SP's Land Forces Dec 2012 - Jan 2013 by SP Guide Publications Pvt Ltd

See page 11

December 2012-January 2013

SP’s

Volume 9 No. 6

`100.00 (India-Based Buyer Only)

AN SP GUIDE

PUBLICATION

• I N D I A N A R M Y D AY S P E C I A L •

INDISPENSABLE

since 1965

www.spsmilitaryyearbook.com

T h e ONL Y j o u r n a l i n A s i a d e d i c a t e d t o L a n d F o r c e s

In This Issue

P's MYB Advert for NF & LF_Small.indd 1

ROUNDUP

www.spslandforces.net

18/10/12 4:07 PM

Page 6 Indian Army’s Saga of Devotion and Bravery Indian Army, as it moves through the first quarter of the 21st century, is likely to face four types of challenges and threats including traditional threats, contemporary challenges in the form of international terrorism, internal threats, and contingency threats. Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor Page 10 Defence Reforms: Managing National Security The first and foremost requirement for improving the management of national security is for the government to formulate a comprehensive National Security Strategy, including internal security. Brigadier (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal Page 11 Humvee Steers towards Right-hand Drive Markets

Message

Minister of Defence India

I am pleased to learn that SP Guide Publications is coming out with a special issue of SP’s Land Forces, coinciding with the commemoration of the Indian Army Day. Our 1.3 million strong Army has time and again lived up to its tradition of valour, heroism, sacrifice and fortitude. The men and women of this glorious organisation take pride in the spirit of bravery, comradeship and brotherhood, irrespective of caste, creed or religion. Our Army stands as a sentinel along the border, alert and ever-prepared to preserve the peace and protect and honour of the nation. I am sure that SP’s Land Forces will continue to come out with material that will motivate our Army personnel. I wish the SP Guide Publications the very best for the publication.

A.K. Antony

The Humvee, manufactured by AM General LLC, has served more than its purpose in many a war, being a tactical vehicle. R. Chandrakanth Page 12 Countering Land-based Threats The way forward to strengthen the homeland security scenario in India would require active management of the policy framework, regulations, process and fiscal environment to create an integrated and self-reliant homeland security apparatus by the government. Lt General (Retd) P.C. Katoch Page 14 The Civil-Military Friction In recent times, the Army is seen more in the secondary role than the primary one.

Message

Chief of the Army Staff India

I compliment SP Guide Publications for coming out with a special issue of SP’s Land Forces, coinciding with the Army Day 2013. The Indian Army today stands tall for its commitment, thorough professionalism and ever positive attitude. While the Army prides itself on its glorious history of achievements, it is nonetheless constantly evolving and training itself to meet tomorrow’s challenges. The Indian Army’s ethos continues to stay committed to pursuit of all round excellence in all spheres which has endowed it with timeless strength and values. I look forward to SP’s Land Forces highlighting more facets of the Indian Army in future and also wish SP Guide Publications success in all its ventures. “Jai Hind” Bikram Singh General

M.G. Devasahayam

TecKnow Learning from the US Experience Lt General (Retd) P.C. Katoch

15 16

Developing Directed Energy Weapons Lt General (Retd) P.C. Katoch

News in Brief

Special 33% discount on Annual Subscription for Serving Military Officials

>> Interview Page 2

Interview with Chief of Army Staff General Bikram Singh

Photograph: Anoop Kamath / SP Guide Pubns

Plus

“Capability enhancement of the armed forces is being progressed in a joint manner wherein the requisite capabilities required for the armed forces are being worked out by HQ IDS” 6/2012-13 SP’s Land Forces

>> Interview Photograph: Anoop Kamath / SP Guide Pubns

‘We are duty bound to ensure operational readiness to meet any contingency in the external/internal security domain’ General Bikram Singh took over as the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) on May 31, 2012. In an interview with SP’s Land Forces, the COAS shared his thoughts on many important issues, including his key focus areas, future threats and challenges, modernisation of the Army, proposal for a Mountain Strike Corps and jointmanship among the three services. SP’s Land Forces (SP’s): How does it feel to take over the Indian Army, the second largest Army in the world, with its formidable reputation in the battlefield? Chief of the Army Staff (COAS): I am elated and humbled on being bestowed with this responsibility. The Army and I will endeavour to live up to the expectations and the confidence which has been reposed by the nation. I assure the nation of dedication and professional focus and conduct from its Army.

www.spslandforces.net

SP’s: What are the key areas that you will focus on during your tenure as the COAS? COAS: I intend to focus on the following key areas:  Operational readiness to enable effective fulfilment of our constitutional obligations and assigned roles.  Force modernisation as per stipulated timelines, and address the existing “hollowness”.  Strengthen our work culture that hinges on professional ethos and uphold our cherished core values of integrity, loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service and honour.  Effective human resource management to ensure highest standards of motivation and morale.  Enhance security consciousness and strengthen our secular fabric and apolitical stature.  Enhance jointness with other services and strengthen our inter-agency relationships.  Ensure welfare of veterans, veer naris and widows. SP’s: What is your perception of the security challenges currently the nation is facing in general and the Indian Army in particular? What are the future challenges that we may have to confront? COAS: The present geopolitical environment in Asia and particularly in South Asia is dynamic. It poses security challenges to our Army across the entire spectrum of conflict, including both conventional and unconventional domains. These range from “traditional land-centric threats” along our borders to “asymmetric threats”, including proxy war and insurgency within our country. Also, rapid and exponential growth in

SP’s Land Forces 6/2012-13

the information and communication technologies, and cyber space, has created fresh technological challenges. Threats emanating from cyber domain have become an everyday reality. In the present milieu—threats are hybridised. There is a need to constantly review the challenges confronting the nation and the Army. The Indian Army is mindful of the conventional threats concurrent to the ongoing proxy war in Jammu and Kashmir and the Northeast. The Army is fully prepared, trained and is modernising to counter these security threats. The current and future challenges faced by the Indian Army mandate that we prepare for conventional conflict with concurrent engagement in sub-conventional conflicts. The new dimensions of threat include information and cyber space and militarisation of outer space. The hybrid nature of threats and challenges require induction of quality manpower with versatile skills. Therefore, requisite modernisation and capability enhancement is planned and is being undertaken to meet all challenges and contingencies. SP’s: Considering that China is India’s most formidable challenge in the future and in view of its close strategic ties with Pakistan, to what extent is the Indian Army prepared to confront this dual challenge? When we talk of a two-front capability, what exactly do we mean in terms of capability building? COAS: Indian Army’s primary mission is to secure the territorial integrity of the nation. In the ongoing force structuring and modernisation process, our focus is on development of various essential capabilities towards achieving the primary mission, without being “country” specific. SP’s: Please give us your views on the slow pace of modernisation. How does Army propose to fast-track modernisation? COAS: Modernisation is a complex and dynamic process impacted by operational changes, emerging technologies and budgetary support. Every defence plan earmarks a substantial component of its capital budget for modernisation. I am conscious of the fact that the Army’s modernisation plan has not progressed as desired. There have been slippages in capital procurement. Delays

