18 - Environment of South Asia by South Asian Media Net

S O U T H

A S I A N

Contents Editor Imtiaz Alam Assistant Editor Bushra Sultana

A South Asian University Imtiaz Alam

In This Issue

MDGs, Environment and South Asia Mukul Kulshrestha and Tripta Thakur

Consulting Editors Bangladesh Reazuddin Ahmed India K K Katyal Nepal Yubaraj Ghimire Pakistan I A Rehman Sri Lanka Sharmini Boyle Publisher Free Media Foundation Facilitator South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA) Designed by DESIGN 8 Printer Qaumi Press Editorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Post E-mail: sajournal@gmail.com

Environmental Concerns and Biotechnology in South Asia Sachin Chaturvedi An Indian Perspective on Environment Law Amir Ullah Khan Biofuels Trade: Pakistan Case Study Shaheen Rafi Khan, Moeed Yusuf, Selina Adam Khan, Reza Abbasy Emerging Environmental Issues in Bhutan Doley Tshering Some Environmental Issues in India Visalakshi Menon Kyoto and South Asian Environment Rieta Rahman Managing Urban Air Pollution in Kathmandu Madan Koirala Solid Waste Recycling in Bangladesh Dr. Md. Salequzzaman, Md. Abul Kashem, S.M. Tariqul Islam, Md. Nazim Uddin, Md. Abdullah Yousuf Al Harun, Md. Atikul Islam, Md. Wahiduzzaman People First in Conservation Case Studies from Nepal Ukesh Raj Bhuju

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The Tryst with the Big Dams Himanshu Thakkar Academic Freedom in India P. Radhakrishnan India and United States: Converging Attitudes? Kolluru Srinivas and Gautam Pingle Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change The Colombo Declaration on SACEP

Climatic Changes in South Asia Imtiaz Ahmed

under great danger of being submerged. Other countries of the region are even more vulnerable to climatic changes and erosion of our combined ecosystems. Floods and droughts occur too often and have a devastating effect on the poor. Almost all urban centres in the region are suffering from higher air pollution and an absence of solid waste management. More than 200 million people in the subcontinent lack access to safe drinking water and 800 million people do not have proper sanitation facilities. There are no proper facilities for natural disaster management, as was observed during the devastation caused by tsunami and earthquake.

limatic changes, as a result of global warming, now pose an imminent threat to the human existence and our environment. Global climate has warmed by 0.7 C in the last century. It is going to worsen with the temperature getting warmer by up to 5.8 C in this millennium. Extreme variations in temperature, changing patterns of rains, floods and droughts, varying precipitation, melting of glaciers and rise in sea level are expected to exacerbate and cause greater adverse changes and hazards. The disaster costs have increased by 15 folds to $652 billion in the last five decades. The targets set by Kyoto protocol to mitigate the dangerous upward trend of six major greenhouse gases emissions are not being met by the major polluters and the Convention's ultimate objective of preventing "dangerous anthropogenic (man-made) interference with the climate system" is being ignored. Consequently, these climatic changes will adversely affect the achievement of UN's Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to eradicate poverty and protect environment.

Despite such a huge challenge, the countries of the region are not adopting strategies to conserve nature, protect environment and ecosystems. There are no structural and regulatory mechanisms in place to protect environment and conserve natural and depleting resources. The possibility of severe ecological disequilibrium exists and needs to be tackled at the regional level. The ministers from the region met in Colombo in 1980 and considered the report of South Asia Cooperative Environment Program (SACEP) and resolved to work together. Later, after the establishment of South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the member countries agreed to tackle environmental issues together. But, as in other field, SAARC has not done anything substantial to collectively tackle these issues of common concern. Even at the international level, the countries of the region have not contributed much in evolving international standards. The time has come that they collectively focus on enabling market structures and regulatory mechanisms to develop sustainable means of addressing environmental issues and climatic change while adopting a balanced approach towards gradual standard-setting processes.

Climatic changes are also badly affecting the environment and socioeconomic development in South Asia. Melting of glaciers in the Himalayas is causing floods and draining out water resources that will result in more droughts. Sir Nicholas Stern described Himalayas being a sponge mitigating the effects of varying precipitation on India and China. Rise in sea levels can increase inundation, erosion, storms and various coastal hazards. While decrease in water availability will badly hit some arid regions in dry season, its abundance during wet season will bring the havoc of floods. Due to rapid increase in population, urbanization, industrialization, development, big dams and rapid growth in vehicular traffic, pollution has tremendously increased and has brought environment and natural resources under greater stress. Crop yields are being estimated to decrease up to 30 per cent in the region in the next 50 years. As malaria, dengue, cholera and other water born diseases become common, the mortality rate is going to rise in this part of the world. As a consequence, it will be hard to achieve MDGs and reduce poverty.

Free market mechanism alone cannot help mitigate the losses being caused by the climatic changes. Nor can it adopt a course that is environment friendly. The states in the region will have to intervene on behalf of their peoples to protect the environment. This cannot be done without the direct participation of the people and local communities. There is a great need to preserve our traditionally eco-friendly life styles and natural resources. Both the countries of the region and SAARC must focus on these issues and evolve regional standards and establish mechanisms and regulatory structures to collectively tackle threats to our glaciers, water and energy resources, habitat, environment and ecosystems. And this cannot be done alone at the regional level. South Asia must join the international efforts to protect this planet from being doomed. The greater responsibility lies on the developed and fast growing economies which must be shared proportionately.

South Asia is facing increasing deterioration of its ecosystems and biodiversity. Since the ecosystems are indivisible and interrelated, their deterioration is affecting a contiguous region as a whole. Greenhouse gases emissions and pollution are increasing in the region. As Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions' (1990-2003) increased to 46.5 per cent, CO2 per unit of GDP and per capita metric tons have increased to 0.4 and 1.0, respectively, which is a dangerous development. While conservation and renewal of natural resources is being ignored, an unsustainable development and vulgar growth model is causing greater depletion of natural resources. Migration to cities and haphazard urbanization is causing greater pollution with no safeguards practiced and a lack of sanitation and disposal of solid waste. Bhutan, which has taken a middle course and far better placed in conserving its environment, is faced with the danger of glacial lake outburst floods (GLOF). Various islands of the Maldives are

identifies the greater concerns, such as failure of waste management in the cities and land degradation in the rural areas. Pleading a balance between environmental protection and human security, he argues to return the management of natural resources, such as forests, back to the communities.

In This Issue (The views expressed in this journal are solely those of the authors)

MDGs, Environment and South Asia

Environmental Concerns and Biotechnology in South Asia

An Indian Perspective on Environment Law

Biofuels Trade: Pakistan Case Study

Emerging Environmental Issues in Bhutan

iii

Mukul Kulshrestha and Tripta Thakur, from MANIT Bhopal, portray a grim picture of poverty, gender inequality, illiteracy, poor healthcare, non-availability of safe drinking water and sanitation prevailing in South Asia while reminding the readers of the necessity to meet the Millennium Development Goals. They discuss measures to improve various social indicators and propose a cohesive strategy to overcome challenges of sustainable development. Since biodiversity is a shared phenomenon in South Asia, its conservation, Sachin Chaturvedi writes, also requires an urgent collective focus on regulating biotechnology. The SAARC has provided a forum to exchange experiences, knowledge and expertise for combined technological advancement of the region. It has also helped in working towards harmonization of biosafety and other regulatory issues. However, more effective and urgent measures are required to address environmental concerns emanating from the introduction of GM crops, for which the SAARC forum should be used more efficiently. Amir Ullah Khan, Indian Development Foundation's economist, looks into the efficiency of legal instruments in tackling environmental degradation. Preferring self-regulation by industry, otherwise tuned to self-interest, guided by international standards' setting bodies, Mr Khan invites South Asian region to focus on enabling market structures to develop sustainable means of addressing environmental issues and climatic change while adapting a sophisticated approach towards gradual standardsetting processes. A group of researchers, at SDPI Pakistan, evaluate the prospects of mitigating steps and issues of sustainable development related with the production of bioethanol fuel in a north-south context with a reference to Pakistan. Evaluating various aspects and prospects of bioethanol fuel production in Pakistan, the authors provide a valuable analysis, as a case study, to promote sugarcane production, sugar refining and conversion of molasses to biofuels with the end product of ethanol. They also make some quite useful recommendations based on their study. Doley Tshering, a leading Bhutanese expert, raises quite stunning possible environment threats to the life and livelihood of the Bhutanese people and their small paradise on earth. Elaborating impressive steps taken by the government to conserve nature, he

Some Environmental Issues in India

Kyoto and South Asian Environment

Managing Urban Air Pollution in Kathmandu Valley

Solid Waste Recycling in Bangladesh: Khulna Case Study

Visalakshi Menon, a Reader at Jesus & Mary College, Delhi, picks up some environmental issues, adversely affecting the big cities like Mumbai, New Delhi and larger regions due to environmental degradation and pollution by human beings and an ostentatious life style. Being a Gandhist, she emphasizes simple and austere life style while rejecting vulgar capitalism and unsustainable patterns of development. Citing various reports, Rieta Rahman says eight member countries of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) are faced with the hazards of climate change due to the greenhouse effect. Taking a pessimist view of the Kyoto Protocol and the SAARC Charter on environment, she predicts climate change is set to cause a cataclysm in South Asia where a large and impoverished population is not ready to fight the devastating impact of global warming. Therefore, she emphasizes, regional cooperation is the only way to stave off this looming disaster. Madan Koirala, an associate professor at Central Department of Environmental Science, Tribhuvan University and 1st Vice President of Environmentalists Association of Nepal, presents a case study of the Kathmandu valley, Nepal, by highlighting media's role in helping to minimize urban pollution impacts on the environment through encouraging development efforts. Driver, Pressure, State, Impact and Response (DPSIR) model is adopted for assessing Kathmandu valley's urban air pollution. Dr. Koirala works out necessary plans, policies, regulation formulation and enforcement with time frame and suggests the role of media at different steps of urban air pollution conntrol. Teachers and students, from Khulna University, Bangladesh, analyze an anaerobic digestion technology adopted to produce biogas from the municipal solid wastes (MSW) of Khulna City Corporation (KCC). The existing management system of these wastes creates unwanted environmental problems in KCC. However, the MSW has a potential value for the production of biogas and bio-fertilizer. The researchers find that six per cent TS (Total Solid) is better for optimum gas production from organic MSW and about 23088.12 kWh a day electricity can be generated by the total organic MSW of KCC area. The Khulna city case study serves as an example for the region in managing MSW.

iii

People First in Nepal Conservation

Ukesh Raj Bhuju, Chairman Nepal National Committee of IUCN members, argues that people's cooperation has been crucial to successful conservation endeavour in Nepal. He gives various examples to build his case. The idea of building partnership between the government and the people through consultative processes and subsequent management plans was resolved by the 1988 National Conservation Strategy (NCS) for Nepal. The essential elements for public participation are acknowledgement of people's rights to participate in decision-making and benefit from shared empowerment of people and public awareness.

View Point India and United States: Converging Attitudes?

Srinivas and Pingle take pain to show how urban India is enamoured with American life style and how far has the urban public opinion changed in favour of US, as compared to China and Pakistan where people have a very low view of America and the Americans. Based on a public opinion survey, the authors have shown great enthusiasm in projecting Americanization of urban India and its public opinion while radically breaking with the non-alignment days.

The Tryst with Big Dams

Himanshu Thakkar, Coordinator South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers and Peoples, critically reviews the big dam strategy and its monumental losses as one of the greatest threats to environment, natural habitat and communities affected by them. Elaborately showing the disaster brought by the big dams, their underutilization and unsustainability, he argues in favour of a paradigm shift to make people the master of water management.

Academic Freedom in India

Professor Radhakrishnan, from Madras Institute of Development Studies, evaluates the scope and nature of academic freedom in India in a broader perspective and with wider implications. Emphasizing the importance of social sciences for society and its development, he places the development of higher education in critical perspective with various angles, such as region, class, caste and private/public. Cautioning against various challenges to academic freedom in India, he stresses the need to critically evaluate what is happening to education sector.

MDGs, Environment and South Asia Mukul Kulshrestha and Tripta Thakur

his paper focuses on the social and environmental issues confronting South Asia. It discusses issues like poverty, education, health, social inequities, including discrimination against women, urban slums, water and sanitation. The paper demonstrates that considerable efforts are still required in South Asia as it lags behind on most parameters representing sustainable development. These issues have been discussed, in particular, with reference to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that represent vital targets for humanity as envisaged by the United Nations. The paper concludes that fulfilment of MDGs in South Asia would warrant firm political commitment, pursuance of sound economic policies, public investment in infrastructure, health, education, environmental management, sanitation and housing, transparent governance and equitable, transparent, and efficient service deliveries. Overall theme is: social and environmental issues, sustainable development, Millennium Development Goals and South Asia. Introduction “South Asia holds the “swing vote” whether the Millennium Development Goals can be reached by 2015…. South Asia has 40 percent [sic] of the problem, which means it has 40 percent [sic] of the solution… South Asia has a special place partly because of its sheer size; it is the place where 40 percent [sic] of the population lives on less than a dollar a day, and where 35 percent [sic] of children do not get proper primary education…So this region is most going to drive whether we reach the targets or not”: UNDP Administrator Mark Malloch Brown (IPS, 2003) In September 2000, at the United Nations Millennium Summit, world leaders had agreed to a set of time-bound and measurable programmes envisaging goals and targets for combating poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, environmental degradation and discrimination against women. Placed at the “heart of the global agenda”, these goals are popularly called the “Millennium Development Goals” (MDGs) (Table 1). These MDGs critically highlight the linkages amongst environmental challenges and social sustainability, and deal with issues like human health, poverty reduction, gender equality, primary education and child mortality. With the strong international political willingness and commitment to back the initiative, the MDGs represent a “once-in-a-generation opportunity” to make significant progress towards the betterment of humankind.

Goal

Table 1: Millennium Development Goals and Targets as Envisaged by the UN MDGs Targets Envisaged

Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger

1. 2.

Reduce by half the proportion of people living on less than a dollar a day Reduce by half the proportion of people who suffer from hunger

Achieve universal primary education Promote gender equality and empower women Reduce child mortality Improve maternal health Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases

Ensure that all boys and girls complete a full course of primary schooling

3 4 5 6

Ensure environmental sustainability

Develop a global partnership for development

Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005, and at all levels by 2015 5. Reduce by two thirds the mortality rate among children under five 6. Reduce by three quarters the maternal mortality ratio 7. Halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS 8. Halt and begin to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases 9. Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes; reverse loss of environmental resources 10. Reduce by half the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water 11. Achieve significant improvement in lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers, by 2020 12.

Develop further an open trading and financial system that is rule-based,

13.

14. 15.

16. 17. 18.

Source: UN Millennium Development Goals (MDG) Available at http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/

The social sustainability is embedded in Goals 1, 2 and 3. These goals specifically aim to eradicate poverty and hunger, promote education at the primary level, and strive to remove gender related inequities in the society. Goals 3, 4 and 5 aim to endorse social sustainability by building a healthy community through appropriate reduction of incidence of specific diseases, and by focusing on child and maternal health. The Environmental Sustainability is specifically implanted in Goal 7 of the MDGs. This MDG aims to integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes to reverse the loss of environmental resources, to halve by 2015 the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation, and envisages significant improvement by 2020 in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers under targets 9, 10, and 11. The implications of goal 7 are significant: Kulshrestha and Mittal (2003) evolved a model to estimate that by the year 2015, 54-80 million deaths would occur globally due to

inadequate water and sanitation services alone, and even if the MDGs are implemented successfully, an estimated 40-58 million people are still poised to die. Such implications of MDGs are vital, and more so for the South Asia region constituting India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Afganistan, Srilanka and Maldives due to the relatively large concentration of global populations, prevalence of poverty, growing urbanization and existence of slums. This paper takes stock of the social and environmental sustainability in South Asia, as we arrive at the mid-point between the inception of the MDGs and the year 2015 targets. South Asia: Key to realizing MDGs The South Asia region is home to more than 200 million people lacking access to safe drinking water and 800 million without proper sanitation service (Davis, 2004); faces some of the lowest per-capita freshwater availability in the world; and also includes several countries ranked in the lower quartile1 of Transparency International's Corruption Index, 2006 (Transparency International, 2006). Nearly 40 per cent of the world's poor are located in this region that comprises weak social indicators (Ahmed and Bery, 2004), so that performance in South Asia is always going to be the key to achieving the MDGs. Despite all progress in the last decade, South Asia as a region that still lags behind other areas of the world, and is the second poorest performer after Sub-Saharan Africa (ADB, 2007a). Although, on a per-capita basis the region shows the lowest estimated investment requirement per person for land, network and bulk infrastructure, housing, schools and health clinics, and community development (Table 2), yet, what makes South Asia particularly relevant is the sheer population concentration in this region, making the development in this region absolutely vital for humanity and for economy that is increasingly being seen globally linked. This assumes special significance as the region is struck by poverty.2 South Asia, with GNI per capita at $594 in 2004, is home to 47 per cent of the world's poor living on less than $1 a day (The World Bank Group, 2007). This is despite the fact that according to World Bank estimates, between 1990 and 2001, globally the proportion of people living in extreme poverty fell from 28 per cent to 21 per cent in the developing world, and the number of people in extreme poverty dropped from 1.21 billion to 1.09 billion (Chen and Ravallion, 2004). Table 2: Regional Average Estimated Investment per Person Required for Land, Network and Bulk Infrastructure, Housing, Schools & Health Clinics, and Community Development (US $) Item

Land Networked Infrastructure Bulk Infrastructure Housing Schools and clinics Community development Average Investment per person

East Asia 50 58 17 169 10 30 334

Latin America and the Caribbean 97 306 92 195 18 71 780

North Africa 105 265 80 292 12 75 829

Oceania

50 58 17 169 10 30 334

South Central Asia 43 58 17 131 10 26 285

Southeast Asia 45 58 17 200 10 33 363

SubSaharan Africa 18 164 49 77 12 32 352

West Asia

105 265 80 292 12 75 829

Source: UN Millennium Project (2005a)

Despite all historical odds, the region has indeed experienced dramatic economic and social progress marked by a rapid GDP growth ever since 1990s, averaging nearly 5.4 per cent a year. This has helped reduce the consumption poverty rate significantly in the countries of the region. For example, India has reduced its poverty rate by 5-10 per cent since 1990; and most other countries have registered reduction in poverty over the period, with the sole exception of Pakistan, where poverty has stagnated at around 33 per cent (The World Bank Group, 2007). South Asia as a region has made some remarkable economic progress, and the per capita GDP growth rates have improved in the last few decades, attaining historical peaks in recent years (Figure 1). Figure 1: Per Capita GDP Growth in South Asia

Per capita GDP growth %

7.0 6.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 South Asia 1.0

excluding India

0.0 1985–89 1990–94 1995–99 2000–04

2003

2004

2005

2006

Year

Source: Global Monitoring Report, 2006 Note: values for the year 2005, 2006 are Forecast values

However, this poverty reduction has not been without its own limitations. A recent report by Asian Development Bank (ADB)3 points out that “the rich are growing richer faster than the poor in developing Asia, and widening disparities in standards of living can threaten the growth process in one of the most dynamic regions of the world” (ADB, 2007b). Furthermore, inequities also seem to exist in asset ownership and access to infrastructure services. Banerjee et al (2007) point out that a great proportion of the population, especially for the South Asian countries, India and Nepal have no access to electricity, sanitation, or clean water, and the proportion of highest and lowest region-wise populations having access to infrastructure shows marked variation (Table 3). Hidden regional and social inequalities are widely prevalent with respect to basic service delivery in the South Asia region. Progress in MDGs at the average national levels often masks considerable social inequalities and this holds true not just for large economies such as India where state-level and district-level disparities are common, but also for smaller countries of the region such as Nepal (Table 3). Such inequities lead to unsustainablity, and necessarily dampen the poverty reduction impacts resulting from economic growth (Ravallion 2004).4

Table 3: Regional Inequities with Respect to Access to Infrastructure across India and Nepal (2001 data) Population Percentage with Access To

Country Overall

Indiaa Nepal

Clean Water Highest Lowest

Health Facilities Overal Highes Lowes l t t

33.7

99.8

2.0

3.2

0.0

44.8

0.3b

2.2 b

0.0 b

Overal l

43.7

Sanitation Highes Lowes t t

93.2

11.2

Overal l

Electricity Highes t

Lowes t

Overal l

Schools Highes t

Lowes t

100

32.2

97.4

5.9

1.4

4.8

0.4

Source: Banerjee et al (2007) a All numbers for India refer to the percentage of villages with access to specific infrastructure b Number of health centers per 1,000 population

Figure 2 depicts the various MDGs for the South Asia region in terms of the progress made so far and the progress needed. It is evident that Goals 1,3,4,5 and 7 need special attention. Challenges remain in key areas such as the social MDGs (child malnutrition, primary and secondary completion rates, maternal mortality, and gender balance in education and health outcomes etc); and in MDG related to environmental sustainability (availability of drinking water and sanitation infrastructure and improvement of slums). In particular, the challenges are severe with respect to water supply and sanitation infrastructure. The JMP (2000) report showed that, for both water supply and sanitation, Asia and Africa were the two regions where lack of access is highest. By the end of the last century, a total of about 1.1 billion people lacked access to improved water supply globally. Asia and Africa alone accounted for 86 per cent of these (of this 61 per cent lived in Asia alone). The report also showed that about 2.4 billion people in the world lacked access to improved sanitation and Asia alone accounted for 79 per cent of them. Estimates for Asia in 2000 (WEHAB 2002) showed that sanitation coverage is by far the lowest of any world region, with 54 per cent still lacking sanitary facilities. Disparities in sanitation coverage heighten when one considers the rural-urban divide: 69 per cent of the rural population lacks sanitation coverage compared with 26 per cent in urban areas. The same is true for safe water coverage: 27 per cent of the rural population without safe access compared with 7 per cent in urban areas. South Asia as a region exhibits an accentuation of such disparities.

Figure 2: Regional standing for MDGs: Status and the Targets

developing countries are unplanned informal settlements where access to services is minimal, and the residents are placed at high risk exposures to disease, morbidity and mortality. UN-HABITAT estimates that in 2001 there were 924 million slum dwellers in the world and that without significant intervention to improve access to water, sanitation, and adequate housing, this number could grow to 1.5 billion by 2020. Currently, nearly half the world's population lives in cities and towns. However, the number of urban dwellers will continue to expand, from 3.2 billion people today to nearly 5 billion by 2030, mainly due to urban migration and rapid population growth. Much of this growth is likely to occur in Africa and Asia (The Millennium Development Goals Report 2007). This also implies growth of slums.

The unsustainabilities in South Asia â&#x20AC;&#x153;Although aggregate income poverty is falling rapidly, South Asia is still home to more poor people than any other region and remains off track for meeting many of the Goals. Primary enrollment and gender equality indicators are lagging. Child health is improving but not quickly enough to meet the targets, while maternal mortality rates remain high, and, without urgent action, HIV is poised to spread. Severe undernourishment afflicts large parts of the population. More than 250 million people live in slum-like conditions, with insecure tenure, inadequate housing, and poor access to essential services. Most of South Asia lacks access to modern technologies and services, with approximately 5 [sic] telephone subscribers per 100 inhabitants. Parts of the region suffer from serious problems of water quality and scarcity, and access to sanitation is low throughout the region. On the positive side, access to safe water has increased rapidly in both urban and rural areas.â&#x20AC;? (UN Millennium Project, 2005b). South Asia is on track to meet the targets on income poverty and access to improved water supply (UN Millennium Project, 2005b). By achieving these goals it will also prevent a large number of new infections of HIV, reduce hunger, cut child mortality, and substantially reduce the number of people living in slums. However currently, the challenges remain most overwhelming in two areas: reducing the numbers of slum dwellers and providing access to safe sanitation.

In most South Asia, slum conditions are characterized mainly by overcrowding and makeshift shelters. In 2005, about one-fifth of the urban population in the developing world lived in overcrowded houses (with more than three persons sharing a bedroom); two thirds of them were in Asia, with half in Southern Asia. Hence the situation remains grim as far as the South Asian region is concerned. The silver-lining is the fact that in percentage terms, the South Asian region has demonstrated commendable improvement in the percentage of populations living in urban slums: from a massive 64 per cent in 1990 to a reasonable 43 per cent in 2005 (Figure 3). However, assuming that the growth rate of slum dwellers decreases in the region due to ongoing national, regional and international efforts, the rapid expansion of urban areas will still make it a challenging task to improve living conditions quickly enough to meet the set targets. Figure 3: Urban Population Living in Slum Conditions (%)

70 60 Percentage

Source: The World Bank Group, 2007

In 2005, one out of three urban dwellers was living in slum conditions_that is, lacking at least one of the basic conditions of decent housing: adequate sanitation, improved water supply, durable housing or adequate living space (The Millennium Development Goals Report 2007).The non-durability of housing, in fact, is a problem for an estimated 11 million people living in cities of the developing world, with over half of these people living in Asia. 94 per cent of the world's slum dwellers live in developing regions, which are the regions experiencing the most rapid growth in urban populations and with the least capacity to accommodate this growth. (The World Bank Group, 2007). Sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Asia are the two regions where lack of adequate shelter among urban populations is most acute.

50 40 30

1990

2001

2005

Slums represent glaring urban poverty and inequities, and contribute to the physical, social and environmental deprivation. Approximately a third of the global urban population lives in these conditions (The World Bank Group, 2007). Typical slums in

South Asia

East Asia

Source: The Millennium Development Goals Report 2007

West Asia

South East Asia

Developing Regions

Region

Table 4 represents the regional distribution of those deprived of improved drinking water and sanitation. Sanitation coverage remains lowest in South Asia (37 per cent). Most of those without access to improved sanitation lived in Asia (73 per cent), while 17 per cent lived in sub-Saharan Africa. Over half of those without access to improved sanitation_nearly 1.5 billion people_live in just two countries, China and India (WHO/UNICEF JMP, 2004). Table 4: Region-wise Access to Improved Drinking Water Sources and to Improved Sanitation (2002) Number of people lacking access (millions) Region To improved To Improved drinking water Sanitation sources South Asia 234 938 Eastern Asia 303 779 Sub-Saharan Africa 288 437 Southeast Asia 115 208 Latin America & Caribbean 60 137 Eurasia 20 50 Northern Africa 15 40 Western Asia 23 38 Developed economies 15 20 Oceania 3 3 TOTAL 1076 2620

Share of regional population lacking Share of all unserved living in access (%) indicated region (%) To improved To Improved To improved To Improved drinking water Sanitation drinking water Sanitation sources sources 16% 63% 2% 36% 22% 55% 28% 29% 42% 64% 27% 17% 21% 39% 11% 8% 11% 25% 6% 5% 7% 17% 2% 2% 10% 27% 1% 2% 12% 21% 2% 1% 2% 2% 1% 1% 48% 45% <1% <1% na na 100% 100%

Source: Adapted from WHO/UNICEF JMP 2004.

Water and sanitation costing is probably the most difficult hurdle in the way of fulfilling the goals with regard to making provisions of safe water supplies and sanitation. The South Asia region is home to more than 200 million people lacking access to safe drinking water and 800 million without proper sanitation service (Davis, 2004); providing facilities to 800 million people in 15 years would require an international flow of $4 billion per annum at a rate of US$75 per capita as estimated above (Kulshrestha and Mittal, 2005). When compared against an existing aid level of $396.2 million (DAC, 2003) for South Asia this implies a ten-fold increase in international flows to the region. Hence, any desirable solution needs to consider the financial inflows in terms of national budgetary allocations, international aid and loans, private investments, and the degree of efficiency gains that can be extracted from existing allocations and utilities.

water and sanitation utilities structures, introduction of good governance and drastic change in the role of governments who almost completely run the sector currently. The last of the solutions would additionally require reducing operational losses and a heightened role for benchmarking of utilities, a prerequisite for increasing sector efficiencies.5 Reducing costs and increasing revenues by operating more efficiently can enable utilities to obtain resources to invest in rehabilitating existing works and building new ones. Outside the stated MDGs, significant linkages exist between the energy services and the Millennium Development Goals (DFID, 2002), and the evidence linking provision of energy services with achievement of social objectives and generation of economic growth is rather strong. Failure to include energy considerations in national development strategies and development frameworks can seriously undermine the ability to achieve the MDG targets and can jeopardize the fate of millions by becoming an impediment to income-generating industrial, commercial, and service activities. Worldwide, as many as 1.6 billion people remain without access to electricity (Modi et al, 2006), more than half residing in South Asia alone (Figure 4). Electricity as a service is crucial for providing basic social services, including education and health. Lack of electricity services can undermine sterilization, water supply and purification, sanitation, refrigeration of essential medicines, besides denting the powering of income generating machines like agriculture pumps, food processing machines, and light manufacturing tools. In rural areas, lack of electricity services can lead to unwillingness on part of service workers and professionals like teachers, doctors and engineers to reside in those areas, thereby undermining the poverty removal in such areas. In urban areas, the electric supplies may be unreliable or the connection simply unaffordable particularly for those residing in slums.6 Hence particular attention of administrators is essential to initiate policy changes and investments required for improving access to energy services in urban and rural areas in the South Asia region. Figure 4: Actual and Projected Regional Distribution of Number of People without Access to Electricity

Any solution to the possibility of fulfilling the MDGs related to water and sanitation alone will incorporate the following possibilities (Kulshrestha and Mittal, 2005): 1. 2. 3.

International aid agencies must increase aid much more than ten-fold of the current levels in the water and sanitation sector International private investments be sought at much accelerated pace. Internal efficiencies of utilities be increased drastically. The current status of these utilities indicates that there is plenty of scope of increasing productivity of existing services.

These solutions would require introduction of reforms and revamping of current

Source: IEA 2002

South Asia also fares poorly on several other parameters (Figure 5). The region has the lowest proportion of maternal deliveries attended by skilled and trained health care personnel, lowest women employees in non-agriculture wage employment, high under 5 mortality rates (per 100 live births) (second only to sub-Saharan Africa), and the highest proportion of children under age five who are underweight. Particular efforts in South Asia are needed to reduce the number of women dying from treatable or preventable complications of pregnancy and childbirth, reducing the proportions of children going hungry, and in promoting child education particularly amongst the female gender as the girl child is still excluded from education more often than boys (The Millennium Development Goals Report 2007). Figure 5: Regional Performances for Various Parameters 100

Percentage

80 60 40 20

Latin America & the Caribbean

SouthEastern Asia

Northern Africa

Eastern Asia

Western Asia

SubSaharan Africa

Southern Asia

Region

Source: The Millennium Development Goals Report 2007

Rural women's major chunk of time in the South Asia region is spent in collecting water and fuel wood, farming, subsistence production, and domestic work, including rearing children. The lack of basic infrastructure and services imposes enormous time and work burdens on women, a factor that is not accounted in the national income and product accounts. The women employees in the non-agriculture wage employment remain particularly low: nearly 18 per cent as compared to 39 per cent as the world average and 47 per cent in the developed regions (The Millennium Development Goals Report 2007). The time involved in less productive engagements can be lowered through improvements in rural infrastructure, such as providing modern cooking fuels including petroleum gas, ensuring accessible and affordable modes of transport, and through provision of affordable safe drinking water and sanitation near the home. The links between environment, infrastructure, and poverty are strong. Nearly all South Asian countries depend on agriculture for a large proportion of GDP, and most of them face problems of water scarcity, soil erosion and salinity. Better environmental management in the region is also required due to the extent of poverty in the region and the vulnerability of the poor to the risks of natural disasters7

particularly in Nepal, Sri Lanka, and coastal Bangladesh, requiring investment in initiating and strengthening disaster management mechanisms. The global climate changes are likely to further accentuate such investments in the short to medium term, particularly in the coastal regions of Bangladesh, Maldives, Srilanka, India and Pakistan. Concluding remarks The MDGs represent vital targets for humanity: targets such as the reduced poverty and hunger, assured shelter, gender equality, improved health and education, and access to safe water and sanitation would be the natural goals of any welfare state. Significantly, the goals are not an end in themselves. Once the goals are achieved, the society will stand at a point ready to take-off for a new era of sustainable development fuelled by inputs from a healthy, happy and productive society. In this sense, the MDGs represent an investment in humanity's sustainable flight to development. Any fulfilment of the MDGs would invariably require firm political commitment. It would require the governments to pursue sound economic policies, support research in science and technology, make appropriate public investments, introduce sound and transparent governance and steer away from populist measures that may be good for continuation of governing regimes, but may not be productive from the economic angle. In South Asia, many of the social sectors are largely controlled by the governments, directly or indirectly. It is essential that the governments progressively and steadily modify their roles and move away from being direct service providers to coordinating and regulating, so that the sectors are run on transparent market mechanisms. Regulation would increase the autonomy of the service utilities, and would automatically bring in accountability, competition and efficiency. At present, the operation and delivery of these services is often not transparent, and is, therefore, infested by corruption, as has been pointed out by researchers such as Paul (1995) and Davis (2004).8 The role of policy and sector regulation, participation of the civil society in the process of reforms including service tariff restructuring and inducting efficiencies in the operation and delivery of services are all parts of good governance. Sound governance is likely to aim at cultivating autonomous, efficient and financially sustainable enterprises, with minimal political interference. Such governance would also require heavy investments and public spending in areas like health (nutrition, disease control, health education), education, infrastructure (roads, electricity, ports, water and sanitation, affordable housing), environmental management (national parks and protected reserves, air, water and land), information and communications, scientific research, and affordable housing. Broadly, such governance will also encompass efficient public administration, protection of basic human rights, and of minority groups. The social, economic and legal discrimination against females would need to be curbed, and minority groups would also need to be extended special protection with regard to their language, religion, and race. The poor must also have a meaningful say in the decisions that affect their lives. In short, such governance would envisage ensuring political and social rights and equality and fairness in the society across groups.

In terms of development, South Asia as a region has been amongst the vulnerable regions of the world. The reasons comprise a history of violence and colonial rule, presence of diverse cultures, constraints imposed by physical geography and microclimatic variations, overpopulation, poverty, corruption, lack of basic infrastructure, and poor governance. Environmental and social policies in the countries of the region are often neglected as these issues rarely form the decisive factors for generating public opinion resulting in politically weak environmental and social ministries. This coupled with even weaker law enforcement implies that issues of vital concern are not addressed adequately. Central to the overall success in achieving the intended targets is the question of provision of much needed investment. The Goals create a framework for identifying investments that need to be made in diverse areas such as_water, sanitation, slum upgrading, education, health, environmental management, and basic infrastructure, pointing to the practical targets of public investment. However, the international and domestic resources are invariably insufficient to meet requirements, and hence the internal efficiencies of utilities, processes and services need to be increased drastically. Thus, delivery of services needs to be not just equitable and transparent, but also needs to be efficient and productive. The public and the private sectors both have a role to play in almost every form of investment needed for the Goals. The private sector (including private capital inflow) is yet to play a major role in the development of the South Asian region. In some areas the private sector may have a predominant role to play, resulting in business growth, thereby generating employment, raising incomes, and raising productivities. However, private investment requires preconditions to be met in order to attract worthwhile ventures. Such preconditions would encompass adequate infrastructure, good governance, and conditions of political and social certainty and stability. One of the key reasons that domestic and foreign direct investment has lagged in South Asia can be accorded to the fact that these preconditions are often not met by the countries of the region. The rather self-centred motive of individual development must in fact drive the South Asian economies to ensure that political differences do not become a barrier to the process of development. This alone should become a driving force enabling the countries of the region to initiate cohesive policies, integrate markets and economies, and promote better relations amongst each other. References l ADB.2007a. “Social Sectors in Transition”, South Asia Economic Report, Asian Development Bank, Publication Stock Number: 071307, Philippines l ADB.2007b. Key Indicators 2007.Volume 38, Asian Development Bank, Manila, Philippines l Ahmed Sadiq and Bery Suman.2004. Introduction, Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics 2003, South Asia Component, The World Bank and National Council of Applied Economic Research, 2004 l Banerjee, A., Iyer L., and Somanathan R. 2007. “Public Action for Public Goods.” NBER Working Paper No. 1 911. National Bureau of Economic Research. Cambridge, MA. l Chen, S., and M. Ravallion. 2004. “How Have the World's Poorest Fared since the Early

1980s?” Policy Research Paper 3341. World Bank, Washington, D.C. l DAC . 2003, Development Co-operation Report 2002. OECD l Davis Jennifer. 2004. Corruption in Public Service Delivery: Experience from South Asia's

Water and Sanitation Sector, World Development, 32 (1) 53-71 l DFID. 2002. Energy for the Poor: Underpinning the Millennium Development Goals.

Department for International Development, UK. l Available Online: http://www.d.d-kar-energy.org.uk/assets/Energy_for_ the_Poor.pdf. l Global Monitoring Report 2006 Millennium Development Goals: Strengthening Mutual

Accountability, Aid, Trade, and Governance 2006, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, Washington DC l IEA. 2002b. World Energy Outlook 2002. Chapter 10, Energy and Development. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)/ International Energy Agency (IEA), Paris, France. l IPS. 2003. Development: South Asia Holds the Key to Millennium Goals. Inter Press Service News Agency, London, 08 July, 2003 l JMP.2000.Global Water Supply And Sanitation Assessment 2000 Report., Joint Monitoring Programme For Water Supply and Sanitation, WHO AND UNICEF l Modi, V., S. McDade, D. Lallement, and J. Saghir. 2006. Energy and the Millennium Development Goals. New York: Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme, United Nations Development Programme, UN Millennium Project, and World Bank. l Kulshrestha Mukul and Atul K. Mittal. 2003. “Diseases Associated with Poor Water and Sanitation: Hazards, Prevention, and Solutions”, Int. Jr. Reviews On Environmental Health, Volume 18, No. 1, p.15-32, Freund Publishing House ,UK l Kulshrestha Mukul and Atul K. Mittal .2005. “Water And Sanitation In South Asia In The Context of Millennium Development Goals” South Asia Economic Journal,6, p 99-115,Sage Publications. l Paul, S. 1995. A report card on public services in Indian cities: A view from below. Public Affairs Centre, Bangalore. l Ravallion, M.2004. “Pro-Poor Growth: A Primer.” Policy Research Working Paper No. 3242 . World Bank. Washington, DC. l The Millennium Development Goals Report 2007.United Nations, New York, 2007 l The World Bank Group.2007.Available Online: l http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/GMIS/gdmis.do?siteId=2&menuId =LNAV01REGSUB5 l Transparency International.2006. CPI 2006 regional results: Asia-Pacific, The 2006 corruption perception index. Transparency International, Berlin: Available online: http://www.transparency.org l UN Millennium Project. 2005a. A Home in the City. Task Force on Improving the Lives of Slum Dwellers, Earthscan, London l UN Millennium Project, 2005b. Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals. New York. l WEHAB.2002. A Framework for Action on Water and Sanitation, World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg l WHO/UNICEF JMP. 2004. Meeting the MDG Drinking Water and Sanitation Target: A Mid-Term Assessment of Progress, World Health Organization and United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund Joint Monitoring Program l World Bank. 2004. Anticorruption.Available Online: www.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/ End Notes 1 There exist considerable differences amongst the countries of the region with regard to the perceived prevalence of corruption. The overall ranks for the countries in South Asia stand at India-70, Srilanka-84, Nepal-121, Pakistan-142, and Bangladesh-156 (Transparency

7 8

International, 2006). The sheer numbers of poor people in Asia remain vast, with more than 270 million in East Asia and 430 million in South Asia, all vulnerable to droughts, natural disasters, and other shocks (Chen and Ravallion, 2004). East Asia and South Asia together are home to the greatest number of absolute poor people in the world. “Key Indicators 2007”, the annual statistical publication of the Asian Development Bank, says the poor are still lagging behind in the region's rapid development even as poverty rates decline. Both relative (concerned with proportionate differences in incomes) and absolute inequalities (concerned with actual dollar differences in incomes) have increased in most parts of developing Asia (ADB, 2007b). This is not to undermine the achievements in certain fields.The region has also witnessed encouraging success in some areas: for example, mortality in children under five has reduced substantially between 1990 and 2004 (from 129 to 92, per 1,000), especially in Bangladesh (149 to 77, per 1,000), Nepal (145 to 76, per 1,000), and Sri Lanka (32 to 14, per 1,000), and appreciable gains have also been achieved in school enrolments at primary and secondary levels (The World Bank Group, 2007). Internal efficiency improvements are always win-win options for the existing utilities. Benchmarking the operational and financial aspects can free up resources, which can bring down the overall resource requirement for utilities. This, however, would require emergence of the concept of efficiency and productivity as this concept of adoption of quantifiable best practices has so far been almost completely ignored in the water sector in low-income countries including the countries in the South Asia. “For those living in slums, many factors can further hamper access to electricity services, such as lack of street addressing, lack of formal housing registration, and tariff structures and payment mechanisms that are not adapted to the customer base. A combination of these factors and other broader issues affecting the performance of the utilities (for example, theft of electricity, legal structures to enforce power purchase contracts, the institutional structure of the utility itself, and the inability to enforce bill collection) can lead to lack of investment in electricity generation and distribution networks, or in development of fuel supply infrastructure, making it even more difficult to extend services to those not served. In addition to generation or supply shortfall and insufficient distribution infrastructure for efficient energy carriers (such as electricity and clean gas or liquid fuels), the lack of access to end-use appliances, particularly those that impact women (such as mills, motors, and pumps), further hampers the use of modern energy services” (Modi et al, 2006) The region remains vulnerable particularly with regard to Droughts, Floods, Earthquakes, Landslides and Cyclones (UN Millennium Project, 2005b) The World Bank has also recognized the prevalence of corruption and since 1997, all World Bank country assistance strategies have included an assessment of ''corruption risks'' to Bank projects. An effective anticorruption strategy built on five key elements has been suggested by the World Bank (2004), and includes ensuring increased political accountability, promoting civil society participation, creating a competitive private sector, ensuring institutional restraints on power, and, improving public sector management.

Environmental Concerns and Biotechnology in South Asia Sachin Chaturvedi

he Convention of Biological Diversity (CBD) addressed several global environmental concerns and particularly those related to biodiversity. However, it seems that conserving biodiversity in South Asia faces a major challenge in governance of new technologies such as biotechnology. The regulatory aspects of biotechnology need an urgent collective attention. As a result, wild biological diversity, diverse cultivars of crops, land races of domesticated animals, and marine and coastal biological diversity are shared by neighbouring countries. They also share the socio-economic context in which biological diversity is used and could be threatened. The biosafety regulations in some countries are not in place while others have to work further on the gaps between Cartegena Biosafety Protocol (CBP) and their national legislations for effective management of biosafety. Moreover, emergence of new technology regime under TRIPs and WTO has set in a canvas where policy options, made available through CBD, have got further squeezed and challenges have multiplied many times. In this context, regional cooperation in South Asia should be seen in a new perspective as living organisms do not recognize territorial boundaries particularly when trade facilitation is being seen as a major objective of regional cooperation. The SAARC has provided a forum to exchange experiences, knowledge and expertise for combined technological advancement of the region. It has also helped in working towards harmonization of biosafety and other regulatory issues. The agricultural biotechnology is being seen as a major force for economic development in South Asia, though there is a strong limitation of funding, facilities and experienced workforce. In the last decade or so almost all countries in the region have initiated some activities in this area. These programmes are largely designed for keeping agriculture at the centre stage. Even within this sectoral choice, national requirements and needs are effective. For instance, in Nepal, food security is the stated objective of biotechnology policy while Bhutan is attaching more importance to the efficacious ex-citu conservation of biodiversity through Renewable Natural Resource Centers (RNRCs). Sri Lanka has a very high emphasis on ethical aspects of biotechnology research. Various programmes in biotechnology are encouraging work to address productivity stagnation in agriculture. However, more effective and urgent measures are required to address environmental concerns emanating from the introduction of GM crops, for which the SAARC forum should be used more efficiently. The region would have to address certain major

environmental challenges on a priority. This paper identifies some of these key issues. In section II we discuss some of the major national strategies adopted by various South Asian countries. Section III focuses on the issues related to the convention on biological diversity while the last section draws conclusions and also comes up with policy recommendations. Biotechnology and institutional mechanisms In this section we take an overview of how institutional mechanisms have emerged in South Asia for commercialisation of biotechnology and in what way governments have responded to the need of biosafety management. Bangladesh Bangladesh, being a party to the CBD, has undertaken an international commitment to preparing a National Biodiversity Action Plan. Several biodiversity-related programmes and projects are now at the implementation stage. Bangladesh is also targeting at achieving self-sufficiency of food grain through introduction the biotechnology. The government has established National Institute of Biotechnology under the Ministry of Science, Information Technology and Communication. The Ministry of Science, Information Technology and Communication support the research-related activities while the Ministry of Environment and Forest supports the management aspects of biotechnology activities. In Bangladesh, Biodiversity and Community Knowledge Protection Act and Plant Diversity Act are also under review for possible enactment. The Ministry of Environment and Forest is also the notified national focal point for biosafety protocol. In case of Bangladesh there is a policy pronouncement on applying biotechnology in agriculture sector primarily to ensure food and nutritional security and also for enhancing the export earnings by supporting industries like tissue culture and other activities. Bangladesh appointed a National Committee on Biotechnology Product Development in 1993 to identify key areas in which Bangladesh could commercialise agriculture related products. Recently, Bangladesh has also passed the rules and guidelines under the Biosafety Act 2001. The National Task Force on Biotechnology of Bangladesh (NTF) was established on 10 February 2004. It is responsible for generating and allocating need-based resources for operating and under-taking various activities through funding support from the government and possible foreign assistance. The Task Force functions as the highest policy-making body to give necessary directives for the development of biotechnology in the country. NTF in its meeting on 26 July 2006, approved the National Policy Guidelines on Biotechnology.1 Bangladesh has also allocated funds for setting up of a National Institute of Biotechnology (NIB) at Savar. The institute has been working since 2006. The National Council for Science and Technology (NCST) is the key agency to work on development of technology in Bangladesh. On the recommendation of NCST, Bangladesh government decided to establish a National Institute of Biotechnology. The institute would work as the central coordinating research centre under the Ministry of Science and Technology. The institute would have six major research laboratories on DNA technology; plant biotechnology; animal biotechnology;

fish biotechnology; formation and bioprocessing and bioenergy and fertilizers.2 The institute would also be supporting and guiding biotechnology research across various research laboratories, universities and other institutions engaged in biotechnology. India India is one of the first few countries to have recognized, as early as in 1980s, the importance of biotechnology as a tool to advance growth of agricultural and health sectors. India's Sixth Five Year Plan (1980-85) was the first policy document to cover biotechnology development in the country.3 The plan document proposed to strengthen and develop capabilities in the areas such as immunology, genetics, communicable diseases, etc. In this context, referring to the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), the document suggested ensuring coordination on interinstitutional, inter-agency and multi-disciplinary basis, full utilization of existing facilities and infrastructures in major areas including biotechnology. In India biotechnology include application of tissue culture for medicinal and economic plants; fermentation technology and enzyme engineering for chemicals; antibiotics and other medical product development; agricultural and forest residues and slaughterhouse wastes utilization and emerging areas like genetic engineering and molecular biology.4 Since then the biotechnology sector, in India, has come a long way. Pakistan In Pakistan, the government has taken an active interest in the promotion of biotechnology. A National Commission on Biotechnology was announced and a sum of nearly US$ 0.5 million allotted to coordinate the national efforts in 2001. The NCB would have 10-11 members. This commission would sponsor research in agriculture, food, flowers and fruits and would also initiate programmes and publications to create mass awareness about biotechnology. Pakistan's Ministry of Science and Technology has approved a project for the promotion of biotechnology research and preparation of a biotechnology action plan. The project was implemented by the Pakistan Council for Science and Technology in three years with a Rs. 38 million (around US$634,000) budget beginning from April 2003. Biotechnology was declared among the top priority areas in the third meeting of the National Commission for Science and Technology. The project was launched to improve the existing research facilities in agriculture, livestock and medical sectors at universities and research and development organizations.5 The biotechnology programme actually started with the establishment of the National Institute for Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering (NIBGE) at Faisalabad in 1987 by the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC). This institute has emerged as an important linkage in the advancement of biotechnology in Pakistan. However, the idea of the institute emerged in 1981 when a course on recombinant DNA technology was organized by the Nuclear Institute for Agriculture and Biology at Faisalabad.6 The NIBGE was approved in 1986. NIBGE was developed by the Government of Pakistan with the investment of US$10 million. The government is also supporting some other initiatives such as the Centre for Advanced Molecular Biology (CAMB) and the Institute of Biochemistry and Biotechnology (IBB). Recently an Institute for

Biotechnology has been established at Karachi. Asian Development Bank has loaned Pakistan US$ $905,000 for the research and cultivation of iron-rich rice. The project was from 2002 to 2005.

biotechnology for the betterment of community, industry and environment. The newly drafted biotechnology policy for Nepal with its main focus on poverty alleviation was recently released.9

Sri Lanka Since 1990 Sri Lanka has a strong research programme in biotechnology. Initially the focus was on plant biotechnology but of late the various research institutions, universities and government departments have entered new areas including health and medical biotechnology. There is a growing sensitivity about the ethical aspects of biotechnology research. Earlier this year, the National Science and Technology Commission (NASTEC) handed over a report to the government on medical ethics. A "Draft National Policy on Biomedical Ethics" related to "New Genetic and Assisted Reproductive Technologies" is also being considered. Sri Lanka National Genetics Commission and the National Assisted Reproductive Technologies Commission is to be set up soon. The National Assisted Reproductive Technologies Commission set up by an Act of Parliament should be the apex body overseeing the introduction and practice of assisted reproductive technologies both in research and clinical settings in Sri Lanka.7

In Nepal a strategy for development of biotechnology is being worked out largely in agriculture. The stated objective is to provide easy and affordable excess to biotechnology products and appropriate inputs such as biofertilisers to agriculturists, especially small and marginal farmers. The areas of priority for research and development include mass production of virus-free pre-basic seeds of potato by tissue culture; mass production of disease-free banana and citrus saplings by tissue culture and grafting; production of virus-free cardamom plantlets; biotechnological development of poor man's food crop_millet, barley, buckwheat etc; development of yield_increasing rice varieties by combination of conventional breeding, marker assisted breeding, anther culture and genetic transformation; mass production of biofertilizers and biopesticides.10 Nepal has also actively started organizing major conferences and seminars on biotechnology and biodiversity. One such major conference with almost 265 scientists from 25 different countries was organized in Katmandu in 2000.11 This gave an opportunity to local industry and academicians to interact with others in the field.

