000 Macedonian cavalry present at the battle, and since Philip was at the head of his infantry, it is reasonable to conclude that Philip entrusted the cavalry to his son Alexander, who was, after all, accompanied by Philip’s ablest generals. Alexander therefore led the cavalry against the Thebans and the Sacred Band, the most formidable of the Greek hoplites and the greatest threat to the Macedonians. It is worth noting that the verb Plutarch uses for Alexander’s offensive action, enseisai, when employed by the same author in other references to actual combat, always denotes an action from horseback (see Marc 7.2; Cleom. 6.3; Art. 10.1). As for the Sacred Band, Plutarch says that all 300 members were wiped out. The sight of their bodies, lying on the field of battle where they had valiantly faced the sarissas, or long spears, of the enemy, supposedly moved Philip to tears (Pel. 18.5). While the sarissa is usually understood to be the weapon of the Macedonian phalanx, it can also refer to the cavalry lance, and there was a unit of Macedonian cavalry called the sarissaphoroi, or sarissa-bearers.7 Students of the battle have supplemented these meager literary references with a major archaeological marker, along with a reading of the battlefield topography, to establish where the two armies were likely situated in the plain.8 Early in the twentieth century, the polyandrion, or mass grave, of the Macedonians was excavated

by G. Sotiriadis. [See Figure 2, opposite.] Its position in the northeastern section of the plain, near the Kephissos River, has been taken to represent the spot where the greatest number of Macedonians fell, probably against the elite Sacred Band, thus marking the Greek right. Scholars have reasonably postulated that the Greek line extended from this point in a southwesterly direction in order to cover the the Greek line which had stretched to the left to accommodate the Athenians’ impetuous charge.

Hammond also addresses the problem of there being no high ground on the plain to which Philip could have withdrawn. Hammond plausibly argues that the banks of the Haemus, a river that in modern times largely disappears beneath the modern agricultural plain, would have been substantial in antiquity, providing an elevation sufficient for a considerable tactical advantage.

7. For the sarissa as a cavalry weapon, see Minor M. Markle III, “The Macedonian Sarissa, Spear, and Related Armor,” American Journal of Archaeology 81 (1977): 323–39; Markle, “Use of the Sarissa by Philip and Alexander of Macedon,” American Journal of Archaeology 82 (1978): 483–97; and Philip Sidnell, Warhorse: Cavalry in Ancient Warfare (London: Hambledon Continuum, 2006), 80–84. For the sarissaphoroi, see, among other examples, Arr. An. 1.31.2; 14.1; 4.4.6–7. Robert E. Gaebel’s comment (Cavalry Operations in the Ancient Greek World [Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2002], 156) that the sarissa is “a weapon that the ancient sources never associate with the Macedonian regular cavalry” would appear to be wrong.

8. For the standard reconstruction of the battle based on a reading of the literary sources and the topography and monuments at the site, see G. Sotiriadis, “Das Schlachtfeld von Chäronea und der Grabhügel der Makedonen,” Mitteilungen des deutschen archäologischen Instituts 28 (1903): 301–30; W. Kendrick Pritchett, “Observations on Chaironeia,” American Journal of Archaeology 62 (1958): 307–11; Hammond, Studies in Greek History, 534–57. These scholars do have slight differences in their interpretations, but they offer a similar overall picture of the battle. Moreover, they all agree that the battle can be fairly accurately reconstructed. For a full account and critique of the standard reconstruction, see Ma, “Topographies of Commemoration,” 73–76.

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Figure 2: Trees growing atop the Macedonian polyandrion [Courtesy of C. Jacob Butera]

Kerata Pass as an escape route. Excavation of the polyandrion yielded many weapons, including very large spear points which likely came from sarissas.9 On the other side of the battlefield, under the lion monument which has been reconstructed in modern times, was found the mass grave of the slain members of the Theban Sacred Band. Analysis of the skeletal remains reveals many types of battle wounds, some of which are particularly consistent with cavalry fighting infantry, to which we shall return below. Thus, the graves of the Macedonians and Thebans at Chaeronea have been combined with the meager literary sources and a common-sense accounting of the topography to provide a rather full reconstruction of the battle.

Despite this former consensus, in the past few decades various revisionist accounts of the battle have been proposed. As mentioned above, Rahe, drawing upon Keegan, argues that horses would never have charged against a disciplined phalanx of heavy infantrymen, and therefore played at most an incidental role in the battle. According to Rahe, it was the superiority of the Macedonian phalanx that proved decisive.10 Buckler and Beck, in addition to dismissing the possibility of a cavalry charge, argue that the stratagem described by Polyaenus is implausible and best ignored by modern scholars.11 John Ma, in an illuminating article focusing 9. Sotiriadis, “Das Schlachtfeld,” 309.