and hindrances so far are attributable to inhouse organisational and procedural delays. The bottlenecks in the existing procurement procedure and lack of indigenous resource base remain major areas of concern. Modernisation is the priority and we will continue to focus on this issue. The Army has initiated specific measures to overcome the existing shortcomings in procurement activities. Currently, our focus in modernisation is on manoeuvre capability, precision firepower, air defence, rotary-wing combat support and lift capability, future infantry soldier as a system, network-centricity and achieving battlefield transparency through improved surveillance, night vision and target acquisition and infrastructure development. The process of modernisation cannot also be complete without India acquiring indigenous capability. The role of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) in this regard is paramount. We need to develop a research and development base which is comparable to the best in the world. Adequate initiatives are being taken by the government, as spelt out in the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) 2011, to encourage the private industry in the country to undertake research, development and production of weapons and equipment. Major progress has been made in removing the bottlenecks and optimising the acquisition process. The Indian Army will definitely see a distinct upgrade in its equipment profile in the near future.

Our focus is on manoeuvre capability, precision firepower, air defence, rotary-wing combat support and lift capability, future infantry soldier as a system, networkcentricity and battlefield transparency

SP’s: The Finance Ministry had returned Army’s proposal for a dedicated Mountain Strike Corps for the Northeast for a tri-services proposal. Do you think this move will delay the entire proposal for raising Mountain Strike Corps for the Northeast? COAS: Based on the threat perception, the Indian Army has identified its defence requirements and formulated its long-term perspective plan for development of capabilities and force structures. The progress on capability development is reviewed periodically. Focus of the Indian Army over the last five years has been to progressively increase our capabilities through enhancement of force levels, upgradation of technology, induction of force-multipliers as also modernisation and improvement of infrastructure. Raising of two Infantry Divisions sanctioned in the Eleventh Five Year Plan by the government has been completed and they are operationally effective. Based on anticipated threats and challenges, need for new capabilities and modernisation requirements, the accretion of a Corps sized force is considered necessary. The proposal is being vetted and validated. There have been some queries, which are being examined by us. The proposal will be resubmitted for early consideration and approval. We are confident that our needs commensurate to the security challenges will be met. SP’s: What are the changes in the nature of warfare which directly impact the mode of functioning of the soldiers in the future and how are we catering to this change? COAS: The nature of warfare is changing and evolving rapidly. Wars/conflicts of today have become increasingly fast paced and violent in nature. The distinction between conventional operations, proxy war and unconventional means is becoming increasingly blurred manifesting in the hybrid nature of warfare. There is an increased use of precision munitions at ever increasing ranges, blurring of the distinction between day and night and increased fatigue due to the nonlinearity and incessant pace of operations. Added to this is the ever increasing technological threshold to optimally operate sophisticated weapon systems in the business Continued on pages 4 & 5

E D I T O R I A L

>> Interview At the start of New Year 2013, it must be admitted with certain gloom that the present government has been rather sluggish in preparing the military to tackle 21 century threats and challenges. The Indian Army has been the worst sufferer in this respect. Its modernisation and transformation as a combat ready force for future conflict scenarios is a dismal story. Some of the pertinent issues include: Security Parameters: India has exceptional security parameters including 15,000 km of land borders, out of which about 7,000 km is the border with Pakistan and China, with whom India has major territorial disputes; 7,516 km of coastline and about 2.1 million square kilometres of exclusive economic zone (EEZ). India has more than 600 islands, which include the Andaman and Nicobar group in the Bay of Bengal and the Lakshadweep Islands in the Arabian Sea. The defence perimeter encompasses some of the most difficult and treacherous terrain, comprising glacial regions, high mountain ranges, jungles, riverine terrain, sandy deserts and swamps. Current Status: The Indian Army is organised, equipped and trained for third generation industrial age, low- and medium-level technology, and conventional conflicts. Some surveillance devices have been introduced and other information age capabilities will be introduced in the next few years. Our traditional methods of warfighting favour deliberate set piece military operations against fixed defences and hence our offensive operations are attrition-oriented and tactically-biased. These need to be changed in favour of manoeuvre and long-range firepower both in the plains and in the mountains, which implies much closer integration of the Army and the Indian Air Force to ensure that this capability can be put into motion at short notice. India has been fighting ongoing insurgencies in Jammu and Kashmir and in the Northeast due to varied reasons. There are no easy solutions and these are likely to continue. The Challenges: The Indian military planners feel that the collusion between China and Pakistan, which is so clearly evident in peacetime, is likely to translate itself into active, mutually supporting military operations during conflict situations, which in Indian context would imply active

operations on two widely separated theatres of war, namely the Western theatre (against Pakistan) and the Northern/North-eastern (against China) in the future. If we add to this the Army’s commitment to fight insurgencies at the same time, it would amount to building a two-and-a-half (2.5) fronts capability for the Indian Army. Can India re-engineer its existing forces to acquire this capability in the backdrop of the technological developments that have taken place or are currently taking place, or would accretions in force levels be necessary? This is a dilemma and a challenge. We can add “nuclear backdrop”, missile proliferation in our region, cyber and space warfare to the above challenges, and realise that the Army has to be prepared for the full spectrum of threats and challenges. Thus the capability required will have to be carefully crafted to remain affordable. Leadership: The Army has an excellent record of junior leadership but the higher leadership needs to introspect. The command style is generally authoritative and dominating, which prevents intellectual growth of junior and middle level leadership and encourages sycophancy, resulting in mediocrity being pushed up, in some measure, to senior ranks. Therefore, adoption of the “Directive Style of Command” to face the future wars will require a change of culture within the Army, which is not going to be easy without resorting to a wide-range of reforms within the Service and by adopting new training methodologies. Building Capability: The former Chief of Army Staff, General V.K. Singh’s leaked letter to the Prime Minister on March 12, 2012, revealed the hollowness existing in the Army. As per media reports, the former Army Chief pointed out the security risk to the nation in view of the shortages in tank and other types of ammunition, ill-equipped Special Forces personnel, deficiencies of nightfighting equipment, obsolete air defence systems in the Army, deficiency of critical weapons in the infantry, obsolete artillery equipment and Army Aviation helicopters, among other deficiencies. It needs to be borne in mind that the size of our Army and the extent of our requirements preclude a quick recovery. Hence capacity and capability building in the defence sector which is a systematic and gradual process, mandates that our political leaders along with the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) have to show

