Managing South Asia's Waters by South Asian Media Net

o u t h i a n t u d i e s s A S S Volume: VI

Managing South Asia's

Waters

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ÂŠ 2006 Free Media Foundation All rights reserved. First printing June 2006 Editorial collective: Imtiaz Alam (series editor); Dr Akbar S Zaidi (series coordinator); Zebunnisa Burki, Waqar Mustafa, and Maheen Pracha (copy editors); and Muhammad Adeel (publication designer). Produced and designed at the Free Media Foundation and South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA), Lahore, Pakistan The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this book are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the South Asian Journal or the South Asian Policy Analysis (SAPANA) Network. The South Asian Journal and Free Media Foundation encourage use of the material presented herein, with appropriate credit. ISBN 969-9060-07-7 South Asian Policy Analysis Network (SAPANA) 9 Lower Ground Floor Eden Heights, Jail Road Lahore, Pakistan www.southasianmedia.net

Volume VI, â&#x20AC;&#x153;Managing South Asia's Waters" of the South Asian Studies series was prepared by members of one of the 14 research groups established under the South Asian Policy Analysis (SAPANA) Network, and assigned to examine the problems of managing the region's water resources, including policy approaches, resource sharing, and water quality issues. The volume also contains articles previously published in the South Asian Journal to supplement this analysis.

About SAPANA

ogether with the South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA), the South Asian Journal conceived a research programme in 2005 to develop a “virtual” think-tank comprising an interactive network of scholars from across South Asia. From this initiative emerged the South Asian Policy Analysis (SAPANA) Network - an autonomous, independent, and crossdisciplinary research and analysis platform for initiating informed policy debates, undertaking fresh research, critically evaluating existing research and public policy, and proposing alternative policy measures in South Asia. As a first step, 14 working groups were set up under SAPANA to carry out research and propose policy alternatives on issues crucial to the region. The groups presented more than 80 draft research papers at a conference organised by the South Asian Journal, titled “Envisioning South Asia”, which was held in Islamabad (Pakistan) on 29-30 April 2006, and attended by more than 150 eminent scholars from across the region. After incorporating the feedback generated by the conference, these papers have been collated for publication as a 14-volume series titled South Asian Studies. The series is intended for public perusal, media review, public debate, and the consideration of policymakers. When SAPANA was formed, the need for “yet another think-tank” was questioned, given that there are already numerous institutions involved in similar work. We, at SAFMA and SAPANA, have found that most current research in South Asia is either too departmentalised or too technical for it to be accessible by a nonacademic audience; and that it is greatly influenced by official and dominant technocratic paradigms.

SAPANA will endeavour to undertake critical, independent, objective, practical, and pro-people research to pursue an alternative policy agenda for sustainable development and the empowerment of people. It will also engage the public and policymakers along with other major stakeholders in order to sustain informed and constructive dialogue between the state and civil society. In collaboration with SAFMA, SAPANA will bring its research-based findings within the domain of public discourse, rather than leave it to the mercy of dust or termites. The next phase will begin with formally establishing a board of advisors comprising prominent and able academics and researchers from across South Asia. It is hoped that SAPANA will establish itself as a leading think-tank in South Asia within the first five years of its inception. The major tasks that lie ahead are: (i) building a comprehensive database of scholars and researchers who are either based in South Asia or based overseas but specialise in the region; (ii) planning research themes for subsequent years, arranging workshops on these themes, and publishing the findings that emerge; and (iii) organising a larger conference every two years to bring together new themes, new research, and emerging scholars. Apart from these tasks, SAPANA will design projects and commission research that is of public and policy interest, and will liaise with policymakers and governments through the media. As a “virtual” institution, it will engage scholars and researchers on specific undertakings, and thus set a new direction for the South Asia of our hopes.

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Contents Preface: Water Issues in South Asia Imtiaz Alam

Recommendations of SAPANA Research Group

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Executive Summary Dr Zaigham Habib

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Arsenic Poisoning and Domestic Water Supply in Bangladesh Dr M Abdul Ghani

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Decentralizing South Asia's Rural Water Sector Dr Satyajit Singh

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Water Politics in Pakistan Dr Zaigham Habib

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South Asian Water Concerns Ramaswamy R Iyer

India's River Linking Plans Syed Shahid Husain

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A Policy Management Approach to Pakistan's Water Resources Dr Zaigham Habib

Nepal's Hydel Power for Export Dr Upendra Gautam and Ajoy Karki

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Nepal's National Water Plan Dr Bishnu Hari Nepal

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Water Resources Management in Bangladesh Giasuddin Ahmed Choudhury

SAPANA Conference Declaration (Islamabad, April 2006)

Bangladesh's Water Issues Emaduddin Ahmad

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Indus Treaty and Baglihar: An Overview Ramaswamy R Iyer

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Pakistan and the Baglihar Hydro Electric Project Shahid Husain

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Preface

Acknowledgements The South Asian Policy Analysis (SAPANA) Network would like to thank all the contributors to this volume - their insight into and understanding of a tumultuous region and the challenges it faces provides a myriad of insights that could help define new options for and approaches to tackling South Asia's most pressing issues. Contributors to the volume include (in alphabetical order): Emaduddin Ahmad, Dr Giasuddin Ahmed Choudhury, and Dr M Abdul Ghani from Bangladesh; Ramaswamy R Iyer and Dr Satyajit Singh from India; Dr Upendra Gautam, Ajoy Karki, and Dr Bishnu Hari Nepal from Nepal; and Dr Zaigham Habib and Shahid Husain from Pakistan. SAPANA would also like to acknowledge the contribution of the series coordinator, Dr Akbar S Zaidi; the research group coordinator, Dr Zaigham Habib; and the editorial and design collective at the South Asian Journal, Lahore - Zebunnisa Burki, Waqar Mustafa, and Maheen Pracha for their hard work and editing, and Muhammad Adeel for designing the volume - without which this volume could not have been published. Finally, SAPANA is immensely grateful to the Royal Netherlands Embassy and Royal Norwegian Embassy for their generous support, without which the production of this series would not have been possible.

Water Issues in South Asia

f there is any single most important issue that mars bilateral relations among the countries of the subcontinent, it is water. The issues of cross-border water distribution, utilisation, management and mega irrigation/hydro-electric power projects affecting the upper and lower riparian countries are gradually taking centre-stage in defining interstate relations as both water scarcity and demand increase and drought and floods make life too often miserable. Thanks to its location, size and contiguous borders with other South Asian countries, it is India, in its capacity as both upper and lower riparian, that has come into conflict with most of its neighbours, except Bhutan, on the cross-border water issues. Given an atmosphere of mistrust, upper riparian India has serious issues to resolve with lower riparian Pakistan and Bangladesh and, despite being lower riparian, with the upper riparian Nepal. This, however, does not mean that India is solely responsible for certain deadlocks, even though its share of responsibility may be larger than other countries which have their own physical limitations and political apprehensions. As elsewhere in the world, and more particularly in the subcontinent where population explosion continues and environmental degradation worsens, water resources, like energy, are going to be much lower than the increasing demand, even if they are harnessed to the most optimum. Given the depleting resources of water, the issues of human security, and water security as its most crucial part, are going to assume astronomical proportions. The issues of water

distribution and management are bringing not only countries of the region, but also states and regions within provinces into conflict since they are not being settled amicably within a grand framework of riparian statutes respecting upstream and downstream rights. What is, however, quite appreciable is that the countries of the subcontinent have made certain remarkable efforts to resolve their differences over water distribution through bilateral agreements. India and Pakistan signed the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) in 1960 allocating three eastern rivers (Ravi, Sutlej and Beas) to India and three western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) to Pakistan. The IWT has remarkably survived the ups and downs of Indo-Pak relations, and despite wars the parties have upheld the Treaty. Although serious differences persist over various projects being undertaken by India over Jhelum (2 projects) and Chenab (9 projects) rivers, the IWT provides a legal mechanism to iron out differences and settle disputes as in the case of Baglihar Project. Similarly, the Ganges Water-Sharing Treaty (GWST) was signed between India and Bangladesh in 1996 and resolved the dispute over Farakha Barrage, although differences continue on Bangladesh's share of water during the lean period. Nepal and India also signed the Mahakali Treaty in 1996, but despite ratification by the Nepalese parliament, the Treaty has remained stalled due to the politics of expediency. Despite these treaties, serious differences over water sharing, water management and hydropower projects continue to spoil relations between India, on the one hand, and Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal, on the other. Differences between India and Pakistan continue to create ill-will between the two on around 11 large hydroelectric projects India plans to construct, including the Baglihar Project over which a neutral expert appointed by the World Bank is about to conclude his arbitration that should be acceptable to both sides. More than the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir, the issue of the waters of Jhelum and Chenab has the potential to once again provoke people in Pakistan against India and push the two countries to war. Bangladesh, which shares 54 rivers with India as a lower riparian, has serious differences with New Delhi that hinder agreement on eight rivers, besides the continuing complaints by Dhaka over sharing of water of Ganges. The Indian plan, which is now under

review, to build a big river-linking-project that includes diversion of water from Ganges and Brahmaputra, has become yet another source of antagonism between the two countries who have not been able to sort out their differences over a whole range of issues that continue to fuel political tension which, in turn, does not allow the resolution of differences over water. As an upper riparian, Nepal has a different relationship with India and faces many problems in constructing its dams due to opposition by the lower riparian and has serious doubts about the projects proposed by India. Nepal's mistrust, beside other factors, has been reinforced by what it perceives to be various unequal treaties -starting from Sharada Dam construction (1927), 1950 Treaty and Letters of Exchange of 1950 and 1965, Koshi Agreement (1954), Gandak Agreement ((1959), Tanakpur Agreement (1991) and the Mahakali Treaty (1996). Since 400 million people live in the Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna region, India needs Nepal to meet its energy needs and for management of water. Besides many issues of water sharing among the countries of subcontinent, crucial water and energy issues are critically affecting the food security, environment and agriculture. Above all, projections of scarcity of water present a doomsday scenario. There are serious differences over water-sharing within different states/provinces in India (Ravi-Beas dispute between Punjab and Haryana and Cauvery dispute among the states of Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Kerala and Pondicherry) and Pakistan (water sharing dispute and construction of dams over Indus between Punjab and Sindh and also NWFP). Rigorous exploitation of groundwater in India and Pakistan is rapidly depleting aquifers, which is a cause of great concern. Contamination of water and presence of arsenic in groundwater has become a major concern, especially, in Bangladesh and some parts of India and Pakistan. Climatic changes that are being forecasted and low-water discharges need to be addressed collectively. India should, as SAFMA's Delhi Declaration calls, 'make more efforts to discuss bilaterally with its neighbours problems relating to river waters. A new regional understanding of the riparian issues is essential to resolve IndoNepal, Indo-Bangladesh and Indo-Pakistan water issues'. Regional Riparian Statutes must be obligatory to resolve the bilateral water

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disputes. RRR statute model, respecting Helsinki Convention proposes 8K upstream and downstream rights should guide the countries of subcontinent to avoid conflict over water and reach a lasting understanding for the collective good of our peoples. Lastly, the 'middle-path' adopted by Bhutan should guide the planners for sustainable development that is environment friendly and is not carried by supply-side approach of the big dam lobbies. Volume VI, Managing South Asia's Waters, of South Asian Studies Series addresses the major water issues of the countries of and the South Asian region, besides addressing the water security, sharing and management of waters among the upper and lower riparian. It includes not only the research papers by the members of the Group on Water, but also articles by leading experts published earlier in the South Asian Journal.

Imtiaz Alam

Recommendations of SAPANA Research Group The SAPANA research group assigned to examine issues of water resource management in South Asia comprised the following people: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Dr Zaigham Habib (group coordinator), Pakistan; Giasuddin Ahmed Choudhury, Bangladesh; Ramaswamy R Iyer, India; Dr Bishnu Hari Nepal, Nepal; Dr Satyajit Singh, India.

Increasingly, governments and concerned institutions are realizing the need to address acute shortage of energy and water, incidence of drought and floods that often bring miseries to the people and, at times, states into conflict. The distribution and management of water resources, though quite a divisive issue among the upper and lower riparian regions across states, needs to be undertaken amicably without depriving the lower and upper riparian regions of their due to avoid a conflict over water issues which must not be politicized. Bilateral treaties, such as Indus Water Treaty between India and Pakistan and the Treaty over Ganges between Bangladesh and India must be respected and upheld in letter and spirit. The Mahakali Treaty between Nepal and India may be implemented by removing reservations of either side. The quadrangle of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal may take up an integrated approach to manage water resources while keeping the interests of upper and lower riparian, on the one hand, and India and Pakistan must overcome their differences over Tulbul, Baglihar and Kishanganga projects

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within the framework of the IWT, on the other.

There are other major water related problems that need to be addressed on a priority basis with water cooperation among the member countries of SAARC to enhance water and food security. There is a great hydro-power potential in Bhutan and Nepal that can be utilized by other countries of the region. However, that would involve the need for a common or bilateral grid, on which all concerned countries would have to agree.

The group's recommendations are summarised below. 1. The regional water scenario of South Asia is predominated by increasing gap between increasing water demand and insufficient supply, high allocation to agriculture and growing new commercial demands, trans-boundary and regional conflicts generated from upper versus lower riparian water needs/interests, increasing interest in hydropower and new management experiences. Policy challenges are linked to the socio-economic approaches, selection of technical solutions and institutional capacity. The following general and specific recommendations could be made, based on the group discussion: 2. The trans-boundary conflicts are based on concerns of the lower riparian countries to secure river flows (Pakistan and Bangladesh versus India) on one hand and development interests of the upper riparian especially for the hydropower (Nepal versus India, India vs. Pakistan). The multi-purpose and multi-country planning for the Himalayan water resources and the South Asian water basins is the proposed future option. (proposed NIBB-C Water Ways is an example) 3. All South Asian countries are going through the experiences of decentralization and local management. Different models have been tried the success so far indicates involvement of local civil society, political acceptance and local institutional implementation capacity as the key elements. The national experiences needs to be impartially evaluated and put in the proper context. 4. The efficiency and productivity of water use in agriculture must be enhanced along with sustainable use of water in agriculture. The physical water stress and growing urban needs of Pakistan and India suggest a slow transfer of water from the sector.

All infrastructure developments should consider long term conservation of the natural water resources (all water bodies, including lakes, river sections and groundwater) and regenerative use of water. The central and top-bottom engineering approaches are not able to move forward due to political as well as hydrological reasons, hence, the technical options must be formulated across the appropriate local hydrological and political boundaries. The human access to water resources, on the one hand, and increased commercial value of water, on the other, are the growing challenges for the planning and development. The secure allocations for the domestic and drinking water, equitable distribution and fair water pricing in different sectors and regions are the essential regulatory measures. The public sector as a service provider has the responsibility to define guidelines. The water related sectors have the great opportunity for the knowledge sharing in the technical and managerial fields.

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inviting private sector participation in dam-and-reservoir projects, which would earlier have been exclusively in the domain of the state. The new National Water Policy 2002 includes a clause that specifically provides for this. Turning from projects to services, the idea of privatizing utilities has been in the air for some time, and now it seems to be getting extended to water supply in some States.”

Executive Summary Dr Zaigham Habib

he Himalayan water resources are shared by India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan. South Asia is generally facing deficit of useable water for the existing and future needs, deterioration of water resources, management inefficiencies, development concerns and water legislation. The infrastructure development is considered inevitable in the region for the hydropower generation and to meet water demands. While facing problems in the selection of technical solutions, water sharing within and across the countries and water productivity; all countries are experimenting management changes to various degrees. Five papers from the South Asia water group review country specific and transboundary issues, brief highlights from different papers are given below: Ramaswamy R. Iyer summarizes water issues of South Asian countries, trans-boundary water conflicts between India and other countries while emphasizing alternative approaches. For the water crises of India, he suggests; “through a combination of two approaches, namely, on the demand side, the practice of the utmost economy and efficiency in water-use and of resource-conservation, and on the supply side, efforts to augment the availability of `usable' water through extensive recourse to local water-harvesting and watershed development, it may be possible to avert a crisis, though the situation will undoubtedly be difficult and will call for careful management. The economic and water sector reforms in India are generally accepted as a public-private partnership. “This is another prescription of economic `reformers' that seems to be gaining a measure of acceptance in India. The paucity of financial resources is pushing the Governments, Central and State, to think in terms of

Mr Iyer summarizes anti big infrastructure views, also using them in the context of trans-boundary issues. Anti-dam lobbies argue that the economic, environmental, social and human consequences of these projects can not be fully compensated, while the small-scale, local, people-centred alternatives are available. Similar logic is mentioned in the context of trans-boundary disputes,” Bhutan is its deep attachment to its cultural and natural heritage and its determination to preserve them….. an `alternative' view in Nepal disfavours large, technology-driven, foreign-funded, export-oriented projects imposed by the state or foreign investors on the people, and favours decentralized, relatively small, environmentally benign projects (whether for irrigation or for hydro-electric power) primarily for Nepal's own needs rather than for meeting the needs of other countries.” Dr. Bishnu Hari Nepal's paper is focused around the theme,” water is to Nepal what oil has been to the Gulf countries, namely, the source of revenues and wealth; and that those revenues will come principally from the export of hydro-electric power to the neighbouring countries.” While emphasizing the use of advance technologies he criticizes anti-infrastructure movements. The 'ecoromanticists', water-mafias and 'dollar farmers' make sometimes 'opposition for opposition's sake' and create havoc to the normal folks. The paper describes surface and groundwater water resources of Nepal, current uses, hydroelectric potential, trans-boundary issues with India and a regional model. Currently, Nepal is using less than 10% of its rivers inflow of 225 billion cubic meters annually and producing 606 MW hydroelectricity out of 83,000 MW capacities. While, only 40 per cent of the households use electricity generated from different systems and the actual energy needs met from fuel-wood, agricultural waste and animal-dung is 88.64 per cent of the total energy consumption. Out of the remaining percentage, the hydro-

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electricity contribution is of 1.66 per cent, contribution of renewable energy resources is 0.52 percent and fossil fuel (petroleum and coal) comes to be 11.18 per cent. Nepal's New Water Resources Strategy and National Water Plan for 2002 to 2027 suggest physical developments, joint trans-boundary projects for hydropower and management reforms in the sanitation and irrigation sectors. The Farmer Managed Irrigation Systems (FMIS) already covers 70 per cent of the country's irrigated area, some systems are being transferred wholly to the Water Users Association (WUA),while some are jointly managed by the government and the WUAs. The government has accepted that the community-managed systems are better than the governmentmanaged projects. The scope of joint reservoir and electricity generation projects by Nepal and India is high, however, as India is the main user of this electricity, there is conflict of interests on location, ownership, price, etc. Dr. Nepal proposes a trans-boundary regulatory mechanism outlined through his SA-RRR-S (South Asian Regional Riparian Rights Statutes) model. The Model proposes that the countries of South Asia could take a distance of 8 KM as a distance of mutual agreement downstream and upstream right of acceptance by managing the system of the provision of consent from the respective country for any kind of water and disturbing development activity within the respective country's territory. In a very interesting paper Dr. Satyajit Singh reviews water sector reforms experiences of the South Asia in the context of local governments, good governance, and communities. He put current decentralization efforts as the centuries old quest for appropriate institutions for good governance, formulated by different schools of thoughts in different social or institutional contexts. The paper argues that local governments are central to the discussions around good governance. A shift from communities to local governments becomes necessary in order to ensure the sustainability of the community institutions as well as to provide a stable channel for public fiscal transfers from the centre or the state to the actual beneficiaries. The local government model provide better defined structural relations with the central state, while it is accountable at the local level and is allowed to make choices between public versus

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private services. An important assertion is that capacity is an issue at the central level, which should be able to design institutes at the local level. “It is an attempt to bring in a convergence between the institutional and the livelihood paradigm”. While rural communities in South Asia are directly affected by the swings in the financial and trade markets, national and state governments are also realizing that good governance for rural infrastructure and service delivery are best handled at the local government level. In this reforms model, the state focuses on policy, strategy and capacity building of the local government for managing, contracting and supervising NGOs, private and community groups. The services are delivered by the public, private, civil society organizations or their partnerships. The success of decentralization process is linked with urgent needs, outcomes in the local political economy and the local capacity. However, many aspects of the implementation process and achievable impacts of decentralization remain to be understood. Crafting a balance between local autonomy, state authority and legitimate national goals is difficult, local governments have neither the capacity nor the local accountability to act autonomously to realize the expected benefits of decentralization. decentralization that works across sectors to provide functional clarity and operational freedom to local governments. The capacity of communities and local Governments is essential for success. India provides examples of different level of decentralization and success. The sector reforms in Karalla are successful, as they are fully integrate with decentralization program and the functional local governments, Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRI), which are largely respected by the communities. Bangladesh has adopted major reforms agenda through five year (2005-9) Rural Water Supply Project. However, delivery mechanism is highly centralized as the ministry delegates responsibilities to the local public departments and NGOs. This supply driven approach is not able to response peoples needs, problems in reporting are mentioned while the expected results are not achieved. “Unlike in India where the local government unit actually manages the water projects, the local government in Bangladesh facilitates and regulates the 'private sponsors'”. Giasuddin Choudhury's paper on water management in Bangladesh

highlights existing water policy approach of the country and describes different issues linked to water quality, low productivity and boundary issues with India. Bangladesh has been closely working with the international donors during the last twenty years and has come up with national policy documents, between 1992-99, in the sectors of environmental, forest, energy, Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation, fisheries, agricultural, industry and water. The National Water Management Plan (NWMP) was prepared in 2001 and approved by the National Water Resources Council in 2004. Bangladesh faces water control and quality problems; groundwater pollution, floods resulted from high river flows and inadequate drainage, and increasing demand for winter irrigation. The arsenic levels are above the safe limit, exposing about 75 million people to this toxic substance on a daily basis. The water use efficiencies are low, while water is subsidized along with other inputs. The country also needs to manage land due to drainage issues and rapid urbanization. The national water policy of Bangladesh states, “Water will be considered an economic resource and priced to convey its scarcity value to all users and provide motivation for its conservation”. The trans-boundary conflict with India originates from the fact that, “Bangladesh has fifty-seven common/ border rivers, out of which fifty-four rivers are with India. The ever-increasing upstream withdrawals from these rivers within the Indian territory have deprived Bangladesh from its traditional uses of the river flows, especially in the dry seasons and thereby disrupting the livelihoods of the people depending on these rivers as well as causing serious environmental degradation to one-third of Bangladesh.” The diversions from Ganges and water control at Farakka have been a major concern for Bangladesh, because of its direct impact on supplies to the irrigated land of Bangladesh. With the help of WB, Ganges Water Treaty (GWT) was signed between Bangladesh and India in 1996. However, the Indian River Link (IRL) mega project is considered to pose great threat to Bangladesh. The paper suggests, that Bangladesh needs to take an initiative for regional cooperation with Bhutan, Nepal and India. The Ganges flows can be augmented by construction a reservoir at the Sunkosh River in Bhutan, similarly, Sapta Kosi High Dam in Nepal, could bring significant benefits to

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Bangladesh. The paper by Dr. Habib from Pakistan reviews water scenario of Pakistan, indicating the scope and implications of different measures available to address the water scarcity and resource conservation in the country. The country is already utilizing more than 75% of its rivers inflow of 178 billion cubic meters, more than 100% groundwater and major part of the rainfall falling in the plains. Different sectors and areas face qualitative and quantitative water shortage in terms of water access, allocation and actual availability. On the supply management side Pakistan is faced with regional disagreements and technical inabilities for the surface water development, water productivity and conservation of water quality, groundwater aquifer and natural aquatic systems. Not only projected, currently allocated river water is more than actual canal diversion, making shortage sharing a critical process during the major part of year. Recycling through groundwater aquifer has increased the actual water use efficiency in fresh aquifer areas, while causing groundwater depletion and a need to maintain the discharge-recharge balance. The drainage projects and water use practices have failed to arrest water logging in the saline zone. The low yield and traditional cropping patterns are the major performance concerns for the agriculture sector. The livelihood orientation, low investment potential and failure of markets to stimulate agriculture production are the main causes. Feasible technical options in the sweet and saline zones are not properly identified and implemented. The paper suggests sustainable recharge-discharge balance in the fresh aquifer zone and water saving at the conveyance level development guidelines. In the context of institutional reforms, clear and locally accepted water management model is still far away, existing dichotomies are obvious from the ongoing disintegrated processes of decentralization and reforms in the political and resource management sectors. The institutional changes in the water sector are initiated and directed by the donor as part of the package (notably World Bank and ADB) leading to the pilot studies. No efforts are yet carried out for the evaluation and formulation of these experiments.

South Asian Water Concerns

an unanticipated outcome was the emergence and spread of the ills of water-logging and salinity. Out of a total of 18 million hectares (mha) of irrigated land in Pakistan, about 6.22 mha are said to be affected by this menace. In response to this the Government of Pakistan launched different Salinity Control and Reclamation Projects (SCARP), starting in 1959. These do not seem to have been very successful. Among the criticisms of the SCARP approach are design defects, severe environmental impacts, and the creation of secondary problems that are as bad as the original ones that the plan had intended to remedy. The impression that one gets is that Pakistan is still struggling with a gigantic problem to which satisfactory answers have not yet been found.

Ramaswamy R. Iyer

his paper aims at presenting a synoptic and objective overview, in very broad terms, of the principal national concerns and issues relating to water in South Asian countries. For the purpose of the paper, â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;South Asiaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; refers only to the countries in the subcontinental mainland, i.e., Pakistan, India, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh. Besides, it is concerned largely with the northern part of the subcontinent where different countries are linked together by the Himalayan rivers. National Perspectives Pakistan The major part of Pakistan -- leaving aside the inland drainage area of Balochistan, as also the southern coastal region -- is in the Indus Basin. Water Deficit? Most writings on the water resources of Pakistan refer to water scarcity (present or imminent), but it is not clear how much of the projected water and food deficit will remain if the ills of poor water management and inefficiencies in irrigated agriculture (on which there is general agreement) are remedied. Water-Logging and Salinity The allocation of the three western rivers of the Indus system to Pakistan under the 1960 Indus Water Treaty, and the development of irrigated agriculture that followed, certainly brought much prosperity to the country or to some sections of the population, but

Inter-Provincial Conflicts Another major national concern is the persistence of inter-provincial conflicts over water distribution. These conflicts have a long history, going back to the middle of the 19th Century when human intervention in the natural flow of the river through the construction of barrages and canals began. The old inter-provincial conflicts and the attempts to resolve them were followed after Partition (1947) by the India-Pakistan dispute over the Indus, which was resolved by the Indus Water Treaty of 1960. The problems of water-sharing among the provinces in Pakistan continued, and were dealt with by several committees and commissions. The settlement currently in force is the Indus Water Accord of 1991. However, there are important unresolved issues with a crucial bearing on water distribution. Issues of flood management, not discussed here, also have inter-provincial angles. Kalabagh Controversy A new dimension has been added to water-sharing disputes by the contentious Kalabagh Dam Project. This Project is the centre of a major controversy in Pakistan. The arguments are familiar. The case for the project is argued on the basis of a projected water shortage and the need for and possibility of one more dam on the Indus system. The opponents of the project argue that water is not available for the dam, that the project is not needed, and that it will have serious environmental and human impacts. There is also an interprovincial angle: Sindh is afraid that with the Kalabagh dam, more of the Indus water will be diverted by Punjab, with serious consequences for it (Sindh); and the North Western Frontier

Province (NWFP), while it might derive some benefits, is seriously worried about submergence of land, displacement of people, and water-logging problems. Two Approaches At the heart of the Kalabagh controversy lies the confrontation between two divergent approaches to water-resource policy, planning and management, encapsulated by one writer (Bengali, 2003) as the 'techno-centric approach' vis-à-vis the 'socio-centric approach'. As summed up by him, the former relies wholly on technical expertise and engineering solutions, whereas the latter recognises that 'development, management and conservation cannot be achieved in a vacuum, and social systems and structures and people's cultures and lifestyles also need to be addressed'. Other Issues There are also serious concerns in Pakistan about the pollution of rivers, the degradation of coastal zones, the problems of sewage disposal in urban areas, and so on, but limitations of space prevent this paper from going into them. India (The Indian concerns outlined below may find a resonance in the other countries of the region.) Water Crisis? An important and widely shared perception in India is that of an imminent water crisis. The crucial element here is the demand projection, and that needs to be looked at carefully. In every kind of water use, major economies are desirable and possible, though difficult. If these are achieved, the demand picture will not remain the same. Turning to the supply side, large-dam projects are not the only answer; there are other possibilities. Local rainwater harvesting (‘catching the raindrop as it falls’) and watershed development are also part of the supply-side answers to the demand. Through a combination of these two approaches, namely, on the demand side, the practice of the utmost economy and efficiency in water-use and of resource-conservation, and on the supply side, efforts to augment the availability of `usable' water through extensive recourse to local water-harvesting and watershed development, it may be possible to avert a crisis, though the situation will undoubtedly be difficult and

will call for careful management. Divergence on Big Projects There is a widespread perception that the growth of population, pace of urbanisation and economic development will accentuate the pressure of increasing demand on a finite resource, and that the answer lies in large supply-side projects and long-distance water transfers. That is the dominant view in India, but there is a strong body of opinion that challenges that view. The Narmada, Tehri Movements The most dramatic confrontation between the two views took place in the case of the Narmada (Sardar Sarovar) and the Tehri HydroElectric Projects. In both cases, the protest movements and their leaders (Medha Patkar and Sunderlal Bahuguna) became well-known nationally and even internationally. In both cases, the battle has been lost in the Supreme Court, and construction activities -- stalled for a while -- have been resumed in full force, but the movements cannot be adjudged to have been failures: they have changed forever the way people at every level (including the general public, the media, policymakers, project-planners and managers) think about such projects. In that sense, the movements have been enormously influential. ‘Flood Control’ This is a controversial subject, but it is increasingly recognised that what we must learn to do is not so much to ‘control’ floods as to cope with them when they occur and minimise damage, partly through ‘flood-plain zoning’ (i.e., regulation of settlement and activity in the natural flood plains of rivers) and partly through `disasterpreparedness'. However, the notion of ‘flood control’ continues to hold some sway over people's minds, and to influence official thinking. Inter-State River Water Disputes Most of the major rivers in India flow through more than one (Indian) state and are therefore ‘inter-state rivers’. The constitutional/statutory mechanism for the resolution of inter-state conflicts within India -- over such rivers seemed initially to be working reasonably well, but it has run into difficulties in recent years. Two currently outstanding disputes are the Ravi-Beas Dispute (Punjab and Haryana) and the Cauvery Dispute (Karnataka, Tamil

Nadu, Kerala and Pondicherry). An early and satisfactory resolution does not seem to be within sight in either case. These unresolved disputes have implications that go far beyond water: they raise questions about Indian federalism. The Groundwater Crisis Continuing reckless exploitation of groundwater, leading to the rapid depletion of aquifers in many places, portends disaster. The situation, which has been described as ‘colossal anarchy’ (Shah 2004), needs to be quickly brought under control, but there are enormous legal, political and practical difficulties here. There may be need for changes in the law relating to ownership rights over groundwater, enactment of new state-level laws for regulating the extraction and use of groundwater, establishment of regulatory bodies, rationalisation of power tariffs, and so on. However, with regard to the very large number of private tube-wells in the country (estimated at 21 million) and the fact that most of these are cases of ‘self-supply’, i.e., outside the purview of supply systems, public or private, there is some scepticism about the feasibility of `regulation' and the efficacy of changes in policy or law as remedies for the depletion and contamination of groundwater aquifers. No clear solutions to this difficult problem are in sight as yet and the debate needs to be pursued further. Water Markets Water markets already exist in India mainly in the context of extraction of groundwater through tube-wells and bore-wells but also in relation to surface water in some instances. Many more instances may emerge. There are many who think that this is the route to follow for the future; there are others who are deeply uneasy at the idea of water markets and at the underlying perception of water as a tradable commodity. The advocates of water markets (who view water as a commodity) recommend: ‘Define property rights and allow trading’, but the citizen's right to water (for drinking, cooking and washing) is a part of the right to life, and the water rights of a farmer for irrigation or those of an industry for industrial uses are use-rights; treating either of them as ‘tradable property rights’ has serious implications that need to be studied carefully. The supply of water by private tankers in urban areas and the

burgeoning bottled-water trade are also instances of (entirely avoidable) water markets. If the public system provided an adequate, reliable and safe supply, the demand for tankers or for bottled water may go down sharply. Apart from that, these supplies (and the soft drinks business) have necessarily to draw raw water from somewhere, and that draft may be an unsustainable or inequitable one. The instance of the bore-wells of the Coca Cola Company depriving an entire area in Kerala of its water is well-known. The case went to the High Court and the judgment has invoked the public trust doctrine, but the story is as yet unfinished, as the case may still go to the Supreme Court. Privatisation The paucity of financial resources is pushing the governments, central and state, to think in terms of inviting private sector participation in dam and reservoir projects, which would earlier have been exclusively in the domain of the state. The new Indian National Water Policy, 2002 includes a clause that specifically provides for this. There has been much opposition to the idea of `privatisation of water', whether in relation to projects or in the context of water services, on several grounds. There was a public outcry against the leasing of a 20-km stretch of the Shivalik River in Chattisgarh to a private corporate entity for water supply, and the state tried to cancel the lease but encountered legal difficulties. This, like the Coca Cola case mentioned earlier, is an unfinished story. Pricing of Water The twin propositions that water rates should be regarded as `user charges' and not as a form of taxation, and that the principle behind `user charges' should be `full cost recovery', are important elements in current economic thinking. They may be acceptable in the context of water as an input into economic activity: irrigation, industrial use, water for hotels. However, these principles cannot apply without modification to `water for life' (drinking water). This too cannot be free, but must be priced reasonably, with full economic pricing to the affluent, penal pricing beyond a certain level of use, some degree of subsidisation to the less affluent, and perhaps some free supplies to the very poor. It cannot be said that these issues have been thought through to clarity and finality in India.

Other Issues There are many other issues such as the third tier of local selfgovernment at the level of villages (panchayats) and cities (nagarpalikas) introduced by the 73rd and 74th Amendments to the Constitution. Among the subjects to be devolved to these bodies (known as panchayati raj institutions or PRIs) is water management at the local level. The future role of PRIs in relation to water is a matter of considerable importance. Another matter which demands urgent attention is the problem of the pollution and contamination of water sources and systems that steadily diminishes the quantum available for use. Nepal A large number of rivers and streams flow through Nepal and into India. The nature of the terrain immediately brings to mind the possibility of generation of hydro-electric power, and a number of sites for large projects have been identified. Only a small part of the power so generated can be used in Nepal; the rest would have to be exported, primarily to India. India can also use all the waters that flow from Nepal for irrigation, and would further like to minimise the damage caused by the floods coming down those rivers from time to time. These possibilities give rise to the idea of large projects for building dams and reservoirs in Nepal. (Bangladesh, for its part, has for long been arguing for seven large projects in Nepal for augmenting the lean season flows of the Ganges at Farakka, where the waters are shared between India and Bangladesh.) Against this background, there is a growing sentiment in Nepal that the country's water resources represent the route through which its visions of prosperity can best be realised; that water is to Nepal what oil has been to the Gulf countries, namely, the source of revenues and wealth; and that those revenues will come principally from the export of hydro-electric power to the neighbouring countries, mainly India. Several multi-purpose projects (Karnali, Pancheswar, Saptkosi, etc) have been under discussion between Nepal and India for over three decades, but little progress has been made on any of them, for several reasons: the long history of mistrust and suspicion characterising India-Nepal relations; the growing salience of environmental concerns, concerns about the displacement of people,

and misgivin about large projects in the seismically active Himalayan region; and a degree of dissent, even within Nepal, from the view that the route to prosperity lies in large-scale centralised generation of hydro-electric power for export. There is an àlternative' view in Nepal that advocates decentralised, relatively small, environmentally benign projects (whether for irrigation or for hydro-electric power) primarily for Nepal's own needs rather than for meeting the needs of other countries. Export of electricity is not ruled out, but large generation primarily for export to a single large buyer (India) under inter-governmental arrangements is not considered desirable. It is difficult to say how widespread the àlternative' view is, but that it commands a degree of influence cannot be denied. Opposition to the Arun III HydroElectric Project did eventually result in the World Bank withdrawing from the project; this is regarded as a great loss by the water establishment and other proponents of the mainstream position, but celebrated as an achievement by critics who argue that the abandonment of this unviable project made created a number of smaller, cheaper and quicker alternatives. (For a short while a leading proponent of this view became a government minister, and for a brief period the àlternative' view became `mainstream', but that is no longer the case.) Turning to another aspect, Nepal -- as a land-locked country -attaches a great deal of importance to a navigational outlet to the sea (to a port in India or Bangladesh). At the moment this is not physically feasible, but creating such a possibility as a part of one of the projects that are being talked about remains an important objective of Nepal. Bhutan Bhutan, close to Nepal and like it a mountainous country lying on the southern slopes of the Himalaya between China and India, is flanked on the western and eastern sides by the Indian states of Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh, with Assam as the immediate southern neighbour. The country is heavily forested and richly endowed with water resources. The annual availability of water per capita is put at 75000 m3 in the Bhutan Water Policy document, but the environmental information portal of the World Resources Institute gives a per capita Internal Renewable Water Resources (IRWR)

figure of 43214 m.3 for the year 2001. It is not clear how those two figures are related to each other, but it is clear enough from either figure that the country is exceptionally well-endowed with water, though even that abundance is expected to come under pressure in the future because of the growth of population and the processes of economic development. The most important point to bear in mind about Bhutan is its deep attachment to its cultural and natural heritage and its determination to preserve them. It has adopted what has been described as `the middle path' to sustainable development. At the same time, the country is (understandably) not exempt from the aspirations that other countries entertain for economic development and prosperity. The contrary pulls of these two strands in Bhutanese thinking are evident in the Water Policy document. For instance, there are fine statements of the holistic ecological point of view and indications of social and human sensitivity; at the same time, the language of economics, management and the market-place is also found in many places. It is hoped that the floodtide of `economic development' and `modernity' will not overwhelm Bhutan and make it indistinguishable from the rest of the world and subject to the same ills. In pursuance of the objective of earning revenues from the country's hydro-power potential, Bhutan has undertaken certain projects with Indian assistance. It is not within the scope of this paper to go into the details of the projects that are in operation; under construction; and in the visualisation/formulation/planning stages (Chuka, Chuka II, Tala, Kurichu, Sunkosh, Manas, etc). What needs to be noted is that Chuka is widely regarded as an example of successful intercountry cooperation for mutual benefit; and that the inflow of revenues from the sale of electricity to India has been very large in relation to the country's GDP and has made the country prosperous in economic terms, with a per capita income much higher than that of its neighbours. However, the question whether the transformation in the economy has been accompanied by ecological and social changes and whether these warrant any concern, has not been adequately debated. If further expansions of, and additions to, hydro-electric capacity take place as planned, would it be possible for Bhutan to continue to adhere to the middle path? That question is of

course one for the Bhutanese to reflect on. Bangladesh Crisscrossed by rivers and streams, Bangladesh is a water-abundant country with a per capita water-availability of 8444 m3 in 2002 (World Resources Institute). (Another study Ahmad et al 2001 - puts the annual per capita water availability at 12162 m3 in 1991, 10305 m3 in 2000, and 7670 m3 in 2025.) As the country acts as a narrow funnel through which three large river systems (the Ganges, Brahmaputra and the Meghna) drain into the sea, its major national problem is the periodical occurrence of disastrous flooding. There was catastrophic flooding in 1988 and again in 1998. However, though floods dominate the thinking of Bangladesh, there is also a perception of a critical shortage of water in the lean season in some parts of the country. Most Bangladeshi writings on water tend to make the point that 94% of the water resources of the country originate beyond its borders, and that 54 rivers and streams flow into Bangladesh from India. This consciousness, combined with that of India's size, colours Bangladeshi thinking and gives it a sense of vulnerability. The water establishment of Bangladesh is acutely aware that, for water security as well as for flood-management, the country needs Indian cooperation. Against this background, there are four prominent concerns in the national thinking about water: flood-management; water-sharing with the upper riparian; internal water-resource management; and the protection and preservation of the natural environment. The massive floods of 1988 brought international attention to this problem, resulting in the Flood Action Plan (FAP) financed by a large number of donor countries. The FAP was a very large programme consisting of numerous studies and some pilot projects. However, it was subjected to severe criticism right from the beginning, and soon fell into disrepute, largely because it was perceived as a top-down, non-participative and essentially donor-driven plan. On water-sharing with upper riparians, treaties or understandings with India on several rivers are favoured. A Treaty with India on water-sharing in the Ganges was signed on 12 December, 1996.

Similar understandings are felt to be necessary on at least eight or nine of the 54 rivers and streams that cross the India-Bangladesh border. Currently, talks are in progress on water-sharing on the Teesta. (Another strong Bangladeshi perception is that of the need for the augmentation of the lean season flows of the Ganges, and the Government of India is in agreement with that view, but there is a divergence between the two countries on how the augmentation is to be brought about). Turning to internal water-resource management, the work done under the aegis of the FAP (though there was disenchantment with that programme) provided useful inputs when, eventually, the preparation of a new National Water Management Plan and a National Water Policy was undertaken. (The National Water Policy was published in 1999, but it still remains largely a declaration of intent lacking in formal backing and not translated into operational plans.) In these new initiatives, the old top-down engineering and structural approaches were moderated by a greater awareness of non-structural measures; the importance of people's participation in planning; environmental concerns; and institutional change. At the same time, the influence of the new processes of `economic reform' is seen in the references to water as an economic good, the importance of pricing as an instrument of water management, private sector participation, and so on. The balancing of these divergent perceptions seems somewhat uneasy and precarious. Environmental concerns are now part of the climate of opinion and have acquired a degree of importance even in the water resources establishment that was earlier primarily driven by engineering considerations. The concern is largely focussed on the control of the incursion of salinity from the sea and on the protection of the wetlands (the Sunderbans). In recent years, the presence of arsenic in groundwater has become a major concern. This problem has been experienced in parts of India as well, though perhaps not in as acute a form as in Bangladesh. Different explanations have been given for this phenomenon; expert opinions seem to vary on this (and therefore on the appropriate responses), and finality does not seem to have been reached. As groundwater `development' has been extensive in Bangladesh, this is a serious national problem.

Another emerging concern relates to the implications for Bangladesh of the predictions of climate change. This is a subject that is currently under study in both official and academic circles. As yet, there is much uncertainty as to what the future holds for the country. As the studies progress, this is bound to become a central concern. Convergences and Divergences Convergences Concerns about food security and apprehensions of future waterscarcity are common to all the countries. The response to these concerns at the administrative, technical and planning levels in governments is generally characterised by a predilection in favour of big supply-side interventions, with some variations in the strength of this way of thinking from country to country. There is also some advocacy of àlternatives' in all the countries, again with variations from country to country. The philosophy of `middle path' is strongest in Bhutan. The àlternative voices' are moderately strong in Nepal, with a degree of influence on official thinking, but the mainstream view continues to regard water as Nepal's oil, i.e., as a potential source of revenue and wealth. In Pakistan and India there is a strong polarisation between the believers in big, centralised, technology-driven, supply-side projects as the only answers to future needs, and those who oppose the approach as unsustainable, destructive and inequitable, and advocate local, small, communityled alternatives that are (in their view) environmentally benign and socially just. The polarisation is particularly marked in India, with an inadequacy or even absence of constructive civil discourse between the `dam-builders' and the ènvironmentalists', either side describing the other as a `lobby'. In Bangladesh, there are not many possibilities of big projects, but the official water establishment, as in India, continues to be dominated by the engineering point of view. Apart from the already completed Teesta Barrage, the proposed Ganges Barrage is perhaps the one big project in view, and it is regarded as very important. Essentially, however, the `big project' point of view is reflected in the advocacy of several large dams in Nepal as a means of augmenting the lean season flows of the Ganges. There is also general agreement at the official levels and among the intelligentsia (especially the economists) on the `potential' of hydroelectric power that exists in the river systems of the countries, and, in particular, in the Himalayan rivers, and the need to exploit as much

of that potential as possible. The critics question such projects on environmental and other grounds, and contend that the need for large centralised power-generation can be minimised by a combination of demand-management, efficiency in energy use, getting more energy out of capacities already created, extensive local decentralised generation, and so on. They also have strong doubts about the wisdom of building large reservoirs in the seismically active Himalayan region. Environmental concerns are widely shared, but are not equally strong or influential in all countries. This is of course a central concern in Bhutan. There are powerful movements in Pakistan, India and Nepal, but they are not often very effective, and despite the existence of Ministries for Environment, the concern cannot be said to be `mainstream'. At the official level, and among the neo-liberal economists who are influential in the `economic reform' process, there is a tendency to juxtapose `development' and `environment' and to argue that the latter should not be over-emphasised to the detriment of the former. That (questionable) point of view finds much implicit (and sometimes explicit) support from the officials of the World Bank and the ADB. Floods loom large in the thinking of both India and Bangladesh. Despite the disenchantment with the FAP, mainstream opinion in Bangladesh is not wholly negative about embankments. Similarly, despite the recognition of the weaknesses and failures of embankments official thinking in India still considers them necessary. An offshoot of the concern about floods is the Indian river-linking project. The use of groundwater is massive in India and quite substantial in Bangladesh. The mining of groundwater and the rapid depletion of aquifers in some parts of the country is a major problem in India, and one which has not been attended to in any significant measure. In Bangladesh, the main problem is the extensive presence of arsenic, which is also experienced, though perhaps not to the same extent, in West Bengal and Bihar in India. Another emerging concern in all the countries is the problem of pollution and contamination of water sources and systems. Potentially, this could be a major source of intra-country and inter-

country friction. However, it cannot be said that there is adequate awareness of this problem in any of the countries. It follows that serious action to deal with this threat to resource-availability has not begun, or even been thought of. Divergences Divergences have occurred essentially in relation to water-sharing in (or projects on) rivers that cross (or flow along) national boundaries. Some of these have been resolved through treaties. However, some divergences continue. The Indus Water Treaty of 1960 between India and Pakistan has acquired a reputation internationally as a successful instance of conflict-resolution, but currently there are a few unresolved disputes under the ambit of the Treaty. In particular, talks about the Baglihar hydro-electric project have failed, and Pakistan has moved for arbitration, invoking the arbitration clause of the Treaty for the first time in its history. The Ganges Water-Sharing Treaty between India and Bangladesh (1996), after a shaky start due to low flows in 1997, has been working reasonably well, and neither country has asked for a review. Whether it will continue to work well will depend on the state of the political relationship between the two countries. In other words, here, as in the case of the Indus Treaty, it is politics and not water that will determine the future of the Treaty. Apart from the Ganga (Ganges), there are many other rivers that cross the India-Bangladesh border, and agreements may be needed on some of them. However, the current state of India-Bangladesh relations is perhaps not conducive to the conclusion of further treaties. Meanwhile the Government of India's announcement of a major river-linking project (including possible diversions from the Ganga and the Brahmaputra) has caused much concern in Bangladesh. However, with a change of Government in India, that project is under review. As far as India-Nepal relations are concerned, a new chapter seemed to open with the Mahakali Treaty of February 1996, but action under

the Treaty has remained stalled because of certain differences between the two countries. We need not go into those differences in detail, but the point is that much time has already been lost without a resolution of these differences, and nearly nine years after the signing of the Treaty there is still little progress on its implementation. It must also be noted that despite the ratification of the Treaty by the Parliament of Nepal, there is a significant body of opinion against the Treaty in the country. Further progress on these matters will have to wait for a degree of internal stability in Nepal. Ramaswamy R Iyer is an honorary research professor at the Centre for Policy Research (CPR), New Delhi, India.