The Ministry for Economic Reform, Science and Technology provides a framework for the strategic economic development and growth of the country. The National Science and Technology Commission (NASTEC) is a key apex policy formulating and advisory body to the Government of Sri Lanka on Science and Technology. Established in 1998, NASTEC works in consultation with National Science Foundation (NSF). NASTEC works as the policy making apex body in the area of science and technology. Its responsibility includes prioritization of areas of national importance of Science and Technology, and advising the government the rational allocation of funds for research and development among the national science and technology institutions. NASTEC also works closely with the Council for Agricultural Research Policy (CARP) and the National Health Research Council (NHRC) and professional bodies such as Sri Lanka Association for the Advancement of Science, Institute of Chemistry, Institute of Physics, Institute of Engineers and Institute of Biology. The CARP, also of Ministry of Agriculture, has identified biotechnology as a thrust area for agricultural research and a key area for development on a national scale.8 So, the CARP committee of specialists in biotechnology and plant breeding in the national agricultural research system (NARS) was required to identify constrains confronted with research relating to biotechnology and to suggest ways as to how CARP can play a role in developing biotechnology to benefit agricultural development of Sri Lanka. Nepal Recently, Nepal has attached a high priority to biotechnology. However, shortage of skilled labour is a major issue (Table1). The Ministry of Science and Technology has placed its vision for biotechnology in Nepal to enhance the quality of life of the Nepalese people in agriculture, forestry, health, safety, environment, social and economic development. The ministry plans to do this by utilizing the benefits of

In the government research centres, there are three major institutes which support biotechnology. They are Department of Plant Resources (DPR), Nepal Agriculture Research Council (NARC) and Royal Nepal Academy of Science and Technology (RONAST). The DPR is largely working on mass propagation of tissue culture disease-free plants of banana and citrus.12 The DPR has already come out with their biotechnology action plan. The NARC has an active programme on developing virus free seeds of potato. The agriculture botany division of NARC is working on anther culture of rice and wheat and is also all set to establish germplasm conservation and diagnostics facilities using PCR technology. The NARC is also planning to initiate some work on biofertilisers. It has established regional linkages with Nepal by establishing laboratories in different parts of the countries. The RONAST has initiated work on molecular studies on genetic variation of rhizobium and in vitro grafting of citrus for disease elimination.13 RONAST has screened more than 80 isolates of Table 1: Manpower Status in Nepal Institutions Manpower RONAST 12 NARC 13 DPR 15 DoA 4 Teaching Institutions Kathmandu University Tribhuvan University etc. 23 Private Co. (GREAT, LIIBIRD) 6 Forensic Lab. 3 RECAST 4 Veterinary Institute 10 Total 100 Source: Yami Kayo Devi (2006).

PhD 2 4

5 1 2 4 18

rhizobium for enhancing productivity of grain legumes. Since the Eighth Five Year Plan (1995), planning in biotechnology has come a long way in Nepal. This was the first plan in which importance of biotechnology and biodiversity was acknowledged. The National Council for Science and Technology, however, has been active in developing and supporting various facets of biotechnology. Nepal has to work towards strengthening the institutional coordination and also establish linkages in the biotechnology research in the country. Several studies indicate an urgent need for a central coordinating agency in Nepal like Department of Biotechnology (DBT) in India or Biotechnology Commission in Pakistan.14 This may help in coordinating allocations for various programmes in biotechnology for instance Panta and Aryal (2000) mention that such funding is needed for a strong programme at the advanced research institutes like Tribhuvan University. The Central Department of Botany (CDB) in Tribhuvan University has been planning for initiation of biotechnology programme but due to lack of proper funds the programme could not be started. The proposal for Biotechnology Development Council (BDC) or Biotechnology Coordination Committee (BCC) is an important idea for advancement of biotechnology in Nepal. There is an acute shortage of trained workforce in this advanced technology. The recently concluded National Biotechnology Policy Conference (NBPC) also discussed this issue. It was suggested that one of the two committees, BDC or BCC, would have to take some steps in this direction. Some of the earlier studies by Yami (1997) and Tuladhar (1994) indicate that there were only 72 graduates out of which 57 per cent had master's degrees and 32 per cent had doctoral degrees. Most of them have specialized in either agriculture or in botany but not in biotechnology. The proposed biotechnology coordination committee is being identified as the agency for developing workforce required for this sector and raising public awareness about biotechnology. Bhutan Bhutan has shown keen interest in international biodiversity conservation activities. It was in 1992 that Bhutan became signatory to CBD. However, the gains to LDCs from this need to be analyzed afresh. The recently concluded 9th Five Year Plan of Bhutan strengthened the various majors taken up in light of the commitment towards CBD. In this regard the National Environment Strategy was announced in 1999. The Ministry of Agriculture has also established a National Biodiversity Centre (NBC) in the year 2000. This Centre has initiated some work on inventorisation of biodiversity in different parts of Bhutan. The National Environment Commission (NEC) established with support from UNEP and Global Environment Facility (GEF) is an important initiatives to evolve a national focal point for environment and biosafety management. In Bhutan, some initiatives have been taken to strengthen the institutional infrastructure for first generation biotechnology.15 The Royal Government of Bhutan has established two tissue culture laboratories for commercial propagation of

agronomically important plants. Recently, four Renewable Natural Resources Centres (RNRCs) have been established to work on the rich biodiversity available in Bhutan. The private sector is yet to take part in this area. International cooperation has helped Bhutan in launching several important initiatives. A National Gene Bank has been established with the assistance of the Dutch government. Under this project the Dutch government is also providing assistance for training technical staff. In 1985, Bhutan became a member of the Centre for Science and Technology of the NAM countries and the International Centre for Genetic Engineering and Biotechnology. Bio-prospecting the search for new genes or chemicals of value in pharmaceutical, biotechnology, or agriculture industries is a rapidly growing endeavor, and one which can have immense economic benefits. Several transnational corporations and other firms have used the rich biodiversity of developing countries in various products without any payment. The argument has been that bioprospecting is justified as in most developing countries there is no technological capacity for complete product development. To avoid this, the CBD and in particular its Articles 15 and 16 proposed allowing access to genetic resources with the condition that the developing countries benefit from the transfer of technology. Though Bhutan signed CBD in 1992 and ratified it in 1995, things have not changed much. Bhutan is rich in biodiversity. It has an estimated 300 species of plants and animals which are of immense value in forming nearly 200 traditional medicines but is still struggling for strengthening technologically advanced facility for ex-citu conservation. This is when Bhutan has been contributing to the global gene pool quite liberally. An International Plant Genetic Resources Institute mission to Bhutan in 1981 collected 483 samples of food plants, legumes and vegetables. The mission noted serious threat to indigenous wheat and rice varieties. In 1983, an IRRI mission collected 184 traditional rice varieties from high and medium altitude rice growing areas, but most remote areas were not visited. Recently, 154 samples of cultivated rice from 68 villages have been collected. This germplasm has a special value as it has been collected from a very high altitude areas and traversing about three quarters of the country's rice growing regions. Biodiversity and biosafety management in South Asia South Asian region is facing a growing challenge of rapid degradation of major ecosystems and their biological components. Developing and establishing adequate conservation measures and mechanisms for sustainable utilization of bioresources pose multidimensional challenges in the region. These issues have been negotiated extensively under the aegis of the United Nations. Consequently, the international treaties such as the CBD, 1992 and the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol, 2000, came up and most of the South Asian countries endorsed them (Table 2). The Contracting Parties of these instruments are actively engaged in evolving mechanisms to effectively implement the provisions contained therein.

Countries

Bangladesh Bhutan India Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Source: RIS Data Base.

Table 2: Status of the Convention on Biological Diversity CBD Contribution to Trust Fund for CBD (in USD) Signatories Ratification Signatories 05-06-1992 13-05-1994 955 11-06-1992 25-08-1995 92 05-06-1992 18-02-1994 31,534 12-06-1992 23-11-1993 370 05-06-1992 26-07-1994 5,641 10-06-1992 23-03-1994 1480

CPB

Signatories 25-05-00 26-08-02 03-01-01 02-03-01 04-06-04 24-05-00

Ratification 05-02-04 09-11-03 09-11-03 09-11-03

In recent years almost all the South Asian countries have promoted development and diffusion of biotechnology in a major way. The inter-linkages between different sectors have been strengthened and institutional structures have been developed for commercialisation of various biotechnology products. However, there is some apprehension about adverse implications of biotechnology. Table 3 summarises the status of regulatory system in each South Asian Country. In Pakistan in order to overcome the biosafety concerns, NIBGE proposed a voluntary code of conduct for release of GMOs in 1994. This has now been updated by the Ministry of Environment as bio-safety guidelines in consultation with all the stakeholders, which hopefully will soon be approved. This will provide an impetus to indigenous research and development biotechnology activities. A National Biosafety Committee was formulated in January 2000. A draft proposal on Biosafety Regulation awaits approval. However, guidelines and institutional mechanisms for commercialisation are still to be put in place. The biosafety debate in South Asia came under sharp focus when Sri Lanka banned the imports of genetically modified (GM) food in May 2001. The Sri Lankan gazette notification on the ban said it affects any food or food additives that have been subjected to genetic modification. It mentioned "genetically engineered food" means food that contains or was produced with a genetically modified material. There are materials derived from any part of genetically engineered organism. One of the reasons given for the ban was that Sri Lanka did not have the expertise to judge whether important GM foods were good or bad. This got Sri Lankan authorities at the centre of storm. The ban was subsequently suspended. However the ban made environmentalists and conservationist happy, though some scientists dismissed it. Biodiversity in Sri Lanka has been a major policy concern. This country is one of the 25 biodiversity hotspots of the world.16 The South Western region of Sri Lanka is rich in biodiversity. The Convention on Biological Diversity was signed and ratified by Sri Lanka in July 1992 and March 1994 respectively. The ministry responsible for the subject is the Ministry of Environment and Forest. It has the duty to ensure that the provisions of the convention are adhered to. In the first option, the Sri Lankan Food Control Authority has the responsibility of looking into the food safety aspect of GM foods on the behaviour of consumers. There is no question some measures have to be put in place. The second option is the ban. Although the word "ban" is not used anywhere in the regulations restricting the imports of GM foods, by implication it is a

ban. Sri Lanka is working with the UNEP-Biosafety project to evolve national guidelines and strengthening the risk assessment and management system for effective biosafety mechanisms. As part of the project, a database is also established to put together information about GMOs and LMOs. Sri Lanka has also signed the Biosafety Protocol on 24 May 2000 and is all set to establish domestic legal measures and build capacity in biosafety before ratification. The Ministry of Environment is the National Focal Point and is obliged to implement the articles of the protocol. Biosafety policy in Bangladesh was adopted in 1999. However, to bring in elements of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity were not in the guidelines. As a result, the Ministry of Environment and Forest, issued revised biosafety guidelines in 2006. The broad objectives of the biosafety policy include facilitating commercialisation of production and preservation capacities of various crops, fishes, and medicinal items as well as restoring various extinct useful species and ensuring safety of public health and the environment. It is also likely to accelerate multidimensional biotechnological research for augmenting human welfare in food security and health and a sound environment. The Ministry of Environment and Forest being the competent national authority and national focal point to implement the Protocol shall establish a National Committee on Biosafety (NCB) in order to ensure environmentally safe management of modern biotechnological development. A Biosafety Core Committee (BCC) will be working to assist and accelerate the functions of NCB. To ensure safe management of biosafety activities in the laboratories and in the field there shall be committees under NCB, such as Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC), Field Level Biosafety Committee (FBC) apart from designated Biological Safety Officers (BSO) in each research establishment of the country. In India, the debate on biosafety guidelines has come a full circle as the Indian Ministry of Environment and Forest reported sowing of unapproved GM cotton seeds in several hundred hectares of land. In 1997 the report stirred the debate on GM crops in India when unapproved GM eggplant was located in an agricultural research institute without sufficient safeguards. This brought the implementation-related aspects of biosafety protocol at the centre-stage and raised several issues concerning the very ability in many developing countries to handle sensitive technologies in such vital sector as agriculture. Though India established the biosafety guidelines in 1989, till now no commercial trial of GM crops has been allowed except the one permission granted in March 2002. India's Biosafety and Recombinant DNA Guidelines (1990) fall under the Environment (Protection) Act of 1986. In 1994, after India signed the Convention on Biodiversity, the DBT revised its earlier guidelines to accommodate the safe handling of GMOs in research, application and technology transfer. This includes the large-scale production and deliberate release of GM plants, animals and products into the environment. The guidelines are also provided for the shipment and importation of GMOs for laboratory research.

Table 3: Leading Biotechnology Institutions and Status of Biosafety in South Asian Countries Status of Regulatory System -------------------------------------------------------Protocol Field Testing Ratified

Country

Responsible Agency

Protocol Signed

India

ÿ Ministry of Science and Technology (Department of Biotechnology) ÿ Ministry of Environment and Forests (Genetic Engineering Approval Committee) ÿ Centre for Cellular and Molecular Biology ÿ Center for DNA Fingerprinting & Diagnostics

Pakistan

ÿ Establishment of Centre of Excellence on Molecular Biology (CEMB) ÿ National Institute for Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering (NIBGE) ÿ Centre of Chemistry and Biotechnology, Agricultural Biotechnology ÿ Institute of Biochemistry and Biotechnology

Sri Lanka

ÿ National Science and Technology Commission (NASTEC) ÿ National Genetic Commission ÿ National Assisted Reproductive Technologies Commission ÿ National Science and Technology Commission ÿ Plant Genetic Resource Centre

Nepal

ÿ National Agriculture Research Council (NARC) ÿ Royal Nepal Academy of Science and Technology (RONAST) ÿ Biotechnology Development Council ÿ Biotechnology Coordination Committee

ÿ National Biodiversity Center ÿ ÿ X ÿ National Environment Commission ÿ Renewable Natural Resources Centres _____________________________________________________________________________________________

Bhutan

Conclusion Significantly, these developments reflect some contradictory trends, which need to be examined to safeguard livelihoods of local communities dependent on biological resources and in ensure full realization of potential of new emerging technologies for the benefit of coming generations. The task of reconciliation cannot be discharged by any single country and that regional cooperation and global responsibilities need to be formalized and given an institutional mechanism. The first meeting of the Technical Committee on Science and Technology under the reconstituted SAARC Integrated Programme of action identified biotechnology an important area of joint activity in Delhi 2001.17 The committee emphasized on the need building a talent pool available

in the SAARC countries. The meeting also called for acknowledging the availability of a vast reservoir of natural resources in the region. The Special Session on Biotechnology also reviewed progress on activities undertaken already such as plant tissue culture, medicinal and aromatic plants, vaccines and diagnostics for human health, aquaculture and human resource development. Appropriate institutional set up at the regional level can only help in streamlining the various efforts made for biodiversity conservation and would also help in meeting individual commitments at international forums. The Technical Committee on Environment and Metrology, which has been considering giving a shape to the SAARC cooperative programme for biodiversity management, and the Technical Committee on Science and Technology, to get SAARC Biodiversity Council established, should work in close cooperation. The SAARC Biotechnology Council may act as a forum for scientists and policymakers in the region and from other developing countries to discuss biotechnology policy in particular and bioresource policy in general. It is desirable that South Asian countries come together to address these constraints and economise on selection and application of various techniques in biotechnology. Regional cooperation may be strengthened for renewed national approaches for management of environment and biological stresses. In the region, CBP has yet to be ratified by some member countries. This puts South Asia on an uneven ground of implementation of a regulatory regime for governance of biotechnology in the region. The biosafety and protocols from all member states except two were exchanged. Follow up action is being taken by member states. It may be agreed that all countries would exchange their biosafety procedures and protocols. Depending on the outcome of on-going WTO discussion on labeling and segregation of GMOs options is explored so as to overcome the scientific uncertainty on thresholds and methods for traceability. In this context a lesson should be learnt from OECD countries where debate on monitoring of GMOs after release into the natural environment has further intensified. Some scientists argued that monitoring should be continued so more insights are available for risk management while others feel that the high cost of monitoring are not justified when transgenics have successfully passed the hurdles of safety assessment and risk management. The South Asian countries may also consider the pooling of resources for ensuring online search for scientific literature through internet and help scientific institutions overcome the high costs of purchase of scientific journals. In order to access such facilities at the regional level through the Internet, availability of broad band will minimize Internet expenses to a considerable extent. Some countries are gaining experience in field testing, while others have not yet completed biosafety guidelines. Information of socioeconomic and scientific development in biotechnology and biosafety can be accessed from a number of information sources, including the Biosafety Clearing House mechanism to be provided under the terms of the Cartegena Biosafety Protocol. It is important to link up various research project funded at the bilateral and multilateral level to converge so as to yield regional gains. Biotechnology may help in overcoming some major challenges together with traditional plant

improvement methods in making available better agro economic practices. In many parts of South Asia, salinity and drought resistance have to be addressed on priority. At regional level, efforts should be made to establish a Regional Biodiversity Conservation Fund (RBCF). The RBCF would be meeting a long felt need for a financial mechanism required for the conservation and management of biodiversity. The SAARC member countries may consider various instruments to tap resources for this fund. The fund may be used for supporting collective initiative such as inventorising the germplasm collected for SAARC gene bank; for setting up of crisis management group for any kind of biohazard and collective monitoring of biosafety protocol for checking transboundry movement of genetically modified organism. References l Arulnandhy V., 2003, Biotechnology and the Dilemma. The Island 20th June 2003. l Aziz, Abdul 2006, 'Biotechnology: Country Position Paper of Bangladesh'. Paper presented at Bin Asia Conference, Dhaka. l Bhutan Royal Government 2001, Country presentation by The Royal Government of Bhutan at Third United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries. l Chaturvedi, Sachin 2002, Collection of Biotechnology Statistics and Status of Biotechnology in India: An Analytical Overview, paper presented to the 3rd Ad Hoc NESTI Meeting on Biotechnology Statistics, Finland. l Chaturvedi Sachin and K.P.S. Chauhan 2000, Legal Frame Work of Cooperation in Conservation of Biodiversity in South Asia: An Indian Perspective. Dhaka, Bangladesh. l Choudhury, Naiyyum and M. Serajul Islam, 2003, Biotechnology in Bangladesh in Chaturvedi, Sachin and S.R. Rao (ed.). Biotechnology and Development: Challenges and Opportunities for Asian Region. New Delhi: Academic Foundation. l Department of Biotechnology, Annual Report, various years. l Farid, Tariq 2002, Biotechnology: Need to do the Needful. The Nation, January 28. l Financial Express, 2006, Bangladesh PM asks for a 20-year roadmap on biotechnology, July 20. l Malik, Kauser A., 2001, In Defense of Biotechnology. The Dawn, February 26. l Mehra, K. L. 2000, Plant Varieties Bill Does Safeguard Farmers' Rights, The Economic Times, December 16. l MoEF 2006, National Biosafety Framework, Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Dhaka, November l NASTEC, 2003, New Genetics and Assisted Reproductive Technologies in Sri Lanka: A Draft National Policy on Biomedical Ethics. National Science and Technology Commission. l Panta, Bikram Data and Mukti Ram Aryal, 2000, Biotechnology: Neglected Discipline in Nepal. Kathmandu Post, February 18. l Prakash, Jitendra, 1997, The Concept of Biovillage in Proceedings of Regional Trainingcum-Workshop on Application of Biotechnologies to Rainfed Farming System, including Bioindexing, emphasizing participatory approach at community level, M. S. Swaminathan Research Foundation, Chennai. l Perera, A.L.T., 2003, Sri Lanka: Risk Assessment and Management. IUCN, Sri Lanka. l Rajbhandary, B. Saman and Mukunda Ranjit, 2001, Status Report on Biotechnology Development in Nepal. Ministry of Science and Technology. Nepal. June. l RONAST, 2000, Newseletter of Royal Nepal Academy of Science and Technology, Katmandu, Nepal, December. l Seraj, Zeba I, 2001, The Exciting Future of Biotechnology. The Daily Star, January 30. l Sri Lanka, 2003, Key Technology and Economic Development MoUs Signed During Visit. Embassy of Sri Lanka in the United States of America Washington DC

l Tuladhar, S.M., 1994, Biotechnology Policy Formulation for Nepal, NCST, Kathmandu,

Nepal. l UNDP 2002, 'Bhutan Develops a National Biodiversity Conservation Strategy', October. l Yami, Kayo Devi, 1997, Potential and Problems of Biotechnology in Nepal. Proceeding.

National. Workshop on promotion of new technologies in Nepal, RONAST and Univ. Skatclyde, UK. l Yami, Kayo Devi, 2006, 'Status, Potentials and Challenges of Biotechnology Development in Nepal', presentation made at BINASIA-Nepal National Workshop 30-31 March, Katmandu, Nepal . End Notes 1 FE (2006). 2 Choudhury and Islam (2003). 3 Chaturvedi, Sachin (2002). 4 India, Sixth Five Year Plan, 1980-85, New Delhi, Planning Commission, p. 326. 5 http://www.most.gov.pk/frames/press_releases/ PressReleases/ 6 Yusuf, Zafar (2001). 7 NASTEC (2003). 8 Perera (2001). 9 The Kathmandu Post Kathmandu, Tuesday July 16, 2002. 10 Agarwal, (2003). 11 Newsletter of Royal Nepal Academy of Science and Technology, Kathmandu, Nepal, December 2000. 12 Rajbhandary and Ranjit (2001). 13 ibid 14 Tuladhar, (1994), Yami (1997), Rajbhandari and Ranjit (2001). 15 Dukpa and Yaganagi (2002). 16 Perera (2003). 17 SAARC News, January 2001.

regulation saw the growth of voluntary standards. Today, firms themselves commit to raise their environmental standards much above the statutory requirement.

An Indian Perspective on Environment Law Amir Ullah Khan

arket failures have resulted historically in the degradation of the environment as individual firms that considered the commons a public good did not have any incentive to protect the environment. That is when governments started intervening and imposing taxes. However, with a complicated relationship within market players, the taxes collected were never efficient in controlling degradation and pollution. This resulted in governmental failure to enact effective legislation and in effectively enforcing law. The Kyoto protocol establishes an enabling mechanism where emission standards are set and the polluter pays for any extra emission. By allocating the amount of emission each nation is entitled to, the protocol has established systems to ensure that the more developed economies, with large industries, do not get away with damaging the environment and causing a negative impact on climate change. Also self-regulation by industry aided by various international standard setting bodies and business associations has worked towards setting higher standards all over the world. Certification bodies and standard setting institutions now have become popular and most contracts and negotiations are carried out between firms that share a common view on standards and have adopted norms that are certified by mutually recognized institutions. For countries like India and the others in the South Asian region, it is imperative they focus on enabling markets structures to develop sustainable means of addressing environmental issues and concerns regarding climate change. Developing countries must build the capacity and sophistication required to participate efficiently in global standard setting processes. Introduction_law and regulation The degradation of the environment has become a serious cause for concern especially after the worldwide debates on this issue since the 1970s. A host of regulations emerged in India, like in other countries as a result of this heightened awareness of the problem. Lyon and Maxwell (1999) explain how the early approach to regulating the environment came by way of the “command and control” concept. This form of regulation enacted law, where clear standards were prescribed and strictly enforced. These standards went so far as to exactly specify what technology had to be used by industry. Lyon and Maxwell (1999) show how this kind of stringent regulation that specifies technology to be used is most inflexible and on account of this rigidity makes the production process inefficient. This inefficiency in regulation enabled a debate to emerge questioning the manner in which regulation first came about to prevent environmental degradation. The result was a series of market based tradable instruments that came about in the 1980s. The search for efficient market-based

Environment is often considered a public good, and therefore there is the free rider problem associated with it. Air, water and noise pollutions are example of externalities. The forest, as also all the commons are seen as public goods. In case of public goods, the free rider problem was explained very early in the twentieth century by Pigou (1928). This article argues for strict government regulation explaining that externalities with respect to the abuse of natural resources need strong laws. This is also because the various players involved are intricately tied together in a string of complicated relationships where it is difficult to ascribe costs to each player. Therefore the need arose to impose taxes and ensure that polluters pay. In complete contrast was the market-based system that came by way of the famous Coase theorem. Coase (1960) argues that taxes are inherently inefficient and the enforcement causes various difficulties. He offers instead a solution that is based on voluntary contracts and negotiated agreements. This system would do away with governmental intervention and therefore would be better enforced. In India, environment became a concern only in the 1980s after it became an economic issue in world trade and politics. Then suddenly the environment question flooded the administration and overwhelmed it by its sheer magnitude and diversity of issues. The policy-setting task, therefore, never quite assumed a central position. The limits of political economy restrict the law operating within. A trade-off exists between economic growth and environment. But, a developing country like India needs to attain a certain degree of economic growth. This is directly linked to the performance of the private sector. Naturally, insufficient penalties and wide-ranging exceptions and exclusions restrict the full scope of law. After the globalization of the Indian economy, foreign direct investment is perceived to be crucial, and so excessive regulation cannot be a disincentive. The Indian constitution and environmental law Specific provisions for the protection and promotion of the environment was absent when the Constitution of India was drafted, debated and adapted by the Constituent Assembly. It was incorporated into the constitution by the 42nd Amendment Act 1976, in the form of Directive Principles of State Policy (Article 48A) and the Fundamental Duties (Article 51 A (g)). This was in response to the Stockholm Declaration adopted by the International Conference on Human Environment in 1972, which clarifies that man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life in an environment of quality that permits a life of dignity and well being. Article 253 of the Constitution of India states that the Central Government may legislate in respect of any subject in the State List, if it is for the purpose of “implementing any treaty agreement or convention with any other country or countries or any international conference association or any other body”. In February 1980, the Committee for Environmental Protection, popularly known as the Tiwari Committee, was set up to review the existing environmental legislations. In

its proceedings the committee not only reviewed around 30 statutes relating to the environment, but also reviewed the 200 odd laws, which in the varieties of their functions do not virtually protect the environment. The committee's report was published in September 1980, and accepted by the government soon after. The Tiwari Committee, in its review of the environmental legislations, had listed out the major shortcomings and had given its recommendations which are valid even today: Most of the laws were outdated. l The laws lacked the statement of explicit policy objectives. l The laws lack adequate provisions for helping the machinery for their implementation. l The laws were mutually inconsistent. l There was no procedure for reviewing the efficacy of the existing laws. l The constitution of a Central Committee to study the laws and suggest suitable reforms. l The enactment of laws relating to noise pollution and toxic substances. l The creation of a comprehensive Environmental Code to cover all types of pollution and environmental degradation. l To empower the Pollution Control Boards with greater powers so that apart from prosecuting the polluters they would also be able to punish them. l The constitution of Environment Courts in all District Headquarters, and the appointment of experts to assist the Court. l The creation of a Department of Environment under the charge of the Prime Minister. (This suggestion was accepted and a department was constituted.). l The setting up of a Central Land Commission. l Elimination of procedural technicalities in pollution cases so that they could be decided expeditiously. l Amending the laws of evidence so that minor technicalities do not pose hurdles in the way of convicting the polluter. l Redefinition of the offences under environmental laws and greater emphasis on the compensation to the aggrieved parties. l Provision of economic incentives to the industries by way of encouraging environment friendly products, income tax and sales tax benefits for adopting clean technology, investment tax credits for purchase of purification devices, replacement cost of purification equipment in the annual operating costs, minimal tax or no tax on the manufacture of pollution control devices, etc. l Introduction of a law that would mandate that every new industry must issue a public notice about the nature of its activities, effects on the environment, etc. l Environment Impact Assessment must not only be a prerequisite for the industry to start but also must be repeated periodically. l Industries should undertake forestation programmes as part of its social duties. l There should be only one administrative and implementation machinery and multiplicity of these agencies should be avoided. l Comprehensive review and reformation of some Central and State Acts, such as those concerning the Insecticides Act, 1968, the Water Pollution Control Act,1927. l Introduction of Environment Protection, in the Concurrent List of the Seventh Schedule.

Environmental regulation The environment and its regulation is now a global issue with various perspectives and concerns. Depletion of natural resources and environmental degradation are increasingly highlighted in global dialogue as worldwide awareness of these issues increases. Resource management to control environmental pollution is a relatively new area with very little work done on it and carries the further drawback of most knowledge in this area being highly disorganized and dispersed. The problem lies not only in the fragmented information but also in the proper use of this knowledge. Information is usually varied and can change remarkably from different time periods and from different geographical locations. The management of resources therefore needs to be done based on information that is relevant and pertinent. What is important to realize is that as in all markets, human conduct is based on incentives and both the private and public sectors are affected by information costs. A solution to the problem based on taxation might not work as the information restrictions might spoil the efficiency and efficacy of the system. Examples from the East European nations and their experiences with the management of natural resources point to the fact that decentralized approaches might be far more effective. The property rights approach, which stems from the Coase theorem, has gained wide acceptance in the management of natural resources and even in the field of controlling water pollution. There is no assumption that the costs of engaging in a transaction are zero or there is perfect competition. In fact a realistic policy about natural resources and environmental policy should recognize and emphasize the costs of coordinating human actions. Self-interest guides human behavior. So, good resource stewardship depends on how well social institutions harness self-interest through individual incentives. Moreover, good resource stewardship also depends on the information available to self-interested individuals. Parker (2002) argues that in an ideal situation the open corporation stands for a coming together of government, law and democracy. The need therefore is to encourage and convince corporations to adopt environmental friendly technologies. In the recent past, this has been done through the focus on and corporate social responsibility. Individual or communal property owners who are in a position and have an incentive to obtain time-and-place-specific information about their natural resource endowments are perhaps better suited than centralized bureaucracies to manage resources. The solution is to be attained by creating a system of checks and balances on both the government and the market. The key is to give the decision-makers the incentives to manage resources properly, by creating appropriate individual or communal property rights. The role of the state and private sector The conventional approach to management of resources and environment usually ignore the systems and establishments that provide information to the political sector. Institutions that provide incentives are also largely ignored. Efficiency is of prime importance in the private sector as this has a direct bearing and impact on profits. The whole focus is therefore on getting the information and the incentives in place as it is only then that prices will be correctly set and profits will follow. The public and political sector however functions by the externalization of costs. These costs are

usually borne by the poorer sections of society. Broadway and Wildasin (1984) have shown how a simple cost-benefit analysis helps in quantifying the effect of the use of natural resources. They show that it is possible to measure the change and the economic impact of any shift in the use of resources. In the field of public finance, it can be shown that the cost benefit analysis concept can be used effectively to calculate the increase in social welfare through specific public policy measures. The use of this tool could effectively provide policy makers with enough evidence to choose between a variety of steps that can be taken in terms of protecting the environment. Product prices are determined by also taking into account the ecological costs as well as the social cost. However, since ecology also involves interaction between different species, it is not easily understood nor can the dynamics of pricing be as simple as the conventional pricing systems. Technology, manufacturing processes and alternative systems also have a direct effect on costs. The government can act by intervening in the market through taxes, financial subsidies and penalties. These measures not only help in the promotion of environment friendly procedures in both production and consumption but also serve to keep prices in control. Taxation aimed at the initial stages of production and consumption such as taxes imposed on raw material could be far more effective than taxing the latter stage violators such as taxation of pollutant emitting industries. International case studies Hauffler (1999) has shown how self regulation by industry aided by various international standard setting bodies and business associations has worked towards setting higher standards all over the world. Certification bodies and standard setting institutions now have become popular and most contracts and negotiations are carried out between firms that share a common view on standards and have adopted norms that are certified by mutually recognized institutions. Various firms have begun to self regulate to satisfy a large number of stakeholders. This objective of satisfying the stakeholders has resulted in what Hauffler refers to as a soft law that is not harshly enforced by the state but is as effective in controlling undesirable behaviour as is constitutional law. Some often quoted examples of international stakeholders ensuring good corporate behaviour in terms of environment protection are Nike and its involvement with international NGOs in setting standards in Indonesia. A number of chemical manufacturers in North America have launched comprehensive care mechanisms that lay down good practices in environmental protection. Vogel (1996) and Wong (2006) argue that self regulation is the optimal manner in which firms comply to high standards as this enables them to develop reputation. The reputational capital that is thus developed, out of voluntary practices, pays back in terms of higher share values and larger market shares among a stakeholder base that is increasingly demanding higher standards from firms and industry. A typical example used in this regard is the green funds in Europe that have been increasing in share value as environmental awareness grows. Beder (2002) explains how environment started occupying space in the policy arena when the government was educated on how corporate decisions were impacting the

environment negatively. The economic reform agenda in Australia has started liberalizing most industrial policies. This was based on providing free market conditions where each entity would operate freely and the economic considerations would outweigh environmental concerns. Laws were therefore made that would allow corporate decision-making to focus on maximizing profits and therefore allow for increased pollution levels. As a result of protest against this lack of regulation, new laws were enacted and the amount of land under forests has started increasing and the moneys being spent on environment protection by private business and state agencies has steadily gone up. This combination of government and private action is how a new paradigm in environment protection emerges that relies on both government action and self-regulation. Globalization and the environment Globalization has had a major impact on the environment with strong contentions for both its negative and positive influences. For those who advocate that globalization has had a harmful effect on the environment, proof lies in the poor enforcement of environment protection laws. They assert that increased global trade and foreign direct investments force governments to lower costs which are done by sacrificing environmental regulation and standards. However, on the other hand, those who favour globalization argue that lower barriers to trade and overseas investment help in the promotion of environment friendly technology and management systems especially if trade is being encouraged between developed countries with higher environmental standards and therefore better technologies to developing countries where access to such capabilities is limited. They contend that self-regulation has an important role to play in the management and regulation of the environment and that globalization can greatly impact the need of a firm or business to self-regulate. Globalization, by increasing multinational corporation investments in developing countries raises the expectation of their subsidiaries to self-regulate environmental performance in these countries. These multinational corporations can pass on advanced environmental technology to their subsidiaries and therefore enable the transfer of such superior technologies. Faced with competition, domestic firms too will feel pressured to adopt environment friendly procedures and also self-regulate. Further, globalization which leads to increased exports from developing countries could impact domestic firms which would feel the need to adhere to strict norms and regulations to appeal to informed and aware consumers in developed global markets where environmental performance could be an important criterion for selection (Christmann & Taylor, 2001). Weidenbaum (2004) looks at the issue of environmental standards and how the pressure on maintaining environmental standards through trade measures is fast gaining ground. However, just as in labour standards, it would be counter productive to have countries use environmental standards as trade barriers to force foreign firms to comply with domestic norms. However, as with any compulsory norm, this too is a measure that would tend to create high barriers to trade and would be distortionary. It would be much wiser to campaign for higher standards and use new techniques to highlight failure in markets to protect the environment. This would be far more effective in actually getting

exporting firms in violating contexts to adapt their technologies to environmentally friendly ones. Looking at the future: The Kyoto protocol The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 was a crucial step towards reducing human induced emission of greenhouse gases. It has set legally binding emission targets for a basket of six greenhouse gases (GHGs). Accomplishing these aims would however translate into a basic change in the processes of consumption and production, investment, energy provision and transport in all the signatory countries. Developed countries and economies in transition were committed to a 5.2 per cent reduction in emissions of greenhouse gases from the levels existing in 1990 by 2008-12. Issues could arise if governments decide to use subsidies to control and reduce national emission level. Probable subsidies could include the promotion of the use of renewable energy, or the promotion of fuel _switching to sources that are less greenhouse gas intensive in nature. As a result these subsidies would be sector specific and lead to the impairment of market shares of competing foreign producers leading to conflicts with WTO law. Do emissions traders exchange 'goods' by the WTO definition? If they do, then the exclusive right to trade them among Annex I parties will violate the WTO's most favoured nation (MFN) principle by discriminating against non-Annex I trading partners.1 Countries will need to allocate emissions rights to various industries, which can be seen as providing subsidies to certain industries, especially if they are exportoriented, and hence illegal.2 The Kyoto Protocol has created an international market for “carbon currencies”. These currencies or tradable units are of four different kinds, namely assigned amount units (AAUs); emission reduction units (ERUs); certified emission reductions (CERS); and removal units (RMUs). The United Kingdom introduced a domestic emissions trading scheme in 2002. The EU has been discussing a proposal for an Emissions Trading Scheme. Canada and Japan are also in the process of introducing domestic emission trading schemes. Since the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, trading in carbon rights and domestic schemes for trade in greenhouse gas emission allowances are much in use. This trading is what India and in fact South Asia are fast moving towards but these would require a certain degree of sophistication in auditing and accounting practices. The report on Climate and Trade rules by the National Board of Trade, Sweden3 points out that there are three potential areas of concern in the context of WTO rules: l The method of allocation of emission allowances. l Rules concerning the services that support emissions trading. l Rules for new entrants.

The report shows how international trade in emission allowances raises these and other concerns. Can cross-border trade of emission allowances fall under WTO rules? There are a number of interpretations. The non trade aspect of environment protection is the first. It is but obvious that these allowances are a creation of the Kyoto Protocol and therefore should only be governed by the Climate Convention or the Kyoto Protocol. However the agreement leaves enough room for members to file

cases of abuse in the WTO's dispute resolution mechanism. The report showcases how emission trading is neither a good nor a service. It argues that international emissions trading is the result of governments creating obligations amongst themselves,4 “a subsequent rearrangement of these obligations is not a trade in goods or services”. Under this interpretation, WTO rules would not regulate whether a Kyoto Protocol Annex B party has to allow emissions trading with another Annex B Party, a NonAnnex B Party or a Non-Party to the Protocol. It can also be argued that initial allocations are not subsidies. However, what is allocated and traded is an obligation created between governments and therefore is not covered by WTO rules; but regarding a domestic trading systems it is simultaneously argued that allocation of allowances might be viewed as a subsidy.5 Non-actionable subsidies6 are those that cannot be challenged as a basis for undertaking countervailing duties. The Kyoto Protocol authorizes the transfer of technology, development of projects, investments and emissions trading between developed and developing countries. The basic feature of trading in emissions as governed by the Kyoto Protocol is an exchange of emission rights between states. It is through the Kyoto Protocol that nations are allocated an emissions “budget” or an “assigned amount”. These nations then have the right to sell or buy parts of these rights. The Kyoto Protocol does not explicitly require the participation of public and private firms, but it is these entities that will trade in rights. However, it is also important to note that the protocol binds nations and not private firms. Implementation of the rights system is the responsibility of each member state. The protocol sets out, for the first time, provisions for an international emissions trading system, thus, imparting an economic value to each unit of emission reduced and in the process providing a fiscal incentive to find ways to lower the cost of emission reduction on a global basis. The difference in the marginal cost of reducing emissions among the participant is largely expected to optimize the `returns' on investment by attracting funding to projects where there is a greater scope of emissions reduction per unit of investment. The Kyoto protocol therefore establishes an enabling mechanism where emission standards are set and the polluter pays for any extra emission. By allocating the amount of emission each nation is entitled to, the protocol has established systems to ensure that the more developed economies, with large industries, do not get away with damaging the environment and causing a negative impact on climate change. Conclusion Market failures have historically resulted in the degradation of the environment as individual firms that considered the commons a public good did not have any incentive to protect the environment. That is when governments started intervening and imposing taxes. However, with a complicated relationship within market players, the taxes collected were never efficient in controlling degradation and pollution. This resulted in governmental failure to enact effective legislation and in effectively enforcing law. As a result what we see now is a stronger legal institution emerging, but along with market based mechanisms that allow for private contracts, higher than mandated standards and a movement towards collective action for saving the environment. References

Reference l Anil Agarwal (ed.), (1985), The Sate of India's Environment: A Second Citizen's Report, Centre for Science and Environment, New Delhi. l Brewer T. L. “The WTO and the Kyoto Protocol Interaction Issues. Climate Policy, Vol. 4. 2004. l Bromley, Daniel W. (1991), “Environment and Economy: Property Rights and Public Policy”, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. l Buck, M. and Verheyen, R.. “International Trade Law and Climate Change - A Positive Way Forward.” 2001. l Carlane. C. The Kyoto Protocol and the WTO: Reconciling Tensions Between Free Trade and Environmental Objectives. Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy. 2006. l Chambers, W. B. (2001), “International Trade Law and the Kyoto Protocol: Potential Incompatibilities.” in Chambers, W. B., ed. (2001), Global Climate Governance: Interlinkages between the Kyoto Protocol and other Multilateral Regimes Inter-linkages, United Nations University Press l Charnovitz, S. Trade and Climate: Potential Conflicts and Synergies, Pew Center on Global Climate Change, July 2003, working draft. p. 2f, 15 l Cheung, S. N. S. (1970), 'The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-Exclusive Resource', Journal of Law and Economics, 13/1: 49-70. l Christmann, P. & Taylor, G. (2001). “Globalization and the Environment: Determinants of Firm Self-Regulation in China.” At http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=277452. Last accessed May 21st, 2007 l Ciriacy-Wantrup, S.V., and Richard C. Bishop (1975),"Common Property As a Concept in Natural Resource Policy", Natural Resource Journal, 15(4), pp.713. l Coase, R. (1960), “The Problem of Social Cost”, The Journal of Law and Economics, New York l Coase, Ronald (1960), "The Problem of Social Cost", Journal of Law and Economics, 3, pp.1. l Colchester, Marcus (1992), Sustaining the Forests: The Community Based Approach in South and South-East Asia, pp. 69-100 l Cosbey, A. Kyoto Protocol and the WTO. Seminar Note. International Institute for S u s t a i n a b l e D e v e l o p m e n t . 1 9 9 9 . A t http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e/subs_e.htm. Last Accessed 7th May, 2007. l Dasgupta, P. and G. Heal (1974), 'The Optimal Depletion of Exhaustible Resources', Review of Economic Studies, Symposium on the Economics of Exhaustible Resources, 41: 3-28. l Demsetz, Harold (1967), "Towards a Theory of Property Rights", American Economic Review, 57, pp. 347. l Fischer, K. and Schot, J. (1993). Eds. Environmental Strategies for Industry, Island Press, Washington DC l Gadgil, M. and Ramachandra Guha (1992), This Fissured Land: An Ecological History of India, Oxford University Press, New Delhi. l Galanter Marc (1994), Law and Society in Modern India, Oxford University Press, New Delhi. l Guha, Ramachandra (1990), "An Early Environmental Debate : The Making of the 1878 Act", Indian Economic and Social History Review, 27, 1 l Hardin, G., (1968), "The tragedy of commons", Science, 162, pp. 1243-48. l Haufler, V. (1999), “Self-Regulation and Business Norms: Political Risk, Political Activism” in Cutler, A., Haufler, V. and Porter, T eds., Private Authority and International Affairs, State University of New York Press, Albany l Jinnah, S. Emission Trading Under the Kyoto Protocol: NAFTA and WTO Concerns. Georgetown International Environmental Law Review. 2003.

l Lawrence, A., Weber, J. and Post, J. (2005), Business and Society: Stakeholders, Ethics,

Public Policy, 11th ed., McGraw Hill, Boston l Lyon P T and Maxwell, J W, (1999) Voluntary Approcahes to Envirnmental Regyualtion: A

survey, Environmental Economics: Past, Present and the Future, Ashgate Publishing Ltd, Hampshire l Mayers, J. and Stephen Bass (1999), “Policy that works for Forests and People”, International Institute for Environment and Development, UK. l McKean M A (1986) 'Management of Traditional Lands ('Iriachi') in Japan' in National Research Council, Proceedings of the Conference on Common Property Resource Management, Washington DC, pp533-589. l Nathan, Dev and Govind Kelkar (2001), “Case for Local Forest Management : Environmental Services, Internalisation of Costs and Markets”, Economic and Political Weekly, July 28. l National Board of Trade, Climate and Trade Rules - Harmony or Conflict? Stockholm, 2004. l North, D. (1990), “Institutions Institutional Change and Economic Performance” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. l Ostrom, E. (1990), Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. l Ostrom, E. (1990), Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge l Panayotou, T. (1988), Comments on Kenneth Ruddle's "The Organization of Traditional Inshore fishery Management Systems in the Pacific"', in P. Neher, R. Arnason, and N. Mollett (eds.), Rights Based Fishing, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, pp. 86-93. l Parker, C. (2002), The Open Corporation, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge l Pearce, D. W., (1941) Economics and environment : essays on ecological economics and sustainable development, Elgar Publications, Cheltenham l Petsonk, A. 'The Kyoto Protocol and the WTO: Integrating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Allowance Trading into the Global Market Place,' Duke Environmental Lawand Policy Forum,1999. 10, 1: 185-220 l Pigou, A C, (1928), A Study in Public Finance, The Economic Journal, McMillan, London l Repetto, Robert (1997), 'Macroeconomic Policies and Deforestation' in Partha Dasgupta and Karl-Goran Maler (eds), The Environment and Emerging Development Issues, Vol 2, Clarendon Press, Oxford. l Runge, C. F. (1986), “Common Property and Collective Action in Economic Development”, World Development, 14/5, pp. 623-35. l Sarin, Madhu (1996), “Who Is Gaining? Who Is Losing? Gender and Equity Concerns in Joint Forest Management”, Working paper by the Gender and Equity sub-group, National support group for JFM, Society for Wasteland Development, New Delhi. l Schwartz, Herman M., 1958 States versus markets : history, geography, and the development of the international political economy St. Martin's Press, New York l Singh, Gurdip (1995), Environmental Law, Lawman (India) Private Limited, New Delhi, pp. 185. l Weidenbaum, M. (2004), Business and Government in the Global Marketplace, 7th ed., Prentice Hall, New York l Wiser, G. M. 'The Clean Development Mechanism Versus the World Trade Organizaion: Can Free-Market Greenhouse Gas Emissions Abatement Survive Free Trade?,' Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, 1999. 11, 3: 531-598 l Wong, S, (2006) Environmental technology development in liberal and coordinated market economies : tweaking institutions, Palgrave Macmillan

End Notes 1 The MFN principle does not allow any member country of the WTO to discriminate against any other member country of the 150 member strong organization. If however, emissions credits are "securities" or transferable financial instruments, then they are not governed by GATT's rules. Instead, the institutions that would be needed to oversee the transfer of these securities would have to comply with the General Agreement on Trade in Services, or GATS. 2 Aaron Cosbey, The Kyoto Protocol and the WTO. Seminar Note. International Institute for Sustainable Development. 1999. At http://www.wto.org/english/ tratop_e/scm_e / subs_e.htm 3 National Board of Trade. Climate and Trade Rules - Harmony or Conflict? Stockholm, 2004. 4 Charnovitz, S. Trade and Climate: Potential Conflicts and Synergies, Pew Center on Global Climate Change, July 2003, working draft. p. 2f, 15 5 Chambers, W. B. (2001), “International Trade Law and the Kyoto Protocol: Potential Incompatibilities.” in Chambers, W. B., ed. (2001), Global Climate Governance: Interlinkages between the Kyoto Protocol and other Multilateral Regimes Inter-linkages, United Nations University Press 6 Thomas L Brewer. “The WTO and the Kyoto Protocol Interaction Issues. Climate Policy, 4(2004). Pp 3-12.

Biofuels Trade: Pakistan Case Study Shaheen Rafi Khan, Moeed Yusuf, Selina Adam Khan, Reza Abbasy

he Climate Change 2007, Fourth Assessment Report, has finally muted the skeptics. Climate change predictions regarding temperature and rainfall, the frequency and severity of extreme events and sea level rise are both dire and scientifically accurate. There is a corresponding urgency to address both the causes (mitigation) and the effects (adaptation). Renewable energy in general, and biofuels, in particular, has begun to look like an increasingly viable mitigation option. For the north they offer prospects for meeting their emission reduction commitments. The south sees in them a way to both reduce energy import bills as well as earn precious foreign exchange. However, risks are associated with going this route. Global environmental benefits also generate adverse local environmental impacts, as forests are cut down to grow 'energy' crops. Similarly, multinationals offer price incentives to farmers to switch food to fuel, thereby threatening food security. The rapid uptake of biofuels reflects, among other things, the ease with which it can replace or be blended with fossil fuels such as petrol and diesel. World biofuel production in 2006 amounted to 38 billion liters. Brazil is presently the largest producer of ethanol in the world (4.23 million gallons), matched by the United States (4.26 million gallons) and China (1 million gallons).1 Blending compatibility also explains why many countries have picked up on biofuels as an easy way to reduce their oil import bill or to earn foreign exchange. Thailand is building over a dozen ethanol plants using sugarcane and rice husks as a fuel source. China has constructed the world's largest fuel ethanol facility at Jilin. It uses corn, but Chinese biofuel distillers are also experimenting with cassava, sweet potato and sugarcane. Beijing is reportedly planning to import Brazilian ethanol as well. Japan has already gone that route; it signed its first 15 million-liter deal with Brazil in May 2006 as a prelude to replacing up to 3 per cent of Japan's gasoline. This is predicted to generate a demand for 1.8 billion liters of fuel ethanol a year. The US is the main importer of bioethanol, accounting for 31 per cent of global imports. US imports represent 5 per cent of domestic production and they mainly come from Brazil (54 per cent). The European Union (EU) imports a large proportion of the bioethanol it uses, mainly from Brazil and Pakistan. Its plans for the future entail replacing consumption of fossil fuels by 6 per cent by 2010. This will significantly boost the growing biofuels trade and would require a fivefold increase in the production of biofuel crops_a gap other countries hope to help fill.2 Malaysia, for one, is expanding oil-palm plantations and setting up biodiesel plants expressly to serve the German market.

A global biofuel economy, with a division of labor favoring the most efficient producers, would be a key boon to developing countries. Year round growing seasons and cheap farm labor offer a valuable competitive advantage over cold, high-cost northern countries. Super-efficient Brazil now sells ethanol at the equivalent of US $25 a barrel, less than half the cost of crude. Because parts of the sugar-cane plant are used both to fertilize the fields and to fire up the distilleries, Brazil uses much less fossil fuel to produce alcohol than Europe and America. In those countries, by contrast, ethanol cost about US $70 and US $50, respectively and up because of shorter growing seasons, lower crop yields, and higher wages. Yet this emerging global market in biofuels is running into political trouble. Developed country farm lobbies provide a momentum to biofuels development, but they also demand protectionist barriers. "Everyone pretends [their enthusiasm] is for the environment, but it's all about agricultural subsidies," biofuels expert Delahouliere warns. To encourage biofuels, the EU pays farmers 45 euros for each hectare of "energy crops" they grow.3 That provides them a powerful incentive to produce and keeps cheap foreign bioethanol from entering their market. When Pakistan got special access to EU markets in 2002 and began shipping bioethanol, local farm lobbies persuaded Brussels to change course and re-establish tariffs. The United States also imposes a 50-cent-a-gallon import duty on Brazilian ethanol. In addition, almost every country has its own biofuel standard with different specifications.4 The preamble provides both a backdrop and a context for this study. Essentially a scoping exercise, its objectives are to: a) assess the production potential of energy crops in Pakistan; b) evaluate the foreign exchange savings potential from reduced fossil fuel imports and the foreign exchange earnings potential from biofuel exports; c) assess the sustainable development (SD) implications of increased biofuel production and trade and; d) suggest economic and institutional policy options to promote the production, domestic use and exports of biofuels. The study also presents anticipatory policy measures and identifies research gaps where more work needs to be done to maximize SD at minimum risk. Section 1 provides a characterization of Pakistan's biofuel sector. Section 2 describes the biofuel value chain. In section 3, we provide an overview of domestic and international policies governing bioethanol production and trade. Section 4 focuses on the sustainable development concerns related to biofuel production and use. Section 5 recaps the major arguments. Section 1 Characterization of the biofuel sector In the study context, the term 'biofuel sector' refers to the primary, secondary and tertiary stages of production. The process includes sugarcane production, sugar refining and conversion of molasses to biofuels. In Pakistan's case, the end product is ethanol.

