06 - Regional Cooperation in South Asia by South Asian Media Net

October-December 2004

Regional Cooperation in South Asia Roadmap for South Asian Cooperation SAFTA and Economic Cooperation Cooperative Security in South Asia A Human Rights Code for South Asia A South Asian Parliament South Asian Economies: Future Challenges SAARC Secretariat: A Critique Islam and Democracy in the Arab World Remittances and Development In South Asia Ethnic Nationalism and Indo-Sri Lanka Relations Curriculum in India and Pakistan Pakistan: Indus Basin and Water Issues Bangladesh: Impact of Globalisation on Governance

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JOURNAL SOUTH

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Contents Editor Imtiaz Alam Assistant Editor Zebunnisa Burki

Regional Cooperation in South Asia In This Issue Roadmap for South Asian Cooperation SAFTA and Economic Cooperation

Bangladesh Enayetullah Khan

Cooperative Security in South Asia

Nepal Bandana Rana Pakistan I. A. Rehman Sri Lanka Sharmini Boyle

A Human Rights Code for South Asia A South Asian Parliament

S. D. Muni

South Asian Economies: Future Challenges

Dr Ishrat Husain

SAARC Secretariat: A Critique

Dr Azzam Tamimi

Address 09-Lower Ground, Eden Heights, Jail Road, Lahore, Pakistan. Tel: 92-42-5879251; 5879253 Fax: 92-42-5879254 Website : www.southasianmedia.net

Iqbal Haider

Facilitator South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA)

Editorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Post E-mail: journal@southasianmedia.net

C. Raja Mohan

Publisher Free Media Foundation

Printer Qaumi Press

Dr A. R. Kemal

Abul Ahsan

iii 7

Professor Rehman Sobhan

Consulting Editors

India K. K. Katyal

Islam and Democracy in the Arab World Remittances and Development in South Asia

69 75 87

Rashid Amjad

Ethnic Nationalism and Indo-Sri Lanka Relations

Neil DeVotta Curriculum in India and Pakistan Dr Rubina Saigol

105

Pakistan: Indus Basin and Water Issues Zaigham Habib

133

Bangladesh: Impact of Globalisation on Governance

148

Delwar Hossain

Documents Gender and Media in South Asia SAFMAâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Guidelines for South Asian Cooperation

162 165

Regional Economic Cooperation South Asia is now booming with the ideas of regional cooperation, as reflected by SAFMA's conference on regional cooperation at Dhaka. Significant sections of intelligentsia, economists, experts, journalists and peace activists have begun to take a wholist approach towards the collective good of the region as they increasingly find state-centric and security-centred approaches inconsistent with the interests of our people. The landmark agreements reached at the 12th Summit of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), at Islamabad, have spurred efforts at collectively tackling the real issues faced by the people while meeting the demands of globalisation and the WTO regime at the regional level. The agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) requires effective implementation, expanding the space for trade and, more importantly, economic collaboration and development. If South Asia's economies are to be integrated, it presupposes development of transnational infrastructure and monetary cooperation involving greater coordination among the governments and central banks. In spite of limited complementarities in trade-able items, due to similar comparative advantages, expansion of trade warrants vertical and horizontal integration of industries and investment in joint ventures by public and private sectors. However, trade and investment will not move ahead unless tariffs are lowered, as envisaged by SAPTA, para and non-tariff barriers removed and standards harmonised, and the negative-list is kept to the minimum. This will, subsequently, translate into a customs union which may lead to a common exchange rate policy that will, eventually, result in adopting a common currency underwritten by macro-economic management at the regional level. No less important is the cooperation in the transport and communication sectors envisaging an integrated transport infrastructure that allows uninterrupted travel across and beyond our region and communication highways facilitating free flow of information. Increasingly, the governments and concerned institutions are realising the necessity to address acute shortage of energy and water, incidence of drought and floods that often bring miseries to the people and states into conflict. In this regard, energy cooperation should evolve into a common energy grid with integrated electricity and gas systems. If India and Pakistan agree, and they must, then gas and oil pipelines can run from Central Asia and Iran, through Pakistan and Afghanistan, to whole of South Asia and beyond. The distribution and management of water resources, though quite a divisive issue among the upper and lower riparian regions, needs to be undertaken amicably in the spirit of Indus Basin Treaty to the mutual benefit of the countries involved, without depriving the lower riparian regions of their due. Given a lowest rate of investment to GDP ratio, South Asia must create an attractive environment for investment in high value-added manufacturing lines and trans-regional projects. Enhanced investment flows, both from within and outside the region, would culminate in production facilities located across the region through integrated production systems. Shares of both national and regional companies would be quoted on our stock exchanges as capital moves without hindrance across national boundaries to underwrite investment in any part of our region through a South Asia Development Bank. However,

economic cooperation, investment, development of transnational physical infrastructure, transportation, communication, energy grid, equitable sharing of water and efforts at poverty alleviation would not produce tangible results unless the concerns of low developed countries (LDCs) are genuinely addressed, the negative-list is minimised, tariffs are substantially brought down and non-tariff and para-tariff barriers lifted, the economies are gradually opened up with a recourse to investment-trade linkage that takes care of trade deficits between partners through investment flows and capital account, vertical and horizontal integration of industries that benefits from relative advantages and economies of scale. To realise this immense economic transformation, interstate and intrastate conflicts and attendant security threats and perceptions of political hostility will have to be addressed. The main obstacle to regional cooperation and economic integration remains political and strategic. The prevailing barriers to cross-border movements make neither commercial nor logistical sense and originate in the pathologies of interstate, as well as domestic, politics. Therefore, the political leadership in the countries of South Asia, whether in government or opposition, must show courage, flexibility and statesmanship to resolve interstate and intrastate conflicts and dismantle political barriers to regional economic takeoff and elimination of the scourge of poverty. They should get out of the straitjacket of enmity and look beyond the traditional notions of security and focus on an integrated and cooperative security that recognises interdependence binding South Asia. The states ought to act in their enlightened self-interest to resolve their conflicts and differences through peaceful means and to the mutual benefit of our people. The choice is often, erroneously, posed between regional cooperation and conflict resolution. We urge all states to simultaneously move forward to address long-standing political disputes and intensify economic cooperation and people-to-people contact. Beyond cooperative security, South Asian nations must ultimately move towards human security by placing people -- their well being and rights to peaceful life and development -at the centre of security concerns, rather than continuing with the arms race. To include the excluded, governments of South Asia take concrete steps to implement the SAARC Social Charter and give priority to poverty eradication. It is imperative for the South Asian countries to agree to a uniform human rights code and set up institutions under the Paris Principles and purposefully set about creating the required mechanisms. There is an urgent need to allow greater interaction among the policy-makers, parliamentarians, businesspeople, media practitioners, professionals and the leaders of civil society. To enable it to happen, it is necessary that India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, who have most restrictive visa regimes, drastically revise their visa policy and remove impediments to free movement of people. To overcome information deficit about the countries of the region, it is essential that all restrictions on access to and free flow of information are removed forthwith and media persons and products are allowed free movement across frontiers. The media, on their part, should give special attention to coverage of the countries of South Asia that remain under-reported. The guidelines issued by SAFMA's conference on 'Regional Cooperation in South Asia, underline the urge of civil society to make South Asia a vibrant economic and social unit. They are based on the research done by leading scholars from our own region. The visionary statement in fact shows the people the future course for action to overcome maladies faced by the countries of the region and face up to the challenges posed by the 21st Century.

In This Issue (The views expressed in this journal are solely those of the authors)

Roadmap for South Asian Cooperation Professor Rehman Sobhan, leading economist and Director Centre for Policy Dialogue, Dhaka, with a wholist approach, formulates a very cohesive and integrated roadmap to promote regional cooperation in South Asia. Inspired by the agreements reached at the Islamabad SAARC Summit on creating a South Asian Free Trade Area, SAARC Social Charter and approval of the ISACP Report on Poverty Alleviation, he identifies both bottlenecks and linkages in evolving a well-integrated South Asian Union. Mindful of the lethargy and domestic political compulsions of the political leadership, he underlines the need to have visionary leaders, who could look beyond conflicts and take the path of peace, while calling upon the civil society to play the role of a vanguard in becoming a South Asian community.

SAFTA and Economic Cooperation Dr A. R. Kemal, Director Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE), Islamabad, thoroughly reviews the structures of exports and imports of countries of South Asia and concludes that there are little complementarities since the comparative advantages are similar in a whole range of products. He, however, solidly pleads for greater economic cooperation, lowering of tariffs and benefiting from efficient allocation of resources and economy of scales, besides emphasising vertical integration of industries and trade which can benefit even low developed countries. Joint projects and investment in high value-added areas, he suggests, can be more useful than trade, which can flourish only if the signatories to SAFTA keep the negative-list to the minimum and agree to remove imbalances in importexport ratios while lifting barriers to free trade.

Cooperative Security in South Asia C. Raja Mohan, Professor of South Asian Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, underlines the imperatives of cooperative security in the subcontinent that may take into account the enlightened self-interest of nation-states in security and economic spheres at the same time while preventing conflicts and promoting regional cooperation. Providing some substance to an otherwise never defined 'Gujral Doctrine' that has, more or less, been followed by the successive governments, Mohan recommends to the neighbours of India to integrate with the larger Indian economy, while criticising the economic bureaucracy in New

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Delhi for not doing enough to open India to its smaller neighbours through 'positive unilateralism'. Focusing on Indo-Pak efforts at normalisation of relations, both failed and current, Mohan stresses a simultaneous approach to address the Kashmir dispute and improve economic ties in a cooperative security framework that, however, remains India-centric.

A Human Rights Code for South Asia Iqbal Haider, an eminent lawyer and human rights activist from Pakistan, surveys the emergence of human rights organisations at the regional level and passage of conventions and covenants by the UN and other bodies to promote and protect human rights. Lamenting a lack of movement in South East Asia and at the SAARC level, he argues for the establishment of autonomous official institutions/courts to protect human rights in those countries of the SAARC region where they do not exist and emphasises the need to take guidance from the Paris Principles while evolving a South Asian Human Rights Code.

A South Asian Parliament S. D. Muni, Professor of South Asian Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, writes about the possibilities of creating a South Asian Parliament while evaluating the development and nature of political and representative institutions in the countries of the region. Drawing lessons from the experience of the European Parliament, he carefully sets the process of creating such a parliament in South Asia in the context of economic and social integration of the region. Cautioning against skipping certain stages, given the inter-state constraints and limitation of the SAARC mandate, he optimistically proposes the structure of a South Asian Parliament and its possible initial stages.

South Asian Economies: Future Challenges Dr Ishrat Husain, Governor State Bank of Pakistan, takes a close look at liberalisation of economies in South Asia and presents a well-argued case for regional economic integration and opening of the economies to the world. Dr Husain, a radical reformer, emphatically proposes a blueprint of integrated measures to face up to the challenges of globalisation, information revolution and good governance. For that to happen, he calls upon the political leadership to evolve a consensus on an economic vision and strategy in each country not to miss the train again in a more competitive and interdependent world while forging closer economic ties among the countries of South Asia.

SAARC Secretariat: A Critique Abul Ahsan, Vice-president of Independent University of Bangladesh and former Secretary General SAARC, compares the mandate of the SAARC Secretariat with the structures of more vibrant regional groupings, such as the European Union and ASEAN. He argues a strong case to strengthen SAARC Secretariat and empower its Secretary General in order to make it more dynamic and efficient.

Questioning the mode of appointments of directors and the Secretary General, he emphasises the selection of SAARC officials on merit, while pleading to expand the role of secretariat, which is presently even worse than a post-office.

Islam and Democracy in the Arab World Dr Azzam Tamimi, an Arab scholar at Kyoto University, traces contemporary Islamic activism in the Middle East in the 18th Century revivalism initiated by Abd Al-Wahhab, founder of puritanic Wahhabism. Admitting that the Wahhabis were oblivious to the threat of colonial intrusion, he narrates how, after the defeat of Wahhabis and Napolean by Mohammad Ali at the behest of the Ottoman Empire, Islamic reformists, such as Rifa'ah al-Tahtawi and others, located Muslim 'sickness' in despotism and sought democracy and pluralism while learning from the western experience. Reversal of this reform movement in Islam, he argues, although quite apologetically by referring to Al-Ikhwan alMuslimun, has been caused due to the repression by nationalist leadership and promotion of despotic regimes by western imperialism. Forcefully arguing a case for democracy and pluralism in the Muslim world, Tamimi is worried that what the West, especially the U.S., under neo-cons, is doing has weakened the peoples' faith in democracy. Remittances and Development In South Asia Rashid Amjad, an eminent economist working with ILO as Director, analyses the impact of remittances and outflow of workers on the economies and poverty in four countries of South Asia. Although Pakistan, Bangladesh and India have, with varying degrees, benefited most from the upsurge in remittances, he argues, their impact on reduction in poverty may not be as visible as in 1980s, even if they have stabilised foreign exchange reserves and the current account and created greater liquidity that helped lowering of interest rates for investment. Post-9/11 surge in remittances, he underlines, may be due to the closing down of informal transfers through 'havala'. Ethnic Nationalism and Indo-Sri Lanka Relations Neil DeVotta, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Hartwick College, New York, with a rational Sinhala viewpoint, essentially blames Sinhala chauvinism for the emergence of Tamil separatism in an almost exclusionary, majoritarian, unitary state that has failed to undertake devolution and include Tamils in the nation-building process. He argues that, thanks to competing Sinhala elites and the expeditious politics of their rival parties, the Tamil question has not been solved. This helped the emergence of reactive nationalism of the Tamils, which assumed quite a radical form, with the emergence of LTTE, after the Tamils' peaceful struggle was crushed with force. He pins his hopes on the Indian factor, due to New Delhi's aversion to Tamil separatism, in maintaining the territorial integrity of a state that is yet to agree even on an interim arrangement, minus separate Tamil homeland, with the LTTE, as demanded by the latter.

Curriculum in India and Pakistan Dr Rubina Saigol, leading sociologist and educationist, analyses the role of ideology and nation-building under various governments in India and Pakistan, who used curriculum as a vehicle to push certain political agendas. In India’s case, she critically surveys the saffronisation of curriculum, besides evaluating the school system run by RSS under the BJP government. In Pakistan’s case, she finds shifting ideologies that defined curriculum from ‘modernist-nationalist’, to the exclusion of sub-nationalism, to General Zia’s ‘Islamisation’ and hate for other religions, especially Hindus. She rationally and persuasively presents a case to free education from ‘ideology’ and ‘nation-building’ to allow a creative, investigative and critical mind to grow. Her analysis should warrant the attention of moderates now in power, both in New Delhi and Islamabad.

Pakistan: Indus Basin and Water Issues Zaigham Habib, a top expert on Indus Basin system from Pakistan, digs out the historical evolution of irrigated agriculture in the Indus Basin system and the way the largest irrigation network in the world has historically evolved. Her article, a part of her doctoral thesis on the Indus Basin system, raises fundamental issues of the emerging water crisis in Pakistan and questions the flawed strategies to overcome water shortage in the country. She takes serious exception to streamlining of water channels that will further deplete groundwater and suggests basic changes in the whole strategy of the water authorities in Pakistan, besides proposing some alternatives that need to be given due attention.

Bangladesh: Impact of Globalisation on Governance Delwar Hossain, Associate Professor at the University of Dhaka, demonstrates that there have been mixed outcomes of the processes of globalisation in Bangladesh. He insists that globalisation has not produced positive results in terms of developmental effects and nor has institutional convergence taken place in a substantive manner. At the heart of continuing poor performance of the state and market structures and failure of policy reforms, he concludes, are the disintegrative effects of globalisation. It manifests in the mismatch between the rules and norms of globalisation and the pre-existing mechanisms of governance and institutional patterns at the domestic level.

Roadmap for South Asian Cooperation Professor Rehman Sobhan

The Islamabad Summit The paper is designed to address the prospect of South Asian cooperation in the aftermath of the 12th SAARC Summit held in Islamabad, what may immediately emerge out of the Summit and explore the future direction for South Asian cooperation. The Islamabad Summit took some far reaching decisions deepening cooperation and went as far as to commit itself to the creation of a South Asian Economic Union. Para (3) of the Islamabad declaration states that: `We reiterate our commitment made at the 11th SAARC Summit at Kathmandu in January 2002 for the creation of a South Asia Economic Union. In this context, we underline that creation of a suitable political and economic environment would be conducive to the realisation of this objective'.

he Summit articulated a bold vision while recognising the political and economic environment which needs to be established to attain this goal. This vision was influenced by the Report of the SAARC Group of Eminent Persons established by the 9th SAARC Summit in 1997 at MalĂŠ. This report, SAARC: Vision Beyond the Year 2000, was submitted to the 10th SAARC Summit in Colombo in 1998. The report was never fully discussed, nor endorsed by the SAARC Summit, but its recommendations and suggested roadmap for future cooperation in South Asia have found expression in the agendas of subsequent summits and are adopted, to some extent, by the Islamabad Summit. It is useful to see what emerged out of the Summit for charting the future direction of South Asia. The Summit signed three agreements: i) The SAARC Social Charter, ii) The Framework Agreement for a South Asia Free Trade Area, iii) The Additional Protocol to the SAARC Regional Convention on Combating Terrorism and the Summit endorsed the report of the Independent Commission for Poverty Alleviation in South Asia (ISACPA) and committed itself to implement its recommendations. The Summit also committed itself to intensify cooperation in a number of areas which include: l l l l l

Reiteration of the commitment made at the 11th SAARC Summit at Kathmandu in January 2002 for the creation of a South Asian Economic Union. Energy cooperation. Strengthening transportation, transit and communication links across the region. Harmonisation of standards and simplification of customs procedures. Public and private sector cooperation through joint ventures.

l l l l l

Setting up a South Asia Development Bank. Cooperation among Central Banks. Development of tourism within South Asia. Discussing, coordinating and exchanging information with a view to adopting common positions, where appropriate, at multilateral fora. The Summit gave special recognition to the challenge of poverty alleviation by approving the Plan of Action on Poverty Alleviation prepared by the Finance and Planning Ministers at their meeting in Islamabad in 2004.

Deepening Cooperation in South Asia The key Summit decisions indicate a commitment towards deepening cooperation in South Asia. The SAFTA agreement is only the first stage in deepening cooperation. However, if South Asia's trade is to be integrated, it will require integration of the infrastructure of the region. This would point to cooperation in the areas of energy as well as the strengthening of transportation, transit and communication links across the region. This would further require harmonisation of standards and simplification of customs procedures. Trade cooperation would point to monetary cooperation thereby suggesting the need for greater coordination among Central Banks. Sustaining trading links would require investment cooperation involving public and private sector cooperation through joint ventures. Investment cooperation would need to be underwritten by financing through a prospective South Asia Development Bank. It would follow from such levels of cooperation that the governments would discuss, coordinate and exchange information with a view to adopting common positions, where appropriate, at multilateral fora.

n each of the above-mentioned areas, there would be scope for deepening cooperation. The Free Trade Area could evolve into a Customs Union with a common tariff barrier with the rest of the world. The Customs Union could lead to a common exchange rate policy and eventually a common currency underwritten by coordination of macro-economic policy across the region. Energy cooperation could evolve into a common energy grid across the region with integrated electricity and gas systems as is the case in Europe today. Transport cooperation would lead to an integrated transport infrastructure which permits uninterrupted travel from Peshawar to Chittagong and from Kathmandu to Colombo as in the European Union. Investment cooperation would culminate in regional corporations with production facilities located across the region within vertically and horizontally integrated production systems. Shares of both national and regional companies would be quoted in the stock exchanges across the region as capital flows without hindrance across national boundaries to underwrite investment in any part of the South Asia region. Within such a framework of cooperation, the goal of poverty reduction enunciated by ISACPA would evolve from a regional goal implemented at the national level into a regional agenda to eradicate poverty across South Asia. The noble goal of a South Asian Social Charter would move beyond a set of pious declarations made in Islamabad into binding commitments for charting out the social obligations of each of the member states enforceable across the region.

Moves towards deepening cooperation would have to take the ultimate step, which today binds Europe, by integrating our labour markets. Today in Europe any European can move across national boundaries to seek work anywhere in the region. We would need to aspire to a similar situation in South Asia after making due allowances for our prevailing social and political realities.

Towards a Free Trade Area The first stage in deepening cooperation would be to enhance trade. For a region which aspires to an economic union, we have one of the lowest levels of intra-regional trade anywhere in the world. While this originates from prevailing trade barriers in each country, the more substantive constraint lies in the structural asymmetries in the national economies which limit the scope for trade. Moving towards SAFTA is the first phase in a process of deepening economic cooperation. The problems to be faced at this stage remain less severe than may be apparent at first glance, but we should not underestimate the enormity of the challenge.

ntra-regional trade has increased significantly in the last decade, mostly through imports by all countries in the region, except Pakistan, from India. While South Asia is a fast growing destination for Indian exports, it remains marginal as a source of India's imports. The principal export destination of all South Asian countries remains North America and the European Union (EU). Trade liberalisation with South Asia has, thus, largely served to stimulate Indian exports within the region but with low levels of reciprocal export growth to India. This owes in some measure to India's relatively more restrictive import regime compared to its neighbours, but it also reflects the structural rigidities in the smaller economies who have relatively little to export to India. Thus a primary goal of trade cooperation in South Asia has been to encourage India to open up its import regime to imports from its neighbours through significant trade concessions and to help the smaller countries to enhance as well as diversify their production and export capacity to exploit emerging market opportunities in India. While SAFTA was seen as the route to opening up trade, it always needed to address the problem of trade asymmetry in the region. To the extent that the SAARC process moved too slowly to address these issues, bilateralism became a preferred option to stimulate intra-regional trade. As of today, India has entered into bilateral free trade agreements with Nepal, Bhutan and Sri Lanka. In the case of Bangladesh a bilateral free trade agreement is under negotiation with India. It is expected from the negotiations that India would offer accelerated market access to Bangladeshi exports as has been permitted under the Indo-Lanka Free Trade Agreement (ILFTA). In return the smaller economies would be given more time to eliminate their trade barriers to Indian exports. There is some apprehension amongst economists in the region that the bilateral FTAs may compromise the move towards SAFTA. It could, however, be argued that these FTAs may facilitate the move to SAFTA since they have already opened up the doors for enhanced trade in the region. Negotiations have already begun through the SAARC Secretariat on working out the details of SAFTA. These negotiations will have to factor in the implications of the bilateral FTAs in place

within the region or under negotiation. The countries of the region should agree on the guiding principles for the official negotiations. (a) India must make the deepest concessions. (b) Generous concessions must be offered to the SAARC LDCs. (c) The negative list principle should be used to accelerate agreement; this list must be reduced to a minimum in each country and, particularly, the bigger economies. (d) Provision must be made to provide financial support to the weaker members to enhance their development and trade capacity. (e) Provisions must be made for financial compensation to those LDCs such as Maldives who are likely to face significant import revenue losses due to trade concessions under SAFTA. (f) A final agreement reached as early as possible, preferably by the time of the next Summit.

Investment Cooperation The move towards SAFTA will be meaningless unless the issue of stimulating investment in the region, particularly in the less developed areas, including Sri Lanka, is accelerated. The substantive point of a free trade area is for small economies with narrow markets, such as Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka, to be able to use the incentive of the larger South Asian and particularly Indian market to stimulate enhanced investment from within and without. In Bangladesh as in Sri Lanka, it is widely believed that the expectation of servicing a market of one billion people in India will open up new investment horizons. Domestic entrepreneurs seeking to access global financing and foreign enterprises, particularly from East and South East Asia looking for entry into the large and growing Indian market, will be encouraged by SAFTA to rethink their investment plans.

iven the opportunities for unrestricted access to an integrated South Asian market, deep structural changes in their production capacities which can expand and diversify the basket of goods available for export are essential to transforming the fortunes of the smaller economies of South Asia. Structural changes have the potential of transforming the dynamic comparative advantage of an economy and can, therefore, never be adequately captured in the static gravity models used to forecast gains from regional cooperation. Business houses in India and outside investors could also be expected to adjust their production base by locating plants to serve South India in Sri Lanka or Northeast India and Eastern Bangladesh rather than servicing them from Mumbai or Haryana. New patterns of vertical and horizontal integration, with plants located across the region, could serve to restructure the manufacturing landscape of South Asia. To realise such a transformation in the investment climate in each of these countries, preconditions will have to be created where perceptions of political hostility and the attendant security threats to investors, particularly from India, will have to be put to rest. While some of these apprehensions may be addressed within a possible SAARC investment guarantee scheme and/or the use of the globally facility known as MIGA,

the real apprehensions remain invisible and originate in the mindsets both in India and the host country. It is the primary responsibility of the host governments, major political parties, the business community and the media of these countries, to create the preconditions whereby investors will feel secure. Allowing for improvements in the social environment for investment the major task will be to put in place the necessary financing facilities to service the emerging investment needs. Within India there is no shortage of private or public institutions which can underwrite investments across regional boundaries. But such facilities will need to be encouraged by changes in the laws governing capital market convertibility. While each South Asian country will take time to open up its capital account, India can take the initiative of moving to restricted convertibility by lifting all policy restrictions to capital flows within the region.

he proposal for a dedicated South Asian development fund may also be encouraged. The Fund was endorsed by SAARC at least a decade ago but has been virtually stillborn. The Fund's mission needs to be clarified and new life needs to be breathed into the organisation. There is some confusion as to the scope of this fund and whether it will cover both financing of infrastructure projects as well as private investment. Here it is suggested that two funds may be developed. One fund should be dedicated to financing infrastructure development projects mostly located in the less developed countries. As in the case of the European Union, a special fund is needed to enhance the development capacity of weaker countries to enable them to enhance their competitiveness in an integrated market. Billions of Euros were invested through the EU in such funds, to finance investment in Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland when they entered the EU, to enable them to upgrade their infrastructure and enhance their competitive capacity. A similar fund, underwritten from within SAARC but supplemented by aid resources from outside the region should be established to enable Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka to invest in infrastructure projects. Investment which modernises and enhances capacity in transport and communications as well as energy, perhaps with a special focus on regional connectivity but not exclusive to it, will enhance the attractiveness of these economies to prospective investors. A second fund should be established as an Investment Fund, serviced by both public and private capital, to finance private sector investment projects within the weaker economies, which involve cross border investment as well as projects for serving regional markets. This should attract prospective investors from India and Pakistan and could be used to leverage further private investment from outside the region which may even cover private investment in infrastructure projects.

Integrating the Infrastructure The Islamabad Summit quite appropriately identified energy, transport and communications as important areas for cooperation. Of these, the need for transport integration is perhaps the most urgent since it is integral to the operationalisation of a free trade area. South Asia inherited an integrated transport infrastructure from the

British who were themselves bequeathed a road network by the Mughal Empire. This infrastructure was fractured not by the partition of India but by its political aftermath and now needs to be rebuilt within the context of greater political harmony in South Asia.

cross the mainland of South Asia the original transport infrastructure is already in place, but in many areas has fallen into disuse or needs upgrading. The main obstacle to improving connectivity is political. The barriers to cross-border movements make neither commercial or logistical sense and originate in the pathologies of inter-state as well as domestic politics. The political leaders of South Asia will therefore need to first dismantle the political barriers to transport integration. Once this is done, procedures for facilitating cross border movement of people and goods will need to be harmonised (visas, customs facilities) and system connectivity will have to be established (linking metre guage rail systems with broad guage systems). Infrastructure where fractured will have to be rebuilt or upgraded to sustain a heavier traffic load and capacity will need to be expanded to accommodate the enhanced traffic emanating from intra-regional movements. In some cases new investment would be needed to build transport links where none exit today. So far SAARC has done very little to address the issue of transport integration. Some meetings have been convened by the SAARC Secretariat to look at the issue of standardising the transport infrastructure but there is no strategic vision to guide the integration process largely because of the underlying political tensions which constrain issues of transport connectivity. Whatever dialogue on improving linkages has taken place owes either to the enterprise of multilateral bodies such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank or UNESCAP or civil society initiatives. The mandate from the Islamabad Summit has inspired the SAARC Secretariat to place the issue of improving transport linkages on its work programme. However much work is needed to both design an underlying vision and then translate it into programmes and projects which free up movement of traffic across South Asia.

Energy Cooperation South Asia is, in aggregate, an energy deficit area largely because India is emerging as one of the world's largest energy markets. In contrast, Nepal and Bhutan retain the potential to emerge as major sources of energy exports though harnessing the vast hydro power potential in their rivers. Indeed power is already Bhutan's largest source of export earnings directed to India which has helped to make it the only country in the region with a trade surplus with India. However, Nepal's export-oriented hydropower projects have been tied up in protracted negotiations with India, its principal prospective market for power. These negotiations have acquired political overtones which have strained bilateral relations and have also become a major issue in domestic politics in Nepal. Bangladesh has a potential for exporting natural gas to India but is reluctant to do so because of domestic political opposition to such exports on the grounds that its gas reserves are insufficient to justify such exports. Pakistan remains a potential transit point for connecting the vast energy reserves of West and Central Asia to South Asia but has not been able to benefit from its strategic location

because of its political tensions with India. This politicisation of what would in most other regions have been viewed as economic or commercial decision derives from the political perspective guiding the development of the energy sector in every country. The idea that the supply and demand for energy must be balanced within a country is not very meaningful in a region where some countries are major importers of energy and others see it as their principal export. In such circumstances, it would make sense for South Asia to move away from conceiving of its energy security as a national project and will have to redefine its market in regional terms. If South Asia's energy scenario were to be redefined within a regional context its energy needs would expect to be served through a common distribution system integrated within a single energy grid of power and gas lines extending across the region. Such an integrated system would need to resolve quite complex problems of cross-border pricing, harmonisation of standards and equipments and the role of external players as sources of supply (Iran, Central Asia) or as corporate investors.

he SAARC governments have already recognised the need for cooperation in the energy sector. The Summit in Islamabad reaffirmed this interest. A meeting of SAARC ministers was held in Dhaka in 2003 to explore the scope for cooperation. But so far very little has been done to work out the economics or explore the political implications of such cooperation. At the level of civil society, SACEPS set up a Task Force to explore the scope for cooperation. Its report identified the attendant benefits as well as the complex issues of politics, ownership, pricing and management associated with building energy linkages in the region. This report was presented to the SAARC Summit in Islamabad. Another study by the Coalition for South Asian Cooperation (CASAC) and the CPD, Dhaka, has taken the work of the SACEPS Task Force forward and completed a more comprehensive study on energy cooperation. There is a need for both SAARC and civil society institutions in the region to come together to draw a substantive and implementable programme for energy cooperation which can be discussed more comprehensively by the SAARC governments before concrete proposals for cooperation are placed before the Summit.

Harmonising Macro-economic Policies Any move towards an Economic Union cannot limit itself to a free trade area. SAARC will sooner or later have to explore the scope for a Customs Union. This issue will not be as complex as it might have appeared some years ago. Under the pressure of the WTO convergence in tariff levels across the world is the order of the day. Since all SAARC countries have been lowering their tariff rates, mostly under pressure from the World Bank/IMF structural adjustment reforms, the deep disparities in tariff levels which once characterised the region are less apparent toady. It, therefore, makes sense to open up discussion on adopting a common tariff policy vis-Ă -vis the rest of the world. However, this task is also problematic. It is the smaller economies who have reduced their tariffs rather faster than India or Pakistan. However, this is not a problem which can persist over a long period of time due to the WTO rules of the game. It would therefore make sense to initiate work on the implications of a Customs

Union within South Asia in order to see when, under what circumstance and at what pace such a Union can be put in place. Deepening integration will involve moving beyond trade to address the broader issue of harmonising macro-economic policies. This would cover such areas as fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies. Such a level of cooperation would demand coordination amongst SAARC finance ministers to ensure that their budget deficits, inflation, exchange and interest rates maintain some element of alignment. Such issues have never been discussed at any level within SAARC. Coincidentally, such macro-economic indicators, with episodic variations, have in recent years not significantly diverged across the SAARC countries. However, this cannot always be the case so that some consultation, if not coordination, amongst finance ministers would be in order.

he more advanced move towards a common currency lies even further ahead. The available professional work on monetary cooperation carried out by IPS, Colombo, and at RIS, New Delhi, on behalf of SACEPS, has examined the implications of moving towards exchange rate harmonisation and eventually a common currency. Both studies have recognised that any move in the direction may be premature. However, what has emerged out of these civil society consultations is the suggestion that a parallel currency rather than a common currency may be put in place largely to underwrite trade and investment transactions in the region. So far little or no discussion at the official level has taken place among SAARC finance ministers on macro-economic policy. Even though the finance ministers are expected to meet every year such meetings have been episodic and have limited themselves to safe subjects such as poverty.

Integrating Labour Markets It makes little economic sense to talk of globalisation though integration of factor markets, in the form of commodities and capital, while omitting all discussion of labour which is a recognised factor of production. Freeing of the movement of labour across national boundaries is not discussed either at the WTO or the SAARC fora. In the WTO the SAARC countries come together to support the inclusion of the movement of natural persons in any discussion on trade in services. It is preposterous for the U.S. and the Europeans to include such issues as the liberalisation of banking, insurance and consultancy services as part of the negotiations on the services sector at the WTO without any reference to labour services which are a major export from Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. In contrast to South Asia's strong position on the subject in international fora it is verboten to discuss the issue of movement of natural or any other variety of persons in any SAARC fora. The truth is that the issue of labour flows across borders, whether at the WTO or in South Asia, is discussed as an issue of immigration, usually illegal, by ministries in charge of internal security rather than those responsible for trade and economic affairs. To the extent that SAARC governments may remain inhibited about discussing the problem of labour flows it is suggested that at the level of civil society serious

discussion of the issue should take place. These dialogues would need to be backed by major research on the underlying economics, the social implications in the receiving and sending countries and the political fallout from this process. Such an exercise should recognise that important issues of human rights as well as national security are involved along with the criminal dimension associated with human trafficking of women and children. It is hoped that out of such research and consultation, a realistic and humanatrian policy will emerge which can serve to formalise the process of labour flows and integrate this into the process of economic cooperation in South Asia. Such an exercise will need to recognise that if a South Asian Economic Union is to emerge labour market integration will have to be a central component of the process.

Trade in Services South Asia has a fast and growing trade in services. Large numbers of South Asians cross each other's borders as tourists, pilgrims, professionals, students and health care seekers as well as providers. Nepal, Maldives, Sri Lanka and India are major tourist destinations both globally and within the region. India is a major attraction for students and health care seekers while Indian nurses and doctors are much in evidence in a number of hospitals in Bangladesh, Nepal, Maldives and Bhutan. Managers and professionals from India are in service in Nepal and Bhutan just as Indian and Pakistani managers are running textile mills in Bangladesh while Bangladeshi cooks and waiters are ubiquitous in Maldivian tourist resorts. With the enhancement in the quality of service delivery across the region this trade in services will grow and may do so exponentially, since this is an area where South Asia has some comparative advantage.

here is, however, no reason why the market in services should be monopolised by India. Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh can invest in their education and health-care sector both directly and though collaboration with India, to attract service seekers from within the region as well as globally. Pakistan already has some excellent hospitals and institutions of educational excellence such as the Lahore University of Management Sciences which attract clients from overseas. It would not take much effort to upgrade such service sectors in these countries to serve a regional and even global market. India is now emerging as one of the major exporters of IT services at the global level. There is an expectation that this could grow to US$ 50 billion. Here again Sri Lanka, because of its level of educational attainment, Pakistan, Bangladesh and even Maldives have the potential to share in the fast growing IT market. Here India, in particular, can play and indeed is beginning to play, a crucial role in enhancing capacity as well as investing in these sectors in all the countries of the region to enable them to connect with the global and regional IT market. SAARC initiatives in the service sector have not moved beyond some consultations related to the tourism sector. Much more work, again possibly at the level of civil society, needs to be done to estimate the extent and nature of this market as well as its

underlying dynamics. Such studies can then be used to open up dialogue at the official level to see how the issue of services should be integrated into the SAFTA process. Since much of this trade in services is informal and hence unrecorded, this trade will continue to expand through the play of market forces. It may be counterproductive for SAARC to interfere with the market but the SAARC process should be used to explore ways to enhance the export capacity in services of the weaker SAARC member countries.

Social Integration South Asia is united by its poverty. It contributes the largest share of the world's poor, illiterate, hungry and medically deprived, though Sri Lanka and Maldives contribute little to these numbers. Any move to integrate South Asia cannot, therefore, bypass this defining social reality. It was, therefore, appropriate that the Colombo Summit of 1991 set up the Independent South Asian Commission on Poverty Alleviation (ISACPA). A quite creative document on how to alleviate South Asia's poverty was prepared by ISACPA and placed before the SAARC Summit in Dhaka in 1993. The Summit indeed set 2002 as the date by which poverty would not just be alleviated but eliminated from South Asia. However between 1993 and 2002 not much was done at the national level to honour this commitment nor was any attempt made at successive SAARC summits to take account of progress in this area. The emerging global compact in the wake of the Millenneum Summit of 2000 has focused attention on poverty reductions and has led to the formulation of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) which are expected to be realised in each country by 2015. This global emphasis on poverty as much as the awareness that poverty was still endemic in South Asia even after 2001 seems to have excited the Kathmandu Summit of 2002 to revisit poverty. The Summit accordingly commissioned an ISACPA-II to address the issue of poverty again. The ISACPA-II report was submitted to and endorsed at the Islamabad Summit. It set itself the more modest goal of alleviating rather than eliminating poverty which was rewarded by the Summit that perpetuated the life of the ISACPA to oversee the implementation of its goals.

he main goals of ISACPA-II, however, appear to be mostly committed to monitoring the poverty trends and progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) in the South Asian countries and in sharing experiences and best practices across the region. These are modest goals which could well be realised even within SAARC. Eradicating or even alleviating poverty remains a national task which is supposed to be addressed by each SAARC country, except India, within the framework of a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) which is the new global development framework initiated by the World Bank and IMF. India has not taken the PRSP route claiming that its current Five Year Plan incorporates its own PRSP. Obviously there is very little SAARC can do to alleviate poverty since this task remains the paramount obligation of the member countries. However, poverty reduction is not just an exercise in development budgeting but is integral to the political economy of the concerned society. Given the salience of political and social

variables, it is less clear how far ISACPA can discharge its role as a watchdog of the progress in poverty alleviation in South Asia without major backup from both the political parties and civil society of South Asia.

SAARC Social Charter A prospective coalition of civil society institutions needs to be established to evaluate the progress towards poverty eradication as well as to see how far South Asian governments are meeting their obligations towards implementing the provisions of the SAARC Social Charter which was signed at the Islamabad Summit. This role of a civil society monitor for the Social Charter is even more important because there was no such entity as ISACPA which prepared the SAARC Charter and can now oversee its implementation. The Social Charter was prepared almost as an afterthought, by bureaucrats convened by the SAARC Secretariat, with little or no consultation either with SAARC governments or civil society. Very little is known about the SAARC Social Charter within most governments who have exercised little ownership over the final document. The signing of the Charter by the SAARC Summit was thus largely a proforma exercise since neither the foreign ministers or the presidents/prime ministers who endorsed the Charter are aware of its contents let alone its implications. Notwithstanding its origins, the SAARC Charter is an ambitious document influenced by similar documents in other parts of the world. However, unlike its role model, the European Social Charter, the SAARC Charter is long on exhortation but makes few binding commitments to which governments can be held accountable.

ddressing such provisions of the Social Charter as the right to food, work and health-care, will demand strong action by civil society. SAARC governments have signed many such international covenants to which they pay little more than lip service. As long as South Asia remains a region mired in poverty and injustice, exposed to growing income inequality and social disparity, the Social Charter must serve as an instrument of advocacy on behalf of the deprived and excluded. It is the responsibility of civil society across South Asia to hold their governments accountable for correcting these injustices. This will demand an alert, informed and committed civil society which will need to bond together within each country and across the region to build a collective identity that can empower them to play the role of both advocate and custodian for the rights of the deprived majority of South Asia.

Conclusion: The Role of Civil Society There is a strong and growing demand within civil society for greater cooperation within South Asia. However, the constraints to cooperation in virtually every area originate in the tendency of member governments to politicise issues for reasons of domestic expediency. Citizens in the region do want to trade with each other, travel across borders as freely as do the citizens of the European Union or ASEAN and to live without the threat of war or fear of terrorism. The leaders of the SAARC countries need to respond to the needs of their citizens and demonstrate the statesmanship to resolve their short and long term conflicts. These conflicts can be more readily addressed within a framework of open regionalism where borders and nationality do

not become constraints to the intercourse of people and commerce. Such a perspective on South Asian cooperation appeared to have emerged out of the Islamabad summit but needs to be sustained by the commitment of the SAARC leaders and incorporated into the institutions governing inter-state relations.

hile South Asia needs visionary leaders who can perpetuate the spirit of Islamabad Summit, it needs a strong civil society that can project the needs of the people of the region before these leaders. These needs are already reflected in the commitment of the leaders to reducing poverty and upholding the rights of the excluded through the SAARC Social Charter. But for these rights to be realised South Asia has to be transformed into zone of peace where its scare resources are not exhausted in building security establishments, which become obstacles to cooperation in the region. The process of South Asian cooperation thus needs to become a shared project between the political leadership and the citizens of the region. This social compact must draw upon the involvement of an engaged civil society, bound by a shared commitment to live as a community. It is these citizens who will not only need to hold their governments' accountable for working together to build a common future but will have to assume a vanguard role in recreating a South Asian community. (Professor Sobhan is Chairman of Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD), Bangladesh and Executive Director, South Asia Centre for Policy Studies, SACEPS)

SAFTA and Economic Cooperation Dr A.R. Kemal

Introduction International trade helps in improving welfare by allowing higher levels of consumption and investment than otherwise possible. In a labour surplus country like Pakistan it also helps in generating higher rates of employment and wages with positive implications for income distribution and poverty, thus further increasing social welfare. While the promotion of multilateral trade, mandate of WTO, promises higher rate of economic growth across the globe, the spread of regional blocs denies the advantages of free trade to the countries outside the group. Therefore, for enjoying benefits of higher trade, including improved resource allocation, higher level of technical and X-efficiency, and wider options for consumers and exposure to new ideas, technologies and products, the South Asian countries must ensure trade facilitation, higher investment and economic cooperation in other areas of economic development.

lthough the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has been in existence for about 20 years, intra-regional trade is still around 4 per cent of their total trade [See IRS (2004)]. The South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) signed in the mid-90s has helped little in promoting the intra-regional trade because most of the products of export interest to the regional countries were excluded from the preferential treatment. It reflects mistrust and unwillingness of the South Asian countries to increase their interdependence, that augurs well for political and economic cohesion. The SAARC summit declaration of Islamabad promises a South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA). It calls for reduction in import duties to 20 per cent by 2006 and between 05 per cent by 2013, but allows the less developed economies to reduce the rate of duties to 0-5 per cent by the year 2016. SAFTA allows the countries to notify the negative-list which will not enjoy concessional import duties. Obviously, if the negative-list is quite large, the impact of the agreements will be little. Considering the significance of trade to welfare, it is hoped the South Asian countries will keep the negative-list small.

Intra-Regional Trade and SAPTA For promoting intra-regional trade, a preferential treaty (SAPTA) was signed in 1994 and in the first round that came into effect in 1995. Concessions were granted on 226 products in 1995 after the first round. It took four rounds to agree on 4700 products out of 6000 by the year 2000, with India leading the table, Maldives being the last as is evidenced in Table 1.

Table 1 Preferences under SAPTA by Countries Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka SAARC

Number of Items 521 233 2554 178 491 491 199 4667

Source: Weerakon and Wijayasiri (2003) Despite the concessions to a large number of products, there has hardly been any increase in intra-regional trade in the total international trade of the region. This is because, firstly, negotiations under SAPTA have been conducted mainly on a productby-product basis, which allows some flexibility to each country, but takes a lot of time1. Second, the tariff cuts offered under SAPTA have not been enough. For example, India has offered the preferences on many products and the margins have been maximum but its MFN rates are typically higher than those of its partners, and as such concessions had very little impact. Third, most of the products, which were given concessions are not widely traded in the region. Confining solely to the tariffs and leaving para-tariff and non-tariff measures out of the negotiations has limited the growth of intra-regional trade as has high local content criterion2. The countries have comparative advantage in similar products which also tends to reduce the trade potential. Intra-regional trade flows The shares of intra-regional trade in imports and exports are quite different and vary significantly across different countries. Despite efforts to strengthen regional economic cooperation through SAPTA, intraregional trade is only 4 per cent of the total trade, though there have been fluctuations around this level since 1995.

hile intra-regional trade has been low, its patterns vary sharply from country to country. For example, the share of intra-regional imports in total imports of Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka stood at 11.7, 33.2 and 10.1 per cent, respectively, in 2000. Pakistan and India met only 2.3 and 0.7 per cent, respectively, of their import requirements from the region in the same period. Bangladesh's share of the regional imports quadrupled and that of Sri Lanka increased by almost one-half over the 19852000 period. The shares of India and Nepal first declined but then recovered in recent years, though only a little higher than their respective shares in 1985. The share of Pakistan shows some fluctuations but it is increasing.

Table 2: Intra- SAARC Trade ($Million)

1980 1985 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

Intra-SAARC World trade of Share of intra - SAARC trade in trade SAARC countries world trade of SAARC countries 1210 37885 3.2 1054 44041 2.4 1584 65041 2.4 4228 104159 4.1 4914 111479 4.4 4390 115961 3.8 6073 121331 5.0 5640 129738 4.4 5884 141978 4.1 6537 139585 4.7 Source: Weerakon and Wijayasiri (2003)

Intra-regional exports In intra-regional exports, Bangladesh's share has gone down from 7.7 per cent in 1985 to 1.6 per cent in 2000, of Nepal from 38.3 per cent to 30.0 per cent, of Sri Lanka from 3.8 to 1.8 per cent and of Pakistan from 5.3 per cent to 2.9 per cent. However, India increased its share from 3.3 per cent in 1985 to 4.4 per cent in 2000. [For details see Kemal et al (2003)]. Smaller countries have the pro-regional bias in their trade structure while larger countries, both Pakistan and India, have an anti-regional bias in their trade structure. Unless all the trade partners benefit from trade liberalisation, trade expansion in SAARC can expand little.

Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

Table 3: Percentage Shares of Intra Regional Imports in Total Imports Bangladesh India Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka 3.46 0.69 32.43 1.59 6.17 3.57 0.49 32.44 1.75 7.64 4.28 0.5 18.8 1.61 6.49 5.28 0.48 18.09 1.86 7.79 4.48 0.28 12.11 1.75 5.79 6.84 0.41 11.7 1.64 6.74 7.47 0.54 13.76 1.42 6.88 10.13 0.83 17.4 1.48 11.89 11.88 0.45 17.23 1.55 10.11 12.76 0.49 18.37 1.55 10.58 17.66 0.53 17.53 1.46 11.08 16.29 0.5 28.55 2.41 12.59 12.91 0.45 26.76 1.96 10.7 17.26 1.11 31.66 2.42 10.09 13.47 0.80 31.99 1.94 9.78 11.68 0.73 33.15 2.32 10.11 Source: PIDE (2003)

Table 4: Percentage Shares of Intra Regional Exports in Total Exports Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

Bangladesh 7.65 6.06 4.1 5 3.9 3.62 4.7 2.21 2.42 2.3 2.65 1.82 2.26 2.69 1.92 1.57

India Nepal 3.25 38.32 3.01 38.11 2.82 27.84 2.78 17.63 2.43 2.69 2.71 7.19 1.78 7.86 3.83 13.07 4.00 4.69 4.13 3.87 4.98 8.7 4.92 12.99 4.36 25.44 5.46 36.49 4.82 28.85 4.43 26.95 Source: PIDE (2003)

Pakistan 5.28 3.2 3.92 5.04 3.51 3.97 3.33 4.93 3.21 3.25 3.13 2.54 1.75 4.08 3.27 2.92

Sri Lanka 3.8 4.52 3.58 5.76 5.21 3.3 2.6 1.97 2.17 2.37 2.28 2.27 2.05 1.53 2.03 1.81

India's trade has not only an anti-region bias, the index of trade balance3 for India falls short of unity; its exports to the region have invariably been higher than its imports. On an average, Indian imports from SAARC countries have been less than its exports to the region. Pakistan, on an average, has trade balance less than 0.5 while other countries, in general, have a trade balance greater than one [see Kemal et al, (2003)].