A Policy Management Approach to Pakistan's Water Resources Dr. Zaigham Habib

he international mapping of water resources by the UN and other leading international research organizations has placed Pakistan among the world's water-scarce countries (FAO, IWMI 2004). The existing per capita water availability of 1,100 m3/person fell as low as 900 m3/person during a drought year, 2000-2001. The country's supply of water is consistently decreasing because of reduced river inflows, groundwater depletion and erratic rainfall. On the demand and management sides, population growth, urbanization, increased water losses, and declining water quality has had a major impact on per capita water availability. Emerging domestic and industrial requirements are key factors competing for the use of water, while ecological imbalances, salinization, and aquifer depletion are typical consequences of the overuse of water resources. New water quantities and allocations are required for domestic and industrial uses, and for use in planned agriculture, as well as to conserve groundwater aquifers, rivers, and lakes, protect aquatic life in these water bodies, and maintain water quality. Small users are most gravely affected by canal water scarcity, aquifer depletion, and land quality deterioration. New water resource development is critical if we are to increase availability during water stress periods while minimizing the impact of water withdrawal from natural streams. The management of water resources in Pakistan faces challenges in the context of development, new allocations, environment, and conservation.

Currently, Pakistan utilizes more than 75 percent of its surface water, 100 percent of useable groundwater, and the major part of rainfall in the plains. River water is central to the rural setup of Pakistan's economy, employment and social structure. With more than 90 percent of developed resources being utilized, agriculture is considered a low-performing sector. Extensively developed agricultural areas are additionally over-drafting groundwater and face increasing competition from other uses. The actual demand for water and hydropower has compelled the Government of Pakistan and water managers to increase the water supply and fully regulate all water resources. Already, cities are reaching out to more distant sources of water supply and relocating industries closer to water sources. It is clear that the future will be heavily concerned with managing a dwindling resource and mitigating the adverse impacts of a profligate past. With the start of the 21st century, there is growing realization of gross water scarcity, and the need for high water use efficiency. Water, which was traditionally a technical and administrative subject, has become an issue of public concern and media coverage. The current polarization of political and administrative institutions on matters of water resource development, sharing, and distribution, has peaked. While there is a clear difference of opinion on development options, the management vision has become obscured after ineffective experimentation with participatory and decentralized management models. Non-agreement on basic water information is more than a provincial interest, there is a serious lack of accounting for water availability and demand. Efforts towards “a management shift” can be seen in new water strategy, policy and committed priorities, especially at the policymaker and donor levels. A national water strategy was formulated recently, and the national water policy is still under discussion. However, the country still has to screen and select achievable objectives, define an implementation framework, and set rules and criteria to regulate competing allocations while conserving the basic resource base. This paper reviews Pakistan's water scenario by briefly commenting on the proposed policy and strategy documents in the first section and presenting an account of water resources, agriculture assessment, different water demands, and sustainability constraints in the second section.

Water Policy, Strategy, and Institutions The last two decades have been a globally active period for water policy and strategy formulations. The issues and conflicts related to technical and legal management of shared water resources, water security against increasing depletion and quality deterioration, and urban versus rural water demands have forced countries and water managers to take action. Supporting national water policies are meant to change some of the existing priorities and strategies. In developing countries, the insistence of donors (especially the World Bank and Asian Development Bank) has been a major factor pushing countries towards “new water policy documents”. Experiments so far have shown that the private sector is not capable of investing in small, extensively scattered, and low-producing agricultural economies. Over the last few years, the Government of Pakistan has developed and approved a National Water Strategy (2004) and launched a draft policy document. This policy draft is not very different from other South Asian countries implementing donor-supported reforms towards privatization and infrastructure development to increase water availability, drinking, and domestic supplies. The wording of the general declaration is global: “that water is essential for life, a finite resource which must be managed by all stakeholders, valuation important and agriculture efficiency must increase”. The water policy of Pakistan (Engineering Council 2005) has following objectives: (i) provision of drinking supply to all, (ii) food security, (iii) sanitation, (iv) reuse of water, (v) conserving environment and ecology, (vi) flood management, (vii) infrastructure security, and (viii) optimization of water use efficiency. It claims five guiding principles: (i) equity, (ii) efficiency, (iii) participatory decision-making, (iv) accountability, and (v) sustainability. Key water issues and a need for integrated planning are mentioned in the document. However, the objectives and strategy do not indicate a focus, envisioned change from the present setup or methods to achieve these changes. The water strategy document (National Water Strategy 2004) is grossly lacking in its presentation of the nature of existing problems and the pros and cons of different options to solve them. The conflicts and required compromises at different levels, from

allocation to infrastructure development, remain ambiguous in terms of their presentation and proposed actions. For example, the total water requirement of different water use sectors exceeds the total water available. The strategy is silent on how the sectors will share the water shortage. What types of rules and implementation procedures are required to ensure allocations to different sectors? Another example is environment, which is described as a priority area. However, discussion on the water needs of environmental concerns (within and outside rivers, lakes, and aquifers) and any mechanism to allocate this water is neither envisioned nor proposed. The importance of water recycling and declining drainage in the Indus River valleys is ignored. Despite the high percentage of international consultants in the sector, it lags behind in the implementation of contemporary sciences. If the current policy and strategy documents are not to be considered a “final product”, but part of the transitory process, and if the correct procedures and directions are selected to plan, test, and refine an implementation framework, it is possible that a practical water framework might evolve in a decade or so. The process followed by the European Union is a good example to understand the complexity of reaching a clear water vision, priorities, and firm actions. The EU started evolving its water policy in 1970; it took 18 years for most countries to reach the required water quality standards (1970-88) and a further 14 years to compile a comprehensive EU framework (2002). The framework targets to achieve ecological safety by 2015. Institutional Approaches Water Sector Organizations Since 1947, there has been a debate on the water sector's organizational limitations, governance issues, users' interface, and management gaps. The original water management model is administrative and colonial. The Public Works Department of India, responsible for development and operation of water resources, roads, and railways, was organized as top-bottom hierarchy like all other departments of the time. The model was close to the British administrative model in structure, but predominantly colonial in management and operation (Ali 1995) of the system. The irrigation network was operated by powerful provincial irrigation departments having their own legislative, judicial, and administrative powers. Development decisions were made with the help of special missions

and commissions, which also functioned as arbitrators among the provinces, in case of disputes. The need for a central planning and management institution arose in the 1950s. Trans-boundary water sharing, reservoir operations, and hydropower generation were issues beyond the provincial irrigation boundaries. The World Bank, a major donor to the Indus works, proposed a semi-autonomous organization at the central level. WAPDA (Water and Power Development Authority) was made custodian of all resources and emerged as the main operator of the power sector and major developer of large-scale infrastructure for irrigation and drainage. Meanwhile, need for a basin level planning on one hand and local decentralized management on the other continued to be mentioned by the donors. Pakistan, like other South Asian countries, has experimented with management changes in the water sector since 1980, but without much success (Bandaragoda 2003, World Bank 2005). A new and conceptually different institutional approach was introduced about ten years ago through participatory irrigation management (PIM). The Government of Pakistan has now adopted the PIM approach as a condition laid down by its donors. A seminar on “Participatory Irrigation Management” was sponsored by the Ministry of Water and Power and the World Bank's Economic Development Institute (EDI) in October 1994. This was the first introduction to the concept. The EDI sponsored another workshop in October 1995, during which representatives from four provinces agreed on a tentative action plans for institutional change. The diverse opinions and lukewarm welcome by water managers led to some pilot projects in selected locations. After pilot experiments at the district level by the international research organization, IWMI, in Punjab and Sindh, the authorities themselves selected larger pilot areas comprising whole canal commands. The Provincial Irrigation and Power Departments (PID) have been renamed the Provincial Irrigation and Drainage Authorities (PIDA Act 1997), but new management pattern is still not emerged. The latest priority of the water sector is provision of drinking water and sanitation to rural and urban population. In the rural areas, district governments headed by the nazims are responsible for planning, investment, and control of municipal services, including

water supply, sanitation and solid waste disposal. Principally, the PHED (Public Health and Engineering Department), which had been responsible for the development and management of rural water supply, has been decentralized and placed under the respective District Coordination Officers. The communities wishing to build a scheme will form Community Based Organisations (CBO) and contribute a part of the capital. In the urban areas, Water and Sanitation Agencies (WASAs) and municipal bodies remain responsible for the management of water supply and sanitation services. While many of these are run relatively well, most of them suffer from inadequate funds due to the way they are financed. Where unable to raise their own money, WASAs must rely on ad hoc inputs of money from central government reserves which are infrequent and inadequate. Hence, most urban water systems are in a poor state of repair and without any real ability to improve the situation. Key Legislation Defining Water Rules and Institutions The Canal and Drainage Act of 1873 is a key piece of legislation providing rules for irrigation water distribution and conflict resolution at the user level. The act has been supplemented after 1950 in the areas of drainage, groundwater, agriculture research, ownership of river water resources, and new institutions. The Punjab Soil Reclamation Act of 1952 governed the preparation of drainage schemes and other drainage-related works. The Act was later extended to cover the whole country. In 1982, Water User Ordinances were promulgated to enable the formation of Water User Associations (WUAs) to participate in water management at the watercourse level. The WUAs made a good start by participating in the improvement of more than 10,000 watercourses. In several cases, WUAs contributed up to 55 percent of the cost of civil works for improvement of watercourses both in cash, kind, and in the form of labour, but these generally became dormant once the improvement works were completed. In order to introduce institutional reforms in the irrigation and drainage sector, the provinces enacted new Acts in 1997. These Acts provide the legal framework for establishment of Provincial Irrigation and Drainage Authorities (PIDAs), Area Water Boards (AWBs), and Farmers' Organizations (FOs). A complete and locally accepted water management model is still far

away (Habib 2005), which is evident from the current efforts of the Government and difficulties faced in the development, management, and regulation of water resources. The diversity of provincial water visions is clear from the ongoing processes. The institutional hesitation in accepting the current draft water policy and â&#x20AC;&#x153;new modified assertionsâ&#x20AC;? in the World Bank's report of 2005 indicate that substantial adjustments are expected in water resources management. Water Resources of Pakistan Pakistan has achieved extensive development of its water resources, supported by highly inter-linked rivers, a widespread canal network, and extraction of groundwater by the majority of individual farmers. Reasonably reliable river inflow data are available from 1940. The estimation of useable, recycle-able groundwater resource remains tricky. A range of values exists, based on assumed seepage losses, aquifer changes, or well density. A good water balance within a spatial boundary needs good information on inflow and outflow across the boundary, infiltration coefficients, and aquifer changes. Rainfall in the basin is well monitored for the major areas; however, volumetric estimates of effective rainfall remain controversial. High variability of rainfall is one of factors causing uncertainty. Rainfall Rainfall data since 1960 are available for 35 MET offices, and even earlier data for a few big cities. The actual rainfall in the basin varies widely, both spatially and temporally. The average rainfall varies from 1,400 mm in the north to less than 100 mm in the south. However, the measuring consistency of these data are difficult to ensure. Eighty-five percent of the rainfall collected through PAN is considered effective by WAPDA consultants (WSIP 1990). The average, minimum, and maximum amounts of rainfall in the basin after 1960 are shown in Tables 1 and 2 below. Following the monsoon pattern, rainfall quantities can vary in the range of 30 maf to 110 maf. Table 1: Annual average rainfall in different Provinces in mm Data 1960-2002 Period Punjab NWFP Sindh Balochistan April-September 254 308 131 72 October-March 79 228 16 63 July-September 202 279 109 50 Average Annual 333 536 147 135

Pakistan 158 80 118 238

44 Table 2: Effective Rainfall in the Indus Basin below RIM stations Average Average 19652001-02 1994-95 1960-90 2004 Rainfall in millimeters (mm) 304 238 153 553 Rainfall million acre feet (MAF) 61.4 49.5 30 110 Source: Pakistan Metereological (MET) Directorate for the rainfall measured at 26 satations

Normally, there is no disagreement on the rainfall measured at a particular location in millimeters. While, computed volumetric quantities and effective rainfall from the provincial and basin boundaries vary widely. A detailed discussion on rainfall estimates and utilization under different hydrological conditions is beyond the scope of this paper, but references can be made to detailed studies carried out at different levels (Waijjne 1996, Kijne.J.W. 96, Habib 2004, Chandio 2003, Bhutta 2004). Based on different analyses, rainfall's quantitative contribution is summarized as follows. The agricultural land of 18 million ha in the Indus Basin uses 8 maf to 22 maf rainfall, which is 40 to 20 percent of the total rainfall in the basin. The groundwater recharge from the rainfall is estimated in the range of 15 percent (Habib 2004, Chandio 2004), and 5 maf to 14 maf from dry to wet years. The drainage component of rainfall in the plains is estimated at 6 maf under average conditions (WAPDA 1989). A range of 4 maf (dry conditions) to 18 maf (wet conditions) is calculated by a recent study (Study III 2005, Environmental concerns of all provinces). Estimates also show that more than 65 percent of the rainfall could be utilized in the basin for vegetation, groundwater recharge and drainage outflow. The rest goes to unaccounted water bodies recharge (indirectly used) and non-beneficial evapotranspiration. The beneficial components of rainfall reduce with the development of urban centers, infrastructure and reduction in the size of water bodies. The contribution of rainfall to groundwater aquifers can substantially increase during a wet spell followed by a dry period and in areas with declining groundwater. Surface Water Resources The river inflows of the major rivers of the Indus Basin have been monitored since 1922 (Ravi, Sutlej, Chenab), 1937 (Jhelum), and 1960 (Indus). The measurements after 1978 represent the existing system with two big reservoirs. The historical trends indicate the influence of the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960 and physical changes carried out during 1960-80. There is a declining trend of river inflows however, the maximum inflows can be double of the

minimum (Table 3). Table 3: Rivers Inflow Pattern after 1940 in MAF Period for Averages

Western Rivers

Eastern Rivers

Indus Rivers

1940 – 1978

139.38

22.54

161.92

1978 – 2004

137.74

7.39

145.1

1999 – 2004

115.39

1.42

116.8

Max year inflow

186.79

32.78

209.5

Min year inflow

99.99

0.90

101.1

Apart from the Indus Basin, there are two smaller river basins in Balochistan. The Makran Coastal Basin includes the Dasht, Hingol, and Porali rivers. These rivers flow southwesterly and discharge into the Arabian Sea. The closed Kharan Basin comprises the Kharan Desert and Pishin Basin and includes the Pishin, Mashkhel, and Baddo rivers which discharge into shallow lakes and ponds that dry out completely in the hot season. The total inflow of the two basins is less than 4 MAF (5 BCM) annually. These are flash streams and do not have a perennial supply. About 25 percent of the inflow is used for flood irrigation. Surface Water Allocated and Diverted to Canals The monitoring and recording of river diversions to canals is carried out at all head works from the date they commence operation. The discharge data recorded in the morning is used by the Irrigation Departments, IRSA (Indus River System Authority) and WAPDA for official purposes. Generally, diversion data are accepted as accurate, but the discharge table is rarely updated and the erratic pattern of water losses in river reaches has raised doubts about the accuracy of monitoring data. Recently, a telemetric system was installed to measure river-flows passing through all river structures, but the calibration and full operation of this system has yet to be established. Out of a 145 maf average inflow for all rivers after 1978 at the RIM stations, 114.4 maf is allocated for the expected annual canal diversions to the four provinces (Water Allocation Accord 1991). Based on the actual data for 1978-82, a 10-daily flow pattern is suggested for individual or groups of canals. Only 25 percent of the time, actual diversions follow proposed pattern of the WAA. These diversions are constrained by river inflows and reservoir storages, while the capacity of the canals is much greater. Average diversions from 1978-2004 were 101.6 maf. The peak diversions of 111 maf

occurred in 1996 with a supportive inflow pattern and maximum storage. After the completion of three on-going canal projects, 3 maf additional canal supplies are expected. Table 4: Provincial canal allocation 1991 and average post Tarbela Diversions Allocation WAA Diversions Average 1976-2004 (MAF) Kharif Rabi Annual Kharif Rabi Annual Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan Sum

37.07 33.94

18.87 14.82

55.95 48.76

33.49 28.94

19.04 14.22

52.54 43.15

3.48 2.85 77.34

2.30 1.07 37.06

5.78 3.92 114.41

2.36 1.22 66.01

1.52 0.82 35.6

3.87 2.02 101.58

Table 5: The maximum and minimum canal diversions between 1978 to 2005 - MAF Diversions

Punjab

Sindh

NWFP

Balochistan

Gross diversions

Maximum

58.20

50.01

6.11

3.17

111.11

Minimum

37.06

31.57

2.91

1.32

77.26

The average outflow at the last barrage on the Indus, Kotri, is 33.8 maf (1978-2004). Natural uses of this water along the rivers are not formally accounted for, including diversions to lakes, aquatic and ecological systems, depending upon river flow and vegetation directly supported by the rivers. A conservative estimate of these uses is between 5 to 10 maf (Study III Volume 1). The groundwater excess pumpage can be up to 15 maf during a dry year (2000-01), which is not easy to replenish in a wet year (1994-95). Table 6: Water Balance Summary of the Indus Basin â&#x20AC;&#x201C; MAF Average year Wet year Category 1993-94 1994-95 Total recharge of groundwater aquifer 65.99 72.25

Dry Year 2000-01 55.1

Total groundwater extraction Groundwater Balance

69.91 -14.8

67.4 -1.4

71.13 1.1

Groundwater Resources The groundwater aquifer in the sweet zone of the Indus Basin is a reliable and rechargeable secondary source. It has played a major role in providing extended water access outside the canal irrigated areas. Fresh shallow groundwater has been used for centuries for domestic and animal consumption, but the last two decades have seen the extensive development of shallow tubewells operated by

electric, diesel, or mechanical power. The use of groundwater has become a critical factor in all water use sectors. Shallow aquifers are tempered in moderate-quality water zones also. Four major waterlogged areas where deep wells were installed under the Salinity Control and Reclamation Projects (SCARP) in 1965 are now facing new threats of irreversible water table depletion. More than 0.6 million tubewells (NESPAK, World Bank) are operating in the Indus Basin. The design capacity of deep electric wells (about 4 percent of the total wells) is 2 to 4 cubic feet per second (cusec), mostly functioning for city water supply and industry. Private shallow wells have an average capacity of 1 cusec. With an average utilization of 8 hours per day and discharge capacity of 1 cubic feet per second, these wells can pump more than 70 MAF water. Groundwater pumpage is the most beneficial in non-perennial canal-irrigated agricultural areas. The areas have higher per hectare canal supplies in summer, compensating for the winter when groundwater becomes a primary resource. This water is economically most beneficial for the farmers and Government because of multicropping and high-value crops. Groundwater quality has a high dependence on soil type, surface flow patterns, topography, and irrigation practices. Currently, groundwater contributes 35 percent of the total water available to users. The water quality of about 45 percent of the area is marginal to brackish (World Bank 1997). In the permanent brackish region, seepage from rivers and canals forms a shallow fresh water layer. Over-extraction of groundwater and change in water levels can cause the depletion and rupture of the shallow sweet layer. Water Demand and Supply Gaps It is normal for projected water demand to be higher than the actual water supply; the situation becomes serious when supply is less than the committed allocations and actual demand. Officially, water shortage is computed against official commitments, while the actual shortage (from the user's perspective) is the quantity required to meet existing water needs. With the increase in demand from different sectors, the targets of the system may become redundant. Agriculture is the primary water use sector in Pakistan where demand and use have gone beyond the original planning. Farmers extract water from aquifers, lakes and ponds, and sometimes directly

from rivers. For water managers, one of the consequences of this situation can be the gradual irrelevance of monitoring and evaluation processes. The following sections briefly discuss the current demandsupply gap with reference to different perspectives. System Shortages with Respect to Commitments Targets set by the Water Allocation Accord of 1991 At the basin and provincial levels, WAPDA, IRSA, and the Irrigation Departments operate to deliver quantitative seasonal allocations (agreed in the 1991 WAA) to the provinces and operate reservoirs and link canals to provide the main canals' discharge according to the 10 daily allocations of the WAA. Below the RIM (rivers inflow monitoring) stations, average canal diversions are short of about 8 maf annually against an allocation of 111.35 maf. The actual annual diversions vary from 94 maf to 111 maf with an average of 103.4 maf (1978-2005). Hence, in a good year, the allocation target is achieved, while in a worse situation, the target remains short by 22 maf (only 89 maf diversions in 2001). Three non-perennial canal systems (Katch, Rani and Thal) are under construction, with an allocation of 4 maf. With the completion of these canals, average diversions will increase, and only during exceptionally low summer flows will these targets not be achieved. However, average diversions will still remain within the approved target of 1991. Targets set at the Design Stage of Canals â&#x20AC;&#x153;Scarcity by designâ&#x20AC;? was the approach adopted in Punjab and northern India for the development of irrigation. It developed into a widespread network, low proposed cropping intensities and low water allowance. The design capacity of the irrigation network was based on design allocation for summer plus 10 percent to 30 percent capacity margins. Canal command areas with less reliable flows were provided with high capacity margins. Because of river flow shortage, 35 percent of the agriculture areas were not entitled to river supplies in winter, while surplus water could be supplied to these canals on low priority. The systems in the lower Indus were designed after 1947. Water allowances and canal capacities were kept two to three times higher than the earlier systems of the Upper Basin. The water allocations of 1991 acknowledge the fact that available surface water in summer is less than existing full capacity. About 10 percent more water can be diverted in summer if canals are operated

at the authorized supply. At least another 10 percent can be diverted by utilizing full canal capacity. The situation in winter is improved, as 25 percent extra water is provided through reservoirs. This situation clearly shows that temporal water distribution has been improved, especially in winter, while canals can draw 20 percent more surface water in summer. Water Shortage against Actual Agriculture Demands All estimates, official and unofficial, indicate shortage and stress with respect to actual demand. The estimated quantities of present and future demand vary widely because of different assumptions on efficiency, recharge, and limitation in accounting for uses. The water balances carried out in the basin also vary in estimates of rainfall and groundwater. The National Water Strategy computes existing and future water requirements to address crop demand while considering population growth and required agriculture production. For the base scenario of the year 2000, the estimated 'shortfall' is 12.6 MAF. For the lowgrowth scenario, 32 MAF more water will be required in 2010 and 31 MAF in 2025. The Strategy suggests that the canal head requirements will increase by over 19 MAF by 2010 and remain around 18 MAF by 2025. This increase will be in the range of additional requirements. The approach suggests that water equal to existing shortage should be saved by improving efficiency. Table 7: Irrigation Water Shortages in MAF in million acre feet (MAF) 2000/01 2010/11 2024/25 High Demand scenario Lower demand scenario

12.59 12.61

66.64 31.93

51.2 30.26

The Framework for Action (FFA) prepared by the Pakistan Water Partnership (PWP) indicates very high water shortages: 40 MAF in 2010 and 107 MAF in 2015 (Framework for Action 2001). High estimates are because of 30 percent assumed gross efficiency, low groundwater potential (15 maf as compared to 45 maf by the national strategy). The message of this scenario is the extreme possible situation, if other things remain at their usual level. The water balances in recent years provide more detailed information. Some important findings are: i.

At the basin scale, current irrigation shortages are mainly

outside the canal irrigated areas in summer. Water shortage in the non-perennial areas during winter is mostly compensated by groundwater extraction. The saline areas have a high dependence on river supplies, limited uses of groundwater, and low final efficiencies. Table 8: Estimation of the Crop Water Requirements

ii.

The areas cropped and partially irrigated outside canals commands are about 30 percent. The traditional Sailaba (riverine belt) and Barrani (rain fed) areas are shifting to well irrigation. Agriculture here depends partly on unauthorized supplies from water bodies, including rivers. The water needs of these areas are shown by different studies, especially indicating provincial water needs; however, they have not been considered in planning. iii. The existing net water shortage in agriculture is about 10 MAF in a wet year to 25 MAF in dry year. A wet year may have a gross excess recharge in the range of 5 MAF and replenish water bodies. Above-normal summer rains and high river flows are critical in maintaining sustainable water resources availability. iv. Agriculture water demand is not increasing linearly or as a function of area because new cropped areas have a bigger share of the non-irrigated or well-irrigated areas, having a smaller impact on demand and higher water use efficiency. v. Actual water uses in agriculture will decrease if the present scenario continues. The surface water availability is already showing a decreasing trend as the residual flows from the eastern rivers and existing storage decreases. The shallow aquifer may drop below the existing pumpage level. Domestic and Industrial Sectors According to the National Water Strategy, access to water for domestic purposes in the urban areas is limited to about 83 percent

of the population. About 57 percent of the people have piped supply to their homes whereas in other mainly poor areas, people get water either from community taps, hand pumps, wells or pay a heavy price to water vendors. The present water use for municipal and industrial supplies in the urban sector is 4.3 MAF. Most urban water is supplied through groundwater except for the cities of Karachi and Hyderabad and part of the supply to Islamabad. Demand is expected to increase to about 12.1 MAF by the year 2025. The present domestic water use in rural areas is estimated at 1 MAF. Most rural water is supplied from groundwater except in saline groundwater areas where irrigation canals are the main source of domestic water. Only about 53 percent of the rural population has access to drinking water from public water supply sources. The remaining population gets their drinking water supply from streams, canals, ponds or springs etc. Water consumed by major industries is about 1.2 MAF (1.45 BCM) per year. Most of the industrial establishments use groundwater and abstract it at their own expense. It is estimated that about 0.023 MAF of water is provided to industries through municipal water supplies. Environmental Needs All Indus Basin rivers are threatened by dryness in their lower reaches as a result of increased upstream diversions. The gradual shrinking of rivers reduces the natural recycling process of the flood plains and water bodies. The rangelands become artificially irrigated, utilized by the infrastructure, or deserted. The lakes are partially provided with river supplies through canals. Mostly, these supplies are at lower priority than irrigation. A serious situation may arise with the further allocation of river resources without considering environmental and ecological conditions. As shown in the previous sections, unallocated uses are also seriously affecting water availability at spatio-temporal scales. It is further complicated if international water sharing is involved in ensuring environmental and drinking water needs. Other than Indus delta, little information is available about river ecosystems and the impacts of reduced water availability on aquatic life, water bodies, and morphological changes in the rivers. Recently, a baseline survey carried out by the Forest Department in Sindh (Baseline Survey Forest Department 2004) showed more than 41,000 tubewells in the riverine areas. This field situation defies the

forecast as well as riverine area development planning (Vision 2002). The report also shows an increase in riverine area from 1.1 to 2.04 million ha from 1978 to 2004. The existing water uses of the riverine area are estimated at more than 2 maf. A recent study by the Federal Flood Commission Pakistan has suggested flow volume downstream Kotri as two logical sets, a minimum constant flow of 0.3 MAF each month and three month average flood of 5 MAF to be achieved over five years period. This procedure to protect the aquatic life and sea intrusion is based on assumptions that the lower system will remain prone to occasional floods. The dry reaches phenomenon has extended over time span and across river stretches in the Indus and eastern tributary rivers, Ravi and Sutlej. The daily river data for a dry year shows nil flows in the whole year in the tail reaches of the Ravi and Sutlej, and more than ten months in the tail reach of the Indus. The reduced and nil flows in the river reaches directly influences aquatic life and natural vegetation in the riverine (sailaba or kacha) areas. An indirect impact of these reduced flows is the decrease in groundwater recharge. The first ever minimum water requirements of the Indus rivers have been roughly estimated by a preliminary study by the Ministry of Water and Power (Study III 2005). The study recommends 4 MAF annual volume as the minimum reach flows; 30 percent of this flow is expected to be used within river reaches while the rest is conveyed downstream. Water Use Performance Managing Salinity and Drainage Effluent from Different Water Uses Salinity and drainage effluent management problems exist side by side in the saline areas of Pakistan. The constrained drainage intake potential of rivers and water bodies and high effluent generation from irrigation in the saline lower Indus are the processes that need to be managed. The irrigation schemes in the Indus basin were not supported by a drainage infrastructure and low lying rivers were supposed to collect all excessive runoff. A part of the summer floods were stored in flood plains that had a low level of human activity, and recollected in the rivers when ground water levels dropped, supporting sub-surface water movement. This process is greatly disturbed by extensive activity along the rivers, by agriculture, industry and infrastructure. During early periods, irrigation sector

also practiced control by reducing supplies to the waterlogged areas. The practice is not expected to be revised because of increased intensities of high water use crops in saline areas. However, the drainage situation is different in the sweet and moderately useable aquifer zones, because of extensive use of groundwater. The SCARP (Salinity Control and Reclamation Project) schemes implemented between 1965 and 2004 have been windup in these areas. The drainage problem in saline zones has yet to be solved. These areas are now permanently waterlogged because of their flat natural slopes and very high water tables. An annual drainage effluent surplus of about 18 MAF is generated in the saline zone (Habib 2004), of which, only a fraction enters the rivers and two outfall drains, while the rest remains in the high aquifer and evaporates from the soil surface because of high temperatures and nominal groundwater contribution. Two big surface drainage projects on the left bank outfall drain and right bank outfall drains were started as a part of a major interlinked drainage system, but could not be finalized as envisaged. According to the National Drainage Program (NDP); â&#x20AC;&#x153;major issues to be addressed are reducing the drainable surplus dramatically and permanently at source, and providing the Indus Basin Irrigation System with a permanent outlet to the sea to dispose off the drainable surplusâ&#x20AC;?. The permanently saline areas of Pakistan lie mostly in Sindh and Balochistan. A detailed salinity survey was carried out by WAPDA during 1977-79, covering a 16.5 mha gross canal command area in the Indus Basin (Table 9). The water samples were taken from a depth of 4 to 5 m. Based on the salinity analysis (Table 9), about 14 percent of the area (2.4 mha) was declared as moderately saline but useable for agriculture, and 39 percent identified as severely saline with groundwater not usable for agriculture. In the saline area, 11 percent of the soil profile was saline and 27 percent were saline-sodic and sodic. The Soil Survey of Pakistan also conducted a detailed survey of about 6 mha salt-affected soils. The saline and saline-sodic soils were 11 and 86 percent, respectively. Both these surveys indicated that saline-sodic soils shared the major proportion of saltaffected soils. The saline zone was grossly waterlogged. Irrigation and Agriculture Performance The poor performance of the irrigation network and irrigated

55 Table 9: Irrigated Area Within Different Ranges of Groundwater Salinity in Mha

Punjab

9.84

<1500 ppm 6.83

Moderate quality zone 1500-3000 ppm 1.33

NWFP

0.40

0.35

0.50

Sindh

6.24

0.94

0.55

4.74

76 percent

6.4

39 percent

Canal Commands

Gross Area

Fresh Zone

Saline Zone >3000 ppm 1.67

Percentage 17 percent

Balochistan Total 16.5 8.1 2.4 Source: Water Sector Investment Planning Study WAPDA (1990)

agriculture is widely discussed and criticized. The country has invested heavily in projects to improve efficiency at the farm and main network levels through on-farm water management and lining projects. An analysis of the actual impact of these schemes is out of scope here, but remains an issue of the national concern. This section discusses some recent performance estimates to highlight the nature of performance issues. Field Efficiency The conveyance efficiency of irrigation systems in Pakistan is reported to have decreased between 1970 and 1995, as there was an increase in seepage losses. Basin-level projects, the Revised Action Plan of 1978, and the Water Sector Investment Planning Study of 1991 reported a 100 percent increase in losses from the irrigation network as compared to the design estimates. Limited field measurements based on the monitoring of low-performing system during the 1980s and 1990s imparted a bias to these â&#x20AC;&#x153;efficiency projectionsâ&#x20AC;? (Habib 2004). Lieftlick (1965) and earlier studies measured 20 percent water loss in the main and secondary canals and another 20 percent loss in the watercourses of Punjab. The measured losses were even low in Sindh (LIP 1967) due to high groundwater levels. The accumulated losses from the main canal to field level were estimated at 36 percent in the sweet zone and 25 percent in the saline zone, field efficiency was taken at 70 percent. With these assumptions, 45 to 52 percent of surface delivery was supposed to reach crops. In 1978, measured watercourse and main canal losses varied across a huge range. The average conveyance efficiency from the main canal to the watercourse tail was estimated at 37 percent, and 40 percent for sweet and saline areas. This means that, at 70 percent field efficiency, only 25 to 28 percent of the water diverted to a canal could

be used for crops. This low average efficiency is continued to be reported in development projects and in recent debate on reservoirs. It is important to mention that primary data collected by research organizations have shown much lower water losses at the primary and tertiary levels (IIMI 1993, ISRIP 1994, IWASRI 1994, Wijjen 1995, Wolter 1998, Kuper 1998, Habib 1998). Based on an extensive review of water loss measurements, Habib 2004 compiled much higher conveyance efficiencies, showing that more than 40 percent of the diversions could be used by crops and field vegetation. Impact of Groundwater Pumpage on Net Water Use Efficiencies Groundwater pumpage has become an essential practice in areas with good and moderate quality water. It is increasingly pumped in the riverine areas of the saline belt. The useable water quality standards set in 1970 for electrical conductivity (EC), and sodium absorption ratio (SAR) were revised in 1991 by WAPDA to accommodate well growth in the areas earlier considered unusable. The recent drought of 2000-03 has shown groundwater use surpassing new standards. Poor-quality groundwater is mixed with canal flows wherever possible and used without mixing when canal water is not available. High and continuous groundwater extraction has generated a cyclical recharge-discharge process and enhanced final water use efficiencies. The impact of groundwater can be understood from its contribution to actual uses, from irrigation to the domestic sector. About 20 percent of irrigated areas depend solely on groundwater in winter. About 6 million ha or 60 percent of the canal-irrigated areas in Punjab receive 50 percent of the supplies at the farm level from groundwater. One-fourth of canal areas (2 to 3 million ha) use groundwater during the kharif season up to 40 percent. A recent analysis based on a complete water balance computes fairly high net water use efficiency at the secondary and main canal levels. A comparative study (Molden 2001) from three South Asian districts in Pakistan, India, and Sri Lanka showed the efficiency of using water beneficially is 90 percent in the Chishtian district of Pakistan as compared to 85 percent in Hakra, India, and 60 percent in Sri Lanka. The water use quantities created through a groundwater recycling process introduce a secondary efficiency factor in the system. If 60 to

Crop

Max. Farm level

Avg. 1994-04

Max annual

Kg/ha

year

Cotton

576

769

1991

Wheat

2240

2491

2001

Sugarcane

47166

50281

1997

Rice

1901

2050

1999

l These farms can mobilize resources and better invest in

agriculture. l Mid-level owners depend on the farm economy and are better

aware of technology improvements. To maximize their income, these farms try to increase cropping intensities and link it with the local market. l A high percentage of medium-level farms are managed by the owners themselves or partly with share croppers. Ownercultivated farms have the maximum gross value returns (Strosser 1997). Average National Yield of Major Crops

55000

Wheat

Rice

Cotton

2003-04

2001-02

1999-00

1997-98

1995-96

1993-94

1991-92

30000 1989-90

35000

0 1987-88

500

1985-86

40000

1983-84

1000

1981-82

45000

1979-80

1500

1977-78

50000

1975-76

2000

Sugarcane in kg/ha

2500

1973-74

Table 10: Average yield of Major Crops Pakistan Average Yield

The relationship between landholding size and the average yield has shifted with time. During the 1970s, small farms were producing high gross values (RAP 1978), but during the 1990s (Zubair, Habib 2001) medium farmers were performing best due to the following factors.

1971-72

Yield of Major Crops The average yield of all major crops in Pakistan is lower than their claimed potential (RAP 1978, WSIPS 1991). The national average yield of the major crops does not indicate a progressive tend. Only the cotton yield reached the internationally competitive level in 1991, but the next year, declined to the level it had been in 1985 and remains there with small fluctuations. Rice yield is generally low in Pakistan. Wheat and sugarcane have shown an increase, however are still lower than the potential level. The figure and table show the yield of major crops in Pakistan after 1970. Agricultural production analyses by different studies identify a number of yield constraints. Reliable water access has remained an

important factor in agricultural output. The availability of groundwater has a clear impact on all crops. The gross water use and crop yields are directly proportional, tubewell owners having a higher yield, especially in wheat producing areas (Habib 2004, Zubair, Habib 2001). Tail-end farmers and saline areas have lower yields (WB 2006), because of the fresh-water shortage.

wheat,rice,cotton (lint) kg/ha

70 percent of the system losses enter the ground and are pumped back, the net water use efficiency increases to almost equal that of primary efficiency. The strongest quality of groundwater for farmers is its reliable access (Habib 2004): l Cash crop areas with low or non-perennial canal supplies have a high dependence on groundwater to support high cropping intensities. Extensive perennial cropping and groundwater mining in the cotton-wheat zone of southern Punjab and the mixed crop zone of northern Punjab has resulted in a negative recharge-discharge relationship and gradual depletion of groundwater. l Areas with high rainfall are becoming intensively well-irrigated. Recharge from rainfall has apparently enhanced with higher extraction of groundwater aquifers. A consequence is decreased drainage contribution from the catchment and decrease in river gains. l Very high well density in the sweet zone (more than half a million tubewells) is also linked to the small farm sizes. An individual ownership of tubewells provides reliable water access.

Sugarcane

Yield / ha Kg/ha 7000

With mechanization, large farm can fully utilize their resources, while, very large farms tend to crop only a part of the land. These farms have dozens of share croppers and limited investments by them. A cumulative impact of farm level variations of different inputs and constraints can influence production to vary in a wide range. The average production of low quartile is only 10 percent to the 30

percent of the top quartile for the major crops. The lower investment potential and cost benefit ratio of Pakistan's agriculture is also linked with a sharp decrease in subsidies from the Government. The latest World Bank report (WB 2005) appreciates the agriculture sector of Pakistan for being able to avoid the “subsidies trap” as a hopeful factor. However, due to high cost of groundwater pumpage, pesticides, seeds and fertilizers, inputs are expensive and farmers tend to use lower quantities of inputs. The low investment potential is a major factor prohibiting farmers to shift to high quality inputs and divert from the traditional agriculture. During the last ten years, wheat, rice and cotton have experienced a “high production crises”. Apparently farmers cannot increase national wheat yield to the level of 2.5 tons/ha without a decline of prices and risk of delayed selling. Not only that, Government is either failing to manage a good crop or the risk of grain shortage. Pakistan's access to the wheat market is limited for imports. The local storage of wheat is also limited, this year local official purchase of wheat was delayed because storage was already utilized by the imported wheat. The same happens with cotton. Hence, a good crop can not guarantee good returns for farmers. The local and international markets dynamics are mostly not in favor of farmers. Trans-boundary Perspectives At Independence in 1947, the international boundary between India and West Pakistan cut the irrigation system of the Bari Doab and Sutlej Valley Project, originally designed as one scheme, into two parts. The headwork fell to India while the rivers and canals ran through Pakistan. In 1948, India stopped water supply to the canals supported by the Ravi River. India's argument was proprietary ownership of the land and water within its territorial boundaries. A temporary agreement was reached between the two nations - the Inter-Dominion Accord of May 4, 1948. This accord required India to release sufficient waters to the Pakistani regions of the basin in return for annual payments from the Government of Pakistan. Pakistan claims historical water rights to all rivers, but supplies from the eastern rivers, Ravi and Sutlej, can be stopped at any time. The agricultural areas fed by these two rivers were the most fertile in West Punjab, comprising one-third of the total irrigated land. In 1951, the World Bank mediated and proposed joint operation of the basin, which was rejected by both countries.

The negotiations continued for nine years. Finally, the Indus Waters Treaty was signed between Pakistan and India in 1960. According to this agreement, the flows of the three western rivers of the Indus Basin - the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab (except a small quantity used in Kashmir) - were assigned to Pakistan, whereas the entire flow of the three eastern rivers Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej were exclusively given to India. India was also allowed to use the western rivers for hydropower generation, on the condition that the use remained nonconsumptive and flow quantities entering into Pakistan were not reduced. The Indus River Commissions were formed in both countries to supervise and implement the treaty. Pakistan can object to a project on the western rivers and can request the World Bank to appoint an independent inquiry commission. Both countries started developing infrastructure and reservoirs, Pakistan to divert western river flow to the eastern rivers command area and India to store the full flows of the Ravi and Sutlej. The reservoirs and link canals built in Pakistan provided a boost to agriculture by increasing water reliability and winter supplies to the irrigated areas. India has built reservoirs, power plants, and infrastructure for new irrigation and power supply to Rajhastan, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Haryana and Delhi. The development on the eastern front has required the full exploitation of the Ravi, Beas and Sutlej rivers. India is now building supply schemes and power stations on the Chenab, Jhelum and Indus tributaries. Both countries have operated within the framework of the Treaty for over four decades. However, India's extensive planning on the upstream catchments of the western rivers and Pakistan's increasing water stress are likely to pose serious challenges to the IWT. The Salal and Baglihar Hydro Electric Project, and Kishan Ganga project have either been completed or are in progress. Pakistan has raised objections to each major project. In 1960, the Treaty did not consider and plan beyond the agriculture water needs of the three eastern rivers (Ravi, Sutlej and Beas) basins. For irrigation canals, water is transferred from the Western rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) through link canals. While, no commitments are made for the environmental water needs, rivers ecology, wetlands and local uses along the rivers. Water stress on both sides of the border set the perspectives of future disagreements: l The hydropower potential available in the upper catchments of

the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab) on the Indian side and domestic as well as industrial needs may impel India to use water of these rivers. The technical issue of “changes in river regime” can emerge in a more complex way, requiring further arbitration by the World Bank. l The impact of gradual death of the eastern rivers was apparently unforeseen. In addition, post-treaty Indus works compensated for the irrigation diversions from the eastern rivers by transferring water from the western rivers, but, totally ignoring the drinking and other needs of the centuries-old populated catchments, where the groundwater is brackish in huge areas and rainfall very low. Riparian non-agriculture water needs and a gross scarcity of fresh water in the southern areas will put high stress on water management in Pakistan, questioning the logic of an “administrative treaty”. Dr Zaigham Habib is a Lahore-based consultant on water issues; her doctoral thesis focused on the Indus basin irrigation system. References l Bandaragoda, D. J. (1993). The Role of Research-supported Irrigation Policy in Sustainable Irrigated Agriculture: An interpretive precis of the case of Pakistan. International Irrigation Management Institute, Colombo, Sri Lanka. l Bandaragoda, D. J. (1999). Institutional Change and Shared Management of Water Resources in Large Canal Systems: l Chandio, B. A. 2002, Water a vehicle for food security and development of Pakistan, world water vision, water for food and rural development PCRWR contribution to PWP Islamabad. 12 Pages. l FAO, 1998. Crop Evapotranspiration, Guidelines for Computing Crop Water Requirements. Paper no. 56. FAO Rome. l FAO, 2004, Irrigation in Asia in Figures, Water Report 18, FAO, Rome Italy. l Habib Z., 2004, Scope for Reallocation of River Waters in the Indus Basin, 22nd September 2004, ENGREF Montpellier France l Hunting Technical Services Ltd and Sir M. MacDonald & Partners (HTS/MMP). 1965. Lower Indus Report, Physical Resources-Groundwater, Volume 6, Supplement 6.1.3, 4 & 5. West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority. l Indus Waters Treaty. September 1960. Signed by Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India and l Michel Arthur Alloy, The Indus Rivers A study on the effects of Partition, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 594. l National Water Strategy. 2003. Pakistan Water Gateway. http://www.waterinfo.net.pk/ l PNC The Pakistan National Conservation Strategy 1998. Where we are, where we should be and how to get there. Environment and Urban Affairs

61 Division GOP and IUCN. Islamabad. l PPSGDP, 2000. Institutional Framework for groundwater management and regulation in Punjab. Technical report No. 38. Punjab Private sector Groundwater Development Project Consultants. Lahore. Pakistan l Punjab Irrigation and Drainage Authority. 1999. Pilot Farmers Organizations Rules. Government of Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan. l PWP - Pakistan Water Partnership. 2001.The framework for action (FFA) for achieving the Pakistan water vision 2025, civil society response to FFA. PWP. 638 WAPDA House, The Mall Lahore, Pakistan. l Review Division, Water and Power Development Authority, Lahore, Pakistan. l Shams ul Mulk, 1993. Water resources management, Pakistan experience. First International Conference “Valuing the water”, Washington DC, USA. l Siddiqi M.H. 1994. Pakistan's irrigation system. Selected proceedings of the second international network meeting on information techniques for irrigation systems, Lahore, Pakistan. l Sindh Irrigation and Drainage Authority 1999. Regulations to provide for the organisation and functioning of Area Water Boards, Farmers Organisations and Watercourse Associations in the Province of Sindh. Hyderabad, Sindh. l Sir M.MacDonald & Partners and Hunting Technical Services (MMP/HTS) Ltd, 1984, Left Bank Outfall Drain Stage I Project Preparation, Groundwater and Tubewell Drainage, Water and Power Development Authority, Pakistan. l The Canal and Drainage Act 1873 with Additions of Punjab Minor Act 1905, Sindh Irrigation Act 1879, Soil Reclamation Act (for whole Pakistan) 1952, Mnasoor Book house Katchry Road Lahore l WAPDA - Water and Power Development Authority. 1996. PC-I Form (Second Revision)-Left Bank Outfall Drain Stage I Umbrella Project (component projects), Integrated Management Organization (IMO) LBOD WAPDA, Hyderabad, Pakistan. l WAPDA - Water and Power Development Authority. Water resources hydropower development Vision 2025. WAPDA House Lahore. 31 p. l WAPDA. 1979. Soil Salinity and Waterlogged Soils. Atlas Master Planning and Review Division, WAPDA, Lahore. l Water and Power Development Authority (1979). Revised action program for irrigated agriculture, Vol I. Master Planning and l Water Sector Investment Plan (1990). Water sector investment plan (19902000). Federal Planning Cell, Lahore, Pakistan. l World Bank (1994). Pakistan's Irrigation And Drainage: Issues and Options. Report No. 11884-Pak. The World Bank, Washington DC. Michel Arthur Alloy, The Indus Rivers A study on the effects of Partition, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 594. l World Bank, 1996, National Drainage Program (NDP) Project, Stall Appraisal Report (Book 1, Book 2). Agriculture and Natural Resources Division. South Asia Region l World Bank. 1997. Staff Appraisal Report. Pakistan National Drainage Programme. Rural Development Sector Management Unit, South Asia Region

nearly one-third length of the total Himalayas. The Himalayas is the world's fifth largest fresh water treasure with nearly 5000 cubic KMs ice and snow after Antarctica, the Arctic islands, Greenland and Alaska.