decisiveness and resilience. We cannot allow voids in weapons, equipment and munitions to build up year after year. If this happens, as it has happened in the case of the Indian Army, it will seriously erode and impact the combat capability of the force, which will in the ultimate analysis impact adversely on the morale of the officers and the men because they would feel that the government is not serious about national security. Government’s Response: Consequent to the leakage of the Army Chief’s letter in March 2012 and the resultant uproar in the Parliament, it seems that the government has finally decided to move faster so as to make up for the lost time. However, with the onset of the new year 2013, the news is that the government has decided to slash `10,000 crore from the defence budget. This will be a further setback to the modernisation plans of the defence services. Army will be the worst affected because its modernisation is already lagging behind by a decade of neglect, faulty decisions and bureaucratic delays. The government while managing the fiscal crises will create crises in its defence preparedness. It may be mentioned that the armed forces sought a defence outlay of `2,39,000 crore this fiscal, but was allocated `1,93,000 crore and the Defence Minister A.K. Antony had stated in the Parliament that he would seek a hike in 2012-13 budget against the backdrop of a China-Pakistan nexus. We need divine intervention to save us in the future. Current Issue: This issue coincides with the Army Day on January 15, 2013. Our earnest wishes to the Indian Army for success and glory in every endeavour they undertake. We have included the interview of the COAS and a wide variety of articles, including a brief history of the Indian Army, defence reforms, homeland security, civil-military relations, directed energy weapons, special vehicles including Humvee among others. Happy Reading and a Very Happy New Year.

Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

‘We are duty bound to ensure operational... continued from page 2

www.spslandforces.net

of war-waging. Human rights issues and the omnipresent media have increasingly brought the realms of warfare into the living rooms of the populace and have impacted the nature of war-fighting profoundly. Not only are we inducting new technologies to deal with the ever changing situation, but also our methodology of war-fighting is evolving constantly, in furtherance of war aims. Concurrently, human resource development is being given a renewed focus to facilitate induction of quality manpower to support a technologically oriented Army. Imparting realistic training for all existing and emerging contingencies to prepare our troops for the future battlefield environment is an area that we are constantly addressing. We are also consciously working towards preparing our military leadership to acquire skills to be able to respond dynamically to the changing security paradigm. SP’s: Military analysts say that in future operations, size of the force will be less important than ‘precision’ and ‘information’, highlighting the time factor as the critical issue. What are the changes being contemplated to restructure or re-equip the Indian Army for these new attributes, including technological upgradation? COAS: Keeping in view our unresolved territorial borders, the requirement of suitably

SP’s Land Forces 6/2012-13

accoutred and equipped troops with modern surveillance means to maintain our territorial integrity along inhospitable and treacherous terrain will remain. However, future operations would require troops who are technology savvy and are able to achieve the desired results by exploiting high-end equipment and weapon systems to their advantage. Precision and information, once fully incorporated into our systems, will enhance our command control intelligence surveillance reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities and shorten the observe, orient, decide and act (OODA) cycle. The aim is to progressively evolve and develop requisite capabilities so that we have

The internal security situation in J&K has shown improvement. This has been possible due to the persistent proactive counter-terrorist strategy adopted by the security forces.

a more lethal, agile and networked force that is prepared to meet the complex security challenges of the future. The Indian Army has been pursuing modernisation schemes that cater for the intricate dynamics of a changing battlefield milieu. The impetus is being given to enhancing our critical capabilities. Our thrust areas include battlefield transparency, night-fighting capability, enhanced firepower, integrated manoeuvre capability, network-centricity and development of critical infrastructure, while also making up the existing voids. Territorial sanctity against external threat is the primary responsibility of the Army. Mountainous terrain requires ‘boots on grounds’, because in these areas, the terrain is tough, communication is tedious and infrastructure development is slow. Therefore, the terrain mandates the correct size of force to dominate it. There is a need to have physical dominance to affect tactical success in such areas. It is imperative to have the ability to move troops to the areas by helicopters/other means. SP’s: What are your views on Army being asked to undertake anti-Naxal operations? COAS: Security situation in left-wing extremism (LWE)-affected states is in the law and order domain and devoid of any secessionist contours. Counter Maoist operations which are currently being coordinated by

the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) must continue to be managed through optimal employment of state police forces and Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF). Enhancing the capacity of CAPF and state police forces requires a committed effort, wherein the Army will continue to provide all possible support in advisory capacity and in providing training to the state police/CAPFs. The primary focus is on training of CAPF units being inducted into LWEaffected areas. As a part of capability development of CAPFs, till date, 72,500 persons have been trained. CAPF officers are attached with the Infantry/Rashtriya Rifles units in Jammu and Kashmir and Northeast for hands-on experience and combat leadership in the conduct of counter-terrorism (CT) operations. SP’s: During your visit to Jammu and Kashmir, what are the changes that you noticed in the environment and how should the Army react to these changes? COAS: The internal security situation in Jammu and Kashmir has shown improvement. This has been possible due to the persistent proactive counter-terrorist strategy adopted by the security forces which has resulted in effective neutralisation of a large number of terrorists and their leaders. The Apex Security Mechanism in the state is functioning effectively, which has

Interview >>

NI G HT V I S I O N

See All Ways

Green NV

ONYX

l Black & White Image ONYX Night Vision l Proven to be more natural to the human eye l Sharper contrast and improved depth-perception l Auto-Gating option for dynamic light conditions l XD-4

ToT with BELOP (BEL)

manifested in desired synergy amongst the security forces and various stakeholders. Consequently, this has provided a meaningful environment for inclusive growth in the state. The focus is on people-friendly and surgical operations. Our intelligencebased surgical operations must, therefore, continue against the residual strength of approximately 400-plus terrorists, while scrupulously upholding the law of the land and respect for human rights. The terrorist threat remains real and the terrorist infrastructure across the borders continues to be active. We need to remain vigilant towards these threats and cannot afford to let the situation go out of hand at this stage. It has improved due to sacrifices and efforts of the security forces. The Army requires all enablers to be intact; and the situation is still not ripe to experiment. SP’s: What is your vision for the Indian Army vis-à-vis the emerging regional power status of India? What should be done in broad terms to enable the Indian Army to match the aspirations of the nation? COAS: We need to remain ready and relevant to the national aspirations, and therefore within the framework of our national policy, the Indian Army will gear itself up for accomplishing all tasks mandated to us by the government. The nation has always reposed full faith in the Army while on its part the Army has always and will always live up to the expectations. We are duty bound to ensure operational readiness to meet any contingency in the external/internal security domain.