Complementarities and Intra-Industry Trade Revealed comparative advantage ratios4, a concept developed by Balassa (1965), is simply a ratio of the share of a given product in a country's exports to its share in world exports. A country is said to have a revealed comparative advantage (disadvantage) in product h if the ratio exceeds or falls short of unity. However, it may give misleading results amid distortions in the market. Therefore, the pattern of â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;trueâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; comparative advantage may differ from the one suggested by the revealed comparative advantage ratios.

he finer the disaggregation, the more useful would be the revealed comparative advantage ratios. Here we report results at three digit classification and the reader is referred to [Kemal et al (2002)] one and second digit classification. The revealed comparative advantages of various countries are examined below. Bangladesh has comparative advantage in fish, vegetables, jute, tea, leather, textile yarn, made-up articles of textile material, clothing, and woven cotton fabrics. India has comparative advantage in food, beverages and tobacco products including meat, fish, crustaceans, rice, fruits and nuts, tea and coffee, spices, feeding stuff for animals, a wide range of 'crude materials' including oilseeds, cotton, stone, sand and gravel, iron ore, ores and concentrates of basic metals, and crude animal, vegetable materials,

petroleum, oils and preparations, fixed vegetable oils; in chemicals and related products including nitrogen-function compounds, other organic chemicals, synthetic organic coloring material, medicinal and pharmaceutical products, perfumery, cosmetic and soaps, and insecticides and herbicides; leather; articles of textile and clothing; machine tools, household equipment, and steel products; and motor vehicles, motor cycles, and bicycles.

epal has comparative advantage in men and women's clothing, knitted or crocheted, floor coverings, textile clothing accessories, and essential oils and perfumes etc. Pakistan's revealed comparative advantage is in fish and crustaceans, rice, fresh and dried fruits, sugar, molasses, honey, spices, vegetables, roots and tubers; crude materials including cotton, besides oilseeds and oleaginous fruits, warm clothing, stone, sand, gravel, crude animal and vegetable materials; textile and clothing; leather; floor coverings; medical instruments; baby carriages; and toys and cutlery. Sri Lanka has comparative advantage in fish, crustaceans, other cereal meals, flour, fruits and nuts, tea and spices; crude materials such as synthetic rubber, fuel wood, oilseeds, oleaginous fruits, paper, paperboard, vegetable, textile fibres, and crude vegetable materials; rubber tyres and articles; wood manufactures; made-up articles of textile materials; pottery, pearls and precious stones; materials of rubber; textile yarn, and woven fabrics of textile materials; and electric power machinery. The profile of revealed comparative advantage suggests that the pattern of revealed comparative advantage is quite similar across the South Asian countries.

ith the exception of India and Sri Lanka, the South Asian countries enjoy comparative advantage in a relatively narrow range of products. Out of 71 commodity groups, Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan have revealed comparative advantage in only 7, 5 and 12 commodity groups while India and Sri Lanka have comparative advantage in 26 and 21 product categories; and no country has comparative advantage in capital intensive and high value-added products. Despite the similar comparative advantage, there is still some scope for increasing intraregional trade. South Asian countries could import veneers, plywood, particle boards and other textile fabrics from Bangladesh; 43 products ranging from various food items to machinery and transport equipment from India; oilseeds and oleaginous fruits from Nepal; molasses, honey, cotton, clothing, crude animal and vegetable materials, fabrics, cutlery, live animals, and surgical instruments from Pakistan; and synthetic rubber, fuel wood, raw or processed textile fibers, residual petroleum products, tobacco, rubber articles, and electric power machinery and parts from Sri Lanka. Trade complementarities Regional trading arrangements are likely to succeed in strengthening intra-regional trade if the trade structures of member countries exhibit strong complementarities5. The low values of trade complementarity indices highlight the absence of strong complementarity among the countries of South Asia. The trade complementarity between Bangladesh and India has increased and is highest in the region. The pattern

of complementarity between India's imports and its trading partners' exports shows lack of trade complementarity in exports of South Asian countries to India. Except for Sri Lanka, the index is around 10 per cent. The structure of Nepal's imports exhibits some compatibility with the exports of Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. While trade complementarity between Nepal and Bangladesh has improved, it has weakened in Nepal's trade with India. On average, Nepal's import structure exhibits the lowest complementarity with exports of Sri Lanka and the complementarity is higher for trade between Pakistan and India. Exports of Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka depict weak compatibility with imports of Pakistan. While Sri Lanka and India are mostly compatible, exports of Nepal and Bangladesh do not match imports of Sri Lanka. The trade complementarity between Sri Lanka and Pakistan, though not substantial, has improved.

he South Asian region has an almost identical pattern of comparative advantage in some products, and that there is no strong complementarity in the bilateral trade structures of South Asian countries. Similarities in the trade structures and absence of comparative advantage in capital intensive and high value-added products, i.e. the products that are normally imported by countries in the region may have limited the growth of intra regional trade in South Asia. Intra-Industry trade in South Asia While trade would take place only if there are differences in factor endowments, Grubel-Lloyd (1975) argue that differences in technology and human capital can lead to intra-industry trade even in products with identical factor input requirements. Krugman (1981) argues that industries in which increasing returns are achieved at a fairly low level of output can accommodate many producers, with each producing differentiated products. Under these circumstances, each country will specialise in different varieties of the product and engage in intra-industry trade. The growth of regional integration schemes involving cross-country production sharing arrangements also increases intra-industry trade6. Yeats (1998) points out that production sharing has become a major factor in regional trading arrangements, approximately 30 per cent of the world trade in manufactured goods is largely of intra-industry variety.

n the basis of two-way trade in similar products Grubel-Lloyd have provided the index of intra-industry trade7. The intra-industry trade index ranges between zero and one with larger values indicating a greater degree of intra-industry trade. In the chemicals and related products category, the bilateral intra-industry trade between Bangladesh and India largely consisted of inorganic chemical elements, oxides and halogen salts, fertilisers, insecticides and herbicides. Significant intraindustry trade took place in basic manufactures, such as made-up articles of textile material, floor coverings, nails and screws. Intra-industry trade in machines and transport equipment is hardly noticeable, except for some trade in ships, boats and floating structures in the year 1995. Intra-industry trade has strengthened over time in such miscellaneous manufactured goods as clothing, knitted or crocheted women's clothing, articles of apparel, textile fabrics and clothing accessories of textile fabrics.

No intra-industry trade took place between Bangladesh and Nepal during this period. A low level of intra-industry trade occurred in chemical and related products consisting of dyeing, tanning extracts and synthetic tanning materials, medicinal and pharmaceutical products, and monofilament rods between Bangladesh and Pakistan,. A moderate to high degree of intra-industry trade was indicated in textile yarn, woven textile fabrics, special yarns, made-up articles of textile materials, and manufactures of base metals. In 1998, Bangladesh and Pakistan engaged in significant intraindustry trade in several industrial products; machinery and transport equipment, prominent among them being rotating electrical plants and parts, agricultural machinery, excluding tractors, and pumps for liquids. In miscellaneous manufactured goods, intra-industry trade was confined to knitted and crocheted women's clothing, and articles of plastic.

here are only a few products in which the Grubel-Lloyd indices show a reasonable intensity of intra-industry trade between Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. These products include textile yarn, woven fabrics, special yarns, and printed matter. Some intra-industry trade is discernible in soap and cleansing preparations, monofilament rods, cotton fabrics, and made-up articles of textile materials. In the chemicals and related products group, the Grubel Lloyd index indicated some intra-industry trade between India and Nepal in nitrogen compounds, inorganic chemical elements, perfumery and cosmetics, and a moderate degree of intra-industry trade in monofilament rods, and miscellaneous chemical products. In some years, intra-industry trade was significant in some basic manufactures, such as articles of textile and clothing, leather, rubber tyres, plywood, floor coverings, mineral manufactures, rails and railway track construction materials, copper, aluminium, metal containers, wire products, and equipment of base metal. In machinery and transport equipment, no significant intra-industry trade occurred except in heating and cooling equipment. Other miscellaneous manufactured goods in which intraindustry trade was indicated were mainly women's clothing, footwear, road motor vehicles, articles of plastic and works of art.

ntra-industry trade took place between India and Pakistan in nine items in chemicals and related products in which, the prominent among them being medicinal and pharmaceutical products and soap and cleansing preparations. The Grubel-Lloyd indices show some intra-industry trade in basic manufactures, such as leather, articles of paper and paperboard, embroidery, made-up articles of textile materials, floor coverings, lime, cement and fabricated construction materials, nails and screws, and manufactures of base metal. There are many products in the category of machinery and transport equipment in which intra-industry trade occurred between the two countries. These products range from textile and leather machinery and parts to heating and cooling equipment, and from data-processing machines, to medical apparatus. In miscellaneous manufactured goods, intra-industry trade mainly consisted of medical and measuring instruments, photographic supplies and musical instruments.

Intra-industry trade between India and Sri Lanka in chemicals and related products was confined mainly to carboxylic acids and nitrated derivatives, other organic chemicals, dyeing, tanning extracts and synthetic tanning materials, and essential oils. In the category of basic manufactures, leather and leather products, pottery, pearls and precious stones, construction material of rails, and metal containers figured prominently in intra-industry trade between the two countries. In some years, there was significant intra-industry trade in non-electric engines and motors, paper and pulp machinery, and electric power machinery. Other major products in which the Grubel-Loyd indices showed a somewhat high degree of intra-industry trade were articles of apparel, motor cars and other motor vehicles, and photographic supplies.

ntra-industry trade between Nepal and Pakistan was confined only to metal salts, while intra-industry trade between Nepal and Sri Lanka consisted of trade in rubber tyres and textile yarn. Pakistan and Sri Lanka traded a variety of products intra-industry. In chemicals and related products, the GL index indicated some intraindustry trade in inorganic chemical elements, metal salts, and medicinal and pharmaceutical products. In some years, intra-industry trade appeared significant in a number of basic manufactures, such as leather, articles of textile and clothing, rubber tyres, floor coverings, wire of iron or steel, and manufactures of base metal. In machinery and transport equipment, intra-industry trade was indicated mainly in textile and leather machinery and parts, printing and book binding machinery, pumps, non-electrical parts, equipment for electricity distribution, electrical machinery and apparatus, and motor cycles and cycles. Other miscellaneous manufactured goods in which intra-industry trade occurred were furniture, bedding and mattresses, articles of apparel, medical instruments, printed matter, and articles of plastic [For details, see PIDE (2003)].

he following observations can be made regarding the nature and extent of intraindustry trade in the South Asian region. First, the historical pattern of intraindustry trade amongst the South Asian countries is highly erratic, and there are only a few products in which intra-industry trade has occurred on a sustained basis. Second, with few exceptions, leather products, textiles, clothing, some basic machinery and tools dominate the intra-industry trade profiles of the South Asian countries. Third, the proportion of intra-industry trade in total trade has been very low for most of the products. This is also reflected in the average bilateral GrubelLloyd indices of intra-industry trade. In 1995, intra-industry trade of Bangladesh was only 1.0 per cent, 0.08 per cent, and 0.01 per cent of its bilateral trade with India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, respectively.

Table 5: Average Bilateral Grubel Lloyd Indices of Intra Industry Trade: 1995

Bangladesh India Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka

Bangladesh

India

Nepal

Pakistan

Sri Lanka

0.010 -

0.000 0.140 -

0.008 0.083 0.000 -

0.001 0.017 0.393 0.068 -

Source: Kemal et al, (2003) Note: Figures of Sri Lanka are for the year 1994

ntra-industry trade can play a pivotal role in promoting regional integration in South Asia because it can flourish even in situations where the trade and production structures of the trading partners lack strong complementarities. This leads to trade expansion and dynamic scales of economy. The South Asian countries can strengthen their trade linkages by devising mechanisms to promote intra-industry trade within the region. One way to accomplish this is through regional production sharing arrangements that involve the initiation of part of a manufacturing process for a specific good in one country and the transfer of the activity to another for processing8. The South Asian countries can achieve greater economic cooperation and integration by evolving a vertically integrated regional production structure in sectors that can boost regional economy9. This would allow the South Asian economies to specialise in different lines of production within a particular industry and thus achieve benefits of specialisation and economies of scale. It must, however, be pointed out here that the regional production sharing arrangements generally emerge in response to a combination of factors including low tariffs, wage differentials, low transportation costs, and favourable government policies.

Constraints to Intra-Regional Trade Identical comparative advantage, lack of communication link, restrictive trade policies, lack of finances and political problems cause weak trade linkages in South Asia. Identical comparative advantage The South Asian countries have an almost identical pattern of comparative advantage in a relatively narrow range of products. Similarly, their bilateral trade structures hardly show any complementarities in the trade structure. Together with absence of comparative advantage in capital intensive and high value-added products, which are normally imported by countries in the region, they act as structural constraints on expanding intra-regional trade. Though South Asian countries have undergone major structural reforms and share of industrial sector has increased sharply, their industry is not diversified. With the exception of India and, to some extent Pakistan, these resource constraints have prevented the South Asian countries to invest in high value-added exportable

products and have made these countries dependent on industrialised countries for their capital goods and technology. The regional exports largely consist of raw materials and traditional products, such as textiles and garments, and some regional countries are direct competitors in the world export market for these products. The import requirements of the region mainly consist of capital goods and high-tech products. In this way, the trade pattern of the South Asian countries is tilted towards the developed countries.

espite the demand for the South Asian products in the region, there is a rather limited capacity to generate exportable surpluses of the product in accordance with the specifications. It has marred the growth of intra-regional trade. The specifications of products imported and exported are different. Lack of communication links There are no communication links between the South Asian countries and as such the production, consumption and trade patterns of potential trading partners within the region may not be known. There are hardly any ships which call on specifically for the export of South Asia to other regional countries. Similarly, inadequate trade facilitation mechanisms contribute to the unrealised potential of intra-regional trade in certain areas. For example, Nepal's trade with other countries in the region depends on transit facilities provided by India. These facilities often involve high handling and transportation charges and delays in delivery, thus hampering the flow of trade between Nepal and its trading partners in the region. Restrictive trade policies Restrictive trade policies also cause the low level of intra-regional trade. The restrictions have been more severe on the export interest of South Asia. However, the South Asian countries have substantially liberalised their economies in the past decade. Some trade liberalisation has also occurred under the SAPTA regime, according to which almost 5000 products from all SAARC member countries are entitled to preferential duty treatment. The trade regimes of South Asia are still quite restrictive. There is, however, a general perception that the trade liberalisation episodes, including SAPTA, have not made any significant impact on intra-regional trade in South Asia. Political problems Political differences have also undermined efforts to foster regional economic cooperation in South Asia. India and Pakistan, the two largest economies of the region, have not been able to realise the full potential of their bilateral trade owing to various political compulsions. The small South Asian countries have been skeptic towards regional economic cooperation initiatives, fearing that a large trading partner like India will dominate the region economically to the detriment of their domestic industries. The political conflicts as well as differences in economic outlooks have hindered intra-regional trade in South Asia. The prospects of trade cooperation have enhanced with improved Indo-Pak relations and signing of SAFTA.

Prospects after SAFTA SAARC's Islamabad declaration promises South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) which would come into force on January 1, 2006, to be fully implemented by the end of 2015. Under the agreement, tariff reductions, rules of origin, safeguards, institutional structures and dispute settlement will be sorted out by various committees10. It also calls for harmonisation of standards and customs procedures, mutual recognition of test results and transport infrastructure cooperation. These measures would hopefully help in promoting the intra-regional trade. SAFTA's tariff reduction program calls upon India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka -- more developed countries -- to reduce tariffs to 20 per cent by 2006. While Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Maldives -- less developed countries -- are required to reduce tariffs to 30 per cent in the same period. Following that Pakistan and India, in five years, Sri Lanka in six years and other SAARC countries in eight years shall have to reduce their tariffs to 0-5 per cent. Moreover, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka will reduce their tariffs on imports from the relatively less developed countries to 0-5 per cent by January 1, 2009. The agreement calls for elimination of all quantitative restrictions for products on the tariff liberalisation list. The agreement allows a negative-list, but it provides for reviewing the number of products on the sensitive list at four-year intervals to reduce the list and expand the free trade coverage of the Agreement.

egional groupings have proliferated around the globe. While some have been successful, others have not. World Bank (2004) reviews the regional experiences around the world and points out six broad conclusions for the success of such groupings of free trade. First, a regional trade agreement does not automatically result in increased trade and growth. Whereas the intention at the time of formation of the group is always to promote intra-regional trade and economic cooperation in all fields, a large number of interest groups emerge who on the grounds of injury to their industry, call for exemption on reduction in the import duties. For this reason the experience with SAPTA has been disappointing. SAFTA allows a sensitive list and if the list is large, then it may not see higher intra-regional trade. Whenever trade liberalisation is promoted, the industries in which the country does not have comparative advantage will close down. Moreover, agreements that kept in place high external barriers, protect inefficient activities and undermine the competitiveness of all countries. Second, the trading arrangements with unilateral efforts among members to reduce external protection have been more successful. Reducing trade barriers vis-Ă -vis the rest of the world creates an incentive for all members to export. It augments competition that drives domestic productivity [see Muendler (2002)]. When external protection is generally low, trade creation usually dominates trade diversion, and so the risk that regional agreements will be a drag on growth is substantially reduced. Indeed regional agreements where members have had low external protection have achieved greatest success [see Baldwin and Venables (1995) and Burfisher, et al, (2003)].

Third, the agreements between the countries with different factor endowments have shown more consistent success because of the opportunities to exploit different comparative wage rates, capital availability, technological levels that give rise to differing factor proportions in production [Schiff and Winters (2003) and Lederman et al, (2003)]. However, this conclusion runs contrary to the success of EU. The promotion of intra-industry trade would result in higher growth even if factor endowments are similar. Fourth, a regional integration framework that helps in trade creation and competition amongst regional countries would help in lowering domestic prices and providing new technology. It is impossible to have the benefits of a regional agreement without exposing the member economies to new competition [Hoekman and Schiff (2002)].

ifth, competition in services also results in successful integration. Lowering the cost of telecommunications, finance, business services, and retail and wholesale commerce would result in productivity gains. Finally, there is a need to streamline border transactions through trade facilitation. Increase in efficiency within the region often spills over into trade outside the region as well, because improving customs or improving efficiency of ports helps both intra-regional trade and international trade. To ensure the success of SAFTA, the member countries have to take a number of initiatives. First, all countries must have very small negative-list. If the list is large, the SAFTA would become redundant. There should be a firm basis to exclude products and ground rules should be laid down and be transparent. Second, keeping rules of origin simple and transparent so that they do not become devices of protection and impediments to trade. The SAPTA rules, which are quite stringent, need to be revised. Third, ambitious agreements to establish detailed investors' protections and separate dispute panel resolution systems should be left for the future, because it could delay the progress unnecessarily. Fourth, since some of the SAARC members may dump and some may provide subsidies to exports and hence unfair competition, the transparent anti-dumping and countervailing methods may be necessary. However, anti-dumping actions and countervailing duties against regional partners can bring back the protectionist tendencies; anti-dumping mechanisms can stifle the benefits for SAFTA arrangements.

hat would be the impact of SAFTA? RIS (2004) reports results of studies conducted in the framework of gravity model. It suggests that complete elimination of tariffs under SAFTA may increase the intra-regional trade by 1.6 times. It further suggests that in the dynamic framework the gains from liberalisation are at least 25 per cent higher than the static gains. However, these gains are grossly in view of SAARC's large trade potential; it exists both in trade diversion from traditional sources towards SAARC countries by removing the constraints and trade creation and expansion by easing import restrictions on products which SAARC countries are not trading in but are their major exports. While more than half the exports of manufactured goods from South Asia consist of textiles and leather products, they are subject to very high rates of import duties and/or quantitative restrictions and even outright bans in South Asia. Similarly, rather limited trade in engineering goods is

owing to a number of factors including reliance on foreign aid to finance the import of capital goods, poor quality of goods and heavy import duties on capital goods even by the countries who are themselves exporters of capital goods.

ntra-industry trade can play an important role in bolstering economic and trade relations within the region. This is because intra-industry trade can take place even in situations where the trade and production structures of the trading partners lack strong complementarities, as observed in South Asian countries. Whereas the intensity of intra-industry trade is low, the potential for widening the scope of this type of trade within the region is rather large. However, that can only be realised if the import duties are low. Intra-industry trade is largely driven by product differentiation and increasing returns to scale. Therefore, an increased level of intra-industry trade in the region can only be achieved if the regional countries develop the technological capacity to produce different product varieties at declining average cost. Lack of trade complementarities causes weak trade linkages in South Asia. However, trade complementarities can be developed within the region if countries achieve vertical specialisation through production sharing arrangements. The manufacturing of components for automobile and engineering industries would be quite helpful. Similarly, in chemical industries the possibilities exist. Vertical specialisation would not only allow the regional trading partners to strengthen their trade ties, but also enable them to reap economies of scale by concentrating on a specific production process in the value-addition chain. Therefore, as in the case of various regional trading groups around the world, the South Asian countries can boost economic cooperation by developing vertically integrated production structures, thereby attaining vertical specialisation.

oint ventures can pool regional resources to promote industrialisation and economic growth in South Asia. Since the South Asian countries have collectively gained substantial experience in agro-based industries, textiles and clothing, paper and pulp, and light engineering, there seems to be scope for joint ventures in these areas. The establishment of joint ventures will particularly benefit the small South Asian countries because they lack the resources to undertake industrial investment efficiently.

Conclusion The signing of SAFTA has created euphoria in the South Asian countries. However, there are, at least, two possibilities which may make the agreement redundant. Firstly, all the countries are members of WTO and would reduce the tariff levels. If their MFN tariffs are close to preferential tariffs under SAFTA, intra-regional trade may not grow rapidly. Though one could argue that at lower rate of import duty, with or without SAFTA, the intra-regional and trade outside the region would flourish. Second and more importantly, if the negative list is large and includes most of the products of export interest of South Asian countries, trade would not flourish. The SAARC countries must make an effort to make SAFTA a success to expedite economic development, mainly because of the problems in global market access and the higher

transaction costs of producing for the world market. The expansion of regional trade yields gains in production specialisation, efficiency and improved quality of exports, which benefit the countries participating in the regional cooperation effort. The SAFTA has great potential and South Asian countries should accept the short-term costs for long-term benefits. (Dr Kemal is a senior economist and the Director of Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) based in Islamabad) End Notes 1. In the third round negotiations were conducted by some countries on a sectoral basis, albeit in a limited way. 2. In order to qualify for concessions under the SAPTA Agreement, non-LDC countries had to have a domestic content of 50 per cent and the LDCs 40 per cent. In 1998, the ROO requirements were revised downwards to 40 per cent but for LDCs it was 30 per cent. 3. The index of trade balances (TB) is Share of the country in intra - regional Imports TB = Share of the country in intra - regional Exports If TB exceeds unity, the country runs deficits; If TB is equal to unity, trade is balance; and If TB is less than unity, the country runs surpluses. It should be noted that the trade balance indices are reported here only to highlight the existing pattern of intra-regional trade, and not to argue for balanced trade within the region. 4. where

Rih =

X ih / X it X wh / X wt

Rih = Revealed comparative advantage ratio for country in product. X ih = Country exports of product. X it = Total exports of country. X wh = World exports of product. X wt = Total World exports. 5. Trade complementarity index, measures the compatibility of imports of country with exports of country , as defined below. where

C ij = 1 -

| mhi - x hj | 存 2

C ij = mhi = x hj =

Trade Complementarity index for trade between countries and . Share of good in total imports of country . Share of good in total exports of country . The trade complementarity index is zero when no good exported by one country is imported by the other, and equals one when the shares of one country's imports correspond exactly to those of the other's exports. 6. Under the production sharing arrangements, various stages of the production process for a specific product are undertaken in different countries, giving rise to intra-industry trade. 7.

Gh =

where

Xh + Mh - | Xh - Mh | (X h + M h )

Gh = Xh = Xh =

Grubel-Lloyd index of intra-industry trade in industry . Exports of industry . Imports of industry .

8. For instance, electronic components may be produced in country A, shipped to country B for

assembly, and then re-exported back to country A. 9. Some of the potential areas where regional production sharing systems can be developed are leather products, textiles and clothing, and basic machinery. 10. With a view to ensuring that agreement is implemented, it establishes the SAFTA Ministerial Council, the regional body's highest decision-making authority, and a Committee of Experts responsible for monitoring implementation and resolving disputes. The Committee of Experts is required to update the Ministerial Council every six months on the progress of the Agreement.

References l Bela Balassa, 'Trade Liberalisation and Revealed Comparative Advantage', The Manchester

School of Economics and Social Studies, vol. 33, 1965. l Richard E. Baldwin and Anthony J. Venables, 'Regional Economic Integration', in G.

l l

l l l l l

Grossman and K. Rogoff (eds.), Handbook of International Economics, vol.3, section 1.2., (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 1995). Mary Burfishcer, Sherman Robinson and Karen Thierfeldler, 'Regionalism: Old and New, Theory and Practice', Paper from the International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium (IATRC) Conference, Capri, Italy, June 2003. H. Grubel and P. Lloyd, 'Intra Industry Trade: The Measurement of International Trade in Differentiated Products', New York, 1975. Bernard Hoekman and Maurice Schiff, 'Benefiting from Regional Integration', in Bernard Hoekman, Aaditya Matoo and Philip English (eds.), Development, Trade, and the WTO: A Handbook, (World Bank: Washington, D.C., 2002). A. R. Kemal, Musleh-ud Din, Kalbe Abbas and Usman Qadir, 'A Plan to Strengthen Regional Trade Cooperation in South Asia' in T. N. Srinivasan (ed.), Trade Finance and Investment in South Asia, (New Delhi: Social Science Press) 2002. P. R. Krugmen, 'Intra-Industry Specialisation and the Gains from Trade', Journal of Political Economy, vol. 89, no. 5, 1981. Daniel Lederman, William Maloney and Luis Serven, Lessons from NAFTA for Latin American and Caribbean Countries: A Summary of Research Findings, (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2003). Michael Michaely, 'Trade Preferential Agreements in Latin America: An Ex-Ante Assessment', (Latin America and the Caribbean Region: World Bank, Washington, D. C. 1994). PIDE, 'Revealed Comparative Advantage and Trade Complementarity in South Asia', A study prepared for the SAARC Network of Researchers on Global Financial and Economic Issues. (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 2003). RIS, South Asia Development and Cooperation Report 2004, (New Delhi: Research and Information System for the Non-Aligned and Other Developing Countries (RIS), 2004). Maurice Schiff and L. Alan Winters, Regional Integration and Development, (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press and Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2003). Dushni Weerakoon and Janaka Wijayasiri, 'Implications to Member States of Progression from SAPTA to SAFTA', Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka, 2003. World Bank, 'South Asia Free Trade Area: Promise and Pitfalls of Preferential Trade Arrangements', The World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2004. Alexander J. Yeats, 'Just How Big is Global Production Sharing', World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 1871, (Washington, D. C.: The World Bank, 1998).

Cooperative Security in South Asia C. Raja Mohan

Introduction The notion of collective security has always been attractive to students of international affairs. Yet, it has also been the most elusive in practice. Throughout the evolution of Westphalian system of international relations, many saw that the concept of collective security was the only alternative to perpetual war and conflict. Rooted in the principle of 'all for one and one for all', the idea of collective security posits that peace cannot be secured in an environment of self-help and balance of power1. This notion is contested by realists who insist that pursuit of power, conflict and hegemony are natural conditions of international system and that it is not possible for states to put collective interest above that of the national interest2. The context of this age-old argument, however, has been transformed in recent decades amidst the rise of a number of new concepts such as common security, comprehensive security, cooperative security, and human security. Common security emphasises the reality of interdependence among adversarial states and the importance of developing shared perspectives3. Comprehensive security brings into consideration many traditional non-military challenges4. The proponents of human security challenge the traditional state-centric model of security and demand that peace and well being of the individual receive the primary focus5.

t is easy to argue from the traditional perspective that given the deep divisions and security problems within the subcontinent, the idea of collective security is not attainable in the foreseeable future. Could 'collective self-defenceâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; -- a lesser form than collective security be considered an appropriate model for South Asia? Different regions in recent history -- most notably Europe and South East Asia -- have put in place varying forms of collective self-defence arrangements. Collective self-defence was successful in Europe, given the common threat faced by the West European nations during the Cold War from the Soviet Union. Under the leadership of the United States, the West European states found it necessary to bury their past differences which led to a series of wars and face the perceived all-encompassing threat from the Soviet Union in a united manner. In South East Asia, too, shared internal and external threats allowed security cooperation among the regional states. South Asia, however, has found it hard to emulate either West Europe which had alliance-based collective defence arrangements or South East Asia with its looser forms of regional cooperation. While the Cold War dynamics forced stronger forms of cooperation in West Europe and South East Asia, they sharpened the intra-regional security problems in the subcontinent. The impact of the Cold War accentuated the problems between India and Pakistan that arose out of the Partition. India and

Pakistan joined the opposing coalitions of the global Cold War. While the alliances they formed -- Pakistan with U.S. and China and India with the Soviet Union -seemed to provide stability at one level, they also created the conditions for long-term instability in the region. The combination of regional and global dynamics meant that, let alone collective security or collective self-defence, the states of South Asia found it impossible to have even normal neighbourly relations. While South Asia is a long way from implementing either collective security or collective self-defence, the traditional debate on security in the region has been altered by the impulses of globalisation as well as regional developments.

South Asian Security after the Cold War The end of the Cold War at the global level did not match any of the expectations for a peace dividend in South Asia. The 1990s seemed a depressing decade for the subcontinent in terms of peace and development. The early hopeful signs of democratisation at the turn of the decade vanished into thin air by the time the new millennium arrived. The Army returned to the centre-stage in Pakistan amidst the incompetence of its political class. Democratic politics in Nepal failed to deliver, and the parliamentary system in Bangladesh degenerated into a war of bandhs. The rapid dissipation of the hopes for more representative and effective governance in the subcontinent during the 1990s was accompanied by the rise of religious extremism and anti-modernism in the region, exemplified most significantly by the Taliban in Afghanistan. The northwestern parts of the subcontinent became the epicentre of terrorism in the world, with an impact that ranged from Tanzania to Tajikistan and Manhattan to Mindanao. In India, the destructive trail of the Hindutva ideology moved from the demolition of the Babri Masjid to the gruesome communal riots during early 2002 in Gujarat. Civil wars from Kashmir to Jaffna meanwhile raged on, with victims countless for any one to enumerate. The introduction of nuclear weapons, covertly at the turn of the 1990s and overtly at the end of the decade, combined the weapons of mass destruction with violence, terrorism, jihad and interstate conflict. All optimism for the future of the subcontinent -- either in terms of internal security or inter-state security -- appeared to have been smothered.

et the very negative developments in the subcontinent carried within them the seeds of a radical transformation of the region. The international impact of the extremist forces -- dramatised on September 11, 2001 -- inevitably drew retribution from the sole super-power of the international system. Never mind the irony that it was the U.S. policy of pitting jihadis against godless Soviet communists in Afghanistan in the 1980s that produced Osama bin Ladin and his jihadi allies6. The American War on terrorism has had its intended and unintended consequences. The Taliban was ousted, and the Army in Pakistan has become the instrument to clean up the jihadi mess that was nurtured by it in the 1980s and 1990s. Equally important, it has focused international attention on the subcontinent and its intra-state and interstate wars. Never in the past has the international system paid so much attention to the problems of regional security in South Asia. During the Cold War, the external environment complicated the security politics of South Asia. Now an external environment may be emerging that is favourable to a reasonable resolution of South

Asia's security challenges7.

he accumulated impact of globalisation on the politics and economics of the subcontinent over the last decade has begun to reveal a radical transformation. The Indo-Pak military confrontation since the attack on parliament on December 13, 2001 has brought the Anglo-American powers into play in a manner that has not been seen since the early 1960s. The prospect, however remote, of a war between India and Pakistan escalating into a nuclear exchange has forced the international community to explore a final resolution of the underlying political conflict between the subcontinental rivals. The Kashmir question is not the only one among the regional conflicts that is on the Anglo-American radar. The expansive American war on terrorism has brought the United States, with Britain in tow, and the European Union into a political effort to deal with the other security challenges in South Asia -- the tragic war in Sri Lanka and the Maoist insurgency in Nepal. The world has begun to impinge on the subcontinent. Along with the global war on terror that is focused on Afghanistan, there have been Anglo-American efforts to defuse the Indo-Pak tensions, the Norwegian mediation between the Singhalese and Tamils in Sri Lanka, and the international initiative on Nepal led by Britain. The security dynamics of the subcontinent are being altered irreversibly. But external environment alone is not enough to resolve regional security problems. It needs political courage and statesmanship within the region to grasp the new challenges as well as opportunities for peace and development in the subcontinent. To some extent the pressures from below are already forcing states in the region to act more purposefully. After a series of military crises and real wars, India and Pakistan have finally recognised the importance of a sustained bilateral engagement that would involve both bilateral cooperation and conflict resolution. There is also recognition throughout South Asia that the time has come to deal with the civil wars within the region in a more innovative and political manner rather than trying to deal with them as law and order problems. The current efforts at peace within the region can at best be characterised as 'work in progress' with no guaranteed prospect of success. But there is no denying the fact that the assumptions and premises on how to end conflict have begun to be questioned and revised in a fundamental manner. That is a reason for hope.

ore subtle, but even more significant, has been the consequences of economic globalisation in the 1990s. Under pressure from the 'Washington Consensus', all nations of the subcontinent have adopted liberal economic policies. As they open up their markets to the world, the South Asian states are discovering that they cannot keep them closed to their own neighbour, India. While Islamabad continues to resist normal trade relations with New Delhi, some of the smaller countries of the region have begun to acknowledge that their economic future is now intertwined with that of India. There is no escape from the logic of globalisation that demands deeper trade relations and economic integration with India. Meanwhile proposals for megaprojects for pipelines and transportation corridors, straddling across borders in South Asia, promise to further deepen economic integration in the subcontinent.

hatever might be its other negative consequences, the relentless pressures of globalisation are helping to break down the economic walls within the subcontinent. Trade volumes within South Asia have begun to surge, although entirely in India's favour at the moment. Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are among the top ten export destinations for Indian goods. Nothing less than a reversal of the economic partition of the subcontinent is now on the cards. After British India was partitioned into separate states, insular economic policies and political differences had made borders into high-security barriers. Now globalisation offers the prospect of transforming these borders into zones of economic cooperation and reconnect regions that were once part of the same economic and cultural space.

India: Towards Positive Unilateralism For all its own internal difficulties, the task of leading the region towards economic and political moderation, and social development inevitably falls on New Delhi. One of the most significant developments in India since 1991 has been radical rethinking about the relevance of a more effective regionalism in the subcontinent and a sea change in the Indian policy towards her smaller neighbors8. This was based on the recognition of the acute crisis that had enveloped India's relations with her neighbours at the turn of the 1990s. At the heart of the changing Indian policy towards the neighbors is the so-called 'Gujral doctrine'', named after Inder Kumar Gujral who served as the external affairs minister during 1996-97 and as prime minister during 1997-989. The doctrine argued that if India's neighbours were willing to respect India's security concerns, New Delhi would not insist on reciprocity in resolving bilateral problems. Mr. Gujral's willingness to go more than half the distance in resolving the long-standing problems of the subcontinent was followed by his successors. Although the doctrine was named after Mr. Gujral, given his enthusiastic articulation of it, the broad lines of it were followed by the government of P.V. Narasimha Rao, (1991-96) and that of Atal Behari Vajpayee, who followed Gujral. Yashwant Sinha, foreign minister under the BJP led coalition explicitly acknowledged the debt to his predecessors and the Vajpayee government's commitment to take it forward. He has coined a new expression for the core of 'Gujral Doctrine', namely to 'institutionalising positive asymmetry in favour of our neighbours'10.

o state bases its policy on altruism. India's new regional policy has been guided by three imperatives. First is the recognition that India cannot fulfill its aspirations for a larger international profile without addressing its problems in the neighbourhood. The real tensions in India's relations with all its neighbours will act as a huge fetter on its attempts to become a major power on the global scene. India cannot run away from its neighbourhood. However frustrating it might be, there is no alternative available to Indian diplomacy other than a substantive and patient engagement of its neighbours. Second, as it coped with the emerging globalisation of regional security, India had to discard much of its traditional baggage about the role of other major powers in the subcontinent. Shedding the past suspicion of the major powers has become necessary.

In the past, New Delhi had sought to keep the other powers out of the region, claiming some kind of an exclusive mandate as a regional power to manage the affairs of the subcontinent. That approach has been neither credible nor effective. New Delhi does not have the luxury of pursuing a kind of Monroe doctrine for the region. Instead of trying to keep other powers out of the region, India must work with them to promote economic modernisation, social harmony, and political moderation. The old way of looking at the internationalisation of South Asian security is to define it as a set back. The other is to take advantage of the trend to achieve India's interests. India's focus is slowly shifting away from mechanics to political outcomes.

hird, India has begun to recognise that it has a huge stake in the rapid economic development of its neighbourhood. The economic performance of India has been the best in South Asia during the decade of 1990s. But that rapid development is no guarantor of stability in South Asia. Without all boats rising in South Asia at the same time, India can neither prosper nor be secure. While globalisation is chipping away at the notion of South Asia as an exclusive sphere of influence of India, it is reinforcing the primacy of the Indian market in the long-term evolution of the South Asian economies. The integration of the markets of the subcontinent over the coming decades is inevitable. This has opened the doors for unilateral Indian initiatives to promote economic integration and political stability in South Asia. Globalisation is beckoning India with the prospect of resolving long-standing conflicts in the region and re-integrating the South Asian market. If India can think big and act bold, a prosperous subcontinent is within the realm of political imagination. An Indian strategy to shape such a future would involve shedding excessive suspicion of other great powers, finding ways to act in cooperation with them, and discarding the old slogans on 'internationalisation', 'bilateralism' and 'reciprocity'. Such a strategy must consider unilateral economic actions that will accelerate integration of the region. Instead, embarking on tortuous bilateral negotiations on trade with the smaller neighbours, India can alter the economic dynamics of the region through unilateral actions. Security multilateralism and positive economic unilateralism from India are the keys to a different future of the subcontinent.

Towards Cooperative Security While collective security and collective self-defence will remain unrealisable goals, the changed global and regional context allows the nations of the subcontinent to pursue cooperative security. 'Cooperative Security' is an idea, which gained currency in the discourse on East-West relations after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. During the 1990s many European institutions like the Organisation for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation began to use the term to denote the changing relations with Russia and former Soviet Republics. At the same time there was also profound skepticism about the concept in many policy quarters in the Western world. There is no real consensus on the meaning of the term 'Cooperative Security'. Among the several definitions that tend to compete include cooperation between great powers, comprehensive cooperation, and cooperation to overcome prior conflict11.

ut in a more narrower and precise sense, Cooperative Security could be understood as policies of governments, which see themselves as former adversaries or potential adversaries to shift from or avoid confrontationist policies. Cooperative security essentially reflects a policy of dealing peacefully with conflicts, not merely by abstention from violence or threats, but by active engagement in negotiation and a search for practical solution and with a commitment to preventive measures. Cooperative security assumes the existence of a condition in which the two sides possess the military capabilities to harm each other. It also assumes a political willingness to negotiate about one's own means of violence with an adversary -current, former or potential. According to Olaf F. Knudsen, 'Cooperative security implies a tentative mental conversion of the parties to an attitude of good faith to the other side, an acceptance of letting the relationship function, loosely, on the basis of the principle of transparency12'. Establishing cooperative security runs into a complex process of building confidence and trust and there could be repeated failures. The Indo-Pak experience of recent years can be described as a struggle to come to terms with cooperative security. Immediately after their respective nuclear tests of May 1998, the two sides sought to initiate an engagement. The events since then have included high profile summitry to achieve political breakthroughs as well as war and conflict. The failure of these initial attempts, however, has reinforced the importance of finding ways to minimise conflict as well as expanding cooperation. Unlike 'collective security', cooperative security is not rooted in idealist notions of how the world ought to be. Cooperative security also accepts the reality on the ground that an alliance like relationship between India and all her neighbours is not possible in the foreseeable future. But the idea of cooperative security recognises the reality of profound interdependence among the South Asian nations in both economic and security realms. The imperatives of this new interdependence range from common steps to avoid a nuclear war between India and Pakistan to the actualisation of a free trade area in the subcontinent13. It could indeed be argued that the outlines of such a cooperative security regime in South Asia have begun to emerge. The challenge now is to lend political energy to the processes of problem-solving and accelerate wide ranging regional cooperation.

he 12th SAARC summit has helped lift the profound veil of pessimism that had engulfed the prospects of SAARC. The signing of a framework free trade agreement has launched a new era of cooperation in hard areas of commerce and trade. While many elements of detail need to be sorted out, the agreement to create SAFTA is indeed a turning point in the evolution of South Asian regionalism and has restored the intuitional credibility of SAARC. The 12th SAARC Summit has also opened the doors for thinking about trans-border energy cooperation and even bolder concepts such as common currency. It has also talked about engaging other regional groupings and nations to widen the ambit of regional and trans-regional economic integration. While much hard work remains to be done, it has created the basis for optimism about future direction of regionalism in the subcontinent. Cooperative security is premised on the assumption that states will act in their own

self-interest. That self-interest is evident in the case for regional free trade and transborder energy cooperation. Yet, states in the region have been unable to act even when it serves their own national interest. While Sri Lanka has shown a forwardlooking vision for economic cooperation, the same cannot be said about others. Bangladesh seems reluctant to follow the logic of regional integration despite being increasingly tied to the Indian economy. Pakistan too holds back on beneficial economic regionalism, citing the importance of settling the question of Jammu and Kashmir first. Negative thinking is also pervasive in New Delhi, where the tunnel vision and tight-fistedness of its economic bureaucracy is constraining rather than facilitating the integration of the subcontinent. Despite the dramatic surge in its exports to its South Asian neighbours and much slower rise in imports from the neighbours during the 1990s, India has been niggardly in opening its market. South Asians nations have wallowed in poverty for so long and marketed it abroad for aid that they find it hard to conceive of shared prosperity through greater economic integration. Breaking out of this cycle is possible only if South Asian states move towards depoliticising issues of economic cooperation and building the habits of cooperative security. Depoliticisation of economic cooperation need not mean avoiding the negotiation on long-standing political disputes. Finding final settlements to difficult issues, completing the negotiations on delineation of boundaries, respecting the security concerns of others are all in the self-interest of individual nations of South Asia. The temptation to put either one -- conflict resolution and normalisation of bilateral relations -- ahead of the other has resulted in lack of movement on both fronts. Cooperative security demands walking on both legsexpanding economic cooperation wherever possible and making sustained efforts to resolve political disputes.

he 12th SAARC Summit at Islamabad in January 2004 had also provided a venue for a long-delayed engagement between the leaderships of India and Pakistan. And going beyond expectations the two sides produced a framework to renew the peace process on January 6. Since then the process has survived an expected change of government in New Delhi in the general elections. The first round of talks at the official and ministerial level since then has produced a broad range of possibilities for cooperation. A whole range of confidence-building measures on subjects ranging from nuclear and conventional military stability to the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir have been exchanged. But the movement forward appeared to have been stalled by political misperceptions. Some of these seemed to have been cleared in the meeting between the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly on September 24, 200414. Both sides have claimed a breakthrough and called it a historic moment. Such proclamations must always be taken with a pinch of salt. But it will be a mistake to under-estimate the significance of what has been said. The two leaders 'addressed the issue of Jammu and Kashmir and agreed that possible options for a peaceful, negotiated settlement of the issue should be explored in a sincere spirit and purposeful manner'. For the first time in decades, the two sides have now agreed at the highest level to look at potential solutions to the conflict in Kashmir. They have at

the same time, 'agreed that confidence building measures (CBMs) of all categories under discussion between the two governments should be implemented keeping in mind practical possibilities'. This political understanding to 'walk on both legs' -simultaneously address the most divisive dispute as well as expand economic cooperation -- could indeed constitute a new beginning in Indo-Pak relations. If the elements of cooperative security that have been identified on the Indo-Pak agenda begin to get implemented, it could profoundly transform the security environment in the subcontinent. (C. Raja Mohan is Professor of South Asian Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi) End Notes 1. For a current defence of the notion of collective security see, Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, 'The Promise of Collective Security', International Security (Cambridge, MA), vol. 20, no.1, Summer 1995, pp. 52-61. 2. For the basic neo-realist conception of international relations, see Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Relations (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1979). 3. For an exposition on the idea of common security, see, The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, Common Security: A Blueprint for Survival, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982). 4. For a comparative discussion of the various concepts, see, David Dewitt, 'Common, Comprehensive, and Cooperative Security', The Pacific Review (London), vol.7, no. 1, 1994, pp. 1-19. 5. For a comprehensive review of the idea of human security, see, Kanti Bajpai, 'The Idea of Human Security', International Studies (New Delhi), vol. 40. no. 3, July-September 2003, pp. 195-228. 6. For a comprehensive role in the American promotion of Islamic extremism during between the 1970s and 80s against the Soviet Union, see, John K. Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism(New Delhi: Penguin, 2001) 7. For an analysis of the impact of American war on terrorism after 911 on South Asia, see, C. Raja Mohan, 'Catharsis and Catalysis: Transforming the South Asian Subcontinent ', in Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (eds.), Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 205-14. 8. For a discussion of India's neighbourhood policy after Cold War, see S.D. Muni, 'Problem Areas in India's Neighbourhood Policy', South Asian Survey (New Delhi), vol.10, no.2, JulyDecember 2003, pp.185-96. 9. The doctrine was first articulated in a speech by Mr. Gujral at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London during 1996. The speech is reproduced in I.K. Gujral, A Foreign Policy for India (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 1998), pp.69-81. See also I.K. Gujral, Continuity and Change: India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2003), pp. 107-74. 10.See Yashwant Sinha, 'The 12th SAARC Summit and Beyond', Seventh Dinesh Singh Memorial Lecture, New Delhi, Sapru House, 3 February 2004. See also, C. Raja Mohan, 'Neighbourhood Policy: Yashwant Doctrine', The Hindu (New Delhi), 13 January 2003. 11.For an early discussion of cooperative security, see, Janne Nolan (ed.), Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century, (Washington DC: Brookings, 1994). 12.'The Concept of Cooperative Security and its Relationship to Policy', unpublished paper, 2001. 13.Dipankar Banerjee ( ed.), Comprehensive and Cooperative Security in South Asia (New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 1998). 14.The text of the Joint Statement issued by the two leaders is available at www.meaindia.nic.in

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A Human Rights Code For South Asia Iqbal Haider

outh Asia, much to the misfortune of our people, happens to be one of the most polarised and poverty-ridden regions of the world. Multiple polarisation, illiteracy and poverty not only reinforce each other, but also create many hurdles in promotion and protection of human rights. It is rightly emphasised that: 'One does not enjoy human rights with a bare body and empty stomach'. Hence, poor countries not only require faster economic growth, but also quicker reduction in poverty to enhance human development and enforce commitment to human rights. There is also a growing realisation that the universal nature of human rights calls for across the borders cooperation. The United Nations has been expressing serious concern over repeated violation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenants on Human Rights, as well as the failure of the member states to implement and adhere to the same. In the past three decades, the UN has been emphasising the significant role that institutions at the regional and national level can play in promoting and protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms and in developing and enhancing public awareness of these rights and freedoms. Many developed countries have also linked economic cooperation to the democratisation of institutions and promotion of human rights in the countries of the Third World. Increased awareness in civil society and consistent efforts being made by non-governmental organisations for regional cooperation have also forced South Asian countries to establish regional and subregional institutions and mechanisms for the promotion and protection of human rights.

ost of the regional or sub-regional groupings in Europe, North America and Africa have appreciated the need to have common human rights treaties/conventions or codes and have officially constituted autonomous statutory forums to ensure their observance and enforcement. Perhaps the first initiative in this direction was taken by the European Union. On 14th November 1950, in Rome, members of the Council of Europe had adopted the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom. This Convention has been amended and improved from time to time. On 21st November 1998, this Convention was further amended by protocol No.11 to provide for the establishment of the European Court of Human Rights with wide jurisdiction to deal with human rights cases and issues. The European HR Court is also vested with the power to grant relief to any person, NGO or group of individuals, to disapprove any policy or legislation of any member country and conduct trials. Such Human Rights Charters and Commissions or Courts have also been established by the 3Organisation of African Unity and Latin American

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countries.

owever, no regional or sub-regional grouping in Asia, Asia Pacific, South East Asia, South Asia, Central Asia or the Middle East is willing to pay more than lip service to the cause of human rights. Consequently, no regional or sub-regional group in Asia has any kind of common Human Rights Convention/Charter or officially constituted statutory body. Most countries in Asia, including the regional groups, attempt to justify their failure in adopting a uniform HR Charter and enforcing an official mechanism on the grounds that: (a) HR issues are an internal matter; (b) International Human Rights Charters/Declarations and Treaties etc., are in conflict with certain religious rites, cultural values, customs and practices; (c) National security and economic considerations must prevail over rights of individuals; and (d) Common regional or sub-regional human rights official forum or mechanism is not advisable in view of diversity on many issues among member states of the regional alliances.

espite all these reservations among the Asian countries, the need for regional human rights mechanism cannot be ignored. In our neighbourhood, 10 members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) have been debating this issue but the final decision to establish ASEAN Human Rights Commission has yet again been deferred. In the meantime, some of the ASEAN Countries have established official statutory human rights institutions. In Thailand, a comprehensive statute, 'National Human Rights Commission Act' was passed by its legislature in 1999 to establish the Commission, specify its jurisdiction, composition, etc. Members of the NHRC4 of Thailand are appointed by the King on the advice of the Senate and the Commission also enjoys the powers, among others, to examine human rights violations, entertain complaints/petitions of individuals or private organisations against such violations and, if it considers necessary, it may conduct detailed enquiry, hearing, trial and propose remedial measures. The Commission in Thailand submits its reports and recommendations regularly to the parliament. In the Philippines the Commission on Human Rights is constituted by the president in pursuance of Article XIII, Sections 17-19, of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.. It was first established by the president on 5th May, 1987. The Commission comprises a Chairman and four members, who are vested with sufficient powers to promote awareness and protection of human rights. In Malaysia, a Human Rights Commission has been established by the government in pursuance of a comprehensive statute 'Human Rights Commission of Malaysia Act 1999', which provides that the Commission shall be a corporate body and shall have not more than 25 members and one of them will be Chairman & Vice Chairman. The Commission is vested with the power to conduct enquiry on its own or on a complaint made by an aggrieved person or group of persons. Similarly, in Indonesia the then President Soeharto had issued a presidential decree on 7th June 1993 to establish a statutory body: 'The National Commission of Human Rights', which was not autonomous since only the president

