Interstate Conflicts in South Asia by South Asian Media Net

South Asian Free Media Association, India

Interstate Conflicts in South Asia October 9-10, 2004, New Delhi

Acknowledgement A large number of individuals, institutions and organisations have contributed to the success of this conference. SAFMA wishes to place on record its thanks and gratitude to all of them. The Prime Minister Mr Manmohan Singh, Congress president Ms Sonia Gandhi, leader of the opposition in Lok Sabha, Mr L.K. Advani, sent messages of encouragement and support. These will stand SAFMA in good stead in the pursuit of its goals. The Minister of External Affairs, Mr. K. Natwar Singh, deserves thanks for his inaugural address and his overview of the challenges facing the countries of South Asia which set the pace for the deliberations of the conference. Mr Jaswant Singh and Mr Yashwant Sinha of the BJP, who served as External Affairs Minister in the Vajpayee-led government, Mr Salman Khushid, former minister of state for external affairs, Mr Jaghmohan, former minister in the NDA government, enlivened the debate with their incised observations. A special vote of thanks is for scholars, journalists, civil servants, activists, students and academics who participated in this conference. Their interventions accounted for the depth and liveliness of the discussions. The individuals who worked behind the scene to ensure the smooth functioning of the conference include those of the central secretariat of SAFMA, those involved in SAFMA activities in India, the staff of Press Institute of India and the staff of the Ashok Hotel. Their efficiency, hard work and dedication are worthy of our warmest gratitude. To every one who took part in this conference SAFMA, taking a cue from an old Indian saying, I say: You came here as guests, you bid farewell as friends. Friendship begets trust and trust begets what all of us yearn for, stability, peace and prosperity for our people who represent one fifth of human kind. Dileep Padgaonkar Vice President of SAFMA, India

Prime Minister MESSAGE I am delighted to learn that the annual convention of the South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA) is being held in New Delhi this month. This conference provides an open platform for journalists of all opinions from South Asia to meet and exchange ideas on increasing regional cooperation. Creating a neighbourhood of peace and stability is a high priority of our government. In this effort media can play a substantial and critical role by shaping ideas that can overcome the burden of past perceptions. We would like to encourage the free flow of ideas and people to help us shed prejudices and develop an appreciation of the existing ground realities. To this end we liberalized our visa rules for journalists from Pakistan to visit India. I am glad that has yielded concrete results. I am pleased that this conference is taking place just a few days after a visit to the State of Jammu and Kashmir by a group of journalists from Pakistan. South Asia still remains one of the world's less developed regions despite our advantages. Our individual and collective struggle to march forward on the road to development has been impaired by weak intra-regional cooperation, compounded by mutual suspicion. I hope your conference also devotes attention to improving regional economic cooperation for the benefit of all our peoples. I wish the conference all success and extend my best wishes to all participants. New Delhi October 6, 2004

(Manmohan Singh)

Sonia Gandhi, President

ALL INDIA CONGRESS COMMITTEE

MESSAGE I am glad to know of the plans of South Asian Free Media Association to hold a regional conference on interstate conflicts in South Asia. This is in keeping with SAFMA's role in the promotion of peace, cooperation and free flow of information in the region. The United Progressive Alliance gives the highest priority, to quote its Common Minimum Programme, to "building closer political, economic and other ties with the neighbours in South Asia and to strengthening SAARC." I, therefore, welcome the move by SAFMA to focus on ways to address interstate conflicts. The resolution of conflicts through peaceful means is an essential pre-requisite for strengthening the manifold ties among the countries of the area. In the past, the Congress Party and the governments led by it took several steps to resolve conflicts through bilateral efforts and other means. That continues to be its motto and its policy. I congratulate the India chapter of SAFMA for its latest initiative.

L. K. Advani Leader of Opposition (Lok Sabha)

MESSAGE South Asia occupies an important position on the world map. Its economic, social and religious activities get noticed by all. A cohesive and united South Asia could pose an unbeatable challenge to the rest of world. Interstate conflicts in this region have marred its prospects of progress to a great extent. I am happy that an effort is being made to resolve interstate conflicts in South Asia under the auspices of South Asian Free Media Association. I commend SAFMA for their role in promoting peace, regional cooperation and better understanding. I congratulate SAFMA for organizing the regional conference and wish them all success in their endeavours.

(L. K. Advani)

iii

Building Edifice of Peace K. K. Katyal Welcome to this very exciting conference of South Asian Free Media Association. Exciting both in the context of the objective reality in the region and evolution of SAFMA's agenda. We, the organisers, feel elated over association with the romance of peace and cooperation in a region that witnessed the dance of death and destruction. Four years ago, a new organisation, SAFMA, appeared on the media horizon. Its contours were hazy. That was because those responsible for conceiving and implementing a bold idea had mixed feeling -confidence, on the one hand, trepidation, on the other. The organisers of SAFMA had a clear vision and missionary spirit. But they were also conscious of the gigantic nature of the two-fold task they had undertaken - to work for freedom of media and access to information in the countries of South Asia and the resolve to lobby with the national governments for removing barriers in the way of free flow of information and for ensuring unhindered movement of media persons and media products. There was no dearth of sceptics - in the ruling establishments, among politicians and media persons themselves. The well-meaning sections of the civil society, too, made no secret of their reservations. "Media persons", they wondered, "were themselves the villains. They were largely responsible for causing distrust, misunderstandings, for spreading disinformation. How come they talk of the virtues of press freedom and free flow of information". The organisers remained undaunted and went about their job. Their persistence was rewarded. SAFMA's outline on the media horizon became clear. It was accorded recognition by SAARC and,

with that, it got a higher profile. Senior leaders of the governments in the region expressed support and sympathy for the causes espoused by SAFMA, though these sentiments were not translated into policy decisions and actions on the ground. The media persons in India and Pakistan were the worst sufferers of the restrictive regime, adopted by them. Imagine the ironies it produced. Journalists from all over the world could visit the sub-continent without much ado but those from this area did not have easy access to each other's countries. They got only cityspecific visas, entitling them to entry into the municipal limits excluding cantonment areas. In Delhi or Rawalpindi and Islamabad, as you know, it is simply not possible to stick to this demarcation - one doesn't know where the cantonment area begins and where it ends. Violation of the visa regime is, thus, built in the system. The foreign ministers of the two countries recently announced their resolve to relax the curbs in part. In pursuance of this, New Delhi came out with certain measures and a reciprocatory gesture from Islamabad is considered certain. But even this is a far cry from the demand for visa-free regime and free movement of media persons and products - books, journals, newspapers - contained in the draft protocol commended by SAFMA for the consideration of SAARC leaders. As such, the struggle will have to be continued at various levels - in dealings with the governments of the member-countries and the SAAARC secretariat. A very small dent has been made and, as such, there is room for some satisfaction but not for euphoria. Soon after SAFMA's formation, its organiser's became aware of another problem - the heavy baggage of entrenched political animosities, the play of divisive factors, chauvinistic trends and postures. This led to the

realisation that SAFMA would do well to broaden the sphere of its activities. Media-related issues, of course, were to remain its major concern but it had also to take note of the political and social context in which it operated. There was an intense internal debate on whether SAFMA, a media body, ought to strictly confine itself to the problems and challenges facing the profession or whether it had to move into the political arena as well. In the end, a middle path was favoured. Without involving itself into specific disputes and problems, SAFMA, chose to throw its weight towards positive, constructive reconciliatory processes in the face of manifold controversies and conflicts. At its Rawalpindi meeting this year, SAFMA welcomed "the wave of confidence-building, reconciliation and peace moves in the region and steps being taken by the governments to resolve their differences and disputes through peaceful means and the proposals to widen and deepen economic cooperation between SAARC countries". The declaration adopted there was significant on various counts. On the one hand, it spoke of political problems between India and Pakistan both of which, it was noted, were victims of terrorism and called for an integrated, uninterruptible, inter-sector composite and result-oriented dialogue. Also mentioned were the ethnic problem in Sri Lanka, the issue of Bhutanese refugees and Nepal situation. On the other, it focussed on "our duties as citizens and opinionmakers in the region to promote peace, eradicate terrorism and violence and religious extremism and communalism". It also stressed the importance of freedom, democracy, pluralism, human rights, including the rights of women, minorities and the dispossessed. The present conference and its theme - resolution of inter-state conflicts in South Asia in the region is to be seen in this context. The agenda drawn up is

A mixed audience at a session

comprehensive, covering as it does the India-Pakistan problem, Kashmir, Siachen, Sir Creek etc, stabilization of the nuclear regime, ethnic issue in Sri Lanka, the irritants in Indo-Bangladesh relations and the human cost of conflicts. The contribution by experts is certain to go a long way in clarifying the thinking on these subjects and, in turn, help policymakers in the SAARC capitals to take appropriate decisions and forge appropriate instruments. There is a logic behind the choice of the subjects for discussion by regional meetings. SAFMA discussed media and peace at the Kathmandu, media and democracy and regional cooperation at the Bangladesh conferences and now inter-state conflicts in the region. Next month at Colombo we will address the problems of intra-state conflicts and, soon after, the regional conference in Lahore will focus on reconciliation processes. The idea is to build, brick by brick, the edifice of peace and cooperation. The story of media-related activities by SAFMA will not be complete without a reference to the website, which makes available a rich fare of news and views, special articles and backgrounders, culled out from the daily papers from the SAARC countries. It is a boon for scholars, researchers, journalists and students of the region. South Asian Journal, a scholarly, analytical and investigative journal, a quarterly, helps to build intellectual bridges in the region. For too long we had seen our region from the prisms of western scholars. The SAFMA quarterly enables scholars from our region to focus on issues and problems from the South Asian perspective. Sky is the limit for cooperation among South Asian countries - which could cover trade, customs, energy, investment flow, economic ties. The present conference is certain to be a major step towards the laudable goal of peace, cooperation and conciliation in the region. K.K. Katyal is the President of SAFMA lndia Chapter

Contents Message from Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India

Possibilities of Indo-Pak Peace Salman Khurshid

Message from Sonia Gandhi, President of Congress Party

Bipartisan Consensus on Peace Yashwant Sinha

Indo-Pak Relations: Present and Future Najmuddin A. Shaikh

Legal View: Wullar, Siachin and Sir Creek Ahmer Bilal Soofi

Sir Creek and Siachen Issues S. K. Lambah

Human Security Vs Military Security Riyaz Punjabi

Message from iii L. K. Advani, Leader of Opposition, Lok Sabha Building Edifice of Peace K. K. Katyal

Dilemma of Conflict Resolution Imtiaz Alam

Prospering Together Shri Kunwar Natwar Singh, External Affairs Minister of India

South Asia's Unresolved Disputes Khaled Ahmed

Session III: Siachen, Sir Creek and Tulbul

Bangladesh India Relations Convergence and Discord Abul Ahsan

Towards Peace in Kashmir Prem Shankar Jha

Engaging Kashmiris Ved Bhasin

Developing Closer Indo-Bangladesh Relations I.P.Khosla

Kashmir and Indo-Pakistan Dialogue Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi

Session I Indo-Bangladesh Relations Ashish Chakraborty

17 Reporting Kashmir Dileep Padgaonkar

Stabilization of Nuclear Regime Moeed Yusuf

Sri Lankan Peace Process and India M.R. Narayan Swamy

Dilemmas of Deterrence Theory and Security Claims Achin Vanaik

Session IV: Sri Lankan Peace Process

Missed Opportunities Jaswant Singh

Session II: Stabilisation of Nuclear Regime in South Asia

Declaration

India Nepal Relations Krishna V Rajan

Time for New Thrust Dr Bishnu Hari Nepal

Resolution of Interstate Conflicts in South Asia

India's External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh inaugurates South Asian Free Media Association's Regional Conference on Interstate Conflicts in South Asia with a symbolic lighting of the lamp of hope. SAFMA President Reazuddin Ahmed, SAFMA Secretary-General Imtiaz Alam, Indian Chapter President KK Katyal, General Secretary Vinod Sharma, Sri Lankan Chapter President NM Ameen happily look on.

SAFMA Secretary General Imtiaz Alam speaks about the theme and objectives of the conference as Dr Bishnu Hari Nepal, Khaled Ahmed, Vinod Sharma, Sanjaya Baru, Natwar Singh, KK Katyal and Reazuddin Ahmed listen

Dilemma of Conflict Resolution Imtiaz Alam The theme of the conference warrants frank analysis of the dilemma South Asia faces with regard to: Conflict resolution and economic cooperation: if the first-dispute resolution approach is followed, then economic cooperation suffers; and if the track of economic cooperation is pursued, then disputes are pushed to the back-burner which doesn't allow the agenda of cooperation move. What is quite disturbing is that efforts to solve differences do not move in a spiral, they tend to regress or break up. Then how can South Asia jointly move to face the challenges it faces? So far, South Asia has not been able to resolve inter and intrastate disputes that threaten its peace and impede the prospects of regional cooperation. There are perennial disputes that continue to fuel hostility that, in turn, give birth to ancillary conflicts which further complicate the prospects of conflict management and prohibit progress on the economic agenda envisaged by South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The past, and the current, mutually exclusive approaches to either dominate the region while ignoring the concerns of immediate small neighbors, or looking beyond it to counterbalance the immediate 'hegemon' did not help forge understanding in the region, nor will they in future. While India abhors third party mediation, bilateralism should have provided a palpable alternative. No doubt, India holds the centre, so should have it responded to its responsibilities. The best approach is to

simultaneously tackle disputes without making regional/bilateral economic cooperation a hostage to the disputes. Conflict management, confidence building and resolution of ancillary issues will create necessary conditions to settle the major disputes among and within the states. The governments and the parties to the conflict have been under tremendous domestic and international pressure to find amicable solutions to their conflicts, especially in a changing regional, ecological and global environment. The states of South Asia need to jointly face the challenges, such as low river-water discharges, natural disasters, like the recent Tsunami, and global trade disparities, in order to prevent the birth of a new inward-looking era in which each state fends for itself in the face of problems that can essentially be handled collectively. A new regional understanding of the riparian issues is essential to resolve water disputes between India and its two neighbors, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal. While regional riparian statutes are obligatory, Helsinki Convention envisages upstream and downstream rights. The reconciliation processes and negotiations will not last, if they are not even-handed, attuned to the priorities of the parties to the conflict and phased out in a manner that the interlocutors continue to benefit from them. The slow pace of negotiations between India and Pakistan,

suspension of the negotiation process between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), failure to initiate reconciliation with the Maoists in Nepal and reversal of democratic process by the King, inability of New Deli and Dhaka in putting together a comprehensive negotiation framework to iron out their differences is causing despair among the people who have suffered too long due to these conflicts. Despite favorable domestic opinion and international persuasion, no substantive breakthrough is visible on any of inter or intra state dispute in the region. This is a matter of extreme concern that Indo-Pak composite dialogue continues to be informed by subjective rigidities of the two sides. Although, the composite dialogue process between India and Pakistan has entered its second round and both the governments have reiterated not to let the reconciliation process get derailed, it needs to be made more productive and free from acrimony. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh underlined the need to think â&#x20AC;&#x153;out of the boxâ&#x20AC;?, which gave some hope, but it is yet to be translated into new approaches. On the other hand, Islamabad is so impatient about the process that if it doesn't get the prompt solutions to its pressing issues, it sees no sense in continuing with the process. This makes the process vulnerable to the failure on one issue or the other. If Islamabad has used its right to go to the World Bank on Baglihar Dam, why should it allow its negative fallout extend to the composite dialogue? Similarly, why should India or Pakistan try to settle the strategic Kashmir issue by overloading the tactical issue of Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus, a CBM? Or why should Islamabad attach a long list of conditions to granting New Delhi the MFN status, with the exception of the issue of tariffs? Or why should India brings in a plethora of hiccups to scuttle the chances of a gas pipeline from Iran and Pakistan to India? (Thanks to the flexibility shown by the two sides, India and Pakistan have agreed to allow

Muzafafrabad Srinagar Bus link and the gas pipeline has got the political clearance.) Indo-Pak peace process will not move forward without replacing the respective nationalist ideologies of enmity with a New Paradigm of DĂŠtente that view bilateralism as mutually reinforcing and equally rewarding. India, the regional power, and Pakistan, a pivotal state, need to evolve a partnership in economic and strategic affairs within and beyond the region. This would require approaching the outstanding issues with flexibility of approach and innovation, especially with regard to Jammu & Kashmir. The lesser differences should be quickly resolved to create an environment favorable to a process that may essentially result in the resolution of the main issue. The joint statements of January 6 and September 24, 2004, ask for stopping cross-border infiltration, and repression by respective states, exploring all possible options on Kashmir to find a solution to the satisfaction of the parties to the conflict-- above all the peoples of Jammu and Kashmir. They, simultaneously, call for normalization of relations, taking confidence-building measures and expanding areas of possible cooperation. Kashmir is the most difficult issue to resolve, but it has to be resolved. Indeed, it will take much more time than Islamabad thinks. Then why make the whole gambit of relations a hostage to one issue that can neither help resolve it. And if some people in India and Pakistan think that old ways can work, that will be fatal for the subcontinent. Just not Indo-Pak relations that are vital to South Asian progress towards an economic union, relations between India and other neighbors are also very crucial for regional amity. Indo-Bangladesh relations are passing through yet another uneasy phase of tension, although the recent agreement on Myanmar-Bangladesh-India gas pipeline sets an encouraging example. It seems that New Delhi's complaints of Dhaka's alleged 'help' to militants from India's north-east and Bangladesh's concern over India's 'refusal' to correct the trade imbalance and differences over the river-linking project by New Delhi have strained their

Shri Natwar Singh asks Imtiaz Alam to also shed light on his visit to Jammu and Kashmir which he undertook before the conference along with 16 journalists from Pakistan.

relations. While India should do more to remove tariff barriers on exports from Bangladesh and take Dhaka into confidence over the river-linking project, both the countries must take each other's security concerns more seriously and prevent cross-border hostilities. On this count Pakistan must remove Indian suspicions that it is in any way fishing in the troubled waters of its North-East. The political conflict in Sri Lanka, that has assumed an ethnic form due to the marginalization and exclusion of ethnic minorities, cannot be resolved with a mindset of an already defined majoritarian state. Nor can a distinct Tamil political identity in north-eastern region be recognized, without ensuring equality to other ethnic and religious minorities, territorial integrity of the state and stopping human rights violation from all sides and guaranteeing the rights of minorities. In the interim, the Ceasefire Agreement of 2002 needs to be strengthened and the urgent needs of the people of the war zone, including the minorities, necessitate the establishment of an interim administrative structure without further delay. The current havoc caused by Tsunami demand joint efforts by the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government.

South Asian Journal being presented to Mr Natwar Singh

Given a very serious crisis in Nepal, it is time to review the Indo-Nepal Treaty of 1950 and the Letters exchanged in 1950 and 1965 and the constitution of the country. There is a need to effectively regulate Nepal-India border to stop cross-border activities that are detrimental to peace and security of the two counties. However, the Maoist conflict cannot be solved militarily and, therefore, calls for a negotiated settlement that can happen only if the parliamentary forces reach a consensus to bring the constitutional process back on the rail and the Maoists are brought on board to settle the conflict on a democratic basis. There is an urgent need to stop violence and violations of human rights by the security forces and the Maoists. Almost whole of South Asia awaits solutions to disputes in order to tackle the real ailments. This is quite disappointing that certain sections of establishments, media and societies are still embedded to the so-called 'national consensus' that are one-sided and exclusionary. As if not enough, the pretext of inter or intrastate conflicts or 'war against terrorism' is being used to clip civil liberties, introduce draconian laws and suppress democratic aspirations of the people. The time is not for perpetuating conflicts, it is to settle them. The leaders of South Asia need to think â&#x20AC;&#x153;out of the boxâ&#x20AC;? while not remaining in the box.

Prospering Together Shri Kunwar Natwar Singh, External Affairs Minister of India I am happy to be here to interact with this conclave of South Asian journalists. In the four years of its functioning, SAFMA has developed a reputation as a forum that generates new ideas and is committed to implementing them. The fact that the SAFMA Conference today is discussing the politically sensitive issue of conflicts in our region, and the recent decision for exchange of visits by Indian and Pakistani journalists indicates that SAFMA has taken off rather smoothly. Although the 21st century has begun, it has not had an auspicious beginning. Now there is a glimmer of hope on the Indo-Pak arena. The history, politics and diversity of our region raises several difficult but pertinent questions for the media. We have a huge deficit of information about each other. On the other hand, misinformation and negative perceptions of each other have accumulated over the decades. Both are linked directly to the issue of access to information and media products. Another challenge is how we can keep pace with the galloping technological development in the information and technological fields.

The role, or should I say intrusion, of the media in our functioning is now irreversible. One has to learn to accept this reality. There is hence a greater need for structured and regular exchange of media professionals. This could include annual conferences of editors from SAARC countries as well as frequent exchanges between younger journalists, including training exchanges. On India-Pakistan relations, we are making steady progress. India is committed to moving ahead with the Composite Dialogue. Today, the climate that characterises India-Pakistan relations is significantly different as compared to 2002. The two sides have been able to identify the areas of convergence and future cooperation. As you are aware, Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh had a constructive and cordial meeting with President Musharraf in New York at the UN General Assembly, on September 24, 2004. Both agreed to restore normalcy and cooperation, and implement confidence-building measures. Prime Minister also agreed to look at the possibility of a gas pipeline via Pakistan to India in the larger context of expanding trade and economic relations between the two countries. We remain committed to deepening our engagement.

However, the whole process is critically dependent on the fulfillment of President Musharraf's reassurance of January 6, 2004 not to permit any territory under Pakistan's control to be used to support terrorism in any manner. In many aspects, our subcontinent is unique. Bounded by the Himalayas and the Indian Ocean, we can develop a coherent economic space where each region and country can be proud of its individual contribution, and an exceptional, multifaceted identity that easily merges and changes from one village to another, and then from one country to another, without resort to conflict or confrontation. This augurs well for us all. Television in all our countries has burgeoned over the last two decades, and perhaps, as a region, our TV growth could be the fastest in the world. The media now constitutes a resource for education, development and reform. Information and communication technologies are beginning to transform life in our villages, bringing news and knowledge to millions. Information is an empowering resource, the means for us to exchange experiences on best practices in our many paths to development. But there is also the negative media reality sensationalizing and trivializing of grave and complex issues. Economic development through closer integration is not the chant of a few. Our people and our media must broadband our communication to cover regional political, economic, security and cultural matters. It must talk of issues pertaining to collaborative opportunities in communications, agriculture, energy, water, education and health. This is not information from one country that will swamp another. It is merely showing respect to the economic and information needs of the people of this vast subcontinent. It is admitting that we can prosper together, for we are one geopolitical region, a region of extraordinary and interwoven cultures, languages and lifestyles.

permanent activity. Free movement of media persons and products is not merely about taking information to the people. In this information age, the people are our umpires, as they are entitled to be. We all agree with the urgent need to free the movement of media and media products within the region. But we hesitate when we actually come to implementing supportive measures. The biggest non-tariff barrier we encounter in this process is the suspicion in our minds. We are not protecting our respective economic interests by these unfounded apprehensions. We are not always safeguarding our respective cultures. We are only limiting opportunities for better understanding among ourselves, for our growth. Our region needs its own version of the BBC, CNN or Al Jazeera. India is keen to support the process of free movement of media and media products within the region. Today India is for all practical purposes completely open to the flow of media products from outside. We are working towards removing the few restrictions that remain. The Government of India has been continuously working for the liberalization of the grant of visas, to Pakistani nationals, including journalists. During my meeting with SAFMA on 22nd July 2004 at Islamabad, I had promised multiple entry visas to the SAFMA office bearers for a period of one year. I am glad that we have been able to implement this. On September 18, 2004 we had unilaterally announced that journalists with a minimum of three years of accreditation with national or international media of repute could be issued multiple entry visas, and with exemption from reporting to the police. I am happy that this too has been done. The intimacy of village life of the centuries past has been

In general, we have not stopped transnational media organisations, people and products from entering our countries. Why then do we raise barriers against ourselves? The irony is that misinformation emanating from outside the region, finds its way to our own newspapers and television channels. The damage sometimes is serious. Misunderstandings multiply. Rumours take precedence over accuracy. Opinions are paraded as facts. Damage control becomes a semi-

Vinod Kumar Sharma accompanies the chief guest, Mr Natwar Singh, to the conference hall

replaced by a new intimacy of communication across space. Freedom is not just therefore the right of media persons to express their opinions as representing that of the populace. The media is not about a one way flow of information, as it was in the age of newspapers and radio broadcasting. In the regional context, we have repeatedly articulated our interest in a South Asian Common Information Space. SAARC media representatives, as indeed the larger public should be able to visit each other freely and travel across the length and breadth of our countries. The capabilities embodied in the new technology make it interactive. The information world is hence abandoning the format of the society and the spectacle. We now have multiple directions of information and opinion flows. Participation replaces representation in an interactive age, and is, hence, the best guarantor of democracy. The 'seer' is as important as the 'spectacle' in the electronic marketplace, and everyone is increasingly able to participate freely in the production and consumption of media products. At nominal cost, a new singer in Lahore can load her songs on the Internet so to be heard in Manchester, and a high-school student in Kanpur can offer Californian companies his expertise in upgrading and maintaining their websites. They are also media people creating media products. Then, who and what are we trying to stop? Eventually technology is championing the real struggle for media freedom. Let us open our markets to each other's films, educational and entertainment products such as audio and video CDs and DVDs The Indian entertainment industry is, undoubtedly, very large in comparison to the others in the SAARC region. But even this industry is ever hungry for new ideas and inspiration. This presents collaboration opportunities that open up the markets for all SAARC countries. The education and entertainment industries have great power to bring our people closer together. Bollywood is a spectacular example. Shah Rukh Khan this week adorns the cover of Time Magazine. In the past, the melody of a Rafi or a Noorjehan wafted across our frontiers to a common heartbeat. In the eighties, there was not a video parlour in North India that did not stock copies of Pakistan's all-time great television serials like Dhundh and Waris. Let us not, so much later in the day, still hinder one from enjoying

another's creativity, or joining with the other to find fresh and inspiring expression. If we do so, piracy and other forms of copyright violations will deny legitimate returns to our media operatives and inhibit their growth in an environment where powerful global companies virtually control information and its channels. We should work to ensure that the talent, content and the technology of this enterprising subcontinent are jointly exploited, so that we create a powerful South Asian entertainment industry --- one that can advance our region and influence the world. Our balance sheet is not all negative, however. There are several positive factors and trends. The imperatives of technology and inter-connectedness, the compelling and mutually beneficial logic of regional cooperation and the intense and growing desire of the people of our region for friendship, peace and economic development are the most prominent among these. Also, our region has gradually but surely emerged as an important player in the global revolution in information and communications. The talents of our people have in fact played a leading role in this process and our culture has enriched it. It is only fair that the benefits of this progress should reach us as well. The media has a twin task. It needs to nurture the spirit of cooperation and at the same time counter negative perceptions. This can only be achieved by operating within a framework of empathy, and by looking at issues with the sensibilities of the other. A responsible projection of issues which avoids dramatization and rejects stereotypes is an essential requirement of this process. This is where I see SAFMA playing a seminal role. SAFMA is a forum that provides an opportunity for close interaction in a cooperative framework between media persons of diverse political cultures, varied economies and societies. I would end by saying that the people of South Asia are politically mature and aware. Let us not rate them unthinkingly compliant, and ready to forever accept what is fed to them. Disinformation, misperceptions and prejudices may hold sway for a while, and do some damage. But eventually, our people know how to sift and process information, how to interpret messages they receive, and eventually their collective wisdom perceives the truth.

