SP's Land Forces August-September 2011

August-September 2011

SP’s

Volume 8 No 4

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ROUNDUP

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IN THIS ISSUE

T h e O N LY j o u r n a l i n A s i a d e d i c a t e d t o L a n d F o r c e s

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Fighting a Two Front War Indian military planners feel that collusion between China and Pakistan which is so clearly evident in peace-time is likely to translate itself into active, mutually supporting, military operations, during conflict situations.

Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor PAGE 6 ‘Any decision for induction of F-INSAS or BMS will only be taken after both the systems have been field tested’ Interview with Lt General N.B. Singh

INTERVIEW

‘I find a complex set of external and internal security challenges confronting our nation’ PHOTOGRAPHS: Anoop Kamath/SP Guide Pubns

PAGE 9 For Versatile Use One of the major weaknesses that the Indian Army currently suffers from in their equipment profile is the lack of availability of a suitable HMMWV. Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor PAGE 11 Why Have a Dialogue with Pak? Policy-makers in India need to turn the thinking of the Pakistani polity, instead of engaging in futile dialogues and discussions.

Lt General (Retd) Vijay Oberoi PAGE 14 Global Response to a Global Issue Global understanding has dawned that by bringing together our strategic capabilities, we will be able to address current and emerging cyber threats.

Lt General (Retd) P.C. Katoch PAGE 15 The Way Ahead The recurrent and tiring round of talks, agreements and discussions without any significant breakthrough or even the possibility of the same, seem to point that borderconflict has all ingredients of becoming a major spoiler in Indo-China relations Dr Monika Chansoria PAGE 16 Act Before It’s Too Late The brutally-suppressed local movements of the Gilgit-Baltistan region and PoK can be exploited, if our government has the political will and the sagacity to think and plan for long-term.

Lt General (Retd) Vijay Oberoi PAGE 18 Patriot’s Versatile Capabilities Interview with Sanjay Kapoor, Vice President, Integrated Air & Missile Defense, Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems Lt General (Retd) Naresh Chand PLUS Tecknow News in Brief

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In an interview with SP’s Land Forces team comprising Editor-in-Chief Jayant Baranwal and Editor Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor, Chief of Army Staff General V.K. Singh shared his thoughts and perceptions on several issues like transformation of the army, status of insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir, offensive and defensive capabilities on two widely separated fronts, visibility of troops in Jammu and Kashmir, status of the project F-INSAS, etc.

SP’s Land Forces (SP’s): After having commanded the Indian Army for over a year what are your feelings regarding the combat capabilities of your fighting force? In which areas do we lack the capabilities that we desire?

Chief of Army Staff (COAS): It is indeed an honour for me to be heading one of the most professional armies, which is well-equipped and trained. The Indian Army is fully poised to meet the varied security challenges confronting our country, both internal and external. Due to the rapidly changing nature of conflict, ranging from conventional to irregular warfare, including its proxy war manifestation and the effects of emerging technologies, a constant reappraisal is required with resultant improvements.

Having laid down an all-encompassing ‘Vision for the Indian Army’, we are focusing our efforts on some salient issues, namely, to modernise our Army, while concurrently seeking to consolidate and address aspects of hollowness and critical deficiencies. Modernisation, based on technology upgradation and induction, is an area that remains high on my agenda. The primary areas that are being addressed are aimed at greater battlefield transparency, increasing the lethality and precision of firepower capabilities, overcoming night blindness and achieving network-centricity. In addition, imparting realistic training towards all existing and emerging contingencies, as also to prepare our troops for the future battlefield envi-

ronment is another area of focus that we are addressing.

My main focus is presently on transforming the Army into an agile, lethal, versatile and networked force. This force will be prepared for the emerging security environment and complex challenges of the 21st century.

SP’s: In your view which are the areas of responsibilities, as the COAS, which work takes most of your time?

COAS: As COAS, my areas of responsibilities are large. When I take an eagle’s-eye view on the security environment prevalent in our immediate and extended neighbourhood, I find a complex set of external and internal security challenges confronting our nation,

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INTERVIEW

across the spectrum of conflict. The regional and global trends show a strategic shift towards ‘balance of interest’ rather than ‘balance of power’. Our armed forces need to be extremely dynamic in measuring up to these challenges. Therefore, I feel the greatest responsibility is to hone the army into a well motivated, operationally prepared, wellequipped force, capable of meeting the security challenges faced by the nation.

I am satisfied with the army’s role both in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and Northeast.

We are now helping the misguided elements and youth, who have strayed away from the mainstream and providing them with all opportunities to return back to the fold in a dignified manner.

Transformation too is taking up a lot of my time. To deal with such multifarious threats, transformation of army is focusing towards a ‘capability-based force’ rather than ‘threat-based force’. This transformed force will have the capability, tempered with credible deterrence and the stamina to scale up the tempo of operations.

Modernisation is yet another aspect. We are modernising our armed forces through technology accretions and better management of our equipment and human resource capital, to operate in a joint services environment.

I am aware that the whole country looks upon the Army as a highly disciplined organisation, and therefore, it is my responsibility to ensure that the ‘internal health’ of the army is at its best, so that officers and soldiers serve with pride. Towards this, I have the ‘sacred obligation’ of maintaining the trust reposed in us by our citizens. We cannot take our eye off the ‘ball’ in matters of discipline and personal conduct. I attach the highest premium towards maintaining impeccable standards of personal conduct and adherence to our core values.

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SP’s: Considering the nature of future wars and the likely future threats and challenges, you had carried out a study on the transformation of the Indian Army when you were the Eastern Army Commander. That study must now be in the stage of implementation. Can you tell us the major changes envisaged in operational and logistics philosophies of the Indian Army?

COAS: It is an accepted fact that every modern military goes through transformation to keep pace with current and perceived changes in its security perspective. The aim of this transformation is to improve our operational and logistics functioning as also the related organisational structures, to make the Army more lethal, agile, versatile and a networked force. In the course of this endeavour, we have examined our future challenges, military strategy, operational orientation and the desired force capability, to provide for a ‘wide range of options across the spectrum of conflict’. Essentially, it is aimed to review the entire gamut of operational functions and structures, with a view to optimise our operational planning and concepts. Besides this, some specific functional aspects of the Army, like training audit, financial management, functioning of Corps of Military Police and combat medical support are also being looked at, with the aim of incorporating ‘best practices’ and improving efficiency. These studies have made good progress. While some of the studies are in the process of finalising their recommendations, others are in advanced stages nearing completion, the aim being to implement the recommendations at the earliest.

SP’s: The Indian Army today is faced with challenges on two widely separated fronts.

While we may not anticipate a full-fledged state-to-state war on two fronts, yet we require effective offensive and defensive capabilities on both fronts to cater to a large number of unforeseen contingencies that may unfold in the future. What is the state of operational preparedness on this count? What are

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achieve our desired operational preparedness at a rapid pace.

the concrete steps being taken, which you would like to share with the people of our country?

COAS: Capacity building is the cornerstone of our modernisation and equipping policy. The possibility mentioned by you has been factored into this calculus. While such threats will need to be addressed by a combination of measures covering all elements of state and national power, the Army remains prepared to take on all eventualities and bring about a favourable outcome. I assure the nation, through you, that necessary steps are being taken in this regard.

The project F-INSAS is progressing at a rapid pace and the Army is leaving no stone unturned to see fructification of this prestigious project

SP’s: What is the status of insurgency in the state of J&K at present and does this require a review of our employment and deployment philosophies?

COAS: Though the internal security situation in Jammu and Kashmir is relatively stable, proxy war continues. The terror infrastructure across the borders remains intact and the terrorist threats remain real.

State abetment to terrorists in terms of assistance for infiltration, arms/ ammunition and finance persists. Separatists and their mentors across the border are continuously and consistently trying to keep the pot boiling in the state so as to keep the Kashmir issue alive. The unwarranted incitement of mob violence by entities across the border and inimical groups operating in J&K, as witnessed during the summer months of 2010, is clearly indicative of the same.

The counterterrorism strategy adopted by the Army has resulted in effectively reducing the infiltration from across the border in J&K and neutralisation of a large number of terrorists and their leaders in the hinterland, thereby, limiting the influence of terror and levels of violence in the state. However, indicators point towards renewed efforts by the terrorist organisations and their mentors across, to resume their activities to create unrest in the state. The Army and Central Police Forces as also the security apparatus of the state are working in unison and continuously reviewing their employment and deployment philosophies, so as to counter any such disruptions and unrest, thereby providing a meaningful environment for comprehensive growth of the state.

taining to the Army, through periodic briefings and conferences. Regular interactions with the National Security Agency (NSA) ensure that the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) is kept abreast of all relevant issues. On important issues the Prime Minister is also briefed so that he is appropriately armed with information and data for any contingency.

SP’s: While building capabilities, the military has to ensure that it is able to provide multiple options to the political leadership to cater to situations that may develop. This requires national level war gaming and close politicomilitary interaction and consultations. Are there any formal arrangements in place to ensure regular interaction not only with the Defence Minister but also with the Prime Minister who is the executive head of the State?

COAS: There is an established system in place for a regular two-way flow of communication between the Army and the Ministry of Defence (MoD). The MoD and the Defence Minister are kept updated on all issues per-

SP’s: During your first interview to SP’s Military Yearbook in April 2010, you had said that upgradation to new generation technology and better equipment was an ongoing process and you considered this as your thrust area.

How is the delay in procurement of weapon systems affecting the modernisation process and transformation of the army? What is being done to cut down this delay?

COAS: Military modernisation and capability development is a capital-intensive venture with very long gestation periods. Geopolitical realities of our region dictate that we modernise rapidly to meet emerging security challenges and enhance our capabilities. We have had some slippages due to various factors over the last two decades or so.

Currently, our focus in modernisation is on precision firepower, air defence and aviation, future infantry soldier as a system (F-INSAS), network-centricity as also achieving battlefield transparency through improved surveillance, night vision and target acquisition.

A number of new projects have been initiated and are in their final stages. This is the first year in which we have spent our entire capital outlay for modernisation.

Specific measures have been initiated to overcome the existing shortcomings in procurement activities within the Army. We have also considered areas where there is a scope to improve the process and to carry out systemic changes in the organisation and the manner in which we conduct our procurement. We are also working on simplifying procedures and encouraging indigenous research and development (R&D) and production so as to speed up the modernisation process. A new Defence Procurement Procedure 2011 has also been formulated, which further seeks to simplify procurement procedures and encourage indigenous production.

I am sure, we will make our procurement and acquisition focused and, thus, be able to

SP’s: Army Aviation requires to be strengthened and upgraded to include attack helicopters, medium lift helicopters and some fixed wing assets. Why should these important ingredients of the land battle be owned by a different service when the nature of future wars demands an integrated effort and much greater exploitation of the third dimension to win wars?

COAS: The future battlespace envisages integrated employment of all arms based on ‘combined arms concept’. There is a symbiotic relationship between manoeuvre and fire.

Combat aviation units manoeuvre, while leveraging organic firepower to shape the tactical battle area (TBA) and conduct decisive operations as per directions of the field force commander. Synchronising aviation manoeuvre with ground manoeuvre allows the field force commander to achieve a position of advantage in both time and space, thus fulfilling the tenets of manoeuvre warfare.

Unity of command and control of all weapon systems, which form part of the TBA, would be a pre-requisite to ensure that fire and manoeuvre is conducted with cohesive and seamless integration amongst all the combat elements operating in the TBA. The integration of all combat elements, including combat aviation resources, under the unified command of the field force commander; trained, administered and employed in combat with common operating procedures and ethos, will lead to a greater degree of synergy at all levels. This is the basis of placing all combat aviation assets as dedicated resources in support of the field force commander for prosecution of decisive operations.

All contemporary modern armies of the world have felt the operational necessity of integrating attack helicopters with field army formations.

SP’s: What is the status of the project F-INSAS? If it is a part of the battlefield management system, which it ought to be, why is it being handled by the Infantry Directorate instead of the Director General Information Systems?

COAS: The project F-INSAS is progressing at a rapid pace and the Army is leaving no stone unturned to see fructification of this prestigious project. The induction of various weapons and equipment of F-INSAS are being done in a phased manner with priority to personal weapon and protection systems.

The qualitative requirements for all systems are being firmed after regular interaction with original equipment manufacturers of own and friendly foreign countries. A sincere endeavour is under way to meet all deadlines.

There appears to be lack of clarity about scope of the F-INSAS programme. It is a soldier modernisation programme designed to enhance capability of an infantry soldier in lethality, survivability, sustainability, mobility and situational awareness. Being a ‘system of systems’, it has the following sub-systems as follows: l Weapon sub-system, which includes assault rifle, CQB carbine and light machine gun. l Body armour and individual equipment (BAIE) sub-system, which includes bullet proof jacket, ballistic helmet, individual load-carrying and survival equipment. l Target acquisition sub-system, which includes surveillance devices and weapon night sights. l Computer and communication subsystem.