Operational readiness and relevance of Indian Army to take on any challenge will always be ensured. SP’s: What is the progress of Indian Army in the areas of cyber and electronic warfare? COAS: Electronic warfare (EW) is a potent tool for prosecution of information warfare and commanders at all levels, in future conflicts, would attempt to dominate the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum for locating, monitoring, disrupting/denying the enemy’s electronic systems that support military operations. Indian Army has made rapid strides in developing its information warfare structure, prominent amongst these is the synergised development of cyber and electronic warfare. An effective cyber defensive capability is being developed to dissuade and deter any cyber threats. Augmentation of specialist manpower is being undertaken on fast-track basis and is being given impetus at the highest level. We are modernising our EW capability with latest cutting-edge technologies and procuring EW systems as per a well thought out long-term plan. Raising of EW organisations is also on the anvil, especially to counter the threats. SP’s: Despite there being a well-established system of selection/promotion in the Army, why do so many officers feel aggrieved in the system? Does this issue need a detailed re-examination? COAS: We are aware of this issue. The system is very fair; efforts are on to make the system more transparent. Review is being

Learn more about our products on: http://www.photonis.com/ SPLF113.html

undertaken to meet the aspirations of the officers. Senior ranks in the Army constitute only three per cent of the total number of officers. Aspiration levels of officers have also risen in keeping with societal norms. However, unlike other organisations where pyramids are less steep, prospects for higher promotions remain comparatively restricted. The perception of arbitrariness or subjectivity in the selection process has been addressed to a large extent through implementation of the quantified system for selection. However, I am convinced that we need enduring policies and as such have already ordered an examination of the current system to ensure that we provide a level-playing field to all our officers. SP’s: What are your views with regard to the appointment of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)? In the absence of a CDS, what are your views on the utility of the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) in the Indian context? COAS: Today, more than ever before, it is an operational imperative to synergise and strengthen the capabilities of all the three Services for joint war-fighting. The appointment of a CDS would help synergise integrated forces structuring, training and logistic support functions of the tri-services institutions. HQ IDS and the Services’ HQ have been jointly developing various joint war-fighting doctrines and concepts. Efforts are also under way to further optimise the training and logistics resources of the three services. Creation of the tri-services Strategic Forces Command (SFC) and Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) has demonstrated

the capability and efficacy for integrated operational planning and execution. However, these are only a few steps, albeit important ones, in the right direction and a good evolutionary base has now been created to further move towards achieving true triservice synergy. It is a long process, but we are surely moving forward in that direction. SP’s: Joint and integrated operations have been weak in the Indian armed forces. Has this issue been resolved satisfactorily between the three services? How can this be improved upon in the future? COAS: Integration of the three services into a fully joint force is evolutionary in nature. The services have made significant progress towards achieving ‘jointness’ in various operational, training and administrative fields. Structures for joint intelligence, planning and conduct of operations at the highest level are already in place and joint doctrines have been formulated. We have made considerable progress and are confident of undertaking integrated operations in future. Capability enhancement of the armed forces is being progressed in a joint manner wherein the requisite capabilities required for the armed forces are being worked out by HQ Integrated Defence Staff in consultation with all the three services. The smooth and efficient functioning of the various triservices organisations amply explains that we have set ourselves in the right direction. The three services are constantly working at all levels to enhance the integration and our capability for executing joint operations with precision. SP

6/2012-13 SP’s Land Forces

>> Military History

Indian Army’s Saga of Devotion and Bravery Indian Army, as it moves through the first quarter of the 21st century, is likely to face four types of challenges and threats including traditional threats, contemporary challenges in the form of international terrorism, internal threats, and contingency threats. Defence of a nation and development are complementary. If India aspires to be a regional/global economic power, its military power must reflect that desire through its ability to protect its interests. Photograph: SPSC

Arjun main battle tank in action during Exercise Sudarshan Shakti

 Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

www.spslandforces.net

he early military history of India dates back thousands of years. From the ancient period through to the 19th century, a succession of powerful dynasties rose and fell in India as smaller rulers also struggled for power through war. Thus the early military history of India is a history of princely kingdoms constantly at war with each other and this motivated their thinking with the resultant lack of unity against foreign invaders. The British colonised India during the 19th century. The Indian saga of battles against all invaders including the British is full of tactical level battles of personal bravery of kings and princes which lacked strategic level thinking and planning. From the lesson of these wars it also becomes clear that the military leaders of India’s princely kingdoms did not understand the importance of battlefield mobility and the need to evolve new concepts and to have new weapons synchronised into a new art of warfare to confront more skilful opponents. The British era of the Indian Army lasted for about 200 years. Major Stringer Lawrence was the first Army officer appointed Commander-in-Chief of all the East India Company’s forces in 1752. He can thus be deemed as the Father of the Indian Army. The forces then comprised Europeans recruited from England or locally and Indian auxiliaries. These Indians were armed with their own weapons, wore their own dress and were commanded by their own officers.

SP’s Land Forces 6/2012-13

After the reorganisation in 1796, the major changes were: increase in the number of British officers in Indian units and consequent diminishing of the importance and responsibility of Indian officers (subedars and jemadars); artillery units were created with European gunners and Indian helpers (lascars and syces); infantry battalions were grouped into regiments with each regiment having two battalion; Indian Cavalry was formed into a cavalry brigade and declared a distinct service. The events of 1857 are too well-known to be recounted in any detail in this brief focus on the Indian Army. Following the First War of Independence in 1857 (called the Indian Mutiny by the British Government), the British Queen issued a proclamation in 1858, taking over the Government of India from the East India Company. A Royal Commission appointed in July 1858 suggested that the Army in India be composed mainly of Indian troops with a proportion of Indian to British being 2:1. By 1863, the actual numbers were 3,15,500 Indian and 38,000 British troops. Step by step the three Presidency Armies were amalgamated which was completed by 1895. With the overall control of the Indian Empire being vested in the Crown, the imperial strategy for the defence of India envisaged a wide cordon sanitaire to give depth to this jewel in the crown. Afghanistan, Tibet and Burma were the immediate buffers, while the global dominance of the British Navy of the time allowed them even further outposts like Hong Kong, Singapore, Aden and Cyprus in the Mediterranean Sea. Pax

Britannica was at its zenith and the core was centred on India.