Khaled Ahmed

Keynote address by Khaled Ahmed, Executive Editor, The Friday Times

South Asia's Unresolved Disputes States located in South Asia have taken longer than expected in overcoming their mutual suspicion and relating to one another as a bloc. Inter-state hostility has lingered in the region while in Southeast Asia, the states of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) have overcome far more complex hurdles to successfully activate a regional trading bloc. On the other hand, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has not taken off because of bilateral impediments. Politicians are often heard saying that regional disputes should be resolved first. Outside observers and a growing community of intellectuals in South Asia recommend that regional disputes should be isolated to pave the way for a regionally active SAARC. The negative jurisprudence of old and simmering disputes has shaped national politics in the region; and its inhabitants are too deeply indoctrinated in it to allow their governments to move to a new paradigm of relations. The recent official dialogue between India and Pakistan has aroused familiar misgivings. Democracy may indeed be a complicating factor in the most important triangle

of the region: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh. Physical imperatives of the region place India in the centre of the problem. It abuts on almost all the South Asian states while these states are separated from one another by natural features or Indian territory. India has a complex and troubled relationship with Pakistan, giving rise to the development of country-specific nationalisms on both sides. It began with the single territorial dispute of Kashmir in 1948, but after half a century and three wars, more disputes have emerged in a cumulative negative process. The pattern constantly anticipates further proliferation of disputes in the future rather than their isolation in favour of resolution. So far the tendency to gestate and produce new disputes has been more prominent than the effort to settle them. Because India is the upper riparian state, bilateral tensions are beginning to focus more urgently on water than on territory. The current movement towards normalisation of relations between the two states is underpinned by efforts to resolve the bilateral disputes. The process highlights the tension between the instinct to settle the disputes in accordance with the nationalist interpretation placed on their evolution, on the one hand, and the international persuasion to bring about a new cooperative mode of state behaviour, on the other. India's relations with Bangladesh tend to fluctuate while the bilateral disputes remain un-tackled. As the upper riparian state, India is increasingly seen in Bangladesh as

the enemy that wants to squeeze its traditional water resources. Hundreds of border enclaves left over from the 1947 boundary demarcation have not been streamlined and continue to give bilateral trouble. Bangladesh has problems with India in the Bay of Bengal, much exacerbated by a disputed silt island in the Bay. This dispute, impacting on maritime delineations of territorial waters and economic zones, is remarkably similar to the Sir Creek dispute India has with Pakistan. Bangladesh's nationalism has become bifurcated between the traditional 'painful birth' syndrome, which makes it anti-Pakistan; and the constitutional Islamisation of the state, which makes it anti-India. A two-party system, which should normally stabilise the electoral system in a democracy, actually weakens the state because of the violently polarised Bengali and Bangladeshi nationalisms espoused by the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh National Party (BNP). After a much disputed effort made in the 1990s by upper-riparian India to resolve the river water disputes with Bangladesh, the new millennium has seen new tensions rather than cooperation between the two neighbours. Sri Lanka has feared India because of its 'minority complex' vis-Ă -vis the 65 million Tamils that live in the Indian state of India. It began by seeking settled maritime boundaries with India in the Palk Strait and Gulf of Mannar, then put its diplomatic pressure behind the creation of a UN-backed Zone of Peace in the Indian Ocean as an instrument of national security. Sri Lanka tried to avoid linkages within the region as a means of achieving security. It was lukewarm about its membership of SAARC and sought extra-regional relations with the ASEAN states. Yet out of all the states in the region, Sri Lanka has behaved more like a state of the future. It has rationalised its relations with 'hegemonic' India and moved more successfully in the direction of bilateral

Two editors from Pakistan, Mujeebur Rahman Shami and Athar Nadeem

free trade with it than states have within the SAARC framework. It looked at the 1987 Indian military intervention with suspicion but then saw the withdrawal of the Indian troops from its territory in 1989. In the eyes of many Sri Lankans, after having failed to negotiate an independent position for itself, Sri Lanka implicitly acknowledged India's predominance before signing the 1987 agreement that brought the Indian troops to Sri Lanka. Together with Sri Lanka, Nepal has a history of interacting with India before 1947 as an independent state. It has accepted the suzerainty of the 'Indian empire' in the past, which it continues to do subliminally today in a bilateral framework that it seeks also to challenge. Economically dominated and much weakened by cross-border movement of populations, it has sought to balance its relations with India by reaching out to China, which India has looked at with suspicion. Nepal views its 1950 security treaty with India with dissatisfaction and would like to renegotiate it. India's own unspoken security doctrine hinges on its strategy of preventing its neighbours from communicating with extra-regional powers. To secure this objective it has signed treaties with Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh, binding the neighbours to 'consult' India as a first resort to counter external security threats rather than allow non-regional 'protectors' to intervene. Some critics have called it the 'India Doctrine' serving as a legal prop to India's hegemony in South Asia. India is the status quo power in South Asia in most discussions relating to the resolution of disputes in the region. India's perception of security compels it to perceive extra-regional threats through the instrumentality of the states situated on its periphery. During the Cold War, when its security perceptions were formed, it acted to prevent the peripheral states from joining up with the wrong ideological camp at the global level. If seen transgressing, it used its status quo advantage as a punitive tool to bring them to heel. As it increasingly perceived threat from China and Pakistan, it used the punitive tool effectively to encourage a certain pattern of behaviour among the peripheral states. From this mode of behaviour emerged more disputes between it and the neighbouring states while the old ones were not resolved as a matter of security policy. However, India's attitude began to change in the 1990s when the Cold War came to an end and India's over-all Nehruvian orientation began to decline. It saw rapid economic growth and was forced to look at the peripheral states more as entities that may assist in the rapid expansion of its economy rather than as rivals. More and more intellectuals in India are trying to persuade the strategic elite in New Delhi to move in the direction of resolution of disputes with the peripheral states in order to

attain the global status India deserves as a nuclear and economic power. There could be unspoken doctrines behind policies that resulted in the non-resolution of disputes. As the upper riparian state, India threatened the lowerriparian Pakistan (East and West Pakistan till 1971) with economic damage through control of waters. As time passed lesser disputes served as disincentives to the pursuit of the large disputes. One can say that in the Indo-Pak equation, smaller disputes were linked by India to the politics of preventing Pakistan from asserting its rights on the Kashmir dispute. The proliferation of disputes after 1947 seems to flow from a policy of actual creation of smaller disputes. Today, Kashmir has come to be labelled as a 'core' dispute by Pakistan in order to prevent it from being enumerated as one of the 'non-core' issues. The 'non-core' disputes have become linked to conditions placed by India on Pakistan's conduct. For instance, disputes can be discussed meaningfully if Pakistan stops its 'crossborder' infiltration of terrorists. In this formulation, the existence of 'non-core' issues can lessen the compulsion of discussing Kashmir as the irreducible quid pro quo for Pakistan's stopping its 'cross-border terrorism'. Today as India and Pakistan once again engage in a 'composite' dialogue, the two sides actually betray their real positions by insisting on two different approaches. Pakistan wants the 'core issue' discussed on priority; India wants it to be a 'basket' among other non-core 'baskets'.

have sought to persuade India to resolve the bilateral disputes through a variety of policies. In all cases, the various strategies of compelling India to come to the negotiating table in a meaningful way have failed. This has in turn resulted in the weakening of the peripheral states, mostly accompanied by instability and internal division. Pakistan took the most dangerous course. It embraced the doctrine of low intensity warfare after 1989 and sought to bring India under pressure as the stronger status quo power through deniable privatised jihad. After a decade of inflicting considerable damage on India, this jihad has subsided amid global condemnation. Pakistan, not able to see the connection of Kashmir jihad with global terrorism, is now a destabilised state while in possession of nuclear weapons. If Bangladesh thought that India's policy over the Ganges waters emanated from its conflict with Pakistan and that the Farakka Dam dispute would be resolved amicably after the creation of Bangladesh under a pro-India government, it was gravely mistaken. India's unwillingness to discuss the dam with Bangladesh before commissioning it has created a great schism in Bangladesh, represented by two violently opposed political parties. The instability of Bangladesh has pushed millions of Bangladeshis into India illegally. The nonresolution of disputes between India and its neighbours appears to be creating a domain of disorder in India's periphery. In the long run this disorder will hinder India's progression towards the status of a big power it wants to be at the global level (Khaled Ahmed is Consulting Editor, Daily Times)

The peripheral states (Bangladesh added after 1971)

(L to R) Vinod Sharma, Sanjiv Barua, Press Secretary to Prime Minister, Imtiaz Alam, Natwar Singh, KK Katyal and Reazuddin Ahmed

Bangladesh-India Relations:

Convergence Discord and

Abul Ahsan Bangladesh and India share about 4100 kilometers of border. Over the years all but 6.5 kilometers have been demarcated. The Nehru-Noon pact of 1956 and particularly Mujib-Indira border agreement of 1974 cover the exchange of enclaves and vacation of areas by the two countries, but the issue remains unresolved. Bangladesh ratified the 1974 agreement within one month of its signing but India could not do so. Similarly Berubari enclave was immediately transferred to India but it took the latter about 18 years to provide a limited corridor to Bangladesh at Tin Bigha to access Dahagram and Angarpotha. People on both sides have been suffering and death and destruction take place regularly. According to Odhikar a Bangladesh human rights watch group as many as 243 innocent civilians got killed in crossfire along the border between 2001 and 2003. The situation has generated tension and misunderstanding between the two countries. India accuses Bangladesh of providing shelter to insurgents from northeastern states and allowing them facilities to operate training camps. Bangladesh denies the allegation. Bangladesh charges India with harboring anti-Bangladesh elements. An allegation about hundreds of thousands illegal immigrants from Bangladesh entering India has added another irritant to Bangladesh-India relations. The matter, however, is

under regular discussion. The two countries also have differences over sharing the flow of water of the 54 international rivers that flow from India into Bangladesh. The rivers are vital for Bangladesh's irrigation, navigation and ecological sustenance. Joint River Commission is discussing the division of water of six common rivers, notably of Teesta, but with little progress. Water is becoming scarce due to a rapid increase in population. Given the growing need of water for agriculture in the two countries, the matter can take a serious turn. Bangladesh has disliked a recent Indian proposal to link 30 major international rivers to divert water to drought-prone southeastern and southwestern parts of India. The project's task force chief Suresh Prabhu says the availability of water in Bangladesh is 12 times higher than in India. Bangladesh's problem is having too much of water during rainy season and shortage of it during winter. The Congress-led Indian government has held out an assurance that nothing would be done without consulting Bangladesh and safeguarding its interest. This is positive. Ganges water division issue was amicably resolved in December 1996 through the signing of a 30-year treaty

THE DUO: Iqbal Sobhan Chaudhary and Enayatullah Khan, Bangladesh

between the two countries. The treaty is serving both the countries well. Through goodwill and mutual accommodation, agreement cannot be reached on the remaining rivers as well. Bangladesh today is a major destination for Indian exports. It ranks 8th and if informal trade is added 3rd in value of India's global export. About one third of Bangladesh's imports come from India. Bangladesh export totals less than $100 million. The deficit varies from year to year but according to one estimate it currently runs as high as about $ 2.7 billion, much to the concern of Bangladeshi people. Trade and industry representatives say India is not doing enough to narrow the trade gap. For example it has not matched the reduction in tariff introduced by Bangladesh since 1990 nor delivered on its commitment to provide Zero tariff concession to 25 items from Bangladesh. They also complain about non-tariff para-tariff and other barriers that hinder exports to India. Substantial part of formal imports from India comprises inputs for export-oriented industries. The deficit largely results from India producing a wide range of products including machineries and intermediate goods which Bangladesh needs as against latter's narrow production base. Bangladesh can increase export to India only if it can widen

production base through investment, and introduce new items to the export list. It can also take advantage of its geographical location factor endowment to its benefit. International oil companies, the World Bank and foreign countries like the United States, have for been urging Bangladesh to sell natural gas to India. There are also suggestions that the country allow pipelines to run through its territory to India to carry gas from gas-rich Indian state of Tripura as well as from the neighboring Myanmar and earn handsome royalties. Other ideas involve providing transit and transshipment facilities to move goods from the mainland India to the seven landlocked northeastern states and back as well as the use of Chittagong seaport. Bangladesh can play as a bridge between South Asia and Southeast Asia to provide land, rail and port facilities to a region comprising Kunming in southwestern China Rakhaine in Myanmar, Nepal, Bhutan and the eastern Indian states. This is also the idea underlying the initiative for the establishment of the South Asia Growth Quadrangle (SAGQ) and BIMSTEC. The agenda of the two growth zones includes development of huge hydroelectric resources of Nepal and Bhutan and the water and other resources of the area to promote development of tourism agriculture industry and navigation. The realization of such a vision will create common stake in peace and co-operation between and among all the countries. Abul Ahsan is a former secretary-general of SAARC

A grand view of the conference

Developing Closer Indo-Bangladesh Relations I.P.Khosla There are two basic elements in the bilateral relationship between India and Bangladesh; first the large difference in size and power, which leads to the neighbours view that India aspires to be a regional hegemon, a dominating power which will bully its way in whichever issue arises. A corollary to this is that India would like to keep the region as an exclusive sphere of influence in its own version of the Monroe doctrine. The second element is the intricacy with which domestic and foreign policy interact in the matter of relations with neighbours.

Issues I) Sharing the Ganges waters The sharing of the Ganges waters is no longer, since the 30-year Treaty was signed in December 1996, as live an issue as it has been. The real problem was confined to a month, or, in the phraseology used in later agreements, three ten days periods from April 11 to May 10 each year. For the rest of the year there was enough for both sides. Second, the needs of India were evolving; upstream requirements were increasing and India's needs were now for the people of UP and Bihar (irrigation) and for the people of Kolkata (reduced salinity); the hydrological compulsion of having to put 40,000 cusecs into the feeder canal were not so strong. Third, the real needs of Bangladesh were considerably smaller or at least more flexible, than had been projected. With this flexibility on both sides about the irreducible

minimum actual (as opposed to demanded) needs it should not have been difficult to reach agreement on technical considerations. In fact the negotiations acquired a jerky, disconnected quality. The absence of agreement during the 1976 and 1977 dry seasons was used by Zia ur Rahman to consolidate his somewhat shaky position. A Bangladesh White Paper of 1976 asserted that the withdrawal of water by India threatened the survival of millions of people of Bangladesh; the media, with official encouragement, referred to it as a conspiracy against the independence and sovereignty of the country; it was taken to the UN with an official complaint to the General Assembly, and to China during an official visit of Zia with the complaint that Bangladesh faced a real threat to her security and sovereignty from Farakka; the leftist leader Maulana Bhashani started a long march to Farakka with thousands of his supporters. In early 1977 Morarji Desai became the prime minister of India, determined to show that Indira Gandhi's policies, especially towards neighbours, had been wrong. Bangladesh scaled down its requirements and agreement was reached within eight months. The final agreement of 1996 was signed in similar circumstances. I.K.Gujral became Foreign Minister under a non-Congress government in June 1996. In the same month Sheikh Hasina became prime minister of Bangladesh. So six months of negotiations were sufficient to arrive at agreement.

ii) Migration The migration of persons from East Pakistan and then Bangladesh into India has been substantial. The total number of Hindus there has since 1951 remained almost the same, meaning that the entire increase migrated to India. This means (assuming a moderate population increase of 2.5% p.a.) that 250,000 Hindus moved each year. For the Muslims the figures are not so clear. At the border there has been a general impression of the Border Security Force and state police that more, or at least as many Muslims are moving; some journalists and even officials (off the record) put the figure much higher, as much as 4 Muslims to every Hindu. Assuming the low figure would mean a total of half a million migrants per year (Hindus and Muslims together) then when the then Home Minister in January 2003 mentioned 20 million as the total of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh to be sent back this figure would account for forty years. This is of uncertain accuracy, for a previous Home Minister had referred in August 1998 to 8 million, and a West Bengal Minister said in the same year there were none in his state. Most of this, among both Muslims and Hindus, is for economic reasons; though some of the latter, sporadically and in small numbers, is due to violence against the minorities. More important, the perceived Islamization of the country, the amendments to the constitution brought in by Zia ur Rahman and Ershad,

the increasing salience of Islamic parties, have led the Hindus to leave India took up the issue with the Bangladesh government and decided to build a fence along the border in an effort to stop the 'infiltration'. Other measures were planned: roads along the fence for patrolling; better intelligence; and more effective force along the border. Largely these measures were intended to assuage feeling that nothing was being done about this 'human invasion', a response to a political problem. For India this cannot be a straightforward issue of sending back illegal immigrants/infiltrators and stopping any more from coming in. Since the figures were not unambiguous it was never known how many should or indeed could be sent back. The Hindus could not; they were regarded as refugees more than immigrants. Of the Muslims many had settled in states far from the border; the population figures showed high increases in Bihar and even further away in Delhi. Most seemed to have documents proving that they were Indian citizens, given to them when they were being encouraged to vote. They had been there for two or even three generations. The policy of sending back resulted only in a few incidents in each of which some dozens were pushed back; this only led to border incidents, and those pushed back re-entered by another route. The fence work has been desultory. To work out concrete measures for cooperation between the Border Security Force and the counterpart Bangladesh

Pakistan's High Commissioner to India, Aziz Ahmed Khan, his wife and diplomats at the conference

Rifles, discussions have been held and there are some signs that they will lead to better security along the border, but the long term solution lies in more jobs and better living conditions in Bangladesh. iii) Trade and economic relations Bangladesh's trade deficit with India has caused resentment. India's exports have risen steadily so that today Bangladesh is India's sixth largest customer, buying, during the last year, $1.8 billion of goods; selling less than $100 million. Then there is the illegal or informal trade across the open border, which may account for a figure of exports and imports which is as much or higher, and equally unbalanced. Bangladesh has consistently used the trade deficit for political purposes, the usual accusation being made by either of the two main political parties that the other has 'sold out' the economy to India, or acquiesced in India converting Bangladesh into a 'captive market'. It is not clear how voters respond to such charges, but election campaigns see a heightening of the level of accusations. Second, given the diversity of India's productive capacity and the limits of that of Bangladesh, the trade deficit will continue, perhaps in abated form, even if India were to grant the tariff, non-tariff and para-tariff concessions asked for. Just three products account for the bulk of Bangladesh exports: jute, textiles and inorganic chemicals. This is reflective of the general limits of the global export basket: 75% of this comprises textiles and garments. Third, this issue will disappear from the purely trade point of view in few years. The mandatory removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers under the WTO regime by 2008 will ensure that the grant of any special concessions such as Bangladesh is now asking will become redundant. The 12 th SAARC summit

(Islamabad, Jan.2004) decision to launch a South Asian Free Trade Area by 2006 will achieve the same result, perhaps even earlier. Then there are the arguments used by India to counter Bangladesh's demands for restriction free exports in certain items. If India is given transit facilities, the resulting transit fees, and Indian investment in the infra-structure required, would ease the trade imbalance. On occasion India has linked trade with transit. This makes the issue even more political. A third is the export of gas to India, which should reduce the trade deficit. However, after some hesitation, most leaders in Bangladesh have agreed that reserves of recoverable gas are too low and that these must be larger than 50 years domestic consumption for such exports to be considered. India argues that if Bangladesh liberalises the conditions for Indian investment then the industrial and export base of the latter could be expanded, enabling more exports. At present India accounts for about 7% of the total number of foreign investment projects, 70 out of 1,000. For this a congenial atmosphere free of overt hostility and propaganda, is needed. It is difficult to foresee that the Bangladesh request for trade concessions will easily be accorded. There is little doubt, however, that at little cost to itself, India could grant all the concessions asked. Even if India gives customs free access to the exports of Bangladesh the loss of revenue would be less than 1% of the total. And the result would be a considerable boost to bilateral trade and to the goodwill in Bangladesh, and create a strong support base among commercial circles there for the development of yet closer relations. I. P. Khosla is a former secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs of India

A session in progress

Session I:

Indo-Bangladesh Relations Ashish Chakraborty Bangladesh's relations with India have been a prisoner to the former's domestic politics, be it in trade, water sharing or other issues, I.P. Khosla, former secretary to India's External Affair Ministry, said in his presentation on IndiaBangladesh relations on the opening day of SAFMA's regional conference on interstate conflict in South Asia. The agreement on the sharing of Ganga water was then possible in 1996 because of political factor in Bangladesh and India with I K Gujral's doctrine of accommodation of neighbour's interest and Sheikh Hasina Wajid's Awami League government. Khosla, however, noted a certain hardening of relations in recent years over the border dispute, illegal immigration of Bangladeshis into India and Dhaka's alleged harboring of militants in India's northeast. Lailofar Yashmin, professor of international relations at Dhaka University, outlined the broader perspective of the economic and diplomatic issues which have strained relations between two countries. She also mentioned Dhaka's “threat perception” from India.

Both Khosla and Yashmin also referred to Bangladesh's concern over the riverlinking project conceived by the previous government in India. Khosla, however, thought it was a long-term project that could take 25 years for implementation and undergo many changes during the period. Discussant Enayetullah Khan from Bangladesh regretted a recent trend in India to project Bangladesh as a “failed state”. The rise of religious fundamentalism and the “bomb culture” in Bangladesh, he argued, were causes of concern for civil society in Bangladesh. On allowing India transit through Bangladesh and the gas export to India, he referred to problems for Bangladesh's domestic policies. Ashish Chakraborty from India referred to wrong media perceptions in India about important issues relating to Bangladesh. He said Dhaka's persistent denial to seriously consider India's security concerns from the rise of fundamentalist terror and the support to militants from India's northeast in Bangladesh has complicated relations between the two countries. Delegates from India, Bangladesh Pakistan and Nepal took part in the debate that followed the presentation by the speakers and discussants. Khaled Ahmed from Pakistan saidBangladesh is geographically surrounded by India except for a stretch of 283 km border with Burma (Myanmar). Its relations with India were hostile when it was a part of Pakistan. India's policy was punitive in response to Pakistan's pursuit of a change in the territorial status quo in the region. The 1965

Ashish Chakraborty from Kolkatta and top Bangladeshi editors in an informal mood to make dialogue easy

war was fought to a stalemate in West Pakistan but it exposed East Pakistan to new fears of security. Interwing political contradictions created an opposition in East Pakistan that was pro-India. Internal strife separated East Pakistan from Pakistan 1971 after what looked like a pro-India revolution seeking national liberation. Many observers expected BangladeshIndia relations to improve as partners in South Asia. It was thought that the disputes relating to territory and waters that bedevilled India's relations with Pakistan would be resolved in short order. Unfortunately that did not happen. Today instead of clearing the backlog of bilateral troubles the two countries have entered a phase of bitterness unseen before. The old Farakka Dam issue that simmered between India and Pakistan was resolved in the 1990s but not completely. Other issues have snowballed meanwhile to heighten mutual hatred at the popular level. River Ganges flows through China, Nepal, India and Bangladesh. It receives 80 percent of its rainfall during the June-September monsoon period till the volume of water at Farakka becomes 2.5 million cubic feet. In 1951 India first thought of building a dam at Farakka 18 miles upstream from Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) designed to divert the Ganges' flow during the dry season into Baghirathi-Hoogli River to flush out the silt at the port of Calcutta. Concern for the future of East Pakistan's agriculture was aroused by the planned barrage. As time passed the Farakka Dam became a dispute between India and Pakistan, second in bitterness only to the Kashmir dispute. The Dam was commissioned after the independence of Bangladesh. It was expected that given the cordial relations between India and the newly created state the Farakka Dam issue would be dealt with amicably, but it was not. India did not consult with Dhaka before operationalising the barrage. In the years that have followed, Bangladesh has suffered adverse effect on its agriculture, fishery, navigation and forestry due to the reduced flow in the dry season when it most needs the Ganges water. (Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna rivers sustain 86 percent of the total land area in Bangladesh.) AntiIndia sentiment was fuelled by the dispute over the Farakka Dam. In contrast when India as the upper riparian state interfered with rivers flowing into Pakistan the dispute was resolved through the Indus Waters Treaty in 1960. India and Bangladesh have failed since 1974

to agree on a strategy of water flows during the dry season. When Bangladesh proposed several storage dams on the tributaries of the Ganges up river in Nepal, India objected to it. Instead it proposed a diversion from Brahmaputra through a large canal to augment the Ganges waters. This was not acceptable to Bangladesh which feared ecological damage from the canal. India and Bangladesh signed a 30year agreement on water sharing from Farakka in December 1996. The agreement has not satisfied the opposition parties in Bangladesh. One fear that drives the anti-India feeling in Bangladesh comes from any future measures that India might take to divert the 54 rivers that flow into Bangladesh from its territory. The issue of demarcating territorial waters between the countries has resulted in serious differences. Both lay claim to a new-born island in the estuary of Haribhanga River on the border of the two countries has simmered since the 1970s. This island, known as South Talpatty to Bangladesh, and New Moore/Purbasha to India, first appeared on a satellite picture in 1975. Both immediately laid claims to it. Bangladesh proposed that a joint Indo-Bangladesh team go to the spot to determine the flow of channels of the river in accordance with international law. India instead sent out troops and stationed its naval force on the island in 1981. However, India withdrew its forces after protest from Dhaka and agreed to negotiations. There was tension over the issue in 1998 after the Indian Border Security Force (BSF) established a base in the island and Indian navy started visiting the island regularly. In 2001, the quarrel over the island was compounded when border skirmishes occurred in Meghalaya state of India and the Sylhet district in Bangladesh. Dhaka accused India of holding territory in the area illegally since 1971. An operation by the Bangladesh troops against the Indian army resulted in the death of 16 Indian and three Bangladeshi soldiers. An estimated 10,000 people on Bangladesh side and 1,000 people on Indian side were forced to flee from the disputed area as a result of the ongoing tension. This brought to the fore the much tortured question of the unresolved 'enclaves' that exist along the border. The border drawn between India and Pakistan within six weeks Sir Cyril Radcliffe resulted in India's control over 112 enclaves and Bangladesh's control over 32 enclaves based on the religious identities of the inhabitants of those areas. To avoid trouble the two countries signed an agreement in 1972 to resolve the enclaves issue, but India did not ratify it. Bangladesh immediately ratified the treaty and returned the disputed Berubari to India, while India gave Bangladesh the permission to use the Tin Bigha corridor, a gateway to Bangladeshi enclaves inside India, in 1992.

Bangladesh has refugee problems with both Burma and India. In the first case, it is Burmese Muslims (Arakanese) who flee into Bangladesh; in the second case, it is the Bangladeshis fleeing into India mostly for economic reasons. Bangladesh also has 260,000 'Pakistanis' who have not been expatriated to Pakistan. India has become sensitive to the stream of migration from Bangladesh; and because of it the bilateral equation dips dangerously when the BNP of Khaleda Zia is in power. In January 2003, the former Deputy Prime Minister of India, LK Advani, announced the deportation of some three million 'illegal' Bangladeshis from India. The government of West Bengal state contested the criterion on which the Bangladeshis were designated as illegal but New Delhi remained adamant and finally deported some 213 Bengali-speaking people from West Bengal. Bangladesh disagreed with the principle on which India sought to resolve the 'illegal Bangladeshis' issue. This issue took India-Bangladesh relations to their lowest point in 2003. According to Bangladeshi sources, that year India is alleged to have made 60 attempts to push thousands of people into Bangladesh from various points on the border. Indo-Bangladesh trade has been another bilateral irritant. Bangladesh has to accept Bangladesh as its biggest trade partner because of geographic proximity but has a trade deficit of a billion dollars it doesn't like at all. It imported goods worth US$ 1,022 million in 2001-02 and exported to it goods worth only US$50.28 million. In the last ten years the trade

deficit has grown three times over because of the economic disparity and India's comparative economic advantage. Borders being porous and rendered vulnerable by enclaves lead to massive smuggling that undermines Bangladeshi economy. The unhappiness over the unequal trade relationship spills over into the entire area of economic cooperation. Political bitterness has fostered the habit in Bangladesh of subjecting the issue of economic adjustment with India to electoral pressures. The question of exporting Bangladeshi gas to an energy-starved India could become a counter in the Bangladeshi leverage on India to resolve some of the outstanding disputes, but it was politicised between the anti-India BNP and supposedly pro-India Awami League. One of the issues highlighted in the 2001 elections was Dhaka's agreement to exporting gas to India. Awami League's Hasina Wajed was warned that if she agreed she would lose the elections. However the popular sentiment was so intensely anti-Indian that she lost the elections anyway and the gas project was shelved. On the other hand, India has alleged that BNP allows Pakistan to pursue its hostile anti-Indian agenda from the soil of Bangladesh. Exchanges have been bitter over statements made in India that the ISI has been operating out of Bangladesh. There is a counter-allegation that under the Awami League government India extends its influence in Bangladesh through RAW. A free trade treaty between India and Bangladesh is under discussion but given the state of bilateral relations it is expected to take a long time materialising.