It ought to be apparent from the above that since bulk of the programme involves infantry equipment procurement, it is best handled by the Infantry Directorate. Modalities have been worked out to ensure coordination of computer and communication systems with network-centric architecture of battlefield management system, within the ambit of larger Army communication and net-centric warfare philosophy.

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In the backdrop of peaceful protests throughout the country for a strong Lokpal Bill by Anna Hazare and his team, and the groundswell of support for his campaign against corruption, we hope that wisdom prevails both within the government as well as in Anna Hazare and his team to meet the people’s heightened aspirations by crafting a bill which is practical, implementable and effective in curbing corruption. The political impact of this movement seems historic because it signifies the awakening of the masses with regard to good governance and which despite India’s economic growth is conspicuous by its absence at the Centre and in the states.

While the attention of the nation is focused these days on domestic issues, the gravity of the existing internal and external security situation seems to have taken a back seat. The recent spurt in Naxal killings of policemen and the CRPF personnel and the disturbing reports of our inability to even evacuate the dead bodies of the soldiers for

nearly 18 hours (refer to Indian Express, August 24, 2011) is a sign of apathy and inertia in the government and in the leadership of the security forces. The larger issue of external security and the inordinate delay in procurement of the much needed weapons and other systems to transform the military to meet future challenges is even more distressing. Our political leadership is too busy dousing domestic fires to appreciate the extent to which the military would be handicapped in future conflicts because of lack of modern weaponry.

This is at a time when India requires a two-front capability which is the anchor on which India’s new war doctrine is based which means that India should be prepared to effectively meet simultaneous threats from China on the northern borders and Pakistan on its western borders. In this context, the Army has the maximum challenges. It needs a new family of night capable small arms, long-range field guns to replace obsolete equipment in large numbers, fire control system with

night fighting aids for the large fleet of T-72 tanks, new helicopters to replace obsolete equipment in Army Aviation units, a new tactical communication network, network-centricity for better situational awareness and a host of other weapons and systems in order to acquire new capabilities for the transformation that has been planned for the Army. Modernisation to make the Indian Army a 21st century force cannot be delayed indefinitely.

This will seriously compromise the Army’s preparedness to fight future conflicts.

Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

Fighting a Two-Front War Indian military planners feel that the collusion between China and Pakistan which is so clearly evident in peacetime is likely to translate itself into active, mutually supporting, military operations, during conflict situations. In Indian context it would imply fighting simultaneous conflicts in two widely separated theatres of operations namely the Western theatre (against Pakistan) and the Northern/Northeastern (against China) in the future.

GRAPHIC: Wikipedia

n LT GENERAL (RETD) V.K. KAPOOR

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T

HE CHIEF OF ARMy Staff, General V.K. Singh, while delivering the inaugural address during a seminar on “Emerging Roles and Tasks of the Indian Army”, organised by the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) on October 15, 2010, referred to Pakistan and China as ‘two irritants’. In the same vein, but more explicitly, in endDecember 2009, the former Army Chief, General (Retd) Deepak Kapoor had also stated during a seminar of the Army Training Command that the Indian Army must prepare for a two-front war. The statement of the current Army Chief coming close on the heels of the former Army Chief ’s declaration indicates that our armed forces are indeed planning and preparing for a contingency in which they may have to confront both neighbours simultaneously.

The five thrust areas of the new war doctrine as reported in the media at that time are as follows: l Two-front capability: This is the anchor on which India’s new war doctrine is based which means that India should be prepared to effectively meet simultaneous threats from China on the northern borders and Pakistan on the western borders. l Asymmetric warfare and sub-conventional threats: Both the adversaries can be expected to use asymmetric means in the form of infiltrators and terrorists across porous borders to divide our attention and thus hope to militarily weaken our overall response. Our focus on fastpaced operations could be slowed down considerably by such threats to our lines of communications and the civil infrastructure. We therefore need to have an independent operational capability to confront such threats without diluting the main military effort. This capability is being referred to as half front capability. l Strategic reach and out-of-area operations capabilities: The new war doctrine also seeks to confront future challenges by acquiring an out-of-area capability so as to militarily meet the role and aspirations of a regional power. l Tri-service operational synergy: The

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key aspects of strategic planning and conduct of future wars will be based on interdependence and operational synergy among the three services. Therefore, joint operations, space-based capability, ballistic missile defence and airborne, amphibious and air-land operations must be addressed comprehensively. l Military technological dominance over adversaries: This will be covered by acquiring capabilities for networkcentric warfare, information warfare, cyber warfare, all integrated to facilitate speedy decision-making and exploitation of fleeting tactical opportunities.

Future Strategic Direction From a strategic viewpoint, it seems that India has shifted to a doctrine of ‘active and aggressive defence’ as opposed to passive defence in the past. However, it would be wrong to assume that these capabilities show India’s growing proclivity towards military adventurism. India’s record on the contrary shows a matured and measured attitude towards engaging in wars. The doctrine’s enunciation of a ‘two-front war’ and enhancement of ‘strategic reach and out-ofarea operations capabilities’ carry immense political and strategic significance in terms of India’s future strategic directions.

Speaking to the media on Army Day,

January 15, 2011, General Singh for the first time publicly revealed that the Army would ‘reorganise, restructure and relocate’ various formations to help transform into a more agile and lethal force. “We are looking at reorganising and restructuring our force headquarters…for faster decision-making, so that it becomes slightly flattened and more responsive,” he said. Essentially, the changes are aimed at strengthening the Army’s capacity for fighting what a serving General had once described as a war on ‘two-and-ahalf-fronts’—a reference to possible simultaneous confrontations with Pakistan and China at the same time as managing an internal counter-insurgency effort.

Analysts often discuss the reasoning for such a doctrine. Are we anticipating a fullfledged war among the three nuclear armed neighbours? Nothing can be farther from truth. Then what is the necessity of having a doctrine of this nature. A more pragmatic and logical explanation seems to be that by placing a ‘two-and-a-half-front war strategy’ as a top priority of the new war doctrine, it will henceforth provide an unambiguous political and military focus on strategic and operational initiatives to ensure readiness.

At strategic levels, it would cater to strategic responses in acquiring comprehensive national power in relation to the threats, while at operational levels it would indicate the focus for capability building. Its inclusion would help in blending political, economic, diplomatic, technological and military measures to achieve the dynamism and synergy at national level that is currently lacking.

Let us also try to further understand this reasoning by focusing on our two neighbours, Pakistan and China, and then examine the nuts and bolts of the capability required.

Duplicitous Pakistan Pakistan continues to plead pristine conduct while its internal dynamics driven by the support it has extended to the Taliban and other terrorist organisations are pushing the country to the edge of an abyss. Late Dr K. Subrahmanyam, the renowned defence analyst in his interview with Shekhar Gupta, Editor of the Indian Express, had stated, “They are playing with a venomous snake.

And there is no doubt about it that one of these days, the snake is going to bite them.

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And Pakistanis are going to pay a high price, when the various jihadi organisations are going to turn on the Pakistani state and the Pakistan Army. One of them has already— the Pakistani Taliban. But it is only a question of time when others also do.”

Pakistan is in the danger of being overrun and ruled by radical Islamist groups, whose ideology of death and destruction will ruin whatever is left of Pakistan society.

After the killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad in Pakistan on May 1, 2011, the nexus between Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan and the terrorist groups stands completely exposed. While trying to deceive the whole world, they have ended up not only deceiving themselves because they perhaps forgot that terrorists have no friends and do not respect their benefactors because hatred and killing becomes a way of life and there is no room left for any other finer human trait. It is a bleak future that confronts Pakistan and unless they decide to face the problem squarely and seek both global and regional assistance, there is little hope for them as a nation-state.

Their economy is in a bad shape. A $7.5 billion (`33,750 crore) package of civilian aid over five years was approved by the US in 2009. Since 2005, Pakistan has received more than $1 billion (`4,500 crore) of military aid a year from the US—and received close to $2 billion (`9,000 crore) for the last fiscal year. This year again $2 billion aid has been announced which the US says will pay for equipment needed in counter-insurgency and counter-terror operations, among other things. This is despite the belief among the US intelligence agencies that the Pakistan military is continuing to avoid military engagements that would put it in direct conflict with Afghan Taliban or Al-Qaeda’s forces in North Waziristan.

Inflation in Pakistan remains the top

concern among the public. The inflation rate in Pakistan was last reported at 12.91 per cent in February 2011. From 2003 to 2010, the average inflation rate in Pakistan was 10.15 per cent reaching an historical high of 25.33 per cent in August 2008. In addition, the Pakistani rupee has depreciated since 2007 as a result of political and economic instability. Devastating floods in 2010 have added to their woes. The country is being kept afloat by the donors.

The military in Pakistan continues to use the radical jihadi groups to its advantage both in its western provinces facing Afghanistan and on its eastern front against India in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Renewed pressure from the US has so far had virtually no results as far as India is concerned. There seems to be a consensus among military analysts that Pakistan Army’s traditional Kashmir policy and resultant proxy war is unlikely to change. Currently, their military capability against India is not threatening because of its own commitments. However, they are not likely to let go of any opportunity to take military advantage in what may be perceived as a crisis for India. In this context, their relationship with China needs a closer scrutiny.

negative disposition in allowing India to become a permanent member of the Security Council; it’s duplicity in the Nuclear Supplier Group negotiations; it’s unwillingness to resolve the border dispute; it’s claim over the entire Arunachal Pradesh being a Chinese territory—all serve as indicators and warnings that India cannot afford to ignore.

Historically, China has negotiated border disputes with neighbours in their moment of national despair (Pakistan, Burma in 1960s and Central Asian Republics in the 1990s) or when the regional balance of power has shifted decisively in China’s favour or after they have ceased to be a major threat (land settlements with Russia and Vietnam in the 1990s) but not with those who are perceived as current or future threats (India, Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan). No progress has been made to resolve the territorial and boundary dispute with India since the two nations fought a war over it in 1962 despite 14 rounds of talks between political interlocutors and many meetings of the Joint Working Group. Even the line of actual control (LAC) has not been clearly demarcated on military maps and on the ground due to China’s intransigence.

China—An Untrustworthy Neighbour

Collusive Support to Pakistan

China has emerged as a major challenge and a possible military threat in the future. The indicators are—China’s self-image as a predominant power of South Asia; its aspirations to be a superpower by 2049; its fast paced military modernisation and positioning of missiles in Tibet; its compulsive use of Pakistan to keep India engaged on her western front and off balance militarily; its dismissive and derogatory approach to India’s democratic experience; its strategy of encircling India through her neighbours and confining her within the subcontinent; it’s totally critical approach to India’s nuclear status; it’s

The following actions indicate the collusive support that China has provided to Pakistan: l Civilian nuclear cooperation between China and Pakistan began in 1999.

China has built Chasma-1 and 2 nuclear reactors in Pakistan. Now armed with the approval by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of a safeguards plan in March 2011, China is set to construct the Chasma-3 and Chasma-4 nuclear reactors in Pakistan. l Direct assistance for its nuclear weapons programme, including nuclear warhead designs and highly enriched uranium

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for at least two nuclear bombs.

Dual-use technology and materials for the development of nuclear weapons.

Assistance in building a secret reactor to produce weapons-grade plutonium at the Chasma nuclear facility.

Transfer of M-9 and M-11 nuclear-capable ballistic missiles followed by the transfer of “Taepo Dong” and “No Dong” ballistic missiles from North Korea.

Joint development of fighter aircraft, JF17 Thunder/FC-1 Fierce and Pakistan’s main battle tank (MBT), Al-Khalid, besides other military hardware.

China has “guaranteed Pakistan’s territorial integrity” and in the words of the leaders of the two countries, their friendship is “higher than the mountains and deeper than the oceans”.

China’s efforts to develop port facilities in Myanmar (Hangyi), Chittagong (Bangladesh), Sri Lanka (Hambantota), Maldives and at Gwadar in Pakistan are seen by many Indian and foreign analysts as forming part of a “string of pearls” strategy to contain India and develop the capacity to dominate the northern Indian Ocean region around 2015-20.

Gwadar port on the Makran Coast could be upgraded to a naval base for Chinese naval vessels with minimum effort.

During the 1965 and 1971 India-Pakistan wars, China had made threatening military manoeuvres in Tibet in support of Pakistan and during the Kargil conflict in 1999 Chinese military advisers were reported to have been present at Skardu in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK).

Recent reports regarding the large presence of Chinese military in PoK. Aggressive patrolling of the borders to keep India on its toes and militarily com-

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INTERVIEW

‘Any decision for induction of F-INSAS or BMS will only be taken after both the systems have been field tested’ SP’s Land Forces team comprising Jayant Baranwal, Editor-in-Chief and Lt General V.K. Kapoor, Editor, had a tête-àtête with Lt General N.B. Singh, on a range of issues which impact the capabilities of the Indian Army in the future.

Singh was then the Director General Information Systems (DGIS), Indian Army, and has recently taken over as the Commandant of the Military College of Electronics and Mechanical Engineering (MCEME). Excerpts of the interview: fied. The aspects of integration will also be evaluated when the system is fielded in the test bed shortly.

