SP's Land Forces April-May 2013

April-May 2013

SP’s

Volume 10 No. 2

AN SP GUIDE

`100.00 (India-Based Buyer Only)

PUBLICATION

ROUNDUP

www.spslandforces.net

T h e ONL Y j o u r n a l i n A s i a d e d i c a t e d t o L a n d F o r c e s

In This Issue

>> Mountain Strike Corps

Page 4 Indian Army’s Alignment for Net-centric Combat

Photograph: Indian Army

Net-centricity calls for sweeping revisions in the manner of engaging in warfare. As a corollary, it requires restructuring of the fighting, supporting and logistic elements, which in turn necessitates application of across-the-board reforms in the management of the military institution.

Lt General (Retd) Gautam Banerji Page 5 Defence Spending: Army, Navy & Air Force The defence budget of `2,03,672 crore ($37 billion) for 2013-14 is a hike of 5.3 per cent from last year’s budget estimate of `1,93,407.29 crore ($35.8 billion).

Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor Page 7 Optimising Technology for Border Security As the asymmetric war is likely to heighten with the implosions within Pakistan and fallout of post-2014 withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan on the region, there is an urgent need to upgrade our border security, using the best technology.

Lt General (Retd) P.C. Katoch Page 8 Anatomy of China’s DBO Intrusion The government should once again seriously review the external intelligence mechanism and make the Indian Army responsible for complete land borders. All security forces including Border Security Force, ITBP, Sashastra Seema Bal on the borders must be put under the operational control of the Army.

Lt General (Retd) P.C. Katoch Plus Emerging Concepts in Air and Missile Defence Exercise Ajeya Warrior News in Brief

10 10 11

Special 33% discount on Annual Subscription for Serving Military Officials

Raising New Formations The proposal of a new corps, including two independent infantry and two armoured brigades, would together cost around `81,000 crore, spread primarily over the Twelfth Five Year Plan (2012-17) period, with some spill over into the Thirteenth Plan  Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

A

mountain strike corps (MSC) for the eastern theatre has been in the news now for some time. The Cabinet approval for the same was reported some time ago. The latest reference about this strike corps was made in the first and second week of February 2013 when it was mentioned that apart from the strike corps for the mountains, the Army also desired to raise two independent infantry brigades and two independent armoured brigades.

It seems that the proposal was first mooted in 2010 and given in-principle clearance by the government in 2011.The plan involved recruiting of over 80,000 soldiers and nearly 500 officers to man the strike corps, an offensive formation, to counter China’s growing capabilities across the border in Tibet. It was then estimated that the new corps would cost about

`65,000 crore. India has no strike corps for the mountains whereas for the western border, India has three strike corps, which are trained and equipped for offensive operations against Pakistan, in plains, semi-desert and desert terrain. The headquarters of these three strike corps are located at Mathura, Ambala and Bhopal respectively, with the formations spread in Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan.

It was also reported in the media that the raising of the new formations, including two independent infantry and two armoured brigades would together cost about `81,000 crore, spread primarily over the Twelfth Five Year Plan (2012-17) period, with some spill over into the Thirteenth Plan.

The Finance Ministry and the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) initially had raised their objections to such huge investments.

The PMO had sent back the proposal to the Defence Ministry and had asked for a

comprehensive joint proposal. The Chiefs of Staff Committee had tasked the Headquarter Integrated Defence Staff to come up with a revised draft for the mountain strike corps which seems to have now been approved. The proposal has now been given a final shape. This includes the raising of the corps which implies raising of three more infantry divisions (20,000 soldiers each), complete with tactical airlift capability and armed with necessary armoured regiments and artillery components. The Indian Air Force (IAF) has also projected its requirement in this plan. It includes deployment of the C-130J Hercules aircraft meant for special operations like para-dropping.

It has been reported in the media that the MSC is to be located in the eastern theatre, with its headquarters at Panagarh.

The independent infantry and armoured brigades would have multiple contingencies for employment in Ladakh and in the eastern theatre.

2/2013 SP’s Land Forces

1

E D I T O R I A L

>> Mountain Strike Corps This year’s defence budget is as uninspiring as the economic performance of the government in the past two years or so. The Hindu had reported on April 30, 2012: “Afflicted by misgovernance and corruption, India’s global clout has waned over the past year but could swing back if the economy regains its growth trajectory.” However, on April 12, 2013, according to a Reuters poll of economists, it was stated that India’s economic growth will remain subdued this year and any recovery will be gradual, as government spending and interest rate cuts from the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) revives domestic demand. It further states: “Although inflation is expected to ease, it will not fall near the RBI’s perceived comfort level of around five per cent, reducing the chances of aggressive policy action to pull the economy out of its slowest pace of expansion in a decade.”

The economic downturn has put paid to the modernisation plans of the defence services, which is involved in a major modernisation process with several acquisitions in the pipeline besides upgradation of infrastructure in the Northeast along the border with China. The modernistion of all three services is way behind schedule adversely affecting the operational capabilities of the three services. The five per cent actual increase in the overall defence budget, apart from being meagre, when seen in the light of the lacklustre performance of the Defence Ministry in ensuring timely procurements of requisite weapons and other systems, has raised the concern of all strategic and military analysts about national security. The details have been given in the article on the defence budget.

The other important piece in this issue is on net-centricity and modernisation. Net-centricity is a tool of warfare which is acquired by nearseamless integration of many ‘networks’ to en-

www.spslandforces.net

Necessity for a Strike Corps in the Eastern Theatre The requirement for a strike corps for the mountains in the eastern theatre has long been felt in the Army. After the debacle of 1962, India raised a large number of mountain formations to defend India’s borders in the North and East against China. Two more mountain divisions were raised recently in 2010-11 to ensure that all existing gaps are plugged and some reserves are available for tactical/operational level reactions in the eastern theatre based on the operational situations that may develop during hostilities. However, the eastern theatre had remained a low priority theatre as far as modernisation and induction of new weapon systems and “force multipliers” are concerned as compared to the western theatre due to the constant Pakistani threat and the imposition of 1965 and 1971 wars fought in fairly quick succession. This fact combined with the relative dormancy in the eastern theatre after 1962 war and the ongoing budgetary constraints, modernisation and capability building on both fronts, was simultaneously not considered feasible.

Moreover, the weather conditions and the nature of mountainous terrain in the east also urged restraint in the introduction of new technologies in conducting warfare which were not considered to be so effective in the mountains. This resulted in accumulation of large voids in the inventory of the fighting formations located in the east. By the turn of the century and with the onset of the 21st century, it started becoming clearer that China was going to be our principle opponent in the future and the indicators were: China’s self image as a predominant power of South Asia; its aspirations to be a superpower by 2049; its compulsive use of Pakistan to keep India engaged on its western front and off balance militarily to pose any threat to it; its dismissive and derogatory approach towards India’s democratic experience; its strategy of encircling India through its neighbours and

2

SP’s Land Forces 2/2013

able the entire military force for precise and predominant operations. For example, networks that perform the functions of transmitting command, logistic, intelligence, surveillance and fire control signals through dedicated media, when integrated into one system and made accessible to the lowest fighting, supporting and logistic echelons, bring about net-centricity of the overall war machine. However, net-centricity requires sweeping reforms in the method of warfighting and it also requires restructuring of the fighting, supporting and logistic formations and units. Thus this form of warfare necessitates application of across-the-board reforms in the management of the military and the jointness among all other agencies of the government involved in the planning and conduct of wars. We are far from attaining this capability at present.

Another important piece concerns the Mountain Strike Corps for the eastern theatre, which has been in the news for some time now.

Cabinet approval of the same was reported some time ago. The latest reference about this strike corps was made in the first and second week of February 2013 when it was mentioned that apart from the strike corps for the mountains, the Army desired to raise two independent infantry brigades and two independent armoured brigades for multiple contingencies in the northern and eastern regions. The article gives the necessity of the strike corps for the eastern theatre and the manner in which it is likely to be employed. An offensive capability imparts flexibility to operational plans and gives a larger number of military options to the military commanders, in order to achieve the political objectives of war and therefore politically and operationally an offensive capability is vital for winning a war.

confining it within the subcontinent; its critical approach to India’s nuclear status; its negative disposition in allowing India to become a permanent member of the Security Council; and its unwillingness to resolve the border dispute. All served as warnings that India could not afford to ignore.

All nations who only try to defend their borders without going on the offensive at any stage during the war, generally ending up losing the territory and therefore in the war. Wars can never be won by remaining on the defensive throughout. Undertaking an offensive at an appropriate time can not only neutralise the opponent’s gains but also positively motivate the troops, thus ensuring a high morale of the military and of the nation as a whole. An offensive capability imparts flexibility to operational plans and gives a larger number of military options to the military commanders in order to achieve the political objectives of war and therefore politically and operationally an offensive capability is vital for winning a war. Moreover, an offensive capability can also serve as deterrence to an opponent who may otherwise be tempted to adopt an adventurist approach.

Many would ask the inevitable question regarding the necessity of increasing the density of defensive formations when offen-

The IAF has also projected its requirement in this plan. It includes deployment of the C-130J Hercules aircraft meant for special operations like para-dropping

The other articles included in this issue are: “Technology for Border Management”; and Anatomy of China’s DOB intrusion; and a brief report on the “Army Air Defence International Seminar” held on February 20, 2013.

As we go to print, the news of a platoon strength contingent of China’s People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) intrusion in DBO sector of Ladakh on April 15 is being flashed by the media.

It seems that the Indian Army has mobilised the Ladakh Scouts after reports surfaced that China had intruded 10 kilometres deep inside the Indian territory in the region and set up a tent post there. The Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP), who were guarding line border in that sector, reportedly erected a tent post near the one set up by the intruding troops.

A second flag meeting between the local military commanders of the two countries on the latest Chinese intrusion held on April 23 has not achieved any results, though the Indian Army has asked the Chinese to get back to status quo. Army Chief General Bikram Singh also began his two-day visit to Jammu and Kashmir on April 23, 2013. This is not the first time that Chinese troops have entered deep into the Indian territory. However, considering that the Chinese never take any action without a longer-term strategy, this move seems to have perplexed the Indian Government into somnolent inaction instead of resolute action.

sive formations are in the process of being raised. The answer is quite simple and that is: a military commander must protect his launch pads or firm bases from where he can undertake offensives. He cannot afford to lose areas which provide lucrative avenues for launching his offensive operations which could reach out to capture vulnerable and vital terrain of the opponent and therefore heavier defensive density in such areas is a necessity to retain maximum options for launching offensive operations.