Stabilization of Nuclear Regime The May 1998 nuclear tests by Pakistan and India led to a fundamental change in the Indo-Pak relationship. The nuclear explosions ended covert nuclearization when the two sides had exercised â&#x20AC;&#x153;existential deterrenceâ&#x20AC;?. Overt nuclearization established a new nuclear equation raising hopes that it would bring stability to the conflictprone region. Whether events on ground in the past five years have led to stable deterrence is an ongoing debate. However, the euphoria of nuclear optimists has been severely dented by recurring crises and the seeming indifference of both sides to flirt with each others' nuclear threshold. Any risk reduction or confidence building measure (CBM) is inherently based on trust. To generate trust, a broader confidence building process (involving nonmilitary as well as military CBMs) is required. In the absence of a trustworthy environment, specific stability enhancing measures must be legally binding. A nonbinding agreement is unlikely to deliver. Any agreements that do not carry with them assurances of continued implementation during crises end up being ineffective. Previous Indo-Pak CBMs have tended to become inoperative in crises. Pakistan and India have several military CBMs in place. These include the communication hotline between Directors-General of Military Operations (DGMOs), agreement of non-attack on nuclear facilities and installations, agreement on prior notification of military exercises, agreement on air space violations, etc. New official proposals like extending the DGMOs hotline to the foreign secretaries, agreement on pre-notification of the technical parameters of missile flight tests, and agreement on observing a moratorium on nuclear tests, have surfaced during the ongoing peace process. Experts, too, have contributed many proposals. Certain measures are suggested below. An attempt is also made to point out complexities in some of the previously suggested measures.

Moeed Yusuf (I) Negotiation on Kashmir Whether Kashmir is acknowledged as a core issue by India, it lies at the heart of hostilities between the two neighbours. Developing trust between Pakistan and India is a virtual impossibility till the issue remains in the forefront. Moreover, it will continue to precipitate future conflicts and to undermine the potential of specific stability enhancing measures. Although other stabilityenhancing measures ought not be held hostage to a resolution of Kashmir, since such a prospect seems nowhere on the horizon, continuous efforts to resolve the issue are an imperative. The key is to continue talks on this issue with a genuine intent to move towards resolution. Discontinuing a dialogue on Kashmir by itself could disrupt the current peace initiative. Absence of the b ro a d e r c o n f i d e nc e b u i l d i n g p ro c e s s w o u l d automatically reduce the chances of success of specific measures. (Ii) Crisis Prevention Mechanism The focus of any specific measures to enhance strategic stability in South Asia ought to be on crisis prevention. Pakistan and India could consider entering into a binding bilateral agreement under which they make it necessary for prime ministers of both sides to establish contact if a crisis seems developing. They should be mandated to hold at least three telephonic conversations a week in an attempt to diffuse an imminent crisis. A clause in the agreement could necessitate such interaction before either side could order conventional

force deployments. Such an arrangement would guard against two pitfalls. First, it will ensure that official communication channels remain open at the highest level. Second, Indo-Pak crises tend to erupt and escalate suddenly. A provision for three telephonic conversations spread over a week would give time to both sides for informed decision making. At the very least, these interactions would ensure that troop deployment plans are put on hold until all avenues for rapprochement are exhausted. For example, if India planned to mobilize in response to a terrorist attack on its territory, Pakistan could provide proof of its innocence or agree to specific measures to rectify the situation within a set time frame. The utility of such a mechanism would be tremendously enhanced if the two sides agreed to involve a neutral mediator in their conversations through a conference call. The mediator could be an individual of international repute or a representative of the UN or from a third country. Although, the two sides might be averse to such direct outside involvement, both inevitably end up depending on outside forces to subdue their crises. A

signalling resolve remains a necessary aspect of deterrence. By the same token, removing misperceptions by signalling is also imperative for stability. The only way out of this conundrum is to ensure that official communication channels remain open during crises. These channels could be the hotline between DGMOs or the one proposed for foreign secretaries. A binding agreement stating that these channels would remain open during crises has been floated but needs to be formalized. The prime ministers' telephonic interaction cannot substitute for this direct communication, needed frequently. Although both Pakistan and India are likely to transmit some signals through indirect and tacit channels regardless of the availability of direct channels, misperception could be sufficiently reduced by concurrently maintaining official contact. (iv) Non-Deployment Agreement From the analysis of strategic stability, it is clear that nuclear force deployment on semi-operational or operational status increases the risk of a nuclear holocaust. Much of the current stability should also be

(L to R) Ejaz Haider, Shahid Kardar, Ahmer Bilal Soofi, and other Pakistani delegates

more direct role for a mediator would perhaps be able to help in crisis prevention rather than escalation control. To expand the initiative, the two sides could allow designated officials from each side plus the mediator (or his appointed team) to observe troop movements on ground. While “tele-diplomacy” is continuing, these observers could confirm the absence of wartime deployment. It must be ensured that telephonic conversations are only restricted to discussion about crisis prevention. They should not be used as a means to transmit nuclear signals, lest they generate further mistrust. Involvement of a neutral mediator could help ensure this as well. (iii) The Signalling Conundrum Nuclear signalling creates a conundrum. Absence of official communication channels during crises leaves tacit and indirect communication as the only options for nuclear signalling. However, both induce strategic instability in times of crises. On the other hand,

attributed to a non-deployed posture. While operational deployments during peace are not likely any time soon, a binding agreement is needed on non-deployment during crises or conflict. Pakistan has previously offered to formalize an agreement guaranteeing “non-deployed deterrence” with India. However, the latter rejected it. Pakistan says it will not initiate deployment. Given that India has a no-first-use policy, it could afford to maintain non-deployed forces. The two sides should work towards formalizing such an agreement. To verify implementation of the agreement in the absence of sophisticated intelligence gathering capabilities would be problematic. The most obvious alternative to satellite based intelligence would be limited verification by a designated joint team of military personnel. Lack of trust necessitates inspectors of the inspecting country to pick sites at random. Otherwise, the process will lack credibility. If avenues for satellite-

based intelligence open up for Pakistan and India, verification would become simple and the true stabilizing potential of the agreement would be realized. (v) Agreement Not to Attempt Pre-emption What is envisaged here is a binding agreement between the two sides not to attempt pre-emption of the other's nuclear forces, both in peace and crises. The likelihood of pre-emption is almost non-existent. However, formally agreeing to this would guard against the possibility of punitive strikes being misinterpreted as pre-emptive ones during high tension. Notionally, the agreement could be implemented by negotiating the maximum number of nuclear delivery systems (aircrafts on ground and missile batteries) that can be “successfully hit” in a conventional strike without qualifying as an attempt at pre-emption. The maximum number should be low to ensure that majority of delivery systems remain functional. Any offensive that strikes more than the agreed number of delivery systems would be perceived as pre-emption. The agreement would have several benefits. First, it will act as a strong deterrent for the attacker against targeting more than the agreed number of delivery systems. The rationale for the agreement implies that if the limit were exceeded, the defender's “red lines” would have been tampered with. Possibility of nuclear retaliation is thus implicit. Limiting the number of strikes means that the defender would not have to face the 'use em or lose em' dilemma. In other words, the nuclear threshold of the defender would be raised. A recommendation for an agreement not to strike airfields in conflicts has been floated previously for the same reason. This agreement would be more comprehensive, as it would cover missile delivery systems as well. The proposal does not necessitate sharing of information on positions of delivery systems. The attacker would base its calculations on its own intelligence. Although not all strikes will be “successful” (the agreement will be based on successful strikes not attempted strikes), the attacker would have no way of confirming the outcome of each intended strike on delivery systems. Given the consequences of crossing the agreed limit, the attacker may choose to play safe and base its calculations on number targeted, and not number hit. This ought to reduce the defender's losses, thus leaving more delivery systems functional and consequently keeping the nuclear threshold from lowering. One potential problem could be a lack of verification by the defender if it claims that the agreed limit has been crossed. However, this need not be stipulated as the defender would have no incentive to launch a nuclear

strike before it is convinced that pre-emption is being attempted. The underlying goal of this agreement would be to deter the aggressor from targeting a significant number of delivery systems and consequently lowering the nuclear threshold. (vi) Nuclear Risk Reduction Centres (NRRCs) Proposals for setting up NRRCs on the Cold War model are present. Although technically, NRRCs could be of help in both crisis prevention as well as escalation control, the often-suggested benefits of NRRCs in the Pakistan-India context are exaggerated. While they may be of much use during peace, their utility is likely to remain limited during crisis. Most information NCCRs would transmit will not be verifiable. Given the mistrust between the two sides, information from an adversary's NCCRs is likely to be discounted during high tension. This is so since NCCRs could be used to provide misinformation during crises. On the other hand, in peace time NCCRs could be useful for maintaining an instantaneous channel for communication between technical experts on both sides. It could assist in developing a common vocabulary regarding doctrines and nuclear “red lines” for experts. Furthermore, it could also serve as a Center to assist in implementing existing CBMs (for example, by prenotifying missile tests), clear misperceptions developed due to faulty intelligence, and notify about nuclear accidents, which could be perceived otherwise. To begin with, NCCRs could act as a confidence building measure. Continuous exchange of accurate information during peace time could gradually build trust which might be kept intact during crises as well. However, this is a longterm prospect. (vii) Cooperative Ariel Observation Another proposed risk reduction measure in South Asia is Cooperative Ariel Observation (CAO). It is essentially a verification mechanism, which theoretically could help in crisis prevention as well as escalation control. However, operationally CAO would be of limited use.

Diplomats and Mr Dua, the editor of Tribune

The underlying principle behind CAO is that by aerial monitoring both sides could access reliable information about each other directly. However, given that it is not realistic to conduct observation missions on an adversary's entire territory, such missions would not be able to provide current, up-to-date information. Especially in crises, force deployments could well be underway in areas not being monitored. Furthermore, if the frequency of observation missions is too low, deployments could be initiated and completed within the time interval between two successive missions. On the other hand, an extremely high frequency of missions covering a large portion of ones territory would raise concerns of rendering the entire force structure naked. Neither side is likely to accept that. What CAO can be most effective in is to monitor arms control or nondeployment agreements in specific areas, which does not apply to the Indo-Pak context. In enhancing strategic stability in South Asia, CAO has limited near-term utility. It would have to start with largely symbolic missions and gradually move towards gaining real time information, if trust is generated. (Viii) An Adequate Command and Control Both countries need to ensure that a fail-safe command and control system is operational. A clear chain of command on paper does not necessarily mean that it will hold during conflicts. Safeguards must be built to ensure that the chain of command is fully respected under all conditions. Furthermore, even when conflict necessitates dispersal, pre-delegation should be avoided. A necessary prerequisite for this is hardened communication facilities, lacking in South Asia. “Personnel reliability measures” should also be pursued to make potential decision makers comprehend with the level of responsibility entrusted in them. Psychological training to retain informed decision-making skills under stress of war could also help. To ensure safeguards against inadvertence, warheads should be removed from their cores, and at the very least nuclear and non-nuclear explosives must be separated. Even when forces are deployed, warheads should not be mated with delivery systems. Advanced technology is required to provide greater assurance of the “safety” of nuclear forces. The U.S. could be a potential source of such cooperation. Technological cooperation could include sharing portal command equipment, access doors, PALs, sophisticated vaults, and the like. Realistically, such cooperation is not likely any time soon since the US is curbed by its export controls and even Pakistan and India might not be willing to share sensitive information with the US. However, the US could assist on other counts. It could share its Cold War

experiences regarding problems with command and control and safety of the arsenal. Perhaps, its Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTRP) could be expanded to include South Asia. This ought to assist in enhancing the safety and security of South Asia's nuclear arsenal. Lack of trust between Pakistan and India is likely to restrict the benefit any stability enhancing measure could have. One must be cautioned against expecting the potential of such measures to be realized in its entirety. For now, most stability enhancing measures will merely end up being confidence builders. As an atmosphere of trust is generated, impact of such measures on strategic stability could increase. Till then it would be sensible to focus on targeted agreements that aim at preventing crises and enhancing stability. Progress even on these is likely to be sluggish. The key however, is not to allow the process to stall. Conclusion The nuclear regime in South Asia exhibits stability during periods of calm. However, in crisis the nuclear equation becomes highly unstable. This raises serious concerns as Indo-Pak relations have been prone to crises and overt nuclearization seems to have increased the propensity of the two sides to be involved in crises. Both tend to believe that room for limited escalation below the nuclear threshold is present. Pakistan's past connection with the Kashmiri insurgency, and the Indian limited war doctrine combined with its growing conventional disparity vis-à-vis Pakistan is worrisome in this regard. Any measures designed to enhance strategic stability must be part of a broader confidence building process which seeks resolution of outstanding disputes and looks to create an overall environment of trust. The thrust of stability enhancing measures should be on crisis prevention, with escalation control as the second best option. The key is to ensure that all agreements are legally binding and are guaranteed to work during heightened tensions. Diplomacy at the highest level must be given a fair chance to diffuse imminent crises. By the same token, official communication channels must remain open regardless of the situation on ground. A non-deployment agreement and an agreement not to attempt pre-emption would also enhance stability. Other previously suggested measures such as NRRCs and CAO, while promising, are only likely to realize their potential in the long run. Pakistan and India must also take unilateral measures to enhance safety and security of their nuclear arsenals. Realistically, until an atmosphere of trust develops, progress on stability enhancing measures is likely to be sluggish. However, perseverance is the only way forward!

Dilemmas of

Deterrence Theory and Achin Vanaik

refutation. Anti-nuclearists, with justice, believe that the balance of plausibility in argument has always rested on their side.

Security Claims

But there is another test of efficacy -- which is simply whether nuclear weapons do actually make countries, their governing elites, and their wider publics, more secure and stable. Here again, despite the inescapable nebulousness of any measure or evaluation of 'security' the balance of plausibility, supported by historical evidence, rests with the anti-nuclear side. The world is now moving 'upwards' to nuclearisation of space and 'downwards' to production of tactical, battlefield, and mini-nukes. This terrible and unfortunate trajectory that makes the world more nuclearly insecure and unstable, is being led by the US, which as the most powerful nuclear weapons state in the world, should therefore in the eyes of 'deterrence believers', be presumably the most 'nuclearly secure' country in the world! If only in the name of providing honest clarity and an accurate understanding of the world we live in, South Asian pronuclearists should at least acknowledge that the world today is in a nuclear mess caused, incidentally, not by the anti-nuclear mindset but by the pro-nuclear, deterrencebelieving, mindset.

Claims made for the efficacy of nuclear deterrence in bringing about greater security and stability, are problematic and must always be exposed. There is the profoundly abstract character of the logic used in the best arguments made in defence of the 'nuclear war avoidance' claims of nuclear weapons. Thus, not only are the conditions in which 'deterrence rationality' operates so strict and demanding that they are unavailable in real life, but this abstractness means the whole framework of deterrence thinking and strategizing is de-historicised, de-socialised, indeed de-politicised. This abstractness makes 'deterrence logic' available for adoption by virtually any country in the world that might have the capacity to produce nuclear weapons. No wonder, also, that its proponents are invariably prisoners of a very conventional realist mindset in thinking about the nature of international relations in general. Realism, here, refers to the label used to describe a particular paradigm of thought about international relations, which, after all, is itself marked by its basically ahistorical and asocial character.

Moving Towards Nuclear Sanity in South Asia

Moreover, 'deterrence logic' simply does not address another vital function demanded of nuclear weapons by nuclearised governments, which goes beyond the issue of war prevention. This is the role of nuclear weapons as instruments of foreign policy support, thus embedding the whole issue of nuclearisation within a broader framework of another kind of logic altogether the 'behavioural logics' attendant upon the existence of political hostility between states. This ensures that nuclear-related crises invariably emerge in one form or the other precisely because of the possession and development of nuclear weapons; and by doing so make a mockery of the claim that nuclear weapons adoption provides greater security and stability. There are always two tests of whether security has been enhanced or not. One is the 'extreme' test provided by 'breakdown' and therefore nuclear exchange. However, the absence of breakdown does not confirm the efficacy of nuclear deterrence because of the known problem of counterfactuality. Thus claims and counter-claims about deterrence efficacy are always subject to the 'balance of plausibility' between arguments, not to decisive proof or

You cannot stabilize a nuclear regime in South Asia. Nuclear weapons destabilize the security conditions between rival nuclearly equipped countries like India and Pakistan and the region (South Asia) where they exist cheek-by-jowl. As long as there exist nuclear weapons you can only try and make the situation less unstable and less insecure by transitional measures such as nuclear risk reduction. These are transitional measures because they cannot in themselves make the region 'nuclear safe', only less unsafe. Genuine and enduring nuclear safety comes from being 'nuclear free' regionally and globally. There is no substitute for nuclear disarmament and to believe that we must always 'live with nuclear weapons' is to make a grievous mistake. Interestingly, and perhaps revealingly, the most serious efforts by South Asians to elaborate on nuclear risk reduction measures for India and Pakistan in the public domain, have come from the ranks of opponents, not defenders, of nuclear weaponisation in South Asia. Moreover, there is an unavoidable trade-off between the strongest demands of nuclear safety (avoiding accidental or unauthorized detonation or launching) and the

strongest requirements of deterrence 'readiness'. This being so, it is best to come down on the side of greater safety through de-mating and substantial timeabsorbing separation of warheads and delivery systems. However, risk reduction is not a substitute for moving towards regional disarmament, as well as promoting a process of global disarmament. The Pakistani and Indian governments have made proposals and counterproposals to each other since 1998 regarding issues like No First Use, regional nuclear disarmament, a nonaggression pact. Since these proposals have entered the domain of official pronouncements, they should be explored. Given existing circumstances we cannot expect short-term or even medium-term success. But despite the possibility of being accused of making wish-list suggestions, these can nevertheless serve as signposts that point out the direction and journey we must take. Insofar as the politics of nuclearism is embedded in the wider (historicized and socialized) politics of IndiaPakistan relations we have to address the four main barriers preventing a positive transformation of relations between the two countries. There is the need for both India and Pakistan faced by grave authoritarian pressures from within military dominance as well as religiously cloaked reaction in one case, a pernicious rightwing religiously cloaked reaction in the other case to decisively overcome these internal dangers. Such rightwing reaction on both sides represents a serious obstacle to lasting friendship or even peaceful coexistence between both countries. There is the need for both countries to come towards each other

K. Gopalkrishnan, Editor of Matrabhoomi with other Indian delegates

independently of the US presence in the region and to recognize that defeating the imperial global (and regional) project of the US is a paramount need. The current triangulated relationship between the US, India and Pakistan benefits primarily the US. There is the need for a stable solution to the Kashmir issue, where enduring stability requires a search for a just solution, which in turn requires bringing in the independent representatives of Kashmiris on both sides of the border into a deliberation on the future of their Kashmir. The kind of politics we need to think about for South Asia and to try and bring about is not the kind that will emerge out of the restricted imagination of conventional 'Realism'. This can only provide a more or less 'managerialist' perspective, rationalized and justified in the name of a restricted conception of politics as the 'art of the possible'. Here, the vision of what constitutes the possible is flawed by a strong 'presentist' bias and a narrow and strongly state-centred conception of how changes take place in the world we live in. What we need in South Asia is a transformative political imagination that has a wider conception of what are the forces of change, where and how to work for it, and a very different conception of the possibilities that exist in and through political behaviour. Here the spectrum of political operation is not the space defined by conventional notions of the 'art of the possible' but the space that exists between the rejection of the pursuit of the probably impossible and the endorsement of the pursuit of the improbably possible. Achin Vanaik teaches at the University of Delhi

Session II:

Stabilisation of Nuclear Regime in South Asia Rashid Rehman Nuclear weapons are weapons of mass murder. They are military means, open for debate. To me, they are unacceptable. Here we have heard about the possibility that both India and Pakistan have diverse means of delivery of nuclear weapons. I think this is dangerous talk. I know from my bare reading of the Cold War and the nuclear proliferation between the United States and USSR that these very sophisticated and developed societies with very normal command and resources of these weapons came on the verge of a nuclear exchange innumerable times accidentally; misunderstanding made these things happen. Indian and Pakistani levels of tolerance towards each other are very low. Nuclear weapons after the World War II are quite a symbol/status of power of a country. The Americans used the bomb at the end of the 2nd world war on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Inevitably, the exercise was followed by other countries: Soviet Union, Britain, France etc. The criterion for permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council was that you had to possess nuclear weapons; in other words you had the means to destroy others. China was not admitted to the SC even years after it became a nuclear power (for other reasons).

whole debate about deterrence -- this regime is based upon fear and terror. Is this the regime you want to live in, in the subcontinent, in South Asia and in the world at large? I don't want my children to be in such a regime, in a world where fear and terror prevails. We have talked much about the US role in normalising the relation between India and Pakistan and preventing war between them. I don't deny that role but India and Pakistan have greater madness about peace than my friends believe. Bharat Karnad India-Pakistan wars have been disasters in terms of material and physical loss. After each war both countries go back on the same economic and social position and have to start things again. In the region India cannot reinforce stabilisation without Pakistan's interest. If India and Pakistan share a turbulent history after 1947 onwards and do not trust each other, then on what basis do you people say that they will be good neighbours with nuclear weapons? It is absolute fantasy. One thing that these nuclear weapons have done (and I am glad for it) is that they have developed a sense of interaction and we have tried to know each others' view about things. These weapons added to the moderation of both sides.

However, today we see there are three nuclear powers out of the Security Council: India and Pakistan and the debate is going on that shall they be given membership on the same old criteria or not because rules are changed now. These weapons shall be abolished worldwide and I think it is defeatist to say that it is not possible. When we started talking about peace and normalisation between India and Pakistan more than a decade ago, people said it was impossible. I think that ideas should not be given up, if they are right they should be pursued and if they are right they should be fought for. We all know that NPT was an unequal treaty; it seeks to retain the monopoly of nuclear weapons in the hands of a few against the rest of the world. This whole question of equality, stability, instability, and the

Making a curious point: Amit Barua (The Hindu) with Mohan Narayan (PTI)

India-Nepal Relations Krishna V Rajan

It is a truism that India and Nepal, despite their proximity and cultural affinities, have not been able to build up a relationship of trust and confidence, or even partially succeeded in using their complementary economic potential for the benefit of their citizens. Since 1947, when India gained its independence, regimes have changed many times in Kathmandu, as have governments in New Delhi. Little has changed in the relationship. Nepal is currently experiencing a major and multifaceted crisis. The prospect of Nepal as a “failing State” is a matter of deepest concern not only for the Himalayan kingdom but for India and indeed for many other countries. In this grim crisis, India and Nepal need to introspect and see how their relationship could measure up to the challenges, rather than being held hostage to them. Political and security considerations have usually been the driving force in bilateral ties. Over nearly six decades, India has dealt with every kind of regime in Nepal, tried different tactics and strategies, gone the extra mile in winning friends and influencing leaders basically guided by its own security perceptions. Nepalese sensitivities, whether at the personal, political level or relating to the Nepalese psyche, have not always been fully anticipated or well-managed. Nepalese political elites for their part have often exaggerated India's interest or ability to manipulate internal competitions for power in Nepal, and tended to expect political quid pro quos for cooperation on India's security concerns. An inevitable result of such approaches has been the corrosion and devaluation of a relationship whose natural assets and complementarities could well have led it in a very different direction. In the early fifties Nehru sought understanding with the autocratic Rana regime a la British India, while encouraging an end to Nepal's international isolation and modification of its undemocratic polity. The 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, was a robust imitation of the 1923 Treaty between British India and the Ranas it

could not and did not go down too well with many Nepalese, who felt that the Treaty was unequal, noncredible and undemocratic, and who bristled openly at the suggestion that India's security perimeter legitimately extended up to the Himalayas. India, however, persisted with its efforts with the friendly constitutional monarch (King Tribhuvan) it had helped restore, and the democratic set-up (headed by the Nepali Congress) which it helped to install. Neither survived for long; both would have resented the excessively visible Indian role in “guiding” the country's affairs while promoting India's own security interests vis-à-vis China. In the subsequent decades India switched on and off its active support for friendly democratic forces (especially the Nepali Congress) depending on India's leverage at the given moment and prospects of receiving minimum security-related cooperation from the absolutist inclined monarchs (first King Mahendra, then his son Birendra). There were many visits and agreements; and much Indian aid which went into building roads, hospitals, communications, irrigation and power projects, and self defence for the Royal Nepalese Army. The result (from an Indian perspective) was only declining levels of gratitude and increased anti-Indian sentiment at the level of the common man in Nepal, and, at the level of the government, playing of the China card, cosying up to Pakistan, systematic non-observance of Nepalese commitments under the 1950 Treaty and other agreements, the campaign to declare Nepal a Zone of Peace, protests on Sikkim's merger with India, much brinksmanship on India's security concerns. The nationalist Nepali perspective on all this was of course quite different and has traditionally been dismissed by the Indian establishment. It is only recently that Indian experts have, for example, started conceding that the Nepalese sense of grievance on the poor quality of design, inefficient implementation and bad maintenance of Indian executed projects like Kosi and Gandak may not be unjustified; or that if King Mahendra had been

handled differently, he would have been as friendly and accommodative of Indian sensitivities as his father; that the misunderstandings between Birendra and Rajiv could easily have been avoided if there had been a little more transparency. By the end of the eighties India was pitching in wholeheartedly with the democratic forces while maintaining a cold and formal relationship with the King, foreseeing a popular tide in favor of pro-India groups in any free and fair election. Poor personal chemistry between the monarchy and at first Indira Gandhi, and later Rajiv, along with other factors, created and sustained mutual suspicions and antipathy ultimately translating into confrontational politics at the time of Rajiv Gandhi. When Rajiv Gandhi imposed a blockade against Nepal after King Birendra imported Chinese missiles in contravention of the 1950 Treaty (and also incidentally permitted the Trade and Transit Treaty to lapse) and tensions escalated, G P Koirala, then in the vanguard of the pro-democracy, anti-King movement, is reported to have asked Indian Army ex-servicemen in Nepal's gurkha districts as to what they would do if there was a war between India and Nepal. To a man they are said to have insisted, “India has given us our bread, we will never fight against India!” On the Indian side, the Army Chief of Staff is known to have protested to Rajiv Gandhi that the embargo must be immediately lifted, as it was causing great hardship to the families in Nepal of serving gurkhas in the Indian Army who were willing to lay down their lives for India's national interests. Leaders are sometimes totally out of touch with the sentiments of the people they are supposed to be serving. When the Panchayat system was replaced by constitutional monarchy and multi-party democracy, after a mass agitation enjoying cross-party political support, there were huge expectations of a new era in India-Nepal relations. Indeed, during the first few years India and Nepal seemed to be making up for lost time. Visits multiplied, agreements were signed and new vistas of cooperation in trade, economic development and water resources opened up. But the bold steps taken between the Nepali Congress Government and India in strengthening ties were to some extent undermined by the widespread (if largely unfair) perception that India was putting all its eggs in one “pro-India” political basket in Nepal in order to promote its own interests. The monarchy was a passive spectator while the Opposition (leftist as well as pro-Palace) exploited these sensitivities to create an anti-India vote-bank. Political infighting within the Nepali Congress brought

its own government down, provoked premature elections, and brought a minority Communist (CPNUML) government to power (1994) after an election campaign marked by anti-Indian rhetoric. Much to the relief of India, however, the basic direction of bilateral relations was maintained by the Communists. While rejecting the concept of a special relationship with India, and raising “national” issues like the need for the 1950 Treaty to be updated, the Tanakpur Agreement to be renegotiated, the Bhutanese refugee problem with greater persistence than its predecessor Government, the UML Government of Manmohan Adhikari gave sufficient indication, during its brief nine month tenure, of its serious desire to strengthen relations with India on a long term basis. For his part, Prime Minister P V Narasimha Rao brought home to Adhikari that India would deal with Nepal as a country, irrespective of the political or ideological complexion of the party in power or the (alleged) pro- or anti- India leanings of the Prime Minister of the day. With somewhat uncharacteristic crispness, Narasimha Rao made it clear that while India did not expect reciprocity in an arithmetical sense, there had to be reciprocity at least in spirit, and certainly in core areas of the relationship. The Adhikari Government fell after just nine months in office, and was replaced by a coalition of the Nepali Congress (NC), Rashtriya Prajatantra Party(RPP), and Terai-based National Sadbhavana Party (NSP) under Sher Bahadur Deuba. The following years saw political instability assume chronic dimensions. Prime Ministers and Governments changed with bewildering frequency. Every possible permutation and combination of political parties was forged through temporary alliances in their bid for power. The result of the general elections of 1999, held despite a threat of disruption by the Maoists, iffered real hope of political stability, since it restored a majority NC Government under K P Bhattarai. But history repeated itself, the NC squandered away its advantage