The Era of the World Wars The final shape and professional restructuring of the Indian Army was carried out prior to World War I under General Kitchener, the Commander-in-Chief in India from 1902. During this period, due to a clash, between him and Viceroy George Curzon, over the perceived organisational duality of control of the military in India, Curzon resigned. The issue has had a significantly negative effect on the higher defence control mechanism that evolved after independence, which leaves the service chiefs outside the governmental decision-making forums. Till date this aspect remains an Indian weakness. In World War I, more than one million Indian soldiers served overseas. The Army expanded from 2,39,511 in 1914 to 14,40,428 personnel by 1919. While there were no commissioned Indian officers in the Army, the Indian Army fought in all major theatres including France Gallipoli, Mesopotamia, Egypt and Palestine. The period between World War I and World War II, the 20 years separating the two wars saw the emergence of the Indian officer Corps and the first batch was commissioned on December 1919, when 33 Indian cadets were granted Kings Commission with effect from July 17, 1920. Field Marshal Kodandera Madappa Cariappa was a member of the first batch. The British made an effort to ensure that no British officer would ever have to serve under any

Indian. However, the rapid expansion in World War I put paid to this scheme and by the end of the war there were a number of units where British officers and troops were serving under Indian officers. When Poland was attacked by Germany on September 1, 1939, Britain declared war against Germany on September 3, 1939. The Viceroy declared India at war on the same day. The World War II had started. Congress governments in power in eight provinces resigned as they had not been consulted at all and declared that they would not cooperate with the government. This was not due to any love for Nazi Germany but as a matter of principle. At the start of World War II, the Indian Army had a strength of 1,94,373 personnel which was a little more than the strength available at the start of World War I. The Army had 96 infantry battalions and 18 cavalry regiments. The cavalry had no tanks and was mounted on trucks. The infantry had no mortars or anti-tank weapons. Radio equipment was available at Brigade level and above. The modernisation planned in 1938 had yet to start. Indian Army was not intended to fight overseas but only protect India’s borders and nearby areas. However, before the war ended, the Indian Army had expanded to a strength of over 20,00,000 men and engaged in operations stretching from Hong Kong to Italy. In the re-conquest of Burma, it provided the bulk of forces and played important roles in the campaigns in North Africa and Italy. About 63,000 awards were received by the Indian Army in World War II. Awards for gallantry alone totalled approximately 4,800. They included 31 Victoria Crosses, four George Crosses, 252 Distinguished Service Orders, 347 Indian Orders of Merit and 1,311 Military Crosses.

Independence and Partition Among the factors that led to independence, a major factor was the formation of Indian National Army (INA) by the Indian prisoners of war. Nearly 20,000 officers and men joined the INA. The British were stunned at the defection of officers. They realised that they could not rely on the Indian Army to put down a movement for Independence. This was reinforced by the mutinies in the Royal Indian Air Force in January 1946 and an even more widespread one in February 1946, in the Royal Indian Navy. It was acknowledged that India could not be held by force of arms and this was a major factor in the British decision to grant independence. Great Britain, fearing a revolution, decided to quit India on February 20, 1947. His Majesty’s Government announced its intension to transfer power to Indians. Lord Francis Albert Victor Nicholas Mountbatten replaced Lord Wavell as the Viceroy. Based on the views of two main political parties, the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League, it was decided to Partition India into the Dominions of India and Pakistan on August 15, 1947. No planning had been done to work out the administrative consequences of the Partition and its

Military History

Recognizing threats is our instinct

Empowering your mission is our speciality

Photo credits: Aspheri, D. Benson/Masterfile, Y. Debay -

01 41 37 96 70

Your adversary is fierce. But so is your determination. Which is why we created Caesar®, a new-generation artillery system that delivers the performance, precision and simplicity you need to succeed. With its 6x6 chassis and unique 52-caliber cannon, you’ll experience unparalleled tactical and strategic mobility. You’ll also benefit from enhanced firepower through quicker response, longer range and improved accuracy. Caesar ® is fully autonomous and easy to operate. It supports all types of motorised, mechanised and armoured units, including rapid-deployment forces. Whatever the battlefront or conflict level, Caesar® is a great partner to have on your side.

Nexter Systems www.nexter-group.fr

allied problems of law and order and many other vital issues such as the boundary alignment, division of armed forces and defence assets, economic assets, status of princely states and numerous other aspects of Partition which had to be resolved under a frenetic timetable. An Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee under Field Marshal Auchinleck was set to divide the units and stores in the ratio of two to one between India and Pakistan respectively. Muslims from India and nonMuslims from Pakistan could elect which dominion they would serve. The tragedy of Partition is a story which deserves separate coverage. The misery of Partition and Punjab migration could have been lessened had Mountbatten been a wiser man and not rushed independence and delayed the announcement of the boundary award. Out of about 14 million people involved in migration, it is estimated that more than half a million died in the violence that erupted on both sides. The strain on the troops of the old Indian Army with the emotional stress of communal differences, personal tragedies and daily exposure to heart-rending scenes of murders, rapes and other brutalities, brought their discipline to a breaking point but its hard crust did not break. It was the greatest test of the Indian Army which it passed with flying colours under the most adverse circumstances.

Operation Gulmarg Operation Gulmarg, which was a deliberately planned operation by Pakistan, aimed at the annexation of Jammu and Kash-

mir (J&K). According to its leader Colonel Akbar Khan of Pakistan Army, its planning was done in August 1947. Indian Army’s operations in Jammu and Kashmir and the achievement of the Indian Army under its own officers despite logistics constraints, daunting terrain and severity of climate is a proud tribute to its leadership, fighting spirit and patriotic fervour of all ranks. They undertook a task allotted to them as a sacred mission to be fulfilled whatever the cost.

Post-Independent Indian Army The strength of the Indian Army in August 1947 was 4,00,000 but the political leadership was keen to reduce the strength to save defence expenditure and hence it was decided to bring down the strength of the Army to 2,00,000 after the J&K Operations which would involve the disbandment of many units. A new Territorial Army Act was passed in 1948 and infantry and artillery units with a nucleus of regular officers were raised in 1949. Many other changes occurred during the period 1948-60. The designation of Commander-in-Chief ceased to be in use from 1955 and the three Chiefs (Army, Navy and the Air Force) were made equal and independently responsible for their respective service. Every function of the defence services was duplicated in the Ministry of Defence where civilian bureaucrats not only ensured financial and administrative control but also gradually took over the decision-making powers of the defence services. One of the first steps after Independence was the introduction of a new pay code for Indian Commissioned Officers

(ICOs) and a reduced warrant of precedence to downgrade the status of defence services officers. The standing of the military reached an all-time low during the time of Krishna Menon as Defence Minister when decisions concerning matters of major military importance were taken without consultation of the concerned service. Nehru’s bias against the military was well known in the services. The clearest example of this is when Cariappa outlined his plan for the security of North-East Fron-

The transformation of the Indian military for the future, through technological improvements coupled with innovative operational art will give India a distinct advantage over its potential adversaries, which is vital for preserving India’s sovereignty and furthering its national interests

tier Agency (NEFA), after China had occupied Tibet, Nehru flared up and thumping the table said, “It is not the business of the C-inC to tell the Prime Minister who is going to attack us where. You mind only Kashmir and Pakistan.” Nehru continued to appease the Chinese and the untimely death of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel took away all opposition to Nehru’s views. The Sino-Indian War of 1962 and the national humiliation was the result of this policy and the bias against the military. Politicisation of the officer class led to the appointment of General P.N. Thapar as the Chief of the Army Staff (COAS) in May 1961 and Lt General B.N. Kaul as the Chief of General Staff (equivalent to the current Vice Chief of Army Staff). This team was suspect in the eyes of the officer corps who resented political appointees and questioned their professional calibre and bona fides.