Contribution of sugarcane and sugar production to the national economy The sugar industry in Pakistan is the second largest after textiles. Currently, 76 sugar mills are functional in the country.5 Sugar production in Pakistan has shown an upward trend since the 1990s. From a production level of 2.89 million tons in 199192, production reached 4 million tons in 2003-04.6 Notwithstanding, sugar production has been fluctuating over the years, primarily due to unpredictable sugarcane yields. An increase in sugarcane production is possible through yield increases which, currently, are well below the global average. In contrast, the scope for area expansion is limited (NCS, 1992).7 Table 1: Sugar Production and Yield in Pakistan Area'000 Hectares Year

Punjab

Sindh

NWFP

Baloch

Pakistan

5-Years Avg

669.5

253.7

105.8

0.7

1029.7

2000-01

615.5

238.8

105.9

0.6

960.8

2001-02

656.8

240.7

101.5

0.7

999.7

2002-03

735.3

258.6

104.9

0.8

1099.6

2003-04

709

259.9

104.8

0.8

1074.5

2004-05

644.7

214.9

106.4

0.4

966.4

5-Years Avg

28693

14837.8

4803.5

36.9

48371.2

2000-01

26740

12049.7

4784.4

32.2

43606.3

2001-02

31803.1

11416.3

4787.2

48041.6

2002-03

33168.6

13797.6

5049

40.6

52055.8

2003-04

34023

14611.8

4745.6

38.6

53419

2004-05

33048

9357.4

4816.2

22.5

47244.1

5-Years Avg

42.86

58.49

45.40

52.71

46.98

2000-01

43.44

50.46

45.18

53.67

45.38

2001-02

48.42

47.43

47.16

48.06

2002-03

45.11

53.35

48.13

50.75

47.34

2003-04

47.99

56.22

45.28

48.25

49.72

2004-05

51.26

43.54

45.27

56.25

48.89

Production'000 Tonnes

Yield per Hectare (Production/Area)

Source: Agriculture Statistics of Pakistan, 2005 -06.

For most years, Pakistan consumes all the sugar produced within the country meeting excess demand through imports. Pakistan imported 0.27 million tons of sugar in 2004-05 and faced a domestic shortage again the following year, in 2005-06, which had to be met through imports. In the few years when the country produced surpluses, high production costs prevented exports. Despite a more than doubling of sugar prices since 1992, Pakistan continues to remain globally uncompetitive. In fact, the emerging markets in ethanol offer prospects of making sugarcane production economically viable.8

Biofuel production potential Pakistan's bioethanol production grew rapidly, by 3 per cent in 2000, 7 per cent in 2001, 9 per cent in 2002 and 14 per cent in 2003. Bioethanol is produced entirely from molasses, a direct by-product of sugar production. While other indigenous raw materials, such as maize, rice, wood pulp and other forest residues are available in large quantities, they do not offer the same scope for additionality that sugarcane does. In other words, the opportunity cost of producing bioethanol is substantially lower than what it would entail for other available sources. The SD implications are, therefore, positive. Bioethanol production will not displace food crops or cause deforestation due to land clearing. Basically, there is a large untapped potential to convert raw molasses to bioethanol, provided the right kind of policy incentives are in place. Molasses are a direct by-product of the cane crushing process. Table 2 shows the production levels of molasses since 1990. The fluctuating trend tracks sugar production. In part, molasses production has also been held back somewhat by a slight improvement in the sugar recovery rate.9

Year

Table 2: Molasses Production in Pakistan (Million tonnes) Pakistan Punjab Sindh NWFP

1990-91

1.12

0.61

0.47

0.04

1991-92

1.17

0.54

0.58

0.04

1992-93

1.33

0.63

0.65

0.05

1993-94

1.69

0.97

0.68

0.05

1994-95

1.65

1.01

0.59

0.05

1995-96

1.36

0.82

0.50

0.04

1996-97

1.32

0.80

0.48

0.03

1997-98

1.98

1.24

0.68

0.06

1998-99

2.11

1.28

0.76

0.08

1999-00

1.40

0.80

0.53

0.06

2000-01

1.50

0.90

0.55

0.04

2001-02

1.82

1.22

0.52

0.08

2002-03

2.05

1.30

0.66

Source: Pakistan Sugar Mills Association, Annual Report 2003

Despite the increase in sugar and molasses production, bioethanol production has remained miniscule in terms of its contribution to the national economy. As we indicate later, the unrealized potential reflects policy lapses, particularly the absence of an incentive framework. Until recently, the bulk of the raw molasses were exported, with only minor quantities converted to industrial alcohol for domestic use and export. An even smaller proportion was converted into ethanol for export. While recent policy impetus enhanced interest in the sector, unpredictable global demand, thanks largely to European import restrictions, dampened industry interest in

producing ethanol. Alcohol exports Export of molasses have remained between 0.70 million to 1.75 million tonnes over the years. However, over the past five years, a substantial proportion of these molasses was converted into three grades of alcohol i.e. fuel or anhydrous, neutral or extra-neutral (ENA) and industrial or rectified ethanol (REN). Table 3: Export of molasses Year 1990-91 1991-92 1 992-93 1 993-94 1 994-95 1 995-96 1996-97 1 997-98 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03

Quantity (000 tonnes) 776.07 947.00 892.62 703.45 769.64 806.40 1,056.13 1,359.33 1,688.51 1,748.00 1,190.01 1,607.38 1,272.63

Value (Million Rs.) 0.82 1.35 1.40 0.99 1.21 1.85 2.02 2.54 1.80 2.20 2.46 3.90 2.65

Source: Pakistan Sugar Mills Association, Annual Report 2003

Pakistan exports two forms of alcohol: undenture ethyl alcohol and ethyl alcohol spirit.10 Presently around 21 distilleries in the country operate at roughly 60 per cent capacity, converting on average 1.8 million tons of molasses.11 Fuel grade ethanol, which is blended in petroleum products, fetches the highest price in the world market. Requiring 99.80 per cent purity, pure alcohol can be converted into fuel ethanol through the simple molecular sieve process. Alcohol exports increased rapidly over the past five years, as indicated by the trend data below. The bulk of exports went to Japan and the EU, with Italy being the single largest recipient within EU. Notwithstanding, exports to EU as a whole declined in the wake of Pakistan's removal from the General System of Preferences (GSP) scheme. Pakistan exported around 167,610 tons of alcohol during 2006 and about 22,975 tons during first two months of 2007. The average export price for different grades of alcohol ranged from USD 560 to USD 680 per ton. Total earnings amounted to USD 100.6 million in 2006. The value-addition in molasses through its conversion into alcohol has enabled exporters to earn eight to ten times more foreign exchange.12

Figure 1: Pakistan’s industrial alcohol exports 1400000 1200000 1000000 800000 600000 400000 200000 0 1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics (statistics from various years). Note: Measurement in litres

The main destinations for Pakistani industrial alcohol exports in 2004 were Italy (30%), Japan (18%), France (10%) and Turkey (9%).13 Including the Netherlands, more than 50 per cent of Pakistan's total industrial alcohol exports went to the EU prior to the imposition of the revised GSP (see International policies, p 57).14 Figure 2: Destination of exports

Destination of Pakistan exports 2004 Switzerland – 6% Singapore – 6%

France – 15%

Netherlands – 6%

Japan – 22%

Italy – 45%

many as 50 per cent of the farmers consider ratoon crop a bonus and maintain cane crop as ratoon.15 However, average yields of the ratoon crop are low even by Pakistani standards. Furthermore, water availability is a serious problem. Sugarcane cultivation coincides with the summer months when water is scarce; competing crops limit the availability of water for the sugarcane crop. Finally, water logging and salinity remains a major concern since a number of areas under cane cultivation are affected by salinity and thus sugarcane yields are lowered drastically as is the sugar content in the cane.16 Moreover, despite being the fifth largest sugarcane producer, Pakistan ranks fifteenth in terms of global sugar production. The low sugarcane yields, stagnant acreage and low sugar recovery ratios are the major reasons for the high cost of production of sugar in Pakistan, compared to other major sugar producers world wide. Table 4 : Major Sugarcane Producers in the World Int ($ 1000) MT Brazil 8,725,914 420,121,000 India 4,825,286 232,320,000 China 1,819,452 88,730,000 Thailand 1,029,610 49,572,000 Pakistan 981,260 47,244,100 Mexico 937,277 45,126,500 Colombia 827,669 39,849,240 Australia 794,369 38,246,000 Philippines 643,870 31,000,000 United States of 535,948 25,803,960 America Indonesia 529,635 25,500,000 South Africa 451,230 21,725,100 Argentina 400,861 19,300,000 Guatemala 373,860 18,000,000 Egypt 339,278 16,335,000 Viet Nam 311,550 15,000,000 Cuba 259,625 12,500,000 Venezuela, 182,776 8,800,000 Peru 147,467 7,100,000 Iran 135,005 6,500,000 Source: Major food and agricultur al producers, Food and Agriculture Organization

Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics 2004-05

Section 2 Biofuel value chain Sugarcane production Pakistan is the world's fifth largest sugarcane producer. However, in terms of per acre yield, it compares unfavorably with other major producers. The low yield is a consequence of poor agronomic practices. Land is poorly prepared with simple cultivators which do not plough the fields to the depth required for a deep-rooted crop like sugarcane. Seed qualities are also often poor and the seed rates used are low, the latter resulting in lower plant population. Moreover, while fertilizers are applied heavily, their use is imbalanced for the most part. Another factor constraining sugarcane yield is poor management of the ratoon crop. A recent survey found that as

As indicated earlier, after cotton, sugarcane is the largest non-grain crop produced in the country.17 Sugarcane is grown on nearly one million hectares, which represents 4 per cent of the total cropped area.18 A large proportion of the farmers growing sugarcane own less than two hectares. Such farms cover a total of approximately 140,000 hectares. Underscoring the disparity, farms over 4 hectares cover the bulk of the cropped land area.

Size of Farms (Hectares)

All farms Under 0.5 ha. 0.5 - 1.0 ha. 1.0 - 2.0 ha. 2.0 - 3.0 ha. 3.0 - 5.0 ha. 5.0 - 10.0 ha. 10.0 - 20.0 ha. 20.0 - 40.0 ha. 40.0 - 60.0 ha. 60.0 ha. and above

Table 5: Area Under Sugarcane by Farm Size Total Farms Farms reporting sugarcane No of farms %age Area distributi (hectares) on 6620224 838997 884214 1290098 39830 4.75 10085 1099330 76786 9.15 31647 1425370 179563 21.40 99307 966411 160269 19.10 116255 890755 183963 21.93 181941 580200 124965 14.89 165855 260791 51837 6.18 126129 77773 16318 1.94 83187 15277 2718 0.32 22542 14054 2720 0.32 46539

Alcohol production %age distribut-ion

1.14 3.58 11.23 13.15 20.58 18.76 14.26 9.41 2.55 5.26

Source: Agriculture Census Report, 2000.

Sugarcane owners fall in one of the three tenure classes: landowner, tenant/sharecropper, and lessee. A study on the socio-economic impact of sugarcane cultivation in Pakistan found the majority of growers in Punjab to be landowners, while most cultivation in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) was undertaken by tenants.19 No sugarcane cooperatives exist in the country. Growers continue to interact with their buyers in individual capacities. About 80-85 per cent of the total sugarcane production goes towards the production of sugar.20 The remaining 15-20 per cent is converted into gur, a local variant of sugar, which is largely produced and consumed in the NWFP.21 The government establishes the support price of sugarcane annually based on various economic considerations.22 While the aim is to protect small sugarcane growers from exploitation, policy loopholes negate this intent. The most important commission relates to zoning. Lobbying by the sugar mills has made such zoning selective. Under the zoning laws, sugar mills can only purchase from designated areas; the purpose is to restrict the growth of sugar mills and hence prevent the creation of excess capacity. However, the government has succumbed to large investors and instituted de-zoning arrangements, which allow sugar mills to purchase from anywhere. This creates pricing distortions which adversely affects small farmers, who then are compelled to sell at distress prices thanks to over supply. The middleman (beopari) and the premature crop contractor also exploit small and medium sugarcane farmers. Their financial dependence (for loans) on such intermediaries forces them to accept the price on offer. Finally during the harvesting season, sugar mills withhold immediate payments. The potential loss of weight through such orchestrated delays forces the farmers to sell at less than the official price. The Afghan refugee influx however provided a temporary reprieve to the NWFP farmers since gur is a preferred consumer item in Afghanistan. Gur making is a cottage industry and tax exempt. Therefore, given the higher profit margins of gur makers, producers are able to pay better prices to the sugarcane farmers in the NWFP.

The essential characteristics of the sugar industry have already been discussed. Cane crushing produces sugar and molasses as a by-product. The molasses-to-bioethanol conversion process is conducted in distilleries. Currently, 21 distilleries exist in the country. The following table provides the installed capacities of the distilleries. Table 6: List of Distilleries and Installed Capacities (2005-06) Name

Ltr/Day

M.T./Day

M.T/Yr

Frontier-Takhat Bhai

14,000

2,800

Premier-Mardan

46,000

9,200

Khazana-Peshawar

23,000

4,600

Crescent-Faisalabad

22,000

4,400

Noon-Bhalwal

80,000

16,000

C.S.K.-Phalia

125,000

100

25,000

Shakarganj -I- Jhang

160,000

128

32,000

Shakarganj -II- Jhang

100,000

20,000

Crystaline-Sargodha

100,000

20,000

Chishtia

100,000

20,000

United Ethanol-Sadiqabad

100,000

20,000

Haseeb Waqas-Nankana

125,000

100

25,000

Tandianwala-Faisalabad

125,000

100

25,000

Habib-Nawab Shah

143,500

115

28,700

Al Abbas- Mirpur Khas

170,000

136

34,000

Shah Murad-Thatta

125,000

100

25,000

Dewan-Thatta

125,000

100

25,000

Uni Col-Mirpur Khas

100,000

20,000

Mitiari-Hyderabad

100,000

20,000

Pinnacle-Badin

125,000

100

25,000

Murree Brewery-Rwp

9,000

Total

2,017,518

1,800

1,614

403,500

Source: Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry, 2005-06.

The majority of the distilleries are a part of sugar mills and are situated on-site. This makes integration of the bioethanol production chain relatively simple. The mill receives the cane, crushes for sugar, stores the molasses in storage tanks on-site, and then passes it on to the distillery for industrial alcohol production. Industrial alcohol can be converted into fuel alcohol in a simple process by using molecular sieve technology, which requires a capital expenditure of USD 1.5 million and can be completed in 5 to 6 months.23 As many as 8 distilleries have installed the sieve technology to process industrial ethanol into fuel ethanol. The fuel ethanol conversion plant is linked to the industrial alcohol plant. Notwithstanding the integrated production cycle, we found during out interviews that the distilleries are unable to satisfy their entire demand from internal molasses production. They purchase additional molasses from other sugar mills not having distillation facilities.24

Alcohol distribution Distilleries in Pakistan have three major buyers. Domestic industry purchases industrial alcohol for various purposes. Fuel ethanol is currently only being sold domestically in small quantities to Pakistan State Oil (PSO) as part of a pilot project. PSO blends the ethanol with gasoline in a 10 per cent ratio. The third and predominant outlet is exports. Industrial and fuel ethanol are exported through international trade houses.25 They are brought from distilleries throughout the country to the Karachi port for onward shipping to different parts of the world. The bulk of the bioethanol exported finds its way into industries and is used for various industrial uses. The final consumers of exported biofuel are oil refineries where the biofuel is blended with gasoline in a 10:90 ratio. No Pakistani distilleries however deal directly with the end-users of bioethanol. Trade is conducted through trade houses which act as intermediaries.

Biofuel promotion policies Domestic policies The correct mix of domestic policies can produce desirable economic and environmental outcomes. Such polices should focus on export and import substitution, which will generate both foreign exchange earnings and savings. To date, one of the main reasons for the retarded growth of the biofuel industry is the lack of enabling government policies that could motivate the private sector, supporting its demonstrated willingness to invest. Sustaining such investment requires the correct mix of policy incentives and political will. Import substitution Pakistan imported petroleum products worth USD 3.1 billion in fiscal year 2006, which accounted for 85 per cent of the total oil consumption in the country. This also constitutes a large chunk of the country's trade deficit. Clearly, a shift towards local fuel ethanol consumption would save the country considerable foreign exchange. Any decrease in foreign exchange earnings or government revenue due to reduced molasses exports or subsidies and tax breaks that may be necessary to incentivize the fuel ethanol industry would be more than offset by the forex gains due to a decrease in oil consumption. Below we produce four future scenarios for fuel ethanol use in the country and the estimated reduction in the oil import bill under each scenario (see annex 1 for background data used to calculate scenarios).

Figure 3: Biofuel sector flowchart

Exports

Export houses

Ethanol

Industrial alcohol

Section 3

Industry

Vertically integrated

Assumptions

Molasses Exports Consumer Distilleries Sugar Molasses

Cane processing

Table 7: Foreign Exchange Saving in Terms of Oil Import Reductions Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 The entire production of Entire production of molasses is Current exports of molasses is used to make used to make ethanol, such that molasses continue (0.4 50 fuel ethanol; the re is no 50% of molasses are used to million tons); The rest is export of molasses make fuel ethanol and 50% are converted to fuel ethanol used to make industrial ethanol; there is no export of molasses

Estimated production of 284,240 MT fuel ethanol Potential foreign US$ 125,065,600 exchange savings through reduction in oil imports Source: In-house calculation

142,120 MT

198,740 MT

Scenario 4 Current exports of molasses continue (0.450 million tons); 50% of the remaining is converted to fuel ethanol and 50% to industrial ethanol 99,370 MT

US $ 62,532,800

US $ 87,445,600

US $ 43,722,800

Gur making

Middleman (beopari)

Sugarcane production

Both the economics and production conditions for bioethanol are favorable. Fuel ethanol is highly price-competitive with gasoline. While a detailed comparative estimate has not been attempted, the guesstimate is that the unit cost of production is approximately half that of gasoline, accounting for crude import and processing costs. The raw material, molasses, is abundantly available. Also, the potential for producing fuel ethanol from major crops, such as rice and maize, and wood pulp and forest products has not been tapped. Pakistan consumed 1.6 million tones of gasoline in the

fiscal year 2006. A 10 per cent blend represents a foreign exchange saving of USD 300 million, which doubles at a 20 per cent_ and feasible_blend. The private sector has swung its weight in favor of fuel ethanol production, stipulating the following conditions:

The Pakistan Sugar recommendations:

Mills

Association

has

made

the

following

1. 'A mandatory 10% blending with petrol be announced after consultation with the oil companies. To make it viable for the oil companies substantial tax breaks may be announced. Most obvious in the list of incentives for the Sugar Mills Association is the removal of General Sales Tax on the sale of industrial alcohol which is currently imposed. While this will only impact government revenues marginally, it may in fact prove consequential in incentivizing domestic sales of ethanol if enough demand is generated. Throughout the world the blending program is introduced with full support of the Government and by offering major incentives to the industrial stakeholders. No change in car engines is required for a 10% blend. 2. 10% blend can be increased, subsequently, with minimal changes in the engine. 3. All auto mobile companies must be given a target to produce a certain percentage of flex fuel cars by a certain date. This percentage should then increase in the following years. 4. Other sources of raw material; maize, wheat, rice, potatoes, sorghum etc., should be explored by the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock (MINFAL) 5. As the program moves ahead and the consumption of fuel ethanol increases, the sugar industry can make ethanol directly from cane juice, as is done in Brazil and many other countries. 6. For the program to succeed it is imperative to set the price of fuel ethanol according to the price of molasses. A system of determining the price of molasses can be set-up in consultation with all the stakeholders. 7. To ensure the availability of molasses, the Government might have to restrict the export of molasses, as is done in several countries. But this can be done only by taken all stakeholders into confidence. Source: Ministry of Industries, Production and Special Initiatives, â&#x20AC;&#x153;Production & Consumption of Ethanol & Gasol in Pakistan. Formulation of a National Policy To Encourage the Local Production Of Ethanol /Gasol In Pakistanâ&#x20AC;?.

In July 2006, Pakistan State Oil (PSO) and the Hydro Carbon Institute of Pakistan (HDIP) announced a pilot project to introduce blended fuel within the country aimed at meeting the energy shortfall. In three PSO petrol pumps (Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad), fuel ethanol is being blended with gasoline in a 10:90 ratio (E10). However, there is a cosmetic aspect to this initiative. Essentially, despite fuel ethanol's potential and private sector backing, policy support is still nascent; further, the prognosis is not encouraging. While the government has directed the petroleum

ministry to develop a long-term fuel ethanol conversion plan, it is almost self-evident that the oil lobby will stall progress. The private sector communicated certain policy proposals to the government, highlighting these repeatedly during our interviews. These included a ceiling on molasses exports and a subsidy on bioethanol production to compensate for the fluctuation in molasses prices. To date however, there has been no visible government response. In fact, the government's move to allow PSO, a state owned Oil Company to conduct a background study on the feasibility of bioethanol clearly illustrates the clout of the oil mafia within the official enclave. An equally obvious signal was the move to situate the bioethanol promotion mandate within the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources rather than the Ministry of Industries or the Ministry of Environment. The policy provenance clearly needs to shift if any pro-ethanol initiative is to succeed. As further evidence of the pro-oil bent, Pakistan has initiated an aggressive domestic policy to explore indigenous reserves. Foreign investors have been provided highly attractive terms to invest in the oil and gas sector in the country. A number of concessions and exploration licenses have been accorded to various multinational entities during the past few years. Export promotion As long as current policy on fuel ethanol is dictated by the oil sector, import substitution will be a slow process. The immediate prospects lie in export promotion. As indicated, Pakistan presently exports over 160,000 tons of industrial alcohol and bioethanol, earning a little over USD 100 million in foreign exchange, which is well below potential earnings. While industrial alcohol and fuel ethanol have a higher value added component and fetch a substantially larger price, molasses continue to be exported in bulk, notwithstanding the recent pick up in fuel alcohol exports. As table 8 indicates, a mismatch exists between the revenues and the quantum of exports; the same quantum converted to industrial alcohol or fuel ethanol would yield substantially higher foreign exchange earnings. Table 8: Export of Molasses Quantity ('000 Tons)

Value US $ million

2001-02

1742.7

70.30

2002-03

1272.6

44.21

2003-04

1457.3

44.98

2004-05

1151.4

71.62

Year

Source: Agricultural Statistics of Pakistan, 2004-2005

A perverse domestic policy which contributes to this sub-optimal outcome is the high central excise duty and sales tax on alcohol. This needs to be removed to increase price competitiveness both abroad and domestically; the domestic comparison is between the bioethanol blend and gasoline price. Internationally, too, tariff restrictions are in effect, which we referred to earlier and discuss in more detail in the next sub-section. However, negotiating tariff cuts is an extended process. In the

interim_ and especially, in the light of the demonstrated positive environmental externality_ Pakistan could follow India in imposing a ceiling on molasses exports. The sugar sector, which provides the direct input to the bioethanol sector has traditionally been subsidized through various government interventions in order to ensure food security. Sugar producers are protected from global competition by a 10 per cent import duty and 35 per cent regulatory taxes over the years. In addition, the sugar industry has also been accorded interest rate subsidies and export subsidies.26 Over the past two years, sugar produced in excess of the previous two years volume was exempted enjoyed excise duty exemptions. What is relevant from our perspective is that sugar producers in Pakistan have never faced any major disincentives that would prompt them to leave the sugar industry. The constraining factor, as we discuss shortly, is declining sugarcane production (see Sustaining sugarcane production). Theoretically there does exist a scope for intraregional trade in bioethanol. India, especially, depends on imports to meet an overwhelming proportion of its oil demand. Energy trade in particular has been a widely discussed possibility for years; in particular, negotiations are underway for a trans-country pipeline from Iran, through Pakistan to India. However, in reality the region remains one of the least integrated in the world. The rivalry between the two countries has stalled any possibility of the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) getting off the ground. Even if Pakistan's bioethanol sector grows substantially, it is likely to continue finding extra-regional destinations until the two countries settle their political differences. International policies

consequently removed Pakistan from the GSP. In the revised GSP regime, the antidrug system has been replaced by GSP Plus for which Pakistan does not qualify. Eligibility requires countries to demonstrate that their economies are poorly diversified and consequently are dependent and vulnerable. Further, GSP covered imports from such countries must amount to less than one per cent of total EU imports under GSP. Pakistan's industrial alcohol exports are just above one per cent. Thus, the country does not qualify on either ground. Currently there is no unique customs classification for bioethanol. Industrial alcohol is traded under the code 22 07 which covers both denaturated (HS 22 07 20) and undenaturated alcohol (HS 22 07 10).28 Both types of alcohol can be used for biofuel production.29 Despite this lack of specific customs classification, there is already evidence indicating that the use of tariffs is common practice in countries keen to protect their domestic agricultural and biofuel industries from external competition. Moreover, the actual tariffs vary. For instance, the EU and the US have trade agreements that grant different market access conditions to various countries. Table 9 shows present tariff levels in the EU and in other importing countries. Table 9: Tariffs on Ethanol 2005 Country USA Brazil Argentina Thailand India Canada EU

Ethanol Import Tariff 2.5% 20% 20% 30% 186% 4.92 cents per liter = 19 cents per gallon 19.2 cents per liter = 87 cents per gallon

Source: Ethanol Facts: Trade, Renewable Fuels Association, 2005

Tariff preferences Until recently, Pakistan was the second largest industrial alcohol exporter to the EU after Brazil, under the GSP. Initially, Pakistan and six other countries exported industrial alcohol to the EU under a no tax regime following a dispensation given in the EU anti narcotics policy. In May 2005, the Commission of Industrial Ethanol Producers (CIEP) of the EU accused Pakistan and Guatemala (the largest duty free exporters for the period 20022004) of dumping ethyl alcohol in the EU market, causing material harm to domestic producers. The Commission dropped proceedings a year later when full custom tariffs were restored on Pakistani imports. In particular, differentiated tariffs on bioethanol and feedstock (raw molasses in Pakistan's case) point to tariff escalation, which discriminates against the final product.27 Reflecting these tariffs and closer monitoring of industrial alcohol exports to the EU, their prices went up. Subsequently, following a complaint lodged by India, a World Trade Organization (WTO) panel concluded that by granting tariff preferences to 12 countries under this special arrangement the EU was violating General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/World Trade Organization (WTO) preferential treatment obligations. The EU

The local distilleries have consequently begun to suffer losses and some have ceased operations. After 2002-03, the number of distilleries in the country had increased from 6 to 21.30 However, given a rise in molasses exports post-2003-04, and the more stringent EU tariff measures, the distilleries were soon running idle capacities. Currently, at least two distilleries have shut down, with another five contemplating that option.31 Technical, environmental and social standards Environmental and social standards are now part of the global trading regime. There is little dispute on whether such sustainable development issues should be linked to trade. The question now is how it should be done. While the North continues to insist upon the stringent implementation of such standards, the South is becoming increasingly wary of the use of standards as hidden tariffs. Moreover, since standards do not tend to be uniform, it becomes virtually impossible for resource constrained producers in the South to develop variants of their products to conform with standards specific to a particular destination. Bioethanol trade has been no exception in the debate over standards. The EU, a major market of Pakistani industrial alcohol exports till 2006, has imposed domestic, fuel

quality limits on the use of bioethanol and biodiesel. A maximum of five per cent blending is allowed, thus limiting the biofuel market. Specifically for biodiesel, further directives necessitate the production of biodiesel predominantly from rapeseed oil and not from soya oil or palm oil. In addition, the EU's â&#x20AC;&#x153;Biomass Action Planâ&#x20AC;? is contemplating certification to ensure that biofuel imported is produced from crops grown in an environmentally sustainable manner. Individual EU members such as the Netherlands and UK are already implementing certification schemes. A number of additional voluntary measures to ensure import of 'sustainable' biofuel are also underway. The varying standards requirements across the North present additional compliance problems for a technically and institutionally unprepared South.32 Pakistan, in principal has supported standards in the global trading regime. But, concurrently, as a member of the Southern block, it has repeatedly opposed any measures that may allow the North to use standards as 'protective' devices against free trade. Its stance on the EU agricultural support, which includes energy crops, echoes that of the G-20 block within the WTO. Pakistan seeks an end to EU subsidies to its farmers, especially 'Amber Box' subsidies. Negotiations on EU's agricultural support however continue with no end in sight. Institutional uncertainty Biofuels and bioethanol continue to remain unresolved issues in the World Trade Organization (WTO), complicating the development of and trade in the products. Experts claim that the WTO has never really probed energy issues because few energy producing countries have been members of the organization; biofuels has warranted even less attention as it constitutes a small percentage of the world's energy supply.33 The WTO classifies bioethanol as an agricultural product, making no distinction between its use as fuel and for other purposes; bio diesel is classified as an industrial product, thus 'having two competing fuels with different rules'. 34 Fuel ethanol as an environmental good is the subject of yet another debate. 'Weber Amaral, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Brazilian Biofuels Institute, predicts that the discussion around biofuels is likely to become more complicated as the range of products used to make biofuels expands. Amongst other things, classification could affect how fuels are treated during trade talks and whether governments will be allowed to pay biofuel producers export subsidies. Further, there has been a call for world standards on biofuel contents as well as rules and regulations on subsidies on biofuel crops in a report published by the International Food and Agricultural Trade Policy Council. 'If no decisive action is taken, Hebebrand said governments could end up "cross-subsidizing" biofuel by-products like glycerol'.35

standards varying from country to country, the WTO, the World Customs Organization and national governments must work together to make sure that future biofuel trade runs smoothly'.36 The report warns against government intervention, aimed at protecting the domestic fuel market, as threatening to stunt the growth in trade; intervention includes tax incentives and high tariffs and subsidies. Further it recommends a unified classification for biofuels. Pakistan stands to gain from increased bioethanol trade. Within Pakistan, agricultural subsidies have been withdrawn for virtually all crops, largely due to lack of resources and IMF/World Bank led structural adjustment of the economy that has been undertaken since the 1990s. Overall agricultural production in Pakistan is taxed. Sugarcane production, which is the only crop relevant to the bioethanol industry is not subsidized. In fact, a major worry is the gradual shift of farmers away from sugarcane to more economically lucrative crops. Section 4 Sustainable development impacts This section attempts to identify the potential SD impacts of increased bioethanol production. The economic aspects have been assessed such as import substitution, export promotion, energy security, and predictability of production. In this section we focus on potential social and environmental impacts. Sustaining sugarcane production Sugarcane production is driven by a national policy which emphasizes sugar self sufficiency. In the short to medium term, such a policy potentially generates derivative benefits in the shape of bioethanol production. Essentially, they would ensue from the alternative use of the abundant stocks of molasses, provided the correct policy and economic incentives are in place for such conversion. There are no backward linkages with sugarcane production per se. As indicated, it is the concern with food security that drives the government to seek ways to incentivize sugarcane growers, or to find alternates such as sugar beet. However, in the long term, the SD concerns associated with the production of feedstock may materialize if biofuels production in Pakistan takes off. In view of the emerging scarcity of water and land, land use conversions (deforestation) and crop switching (undermining food security) would then become legitimate concerns. On average, over the past five years, sugarcane production has averaged 50 million tons per annum as compared to the requirement of nearly 75 million tons to meet the installed sugar mill production capacity.

Given the optimistic forecasts for biofuel growth prospects, 'the World Trade Organization and others must act now to regulate rules and standards that are all over the map. According to the International Food and Agricultural Trade Policy Council, which released the report on WTO rules on fuels like fuel ethanol, developing countries are 'wildly producing biofuels'. But with rules for things such as import

Figure 4: Fluctuating Sugar Cane Production in Pakistan

Another way to address these concerns is to enhance sugarcane yield. The yield has increased only marginally over the past five years and is currently about 50.1 tons/hectare, which is much below the global average of 60 tons/hectare.42 (see section on Sugarcane production) A possible long term equity issue relates to the conversion of sugarcane or beet production to 'cash crop' agriculture, with its attendant negative spin-offs. One can envisage added impetus for corporate agricultural giants to take over and thus marginalize small producers in a bid to concentrate sugarcane or beet production. Moreover, agricultural encroachments into ecologically sensitive areas could also be an unwelcome consequence.43

Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan 2005-06

The lack of predictability is linked to variable water supply. Sugarcane is a water intensive crop requiring between 64 and 80 acre inches of water. While Pakistan has adequate surface and ground water, the difference between good and bad production years is contingent upon rainwater. During drought years, sugarcane production drops substantially. In years of high rainfall, sugarcane production rises, on occasion producing gluts. For the future, sugarcane shortages have been forecast as the norm as discrete water supply runs up against increasing demand to meet agricultural, household, energy and industrial needs. Consequently, growers have begun to shift to crops such as maize and sunflower that require much less water, and mature over a much shorter period. According to current estimates, approximately 75 million tons of sugarcane input is required to satisfy the 6.7 million ton domestic demand for sugar.37 Over the last decade however, on average, mills have received just 35 million tons of sugarcane.38 Clearly, in years when sugarcane production is low, not only does sugar production suffer but so does molasses output. The Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock (MINFAL) is attempting to promote sugar beet as a viable alternative to sugarcane, both for sugar and bioethanol production. However, annual production currently stands at just 300,000 tons and the crop is grown mainly in the NWFP.39 In 2002, Government of Pakistan started experimenting with various varieties of sugar beet in order to determine its feasibility in the Pakistani climate. Thus far, experiments in Punjab, Singh, and NWFP have produced encouraging results. Imported beet seeds from France and Germany have proved to be resilient enough to do well in Pakistani conditions, thus allaying concerns about beet's inability to mature under excessive temperatures experienced in Pakistan.40 The advantages of beet are higher yield (above 50 tons/hectare), significantly less water requirement, and a higher conversion ratio from beet molasses to bioethanol.41 It can also be intercropped with sugarcane. Interview responses confirmed that the government would need to provide substantial subsidy to the mills to convert their production processes to beet_ concerns about the high capital cost to process beet were raised.

Social impacts Pricing issues The government price support policy aims to ensure fair prices for sugarcane growers while keeping consumer welfare in mind. Equity concerns emerge from market imperfections. Middlemen (see Biofuel value chain, p 49) play a key role in sugarcane procurement and often end up exploiting small-scale farmers forcing them to sell at distress prices. In collusion with mill owners, they orchestrate delays at the mill gate; the problem becomes exacerbated during surplus years.44 The farmer has no option but to accept the price offered (lower than the support price) or face further delays. Large farmers are better placed as their crop represents a large proportion of the mill intake and they also have greater political clout.45 Small farmers are indebted to middlemen for their consumption and input needs, which also leads to under pricing. Further, a report by the Agricultural Prices Commission of Pakistan indicates that the scales installed to weigh sugarcane do not provide correct readings.46 However, given the high level of illiteracy among small-scale growers, such practices go undetected. Moreover, mills are also known to make undue deductions contending that sugarcane quality is low and contains high trash content.47 The effects of government intervention are also felt in the molasses and industrial alcohol markets. While the benchmark prices for these products/by products are determined in global markets, the government distorts relative prices by taxing locally produced alcohol (see Export Promotion, p 56). Labuor issues A life cycle analysis suggests little impact on employment either way. In the short to medium term, value added is likely to occur as a result of switching from molasses to bioethanol production, which has no back effects on either sugarcane or sugar production. In the long term, if Pakistan finds substantial markets abroad for bioethanol and this triggers land use changes, it may trigger discernible impacts both in growing sugarcane and processing.

Reverting to the short to medium term, the sugar sector in Pakistan employs nearly 75,000 people. The sector suffers from over-capacity. While unions exist, sugar mills often threaten layoffs in order to right size the industry. Labor unions find it difficult to negotiate with employers as the sugar cartel exercises enormous clout over decision makers in the country.48 Labor conditions in general are no different than in other industries that produce for domestic consumption. Pakistan, in general has made progress in meeting global labor standards in export oriented industries. However, the performance has remained dismal in cases where client pressure to conform has been absent. On average, industrial wages in sugar processing remain at par with industries in other sectors. However, the situation is markedly poor in the province of Sindh, where instances of employers not entertaining labor laws, withholding employee benefits agreed upon in original contracts, and punishing them for involvement in union activities is commonplace.49 Unlike the sugar industry, industrial alcohol production is highly capital intensive and requires a few skilled plant operators and engineers. Adding value in the form of ethanol is again a highly capital intensive process, requiring little or no additional labor. Taking realistic projections for Pakistan's bioethanol production in coming years, there is little possibility that the bioethanol sector would become a major employer. At the same time however, an analysis suggests that no labor displacement would occur as a result of an increase in fuel ethanol production. First, as fuel ethanol is produced from a byproduct of the sugar production process, there is no question of labor displacement within the sugar mills. The other potential concern could be with regard to labor displacement in the oil industry, as fuel ethanol will end up replacing oil consumption. Again, for the foreseeable future, one does not envisage an increase in the blending ratio beyond 10 per cent. At this rate, oil refining processes are not likely to be discontinued (this is distinct from revenues for the oil companies, which may drop).

and contamination of water bodies via pesticide residues. Moreover, oxygen depletion in water bodies is caused by inefficient harvesting practices that lead to water run-off containing substantial quantities of cane juice. Finally, air pollution is caused due to the predominant practice of post-harvest burning of the sugarcane trash. While this is designed to achieve ratooning success and pest and disease prevention, it allows ash and smoke to escape into the atmosphere.50 Production of molasses, the second leg in the fuel ethanol production cycle, also has environmental concerns associated with it. Since molasses is a byproduct of sugarcane processing in sugar mills, all environmental concerns related to the sugar industry apply to molasses production. While the sugar industry discharge includes solid, gaseous, and liquid waste, the latter two are harmful from an environmental perspective. The solid waste includes bagasse and press mud. The former is used as a fuel source within the industry and is thus recycled while the latter is mostly used by farmers in the vicinity of sugar mills as manure. The level of gaseous discharge from the sugar industry is largely dependent on the source of fuel. Hydrogen sulfide, sulfur dioxide, oxides of nitrogen, carbon monoxide and trace metals are all discharged in varying degrees. Most literature on Pakistan suggests that these emissions remain well below the National Environmental Quality Standards (NEQS) limits. An exception is the smoke discharged from mills using fuel oil as a source of energy for the boilers, where the discharge is often found to be above NEQS. Finally, wastewater flowing out of sugar mills can potentially be highly polluting unless treated efficiently. Incidentally, the track record of the sugar industry and distilleries on this count has been exceptionally good (see below).51 The next step in the production chain is processing of molasses into industrial ethanol and further into fuel ethanol. This process takes place in the distilleries. Wastewater flowing out of distilleries is highly contaminated; it can pollute fertile land and harm aquatic life in water bodies, if left untreated. The rough proportion of waste in the outgoing effluent is provided in the following table:

Environment Environmental impacts are evident at every step along the bioethanol value chain. Key stages include: (i) sugarcane production; (ii) production of molasses; (iii) distillation of molasses and; (iv) coherent harmonic generation (CHG) emission reductions through use of blended fuel. Perhaps the most adverse environmental impacts occur at the sugarcane production stage. Such impacts derive from poor management practices. Environmental issues associated with cane production include impacts on soil, vegetation clearing, ground water use and contamination, pesticide pollution, and oxygen depletion in freshwater bodies. Sugarcane cultivation in Pakistan is known to cause soil erosion, soil alkalinity and a consequent reduction in the soil's nutrient holding capacity, as well as soil salinization. Fertilizer and pesticide use is also often inefficient and ineffective, which apart from increasing costs of production also leads to poorer ground water quality

Table 10: Typical Distillery Wastewater Composition

Table 11: Waste Concentrations in Treated Distillery Effluent Values Performance PH 7.5~7.6 Alkaline BOD5 4,000~4,500 mg/lit 90% reduction COD 27,000~33,000 mg/lit 65~67 reduction Source: Talib, Pollution Control in Sugar Industry, 2001. Note: pH hydrogen-ion concentration. 7 is normal. Above 7 indicates acidity, below 7 indicates alkalinity BoD - Biological oxygen demand CoD - Chemical oxygen demand Parameters

Parameters PH

Values 4.0 ~ 4.5

BOD5

40,000 ~ 45,000

COD

80,000 ~ 1,000,00

TSS

3000 ~ 5000 mg/lit

Sulphates

4000 ~ 6000 mg/lit

Chlorides

4000 ~ 6000 mg/lit

K+

4000 ~ 10000 mg/lit

PO 4

100 ~ 150 mg/lit

Ca++

500 ~ 700 mg/lit.

Source: Talib, Pollution Control in Sugar Industry, 2001. Note: pH hydrogen-ion concentration. 7 is normal. Above 7 indicates acidity, below 7 indicates alkalinity BoD Biological oxygen demand CoD Chemical oxygen demand TSS Total suspended solids K Sulphate PO Potassium Ca Calcium

While environmental legislation (Environmental Protection Act, 1997) exists to ensure industrial waste treatment in Pakistan, the implementation of these regulations is inevitably lax. The extensive technical and financial resources required for a robust monitoring and verification mechanism are not available.52 Only industries that find a clear advantage in adhering to environmental stipulations tend to implement regulations seriously. The distillery industry falls in this category. Notwithstanding the general lack of effluent treatment by industries in Pakistan, most of the distilleries in the country have installed treatment plants, albeit with varying efficiency. The major push factor for distilleries to be environmentally conscious is the cost saving associated with waste treatment. The distillery wastewater treatment is an anaerobic process through which the organic components of the wastewater are converted to biogas, with the excess sludge production being extremely small. The two major products of the treatment process are methane gas and CO2. Methane gas is recycled as an energy source in the distilleries, with as much as 70-90 per cent of the total energy requirement being met from methane.53 In effect, distilleries have a 'closed carbon cycle'. The final discharge, when diluted with subsoil saline water has biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) and chemical oxygen demand (COD) concentrations reduced by as much as 97 per cent and can be used for land irrigation.54 The environmental gains from treatment are thus obvious. More important from the point of view of the distilleries however is the cost saving as a result of treatment.

Despite the reduction in contaminants, waste concentrations are still higher than the nationally set standards (National Environmental Quality Standards). However, this points to the unrealistically low levels of concentrations stipulated in official standards rather than any problems in the treatment process.55 In fact, distillery plants maintain a reasonable level of technological sophistication in treatment, especially in the medium and large sized distilleries. Regarding end use, the consumption of fuel ethanol in automobiles leads to a substantial reduction in GHG emissions. The blended fuel provides a higher-octane content without any presence of lead (traditionally used in gasoline as a booster), thus enhancing car performance and, at the same time, reducing disease-causing emissions from car exhausts. Although no Pakistan-specific estimates are available, the general norm is that for blended gasoline carrying 22-24 per cent fuel ethanol, reduction of fossil CO2 from the tailpipe could be as high as 80 per cent.56 Moreover, the fact that fuel ethanol has a positive net energy fuel balance is also widely acknowledged. For instance, a recent study conducted at the Michigan State University found that on average a gallon of fuel ethanol contains 56 per cent more energy than the energy requirement to produce it.57 While such estimates may not provide a good proxy for the potential benefits in Pakistan, given the varying production technology and practices, it nonetheless does point to a strong likelihood of a net environmental gain by using fuel ethanol. However, there is a partial offset. Despite the 'closed carbon cycle (CCC)' we observed in the plants we visited, replication on a larger scale would make the CCC a more difficult option. Hence, emissions during the industrial alcohol and ethanol production process would remain an enduring problem. Section 5 Conclusion Given that the bioethanol industry in Pakistan is only starting to be developed, this paper can be considered as an anticipatory policy work and therefore it can set a concrete set of policy recommendations and research gaps about how to promote an industry that maximizes SD opportunities and minimizes risks. The promotion of bioethanol presents a win-win scenario for Pakistan. The country incurs an oil import bill of $3.1 billion every year. Substituting gasoline with bioethanol could result in considerable foreign exchange savings. Moreover, there is no trade-off between bioethanol and the food production cycle. The environmental benefits of using biofuel have been globally documented. Environmentally, the

bioethanol production process in distilleries exhibits a closed carbon cycle. Moreover, bioethanol substantially reduces CHG emissions from automobiles, at the same time allowing for better performance of vehicles. Despite the potential advantages of bioethanol use as fuel however, progress in promoting bioethanol use lacks impetus. The oil refining companies in collusion with the petroleum ministry have thus far managed to keep a lid on private sector involvement in popularizing bioethanol use. The private sector, rather than being given incentives, faces domestic taxes on industrial alcohol sales. In addition to the domestic policy biases, major importing countries have also imposed restrictions on Pakistan, which has ended up compromising the country's export potential. EU imposed tariffs under the revised GSP, that impacted the distillation industry badly. The loss of international markets has resulted in the closure of two distilleries. Another five are contemplating shutting down. Further, institutional uncertainties and unresolved issues especially pertaining to bioethanol classification may complicate the development and global growth of the industry. Initiatives such as the EU Biomass Action Plan may present further barriers in bioethanol exports from developing countries such as Pakistan. Another major concern is with the sustainability of bioethanol production. In Pakistan, bioethanol is produced from molasses generated as a byproduct of sugarcane crushing. While sugarcane is a major crop, the stagnating area and lowering yields of the crop are likely to cause severe sugarcane shortages in the future. Bioethanol production is sure to suffer as a result. While sugar beet has the potential to make up for the shortage, it will only be able to supplement sugarcane over the long run. Other major crops also offer possibilities, as indicated in the table 12. Table 12: Crops grown in Pakistan that can be converted into ethanol Crop

Production '000 tonnes

Area '000 hectares

Rice

5024.8

2519.6

Wheat

21612.3

8358

Maize

2797

981.8

Barley

91.7

93.3

Sugarcane

47244.1

966.4

Sugar beet

121

2.8

Rapeseed and Mustard seed

215.8

257.2

Potatoes

2024.9

112

Source: Agricultural Statistics of Pakistan 2004-05

In essence, the domestic policy biases, export barriers, and concerns with regard to sustainability of sugarcane all lead to a poor prognosis for future development of bioethanol as a renewable fuel source in Pakistan. While the potential both for domestic use as well as exports remains high, key constraints fiscal, policy and external constraints will have to be addressed if positive outcomes are to accrue.

In light of the above, decision makers should consider the following steps along the fuel ethanol production chain: l Removal of local taxes on the sale of industrial alcohol l Impose a ceiling quota on the exports of molasses from the country l Duty free import of the machinery required to convert industrial alcohol into

biofuel l Reduce collateral and/or institute revolving leases for investors willing to set up

distilleries or import machinery l Institute an aggressive marketing campaign within the public sector to apprise

users about the availability and benefits of E-10; in addition individual oil companies apart from PSO should be allowed to set up E-10 stations and run their own marketing campaigns l The number of pilot projects experimenting with E-10 should be increased after a marketing campaign and PSO's monopoly on the experiment should be removed l The government should allow the Ministry of Industries rather than the Ministry of Petroleum to take charge of biofuel development l Until domestic demand rises, the Trade Development Authority of Pakistan (previously Export Promotion Bureau) must be mandated to seek new markets for the country's industrial and fuel ethanol, perhaps through a dedicated unit l There is still a substantial gap in academic and technical research on the benefits of bioethanol usage in Pakistan. Both the public and private sectors should invest in research to determine the potential gains and major pitfalls in expanding the fuel ethanol industry l The government must ensure that its price support policy for sugarcane is implemented and market imperfections due to the negative role of middlemen are removed. A viable option is to introduce a formal marketing mechanism by virtue of which designated agencies could act as middlemen between farmers and mills, ensuring that farmers get the officially stipulated price. l There is a need for effective control over the sugar mills owners. The sugar mills behave in the form of a cartel which creates difficulties for sugarcane growers. Sugar hoarding is a common practice and though irrelevant to the bio-ethanol production per se, it could suggest a possibility for molasses hoarding in the future if domestic demand for molasses increases multifold. The Monopoly Control Authority must take proactive initiatives in this regard. l The merits of zoning and de-zoning for sugarcane marketing are debatable and the scheme ought to be revised to benefit the sugarcane growers. l A multi-pronged approach is required to tackle low sugarcane yields. This would include discouraging farmers from using discarded or low yielding varieties and introducing new plant-disease resistant varieties as alternatives. In addition, education programs to ensure better crop management practices have been repeatedly recommended. l Environmental impacts in sugarcane and molasses production ought to be tackled. Application of Geographic Information Systems, better land preparation practices, integrated water management practices, and integrated pest management are already well known solutions and need to be stressed through

better farmer education programs. Waste water treatment in sugar mills and distilleries is also widely practiced and must be emphasized further through the Environmental Protection Agencies to bring non-conforming units into the fold. Bibliography l “Anti-dumping: Protection against dumped Imports”, Trade Issues. http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/respectrules/anti_dumping/index_en.htm, accessed on 20 February 2007. l Bendz, K., Pakistan, 2005. “EU's largest ethanol exporter, loses privileged status”, Global Agriculture Information Network, GAIN. l “Fuel ethanol FAQs”, Saab BioPower, http://www.saabbiopower.co.uk/faqs/, accessed on 13 March 2007. l “Fuel ethanol: Climate Benefits with Responsible Production”. World Wildlife Fund, Workshop on Sustainable Biomass Production for the World Market, Brazil. l “Ethanol blending to boost petrol production”, Dawn, 15 July 2005. l “Ethanol Facts: Trade”, Renewable Fuels Association. http://www.ethanolrfa.org/resource/facts/trade/, accessed on 20 February 2007. l Government of Pakistan. 2005. “Agricultural Statistics of Pakistan 2004-2005”. (Islamabad, Economic Wing, Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock). l Government of Pakistan. “Exports and Re-Exports 2004-2005” (Islamabad, Statistics Division, Federal Bureau of Statistics). l Government of Pakistan. 2005. Hydrocarbon Development Institute of Pakistan. “Pakistan Energy Yearbook 2005” (Islamabad, Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources). l Government of Pakistan. 2005. Agricultural Prices Commission. “Price Policy for Sugarcane: 2005-06”, Islamabad. l Government of Pakistan. 2006. Research and Economic Development Cell. “Sugar Sector in Pakistan It's Performance and Way Forward” (Karachi, Chamber of Commerce and Industry). l Hassan, Bilal. “Increasing Sugar Cane Yield”. Dawn, 19 February, 2007. l Inayatullah Khan. Unpublished. “Feasibility of Sugar Beet Cultivation in Pakistan”. (Islamabad: Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock). l “Increase in oil and gas prices”, The News, 2 July 2005. l International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers' Associations. “Union Busting in Pakistan's Sugar Mills: Workers Face Dismissal and Illegal Detention” Asia and Pacific Regional Secretariat. l Javed Kayani, “Ethanol and flex-fuel vehicles”, Dawn, 16 January 2006. l Khan, H.K., 2005. “Trade Policy 2005-06”, (Islamabad, Ministry of Commerce). l Khan, S.R., et al. “Managing Conflict Through Trade: The Case of Pakistan and India” Sustainable Development Policy Institute, forthcoming. l “Long Ignored by WTO, Biofuels Might Receive Attention”, Congress Daily, 27 October 2006. l Memon, M.A. “Sugar Industry in Pakistan”, Pakistan and Gulf Economist. 23-29 September, 2002. l “Multilateral Disciplines to Phase Out Agriculture Dumping”, Trans Atlantic Consumer Dialogue. http://www.tacd.org/docs/?id=199, accessed on 23 February 2007. l Nadia M. Akbar and Mahmood A. Khwaja. 2006. “Study on Effluents form Selected Sugar Mills in Pakistan: Potential Environmental, Health, and Economic Consequences of an Excessive Pollution Load”, Sustainable Development Policy Institute. l “Pakistan's Sugar Industry: Responding to the Environmental Challenge”. Undated. <http://www.cpp.org.pk/etpibrchr/brochure-sugar.pdf>. l Parvaiz Ishfaq Rana. “Ethanol export to EU comes to a halt”. Dawn, 27 August 2005. l Parvaiz Ishfaq Rana, “Alcohol worth USD100m exported in 2006”. Dawn, 6 March 2007.

l “Production & Consumption of Ethanol & Gasol in Pakistan. FORMULATION OF A

NATIONAL POLICY TO ENCOURAGE THE LOCAL PRODUCTION OF ETHANOL /GASOL IN PAKISTAN”, Ministry of Industries, Production & Special Initiatives. http://www.moip.gov.pk/ accessed on 15 February 2007. l “Quick Guide Biofuels”, BBC NEWS, 24 January 2007. l Salameh, M.G. 2005, “Can Biofuels Pose a Serious Challenge to Crude Oil?” Oil Market Consultancy Service. United Kingdom. l “Sugar Manufacturing In North West Frontier Province Problems and Proposed Solutions”. Pakistan Sugar Mills Association. North West Frontier Province. l “WWF - Pakistan Sustainable Sugar Initiative”. 2004. National Project Planning Workshop February 2004. Pakistan l “WTO must set rules for future biofuel trade-report”, Reuters AlertNet, 27 October 2006. l “WTO must set rules for future biofuel trade: report”, Daily Times, 28 October 2006. l “WTO Disciplines and Biofuels: Opportunities and Constraints in the Creation of a Global Marketplace”. 2006. International Food and Agricultural Trade Policy Council. l Zaidi, S.M.S., 2001. “Pollution Control in Sugar Industry”, XXXVI Annual Convention 27 28 August 2001. The Pakistan Society of Sugar Technologists. Endnotes 1 Figures for 2005 2 Karen Bendz. 2005. “EU's largest ethanol exporter, loses privileged status”, GAIN Report. 3 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8769619/site/newsweek/page/2/ 4 Ibid. 5 Research and Economic Development Cell, 2006, “Sugar Sector in Pakistan its Performance and Way Forward”, Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry. 6 Ibid. 7 Government department experts refer to the possibility of converting waterlogged saline areas in southern Punjab and Sind to sugarcane production. However, independent experts argue that the area gains here will be offset by declining water availability in areas in the Northern Punjab and the NWFP, which are presently devoted to sugarcane production. 8 Research and Economic Development Cell, 2006. 9 In absolute terms, recovery is still low at 8-9 per cent compared to other major sugar producing countries (Philippines, Cuba), where the recovery is over 10 per cent. 10 The different grades of alcohol are being produced from molasses with a ratio of 1:5, meaning of five tons of molasses are required to produce 1 ton of alcohol. 11 Rana, P.I., “Alcohol worth USD100m exported in 2006”. Dawn, 6 March 2007. 12 Rana, “Alcohol worth $100m”, 2007. 13 More recent figures are being compiled. 14 Randy Schnepf, “European Union Biofuel Policy and Agriculture: An Overview”, CRS Report for Congress 15 “WWF - Pakistan Sustainable Sugar”. 2004. 16 Bilal Hassan, “Increasing Sugar Cane Yield”, Dawn, February 19, 2007. 17 “WWF - Pakistan Sustainable Sugar Initiative”. National Project Planning Workshop February 2004. 18 Government of Pakistan. 2005. “Agricultural Statistics of Pakistan 2004-2005”. Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock 19 “WWF - Pakistan Sustainable Sugar”. 2004. 20 Asif Khan and Arshad Farooq, “The sugar dilemma”. Dawn 25 April 2005. 21 Gur is a consumer item which is not linked to the biofuel production chain but by the fact that gur production signifies a trade-off with sugar, and therefore molasses production. H.A. Naqvi, “Raising productivity in sugar industry”. Dawn 22 August 2005. 22 The key variables considered in the pricing policy include cost of production of sugarcane, market prices of the crop, nominal and real prices, economics of fertilizer use, domestic

24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43

44 45 46 47 48 49

50 51

demand, supply, stocks, and prices of sugar, comparative economics of sugarcane and competing crops, prices of gur, average wholesale prices of sugar, international market dynamics, import and export parity prices, and efficiency of sugarcane production. Agricultural Prices Commission, 2005, “Price Policy for Sugarcane: 2005-06 Crop”, Government of Pakistan. Government of Pakistan, “Production and Consumption of ethanol and Gasol in Pakistan”, Formulation of a National Policy to Encourage the Local Production of ethanol/Gasol in Pakistan, 22 March, 2006. Interview with Mr. Ahsan Ahmed, Deputy Managing Director, Noon Sugar Mills and Distillery, 7 March 2007. Ibid. Research and Economic Development Cell, 2006. The News 2005 “Increase in oil and gas prices.” See the World Custom Organization Website at http://www.wcoomd.org/ie/en /Topics_Issues/HarmonizedSystem/DoucmentDB/0422E.pdf EC 2005 Not all of these distilleries produced fuel ethanol. Parvaiz Ishfaq Rana, “Ethanol export to EU comes to a halt”. Dawn, 27 August 2005. IIED, 2006. “Long Ignored by the WTO, Biofuels Might Receive Attention”, Congress Daily, 27 October 2006. Ibid “WTO must set rules for future biofuel trade-report”, Reuters AlertNet, 27 October 2006. Ibid Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Interview with Inayatullah Khan, Cane Commissioner of Pakistan, Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock, 20 February 2007. Inayatullah Khan, unpublished ,“Feasibility of Sugar Beet Cultivation in Pakistan”, Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock. Khan, “Feasibility of Sugar Beet Cultivation”, unpublished. See Ilan Kruglianskas, “Fuel ethanol: Climate Benefits with Responsible Production”, Task 40 workshop on Sustainable Biomass Production for the World Market, World Wildlife Fund. “Price Policy for Sugarcane”, 2005 Research and Economic Development Cell, 2006. Ibid. Ibid. Muhammad Aslam Memon, “Sugar Industry in Pakistan”, Pakistan and Gulf Economist, 23-29 September, 2002. “Union Busting in Pakistan's Sugar Mills: Workers Face Dismissal and Illegal Detention” Asia and Pacific Regional Secretariat, International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers' Associations. “WWF - Pakistan Sustainable Sugar”. 2004; Research and Economic Development Cell, 2006. “Pakistan's Sugar Industry: Responding to the Environmental Challenge”, undated, <http://www.cpp.org.pk/etpibrchr/brochure-sugar.pdf>;“WWF - Pakistan Sustainable Sugar”. 2004. Nadia M. Akbar and Mahmood A. Khwaja, 2006, “Study on Effluents form Selected Sugar Mills in Pakistan: Potential Environmental, Health, and Economic Consequences of an Excessive Pollution Load”, Sustainable Development Policy Institute. Akbar and Khwaja, “Study on Effluents from Selected Sugar Mills in Pakistan”, 2006.