Types of Offensive Manoeuvres Offensive manoeuvres in the mountains, especially the higher reaches, are constrained by the difficult terrain, the additional time taken to cover a given distance due to difficult terrain and high altitude effects, the generally adverse climatic conditions, the limitations on the loads that a soldier can carry at higher altitudes and the difficulty in establishing a logistic chain for replenishment of the units and formations who are required to move into enemy territory. As compared to the plains and desert terrain, an attack on a locality in the mountains, requires three to four times the number of troops as compared to the plains and far greater time. Hence the mountain formations have to be manpower intensive. There is also a constraint on the operational logistics in the mountains due to lack of adequate roads and tracks. Thus backup logistic support by air (both fixed-wing and rotarywing) becomes vital for the mountains.

The manoeuvres that can be adopted in the mountains at operational and strategic levels can be proactive or reactive. These are not very different from those adopted in the plains and deserts except for the fact that far greater time is required to conduct operations due to terrain and climate constraints combined with lowered human endurance in the higher altitudes. Movements on foot being very slow, deep operations planned can be executed by simultaneously employ-

Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

ing helicopter-borne troops or airborne troops in the depth areas.

Reactive Operations Counter-offensive: A counter-offensive is the term used to describe large-scale military manoeuvres usually at operational or military strategic levels by a defender who after successfully halting the enemy’s offensive, undertakes a counter-offensive manoeuvre in another sector to capture advantageous positions in enemy territory in order to either force him to move back from the positions occupied by him in our territory or to occupy such enemy territory in his depth areas which would give us post-war bargaining power. This is executed by specially trained and equipped strike formations. In the mountains, due to terrain constraints, manoeuvre by helicopter-borne troops and airborne troops assisted by ground formations, it would be the most preferred option. Military strategist Carl von Clausewitz considered a counter-offensive to be the most efficient means of forcing the attacker to abandon offensive plans.

Counter-strike: A counter-strike is aimed at destroying the firm base of the attacker. Essentially, therefore, a counterstrike is a shallow counter-offensive launched from one or both flanks of an enemy offensive. The defender, in the process of absorbing an offensive, strives to strike at the launch pad or firm base of the attacker by going behind the enemy lines. If this operation is carried out at a critical juncture when the attacker has sent most of his troops forward to advance deep into the defender’s territory and is relatively weak in his firm base area, then the defender through the counter-strike may stand a good chance of cutting off the axis of maintenance of the attacker, thus forcing him to retract his forces, as otherwise he faces the danger of being cut off logistically from his firm base.

Continued on page 6

Mobile Surveillance Capability (MSC) Our field-tested MSC provides situational awareness, real-time surveillance, and night-vision capability for all of your border and perimeter surveillance needs. Telephonics’ MSC ensures mission effectiveness every time with a flexible and fully integrated system.

For more information, contact our Mobile Surveillance Experts at 1-631-755-7050.

ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY WITH A GLOBAL REACH 38235

www.telephonics.com

>> NCW

Indian Army’s Alignment for Net-centric Combat Net-centricity calls for sweeping revisions in the manner of engaging in warfare. As a corollary, it requires restructuring of the fighting, supporting and logistic elements, which in turn necessitates application of across-the-board reforms in the management of the military institution.

Photograph: SP Guide Pubns

“What I cannot do now is the sign of what I shall do hereafter. The sense of impossibility is the beginning of all possibilities.”

—Sri Aurobindo  Lt General (Retd) Gautam Banerji

I

t was in the 1980s that the Indian Army took baby steps towards a process which has today morphed into the concept of ‘net-centricity’ in conduct of military operations. A decade later, military policymakers had envisaged that the process would, in natural course, cascade to the realm of revolution in military affairs (RMA). Further down the line, at the dawn of the 21st century, it was expected that a RMA-induced modernisation programme would lead to Indian Army’s overdue ‘transformation’—an upgrade that would be in tune with tactical and scientific developments of the time and in conformity with the political mandate of the state within a cost-efficient fiscal allocation. That alas has not happened as the nation lands up spending about `2,00,000 crore from its deficit budget. Arguably, it fails to reap the corresponding benefits of assured deterrence and peace-dividend.

In this article, an attempt has been made to examine as to how we could choose the right alignment towards net-centricity of the military structure. Doubtlessly, this is a pleasant call as it raises hope that such a course of military modernisation might trigger manifestation of true and comprehensive transformation of the Indian Army in the coming days.

www.spslandforces.net

Net-centricity and Modernisation It may be noted that RMA-induced modernisation of the military structure calls for sweeping revisions across the entire gamut of engaging in warfare and when described in a more profound sense, it is but a ‘transformation’. Indeed, net-centricity is just one of the many components of equal salience, all of which must function in synergy to bring about true modernisation, and consequently, to optimisation of defence capabilities. To be really effective, therefore, net-centricity must be complemented, firstly, with corresponding modernisation and restructuring of fighting, supporting and logistic elements, and secondly, by institution of reforms in the management of induction, training, scaling and administering military men and material.

Simply put in strategic parlance, net-centricity is one ‘system of systems’ that serves a cost-efficient, modernised and profoundly transformed military structure.

Net-centricity is a tool of warfare which is acquired by near-seamless integration of many ‘networks’ to enable the entire military force in prosecution of precise and predominant operations. For example, networks that perform the functions of transmitting command, logistic, intelligence, surveillance and fire control signals through dedicated media, when integrated into one system and made accessible to the lowest fighting, supporting and logistic echelons, brings about net-centricity of the war machine.

4

SP’s Land Forces 2/2013

Architecture of Net-centric Military Force Looking from top down, below the integrated Net-centric Warfare Command Centre (NCWCC), the second tier of net-centric hierarchy consists of over two dozen or more of such broad categories of networks which would be functional at wartime. Apart from the more visible functions of command, control, logistics, intelligence, fire support and the like, the rest of the two dozen odd networks serve a wider range of functions such as surveillance, electronic warfare, movement control, mine warfare, nuclear warfare, inventory management, etc.

At the third tier, there would be varying numbers of ‘nets’ which are dedicated channels for exchange of information data among different units and formations that perform specified operational roles in war­ fighting. For example, nets that are dedicated to firepower would serve various units and formations which provide fire support from air, field and medium artillery, multibarrel launchers and missiles, as well as the ancillary elements that serve the purpose of acquisition, analysis, designation and damage assessment of targets. In certain cases, to obviate overcrowding and yet leave open the choice of access, some of these nets may opt to have another echelon of exclusive data exchange between certain intimate groups—the missile group, for example.

When amalgamated with other nets—command and intelligence nets for example— into one whole, nets coalesce into a network to serve a particular function of warfighting.

As it would be noted, the second and the third tiers—the networks and nets respectively—conform to the eternal models of controlling battles. There is really nothing new to this architecture. What really makes difference in the contemporary era is that input collection, processing and transfer functions are executed faster, in comprehensive details and with near-perfect accuracy, to be delivered in near-real time across a much wider base of force-elements.

The preceding discussion may give an impression that net-centricity is all about transfer of data signals of various operational content through a mix of state-of-theart electronic and electromagnetic media.

But that is only partially true. Apart from high capacity, high speed and wider connectivity through vertical as well as horizontal media, the cause of net-centricity must be served by equally important ‘assets’ of digitised databank, collector sensors, data converters, intelligent computation and input filters, all managed by cadres of tactical and technical specialists, and regulated by logical protocols and procedures. Each of these assets have their own attributes and therefore have to be specifically designed, designated, authenticated and finally construed, for a net-centric force to have good prospects of getting better of an adversary in the field of battle.

We may therefore delve into the nuances of organising the aforementioned assets.

Digitisation Digitisation is an imperative for the system of net-centricity to proceed beyond the drawing board. It is a process of recording input signals in electronically digitised format from two categories of sources. Such data lends itself to mathematical manipulations and reformatting, according to the military commander’s choice. It is therefore fundamental to the conduct of warfare by means of command, control, communications, computer, intelligence, integration, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4I2SR) systems.

To elaborate further, one category of inputs involves conversion of basic attributes pertaining to the terrain, weapon, equipment and other war-like assets—‘primary’ or ‘basic’ digitisation, so to say. This basic data is to be complemented by ‘secondary’ digitisation, that of the libraries of tactical, technical, man-

The Army’s past naivety had caused it to confine the scope of net-centricity just to the field of communications and some bit of data processing

agement and decision support information pertaining to each arm and service, which would have been built up over time. Digitised databank is thus created by feeding basic as well as arm or service specific information into the system. Obviously, the process of basic as well as secondary digitisation is an extremely laborious undertaking that requires sustained engagement over many years in field work, in order to acquire, update and authenticate the items of information. Sadly, the Indian Army’s performance on build up of the requisite digitised databank has been rather dismal.

Over the past two decades, neither has it been able to format the requisite range and depth of primary attributes of geospatial information (GIS), nor has it built up a comprehensive range of secondary arm or service specific information bank pertaining to own, allied and adversarial forces.

The second category of inputs pertains to characteristics of the tactically significant objects at a point of time. These have to be recorded in real time from dynamic signatures emitted by enemy’s or own activities in the war zone. Recording is executed through suitably positioned collectors or sensors of various working principles to gain the advantages of wide coverage, near-perfect accuracy, high resolution and real-time transferability. Of course, raw signatures have to be converted to a standard format before analysis. In this instance too, limited availability of reliable array of sensors has been a restraining factor upon the advent of true net-centricity in the Indian Army.