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PHOTOGRAPHS: SP Guide Pubns

SP’s: The communication grid knits the entire CIDSS together. What will be the communication pattern forward of the Corps headquarters and rearwards to the Command and the Army headquarters? Has any progress been made on the tactical communications system (TCS) which will be an important part of the communication grid established for executing NCW? DGIS: The ongoing TCS programme is being handled by the DG Signals. We are adopting the interim arrangements till the time TCS is developed and fielded. Other details of this project are with the Signals Directorate.

SP’s Land Forces (SP’s): Network-centric warfare (NCW) is an information superiority enabled concept at the heart of which lie the digital communication networks and our ability to process information most expeditiously and pass it on to frontline units and the decision-makers in the rear in real timeframe thus making the battlefield transparent and reducing the response time. How is the Indian Army visualising the transformation to this type of warfare? What is the type of framework (intra and inter-service) involved and what are the types of projects initiated in this regard?

Director General Information Systems (DGIS): In the Indian Army, the policies for transformation to NCW have been clearly spelled out and the Directorate General Information System is responsible to facilitate this transformation by developing various operational information systems (OIS) along with the associated geographical information system (GIS) including GIS ready topographic data as well as automation of management information systems (MIS). The digital network connecting various systems is being developed by the Directorate General of Signals. The transformation of this nature also necessitates certain amount of restructuring, and the same was adopted by the Indian Army by creating the appointment of Deputy Chief of Army Staff, Information Systems and Training and placing both DGIS and DG Signals under him. As regards the frameworks for NCW is concerned within the Army, we are developing systems at strategic, operational as well as tactical level. The integration with the other two services at appropriate

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level has been planned under the aegis of HQ IDS. The various projects that are in different phases of development and fielding include the Army Strategic Operational Information Dissemination System (ASTROIDS) for providing OIS at Army HQ, Command HQs and Corps HQs level. At the operational and tactical level, the tactical command, control, communication and information systems (Tac C3I) is being developed to provide net-centricity and at the cutting edge of operations, battlefield management system (BMS) for units and below level is planned.

SP’s: CIDSS will be the hub of the integrated command and control enterprise which will integrate four functions—operations, intelligence, logistics and terrain. At the core of this enterprise are three vital links, namely ASTROIDS, TAC C3I, and the BMS. What is the state of development of these links?

DGIS: Command information and decision support system (CIDSS) is in effect the hub of Tac C3I Systems and the most important

At the operational and tactical level, the tactical command, control, communication and information systems is being developed

component located at HQs. It is the command and control centre of Tac C3I system with all sensor and shooter system at each level of hierarchy connected to it. ASTROIDS will be integrated with Tac C3I through the CIDSS at Corps HQs. Similarly, the BMS will be integrated to the CIDSS through the CIDSS node at unit HQs. ASTROIDS is in the test bed stage and the other components of Tac C3I system are already in the test bed/fielding stage. BMS is a complex and an expansive project currently at the planning stage and the development of the same is likely to commence soon.

SP’s: What is the state of development of the artillery command and control, and communication system (ACCCS); air defense control and reporting system; electronic warfare system; and battle management system in CIDSS? DGIS: CIDSS Phase 2 is an enhanced version of the software. The user feedback received from the test bed is being incorporated in this version. However, the most important aspect of Phase 2 remains integration of all components of Tac C3I in this version. The development work on Phase 2 has commenced after signing of the contract for the CIDSS Phase 2 in March 2011. As regards other systems, all are at various stages of the development cycle. While ACCCS has already been fielded, other projects are at various stages of development. As regards ADC&RS, we have worked with the Air Force closely to ensure seamless integration as and when the system is fielded. Necessary aspects of integrating EWS with CIDSS have been identi-

SP’s: Despite regular certification by the three services to the effect that “Jointness” in the Services is quite satisfactory, the truth is that the Services are still doing operational planning service wise and involving the other service(s) later. Single service doctrines and insulated operational planning apart from precluding operational synergy, adversely affects the development of all systems within the services. Defense communications and Tac C3I are two prime examples. What are the major problems in these areas and how are you overcoming them?

DGIS: The aspects of tri-services integration are being handled by HQ IDS with active participation of the three services. For exchange of information between the three services, C4I2 applications have been planned which will be deployed at the relevant levels of hierarchy.

The required information that is to be exchanged with other two services will ride over this application after due integration with CIDSS/ASTROIDS. We interact regularly with the concerned directorates of the other two services as well as HQ IDS for a regular update on the systems and future requirements of integration. Our close interaction with Air Force during the development of ADC&RS is a clear example of this cooperation. Nevertheless, there are issues related to standardisation which are being dealt with through joint study teams under the aegis of HQ IDS. SP’s: In NCW, future focus of the Indian armed forces will be on leveraging the emerging technologies to integrate dispersed sensors, networks and modern weapon systems. This transformation requires alterations in concept of operations, doctrine, organisations and force structure, and above all in the psyche of the fighting man and the leaders. What are the future integrative technologies that we are looking at; the types of sensors we are interested in and what is the position of the Indian defence industry in the design and manufacturing of the required sensors; and the major changes that we should contemplate in the concept of operations, force structuring and training of the soldier and military leadership?

DGIS: Integration and interoperability are perhaps least understood terms when it comes to command and control systems.

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INTERVIEW

While integration of disparate systems is technologically possible through translation approach at the database level and gateways at the interface level, this comes at the cost of time penalties, additional hardware, processing power and bandwidth. While many solutions for integration are being evaluated by us, we are also working on creating standard data structures for essential information that is to be exchanged between different systems both for spatial as well as non spatial data. As regards sensors, each arm has its own requirement depending on the role. As far as the DGIS is concerned, our role is to integrate any future sensor into Tac C3I Systems. However, we do interact closely with the concerned directorate to study the feasibility of integration of any sensor being considered for induction. As far as the types of sensors are concerned, the focus of Indian Army remains on providing all-weather 24hour surveillance capabilities. Electro-optical, electrical as well as airborne sensors remain the focus areas. Synthetic aperture radars, thermal imagers are some of the sensors that are being studied by various directorates. We are looking forward to greater research and development (R&D) in designing and developing these systems by the Indian industry. The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and some of the DPSUs have done good work in this field. As far as the operational concepts, force structuring and training are concerned, these are dealt by other directorates.

However, we are closely involved in the development of net-centric capabilities.

SP’s: Today the reality is that the three services do not talk to each other. Neither voice or data networks nor our radio communications are interoperable to the desired degree. Radio sets differ in their frequency bands, wave forms and secrecy algorithms. What are the remedies that we could adopt to overcome these problems?

DGIS: It not necessary that every network should talk to other networks. It is the information that requires to move between the users. While it is true that communications are not at the desired level of interoperability at this stage, the issue is being addressed under various projects including development of common wave forms for use in multi-service environment. By the time various systems of the three services are fielded, I am sure that this interoperability would have been achieved.

SP’s: How is India’s advanced software capabilities being exploited by the armed forces and the Army?

DGIS: In all our projects, the Indian industry has been an active participant either work-

have carried out certain amount of standardisation already, however, much more is required to be done and we have not closed the option of outsourcing. As far as the formats are concerned, during the integration stage of Tac C3I, we are looking at various options for a military exchange format for exchange of information. We are also working on a spatial data model for geospatial information. In all these projects, we will require certain assistance from the industry in due course.

SP’s: For NCW, even the standard operating procedures and formats have to be synchronised. Has this been achieved?

DGIS: The ICT branch at HQ IDS will definitely help the Services by having an integrated approach to some of the common issues related to the three services. Many aspects of integration and interoperability are likely to be addressed at the level of IDS. There are issues related to trusted computing platforms and security solutions which can be taken up centrally rather that each service pursuing the agencies involved separately. This is a logical step in the ultimate goal of a joint approach towards NCW. ing with DRDO, defence public sector undertakings (DPSUs) or directly with us. The situational awareness and tactical hand-held information (SATHI) project was undertaken jointly with the industry way back in 2003. All our MIS and auto projects are being developed by the Indian industry. We are also actively engaging with our academia by way of Army Technology Board where new and innovative solutions are being developed.

SP’s: Is the Indian Army planning to network all weapon platforms for ‘situational awareness’ or is this going to be done selectively?

What would be the criteria for selective transformation?

DGIS: In the ultimate analysis, unless all elements operating in the battlefield are on a common platform for situational awareness (SA), the concept of NCW will remain unexploited. However, direct integration of weapon systems with computing devices will take place only when such weapon systems are developed and inducted. Project BMS aims to integrate all fighting and support platforms down to individual tanks/specialist or modified vehicles with varying scales of SA capability, hence the transformation will be selective based on our operational requirement.

SP’s: It seems that common standards and protocols, vital for network centricity, for the services have not been evolved. This is a gigantic task that can only be solved through

The ongoing tactical communication system (TCS) programme is being handled by the DG Signals. We are adopting the interim arrangements till the time TCS is developed and fielded. Other details of this project are with the Signals Directorate.

outsourcing, given the levels of expertise available within the services. What is being done in this regard?

DGIS: The policies for various aspects of standardisation are already in place. A number of study groups under the aegis of HQ IDS have been constituted to work on various standards. Geospatial reference framework is one such area where much work has been done. Within the Army, we

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SP’s: Currently communications and information which cannot be segregated are being dealt with by two separate Directorate Generals. How is the cohesion and integration achieved between the DGIS and the Signal Officer-in-Chief (SO-in-C)?

DGIS: The DGIS is responsible for development of application software and related databases while DG Signals handles communications and related aspects. The synergisation of activities between the data grid and communication grid is carried out at the apex level under the Deputy Chief of Army Staff (Information System and Training). Both the directorates interact on a regular basis. All major issues are being discussed in periodic joint conferences and addressed.

SP’s: Infantry Directorate is supervising the development of F-INSAS project which is in the domain of battle management systems being developed by the DGIS. What are your views on this issue?

DGIS: A decision has been taken that F-INSAS will be fielded for Infantry for levels below company. However, DGIS will be responsible for integration of F-INSAS with BMS. This was a specific functional requirement projected by the Infantry and as such this decision has been taken. However, any decision for induction of F-INSAS or BMS will only be taken after both the systems have been field tested in an integrated environment.

M U LT I - P U R P O S E V E H I C L E S

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www.amgeneral.com

For Versatile Use One of the major weaknesses that the Indian Army currently suffers from in their equipment profile is the lack of availability of a suitable HMMWV, for the plethora of vital functions which have to be performed on the battlefield n LT GENERAL (RETD) V.K. KAPOOR

K

NOWN By ITS MILITARy designation as the high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle, the HMMWV is defined as a lightweight, highly mobile, dieselpowered, four/six-wheel-drive tactical vehicle that uses a common chassis to carry a wide variety of military hardware ranging from machine guns to anti-tank missiles, grenade launchers air defence missiles. It must perform in a wide variety of terrain, from deserts to jungles, for long periods of time and with minimal maintenance. It has to carry its cargo and occupants in safety while dodging instruments of war—bullets, bombs and mines.

tion even against small arms fire and their mobility off the roads is also poor. The current vehicles do not have the requisite mobil-

ity, firepower and protection to survive on the battlefield in any type of terrain. They are also not designed as weapon platforms or

AM General’s Humvee in action

for carriage of communication equipment.

Some anti-mine vehicles have been procured for formations and units including Rashtriya Rifles functioning in insurgency areas. However, these vehicles do not cover all types of tasks and missions that have to be performed in conventional conflicts or in low intensity conflicts like the counter-insurgency environment existing in Jammu and Kashmir and in the Northeast.

Indian Army requires a common platform for a HMMWV which could fulfill the role of all battlefield functions in conventional and asymmetric conflicts.

Battlefield functions for HMMWV All formations and units of the army would be interested in a common platform of HMMWV which could fulfill most of their missions/tasks. The Indian Navy and the IAF too would be interested in the vehicle in different configurations. Some of the functions for such vehicles are listed below: l Command and control vehicles which would be fitted with radio sets and high power antennas and would be used by commanders and staff officers for radio communications and for liaison duties. l Reconnaissance and surveillance vehicles

Indian Army One of the major weaknesses that the Indian Army currently suffers from in their equipment profile is the lack of availability of a suitable HMMWV, for the plethora of vital functions which have to be performed on the battlefield. At present these functions are performed by unarmoured light wheeled vehicles which have an open configuration and a canvas covering. They offer no protecPHOTOGRAPH: US Army

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>> M U LT I - P U R P O S E V E H I C L E S PHOTOGRAPHS: Oshkosh, Wikipedia, US Army

l

Could be modified as a light recovery vehicle. l Carriage of forward observation officers, Air Control Team and tentacle and their communication equipment. l Air portability for airborne and helicopter borne operations.

Major Characteristics Considering the above tasks, the major characteristics desired of such vehicles are safety, endurance, firepower, reliability, adaptability to terrain and maintainability.