54 55 56 57

K. Iqbal Talib, 2001, “Pollution Control in Sugar Industry”, XXXVI Annual Convention 27 August 2001, The Pakistan Society of Sugar Technologists. Ibid “Fuel ethanol FAQs”, Saab BioPower Salameh, “Can Biofuels Pose a Serious Challenge?” 2005.

Emerging Environmental Issues in Bhutan Doley Tshering

hutan is a small country located in the Eastern Himalayas with an area of 38,394 sq km. It rises sharply from the Indo-Gangetic plains in the south at an altitude of about 200m to more than 7,500m in the Himalayas that form a natural northern border with China. Due to the extreme variation in altitudes the range of climatic conditions varies from hot and humid tropical and subtropical conditions in the southern foothills to cold and dry tundra conditions in the north. Latitude, precipitation, slope gradient, and exposure to sunlight and wind further influence conditions. Consequently, the nation features an equally amazing diversity of vegetation. Over the centuries, the Bhutanese people have always maintained a close relationship with their land and have been careful custodians of their environment. There is a standing government policy to maintain forest cover at 60 per cent for all times. Environment forms one of the four pillars of Gross National Happiness_ a uniquely Bhutanese development philosophy and enjoys a very high priority in Bhutan. For its size, Bhutan probably has the greatest biodiversity of any country in Asia and has been declared one of the ten biodiversity hotspots of the world. The country is home to at least 80 unique species among its 5,870 species of plants and animals, at least 41 of which are threatened. Being situated in the world's highest mountain ranges, the Himalayas, more than 45 per cent of the country's land has an elevation of more than 3000 metres. This location at such high elevation coupled with the very active tectonic movements associated with the active mountains means that Bhutan has had to consciously maintain the good forest cover to avoid catastrophic floods and landslides as evident in the neighbouring countries. As such the country today boasts of over 72 per cent forest cover of which more than a quarter has been set aside as protected areas. This does not make the government of Bhutan any complacent about protecting its environment as is clearly evident from Bhutan Vision 2020 document which states that â&#x20AC;&#x153;although our natural heritage is still largely intact, â&#x20AC;Ś the conservation of the natural environment must be added to the challenges in the years aheadâ&#x20AC;? (RGOB, 1999). The importance of an intact environment and natural resources also stems from the fact that the predominant occupation of the Bhutanese (total population - 672425)1 is agriculture with about 70 per cent living in rural areas and dependent on agriculture and the appropriation of the natural resources for their livelihood.

However, changing circumstances due to growing economic activities and population, changing consumptions trends particularly in the urban areas and the corresponding increases of environmental pressures and global climate changes, Bhutan today confront some major emerging environment issues. These include the threat of GLOF, massive solid waste problems in her towns and cities, the delicate balance between conservation and people's livelihoods in the rural areas. The challenge for Bhutan remains to sustain national efforts to conserve the country's rich environment, adapt to impacts of the global climatic changes and balance its almost draconian conservation laws with the needs and priorities of the rural people who bear a disproportionate share of the cost of conservation. This paper gives a brief overview of these emerging environmental issues in the country and makes an attempt to analyze some of the root causes and suggests potential actions that can be taken. Climate change and glacial melting As mentioned earlier, Bhutan has done very well to protect its environment in an intact form and has contributed very little to the process of global warming. Owing to the vast forest cover she is a net sequester of green house gases; Bhutan has to suffer the consequences of other countries, mistakes. This is particularly problematic for Bhutan as her development is highly dependent on climate-sensitive sectors such as agriculture, hydropower and forestry. The formation of supra-glacial lakes due to the accelerated retreat of glaciers as a result of increasing temperatures is of significant concern. The Himalayan glaciers which feed the mountain river system of Bhutan are melting quickly, leading to unprecedented degrees of glacial retreat. The melting of glaciers is leading to the increasing volumes of water in downstream glacial lakes at an alarmingly rapid rate. Increased temperature also causes melting of ice-cored moraine dams to the point that the ridges can no longer resist the pressure. The concern is that when the current holding capacity of the lakes reaches a critical threshold, loose glacial debris that act as dams or barriers could fail and lead to flash floods, called Glacial Lake Outburst Floods (GLOF), that result in severe adverse impacts on downstream communities. The threat from GLOF is a real one for a mountainous country like Bhutan with a huge number of glaciers and glacial lakes. A study by a team of Bhutanese and foreign experts in 2001, identified 677 glaciers and 2,674 glacial lakes (ICIMOD 2001). With such high concentration of glacial lakes, it was no surprise, the same study revealed, that a total of 24 glacial lakes pose potentially high risk for GLOFs. The risk of GLOFs threatens lives and livelihood resources posing a new dimension of threats and a high risk of glacier lakes filling up to critical geostatic thresholds. A significant portion of the country's revenue is derived from hydropower, which has involved huge investments in infrastructure and requires sustainable water resources. Climate change can impact Bhutan's economic backbone in two ways_ glacial melting

would mean that the water availability in the rivers that feed the hydropower stations would fluctuate disrupting the power generation; and in the event a GLOF occurs, dams and other hydropower infrastructure could be damaged as huge volumes of water rushes downstream. The fact that Bhutan's economy is highly dependant on hydropower resources, constituting more than 12 per cent of the GDP, is alarming given the risks (RGOB, 2006a) outlined above. Other sectors are also highly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, including GLOF risks. For example, heavy monsoon floods in the year 2000 negatively affected economic growth by more than 2 per cent (RGOB, 2002). The glacial lakes feed rivers that provide a significant amount of the freshwater resources for downstream regions where about three quarters of the population live in the rural areas and practice subsistence agriculture. These people will be directly affected by rising of temperature, fluctuations in water availability and unpredictable rain patterns as their mainstay occupation (agriculture) is highly climate-sensitive sector. Climate change is also likely to further exacerbate some of the natural hazards to which Bhutan is prone and lead to significant additional impacts (either in terms of severity or frequency) on the country's development pathway. Climate changeinduced GLOFs, increasing temperature, and changed rainfall patterns also pose risks for Bhutan's unique ecology. Warming temperatures may promote the growth of some new tree species at higher altitudes, but it could also lead to increased pests and disease. Warmer winters are resulting in reduced snow cover and increased dry periods during later seasons in the year. The potential for increased forest fires, already a frequent disaster in Bhutan, along with expanding human settlements and the risk of climate change-induced GLOFs will further encroach on various species' native habitats. Thus climate change is likely to have adverse impacts on the country's progress towards environmentally sound economic and social development. Such impacts would include significant declines in agricultural production, as well as harm to forests and water resources. Already frequent landslides and prolonged dry periods and unprecedented heavy monsoon rain affecting agriculture and biodiversity are visible in recent years because of climate change. Most of the population and infrastructure are located either in the valley bottoms or on the mountain slopes. This is a serious concern because nearly all settlement areas are prone to landslides and flooding, and hence likely to be very vulnerable to climate change. Given the scarce resources typical of a developing country, lack of capacity and trained manpower and the corresponding difficulties in predicting climate change and adapting to its impacts remain huge challenges for Bhutan with regard to climate change. Concerted efforts are required to heighten the awareness of climate change across all sectors. This awareness then has to be translated into practical action to adequately incorporate climate information into development plans and programmes. This in turn requires the national capacity to be built critically both in terms of human resources and finances to adequately be able to tackle the challenge of climate change

and its associated impacts on Bhutan's development. Proactive and concerted efforts are required to deal with the natural disasters that would become increasingly frequent as a result of climate change. National policy instruments such as the National Disaster Management Strategy (RGOB, 2006a), the National Programme of Action (NAPA) for climate change (RGOB, 2006b) need to be operationalised through targeted projects and activities that would contribute towards both mitigating the threats and enhancing the national capacity to adapt to these changes. Urban solid waste management Urban areas in Bhutan exhibit a complexity of environmental and social issues, including the problem of municipal wastes. Inadequate management of solid waste and waste waters are some of the conspicuous environmental problems arising due to insufficient infrastructure planning and municipal facilities and services. This problem is further compounded by population growth mostly due to rural-urban migration. Currently, there are 54 urban settlements of varied sizes accommodating more than 30 per cent of the country's total population. At the rate of growth of urban centres and population added to rural urban migration, it is envisaged that by 2020, half of the Bhutanese population will live in urban areas. At this rate, the issue of solid waste management and associated environmental and social problems will be more pronounced in the absence of a proper solid waste management system. While most urban areas are facing unparalleled problem of solid waste management, the case of the capital city, Thimphu is illustrative. Thimphu has been experiencing rapid socio-economic development over the last few decades. The city's population has more than quadrupled in the last decade to an estimated 100,000 in 2005 (RGOB, 2005) with limited scope for expanding the urban area. Although living standard has improved for many people, the quality of environment in the city has deteriorated. The solid waste collection system is one of the main pressing problems in the city. Two causes of uncontrolled waste dumping are the lack of infrastructure and the behaviour of the public. Rural to urban migration has been the main source of the rapid population growth in Thimphu. The majority of the residents in Thimphu were brought up in a rural environment and have only recently come in touch with modern lifestyles. With the predicted improvement in health facilities, schools, business and employment opportunities, it is expected that Thimphu will continue to attract large numbers of people. The amount of waste produced in Thimphu from 1998 to 2003 has doubled from an estimated 10 tones per day in 1998 to more than 36 tones in 2006 (RSPN, 2006). A large proportion of waste is a direct result of excessive packaging of consumer items and the increased buying power of the urban population. Waste from many areas at the periphery of Thimphu City remains uncollected by the municipal trucks due to poor accessibility. Even people who have access to waste collection facilities continue to dump their waste into the nearby streams, gullies and slopes creating water

pollution and a highly degraded living environment. Increasing pollution of the Thimphu River is becoming more prominent and public concern is increasing as well. Besides, the present landfill site is nearing the end of its life and a new safe landfill site is proving difficult to find. Thimphu City Corporation (TCC) is grappling hard in isolation to manage its waste effectively. One of the basic challenges is the lack of individual action at the household level to appropriately handle waste due to poor awareness level. So far TCC has not developed any standard and effective strategy for waste management at the household and community levels and in encouraging better use of its waste disposal facilities. The present waste collection system of TCC does not encourage residents or the business community to separate the waste into organic, reusable, recyclable or toxic ones. No initiative has been made to establish partnerships between the stakeholders, public-private and civil society in addressing the waste management in Thimphu. Everyone living in Thimphu recognizes that there is a problem with the management of waste. However, no one actually seems to come forward to collaboratively solve the problem. It appears that everyone's concern has become no one's responsibility. For many Bhutanese urban issues and its management is relatively a new challenge. This collective problem and the failure thereof are not unique to the capital city. Although on a relatively lower scale, most urban centres in Bhutan are facing the same problem. Over the years numerous cleaning campaigns and advocacies have failed a behavioural change in the urban residents. The general notion that the municipalities alone are the responsible organizations for managing the urban environment is a serious concern. At the institutional level, there is an acute lack of partnership and cooperation amongst the various stakeholders engaged in waste management. Although some forms of solid waste management are in place in about 12 towns, the municipalities continue to face major challenges in the absence of a well developed regulatory and legal framework with stringent enforcement mechanisms for compliance of rules by the citizens. It is also worth mentioning here that, with more rural areas becoming accessible to market and external products, garbage is a cause for concern in the rural areas as well. In essence, substantial inefficiencies in institutional and legal arrangements, strategic planning, insufficient resources and lack of civic responsibilities of the so called resident urbanites are some of the prominent issues compounding the waste management problem. As a result, solid waste and indiscriminate open dumping are creating ugly surroundings, choked drains and eventually polluted waterways that not only contaminate the natural environment, but also pose serious hazards to public health. This affect of rapid urbanization on the environment is well recognized by the government (RGOB, 1999). Lack of proper waste management also jeopardizes Bhutan's reputation as a clean and green country which could affect tourism, one of the key target sectors for economic growth. Considering that the solution to the waste problem requires a concerted effort on part

of the urban dwellers, households and institutions, there is an acute need to assess and provide solid waste management options for urban centres in Bhutan. It is clear that the Thimphu City Corporation, or for that matter any municipal authority alone, cannot address the continually growing problem of waste management. There is a need to look for support from other sections of the society within the city such as the civil society organizations (CSO) and the private sector. It becomes imperative then that municipalities should explore ways to collaborate with the private sector to carry out some of these functions through the initiation of Public-Private Partnerships (PPP). Through such an initiative, the financial, technical and other resources of both the public and the private sector can be pooled to improve the service offered to all citizens. Efforts to encourage such collaboration (e.g. RSPN, 2006) should be encouraged and lessons incorporated when drafting national and local strategies and policies on waste management. Other side of conservation story Generally, environmental conservation in Bhutan is dubbed as successful. This success has been defined purely from the conservationist point of view. At present the large section of the high income population group has no role in environmental conservation, but enjoys the benefit of a pristine environment in the country. As such strong environmental conservation policy of the government can best be described by the Stiglirian case, wherein â&#x20AC;&#x153;â&#x20AC;Ś the benefits of regulatory controls are concentrated heavily on few entities, while the costs are rather thinly spread across many entities. The regulatory controls are more stable because the influence advantage falls to those who benefit from regulation, while those who would like to overturn the regulation have relatively little incentive to do so and also face high organizational costsâ&#x20AC;? (Hackett, 1998). This unbalanced distribution of the cost of conservation has been unfairly heavy on the poor, resource strapped, rural farmers that depend on subsistence agriculture. The ban on shifting cultivation (Tseri) did not consider provision of viable alternative livelihood support resulting in loss of livelihood for the farmers who were engaged in such practice. This has forced marginal farmers to resort to unsustainable land use practices with crop yields that are not able to feed their families. While the ban was largely driven by the perceived adverse affect such practices had on the environment, it is not clear whether the views of Tseri cultivators were heard (UNDP, 2006). The shifting cultivation ban is also ineffective from a biodiversity perspective_as many of the crop varieties that were grown on such lands are now not grown anymore and as such contribute to the decrease in the amount of agrobiodiversity genetic resources. Prohibiting the shifting cultivation without providing any viable alternative livelihood sources have created reduced landholding size and, in some cases even, making the people landless wherein they have to lease land from rich farmers. Decreased per capita land holding size has directly reduced food production thus undermining the food security of the rural household. Leasing land or sharecropping adopted by the landless farmers as a coping strategy has proved to be detrimental to both households' livelihoods and to the limited land resources.

The almost draconian conservation policy was successful particularly in the increase of the forest area with forest fringes now having come closer to the rural dwellings. This means that rural farmers have to now increasingly spend more time guarding their crops from the wild animals. Farmers report spending up to half their time guarding their crops from wild life and still lose significant amount of their harvest to the wild animals. Crop and livestock depredation has reached such new heights that farmers, particularly in the rural areas, have to expend considerable time and resources to guard their crops and in some cases farming has simply become impossible because of this. A study done in 1996 showed that farmers lose about 40 per cent of their crops to boars, monkeys and deer etc (Choden and Namgay, 1996). In the past, farmers traditionally mitigated some of the loss from crop damage by hunting wildlife in their fields, thus reducing the population of potential crop raiders while providing a source of much needed protein to the local communities. However, this mitigation method is no longer an option to the farmers as hunting of wildlife is restricted by law (while wild boars can be killed on farm lands, tigers and leopards and other animals are strictly protected). Wild boar problem is wide spread all across the country. In the southern part of the country crop damage by elephants are increasing every year. Houses are often being destroyed and in some instances even human life is lost due to the wild elephant encroachment to the rural settlement areas. Wild predator population like tiger, wild dog, and wolf has increased and consequently increased the incidence of predation on the domesticated animals. Loss of livestock has direct bearing on the rural subsistence farmers thus increasing their livelihood vulnerability. Recent introduction of compensation scheme by the Ministry of Agriculture for the livestock predation by tigers does little to appease the farmers as the compensation rates offered (only for cases of tiger predation) are very small. The process to receive compensation is lengthy and thus not worthwhile to the farmers The provision of subsidized timber in rural areas is cited by some studies (e.g. UNDP, 2006) as perhaps a means to compensate the people living in such rural areas for bearing the high cost of conservation. However, such provisions do not necessarily compensate people enough for their losses due to the lengthy and centralized system of permitting and sanctioning timber to the rural areas. Besides the standing ban on sale of such timber means that they cannot be converted into monetary terms to buy food or replace lost animals. This high cost of conservation borne by the people has naturally caused rural people to resent the conservation policy and activities. A study by a park manager of one of the national parks in the country found an overwhelming disapproval for current park policies based on the Forest and Nature Conservation Act of 1995, and widespread support for the extermination of problem wildlife. Negative attitudes were attributed to crop and livestock damage and restrictions on grazing and resource use (Wang et al., 2006).

Thus it is clear that the cost of conservation is directly borne by the rural poor through crop losses, livestock depredation, time lost for guarding their fields and animals and indirectly through reduced access to forest resources that traditionally served as an insurance scheme and mitigated crop failures as people could always depend on forest resources. As there is a direct link between conservation and livelihood of the rural people, it is important that the government find innovative ways to make difference in the lives of the rural people. Examples include integrated development approaches followed by some of the parks that create alternative livelihoods and mitigate farmers' losses. This would also contribute towards the national priority to halting / reducing the rural-urban migration that is of serious concern as this leads to greater impoverishment related to unemployment in urban areas and shortage of labour in the rural areas. Land degradation and poverty Bhutan's landscape is susceptible to soil erosion, land slides, and seasonal floods partly due to natural factors such as steep terrain, fragile geologic conditions and heavy rainfall. However, anthropogenic factors triggered by population pressure seem to be major cause of land degradation. Intensive land use, poor soil and irrigation water management, tseri (shifting cultivation), overgrazing, firewood gathering, and development of infrastructure such as roads cause serious damage and accelerate the land degradation process. The annual rate of forest degradation in Bhutan is estimated at 0.5 per cent and the total area of degraded forest is estimated at 231,600 hectare, according to the master plan for forestry development of 1991. Fuel wood, fodder and other forest products continue to be collected without replenishment resulting in the degradation of forests. Commercial timber harvesting is not a serious problem in the country as it is heavily regulated. Bhutan's cultivable land resource is also limited owing to difficult and high mountain terrain, vast areas of snow and barren rocks, and large forests. Arable land makes up less than eight per cent of Bhutan's territory, most of it is located in the central valleys and southern foothills. In these relatively flat areas, agriculture must contend with the other development activities of a population which is growing at 2.5 per cent per year. Population growth has led to split inheritance among families, and consequently farmlands are becoming fragmented resulting in less investment in sustainable land management by farmers. The average rural household now owns 3.48 acres of land. Most of this limited land currently under cultivation lies in small, often isolated pockets along main river valleys and throughout the southern foothills. The extremely steep slope makes farming labour intensive as mechanization is often not possible. In addition the urbanization of the country is resulting in conversion of alarming amounts of agricultural land into the urban settlement. For a small country with limited arable land and an economy dependent on the generation of hydropower, the protection of topsoil from sloping farmlands is of high priority. Maintenance of the country's rich biological diversity will also depend on sustainable land management. Deforestation and land degradation cause loss of biodiversity due to reduction and

modification of the habitat. With the nationalization of the forests in 1969 (RGOB 1995), local people lost ownership and management control over resources that had in the past been under their stewardship and management. With the cessation of community involvement in the management of their resources, and in the absence of locally agreed arrangements and the failure of the state to patrol and manage them, a de-facto open-access situation has been created. With an incentive to extract more resources by everyone and a disincentive to protect and manage the resources, the end result is an overexploitation and degradation, a phenomenon typical of most commons (Hardin, 1968). Under continuous degradation, the land could ultimately become unproductive; soil fertility could decline and soil erosion enhanced. Land degradation and poverty are inextricably linked. Land degradation affects the livelihood of rural populations in many ways. About 69 per cent of the Bhutan's population live in rural areas and subsist on an integrated livelihood system of crop production, livestock rearing and gathering forest products. Land degradation reduces agricultural productivity, including livestock production, and thereby affects rural income and the social wellbeing of poor and subsistence farmers. In Bhutan, poverty in rural areas is nine times greater than in urban areas. These linkages become even more pertinent for contemporary Bhutan where the poor are more likely to reside in resource-constrained areas with poverty rate highest among children, women and the elderly population. Unless land degradation is addressed decisively and in an integrated manner, it will hamper the government's efforts to alleviate poverty and promote sustainable development. Thus appropriate policies must focus upon reducing the incidence of environment related or environmentally conditioned poverty such as those due to lack of land, land degradation and lack of access to natural resources. The current government's efforts to encourage community participation in the management of the natural resources through programmes such as the community-based natural resource management (RGOB, 2000), community forestry and other initiatives need to be stepped up and the momentum increased to hand the natural resource management responsibility back to the people. Initiatives to enhance people's capacity in the management of their resources and engendering a respect for the local knowledge would prove crucial. Conclusion The five emerging environmental issues discussed here are not necessarily exhaustive but are some of the most pressing and perhaps most critical ones that Bhutan faces today. To address these issues, appropriate policies should be framed and actions taken as described above. Government programmes that encourage local ownership of natural resources need to be up-scaled to revitalize previously vibrant forms of indigenous management practices, knowledge and systems. This would ensure that the natural resource remain conserved while local people maintain their traditional way of life in tune with nature. Such an approach becomes even more relevant from the standpoint of the situation of increasingly limited state capacity to manage far and

remote areas of the country. Promotion of community organizations and enhancing their capacities on the basis of environmental needs such as waste management, sustainable land management, water management, in the interest of efficient use and management can contribute towards reducing some of the effects of poverty by facilitating the development of enabling frameworks for poverty reduction. A balance must be struck between the national objective of conservation of environment and at the same time protecting the livelihood of the rural people and ensuring food security. An emphasis on the conservation alone would negatively impact food security and rural livelihoods and in turn threaten the national efforts to reduce poverty particularly in the rural areas. In addition, land degradation and other environmental issues need to be mainstreamed into governmental policies, regulations, strategies, plans, and educational systems so that interventions do not remain casual but are sustained. There is also a need for general recognition on the part of politicians and decision makers that land degradation and other environmental problems are a significant barrier to sustained economic development. In addressing some of the emerging issues described in the paper, Bhutan with her exemplary record in environmental conservation in this present world of increasing materialism and an alarming absence of concern for the environment can stand out as the conscience of the world. References l Choden, Dechen and Namgay, Kinzang (1996). Assessment of Crop Damage by The Wild Boar: Report on the findings and recommendation of the wild boar survey. National Plant Protection Centre, Research Extension and Irrigation Division, Ministry of Agriculture. Semtokha, Bhutan. June 1996. l Hardin, Garrett (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. Science 162(1968):1243-1248. l Hackett, Steven C (1998). The Political Economy of Environmental Regulation and Resources Management. Chapter 9 of Environmental and Natural Resources Economics: Theory, Policy, and the Sustainable Society. ME Sharpe, New York. Armonk. l ICIMOD (2001): An inventory of glaciers, glacial lakes and glacial lake outburst floods, monitoring and early warning systems in the Hindu Kush-Himalayan Region. l RGOB (1995): Forest and Nature Conservation Act of Bhutan. Ministry of Agriculture, Thimphu, Bhutan. l RGOB (1999). Bhutan 2020: A Vision for Peace, Prosperity and Happiness. Planning Commission, Thimphu, Bhutan l RGOB (2000). National Framework for Community Based Natural Resource Management. Ministry of Agriculture, Thimphu, Bhutan l RGOB (2002): Ninth Plan Document. Planning Commission Secretariat, Thimphu, Bhutan l RGOB (2005). Population and Housing Census of Bhutan - 2005. Office of the Census Commissioner, Thimphu, Bhutan l RGOB (2006a). Bhutan National Adaptation Programme of Action. National Environment Commission, Thimphu, Bhutan. l RGOB (2006b). National Disaster Risk Management Framework. Ministry of Home and Cultural Affairs, Thimphu, Bhutan. l RSPN (2006): Policy Framework for Solid Waste Management. Royal Society for the Protection of Nature, Bhutan. l Sillero-Zubiri, C. and Switzer, D. (2001). Crop raiding primates: Searching for alternative,

humane ways to resolve conflict with farmers in Africa. People and Wildlife Initiative. Wildlife Conservation Research Unit, Oxford University. www.peopleandwildlife.org.uk/crmanuals/CropRaidingPrimatesP&WManual l UNDP (2006): Macroeconomics of Poverty Reduction: the case study of Bhutan. l Wang, Sonam W, James P. Lassoie and Paul D Curtis (2006). Farmer attitudes towards conservation in Jigme Singye Wangchuck National Park, Bhutan. Environmental Conservation 33(2): 148-156 End Notes 1 Population and Housing Census of Bhutan, 2005

Some Environmental Issues in India Visalakshi Menon

limate changes and global warming are impacting on Europe and America as much as on India and Pakistan. Unusually heavy rains in some parts of the world and heat waves in regions which have had temperate climate have become the norm. It is reported that rising temperatures fuelled by global warming are necessitating changes in crop patterns in certain areas. In the Arctic region, forests of spruce trees have begun to invade the Tundra_ a land where, until now, the only vegetation that could grow were grasses, mosses and lichen. Closer home, along the coastal areas, there are reports of rising sea levels causing considerable danger to coastal cities like Bombay where the most posh residential and business areas are located on lands which have been reclaimed from the sea. Across on the eastern coast too, it is reported that many islands in the Sundarbans are disappearing under water for the same reason. Even as we are becoming more and more aware of environmental issues, our lifestyle choices are tending to become more profligate. This is the major contradiction that we are faced with. Consumerism has reached levels of absurdity. The roads of Indian cities are now clogged with cars. Whereas thirty years ago we had only two brands of cars_ the Fiat and the Ambassador_ now we have virtually every car manufacturer in the world producing and selling cars in India. BMWs, Mercedes, Chevrolets, Hondas, Toyotas, Porsches and innumerable others jostle with each other on the streets of Mumbai, Delhi, Bangalore and other cities to a lesser extent, causing huge traffic jams and immense air pollution. Fossil fuels are being burnt to extinction. For a growing number of the Great Indian Middle Class, it is not enough to just own a car. Having one for each adult member of the family and the most expensive one on the market has become a norm. If ownership of the most expensive cars is one obsession the other is acquisition of more and more apartments. Considered one of the best forms of investment given the high returns on real estate, practically every small town and big city is now passing into the hands of "developers" who promise apartments at affordable rates with every convenience to be desired. Considerations such as retaining a site's natural character or using cheap, locally available materials are usually bypassed. Even in the rural areas houses of mud and cowdung or laterite or other locally available building material are no longer preferred. Cement and concrete structures with abundant use of wood have become extremely popular. We have moved so far away from the ideals of Mahatma Gandhi, who had warned that

"the world has enough for everybody's need, but not enough for one person's greed"1. J.C.Kumarappa, Gandhi's follower, very perceptively observed that: "â&#x20AC;Śin the case of an agricultural civilization, the system ordained by nature is not interfered with to any great extent. If there is a variation at all, it follows a natural mutation. The agriculturist only aids nature, or intensifies in a short time what takes place in nature in a long periodâ&#x20AC;ŚUnder the economic system of [industrial society]â&#x20AC;Śwe find that variations from nature are very violent in that a large supply of goods is produced irrespective of demand, and then a demand is artificially created for goods by means of clever advertisements."2 The violence being perpetrated on nature takes its toll on everyone_ the rich and the poor. This was demonstrated by the Bombay floods which occurred two years ago. On 26 July 2005, Mumbai received a record rainfall of 244 mm. Apartments were flooded, commuters waded through neck-deep water, those travelling in cars and buses were stranded for 20 hours or more. The city came to a standstill. Tens of thousands of railway passengers were stranded as all three suburban and outstation railway lines grounded to a halt on submerged tracks. Electricity, telephone and cellular phone networks failed, and India's most efficient city came to a bewildering halt. The collapse of communication continued through the next two days and the water did not recede for 48 hours in some areas. What happened? Environmentalists say that indiscriminate construction activity was the main culprit. It blocked the natural flow of water to the sea. The Mithi River, the city's biggest storm water drain, flows from the lakes in Mumbai's hinterland, winds through various suburbs of Bombay before emptying out at Bandra. In the past it acted as the city's natural safety valve, carrying excess rainwater into the sea and absorbing seawater at times of high tide. However, because of excessive land reclamation in this area, the river is now unable to empty out into the sea. Like most other rivers flowing through cities, Mithi, which was once used for transport and fishing, has become a dirty, polluted drain. It carries tonnes of industrial and municipal waste. Construction debris is also often dumped in it all along the route. The river was also diverted to make space for Mumbai's new industrial district, the Bandra-Kurla Complex, despite strong objections from environmentalists.3 On 26 July, when very heavy rain in the river's catchment area brought down a higher volume of water, the Mithi overflowed, carrying with it all the filth that had been dumped in it. At the same time, owing to a high tide, the water was pushed backwards from the sea. As a result areas all along the route were affected, with water levels rising to 15 feet in some areas.4 Since 2005, such flooding, though with less disastrous consequences, has become an annual phenomenon in Mumbai. In Delhi, we have a similar story with the Yamuna. When the river enters Delhi at the Wazirabad barrage, it is relatively clean and unpolluted, but barely 100 meters past the barrage, untreated sewage and industrial waste is dumped into it. The Committee on Minimum Flows in the Yamuna has stated that if the minimum flows requirement of 10 cusecs were to be met, it would improve matters for the entire flow of the river.

If more fresh water were present in the river, many of the effluents would get diluted. But that is not allowed to happen. Worse still, major construction projects are now being undertaken on the floodplains of the Yamuna. The Akshardham temple complex, which has come up in the last five years and has now become a major tourist attraction in Delhi, was the first such assault. Now, there is the Commonwealth Games Village which will come up by 2010. Environmental activists are opposing this project tooth and nail. On 1 August, the birth anniversary of Bal Gangadhar Tilak who declared that "Swaraj is my birthright and I will have it", members of various conservation groups came together at the site of the Commonwealth Games Village and planted saplings there. According to Gopal Singh, a member of the Tarun Bharat Sangh which has played an extremely active role in water conservation, "it is this land that has ensured that Delhi, which relies so heavily on ground water, has not turned into a desert. Even the illiterate farmers here know that this site, with its unusual ratio of sand and soil is the most important recharge zone, but the Government seems completely oblivious to it."5 Incidentally, about 40 per cent of Delhi's water requirements are met by the Yamuna. What is worse, there is also a proposal to set up a maintenance depot for the Delhi Metro on the Yamuna floodplain, which means that the washing of the railway wagons will be carried out at this spot and effluents will flow into the river. Increasingly, urban dwellers have begun turning their backs to the rivers that flow through their cities. Even though they know that most of their drinking water comes from these rivers, they unhesitatingly pollute it. Most industries are located close to the rivers because of the need for water at various stages of production. For instance, one of the worst offenders are producers of rayon. The Gwalior Rayon and Silk Manufacturing Company (GRASIM) has been polluting the Tungabhadra River at Dharwar in Karnataka to such an extent that the once sparkling river of the Tungabhadra, considered the elixir of the gods, is now a stinking brownish red. Almost all the villagers using the polluted water complain of dysentery, indigestion, frequent headaches and pain in the back and legs.6 This is the price we pay for fabric which is so popular because we find it so convenient to maintain and wear! The Ganga river is one of the worst victims of human pollution. Despite crores of rupees being spent on the Ganga Action Plan, the pollution of this river occurs faster than the efforts at cleaning it. At Benares, according to the Citzen's Report on the Environment prepared by the Centre for Science and Environment, there is a seven kilometer stretch in which over six million devotees bathe every year. Almost 40,000 human bodies are burnt at the cremation ghats and their ash dumped into the river. Another 10,000 half-burnt bodies are pushed into the river by those who cannot afford to burn the bodies completely. Besides these, unburnt bodies are also thrown into the river. The condition of the river, with these horrifying levels of decomposition can be well imagined. And yet it is the same river which is the source of drinking water to the city!

The issue of big dams In the early decades of independent India, industrial development was a major priority. Gandhi's ideas and warnings about the inherent violence of industrialization were forgotten and huge industrial projects were sanctioned. For these, electrification was an absolute necessity and this was how the first steps were taken towards the construction of large dams. Jawaharlal Nehru's famous words describing the Bhakra Nangal Dam as the temple of modern India represented the thinking of that period. Today, this has become one of the most contentious issues because large dams mean displacement on a large scale. The number of people displaced due to the construction of dams all over the country is estimated to run into millions. According to one estimate 20 million people have been displaced by dams and reservoirs between 1947 and 1992. In some cases, as that of the Rihand Project in Uttar Pradesh (UP) in the 1960s, ousted peasants received no advance warning and had to flee for their lives while rising waters drowned their homes. In recent times, as with the Tehri Dam and the Narmada Projects, warnings have been issued and the more common scenario is for people to resist displacement by clinging to their dwelling places until they are submerged. Historical towns like Tehri in Uttaranchal and Harsud in Madhya Pradesh have been totally submerged and environmentalists say that the loss of cultural heritage is incalculable. What is more calculable is the loss of wildlife, forest and agricultural land. As a result the last three decades have witnessed major environmental movements centering around the issue of big dams. Medha Patkar's Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA) is one of the most visible and vehement protest movements. In order to understand this, let us look closely at the Narmada River Valley Project (NRVP). The beautiful Narmada river originates in the Amarkantak region of Jabalpur in Madhya Pradesh and flows westwards through Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat and finally drains out into the Arabian Sea. The NRVP is a plan to construct 30 major dams and 135 medium and 3000 minor dams on the Narmada and its tributaries. The whole project has been described by environmental activist Claude Alvarez as the "world's greatest planned environmental disaster". At present opposition focuses largely on the Sardar Sarovar Project which is touted as being beneficial to Gujarat since it would bring drinking water to many of the dry western districts of this state. But the large reservoir which is to be created is in the process of submerging 243 villages, the majority of which are in Madhya Pradesh. As a result, this has become a Madhya Pradesh versus Gujarat issue. While the people of Madhya Pradesh are vociferous in their opposition to the dam, those in Gujarat are equally vehement in its favour. The NBA, with Medha Patkar at its head, is constantly at loggerheads with the Gujarat Government on the issue of the Sardar Sarovar Dam with the latter wanting to raise the height of the dam from 110 to 122 meters and the latter pointing out that it will displace even larger numbers of people at a time when those already displaced when the dam was at a height of 110 meters are yet to be rehabilitated.7 One of the earliest recorded organized protests opposing big dams and river valley projects is the Mulshi Satyagraha near Pune in the 1920s. One of India's pioneering industrial houses, the Tatas, had planned a series of dams in the Sahayadri hills,

primarily to supply power to the growing industrial city of Bombay. When the first dam was built near the hill station of Lonavla, the farmers and herders whose lands were submerged were not given any compensation. However, when the next phase of the project began at Mulshi near Pune the peasants objected. They were backed by leaders of the Indian National Congress and the ensuing agitation forced the Tatas to give some compensation to those whose lands were submerged. More significantly, the Tatas then changed their mind and did not proceed with any other hydroelectric project in the Sahayadris.8 In the 1970s, a strong environmental movement also emerged in the Nilgiri Hills of Palakkad district in Kerala. The Silent Valley, located here, is a unique rainforest one of the last surviving patches of such forests in the country. No human community was to be displaced by the Silent Valley Hydro Electric Project (SVHEP) proposed to be set up in the 1970s, but the damage to flora and fauna would have been immense. Innumerable species of flowers, insects, reptiles and mammals would have vanished. The Kerala Shastra Sahitya Parishad (KSSP), a people's science movement committed to environmental protection, waged a successful campaign against this project involving civil society groups, scientists and NGOs worldwide. Finally the Government decided to shelve the project in the 1980s. Instead, 89 square kilometer Silent Valley National Park was created there in 1984. However, quite recently there are fresh stirrings of unrest in the Silent Valley. In April 2007, a new project the Pathrakadavu Hydroelectric Project (PHEP) on the river Kunthi, has received sanction from the Kerala Government. This project is located only a few kilometers from the Silent Valley and environmentalists fear that it would cause irreparable damage to this fragile forest ecosystem.9 The opposition to the Tehri dam, though powerful and sustained, was less successful by contrast. Despite the long-standing opposition to this dam, built on the Bhagirathi river, a tributary of the Ganga, by the Tehri Baandh Virodhi Sangharsh Samiti, and the several hunger strikes undertaken by Sundar Lal Bahuguna, the Chipko activist, work on the dam is now virtually complete. It is expected to provide 270 million gallons of drinking water per day, irrigation for thousands of acres of land and generate over 2,400MW of hydel power. This is a classic case of misleading illusion that "the suffering of the displaced people was for the good of the greatest number".10 Tehri dam is the fifth highest dam in the world and the objections to the project are manifold. One is the seismic sensitivity of the region. The Himalayan mountain range is relatively fragile and this area has witnessed a major earthquake in 1991 at Uttarkashi, less than 50 kilometers away. Environmentalists predict that if this dam, which is at a height of 260 meters (855 feet) were to burst, it can cause huge floods which would wash away the holy cities of Haridwar and Rishikesh downstream within half an hour. Even India's capital city, Delhi, would be washed away within hours. On the flip side, it is Delhi which is one of the major beneficiaries of the Tehri Dam! The second objection is to the submergence of large areas of forest and agricultural land. The third is the submergence of the historic town of Tehri, which was located at

the confluence of the Bhagirathi and Bhilangana rivers, which has now happened. Tehri was the nerve centre of economic activities in the Garhwal region and a favourite market place for the people of all the adjoining villages. All in all, it is estimated that the homes of one lakh people would be submerged by the dam. The rehabilitation of these people is far from complete. The alternative town of New Tehri which has been created is a ghost town despite the planning and infrastructural facilities that the state claims to have provided. The issue of displacement of people by dams, wildlife and forest reserves and now Special Economic Zones (SEZs) is a very real one in India today. There is a tendency to overlook and give short shrift to peasants and villagers who lose their lands due to so-called development activities. The same is the case with tribals and forest dwellers when they are denied access to forests due to conservation efforts. As one displaced person in Harsud put it, "we are like waste to the government. You do not rehabilitate waste, you bury it. Our towns and souls are being buried". The problem that most rehabilitated people face is that the new areas earmarked for them are either infertile or incapable of generating employment. Often the new towns that are built have no infrastructural facilities and, while the rich are able to move to neighbouring cities and lead relatively comfortable lives, the poor have no choice but to join the ranks of itinerant labourers. What is less easily quantifiable is the cultural loss when towns, forests, and grazing grounds are submerged. Whole ways of life disappear, communities of people with their cultural practices and belief systems get fragmented and such loss is irreparable. This is why now it is increasingly felt that small dams, which cause less environmental damage, are preferrable to big dams. Judicial activism Quite often environmental groups have resorted to courts for redressal of their grievances. The record is mixed. In some cases, the Supreme Court has come to their rescue. For instance, in early September 2007, the Supreme Court refused to give clearance to the aluminium giant Vedanta for bauxite mining in the Koraput district of Orissa. This bauxite is buried under 630 hectares of dense sal forests on a hill called Niyamgiri, which is an ecologically rich area. These forests are home to the nomadic Dongaria Kond tribe. Two rivers also originate from the forests of Niyamgiri. It is the bauxite deposits which help retain water, which in turn gives rise to perennial streams. These streams and rivers provide water to Kalahandi district in Orissa which is already drought and famine prone. It is also home to elephants and there is a proposal to notify the Niyamgiri hill as the South Orissa Elephant Reserve.11 In fact Orissa is one of the regions where environmental battles are currently being furiously waged. Environmentalists point out that there are about 500 tonnes of aluminium in this region. This ecologically fragile area is the only biological resource pool left in the Eastern Ghats. What is more, the aluminium industries are major consumers of power and the industries set up in this region are contributing in a large way to the generation of greenhouse gases leading to accelerated climate change.12

If the Supreme Court has adopted an environmentally friendly approach in the case of bauxite mining in Orissa, it has not done so in the case of the Ridge Bachao Andolan in Delhi. The Delhi Ridge is part of the Aravalli range of hills extending from the North Campus of Delhi University to Mount Abu in Rajasthan and is a major conservation area which is constantly under threat because of building activities in Delhi. One of the major encroachments in recent times is in South Delhi near the housing colony Vasant Kunj where the Supreme Court has given clearance for the construction of shopping malls and a hotel by the Delhi Development Authority (DDA). This is in spite of the valiant attempts at lobbying by the Ridge Bachao Andolan (RBA) consisting of scientists and professors of the Indian Institute of Technology, IIT Delhi, the Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), residents of Vasant Kunj and Kusumpur Pahari as well as other concerned citizens to save the ridge. They point out that this area is about 2.4 billion years old (compared to it the Himalayas are only a recent phenomenon). Kumar Onkareshwar, one of the major activists in the RBA explains that the ridge acts as a sink for pollution and acts as a buffer against hot and dusty winds from Rajasthan. Its loss will lead to pollution related diseases and rising temperatures in Delhi.13 Professor Varun Soni of IIT Delhi, another activist, also points out that the groundwater reserves in this area are invaluable and construction of huge concrete structures will impede the permeation of water through the rocky layers which will add to the water shortages in the years to come. These are just a few of the many environmental issues that India is confronted with. Others are the vanishing tiger and other species of wildlife, the massive deforestation and soil erosion, air pollution in the cities, problems of waste management, depleting ground water resources and so much more. Along with this there is also a growing environmental awareness and major environmental movements, often led by women, in different parts of the country. Their effectiveness is dependant on many factors_ their ability to mobilize the people who are directly affected by the problem, their capacity to sustain the campaign, their bargaining power and the willingness of the state to stand up to powerful business lobbies both within and outside the country. The state too has been enacting conservation legislation from time to time beginning with the Wildlife Protection Act promulgated in 1972, the Environment Protection Act 1986 and the creation of a separate Ministry of Environment and Forests, Environment Impact Assessment Committees and the Scheduled Tribes and Forest Dwellers Act 2006 (which is yet to be notified). However what we need to realize is that we do have a rich tradition of environmentalism going back not only to Gandhian ideals but also to religions like Buddhism and Jainism which protected animals and advocated austerity and simplicity as a way of life. In fact, even the major religions like Hinduism, Christianity and Islam, share this belief in austerity, in "living gently on the earth" and believing firmly that every human being has a right to live, to feed, to cloth and to house himself and herself. One can only hope that, as environmental awareness grows and as more and more people and the State and its institutions become sensitized to environmental issues and the need for sustainable development, things will change

and we will stop rushing headlong towards disaster.

End Notes 1 Cited in Ramchandra Guha, Environmentalism: A Global History, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2000, p.22. 2 Ibid,p.24. 3 Bittu Sahgal, one of Mumbai's most well-known environmentalists, had pointed out that a large mangrove patch between the river and the Bandra-Kurla Complex, which provided a natural barrier against flooding, had been illegally reclaimed. Because of the objections that he raised to this and other such schemes, he was removed from the Expert Committee set up by the Ministry of Environment. 4 Article by Kalpana Sharma, The Hindu, Magazine Section, 7 August 2005. 5 "Saving the Yamuna is their only mission", The Hindu, 12 August 2007. 6 Centre for Science and Environment, Fifth citizen's Report on Environment, Part 1, pp.8-14. 7 The Hindu, 3 January 2007. 8 Madhav Gadgil and Ramchandra Guha, Ecology and Equity, Oxford India Paperbacks, 2004, pp.68-69. 9 India Together, 10 September 2007. 10 H.C.Hart, New India's Rivers, Orient Longman, Bombay, 1956, cited in Madhav Gadgil and Ramchandra Guha, Ecology and Equity, p.71. 11 Indian Express, 7 September 2007. 12 Mining in Orissa, India, by William Stanley, Echoes, Issue 21, 2002. 13 Grassroots Media, 18 October 2006.

Kyoto and South Asian Environment Rieta Rahman

ight countries making South Asian regional group, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, are facing the hazards of climate change due to a deplorable ecological peril, the greenhouse effect. A report prepared by Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has warned the region of a bleak future if it does not act thoughtfully and futuristically immediately. Despite its environmental biodiversity, the region would be additionally vulnerable to the catastrophic climate change because of its geological position. The lower riparian areas would, as the prediction goes, plunge several feet under water with the rise of sea level by 20 feet. Under the Kyoto Protocol, restrictions were imposed on harmful greenhouse gases' emission, which is causing the temperature to phenomenally increase. The IPCC fears that the temperature world over could soar an alarming 1.4 C (2.5 F) to 5.8 C (10.4 F) between 1990 and 2100. Kyoto Protocol The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, known as Kyoto Protocol, named after the city of Japan where it was held in 1997, calls on developed and developing countries to sign the Protocols on remedial measures to curb emissions of greenhouse gases. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) is a part of a broad framework established by the Kyoto Protocol for initiating steps to curtail or reverse the growth of emissions of greenhouse gases. The Kyoto Protocol is known to have two broad objectives, cost effective mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and sustainable development. Its central feature is an agreement on binding targets, which is quantified emission limitation or reduction commitment for emission reduction by an average 5.2 percent (by Annex B countries) below 1990 levels. The Kyoto Protocol defined three innovative 'flexibility mechanisms' to lower the cost of achieving its emission targets. These mechanisms enable parties to access cost effective opportunities to reduce emissions or to remove carbon from the atmosphere in other countries. While the cost of limiting emissions varies considerably from one region to another, maintaining a uniform standard for the countries and independent agencies working on the issues remains a problem.