Sensing Equipment Of necessity, net-centricity is also contingent to design, quality and quantity of various kinds of sensors that have to be deployed to focus on the intended objects of information. Location, movement and span of scan of the sensors in relation to the objects of coverage are achieved through a combination of remote electro-mechanical and manual articulation. Sensors collect ‘primary’ or ‘raw’ input signals from designated objects and feed these into a network, of which it forms a part. Next, at the controlling ‘hubs’ of designated networks, raw input is subject to authentication, reformatting to usable form, analysis for possible effect, and filtration to prevent redundancy or information overload. Finally, the information is disposed into the net-centric domain for all concerned to harness.

Regrettably, inability of the nation’s defence research, development and industrial complex to produce indigenous and therefore algorithmically secure and battleworthy sensors, has combined with our overlook of the burden of digitisation to prevent the Indian Army from proceeding beyond a superficial stage of net-centricity.

The Status of Net-connectivity The situation in favour of net-connectivity— that is, the ‘media’ of net-centricity—is much to be satisfied with, thanks to the Army’s early excursion into the field of digital telecommunications and to a limited extent, data Continued on page 6

Union Budget 2013-14

>>

Defence Spending: Army, Navy & Air Force The defence budget of `2,03,672 crore ($37 billion) for 2013-14 is a hike of 5.3 per cent from last year’s budget estimate of `1,93,407.29 crore ($35.8 billion). The Army has been allocated a total of `17,879.28 crore as capital budget as compared to `15,750.30 crore in the revenue estimates of last year, an increase of about `2,129 crore.

Photograph: PIB

 Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

T

he Union Budget 2013-14 presented in the Parliament on February 28, 2013, by Finance Minister P. Chidambaram, has increased the defence budget to `2,03,672 crore ($37 billion) for 2013-14, marking a hike of 5.3 per cent of last year’s budget estimate (BE) of `1,93,407.29 crore ($35.8 billion), which does not even cater to the inflation. If the revised estimates are taken into account then the increase amounts to 14 per cent over and above last year’s revised allocation. The unspoken and hidden aspect is that the capital budget quite often remains underutilised to some extent or is cut by the Finance Ministry halfway into the year. For instance, in December 2012, Finance Minister P. Chidambaram had cut the defence capital outlay by `10,000 crore. This year’s budget announcement was accompanied by the Finance Minister’s statement promising more funds. This is the usual rhetorical statement which every Finance Minister makes after declaring the allocations for the defence budget. The budgetary allocation this year marks a reduction in GDP ratio from 1.9 last year to 1.79 per cent of GDP this year.

The fact that it is an uninspiring defence budget is obvious because the defence services are involved in a major modernisation process with several acquisitions in the pipeline besides upgradation of infrastructure in the northeast along the border with China. The modernisation of all three services is way behind schedule, adversely affecting the operational capabilities of the three services. The five per cent increase in the overall defence budget, apart from being meagre, when seen in the light of the lacklustre performance of the Defence Ministry in ensuring timely procurements of requisite weapons and other systems, has raised the concern of all strategic and military analysts about national security. We know that the buck stops at the level of the fighting formations of the Army, the naval fleets and fighter squadrons of the Indian Air Force (IAF) and if these are not equipped with modern weaponry and voids continue year after year, then we are looking at disastrous consequences in the making. We have seen the gradual degradation of the operational capabilities of the armed forces over the years. The Indian Army is the worst affected in this regard because no new weapon or other systems have been introduced for the past two decades or so barring a few conventional missile systems.

What is not usually appreciated is that voids in the Army cannot be made up quickly due to the magnitude of our requirements and lack of military capability is also likely to weaken our national resolve to safeguard our national interests because either politically or diplomatically, we will not be able to act firmly if we are militarily weak.

It can be broadly concluded from the figures (see Table) that the share of the defence budget in the GDP has decreased from 1.9 last year to 1.79 this year. Moreover, what is quite evident is the fact the revenue expenditure has been decreased and this will undoubtedly impact the transportation

Budget 2012-13 & 2013-14 Defence Budget (` in crore) Growth of Defence Budget (per cent) Revenue Expenditure (` in crore) Growth of Revenue Expenditure (per cent) Share of Revenue Expenditure in Defence Budget (per cent) Capital Expenditure (` in crore) Growth of Capital Expenditure (per cent) Share of Capital Expenditure in Defence Budget (per cent) Share of Defence Budget in GDP (per cent) Share of Defence Expenditure in overall Central ­Government expenditure

2012-13 1,93,407.29 17.63 1,13,828.66 19.55 58.85 79,578.63 15.00 41.15 1.90 12.97

2013-14 2,03,672.12 5.3 1,16,931.41 2.72 57.4 86,740.71 9.0 42.60 1.79 12.23

(fuel) courses abroad, and overall training of the three services. It seems that the negligible growth of the defence budget has been influenced primarily because of the poor economic state of the country.

process of undertaking an extensive modernisation drive and therefore the meagre amount of increase in the capital budget implies another dry year for most procurement.

Service Wise Share in the Total Budget

The Army has been allocated a total of `17,879.28 crore as capital budget compared to `15,750.30 crore in the revenue estimates (RE) of last year, an increase of about `2,129 crore. Under the heads: aircraft and aero engines, heavy- and medium-vehicles, and other equipment which constitute the heads under which most capital procurement is done, the Army has been allocated only `13,311 crore (approximately $2.7 billion) and considering the high inflationary trends and unfavourable exchange rate regime, and the fact that more than 60 per cent would go for paying committed liabilities, it would leave `5,324.4 crore for new procurements which is meagre considering that even the Eleventh Five Year Plan (2008 to 2012) procurements have not fructified. Added to this is the incredibly slow and complicated procurement procedure in which any agency of the government (there are more than 20 such agencies apart from Service Headquarters) involved in the procurement process can stymie the entire process through their observations and noting on the file.

The Army needs to induct various types of new equipment. The list includes new Arjun Mark II tanks and upgradation of its T-72 tank fleet and the infantry combat vehicle (ICV) BMP-2/2K fleet, procurement of about 1,500 Howitzer of 155mm

The Army with an approximate budget of `99,707.8 crore accounts for 48.96 per cent of the latest defence budget, the Air Force with `57,502.9 crore accounts for 28.23 per cent, the Navy with `36,343.5 crore accounts for 17.84 per cent while the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) with `10,610.2 crore accounts for 5.21 per cent and ordnance factories with minus `508.7 crore amounts to minus 0.24 per cent. It is obvious that the Air Force has increased its share in the total defence allocation (from 24.9 per cent to 28.2 per cent). The Navy’s share has decreased the most (by 1.4 per cent), whereas the Army and DRDO’s shares have declined by 1.3 and 0.3 per cent, respectively. This time, the Air Force is the only service which has seen an increase in both the revenue expenditure and capital expenditure.

For the Army, there is a fall in the capital budget of `1,294.35 crore when the budget estimate figure of previous year is compared to this year’s allocation.

Impact on Modernisation The capital budget shows an increase of nine per cent as compared to 15 per cent last year.

Capital budget is mainly meant for new procurements for modernisation of the armed forces. Currently, all three services are in the

Army

52-calibre, procurement of 145 ultra-light weight 155mm howitzers for the mountains from BAE Systems, weapon upgrades for air defence units of L-70 guns, ZU-23-2 twin-guns, and ZSU-23-4 Schilka, a lethal and sophisticated assault rifle for its infantry, and 197 light observation helicopters for the Army Aviation to replace the existing fleet of Cheetas and Chetaks and to induct attack and armed helicopters for close support of Army formations in the battlefield.

Additional requirements have to be catered for five new infantry/mountain divisions, out of which two have already been raised for the eastern theatre, for which various types of equipment including infantry weapons, light armour, artillery and small arms are required. Three more infantry divisions are required as a part of the mountain strike corps whose proposal has been accepted by the government. Over the next five to seven years or so, the Army will have to increase its manpower by about 1,20,000 soldiers.

The equipment listed above comprises the major items required and is by no means exhaustive while the capital budget this year is extremely modest. If the unimplemented schemes of Eleventh Defence Plan and the requirements of the Twelfth Five Year Plan (1213 to 1217) are added, the situation is extremely critical.

Air Force The Air Force is looking to procure the 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) Rafale fighter aircraft from France, apart from 22 Apache 64-D attack helicopters from the US. In the pipeline there are also15 Boeing CH-47F Chinook heavy-lift helicopters for $1.4 billion, and six Airbus A330 multi-role tanker transport for about $1 billion. The total capital budget allocation to the Air Force under the heads aircraft and aero engines, heavy and medium vehicles, and other equipment amounts to `37,048 crore ($6.74 billion) and if about 80 per cent is used to pay for committed liabilities, it would leave about `7,409.6 crore for new purchases whose list is rather long.

Navy The Indian Navy has been allotted `8,965.37 crore (about $1.63 billion) under various heads as compared to last year’s figure `4,968.13 crore (about $0.9 billion); almost a twofold jump. In addition, the Naval fleet has been allotted `11,772.26 crore (about $2.14 billion), as compared to last year’s figure of `11,012.90 crore (about $2 billion) which is a marginal increase. This amount is used for acquiring new ships and for paying for committed liabilities under capital acquisitions. The Indian Navy currently awaits the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) decision on procuring 16 multi-role twin-engine helicopters (10-tonne), for which the Europe NH Industries NH-90 model is pitted against Sikorsky’s S-70B Sea Hawk. The advanced anti-ship and anti-submarine warfarecapable platforms, desperately needed by the Indian Navy to replace the ageing fleet Continued on page 6

2/2013 SP’s Land Forces

5

>> Raising New...continued from page 2 Counter-attack: This manoeuvre is carried out in own territory to blunt and limit the offensive of the attacker by directly attacking and confronting his forces from the front and flanks. This manoeuvre, unlike the counterstrike, does not strive to go behind the enemy lines to attack his firm base but conducts the same operation from own side of the border.

This is likely to be costly in terms of own casualties as it attempts to hit the enemy where he is likely to be strong. However, at times, the defender may be forced to undertake such an operation. In recent times, Kargil operations

by India is an appropriate example of counter-attacks in our own territory as the government had laid the restriction of not crossing the line of control (LoC) into Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK).

Proactive Operations An offensive could also be employed to launch offensives into opponents territory before he launches his attacks. This means that India must have the “situational aware-

ness” regarding the opponents movements at strategic, operational and tactical levels.