Dr Bishnu Hari, Nepal

through infighting between the Koirala and Bhattarai camps, and the football of Prime Ministership moved from Bhattarai to Koirala, and back to Deuba. The Maoists took full advantage of the political instability. The tragic royal massacre of June 1, 2001, further boosted their prospects. In October, 2002 the Constitution itself was derailed when King Gyanendra dismissed Deuba, and took one initiative after another, in an unsuccessful bid to find a solution to the Maoist insurgency while consolidating the position of the monarchy at the cost of the multiparty system. In India, too, there was political uncertainty and change. Between 1996 and 2004, there have been six changes of Prime Minister and four general elections. Both countries have paid a stiff price for this political turbulence. Yet initially at least they succeeded in maintaining a certain stability, continuity and direction in bilateral ties, which appeared to vindicate India's long-held conviction that multi-party democracy was not only good for Nepal but offered the best hope for developing bilateral cooperation on a long term basis. This was partly due to the transparency and public awareness resulting from democratic functioning and a free press, but also due to a consistent approach on India's part not to play favourites in dealing with Nepalese political leaders. A refinement of the Narasimha Rao approach of “nonarithmetical reciprocity” as a basis for Nepal-India relations came in Foreign Minister Gujral's Chatham

House speech of 1996, the now famous “Gujral Doctrine” of non-expectation of reciprocity in India's dealings with its neighbours (except Pakistan). The “doctrine” made a huge impact on Nepal, where it generated somewhat unrealistic expectations. The first test it was subjected to was when the Trade Treaty came up for renewal in December 1996. Commerce Secretary Tejendra Khanna negotiated a far-reaching agreement under Gujral's personal instructions, providing for dutyfree access to the Indian market for all goods manufactured in Nepal, irrespective of labor and material content. The idea was to stimulate Indian investment in export-oriented manufacturing activity in Nepal and thus expand the basket of exportable commodities from Nepal to India the only way to address Nepal's long-standing grievance of a huge trade deficit and the huge potential for Indian investment in Nepal, which had been largely untapped for decades.. The Treaty began to show results almost immediately. Over the following five years, Nepalese exports to India increased at the rate of 57% per annum, India's at 14%, and a number of Indian companies including Hindusthan Lever, Dabur, and Colgate invested in joint ventures on the Nepalese side of the border for export to India and third countries. The Treaty has not had smooth sailing in subsequent years, but the principle of enabling manufacturing industry in Nepal to ride piggy back on the vast Indian market for the good of both countries has

TOO ENGAGED: Iftikhar Ahmed, Najmuddin Sheikh and others from Pakistan

been accepted. The “Doctrine” came under further scrutiny when Gujral (now Prime Minister) visited Nepal in 1997 at the invitation of his counterpart, Lokendra Bahadur Chand. Apart from other agreements signed, Gujral overruled objections from his bureaucrats and agreed to a long time Nepalese request for an alternative transit route to and through Bangladesh (the so-called Phulbari route). In order to address the special security concerns posed by the fact that the route passes through the sensitive “Chicken's Neck” area of West Bengal, it was decided to provide escort for the Nepal-bound or -origin cargo by Indian security personnel---perhaps the most striking example of going the extra mile in accommodating a landlocked neighbor's aspirations in the history of transit agreements. The fact that this exceptional gesture was being made with a coalition government led by individuals who did not have a particularly “pro-India” complexion, did not go unnoticed. The message to Nepal that India's cooperation would not be influenced by the political orientation of the government in power in Nepal was further reinforced by the successor Indian Government of Prime Minister Vajpayee, when the Indo-Nepal transit Treaty came up for renewal. By now three governments had changed and Koirala was heading a Congress-Communist coalition. In what was possibly a unique concession to a landlocked neighbor, the Treaty was made automatically renewable every seven years, unless either country gave notice to the contrary before its expiry. In other words, Nepal's access to the sea was in principle granted in perpetuity, not something to be renegotiated and renewed every seven years. To his credit, while other leaders in the ruling party and coalition pulled in different directions on Nepal and relations suffered as a consequence, Vajpayee himself showed the same sensitivity towards Nepal as had his predecessors Rao and Gujral, and frequently overruled his advisors in showing accommodation to Nepal's expectations. The hijacking incident of December, 1999, and the somewhat casual and insensitive way in which even close friends of India like K P Bhattarai and G P Koirala treated India's requests for cooperation, came as a personal shock to Vajpayee. From then on his personal interest in and sympathy for Nepal was conspicuously absent as the inter-Ministerial bureaucracy in India took hard line positions on various issues, often negating concessions earlier accorded to Nepal in the spirit of the Gujral doctrine. To its credit, the political community in Nepal did make impressive efforts especially before the hijacking

incident vitiated the atmosphere of bilateral relations, to create cross-party consensus for constructive discussions on important bilateral issues. The experience of the Mahakali Treaty was particularly striking. The Treaty was first proposed to the Narasimha Rao government by the CPN-UML in April, 1995. It proposed a mega-project at Pancheshwar on the Mahakali river, upstream of Tanakpur on which the CPN-UML itself had created a major controversy when it was in Opposition. The idea was to subsume Tanakpur in a larger project to be jointly designed and implemented (unlike previous river projects in Nepal which had been entirely executed by India, like the Kosi). Pancheshwar is at a point on the Mahakali where the river forms a boundary stretch, and the proposal was to have two stations of equal capacity on either bank, with power surplus to Nepal's needs being exported to India at mutually agreed tariffs, and additional downstream benefits to be paid for by India. The UML Government fell before the proposal could be discussed. However, the successor NC-RPP-NSP coalition led by Sher Bahadur Deuba, with Water Resources Minister Pashupati Rana and Foreign Minister P C Lohani taking the lead, picked up the threads of the same proposal, hoping that the UML, now the main Opposition party, would find it difficult to oppose a draft initiated during its own administration. The Treaty was finalized on the basis of a formal all-Party consensus in Nepal, and signed in New Delhi by Prime Ministers Sher Bahadur Deuba and Narasimha Rao during the former's New Delhi visit in March 1996. By the time the Treaty was placed before the Nepalese Parliament for ratification the Gujral Government was in office in India; the Nepalese Parliament ratified the Treaty with the requisite 2/3 majority, after a thorough and occasionally divisive national debate. The Deuba Government fell soon thereafter; its successor was a coalition led by anti-Mahakali dissidents in the RPP and CPN (UML), Prime Minister Lokendra Bahadur Chand and Deputy PM Bamdev Gautam. The new Government opted to honour past international commitments, and the Instruments of Ratfication of the Treaty were exchanged during Prime Minister Gujral's official visit to Kathmandu in July 1997. The Mahakali Treaty attracted attention in a number of countries as an important indication of the ability of India and Nepal as multi-party democracies to reach agreement on cooperation in water resources on the basis of equality, transparency and equitable sharing of costs and benefits. The Nepalese Constitution requires ratification by two thirds Parliamentary majority for any agreement affecting the country “extensively, seriously

or in the long termâ&#x20AC;?; many had thought that with such a provision Nepal and India would never be able to reach an understanding on cooperation in such a sensitive area as water, since ratification by Parliament would be next to impossible, given the quality of politics in the subcontinent. Nepal has some 83,000MW of hydropower potential, half of which is feasible for development. It presently has a demand of only 270MW. With India's energy deficit projected to reach 20,000MW by 2010, the compelling logic of economic complementarity is all too obvious. Also, large-scale export of hydropower is perhaps the only way Nepal can hope to achieve speedy growth and remove poverty within a decade. The only other resource it has is

reach important understandings despite the uncertainties of democratic politics and coalition governments. It is waiting to be implemented the moment Nepal's polity can summon the political will, consensus and resolve it once showed, and India the priority it once accorded and sense of patience and accommodation it earlier demonstrated. It is encouraging to note that meanwhile, India and Nepal are seriously discussing a number of other projects (including Kosi High Dam, Upper Karnali and Budhigandaki); and that at least one private sector hydropower project for export to India (West Seti) has been finalized.

Youngsters wait for their turn

Tourism, which has its limitations. Thus, the fact that despite a hung Parliament and considerable political uncertainty, Nepal's main parties could unite to the extent of securing Parliamentary ratification for the Treaty was hailed in many quarters as an impressive demonstration of the maturity of Nepal's democracy and the promising prospects now available for investment in the power sector. That a Power Trade Agreement had already been signed between the two countries during Deuba's visit to India, providing in principle for private sector investment in hydropower projects in Nepal for export to private sector consumers in India, further encouraged interest of prospective investors world-wide. It is unfortunate that the Treaty is being implemented at such a slow pace, mainly because of its overpoliticisation in Nepal compartmentalised, overlytechnical, poorly coordinated approaches to it in India. But for all its shortcomings no Treaty is probably perfect -- it does offer a model for India and Nepal on how to

During the period 1990-2001 when King Birendra attempted with some success to play the role of a constitutional monarch, India's relations with the institution of monarchy improved. The King shed his reserve vis-Ă -vis India, and in various ways he sent out signals to India as well as his own people that the misunderstandings and bitterness of the eighties should be put behind both countries, and that he was personally strongly supportive of closer India-Nepal relations. He maintained regular contact with the Indian leadership on all matters of mutual interest, so that to the extent possible, neither country was taken by surprise by developments in the other; graced private and public functions regularly at India House after more than twenty years of avoiding them; made unusual departures from protocol in dealing with the Indian Embassy or visiting Indian dignitaries; paid several private as well as official visits to India, including a pilgrimage to Hardwar, Kedarnath, Badrinath, Dwarika; warmly received President Narayanan on an official visit; and was himself invited to visit India as Chief Guest on

Republic Day, 1999--- the first time a King of Nepal had been accorded this honor in fifty years. Mutual goodwill and the momentum for strengthening cooperation appeared to have reached unprecedented levels. Speaking in Parliament in reply to a noconfidence motion shortly after the King's visit as Chief Guest on Republic Day, Prime Minister Vajpayee defended his Government's foreign policy achievements by giving the example of Nepal: an election campaign was in progress there, he said, but there was not a hint of anti-Indianism in the air! Indeed, unlike in previous elections, India-related issues like the 1950 Treaty, Mahakali Treaty or Kalapani border dispute did not figure in the campaign. Tanakpur, which had brought the Koirala Government down in 1994 and had once seemed such an intractable issue, was not mentioned even once. The results of the general elections in May, 1999 were widely percieved as a vote for stability, development and apparently also for good relations with India. Parties and individuals professing a commitment to the politics of the far left as well as the extreme right were categorically rejected. India's constant reiteration of its faith in the multiparty democracy-constitutional monarchy arrangement, despite its recent failures, has much to do with its experience of the positive achievements in Nepal and in the bilateral relationship, up to the time of the hijacking incident. Old suspicions and mutual demonizing have unfortunately vitiated the atmosphere once again. As in the past, India's security concerns and Nepal's inability to satisfy them has became the central issue for India, and the ground for reviving anti-Indian sentiments in Nepal has become fertile once more. The Maoist insurgency has of course taken full advantage of this to enhance its own appeal within Nepal. Until recently, India's formal position on the insurgency was that while it would readily respond to requests for supply of arms, equipment and training, strengthen cooperation on cross-border movement of Maoists and extradite Maoist leaders from India, this should be treated as Nepal's internal matter. After the visit of Prime Minister Deuba to India in September 2004, both countries have accepted it to be a shared concern. There is to be an expansion of Indian support to the Government of Nepal. The latter has been advised at the highest level not to encourage involvement of third parties. What seems to have prompted the change of policy is proliferating cross-border linkages between the Maoist groups on the two sides of the border, the revival of hostile attacks against Indian interests in Nepal, the demonstrated ability of the Nepalese Maoists (eg,

through their recent blockade of Kathmandu and forced closure of dozens of industries all over Nepal) to mock the Government's writ in the land, as well as the evolution of new policies on the part of Government of India in dealing with its own Maoists. In India's judgement, a collapse of the constitutional forces in the face of the Maoist threat must be averted at all costs. It is however unfortunately clear that the combination of multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy in Nepal is saddled with too many inner contradictions and deep mutual distrust, and may not be able to deal effectively with the crisis facing the state. It is far from clear as to how in this situation, Nepal can be helped in a bilateral framework towards the only viable solution, which is to become an inclusive democracy with minimum levels of delivery. Any inclination on the part of India to be proactive will only attract controversy and become counterproductive. Nor is it clear how complicated issues like the Maoist demand for a Constituent Assembly, future of constitutional monarchy, civilian control over the Royal Nepal Army, disarming Maoist cadres, holding elections, etc are to be addressed without a facilitation acceptable to all sides if and when a peace process starts. India and Nepal also need to move beyond the Maoist insurgency and away from traditional concepts of military and strategic consideration. Apart from more effective joint management of the border and improving the infrastructural arrangements, the core issue of improvement of the quality of governance on both sides of the border will have to be tackled with a sense of urgency. Without this, threats to India as well as Nepal, whether from unfriendly third countries or the Maoist insurgency or the drugs-and-arms smuggling network will continue. In this context, India will have to look at the need to respond to the widely held feeling in Nepal that the 1950 Treaty is outdated and unfair to Nepal and needs to be reviewed. A special relationship--- one in which Nepal obtains economic advantages in exchange for dilution of its sovereign space--- is less sustainable than a relationship of strategic interdependent economic interlinkages. Specifically, the two countries need to build on possibilities in the water resources and hydropower sector, and attracting investment and economic growth in the Bihar-UP-Nepal triangle if the security and economic prospects for the entire subregion are to be strengthened. K V Rajan is a former Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs and served as India's Ambassador to Nepal from 1995 to 2000.K V Rajan is a former Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs and served as India's Ambassador to Nepal from 1995 to 2000.

Nepal-India relations:

Time for New Thrust

to say, overall inundation problems back from 1985 to until 2 October 2004 were discussed. SB Regmi, the leader of the delegation of SCIP from the Nepalese side, in an interview with this author, informed that there are at least 7 places where due to Indian construction works the inundation problem in Nepal occurs. The Nepalese side had 31-point-agenda and the Indian side had 21 for discussion. So, "Disputes over allocation of water rights either achieve celebrity status or remain simmering until they erupt." Out of many irritant zones, the Bund constructed opposite to Nepal's Banke district, Laxmanpur, has effected Nepal's 9-VDCs and has been constructed at a distance of 300 metre from the border. The 10th SCIP Meeting had agreed not to carry on construction further without Nepal's consent.

Dr Bishnu Hari Nepal Nepal and India have friendly relations, and so I better use the word 'constraint zones' instead of 'conflicts'. While being very close, it is natural that some resolvable differences or unresolved issues prevail, and history shows that they are resolved by frequent negotiations. In the 21st century, countries, big or small, can live together with equal status and draw mutual benefit out of their resources. Singapore exemplifies the size query positively.

Inundation -- a regular problematic paradigm: The Third High Level Technical Committee Meeting on Inundation between the two countries was held during 27-29 September 2004 and it could draw no conclusion regarding Nepal's problem of inundation particularly due to Laxmanpur Barrage vis-a-vis Rupandehi and Rassyal Khurda Lautan vis-a-vis Banke districts of Nepal. India agreed to manage â&#x20AC;&#x153;sluice gateâ&#x20AC;? regarding Laxmanpur Bund but regarding the threat of inundation to Lumbini, the birthplace of Lord Buddha, India rejected the maps presented by the Nepalese side.

Regarding Koshi Dam, Nepal's suggestion for the dam site was in Barah Kshetra, upper part from today's location. Irrigation sharing in practice from Koshi Project is: Nepal nearly 87,000 hectares and India about 2 million hectares. Similarly, Western Koshi Canal remained a decades-long project to be completed. Under the Gandak scheme Nepal was supposed to get water for nearly 16,000 hectares from the west canal and 40,000 hectares from the east canal and in this project also India irrigates nearly 2 million hectares, 33 times higher than Nepal's. Due to strong protests in Nepal Tanakpur Agreement had to be terminated and be replaced by the Pandora's Box, Pancheswore Multipurpose Project, popularly known as the Mahakali Treaty, having no DPR even in 8 years.

Following the failed 3rd HLTC Meeting, the 13th Meeting of the bilateral Standing Committee on Inundation Problem (SCIP) was held on September 30-October 2,2004, in Kathmandu, but without concrete outcome. Extensive discussions were held on Mahalisagar arrangements vis-a-vis Kapilvastu to Koilabas barrage of Dang district and Ring Bund endangering Rautahat. So

In 1995, on cost-benefit analysis of mutual cooperation, this author had calculated 1947-1995, out of some 1 J 8 India donated projects, it had totalled approximately NRs. 5,490.00 million including very significant projects like Bir Hospital, Tribhuvan Highway, Tribhuvan Airport and many more. But in 1999, Nepal's senior journalist and writer Aditya Man Shrestha while

Water and Energy CBMs

b. Irrigation: a Tragedy Zone Sharada Dam constructed in 1928 by the Agreement of 1927 between British India and the Rana regime of Nepal in exchange with some sal trees and lC Rs 50,000.00 that time, Koshi Agreement of April 25, 1954 and revised on December 19, 1966 bears technical constraints of the "sluice gate", silt in the Chatara canal and change of the course of the river etc. for getting either "no" or "less" water to Nepal side during dry season and "inundation" during lean season; Gandak Agreement of December 4, 1959 with similar technology, Dam constructed in Bhainsalotan, and Tanakpur Agreement done by G P Koirala in 1991, have been very unpopular in Nepal.

calculating irrigation benefits revealed very astonishing figures, in his words, â&#x20AC;&#x153;Nepal's aid to Indiaâ&#x20AC;?, he says, â&#x20AC;&#x153;Indian aid to Nepal totals Rs 5 billion whereas the benefits it has derived from Nepalese cooperation comes to Rs 3,671.25 billion. In that sense India has gained a cool Rs 3666.25 billion more than what it has given to Nepal. That means, for every visible rupee India has donated to Nepal in the form of aid, it has gained Rs 733.25 in return in invisible ways from Nepal." Shrestha's methodology of calculation is yielding of products per hectare per annum and based on the then price. But he is forgetting to calculate the health, education, road or airport utility factor benefited by Nepal. These sectors have no measurable and material value. Nepal is working on six major irrigation projects. They are: Pancheswore Multi-purpose Project, Shikta (Banke), Babai (Bardiya), Kankai Multi-Purpose Project, Bagmati and Kamala irrigation projects-all flowing to five sub-basins in India, namely: Ghagra (Karnali, Sharada, Rapti, Babai,etc.), Gandak, Budhi Gandak (from the vicinity of Birgunj), Koshi (the Sapta Koshis) and Mahananda (Mechi, Kankai, Tista, etc.). Then after, most of the rivers flow to the Ganges-Basin. They have the linkage to India's ambitious River Linking Project, which Bangladesh has vehemently criticised. HMGNepal has kept mum in this regard, because it has not speculated the detrimental effects of the project. The biggest constraints regarding irrigation developments in Nepal, at the moment, are two projects, namely, Babai and Shikta. In Babai, the Nepalese side says, nearly half of the work was done. International donors were ready to invest. The project got momentum in 1995. Similarly, Shikta Irrigation Project readied its DPR some 25-30 years ago with a target to irrigate nearly 1 lac hectares. The EU and Saudi Fund were available for the implementation of the project. But due to India's stand on the basis of the unilateral downstream riparian right, Nepal has been unable to enhance the projects. Experts believe that Nepal and India share both the possible benefits of the immense Himalayan river water resources as well as the disasters, hence, they should manage it for their mutual benefit, and because water is affected by everything, and water affects everything and everyone. c. Hydropower: A Missing Opportunity Out of 83,000MW capacity, second highest after Brazil, Nepal's economically viable hydropower production has been estimated 42,000MW, of which 25,000MW has been under active consideration. Many scholars regard India has better interest in 'water' than 'hydropower'

generated in Nepal. Water is life but India also needs power. Perhaps, UP alone needs 20,000MW by 2010. Therefore, killing two birds with one stone approach seems pragmatic. Water can be stored in Nepal in appropriate natural arrangements for multipurpose use in downstream. As you raise the dam level, you increase the energy output. Even Bangladesh's drought and flood crisis could be resolved with this approach. Electricity also can be traded to Bangladesh from India's "chicken neck". Many scholars also speculate since India already produced 336MW in Chukha and is engaged in Tala Hydro Poject with I020MW capacity in Bhutan, costeffectively, so, Nepal is not on the priority list. But this approach is non-pragmatic because, the demand of the Indian people is very high, and "The Jewels of Nepal" like "Upper Tama Koshi" and "West Seti" are wasted. Joint venture should start before it is too late, provided the venture must yield mutual benefit. Frankly, The Koshi and The Gandak projects scared many Nepalese. Therefore, no major hydropower agreement could be signed with India during 60's, 70's, 80's and mid 90's. It is only in 1996 that Mahakali Treaty was possible. That also brought a great rift in the country's current largest political party CPN-UML. Because of this rift, it had to sit out of the government for five years. Many diplomats say better wrong agreement than no agreement, but this author prefers to say better no agreement than a wrong agreement. Still agreement is inevitable for mutual cooperation. Water once used in hydropower generation can be used as drinking water, but water once used for irrigation, factories or household consumptions usually cannot be reused The exception to this might be Yokohama city water supply. Comparing personal interests and national interests, Nehru, in 1948, speaking to the villagers who were to be displaced by the Hirakud Dam, had said, "If you are to suffer, you should suffer in the interest of the country." B. Nepal-India Open Border and Threats to Regional Security The unique character of Nepal-India relations is their open border. It has so many positive implications for the Nepalese and Indians. For instance, it is convenient to travel. strengthens bilateral ties, quick emergency response and assistance can be found, provides medical service facilities, immediate supply of food grain and daily consumer goods to the locals, competitive market, supply of local labour, etc. is possible. In spite of these positive implications, the negative implications are rampant. They are: Encroachment of No-Man's-Land and Border: Post-Sugauli Agreement of 1816, in modern Nepal, "So far 60,000.00 hectares of the Nepalese land

in 54 border areas along the frontier have come under India's encroachment." Major points are: KalapaniLimpiyadhura occupied by Indian army: 37,840 ha, Susta area: 14,860 ha, Mechi River segment: 1630 ha, Banbasa-Sharada canal area: 15 ha, Tanakpur Afflux Bund: 222 ha, etc. Open border causes problems of migration. Some 135,000 Bhutanese refugees are living in Nepal today. “Nepal as a nation state has a history of more than 3000 years”, but it is bleeding today due to the Maoist insurgency. Therefore, the new approach is the regulated border. C. Creating New History Anand Aditya says, “Unlike in the case of private contractual law, might, in the course of their treaty transactions, becomes right and duress does not invalidate treaty, although it may continue to generate considerable controversy.” He gives three examples to back this statement: The Durand and MacMahon lines and Korea-Japan Protocol of 1904 but observation of the functional character of Treaties is mandatory in International Law. World Watch Institute 'identified India as one of the countries to be worst hit by water scarcity in the new millennium'. According to J. Bandyopadhya, Nepal as Water Tank contributes about 71% of the Ganges dry season flows and 41 % of the total annual flows. Considering these needs and potential realities, the NIBB Water Ways Model has been developed. 3R Model has been developed to resolve interstate water conflicts in South Asia. Interstate water agreements of the region were: The Koshi Agreement, April 25, 1954 and later amended on December 19, 1966; The Gandak Agreement, December 4, 1959 and later amended on April 30, 1965; The Indus Water Treaty, September 19, 1960; Mahakali Treaty, February 12, 1996 and Treaty on Sharing of the Ganges Waters at Farakka, December 12,

Nepalese delegation using the occasion to be heard in New Delhi

1996. More or less, they all failed and the conflicts continue. Upstream and downstream riparian rights have not been clarified. Therefore, unanimous SA-3R i.e. South Asian Regional Riparian Rights Statute has been obligatory to resolve interstate water conflicts. Proposed Resolution: Respecting the Helsinki Convention on riparian rights, South Asian Countries could adopt 8KM distance as RRR zone, upstream or downstream, from the international border, while constructing a dam or major water management activity. Other Proposed Resolutions d. Abolish and re-write all ineffective Treaties and Agreements: bilateral, multilateral and regional among nations in South Asia. That specially applies to NepalIndia Relations also. e. Effectively regulate and manage all bilateral borders so that cross border criminal activities can be stopped. f. Further facilitate LDCs to implement SAFTA smoothly on bilateral or multi-lateral basis. These countries need FDI for their employment generation to alleviate poverty. g. Educate, implement, promote and maintain water harnessing in a broader perspective so that the poorest living standard of the potentially richest subcontinent can be upgraded. The best example can be taken from Bhutan. h. Flow of print media within the South Asian countries is constrained even today, though it was agreed theoretically in the earlier SAFMA resolutions and should become viable. i. Intra-regional Tourism is a boon to South Asia. It should go on smoothly and should not be disturbed by the insurgents in conflict-prone zones, because, this service industry is directly related to the poverty alleviation.

Salman Khurshid addresses the session on India-Pakistan relations

Possibilities of

Indo-Pak Salman Khurshid

Peace

The history of our attempts to resolve the Indo- Pak conflict can, at best, be summed up as a combination of wishful thinking, self-righteousness, hypocrisy and acute myopia, on both sides. The search for a solution has acquired a new meaningful context and urgency because of the convergence of changing contexts for both countries. But distressingly, despite the BJP's stated commitment to peace in the 6th January 2004 joint statement about a composite dialogue on “all issues including Jammu and Kashmir”, their response to the September 24th, 2004 Manmohan SinghMusharraf joint statement was curiously negative. Their objections may well be the usual party political damage control unrelated to real positions on bilateral issues. But they do indicate a naivetté on Jammu and Kashmir. We know it and so does the world that it is Jammu and Kashmir that has soured relations between India and Pakistan. We all would of course be very happy if Pakistan just forgot about Jammu and Kashmir and cut off the oxygen to the terrorist outfits that continue to cause casualties in Jammu and Kashmir. Some people actually believe this is what the talks are about with Pakistan. In other words it is not

about 'what', it is only about 'when' and 'how'. But what is there in it for Pakistan? They would certainly want to know why did they had to fight so long and so disastrously, if this is all that could be achieved? Similarly, for Pakistan it would be misplaced optimism to assume that the changed context in the world and U.S. policy planners' perception of Pakistan having acquired fresh strategic significance in the global war against terrorism would inevitably lead to a “ territory for terrorism” swap on the lines of “ land for peace” in Palestine. Yet India too has to watch out for a unique dilemma so long as terrorist activity continues, whether we say it in joint statements or we don't, no Indian government can talk peace or show any concession; but if terrorism stops there will be an expectation on the Pakistan side of a “peace dividend”. Something like that happened in the aftermath of 9/11 when the U.S. sought a partnership with both Pakistan and India in the war against terrorism and disappointed India. And to top it, circumstances made Pakistan more critical to that war. So where does all this take us? There is too much at stake for India to allow our relations with Pakistan to keep us from seizing the opportunities. Pakistan, after 57 years of traumatic existence, cannot afford not to find a national objective and an aspiration other than a myth from the past. For both sides to cling on to a hope, indeed a shortsighted expectation of an “all or nothing” solution is detrimental to their own interests. If President Musharraf has to rein in and persuade his own fundamentalists, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh too has to carry the separatists in Jammu and Kashmir and at least silence the saffron fringe. Neither of them has an easy task. Nor do our two countries.