The Kyoto Protocol now covers 169 countries. The USA, being the largest emitter of the greenhouse gas, signed the Kyoto Protocol but did not agree to ratify it or withdraw. Australia is the only other major industrialized country not to have ratified it. Emission of the greenhouse gases is also rising in the largely populated developing countries of Asia. China's emissions are projected to be nearly double, and India's increase is an estimated 80 percent, by 2010. Although environmentalists are concerned at the situation, yet per capita emissions of China and India together will still remain much lower than those of developed countries. While China's per capita emissions are expected to rise more than double by 2025, to slightly over the world average, they will still be just one quarter of those of Unites States. Similarly India's per capita emissions are expected to rise slightly, to about half of the world average, and one fourteenth of those of United States. Kyoto Protocol now includes with binding targets 36 industrialized countries accounting for 66 percent of developed country's emissions and roughly a third of total global emissions. Proponents of the protocol also note that Kyoto is a first step, and the UNFCCC will be modified until the objective is met. As the emissions of the greenhouse gases in the developing countries are only a fraction of what is being emitted by the developed world, the Kyoto protocol to the UNFCCC, in article 2 categorized countries as Annex I' (developed), countries that are developing as non Annex I, and Annex B (industrialized) elaborated policies and measures in accordance with its national circumstances for the binding. Developed countries (Annex I) accepted greenhouse emission reduction obligations and must submit an annual greenhouse gas emission' inventory. While developing countries (Non Annex I) have no greenhouse gas reduction obligation but may participate in Clean Development Mechanism. Climate change is a contemporary challenge that requires a united global solution. Because of pollution that traps heat, the planet of earth would never have warmed as fast as it did in the past 25 years. The change, courtesy greenhouse gas emissions, particularly carbon dioxide, threatens the whole world, yet some of its parts would be more vulnerable than the others putting the fate of a large population at stake, if a consensus is not reached and an action not taken now. Though the whole planet, including the United States, Australia or any industrialised nation (more responsible for the situation), would be dreadfully troubled, to suffer the most would be poor nations of South Asia. Former Vice President of USA Al Gore's documentary 'Inconvenient Truth' shows that 70 million tons of carbon dioxide is emitted daily globally, mostly from the rich industrialized north, and that the pollution level in the past 100 years has risen more than four times. Criticizing the Bush administration for preferring business over environment, Al Gore stressed the need for a strong 'political will that could save the earth from excessive heating caused by the greenhouse gas emissions “capable of

ending human civilization”. Mr Gore also recognized the global warming impact on South Asia and the developing world. Inundation of coastal areas, increasing beach erosion, flooding from coastal storms, changes in precipitation patterns, increased risk of drought and floods, threats to biodiversity and a number of potential challenges for public health, all will be confronting the already underprivileged population of South Asia. The vulnerability and increasing risks for Africa and South Asia are also linked to their insufficient resources, un-preparedness, lack of scientific information, inability to manage abrupt and dangerous circumstances, lack of negotiating ability, and most of all lack of strong political determination. South Asia South Asia has a population of about 1.3 billion. Almost half of the world's poor resides here. It is bounded in the south by the Indian Ocean, in the southeast by the Bay of Bengal and in the southwest by the Arabian Sea. Countries like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, India and the Maldives lying on the lower riparian coastal zone are at high risks from the greenhouse effect. The region is representative of five of the fourteen major ecological areas called 'biomes', demonstrating that the biodiversity and vegetation patterns are determined by climate, water, geology, soil and diverse topography. The diversity of the region's physiography is exhibited in some of the most spectacular natural sites_Sagarnatha (Mount Everest), the world's highest mountain in Nepal, is now threatened. Sundarban, the largest mangrove swamp in the world shared by India and Bangladesh, is endangered. The temperature forest in Bhutan, the desert and arid region of northwest India (Thar) and south Pakistan high altitude cold deserts, major plateau region in south India and the Arabian peninsula, great structural basin and river plains, and also the coral reef lagoons and atolls in Maldives, the Lakshadweep islands in India, which dot the Indian Ocean, the Andaman islands in Bay of Bengal_ are all under great risk of extinction because of the climate change. Yet incongruously, the region's humongous poor population is largely unaware of the gross environmental aberrance. Impact on South Asia The IPCC report is a clarion call for urgent action globally. It lays out whatever lies in future for South Asia and added opportunities for countries to take lead in defining a more secure and sustainable future. The IPCC report on Asia says that sea level will rise up to 40 cm by 2100, inundating vast areas on the coastline, including some of those densely populated cities whose populations will be forced to migrate inland or built dykes _ [sic] both requiring a financial and logistical challenge that would be unprecedented. In the South Asian region as a whole, millions of people will find their lands and home inundated. Up to 88 percent of all Asia's coral reefs, termed the “rainforest of the ocean” because of the critical habitat they provide to sea creatures, may be lost as warming ocean

temperatures arise. The Ganga, Brahmaputra and Indus, -- the main source of water for 40 percent of the world's population living in South Asia, sourcing from the Himalayas, have been envisaged as becoming seasonal rivers, dry between monsoon rains as Himalayan glaciers will continue their retreat, disappearing, as predicted, by 2035, if not sooner. Water tables will continue to fall and the gross per capita water availability in the region will decline by over one third by 2050. With the drying out of major rivers, water tables fall will lead to salinity. This may slowly take its turn on the health of the vast populations of the region, with an increase in the waterborne diseases such as cholera, malaria, dengue et cetera, in newer and more acute form. In an article entitled 'Third World bears burnt of global warming impacts' quoting World Health Organization's assessment report, Paroma Basu writes, “… human induced change in the earth's climate now leads to at least 5 million cases of illness and more than 150,000 deaths every year. She says temperature fluctuations may affect human health in 'surprising number of ways,' scientists have learned, “from influencing the spread of infectious diseases to boosting the likelihood of new illnesses _”. “That those least able to cope and least responsible for the greenhouse gases that cause global warming are the most affected is an irony", says Jonatheran Patz, a professor at UW-Madison's Gaylord Netson Institute for Environmental Studies, and “herein lies an enormous global ethical challenge”. Climate change will scale up heat stroke deaths, especially among the poor, elderly, children, day labourers and agricultural workers. Millions of people will be dislodged by inundation of lands. Misery will eventually spread over the whole region beyond borders. Crop productivity will fall greatly as temperature rise for South Asia would be of over 25 percent; from 1.2 degrees to 5.4 degree C by the end of the century, yielding the region even a lower calorie intake, malnutrition and hunger in most rural areas dependent on rainfall for their cultivation of crops. The areas relying on irrigation will find a growing crisis of availability of water.

the calamity of global warming. As a major country of SAARC, India is the highest emitter in South Asia. It should lead the SAARC countries to choosing a least carbon intensive economy and focus on clean energy such as solar and wind. On energy efficiency, it should work in partnership with the rest of the SAARC member countries. Considering the socio-economic impact of the climate change, developing countries need further access to information and development of scientific capacity that will allow their governments to integrate climate, environment, health, socio-economic factors into development planning and resilience strategies, in partnership with other countries. Remedial actions to combat the situation for SAARC member countries would require global knowledge and joint research with advanced countries on the issues, with each country's integrated plan. Role of SAARC The year 2007 was declared 'Green Year' in the fourteenth SAARC Summit. The greenhouse issue is drawing increasing attention from the media, policymakers and citizens around the world, yet attention towards high-risk areas is still not sufficient. The IPCC final draft report urges India and other Asian countries to prepare for the climate apocalypse with crop varieties that can withstand higher temperatures, salinated aquifers and an increase in pests. It also advises better water resource management and improved disease monitoring and control. South Asian countries, the IPCC recommends, need to take a preventive approach by moving their economies away from fossil fuels and towards clean and renewable form of energy. This could be a clear solution for preserving a sustainable way of life for the region. Blaming the industrialized nations for warming up the world causing suffering of the 'poor east' will not get SAARC anywhere, rather close coordination among the member countries for urgent action on conserving the environment to stave off, in Al Gore's term, "the biggest crises in history". The SAARC representation in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change is vital for partnering with the world to avoid the colossal devastation through scientific information. The presence of SAARC, along with the African countries in the international forum, would automatically mount pressure on major emitters of greenhouse gases to abandon harmful economic policy decisions.

The IPCC report portrays Bangladesh as slated to 'lose the largest amount of land globally'_ approximately 1000 square km of cultivated land from sea level rise. The large population of about 20 million, as a consequence of the situation becoming environmental refugees will be nowhere. The scenario strictly cautions SAARC to initiate quicker preventive actions to avoid incompatible pressure on the countries' economies.

Although environment has been an important SAARC agenda and successive summits have stressed the importance of strengthening regional cooperation in environmental preservation and management to ensure that development process in the member states is not undermined, little progress has been achieved yet.

Global warming is not fair to South Asia. The price South Asia has to pay is the highest on those least responsible for the problem. South Asian nations, having almost half of the world's poor as its population, would have to excruciatingly endure

A technical committee on environment was formed immediately after the formation of SAARC. Mandated, conducted and endorsed by all heads of the state and governments, several studies warned SAARC on the changing environment caused by

'extensive deforestation resulting in increase of natural disasters' like repeated floods, cyclones and earthquakes and soaring sea levels. They recommended measures to protect and manage environment, strengthen disaster management capabilities and devise mechanisms for implementation. They also suggested regional measures in sharing experiences, scientific capabilities and information on climate change, monitoring climatology, sea level rise, and natural disasters. As a part of the plan on environment, two regional centers, a coastal zone in Male, Maldives and a forestry center in Bhutan, were established. The SAARC Plan of Action recommended conventional directory of scientific and technological institutions on environment and state-of-the-art friendly technologies. But South Asian cooperation continues to stagnate mostly over bilateral issues, which require quick resolution for SAARC to act, as observers notice. A SAARC Summit was put on a hold for a long time because India was unwilling to take part. India's disputes with its neighboring countries, Pakistan over Kashmir, border skirmishes, and water sharing issues, and Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka remain an impediment.

Environment/WEB l Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol/Opportunities and Pitfalls for Developing

Countries/WEB l World Directory of Environmental Organisations by Thddey s C Trzyna and Julie

Didion l BBC News/Climate Change

By Richard Black/Ruining 'Everest l Sage Journal/South Asian Online Survey/2006 Sage Publication l Third World Bears Burnt of Global Warming Impacts by Paroma Basu l Clime Asia/Climate Action Network/South Asia/Published by CANSA/WEB l Climate Change: Causes, Effects and Solutions by John T Hardy l Kyoto Protocol: Wikipidia, the free encyclopedia/WEB l Inconvenient Truth (Documentary) by Al Gore l Climate Change: International Action/PEW Center/WEB l Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change l Regional Overview: SAAR/WEB l The Clean Development Mechanism and Sustainable: GHG Emission and

Economic Growth by Tariq Banuri and Sujata Gupta/WEB l Climate Change Will Devastate South Asia by Dephne Wysham and Smitu

Despite all these, SAARC has started moving forward. But rapid and dangerous climate changes require urgent and immediate actions. Implementation of SAARC Charter is crucial to conserving the regions' ecological balance as well as providing security to the regions' large population.

Kotarie/Published in The Hindu

Although 'natural disaster' is a priority for all the SAARC countries, focus on endangered environment is limited to themes like 'measures to protect and manage environmental degradation'; 'measures and programme for strengthening disaster management capabilities'; and 'Implementation mechanism'. Sustainable actions are still missing from the agenda. The emphasis must be on climate proof development, -- more water storages, more protection of coastal areas, higher capacities in flood mitigation, higher environmentally friendly building designs, and, of course, global cooperation. The cataclysm is already hitting, there is no time to waste for SAARC to stand up strong for its large and impoverished population overcoming bilateral differences, to fight the devastating impact of global warming on the region, to become, possibly a vivid example of regional cooperation to the world. References l SAARC Documentation Center Web. http://www.sde.gov.in/abourSAARCenvironment.htm l SAARC Regional Study Report on Causes and Consequences of Natural Disaster and Protection and preservation of Environment l Climate Change101 Understanding and Responding to Global Climate Change PEW CENTER/Global Climate Change/WEB l SAARC Documentation Centre

Kathmandu's air quality are Kathmandu-centric development, weak institutional capacities, and increasing affluence and modernization.

Managing Urban Air Pollution in Kathmandu Madan Koirala

ssues of environment and development couldn't be viewed separately. Rather a complementary observation is necessary from the domestic, village, national to international level (WCED, 1987). Included are all contemporary international and national forums and the development indices of the modern social and natural sciences_ environment and development. In this context the fourth estate of the nation state_ media, which is contributing in making people aware and informed on various contemporary issues. In Nepal where the pace of economic growth and population growth is almost the same it is next to impossible to overlook the environment and developmental issues at any step of national development. For a country like Nepal that has signed 21 environment related international treaties or been the party to important agreements, such as Climate Change, Desertification, Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), it is necessary to take into confidence the state machinery, civic society and media in formulation, implementation and monitoring of any development projects. As the world becomes a village, changes induced in the daily lifestyle and the consumerist culture are impacting the social and physical environment. This paper attempts to delineate the linkages of the media in assessing the pressure and negative impact on the urban environment especially contributing to urban pollution and attracting media in playing their role to mitigate those impacts. This presentation is based upon the Drivers, Pressure, Status, Impact, Response (DPSIR) model adopted by United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) for studying the pollution impact in major cities of the world. Example is cited from Kathmandu valley that embodies the only metropolitan area of the country, i.e, Kathmandu Metropols, one sub-metropols (Lalitpur) and three municipalities (Bhaktapur, Madhyapur Thimi and Kirtipur), are experiencing rapid urbanization and facing high population pressure compared to other parts of the country. Considering that DPSIR will be common steps in increasing urban pollution, identification the issues and mitigate it this modality could be ideal in coverage by the media sector. Drivers (D) Normally these are the underlying drivers or driving forces to which cause activities having a direct impact on the environment. The main drivers in impacting

Khatmandu-centric development Kathmandu has become the centre for all services and facilities nationally over the years. As the capital city, it is natural that the political and administrative centre lies over here. Besides, it remained the hub for finance, industry, education, healthcare services, tourism, and sports as well. Both service seekers and service providers for the above activities contribute in the quantity and quality of air pollution. The conflict situation that continued for a decade also contributed to the population pressure on Kathmandu (MOEST, 2006a). Aspects and steps of the pollution generating activities become the pertinent issues for media professionals to cover. Some indicators of this process of centralisation are presented in Table 1. The trend of Kathmandu-centric development seems to be still continuing. Allocation of 35.4 per cent of the national budget for water supply and sanitation, for the current fiscal year (2006/06), is to be spent in Kathmandu Valley (ICIMOD, MoEST, UNEP, 2007). Table 1: Centralisation of development in Kathmandu Valley Indicator Capital city: Past insurgency situation had confined the activities of most political parties to Kathmandu and other urban centres. Administrative Capital city: Headquarters of certain institutional and regional instituions such as SAARC, UNICEF. ICIMOD, IUCN. central regional headquarters of various ministries and departments, district headquarters of three districts are located here. Finance Headquarters of all major banks and financial institutions and only share market in the country. Education Largest university and most well-known schools and colleges of the country are located in Kathmandu valley. Education consultancies and skill oriented training institutes of manpower etc. Health care Largest hospitals in the country, specialised health care facilities, such as Ganga Lal Heart Centre, Neuro centre, etc. Sports The only international quality football stadium, covered hall, cricket field and swimming pools in the country are all located in Kathmandu valley. Industry The largest and labour-intenstive industries, such as carpet and garment are mostly located in Kathmandu valley. Many polluting industries such as brick kilns and stone crushers. 14,791 small and cottage industries in Kathmandu valley. Tourism Major tourist attractions including seven world heritage sites and hotels are located here. Transportation Country s only international airport is located in Kathmandu. The valley is connected by various highways going north-south and east-west. Of the total vehicles registered in the country, 56 per cent are from Bagmati zone, almost all of which are in Kathmandu valley. Source: Kathmandu Valley Environmental Outlook (with modification), 2007 Function Political

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Weak institutional capacity Agencies prmarily responsible for urban environmental management are weak in institutional capacity. Local Self Governance Act 1999 has empowered the local governments to look after the environmental issues locally. The local governments having very limited resources, both human and financial, are to invest in activities related to urban environmental management. An analysis of the revenue and expenditure of the five municipalities in Kathamndu valley shows that most municapilities depend on a local development fee provided by the central government for their revenue and most of it is spent on current expenses, such as the salaries of the personnels. Personnel expenses of the Fiscal Year 2003/2004 accounted for 27 per cent in Kathmandu metropolitan city (KMC), 65 per cent in Lalitpur Sub Metropolitan City (LSMC), 18 per cent in Bhaktapur municipality (BKM), 52 per cent in Madhyapur Thimi municipality, and 61 per cent in Kirtipur municipality (KM). As a result, municipalities are left with no resources to manage the urban environment and are preoccupied with day to day administrative work and crisis manangement. Despite the larger chunk of the income spent on salaries and administration, municipalities have very limited number of trained manpower to deal with the urban environmental pollution. For example, KMC has an Environment Department, but the department is preoccupied with managing the city's garbage. The urban environment section of the department responsible for air and water pollution control and managing greenary, has two staff members. Similarly, other municipalities also lack the manpower in pollution control and related issues. Department of Transport Management (DoTM) is other insittution related to urban environmental management, it is confined to registering vehicles and issuing route permits. In addition, coordination amongst the organisations involved in urban management is almost lacking. As a result, many issues remain neglected and pollution problems exacerbate. For example, simple digging of roads disrupts underground systems, such as water supplies, drainage, telecommunication cables, which often results in converting well-paved roads into patches of dirt and potholes causing congestion and air pollution. It is estimated that 25 per cent of the total particles less than 10 microns (PM10) in the air of Kathmandu valley are from road dust (Gautam, 2006). A lack of monitoring and the capacity to enforce compliance with standards and regulations is another instituitonal weakness. Nepal has standards for ambient air quality and vehicle emissions, but the enforcement is rare. Since, 2002, the ambient air quality in Kathmandu has been monitored, but the monitoring results have not been used to develop plans and programmes (MoEST, 2006). The status quo work culture prevailing in the government offices including the municipalities prevents institutions responsible for urban management from addressing the challenges of a rapidly growing urban centre adequately. Increasing affluence and modernisation Rural to urban immigration of the people towards Kathmandu valley from different parts of the country is attracting rise. There is a growing middle class in the valley which is demanding new modern facilities such as houses in the suburbs and vehicles. Different financing insitituions are offering attractive and competitive consumer

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facilities to these target groups. Congestion of the city centre is propelling the expansion and additions of a number of satellite towns at affordable prices and attracting middle class population to these satellite towns. Tremendous increase in the city's poulation have brought extended pressure on trafic, roads, social services and environment. Tremendous jump in vehicular traffic due to cheap financing schemes by the banks, have resulted in greater air pollution. Pressure (P) Rapid urbanization Kathmandu-centric development has resulted in rapid urbanization in the valley. Five municipalities in Kathmandu valley out of 58 in the whole country are home to 30 per cent of the urban population. Kathmandu metropolitan city is the largest in the country with more than 20 per cent of the total urban population. The second largest city Biratnagar has less than one fourth of the Kathmandu's population. The population in the valley is increasing at twice the national rate of 2.2 per cent (Pantha & Sharma, 2003). Another significant contributing factor behind the increase of urban population is insurgency induced migration which is directed toward the urban areas, especially Kathmandu valley, since they feel safe there. Although reliable statistics are lacking, recent data collected from 12 municipalities indicate that their population growth has increased from an average of 3.6 to 5.2 per cent per year (ICIMOD,MoEST, UNEP, 2007). The rapid urbanization in Kathmandu is stretching municipal boundaries and converting open spaces and agricultural fields into concrete jungles. Between 1984 and 1999, agricultural land in the valley decreased from 62 to 42 per cent (MOPE, 1999). The Municipial Association of Nepal (MuAN) predicts that Kathmandu valley will be one of the sites to see maximum urbanisation in the forseeable future (FCM/MuAN 2002). Poverty, limited economic activities, aggravated by the insurgency in rural areas, force many people, especially the youth, to migrate to the cities in search of opportunities for employment, education, health and security. Census 2001 depicts that over 30 per cent of the people living in cities are migrants and the proportion is higher in mega cities (populations > 100,000). Haphazard growth and unplanned settlements Institutional weakness in Nepal from the perspective of urban development has resulted in haphazard growth and unplanned settlements. Unplanned settlements and haphazard growth have resulted in reduction of density and increase in mobility. Similarly, expansion of urban areas without adequate infrastructure and transportation system has resulted in increase in vehicular congestion and emission. This unplanned growth in Kathmandu valley has led to set up polluting industries in the middle of residential areas or near enviornmentally sensitive areas, or establishment of major traffic-generating activities such as long distance bus parks in city centres. The wholesale fruit market in Kuleshwor, vegetable market in Kalimati,

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and bus park for Bhaktpur bound buses at Ratna Park illustrate this problem. Increase in number of vehicles and their emissions Out of the total vehicles registered in Nepal in the fiscal year 2004/05, 56 per cent were registered in Kathmandu Valley. In the past five years, the number of vehicles in Kathmandu Valley has been growing at about 12 per cent per year, which accounts about three times the population growth rate and this growth rate is highest in the case of private vehicles such as motorcycles and small cars. The rapid increase in vehicles, particularly private vehicles, results in traffic congestion and air pollution. A recent study on Kathmandu valley air pollution status shows that 38 per cent of the total PM10 is contributed by vehicular emissions, compared to 18 per cent from agricultural sector and 11 per cent from brick kilns (Gautam 2006). Industrial and other types of emissions About 38 per cent of all industries in Nepal are located in Kathmandu valley. Out of the 14,791 industries in the valley, 111 are brick kilns, 89 stone crushers, and 70 industries with boilers (MoEST, 2006a). These industries generate stack as well as fugitive emissions directly resulting in air pollution. According to a recent emission inventory, the industrial sector accounts for about 14 per cent of the PM10 in the Kathmandu valley. Emissions generated through the burning of pile solid wastes especially plastics, too contribute to the urban air pollution. Burning tyres, a general practice, during strikes and 'bandhs' these days in Kathmandu valley has multifacted impact on human health and ecosystem in addition to contributing to the air pollution. State (S) Various studies published after 1990 show Kathmandu's air is densely polluted. According to newspaper reports in mid 90s and 2005, Kathmandu is one of the most polluted city of the world. In the 1990s, UNDP funded Kathmandu Valley Vehicular Emission Control Project (KVVECP), World Bank-funded Metropolitan Environment Project (MEIP), and few NGO and private research laboratories carried monitoring at various locations. Findings showed increasing trend of pollution level. In 2002, the then Ministry of Population and Environment (MoPE) established six permanent airquality monitoring stations in Kathmandu Valley (Table 2) and there are monitoring PM10 concentrations and other key parameters. Table 2: Monitoring Station Locations in Kathmandu Location Classification Putali Sadak Urban traffic Patan Hospital Urban traffic Thamel Urban traffic/residential Bhaktapur Urban background TU, Kirtipur Urban background Matsyagaon Valley background Source: ICIMOD, MoEST/GoN, UNEP, 2007

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Parameter PM10 PM2.5 TSP CO NO2 SO2 Benzene PAH Lead

Table 3: Kathmandu Air Quality Monitoring Programme Methods and location Low volume samplers, 24 hr sampling daily at 6 stations Since Nov. 2005 at Thamel station, 6 hr campaign from Nov 05 to Feb 06, then after 24 hr sampling High volume sampler at Putalisadak & Patan. One 24 hr sample/week Not determined Passive samplers, all stations, monthly sampling Not determined Passive samplers, all stations, monthly sampling Campaign monitoring only To be determined in 2 samples per station per week

Source: ICIMOD, MoEST/GoN, UNEP, 2007

Ministry of Environment, Science & Technology has developed a mechanism to access the daily monitoring report to all. Awareness level among the general public has been raised about the pollution status in the Kathmandu valley. Some interesting conclusions have been drawn from the results of pollution monitoring. l Putali Sadak, is observed as the most polluted location. It is due to the congested

traffic area and highrise buildings that block the pollutants to disperse. l PM10 levels in Putali Sadak area is above national standard in dry winter months

but decrease with the advent of monsoon, however the level is still above the national standard. l There is a significant seasonal variation in the level of PM10. It is high in dry winter season and low in wet months. Additional factor to keep the air pollution low in monsoon is the polluting brick kilns do not operate during monsoon. l Pollution level drops during the weekends and the days of general strike. Thus, the major source of air pollution is the vehicular emission. Other gas pollutants NO2 and SO2 are also observed in Kathmandu's air quality. However, it is within the national average. Concentration of NO2 is higher in the area of heavy traffic and that of SO2 is higher in the area where brick kilns burn coal. Benzene and Polycylic Aromatic Hydrocarbons (PAH) are also recorded in the air quality of Kathmandu valley. Possible source of both the air toxins are the automobile combustion. National standard of benzene has been set by MoEST; however, more needs to be done for PAH. The above could be the emerging issues need to be covered by the media sector. Impact (I) Studies have shown that air pollution has significant impact on human health. Since inhalation is the most common route for pollutants to affect the human body it damages the respiratory system. Exposure to air pollutants weakens the immune system of the body and a number of respiratory diseases such as bronchitis, asthma, cancer and emphysema are caused by it. Fine air pollutants are dangerous to human body as they carry toxic substances. Other affects of air pollution are economic impacts as they adversely affect tourism and loss of human productivity.

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The first study to examine the effects of Kathmandu's air pollution on health used dose-response relationships developed from research in the US, and combined it with estimated frequency distribution of PM10 exposure in Kathmandu Valley to estimate impacts on mortality and morbidity revealed a major impact on respiratory diseases such as bronchitis in children, chronic bronchitis and asthma attacks (Shah & Nagpal 1997). Chronic bronchitis can lead to chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD). A recent study carried out by MoEST estimates that Kathmandu's air pollution results in approximately 1,600 premature deaths per year (MoEST, 2005). The cost of health impacts of PM10 in Kathmandu valley in 1990 approximated to NRs. 210 million (Shah and Nagpal, 1997). Since then the number of vehicles has increased six times and the PM10 concentration has tripled. Similarly, the number of people exposed to air pollution has also increased significantly due to urbanisation. Therefore, economic cost of health impacts must have increased manyfold since then. The high level of air pollution is causing negative impact on tourism. Number of days with good visibility (>8000m) around noon decreased in the winter months from more than 25 days a month in 1970 to five days a month in 1992 (Shah and Nagpal 1997). The urban air pollution adversly affects tourism which is one of the major revenue generating sources. Response (R) Faced with the enormous challenge of pollution, both the government and international agencies have played an important role in evaluing a strategy to adopt various measures. Non-goverment organizations have also got involved in the field. Table 4 gives an overview of agencies taking part in urban air pollution control along with their responsibilities.

Table 4: Key Stakeholders in Air Quality Management Stakeholders Government agencies MoEST

MoLTM MoICS Dept of Trans Management

Traffic-Police Dept of Small Cottage Industries Dept of Industries Municipalities Nepal Oil Corporation Private Organizations Various Transport Associations Electric Vehicle Association of Nepal (EVAN) Nepal Automobile Dealers Association (NADA) Industrialists Federation of Nepalese Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FNCCI) Nepal Environmental & Scientific Services (NESS) Non-government organisations Clean Air Network Nepal (CANN)

Clean Energy Nepal (CEN) Environment and Public Health Organization (ENPHO) Nepal Forum for Environmental Journalists (NEFEJ) International Organizations Asian Development Bank (ADB)

DANIDA

ICIMOD Kathamandu Electrical Vehicle Alliance (KEVA) Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC)

Responsibilities Formulation for air quality related policies and programmes Air quality management project in Kathmandu, Environmental Sector Support Programme (ESPS) of DANIDA support Formulating policies related to transport management Formulating policies related to industrial development Transport management, including issuing of route permits to public transport vehicles and testing vehicular emissions Traffic management and on-the-spot emission testing Promoting and monitoring small and cottage industries, including brick kilns Promotion and monitoring of industries Urban environmental management Supplying Petroleum products and ensuring quality control Operating public transportation and representing the interests of various public transport operators An umbrella organisation for EV manufacturers, owners/operators, and charging station managers Represents the interests of vehicle importers Owners of various industries including limited vehicle manufacturing Umbrella organisation of the private sector Air quality monitoring, all types of pollution studies and environmental studies Network of professional involved in air quality management. CANN is also the local network for Clean Air Initiatives for Asian Cities (CAI-Asia). Research based education and advocacy campaigns Monitoring, research and education campaigns on air quality, solid waste management, pollution control and other aspects of environmental management. Advocacy, lobbying, awareness raising and research on all sorts of pollution problems Project on Environmental Improvement in eight towns Clean Air Initiative for Asian Cities (CAI-Asia), joint ADB-WB programme supporting for air quality management ESPS from 2000-2005 having component on air quality improvement, industrial pollution prevention, and control and institutional strengthening Implementing transboundary air pollution projects on Male Delaration and Project Atmospheric Brown Cloud Promoting electrical vehicles Implementing Vertical Shaft Brick Kiln (VSBK) technology for clean brick production

Source: ICIMOD,MOEST/GoN,UNEP 2007 (with modification)

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In addition, a number of plans and policies are formulated and implemented to some extent by different sections of the government. A brief overview of the plans and policies regarding urban pollution is given in Table 5.

DPSIR Framework and urban air quality in Kathmandu Valley

Driver

Kathmandu Centric

Weak Institutions

Devt

Increased affluence & dernization

Table 5: Plans, Policies and Regulations Related to Air Quality Management Policy/Plan/Regulations National Conservation Strategy (NCS), 1987 Industrial Policy, 1992

Nepal Environmental Policy and Action Plan (NEPAP), 1993 National Transport Policy, 2001

10th Five Year Plan, 2002-2007

Sustainable Development Agenda Nepal (SDAN), 2003

Interim Constitution, 2007 Medium Term Interim Plan, 20072009 Legislations Industrial Enterprises Act, 1992 Vehicle and Transport Management Act, 1993 Environmental Protection Act, 1996 Environment Protection Rules, 1997 Fiscal Act, 2003/04

Salient features First environment-related policy of government taking into account of the urban and industrial pollution. Suggest Environment Impact Assessment of proposed projects Promote industrial activities through minimisation of adverse environmental impacts during establishment, extension and diversification of industries. Formulation and implementation of guidelines to control pollution and tax benefits for investments in activities related to pollution control Need to address urban and industrial pollution. Stresses the need of EIA A number of policy formulation regarding management of air quality from construction, repair, maintenance to tax and customs rebates for pollution-free vehicles Decentralization in pollution related activities, Enforce Nepal Vehicle Emission Standards, Promote railway and trolley buses through public-private partnerships Strict enforcement of ambient air quality standards Encourage shift towards zero-emission vehicles and cleaner fuel in industries Promote cleaner energy tecnology and alternative energy technology Clean environment as fundamental right Strict enforcement of emission standards, Implementation of Clean Development Mechanism, Carbon trading through Kyoto Protocol Energy efficiency, conservation and pollution abatement and tax rebate Emission standards, fuel efficiency timely maintenance Pollution control, mitigation, awareness raising Guideline formulation, authority delegation Emission standards and regulatory mechanism Incentives to electrical vehicles Compulsory implementation of of mass emission standard Pollution tax on diesel and petrol to be sold in Kathmandu valley

Source: ICIMOD, MoEST/GoN, UNEP 2007 (with modification)

Conclusion Given the increasing pollution and environmental degradation in Kathmandu valley, the media should be playing is due role in bringing the issues of environment into publics focus. With the efforts of media, clean environment as a fundamental right has been included among the rights chapter of the interim Constitution.

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Pressure

Rapid Urbanization

Haphazard Growth

Increase in Vehicles

Status

Poor Air Quality

Impact

Response

Health Impacts

Government Policies

Impact on Tourism

Media

Civil society, NGOs, Private S e c t o r

References: l FCM/MuAN, 2002. Country Profile: Nepal Urban Sector and Muncipal Governance. Kathmandu: Federation of Canadian Municipalities and Municipal Association of Nepal. l Gautam, C. 2006. Action Plan for Air Quality Management in Kathmandu Valley. Kathmandu: Ministry of Environment, Science & Technology, Government of Nepal. l HMG/MOPE, 1999. Environmental Planning and Management of the Kathmandu Valley. His Majesty's Government of Nepal, Ministry of Population and Environment, pp. 211. l Internatioanl Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), Ministry of Environment, Science and Technology (MoEST)/Government of Nepal (GoN) and United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 2007. Kathmandu Valley Environmental Outlook. pp.133. l MoEST, 2006a. State of Environment_ Nepal, 2006. Ministry of Environment, Science & Technology, Government of Nepal. l MoEST, 2006b. Ambient Air Quality of Kathmandu Valley 2005, Kathmandu. Ministry of Environment, Science & Technology, His Majesty's Government of Nepal. l Pantha R., & B.R. Sharma, 2003. Population size, growth & distribution. Population Monograph of Nepal, Central Bureau of Statistics, National Planning Commission, HMG, Nepal. l Shah J., Nagpal, T. (eds), 1997. Urban Air Quality Management Strategies in Asia: Kathmandu Valley Report, World Bank Technical Paper No. 378. Washington D.C., World Bank. l The World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987. Our Common Future. Oxford University Press, pp. 400.

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Solid Waste Recycling in Bangladesh Dr. Md. Salequzzaman1, Md. Abul Kashem2, S.M. Tariqul Islam2, Md. Nazim Uddin3, Md. Abdullah Yousuf Al Harun3, Md. Atikul Islam3, Md. Wahiduzzaman4

unicipal solid wastes (MSW) include garbage, refuse, and other residential or commercial discarded materials, also including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous materials resulting from human activities that are normally solid and discarded as useless or unwanted (Howard, 1985). The amount of solid wastes is increasing day by day with rapid population increase especially in urban areas thus hampering waste management in urban life. Deterioration of daily life of the people with the loss of economy and environment has also been focused as a major threat caused by these solid wastes (Salequzzaman et al., 2006). Khulna is the third largest city of the country and situated below the tropic of cancer, around intersection of latitude 22.49 o North and longitude 89.34 o East. It lies along the Bhairab River and has an important port. About 1.50 million people are living in Khulna City and its area is 47 sq. km and the population growth rate is 2.96 per cent per year. The average per capita waste generation rate in KCC 0.346 Kg/day and major portion of generated wastes is organic in nature. Total organic wastes are 88.40 per cent, 90 per cent out of them residential. Per day about 420-520 tons of solid wastes are generated and total amount of organic wastes is 459.68 tons; among them about 413.72 tons are residential solid wastes (Alamgir et al., 2005). These wastes hamper the daily life of the inhabitants and lose the city and the country their resources. Usually it causes damage or loss of the trend of economy and development of the city (Ahmed and Raman, 2000). So, it is necessary to take proper steps and develop innovative technology for potential resource recovery from MSW for sustainable waste management in Khulna city. On the other hand there is a crucial demand of electricity in households, factories, industries, and public institutions. However, the supply is really inadequate because of scarcity and high cost of fuel (Azad et al., 2003). Therefore, organic wastes of the city areas can be utilized to produce biogas which can be used further for generating electricity or for other necessary purposes. This way, the technology can solve energy problem of Khulna city. Objectives of the study The study aims at learning â&#x20AC;&#x153;how to convert the municipal solid wastes into biogas resource at a small-scale processâ&#x20AC;?, with the following major objectives 1. To identify the utilizable organic wastes from Municipal Solid Wastes (MSW) and

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how to utilize these unused organic wastes into potential resources as a biogas and bio-fertilizer; and To recommend research on the applicable design of portable, low cost and locally available biogas plant.

Materials and methods To select the sampling sites and data collection, a reconnaissance survey has been conducted in different spots of the KCC area. Random sampling procedure was chosen for the collection of samples. Temporary storage sites from three Kacha bazars (Nirala: ward no-25, Rupsa: ward no-29, Khalispur: ward no-12) were selected for sampling because these three sites are one of the main sources of solid waste generation in KCC area. Samples were collected randomly and brought to the laboratory. In the laboratory, the samples were sprayed upon the polythene paper and were prepared as a composite sample. From this composite sample, three samples were taken and sorted out as organic and inorganic portions. After sorting, the organic and inorganic portions were weighed and the organic waste shredded before

Figure 1: The Sorting of MSW

Figure 2: The Oven Drying Process of MSW

being taken for determining of the moisture content (important to biogas production). Comparatively larger pieces were to be sliced before keeping it in an electric oven for drying. The samples were kept in the chamber for 24-36 hours at a temperature of 601000C. After drying, the samples were weighed. The percentage of moisture content, TS (factor for biogas production) as well as the amount of influent was calculated by using the following formulas. Percentage of moisture content = (Initial weight_ final weight after dried) /Initial weight x 100 Total solid content = (100_ moisture content) % Influent calculation = 100 / Percentage of TS x TS of used materials. (Biogas operation and training manual, 1999) Fifteen and a half kilogram (15.5 Kg) of solid wastes was used in each drum for anaerobic digestion that had six different percentage of TS content. The amount of TS and influent for 15.5 Kg solid wastes were calculated in the following way.

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Table 1: Influent Calculation for Each Drum of the Different Percentage of TS

A (m3) = Amount of raw materials (Kg) Ă&#x2014; Total solid content (%) Ă&#x2014; gas generation rate per unit of solid waste (m3/ Kg TS)

% TS

Solid waste (Kg)

TS content

Influent (Kg)

Water to be added (Kg)

4 5 6 7 8 9

15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5

2.345 2.345 2.345 2.345 2.345 2.345

58.63 46.9 39.08 33.50 29.31 26.06

43.13 31.04 23.58 18.00 13.8 10.56

Source: Laboratory analysis, 2006.

According to the calculation, the six plastic drums (4%, 5%, 6%, 7%, 8%, and 9% TS) were set up in the laboratory. Each drum contained 15.5 Kg of solid waste, but the TS values differed from 4 per cent to 9 per cent. So the water added to each drum was measured and then the drums were sealed. Figure 3: Drums for anaerobic digestion

Energy from biogas E1 (kJ) = A (m3) x (%) of methane x LHV (kJ/m3 Electricity generation from biogas Total Electricity generation is E2 (kWh /day) = E1 (MJ) x Generator efficiency / 3.599884 MJ. (1kWh =3.599884 MJ) (Biswas and Lucas, 1996). Result and discussion Waste generation in KCC area According to the survey it was found that the waste generation rate is 0.347 kg per day per capita. If it is assuming an annual Gross Area Product (GAP) of 4 per cent and 70 per cent of the additional income coming into consumption, waste generation growth factor may be taken as 4 x 0.7=2.8%. With this trend, the year wise growth rate per day of waste generation up to 2020 is shown below.

Y ear w is e w as te generatio n in K C C area 1600 1400 1200 1000 800

2020

2019

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

200 0

2006

600 400

2005

W aste G en eratio n (T o n s)

Figure 4: Year Wise Waste Generation per Day

Y e ars

There are two nozzles with PVC pipe and gate valves upon each cap of the drums. One pipe is for passing out gas and another is to know the gas pressure. To make the drums air tight, oil-based putty, tape and side ring barrier were used. To check for any possible leakages, air pressure was given and then a polythene paper was rounded around each drum. For enhancing microbial growth, the seeding (residue of biogas plant) was added in to the each drum before sealing. After sealing the drums the time was noted and the drums were kept in the laboratory for the digestion of the MSW. The production of the gas was measured from the next day for 45 days. The amount of biogas, energy, and electricity was calculated by using the following formulas.

This graph shows the generation rate of wastes is increasing sharply in the urban areas and it will reach at around 1421 tons in the year 2020. This huge amount of wastes will require a large area of land and also produce a significant amount of GHGS (CH4 gas) into the atmosphere. The CH4 gas is an important precursor of electricity generation. Moisture content, TS and the amount of influent Average percentage of moisture content of the sample (S) = (82.13+81.73+90.76/3) % =84.87% The Total Solid (TS) = (100-84.87) %=15.13% The amount of TS for 15.5 Kg solid wastes =2.345 Kg For 4% TS the influent = 100/4 x 2.345 Kg =58.63 Kg solid waste influents

Calculation of total biogas production Amount of biogas (A) generated from MSW,

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Figure 6: Total amount of biogas production against percentage of TS in 45 days.

Carbon- Nitrogen ratio Table 2. Carbon-Nitrogen ratio determination

Organic carbon (C) % (in an average)

S1,S2,S3

26.65

Nitrogen (N) % (in an average)

1.46

C/N ratio

18.25 / 1

Source: Laboratory analysis, 2006

Comparison between different percentages of TS as a Factor of Biogas Production The comparison graph shows the day-wise experimented gas production of several percentages of TS. Figure 5: Comparison Graph, Showing Volume of Gas (L) Against Day 25 Peak

Volum e of Gas (L)

Am o u n t o f g as (L )

Samples

A mo u n t o f g as p ro d u ctio n ag ain s t p ercen tag e o f T S

600 500 400 300 200 100 0 4% TS

5% TS

6% TS

7% TS

8% TS

9% TS

P ercent age of T S

The graph shows that the maximum gas production is for 6 per cent TS (at temperature 26oC to 30oC) because it is suitable condition for microbial growth that is directly involved in the decomposition of the organic MSW. So, for maximum gas production by anaerobic digestion from MSW the 6 per cent TS (experimented two times) is better than other percentages of TS but it may vary depending on the composition of MSW.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45

0 Da ys 4% TS

5% TS

6% TS

7% TS

8% TS

9% TS

This comparison graph shows there was no gas produced on the first day and the maximum gas production was 21.5 L for 6 per cent TS on the sixth day. The peak value of all the percentages of TS was observed within two to seven days. After 45 days it was also observed the rate of gas production for all percentages of TS was near to zero except 6 per cent TS and 7 per cent TS but comparatively gas production for 6 per cent TS is high. During the digestion period, at any temperature, the rate of gas production gradually increased at first, reached a maximum rate-plateau, and then decreased. Total gas production for different percentage of TS The following graph shows the total gas production in 45 days for all percentages of TS.

Gas flow rate calculation The gas production for 6 per cent TS was maximum and so the average flow rate was calculated by the following ways: The total gas production for 6% TS = 564.2 L (within 45 days) The TS value for 15.5 Kg solid waste = 2.345 Kg We know that, 1,000 L = 1 m3 So, 564.2 L = 1 / 1,000 x 564.2 m3 = 0.5642 m3 For 2.345 Kg TS the gas production is = 0.5642 m3 So, for 1 Kg TS the gas production is = 0.5642 / 2.345 m3/ Kg TS = 0.24 m3/ Kg TS Gas flow rate = 0.24 m3/ Kg TS Calculation of total biogas production Amount of biogas (A) generated from MSW, A (m3) = Amount of raw materials (Kg) Ă&#x2014; Total solid content (%) Ă&#x2014; gas generation rate per unit of solid waste (m3/ Kg TS). Here, the amount of organic municipal solid wastes (Kg) = 4,15,480 Kg /day (88.4 per cent of averaging 470 tons) Total solid content of MSW waste = 15.13 per cent Gas generation rate per unit of solid waste = 0.24 m3/ Kg TS Amount of biogas (A3/day) will be generated from MSW = 4, 15,480 x 15.13 / 100 x 0.24 m3 / day = 15086.91 m3 / day Energy from biogas E1 (kJ) = A (m3) x (%) of methane x LHV (kJ/m3)

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Where, A = 15086.91 m3/day Methane content = 55-75% (in an average 65%) Lower heating value (LHV) = 20,580 kJ/m3 So, E1= 15086.91 x 65/100 x 20580 kJ / day = 201817592 kJ / day = 201817.592 MJ / day

anaerobic condition.

Electricity generation from biogas Total Electricity generation is E2=(kWh / day) = E1 (MJ) x Generator efficiency / 3.599884 MJ. (1kWh =3.599884 MJ). Where, E1 = 201817.592 MJ / day Generator efficiency = 41.183% So, E2 = 201817.592 x 41.183/100 /3.599884 kWh/day 23088.12 kWh / day Chemical analysis of bio-fertilizer Table 3. Nutrient Constituents of Bio-fertilizer Nitrogen (N) %

Phosphorus (P) %

Potassium (K) %

1 - 1.2

1.40-3.0

0.7-1.2

Source: Laboratory analysis, 2006 Table 4. Chemical characteristics of bio-fertilizer Chemical constituents

Percentage (%) by weight

Carbon (C)

8-50

Nitrogen (N)

0.4-3.5

Phosphorous (P)

0.3-3.5

Potassium (K)

0.5-1.8

Source: Laboratory analysis, 2006

Recommendation For a better resource recovery from MSW in KCC area, we recommend: Design of MSW based biogas plant The study has already identified the appropriate percentage of TS (6 per cent TS) for maximum biogas production from organic MSW as well as the flow rate of gas production. Now a further study can be conducted for a suitable design of MSW based biogas plant that will be low cost, locally available, sustainable, and environmentally friendly. A high enhancer should also be developed to decompose the organic portion of MSW rapidly and for the microorganisms to act quickly with less residential time in the

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Series of biogas plant at the land fill site It is necessary to separate the MSW as organic and inorganic before carrying it out into the land fill site from the sources. Seven fixed dome/floating cover biogas plants can be installed in the land fill site depending on the amount of organic wastes. The biogas plants will be filled by the first three days' wastes and on the third day it will be sealed by adding water and enhancer. Here the biogas will be converted into bio-electricity to serve the demand. Community based biogas plant Within a community, a large-size biogas plant can be installed depending on the demand of biogas as well as the amount of organic solid wastes. Here a crushing part of a biogas plant and a strong degradable enhancer such as Trichoderma hargianum (Rafi) and Trichoderma virens (Ilias, et al., 2006) are necessary. The community will directly use the gas through pipelines. Small-scale house-to-house biogas plant To set up small scale house-to-house biogas plant, sufficient amount of organic solid wastes will be required. Depending on the generating solid wastes capacity and gas requirement of the family, the biogas plant can be installed but in this case more advance technology and appropriate design of biogas plant as well as strong degradable enhancer is the first priority. Conclusion Solid wastes, increasing with the population, are difficult to dump, and manage. But given the shortage of electricity and gas, they can help Khulna and the country to overcome it. The biodegradable MSW can produce burnable gas as well as ecologically sustainable organic bio-fertilizer through anaerobic digestion process. Thus the research is set up on how small-scale biogas plants can help in potential resource recovery. The study found that a total 470 tons of waste is generated per day and out of which 88.4 per cent (around 415480 Kg) is anaerobic digestible. By using these wastes, 15086.91 m3/day biogas can be produced easily by the anaerobic process. Using this gas can produce 201817.592 MJ/day energy. Various types of generators are used to convert biogas into electricity. If the generator efficiency is 41.1 per cent per day, 23088.12 kWh electricity can be produced, saving the country extra money it is using to buy fuel for electricity generation. Moreover, by this approach large amount of MSW could be managed environmentally friendly. 1

Professor, Environmental Science Discipline, Khulna University, Bangladesh and Research Fellow, Institute for Sustainability and Technology Policy (ISTP), Murdoch University, Australia, 2Student, Environmental Science Discipline, Khulna University, Bangladesh; 3Assistant Professor, Environmental Science Discipline, Khulna University, Bangladesh, and 4 Water Supply Specialist (Individual Consultant), Interim water Supply Project, Khulna City Corporation, Bangladesh (under lien from LGED)

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References l Ahmed, M. F. and Rahman, M. M. 2000. Water Supply and Sanitation, Rural and Low Income Urban Communities. First Edition. ITN-Bangladesh. Centre for Water Supply and Waste Management BUET. Dhaka. Bangladesh. pp. 444 l Alamgir, M., McDonald, C., Roehl, K., E. and Ahsan, A. 2005. Integrated Management and Safe Disposal of Municipal Solid Waste in least developed Asian countries. Waste Safe, Department of Civil Engineering, KUET, Khulna. Bangladesh. pp. 420 l Azad, A., A., Sultana, J. and Harun, M., A., Y., A. 2003. Impact of energy consumption on the air environment in Bangladesh, Journal of science foundation 1(1), pp 1-8 l Biogas operation and training manual, 1999. Local Government and Engineering Department. Government of People's Republic of Bangladesh. l Biswas, W. K. and Lucas, N. J. D. 1996. Economic Viability of Biogas Technology in Bangladesh Village. Asian Institute of Technology (AIT). pp 763-769 l Howard, B. G. 1976. Composting. Sanitary Disposal Reclamation Organic Wastes. World Health Originations. Geneva. Switzerland. pp. 203 l Ilias, M., G., N., Molla, A., H, Rahman, M., A. and Alam, M., F. 2006. Role of Trichoderma in composting of garbage and in agriculture. Conservation of medicinal plants in Bangladesh. In: Annual Botanical Conference-2006. 02-03 March, 2007. Khulna University. Khulna. Bangladesh. p. 25 l Salequzzaman, M., Sultana, U. T., Iqbal, A. and Hoque, M. A. 2006. Ecological footprint of waste generation: A sustainable tool for solid waste management of Khulna City Corporation of Bangladesh. In: International Conference on Complex Systems. USA. pp. 2-5 l www.wasteconcern.org , July 2006.

People First in Conservation Case Studies from Nepal Ukesh Raj Bhuju

eople's cooperation has been crucial to successful conservation endeavour in Nepal. Since the establishment of the first national park in Chitwan in 1973, the Government of Nepal has considered public cooperation as an indispensable tool for the successful management of the protected areas. At the time of nomination for the World Heritage Site in 1979, the technical team of the World Conservation Union (IUCN) observed that the government had recognized the Sherpa community as a partner for conservation in the Sagarmatha National Park (SNP). In the case of the Chitwan National Park (CNP) in 1984, the team noted that the government had promoted public awareness programmes to resolve the issues of wildlife damage in CNP. In all the three Conservation Areas namely the Annapurna, Manaslu and Kangchenjunga, the local people have been given the rights and responsibilities of conservation and development by refraining the involvement of armed guards in the protection works. The 1988 Master Plan for the Forestry Sector (MPFS) had outlined high priority to human interests while developing protected areas during its proposed period of two decades between 1990/91-2010/11. The policy objectives of the Plan included two imperative components such as meeting people's basic needs on a sustained basis, and promoting people's participation in conservation (HMG/MFSC 1988 p9). The idea of building partnership between the government and the people through consultative process and subsequent management plans was resolved in the 1988 National Conservation Strategy (NCS) for Nepal. The NCS specifically resolved, “the consultative process and subsequent management plans will address such issues as: identification of management zones within the parks and protected areas on the basis of the nature and level of acceptable human activity and /or intervention; such management zones might include: … … buffer zones adjacent to areas where customary harvesting is permitted, to be harvested according to a described management plan and to be subject to control measures with respect to wildlife where local communities are endangered” (HMG/IUCN 1988 pp110-111). During the first public movement in the country in 1990, the local communities living around the protected areas especially in CNP and Langtang National Park (LNP) intensified their voice on sufferings from wildlife damage including human casualty.

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Similar voice was publicly heard during the 1980 national referendum. Following the formation of an interim government in 1990, all the sectors were instructed to devise a plan to provide direct benefits to the people. In response, the Ministry of Forests and Soil Conservation (MFSC) initiated for fourth amendment of the National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act in 1993 to accommodate the buffer zone. Along with the other provisions, the major highlight of the buffer zone policy was the Article 25(a) of the Act that entitled the buffer zone residents to receive 30 to 50 per cent of the annual revenue of the park for their community development and biodiversity conservation. In the case of the Conservation Areas, the local communities receive 100 per cent revenue for conservation development programmes as per the Rule 26(1) of the Conservation Area Regulations 1996 (HMG/MLJP/Law Books Management Committee, 2003).