India’s intelligence and surveillance means must be in place to be able to fight future conflicts. We cannot afford to be surprised in the future. However, with limited offensive forces and difficulties of logistic support across the border in the mountains, the most lucrative option would be to pre-empt the opponents launch off areas, which would perforce have to be close to the border. This would be equivalent to a cold start doctrine for the mountains. This implies proactive operations into the opponent’s territory.

Employment of the Mountain Strike Corps A strike corps being an operational level formation (as opposed to the tactical level units and formations) derives its aims and missions from the political objectives of war.

The political objectives are translated into military objectives at the level of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) and these are

then passed on through COSC directives to the three service chiefs and the concerned operational commands of the three services.

A corps being the highest level of field formation in the Army, is expected through its operational conduct, to achieve the laid down military objectives which would in the ultimate analysis achieve the political objectives of war. At the national strategic levels, the political objectives of the three services will be the same but when translated into military strategic objectives, differences will naturally arise based on the capabilities of each service.

It is generally not appreciated that a strike corps with all its complements can hardly be employed from a single axis or a single launch pad (firm base) in the mountains due to the vast areas required for its concentration, moving forward and launching across the borders. Mountainous areas lack adequate number of roads and tracks and do not provide sufficient avenues for launching largescale offensives. Thus in the mountains, lower tactical groupings and formations like bri-

gade groups and divisions may be employed through different sectors using firm bases provided by the holding corps. Firm bases/ launch pads are locations from where offensive operations can be launched and will depend upon the availability of suitable objectives across the border, generally opposite the firm bases. Objectives should be such which will provide a military advantage to pursue the offensive further and help in achieving the political aims of war. A sector which provides multiple objectives is preferred over other areas as it gives a military commander greater number of options and hence imparts greater flexibility to operational plans. If a number of offensives are planned to be launched simultaneously through different sectors, they may either converge on to the same objective or may aim at approaching different intermediate objectives from where the Corps offensive can be progressed deeper into the opponent’s territory. SP

base in digitised format. In this, terrain GIS— the fundamental plank of net-centricity— deserves to be accorded prime attention. Build up of terrain, subterranean and tropospheric GIS being a highly specialised field, strengthening the Army’s Military Survey (Corps of Engineers) units and equipping these with full range of wherewithal for recording of ground, air and inland hydrographic survey should be thought of. Most advanced armies have already done so; some have even created distinct corps of Military Survey.

The second step would be to shake the indigenous industry to develop a range of futuristic data sensing equipment, switches, routers, converters and the related paraphernalia, each customised to own conditions and programmed to function with home grown algorithm. Meanwhile, sufficient inventory of net-centricity specific equipment to equip two ‘test bed formations’ should be acquired.

Third, each arm and service should be set with timelines to digitise the entire range of information data that might pertain to their operational role. In this manner, over a specified time, it would be possible to build up a comprehensive databank that is geared to respond to most tactical and technical queries.

Fourth, at least two mutually competing ‘test bed formations’, with full complement of headquarters and subordinate units,

should be constituted to apply the theories of net-centricity and formalise appropriate functional protocols and practices. These could be structured in the manner of standard ‘brigades’, but staffed and equipped in conformity to modern requirements.

Dedicated connectivity highway and welltrained staff should be specifically assigned to these formations, for them to engage in experimenting with net-centricity to start with, then generate interest in it, and follow up by experimentation and trials.

(To be continued)

Indian Army’s Alignment...continued from page 4 processing. At the current stage, the media of net-connectivity having been successfully tested under limited warlike conditions, the Army’s net-centric functions have proved to be quite effective in handling command and control (C2), target acquisition, fire control, voice communications and routine data transfer traffic. However, to cater to situations when concurrent networks — such as wide area surveillance and reconnaissance network, intelligence network, target acquisition, designation and engagement loop, logistic net, etc. have to be activated under full warlike conditions, the current status of net-connectivity would need to be substantially upgraded if it is to inspire the requisite degree of confidence. Thankfully, unlike the case of digitisation and deployment of sensing equipment, defence planners have accorded sufficient thrust to this aspect.

Having discussed the status of net-centricity in the Indian Army, we may now turn to seek measures that could take the promise forward.

Four Steps to True Net-centricity The Army’s past naivety had caused it to confine the scope of net-centricity just to the field of communications and some bit of data processing. Thus apart from the Corps of Signals, in the rest of the Army, the fundamentals of net-centricity—advanced education and training, conceptual development,

restructuring of the organisational as well as equipment profile, and finally, field trials and exercises, remain somewhat tentatively attended to. While signal communication network and its related training, experimentation and upgrade are proceeding well, research and development of battleworthy net-centricity equipment of indigenous algorithm has not kept the right pace. More seriously, the very foundation of net-centricity, that is, the build up of military GIS— both primary and secondary—remains but nascent. As for the necessary revision of the policies and procedures of personnel and equipment management, and even the government’s rules and regulations, to foster modernisation, the state is no better.

Currently, due to inadequacies of digitised databank, sensing hardware, control ‘hubs’ or effective NCWCC and functional protocols, net-centricity in the Indian Army is effective only in patches. Resultantly, that capability remains confined to the realm of specified operational situations in which specified field formations may operate for limited objectives. It may therefore be in order to see as to what might help the Army align itself for digital combat better.

Considering the stupendous effort and time that it takes to prepare battleworthy digitised databank, the immediate step is to accord top priority to build up basic as well as arm and service specific information data-

Net-centricity as Harbinger of Modernisation We are aware that net-centricity calls for sweeping revisions in the manner of engaging in warfare. As a corollary, it requires restructuring of the fighting, supporting and logistic elements, which in turn necessitates application of across-the-board reforms in the management of the military institution. These reforms have to cover the aspects of induction, training, scaling and administering military men and material, so as to enable the entire warfighting machine to remain upfront with the extensive range and scorching pace of tactical and technological developments. SP The author is a former Chief of Staff, Central Command and Commandant of the Officers’ Training Academy, Chennai

Defence Spending...continued from page 5 of Sea King Mk42B’s had completed field trials in 2011. Other naval acquisitions include P-8I Poseidon multi-mission, maritime reconnaissance aircraft from the US and INS Vikramaditya (ex-Admiral Gorshkov), the 44,500-tonne Kiev class Russian aircraft carrier.

www.spslandforces.net

Our Observations It needs to be noted that a comparatively large amount of the modernisation budget is mostly earmarked for committed liabilities, thus little money is available for new schemes.

The overall ratio could vary from service to service, from 60:40 to 80:20, year after year.

Thus if we were to assume the above ratios in the new allocation, taking into account the capital budget allocated under the heads: aircraft and aero engines, heavy- and mediumvehicles, other equipment, and naval fleet (for navy only); the total amounts to `71,086.61 crore. If committed liability of 60 per cent is

6

SP’s Land Forces 2/2013

taken into account, it leaves `28,434 crore.

However, even this is not a true picture because in the case of the Army with only `13,311 crore under the above heads, it will be left with `5,324 crore (about $1 billion) after deducting 60 per cent for committed liabilities. Considering its overall requirement and the existing backlog, its modernisation is unsustainable with the current allotment. So once again the Army’s big ticket items like the 155mm towed artillery guns and 197 light observation helicopters are likely to be relegated to the background. For the Air Force, the committed liability may be as high as 80 per cent and therefore they would still need more money to sustain their modernisation drive. For the Army and Navy, the resource constraint is much more severe.

Indigenisation – A Mirage The Defence Minister A.K. Antony on February 20, 2013 had said that India needs

to speed up the indigenisation process of its defence production in order to root out corruption from the sector. The hollowness of this statement is obvious from the fact that the focus on indigenisation is missing in the Defence Ministry’s budget document. This is evident from the utilisation and allocation of resources for the ‘Make’ projects under which domestic industry, particularly the private sector, is required to design and produce advanced platforms for the armed forces. Laxman Behara of Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) states that of the total allocation of `89.2 crore made in 2012-13, not a single rupee has been utilised so far. Moreover, the allocation has been further reduced to a mere `10 crore in the new budget, implying that no major work can be undertaken for the two Army projects—tactical communication system (TCS) and future infantry combat system (FICV)––which have

been identified for development by the domestic players.

Conclusion The Indian military establishment is already planning for a two-front confrontation in the future, with Pakistan in the West and China in the Northeast. This puts a heavy burden on the Indian military but the defence budget allocations and the inordinately slow and skewed procurement process show an indecisive and pusillanimous political establishment advised by generalists who do not wish to face reality.

The MoD with the present leadership has consistently shown its inability to grasp the fundamentals of defence preparedness and therefore it is unlikely to deliver even in the future. We need total integration of the uniformed element with the bureaucrats and a dynamic minister of the calibre of Arun Singh, formerly the Minister of State for Defence. SP

Technology

>>

Optimising Technology for Border Security As the asymmetric war is likely to heighten with the implosions within Pakistan and fallout of post-2014 withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan on the region, there is an urgent need to upgrade our border security, using the best technology. Our DRDO and private industry should focus on this aspect. The policymakers need to review this critical requirement.

Photograph: Telephonics

 Lt General (Retd) P.C. Katoch

been able to come up with one suitable for snow conditions.

I

ndia has a land border of some 15,072 kilometres with six countries—5,852 km combined with ChinaNepal-Bhutan, 3,431 km with Pakistan, 1,452 km with Myanmar and 4,337 km with Bangladesh. A major portion of the land border is along difficult terrain and passes through high and very high altitudes. Then there is a coastline of 7,863 km that needs to be guarded, in addition to an exclusive economic zone of 102 million square km with 97 per cent of our trade done by sea. Our unstable and volatile neighbourhood coupled with Pakistan being the epicentre of global terrorism and waging a proxy war against India, we have been subjected to transborder terrorist strikes over past two decades both across the land border and coastline. Difficult terrain and hostile weather make the task of border security difficult. Infiltration and illegal immigrants are occurring at rapid frequency. The land borders are manned by a mix of forces like the Army, Border Security Force, Indo Tibetan Border Police, Assam Rifles, Sashastra Seema Bal, etc—all not operating under, the Army or for that matter under one Ministry. Then there is the issue of guarding the airspace to prevent recurrence of incidents like the clandestine arms drop at Purulia. This article primarily examines the role of technology in securing our land borders excluding the ‘designer technology’ being used by most nations at airports, ports and official land crossings for individuals and cargo.