Common people do usually prefer peace over violence provided the latter is not given the colours of romance (ideology). But the romance fades quickly as violence draws closer to home. Ironically peace efforts have the greatest chance of success when one side figures out that it has lost on when a stalemate of continuing violence begins to tire the common folk. In the IndiaPakistan relationship, the former is now virtually impossible and the latter is only beginning to happen. But it seems that the world is in a hurry and in no mood to wait. That can be an advantage for both of us but we need some understanding and a lot of courage. It seems that India has toyed with some ideas for solution that depart from the formally stated position. Similarly, Pakistan has lately suggested a methodology that in turn is indicative of their preference. The past practice of suspecting everything said by the other side and therefore saying 'no' will take its own time to fade away. There are several contemporary models of successful reconciliation and transformations, leading from hostility to peace. South Africa, Berlin, Vietnam, Palestine, etc. One can pick out interesting pointers from each one of those. However the most rewarding exercise would be to examine the IRA peace agreement. There are obviously many layers and dimensions to the resolution of that long and bloody conflict but for India and Pakistan the particular

aspect of boundaries becoming progressively irrelevant is most interesting. The growth of EU as a supranational identity with the attendant practical conveniences, the common market, easy travel across frontiers etc., had a psychological impact that made the ethnic/nationalist concerns less dominant. The opportunity that came with the union in a sense blunted the complaints of past injustice. It thus became possible to talk about and embrace a solution, if the traditional or artificial sense of nationalism and territorial sovereignty can be tempered with a sense of participation in a greater enterprise. Since all the imagined or real reasons of the conflict have largely disappeared, it remains for us to overcome established mindsets. If Pakistan can play India in cricket and hockey as equals, talk to India as a nuclear country to another, why cannot we sit as equals in the pursuit of peace? If Pakistani leadership shows statesmanship in working towards a futuristic concept that binds Pakistan, rather than genetically flawed concept of a state for Muslims of the sub-continent and Indian leadership can achieve statesman-like rapprochement with our estranged compatriots in Jammu and Kashmir, we can come to the table with the ability to secure sustainable peace. The mention of the gas pipeline in the MusharrafManmohan Singh joint statement may be the beginning of a model of coexistence or cooperation that has eluded us for half a century.

Kalyani Shankar and K. Gopalkrishnan, India

Former External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha assures SAFMA of his support for peace

Bipartisan Consensus on Peace Yashwant Sinha The opposition will support the United Progressive Alliance government's efforts to normalise ties with Pakistan. As the then opposition (Congress) had lent support to the Vajpayee government for initiating peace between New Delhi and Islamabad. There will not be partisan politics on the issue in the country.

National security is a major concern not only for India but for any other nation and should be dealt with sensitivity.

I welcome the government decision to allow Pakistani journalists to travel to Jammu and Kashmir. There may be minor differences between the government and the opposition, but the end objective is to find peace in the region.

A South Asian Union with softer borders among the region's countries should be formed as a logical step for the Free Trade Agreement (FTA). Economic advancement of India alone will not help in the development of the entire region.

However, India will never compromise its national security and interest. Any move for a third-party mediation on Kashmir will derail the fledgling peace process between India and Pakistan.

India may become a developed nation by 2020-25 but it will not eradicate poverty from the entire South Asian region. Our neighbours should not wallow in a sea of poverty and deprivation. The SAFTA agreement is an outstanding achievement of the SAARC Summit held in Islamabad in January 2004. The importance of cooperation in trade and economy would yield dividends to the peoples of the both sides.

The two sides owe great responsibility towards peace process, which should not be allowed to be derailed by the interference of the third force. The strong understanding between the two sides must be maintained which should be understood by the rest of the world. It is important to ensure that the despondency does not dominate the dialogue process and at the same time, impatience has to be kept under check. Indian policies have never been Pakistan-centric, they rather enshrine broader objectives. The approach towards neighbouring countries is an important part of the overall policy of India. There would always be an asymmetry in India's relations with its South Asian neighbours, including Pakistan, given the country's size and pace of economic development. We accept that asymmetry in other fields, particularly trade and economic exchange.... But like any

other nation we will never compromise on our national interest and security.

The pace of progress in economic and trade cooperation need to be accelerated, maintaining his concern was that neighbouring countries should not be left behind in economic development. We all (South Asian states) have to make economic progress together and they (other states of South Asia) can take advantage of the Indian market. India being bigger among South Asian countries in terms of size and resources would be ready to make concessions in the field of trade and commerce. South Asia can never be a zone of peace if there is economic disparity. Yashwant Sinha is a senior BJP leader and former external affairs minister

Indo-Pak Relations: Present and Future All this can only happen if Pakistan and India work together. In Siachen, if both sides agree not to cut their nose to spite their face (we will continue to pay Rs 500 for every Chappati the Jawan eats while stationed in Siachen so long as the Pakistanis have to pay Rs 100 for every Chappati fed to their Jawans stationed in the same frosty wastes), the agreement reached in 1989 can be signed and implemented quickly. One can only hope when Indian Defense Minister Mr. Pranab Mukherjee, in announcing the resumption of the talks between the military officials of both sides referred to the history of past negotiations, this was the direction in which he was pointing.

Najmuddin A. Shaikh Pakistan achieved 6.4% growth in 2003-04 and in 200405 growth was expected at 6.6% despite the water shortage. In the first quarter of 04-05 India's growth rate was 7.2% and would be about 6.6% for the year. Without the constraints and the expenditure the tensions between the two engender, the growth rate of each could top or at least come close to 10% annually. By one estimate, transit fees from the proposed pipeline would add $500 million to Pakistan's or close to 1 % of GDP while in the case of India the lower costs of gas and its transportation costs would give India an equal percentage boost in its much larger GDP. If SAARC as a regional organisation is ever to rival ASEAN or to provide incentives for ECO and ASEAN to seek cooperation with South Asia through the SAARC mechanism, the political barriers to the development of SAARC must be done away with and methodologies must be designed to ensure that all SAARC members benefit, in more or less equal measure, from this organisation. If there is to be genuine free trade in the region it must be ensured that such trade promotes a division of labour that will enable all members to benefit equally.

Similarly, the settlement of the Sir Creek boundary along the lines indicated in all the maps accepted by both sides would enable both countries to demarcate not only the land border but also the maritime boundary in an area in the existence of substantial undersea gas and oil deposits. Whether one side gets less and another more should be seen as less important than the fact that both would benefit. So too on Tulbul, if it is indeed no more than a navigational project and does not involve any obstruction to the full flow of water downstream, or if the obstruction is of minor nature, an agreement should be reached. Any substantial difference should, as provided in the Indus Waters Treaty, be referred to international arbitration. The same position should hold with regard to Wullar. It seems that agreement will be reached on a formal pact providing for advance notification of missile launches. This will be a good start even though it will only formalize what is already being done in practice. It is my hope that we will move further and also reach agreement on the non-deployment of short-range missiles in the border areas. Since both countries have tested medium range missiles, the effect of this agreement will be more symbolic than real but it will be an important political signal and an important indicator of the intent of both sides to minimize the chances of an accidental or inadvertent incident triggering the wrong sort of alarms in the other country. These measures as also the creation of better communication facilities between the strategic forces of

the two countries are important, but even more important if we are genuinely seeking to jointly wage a war against poverty. We have to find ways to reduce our conventional defense expenditure and to ensure that our nuclear deterrent is maintained at the minimum level. A sense of security has been engendered in Pakistan by the acquisition of a minimum nuclear deterrent. Were the value of the deterrent to be called into question by the Indian acquisition of weapon systems, Pakistan would have no choice but to expend limited resources on further strengthening its deterrent. As the example of the Soviet Union and the United States has shown that once the two countries step on top this slippery slope there will be no stopping. The US and the Soviet Union spent $5.5 trillion on building and maintaining their nuclear arsenals. More importantly they built powerful lobbies within the country. As a result the United States is budgeting for research on new nuclear weapons. It has wasted more than $70 billion on the quest for a missile defense system, which the United States needs as much as it needs a hole in the head. All it has to show for it is the so-

called deployment of a system that, according to experts, cannot possibly tackle the nonexistent threat that it is deployed against. So do we want to step on to this path? Or should we be sagacious enough to agree on a restraint regime in both the conventional and nuclear field that addresses the differing security concerns of the two countries but without exaggerating the threat? The answer is obvious. Pakistan has proposed a restraint regime. Clearly it is of greater benefit to Pakistan, which has a much smaller resource base. But no one should doubt that it is of benefit also to India. If we are not "playing thy neighbour", the Pakistan proposal deserves serious consideration and substantive discussion. It may sound overly optimistic, but I feel that the present leadership will take steps, with the full support of the people of both countries, to resolve existing problems and to realize in full the advantages that a cooperative relationship between the two countries can bring. Najmuddin A Shaikh is a former Pakistani foreign secretary

(L to R) C Raja Mohan, Najmuddin Sheikh, Yashwant Sinha, Imtiaz Alam, Salman Khurshid, KK Katyal and Ejaz Haider

Ahmer Bilal Soofi

Legal View:

Wullar, Siachin and Sir Creek I am presenting a legal summary of the three issues along with brief positions taken by both the parties. All these disputes are technical. They stem from legal texts (Wullar from 1960 Treaty, Siachin from 1949 Karachi Agreement, Sir Creek from interpretation of maps). Wullar Barrage Wullar, upstream Jhelum river on the Indian side of Jammu and Kashmir, is said to be the largest fresh water lake. India proposed to build a barrage on the mouth of the lake to provide for storage of water and its controlled release to make the river Jhelum navigable throughout the year. That is why Indians also refer to it as Tulbul Navigation Lock project. Pakistan opposed the move saying it violated the Indus Water Treaty of 1960 between both the states. Pakistan says that under the controlling Articles of the Indus Water Treaty, namely Articles 2 and 3, the broad principle of distribution of the rivers has been spelled out clearly. Under the principle, the waters of the three western rivers, Jhelum, Chenab and Indus would be available to Pakistan. The waters of three remaining rivers (eastern rivers), namely Beas, Ravi and Sutlej, would be available for unrestricted use of India. Pakistan maintains that any attempt to block the water, or make a storage, upstream on river Jhelum, would be in violation of the 1960 Treaty and that storage for navigation is not permissible under the Treaty of 1960. Secondly, several improved communication links are serving as better alternative to river navigation, and so, India has no rationale to build the barrage.

India says it has the technical endorsement to build a barrage on Wullar in the light of the article III para 4 of the Indus Water Treaty. The article first broadly prohibits all attempts to store or restrict flow of water on Jhelum, but as an exception allows construction under certain conditions and technical specifications which are enlisted in Annex D and E of the 1960 Treaty. Wullar has been included in Indo-Pak talks almost 10 times. It came very close to resolution when in 1991 a draft agreement was prepared but could not be signed. Indians blame Pakistan for tying up the resolution with construction of proposed 390-MW Kishanganga Hydroelectric project. The parties have later considered using the draft agreement as a starting point for resolution. The agreement tacitly allowed building of the barrage with monitoring by the Indus Water Commissioners (established under the 1960 Treaty) and intends to introduce technical restrictions such as 6.2 meters of barrage would remain ungated with crest level at EL 1574.90 meters along with other stipulations. If there is a political acceptance on both the sides for the construction of the barrage, several alternatives are available to find a way forward. For example, both the states can (a) agree to assign the issue to resolution under the Indus Water Treaty Mechanism (b) revisit the draft agreement prepared in 1991 (c) prepare an independent technical solution and for resolution of future disputes, link it with the dispute resolution mechanism of 1960 Treaty.

Siachin After the 1948 ceasefire between the Indian army and Pakistani army in Kashmir, under the mandate of UN, the positions held by both the sides were frozen and the line dividing these positions was referred to as the ceasefire line (CFL). The following year, in 1949, military commanders of both the sides entered into a detailed agreement whereby the ceasefire line was documented, delimited on the map and demarcated on the ground. This was done under the 1949 Karachi Agreement. This delimitation ended almost with the position of the troops and the areas further north of the troops' positions were not delimited or demarcated. In the 1971 war, the position of Indian and Pakistan armies opposing each other on the ceasefire line, changed. There were some gains and losses on earlier positions by both the side. Again when the fire ceased, courtesy UN intervention, the new positions emerged. Instead of withdrawal to the ceasefire line positions, the new positions were accepted and now the line dividing the opposing troops on the ground was referred to as the line of control (LoC), which exists even today. The military commanders again delimited and demarcated the LoC and its last point on the map was NJ 9842. This point was almost 78 kilometers short of the present Siachin glacier. In short in 1980s Indian army movements were detected around Siachin area and Pakistan mobilised its troops and since then both the armies are locked in Saichin without a clear military victory. India has two alternative positions on Siachin. Firstly, it argues, that Siachin is part of Kashmir and Kashmir is part of India which is endorsed generally by the Indian Constitution and therefore, it has the right to station troops on Siachin. In alternative India argues that under the 1949 Karachi agreement, when `the line proceeds northwards towards glacier' straight upwards, Siachin falls on the Indian side of the so extended LOC. Pakistan says that extension of line if made northwards towards glaciers, while keeping in view the previous course of direction of LOC, would see distinctly Siachin falling on the Pakistani side of the so extended LOC. Pakistan relies on evidence of state practice whereby Pakistan is confident of its claim of having asserted better administrative control in relation to Siachin. For example, it relies on several atlases and expeditions seeking approval from Pakistan. Pakistan also argues that Siachin occupation is a breach of Simla Agreement thus relieving Pakistan from obligations of bilateralism.

Resolution of Siachin means solutions of two different issues. First, the de-militarisation of the glacier itself and second the resolution of the title of the glacier. One concern holding back the solution of this issue is that parties fear that resolution of first may not be tied up with the second. Although there are formulations that de-militarisation is notwithstanding the issue of eventual title, it does bother both the states. Therefore, the starting point of the negotiations should be a clear, well-declared and well-phrased verdict mutually accepted that de-militarisation (a) does not tantamount to waiver of claims to title of either party (b) a time bound mechanism to commence the process of determining the title of the glacier. In this mechanism, there are multiple choices before the parties. For example, they can agree on international arbitration, or agree to submit the issue to ICJ. In case of ICJ or arbitration, the parties would need to agree on the terms of reference to be submitted to arbitration. Or the parties may continue with the political dialogue for a political rather than technical solution. What should be the legal status of the Siachin territory while demilitarisation takes place and parties await resolution of the title. In my view, it may be declared as `terra nullis' (territory belonging to no one), a recognised regime under international law. The talks on Siachin, must take account of the issues raised, other wise, they would again end in a deadlock, because giving up the territory means extinguishing executive control over the disputed terrain. Sir Creek Wherever a river forms a delta before falling into the sea, it develops creeks on the coastal line. Around the area where the present border of Pakistan is supposed to meet India in the delta area south of the Rann of Kutch, a dispute arose over drawing a dividing line between the two countries. The demarcation becomes significant when the line is extended seawards to divide the sea boundary between India and Pakistan. The line then directly affects the division of sea resources including minerals, fish and other marine life between the two countries. A country's rights on the resources of the sea are now granted by the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. The Convention gives additional rights, to both India and Pakistan, over sea resources up to 200 nautical miles in the water column and up to 350 nautical miles in the land beneath the water column. It also provides principles on the basis of which sea boundaries have to be drawn between the states adjacent to each other with a concave

coastline. In short, the land boundary's general course of direction on the land leading up to the coast, can make a difference of hundreds of square nautical miles of sea when stretched into the sea as a divider between the said two states. Pakistan and India have a concave coastline. With the new 1982 Law of the Sea Convention adopted by both, the governments have suddenly realised the enormous sea resources that can be lost or won on the basis of the land terminal point where the border between India and Pakistan ends. That is why Sir Creek has become more contentious than ever before. There is a comprehensive dispute relating to maps of the creek. During the British period, the Rann of Katch was partly administered by the Government of Sindh and partly by the Maharaja of Rann of Katch. In 1913, the Government of Bombay resolved the boundary dispute through a ruling, which became the basis of the 1914 map referred to as B-40. It was around 1925-6 that some pillars were erected at distances, demarcating on ground the agreed boundary between the state of Katch and the Sind Government. The line was to follow a longitude till a specific point called border post (B.P) 1179 and from there run parallel with (longitude) to the mouth of the creek and then follow the eastern side of the creek. The eastern edge was also called the Green Reband because of its visible thickness on the map. Around 1937-8, the Government of India issued the map of the said terrain by the Surveyor General, which affirmed eventually the said position of eastern side being the border. In 1947, due to partition, the eastern edge of the creek was deemed to have been converted as the concluding portion of the international border between India and Pakistan. In 1965, the Rann of Katch Arbitration took place. India agreed to exclude the line beyond B.P. (border post) 1175 from arbitration for it was not disputed. Thus the arbitrator never adjudicated on the boundary of the Sir Creek as both parties agreed that no dispute existed.

Salman Khurshid, KK Katyal, Ejaz Haider and Vinod Sharma

India said that the border from the mouth of Sir Creek should run on the western side of the creek and not the eastern one. This was a major departure from its earlier position of agreeing to the eastern side. Pakistan opposes this and instead relies on the Resolution Maps of 1913-14 and the 1937 Map approved by the Surveyor General of India. One option for the parties was to follow the Thalweg principle. This means drawing a line in the middle of the deepest navigational channel. The fundamental technical confusion is that the dialogue process has failed to realise that Sir Creek negotiations is not part of political process alone, but is a clear obligation on the two states under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. Whether the dialogue process is on or not, both the states have obligations Article 76 (in respect of Continental shelf), Article 74 (in respect of the Exclusive Economic Zone) and Article 15 (in respect of the territorial sea) of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention to arrive at a negotiated settlement based on principles of International Law. India could argue that there is no dispute on delimitation of sea boundary and that the present dispute is regarding the international border, which was simmering much before the 1982 Law of the sea Convention came on-line. However, even if this argument is accepted, the obligations under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention remain unfulfilled because the sea boundaries remain undivided. If both the parties fail to reach an agreement then Part XV of the 1982 Law, which provides for the formal mechanism in respect of settlement of disputes, can be invoked. The process of dialogue can authorise resort to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. The 'management of the talks' is an important issue. Experts' input must be obtained first, with several alternatives. Diplomats should make a political choice from the technically approved alternatives.

Former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan Satinder Kumar Lambah addressing the conference

Sir Creek and Siachen Issues S. K. Lambah Sir Creek India and Pakistan differ over delineation of the boundary in the Sir Creek. India cites a resolution adopted by the then Bombay Government on Feb 24, 1914 that the boundary lies at â&#x20AC;&#x153;the Centre of the navigable channelâ&#x20AC;? for the Sir Creek changes its course from time to time. The map showed the boundary as a thick band along the eastern bank of Sir Creek. Pakistan's position is based on this map. Since September 1967 when joint demarcation of the Sir Creek area was discussed in Lahore, Pakistan has been saying that the Sir Creek boundary lay along with its eastern bank. There has been no progress in the several rounds of discussions. In these discussions Pakistan has maintained that the maritime boundary is directly linked to the settlement of the termination points. The fixation of a boundary around the middle of the Creek in accordance with the 1914 resolution would also help in the delineation of the maritime boundary line. The median/equidistance line method using the low water lines and low tide elevation of India and Pakistan could be the criteria for the demarcation of the maritime

boundary in the territorial sea. Similarly the equidistance/equitable principles could be the basis for the maritime boundary beyond the territorial sea. India has settled its maritime boundaries with other neighbours. The resolution of the Sir Creek could lead to the settlement of the maritime boundary with Pakistan which will enable both countries to divert their energies to mutually advantageous issues. Siachen Glacier The Siachen Glacier is 76 kilometres long and its width varies from 2 kms to 8 kms. It is considered one of the largest glaciers in the world. The Siachen Glacier starts from the pass called Indira Col in the west and runs in south-eastern direction into the Nubra River which flows south to meet the Shyok River. The Karakoram Range is to the east of the glacier and the Saltoro Range is to the west. The important passes along with Saltoro Range are Sia La, Bilafond La, Gyong La and Yarma La. The Glacier is the source of the Nubra River. Some early information about this area is found in the works of Vigine who visited Skardu in 1835 and wrote about this area. More information is available in the Gazetteer of Kashmir and Ladakh compiled at the end of the 19th Century. The conditions in that area are certainly inhospitable. India would like a settlement. Some strategic thinkers in Pakistan have misunderstood the inhospitable condition and costs being incurred by India as a reason for Indian keenness for a settlement in Siachen. They have often

written that India spends more than Pakistan. The dispute between India and Pakistan is not about the point where the Loc ends but about the interpretation beyond NJ 9842. There have been eight rounds of talk on Siachen since 1986. The first round of talks was held in Rawalpindi in January 1986 where the atmosphere was from the outset not conducive. The Pakistan delegation had displayed prominently a big map joining 9842 with the Karakoram Pass. This was the only round after which no joint statement was issued. The second round in Delhi will be best remembered for the excellent analysis of Brig. V R Raghavan. Quoting from historical records he said Nubra area was never a part of Pakistan as had been claimed by Pakistan in the first round. Round three and four saw discussions without much progress. Round five held in June 1989 was the first after General Zia's death. There were high expectations as it was held after informal contacts. The joint statement said that “there was agreement by both sides to work towards a comprehensive settlement, based on redeployment of forces to reduce the changes of conflict, avoidance of the use of force and determination of future positions on the ground so as to conform to the Simla agreement and to ensure durable peace in the Siachen area. The Army authorities of both sides will determine these positions.” Pakistan said there was agreement. There was none. The joint statement said an in-depth examination of the proposals would be made in the next round. The sixth round was held in Delhi in November 1992. The joint statement said that “proposals aimed at a comprehensive resolution of Siachen issues were discussed.” There was a

A rare moment of refreshing acquaintance

broad understanding on disengagement and redeployment. The joint statement at the end of the seventh round (June 1997) reflected no progress. It said “discussions were held in a frank and cordial atmosphere the two sides stated their respective positions on the issue”. The eighth round was held in August 2004 after seven years. The statement said that “the military experts of the two sides also met to discuss modalities for disengagement and redeployment of troops and agreed to have further discussions. The two defence secretaries agreed to continue the discussions with a view to resolving the Siachen issue in a peaceful manner.” The foreign ministers of India and Pakistan who met in Delhi in September 2004 agreed to implement this decision. There is today a comparative peace and tranquillity in the area since the ceasefire of November 2003. This should be taken advantage of and the two countries could reach a meaningful settlement. The ingredients of the settlement have been discussed in various Siachen rounds and even informally agreed too. These include the establishment of a demilitarized zone in the Siachen Glacier, exchange of authenticated maps between the two countries showing the positions and redeployment on which there was basic agreement at the end of sixth round. Further agreements delineate a line from NJ 9842 based on current ground realities and ground rules for future conduct. A Siachen settlement could facilitate the dialogue between the two countries on Jammu & Kashmir. S.K. Lambah is a former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan

Human Security Vs Military Security Riyaz Punjabi The civil society is prodding the governments to accommodate the peoples' perceptions in the conduct of their international relations. These approaches are resulting in new cooperative mood of the state behaviour. There is a growing consensus across the world that these approaches have to be centered on peace and harmony between and among the peoples. Thus, this realization has introduced the concept of human security which is fast gaining currency and acclaim. It has resulted in the creation of a strong movement globally involving the people cutting across ideological differentiations and representing varied interests that human security should take precedence over military security. This movement has engaged the special attention of people who have actively participated in wars and witnessed horrors which wars inflict on the lives of the people. Therefore, the human security paradigm which focuses on the welfare of people and is directed towards realizing the goals of social and economic development deserves to be adopted as a basic doctrine in the conduct of relations between the states in South Asia. These states are beset with their own economic problems and an

approach based on cooperation, friendship and goodwill holds the key to the alleviation of these problems. This is not to suggest that the disputes which arose due to different historical and political reasons do not exist between the South Asian states. However, the confrontationist postures, especially of the military nature, have not resulted in the resolution of any dispute or provided a solution to any contentious issue which have embittered the relations between these states. This is especially true about India and Pakistan. On the other hand, the negotiations and peaceful engagements have paid the dividends. Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 which regulates the waters which flow out of Indus basin and pass through India provides an illustration to the point. Dr Riyaz Punjabi (Hony.) President, International Centre for Peace Studies, New Delhi is Editor, Journal of Peace Studies. He teaches in Centre For The Study of Social Systems, JNU, New Delhi.