The Period 1961 to 1971 The period 1961-71 was one of the most traumatic periods of the Indian Army. The defeat in 1962 shook the foundation of the nation and the armed forces. The Army began to introspect to overcome its weaknesses. The 1965 War helped the Army to redeem itself but revealed embarrassing weaknesses in its equipment and its training and even leadership at various levels. These two wars spurred the political leadership to modernise and expand the services. As 1970 came to a close, the Indian Army was now ready to face new challenges emerging on the horizon. The 1971 War resulted in creation of a new nation, Bangladesh, and a decisive

6/2012-13 SP’s Land Forces

>> Military History It is encouraging to note that India’s security concerns have, for the first time, converged with international security concerns which makes global community understand the need for India to develop and modernise its military capabilities

Photograph: Wikipedia, US Army

in starting from May 3, 1999, it became clear that armed intruders had occupied heights in the gaps between all defended areas in the sector. It became apparent that India was facing an attempt by Pakistan to change the LoC using its regular troops. The complacency of the local army formations in not conducting even routine surveillance in the winter months, stood out. Having been surprised, the initial reactions were unsatisfactory, leading to poorly planned patrols and attacks. While these did fix the enemy, success came their way only when the whole act was put together. Air and artillery (155mm howitzers) was employed with devastating effect to allow the Indian soldier, the infantryman, to live up to his reputation of fortitude under adversity and courage, and determination in the attack.

Indian Army’s T-90 Bhishma tanks take part in a military training exercise in the Thar Desert, Rajasthan. The tanks have two different turret armour arrays

Operation Parakram Operation Parakram, which means “valour”, was a momentous event which could have unleashed a major war on the subcontinent. It involved a massive build-up that Indian Army ordered in the wake of the December 13, 2001, terrorist attack on the Parliament House. This 10-month-long mobilisation from January-October 2002 along the border with Pakistan generated high levels of tensions in the relations between the two South Asian neighbours and raised the prospects of a major war. The operation was a major effort in coercive diplomacy by New Delhi in the wake of the terrorist attacks on the Indian Parliament and while the government claims that their strategic objectives were met by mere posturing which avoided a war, military analysts are of the view that gains were not commensurate to the mammoth exercise in coercive diplomacy by India.

military victory in which 93,000 prisoners of war were taken. While many books have been written to describe each battle in detail, it is the spirit of the soldiery during this campaign that deserves mention. Sydney Schanberg of the New York Times, who accompanied Indian troops in two sectors, said, “I don’t like sitting around praising armies. I don’t like armies because armies mean wars—and I don’t like wars. But this [the Indian] army was something…They were great all the way. There was never a black mark…I lived with the officers and I walked, rode with the jawans—and they were all great. Sure some of them were scared at first—they couldn’t be human if they weren’t. But I never saw a man flinch because he was scared. There is a tremendous spirit [in the Indian Army] and it did one good to experience it…And they were the most perfect gentlemen. I have never seen them do a wrong thing not even when they just saw how bestial the ‘enemy had been’.” The formation commanders of the Eastern Command employed the tenets of ‘Operational Art’ by containing strongholds of the enemy and bypassing them to reach the enemy defences in depth, thus ensuring surprise, psychological dominance and initiative, thereby maintaining speed and momentum of operation.

Counterinsurgency Operations The Indian Army has been involved in counterinsurgency (CI) operations almost continuously since Independence. Army formations have been active in CI operations in the Northeast since the 1950s and in Jammu and Kashmir since the early 1990s. This experience has been good for our young officers, junior leaders and the soldiery. However, the involvement of the armed forces directly or indirectly in CI duties tends to take them away from preparing for their primary role—that of defending the nation. Perhaps it is this realisation that led the Army leadership to finalise the study on the transformation of the Indian Army for future wars and to prepare the Army for all types of conflicts in the entire spectrum of war.

www.spslandforces.net

The Period from 1971 to 1998 The period after 1971 War saw the steady modernisation of the Indian Army with new equipment for modern wars. The Experts Committee under the Chairmanship of Lt General K.V. Krishna Rao submitted its report in 1976. Some of its major recommendations started getting implemented in the 1980s. The expansion of mechanised forces was achieved as a result of this report. On April 13, 1984, 34 soldiers of the Indian Army were landed by 17 sorties of helicopters at a point, three kilometres short of Bilafond La, a pass on the Soltaro ridge, West of Siachen glacier. The soldiers occupied the pass. This was the opening move in what is referred to as the Siachen conflict between India and Pakistan which continues till date. The period July 1987-March 1990 saw the Indian Army fight separatist Tamil militants in Sri Lanka with one hand tied behind their back. The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) moved to Sri Lanka to carry out peacekeeping duties as generally assigned during the UN operations and to separate the warring factions i.e. LTTE and Sri Lankan armed forces but ended up enforcing peace and conducting military operations against LTTE. What the Indian Army achieved is best described in the words of Rajan Wijeratrie, at one time the State Minister of Defence in Sri Lankan Government. He is reported to have said, “The IPKF had virtually finished them off. They were gasping for breath in the jungles. It was we who provided that oxygen to them.”

SP’s Land Forces 6/2012-13

The Way Ahead

Indian Army soldier during an exercise

This summed up what IPKF had achieved before de-induction. During the 1980s, the Indian Army also conducted the operation in Maldives to prevent mercenaries from overthrowing the Government of Maldives and while it did not involve much fighting, it demonstrated to the world the speed and efficiency with which the Indian armed forces could react. This period (1989 onwards) also saw the start of the terrorism and insurgency in Kashmir and deployment of additional troops in J&K.