Border Fencing India began fencing 190 kilometres border with Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) during 2001. In 2001, about 40 kilometres of fencing was laid and the overall task as per government officials is likely to be completed in the next two years. However, there have been numerous impediments to laying this fence. Work has been stalled many times due to firing by Pakistanis. Pakistani infiltrators have been using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to make entries for infiltration and clandestinely laying mines to hinder construction. Portions of the fencing get destroyed in avalanches every year and need to be laid again. Heavy snows in North Kashmir during winter also cause major portions of the fence to get buried completely, rendering it ineffective. In the plains sector, Pakistan has resorted to tunneling under the fence for both purposes of infiltration and smuggling. On the India-Bangladesh front, of the 3,000 kilometres fencing sanctioned, close to 75 per cent of the work has been completed but disputes between the two countries have arisen over some 180 sites on the border, where fencing needs to be done up to 150 yards of the zero line. Laying of IEDs or mines along the fence is not feasible because of agriculture in many areas permitted right up to the border, as even locals reside in close proximity to the border. Abroad, in no conflict conditions, fences have extensive provision of floodlighting. Solar panels, rechargeable batteries and diesel generators provide

Surveillance

Telephonics MSC: A Tool to Secure Borders When the borders are vast, such as in India, deployment of human resources to man them is next to impossible. Technology is the answer and in developed parts of the world they have been used to good effect. Take, for instance, the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) which has successfully deployed technology in the southern border of the United States. From the desert of the US, south-west to the forest of the northern border or the open waters of the Great Lakes, the mobile surveillance capability (MSC) systems of Telephonics Corporation has effectively detected, identified and tracked items of interest, helping the authorities in securing the nation.

The expansive Indian borders need to be secured, considering the growing threats from across the borders and massive investment in technologies is part of the answer.

The Telephonics MSC is a fully-integrated, rapidly deployable surveillance system, capable of operating either as a stand-alone system, providing detailed information of a selected region or networked together creating a “virtual fence”. System flexibility allows the MSC to be equally effective in all terrains and environments.

Command and Control

As surveillance requirements grow, so does the need for expanded command and control (C2) capabilities. Telephonics integrates the critical information needed by operators, using state-of-the-art C2 software. Operators can manage a wide area of surveillance with multiple targets of interest, all within the click of a mouse. Proactive surveillance, knowing where a target is coming from and where it is headed, gives the operator the advantage. Interventions can be coordinated to the operators’ advantage based on each individual threat. Built-in scalability and compatibility provide for system growth and interface with legacy sensors. The C2 software also supports a seamless integration of new and existing assets.

Support and Training

Known as “Best in Class”, Telephonics provides a complete package: technologies, system components, training and maintenance support. The design takes into consideration reliability, endurance and quality, as reflected in its Mil 810F testing. Understanding the importance of training to maximise the effectiveness of the MSC in the field, it provides detailed user training for both the C2 software and sensor suite. Operators receive classroom training as well as hands-on field training and support to ensure a successful start.

One of the highlights of Telephonics is it designs and implements a tailor-made integrated logistics support and preventive maintenance programme that ensures continuous operation in the harshest of conditions. No matter what the environment, Telephonics provides the end-user with an assurance that the MSC operates at maximum performance, providing unparalleled surveillance coverage.

the system with enough power to run off the power grid. Operators can pan and tilt the cameras remotely whenever any suspicious activity is observed. However, such arrangements are not feasible along an active border with an enemy like Pakistan that resorts to unprovoked firing repeatedly.

Electronic Monitoring While the age-old tripwires are very much in use, modern electronic surveillance involves detection of movement and is largely based on seismic, acoustic, inductive sensors and infrared sensors. Seismic

sensors detect vibration in the ground and they can distinguish between people and vehicles. Inductive sensors detect metal in an object that is moving, while an infrared sensor can detect human body heat from a distance of up to 100 metres. There are many kinds of conventional sensor technologies, each having its advantages and disadvantages. The unattended ground sensors (UGS) are mostly imported and primarily meant for guarding houses/premises in the West. These are ineffective with snowfall.

Unfortunately, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has not

The fencing along the border has been fitted with cameras and the consoles are with requisite commanders though limitations exist during adverse weather and visibility conditions. This capability is beefed up with night vision devices (NVDs), night vision goggles (NVGs) and hand-held thermal imagers (HHTIs), but these are always in limited supply and not across the board with every boot on ground. Use of radars as done abroad to detect smugglers as along the US-Mexico border, has the danger of giving away the electronic signatures of the equipment to the enemy. Besides, radars also have a dead zone. Significantly, electronic surveillance with border dogs is a very successful mix.

Use of unarmed aerial vehicles (UAVs)/ drones for border surveillance is being done but is in limited numbers due to paucity of resources and restrictions on flying multiple UAVs simultaneously in the same area/zone.

Additionally, the induction of the battlefield surveillance system (BSS) and battlefield management system (BMS) in the Indian Army are still a few years away and hence, the UAV picture cannot be delivered directly to the cutting-edge soldier on ground who can prevent the breach or intrusion. The UAV picture goes to the ground control station and only then the information is conveyed to the cuttingedge soldier, by when its actionable value may be lost. More importantly, what has been lacking is the delayed induction of the mini-aerial vehicles (MAVs) that are hand launched and are planned to be inducted into the infantry.

Digital imaging technology, miniaturised computers and numerous other technological advances over the past decade have contributed to rapid advances in aerial surveillance hardware such as micro-aerial vehicles, forward-looking infrared and high-resolution imagery, capable of identifying objects at extremely long distances. For instance, the MQ-9 Reaper, a US UAV used for domestic operations by the Department of Homeland Security, carries cameras that are capable of identifying an object the size of a milk carton from altitudes of 60,000 feet and has forwardlooking infrared devices that can detect the heat from a human body at distances of up to 60 kilometres. Britain is working on plans to build up a fleet of surveillance UAVs ranging from micro-aerial vehicles to full-size drones with MAVs capable of carrying tasers for “crowd control”, or weapons for killing enemy combatants. The latter actually implies weaponised MAVs, which would be invaluable against terrorists infiltrating across the borders. The US military is developing swarms of tiny unarmed drones that can hover, crawl and even kill targets. These micro UAVs will work in swarms to provide complex surveillance of borders and battlefields. Besides a laser weapon they can also be armed with incapacitating chemicals, combustible payloads or even explosives for precision targeting.

Continued on page 9

2/2013 SP’s Land Forces

7

>> Neighbourhood

Anatomy of China’s DBO Intrusion The government should seriously review the external intelligence mechanism and make the Indian Army responsible for complete land borders. All security forces including Border Security Force, Indo-Tibetan Border Police, Sashastra Seema Bal on the borders must be put under the operational control of the Army.

Graphic: Anoop Kamath

 Lt General (Retd) P.C. Katoch

S

oon after 50 Chinese were spotted camping at Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO), Ladakh, on April 15, 2013, media reports came up giving varied location of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) platoon.

While some stated that the PLA platoon was positioned 10 km deep inside the Indian territory, some reported 18 and others stated they were 30 km within. Media blitzkrieg including TV debates followed. The pacifist lobby waved white flags reiterating that even modest physical action by India, say in establishing a new post ‘elsewhere’, would culminate in a Sino-Indian war that would go nuclear. The government finally admitted on April 25 that Chinese were indeed 19 km inside the Indian territory. Two days prior to this, the Minister of External Affairs Salman Khurshid had said that “these things keep happening” and that the issue will be resolved through dialogue. Defence Minister A.K. Antony stated that “India will take every step to protect its interests.”

He initiated a series of military-to-military India-China flag meetings that have been fruitless with the Chinese Foreign Ministry categorically reiterating that the PLA had not crossed the line of actual control (LAC) and that these troops were located inside the “Chinese territory.”

www.spslandforces.net

Failures We have witnessed many failures and whether we will learn our lessons at all is a moot question with lack of strategic culture, absence of a national security strategy, lack of an integrated border management structure, neglect of forward communications despite the substantial upgrades by the adversary and lack of intelligence, to name a few. Surely, this camp did not come up overnight. So where are the reports from the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and above all the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) which is manning this sector independently? A 19-km deep intrusion occurring in the wake of the massive intrusions in Kargil during 1999, is all the more shameful. What has happened to integration and improvement of intelligence that was expected to have happened post the Kargil conflict?

The External Affairs Minister’s statement that “these things keep happening” appears out of context when the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) itself is admitting that this PLA platoon is sitting way beyond even the Chinese perception of the LAC. The MEA has full details of Chinese perception of the LAC, which has been the basis of the ongoing border talks. The Defence Minister has acknowledged that there were 400 transgressions by the PLA during 2012.

These, as well as similar transgressions in the previous years, could perhaps be categorised as transgressions because of “their perception of LAC” but certainly not what has happened at DBO. The latter is a deliberate and wanton intrusion by the Chinese, which really cannot be passed off as “these things keep happening”.

8

SP’s Land Forces 2/2013

c h ina

Gilgit

Khotan

Karakoram Pass

Pak occupied Kashmir Aksai Chin

paki s t an

Daulat Beg Oldi Srinagar

LoC

Leh Line of Actual Control

Jammu and Kashmir

I N D I A Gar Gunsa

Map not to scale

Media reports, quoting government sources, state that the DBO intrusion is a “localised action”. Nothing can be more absurd. Every unit and every formation of the PLA is posted with Political Commissars who report directly to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Such is their control that promotion of PLA officers is contingent upon the report by the Political Commissar.

The PLA Chief himself reports directly to the CCP and not the Chinese Government. Under such a set up where is the question of a local PLA commander establishing a platoon 19-km deep inside the Indian territory all on his own? Such a statement may be meant to pacify public sentiments but government should not take this incidence as routine.