Design: The design of HMMWV should be such that they have a compact profile, to the extent possible, and are transportable by aircraft, helicopter, large transporter trucks and by rail for rapid deployment. Their body should be so designed that it enables rapid exit of the crew when required.

Optional equipment: Depending upon the role and tasks envisaged, optional equipment may include electrical self-recovery winch, nuclear, chemical and biological (NBC) protection kit, infrared driving lamps, smoke grenade dischargers, night-visiongoggle-compatible (NVG) glazing, fire suppression system, night-vision periscopes for driver and commander and daytime periscopes for driver and commander.

Fording: All vehicles could be designed for shallow fording of 2.5 feet and deep fording (with kit) up to five feet if required, in some cases.

Armament: Depending upon the roles and tasks, various types of weapon stations incorporating 7.62mm or 12.7mm machine guns, 40 mm automatic grenade launcher, anti-tank missiles and air defence missiles can be adapted to such vehicles. Sighting systems with night vision capability or thermal imaging could also be made available if a turret is designed for a weapon.

Self-protection: The structure of the hull should be so optimised that the vehicle has a low silhouette and optimised for increased survivability. Run-flat tyres are a standard feature, allowing the vehicle to continue its mission with deflated tyres.

The vehicle should also provide protection against small arms fire, anti-personnel and anti-tank mines and indigenous explosive devices (IEDs). Add-on armour kits and additional composite flooring can be provided, if required, to increase the protection of crews.

Propulsion: Such vehicles should be powered by turbo diesel engines which have the power to weight ratio in excess of 30 to give the vehicle a good cross country performance. A four/six wheel design with automatic transmission, which is electronically controlled would be an advantage. The maximum range without refuelling should be in excess of 500 km across the country and more than 800 km by road.

Common Platform: The vehicle should form a common platform, which can be adapted for various roles and missions. In addition, we could also think of using the same platform for a turreted vehicle for 12.7 mm machine gun, 30 mm cannon, antitank guided missiles such as the tubelaunched, optically-tracked, wire command data link, guided missile (TOW) missile or surface-to-air missiles.

Oshkosh mine-resistant ambushprotected (MRAP) all-terrain vehicle (M-ATV)

GAZ-2975 is a military version of GAZ-2330 Tigr high-mobility vehicle

Some Global Market Trends l

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Stryker is based on the GDLS Canada LAV III 8x8 light armoured vehicle, in service since early 2001

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which may be fitted with various types of sensors for route, terrain and enemy reconnaissance and surveillance.

Weapon carriers fitted with light and medium machine guns, up to 30 mm cannons and anti tank missiles.

Mortar carriers.

Ambulance vehicles.

Carriage of rapid reaction teams of Spe-

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cial Forces or infantry/engineer reconnaissance teams.

Patrolling of roads/tracks and operational sectors.

NBC reconnaissance.

Weapon carriers such as air defence vehicle by fitting a turret for firing air defence missiles or guns.

Carrier of small arms ammunition

Humvee, the high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV), is a military 4WD motor vehicle created by AM General. Primarily used by the United States Armed Forces, it is also used by numerous other countries and organisations.

Thousands of these vehicles in different versions have been produced for the domestic and the global market. Civilian adaptation called the Hummer series was also inspired by the HMMWVs. l Stryker is a family of eight-wheel-drive combat vehicles, transportable in a C130 aircraft, being built for the US Army

by General Dynamics Land Systems

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(GDLS) Canada (formerly General Motors Defense) and General Dynamics Land Systems Division of USA. Stryker is based on the GDLS Canada LAV III 8x8 light armoured vehicle, in service since early 2001. The LAV III is itself a version of the Piranha III built by Mowag of Switzerland, now part of GDLS Europe.

The Australian light armoured vehicle (ASLAV) is a highly mobile, amphibious eight-wheeled armoured vehicle that is ideally suited to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance operations.

General Dynamics Canada worked with GDLS Canada to supply the Canadian Army with light armoured reconnaissance vehicles (LAV Recce). This vehicle, designated by the Army as the “Coyote”, is the first to be fitted with such an integrated surveillance system and is regarded as the baseline capability against which modern armed forces will evaluate their requirements for future armoured reconnaissance vehicles.

Oshkosh Defense and GDLS Canada teamed for the TAPV programme, which will replace the 4x4 RG-31 mine protected armoured patrol vehicle (APV) and the light armoured vehicle LAV-2 6x6 Coyote reconnaissance vehicle.

Textron Marine & Land Systems, an operating unit of Textron Systems, a Textron Inc. company, and MDT Armor Corporation, a division of Arotech Corporation, has announced a teaming agreement to market, design and manufacture the Tiger light protected vehicle.

Based on a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) Dodge RAM 5500 platform, the Tiger is a cost-effective, light protected

The Indian Army requires a common platform for a HMMWV which could fulfill the role of all battlefield functions in conventional and asymmetric conflicts class all terrain vehicle with proven, highly reliable armour for a crew of six to nine. The Tiger is ballistic and mine blast protected with various add-on armour options and is designed with a spacious, versatile cabin and large payload capacity allowing the Tiger to be tailored to many missions. l Oshkosh mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) all-terrain vehicle (MATV) is an armoured vehicle with improved mobility. In June 2009, Oshkosh Corporation received an initial order to deliver 2,900 M-ATVs to the US Armed Forces for deployment in Afghanistan. The M-ATV is based on the Oshkosh medium tactical vehicle replacement (MTVR) platform and is fitted with patented TAK-4 independent suspension system for utmost mobility and survivability. l GAZ-2330 Tigr (Tiger) light utility vehicle was designed by the famous Russian automaker GAZ for military and civil markets. The GAZ-2975 is a military version of this high-mobility vehicle. It is broadly similar to the US HMMWV. The first prototypes were revealed in 2002.

Production commenced in 2005. Currently, it is in service with the Russian Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Internal Affairs. These vehicles are used to deploy rapid-reaction teams, escort convoys and conduct patrols. Some sources claim that by 2010 over 350 of these vehicles were delivered.

N E I G H B O U R H O O D <<

Why Have a Dialogue with Pak? It is not peace dialogue and talks but the whittling down of the Pakistan Army’s predominant position as the sole policy formulating organisation that will bring eventual peace between the two countries. Policy-makers in India need to turn the thinking of the Pakistani polity, instead of engaging in futile dialogues and discussions.

PHOTOGRAPH: PIB

n LT GENERAL (RETD) VIJAY OBEROI

at Abbottabad, many well-meaning independent analysts, non-resident Pakistanis and journalists have tried to change the thinking of the Pakistani Army, urging it to abandon its support to the various jihadi outfits like Lashkar-e-Toiba, but to no avail.

W

E ARE ONCE AGAIN trying to do the impossible—making peace with Pakistan. This is despite the Mumbai carnage of November 26, 2008, and the recent serial blasts in Mumbai on July 13, 2011, which everyone knows is the handiwork of Pakistan and its Jihadi cohorts. The only exception seems to be our government.

It seems to have its head buried in the sand, ostrich-like. The leadership is so firm on continuing the dialogue with Pakistan that it has brushed aside all opposition to these talks as well as the mounting evidence that it is contrary to the sentiments of the overwhelming number of the populace. Even in the case of the latest terrorist attack in Mumbai on July 13, the government is working overtime to somehow prove that it was neither Pakistan nor any other Jihadi outfit that did the dastardly work, so that the talks are not interrupted. How naive?

When will we learn that the ruling hierarchy in Pakistan that matters, viz. the Pakistani Army, does not want peace with India?

On the contrary, it continues to nurture and train the Jihadis, who have publicly announced that as soon as the American troops are out of Afghanistan, their cadres will turn their full focus on India.

Formal Dialogue Benefits Pakistan It suits Pakistan that we keep the dialogue going with them, as it serves a number of purposes of that country.

Firstly, it reduces the pariah image of Pakistan internationally, which has plummeted to a nadir after Osama bin Laden was found by the US Special Forces from under the very nose of the Pakistan Army. It was India’s unthought-of announcement that it will not affect the ongoing talks/dialogue that went against near-unanimous international opprobrium of Pakistan, following the Osama bin Laden killing. Pakistan fully understands that it is only a continuing dialogue with India that will somewhat retrieve its image and no amount of hobnobbing with the West, especially the United States, as also with the Islamic countries, will be able to. These countries, for their own national interests, would actually like to shore up Pakistan, for which a continuing dialogue with India would be helpful even if it produces no results.

Its second aim is to keep the Kashmir pot simmering and bring it to a boil when needed for domestic or other compulsions, to keep India and especially the Indian Army committed in costly, time-consuming and futile

The inputs from the military, which has been deliberately kept out of the policy-formulation loop, are considered inconsequential, especially when strategic and other external policies are formulated

Pakistan’s Military Preparations

External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna with Foreign Minister of Pakistan Hina Rabbani Khar

counter-insurgency/counter terrorist (CI/CT) operations, with the twin aim of slowing down the economic growth of India and reducing the war-waging capabilities of the Indian Army. A third important aim is to get military concessions, which it has not been able to get by force, e.g. demilitarising Siachin.

Fourthly, by exerting pressures of various types through China; USA; the Islamic countries of West Asia; and the other western nations, Pakistan wants to negotiate from a position of strength. Lastly, the resumption of the dialogue with India dilutes the latest horrendous terrorist act in which a score of innocent Indians have been killed and hundreds injured. The end result is the continued destabilising of India, despite its bigger size, economy and larger and stronger military.

On the other hand, India has nothing to gain out of such a dialogue. Our experience with many past talks, dialogues and discussions that were started and then abandoned at various stages should be sufficient pointer to any government that has the interest of the country at heart. Why then does this government persist? No doubt there is pressure from the United States, but what has the US given back to us for going out of our way and against public opinion; other than meaningless verbiage. The US Secretary of State, during her recent visit to India, has again repeated the same words and assurances and our government has again gone into overdrive, through its official public relations organisation and a committed media. Meanwhile, the citizens of the country and not just those of Mumbai will wait for the next terror strike, hoping that they do not become targets and this pattern will be repeated ad nauseam.

Pakistan Army has always perpetuated the myth that India is out to gobble up Pakistan and it is only that they stand as a bulwark against these perfidious ambitions of India.

This is such an oft-repeated statement that most Pakistanis, if not all, believe it to be true. Following the Osama bin Laden killing

Besides nurturing the jihadi card, the Pakistan Army continues to bolster its conventional forces by inducting state-of-the-art weaponry from the funds generously provided by the United States as well as its other friends. In addition, it is rapidly adding to its nuclear arsenal, including inducting the socalled tactical nuclear weapons. All this is being done with the overt and covert support of its all-weather friend China. The United States is also tacitly accepting this and has been closing its eyes to both nuclear proliferation and the diversion of its massive funding to Pakistan to fight the terror war. The current withholding of $8 billion in aid is only a temporary phase. Both the countries know it, but it suits them to enact the drama for some time.

On account of its nefarious activities, either through non-state actors, which Pakistan has nurtured over decades and which are still its trump cards or brandishing its illegally acquired nuclear weapons and missiles

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Sole Decision-Makers Let us first be clear about who are the decision-makers in Pakistan. It is neither the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) nor any other political party, and certainly not the civil society. The last word on decisions on security (including nuclear aspects) and foreign policy affairs in Pakistan is that of the Pakistan Army. Hence, the Pakistan Army, for all practical purposes, is the government of Pakistan. This has been so since the early 1960s, if not earlier and is continuing. President Zardari and company are mere puppets to showcase the so-called democratic face of Pakistan to the world.

It also needs to be highlighted that the

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NEIGHBOURHOOD PHOTOGRAPH: ininb.com

and threatening to use them, Pakistan is periodically dubbed the fountainhead of global terrorism and an unstable state. In the past, with deft diplomacy, threats and cajoling, the Pakistani leadership has managed to retrieve the situation, but it is now becoming difficult.

and Pakistan succeed in bringing about a rapprochement and agrees to live in peace as friendly neighbours, will be the start of the Pakistani Army losing its pre-eminent position in the power structure of Pakistan.

Obviously, no one in the Pakistani Army would like to relinquish their premier position, which abounds with power and pelf. So, where is the question of peace between India and Pakistan?

India will be able to come to a genuine peace agreement with Pakistan only when the Pakistan Army relinquishes or is made to relinquish their pre-eminence in Pakistan’s security and foreign affairs. Consequently, it is not peace dialogues and talks but the whittling down of the Pakistan Army’s predominant position as the sole policy formulating organisation that will bring eventual peace between the two countries. Policy-makers in India therefore need to turn the thinking of the Pakistani polity, instead of engaging in futile dialogues and discussions.

India’s Simplistic Diplomatic Responses In this game, India is perhaps the only major country that succumbs to such blandishments and has been unable to generate counter-strategies to put Pakistan on the defensive. There are two main reasons for this.

Firstly, our strategic thinking is abysmally poor, resulting in continually diluting our stand. Secondly, our political leadership has been unable to correctly gauge the true feelings of our citizens towards Pakistan. It is unfortunate that a few persons with vested interests are able to convince the leaders to take the line of least resistance, despite the utter failure of such policies.