10. Rahe, “Annihilation of the Sacred Band”; Keegan, Face of Battle, esp. 154–62.

11. Buckler and Beck, Central Greece, 257. Polyaenus has often been censured as unreliable and frequently inaccurate. Pritchett (“Observations on Chaironeia,” 310), for instance, feels that MILITARY HISTORY

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on the commemoration of the battle, proposes an entirely new layout of the two armies and their battle lines. He stresses first of all that the polyandrion need not be located at any specific point in reference to the battle. To back up this claim, he says that the polyandrion at Marathon, called the Soros, was nowhere near the battlefield. Ma also argues that Plutarch received the information that Alexander broke into the Sacred Band from the inferior “vulgate” tradition of Alexander historiography, and that Plutarch himself does not “vouch for” the truth of this fact since he adds an “it is said” qualification.12 In the end, Buckler and Beck doubt whether any attempt should be made to reconstruct Chaeronea, insisting that “surprisingly little is known of [the battle], and that little has unfortunately and unnecessarily been embroidered by modern historians.”13 Rahe similarly concludes that “the evidence concerning the battle of Chaeronea is too sketchy to justify confidence in any reconstruction of its course.”14 It might seem doubtful, in light of such comments, whether historians should even attempt a reconstruction of Chaeronea—including its cavalry charge—or indeed of countless other battles of antiquity. But this need not be the case, since the the passage in question is “too anecdotal in nature to be made the basis for the topographical reconstruction of the battle.” For Polyaenus in general, see Peter Krentz and Everett L. Wheeler, Polyaenus: Stratagems of War (Chicago: Ares, 1994); and Everett L. Wheeler, “Polyaenus: Scriptor Militaris,” in Polyainos. Neue Studien / Polyaenus. New Studies, ed. Kai Brodersen (Berlin: Verlag Antiken), 7–54; and for Polyaenus’s treatment of Alexander, see N. G. L. Hammond, “Some Passages in Polyaenus’ Stratagems concerning Alexander,” Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 37 (1996): 23–53. Despite Polyaenus’s reputation, both Krentz and Wheeler and Hammond stress Polyaenus’s often rigorous original research and source consultation. We see no reason to disregard Polyaenus’s remarks on Chaeronea, especially the salient point that Philip led the infantry.

12. Ma, “Topographies of Commemoration,” 73–74, n. 13. For a thorough treatment of the source traditions for Alexander, see N. G. L. Hammond, Sources for Alexander the Great: An Analysis of Plutarch’s Life and Arrian’s Anabasis Alexandrou (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), esp. 6–14 for Plutarch’s sources for this period of Alexander’s life. As Hammond argues, expressions such as “it is said” (legetai) indicate that Plutarch doubted his sources. We would hesitate to argue that such strong doubt is indicated in every single instance of this and similar expressions since, as Hammond points out, Plutarch’s doubt often concerns a salacious or incredible episode, such as those surrounding Philip’s various sexual affairs. Hammond lays down a good general principle (13–14), namely, that other sources covering the same events are to be preferred to Plutarch’s supposedly dubious ones. There are, however, no other sources indicating that Alexander attacked the Sacred Band, leaving us with the option of either accepting the account as related by Plutarch, or admitting ignorance concerning Alexander’s role in the battle. We see no reason to do the latter. In this particular passage, the “it is said” could very well indicate that Plutarch doubts—if indeed he doubts the account at all—that Alexander was the first to break into the Sacred Band rather than that he attacked the Sacred Band at all: “He was present at Chaeronea and took part in the battle against the Greeks. It is said [legetai] that he was the first to break into [enseisai] the Sacred Band of the Thebans.”

13. Bucker and Beck, Central Greece, 254.

14. Rahe, “Annihilation of the Sacred Band,” 87.

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situation concerning Chaeronea is not at all as dire as these recent treatments of the battle suggest. As a general principle, historians should be very hesitant to jettison the testimony of ancient sources, even relatively late and sometimes unreliable sources, unless the testimony in question is directly contradicted by other, arguably more reliable, ancient evidence. There is no a priori reason to ignore or even flatly contradict Plutarch’s reference to Alexander attacking the Sacred Band, nor need we dismiss the entirely plausible account of Polyaenus. Also, given that there were 2,000 Macedonian cavalry at the battle, it would be surprising if they were not used.

Philip had indeed used his cavalry to great effect in the past, including at the Battle of the Crocus Field in the late 350s (Diod. 16.35.4–6), and the plain of Chaeronea afforded ample room for the Macedonian cavalry, despite the objections of some scholars.15 Finally, despite Ma’s arguments, the location of the Soros vis-à-vis the action at Marathon continues to be a matter of some debate. Most scholars consider the Soros to have been erected near the center of the battle where the Persians broke through the Athenian formation and thus where the majority of the Athenians fell.16 It is still plausible that the polyandrion at Chaeronea was constructed where the greatest number of Macedonians died. The once-standard interpretation of the battle advanced by scholars such as Sotiriadis, Hammond, and Pritchett makes the best sense of all the ancient testimony and what archaeological and topographical clues do exist on the battlefield itself. [See Figure 3, next page.]

Cavalry and Infantry This entire discussion is moot, however, unless a frontal cavalry charge against a disciplined phalanx is possible. The central thrust of Keegan’s argument is that a cavalry charge works primarily in breaking the morale of the opposing infantry.

The thunderous approach of galloping horses and their metal-clad riders was often enough to cause an infantry formation to buckle, leaving the infantrymen vulnerable to being ridden down and slaughtered as they cowered or tried to run away. If the infantry held firm in the face of a cavalry charge, however, then the horses would pull 15. John Buckler (Aegean Greece in the Fourth Century BC [Leiden: Brill, 2003], 503) argues that the plain of Chaeronea was too narrow for effective cavalry maneuvers. Below, we concur with the generally received opinion that Alexander used his cavalry as the decisive shock force at Issus, where the battlefield was essentially as narrow as at Chaeronea.