Media reports on April 25, 2013, stated that the Army Chief General Bikram Singh met the Defence Minister but surprisingly even after 10 days of the intrusion having been detected, there were no reports of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) having met and discussed the situation in the presence of Service Chiefs. It gives an impression that the incidence is actually being dealt as routine occurrence. We appear to be still under the Nehru-Krishna Menon syndrome of 1962 that China will do nothing adverse

Should the Chinese not vacate Daulat Beg Oldi, it would hinder the ITBP patrolling the Karakoram Pass

to us. The lobby of defeatists too is going full blast stating that “China will take what it wants” and “China is so strong economically and militarily that what can India do”.

The words ‘self-respect’ and ‘reputation’ are obviously not in their vocabulary and they are unaware of the strengths of our military.

No wonder, we have been ruled by foreigners for centuries. If we cannot get our acts together, we will continue to lose more and more territory. Do we understand the damage to India’s global standing when numerous nations including in the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean region are looking up to India as a “security provider.”

significance of which was apparently glossed over and has resulted in flux in the situation at Demchok on account of Chinese incursions and claims. Google imagery of 2006 shows an extraordinary large scale (1:500) terrain model extensively duplicating eastern Aksai Chin built close to Yinchuan (capital of Ningxia Autonomous Region). The 3,000 × 2,300 feet model is being used for tank war-games in preparation of a future battle in Eastern Ladakh/North Sikkim? In 2012, China called upon Japan and South Korea to establish astronomical observatories in Aksai Chin, in an apparent bid to consolidate its hold on the region.

Strategic Importance

Game Plan

DBO lies astride the old silk route leading to Karakoram Pass (KK Pass), which goes beyond to Yarkand in China. Should the Chinese not vacate DBO, it would hinder the ITBP patrolling the KK Pass. There are already conflicting reports of the periodicity of patrolling the KK Pass—when was the last time they did so and are the Chinese already sitting on the reverse slopes, ready to make an appearance to surprise the vacillatingly unclear political hierarchy of India yet again. This apart, it would be possible for DBO being used as a base to threaten the route to Siachen Base Camp that feeds the Northern and Central Glaciers on the Saltoro Range. Chinese occupation of DBO would turn the flanks of the Indian defences on Saltoro Range—similar to Chinese claims to Doklam Plateau in Bhutan whose occupation by Chinese would turn the flanks of Indian defences in East Sikkim, particularly in area of Tri Junction. During Operation ‘Vijay’ in 1999, China quietly developed a road in eastern Aksai Chin towards DBO, the

The pacifist lobby is trying its best to say that the DBO intrusion is not part of any larger Chinese plan but has failed to give any logic for such assertion. It is naive not to see the writing on the wall. The US think tanks had warned in 1999 that China will start flexing its military muscle by 2010, but India hardly paid any heed to it. Some strategists are also saying that the DBO intrusion is to provide more depth to China’s Western Highway/ China’s National Highway 219 running through Aksai Chin, connecting Tibet with the Xinjiang region. The fact is that China has larger designs necessitated by its hunger pangs for more and more resources and for acquiring multiple land axes to the Indian Ocean, the latter also because of opposition at sea on its eastern front including Asia Pivot of the US. Chinese occupation of Aksai Chin was a strategic move looking into future requirements of resources, as was its taking control of Shaksgam Valley in exchange of nuclear assistance to Pakistan and now strategic footprints into Gilgit-Baltistan region.

Neighbourhood If our decision-making remains in limbo and we do not take resolute action, many more intrusions will follow and we will lose much more territory For the same reason, China literally invested Myanmar and Nepal, claims Doklam Plateau in Bhutan and is practising economic hegemony in Afghanistan, Central Asia and Africa, besides employing water as a weapon against India, blatantly ignoring water sharing norms. It is only in 2006 that China converted its claim from Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh to entire 90,000 square kilometres of entire state of Arunachal Pradesh. Even economically, China has invested India akin to the British East India Company. Sixty per cent of the bilateral trade is in China’s favour and it is already adversely affecting the indigenous small-scale industry.

We may hesitate to admit but the intrusion into DBO is a well engineered strategic move orchestrated as part of a military strategy jointly by the CCP and the PLA. It should be seen (in conjunction Pakistan reportedly leasing out Gilgit-Baltistan to China for 50 years and illegal Chinese occupation of Shaksgam Valley and Aksai Chin) as placing the framework for bridging the gap between Gilgit-Baltistan and Aksai Chin. It is in this context that both former Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf and General Ashfaq Parvez Kiyani have been pushing for withdrawal from Siachen, the adverse geostrategic implications of which should be amply clear by now. Both China and Pakistan are willfully supporting and arm-

ing insurgencies in India, employing cyber attacks and every conceivable asymmetric method to destabilise India.

Psychological Challenge Besides the physical challenge, the Chinese have also thrown a psychological challenge through the DBO intrusion. It is quite logical that the CCP would have obtained a prior assessment from the Chinese Embassy in India; and given the state of affairs, Zhang Yan, the Chinese Ambassador, would have assessed that India would perhaps not go beyond diplomatic pleadings and rhetoric, which would suit China. Zhang’s assessment would probably have been based on how we handled our smaller neighbours.

Some recent incidents like Pakistan’s Interior Minister Rehman Malik being invited against bureaucratic advice and his anti-India utterances not being responded to; our Foreign Minister rushing off to Jaipur to host the Pakistani Prime Minister on a private visit and the latter heading an anti-India resolution in the Pakistan Parliament soon after returning from India; India’s response to Pakistan in general and in the wake of recent beheading of an Indian soldier; increased infighting between political parties in the wake of coming elections; avalanche of scams; indecisiveness in the absence of a national security strategy and disjointed higher defence structures; may well have been examples for him.

China has thrown the gauntlet through this deep intrusion to gauge whether India can respond beyond diplomatic pleadings at all. It is a psychological challenge. The so-called preconditions laid by China for withdrawing the DBO intrusion (as being reported in the media) is another ploy to put India on the defensive, as these would be unacceptable. It is amusing to see how the Chinese build up pressure. China which very tightly controls social networking within the country has allowed a stream

of messages on twitter that claim no PLA troop movement has taken place, that India has completely fabricated the DBO intrusion and that India should be ‘taught a lesson’ for this demeanour. It would not be surprising if these messages are being posted by nominated agents of the CCP.

Response China’s DBO intrusion will stay, consolidate and expand if we think that mere reliance on diplomacy can wish away the problem.

We have failed to convey a strong message even through diplomacy. The External Affairs Minister is treating the issue as routine and not even postponing his visit to Beijing. Should the Indian political leadership not be held responsible for turning a blind eye towards the increasing Chinese influence in the border villages of Ladakh and East Sikkim? Is it not a matter of shame that the Indian Tricolour flies no more at Demchok for fear of the Chinese? Shouldn’t the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Defence Minister explain to the nation why such a state of affairs has been permitted to evolve despite having a 1.2-million-strong military? It should be quite clear that this intrusion cannot be resolved through dialogue alone. There is no need to physically attack this intrusion. We need to create conditions to commensurately respond to this physical and psychological challenge posed by China. China should be clearly told that sitting in our territory they have no business to put forward any pre-conditions in the first place. We need to draw lessons from earlier Sino-Indian standoffs. Even the most intense one at Nathu La (1967) did not escalate into war. Then what are we scared of? There is no need to attack and throw the Chinese out from DBO—which is giving the jitters of escalation to pacifists. Let a counter challenge be posed to China by establishing an Indian Army post behind the DBO intru-

>>

sion in what is our own territory and throw the ball back in their court. Alternatively, such a step could also be taken in another sector. This should not be misconstrued as beating of war drums, as the weak-hearted may.

This is not 1962 and the policymakers must have faith in our military. Surely, the Chinese are not gunning for conflict, for if it does escalate, then they have equal vulnerabilities and they will know that at tactical levels the Indian Army would well match them. Media reports are talking of India having established a post in front of the DBO intrusion. If true, that can be construed by the Chinese of having gained another 19-km of Indian territory. There is every possibility that without resolute action by India, the Chinese will develop a metalled road linking DBO with Aksai Chin, develop defence works, helipads, permanent shelters and plan further expansion. Unchallenged, China may well occupy KK Pass.

Conclusion The government should once again seriously review the external intelligence mechanism and make the Indian Army responsible for complete land borders. All security forces including Border Security Force, IndoTibetan Border Police, Sashastra Seema Bal on the borders must be put under the operational control of the Army.

Our political leaders must realise that at this point of time the reputation of the country is at stake as the world is watching. If we are going to let the Chinese consolidate in DBO then passing resolutions in the Parliament affirming that J&K is an integral part of India is meaningless. If we dilly-dally, China will consolidate at DBO. If our decision-making remains in limbo and we do not take resolute action, many more intrusions will follow and we will lose much more territory. SP

Optimising Technology...continued from page 7 While our DRDO too is developing UAVs and MAVs and produces the ‘Razzler Dazzler’ for crowd control, it should actually work on mating the ‘Razzler Dazzler’/ weapon with the MAV ab initio. Rather than looking into this aspect after a few years at least we land up with a situation of trumpeting the development of the underwater BrahMos test while the compatible submarine to fire is a decade away. Interestingly, there is a whole range of micro mini UAVs available off the shelf that can tremendously boost surveillance capabilities at the cutting-edge. For example, the lighter than air surveillance (LTAS) systems have almost unlimited flight time, can carry up to 200 pounds (plenty for a point-and-click SLR camera or full-size high-definition video camera) and can reach up to 2,500 feet in the air. Then there are a range of fixed-wing and rotary-wing MAVs that are also available in the world market:

Photograph: Telephonics

Radar

GPS

Video/IR Camera Suite

Processors Off-Platform Receivers Battery w/Backup Generator

Coastal Surveillance For effective coastal surveillance, the coastline necessarily must have a no gap radar and electronic surveillance, satellite cover and also own vessels. The Navy, Coast Guard as well civilians must be fitted with radio fre-

Large defence firms are ready to provide the ‘virtual fence’ that applies software structures to the security system but at exorbitant price

mise technology but more significantly coordinating and matching the technology with the human resources deployed at the border. It goes without saying that considering the expanse of our borders, it is undoubtedly an expensive affair. Large defence firms are ready to provide the ‘virtual fence’ that applies software structures to the security system but at exorbitant price. In our case, a holistic assessment of what technology should be applied where and in what measure must be weighed vis-à-vis national security requirements. It would be prudent to focus on the following:  Early induction of the BSS and BMS to enable provision of real time information at the cutting edge.  Fielding of MAVs and micro mini UAVs with the Infantry.  The DRDO should mate the MAV under development with the ‘Razzler Dazzler’ and progress to a weaponised MAV.  Appropriate UGS for snow conditions should be developed/procured.  Scaling of NVDs, NVGs and HHTIs should be reviewed.