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had the powers to appoint its members and approve the office bearers of the Commission.

espite sustained efforts by civil society, the respective governments of the SAARC countries are not willing to even consider adoption of a uniform Human Rights Code or Convention and to provide any common forum or mechanism to supervise adherence to and implementation of the same.. Although not all SAARC countries have autonomous and official statutory institutions devoted to address the grievances of the people on Human Rights issues, India, Nepal and Sri Lanka have established independent statutory National Commissions/Court for Human Rights, to provide some relief to their people. In 1993, the Protection of Human Rights Act5 was passed by the Parliament of India, which provided for establishment of not only National Human Rights Commission at the Federal level, but also establishment of State Human Rights Commission and Human Right Courts. The National Human Rights Commission in Nepal was established under the Act of 19976 as an independent autonomous statutory body. Similarly the Human Rights Commission in Sri Lanka was established in March 1997 under the Human Rights Commission Act of 1996. In Pakistan the need for such an independent, autonomous statutory body was felt by the government of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, when it established: (1) a statutory body called 'Tribunal for the Disadvantaged Persons'; (2) a permanent non-lapsable statutory funds to provide financial assistance and legal aid to women victims of Human Rights violations, in pursuance of the Fund for Women in Distress Act 1996; and (3) a separate full-fledged Division and Ministry of Human Rights with wide powers to check and monitor compliance with the international conventions, treatises as well as relevant provisions of the constitution and local laws and to promote awareness about Human Rights both in the administrative machinery and in society at large.

nfortunately all these measures were discarded or made ineffective after the fall of the government. There is only one active official institution in Pakistan to protect women's rights National Commission on the Status of Women7 (NCSW)-which was established in pursuance of an Ordinance promulgated by the president on July 17, 2000. This Commission addresses some of the human rights issues relating to women. In South Asian countries, relief is provided to the victims of Human Rights in vast majority of the cases, by the judicial or quasi-judicial forums. However, jurisdiction of the courts in South Asian countries, much to our disappointment, is limited to specific violations of any particular legal right, law or constitutional provision. Generally, the courts exercise their jurisdiction only on a complaint filed by an aggrieved party and the grant of relief or compensation by the courts is critically dependent upon the quality of evidence in each case. The concept of public interest litigation or representative action is being discouraged and restricted by the superior judiciary. The ordinary courts of law, in any case, are unable to dispense inexpensive justice expeditiously simply because they are already overburdened with millions of cases,

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pending for many decades.

nother serious impediment that the conscientious complainant suffers is that the ordinary courts have very limited jurisdiction on human rights issues and almost no jurisdiction on the collective human rights violations or issues of any community or any section of public. Until a couple of years ago, High Courts in Pakistan were entertaining public interest or representative action matters. However, now in Pakistan, India and other SAARC countries, the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to directly entertain, adjudicate and decide public interest matters on some of the human rights issues. The problem is that only a few victims or organisations have the means to invoke jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in a serious and effective manner. Consequently, very few human rights cases are filed directly before the Supreme Court to invoke its jurisdiction. Expeditious and inexpensive justice from the ordinary courts is still a far fetched dream for the oppressed people in South Asian Countries. The public opinion, both internationally and locally, is increasingly asserting for the establishment of regional mechanism to protect and promote human rights. This growing realisation and public pressure is reflected at different levels. First, the international community, particularly the UN organs are playing a more effective role to persuade the member states to setup statutory official human rights institutions at the national level and to encourage regional cooperation among them. Second factor is the growing acceptance of the universality of human rights across the borders. Thirdly, to the good fortune of the oppressed people living in the third world countries, some of the developed countries have attached trade and investment to the human rights values. Growing awareness in civil society and increasing cooperation among the people on a regional basis to address human right issues also increase awareness. These factors give every reason and justification to be optimistic about realisation of the basic objective to establish a common Human Rights Charter and effective mechanism to protect human rights on regional basis among the countries in South Asia.

he concerned prominent citizens of the SAARC countries took an initiative to establish a non-governmental organisation on a regional basis, called 'South Asians for Human Rights (SAHR)', in pursuance of a declaration passed in a representative convention held at Neemrana Fort, Rajasthan, India on July 21-22, 2000. It is a broad alliance of peace and human rights activists belonging to the SAARC countries. This was indeed a much needed initiative at non-governmental level to promote awareness and mobilise public opinion with a view to pressurising the governments of the SAARC countries to sign a Human Rights Charter and establish a common official mechanism to check the Human Rights abuses in the SAARC countries. There are a large number of non-government organisations in most of the SAARC countries who actively support various human rights causes. The SAARC countries have already signed several conventions on narcotics, combating trafficking in women and children for prostitution, promotion of child welfare, among other areas. Several agreements have also been signed on Food

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Security and specific social issues, which require concerted and coordinated actions for the effective realisation of their objectives. In the 12th SAARC Summit, a Social Charter8 was signed on 4th January, 2004 at Islamabad. This Charter spells out laudable goals and objectives, such as poverty alleviation, promotion of the status of women, education, human resource development, welfare of children, population control, promotion of tolerance, pluralism, human dignity, social justice, protection of the rights and interests of minorities, elimination of discrimination in all forms, etc. Although, other treaties address some human rights issues, SAARC has not adopted any uniform human rights convention or charter, nor has it agreed to create any regional institution or mechanism to monitor adherence to and implementation of various human rights conventions, charters and treaties signed by the member countries.

he need for regional and sub-regional uniform Human Rights Charter/Court and implementing mechanisms, such as Regional Human Rights Commissions and Courts, has been emphasised time and again by the UN organs and UN-sponsored summits, in the past three decades. In December 1978, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution containing guidelines on the structure and functioning of national and local institutions for the promotion and protection of human rights. The effective implementation of International Human Rights Standards was highlighted and basic parameters/guidelines were prescribed first in the UN sponsored meeting of the representatives of the member countries held in Paris in 1991, which had laid down detailed set of principles to guide as to how to promote and ensure protection of human rights on a regional and national basis. These are commonly known as 'The Paris Principles'9. These principles were subsequently endorsed by the UN Commission on Human Rights (Resolution 1992/54 of 3 March 1992) and the UN General Assembly (Resolution 48/134 of 20 December 1993). Similarly, the need for strengthening of regional and national institution/mechanism was reiterated and emphasised in a number of UN-sponsored conferences on human rights issues, including the Regional Meeting for Africa of the World Conference on Human Rights, held at Tunis in 1992, the Regional Meeting for Latin America and the Caribbean, held at San Jose in 1993, the Regional Meeting for Asia, held at Bangkok in 1993, the Commonwealth Workshop on National Human Rights Institutions, held at Ottawa in 1992, and the workshop for the Asia and Pacific Region on Human Rights Issues, held at Jakarta in 1993. 'The Paris Principles' of 1991, which were endorsed by both the General Assembly and the Human Rights Commission of the UN at Geneva, prescribed the basic standards, specifications and characteristics of regional/sub-regional and national institutions: (a) Competence and Responsibilities: The institutions ought to be vested with adequate powers and competence, having as broad a mandate as possible, to promote and protect human rights effectively, in pursuance of a constitutional provision or a special statute.

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(b) Composition, Guarantees of Independence and Pluralism: Autonomy/independence and pluralism ought to be ensured by the constitution or the law, in the composition of the institution, which should include representation of various sections of civil society actively involved in the promotion and protection of human rights. Pluralism ought to be reflective of the society they represent. (c) Methods of Functioning: Complete freedom to consider any question within its competence and to have free access to the people directly, or through media; free access to gather information from any department or authority; complete freedom to promote and propagate awareness among the masses about the human rights and the basic rights, remedies and entitlement of the people; adequate powers to conduct enquiry, investigations, intervention in any proceedings, make mandatory recommendations and conduct trial and hearing of specific cases; to submit to the government/parliament and other competent bodies, reports, requests and proposals on any matter concerning promotion and protection of human rights; proposed legislative or administrative measures the government should adopt; to promote and ensure harmonisation of the local laws/regulations and practices with the international human rights instruments and to encourage ratifications of the international human rights instruments etc., etc. (d) Judicial powers: To receive, hear and decide complaints and petitions of any individual or group of persons or any NGO concerning human right issues or violations; seeking an amicable settlement through conciliation or decide the disputes in accordance with the law. (e) Financial Resources: The institutions ought to have financial autonomy in pursuance of the constitution provision or the statute, which should guarantee that the government shall allocate in the annual budget sufficient funds, which the institution would be authorised to spend in its discretion, but in a transparent, fair and lawful manner.

hese are just some of the basic standards, parameters and characteristics prescribed by the 'Paris Principles'. Institutions set up under the Paris Principles display a great deal of commonality in perception of human rights issues and approach to protect and promote the same. It is suggested that South Asian countries must, without any further delay, also agree to set up a uniform Human Right Code and establish institutions in accordance with the Paris Principles. For this purpose, the following course of action needs to be adopted: 1.

SAARC countries and its Secretariat may be approached by South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA), and other regional organisations committed to human rights causes, such as SAHR, should also make such an appeal to place this issue on the agenda of SAARC Summit, scheduled to be held at Dhaka in January 2005, and the member states may be persuaded to agree to adopt a uniform comprehensive Human Rights Code/Convention, enforceable on all the member states of South Asia. Once SAARC Summit takes the decision in principle, it can appoint a group of eminent human rights activists to prepare a

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Draft Human Rights Code with the help of the UN Human Rights Charter, European Convention on Human Rights and other related treaties. 2.

Identify the maximum possible International Conventions/Treaties & Charters relating to human rights issues, which the member states of SAARC agree to honour, abide and enforce.

Across the border cooperation is needed among the SAARC countries, to prevent and eradicate human rights abuses, terrorism and other organised crime and undesirable practices such as slavery, trafficking of women and children, drugs, smuggling etc.

Extending help and assistance to the governments of each other member states of SAARC, in their endeavour to establish their own national institutions, in conformity with the Paris Principles, to promote and protect human rights.

Mutual support to strengthen the capacity of national institutions of the member states of SAARC to undertake their mandates.

In this regard, the European Convention of Human Rights/European Court of Human Rights, the African Commission of Human and People Rights, are successful illustrations of a step by step building block approach and should stimulate joint efforts in evolving a regional mechanism for the protection and promotion of human rights in South Asia, as well. What appears to be lacking is sincerity of purpose and bona fide commitment to set up such regional mechanisms. A beginning should be made with certain minimum common denominators of easily achievable objectives, projects and programmes. A regional common mechanism for South Asian Countries must precede the establishment of Official/Statutory Human Rights Commissions/Courts at national level in all member states of SAARC. As stated above, at least three of the SAARC countries already have official independent autonomous national human rights institutions. Other member states must establish the same without further delay in accordance with the 'Paris Principles', to provide the first effective edifice for the protection and promotion of human rights in the region. (Iqbal Haider is a former Senator, Attorney General and Federal Minister for Law, Justice, Parliamentary Affairs and Human Rights, Pakistan) End Notes 1. Human Rights Information Centre Counsel of Europe http://www.dhdirhr.coe.fr 2. Ibid 3. The African Commission on Human and People's Rights Organisation of African Unity The Secretariat of the African Commission on Human and People's Rights Banjul, The Gambia 4. For details see www.nhrc.or.th/en/nhrc_full.htm 5. For details see www.nhrc.nic.in/hract.htm 6. For details see www.nhrc-nepal.org/?ID=122&AFD=0 7. For detail refer http://www.ncsw.gov.pk 8. For details see www.saarc-sec.org/main.php 9. For compete text refer www.ohcr.org/english/law/parisprinciples.htm

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A South Asian Parliament S.D. Muni

Introduction The idea of a South Asian Parliament (SAP) is not very old. It was first mooted academically during the early 1990s, and was elaborated upon in 1995 in a research paper1. One of the authors of the paper, Professor M.L. Sondhi, taking advantage of his position as the Chairman of the Indian Council of Social Science Research, organised an India-Pakistan Social Scientists Forum and issued a call from this forum to establish a South Asian Regional parliament. Gradually, journalists and academics have endorsed and propagated this initiative2. While some of these academics and analysts have projected the idea of SAARC parliament as a mechanism for 'crisis management and resolution'3, others have seen it as a legislative body to monitor the 'economic and security interests of the region'4.

he idea of SAP did not emerge initially from the SAARC process as sensitive political issues were generally kept out of its framework. The idea of a SAARC or South Asian Parliament is a manifestation of an advanced degree of political integration in the region. As the questions of preserving sovereignty and national identity are powerfully defining national agenda in South Asia, compromising sovereignty could not be envisaged under any regional institutional arrangement. Accordingly, even the Group of Eminent Persons (GEP) appointed during the 9th SAARC Summit in Male in 1997, steered clear of the aspects of political integration in the region, though it proposed the setting up of a South Asian Economic Union by the year 2020. The GEP, while commenting on the 'Political Dimension' of the SAARC process only acknowledged that 'often, cooperation has been hindered by a lack of political will and hampered by the vicissitudes of the political climate'5. This concern with sovereignty and political identity would still be a major challenge to overcome when concrete moves are made towards establishing a regional parliament. However, the idea of SAP has started tapping gently on the political sound board in some of the South Asian countries and also in the SAARC forum. It appeared very feebly during the deliberations of SAARC Ministers meeting to celebrate the 10th Anniversary of SAARC and articulate a 'SAARC Vision For The Second Decade', in New Delhi on December 8, 1995. India's then Prime Minister Narasimha Rao mentioned the idea of a South Asian Parliament in his inaugural address at this commemorative meeting and the Bangladesh Foreign Minister, ASM Mostafizur Rahman endorsed it in the form of a 'non-legislative South Asian parliament'6. In 1998, at the Male summit, the Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif did propose a forum of South Asian foreign ministers as 'High Council' for 'inquiry, mediation and

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conciliation' on peace and security in South Asia, but that was not comparable to parliament. The then opposition leader Benazir Bhutto had taken an initiative to hold a meeting of the parliamentary opposition leaders of SAARC countries. In May 2003, Pakistan's PPP parliamentarians complained that they were not allowed by General Pervez Musharraf's military regime to participate in a meeting in India called to discuss the formation of a SAARC Parliament. They were referring to a South Asia Forum of Parliamentarians established in India by the Members of Indian parliament led by the Congress Party's Edwardo Falerio7. Another articulate Indian political leader and a parliamentarian Dr. Subramanian Swami talked about a South Asian Parliament to his audiences in Washington8. Political support for the idea of a South Asian parliament received a boost when India's Congress leader Mrs. Sonia Gandhi endorsed it at a 'Conference on Peace Dividend in South Asia', organised by the Hindustan Times group of newspapers in New Delhi in December 2003. Responding, in a way, to the call for greater economic integration, open borders and security cooperation in South Asia by Prime Minister Vajpayee, the leader of opposition in the Indian Parliament Mrs. Sonia Gandhi said at the same forum: â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Over time, why can't we, for instance, conceive a South Asian Parliament as a permanent deliberative body on issues of regional concern and importance? Such a body could expand the perspective on South Asia among all our countries9.' Mrs. Gandhi has repeated the idea of a South Asian Parliament on subsequent occasions. This has led the Congress Party to endorse the idea in its agenda for the April-May, 2004 elections. After its electoral victory, the newly formed United Progressive Alliance (UPA) has also accepted the idea in the Common Minimum Programme (CMP). With what sincerity and commitment this objective will be pursued and how political and structural difficulties coming in its way will be dealt with, remains to be seen.

Political Context and Culture Parliament is a political institution. There are two important aspects of the context and culture required to evolve and strengthen this institution in a given region. One is the nature of the system of parliamentary democracy in each of the regional countries and second, the level of political integration among all the countries of the region where such an institution has to be established. In South Asia, there are two broad categories in which democratic parliamentary institutions can be seen. One: where parliamentary democracy has taken considerable roots and another, where this system is under stress and still evolving.

n the first category, India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh may be included. In India and Sri Lanka, parliamentary institutions have been functioning since independence, for nearly fifty years within a democratic framework of polity. However, in Sri Lanka the prestige and powers of parliament have been seriously undermined since the introduction of the system of Executive Presidency in 1978. The parliament and its related institutions have also come under additional stress in Sri Lanka due to political divide between the executive president and the parliament, between 2001

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and April 2004. This divide still persists even after 2004 election in which the president's coalition emerged victorious but without a clear parliamentary majority. Lack of healthy political traditions of 'co-habitation' between a powerful president and a popular parliament that could not be envisaged while drafting the 1978 Constitution, has brought discomfiture and embarrassment to both the president and the parliament. In Bangladesh, parliament has functioned as a truly democratic institution for about 16-17 years, from 1972-75 and from 1991 until now. The period in between was marked by military rule and politically docile and tailored parliaments. It is only in India that parliamentary democracy has remained a stable structure of governance. Some see this stability as having been eroded during the period of emergency rule, from August 1975-July 1977.

he remaining four countries, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives fall into the second category of pseudo- quasi- or undemocratic systems. These countries have witnessed serious distortions in the democratic institutions, except during short intervals. Nepal and Pakistan have had functioning parliamentary democracies during 1959-1960 and 1990-2002; and 1988-1999 respectively. In Pakistan, during the initial decade of 1947-1958, the basic tenants of parliamentary democracy were accepted by the institutional structures but in practice, parliamentary democracy remained fragile and unstable10. During the remaining times, there have been autocratic political orders in these two countries under the military generals in Pakistan and feudal monarchs in Nepal. In Bhutan the monarchy is trying to assume democratic institutional framework and in Maldives, the powerful presidency governs under one-party dominance system. Notwithstanding the democratic distortions in these countries, there have been elected (directly or indirectly) legislatures where public and sectional concerns are voiced and executive responses to such concerns invoked.

he South Asian region does not stand for strong parliamentary institutions. Even in stable democracies like India and Sri Lanka, socio-political dynamics have evolved in a manner that healthy political culture has not been reflected in the functioning of parliaments and its associated institutions. Political defections, indiscipline, corruption and power struggles have not allowed healthy norms and traditions of parliamentary functioning to take roots. For months on, oppositions have boycotted parliaments to make trivial political points and in the process, have also not allowed parliaments to transact legislative business. More often than not, the ruling parties have not shown necessary respect and deference to the wishes of the opposition. This is true in almost all the parliaments of the region. This is not the place to go into a detailed analysis of the malady of parliamentary functioning in South Asia but one of the important factors is expansion of politics in South Asian societies and the introduction of hitherto marginalised social groups into national legislatures. These groups are not aware of parliamentary processes nor are they fully acultured in democratic norms and discipline. Social fragmentation of polities in South Asia has led to the intensification of the race of political power along sectarian identities and interest groups, loosening of the control of party organisations and erosion of values and ideals. Above all, the autocratic rulers and undemocratic political orders in some countries of the region have also not allowed democratic

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institutions to develop in these countries. Despite the fragility of parliamentary democracy in South Asia, there is a positive side as well. The stable democracies in India and Sri Lanka have accumulated rich experience in evolving parliamentary institutions over the years in the given social and political context of the region. This experience has been shared, consciously or otherwise with other countries in the region. Thus the institution of Parliament has developed its procedures, rules of transacting legislative business, defined the roles of its officers, political groups and individual members, and developed norms of parliament's engagement with other governing institutions like the executive, judiciary, media, civil society etc. There is also the experience of bicameral legislative structures in India and Nepal. India being a dynamically federal system, also has the experience of operating state level legislatures, presenting a wide variety of experiences to its neighbouring countries to learn, by way of both acceptance and rejection of specific aspects of institutional evolution. Therefore, South Asia has the experience, expertise and ingenuity to develop a regional parliament, at least its design and structures, if there is political will in the region to have such an institution.

Towards Regional Integration The idea of a regional parliament is closely related to the level of regional political integration. In South Asia, until recently, political integration has been kept out of the SAARC process while emphasising economic integration. There is no dearth of SAARC documents, scholarly analyses and media commentary that lament slow and tardy progress of SAARC in furthering the cause of economic integration in the region. SAARC was initiated on the theoretical premise of 'functionalism' that stresses that economic cooperation and socio-cultural exchanges would help build the required mutual confidence in the region where political understanding would be strengthened, conflicts resolved and integration initiated. But in the past two decades, the slow progress of SAARC has been blamed on lack of political will and reluctance to address political issues. Pakistan, in particular, has raised the question of Kashmir and bilateral political conflicts in the SAARC forum, and other members of the regional organisation have also supported the idea of opening SAARC to regional and bilateral political discussions. India has not accepted this because the SAARC Charter, based on functional theory's approach and original consensus, does not allow bilateral and contentious issues to be raised.

he roots of the conflict between political and cooperative issues in South Asia mainly lie in two areas: the Indo-Pakistan conflict and the inherent regional structural imbalance where India, being overwhelmingly large and better endowed, invokes suspicion and fear among its smaller neighbours, who pursue strategies to counter-balance India12. Both these roots of regional conflict are gradually softening under the twin pressures of domestic popular aspirations aroused by fast spreading awareness and the global integrative forces unleashed by globalisation13. Almost all the SAARC statements reflect such pressures. On India's part, initiative in the direction of alleviating the concerns of its smaller neighbours to speed up the SAARC process were taken during Rajiv Gandhi's (1984-89) regime in many ways. His Foreign Minister

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Dinesh Singh even took these efforts to the popular and civil society levels by establishing the Indian Council for South Asian Cooperation to propagate this line. A decade later the 'Gujral Doctrine', initiated by the then Foreign Minister I. K. Gujral in 1996, was seen as the thoughtful response, which helped India move toward assuaging the fears and apprehensions of its smaller neighbours14. The foreign minister of his successor government NDA, Yashwant Sinha while endorsing the essence of 'Gujral Doctrine' committed his government to 'institutionalising positive asymmetry in favour of our neighbours'15. Mr. Sinha had in fact gone much beyond that when in addressing a seminar on South Asian Cooperation in Dhaka, in January 2003, he gave a call of a 'Union of South Asian States'. He said: 'If Africa could think in terms of a Union, if the Economic Community in Europe could become a European Union, if ASEAN could make progress, if the countries in Latin America could make progress, there is no reason why we in South Asia cannot become a Union of South Asian states. So I am putting this idea on a table. We will be interested in negotiating a new agreement which will create a South Asian Union and in course of time, the South Asian Union -- the SAU will not merely be an economic entity. It will acquire a political dimension in the same manner (by) which the European Union has come to acquire a political and strategic dimension. This is the direction in which I suggest we move. I am not suggesting an end to SAARC but an upgradation of SAARC into a South Asian Union16.'

he effect of domestic and global pressures was not evident only in the speeches. There were positive developments in South Asian bilateral relations as well, of course, along with persisting tensions and misunderstandings. In 1996, India resolved the Chittagong Hill Track refugee and insurgency issue with Bangladesh and signed Mahakali Treaty with Nepal. In 1998, India resolved the Ganga waters dispute with Bangladesh and also signed Free Trade Agreement with Sri Lanka. Now Sri Lanka and India are pursuing a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement to integrate their economies as closely as possible17. Bangladesh is also interested in having a Free Trade Agreement with India. In 2003, Bhutan demonstrated an unprecedented level of cooperation with India when it decided to have mutually coordinated operations to flush out India's Northeast insurgents from their sanctuaries on its territory. These are only some of the landmark signs of a change in the dynamics of India's cooperation with its immediate neighbours both within and outside the SAARC parameters. It is hoped that there is a similar positive move in Indo-Pakistan relations as well. Surely, the international community, particularly the U.S. has been nudging these two adversarial neighbours to resolve their differences since the 1998 nuclear explosions18. The Kargil conflict and the consequences of post-September 11 developments have only strengthened the U.S. resolve to 'remain engaged' with the Indo-Pakistan issue. That both India and Pakistan are feeling the pinch of domestic developmental challenge being vitiated by their bilateral conflict became evident when both the Indian and the Pakistani Prime Ministers talked of poverty as the common challenge in 2003. The then Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in April 2003, called

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for fresh initiatives to open a dialogue between India and Pakistan, and proposed the prospects of 'security cooperation, open borders and even a single currency'. Inaugurating a symposium on 'The Peace Dividend: Progress For India and South Asia' in New Delhi in December 2003, Vajpayee said: â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;I would suggest that the demands of globalisation and the aspirations of o u r people provide the objective bases of our energetic pursuit of a harmoniously integrated South Asia. Our people, business and organisations are waiting to interact more closely with each otherâ&#x20AC;ŚThey have waited for over an half-century for its fulfillment and are now impatient to move ahead. We can sense this impatience in the outpouring of popular sentiments after our initiatives. The increased travel between India and Pakistan of Parliamentarians, businessmen, artists and sportsmen show the intense desire for amity and goodwill. We have to respond to this desire by seeking every possible way to banish hostility and promote peace19.'

he Indo-Pakistan decision during the Islamabad SAARC summit to initiate a bilateral dialogue for conflict-resolution between them was the result of the sentiments expressed in the above statement and efforts made to build mutual confidence. This has given the SAARC a new momentum and the positive manner in which this dialogue is being pursued by the new UPA government clearly underlines that India-Pakistan relationship is a part of the whole subcontinent's movement towards greater economic cooperation and political integration20. There are optimists in India and Pakistan who even claim that a positive Indo-Pakistani relationship will be put on viable track by the end of this year.

egional political integration is a difficult and complex process. It often follows regional economic integration, but only when there is a strong political will. In South Asia, some signs of such a political will slowly emerging can be seen but these are still very weak and fragile. The dynamics of regional economic and political integration is best illustrated by the European experience where credible initiatives for regional economic integration started only during the 1950s after long Westphalian stability. The process of European integration has become a strong movement but it is in no sense complete, not even the economic integration process has been fully accomplished and secured21. Politically, the European Union is struggling to evolve consensus on Common Foreign and Security Policies of the member countries. The European Parliament which was first constituted after direct elections in 1979 is still evolving. However, both the process of European Integration and the evolution of the European Parliament offer useful insights for South Asia to learn from, in terms of following positive lessons and avoiding pitfalls, though social, political and economic conditions in South Asia are vastly different from what they have been in Europe22. No other region in the developing world has so far come forward firmly in emulating Europe in working for political integration. ASEAN, considered more successful comparatively and has developed institutions for security issues (such as ARF), has neither thought of an ASEAN Parliament nor a common approach to critical political values like democracy, pluralism, human rights and freedom. Other developing regional groupings like GCC, SCO, OAU, IOC-ARC, etc.,

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are far behind on the political front. South Asia has at least started talking about the goal of a community and establishing a regional union with talks of a South Asian Parliament.

South Asian Parliament Like the European Parliament, the SAP can both induce and reinforce the process of South Asian cooperation and integration, as also get reinforced by such process. Mrs. Sonia Gandhi, the leader of India's Congress party viewed the SAP as an instrument that could be helpful in the growth of a regional perspective. The academics have looked at it as an institution of political mutual understanding, communication and consensus building that may positively impinge on conflict resolution. Perhaps, under the SAARC process, somewhat unwittingly though, this inherent role of SAP was taken note of when introducing provisions for visa-free travel of parliamentarians. The parliamentarians on their own are also realising the value of getting together at the regional level as evident from the establishment of SAARC forum of parliamentarians. So far SAP is still an idea, even a nebulous idea, but as and when the region starts working for it, its structural aspects will have to be considered carefully. The first pre-condition for establishing SAP will be an Agreement or a Treaty among all the South Asian countries on the structure. The example of Maastricht Treaty (1992) and the Amsterdam Agreement (1997) to support the structure of the European Parliament may be recalled here. Such Agreements and Treaties may be negotiated within the SAARC framework. To facilitate such negotiations, another Group of Eminent Persons or a specially constituted task force may be appointed by SAARC to thrash out theoretical details of SAP structure.

outh Asian countries have a strong electoral tradition based on adult suffrage, with the exception of Bhutan. Accordingly, an elected SAP can be constituted on the prevailing electoral systems of the member countries. While the preference for a free and fair election based on adult suffrage may be highlighted, accommodation be made for indirect elections to SAP from any specific country until it is ready to hold direct elections. The life of SAP may be five years as is the general practice of parliaments in South Asian countries. Numerical strength of the parliament poses a real challenge in South Asia because of its inherent imbalance. Any proportionate representation would invariably put Indian SAP members at absolute majority because of India's demographic enormity. This will not be acceptable to the other countries. Therefore there are two alternatives in deciding the strength of the parliament and the number of representatives from each country. One is to have equal number from each country and another to have a proportionate number but not (emphasis added) based on population size of the respective countries. Equal numbers will naturally militate against India since its representation in SAP will be reduced to 1/7 of the total size, making the composition look grossly unnatural. It may also create difficulties for very small countries like Bhutan and Maldives, who may not have a large pool of competent people to be spared for South Asian regional deliberations. Thus, for a balanced composition of SAP, while India's overall demographic dominance has to be avoided, the size

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differential of the countries has also to find some reflection in the regional body. One formula for composition could be that while India contributes 25 per cent of the total strength, the other two demographically sizable countries, Pakistan and Bangladesh, contribute 15 per cent each and the remaining four smaller sized countries contribute 10 per cent each of the total numbers. This is just a suggestion to illustrate a balanced formula, which can surely be improved upon. In SAARC, financial contributions are made on the basis of each member country's capabilities. Perhaps the same formula may be applied for meeting the expanses of SAP, and there again a differentiatedbalanced representation will seem rational. The European Parliament also follows a differentiated approach where number of representation from member countries differ from each other and is collectively decided.

here is another sensitive aspect linked to representation. In the European Parliament national identities are submerged under political identities because in the Chamber, the seating arrangement does not follow nationality criteria23. This does not seem workable for SAP. Not only because the national identities in South Asia have not been softened at the European level but also because, due to lack of uniform political and democratic norms and practices in South Asia, political groups cutting across national boundaries with similar ideologies and political programmes have emerged. The prospects of such groups emerging in the foreseeable future also seem dim. The SAP members will, therefore, continue to retain their respective national identities along with their political and ideological complexions. On specific issues, national representatives from the same country may take different positions according to their respective political programmes, and so, even cooperate with politically sympathetic groups from across the borders. For instance Communist party members of various South Asian countries may take a mutually coordinated approach in SAP that may be in conflict with other political representatives from their countries. Recurrence of such situations will initiate a process of political harmony across national boundaries in South Asia.

he officers of SAP, particularly the speaker and the deputy speakers may be elected within the parliament on a rotational basis according to the alphabetical order. Each one may have a term of less than one year because all the seven member countries will have to be accommodated during the five-year term of SAP. Accordingly, while the candidates for each term can only be from among the members from only one country, votes will be cast by all the members of SAP. Other procedures and rules to govern smooth functioning of SAP may be drawn from the best available in South Asian countries. Total strength of the parliament may be fixed somewhere between 300 t0 500, though in some of the South Asian countries like India, the strength of parliament stands at more than 570 members. Raising or reducing the numbers of SAP must be collectively decided by the South Asian countries. However, larger the Parliament more would be the expenditure incurred on its functioning and upkeep. The parliament may have at least two annual sessions with the gap between one and the other session not exceeding six months. SAP procedures may involve discussions in subject committees, question sessions and open House debate. And decisions may be adopted in the form of resolutions adopted by majority vote. It may

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be desirable to provide a safeguard that any particular resolution which does not have support of atleast 1/3 of all the member countries representatives may not be adopted.

ike the European Parliament during its initial stages, SAP can only start as a deliberative body. At this stage we are not even envisaging a regional executive on the lines of the European Council or Commission. It may still take years before the next stage of South Asian regional political integration can be contemplated. The SAP will therefore address its decisions/resolutions to the South Asian governments or even SAARC. As other institutions of political integration evolve in South Asia, SAP may, over the years, begin to assume a legislative character. Until then SAP decisions will be in the form of suggestions and recommendations. Even when these SAP decisions are ignored or rejected by the individual governments, they will generate public pressures in their favour throughout the region. More so when some South Asian governments accept them and others do not. The subjects under the purview of SAP should then be those areas where SAARC has been working and where there already is a regional consensus. This gives a wide variety of issues to SAP for deliberations, ranging from those of economic cooperation to the ones adopted under the Social Charter in the Islamabad SAARC summit. SAP may also deliberate upon security issues affecting the region like terrorism where SAARC Charter is being revamped. As security and nuclear confidence building grows between India and Pakistan, the related issues would also become ripe for SAP deliberations. Holding of the SAP sessions and its various subject committee meetings may be so disbursed throughout the region that no country feels either burdened or neglected. Further, such meetings will expose local people and national media, and sensitise them to regional issues. This is how a harmonised regional perspective indicated by Mrs. Sonia Gandhi will gain momentum. The SAP members, being free from specific national constraints may be able to think beyond their national positions even on complex and sensitive issues of conflicts and tensions in the region. In the process unconventional ideas and constructive possibilities may emerge for resolving such issues. The vibrations of regional political integration have already started being felt. Both domestic and international forces are working on the vibrations to give them strength and direction. Under such circumstances the idea of SAP may look distant but not unrealistic. This distance between the idea and reality may be bridged if IndiaPakistan confidence building gathers momentum and India takes bold initiatives to push regional integration in a positive direction. (S. D. Muni is Professor of South Asian Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi) End Notes 1. M.L.Sondhi and Srikant Paranjpe, 'SAARC Parliament', The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, July 27, 1990. Subsequently both these authors produced a detailed argument in favour of SAARC Parliament in a study entitled SAARC Parliament and the Pursuit of Stable Peace in South Asia, (New Delhi: Conflict Management Group, JNU, 1995).

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6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

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14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

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Rakshat Puri, 'Establish SAARC Parliament Like EU', The Tribune, Chandigarh, June 10, 2001. Also his, 'Giving SAARC to the people', in India International Center Quarterly, vol.29, no.1, Summer 2002 and 'Perspective On SAARC', Kashmir Times, Srinagar, December 20, 2003; Ishtiaq Ahmed, 'A South Asian Union of Independent States', Op-Ed, Daily Times , Lahore, June 1, 2003; Hiranyalal Shrestha, 'Tomorrow's SAARC Cannot Operate Without SAARC Parliament', Kathmandu Post, Kathmandu, January 6, 2002. See also Himal, Kathmandu, vol.13, no.1, January 2000. Srikant Paranjpe, 'A Multilayered Approach To Security: Perspectives From Western India', in Comprehensive Security: Perspectives From India's Regions, Seminar Proceedings, Delhi Policy Group, August 2001, pp. 183-204. Ishtiaq Ahmed, op.cit. SAARC VISION BEYOND THE YEAR 2000: REPORT OF THE SAARC GROUP OF EMINENT PERSONS, (Sri Lanka: South Asian Association For Regional Cooperation, Department of Government printing, 2000), pp.7-8. Text of the speeches released on the SAARC Secretariat Website: <http://www.saarcsec.org/vision.htm>. This author is associated with this forum as a 'Friend of the Forum'. As reported in Dawn, Karachi, July 25, 2003. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, December 13, 2003. Ayesha Jalal, The State Of Martial Rule, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). S. D. Muni and Anuradha Muni, South Asian Regional Cooperation, (New Delhi: National Publishing House, 1984). For a more theoretical discussion, see Ernest B.Hass, Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organisations, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964). Also writings of David Mitrany, A Working Peace System, (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946); Joseph S. Nye, Peace In Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organisations, (Boston: Little Brown, 1968); Robero O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye Jr., Power and Interdependence, (Boston: Little Brown, 1977). SD Muni, 'Coping With the Contentious Issues in South Asia', in L. L .Melhotra, H. S. Chopra and Gert W. Kueck, SAARC 2000 And Beyond, (New Delhi: Omega Scientific Publishers, 1995), pp. 78-97. South Asian leaders are increasingly taking note of these forces as reflected in their speeches. For one articulate version of such speeches see Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, 'Seven Sisters Of South Asia: Where Are They Going?', 10th Lal Bahadur Shastri Memorial Lecture, January 11, 2003, New Delhi. Gujral Doctrine was articulated in Mr. Gujral speech at Chathem House, London on 23 September 1996. See Yashvant Sinha's Dinesh Singh memorial lecture in New Delhi on February 3, 2004. Text available with the Indian Council of World Affairs, Sapru House, New Delhi. Text of the speech from MEA, Government of India website: <http://meaindia.nic.in/speech> . India-Sri Lanka Comprehensive Economic Partnership Report, Colombo: Joint Study Group Report, October 2003. Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and The Bomb, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institute, 2004). Text on the MEA website. Also The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, December 12, 2003. The dynamics and dilemmas of integration in South Asia have been discussed widely. See, for instance, Sridhar Khatri, 'The Politics of becoming a Community: Stages and Prerequisites', South Asian Survey, vol.6, no.2, July-December 1999, pp.197-230; Rasul Bakhsh Rais, 'Integration and Community Formation in South Asia: Need For Institutions, Norms and Values', South Asian Survey, vol.8, no.2, July-December 2001, pp.203-212. For understanding the process of European integration, see James A. Caporaso, European Union : Dilemmas Of Regional Integration, (Boulder: Westview press, 2000) and

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Anderson James and Eberhard Brot, The Frontiers of The European Union, (New York: Palgrave, 2001). 22. See K.K.Bhargava & Ross Masood, SAARC And EUROPEAN UNION, (New Delhi: HarAnand Publications, 1994); Hartmut Elsenhans, 'European Integration: Limited Automatisms And Implications For SAARC', in South Asian Survey, vol.4, no.2, JulyDecember 1997, pp. 235-257; Dick Gupwel, 'The EU and SAARC in the First Decade of the Twenty-first century', in K.K.Bhargava, Sridhar Khatri (eds.), South Asia 2010, (New Delhi: Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 2002). 23. 'Overview of the European Parliament: An Introduction', taken from the European Parliament website: http://www.europarl.eu.int/presentation . P.2.

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South Asian Economies: Future Challenges Dr Ishrat Husain

he first decade of the 21st Century is bringing about several fundamental structural changes in the economies around the world. South Asian economies have to accelerate the pace of internal transformation of their 'economies' if they choose to benefit from the opportunities the structural changes present. There is a need to shift from the old paradigm of dependence on official aid and putting blame on the unjust international economic order for their woes to the new paradigm of becoming an active participant in the emerging globalised economy. What are the key characteristics of this new globalised economy? First is an open trading environment 'in which low cost and reliable producers of quality goods and services are able to deliver them just in time will derive maximum gains. The countries in this environment will have to compete for market shares in their quest for selling goods and services to the rest of the world. Second, the integration of financial markets and liberal flows of cross border capital, particularly foreign direct investment, provide ample scope for supplementing domestic savings and raising investment levels to accelerate the pace of growth and poverty reduction. In South Asia, the earnings and remittances of workers employed overseas do play a key role in accumulation of net foreign assets. Third, rapid changes in information technology and communications can lead to improving efficiency in the utilisation of capital and labour and thereby to total productivity increase. But, at the same time, it places a severe burden on the prospects of employment for unskilled labour. Fourth, a silent revolution in expectations of the so far voiceless voters is taking place due to a perceptible impact of electronic media and skilful management of these expectations and delivery of tangible results against promises is assuming a new dimension in good governance.

his paper addresses the following issues: To what extent are the South Asian Economies prepared to face these four major challenges and what is the agenda they should follow in the next 10 years? Before analysing this issue a few thoughts need to be considered on the process of decision-making that should be followed by the leaders of South Asia in order to bring about the paradigm shift. Each country must begin by preparing a long-term vision and the roadmap to translate this vision into action with milestones and time-lines. This vision and road map must have a non-partisan and national consensus and all political parties must agree and commit to the broad thrust and the direction of the economy. Of course, there will be many nuances and approaches to implementation and the roadmap will

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be altered in the light of experience gained but, at least, the investors and economic actors will be assured that there will be no abrupt reversals and significant derailments. China offers an excellent example of this process where the vision and the road map adopted by Deng Xia Ping has been followed, with some modifications and alterations, by successive governments. The skeptics may contest this conclusion by arguing that the same political party has remained in power since 1978. While this is true, but the point to consider is that in plural democratic societies when even contesting political parties have a broad agreement on the vision and direction of the economy, the voters will judge the performance by their relative success in implementing the programs, policies and projects and bringing about an improvement in the living standards of their electorate during their respective tenures. It is the differentiation in their relative performance that will distinguish the record of one political party from the other and win and lose the support of the electorate.

Past Achievements and Current Status What is the state of South Asian economies in meeting he challenges mentioned earlier? South Asia has grown at 5.6 per cent in the 1990s -- faster than the low income countries as a group but slower than the East Asian countries. The wideranging reforms implemented in this region during the last 10 years or so have brought about some fundamental changes in the economic landscape and removed some of the major constraints retarding the progress of this region. The changes that have come are noteworthy: 1.

There is now a broad political consensus about the objectives and content of economic policies in almost all the countries. The defeat of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led Government in the recent Indian elections should not be construed as an indictment of reforms but a manifestation of the growing impatience of the electorate that these reforms have not been deep and fast enough to touch the lives of the majority of the population. This political consensus has survived many changes of the governments in India since 1991 and the alternating shift of power in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. South Asian countries did not blindly and relentlessly follow the Washington consensus but selected only those elements which suited them thus avoiding the kind of crisis faced by East Asian countries. 2. Reliance on private sector as the main investor, producer and distributor of goods and services has replaced the old notion of the commanding heights model of the economy in which state and state-owned enterprises were the main tools of industrial development. The demise of Licence Raj has given rise to a healthy competitive environment in which market mechanism is used for allocation of resources. This shift has improved the efficiency of resource allocation and utilisation in South Asia. State intervention has been limited to provision of physical infrastructure, social services and other public goods in support of private investment and making markets function efficiently. 3. Unilateral trade liberalisation has been quite rapid in the 1990s in the region. Average tariff rates have declined from 90-100 per cent in 1980s to 13-32 per

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cent. Sri Lanka leads the way followed by Pakistan. India and Bangladesh are considered laggards in trade liberalisation according to a World Bank study, but are in much better shape than what they were in the 1970s and 1980s. Export promotion has finally been accepted the new gospel in contrast to the past five decades of obsession with inward looking import substitution and protection of domestic industry. 4. Domestic financial and capital market reforms have made the financial sector sound and healthy. In Sri Lanka and Pakistan the strides made are quite advanced. India is slowly and gradually opening up to foreign competition and introducing new legislation to improve the performance of the banks and upgrade the quality of assets. Bangladesh has begun the process more recently but is committed to moving forward in the same direction. But directed credit and credit ceilings, administered and subsidised interest rates, have gradually given way to market-based allocation of credit and determination of prices. 5. Macroeconomic stability i.e., low inflation, low domestic interest rates and stable but realistic exchange rates, has become the hallmark of these economies. Exchange rate regimes in all the countries have switched from fixed to managed float. Bi-directional movement i.e. both, depreciation or appreciation of domestic currency, takes place according to market supply and demand conditions. There is no longer a hang-up to defend a particular level of exchange rate and preserving competitiveness of exports and smoothing volatility are the main policy considerations. Large foreign exchange reserves are piling up in all the countries with India's coverage more than 15 months imports followed by Pakistan about 12 months and Bangladesh 4 months. 6. Fiscal consolidation and discipline are the furthest in Pakistan with fiscal deficit down to 4 per cent of GDP compared to average 7 per cent and domestic resource mobilisation stepped. up in the last five years by almost 70 per cent. India's budget (2004-2005) aims at 4.4 per cent deficit of GDP for the Central Government but the consolidated deficit is still uncomfortably high. Tax-GDP ratios are low by comparison to other countries at the similar income levels. Therefore, domestic savings and investment ratios have not matched those of China and other fast growing East Asian countries. 7. India has clearly taken advantage of the low wage, English speaking, highly educated technical manpower to become a leader among the recipients of outsourcing of IT related services. The same trend is beginning to emerge in other services such as drug clinical trials, health care, biotechnology, research and development. Although the immediate employment impact of the exports of these services is likely to be limited in the medium and long-term, the expansion of burgeoning middle class and the demonstration effect on the younger generation to acquire higher scientific and technical education will help India in the transformation of its economy. Other countries in South Asia are latecomers to the scene and have a lot of catching up to do. This Indian strategy of export of services does make much sense as the services sector accounts for 60 per cent of the output of developed economies and many services are becoming mobile across borders due to breakthroughs in technology and communication.

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These improvements in macroeconomic fundamentals have led to upgradation of credit worthiness of India and, more recently, Pakistan. Both the countries have established access to international bond market at fine pricing. It will, therefore, be fair to surmise that economic fundamentals have improved to a very large extent in all the South Asian countries in the last decade or so. Broad political consensus on the content and direction of economic policies and their credible and consistent pursuit should provide some signal to the markets that the South Asian economies can be relied upon in the exchange of goods and services and inflow of capital.