Nepal's National Water Plan and Regional Issues Dr. Bishnu Hari Nepal

emmed between the two largest populations of the world China and India, Nepal is a tiny country. But it is a world water power. Nepal has four major river systems, namely: Mahakali, Karnali, Narayani (Gandaki) and Saptakoshi, which originate from the high Himalayas and cut through the mountain ranges to form deep river valleys. Medium-sized rivers like Kankai, Kamala, Bagmati, West Rapti and Babai originate from the Mahabharata Range. Rivers originating from Shivalik Range and flowing to the country's south, contain less water during the dry season, but can create havoc due to floods during the monsoon. Undoubtedly, the source of the medium- and small-sized rivers too is the Himalayas but indirect. Rivers thus form an average annual runoff water of about 225 BCM (Billion Cubic Meters). This is considerably a large volume of water flowing every year from the four river systems of Nepal to the Ganges of India and then to the Bay of Bengal. Nepal's hydropower generation capacity is 83,000 MW, largest after Brazil. Out of this huge capacity, it is estimated that some 42,000 MW to 50,000 MW is financially and technically viable. The Himalayas is the greatest boon to South Asia, in general, and for Nepal, in particular. Out of 2500km long and 300km wide Himalayan Range, 800km long area is covered by Nepal. Nepal thus deserves to be a â&#x20AC;&#x153;water powerâ&#x20AC;? of the world because it occupies

Out of 194,471 sq. km drainage area, 76 per cent falls in Nepal. (Nepal: 2004). The Karnali, Sapta Gandaki and Sapta Koshi, all trans-Himalayan rivers flowing through Nepal, contribute 71 per cent of the dry season flows and 41 per cent of the annual flows of the Ganges. So, there are great repercussions of the Nepalese Water Management Plans and Actions for the Indian River Linking Project, officially introduced in 2002 by India, and Bangladesh subregionally and matters relating to the integrated statutes for Pakistan, Bhutan and China as riparian countries in the region as a whole. Nepal's Surface Water Resources Capacity KOSHI RIVER BASIN: Nepal's largest river basin is the Koshi River Basin covering catchment-area of 60,400 sq. km., out of which 46 per cent i.e. 27, 863 sq. km. lies in Nepal. The rest is occupied by Tibet, China. In Nepal, out of seven; Sunkoshi, Tamakoshi, Arun and Tamur are the major tributaries of the Saptakoshi River Basin. The average annual runoff (discharge) of Saptakoshi at Chatara is around 1,409 CM/S (Cubic Meters per Second) i.e. 45 BCM per annum. NARAYANI RIVER BASIN: The total catchment-area of the Narayai River Basin is 34,960 sq. km. and nearly 90 per cent of the total catchment-area falls in the Nepalese territory. Trishuli, Budhi Gandaki, Marsyangdi, Seti and Kaligandaki are the major tributaries of the Narayani River Basin. Some 1600 CM/S i.e. nearly 50 BCM per annum is regarded as the runoff rate of the Narayani River Basin at Narayanghat, Chitwan. KARNALI RIVER BASIN: The origin of Karnali River is the south of Mansarovar and Rokas lakes of Tibet, China. The total catchmentarea of Karnali River at Chisapani is 43,679 sq. km. and 94 per cent of the total catchment-area falls in Nepal. The major tributaries of Karnali River Basin are: West Seti, Bheri, Humla Karnali, Mugu Karnali, Singa Tila, Lohare and Thuli Gad. The average rate of annual runoff of the Karnali River Basin is 1,397 CM/S i.e. 44 BCM per annum.

MAHAKALI RIVER BASIN: Earlier, there was a reading that Mahakali River, on the western border with India, belonged to Nepal alone. During post-1990 interim government, KP Bhattarai, as an interim prime minister of Nepal announced that Mahakali was the common river of Nepal and India. But two Nepalese villages named Chandani and Dodhara are located across the Mahakali River. Neglecting this truth, with an understanding for managing the precious water of the Mahakali River, Nepal and India signed the popular Mahakali Treaty in 1996. Due to major differences, the Detailed Project Report (DPR) has not been finalized yet though it was to be prepared within six months of the agreement. There are differences over the source of the Mahakali River and the installations of the Indian army at Kalapani since 1960 when the late King Mahendra sacked the first elected government led by late B.P. Koirala and dissolved the first democratically elected parliament of Nepal. Instead, the father of the present king introduced non-party Panchayat system. Two years later, in 1962, a major war between India and China broke out. So Mahakali River Basin serves India's water and security interests. Therefore, the Mahakali River Basin has remained a very sensitive zone between Nepal and India. The Tanakpur Agreement of 1991 done by Girija Prasad Koirala, the first and longest ruling Prime Minister of Nepal during post-1990 governments created great havoc in the country. Later in 1996, it had to be amended by the popular Mahakali Treaty. This Treaty also could not remain exceptional. There is a saying in Nepali that it also could not remain- paani maathiko obhaano meaning remaining dry while lying on water! Because of the Mahakali Treaty of 1996, then largest party in the Parliament- the CPN-UML was broken. The result was that the best opportunity for the CPN-UML to form government with absolute majority was lost. Therefore, the Mahakali River Basin has remained a very sensitive area not only due to potential water sharing but also because of politics. The Government of Nepal says that Api Himal is the origin of the Mahakali River. The total catchment area of the Mahakali River Basin is 15,260 sq. km. and 34 per cent of the total catchment area

falls under the Nepalese territory. MEDIUM RIVER BASINS: Some rivers originate from the Mahabharat Range of the mountains. They are Kankai, Kamala, Bagmati, West Rapti and Babai. They are not very forceful during the dry season. These rivers are also perennial, with groundwater and springs sustaining the river-flow during the dry period. They are but mostly primary and rain-fed. The total catchment area of these rivers is around 17,00 sq. km. and the average combined runoff at various gauging stations is 461 CM/S i.e. 14.5 BCM per annum. SOUTHERN OR SHIVALIK RIVER BASINS: The origin of this class of the rivers is the Shivalik mountain ranges mostly in the southern part after the Mahabharat Range in Nepal. The rivers during the dry season are mostly dry but in the monsoon these rivers also swell to a considerable level and are able to do harm in the riparian belts. The government of Nepal has numbered them to be 73 in major categories and they have been divided into 8 groups, each between a basin covered by large and medium rivers. The total catchment area is supposed to be 23,150 sq. km. and the combined runoff capacity is 1,682 CM/S, i.e., 53.0 BCM per annum. These rivers are used for supplementary seasonal irrigation by the small-scale-farmers extensively under the Small Scale Farmers-Managed Irrigation Schemes (FMIS). Groundwater Resources Capacity Nepal's southern belt Terai's hydro-geological mapping indicates that this sector has a tremendous potential of groundwater resources. The thick sequence of saturated sediments of alluvial and colluvial origin represents as one of the most productive aquifers in the subcontinent. It is regarded that the erosion of the Shivalik Hills and the outwash fans of rivers form the northern-most Bhabar Zone. The government says the aquifers are unconfined and sediments being of coarse materials have very high permeability in the range of 100-150 meters per day and thus the Bhabar Zone is considered to be the main source of recharge for the Terai Groundwater (NWP: 2005). The NWP further states that the groundwater re-charge at specific areas is estimated to be as high as 600mm per annum. However, it is assumed that overall 450mm is recoverable re-charge figure for all of the Terai region and inner Terai areas such as Chitwan, Dang and

Surkhet are also estimated to hold good groundwater potential. The government assessment of rechargeable groundwater in the Terai region is between 5.8 BCM and 11.5 BCM per annum. Annual withdrawal of groundwater for different purposes in the Terai region is 1.04 BCM, which is nearly 20 per cent of the minimum possible re-charge estimate of 5.80 BCM. Contrary to it, the Kathmandu Valley is already in an alarming situation, because present estimation of annual abstraction is 23.4 MCM (Million Cubic Meters), much greater than the maximum recharge estimate of 14.6 MCM (Nepal: 2005). Anyhow, the conclusion of the research based on the justifications shows that Nepal is a country of waterpower in the region if managed properly. Achievements Out of 225 BCM annual availability of its water flow, Nepal is using only a minimal amount; nearly 15 BCM annually. The rest is wasted. The world normally cites Nepal as a country of “white gold”, “white gem”, and “hydro-dollar” out of its 83,000 MW capacity, Nepal is producing 606 MW hydroelectricity only, nearly 1.6 per cent of the capacity that too only after the completion of Kali Gandaki-A last year with the production of 144 MW by the support of the government of Japan and Asian Development Bank. This is Nepal's largest single project so far not only in the history of hydropower projects after failed Arun-3 but also in terms of any development projects of Nepal. ON DRINKING WATER: Nepal government claims it is providing potable pure drinking water to some 71-72 per cent of the people. But many water experts have reservations. Nepal's southern Terai belt is inhabited by more than half of the country's population. More than 95 per cent of the people there use groundwater through tube-wells pumping from 20-100 feet deep. Nearly 800,000 tube-wells are in the Terai region, out of which only 30,000 tube-wells have been tested for arsenic. In some 2000 tube-wells arsenic content was discovered. The WHO standard for drinkable water is up to 10 micro-gm of arsenic content per liter. But India and Bangladesh have also accepted 50 as the upward margin. In Nepal's districts like Nawal Parasi, Siraha, Kailali and Rautahat nearly 30, 18, 15 and 8 per cent

tube-wells respectively contain arsenic above Nepalese standard of 50 micro gm per liter. (see Nepal: 2005). Nepal's capital Kathmandu is not an exception in problems regarding supplying safe and sufficient drinking water to its city dwellers. Out of Kathmandu's demand of estimated 31-cr-liter per day, so far the Drinking Water Corporation of Nepal is able to supply estimated 11cr-liter only. Hence, Kathmandu badly needs sustainable water supply plan and projects. There are three major projects where Nepal has completed certain degree of feasibility studies. They are: Kodku Khola Drinking Project, Roshi Khola Drinking Water Project and Melamchi Drinking Water Project. Among the three, the last one is the biggest. In 1995, the CPN-UML government, considering the Melamchi Project very large and difficult to accumulate huge budget immediately, had given a priority to Kodku Khola Drinking Water Project, which needed to construct a dam for the storage of water in two years. As an Ambassador of Nepal to Japan I was involved in convincing the government of Japan for ODA to implement the project. The agreement was almost finalized, but the CPN-UML government collapsed and the new Nepali Congress-RPP government gave a priority to Melamchi Drinking Water Project under the multi-national cooperation including Japan. So the proposed Kodku Khola project remained pending. Water has always played a crucial role in Nepal's politics. The work on the Melamchi Drinking Water Project had started when on February 1, 2005 the king sacked prime minister Sher Bahadur Deuba government. Now Deuba and his local development minister Prakash Man Singh face jail on the charge of malpractices in honoring the construction of the Melamchi Drinking Water Project. Thus the urban water supply system is disturbed and is not satisfactory. The latest National Water Plan states that in the rural areas, the government policy has been to hand over management of the Department of Water Supply and Sewerage (DWSS)-built systems to the communities and planning to rehabilitate and upgrade more than 500 such schemes and hand them over to the communities for operation and maintenance (O & M) (NWP: 2005, p.4).

ON IRRIGATION: According to the latest statistics, Nepal has 2.64 million ha of cultivable land and 66 per cent of this land, i.e., 1.76 million ha, is irrigable and around 60 per cent of the irrigable land has some kind of irrigation facility, and less than one-third has round-the-year irrigation. Agricultural production in 2003 was 7.2 million tons, just meeting the minimum requirement of the nation's edible grains. Out of this, only 3.3 million tons were from the irrigated agriculture (Ibid, p.5). In 2000 the government stopped giving subsidy on shallow tubewells and continued subsidy on deeper tube-wells. The deep tubewells irrigating 30-40 hectares of land are found quite useful in Nepal. Experts joke in Nepal that on the one hand Nepal is striving hard to provide irrigation facilities to its farmers through traditional methods but on the other hand India irrigates nearly 1.7 million ha land from the Sharada Barrage (constructed after Agreement with Nepal in late 1920s) alone! Nepal gives a top priority to Pancheswar Multi-purpose Project, Shikta (Banke), Babai (Bardiya), Kankai Multi-purpose Project, Bagmati and Kamala irrigation projects. They all serve five subbasins of India. More than 70 per cent of the country's irrigated area falls under Farmer Managed Irrigation Systems (FMISs) and in the remaining areas, some systems are being transferred wholly to the Water Users Association (WUA). Some of them are jointly managed by the government and the WUAs. The government has accepted that the community-managed systems are better than the governmentmanaged projects. HMG/Nepal seems interested in starting Shikta Irrigation Project in phases after nearly 25 years. Due to India's direct intervention, Nepal could not enhance this project. On India's opposition the Asian Development Bank stopped financing the project. The same happened to Saudi Fund (NRS 26 cr.) and the European Union (NRs 8.00 billion). But now Nepal may do it alone. The major canal would be 9km long and 33 km feeder canals would irrigate 34, 270 ha of dry land in 39 VDCs east of Banke District via Nepalgunj Municipality. The inflow capacity is estimated to be 24 cubic metre per second and the dam is expected to be 372 metre over Rapti River with a concrete

bridge over it. The project is estimated to cost nearly NRs 8.00 billion. ON ENERGY CONSUMPTION PATTERN: Nearly 40 per cent of the households use electricity generated from different systems including hydropower. But the energy needs met from fuel-wood, agricultural waste and animal-dung are 88.64 per cent, from hydro-electricity 1.66 per cent, from renewable energy resources 0.52 percent and from fossil fuel (petroleum and coal) 11.18 per cent of the energy consumption. ON HYDROPWER: Due to lack of funds and firm policy, Nepal has not been able to benefit from the vast power generation capacity properly. India, the largest buyer for Nepal, too, should sincerely realize its need of electricity for rural electrification. One estimate shows that Indian State of Uttar Pradesh alone needs 20,000 MW of electricity in the coming decade. Therefore, these two countries need to assess production, demand and supply properly. Nepal's production so far is minimal and the country needs more than $80.00 billion to increase it. Nepal's private sector or community supply share to the national hydroelectricity capacity is 17per cent. To attract micro hydroelectricity production the government has exempted the production of up to one MW from tax and license. Simply the producer needs to register the scheme with the district administration office. This has been very attractive scheme in the mountainous and rural areas improving the living standard of the people. The Integrated Nepal Power System (INPS) manages medium-scale production and the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) with a capacity between 606 MW and 619 MW makes power purchase agreements with the producers. Small-scale private sector will produce nearly 50 MW. It has been proved that domestically planned, managed and implemented projects are more cost effective than the internationally developed schemes. It is estimated that some 20 MW electricity will be produced per annum by the local Nepalese resources but the demand has already reached 60-66 MW.

Nepal needs nearly NRs.4.00 billion extra money to maintain the production of electricity in normal conditions which is difficult to foot due to the security costs of the armed conflict. Many potential donors except Japan and a few more have taken their hands off seeing the king's hunger for absolute power. If the situation persists, many experts speculate that 'load-shedding' in Nepal would be worse though the government is planning to allocate 42 percent of its budget for the electricity (Thapa: 2006). Private Sector Initiative In January 2006, Nepal's first Hydropower Investment Mart (HIM) was held in Kathmandu at the initiative of private sector involving Confederation of Nepalese Industries (CNI), Small Hydropower Promotion Project. (SHPP), German Cooperation Agency-GTZ and Winrock International. Organizers said the HIM was aimed to bridge the gap between the prospective private investors and private parties holding licenses and PPAs for feasible hydropower projects. The HIM not only encouraged the private sector in Nepal but also from across South Asia. The hydropower sector was open to the private sector in Nepal significantly since 1994. Out of the total hydropower national grid of Nepal, 148 MW is produced by the private sector. Out of which also, the exclusive Nepali private sector contribution from their plants is 15 MW only. Some license holders in the country have signed PPAs worth about 200 MW with NEA. However, their projects have not gone ahead due to lack of funding. They cite NRs 300.00 billion liquidity in the country. But if only five per cent of that could be channeled to hydropower generation, they could produce 30 MW every year. Investment, technology and bureaucratic hurdles are not so complicated particularly after 1995 for micro and mini-level hydropower generation. In the small scale also, for instance, the Upper Tamakoshi Hydropower Generation Project is one of the most cost effective projects in Nepal but the 'Dolakha's White Gem' (as it is popularly known: see Nepal: 2004) waits for its potential investors impatiently. After 2001, the NEA is supposed to be in loss by NRs4.00 billion, whereas, earlier this authority used to earn nearly NRs1.00 billion as profit per annum. In 2005 alone, the NEA had to bear a loss of nearly NRs 2.00 billion. It is likely to join two bankrupt but important

corporations namely Royal Nepal Airlines Corporation (RNAC) and Nepal Oil Corporation (NOC). As per agreement, the NEA needs to pay the foreign investors some 36.7 per cent of the profit. The payment to the Khimti, Bhote Koshi and Indrawati Hydropower generation projects alone was nearly NRs6. 56 billion out of the total income of NRs12.82 billion. On the other hand, the NEA also pays interest to the government nearly by 10.5 per cent (Thapa: 2005). Thus, private sectors are a great hope and challenge to the NEA concern. First Positive Understanding with India On 14 January 2006, in India's capital New Delhi, 'a very positive understanding' on hydropower trade has been made between Nepal and India. The talks were held between the officials of NEA and Ministry of Water Resources and India's the Power Trade Corporation (PTC) officials. The details of the understanding are very much welcome! Nepal lacks nearly 90MW electricity in winter up to 2012 with the present mechanism. It is estimated that till 2010, India's state of Uttar Pradesh alone needs nearly 20,000MW electricity for rural electrification. During winter, Nepal goes for 'load-shedding' due to shortage of electricity. So, the two countries have come to an understanding that during winter India sells electricity to Nepal and during summer, when Nepal has over-supply due to less consumption, it will sell electricity to India. The signatories have not fixed the rate of electricity. Electricity is cheaper in India than in Nepal. Three complications are seen in this understanding: On the 'rate of the electricity' Nepalese fear being cheated by India. Both India and Nepal need to have a pact that favours both the countries and so, politics should not hinder it. India says it will supply Nepal the electricity after the transmission lines are improved. Let the technology be improved in time in India. The hope in Nepal is so strong that they believe India would sell electricity to them even by reducing the supply to Farbesgunj in India.

Nepal is getting 50MW electricity for its eastern zone from India. India will supply 50 MW more next year after the improvement of the infrastructure. Before that in 2006, India can supply 20 MW more making it 70 MW in total. The understanding shows that up to 150 MW of electricity can be exchanged at the present capacity and after the improvement of infrastructure. The agreed rate of electricity is NRs5.57 per unit (Kantipur: 16. 01. 2006, p.1). Nepal's New Water Resources Strategy and Water Plan Having initiated in 1995, Nepal brought out its 'Water Resources Strategy' in 2002. The plan envisages integrating and improving water laws and regulations and policies like 'Water Supply Sector Policy 2055', 'Kathmandu Valley Strategy on Water Supply and Sanitation 2057', 'Irrigation Policy 2053' and Hydropower Development Policy 2058' etc. Now the water sector aims to help reduce incidence of poverty, unemployment and underemployment; to provide people access to safe and adequate drinking water and sanitation for ensuring health security; to increase agricultural production and productivity ensuring food security of the nation; to generate hydropower to satisfy national energy requirements and to allow for the export of surplus energy; to supply the needs of industry and other sectors of the economy; to facilitate water transport, particularly connection to a sea port; to protect the environment and conserve the bio-diversity of natural habitat and to prevent and mitigate water-induced disasters (WRS-N: 2002, p. 47.). Nepal Water Resources Strategy started in 2002 but it took four years for Nepal to bring out the National Water Plan. The Plan was brought out in January 2006. The National Water Plan has been integrated with the National Five Year Plan System of Nepal. Starting from the 10th Plan as its 'Short Term Strategy' i.e. from 2002 onwards- it declares 11th & 12th Five Year Plans as its 'Short Term Plan' and the 13th & 14th Five Year Plans are supposed to fall under 'Long Term Plan', clearly defining Nepal's New Water Resources Strategy and National Water Plan to be of 25 years starting from 2002 and ending in 2027. The following table shows breakup of the Projected Capital Cost Proposed in NWP:

73 Table: Summary of Projected Capital Cost Proposed in NWP by Plan Period (NRs in million a 2001 price level) S.N. Projects/Programmes

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Drinking Water and Sanitation Irrigation Hydropower Rural Electrification Elec.System.Reinforcement Disaster Management Environment Fishery & Others River Basin Plan. Institutional Total Cap. Exp. Cap Exp % of Total

Short Term 10th Plan 25400 17623 28416 11305 4253 3842 467 191 37 1242 92775 86.8

Medium Term 11 th

Plan

35615 37441 87361 10841 7763 4963 324 375 18 1576 186276 86.0

Long Term 12th Plan 39125 27075 101387 10841 8100 7333 310 375 18 1490 196054 81.8

13th Plan 40790 33469 114738 18716 8438 4840 302 365 1 1205 222864 80.5

14th Plan 42727 45504 130150 18716 8775 4596 300 365 1 825 251960 80.4

NWP Total

% Share

183658 161111 462051 70418 37328 25575 1704 1670 76 6337 949928 82.4

19.3 17.0 48.6 7.4 3.9 2.7 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.7 100

Source: NWP-Nepal, HMG/N, WECS, Singha Durbar, Kathmandu, p. Annex-11, K-1.

The table shows that Nepal gives a priority to hydropower. Out of its total investment in water resources, 48.6 per cent is in this sector followed by drinking water and sanitation with 19.3 per cent and irrigation with 17.0 per cent of the investment planned for the 25 years starting from 2002-2027. The NWP has come out with significant changes in the 14th Plan for instance on Water Transportation. The WRS-Nepal: 2002 set down a strategy to invest 16 per cent in water transportation (Summary of WRS-N: 2002, chart at p. xx) but NWP-Nepal: 2005 is not specific to this sector. Similarly, while the former indicates 53 per cent, the latter shows 48.6 per cent investment in hydropower. Nepal's hydropower production targets are not very ambitious but the national budget allocation is. The targets are: by 2007 up to 700 MW, by 2017, up to 2035 MW and by 2027 up to 4000 MW -- both by the government and the private initiatives, which meet the projected domestic demand (NWP-N: p.42). Thus the figures in NWP also vary because on page 77, the target of 2027 hydropower production is 3345 MW as not 4000MW. The domestic demand at that time is estimated to be 2661.4 MW and Nepal through this scheme will be able to export 683.6 MW electricity. But the greatest difficulty for Nepal is managing the fund. The table indicates the capital cost details but actual costs including the O&M and others are NRs1218.938 billion. By 2027 Nepal needs NRs 511 billion (42 percent) for hydropower generation, NRs267 billion (22 percent) for irrigation and NRs231 billion (19 percent), etc. Nepal's

current GDP is around US$3.0 billion i.e. nearly NRs210.00 billion. The conflict has distorted the production process very badly. For example, so far, Nepal's thought-to-be cheapest, the 'Upper Tamakoshi Hydropower Project', estimated to produce 309 MW is disturbed by the Maoists (Kantipur: 19.01.2006). The NEA had started constructing the link-road, but the Maoists stopped the construction work. If Nepal could run this project alone and start producing electricity, it would have been able to end the loadshedding. Indo-Nepal Water Conflicts There are so many examples that in water resources management the two friendly countries could not satisfy the Nepalese people. Some typical instances are touched upon below: Nepal feels badly deceived in the 1927 agreement between the British India government and the Rana regime in Nepal in exchange for some saal-trees and 50,000.00 Indian rupees on Sharada Barrage. The barrage irrigates some 1.7 million ha of land in India now. Another bitter experience for Nepal was Koshi Agreement of April 25, 1954 which was revised on December 19, 1966. It bears the technical constraints of the 'sluice gates', silt in the Chatara canal and change of course of the river etc. leaving little water for Nepal during the dry season and causing 'inundation' during the lean season. AM Shrestha writes that the agreement mentions the potential irrigation benefits for Nepal but keeps the nature and magnitude of similar gains to India secret. In reality, Nepal irrigates 87,000 ha of its land but India waters nearly 2.00 million ha i.e. 23 times more than Nepal (see Shrestha: 1999, p.158). Coincidentally, India is nearly 23 times bigger than Nepal! The Koshi barrage saves thousands of lives and property worth hundreds of billion rupees in India by flood control, says Shrestha. Another important agreement done by Nepal with India was 'Gandak Agreement' of December 4, 1959. With a similar technology as of Koshi Barrage, the dam was constructed in Bhainsalotan providing for the Narayani to flow to India first and through the dam constructed half on the border, it could be controlled by India to flow to the West and East Canals in Nepal. Under the agreement, Nepal could irrigate nearly 60,000 ha by getting water for the west for

about 16,000 ha and for 44,000 ha of land. But this too could not be done properly because of Bihar's 94 KM long Don Branch canal. Shrestha says that in today's calculation, India irrigates some 2.00 million ha of Indian soil, some 33 times more than that of Nepal benefiting from the project (Ibid, pp.168-169). With this feeling of being cheated, Nepal waited for nearly three decades to sign any major agreement with India. It was in 1991 that Prime Minister of Nepal G.P Koirala signed Tanakpur Agreement. Shrestha says the agreement was an endorsement of India's subsequent plan for constructing Tanakpur Dam to supply the Mahakali river water to a powerhouse through a 566 meter long canal and then to irrigate half a million ha of land in India. Nepal also allowed use of 2.9 ha of its territory for the Tanakpur barrage for 7 MW electricity and 4.25CM/S water to irrigate 2,500 ha of Nepalese land whereas the total hydropower generation was 120 MW (Ibid, pp.175-176). But it faced a vehement criticism in Nepal. The Supreme Court ruled that the agreement required two-third majority of the parliament as per Article 126 of the Nepalese constitution. B. G. Verghese writes that the central government of India had to intervene when a hydelcum-irrigation project was planned near Tanakpur in Kumaon which would have diminished flows in the Mahakali for Nepalese uses and the project was recast to ensure that Nepalese interests were protected (Verghese: 1999, p.342). Indian River Linking Project and Detrimental Effects: Nepal faces inundation in its southern belt due to the construction work by India at the Indo-Nepal border related to its River Linking Project. India officially declared the project in 2002, though the country had been working on it by other titles for a long time. According to SB Regmi, the Executive Secretary in the Water and Energy Commission Sector (WECS), from west to east, Nepal is flooded at some 19 places endangering world heritage site of Lunbini, the birthplace of Lord Buddha and the birthplace of mythological symbol Devi Sita in Janakpur. Unlike Bangladesh, Nepal government has not spoken a single word against the river linking project. On the IRLP, the government of Nepal writes, â&#x20AC;&#x153;The high dam projects identified, which store large volumes of monsoon flood and

generate huge hydroelectric power, will essentially have regional ramifications. The bone of contention in these projects seems to be the Indian viewpoint that sees such projects as strictly bilateral issues and undermines the issue of downstream benefits in terms of irrigation as well as flood. It is yet to be seen how India intends to address the issue of cost sharing regarding the proposed 'riverlinking-project', which eventually will involve building storage dams in Nepal' (NWP: 2005, p.6). Post-February 1, 2005 move of King Gyanendra, no Indo-Nepal water talks have been held officially except the preliminary talks on buying and selling of electricity in the first week of January 2006 in New Delhi. Third high level technical committee meeting (HLTC) of 27-29 September 2004 the 13th meeting of the bilateral Standing Committee on Inundation Problem (SCIP) on 30 September 2004 in Kathmandu and at the secretary level in October in New Delhi had failed. The Babai and Shikta Irrigation projects, out of Nepal's six major irrigation projects, are the vivid examples of Indian interference in Nepal's internal affairs. Due to India's opposition, as a lower riparian country, Nepal could not construct these projects by the help of the foreign support (Nepal: 2004:SAJ-8, p.47). On the similar grounds of being a lower riparian, India is ignoring the Bangladeshi and Pakistani demands guided by Farakka Agreement of 1996 and Indus River Treaty of 1960 respectively. So, regional statutes to regulate their waters resolving the water conflicts among the countries of the region are badly and immediately needed. Sour Experiences of the Immediate Past Mahakali Agreement of 1996 is a failed agreement. It failed the possibility of CPN-UML majority government in Nepal. It failed the Tanakpur Agreement. It also failed the Arun-3 hydel project directly or indirectly. Finally, it failed because the Detailed Project Report could not be prepared in 10 years though it was supposed to be ready in six months. No better is the Karnali (Chisapani) Multi-purpose Project supposed to yield 10,800MW with 16.2BCM live storage capacity planned for export. Due to India's hesitation, Enron was fully disturbed to work in Chisapani. India likes to engage every important river basins of Nepal to keep

the resources in its grip to irrigate millions of hectares of its dry lands and light thousands of villages. India needs a huge amount of well-managed water and energy but its water policy so far seems not in its own favour. B. G. Verghese accepts that until the mid-eighties Indian Planning Commission had never looked at the Himalayan potential in Nepal and Bhutan in terms of long-tem energy planning (Verghese: 1999, p.343). India needs to change its water policy, strategy and plans. It needs to give its top priority for investment to this sector before it is too late for the country and the region. Hope at Hand The rays of hope are not dim. On January 14, 2006 in New Delhi, Nepal and India for the first time agreed that electricity could be sold or exchanged in need. Three major case-studies are discussed below: NIBB-C Water Ways: 21st Century Multi-purpose Project and the Need for its Joint Pre-feasibility Study NIBB-C stands for Nepal, India, Bangladesh, Bhutan and China. These countries benefit from the Eastern Himalayan Waters directly. These are the waters of hope for South Asia - particularly for the Bay of Bengal Initiative for MultiSectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation BIMSTEC region in South Asian perspectives. The region's leadership has not scarcely exploited the resources. The superficially perceived national interests of the riparian countries hinder management and proper utilization of the vast treasure of nature in the sub-region. The Ganges, Meghana and Brahmaputra (GMB) region consists of more than 400 million people, the largest concentration of the poor in the world. Nearly 45 percent of the population falls below the poverty line, i.e. earning less than USD1.00 per head per day. South Asia's global share in business is just 1.3 percent but it is home to nearly 1/5th of the world's population (Nepal: 2005). The efforts by the planners, implementers and decision makers of the region to uplift the living standards of the people have remained remarkable but not satiable. NIBB-C Water Ways The 'NIBB-C Water Ways: 21st Century Multi-Purpose Project'

envisions exploring the possibility of shipping from the Bay of Bengal to the cities of the riparian countries; e.g., Kosh i-Tappu and upper parts of Nepal, to the cities like Varanasi, Lucknow and many more and in the Assam highlands of India and still higher to the Tibetan highlands of China via Brahmaputra and adjoining cities of Bangladesh in the Meghana region and similarly to Bhutan. It makes Nepal, Bhutan and Tibet no more landlocked parts of the globe geographically. This multifarious economic activity could change the fate of the region dramatically. Many multinational companies and shipping corporations are ready for investment in this ambitious proposal of 21st century. The governments of riparian countries need to be deeply convinced and be sincerely ready to adopt it. Koshi High Dam a 'Litmus Test' for the Region This author worked for Arun-3 until it was cancelled. It was very much a necessary project for Nepal, India and Bangladesh and the SAARC sub-region. But the water-mafias were able to get it cancelled after Nepal had spent nearly NRs1.00 billion and one decade of time on it. The same is going to happen with the Koshi High Dam construction also. The opposition in Nepal and India to Koshi High Dam construction has already taken shape. One is genuine in saying that India has never benefited Nepal in any agreement except for the Mahakali, so it won't in the Koshi. But in politics, there is no permanent friend or enemy. So before snapping ties, careful study and negotiation is necessary. But India has already allocated IRs300.00 million and a feasibility study has already started. So, politics should not be allowed to hamper the Koshi High Dam. The dam opponents say that since the Himalayas falls under seismiczone, high dams are not favourable here. But needed is the application of appropriate technology to combat natural hazards. This high dam technology should store water even considering the probability of the NIBB-C WW. If the water storage is not arranged from the start, flood and silt control and regulated water supply downstream will not be possible. So, before building the Koshi High Dam, technical experts, not only from India and Nepal but also even

from Bangladesh and other countries, should be consulted to apply the latest technology. Koshi River Basin is the largest River Basin in Nepal and has direct consequences downstream. Many Nepalese claim even today that they are yet to be compensated and resettleed for the land acquired for Koshi and Gandak projects. So Koshi High Dam is a 'Litmus Test' project. SA-RRR-S Model: Demand of Time for South Asia India is beset with intra-state water conflicts. Scientists forecast that India will suffer water crisis more in the coming decades, because of its population, politics and the geography. Since India is the largest country in the region after China, such a prediction concerns all the countries of South Asia having water links with it, through sea with Pakistan, Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh and through river with, Nepal, China, Bhutan and again with Pakistan and Bangladesh. So, it is very important that Indian planners consider this sector very sensitive and useful for themselves and for the region as a whole. The situation demands a far-sighted approach from all its neighbors in water management. Water is not a matter of bilateral concern. Rivers cross the national boundaries. The 21st century will not be guided only by politics but by political economy also. Therefore, South Asia should drive ahead towards uplifting the living standards of its people reducing cultural and economic conflicts. It is time for South Asian countries to bind themselves by the statutes on their water conflicts. Like the European Union and other institutions in Europe, South East Asia and other regions, South Asia too can frame a regulatory mechanism so that the common problems can be resolved. With this objective, the author during the SAFMA Regional Conference on Inter-state Conflicts in South Asia in New Delhi, October 9-10, 2004 presented a vision named SA-RRR-S Model for South Asia. It meant 'South Asian Regional Riparian Rights Statutes'. Under this vision, the countries of South Asia make their regulating laws on their own. The SA-RRR-S Model proposes that the countries

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Water Resources Management in Bangladesh Giasuddin Ahmed Choudhury

ater resources management is of prime concern in sustaining life and livelihood in Bangladesh. The river systems and waterbodies (like hoars, baors and beels) have shaped the country as well as its culture. Bangladesh has too much water in the wet season and too little in the dry season. The seasonal variation of availability of water and the competing demands for water supply and sanitation, agriculture, industry, fisheries and wildlife, navigation, hydropower and recreation as well as environment and the preservation of the waterbodies have made water management and planning a very challenging task. Moreover, the recent discovery of arsenic contamination in the shallow aquifer has set back past successes in bringing safe water supply to the rural population. Pressures remain on agriculture to intensify production and maintain self-sufficiency in food grains. Aquatic resources and natural environment are under severe threat from changes in flood plain management over the last three decades and, more recently, from an alarming rise in pollution due mainly to industrial growth and poor sanitation. The problems compound when the present population of 135 million is expected to rise to 181 million by 2025 and to 224 million by 2050. Rapid urbanization is expected with 40 percent of people living in towns and major cities by 2025, and 60 percent by 2050. Adequate water supply and sanitation for the increasing population is a huge task. Policies and Plan for Water Management Bangladesh adopted the National Water Policy in 1999, which provides a framework for water management. The policy provides directions on basinwide planning, water rights and allocation, public and private involvement, public investment, water supply and

sanitation, fisheries navigation, agriculture industry and environment. The document is intended to guide public and private actions to ensure optimal development and management of water that benefits people. Other related policies are (i) National Environmental Policy (1992), (ii) National Forest Policy (1994), (iii) National Energy Policy (1996), (iv) National Policy for Safe Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation (1998), (v) National Fisheries Policy (1998), (vi) National Agricultural Policy (1999) and Industrial Policy (1999). Though there are no major contradictions between them, there are, however, some gaps in water planning. Main policy gap is in the land use planning. A principle needs to be established for guiding the management of the massive urban expansion expected over the next 25 years. There are also issues of land tenure reform. Usufruct rights are linked with the willingness and ability to invest, and the protection of the rights of the landless and other disadvantaged groups is of paramount importance. Displacement and resettlement, as a result of natural disasters or land acquisition, need to be addressed for they affect planning of water resources. Based on the policy directions provided by these policy documents, the National Water Management Plan (NWMP), a framework plan, was prepared in 2001 and approved by the National Water Resources Council on March 31, 2004. The plan is presented in three phases: a short-term (2000-05) firm-plan of on-going and new activities, a mid-term (2006-10) plan, and a long-term (2011-25) perspective plan. The plan has 84 different programmes grouped into eight clusters: Institutional Development (10), Enabling Environment (13), Main Rivers (12), Towns and Rural Areas, Major Cities (17), Disaster Management (6), Agriculture and Water Management (8) and Environment and Aquatic Resources (10). The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP, 2005) has stressed the need for implementing the programmes proposed by NWMP to reduce poverty. Water Management Issues Floods and Drainage Problems: Floods are an annual phenomenon

in Bangladesh. The high flows of transboundary rivers, high internal rainfall, general low-level of the country and inadequate drainage result in widespread inundation each year. In 1954, 1955, 1974, 1987, 1988, 1998 and 2004, the peak flows of major rivers, spring tides in the Bay of Bengal, and cyclonic surges transformed the annual inundations into devastating floods. These floods result in major damage to life and livelihoods and property, particularly in the coastal regions. Equally, however, the northeast and northern transboundary rivers are susceptible to flash flooding from the adjacent hills in India. In 2004, the flood in the northeast was very devastating. The southwestern region experienced a devastating flood in 2000 due to heavy rainfall in the Damodar Valley and consequent heavy releases from the reservoirs. Drainage problems themselves arise from drainage impediments and drainage congestion. Drainage impediments are caused by insufficient drainage capacity through road embankments, blocked drainage channels due to siltation, cross-dams or fishing activities and inadequately sized drainage sluices. Drainage congestion, on the other hand, occurs due to high outfall water levels that prevent the drainage flows, irrespective of any other impediments. Both circumstances are inter-linked, as one can affect the other, and both are common in Bangladesh. Annual inundation has both negative and positive impacts. Positive impacts of floods are increase in soil fertility, enhancements of capture fisheries and navigation, increased groundwater recharge and flushing of pollutants. Negative impacts include damage and loss to property, infrastructure and crops, and sometimes loss of life. Furthermore, the inundation of hand pumps and latrines increases the incidences of diseases, while disruption to transport, communications and economic activities leads to the loss of employment opportunities. Coastal flooding mainly affects modern agricultural system because of the salinity of floodwater. Women, children and the extreme poor are especially vulnerable. The Bangladesh Water Development Board has provided flood protection to 66 percent (5.45 million ha) of 8.24 million ha of cultivable lands in the last half a century. The remaining areas, especially the urban areas, need to be brought under flood protection. The drainage congestion in the coastal areas needs to be

addressed immediately. In this connection rationalization of existing flood control and drainage projects as proposed by NWMP needs to be taken up. Drought: Prolonged droughts are not common in Bangladesh. However, the country experiences dry spells or â&#x20AC;&#x153;crop droughtsâ&#x20AC;?. Much of the western part of the country can be affected by droughts, with the northwest being most commonly affected. The country has experienced droughts of major magnitude in 1973, 1978, 1979, 1981, 1982, 1989, 1992, 1994, and 1995. Droughts afflict the country, at least, as frequently as do major floods and cyclones, averaging about once in 2.5 years. Although droughts are not always continuous in any area, consecutive droughts occurred in 1978 and 1979, 1981 and 1982, and 1994 and 1995. The northwestern region of the country experienced one of the most severe droughts of the century, which started in October 1994 and was broken in July 1995 with the onset of monsoon rain. The continued drought in the northwestern districts of Bangladesh led to a shortfall of rice production of 3.5 million tons. These districts are considered to be the granary of Bangladesh and produce surplus rice - the main staple of the country.

supply, where ground water levels are receding. At present, the dry season crop production has exceeded wet season aman production. Erosion: Riverbank erosion in Bangladesh is a chronic problem forcing involuntary resettlement of as many as 50,000 people a year. The studies show that about 3,575 square kilometer area along the Brahmaputra, the Ganges, the Padma, the Lower Meghna and their estuaries will be lost due to erosion by the year 2025. On the other hand, 3,665 square kilometer of land will be gained due to accretion in the same period. Perusing these data, it may appear that the loss of land is not very significant. But this has major social, economic and environmental implications. Riverbank erosion poses a severe threat to the livelihoods of the people living along the banks of the major rivers and particularly the poor are the most vulnerable. Moreover, the people living on the chars are vulnerable and are forced to move frequently due to river erosion. Though very expensive, the major cities, towns and important rural areas in more than 400 places are being protected with bank protection interventions in different forms. A riverbank erosion-forecasting tool, developed by CEGIS, enables the country to maximize the scarce resources to combat river erosion.

Most of the public irrigation systems were planned for supplementary irrigation during the monsoon. Droughts connote enormous suffering for those depending on rainfed-subsisting farming. To mitigate drought, the drought affected areas need to be brought under supplementary irrigation systems. Barrages over the Ganges and the Brahmaputra rivers need to be constructed immediately. In the meantime, the drought assessment model developed locally (by CEGIS) need to be implemented for optimum use of scarce water resources.

Cyclone and Storm Surges: Cyclones affect the coastal districts of Bangladesh and cause tremendous damages to housing, agricultural crops, livestock and poultry, food stocks and sources of drinking water. The coastal areas have experienced more than 70 major cyclones in the last 200 years. The cyclones are accompanied with storm surges of 3 meter heights above normal times and in some places it may go up to 6 to 7 meters. Since 1960s, about 123 polders having 5107 kilometer of coastal embankments were constructed to protect an area of 1.5 million ha of lands from saline inundation as well as from storm surges.

Dry Season Reduction of River Flows: Bangladesh is the traditional water user of the transboundary rivers i.e. the Ganges, the Brahmaputra, the Meghna Rivers etc, but because of the continuous upstream withdrawals beyond its territory, the country is facing water scarcity in the dry season. The country has 7 million ha of irrigable lands, out of which 4.68 ha are irrigated. There is a need for development of water resources in order to bring the remaining areas under the irrigation network and supplement the groundwater water

Arsenic contamination: The latest data indicates that 59 out of 64 districts have tube-wells with arsenic levels above the safe limit, exposing about 75 million people to this toxic substance daily. The deteriorating health of arsenicosis patients puts a heavy burden on their families contributing to economic hardship, social expulsion and food security. Various agencies are working all over Bangladesh in testing tube-well water for arsenic. However, the testing methods have not yet been standardized, field activities are not coordinated,

and valuable information from field investigations is not properly archived for further use. There is an urgent need to develop an arsenic database, which should include information on the tubewells being affected, the population under threat, the mitigation measures being undertaken, the method used for testing, the agencies involved etc. Such a database will contribute immensely to planning a coordinated arsenic mitigation plan for the country. Research is urgently needed to improve understanding of the mechanisms involved and its probable impact on the food chain. Salinity: The main groundwater salinity problems lie in the coastal areas of the country and constitute a constraint to its use, although there is some localized fresh water lenses close to the coast. Abstractions of groundwater reduce the ability of freshwater to hold back saline intrusion and this is reportedly a major concern in the Khulna area and other parts of the southern half of the southwest region. Fresh groundwater in most coastal areas has to be abstracted from a depth of over 150 meter and up to 450 meter. Whilst this can be relatively costly to develop and operate when compared to shallow aquifers, it has the benefit of being free of arsenic, but it does restrict the use of this aquifer for irrigation. The upstream withdrawal of the Ganges waters at Farakka in the dry season causes the saline water to intrude further inland in the southwest region, causing industries to close down, reducing crop yield, degrading the environment and damaging the bio-diversity of the Sundarbans, which is a World Heritage site. Declining Seasonal Groundwater Levels: Due to extraction/exploitation of groundwater through irrigation tube-wells, seasonal groundwater levels have been declining day by day, rendering many drinking water hand pump tube-wells inoperable during the dry season. Urban Water Supply and Sanitation: The urban population will increase 2.7 times by 2025. The gross daily water demand in the major metropolitan cities (Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna and Rajshahi) will rise from the present 2,460 to 7,970 million liters per day by 2025. There is already a major shortage of required supply of safe water. Due to over abstraction and loss of recharge areas, the groundwater table under-lying Dhaka city has declined at an

alarming rate over the last couple of decades. Dhaka has the largest piped sewerage system in Bangladesh; however, the existing system serves only 20 per cent of the city. Of this only 3 per cent reaches the sewage treatment plant at Pagla, the rest leaks into ground or surface water system, which cause widespread pollution. 40 per cent households in Dhaka have septic tanks with soak wells. In the future, with the increase in population density, the quantities will not only exceed soak well capacity, high land values will discourage the setting aside of land for such purposes. Therefore, immediate measures to collect and carry the effluent for treatment and disposal are necessary. Water Quality: Water quality in and around the urban areas is fast deteriorating. Human excretes and industrial wastes are the main reasons for the deterioration of water quality in the river systems. The Buriganga in Dhaka, the Karnafuli in Chittagong and the Bhairab in Khulna are the worst affected. Other rivers are also showing gradual decline in water quality. The water quality of the Buriganga River has deteriorated so much that no aquatic life could survive in it. Participatory Water Management: The level of participation of stakeholders in the water management systems is not adequate. Participatory water management following the â&#x20AC;&#x153;Guidelines for Participatory Water Managementâ&#x20AC;? needs to be institutionalized. Water Resources Available for Use Bangladesh has abundant water in the monsoon season from June to October, but there is a shortage of water in the dry season. However, in the early part of the season and also during the monsoon, the rainfall can be variable which has necessitated the supplementary irrigation. Rainfall: Bangladesh has a tropical monsoon climate with four main seasons: pre-monsoon (March-May); monsoon (JuneSeptember); post-monsoon (October-November); and winter (December-February). The mean annual rainfall varies from 1400 mm in the extreme northwest to 5,500 mm in the northeastern part of the country and the mean annual rainfall is 2,400 mm. Some 85 to 90 percent of total annual rainfall occurs between April and September, with regional variations.