Upgrade Border Security Command and Control Station

Telephonics’ Mobile Surveillance Capability (MSC) is a fully integrated, rapidly deployable surveillance system, capable of operating either as a stand-alone system or networked together to create a virtual fence

quency identification (RFID) and geo-location devices, RFID being the wireless non-contact use of radio-frequency electromagnetic fields to transfer data, for the purposes of automatically identifying and tracking tags attached to

objects. In addition, comes the aerial surveillance cover combined with sea patrolling.

Requirement The requirement really is not only to opti-

Protecting our borders is a vital requirement for our national security as the country is facing infiltration, cross border terrorism and illegal immigration since the past several years. As the asymmetric war is likely to heighten with the implosions within Pakistan and fallout of post-2014 withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan on the region, there is an urgent need to upgrade our border security, using the best technology. Our DRDO and private industry should focus on this aspect. The policymakers need to review this critical requirement. SP

2/2013 SP’s Land Forces

9

>> Seminar Report / Indo-UK joint exercise

Emerging Concepts in Air and Missile Defence The Second International Seminar on Army Air Defence organised by the Corps of Army Air Defence in conjunction with the CII aimed at synergising and stimulating air defence criticalities.

Photograph: CII

 Rohit K. Goel

T

he Second International Seminar on Army Air Defence (AAD) in the 21st century was conducted on February 20, 2013, at the Kothari Auditorium, Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) Bhavan, New Delhi. The focus of the seminar was on, ‘analysing and identifying the emerging concepts in air and missile defence against a backdrop of emerging technologies within the purview of futuristic aerospace threat, so as to enable the formulation of a pragmatic roadmap for the modernisation of the AAD’. The seminar was organised by the Corps of Army Air Defence in conjunction with the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) so as to interactively synergise and stimulate relevant awareness of air defence criticalities which would promote collaborative indigenisation.

During the inaugural session, Atul Punj, CMD Punj Lloyd, and member of the Defence Council of CII, welcomed the chief guest Defence Minister A.K. Antony; the guest of honour Chief of Army Staff General Bikram Singh, the assemblage of military and civilian dignitaries and the media. Atul Punj described the seminar as a very important forum for the armed forces to engage with the industry and the academia on AAD issues. He remarked that with the change and advent of various enabling technologies, modern warfare has become highly technology driven. Therefore, it is pertinent to develop and absorb modern technologies to keep an edge over our adversaries. Lt General Kuldip Singh, Director General, AAD, in his theme address, lucidly, espoused the scope, theme and the sequence of the proceedings to follow during the course of the day. He highlighted the importance of developing emerging concepts and to evolve

new doctrines and at the same time embracing new technologies to modernise weapon systems to comprehensively counter the emerging air threat. The Chief of Army Staff thereafter welcomed the Defence Minister and reiterated the criticalities of futuristic battlefield scenarios, necessitating a proactively efficient air defence infrastructure which would function in a time critical network-centric warfare environment of the 21st century. The Defence Minister then addressed the assemblage and stressed on the need for interaction between the industry and the armed forces.

He also emphasised on matters of probity in defence procurement and on the need for quality indigenisation to be progressively facilitated within the country. He assured the Defence Ministry’s total support and commitment to the efforts of the industry towards indigenisation. The Defence Minister then proceeded to formally release the compendium of the seminar. After a vote of thanks by Gurpal Singh, the head and Principal Advisor of Defence, Aerospace and Security of CII, the seminar was formally inaugurated.

The morning session of the seminar on “Emerging Aerospace Threat and Concepts in Air and Missile Defence” was chaired by Lt General V.K. Saxena, Commandant of the AAD College. The session opened with a discourse from Major General H. Gopalan, the Additional Director General at the Directorate General of AAD. He spoke on the changing contours of air threat and the envisaged countermeasures during the 21st century.

Thereafter, Lt General Philip Campose, Director General of Perspective Planning of the Integrated Headquarters of the MoD (Army), brought out the nuances of asymmetric warfare. This was followed by a presentation by Laurent Duport of Thales (France) who brought out the cost-effective capabilities in the employment of high performance and precision gun systems. Air Vice Marshal B. Suresh then introduced the challenges inherent in modern digitised air space management. The session was capped by a presentation by Eili Behar of Israel Aerospace Industries (Israel) who explained the concepts of Air and Missile Defence of Israel. Lt General

V.K. Saxena, then summarised the morning session proceedings.

The post-lunch session was chaired by Major General (Retd) A.K. Mehra on topics pertaining to “Futuristic Trends and Emerging Technologies in Air Defence”. Major General B.N. Vijay Kumar presented an elaborate summation of emerging and current trends in air defence gun systems, ammunition and fire control systems. Mats Johansson of Saab industries (Sweden) then presented the working solutions manufactured and utilised in his country. N. Prabhakar, Scientist, Defence Research and Development Laboratory (DRDL), Hyderabad, then dwelt on the emerging threat from the UAVs. A. Ravi Sankaran of Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) then spoke on futuristic developments of air defence radars. Commodore P. Suresh of the Indian Navy made a presentation on the functionality of non-communication electronic warfare. The session ended with summing up by the chair.

In the valedictory session, Rahul Chaudhury, CEO Tata Power SED, a member of the Planning and Strategic Group of CII, summed up the feasibilities in vogue with the scope of the seminar. Lt General Kuldip Singh spoke on the resolution of the seminar in synergising the efforts of the defence forces and the Indian industry in proactive indigenisation of futuristic air defence equipment. The valedictory address was delivered by Air Marshal Arup Raha, Air Officer Commanding in Chief, Western Air Command who spoke on the importance of various system components of air defence. The proceedings of the day were deemed closed after the concluding remarks

by Gurpal Singh. The way forward now is to prioritise the achievable challenges and affect governmental indulgence in proactive indigenisation of the critically feasible air defence equipment required by the country. SP

Exercise Ajeya Warrior The Indo-UK joint counter-terrorism training exercise is a great step for the armies of the two democratic countries to train together and gain together from each other’s rich operational experiences.

Photographs: Indian Army

 Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

www.spslandforces.net

T

he Indian Army has sizeable experience in fighting insurgencies since independence. In fact from the 1950s onwards there has been no respite in this regard in the Northeast. In the past five decades or so, besides the ongoing insurgency in the Northeast, the focus has also been on the extinguished insurgency in Punjab, the dissidence and proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) which is continuing, and the burgeoning Naxalite violence which started as a peasant uprising in West Bengal in the late 1960s and was put down by the Army, but has now spread to 20 of India’s 29 states with seven states being severely affected. While the Indian Army is fully committed to tackling the insurgencies in the Northeast and J&K, in the case of Naxalite violence it is only a facilitator imparting training to the paramilitary forces tackling the insurgency. The Maoist insurgency affects 2,000 police stations spread over 223 districts across 20 states. Internal security challenges to the Indian Union are serious enough to destabilise India if allowed to grow unchecked. It is in this background that India’s defence cooperation with many

10

SP’s Land Forces 2/2013

nations in the field of counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism has to be seen.

On April 3, 2013, an Indo-UK Joint Military Training named “Exercise Ajeya Warrior” aimed at enhancing counter-terrorism skills and promoting positive military relations, trust and interoperability got under way at Belgaum. Exercise Ajeya Warrior 2013 is one of the major ongoing bilateral defence cooperation endeavours between the two countries and is the fifth in the series of joint training exercises which initially started as a biennial feature in 2007 to be held in India and UK alternatively. The exercise confirms that India’s multifaceted bilateral relationship with UK has intensified since upgradation of their relationship to a strategic partnership in 2004.

Aptly baptized as “The Invincible”, Exercise Ajeya Warrior is scheduled from April 3 to April 30, 2013 and will witness a company of 1st Battalion of the Royal Welsh Regiment of UK Army and similar strength of 17th Battalion the Kumaon Regiment of Indian Army participating in the training.

Both countries have troops deployed in active counter-insurgency/counter-terror operations and thus sharing each other’s operational experiences in such diverse environment is of immense value. The exercise curriculum is progressively planned where the participants are initially made to get familiar with each other’s organisational structure, weapons, equipment, confidence training and tactical drills. Subsequently, the training advances to joint tactical exercises

wherein the battle drills of both the armies are coherently unleashed on the terrorist.

A brief stint with the Indian Air Force is also planned by way of helicopter effort and showcasing of the latest technology being provided to battalions combating terrorism has also been given due consideration. The exercise is a great step for the armies of the two democratic countries to train together and gain together from each other’s rich operational experiences who have been combating the terrorists in the Asian region.

Belgaum has in the past played host to a number of joint military exercises and many countries have held joint training here including USA, UK, France, Mangolia and China.

There was a news that India might be embarrassed if the British troops arriving in Belgaum for the month-long joint exercise with the Indian Army return without firing a single bullet, thanks to the state government’s November 2012 decision denotifying the Bagdad Asmara Field Firing Range. However, the outgoing General Officer Commanding, Kerala and Karnataka Sub Area, Major General K.S. Venugopal said that the state government will reconsider the denotification of the Bagad Asmara Field Firing Ranges and there will be no distraction in the joint exercise. SP

news in brief

>>

Army Commanders’ Conference The five-day Army Commanders’ Conference held at the Manekshaw Centre, New Delhi, was attended by Army Commanders of all the Operational Commands and Army Training Command. The conference focused on various macro-level issues pertaining to operational preparedness, equipment sustainment for mission readiness and maximising combat power generation capability of the Army, enhancing professional military education for scholar warriors, logistics and other administrative aspects.