16. Until recently, scholars were nearly unanimous in placing the main action of Marathon around the Soros: N. G. L. Hammond, “The Campaign and the Battle of Marathon,” Journal of Hellenic Studies 88 (1968): 18; Eugene Vanderpool, “A Monument to the Battle of Marathon,” Hesperia 35 (1966): 105; J. A. G. van der Veer, “The Battle of Marathon: A Topographical Survey,” Mnemosyne 35 (1982): 290; J. A. S. Evans, “Herodotus and the Battle of Marathon,” Historia 42 (1993): 291–92; and Norman A. Doenges, “The Campaign and Battle of Marathon,” Historia 47 (1998): 13. Against the majority view, see Peter Krentz, The Battle of Marathon (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2010), 122–29. For our part, we take Thucydides’s comment (2.34.5) that the dead at Marathon were so valorous that they were buried “right on the spot” (autou) to mean that they were buried exactly where most of them fell, not merely in an arbitrary spot in the battlefield.

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Figure 3: Plan of the battle, from N. G. L. Hammond, Studies in Greek History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), 550. Reprinted with the permission of Dorothy J. Thompson and Oxford University Press.

up at the last minute and refuse to charge home. Keegan’s maxim has certainly taken hold. He is explicitly cited, for instance, by I. G. Spence in a comprehensive book on Greek cavalry. Spence argues that shock tactics, even those of the Macedonians, rely on their moral and psychological, rather than physical, effects.17 Keegan is evoked 17. I. G. Spence, The Cavalry of Classical Greece: A Social and Military History with Particular Reference to Athens (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 107.

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indirectly by Robert Gaebel, who considers that Rahe’s arguments should lay to rest once and for all the notion of a cavalry charge at Chaeronea.18 Even Philip Sidnell, whose central project is to defend the idea of true shock tactics in antiquity before the advent of stirrups, attributes the success of cavalry against infantry to the latter’s loss of nerve.19 To be sure, under any circumstances a direct cavalry assault against well-ordered infantry would have been difficult. But Keegan’s maxim, at least as it has been adopted by scholars of the ancient world, is in need of reappraisal.

Tarn certainly had reason to employ the Persians at the Battle of Plataea in 479 BCE as an example of cavalry failing to break an infantry formation. Yet the Persian cavalry at Plataea—the land battle that ended the Persian invasion of Greece—was a far cry from the Macedonian Companions. At Plataea and elsewhere, the Persian cavalry was strictly speaking light cavalry, skilled in the use of missile weapons such as the javelin and bow and prone to use its speed and mobility to attack the vulnerable flanks and rear of the enemy. Mardonius, the Persian commander at Plataea, had sought for many days to lure the Greeks into open ground so his superior cavalry could swarm around the Greek hoplites to discharge its missiles and withdraw and regroup at ease, far out of reach of the heavy-armed and relatively immobile hoplites. Mardonius only attacked the Greek phalanx directly, with disastrous consequences for the Persians, when he thought that the Greeks were retreating in disarray and thus ripe for attack (Hdt. 9.18–24, 58–65). Much of the history of Graeco-Persian warfare is one of the Persians trying to fight on open ground, and the Greeks seeking the protection and force-multiplying elements of narrow passes and mountainous terrain.

As is well known, the Macedonian cavalry was much different from the Persian, both in terms of equipment and tactics. The best Macedonian units, such as the Companion Cavalry, were heavy-armed and designed for shock, not hit-and-run attacks. [See Figure 4, next page.] An important passage concerning the tactics of the Macedonian heavy cavalry is found in the Tactica of Arrian, himself a military commander of considerable experience and prestige in the second century CE: We hear that the Scythians used wedge formations, and the Thracians too, having learned from the Scythians. Philip of Macedon taught the Macedonians to use this formation as well. This formation seems useful because the leaders are arranged around the outside and the front narrowing to a point allows the unit easily to cut through every type of enemy formation and grants that it can make sharp about-faces one way and then another. Square formations are difficult to wheel about, but the pointed formation, even when it advances in depth, rapidly turning about the point is able easily to unfold into line. The Persians, especially, use the square formation, as do the natives in Sicily and the majority of the most skilled Greek cavalries (16.6–9).20

18. Gaebel, Cavalry Operations, 156.

19. Sidnell, Warhorse, 97–99.

20. Unless otherwise noted, translations are our own.

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Figure 4: Artist’s conception of a member of the Macedonian companion cavalry, from John Warry, Warfare in the Classical World (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995), 82. Reprinted with the permission of Salamander Books and the University of Oklahoma Press.

First of all, perhaps the key point in this passage is that the wedge formation as used by the Macedonians was importantly different from other cavalry tactics, particularly those used by the Persians and Greeks. Thus, Tarn would seem to err in applying the lessons of Plataea directly to Alexander’s cavalry charge at the Battle of Issus. Another major point has to do with what the wedge formation could accomplish in battle. Though scholars have tried various ways to make sense of Arrian’s passage in light of the apparent axiom that cavalry cannot break a disciplined phalanx, according to the plain sense of Arrian’s Greek a crucial advantage of the wedge is its ability to cut through (diakoptein) any enemy formation, phalanx included.21 Nothing in the verb diakoptein suggests attacking on the flanks, or picking off disorganized troops fleeing in a panic before galloping horses. The examples cited by the Greek-English Lexicon of Liddell and Scott are instructive: Xen. Anab. 1.8.10 tells that Persian scythed-chariots are designed to 21. For one novel interpretation of Arrian, see Spence (Cavalry of Classical Greece, 104–8), who suggests that Arrian really means us to understand the cavalry wedge slowing down before encountering the phalanx in order to engage in a series of one-on-one combats, relying on the advantage of their long lances. Once the lead horseman killed his opponent, the wedge would slowly advance “like mounted police controlling a crowd.” Unsurprisingly, Spence arrives at these ideas because his reading of Keegan has convinced him that cavalry could not charge at speed into infantry.