Surface Water: The river systems of Bangladesh are intricate, crisscrossing the whole country like a web and covering 8 percent of the country. They are the sources of danger from both flooding and from erosion, and of sustenance to agriculture, as they contain sediments. They provide an arterial transportation network for people, goods and fish migration, and keep salinity intrusion at bay in the coastal areas.

Projected Future Water Needs Land Use: Future water demands depend on the land use pattern. Bangladesh has an area of 147,570 kmÂ˛ comprising hills (12 percent), terraces (8 percent) and floodplains (80 percent). Floodplains are categorized into four types: active river floodplain, meander floodplain, piedmont, and estuary and tidal floodplains.

In-country run-off during the dry season is minimal and the main source of surface water is the transboundary inflows from the Brahmaputra, the Ganges and the Meghna. They drain an area of 1,750,000 km2, out of which only 8 percent lie within Bangladesh.

Over the next 25 years, the area of rivers is expected to remain almost constant at 8 percent and water bodies are forecast to rise from 5 percent to 7 percent of the total area as ponds are increased to satisfy demand for fish. Forest and mangrove will increase slightly from 17 to 21 percent, while urban and rural settlements together will increase from 11 percent to 13 percent. The biggest change affects agriculture, which is expected to reduce from 56 percent to 48 percent. The absolute decline of agricultural land of 1.64 million ha, or 20 percent of the existing area, is a cause for considerable concern. By the year 2025, agricultural land availability per capita is expected to be 56 percent of the 1996 level. However, over the past 25 years the total crop area has been steady at 13 14 million ha per annum, land loss being compensated for by increasing cropping intensities. An increase of 0.33 percent per annum would be needed to keep up with the overall loss of agricultural land, and up to 2 percent per annum would be needed to sustain per capita production levels.

The river flows have huge seasonal variation, with the combined flows of the Ganges and the Brahmaputra typically increasing from less than 10,000 mÂł/s early in the year to a peak of 80,000 to 140,000 mÂł/s in late August or early September. During the monsoon season, 20 percent of the country is inundated each year, with over 60 percent in a peak flood. These peak floods generally occur every 10 years that bring severe hardships to those affected. By contrast, the dry season from November to May brings water shortage. Dry season water deficits occur in different localities and are marked in the southwest and extreme west where rainfall is the lowest, and in the eastern hill regions. Surface water is an important strategic resource for Bangladesh in the dry season. It is the only resources for some 44 percent of the country (barring some small pockets of groundwater used for domestic and municipal supplies), and can be used to augment all areas where deficits arise. Groundwater: Groundwater in appreciable quantities underlies only in some areas, mostly in the northwest region of the country. In other areas, small quantities of available groundwater exist, sufficient only to support a limited amount of domestic and municipal uses, but are easily overexploited (especially levels are falling under Dhaka city due to heavy abstractions there). In other parts of the country, mainly the northeast, southeast, eastern hills and southern parts of the southwest and south central regions, the availability of good quality groundwater is very limited.

Monsoon Season Water Demands: In general, water shortages do not occur during the monsoon season from June to October. In the early part of this season, rainfall can be variable, which is significant to those farmers who plant aman at this time of the year. Some farmers practice supplementary irrigation, although there is potential to expand this. Many of the public sector's surface water irrigation schemes were originally designed for both early and late monsoon crops, rather than the now popular dry season boro crop. Dry Season Water Demands: The dry season from November to May brings water shortages. NWMP puts the projected water demands in 2025 at 0,000 million cubic meters. The consumptive demands for water include evaporation from forests, water bodies, charlands, urban and rural environments, rain fed and irrigated agriculture, as well as the needs of water supply and sanitation. In-

stream demands include the overlapping requirements for salinity and pollution control, navigation and fisheries. The consumptive demands are estimated to be 44 percent of the total water demand and in-stream demands to be the balance 56 percent. Agriculture: Agriculture has the highest overall consumptive demand in the country. The country is still deficient in food grain production by 1.5 to 2 million tons. More than 80 percent of irrigation water is used for rice and the rest for the other crops. Over the last three decades, much effort has been put into intensification of agriculture by promotion of dry season cropping through irrigation. In 2025, the approximate irrigation area will be 8 million ha, and the dry season water demand will be 50,300 million cubic meters. Domestic, Commercial and Industrial Needs: NWMP estimated the gross domestic, commercial and industrial demands as 998.62 millions of cubic meters per month and the overall net demand as 430.57 millions of cubic meters per month. Water for domestic, commercial and industrial needs has been expressed in terms of both gross and net requirements. Forest: NWMP estimates that the forest and mangrove will increase slightly from 19 percent at present to 22 percent covering an area of 2 million ha in 2025. The estimated water requirements for the forests will be 8,200 million cubic meters. The area excludes the Sundarbans, for which the water requirement is included under the salinity control flow. Fisheries: The area of rivers over the next 50 years is expected to remain almost constant and water bodies are forecast to rise from 5 percent to 9 percent of total area as ponds are increased to satisfy demand for fish. Water for fisheries falls into two categories: demands for flowing water fisheries; and demands for fisheries in water bodies and ponds. The minimum dry season water requirements for fisheries in rivers are in the form of pools of water. An approximation to the gross water demand for fisheries can be based upon the area of rivers and water bodies, which is 16, 050 million cubic metre. Navigation:

River

transport

important

mode

communication and shipment in Bangladesh, and a network of routes has been developed by BITWA with specified depths according to the class of route. Many of these routes are in tidal areas, and little affected by the freshwater flow in the rivers. The total flow required for regulating the navigation routes is 340 m3/s. These minimum flows are needed for operation of locks and fish passes. Salinity Control: In the southwest region, the reduction of dry season flows upstream of the Farakka barrage led to an increase in intrusion of the saline front in the dry season. The flow required in the Lower Meghna to ensure that the saline front did not penetrate upstream of Ilshaghat for more than 5 consecutive days has been estimated as 3,000m³/s. The total minimum water requirements for salinity control are, therefore, estimated to be 3000m³/s in the Lower Meghna, of which about 1000m³/s is estimated to pass through the south central region, 250m³/s through the Gorai for the southwest, 100m³/s for other outflows in the southwest region and 60m³/s for the south-eastern region Environment: Some flows are essentially required to ensure the minimum flows in the river systems. These are needed to provide dilution of effluents from sewage treatment works, untreated effluents and for the maintenance of aquatic life. NWMP assessment has identified 10 pollution “hot-spots” for which it is estimated that a flow of 200m³/s would be required for all hot spots to help improve water quality. In addition, the treatment, recycling and inland disposal need to be geared up for managing non-agricultural pollutants, as these are the appropriate long-term mechanisms for protecting the environment. In-stream needs: NWMP estimates the minimum in-stream needs to be 30,984 million cubic meters per month, taking into account the percolation losses, dilution flows and the higher of the computed navigation flows. Scenarios of Shortfalls and Crisis Water Balances in 2025: The consumptive demands, at present, are being met ignoring additional in-stream needs for fisheries and navigation, except in the Southwest region where, as is commonly known, shortages exist to meet both the agricultural and salinity control demands. By 2025, considering the future in-stream needs

and ultimate agricultural demands, meeting full in-stream needs (i.e., provision of base flows for fisheries and navigation in most rivers and streams, as well as provision for salinity control and dilution of flows at particular environmental hotspots) will not be possible except in some areas in the south central region in the face of increased agricultural demands. Under this scenario, there would be an overall national shortfall for three months (the maximum monthly shortfall is 3,570 million cubic meter in March, equivalent to 1,377 m³/s, or about the same as the entire flow of the Ganges in that month). No amount of inter-regional transfer would be able to overcome this situation without a major augmentation of flows entering Bangladesh. Beyond 2025, as agricultural demand continues to expand, shortfalls would worsen both in quantity and duration, with an ultimate maximum monthly shortfall of nearly double the 2025 situation. With more modest fulfilment of in-stream needs by 2025 associated with maintaining year round flows only in the main navigation and fish migration routes through augmentation or regulation, the situation appears more manageable as there would be an overall positive national balance throughout the dry season. With an overall positive national balance, inter-regional transfers would enable these lower in-stream needs to be met. Possible impact of arsenic contamination of groundwater on water balances: The full implications of arsenic contamination of the groundwater are yet to be determined; one possible scenario is that the groundwater could be considered to be unsafe for water supplies and irrigation, the latter if arsenic were shown to be entering the food chain. The possible extent of the contamination across the country is still being quantified, but appears to be becoming greater as the testing continues. Assuming an arbitrary estimate of 75 percent reduction in the groundwater availability as a result of contamination, even with the lowest estimate of in-stream needs and ensuring full re-use of percolation losses from irrigation, extensive shortages can be expected to arise. These would create an overall national deficit in March of about 2,134 m³/s. Projected Changes in Climate: The probable effects of global climate change have been examined in general by the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) and are

regularly reviewed. The most recent projections set out the changes anticipated in Bangladesh, which are: i)

A rise in sea level in the order of 300 mm by the year 2030 and 700 mm by 2075. This suggests a rise of 250 mm by 2025, at the rate of 10 mm/year. ii) A rise in monsoon season temperature of 0.7°C by 2030 and 1.1°C by 2050. Dry season temperatures would rise by 1.3°C by 2030 and 1.8°C by 2050. iii) An increase in monsoon rainfall of about 10 percent by the year 2030 and 25 percent by 2050. Dry season rainfall is projected to reduce in the long term. Climate change will also affect flows in the transboundary rivers. Temperature changes would affect the timing and rate of snow melt in the upper Himalayan reaches, which would alter the flow regime in the rivers, which rise in the Himalayas. Lower dry season rainfall and increased water demands due to higher temperatures would increase abstractions from rivers upstream and reduce the flow reaching Bangladesh. Restraining Growth of Demand and Possible Measures: Unquestionably, it is necessary to make adjustment from water supply management to demand management for the sake of realizing sustainable water utilization under the pressures of heavy population, rapid economic development, sharp contradiction between water supply and demand, serious water pollution and low efficiency in water utilization etc. The development trend of water demand management on the dependence of analyzing its current situation and existing problems is: l Strengthening water resources legislation; l Reinforcing water resources management system; l Strengthening water saving; l Reinforcing water resources protection; l Taking the water resources appraisal of constructing projects into effect; l Rationalizing water pricing system from the marketing principle; and studying the assets management on water resources. Perceived Sector Problems and Challenges Poverty Reduction: Poverty is endemic in Bangladesh. The trends in income poverty in Bangladesh show a modest poverty reduction

rate of around one percentage point a year since the early 1990s from 59 percent to 49.8 percent in 2000. Human-poverty trends have shown faster improvement than the income poverty trends. The human poverty index (based on deprivation in health, education and nutrition) stood at 61 percent in the early 1980s, but declined to 47 percent in the early 1990s and dropped further to 35 percent in the late nineties (1998/2000). The index of human poverty declined by 2.54 percent per year compared with 1.45 percent in the national head count ratio for incomepoverty over the last two decades. Bangladesh formulated the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in October 2005. PRSP recognizes the role of the development of water resources including irrigation development, flood control, and drainage improvement in increasing agricultural production and food security. Following the vision of the National Water Management Plan (NWMP), PRSP sets the following policy directions: i)

promote rational management and optimal use of the country's water resources; ii) improve the people's quality of life by ensuring equitable, safe and reliable access to water for production, health and hygiene; and ensure availability of clean water in sufficient quantities for multipurpose use and reservation of the aquatic and water dependent eco-systems. Along with facilitating the cultivation of HYV rice and other crops and increasing the yield levels of boro and aman crops, PRSP advocates the structural interventions in order to save properties and lives by controlling river erosion, monsoon flooding and saline water intrusion; and improving irrigation and drainage congestion and mitigating drought through re-excavation of khals [watercourses] and canals. Measures would also be taken to enhance the social impacts of flood control drainage and irrigation (FCDI) projects through rationalization of existing projects, and promoting stakeholder participation and multi-purpose use of flood embankments. The National Water Policy and the National Water Management Plan will be periodically reviewed and revised to guide the management of the country's water resources. Increasing Agricultural Production: Bangladesh has made an

impressive progress in food production over the last three decades. Food production has increased from 9 million tons in 1971-72 to about more than 25 million tons in 2004-05, which is up by 178 percent or about a three-fold increase. However, the country is still deficient in food grain production by 1.5 to 2 million tons. Increase in agricultural production could be achieved due to rapid expansion of irrigation, flood control and drainage systems as well as the adoption of improved seed and fertilizer technology. 60 percent of the country is now flood protected. During the period 2003-04, it is estimated that an area of 4.84 million ha was irrigated, out of which 3.4 million ha was irrigated by groundwater and 1.44 million ha by surface water. The annual compound growth has been 4.5 percent over the period of three decades. Surface water irrigation has not, however, grown as fast as ground water and in fact has flattened. In order to achieve the Millenium Development Goals' top agenda of eradication of poverty and hunger, the shrinking agricultural resource base needs to be matched with the greater demand for food. In recent years, both the land and water, particularly surface water, are continuously shrinking. NWMP has projected that the lands under agriculture is expected to reduce from 59 percent to 48 percent. The absolute decline of agricultural land of 1.64 million ha, or 20 percent of the existing area, is a cause for considerable concern. By the year 2025, agricultural land availability per capita is expected to be 56 percent of the 1996 level. The areas irrigated by canal and low-lift pumps have been vastly outnumbered by use of groundwater using shallow, deep and deepset tubewells. There is a limit to which groundwater extraction can stretch itself without compromising environmental degradation. It is in this context that the issue of sustainable agricultural development acquires an added relevance in the light of the MDG. This calls for greater use of surface water to meet the requirement of increased food production. Arresting the alarming downward trend in the availability of land and water resources remains perhaps the most daunting challenge to achieve the MDG. The irrigation demands are expected to increase potentially by at least a quarter over the next 25 years, depending upon the extent to which future agriculture production requirements are met through yield improvements as opposed to intensification.

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Environmental Degradation: As over one-fifth of Bangladesh is flooded in the average monsoon and waterbodies cover 9 percent of its area, the natural environment of the country is dominated by water. It is, therefore, of great concern to ensure healthy and sustainable habitats for the many species of flora and fauna, both aquatic and terrestrial. Problems of urban and rural water supply and sanitation: Considerable progress has been made in the provision of potable water supplies in towns and rural areas in the 1990s. However, arsenic contamination of groundwater has become a serious health hazard needing the highest priority. Two of the MDGs are directly related to sanitation. Bangladesh has given priority to sanitation in order to reduce child mortality, combat diseases, and ensure environmental sustainability. Also the target of decreasing poverty is directly related with sanitation. Considering the importance, Bangladesh has set the target to achieve total sanitation by 2010.

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Dhaka has the only piped sewerage system in Bangladesh. It serves about 1.1 million people living in about 20 percent of the city's area. The sewage treatment plant has a capacity of 120 million l/day, but in many areas the sewers, which were built to serve much lower population densities, are overloaded and leaks occur. Many sewers are totally or partially blocked with sediment and some of the sewage pumping stations are totally or partially inoperative resulting in a very small proportion of the water supplied ever reaching the treatment works. A further 40 percent of households have septic tanks with soak pits and about 20 percent have pit latrines. Sanitation in slum areas is practically non-existent. l Implications of Global Climatic Change: Due to Global Climate

Change (GCC) the effects anticipated in Bangladesh are: l A rise in mean sea level in the order of about 250mm by 2025. l An increase in monsoon rainfall of 10 percent to 15 percent by

the year 2030. l These two factors will combine to increase flooding, which will

The percentage of hygienic latrines increased from 33 percent in 2003 to 59 percent in 2005. At the same time, the percentage of unhygienic latrines reduced from 25 percent in 2003 to 21 percent in 2005 and sanitation without latrines from 42 percent in 2003 to 20 percent in 2005. From this scenario, it appears that Bangladesh has several immediate challenges; such as : l To develop sanitation and health which needs strong leadership, political commitment to formulate aerial rules, regulations, laws and principles l To convert the sanitation program into a social movement and to relate it with other cultural and social activities and create social mobilization for the use of sanitary latrines The current water supply production capacity in Dhaka city is about 900 million litres a day. Low pressure in the distribution system is a problem in many parts of the city and creates a potential health hazard resulting from the ingress of groundwater into the mains at times of zero pressure. Low pressure is often a result of the increased demands resulting from a vertical expansion of the increasing population densities. Abstraction exceeds recharge by about 240 million l/day and the groundwater level under Dhaka is dropping by about 2.6m/year.

be further worsened if the increased rainfall also occurs in the catchments of the transboundary rivers. Water Pricing Water pricing is an issue well debated in Bangladesh. Water pricing ensures the optimum water use. The National Water Policy (1999) states â&#x20AC;&#x153;Water will be considered an economic resource and priced to convey its scarcity value to all users and provide motivation for its conservation. A system of cost recovery, pricing, and economic incentives/disincentives is necessary to balance demand and supply of water.â&#x20AC;? In the case of electrically driven pumps for extraction of groundwater, the farmers pay their electricity bills at a subsidized rate. The farmers also bear the cost of fuel for abstracting surface water by low-lift pumps. In some publicly managed surface water irrigation projects, the service charges are realized from the beneficiaries. All the public irrigation projects are yet to come under the service charge net. This needs strong institutional and political support. Accepting that water will naturally acquire scarcity value, the underlying problem is how to ensure equity of access and particularly that the poor will not bear the burden of increased water costs. It is relatively easy to make safeguards for domestic water, but ensuring

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equity in the competition for water for agriculture while also increasing the cost of water will be difficult. Industry will also be able to out-bid agriculture for water provided that its profit per unit of water used is higher. Increasing the cost of energy (diesel fuel or electricity) is therefore the most attractive way of raising the value of water through increasing the cost of its use. This will affect rich and poor alike without taking measures to restrict access and usage. There is considerable potential to increase the energy use efficiency of existing pumping equipment, which could offset the higher energy costs and it may be appropriate to specifically target poorer farmers in the introduction of improved technology since they are the people least able to afford investments in new equipment. Water Related Social Conflicts Flood Control Projects: The construction of flood control embankments in a complex flood plain ecosystem is a source of conflicts between the different users. Prior to the construction of flood control projects, the fishermen used to extensively rely on capture fisheries. In addition to over fishing, the embankments have caused a marked decline in capture fisheries within the flood control projects, causing disruption in the fishermen's livelihoods. The traditional cropping patterns have changed due to the advent of embankments as the water levels within the FCD projects are regulated by sluice gates/regulators. This has caused conflicts between the farmers and fishermen. The farmers want to regulate the water level as per the crop's requirement, which sometimes goes against the fishermen's interest. Land use conflict: The commercial uses of land, especially government land under lease are the cause of significant conflicts. With khals once excavated using public or project funds, conflicts revolve around the use of khal water for irrigating dry season boro rice or fish culture. These are regarded as income-generating activities for private gain as opposed to shared benefits for the community as a whole. Within beels or perennially flooded lands, conflicts often occur between high and low landholders as to the optimum level of water to be maintained. Because of the lucrative possibilities afforded by fish culture within

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Bangladesh, cooperative ventures involving the leasing of beels and haors to traditional fishermen have been launched with donor support. These are largely successful. When beels are leased out to local influential people, however, conflicts are more likely to ensue. These men often re-lease the area to fishing co-operatives who then must pay a proportion of the catch to the leaseholder, an arrangement again in which local fishermen suffer. Furthermore, according to the law, khals remain common property resources. No one is entitled to construct cross dams or block the flow of water downstream. Nevertheless, such projects including the innovative rubber dam schemes are being built. While relatively successful for the farmers who need water for irrigation, downstream users are deprived of sweet water flow in the dry season. In areas prone to salinity, this can be disastrous. In general, upstream/ downstream conflicts are created when decisions are taken to obstruct or divert flows on khals for private purposes. By the same token, where the channel is excavated as part of a project to open out and sustain the seasonal flow of water as well as to improve drainage, there are fewer social conflicts since the benefits of water can be more easily and equitably shared. Transboundary Issues Bangladesh has fifty-seven common/ border rivers, out of which fifty-four rivers are with India. The ever-increasing upstream withdrawals from these rivers within the Indian territory have deprived Bangladesh from its traditional uses of the river flows, especially in the dry seasons and thereby disrupting the livelihoods of the people depending on these rivers as well as causing serious environmental degradation to one-third of Bangladesh. The increase in salinity in river waters and groundwater has caused thousands of industries to close down in the southwestern region. Farmers are forced to abandon agricultural lands due to the increase in soil salinity and lack of freshwater for irrigation. A large area in the southwest region is suffering from drinking water crisis. As a result, the people are migrating to other parts of the country in search of jobs and better living conditions. Moreover, the Indian River Link (IRL) mega project, as envisaged, poses a great threat to the lives and livelihoods of the people of

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Bangladesh. The impact of IRL on Bangladesh would be much more severe than that being witnessed in the Ganges dependent areas due to the withdrawals of water upstream of Farakka. Some preliminary studies indicate that the salinity intrusion might reach as far as 100 km inside the country even in the month of September. Drainage from waterbodies will be quicker. Due to the reduction in water availability during the monsoon (especially at the later part), the advent of dry season would be earlier. The mouths of the major river distributaries would be silted up causing cut-off of fresh water flow to different corners of the country. The lowering of water levels in rivers would cause depletion of aquifers and recharge ground. Undoubtedly, it goes without saying that the Indian River Link project would cause major changes to the environment of the entire country triggering off one of the major socio-economic and environmental disasters of modem times. Bangladesh has now an arrangement for sharing the dry season flow in the Ganges, as set out in the 1996 Ganges Water Treaty (GWT) between Bangladesh and India. The treaty provides for the sharing of flows for each 10-day period between 1st January and 31st May: There are fifty-three other rivers that flow into Bangladesh from India for which agreements are yet to be reached. After the signing of the Ganges treaty, the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission set up a Joint Committee of Experts (JCE) to formulate longterm/permanent sharing of water sharing of other common rivers in phases. It was agreed to take up the cases of seven rivers i.e Teesta, Manu, Khowai, Gumti, Muhuri, Dharla and Dudhkumar in the first phase with the top priority to the Teesta. An agreement for sharing of the waters of these and other common rivers need to be worked out in order to maximize the water utilization of both the countries. Regional Perspective As a lower riparian state, Bangladesh needs to work with its neighbours towards an overall basin management, with an early focus on the different hydrological regions and promoting information exchange. In the longer-term, there will be increased competition for water and greater environmental risks. A continuing dialogue amongst the co-riparian countries and further extensive studies are needed to develop appropriate long-term strategies in response to the increasing demands on the overall system.

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Since the Ganges, the Brahmaputra and the Meghna River basins are spread over five countries, there is a great potential for regional cooperation for optimal harnessing of the regional water resources. Cooperation should form part of a long-term water vision for Bangladesh. Potentials for such cooperation exist in respect of supply augmentation, sharing of common or transboundary rivers, and flood forecasting. Since the 1996 Ganges Water Sharing Treaty is in place, Bangladesh needs to take an initiative for regional cooperation towards realizing the potential of augmenting lean-season flows of the Ganges and other rivers for the benefit of all the co-riparian. The scope for augmenting the Ganges flows at Farakka through the construction of a reservoir on the Sunkosh River in Bhutan is known to be high and may be examined. Similarly, the proposed Sapta Kosi High Dam on the Kosi River, a tributary of the Ganges in Nepal, could bring significant benefits to Bangladesh (as the lower riparian) in terms of flow augmentation. Bangladesh can collaborate with Nepal and India in the construction of this dam for mutual benefits. Conclusion Bangladesh has made tremendous achievement in the management of its water resources spanning a period of half a century. In the past, the focus was on increasing food production through the implementation of flood protection, drainage and irrigation projects. Though the primary objectives of these projects were achieved, other sectors like fisheries, forestry, navigation and environment were not paid due attention in this process. This realization led to a holistic approach in the management of water resources encompassing all these sectors. NWMP could be cited as an example of integrated water resources management as a planning document. Another realization came into focus: the participatory water management involving stakeholders and local government institutions for the sustainability of water management systems through proper operation and maintenance. The extensive and uncontrolled abstraction of groundwater led to the realization that abstraction of groundwater needs to be regulated in order to protect the environment. Another factor is the institutional development of water sector agencies to make them more service oriented. NWMP has taken all these concerns during the formulation of the plan. However, all these achievements will be frustrated if Bangladesh fails

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to secure its rightful share from the transboundary rivers. Moreover, all year round data sharing is needed among the co-riparian countries for optimization of uses of regional water resources. References l National Water Policy, 1999 GOB, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh l National Water Management Plan, Volume 1,2,3,4,5; Water Resources Planning Organization, December 2001 l Unlocking the Potential- National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction, October 2005, General Economics Division, Planning Commission, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh

Bangladesh's Water Issues Emaduddin Ahmad

n the last few decades, water management practices in Bangladesh were mainly concerned with finding ways to develop water resources in response to an increasing demand in the agricultural sector. This practice brought the country close to food self-sufficiency in the 1990s. However, focus on water development is now missing in the country's policies. Many areas in Bangladesh are now confronted with deteriorating quantity and quality of existing water resources and economic development is leading to a negative impact on the life supporting ecosystem. It is envisaged that rapid growth of population, economic activities and climate change will further complicate the water development issues in the years to come. Water Sector Development in Bangladesh l Till the 1950s â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Flood Management with small dykes under

individual control, irrigation from river water using manual or semi-mechanical lift. l Water Sector Master Plan of 1964 -- Concepts of major flood control, drainage and irrigation projects. This implementation continued until 1971. The objective was safe paddy cultivation. l IBRD Review 1972 -- Concept of small scale project with emphasis on irrigation using ground water. Large coverage could be achieved by private sector initiative. Food grain self sufficiency was achieved but with adverse impacts such as lowering of ground water and arsenic pollution. l 1983-1989 and 1990-1995 -- Master Plan Organisation (MPO) and Surface Water Simulation Modelling Programme (SWSMP).

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Flood Action Plan (FAP) considered 26 components after the floods of 1987 and 1988, initially on the flood, and finally on round-the-year water management. Regional study on environmental impacts was introduced. However, due to a lack of quality control in managing the studies at one times and results of pilot studies not in, the FAP could not provide definite and useful output. Simultaneously Flood Forecasting was introduced using mathematical model to support flood management. Major and important secondary rivers were covered. Due to limited upstream information, lead time was inadequate. l A new National Water Management Plan has been initiated in 2004. The plan is guided by the National Water Policy introduce in early 1999. l 2004 -- The National Water Management Plan (NWMP) was approved by the Government of Bangladesh. Achievements and Impacts So far 60 per cent of Bangladesh has been brought under flood control and drainage. Many of the projects are not well maintained due to lack of funds. No tax rule exists to recover the cost. Adverse impact of water logging, disallowing available necessary flooding, closing navigational routes and an overall shortage of fresh water fish are seen. While the stakeholders are theoretically in favour of flood management, their participation is still not ensured. Operation of the structures, maintenance of drainage canal and participation of decision makers has been missing. River monitoring is a necessity which requires large sums for hard material and was neglected until recently. While river monitoring on a regular basis can reduce the severity of erosion and, thereby, the costs of initial construction and maintenance, there is no systematic measure being taken for this. Policy and Reforms Management actions taken at one location can influence the geomorphology, water quality and ecosystem of other areas, even far beyond the project area. Recent approaches to river management are multi-objective, balancing beneficial uses for agriculture, fisheries, water supply, navigation with the protection and enhancement of the riverine and flood plain habitat and water quality. These emerging

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concepts make room for the physical processes to drive the ecological restoration by natural progression, rather than engineering. There is a gradual shift of the government policies of the early 1990s towards a more comprehensive and holistic approach in water management from expensive structural measures for flood control and drainage. There is a new consensus among stakeholders, professionals and the policy makers on the need for integrated water resources management, reflected in the Bangladesh Water and Flood Management Strategy (FPCO, 1996). The Flood Action Plan culminated in the publication of the Bangladesh Water and Flood Management Strategy (BWFMS) in 1996. This recognised the limitations of earlier plans, which had focused too heavily on agricultural development without adequate consideration of the needs of other sectors. The BWFMS recommended that the government should formulate a National Water Policy together with a comprehensive National Water Management Plan (NWMP). The government acted promptly to implement these recommendations. The National Water Policy (NWPo) was prepared and published in January 1999 following endorsement of the National Water Resources Council (NWRC). A new National Water Management Plan (NWMP) was formulated and approved in 2004. The National Water Policy The NWPO provides an overall framework for future management of the water sector. Directions are provided on such issues as overall basin-wide planning, water rights and allocation, public and private involvement, public investment, water supply and sanitation, fisheries navigation, agriculture industry and environment. The document is intended to guide both public and private actions to ensure optimal development and management of water that benefits both individuals and society at large. Other Related Policies In 1998, the National Policy for Safe Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation (NPSWSS) was published. The main objective of this policy is to improve public health and produce a safer environment by reducing water borne disease and contamination of surface and groundwater. In this policy the government recognised the

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importance of increasing participation of users including active support and involvement of other partners, such as NGOs, marketoriented business organisations and similar private organisations in water and sanitation development. The National Agricultural Policy (NAP) was issued in 1999. The main goal of this policy is to maintain self-sufficiency in food. It also aims to ensure that agriculture is profitable to farmers by improved input supply and credit. One important aspect of this policy is that it sets out clear agenda to promote and develop socially and environmentally-friendly agriculture. As early as 1994, the National Forest Policy (NFoP) proposed approximately 20 per cent afforestation by the year 2015. For the first time multiple uses of the Sunderbans were recognised including water, forest and fish. Issues such as global warming, desertification and control of trade of wild birds and animals were also addressed. The National Fisheries Policy (NFiP) of 1998 aims to enhance fisheries production and improve socio-economic conditions for households where capture fishing is the main activity; to meet the demand for animal protein; to boost economic growth by export of fish and fisheries product; and to maintain ecological balance. The policy highlights the need to conserve fish habitats, to prevent further drainage of standing water bodies for agricultural development. The National Environmental Policy (NEP) of 1992 is broadly similar to the National Fisheries Policy. This policy also highlights the need to maintain ecological balance and overall development through protection and improvement of the environment. It seeks to identify and regulate activities that pollute and degrade the environment to ensure environmentally sound development in all sectors. One important aspect of this policy is proposing to audit existing flood control and drainage projects on an emergency basis along with steps to modify these projects as necessary. Assessment of Policies There are no major contradictions between national policies for different sectors with respect to water resources development in the country. However, there are no clear guidelines in the country as to

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how the actions required by different policies should be coordinated. Contradiction also arises due to gaps and interpretation of policy issues. A major gap in the NPSWSS is its obscurity in stating the need for regulating private sector activities to ensure water quality. Neither the treatment levels nor the industrial effluents are discussed in the policy. No reference has been made to the interaction of wells for drinking water and irrigation. The NPSWSS also does not clearly address the coordination of activities of different agencies in other sub-sectors. The NAP objective to maintain food self-sufficiency along with issues related to water requirement and land use to meet the policy objective need to be adequately addressed. The NFiP policy aims at expanding the capture fisheries resources with a target to export surplus. However, this may trigger conflict with the agricultural sector in the management of water bodies. Another area of conflict is advocating banning of discharge of industrial wastes, agro-chemicals and fish-farm chemicals into water bodies. This may again give rise to conflict with the target of NAP to maintain food self-sufficiency by expanding HYV crops. There are no major conflicts between NEP and other policies except for auditing the FCD projects. The NWPO does not provide any guidelines or direction in this regards. Water Development Issues: Today and 2025 The population projection for 2025 for medium fertility decline is 181 million, taking 1995 as the base year, according to National Water Management Plan (NWMP). NWMP also predicts that the urban population will grow at a rate of 8 per cent per annum, which means 73 million inhabitants in urban areas in 2025 compared to 27 million in 2000; an increase of 2.7. According to the draft Development Strategy formulated by the National Water Management Plan Project (NWMPP), under the medium economic growth scenario the GDP will rise from 2021 billion in 1999-00 to 7965 billion in 2024-25. Considering medium economic growth and medium fertility decline, it has been estimated by the NWMP that an additional demand of 9.5 million tons of food grains will be created in 2025 compared to 2000. Annual fish consumption will increase from 1.68 Mt/a to 4.43 Mt/a in 2025.

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Increase in population and economic activities will be the main driving force in determining the water demand in the coming years. Some indication of the development scenario could be obtained from the estimated land distribution in 2025. Classification River Mang rove Forest Urban Rural Other Water Agriculture

1995 (Mha) 4626 4957 21058 8697 6734 3373 7584 82784

2025 (Mha) 4520 5623 24693 12956 8167 4383 10891 68661

Changes in the area of river, forest, urban and rural settlements will not be appreciable. However, the major concern is the absolute decline of approximately 1.4 Mha of agricultural land. This is largely due to the expansion of fish production on agricultural lands. In that case, the rate of increase of yield should be 2 per cent per annum to maintain food self-sufficiency. In order to increase production, most of the irrigable areas will need to be brought under irrigation. A 1997-98 estimate by NMIDP shows that only 2.83 Mha out of a potential 7.89 Mha is irrigated in the Rabi (winter) season. However, it must be recognised that getting water to all irrigable lands at an affordable price will be difficult. The above estimates do not consider the effect of global warming. It is envisaged that global warming will have a major impact on crop production due to prolonged dry season. Flood Mitigation and Management Floodplains of the major rivers and their tributaries and distributaries cover around 80 per cent of Bangladesh. As a result of very flat topography 20 per cent of the lands are inundated due to spilling of the rivers each year during the monsoon period (JuneSeptember). Rainfall of high intensity and long duration in the river catchments causes drainage congestion within the country due to inadequate conveyance capacity of the rivers. The situation becomes severe when peak flow in the rivers synchronises with high rainfall. The nation experiences around 37 per cent inundation due to floods every 10 years. In 1988 and 1998 more than 60 per cent land was inundated.

During the last 50 years, hundreds of kilometres of embankments have been constructed by Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB), Local Government Engineering Department (LGED) and local authorities (zilla parishad/union parishads/pourashavas). As time progresses and more projects are completed, interdependency of these kinds of flood mitigation measures with the surrounding water environment has resulted in a number of adverse impacts. Some of the adverse impacts include increase in the depth, duration and extent of inundation in the unprotected areas, increase in sedimentation rate in the drainage channels, increase in flood levels, drainage congestion in the protected areas, loss of fish habitats and breeding grounds. Due to inadequate maintenance of flood embankment, embankment breaches are common phenomenon. These embankment breaches are the cause of major flood disaster particularly in the areas on the right bank of Jamuna River. Therefore, mitigation measure for one hazard can cause a wide range of hazards in other areas. Human Intervention and Associated Impacts Human intervention in the flood plains and in the water bodies has introduced large scale environmental, social and economic impacts. Conventional methods of engineering practices of analysis and design had to use simplified approaches without considering interactive responses from system interventions, which is inevitable in the complex river and flood plain system in Bangladesh. The designers had to opt for conservative design parameters to remain on the safe side, or to omit some very important issues which later proved to be the main reasons behind unacceptable hazards that took place within and around project area. Freshwater Withdrawal and Salinity Intrusion Salinity in the coastal areas, particularly in the south-west region is a major concern. Salinity intrusion in the south-west has increased due to low fresh water flow through Gorai during dry season. The main reason is the withdrawal of water in the upstream resulting in degradation of the Gorai offtake. This has resulted in major adverse impacts on the environment and socio-economic condition in the area. The historic Ganges Water Sharing Treaty (GWT) with India signed in 1996 makes a certain quantum of flow available to Bangladesh during the dry season. The main challenge in the future will be to best utilise this additional flow to restore the Gorai and

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other rivers; arrest environmental degradation by salinity control; extend irrigation facilities; control of sedimentation. Diversion, distribution and management of this additional flow will require major interventions like a barrage on the Ganges, water control structures and distribution canal in the Ganges Dependent Areas (GDA). A detailed study on the feasibility of various intervention options should immediately be undertaken. Sedimentation of Rivers, Estuaries and Coasts Each year a huge volume of sediment is being conveyed by the major rivers to the sea. Although it is difficult to quantify the volume of sediment accurately, estimates by different studies show that the quantity of sediment ranges somewhere between 0.5 to 2 billion tonnes per year. It is, however, reasonable to state that sediment load could be in excess of 1 billion tonnes per year. This is a potential resource, which needs to be harnessed in the reclamation of land in the coastal areas. An NWMPP estimate suggests that if 10 per cent of the sediment is deposited on 31,000 km2 land with flooding deeper than 0.9m with a consolidation of 1.5t/m, then the thickness of the deposit would average 10mm per year. This is important for compensation of land subsidence which is typically 2mm per year. Erosion of River Banks The seasonal variation of river flows causes variation in sediment transport and as a result, erosion of river banks occurs. The possible after effects are migration of bank lines, resulting in a loss of valuable lands. Previous studies have estimated that by the year 2025 around 3,575 km2 area in the erodible river valleys of Brahmaputra, Ganges, Padma, Lower Meghna and estuary will be lost due to erosion. On the other hand, 3,665 km2 land will be gained due to accretion in the same period. From these figures it may seem that the loss is not very significant. But this has major social, economic and environmental implications. Structural measures like river bank protection, canalisation etc. for mitigation for erosion in the extremely dynamic river valleys of Jamuna, Padma, Ganges or Lower Meghna would require huge investment in implementation and more so in maintenance. Planning of any such mitigation measure requires prediction of river erosion and the most suitable measure for mitigation based on their resulting impact upstream and downstream of the mitigation work. Remote sensing data can be used for study of pattern of changes to river plan form and bank

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lines. Mathematical models could be useful to predict river erosion, and study of different mitigation options and their impacts. Prediction of erosion for early warning can also save life and property. Cyclone and Storm Surge Bangladesh has over 700 km of coastline, which is exposed to recurring cyclones from the Bay of Bengal. The coastal areas have experienced over 42 major cyclones in the last 125 years. These cyclones cause immense damage to the coastal social and economic life and to the environment. In 1991, the coastal areas experienced a storm with a surge height of 4.0-5.0 m, killing 140,000 of the population and damaging livestock, crops, property and infrastructure in the area. Since the 1960s a large number of polders have been constructed in the tidal plains of the south as mitigation measures against tidal surges and saline water intrusion. A large number of cyclone shelters have also been constructed to save life in the event of a storm surge. One of the major mitigation measures are land-use policies, which should guide development activities in disaster prone areas. The land-use policy should be based on analysis of risk due to hazard. Deterministic models can be used to simulate any events and GIS could be very a handy tool for risk mapping based on risk analysis on the basis of an inventory of the property at risk to the hazard, and estimates of different intensities of hazard events. Probabilistic models could be used to take into account of the whole range of likely events by assigning probabilities to each range of events and estimating the damage that would be expected to occur as a result. Water Stress Agricultural drought is a common phenomenon in many areas of Bangladesh in post monsoon and dry season. In major cities, scarcity of water for drinking and sanitation is a major problem. Main causes of drought are limited rainfall, high temperature associated with low humidity and withdrawal of water in the upstream. Over withdrawal of groundwater is causing lowering of groundwater in many areas; as a result, many Shallow Tubewells (STW) are becoming inoperable. Moreover, low flow in rivers in the dry period and lowering of groundwater table is causing environmental problems like salinity intrusion in surface and groundwater, increase in the concentration

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of pollution in surface water, sedimentation etc. The problem becomes multifaceted when there is scarcity of ground water during the monsoon in most years, especially in the flood-controlled area. This reveals the significance of annual flood plain's inundation for ground water recharge. Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Pollution from human and industrial sources is the main water quality problem in the river systems near urban areas. Buriganga in Dhaka and Karnafuli in Chittagong are the worst affected. Other rivers are also showing gradual decline in water quality. It has been estimated that urban population will increase by 2.7 times by 2025. The gross daily water demand in the major metropolitan cities (Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna and Rajshahi) will rise from the present 2460 Ml/d (million litres per day) to 7970 Ml/d assuming a system loss of 20 per cent. There is already a major shortage of required supply of safe water. Due to over abstraction and loss of recharge areas, the groundwater table in Dhaka has declined at an alarming rate over the last couple of decades. A 1997 study by Institute of Water Modelling (IWM) has shown that the maximum drawdown due to groundwater abstraction was 25m. However, this drawdown could have been reduced to 15m by conjunctive use of surface and groundwater. Based on model study, the IWM recommended the use of surface water during wet season from the rivers surrounding Dhaka and use of groundwater during dry period. It may be mentioned here that cost of treatment of surface water will be lower in wet season because of lower pollution level. Recharge during wet season will raise the groundwater table, which will reduce the cost of groundwater abstraction during dry season. Alternative sources like River Jamna, which is only 80km away with reliable flow needs to be investigated. Conjunctive use in other major cities and urban areas should also be studied. Other options relate to more stringent regulations implemented on the ground relating to protection of the quality of water and reduction of wastage and unaccounted-for water. Community participation in the process is vital. Demand management by imposing tariffs could be useful to discourage wastage of water. Private sector management of water supply system could be more efficient in the management of demand and quality services. Dhaka has the largest piped sewerage system in Bangladesh;

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however, the existing system serves only 20 per cent of the city. Of this only 3 per cent reaches the DWASA sewage treatment plant at Pagla, the rest leaks into ground or surface water system, which cause widespread pollution. 40 per cent households in Dhaka have septic tanks with soak wells. In the future, with the increase in population density, the quantities will not only exceed soak well capacity, but high land values will discourage the setting aside of land for such purposes. Therefore, immediate measures to collect and carry the effluent for treatment and disposal are necessary. Arsenic Contamination of Groundwater The issue of arsenic is now the most important environmental concern of Bangladesh. In recent times arsenic in tube-well waters has upset the drinking water supply from groundwater. Arsenic has turned into a national health issue, groundwater users panicking as a result. Out of 64 districts, arsenic contamination in groundwater has been detected in 59 districts. The most common mitigation measure being taken is identifying the tube-wells with arsenic level crossing allowable limits for drinking water. Various agencies are working all over Bangladesh in testing tube-well water for arsenic. The testing methods have not yet been standardised, field activities are not coordinated, valuable information from field investigations is not properly archived for further use. There is an urgent need to develop an arsenic database, which should include information on the tubewells being affected, the population under threat, mitigation measures being undertaken, method used for testing, agencies involved etc. Such a database will contribute immensely into planning a coordinated arsenic mitigation plan for the country. Research is urgently needed to improve understanding of the mechanisms involved and its probable impact on the food chain. Institutional Development The National Water Policy states that â&#x20AC;&#x153;the governance and management of the national water resources require a great deal of coordination of existing institutions and, in some cases, reform and creation of new community-based institutions. Water resources management extends across many water-using sectors as well as political jurisdictions and geographically and hydrologically diverse areas. Properly functioning institutions are essential for effective implementation and administration of the country's water and related environmental resource management policies and directives.â&#x20AC;?

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It further states “firstly, there should be separation of policy, planning, and regulatory functions from implementation and operational functions at each level of government. Secondly, each institution must be held accountable for financial and operational performance.” Regarding community participation and involvement of local government institutions in water resources management, the policy states that, “the principle that community resources should be managed by the community concerned, along with local government institutions unless a greater national interest prevails, should guide water resource management. It is recognised that women have a particular stake in water management because they are the principal providers and carriers of water, main caretaker of family's health, and participants in many stages of pre- and post harvest activities.” The NWPo clearly states the responsibility of public and private sectors and need coordination of existing institutions. It is important to note that the policy has emphasised on participation and mobilisation of community resources and recognises the importance of the role of women in water resources management. In NWPo, the government states its intention to transfer a large part of all water development schemes to the Zila and Upazila parshads from the line agencies. These local government institutes are supposed to secure public participation in all aspect. The government also declares that restructuring or reform of existing institutions will be required to implement the policy. Institutional reforms as declared are never easy to achieve. It may take several years before such reforms are effectively in place. However, targets to achieve different institutional reforms have to be developed and acted upon. Regional Water Issues South Asian regional water issues can be mainly divided into three broad categories: i) sharing of river waters ii) cooperative development of water resources, and iii) sharing of data and information on common rivers to facilitate flood forecasting and water quality control. The sharing of the

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riparian river water has been a bone of contention between India and Bangladesh for the last 35 years. In 1972, the Indo-Bangladesh Joint Rivers Commission was formed with the intension to address water related issues concerning the common river systems between India and Bangladesh. The statute of the Commission defines its function as follows: (a) to maintain liaison between the participating countries in order to ensure the most effective joint efforts in maximising the benefits from common river systems to both the countries, (b) to formulate flood control works and to recommend implementation of joint projects, (c) to formulate detailed proposals on advance flood warnings, flood forecasting and cyclone warnings, (d) to study flood control and irrigation projects so that the water resources of the region can be utilised on an equitable basis for the mutual benefit of the peoples of the two countries, and (e) to formulate proposals for carrying out coordinated research on problem of flood control affecting both the countries. (ii) The Commission shall also perform such other functions as the two Governments may, by mutual agreement, direct it to do. The Commission, over the last 30 years, has only involved itself effectively (with mixed results) in water sharing issues and sharing of data on common rivers between India and Bangladesh. The major dispute between Bangladesh and India is on the sharing of the Ganges water during lean period. India has constructed a Barrage on the Ganges at Farraka in West Bengal to divert water through the Bhagirati-Hoogly system to flush mainly the port of Calcutta. Bangladesh claims that there is not enough flow in the Ganges that could be diverted through Bhagirathi-Hoogly to flush Calcutta port and at the same time maintain the agriculture, ecology and economy of the areas in the downstream, particularly, the southern part of Bangladesh. On 12 December, 1996 Bangladesh and India signed the historic Ganges water sharing treaty. The 30-year Ganges Water Treaty concluded 35 years of discussions and negotiations between India and Bangladesh. The Treaty provides Bangladesh the opportunity to invest in long-term sustainable projects to develop freshwater

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resources in the Ganges. They must be used to nurture the region that has suffered so much social and environmental damage in the past due to low freshwater flow during the dry season as a result of withdrawal of water in the upstream. One big question about the Treaty is the guarantee of minimum flow for Bangladesh. This is still one area of great concern for Bangladesh, which needs to be resolved in the shortest possible time. Over the last couple of years a new area of major concern for Bangladesh has emerged. This is in connection with the proposed Indian River Link Project. The main objective of the project is to divert a large volume of water from the so-called water surplus areas to the water deficit areas in India. The Ganges and the Brahmaputra River basins have been identified as marginally surplus and surplus areas, respectively, while most of the western and southern areas have been identified as the water deficit areas. The transfer of water would, therefore, primarily occur from the Ganges and Brahmaputra river basins. Bangladesh has voiced its concern to the Indian side formally. Unfortunately, the response from India has been discouraging to initiate a fruitful dialogue on the issue.