Publisher and Editor-in-Chief Jayant Baranwal Editor Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor Assistant Group Editor R. Chandrakanth Senior Technical Group Editor Lt General (Retd) Naresh Chand Air Marshal (Retd) B.K. Pandey Contributing Editor Air Marshal (Retd) Anil Chopra Sr. Copy Editor & Correspondent Sucheta Das Mohapatra

Cassidian gets contract for Swedish radio communications network Cassidian has signed a seven-year system maintenance contract with the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) for the Rakel nationwide radio communications network.

The contract includes third line support, a hardware repair service and the supply of Tetra system equipment and software.

Major General Ravinder Singh, COA Singapore Army, at Amar Jawan Jyoti during his India visit

Northrop Grumman launches ­CUTLASS Next Gen UGV

Selex ES selected to provide “see through the hull” VigilX system i

Northrop Grumman has launched its latest generation unmanned ground vehicle (UGV), named CUTLASS, thus expanding its range of industry-leading capabilities in unmanned systems for remote handling and surveillance of hazardous threats.

CUTLASS has been designed, developed and manufactured by Northrop Grumman in the UK, and includes significant advances in technology and performance and a range of features that provides stateof-the-art capabilities for national security and resilience applications.

Selex ES has had its VigilX enhanced vision system formally selected by the Australian Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) as part of a contract for evaluation of an integrated solution for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) for operation of helicopters in degraded visual environments (DVE). The contract, which will be primed by Rheinmetall Simulation Australia Pty Ltd, is a consequence of a grant awarded under the DSTO Capability and Technology Demonstrator programme with a view to trialling and potentially acquiring the system for the ADF’s Army and Navy’s helicopter fleets.

Indo-Nepal Army Everest Expedition A joint Indo-Nepal Army Mountaineering Expedition to Mt Everest was flagged off by Chief of Army Staff General Bikram Singh from New Delhi. The expedition planned to coincide with the diamond jubilee of the first ascent on the Everest by Sir Edmund Hillary and Sherpa Tenzing Norgay, aims to not only summit the peak but also to clean it by bringing out as much non-biodegradable garbage which has accumulated on the route to the peak over the decades as possible.

>> Show Calendar 7–10 May International Defense Industry Fair 2013 Tüyap Fair Convention and Congress Center, Istanbul, Turkey www.idef13.com 20–22 May Armoured Vehicles UAE Armed Forces Officers Club, Abu Dhabi, UAE www.armouredvehiclesuae.com 22–24 May International Fair of Defence and ­Security Technology Brno Exhibition Centre, Czech Republic www.bvv.cz/en/idet/ 4–6 June International Defence and Security Exhibition ISDEF Tel Aviv, Israel http://isdefexpo.com 11–14 June Soldier Technology Olympia Conference Centre, London, UK www.wbresearch.com/soldiertechnologyeurope 18–20 June Soldier Equipment & Technology Expo & Conference The Fort Bragg Club/Lafayette Room, Fort Bragg, NC, USA http://www.soldierequipmentexpo.com/ FortBragg 19–20 June Future Artillery India New Delhi, India www.futureartilleryindia.com

VCOAS visits Nigeria Vice Chief of Army Staff Lt General S.K. Singh was on a goodwill visit to Nigeria from February 26 to March 1. The visit is expected to further boost the defence cooperation between the two nations. During his four-day visit, the VCOAS met senior officials of the Nigerian armed forces, and discussed issues to enhance military cooperation. The visit cemented the historic ties between India and Nigeria which are based on mutual trust and understanding.

India conducts development tests of advanced Pinaka rocket system The Indian Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has conducted development trials of an advanced variant of the domestically manufactured Pinaka rocket system from firing point-II of the Proof and Experimental Establishment at Chandipur. Carried out by DRDO’s Punebased Armament Research and Development Establishment (ARDE) personnel, three rounds of Pinaka rockets were test-fired from a multi-barrel rocket launcher during the testing to evaluate the rocket’s stability in flight, accuracy and consistency.

Indian Army orders CBRN training simulators from Argon The Indian Army has placed orders with Argon to supply a range of chemical detector simulators, intended to meet current and future training capability requirements. Under the first major contract from an Indian customer, Argon will deliver CAMSIM, ChemPro100SIM and GID-3-SIM to the Army. The systems will be delivered for the Army’s chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) training establishment, the Faculty of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Protection at the College of Military Engineering, Pune.

Indian Army orders Cheetal The Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) has been awarded a contract by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for delivery of new Cheetal helicopters to the country’s Army.

The `4,180-crore contract covers production and supply of 20 helicopters, as well as

associated equipment to the Army. Under the contract, which represents the first Cheetal helicopter delivery order for the service, HAL will also deliver training to pilots and technical crew. Ordered for boosting the Army’s ability to conduct high-altitude operations in areas such as Siachen, the aircraft are being procured following persistent delays in acquiring new 197 light utility helicopters.

Oshkosh introduces L-ATV utility variant for JLTV programme The Oshkosh Defense has introduced its light combat tactical all-terrain vehicle (L-ATV) utility variant for the US Army and Marine Corps multibillion-dollar joint light-tactical vehicle (JLTV) programme. The newly introduced L-ATV utility version addresses the JLTV requirement for a two-seat cargo vehicle, while the L-ATV base variant fulfils the four-seat multi-purpose vehicle needs.

Both versions feature common crew protection and advanced automotive systems, as well as the patented Oshkosh TAK-4i intelligent independent suspension system to offer enhanced levels of protection and off-road performance in a light vehicle.

A Robot for high-risk environs ReconRobotics has introduced the Recon Scout XL reconnaissance robot at the Counter Terror Expo in London on April 24. The 1.4-lb robot is designed for use by law enforcement and military personnel to conduct reconnaissance within challenging outdoor terrain and within cluttered indoor environments.

The robot features a trademarked two-wheel, single-axle design, plus aggressive wheels and a distinctive stabilising tail that produce superior obstacle climbing ability. Dismounted military personnel will use the robot to conduct surveillance and search high-risk environments for adversaries, weapons caches and explosives. SWAT teams will use the XL to quickly gain video and audio reconnaissance during warrant-service operations, hostage rescues, barricaded subject callouts and remote inspections of suspected explosive devices. SP

APPOINtMENTs Lockheed martin Phil Shaw is the new Chief Executive, Lockheed Martin India. Prior to this he was in charge of the International Business Development-India and the Americas, Lockheed Martin. Shaw has served in the Royal Navy for 20 years from February 1983-February 2003.

Mahindra Defence Systems

Contributors India General (Retd) V.P. Malik, Lt General (Retd) Vijay Oberoi, Lt General (Retd) R.S. Nagra, Lt General (Retd) S.R.R. Aiyengar, Air Marshal (Retd) Vinod Patney, Major General (Retd) Ashok Mehta, Major General (Retd) G.K. Nischol, Brigadier (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, Brigadier (Retd) S. Mishra, Rohit Sharma Chairman & Managing Director Jayant Baranwal Executive Vice President (Planning & Business Development) Rohit Goel Administration Bharti Sharma Senior Art Director Anoop Kamath Design Vimlesh Kumar Yadav, Sonu Singh Bisht Research Assistant: Graphics Survi Massey Sales & Marketing Director Sales & Marketing: Neetu Dhulia General Manager Sales: Rajeev Chugh SP’s Website Sr. Web Developer: Shailendra P. Ashish Web Developer: Ugrashen Vishwakarma Published bimonthly by Jayant Baranwal on behalf of SP Guide Publications Pvt Ltd. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, photocopying, recording, electronic, or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publishers.

Printed in India

by Kala Jyothi Process Pvt Ltd © SP Guide Publications, 2013 Subscription/ Circulation Annual Inland: `600 • Overseas: US$180 Email: subscribe@spguidepublications.com subscribe@spslandforces.net Letters to Editor editor@spslandforces.net For Advertising Details, Contact: neetu@spguidepublications.com rajeev.chugh@spguidepublications.com SP GUIDE PUBLICATIONS PVT LTD Corporate Office A 133 Arjun Nagar, Opp Defence Colony, New Delhi 110 003, India Tel: +91(11) 24644693, 24644763, 24620130 Fax: +91 (11) 24647093 Regd Office Fax: +91 (11) 23622942 Email: info@spguidepublications.com Representative Offices Bengaluru, INDIA Air Marshal (Retd) B.K. Pandey 204, Jal Vayu Vihar, Kalyan Nagar, Bangalore 560043, India.

Tel: +91 (80) 23682204 MOSCOW, RUSSIA LAGUK Co., Ltd, Yuri Laskin Krasnokholmskaya, Nab., 11/15, app. 132, Moscow 115172, Russia.

Tel: +7 (495) 911 2762, Fax: +7 (495) 912 1260 www.spguidepublications.com www.spslandforces.net RNI Number: DELENG/2008/25818

Mahindra Group has announced that S.P. Shukla will head Mahindra Defence Systems (MDS). Shukla, who earlier headed the Group’s Strategy function, has been redesignated as President, Group Strategy, Defence Sector and Chief Brand Officer.

2/2013 SP’s Land Forces

11

Founder Editor Shri S P Baranwal...

2014 intensity of magazines

from ‘98 and within a span of a few years...

conveying gratitude to Founder Publisher...

1994

M.A.I. follows the

are launched starting

Military Yearbook

2004

introduction...

SP’s Airbuz, SP’s

Forces, SP’s Naval Forces

2013

rechristened as SP’s

JUST 1 STEP SHORT OF 50 YEARS

50

1984

India...

Ministers and Presidents of SP’s Aviation, SP’s Land

of a few magazines...

support from dignitaries

Military Yearbook is

Founder...Also envisioned is the path of introduction

relentlessly with collective

including the Prime

Publications offering tribute and gratitude to its

Guide Publications is rechristened as SP Guide

WE SHALL BE 50 THIS YEAR

Military Yearbook continues

Yearbook is introduced in 1965...

and published by the Founder, Military

Apart from many publications written, edited

1974

1964 196 64 64

was founded by its Founder Publisher &

Our Journey Starts as Guide Publications