Session III: Siachen, Sir Creek and Tulbul

Shashank Civil society is changing, and SAFMA being a part of it, is changing the whole paradigm of relationship in South Asia. In the post cold war era, globalisation is taking a greater role over the thinking of the people. Young people are perhaps more in tune with the trends of the globalisation. But they don't have the experience of the past, whereas SAFMA as an organisation can perhaps play that role watching what are the modern world expectations and how are we going to chase them. We have to understood that things considered respectable at one time are no longer so. Idea of national security as the strength of everything would perhaps not be considered very proper. We have also to think of human, economic and emotional security. So, good governance and transparent system are the standards by which performance of a government or nation is judged. Countries of South Asia will have to move forward and economic development and social requirement are to be fulfilled. We would like to move on because Asia has generally kept away from any kind of conflict ideology; they always have very comprehensive, inclusive ideology. It is time for the people of Kashmir to think in terms of social benefits for them. In Siachen a technical negotiation has to be undertaken so that both sides can be sure that until you reach a final settlement or whatever you do about the Indo-Pak relations on Kashmir, at least the other side will be cooperative. Now the two sides seem to have agreed that they have to move further. Indus Water: I would say in the context of the new paradigm we are working in, that the possibility for cooperation exists and a more cooperative approach needs to be taken. Wherever there is a possibility, we shall explore it with sincerity. If India and Pakistan work together, they can get better results. The changing civil society is looking at a future. I hope SAFMA can work and help in it. (Shashank is a former foreign secretary of India)

Shafqat Mehmood The only commitment we have made on Siachin is that it is meaningless to fight over it for so long. Both Pakistan and India have already lost a lot because of other circumstances than fight. Now we need to make a certain framework for withdrawal of forces from both sides of the area without going into the segregation and line draw business. Can we live without an agreement on Sir Creek? If we come to an agreement that we cannot live without an agreement on this issue, the problem is with our thinking. And if we agree that we can live without an agreement on Sir Creek issue, then just put it aside and move on instead of making it a bone of contention. When it comes to Wullar Barrage and Tulbul, it is slightly different. There is a treaty called Indus Water Treaty. So when we let the other two issues to benefit from ambiguity, it is difficult for this issue to benefit from ambiguity. But again this matter has been frozen for quite some time. Nothing is going on there which is of serious and immediate concern for Pakistan or India or can create a problem between India and Pakistan. Perhaps this is one issue about which clarity would have needed to be created and some sort of statistical information is needed about it. But if it is not to be solved right now, we shall move forward. Let us take advantage of ambiguity and doubt. Perhaps this way the peace process can move forward. As people have been singing for liberalism and peace I'm a liberal at heart and my heart beats for peace. (Shafqat Mehmood is a former minister of Pakistan) Khaled Ahmed said: 'Lesser' disputes have cropped up between India and Pakistan while the two countries were

being persuaded by the international community to resolve the big issue of Kashmir. The dispute over Siachen surfaced in 1984 when the two faced each other over the glacier approximately 150 miles northwest of Srinagar. Technically a part of Jammu & Kashmir, Siachen is located in a territory not clearly defined by the Simla Agreement. The Line of Control (LoC) established by the Agreement relied on the 1949 UN-mediated Ceasefire Line which was demarcated up to NJ9842 on the map. Beyond this point the document mentioned only the glaciers in general because of their inaccessibility. Both sides claimed that the other had provoked it into high-altitude deployment. India claimed that it wanted to secure the glacier because it formed a kind of gateway to Ladakh which was a part of the Indian-held Kashmir. It is accepted on all hands that India had made the first move on Siachen. The officers who had planned the operation tended to relate it to Chinese occupation of Aksai Chin, leading to the IndiaChina war of 1962. Their position was that New Delhi had not allowed reconnaissance of the high mountains in the 1950s, thus making it possible for the Chinese to build the secret Xinjiang-Tibet road. Pakistan mobilised claiming that the Indian move to Siachen would interdict Pakistan's communication with its Northern Areas. The Indian and Pakistani pickets on the Siachen glacier have fired upon each other for the last 20 years. Siachen seems to have become a permanent dispute because of (rather than in spite of) the Simla Agreement provision that all disputes would be resolved through bilateral discussion for which there is no enduring mechanism. The Agreement has thus became a kind of useful docket in which to regularly insert new disputes. The irony is that the Siachen dispute was first created by violating the Simla Agreement; then Simla Agreement was used as a peg to make it permanent. In 1985 prime minister Rajiv Gandhi and president Zia-ul-Haq agreed to solve the dispute through talks, then in 1987 Siachen saw one of its worst incidents of fighting on the glacier. In 1989, foreign secretaries from both sides came close to clinching an accord on calling the troops back to pre1984 positions, but India backtracked saying the accord had not been conclusive. Some Indian experts say that the Siachen issue is now as permanent as the Kashmir dispute. Outside observers think that prime minister Rajiv Gandhi backtracked on Siachen because electorally a climb-down from the Siachen would have been seen by the Indian masses as a confession of defeat at the hands of Pakistan. By 1993, six foreign secretary level talks had taken place without any result while much vitriol was expended on both sides on partisan presentations of the

issue. While the world categorises the war on Siachen as one of the most absurd undertakings of the 20th century it also looks at Siachen as a crisis 'successfully managed' by New Delhi and Pakistan. This is the minimalist view allowing the two countries to be seen as reasonably competent to isolate their disputes and not let them escalate into bigger crises. Since they are accompanied by flights of nationalist imagination on both sides, the truth may be that the accumulation of the secondary disputes is developing national psyches against any final resolution. A number of issues have come to surface in consequence of India's status of an upper riparian state. Here too India has been inclined to using the status to compel Pakistan to modify its conduct on the Kashmir dispute. Another issue which falls in the category of 'successfully managed' crises is the Wullar Barrage-Tulbul Navigation Project. The dispute arose in 1985 after India started work on a barrage on the Jhelum River at the mouth of the Wullar Lake near Srinagar. India claimed that the dam was meant to regulate navigation on the river in certain months of low flow. Pakistan accused India of violating the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty of 1960. Predictably the two could not resolve the issue through negotiations under the Simla Agreement in the decades that followed. The escalation represented by Wullar is the transformation of an otherwise well-performing Indus Treaty into a disputed one. While avoiding the option of arbitration under the Treaty, the two sides have peculiarly conflicting views on the status of the Wullar Barrage dispute after suspension of work on the barrage. India thinks that the dispute has been resolved to the satisfaction of both sides while Pakistan thinks that the dispute is pending. An official Pakistani website posits the dispute(s) like this: 'Over the years India has tried to start projects on the western rivers in Indian Occupied Kashmir that violate the provisions of the Treaty. Some of the important projects among these are: a) The Baglihar Hydroelectric Project on River Chenab. b) The Wullar barrage Project on River Jhelum. c) The Kishanganga Hydroelectric Project on River Kishanganga (River Neelum). d) The Dul-Hasti Hydroelectric Project on River Chenab. e) The Sawalkot Dam on River Chenab. Apart from above-mentioned controversial project, India has recently started avoiding holding of special meetings of the Pakistan India Commission (PIC) and conducting tours. During the last year (2002) no general tour of inspection could be carried out due to Indian reluctance. Similarly, India refused to entertain Pakistan's request of carrying out a special inspection

tour of the Baglihar hydroelectric project on river Chenab and also refused to hold a special meeting of the PIC on the same issue. These are all blatant violations of the Indus Water Treaty'. It appears that instead of 'managing' the crises the two countries are busy creating new disputes.

in the middle of the stream. Pakistan contends on the basis of earlier agreements that it should pass on the eastern shore of the creek, thus practically giving the creek to Pakistan. Since India had relied on an earlier map giving the boundary on the eastern bank it was supposed to have yielded the point.

The Pakistani view of the Baglihar Hydroelectric Project on River Chenab is summarised as follows: The 450-MW Baglihar power-project, which India is building on the Chenab River in occupied Kashmir, is at present a major water issue between the two countries. Under the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), India is entitled to use the three Western rivers, allocated to Pakistan for unrestricted use, for purposes such as generation of hydroelectric power. The present controversy arose as a result of the provision of submerged gated spillways in the Baglihar project-design that Pakistan says violates the IWT.

The truth however is that the determination of the boundary will also decide the beginning of the maritime boundaries of India and Pakistan. If India gets the line to fall in the middle of the stream on the principle of thalweg, then Pakistan tends to get less of the territorial waters zone and economic zone in the Indian Ocean. Both countries already routinely arrest each other's fishermen on the maritime boundary drawn notionally from Sir Creek. Sir Creek is similar to the Delta Island dispute between India and Bangladesh as in that case too the drawing of the maritime boundary is an underlying issue.

The design would increase the dam's water-storage capacity. Pakistani experts say the project on completion would deprive Pakistan of about 7000 cusecs of water per day, in addition to completely disrupting supplies for an uninterrupted period of 26 days during the critical December-February period. India claims to have made changes in the design taking into consideration Pakistan's objections, but Pakistan remains unsatisfied. Following the failure of talks on the issue during the special meeting of the Indus Commission in February 2003 (which was held after much dilly-dallying by India), Pakistan asked for the appointment of a neutral expert in accordance with article IX of the IWT. India has not responded positively so far to Pakistan's demand'. However, bilateral talks on Baglihar have been publicised as friendly and promising without an indication of a breakthrough in 2004. In August 2004, an Indo-Pak discussion of the Sir Creek dispute has also not yielded anything positive. The two sides decided to stick to their conflicting positions on Sir Creek, a 60-mile estuary in the marshes of the Ran of Kutch forming the southern border (Gujrat-Sindh) between the two countries. In 1968, an arbitration tribunal had decided that India was right in claiming that the Rann belonged entirely to it. The two countries had fought a war in the Rann in 1965 disputing the boundary north of Sir Creek. The tribunal did not go into the matter of where the frontier was in the Creek but that itself became a dispute later on. By 1992, the two countries had talked about Sir Creek six times without a result. Where was the line separating India and Pakistan on the waters of the creek? International law would incline to the India view that the line should pass

The above 'lesser' disputes between India and Pakistan have often been consigned to a domain of discussion devoted to confidence building measures (CBMs). Despite the fact that these disputes have become perennial a number of publications have listed them as possible CBMs serving to soften the two sides before they approach the 'core issue' of Kashmir. The idea tacitly yields the position that the lesser issues are not real and may have been created to strength bilateral positions on the issue of Kashmir: that somehow India and Pakistan have dug a moat of obstacles to safeguard the castle of the main dispute. It has been presumed that since these obstacles are not really substantive they can be removed to improve the atmospherics between the two rival states. In this thinking, Kashmir indeed is tacitly viewed as the core issue. Pakistan too designates Kashmir as the core issue and looks at these lesser issues as distractions that can be sorted out easily once Kashmir is resolved. On the other hand, India does not recognise the designation of a 'core issue'; it does not want to discuss Kashmir on any priority. At the internal political level Kashmir is actually non-negotiable. This puts a different complexion on the 'non-core' issues discussed above. The two sides are not actually agreed on the status of the issues other than Kashmir. Are they peripheral to the Kashmir dispute? Can they be treated as CBMs? Their importance and seriousness lies in the fact that they threaten to become 'core issues' if India and Pakistan do not make up their minds about the postnuclear status quo in the region.

Towards Peace in Kashmir still leave a large number of possible solutions.

Prem Shankar Jha When Prime Minister Manmohan Singh met Pakistan's President General Pervez Musharraf in New York in September 2004, he is reported to have asked him, â&#x20AC;&#x153;What do you think should be the solution to the Kashmir problem, and Gen Musharraf is believed to have told him that he would get back to him after consultations with his people. Gen Musharraf did not mention a plebiscite and Dr Manmohan Singh did not reiterate India's claim to Azad Kashmir and the Northern areas. With that exchange the ice was finally broken over how to proceed in the search for peace. In the coming months, engagement will take place on two fronts simultaneously: on what are referred to collectively as confidence building measures, and on Kashmir. Members of the establishment in both countries share a wry observation that if we follow Gen Musharraf's plan and eliminate all solutions that are not acceptable to Pakistan and all those that are not acceptable to India, there will be nothing left on the table. In recent months, both Gen Musharraf and Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmood Kasuri have given a number of hints that this need not necessarily happen. Gen Musharraf is believed to have said that he can think of eight to nine possible solutions. A more accurate statement would be that eliminating the official positions of the two countries will

Over the years, in unofficial fora India and Pakistan have mooted one alternative each. India has let it be known in private that it will accept the Line of Control as the international border, with or without some rectifications. Pakistan has often mentioned, although never formally the possibility of implementing what is known as the Dixon Plan, after Sir Owen Dixon, although it was first mooted during the first days of the tribal invasion by V.P. Menon. This is to leave Jammu and Ladakh with India and transfer the valley to Pakistan. A variant of this plan would make the valley a UN trust territory for a specified number of years, to be followed by a plebiscite in the valley alone. The plebiscite would give Kashmiris only two choices -- India or Pakistan. The LoC as International border The Indian proposal has a good deal of international support. Not only has the LoC endured for 55 years, but there are ceasefire lines all over the world that have, through the passage of time, become accepted as international boundaries. Other countries have become tired of the Kashmir dispute and grown increasingly apprehensive of its potential to trigger a war on the subcontinent that could turn nuclear. The Simla agreement of 1972, moreover, strongly pointed towards the LoC becoming the basis for a final settlement of the Kashmir 'situation', after the resumption of normal relations between the two countries. If all else failed India could insist on this particular meaning of the agreement and would probably get abundant support abroad for its interpretation. This could become the default solution if India and Pakistan are never able to find common ground. But for India to opt for this 'solution' without making every effort to take Pakistan on board would be extremely shortsighted. For it would do nothing to resolve the tension between it and Pakistan. So long as that

continues, Pakistan would continue to be tempted to nourish Jihad in Kashmir while kowtowing to the US and trying to stamp out another kind of Jihad on the other border. It would be forced by its domestic politics to carry on with this policy though it carries within it the seeds of catastrophe for Pakistan. The twin attempts to assassinate Gen Musharraf last December, and all the conspirators apprehended so far having a connection with the Jihad in Kashmir has demonstrated that terrorism cannot be compartmentalised. Pakistan needs to crack down really hard on fundamentalism to ensure its own progress. But to do that it needs to find a solution acceptable to the people, and at least marginally acceptable to the army, first. The longer this is delayed the greater is the danger of sudden catastrophic change in Pakistan, and of its getting dragged into the vortex of violence that is being created in Afghanistan and the Middle East. The Dixon Plan If the LoC is not an optimal solution even for India, the Dixon Plan is even more impracticable. Whatever may have been possible in 1947, when V.P. Menon first mooted the idea to the British Acting High commissioner in Delhi, such a solution would be unacceptable to India for the same reasons as the original UN proposal. If no plebiscite can be held without Pakistan appealing to communal sentiment in Kashmir, no part of India can be ceded simply because it is a Muslim majority area. The risk that this could trigger a powerful backlash against Muslims in India is one that no responsible Indian government can take. India is a democracy and hardliners in the Sangh Parivar would pounce on any such arrangement as a betrayal of the nation. There are, however, weightier reasons for not exploring such a solution. The original Dixon Plan has been bypassed by time. In 1947 the Kashmiris, along with the subjects of other princely states, were treated as chattel that could be handed over from one ruler to another at will. Today, more than half a century later, after eleven elections, (including three that all concede were fair elections, in 1977, 1983 and 2002), and a huge spread of literacy and higher education in the valley, no country that is, or aspires to be, a democracy can impose a solution on the people of Kashmir. Kashmir has a militantly nationalistic intelligentsia, extremely conscious of 'Kashmiriyat' -- its Kashmiri identity -which will not allow anyone else to decide its fate. A Plebiscite with three Options What is possible, in theory, at least, is a plebiscite in the valley, with or without a prior cooling off period that offers Kashmiris three options -- Pakistan, India and

independence. We have no clear indication of how people in the valley would vote if they were given three choices, because the only scientific opinion poll, the MORI poll, was so obviously designed to give Pakistan ammunition for use against India in international fora that its questionnaire did not even contain the third option of independence. But if we assume that the 33 percent who claimed they were 'undecided' between Pakistan and India would have been in favour of independence, and if we also assume that a large majority was concentrated in Kashmir valley, it would seem that somewhere around 55 to 60 percent of Kashmir valley would opt for independence. A three-option plebiscite that resulted in some form of independence for the valley would reduce the risk of a communal backlash in India against Muslims, but not eliminate it. The question can be asked therefore whether any Indian government, or any government anywhere in the world, has the moral right to take a decision that it knows will put a large part of its population in jeopardy. However, there are three other practical hurdles to such a plebiscite. First, almost without exception, the Kashmiri nationalist leaders have expressed themselves against any further partition of their state. Secondly, it is difficult to see why Kashmir valley be singled out for such a plebiscite? Why should the three options not be extended to the whole of the original state of Kashmir? At the very least why should it not include Azad Kashmir? There is, after all a substantial movement for independence in Azad Kashmir too. A long moment's reflection shows, therefore that neither Pakistan nor India would be receptive to the idea of a three-option plebiscite. In India no ruling coalition, acting on its own, would be able to endorse such a proposal, because it would be immediately accused by the opposition of betraying the nation. Any major constitutional change in Kashmir would require a constitutional amendment. This would not be available without agreement with the BJP. Such an endorsement would be exceedingly difficult to obtain. Not only would the opposition accuse the government of giving away a part of the country, but it would endanger the federal structure of the country. Kashmir would become a precedent for every aspiring state leader trying to whip up public support to win a state election. That is a risk that no central government in Delhi will ever take. Pakistan too has demonstrated its aversion to the idea by never once endorsing it during five decades of incessant campaigning to secure Kashmir. Even when it was inciting the leaders of the JKLF to take up arms against

India, during talks held in Muzaffarabad, in the late 1980's, it never offered the 'third option'. In February 1992, when the Pakistan security forces fired upon JKLF cadres trying to cross the LoC into Indian Kashmir at Chinari, prime minister Nawaz Sharif was sufficiently rattled by the reaction to endorse the third option of independence for Kashmir. The storm that broke out in Pakistan forced him to issue retractions every few hours for the next two days. The plain truth is that for all the strategic and military reasons cited ealier, Pakistan cannot endorse any solution that makes it run the risk of losing Azad Kashmir. Is a Condominium Feasible? But what if Indian and Pakistan agreed to join the valley to all or the larger part of Azad Kashmir and turn it into a kind of condominium. This would involve giving the new state of Kashmir sovereignty in all internal affairs and jointly guaranteeing its defence against external threats. Proposals for limited or constrained sovereignty somewhat along these lines have been put forward by the New York-based Kashmir Study Group headed by Farouq Kathwari. This proposal has the merit of meeting the aspirations of the majority of the Kashmiris while largely avoiding the risk of a communal backlash in India. However, at the present state of India-Pakistan relations it suffers from one fatal flaw. Any joint guarantee of security or the implementation of any agreement between the two countries to respect Kashmir's sovereignty presupposes a high degree of trust between the two countries. That trust is precisely what does not exist today. In its absence Pakistan will constantly wonder whether every agreement Srinagar signs with New Delhi does not signal a closer integration with India. It will view every seat offered in an Indian medical or engineering college to a Kashmiri, every new road or rail link between India and Kashmir, and every addition to the Indian armed forces in Ladakh or Jammu as part of a larger design to reabsorb Kashmir into India. India will entertain similar fears about Pakistan. After fifty years and three attempts by Pakistan to annex Kashmir, a condominium arrangement of the above kind will not really end the suspicion in New Delhi that Pakistan's main purpose is to get the Indian army out of Kashmir so that it can make a fourth attempt on terms far more favourable than those that exist today. It has also seen Pakistan control Hurriyat through a combination of assassination and bribery for the last 12 years. It will find it hard to believe Pakistan will stop trying to do this in an independent Kashmir. Nor will a condominium arrangement necessarily bind organisations like the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba or the Jaish-eMuhammad. New Delhi will, moreover, view the arrival

in Kashmir of every Maulvi preaching orthodox Deobandi, Wahhaby or Ahl-e-Hadis variants of Islam, as preparation for fomenting a rebellion on religious grounds by discrediting Rishi Islam and thereby undermining one of the main pillars of Kashmiriyat. Indeed many of the key leaders of Kashmiri nationalism today regard the 1972 decision by a Congress government in Kashmir to lift the ban on the Jamaat-eIslami as the first and most grievous blow against Kashmiriyat, and it was dealt not by Pakistan but by India. Such suspicions will make it difficult for India not to keep troops in a constant state of readiness for re-entering Kashmir. There will in short, be no peace and no let-up of tension. In many ways, therefore, we will all find ourselves back where we were in 1947. Towards a Lasting Solution Key requirement of a lasting solution to the Kashmir problem is the building up of trust between the two countries. Without trust no solution is likely to endure. But trust too cannot be built up in a day. We therefore need to establish a process -- a phased succession of actions by both countries -- whose successful implementation will build up trust step by step, even as it leads towards a final solution. This final solution cannot be one that is acceptable only to India and Pakistan. It must be acceptable to the people of Kashmir too. It must, in short, be one in which all parties give up some of their aspirations in exchange for the benefits of lasting peace, but from which none emerges as a loser. Both Delhi and Islamabad, in their saner moments acknowledge they need to start the process and go step by step, without jumping to its end point. But even this movement gets bogged down before it starts because each fears that the other will try to push the process itself in a direction the other does not want to go --India towards acceptance of the LoC, and Pakistan towards some version of the Dixon Plan. So, watching the numerous abortive attempts to start the dialogue since the mid-nineties, I have come to the conclusion that the process cannot be divorced completely from the end. Both countries need to have an idea of the kind of solution that they could accept and sell to their own people, even before the process of dĂŠtente begins. This need not be a precise idea. Indeed there would be virtue in imprecision because it would enlarge the room for negotiation. But if there is not some narrowing of the gap that exists at present between even the 'informal' positions held by Delhi and Islamabad, it will be difficult even for discussions on process not to get bogged down.

Let me therefore take the bull by the horns and suggest the broad outlines of what a final settlement of the Kashmir dispute could look like, and the process by which India and Pakistan could arrive at it. To do so we do not have to invent something new. History has enough examples of how similar problems have been resolved elsewhere. Learning from the Tyrol The model I have in mind is that of the Tyrol, a German speaking trans-Alpine region, which falls partly in Austria and partly in Italy. Southern Tyrol came into Italy after the fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918, and had a troubled relationship with it for most of the twentieth century. But well before the formation of the European Union, Italy and Austria had learned how to turn the existence of Tyrol between them for a big minus into a big plus. Today Southern Tyrol enjoys a considerable measure of autonomy within Italy, with its own elections and its own laws over a wide range of subjects. It enjoys immense tax advantages in comparison to the rest of Italy, which make it a magnet for industry. It has complete freedom of communications with northern Tyrol, with Austria and with the rest of Europe. People from the rest of Europe are free to visit, to trade with, invest and live in the Tyrol. Tyroleans enjoy unhindered access to both Italy and Austria and now, of course, the whole of Europe. What Italy and Austria have done is to reduce the significance of the international border between the two parts to the point where it no longer impinges upon the lives of the people of Tyrol, Austria and Italy. Yet Southern Tyrol remains a part of Italy and northern Tyrol of Austria. The foreign relations of the two parts

Suman Sharma and Ved Bhasin

remain securely in the hands of the two countries. They vote separately for the European parliament. Presumably their defence, insofar as it is not subsumed in the defence arrangements of the European Union and NATO, would also be the separate responsibility of the two countries. The Tyrol is therefore a sort of condominium, in which the areas of responsibility for defence and foreign affairs of the region have been demarcated by history instead of by explicit agreement. The Lessons for Kashmir What is the relevance of the Tyrolean model for India and Pakistan? The first lesson is the need to shift the focus from freeing (or annexing) territory, to freeing people. The Kashmiris are the only ethnic group in British India whose rights were curtailed by Partition. First, they lost the freedom to travel to, study and work in, or do business with any part of India and Pakistan that they had enjoyed before August 15, 1947. Second, they suffered a severe economic blow from the closing of the road to Rawalpindi. While the valley was given an easy access route to India, the economy of the Jhelum valley never recovered, because the road had been its lifeline. Third, while other parts of India and Pakistan, such as the two Bengals and the two Punjabs at least received democratic rights, Kashmiris in both countries were denied this too, because of the tension between India and Pakistan. Finally, from 1990 Kashmiris have begun to die in large numbers, and almost as many of them have been killed by the militants as by the Indian security forces. Perhaps the starting point of the search for a solution is to acknowledge that we need to make amends. The second lesson is the need to stop looking at the dispute through the narrow prism of bilateral relations alone. Even viewed bilaterally the gains from peace to both countries are immense. The gas pipe line deal struck in Delhi and reiterated by the two heads of government in New York, is only the thin end of the wedge. Both countries will also gain considerably in freedom from external pressure. But above all, the resolution of the Kashmir issue and the burgeoning trust and interdependence between them will open the road to a much larger role in international politics for both countries, both singly and together. This would make it possible for them to play

Vijay Naik and M. K. Dhar (India)

a pivotal role in the restoration of peace, and the economic reconstruction of Afghanistan. And while the future looks extraordinarily uncertain in Iraq at the moment, the possibility that India and Pakistan, acting together, could play a key role in stabilising the country and restoring its sovereignty, cannot be ruled out. Lastly, the key ingredient that accounts for the success of the arrangement between Austria and Italy over Tyrol is trust. Trust has been built between Italy and Austria by the larger process of European integration, of which they are both a part. It is because Italy and Austria have removed barriers between them, that the Tyrol dispute has lost its significance and become easier to resolve. Admittedly, it has taken the better part of a half century to build. But India and Pakistan can do it in a much shorter period of time. The parallel process that has now begun is of inestimable importance. In its eagerness to see progress and report encouraging developments, the media in both countries has frequently given only casual mention of the confidence-building measures over which our officials are struggling, and focused excessively on the a seeming lack of progress over Kashmir. But the CBMs are of immense importance. In the 18 months since prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's Srinagar speech, the people of India and Pakistan have moved far more rapidly towards building mutual trust and friendship than anyone could have dreamed possible to years ago. We now need to complement the closing of distance between the two countries by closing the distance between the two parts of Kashmir.

l The first step is already under consideration. This is to reopen the bus route between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad. This can start as a humanitarian

measure limited to Kashmiris, but the route could be opened to trade and eventually tourism, as the negotiations progress. l On paper at least, both the Kashmirs enjoy immense autonomy. Indian Kashmir has a separate constitution and the power to redefine its relations with India. It has used this power to increase integration but can use it to reduce it too if it wants to. Pakistan says Azad Kashmir is an independent nation, although this has been even more of a fiction than Kashmir's autonomy. An essential stage in the step by step resolution of the Kashmir problem would be to clothe this skeletal autonomy with real flesh. India and Pakistan can then allow the elected representatives of the two Kashmirs to decide whether or not they want to set up a common consultative council and the subjects on which they will coordinate their policies. High on their list, of course, will come the opening of the LoC between the two parts at various crossing points for travel and trade between the two Kashmirs. It will then be up to India and Pakistan to work out how this will be confined only to Kashmiris. But why should it remain confined to the Kashmiris? Why should Pakistanis not be enabled to visit Indian Kashmir and Indians not be allowed to visit Azad Kashmir and the northern areas. The people of these regions can only gain from the increase in tourism that will result. Greater contact will also break down stereotypes and build friendships. The next obvious step would be to extend freedom of trade and transit between the two Kashmirs to freedom of trade and transit for Kashmiris from each part of Kashmir with the whole of the other country. In practice this would be difficult to keep separate from a more general move towards full trading and consular relations between India and Pakistan. But that is something that civil society in Pakistan is already asking for with increasing assertiveness, for the simple reason that its benefits for Pakistan far outweigh its benefits for India.

The process outlined above will take time to work out because it is immensely complex and will need to be synchronised with the deepening of relations between India and Pakistan.

Engaging Kashmiris

Fire Line. It concerns their inalienable right to self determination which has been denied to them for the last 57 long years on one pretext or the other. Their expressed will has to be taken into account before it can be claimed that the issue has been closed. India and Pakistan may have interests in the state, but these must not have precedence over the will, political aspirations and interests of the people who live there and whose future is intimately involved with the future of the state. The people of the state should actively take part in the talks. People of the state must be heard before any thing is decided about their future. Without finding a just and realistic solution of the Kashmir problem there can be little possibility of peace and normalcy returning to the sub-continent. The dispute has bedevilled relations between the two neighbouring countries. They have fought three aimless wars. Kashmir has become a nuclear flashpoint. The consequences of any further escalation can indeed by disastrous.

Ved Bhasin

I welcome the on-going efforts both by India and Pakistan for a peaceful negotiated settlement by exploring various options but neither Islamabad joint statement nor talks between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Pervez Musharraf in New York had any reference to the people of Kashmir in finding a solution to the dispute. What was emphasized was that a solution to this vexed problem should be found to the satisfaction of both India and Pakistan. Now is it enough for India and Pakistan, controlling parts of Jammu and Kashmir on both sides of the dividing line to be satisfied with a settlement over Kashmir that may be accepted to both of them? Are the people of Jammu and Kashmir just dumb cattle to be herded and bartered away by New Delhi and Islamabad as they wish? Kashmir issue is not a border dispute. It is a human issue involving over 15 million people on both sides of the bloody dividing line called the Line of Control or Cease

The policy of military suppression of insurgency, called by India as proxy war, has failed to lead anywhere. The violence in Kashmir has cost immense sufferings to the people of the state and there appears to be no end of the long dark tunnel. All hostilities should end and a meaningful dialogue should be initiated. India insistently argues that with the signing of the instrument of accession by the Maharaja in 1947, the princely state became an integral part of India. Notwithstanding the validity of the accession, it cannot be ignored that the approval by India of the UNCIP resolution of 13 August, 1948 and 5 January 1949, envisaging holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir, have a binding effect in international law. The repeated assertions by New Delhi that the people of the state have exercised their right to self determination by way of elections to the constituency assembly and subsequent elections to the state assembly and Lok Sabha, cannot be accepted. There is no denying that the elections were rigged and so lacked credibility. While Pakistan talks of the Kashmiris right to self determination, it has yet to unequivocally concede that the right cannot be limited to their deciding about accession to one or the other country. Such a right has to be unqualified with the people free to decide what kind of future status they want for Jammu and Kashmir.