A slow and deliberate march through infantry, affording the infantry plenty of opportunity to make the most of its own weapons, strikes us as far more dangerous than a rapid charge.

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cut through the ranks (taxeis) of the enemy; Plut. Pyrrh. 7.5 describes the soldiers of Pyrrhus cutting through a Macedonian phalanx; and Xen. Hell. 7.5.23 speaks of the military innovator Epaminondas leading his army “prow-first, like a trireme” in order to cut through a point in the enemy’s line. Diakoptein, then, implies a direct breakthrough of an enemy formation.

Antiquity furnishes good examples of clashes between cavalry and infantry that seem to defy modern sensibilities. Employing a charge of heavy cavalry to break a formation of heavy infantry is exactly what Alexander did at Issus, five years after Chaeronea. Based on Arrian’s account of the battle, Alexander personally led his heavy cavalry, a mixture of squadrons drawn from the Companions and other units, in a brazen charge across the river Pinarus, a maneuver reminiscent of his attack at the Granicus (Arr. An. 2.8.9; 10.3–4).22 The attack at Issus was directed at the Persian units known as the kardakes, which Arrian tells us were equipped as heavy-armed hoplites (An. 2.8.6).23 These kardakes were quickly routed, allowing Alexander to commence an assault directly against Darius’s position, leading to the Persian king’s panicked retreat. N. G. L. Hammond argues that Alexander led the attack on foot, at the head of his own heavy infantry. Hammond, basing his argument primarily on the “axiom” that cavalry cannot charge heavy infantry, is forced to explain away the obvious—and widely accepted—reading of Arrian as he scrambles to account for all of the action on the battlefield. For instance, Hammond places Alexander first on horseback, haranguing the troops, before dismounting to lead his infantry against the kardakes, and then finally remounting in order to attack Darius.24 To support his interpretation, Hammond focuses in on Greek words such as badēn (step-by-step) and dromōi (at a run), which for Hammond indicate an infantry action even though he is forced to admit that they can just as sensibly refer also to cavalry, even within Arrian’s text.25 In the end, Hammond’s argument is circular: Alexander could not have charged heavy infantry with cavalry, since cavalry could not have charged heavy infantry. Arrian’s text is clear in placing Alexander in personal command of heavy cavalry, both during the initial advance and the decisive attack against the kardakes (An. 2.8.9; 10.3–4).26 22. For the superiority of Arrian’s account, probably based on Ptolemy’s eyewitness testimony, see N. G. L. Hammond, “Alexander’s Charge at the Battle of Issus in 333 B.C.,” Historia 41 (1992): 395–99.

23. There is some debate as to whether the kardakes were not in fact lightly armed peltasts, as they are labeled as such by Polybius’s sources (Polyb. 12.17.7). Tarn (Alexander the Great, 180– 82) argues that the kardakes were lightly armed, which would explain the success of Alexander’s cavalry charge. We agree with Hammond (“Alexander’s Charge,” 399–400, n. 15) that Arrian clearly meant us to understand heavy-armed soldiers arranged in a phalanx.

24. Hammond, “Alexander’s Charge.”

25. Ibid., 402 and n. 24.

26. An. 2.8.9 clearly puts Alexander in charge of cavalry units: “Alexander, when the ground began to open up a little while he was advancing, brought the cavalry units to the front, those called the companions, the Thessalians, and the Macedonians. He placed them on the right wing under his own command.” And 2.10.4 refers to these same units, those marshaled under Alexander’s command: “Alexander and those with him won brilliantly.”

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At the Granicus River too, in 334 BCE, though the main action of the battle was a clash of cavalry against cavalry, Alexander defeated a solid phalanx of heavy infantry at least partly with his cavalry. Once the Persians had been defeated, their Greek hoplite mercenaries were left to fend for themselves, closely packed together on a hillock. In a rage, Alexander ordered his infantry and cavalry to attack the mercenaries at once, attacking head-on against all sides of the square the infantry had managed to form. That the cavalry took a central role in the attack itself is evinced by the report that Alexander’s own horse was killed under him by a sword thrust of the enemy (Arr. An. 1.16.2; Plut. Alex. 16.7).27 Alexander’s preference for the cavalry charge was sometimes emulated in the Hellenistic period. At the Battle of Magnesia in 190 BCE, for example, Antiochus III led his heavy cavalry directly against a Roman legion, and managed to break through ( Justin 36.8.6).28 The modern world has many instructive cases too. In the eighteenth century, Frederick the Great achieved success after success with his cavalry, his favorite military arm. Eschewing large horses and large riders as too slow, he urged smaller horsemen riding upon lighter horses to attack as quickly and ferociously as possible directly against the enemy, using only their thrusting swords instead of firearms. For Frederick, speed and boldness were the keys to a successful charge, and the smaller mounts of the Macedonians might have fit in well with the Prussian cavalry. Frederick’s tactical writings do not at all suggest that his cavalry would fail to slam into the ranks of the enemy, including enemy infantry. Rather, the rush of the charge would force even the cowardly cavalryman to ride along with the others into combat.29 The Baron de Marbot, a Napoleonic cavalry officer, is a lively firsthand source on the effectiveness of the cavalry charge. Several passages from his extensive memoirs shed light on how cavalry could and did attack infantry around the turn of the nineteenth century: As soon as their fire had shaken the Austrians, Marshal Bessières charged them with six regiments of heavy cavalry, supported by part of the cavalry of the guard. In vain did the Archduke form squares; they were broken with the loss of their guns and a great number of men.