Kargil War (May-July 1999) Kargil Sector is 168-km along the line of control (LoC) stretching from Kaobal Gali in the west to Chorbat La in the east. The sector was vast with the line of control runs along the watershed along heights 4,000-5,000 metres high. The frontage and the nature of terrain ensured large gaps between defended areas. The deployment included one infantry battalion at Dras; two infantry battalions and a BSF battalion covering Kargil and Chorbat La was held by Ladakh Scouts. As indications of Pakistani intrusion came

The Indian Army as it moves through the first quarter of the 21st century is likely to face four types of challenges and threats including traditional threats, contemporary challenges in the form of international terrorism, internal threats and contingency threats. In essence, India faces a far greater threat than any other country in the world because of a highly volatile strategic neighbourhood. Moreover, with India’s vibrant economic growth, it would naturally have to assume additional responsibility as a stabilising force in the region. It is encouraging to note that India’s security concerns have, for the first time, converged with international security concerns which makes global community understand the need for India to develop and modernise its military capabilities. Defence of a nation and development are complementary. If India aspires to be a regional/global economic power, its military power must reflect that desire through its ability to protect its interests. In this context, the transformation of the Indian military for the future, through technological improvements coupled with innovative operational art will give India a distinct advantage over its potential adversaries, which is vital for preserving India’s sovereignty and furthering its national interests. SP

6/2012-13 SP’s Land Forces

>> Strategy

Defence Reforms: Managing National Security The first and foremost requirement for improving the management of national security is for the government to formulate a comprehensive National Security Strategy (NSS), including internal security. The NSS should be formulated after carrying out an inter-departmental, inter-agency, multi-disciplinary strategic defence review. Photograph: SP Guide Pubns

 Brigadier (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal

ndia faces complex external and internal security threats and new challenges are emerging on the horizon. Unresolved territorial disputes with China and Pakistan, insurgencies in Jammu and Kashmir and the North-eastern states, the rising tide of left-wing extremism (LWE) and the growing spectre of urban terrorism have vitiated India’s security environment and slowed down socio-economic growth. Yet, as the recent serial blasts at Mumbai have once again indicated, India’s national security continues to be sub-optimally managed. Strategic reviews need to be undertaken periodically to evolve a comprehensive national security strategy.

www.spslandforces.net

Post-Kargil Reforms In 1999, the Kargil Review Committee headed by international strategic affairs analysts late K. Subrahmanyam had been asked to “review the events leading up to the Pakistani aggression in the Kargil District of Ladakh in Jammu and Kashmir; and to recommend such measures as are considered necessary to safeguard national security against such armed intrusions.” Though it had been given a very narrow and limited charter, the committee looked holistically at the threats and challenges and examined the loopholes in the management of national security. The committee was of the view that the “political, bureaucratic, military and intelligence establishments appear to have developed a vested interest in the status quo.’’ It made farreaching recommendations on the development of India’s nuclear deterrence, higher defence organisations, intelligence reforms, border management, the defence budget, the use of air power, counterinsurgency operations, integrated manpower policy, defence research and development, and media relations. The committee’s report was tabled in Parliament on February 23, 2000. The Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) appointed a Group of Ministers (GoM) to study the Kargil Review Committee report and recommend measures for implementation. The GoM was headed by Home Minister L.K. Advani, and in turn, set up four task forces on intelligence reforms, internal security, border management and defence management to undertake in depth analysis of various facets of the management of national security. The GoM recommended sweeping reforms to the existing national security management system. On May 11, 2001, the CCS accepted all its recommendations, including one for the establishment of the post of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), which has still not been implemented. A Tri-Service Andaman and Nicobar Command and a Strategic Forces Command were established. Other salient measures included the establishment of HQ Integrated Defence Staff (IDS); the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA); the establishment of a Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) headed by the Defence Minister with two wings: the Defence Procurement Board and the Defence Technology Board; and the setting up of the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO). The CCS also issued a directive that India’s

SP’s Land Forces 6/2012-13

T-90 battle tank

borders with different countries be managed by a single agency—“one border, one force”—and nominated the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) as India’s primary force for counterinsurgency operations.

National Security Strategy Ten years later, many lacunae still remain in the management of national security. The lack of inter-ministerial and inter-departmental coordination on issues like border management and centre-state disagreements over the handling of internal security are particularly alarming. In order to review the progress of implementation of the proposals approved by the CCS in 2001, the government appointed a Task Force on National Security led by former Cabinet Secretary Naresh Chandra. The Task Force has submitted its report. The first and foremost requirement for improving the management of national security is for the government to formulate a comprehensive National Security Strategy (NSS), including internal security. The NSS should be formulated after carrying out an inter-departmental, inter-agency, multidisciplinary strategic defence review. Such a review must take the public into confidence and not be conducted behind closed doors. Like in most other democracies, the NSS should be signed by the Prime Minister, who is the head of government, and must be placed on the table of Parliament and released as a public document. Only then will various stakeholders be compelled to take ownership of the strategy and work unitedly to achieve its aims and objectives. It has clearly emerged that China poses the most potent military threat to India and given the nuclear, missile and military hardware nexus between China and Pakistan, future conventional conflict in Southern Asia will be a two-front war. Therefore, India’s military strategy of dissuasion against China must be gradually upgraded to deterrence. Genuine deterrence comes only from the capability to launch and sustain major offensive operations into the adversary’s territory. India needs to raise new divisions to carry the next war deep into Tibet. Since manoeuvre is not possible due to the restrictions imposed because of the difficult mountainous terrain, firepower capa-

bilities need to be enhanced by an order of magnitude, especially in terms of precisionguided munitions. This will involve substantial upgradation of ground-based (artillery guns, rockets and missiles) and aeriallydelivered (fighter-bomber aircraft and attack helicopter) firepower. Only then will it be possible to achieve future military objectives. Consequent to the leakage of the Army Chief ’s letter and the major uproar in Parliament that followed, the Defence Minister is reported to have approved the Twelfth Defence Plan 2012-17 and the LTIPP 2012-27, in early April 2012. While this is undoubtedly commendable, it remains to be seen whether the Finance Ministry and subsequently the CCS will also show the same alacrity in according the approvals necessary to give practical effect to these plans. Without these essential approvals, defence procurement is being undertaken through ad hoc annual procurement plans, rather than being based on carefully prioritised long-term plans that are designed to systematically enhance India’s combat potential. These are serious lacunae as effective defence planning cannot be undertaken in a policy void. The government must commit itself to supporting long-term defence plans or else defence modernisation will continue to lag and the present quantitative military gap with China’s People’s Liberation Army will become a qualitative gap as well in 10-15 years. This can be done only by making the dormant National Security Council a proactive policy formulation body for long-term national security planning (CCS deals with current and near term threats and challenges and reacts to emergent situations).