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Recommendations 1. The National Water Management Plan (NWMP) being prepared should be implemented. 2. In order to meet the national policy to maintain self-sufficiency in food, research in crop diversification and high yielding variety of crops should be given top-most priority. 3. Irrigation facility to maximum irrigable lands should be extended in the next 15 years. Conjunctive use of surface and groundwater, water retention in river valleys and beels, water conservation, rain water harvesting, flow augmentation and diversion and utilisation of major river flows should be investigated. 4. An integrated land and water management policy for Bangladesh formulated by 2007. The policy should: i) ii) iii)

The GBM Basins, covering an area of around 1.75 million sq. km in five countries, have immense potential in developing its water resources in areas like flood management, flow augmentation, hydropower, navigation etc. This is vital for uplifting the economy and living condition of 600 million people living within the GBM region.

iv) v) vi)

Lessons l Past strategies focused on flood prevention with a view to increasing food production. As a result, other water-using sectors were neglected and a holistic and integrated water management strategy and vision could not be developed. l Stake-holder's participation was completely unknown and absent in the past water development activities, which contributed to the lack of sustainable development in this sector. l The reason behind failure of many institutions in the water sector was due to poor operation and maintenance mechanism and capability. l Over exploitation and unregulated use of groundwater have contributed to adverse environmental impacts including lowering of groundwater table. l Lack of coordination among various agencies in planning and implementation of projects prevented in achieving the desired objectives; rather resulted in some adverse impacts.

vii)

address to the gaps in different sectoral policies provide guidelines for coordination of activities in different sectors, provide guidelines of land use and management in Bangladesh, provide principles determining development of urban, rural and industrial areas, provide policy on the preservation of wetlands and biodiversity, provide a policy on the mobilisation of private sector resources, a policy related to access of water to all elements of society, including the poor and the under-privileged, taking into account the need of women and children.

Nationwide environmental assessment for 2005 and prediction for the next 50 years for different development options is required. Mitigation plans for any adverse impacts should be formulated.

6. Water quality in many of the rivers and wetlands in Bangladesh has deteriorated due to lack of awareness among water users, failure to implement regulatory mechanisms to ensure water quality, indiscriminate use of agro-chemicals and untreated disposal of industrial and domestic waste. Immediate steps have to be taken to implement strict measures for waste treatment, monitor use of agro-chemicals and raise awareness about water

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quality.

18. Immediate steps for revival of Buriganga River.

Coordinated efforts to reduce risk of flood in the affected areas by 50 per cent within the next 10 years and by 75 per cent by 2025.

19. Augmentation of water supply for Dhaka needs urgent attention

8. Reassessment and audit of all coastal polders and FCDI projects by 2006. Immediate rehabilitation of the projects to meet the need for overall development completed by 2010. 9. Management of water in the monsoon through controlled flooding and drainage where possible. 10. Dredging of offtakes and river beds can be viable solution for restoration of rivers. Appropriate technology for dredging to minimise cost has be studied. 11. Flood forecasting and warning system need to be integrated with the overall mitigation activities for arriving at optimum benefit from the system. Immediate need for institutional strengthening, human resources management and community participation in flood forecasting and warning for better dissemination and utility of forecast. Existing flood Forecasting Model extended further upstream to increase lead-time of forecast in the next 3 years. 12. Computerised Emergency Response System based on wireless and Internet technology instituted in the country by 2007 linking the stakeholders and the central decision making agency. 13. Ganges barrage and associated interventions completed for maximum utilisation of dry season flow of the Ganges in extending irrigation facilities and control salinity intrusion in the Ganges Dependent Areas in the next 5 years. 14. Models for erosion and storm surge prediction developed and applied by 2005. 15. Structural measures for reclamation of coastal lands initiated by 2006. 16. Phase-wise programmes for expansion of access to safe drinking water and sanitation completed within the next 20 years. 17. Hygiene education in 80 per cent of schools by 2010

20. Sanitation problems in particular of urban cities like Dhaka needs to addressed on an urgent basis 21. Standardised testing method for arsenic detection in groundwater, national arsenic database, development of low cost mitigation measures by 2006. Research on probable impact of arsenic contamination on food chain is urgently required. 22. Institutional restructuring and reforms initiated for creating enabling environment for: i) ii) iii) iv)

participation of stakeholders in planning, design, implementation and management of water schemes, mobilisation of private sector resources, transfer of water sector schemes below 5000 ha to local government institutions, and enhancing the role of women in water management. Social and cultural aspects should be given importance in development planning and management of water resources.

23. Campaign to raise awareness among the stakeholders about water planning, management, use and conservation in the next 10 years. 24. Mechanisms for mobilising new financial resources identified and under process of implementation by 2006. 25. Government investment in research in water management issues increased by 2006. 26. Regional cooperation for share of information and data, hydropower, flow augmentation, flood management and flood forecasting by 2010. Basin wide approach is needed for development and management of water resources in the GBM basins for fostering effective regional cooperation. 27. Need of political goodwill to ensure an equitable sharing of the water of the international rivers among the co-riparian as well as to maintain ecological balance and environmental quality.

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28. To facilitate implementation of co-riparian state's interests and obligations, an apex body comprising representatives of all the co-riparian states needs to be set up to evolve a plan for development, conservation, sharing and utilisation of the international water according to the needs of the member states and the principle's of international law. 29. Cooperation and coordinated approach is essential to achieve sustainable development in the water resources sector since water is integration of technical, economical, social, political, institutional and policy factors. Emaduddin Ahmad is executive director of the Institute of Water Modelling in Bangladesh. References l Q. K. Ahmad et al, Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Region: A Framework for Sustainable Development, (Dhaka: UPL, 2001). l Emaduddin Ahmad et al, Sustainable Development of Water Resources Towards 2025, BUP, 2002. l Bangladesh Water and Flood Management Strategy, MoWR, GOB, 1995. l Bangladesh Water Vision 2025, Bangladesh Water Partnership, 2000. l M. C. Chaturvedi, Transboundary River Basin Management and Sustainable Development-Case Study of Ganges-BrahmaputraMeghana Basin, Proceedings of a seminar on Transboundary River Basin Management and Sustainable Development, UNESCO, 1993. l A N H A. Hossain, Peoples Initiative for Transboundary River Basin Management, (SAWAF III, Dhaka, 2003). l Hossain, S. M. M. A. Rahman, Integrated Water Resources Management in Bangladesh: Role of SWMC, 2nd SWMC Users Conference, Dhaka, 1999. l Ministry of Water Resources, Govt. of Bangladesh, Overview of Water Resources Management and Development in Bangladesh, 1997. l National Water Management Plan, WARPO, 2004. l National Water Policy, 1998. Abbreviations BAMWSP BBS BRE BUET BUP BWDB BWFMS DAE DANIDA DDS DEM DO

Bangladesh Arsenic Mitigation Water Supply Project Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics Brahmaputra Right Embankment Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad Bangladesh Water Development Board Bangladesh Water and Flood Management Strategy Department of Agricultural Extension Danish International Development Agency Draft Development Strategy Digital Elevation Model Dissolved Oxygen

DoE DoF DPHE DWASA ECNEC ECNWRC EIA FAP FCD FCDI FFWC FPCO GBM GDA GDP GIS GoB GRRP HYV IBRD IUCN IWM IWRM JRC LGED MoA MoEF MoFL MoI MoL MoLGRDC MoWR MPO NFiP NFoP NGO NPSWSS NWMP NWMPP NWP NWPo NWRC NWRD O&M OGDA PAP PPP RHD SOB SPARRSO SWSMP WARPO WASA WB

Department of Environment Department of Fisheries Department of Public Health Engineering Dhaka Water and Sewerage Authority Executive Committee of the National Economic Council Executive Committee of the National Water Resources Council Environmental Impact Assessment Flood Action Plan Flood Control and Drainage Flood Control, Drainage and Irrigation Flood Forecasting and Warning Centre Flood Plan Coordination Organisation Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Ganges Dependent Area Gross Domestic Product Geographical Information System Government of (the People's Republic of) Bangladesh Gorai River Restoration Project High Yield Variety International Bank for Reconstruction and Development International Union for the Conservation of Nature Institute of Water Modelling Integrated Water Resources Management Joint Rivers Commission Local Government Engineering Department Ministry of Agriculture Ministry of Environment and Forest Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock Ministry of Industry Ministry of Land Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Co-operatives Ministry of Water Resources Master Plan Organisation National Fisheries Policy National Forestry Policy Non-Government Organisation National Policy for Safe Water Supply and Sanitation National Water Management Plan National Water Management Plan Project National Water Plan National Water Policy National Water Resources Council National Water Resources Database Operation and Maintenance Options for the Ganges Dependent Area Project-affected Person People's Participation Process Roads and Highways Department Survey of Bangladesh Space Research and Remote Sensing Organisation Surface Water Simulation Modelling Programme Water Resources Planning Organisation Water and Sewerage Authority World Bank

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Indus Treaty and Baglihar: An Overview Ranaswamy R Iyer

his article focuses on issues and concerns rather than facts and figures or engineering details regarding the Indus Waters Treaty and the Baglihar controversy.

The Indus Water Treaty, 1960 is internationally regarded as a successful instance of conflict resolution between two countries that have otherwise been locked in conflict. It was also the practice until recently to express satisfaction at the fact that the arbitration provisions of the Treaty had not so far been invoked, but that record seems about to change. On the other hand, there are some who question the statement that the Treaty is a good example of conflict resolution; they feel that the surgery that it did on the river-system was harmful. There is also a body of opinion in both countries that the division of waters under the Treaty was unfair, but the unfairness alleged in one country is the exact opposite of that alleged in the other country. On the outstanding differences under the Treaty (relating to the Tulbul/Wullar, Baglihar and Kishenganga projects) there are divergent perceptions in the two countries as to the question of conformity to the Treaty. Where does the truth lie in relation to all these differences? Conflict Resolution Is the Treaty really a successful example of conflict-resolution? The answer has to be `Yes and No'. The water-sharing under the Treaty was a simple allocation of three rivers to Pakistan and three to India, and there was nothing much thereafter to `operate'; there is

no continuous water-sharing on the same river as in the case of the Ganges (between India and Bangladesh). It is much more difficult to operate the Ganges Treaty than the Indus Treaty, and high praise of the Indus Treaty as a successful instance of conflict-resolution is perhaps somewhat exaggerated. Having said that, one must give due credit to the fact that the Treaty has managed to survive three wars, that the Indus Commission has continued to meet even when the political relationship between the two countries was extremely bad, and that at the working level the relationship between the officials of the two countries has been marked by cordiality. At the same time, a few differences under the Treaty have proved quite intractable, and that is a poor reflection on the Treaty. On the claims of `successful conflict-resolution', the picture is, therefore, mixed, with the positive elements having a slight edge. Was the `surgery' on the Indus system necessary and good? We must note that the `surgery' on the river-systems (Indus in the west, GangesBrahmaputraMeghna in the east) was a part of the surgery on the subcontinent. That surgery is now a fact of history. However, without entering into a discussion of that division, it must be noted that in deciding whether the subcontinent should be divided, little (if any) attention was paid to the fact that major riversystems were going to be cut across. That did not figure as a factor in the decision-making but was only considered later as a consequence of a decision taken on other grounds. Water Sharing Issues and Partition Was the Treaty a good answer to the water-sharing problem that surfaced after the Partition of the subcontinent? It has been argued that dividing the river-system into two segments was not the best thing to do, and that the better course would have been for the two countries jointly to manage the entire system in an integrated and holistic manner. However, given the circumstances of Partition and the difficult relationship between the two newly formed countries, it would have been na誰ve to expect that such a joint integrated cooperative approach would work. (If a constructive, integrated approach were possible in relation to the river system, then why not in relation to the totality of perceptions that led to the partition of the subcontinent? Obviously this speculation is pointless). An alternative possibility would have been to agree upon a sharing of waters between the two countries on each of the six rivers

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constituting the system. That might have been technically feasible but very difficult to operate. Continuous sharing on each river with joint monitoring arrangements and so on might have proved cumbersome, difficult and productive of endless disputes. Instead, the actual division agreed upon was the allocation of the three western rivers to Pakistan and the three eastern rivers to India. If the ideal solution is unavailable, the choice has to fall on the second-best solution; agreement of any kind is better than discord. Was the sharing of waters fair? Many in India feel that the allocation of 80 per cent of the waters to Pakistan and 20 per cent to India was an unfair settlement foolishly accepted by the Indian negotiators; and many in Pakistan argue that the territories that went to India under Partition were historically using less than 10 per cent of the Indus waters, and that the Treaty was generous to India in giving it 20 per cent of the waters. Both are fallacious arguments. A share of 20 per cent is not ipso facto low; on the other hand, the level of historic use (10 per cent or whatever) does not necessarily determine a country's future needs or entitlements. A multiplicity of factors and criteria has to be applied, having regard to all the relevant circumstances; not a priori view on what is fair is possible. However, it is hardly necessary for us to go into this question. When prolonged inter-country negotiations by teams acting under governmental briefings led to a Treaty, and the Treaty was approved and signed at the highest levels, it must be presumed that it was the best outcome that could be negotiated under the given circumstances; either side is then precluded from saying that it was unfair, unequal, poorly negotiated, etc. If a degree of dissatisfaction with the Treaty arises in the course of operation of the Treaty, it would be a matter for inter-state discussions within the ambit of the Treaty, or a re-negotiation of the Treaty with much uncertainty as to the outcome. On the whole, it would probably be best to leave things as they are. The Treaty embodies a negotiated sharing that doubtless represents what was achievable. Resolution of Differences Why are certain differences (Tulbul, Baglihar, etc) proving intractable? Ignoring the complexities involved in these cases and simplifying the issues, the Pakistani position is that these projects constitute

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violations of the Treaty by India which India denies. The Treaty precludes the building of any storages by India on the rivers allocated to Pakistan. The crucial question, therefore, is whether the projects proposed by India involve the creation of storages. That is not as simple a question as it might seem. The conventional engineering view is that a diversion barrage or a run-of-the-river hydroelectric project (unlike a dam and a reservoir) does not create any storage. However, even run-of-the-river projects involve structures, and any structure on a river does raise the water-level and create a minimal storage. The question then becomes one of the level and acceptability of that storage, and a difference of opinion on this is possible. It is the Pakistani view that the Indian projects mentioned above involve storages and are therefore unacceptable; Pakistan is also apprehensive of the structures in question giving India a measure of control over rivers allocated to Pakistan, and enabling India either to reduce water-flows to Pakistan or to release stored waters and cause floods. The Pakistani objections are thus partly water-related and partly security-related. The Indian position is that the security fears are misconceived as India cannot flood Pakistan without flooding itself first (such an explanation was earlier accepted by Pakistan in the case of the Salal Project); that its capacity to reduce flows to Pakistan is very limited; that the Treaty does give India some minimal rights on the western rivers, which India has not been able to use partly because no proposal, drawing, design or other technical detail submitted by it is ever cleared by Pakistan; and that Pakistan is deliberately unreasonable in its examination of such proposals, the aim being the obstruction of all efforts by India to use the limited rights given to it by the Treaty. It is the Indian perception (privately stated) that the operation of the Indus Treaty has been hamstrung by total and persistent Pakistani negativism. It is also the Indian perception that Pakistan's objections to Wullar (Tulbul), Baglihar, and Kishenganga are essentially political and not technical. As mentioned above, one such project, namely Salal Hydroelectric Project, was (after many years of talks) cleared by Pakistan in the 1970s. Subsequently the relations between the two countries deteriorated and touched rock bottom in the post-Kargil period. It was unrealistic at that stage to expect the differences relating to Baglihar, etc, to be resolved. There was even some uncertainty in 2002 about the future of the Treaty itself, but that trouble blew over and the Treaty continued to function. However, there was a feeling

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that once the political relationship between the two countries improved, agreement would be reached on these outstanding issues. That expectation has been belied. While the two countries have begun to talk to each other, and a`peace process' has been put in motion, the talks over Baglihar have failed and Pakistan has invoked the arbitration provisions of the Treaty and asked the World Bank to nominate a neutral expert. It is a bit puzzling that this negative development that casts a shadow on the `peace process' has been allowed to occur. There are two possible explanations to this unfortunate development. The first is that there is indeed a genuine and sharp difference between the two countries on the conformity of the Baglihar Project to the provisions of the Treaty, and perhaps the talks broke down on that issue. The other possibility is that Pakistan's objection continues to be political rather than technical, and that there has been a hardening of the Pakistani position on the talks with India. If this understanding is correct, the breakdown of the talks on Baglihar might be the result of a deliberate decision about political relations, unconnected with the details of the Baglihar case. Is the invocation of the arbitration provisions a matter for regret? It seems to this writer that there is no need for unhappiness at the invocation of the arbitration clause. The Treaty provides for arbitration. That would also be action under the Treaty. If India is convinced that its position is correct, it should be able to present its case strongly to the neutral expert, and eventually to the Court of Arbitration if that contingency arises. However, an agreed settlement is definitely preferable to arbitration, and India should continue to try to persuade Pakistan to return to the negotiating table. Relation with the Kashmir Issue Finally, what is the Jammu & Kashmir dimension of Baglihar, Wullar, etc? There is a strong sense of grievance in Jammu & Kashmir that the Treaty has made it very difficult for it (J&K) to derive any benefit by way of irrigation, hydroelectric power or navigation from the rivers that flow through it but stand allocated to Pakistan. The Government of India would like to remove J&K's sense of grievance. However, the first step here is the communication of the technical details of the projects concerned to Pakistan. Things get stalled at that stage

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because of Pakistan's objections. Speculatively speaking, Pakistan is perhaps not keen on letting these projects go forward because (a) they are in what it regards as disputed territory, and (b) the benefits of the projects would go to J&K under Indian auspices. Hence, (presumably) the stalemate. Tulbul, Baglihar, etc, might not have proved so difficult to resolve if they had been located not in J&K but elsewhere. However, Pakistan did at one stage let Salal proceed under certain conditions; one had hoped that Baglihar would also be similarly allowed to proceed. That has not happened. One has to wait and see what the future holds. Ramaswamy R Iyer is an honorary research professor at the Centre for Policy Research (CPR), New Delhi, India. References l K. B. Adhikary, Q. K. Ahmad, S. K. Malla, B. B. Pradhan, Khalilur Rahman, R. Rangachari, K. B. Sajjadur Rasheed, B. G. Verghese (ed.), (2000), Cooperation on the Eastern Himalayan Rivers: Opportunities and Challenges, (New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 2000), under the auspices of Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad, Dhaka, Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi and Institute for Integrated Development Studies, Kathmandu. l Q. K. Ahmad, Nilufar Ahmad and K. B. Sajjadur Rasheed, Resources, Environment and Development in Bangladesh, (Academic Publishers, 1994) under the auspices of Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad, Dhaka. l Q. K. Ahmad, Asit K. Biswas, R. Rangachari, M. M. Sainju (ed.), Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna Region: A Framework for Sustainable Development, (Dhaka: The University Press Ltd, 2001). l Kaiser Bengali (ed.), The Politics of Managing Water, (Islamabad: Sustainable Development Policy Institute, and Oxford University Press, 2003) l Dying Wisdom: Rise, Fall and Potential of India's Traditional Water Harvesting Systems, (New Delhi: Centre for Science and Environment, 1997). l Anil Agarwal, Sunita Narain and Indira Khurana (eds.), Making Water Everybody's Business: Practice and Policy of Water Harvesting, New Delhi: Centre for Science and Environment, 2001). l B. R. Chauhan, Settlement of International and Inter-State Water Disputes in India, (Bombay: Indian Law Institute, N. M. Tripathi Pvt Ltd, 1992). l Rakesh Chettri, ‘Bhutan's Mega Power Politics’, Kathmandu Post, February 29, 2000. l Kanchan Chopra and Biswanath Goldar, ‘Sustainable Development Framework for India: The Case of Water Resources’ Final Report, Institute of Economic Growth, Delhi, for the UN University, Tokyo,

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133 October 2000.

l Ben Crow, Alan Lindquist and David Wilson, Sharing the Ganges: The

Politics and Technology of River Development, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1995). l Ben Crow, (1997) ‘Bridge over Troubled waters? Conflict and Cooperation over the Waters of South Asia’, in Sony Devabhaktuni (ed.), Regional Cooperation in South Asia: Prospects and Problems, Occasional Paper No.32, February 1997, The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington D. C., USA. l ‘Water Management in Bangladesh: A Policy Review’, Livelihoods and Policy Relationship in South Asia, WP I, DFID, UK, and Other organisations, Department for International Development (DFID), UK. l B. D. Dhawan, Indian Water Resource Development for Irrigation: Issues, Critiques and Reviews, (1993). l B. D. Dhawan (ed.), Big Dams, Claims, Counter Claims, (New Delhi: Commonwealth Publishers, 1990). l Tim Dyson, Robert Cassen and Leela Visaria, Twenty-first Century India Population, Economy, Human Development, and the Environment, (Oxford University Press, 2004). l Vinod K. Gaur (ed.), Earthquake Hazard and Large Dams in the Himalaya, (New Delhi: INTACH, 1993). l Peter Gleick, ‘Basic Water Requirements for Human Activities: Meeting Basic Needs’, Water International 21, International Water Resources Association, 1996. l Peter Gleick, ‘The Human Right to Water’, Water Policy I (1998), Elsevier Science Ltd 1999. l `Water Resources in Bangladesh', Government of Bangladesh (website) . l National Water Policy, Ministry of Water Resources, Government of India, 1987. l ‘Integrated Water Resources Development A Plan for Action’, the Report of the National Commission on Integrated Water Resources Development Plan, Ministry of Water Resources, Government of India, September 1999. l ‘Reply to the World Commission on Dams’, letter No.2/WCD/2001/DT (PR) Vol.-III dated 1-2-2001 addressed to the Secretary General of the WCD (see WCD's website www.dams.org), Government of India. l National Water Policy 2002, Ministry of Water Resources, New Delhi, Government of India. l National Policy on Resettlement and Rehabilitation for Project (2004), Ministry of Rural Development, Department of Land Resources, Government of India, Resolution dated 17 February 2004. l S. Guhan, The Cauvery River Dispute: Towards Conciliation, (Madras: Frontline Publication, 1993). l Dipak Gyawali and Ajaya Dixit, ‘How Not To Do A South Asian Treaty’, HIMAL, Kathmandu, April 2001. l Dipak Gyawali, Water in Nepal, (Kathmandu: Himal Books, 2001).

l Fantastic Dams, HIMAL South Asian, (special issue), Vol.11, Number 3,

1998. l Ramaswamy R. Iyer, ‘India and Bangladesh’, The Daily Star, Dhaka,

Bangladesh, 22 May 2001. l Ramaswamy R. Iyer, ‘Delay and Drift on the Mahakali’, Himal South

Asian, Kathmandu, June 2001. l Ramaswamy R. Iyer, WATER: Perspectives, Issues, Concerns, (New

Delhi: Sage Publications, London: Thousand Oaks, 2003). l Ramaswamy R. Iyer, ‘Making of a Subcontinental Fiasco’, HIMAL South

Asian, Vol.16, No.8, August 2003. l Ramaswamy R. Iyer, ‘Beyond Drainage Basin and IWRM: Towards a

Transformation of Thinking on Water’, not yet published, but available for reference in the website of the University of California Santa Cruz (eScholarship Repository, May 2, 2004, http://repositories.cdlib.org /cgirs/CGIRS-2004-7 l Ramaswamy R. Iyer, ‘The UPA and the Cauvery Dispute’, The Hindu, 14 June 2004. l Ramaswamy R. Iyer, ‘Punjab Water Imbroglio: Background, Implications and the Way Out’, Economic and Political Weekly, 31 July 2004. l Ramaswamy R. Iyer, ‘Cauvery: Disappointments, Appeals’, The Hindu, 9 November 2004 l Ramaswamy R. Iyer, ‘Preserving Proprieties’, The Hindu, 14 December 2004. l Ramaswamy R. Iyer, ‘Water Governance, Politics, Policy’, paper prepared for a Conference organized by Institute of Rural Management, Anand, Gujarat, in December 2004 (not yet published). l Ramaswamy R. Iyer, ‘India's River-Linking Project: Implications For Nepal And Bangladesh’, Address at an International Conference on Regional Cooperation on Transboundary Rivers held at Dhaka on 17- 19 December 2004. l Patrick McCully, Silenced Rivers: The Ecology and Politics of Large Dams, (India: Orient Longman, 1998). l Dinesh Kumar Mishra, ‘Living with Floods: People's Perspective’, Economic and Political Weekly, 21 July 2001. l Moench Marcus, Caspari Elisabeth and Dixit Ajaya (eds.), Rethinking the Mosaic: Investigations into Local Water Management, Nepal Water Conservation Foundation, Kathmandu, and Institute for Social and Environmental Transition, Boulder, Colorado, USA, Dec.1999. l Vasudha Pangare and Ganesh, From Poverty to Plenty: The Story of Ralegan Siddhi, (New Delhi 1992). l Report of the Committee on the Pricing of Irrigation Water, Planning Commission, New Delhi, 1992. l R. Rangachari, ‘Some Disturbing Questions’, Seminar , 478, June 1999. l A brief report on Bhutan Water Vision, Policy and Act workshop held at Trashigang. (Ministry of Agriculture, 2003 – website) Royal Government of Bhutan.

134 l National Environment Commission: Brief State of Environment, Royal

Government of Bhutan. l Bhutan Water Policy, SaciWaters, (website): l ‘Floods: A Symposium on Flood Control and Management’, Seminar No.478, June 1999. l R. B. Shah, ‘Inter-State Water Disputes: A Historical Review’, International Journal of Water Resources Development, Vol. 10, No.2, Oxford, UK, 1994. l Tushaar Shah, Groundwater Markets and Irrigation Development, (Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1993). l Tushaar Shah, ‘Water and Welfare: Critical Issues in India's Water Future’, Economic and Political Weekly, 20 March 2004. l Vandana Shiva, Water Wars: Privatization, Pollution and Profit, New Delhi: India Research Press, 2002). l Satyajit Singh, Taming the Waters: The Political Economy of Large Dams in India, (Oxford University Press, 1997). l Bhim Subba, Himalayan Waters Promise and Potential, Problems and Prospects, (Kathmandu: Panos South Asia, 2001). l Bhekh Thapa and B. B. Pradhan, Water Resources Development: Nepalese Perspectives, (Konark Publishers Pvt Ltd, under the auspices of Institute for Integrated Development, Kathmandu, 1995). l Bhutan: State of the Environment 2001, Report No.1999EE46, The Energy Research Institute, New Delhi. Submitted to United Nations Environment Programme] UNEP: Regional Resource Centre for Asia and the Pacific web site. l E G Thukral, Big Dams, Displaced People: Rivers of Sorrow, Rivers of Change, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1992) . l A Vaidyanathan, ‘Integrated Watershed Development: Some Major Issues', Society for the Promotion of Wastelands Development, Foundation Day Lecture, May 1991. l A Vaidyanathan, Water Resources Management: Institutions and Irrigation Development, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999). l A Vaidyanathan, ‘Imperatives of Water Governance’, The Hindu, 30 March 2004. l V. M. Valsalan, Inter-State Water Disputes in India: A New Approach Central Board of Irrigation and Power, New Delhi, 1997. l B G Verghese, 1990: Waters of Hope: Himalaya-Ganga Development and Cooperation for a Billion People, (Oxford & IBH Publishing Co. Pvt Ltd, for Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi, 1990), 1999: Second edition, with the sub-title ‘From Vision to Reality in Himalaya-Ganga Development Cooperation’. l B G Verghese, Winning the Future, (New Delhi: Konark,1994). l B G Verghese and Ramaswamy R. Iyer, Harnessing the Eastern Himalayan Rivers: Regional Cooperation in South Asia, (New Delhi: Konark Publishers Pvt Ltd, for Centre for Policy Research, 1993) . l B G Verghese, Ramaswamy R Iyer, Q K Ahmad, S K Malla and B B Pradhan (eds.), Converting Water into Wealth, (New Delhi, Dhaka,

135 Kathmandu: Konark, 1994). l Special issue on water resources development, WATER NEPAL, journal

of water resources development, Kathmandu, Nepal, Vol.6, No.1, January-July 1998. WASH: From Vision 21 to Action, Power Point Presentation, Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative Council, Geneva www.wsscc.org l ‘Water Resources and Freshwater Ecosystems, Country Profile, Bangladesh’, World Resources Institute, 2004. l `Water Resources and Freshwater Ecosystems, Country Profile, Bhutan', World Resources Institute, 2004 Water Vision 2025 papers: l Bangladesh Water Partnership, Bangladesh Water Vision, June 1999. l M. Maniruzzaman Miah (ed.), Water Management in Bangladesh: From

Vision to Action, Bangladesh Water Partnership, (Boipatra, Dhaka, 2003). l India Water Partnership, India Water Vision, July 1999 (India Water Partnership and Institute for Human Development, New Delhi 2000). l Jalasrot Bikas Sanstha, Nepal Water Vision, June 1999. l Pakistan Water Partnership, Pakistan Country Report- Vision for Water for the 21st Century 15 June 1999. World Bank: l ‘Water Resources Management’- A World Bank Policy Paper, 1993. l Round Table on Water Sector Strategy Review, New Delhi, 11-12 May

2000: WB's website <www.worldbank.org > - Topics and Sectors Environment - Water Resources Management - Water Resources Management - Water Resources Strategy - South Asia). l ‘Water Resources Sector Strategy Review Draft March 2002’. l Rashid Faruquee and Yusuf . Choudhry, ‘Improving Water Management in Bangladesh’, Policy Research Working Paper 1569, the World Bank South Asia Country Dept I, Agriculture and Natural Resources Division, January 1996. l Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-Making, World Commission on Dams, (London and Sterling, VA: Earthscan Publications Ltd, November 2000).

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2. 3.

Pakistan's and Perspective: the Baglihar Project Shahid Husain

hile the Baglihar Project may have been at a conceptual stage for a very long time, it emerged on public consciousness in 1992. However, the issue entered the arena of intense public debate in the year 2000 and has assumed classical proportions of an IndoPak dispute. Having accepted the scope of bilateral dialogue, the Government of Pakistan has finally referred the question to the World Bank for the appointment of a neutral expert. It notified the World Bank on 15 January, 2005 of its intention. The decision to appoint a neutral expert had been taken earlier but was deferred on the personal intervention of the Indian Prime Minister with his Pakistani counterpart. The neutral expert, when appointed in any of the three manners defined in the Indus Water Treaty, would help both the parties reach an agreement but if he fails wholly or partly, the differences remaining unresolved are designated as â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Disputesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;, which which would then find their way to the Arbitration Court. Article IX of Indus Water Treaty 1960 provides for the settlement of differences and disputes for questions arising between the parties concerning the existence of any fact which if established, might constitute a breach of this Treaty. To the Note Verbale dated 7th August 2003 sent by the Government of India to discuss the issue at the government level, under Article IV of the Treaty, the Government of Pakistan put forward the following three conditions:

All construction work on the project would be suspended pending amicable and satisfactory resolution of the issues raised by Pakistan's Commissioner. On-site inspection by 30th September, 2003 would be provided to Pakistan's Commissioner and Agreement to amicably settle all issues pertaining to the Project by 31 December, 2003.

The previous round of talks between Indian Water Resources Secretary V. K. Duggal and his Pakistani counterpart Ashfaq Mehmood, lasted for four days, and yet did not yield any results. 'Collapse of talks' as observed by Kuldeep Kumar was considered a setback by observers to the CBMs (Confidence Building Measures). Pakistan's request to the World Bank has been received by India as a spanner in the works the reconciliation process. According to one report, 'Pakistan's reference to the World Bank was premature', as both sides had achieved some degree of convergence on technical details during the last round of talks. Indian Foreign Secretary said, 'if carried forward the area of convergence would have increased further.' After secretary-level talks between India and Pakistan, a Joint Press Release (JPR) was issued on 24th June, 2004. Like all such diplomatic minutiae this statement, innocuous in content, failed to address any issues or reveal anything of substance. The joint press release must have involved intense efforts on the part of the two foreign office experts. The brief statement is reproduced below: 'Secretary level talks between Indian and Pakistan on the Baglihar Hydroelectric Project were held at New Delhi on 22.6.2004. Mr Ashfaq Mahmood Secretary Water and Power led the Pakistan delegation and Indian delegation was led by Shri VK Duggal, Secretary, (Water resources). Prior to the meeting the Pakistan delegation called on Shri Priyaranjan Dasmunsi, Hon. Minister of Water Resources on 21st June, 2004. The talks were held in a very cordial and friendly atmosphere and in the spirit of goodwill and cooperation. The two Secretaries discussed ways and means to resolve technical concerns relating to the Project and shared their assessments on this issue. They will now report back to their respective governments.'(New Delhi June 22, 2004).

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Following a reference to the World Bank, Ministry of External Affairs of India's (MEA) spokesman, in his statement on 18th January, 2005 said: 'We do not believe that the reference to the World Bank was justified.'Irritation was more pronounced, when on 11th January, 2005 the MEA Spokesman said, 'If Pakistan still chooses to go the World Bank, then we will respond appropriately.' On 16th February, 2005, a month after the reference to the World Bank by Pakistan, Mr Shyam Saran, the Indian Foreign Secretary, made the following public statement: 'Our viewpoint is that last round of talks which was held between India and Pakistan was perhaps the first time that there was a really very intensive technical discussion. It was our sense, perhaps not shared by the Pakistani side, that some degree of convergence was achieved during these discussions. It was our assessment that if these technical discussions could be carried forward then perhaps the area of convergence could increase further. Perhaps, it was a sense on the Pakistani side that we were not going to get anywhere even if there were further discussions. As you are aware, a reference has been made by Pakistan to the World Bank. It remains our view that we should continue bilateral discussions, it remains our view that there are possibilities for us to be able to find greater convergence to these discussions.' The Foreign Secretary seemed to express frustration at the reference to the World Bank but did not identify the exact areas of convergence. He acknowledged that this was the first time that technical discussions had taken place. But water issues cannot be treated as pure technical matters or divorced from political subtext. According to Rajeev Sharma, 'Pakistan's objections were not really technical.' It only wanted to prevent India from doing a major project in Jammu & Kashmir even if it is permissible under the Treaty. Pakistan's decision according to him, to bring in neutral expert, 'will inevitably cast a shadow on the projects in Jammu & Kashmir.'(The Tribune, NOIDA, Jan 10, 2005). The same newspaper in its editorial characterised the dispute as 'essentially technical, rather than political.'Pakistan's decision will prove to be a potential headache for the Government of India. As articulated by Professor Pushpesh Pant, such setbacks are normal

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in any peace process and should not dishearten any side. In fact it will convince Pakistani people that their government was not buckling under Indian pressure, thus arming it with more credibility. But credibility, without being put to use in resolving the issue to the mutual benefit of both the parties, is of no use. Pakistan however offered whatever it could as a lower riparian to reach a settlement predicated upon suspension of work followed by a dialogue. But Indian desire to proceed with exploiting hydropower potential was too overwhelming. What precisely are Pakistan's objections? They primarily relate to the design of the plant without questioning India's right under the Treaty to construct hydroelectric dams and the fear that the dam will cause a loss of 6,000 to 7,000 cusecs of water every day, equal to a 27 per cent decrease in the Jhelum River. Other experts say that the Baghlihar dam will have major security and economic implications for Pakistan owing to increased Indian control over its share of water supplies. According to this report the Project will tap around 7000 cusecs of water for irrigation purpose in the short term. This only confirms Pakistan's apprehensions regarding India's intentions on its storage potential. The electricity would meet 1/3rd the total power requirement of the State. Due to suspension of supplies for up to 28 consecutive days during certain months, the project can lead to acute water shortages. Some apprehensions expressed by Pakistan are: l India can use water as a weapon against Pakistan. l The design of the hydropower project violates the terms of the 1960 Indus Water Treaty. l The structure will provide India the capability to manipulate the flow of water to Pakistan's disadvantage. l Complete stoppage for a continuous period of 27/28 days during December, January and February would adversely affect agriculture and other requirements at Marala head works. l The project can also lead to inundation of the area above Marala head works due to the sudden synchronised releases from DulHasti, Baghlihar and Salal reservoirs. India plans to operate the dam at maximum capacity by 2007. (Bilal Hassan, Dawn, 14th February, 2005). It has already constructed the

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Wullar and Salal Barrages, on this river and has plans to construct 16/17 dams on river Chenab and 6/7 on River Jhelum. Pakistan has already, according to the Dawn report, sacrificed 27 MAF to the India under the Treaty. The objections officially communicated to India reflecting these concerns are: i) 'The works themselves appeared to be capable of raising artificially the water level beyond the full pondage level specified in the design and would contravene the provisions of Paragraph 8 (a) of Annex D to the Treaty. ii) 'The pondage in the operating pool being 37.722 million cubic meter exceeds twice the pondage of water level. iii) 'The site was suitable for an ungated spillway and, therefore, a gated spillway should not be provided. This was in contravention of Paragraph 8 (e) of Annex D and iv) 'The intake for the turbine had not been located at the highest level as required vide Paragraph 8 (f) of Annex D to the Treaty.’ Reference to the parts of Treaty that Pakistan referred to above find mention in Annexure D paragraph 8 and the relevant sub paragraphs 8(a), (c), (e) and (f) read as follows: 8.

b) c) d) e)

Except as provided in Paragraph 18, the design of any new Run-of-River Plant (hereinafter in this Part referred to as a Plant) shall conform to the following criteria; 'The works themselves shall not be capable of raising artificially the water level in the Operating Pool above the Full Pondage Level specified in the design. xx 'The maximum Pondage in the Operating Pool shall not exceed twice the Pondage required for Firm Power. xx 'If the conditions at the site of a Plant make a gated spillway necessary, the bottom level of the gates in normal closed position shall be located at the highest level consistent with sound and economical design and satisfactory construction and operation of the works. 'The intakes for the turbines shall be located at the highest level consistent with satisfactory and economical construction and operation of the Plant as a Run-of-River Plant and with

customary and accepted practice of design for the designated range of the Plant's operation.’ India, and the State of Jammu and Kashmir are deficit in power and it seems that the Indian Government has taken a policy decision to increase the generation. 'Even as the Government of Pakistan is crying wolf over India's Baglihar, Wullar and Kishanganga Hydroelectric Power Project, the Indian government is reportedly planning to construct another three projects. J&K is reported to have about 15,000 MW of power potential. In the past two decades Indian Rs.40b have been invested in the power sector in the State’. (Daily Times, January 17, 2005). There is growing resentment amongst the people of the State over (the) government's failure to harness the enormous hydroelectric power potential. This is why a number of other disputes seem to have emerged in public view, the Kishenganga hydroelectric project on Neelum River, which is a tributary to Jhelum, being one of them. The other projects are: Uri II on the Jhelum River in Baramulla District, the Pakul Dul and the Burser Dams, both on the Marusundar, a tributary of the Chenab River in Dhoda district. The Pakuldul and Burser dams are mega projects with a generating capacity of above 1000 MW each. According to another report, the Prime Minister's Office has not only approved more hydel projects but has matched the intention with money. These projects have been forwarded to the Cabinet for approval. An allocation of Rs.163 billion by the State of Jammu & Kashmir and Rs. 240 billion from the Prime Minister's construction plan have been earmarked. Ministry of Power has reserved about Rs. 120 billion for the three projects. Chenab is one of the three western rivers allocated to Pakistan under the Treaty. It is an important water source for the Indus. Both the countries are planning a dam on the Neelum River, a tributary of River Jhelum. Under Indus Water Treaty 1960, Article I the term 'Western Rivers' means the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab taken together. Article III provides for unrestricted use by Pakistan of 'all those waters of the Western Rivers which India is under obligation to let flow under the provisions' of the following paragraph, which lays down that India shall not permit any interference with these waters except for

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the specified uses like Domestic Use, Non consumptive Use, Agricultural Use and Generation of hydroelectric power as set out in Annex D. Article III (4) reads: 'Except as provided in Annexure D&E, India shall not store any water of, or construct any storage works on, the Western Rivers.'Annexure D & E to the Treaty provide for exceptions to the use of Western Rivers by Pakistan. The Treaty allows India generation of hydroelectric power as one of the uses. Annexure D applies to unrestricted generation of hydroelectric power. India is planning many more such projects. Annexure D to Indus Water Treaty, 1960 applies with respect to the use by India of the waters of western rivers for the generation of hydroelectric powers under the provisions of Article III (2) (d) of the Treaty. The design, construction and operation of the plants shall be governed by provision of Annexure E (ibid). The design shall conform to the criteria laid down in para 8, part iii to Annex D and includes the requirement that the works shall not be capable of raising artificially the water level in the operating pool above the Full Pondage Level specified in the design. There shall be no outlets below Dead Storage Level. Under the Treaty India can make only â&#x20AC;&#x2DC;Non-consumptive usesâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;, which include any control or use of water for navigation, floating of timber or other property, flood protection or flood control, fishing or fish culture, and other like beneficial purposes so that the water undiminished in volume within the practical range of measurement remains dormant in or is returned to the same river or its tributaries. Such use does not include agricultural use or use in the channels of hydroelectric power. As soon as it found out Indian 'designs', Pakistan did not hesitate to ask for more information, and then raised objections as early as August, 1992. This should be enough to allay any suspicion that Pakistan's government was found not vigilant. The project is divided into two phases and each phase is designed to produce 450 MW power. The first phase is likely to be completed within 2005. However, the MoU for construction of 450 MW Baglihar Project was signed on 11th March, 1999 with Jaiprakash Industries Ltd., the biggest Indian hydropower construction

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company, and two other companies, Siemens and Hydro Vevey Ltd. Total cost of the project is Indian Rs.38b (less than a billion dollars) and the Indian government is providing massive assistance to the state government in completing the project. The state allocated Rs. 16b; the Indian government promised assistance of Rs. 22b. The Project envisages the construction of a 308 meters high dam on River Chenab near the place known as Baglihar (see Map) with storage of 321,000 Acre Feet of which 291,000 acre ft. is dead storage capacity. Live storage, also termed as Pondage (Operational Pool), is 30,400 acre ft. This Pondage is required to supplement the discharge during low flow period. This is what Pakistan is opposing. The Treaty has an excellent record of full compliance by both the parties and has held for the last 45 years and yet we may have entered a phase where water has acquired a new sense of urgency about shortages. Population explosion continuing apace in both the countries, water is going to come under intense pressure. The Treaty lays down an elaborate dispute resolution mechanism, which has not been necessary to invoke for the past 45 years. No difference between the two commissioners has, so far, graduated to a dispute, not even to the point of difference requiring reference to a neutral expert before this one. India insists on bilateral discussion under Article VIII whereas Pakistan seeks recourse to Article IX. The latter provides for dispute resolution and involves third party involvement, which India religiously avoids in settling any dispute with any of her neighbours. Under the Treaty, it is the Commission that shall first examine any issues arising. The Commissioners from both sides together form the Commission. This Commission, if it fails to reach an agreement, a difference will be deemed to have arisen. It may be noted that 'questions' remain questions so long as they are under discussion in the Commission. When they defy resolution, they become differences, which are then to be referred to the neutral expert. Annex F to the Treaty prescribes the procedure to be followed in that case. If there is any difference, which in the opinion of either Commissioner falls within the scope of Article IX read with Annex F to the Treaty, then at the request of either Commissioner (in this case

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Pakistan's) a neutral expert will be appointed in accordance with the provisions mentioned in Annex F. The two governments may make appointment jointly, and failing which, by such person as may be agreed upon between the two governments. In the absence of such agreement the World Bank will appoint the neutral expert. Annex G deals with the establishment of a Court of Arbitration. A Court of Arbitration shall consist of 7 Arbitrators including two appointed by each party, and three called the umpires, one from each of the following categories: 1.