In the past our leaders have tried to rationalise the continuing dialogue by saying that if we do not talk, should we then fight a war? What a simplistic statement from the country’s leaders who are supposed to be persons of great intelligence and sagacity.

They probably do not know that there are a host of other options between the two extremes. What we need to do is to take a much-needed break from any kind of formal negotiations (like a composite dialogue) with Pakistan. Let us continue with routine, impersonal and correct relationship with Pakistan, so that the Pakistani leadership— political, civil, bureaucracy and military— fully understands that we mean business and we will not succumb to its threats, cajoling and blandishments, or pressure from other countries. This will require not only a drastic change in our policy but also building up our military and internal security apparatus for meeting the challenges posed by the Pakistan Army.

Military Policy sans Military Inputs

Ignoring Public Opinion In our exuberance to continue the dialogue with Pakistan, either on account of pressure from foreign countries like USA, or by the few so-called peaceniks, for whom neither self-pride nor national pride are important, or even on account of a desire by some of our political leaders to go down in history as the harbingers of peace, we have truly neglected to take stock of how the bulk of the national polity views the actions of Pakistan.

After the Mumbai mayhem and the recent serial blasts, the anti-Pakistan feelings have hardened greatly.

The common man in India, although

wedded to non-violence, strongly believes that Pakistan cannot be trusted and must not be appeased. Then, why does the government think otherwise? All political leaders are supposed to gauge the pulse of the people very well. They seem to do so while responding to internal situations and especially when they sense an electoral benefit, but their ability to do so with respect to external players appears to be blinkered, linear and repetitive.

Prognosis One does not need to be a rocket scientist to come to the conclusion that the day India

Why does this happen in a country that has been progressively improving its economy and has the strength of over 5,000 years of culture and history behind it? The reality of India is that the three policy-making entities of the country, viz. the political leadership, the diplomats and the civil bureaucracy have hardly any knowledge of the strategy and have no desire to learn either. The inputs from the military, which has been deliberately kept out of the policy-formulation loop, are considered inconsequential, especially when strategic and other external policies are formulated. Surprisingly, the Indian military has long accepted this subordinate and peripheral role for itself and except in rare occasions has made no attempts to correct this stark imbalance in how our policies, including when the predominant focus is on military issues, are formulated. So, why are we talking?

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mitted along the borders in the North and Northeast. l China’s denial of a visa to the former Northern Army Commander Lt General B.S. Jaswal, serving in Jammu and Kashmir on the pretext that it is a disputed territory. l China physically occupies large areas of Indian territory since the mid-1950s.

Aksai Chin in Ladakh accounts for 38,000 sq km of Indian Territory, while the Shaksgam Valley comprising 5,180 sq km was illegally ceded by Pakistan to China in March 1963. Beijing also continues to claim the entire Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which is more than 90,000 sq km.

Thus China’s so-called “peaceful rise” at strategic levels, is entirely contradicted by the political diplomatic and military aggressiveness at functional levels against India, raising the anxiety about their intentions especially in light of their rapidly improving military capability. What is becoming clearer by the day is that with continued wrangling over Chinese activity in support of Pakistan, China’s overall aggressiveness, proliferating trade disputes, hardening positions in border negotiations, and growing nationalism, Sino-Indian relations is going to become increasingly difficult to manage. Pakistan has become a vassal state of China having allowed China to even position troops on their soil in PoK. Hence, Indian military planners have rightly concluded that both countries are likely to collude with each other in any scenario that develops into active military operations in the future.

A Two-and-a-Half-Front Capability Indian military planners feel that the collusion between China and Pakistan, which is so clearly evident in peacetime, is likely to translate itself into active, mutually support-

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ing, military operations, during conflict situations, which in Indian context would imply fighting simultaneous conflicts in two widely separated theatres of operations namely the Western theatre (against Pakistan) and the Northern/Northeastern (against China) in the future. If we add to this the Army’s commitment to simultaneously fight insurgencies, it would amount to about two-and-a-half-front capability. Thus instead of waiting for adverse situations to develop, the planners feel that it would be prudent to acquire this capability involving a conventional force level for fighting limited conflicts/border skirmishes along with an independently designed and equipped force for asymmetric conflicts simultaneously in two different theatres of operations which are widely separated.

It may be recalled that the 1962 War was thrust upon an unsuspecting nation and an unprepared Army, hibernating under the influence of false assertions of friendship by an unwise political leadership who prior to the war, had tried to politicise the military leadership thus weakening its moral fibre. This weak military leadership of an unprepared and ill-equipped Army was ordered to undertake active operations in the high altitude regions of the Eastern theatre. And for some strange reasons, it was decided not to use air power offensively in which India had an upper hand. Disastrous results were inevitable. India woke up to face its own weaknesses. This defeat at the hands of a deceitful opponent led to soul searching within the government and resulted in the raising of a fairly large number of mountain divisions for constant deployment in the high altitude region astride the line of actual control with China.

Similarly, the air force infrastructure to position a few strike squadrons was improved considerably. Today, as per open source

information, India has 10 Mountain Divisions including the two under raisings.

However, mere raising of more defensive formations will only boost our defensive capability and will not add to our strike capability across LAC which is vital for conventional deterrence. Moreover, the Army in the east lacks long-range firepower, aviation resources for intra-theatre movement, air defence and electronic warfare capability, intelligence surveillance reconnaissance (ISR) resources and armour in the form of light tanks for deployment in certain sectors of our mountainous regions where the terrain allows mechanised operations.

Air power needs to be increased by four to six strike squadrons of multi-role combat aircraft for a strike capability in Tibet, to protect the Indian airspace and to prevent the aggressor from concentrating troops close to the border.

The required capability is not quite apparent at present even though some forces do exist and which came as a result of the 1962 War with China. The Western and the Eastern theatres of the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force and the Western and Eastern fleets of the Indian Navy are independently equipped and postured. However, large operational voids including infrastructural deficiencies exist which need to be remedied urgently. The need to prepare our forces for a two-and-a-half front confrontation must be recognised and in turn must drive our future national and military strategy, warfighting doctrines, technology induction, force structures and equipment procurement/development.

Asymmetric Threats India’s rapid economic growth will impact favourably on its strategic capabilities and both state and non-state actors are likely to adopt asymmetric warfare means against

India to achieve their aims. Such threats will tend to bypass India’s conventional military capabilities as seen in J&K and in the Northeast and will need separate force structures and a doctrine for asymmetric warfare. Conventional military capabilities do not and will not deter asymmetric threats.

Areas of Reform The security threats and challenges facing India have increased enormously. Thus Indian military stresses the need to prepare itself for the full spectrum warfare. The dilemma is only regarding the extent of emphasis that should be laid to acquire each type of capability. After years of focusing on Pakistan-centric plans mostly based on operations in the plains and desert terrain of Punjab and Rajasthan, respectively, the Army now wants to also build its capability for offensive mountain warfare with China.

Transformation also entails major force accretions and modernisation for the eastern front along with the simultaneous strengthening of capabilities on the western one.

Recent Initiatives l

A new South-Western Command has been created as the Army’s sixth operational command at Jaipur in 2005, to provide a greater offensive punch on the Western front. It also provides an additional command headquarters to take control of the offensive operations on the Western flank, if required. Similarly, in the Eastern flank, two new mountain divisions have now been raised at Zakama (Nagaland) and at Misamari (Assam) respectively. Other improvements are under way including `10,000 crore plan cleared last year for military infrastructure development in the Northeast, with a new mountain strike corps and a third Artillery Division also

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M I L I T A R Y S T R AT E G Y

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PHOTOGRAPH: asociallyconstructedlife.wordpress.com

sion also on the anvil. l The Indian Air Force, much smaller than the Indian Army, is also taking steps to bridge the gaping military asymmetry with China. After Tezpur, it is now basing Sukhoi-30 MKIs at Chabua (Assam) as well as upgrading Eastern sector advanced landing grounds (ALGs) like Pasighat, Mechuka, Walong, Tuting, Ziro and Vijaynagar and helipads in Arunachal Pradesh. Plans are also under way to progressively base six surface-to-air Akash missile squadrons in the Northeast to counter Chinese fighters, helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

The above initiatives though delayed are appropriate. However, the main problem is that the Army’s modernisation is lagging, with critical deficiencies in artillery, air defence, aviation, night-fighting and strategic/ tactical intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. India’s complicated, lengthy and controversy-ridden military procurement process, coupled with the embarrassing lack of a robust domestic defence-industrial base, are enormous problems in the planned modernisation.

concentrations of his ground forces along LAC and international border and its vital targets inland. l The Indian Navy’s Eastern fleet will require a more robust force level including one/two carrier task force(s) and additional submarines to deny intrusions and for sea control in the Southern Indian Ocean. l Ballistic and cruise missile capability to engage targets in Tibet with conventional munitions should the adversary indulge in missile warfare. l A Tri-Service Special Forces Command for special operations, both overt and covert

National War Gaming Facility

Indo-China border at Nathu La, Sikkim

l

Capabilities Required Our current force level and our operational posture allows for the development of a twoand-a-half front capability. Keeping in mind our adversaries capabilities on both flanks, some of the key areas in which we will need to acquire capability are briefly discussed in succeeding paragraphs.

l l l l

Strategic Level Nuclear deterrent to include delivery systems with a strike range of up to 5,000

l

and a Joint Services Cyber Command

Operational Level l

A potent offensive and defensive capability in the Eastern theatre is on similar lines as obtaining in the Western theatre against Pakistan. A mountain strike corps will be a vital addition for conventional deterrence of Eastern theatre. l IAF’s strike resources will mandate an increase of about four to six squadrons of multi-role combat aircraft in the Eastern theatre capable of striking anywhere on the Tibetan plateau thus denying the attacker entry into Indian air space and a capability of destroying

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km range to cover the entire region up to mainland China.

Tri-Service network-centricity through a defence communication network to attain greater synergy between the three Services on land, air, sea and space.

Tri-service, cyber warfare capability.

Missile and anti-missile capability at tactical, operational and strategic levels.

Induction of unmanned combat aerial systems (UCAS).

Induction of precision (denoting accuracy) and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance technologies into manned and unmanned systems.

Establishing a National Cyber Command

Under the existing circumstances, it would be prudent to assume that the situations demanding a two-and-a-half-front capability are likely to arise irrespective of our personal convictions. War gaming at national and military strategic levels will throw up the likely situations which would mandate such a capability. Currently, this is one of our greatest weaknesses because despite having a large military force we do not have a national war gaming facility to validate our concepts, force structures and doctrines. Moreover, unlike Western democracies, we have a polity totally ignorant of matters military and a self-serving bureaucracy unmindful of operational issues and understanding of the need to modernise the forces at a much faster pace to face future challenges. The trust deficit between the services with the Ministry of Defence (MoD) can only be removed by a well-informed and competent political leadership and proper integration of the MoD with the three services.

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CYBER SECURITY

Global Response to the Global Issue Global understanding has dawned that by bringing together our strategic capabilities, we will be able to address current and emerging cyber threats. Cooperation and coordination between member states through the United Nations, is indispensable to reach a consensus on global strategies and involve all relevant bodies and stakeholders. n LT GENERAL (RETD) P.C. KATOCH

Homeland security will not be effective without protecting our cyber space in order to enjoy our freedom at home and advance our interests abroad

T

HE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN CyBER crime, cyber terrorism and cyber warfare are blurred. The 21st century living is already dependent on the internet and hence cyber threats will only multiply. It is increasingly apparent that other than individual and syndicated cyber crime, cyber terrorism and cyber warfare are being conducted by nation states, often through so called non-state actors. Cyber threats have been expanding exponentially over the years and have become as dangerous as nuclear war. As far back as 1998, Russia had proposed a treaty to ban the use of cyberspace for military purposes but given the difficulty in identifying the source of attack, it did not come through. A report in the US talked of 25 million new strains of malware created in 2009 itself. That equals a new strain of malware every 0.79 seconds.

The report underlined how the current cyber threat environment is dramatically changing and becoming more challenging as the clock ticks. Despite cyber threats magnifying over the years, it is only sometime in the middle of 2010 that some semblance of collective efforts became visible in bringing order to cyber space and in confronting the scourge of cyber terrorism. Last year, therefore, may be paged as another modest beginning towards a global cyber security mechanism when a US led 15 nation group reached an agreement to make collective recommendations to the United Nations in July 2010. Consensus within this group itself ironically took five years of deliberate efforts commencing 2005.