Agenda for the Future However, the challenges and tasks ahead for economic managers in the region are simply daunting. Sri Lanka and India have almost one quarter of their population living below the poverty line. The estimates for Bangladesh are in the mid 40 per cent, while Pakistan has one-third of its population living below the poverty line. Unemployment rates are quite high and Human Development indicators are dismally low. Moreover, these tasks have to be pursued in the context of a more volatile economic environment -- both domestic, as well as, international. Capital inflows and outflows have much greater potential to destabilise markets, exchange rate and interest rates.

echnological, communication and media revolution, especially the satellite television and cable channels, have raised people's expectations through the demonstration effect of conspicuous consumption by powerful and affluent classes. These expectations are placing enormous pressures on the ruling classes for providing access to basic necessities of life to the majority of the population. At the same time, the state apparatus for delivery of these services in most South Asian countries has become largely dysfunctional due to induction of poor quality personnel, corruption, inertia, waste and institutional decay. How to narrow this widening gap between the rising expectations of the common man and the declining capacity of state institutions is one of the most difficult tasks for the leaders of South Asia. South Asia is lagging behind the East Asian economies and has a lot of catching up to do, that too, in the shortest period of time. We are way behind China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines both in level as well as the rate of improvement. What can be done to reduce poverty and unemployment and catch up with East Asia? We should recognise this region as the benchmark against which we should evaluate our performance, although it is our biggest competitor in the global market, particularly China, which is becoming an industrial giant. A few points are worth consideration, although not exhaustive, to initiate a debate in the region: (a) Between 1980 and 2001, South Asia received US$ 17 billion as Official Development Assistance (ODA). However, between 1990 and 2001, ODA inflows had declined both per capita and as percentage of GDP. There was a change in the composition of external capital inflows with a declining share of aid in relation to other types of inflows. This change in composition suggests that the influence of the official donors and particularly the International Financial Institutions (IFIs)

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is thus likely to wane while that of the fund managers, rating agencies, equity research houses, investment banks and multinational companies is likely to grow. Thus credibility of economic policies pursued by the countries assumes a much important role than the relationships nurtured with donors and the IFIs. The market's power to penalise imprudent policies and breach of commitment is more damaging to the economy than the slippages in the observance of IMF or World Bank conditionalities. Mexico had to suffer heavily when the Zedillo regime reversed the commitment made by the Salinas regime to the markets on the exchange rate. The country witnessed huge and sudden capital outflows, depreciation of currency, inflation and economic recession. To keep access to the international financial markets, the South Asian countries will have to maintain not only open and liberal foreign exchange regimes, sound and robust financial sector, but also pursue consistent, credible and transparent economic policies. (b) Along with sound economic policies, there is growing evidence about the critical role of good governance and institutional quality in the growth-poverty reduction nexus. Weak governance normally associated with South Asia breeds corruption, political patronage, lack of transparency, low observance of rule of law, absence of level playing field, heavy tilt in the delivery of public goods and services towards the privileged and elite classes. Political leaders are now beginning to realise that the disenchantment of the electorate with these poor governance practices increases the burden of incumbency and risks their survival. Thus, improved governance should be on the top of the agenda of all political parties in South Asia. Bureaucratic hassles, long drawn procedures, un-even application of rules and regulations, excessive discretionary powers in the hands of lower level bureaucracy, shortages of essential infrastructure facilities and low productivity of labor force have made the region not such an attractive place for foreign investors. Consequently, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has not yet made any significant impact on the economies of the region. FDI accounts for 0.5 per cent of GDP with India receiving US$ 3-4 billion annually and Pakistan about US$ 1 billion. Portfolio investment to India had taken an upward trend but suffered a setback after the recent elections. A major overhaul of the structure of civil service, judiciary, police and local government institutions, re-engineering of business process and inculcation of modern management practices will be required in all the countries of the region. (c) Political and geopolitical risks are still quite elevated in the region. The longstanding hostility between India and Pakistan; the acquisition of nuclear and missile capability by the two countries and the consequential sanctions imposed on them, the active frontline status of Pakistan in the war against terrorism, the prolonged civil war between Tamil Tigers and the government in Sri Lanka, and the frequent strikes called by the opposition parties against the government in power in Bangladesh have added risks to doing business and locating investment in these countries. The external perceptions about our region are, therefore,

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heavily biased due to these risks. The sooner we can overcome these problems, the sooner the better the region will be as a reliable trading partner, active participant in the international capital markets and a choice location for foreign investment. (d) Investment in education and human development in countries, other than Sri Lanka, has been inadequate in volume, deficient in quality and lacking in relevance. The most recent census data for 2001 shows that India's literacy rate has gone up to 64 per cent but female literacy rate is less than 50 per cent. It also shows that at least one third of its population and labor force is not equipped to take up the ever changing and more complex tasks of the economy trying to outclass other competing countries. In Pakistan and Bangladesh almost half of their population and two-third of female population is illiterate. This large proportion of women among illiterates is a cause for serious concern. Sri Lanka is the only country in the region with almost a hundred per cent literacy. But this literacy level shows the growing imbalance between the demand for skills imposed by market economic forces and the supply of skills produced by our educational institutions. There is a surfeit of highly educated graduates who are not employable and there is a shortage of workers who can carry out routine technical jobs in production and service. India produces good quality science and engineering graduates every year who can cater to the high end of the job market but lack of attention to non-university technical education and its quality have created wide gaps at the middle end of the job market. This situation is aggravated in Pakistan and Bangladesh where the issues of quality, relevance and numbers are all intertwined. Sri Lanka has no problem with the numbers, but high level of unemployment among university graduates testifies to this mismatch in the skills. The widespread frustration among the parents and graduates and a high level of dissatisfaction among the employers in finding the right persons for the right jobs are further evidence of the imbalance in labor market. (e) This skill imbalance and lack of employability has serious repercussions for the composition and growth of the basket of goods that can be exported: The most dynamic and rapid growing sectors of exports in the world market today in the medium term are those associated with high technology and to some extent medium technology. While India is making some headway in increasing high technology exports, the record of other countries in the region is not very promising. They are still stuck in the low technology exports particularly textiles and clothing which have declining share in the world trade. Thus the need to overcome the skill obsolescence and turn towards medium and high technology exports was never as apparent as it is now. A change in the composition of exports can be achieved by removing the barriers and constraints in the way of foreign investors and Multinational Corporations (MNCs). FDI is an important force for integration for this as MNCs have set up supply chains and integrated production networks that tend to locate each stage of production in the country with the lowest cost. Affiliates of a MNC in one country often export to another for eventual sales in a third country market. These affiliates act as the on-the-job

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training grounds for the acquisition and dissemination of the skills needed for production and minimising costs. These skills are then disseminated and multiplied throughout other firms in the country. (f) Very little intra-regional trade is taking place in South Asia. Intra-regional trade has remained stagnant at less than 2 per cent of the total trade in the last 25 years. A study carried out by the Pakistan Ministry of Commerce in 1996 concluded that due to low transportation costs, cultural similarities which influence taste and cause profitable complementarities to emerge and low transaction costs, the economic benefits of liberalising trade with India outweigh costs. Despite this, the trade between the two neighbouring countries has remained negligible. Regional trading arrangements have made a huge difference in North America, Europe and East Asia, but they have not, so far, been successful in South Asia. The recent attempt to revitalise SAARC will stimulate trade and growth but only to the extent that it unleashes competition' that lowers domestic prices, enables achieving economies of scale and acquiring new technology. SAFTA arrangements can be successful the coming years but they some important preparatory measures, such as: ·

Trade facilitation through expeditious border crossings, quick custom clearance, efficient port facilities and improved transport links should precede or take place simultaneously with the expansion of volume in cross border trade. Domestic tax, tariff and subsidy policies that affect production. and trade incentives should be harmonised to avoid recurrence of trade disputes and frequent use of anti-dumping laws. As India provides a lot of subsidies to its producers, in various forms an shapes, the smaller countries are hesitant to allow MFN status to India. The recourse to a long negative list that restricts the volume of trade should be avoided at all costs. Macroeconomic policies, in fiscal and monetary spheres, should be harmonised to achieve a stable, non-discriminating macroeconomic environment for all the countries in the region. Supporting institutions to manage and facilitate integration, for example, setting standards, establishing regional development funds and for dispute resolution should be created. Communication and transport infrastructure between the bordering countries should be improved and upgraded to facilitate increased trade and factor mobility. Legal regulations for investor protection, intellectual property rights enforcement, anti-trust law, commercial law, labor relations and financial institutions should be harmonised. Financial markets should be widened and regulatory changes introduced to promote cross-border investment, listings, syndication, bond issues, etc.

(g) South Asian countries should tap the enormous potential of their large expatriate population in mobilising investment capital, foreign exchange earnings, skilled manpower and exports of ethnic products and services. India, Pakistan,

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Bangladesh and Sri Lanka together receive about US$ 20 billion of remittances from their workers annually but their contribution in domestic capital formation is insignificant. Unlike the overseas Chinese community that has played a substantial role in foreign direct investment, non-resident Indians have been a source, to some extent, of professional, technical and managerial skills but not much in terms of large financial outlays. The non-resident deposits transferred to India account for only a miniscule proportion of their wealth holdings abroad. These flows are quite stable and should augment domestic savings for accelerating the pace of investment without creating future debt obligations. Innovative products and investment vehicles to attract the savings of nonresident South Asians should be encouraged with the help of regulatory agencies.

outh Asian countries have not become a part of global value chain nor participated in international supplier chain arrangements. There is no single business model for participating in this chain and there can be many phases of transition and many modes of involvement. For example, joint ventures, franchising, purchasing by international firms, licensing, sub-contracting, fully owned firm, original equipment, original design and manufacturing, strategic partnerships for technology, overseas acquisition of equity are the diverse means whereby developing country enterprises can gain wide access to international markets at their own level of capability, climb the technology ladder and benefit from globalisation. East Asia is a major participant in this global supply chain and produces parts and components for a variety of manufactures. It is time the South Asian countries got engaged in this value chain.

The Impact of WTO The prevailing confusion needs to be cleared that something drastic or unexpected is going to hit us in the near future due to WTO. All the countries in the region are already members of this organisation since 1995 and have made binding commitments to maximum tariffs. In some cases the applied tariffs are lower than the bound tariffs. The South Asian countries have already liberalised their imports and have been flooded with cheaper imports from China in the recent years. There could be no greater threat to the survival of domestic industry than competition from Chinese goods. Some industrial firms could not face the onslaught and have been wiped out. Others have taken up the challenge by cutting the fat, taking up the slack, becoming cost efficient and improving quality, and are competing with the new entrants. Thus the process of restructuring and transition is going on and should not pose any systematic threat to the industries of the region.

hat we are focusing upon is the abolition of the textile quotas under the MultiFiber Agreement and the adoption of the new agreement on clothing and textiles in January 2005. The impact of this new pattern of textile trade on the economies of South Asia region is highly varied. Most simulation studies and modeling exercises carried out by the World Bank, USITC and independent consulting firms confirm the view that China, followed by India and Pakistan, will be the main beneficiaries of the abolition of quotas. These countries are all vertically integrated

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i.e., from producing cotton all the way to finishing, dyeing, stitching, etc., and enjoy low wage costs and low raw material costs. Pakistan, for example, has invested US$ 34 billion in the past five years in modernising and acquiring state-of-the-art machinery that can produce quality goods according to the changing demand patterns of the buyers. However, it is not clear if all the ready-made garment exporting firms in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka will survive in the post-2005 markets. Both countries are seized of this problem and are taking measures to assist their firms and their workers.

hatever the benefits of regional trading blocks, they are no substitute for participation in multilateral trade arrangements. Multilateral arrangements provide a much larger market, several times the size of any regional block, enlarge the market access substantially and permit wider competition, larger scale of operation and greater specialisation, all of which increase productivity and growth. Thus the successful completion of the Doha Development Round is in keeping with the interests of South Asian countries. However, the deferential impact on the countries of the region has to be handled carefully, imaginatively and expeditiously. Short-term adjustment costs to the workers and business have to be absorbed in the long-run interest of expansion in activities these countries have dynamic advantage in.

Conclusion South Asian countries improved their economic landscape in the last 10 years or so and despite many vicissitudes and shocks have bee able to maintain positive growth momentum. In the coming decade, while the policy reform and will help the internal transformation of these economies, the task facing the leaders of these countries are formidable. To maximise the benefits from globalisation and thus help reduce poverty, the future agenda should focus on good governance and institutional reform, investment in skilled manpower, shifting away from low-technology exports, aligning with international value chain of production, attracting foreign private capital flows including that from expatiate nationals, promoting intra-regional trade and mitigating political and geopolitical risks. (Dr Ishrat Husain is the Governor of the State Bank of Pakistan)

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SAARC Secretariat: A Critique Abul Ahsan

he secretariat of any organisation or institution as the Secretariat of South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) is a vital instrument for the realisation of its aims and objectives. Its head, whether he is designated as the Secretary General1 or by any other name, is the key player. He uniquely brings to bear regional perspective and represents overall interest of the organisation with regard to all matters brought before it for consideration. This may not always be the case with other institutions of the body comprising representatives of member states who are required to look at issues from the point of view of their respective countries. For several reasons peculiar to the region, the role of the secretariat is particularly important in South Asia.

Reviewing SAARC Secretariat The SAARC secretariat was set up at Kathmandu in January 1987 about two years after the seven nation organisation with Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka as members came into being. A review of the role and function of the SAARC Secretariat and its Secretary General is important because of a number of reasons. First, the several recent meetings of the heads of state or government of SAARC have taken some important decisions and bold initiatives to strengthen the organisation and to widen and deepen regional cooperation. The 12th2 summit in Islamabad early this year, for example, concluded the agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) under which that member countries would bring down tariff from the existing level to 0-5 per cent between the years 2006 and 2015 in two phases. The leaders re-iterated their commitment to establish the South Asian Economic Union as recommended by the Group of Eminent Persons and urged that earnest step should be taken in this direction. Special mention should also be given to the signing of SAARC Social Charter demanding cooperation in the vital field of energy and the establishment of a South Asian Development Bank. These are areas which can provide much needed substance to regional cooperation. Secondly, regional organisations like the European Union (EU), Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) are now expanding their membership and scope of operation. The membership of the European Union has recently been increased from 15 to 25 and when Romania and Bulgaria join the forum the number would rise to 273. Similarly, NAFTA today consists of the United States, Canada and Mexico. It is expected to have 31 more members by 2005 to form a larger free trade area extending through Central and South America4. In South East Asia, ASEAN is reaching out both to neighbouring China, Japan and South Korea through the recently initiated ASEAN free trade area arrangement, the ASEAN +3 initiative and the

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mechanisms designated as Dialogue Partners and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)5. Recent resurgence of regional organisations among industrial nations is comes from their sense of frustration about the tardy progress in trade negotiations under the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and whatever reduction in tariff that has taken place is far short of their expectations. The same logic applies more strongly in the case of developing countries like those in South Asia .The commitments made earlier by developed countries to the developing countries under the WTO have not been acted upon and the issues of vital interest, like agriculture, intellectual property rights and movement of natural persons are being sidetracked. If SAARC is to compete in this environment and become effective it needs to have a strong and result oriented secretariat.

Role and function of SAARC Secretary General The role and function of the SAARC secretariat and the Secretary General and on the Establishment of the Secretariat are provided for in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed by foreign ministers of member countries on 17 November 1986 at Bangalore India6.

ccording to the Memorandum, the Secretary General is appointed by the SAARC Council of Ministers upon nomination by the member states on the principal of rotation in an alphabetical order. The other professional staff is Directors nominated by each member state but formally appointed by the Secretary General. Under Chapter VIII of the Memorandum the Secretary General 'shall be responsible for coordination and monitoring of the SAARC activities' and act as the 'channel of communication and linkage' between SAARC and International Organisations when empowered by the Standing Committee to do so and assist in the organisation and preparation of SAARC meetings. The Secretary General is also the custodian of the SAARC documents and publications. Chapter III of the Memorandum provides that the secretariat shall 'co-ordinate and monitor' the implementation of SAARC activities and 'service the meetings of the Association'. The original tenure of two years of Secretary General was, subsequently, raised to three years at the 9th SAARC Summit held at Male. Since the decision of the 11th summit, the Secretary General holds the rank of a minister.

Mandate Exercised by Similar Secretariats A survey of the functions and powers exercised by secretariats of similar organisations elsewhere point to broad common features. The Secretary General or his equivalent in a regional organisation cannot, no doubt, take decisions on matters which are not entrusted to him by the charter of the organisation. These are left to the member states to decide. His job generally is to provide data objective information and analysis to facilitate decision-making. As an institution, conceived to represent general interest of the organisation, and because of its non-partisan character, the secretariat in most cases has the authority to initiate and propose programmes and projects to strengthen cooperation. Once decisions are taken at the appropriate intergovernmental level it is for the Secretary General to administer, implement and monitor follow-up. In most

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cases the secretariat also acts as the guardian of agreements, understandings and treaties adopted by the body and ensures that these are applied correctly. In the event of default, the secretariat has the duty to draw attention of the concerned party to the matter and urge remedial action.

European Commission and ASEAN Secretariat The European Commission, which is the secretariat of the EU, has been mandated to undertake policy initiative, propose legislation as the executive body of the organisation and to act as the guardian of treaties along with the European Court of Justice7. It serves as the honest broker between conflicting national interests, negotiates trade and cooperation agreements with foreign countries and international organisations and independently decides on agriculture and trade policy issues. The President of the Commission, who holds tenure of five years, takes part in the heads of state and government meetings. The Commission has, over the years, played a constructive role in bringing the community members closer.

he European Commission and its president are given the credit for their efforts at bringing about the integration of the community. It played a vital role in realising the European single-market idea at the beginning of 1993 and, subsequently, in finalising the blueprint for economic and monetary union8. The ASEAN revised the role and mandate of its Secretariat several times since its establishment in 1976 (the ASEAN came into being about nine years earlier). The original mandate of the Secretariat was 'to provide for greater efficiency in coordination of ASEAN organs and for more effective implementation of ASEAN projects and activities' Subsequent amendments made in 1983, 1985, 1989, 1992, were aimed at providing more manpower resources, authority over and freedom of operation to the Secretary General. The Manila protocol signed in July 19929raised the term of office of the Secretary General to five years. He works as the channel of communication between different organs and institutions of the ASEAN as well as foreign governments and international organisations. The Secretary General is mandated to initiate plans, programmes and activities to strengthen regional cooperation, prepare the Three-Year Plan of cooperation and monitor its implementation. All funds established for ASEAN cooperation are administered by the Secretary General. He is the spokesman of the organisation and represents the body on all matters. In organisational terms, the Secretary General is appointed by the heads of state and government on merit and enjoys the rank of a minister. The professional staff is recruited through region-wise open competition, as compared to SAARC where all directors are nominees of the member countries. Need to Change SAARC Secretariat SAARC Secretariat hardly exercises even a modest role assigned to it by the Charter. It has only occasionally been involved in the preparation of documentation for important meetings. The Standing Committee and the Technical Committees, which

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comprise representatives of member nations, are currently assigned the function of monitoring and co-coordinating SAARC activities. The SAARC activities are highly decentralised and disaggregated. In fact all activities are undertaken by the member states themselves. The role of the Secretary General simply acts as a channel of communication with the outside world and seeks specific authorisation by the Standing Committee10, since he has no mandate to communicate with foreign countries or outside organisation, except for the exchange of published materials.

n matters related to SAARC agreements, protocols and understandings, the Secretary General has little role. A look at the Agreement on Establishment of SAARC Food Security Reserve11 indicates that the drawing of food grains from the reserve is left to the borrowing and lending countries. The two parties will agree on the terms of the borrowing and simply notify the details to the Food Security Board, which comprises representatives of member states. It is to be noted that since inception in 1987, no food grains were ever withdrawn from the Reserve. To take another example, any request of a contracting party for extradition of an alleged offender from another party for violation of provisions of SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism12 is left to the concerned member state to deal with. The SAARC Secretary General is the depositary of all SAARC agreements and conventions but his role is restricted to transmit notification about their ratification and the date of their enforcement. Thus all SAARC agreements may be seen merely as an intention on the part of member states to address some common regional issues but for all intents and purposes it is left to the member states to work out their implementation as they deem fit. Finally, in a singular departure from the general norm, funding of the SAARC activities is to be undertaken through voluntary contribution of member states.

he SAARC Secretariat is the only regional institution available to the organisation to provide regional perspective and to realise the objectives of the body. Other bodies like the Technical Committee or the Standing Committee are intergovernmental institutions. Those who participate in those meetings take the positions of their respective countries. The narrow mandate and restricted scope of operation of the Secretary General is designed to keep all the options open for the member states. The Charter's provision that all decisions of the organisation shall be taken on the basis of unanimity and that the bilateral and contentious issues shall be excluded from deliberations provides each member state with veto power.

Fragile Mandate of Secretariat No doubt the power and authority of a secretariat depends on the nature of cooperation envisaged and the purpose and the way member states use it. It is similar to the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), in operation for more than four decades, which is merely a consultative forum; its decisions having no mandatory force and has also not found it necessary to have a secretariat for itself. The co-coordinating mechanisms at New York, Geneva and a few other places as well as the host countries of respective events have managed meetings and other activities. On the other hand, the European

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Union is the most integrated regional institution. It is an economic union with a common currency and an elected parliament that allows free flow of goods, services, capital and labour. It has common external tariff and close cooperation in political security and economic cooperation policy. As a result, the European Commission, as mentioned earlier, has been given wide powers and freedom by the constitution to operate in the interest of the Union. The ASEAN, which started with a modest agenda is progressively expanding and deepening cooperation and has over the years transformed into a dynamic regional organisation. The growing power and responsibility assigned to the Secretary General is a measure of a realisation on the part of member states that a strong secretariat is vital to carry the body forward. It may be noted that the SAARC charter defines the aims and objective of the organisation in rather general terms. (To promote the welfare of the peoples of South Asia' and to promote 'active collaboration and mutual assistance' etc.)13 But as the organisation is currently poised for qualitative transformation in its scope of work, it should follow other successful organisations in the revitalisation of the secretariat.

Conclusion SAARC has, so far, achieved little. The stringent controls over the economies by governments of the region and their inward looking policy administered by a corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy have hampered effective regional cooperation. Most crucially, the strained relationship between India and Pakistan, the two major countries of the area, and the lack of goodwill, trust and confidence have seriously impeded the progress. Consequently, the strict control imposed on the Secretary General is symptomatic of member states' hesitation to part with a degree of their sovereignty. The resumption of long stalled dialogue between India And Pakistan following the meeting of the leaders of the two countries during the January 2004 SAARC summit in Islamabad and the economic reform measures undertaken by all South Asian countries since 1990s should positively impact on the SAARC process. Also important are the spread of education, democratic awareness and the emergence of a growing middle class in the region with fresh ideas priorities and aspirations. It is time the civil society in the region and the media, in particular, played a proactive role to mobilise public opinion for regional cooperation and to underline the cost of non cooperation. The well-being of the people of the region should not be allowed to remain hostage to the outmoded ideas of security and national chivalry. (Abul Ahsan is Vice-President of Independent University Bangladesh. He has also served as Foreign Secretary Bangladesh and first SAARC Secretary General) End Notes 1. The term secretariat and secretary general is used interchangeably through out the article. 2. For the Declaration of the 12th SAARC Summit, see Daily Dawn, Karachi, 7 January 2004. 3. Taniguchi Makoto, 'Time for An East Asian Economic Zone', Japan Echo, (Japan Echo Inc, December 2003), pp. 28-29. 4. Ibid. 5. Association of South East Asian Nations - An Overview, (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2004). 6. Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the SAARC Secretariat

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Information and Media Division, (Kathmandu: SAARC Secretariat, June 1999). 7. Pascal Fontaine, Europe in 12 Lessons, (European Commission Publications, Brussels), October, 2003. 8. Role of the European Commission, (Brussels: EU 2003). 9. The ASEAN Secretariat: Basic Mandate Function and Composition, (ASEAN Secretariat, 2004). 10. Op.cit. Memorandum of Understanding of the Establishment of the Secretariat (SAARC secretariat Publication, 1987). 11. Agreement on Establishing the SAARC Food Security Reserve, (Kathmandu: SAARC Secretariat July 2002). 12. SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism, (Kathmandu: SAARC Secretariat). 13. Ibid.

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Islam and Democracy in the Arab World Dr Azzam Tamimi

ontemporary Middle Eastern Islamic activism, in the form of political movements that declare Islam as their point of reference, finds its roots in 18th Century revivalism. Invariably, all contemporary Islamist projects in the region spring from or have been influenced by the movement of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (17031791) who campaigned, and then embarked on a jihad, to cleanse Islamic faith and practice in Najd, his Arabian homeland, from impurities and bida’ (pl. of bid’ah -- an illicit accretion to ‘aqidah, faith, or ‘ibadah, worship). These contemporary Islamic movements have, to a lesser extent, been influenced by two other major 18th Century efforts at revivalism; the first in the Indian subcontinent by Shah Wali Allah al-Dehlavi (1703-1762) and the second in Western Africa by Uthman bin Fudi (or Usuman dan Fodio) (1754-1817). While the Arab movement was characteristically anti-Sufi, the Indian and African endeavors emanated from within well-established Sufi traditions. In the first case Sufism was deemed the enemy while in the other two cases it was the vehicle of reform itself. Despite this major distinction, the three revivalists sought to reform Islam from within and had clearly been responding to entirely domestic challenges. In their assessment, deviating from the true path of Islam and losing the essence of its pristine monotheistic faith were the principal causes of decline and backwardness. Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab’s concern was to fight the deviant semi-paganist form of Islam claimed by the scholars of the day. Al-Dehlavi’s concern was to shield India’s Islam against a rising tide of Hindu influence, and Bin Fudi’s struggle was aimed at salvaging Africa’s Islam from the encroachment of an animism that had already appealed to the ruler and ruled alike.

o Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab politics mattered only in as far as it impacted on his mission; that is, only to the extent that his campaign was hampered or assisted by the powers that be. He did not seem to have any political ambitions and had shown no interest in how government was run provided the governor espoused his ideas of ‘reform’ and embarked on a jihad to enforce them. His first encounter with political authority was the offer of protection made to him by the ruler of al’Uyaynah, his home town to which he returned after years of exile. He married alJawharah, the ruler’s aunt and that seemed to serve him well as a source of political empowerment. However, the Najd ulama (scholars) were alarmed by his rising influence and managed to convince the ruler to end his support for him and even ask him to leave town. It was then that he sought refuge in al-Dir’iyah at the invitation of its ruler Muhammad Ibn Saud. Following two years of appeals, through letters, to the

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rulers of neighboring regions, inviting them to join his movement, he decided, in1746, to wage jihad in alliance with his protector Ibn Saud against those who opposed the Wahhabi teachings. Clearly, Ibn Saud was the political animal and an ambitious king in-the-making. The death of Ibn Abd Al-Wahhab in 1791 did not stop the expansion of the new Saudi state, which was able, in a relatively short period of time, to expand all the way to Mecca and Medina, which were captured from the Ottomans in 1805 and 1806, respectively.

he current vilification campaign waged by liberal circles against Ibn Abd AlWahhab and ‘Wahhabism’ because of the assumed association with radicalism, or more frequently what has become known as ‘Islamic terrorism’, is not new. It goes all the way back to the Ottomans’ endeavor to discredit the movement that snatched AlHijaz from them -- the home of the two holiest Muslim places on earth. In fact the Ottomans could do very little about it themselves and had to commission their own rebel Muhammad Ali, who had just liberated Egypt from Napoleon and claimed it to himself, to re-conquer Hijaz on behalf of the Ottoman Sultan in Istanbul. Muhammad Ali sent his son Ibrahim to crush the expanding Wahhabi movement in Arabia between 1811 and 1819. He almost exterminated them and chased them all the way to their original power base in Najd; few people thought they would resurface again. The Wahhabis had been oblivious to the challenge posed to Islam and the Muslims by the rising European powers. They had been jubilantly preoccupied with conquering Arabia when Napoleon Bonaparte (1769-1821) was invading Egypt between 1798 and 1801, thus dealing a humiliating blow to the Muslim Ummah rather reminiscent of the Crusades more than five centuries earlier. It was inevitable that the contact with a superior and conquering Europe provoked debate over the cause of Arab and Muslim decline and the role played by religion. Muhammad Ali, perhaps unwittingly, is said to have initiated the debate within intellectual circles in Egypt, and to a lesser extent in other parts of the Arab world, over the causes of Muslim decline in contrast with to rise of Europe. As part of his desire to import from Europe what he believed was greatly needed in Egypt, he dispatched of students and professionals to France.

close associate of Muhammad Ali was Sheikh Hasan Al-Attar (1766-1835), who at the age of 32 had been through the devastating moments of Napoleon’s invasion. His initial response to the French conquest was to flee Cairo and seek refuge in Upper Egypt. A few months later he returned to Cairo and became acquainted with some of the leading scientists and intellectuals, who accompanied Napoleon in his campaign, learned from them some of their sciences and taught them Arabic. From that moment onwards Al-Attar joined the quest for modernisation and hoisted the slogan 'our countries must change their conditions and acquire the sciences not available yet to them.' It was Al-Attar who recommended to Muhammad Ali to send to France his own disciple and loyal friend Rifa’ah al-Tahtawi (1801-73) as a guide and an imam, of the students. An Al-Azhar scholar himself, Tahtawi was advised by his mentor to make the best use of his mission to France as a religious guide for the group of army cadets who had

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been dispatched to learn French sciences and acquire modern military technologies. He told him to observe well what he sees or encounters and to note down his observations. Tahtawi, a scion of a scholarly family, heeded the advice and threw himself into study with enthusiasm and success. He acquired a precise knowledge of the French language and read books on ancient history, Greek philosophy and mythology, geography, arithmetic and logic and, most importantly, the French thought of the 18th Century -- Voltaire, Rousseau’s Social Contract and other works.

eturning home after five years, Tahtawi could not help but express his admiration of what post-revolution France had accomplished. His admirers insist that this was in no way a blind infatuation. His French experience enabled him to diagnose the illness of the Ummah as being due to the lack of freedom. He suggested multi-party democracy as a remedy. At the same time, he criticised those who opposed the idea of taking knowledge from Europe saying: 'Such people are deluded; for civilisations are turns and phases. These sciences were once Islamic when we were at the apex of our civilisation. Europe took them from us and developed them further. It is now our duty to learn from them just as they learned from our ancestors.' Tahtawi is said to have been the first to campaign for interaction with the European civilisation. Being an Islamic scholar, he insisted that such interaction should aim at borrowing elements not in conflict with the established values and principles of the Islamic Shari’ah. In 1834, shortly after his return to Cairo from Paris, Tahtawi published his first book Takhlis al-Ibriz Ila Talkhis Bariz. The book summarised his observations of the manners and customs of modern France, and praised the concept of democracy as he saw it in France and as he witnessed its defense and reassertion through the 1830 revolution against King Charles X1. Tahtawi tried to show that the democratic concept he was explaining to his readers was compatible with the law of Islam. He compared political pluralism to forms of ideological and jurisprudential pluralism that existed in the Islamic experience2.

rom then on, almost all nineteenth century Islamic reformists in the Arab region took up the issue of political reform as a prerequisite of overcoming decline and backwardness. It had become increasingly apparent that ‘despotism’ was a major source of ‘Muslim sicknesses’. It had also become clear that the remedy is not to be found only within but should be sought elsewhere as well. Khairuddin Al-Tunisi (1810-99), Jamal Al-Din Al-Afghani (1838-97), Abd Al-Rahman Al-Kawakibi (18541902), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) and Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935) followed Tahtawi in stressing that Muslims could benefit from European successes without undermining Islamic values or culture. Khairuddin Al-Tunisi was the leader of the nineteenth century reform movement in Tunisia. In 1867, he formulated a general plan for political and administrative reform in a book entitled Aqwam al-Masalik fi Taqwim al-Mamalik (The Straight Path to Reformation of Governments). He appealed to politicians and scholars to explore all possible means to improve the status of the community and develop its civility, and

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cautioned the general Muslim public against shunning the experiences of other nations on the misconceived basis that all the writings, inventions, experiences or attitudes of non-Muslims should simply be rejected. He called for an end to absolutist rule, which he blamed for the oppression of nations and the destruction of civilisations3. In his search for the causes of decline in the Muslim world, Jamal AdDin Al-Afghani diagnosed that it was due to the absence of ‘adl (justice) and shura (council) and non-adherence by the government to the constitution. One of his main demands was that the people should be allowed to assume their political and social role by participating in governing through shura and elections. Al-Afghani attributed the decline to despotism, which is the reason as to why thinkers in the Muslim countries of the Mashriq (Arab East) could not enlighten the public about the essence and virtues of republican government4.

uhammad Abduh believed that Islam’s relationship with the modern age was the most crucial issue Islamic communities needed to deal with. In an attempt to reconcile Islamic ideas with Western ones, he suggested that maslaha (interest) in Islamic thought corresponded to manfa’ah (utility) in the Western thought. Similarly, he equated shura with democracy and ijma’ with consensus. Addressing the question of authority, Abduh denied the existence of a theocracy in Islam and insisted that the authority of the hakim (ruler) or qadi (judge) or that of the mufti was civil. He demanded that ijtihad be revived because 'emerging priorities and problems, which are new to Islamic thought, need to be addressed.' He was a proponent of the parliamentary system. He defended pluralism and refuted the claims that it would undermine the unity of the Ummah. He argued that the European nations were not divided by it. 'The reason,' he concluded, 'is that their objective is the same. What varies is only the method they pursue toward accomplishing it5.' Abdurrahman Al-Kawakibi (1849-1903) wrote two books on the subject, Taba’i’ AlIstibdad (The Characteristics of Tyranny) and Umm-ul-Qura (The Mother of Villages). The first is dedicated to defining despotism and explaining the various forms it may take, with much of the discussion focused on political despotism6. In his other book, Al-Kawakibi constructs a series of dialogues involving fictional characters, which he describes as thinkers, each belonging to a known town in the Muslim world. He imagines that these prominent figures are summoned to a conference organised in Umm-ul-Qura (Mecca) during the haj (Pilgrimage) season to discuss the causes of decline of the Muslim Ummah. The conferees finally agree that progress is linked to accountability while regress is linked to despotism7.

uhammad Rashid Rida believed that the cause of the Ummah’s backwardness was the loss by the Muslims of the truth of their religion. Bad political rulers, he explained, had encouraged this. True Islam, he added, involves two things, acceptance of tawhid (the creed of monotheism) and shura (council) in matters of state. But despotic rulers, he lamented, have tried to make Muslims forget the second by encouraging them to abandon the first. He stressed that the greatest lesson the people of the Orient can learn from the Europeans is to know what government should be like8. The significance of Rida is that it was out of his circle that Hasan Al-

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Banna (1906-1949) founder and first spiritual guide of Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood) emerged. It is believed that the link Rida had with both the Wahhabi and Afghani salaf’ schools of thought is the source of the special ‘salafism’ that Al-Banna’s movement upheld and promoted, a ‘salafism’ that combines aspects of Wahhabism and Sufism. This may explain, at least partly, why Al-Banna’s influence, and that of the movement he founded, has been global and instrumental in effecting revival across the Muslim world.

orn in Mahmudiyah near Alexandria, Hasan al-Banna, from his youth onwards, took part in the Hasafiyah Sufi order with his friend Ahmad al-Sukkari. After attending the Damanhur teachers’ training college (1923-1927) he went to Dar al’Ulum in Cairo, founded by Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905) and made famous by Muhammad Rashid Rida, who taught there until his death in 1935. Al-Banna’s exposure to European thought was modest; while a student, he read Spengler, Spencer and Toynbee. In September 1927, he began teaching at a primary school in Isma’iliyah, the headquarters of the British garrison. While on the job, he wrote for the Cairo Muslim Youth magazine Al-Fath and pursued his relationship with Rida’s al-Maktabah al-Salafiyah group and with his scholarly journal Al-Manar, which AlBanna edited from 1939-19419. In March 1928, al-Banna and six of his friends founded a 'religious association devoted to the promotion of good and rooting-out of evil,' a branch of the Hafsiyah Sufi order. By 1929, the organisation was already being referred to as Jam’iyat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun in the Al-Ahram newspaper, where a photograph of the group was published. The growth of the movement, which shifted to Cairo in 1933, was rapid: 4 branches in 1929; 15 in 1932; 300 by 1938; more than 2000 in 1948. By 1945, it had half a million ‘active members’ in Egypt. Between 1946 and 1948, branches were opened in Palestine, Sudan, Iraq and Syria. The genius of Al-Banna manifested in his ability to take the concerns of the intellectuals of his time and the reformists that preceded him to the people. Working not from mosques or cultural clubs but from café shops and popular meeting places, he reiterated in simple and direct terms the calls for reform made by reformers of the 19th century. On colonialism, he echoed Jamal Al-Din Al-Afghani and Mustafa Kamil (1874-1908); on riba (usury), Abduh and Rida; on the influence of foreign companies, M. Kamil; on intellectual chaos and loss of moral values, Abduh and Rida; on blind imitation of the West, Afghani and Shakib Arsalan (1869-1946); on man-made laws that fail to curb crime or deter criminals, Arsalan; on mismanagement of education, Abduh; on signs of desperation and loss of will, Arsalan and Kamil10.

ut Al-Banna was the first to condemn partisan divisions and express a rather negative opinion vis-à-vis the political parties of his time. His priority had been to mobilise public opinion against the threat of British control not only of Egypt but also of much of the Muslim World at that time. He held the European powers responsible for ‘dismembering the Islamic Empire and annihilating the Islamic State and erasing it from the list of powerful living states.’ His movement’s goals were: first, to free the Islamic homeland from all foreign authority; and, second, to establish an Islamic state within this Islamic homeland. Emphasising the concept of one Ummah

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was, therefore, of paramount importance. He believed that political parties were a threat to the unity of the Ummah. Islamic analysts have had different opinions as to the real reason behind his rejection of political pluralism despite standing, or trying to stand, twice for parliamentary elections as an independent candidate. Some attribute this to the corruption and disloyalty that allegedly afflicted the leaderships of political parties during this time. Some others believe that the thirties were the years when Third World liberation movements believed in the viability of the single party system. Fascism, it is argued, was the model most liberation movements looked up to.11

hree years after the assassination of Al-Banna in 1949, a single-party government took over in Egypt in what seemed initially a dream coming true. However, as elsewhere in the region, the struggle for liberation from European colonialism ended up with a ‘territorial’ state that fell well short of the dreams and aspirations of the freedom-fighters. Despotic ‘republics’ or ‘absolute monarchies’ replaced the colonial authorities in most of the Arab countries. Throughout the post-independence era, Islam, its culture and its heritage came under savage onslaught in the name of modernisation. The Al-Azhar of Egypt was turned into a secular university, the Tunisian Az-Zaytouna Institute was closed down, awqaf (endowment) institutions were nationalised, Shari`a courts were either dissolved or marginalised and political parties and non-governmental organisations were banned or outlawed. The Ikhwan, who had already established branches or strong links in many Arab and Muslim countries, were hit hard by Nassir in Egypt soon after he came to power in 1952. Following the execution of several of their leaders and the imprisonment of hundreds of their followers in 1954, they were driven underground. The challenge had once again changed form. It was no more the challenge of the struggle for independence and freedom, but rather of the struggle to resist what was perceived as a pernicious onslaught against Islam and the cultural identity of the Ummah this time not by foreign colonial powers but by post-independence ‘national’ regimes. From then until the early seventies affiliates of the Islamic movements in the Arab region were influenced mainly by the works of Maududi and Sayyid Qutb.

ayyid Qutb (1906-66), who was imprisoned for 10 years in 1954 and then executed in 1966 had only joined the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt after the assassination of its founder Hasan Al-Banna but had soon become the leading ideologue of the group and for no less than 30 years from the mid-fifties to the mid-eighties. Prior to his fame as an Ikhwan ideologue he was a renowned literary critic, novelist and poet. Most of his earlier writings were in fiction, literary criticism and poetry. He belonged to the prestigious circle of Taha Hussein, Abbas al-’Aqqad and Ahmad al-Zayyat, all three of them were modernists who had influenced him. But Qutb later turned against al-’Aqqad for his overtly intellectualised writings and against Taha Hussein for his Western orientations. In 1948, he was dispatched by his government’s Ministry of Education to the U.S. to study Western Methods of Education where he studied at Wilson’s Teachers’ College for three years until 1950. On his way back from the U.S. he toured Britain, Switzerland and Italy arriving back home in 1951. It is believed that his experience in the U.S. was a defining moment for him. His interest shifted from

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literary and educational pursuits to intense religious commitment. Without denying America’s scientific progress, he disliked its racism, sexual permissiveness and proZionism. Upon returning home, he refused to work at the Ministry Education while declining an offer of promotion. Instead, he started writing articles for different publications on issues of society and politics.

pon joining the Ikhwan in 1953, he was appointed editor of their publication AlIkhwan al-Muslimun. He then became the director of the Ikhwan’s Media Section and soon afterwards he became a member of the Ikhwan’s Guidance Council and Executive Committee, the two highest bodies in the organization. Winds of change blew when a dispute erupted between the Ikhwan and Egypt’s ruler Gamal Abd Al-Nassir over the 1954 withdrawal treaty with Britain. The Ikhwan condemned the treaty for granting Britain the right to re-deploy its troops in Egypt within seven years should its interests be threatened. They demanded a plebiscite on the agreement to the displeasure of the government. In October 1954, an assassination attempt was made on the life of Nassir, who used the occasion to hit hard at his former allies and present adversaries. Qutb had initially been imprisoned for three months in 1954. As a result of severe torture he was transferred in May 1955 to the prison’s hospital and was released due to bad health only to be rearrested in July 1955 and sentenced to 15 years most of which he spent in hospital. While in prison he witnessed the persecution of his colleagues. He was particularly affected by the Turrah prison massacre in 1957 when 10 of his ‘brothers’ were killed and many more injured as prison guards opened fire at them in their cells. That is believed to have been the moment when he started thinking of the creation of a disciplined secret cadre of devoted followers. His initial objective was self-defense but later he expressed the belief that the Ikhwan had the right to resort to force to respond to state violence. The culmination of his theory was the belief in the use of violence against the unjust state that refuses to alter its behavior. Upon an appeal for clemency by Iraqi President A. Arif, he was released from prison in 1964 only to be rearrested in August 1965 and charged with terrorism and sedition.

he detention, torture and execution of leading Islamic activists in Egypt created reaction that led to rejection of all else but what was considered pure Islamic means and methods. Democracy and all it entailed was deemed alien and un-Islamic and ‘the other’ had become the enemy. Such rejection was based on the categorisation of modern societies, including those in majority-Muslim countries, into Islam and jahiliyah as asserted by Sayyid Qutb in the book for which he was executed Ma’alim Fi Al-Tariq (Mile Stones). Some young members of the Ikhwan in prison could not accept that those who were torturing them to death were Muslim. They came to the conclusion that no form of peaceful coexistence would be legitimate, even if allowed, with such jahili rulers who have claimed for themselves God’s hakimiyah (sovereignty), another term introduced by Qutb in his book. It was some of these young dissenting Ikhwan that later on created some of the most radical and violent groups in the modern history of Islam. Incidentally, both hakimiyah and jahiliyah

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were borrowed by Qutb from Maududi’s earlier writings. It took nearly two decades for the Islamic movements in the Arab region to reconsider their positions vis-à-vis democracy and political pluralism and to re-read Sayyid Qutb with a critical mind. This development coincided, or perhaps was encouraged, by what seemed to be a general inclination of Arab governments toward political liberalisation. It also coincided with the emergence of a new breed of Islamic thinkers, some of whom were leading figures in the Islamic movements and some were independent scholars. However, the greatest impact on Islamic movements in the late seventies and the early eighties had come from a group of former leftist thinkers who, upon the defeat of the Arabs in 1967, decided to shift from the nationalist camp to its Islamic counterpart. Some of the biggest names in contemporary Islamic political thought, such as Tariq Al-Bishri, Muhammad Amarah, Abdul Wahhab Elmessiri, Rachid AlGhannouchi and Munir Shafiq, to name a few, had at one time been nationalists or Marxists.

owever, one very influential figure from within the Islamic circle has been Malik Bennabi (1905-73). Credited with having laid the foundation of the contemporary Islamic democratic school of thought, Bennabi, an Algerian thinker of French culture, believed that the coming of Europe had enabled the Muslims to escape from their decadence - caused by a mind incapable of thinking amid moral paralysis - by breaking up their rigid social order and freeing them from belief in occult forces and fantasies12. From the early 1950s until his death, he wrote and lectured on what he believed to be the grand issues: civilisation, culture, concepts, orientalism and democracy. In a lecture entitled `Democracy in Islam' delivered in French at the Maghreb Students Club in 1960 -- attended by Rachid Al-Ghannouchi who later co-translated it into Arabic by him -- Bennabi attempted to answer the question ‘Is there democracy in Islam?’ He pointed out that defining the concepts of ‘Islam’ and ‘democracy’ in a conventional manner would lead to the conclusion that, with respect to time and space, the connection between the two is non-existent. He suggested that deconstructing the concepts in isolation from their historical connotations and re-defining democracy in its broadest terms, without linguistic derivatives and free from any ideological implications, would lead to a different conclusion. 'Democracy,' he said, 'ought to be looked at from three angles: democracy as a sentiment toward the self, democracy as a sentiment toward the other, and democracy as the combination of the socio-political conditions necessary for the formation and development of such sentiments in the individual.' That is why he strongly believed that democracy be considered an educational enterprise for the whole community, administered through the implementation of a comprehensive curriculum that encompasses psychological, ethical, social and political aspects. Bennabi believed that an Islamic model of democracy is attainable. In his opinion this would be a superior model of democracy. Whereas in other models the main objective is to endow man with political rights, enjoyed by the ‘citizen’ in Western countries, or social securities, enjoyed by the ‘comrade’ in Eastern countries, Islam endows man with a value that surpasses every political or social value.

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ennabi’s analysis was revolutionary during his time, when Islamists in much of the Arab world, especially in the Middle East, made an enemy out of democracy without ever understanding it. Thanks to his disciples, such as Rachid Ghannouchi and other North African thinkers mainstream Islamic movements gradually relinquished old positions on this matter. Ghannouchi’s encounter with Bennabi happened when he traveled back home to Tunisia from France by land through Spain, Morocco and Algeria where he visited the man whose writings had already intrigued him. That explains the pioneering role of Ghannouchi and his Tunisian Islamic movement in espousing the cause of democracy and promoting it across the region. However, he has been rewarded with exile and his followers have been met with suppression and persecution. Until Algeria’s democracy was derailed, sinking the country into bloodshed that has so far claimed more than 100,000 lives, Islamic movements throughout the Arabic speaking world were enthusiastically embracing the democratic cause. For some, this was the most appropriate thing to do since, pragmatically, they were going to reap the fruits of democratisation. For others, however, it was a question of conviction; democracy is the way forward if Muslims were to revive the Islamic value of shura which came to an end after Mu’awiyah and his son imposed oligarchy on the Muslim Ummah. Such a principled position had been expressed by prominent thinkers such as Ghannouchi who said: 'The Europeans benefited from the Islamic civilisation in creating profoundly enlightened conceptions of social values whose fruit was the emergence of liberal democracy;' or Tawfiq Ash-Shawi who wrote: 'Democracy is a European version of Islam’s shura. When the tree of shura withered in the land of Islam due to un-sustainability, its seeds were ploughed during the renaissance, in the lands of the Europeans where the tree of democracy grew and blossomed; or Hasan At-Turabi who wrote: 'The origin of modern democratic thinking is traceable back to the [Islamic] contract of bay`ah . The Europeans derived the origin of democratic theory from their contacts with the Islamic political fiqh (jurisprudence).

owever, the nineties have witnessed the gradual erosion of enthusiasm for democracy within the circles of Islamic movement, though many of them continue to take part in the political process when permitted. Profound disappointment replaced the enthusiasm that prevailed toward the end of the eighties when the Middle East and North Africa awaited the breeze of democracy that blew across the globe. Unlike Eastern Europe and Central America, in the Arab and Muslim regions the breeze soon gave way to scorching winds of turmoil that only consolidated existing dictatorships across the region. It turns out that democracy, in as much as it entails free elections, accountability, transparency, the rule of law and protection of fundamental human rights, is a forbidden fruit in our part of the world. Today, except for five Arab countries, where a degree of liberalisation has been allowed, no democratisation is tangible. In Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Kuwait and Yemen political parties do exist, parliaments do convene and elements of constitutionalism are found. The press in these countries is relatively free and, occasionally, political opposition is granted permission to assemble and protest. After

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several years of bloodshed and destruction, Algeria has chosen to join this club of Arab ‘semi-democracies’.

owever, what impedes genuine democratisation even in those relatively ‘liberal’ states is that the top executive enjoys absolute powers, usually provided and protected by the armed forces and other paramilitary agencies -- such as the intelligence services -- so much so that the rule of law and the people’s right to choose, assemble and speak are easily undermined. In almost every one of these countries the judiciary is quite independent and vocal but suspected opponents of the regime -- and for that matter all those who allegedly pose a threat to the ‘state’ -- are arbitrarily arrested, detained without trial for as long as the state wishes and then brought before military courts for summary trial and punishment. Emergency laws dating from colonial times are enacted to intimidate and brutalise critics while silencing potential dissent. Local despotism hinders democratisation. However, what is even more formidable obstacle is the attitude of the world’s leading liberal democracies that sponsor, support or protect most of the despots in the region. The Economist once noted that to the U.S. democracy meant two things: free-market economy; and posing no threat to American interests. Evidently, the United States of America has shown interest in promoting democracy elsewhere in the world only so long as this is in its interest. Experience has shown that where the democratic process is likely to give rise to a regime that is not to the liking of the United States and its Western European allies, not only is democracy discouraged but may even be aborted with the knowledge and direct involvement of these superpowers. The working relationships between some of the world’s leading democracies and some of the world’s most despotic regimes at the expense of human rights and the rule of law has been another major setback for the cause of democracy worldwide. Today, and as a consequence of the wars first against Afghanistan and then against Iraq, democracy to the United States of America has ended up meaning ‘being on our side against whoever is on the other side.’

hat makes the prospects of democracy in the Arabic speaking world even bleaker is that it is faced with real crisis in the West. Ruling liberal democratic elites, in both Washington and London, have violated every democratic principle in the name of freedom, ever since George W. Bush acceded to the White House, with less votes than his contender. The close circle of his neoconservative ultra-Zionist advisers and staff has been instrumental in expediting the erosion of U.S. democracy. The war on terrorism, which has been so convenient for many governments around the world, has provided other Western liberal regimes in Europe with an opportunity to curtail democratic rights and freedoms in the name of protecting it. Clearly, it is not just democracy that is at stake, but all the values said to be associated with it: inalienable fundamental human rights, civil liberties, the rule of law and equality before the law have all been undermined with varying degrees across the liberal democratic world under a variety of pretexts. The abuses perpetrated by the army of the world’s leading power, as manifested in the pictures and footage smuggled out of the Abu Ghraib prison, are not the exception but the rule of the neo-cons’ unilateral

world order.

ry and speak about democracy in the Muslim world today and see how skeptical and suspicious your listeners are. The Muslims have been the primary targets of a war on terrorism, which has for all intents and purposes been nothing but a war on everything associated with the Islamic faith and the Islamic culture, in the name of freedom, democracy and human rights. Since September 11 thousands of Muslim men and women have been arrested and detained without charge in the U.S., the U.K. and other European allies in the ‘war on terrorism’; laws have been enacted in all these places to restrict the freedoms of expression, movement and assembly; and Muslim school girls in France have been banned from entering schools with head scarves. This inevitably struck irreparable damage to the prospects of democratisation in the Orient. The Americans and their allies have given such a bad name to democracy that few Arabs or Muslims deem it appropriate to associate themselves with any move to bring democracy to the Muslim World lest this is seen as collaborating with the foreign invading powers. Iraqis who loathed Saddam and prayed for an end to the nightmare they endured under him have regretted the end of his reign because America’s promised democracy has turned out to be a worse nightmare. That said, democracy is one of humanity's greatest achievements. As quoted above, leading Islamic political thinkers believe that democratic values are perfectly compatible with Islam. They see democracy as a human innovation that, at least, provides useful tools to revive and institutionalise the Islamic value of shura, suspended at the level of governance for many centuries. Islamic movements, thinkers and activists have no option but to champion the cause of democracy and continue the struggle until genuine democratisation delivers the people from the shackles of backwardness, despotism and imperialism. (Dr Tamimi is Director of the London-based Institute of Islamic and Political Thought (IIPT) and Visiting Professor at Kyoto University, Japan). End Notes 1. Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939, (Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 69. See also R.S. Ahmad, Ad-Din Wad-Dawlah Wath-Thawrah (Religion, State and Revolution), Al-Dar Al-Sharkiyah, 1989, p. 34; and Ahmad Sudqi Ad-Dajani, ‘Tatawur Mafahim Ad-Dimuqratiyah Fil-Fikr Al-‘Arabi Al-Hadith’ (The Development of the Concepts of Democracy in the Modern Arab Thought) in Azmat Ad-Dimuqratiyah FilWatan Al-’Arabi (The Crisis of Democracy in the Arab Homeland), Arab Unity Studies Centre, Beirut, 1984, p. 121 (quoting Lewis Awad’s The History of Modern Egyptian Thought). 2. Faruq Abdessalam, Al-Ahzab As-Siyasiyah Fil-Islam (Political Parties in Islam), (Cairo: Qalyoob Publishing House, 1978), p. 27. 3. Khairuddin At-Tunisi, Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Ma’Rifati Ahwal Al-Mamalik, Tunis, 1972, p. 185. 4. Jamal ad-Din Al-Afghani, ‘Al-Hukumah Al-Istibdadiyah’ (The Despotic Government) in Abdulbasit Hasan’s Jamal Ad-Din Al-Afghani, Cairo, 1982, pp. 267-8. (The article was first published in Misr journal on 14 February 1879).