There is an immense loss to life and property as a result of terrorist activities and counter insurgency measures. Armed militants should be isolated through dialogue and not by terrorising the people. While decrying the role the Indian government in perpetuating the dispute, one cannot remain oblivious of the tight control exercised by Pakistani military over people living in Kashmir territory held by them. People of Gilgit-Baltistan are facing a severe repression at the hands of the local and Pakistan agencies. For creating a climate conducive for dialogue to succeed some confidence building are imperative. The two countries should take steps for reopening the Rawalpindi-Baramullah road, Jammu-Sialkot Road and Jhangar-Kotli road to facilitate the movement of the people in general and divided families in particular. The opening of these routes can be useful only if the visa curbs too are removed and the movement is allowed on the basis of a permit. The conduct of the forces should be brought under the purview of Human Rights Commission. The bulk of the forces should be shifted to barracks. All bunkers from civilian areas should be removed and all combing and

search operations stopped. The landmines along the LOC on both sides and border fencing, which threaten human lives, must be removed. Free trade should be allowed between two parts of Jammu and Kashmir. All political prisoners, arrested under the draconian laws and languishing in various jails in the state and outside, should be released and no one should be detained under these laws. The civil rights of the people like holding of peaceful rallies, processions, demonstrations must be restored. The practice of arming and deploying surrendered militants by the security forces must be done away with. The whereabouts of all disappeared persons must be made known to their family members. All cases against the political leaders, pending disposal by courts must be withdrawn. While exploring the options for the negotiated settlement, it must be kept in view the entire state as it existed on August 14-15,1947 must be restored and preserved. The plural, federal and democratic character of the state must be preserved and strengthened. Ved Bhasin is Chairman of the Kashmir Times Group of Publications

composite dialogue is needed that takes into account all the issue areas agreed to in the Secretary level talks in May-September. It is quite possible that some of the issues like the Siachen glacier issue, the boundary in the Sir Creek, Tulbul Navigation Project/Wuller Barrage, the Khokhrapar-Manobao rail link, the MuzaffarabadSrinagar bus service, and trade and economic relations may lend themselves to mutually acceptable solutions on a relatively fast track. The Kashmir problem

Kashmir and Indo-Pakistan Dialogue Dr Hasan-Askari Rizvi India and Pakistan have adopted a host of measures not only to improve their bilateral relations but have also given strong indications of addressing the major contentious issues for evolving viable solutions. The January 6, 2004 Islamabad Joint Declaration issued after a meeting between President General Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan and the then prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee of India, and September 24 meeting between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President General Pervez Musharraf in New York removed skepticism about the Indo-Pakistan dialogue. The leaders of India and Pakistan want to promote mutual trust and confidence by overcoming the problems that adversely affected their relations in the past. However, they diverge on the strategies to achieve this goal. India makes a distinction between normalization of relations and conflict resolution, with a preference for the former. Pakistan asserts that the normalization of relations must be accompanied by problem-solving. It is fully recognized in Pakistan that different issue areas of the composite dialogue may not show equal progress; some issue-areas may demonstrate results on a fast track while others may move on slowly. However, a

The Indo-Pakistan Declaration of January 6, 2004, specifically mentions Kashmir as one of the issues to be resolved through a composite dialogue “to the satisfaction of both sides.” This declaration also contains a statement by Vajpayee that violence, hostility and terrorism must be prevented for ensuring progress in the dialogue. Pakistan expressed its determination for not allowing the territories under its control (Pakistan mainland and Pakistan-administered Kashmir) to be used for supporting “terrorism in any manner.” The Kashmir issue was also discussed in the ManmohanMusharraf meeting in New York and the two sides agreed to engage in a comprehensive and composite dialogue to take up this and other issues. These developments engender the hope that Pakistan and India would soon resume a dialogue on Kashmir for evolving a mutually acceptable solution. If this happens this will be for the first time since the Bhutto-Swaran Singh talks (December 1962-May 1963) that India and Pakistan engaged in a serious and sustained dialogue on Kashmir. A meaningful dialogue on Kashmir must be unconditional and it should take into account all the possible solutions. It must also discuss the major concerns of the two sides, i.e. India's complaint that “cross border terrorism” from Pakistan still persists and Pakistan's complaints about human right violations and killings by India's security apparatus in Indianadministered Kashmir and the construction of the fence on the Line of Control by India). No satisfactory progress was possible on Kashmir in the past because India and Pakistan were not prepared to show flexibility. What made the problem intractable was that the two sides articulated the Kashmir issues with reference to their national identities and ideologies. The goal of good governance, transparent and efficacious political and economic management as well as the welfare of the common people cannot be pursued effectively with the current security paradigm and overt and covert spending on external defence and internal security. The solution of the Kashmir problem can

contribute to shifting the current security paradigm of India and Pakistan which will make more resources available for human development and societal security. Several studies of the Kashmir problem suggest a correlation between the outbreak of the on-going insurgency in the late 1980s and socioeconomic discontent among the post-independence generation of the Kashmirs in Indian-administered Kashmir. A solution of the Kashmir problem will help to improve internal socio-economic conditions in Kashmir. Furthermore, the Kashmir problem has greatly undermined bilateral trade and economic ties between India and Pakistan. Both economies will gain with rewards for the common people if their trade and economic relations improve. However, a major breakthrough in trade and economic relations is not likely to be achieved without a strong political push which is not likely to materialize without the resolution of the Kashmir problem. Pakistan is no longer insisting on the UN resolutions for the solution of the Kashmir problem. It is prepared to go beyond the UN resolutions to find a solution that is acceptable to India, Pakistan and the people of Kashmir. Similarly, India has signaled flexibility in its traditional position on Kashmir. It is willing to discuss all the contentious issues, including Kashmir. India no longer insists on the end of cross-border terrorism from the Pakistani side to its full satisfaction as a pre-condition for talks, although it raises this issue in general terms. Given the flexibility in the disposition of India and

Pakistan, it is possible to work towards evolving a workable solution to the Kashmir problem. This calls for exploring all possible options to find a solution that assigns the highest priority to the welfare of the people and is acceptable to India, Pakistan and the people of Kashmir. There is no ready-made solution to the Kashmir problem. It has to be evolved through a phased dialogue between India and Pakistan. It is quite obvious that the traditional positions of India and Pakistan ( India's internal autonomy solution to the exclusion of Pakistan, and Pakistan's insistence on a UN supervised fair and free plebiscite in Kashmir on the basis of the relevant UN resolutions) do not offer acceptable solutions. India and Pakistan will have to go beyond their traditional positions. The Indo-Pakistan dialogue can explore the different non-official proposals for the resolution of the Kashmir problem presented by academicians, public leaders, and think tanks based in India, Pakistan and the U.S. The underlying assumption of these proposals is that no party to the Kashmir problem loses absolutely. The emphasis is on adjustment and accommodation on the part of India and Pakistan. Various non-official proposals floating in the academic, journalistic and diplomatic circles can be divided into several major categories. (This does not include the traditional positions of India and Pakistan on Kashmir) 1.

The partition proposals offer different criteria for division of the state of Jammu and Kashmir as it

TRIANGULAR CONSULTATION: Ved Bhasin, Editor, Kashmir Times, talks to Pre Shankar Jha as Jagmohan listens

existed on August 14, 1947 on the basis of religion, linguistic and ethnic identities and territorial adjustments. 2.

The recognition of the Line of Control (LOC) as the international border with mutually acceptable territorial adjustments.

A region based (rather than the whole state) plebiscite to opt either for India or Pakistan.

Semi-independent, or autonomous federal Kashmir, with a host of proposals allowing close interaction of Kashmir with India and Pakistan. Such an arrangement should accommodate the security interests of India and Pakistan and guarantee the flow of river water to Pakistan. Some proposals suggest that India and Pakistan should jointly take care of security and foreign policy. India and Pakistan would look after their respective borders with China.

The revised application of conflict management models of the Aland Island, the Trieste case, the Andorra case, and the Northern Island Agreement. None of these models fully applies to Kashmir but some useful lessons can be drawn.

The handing over of Kashmir to the Trusteeship Council for a specified period of time. At the expiry of this period a UN managed vote can decide the political future of Kashmir.

Independence for Kashmir or part thereof. Some proposals combine partition and independence.

Some proposals (i.e. Kashmir Study Group) are detailed while others represent a set of ideas and suggestions. These proposals have to be explored, first to exclude those which are not acceptable to India and Pakistan. A thorough review of the assumptions and ideas underlying these proposals can help to evolve a framework for solution of the Kashmir problem which may be implemented in phases. India and Pakistan should explore the options at the bilateral level, with the blessings of the international community from the sidelines. If India and Pakistan agree on some arrangement for settling the Kashmir problem, the cooperation

of the UN and major global actors can be sought for its implementation. In addition to the official India-Pakistan dialogue on Kashmir, semi- and non-official dialogue has to be initiated at different levels in each country. An intrastate dialogue among various political and civil society groups should be held in India and Pakistan to develop a consensus on adopting a pragmatic solution to the Kashmir problem. There is a need to build widespread popular support in each country for a workable solution of the Kashmir problem. An intra-Kashmir dialogue must also be encouraged. This dialogue must have three dimensions: a dialogue between the Kashmiri leaders and their respective administrating state; another dialogue among the Kashmiri groups in each part of Kashmir; still another dialogue among the Kashmiris across the LoC on the possible solution of the problem. When the IndoPakistan dialogue on Kashmir shows some progress, the Kashmiris can be invited to the dialogue. Some spadework would be needed to bring the Kashmiri leadership in the dialogue process. The unofficial and civil society interaction between India and Pakistan, covering the major sectors of the society, the media and the academics, should continue to be encouraged. The scope of the CBMs should be expanded so that the popular support for normalization of relations, peace and stability increases and the lobbies for peace develop in both countries that keep pressure on their respective governments to pursue a result-oriented dialogue.

Ahmer Bilal Soofi and Najmuddin Sheikh in discussion

Reporting Kashmir

a) even within the assembly there is very little dialogue between the ruling party and the opposition, b) We agree with the representatives inside the assembly and outside the assembly that there are no chances of communication. c) There is no harmony between various separatist groups. As a member of the Kashmir committee, I had the opportunity to meet different separatist groups formally and informally but at no point have I come across this degree of intensity of acrimony. Given the amount of hatred between the separatist groups, questions as to who to invite and who to reject, to whom you are going to talk and who you are going to discuss come to mind. It is not a question of counter glimpse and re-glimpse. Here no one is ready to concede that the other person may have a point of view and this scattered objective view may be of advantage to some of us.

Dileep Padgaonkar These are my observations when I accompanied the journalists' group to Kashmir. You feel the presence of the troops largely almost every where in Kashmir. No doubt the one word we heard constantly and every day was Azadi. It was a little difficult to understand that no one was willing to go into the gist of the word Azadi. But a few people said that they had options and proposals and would put them on the table once the dialogue process started in earnest. But again there are those who have been covering Kashmir for many years and they say that there is no clear idea of something good and even with interaction one could move ahead. It is a good thing that we have a crosssection of people who are moving across the border: separatist groups, NGOs, students, academies, schools, journalists, lawyers and families. The feeling one gets is that Pakistan has not yet agreed to recognize the legitimacy of the elected representatives. This may be used in the talks at one point or the other. I say this because these are demands that ought to be answered. Kashmiri participation is part and parcel of the negotiation process; the question is how you choose the representatives of Kashmir. Because what we saw was:

The journalists' delegation got different responses form different fractions. It was very difficult to convince some of them (separatist groups) that journalists were there neither to make peace nor war, but to report as faithfully as they could of what they saw and what they heard. But in the context of Jammu and Kashmir, I found out that certain words cannot even be pronounced in Srinagar. You cannot talk about human dignity, professionalism, and as far the media is concerned, the last thing you should be talking about is professionalism. Many of them do not want professionalism, they want you to be a stenographer and report as faithfully as possible. There are certain media people who were unable to or unwilling to express themselves. But as they explained in whispers, they were afraid that they might be brushed off by the militants, as its shards were coming in the newspapers. Even while we were there it was a difficult task to identify the people who will be representing Jammu and Kashmir. One suggestion at that time was to ask these groups: why did you people boycott the elections? Why do you not contest elections? As soon as you win you can resign, because there you have proved your representation caliber. Then there are other three or four trends which I saw and I think they needed to be discussed here: 1)

Abhorrence against India is there. It cannot be omitted, but it has increased. It is also believed that one would not want Pakistan to be in picture. It is

also felt, partly in the slogans -- which are heard in the university and partly by the discussion of repression, of Jammu & Kashmir coming together and becoming a sovereign independent identity. So we have to play on both of the houses. 2)

The other element which I thought was somewhat new again: of the Nizam-e-Mustafa. Young people are talking about it a lot. I don't know whether it is a widely spread thing or it is chunked here and thereâ&#x20AC;Śthis element should be taken into account.

Despite the goals being unclear (there are very serious differences), the process of dialogue of reconciliation between India and Pakistan will be helpful for the conflict in Kashmir. There seems to be an emerging consensus that roads should be open, all roads leading from one side of Jammu and Kashmir to the other side. Through this system, population exchange will increase, and it will be welcomed by people in the valley.

We should concentrate on focal things. I think it is important that we should not go into too much clarity. The minute you begin to define the goal and to trace the roadmap, there will be enough ego to sabotage all. There will neither be interest of a few people nor of the militants, peculiarly of the media.

Journalists shall visit each other at a greater level, even if it is only to address the grievances of others. A few people suggested to us to visit places other than Srinagar. Others said: you have been only meeting that section of the people who are titled 'the extremists' and you look for the voice of moderation as well. I would request governments of both the sides to kindly continue this. It was strictly in a professional sense a reposting experience.

Shashi Kumar

The one difference between Kashmir and other conflicts in the world is that despite bigger inter-state differences, both parties to the conflict have a shared understanding of peace within Kashmir. All conflict resolution exercises try to create consensus and understanding at the beginning of the process and the whole region -- South Asia -- intends to provide the policymakers with an opportunity to find out a solution in the realm of imagination. For instance Indus Water Treaty is an example of the future-feasible conflict resolution exercise which was first found out from the realm of imagination and is really workable as well. Principled though, a bilateral process of conflict resolution management, can work to find a solution out. The most important strategy for both India and Pakistan in Kashmir is the Indus river basin. The truth is that India and Pakistan will keep on shouting unless they work on a plan and strategy to solve this problem as they did on the Indus water problem. An early settlement on the Indus water has contributed immensely in the maintenance of peace in the subcontinent. Initially what the Indus Water Treaty did was to create a security concern between India and Pakistan on how to share the water. However, the Kashmir question became international not only because of partition and its consequences but also because of nationalizing the divide of the two nations, and the divide of the Indus river basin. Primarily the rivers Indus, Chenab, Bias went from India to Pakistan; the parting caused the basin split and established an irrigation system leaving behind both the countries without specifying how the water was to be divided and system can be developed. India was left to control the water of two rivers from the abovementioned and supplying Pakistan irrigation canal. In 1948, while both countries were in the middle of hostile engagement, Indus water and water away form Pakistan when (the following events are interesting because there the two countries engaged in hostility actually signed 4th May 1948) agreement was signed way before common ceasefire (1 Jan.1949). In the long run India and Pakistan should find out a way in the same manner to settle the conflict as the Indus Water Treaty, through bilateral participatory conflict management module supported and backed by international facilitation. The Indus Water Treaty divided the rivers but maintained the integrity of India and Pakistan. Water security complex similarly empowers the program that both the people have equitable excess to the political, social and cultural economic resources in such a manner that it should protect the inter-security complex. The nation-building

activity between India and Pakistan completely disregarded the political, social, cultural and economic security complex that envelops them and has turned failed to the national integrative desires. Despite the long running tension between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, if water issues are successfully allocated then we can peacefully resolve this conflict as well. The international community should take an interest in evolving such an agreement on Kashmir. In this scenario, security will not mean military security but the network of relationships and economic and social development and not security concerns.

Talat Hussain The National Conference has maximum political autonomy as part of their political agenda. So one really wonders what will happen to those groups who do not have maximum political autonomy on their agenda (Yaseen Malik and Shabir Shah, and both factions of the APHC). Perhaps when discussions are held, it can be clarified how maximum autonomy is being granted. The rest of the groups, which are dead against the maximum autonomy and have more absolutist demands, can be accommodated in the peace process. I think to address these issues of whether Kashmir solution is going to proceed along the communal line or territorial division, rather whether it is going to be independent as part of India or part of Pakistan, there is a simple solution available. There is a probability that partition has taken place along the imperial line. There is another way of looking at it: that it took place on the majoritarian line, that a certain majority was supposed to retain a certain area and another majority was supposed to retain another area. So the same kind of majoritarian principle can be applied to the Kashmir problem. Majoritarian rule can be conducted through elections in Kashmir. Elections can be conducted under the observation of international commissions and can take place in the entire Jammu and Kashmir, including the Pakistan-administered areas. For the international commissions holding elections according to the principle of majority rule, more options should be given to the electorate. The first option is to join India, second to join Pakistan, third option is to become independent and fourth option is to become a part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as illustrated in 1947. We have seen the majoritarian rules are tricky in democracy. Minorities in a strong democracy are protected not threatened and if apply the majoritian rule, the future of Kashmir and the issue of elections that can

be conducted by international commission, by these four options hopefully things will settle down. The confidence building measures cannot simply be seen in the in the perspective of India and Pakistan, they have to seen by the perspective of the Kashmiris as well. We moved around quite a lot in Kashmir and everybody we spoke to had a massive concern about the massive violation of human rights. There was disappearance of people. Every body was saying that it was a repressive regime and it (to me) was very visible that they had a massive problem with the security forces. While we wait for the majoritarian rule to take place, we will have to give some thing to the Kashmiris. Kashmiris have to be given the feeling that they are not cattle that can be transported from one area to another; they have to be made part and parcel of the whole process. Khaled Ahmed The India Pakistan rivalry is mostly understood in the context of the challenge Pakistan has posed to India on the issue of Kashmir. India annexed Kashmir after the ruler of Kashmir acceded to India in 1947. This is

Muslims. It is moot whether he could have done so in the midst of an uprising in Kashmir with chances of it falling to Pakistan along with its 3 million non-Muslims. In the eyes of the international community it was no longer acceptable to give to Pakistan the whole or a part of Kashmir inhabited by non-Muslims. The world therefore started thinking more in terms of compelling India to award more genuine autonomy to the unhappy Kashmiris in return for a tacit conversion of the Line of Control (LoC) into an international border. India stood firm against all international pressure and hunkered down to confronting the unofficial Pakistani jihad in Kashmir under an all-parties consensus of 1993. What followed has been described as a reign of atrocities over the Muslim Kashmiri civilians. By the end of the decade India became an offender of human rights in Kashmir and Pakistan was identified as a patron of terrorism in the name of jihad.

contested by Pakistan and by some scholars in the West. The first war over Kashmir ended in 1948 after India went to the UN Security Council. The Security Council recommended plebiscite in Kashmir which could not be held because of the changed position of India. There were other 'solutions' floating around too but none was accepted seriously. In 1971, Pakistan experienced civil war in East Pakistan. India responded to a pro-India uprising there and intervened. Pakistan army was defeated by India and Pakistan was dismembered. One of the reasons behind the uprising was West Pakistan's security doctrine that posited defence of East Pakistan through enhanced military capacity in West Pakistan. In 1972 the two countries signed the Simla Agreement, binding themselves to a resolution of the Kashmir issue through bilateral talks. The issue went into cold storage after 1972, only to re-emerge in1989 after an uprising in Kashmir caused by India's misrule in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan decided to start a low intensity conflict in Kashmir based on the experience gained from the deniable war in Afghanistan it had pursued in the 1980s together with the United States against the Soviet Union. General Zia who died in 1988 had transformed Pakistan under his strategy of Islamisation. Unwittingly, he undermined Pakistan's Kashmir cause by introducing laws in Pakistan that reduced the citizenship of all non-

By the end of the 1990s decade, Kashmir jihad was increasingly seen by the world as terrorism or crossborder terrorism as labelled by India. Pakistan-based militias began to be declared terrorist by the United States as it began to bear the brunt of Al Qaeda attacks in different parts of the world. India increased its military drive against the uprising, its troops committing human rights violations that the world noticed but could do nothing about. The Indian point of view, barring a few knowledgeable personalities, remained supportive of the Indian military action. On the Pakistani side the popular view remained supportive of the proxy war and no criticism of the jihadi militias could be made public without the fear of being physically attacked. Inside Kashmir, the All-Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) represented the popular rebellion against India. Most of the parties comprising the APHC demanded an independent Kashmir instead of a plebiscite that would make it possible for Pakistan to annex Kashmir. APHC was also internally divided, which seemed to replicate the Pakistani experience with the jihadi militias in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. In 1998 the Kashmir dispute attained an extra dimension when India and Pakistan tested their nuclear devices and became overt nuclear powers. By the time Pakistan embarked on the Kargil Operation in 1999, the lowintensity conflict in Kashmir was yielding mostly negative results for Pakistan in terms of international support. The Kargil Operation, ostensibly meant to 'highlight' the Kashmir cause, collapsed to make Pakistan realise that it had become too isolated internationally for the policy of 'highlighting' to work.

Kargil was another incident that woke the world to the possibility of a major war in South Asia. In 1987 Indian exercise Brasstacks triggered fears in Pakistan of an Indian invasion; in 1990 India's military exercise Mahajan in Rajasthan is said to have brought the two 'recessed' nuclear powers to the brink of a nuclear conflict. By 1999, the world believed that the theory of nuclear deterrence was not understood in South Asia the same way as had been in the West and that India and Pakistan could actually go at each other with nuclear bombs. Kargil caused the elected government in Pakistan to collapse; it strengthened the rightwing Hindu nationalist party the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) under an upsurge of nationalism in the country. The architect of Kargil, General (now President) Pervez Musharraf went to a summit with prime minister Vajpayee at Agra in July 2001, but failed to get a 'flexible' response from him. The chastening of Islamabad at Kargil was not in equal measure with the moral boost the operation had yielded to New Delhi. The next trauma to Pakistan was not late in coming. On 11 September 2001, Pakistan suffered a blow to its over-all independence of policy when the United States challenged it to join the global drive against terrorism and ban all the jihadi militias operating in Kashmir. To compound Pakistan's problems with the world, the jihadi militias would not go away. Jaish-e-Muhammad struck in December 2001in New Delhi, this time in the very heart of India's democracy, the parliament building. India moved its forces to the border where they remained for over a year. The world doesn't care for Pakistan's stand any more, that is, it thinks that the position on plebiscite is passĂŠ and now the two states must sit down and evolve a new solution encompassing the rights of the Kashmiris within or without India. (The influential view outside is for a solution within India.) The world is also conscious of India's ability to withstand all kinds of pressures for the alteration of the status quo. It is more or less reconciled to the Line of Control (LoC) as a permanent frontier. But it wants to use the freezing of the LoC as a lure for India to give genuine autonomy to the Kashmiris. However, to keep the Pakistanis within the loop, a variety of new solutions involving Jammu and Kashmir with soft borders between the two occupied territories have been offered, only to be rebuffed, mostly by India, while Pakistan plays its cards close to the chest, benefiting from India's quick rejectionism as a status quo power.

Kashmir Study Group, floated his paper Kashmir: a way forward. The report allegedly contained five proposals for the creation of one or two new states which would together constitute a 'sovereign entity but one without international personality'. An Indian journalist cited the Kathwari paper as saying: 'The new entity would have its own secular, democratic constitution as well as its own citizenship, flag and legislature, which would legislate on all matters other than defence and foreign affairs... India and Pakistan would be responsible for the defence of the Kashmir entity, which would itself maintain police and gendarme forces for internal law and order purposes. India and Pakistan would be expected to work out financial arrangements for the Kashmir entity, which include a currency of its own'. The Kashmir Study Group came under attack in India. It had been drawing upon the various Kashmir-related proposals made by independent Indian and Pakistani personalities. While Pakistan has been insisting on 'third party mediation' (read the US) in Indo-Pak talks, it is common knowledge in Pakistan that the US think-tanks favour a solution based on the conversion of the Line of Control (LoC) into an international border and a special status in Indo-Pak talks for the Kashmiri leaders. Indian diplomat and journalist Kuldip Nayar has been discussing the Trieste Model which he claims was personally supported by former Pakistan prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. In 1993, Indian journalist Khushwant Singh stated that India should give serious consideration to allowing the Vale (excluding Ladakh and Jammu) 'to become an autonomous entity whose existence is guaranteed jointly by its neighbours - India and Pakistan'. In the 1960s, Indian statesman Jayaprakash Narayan and Indian president Rajagopalachari favoured the aspirations of the Kashmiris which could then be described as 'autonomy short of independence'. Alastair Lamb studied these various proposals and thought they all pointed to the solution of the Kashmir problem on the 'Andorra' model. His 'Andorra Approach' refers to the French-Spanish 'co-principality' in the Pyrenees which achieved limited independence through a constitution in 1993. Finland has been keen that Pakistan and India study the League of Nations case of Aland Islands between it and Norway and draw lessons from it. The case of South Tyrol between Italy and Austria has also been held up as a model if India and Pakistan decide to resolve the dispute by becoming flexible in their approach.