(Annex 1). Among the emerging applied research and development institutions, the LI-BIRD (Local Initiatives for Biodiversity, Research and Development) has recently applied for the membership of IUCN. Mass participation has been mobilized in the historical events like Visit Nepal Year 1998, and Eco Walk 2000. Department of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation (DNPWC) has regularly observed the Wildlife Week in the first week of the Nepali official year in mid April. National and international days have been observed throughout the year, such as World Environment Day, World Heritage Day and so on. Under various projects, environmental education has been promoted through schools. A network of eco clubs has been developed in about 500 schools through the joint efforts of the government and the nongovernmental organizations.

In continuation with the MPFS and NCS, the Government of Nepal has emphasized in the 2002 Nepal Biodiversity Strategy (NBS) and its 2006 Implementation Plan on fulfilling the people's basic needs as well as on their active participation for realistic conservation endeavours. The essential elements that have been adopted in the NBS for public participation included acknowledgement of people's rights to participate in decision-making and benefit sharing, empowerment of people (both men and women) and public awareness (HMGN/MFSC 2002 p 149). The NBS had elaborated the sectoral strategies that new models of protection and management of protected areas would be extended in which case community participation would replace army involvement as in the Annapurna, Kanchenjunga and Manaslu Conservation Areas (HMGN/MFSC 2002 p135). On conservation of forests, ecosystems and biodiversity, the 2003 Sustainable Development Agenda for Nepal stated, “promote people's participation in forestry resource development, management, and conservation… …” (HMG/NPC/MOPE 2003, p 27).

Public opinions have been considered in park administration. In 1999-2000, DNPWC with the support of UNDP conducted participatory workshops on management strategy framework for nine protected areas, namely Khaptad National Park (KNP), Koshitappu Wildlife reserve (KWR), LNP, Parsa Wildlife Reserve (PWR), BNP, CNP, Rara National Park (RNP), Shuklaphanta Wildlife Reserve (SWR) and SN. Local communities and nongovernmental organizations were invited at the workshops that used the process of objective oriented project planning popularly known as ZOPP (Ziel Orientierte Projekt Planung). The local communities and the representatives of the nongovernmental conservation partners were involved in various stages of planning and implementation of management plans and projects in the protected areas. The Ministry of Forests and Soil Conservation prepared the Nepal Biodiversity Strategy document in 2002 through a participatory process that involved 120 national and international NGOs, all 75 District Development Committees and 350 government officials and national international experts (HMGN/MFSC 2002 pp 7). A cursory glance of major events is given in the Annex 2.

An era of partnership 1992-2003 The decade of 1992-2003 has been a remarkable era of partnership for conservation. In terms of legal arrangements, the buffer zone has been institutionalized with regulations, guidelines and a coordination forum. During the decade, the three Conservation Areas that have been gazette notified or declared are the Annapurna, Kangchenjunga and Manaslu. This type of protected areas is managed according to the principles of integrated conservation and development programmes through active participation of the local communities, community-based organizations (CBOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). A network of conservation organizations has been developed during the last decade. The two leading international conservation organizations namely the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and IUCN established their permanent country offices to further promote the conservation efforts of the government and the nongovernmental organizations. All 14 Members of IUCN have formed the Nepal National Committee with an objective of furthering conservation efforts through synergy and coordination

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Achievements Government response to community needs The fourth amendment of the National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act in 1993 introduced buffer zone policy that brought a landmark positive change in promoting community partnership in conservation. One of the articles states, “8. Additional Article 25 A: The following article 25 A has been appended with the Article 25: 25 A expenditure for the local development: 30 to 50% [sic] of the income generated by the national parks, reserves or conservation areas can be spent for the community development of the local people by coordination with local agencies” (HMG 1993 p39). The Buffer Zone Management Regulations 1996 and Buffer Zone Management Guidelines 1999 made provisions of institutional structure, programme planning,

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resource mobilization and funds management. With the promulgation of the regulations in 1997, buffer zones have been declared in BNP and CNP. By 2006, eight national parks and three wildlife reserves have been declared buffer zones. The 11 buffer zones cover the total area of 5,081 Km² in 179 Village Development Committees and three municipalities with the approximate population of 665,000 which is represented by 130 User Committees and over 4,000 User Groups. For furthering the coordination as well as competition among the Buffer Zone Management Committees, a Buffer Zone Forum was launched in 2002. The forum also helps the government in revision of the buffer zone related policies and programmes (Table 1). Table 1. Buffer Zone Status Buffer Zone 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

LNP MBNP BNP CNP SNP SPNP KWR PWR SWR KNP RNP

12. ShNP* * Conceived

Year Declared 1998 1999 1997 1997 2002 1998 2004 2005 2004 2006 2006 Total -

Area Kmÿ 420 830 328 750 275 1,349 173 298 244 216 198 5,081 -

Population 40,000 32,000 103,806 180,965 13,000 9,000 74,466 65347 78,557 54,693 12,850 664,684 101,493

VDC Municipality 34 12 17 37 3 8 13 17 11 21 9 182 25

Source: DNPWC/PCP 2002, HMGN/MFSC 2002, DNPWC/PCP. 2006, Bhuju, et al. 2007.

financial support of United States Agency for International Development. All these projects helped the park authorities and the buffer zone representatives for biodiversity conservation and poverty reduction. Three cases of buffer zones Bardia Case: NEFEJ, BNP and WWF jointly organized an interactive workshop on “Park People: Interrelation and Interdependence” in Thakurdwara, Bardia on May 1-2, 1995. The workshop resolved that people's participation was a must in conservation efforts, and the fourth amendment that is buffer zone policy should be implemented without delay. Following the workshop, the facilitators approached the MFSC officials to put the buffer zone regulations in a fast track, for without the regulations the fourth amendment of the NPWC Act was inactive. The workshop was a positive thrust for the officials of DNPWC and MFSC to bring the regulations out in a gazette in 1996 (NEFEJ 1995, personal communications with Mr Bhairav Risal, and personal observations). Langtang Case: NEFEJ and LNP with the assistance of Friedrich Naumann Stiftung organized a district level discussion programme in Dhunche, Rasuwa in 1998 on the relationship between the inhabitants of Rasuwa district and the Langtang National Park. Men and women from all the 26 Village Development Committees of the districts participated in the programme. The district leaders enthusiastically mobilized the local people for cooperating with the park administration, and demanded for the maximum ceiling that is 50 per cent park revenue to be recycled in the buffer zone. The interactive meeting was instrumental in helping the park authorities for the recommendation to the DNPWC/MFSC (NEFEJ 1995, personal communications with Mr Bhairav Risal)

Some remarkable public activities complemented the DNPWC declared buffer zones. The Bardia workshop supported the officials of the Ministry of Forests and Soil Conservation to put the process of formulating buffer zone regulations in a fast track. The Langtang stakeholders' discussion programme helped the DNPWC officials recommend for the highest of 50 per cent revenue allocation for the buffer zone programmes in the Langtang National Park. The Sagarmatha event helped declare the buffer zone within two months of the ministerial visit to the site by also including the Pharak region of the Sagarmatha National Park.

Sagarmatha Case: To mark the 25th anniversary of the Sagarmatha National Park and the International Year of Mountains 2002, the Government of Nepal declared Buffer Zone in the Sagarmatha National Park on January 1, 2002.

The government took several steps for meaningful partnership and networking with the community based organizations (CBOs) and the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) during the last decade (1992-2002). For example, DNPWC invited stakeholders at various forums for developing projects in and around the protected areas such as the UNDP funded Park and People Programme (NEP/94/001) in the seven protected areas namely KNP, KWR, PWR, BNP, RCNP, RNP and SWR. Similarly, DNPWC, National Trust for Nature Conservation (NTNC) and WWF worked together to develop and implement the DGIS funded Bardia Integrated Conservation Project (1995-2001) in BNP. DNPWC and WWF developed and implemented the Northern Mountain Conservation Project in the SPNP with a

In the first week of November 2002, the Minister of Forests and Soil Conservation and the senior officials made a special visit to the Sagarmatha National Park and the project area of Sagarmatha Community Agroforestry Project launched by the Department of Forests and WWF. On the occasion, the local women working for the community forestry programme gave impressive presentation, briefings and demonstration to the minister and the officials on their contributions in forestry and fuel saving programmes. They also lobbied for the buffer zone declaration in Sagarmatha by including the Chaurikharka Village Development Committee (VDC). Till then, buffer zone declaration in Sagarmatha was pending for years due to indecisiveness to

121

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whether include Chaurikharka VDC or (http://www.wwfnepal.org.np/scafp.htm and personal observation).

not

Government initiatives for partnership Since 1992, the Government of Nepal has established and expanded its organizational structure for the enhancement of partnership with the nongovernmental sector including private sector. The Environment Protection Council (EPC) was established in 1992 and was recognized by the Environment Protection Act in 1996. Formed under the chairmanship of the prime minister, with seven independent experts as members, the EPC had been active in the initial years, but remained a â&#x20AC;&#x153;virtualâ&#x20AC;? body since its functions and area were not stipulated in either the Environment Protection Act 1996 or in the Environment Protection Regulations 1997. Since its establishment in 1995, the Ministry of Population and Environment came into full operation. The ministry invited stakeholders and interest groups while formulating environmental policies and programmes. Its annual function of celebrating the World Environment Day on June 5th has been a good example of how the ministry coordinates with various governmental, nongovernmental as well as private sectors. The National Biodiversity Coordination Committee has been envisioned in the Nepal Biodiversity Strategy 2002 with a view of expanding coordination and networking among the government ministries, private sector, civil society and major donors. It will have 12 to 15 members representing the sectors. The Nepal Tourism Board (NTB) was established in 1999 by dissolving the Department of Tourism by an act of the parliament. It functions as an autonomous body under the guidance of a board consisting of 11 Members from the government and the private sector. The secretary of the Ministry of Tourism, Culture and Civil Aviation is an ex-officio chairperson, while there are 4 ex-officio members from government ministries, and six members from the private sector representatives, and the chief executive officer of the NTB itself. Considering the fact that the protected areas are the major destinations of approximately 45.50 per cent of tourists (191,617 out of a total of 421,188), the activities of NTB are of interest and concern for the conservation organizations. Since 1992, there has been a remarkable growth and development in the nongovernmental sector. The Government of Nepal encouraged international nongovernmental conservation organizations like CARE, Eco Himal, ICIMOD, IUCN, TMI (The Mountain Institute), UNESCO, Winrock International and WWF to establish and expand their country offices and operate conservation and development projects to complement government programmes for the benefits of the Nepali people. The international nongovernmental organizations operating in the country have established Association of International Nongovernmental Organizations (AIN) for coordination and harmonized activities. A community of national level nongovernmental organizations has been actively involved in various fronts of conservation and development in the country. There are

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several apex bodies or federations of the NGOs. Thousands of local level nongovernmental organizations are also operating their activities under the broad umbrella of the Social Welfare Council, a government coordination and facilitation body. Most of the social clubs have conservation activities such as tree plantation, cleaning etc. The two social organizations namely Nepal Red Cross Society and Nepal Scouts have established their separate networks ofs students based community organizations in over 3,000 schools. They have been instrumental in promoting conservation messages across the country. In the field of conservation, the formation of Nepal National Committee of IUCN Members is noteworthy. Its ad-hoc committee was formed in 2000, recognized by the 56th Council of IUCN in 2002, and legally registered as an NGO in Nepal in 2003 (Annexes 1 and 2). There are other professional forums where the government officials and the NGO members as well as the individual experts in conservation exchange their ideas. For example, NTB and other organizations have been promoting a forum of ecotourism; DNPWC and NTNC have been promoting a forum of protected areas, Research Centre for Educational Innovation and Development, Tribhuvan University (CERID) and Nepal Heritage Society have been promoting eco club forum, and so on. The other examples include forums on policy and practices in environment for the policy makers and legislators periodically organized by the Nepal Forum of Environmental Journalists (NEFEJ); and the environmental camps and exchange programmes organized by the Environmental Camps for Conservation Awareness (ECCA). Among the national level NGOs, NTNC has been a leading body established in 1982 under its own Act. NTNC enjoys legal rights to undertake research activities in the park and the buffer zone. Its permanent research station, Biodiversity Conservation Centre (BCC), located in Sauraha, Chitwan facilitates and conducts research and training activities in the park and the buffer zone. NTNC also advises the government during policy formulation on nature and natural resource conservation and management. Under the National Capacity Enhancement component of the Biodiversity Conservation in Nepal, NTNC organized training for 616 personnel of DNPWC and the Nepal Army in park management. The NBS document has stipulated that the non-governmental community would continue to be a central player in biodiversity conservation in Nepal during its implementation. The document explains, â&#x20AC;&#x153;the National Trust for Nature Conservation (previously known as the King Mahendra Trust for Nature Conservation), IUCN-Nepal, The Mountain Institute, and WWF-Nepal will join GoN [sic] in the implementation of integrated conservation and development projects and in other specific areas. Concerned national NGOs and community-based organizations will be mobilized to undertake conservation and development activities. ICIMOD will contribute its expertise in the implementation of integrated mountain

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Table 3: NCS Implementation Partners

development programmes” (HMGN/MFSC 2002 p147). In reference to the nongovernmental community as whole, the NBS document states, “…while accepting the lead role, GoN [sic] welcomes the participation of NGOs and civil society to complement its work in partnership” (HMGN/MFSC 2002 p151). SPCC case study Garbage was the number one environmental pressure in the Sagarmatha National Park and Buffer Zone in the early 1990s. There were news articles defaming the park that the Khumbu region was the “highest trash pit” in the world, or “you could follow tin cans and toilet papers and reach the top of the mountain!” Shocked by the news, His Holiness Rimpoche of Tengboche, Ngawang Tenzing Jangpo, took initiative of mobilising the local people to clean up their backyards. The initiative gave birth to the organisation, Sagarmatha Pollution Control Committee (SPCC) in 1991. During the 3 years period from 1994-95 to 1997-98, the SPCC managed 767,776kg of garbage as follows (Table 2):

Priority Areas Environmental Education Environmental Impact Assessment Environmental Planning Environmental Law Heritage and Biodiversity Total

Total Partners 25 18 27 6 27 103

Government Agencies 10 13 21 4 11 59

Others 15 5 6 2 16 44

Source: NPC/IUCN NCS Implementation Project 1998 pp100 -102

of NCS in 1988, IUCN provided technical assistance for the NCS implementation (1989 - 1997) with the financial support of the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. The five areas of NCS were environmental education, EIA guidelines, draft environmental law, local level environmental planning guidelines, natural and cultural heritage. The endeavour of NCS implementation was a concerted effort of over 100 government agencies and NGOs together (Table 3). The list of participating organizations contains well over 103 district-level government-line agencies and NGOs

Table 2: Garbage Management by SPCC Year

1994-95

1995-96

1996-97

1997-98

Garbage managed (kg)

126,373

189,824

242,091

209,488

The amount of garbage collection has increased over the years. In 2000-01 alone, the committee collected 217,238 kg of garbage. The figures indicate that garbage deposits in the region have also increased. The buffer zone residents suggest that the garbage management should be directly under the park administration. The two major sources of funding SPCC's activities were His Majesty's Government of Nepal and WWF. Under the policy of recycling peak fees generated from the Khumbu region, Government of Nepal has been providing the SPCC with approximately Rs2.5 million per year since 1993. WWF provided matching grants to SPCC. To implement the SPCC operational plan, a tripartite agreement was signed in 1993 between the Ministry of Tourism and Civil Aviation (then without the portfolio of Culture), WWF and SPCC. The Himalayan Adventure Trust of Japan has separately provided support to SPCC for apple tree plantation and garbage incinerator at Lukla. (Source: SPCC Annual Progress communications with SPCC staff)

Reports;

personal

observations,

Networking and partnership for a purpose NCS Implementation Implementation of the National Conservation Strategy for Nepal (NCS) is a fine example of partnership between government agencies and nongovernmental sector for biodiversity conservation in the country. Following the government endorsement

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Ecoregion-based conservation The other conservation landmark that brought the government and the NGOs together is the ecoregion-based conservation in the Himalaya. Over 85 experts representing the government agencies from six countries (Bhutan, China, India, Myanmar, Nepal and Pakistan), NGOs, donors, and scientists envisioned ecoregional cooperation for biodiversity conservation in the Himalaya in the international meeting organized by UNDP, WWF and ICIMOD in Kathmandu in February 1998. Similarly, in April 2001, over 83 experts from the government and the NGOs jointly identified the important areas for biodiversity conservation in an international workshop on Ecoregion-based Conservation in the Eastern Himalaya jointly organized by WWF and ICIMOD in Kathmandu. Based on the concepts and visions developed in the workshops, the government agencies and the NGO conservation partners have launched landscape level conservation and development programmes such as the Terai Arc Landscape (TAL) programme linking the protected areas of Nepal and India, and the Tiger Rhino Conservation Project in the Barandabhar forest corridor in Chitwan. Specific actions There are numerous actions jointly undertaken by the government and the NGOs together in the specific aspects of conservation. Transboundary cooperation between Nepal and her neighbours (China and India) has been a good initiative of the respective governments where the NGOs were invited as observers. The proposal of tri-national Peace Park around the Kangchenjunga is another example where both the government sector and the NGOs are working together. The species actions plans (such as Tiger, Snow Leopard, and Rhinoceros) are the products of these partnerships between government and the NGOs. Community members have joined with the government staff and NGO experts in the preparation and implementation of these

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plans. Another exemplary achievement of partnership is in the preparation of the Park Management Strategy Frameworks (PMSF) for the five protected areas (KWR, PWR, BNP, RNP and SWR) between September 1998 and November 1999. Over 150 persons representing various stakeholders participated in the field level appreciative workshops. DNPWC authorities gathered opinions and views of stakeholders for the preparation of comprehensive management plans for the protected areas and buffer zones. Similarly using the partnership techniques, DNPWC authorities prepared management plans and tourism plans for the protected areas including buffer zone of BNP, RCNP, SNP and SPNP. Stakeholders in the Sagarmatha National Park and the Buffer Zone “A stakeholder is someone with a legitimate interest in what Sagarmatha National Park and its Buffer Zone (SNP-BZ) have to offer. Stakeholders can be viewed individually or grouped together.” Using the above definition, altogether 32 types of stakeholders were identified in the SNP-BZ. Based on their legitimate interests, they are grouped into five different categories, as follows: . Legitimate Interest Business Job

Leadership (Priority set up, Fulfil objectives) Livelihood (Basic needs, daily earnings, employment, education)

Peace and enjoyment

Stakeholders Airlines, lodge and trekking business owners, shopkeepers, trekking business owners Armed guards, government-line agencies, local residents in job, project staff, Nepal army, Sagarmatha National Park personnel, teachers BZ Management Committee, BZ User Committees, local club members, organizations, VDC representatives BZ User Groups, Community Forestry User Groups, farmers, farmers with lodges, farmers with lodges and trekking business, farmers with trekking business, lodge/tea house owners, market porters, others residents, seasonal labours, students, technical service providers, visitor-guides, visitor-porters religious leaders, visitors

Sources: MFSC/DNPWC/SNP, 2003; Chaurikharka VDC, 2059; personal observation

An overall contribution of the stakeholders is significant for both conservation and economic activities in SNP-BZ. The stakeholders are interlinked with each other around the SNP-BZ system depending on their contributions and dependency. Similarly, their legitimate interest in SNP-BZ varies from livelihood to job and business to enjoyment. The stakeholders with legitimate interest as livelihood have a desire to improve their quality of life through better training opportunities, let it be agriculture or a teashop operation. Along with their ambition and expectation of getting promotion after serving in the remote are like SNP-BZ, the jobholders are interested to learn more about their job related activities. The business people are keen to learn better techniques of business to be in the front. The visitors are inquisitive to learn about both nature and culture of the area for higher level of peace and enjoyment. SWOT analysis of partnership From the perspective of the people's participation in conservation, a SWOT (strength,

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weakness, opportunity, threat) analysis has been attempted based on the analysis conducted for the training needs of the government and the communities. The strengths in people's participation include park management prepared for participatory approach and the local communities organized in their contributions. The weaknesses include poaching incidents in the core as well as buffer zones of the protected areas. There are still some conflicting issues arising from wildlife damage and policy implementations. There are opportunities available for people's participation in conservation such as expansion of community network and increasing trust between the park authorities and the communities. The threats include misuse of information and politicizing of the community based organizations (Annex 3). Conclusion During the last decade of partnership for conservation, there has been a “hostehainse” (Nepali terms for “push pull”) factor between the government agencies and the nongovernmental sector including communities. The government took initiatives in policy formulation; the NGO/CBOs responded by participating in the activities. For example, the government declared buffer zone policy in response to the popular demand; and the NGO/CBOs enthusiastically participated in the buffer zone programmes. The experts envisioned the ecoregional based and landscape level programmes in conservation; the government endorsed the projects of landscape approach such as Terai Arc Landscape project. The long period of hostility between the local people and the park authorities has turned into friendship and hospitality with the implementation of people centred programmes like buffer zone and conservation area. Direct benefits for the local people are the key factors in enhancing the participation of the people in conservation. For example, seeing the direct benefits from the park, the buffer zone residents of Chitwan and Langtang have enthusiastically participated in the conservation activities. Similarly, the local people in Sagarmatha have demanded the government for declaring a buffer zone. There are communities waiting for buffer zone declaration in KWR, PWR and SWR. The chronological events in the last decade (1992-2003) revealed that together the government agencies and the NGOs/CBOs cannot just make a difference in conservation but also create a history of conservation. Acknowledgements The author is indebted to the following persons for their informal contributions by providing valuable information that has been used in this paper. l Community leaders/members from the buffer zones of LNP, CNP and SNP l Dr Tirtha Bahadur Shrestha, Chairman, NNC l Field staff from LNP, CNP and SNP l Field staff of NTNC/BCC, SPCC and WWF l Mr Bhairav Risal, senior journalist, NEFEJ l Mr Diwakar Chapagain, Legal Expert, DNPWC l Mr Narayan Poudel, Deputy Director General, DNPWC l Mr Shyam Bajimaya, Ecologist, DNPWC

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Annex 1: Nepal National Committee of IUCN Members _NNC

l Mr Top Bahadur Khatri, National Programme Manager, PCP/DNPWC

Name

References l Bhuju, UR, PR Shakya, TB Basnet and S Shrestha. 2007. Nepal Biodiversity Resource Book Protected Areas, Ramsar sites, and World Heritage Sites. Kathmandu: ICIMOD, MoEST, Nepal Nature dot Com and UNEP l Chaurikharka Gaun Bikas Samiti 2059. Chaurikharka Gaun Parswo Chitra 2059 (in Nepali). l DNPWC/PCP 2002. Launching of Buffer Zone Forum (Proceeding) l DNPWC/PCP 2003. Training Needs Assessment and Training Plan for the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Personnel and the Buffer Zone Representatives. Kathmandu: Participatory Conservation Programme, 2003 l DNPWC/PCP. 2006. Forging partnerships in Promoting sustainable Livelihoods: Reflections on Achievements in participatory conservation (1995-2006). Kathmandu: DNPWC/PCP l HMGN/MFSC 1988. Master Plan for the Forestry Sector Nepal: Forestry Sector Policy l HMGN/MFSC 2002. Nepal Biodiversity Strategy. 170 pages l HMG/IUCN 1988. Building on Success: The National Conservation Strategy for Nepal. l HMG/MLJP/Law Books Management Committee, 2003. National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act 1973 and the Relevant Rules and Regulations 2002 (in Nepali) l HMG/NPC/MOPE 2003. Sustainable Development Agenda for Nepal, 32 pages. l MFSC/DNPWC 2002. Royal Bardia National Park and Buffer Zone Tourism Plan 20012006. Kathmandu: WWF Nepal Programme l MFSC/DNPWC/RCNP 2000. Royal Chitwan National Park and Buffer Zone Management Plan 2001-2005. Parks and People Programme l MFSC/DNPWC/SNP 2003. Sagarmatha National Park- Buffer Zone Management Plan 2003-2007 (draft) l NARMA. 2004. Poverty reduction through sustainable Management of Protected Areas and Wetlands in Nepal. JICA Nepal (unpublished) l NPC/IUCN NCS Implementation Project 1998. Report on the End of the Project Workshop of the National Conservation Strategy Implementation Project. Kathmandu: IUCN Nepal xi+110p l NEFEJ 1995. Into the Second Decade 1995 Annual Report of Nepal Forum of Environmental Journalists l NEFEJ 1998. Annual Report 1998 of Nepal Forum of Environmental Journalists l SPCC (1995). Annual Progress Reports 1994-95, Namche l SPCC (1997). Annual Progress Reports 1996-97, Namche l SPCC (1998). Annual Progress Reports 1997-98, Namche l SPCC (2001). Annual Progress Reports 2000-01, Namche l WWF Nepal Programme 2000. WWF in Nepal: Three Decades of Partnership in Conservation 1967-2000 l http://www.wwfnepal.org.np/scafp.htm

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

Annex 2: Chronology of Partnership for Conservation (1992-2003) 1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

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DNPWC: Department of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation ICIMOD: International Centre for Integrated Mountain and Development APEC: Association for the Protection of Environment and Culture BCN: Bird Conservation Nepal CRT: Centre for Rural Technology ECCA: Environmental Camps for Conservation Awareness GCN: Green Camp Nepal HWEPC: Human Welfare and Environment Protection Centre NTNC: National Trust for Nature Conservation NEFEJ: Nepal Forum for Environmental Journalists NHS: Nepal Heritage Society WE: Women in Environment WWG: Wildlife Watch Group YAEF: Youth Awareness Environmental Forum

IUCN Membership # ST 497 IN 15970 NG 1510 NG 24730 NG 24698 NG 1044 NG 22348 NG 22349 NG 1059 NG 991 NG 1054 NG 1619 NG 24923 NG 23956

ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ

Annapurna Conservation Area gazetted Convention on Biological Diversity signed Makalu Barun National Park and Conservation Area declared Environment Protection Council (EPC) established National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act fourth amendment to include buffer zone policy WWF Nepal Programme established IUCN country office established CITES implementation workshop Curriculum for Human Resource Training on Conservation Feasibility study of Kangchenjunga Conservation Area First Rhino Count in Chitwan Parks and People Programme Convention on Biological Diversity implemented Nepal Biodiversity Profiles BNP Regulations formulated Ministry of Population and Environment (MOPE) established Agro-forestry Project in Sagarmatha National Park Buffer Zone Management Regulations Buffer Zone declared in CNP and BNP Environment Protection Act formulated EPC recognized as a statutory body First Nepal India Transboundary meeting on conservation in Kathmandu Kangchenjunga declared Gift to the Earth, and Conservation Area Tiger Monitoring in Bardia, Chitwan and Shuklaphanta Environment Protection Regulations formulated Buffer Zones declared in Langtang and Shey Phoksundo Grassland management workshop in BNP Manaslu Conservation Area declared Regional tiger symposium in Chitwan Sauraha week (March 1-7) Kangchenjunga festival (October 29-30) Visit Nepal Year 1998 4 male rhinos translocated from Chitwan and Sarlahi to Bardia Buffer Zone Management Guideline Management Strategy Framework for KWR and PWR Makalu Barun Conservation Area declared as Buffer Zone Second Nepal India Transboundary meeting on conservation in India Tiger Action Plan prepared Vision workshop on ecoregional based conservation Nepal Tourism Board established with private public partnership

130

2001 2002

2003

ÿ ÿ ÿ

ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ

2004

2005 2006

2007

ÿ ÿ

16 rhinos (8 male and 8 female) translocated from CNP to BNP 4 rhinos (1 male and 3 female) translocated from CNP to SWR Management Strategy Framework for BNP, RNP and SWR Proposed extension of BNP declared Gift to the Earth CNP and BZ Management Plan (2001-05) Second Rhino Count Eco Walk 2000 Nepal National Committee of IUCN Members (NNC) formed ad-hoc 5 rhinos (2 male and 3 female) from CNP to BNP Buffer Zone declared in SNP Buffer Zone Forum launched Nepal Biodiversity Strategy endorsed Participatory Conservation Programme initiated Rhino Action Plan drafted Shivapuri National Park declared Snow Leopard Action Plan finalized Tourism Plan 2001-06 for Bardia prepared 10 rhinos (5 male and 5 female) translocated from CNP to BNP NNC recognized by IUCNs 56 th Council 10 rhinos (4 male and 6 female) translocated from Chitwan to Bardia CNP recognized as the best managed park Three wetland sites namely Beeshazari tal, Jagadishpur Reservoir and Ghodaghodi tal recognized as Ramsar Sites Working Policy on Wildlife Farming, Breeding and Research Domesticated Elephant Management Policy Working Procedure for the Implementation of the Policy with regard to the Handover of the Management of National Parks, Wildlife Reserves and Conservation Areas to Non governmental Organizations or Other Organizations as stated in the Paragraph 50 of the Budget Speech of FY 2060/61 (2003/04) Nepal National Committee of IUCN members registered Padampur evacuated area (8 sq km) annexed to CNP Buffer Zones declared in Koshitappu and Shuklaphanta PALNet launched in Terai Arc Landscape Buffer Zone declared in Parsa Buffer Zones declared in Rara and Khaptad Kangchenjungha Conservation Area management handed over to the local body Tiger Action Plan revised Rhino Action Plan prepared Snow Leopard Action Plan prepared Blackbuck Action Plan Prepared Sagarmatha Tourism Coordination Forum jointly formed by Department of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation (DNPWC) and Nepal Tourism Board (NTB) for promoting private-public participation South and East Asia Regional Conservation of IUCN held in Kathmandu Four High Altitude Ramsar sites nominated

Sources: WWF Nepal Programme 2000, and Personal Communications with DNPWC Officials Annex 3: SWOT Analysis of Peoples Participation in Conservation

Government

Community

SWOT

Strengths

ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ

Weaknesses

ÿ ÿ

131

ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ

Availability of educational and promotional materials on conservation Park staff presence in geographically remote areas Management plans and Tourism plans for some protected areas exist Integrated conservation and development programmes Park scouts unskilled in community mobilization Park administration involved in nitty-gritty and lengthy legal procedures Warden has a dual role of controller and facilitator MIS and Strategy Framework not yet implemented Frustration among field staff Poaching incidents in parks and reserves

ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ

Increasing momentum of participation in Wildlife Week and other events Partnership approach for species action plans (tiger, rhino, snow leopard) BZ Users organized and institutionalized Public enthusiasm and support for conservation Limited activities of NGOs in local communities Park administration and CBOs complaining each other Unmanaged growth of visitors and their activities Wildlife damage and human casualties Poaching incidents in buffer zones and conservation areas

Opportunities

ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ

ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ

Threats

2000

ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ

Biological corridors connecting protected areas exist Partners supportive of antipoaching and conflicts resolutions Species action plans ready for implementation Positive image of park authorities Problems and conflicts of garbage management e.g. dumping site, and incineration Development lobbies getting stronger for airport, canal, bridge, electricity, road etc. Increase in disorganized tourism Continued poaching and illegal collection of forests and other products Misuse of wildlife information by poachers Overuse of BZ resources (driftwood, forests)

ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ ÿ

Cultural heritage sites exist in the protected areas Buffer zone programmes as incentives for public support in park management Participation identified as a strategy in the Nepal Biodiversity Strategy Expansion of public participation in conservation Increasing demands and expectations of buffer zone residents Loss of indigenous knowledge and traditional practice Encroachment of habitats e.g. wetlands, forests Misinterpretation of self governance acts on natural resources Human population pressure Grazing pressure from livestock Over emphasis on community development against nature conservation Political issues in buffer zone activities

Acronyms BNP BZ CBOs CITES CNP DNPWC EIA EPC GEF GIS GoN ICIMOD INGO IUCN KNP KWR LNP MBNP MFSC MIS MOPE NA NBS NCS NEFEJ NGO NNC NPWC NTB NTNC PCP PWR RNP SNP SPCC SPNP SWOT SWR TAL TMI UC UG UNDP VDC WWF

Bardia National Park Buffer Zone Community Based Organizations Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora Chitwan National Park Department of National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Environmental Impact Assessment Environment Protection Council Global Environment Facility Geographical Information System Government of Nepal International Centre for Integrated Mountain and Development International Nongovernmental Organization The World Conservation Union Khaptad National Park Koshitappu Wildlife Reserve Langtang National Park Makalu Barun National Park Ministry of Forests and Soil Conservation Management Information System Ministry of Population and Environment Nepal Army National Biodiversity Strategy National Conservation Strategy for Nepal Nepal forum for Environmental Journalists Non-Governmental Organization Nepal National Committee of IUCN Members National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Nepal Tourism Board National Trust for Nature Conservation Participatory Conservation Programme Parsa Wildlife Reserve Rara National Park Sagarmatha National Park Sagarmatha Pollution Control Committee Shey Phoksundo National Park Strength, Weakness, Opportunity, Threat Shuklaphanta Wildlife Reserve Terai Arc Landscape The Mountain Institute User Committee User Group United Nations Development Programme Village Development Committee World Wildlife Fund

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The Tryst with the Big Dams Himanshu Thakkar

he tryst with the destiny, the famous words of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first Prime Minister, on the midnight of August 14, 1947 has been unfortunately translated into the Tryst with the Dams as far as water resources development in India is concerned. It is time to take stock of the implications of this big dam centric water resources development that India's first government pushed the country into. Unfortunately, there has been no credible independent attempt to comprehensively assess the performance of large dams in India, though the India Country Study (1999) done for the World Commission on Dams (WCD) did attempt such an assessment. Let us look into some broad strokes where we stand. The dam pace In 1950, India had a total of 346 large dams.1 That number has become 4525 as per the latest edition (dated July 2002, the fact that we do not have latest figures after that over five year old publication speaks about the state of information gathering and dissemination) of the National Register of Large Dams, published by the Govt of India's Central Water Commission. The pace of completion of large dams had peaked in 1970s (1263 completed between 1971 and 1980), and dropped thereafter (1186 in 1980s and 347 in 1990s), but evidently, seems to have gone up in the new millennium, considering that the 425 dams that were under construction in 1999, have almost all been completed. Moreover, the CWC list does not include projects that are solely hydropower projects and the population of such projects has been going up in recent years. Large dams have thus dominated India's water resources development, to the exclusion of local water systems or groundwater recharging or repair and maintenance of created infrastructure and as if people and ecosystems do not matter. There is no credible attempt to look at the non dam options when a new dam is proposed. This has been officially accepted.2 Secondly, at present, detailed documentation regarding examination of alternative options to optimally meet the overall objectives and aspirations in the light of basin plan is not given in the Feasibility Report/ DPR.3 A detailed chapter analyzing the available options, even not involving large dams, should preferably be included in the DPR of future project proposals.” New attempts to push more large dams Some of the noteworthy recent attempts of the Government of India to accelerate the pace of dam building in India are described below.

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Interlinking of rivers Through a strange sequence of co-incidents, as soon Dr APJ Abdul Kalam took over as India's President in July 2002, the mega plan to link up India's 37 major rivers through some 30 river links got a big and high profile push, which then involved many arms of Indian state. As one of the sharp observers of India's water resources scene observed, with the introduction of the Interlinking of Rivers (ILR) plan on the national scene, the water resources establishment seems to have got a new life, since the Narmada and other campaigns had put them on the defensive in 1980s and 1990s. With the new government and the new President at helm in Delhi, the high profile that the ILR plan got earlier has gone away, but the new government continues to remain committed to building the project. Accelerating hydropower initiative In March 2001, Government of India, in an attempt to formulate a road map to accelerate the pace of Hydropower Development, asked the Central Electricity Authority to put together ranking study of the remaining hydropower projects. That seven volume study was published by Government of India's Central Electricity Authority in October 2001. “The Union Government is giving highest priority to the development of hydropower, keeping in view the need to double our power generation capacity in the next ten years to overcome the shortage of power”, said the then Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee while launching his government's 50,000 MW hydropower initiative.4 Under the initiative, 162 hydropower projects (identified through the ranking study mentioned earlier) in 16 states were to be completed in next 15 years. The current government continues to pursue that path. Private hydro initiative Since 1991, the government has been trying hard to push private companies to take up large hydropower projects so that more investment could be attracted into the area. The attempts have not been particularly successful until recently, when the Electricity Act of 2003 and incentives offered by states like Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh, a large number of hydropower projects have been and are being handed over to the private companies for development. The NE initiative India's North East is considered to have huge untapped potential of hydropower development and the government has been trying various measures to push large dams for hydropower generation (“Large Dams for Hydropower in North East India”, SANDRP, June 2005). They have not succeeded in a big way, but recently many MOUs (Memorandum of Understanding) have been signed for a few big Hydro Electric Projects (HEPs). The World Bank has also been trying to push this through the proposition of a North East Water Resources Authority, on the lines of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) of the US. They too have not succeeded so far, but the attempts are still on. They have of course not bothered to say that the very high profile attempt to replicate TVA model in India, in the form of the Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC), has largely been seen as disaster, even according to its first Chief Executive Officer Sudhir Sen.5 As the World Bank's 2005 report agrees (p 73), the

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Damodar Valley Project was â&#x20AC;&#x153;the very first Bank financed projectâ&#x20AC;? in India. DVC continues to exist, but its future plans and current installed capacity largely comprises of thermal power projects. AIBP, Bharat Nirman India's current Finance Minister, Mr. P Chidambaram, a decade ago in 1996, when also he was a finance minister, launched Accelerated Irrigation Benefits Programme, which was essentially a programme to push funding of Large Irrigation Projects. A decade later in 2005, to add to his options of funding larger dams, his government started Bharat Nirman Project, whose irrigation component had the objective of adding 1 crore hectare irrigated area, in four years, by 2009. This is another way to add to the funding of large irrigation projects. The farmers suicide package One would have thought that at least a package designed to solve the crisis affecting India's millions of farmers and leading them to commit suicides in thousands would not be used as an opportunity to push larger dams. However, when India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh announced the Rs 3750 crore package for Vidarbha region in Maharashtra in June 2006, Rs 2177 crores (over 58 per cent) of that package was for large irrigation projects.6 Attempts at nationalization In India's constitution, water being a state subject, the World Bank and the Government of India (GOI) have often found themselves handicapped by the divergent views of different states on various water resources projects (e.g. ILR). One of the ways to solve this hindrance is that both the World Bank and GOI have been trying to push for nationalization of rivers or water resources. Various formulations are being tried in this regard, but nothing has fructified so far. The World Bank's storage advocacy In June 2005, when the World Bank published India Water Country Assistance Strategy, titled India's Water Economy: Bracing for a Turbulent Future, (the Report was published in 2006 as listed in the references) they launched a new way to push big dams, when they said that India has a very low per capita storage capacity compared to US, China, Australia, Spain or even Morocco.7 This is very mischievous. Firstly, per capita storage cannot be a measure of development. Storage is only a means to an end and this advocacy is an attempt to make the means an end in itself. Secondly, it mentions only about storage through big dams. But there are many options for storage, including small storages and the best option of underground storages. Unfortunately, the World Bank's tendentious advocacy, happily adopted by Indian water establishment, does not look at these issues; it is essentially driven to promote more big dams. However, there is no attempt to analyse the performance of created storage capacity. When we analysed the figures for the last 13 years (1993-94 to 2005-06), we found that on an average, out of the monitored storage capacity, each year about 34.41 BCM

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(equivalent to live storage capacity of 6 Sardar Sarovar Projects) is not filled up. That means that on an average an investment of Rs 34886 crores has remained idle in each of the last 13 years. This happened when in 9 of the 13 years the rainfall was almost average or above. Should we not be trying to understand why this is happening? How can we make the existing storage capacities play a useful role in stead of pushing for more storages? Another indicator to assess the performance of the existing storage capacity would be to see, to what extent the water stored in reservoirs is used before the next monsoon. The water that remains in the storages when the next monsoon is about to set would generally indicate (except in dams that have carryover capacity in its design, which is true for very few dams in India) that the water stored in the previous monsoon has not been used up. On the onset of 2006 and 2007 monsoon, a number of reservoirs had high water stored, some reservoirs having upto 60 per cent water. This clearly indicates that existing storage capacities are not being put to useful purposes. This has another serious implication: it would also mean that the dams will have that much less storage capacity for the following monsoon, many times leading to sudden release of high volume water, leading to floods in the downstream areas. This was indeed the situation in a number of river basins in India in 2006 and 2007, including in Tapi, Mahi, Sabarmati, Krishna and Godavari basins. No questions are even asked as to what is the reason behind this non optimum use of reservoir capacities. 11th Five Year Plan Government of India's 11th Five year plan is supposed to have started on April 1, 2007, but the plan awaits final approval. The report of the Working Group on Water Resources Development, chaired by Secretary, Union Ministry of Water Resources, recommends that there should be allocation of Rs 153000 crore for large irrigation projects and Rs. 13500 crores for smaller projects. This again shows the continued heavy bias for big projects. This fails to recognize that groundwater is India's lifeline and the only way to sustain this lifeline (in crisis situation today already) is to ensure maximum harvesting of rainwater locally and recharging of groundwater aquifers. Regulatory issues There are many issues involved here, including the social and environmental issues, which are all driven towards making it easier for large projects to go through. Another attempt in this direction is to create state level water regulatory authorities (already created in Maharashtra, acts formulated in Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Arunachal Pradesh). The 11th Five Year plan Water Resources working group report mentioned above recommends that all states should have a Maharashtra style regulatory authorities and that there should also be a national water regulatory authority. These institutions would bring sea change in the way water resources are regulated, largely in favour of facilitating larger projects and also facilitating institution of entitlements and trading of entitlements. These institutions are full of bureaucrats with little role for any body from outside the governments.

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The performance One of the stark realities of India's dam building is that there is absolutely no attempt at credible, independent assessment of performance of the large dams. Let us see the limited evidence that is available about the performance of large dams in India. l Out of India's net cultivated area of about 142 million hectare (m ha), the net

irrigated area is 57 m ha as per working report (agriculture) of 11th Plan and has remained around that figure for more than seven years now. Out of the net irrigated area, the area irrigated from large dams is about 17 m ha, the rest is either irrigated by groundwater or small systems. This means that after spending over Rs 200,000 crores on large dams and allocating 75-80 per cent of available resources for large dams, the projects have benefited just 12 per cent of net cultivated area. l It should be remembered that the productivity of area irrigated by large dams is lower than the productivity of area irrigated by groundwater. In addition, the vast 85 m ha area remains rain fed. So what is the contribution of large-dam-irrigated lands to India's food production, the most celebrated reason for building these projects? Calculations suggest that gross contribution of large-dams-irrigated lands to foodgrains production is 9.98 per cent.8 This was also the conclusion of India Country Study done for the WCD, mentioned earlier. Considering that these lands would have anyway produced some foodgrains and that in the process of building these projects, large area has been submerged (as per recent calculation, a total of 4.42 m ha land has been submerged by India's large dams), canal building and for other related infrastructure, the net contribution would be even less. Remember that some of the lands irrigated by large dams are also water logged and salinised, further reducing the contribution of large dams. l On Hydropower front, India now has total hydropower installed capacity of 32593.15 MW as on March 31, 20079 and the projects generated 107321 Million Units electricity at the rate of 3.29 Million Units per MW installed capacity. It is interesting to note that this performance of 2006-07 (a good monsoon year) in

electricity generation from hydropower projects is lower than the performance of at least 13 of the last 22 years (for which we could get data). In fact if we plot the data, for 1993-94 to 2005-0610, there is gradual downward trend, see the graph above, the drop being a huge 20 per cent between the two years. It means that each MW of additional capacity we are adding is generating less power. In September 2007, Member (Hydro) of Central Electricity Authority, Government of India accepted at a meeting that indeed this decline is happening. There are many reasons for this trend, including silting of reservoirs, aging dams and machines, over development of river basins and so on. Another related issue is that hydropower projects are justified in the name of peaking power, but consumers do not pay extra for the peaking hour power consumption, time of day metering is just being thought of now. l Coming to the issue of storage capacities, our study (based on siltation data obtained from the Central Water Commission, government of India, under the Right to Information Act) shows that over the last ten years, India has added about 3 billion cubic meter of storage capacity through big projects each year and 1.95 BCM of that capacity (i.e. almost two thirds of the new capacity added) is getting silted up and nothing is being done on ground to arrest that destruction.11 Hydropower is not clean, green, renewable or cheap The claims that hydropower is cheap, clean, green and renewable are untenable. The storages get silted up, which means they have finite life and are not renewable. The projects cause a lot of social and environmental impacts, which show they are not green. The fact that the project developers do not pay for many of the costs (e.g. huge social and environment losses) involved in building the projects, some other people pay for it; that they are not cheap as made out to be. Research over the last decade has shown that storages in tropical countries can cause large amounts of green house gas emission.12 In fact recent estimates suggest that methane emissions from India's dams may be contributing more to global warming than the dams of any other country and it could be almost a fifth of India's total green house gas emissions.

3.97

Per Ha cost of irrigated area over the years Generation-MU/MW

3.69

260000 210000

3.14 2.551

2.8 2.6

2005-06

2003-04

2001-02

1999-00

1997-98

1995-96

1993-94

110000

2.4

137

160000 60000 10000

2.74

2.957

3.2

2.893

3.4

Series1 Series2

360000 310000

3.168

3.6

3.404

3.46

3.8

3.383

3.9

Cost of Irrigation: Minor irrigation could become major one

9 10 1111 12

In the above graph, series 1 is for the figures of per ha cost of irrigation for major and medium irrigation projects and series 2 is for the figures of per ha cost of irrigation through minor irrigation projects, all figures are from Planning Commission (Government of India) documents. It is clear that adding a ha of irrigation potential

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through major project is now costing ten times the cost of adding 1 ha of irrigation through smaller projects. l On the flood control front, though very few large dams in India have provision of

designed flood cushion storage, it is claimed that the dams help flood control. However, there are increasing number of instances that show that the wrong operation of dams are actually creating flood disasters, as it happed in Tapi, Sabarmati, Mahi, Chambal, Krishna and Godavari basins in 2006 and Sabarmati, Mahi, Tapi Godavari and Krishna basins in 2007. Environmental impacts: does anyone really care? It is well known that big dams can have significant environmental impacts in the reservoir area, upstream, downstream, command areas and at global level (e.g. emission of global warming gases like methane). The track record of environmental impact assessment, management of environmental impacts is dismal. As noted by Shekhar Singh et al in their review in 1999 (preface), “The findings of this study suggests that, in India, the environmental and social impacts of large dams were inadequately understood, mostly ignored in financial and economic calculations, and the prevention and mitigation of adverse impacts usually ignored.” Since that report was made public, the situation has only gone from bad to worse. The trouble begins at the stage of assessment of the impacts. Environmental impact assessment reports are typically based on incomplete studies, reflect pro big dam bias of the authors, are often based on wrong facts and figures and reach erroneous conclusions. They almost never include proper downstream studies, basin wide impacts of the project, cumulative impact assessment, options assessment, downstream water releases, muck disposal plan or public disaster management plan. The question of assessment of global warming impact of the projects or how the project will perform in view of the global warming impacts possibly does not even cross the minds of the authors or the project authorities. These systemic appraisal problems are equally applicable to even World Bank funded projects as is clear from the experience of the World Bank funded 1500 MW Nathpa Jhakri Project on Sutlej River in Himachal Pradesh and the IFC (International Financial Corporation_ the private sector arm of the World Bank) funded 192 MW Allain Duhangan hydropower project on Beas River in the same state. The next important issue is that of implementation of the environment management plan as written in the EIA report and as generally required under the conditions of environmental clearance of the project. The official agencies have accepted for example, that the catchments area treatment plan required for ensuring that projects function as planned during the project life span, have not been implemented till the completion of projects and beyond even in more celebrated and World Bank funded projects like the Sardar Sarovar, Nathpa Jhakri projects, leave aside the lesser projects.