5. 6. 7.

Faruq Abdessalam, Al-Ahzab, p. 28. A. Al-Kawakibi, Taba’i’ Al-Istibdad, Mofam, Algiers, 1988, p. 187. A. Al-Kawakibi, Umm-Ul-Qura, Dar Ash-Shuruq Al-’Arabi, Beirut, 1991. Also Ad-Dajani, p. 124. 8. M. Rashid Rida, Al-Khalifah, (Cairo: Az-Zahra Publications, 1988), p. 9. 9. See Hasan Al-Banna, Mudhakkarat Al-Da’wah wa al-Da’iyah, (Cairo: Dar Al-Shihab, 1966) and Richard Mitchell, The Society of Muslim Brotherhood, (New York: OUP, 1969). 10. Su’ud Al-Mawla, Min Hasan Al-Banna Ila Hizb Al-Wasat (From Hasan Al-Banna to AlWasat Party), Beirut, 2000. 11. This opinion is expressed by Rachid Ghannouchi as quoted in A. Tamimi, Rachid Ghannouchi -- A Democrat Within Islamism, (New York: OUP, 2001). 12. Malik Bennabi, Al-Qadaya Al-Kubra (The Grand Issues), (Beirut: Dar Al-Fikr, 1991). Arabic References l Rachid Ghannouchi, Al-Hurriyyat Al-’Ammah Fid-Dawlah Al-Islamiyyah, (Public Liberties in the Islamic State), (Beirut: Markaz Dirasat Al-Wihda Al-’Arabiyah, 1993). l H. At-Turabi, Ash-Shura Wad-Dimuqratiyah (Shura and Democracy), (Casablanca: AlFurqan Publications, 1993). l Tawfiq Ash-Shawi, Fiqh Ash-Shura Wal-Istisharah (The Jurisprudence of Shura and Consultation), (Cairo: Al-Wafa’ Publications, 1992). l Azzam Tamimi (ed.), Ash-Shar’iyah As-Siyasiyah fi Al-Islam Masadiruha wa Dawabituha (Political Legitimacy in Islam, its sources and its checks and balances), (London: Liberty for Muslim World Publications, 1997). English References l A. El-Affendi, Who Needs an Islamic State?, (London: Grey Seal, 1991). l J. Esposito & J. Voll, Islam and Democracy, Oxford & New York, 1996. l J. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality, Oxford, 1995. l D. Hiro, Islamic Fundamentalism, (London: Paladin, 1989). l A. Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939, (Cambridge University Press, 1991). l S. Qutb, Islam: the Religion of the Future, (Kuwait: International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations (IIFSO), 1992). l S.Qutb, Milestones, English translation of Ma’alim Fit-Tariq, (New Delhi: Naushaba Publications, 1991). l A. Tamimi and Rachid Ghannouchi, A Democrat Within Islamism, (New York: OUP, 2001). A. Tamimi (ed.), Power-Sharing Islam?, (London: Liberty for Muslims World Publications,1993). l A. Tamimi and J. Esposito (eds.), Islam and Secularism in the Middle East, (London: Hurst, 2000). l R. Wright, ‘Islam and Liberal Democracy: Two Visions of Reformation’ in The Journal of Democracy, vol. 7, no. 2, April 1996.

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Remittances and Development in South Asia Rashid Amjad

Introduction The outflow of migrant workers and the inflow of overseas remittances have had a profound impact on the economies of South Asia. Clearly this impact varies depending upon the size of the migration outflow in relation to the total labour force and remittances as a percentage of gross export earnings or the domestic product in different countries. In Pakistan during the 1980s migration and remittance flows were perhaps the single most important factor in explaining the rapid decline in poverty during these years. In Sri Lanka, where nearly half of out-migrants are women, migration and remittances have both affected the labour market and foreign exchange position of the country. In Bangladesh and India migration outflows have been significant but never so large to have a major impact on the labour market, although in India at the regional level e.g., Kerala and in certain districts of Bangladesh the impact may have been more important. In Bangladesh and India remittances are still significant as a proportion of the gross domestic product.

his paper reviews the trends in remittances post-September 11, 2001 and analyses factors which may explain a significant increase in three of the four South Asian economies reviewed in the paper, namely, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka and the impact of this increase on economic developments in these countries.

Remittances and Development There is rich literature available on the impact of remittances on economic development as well as more specifically on the labour market and poverty in developing countries. Of special interest is the recent study by Adams and Page (2003) of the World Bank which, based on a new data set of 74 low and middleincome developing countries, has concluded that, 'international migration - defined as the share of a country's population living abroad has a strong statistical impact on reducing poverty. On average, a 10 per cent increase in the share of international migrants in a country's population will lead to a 1.9 per cent decline in the share of people living in poverty (US$ 1.00/person/day).' As regards remittances, their key conclusion is that, 'international remittances defined as the share of remittances in a country GDP has a strong, statistical impact on reducing poverty. On average, a 10 per cent increase in the share of international remittances in a country's GDP will lead to a 1.6 per cent decline in the share of people living in poverty'. The other major recent development has been the increased concern about the security implications of formal and informal (havala) remittance systems and their susceptibility to money laundering or terrorist financing. At a recent International

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Conference on Migrant Remittances (London, 9-10 October 2003), organised jointly by the U.K.'s Department for International Development (DFID) and the World Bank in collaboration with the International Migration Policy Programme (IMP), this issue of increasing transparency and accountability in remittance flows was discussed with a view to determine the optimal legal and regulatory framework for remittances. The meeting especially addressed the concern that tighter controls in the form of greater regulatory supervision on remittances may reduce availability and drive up costs of services for the migrants. The paper does not rigorously pursue the conclusions of the Adams and Page study or the issue of building up an optimal regulatory framework for remittances but does explore both issues in the context of changing levels of remittances to the four South Asian economies in recent years. Recent trends in Remittances Table 1 Remittance Inflows : Annual (Million US $) 1997-98 1998-99 19992000 Bangladesh 1525.4 1705.7 1949.3 India 11875 11830 12290 Pakistan 1490 1060 983 Sri Lanka 817.7 867.5 930.5

2000-01

2001-02

2002-03

2003-04

1882.1 12125 1086.57 979

2501.1 14807 2389.05 1040.5

3062.0 15174 4236.85 NA

3343.2 14150 (9 mths.) 3871.58 NA

Source: Data from website of Bangladesh Bank; Reserve Bank of India; State Bank of Pakistan and Central Bank of Sri Lanka. For India for 2003-04 from Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey, 2003-04.

Officially recorded remittance flows, based on data from their respective central banks, to the four South Asian countries are shown in Table 11. In Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, they show a significant increase as compared to the 2000-01 inflows. The most dramatic increase is in Pakistan where remittances increased four-fold from just over US$1 billion in 2000-01 to over US$4 billion in 2002-03. In Bangladesh, they increased by over 70 per cent from around US$1.9 billion to over US$ 3.3 billion. For India the increase was around 25 per cent from around US$12 billion to slightly over US$ 15 billion. The impact of remittances on the national economy can be gauged by seeing it as a percentage of gross domestic or national product. Table 2 Remittances as % of GDP /GNP

Bangladesh India Pakistan Sri Lanka

1995, 1996 or 1997 as GDP 3.16 (1996) 2.7 (1997) 2.19 (1997) 6.06 (1995)

% of

2002-03 as % of GNP 6.0 3.07 7.0 6.46 (2001-02)

Source: For 1995, 1996 or 1997, Adams and Page (2003); For 2002 -03 data on remittances from Table 1 an d GNP from World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2004.

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In Table 2, besides reporting the Adams and Page estimates for the late 1990s, we have recalculated remittances as a percentage of gross national product (GNP) for 2002-03 (2001-2002 for Sri Lanka). Though the data are not strictly comparable, as for 2003-02 we have used the GNP estimate which means that as a percentage of GDP the ratio of remittances would be slightly higher, the figures are still very revealing. They show an almost doubling of percentage for Bangladesh from around 3-6 per cent, about a 15 per cent increase for India and a more than three-fold increase for Pakistan to around 7 per cent of GNP. In Sri Lanka there is only a marginal increase in part because most remittances were sent through official channels.

ased on the results of the Adams and Page study we should see a significant fall in poverty in South Asia, especially in the case of Pakistan and Bangladesh. Outflows of migrant workers and inflows of remittances to Pakistan in the 1980s had been perhaps the single most important factor explaining a rapid decline in poverty during this period2. In analysing this impact especially on poverty a number of caveats need to be kept in mind. The most important of these is that the sudden jump in remittances to these countries does not appear to have been the result of any significant increase in the outflows of migrants from them. What appears most likely to have happened and what national official sources attribute this increase to is that in the post 9/11 period the inflows of remittances began to come much more through official rather than the previous unofficial (havala) channels as financial controls and scrutiny were tightened on such transfers, especially in the United States. This is perhaps best illustrated by looking at the main sources of increase in Table 3 Pakistan: Inflow of remittances by country of origin Million US $ Country 2000-01 2001-02 Bahrain 23.87 39.58 Canada 4.90 20.52 Germany 9.20 13.44 Japan 3.93 5.97 Kuwait 123.39 89.66 Norway 5.74 6.55 Qatar 13.38 31.87 Saudi Arabia 304.43 376.34 Oman 38.11 63.18 U.A.E 190.04 469.49 U.K. 81.39 151.93 U.S.A. 134.81 778.98 Other Countries 88.40 293.28 Encashment/ 64.98 48.26 profit FEBCs Total 1086.57 2389.05 Source: State Bank of Pakistan (Website).

2002-03 71.46 15.19 26.87 8.14 221.23 8.89 87.68 580.76 93.65 837.87 273.83 1237.52 727.64 46.12

2003-04 80.55 22.90 46.52 5.28 177.01 10.19 88.69 565.29 105.29 597.48 333.94 1225.09 567.93 45.42

4236.85

3871.58

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remittances to Pakistan (Table 3). Between 2000-01 and 2002-03 while there is a general increase for all countries, the really big jump is from the United States where remittances increased from around US$ 135 million to US$ 1238 million. In the case of the UAE also there is an increase from US$ 190 to US$ 838 million. It is also important to note that in fact total inflow of remittances actually fell between 2002-03 and 2003-04 for Pakistan from around US$ 4.1 billion to US$ 3.9 billion with inflows from the United States remaining at the same level but falling sharply in the case of UAE from US$ 837 to US$ 597 million.

hile we have not been able to examine the sources of increase for Bangladesh and India, in all probability the same has happened in these countries. Therefore, the increase signals a much greater flow of remittances from official channels of either incomes earned or past savings of migrants in the host countries. It is also probable that some of this increase is also money transferred in the face of greater scrutiny of bank accounts in these countries. The first question that we explore is the economic impact on the receiving countries as a result of this increase in remittances through official channels. One unambiguous advantage that accrued as a result of the increase in official remittance flows was that it improved, and in the case of Pakistan dramatically, the balance of payments situation. This increase in remittances, if substantial, can contribute significantly towards stabilizing the exchange rate, increasing availability of foreign exchange for imports, lessen dependence on foreign borrowing and in some cases relieve the pressures to accept the harsh conditionalities imposed on such borrowing especially by the IMF and the World Bank.

or Pakistan's economy, which had been in a deep recession for many years, this increase in inflows was 'manna from heaven'. The rupee exchange rate against the US dollar was depreciating in the late 1990s due to an unfavourable balance of payments situation and a decline in aid inflows following the 1998 nuclear explosion. To prevent rupee resources from flowing into dollars during this period, which was possible as controls on nationals keeping foreign exchange accounts were considerably relaxed, thus leading to a further depreciation of the rupee the rate of interest on domestic savings was kept very high. This had a dampening affect on investment. Interestingly, after the large increase in remittances post- September 2001, the dilemma was reversed as the government now endeavoured to prevent the rupee from appreciating sharply against the dollar which would reduce competitiveness of the country's major exports. Once the exchange rate was stabilized the State Bank was able to reduce drastically the rate of interest which was an important factor in both increasing consumer borrowing and new investment which helped turn around the economy. Also the resurgence of the national economy and improved macroeconomic indicators and balance of payments position led to not renewing the IMF's PRGF programme, with its harsh conditionalities, from the end of 2004 which it had entered into to help stabilize the economy in 20003. In Bangladesh the increase in remittances from US$ 1.5 billion in 1997-98 to US$3.3

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billion in 2003-04 was an important factor in putting into effect currency reforms including the free floatation of the currency from May 31st, 2003. Bangladesh had been under pressure from the World Bank and the IMF for a few years to float the currency but had earlier hesitated to do so until it felt that it had adequate foreign reserves. The strong inflow of remittances allowed foreign reserves to increase and provided the confidence to float the currency4.

or India the balance of payments situation was already very healthy with large reserves building up as a result of very high foreign direct and portfolio investment and therefore the increase in remittances by themselves did not have a significant impact on the exchange rate or overall monetary policy. India's foreign exchange reserves (including gold and special drawing rights) had reached US$ 118.6 billion on May 7th, 2004 an unprecedented increase of US$ 42.5 billion since the end of March 20025. However, the increase in remittances did contribute to the current account moving into surplus in 2001-02 for the first time in 24 years in spite of a sizeable trade deficit. Remittances over US$ 15 billion in 2002-03 more than offset the US$ 12.9 billion trade deficit that year and almost fully financed it during AprilDecember 2003. For India, a factor that may have contributed to the increase in remittances, besides pressures to send them through official channels was the relatively more attractive rate of interest being offered by the Reserve Bank of India as compared to the historical all time low interest rates in the United States and most developed economies. One result of the increase in foreign reserves, to which remittances contributed marginally, has been the pressure on the exchange rate to appreciate. In March-April 2004 as foreign exchange inflows accelerated the rupee rose in value by 2 per cent against the US dollar despite the intervention by the Reserve Bank of India to buy US dollars. It would appear that the overall policy being currently followed by the Reserve Bank is to allow the rupee to appreciate if inflows of 'hot money', encouraged by the rising US-dollar returns, continue to accelerate6. These movements also shows that exchange rate in India is now increasingly determined by capital flows and not by trade flows as conventional theory would predict7.

n Sri Lanka remittances primarily from housemaids working in the Middle-East are the second leading net foreign-exchange earner after garments and are an important balancing element in the current account, usually offsetting around 60 per cent of the trade deficit. In 2002, private transfers, primarily transfers from housemaids in the Middle-East, were sufficient to finance 90 per cent of the combined deficit on the trade, services and income accounts8. There was no significant increase in these remittances most probably as they were being sent through official channels although we do not have the most recent data. The next important question we need to explore is the extent to which the increase in remittances injects increased demand or purchasing power into the economy, thereby stimulating growth in the respective economies. This would depend critically upon how much of this increase in remittances simply represents migrants switching from

sending funds through formal rather than non-formal channels. And, if there was an increase in total remittances being sent back, that is through both official and nonofficial sources, the magnitude of this increase and its causes need to be explored. Again evidence on both counts is very sparse. A study carried out by the ILO in the late 1980s estimated that of total remittances flowing into Pakistan around 57 per cent was through official channels9. If one was to use the same benchmark, the total flow of remittances in 2000-01 would have been double at nearly US$ 2 billion as compared to the official inflow of US$ 1 billion. Continuing on the same assumption one could argue that of the US$ 4 billion that came as remittances in 2002-03 the net increased inflow into the economy was around US$ 2 billion. This represents a major injection into the domestic economy of Pakistan at around 5 per cent of GDP. It is also of the same magnitude as the country's total Public Sector Development Plan (PSDP) in that year.

e do not have any surveys available to estimate the break-up of total remittances into official and unofficial inflows for the other countries and even the estimate for Pakistan is dated to a time when the rupee was still overvalued and there were much stricter restrictions on foreign exchange holdings and transfers by Pakistani residents and non-residents. While therefore being extremely cautious in drawing conclusions one could say that depending on a host of factors, and using the previous Pakistan study as some kind of a benchmark, anywhere up to 50 per cent of the increase in remittance through official channels in recent years could have been net additions to the remittances flowing into the country.

f indeed there was an increase in the remittances being sent through both formal and informal channels post-9/11, what could have been the reasons for it to happen? One factor which could have influenced this decision was the uncertainty and insecurity felt by the migrants in the post-9/11 atmosphere which made them, especially those living in the United States, to transfer a greater amount of their current earnings and possibly even more importantly transfer part of their accumulated savings to their home countries. The ILO/ARTEP (1987) survey of return migrants in Pakistan had shown that migrants keep part of their incomes as savings in the host country which they bring along with them on their final return. Also part of the increased remittances could have been transfer of deposits in banks which their owners felt may be subject to greater scrutiny. If these were indeed significant factors responsible for a possible increase in the overall remittances post9/11 through official and unofficial channels, the flows could become more volatile in the foreseeable future depending very much on general conditions prevailing in the migrant's country of residence. We now examine whether this increase in remittances, through both official and nonofficial channels, would have a positive impact on poverty as argued by Adams and Page. To the extent that these inflows increased domestic demand, stimulated new investment and spurred economic growth clearly the impact in the medium and long term on poverty should be positive.

owever, we cannot say whether they would have a direct and more immediate impact on poverty levels. The best outcomes, in terms of poverty impact, is if the increase in remittances, is the result of an increase in the outflow of migrant workers from the county. And to the extent that these workers are mainly semiskilled or unskilled and come from poor households, the money they send back has an immediate impact on the living standards of the families left behind. This is clearly what happened in Pakistan during the 1980s when the major migration took place to the Middle-East, mainly of skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers. In the given circumstances this increase would have a far less immediate favourable impact on poverty and certainly not of the magnitude that Adams and Page stipulate. Indeed the results of recent survey in Pakistan on poverty shows some marginal decline in 2003-04 after increasing in the past decade but the immediate impact is clearly far less than one would have expected from the magnitude of the increase in remittances10.

ome evidence on this can be gauged from the areas in which remittances have been flowing in Pakistan after the recent upsurge. The present boom in real estate prices and the stock market has been credited to a large extent to remittances from abroad. Also the increase in sales of consumer durables, mainly cars, facilitated by favourable lending arrangements, all seem to suggest that these remittances are coming from more well-to-do migrants rather than from the average skilled and unskilled workers in the Gulf. Also these inflows are going into bank deposits rather than National Savings Schemes which were mainly favoured earlier11. Finally, on the issue of havala and other informal funds transfer system, where cash is accepted at one location and a corresponding cash sum to a beneficiary paid at another location by a message or phone call, a number of steps have been initiated, including by the IMF and national banking authorities to ensure that consistent antimoney laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures are imposed on all forms of money or value transfer systems -- informal as well as formal. However, the success of any such measures needs to consider the factors which have encouraged migrants to send remittances through unofficial channels, the most important of which is the low cost and timely delivery of funds as compared to the formal banking system. Before enacting legislation or other measures, policy makers and central bankers need to analyse the role of havala and other informal transfer services, on how they can be better regulated and the formal banking system made more efficient in transferring funds; otherwise any new legislation or regulation could only drive these operations further underground12.

(Rashid Amjad is Director, Policy Planning, Employment Sector at the International Labour Organisation (ILO), Geneva. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of the ILO. The author would like to thank Asif Ismail for his helpful comments on the paper)

Conclusion The large increases in remittances post-9/11 in at least three of the four South Asian economies -- Bangladesh, India and Pakistan -- have had a significant impact on economic development. Based on our preliminary analysis of the causes and nature of this increase its immediate impact on poverty alleviation may be far less as compared to earlier inflows. In the medium and long term it could still have a positive impact on poverty as Adams and Page stipulate. There is a need for carrying out more analysis including primary data collection in both countries of residence and origin of the migrants to better gauge the economic and development impact of these flows including on reducing poverty. End Notes 1. A comparison of these figures with those from the IMF on workers remittances used by other studies including Adams and Page show broadly the same magnitudes except in the case of India where the IMF figures for 2000, 2001 and 2002 are given as slightly over US $ 8 billion. While estimates in Table 1 for India and Sri Lanka represent private transfers on the balance of payments account these comprise predominantly of inflows of remittances from Sri Lankans and Indians working abroad as cited in official publications of both countries. ( For IMF data see International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook 2003, Table B-19 Workers' Remittances.). 2. See Amjad and Kemal (1997) 3. See Ishrat Hussain, Governor, State Bank of Pakistan, 'Why Pakistan should Exit the IMF Programme', Daily Dawn, February 29 and March 1, 2004. 4. See Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2003 Bangladesh. London. 5. See Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2004 India. London 6. See Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report India, 01 June 2004. London 7. 'In more recent times, with the tail of mobile capital accounts wagging the dog of the balance of payments , the importance of capital flows determining the exchange rate has increased considerably, rendering some of the earlier guideposts of monetary policy formulation anachronistic. â&#x20AC;Ś On a day to day basis it is capital flows which influence the exchange rate and interest rate arithmetic', Rakesh Mohan, Deputy Governor, Reserve Bank of India, speech at the 22nd Anniversary Lecture of the Central Banking Studies at the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Colombo, 21 November, 2003. 8. See Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile 2004, Sri Lanka, London. 9. ILO/ARTEP, Impact of out and return migration on domestic employment and labour market situation in Pakistan, 1987. Report submitted to the Pakistan Planning Commission. 10. See Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Economic Survey 2003-04, Islamabad. 11. I am grateful to Sakib Sherani for pointing this out. 12. See remarks by Agustin Carstens, Deputy Managing Director, International Monetary Fund at the IMF Seminar on Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Law, Washington D.C., May 24-June 4, 2004 (IMF Website). References l Richard H. Jr. Adams and John Page, 'International Migration, Remittances and Poverty in Developing Countries,' World Bank Research Working Paper 3179, December 2003. l Rashid Amjad (ed.), To the Gulf and Back: Studies on the Economic Impact of Asian Labour Migration, (ILO/ARTEP, 1989). l Rashid Amjad and A.R.Kemal, 'Macroeconomic Policies and their impact on Poverty Alleviation in Pakistan', The Pakistan Development Review, Winter 1997, Islamabad. l ILO/ARTEP, Impact of Out and Return Migration on Domestic Employment and Labour Market in Pakistan, vol. I to VII, Asian Employment Programme, 1989.

Ethnic Nationalism and Indo-Sri Lanka Relations Neil DeVotta

ccasional ethnic tensions between Sri Lanka's majority Sinhalese and minority Tamil communities notwithstanding, both groups had lived together peacefully for centuries. Indeed, Sinhalese and Tamil elites collaborated to attain universal franchise from the British colonial authorities in 1931, merely three years before the British themselves enjoyed such egalitarian status, and their camaraderie also enabled the island to gain independence in 1948. But around 1955, just seven years after independence, the island's Sinhalese elites began outbidding each other on who could provide the best deal for their community at the expense of the Tamils. The ethnocentrism that was consequentially embedded led to the Tamils' marginalisation, and their reactive nationalism eventually unleashed a gruesome civil war that has killed nearly 70,000 persons and threatened to dismember Sri Lanka. In what follows, this paper will argue that (i) Sinhalese ethnocentrism contributed to the reactive Tamil nationalism that has now culminated in civil war, (ii) an arrangement that jettisons the unitary system and provides wide devolution to the mostly Tamilspeaking northeast region is the optimum way to end the ethnic conflict and (iii) Sri Lanka's very close relations with India should also help ensure that the country stays united.

Ethnic Outbidding and the Politics of Opportunism English continued to operate as the official language when Sri Lanka (then called Ceylon) gained independence, despite only about 10 per cent of the population speaking it fluently. It was thus understandable why many Sinhalese and Tamil elites felt it was high time the vernacular languages were given their rightful place, and this led to a movement that called for replacing English with Sinhala and Tamil as official languages. Sri Lanka's politicians in the opposition, headed by S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, however, realised that linguistic nationalism could be manipulated to attain power, and in 1955 his party, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), began demanding that only Sinhala be made the official language. The irony is that Bandaranaike had been one of the strongest proponents of linguistic parity, arguing that 'it would be ungenerous on our part as Sinhalese not to give due recognition to the Tamil language1.' But eager to become prime minister, Bandaranaike changed stripes and began thundering that linguistic parity would spell 'disaster to the Sinhalese race2.' The island's Tamil leaders had collaborated with their Sinhalese counterparts to ensure that the transfer of power from the British to the Ceylonese was a tidy affair, and this was partly because Sinhalese elites had promised that they would not abuse their majority status and instead treat the minority communities fairly. The Sinhala-only movement was the first sign that the concord reached among

the elites was about to be sundered.

aking Sinhala the only official language, especially at a time when the state was the largest employer, meant that those not speaking the majority community's language stood marginalised and their socio-economic upward mobility undermined. Part of the argument made by those clamouring for Sinhala-only was that British colonial policies had disproportionately benefited the minority communities. This was certainly the case, given the British proclivity to divide and rule. That noted, marginalising the Tamils and their legitimate aspirations signalled that the majority Sinhalese state was unwilling to treat its minorities fairly. When it became clear that Bandaranaike was going to win the 1956 elections on the Sinhala-only platform, the governing United National Party (UNP), which had hitherto strongly supported linguistic parity, also changed positions, with Prime Minister Sir John Kotelawala claiming that he wanted Sinhala 'to be the official language as long as the sun and moon shall last3.' Thereafter, the UNP and SLFP began outbidding each other on who could provide the best deal to the majority Sinhalese community at the expense of the minority community. It was the beginning of Sri Lanka's outbidding culture that has, in various other guises, continued to this day.

he political agitprop that Bandaranaike and his supporters resorted to, made many Sinhalese believe that their socio-economic conditions would be transformed overnight. This was pie-in-the-sky, and in trying to appease their disgruntled Sinhalese constituencies, subsequent Sinhalese politicians began promoting policies that further undermined the Tamils. Some of these policies saw Tamils forced to operate in Sinhala when dealing with the country's courts, traditionally Tamils areas colonised by transplanted Sinhalese settlers, resources earmarked for Tamil areas diverted to Sinhalese areas, Buddhism (which is practiced by the vast majority of Sinhalese) provided special status in the 1972 Constitution, and quota systems instituted for tertiary education so that fewer Tamils were admitted to the university system. The anti-Tamil riots that ensued in 1956 and 1958 further consolidated Tamil opinion that the Sinhalese were bent upon dominating and marginalising the minority communities. The Tamils initially resorted to non-violent protests when demanding that the language policies be reversed. But the numerous pro-Sinhalese and anti-Tamil policies that were instituted over the next two decades caused Tamil youths to mobilise seeking separation. The more Sinhalese politicians disregarded legitimate Tamil grievances -- so that even agreements reached between the two groups' elites were abrogated once Sinhalese nationalists put pressure on their leaders -- the more the moderate Tamil politicians were made to look impotent and ineffective. The military was stationed in Tamil areas in 1961, and the mostly Sinhalese soldiers soon began operating in a ham-fisted fashion. The more these miscreants in the military misbehaved with impunity, the more marginalised the Tamils started to feel and the more it undermined their confidence in the Sri Lankan state. A state may have a monopoly on the use of force, but that force is legitimate only if used in a fair and just fashion. Whenever state authorities resort to force to

dominate and marginalise a minority community, and utilise such emotive issues as language and religion to stoke such subordination, a territorialised minority is likely to rebel. This is indeed what ensued in Sri Lanka4; especially after the 1983 anti-Tamil riots killed 400-2000 Tamils5.

t is clear that the opportunistic practices adopted by Sri Lanka's Sinhalese elites, who cavalierly placed their personal political ambitions ahead of the island's national interests, were what legitimised Tamil extremism, though none could have envisioned it would lead to the emergence of a militant group, such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), dominating the northeast. As Nigel Harris has aptly observed, 'Successive [Sinhalese] governments were more preoccupied with securing their own base among the Sinhalese. . . at virtually any cost -- or rather, in the political auction, preventing themselves being pushed out by their rivals. If the Tamils had not existed, Colombo would have had to invent them. And, in an important sense, it did. It was Colombo that forced the inhabitants of the north to become different, to cease to be Sri Lankan and become exclusively Tamil7.' Sri Lanka's present leaders also agree: for example, President Kumaratunga has repeatedly observed that the island has not succeeded in the crucial task of nation building because its governments 'failed to address the issue of building a truly pluralist nation state.' The former Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe has also noted that 'The Tamils tried peaceful protests which soon degenerated into violence. With the underlying grievances being unattended, the stage was set for terrorist groups to emerge. Whatever the cause, the reality became the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam8.'

he LTTE is branded a terrorist outfit by a number of countries, and Sri Lanka's future as a united island now also depends on what its (LTTE's) leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran, decides to ultimately settle for. Since Sri Lanka's Sinhalese leaders continue to try to outbid each other on all issues concerning the ethnic conflict, their numerous enlightened pronouncements notwithstanding, they are more interested in attaining and maintaining power than formulating a lasting settlement that may see Sinhalese and Tamils coalesce9. That the lessons learnt from 50 years of ethnic malpractice have not managed to coax them away from such expeditious behaviour is one of the attendant tragedies of the island's civil war.

The Debate on Devolution One would think that after all Sri Lanka has gone through there would not be much debate on how a more devolved structure -- federal or otherwise -- would be a welcome option, since that would maintain the country's unity even as it satisfies the vast majority of Tamils. Indeed, devolving power is the best option for both parties because it requires the predominantly Sinhalese state and the LTTE to compromise. Not only is devolution opposed by nationalist politicians whose monomania over maintaining the extant unitary state structure contributes to ethnocentric rhetoric, but the debate on devolution is also used by mainstream leaders who adeptly manipulate the issue (especially when in the opposition) to outbid their respective opponents.

he Sinhala-only language policy had legitimised the Tamil demand for increased autonomy in the northeast, which the Tamils have long considered their traditional homeland, and the Federal Party (FP), headed by S. J. V. Chelvanayakam, made this its fundamental plank when negotiating with Sinhalese leaders. Indeed, the FP and Chelvanayakam were initially opposed to the country being divided and instead only demanded devolution, since they believed that would allow the Tamils to oversee their own affairs with some self respect and prevent further colonisation of the northeast by Sinhalese settlers10. Sinhalese nationalists, assisted by radical Buddhist monks, campaigned against any form of devolution, claiming that such a change would be the first step towards the island's dismemberment. Indeed, the nationalist forces are assisted by the country's omnipresent Buddhist monks who command veneration and influence among the Sinhalese Buddhists11. Claiming that the island was destined to be a repository for the Buddhist faith, the most radical among these monks have promoted a military solution and long argued that all minorities in the island live under the sufferance of the Sinhalese Buddhists. These purportedly peace-loving monks have volunteered to go house-to-house to promote such an outcome, abused and attacked pro-peace activists, and even claimed that some of them are ready to disrobe to join the army. The radical monks' ferocity even led the state owned Sunday Observer to note that 'it is frightening to observe the insouciance with which the most revered prelates of the Maha Sangha talk of a recourse to arms12.' The monks were at the forefront in forcing S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike and others to abrogate agreements that were reached with the Tamils, agreements that, if implemented, could have ended the Sinhalese-Tamil antipathy that followed the Sinhala only movement. But Sinhalese politicians have long pandered to the monks' every whim and fancy to unleash an invidious charade whereby the monks and the politicians shamelessly manipulate each other to perpetuate their corrupt and divisive designs13. These extremist monks in no way represent all monks in Sri Lanka and they certainly do not represent the views of most Buddhists14, have consequently had a baneful influence on the attempt to seek a solution to the ethnic conflict between the LTTE and the government.

he LTTE now oversees vast areas in the northeast, and the written proposals the organisation made to the previous United National Front (UNF) government in October 2003, if implemented, would enable a de facto statelet. The vast majority of Sri Lankans now agree that the ethnic issue may have been settled if Sinhalese leaders had agreed to the modest demands the FP made in the 1950s and 1960s. Yet many Sinhalese, no doubt influenced by the ethnocentric agitprop of the nationalists, oppose any form of devolution and argue that the LTTE should be militarily defeated. One president even had the chutzpah to argue that what the country faced was not an ethnic problem but a terrorist problem. That the terrorist problem was due to the majority community's chauvinism was conveniently disregarded. The LTTE has publicly stated that it could settle for a federal arrangement, though its demands are more in line with a confederal set up15. Indeed, it is highly questionable if the LTTE is sincere in its claim, though one cannot be fully certain of this until the Sinhalese

parties craft a package that allows the northeast autonomy. The LTTE's practices -i.e., forcibly recruiting child soldiers, unleashing suicide bombers, assassinating its Tamil rivals, and not tolerating a modicum of dissent -- have provided ample fodder for these nationalists to hold strongly to their extremist beliefs. The irony is that while it was the extremist and ethnocentric actions of the radical Sinhalese that legitimated the rise of the LTTE, now it is the LTTE's actions that have provided the extremist Sinhalese with the legitimacy to operate in the most intransigent fashion.

hose against devolution have also opposed the activities of civil society groups, and they pillory the Norwegians who have been facilitating the peace talks between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan state. The nationalists and many Sinhalese consider the Norwegians to be biased in favour of the LTTE, and a member of the SLFP -- before the party, as part of the United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA) coalition, returned to power in April 2004 -- even derogatorily referred to the Norwegian representatives as 'salmon eating busybodies.' Civil society groups are especially lambasted as parasitic organisations that have used the ethnic conflict to pursue agendas inimical to the island's sovereignty and territorial integrity. As the newspaper Island, which toes the nationalist line, argued: 'Now, who constitutes Sri Lanka's civil society? Gullible foreign organisations have fallen into the trap of recognising groups of wishy-washy individuals who have no standing in Sri Lankan society. These groups hobnobbing at embassy functions, milking foreign monetary and travel grants are mostly those who have failed to gain entry to Sri Lankan universities and gone abroad on various scholarships . . . and come back with doctorates in law and other esoteric subjects. Others are those who have been sponsored by anti-national Sri Lankan interests, determined to change the religious and cultural outlook of this country and distort its history16.' Such caustic rhetoric stems from the nationalists; belief that the LTTE is not to be trusted and that the group does not qualify to be regarded as the Tamils' sole representative (a principle LTTE demand). They are most likely right, but two decades of war have proven that there is unlikely to be a military solution to the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict. The only reason successive governments have decided to talk peace with the LTTE is because of the rebels' military prowess. There can consequently be no peace to the island's ethnic imbroglio unless the government talks to the LTTE -- irrespective of whether the rebels at this stage are willing to settle for an arrangement short of eelam (Tamil state) or not. What will mostly help the government's position is a united southern front, whereby parties would come together across the ideological spectrum to form a national government determined to devolve power to the northeast in a fair fashion while maintaining the island's territorial integrity. But rampant ethnic outbidding among Sinhalese politicians has prevented such an association, and that by itself is reason enough for the LTTE to believe it has to keep the military option open.

The India Factor There is no gainsaying that India's preferences will play a big role in how conflict resolution transpires in Sri Lanka. With only 22 miles of the shallow Palk Strait separating Sri Lanka from India, all parties well understand that an outcome undermining Indian interests in the region cannot be implemented17 As president

Chandrika Kumaratunga has noted: 'India is our immediate neighbour, with whom we have been inextricably bound by ties, the origins of which have long been lost in the mist of time. We have with India the broadest and deepest interaction that we as a nation could have with another state. India therefore possesses the capacity, given her vastly disparate strength and influence, to help or hinder (us) to a great extent. In a word the India factor is crucial to the existence of our nation. Forging and sustaining a mutually trusting and supportive friendship with India must therefore be for us, not just a conscious and soundly judged policy . . . [but] a natural and vital ingredient for our national well being18.' Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar has likewise stated that 'there can be no viable solution to our problem without the support of India19.'

n a real sense, the policies pursued during the early years of the J. R. Jayewardene administration (1977-88) and India's angry reaction to these policies is what has convinced Sri Lankan leaders to scrupulously take Indian interests into account. The pro-west, pro-free trade Jayewardene administration disregarded India's strategic concerns and began promoting policies that India felt was inimical to its interests. The more the government's structural adjustment policies became tied to its legitimacy, the more it embraced the west and distanced itself from India. Its antiTamils actions further angered the Tamil Nadu electorate and Indian leaders20. Indira Gandhi and the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) responded by arming and training Tamil rebels. The LTTE ultimately became the most dominant rebel group, and when an Indian Peacekeeping Force (IPKF) deployed in 1987 in the northeast failed to keep the peace, the IPKF ended up fighting the LTTE. What ensued has been branded 'India's Vietnam' and 'India's Afghanistan21.' Fearing that the IPKF may be redeployed if Rajiv Gandhi was to be re-elected, the LTTE used a suicide bomber to assassinate Gandhi in 1991. The IPKF experience and Gandhi's killing have made the Indians cautious -- and some would argue overcautious -- when dealing especially with Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict, so much so that in May 2000 the Indians refused to directly intervene to save nearly 40,000 Sri Lankan soldiers when it seemed like they were on the verge of being captured by the LTTE22. The LTTE's assassination of Rajiv Gandhi and many Sri Lankan leaders using suicide bombers and the forcible recruitment of child soldiers are two reasons a number of states, including the United States, have branded the group a terrorist organisation. Though they initially opposed internationalising the conflict, successive Sri Lankan governments have welcomed the international involvement, as that has further marginalised the LTTE among the international community. Thus the Norwegians, much to the chagrin of Sinhalese nationalists, have operated as facilitators between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE while Japanese and European Union diplomats have also stepped in and conducted discussions between the two antagonists. Throughout, Sri Lankan leaders and their foreign counterparts have kept the Indians fully informed of their dealings with the LTTE. Indeed, Sri Lankan leaders in the past few years have travelled to New Delhi so frequently to genuflect before Indian leaders and, more ignominiously, to bicker about their respective political opponents that they are generally regarded an embarrassment to most

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independent minded Sri Lankans.

oon after the UPFA came to power in April 2004, the new Sri Lankan foreign minister flew to New Delhi and asked the Indians to get more involved in the peace process. With the Indians unwilling to see a separate Tamil state created in Sri Lanka and also vehemently opposed to the LTTE's activities in the region -- especially the group's naval capability that is used to smuggle in arms and its harassment of Indian fishermenSri Lanka's leaders are right to want increased Indian involvement in the peace process. The problem, however, is that the LTTE is unlikely to consider India a dispassionate third party to the conflict given the IPKF-LTTE war and the undiminished Indian antipathy towards the group, the Indian warrant still in place for Vellupillai Prabhakaran's arrest (given his alleged involvement in Rajiv Gandhi's assassination), and the LTTE's continued proscription as a terrorist group in India. The Congress Party, for obvious reasons, has been more anti-LTTE, and it even made clear before the April-May 2004 Indian elections that Prabhakaran's extradition 'remains on the table and there is no question of it being withdrawn23.' The Congress, as a part of coalition, has now regained power in India, and this makes it even more unlikely India would act as a facilitator, although its preferences would continue to be taken into account and its military support for the government against the LTTE could most likely grow. The Sri Lankan government under Sirimavo Bandaranaike (President Kumaratunga's mother) enjoyed exceedingly friendly relations with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, and there is every reason to believe that President Kumaratunga and Sonia Gandhi (representing Congress) would enjoy equally close relations. Indeed, both women have had similar experiences: belonging to political dynasties, raising two children as single mothers after their spouses were assassinated by extremists24, and replacing their husbands to head political parties. Both also aspire to see their children succeed them at the helm of their respective parties. Moreover, Kumaratunga escaped an assassination attempt by the LTTE, while Sonia (Gandhi)'s husband was killed by the LTTE, and this should intensify the empathy they are bound to have for each other. It is hard to predict how Dr Manmohan Singh, Sonia Gandhi and the Congress Party will deal with the LTTE. On the one hand, the parties Congress allied with in Tamil Nadu for the 2004 elections either sympathise with the LTTE (i.e., Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, DMK) or openly support it (i.e, Pattali Makkal Katchi and Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam), which suggests that Congress may not pursue too drastic a policy against the LTTE. On the other hand, it is also clear that as long as Sonia Gandhi and her children play a leading role in the Congress Party a separate Tamil state in Sri Lanka, even if attained militarily, would never be condoned by the Indians, which is to say that it will also not be recognised internationally.

ome claim that the main reason India opposes an independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka is because that would radicalise separatist elements in Tamil Nadu. This is a dubious argument, given the extent to which India has succeeded in making South Indians think of themselves as Indian -- something the Sri Lankan state has failed to do with its northern Tamils -- and given the impotence of these supposedly separatist

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elements in South India. This line of reasoning is also questionable given that the LTTE craves closer relations with India and would rather support Indian interests than be subjected to the ethnocentric dictates of predominantly Sinhalese governments. An independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka will no doubt embolden separatists in Kashmir and insurgents in India's northeast. Indeed, separatist elements throughout the world would likely wonder why they should not succeed in their quests for independence if the LTTE was able to carve out a separate state in a small island like Sri Lanka. However, separatist groups rarely achieve success25, which does not bode well for the LTTE's quest to create eelam (an independent Tamil state). Consequently, the LTTE may ultimately have to jettison the struggle for eelam and instead settle for a more devolved structure, albeit one with more autonomy for Tamils than India and Sri Lanka prefer. This, too, would depend on intra-Sinhalese politics and India's involvement in the island.

Conclusion In the mid-1950s opportunistic and unprincipled Sinhalese leaders began sowing the seeds of ethnocentrism to capture power, and in doing so the island reaped an ethnic conflict. The subsequent civil war has caused untold misery to tens of thousands of innocent civilians and exacerbated the regional security dynamic in South Asia, even as it has allowed the countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s elites to continue to practice ethnic outbidding. Like a repetitive nightmare, Sri Lanka's politicians in the opposition keep coming up with reasons to disagree with the respective government's policies to bridge the ethnic divide, even when the policies advocated are the same as those the opposition may have propounded when in power. Thus, the United National Front, which was relegated to the opposition after the April 2, 2004 parliamentary elections, has threatened to oppose the UPFA's attempts to continue the peace process with the LTTE, claiming that the UPFA criticised the UNF's approach to peace when it was in the opposition but has now embraced the same positions merely because it wants to ensure a parliamentary majority26 and receive the billions of dollars pledged by international donors to the peace process27. Such political opportunism is the LTTE's best ally, and the resulting outbidding is also the LTTE's best argument as to why the Tamils cannot trust Sinhalese elites and therefore qualify to create eelam. (Neil DeVotta is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Hartwick College, New York) End Notes 1. Ceylon State Council, Debates, 25 May 1944, pp. 810-11. 2. 'Parity Means Disaster to SinhaleseSWRD', Ceylon Daily News, 24 November, 1955, p. 7. 3. 'Sinhalese Only -- 'If the UNP Gets 68 Seats or Less', Ceylon Daily News, 15 March, 1956, p. 5. 4. See Neil DeVotta, 'Control Democracy, Institutional Decay, and the Quest for Eelam: Explaining Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka,' Pacific Affairs, vol. 73, no. 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 55-76. Also see A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism: Its Origins and Development in the Nineteenth and Twentieth

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Centuries (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2000). 5. Patricia Hyndman, Sri Lanka: Serendipity Under Siege (Nottingham, UK: Spokesman, 1988). 6. Nigel Harris, National Liberation (London, I. B. Tauris, 1990), p. 221. 7. Quoted in 'Massacre a Conspiracy by LTTE: Chandrika', The Hindu, Nov. 1, 2000 at wysiwyg://36/http://www.the-hindu.com/holnus/03011801/htm. (accessed Nov. 2, 2000). 8. Quoted in 'Our Approach for a Better Tomorrow Free from Terrorism', Daily News, July 25, 2002 at http://www.dailynews.lk/2002/07/25/fea01.html. (accessed July 25, 2002). 9. This was (made) especially clear by how Chandrika Kumaratunga and her allies vilified the UNP led United National Front coalition for negotiating with the LTTE in a way that supposedly compromised Sri Lanka's sovereignty, even though the president and her United People's Freedom Alliance government that came to power in April 2004 have sought to continue the peace process in the exact same manner. 10. A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, S. J. V. Chelvanayakam and the Crisis of Sri Lankan Tamil Nationalism, 1947-1977 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000). 11. While about ten per cent of the Sinhalese population is Christian, Sinhalese Buddhists and Christians coalesced in the mid 1950s to clamour for a Sinhalaonly policy to be instituted. However, the nationalists' recent violent actions against Christian evangelicals, who are said to be 'unethically converting' Buddhists, has caused tension between Buddhist and Christian Sinhalese. 12. See 'The Maha Sangha and the Nation', The Sunday Observer, March 19, 2000, at http://www.sundayobserver.lk/2000/03/19. (accessed on March 20, 2000). 13. See H. L. Seneviratne, The Work of Kings: the New Buddhism in Sri Lanka (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999); Stanley J. Tambiah, Buddhism Betrayed? Religion, Politics, and Violence in Sri Lanka (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). 14. See Seneviratne, The Work of Kings; Chandra R. de Silva, 'The Plurality of Buddhist Fundamentalism: An Inquiry into Views among Buddhist Monks in Sri Lanka', in Tessa J. Bartholomeusz and Chandra R. de Silva (eds.), Buddhist Fundamentalism and Minority Identities in Sri Lanka, (Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1998), pp. 53-73. 15. See Neil DeVotta, 'Sri Lanka in 2003: Seeking to Consolidate Peace', Asian Survey, vol. XLIV, no. 1 (January/February 2004), pp. 49-55. 16. 'The Peace Brokers are Back', Island, May 9, 2004, at Island http://www.island.lk/2004/05/10/editoria.html. (accessed May 9, 2004). 17. P. V. J. Jayasekera (ed.), Security Dilemma of a Small State: Sri Lanka in the South Asian Context, vol. 1 (New Delhi: South Asian Publishers Pvt. Ltd, 1992). 18. Quoted in K. Godage, 'India and Our Peace Process,' Island, May 9, 2004, at http://www.island.lk/2004/05/09/politi03.html. (accessed May 9, 2004). 19. Quoted in 'Both Major Parties Corrupt,' Island, May 15, 2005, at http://www.island.lk/2004/05/15/news04.html. (accessed May 15, 2004). 20. See Neil DeVotta, 'Sri Lanka's Structural Adjustment Program and its Impact on Indo-Lanka Relations,' Asian Survey, vol. 38, no. 5, May 1998, pp. 457-73. 21. Stephen P. Cohen, India: Emerging Power (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), p. 149.

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22. For details see Neil DeVotta, 'Is India Over-extended? When Domestic Disorder Precludes Regional Intervention,' Contemporary South Asia, vol. 12, no. 3, September 2003, pp. 365-380. 23. As reported in Daily Mirror, 'Kadir Sees no Policy Shift by India,' May 15, 2004, at http://www.dailymirror.lk/2004/05/15/front/2.asp. (accessed May 15, 2004). Indeed, the Indians have even advertised in Sri Lanka's press seeking information on Prabhakaran's whereabouts. However, many close to the LTTE make clear that Prabhakaran has no intention of spending a single day in an Indian or Sri Lankan jail, and a LTTE representative is reported to have sarcastically said that those who want to extradite Prabhakaran should go to the Wanni (the jungle area the LTTE controls) and try to apprehend him. 24. As already noted, an LTTE suicide bomber assassinated Rajiv Gandhi, while Kumaratunga's husband was said to have been killed by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (People's Liberation FrontJVP) in February 1988. Since allying with the JVP to create the UPFA, Kumaratunga has conveniently sought to implicate the UNP in the assassination. 25. Donald L. Horowitz, 'The Cracked Foundations of the Right to Secede,' Journal of Democracy, vol. 14, no. 2, April 2003, pp. 5-17. 26. Neither coalition was able to garner sufficient seats to ensure a majority in parliament. The main parties are thus heavily dependent on minority parties, including the Tamil National Alliance, which now operates as the LTTE's proxy. 27. 'UNF Rejects UPFA Peace Talks as Sham,' Daily Mirror, May 14, 2004, at http://www.dailmirror.lk/2004/05/14/front/2.asp. (accessed May 15, 2004).

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Curriculum in India and Pakistan Dr Rubina Saigol This paper is a shorter version of 'Enemies Within and Enemies Without' which appeared as 'History, Social Studies, Civics and the Creation of Enemies' in a book edited by Akbar Zaidi, Social Sciences in the 1990s, (Islamabad: COSS, 2003). The section on India is based on a paper called 'Between the Sacred and Secular: Educational Debates in India and Pakistanâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;.