Persons qualified by status of reputation to be Chairman of the Court of Arbitration who may, but need not be Engineers or Lawyers. 2. Highly qualified engineers and 3. Persons well conversant in international law. It appears that sooner or later, the World Bank will have to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty. It cannot escape the responsibility by claiming that it is not a guarantor. That is precisely what its role was contemplated by the two parties before agreeing to subscribe to the Treaty. The appointment of a neutral expert is not going to be easy. Once the World Bank is referred to, and the two governments fail to jointly appoint one, the Bank, within one month after the date of request, shall appoint him. This provision is subject to an important caveat, which stipulates, 'Every appointment shall be made after consultation with each of the parties.' According to reports, Pakistan's Ambassador to the U.S. met the World Bank President. A leading expert of the World Bank has predicted a prolonged and complicated legal battle. According to a report (31st January, 2005), the World Bank responded on 19th January, 2005 and made it clear that it is just a signatory and not a guarantor. The WB needs the approval of both countries and as such the process could be time consuming allowing India sufficient time to complete the project. There has been no outcome yet. The World Bank is dragging its feet and has adopted the role of a conduit of messages between the two protagonists. The two governments may ultimately agree to finalise the services of one or more mediators. If and when the neutral expert

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agreeable to the two parties is found, the process will begin and in the meanwhile India will be busy changing realities on the ground. The provisions contained in paragraphs 3,4, and 5 of Article IX relating to the 'Dispute' shall not apply to any difference while it is being dealt with by a neutral expert. In case the neutral expert determines that in his opinion the difference or a part thereof should be treated as dispute, then the dispute will be deemed to have arisen, which will be settled in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of Article IX. Mr. T.C.A. Raghavan, Deputy High Commissioner of India, whom the author met recently, recently stated that the Project is not due for completion anytime soon and might get completed by Dec 2006. According to him about 60 per cent work on the Project has been completed. According to a newspaper report, Senator Khurshid Ahmad, on the other hand claims, that 85 per cent work on Baglihar has been completed. Trevor D'Souza, in Business and Finance Review, 28th February 2005, claims that 'The percentage of progress at stage I so far is 41 per cent for civil works and 63 per cent for hydro-mechanical works. Design and engineering 94 per cent, infrastructure works 99 per cent, river diversion works 88 per cent, dam and intake 17 per cent, waterways 60 per cent, powerhouse complex 90 per cent and pothead yard 13 per cent. The completed structure so far comprises eight bridges, 30 km of roads, 10 km of tunnels, 300 m vertical shafts and 5 huge caverns plus camps, storehouses and workshops, offices, laboratory, hospital and complete facilities for production of aggregates and concrete and placement.â&#x20AC;&#x2122; When asked why India did not suspend work on the Project as demanded by Pakistan to provide for further bilateral discussions, Mr Raghavan referred to the Tulbul Project, which was suspended by India at the instance of Pakistan, and has remained so since then. Wullar Barrage Storage Project, which India prefers calling Tulbul Navigation Project, remains suspended since 1987. According to India Indian Rs.170 million has already been spent on the project. India does not want to repeat the mistake. Similarly, India does not want third party involvement because of sad experience with the

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Rann of Kutch and points to India's suspicions of the multilateral process. Then there is another twist to the dispute. Kashmir is back again center stage. According to Dr. Syed Nazir Gilani (South Asia Tribune, 24 January, 2005), taking a position on the Baglihar dispute is full of risks. Gilani is Chair of International Kashmir Alliance and Advocate of the Supreme Court. He says that since Pakistan has moved to the World Bank, 'it is in our prime interest that we become a party without failâ&#x20AC;?. According to him the dispute is a blessing in disguise and has landed Pakistan in the soup by exposing its disregard for the welfare of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. The dispute has created an opening for the defence of Kashmir Interests. He holds that allocation of water under the Treaty was a breach of the Instrument of Accession of Kashmir with India 1948, which could not trade off a natural resource without fully assessing 'the jurisprudence of principality of water, and whether the water being allocated actually exists or may be taken without detriment to other users, the water or the environment.â&#x20AC;&#x2122; By concluding the 1960 Indus Water Treaty with India, Pakistan has, in practice, accepted the sovereignty of India over water resource and habitat. According to a Kashmiri website (jammukashmir.com/insights) accessed on 31st January, 2005, J&K Assembly passed a Resolution on 3rd March 2003 asking New Dehli to reconsider Indus Water Treaty so as to safeguard the interests of the State. According to this report, Pakistan's opposition to the project amounts to playing with aspirations of the Kashmiri people. It states that average annual flow of water in the Eastern Rivers allocated to India is around 33 MAF and in the Western Rivers given to Pakistan 135 MAF. Pakistan certainly harbours suspicion of India's intentions because of the design of the Project. The official spokesman for the government of Pakistan, Mr Masood Khan referred to 'trust deficit'between the two countries. He went on to say that water is precious and the two countries need to manage it with prudence. Even if India does not breach the spirit of the Treaty, there is obviously no remedy against future intentions of India. A reference to the World Bank may have satisfied diplomatic ego of Pakistan but

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may take long in yielding any returns. In the process it has hurt the spirit of the reconciliation process. There appears no escape from confronting each other as well as the thorny issue. One has to contend with a stream of such project in the pipeline, which India has suddenly realised offer it the best potential for progress, in general, and to Indian-administered Kashmir, in particular. The basic dispute between the two governments arises more out of mistrust by Pakistan of India's intention, because at some point in the future, once it acquires the capacity to store water, India can easily withhold it during shortage and release it during excess, the precise opposite of what the lower riparian country would want. India answers to the Pakistani fears by saying that 'the first installation which would disappear would be the Salal project, which is down-stream the Baglihar project, and if they were to flood Pakistan, they would endanger the Salal Project. The Indian Foreign Secretary, on Pakistani fears that somehow India would have the 'capability either to flood Pakistan or to deny water to Pakistan', says: 'The treaty cannot deal with suspicion of this kind; it cannot deal with intentions of this kind. We are confident that what we are doing with this project is entirely within the parameters laid down by the Indus Water Treaty. We respect the Treaty because this Treaty held for the last forty five years.'He went on to say that: 'We cannot find a technical fix for suspicion of the kind.' This issue is an addition to other irritants in the relations between the two nuclear neighbours. Its early resolution to the satisfaction of both parties is highly unlikely. The process of appointing a neutral expert followed by arbitration will be long and tedious. India seems to be following its decision to proceed apace, and create a fait accompli like Israeli settlements in the West Bank and other Palestinian territories. But then India would have to pay a price; it will undermine the sanctity of an international treaty, which has held for 45 years. There is nothing to force India to accept the terms of the Treaty, both in letter and spirit, except the moral force. As the future unfolds, the waters will be choppy, and the feeling of trust and good will having been lost, resolution of issues would be less susceptible to an easy solution. In the final analysis the dispute will have to be resolved by the two

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South Asian nations in the spirit of give and take. Shahid Husain is a former secretary for water and power with the Government of Pakistan.

April 2002 28.5 - 1.6.2002 24.5.2002 13.7.2002

Refernces l Indus Water Treaty, 1960.

31.7.2002

l Official Documents. l Joint Press Release, dated 24.6.2004. l Interviews

with Pakistan Commissioner for Indus Waters (4-Lytton Road, Lahore) and Mr. l T.C.A. Raghavan Indian Deputy High Commissioner, Islamabad. l ‘India Planning three more dams in Jammu and Kashmir’, Daily Times, (Feb 21 2005). l Daily Times, Jan 17th 2005. l The Tribune, NOIDA, Jan 10,2005. l Bilal Hassan, Dawn, 14th Feb, 2005. l Trevor D'Souza, ‘Baghlihar Dam: Stalemate In Peace Talks’, Business and Finance Review, 28, Feb 2005. l Dr. Syed Nazir Gilani, South Asia Tribune, 24 January, 2005. l Jammu Kashmir website (jammu-kashmir.com/insights) accessed on 31 Janusray, 2005. l Delhi Times, Feb 8, 2005. l Daily Times, January 17th 2005.

29.8.2002 6.9.2002. 16.9.2002 17.9.2002 27.9.2002 28.9.2002 18.10.2002 7.11.2002 18.11.2002 11.12.2002 13.12.2002 4-6.02.2003

Chronology of Events 8.05.2003 20.5.1992

The first time India supplies information and Pakistan got to know about the proposal. 12 .8.1992 Pakistan raised objections. 7.5.93 - 28.9.99 Exchange of arguments on the design of the Plant and request for the Commission's meeting on the issue. 6 -11.1.1996 Site inspection No work at site. th 29 - 30.3.2000 First discussion at the 84 meeting of Permanent Indus Commission. 29.5. - 1.6.2000 85th Meeting of Commission. India promises data. India also states that no river works have been taken so far. However, construction on infrastructure continues. 29.5 - 1.6.2001 Permanent Indus Commission agrees to consider the matter under Article IX (1) of the Treaty.(Dispute Resolution). 10.01.2001 Pakistan's asks through a letter about status of work in progress. 15.10.2001 Pakistan writes a letter asking for work to stop and to have a meeting to resolve the issue. 15.1.2002 Pakistan writes a letter asking the construction to stop pending resolution. 6.3.2002 India replies that it is under no obligation to stop work under

28-30.05.2003 20.6.2003 4.7.2003 7.7.2003 18.08.2003

Oct, 2003 Nov, 2003 6.11.2003 GOP 18.12.2003

the Treaty. Pakistan conveys 'questions' relating to the project to India. th 87 Meeting of the Commission. India seeks Pakistan's reaction on particulars of change, which they posted to Pakistan. Particulars of change conveyed by India. Pakistan writes a letter and maintains objections on the revise design. Pakistan writes a letter for meeting to resolve the issue under Article IX (1). India gives interim reply that awaiting comments internally. Pakistan writes a letter and urges an immediate meeting. India writes a letter and repeats its reply dated 29th 2002. Pakistan urges for a meeting and proposes to proceed to the next step provided in the Treaty, if no positive response. India writes a letter that it will revert to the subject in coming weeks but refuses to suspend work. Pakistan writes a letter and asks for a meeting in October. Pakistan writes again and urges a meeting in October and asks to suspend construction. India writes a letter and expresses its inability to meet in October. Pakistan writes to India proposing suspension of work and also to hold meeting. India writes a letter and suggests meeting in January 2003. Pakistan accepts the proposal. Permanent Indus Commission meets in Islamabad. India disagrees with the questions formulated by Pakistan. Pakistan records failure. Pakistan's Commissioner gives notice for the appointment of a Neutral Expert. Annual Meeting of the Commission is held. Fails to prepare 'statement of points of difference’. Pakistan's Commissioner requests the two Governments for the appointment of a Neutral Expert. GOP issues Note Verbale to India regarding modalities of appointing a Neutral Expert. GOI issues Note Verbale. Suggests bilateral discussion. Government of Pakistan sends Note Verbale. Asks for: 1. Suspension of work 2. Site Visit and 3. Time bound resolution Pakistan Commissioner is allowed a Tour of Inspection to the site. Work was in progress as per design. Pakistan communicates its observations based on the site visit to India. issues Note Verbale. Reminds India to suspend work and proceed towards time-bound resolution. GOI issues a Note Verbale and again asks for a meeting of the Commission.

150 27.12.2003 13.01.2004 15.01.2004 15.01.2004

26-29.05.2004

03.06.2004

21-22.06.2004

Aug, 2004 10-9-2004 13.09.2004 10.10.2004

24.11.04.1 25.11.2004

27.11.2004

01-02.12.2004

11.12.2004

15.12.2004

3-7.1.2005 15.1.2005 24.1.2005 28.1.2005

151 GOP issues Note Verbale. Accepts proposal to have meeting to discuss & resolve the issue under Article IX (1). GOI issues Note Verbale. Proposes meeting under Article VIII (5) and not IX (1). Pakistan does not accept Article VIII (5), being not relevant and proposes a meeting under Article IX(1). Special Meeting of the Commission is held at Islamabad/Lahore. India refuses discussion under article IX (1). Annual Meeting of the Commission takes place. India urges bilateral resolution. Pakistan maintains its demand for suspension and time-bound resolution. Pakistan High Commissioner to India raises the issue with Indian External Affairs Minister. Secretary level talks are proposed. Secretaries Water (India and Pakistan) meet and agree on certain modalities including examination by a Technical Committee. Pakistan dispatches data as agreed in the previous meeting. GOP issues Note Verbale. Reminds India to start process for time-bound resolution. India demands Pakistani objections to be substantiated. Pakistan issues Note Verbale and protests against the Indian statement that Pakistan had offered to resolve all technical objections without reference to Article IX of the Treaty. The two Prime Ministers meet. Both decide to make another attempt to resolve the issue bilaterally. st Indian Commissioner writes letter and refers to 1 Secretary level meeting and promises to supply all possible information by mid December 2004. GOP issues Note Verbale and proposes to hold the final th meeting between Water Secretaries of Pakistan and India on 6 December 2004. GOI issues Note Verbale and suggests a meeting in end December, 2004 because talks between Secretaries of Water Resources would be more effective after Pakistan has examined relevant data provided by India. Prime Minister chairs an informal meeting of all relevant Ministries and issues instructions for holding one last meeting with India. GOI supplies requisite data/information through Indian High Commission, Islamabad. Data is examined by Pakistan. Objections on the design are maintained after due substantiation. The Secretaries meet in Delhi but fail to resolve the differences. Pakistan requests World Bank to appoint a Neutral Expert. World Bank asks for some documentary evidence. Pakistan supplies documentary evidence to the World Bank.

Arsenic Poisoning and Water Supply in Bangladesh Dr M. Abdul Ghani

he river system that flows through Bangladesh is the third largest source of fresh-water discharge to the world's oceans. The annual volume of flows passing below the confluence of the Ganges and the Brahmaputra is about 795,000 cubic meters, which is equivalent to about 5.5 meters of depth over the country. In addition to that the country receives on an average about 2 meter rainfall annually. Therefore, hypothetically the country will be under about 7.5 meter water if there was no flow to the Bay of Bengal. Still Bangladesh faces shortages of water every year for crop production and even for home consumption during summer months especially during February to May. This contrasting situation is mainly due to regulation of flows of the major rivers outside Bangladesh and uneven or skewed distribution of rainfall over the year (Table 1) Table 1: Average Monthly Rainfall Data of Bangladesh for 1986 to 1998 . Period (in mm) Year

Jan

Feb

Mar

1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Normal

3 1 2 2 0 7 8 22 11 6 10 27 28 8

1 5 41 13 50 19 54 57 27 28 23 19 39 15

14 4 58 7 121 33 4 109 106 23 68 121 101 42

Apri

116 148 122 76 133 58 21 124 157 47 118 113 150 111

May

June

146 113 336 203 245 274 187 367 183 216 211 223 251 265

363 237 551 344 334 461 264 599 407 416 337 299 219 506

Source: Bangladesh Meteorological Department, 2000.

July

438 779 474 526 586 378 398 464 280 366 583 559 697 537

Aug

315 450 429 134 206 341 254 434 309 392 357 3018 657 429

Sept

497 320 236 289 253 460 274 341 164 238 446 277 117 304

Oct

189 93 164 237 238 268 150 148 90 268 27 29 161 186

Nov

Dec

Avera ge

131 31 98 0 60 3 9 18 8 45 12 7 86 35

5 16 2 3 30 52 3 0 0 0 18 22 0 9

185 183 209 153 188 196 136 224 145 170 184 393 209 204

152

recent and long term data show similar pattern). The country depends on intensive withdrawal of groundwater for irrigation and household purposes during the summer months. Quality deterioration of groundwater during the recent years due to arsenic contamination has reduced safe water availability for drinking and irrigation purposes all over the country. However, fortunately the quantity of groundwater pumped and used during the dry months -- November to May -- is fully recharged during the rainy season -- June to October -- except in Dhaka, where withdrawal rate is higher than possible recharge rate. Bangladesh receives plenty of rainwater during the monsoon, which mostly coincides with the period of the year when it receives huge volume of water from the catchments outside the country. Therefore, an unfavourable water environment, due to drought during February to May and frequent floods during June to October, is created. During the dry months ground water level goes down at many places beyond suction limit (>25 feet or about 10 m), arsenic content in ground water becomes high and crosses safe limit (> 0.05 ppm) for irrigation and domestic consumption and coastal water (both surface and ground) becomes saline in many places. Bangladesh, therefore, needs better management of water resources for crop production and human consumption. Groundwater is contaminated by natural arsenic in 60 out of 64 districts in Bangladesh. Out of 640 upazillas (sub-districts), 268 are affected by arsenic contamination (personal communication with a senior manager of the Department of Public Health Engineering, DPHE). However, the extent of contamination varied from area to area and entire area of a district or sub-district is not affected. High concentration of arsenic is found in water from thousands of wells across the country and an estimated 30 million out of 130 million people are at risk (DPHE 2000). However, the extent of contamination level varies from area to area. The extent of problem and its impact on health and production are still unknown, but millions of people are threatened. Information on arsenic contamination in groundwater does not cover all areas of potential contamination and is not always reliable or conclusive. However, in recent years arsenic contamination has become an additional problem and is becoming a major concern both from human

153

consumption and irrigation points of views. It is a complex problem in Bangladesh which needs to be dealt with scientifically. Careful investigation is also required to find out impact of using arsenic contaminated water on crop production, its effects in the food chain as well as arsenic build-up in the soil. The coastal area of Bangladesh consists of about 2.8 million hectare (Mha), which is over 20% of the country. Due to suspected salinity problem, people in this area are forced to use costly tube-wells of over 300 meter depth for avoiding pumping saline water. In view of the above situation, Bangladesh should develop strategies for addressing salinity and arsenic contamination to ensure supply of clean water for agriculture and household use. Since 25 per cent of the country is suspected salinity prone and about another 25 per cent affected by arsenic contamination, Bangladesh cannot afford to leave almost 50 per cent of the country unattended. The impact of this situation on human health, production, social and natural environments needs to be assessed so that professionals can assist in developing research programmes for mitigating the problems. Bangladesh has excess water from June to October, which causes floods carrying debris, dirt and sediments. Therefore, physical cleanliness is a visible problem in addition to the chemical contamination of water, which makes it unsuitable for drinking unless purified. Salinity and arsenic contamination are problems for coastal and affected areas respectively for agricultural and human consumption purposes in the dry seasons. Improvement Strategy Water availability over the year indicates that the country should not face problem in supplying adequate water for human consumption and agricultural production. In addition to deep and shallow tubewells mainly used for irrigating about 4 million hectares in recent years, about 8 million hand tube-wells and about 1500 production wells (deep tube-wells of different capacities used for urban water supply) are in operation for drinking water supply all over the country (Personal communication with concerned DPHE high management 2005).

154

155

Water Availability Water for drinking is not scarce in Bangladesh. The document on national water management plan confirms that the requirements for domestic and industrial supplies are only to the extent of 0.7 per cent and is assured while planning agricultural water demand for the country (MPO 1991). However, its quality is the limiting factor at places and during a certain period of the year. With possible low cost treatment/purification, this can be solved specially during the rainy season (May to October). Water pollution caused by dumping industrial and other wastes in the low-lying areas, rivers and other water bodies will improve the situation. Improved management at local and national level through government and social interventions can ensure clean water for all. Bangladesh has assessed availability of groundwater over the Agro-Ecological Regions of the country Table 2: Agro ecological Regime and Surface and Ground Water Availability Situation in Bangladesh

15.

Atrai Beel

Ample surface and groundwater with some limitation of groundwater in certain areas.

16.

Middle Meghani River Floodplain

Ample surface and groundwater

17.

Lower Meghna Floodplain

Ample surface and groundwater

18.

Young Meghana Estuarine Floodplain

Ample surface water but little salinity in dry season. Groundwater is good below 300 meter.

19.

Old Meghna Estuarine floodplain

Ample surface and groundwater but saline in some

20.

Eastern Surma-Kushiyara Floodplain

Surface and groundwater are available but not enough for the entire area.

21.

Sylhet Basin

Ample surface water Limited groundwater

22.

Northern and Eastern Piedmont plains

Surface and groundwater are limited

23.

Chittagong Coastal Plain

Limited surface and groundwater

24.

St. Martins Coral Islam

Surface water is saline No mention about groundwater

25.

Level Barind Tract

Limited surface water Good groundwater

26.

High Barind Tract

Limited surface water. Groundwater is poor but need detail investigation

27.

North Eastern Barind Tract

Limited surface water but groundwater is good

Old Himalayan Piedmont Plain

Limited surface water Ample groundwater

28.

Madhupur Tract

Limited surface water but Ample groundwater

Active Tista Floodplain

No dependable surface water Ample groundwater

29.

Northern and Eastern Hills

Limited surface water, Groundwater is also limited, but need detail surveying.

Tista Meander Floodplain

Limited surface water Ample groundwater

30.

Akhaura Terrace

Koratoya-Bangali Floodplain

Limited surface water Ample groundwater except in some locations.

Limited surface water Groundwater is good but need detail survey whether it is enough for the entire area.

Lower Atrai Basin

Limited surface water Ample groundwater

Lower Purnabhaba Floodplain

Limited surface water Uncertain groundwater

Active Brahmaputra and Jamuna Floodplain

Limited surface water Uncertain groundwater

Young Brahmaputra and Jamuna Floodplain

Ample surface and groundwater

Old Brahmaputra Floodplain

Available surface water (exploited) Ample groundwater

10.

Active Ganges Floodplain

Limited surface water Ample groundwater

11.

High Ganges River Floodplain

Limited surface water Ample groundwater

12.

Low Ganges River Floodplain

Limited surface and groundwater Groundwater is not available in some places

13.

Ganges Tidal Floodplain

Limited surface water, satisfactory groundwater but with some dead zone

14.

Gopalganj-Khulna Beels

Adequate surface water but saline within 500 meter. Adequate groundwater but saline near surface and good below 300 meter.

Sl.No.

Region

Water Availability

Source:

Land Resources Appraisal of Bangladesh for Agricultural Development. Report 2, Agro -Ecological Regions of Bangladesh, UNDP & FAO, Rome, 1988.

(UNDP & FAO 1988). The country can a develop plan for its sustainable use and quality improvement using this information (Table 2). The Department of Public Health Engineering (DPHE) confirmed that there are 11 Zonal Laboratories in Bangladesh for monitoring drinking water quality. DPHE is also setting up a donor-funded central laboratory. Arsenic Contamination Groundwater is contaminated by naturally occurring arsenic in 60 out of 64 districts in Bangladesh. Technical options for using groundwater in the arsenic contaminated area will need to be developed. This will require analysis of existing water supply infrastructure and options for alternative supply and treatment of

156

157

water.

Table 4. : Arsenic in water and corresponding As in Soil of Different locations in Bangladesh.

Low cost mitigation of arsenic contaminated water is available, which indicates that through community participation, cost effective methods of supplying arsenic free water can be made available at less than Taka 0.1 (0.2 cent) per litre (PROSHIKA 2001). Tube-wells used for irrigation can also be used for household water supply. (BMDA 2002). The relationship between pumping depth and arsenic concentration of groundwater has been studied for three years, and there is no correlation between the parameters. At the beginning of the dry season (December/January) arsenic concentration in the tube-wells was <0.05 ppm. It gradually increased to >0.05 ppm by the end of dry season (May/June) but dropped again to <0.05 ppm after the rainy season. If this trend continues over the years, Bangladesh need not fear the arsenic havoc claimed by professionals and interest group (Ghani 2004). However, the study needs three to five more years for reaching a dependable conclusion. A major constraint to addressing the arsenic problem in Bangladesh is insufficient information on the extent, causes and remedial interventions. Although many research organizations of the country, government agencies and NGOs are now engaged in data gathering, information on arsenic contamination in groundwater does not cover all areas of potential contamination and is not always reliable or conclusive. The technical options for using groundwater for drinking in the arsenic areas will need to be developed. This will require analysis of the water supply infrastructure, options for alternative supply and treatment of water. Tables 3 and 4 show that preliminary level of information through limited studies and more detailed Table 3: Status of Arsenic in Experimental Soil and Water for Different Locations in Bangladesh. Place

No. of Samples

Gopalganj Sadar 132 Muksudpur 86 Monirampur 70 Pirgacha 90 Rajhat 90 Chapai Nawabganj 78 sadar Charghat 220 Adopted from Farid A.T.M., et al., 2 002

Soil As Range (ppm) 0.261 to 7.035 0.303 to 8.628 0.690 to 4.960 1.200 to 8.100 0.200 to 5.500 1.980 to 7.480

Water As Range (ppb) 150 to 791 129 to 532 247 to 765 134 to 667 112 to 490 59 to 796

0.200 to 40.080

158 to 689

Serial No. Location Water As (mg/kg) Soil depth, cm 1 Sharsha 0.041 0-15 2 Sirajdikhan 0.544 15-30 3 Alamdanga 0.021 0-15 4 Alamdanga 0.021 15-30 5 Alamdanga 0.191 0-15 6 Alamdanga 0.058 0-15 7 Meherpur 0.163 0 15 8 Meherpur 0.016 15- 30 9 Laksham 0.145 15- 30 10 Laksham 0.658 15-30 11 Laksham 0.729 0-15 12 Laksham 0.037 15-30 13 Laksham 0.261 O- 15 14 Laksham 0.261 15-30 15 Laksham 0.397 15-30 16 Laksham 0.341 15-30 17 Chandina 0.380 0-15 18 Chandina 0.160 0-15 19 Sonargaon 0.682 15-30 20 Sonargaon 0.860 0 to 15 21 Sonargaon 0.860 0 to 15 22 Sonargaon 0.860 15 to 30 23 Sonargaon 0.860 15 to 30 24 Bancharampur 0.092 0 15 25 Bancharampur 0.115 0 to 15 26 Netrokona 0.077 0-to 15 27 Netrokona 0.064 15 to 300 Adopted from Huq, S. M. I., Rahman, A., and Sultana, N., 2002.

Soil As (mg/kg) 13.670 10.655 16.647 11.820 11.918 10.675 33.912 28.220 10.791 39.107 18,125 16.971 28.009 42.608 22.763 12.529 19.270 19.270 38.930 22.866 14.829 14.000 13.671 17.147 11.318 81.248 26.559

studies are under way. Similar studies should continue in a more comprehensive way for a longer period for developing data-based information and mitigation measures. In the coastal area, where salinity level of the river water becomes a limiting factor during later part of February to end of May (Table 5 cited as an example as many rivers are flowing through the coastal area), the author and fellow researchers explored the possibility of storing water in the canals and low lying area when salinity level is within acceptable level for enhancing ground water recharge, multiple uses of the stored water including fish farming. Expansion of the research idea in wider area in the region received enthusiastic support from the beneficiaries. They agreed to provide 10-15 per cent of the research cost through cash and kinds, if a pilot study is undertaken in their area. About six km of canals can be used for water conservation in a proposed study site and more than 100 ha area can be irrigated with the stored water during the dry season.

158

159

Fish farming in the canal and domestic water supply with water purification will be additional benefits. The author believes that out put of the research findings can be expanded in the remaining part of 2.8 million hectare of coastal area in Bangladesh. Similarly, rainwater conservation and its planned use can minimise the problem of clean water availability especially during dry months if properly planned and implemented. This can also be used even for the coastal and arsenic affected areas. Table 5: Salinity Level in dS/m in Kazibacha River, Batiaghata, Khulna. Year Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov 1990 12.5 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 1991 1.0 3.9 13.8 17.3 19.3 1.3 1.2 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.5 1992 1.7 6.5 11.3 21.3 20.0 13.9 1.2 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.5 1993 5.5 11.2 14.5 18.0 15.5 2.0 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.3 1994 0.8 5.7 10.0 15.2 14.7 12.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 1995 3.2 8.4 14.9 19.9 21.2 2.9 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 1996 1.6 8.9 15.8 15.2 14.6 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.6 1997 2.7 10.5 11.4 13.4 17.4 11.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 1998 1.9 2.3 11.1 12.5 14.3 6.9 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 1999 1.7 2.6 9.4 16.3 13.7 1.1 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 2000 0.7 1.1 1.8 9.7 1.3 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.4 2001 0.7 5.9 11.7 19.6 9.1 0.6 0.14 0.33 0.30 0.36 Adopted from CEGIS, 2002.

Dec 0.3 2.4 2.4 0.3 0.4 0.4 1.0 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.5

Bangladesh Water Development Board (BWDB) has created facilities for irrigation, drainage and flood control for over 5 million hectares (BWDB 2004). BWDB has also created irrigation and drainage canals and borrow pits for water conservation. Similarly, adequate water can be stored in the small rivers through water control structures from end of the monsoon till up to beginning of the following monsoon. This will provide additional water bodies for year-round use and help in continued recharge to the groundwater and improved water environment. Water conservation during the monsoon in the upper region through active participation of the neighbours will further assist Bangladesh in solving water availability problem during the dry months and will also assist in establishing friendly relations with its neighbours. Comprehensive studies should be undertaken at upazila or subdistricts levels involving stakeholders, government and nongovernment organisations (NGOs) working with agriculture, soil and water based development programs. This will assist in developing and implementing upazila level crop production and drinking water supply plans. Experiments on on-farm water management will be complemented with crop demonstration programs over the country

for comprehensive use of water for agricultural development and drinking water supply. Water saved in one sector can complement water supply to other sector. Appropriate management and low-cost water purification and treatment will ensure good quality drinking water supply for Bangladesh. Conclusion Safe water for Bangladesh can be ensured through improved planning and management. However, this will require water purification, treatment and selection of pumping depth from region to region. Government policies should ensure regulation of city, town and industrial waste disposal so that water bodies are not polluted. Improved management and conjunctive use of water resources are major needs for Bangladesh. Rain water conservation and its planned use during less or no rainfall period can minimise the problem of clean water availability. Dr M Abdul Ghani is national coordinator of the International Rice Research Institute in Bangladesh. References l Weather Data Report, Bangladesh Meteorological Department, (BMD, Sher-e-Bangla Nagar, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 2000) l Personal Communication, Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), (BRAC Center, Dhaka, Bangladesh) l Annual Report for 2002- 03 and Project Brief of BWDB Projects, (Bangladesh Water Development Board, BWDB 2004 and 2005). l Personal Communication, Barind Multipurpose Development Authority (BMDA), 2002. l CEGIS, Unpublished Data 2002, Bangladesh. l BGS Technical Report, Department of Public Health Engineering, DPHE (2000). WC/00/19 Volume 1. (Kakrail, Dhaka, Bangladesh). l Farid et. Al., A study of Arsenic Contaminated Irrigation Water and its carried Over effect on Vegetable. Proceedings of the International symposium on Fate of Arsenic in the Environment. Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET) and United Nations University ( BUET, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 2003). l M. A. Ghani, Arsenic Research in Bangladesh Agriculture: An Overview. Proceedings of the workshop on "Arsenic in the Food Chain: Assessment of Water-Soil-Crop Systems" held in Dhaka on July 22, 2004. Publication number 147 (Bangladesh Rice Research Institute, Gazipur). l S. M. I. Huq, A. Rahman and N. Sultana, Extent and Severity of Arsenic Contamination in Soils of Bangladesh. Proceedings of the

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International symposium on Fate of Arsenic in the Environment. Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology (BUET) and United Nations University, ( BUET, Dhaka, Bangladesh, 2003) l Master Plan Organization (MPO), National Water Plan Project Phase II. Ministry of Water Resources, Bangladesh Secretariat, Dhaka, 1991). l PROSHIKA Initiatives on Arsenic Mitigation in Bangladesh, Progress Report, PROSHIKA - A Center for Human Resources Development., Dhaka 1216, Bangladesh. l UNDP and FAO, Land Resources Appraisal of Bangladesh for Agricultural Development, Report - 2, Agro-ecological Regions of Bangladesh, FAO, Rome, 1988.

Decentralizing South Asia's Rural Water Sector Dr Satyajit Singh

arl Wittfogel is thesis of Oriental Despotism emphasized that it was the distribution of water which laid the foundation of society, state and empire (Wittfogel, 1957). The Wittfogelian thesis argued for an all powerful, centralized and despotic state that should control all water resources. In contrast, Clifford Geertz, based on a historical and sociological study of a subak, or irrigation society, in the Indonesian island of Bali points out that peasants and communities played a central role in the control and regulation of water (Geertz, 1980). As Geertz puts it, 'Theories of hydraulic despotism to the contrary notwithstanding, water control in Bali is an overwhelming local and intensely democratic matter'. It is argued in this paper that an understanding of this debate on a centralized versus decentralized state for water management is central to the understanding of water and its related conflicts in South Asia. This paper will highlight the centralizing versus decentralizing debate in the context of the rural drinking water sector in South Asia and draw lessons for the wider water sector. In South Asia we have had a few large irrigation projects in the forms of lakes and canals built by empires. The classic examples are the Lake Sudarshana constructed by Chandragupta Maurya and the Grand Anicut by the Cholas and numerous canals off rivers that were supported by the State. At the same time, groundwater irrigation through the charsa and the araghat or small bunds on rivers and streams (also supported by the State at least from the time of the Mauryan empire documented in the Arthsashtra) met the bulk of

162

irrigation requirement in South Asia. Indeed, this decentralized production of water led to the consolidation of petty peasant production in agriculture as medieval historians like Irfan Habib have pointed out (Habib, 1963). The existing social relations to water were to change under the British colonial rule. Under the management of military civil engineers, water was seen as an empire builder and Lt. Gen Sir Arthur Cotton visualized a web of canals linking the rivers in India and China. Water was not only an instrument for empire building but also a revenue generator. The early returns from water led Cotton to make the statement, â&#x20AC;&#x153;Water in India is more valuable than gold of Australia.â&#x20AC;? Post-colonial South Asia continued with the colonial quest of taming the waters in a centralizing manner with disastrous social, ecological and economic implications (Singh, 1997). Present-day South Asia has seriously begun the quest of decentralizing and democratizing governance. Institutional designs for the production, control and regulation of water at the local government level are being attempted in earnest. This paper points to some - issues and concerns related to the decentralized management of drinking water in rural South Asia that has implications for decentralizing the water sector as a whole. Similar attempts at decentralization are also being made for watershed management. While farmers associations are also being established for the efficient distribution of canal water, reforms in the irrigation sector as a whole are not yet on the table in South Asia. Here policy makers, academics and critics are working for spaces within the centralized structure rather than calling for an overhaul of the system. State and Provision of Service Delivery Drinking water and sanitation services to rural areas have traditionally been delivered by state agencies funded through fiscal transfers from the center. It is a public sector model of delivery where the incentives are so structured that the public agency is responsive to central bureaucracy rather than beneficiaries. In South Asia they are structured to disburse capital funds rather than focus on sustainability, outputs and outcomes of the investment. This is a supply driven mechanism where technology is chosen on the basis of incentives to the professional managers rather than the people. The existing perverse incentives have led to an over-emphasis on the

163

technological super-structure rather than the economic and social sub-structure through which people relate to water. In contrast, civil society initiatives have focused on issues of appropriate technology; equitable distribution of developmental benefits and prioritized targeting of the poor; greater gender equality; and sustainable use of resources. People's participation is seen as key for better developmental outcomes. Recent studies have also pointed out that many of these public investments are also inefficient. In South Asia unaccounted-for water ranges from 40 to 60 percent. Cost recovery from water is grossly inadequate. While the proponents of the public sector justify its existence in the name of the poor, the public distribution system for drinking water has not reached full coverage. This actually means that the poorest are actually not provided public water and are left to depend on water vendors who could charge according to recent studies anywhere between 20 to 60 times more than the public utility price. The poor are already paying the cost of public sector inefficiency. In the name of public goods, while about 10 percent of the total plan funds since independence have been spent on irrigation, hydraulic property rights are linked to property rights in land. Given the skewed distribution of land in South Asia, it is not wrong to say that public investment in irrigation has benefited the affluent in the countryside rather than being used for poverty reduction. It is time to question the outcome of our public sector investment in the effort to design pro-poor institutions and safeguards. Democratic and devolutionary decentralization that puts the responsibility of distribution and development of public goods and distribution of subsidy at the local level may be the starting point for addressing pressing concerns of poverty and what water can do to help alleviate it. A worldwide emphasis on reforms is a political reaction to the failures of centralized models of administration and economic management, whether Leninist or Keynesian. Today the centralized state is being dismantled because the economic gurus have found a competitive market to be more efficient and responsive to the citizens than a monopolist state where accountability is to the centre. This theory states that the market creates efficiencies due to the existence of bargaining in economic transactions and the existence of institutions that define the procedures under which this bargaining

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takes place and the mandates of those involved. Under a monopolistic state, organizations face informational constraints, there are huge transaction costs, contracts do not provide for all the contingencies or specifically define the outputs and outcomes of public investment. In short, institutional weaknesses, graft and rents, inappropriate incentive systems and lack of enforcement lead of chronic failures in centralizing states. Economies that are in transition form socialism or developing economies to a market economy, face the added problem of working in an institutional vacuum created over the control of rents in a situation where the older elite has not yet been replaced with a new governing configuration. In fact, the nature of the new governing structure is 'under construction' for the market and the state have to define their 'equilibrium' positions in the new order. A recent economic theory argues that Paroto-optimal allocation through the price mechanism can be achieved for private goods only. For public goods such as health and education, market allocation leads to undersupply. However, before we celebrate the inefficiencies of the market in the supply of public goods we need to heed carefully to the institutional paradigm that call for the demise of the monopolistic state and the need to establish institutional and organizational bargaining for greater efficiencies. The institutions regulate the exercise of authority, establish incentive systems and reduce transactional constraints. Douglas North calls institutions the rules of the game, according to which individuals and organizations function. They constrain and facilitate behavior and together with endowments and technology, define the set of economic opportunities in a society. Institutions define norms of behavior, provide transparent information, define commitment mechanisms, and establish an effective monitoring and evaluation system (North, 1986). The state thus redefines itself to focus on policy, leaving the process of implementation or service delivery to a plethora of institutions characterized as public, private, civil society or partnerships between these organizations. The issue is not one of state versus market, or state versus civil society, rather one of institutional design that separates the functions of policy, implementation and regulation. Currently, these roles are all combined in one, making the government the judge, the jury and the executioner. Yet, the state cannot be wished away as government regulation in some form is

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required due to the public good nature of water. The state needs to ensure sustainability of the water resource over time and provide standards for water quality. An important function of the state is the provision of public goods to the poor to help them with asset creation. The state needs to devise safety nets and instruments of managing the shocks to the economy that enhance the vulnerability of the poor (drought, floods, natural calamities, etc), devise mechanisms for redistribution and also methods that enable voice and choice in the determination and distribution of public goods. There is thus a need to evolve models of state ownership and control without necessarily being part of the delivery process. Decentralization is one such option. Decentralization, driven by political, economic and technical factors has led to the emergence of multi-tiered governments in one form or another across the world. Of the 75 developing and transition economies, with a population of over 5 million, 63 are devolving political, administrative or fiscal authority at the local governments. In some countries, administrative de-concentration is the path while in others it is full political and fiscal decentralization. There is a potential that the attempts to address the rural drinking water scarcity may require some form of decentralization of powers partial or otherwise - in South Asia. In today's world more often than not, several tiers of government are often involved in the delivery and financing of public goods. There is a need to clearly define the institutions, role of different tiers of governments within a country in the management, financing and delivery of these public goods. Decentralizing the Rural Water Supply in South Asia In the mid-nineties a $80m community driven project, popularly known as the Swajal project, was designed in Uttar Pradesh in India. This was a follow-up on the institutional design of the JAKPAS project in Nepal designed in the early nineties. Under these projects, for the first time the communities had a say in every aspect of project design and implementation, including the choice of technology and community contracting. The earlier NGO, bilateral and multi-lateral projects encouraged participation for O&M while hardware was designed and constructed by the state water boards, e.g. World Bank and DFID Maharashtra, World Bank Karnataka, Danida Karnataka, Dutch AP, Gujarat and Kerala projects. The JACPAS project in Nepal and the Swajal project in UP demonstrated to the world that

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community-driven development for rural infrastructure could be cost effective and sustainable. The per capita cost of these projects ranged between 40 to 60 percent of the UP Jal Nigam rates. Similarly in Ollavanna panchayat in Kerala, the cost of local government projects was about 18 percent of the Kerala Water Authority projects. Community management characterized the institutional design of this scheme. The management of the project was situated outside the government, as the Project Management Unit (PMU) was an autonomous body registered under the Societies Act. The PMU and the communities in the form of the village water and sanitation committees (VWSCs) sought the help of NGOs for both hardware and software support. The VWSC was a stakeholder group, bypassing the political institution of the Gram Panchayat. This was a very efficient, executive led, fast delivery vehicle for the supply of rural water. However, there are a few issues associated with this institutional design marked by a flow of funds to community and user groups bypassing of state as well as local governments. The first relates to economies of scale. Drinking water technologies that require economies of scale beyond the boundaries of user groups or village committees and which are economically efficient and affordable are not addressed by the project. As a result, most rural communities are left with small gravity systems or tube wells rather than piped water systems that may be recommended for areas with water quality problems. Excessive decentralization can be as problematic as overcentralization. It is important to draw up a right balance of the roles and responsibilities of the different tiers of the government as per the local needs. Second, in order to effectively deal with issues of equity, sustainability and reducing the vulnerability of the poor due to uncertainties, a local fiscal base is required. In other words, there is a need to develop the local government's fiscal foundations rather than by-pass an underdeveloped local government. Finally, there is the issue of scaling up the best practices of decentralized management. The local government structure provides a constitutional and institutional base to scale up what are identified as local, decentralized and community initiatives in resource and water management. The rational option seems to be an alignment with the local government system in a way that local government and community interface is strengthened. This has to be along with the

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need to develop local capacity and innovative mechanisms to contract in state level training institutions, NGOs, professionals and the private sector for support to implement the water and sanitation services. Policy Reforms in Rural Water Supply in India The 73rd Constitutional Amendment is changing the institutional landscape in rural India. The Government of India is committed to rural decentralization. The constitutional amendment has mandated a minimum level of rural decentralization across all states. The States have modified their Acts to conform to the 73rd Amendment and have set up State Finance Commissions to recommend resource allocation to the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs). Political decentralization in most states has taken place and has been highly successful. However, with regard to devolution at the state level there is a hesitant beginning in spite of the possible positive outcomes. With the Constitutional Amendment, local governments have been given functional responsibilities for water supply and sanitation. In many ways these are natural functions for rural local governments as these are critical to their everyday needs. The general disillusionment with the centralized delivery of these services has resulted in growing expectations for better services from the local governments. The national and state governments face the challenge of providing the poor with efficient services and substantially increased access to sufficient quantity and quality of water and sanitation services. In spite of significant public investment to the tune of Rs 37,000 crores (about $ 9 billion) since independence till the Ninth Five Year Plan, it is estimated that nearly fifty percent of the country's rural population does not have access to safe and sustainable water supply and the sanitation coverage for rural India is estimated to be only about twenty percent. Lack of sufficient safe drinking water and sanitation facilities significantly worsens the conditions of the rural poor. The Rural Water Supply and Sanitation (RWSS) sector in India is undergoing a gradual but dramatic transformation. A centralized state-run supply-driven organization staffed by hydraulic engineers has till recently been considered as the most efficient form of institution to be entrusted with the responsibility of safe and sustainable supply of drinking water in rural India. It is increasingly

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being recognized that this model of service delivery has failed to live up to its expected outcomes of quality service delivery, financial and ecological sustainability. The Government of India has introduced a national policy that promotes the financing and management of rural drinking water and sanitation services at a decentralized level through local governments and communities. The programme advocates for an increased role of communities in the planning and management of their own facilities. It envisages a shift in the role of government from provider to facilitator and promotes participatory management and increased cost recovery from users (at least 10 percent capital cost and 100 percent operation and maintenance contribution) as being critical in order to ensure good quality, sustainable services. Under this programme, the fiscal transfer from the national government is directly to a dedicated district unit that in turn acts as a facilitator of this programme with the involvement of local government and community groups. These principles were first articulated in the GOI Eighth Five Year Plan, and are being implemented under the GOI Accelerated Rural Water Supply Programme (ARWSP) in the Ninth Five Year Plan. 20 per cent of the ARWSP funds have been earmarked to implement sector reforms on the basis of a demand responsive approach across 63 pilot districts in 26 states. Till August 2001, more than Rs 1,820 crores had been sanctioned to implement sector reforms in the 63 districts. Based on the wide success and acceptance of this programme, the Government of India now wishes to allocate its entire ARWSP budget on the basis of these demand-driven principles from April 2006. State governments are being asked to restructure the PHEDs and enter into a memorandum of understanding with the central government to move from a supply driven to a demand driven paradigm. Failure to do so would result in a denial of the central funds that form the core of the state government's resources for drinking water.

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The nature and scale of the reform process is unprecedented and therefore requires focused intervention to catalyze the capacity fund to make the reforms more effective. An increase in the access of the poor to safe and sustainable water and sanitation services would assist in better health that will positively impact economic gains from the livelihood of the poor. The Government of India (GOI) guidelines on sector reforms mark a shift in the institutions primarily responsible for the delivery of water supply and sanitation services. The reforms are clearly aimed at developing alternatives to the water boards or the public health and engineering departments. However, the GOI has provided a flexible institutional design for state governments to adopt in line with state policies. After one year we see three generic models developing amongst the 26 states that would be discussed later. At the state level, the GOI guidelines call for the creation of a State Water and Sanitation Mission (SWSM) or an equivalent institution to facilitate the reform process, provide policy guidelines salient to the state, coordinate with other line departments, ensure uniform policies across pilot districts and ensure proper monitoring and evaluation. Diagram 1: Institutional Reforms in the Water Sector in South Asia Existing Arrangement: Supply Driven Reform Design: Demand Driven State

Local Governments

Water Boards

Communities

As institutional change of this magnitude has to be supplemented with adequate capacity, a significant proportion of the national funds are earmarked for capacity building of the local government and communities. This is a unique scheme, perhaps the only one in the world, to pilot a reform process in rural water supply and sanitation.

Under the reform programme, the GOI instead of funding the state water boards, directly funds a District Water and Sanitation Mission (DWSM) or an equivalent institution like the District Panchayat for project preparation, design and implementation. The DWSM is

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responsible for managing central funds, communicate the key features of the programme to the entire district, form Village Water

Reforming the Rural Water Supply in Bangladesh:

s per the Gram Sarkar Bill of 2003, the local governments work as agencies of the central government with little or no autonomy. Their responsibilities are restricted to conducting surveys, maintaining birth and death and marriage statistics, supervise management of primary schools, create awareness for better health care, maintain law and order, ensure participation in government development programmes, etc. The local government structure has helped the administration reach the grassroots and built mechanisms for participatory decentralized administration. However, it is still a long way away from the stage of devolution of the rural local governments. While the draft Upzila/Thana Parishad and the Zila Parishad bill discusses autonomy by suggesting the devolution of 26 subjects currently with the central government to the local governments, there is as yet no firm support for these bills by the ruling party in the country. A weak administrative structure and lack of financial and human resource base would inevitably result in questionable outputs from the local governments. At best, the Bangladesh model of local governments can be described as a deconcentrated model that combines in itself democratic representation. It represents a centralized administrative system with the Union Parishad having little resources itself and little say in the manner in which the centre decides to allocate resources. While the Union Parishad is directly elected, it is dominated by administrative officials whose accountability lies elsewhere as well as by members of the parliament. Given the lack of accountability it has been characterized as a hub of patronage, clientialism and corruption. The Government of Bangladesh has recently embarked upon major reforms through its five year (2005-9) Rural Water Supply Project.