Having come to attack us unawares, they were so astounded at being thus unexpectedly attacked themselves that the foremost ranks had hardly time to bring their bayonets down. In a moment the three battalions were literally rolled over under the hoofs of the cuirassiers’ horses, not one remaining on his legs.

27. In his account of this action, Sidnell (Warhorse, 97–99) argues that the cavalry would have represented the main thrust of the assault.

28. See Bezalel Bar-Kochva, The Seleucid Army: Organization and Tactics in the Great Campaigns (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 163–73, esp. 170. It should be noted that Antiochus employed cataphracts, which were more heavily armored than Alexander’s horses.

Nevertheless, the horses did charge into and through disciplined infantry.

29. For a useful collection of Frederick’s own writing on the art of warfare, see Jay Luvaas, Frederick the Great on the Art of War (London: Free Press, 1966), esp. 81–84, 149–56.

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Alexander’s Cavalry Charge at Chaeronea Montbrun’s cavalry, having beaten that of the enemy, soon found itself in presence of Craufurd’s infantry. It charged and broke two squares, cutting one literally to pieces . . . The third English square held firm. Montbrun caused Fournier’s and Wathiez’ brigades to attack it, and they had pierced one of the faces when both generals had their horses killed under them and all the colonels were wounded, so that there was nobody to take charge of the victorious regiments. . . .

The Austrian general replied that his men could defend themselves with the bayonet, and would be all the better to do so that the French horses were up to their hocks in mud, and could not meet them with the breast-to-breast shock in which the strength of cavalry lies.

I tried to break the square, but our horses could only advance at a walk, and everyone knows that without a dash it is impossible for cavalry to break a well-commanded and well-closed-up battalion which boldly presents a hedge of bayonets . . . Their long weapons [of lancers], outreaching the enemy’s bayonets, soon slew many of the Prussians. . . . 30

According to Marbot, cavalry are perfectly able to charge and break infantry squares. Moreover, it was “breast to breast shock” that proved the most formidable weapon of the cavalry, which certainly does not indicate mere psychological shock, but instead a physical collision of mass on mass. Only when muddy ground or other factors prevented the horses from gathering enough speed was a charge inadvisable.

In his seventeenth-century cavalry manual, John Cruso, an English military writer, reinforces the picture given by Marbot. The manual advises that on open and favorable ground, cavalry can charge infantry, even if the infantry is in good order. Only if the infantry is in a fortified or otherwise favorable position must a direct charge be avoided. The legendary Swiss pikemen are invoked as an example of the type of infantry that is most effective against cavalry and thus should not be attacked directly.31 It seems to us that the Swiss pikeman, wielding a massive two-handed weapon, is what most general readers and even scholars have in mind when they envision an ancient phalanx withstanding a cavalry attack. A horse charging at full speed against such a weapon, perhaps braced against the ground, would literally be skewered by the force of its own momentum. This, certainly, seems to be what Cruso has in mind. However, Greek hoplites, including the members of the Sacred Band, were equipped with one-handed spears, necessarily so given that the left arm of the hoplite was needed to hold the large double-grip shield. One of 30. Jean Baptiste Antoine Marcellin de Marbot, The Memoirs of Baron de Marbot, vol. 2, trans. Arthur John Butler (London: Greenhill, 1988 [1891]), 19, 45, 165, 371, 381.

31. John Cruso, Militarie Instructions for the Cavallrie (New York: Da Capo Press, 1968 [1632]), 99.

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the most important innovations of the Macedonian phalanx was the substitution of the smaller pelte for the large hoplite shield. The pelte could be secured by a strap around the neck to allow the soldier to hold the long sarissa with two hands. There is no evidence—either literary or iconographic—that hoplites ever held their spears in two hands or braced them against the ground in order to receive a charge of infantry or cavalry.32 No hoplite phalanx, therefore, could pose the same sort of threat as Swiss pikemen against charging horses.33 The momentum of a galloping horse, far from impaling the animal against a hoplite spear, would instead trample the opposing hoplite underfoot, with the hoplite’s one-handed grip on his spear perhaps availing little against such an impact. This image is in line with the “breast to breast shock” described by Marbot. Later, in the Napoleonic period, when infantry prevailed against cavalry as at Waterloo, it was not by relying upon the tactics of pikemen. While bayonets certainly could do considerable damage, the 32. The closest one might come to such evidence is an enigmatic statement made by Diodorus (15.32.4–6; picked up by Nepos Cha. 1.2) concerning the Athenian general Chabrias, who ordered his mercenaries to rest their shields against their knees and hold their spears upright to await a charge of Agesilaus’s hoplites. As John Buckler (“A Second Look at the Monument of Chabrias,” Hesperia 41 [1972]: 466–74) has persuasively argued, this was an “at ease” position to show contempt for the enemy, rather than the sort of bracing action performed by pikemen.