The recommendations clearly indicated the willingness to engage in reducing the threat of cyber attacks on computer networks, calling upon the United Nations to create norms of accepted behaviour in cyberspace, exchange information on national legislation and cyber security strategies as also strengthen the capacity of less-developed nations to protect their computer systems.

www.spslandforces.net

Homeland Security & Cyber Security The US and the world at large realised the globalisation of terror post 9/11. However, cyber crime, cyber terrorism and cyber war required no specific incident like this. Cyber threats were borderless, omni-directional and omni-present from the very outset. India that has been facing cross border terrorism since over past two decades has also been subjected to cyber attacks, mainly from China and Pakistan. Osama bin Laden had been giving calls for strikes “through all possible means”, obviously also targeting economic centres, infrastructure and the like. It was perceived that while Laden had his finger on the trigger of his AK-47, his successor’s future lineage will have the finger on the mouse. The focus would be to attack the economy of a country. Therefore, homeland security has to go far beyond than merely providing physical protection of life and property. Cyber security may be considered the flip side of homeland security and must now be synonymous to both economic security and homeland security. Without adequate cyber security, it may not be possible to enjoy the full benefits of globalisation and a developing economy. Homeland security will not be effective without protecting our cyber space in order to enjoy our freedom at home and advance our interests abroad.

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Therefore, steps need to be taken from the national level right down to the community and individual levels to protect us against cyber threats.

Critical infrastructure Protecting critical infrastructures from disruption is not a new concept. The need to manage the risks arising from physical attacks and service disruptions has existed for as long as there have been critical infrastructures. The change that has taken place now is that as a result of advances in information and communications technology, there is a threat to critical infrastructures that goes beyond that of physical attacks. Critical infrastructure assurance is an essential element of our overall approach to homeland security.

Industries, institutions, and distribution networks that provide a continual flow of goods and services essential to the nation’s defense and economic security, the functioning of its government, and the welfare of its citizens constitute the critical infrastructure. It would include information and communications, transportation, electric power, oil and gas storage and distribution, banking and finance, transportation, water supply, emergency assistance, etc. These are deemed critical because they are the enablers of economic activity as well as essential to the delivery of vital government services. Their disruption can have a debilitating regional, national, or even international impact. Information systems and networks of the infrastructure sectors that facilitate commerce also are increasingly vulnerable to cyber attacks and heightened services disruption, the cascading effect of which can even bring daily life to a standstill and cause grievous damage to our economy. Cyber attacks on critical infrastructures can cause mass disruption at regional, national and even international levels. Access to the internet has the potential through cyber attack to wreak havoc on an entire network or infrastructure. This requires unprecedented partnership between private industry and government especially since there are no boundaries in cyberspace and because a large part of the nation’s critical infrastructures are privately owned and operated. There is a requirement of off-the-shelf solutions in managing risks posed to critical infrastructures and raise awareness that massive disruptions due to deliberate cyber attacks are a risk management problem that companies must solve with government playing a supporting role. Organisations must institutionalise the process of identifying critical assets, assessing their vulnerabilities, and managing

the risks associated with these vulnerabilities.

Cyber security is essential to business assurance and continuity. Regulations by themselves cannot ensure proper implementation of cyber security within complex organisations. The private sector must play a major role in securing our economy from cyberbased attacks.

Global Efforts The International Multilateral Partnership Against Cyber Threats (IMPACT) was launched in 2006 in USA at the end of the 15th World Congress on Information Technology (WCIT). Its Global Headquarters was launched in May 2009 at Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. IMPACT is a global public-private partnership alliance against cyber threats; positioned to assist partner countries focusing on developing nations in broadening their cyber security capabilities and capacity.

It is a politically neutral platform, bringing together national governments, academia, industry leaders, international organisation, think tanks and cyber security experts to enhance the global community’s capacity to prevent, defend against and respond to cyber threats. Since 2006, the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference, ITU Secretary General had set cyber security as one of his top three priorities. In May 2007, the GCA was launched aimed at a framework for international cooperation in cyber security. In September 2008, IMPACT signed an memorandum of understanding (MoU) with the International Telecommunications Union (Leading UN specialised agency for Information and Communication Technologies—founded in 1865) under which the Global Headquarters of IMPACT the focal point of the Global Cyber Security Agenda (GCA), providing the 192 members of ITU (including India) expertise, facilities and resources to effectively address cyber threats. In 2010, the ITU World Conferences and the Plenipotentiary Conference further strengthened the role of ITU in cyber security and endorsed the GCA as the ITUwide strategy on international cooperation.

Then is the East West Initiative (EWI), which is working with leading corporations, specialists and governments around the world to mobilise cooperative approaches to cyber security. EWI is working with the numerous countries including the US, Russia, China and India to address thrust areas—create new and effective international collaborative mechanisms and trust; reframe issues and develop consensus proposals for new agreements and policies; champion and mobilise resources necessary to implement high-

impact proposals. This initiative combines EWI’s established process—convening diverse parties, reframing security challenges and mobilising resources to implement solutions— with the technical expertise of our partners to build trust and reduce the sense of vulnerability that dominates cyber security policies in most countries.

The recent visit of Hillary Clinton to India saw signing of an Indo-US accord on cyber security cooperation between the Computer Emergency Response Teams of the US and India, these being the lead agencies in respective countries to respond to virtual attacks. The accord will enable India and the US join hands to secure their cyberspaces amid increasing attacks on sensitive records from hostile elements, including the terrorists. The accord will permit exchange information on cyber strikes, cooperation in technology and exchange information on cyber security policy, capacity building and exchange of experts, enabling mutual response to cyber security incidents. Expertise will be shared in artifact analysis like studying traces of virus and worm, network traffic, etc.

CERT-India functioning under the Ministry of Communications and IT raises security awareness among India’s cyber community and provides technical assistance and advice to recover from computer security incidents.

Similarly, US-CERT is the operational arm of the National Cyber Security Division in the Department of Homeland Security.

Requirement The primary international requirement obviously is successful execution of the Global Cybersecurity Agenda (GCA). GCA is designed for cooperation and efficiency, encouraging collaboration with and between all relevant partners, and building on existing initiatives to avoid duplication. The five pillars on which the GCA is being built, comprise legal measures, technical and procedural measures, organisational structures, capacity building and international cooperation. The requirements are colossal to say the least and international cooperation is not something that comes easy, especially when rogue nations may be pursuing their own secret agendas. As part of the GCA, ITU has also initiated the Child Online Protection (COP) initiative as an international collaborative network for promoting online protection of children and young people worldwide by providing guidance on safe online behaviour with key objectives to identify risks and vulnerabilities to children in cyberspace, create awareness, develop practical tools to help minimise risk and share knowledge and experience. This too will need international cooperation for accelerated implementation.

Join Hands Global understanding has dawned that only by joining the forces and bringing together our strategic capabilities, we will be able to address current and emerging cyber threats.

Cyber security is a global issue and it requires a global response. The GCA is the first truly global multi-stakeholder and public-private alliance against cyber threats.

Cooperation and coordination between member states through the United Nations, is indispensable to reach a consensus on global strategies and involve all relevant bodies and stakeholders. The world has little time to lose.

NEIGHBOURHOOD

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The Way Ahead The recurrent and tiring round of talks, agreements and discussions without any significant breakthrough or even the possibility of the same seem to point that the border conflict has all the ingredients of becoming a major spoiler in Indo-China relations PHOTOGRAPH: Wikipedia

n DR MONIKA CHANSORIA

C

HINA’S MILITARy CONVENTIONALLy HAS been dominated by its land troops, traced back to the time when the ‘Red Army of workers and peasants’ was founded in 1927. Ever since becoming the first constituent element of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), till assuming the role of the PLA as it is today, Chinese armed forces have borne the stamp of their revolutionary origin and combat experiences while transforming into a tri-service military force.

The historical status of China’s military has traditionally been influenced by its ground forces given that it was known to be a land power. China has put forth a justification of its military modernisation campaign as a reasonable chain of actions undertaken by a nation that seeks to update antiquated weapons systems and equipment and thus rationalise an outdated military structure.

The policymakers in China have frequently noted its history of vulnerability to external aggression as the primary reference point.

Despite the modernisation effort focusing more upon the PLA Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Corps, the PLA ground forces continue to bear the stamp of being the key authority that ensures sustenance of the proverbial rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) throughout China. PLA Army (PLAA) remains committed to guarding China’s nearly 22,000 km-long-land boundary. Given that China has sought territorial dispute resolution with 12 out of 14 land neighbours including the Central Asian Republics, Russia and Vietnam, the ongoing land boundary dispute that Beijing shares with India and Bhutan remains a source of concern. China’s military modernisation campaign, especially its readiness to fight a local border war, raises caution for India. This can be attributed to Chinese military’s doctrinal strategy of fighting local limited border wars under informationised conditions.

China recognises the McMahon Line as its boundary with Myanmar, but refuses to do so with India. Prior to Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao’s visit to India in December 2010, an official Xinhua news agency report described the Sino-Indian border to be about 2,000 km long. However, the official Indian count of the operational border stands at nearly 3,500 km (not taking into account the line separating Pakistan occupied Kashmir [PoK] and China).

This appeared to be a tactical strategy of exercising pressure against India since the discrepancy in the figures is too large to be treated merely as an inadvertent error, that too coming from an official news channel.

PLA Army Addressing the often conferred to ‘bloated’ size of the army, the PLA has streamlined its military to create a more professional and efficient fighting force having undergone two large reductions in force in the past decade, starting with about 5,00,000 personnel from 1997 to 2000 and another 2,00,000 from September 2003 to 2005.

The past decade has also witnessed enhanced focus on improving the system of leadership and command; streamlining the staff offices and the affiliated organs at the Corps level and above, so as to directly compress the command chains and further improve the operational command system to strengthen the command functions.

To accommodate the loss of over 5,00,000 troops and to prepare for new missions, the PLA Army has changed its structure greatly since the mid-1990s, when the main combat force was organised into 24 Group Armies (equivalent to a Corps), approximately 90 manoeuvre (infantry and tank) divisions, around 15 brigades (mostly tank), plus scores of artillery, anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), combat support, and local/border defence units. Interestingly, a book published by the National Defense University titled Zhanyi Xue (On Military Campaigns), provides a detailed insight as to how the PLA proposes to conduct operations at Group Army and higher levels in future military campaigns i.e. the operational level of war. The book defines campaigns as “combat operations comprising a series of battles conducted by army corps-level units under a unified command to achieve a local or an overall objective in a war.”

That the ground forces’ Generals are the dominant lot in the present structure of the PLA’s Generals cream of the crop is not surprising. As stated in a China Brief report, ground forces’ represent a lion’s share or 71 per cent of the total. Reportedly, 45 per cent of Hu’s Generals are non-ground forces, compared to 25 per cent and 24 per cent to that of Jiang Zemin’s and Deng Xiaoping’s.

Defence White Paper 2010 In its latest White Paper, China’s National Defense 2010, released in March 2011, China has categorically referred to the ground troops as the “PLA Army”. This underlines the ongoing transformation of the PLAA. China has stressed upon the strategic requirements of mobile operations and tri-dimensional offence and defence strategies from regional defence to transregional mobility. In further advancement of the overall transformation of the service, the PLAA has invested in reform, innovation and development.

According to the White Paper, the PLAA places emphasis upon the development of new types of combat forces, optimising its organisation and structure, strengthening military training in conditions of informationisation, accelerating the digitised upgrading and retrofitting of main battle weaponry, organically deploying new types of weapon platforms, and significantly

boosting its capabilities in long-distance manoeuvres and integrated assaults. Currently, the PLAA’s mobile operational units include 18 combined corps plus additional independent combined operational divisions. The combined corps, consisting of divisions as well as brigades, remains under the seven military area commands of Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou and Chengdu.

The 2010 White Paper underscores that the PLAA has made great progress in strengthening its arms with the armoured component strengthening the development of digitised units, accelerating the mechanisation of motorised units and improving its combat system, which combines heavy, light, amphibious and airborne assault forces.

Insofar as the artillery component is concerned, the focus primarily has been upon new types of weapons, equipment and ammunition, with higher levels of informationisation, forming an operational and tactical in depth strike system, and developing the capacity to carry out precision operations with integrated reconnaissance, control, strike and assessment capabilities.

The air defence component has stepped up the development of new types of radar, command information systems, and medium- and high-altitude ground-to-air missiles. It has formed a new interception system consisting of anti-aircraft artillery and missiles, and possesses enhanced capabilities of medium- and low-altitude air and missile defence operations.

The aviation wing of the PLAA has made a significant transition from being merely a support force to becoming the main-battle assault force, further optimising its combat force structure, and conducting modularised grouping according to different assigned tasks. It has upgraded armed helicopters, transport and service helicopters, and improved its capabilities in air strike, force

PLAA is committed to guarding China’s nearly 22,000-km-long land boundary

projection and support considerably.

The engineering component of the PLAA has accelerated its transformation into a new model of integrated and multifunctional support force which is rapid in response and can be used both in peacetime and in war. It has also strengthened its special capabilities in emergency rescue operations as well as during disaster relief operations. This in turn has resulted in the enhancement of capabilities of integral combat support and military operations other than MOOTW missions.

The chemical defence component has worked to develop an integrated force for nuclear, biological and chemical defence which operates both in peacetime and war, combines civilian and military efforts, and integrates systems from various arms and services. It has developed enhanced permanent, multi-dimensional and multi-terrain defence capabilities against nuclear, biological and chemical threats.