Knowledge Systems in Post-colonial Societies Post-colonial societies and states tend to be caught in the tension between preservation and change. On the one hand, there is an ideological imperative to transmit the inherited culture and traditions to future generations as a way of maintaining continuity with the past. The urge to preserve a sense of collective identity in the face of change underpins a large segment of the social knowledge provided to children. On the other hand, most post-colonial states are under pressure to become modern, democratic and secular. The need to 'catch up' with the world and a fast-changing, globalised world, comes into conflict with the simultaneous desire to preserve the past along with a sense of difference as national identity. The tension between preservation and change is most clearly reflected in educational discourse, theories, institutions and practices in the developing world. Usually, early educational experiences from the primary to the secondary levels are reserved essentially for preservation and continuity. In the initial stages of education, children are socialised into the dominant ideologies, values, beliefs, culture and practices of a society. Higher education is expected to provide the intellectual and ideological basis of change, innovation, novelty and development. New ideas and views of the world are considered the preserve of post-graduate studies.

ithin educational theory and practice, social knowledge, in the form of social studies at the elementary levels and social sciences at the higher levels, is relied upon to provide cultural and social knowledge, values, beliefs and ideologies. The subjects of history, geography and civics, lumped together as social studies, are deeply implicated in the production of national identity. History produces the past and constructs national memory as the basis of national identity. It thus refers to the dimension of time in the creation of a collective sense of Self. Geography provides a sense of physical space and territory to the notion of identity. It tells us where we are located in relation to others with whom we share some characteristics and differ in others. Civics constructs the modern citizen for the nation-state by defining the relation of the citizen with the state. Civics refers to the dimension of political power

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and offers the future to the modern citizen1. Collective national identity, a requirement of modern nation-states in post-colonial societies, is thus created at the nexus of time, space and power.

he process of so-called 'nation-building' in post-colonial societies entailed the homogenisation of diverse social and cultural entities. Regional, parochial and provincial consciousness had to be rejected or denied in favour of national consciousness. While social knowledge, applied selectively and inconsistently, offered citizenship and national identity, the hard sciences offered the future to the newly constructed states and citizens. Apart from the imperative of national cohesion, the ideologies of modernisation and development were offered as the future to the new and homogenised citizenry. Science, technology and technical education were heralded as the motors of economic development and progress. Although not entirely devoid of ideology, science and technology, and in particular technical education, gained prominence and respect in the project of nation-building across the whole spectrum of developing societies. However, it is social knowledge that lends itself more easily to the production and manipulation of ideologies, values, beliefs and practices as it refers to collective human interactions, which are far more complex and infinitely less exact, predictable, verifiable, replicable and quantifiable as compared with inanimate matter with which the hard sciences work. The social sciences have, therefore, been the major instruments deployed in the production and reproduction of hegemony. They are at the center of social conflicts and the expression of cultural power by competing groups and classes in society. Whose knowledge will ultimately become the dominant knowledge and be disseminated through the major ideological state apparatus of education, is a matter of which group or class is powerful in the perennial conflicts that characterise societies. Social knowledge is not neutral, impartial or objective as it is the expression of human labour, performed in the context of conflict between competing interests in society. For example, what may be true for a landlord may not be true for the peasant, what may be true for a Punjabi may not be true for a Baluch, what may be true for a Muslim may not be so for a Christian and what might be true for men may not be equally true for women. Truth is contested, contradictory and conflicted as different interests project their own truth on to the social realm. Social knowledge is always contested, forever arbitrary and permanently open to change. Depending on which group is socially and politically hegemonic, social knowledge accordingly changes. This process is evident in both India and Pakistan, where changes in political alignments and power have led to changes in the dominant knowledge designed to construct specific national narratives as the basis of specific identities.

The Case of India In India the process of the communalisation of social studies textbooks is intertwined with political conflicts. The Indian National Congress, the party that led India to independence, propagated secularism as its defining ideology. In Indian textbooks of the earlier era, secular values are upheld while communalism is denigrated as a policy initiated by the British as a part of the doctrine of divide and rule. For example, a

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history textbook produced by the National Council for Educational Research and Training (NCERT) in 1989 warns children of Class VIII against communalism: â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Formation of political organisations on the basis of religion is an unhealthy thing in the political life of a people. Such organisations are harmful because they create the belief that the interests of one or the other community are distinct and separate from those of the rest. This belief prevents people from realising that the interests of one community cannot be promoted unless the interests of the entire nation are promoted. The organisations promoting these beliefs are called communal organisations. They, directly or indirectly, create and promote hatred against other communities and thus stand in the way of national unity. People belonging to a nation may profess different faiths, but they enjoy equal rights. One s religion is a matter of each citizen s personal belief and this belief should not be mixed up with political activities, because political activities of the citizen s of a nation relate to common problems of all the people constituting a nationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;2.

ost of the earlier history textbooks written by renowned historians such as Romila Thapar and Bipen Chandra carry an anti-communal message and criticise not only the Muslim League, but also the Hindu Mahasabha for their communal leanings. History was taught in India in terms of a secular versus communal debate3. However, with the rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the ascendancy of the right-wing Hindutva rhetoric of the Rashtriya Swaymisevak Sangh (RSS), there was a distinct and clear move by the government to create a Hindu India in opposition to Muslim Pakistan. The RSS is an alternative site of the production of historical knowledge laced with a right wing nationalist and religious ideology. As the ideological mentor of the ruling BJP, the RSS supplies the 'history' that is permeating the knowledge system of the erstwhile secular State. A steady communalisation of education was attempted in a series of moves by the Human Development Resource Ministry, run by the former minister, Murli Manohar Joshi since 1998.

he Sangh Parivar (a combination of right-wing organisations that propagate Hindutva ideology including the BJP, Vishwa Hindu Parishad and RSS) relied upon history to redraw the ideological map of the nation and state. This was done at many levels including changes in the institutions engaged in the production of historical knowledge, changes in textbooks, and significantly by taking refuge in the socially acceptable idea of values education. The prime institutions for the production and dissemination of historical and social knowledge in India include the Indian Council for Historical Research (ICHR), the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI), the Indian Council for Social Science Research (ICSSR) and the Indian Institute of Advanced Studies (IIAS). The vacant posts in these institutions were filled with dubious names of people with known Hindutva sympathies rather than outstanding accomplishments in historical or social research4. The University Grants Commission (UGC) had similarly been filled with Hindutva sympathisers. This infiltration by the right wing Hindu nationalists was designed to ensure long-term continuity and

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relative permanence of these changes. In the past, the research positions in these prestigious institutions were filled by world-renowned and highly respected scholars and historians. The move to change this allowed the Hindu nationalists to get a firm grip on the institutional sites of the production of historical knowledge, and by extension, over the process and content of the knowledge construction. Apart from these changes, the National Council for Educational Research and Training (NCERT), the prime institution of the production of textbooks, was filled by people belonging to the right wing nationalist camp. The BJP and its ideological partners thus ensured control over the institutions of production as well as distribution of the new knowledge of the Indian past. The latter move would ensure that the new version of the past constructed by the Hindutva camp would enter the massive state schooling system, which has a wide outreach.

he former government, with Joshi at the helm of educational planning, aimed to homogenise the sites of knowledge production and dissemination by ignoring the diversity and multiplicity of India's culture, politics, class, religious, regional and gender interests. For example, the Goa School Education Advisory Board, which has deep rooted saffron leanings and links with the Hindutva supporter, Chief Minister Manohar Parrikar, made the controversial decision to hand over 51 government primary schools in rural Goa to the RSS Vidhya Bharati Educational Trust. About 30 per cent of Goa's population is Christian and parents feel that this move provides the RSS a backdoor entry into primary education. The schools have been allocated to local bodies, which act as fronts for the RSS. The parents complain that Parrikar and his appointees to the Board are trying to 'inculcate fascist ideology under the guise of protecting Marathi'5. Knowledge forms existing on the periphery of Indian society, and outside the state system, are slowly but surely making inroads into the mainstream knowledge economy of the country. The multiple sites of the production of knowledge about the state and nation has been homogenised and the space for an alternative discourse narrowed.

n the year 2000, the NCERT produced the highly controversial National Curriculum Framework for School Education (NCF), which radically redefined the educational agenda of the State. The BJP set about changing national curricula in favour of the newly-constructed vision of a Hindu Rashtra. Since Article 28 of the Indian Constitution disallows the teaching of religion in institutions receiving state funds, recourse was taken to value education. In the name of teaching 'indigenous' and 'Indian' values to students, religious knowledge was inserted into the curriculum. It was claimed that education was being Indianised, spiritualised and nationalised in order to provide children with a set of values governing existence. According to the authors, 'the education system of the country has to be built on the firm ground of its own philosophical, cultural and sociological tradition and must respond to its needs and aspirations. Indigenousness of the curriculum, therefore, is being strongly recommended'6. The National Curriculum Framework for School Education sees religion as a major source of values. Lamenting the decline of values and growing cynicism in society, the

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authors underscore the importance of value education by differentiating between teaching religion and teaching about religion7. Although this seems to be a valid distinction since teaching about religions is a part of history and sociology, nevertheless in the context of the contemporary Saffron agenda, the dominant religion of the majority is likely to become the source of values for everyone. This in effect would mean that non-Hindu citizens would be subjected to the values and beliefs of the Hindutva versions of Hinduism. Additionally, teaching about religion necessarily includes the bad parts and the oppression that can result in the name of religion. As early as November 1998, the BJP government in Uttar Pradesh, led by Kalyan Singh decreed that Vanday Mataram and Saraswati Vandana (song of the Hindu goddess of learning) would be sung in government funded schools before beginning classes. This idea resulted in vigorous protests and was finally abandoned, and no specifically Hindu rituals were allowed in the UP state schools. It is hard to believe that the BJP government was not aware of the communal implications of such measures, given that there were widespread protests against the Wardha (Vidya Mandir) scheme, a basic education program in pre-partition India, which also introduced similar rituals.

he NCF was adopted without consulting the Central Advisory Board of Education (CABE), a body comprising 104 members including experts and Union ministers. The standard practice in the past has been to consult the ministers of states since education in India is a concurrent subject. The vast diversity of cultures demands an input into national educational goals and practices. According to several academics and activists, the process of consultation was shrouded in mystery and secrecy.8 Mere circulation of the text was declared to be consultation by the NCERT. Through a pretense of consultation, the Saffron agenda of the then political dispensation could be declared to have been widely approved by academics and educationists. As a result of the lack of consultation, several states refused to bow down before the central government's ideological onslaught. In August 2001 the governments of nine states (Delhi, West Bengal, Bihar, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Nagaland, Karnataka, Pondicherry, and Chhattisgarh) signed a statement rejecting the National Curriculum Framework, arguing that it was a 'blueprint for lowering the quality of school educationâ&#x20AC;Ś and giving it a narrow exclusivist, sectarian and obscurantist orientationâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;9.

imultaneously, a rewriting of history textbooks began with selective deletions, excisions and additions aimed at constructing 'facts' and 'truths' that conjure up a pure, glorious and great Hindu nation, and repressing knowledge, facts and ideas that do not fit into the re-imagining of the nation as Hindu. One of the first tasks of cultural nationalism is to invoke the idea of cultural superiority of the race. The claim to superiority relies on the notion of time, and if a civilisation can stake a claim to antiquity, it can base its claim for moral and cultural superiority on the basis of being older and more ancient. This was done by claiming that the Harappan civilisation was the same as the Vedic age, and that ancient Hindus were Aryans, and the latter an indigenous people of the land. There is a rejection of the notion that the Aryans were invaders who subjugated the Dravidians and tribals, the indigenous inhabitants of India. The idea that the Aryans were a superior race was appropriated by Hindu nationalists by arguing that the Saraswati-Sindhu civilisation was Vedic civilisation.

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The following are excerpts from the High School Itihaas Bhaag: ‘With the finds of bones of horses; their toys and yajna alters; scholars are beginning to believe that the people of Harappa and Vedic Civilisation were the same’10. ‘Aryan culture is the nucleus of Indian culture, and the Aryans were an indigenous race…the Aryans who were the builders of Bharatiya Sanskriti in Bharat and creators of the Vedas; this view is gaining strength among the scholars in the country that India itself was the original home of the Aryans’11.

odern digital technology was deployed in the service of Hindutva ideology. According to Muralidharan, one of the new nominees to the Indian Council of Historical Research, N.S. Rajaram, an engineer from Bangalore, created the presence of a horse in the Harappan civilisation. The mythical unicorn on Harappan seals was digitally changed to look like a horse in order to prove that horses, usually associated with the Aryans, were indigenous to Vedic India12. Muralidharan further reveals that D.P. Sharma, Keeper in the National Museum, was grieved over the excision of certain sections of his book on Harappa, done with the intent to conform to Human Resource Development ministry's ideological slant. Deliberate and forced efforts were made to read the Harappan script from left to right to force fit it with the subsequently evolved Sanskrit script. This was a part of the effort to draw a direct line of descent between Harappan and Vedic civilisations akin to Rajaram's effort to engineer a horse image on a Harappan seal. The scholarly consensus on the script was that it was read right to left, but this was overlooked in the effort to weld the two civilisations into a unified whole13.

he Saraswati-Sindhu civilisation, that is, the Vedic Age in Hindutva discourse, was the Golden Age of Hindu culture. It was superior to all other cultures and civilisations which learned everything from it. India, according to the new history, was the oldest and greatest civilisation and the most ancient country in the world14. The first man on Earth was an Indian and the credit for lighting the lamp of culture in China goes to ancient Indians who were also the first to settle in Iran. Homer's Iliad was inspired by the Ramayan and the languages of native Americans, say the Hindutva historians, were derived from Indian languages. Jesus Christ himself roamed the Himalayas in search of Hindu wisdom from which he derived his ideas. The origin of Christianity is thus traced to ancient Hinduism. Textbooks filled with such 'facts' appear to conform to the objectives of the National Curriculum Framework according to which 'the school curriculum must inculcate and nurture a sense of pride in being an Indian through a conscious understanding of the growth of Indian civilisation and also contributions of India to the world civilisation and vice versa in thoughts and deeds'15. Knowledge is stored in language whether written, visual or tactile. One of the ways to glorify an assumed golden and pristine past is to reclaim and preserve the language representing such a past. The National Curriculum Framework privileges the study of Sanskrit as the repository of a uniquely Hindu tradition and culture. According to the NCF, Sanskrit has a claim on the national system of education because it has been in

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India for thousands of years and 'is still inextricably linked with the life, rituals, ceremonies and festivals of vast Indian masses'16. However, the insidious way in which this was done led some university teachers to question the hiring of new Sanskrit teachers in the presence of the existing departments of Sanskrit at the Universities17. It was suspected that the University Grants Commission was hiring teachers of Hindutva persuasion in the guise of teaching Sanskrit. Reacting to an advertisement in August 2001 for hiring Sanskrit teachers without a transparent process, Uma Chakravarti and Kumkum Roy expressed the fear that teachers would be recruited from RSS cadres in the name of language teaching.

lthough the study of ancient languages in which classical religious texts are represented, is by itself an innocent and even worthy endeavour, the accelerated Saffron agenda renders the whole enterprise suspicious. J. Sri Raman rightly argues that despite the fact that Sanskrit has come to symbolise a particular view of India's past and is juxtaposed to Urdu in a move mirroring Hindu nationalism with Muslim nationalism, its study should not be questioned simply because it has become part of a nefarious political agenda18. This is akin to the argument that it is not the rewriting of history that is by itself a problem. Nevertheless, it cannot be completely ruled out that the study of Sanskrit is likely to favour the privileged castes over the Shudras and Dalits who generally have less access to higher status knowledge. Rather, the real issue refers to the compulsions under which the rewriting is done. The issue really is: who is rewriting history, for whom and with what end in view? It is the politics of knowledge production and distribution that constitute the crux of the issue. Nonetheless, the renewed vigour with which Sanskrit is resurrected makes it one of the components of the Hinduisation and Saffronisation of education. In order to construct the new 'reality' as essentially Hindu, mythology and history are collapsed into one and Ram and Krishna are transformed from mythical to historical figures. As historical 'realities', they have birthplaces and there are 'real' dates and 'facts' that prove their existence. According to one version of 'mythistory', Ram was born nine hundred thousand years ago. The RSS and VHP claim that 174000 Hindus were killed during the demolition of the Ram temple, and subsequently in 77 battles 350000 Hindus were killed. Patwardhan rightly argues that numbers tend to give a feeling of exactness and precision and therefore truth to the narratives19. In giving exact dates and providing exact numbers, a kind of positivist notion of 'truth' is created and the narrative, thus scientised, seems to reflect reality rather than myth.

s a way to underline the fact that ancient Indian civilisation was highly advanced, it is claimed that the classic Vedic texts had foreseen the development of the binary system, which underlies computers. Books published by RSS claim that Indians discovered America because there are images of Indian art in the Aztec temples, that the theory of Pythagoras finds mention in ancient Indian texts, that houses covered with cow dung can withstand atomic radiation and that the concept of binary numbers used by computers existed in the Hindu scriptures because the binary format is either 1 or 0 and the Upanishads say that all creation is a combination of existence (1) or non-existence (0)20. Ideology is so enmeshed and tangled with 'facts'

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and numbers and 'proofs' that it is hard for students to challenge the positivist spin on religious belief. The latter tendency was illustrated by an incident involving 500 Vedic Pundits practicing Transcendental Meditation (TM) in Vedic City, Jefferson County. The Pundits, who have been brought to Jefferson County from India by the Maharishi University of Management, argued in response to a controversy about the use of tax funds for non-secular purposes, and the consequent undermining of Church-State separation, that TM is different from religion, and is a practice based on â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;scientifically researched and verified methodsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; to create peace21. In this rhetoric, scientific methodology, with its credibility and respect, becomes the vehicle for the transmission of barely disguised, religiously laced knowledge.

he intermingling of mythology, belief, fact and history is also discernible from the introduction of the dubious notions of Vedic Mathematics and Vedic Astrology at the school and university levels respectively. The National Curriculum Framework refers to Vedic Mathematics and Astrology, Ayurveda and Yoga as 'living phenomena relevant to the general life needs of the people of India' and to the global attention now accorded this knowledge!22 Superstition and obscurantism are here defined as the general life needs of the people of India, possibly because the government finds itself unable to provide basic rights such as food, clothing and shelter to its povertystricken people. Filling their minds with Astrology and Karmakanda become substitutes for filling their bellies, when the state is unwilling to deliver real needs. Respected Indian mathematicians argue that Vedic Mathematics is not mathematics, but simply a series of tricks to perform computations quickly and easily, a skill more relevant to recreation than serious study, and not required in the age of computers23. A series of Hindu rituals, mythology, beliefs and practices, not necessarily always derived from reliable sources, are being promoted in the name of value education and spirituality. The politics of knowledge do not reside merely in its construction and distribution, but also in the silences, gaps, elisions and absences. What is not said goes as much into the making of knowledge, as what is said. The silences are felt by their very absence. The repressed knowledge periodically rears its head and irrepressible truth tends often to break into consciousness. It requires that much more expenditure of energy to be suppressed and subjugated again and again. The repressed consists of precisely that which does not fit into the hegemonic construction of the pure, singular, unified nation. It is not compatible with what is fabricated, and therefore sits uncomfortably on the landscape of social and cultural consciousness, like an outsider who also belongs to the self.

n Hindutva versions of the story of the nation, some facts are written out as much as others are forcibly written in. One of the most glaring examples of this kind of omission is the assassination of Mahatama Gandhi by Nathuram Godse, an RSS worker, and the fact that the RSS was banned for a few years following the murder of Gandhi. In a new textbook on contemporary India for Class XI, produced under the guidance of Joshi's Ministry, the assassination of Gandhi has been omitted. The reason given is that there is a need to lessen the burden on children and the history

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curriculum needs to be curtailed in order to meet space constraints. It was claimed that the font size did not allow this piece of information to fit into the textbook. However, as Amulya Ganguli rightly remarks, if the assassin had been a Muslim instead of a member of the Saffron brigade, no amount of space constraint or font size would have deterred the authors from expounding at length upon the incident24. The fact that Gandhi was murdered by a man who shared the worldview of Hindutva, is incompatible with the idea of a great Hindu nation, as conceived by the new alignment of political and social forces. The Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) issued a directive that there should be no discussion on the deleted portions of the textbooks25. The silencing is not merely metaphorical, but is executed by direct command.

he construction of a pristine and golden period of Hinduism requires the suppression of knowledge that fractures the narrative of pure nationhood. In a Brahmanical world, ancient India, which is considered Hindu India, cannot be allowed to eat beef. Passages in textbooks that referred to beef eating in ancient India have been deleted to purify the picture of the pure nation, uncontaminated by beefgorging Muslims. Scholarly works on the subject have been suppressed and Professor's D.N. Jha's book on beef eating in ancient India was banned. The Sangh Parivar has tried to establish that only the lower castes ate beef thereby rendering them impure and outside the pale of authentic nationhood. The reason given for this deletion was that the idea of beef eating among In his view, this idea homogenises the community overriding the differences that necessarily characterise all communities, and fixes the community within a singular religious identity. Communities have other identities that compete with the religious one and not all the members are necessarily offended. Rather, it is the upper caste politically motivated leaders who take umbrage. Furthermore, he argues that just because someone's sentiments may be injured, does not mean that sentiments are immune to rational judgment, evaluation and change. However, Rajeev Bhargava challenges the idea that knowledge should be subject to a community's sentiments26.

nother thing that does not fit into the re-imagined Hindu Rashtra is the presence of religious minorities. India is a multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and multi-religious society. However, the homogenisation of the state and citizen as Hindu makes it difficult to incorporate religiously different citizens into the reformulated nation. These outsiders within have to be exterminated physically or obliterated from the pages of history, as well as from the ideological landscape. If they are acknowledged at all it is as foreigners and invaders who do not belong, or as Golwalkar suggested, they must live in subordination to the real citizens who are Hindus. The new textbooks present Muslims only as conquerors and invaders, their other roles as traders, travellers and saints being written out of Hindutva versions of history. Presenting them as conquerors and marauders incites the sentiments of hate and revenge that are required for actions such as razing of the Babri Masjid and the Gujarat massacre of 2002. The following are some examples of how the 'others' of the Brahmin Hindu nation are constructed in books produced by the Sangh Parivar and used in the parallel education system run by right wing Hindu organisations:

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‘Our land has always been seen with greedy eyes by the marauders, barbarous invaders and oppressive rulers. This story of invasion and resistance is our 3000 year long Gaurav Gatha’ (GG). ‘for our ancestors these marauders were like mosquitoes and flies who were crushed’ (p. 8 GG). ‘The preaching of ahimsa had weakened North India. Lakhs of foreigners came during these thousands of years…but they all suffered humiliating defeat….There were some whom we digested…when we were disunited, we failed to recognise who were our own and who were foreigners, then we were not able to digest them’. (Itihaas Ga Ra Hai, Class V, Shishu Mandir Schools) ‘Islam spread in India solely by way of the sword. The Muslims came to India ‘with the sword in one hand and the Qoran in the other’ ‘Numberless Hindus were forcibly converted to Islam on the point of the sword. This struggle for freedom became a religious war, Numerous sacrifices were made in the name of religion. We went on winning one battle after another. We did not let the foreign rulers settle down to rule, but we were not able to reconvert the separated brothers to Hinduism’. (Itithaas Ga Raha Hai) ‘Arabs (barbarians) came to convert people to their religion. Wherever they went, they had a sword in their hand. Their army went like a storm in all the four directions. Any country that came in their way was destroyed, Houses of prayers and universities were destroyed. Libraries were burnt.. religious books were destroyed. Mothers and sisters were humiliated. Mercy and justice were unknown to them’. (GGp.s.52-53) ‘Qutb Minar was constructed by Samundragupta, and its original name was Vushnu Sthambha ( p. 73, GG). It has also been argued that the Taj Mahal was originally built by Hindus and was called Tejomahale27’. ‘The 'foreign' ruler Muhammad bin Tughlak transferred his capital from Delhi to Deogiri in South India out of fear of the Hindu kings (p. 73, GG )’. ‘Due to the circumstances, it ( Islam ) gradually assumed the form of a military religion (sainik dharma) and with the force of arms, with a lightening speed it advanced and became an international religion.( p. 184, High School Itihaas Bhaag, HSIB 1)’ ‘Child marriage, jauhar, sati, purdah, jadu-tona and superstition were all due to the fear of the Muslims (p.,. 284 HSIB 1)’ ‘The Babri Mosque was constructed after destroying a temple, which in turn stood on the exact spot where Rama was born (HSIB 2, p. 146.)’ ‘Destruction of temples and schools attached to them and the building of mosques in their place was a general policy with Aurangzeb .(HSIB 2 p. 120)’ This kind of knowledge, designed to create hatred and violence against religious and national others, was extensively used in the Vidya Bharati Educational Trust schools,

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the Shishu Mandirs that were allowed to flourish alongside the State system. The RSS, and its ideological organ Vidya Bharati Trust, run 30,000 schools, which provided education to 1.2 million students and employed some 40,000 teachers around the country. The Vidya Bharati ran 1300 schools in the tribal areas in 1998. Several writers have commented upon the staunchly communal nature of the education and its capacity to incite violence and hatred against other communities.28 The Akhand Bharat imagery conjured up by the RSS appears in a Vidya Bharati textbook in the form of a map of India which includes not only Pakistan and Bangladesh, but the entire region of Bhutan, Nepal, Tibet and even parts of Myanmar (punnya bhoomi Bharat).

uring the BJP tenure, there were attempts to reconstitute state education along similar lines. Krishna Kumar of Delhi university argues that there is a need to ask why the secular nationalist elite allowed the communalist schools run by RSS's Vidya Bharati organisation.29 Even during the ostensibly secular rule of the Indian National Congress, the ideas of Hindu supremacy and the Hindu claim that they were the only authentic inhabitants of the land and thus the natural inheritors of the State, were being disseminated through alternative systems in society. With Murli Manohar Joshi and the HRD Ministry, such ideas found favour with the State. The entire Medieval period, referred to by James Mill as the Muslim period, is considered a Dark Age as opposed to the Golden Age of ancient Hindu India. Whereas each age has a mixture of all the colours of the rainbow, and neither age was a homogenous and uninterrupted tale of wonder or horror, the colonial periodisation of history by Mill provides a convenient time canvas on which to paint pictures of Hindu glory or Muslim tyranny. Notwithstanding the fact that the Medieval period was not a singularly Muslim period, and there were parts of India that were not under Muslim rule at one time or another, the entire period is presented as one monotonous tale of foreign conquest and untold misery of the Hindus who resisted the invasions and forced conversions. Muslim contributions to Indian architecture, such as the Qutb Minar and Taj Mahal, are either appropriated as Hindu monuments in the new concept of the nation, or are declared to have been built upon demolished Hindu temples. In the latter case, they have to be destroyed as in the case of the Babri Masjid.

n the discourse of religico-cultural nationalism, India is a palimpsest where mosques have been written over temples. These now are to be erased so that the original canvas can be revealed as being a pristine Hindu landscape. The repressions and absences in the stories include the fact that on many occasions the Hindu soldiers in armies led by Muslims also participated in the carnage. Hindu Rajas also destroyed temples for the enormous wealth that they boasted.30 The rich and royal of each religious community plundered the wealth and tyrannised the poor.31 No religious community is innocent of such acts and every religious community, at one time or another, became a victim of the loot and plunder of the rulers of its own or rival community. Such contradictions are typically absent in textbooks that tell a straightforward 'moral' fairy tale, which usually has the 'good people' and the 'bad people' and

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the former ultimately triumph. Blurred categories and contradictions are usually considered too complex for children to understand, although this is pedagogically incorrect. 32

hile the Muslims are thus treated to severe castigation for the morally reprehensible acts of their forefathers, Christians fare no better. According to John Dayal, there are a total of 268 words at the close of the Class IX textbook on Christianity.33 Will the children know, asks Dayal, that Christianity came to India from the first to the fourth century AD? He writes that even the RSS Supremo Kuphahalli Sudershan praised the Indian roots of Syrian Christians when he needed to draw them into a dialogue. In the short space given to Christianity there is nothing about the Bible, the New Testament or the Disciples, the Beatitudes or a parable of the Good Samaritan. Similarly, there is nothing about Peter or Paul or about Sir Thomas Roe's visit to India. Buddhism and Jainism are presented as mere derivates of Hinduism rather than as major challenges to Brahmanical domination. Hinduism itself is presented as monolithic and unchanging for six millennia. Dayal concludes that the Class XI book is highly bigoted, dishonest, anti-Islamic, anti-Catholic and antiChristian. Vasco da Gama is accused of a conspiracy to Catholocise the world. Presenting the religious 'others' of the Hindus in sketchy bits and pieces of information, and these too in a negative light, serves only the function of an exclusionary Hindu State, not an understanding of the forces and dynamics of history. In order to prevent an alternative viewpoint from finding its way into the collective storehouse of knowledge, in February 2000 the ICHR withdrew two volumes of 'Towards Freedom' by K.N. Panikkar and Sumit Sarkar at an advanced stage of publication. This move was designed to ensure that readers are not exposed to alternative views of history in which the 'other' may not be demonised. When worldrenowned historian, Romila Thapar was appointed to the prestigious Kluge Chair by the Library of Congress, the Hindutva bandwagon unleashed a vicious campaign against her appointment. Hate mail against Thapar was spread on the Internet and letters were sent to the Librarian arguing that Thapar was not fit to present ancient India as she did not know or understand ancient Indian history, and was a Marxist/communist. The latter labels were clearly meant to discourage an openly capitalist America by instilling the fear that they were hiring someone from the 'enemy camp'. The Hindutva Brigade uses all means available to ensure that other versions of history, not based on hatred of the 'other' fail to find their way into collective national memory.

he Indian Supreme Court, whose duty it is to uphold the secular principles underlying the Constitution, first gave a stay on the use of the new NCERT textbooks and, in the fall of 2002, gave a judgment which allowed the use of the communalised textbooks on the pretext that teaching religion is different from teaching about religion. In a scathing critique of the Supreme Court's decision, Praful Bidwai commented that the Supreme court has allowed itself to be seen as partisan ideologically towards those who drew up the NCF, and that this is a cruel blow to citizens fighting for secularism, especially when the judgment came barely six months

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after the Gujarat Pogrom and BJP's campaigns against India s minorities consisting of 180 million people.34 The judgment dealt a blow to the knowledge system based on a secular struggle for independence. The Sangh Parivar's communal knowledge system was here to stay.

he Sangh Parivar's agenda as regards knowledge about women is evident from a move during the BJP government to redefine Women's Studies as a discipline. The University Grants Commission took the decision to reorganise and rename the twenty or so Women's Studies Centres across India as 'Women and Family Studies Centres'.35 This action relocates women back in the family as the primary and sole site of activity. As a discipline, Women's Studies has made strident efforts to insert women into the knowledge system by ending their absence from history and social analysis. The family is only one site where women are located, the others being politics, the economy and society in general. To redefine women primarily and solely in terms of their familial and reproductive functions, is to deny the reality of their contributions to agriculture, industry and every imaginable field of human endeavour. The denial of women's economic and political contributions leads to the denial of their rights as citizens. However, an economically and politically active woman aware of her rights, does not fit into the Hindutva definition of womanhood that goes into reonceptualising the nation. The nation, in right wing nationalist ideology, is defined by pure motherhood engaged in reproducing a nation of warrior sons. The control over the knowledge apparatus capable of providing a different view of women's multiple roles in society, is a way to silence alternative meanings of social roles from emerging. The Vaishyas, the Shudras and the assortment of untouchables, unseeables, and unhearables such as the Dalits, women, children, the elderly, the handicapped, the minorities and the poor are all kept out of the picture of mainstream, upper caste Hindu construction of the nation.36

The Case of Pakistan The processes of national integration and economic modernisation are evident in educational discourse in Pakistan almost from the beginning. The most articulate expression of the two urgent imperatives of the State appears in the detailed and comprehensive Sharif Report on education, prepared one year after the first Martial Law was proclaimed by Ayub Khan.37 Pakistan was only twelve years old and its five distinct entities, that is, Bengal, Punjab, Sindh, NWFP and Baluchistan had not developed a common national consciousness. Education was called upon to perform the function of homogenisation by welding the diverse cultures into a monolithic nation-state. The following passage from the Sharif Report reflects the urgent imperatives of the new state: â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;The disruptive forces of communalism, regionalism, and provincialism came to the fore in the subcontinentâ&#x20AC;Śprogress and patriotism reflect, to a large degree, basic attitudes and values. â&#x20AC;Ś In a situation where the overriding objective is that of nation building, and where there exist these centrifugal forces of regionalism, indiscipline,

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and non-cooperation, the immense tasks to be accomplished can only be carried out when a strong and responsible leadership emerges. Such leadership must come from the highest levels and it must be strong enough to overcome these forces and by its public behaviour change the attitudes behind them.’38

egionalism and provincialism disrupt the national narrative and rupture the smooth surface of 'national consciousness'. They are decried as impediments to progress as the sense of connection with ethnic or provincial identity interrupts and punctures the tale of two nations, a narrative preferred by the centralising rulers of the country. Centralisation and homogenisation were to be achieved by invoking religious nationalism as a binding force overcoming all differences of language or ethnicity. Ayub stated in 1962 that ‘Pakistan came into being on the basis of an ideology which does not believe in differences of colour, race or language. It is immaterial whether you are a Bengali or a Sindhi, a Balochi or a Pathan or a Punjabi we are all knit together by the bond of Islam.’39 Immense reliance was placed on the educational system to produce and distribute 'national integration' and 'national cohesion' while discouraging narrower subnational and sub-state identities. The other hegemonic ideology of the time revolved around notions of economic development, progress, science, technology and technical education. In 1959, Ayub Khan remarked: ‘When Europe was entering the age of industrialisation, we were still clinging desperately to outmoded and antiquated techniques of production and our growth in scientific and technological fields became sterile and static…The problems faced by our country in this nuclear age demand that we make rapid progress in science and technology not only to make this country a prosperous and happy place to live in, but also to safeguard our liberty and our very existence as a self-respecting nation. The country needs scientists and technicians by the thousands to accomplish these national requirements. It is unfortunate that our present system of education is not completely suited to produce the kind of technical human material, which is needed to achieve our objectives. It was to meet these and other inadequacies that we have set up the Education Commission to review and recommend a system of education which, among other things, would help in overcoming these major handicaps in our continued under-development….we should also try very fast and very hard to build up a tradition of scientific and empirical inquiry.’40

n accordance with the dominant ideology of economic progress and development, a large number of technical institutes, for example the Habib, Dawood and Government Polytechnic Institute, were set up to produce skilled technical labour to man industry which was being encouraged by the State through massive tax holidays and incentives to a nascent bourgeoisie.41 The social sciences were being called upon to produce the hard working, upright, patriotic, modern and industrious citizen, free of narrow ethnic loyalties and tied to the overarching State identity, and the technical disciplines and sciences were expected to produce the scientific manpower for

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progress and development. The policy prescriptions of the time found expression in curricular and textual practices of the time.

n examination of a sample of textbooks of the 1950s and early 1960s reveals that nationalism was conceived in futuristic and modernist terms. Nationalism in the early period after independence did not necessarily rely on the construction of internal and external enemies and others. The enemies of the nation rather seemed to be ignorance, backwardness, parochialism, corruption, black-marketing, superstition and lack of industry. These ills are frequently referred to as being the main enemies of national integration and development.42 At the time a great deal of emphasis seemed to be on internationalism rather than nationalism, and on becoming a part of the comity of nations. For example, the Sharif Report stated that â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;But narrow nationalism in the modern world is not enough; and if we gave the child only this, we would be doing him a disservice. Nations are a part of one another, and none stands alone. Pakistan is in a particular position of having cultural, historical and spiritual ties with the Middle East, Europe and North America. This rich heritage is itself a national asset and provides an ideal starting point for teaching international understanding and a realisation of our membership in a comity of nations.â&#x20AC;&#x2122;43 Ayub Khan himself echoed similar sentiments when he remarked that 'when nationalism, in its extreme form, takes charge, human reasoning gets second place'.44 This forward-looking, future-oriented and progressive nationalism did not require enemies on every border to invoke a sense of patriotism, or create fear in order to enhance militarisation in the name of defence. In the textbooks of the 1950s and 1960s, the figures of Buddha, Ram, Jesus Christ and Moses appear in very positive terms. Generous praise is lavished upon them as those who taught people to love and live in peace and sacrificed for the good of the people. A young nation retained its connections with the past and with other religious groups, as it did not feel tremendously threatened and insecure. The heady excitement of independence was still fresh and the young country looked forward to becoming a modern nation.

eginning with the 1965 war with India, but especially after the 1971 break up of Pakistan, educational discourse on nation building became much more inward looking, defensive and backward looking. The results of the 1965 war were ambiguous, and although there was a great deal of shallow patriotism, the 'national psyche' was not deeply wounded. However, 1971 sundered apart a fragile nation. Long-accepted notions of common identities were shattered, and national myths were blown apart in a violently bloody redrawing of emotional, physical and ideological maps. The shock and horror of the defeat in East Pakistan, led to the reconstruction of ideological boundaries in a much more narrow and exclusivist form. A violent, militaristic and negative nationalism, which saw enemies on every border, was reconstituted. This nationalism was not so much for progress or development as much as against Pakistan's myriad enemies lurking behind every door. he new nationalism required a re-ordering of the past. Those unacceptable to the newly formed insecure national self had to be violently expunged. The pages of

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time had to be cleansed of the enemy's presence. Ram, Buddha, Jesus Christ, Gandhi and several others, who had earlier been allowed in with a generous hospitality, had to make unceremonious exits from the pages of history textbooks. In their stead, the Khulfa-e-Rashideen, belonging to Arabia and to an 'other' and alternative past, were welcomed warmly into the texts. After the humiliating defeat of the Pakistan army in East Pakistan, the image of the military had to be re-made. In the era of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto then, the army marched triumphantly into the heart of social studies textbooks. The glorious victories of the brave Pakistan army find a generous allotment of pages in the textbooks produced in the early and mid 1970s.45 For example, the social studies textbook published in 1975 for Class V, describes the battles of Chamb, Jorian and Sialkot as monuments to the greatness of the Pakistan army.46 Throughout the section on the military, Hindu cowardice, sneaky ways and timidity are contrasted with the memorable courage of Pakistani soldiers. In the textbook for Class VIII, also produced in 1975, a whole section is devoted to 'The Achievements of the Pakistan Army' and 'Merits of the Pakistan Army'.47 The Civics textbook for Class VI of the same year makes connections of Hindus with darkness, timidity and night by describing the 1965 war as a result of attack by Hindus in 'the darkness of the night'.48 The pages of the textbooks of the time are smattered with pictures of guns, tanks, battles, warplanes, famous martyrs and soldiers. The nation now had to be purged of evil outsiders and ready to be militarised to the core. Its refashioning was done, ever more urgently, in the light of religion.

n the era of General Zia, religion as an instrument of homogenisation and control, became center-stage in educational policies. Religious nationalism of the twonation variety was resurrected with a vengeance. Islamisation became the cornerstone of General Zia's social policies until the day of his flight into oblivion. For him it was not enough that the Objectives Resolution of 1949 had already communalised the constitution. The whole nation and society had to be communalised and sectarianised as a form of maintaining military control over all civil and social institutions. General Zia's educational policy of 1979 states that: â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;The highest priority would be given to the revision of the curricula with a view to reorganising the entire content around Islamic thought and giving education an ideological orientation so that Islamic ideology permeates the thinking of the younger generation and helps them with the necessary conviction and ability to refashion society according to Islamic tenets.â&#x20AC;&#x2122;49 Almost all the official sites of the production of knowledge, were put to the task of reimaging an Islamic nation in an exclusionary exercise, which involved the diminution of the citizenship of non-Muslim and female citizens of Pakistan. A spate of discriminatory laws, derived from a narrow and communal version of history, were drawn up to erase the ungodly secular influences of the social policies of Ayub Khan and Zulfiqar Bhutto periods. Realising the power of education to manipulate the mind, General Zia quickly seized upon it to re-make the nation in a sectarian image.

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As expected, it was the subject of history that was subjected to the maximum deletion and addition in the process of forging a Sunni Muslim Pakistan50. For example, the following example from a textbook of Pakistan Studies produced in 1986, shows the levels of historical distortion: ‘During the 12th Century the shape of Pakistan was more or less the same as it is today...Under the Khiljis, Pakistan moved further south-ward to include a greater part of Central India and the Deccan...In retrospect it may be said that during the 16th century 'Hindustan' disappeared and was completely absorbed in ‘Pakistan’.51

n this total collapse of the identities of Muslim and Pakistan, the latter is said to exist when it was not yet imagined as an idea. It is as though Pakistan was always there in India's womb just waiting to be born, which it ultimately did with the help of a much awaited mid-wife, the Muslim League! Pakistan is projected back into history to lay claim to antiquity and authenticity since its founding myth, the two-nation theory, was seriously challenged with the formation of Bangladesh. However, science was not spared the axe of Islamisation. Debased science and degenerate religion came together in an official conference called during the Zia period in which papers on the following topics were read: the harnessing of Djinns to create an alternative energy source, chemical compositions of Djinns, measuring the temperature of Hell, calculating the formula for sawab (blessing), measuring the Angle of God, speed of Heaven and so on52. During two stints of Benazir Bhutto there were short policy statements but no major educational policy was formulated. In 1998, during the time of Nawaz Sharif, an educational policy based largely on a mixture of the policies of Ayub Khan and General Zia, appeared. This policy was such a mixture of contradictory ideas and values that its implementation was difficult, if not impossible. However, its thrust can be gauged from the following statement: ‘Educational policy and particularly its ideological aspect enjoys the most vital place in the socio-economic milieu and moral framework of a country…We are not a country founded on its territorial, linguistic, ethnic or racial identity. The only justification for our existence is our total commitment to Islam as our identity. Although the previous educational policies did dilate on Islamic education and Pakistan Ideology but those policies did not suggest how to translate the Islamic Ideology into our moral profile and the educational system53.’ As a protégé of General Zia, Nawaz Sharif attempted to carry on the (un)holy mission of his mentor. However, the emphasis on a homogenised polity, along with a tendency to discourage narrow and ethnic identities, echoes the imperatives of the era of Ayub Khan. The more the project of national integration and nation building failed, the more ardently was religion invoked as a unifying force. The State's main imperatives of control and domination through centralisation did not change, despite changes in governments and regimes. As a result, there does not appear to be a major shift in curricular and textual practices from the period of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to the

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time of General Pervez Musharraf. The anti-India, anti-Hindu refrain continues and the curriculum and textbooks produced in 2002, three years after General Musharraf came to power, seem to reflect the priorities set in motion after the Fall of Dacca in 1971. An inward-looking, regressive, defensive and insecure nationalism still seems to underpin social knowledge, while the earlier version of an outward and forwardlooking, progressive nationalism seems to have faded away completely.

he Sunni, Muslim Pakistani Self seems to have an array of enemies and 'others' lurking on the borders and ever ready to destroy us. The many and varied others provide the Pakistani sense of nationhood with a rich and diverse source of the construction of the Self. National memory in Pakistan is constructed by reference to a range of enemies who are inimical in varying degrees and myriad ways. The national narrative is crafted through a series of exclusions and inclusions, a process that educationists call 'framing'. Certain facts, ideas and values are framed in and others framed out to create a palatable picture of history. The main others of Pakistani identity that enable it to define itself in Otherness, include the Hindus, Christians, Sikhs, Jews and various internal Others who comprise the ethnic and religious minorities that are the enemy within54. Textbook historians treat each of these 'enemies' differently but reserve the most severe treatment for Hindus, who are sometimes expanded as a category to include all Indians, and at other times, the religious identification is sufficient so that Indian Muslims can be excluded from the harsh upbraiding that Hindus receive.

ach religious other of Pakistani Muslims is reduced to a singular dimension. All complexities, contradictions, differences within the out group are erased so that each group appears as a homogenised whole. The Hindus appear in textbooks primarily as inherently evil, wicked, perfidious, cruel and conniving. Terms such as 'Machiavellian' are generously bestowed upon them. Additionally, they are regarded as permanent, eternal, continuous enemies who were always inimical to Muslims and will forever be so. The two nation theory requires them to be a permanently inimical other. What is excluded is any mention of the large number of Hindus who were sympathetic to Muslims and helped them during the partition riots and supported their causes. Since their only dimension is Hindu-ness and students are not told anything more about them, except negative things such their caste system, they become caricatures. The vast diversity in India among and between Hindus belonging to different geographical regions is not mentioned, so that they are not represented as real people with all the human wants, miseries, sufferings, desires, motivations and needs. A great deal of animosity against all Hindus is created and all aggression and hatred is attributed to them. For example, a textbook on social studies produced for Class VIII in 2002 says: â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;During the Khilafat Movement the Hindus and Muslims were completely united and like brothers and they started to co-operate and live in peaceful togetherness. But as soon as this movement ended, Hindu hatred of the Muslims re-emerged55.

he sudden and unexpected re-emergence of Hindu hatred is not explained, and comes to seem like a natural characteristic of Hindus. Since there are no

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historical details which would explain why differences emerge, and no dynamics or causes provided, the tendency to hate Muslims seems like a defining feature of Hinduism, and a feeling shared by all Hindus. Yet, it seems like a projection of one's own feelings on to the other. Hate is evident from the following description of an aggressive Muslims assault on Hindu religious space, which appears in the social studies textbook for Class VI produced in 2002: I’n the middle of the city of Dabel there was a Hindu temple. There was a flag hoisted on top of it. The Hindus believed that as long as the flag kept flying, nobody could harm them. Mohd. Bin Qasim found out about this belief. The Muslims began to catapult stones at the temple and at the flag, ultimately making it fall to the ground. The whole city became tumultuous and the Hindus lost heart. Some Muslims clambered up the walls of the temple and forced open the door. Qasim's army entered the city and after conquering it, announced peace. The Muslims treated the vanquished so well that many Hindus converted to Islam’ 56. This description of breaking down the barriers of the sacred space of the 'other' and making a forcible entry to take over is typical of several other depictions that appeared in the textbooks of the era of General Zia. A very similar account of the forced and violent entry of Mahmud of Ghazni into a Hindu temple, along with the defeated and begging postures of Hindus, appears in a Class V textbook produced in 198757. In an inconsistent moral stance, the aggression and violence by Muslims is justified and warlike values are glorified, while hatred and aggression in the Other are condemned. As if to provide physical evidence for the two nation theory, the sacred and profane space and architecture of the two communities is contrasted in terms that associate Hindu architecture with darkness, narrowness and crookedness, while depicting Muslim architecture as full of light, openness and transparency. This is how the Class VI textbook describes 'Muslim Contributions to the Architecture of the SubContinent': ‘The Muslims made valuable contributions to the architecture of the subcontinent. Prior to the advent of the Muslims, the people of the subcontinent resided in narrow, congested and dark houses. The architecture of the Hindus exhibited narrowness, labyrinthine complications, layer upon layer of complexity and conical shaped structures. The architectural refinement of the Muslims exhibited openness, vast spaces and external glory. They built open, airy and grand structures’58.

he association of narrowness, congestion and darkness, which in the earlier discourse was associated with Hindu sacred space, is now transferred to the Hindu home. The image of 'labyrinthine complications, layer upon layer of complexity' seems designed to suggest that the Hindus were somehow 'not straight and simple' and that there were deeper, darker layers in their psyche that suggest 'something crooked' or 'mysterious'. This description fits in with the notion that Hindus are devious. The Muslim contribution is defined as 'architectural refinement' exhibiting openness (read honesty), vast spaces and external glory (read imperial domination). The word 'open' is used again in the last sentence to underscore the idea

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that Muslims are somehow more honest and transparent than the more 'opaque' Hindus. Since the discourse is written within the two-nation differentiation, the Hindus represent all that is denied and repressed within the Muslim Self. In a number of subtle, and not so subtle ways, negative images of Hindus pervade textbooks written for history, civics, geography and Pakistan Studies. They do not convey any real information about the Hindus to children, as there are no details about their histories, cultures, dresses, foods and customs. The young reader gets the picture of a monolithic group of people who want to harm the Self and against whom one must be ready with all one's defenses.

he Christians are the second most frequently derided group in mainstream state knowledge systems. In references to imperialism and domination, they are referred to in secular terms as 'the British', but in the Class VII textbook, which focuses on the Crusades, they are referred to by their religious identity. When their cheating and trickery are to be highlighted, they are simply referred to as 'the English'. The Class VII book is designed to convey geographical notions to children. Since the days of General Zia, the Class VI social studies textbook creates a fictional entity called 'The Muslim World' by referring to 'Seas of the Muslim World', 'Mountains of the Muslim World', 'Rivers of the Muslim World' and so on59. The Ummah is imagined as a community that not only shares a religion but physical and geographical boundaries, notwithstanding the fact that physical features do not follow ideology. A child of about twelve can easily be misled into thinking that a single place called 'the Muslim World' exists somewhere on the globe. She/he has no way of knowing that this is an ideological construction. The Ummah is pitted against Christianity as its Other. The Christians as Europeans, as the British, as the English and only occasionally as the Americans, appear as cheats, liars, tricksters, crafty, wily, conniving and forever hatching conspiracies. For example, the Class VII social studies textbook of 2002 says: 'Some of the Christian pilgrims to Jerusalem fabricated many false stories of suffering. If they were robbed on the way, they said it were the Muslims who robbed themâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;60. They succeed in their conspiracies only through deceit and betrayal, for example the defeat of Siraj-ud-Daula in Bengal and of Tipu Sultan in Mysore occurs purely through English deception and duplicity. Once again, the Christians are a homogenous group with no internal differences and are one-dimensional. And again no historical details are provided to make them real people and the child is left wondering about causes and dynamics. For example, the child learns nothing about the development of maritime power, the discovery of gunpowder, the development of capitalism with its tendency to seek markets and raw materials, as possible causes of the conflict. All history is a tale of good versus evil, bad people against good people, a fairy tale form of telling the national story. The same is true of Sikhs about whom no information is provided. Children are not told who they were, what they believed in and why there was conflict between them and Muslims. The Sikhs appear primarily as knife-wielding and murderous butchers. Two occasions are usually reserved for their appearance on the stage of textbook history. Once when Ranjit Singh took over the Punjab, the Sikhs are shown killing and murdering Muslims and destroying their property. The second is during partition