In 2000, Farooq Kathwari, head of a New York-based

Sri Lankan Peace Process and India

M.R. Narayan Swamy Relations between Sri Lanka and India are very warm despite the occasional hiccups. In the year 2003 or thereabouts, and even more since the change of government in Colombo in April, there have been demands in Sri Lanka that India should replace Norway as the peace facilitator. Of course, this demand is not acceptable to India, which has followed a strict hands-off policy vis-Ă -vis Sri Lanka since the 1987-90 military fiasco. In any case, India considers the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, LTTE, a terrorist group and has no desire to get engaged with the Tamil Tigers an unavoidable condition for anyone wanting to act as a mediator in Sri Lanka. However, New Delhi is not aloof; no other country takes as much a deep interest in the goings-on in Sri Lanka as India does. But unlike in the past India is not, perhaps by design, very vocal about its Sri Lanka concerns. In contrast, the United States loses no opportunity to put public pressure on the LTTE to give up terrorist methods and end child recruitment. Surprisingly, despite the vicissitudes in the Sri Lankan situation during the last two tumultuous decades, the

basic thrust of India's policy towards that country has remained unchanged. One, that New Delhi will never accept any breakup of Sri Lanka; two, Colombo should try to satisfy the basic aspirations of the Tamils. In recent times, India has slightly, but crucially, modified its position to say that any final settlement should be satisfactory to all communities. This in effect is meant to include the Muslims who in the north-east of Sri Lanka have emerged as the third factor, apart from Colombo and the Tamils/LTTE. Indeed, it can be safely argued that India's consistent opposition to the formation of any independent Tamil Eelam state constitutes the biggest obstacle to the LTTE's aim of seceding from Sri Lanka. However, today the LTTE runs a sprawling de facto Tamil Eelam state, one which has all the features of a de jure state: a secure border, a police force, an army, an unconventional but lethal navy, a loose judicial system, immigration checks, an administrative structure, and a tax structure bordering on extortion. What the present LTTE domain, covering parts of Sri Lanka's north and east, obviously lacks is formal international diplomatic recognition. While India fully backs the Norwegiansponsored peace process and hopes it would lead to an eventual settlement of the Sri Lankan conflict, it is aware that this interlude has been used by the LTTE to beef itself up -- politically, militarily and diplomatically. The Tigers have also used the peace process to legitimize themselves by demanding sweeping powers for an interim administration in Sri Lanka's north and east. Among the features of the proposal that India is deeply wary of anyway are demands that such an administration should be allowed to have (1) direct dealings with international aid agencies, and (2) control the marine and offshore resources of the seas around Sri Lanka. The latter in effect puts the LTTE's Sea Tigers, as the rebel navy is known, on a par with the Indian and Sri Lankan navies. Indian officials insist that while Norwegian officials keep New Delhi appraised of their discussions in Sri Lanka, there are areas of suspicion. One such was linked to the use of Norwegian diplomatic facility in Colombo to procure powerful radio equipment for the LTTE. This touched off an outcry in Sri Lanka. Indian diplomats say the Norwegians tried to hide this from India but eventually had to admit it when the matter became public knowledge. But there are problem areas for India vis-Ă -vis Sri Lanka. One of it relates to the deep and seemingly irreconcilable divisions in the Sri Lankan polity that make the country's two main political parties regard India with suspicion if one of them believes that Indian policy makers are favouring the other. This happened during the April general elections in Sri Lanka. There was intense

speculation in Colombo then that the Indian state had thrown its weight behind President Kumaratunga and her Sinhalese-Marxist ally, the JVP, and also played a behind-the-scenes role in deciding who should be the prime minister of Sri Lanka. Such beliefs, however farfetched, prevent India from playing a constructive role in bringing the country's two main political parties, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and United National Party (UNP), together on issues confronting that country. However, for the present, both the SLFP and UNP, as also the JVP, believe that close ties, including on the military front, with India are vital for Sri Lanka. The previous Sri Lankan government, led by the present opposition leader Ranil Wickremesinghe, had pursued the idea of an India-Sri Lanka military pact with relentless zeal; it is one area his successor government has followed with equal interest. The SLFP and UNP (as well as JVP) believe that close military relations with India are strategically important to keep the LTTE at bay. In September 2004, the Indian navy chief visited Sri Lanka and, besides holding talks with the country's leaders and military brass, visited the ports of Trincomalee in the east and the Colombo harbour. Not many are aware that the Colombo harbour handles 60 percent of all Indian imports and exports by sea, acting as a mother port. In the event of a renewed conflict in Sri Lanka, the LTTE is bound to target both Colombo and Trincomalee ports; the former to cripple the Sri Lankan economy and the latter to snap the vital sea links that keep the Sri Lankan military in Jaffna replenished with its needs in the absence of a land and air corridor. But what kind of help, if any, India can provide to Sri Lanka in the face of any renewed LTTE offensive considering that New Delhi is unlikely, ever again, to send its troops to the island nation. India, however, remains wary of LTTE's long-term

intentions although the latter has more than once overtly stated that it has no desire to gang up with any force that is inimical to New Delhi's interests. But such is the LTTE's blood splattered and brutally hoary past that the group enjoys no sympathy in the corridors of power in New Delhi. The Indian state is highly unlikely to forget and forgive LTTE chief Velupillai Prabhakaran for assassinating prime minister Rajiv Gandhi even if it does not derail the peace moves in Sri Lanka by calling for the extradition of the guerrilla boss. The LTTE's dubious links with Indian insurgent groups, at least in the past, have only sowed the seeds of enmity with New Delhi. At the same time, the group's overarching clandestine structure that helps it move vast quantities of arms, ammunition and explosives from one part of the world to the stone-throw's vicinity of southern India is viewed with grave concern. Most Tamil activists killed by the LTTE in the last two decades have been those who were dubbed pro-India. It is probably the geopolitical importance of the India factor in Sri Lanka that compelled Karuna to speak effusively about New Delhi during his rebellion against Prabhakaran. V. Muraleedharan alias Karuna, the group's regional commander in Sri Lanka's east, rose up against the leadership of Tamil Tiger supremo Prabhakaran. The rebellion, involving thousands of LTTE cadres, lasted just over a month before Prabhakaran crushed it in his trademark style. This was the same man who had fought against Indian troops in Sri Lanka in 1987-90. But when he found himself on the wrong side of Prabhakaran, he chose to declare that Rajiv Gandhi should have never been killed and that without New Delhi's blessings Sri Lankan Tamils would never be able to achieve anything concrete. Whether the assessment is correct remains to be seen. M. R. Narayan Swamy is a senior Indian journalist.

Mohan Narayan (PTI) and Amit Barua (The Hindu) at the conference

Session IV: Sri Lankan Peace Process Mr Swaraj Kaushal from India said: “All insurgency problems in the world have to be negotiated. Neither has any insurgency evaporated with time nor will any. Whole of South Asia is concerned with the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka. If Sri Lanka is disturbed South Asia will not be in peace.” To a question whether LTTE will accept a settlement within the political framework of Sri Lanka, Victor Ivan said it would be difficult but things had changed. “First they were fighting for a separate state and now they say they are ready for a federal state which I think is a positive signal.” Narayan Swami said: “LTTE will never accept a decision which makes it accept the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. The growth of LTTE is a fascinating story; in 1976, and even after that, people had hardly heard of it. From 1983 to 1987 it was growing and in 1997 LTTE was the strongest insurgent group in South Asia.” “In 1990 LTTE was in control of one third of Sri Lanka and two-thirds of its coastline. From 1990 to 1995 it controlled the entire Jaffna peninsula. Now they have a de facto state. How would they accept such a decision?” Ivan said: The LTTE is prepared to accept the federal solution where Tamil speaking people of the region can live with dignity and honour. In the last 50 years Tamils have asked for many things but nothing has been given to them. So far I've understood the psyche of the LTTE, they are going to agree on a federal solution. I'm not an LTTE voice but the voice of a normal Tamil person living in Colombo or anywhere. Former Indian foreign minister Jaswant Singh said: “When I was in responsibility and was negotiating Free Trade Agreement with Sri Lanka I met anger and resentment from the south; Tamil Nadu and Kerala, even Karnataka. Absence of trade has its human cost. We agreed to it and negotiated upon the

Sahina Inderjeet and other Indian journalists

effective ways of trade including tea, coconut, Khopra, textile, coffee from 347 to 1900 common trade items. India suffered a terrible human cost in the conflict in Sri Lanka as prime minister Rajiv Gandhi was killed. Shiva said: “Constitutional crisis is one of big problems Sri Lanka faces. And having a political solution to LTTE or Tamil-Sinhala problem is a difficult thing. Another aspect of this conflict is that other minorities are sidelined. Either they are not heard or they've to raise their voice from the platform of either party involved in the struggle where they are also affected by the conflict the same way as Tamils or Sinhalese are. At the same time Tamils and Muslims have different cultures but same language. Another common thing is their being a minority. Now Muslims want their identity maintained. They don't want their voice lost in another party's voice. So how are they going to solve this conflict when minority and majority problems are coming up in the way? The only way to solve this problem is that they shall feel as Sri Lankan rather than behaving like Tamils, Sinhalese or Muslims. Media divide is another big problem; there is Sinhala media, Tamil media and then there is English media. They've their own affiliation to one mindset and this way reporting and journalism is also divided in three different parts, none unbiased. Tamil movement is not terrorism. It's freedom fight. They want freedom to live in their area and land with dignity. The war is for freedom not liberation. We seek liberation from any other nation's control but this movement is to seek freedom to live in this state with own values and with dignity. Realities have to be accepted. It is going to be a political war in which mistrust and suspicions are coming up. Sinhalese think that Tamils

are going to take over and join Tamil Nadu but it is not going to be this way. It is a historical hangover. Indo-Sri Lanka accord provides basis for a very good solution. The political process is paralysed and various political groups are muddled. Mindset has got to change. We always expect India and Norwegian role as very important for coming to a solution. ISGA is a basis as it can be discussed and negotiated and in the long run we can create a very good atmosphere for a good solution. India's and international role is very important. Sri Lankan political process shall have to be very carefully handled. Khaled Ahmed from Pakistan said Sri Lanka and Nepal fall in the category of states with which India has an 'asymmetric' relationship. The unresolved issues basically relate to this permanent factor. India's neighbours began in 1947 to think of national security as a part of their relations with India. The threats were perceived as being external, mostly tied to unsettled disputes with India. Over the years, the direction of threat has become internal rather than external. Like Bangladesh and Pakistan, Sri Lanka too has started positing national security as related to internal threat. As they stand today the Sri Lanka India relations could be described as South Asian model for the future. But Sri Lanka began by maximising its security against India. Its perception of India was dominated by its concern to secure its territorial integrity. Top priority was given by Colombo to the resolution of the disputes over Gulf of Mannar and the Palk Strait. Up to the 1980s Sri Lanka sought to neutralise India by getting the UN to declare the Indian Ocean as Zone of Peace. It feared Indian intervention on behalf of the Tamil community in the north of the country as they represented the 65 million strong Indian state of Tamil Nadu. So strong was the Sri Lankan fear of being absorbed by the Big Brother in the north that it sought in the beginning to turn away from the subcontinent and establish relations with the states of Southeast Asia within ASEAN. It was lukewarm towards SAARC and its regional framework. If the past is a bitter memory it should fade away in the coming economic era. India's policy towards Sri Lanka was directed at preventing it from looking outwards from the subcontinent and thus attracting external interests into the region. 'Broadly speaking, two major considerations underlay India's Sri Lanka policy when Indira Gandhi was Prime Minister. First, there were geostrategic concerns, and a desire to insulate Sri Lanka from external forces that would have a destabilising effect on India's security and strategic environment. The

second consideration was to prevent geographical proximity and ethnic affinities from leading to a resurgence of secessionist demands in Tamil Nadu. While proclaiming India's commitment to the unity of Sri Lanka, New Delhi also helped Tamils wrest concessions from an unwilling Sinhalese-dominated Government. The cumulative effect was the pursuance of a two-pronged but contradictory strategy - mediatory and militant-supportive'. It was under prime minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1985, Rajiv Gandhi decided to stop all training and assistance to Sri Lankan Tamil groups to ensure the success of the mediatory efforts he had initiated. However some sources in India maintain that the LTTE received massive assistance when Rajiv Gandhi was in power. It received more arms than all the other militant groups put together; the quality of the arms the organisation received was also higher than that of what the other organisations received. This assistance continued till July 1987. In 1987 an Indo-Sri Lanka treaty made it possible for the two countries to start a new relationship. India initiated a new perception of the Tamil problem in Sri Lanka and Sri Lanka looked at India as a balancing factor against its own Sinhala nationalism of Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). New Delhi withheld its support to the Tamil Tigers to give Colombo the breathing space to confront the JVP violence. Under the treaty an Indian 'peace-keeping' force entered Sri Lanka but failed to achieve its objectives. India was not able by this policy to make the Sri Lankan government reach an equitable solution to the problem of separatism. The Sri Lankan nationalists campaigned to paint the Indian intervention as a violation of Sri Lanka's sovereignty while on the LTTE's side India was unable to persuade the Tamil leaders to accommodate the Sri Lankan point of view. The two countries moved forward to a free trade treaty in 1998 the only bilateral one in the region which is said to be operating satisfactorily. Under the agreement, India will eliminate tariffs on 1,000 Sri Lankan products over a period of three years and Sri Lanka will do away with tariffs on 900 Indian products within eight years. The list of products whose tariffs will be eliminated or reduced and the 'negative list' of products be negotiated as the bilateral trade now at a billion dollars - takes off. A Sri Lankan economist however takes a cautious view of the agreement: 'There is a fear among the smaller countries that the main beneficiary from tariff liberalisation would be the larger countries. Irrespective of the theoretical viewpoint, the perception of smaller countries needs to be recognised,

and it was this realisation that led to the “Gujral Doctrine” to be introduced by India in 1997/98. However, there is some dilution of the doctrine in recent years and, giving vent to this, an editorial of the Economic and Political Weekly (EPW) stated: “It is for India to ensure that smaller members of the region have a growing stake in regionalism. This responsibility India has not taken seriously”. (EPW, January 10-16, 2004: 119) The 'unresolved dispute' of Tamil separatism has forced the two states to become aware of their limitations. India has come to realise that there is a limit to how far it can go to offer assurances to Colombo at the risk of alienating the state of Tamil Nadu; and Colombo has realised that the people of Sri Lanka simply cannot suppress their fear of India because it contains the state of Tamil Nadu where people are generally in sympathy with the LTTE. The Indo-Sri Lanka model of cooperation emerges from this mutual realisation. It is also based on the tacit acceptance by Sri Lanka of India's regional vision. The two Muslim states of the region - Pakistan and Bangladesh are strongly resisting this regional vision, but their rebellion is fast giving way to the realisation that they are both weak from within and that their security needs to be strengthened against internal threats. This phenomenon of internal threat is in line with the Sri Lankan experience. Relations between India and Nepal are close yet fraught with difficulties stemming from geography, economics, the problems inherent in big power-small power relations, and common ethnic and linguistic identities that overlap the two countries' borders. In 1950 New Delhi and Kathmandu initiated their relationship with the Treaty of Peace and Friendship and accompanying

Sri Lankan delegates

letters that defined security relations between the two countries, and an agreement governing both bilateral trade and trade transiting Indian soil. The 1950 treaty and letters stated that 'neither government shall tolerate any threat to the security of the other by a foreign aggressor' and obligated both sides 'to inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with any neighbouring state likely to cause any breach in the friendly relations subsisting between the two governments'. These accords cemented a 'special relationship' between India and Nepal that granted Nepal preferential economic treatment and provided Nepalese in India the same economic and educational opportunities as Indian citizens. In the 1950s, Nepal welcomed close relations with India, but as the number of Nepalese living and working in India increased and the involvement of India in Nepal's economy deepened in the 1960s and after, so too did Nepalese discomfort with the special relationship. Tensions came to a head in the mid-1970s, when Nepal pressed for substantial amendments in its favour in the trade and transit treaty and openly criticized India's 1975 annexation of Sikkim as an Indian state. In 1975, King Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev proposed that Nepal be recognized internationally as a zone of peace; he received support from China and Pakistan. In New Delhi's view, if the king's proposal did not contradict the 1950 treaty and was merely an extension of nonalignment, it was unnecessary; if it was a repudiation of the special relationship, it represented a possible threat to India's security and could not be endorsed. In 1984 Nepal repeated the proposal, but there was no reaction from India. Nepal continually promoted the proposal in international forums, with Chinese support; by 1990 it had won the support of 112 countries. In 1978 India agreed to separate trade and transit treaties, satisfying a long-term Nepalese demand. In 1988, when the two treaties were up for renewal, Nepal's refusal to accommodate India's wishes on the transit treaty caused India to call for a single trade and transit treaty. Thereafter, Nepal took a hardline position that led to a serious crisis in India-Nepal relations. After two extensions, the two treaties expired on 23 March 1989, resulting in a virtual Indian

economic blockade of Nepal that lasted until late April 1990. Although economic issues were a major factor in the two countries' confrontation, Indian dissatisfaction with Nepal's 1988 acquisition of Chinese weaponry played an important role. New Delhi perceived the arms purchase as an indication of Kathmandu's intent to build a military relationship with Beijing, in violation of the 1950 treaty and letters exchanged in 1959 and 1965, which included Nepal in India's security zone and precluded arms purchases without India's approval. India linked security with economic relations and insisted on reviewing India-Nepal relations as a whole. Nepal had to back down after worsening economic conditions led to a change in Nepal's political system, in which the king was forced to institute a parliamentary democracy. The new government sought quick restoration of amicable relations with India. Nepal too has followed the pattern of the other peripheral states challenging the subcontinental status quo against Indian interests. The special security relationship between New Delhi and Kathmandu was re-established during the June 1990 New Delhi meeting of Nepal's prime minister Krishna Prasad Bhattarai and Indian prime minister VP Singh. During the December 1991 visit to India by Nepalese prime minister Girijad Prasad Koirala, the two countries signed new, separate trade and transit treaties and other economic agreements designed to accord Nepal additional economic benefits. Indian-Nepali relations appeared to be undergoing still more reassessment when Nepal's prime minister Man Mohan Adhikary visited New Delhi in April 1995 and insisted on a major review of the 1950 peace and friendship treaty. In the face of benign statements by his Indian hosts relating to the treaty, Adhikary sought greater economic independence for his landlocked nation while simultaneously striving to improve ties with China. In India, most men of opinion are agreed that an asymmetry of relations between the two countries is inevitable. The leaders in India stressed India's special relationship with Nepal. In 1990, Indian external affairs minister IK Gujral, in an interview with the representative of The Rising Nepal stated that the size and levels of economic growth of Nepal and India were such that reciprocity in the strict sense of the word was neither feasible nor possible in their relationship, that was the reason why he had often said that the relation between the two countries was bound to be asymmetrical and the only point was how to make that asymmetry more beneficial to both sides. (The

Rising Nepal June 1, 1990). A Nepali scholar emphasised that India's unwillingness to accept Nepal's equidistance approach in its relations with its immediate neighbours - India and China - was expressed by the then Indian Ambassador to Nepal, S.K.Sinha who, addressing at a function organized by the Rotary Club of Biratnagar, stated that it was not practical for Nepal that it would maintain relations based upon equidistance with which India had special relations in all fields. Nepal could not have relations with China, which were similar to those with India. He had made similar other remarks in other places as well. Indian scholars and academicians like Bhabani Sen Gupta also openly emphasised India's special relations with Nepal. (Spotlight March 32, 1991). Recently Indian writer Raja Mohan clarified the following aspects of the Indo-Nepalese relationship. 'India's current Nepal policy has three components. First is military assistance to Kathmandu in enhancing the capabilities of the Royal Nepal Army to counter the violence of the Maoists. India sees the rise of Maoists as a threat not merely to Nepal but also itself. India has a unique relationship with Nepal and is obliged under a 1950 treaty to offer protection to the state in Kathmandu. For New Delhi, Nepal's war against Maoists was intimately linked to its campaign against the terror of the left wing extremist groups within India. Second, New Delhi called for a restoration of the balance between Constitutional monarchy and multi-party democracy to strengthen the ability of the Nepali state to deal with the grave crisis. Third, New Delhi impressed upon Kathmandu that there can be no military victory against the Maoists and a political dialogue is necessary to address the genuine grievances of the people that the movement has articulated. As the Maoists gain ground, this three-fold policy of India has come under stressâ&#x20AC;ŚIndia's own ardour for military intervention in its neighbourhood has cooled considerably since its last disastrous experience in Sri Lanka in the late 1980s. India has also traditionally been opposed to letting the United Nations have a say in managing the regional conflicts within its neighbourhood. As the crisis in Nepal unfolds, India will have to choose between many unpleasant and probably ineffective options. But the first step in New Delhi must be to devote urgent political attention to potential state failure in Nepal'.

PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTION: Jaswant Singh building his thesis

Missed Opportunities

Jaswant Singh

We, the countries of the South Asian region, got locked in to the cold war determinations. I am astonished at the speed at which we moved towards partition. The original date announced by Atley was August 1948. It was accelerated and advanced to August 1947. There was no discussion on Indus river waters. Had 48 been stuck to, perhaps the countries would have been able to deal with water issue. The end of the cold war has not resulted in end of the conflict. There continues to be a colonial overhang in our thoughts and policy determination and formulation in our region. We continue to be afflicted by enmity, and therefore envy and perpetual hostility as a glue for nationhood continues to be a policy posture causing untold suffering. Creating nationalism through enmity is an antiquated thought. We must give up competitive beggaring the neighbour as an alternative to policy. There were many missed opportunities all resulting in human cost. Hence, the lack of sufficient development and evolution in Saarc.

Bhutan is one of the unrecognised success stories. Today Bhutan is fast moving towards having the highest per capita income of any country of South Asia. It has become an energy exporting country. But Nepal is an example of missed opportunities. The floods that afflict Bangladesh are born in the high Himalayas in Bhutan or Nepal or Arunachal Pradesh. The money in water is being lost every minute, every second. It is there for these land-locked countries to act. India and Pakistan would have to learn and relearn to live together to face the challenges of the 21st century. The conflict in the sub-continent could be explained in terms of missed opportunities, errors of judgement and the colonial overhang in policymaking. We are victims of a system we adopted in 1947 without much thought. We need to break free. Mr Jaswant Singh is a former external affairs minister of India

Question Answer Session Nusrat Javeed: Yashwant Sinha was very confident that the process between India and Pakistan might not be delayed or subverted. But, of course, keeping his limits in mind he said there were fears that third party from outside the region could somehow play the role of a spoiler. Do you also feel that there are forces outside the region which can somehow subvert, delay or spoil the peace process? Jaswant: With no prejudice against somebody, I once told Sartaj Aziz, then foreign minister, that why can we not speak to each other without the involvement of a third party. We speak the same language, we understand our situation, and we understand each other. Rashid Rehman: Your government initiated the peace process between India and Pakistan, but there are people who think that the policy was contradicted by your government's decision to test the nuclear bomb in 1998. Do you see that as a contradiction in policy, and how do you justify the 1998 explosion?

Jaswant: There is a difference between individual morality and national morality. The nuclear weapons of India are not part of any thing. I do not speak for Pakistan which has a state dynamic policy as a sovereign state, but the two are not discordant or indeed even different. I believe that India and Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and Sri Lanka have to learn and relearn to live together in connectivity. Shahid Kardar: Considering our abilities even on domestic issues to think outside the box, do you think we are capable of thinking outside the box? If we are, what is the evidence and what would you suggest as a way out of the box when it comes to India and Pakistan? Jaswant: This entire land is one third of humanity but this has not been demonstrated in terms of achievement. I have great faith in the creative genius of the entire onethird of humanity that lives in this region.

Declaration

Resolution of Interstate Conflicts in South Asia SAFMA's Regional Conference on Interstate Conflicts in South Asia (October 9-10, New Delhi) Journalists from South Asia met in New Delhi on October 9-10, 2004 at the South Asian Free Media Association's Conference, to deliberate on 'Interstate Conflicts in South Asia'. Reiterating SAFMA's commitment to a peaceful settlement of all disputes and differences among states as emphasised by the Declaration issued by the Second South Asian Free Media Conference held at Kathmandu, January 1-2, 2002 and Reaffirming our principled position as defined by the SAFMA's Guidelines for South Asian Cooperation; l

The main obstacle to improving connectivity remains political. The prevailing barriers to cross-border movements make neither commercial nor logistical sense and originate in the pathologies of inter-state, as well as domestic politics. The political leaders of South Asia should, therefore, dismantle the political barriers to free movement of people. South Asian nations should look beyond the traditional notions of security and focus on cooperative security. This notion recognises the profound condition of interdependence that binds South Asia and calls on the states of the region to act in their own enlightened self-interest to resolve the problems facing them through peaceful means. In South Asia, the choice is often posed between regional cooperation and conflict resolution. We urge all states to simultaneously move forward to address long-standing political disputes and intensify economic cooperation and people-to-people contact.

The Conference on Interstate Conflicts reached the following understanding: South Asia has lagged behind the rest of the world in the resolution of its regional disputes that have led to conflict and threaten its peace. Some disputes are perennial and maintain interstate hostility at a steady boil. Other issues crop up regularly as a result of this hostility, further complicating the prospects of regional peace and postponing the agenda of regional economic integration envisaged at SAARC. There is a need to address these disputes urgently in order to stop a virtual proliferation of ancillary disputes, especially in a changing regional-ecological and global environment. The states of South Asia have to face up collectively to challenges such as low river-water discharges and global trade disparities in order to prevent the birth of a new inward-looking era in which each state fends for itself in the face of essentially collective problems. The SAFMA conference noted with satisfaction the new efforts by India and Pakistan to discuss their bilateral issues in a composite dialogue while taking measures to normalise relations. Meetings between the leaders of the two countries have ushered in a period of unprecedented hope, raising the expectations of the people on both sides of the border. As nuclear powers putting at risk the entire region, India and Pakistan must respect the desire for peace of their respective peoples and not let them down by slipping back into their old official postures. This would require approaching the outstanding issues with flexibility of approach and innovation, especially in regard to Jammu & Kashmir. The lesser differences should be quickly resolved to create an environment favourable to the resolution of the main issue. Delegates to the SAFMA conference were agreed that India should make more efforts to discuss bilaterally with its neighbours' problems relating to river waters. A new regional understanding of the riparian issues is essential to resolve Indo-Nepal, Indo-Bangladesh and Indo-Pakistan water disputes. The conference noted that India-Sri Lanka relations had improved and that their bilateral free-trade agreement could serve as a model for a SAARC free-trade regime. On Indo-Nepal Relations Countries of the GMB region are encouraged to conduct the preliminary survey of the technical feasibility of the proposed 'NIBB Water Ways: 21st Century Project'. NIBB Water Ways is a vision to develop navigation (shipping) starting from Bay of Bengal to Koshi Tappu and other riparian cities. Regional Riparian Statutes are obligatory to resolve Indo-Nepal, Indo-Bangladesh and Indo-Pakistan water disputes. RRR statute model respecting Helsinki

Convention proposes 8K upstream and downstream rights. SAFMA suggests: l l l l

To review the 1950 treaty and letters of exchange in 1950 and 1965. To effectively regulate and manage Nepal-India border to stop cross-border criminal activities, detrimental to the peace and security of both countries. To educate, implement, promote and maintain water harnessing in a broader perspective so that the poor living standards of the potentially rich subcontinent can be upgraded. Resolving the political crisis through a process of negotiations and engagement of all sides to restore democracy and peace in Nepal.

On Indo-Bangladesh Relations: The SAFMA Conference noted with concern the recent cooling of relations between India and Bangladesh over several issues. India's complaints of Dhaka's 'help' to militants from India's North-east and Bangladesh's concern over the Indian 'refusal' to correct the trade imbalance and over the river-linking project in India seem to have particularly strained relations between the two countries. The Conference recommended that India do more to withdraw the tariff barriers on the export of Bangladeshi goods to India. It also suggested that New Delhi take Dhaka into confidence over the river-linking project. The Conference also recommended that Bangladesh and India take each other's security concerns more seriously and act on them. On Indo-Pakistan Relations: The conference warmly appreciated the January 6 and September 24 Joint Statements issued by the leaders of India and Pakistan and called on both countries to implement them in letter and spirit. It expressed the hope that confidence-building measures will be taken while simultaneously examining various proposals regarding the Jammu and Kashmir issue with a sincerity of purpose. On Kashmir: SAFMA welcomes the positive and constructive tone of the meeting between President General Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh in New York, and the jointly expressed determination to engage in constructive and meaningful dialogue on all issues, including Kashmir without preconditions. In that spirit the SAFMA Conference discussed several alternatives on Kashmir for going ahead with the dialogue. The conference concluded that the twin processes of normalizing relations between India and Pakistan and, simultaneously, addressing the Kashmir issue with vigour. Stabilisation of Indo-Pak relations and confidence- building measures will, however, deepen trust and facilitate progress on Kashmir. There was a consensus that Kashmiri interests and aspirations needed to be addressed by both governments. It was felt that the representatives of Kashmiris from both parts should be consulted by the respective governments. The SAFMA conference generally agreed that only a solution from which all parties felt they had gained would be viable in the long run. On Sri Lanka: The Conference strongly endorsed the view that the return of peace, harmony and prosperity to the people of Sri Lanka calls for the sustained pursuit of the peace process that has been initiated. Unsettling developments that have marred the process in the past must not be allowed to impede its progress. On stabilising the South Asian nuclear regime: Appreciating the already agreed upon measures intended to stabilize the South Asian nuclear regime, the conference proposed the following additional measures: 1. Kashmir should be declared a nuclear-free zone through a bilateral Indo-Pak agreement. 2. Both India and Pakistan must ensure that missile deployments (conventional or nuclear capable) do not directly threaten the other side. 3. Both sides should ensure that in crisis situations, direct communication channels remain functional. In addition to the arrangements in place and measures which have already been suggested, such channels must operate at other key levels of diplomacy and governance. However, SAFMA reiterates its opposition to all weapons of mass destruction and commits itself to striving for their elimination.

Round table conference on media issues between Information and Broadcasting Minister Jaipal Reddy and SAFMA representatives

Singing time: Sirmed Manzoor Kushal Jeena (Left), Vinod Sharma, Saurabh Shukla, Renu Mittal and K. Srinivasan

Glimpses of reception dinner hosted by Information & Broadcasting Minister Jaipal Reddy SAFMA Sri Lankan chapter President N.M. Ameen with other delegates

Hindustan Times Vice Chairperson Shobana Bhartia talks to Pakistani columnist Ayaz Amir as Vinod Sharma and K. K. Katyal look on

Reception by Hindustan Times Vice Chairperson Shobana Bhartia Having an argument: Nirmala Shirma and two other journalists

Party Hour

Late night consultation: Talat Hussain with Abdul Qadir Hassan and Nusrat Javeed