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Accountability

Water Politics in Pakistan Dr Zaigham Habib

O&M

Source: Adapted from Singh, forthcoming

Planning, Technolog-ical Choice, Procurem-ent & Implementation Selection of Beneficiaries District Office Overall Responsible State Level Institution State

Table 1: Rural Water Supply Delivery System under Reforms in Select States in India

Software Procurement

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he political formulation of water-related socio-economic interests and the civil society debate on water issues have remained limited in Pakistan. The political parties have not gone much beyond the regional water demands they had promised to provide to their constituencies. The development of water storage is a hot issue, but the existing extreme positions are taken superficially, without any real vision and understanding of future implications. The media have recently started playing an active role in the projection of water related issues. For the common public, facts about water remain controversial and all domestic water issues are explained in the context of provincial antagonism. Water-related policies, economically important and socially relevant, are mostly undertaken by the public sector in Pakistan. However, technopolitical controversies may become complicated requiring intensive political process to resolve them. Background of Water Politics

Large-scale development and management of water resources of the subcontinent were introduced under a centralised policy of the British colonialists. The objective was to exploit maximum agricultural potential. The regional and local administrations played a key role in the identification of feasible water projects. The management of developed water resources was handed over to the provincial departments. The state, as the owner (usually termed as custodian), promised water access to everyone. The constitutions of all South Asian countries have similar clauses ensuring 'public access' to water. However, in Pakistan, as in South Asia, the state

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mainly develops water resources for agriculture. The physical integration of the river systems and scattered population in Pakistan, and North India, made the development of water resources a matter of competition among various regions. This competition is mostly reflected by the conflicting demands of the provincial/state governments. The last two decades of the 20th Century have highlighted the global and local water scarcity, conservation threats, crisis of water management and ownership issues. 'New water policies and paradigms' are debated (Annexure 1) and sometimes changed to suit competing interests of various stakeholders. However, changes introduced in the developing countries, with the help of donors and multilateral funding agencies, have not produced expected results (WB 2003). The factors behind a need for change in water management are: l steady decrease in per capita water availability; l financial inefficiency of agriculture, especially services; l increasing need and demand for drinking water and sanitation; l competitive water-related business (agriculture, industry); and

interest of donors. With the whole water infrastructure of Pakistan developed with the help of foreign and international experts (British engineers before 1947, many international consortium after 1950, different management approaches have been tried as well. The basin level water resources management (main theme behind Water and Power Development Authority [WAPDA]), participatory management (change of the provincial irrigation departments into irrigation authorities in all provinces 1997) and the National Water Strategy (2002) are a few examples. However, not much is changed for the development and management objectives and procedures. Sp far no proper political dialogue on water management issues in Pakistan has taken place. Inability of the present system to move forward indicates the need to understand what is wrong with it, what the long-term solutions are and how constructive political choices can be made. Existing Procedure

Generally, three sets are followed to implement and improve water resources development and utilisation:

Technical solutions are formulated and proposed by different public sector institutions and donors considering multidisciplinary factors and constraints; Solutions are formally approved by the administrations and legislation at the national and/or at the provincial levels on the basis of priorities and compromises; and Decisions are administratively implemented.

It can be seen that none of the above mentioned processes is independent, linear and convergent. Political and economic interests may influence the selection of technical options as well as institutional priorities. Institutional interests may lead to limited vision of management and development options; a dominant institution can over-shadow the less developed and less influential institutions. In case of political disagreement, the process can be complicated, formulation of issues exaggerated and political representation biased towards the vested interests and vocal groups. The technical aspects of water resource management are generally not understood by the politicians nor are they communicated to the common public. In case of diverse opinions, step 2 becomes difficult and selection of appropriate solutions a major techno-political task. The dominant mode of thinking prevails and the probability of making wrong decisions remains high. There could be intensive negotiations and a deadlock in case of disagreement and unnecessary uniformity in case of agreement. Water Issues

The provincially disputed issues - debated by the media and politicians are: 1.

provincial river water sharing from the gross pool and during water shortage periods, 2. development of a new reservoir, 3. protection of the Indus delta, and 4. potential for water saving and increased efficiency Emerging issues at the national scale but less debated are: i) shortage of water required for agriculture; ii) groundwater depletion in intensively cropped areas and urban centers; iii) drinking water supply and water quality hazards, and iv) pollution of the water bodies: river, lakes and groundwater. On the first set, technical and institutional opinions are different, not

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only between Punjab and Sindh, but also across the country. There are different opinions among the media and public groups. No technical solution seems possible because all given solutions are controversial and the justifications diverse. The river water transfer approach adopted in the Indus Basin, estimation of total water availability and mode of water use are strongly linked with these issues. The second set of issues is less debated, but more basic and critical in nature. These are the real challenges faced by the water shortage and non-optimum performance of the water systems. In fact, these shortages are to be addressed with a long term planning, integrated and priority based choices, to avoid adverse future impacts. River Water Transfer and Implications

The water transfer from a bigger to a smaller river had been adopted as early as 1905, to support agriculture on physically suitable and populated areas of the Basin. The river commands of the Eastern tributaries benefited the most from this approach. Sindh objected to each upstream project as the lower riparian of the Indus river, especially those which would reduce winter flows in the lower Indus. Historically, regional conflicts of interests were represented by the institutions, and addressed by the technical and judicial committees formed by the central governments. The five committees formed during 1916, 1925, 1932, 1939, 1945 suggested technical solutions. Principally, all mainstream and local political institutions supported the development of irrigation schemes while defending their existing uses and water access. The tedious negotiations between the Bahawalpur State and the British Government show the conflict of regional and central interests. With the development of Sukkur Barrage scheme in 1932, irrigation rights were provided to the vast area of Lower Indus, to be developed over a long period of time. In 1947, the water sharing issue acquired a new intensity, with the division of the basin between the two countries, cutting the upstream reaches of the tributary rivers of the Indus. The whole country became lower riparian. Pakistan, being at the neck of the rivers, had limited choices, especially from the Eastern Rivers. The Radcliff line dividing the two nations was drawn so hastily that 'there was not sufficient time to divide the Indus waters or the assetsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;. After 13 years of negotiations and international mediation the Indus Water Treaty was signed between Pakistan and India on September 19, 1960. The Treaty is an internationally appreciated and well-quoted

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example of successful trans-boundary agreements on river water sharing. However, it was signed after a high-level political agreement between the two countries, only 'After long, intensive, and difficult discussions'. The World Bank and the Consortium of donors had to persuade the president and prime ministers of Pakistan and India. Kirmani and Rangeley conclude that 'they differed too sharply in their views to pursue joint planning.' The Treaty brought major changes in river water availability and sharing. l A shift from the Basin to the Dominion level water development

planning. l Annual average of 29 million acre feet (MAF) water from three

Eastern Rivers was allowed to be fully used by the India. A number of dams, barrages, and link canals have been built to distribute water from the eastern Indus tributaries to the Indian Punjab and neighbouring states. l The construction of replacement works included inter-river link canals to transfer water from the Western Rivers and a reservoir (Mangla on Jhelum) to store water for the Rabi (winter crop) irrigation. Pakistan started another reservoir to transfer water from the summer flood flows to winter. On an average 10 MAF water is transferred (from the Indus and Jhelum rivers) to the Eastern Rivers systems, which is bound to increase as supplies from India are becoming nil after 1995. l Between 1947 and 1978, Pakistan extended canal systems to divert 70 per cent more canal water and irrigate 29 per cent more area. Provincial Water Accord

With the development of reservoirs, winter water availability increased and provinces started to count their volumetric share from the gross storage. Practically a mix of design authorised discharge and seasonal volume sharing evolved new regulation of the network. The Water Allocation Accord (1991) was another success in the regional water sharing. Each province is provided a volumetric share and 10-daily reference allocation to share the daily flows. However, the developments of 1960-78 could not continue satisfying the water demand of the increasing population and agriculture and differences on the interpretation of WAA increased. Further storage of summer water was once more rejected by the

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Sindh. The four year drought made the situation worse, strongly indicating the need for sustainable water supply to highly arid areas. The current debate on further water development is extremely important as the water left in the basin is at a minimum level while agriculture and drinking water shortage is maximum. Existing Water Scarcity

Agricultural sector use has reached 70 per cent of the river inflow, more than 95 per cent of the developed water and more than 90 per cent of the groundwater pumped. During a dry year, the percentage of river water used goes to 90 per cent (PWP 2000). No government or political institution can deny that the whole riverine belt (called Saila area in the upper and Kacho area in the lower basin) has become heavily well irrigated and cropped. Officially five million acre riverine cultivation is reported in the country (WAPDA 2000). The water used by riverine agriculture is around 20 MAF (Habib 2004). Like other developing countries, Pakistan has the land potential to expand agriculture, while existing agriculture has become highly groundwater dependent. Every farmer will prefer to have and use more canal water; this is partly due to irrigation practices and groundwater quality. The existing canal system can divert 20-30 per cent more water. Because of economic pressures and modernisation, the cropping intensities are increasing with future demand further increasing. The basic question is: Do we have sustainable water availability to expand agriculture? A big technical failure of the public sector institutes is to realise this basic water shortage and communicate it to the users. The political handling is even worse; all political institutions (within the government or outside) advocate or promise extension of agriculture. Notwithstanding the political value of such slogans, it is a dangerous path of thinking and planning. The groundwater table is depleting around the urban centers and intensively irrigated areas, because of higher extraction than recharge to the aquifer. It is being evaluated since 15 years (a nation wide NESPAK study was carried out in 1991). The control of groundwater pumpage is a difficult problem to be addressed, because it has become a major source of supply for the domestic and industrial uses, livelihood agriculture and riverine areas. Unfortunately, technical and institutional failure of the public sector

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to protect the regenerative nature of alluvial water supply system is the least understood issue. Rather, there is continuous advocacy for the canal lining (projected by the media and politicians as capable of saving water equivalent to few surface reservoirs). It is not only 40 maf pumpage (WAPDA vision 2001), its leaching character is ignored. A very basic contribution of the shallow drinkable groundwater is the dependence of more than 70 per cent population on it. The physical works are always the choice of the engineering institutes. A lack of understanding of the environment friendly regenerative water and land systems of the basin can cause permanent damage to the system. It will further accelerate groundwater depletion and quality deterioration. Drainage and effluent management systems are other areas of technical and administrative failure. The drainage projects proved short-lived despite maximum investment across the country, (SCARP Projects, LBOD). Most of the vertical drainage is replaced by the irrigation tube-wells; surface drains have no effluent and could not be maintained. About 80 per cent of the total area is waterlogged in the saline zone. The mega LBOD drain has a major problem of direct seawater back-flows and has to share fresh river water below Kotri. Another technical and institutional failure is to control the water loss to the saline aquifer. The much advocated lining projects are hardly implemented in the saline Lower Indus (Sindh). It is unfortunate that the technical organisations cannot put together the failure of watercourse lining in the high water use saline areas and push it forward for political reasons. A common explanation is that the system has deteriorated so much in Sindh that watercourses cannot be lined. In reality, a new water use system has evolved in Sindh, canals and watercourses are governed by new regime, tail-ends of the channels have gone lower than the ground level and water is pumped for irrigation. The vested interests of the large land holdings are understandable, but the bigger political issue is the high vulnerability of this system. In case of shortage, some areas quickly lose access to water, a higher probability for the small land holdings, and a general drinking water shortage for the millions of people relying on the river water. The low performance of water conveyance and distribution systems in Sindh is linked to the low performance of the irrigation department and vested interests of the big land holding.

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There should be no doubt about emerging drinking water problems in Pakistan. All big cities are facing shortage of potable drinkable water. The drinkable water supply to big cities -- Karachi, Islamabad and Quetta -- has forced an increasing percentage to shift to bottled water. The access of millions of rural users to safe drinking water is considered critical. It has increased the common public's vulnerability to scarcity of water. New Surface Storage

Pakistan has a shortage of water in all areas, with higher vulnerability in the saline and more arid areas. The agriculture of the lower Indus mostly depends on the surface storage, which is depleting. The question arises as to why there is a big resistance to the new storage in Sindh. To some extent it is mistrust, but there is a more sound background to this opposition, which needs to be understood and addressed. The lower Indus has been the major recipient of Indus waters before the irrigation development and has always claimed its riparian right on its water. It is now a shareholder in the developed water used for irrigation, vulnerable to drinking water shortage, sea intrusion and having a greater percentage of the unaccounted water uses. Water experts from Sindh have the dual task of protecting bigger gross share and securing a sustainable water supply. The water shortage is more dangerous because the majority of the population uses canal water for domestic purposes as well. At the national scale river-regulation cannot be allowed to move backwards, which is happening with the depletion of existing surface storage. The gross available river inflow is expected to decrease in the future with water management schemes on Chenab, Jhelum and Kabul rivers in the upstream countries. The climate change can have longer dry spells. These challenges have forced the president of Pakistan to campaign for water storage development. However, due to shortcomings of the water management institutes and apprehensions of the provinces, the techno-political process remains weak. Some of the factors not properly understood/conveyed are:

181 l The reservoir site has a critical link with the gross and minimum

availability of water. This point is understood by the technical institutions (WAPDA) but not conveyed to the politicians and common people. l All provinces of Pakistan have adopted a water use system based on river regulation. Each province is to protect its systems depending upon natural inflows or flood pattern (highly unreliable with decreasing probability at the current level) with the help of an efficient use of regulated flows. Intensive negotiations at Indus River System Authority (IRSA) are proof of that. Institutional and Political Failure

The issue of below Kotri is the most serious example of the failure of technical and management system of the public sector institutions. It is a much debated and politically controversial issue, but the national and provincial water management organisations have not addressed it. With any new development of water infrastructure, the annual gross quantity passing below Kotri (limited to couple of weeks) has been decreasing. There is an inevitable increase in water uses upstream and a part of flows are shared with the drainage system (LBOD). It is amazing that the basin famous for the engineering interventions could not move for a solution here. There is also a lack of discussion on the solutions suggested by the Sindhi engineers (Panhwar 2002). Political sensitivity of the issue is the obstacle to technical debate. However, it will be highly unfortunate to postpone solutions for the below Kotri management and to continue focusing on the water demand. Some recommendations made in the past show that the scope of this debate should be widened. Another barrage below Kotri could ensure and control the supply downstream, the sea intrusion through the groundwater table is caused by the depletion of sweet water layer, which is also linked with the irrigation and drainage practices. Human efforts and modern science need to be applied to preserve the Indus delta. Water Policy and Politics

l There is a growing need to manage water demands, as the water

available for development is limited. The claims to develop many reservoirs are misleading. l The water needs outside agriculture are critical and are bound to increase because these uses are informal and highly stressed. There must be an allocation for all uses to secure them.

The practiced and legally accepted relation between water and its users is a key factor in shaping the communal and institutional water interests. A major policy challenge is to protect the future water security. This can be achieved only by ensuring livelihood-oriented water availability for future generations and by conserving and improving existing water resources of the country. As is obvious, it is

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a complicated political and institutional task. Since the country is trying to do business as well, we cannot avoid political influence of the donors, vested local interests and decay of water management institutions (WAPDA) in their desired functions. The political dialogue is still weak and superficial in the country. Politicians and major political parties continue promising water without prior thinking. The water issues of Pakistan and selective political sensitivity show the need to go down to the community and users levels and make an inventory of the challenges faced by them, then up-scale their issues to the national level with a futuristic vision. No correct political process and vision on water policy issues could be suddenly evolved but more aware techno-political debate is towards filling the gaps. Three water policy approaches globally discussed are given in the annexure-1. The water management institutes have played a strong role in the national and provincial water politics as well as authoritative control on water resources development. Both roles have declined with the evolution of new historical realities. It is important to realise that water politics cannot be contained within the old boundaries and the new water policy should go for strategic changes. Dr Zaigham Habib is a Lahore-based consultant on water issues; her doctoral thesis focused on the Indus basin irrigation system. References l Z. Habib,

Scope for Reallocation of River Waters in the Indus Basin, ENGREF Montpellier France, 22nd September 2004. l P. H. Gleick, ‘The Changing Water Paradigm – A look at the Twenty-first Century Water resources Development’, Water International, Vol. 25, no.1, (International Water Resources Association, 2000). pp. 127-138 l WSIPS -- Water Sector Investment Planning Study, Vol. I - IV, (Islamabad: Federal Planning Cell, WAPDA, 1990). l David Aubin and Frédéric Varone (AURAP - UCL) March 29, 2002 European Water Policy. l WAPDA 2001, Water Resources Hydropower Dev Vision 2025. l Michel Arthur Alloy, The Indus Rivers -- A study on the effects of Partition, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 594. l Lisa Widawsky, The Integral Role Of International Actors In Solving Riparian Disputes: A Case Study On The Indus Waters Treaty of 1960. l M. H. Panhwar, Water Requirements of Riverine Areas of Sindh, (Sindh Education Trust Hyderabad, 2002). l Thomas, 48. 90 Kirmani and Rangeley, 4. l Ayoob, 57. 91 Gulhati, 97.

183 l Hussein

A. Amery and Aaron T. Wolf, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2000), p. 210.

Annexure 1.

Privatisation approach of the major donors as formulated by the ' freedom from debt Coalition (7/17/2003)

l The dominant water policy promotes and ' imposes' : l Liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation of water services to meet the loan conditions established by the World Bank and the IMF, which require that a country liberalise, deregulate and privatise a sector for which it is seeking loans. l Prioritisation of private investment. The priority has been once again ' consecrated' by the ' Camdessus' report in ' Financing Water for All' , that was presented in Kyoto. Based on the final declaration of the Monterrey Summit on the financing of development in the world, and the Camdessus report, it is only the private sector that can assure the ' efficacious' financing of the hundreds of billions of dollars of supplements (an hugely exaggerated amount), which according to the World Bank would be required to reduce by half the number of people with access to drinking water and hygiene from now to 2015 2. Towards demand management An international paradigm shift towards demand-based management has been summarised by Gleick (1999, 2000) ' the dynamic process of managing freshwater resources is changing again. There are many components to this change: a shift away from sole, or even primary, reliance on finding new sources of supply to address perceived new demands; a growing emphasis on incorporating ecological values into water policy; a reemphasis on meeting basic human needs for water services and a conscious breaking of the ties between economic growth and water use' . 3.

New Socialistic Approach: An alternative global and local water policy ' freedom from debt Coalition (7/17/2003)

As a point of departure, we propose the right to life for everyone by 2020. The objective is to guarantee the right of access to water for all the 8 billion people who will live in the world by 2020, for all living species, and for all future generations, while equally guaranteeing the sustainability of ecosystems. In this spirit, we affirm the ' sacred' value of water at the symbolic level. Water is the expression of life, human dignity and nature, and of human cultures and history. Basic Principles

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185 The access to water in necessary quantity (40 liters per day for domestic use) and quality for an acceptable quality of life, should be acknowledged as a constitutional, universal and indivisible human and social right. In this regard, we salute with satisfaction, the ' General comments' of the United Nations Human and Social Rights Committee, which considered access to water as a human right. Water should be treated as a common good belonging to all human beings and living species of the plant. The ecosystems should be considered as a common good. Water is a good only available in limited quantity at local and global levels. No level of profit justifies the unlimited consumption of this good. The current excessive waste of water constitutes a crime against necessities of life. That is why ownership, governance and political control of water (specifically the management of water services) should remain in public hands and within public authority. It is the task of public authorities to ensure and promote the use of water resources with regards to human rights, to take into consideration future generations and to safeguard and value ecosystems in an integrated fashion. The public sector (from communities to the state, from continental unions to the global community) must assure the necessary financing and investment to realise the right of access to drinking water and sustainable use of water resources. The most appropriate instrument for this purpose is the establishment of a progressive fiscal system with a redistributive nature at all levels, from local to global, based on multiplicity and modularity of public provision of financial resources for territorial investment needs. For this purpose, it is imperative that the role and function of multilateral financing agencies such as the World Bank, the IMF, BERD, BEI, IBD, ABD etc. be revisited without further delay, and that new national or international cooperative financing institutions based on public-public partnerships are defined. Citizens have to participate in a representative and direct manner in the definition and realisation of the water policy, from the local level to the global level. Democracy has to be at the center of ' coexistence' , even at the global level. It's hard to accept that globalisation can really be ' global' , if it only occurs at the level of trade, finance, production, consumption, lifestyles and cultural flux, while democracies are still based on nationstates or continental-state in nature, such as is the case of the United States, China, Russia, India, Brazil and Indonesia. The concept of ' global governance' put in fashion by policymakers in the ' north' is a great mystification. Democracy necessitates the promotion of a new democratic, participatory and solidarity-based public sector, and the establishment of participatory mechanisms which include citizens and local

communities, workers, local institutions and valuing diversity in all its different forms, which represents the richness of the democratic experience in different continents and countries.

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(SARP) organised the South Asian consultation on River Linking Project (21-22 August 2004), so as to focus on the implications of the proposal on linking the two large rivers in the subcontinent. Concerned citizens from India, Pakistan and Nepal joined their Bangladeshi counterparts to voice their concern at the Indian proposal of changing the geomorphology of the subcontinent.

India's River Linking Plans Syed Shahid Husain

he Indian government got judicial sanction from its Supreme Court in October, 2002 to be able to implement its scheme on linking major Indian rivers to 'overcome drought and floods'. The BJP government followed this up with pronouncements supportive of the scheme. The proposal was not received without dismay in the neighbouring countries, particularly Bangladesh, which organised a series of conferences to highlight the folly inherent in the scheme. The most recent of these conferences was a three-day international conference on Regional Cooperation on Transboundary Rivers in Dhaka (December, 2004) with a call to India to dispel mistrust and concerns over its river linking project and to follow a 'no harm policy' towards its neighbours. This is a phrase used in the Treaty between India and Bangladesh on Farakka. According to reports, the Indian Ambassador to Bangladesh assured the Bangladeshis that India would undertake a detailed consultative process with all concerned. She asserted that the project was still at a conceptual stage. This does not mean that the proposal has been shelved; hence, the continued concern for Bangladesh. This conference was a follow up, close on the heels of the August conference in 2004. Aware of the threat posed by this gigantic project and the challenges faced by the region on account of population growth, food scarcity, the Third South Asia Water Forum (SAWAF-III) was held in Dhaka in July, 2004. The Bangladesh People's Initiative against River Linking (BPIRL) in collaboration with the South Asian Solidarity for Rivers and Peoples

Brahmaputra and Jamna Basins account for 65 per cent of surface water in Bangladesh. In all, 80 per cent of the surface water in Bangladesh comes through these two rivers (Brahmaputra and Jamna) originating in Himalayas and passing through Nepal, Bhutan and India. Bangladesh inter alia decided to endorse the principle of 'more crop for each drop' of water as an alternative to this mega project, so as to increase water efficiency, to decrease non-structural options, to evolve cost effective technologies including rain water harvesting as well as re-cycling of effluent and for action to use water as a source of peace and prosperity rather than a source of discord. The 21st century is marked with a growing need for global cooperation, in general, and regional cooperation, in particular. What could be more important for global understanding than on water, which is getting scarcer by the day and will get more so in the future? Days of profligacy are long gone and the mounting pressure of population has forced the issue of this precious commodity to the fore not only in this region but also in other parts of the world. The controversy is not confined to Bangladesh and India. The Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Basin (GMB) represents a far bigger region comprising Bhutan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal and some parts of Tibet. According to a recent report, India has nearly exhausted underground water reservoirs by pumping water for irrigation to achieve a mirage of food self-sufficiency. The proposed project is thought to be the only solution to overcome the problem. India has proposed to transfer water from the Brahmaputra through a gigantic 324-km long link canal, which will run from Assam across northern Bangladesh to just above Farraka. The second part of the proposal envisages three large dams, which are potential hydropower-cumflood control sites. The project consists of thirty river links, 14 on the Himalayan Rivers and 16 on the peninsular south. The project involves storage of flood and monsoon water. The important links

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are four, including Brahmaputra with Ganges, Subamarekaha and Mahanadi with Brahmaputra so as to irrigate Assam, West Bengal, Bihar, Jharkhand and Orissa. The proposal for interlinking of rivers is not new. Sir Arthur Cotton first mooted it in the 19th century primarily for promoting inland navigation. Dr K. L. Rao later revived the idea in 1972. After that the focus shifted from navigation to the issue of water scarcity in the south. In 1977 Captain Dastur, a pilot by profession, proposed construction of two canals named Garland Canal -- because it envisaged 4,200 km Himalayan Canal and the twice as long Southern Garland Canal, which were to be connected through pipelines passing through Patna and Delhi. Much before the Supreme Court decision in 2002, National Water Development Agency (NWDA) was established in 1980, to carry out two separate studies, viz. Himalayan and Peninsula rivers. NWDA has to survey and investigate possible storage size and interconnecting links. There are two action plans. Under action plan-I, the schedule for implementation is 10 years from the start. It is stipulated that work will start in 2007 and complete in 2016. Under action plan-II, two committees have been set up to go into the financial aspects of the project. Both the committees are to work concurrently. The NWDA has conducted feasibility studies jointly with the Ministry of Water Resources on six of the thirty possible river links in the last few decades. It is reported to have completed water balance studies of 137 basins/sub-basins and prepared prefeasibility studies of 30 links. A task force has also been set up by the Government of India on December 13, 2002, with Suresh Prabhu as the Chairperson with the following terms: 1.

To provide guidance on norms of up-raising of individual projects in respect of economic liability, socio-economic impacts, environmental impacts and preparation of re-settlement plans; 2. Devise suitable mechanisms for brining about a speedy consensus among the stats; 3. Privatise different projects' components for preparation of detailed project reports and implementation; 4. Propose suitable organisational structures for implementing the

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projects; 5. Consider various funding, modalities; and 6. Consider international dimensions that may be involved in some components of the project. A full-fledged cost benefit analysis will follow the feasibility studies and detailed project reports. It is, however, claimed that phenomenal economic and socio cultural benefits will accrue, like: 1. 2. 3. 4.

5. 6. 7.

Agricultural production will increase by 100 per cent in the next five years; 35 million hectares will be added to the command area to the current 90 million hectares; Loss of crops worth Rs.250b will be saved by preventing drought and floods; Savings in foreign exchange of Rs.30b per annum will accrue because of cost effective alternative navigation and reduced import of oil; The country will further be bound together. Employment to one million people will be provided in next 10 years; and Additional water line defence will be provided along the western and north-western borders.

There are sceptics who doubt the viability of the scheme or even the seriousness on the part of India. They suspect that it was an election stunt and will not go beyond the laying of foundation stone. With the new government in place one has not heard of it so loudly. 24 years after the project emerged on the public scene, it is nowhere near completion. But there are those who are afraid of India's seriousness. Once the government conducts studies, like it did on the Kalabagh Dam in Pakistan, without involving the stakeholders in a discussion, then a vested interest is created in going ahead with its execution. Narmada is another example of the same approach. Consequently, the dam is still incomplete. The question remains whether there is enough water to sustain the idea. Except for the Brahmaputra basin in the northeast, there is no surplus water anywhere. The scheme is predicated on the assumption that there is surplus water in the rivers that could be diverted to the deficit rivers. Dr Ainun Nishat, Country representative of IUCN in Bangladesh, in his brilliant exposition at

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the August Conference in 2004, brought out -- with the help of data - that dry deltas in Bangladesh bring forth (very poignantly) an affirmation of the claim by the critics of the proposal that not much water is left to flow into the sea. Those who are building a superstructure over a pipe dream either do not understand or have a sinister agenda hidden from public view. The receding snow lines of the Himalayas are another development which cannot be overlooked. The glacier mass showed a negative trend since the middle of the last century, signalling a sharp reduction in flow into the rivers in the next 30 years. Himalayan glaciers could disappear by the year 2035 according to some researchers. There is no scientific database on climate pattern and discharge pattern in the Himalayas. Pakistan is facing its gravest crisis with its existing dams almost empty and its present and future crops in jeopardy. In-depth studies of glacier hydrology is in order. The claim that water flows into the sea is no longer true. India has highly uneven water availability. In Pakistan and India diversions on the mighty Indus and its tributaries have reduced water outflows into the sea by 80 per cent; destroying deltaic mangroves that once stretched over 250,000 hectares and were spawning grounds for coastal fisheries. In Philippines, rights to environment have been included as fundamental rights. Engineering a geo-morphologic feature changes both the object and the process and thus triggers a chain of developments that persist long after the intervention is over. The system takes its own time to settle into a new equilibrium. This on a generational time scale is much longer than the executive decisions. The natural level of all water on earth being the sea, the river -- unlike a canal -- augments its flow along its path. Such a project will invite the Law of Unintended Consequences. Moreover the project will involve submergence of forestland, habitations and wild life. How good is the prevailing use of irrigation water? 70 per cent of river water is wasted before its delivery into the fields. High intensity use for sugar cane and rice further compounds the problem. The region faces floods and droughts at the same time. Obtaining the consent of the states within the Union of India will prove an almost insurmountable hurdle. The states have full

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authority over water and yet the Centre can intervene by taking steps to interfere with their plans for use of the water. Ironically the states where the rivers are located are the most undeveloped parts of the country. East Punjab followed Kerala in opposing the project. Punjab and Haryana are still fighting over the Sutlej water. The annual discharge of the system is 1350 billion cubic meters with a total drainage area of 1.75 million sq. kms Brahmaputara contributes 700 BCM, Ganges 500 and Meghna 150. Tamil Nadu supports the project completely, whereas Andhra Pradesh supports it conditionally. Tamil Nadu has already completed the Mekkara Dam, which is to be used in the proposed link even though Kerala is opposed to the project. Kerala Legislative Assembly has passed a unanimous resolution against the link on August 6, 2003. Gujarat has objections because Daman Ganga-Pinjal River Linking Project, one of the 30 interstate projects, located in Gujarat will be adversely affected. There are two out of thirty proposals that fall in Gujarat. West Bengal is worried. It is demanding adequate funds from the centre to combat post Farakka problem causing floods and erosion. Assam is opposed to the project and is of the view that while remaining within the constitution, the Centre must evolve a consensus of the states. A board or an ordinary bill in parliament cannot supersede the constitutional provisions. One opinion suggests that Bihar should not oppose linking of Brahmaputra because there is sufficient water to meet the needs of the south. However, Nepal will have to be excluded from the plans. Bihar, after spending over Rs.19b on flood control in the flood prone area, is worse off with floods affecting almost three times the area (from 2.5m hectares to 6.9m). Bihar also fears that India will reap benefits at its cost. Bringing the countries of the region, particularly Bangladesh, on board may be far more difficult for India, especially after the IndiaBangladesh Treaty of December 1996 on the sharing of the Ganges waters. Farakka Barrage, completed in 1975, has been a significant source of friction between India and Bangladesh, much before the latter's creation. The Barrage allows India to divert the Ganges water into Hoogly River through a feeder canal. A decline of 51 per cent flow of water is claimed to have been experienced by Bangladesh

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after Farakka. Under an ad-hoc arrangement reached in 1983, pending scientific studies, 39 per cent of the dry season flow was to be allocated to India, 36 per cent to Bangladesh and the remaining to continue to be unallocated.

fact a river privatisation project. Projects that have already been planned or executed are being shown as new projects under the scheme. India seems to be re-making its geography so that water flows where it previously never did.

The 1996 Treaty protects the flows at Farakka and any storage upstream of Farakka will be in breach of that Treaty. Ganges and Brahmapatra are international waters and their historic use cannot be overlooked. Para 3 of the Preamble of the Treaty requires the two countries to make optimum utilisation of the water resources of their region for the mutual benefits of the people of the two countries. Article IX of the Treaty enshrines the principle -- 'Guided by the principles of equity, fairness and no harm to either party both the Governments agreed to conclude water sharing Treaties/Agreements with regard to other common rivers'.

There is need for a regional treaty that forces each country to honour its ecological obligations towards the great oceans. The combined population of the region is about 600 million. If India thinks that it can exploit its upper riparian position and its size, China, which has reportedly drawn its own plans to divert rivers originating in Tibet -including Brahmaputra, may follow suit. While India plans to complete the project by the year 2013, China plans to do so by 2009. An estimated 90 per cent of the Tibetan rivers flow downstream to India, Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan. Both India and Bangladesh are at the mercy of China which could for its own interest withhold water for irrigation and power during dry season and release water during the flood season. Bangladesh experts brought the issue to the attention of Indian journalists.

According to Bangladesh, its share in Farakka is fixed at 35,000 cusecs, if availability of water is 75,000 cusecs. In case water exceeds, India will get 40,000 cusecs and Bangladesh the balance. The water sharing arrangement was to be reviewed by the two governments at five years interval or earlier, but so far no such review has taken place. Bangladesh took up the issue of the interlinking project at the Joint River Commission. According to Mr. Hafiz Uddin Ahmad, Bangladesh Minister for Water Resources, India was reluctant even to discuss it, calling it outside the scope of the Joint River Commission (JRC). Bangladesh persisted and the discussion continued for 13 hours, but at the end of the day it was not even minuted. The marathon discussion was dismissed in a single line signifying, nothing. However, there may be some meeting of minds with the new government in place in New Delhi. There are alternatives available to the proposed millennium folly such as decentralised water harvesting, non-conventional energy sources and conservation strategies. A former Indian Prime Minister, while addressing state irrigation ministers in 1986, had this to say: 'Since 1951, 246 big surface irrigation project(s) have been initiated. Only 66 out of these have been completed. 181 are still under construction. For 16 years, we have poured out money. The people have got nothing back, no irrigation, no water, no increase in production, no help in their daily life'. The river linking project is in

All the rivers flow into the Bay of Bengal. All these countries have abiding interest in the sustainability of the system in order to ensure livelihood of people, who depend on agriculture as well as to protect ecology, environment and wild life for present or future collaboration necessary to evolve common goal of survival. Ganges is reported to be the most polluted river. The effort is not going to be easy but each country has to be prepared to make sacrifices and suffer the perceived loss involved in an agreement. Equity and understanding of the other's point of view are crucial to any settlement, tentative or permanent. Another option is that a public interest petition is filed by any concerned citizen of India requesting review of Supreme Court order, which may possibly review its own order suo moto in the region's interest. There are other hurdles that India must cross before establishing feasibility such as: 1.

External financing in view of huge external debt may not be forthcoming. The private sector sees a distinct road for itself in the proposed mega project after having experienced the privatisation of Sheonath River in Chattisgarh.

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As per the Constitution, water is a state subject, but no project can be undertaken without following the planning process, which means every proposal must go before the central government. Whether or not there will be a political will to interlink rivers is an open question. A proposal was made to constitute a commission on the lines of the Finance Commission to examine the project.

There is also the role of international law and treaties. United Nations Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses, although not ratified, could provide a basis to proceed. The Convention was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1997. Watercourse has been defined as a system of surface waters and ground waters forming a unitary whole and normally flowing into a common terminus. The Convention was based on the principles and recommendations adopted by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development of 1992 in the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21. It expressed the conviction that a framework Convention will ensure the utilisation, development, conservation, management and protection of international watercourses and the promotion of the optimal and sustainable utilisation thereof for present and future generations. Nothing in the Convention shall affect the rights or obligation of the Watercourse state arising from agreements in force on the date on which that State became a party to the Convention. There are 37 Articles to the Convention. The Articles in the Convention relate to subjects like watercourse agreements, equitable and reasonable utilisation participation, factors relevant to equitable and reasonable utilisation, obligation not to cause significant harm, general obligation to cooperate and settlement of disputes, etc. The Convention shall enter into force following ratification of 35th Instrument. So far the Convention has attracted perhaps no more than 16 signatures and 11 ratifications. 103 nations including Bangladesh had voted in favour. Surprisingly India and Pakistan were on the same side and were amongst 27 nations that had

abstained from voting. Times have changed; the demand for water is growing. Dams and megaprojects are known to disrupt the existing pattern of water use. Where people depend on fish, flood plains or deltas for their livelihood, big dams can wreak great havoc. Watershed eco-systems suffer and fragmentation of aquatic and terrestrial eco systems cause growing threat to the ecological integrity is one of the many factors impacting on the change in climate. The growing rate of extraction of fresh water has put enormous pressure on aquifers. Sedimentation causes the dams to lose storage capacity at an estimated rate of 05-1 per cent per annum. In the next 25 to 50 years, 25 per cent of the existing storage will have been lost mostly in the developing countries. In three Asian countries -- China, India and Pakistan -- the water table is sinking at the alarming rate of 1 to 2 metres a year. Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt and Israel are the most water stressed countries. Pakistan is close to Germany in being less stressed. Today most of the countries are focusing their attention on management of existing water resources including the dams. The effort involves rehabilitation, renovation and optimisation. Demand side management and improvement of efficiency of the existing supply are receiving greater attention. There are bound to be difficulties for the countries of the region along the way. However, inaction is not an option. If the waters in the basin are sufficient to justify an equitable and just sharing of waters and the social, economic, political and environmental impact of such structural intervention on common river systems is manageable, then the project cannot be dismissed as being unfeasible. It will require cooler heads in the spirit of give and take for the stakeholders in all the countries of the region to grapple with hard choices. The outcome may yet produce a win-win situation for everybody. The growing population of all the countries of the region, which they have failed to control, imposes an obligation on their leaders to do something substantial to avert the looming disaster of famine and poverty. Forming a common front against India as being the largest country

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in the region will be a self-defeating strategy. After all Pakistan did the unthinkable of bartering away three of its six rivers for the sake of peace and amity in the largest part of the subcontinent. The important thing to note is that the intervention of the World Bank proved crucial to the culmination of the effort in the signing of the Treaty. (Syed Shahid Husain has served as Secretary, Water and Power in the Government of Pakistan and as Chief Secretary, Balochistan. Mr. Husain may be contacted at sshusain@hotmail.com) References l Indus Water Treaty 1960. l Professor Hap Dunning , 'Water Law', in Water Resource Management, fourth edition. l 'Riparian Rights Case Summaries', Environment Probe. l Islam M. Faisal, 'Managing International Rivers in the GangesBrahmaputra-Meghna (GBM)'. l Jayanta Bandyopadhyay and Shama Perveen on Doubts over the scientific validity of the justifications for the proposed inter linking of rivers in India. l Mostafa Kamal Majumdar, 'River Linking and the Environment'. l Dr. Sudhirendar Sharma, 'Interlinking Rivers , Whose Concern is it Anyway?'. l Dr. Asif Nazrul, The RLP and International Law l Dr. Uma Shankari, Interlinking Rivers, Contradictions and Confrontations, A Report on the electronic debate (riverlink@ yahoogroups.com)

Nepal's Hydel Power for Export Dr Upendra Gautam and Ajoy Karki

epal is ideal for the development of hydro-power due to its vast water resources and steep topography. Furthermore, the only significant source of energy in Nepal, apart from bio-mass (which is a traditional source comprising firewood, animal dung and agricultural residue), is hydro-power. The present technoeconomically feasible hydro-power potential (given the state of infrastructure and price of fossil fuel) in the country is estimated to be around 43,000 MW. However, to date, the Integrated Nepal Power System (INPS) has a total installed capacity of about 610 MW, of which about 550 MW is hydro-power based. Of the hydro-power plants, only 92 MW (cascaded between Kulekhani I of 60 MW and Kulekhani II of 32 MW) is from seasonal storage and the rest is from run-of-river schemes (some have daily pondage). Thus, so far, less than 2 per cent of the techno-economically feasible hydro-power plants have been developed in the country. The annual electrical energy available for use within the country in the fiscal year 2003-2004 was 2381 GWh (92% of which was from hydro sources) -- an increase of about 5.3 per cent compared to the previous fiscal year. The state-owned utility, Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA), has estimated the total number of grid connected consumers to have reached 1,060,700 by the end of 2004. Of these, the domestic consumers were expected to be around 1,018,000. Thus, in 2004 among the country's population with access to the electricity grid (23 per cent), the average national consumption per

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connection was 187 kWh/month. In the domestic consumer category, the consumption per household was about 56 kWh/month. Assuming average household family size to be between four to five members, the electricity consumption per capita would be around 11 KWh/month to 14 KWh/month. These figures indicate that on one hand only limited population has access to grid electricity in Nepal, and even among those who are grid connected the consumption is nominal. It should be noted that electricity consumption in developed countries such as Canada and Sweden had reached 4500 kWh/annum per capita (i.e., 375 KWh/month per capita) in 1998. Based on a load forecast study undertaken by NEA, the expected peak load in the Integrated National Power System (INPS) by the year 2020 is estimated at 1820 MW with the corresponding annual energy availability at 8300 GWh. Thus, even if Nepal is able to meet the projected demand for electricity in 2020 (and reach an installed capacity of 1820 MW), only about 4.2 per cent of the technoeconomically feasible hydro-power potential of the country will have been developed. These projections clearly indicate that within the distant future, Nepal's hydro-power potential will far exceed the growth in demand for electricity within the country. It is against this backdrop that this paper discusses the possibilities of how Nepal's hydro-power potential can be used to meet regional energy demand creating a win-win situation. The relevance of the regional context is obvious when one looks at the map entitled: "Earth at night, lights of the world" produced by the National Geographic Society in November 2004. Darkness carpeting South Asia and western part of China adequately reflects the need of a substantive inter-Himalayan regional energy drive to take this part of the world from darkness to light. Hydro-power Development Plan The only significant hydro-power plant currently under construction is the 70 MW Middle Marsyngdi Project located in Lamjung District, Western Region of the country. Due to various delays, this hydropower project is now expected to be commissioned in 2007. At present, the Nepali private sector is mainly involved in developing small hydro-power projects that are limited to 5 MW installed capacity. This year (2005), the 2.5 MW Sun Koshi and the 500 KW Rairang hydro-power plant have been commissioned and the 1.5 MW

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Chakhu is also expected to come on line within a month. Although, the Nepalese private sector hydro-power developers have acquired a number of licenses and have also entered into power purchase agreements (PPA) with NEA, at present not one has entered the construction phase. After having successfully implemented the 60 MW Khimti and 36 MW Bhote Koshi projects in the early 2000, the multi-national companies too do not seem to have immediate plans to develop more hydro-power plants in the country. Thus, in the next four-five years the installed capacity in the INPS is likely to be limited to 700 MW. Snowy Mountain Engineering Consultancy (SMEC) had acquired the license to develop the 750 MW West Seti Hydropower Project in the mid 1990s. SMEC plans to develop this project for export of hydroelectricity to India. Under the terms of the licence, Nepal will be entitled to receive 10 per cent of the generation capacity free of cost from the project. Thus, with the completion of West Seti (planned for 2012/13), the INPS will have an equivalent 75 MW of additional installed capacity. SMEC has successfully concluded the PPA with India. The tentative list of hydro-power projects that NEA has identified for development in the near future are presented in Table 1. These projects were initially planned to be commissioned by 2015. However, since only the feasibility studies have been completed for most of these projects and furthermore, none have reached the construction stage and the 2015 commissioning target now appears to be over optimistic basically due to large number of power plants and limitation of funds. It should be noted that if all of the hydro-power plants listed in Table 1 were to be developed, the installed capacity within the INPS would reach around 1850 MW which would be sufficient to meet the predicted system demand till the year 2020.

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201 Table 1: Hydropower projects identified for development in the near future S.N.

Hydropower Project

Kabeli A Chameliya Lower Modi Upper Modi-A Rahughat Upper Marsyngdi A Budhi Ganga Hewa Khola Likhu-4 Khimti-2

Installed Capacity (MW) 30 30 19 42 27 50 20 10 44 27

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.

Average Annual Energy (GWh) 164 196 123 285 165 340 106 67 270 157

11.

Upper Seti

122

592

12.

Madi Ishaneswar

355

13.

Upper Tamakoshi

250

1568

14. 15.

Tamur -Mewa Dudh Koshi -1

101 300

489 1702

Remarks

Feasibility study completed Feasibility study completed Feasibility study completed Feasibility study completed Feasibility study completed Feasibility study completed Feasibility study completed Feasibility study completed Feasibility study completed Pre-feasibility study completed Storage type, Feasibility study completed Storage type, Feasibility study completed Feasibility study- Phase 1 completed Feasibility study completed Feasibility study completed

Source: Nepal Electricity Authority, Corporate Developme nt Plan FY 2003/04 - 2007/08.

Challenges One of the main challenges in the hydro-power sector in Nepal is the excessively high consumer end tariff. The present domestic (household) tariff in Nepal and that of Delhi, India, are compared in Table 2. The current exchange rate between Indian Rupee-IRs. and Nepali Rupee-NRs. is one IRe. is equal to 1.60 NRs. As can be seen from Table 2 the electricity tariff (on per kWh basis) in Nepal is around 90-250 per cent higher than that of Delhi, India, although the Indian electricity tariff is subsidised (i.e., cost of supply in Delhi is 20 per cent higher than the consumer end tariff). However, even when the subsidy is accounted for, the Indian domestic tariff is still significantly lower than that of Nepal. Table 2: Domestic electricity tariff in Nepal and Delhi, India Monthly Energy Consumption (kWh) 0-20 21-100 101 -200 201 250 251-400 Over 400

Tariff, NRs./kWh (IRs./kWh) Nepal Delhi, India 4.00 2.10 (1.31) 7.30 2.10 (1.31) 7.30 2.53 (1.58) 7.30 5.04 (3.15) 9.90 5.04 (3.15) 9.90 6.05 (3.78)

Remarks Nepal: Min. monthly charge varies from NRs. 80, 299, 664 and 1394 based on 5A, 15A, 30 A, and 60 A meters installed. Delhi, India : Min. monthly charge varies from NRs. 80 to 160 for 1 kW and 2 kW loads and NRs. 96 per additional kW load thereafter.

The main reason for such high tariff in Nepal is because of high per unit (kW) cost of hydro-power plants that are developed in the country (i.e., high cost of supply), especially the larger ones with public funding. This high cost of supply of electricity is mainly due to the need for importing construction materials (e.g., steel) and equipment, the inability of the local contractors to take up significant construction work volume and the inability to mobilise local finances and thus the reliance on hard currency loans. Furthermore, large hydro-power plants in Nepal are implemented under bilateral or multilateral donor aid with the preconditions (tied aid) that the generating equipment, accessories and the main contractor be from the donor countries. On the other hand, India is able to produce most of the required construction materials and equipment for hydro-power development within the country along with the capability to mobilise significant local finances. Another reason for high tariff is due to ‘cost-plus pricing’ approach used to fix the tariff in the Nepalese hydro-power sector. In this approach the generator fixes the price of electricity based on its average cost of generation plus a certain net profit margin. Although from the developer's point of view, cost-plus pricing is good as it guarantees a minimum profit, it does not encourage reduction in generation cost and thus the tariff. Some would even argue that under the cost-plus pricing mechanism, power generation with high costs generates higher profit and vice versa, as profit margin is estimated as a certain percentage of the total costs. It is also interesting to note that small hydro-power plants developed by the Nepalese Independent Power Producers (IPP) are within the range of US$1500/kW installed capacity, whereas the larger projects developed by the public sector easily exceed US$2500/kW. Based on the principles of economy of scale one would expect larger project to be more cost effective on a per unit basis. The reason for small hydro-power plants being more cost effective is mainly due to use of local finances and local contractors in larger proportion along with a higher ability to manage risks internally. ‘If one further transparently analyzes the strategic implications of the ‘high cost’ of hydropower pricing in Nepal, no developer other than India would have an interest in harnessing Nepal's water for energy as it is only India which can reap all other geo-political and economic

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benefits (flood and drought mitigations, maintenance of ecological balance, industrial development, and redistribution of benefits in the poverty-centered and politically - sensitive heart-land of denselypopulated northern states of India, namely, the Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and West Bengal) out of the ”high cost” hydropower development.’ (U. Gautam and A. Karki, Editors Note, Hydropower Pricing in Nepal, Developing a Perspective (2004)

China and India, with higher rates of pollution due to the excessive use of fossil fuels, require a regime of more environment-friendly energy under the Kyoto Protocol. As the sustainability of increasing China-India trade depends on progressive use of environmentfriendly energy in the coming time, Nepal can offer comparative advantage to both neighbors through regional cooperation and management of its water resources.