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Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) that is responsible for ensuring compliance with the conditions under which projects are given clearance has shown absolute inability to ensure compliance. An assessment done by Ashish Kothari, then member of the MoEF's Expert Advisory Committee (EAC) for the River Valley projects concluded in a study in 1998, “Data emerging from the records of the Government of India, collected by the regional offices of the MoEF, suggests that in 90 per cent of the cases, project authorities had not complied with the conditions which their projects had been cleared… Our EAC assessed the state of monitoring and reappraisal of the dams cleared by the MoEF in the 1980s and 1990s. The most shocking fact that our EAC found was that, despite being told that the huge scale of defaulting (that) was taking place, MoEF rarely took stringent action, indeed on no occasion had it used its powers to halt construction and prosecute concerned officials even in cases of extreme violations of conditions”. As a Government of India Report (GOI Sept 1999, p 310), noted, “Environmental concerns continue to be regarded as disagreeable external imposition and they have not become parts of the project planning from the start, despite many guidelines and instructions to that effect.” Indeed the whole process of creating EIA and the public consultation process should be part of the decision making process, but that is far from the case even today. In Sept 2006 India's Ministry of Environment and Forests amended the rules governing environmental impact assessment and public consultation process before projects are considered for environmental clearances, reversing some of the improvements achieved in earlier years. The changes involved huge dilution of the processes, reducing the possibility of proper environmental impact assessment or mitigation. Authors of a detailed review of the notification noted (ESG 2007, p iii), “the resulting legislation clearly subordinates environmental and social concerns to the interests of industry and investment”. To see if situation has improved in twenty-first century, let us take just one example of one of the largest dam being taken up in India in recent years, namely Polavaram Dam on Godavari River in Andhra Pradesh. The dam is causing submergence in neighbouring Orissa and Chhattisgarh. In that project, the environmental impact assessment is incomplete, based on wrong and outdated data, full EIA has not been provided to the local people in the language they can understand, there were serious violations in the public hearings conducted before the environmental clearance, in fact when people protested against violations, many were arrested. The neighbouring states have yet to give their clearances, and yet the project work started and a few hundred crores were already spent, before court ordered stoppage of work.13 It only goes to show where we stand even today. Bhakra Dam: Environmental Impacts Bhakra Dam on Sutlej River in Northern India has been described in iconic terms among the large dams in India. A pioneering study of that project (Unravelling Bhakra, p 193-205) has described the serious environmental impacts of that project in

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terms of submergence of lands and forests, siltation in the dam, displacement, health impacts and downstream impact on fisheries and flood plain agriculture in Indian Punjab. Most impacts remained unaddressed. Government of India's Comptroller and Auditor General has noted that though the money for the catchments area treatment for the project was spent, there was little credible evidence of its implementation. The report (Unravelling Bhakra p 206) also notes that Bhakra had impacts across the border in Pakistan in terms of depletion of groundwater, decrease in soil fertility and adverse impacts on pastoral communities of Cholistan, in addition to other livelihood impacts. Here it is worth noting that the people who suffer the ill effects of dams are almost invariably different than the people who benefit from the projects and people who face adverse impacts rarely benefit from the project. Decades after the Bhakra dam was completed, when in 1970s the then Union Irrigation Minister, Government of India, KL Rao visited it he recorded, “it is curious how we handle our projects. The village of Bhakra on the bank of the river Sutlej was submerged. The Dam resulted in great suffering to the people of the village, but nobody took note of the people's representations. I found that the new village of Bhakra had neither drinking water nor electricity though surrounded by blazing brilliant lights. This was indeed unfair.”14 The story is not much different for other large dams. Pong, Bhakra, Hirakud, Tawa, Bargi, Nagarjunsagar - you name the dam and you will find that people affected there from are still fighting for rehabilitation. Large dams also submerge forests, bringing further impacts in the process. The work of Tarun Bharat Sangh in areas around Alwar District in Rajasthan over the last 22 years have shown what dramatic changes are possible when communities take up building, rejuvenating and managing local water systems on a large scale. Such examples are available from a number of different regions in India, including from Gujarat, Tamil Nadu and others. They all show that non large dams options exist, they are viable, desirable, sustainable and more equitable than dams. Moreover, they do not involve the trade offs in terms of serious social and environmental impacts in one region to benefit another region. Impact on rivers The World Bank in the 2005 report India's Water Economy said that India's rivers are fetid sewers. The GOI's Central Pollution Control Board said in 1981 that no rivers have potable water in plains area of the country. Dams in fact kill rivers_ no water is allowed downstream from the dams, for the environment or even for downstream communities & economic/livelihood activities like fisheries. In India there is no regulation for downstream releases from large dams and as the World Bank noted, “An important area where mindsets have to change is that of in-stream flows. Any water flowing out of a river basin is still seen by many water engineers as 'wastages'.”15 Social impacts: who pays the costs Total reservoir area of India's 4528 large reservoirs is 4.42 million ha as per the latest estimates (Dams, Rivers & People May-June 2007, page 8). In 2000, the Planning

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Commission acknowledged about Water Resources Development that upto 25 million persons have been displaced by big water resources projects since 1950, “Almost half of the displaced persons are tribals who have least resources”.16 Less than 50 per cent have been rehabilitated_ the rest pauperised by the development process. The actual numbers are more likely to be close to 35-40 million and proportion of those rehabilitated much lower. The crisis of agriculture From Prime Minister of India to the farmers, everyone is certain that India's agriculture is in crisis. That is indeed the case. Everyone also agrees that every farmer would benefit from better water management. But the water resources development and management policies continue to be a prisoner of the agendas of large dam lobby, neglecting the other water resources development options, including new water saving technologies like the System of rice intensification and also not bothering about export of virtual water through export of water intensive products like Sugar and Basmati Rice. Despite pledges in successive Five Year Plan, there is very little attempt to get better results from existing water infrastructure. India now has the largest irrigation infrastructure in the world. That infrastructure is giving some of the poorest results as India's finance minister said in his budget speech in 2005. The mid term appraisal of India's 9th Five Year Plan had noted, “With a 10 per cent increase in the present level of water use efficiency, it is estimated, an additional 14 m ha can be brought under irrigation from existing irrigation facilities”. Gap between potential created and realised is over 25 m ha and is growing. The World Bank report of 2006 quoted earlier said that annual requirement for repair and maintenance of India's water infrastructure is about USD 4 billion, that is about Rs 17 000 crores. That is less than the total annual water resources budget of India during 10th Plan. A small fraction of the required amount is being spent on actual repair and maintenance of that infrastructure. That is one of the reasons why India's irrigation infrastructure is performing so poorly. The 11th Plan working group report quoted above says that 15 per cent of all water resources budget should be reserved for Irrigation Maintenance Fund. That will be far from sufficient, but it is doubtful if the big dam lobby would allow even that. The paradigm shift to bring people at the centre of managing water resources is not even on the agenda. In the famous James Bond film Golden Eye, Bond repeatedly destroys the vehicles he uses. A stunned computer programmer Natalya Siminova asked James Bond, “Do you destroy every vehicle you get into?” The answer of Bond, pointedly precise, was, “standard operating procedure”. India's water resources establishment is not known to act in James Bond style, but, if one were to ask them, “Do you destroy every river, every community you touch?”, the answer should not be much different than that of the Bond in Golden Eye. Famous Indian writer Arundhati Roy wrote (The Greater Common Good, p 62) in the

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last monsoon of the twentieth century, “Whether you love the dam or hate it, whether you want it or you don't, it is in the fitness of things that you understand the price that's being paid for it”. The trouble is that there is little readiness to understand it even today. References l Dams, Rivers & People various issues, www.sandrp.in/drpindex l Dharmadhikary Shripad, Sheshadri Swathi, Rehmat, Unravelling Bhakra: Assessing the Temple of Resurgent India, Manthan Adhyayan Kendra, Badwani, Madhya Pradesh, India, April 2005 l Environment Support Group, Green Tapism: A Review of the Environmental Impact Assessment Notification 2006, ESG, Bangalore, 2007 l Government of India (Central Water Commission), National Register of Large Dams, New Delhi, July 2002 l Government of India (Planning Commission), Mid Term Appraisal of Ninth Five Year Plan 1997-2002, Delhi, October 2000 l Government of India (Ministry of Water Resources), Report of the Working Group on Water Resources for the 11th Five year plan (2007-2012), http://planningcommission.gov.in/ Dec 2006 l Government of India (Ministry of Water Resources), Integrated Water Resource Development: A Plan for Action, Report of the National Commission for Integrated Water Resources Development, India, Sept 1999 l Kothari Ashish Environmental Aspects of Large Dams in India: Problems of Planning, Implementation and Monitoring, 1998, submission to the World Commission on Dams l Rao KL, Cusecs Candidate: Memoirs of an engineer, Metropolitan Publishers, New Delhi, 1978 l Roy Arundhati, The Greater Common Good, India Book Distributors, Mumbai, India, 1999 l Sen Sudhir, A Richer Harvest: New Horizons for Developing Countries, Tata McGraw Hill Publishing Co, New Delhi, 1974 l Singh Shekhar, Banerji Pranab (Editors), Large Dams in India: Environmental, Social and Economic Impacts, Indian Institute of Public Administration, India, 2002 l South Asia Network on Dams, Rivers & People & Kalpavriksh, Large Dams for Hydropower in North East India, New Delhi, June 2005 l Thakkar Himanshu, Assessment of Irrigation Options: A study of Indian situation, World Commission on Dams, 1999 l World Bank, India's Water Economy: Bracing for a Turbulent Future, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 2006 l World Commission on Dams, Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision making, The report of the World Commission on Dams, Earthscan Publications, Nov 2000

Tata McGraw Hill Publishing Co, New Delhi, 1974, on page 86, Sen writes, “Thus, at the dawn of her independence India relied wistfully, on her high dam builders… it was a luxury India could least afford”. 6 See, http://www.thehindubusinessline.com /2006/07/02/stories /2006070202980300.htm, among many other sources 7 See page (xv) of the World Bank, 2006 8 See page 22-24 of Thakkar (1999) for detailed calculations. The contribution of large dams irrigated lands since than is likely to have gone down as the proportion of lands irrigated by large dams in total irrigated area has gone down and proportion of groundwater irrigation has gone up. 9 See the Monthly generation figures from Government of India's Central Electricity Authority for March 2007, www.cea.nic.in 10 All the figures are from Central Electricity Authority, Government of India. 11 See cover story in Aug-Sept 2006 issue of “Dams, Rivers & People”, available at www.sandrp.in/drpindex 12 See May-June 2007 issue of “Dams, Rivers & People”, page 5. 13 See for example, Gujja Biksham et all, Perspectives on Polavaram: A Major Irrigation Project on Godavari, Academic Foundation, New Delhi, 2006 14 See Rao, 1978, p 79 15 World Bank, 2006, p 61 16 Govt of India, Oct 2000, p 89

End Notes 1 The World Commission on Dams and the International Commission on Large Dams both define large dams as one that is more than 15 m high from the deepest foundation. The National Register of Large Dams also includes dams with height of 10 m to 15 m under large dam if it complies with one of the special conditions, e.g. if the crest is longer than 500 m, storage capacity is over one million cubic meters, etc, (Preface of the CWC publication). 2 See the Report from the Ministry of Water Resources for the 11th Five Year Plan that started in April 2007, page 53. 3 DPR stands for Detailed Project Report 4 see http://www.tribuneindia.com/2003/20030525/nation.htm#2 for example 5 See for example, Sen Sudhir, A Richer Harvest: New Horizons for Developing Countries,

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144

Academic Freedom in India P. Radhakrishnan

cademic freedom is freedom of academics_ teachers, students, and other interest groups - to pursue knowledge through teaching, learning, research, and other means. The justification for it, some would argue, lies not in the comfort or convenience of teachers and students but in the benefits to society; for, the long-term interests of a society are best served when the educational process leads to advancement of knowledge, and knowledge is best advanced when its pursuit is free from restraints by the state, other institutions, or special-interest groups.1 The underlying assumption of such an argument seems to be that knowledge is the supreme good of society. This paper deals with academic freedom, in general, and academic freedom in India, in particular. Its main arguments are the following: a) Academic freedom cannot be universal so long as education systems are not universal, inclusive, and robust. b) Educational systems cannot be universal so as long as recalcitrant social patterns are not reshaped through context-specific human rights approach. c) In discourses on academic freedom it is important to make a distinction between developed countries and developing countries. d) Such discourses are best done within a development framework General Whether knowledge is the supreme good of society depends on the nature and extent of access to it, and the nature and extent of its dissemination and utilisation by society. So long as access, dissemination and utilisation are unjust and unfair and uneven, the claim that knowledge is the supreme good of society remains hollow. Academic freedom as human right The argument that society is the principal beneficiary of knowledge without which no social advancement can take place, is based on the assumption that available knowledge is widely and fairly distributed in society. But the perception of academic freedom hinging on the benefits to society should not override the related freedom of individuals and institutions. This can be calibrated only if society renders its expected role as principal provider of the comforts and conveniences of teachers and students, or of the requisite freedom to the producers, providers, and seekers of knowledge, and treat such freedom as sine qua non of knowledge production. Only freedom and recognition of knowledge providers and knowledge seekers by the

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academia, state and society can spur them to the pursuit of knowledge, and make it gratifying. Its absence renders the task of knowledge production tedious, effete and even counter-productive. Ensuring its presence entails civil society bringing sufficient pressure to bear upon the state to ensure that the state as its creation and custodian overcomes the pervasive disparities and discriminations in the educational process through affirmative and anti-discriminatory measures. Understood thus, academic freedom along with its centrepiece freedom of expression has to be a fundamental and touchstone of human right. Conceptual conundrums As a package of academic freedom is defined in many ways and interpreted differently in different contexts, it is loaded with numerous social, political and cultural connotations and dimensions. As a concept it is widely contested and continues to evolve. What is important to note here is though academic freedom in one form or another is characteristic of all societies, especially democratic societies, as it is intertwined with, and is the interplay out of multiple societal processes; it appears in different forms with different intensities and degrees of salience. This raises a number of related issues. Some of these are listed below. a) b) c) d) e) f) g) h) i) j) k) l)

Whether academic freedom is different from other freedoms; Whether academic freedom is contingent or derivative freedom operating within a framework of freedoms, and their socio-cultural and political contexts; How academics reconcile academic freedom with other freedoms; The dual role of academics as members of the academia and of society; Whether the former influences the latter and vice-versa; What could be considered as the threshold of academic freedom, or is there a â&#x20AC;&#x153;measure of all measuresâ&#x20AC;? in its context; When do sections of the academia feel lack of freedom, or the freedom they have is inadequate or in jeopardy; How and why academics compromise their freedom; Conversely, how and why academics do not use their freedom as academic activists and public intellectuals;2 How academics reconcile with different models and interpretations of academic freedom; What are the prerequisites for ensuring right and reasonable models and interpretations of academic freedom; When legitimate academic freedom is in jeopardy what the redress mechanisms are.

The freedom discourse Discourses on academic freedom are generally in the context of higher education. The underlying assumption is that knowledge systems, knowledge production, knowledge development, and knowledge delivery are mainly in the domain of higher education. If development is freedom as Amartya Sen3 and some of the UNESCO reports4 have persuasively argued, academic freedom should be embedded in the processes of social

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development and academic development should be used for overall social development. But academic development by its very nature is not a mere higher echelon affair; more so, when education is seen as a ladder from the gutter to the university. Seen thus, academic freedom has greater salience as human right in its overall context in terms of access, praxis and delivery, at different levels of education. In a speech in 2003 Alan Gilbert brought this out eloquently:5 Because good quality education promises an escape from poverty, powerlessness, and despair, creating aspirations, opportunities, and choices otherwise unimaginable, it has emerged more clearly than ever as the last best, yet often seemingly forlorn hope that humankind may use its Promethean resources to build a safe, peaceful, prosperous world. As H.G. Wells put it in a famous aphorism exactly 100 years ago, "Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe." In the same speech Gilbert pointed to the fact that for 15 per cent of the world's population educational opportunities are more widely available than ever before in human history and the other 85 per cent remain seriously disadvantaged and often dangerously frustrated by educational deprivation. Gilbert cautioned that access to higher education would be one of the most serious global challenges of the 21st century. Academic freedom and disciplinary diversity Whether academic freedom is understood from a human rights' perspective or as facilitating knowledge pursuits, it is important to understand the nexus between academic freedom and disciplinary diversity. In this connection a broad distinction may be made between social sciences and non-social sciences. Social sciences are very important and are subject to much debate of the issues they cover, for at least four reasons. a) Social sciences often involve critical thinking about culture, economics, history, politics and society, and public debate on related issues. b) Dissemination of social knowledge is intrinsic to the well-being of society. This is especially so as education, as some of the UNESCO reports would have it, is the process by which people not only acquire knowledge and information skills, but also values and ability to live and interact within and with social groups, as well as participate in cultural life and productive activities which may not always be economic. c) Despite this great academic relevance and importance, as social sciences deal with social issues, they are often opinionated, manoeuvrable, and have direct bearing on social sensibilities. This can cause widely varying social and administrative reactions. d) Those who make a difference to life and social well-being are primarily from critical sciences. They have to go well beyond the class room in expanding the

147

civil space. In that sense also academic freedom gets transformed into human rights issues. As non-social sciences are â&#x20AC;&#x153;exactâ&#x20AC;? sciences, but for occasional reactions6 often the praxis and products of them have no direct bearing on social sensibilities. In this context, it is appropriate to conclude this section with the following observations by Karl Popper: Einstein's theory of gravitation clearly satisfied the criterion of falsifiability. Even if our measuring instruments at the time did not allow us to pronounce on the results of the tests with complete assurance, there was clearly a possibility of refuting the theory. Astrology did not pass the test. Astrologers were greatly impressed, and misled, by what they believed to be confirming evidence_ so much so that they were quite unimpressed by any unfavorable evidence. Moreover, by making their interpretations and prophesies sufficiently vague they were able to explain away anything that might have been a refutation of the theory had the theory and the prophesies been more precise. In order to escape falsification they destroyed the testability of their theory. It is a typical soothsayer's trick to predict things so vaguely that the predictions can hardly fail: that they become irrefutable. The Marxist theory of history, in spite of the serious efforts of some of its founders and followers, ultimately adopted this soothsaying practice. In some of its earlier formulations (for example in Marx's analysis of the character of the "coming social revolution") their predictions were testable, and in fact falsified. Yet instead of accepting the refutations the followers of Marx re-interpreted both the theory and the evidence in order to make them agree. In this way they rescued the theory from refutation; but they did so at the price of adopting a device which made it irrefutable. They thus gave a "conventionalist twist" to the theory; and by this stratagem they destroyed its much advertised claim to scientific status.7 Threat perceptions As the pursuit of knowledge is socially conditioned, irrespective of the nature of the sciences, if academic freedom is in jeopardy, it is not so much because of the processes involved. It is because of externalities of the larger contexts and premises which determine academic freedom. Of late such externalities have been on the increase for several reasons. Some of these are listed here. Of these probably the most important is the impact of globalisation which has restructured and continues to restructure academia, pushing it between the Scylla of diminishing funding and the Charybdis of market forces.8 The Indian Case It is difficult to draw parallels between academic freedom in the west and in India as

148

their educational processes and advancements vary widely. However, to understand the nature and extent of academic freedom in India it is important to record the main features of both. Of these features three are discussed here. West v. India One, west has a history of private education, impelled and conditioned by the philosophy of educational service to society, and many educational institutions are private and self-regulating. India does not have such a history. India's education system is mostly a bureaucratic appendage of the state. This may have some advantages such as security of tenure, perceived (though not necessarily real) freedom of students, teachers and non-teaching staff to organise, and involvement of students and teachers in knowledge construction (such as emphasis on student participation in curriculum development). But the regulatory features of the state militate against advancement of knowledge. These include overweening presence of non-academic structures in educational matters which causes bureaucratisation of academic and intellectual pursuits; lack of concern and cavalier approach by regulatory bodies; and their abdication of regulatory responsibility, and failure to nurture the education system. A case in point is the recent controversy about Quotas for backward classes in higher education in India.9 Though India also has private institutions, only those with an educational history have imbibed some of the western educational traditions, and nurture the education systems. Private institutions established during the last two decades, mostly professional colleges, are run as corporate enterprises for profit and greed. Two, educational advancements in India are incomparably lower than in the west. Two indicators should drive this home. The first is India's gross enrolment ratio (GER) for higher education (tertiary or degree-level) is between nine per cent and 11 per cent of the population in the relevant age group. This is in striking contrast to the figures for developed countries. Going by UNESCO statistics, the GER in developed countries is between 44 per cent (Switzerland) and 86 per cent (Finland).10

schooling and enrol for higher education many will drop out. This is also evident from the NSS data for 1995-96 according to which the overall drop out rate in higher education is 3.3 per cent.11 This clearly shows that the internal efficiency of India's education system from primary to tertiary levels is very weak. Table 2: Percent Distribution of Drop-outs, all-India, 1995-96 Educational level

level

Developed Countries Tota l

Male

Female

Urban

Female

Total

Male

Female

Total

Male

Female

Primary

30.4

28.3

33.1

33.2

30.4

36.9

22.2

22.4

21.9

Middle

26.2

26.5

25.9

26.9

27.4

26.4

24.2

23.8

24.6

Secondary

28.7

30.0

26.9

28.7

24.5

33.9

34.0

33.8

Hr Secondary

8.0

8.6

7.2

7.1

7.8

6.1

10.9

11.1

10.5

Higher education

3.3

3.7

2.8

2.2

2.7

1.4

6.7

6.5

7.0

Total

100.0

Access asymmetries India is a large country (accounting for about 16 per cent of the world population) with every conceivable form of diversity_ political, religious, social, cultural, linguistic, economic, and so on. It is about six decades since India attained independence and became a secular democratic republic. But its traditional hierarchical and segmented economy and society and entrenched backwardness of the social groups at the bottom of the traditional caste-based social hierarchy still persist. These bottom groups account for at least two-thirds of India's population. The state's failure to actively address their special needs has widened the disparities in access to education in general and higher education in particular. According to Census of India 2001 the overall share of Graduate-plus in India's 20-24 age population is 7.5 per cent (6.8 million). But it is even much lower among the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Muslims. These groups together comprise bulk of India's constitutional category of socially and educationally backward classes. They account for about 36 per cent of the total 20-24 age population. But the degreeholders among them are two to four per cent in their respective 20-24 age-cohort populations. Table 3: Graduate-plus (%) in 20-24 age-group Population of Each Community, 2001

India GPI

Total

Male

Female

GPI

Community

Rural + Urban

Rural

Urban

Total

Male

Female

Total

Male

Female

Total

Male

Female

3.6

4.7

2.4

3.6

1.2

7.4

8.2

6.6

Primary

100.6

100.7

100.6

1.00

98.1

106.0

89.7

0.85

2.3

3.1

1.5

1.6

2.4

0.9

8.5

9.3

7.7

Secondary

105.9

104.7

107.2

1.02

50.3

57.5

42.5

0.74

Caste Hindu

9.8

10.8

8.7

5.3

7.0

3.6

18.5

17.9

19.2

54.6

39.5

70.1

1.80

11.4

13.4

9.3

0.70

Tertiary

Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. World Education Indicators.

The second is lack of internal efficiency in India's education system. Those who reach higher education in India are generally from those who survive the four preceding stages of schooling, namely the four-year primary, three-year middle, three-year secondary, and two-year higher secondary. In each of these stages, particularly the first three, 26 per cent to 30 per cent of those enrolled drop out. In view of this, it is unlikely that from among the limited number who survive all the four stages of

149

Rural

Male

Table 1: GER in Developed Countries and India, 2001 Enrolment

Rural + Urban Total

Muslim

4.0

4.7

3.3

2.1

2.9

1.2

6.8

7.0

6.6

Christian

11.0

10.0

11.9

6.6

6.1

7.2

18.2

16.6

19.7

Sikh

7.9

6.5

9.5

3.5

3.0

4.1

19.4

15.6

23.7

Buddhist

7.4

8.3

6.4

4.7

6.3

3.0

10.9

10.8

Jain

32.3

30.6

34.2

15.5

16.6

14.1

37.3

34.9

39.8

Others

3.1

4.0

2.2

1.7

2.6

0.9

13.3

13.8

12.8

All

7.5

8.4

6.6

4.0

5.4

2.7

15.1

14.7

15.5

Source: Tabulated from the Census of India, 2001, Social and Cultural Tables. Note: Table excludes data on Age not stated.

150

If the Other Backward Classes, particularly the lower strata among them, are excluded from Caste-Hindus, it may become apparent that the upper-castes continue to dominate the higher education system. Nearly two-thirds of India's population are in rural areas. But the proportion of graduates in rural areas accounts for only about one-fourth of the graduates in urban areas. This urban bias of higher education is evident in all communities. The proportion of degree holders among women from the 20-24 age-group population is only about four-fifths of the degree holders among men. Literacy and Higher Education Notwithstanding the overall low access to higher education, communities which have higher literacy have relatively more access to the higher education system.

The BIMARU region has about one-fourth of the enrolment in universities, whereas the southern region has only about eight per cent and the remaining regions have between six per cent and 14 per cent. Enrolment of women is only about 33 per cent in the BIMARU region, whereas it is between 38 per cent and 46 per cent in other regions. Table 5: Percent Institutions and Enrolment by Region and Population, 2001 Region

Community

Rural + Urban Total

Male

Rural Female

Total

Male

Female

Total

Male

Female

54.7

66.6

41.9

51.2

63.7

37.8

68.1

77.9

57.5

47.1

59.2

34.8

45.0

57.4

32.4

69.1

77.8

59.9

Caste Hindu

70.5

81.1

59.1

64.2

76.9

50.8

84.2

90.1

77.6

Muslim

59.1

67.6

50.1

52.7

62.3

42.7

70.1

76.3

63.2

Christian

80.3

84.4

76.2

74.5

79.5

69.7

90.9

93.6

88.3

Sikh

69.4

75.2

63.1

64.2

70.6

57.2

83.6

87.5

79.2

Buddhist

72.7

83.1

61.7

66.9

78.8

54.6

81.6

89.8

72.9

Jain

94.1

97.4

90.6

87.5

94.2

80.3

96.1

98.4

93.8

Others

47.0

60.8

33.2

43.9

58.2

29.5

75.3

83.8

66.5

All

64.8

75.3

53.7

58.7

70.7

46.1

79.9

86.3

72.9

Source: Tabulated from the Census of India, 2001, Social and Cultural Tables. Note: Table excludes data on Age not stated.

Institutional Disparities While the causes for disparities in enrolment and outturn_ social and spatial_ have to be located in the social conditioning of learning, a concomitant and corollary of these disparities is evident in the spread of institutions across regions. Institutions vary in their overall size, infrastructure, quality of students, quality of instruction imparted, nature and quality of teachers and disciplines taught, and per capita cost of and expenditure on education. So they are not really comparable. All the same, their nature and number relative to population and enrolment should give a broad idea of the regional spread of higher education vis-Ă -vis the disparities in enrolment and outturn. Universities v. colleges The southern region has a significantly higher share of universities, colleges, and enrolment than their share in the population. Reverse is the case in the northern region (BIMARU).12 The western and north-western regions also have better distribution of institutions and better enrolment compared to their population. What is, however, important to note is the contrast between the two major regions, southern and BIMARU, in the availability of institutions and the extent of enrolment.

151

Varsities

Colleges

State-level

Total

enrolment ratio

enrolment

women

Varsities

Colleges

21.8

26.6

31.8

8.0

92.0

24.8

43.3

North (Bimaru)

41.1

31.3

27.9

23.8

76.2

31.8

32.9

West

14.5

16.0

19.3

6.8

93.2

20.0

42.1

7.4

12.5

7.3

14.0

86.0

9.1

46.4

11.4

9.0

9.3

7.7

92.3

10.8

37.6

East Urban

Institutions

South

Northwest

Table 4: Percent Literates in 7-plus Population by Community and Region, 2001

Population

Northeast India

3.7

4.7

4.4

5.9

94.1

3.5

42.1

100.0

13.2

86.8

100.0

39.4

Source: Tabulated from UGC Annual Reports; Census of India 2001, Basic population data.

Affiliation and academic freedom At the all-India level about 90 per cent of under-graduate and 66 per cent of postgraduate students are in affiliated colleges and only the rest are in university departments and constituent colleges. Of the research students 91 per cent are in universities. As many of the colleges lack facilities, they do not have academic freedom for teaching and research. As affiliation is seen as an affliction and a systemic malaise, of late there has been increasing demand to do away with it. As majority of the students and teachers are in affiliated colleges where the foundations of higher education are laid, to place higher education on a fast track, the most important need is to foster these institutions by ensuring equity and fairness in intake, by strengthening basic and infrastructure needs including, especially of qualified teachers, and by grounding these institutions in disciplinary diversity and excellence in quality. In the absence of these measures any discussion of academic freedom in the context of most of these colleges is inane. To provide academic freedom to potential colleges, the University Grants Commission (UGC) has been granting autonomous status. Granting autonomy is an important measure of fostering quality education and academic freedom.. But as of 2001 there were only 130 autonomous colleges. These are spread over 29 universities of eight states. Stage-wise enrolment Higher education in India stops mostly with the first degree. Going by the UGC, of the total enrolment in 2000-01 about 89 per cent was in under-graduate courses, nine per cent in post-graduate courses and less than one per cent in research.

152

The low enrolment for research degrees has serious implications for grooming and motivating teachers and researchers at the highest level for developing a critical mass of scientific talent pool in different faculties.

continuing and if anything increasing social relevance will further deprive the disadvantaged social groups, and result in the emergence of a newfangled education system and a social order devoid of socio-cultural moorings and sensitivity.

Higher education growth Going by the UGC data, the growth is mostly in the southern region (which along with the western region also has a higher enrolment in medicine), followed by the western and north-western regions.

The enormity of the task of expanding the education system by increasing institutions and enrolment, commensurate with the needs of the relevant age-groups, the late-learners, and the national imperative of confronting the challenges of globalisation which has already driven the system haywire, is only too obvious. This task is made complex by the wide social, gender, rural-urban, regional and disciplinary disparities, which if not addressed will only vitiate further attempts to develop the education system.

Table 6: Total Enrolment by Field of Study and Region, 2001 Region

General Education

Professional Education

Arts

Science

COM

Total

E&T

AGR/VS

EDN

LAW

Total

South

23.5

31.6

19.9

75.0

13.8

5.9

0.7

1.8

2.7

24.9

North (Bimaru)

57.5

18.7

13.3

89.5

2.5

1.6

0.9

1.1

4.4

10.5

West

42.6

12.4

27.2

82.2

8.9

3.6

0.8

1.2

3.4

17.9

Northwest

57.3

15.5

14.3

87.1

6.1

3.2

0.7

1.6

1.2

12.8

East

57.4

17.2

17.5

92.1

2.8

1.2

0.3

1.0

2.5

7.8

Northeast

71.3

15.0

6.5

92.8

1.9

1.0

0.7

1.2

2.4

7.2

India

46.5

20.1

18.0

84.6

6.9

3.2

0.8

1.3

3.2

15.4

Note: Enrolment in %; COM = Commerce; EDN = Education; E & T = Engineering and Technology; M = Medicine; AGR = Agriculture; VS = Veterinary Science. Table excludes Others or unspecified.

The rapid increase in private educational institutions since the last two decades, mostly engineering colleges may be an important reason for the higher presence of professional courses. The southern region where ICT has been having its greatest impact is spearheading India's information revolution. In it, with an exponential growth of private professional colleges, only less than 10 per cent of the engineering colleges are staterun and the rest are under private management.13 This has implications for academic freedom; for in the absence of regulatory measures these institutions have been a law unto themselves.

The problem has been placed in perspective by the UGC in its Tenth Plan Document.14 Its relevant observations are reproduced below: The problems of the Indian education system relate to size, access, equity, relevance, quality, and resource constraint. Public universities are facing several crippling constraints, many of which are the result of the unwillingness on the part of all the players in higher education to change with time and adopt new ways and methods to address various issues concerning the sector. The system is inextricably entangled in its myriad problems and there is no magic solution to sort this outâ&#x20AC;Ś Alternatives, like private institutions and foreign universities opening centres etc., are emerging in India. These alternatives, albeit expensive, are equipped to give better and more useful education. This will, no doubt, give an advantage to a few people, who come from an enlightened family background, have a strong academic commitment and better resources for meeting the financial demands of such education. The poor and disadvantaged communities, thus, run the risk of being marginalised in this competitive regime. When an education system is mired in myriad problems, as the UGC has admitted, sustaining academic freedom even at the minimalist level is difficult.

While South has only 23 per cent enrolment in Arts subjects the enrolment in other regions including west is between 43 per cent and 71 per cent. Though social sciences are included in Arts, the nature of enrolment and quality of education imparted calls for close scrutiny. As the basic degree in Arts is generally of three year duration, unlike engineering, technology, and medical degrees which have longer duration, education in social sciences picks up momentum only from the post-graduate level. But considering the low enrolment for post-graduate courses in general social sciences are increasingly being neglected is the inevitable conclusion from the available data. This again has implications for academic freedom.

The failure of the higher education system to expand to take care of the increase in demand should mean many things: These include the resistance of a hierarchical society to transform into an egalitarian society; the advantages of the traditionally entrenched groups to take to education; the continuing capability deprivation of the traditionally oppressed and disprivileged groups; and the continuing neglect of education as a fundamental human right. This makes a multi-pronged approach to the expansion of education at all levels a socio-political and national imperative.

As of now, degrees in social sciences are poor cousins of degrees in professional and technical courses. As a result of this and the fast changing education scenario, social sciences may gradually lose whatever little sheen they have. As social sciences are also the main choice of the weaker sections and the last resort of others who cannot get admission to professional courses, the neglect of social sciences despite their

If the data available are any indication India has about 131 million population in the 18-24 age cohort of which a major part should have ideally been in higher education. However, as mentioned earlier the enrolment is only between 9 per cent and 11 per cent. The problem of meagre presence of the youth population in higher education cannot be addressed without reference to the access to and the survival rates in

153

154

primary and secondary education.15 If the dropout and survival rates, and the literacy and illiteracy rates of the broad social categories are any indication, India has not done much for democratisation of access even at the primary level: Going by the Census of India 2001, India's illiterates are 41 million, 16 million, 33 million, 56 million, and 157 million in the 7-13, 14-17, 1824, and 25-34 age-cohorts, and in the 35 and above population. India has denied 56 million of its school-age children (primary and secondary),16 and 33 million of its college and university level age youth access to relevant education. In each age-cohort women far outnumber men. The percentage of illiterates is highest among the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Muslims (26, 24 and 35; 35, 33 and 44, and 32, 27, and 33 respectively for the age groups 7-13, 14-17, and 18-24), and highest among women in each of these categories (31, 32 and 48; 42, 43, and 58, and 35, 32, and 40 respectively).17 Thus, if India has a long way to go to achieve basic education for all, its distance to achieve universal higher education seems infinity. It is only against the above background of India's complexity and diversity as a nation, its very low enrolment for higher education, the various pulls and pressures over the education system, its internal weaknesses, and widely varying quality of universities and colleges, that any debate about academic freedom in India will be meaningful. Lack of academic freedom If the purpose of development is to expand freedom and that expansion drives further

Illiterates in million Total

Male

Illiterates in %

Female

Total

Male

Female

Scheduled Castes 7-13

8.014

3.506

4.508

21.7

30.8

14-17

3.161

1.264

1.897

23.8

17.5

31.5

18-24

7.117

2.375

4.742

34.7

22.2

48.2

7-13

5.559

2.386

3.173

35.2

29.2

41.5

14-17

2.188

0.849

1.339

24.4

42.5

18-24

4.33

1.436

2.895

29.7

57.7

Scheduled Tribes

Caste Hindus 7-13

16.602

6.97

9.631

17.8

14.3

21.7

14-17

6.228

2.277

3.951

13.9

9.5

18-24

14.635

4.482

10.153

19.7

11.4

Muslim

155

7-13

0.664

0.322

0.342

18.5

17.6

19.5

14-17

0.214

0.096

0.118

11.2

10.1

12.4

18-24

0.415

0.163

0.253

10.4

15.6

7-13

0.416

0.205

0.21

13.6

12.4

14-17

0.187

0.088

0.099

11.7

10.4

13.2

18-24

0.467

0.205

0.262

14.9

21.4 12.8

Sikh

Buddhist 7-13

0.15

0.068

0.082

11.3

9.9

14-17

0.053

0.021

0.032

7.8

5.9

9.9

18-24

0.138

0.041

0.097

7.4

19.3

Jain 7-13

0.019

0.009

0.01

3.6

3.3

3.9

14-17

0.004

0.002

1.3

1.2

1.6

18-24

0.012

0.004

0.007

1.4

2.7

All 7-13

40.563

17.771

22.792

22.9

19.2

14-17

15.531

6.174

9.357

14.2

24.6

18-24

33.202

11.167

22.035

25.4

16.3

35.4

Note: Table excludes Others and data on Age not stated.

development because development depends on the free agency of people; then seen against the persistent lack of educational development, India has hardly any academic freedom. For, the various choices which the stake-holders in education can normally exercise in a developed democracy are lacking in India. There are other problems as well. These include:

Table 7: Illiterates by Age-cohort and Community, 2001 Caste/Community and age-group

Christian

7-13

8.652

4.092

4.56

31.5

28.6

34.6

14-17

3.329

1.513

1.817

27.4

23.7

31.6

18-24

5.781

2.367

3.414

32.5

25.3

40.4

The ongoing privatisation and commercialisation of education which undercuts freedom and autonomy of students, teachers, and parents in relation to education. Within the state sector teachers and students are fairly well organised. This cannot happen in private institutions. Recently, when the AICTE (All India Council for Technical Education) de-recognised a number of deemed universities, students, parents, and teachers all were helpless. The students, anxious about their future, went on strike. But they were roughed up by the police. Police also filed false cases against some of them, apparently at the instance of the managements. The state was a passive spectator. Many of the state universities are in disarray. Because of language and Quota politics the quality of students, teachers, and teaching leaves much to be desired. There are cases of teachers migrating to other universities under duress. The faculty incentive scheme recently introduced in some state universities works against academic ethos. Those who can bring in money to the university corpus are given incentive credits in cash. The attempts to turn education into a money-spinner are apparently at the cost of academic freedom.

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The political and bureaucratic interference in state-run universities is deplorable. Often Vice Chancellors cannot inspire the faculty and students; in their eagerness to please politicians and bureaucrats they forget their academic and leadership roles in universities.18

capsule” in front of the Red Fort.22 It was dug out by the successor the Janata Party. As the history capsule could not have been prepared without the help of historians and pseudo-historians, there is need to make a distinction between establishment and opportunistic academics and those who uphold professional integrity.

Corruption is rampant in state universities. According to Transparency International next to health education is the most corrupt sector in India. When some of the appointments of teachers and Vice-Chancellors are by ingratiating politicians, their primary concern is profit, and not teaching. Quality of the profession is the casualty. In such situations academic freedom cannot flourish.

But for the short period of emergency, until recently state interference in academic freedom was not direct and frequent.23 During the 1990s, in Tamil Nadu in the confrontation between Governor Channa Reddy and Chief Minister Jayalalitha, the latter replaced the Governor as Chancellor of all state universities with the Chief Minister. This was direct interference with the autonomy of the universities as provided in the statutes. Whether it affected academic freedom per se is difficult to say.

Between central universities and state universities, the former get favoured treatment. It is mainly the former which may be said to have academic freedom, though even in their case only very few academics are active as to claim their role as one of freedom. Academic colonialism Drawing on the debate on academic colonialism in the December 1968 issue of Seminar, in its November 2000 issue on `Situating Sociology', Patricia Uberoi wrote: Setting 'the problem' in the opening essay, Satish Saberwal described the several facets of the phenomenon of academic colonialism: (i) where foreign intellectuals contribute information for political domination and infiltration; (ii) where foreign intellectuals seek to use their status to influence local politics; and (iii) where Afro-Asian social scientists come into relations of financial, political and intellectual dependence on first world (particularly U.S.) academic institutions, moulding their research designs and priorities accordingly.19 As he saw it, the basic problem for academics in the non-West was: "[H]ow does the stimulus of communication with the international intellectual community balance against the hazards resulting from the flow of data concerning our societies into the U.S. war machine? What are our options for improving the balance sheet? How shall we relate our research to the needs of our society, and how shall we communicate its findings to our local constituents, so that we may shed our clientship to patrons abroad, a relationship of subservience always and everywhere?"20 Academic colonialism persists even four decades down the line, and if anything persists on a higher level. Its persistence is mainly because of lack of integrity of sections of the academia, and the lure of lucre and assignments and travel abroad. The hubris of those with some recognition and close to the power-centres in Delhi silences their peers from lesser institutions. That also affects academic freedom. Threats to academic freedom During the political emergency from 1975 to 1977, freedom in general was curbed by the state, though unlike the media whether the academia did anything to contest the curb is questionable.21 The Congress Party which was in power buried a “history

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Academic freedom in India is, however, often stymied by state's inaction, particularly failure to foster academic institutions, and lack of well-being, ethos, and integrity in many institutions. Other ways in which academic freedom is denied are (a) restriction on the use of archival material, by treating the last 30 years records as “current”, and inaccessible to scholars; (b) some universities not allowing dissertations on living personalities without their written permission; and (c) political interference in university appointments and affairs. During the BJP rule which preceded the present Congress-led United Progressive Alliance, state actions went against established academic norms. These included introduction of astrology as an academic discipline, rewriting of textbooks by the NCERT,24 rewriting of history books, and in general, attempts to introduce through education the BJP's version of Indian society, through what was generally termed as falsification of history.25 As the persons who carried out the state's diktats were academics, who could have resisted what are now considered political aberrations, whether it is the academia or the state which should be blamed is debatable.26

In this context, it is important to note the following observations of August 21, 2004, by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, in his address to the AICC (as reported in the media): A major issue we are tackling is to reverse the ideological and bureaucratic onslaught on education which was one of the major damages inflicted on the Nation by the previous government. The Congress Party has always stood for liberal values and principles and believed in academic freedom, institutional autonomy, social justice and intellectual excellence as the guiding principles of educational policy. The announcement by Arjun Singh, Minister for Human Resource Development in May 2006 of 27 per cent reservation (Quota) for Other Backward Classes in all central

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institutions, widely seen as a political move, is interpreted by sections of the academia as interference with academic autonomy. The state's callousness towards the agitating students, and the confrontation between Union Minister for Health, Anbumani Ramdoss_a political upstart_ , and the All-India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) resulting in the dismissal of the eminent doctor and veteran Director of AIIMS, K. Venugopal, which the Supreme Court stayed, though in the realm of petty power play, are not without bearing on academic autonomy and freedom. Teaching v. research Though both teaching and research institutions and their stake-holders need academic freedom, considering that those engaged in full-time teaching may not find adequate time for research, over the last three decades India has evolved a network of social science research institutions within the framework of the Indian Council of Social Science Research. Though they are supposedly engaged in full-time research with hardly any teaching load, for the kind of autonomy, freedom, and facilities they have their research output is deplorably poor. Conclusion In about half a century since independence India has developed one of the largest higher education systems in the world (265 universities, 13,150 colleges, 8.821 million students, and 0.427 million teachers during 2001-02 as against 32 universities, 695 colleges, and 0.174 million students during1950-51), and India's enrolment for higher education is the third largest in the world next only to US and China. However, numbers in Indian context can be deceptive. To understand academic freedom in a socially meaningful way, the first important thing is to have institutional facilities, freedom and flexibility to admit eligible and aspiring students to academic institutions. In the absence of this freedom, which is capability deprivation, freedom of those who are already in the academia cannot be construed as academic freedom. For such freedom is not functional to the entire society. In this sense, the observation made at the beginning of this paper that academic freedom is intertwined with, and is the working out of multiple societal processes, appears in different forms with different intensities and degrees of salience, assumes added importance in India for developing education from a human rights' perspective. Central to this is the need to understand the nature and extent of the persistence of historically accumulated social deprivations of several groups which in turn have led to their capability deprivations, especially in gaining access to education.

For doing this, a comprehensive White Paper on India's higher education policy for a pragmatic programme for at least the next 20 years is urgently needed. Such a Paper should take stock of the present and required availability of access taking into consideration the size of the populations in the relevant age-groups, and cover all issues relating to higher education such as ensuring social justice through education for all, relevance of public-private partnership, admission policy, Quotas, feestructure, quality-control and other matters. Without this, higher education in India will continue to be in a mess with the state and the judiciary tossing issues around without moving towards a resolution on genuine concerns, and politicians and the fast emerging education industry continuing to fish in troubled waters. Such a scenario leaves no scope for any meaningful discourse on India's academic freedom in its overall societal context. [The author is senior professor of sociology at the Madras Institute of Development Studies, Chennai, INDIA. He is also a social critic and from to time writes for the print and electronic media on important issues. His home page is http://www.mids.ac.in/prk.htm.] End Notes 1 “Academic Freedom”. Encyclopaedia Britannica Online. 2 The reference is to concerned, committed and discerning intellectuals making use of their knowledge pursuits and capabilities to improve human rights particularly in the context of the less fortunate in society by contributing to increasing the dynamic interplay of democracy and civil society. 3 Amartya Sen. 1999. Development as Freedom. Oxford University Press. 4 The UNESCO, and the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights observed the issues thus: Academic freedom is rooted in the fundamental human right to education. A key component of this right is that governments must educate their citizens without discrimination through their acts or their omissions. The eternal triangle of access, quality and cost has been a straitjacket for education in the past; a virtuous circle of hope made up of education, freedom and development. It is a circle of hope because more education means more freedom, which means more development, which means more education_ and so on. 5

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To conclude, if Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has to honour his recent assurance to the agitating students of a fair, just, inclusive, and robust education system, addressing the needs of the heterogeneous ensemble that makes up the student community in the melting-pot of the education system from primary to tertiary levels by fostering existing institutions and creating new ones commensurate with the perceived and projected demand for education should be a national imperative.

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Education or Catastrophe, General Conference of the Association of Commonwealth Universities held at Queen's University, Belfast. Media Release, September 1, 2003. Web: www.acu.ac.uk/belfast2003. A case in point is the cloning of sheep in which scientists were engaged for about 20 years, and the birth of Dolly as the first genetically cloned sheep, with larger implications for cloning and geneticism. Even in this case, the reactions were mainly from the scientific community, and not from society at large. Karl R Popper. 1963. “Science as Falsification.” Originally published in Conjectures and Refutations. London. Routledge and Keagan Paul. Pp. 33-39. An important work on this is Ann Brooks and Alison Mackinnon (Ed.) Gender and the Restructured University: Changing Management and Culture in Higher Education. The Society for Research into Higher Education and Open University Press, 2001. See also my write-up on this book “Globalisation and the gendered academia”. The Hindu (Sunday Magazine), September 01, 2002; and review of the book in Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management. XXV (1). May 2003. India's recent Quota controversy was discussed by me in two newspaper articles, one media interview, and one journal article. These are: 1) `The reservation rigmarole'. The New Sunday Express (magazine section) May 7, 2006; `Dalits have not benefited from quotas'.

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Rediff.com. June 13, 2006; ÒBC Reservation and TN Model'. The New Indian Express (leader page). July 8, 2006; and ÒBC Reservation and Tamil Nadu'. South Asian Journal. No. 13. July-September 2006. UNESCO Institute for Statistics. World Education Indicators. Going by UNESCO data of those enrolled for primary education in 2001 the survival rate at grade 5 was only 61.4 % (male 59.7; female 63.4); and the NER in secondary education during 2000 was 49.9 (male 58.9; female 40.2). BIMARU is an acronym for the states Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh, and suggests that these states' economies are ailing. S.S. Gill. “Profit and education do go”. The Indian Express. November 8, 2005. Tenth Plan of University Grants Commission. Part 1: UGC's Vision and Strategy for X Plan. On access to education quoting the UN, the Human Rights Watch Report for 2001 observed: As pointed out by the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, academic freedom was rooted in the fundamental human right to education. Another key component of this right was that governments must educate their citizens without discrimination through their acts or their omissions. Discrimination based on caste status was also a concern, as evident in the widespread cases of discrimination against members of India's Dalit community, which belong to the lowest rung of the traditional caste hierarchy In its Global Monitoring Report, UNESCO has ranked India with 34 other countries in the lowest category. The report was released in Brasilia on 8 November 2004. It means that despite Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, UNESCO doubts that India would not be able to ensure that every child goes to school by 2015, the target date for UNESCO's `èducation for all'' goal. The New Indian Express. 9 November 2004. Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan is a premier program of the Government of India launched in 2001 to achieve the cherished goal of Universalization of Elementary Education, a Fundamental Right (Constitutional Amendment 2002). The super goals of the program are: All children in school by 2005; Focus on satisfactory quality with emphasis on education for life; Bridging gender and social gaps in Primary education by 2007, and Elementary by 2010; and Universal retention by 2010. According to UNESCO's EFA Global Monitoring Report, 2002, 28 countries, accounting for over 15% of the world's population, may not achieve any of the three measurable Dakar goals: universal primary education (UPE), gender equality and the halving of illiteracy rates. Twothirds of these countries are in Sub-Saharan Africa; but they also include India and Pakistan. In this context the following observations by Philip G. Altbach in the write-up “Higher Education India” (The Hindu, April 04, 2005) are important: India's colleges and universities, with just a few exceptions, have become large, under-funded, ungovernable institutions. At many of them, politics has intruded into campus life, influencing academic appointments and decisions across levels. Under-investment in libraries, information technology, laboratories, and classrooms makes it very difficult to provide top-quality instruction or engage in cutting-edge research. The rise in the number of part-time teachers and the freeze on new full-time appointments in many places have affected morale in the academic profession. The lack of accountability means that teaching and research performance is seldom measured. The system provides few incentives to perform. Bureaucratic inertia hampers change. Student unrest and occasional faculty agitation disrupt operations.

Satish Saberwal. 1968. 'The problem', Seminar issue 112 on 'Academic colonialism', December 1968, pp. 10-13. See also in the same vein, Yogendra Singh, 'Sociological issues', Seminar 112, December 1968, pp. 25-29. 20 Satish Saberwal, 'The problem', Seminar 112, December 1968, p. 13. 21 In an obituary on historian S. Gopal, K.N. Panikkar recalled in the Frontline of April 27-

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May 12, 2002: During the Emergency of 1975-77, despite being close to the government establishment he did not hesitate to articulate his opposition. At the Indian History Congress session at Aligarh in 1975 Gopal moved the resolution opposing the Emergency. While several senior historians were hesitant to support such a resolution, Gopal stated unambiguously that the Emergency was an assault on academic freedom. 22 Red Fort in Delhi is known by that name because of the red stone with which it was built. It is one of the magnificent palaces in the world. India's history is closely linked with this fort. It was from here that the British deposed the last Mughal ruler, Bhadur Shah Zafar, marking the end of the three century long Mughal rule. It was also from its ramparts that the first Prime Minister of India, Pandit Jawharlal Nehru, announced to the nation that India was free form colonial rule. 23 Absence of state interference does not mean that the managements of institutions have not been targeting individual academics. There have been a number of reports on this in the media and on websites. 24 The National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT) is an apex resource organisation set up by the Government of India, with headquarters at New Delhi, to assist and advise the Central and State Governments on academic matters related to school education. 25 A report in the Frontline of March 18-31, 2000 by Parvathi Menon under the title “Falsification of History” began thus: The latest ICHR-sponsored assault on academic freedom is just one of several official actions under BJP rule in the realm of education and research that are aimed to disseminate the Hindutva version of history. A related observation is in the report “Freedom in the World India (2005)” by the Freedom House in Washington, D.C. The promotion of Hindu nationalist ideology by the BJP government also affected the educational system. According to the U.S. State Department's International Religious Freedom Report for 2004, textbooks that had been rewritten to favor a Hindu extremist version of history were introduced in late 2002, despite protests from academics, minority leaders, and advocates of secular values. However, the new Congress-headed government pledged to reverse the "saffronization" of education, and the content of the textbooks is currently under revision. Academic freedom is also occasionally threatened by intimidation of and attacks on professors and institutions: in January, Hindu activists vandalized a research institute in Pune, according to the BBC. On the curbs on academics during the BJP rule, the Human Rights Watch report for the year 2001 observed the following under the subtitle “Censorship and Ideological Controls” in the section on Academic Freedom: India also instituted regulations governing attendance of foreigners at international academic meetings held in India. The Indian Home Ministry issued a circular ordering security clearance before holding such gatherings, singling out participants from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, China, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Similarly, the ministry issued an edict requiring prior approval for all international academic meetings. India's governing Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party continued its policy of "Hinduizing" education at all levels. India's University Grants Commission earmarked funds for university courses in astrology, a move that sparked strong opposition from India's academic community. A lawsuit brought by a group of academics contesting the new university program was before the Supreme Court of India.

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26 In an open letter dated April 9, 1999 to Indian president K.R. Narayanan, the Human Rights Watch Academic Freedom Committee called on the government to launch an investigation into reports of politically motivated censorship at the Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute, a government-funded Asian studies center in Calcutta. The letter urged Indian government to ensure that political tensions in the country do not spill over and restrict academic freedom.

India and United States: Converging Attitudes? Kolluru Srinivas and Gautam Pingle*

here is now a close complementarity between the US and Indian economies. Moreover, American and Indian interests coincide over a wide range of issues. They are not viewed as 'estranged democracies' as they were in the past decades. Much of the US model is associated with booming markets in industrial and service sectors, fast food restaurants, new ideas, academic pursuits, modern technology, democratic process, rule of law, multiculturalism and diversity in population. Urban India has progressed fast in the last two decades and aspires in many ways to be like the US. The US has recognised India's success and potential in many fields despite the visible poverty of much of the population. The result has been a potential economic and strategic relationship between the two great democracies. This rests on a foundation of mutual respect and recognition of mutual interests. Pro-American, anti-Americanism, Americanisation The American Connection: The American link has become a vital element in the life of middle class Indians. This is due largely to Internet and television, which display the 'American dream' in all its grandeur to millions of Indians. The Queen's English, as we knew it in India, is being replaced by American slang. Historically, the US had helped and encouraged Indian independence during the Second World War and later. US aid was critical in assisting India to overcome shortages in food grains through PL 480. The crisis of mid sixties led to the Green Revolution in India, which was stimulated and assisted by the United States. The US was our main ally giving material and moral support at the time of devastating Chinese invasion in 1962, when Indian administrators and public were totally demoralised. The US even played a major crucial behind-the-scenes role in the two Indo-Pak wars of 1965 encouraging first the British and then the Soviets, to take the lead in resolving the issue. The Indo-Pakistan conflict in early 1971, however, witnessed a US tilt towards Pakistan. The US tried desperately and with little avail to persuade India and Pakistan to avoid nuclear testing and armament. Yet India's apparent indigenous nuclear, space and missile technology compared to the suspected transplanted Pakistani capacity has raised its status among Americans. Recently, pressure from the United States was one of the reasons for Pakistan's withdrawal from Kargil. There were swings in the relationship but there was no basic US hostility towards India, only frustration. Indeed, US is an admirer of Indian democracy_its setup and functioning seen as a unique feature in the developing world. The present world is witnessing two tendencies. One is continued global anti-

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Americanism despite near collapse of Communism and, the other, Islam phobia. Notwithstanding this, a remarkable combination of factors has created a unique situation in India where anti-Americanism is tending to decline and Islam is not seen as a threat to Indian national integrity. The two most important reasons for improved relations between US and India are the dynamics of migration and the changing nature of the two economies. Strategic and geopolitical imperatives provided the main frame of reference for India and US foreign policy. Earlier this often strained relations between the two because of India's non-aligned policy in the face of the US position in the Cold War. However, after the collapse of Communism, increasing economic interdependence, growing migration of educated elite to US and cultural absorption appear to be driving the two countries towards a closer relationship. The Indian Diaspora in the United States with its high level of education, its wealth and its unique role in information technology undoubtedly helped to change earlier perceptions on both sides. The following factors seem to have had a role: US_India relationship In Search of Wealth: Until the 1980's, Indian economic planning and policy was based on the Soviet ideologies. The Indian five-year plan model rested on heavy industrialisation in a nearly closed economy with a strategic role assigned to the public sector. The policy was based on widespread state intervention and regulation of most economic activity. Domestic crises in the 1990's brought a paradigm change in Indian economic policy_a strong and irreversible move towards liberalization and dependence on (domestic and international) market forces. Despite change in policy environment, out migration of young Indian talent continued to the West, largely to US. The Western environment_individual freedom, liberal values, performance and efficiency-based rewards stimulated Indian Diaspora. On the other hand, the release from stranglehold of state controls prompted domestic and Diaspora businessmen as well as foreign investors to increase investments in India and enter into collaboration. Giant companies such as General Electric, Microsoft, International Business Machines and many others set up offshore activities in India. Many joint ventures emerged while other symbols of American culture, such as - Pepsi and Coca-Cola, Pizza, and McDonald's became established1. Consumerism took hold of Indian middle class. Box 1: Indians in the United States Indians in America are doing quite well for themselves with raising living standards. A study confirms that Indians are the best-educated, highest-earning, youngest and most likely white-collar workers among all major ethnic groups in the US. Indian men had the highest year-round full-time median earnings ($51,900), more than the Japanese in US ($50,900) and well ahead of the national average in US ($37,057) and the Asian average ($40,650). Overall, the Japanese have the highest median family income ($70,849) followed closely by Indians ($70,708). Both were way ahead of the national average of $50,046.