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when kirpan-wielding murderous hordes invaded Muslim caravans as they departed to their new homeland. The Sikhs are hardly mentioned at any other time so that one does not discover anything about them. Once they have done their 'historical task' of murdering, looting, plundering and killing, they disappear into the mists of history. The Jews are predictably reduced to their prototype -- Shylock. They are nothing but greedy usurers who enriched themselves by impoverishing Muslims. The children are not provided with much history about Muslim-Jewish relations. There are no possibilities in this discourse of good-hearted and mild-mannered Sikhs or magnanimous Jews as each category is only a stereotype, not real people acting and behaving in a real world with all its complexity. Most significantly, children are not taught any differentiation between Jews, Zionists and Israelis. As a result, they cannot possibly conceptualise a non-Zionist Jew, or a Jewish person who might be sympathetic to the plight of the Palestinians. In reality, there are many, but they do not figure in the reductive discourse of social studies.

he focus so far has been on the varied and multiple external 'others' of the Muslim Pakistani self. However, the self is not an unbroken whole. It is a partitioned and fractured self which is ruptured from within by internal 'enemies' residing in its core. The national narrative is interrupted at many points by 'others' residing within its territory and pushing at its seemingly inviolate boundaries. The stranger in the house comprises the religious, parochial, provincial and regional minorities who have never been fully included into the shifting self. At times, these dangerously close 'others' have been rudely catapulted out of the definition of the national Muslim self, for example, when the Qadianis were declared non-Muslims in 1974. At other times, these parts of the self have violently ruptured through the layers of repression built around them and broken away, as the East Pakistanis did in 1971. A nation defined as Muslim has never been at ease with the non-Muslims residing within its territorial boundaries, as their loyalties are forever suspect. While the national self may be engaged in a perpetual war of self-definition in relation to the many inimical and hostile external 'others', it is also at war with itself. Its boundaries, both ideological and physical, keep shifting in renewed efforts to define and re-define itself. Pakistan perhaps has the unique distinction of being the only country from which the majority seceded in 1971 and formed a separate homeland.

he violent tearing apart of East Pakistanis is the most traumatic event in Pakistan's history. The nation as a whole has not yet fully come to terms with the break the second partition in less than a quarter of a century. Another partition dripping with blood and gore, the formation of Bangladesh is a painful memory of dismemberment. The latter word, used frequently to describe the rupture of the Eastern wing, suggests torn limbs, a painful tearing apart of the body. There is intense moral ambivalence among Pakistanis regarding the events of 1971. When the quarrel is with a Hindu, Christian or Jewish 'other', religious justifications are easily invoked in support of the besieged self. When the quarrel is with fellow Muslims, not only does the story of the two nations become transparently fictional, the religious basis of holy war cannot be invoked. Bangladesh becomes a gaping hole in national memory. The only way to speak about it is through silence. This 'other' is a part of

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the self, is not really an other. It is not really the self. The only way to define it is to not define it. A self so constrained and confined within a religious self-definition, has no language with which to speak of other definitions based on language or ethnicity. They can only be erased from consciousness.

his is precisely what the textbooks do they erase Bangladesh by not telling the tale. There are many ways of not telling. One of these is to tell a different story, to speak half the truth. The story of Bangladesh is silenced between half truths, and full lies. If ever speech is used to create silences, it happens in the case of Bangladesh. One liners and short phrases on Bangladesh at the end of chapters cover up oceans of unspoken horrors. The idea that language is the 'cloak of thought' used more to conceal and mask than to reveal, was never truer than in the case of the genocide of 1971. The compulsion to not remember requires the expenditure of energy on the different story. Here is how the untold story of Bangladesh appears in the Civics textbook for Class IX and X produced in 2001: â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Certain political elements began to propagate that nation depends on language and ethnicity instead of religion. This led to an increase in provincial prejudices. Shaikh Mujib-ur-Rehman took full advantage and started telling the people that the people of West Pakistan were exploiting them. He had the support of India and other enemies of Pakistan to break Pakistan up into pieces. He started to sow hatred into the hearts of the Bengalis. The Bengalis were influenced by this propaganda and as a result the Awami League won the election overwhelmingly. Mujib started to propagate a confederation and said that East Pakistanis can only develop under his 6 point formula. This was an evil design dressed in the garb of provincial autonomy. The Awami Leaguers and the so-called Mukti Bahini began the mass murder of nonBengalis. They destroyed public property. In this storm of murder and looting, nobody's life and property was safe. At every step the law of the land was violated. Bangladeshi flags were flown all over the land. Finally in order to overcome this revolt, the Pakistan army was given authority. India started to pass statements to incite the Bengalis against the Pakistan army. India convinced them that the Pakistani army is inflicting cruelty upon them. Finally Mujib-ur-Rehman was arrested and India, which was fully part of the conspiracy by Mujib, made a great noise over this arrest. India used the insurgents and miscreants and started a poisonous campaign against Pakistan all over the world. When India saw that it is achieving its nefarious designs, it attacked Pakistan. The Pakistan army fought with full courage for the sake of the pure land, they sacrificed their lives. If they had been allowed to go on fighting, the enemy would never have succeeded, but because of incompetent leadership in Pakistan, they had to surrender. So, finally East Pakistan became separate from Pakistan due to treason of Awami League, and Indian aggression. The whole Pakistani nation was tormented and writhing in the pain of this deep wound61. The entire episode of the formation of Bangladesh is relegated to the dark and insidious realms of conspiracy. The Bengalis 'stabbed us in the back' by joining hands with India. They committed the murder of non-Bengalis, they looted and they destroyed property. The Bengalis started the violence and were responsible, along

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with conniving and scheming India, for the deeply wounding break of Pakistan in 1971. There is a great deal of silencing in this story. Why were the Bengalis so easily misled and convinced by India's propaganda? Why did they start killing nonBengalis? Why did they believe that the Pakistan army was committing atrocities upon them? None of these questions are answered. The brevity and compression used here to describe events that have a long history and background in Pakistani politics and economics, forestalls any critical thinking about what parted us. What is absent here is also the role of the Pakistani military, which receives plaudits for its exploits but no disapprobation or condemnation of its notorious acts.

he Pakistan Studies Textbook for Classes IX and X, produced in March 2002 virtually repeats the same account in about two or three sentences. According to this textbook, after the elections of 1970 the country was plunged into crisis and East Pakistan separated. This was a national tragedy. At another point in the same textbook, one more sentence is devoted to this 'national tragedy' along the lines that in 1971, when the East Pakistani government was in political turmoil, India used the opportunity and attacked us as a result of which East Pakistan broke away and became a separate country62. Why was the East Pakistani government in turmoil? We are not told. Why was the country plunged into a crisis after the elections of 1970? No answer. Students who may wonder about such questions would have to look elsewhere for analysis, interpretation and history. In telling half the story, the textbook historians fail to mention that the Awami League of East Pakistan had won the 1970 election overwhelmingly but the elite establishment of West Pakistan refused to transfer power to a duly elected party. This failure was at the center of the crisis of 1971. The myth of the moral and upright self would fall apart if the real story were to be told instead of half truths and full lies. The fiction of oneness, implied in the story of the two irreconcilable nations, would also fall apart the Muslims of India were not one or united even among themselves. They were instead divided by ethnic, class, sectarian and language barriers. This is the unsavoury truth that cannot be allowed to escape through cracks in the dominant construction of Pakistani memory and national identity. Bangladesh defied the two nation theory and gave the lie to it.

he other within is far more threatening than those outside as it ruptures the core of the self. This is the reason that every educational policy from the Report of the Commission on National Education, 195963 to the National Education Policy of 199864, emphasises the need for national integration and cohesion and calls upon education to undermine parochial and provincial sentiments. This is also the reason that in the construction of citizenship in Pakistan, the Civics textbook for Classes IX and X produced in 2001 divides citizenship along religious lines by outlining differing rights and duties of Muslim and non-Muslim citizens. It is only in the duties of non-Muslim citizens that loyalty and allegiance to the country are included65. In a nation defined by religion, the loyalty and allegiance of non-Muslims remains suspect.

Conclusion The production and distribution of knowledge in both India and Pakistan is deeply interwoven with the politics of power. Whether it is a military dictator seeking to

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legitimise illegal rule by recourse to a religious ideology, or an elected party seeking votes by invoking a pernicious form of religious nationalism, educational systems in India and Pakistan have been deployed in the service of creating hegemony and legitimising the dominant ideologies of particular ruling classes and their governments. Changes in curricula and textbooks have been undertaken both in the name of preservation of culture, religion and nation, as well in the name of progress, development and change. The ideas of preserving a so-called 'glorious heritage' or 'golden age' can be as dangerous as the idea of becoming the strongest, most powerful and nuclearised nation in the world. References to both the past and the future can be used to create the hegemony of a particular class or group that is ascendant. In this process state as well as non-state actors, have played a significant role. The non-state educational systems of religious outfits such as Dawa wal Irshad in Pakistan and the RSS schools in India have attempted to make inroads into the mainstream state systems of education. The result has been the dissemination of ideologies of hate, otherness and difference, leading to violence against those perceived as enemies of the nation. National narratives in both countries have been constructed against 'others' allegedly threatening the core values of the Self. Monolithic constructions of both the self and other in a series of binary oppositions in which the self is good, moral, upright, strong and valiant, and the other represents evil, weakness, trickery, moral depravity and timidity, are produced in discourses of social knowledge. The rival tales spun by the ideologues of Hindutva and so-called Islamisation, lead to alienation, distance, divisiveness and ultimately a violent form of hatred which may manifest itself in pogroms like the one in Gujarat in 2002 or a holocaust such as the one in East Pakistan in 1971. Given the above scenario, certain recommendations may be tentatively offered: 1.

5. 6.

Education needs to be de-linked from the agenda of nation-building, state formation or the construction of nationalism. It is not the aim or goal of education to create and disseminate specific ideologies. The philosophical and moral foundations of education need to be re-invoked and education needs to be strongly anchored in moral philosophy without becoming the handmaiden of one specific ideology. The main aim of education should be the intellectual and cognitive development of the child which, in effect, means the development of the capacity to think critically, to analyse, to compare and contrast, to evaluate, to judge and to synthesise. As in the hard sciences, children in the social sciences should also learn to ask the questions: why and how and who and what. How did it happen? Why did it happen? Who was responsible for it? Was it right or wrong? Who was affected? In what ways? What possibly could/should have been done and so on. Instead of bombarding children with a vast array of unrelated 'facts' and bits of information, the reasons, causes and dynamics of all phenomena should be provided. Children should be provided with alternative views and perspectives on any issue to create the idea that there any one single truth but versions of it. The specific methods of every subject should be provided. For example,

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historians have specific methods and means whereby they arrive at their conclusions such as the examination of archives, historical documents, reading of monuments, scripts and art and architecture of a time period. Children should be taught the methods of arriving at the truth in any subject rather than being provided with a pre-given package of already-constructed truths. 7. Curriculum can be subverted in pedagogy. Teaching methods should be such that alternative and multiple visions of reality become possible. Children should be allowed to contest the teacher and the textbook based on their everyday lived realities. Popular folklore and everyday street knowledge can contribute greatly to understanding. Rote learning and regurgitation in examinations should be banned. 8. Examinations, externally controlled and conducted, should be abolished as they allow the state to control the content that will be internalised. In their stead, continuous evaluation of ongoing assignments and projects by those who teach should be the basis of evaluation. 9. Textbooks should be written and vetted by subject specialists and educationists of differing hues and perspectives. 10. Children of India and Pakistan should be given chances to interact face to face with one another in order to overcome stereotypes engendered in the family and on popular media. They should also exchange all kinds of information with one another. 11. Local histories can be used to contest the official and state version of history written under communal, sectarian or nationalist interests. Local histories and their interrelation with regional and national ones should be taught. 12. As a provincial subject, the Centre should not be allowed to interfere too much in education so that diverse histories, geographies and politics can emerge. These recommendations may not revolutionise education, but they can be a start in the right direction. (Dr Rubina Saigol is a leading sociologist and educationist from Pakistan) End Notes 1.

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

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Renowned Indian educationist Krishna Kumar argues that as a commercial enterprise in India became a colonial state, the colonial order used education as one of the ways of creating a civil society among the natives. See Krishna Kumar, Political Agenda of Education: A Study of Colonialist and Nationalist Ideas, (New Delhi: Sage, 1991), pp. 2430. Kumar has argued that the subject of civics played a central role in transforming colonial subjects into modern citizens of the state and in constructing a civil sphere. Modern India, A History Textbook for Class VIII, NCERT, May 1989, pp. 194-195. Krishna Kumar, Prejudice and Pride: School Histories of the Freedom Struggle in India and Pakistan, (New Delhi: Viking) Sukumar Muralidharan, 'The History Project', Frontline, vol.19, issue 05, March 2-15, 2002. Devika Sequeira, Deccan Herald, June 11, 2001; Goa Newsletter, Goa DESC Resource Center. National Curriculum Framework for School Education, National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT), 2000. p. vii. Ibid, p. 19.

9. 10. 11. 12.

13.

14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

23. 24. 25. 26.

27. 28.

29. 30.

Praful Bidwai, 'The Right to Secular Education', The Hindustan Times, September 20, 2002; see Anita Joshua, 'NCERT Curriculum: row over consultation', The Hindu, April 12, 2002; also see R. Champakalakshmi, 'Rewriting History', The Hindu, March 25-26, 2002. Cited in Aminah Muhammad-Arif, 'History rewriting in India and Pakistan: Textbooks, nationalism and citizenship', 2003. Unpublished document, p. 18. High School Itihaas Bhaag, p. 43. Quoted in Teesta Setalvad, 'In the Name of History: Examples from Hindutva-inspired school textbooks in India'. Ibid, p. 48. Sukumar Muralidharan, 'The History Project', Frontline, vol.19, issue 05, March 2-15, 2002. Also see 'Horseplay in Harappa', Frontline, cover story, October 13, 2000. Sukumar Muralidharan, 'The History Project', Frontline, vol.19, issue 05, March 2-15, 2002. According to historian, Irfan Habib, 'The imaginary claims of Sangh Parivar historians about the Aryan civilisation and that Homo Sapiens originated in the upper reaches of the Saraswati river, brings them close to the Nazi ethnocentric ideology'. Paper presented at the SAHMAT conference on the communalisation of Education, New Delhi, August 2001. National Curriculum Framework for School Education, p. 12. Ibid, p. 53. R.R. Punyani, Tuesday, August 14, 2001, from umc@bom3.vsnl.net.in. The UGC ran the advertisement for the hiring of Sanskrit teachers in August 2001. J. Sri Raman, 'HUM HINDUSTANI: Of Sense and Sanskrit', The Daily Times, October 30, 2003. Amrita Patwardhan, 'Teaching Hatred? History Textbooks and Communalism in India and Pakistan', December 2002; IDCE Clark University, p. 18. Amulya Ganguli, 'Blowing up the past', Editorial, The Hindustan Times, November 17, 2002. Erik Gable, 'Vedic City officials meet with supervisors', The Fairfield Ledger, November 3, 2003. National Curriculum Framework for School Education, p. 54. S.G. Dani, 'Unscientific Maths', from R.R. Punyani, Online Edition of India's National Newspaper, August 14, 2001. According to Professor Dani, Vedic maths is being practiced based on a book of Swami Sri Bharati Krishna Tirthaji, who passed away in 1960. He was Shankaracharya at Puri from 1925. Vedic civilisation is at least 2500 years old and the contents of the book do not belong there. Neither Tirthaji nor have the protĂŠgĂŠs, says Professor Dani, provided any evidence or clue in this respect that a rational mind can appreciate. Amulya Ganguli, 'Muting History', Editorial, The Hindustan Times, April 28, 2003. R. Champakalakshmi, 'Rewriting History', The Hindu, March 25-26, 2002. Rajeev Bhargava, 'History and Community Sentiment', Opinion, Online Edition of India's National Newspaper, January 2, 2002. R. Champakalakshmi, 'Rewriting History', The Hindu, March 25-26, 2002. Also see, 'Domain name Hindutva', Indian Express, August 6, 2003. According to this article, 'the Taj Mahal, which no serious historian doubts was built at the orders of Shah Jahan (reigned 1628-58), is transformed into a Hindu monument by the name of Tejomahalay, as though its history as one of the finest examples of Mughal architecture was wholly inconsequential, a malicious invention of Muslim-loving Hindus'. Nalini Taneja, 'The Saffron Agenda in Education: An Expose', Akhbar, Delhi. Also see, BJP's Assault on Education and Educational Institutions, www.indowindow.com/sad/. Krishna Kumar, 'Education and Culture: India's Quest for a Secular Policy', Paper presented at a workshop on education organised by the Centre for Modern Oriental Studies, Berlin, May 2002. Asghar Ali Engineer, 'Medieval History and Hurt Psyche', Secular Perspective, April 16-30, 2003. The argument here is not that it does not matter that the Muslims destroyed temples

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because the Hindus did it also. The point is that such complexities and contradictions are kept scrupulously out of the pedagogical process, thereby rendering the narrative simplistic and couched in terms of good and bad people. I agree with Vinay Lal that establishing equivalencies of evil in a quid pro quo style by saying that the 'Hindus did it too' and thereby seeming to defend a deplorable act, is morally questionable. Vinay Lal, 'History Sheeters', The Hindustan Times, August 6, 2003. 31. Renowned Indian educationist Krishna Kumar in his incisive and deep analysis in his 'Learning from Conflict' argues that textbook historians and teachers typically tend to evade conflicting issues and controversial material for fear that the complexity and contradictions will not be good for children. In his well-known book 'Prejudice and Pride', he argues that history textbooks in India and Pakistan do enable the intellectual development of the child because of the overarching aim of instilling national pride and creating national memory; Krishna Kumar, Learning from Conflict, (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1996). 32. John Dayal, 'To Hell With History', November 15, 2002, South Asia Citizens' Wire (SACW). 33. Praful Bidwai, 'Court ruling on Indian Textbooks opens a Pandoraâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Box', Special to Inter Press Service, New Delhi, September 17, 2002. 34. Nalini Taneja, 'Renaming The Women's Studies Centres', Peoples Democracy, vol. XXVII, no.42, October 19, 2003. 35. S.P. Udayakumar, 'The Drona Syndrome: Reading the New Education Framework as Pedagogy of the Oppressor'. www.servintfree.net/~aidmn-ejournal/publications/ 200111/TheDronaSyndrome.html - 29k. The website referred to in this article is www.education.nic.in. 36. Report of the Commission on National Education, 1959, Government of Pakistan. 37. Report of the Commission on National Education, 1959, Government of Pakistan, pp. 6-7. 38. Speeches and Statements of Field Marshall Mohd. Ayub Khan, (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, 1962), vol. V, p. 90. 39. Speeches and Statements of Field Marshall Mohd. Ayub Khan, (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, 1959), vol. I, p. 90. 40. For a detailed analysis of the educational discourse of the era of Ayub Khan, with its emphasis on national integration and technical knowledge, see Rubina Saigol, Becoming a Modern Nation: Educational Discourse in the Early Years of Ayub Khan (1958-1964), (Islamabad: COSS, 2003). 41. Rubina Saigol, Becoming a Modern Nation. 42. Sharif Report, p. 116. 43. Speeches and Statements of Field Marshall Mohd. Ayub Khan, (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, 1961), vol. IV, p. 82. 44. Rubina Saigol, Knowledge and Identity: Articulation of Gender in Educational Discourse in Pakistan, (Lahore: ASR, 1995), pp. 243-247. The sub-section entitled 'Glorification of the Military' contains examples from textbooks that present an invincible and honorable Pakistan army. 45. Social Studies Textbook for Class V, 1975, pp. 54-77. 46. Social Studies Textbook, History and Civics for Class VIII, 1975, p. 88. 47. Social Studies Textbook for Class VI, 1975, p. 75. 48. National Education Policy and Implementation Programme, 1979, Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan, p. 2. 49. Rubina Saigol, 'Boundaries of Consciousness: Interface between the Curriculum, Gender and Nationalism', in N. S. Khan, R.S. Saigol & A.S Zia (eds.), Locating the Self: Reflections on Women and Multiple Identities, (Lahore: ASR, 1994). 50. M.A. Zafar, 'Pakistan Studies for Secondary Education', Lahore, 1986, pp. 4-7. Also cited in Yvette Claire Rosser, 'Hegemony and Historiography: The Politics of Pedagogy', Paper delivered in Dhaka, July 31, 1999 sponsored by Centre for Development Research, Bangladesh and the American Institute of Bangladesh Studies, published in The Asian

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Review, Spring 2000, Dhaka. www.infinityfoundation.com . 51. Pervez Hoodbhoy, Muslims and Science: Religious Orthodoxy and the Struggle for Rationality, (Lahore: Vanguard, 1991). 52. National Education Policy, 1988, p. 15. 53. For a detailed analysis of how Pakistani textbook historians construct their several 'others', see Rubina Saigol's paper 'Enemies Within and Enemies Without: The Besieged Self in Pakistani Textbooks', paper presented at the Library of Congress Workshop, Washington, D.C. October 2002. Printed in Akbar Zaidi (ed.), Social Science in Pakistan in the 1990s, as 'History, Social Studies, Civics and the Creation of Enemies', (Islamabad: Council of Social Sciences, 2003). 54. Social Studies Textbook for Class VIII, Punjab Textbook Board, March 2002, p. 100. 55. Social Studies Textbook for Class VI, Punjab Textbook Board, March 2002, Lahore, p. 63. 56. See Rubina Saigol, Knowledge and Identity: Articulation of Gender in Educational Discourse in Pakistan, (Lahore: ASR), p. 231. 57. Social Studies Textbook for Class VI, Punjab Textbook Board, p. 67. 58. See Rubina Saigol, Knowledge and Identity: Articulation of Gender in Educational Discourse in Pakistan, pp. 220-221. 59. Social Studies Textbook for Class VII, 2002, Punjab Textbook Board. p. 26. 60. Civics for Class IX and X, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, March 2001, pp. 112-114. 61. Pakistan Studies for Classes IX and X, Punjab Textbook Board, March 2002, pp. 41-42, and 147-148. 62. Report of the Commission on National Education, 1959. 63. National Education Policy, Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan, 1998. 64. Civics for Class IX and X, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore, pp. 75-77.

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Pakistan: Indus Basin and Water Issues Zaigham Habib

he Indus basin hosts the biggest contagious irrigation network of the world (WAPDA 91). The basin provides key water and land resources of the country (Table 1) and has a level of maturity in the exploitation of these resources for agriculture with the help of an impressive river water conveyance and distribution network. Table 2 shows heterogeneous natural and climatic conditions and variable development characteristics of water use systems in the huge basin. The Indus Basin is a rich case to evaluate and understand the requirements of improved water management to address the challenges of increasing economic and livelihood pressures and sustainability threats. This analysis is based on a research study of the Indus Basin carried out from 1998 to 2003 (by the author). The objectives and characteristics of the designed systems have a determining influence on their functioning and performance. But there is an evolutionary process shaped by the responsiveness of different components within the boundaries determined by the potential and constraints of the systems. The evolved existing behaviour of the physical as well as management systems is a key to the future options and actions, defined and selected by the management approach. This article is organised in three sections describing briefly natural setting and planned character of the agriculture in the basin, actual behaviour of the irrigated agriculture and some of the future management options.

Table 1: Land and Water Resources Pakistan 2000 Total Area Population Irrigated Land

79.6 mha 141 million

Share of Agriculture in GDP

18 million ha 23 million ha 26%

Agriculture Labor Force Food grains production

40%- 45% 22 mtons

Crop land

Indus Basin Average River Inflow Eastern Inflows after 1978 declining Rainfall

184 bcm; range 135bcm to 230 bcm 2 to 20 bcm; Avera ge 8 bcm

Diversions after 1978

103 to 137 bcm; Average 132 bcm

Groundwater after 1996 Outflow 1978-2000

65 bcm

Range 23 to 140 bcm, Average = 70bcm

90 bcm to 1.3 bcm; Average = 44 bcm

Table 2: Some natural and developed heterogeneities Topography Catchment -- km to delta 6 zones; 600mm to 50 mm Rainfall in the Basin Temperature 5 zones; max 22c to 53c, min 16c to 22c Salinity Mha fully non-saline saline irrigation area Groundwater Reference Evapotranspiration Summer 900 mm to 1400mm, winter 300 mm to 800 mm

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Figure 1: Population, cropped area and water diversions

Population millions

160

3.0 2.5

120

2.0 1.5

1.0 0.5 0.0 1951 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000

Population -millions CropArea/ person acres Diversion(canal+well)/person 1000 cubic meters

Major Drivers of Agriculture The food and livelihood security, agriculture revenue and political control have been three driving elements behind the agriculture development in the Indus Basin for centuries. A variety of heterogeneous setups existed in the basin having different combination of these drivers. The agro-climatic and soil conditions provided varied natural agriculture potential while the socio-communal structure shaped different ownership, control and management relationships. Over a long historical period, Indian subcontinent had hundreds of states, tribes, kinship groups and small hamlets involved in agriculture and livestock near the supportive reaches of rivers, rain-fed areas, monsoon supported forests and grazing fields. These agriculture settings have survived despite strong central governments in India (Hugh 1928). The modern irrigation that started developing in the 18th Century has a continuity of the basic concepts, some new techniques, but variable priorities.

he water management and irrigated agriculture existed in the Indus basin for centuries. The urban infrastructure of the Harappan period (2500 BC) had water supply and sanitation facilities, the irrigated wheat and rice were grown. These systems were planned and operated by some state machinery. The Greek Ambassador Magasthene to the court of Emperor Chandar Gupta describes (330 BC) the control of irrigation facilities developed by the state (Michel 1967): 'he [a state official] measures land irrigated and water which is shifted into branches through a sluice'. He writes further about 'wealthy Indian farmers, who grow two crops a year. There grows throughout India much millet, which is kept well watered by a large number of streams. Almost all plains of the country have moisture drawn from rivers or rain'. The revenue from agriculture in terms of crops and livestock, and the export of raw and refined agri-products can be traced back to 2000 years back in the Indus Basin. There is mention of rules to obtain water and pay a price for irrigation. The Land of the Five Rivers (Hugh 1928) quotes Arthashastra (a religious book dating from the Ram Chander's period 700 BC) from the Ancient Law by Maine H.S (1901), 'who irrigates by the manual labour pay 1/5th of the produce, for carrying water on

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shoulders 1/4th and by water lifts 1/3rd of the produce. The ‘superintendent’ of agriculture will grow ‘wet’ summer and winter crops depending upon the availability of water'. Abu Yasuf, the Qazi-ul-Qazat (Chief Justice) of Baghdad in the 8th century wrote a long history from Adam to his period (Moreland 1929). He mentioned the revenue rates in India as 2/5th and 3/10th in case of stream and Persian wheel irrigating wheat or barley, 1/3rd for gardens and dates, 1/4th for summer produce in areas under Muslim control.

ith the development of state and administrative machinery, need to enhance the revenue and political control increased. In the 13th century, Feroz Tughlak built four canals, providing water to selected areas and introduced 'water benefit tax' called Haq-e-Sharb (meaning right to water). The Mughal King Akbar established a strong administration in India and supported local states to develop their water resources. His son, Emperor Jahangir (1605-1627) built the first perennial canal, Huslie, from the Ravi River near Lahore for the royal gardens. Another 110 km long canal 'Huslie' was built by Emperor Shah Jahan (1628 1658) for the Shalimar Gardens in Lahore. Both canals continued to exist and were improved by the Sikhs and British (Buckley 1905). ‘The assessment statements were prepared twice yearly for every villagea large army of clerks of the newly created Land Record Department was housed in a large record room at Fatehpur Sikri (Akbar's capital)’. He improved the land record system introduced by the Muslim ruler Tughliq 200 years ago. Two persons in a village were appointed to record the agri-land and assess the revenue, these ‘Qanoongo & Patwari still exists’ (Moreland 1929). The land was granted to individuals with titles indicating the measures of land (Jahangir's Durbar consists of Punj (5) and Dus (10) Hazarvi or thousands of acres). The tax rate during Akbar's period was 1/8th to 1/3rd with no tax on new cultivation for the first five years (Moreland and Ali 1918, Habib 1962). The Sikh Government in Punjab introduced an agriculture controlled by state administration and wealthy investors. They snatched land from the middlemen and title-holders of the Mughal period and distributed it to small cultivators without an ownership right. The agriculture revenue increased, and higher taxes were imposed on big owners, 2/5th to 1/3rd of the crop (Moreland 1929).

he trade of agriculture and food product with other Asian and European countries established the trade routes used by different invaders later on. 'The trade of spices, blue (colour) ivory, refined animal butter, silk, leather, handicrafts and precious metals to west Asia and Central Europe from the land and sea routes (Karachi) in 5th to 7th Century would have been an attraction to the warriors of these less fertile areas' (Extracts from District and State Gazetteers -- reprinted 1977). The export of rice, cotton, silk, spices, organic and animal butter is mentioned in Ian-eAkbri. The climate of the Indus basin needs canals irrigation. Buckley (1905): 'The chief inundation canals of India are found in the basin of the Indus and its five tributaries… Some of the inundation canals of Punjab lie in the high reaches of Sutlej and Jhelum but the majority of them on the areas bordering on the confluence of the rivers. The district of Multan, laying between Sutlej and Chenab, where rain hardly ever falls, is

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rendered beautifully fertile due to a series of inundation canals constructed by Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb (1680-90). In the Derajat on the right bank of the Indus, above Mithankot, there is a group of twelve canals. And Muzzafargahr, a corresponding group irrigates a tract of some 12 miles wide. The Upper Sutlej canals are in the central portion of the Doab lying between Ravi and Sutlej. Here the face of the country is covered with the farmer life and prosperity. More than fifty inundation canals existed in the lower Indus region in the mid-eighteenth century (Nazir Ahmed, Habib.Z 2004 ).

The British Period Under the British Raj, a central authority was able to impose an administrative hierarchy over the whole territory for the first time in history. British realised the potential of agriculture to be a focal point for the rural country and economy. For the development during this period, the central investment and better technical solutions are much acknowledged factors, while political, administrative and economic interests are reported by the few: Theoborn (1905), Hughe (1928), Douie's Settlement Manuals (1899) & Gilmartin (1994).

he revenue was the key consideration when British administration started managing the agriculture sector. About 1/6th of the total revenue of Punjab was from the agriculture: 'Taxation was then levied almost entirely on the rural population. Practically the whole Punjab revenue, from largest head-land revenue-to the smallest-stamps comes from the producing masses while commercial classes escaped from taxation entirely' Hugh (1928). The first paragraph of Douie's Settlement Manual (1899) gives the basic principle of the land policy, 'the state has always claimed a share of the produce of the land from the person in whom it recognised a permanent right to occupy and till it or arrange for its tillage.' He also referred to an earlier law, the first clause of Regulation XXXI (1903): 'By the ancient law of the country the ruling power is entitled to a certain proportion of the annual produce of every beigha' (Douie 1899). Animal husbandry was a big industry, the Nomad tribes perceived rights to the forest and grazing fields without any title of ownership and they were rarely disturbed. Paying a regular tax on these grazing lands was even more difficult. So, it took time to implement a grazing tax per animal, of 0.1 Rs per goat to 1.5 Rs per camel or a buffalo. ( reprinted Gazetteer Mazafargarh). 'A god they apparently had. His name was political economy' (Thorburn 1904). The first set of land ownership and revenue assessment laws was enacted around 1873. The process of 'irrigation colonisation' changed the structure of society in many areas, bringing scattered kinship groups and tribals under the influence of 'village colonies' having an administrative link with the British Government through the village gentry, lamberdar1 and patwari (revenue clerk). In this regard, the discussion on the establishment of Chenab colony is reflective in this regard. In 1891, the Revenue Secretary of the Punjab Government wrote to the center (District and State Gazetteers 1904): 'It seemed essential to preserve the tradition of Punjab as a country of peasants' farmers. No other general frame of society is at present either possible or desirable in the Provinceâ&#x20AC;Ś. As already remarked, capitalist farming in general is not a

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system suitable to Punjab. But a moderate infusion of the capitalist element is not out of advantages. It supplies natural leaders for the new society; it gives opportunity to Government to reward its well deserving servants, and to encourage the more enterprising of the Provincial gentry; it attracts strong men who are able to command the services of considerable bodies of tenants; it furnishes a basis from which agricultural improvements may be hereafter extended, and, lastly, it enables Government to obtain a better price than might be otherwise possible for the ownership as distinct from the user of its land.' In 1892, allotment of land in Chenab colony was split as 40,000 acres to capitalists, 60,000 to yeoman (serviceman) and 27,000 to peasants.

Technical Character of Irrigation The development of big river like alluvial canals, river structures to feed their headworks and a branched distribution system of each main canal feeding thousands of tertiary canals was the start of new era in the history of irrigation. In the Basin, first 50 years was the period of experimentation with the control structure of weir and design parameters of the 'regime alluvial canals'. A history of empirical relations exists for these developments based on the field experiments. For each new system, design parameters of the best performing canals were used as a reference. The later period was more focused on the design and alignment of self-regulatory tertiary structures to deliver 'equitable share' of water allocated to the command area of each watercourse. Many outlets structures have been designed and used in the basin to deliver 'close to the authorised discharge' under the expected flow variability. The key principle for the fair distribution in the upstream control non-regulated systems is to maintain the water level at the 'design target level' or proportionate to it. Hence, physical maintenance, operations of the main canal structures and regulatory procedures to ensure water levels became major responsibility of the organisation responsible for the canal water management. However, very little scientific contribution made in water and crop sciences during development phase of big irrigation schemes in the subcontinent could be quite puzzling for a reviewer of history.

nother dimension of empirical context was the selection of cropping patterns and water requirements for the design of secondary and tertiary systems. Agriculture was the main reference to calculate expected water requirements and cropping intensities. The systems developed in the beginning and sweet water areas had low water allowance, while contribution from the groundwater and rainfall was considered close to the prevailing irrigation. The river water available at a node and downstream commitment were the main constraints. Indus river had flows reduced to thirty per cent in winter, reducing the water levels as well in the river system. This shortage was addressed by making a fraction of the command area non-perennial (no water supply in winter) but with higher Kharif (summer) allocation. When the command area of a secondary canal was divided into perennial and non-perennial, the annual allocation was kept in the same range, providing double supplies to nonperennial in Kharif. No single formula was used for the perennial and non-perennial demarcation. The earlier canals were mostly perennial with a small percentage of nonperennial supplies to the rice growing areas having good rainfall (Jehlum, Chenab and

137

Bari Doab canals). The rice and cotton dominant areas were mostly non-perennial with saline areas provided with perennial supplies. The canals developed at the later stage, some of them replacing flood irrigation through inundation canals, were made non-perennial because the perennial flows were already utilised. These areas were provided with very high water allowance at the pattern of flood irrigation. The water allowance of the canals generally increased with time as the development proceeded to the more arid area. An important influencing factor was capacity of the canals and the size of command areas to be benefited. During the British period allocation remained less than 3.5 cusecs for the perennial and less than 7 for non-perennial systems (even the arid areas like Sukkur barrage had 3 cubic feet/1000 acres).

he regional interest to get maximum supplies had greater influence in the areas owned by independent states and the lower Indus. The exceptionally high allocations to the Guddu and Kotri barrage systems (started operating in 1956 and 1962 with 9 to 17 cusecs per 1000 acres) are due to high aridity, saline groundwater, rice irrigation and availability of river flows for summer only. The design discharge is not used in most of the high allocation canals. Different estimates of the crop water requirements and seepage losses are given by different project studies (LIP 1965, WISP 1978). The river diversions include water supplied to lakes, local structures for the drinking water and infrastructure like railways. For the water sharing negotiation, main canals have been getting out of debate after 1991, as WAA fixes provincial water share with the statement: 'the provinces will be responsible for the internal distribution'. The distribution at the main canal level is highly inequitable (Kijne 1994, Habib, Kuper 1998), this inequality is accepted by WAA by making 1978-82 actual supplies a reference. No forum is officially available to check or rectify water distribution at the main canal level.

The Administrative Model The basic character of administrative and institutional setup adopted at the design stage has sustained till today and closely influenced the way changes are addressed in irrigation and water management. Some important factors behind this robustness are briefly discussed: Central planning: The development and allocation of river water resources was planned at the central government level in India. The provinces and independent states were asked to submit the proposals, which were finalised by the special commissions formed by the central government. Minimum management input: The irrigation systems were planned and designed to have minimum managerial input. The regulatory structures were kept minimum on the primary and secondary network. All tertiary head-works were selfregulatory and farmers were responsible for the maintenance of watercourses. The department was made responsible to monitor some of the responses of irrigation like drainage as a separate activity. Given the size of irrigation infrastructure, heterogeneity of the seasonal water rights, operation and maintenance (O & M) was defined with clear and authoritative rules and roles (Manual of Irrigation Practices 1873).

138

Public works Operations: The provincial public works departments were responsible for the operation and maintenance of the systems like other public utilities, roads, railway, etc. Originally the 'irrigation wing' of the public works and later-on independent Provincial Irrigation Department was not concerned with overall water management or other uses of water. Committed performance targets: In setting the targets, irrigation delivery can be considered like a service oriented public utility. However, nature of the utility was such that targets could only partially be achieved and it was very difficult for the user to evaluate this service. It is the responsibility of the department (service provider) to monitor and evaluate its own functioning. The users can claim a remedy in case of production failure.

he empirical evidence, simplicity and administrative control were three characteristics of the water resources management in the Basin. The 'new irrigated agriculture setup' had few inherited dichotomies (Michel 1967, Gilmartin 1994). The development objectives of the British Indian Government during the earlier and the later periods changed, which resulted into a big difference in water allowance, land tenure and ownership. Famine control and rural settlement2 were the main objectives during the first phase of the development of the North Indian irrigation schemes (Jurriens and Mollinga 1996), while the colonial government's investment in the second phase was more focused on revenue generation through the sale of crown wasteland and the encouragement of cash crops. The conflict between the engineering need to implement an 'appropriate technology' and the administrative interest of the colonial government to develop and facilitate a rural 'loyal elite' could not be resolved by the straightforward irrigation laws enforced by the Canal and Drainage Act of 1873. The hydraulic efficiency of water supply and the economic efficiency of water utilisation did not always match (Michel 1967, Lieftinck 1968).

From Run of the River to a Regulated Basin The Indus Waters Treaty between India and Pakistan in 1960, and the construction of two big reservoirs (Mangla 1967, Tarbela 1978) enhanced the inter-connectivity and inter-river water transfer potential to a very high level. It is unique that the major subbasins of three big rivers having about 6 million hectare irrigated land had to rely on water transferred from other rivers. The net increase in diversions is about 60 per cent after 1960 ( bcm to bcm - Habib 2004) . The Indus network is the same today as it was in1978. All main canal headworks are linked through rivers and link canals, reservoirs supporting whole system other than the 1st barrage of the Chenab river. Sharing the reservoir is a fully regulated system for release of water. Even to feed all canals with fair share from the direct river flows, each structure on the main network would need to be operated. This is a basic change in the designed run of the river supply based water delivery network.

Water Allocation and Division Principles With the design of large-scale canal systems, the surface water availability changed from an 'access control' to an 'authorised allocation'. The concepts of 'riparian water

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rights' and 'prior water use rights' facilitated the access of 'old users' to a limited level, but became obsolete when all â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;divertible waterâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; got engaged with the 'authorised allocation'. With the extension of irrigation, the probability of having lower than the allocated water during low supply period of early and late Kharif (summer) increased. This shortage was distributed among the canals through operational priorities, which increasingly becomes tougher and an issue of disagreement among the provinces. All water allocation committees between 1937 and 1982 (Andersons, Sindh-Punjab draft, Haleem commission, etc.) had to address the priority-issue, but none of the draft agreement were fully accepted by the provincial irrigation departments.

he flexibility provided by the reservoirs relaxed the priorities and decreased the shortage of the authorised allocation, and put a new challenge to share the stored water. The highest demand on this water was during the high stress period. This affected the doctrines of 'equitable distribution' and 'perennial and non-perennial' division. More water could be supplied in Rabi (winter) than officially allocated. An operational technique was to distribute this water through the scheduling of available excess or shortage. By virtue of the regulation process, scheduling has to be responsive to the water demand of different canal commands during the period of interest. Eventually, the non-perennial canals started getting water in Rabi (winter) without any command areas allocation or the distribution formula, regulated through the 'historical diversions'. The differences on the interpretation of WAA (1991) started surfacing as early as 1994 and continue till today. WAA weaknesses are as follows: i.

Conceptually, WAA allocations are neither based on the design philosophy nor any new criterion. The provincial seasonal and annual allocations are neither equal nor proportional to the design allocations. The winter provincial share of water depends upon the actual diversions of 1978-82, which already had the impact of peak storage potential of both reservoirs. However, there was no change in the authorised seasonal discharge of the main canals.

ii.

The WAA accepts that the management of surface water needs a more 'real time' distribution targets than the design discharge. And the originally planned systems can be intervened by replacing two seasonal target values for the year with 10-daily targets. But, adopts the schedule recommended to share the access or shortage of discharge, by modifying it and making actual supplies of 1978-82 a permanent reference. It changed the character of the regulatory water scheduling from a dynamic to a static reference.

iii. The developed portion of river flows is divided for the existing irrigation uses with a small increase, 'other uses will be managed within this allocation (WAA)'. The division of river water was made equivalent to the irrigation canal diversions. Punjab was already using all of the allocated water in irrigation in 1991. Hence, to satisfy other/new water uses, Punjab could exploit the groundwater, develop flood share or shift water from irrigation/old uses. About 70 per cent potential of groundwater was already utilised in 1991, which is quickly depleting now.

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Continuous provincial disagreement inside and outside IRSA and high level administrative interference (at the ministers and even president's level) in water stress situations indicate the insufficiency of the management arrangements. The reservoir operations are influenced by crop demand periods, especially for cotton and wheat. It is very hard to save water for the end of the year shortage while accepting an existing shortage. The influence of this shortage can be seen from the exceptionally low water levels in Tarbela during June, July and August 2004.

Agriculture in the Basin3 A common measure of agriculture performance in the basin is given by the increase in cropping intensities, which are doubled from the planned level in the sweet zone (NWFP & Punjab) but, remains at the design level in the saline and waterlogged zones. The gap is wider at the main canal command level, 60% to 260% of the design (Habib 2004). The minimum cropping intensities are not in the canal commands having a water shortage, but having water and soil salinity and socio-economic factors (Strosser 1997). However, in the basin context, agriculture performance in terms of extension is much better than the planning and forecast by Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) consultant in 1967 and 1978. The first study forecast 23 million hectare (ha) (mh) cropped area after utilising full water potential with canal diversions of billion cubic metres or bcm (million acre feet or maf). This is the potential already achieved with about 5 million ha (sailaba and barani) cropped area outside the canal commands and 130 bcm average direct diversions. This 5 mh is not fully un-irrigated as the shallow wells are used wherever possible. The seasonal cropping intensities show that the agriculture is essentially perennial in the basin. The major cash crops (cotton, sugarcane) are grown in summer存 while the food grains and fodder covers higher areas in winter. Hence, the Rabi irrigation is very important for the food security. With ha size 80 per cent farms are strongly at the subsistence level, practicing livelihood oriented agriculture. But, some of the comparative concepts must change, like protective versus productive and livelihood versus market oriented agriculture, as the markets and prices have influence on the farming decision of the small farms. The use of groundwater The heavy use of groundwater is the main factor in achieving current agriculture potential. It supplements canal supplies and has become the only source of Rabi irrigation in some non-perennial canal command areas (Tahir & Habib 2000). More importantly, the groundwater has provided major security against uncertain canal supplies during critical crop growth periods. The wells are used in the Sailaba (land along the rivers) and Barani (rain fed) areas. To have a secure access to groundwater, each farmer wants to have his own tube-well and the number is reached to half a million. The real issue concerning groundwater is the sustainability of groundwater aquifer, so that its supply and uses could be maintained. Otherwise, the areas relying on groundwater, especially the small farmers using low capacity wells, can face a real disaster. Tushar Shah (2000) mapped 'four stages in the rise and decline of groundwater socio-economic systems: the Indian experience'. Where due to overdraught, socio-economic quality of life starts declining at the 3rd stage and reached to

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80% 60% 40% 20%

Canal

Rain

Groundwater Fulili

Pinyari

Lined Canal

Nara

Kalri

Dohri

Khairpur East

Dadu

Rice canal

Khairpur West

Begari

Ghotki

North West

PAT & Desert

Rangpur

Muzzafargarh

Panjnad

Bahawal

D.G. Khan

Qaim

Abbasia

Fordwah

eastern Sadiqua

Malilsi

Pakpatan

Haveli Sidhnai

Thai

L.B.D.C

LCC

L.J.C

U.J.C

L.C.C east

L.C.C West

DPRUP

C.B.D.C.

DPRLOW

U.C.C

0% M-R-LINK

Figure 2: Share of 3 resources root-zone Rahi 93-94

100%

the initial level (no groundwater) at the 4th stage, he called it â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;bubble burstâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;. It can be inferred from Figure 2 that many canal command areas in the Indus Basin can face a decline in agriculture output in near future. The situation will be worse in only wellirrigated areas.

The Nature of Water Stress The gross inflow is the fresh water entering into a basin, after that it is reused to different degrees. The gross inflow per capita is declining in Pakistan, which is important for all direct and indirect human uses in domestic, infrastructure, food production and industrial sectors. During 50 years, fresh water availability has declined from 5. 103 m3/cap/year to 1.7 103 m3/cap/year. In the global water situation, per capita renewable water available in Pakistan amounts to a little over 1.67 103 m3/cap/year (FAO 1999), which is the world's minimum. For a rational planning, it must be realised that a high percentage of the water resources has already been exploited in the basin and country. Pakistan stands at the 8th position as far as per capita fresh water withdrawals are concerned with an average availability of 1.1 103 m3/cap/year (Shiklomanov 2000). In a normal year, about 75 per cent of the river inflow is diverted.

elatively a small percentage of water remains to be developed in the basin, which is highly variable. The last many years have seen a decrease in rainfall and river inflows. This dry span is hopefully temporary, but a small consistent decrease in river flows and increase in river seepage losses is real and consistently happening. The eastern rivers inflow had an average value of 8 billion cubic metres (bcm) during 1985-95 lowered to 2 bcm in 1995-2001, these flows can reduce to nil as Pakistan has no rights on eastern river water. A decrease in the western river inflows into the basin can also be expected as a result of developments in rivers catchments, spread over Pakistan, India, Afghanistan and China, and increased water uses in the rain-fed areas. A basic water stress factor is a swift depletion of sweet groundwater aquifer. The groundwater is extracted at a rate of 400 m3/cap/year, which is higher than the recharge in the sweet water zone (Habib 2004). After 1993, useable groundwater range has a negative water balance. This depletion of aquifer is not reversible other

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than already waterlogged, high water use or high rainfall areas, which can have excessive recharge during high rainfall years. The areas not suffering from groundwater depletion are those having severe water quality problem. Figure 3

ased on existing status of water management in agriculture and the constraints faced by the original concepts and practices, a change of approach is required to plan future actions. The list of interventions is not presented here, but the priority issues are briefly discussed.

Resources and their Potential Currently, actions are taken to improve the measurements of water at different river nodes that will help Indus River Systems Authority (IRSA) in the division of river flow among the provinces. However, for the planning of water resources, an assessment of net water availability, including rain and groundwater, and the gross demand of all sectors, agriculture plus all other demands, must be carried out at the basin, province and the canal command levels. The current level of groundwater use and contribution of rainfall in the recharge have the major contribution in extensive agriculture with quite low water allocation (300-400 mm reaching to the farm gate). The demand based canal supply are not planned nor possible, however, a close link between demand and supply is established by the farmers/users with the help of groundwater and their own management practices. Practically, IRSA has to struggle to minimise a gross demand-supply gap, which is strongly spatio-temporal. Hence, a correct assessment of the existing demand-supply gap and the remaining water and land potential is essential for water planning and policy decisions.

n example of water accounting at the basin level is shown in Table 3. A substantial amount of water is used for agriculture outside the canal command areas, domestic, infrastructure and industrial uses; in the range of 25 bcm. About 60 bcm is recycled through groundwater, 18 bcm lost to the saline aquifer. The rainfall has a big contribution (with 78 bcm in 1993-94) in maintaining dynamic hydrological process.