Effective Border Control China considers rapid defence modernisation a logical priority in the backdrop when it states, “Taiwan independence separatist force and its activities are still the biggest obstacle and threat to the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations… separatist forces working for East Turkistan independence and Tibet independence have inflicted serious damage on national security and social stability.” The central leadership of China has accredited a noteworthy build-up for the PLAA both in terms of scope and scale. The ground forces are training and equipping task-organised brigades as well as divisions to fight an island-landing campaign in a Taiwan contingency scenario. More importantly, the role of the PLAA would be at the forefront as and when it readies to fight a local limited border war under informationised conditions—with the border dispute vis-à-vis India. New Delhi in the short-term needs to ensure that there are no violations of the line of actual control (LAC) through effective border control and management while maintaining a forceful conventional posture, in order to meet the Chinese threat in the northern and eastern sector.

The writer is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.

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>> N E I G H B O U R H O O D

Act Before It’s Too Late We need to quickly make up for the years lost in procrastination and starving the military and the Army in particular of funds. The brutally-suppressed local movements of the Gilgit-Baltistan region and PoK can be exploited, if our government has the political will and the sagacity to think and plan for the long-term. n LT GENERAL (RETD) VIJAY OBEROI

W

E HAVE TWO MAJOR adversarial relationship with our neighbours – China and Pakistan. Both are related to our international borders in one way or another and both are legacies of the British in India. In the case of China, the British colonial power gave only passing importance to India’s borders with Tibet and China. Although they wanted the continuance of Tibet as a buffer state between India and China, they never placed it at the same level as the so-called Great Game—the fear of Czarist Russia initially and later the Soviet Union getting access to the warm water ports of the Indian Ocean. They did make an attempt in 1913-14, when a tripartite treaty between British India, China and Tibet was negotiated at Shimla, which established the alignment of the border between British India and Tibet in the eastern sector. The McMahon

pation of 40,000 sq km of Indian territory in the west. In addition, it is coveting additional territory in the eastern sector.

In the case of Pakistan, although the international border with India has been demarcated, the line of control (LoC) and the actual ground position line (AGPL) in the state of J&K and in the Siachen Glacier area respectively continue to be militarily active and flare up at the least provocation. The LoC (modified version of cease fire line) came about when Pakistani troops were thrown back by the Indian Army from a large area of J&K, but when a ceasefire came into force in January 1949, some parts of the state remained with Pakistan. These are now known as Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) and the Gilgit-Baltistan area.

The AGPL came into existence when the Indian Army thwarted a Pakistani plan to occupy the Siachin Glacier in 1984. Despite a number of attempts by the Pakistani Army to regain the Glacier, the Indian

ical entity in Pakistan today. It borders Pakistan’s Khyber Pukhtunkhwa province (earlier NWFP) to the west; Afghanistan’s Wakhan Corridor to the north-west; China to the north and north-east; J&K state of India to the east and south-east and PoK in the south. It covers an area of 72,971 sq km and has an estimated population of 1.5 million. It is highly underdeveloped and is sparsely populated. A part of this area, called the Shaksgam Tract, was illegally ceded to China by Pakistan in 1963.

On the eastern flank, China is in illegal occupation of the entire area known as Aksai Chin. This has resulted in the reduction of the length of the border with Tibet from 2,615 km to only 1,568 km and brought Chinese troops much closer. It will thus be clear that the northern portion of Ladakh has been hemmed in from both the east and the west. In addition, the Shaksgam Tract under illegal occupation of China exerts pressure from the north.

PHOTOGRAPH: Wikipedia

PLA soldiers marching through Lhasa in Tibet region

country or as an alibi for China’s true intentions in the region.

An important point for India is that it marks a major change in China’s Kashmir policy, especially when this development follows in the wake of the well-known ‘visa controversy’. Till recently, China was a neutral observer as far as the Kashmir issue was concerned and espoused the bilateral approach between India and Pakistan to solve the issue. China seems to have radically changed its stance with an obvious bias towards Pakistan. This development is inimical to the interests of India and needs to be countered vigorously.

The presence of the PLA, whether of combat troops or combat support troops does serve China’s strategic interests in South Asia? Besides questioning India’s sovereign right over J&K and highlighting it as a ‘disputed territory’, it is deliberately internationalising the issue. Although the Shaksgam Tract has been ceded to China long time back, China can fully incorporate it only if these areas become a permanent part of Pakistan in any future settlement over Kashmir. China may also want additional territory in adjoining areas that abut the Xinxiang Province, with a view to keep its restive Uyghur population as far away as possible from the jihadi elements of Pakistan. China has recently publicly blamed Pakistan for Uyghur “militants“ trained in Pakistan for the deadly violence in its restive Xinjiang province, including in Kashghar, which left at least 22 people dead.

www.spslandforces.net

China’s Long-Term Strategy

Line was drawn by the British negotiator, Henry McMahon on a small scale map, with a broad-nib pen and was attached to the agreement. All three representatives initiated the agreement, but it was not ratified by China and the border was never demarcated.

In the west too, the border between the erstwhile princely state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) with Tibet as well as the small portion with the Xinxiang province of China was left vague and was referred to as ‘undefined’ and treated as a traditional border, implying that both sides could cross it at will for grazing cattle, religious pilgrimages or trade. Soon after the communists came into power in China, Tibet was invaded and annexed by China. China also constructed a road in the west, in the Aksai Chin area (claimed by India) in the 1950s, linking its Xinxiang province with Tibet and presented it as a fait accompli to India and the world.

After fighting a war in 1962, the two countries are negotiating for decades to come to a resolution about the border, but have not succeeded, mainly because it suits China to continue with an uncertain border that can become a cause célèbre whenever China feels that it is in its interest. China is in illegal occu-

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Army stands firm.

It can thus be seen that in case push comes to shove and the security situation deteriorates, India would find itself in the unenviable position of dealing with more than one front, which must be avoided by all means by our leadership.

With the recent reports of the presence of China’s People’s liberation Army (PLA) troops in the Gilgit-Baltistan areas of Pakistan, the situation for India has become even more sensitive in the Ladakh district of J&K.

Compulsions of Geography While assessing the impact of the PLA presence in Gilgit-Baltistan, one needs to study the geography of the area in great detail. In the Ladakh region, India has been squeezed by both Pakistan and China over the years.

China is under illegal occupation of 35,000 sq km area in the Aksai Chin area, as well as 5,120 sq km in the Shaksgam Tract.

In the west, Pakistan is in illegal occupation of 78,000 sq km of Indian territory.

This includes the northern portion of PoK as well as the entire tract of real estate now known as Gilgit-Baltistan.

Gilgit-Baltistan is the northernmost polit-

China’s Military in Gilgit-Baltistan China has denied the presence of troops in the Gilgit-Baltistan area, but it appears quite certain that while combat troops may not have been deployed, there are large numbers of combat support troops from construction, engineering and communication units of the PLA there. They are under the command of the Xinjiang military district and have strength of 7,000. On the Chinese side of the Khunjerab Pass, there are many more PLA troops.

Such a large foreign presence in a thinly populated, undeveloped region has a profound impact, both at the local level and in the adjoining countries. For India, it amounts to the opening of a new front. Similarly, Afghanistan should be equally worried, with its Wakhan corridor immediately next door. It is also a challenge for the United States, as all its strategic plans in West Asia and the Central Asian Republics (CARs) may get negated. The CARs will also get affected.

Can this add up to a creeping process of de facto Chinese control over this region? There is certainly a strong possibility, if this move is left unchallenged. It must not be treated as an innocent move for assisting a friendly

In the last two decades, China has chalked out an ambitious plan to link its hinterland in mainland China to the Indian Ocean. It is attempting to do so from both its south-western and south-eastern flanks. In the southeast, it is carrying its road-building activities from yunnan through Myanmar towards the Bay of Bengal with vigour. It wants a similar opening on its south-western flank.

It is already building a rail link between Kashgar in Xinjiang province and Havelian near Rawalpindi. Combined with the road links already under way, it would become a potent and visible stranglehold of India, which it sees as its main rival in Asia in the medium- and long-term. With this infrastructure, Chinese oil tankers, using the Pakistani ports of Gwadar, Pasni and Ormara will be able to move oil and other commodities to China’s hinterland in a few days instead of a few weeks as at present and in a much secure manner.

China has recently obtained deep-sea mining licence in central Indian Ocean from the International Seabed Authority for exploration and mining licences in the Southwest Indian Ridge. This is part of its grand design of having its presence in the Indian Ocean, both naval and commercial.

In the next few years, China would achieve what neither Czarist Russia nor the Soviet Union could do and if the plans of China succeed, it will do so both in the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal. This has become possible mainly on account of its all-weather friendship with Pakistan, which includes surreptitiously transferring nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan and their support for the military junta in Myanmar, which ensures the latter’s continuing rule, in the face of highly adverse world opinion.

TECKNOW

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T E C K N O W

Micro Unmanned Ground Vehicle The Dragon Runner 10 has the ability to automatically flip video images, antennae and controls upon landing

Q

inetiQ has unveiled its latest micro unmanned ground vehicle (MUGV) based on its Dragon Runner platform. The new Dragon Runner 10 (DR10) is built around the basic Dragon Runner design and is intended for military and first responder duties. At just 15 inches (38 cm) long, 13.5 inches (34 cm) wide and 5.8 inches (15 cm) tall, and weighing just under 10 pounds (4.5 kg), the DR10 is small and light enough to be carried in a standard-issue pack and be thrown into buildings and hostile environments for reconnaissance and surveillance missions.

With the ability to carry payloads of up to five pounds (2.3 kg), the DR10 is compatible with DR20 payloads and can be fitted with a variety of sensors, radios, cameras and a robotic arm. Its day and night sensors allow it serve as a team’s forward eyes and ears, while also delivering remote sensors, setting counter-IED charges, gathering intelligence and con-

ducting surveillance. It is controlled by a wearable controller at distances of up to 2,130 feet (650 m) and can be fitted with tracks or wheels dependent on the terrain to be covered.

When thrown, the DR10 has the ability to automatically flip video images, antennae and controls upon landing and it will travel at speeds of four mph (6.4 kmph) on slopes of up to 45 degree. Its standard battery will provide up to two hours of power, which can be supplemented by an external battery pack to provide over six hours of operation and a quick in-service recharge capability.

Mission Scenarios l l l l l l

PHOTOGRAPHS: Qinetiq

l l

Checkpoint security Under-vehicle inspection Reconnaissance inside buildings, sewers, drainpipes, caves, courtyards Perimeter security using onboard motion and sound detectors Inspecting interiors of buses, trains or planes Hostage barricade reconnaissance and negotiating Route clearance of IEDs Explosive ordnance disposal

Prognosis These moves by China indicate that the leadership of China views India as a weak nation in military terms. China’s perception may well be that it is a good time to increase pressure and force India to negotiate the border question from an advantageous position.

This overt and sensational enterprise by China is bound to adversely affect our strategic position in J&K in general and in the highly sensitive area of Ladakh in particular, especially when the PLA is already deployed on our eastern flank in the Aksai Chin area. This comes at a time when there are renewed moves by Pakistan and its proxies to ‘settle’ the Siachin issue. Unfortunately, there are many in India who either do not understand the deeper implications of this move, or are so driven by their personal agendas that they are willing to sacrifice the interests of the country.

What then should India do? First and foremost, the long talked about modernisation of the Indian military, especially the Army, must now move to the sphere of action. We need to quickly make up for the years lost in procrastination and starving the military and the Army in particular of funds. At the same time, we now need to get our other instruments in an action mode, as the brutally-suppressed local movements of the Gilgit-Baltistan region and PoK can be exploited, if our government has the political will and the sagacity to think and plan for the long-term, instead of the fire-fighting it ends up doing in most strategic situations.

The Army must not accept any more tasks relating to internal security, where the long deployments in counter-insurgency operations have been at the expense of its primary tasks. There is no insurgency in the Northeast states now; it is only a law and order problem, with extortion as its main manifestation. The Army must de-induct from the entire Northeast and re-commence training of these troops in their primary tasks. The Army has unequivocally turned down the proposal to

get involved with the Maoist insurgency. They must not dilute their stand.

China, like any other bully, respects strength. In the real world, ‘the meek do not inherit the earth’. It is our strength, building up relationships with like-minded countries and above all political will, which will get us dividends. Let us act before it is too late.

40th Issue

Well-thought Plans Having done extremely well in economic terms, China seems to be confident of taking risks in the frontier areas of its borders, as part of its overtly resurgent phase. Besides trying to slowly marginalise the traditional US role in the Asia-Pacific region and West Asia, it wants to increase its pressure on India. Its presence in Gilgit-Baltistan needs to be seen as a strong message, not only to India but also to the international community, that it is pursuing its strategic goals according to a well-thought-out plan.