33. Rahe (“Annihilation of the Sacred Band,” 85–86; nn. 9–10), drawing on the nineteenthcentury work of Sir Charles Oman and Hans Delbrück, cites six medieval battles as evidence for the inability of cavalry to charge disciplined infantry: Hastings, Bannockburn, Courtrai, Grandson, Morat, and Nancy. The latter three battles all feature the action of Swiss pikemen deploying their novel square formation during the Burgundian Wars of the late fifteenth century (see Richard Vaughan, Charles the Bold: The Last Valois Duke of Burgundy [London: Longman, 1973], 359–432). Courtrai, a battle of the early fourteenth century between the French and Flemish, did see infantry defeat aristocratic cavalry partly by using pikes, which at the time was virtually unprecedented. The cavalry was also hindered, however, by ditches and other obstacles deliberately cut into the plain. Bannockburn, also of the early fourteenth century, and fought between the Scottish and English, saw the Scottish king Robert the Bruce innovatively deploy the schiltrom, a formation employing long stakes and spears, which was effective against cavalry. The schiltrom, prefiguring the Swiss pike square, was probably invented by William Wallace, the Scottish revolutionary, in the two decades preceding Bannockburn. Just as at Courtrai, the cavalry at Bannockburn was hindered not only by infantry formations, but also by the thorough preparation of the battlefield, with ditches and other obstacles carefully strewn about (for concise accounts of Courtrai and Bannockburn, see Kelly DeVries, Infantry Warfare in the Early Fourteenth Century [Woodbridge, U.K.: Boydell Press, 1996], 9–22, 66–85). We do not see why Rahe included the much earlier Battle of Hastings. William the Conqueror did supplement his cavalry with archers and other arms in order to be more effective against Harold’s infantry, but there is no reason to believe that William’s cavalry could not have charged the Anglo Saxon infantry, even if unsupported by a diverse force (see M. K. Lawson, The Battle of Hastings, 1066 [Charleston, S.C.: Tempus, 2002]). The hedge of long anticavalry spears represented by the schiltrom and the Swiss pike square was a type of formation not really seen before the fourteenth century, and even then deployed only on rare and noteworthy occasions by specially trained troops. The comparison of the medieval pikeman to the Greek hoplite is simply misleading.

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greatest danger to cavalry was well-timed gunfire, which Keegan’s account makes clear.34 Gunfire of course was not a factor in antiquity.

Horses and Bones Many have commented on the deadliness of the Macedonian cavalry lance, a thrusting weapon of considerable length.35 Philip Sidnell, in a comprehensive volume on ancient cavalry, suggests a cavalry lance of around twelve feet in length, and tries to put to rest the notion that shock tactics were impossible in antiquity.36 Peter Connolly argues that armed with the lance, and arranged in a tight and disciplined formation, the Macedonian cavalry effectively became a “mounted phalanx.”37 While these scholars support the idea that a frontal attack by lance-equipped cavalry could break a well-ordered phalanx, Sidnell prefers still to imagine that such a charge was most effective when the infantry lost its nerve.38 Paul Rahe, however, disputes that the technology of the lance would have been so decisive since “the problem lay with the horse.” Horses, according to Rahe, simply will not go into a mass of men unless a path is cleared before them.39 If Rahe is right, then no discussion of technology—the cavalry lance, the Swiss pike, the musket—is of any real bearing. If the above historical instances indicating the opposite of Rahe’s point are not enough to revise the communis opinio, then let us consider the horses themselves, based on the insights gained by Willekes’s extensive experience and experimentation with horses.

If we approach the topic of the cavalry charge at Chaeronea from the perspective of equine behavior, it seems, at first glance, that scholars have been correct in discounting the possibility of the Macedonian cavalry successfully attacking the Sacred Band. The horse is first and foremost a prey animal with an overriding flight instinct; equines are physiologically and behaviorally hard-wired to flee any potential danger, rather than to face it and fight. Thus, equine evolution suggests that a cavalry charge at Chaeronea was impossible. This same logic, that the horse as a flight animal will avoid danger, also discounts the possibility of any cavalry charge or even 34. Keegan, Face of Battle, 154–62, esp. 156–57.

35. Markle (“Macedonian Sarissa”; “Use of the Sarissa”) suggested through experimental archaeology that a Macedonian cavalry lance as long as eighteen feet could be wielded effectively, even without the aid of stirrups which were long thought to be essential for true shock tactics.

Markle’s lance, however, seems too long and poorly suited to the dense formation employed by the Macedonian cavalry. A lance considerably shorter than eighteen feet would still project well in front of the horse and be an effective weapon against infantry and cavalry alike.

36. Sidnell, Warhorse, esp. 84.

37. Peter Connolly, “Experiments with the Sarissa—the Macedonian Pike and Cavalry Lance— A Functional View,” Journal of Roman Military Equipment Studies 11 (2000): 103–12.