The challenge for Nepal remains to produce and market hydro-power at a reasonably affordable price if hydro-power generation and utilisation is to be linked to distributive justice, industrial development, and as a common means of modernising the lives of the Nepali people.

The Way Forward The first two priorities for hydro-power in Nepal are: to ensure that the consumer end tariff is affordable, and to continue to increase supply of electricity to the general population. These require the country to come out of the ‘cost plus pricing”’mindset and to develop a mechanism which rewards efficiency. One option would be to initiate competitive bidding for electric power (kW) and energy (kWh) where the authorised agency would request developers to quote the price they are willing to sell the electricity generated from their proposed hydro-power plants. The authorised agency will then have the option of buying electricity on a least cost basis to meet the growth in demand.

The ‘pricing’ indicates the inherent institutional attitude of the official power sector. Recently India and China agreed to continue to cooperate in exchanging flood-season hydrological data of the transborder rivers. Furthermore, in response to concerns expressed by the Indian side, China agreed to take measures for controlled release of accumulated water of the landslide dam on the river Parechu, as soon as conditions permit. Both the sides noted with satisfaction that an agreement concerning the provision of hydrological data on Sutlej/Langqen Zangbo was concluded and that the two sides had also agreed to continue bilateral discussions to finalise at an early date similar arrangements for the Parlung Zangbo and Lohit/Zayu Qu Rivers. While encouraging developments have taken place, that too of an inter-Himalayan regional significance, in the water resources management, the same was not true when it came to water-energy security and conservation. The joint India-China statement as published by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs stated: ‘The two sides agreed to cooperate in the field of energy security and conservation, including, among others, encouraging relevant departments and units of the two countries to engage in the survey and exploration of petroleum and natural gas resources in third countries.’ But the two sides do not specifically offer cooperation in water energy, a proven resource that is not only renewable, clean, and environmentally friendly but is integral to water, a natural endowment in the inter-Himalayan region.

A second option that can be considered to ensure competition in the electricity sector in the country is to create an environment where multiple generators and distributors of electricity can operate in a free market instead of having a monopolistic and dominant player. Although the private sector has been investing in the generation sector (24 per cent of the INPS installed capacity is contributed by the private sector), the distribution sector is still entirely owned by NEA. Thus, all IPPs need to sign PPA with NEA in order to sell electricity into the national grid. With multiple generators and distributors, the prices could be brought down, as the monopolistic barrier would be broken. With such an arrangement and free market, Nepal could move closer to establishing a spot market in electricity similar to the one set up by India recently. His Majesty's Government of Nepal is currently preparing to divide NEA into generation, transmission and distribution entities. As a result of this and providing a greater room to the private sector, one can expect a competitive electricity market with the end result being affordable end tariff for the consumer. Given the high price of electricity from generation cost to consumer

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end tariff, the electricity market has been operating on a suppressed demand. The projections that have been made by NEA of a system demand of 1820 MW in the country by the year 2020 also reflect such suppressed demand and not the actual or potential demand. If the price of electricity is based on its ‘real market value’ and extensive transmission and distribution networks are established allowing the general population and industries access to virtually unlimited electrical energy, the aggregate demand would be much higher. However, even with such growth that caters to the development driven demand, it is unlikely for the country to have the capacity to fully utilise the 43,000 MW of techno-economic potential hydroelectricity even in the distant future. Priority needs to be given to domestic consumption of electricity, as this would ensure that the secondary benefits (industrial output, employment, etc. resulting form forward and backward linkages in the economy) remain within the country, due to the sheer hydro-power potential. An enormous possibility still exists for Nepal to develop this resource base as an exportable commodity. Apart from being a constant source of revenue for the country, this can also contribute towards regional energy security. There is a growing deficit in the supply of electrical energy in India and more specifically in its northern states. Against the target of adding 6,000 MW annually, India has been able to meet it only halfway and consequently, the demand-supply gap has been increasing annually. With the growing Indian economy, this deficit is likely to increase. Nepal can contribute in bridging this gap in the Indian electricity supply by developing its hydro-power potential further. With the planned implementation of the 750 MW West Seti, to a certain extent, export of electricity from Nepal to India is about to start. China's annual energy need has been increasing rapidly to meet its development pace. According to China Daily of 28 January, 2005, ‘…car ownership and fuel consumption are growing inexorably and today China is the second largest importer of oil in the world’. It is interesting to note that prior to 1993, China was an exporter of oil. To curb the use of fossil fuel, China has also launched grain-fed vehicles programs, i.e., vehicles are driven by gasohol, which comprises 10 per cent ethanol. Corn, wheat and sugar cane serve as raw materials for ethanol and it is claimed that with gasohol, vehicle

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carbon monoxide emissions can be reduced by as much as 40 per cent. It should be noted that only domestic production and huge imports of oil and innovations such as the use of gasohol would not be sufficient to meet China's growing demand for energy. Thus, along with developing huge hydro-power project such as the 18,200 MW Three Gorges which when fully commissioned will produce 84,000 GWh/annum (enough to provide 11% of China's soaring electricity demand), China plans to build nuclear reactors at a rate of nearly two a year between now and 2020 (International Herald Tribune, 17 January 2005). Due to high volume of fossil fuel consumed, projections are that China will be among the leading countries in terms of carbon emissions. Similarly, India's electricity generation is also significantly thermal power plant based and coal, which is the primary fossil fuel used by Indian thermal plants, produces more carbon than most other fossil fuels. The scientific community is of the opinion that high carbon emissions (greenhouse gas emissions) leads to global warming resulting in climate change. In fact, this is the basis for the Kyoto Protocol, which has been ratified this year with Russia signing the ‘Protocol’. The Kyoto Protocol is the outcome of the meeting of more than 160 nations in Kyoto in 1997 when an agreement was reached among the developed nations to limit their greenhouse gas emissions, relative to the levels emitted in 1990. Now that the Protocol has entered into force, the emissions target by the developed countries would have to be achieved on average over the commitment period (2008 to 2012). The Kyoto Protocol has established the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which enables Annex I countries (developed countries and economies in transition) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) meet their greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction targets at lower cost through projects in developing countries. Thus, carbon has now become a tradable commodity with an associated value. One tonne of carbon dioxide (CO2) reduced through a CDM project, when certified by a designated operational entity is known as a Certified Emission Reduction (CER) and can be traded like any other commodity.

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Apart from standard climate change implications due to carbon emissions such as changes in rainfall pattern and frequent occurrences of extreme hydrological events (droughts and floods) affecting agricultural sector and livelihood, other common areas of concern between Nepal, China and India are: l Melting of the Himalayan snow in Nepal and China resulting in

Glacial Lake Outburst Floods (GLOF). l Reduction in river discharges in Nepal and India affecting mostly

hydropower generation in Nepal and supply of irrigation water in India. Studies now indicate that over the past 10 years, the average discharge in the Mahakali River has been gradually decreasing. In the context of climate change, Kyoto Protocol and CDM, there exists a viable cooperation possibility in water-energy sector among the three nations, namely Nepal, China and India. By supplying electricity to its northern and southern neighbors, Nepal can produce other multi dimensional effects. That are as follows:

benefits (mainly irrigation benefits) that will accrue from regulated flows of water from Nepal if it agrees on a mutually beneficial sharing mechanism. Another pre-requisite for such a win-win situation is to encourage people to people interaction leading to private sector investment across the borders. Since both China and India have been supplying construction materials and equipment to hydro-power projects in Nepal, such an interaction is already happening. Thus, this will not be an entirely new field for cooperation; only a multilateral cooperative framework with a vision legitimately based on a mutually agreed international protocol. Such cross country energy trade did not take place earlier due to the constrained political environment because of putting both energy security and national security under the same framework, and in some ways, mutually exclusive. With the Kyoto Protocol coming into force, such constrained perspective will become irrelevant.. Issues considered political will be driven primarily by market and environmental/ecological factors.

l The trade in energy will help China and India reduce their oil

imports. l The sharing of CDM benefits the countries along with a

reduction in pollution level, due to the reduction in carbon emissions in China and India after a decrease in their reliance on thermal as a result of hydro-electricity supplied by Nepal. l The market opportunity for both China and India to supply construction materials and equipment to Nepal for the development of hydro-power plants. For example, construction materials such as steel are imported from India and some small hydro-power plants have recently installed Chinese generating equipment. However, for such a win-win situation, it is essential for the three countries to have the political will at the highest level. First, Nepal needs to take measures to ensure that it is able to supply electricity at a competitive market price and treat water-energy from a business perspective. This may also require allowing multinational investment, including from China and India, in Nepal's hydro-power sector. China and India need to diversify sources of energy to ensure energy security. Furthermore, India needs to duly recognize the

In the words of Stanley A. Weiss, Chairman of the Washington-based Business Executives for National Security, ‘India must be more sensitive to the legitimate water worries of its smaller neighbors. What's good for New Delhi must also be good for the region, economically and ecologically. For example, as part of their new ‘strategic partnership’ and plans for joint energy ventures, China and India should stop treating Nepal and Bhutan as buffer zones and instead see them as future hydro-based economic zone’. Equitable Water Energy Order Water energy offers an equitable alternative to the countries of the inter-Himalayan region as water has an integrated upstream and downstream spread and connectivity. The spread and connectivity have received critical significance in the face of on-going climate change. It is therefore a high imperative to go for an inter-Himalayan regional commission that works for establishment and promotion of equitable water energy order on an inter-regional basis. Conflict cannot be an option in such a cooperative framework. To quote Henry A. Kissinger, ‘India finds no inconsistency between its improving relations with the United States and proclaiming a

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strategic partnership with China, and China, in its own interest, is seeking cooperation with the United States for many reasons’. In such a scenario, regional cooperation should become possible and essential. What the countries of the inter-Himalayan region including China, India, Nepal and others, need is an enforceable cooperative framework for an equitable water energy order, regardless of the internal situation of any country. Dr Upendra Gautam is an institutional development specialist from Nepal. Ajoy Karki is editor of the quarterly publication, Biogas, based in Nepal. References l 'FY 2002-03 -- A Year in Review', Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA), August 2004. l Upendra Gautam and Ajoy Karki, Hydropower Pricing in Nepal, Developing a Perspective, Jalsrot Vikas Sanstha (JVS), Anmanager, Kathmandu, Nepal, 2004 l A. Karki and B. Shrestha, ‘Micro-hydropower in Nepal: Access to Electricity for Isolated Rural Population in the Hills and Mountains’, International Energy Journal, Special Issue, vol. 3, No.2, December 2002. l Website: www.worldenergy.org l Website: http://cdm.unfccc.int/ l Website: www.ipcc.ch l Website: www.prototypecarbonfund.org l Stanley A. Weiss, ‘The Untapped Might of Himalayas,’ The Kathmandu Post, May 12, 2005. l The Joint Statement of the Republic of India and the People's Republic of China published after Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s state visit to India, the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 11, 2005, New Delhi. l Upendra Gautam, ‘China-India accords and Nepal,’ The Kathmandu Post, April 23, 2005. l IAHR Newsletter, vol. 22, 2005 (Supplement to JHR - Vol. 43 - No. 1) l Thomas L. Friedman, The World is Flat, A Brief History of the Twentyfirst Century, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005). l Henry A. Kissinger, ‘Conflict is not an option,’ International Herald Tribune, June 9, 2005.

SAPANA Conference Declaration

eading experts, academics, and scholars from the member countries of SAARC, representing different disciplines and sectors, having met at the South Asian Journal conference “Envisioning South Asia”, facilitated by SAFMA, on 29-30 April 2006 in Islamabad, Pakistan, have deliberated upon and initiated a process of evolving a holistic and integrated South Asian vision by and for South Asians and a strategic understanding on meeting the challenges of the 21st century and globalisation and ushering in a new era of fraternal, equitable, and collective partnership: 1.

South Asia is at a historic moment of unprecedented potential for transforming its economic and social conditions and, together with China, emerging as two large economies in the next two decades, playing a key role not only in the global economy, but also in the development of human civilisation in the 21st century. Yet the world cannot be sustained by economic growth alone. Human life is threatened with environmental crises, conflicts, endemic poverty, natural calamities and an arms race. Our societies have a rich cultural tradition of unity in diversity, creative growth through human solidarity and harmony with nature. In bringing these aspects of their culture in facing contemporary challenges, the people of this region could bring new consciousness and institutions to the global market mechanism that can take the world on to a new trajectory of cooperative, sustainable development and human security. Global cooperation in environmental protection, poverty reduction and defusing the flash points of social conflict and an

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end to violence, terrorism and repression will become the essential underpinning of sustainable development and human security in this century. Thus it is not the military muscle of a state/region that will be the emblem of status, but its contribution to meeting the challenge of peace, overcoming global poverty, protecting the planet from environmental disaster and contributing to humanizing the world and advancement of its people. The global environment provides a historically unprecedented scale of capital flows, trade opportunities, information and technologies, which, if utilized, can dramatically transform the material and social conditions of life of the peoples of South Asia. A vision is efficacious to the extent that it can be concretized. This requires bringing to bear the new consciousness of South Asian cooperative and equitable partnership to undertake specific policy actions. Apart from implementing the decision at the Islamabad SAARC Summit to establish a South Asian Free Trade Area, SAARC Social Charter, ISACPA Report on Poverty Alleviation, three broad areas for deepening economic cooperation can be identified for the purposes of specific policy action: (1) energy cooperation and water management and conservation within South Asia; (2) Increased investment for accelerating economic growth, especially in physical and social infrastructures; (3) Restructuring growth for faster poverty eradication and human resource development. With the most contiguous region of the world, a common history to share and similarities of cultures, South Asia has less baggage to shed than Europe or the Far East. It is now booming with the ideas of regional cooperation that take a wholist approach towards the collective good of the region as they increasingly find state-centric and security-centred approaches inconsistent with the interests of our 1.4 billion people and the imperatives of our times. India and Pakistan are at a crucial moment in history when economic cooperation between the two is necessary for sustaining their respective economic growth rates. a) India will require rapidly rising imports of oil and gas from the Middle East and Central Asia to fuel its economic growth. Pakistan is the natural conduit through which these oil and gas supplies can be transported into India and the rest of South Asia. b) India's

growth in the past has been based essentially on the home market. In the future, sustaining growth will requite export markets in Pakistan and other South Asian countries. c) Similarly, the sustainability of Pakistan's GDP growth requires a large increase in investment, particularly in infrastructure, and the Indian private sector, along with direct foreign investment, can fill this gap for Pakistan. d) The oil and gas pipeline from Iran through Pakistan to India alone can generate over $700 million a year and with similar lines from Central Asia, Afghanistan through Pakistan another $500 million. This could add 1.5 percentage points to Pakistan's GDP growth. e) The gains from trade between India and Pakistan will be greater for Pakistan than India, and can accelerate GDP growth in both countries. Thus opening up trade and investment is vital for growth sustainability in South Asia. Energy and Water are two vital resource inputs into economic growth. South Asia requires integrated gas and electricity grids for the welfare of each South Asian country. Similarly, South Asian regional agreements among upper and lower riparian states on the model of the Indus Basin Treaty need to be made between Nepal, India, Bangladesh. Similar protocols need to be developed for upper and lower riparian districts/ provinces within each country. These are necessary to avid inter and intrastate tensions in the future. Governments in South Asia need to realize that in the next two decades, South Asia will become the second largest economy in the world after China. This means that the centre of gravity will shift for the first time in 300 years, to this part of the world from the West. This presents a new challenge to South Asian citizens to develop new paradigms of economic policy, governance and international relations. a) At the level of economic policy we need to restructure our GDP growth so as to achieve growth with equity which requires making the poor not into victims but the subjects of the growth process, from being marginal to becoming the mainstream of economic growth. b) At the level of governance we need to give up the 18th century notion that economic gains must be translated into increased military power. In an inter-dependent world the emblem of the status of a country will be based not on its ability to destruct but its ability to save the planet from ecological disaster and to build a more humane world. c) At the level of international relations we need

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to replace the competitive and hegemonic model of interstate relations with a cooperative model. We can start with South Asian cooperation to demonstrate to the world that the maximization of national welfare lies not in conflict but cooperation, not through aggression but through human solidarity. 8. The remarkable concurrence of views expressed by the experts at South Asian Journal's conference reflect the immense urge of our peoples to outgrow the past and take a leap into a future that is free from want and conflict. Certain stages of history can be skipped, so can various evolutionary stages through which, for example, the European Union had to pass in the 20th century. The intrastate conflicts and interstate disputes must move from management to resolution in a result-oriented process that must at the same time allow, rather than hinder, regional cooperation to address the demands of our peoples. The lines of conflicts must change into the bridges of friendship and the fencedborders must gradually soften before the urge of South Asians to become a fraternal and indivisible community of people with nation states, while keeping their sovereign equality, joining hands in submitting before the will of their real sovereigns - the people. 9. With a step-by-step approach, and simultaneously, all sided measures can be taken through an integrated and well calibrated sequencing and realistic stages, towards South Asian Free Trade Area, South Asian Union, (tourism/environment/water/energy/ communication /information/economic), South Asian Tariffs and Customs Union, South Asian Monetary Union, South Asian Bank and Development Fund, South Asian Cooperative Security and South Asian Parliament. However, to take a leap forward, there will have to be no hegemony, or ganging up by the small against the big. A new paradigm of equitable, if not equal, partnership must evolve to reshape our all-sided relations. 10. Welcoming the current peace process between India and Pakistan with its two-fold objectives: the exploration of all options for a final settlement of the J&K question in an atmosphere free of violence, terrorism and normalization of bilateral relations while implementing their joint statements of January 6, 2004, September 24, 2004 and April 18, 2005 in their letter and spirit. Appreciating the efforts by India and Pakistan to undertake nuclear and conventional military

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confidence-building measures, we urge them to put in place a comprehensive regime of CBMs that will ensure a nucleartension free subcontinent. We endorse the demands of India and Pakistan for negotiations with the other nuclear weapons powers to promote global non-proliferation and effective nuclear disarmament. Appeal to all countries in the region to put in place comprehensive sustainable dialogue mechanisms for resolving all bilateral disputes. While India and Pakistan today have a composite dialogue in place which needs to be given further impetus and momentum, similar exercises are needed, for example between India and Bangladesh. 11. Concerned about various intrastate conflicts, such as in Sri Lanka, Nepal and elsewhere, we call upon the concerned parties to hold fire, take necessary confidence building measures and allow peace process to address their relevant genuine concerns and propose alternative solutions on which the parties could mutually agree to resolve their disputes. 12. Welcoming the victory of democratic struggle in Nepal, a broader consensus on convening a Constituent Assembly, without any conditions, the urge of all segments of civil society to find an amicable peaceful solution to the causes that gave birth to the Maoist upsurge and to set a democratic path of free and fair elections, we hope that the people of Nepal will realize the dream of a republic and set a laudable example for those other peoples who are still struggling to achieve their democratic aspirations against the remnants of authoritarianism and extremism. 13. Facing the challenges of globalization and taking a collective stand in the ongoing trade negotiations on WTO, South Asia should set its own house in order to pursue its collective goal of creating an even playing filed both within the region and in the world. In view of the above, the individual working groups set up under SAPANA put forward recommendations in the following areas: South Asian Free Trade Area The agreement on South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) requires effective implementation, expanding the space for trade and, more importantly, economic collaboration, investment and development. If South Asia's economies are to be integrated, it presupposes

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development of transnational communication networks and physical infrastructure and monetary cooperation involving greater coordination among the governments and the central banks. Despite limited complementarities in trade-able items, due to similar comparative advantages, expansion of trade warrants vertical and horizontal integration of industries and investment in joint ventures by public and private sectors. However, trade and investment will not move ahead unless tariffs are lowered, the negative list kept to the minimum, para- and non-tariff barriers removed and standards harmonized. Streamlining borders transactions through trade facilitation at subregional junctions, special attention needs to be focused on promoting border trade. Increase in efficiency within the sub-region often spills over into trade outside the region as well, because improving customs or improving efficiency of ports helps both intraregional trade and international trade. The Group on Tariff and Macroeconomic Harmonisation recommends: 14. The average rate of tariffs has gone down in all the South Asian countries, but some of them impose para-tariffs, including regulatory duties, anti-dumping duties, and specific duties and non-tariff barriers. Transparency in the tariffs structure needs to be ensured. While the average duties are not all that high there is a need to remove tariff peaks. Further reduction in duties should ensure that the industries where the country has dynamic comparative advantage are not closed down. The group also recommends trade facilitation because various procedural requirements discourages growth of trade; 15. Containing fiscal deficit policy should be pursued by making judicious choices between growth and stability; 16. The prudential regulations for the banks should be effectively implemented and it needs to be ensured that the efficiency gains result in higher deposit rates and/or lower rates on the advances. The pursuit of prudential regulations should not be applied on the small and micro enterprises who cannot meet the collateral requirements; 17. South Asian countries may continue to have floating exchange rates and the central banks may only intervene to keep the currency near the equilibrium value;

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18. The South Asian countries may further deregulate the economy and may continue privatization policies as long as the private sector monopolies are properly regulated; 19. Whereas South Asian countries are struggling to promote trade within the region, the ultimate objective should be the economic union and common currency. Whereas political agreement would be necessary to make SAFTA effective, formulate the custom union and economic union, various steps will have to be taken before economic union is formed. The countries will have to coordinate the exchange rate, fiscal and monetary policies; 20. The coordination of policies would imply that the countries are willing to increase interdependencies and the commitment of the union to help the country suffering from any problem and a South Asian Fund may be created for this purpose. Various studies need to be conducted to examine the problems by way of policy coordination and the lack of economic policy options when the economic union is formed; and 21. The group also feels that the South Asian countries have achieved growth rates exceeding 8 per cent in recent years and they expect the growth rate to continue. However, the investment rates and other prerequisite to the high growth rates are missing and they must try to overcome the stumbling blocs to growth. Investments Intra-regional investment plays an important role in transferring surplus capital from capital endowed countries of a region to capital deficit ones and along with it technical, managerial and marketing skills. It also plays a vital role in industrial restructuring within the region and helps in moderating trade imbalances among the member countries. In view of the crucial role of investments, it is desirable that member countries of SAARC evolve a common investment policy so that instead of competing with each other in terms of offering fiscal incentives, they facilitate freer flow of capital among them that extend beyond their respective countries. The elements of such an investment policy include capital flows to mitigate the trade deficit and capital scarcity, avoidance of double taxation, protection of investment and conditions governing the management of foreign exchange, differentiating between the requirement s of least and

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non-least developing countries. The 13th SAARC Summit held in December 2005 adopted three treaties for promoting investment facilitation. These are related to customs cooperation, limited double tax agreement and setting up of an Arbitration Council. The scope of these agreements needs to be extended so that the goal of a SAARC investment area is realized. South Asian Customs, Tariffs, and Monetary Union Intra-regional trade and Investment will, subsequently and gradually, translate into a South Asian Customs and Tariffs Union which may lead to a common exchange rate policy that will, eventually, necessitate the creation of a South Asian Monetary Union underwritten by macro-economic management and harmonization of trade, fiscal and monetary policies at the regional level. No less important is the cooperation in the transport and communication sectors envisaging an integrated transport infrastructure that allows uninterrupted travel across and beyond our region and communication highways, facilitating free movement of people, goods and unhindered flow of information across the region and beyond, connecting South Asia with Central, South Western and South East Asia. Not only do rail and road links between Pakistan, India, Nepal and Bangladesh need to be rehabilitated, a system of connectivity will have to be constructed especially for the railways and the truckers will have to be issued special permits. Nevertheless, the Indian and Pakistani governments must agree to transit of trade between Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, India and Central Asia. For promotion of trade the countries will have to facilitate cross border movement of people and goods. Visa and custom facilities will have to be simplified, and for special categories of people and goods waived, across the board. The Group on Custom Laws and Issues recommends: 1. Trade is growing in the region the mindset of protectionism is changing. Trade barriers still exist, with high tariff barriers and a large number of non tariff barriers. The economies are booming and clearly need to be integrated. 2. Customs laws need simplification and harmonization; 3. Dry ports need to be set up and transit rights be given freely;

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4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.

Valuation procedures need to be harmonized; Warehousing infrastructure, charges and fees needs improvement; Common formats need to be developed for declaration forms; These forms be made available in electronic form, and available in all major languages in the region; Information and data be exchanged freely; Countries to do away with secretive sensitive lists; A common software be used that would simplify declaration and valuation; Mutual recognition of certification; Common standards and testing procedures to be followed; Capacity building and technology transfer be speeded up; Pakistan to take a lead in trade facilitation efforts, Sri Lanka to lead the efforts towards breaking down non tariff barriers; Allow and encourage trade in services by recognizing University and college degrees across the region.

Water Sharing and Management Increasingly, the governments and concerned institutions are realizing the need to address acute shortage of energy and water, incidence of drought and floods that often bring miseries to the people and, at times, states into conflict. The distribution and management of water resources, though quite a divisive issue among the upper and lower riparian regions across states, needs to be undertaken amicably without depriving the lower and upper riparian regions of their due to avoid a conflict over water issues which must not be politicized. Bilateral treaties, such as Indus Water Treaty between India and Pakistan and the Treaty over Ganges between Bangladesh and India must be respected and upheld in letter and spirit. The Mahakali Treaty between Nepal and India may be implemented by removing reservations of either side. The quadrangle of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal may take up an integrated approach to manage water resources while keeping the interests of upper and lower riparian, on the one hand, and India and Pakistan must overcome their differences over Tulbul, Baglihar and Kishanganga projects within the framework of the IWT, on the other. There are other major water related problems that need to be addressed on a priority basis with water cooperation among the

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member countries of SAARC to enhance water and food security. There is a great hydro-power potential in Bhutan and Nepal that can be utilized by other countries of the region. However, that would involve the need for a common or bilateral grid, on which all concerned countries would have to agree. Recommendations of the Water Group 1. The regional water scenario of South Asia is predominated by increasing gap between increasing water demand and insufficient supply, high allocation to agriculture and growing new commercial demands, trans-boundary and regional conflicts generated from upper versus lower riparian water needs/interests, increasing interest in hydropower and new management experiences. Policy challenges are linked to the socio-economic approaches, selection of technical solutions and institutional capacity. The following general and specific recommendations could be made, based on the group discussion: 2. The trans-boundary conflicts are based on concerns of the lower riparian countries to secure river flows (Pakistan and Bangladesh versus India) on one hand and development interests of the upper riparian especially for the hydropower (Nepal versus India, India vs. Pakistan). The multi-purpose and multi-country planning for the Himalayan water resources and the South Asian water basins is the proposed future option. (proposed NIBB-C Water Ways is an example) 3. All South Asian countries are going through the experiences of decentralization and local management. Different models have been tried the success so far indicates involvement of local civil society, political acceptance and local institutional implementation capacity as the key elements. The national experiences needs to be impartially evaluated and put in the proper context. 4. The efficiency and productivity of water use in agriculture must be enhanced along with sustainable use of water in agriculture. The physical water stress and growing urban needs of Pakistan and India suggest a slow transfer of water from the sector. 5. All infrastructure developments should consider long term conservation of the natural water resources (all water bodies, including lakes, river sections and groundwater) and regenerative use of water. The central and top-bottom

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engineering approaches are not able to move forward due to political as well as hydrological reasons, hence, the technical options must be formulated across the appropriate local hydrological and political boundaries. The human access to water resources, on the one hand, and increased commercial value of water, on the other, are the growing challenges for the planning and development. The secure allocations for the domestic and drinking water, equitable distribution and fair water pricing in different sectors and regions are the essential regulatory measures. The public sector as a service provider has the responsibility to define guidelines. The water related sectors have the great opportunity for the knowledge sharing in the technical and managerial fields.

South Asian Energy Grid Similarly, the energy cooperation should evolve into a South Asian Energy Grid with integrated electricity and gas systems. As India and Pakistan now agree, and they must move forward, the gas and oil pipelines can run from Central Asia, Gulf, Iran and Myanmar through Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh to whole of South Asia and beyond. In this context of developing energy markets, power trading in the region calls for establishment of high voltage interconnections between the national grids of the countries. India, Pakistan, Nepal and Bangladesh should cooperate in transportation of gas and jointly developing, trading and sharing of energy. The Energy Group recommends: 1. South Asia is home to 22% of the world's population and occupies only 4% of the world land mass. All the countries in the region are developing economies and heavily dependent on energy imports despite being bestowed by nature with large energy resources including hydro, solar, wind and, to some extent, natural gas resources. However, they have not been able to exploit their energy resources to meet the demand. Energy imports constitute 27% to 87% of their commercial energy needs. Price fluctuations in the international oil market have been adversely impacting the economies of the region. Projected energy consumption to sustain the current economic growth levels would call for a more than 300% increase in their energy consumption by 2020. Energy security, therefore, assumes greater significance for the socio-economic development of

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South Asia. The major causes of concern from the regional energy security perspective are: (i) Short-term supply risks due to threat of war and military action that may impact Middle East or Iran, the primary source of commercial energy supply to South Asia; (ii) Difficulty to pay for oil imports, when the prices shoot up sharply; (iii) Prospect of obtaining to long term gas and oil supply contracts at affordable prices, which can also ensure greater price stability; (iv) Availability of electricity to all households within a reasonable time span to enhance the socio-economics development and improve quality of life. 2. The following steps need to be taken urgently to address the above concern: 3. Expedite development of indigenous energy resources including hydropower while taking into account issues of resettlement and socio economic crisis. Non-conventional energy resources, such as, the wind and solar energy resources, such as, the wind and solar energy to meet the long term energy demand; 4. Establishment of a South Asian regional power grid to facilitate exchanges and trading of power to meet the electricity demand in the region; 5. Development of a South Asia Gas Grid with pipelines from Iran. Turkmenistan, to facilitate natural gas surplus countries in the neighborhood of South Asia to facilitate natural gas imports into the region and its distribution among the countries of South Asia; 6. Establish South Asia Energy Research Programs for development of new technologies that would facilitate harnessing the benefits of solar and other energy resources on a more sustainable basis; 7. Establish regional energy cooperation on a long-term basis; 8. Undertake evaluation to examine the appropriateness and impact of power sector reform initiatives undertaken by the countries in South Asia to identify the need for any course correction or policy change. South Asian Development Bank Given a low rate of investment to GDP ratio, South Asia must create attractive environment for investment in high value-added manufacturing lines and trans-regional projects. Enhanced investment flows, both from within and outside the region, would

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culminate in production facilities located across the region through integrated production systems. Shares of both national and regional companies would be quoted on our stock exchanges as capital moves without hindrance across national boundaries to underwrite investment in joint ventures and projects in any part of our region through a South Asian Development Bank. Addressing LDCs' Concerns However, economic cooperation and trade would not produce tangible results unless the concerns of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) are genuinely addressed, the negative-list is minimized, tariffs are substantially brought down and non-tariff and para-tariff barriers lifted, the economies are gradually opened up with a recourse to investment-trade linkage that takes care of trade deficits between partners through investment flows and capital account, vertical and horizontal integration of industries that benefits from relative advantages and economies of scale. The time frame envisaged in the agreement on SAFTA must be strictly adhered to. South Asian Cooperative Security We resolve to get out of the straitjacket of enmity, overcome obsession with over-demanding militaristic security paradigms and look beyond the traditional notions of security and focus on an integrated South Asian Cooperative Security that recognizes interdependence and mutuality of interests. The states ought to act in their enlightened self-interest to resolve their conflicts and differences through peaceful means and to the mutual benefit of our peoples. The choice is often, erroneously, posed between regional cooperation and conflict resolution. We urge all our states to simultaneously move forward to address long-standing political disputes through peaceful means. The main obstacle to regional cooperation and economic integration remains political and strategic. Therefore, we vow to be courageous, flexible and consistent to help resolve interstate and intrastate conflicts and dismantle political barriers to regional economic takeoff. Countering the widespread threat of terrorism, the SAARC countries must implement the current protocol for cooperation against terrorism and bring it in line with the international norms. The regional efforts against terrorism must also include measures to combat the spread of small arms and light weapons, narcotics

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trafficking, smuggling, organized crimes and criminal mafias. This will require exchanges and interaction between the national intelligence and security agencies with their counterparts across the border and greater interaction between the armed forces and military establishments in the region.

Pakistan and India could also lead to a lowering of the nuclear thresholds in terms of South Asian crises. Finally, while the mutual ambiguity of the nuclear regime in South Asia contributes to stability on some counts, it does not allow the adversaries to make informed decisions in times of crises and can thus lead to instability.

The conference strongly emphasizes the principle that there can be no intervention in the internal affairs of any nation in the subcontinent. Yet, given the implications of internal conflicts for regional security as a whole, the SAARC must pay greater attention to the relationship between internal and regional security. It calls on both parties to the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka to take immediate steps towards a revival of the stalled peace process and creation of an interim administration in the Tamil-dominated regions while securing integrity of the country and the rights of minorities there.

Given the above, the recommendations of the group include: 1. Recognizing that much of the tensions are a result of outstanding disputes, we recommend that Pakistan and India must continue dialogue on these issues and continue on the overall drive towards CBMs through the existing normalization process. With regard to nuclear weapons, Pakistan and India should mutually initiate a global drive towards disarmament. The starting point should be a declaration that transforms South Asia into a nuclear weapons free zone. More specifically, the two sides could focus on the following: 2. Declaring a bilateral ban on nuclear testing through an agreement; 3. Ceasing the production of all fissile material (agreement); 4. Signing a non-deployment agreement, agreeing that weapon systems will not be mated or deployed (agreement); 5. Signing an agreement no to pre-empt nuclear installations of the adversary; 6. Establishing of NRRCs but with a legally binding agreement that such channels will remain open during crises; 7. Enhancing command and control structures to eliminate the likelihood of an accidental or unauthorized nuclear conflict.

Without prejudice to the current positions of the SAARC governments on amending the SAARC charter, the conference calls upon the SAARC to initiate a study on mechanisms for cooperative security in the region. Advancing the SAARC charter, the conference welcomes the decision, in principle, of the Islamabad SAARC summit to establish procedures for cooperation with other countries and organizations. Given the increasing interdependence among regions, cooperation with neighboring countries, such as China, Afghanistan and Myanmar and Central Asia, and other regional organizations, it is an essential future activity for SAARC. The Group on Nuclear Stabilization recommends The existence of nuclear weapons in South Asia remains an issue of major concern for the peoples and region's security analysts. Given Indo-Pak history of constant tensions and intermittent crises, we are concerned about the likelihood of a crisis spiralling out of control and eventually leading to a nuclear conflict. While we find the South Asian nuclear regime to be relatively stable in peace time, there is indeed nuclear instability induced into the nuclear equation in time of crises. This is borne out of an analysis of the 1999 and 2002 crises between India and Pakistan. Moreover, since one of the adversaries, Pakistan, inherently links nuclear escalation to conventional asymmetry, the growing asymmetry in conventional arms between

The Group on Conflict Resolution Mechanism Proposes: Conflicts in South Asia are passing through a critical phase of transformation which requires a proper understanding, interpretation and information about issues which cause conflicts. For a long period of time, South Asia has perceived conflicts through a zero-sum perspective but the process of gradual conflict transformation is taking place in the region which may help the formulation of conflict resolution mechanism. Recommendations: 1. Need for proper conceptualization and understanding of conflicts and their interpretations in a rational manner. Therefore, it is recommended to establish conflict resolution

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centers and institutes at the governmental and nongovernmental levels so as to unleash the process of meaningful research in the field of conflict resolution. It is also recommended to design academic curricula on conflict resolution so as to create a better awareness among the people of South Asia about the need for a conflict resolution process. Both print and electronic media of South Asia can play a plausible role for creating proper conditions for conflict resolution process; Involvement of stake holders and allow them the space to craft out alternative conflict resolution mechanism. Stakeholders must have political will for conflict resolution and women should be made an integral part of this mechanism. The composite dialogue going on between India and Pakistan should also focus on the practicable conflict resolution strategy as far as contentious issues are concerned; State structures and their proponents should also be influenced because states are often the creators, promoters and sustainers of conflict; There should be SAARC conventions on minority and water rights' charters and the existing human rights' charter of SAARC needs to be strengthened and properly implemented.

South Asian Human Security Beyond cooperative security, South Asian nations must ultimately move towards South Asian Human Security by placing people -- their wellbeing and rights to peaceful life and development -- at the centre of security concerns, rather than intensifying the arms race. To include the excluded, governments of South Asia should take concrete steps to implement the SAARC Social Charter and give priority to poverty eradication by implementing ISACPA Report on Poverty Alleviation and meeting the Millennium Development Goals. This can be done by increased investment, enhanced economic growth and development, which do not necessarily translate into poverty alleviation unless structured to address the root-causes of poverty and give priority to human resource development, employment generation and empowerment of the dispossessed, women and the poor, in particular. South Asian Parliament The South Asian region emerged out of decolonization as a result of the drawing of political boundaries with sovereignty attributes

forming new states. The political boundaries have further been reinforced through divergent strategies of state and nation building, reinterpretations of history and religion, and due to the Cold-War strategic divides. In the context of these reinforced boundaries and divisions, it may sound imprudent and even unrealistic to talk of political integration in the region. However, over the past decades, the imperatives of globalization, end of the cold war and rising popular aspirations in each of the South Asian states have brought about qualitative changes in the regional perceptions. Processes like SAARC have created institutions and generated impulses under which people are visualizing the prospects of establishing a South Asian community. Regional integration should and will take place within the framework of community building, not by conceiving or attempting erosion of state sovereignties or identities. The examples of SAFMA's initiative towards South Asian parliament and the collective and individual attempts in India and Pakistan to re-write history text books are indicative of growing popular pressure in favour of community building. The SAPANA Group decided to mobilise country-based but comparative studies, that address the question of state building strategies, nationalism, status of minorities within and otherwise in the context of human rights and democratic polices. Studies will also take note of the professional engagements like that of Chamber of Commerce and industries, media, lawyers, academics, doctors and human rights activists across the board initiated and institutionalised within or outside the SAARC framework. The basic strategy to be adopted towards community building through integration will be to encourage institution building and engagements. Patterns of sub-regional cooperation amongst the parts of the states and societies in South Asian, linkages among parliamentarian, political parties, scholars and analysts, as well as transport and communication networks across the borders driven by popular pressures present concrete examples of such strategy. The conclusions of the studies will then be put in a perspective to map out the properties of community building through integration. The Group on South Asian Political Integration recommends: The participants overwhelmingly endorsed the view to initiate a process of moving towards the creation of an institutional interactive mechanism for parliamentarians of South Asia keeping in mind the

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concept of a South Asian Parliament. A full fledged SAP may take a decade or two, but it is time to initiate moves in that direction. To begin with, the conference proposes: a) Creation of an IntraParliamentary Union in South Asia; b) SAARC may in principle agree to create a South Asian Parliament and appoint a group of experts, responsible before the SAARC Speakers Forum, to prepare a comprehensive report and a timeframe to establish it in stages and through an evolutionary process; c) The SAARC Speakers Forum should be activated and; d) To begin with, SAP may be set up as a deliberative and consultative body, not as a legislative body, so as to create regional opinion on and build regional pressures on the issues pending for implementation at the SAARC level. This deliberative body may work within the SAARC agenda. By ultimately creating a South Asian Parliament, the evolution of a regional South Asian identity, without in any sense compromising on or conflicting with respective national identities and sovereignty of nation-states of the region. The Group on Rewriting History recommends: There is very little shared knowledge of how history is researched, written and taught in each of the countries of South Asia. Furthermore, there is inadequate recognition or appreciation of the shared past of this region. Despite this lack of knowledge about the past, references to and the use of history as a resource in a variety of political debates has only increased, particularly for the promotion of communalism, fundamentalism, casteism, regional and linguistic chauvinism. This makes it more difficult to produce trans-national historical perspectives. The close link between the state and historical research and textbook production has had ambiguous and conflicting consequences for developing a sense of the past. Historical research and analysis is still dependent on Western categories and tools of analysis. There is need to develop more indigenous categories. Recommendations: 1. The efforts at working out a common history of South Asia are viable. Even though there may be fundamental differences in perspective, it is possible to identify and work on common themes. Rather than focusing on national histories, themes that are shared by all the countries of South Asian countries should be identified and worked upon.

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Furthermore, a perspective on history that emphasizes the people, and neither fights shy of acknowledging historical injustices of caste, region, religion, gender, (to take some examples) nor glorifies them is an urgent imperative. We believe that such histories can help evolve a broader framework through stronger institutional linkages between groups of professional historians in South Asia. Such an engagement with the past will make a richer, fuller sense of the past possible, and have a great impact on society and the polity today and in the future.

The Group on Religious Extremism and Minorities recommends: Both minority persecution and ghettoisation have to be countered. There is still a major deficit in terms of information and understanding about events across the region even among those actively engaged with various human rights causes. Recommendations: 1. A standing body charged with responsibility to study and compose the institutional frameworks that seek to empower minorities across the region. Where institutional support is absent it should be highlighted. 2. The political position, strategies and rhetoric employed by the participants in the political process be monitored in order to identify issues that may impact minorities. 3. Intellectual tendencies and debates within discourses generated by the minorities about their situation those that promote minority empowerment be highlighted. South Asian Human Rights Code It is imperative for the South Asian countries to agree to and set up institutions under the Paris Principles and purposefully set about creating the required mechanisms to implement all internationally recognized fundamental human, civil and democratic rights. The Proposed Draft on Human Rights Code for South Asia presented before the South Asian Parliament's Conference, convened by SAFMA, will be circulated among the human rights bodies of the region and Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and other human rights bodies in the region will be requested to develop broader understanding among the major stakeholders to develop a regional

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framework at the level of SAARC and its member countries. People to People Contact The prevailing barriers to cross-border movements make neither commercial nor logistical sense and originate in the pathologies of interstate, as well as domestic, politics. There is an urgent need to allow greater interaction among the policy-makers, parliamentarians, businessmen, media practitioners, professionals, youth and the leaders of civil society. To enable it to happen, it is necessary that India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, who have the most restrictive visa regimes, drastically revise their visa policy and remove impediments to free movement of people. All-country visas may be granted at separate South Asian counters on arrival at the airports and on all border-crossings. South Asian Information Society To overcome information deficit in the region, it is essential that all restrictions on access to and free flow of information are removed forthwith and media persons and products are allowed free movement across frontiers. In this regard, SAFMA's Protocols on 'Free Movement of Media Persons and Media Products' and 'Freedom of Information' must be adopted by the national legislatures/governments and the SAARC. To ensure the citizens' right to know, we support SAFMA's Protocol on Freedom of Information. The media, on their part, should rise above national divides, avoid demonization and give special attention to the coverage of the countries of South Asia that remain under-reported. Given the rising numbers of South Asian Cyber citizenry, there is an urgent need to upgrade, integrate and facilitate cyber connectivity and accessibility. Culture and Tourism The scope of collaboration in the sphere of culture, tourism, sports, education, health, research, human resource development and environment is infinite. At the level of SAARC, measures should be taken to promote cultural exchanges, tourism, health and education services and research in all fields. Promotion of Humanities Private initiatives and those of universities should be encouraged by the authorities to introduce country studies, invite faculties from the

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neighbourhood, exchange students, promote humanities and physical sciences through South Asian congresses and undertake a non-discriminatory portrayal of history. Visa restrictions and tedious process for academics, experts and scholars must be dispensed with. Women's Concerns Acknowledging the inadequate attention to and focus on redressing the marginalization and invisibility of women at all levels of national and regional policy-making; and the disproportionately high burden of poverty that women face in South Asia; SAPANA resolves to work towards gender equality and gender justice in all aspects of our work in the process as well as the substance; and exhort all the South Asian governments to acknowledge and rectify the glaring gender inequalities especially the feminization of poverty. South Asian Policy Analysis (SAPANA) Network The participants of South Asian Journal conference have agreed to form South Asian Policy Analysis (SAPANA) Network that will pursue virtual research and develop networking among various independent research groups and scholars across the region to promote free and pro-people thinking and a course of development that addresses the concerns of the people, in a wholist and sustainable framework. The objective and purpose of SAPANA will be to redress the shortcomings found in existing Think Tanks and research organisations. Firstly, it is proposed that the main purpose and objective of SAPANA will be to liaise with policy makers and with governments in separate countries and in South Asia as a whole. The research undertaken by SAPANA, while following all the principles of objectivity and rigour, will serve as a platform for policy dialogue and intervention. SAPANA has a great advantage over all existing think tanks and similar institutions, in that it is part of the Free Media Foundation and will work closely with the South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA). This proximity will allow SAPANA's research output to be available in the public arena through the media. This ability to disseminate extensively will be one of the major advantages SAPANA will have over other institutions.

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SAPANA will focus on multidimensional and multi-thematic interventions rather than specialise in one particular area. Because of the already existing network of the Free Media Foundation and SAFMA, SAPANA is being perceived as a sort of a 'virtual' institution. Unlike most research organisations and think tanks, for the first few years, it will not employ scholars and academics, but will out-source research. Because of its 'virtual' nature, not constrained by the abilities of an in-house research staff, SAPANA will have access to the best scholars working on South Asia who will be hired on short term contracts for specific purposes. Moreover, SAPANA will also be able to design research themes of a more topical and immediate nature requesting scholars to respond quickly. Its flexibility will be one of its strengths. The participants appreciated South Asian Journal and SAFMA for taking this timely initiative. The participants of the First SAPANA Conference agreed to meet again within two years to pursue their objectives and shared goals.