In the Ladakh region, the earlier configuration has now changed, as the two distinct fronts seem to have merged. The separation between the two no longer exists. Instead of the erstwhile dispensation of dealing with the east and the west as separate entities, we need to now plan on the contingencies where advertently or inadvertently the Army may get involved in dealing with both the fronts simultaneously. This is not at all a happy state.

The stakes of the Indian Army have not only become much greater, the importance of holding on to our positions on the Siachen Glacier has also become critical. The Indian Army must have undoubtedly factored this new situation in their planning. However, what is even more important is that the political leadership; the pundits of the foreign office; and those do-gooders who want to hand over the Glacier on a platter to Pakistan, also wake up to these evolving realities.

The writer is the former Vice Chief of Army Staff and the Founder Director of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS).

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>>

INTERVIEW

Patriot’s Versatile Capabilities Raytheon recently bagged a $1.7 billion contract to upgrade Patriot for Saudi Arabia. Sanjay Kapoor, Vice President, Integrated Air & Missile Defense, Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems, gives details of Patriot to Lt General (Retd) Naresh Chand of SP’s Land Forces.

PHOTOGRAPH: Raytheon

SP’s Land Forces (SP’s): What is Configuration-3? What does it include?

Sanjay Kapoor (Kapoor): Basic Patriot Battalion Unit configuration consists of a multifunction radar, engagement control station, launchers (PAC-2 and PAC-3), an electrical power plant, Patriot missiles consist of a battery maintenance centre, an antenna mast group, small repair parts and large repair parts trailers, communication relay groups, and an information coordination centre.

Configuration-3 is enhancements to the selected hardware and software in the Configuration-2 Patriot system. Examples include but are not limited to improvements in search/detection/track capability, improved discrimination of TBMs, increased battlespace coverage, improved communications between battalions, enhanced lethality, remote launch and communication, launch point determination, joint TMD interoperability, enhanced launcher electronics and PAC-3 missile.

SP’s: Patriot modular is under construction and thus can it be upgraded to counter future air threat?

Kapoor: Patriot system is considered very modular and is being constantly upgraded to improve its purpose and capability. Since Desert Storm, Patriot system has undergone multiple cycles of planned improvements to include QRP configuration, PAC-3 Configuration 1, PAC-3 Configuration 2 and PAC-3 Configuration 3. The US Army and international Patriot partners continue to identify new requirements for the system to be added as planned product improvement increments.

steered array. Patriot radar is made up of main array, auxiliary arrays, IFF antenna and track-via-missile array. The main array has the capability of search and track, missile track and command uplink capability. Patriot Multi-function Phased Array also includes auxiliary arrays for the side lobe cancellation, the IFF antenna to perform target identification functions and the track-via-missile array to assist in terminal guidance.

SP’s: Indian Army needs both Quick Reaction SAM (QRSAM) and Medium-Range SAM (MRSAM). Does Raytheon have plans to offer their systems to the Indian Army?

Kapoor: Raytheon, as an OEM, has indeed responded to both Air Force MRSAM and Army QRSAM and SRSAM RFIs with Patriot and HAWK XXI system solutions.

control elements to coordinate the air defence mission. Information Coordination Central (ICC) correlates tracks, resolves conflicts, protects friendly A/C, assesses threats, assesses engagement priorities, and coordinates fire unit engagements. Higher echelon interfaces with other services provide early warning

data, disseminate defence readiness conditions, evaluate air defence warning and weapons control status and protect friendly A/C. At the fire unit level, search, detect, identify, engage and destroy functions are carried out in the engagement control station.

The radar antenna is an electronically

SP’s: Is it possible for the Patriot system to combine the role of QRSAM and MRSAM as it will reduce the cost?

Kapoor: Patriot is a battle-proven system deployed globally for various air and missile defence missions. As stated earlier, it has been combat proven in support of both area and manoeuvre air defence missions.

Specific weapon system solutions should be based on India’s requirements and mission needs.

Patriot is a battle-proven system deployed globally for various air and missile defence missions

SP’s: Does Patriot system fit into high to medium Air Defense of the US Army?

Kapoor: Patriot is classified as a lower tier ATBM weapon system capable of engaging the complete air defence threat set, including air-breathing targets (high performance aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles), short and medium range tactical ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. Patriot is currently the only fielded weapon system that satisfies medium- to long-range requirements for the US Army.

SP’s: What about its role as an anti-ballistic missile system?

Kapoor: Patriot provides a robust capability against short- and medium-range tactical ballistic missiles.

SP’s: Which version of the Patriot missile system can perform the above roles?

Kapoor: Patriot employs a family of interceptors to permit TBM engagements with the most effective interceptor. The combination of GEM-T and PAC-3 missiles is needed to defeat various threats at various ranges.

SP’s: Can you give some details of the configuration of the Patriot system including its mobility, control elements and radars?

Kapoor: Patriot is considered a highly mobile air defence system. Its capability was successfully demonstrated during both Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom. It continues to support various air and missile defence missions around the globe.

Patriot battalion has various distributed

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PHOTOGRAPH: US Army

www.spslandforces.net

SP’s: Can Patriot engage UAVs? Kapoor: yes. Patriot has been tested and proven to be very effective against the UAV threats.

News in Brief CHINA DEMANDS US TO HALT SPY PLANES FLIGHTS China has demanded that the US halt all its surveillance flights near the Chinese coast in a move to maintain good relationships between the two countries. The call follows after two Chinese fighter jets intercepted an US U-2 spy plane over the Taiwan Strait. The Pentagon, however, has rejected the warning and said that the US would continue to fly operations in international airspace. Military ties between the two countries continue to be strained, having grown following the US arms sales to Taiwan.

TEXTRON TO SUPPLY ADDITIONAL ASVS TO US ARMY

previous contract. The ASV is a 4x4 wheeled armoured vehicle that provides protection against small arms fire, artillery projectile fragments, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and land mines. The vehicles perform a variety of missions including scout, reconnaissance, command and control and maintenance as well as field artillery combat observation and lasing teams (COLT) with the M1200 Armoured Knight configuration. Vehicles will be manufactured at the company’s facilities in New Orleans, US. The company has produced 3,161 ASVs till date.

BOEING AWARDED US ARMY APACHE MODIFICATION CONTRACT

Publisher and Editor-in-Chief Jayant Baranwal Editor Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

vehicle designed to demonstrate advanced new technologies and capabilities to protect the US soldiers through improved communications in remote areas. The airship will act as a stationery long-term overhead platform for a telecommunications relay system that will expand the range and reliability of battlefield communications. Lockheed will conduct a full evaluation once the airship is recovered.

NEW RADAR TO DETECT SUICIDE BOMBERS Science, Engineering and Technology Corporation (SET) has developed a new radar system for the US Army to help reduce the threat of suicide bombers. The counter bomber features three radar detectors and uses an algorithm to detect possible bomb materials underneath clothing, at a distance of up to 100 yard. The radar automatically detects and tracks the threat and alerts soldiers by wirelessly transmitting pictures or live video of the threat through a hand-held device, such as a smart phone.

INDIA TO AWARD FICV CONTRACT

Textron Marine and Land Systems has been awarded a contract to supply the US Army with 65 additional M1117 armoured security vehicles (ASVs).The $49.6 million award is a contract option exercised by the US Army Contracting Command under a

>> SHOW CALENDAR 6-7 September Future Artillery Asia Swissôtel Merchant Court Hotel, Singapore www.futureartilleryasia.com/Event.asp x?id=494266 13-16 September DSEi - Defence and Security Equipment International ExCeL, London, UK www.dsei.co.uk 26-28 September Joint Simulation and Training America Square Conference Centre, London, UK www.jointsimulationandtraining.com 26-29 September Cyber Warfare Europe Berlin Marriott Hotel, Berlin, Germany www.cyberwarfare-europe.com 27-29 September Military Airlift The Royal Garden Hotel, London, UK www.milairlift.com

Boeing has been awarded a $189.2 million firm-fixed-price contract by the US Army Contracting Command to provide 16 AH64D Apache aircraft and related support. The AH-64 Apache Longbow is a twin-engine, four-blade attack helicopter equipped with a tail wheel-type landing gear arrangement and a tandem cockpit to accommodate a crew of two. The helicopter features open systems architecture and 26 advanced technology improvements, including level four unmanned aerial vehicle control for increased situational awareness.

TURKEY TO EXPORT ARMOURED VEHICLES TO IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN Turkey-based BMC is to export its Kirpi mine-resistant ambush-protected armoured vehicle to Iraq and Afghanistan. The combat-proven Kirpi, in use with the Turkish armed forces, is a 4x4 wheel configured vehicle that provides protection against ballistic threats. The vehicle is equipped with a 350 PS engine, a central tyre inflation system, an automatic fire suppression system and a run-flat system. BMC executive Nadi Posto?lu said that the company was also working on different versions of the vehicle with special focus on a smaller, multipurpose platform onto which different weapons systems could be integrated.

US ARMY AND LOCKHEED LAUNCH HALE-D

26-28 September Infantry Weapons 2011 Copthorne Tara Hotel London Kensington, London, UK www.infantryweaponsconf.com

26-28 October Military Radar 2011 Sheraton Park Lane, Piccadilly, London, UK www.militaryradarconf.com

INDIAN ARMY TO ORDER ADDITIONAL ARJUN MBTS The Indian Army is set to place orders for additional Arjun main battle tanks (MBTs) MkII version, P. Sivakumar, Director, Combat Vehicles Research and Development Establishment, has said. “We are definitely expecting more orders, at least a minimum of 248 tanks of the MkII version. The Ordnance Factory Board has been instructed by the Ministry of Defence to initiate action for the procurement of the MkII version,” he added.

The MkII version is currently undergoing critical summer trials, while winter trials are expected to take place later in the year. The tank will undergo testing for a further 40 technological improvements, including a new transmission control system and new fuel tanks. The order could be placed in late-2011 and production is expected to be performed at the Heavy Vehicles Factory in Chennai, India.

INDIAN ARMY TO FLIGHT-TEST AGNI MISSILES

4-5 October Soldier Modernisation India The Oberoi, New Delhi, India www.soldiermodindia.com 19-21 October Armoured Vehicles Asia Swissôtel Merchant Court, Singapore www.ArmouredVehiclesAsia.com

The Indian Defence Ministry will soon award a $10 billion contract for the supply of futuristic infantry combat vehicles (FICVs) for the Indian Army. Tata Motors, Mahindra & Mahindra (M&M), Ashok Leyland (ALL), Larsen & Toubro (L&T) and Bharat Forge have already submitted their bids for the contract.

The Ministry will shortlist two vendors and finalise the winning firms by the end of this month. The order to build 70 per cent of the vehicle will be awarded only to Indian firms, with options for technology tie-ups with foreign companies. The FICV is expected to be half-tracked and half-wheeled designed to move infantrymen to the battlefield to follow up after tanks and capture combat areas. The Indian Army requires 2,610 FICVs as the existing Sarath BMP-II combat vehicles will be phased out from 2017.

The US Army and Lockheed Martin have launched the first high-altitude longendurance-demonstrator (HALE-D) in Akron, Ohio, US. The aircraft could not reach its target altitude of 60,000 ft due to a technical problem and the flight was terminated at an altitude of approximately 32,000 ft. The HALE-D team demonstrated a number of key technologies critical to the development of unmanned airships. The HALE-D is an unmanned solar-powered lighter-than-air

The Indian Army will conduct flight tests of Agni I and Agni II in the next 45 days from the launching complex IV of the integrated test range (ITR) on Wheeler’s Island, off the Dhamra coast, Orissa, India. The 700 km range Agni I missile is planned to be tested in the third week of September, while the 2,000 km range Agni II will be tested in the last week of August. The tests have been aimed to determine the performance and effectiveness of the weapons in real time conditions and to allow military personnel to explore the capabilities of the weapon. The Strategic Forces Command (SFC) will launch the missiles with logistic support from the Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO).

Assistant Group Editor R. Chandrakanth Senior Technical Group Editor Lt General (Retd) Naresh Chand Contributing Editor Air Marshal (Retd) V.K. Bhatia Sr. Copy Editor & Correspondent Sucheta Das Mohapatra Contributors India General (Retd) V.P. Malik, Lt General (Retd) Vijay Oberoi, Lt General (Retd) R.S. Nagra, Lt General (Retd) S.R.R. Aiyengar, Air Marshal (Retd) Vinod Patney, Major General (Retd) Ashok Mehta, Major General (Retd) G.K. Nischol, Brigadier (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, Brigadier (Retd) S. Mishra, Rohit Sharma Chairman & Managing Director Jayant Baranwal Administration & Coordination Bharti Sharma, Survi Massey Senior Art Director Anoop Kamath Design Vimlesh Kumar Yadav, Sonu Singh Bisht Sales & Marketing Director Sales & Marketing: Neetu Dhulia Head Vertical Sales: Rajeev Chugh SP’s Website Sr. Web Developer: Shailendra P. Ashish Web Developer: Ugrashen Vishwakarma Published bimonthly by Jayant Baranwal on behalf of SP Guide Publications Pvt Ltd. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, photocopying, recording, electronic, or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publishers.

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