38. See Sidnell’s treatment of the destruction of the Greek mercenaries at the Granicus (Warhorse, 97–99). As we hope the present paper will demonstrate, while Sidnell is right to suggest that Alexander used his cavalry to attack the Greek mercenaries head-on, he need not posit that the mercenaries thus lost their nerve.

39. Rahe, “Annihilation of the Sacred Band,” 85.

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the effective use of cavalry on the battlefield not only at Chaeronea, but at any point in history. If we take the argument that horses would shy away from or even outright refuse to charge a phalanx because they are flight animals, we must also accept that they would avoid anything that might potentially harm them, namely, essentially everything found on a battlefield. Yet cavalry was a military mainstay for thousands of years and often played a decisive role in determining the outcome of a battle.

Clearly the inherent flight instinct of the horse could be overcome or controlled, and if this was possible in other situations, why are scholars so resistant to the notion of a cavalry charge at Chaeronea? The charge at Chaeronea and its success against the Sacred Band were possible for two reasons: equine behavior and training.40 Although the prey status of the horse has a huge influence on equine behavior, we must also take into consideration the fact that equines are herd animals, and the herd mentality plays a significant role in determining how a horse reacts to different situations.41 A horse herd is very hierarchical. Within the herd an individual horse can be considered dominant, submissive, or somewhere in between. Each horse knows its place within the herd, and jockeying for position typically occurs only when a new member joins the group.42 The rank of a particular horse within the herd is determined by personality: bold and assertive horses are likely to rank higher than a shy or timid animal.

Dominant horses will use aggressive body language and posturing to dissuade other herd members from trying to usurp them, and occasionally such confrontations will result in physical blows as well. This is most likely to occur when a stallion is challenged by a rival for control of his harem, but in most cases disputes are solved solely through body language and intimidation.43 The harem band is led by the alpha mare, while the stallion guards the rear. The other herd members follow the lead of the alpha mare without questions and any disobedience is quickly punished either by the lead mare or the harem stallion. The need to be part of a herd is a significant factor in determining how a horse reacts to a particular situation as the greatest fear for any horse is to be forced out of a herd and thus without protection as a vulnerable prey animal.44 40. Carolyn Willekes, “From the Steppe to the Stable: Horses and Horsemanship in the Ancient World” (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Calgary, 2015), 53–56. See also Carolyn Willekes, “Equine Aspects of Alexander the Great’s Macedonian Cavalry,” in Greece, Macedon and Persia: Studies in Social, Political and Military History in Honour of Waldemar Heckel, ed. Timothy Howe et al. (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 2015), 47–58.

41. Two types of herds will form in the wild. The harem band consists of a stallion, his mares, and their young offspring; the bachelor band is made up of young stallions that have yet to successfully challenge a harem stallion for his mares and older males who have been defeated and are unable to regain control of a harem band.

42. Most of this upheaval occurs between the lower-ranking horses that are trying not to fall further down in the hierarchy. Other than this, the herd is a relatively stable and cohesive unit.

43. S. Budiansky, The Nature of Horses: Exploring Equine Evolution, Intelligence and Behavior (New York: Phoenix, 1997), 89–98.

44. This innate fear is used by “natural horsemen” who assert dominance over a horse via body language and “chase” the horse away from the safety of the “herd” (the trainer) whenever the horse reacts negatively to instruction.

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This powerful herd mentality played an essential role in the training of the cavalry horse. According to Xenophon, the ideal cavalry horse was one who . . . is sound in his feet, gentle and fairly speedy, has the will and the strength to stand work, and, above all, is obedient, [this] is the horse that will, as a matter of course, give least trouble and the greatest measure of safety to his rider in warfare.45

The training process was unique to each animal, but it always took into consideration the notion of the herd. The instinctive herd mentality of the horse can be easily manipulated, and this was a boon for cavalry combat. The principle of the cavalry formation was built upon the idea of the horse herd and its inherent hierarchies.

At the front of a formation, such as the wedge favored by the Macedonians, were the bold and dominant horses. These animals had a lower flight instinct and were unafraid of charging towards danger when trained to do so. Behind these came the more submissive or shy animals. These horses were less eager to approach danger but, and this is the key here, they were even more unwilling to be left behind by the herd. At the rear of the formation were more of the dominant sort who prevented the submissive animals from falling out of rank. Thus, the success of the cavalry formation relied on the same principle as the herd.

The charge itself was a controlled affair, not a flat-out gallop. This served to keep control within the formation as the faster a horse goes, the more difficult it becomes for the rider to maintain control and balance. The controlled, collected cavalry charge also added more strength to the attack as a collected horse is more powerful than one that is strung out at racing speed. By keeping the horse balanced and “between the hand and legs” the cavalryman was better able to convince his horse that the potentially scary thing (the phalanx) was not so scary after all, reinforcing the notion that he (the rider) was in charge. The worst thing a rider can do is to chase his horse towards a frightening object: the more a rider urges his mount to speed up in the hope that the horse will not see the scary thing, the more likely the horse is to notice and react to that same scary thing.

From the time of the domestication of horses, humans have trained them to accept a variety of things that are contrary to their prey nature, including the very act of riding. In many ways, training a horse to charge a phalanx is no different from training him to do most of the other things we have asked of him. Just as with the phalangite, the cavalry horse was the result of hours of practice and drilling. These drills instilled necessary combat skills in the horse and tested him without the risk of overfacing him. When it came time for the horse to charge on a battlefield, a cavalryman could use the familiar patterns of practice to keep 45. Xen. On Horsemanship 3.12. He continues: “But those that want a lot of driving on account of their laziness, or a lot of coaxing and attention on account of their high spirit, make constant demands of the rider’s hands and rob him of confidence in moments of danger.” Translations from On Horsemanship are taken from the 1925 Loeb edition of E. C. Marchant and G. W. Bowersock.