143

Selection of Technical Options By accepting that only a small amount of new water is available for further development work on technical options to improve and conserve the existing developed water resource becomes a priority. The physical interventions are required and proposed (PWP 2001) in three arenas, development of new water resources, protection of the existing water resources from deterioration/depletion and water saving from the supply and utilisation process. Based on the earlier review, it can be suggested: 1.

The new water development projects must be highly feasible and sustainable over longer periods of time. The short-term solutions may have quick results but can be disastrous for the future options. A good example of this type of decision is Mangla raising, which has only 40 per cent probability to be filled under average Table 3: Water Variables in the River Network, the Indus Basin and the Provincial Sub-Basins

WATER VARIABLES

RIVER NETWOR K

BASIN

All values in billion cubic meters, Grey Italic is sub component already accounted far, provincial sub-basins does not include the areas outside Indus Basin + Adds INDUS SINDH AND NWFP PUNJAB - Subtracts BASIN BALUCHISTAN

Inflow River Rim Stations Gains un-gauged Tributaries Rainfall Basin

+ 164.7 + 8.2

Canal Diversions River & Link canal losses Evaporation from river, irrigation network Gross Pumpage

- 132.0 - 23.5 6.9

74.57

7.4

60.9

6.21

+ +

132.00 23.50

51.35

4.9 0.93 0.33 2.56

66 13.43 3.46 44.68

61.1 9.13 3.11 4.12

99.35

2.58

65.49

29.83

35.50

5.5

22.64

8.23

119.00 91.10 45.04

6.5 3.07 3.75

75.8 56.8 26.39

36.74 31.25 14.90

21.78

0.41

3.56

18.8

17.0 78.29 52.65

.8 3.9 3.46

14.5 48.67 44.02

1.7 25.72 5.16

24.60

0.86

15.96

7.76

Crop Water Req. canal command areas Crop Water Req. - outside canal command (7.94 mha Sailaba & barani land) Water Uses Indus Basin Crop uses in Canal Command Areas Non- Beneficial Evapotranspiration from Evaporation from Water-logged Areas Evapotranspiration outside considered water use processes Evaporation from rainfall Available Recharge Actual Recharge Drainage from the basin about 75% contributes to rivers Outflow to sea

+ 19.0

- 35.8

Note: Along with water cycle diagram, table 3 shows that a basin is not like a â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;steel vesselâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; with an inlet and a outlet, rather, it hosts a variety of water processes. Only the main and significant processes are computed here, relevant to understand where water savings are possible and where excess water is available. For example, estimated river and link canal losses are close to the average, but drainage from the basin depends upon rainfall, so, it can be many times higher and lower, directly influencing the outflow to sea.

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conditions of 1978-2000 and have a competition with the direct diversions to the command areas of the Ravi and Sutlej canals (Habib 2004). This probability will decrease as the eastern rivers inflow will decrease. The use of this raised capacity is very unlikely during relatively dry years. For any new storage on the Indus river, availability of sufficient flows and the efficiency of diversions must be considered. 2.

The ground water depletion is a more serious threat than the surface water depletion. In addition to a direct threat to small farmers, it is like the breakdown of natural recycling process. A persistent decline in water level is expensive to be reversed and need difficult artificial recharge processes. The lining of channels is another wrong technical intervention in the areas having groundwater depletion. These areas need to enhance the recharge, not to curtail it. The network losses are in fact much lower than the values advertised to promote the lining projects (ISRIP 1994, IWASRI , Habib 2004) and considered in the design allocations. The seepage in sweet water zone is only a recycling process allowing farmers and other users to use this water with a high reliability and efficiency. These areas need good canal supply during summer (when the internal & provincial competition is low), better field efficiency and changes in cropping patterns decreasing the water demand in Rabi (like sugarcane can by be replaced by fodder or wheat) to minimise the net water stress. A good assessment of resources for each canal command area is required to select a proper measure for the water conservation.

The saline areas need a serious water saving plan. The drainage as recharge control measure has failed here because of its low technical feasibility due to flat natural slope and high water uses in summer. The canals in these areas are designed for high diversion during a couple of months. The existing agriculture is much different from the summer flood irrigation and winter non-irrigated agriculture. Not the lining, but a thorough remodeling of the secondary and tertiary system with better water saving devices should be considered, even if it could be a slow and gradual process.

Policy and Planning The recent experiments with water policy have become the 'book exercises' or 'donorimposed experiments' without any real impact. This is happening with 'participatory management' and 'basin level integrated' approaches adopted by the Irrigation Departments and WAPDA. It has become a tradition to use all sorts of concepts without much substance. A review of the recommendations by the Water Sector Investment Study-1978, the Revised Action Plan for Agriculture-1991 and recent Water Strategy-2003 could be quite revealing. The slogans like; 'provide safe drinking water to every body, increase agriculture diversions, provide water for environment and save water for future' are without any focus. The approach of extension continues to persist. The policy should clearly determine its goals, objectives and future priorities to guide planning and management processes. It is time for the planners, managers and researchers to get out of generalised approaches. The water management issues, groundwater sustainability, water stress,

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low efficiency of water use in the saline areas and non-agricultural uses, have specific and localised character. There is a genuine need to have a sound and scientific approach towards the basin, developed with full knowledge of the field conditions and applied with care. It is disappointing that, despite a variety of challenges, local scientists have not been stimulated to evolve alternative strategies. Unfortunately, political interests have played a negative role in proper understanding and useful dialogue on the basin. For example, the issue of water division among the provinces has camouflaged all distribution and conservation issues at the lower level, where supplies are much more inequitable and need to be redressed. (Ms. Habib is an expert on water issues from Pakistan) End Notes 1. Patwari and lamberdar provide link between the village and state machinery; former is a government staff responsible to keep land ownership and crop records, later collects revenue on 2 per cent maintenance cost. 2. 'The construction of the canal was regarded as a matter of political necessity … still across the Indus tracts of the country which the administration responsible for peace on the Frontier would like to see irrigated for the settlement of border tribesmen.' (Thomsons 1925). 'Although later canal projects emphasised the economic advantages to be gained from bringing new lands in, particularly 'Crown Waste Lands' under cultivation and the introduction of new cash crops such as cotton, contemporary accounts leave no doubt that the decisive motive in building the UBDC was to give employment to the Sikh army veterans.' Michel (1967) 3. The agriculture so developed has continued to be the biggest sector of Pakistan's economy. As a major employment provider, it directly supported 40 per cent of the labor force of the country in 2000, declined from 50 per cent in 1965 as population increased from 51 to 140 million. It continues to contribute 25 per cent to the GDP. Every Government of Pakistan distributes thousands of hectares semi-fertile land to the landless. References l District and State Gazetteers (Extracts), vol. I and II, (period 1883-1929), (Lahore: Punjab GOP, 1957) p. 526. l Sir James Douie, Douie's Settlement Manual, (Lahore: Mansoor Book House, 1981), 1st edition, 1899, 3rd revised edition (A.H.Diack), 1918, 6th addition 1981, 450 p. l ‘Irrigation in Asia in Figures, Water Report 18’, FAO, Rome Italy, 1999. l E.H Aitken (compiled), Gazetteer of the Province of Sindh 1924, p. 486. l National Water Strategy, 2003, Pakistan Water Gateway. http://www.waterinfo.net.pk/ l Tahir Zubair and Z. Habib, 'Water and Land Productivity; Trends across Punjab Canal Commands', Pakistan Country Series, Working Paper 14, no.3, International Water Management Institute, 2001. l The Canal and Drainage Act, 1873 with Additions of Punjab Minor Act, 1905, Sindh Irrigation Act, 1879, Soil Reclamation Act (for whole Pakistan), 1952, ( Lahore: Mansoor Book House, Katchry Road). l The Manual of Irrigation Practices, (Irrigation Branch of Public Works Department: Government of West Pakistan, 1963). l Report of The Royal Commission on Agriculture in India, London, United Kingdom, 1928. l S.S Thorburn, Musselmans and Money lenders in Punjab, (Blakewoods and Sons, 1886). l WSIPS -- Water Sector Investment Planning Study, vol. I - IV, (Islamabad: Federal Planning Cell, WAPDA, 1990).. l Gibbs, & Partners, International Land Development Consultants, and Hunting Technical

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l l

147

Services Limited, 1966. Development of irrigation and agriculture in the WEST Pakistan. International Bank for reconstruction and Development (IBRD) Report. D. Gilmartin, 'Scientific Empire and Imperial Science, Colonialism and Irrigation Technology in the Indus Basin', The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 54. no 4, pp:1127-1149, 1994. P.H. Gleick, 'The Changing Water Paradigm A look at the Twenty-first Century Water resources Development', Water International vol. 25, no.1, pp. 127-138 International Water Resources Association, 2000. LIP - Lower Indus Planning Study, 1966, Principals and criteria for Future Development: Water Requirements, vol. 18, WAPDA, Hunting Tech. Services Ltd., Sir M. MacDonald and Partners, Pakistan. Z. Habib and M. Kuper, Performance Assessment of the Water Distribution System in the Chishtian Sub-division at the Main and Secondary Canal Level, Report No. R-59 (Lahore, Pakistan, 1998); International Irrigation Management Institute; Michel Arthur Alloy, The Indus Rivers A study on the effects of Partition, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 594. Report of the National Commission on Agriculture, Islamabad: Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, 1988), p. 489. D.J. Molden, R Shaktivadivel and Z. Habib, Basin water use, conservation and productivity: examples from South Asia, Research Report 49, (Colombo: International Water Management Institute, 1999). P. Lieftinck, Water and Power Resources of West Pakistan: A study in Sector Planning vol. I, II and III, (Baltimore, USA: World Bank Study Group, World Bank -The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968). I. Habib, The Agrarian System of Mughal India (1556-1707) (Urdu version), Press Trust of India, 1962, [based on PhD theses from Oxford University, 1958], 372 p. Hugh Kennedy Trevaskis, Land of Five Rivers. An Economic History of the Punjab from the earliest times to the year of Grace 1890, (Great Britain: Oxford University Press, 1928), p. 597.

Bangladesh: Impact of Globalisation and Governance Delwar Hossain

omestic governance structure is increasingly affected by accelerating globalisation bringing about major changes in the national socio-political institutions. Many pre-existing/old institutions are either abolished or significantly altered. Altering or abolition of existing institutions has put serious pressures on domestic governance in Bangladesh, because it is defined as the 'processes and institutions, both formal and informal, which guide and restrain the collective activities of a group1' (Keohane 2002: 15). Hence, it is systematically related to the institutional characteristics of the state. In addition, the pursuit of hasty transnational integration generates mismatch even within the economic institutions, needless to say about political or societal realms. New issues such as child labour, trafficking of child and women, trade unionism in the Export Processing Zone, and environmental standards are coming to the surface in the economic governance of Bangladesh, though its export market is concentrated on few items, such as ready-made garments and shrimps, which are susceptible to these constraints. Under these new pressures distinct national regimes of extensive labour rights and social protection have become almost obsolete. Nation-states, as perceived by the proponents of extreme globalisation like Ohmae and Reich, have become the local authorities of the global system. The spread of powerful international and regional actors in national politics and accommodation of national politics enmeshed within regionalisation and/or internationalisation has transformed the tools of national governance. Bangladesh national markets in capital, products and labour are more sensitive to the movements and crises of other markets2. To put it quite bluntly, Jahangir argues that Bangladesh experienced a phase of hegemony of the World Bank and IMF, the chaos of privatisation and liberalisation and the demise of the sovereignty of the state3.

s the process of globalisation accelerates, government experiences greater difficulties in trying to control events within the national borders. Those difficulties, summarised by the term diminished autonomy, show why tensions arise from the competition between political sovereignty and economic integration4. While governments in the developing world are constrained to challenge these pressures as they did in the 1950s and 1960s, tensions are evident at societal level. Haggard observes this incongruence in a limited sense. He mainly indicates the political impact of economic liberalisation as he points out; cross-border economic integration and national political sovereignty have increasingly come into conflict, leading to a

148

growing mismatch between political structures of the world5. In short, the accelerating effects of globalisation changed the pattern of interactions among different forms of collective action organisations that provide a variety of governance services to diverse groups.

t raises a critical question: to what extent has globalisation produced integrative effects within Bangladeshi society? This requires dealing with the implications of these changes induced by globalisation from two dimensions: rule-changing capacity and end results. Because it is often argued that the process of globalisation would bring convergence in socio-economic and political practices and increase allocative efficiency by moving toward free market and 'getting the prices right'. It is against this background, the paper is basically an institutional analysis of the impact of globalisation based on empirical evidence.

Privatisation and Lack of Entrepreneurship The problem of entrepreneurship continues to hinder economic development as it did in the 1970s and 1980s. What is observed is the development of trading and real estate business where rates of returns are quite high, or there was a flight of capital6. Despite faster pace of economic reforms towards market economy for more than a decade, private sector has not developed in the market due to poor level of entrepreneurship that is the key to private sector development. The privatisation launched through denationalisation and disinvestment has not contributed much to the strengthening and widening the scope of entrepreneurship in Bangladesh. Industrial policy has been changed several times. Particularly, the industrial policies in 1991 and 1999 undertook sweeping changes towards market reforms. More importantly, the government has vigorously replaced the public sector with private one. But, in reality, the vicious cycle of low savings and low investment continue to exist due to the country's dependence on foreign aid and increasing government's lending from domestic banks7. Despite undertaking considerable extent of

Figure 1: Manufacturing Sector's share in GDP in Bangladesh (in constant price) 12

% of GDP

10 8 6 4 2 0 1972/73

1979/80

1984/85

1989/90

1994/95

1995/96

Year

Source: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics

149

1996/97

deregulation of financial sector, medium and small size financial organisations have not been established. Figure 1 shows that the share of manufacturing sector in GDP has not witnessed any major changes in the post 1991 period. The contribution of manufacturing sector in GDP fluctuated between 10-12 per cent of GDP for the last 25 years. This disappointing picture of manufacturing sector clearly reflects the poor condition of entrepreneurship in Bangladesh.

ome argue that the issue of entrepreneurship is related to creativity. Bangladesh lacks the environment that stimulates creativity. The privatisation, denationalisation and disinvesture have set the process of 'de-industrialisation', instead of promoting entrepreneurship. Some point out that it is the legacy of British colonial rule for two centuries and Pakistani discrimination by concentrating industrial locations in the western part. They further argue that the devastating War of Liberation has largely reduced the capacity. However, this historical reason for the lack of entrepreneurship does not deserve much importance after three decades of independence. The question of creativity has some merits, but it must not be blamed for such a dismal picture of entrepreneurship in Bangladesh. Though creativity largely depends on national environment, the major problem lies with the systems of governance, marked by corruption, rent seeking and patronage. Sobhan rightly points out that discretionary intervention through the widespread use of personal connections hinder the growth of entrepreneurship8. Shafiquzzaman makes it clear that real entrepreneurs don't get opportunities as provided by the government through its policy reforms. In disbursing loan, personal contact and influences played a big role. Entrepreneurial capability was overlooked9. The persistence of a 'predatory state' syndrome has created a nouveau riche class in society. Changes of organisations and policies under the conditions of globalisation are not resulting in building a good class of entrepreneurs. This phenomenon is largely because of the continuity of traditional institutions that discourage the local entrepreneurs. Embracing globalisation before changing the existing values and norms in society creates the problem of incompatibility in adapting to the process of globalisation.

Continuing Trade Deficit: Problem of Market Access Trade openness is a critical factor for accelerating the benefits of globalisation. Various studies particularly sponsored by the Bretton-Woods institutions demonstrate there are a number of beneficial effects of trade both at South-South and North-South levels. Traditionally, the GDP growth is the driving cause, but there are other benefits too. It is argued that trade liberalisation may promote efficiency in resource allocation, increase competitive capability by acquiring global standards of efficiency, broaden options for consumers, and can make use of international capital markets to increase private investment, and may result in familiarisation with new ideas, technology and products. All these benefits largely depend on the capacity to develop dynamic export sector and external markets for exports. The reality is, however, somewhat different in Bangladesh's case. The integration of Bangladesh economy into the world economy against the backdrop of recent policy reforms, has

150

Bangladesh Malaysia Sri Lanka Thailand Zimbabwe Chile Pakistan

250.00 200.00 150.00 100.00 50.00 0.00

% of GDP

Figure 2: Trade as % of GDP in Selective Developing Countries

Year

Source: World Development Indicators 2000 (CD Rom).

not enabled the state to exploit its comparative advantage in world trade. Figure 2 shows that trade in Bangladesh has lower contribution to gross domestic product compared to other developing countries like Malaysia, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe.

he export-led strategy has faltered due to dwindling global market for its export items. Instead of expanding its export base through diversification of products and increasing the volume of existing items, the country faces the prospect of losing its traditional markets for readymade garments and knitwear (around 80 per cent of total exports) in near future. With the demise of Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA)10 in 2005 under the WTO ruling, Bangladesh will lose its protected market in North America and Europe. Furthermore, the conditions of labour and environmental standards in exporting goods and services appear to be a serious blow for its search for external markets. These are new barriers of 'neo-protectionism' for a developing country like Bangladesh. More so, the trade liberalisation has facilitated more imports that results in huge trade deficit every year. Figure 3 demonstrates that trade deficit is higher during 1990-2000 period compared to the previous era. At most, the dismal scenario with the trade deficit continues irrespective of following export led strategy. In this situation, some argue that the success of East Asian export-ed policies cannot be replicated in Bangladesh context. In East Asia it was high domestic savings and modest consumption and a lack of large domestic markets pushed those countries to follow export-led strategies.

he economists in Bangladesh argue that the explosive growth of trade deficit is a direct impact of our ill-timed import liberalisation. Bangladesh's soaring trade deficit with India in the early 1990s is an example. The reason behind this situation is that the country has not developed an efficient and dynamic manufacturing sector. Industrial activism is minimal, if not stagnant. Only garments and urban construction sectors are booming because of no competition11. Consequently, private investors within the domestic industrial sector lack the capacity to compete with imports, which results in a huge trade deficit every year. This situation might be worse in the coming

151

Figure 3: Trade Deficit in Bangladesh 2500

Million US $

2000 1500 1000 500 0 1978

1980

1985

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

Year

Source: International Financial Statistics, 2000 (CD-Rom) years given the constraints of market access for Bangladesh's export items. Here we observe a clear discrepancy in terms of the economic effect of globalisation policies initiated by the governments. Under globalisation, trade liberalisation is supposed to generate export-orientation and to expand external market in a significant way. Figure 3 shows that the average trade deficit of Bangladesh has considerably increased in 2000 compared to 1978.

Financial Volatility Contrary to highly liberal policy regime for private foreign investment in Bangladesh, there was a frustrating amount of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Bangladesh in the last decade12. All the incentives for privatisation and liberalisation have not been able to attract a minimum degree of private foreign investment in Bangladesh. Figure 4 shows that the FDI net inflows continue to be nil in Bangladesh until 1986 when it was only 0.01 per cent of GDP. Surprisingly it remained around 0.01 per cent until 1995. Later it increased to 0.72 per cent in 1998. On the other hand, Malaysia, Thailand and Sri Lanka received FDI at 6.9, 6.23 and 1.23 per cent of their GDP in 1998, respectively. While looking into the disinterest shown by the foreign investors to invest in Bangladesh, it is almost universally recognised that domestic sociopolitical institutions which are marked by bureaucratisation, rent seeking and Figure 4: Net FDI Inflows into Bangladesh (% of GDP)

19 72 19 74 19 76 19 78 19 80 19 82 19 84 19 86 19 88 19 90 19 92 19 94 19 96 19 98

0.80 0.70 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.00 -0.10

Source: World Development Indicators, 2000.

152

corruption and political instability are the major bottlenecks. This clearly indicates that FDI as a driving force of globalisation as well as economic growth cannot be increased without improving governance in the country. The so-called liberal investment policy regime has simply faltered demonstrating another source of divergence between the rules and norms of globalisation and domestic governance as well as in terms of actual outcome of liberalisation in the country.

nother example case is of capital market performance in Bangladesh. The recently instituted capital market to boost portfolio investment and domestic private capital flows is not functioning properly. This is illustrated by the 1996 capital market crisis in Bangladesh. Capital market was reorganised in 1993 as a direct outcome of the market-based liberalisation program of the government. The individual investors demonstrated much enthusiasm about this market. In a short time, the country's stock market experienced a crash in 1996 winter that resulted in huge losses to medium and small investors13. The sudden rise of stock price encouraged thousands of investors who lost out in an abrupt and dramatic downslide. It was reported that 'after an unprecedented bull run lasting some five months at the Dhaka Stock Exchange, the DSE All Share Price Index, having reached the unsustainable level of 3627 points on November 16 1996, came crashing down, amidst widespread panic in the kerb market14.' The crash in capital market is followed by widespread agitation by the middle class investors. Subsequently, all share price index has been plummeting. Still the capital market is in shambles with a crisis of public confidence on this institution. It is widely held that a few sponsored directors of private companies artificially created the crisis. It is reported that four foreign companies played an instrumental role in the stock market crash15. These companies were assisted by the corrupt members of the Stock Exchange. The consistent downward trend in 1999 not only curtailed the profits of market players but also kept capital investments low. Given the volatile nature of capital flows, this crisis raises some crucial questions. First, is Bangladesh prepared for instituting such a fluid market device? What institutional mechanisms Bangladesh need to establish before opening capital market? Although the crisis and the subsequent behaviour of the share market shows that Bangladesh was not ready for instituting the capital market as such, the adequate institutional mechanisms could reduce the risks of the investors, mostly lower and middle class people.

Competition and Competitiveness Competition is another cardinal norm of globalisation. Traditionally, it is closely related to the growth of entrepreneurship in a society that is considerably lacking in Bangladesh. In addition, because of market and information imperfections, there is a general tendency for market failure even in the ideal neo-liberal market-based system. In Bangladesh, imperfections have intensified because social conditions are marked by economic backwardness, lack of access to information technology, widespread illiteracy and government control over media. Thus, competition has not improved efficiency. It was expected that privatisation would decrease rent-seeking conditions in the country; but it has not occurred. Who will compete in the market, if there are not enough number of actors and proper infrastructure?

153

part from market and information imperfectness, there is one critical factor behind the absence of competition i.e., lack of capability. If a country lacks appropriate technological development and sound infrastructure, it is impossible for private investors to flourish and compete with domestic and international firms. Technology is both a public and private good. It is impossible for a poor nation like Bangladesh to develop basic technological capability through the private sector. There is a necessity of considerable state support to improve national capacity in technological and infrastructural capacity. Another factor is the social environment which is marked by rent seeking, patronage and corruption mainly sponsored by the state. Use of physical force is widespread from tender snatching to political nomination. In both cases, government has a critical role to play, but here again the dilemma is that if government continues to play a key role in developing markets and infrastructure then it may provide an environment for continued rent seeking behaviour and ineffective allocation of resources and resulting in continued lack of capability. So in what way should the country acquire local capability to generate competition in the market? It depends on the capacity of the government as well as private sector. Both have to work hand in hand to develop national capability. Ironically, the rules and norms of globalisation pathologically discourage governmental support for local capability entrepreneurship. This shows another disparity between domestic reality and globalisation.

Access to Information Information and communication technology (ICT) is the driving force behind globalisation. More specifically, internet is the underlying institution in the whole process. But Bangladesh has not been able to acquire this technology in a meaningful way. 'Digital divide' is, rather, increasingly widened because of the low level of access to communication technology. Figure 10 demonstrates how a limited number of people have access to telephone mainlines and mobile phones, which is basic infrastructure of information technology. In 1990 only 2.2 out of 1000 people had access to telephone lines, which increased to only 3.0 in 1998. A survey conducted by the Computer Council has revealed that there are around 0.5 million computers, in Bangladesh. Figure 5: Access to Telecommunication in Bangladesh

per 1000 people

3.5 3.0 2.5

Telephone mainlines (per 1,000 people)

2.0

Mobile phones (per 1,000 people)

1.5 1.0 0.5

97 19

93 19

91 19

0.0

Year

Source: World Development Indicators 2000 (CD Rom).

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ore surprisingly, there are only 60 thousand registered internet customers in Bangladesh, even though equipped with outdated computers16. It indicates that Bangladesh is still largely dependent on old and traditional types of institutions such as physical communication, radio, television, telex, fax etc. Most of the local banks and financial institutions overwhelmingly depend on these traditional modes. Very few public organisations and agencies are equipped with computers and Internet system. Thus the domestic traditional instruments and structures remain in fundamental divergence with those of globalisation in ICT.

Dependence on Informal Sector Despite unleashing speedy economic liberalisation program during the last decade, two vital sectors of the economy trade and finance, are facing the problem with informal sector. Smuggling and 'hundi' system are two powerful traditional institutions in the country. There is widespread smuggling of goods along the Bangladesh-India and Bangladesh-Myanmar borders. It is estimated that the informal trade between Bangladesh and India in 1992-93 was US $ 313 million while at the official level, trade it stood at US$ 356.9 million in which Bangladesh imported US $ 299 million17. In the financial sector, underground banking system operates in a rampant way through 'hundi' system and informal credit from individual moneylenders. Still people prefer to borrow from and invest money in the informal sector. Since independence, it was repeatedly emphasised that privatisation would decrease the role of informal sector in Bangladesh economy. Unfortunately, the rapid and comprehensive economic liberalisation in the early 1990s has not been accompanied with meaningful reduction in the informal sector. Bangladesh's illegal imports from India are on the increase, while the trade in formal channel is declining (illegal import volume is almost the same as from legal sources). Hundi is still playing an effective role in trade transactions18. Human smuggling has added yet another dimension. The smuggling and trafficking of human beings from Bangladesh, particularly child and women, has increased in recent years. The growing involvement of organised criminal gangs has been exacerbating this problem. Many problems stem from the public distrust in the market since there is no certainty that they could earn profits through investments. More so, the financial institutions like banks, insurance companies and specialised agencies do not cater for the needs of local entrepreneurs, particularly those who want to start the small and medium scale enterprises. Expensive collateral, payment of bribes, political and bureaucratic linkage are required to obtain loans from the banks. So the persistence of these informal structures like smuggling and 'hundi' are clearly at odds with the elements of globalisation.

Political Instability and Criminalisation Democratisation is a powerful norm of political globalisation since it promotes domestic peace and stability. In Bangladesh, despite the establishment of parliamentary form of government and the withdrawal of military from politics, the process of democratisation contrasts with existing socio-political norms in the society. They are reinforced by perennial political instability, social chaos and street violence.

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The political process is largely criminalised and fractious in the absence of true democratic practices. Political leaders are guided more by personal and inter-party rivalry than socio-economic issues. Anarchy and terrorism are widespread. The party system remains extremely hierarchical and the leadership is exceedingly personalised. Politics is tainted with terror and physical force. Money is also another determining factor for the popularity of political leaders. The traditional forms of political actions such as protests, processions and demonstrations as seen in other democratic countries are largely ineffective in Bangladesh. The widespread use of hartal (strike) to destabilise sitting governments has hindered the growth of healthy environment of democratic politics. For example, the country was shut down for more than 300 days in the 1990s during the two political regimes. Thus, we observe that the ascendancy of traditional political rules and norms in institutional arrangements and governance mechanisms considerably generate divergence with globalisation that emphasises democratic conventions, rule of law, accountability, transparency, merit and devolution of power.

Dependence on Aid Although aid flows have been reduced in recent years, the overall indebtedness of the country is quite high. Figure 6 shows that in 1982 Bangladesh had outstanding debt of US$ 5232.5 million, which increased to US$ 12768.5 m in 1990. By 1998 it reached a staggering figure US$ 16375.6 million. External debt of Bangladesh is 35.1 per cent of GNP in 1997, while debt service ratio is quite high (10.6 per cent in 1997). Some argue that domestic resource mobilisation has increased in a great deal to finance annual development budget in the recent time, but this comes from government's borrowing from domestic banks.

Million Taka

Figure 6: Annual Domestic Borrowing from local banks by the Government of Bangladesh 45000 40000 35000 30000 25000 20000 15000 10000 5000 0 1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

Year

Source: Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Countries 2000, Volume XXXI (China: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 59. Available at: http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Key_Indicators/2000/default.asp?p=ecnm (29 January 2001).

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Figure 7: Annual External Indebtedness of Bangladesh (in total outstanding and disbursed debt) 18000 16000 Million US $

14000 12000 10000 8000 6000 4000 2000 0 1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

Year

Source: As of figure 6 Still annual development program (ADP) for Bangladesh cannot be framed without reference to the aid commitments made in the donors' consortium meeting in Paris every year.

id utilisation also deserves our attention. It is alleged that foreign aid in Bangladesh has not been properly used for development. It is estimated that 75 per cent of foreign aid received by the country during the last three decades was 'plundered' by people from outside the target group. Foreign and local consultants, agents, bureaucrats, politicians and high incoming urban people have divided up this 75 per cent aid among themselves19. In contrast, the apologists of globalisation argue that privatisation and deregulation would reduce aid dependence and ensure better utilisation by increasing trade and investment in the country. Aid dependence as an economic norm has been persisting with a thriving exclusive class of political, military and bureaucratic elite along with nouveau riche created by the long spell of autocratic rule. This phenomenon is in conflict with the norms of globalisation that trade and investment would reduce the dependence on aid.

Underdevelopment and Poverty It is often argued that economic globalisation promotes economic growth and thus reduces poverty through the so-called trickle-down effect. Several economic indicators may be shown to understand the level of development in Bangladesh. These indicators show a gloomy picture of economic development in Bangladesh. It is true that Bangladesh has registered improvements in few economic indicators, such as low inflation rate, low fiscal deficit, more favourable external balance, and domestic resource mobilisation. In addition, bumper agricultural harvests always stabilise the economy. However, the overall development picture remains quite dismal. According to the Human Development Report 1999 and 2000, Bangladesh ranks 150th and 146th, respectively, in terms of both human development index (HDI) and GDP per capita (adjusted purchasing parity of domestic currency with dollar). Figure 8 shows that Bangladesh has not experienced any significant growth of GDP in

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the last 10 years. Instead, we find that the country witnessed a period of high GDP during 1975-1990 periods. The difference between the two periods can be found in the nature of the trend because while the GDP growth rate before 1991 was more erratic, it has stabilised during the last few years. However, it has not affected the overall development process. While there has been some minor improvement in living standards in the 1990s, the outcome is somewhat worse than in the mid-1980s, when rates of economic growth were lower. There has been a stagnation in productive employment opportunities, despite a slightly higher rate of growth20. Figure 8: Annual Gross Domestic Product Growth in Bangladesh (Percentage) Annual Gross Domestic Product Growth in Bangladesh (percentage) 20 15 10 5

19 61 19 63 19 65 19 67 19 69 19 71 19 73 19 75 19 77 19 79 19 81 19 83 19 85 19 87 19 89 19 91 19 93 19 95 19 97

0 -5

-10 -15 -20

Source: World Development Indicators 2000 (CD Rom) Figure 9 shows the extent of annual increase in GNP per capita in Bangladesh. In the last three decades Bangladesh has failed to double its per capita GNP while countries like Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Thailand and China increased the same in many times.

nother dimension of Bangladesh's underdevelopment is massive poverty. Although the people below the poverty line declined from 70.6 per cent in 197374 to 46.5 percent in 1995/96, the incidence of poverty is still very high21. According to the Human Development Report 1994, with 78 per cent of its people in poverty during 1980-1990 and 93.2 million people identified as poor, Bangladesh accounted for 7.2 per cent of the world's poor22. According to Asian Development Bank, in Bangladesh Figure 9: Annual GNP Per Capita in Bangladesh 400 Constant 1995 US $

350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 1972 1975 1978 1980 1983 1986 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1998 Year

Source: World Development Indicators 2000 (CD Rom)

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poverty rate of 47.5 per cent is 49.7 per cent in urban and 47.1 per cent in rural areas23. As a result, economic development remains very low, despite wide ranging changes in national policy and actions towards economic and political liberalisation. Thus, the results of globalisation in terms of economic development are depressing. It has little role to play in creating dynamic environment for national development in isolation. The benefits of globalisation are hardly felt in society. Changes brought by globalisation are not helping performance of political and economic structures in Bangladesh. It appears that neither the global factor, nor the traditional ways, help accelerate development in Bangladesh.

Conclusion Clash or Convergence of Values? There have been mixed outcomes of globalisation in Bangladesh. Neither the positive end results in terms of developmental effects nor institutional convergence take place in a substantive way. At the heart of continuing poor performance of the state and market organisations and failure of policy reforms are the disintegrative effects of globalisation. It manifests in the mismatch between the rules and norms of globalisation and the pre-existing governance mechanisms and institutional pattern at the domestic level. This divergence is most evident in political and societal governance mechanisms. This creates further pressure on domestic governance. As we observed that the process of globalisation has contributed to the precedence of some international set of values and practices over the preferences or policies of Bangladesh state. Extreme globalisers and the international donors community emphatically argue that domestic governance, for that matter, 'good' governance plays a crucial role for adapting to the process of globalisation. Our empirical evidence suggests that globalisation itself hinders this adjustment process as it transforms the domestic norms and rules in a standardised way and creates incompatibility in rules and norms of governance. To put it differently, the agenda of globalisation in Bangladesh has not addressed the domestic realities in Bangladesh, in terms of addressing the

Table: Rules and Norms of Globalisation compared and contrasted with preexisting and existing rules and norms of governance in Bangladesh Areas

Rules and Norms of Globalisation

Politicolegal Realm

Political openness Shrinking government intervention Devolution of power Accountability Transparency Lawfulness Enforcement of contract

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Pre-existing Rules and Norms of Governance in Bangladesh (1971-1990) Political Openness Elitism Personalisation of decision-making process High government intervention Centralisation of power Bureaucratic dominance Rent seeking, corruption, patronage Lawlessness Unaccountability Secrecy

Existing Rules and Norms of Governance in Bangladesh (1991-2000) Limited Political Openness Elitism Personalisation of decision-making process Decentralisation Diminishing government intervention Rent seeking, corruption and patronage Lawlessness Bureaucratic dominance Low level of accountability Low level of transparency

Techno economic Realm

Private Ownership Private property rights Deregulation Trade openness Competition Labour mobility Shrinking aid High dependence on ICT Moderate consumption Low level of asymmetric information

Societal Realm

Individualism High social participation Trust Risk-taking attitude Environmental awareness

Nationalisation Self-reliance & autarchy Planning & control Trade protectionism Public and collective ownership Resistance to cross-border flows of capital Aid dependence Subsidisation High regulation Technological backwardness Consumption Information imperfectness Trade unionism Collectivism Cooperative relations Mistrust Low level of social participation

Denationalisation & privatisation Deregulation Trade liberalisation Private ownership Attracting foreign direct investment Aid dependence Lower level of subsidy Micro credit Technological backwardness High consumption High information imperfectness Individualism Mistrust High social participation

Source: Prepared by the author. institutional settings and governance characteristics in the country. Consequently, the process of linking global neo-liberal values and domestic norms and practices is generating an inevitable clash that Bangladesh is experiencing more profoundly in the last decade. As seen from the Table, the clash of values is more evident in political and societal spheres. Changes in economic dimension are more compatible with the rules and norms of globalisation, but still there is a significant contrast in values like competition, information dissemination, and technology dependence. The political realm presents a stark contrast through the persistence of pre-existing values such as corruption, rent seeking and patronage, elitism, personalised decision-making, unaccountability, secrecy, lawlessness, and bureaucratic dominance. As the British DFID report quite correctly states that the national environment of Bangladesh is marked by 'insufficient information, or transparency, to enable the actions of ministers and civil servants to be scrutinised effectively; limited accountability of those in authority for performance and for how they use public funds; widespread corruption, with bribes often required to do business or to obtain even basic services such as health care24.' The social environment of Bangladesh, for that matter, social capital, has been worsening long before the current spell of changes through rapid implementation of economic and political liberalisation. What is happening now is further and rapid deterioration of this environment causing serious strains on social resilience. Particularly, the growing ascendancy of individualism with the continuity of 'mistrust' poses a serious problem to the society, which has negative implications for national development. Thus a critical assessment of integrative and disintegrative effects of globalisation must figure prominently in national policy framework before further embracing or penetration of the forces of globalisation in this part of the world.

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(Delwar Hossain is Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh) End Notes: 1. 2.

3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

10. 11. 12.

13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

18.

19. 20.

21. 22. 23. 24.

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See for details, Robert O Keohane, Power and Interdependence in a Partially Globalized World, (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 15. Borhanuddin K Jahangir, 'Consensus, Problematics and Reform Agenda' in Hasnat Abdul Hye (ed.), Governance: South Asian Perspectives, (Dhaka: University Press Ltd. 2000), p. 34. Jahangir, p. 38. Stephan Haggard, Developing Nations and the Politics of Global Integration (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), p. xx. Haggard, p. xvvii. Rehman Sobhan (ed.), The Decade of Stagnation: The State of the Bangladesh Economy in the 1980s (Dhaka: University Press Ltd, 1991), p. 12. See, Annual Budget of Bangladesh 2000-2001. Rehman Sobhan, (interview). Shafique uz Zaman, 'Industrialization in Bangladesh: Evaluation of the Strategies since Independence' in Abul Kalam (ed.), Bangladesh: Internal Dynamics and External Linkages (Dhaka: University Press Ltd., 1996), p. 111. MFA was signed in 1974. Sobhan (interview). Ayubur Rahman Bhuyan, 'The Economy of Bangladesh: Present Performance and Challenge for the Future', Perspectives in Social Science, vol. 5 October 1998, Center for Advanced Research in Social Sciences, University of Dhaka p. 31. Ayubur Rahman, pp. 30-31. Journal Articles on Bangladesh, 16 pages, Available, http://www.aedsb.org/ArticlesJ.htm#Mangi,%20Naween%20A (10 April 2001). Ayubur Rahman, p. 33. The Daily Janakantha (Dhaka), 24 December 2000. SK Chaudhury, 'Cross Border Trade between India and Bangladesh, NCAER', Working Paper 58, New Delhi, 1995; Quoted in Nisha Taneja, 'Informal Trade in the SAARC Region', Working Paper 47, ICRIER, New Delhi 1999. 'Smuggling Reaches Climax, Swallowing Nation's Potentials', March 30, 2000, 3 pages, Available, http://www.bangla2000.com/News/Archive/National/3-302000/news_detail1.html (15 April 2001). 'Where does All Foreign Aid Go', The Independent (Dhaka), 11 February 2001. Jayati Ghosh, 'The Liberalization Fallout', Frontline, vol. 16 - issue 7, Mar. 27 - Apr. 9, 1999, 8 pages, Available, http://www.the-hindu.com/fline/fl1607/16071090.htm (23 December 2000). Binayak Sen, 'Poverty in Bangladesh: A Review', 21 pages, Available, http://sdnbd.org/international_day/poverty/povertyinbd-b (22 October 2000). 'The Human Development Report 1994'; quoted in Hasnat Abdul Hye, Below the Line: Rural Poverty in Bangladesh (Dhaka: University Press Ltd., 1996), p. 1. Asian Development Bank Review, vol. 31, no. 4, 1999, p. 16. Bangladesh: Country Strategy Paper1998, The Department for International Development, http://www.dfid.gov.uk/public/what/strategy_papers/bangladesh_csp_text.html , (2 February 2001).

Gender and Media in South Asia SAFMA/Sancharika Samuha Regional Workshop on 'Gender and the Media in South Asiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; June 26-27, Kathmandu, Nepal We, the media persons from the print and electronic media, as well as media activists, in the countries of South Asia, namely Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, having held extensive deliberations on the state of gender and the media at the Workshop on Gender and Media in South Asia, organised by South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA) Nepal and Sancharika Samuha, on June 26-27, 2004, in Kathmandu: REAFFIRMING our commitment to peace, human rights -- especially concerning women and the well being of the family of the South Asian people: DRAWING UPON the ideals of freedom, humanism, democracy and equality; LOCATING the present status of women, their marginalisation, exploitation, exclusion and subordination in the nature of our social systems, archaic conventions, feudal traditions, chauvinist ideologies, patriarchal family and authoritarian state structures; RECOGNISING the rights of women and viewing women as full and equal partners in every aspect of development, and their intrinsic relationship with poverty alleviation and growth and empowerment; ACKNOWLEDGING that the increase in the number of women who work in the communications sector has not translated into their fullest participation and increased access to decision-making in media organisations; RECOGNISING the need for gender balance at decision-making and production levels within the media industry; TAKING SERIOUS NOTE of the persistent negative and stereotypical portrayal of women in different forms of media and the increase in exploitation of women as sexual objects; ACCEPTING that the advances in information technology -- particularly in the scope for communication networks to transcend national borders -- have benefits as well as disadvantages for women; REALISING the gender insensitivity in media policies and programs; increased promotion of consumerism and the need to create self-regulatory mechanisms for the

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media; TAKING COGNIZANCE of the lack of specific research on media portrayal as one of the most critical barriers to ongoing and effective analysis; TAKING EXCEPTION to the obstacles to women's ability to access the expanding electronic information highway; and the need to involve women in the development and dissemination of new information technologies; RECOGNISING the media as a useful tool to promote a positive and realistic image of women and men; We call upon all media practitioners, governments and civil societies in South Asian countries to address the following areas of concern:

Gender Portrayal To refrain from presenting women as inferior to men and exploiting them as sexual objects; To eliminate all forms of gender stereotyping, and the violent and degrading portrayal of women; To conduct studies in order to raise awareness about gender-sensitive representation in relation to policy-making, which should include the recognition of regional differences and implementation of evolving laws based on comparative research in this field; To re-orient and sensitise policy makers, proprietors, editors, news editors, reporters, scriptwriters, producers, crews and camerapersons, as well as advertising executives on gender issues in order to perceive, portray and project women as equal partners in society;

Media Policy To ensure that guiding principles, policies, and regulatory mechanisms on media are determined by the values of gender-equality, human rights, affirmative women's participation and respect for cultural diversity, cultural expression and lifestyles; To utilize existing international human rights and gender-specific conventions and instruments to address concerns of diversity, human rights and gender equality; To assign resources to promote gender-equality through mainstream, alternative media and the internet and to continue supporting public service television, community radio, alternative video, and access to television, community internet and computer networking; To commit resources and implement programs that will increase women's access to communication and knowledge, specially to new communication technologies, within a framework of respect for cultural diversity in keeping with regional and local needs and priorities; To promote public debate on the social role and responsibility of the media and evolve

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and implement codes of ethics.

Equal Participation To introduce affirmative action, such as quota systems, to enhance women's employment opportunities within the media; To encourage and include women's participation at all levels of decision-making in media industries and in senior positions in information technology industries and on government convened advisory/ monitoring boards; To give priority to strengthening of women's communication networks and media and their gender dimension; To establish and support centers which are responsible for monitoring national media, including ICTs, in all countries; To implement mechanisms that address issues of sexual harassment and gender discrimination within media organisations; To ensure equal opportunities for women in capacity building and professional training programs.

Bridging the Gaps To address various lacunae in media coverage on gender and poverty alleviation issues, through training and awareness workshops and to enhance cross-sectoral understanding on these issues; To actively link mainstream media with alternative/local media, so that there is a twoway flow of information and ideas; To influence policy-makers and civil society actors on gender and poverty alleviation issues through effective communication strategies.

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SAFMAâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Guidelines for South Asian Cooperation Dhaka, August 21, 2004 We, the media-persons and experts from the countries of South Asia, having benefited from the well-researched papers in our deliberations on most aspects and major areas of cooperation in our region at the South Asian Free Media Association's (SAFMA) Conference on Regional Cooperation on August 20-21, at Dhaka, Bangladesh, have agreed to promote mutually beneficial cooperation and arrived at the following guidelines for our persuasion: Appreciating some forward movement towards creating a South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), the agreement on the Social Charter and endorsement of the report by the Independent Commission for Poverty Alleviation in South Asia (ISACPA) by the 12th SAARC Summit and the progress being made in the negotiation in four areas with reference to the Framework Agreement for SAFTA and the positive environment created for regional cooperation with the resumption of the Composite Dialogue between India and Pakistan; Expressing our grief over the havoc wrought by the floods in South Asia, especially Bangladesh and parts of India and Nepal, even as some vast regions suffer from drought, causing suffering to hundreds of million people and the environment; Taking note of the initiatives taken by civil society, including SAFMA and other mainstream bodies and the affirmative and creative work done by South Asian scholars, the Group of Eminent Persons in particular, to promote regional cooperation; Concerned about the arrest of the former chairman of the Group of Eminent Persons and others in the Maldives and increasing attacks on the press in the countries of South Asia; Sharing the aspirations of our people for a better life and collectively to face the challenges posed by globalisation and meeting the demands of the WTO regime though enhanced regional cooperation have agreed to pursue the following guidelines: 1.

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The SAFTA agreement is only the first stage on the road to deepening cooperation; its effective implementation will depend on the space created for trade, economic collaboration and development across our frontiers. However, if South Asia's economies are to be integrated it will require the development of transnational infrastructure. Trade cooperation would point to monetary cooperation thereby suggesting the need for coordination among central banks. Sustained trading links would require investment, cooperation, both public and private, through joint ventures.

The customs Union could lead on to a common exchange rate policy and eventually a common currency underwritten by coordination of macro-economic management across the region. 4. Energy cooperation could evolve into a common energy grid across the region with integrated electricity and gas systems. Transport cooperation would lead to an integrated transport infrastructure which permits for uninterrupted travel from Peshawar to Chittagong and from Kathmandu to Colombo and connecting the abutting regions -- Central Asia, the Persian Gulf, South East Asia and China - with South Asia; 5. Investment flows would culminate in regional corporations with production facilities located across the region through vertically and horizontally integrated production systems. Shares of both national and regional companies would be quoted on the stock exchanges across the region as capital moves without hindrance across national boundaries to underwrite investment in any part of the South Asia region through a South Asia Development Bank; 6. The regional economic cooperation, investment in transnational physical infrastructure, transportation, communication, energy grid, sharing of water on an equitable and efficient basis and efforts at poverty alleviation would not produce tangible results unless the following criteria are adopted: a) The concerns of LDCs are genuinely addressed; b) the negative list is kept at the minimum to protect the most vulnerable sectors; c) tariffs are brought down, as agreed, and non-tariff and part-tariff barriers are minimised; d) the economies are gradually opened up to each other with a recourse to investment-trade linkage that takes care of trade deficits between partners through investment flows and capital account; e) vertical and horizontal integration of industries that benefits from relative advantages, economies of scale and provides global competitiveness. 7. To realize such a transformation in the investment climate in each of these countries, preconditions will have to be created to overcome perceptions of political hostility and the attendant security threats will have to be addressed. 8. The proposal for dedicated South Asian Development Fund could also be encouraged. One fund should be dedicated to financing infrastructure and development projects most beneficial to the adjoining regions. A second fund should be established as an Investment Fund, serviced by both public and private capital, to finance private sector investment as well as projects for serving regional markets. 9. The main obstacle to improving connectivity remains political. The prevailing barriers to cross-border movements make neither commercial nor logistical sense and originate in the pathologies of interstate, as well as domestic, politics. The political leaders of South Asia should, therefore, dismantle the political barriers to regional integration. 10. If South Asia's energy scenario were to be re-defined within a regional context, its energy needs would expect to be served through a common distribution system integrated within a single energy grid of power and gas lines extending across and among the abutting regions. 11. As of today, it is the smaller economies who have reduced their tariffs faster than India or Pakistan. However, this is not a problem which can persist over a long period of time due to the WTO rules. It would, therefore, make sense to initiate

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work on the implications of a Customs Union within South Asia in order to see when, under what circumstances and at what pace such a Union can be created. 12. South Asian nations should look beyond the traditional nations of security and focus on cooperative security; the nation of cooperative security recognises the profound condition of interdependence that binds South Asia and calls on the states of the region to act in their own enlightened self-interest to resolve the current problems facing them through peaceful means. 13. In South Asia, choice is often posed between regional cooperation and conflict resolution. We urge all states to simultaneously move forward to address longstanding political disputes and intensify economic cooperation and people-topeople contact. 14. Beyond cooperative security, South Asian nations must ultimately move towards human security by placing people- their well being and rights to peaceful life and development- at the centre of security concerns, rather than continuing with the arms race. 15. There is a greater need to allow greater interaction among the policy-makers, parliamentarians, businessmen, media practitioners, professionals, and the leaders of civil society. To enable it to happen, it is necessary that India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, who have restrictive visa regimes, drastically revise their visa policy and remove impediments to free movement of people. 16. To overcome information deficit about the countries of the region, it is imperative that all restrictions on across to and free flow of information are removed forthwith and media persons and products are allowed free movement across frontiers; the media, on their part, should give special attention to coverage of the countries of South Asia that remain under-reported; 17. Supporting SAFMA's initiative to convene a Conference of South Asian parliamentarians in March 2005, the member countries of SAARC should consider the creation of a South Asian parliament and appoint a commission to study the modalities for such an institution at the 13th SAARC summit; 18. To include the excluded, governments of South Asia take concrete steps to implement the SAARC Social Charter and give priority to poverty alleviation; 19. It is imperative for the South Asian countries to agree to a uniform human rights code and set up institutions under the Paris Principles, and call upon the member countries of SAARC to purposefully set about creating the required mechanisms.

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