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Source: Terrance J. Reeves and Claudette E. Bennett (2004), “ We the People: Asians in the United States”, US Census Bureau. Technology and Development: Over several decades Indians have considered the US as a premier destination for their higher education. The availability of grants from the US universities and the opportunity to work and study became a major attraction for economically less endowed but meritorious Indian graduates. Meanwhile, opportunities for higher quality education have also widened in India. During 1970's institutions like the Indian Institutes of Technology, modeled after the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, became significant destinations for students. The result was availability of highly qualified engineers and scientists - facilitating both outmigration and domestic absorption. The techno-nationalism of the recent decades, inspired various successful experiments in “conspicuous technology” (Nandy, 1996). Both the development of indigenised computer technology and software development advances in technology related to defense industries, provided an environment and opportunities for this Indian 'hitec' labour. Business Process Outsourcing: The phenomenon of outsourcing has gained momentum in recent years. This has been aided directly by Diaspora returnees or by their influence on decision-making by their US employers. In this context, it is interesting to note that the McKinsey report on the Information Technology-enabled Services has predicted that by 2008, India will acquire 25 per cent of the world offshore market, in which the US currently has a lion's share. Americans attitudes towards India United States and India today face an unprecedented convergence of interests, values, and inter-societal ties in a way never experienced before in the sixty-year history of the bilateral relationship. Americans have a more favorable view of India compared to China and Pakistan as shown by surveys commissioned by Anti-Defamation League (December 2003) and Gallup (February 2001). The surveys found that (Table 1) about more than half of the Americans (58 percent) were favourable towards India, compared to 45 percent favourable to China. Only a third of Americans consider India a threat to world peace (Table 2), while more than half believe China and Pakistan are. Data comparison The main purpose of this paper is to compare recent attitudes of Indians and Americans based on responses in an attitudinal survey. It explores possible causes underlaying attitudes towards each other amongst the urban population of India and US. For a contrast, a comparison was made also of attitudes between India, Pakistan, and China2. Table 1: Americans Overall Opinion towards India and China Total Favourable Total Unfavourable (Percent) (Percent) India 58 30 China 45 48 Source: Gallup, February 2001 Country

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Table 2: Americans Who Perceive Threats to World Peace From: Country Opinion (percent) India 29 China 54 Pakistan 57 Source: Anti-Defamation League, December 2003

The analysis is based on 16-Nation Global Attitudes Survey Data carried out by the The Pew Global Attitudes Project3. The information relates to responses to a battery of questions posed (Annexure 1) to the respondents in different countries including United States with respect to their attitudes on several issues. The survey was conducted among 17,000 people in the US and 15 other countries from April 20 to May 31, 2005. Box 2: Nations and Sample Size 16-Nation Survey United States May 18 - May 22, 2005 (N=1,001) India - May 1 - May 29, 2005 (N=2,042) Pakistan - May 2 - 24, 2005 (N=1,225) China - May 21 - 31, 2005 (N=2,191)

Information relating to the neighbouring nations (China and Pakistan) are also taken for comparison. These respondents are also urban. The age of all respondants ranges from 18 to 60 years in all the four countries_US, India, Pakistan and China. Empirical analysis Analysis of simple correlation was made to determine the degree of concordance in the responses to the issues raised4. The additional purpose of the study was to assess and compare attitudes towards the United States among India's neighbouring nations and among themselves. Table 3: Cross Correlation Coefficients of the Responses to the Issues Raised for 2005 Data India China Pakistan United States 0.508* 0.129 0.128 India --0.386 0.310 --China --0.795** --Pakistan ----Observations 22 22 22 * significant at 5 per cent level, ** significant at 1 per cent level.

An Analysis of the Cross Correlations: The correlation analysis reveals the following important features. The concordance is fairly strong between the respondents in US and India. The survey indicates that they react similarly to the issues posed. The correlation is statistically significant. On the other hand, the closeness between the US and Chinese respondents to the same issues is weak. Surprisingly, there is only a weak relationship in US and Pakistani attitudes, despite their being â&#x20AC;&#x153;strategic alliesâ&#x20AC;? in the fight against Taliban in Afghanistan. Another interesting feature is a positive relationship between attitudes of Indian and Chinese respondents on the one hand, and on the other, those of Indian and Pakistani

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respondents. Quantitatively, the relationship between Indian and Chinese attitudes is stronger than that of Indian and Pakistani respondents. However, none of these correlation coefficients are statistically significant. A significant result is the strong relationship between the Chinese and Pakistani attitudes, with the anti-India policy of the two countries converging over the last 40 years. In brief, the two important features that emerge from the analysis are: (a) there is fairly strong positive association between Indian and US attitudes; (b) similarities in attitudes between Pakistan and China are stronger than any other pair of countries; and (c) the concordances between US and Chinese and US and Pakistani responses are very weak. Nations changing attitudes towards US: 2002 - 2005 The United States remains disliked in many of the countries in the world5. But the three-nation comparison in this study finds a wide variation in attitudes towards the United States. Table 4: Favourable Attitude Towards US by Nations 2002 -2005 (Per cent) Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 India 54 NA NA 71 Pakistan 10 13 21 23 China NA NA NA 42 Source: 16-Nation Pew Global Attitude Survey

Inspite of low regard in Pakistan for the US in general, there was an improvement in US image from 10 per cent in 2002 to 23 per cent in 2005. An interesting fact of the survey results is that 71 per cent of urban Indians in 2005 declared a positive opinion of the United States compared to 54 per cent in 2002. The Chinese responses are better than those of Pakistanis but not as highly favourable as those of Indians. It is interesting to note that favorable opinion of the US respondents towards India was higher than it was to Pakistan and China (The Harris Poll, 2005)6. While, urban India appears more likely to view the United States as a friend, this is also matched by similar (though less strong) view of the US population towards India. It is evident from this result that, the anti-Americanism has no resonance with urban Indians and, furthere, that as compared to Pakistan and China, India is considered a close ally by the US public. Political Aspects: The recent U.S. foreign policy is not well received in a number of developing countries. Foreign policy as such is an instrument through which any country furthers and secures its interests. However, there is some support across the neighbouring countries surveyed, that the US foreign policy is not totally inconsiderate of other nation's interests. Urban populations in India and its neighbours felt (in varing degrees) that the US pays attention to other nation's interests. Two-thirds of the Americans feel that the US takes into acount other nation's interests in its foreign policy. In line with the general

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Table 5: Does U.S Foreign Policy Consider Other Nations Interests? (Per cent responding favourably) Country 2002 2003 2005 United States 75 73 67 India 38 NA 63 China NA NA 53 Pakistan 23 23 39

upsurge of positive attitudes towards the U.S, in India it seems to have risen sharply between 2002 and 2005 to almost the US view of itself. However, elsewhere in the survey, people in many other countries indicate that sufficient attention is not paid to their national interests by US. Views on American Character: The study shows that, the favourability ratings of Americans have declined elsewhere since 2002, whereas in India and Pakistan the image of Americans has risen. To find out what the world makes of the American character, other nationalities (including Americans), were asked to rate Americans on seven character qualities_three positives (hardworking, inventive and honest - Table 6) and four negative (greedy, violent, rude and immoral - Table 6a)

Publics in: USA India China Pakistan

Table 6: Positive Characteristics of Americans (Per cent) Hardworking Inventive 85 81 81 86 44 70 63 57

Confidence in American Leaders: Outside the US, the only country where a majority of the people expressed confidence in President Bush is India (54 per cent) close to the US ratings. He secured lowest vote of confidence in Pakistan (10 per cent). The Indian attitude towards Bush is despite his policy towards Iraq and Afghanistan, perhaps another reason could be the nuclear technology deal initiated by Bush and the ending of post-Pokhran sanctions. United States: The Land of Opportunity: US is considered as land of opportunity for a good life for immigrants all over the world. It is very interesting here to note that 38 per cent of Indians see the United States as the world's leading land of opportunity while in the countries of China and Pakistan the ratings is very low. However, a careful look at the data in the survey, not presented here, suggest that publics in many other countries believe that Australia, Canada, Great Britain and Germany are better places than the US to lead a good life. Table 7: Favourable Views on Bush Publics in: Percent US 62 India 54 Pakistan 10 Table 8: US: The Proper Place to Lead a Good Life

Honest 63 58 35 27

Publics in: India China Pakistan

Percent 38 10 5

Concluding remarks Publics in: USA India China Pakistan

Table 6a: Negative Characteristics of Americans (Per cent) Greedy Violent Rude 70 49 35 43 39 27 57 61 44 58 63 51

Immoral 39 36 44 58

A majority of Indians view Americans as "inventive" (86 per cent), "hard-working" (81 per cent) and "honest" (58 per cent). This is again close to the US population's own perception of itself. On the other hand, only a minority of Chinese see Americans as hardworking and honest. Similar perceptions prevails in Pakistani sample. A varying majority of public in all the countries listed above believe Americans are inventive. On the negative side, publics in China and Pakistan generally believe that Americans are greedy and violent as opposed to Indians who think better of Americans than Americans think of themselves!

The fundamental characteristic of the Indian society is extreme heterogeneity. However, the attitudes of the urban elite have a great impact on society. The similarity in attitudes with those in the United States are the characteristics of the urban Indian middle class. The paper discusses some of the possible trends drawing the two publics to similar attitudes. This paper establishes similarity in the Indian and American attitudes based on Pew Survey Data. Based on the data, the era of anti-Americanism among urban Indians seems to be ending. India is unique in not subscribing to antiAmerican feelings. As economic and strategic interests converge, much more convergence may occur in the attitudes of Indians and Americans to various issues and to each other. The Americanisation of India is underway to the extent that urban Indians have a better opinion of the US than the Americans have of their own country. This is a significant finding which should have implication for policy makers.

When it comes to rudeness, only a quarter of Indian respondents are inclined to describe Americans as such, while nearly half of the Chinese and Pakistani respondents do. The idea of Americans as 'immoral' is high among Pakistanis but not so high among Indians and Chinese.

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Annexure 1 Global Attitudes Survey 2005

India

China

Pakistan

1. Are you satisfied with the way things are going on in your own country today?

2. Please tell if you have a favourable opinion of United States

3. Please tell if you have a favourable opinion of Americans

4. Please tell if you have a favourable opinion of China

5. Please tell if you have a favourable opinion of Germany

6. Please tell if you have a favourable opinion of France

7. Please tell if you have a favourable opinion of Japan

8. People in other countries of the world feel about you (liked) 9. In making international policy decisions US takes into account the interests of the countries (a fair amount & a great deal)

10. Positive characteristics associated with Americans (Hardworking)

11. Positive characteristics associated with Americans (Inventive)

12. Positive characteristics associated with Americans (Honest)

13. Negative characteristics associated with Americans (Greedy)

14. Negative characteristics associated with Americans (Violent)

15. Negative characteristics associated with Americans (Rude)

16. Negative characteristics associated with Americans (Immoral) 17. Would you like to see the US remain the only super power in the world? (opposite is another country as powerful) 18. Overall do you think the war with Iraq that removed Saddam Hussein from power made the world a safer place? (opposite is more dangerous place) 19. All in all, do you think the January elections in Iraq will lead to a More stable situation? (opposite question is Less stable). 20. Overall do you think that China's growing economy is a good thing for our country?(opposite question is Bad thing). 21. Which one do you think has the most influence on American policy toward other countries? (The News Media)

22. United States is a proper place to lead a good life.

India and Prof. George Rosen, Professor Emeritus, University of Illinois at Chicago, USA, for their helpful comments and suggestions. 1 It will be recalled that in the late 70's, both IBM and Coca Cola were forced out of India. Policy makers too actively discouraged Hollywood movies. 2 The survey samples for India, Pakistan, and China are exclusively urban. 3 Results for the survey are based on telephone and face-to-face interviews with individuals conducted under the direction of Princeton Survey Research Associates International. The survey information covered several developed and developing countries. 4 See the issues raised in Annexure 1 5 Elsewhere, there is evidence of strong negative attitudes among Muslim nations towards US. It is generally accepted, even in the US, that this is due to US support for Isreal, intervention in Afghanistan and the invasion of Iraq. This threatens to fuel anti-American sentiment and divide the United States from the publics of its traditional Islamic allies. 6 The Harris Poll was conducted by telephone within the United States between August 9 and 16, 2005 among a nationwide cross section of 1217 people aged 18 and above). Results of the Survey for India and its neighbours are given in the table below.

Countries India Pakistan China

How Americans view countries Close Ally (Percent) 20 9 5 Source: The Harris Poll, 2005

References l Anti-Defamation League, December 2003 l Gallup Survey, February 2001 l Harris Interactive Inc (2005), “The Harris Poll”, September 14, USA. l Nandy, A. (1996). “Introduction: Science as Reason of State.” In Science, Hegemony and Violence: A Requiem for Modernity, A. Nandy (Ed.), 4th Edition New Delhi: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-23. l Pew Research Center (2005), “16-Nation Pew Global Attitude Survey”, Washington D.C, US. l Pingle, Gautam (2003), “The Future of Anti-Americanism”, Deccan Chronicle, April 19, pp. 11, Hyderabad, India. l Terrance J. Reeves and Claudette E. Bennett (2004), We the People: Asians in the United States, US Census Bureau. l www.bpoindia.org End Notes The authors are Senior Research Fellow and C C Desai Chair Professor respectively at the Administrative Staff College of India, Bella Vista Campus, Hyderabad_500 082, India. Contacts: kolluru03@gmail.com, gpingle@asci.org.in. The usual disclaimer applies. The authors wish to thank Professor K. Krishnamurty, Honorary Professor, Administrative Staff College of India, for his comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of the paper. The authors also thank to Dr. S.K Rao, Director General, Administrative Staff College of India, Hyderabad,

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Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change United Nations 1998 The Parties to this Protocol, Being Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, hereinafter referred to as “the Convention”, In pursuit of the ultimate objective of the Convention as stated in its Article 2, Recalling the provisions of the Convention, Being guided by Article 3 of the Convention, Pursuant to the Berlin Mandate adopted by decision 1/CP.1 of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention at its first session, Have agreed as follows: Article 1 For the purposes of this Protocol, the definitions contained in Article 1 of the Convention shall apply. In addition: 1. “Conference of the Parties” means the Conference of the Parties to the Convention. 2. “Convention” means the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted in New York on 9 May 1992. 3. “Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change” means the Intergovernmental Panel onClimate Change established in 1988 jointly by the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme. 4. “Montreal Protocol” means the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, adopted in Montreal on 16 September 1987 and as subsequently adjusted and amended. 5. “Parties present and voting” means Parties present and casting an affirmative or negative vote. 6. “Party” means, unless the context otherwise indicates, a Party to this Protocol. 7. “Party included in Annex I” means a Party included in Annex I to the Convention, as may be amended, or a Party which has made a notification under Article 4, paragraph 2 (g), of the Convention. Article 2 1. Each Party included in Annex I, in achieving its quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3, in order to promote sustainable development, shall: (a) Implement and/or further elaborate policies and measures in accordance with its national circumstances, such as: (i) Enhancement of energy efficiency in relevant sectors of the national economy;

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(ii) Protection and enhancement of sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, taking into account its commitments under relevant international environmental agreements; promotion of sustainable forest management practices, afforestation and reforestation; (iii) Promotion of sustainable forms of agriculture in light of climate change considerations; (iv) Research on, and promotion, development and increased use of, new and renewable forms of energy, of carbon dioxide sequestration technologies and of advanced and innovative environmentally sound technologies; (v) Progressive reduction or phasing out of market imperfections, fiscal incentives, tax and duty exemptions and subsidies in all greenhouse gas emitting sectors that run counter to the objective of the Convention and application of market instruments; (vi) Encouragement of appropriate reforms in relevant sectors aimed at promoting policies and measures which limit or reduce emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol; (vii) Measures to limit and/or reduce emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol in the transport sector; (viii) Limitation and/or reduction of methane emissions through recovery and use in waste management, as well as in the production, transport and distribution of energy; (b) Cooperate with other such Parties to enhance the individual and combined effectiveness of their policies and measures adopted under this Article, pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 2 (e) (i), of the Convention. To this end, these Parties shall take steps to share their experience and exchange information on such policies and measures, including developing ways of improving their comparability, transparency and effectiveness. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, at its first session or as soon as practicable thereafter, consider ways to facilitate such cooperation, taking into account all relevant information. 2.

The Parties included in Annex I shall pursue limitation or reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol from aviation and marine bunker fuels, working through the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime Organization, respectively.

The Parties included in Annex I shall strive to implement policies and measures under this Article in such a way as to minimize adverse effects, including the adverse effects of climate change, effects on international trade, and social, environmental and economic impacts on other Parties, especially developing country Parties and in particular those identified in Article 4, paragraphs 8 and 9, of the Convention, taking into account Article 3 of the Convention. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol may take further action, as appropriate, to promote the implementation of the provisions of this paragraph.

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The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, if it decides that it would be beneficial to coordinate any of the policies and measures in paragraph 1 (a) above, taking into account different national circumstances and potential effects, shall consider ways and means to elaborate the coordination of such policies and measures.

Article 3 1. The Parties included in Annex I shall, individually or jointly, ensure that their aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not exceed their assigned amounts, calculated pursuant to their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B and in accordance with the provisions of this Article, with a view to reducing their overall emissions of such gases by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012. 2.

Each Party included in Annex I shall, by 2005, have made demonstrable progress in achieving its commitments under this Protocol.

The net changes in greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks resulting from direct human-induced land-use change and forestry activities, limited to afforestation, reforestation and deforestation since 1990, measured as verifiable changes in carbon stocks in each commitment period, shall be used to meet the commitments under this Article of each Party included in Annex I. The greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks associated with those activities shall be reported in a transparent and verifiable manner and reviewed in accordance with Articles 7 and 8.

Prior to the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, each Party included in Annex I shall provide, for consideration by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, data to establish its level of carbon stocks in 1990 and to enable an estimate to be made of its changes in carbon stocks in subsequent years. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, at its first session or as soon as practicable thereafter, decide upon modalities, rules and guidelines as to how, and which, additional human-induced activities related to changes in greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks in the agricultural soils and the land-use change and forestry categories shall be added to, or subtracted from, the assigned amounts for Parties included in Annex I, taking into account uncertainties, transparency in reporting, verifiability, the methodological work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the advice provided by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice in accordance with Article 5 and the decisions of the Conference of the Parties. Such a decision shall apply in the second and subsequent commitment periods. A Party may choose to apply such a decision on these additional human-induced activities for its first commitment period, provided that these activities have taken place since 1990.

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5. The Parties included in Annex I undergoing the process of transition to a market economy whose base year or period was established pursuant to decision 9/CP.2 of the Conference of the Parties at its second session shall use that base year or period for the implementation of their commitments under this Article. Any other Party included in Annex I undergoing the process of transition to a market economy which has not yet submitted its first national communication under Article 12 of the Convention may also notify the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol that it intends to use an historical base year or period other than 1990 for the implementation of its commitments under this Article. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall decide on the acceptance of such notification. 6.

Taking into account Article 4, paragraph 6, of the Convention, in the implementation of their commitments under this Protocol other than those under this Article, a certain degree of flexibility shall be allowed by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol to the Parties included in Annex I undergoing the process of transition to a market economy.

In the first quantified emission limitation and reduction commitment period, from 2008 to 2012, the assigned amount for each Party included in Annex I shall be equal to the percentage inscribed for it in Annex B of its aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A in 1990, or the base year or period determined in accordance with paragraph 5 above, multiplied by five. Those Parties included in Annex I for whom land-use change and forestry constituted a net source of greenhouse gas emissions in 1990 shall include in their 1990 emissions base year or period the aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions by sources minus removals by sinks in 1990 from landuse change for the purposes of calculating their assigned amount.

Any Party included in Annex I may use 1995 as its base year for hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride, for the purposes of the calculation referred to in paragraph 7 above.

Commitments for subsequent periods for Parties included in Annex I shall be established in amendments to Annex B to this Protocol, which shall be adopted in accordance with the provisions of Article 21, paragraph 7. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall initiate the consideration of such commitments at least seven years before the end of the first commitment period referred to in paragraph 1 above.

10. Any emission reduction units, or any part of an assigned amount, which a Party acquires from another Party in accordance with the provisions of Article 6 or of Article 17 shall be added to the assigned amount for the acquiring Party. 11. Any emission reduction units, or any part of an assigned amount, which a Party transfers to another Party in accordance with the provisions of Article 6 or of Article

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17 shall be subtracted from the assigned amount for the transferring Party. 12. Any certified emission reductions which a Party acquires from another Party in accordance with the provisions of Article 12 shall be added to the assigned amount for the acquiring Party.

In the event of failure by the Parties to such an agreement to achieve their total combined level of emission reductions, each Party to that agreement shall be responsible for its own level of emissions set out in the agreement.

If Parties acting jointly do so in the framework of, and together with, a regional economic integration organization which is itself a Party to this Protocol, each member State of that regional economic integration organization individually, and together with the regional economic integration organization acting in accordance with Article 24, shall, in the event of failure to achieve the total combined level of emission reductions, be responsible for its level of emissions as notified in accordance with this Article.

13. If the emissions of a Party included in Annex I in a commitment period are less than its assigned amount under this Article, this difference shall, on request of that Party, be added to the assigned amount for that Party for subsequent commitment periods. 14. Each Party included in Annex I shall strive to implement the commitments mentioned in paragraph 1 above in such a way as to minimize adverse social, environmental and economic impacts on developing country Parties, particularly those identified in Article 4, paragraphs 8 and 9, of the Convention. In line with relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties on the implementation of those paragraphs, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, at its first session, consider what actions are necessary to minimize the adverse effects of climate change and/or the impacts of response measures on Parties referred to in those paragraphs. Among the issues to be considered shall be the establishment of funding, insurance and transfer of technology.

Article 5 1. Each Party included in Annex I shall have in place, no later than one year prior to the start of the first commitment period, a national system for the estimation of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol. Guidelines for such national systems, which shall incorporate the methodologies specified in paragraph 2 below, shall be decided upon by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol at its first session. 2.

Methodologies for estimating anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol shall be those accepted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties at its third session. Where such methodologies are not used, appropriate adjustments shall be applied according to methodologies agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol at its first session. Based on the work of, inter alia, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and advice provided by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall regularly review and, as appropriate, revise such methodologies and adjustments, taking fully into account any relevant decisions by the Conference of the Parties. Any revision to methodologies or adjustments shall be used only for the purposes of ascertaining compliance with commitments under Article 3 in respect of any commitment period adopted subsequent to that revision.

The global warming potentials used to calculate the carbon dioxide equivalence of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases listed in Annex A shall be those accepted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties at its third session. Based on the work of, inter alia, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and advice provided by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall regularly review and, as appropriate, revise the global warming potential of each such greenhouse gas, taking fully into account any relevant decisions by the Conference of the Parties. Any revision to a global warming potential shall apply

Article 4 1. Any Parties included in Annex I that have reached an agreement to fulfil their commitments under Article 3 jointly, shall be deemed to have met those commitments provided that their total combined aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not exceed their assigned amounts calculated pursuant to their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B and in accordance with the provisions of Article 3. The respective emission level allocated to each of the Parties to the agreement shall be set out in that agreement. 2.

The Parties to any such agreement shall notify the secretariat of the terms of the agreement on the date of deposit of their instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval of this Protocol, or accession thereto. The secretariat shall in turn inform the Parties and signatories to the Convention of the terms of the agreement.

Any such agreement shall remain in operation for the duration of the commitment period specified in Article 3, paragraph 7.

If Parties acting jointly do so in the framework of, and together with, a regional economic integration organization, any alteration in the composition of the organization after adoption of this Protocol shall not affect existing commitments under this Protocol. Any alteration in the composition of the organization shall only apply for the purposes of those commitments under Article 3 that are adopted subsequent to that alteration.

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only to commitments under Article 3 in respect of any commitment period adopted subsequent to that revision. Article 6 1. For the purpose of meeting its commitments under Article 3, any Party included in Annex I may transfer to, or acquire from, any other such Party emission reduction units resulting from projects aimed at reducing anthropogenic emissions by sources or enhancing anthropogenic removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in any sector of the economy, provided that: (a) Any such project has the approval of the Parties involved; (b) Any such project provides a reduction in emissions by sources, or an enhancement of removals by sinks, that is additional to any that would otherwise occur; (c) It does not acquire any emission reduction units if it is not in compliance with its obligations under Articles 5 and 7; and (d) The acquisition of emission reduction units shall be supplemental to domestic actions for the purposes of meeting commitments under Article 3. 2.

The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol may, at its first session or as soon as practicable thereafter, further elaborate guidelines for the implementation of this Article, including for verification and reporting.

A Party included in Annex I may authorize legal entities to participate, under its responsibility, in actions leading to the generation, transfer or acquisition under this Article of emission reduction units.

If a question of implementation by a Party included in Annex I of the requirements referred to in this Article is identified in accordance with the relevant provisions of Article 8, transfers and acquisitions of emission reduction units may continue to be made after the question has been identified, provided that any such units may not be used by a Party to meet its commitments under Article 3 until any issue of compliance is resolved.

Article 7 1. Each Party included in Annex I shall incorporate in its annual inventory of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, submitted in accordance with the relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties, the necessary supplementary information for the purposes of ensuring compliance with Article 3, to be determined in accordance with paragraph 4 below. 2.

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Each Party included in Annex I shall incorporate in its national communication, submitted under Article 12 of the Convention, the supplementary information necessary to demonstrate compliance with its commitments under this Protocol, to be determined in accordance with paragraph 4 below.

Each Party included in Annex I shall submit the information required under paragraph 1 above annually, beginning with the first inventory due under the Convention for the first year of the commitment period after this Protocol has entered into force for that Party. Each such Party shall submit the information required under paragraph 2 above as part of the first national communication due under the Convention after this Protocol has entered into force for it and after the adoption of guidelines as provided for in paragraph 4 below. The frequency of subsequent submission of information required under this Article shall be determined by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, taking into account any timetable for the submission of national communications decided upon by the Conference of the Parties.

The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall adopt at its first session, and review periodically thereafter, guidelines for the preparation of the information required under this Article, taking into account guidelines for the preparation of national communications by Parties included in Annex I adopted by the Conference of the Parties. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall also, prior to the first commitment period, decide upon modalities for the accounting of assigned amounts.

Article 8 1. The information submitted under Article 7 by each Party included in Annex I shall be reviewed by expert review teams pursuant to the relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties and in accordance with guidelines adopted for this purpose by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol under paragraph 4 below. The information submitted under Article 7, paragraph 1, by each Party included in Annex I shall be reviewed as part of the annual compilation and accounting of emissions inventories and assigned amounts. Additionally, the information submitted under Article 7, paragraph 2, by each Party included in Annex I shall be reviewed as part of the review of communications. 2.

Expert review teams shall be coordinated by the secretariat and shall be composed of experts selected from those nominated by Parties to the Convention and, as appropriate, by intergovernmental organizations, in accordance with guidance provided for this purpose by the Conference of the Parties.

The review process shall provide a thorough and comprehensive technical assessment of all aspects of the implementation by a Party of this Protocol. The expert review teams shall prepare a report to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, assessing the implementation of the commitments of the Party and identifying any potential problems in, and factors influencing, the fulfilment of commitments. Such reports shall be circulated by the secretariat to all Parties to the Convention. The secretariat shall list those questions of implementation indicated in such reports for further consideration by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol.

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The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall adopt at its first session, and review periodically thereafter, guidelines for the review of implementation of this Protocol by expert review teams taking into account the relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties.

The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, with the assistance of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation and, as appropriate, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, consider: (a) The information submitted by Parties under Article 7 and the reports of the expert reviews thereon conducted under this Article; and (b) Those questions of implementation listed by the secretariat under paragraph 3 above, as well as any questions raised by Parties.

(b)

(i)

(ii)

Pursuant to its consideration of the information referred to in paragraph 5 above, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall take decisions on any matter required for the implementation of this Protocol. (c)

Article 9 1. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall periodically review this Protocol in the light of the best available scientific information and assessments on climate change and its impacts, as well as relevant technical, social and economic information. Such reviews shall be coordinated with pertinent reviews under the Convention, in particular those required by Article 4, paragraph 2(d), and Article 7, paragraph 2(a), of the Convention. Based on these reviews, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall take appropriate action. 2. The first review shall take place at the second session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. Further reviews shall take place at regular intervals and in a timely manner. Article 10 All Parties, taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and their specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances, without introducing any new commitments for Parties not included in Annex I, but reaffirming existing commitments under Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Convention, and continuing to advance the implementation of these commitments in order to achieve sustainable development, taking into account Article 4, paragraphs 3, 5 and 7, of the Convention, shall: (a) Formulate, where relevant and to the extent possible, cost-effective national and, where appropriate, regional programmes to improve the quality of local emission factors, activity data and/or models which reflect the socio-economic conditions of each Party for the preparation and periodic updating of national inventories of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, using comparable methodologies to be agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties, and consistent with the guidelines for

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(d)

(e)

(f)

the preparation of national communications adopted by the Conference of the Parties; Formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national and, where appropriate, regional programmes containing measures to mitigate climate change and measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change: Such programmes would, inter alia, concern the energy, transport and industry sectors as well as agriculture, forestry and waste management. Furthermore, adaptation technologies and methods for improving spatial planning would improve adaptation to climate change; and Parties included in Annex I shall submit information on action under this Protocol, including national programmes, in accordance with Article 7; and other Parties shall seek to include in their national communications, as appropriate, information on programmes which contain measures that the Party believes contribute to addressing climate change and its adverse impacts, including the abatement of increases in greenhouse gas emissions, and enhancement of and removals by sinks, capacity building and adaptation measures; Cooperate in the promotion of effective modalities for the development, application and diffusion of, and take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies, know-how, practices and processes pertinent to climate change, in particular to developing countries, including the formulation of policies and programmes for the effective transfer of environmentally sound technologies that are publicly owned or in the public domain and the creation of an enabling environment for the private sector, to promote and enhance the transfer of, and access to, environmentally sound technologies; Cooperate in scientific and technical research and promote the maintenance and the development of systematic observation systems and development of data archives to reduce uncertainties related to the climate system, the adverse impacts of climate change and the economic and social consequences of various response strategies, and promote the development and strengthening of endogenous capacities and capabilities to participate in international and intergovernmental efforts, programmes and networks on research and systematic observation, taking into account Article 5 of the Convention; Cooperate in and promote at the international level, and, where appropriate, using existing bodies, the development and implementation of education and training programmes, including the strengthening of national capacity building, in particular human and institutional capacities and the exchange or secondment of personnel to train experts in this field, in particular for developing countries, and facilitate at the national level public awareness of, and public access to information on, climate change. Suitable modalities should be developed to implement these activities through the relevant bodies of the Convention, taking into account Article 6 of the Convention; Include in their national communications information on programmes and activities undertaken pursuant to this Article in accordance with relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties; and

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(g) Give full consideration, in implementing the commitments under this Article, to Article 4, paragraph 8, of the Convention. Article 11 1. In the implementation of Article 10, Parties shall take into account the provisions of Article 4, paragraphs 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9, of the Convention.

(b) Parties included in Annex I may use the certified emission reductions accruing from such project activities to contribute to compliance with part of their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3, as determined by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. 4.

In the context of the implementation of Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Convention, in accordance with the provisions of Article 4, paragraph 3, and Article 11 of the Convention, and through the entity or entities entrusted with the operation of the financial mechanism of the Convention, the developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II to the Convention shall: (a) Provide new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full costs incurred by developing country Parties in advancing the implementation of existing commitments under Article 4, paragraph 1(a), of the Convention that are covered in Article 10, subparagraph (a); and (b) Also provide such financial resources, including for the transfer of technology, needed by the developing country Parties to meet the agreed full incremental costs of advancing the implementation of existing commitments under Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Convention that are covered by Article 10 and that are agreed between a developing country Party and the international entity or entities referred to in Article 11 of the Convention, in accordance with that Article. The implementation of these existing commitments shall take into account the need for adequacy and predictability in the flow of funds and the importance of appropriate burden sharing among developed country Parties. The guidance to the entity or entities entrusted with the operation of the financial mechanism of the Convention in relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties, including those agreed before the adoption of this Protocol, shall apply mutatis mutandis to the provisions of this paragraph. 3.

The developed country Parties and other developed Parties in Annex II to the Convention may also provide, and developing country Parties avail themselves of, financial resources for the implementation of Article 10, through bilateral, regional and other multilateral channels.

Emission reductions resulting from each project activity shall be certified by operational entities to be designated by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, on the basis of: (a) Voluntary participation approved by each Party involved; (b) Real, measurable, and long-term benefits related to the mitigation of climate change; and (c) Reductions in emissions that are additional to any that would occur in the absence of the certified project activity. 6.

The clean development mechanism shall assist in arranging funding of certified project activities as necessary.

The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, at its first session, elaborate modalities and procedures with the objective of ensuring transparency, efficiency and accountability through independent auditing and verification of project activities.

The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall ensure that a share of the proceeds from certified project activities is used to cover administrative expenses as well as to assist developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to meet the costs of adaptation.

Participation under the clean development mechanism, including in activities mentioned in paragraph 3(a) above and in the acquisition of certified emission reductions, may involve private and/or public entities, and is to be subject to whatever guidance may be provided by the executive board of the clean development mechanism.

Article 12 1. A clean development mechanism is hereby defined. 2.

The purpose of the clean development mechanism shall be to assist Parties not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention, and to assist Parties included in Annex I in achieving compliance with their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3.

3. Under the clean development mechanism: (a) Parties not included in Annex I will benefit from project activities resulting in certified emission reductions; and

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The clean development mechanism shall be subject to the authority and guidance of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol and be supervised by an executive board of the clean development mechanism.

10. Certified emission reductions obtained during the period from the year 2000 up to the beginning of the first commitment period can be used to assist in achieving compliance in the first commitment period. Article 13 1. The Conference of the Parties, the supreme body of the Convention, shall serve as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. 2.

Parties to the Convention that are not Parties to this Protocol may participate as

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observers in the proceedings of any session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. When the Conference of the Parties serves as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, decisions under this Protocol shall be taken only by those that are Parties to this Protocol. 3.

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f) (g) (h)

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When the Conference of the Parties serves as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, any member of the Bureau of the Conference of the Parties representing a Party to the Convention but, at that time, not a Party to this Protocol, shall be replaced by an additional member to be elected by and from amongst the Parties to this Protocol. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall keep under regular review the implementation of this Protocol and shall make, within its mandate, the decisions necessary to promote its effective implementation. It shall perform the functions assigned to it by this Protocol and shall: Assess, on the basis of all information made available to it in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol, the implementation of this Protocol by the Parties, the overall effects of the measures taken pursuant to this Protocol, in particular environmental, economic and social effects as well as their cumulative impacts and the extent to which progress towards the objective of the Convention is being achieved; Periodically examine the obligations of the Parties under this Protocol, giving due consideration to any reviews required by Article 4, paragraph 2(d), and Article 7, paragraph 2, of the Convention, in the light of the objective of the Convention, the experience gained in its implementation and the evolution of scientific and technological knowledge, and in this respect consider and adopt regular reports on the implementation of this Protocol; Promote and facilitate the exchange of information on measures adopted by the Parties to address climate change and its effects, taking into account the differing circumstances, responsibilities and capabilities of the Parties and their respective commitments under this Protocol; Facilitate, at the request of two or more Parties, the coordination of measures adopted by them to address climate change and its effects, taking into account the differing circumstances, responsibilities and capabilities of the Parties and their respective commitments under this Protocol; Promote and guide, in accordance with the objective of the Convention and the provisions of this Protocol, and taking fully into account the relevant decisions by the Conference of the Parties, the development and periodic refinement of comparable methodologies for the effective implementation of this Protocol, to be agreed on by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol; Make recommendations on any matters necessary for the implementation of this Protocol; Seek to mobilize additional financial resources in accordance with Article 11, paragraph 2; Establish such subsidiary bodies as are deemed necessary for the implementation of

this Protocol; (i) Seek and utilize, where appropriate, the services and cooperation of, and information provided by, competent international organizations and intergovernmental and non-governmental bodies; and (j) Exercise such other functions as may be required for the implementation of this Protocol, and consider any assignment resulting from a decision by the Conference of the Parties. 5.

The rules of procedure of the Conference of the Parties and financial procedures applied under the Convention shall be applied mutatis mutandis under this Protocol, except as may be otherwise decided by consensus by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol.

The first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall be convened by the secretariat in conjunction with the first session of the Conference of the Parties that is scheduled after the date of the entry into force of this Protocol. Subsequent ordinary sessions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall be held every year and in conjunction with ordinary sessions of the Conference of the Parties, unless otherwise decided by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol.

Extraordinary sessions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall be held at such other times as may be deemed necessary by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, or at the written request of any Party, provided that, within six months of the request being communicated to the Parties by the secretariat, it is supported by at least one third of the Parties.

The United Nations, its specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as any State member thereof or observers thereto not party to the Convention, may be represented at sessions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol as observers. Any body or agency, whether national or international, governmental or non-governmental, which is qualified in matters covered by this Protocol and which has informed the secretariat of its wish to be represented at a session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol as an observer, may be so admitted unless at least one third of the Parties present object. The admission and participation of observers shall be subject to the rules of procedure, as referred to in paragraph 5 above.

Article 14 1. The secretariat established by Article 8 of the Convention shall serve as the secretariat of this Protocol. 2.

Article 8, paragraph 2, of the Convention on the functions of the secretariat, and

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Article 8, paragraph 3, of the Convention on arrangements made for the functioning of the secretariat, shall apply mutatis mutandis to this Protocol. The secretariat shall, in addition, exercise the functions assigned to it under this Protocol. Article 15 1. The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation established by Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention shall serve as, respectively, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation of this Protocol. The provisions relating to the functioning of these two bodies under the Convention shall apply mutatis mutandis to this Protocol. Sessions of the meetings of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation of this Protocol shall be held in conjunction with the meetings of, respectively, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation of the Convention. 2.

Parties to the Convention that are not Parties to this Protocol may participate as observers in the proceedings of any session of the subsidiary bodies. When the subsidiary bodies serve as the subsidiary bodies of this Protocol, decisions under this Protocol shall be taken only by those that are Parties to this Protocol.

When the subsidiary bodies established by Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention exercise their functions with regard to matters concerning this Protocol, any member of the Bureaux of those subsidiary bodies representing a Party to the Convention but, at that time, not a party to this Protocol, shall be replaced by an additional member to be elected by and from amongst the Parties to this Protocol.

Article 16 The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, as soon as practicable, consider the application to this Protocol of, and modify as appropriate, the multilateral consultative process referred to in Article 13 of the Convention, in the light of any relevant decisions that may be taken by the Conference of the Parties. Any multilateral consultative process that may be applied to this Protocol shall operate without prejudice to the procedures and mechanisms established in accordance with Article 18. Article 17 The Conference of the Parties shall define the relevant principles, modalities, rules and guidelines, in particular for verification, reporting and accountability for emissions trading. The Parties included in Annex B may participate in emissions trading for the purposes of fulfilling their commitments under Article 3. Any such trading shall be supplemental to domestic actions for the purpose of meeting quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under that Article. Article 18 The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall,

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at its first session, approve appropriate and effective procedures and mechanisms to determine and to address cases of non-compliance with the provisions of this Protocol, including through the development of an indicative list of consequences, taking into account the cause, type, degree and frequency of non-compliance. Any procedures and mechanisms under this Article entailing binding consequences shall be adopted by means of an amendment to this Protocol. Article 19 The provisions of Article 14 of the Convention on settlement of disputes shall apply mutatis mutandis to this Protocol. Article 20 1. Any Party may propose amendments to this Protocol. 2.

Amendments to this Protocol shall be adopted at an ordinary session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. The text of any proposed amendment to this Protocol shall be communicated to the Parties by the secretariat at least six months before the meeting at which it is proposed for adoption. The secretariat shall also communicate the text of any proposed amendments to the Parties and signatories to the Convention and, for information, to the Depositary.

The Parties shall make every effort to reach agreement on any proposed amendment to this Protocol by consensus. If all efforts at consensus have been exhausted, and no agreement reached, the amendment shall as a last resort be adopted by a threefourths majority vote of the Parties present and voting at the meeting. The adopted amendment shall be communicated by the secretariat to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all Parties for their acceptance.

Instruments of acceptance in respect of an amendment shall be deposited with the Depositary. An amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 3 above shall enter into force for those Parties having accepted it on the ninetieth day after the date of receipt by the Depositary of an instrument of acceptance by at least three fourths of the Parties to this Protocol.

The amendment shall enter into force for any other Party on the ninetieth day after the date on which that Party deposits with the Depositary its instrument of acceptance of the said amendment.

Article 21 1. Annexes to this Protocol shall form an integral part thereof and, unless otherwise expressly provided, a reference to this Protocol constitutes at the same time a reference to any annexes thereto. Any annexes adopted after the entry into force of this Protocol shall be restricted to lists, forms and any other material of a descriptive nature that is of a scientific, technical, procedural or administrative character.

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Any Party may make proposals for an annex to this Protocol and may propose amendments to annexes to this Protocol.

Article 23 The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the Depositary of this Protocol.

Annexes to this Protocol and amendments to annexes to this Protocol shall be adopted at an ordinary session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. The text of any proposed annex or amendment to an annex shall be communicated to the Parties by the secretariat at least six months before the meeting at which it is proposed for adoption. The secretariat shall also communicate the text of any proposed annex or amendment to an annex to the Parties and signatories to the Convention and, for information, to the Depositary. The Parties shall make every effort to reach agreement on any proposed annex or amendment to an annex by consensus. If all efforts at consensus have been exhausted, and no agreement reached, the annex or amendment to an annex shall as a last resort be adopted by a three-fourths majority vote of the Parties present and voting at the meeting. The adopted annex or amendment to an annex shall be communicated by the secretariat to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all Parties for their acceptance.

Article 24 1. This Protocol shall be open for signature and subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by States and regional economic integration organizations which are Parties to the Convention. It shall be open for signature at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 16 March 1998 to 15 March 1999. This Protocol shall be open for accession from the day after the date on which it is closed for signature. Instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

An annex, or amendment to an annex other than Annex A or B, that has been adopted in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 above shall enter into force for all Parties to this Protocol six months after the date of the communication by the Depositary to such Parties of the adoption of the annex or adoption of the amendment to the annex, except for those Parties that have notified the Depositary, in writing, within that period of their non-acceptance of the annex or amendment to the annex. The annex or amendment to an annex shall enter into force for Parties which withdraw their notification of non-acceptance on the ninetieth day after the date on which withdrawal of such notification has been received by the Depositary.

Any regional economic integration organization which becomes a Party to this Protocol without any of its member States being a Party shall be bound by all the obligations under this Protocol. In the case of such organizations, one or more of whose member States is a Party to this Protocol, the organization and its member States shall decide on their respective responsibilities for the performance of their obligations under this Protocol. In such cases, the organization and the member States shall not be entitled to exercise rights under this Protocol concurrently.

In their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, regional economic integration organizations shall declare the extent of their competence with respect to the matters governed by this Protocol. These organizations shall also inform the Depositary, who shall in turn inform the Parties, of any substantial modification in the extent of their competence.

Article 25 1. This Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date on which not less than 55 Parties to the Convention, incorporating Parties included in Annex I which accounted in total for at least 55 per cent of the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990 of the Parties included in Annex I, have deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

If the adoption of an annex or an amendment to an annex involves an amendment to this Protocol, that annex or amendment to an annex shall not enter into force until such time as the amendment to this Protocol enters into force.

Amendments to Annexes A and B to this Protocol shall be adopted and enter into force in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 20, provided that any amendment to Annex B shall be adopted only with the written consent of the Party concerned.

For the purposes of this Article, "the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990 of the Parties included in Annex I" means the amount communicated on or before the date of adoption of this Protocol by the Parties included in Annex I in their first national communications submitted in accordance with Article 12 of the Convention.

Article 22 1. Each Party shall have one vote, except as provided for in paragraph 2 below. 2. Regional economic integration organizations, in matters within their competence, shall exercise their right to vote with a number of votes equal to the number of their member States that are Parties to this Protocol. Such an organization shall not exercise its right to vote if any of its member States exercises its right, and vice versa.

For each State or regional economic integration organization that ratifies, accepts or approves this Protocol or accedes thereto after the conditions set out in paragraph 1 above for entry into force have been fulfilled, this Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day following the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

For the purposes of this Article, any instrument deposited by a regional economic integration organization shall not be counted as additional to those deposited by

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States members of the organization.

Other

Article 26 No reservations may be made to this Protocol. Article 27 1. At any time after three years from the date on which this Protocol has entered into force for a Party, that Party may withdraw from this Protocol by giving written notification to the Depositary. 2. Any such withdrawal shall take effect upon expiry of one year from the date of receipt by the Depositary of the notification of withdrawal, or on such later date as may be specified in the notification of withdrawal. 3. Any Party that withdraws from the Convention shall be considered as also having withdrawn from this Protocol. Article 28 The original of this Protocol, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. DONE at Kyoto this eleventh day of December one thousand nine hundred and ninetyseven. IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized to that effect, have affixed their signatures to this Protocol on the dates indicated. Annex

Industrial processes Mineral products Chemical industry Metal production Other production Production of halocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride Consumption of halocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride Other Solvent and other product use Agriculture Enteric fermentation Manure management Rice cultivation Agricultural soils Prescribed burning of savannas Field burning of agricultural residues Other Waste Solid waste disposal on land Wastewater handling Waste incineration Other

Greenhouse gases Carbon dioxide (C02) Methane (CH4) Nitrous oxide (N20) Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) Perfluorocarbons (PFCs) Sulphur hexafluoride (SF6) Sectors/source categories Energy Fuel combustion Energy industries Manufacturing industries and construction Transport Other sectors Other Fugitive emissions from fuels Solid fuels Oil and natural gas

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Annex B Party

Quantified emission limitation or reduction commitment (percentage of base year or period) 108 92 92 92 94 95 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 94 110 92 92 94 92 92 92 92 92 92 100 101 94 92 92 100 92 92 92 92 92 100 92

Australia Austria Belgium Bulgaria* Canada Croatia* Czech Republic* Denmark Estonia* European Community Finland France Germany Greece Hungary* Iceland Ireland Italy Japan Latvia* Liechtenstein Lithuania* Luxembourg Monaco Netherlands New Zealand Norway Poland* Portugal Romania* Russian Federation* Slovakia* Slovenia* Spain Sweden Switzerland Ukraine* United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland United States of America 93 * Countries that are undergoing the process of transition to a market economy.

The Colombo Declaration on the South Asia Co-operative Environment Programme (SACEP) The Meeting of Ministers to Initiate the South Asia Co-operative Environment Programme (SACEP) At Colombo on 25th February, 1981. Having considered the report of the South Asia Co-operative Environment Programme (SACEP) Intergovernmental Expert Group Meeting convened at Bangalore, March, 1980, Having further considered the report and recommendations of the Meeting of Officials to Initiate the South Asia Co-operative Environment Programme (SACEP) held at Colombo, 18-21 February 1981, Noting the possibilities of the occurrence of severe ecological disequilibrium and the threat of environmental degradation in the Region, Noting also the warm support of their countries in the aims and aspirations of the proposed Programme, as expressed at the foregoing meetings, in contacts among themselves and with UNEP, and the wealth of capability and expertise available within the Region, Noting in addition the offer of the Government of Sri Lanka to provide the facilities for the Secretariat of SACEP, the offers of the Governments of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Iran, Pakistan and Sri Lanka to serve as Focal Points for Programme development and implementation in selected subject areas, and the interest shown by the Governments of Bhutan, Burma, Maldives and Nepal, Conscious of the readiness of their countries to co-operate and extend mutual assistance to each other in matters of environmental concern, to contribute through the application of their resources, to the work of the Focal Points and, in the case of Sri Lanka, to the Secretariat of SACEP, Taking note of the active interest and possibilities of support from various donor countries, international financing institutions, agencies and bodies, Recognising the pioneering nature of the proposed co-operative programme and the organisational arrangements thereto,

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Commending the significant contribution and imaginative initiative of the Director of the Regional Office of UNEP as noted by the Bangalore Meeting and the Meeting of Officials at Colombo, Appreciating the firm support and encouragement extended by the Executive Director of UNEP in this regard, Declares: 1 Its decision to establish a co-operative programme to be known as the South Asia Co-operative Environment Programme; 2. Its endorsement of the agreed institutional arrangements, the over-all programme content, and technical co-operation and the financing arrangements; 3. Its resolve to sustain, strengthen, and utilise to the fullest, for the benefit of the peoples of their countries, the agreed programme and the arrangements for its implementation; 4. Its intention to foster the Programme as essential for the promotion of human welfare, development and amelioration of poverty in the region; 5. Its commitment to work out a harmonious balance between the process of development and resources of nature; 6. Its conviction that this Programme and the co-operative arrangements thereto, could provide a valuable basis for mutual cooperation, in the fields of social and economic development; Calls upon: 1. The interested donor states, international financing institutions, agencies and other bodies to extend their support readily and in imaginative and concrete terms, keeping in mind the importance of maintaining the momentum in implementing a Programme of such far-ranging significance; 2. The United Nations system, UNDP in particular and UNEP, to assist SACEP, as required, with financial support, technical assistance, information, and guidance in the implementation of the Programme;

The Little Green Data Book (2007) by The World Bank (Excerpts of the statistics for the South Asian Region)

The member states of the SACEP region to see in these a worthy cause with goals and objectives fully capable of attainment through their common perceptions, friendly cooperation and mutual assistance

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