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his horse focused.46 Horses are very much creatures of habit, and establishing a regular routine can be beneficial for combat. Finally, proper training built a relationship between horse and rider, and this should not be underestimated. The training process was one that required much patience on the part of the trainer, but the reward was an animal that was obedient, fit, and confident.47 Thus, by making use of inherent equine behavior in tandem with a careful consideration of where to place each horse within the formation, cavalry were more than capable of confidently charging a massed group of infantry like the Sacred Band.

In addition to experimental archaeology with horses, the excavated skeletal remains from the Theban Sacred Band provide another new type of evidence to shed light on the battle. [See Figure 5, opposite.] Students of the battle can now benefit from the careful work of Maria Liston, a forensic anthropologist who had a rare opportunity to study the bones from Chaeronea in person. Though 254 skeletons were initially excavated from the Lion enclosure in the nineteenth century, only those bones that showed clear signs of battle trauma were preserved. Liston estimates that between 10 and 18 individuals are represented in the surviving collection. The evidence from the bones provides chilling testimony to the horrifically violent experience of combat at Chaeronea in 338. Most importantly for the present study, three of the preserved skulls exhibit sharp force trauma wounds, all of which were delivered to the top of the head from above, by a long, straight sword blade. Though it is possible that the soldiers were kneeling at the time that they suffered these blows, according to Liston these injuries were most likely delivered from horseback against infantry standing on the ground. As Liston says, in the evidence from other battles in which sword wounds were delivered by infantry fighting against infantry, the wounds tend to be on the sides of the head, rather than the top. Liston’s anthropological analysis, thus, provides compelling evidence that the Macedonian cavalry did participate at Chaeronea, and that it engaged the Sacred Band.48 46. Xenophon writes: “It should also be known that a horse can be taught to calm by a chirp with the lips and to be roused by a cluck with the tongue . . . Accordingly, if a shout is heard or a trumpet sounds, you must not allow the horse to notice any signs of alarm in you, and must on no account do anything to him to cause him alarm, but as far as possible let him rest in such circumstances, and, if you have the opportunity, bring him his morning or evening meal” (On Horsemanship 9.10–11).

47. As suggested by Xenophon: “Let the groom be under orders also to lead him through crowds, and accustom him to all sorts of sights and all sorts of noises. If the colt shies at any of them, he must teach him, by quieting him and without impatience, that there is nothing to be afraid of ” (On Horsemanship 2.5).

48. Maria A. Liston, “Skeletal Evidence for the Impact of Battle on Soldiers and NonCombatants,” in New Approaches to Greco-Roman Warfare (Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell, forthcoming). Matthew A. Sears has benefitted from several conversations with Dr. Liston concerning the Chaeronea skeletons and the likelihood of the presence of cavalry in the battle. Dr. Liston also generously shared a copy of her forthcoming chapter. Sears has also seen Dr. Liston present this often arresting evidence in visually compelling lectures delivered in her role as a speaker for the Archaeological Institute of America.

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Alexander’s Cavalry Charge at Chaeronea Figure 5: The Lion of Chaeronea, where the dead of the Theban Sacred Band were buried.

[Courtesy of C. Jacob Butera]

Conclusion As we have seen, horses could be trained to charge into infantry head-on, and the wedge formation used by the Macedonians was ideal for exploiting the natural herd instinct of horses. Not only would the horses in the broad part of the wedge naturally follow the lead horse into an enemy formation, but the more timid horses could be placed in the center of the wedge. This latter point corresponds to Arrian’s comment that one of the strengths of the wedge is its distribution of the leaders around the outside. These observations also corroborate the testimony of Frederick the Great to the effect that even the most craven riders and horses will be swept up in the rush of the charge to attack the enemy despite themselves.

Plenty of examples exist in the modern period of cavalry physically smashing into formed infantry, and on a plain reading several accounts of ancient battles bespeak the penetrating power of heavy cavalry. Finally, Liston’s work on the Chaeronea skeletons strongly suggests that mounted soldiers killed at least some of the members of the Sacred Band. Certainly a direct charge was dangerous and risky for any cavalry to perform, to which the results of Waterloo and several ancient and medieval battles attest. The Macedonian cavalry, though, superlatively well trained and equipped, and led by a brazen commander, no less than Alexander the Great himself atop his famously aggressive horse Bucephalus, was the ideal force to carry out such a maneuver. The bulk of the evidence indicates that Alexander led a successful cavalry charge against the Theban Sacred Band at Chaeronea.

Sears would also like to thank C. Jacob Butera for his insights on and photographs of ancient battlefields; Barry Strauss for reading and commenting on an earlier draft of this paper; the audience of the 2013 Atlantic Classical Association annual meeting, at Acadia University in Wolfville, Nova Scotia, where some preliminary thoughts on the cavalry at Chaeronea were presented; Sally McGrath for sharing her wide knowledge of all things equestrian; and the anonymous readers and editor of the Journal of Military History for offering valuable suggestions and feedback.

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