Additional Measures Necessary The defence procurement decision-making process must be speeded up. The Army is still without towed and self-propelled 155mm howitzers for the plains and the mountains and urgently needs to acquire weapons and equipment for counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism operations. The Navy has been waiting for long for the INS Vikramaditya (Admiral Gorshkov) aircraft carrier, which is being refurbished in a Russian Shipyard at exorbitant cost. Con-

struction of the indigenous air defence ship is lagging behind schedule. The plans of the Air Force to acquire 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft in order to maintain its edge over the regional air forces are also stuck in the procurement quagmire. All three services need a large number of light helicopters. India’s nuclear forces require the Agni-III missile and nuclear-powered submarines with suitable ballistic missiles to acquire genuine deterrent capability. The armed forces do not have a truly integrated command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, information, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4I2SR) system suitable for modern network-centric warfare, which will allow them to optimise their individual capabilities. All of these high-priority acquisitions will require extensive budgetary support. With the defence budget languishing at less than two per cent of India’s GDP—compared with China’s 3.5 per cent and Pakistan’s 4.5 per cent plus the US military aid— it will not be possible for the armed forces to undertake any meaningful modernisation in the foreseeable future. Leave aside genuine military modernisation that will substantially enhance combat capabilities, the funds available on the capital account at present are inadequate to suffice even for the replacement of obsolete weapons systems and equipment that are still in service well beyond their useful life cycles. The Central Paramilitary Forces (CPMFs) also need to be modernised as they are facing increasingly more potent threats while being equipped with obsolescent weapons. The government must also immediately appoint a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) or a permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, as recommended by the Naresh Chandra Committee on defence reforms, to provide single-point advice to the CCS on military matters. Any further delay in this key structural reform in higher defence management on the grounds of the lack of political consensus and the inability of the armed forces to agree on the issue will be extremely detrimental to India’s interests in the light of the dangerous developments taking place in India’s neighbourhood. The logical next step would be to constitute tri-service integrated theatre commands to synergise the capabilities and the combat potential of individual services. It is time to set up a Tri-Service Aerospace and Cyber Command to meet emerging challenges in these fields. International experience shows that such reform has to be imposed from the top down and can never work if the government keeps waiting for it to come about from the bottom up. The defence budget has dipped below two per cent of the country’s GDP despite the fact that the services have repeatedly recommended that it should be raised to at least three per cent of the GDP if India is to build the defence capabilities that it will need to face the emerging threats and challenges and discharge its growing responsibilities as a regional power in Southern Asia. The government will do well to appoint a National Security Commission to take stock of the Continued on page 17

Technology / HMMWV >>

Humvee Steers towards Right-hand Drive Markets The Humvee, manufactured by AM General LLC, has served more than its purpose in many a war, being a tactical vehicle. Over 60 countries and military organisations across the world operate these vehicles. As of 2012, an estimated 3,00,000 HMMWVs have rolled out of the Mishawaka unit in Indiana, United States. Photograph: AM General

Fact File  3,00,000 Humvees have rolled-out  1,50,000 Humvees are with the

US armed forces  20,000 Humvees were deployed

during Gulf War  HMMWV to garner 70 per cent

of market share of light wheeled vehicle till 2017  HMMWV presence in 60 countries

Popularity Sees Similar Vehicles Humvees popularity has been such that several countries have come up with similar vehicle and they include the Tiuna from Venezuela; GAZ-2975 Tigr from Russia; Koukidousya which is with the Japanese Self Defence Forces; Iveco LMV; Renault Sherpa, etc. Recently, Israeli Army bought 2,000 HMMWVs from the US Army.

Recapitalisation

 R. Chandrakanth

he high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV), popularly known as Humvee, is still an iconic military vehicle. It became a symbol of American military might during the Iraq War when reportedly the coalition forces deployed about 20,000 Humvees to great effect. Its popularity ascended when Terminator film star Arnold Schwarzenegger bought one, starting a whole new craze, including the birth of Hummer. The Humvee, manufactured by AM General LLC, has served more than its purpose in many a war, being a tactical vehicle. Over 60 countries and military organisations across the world operate these vehicles. As of 2012, an estimated 3,00,000 HMMWVs have rolled out of the Mishawaka unit in Indiana, United States. From Iraq War to present day, the battlefield has undergone a drastic change with asymmetric warfare and improvised explosive devices being the norm of disruption. In the light of this, the US Army is now scouting for a mine resistant vehicle as a replacement of the Humvee.

Light tactical vehicle The Humvee itself replaced the M151 series jeeps. As a light tactical vehicle for command and control, special purpose shelter carriers and special purpose weapons platforms, the Humvee has been a crucial ingredient of battlefield requirement. The HMMWV has been manufactured in several configurations to support weapon systems; command and control systems; field ambulances; and ammunition, troop and general cargo transport. Its four different models are the A2 series vehicles, reliability extended vehicles, expanded-capacity vehicles and

international vehicles. The international models are the vehicles produced in collaboration with Swiss firm Mowag and Turkish company Otokar. The Eagle and Cobra are two of its international models.

First US Army Contract in 1981 The US Army awarded AM General a prototype contract in 1981 and the development and operational testing was conducted over a five-month period in 1982. In March 1983, AM General won an initial $1.2 billion (`6,000 crore) contract to produce 55,000 Humvees to be delivered in five basic models and 15 different configurations over a five-year period. Of the 55,000 units, 39,000 were for the US Army and remaining for the US Marine Corps, US Air Force and the US Navy. The US Army subsequently increased their order, raising the total contract order to 70,000 Humvees valued at $1.6 billion (`8,000 crore). In 1989, it entered combat as part of “Operation Just Cause”, the US invasion of Panama. The workhorse Humvee was very prominent in Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and more recently they have played important roles in Somalia, the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq. By 1991, AM General had produced 72,000 Humvees and it touched a staggering figure of nearly 3,00,000 by 2012. Forecast International Weapons Group had estimated that there would be a requirement of 71,300 light-wheeled vehicles, worth in excess of $21 billion (`1,05,000 crore), through 2017 and that the HMMWV would have a significant impact on the overall market. Forecast Group said that the Humvee will dominate during the forecast period, accounting for almost 70 per cent of all light-wheeled vehicle production worldwide, worth a commanding 35 per cent of the market value, through 2017.

Continued on page 15

INDISPENSABLE

AM General, with the right-hand drive version of Humvee, is looking eastwards to cater to the requirements of customers who mostly operate on right-hand drive unlike their western counterparts

A large portion of the HMMWV fleet was built in the first six years of the programme, with life expectancy of 15 years. By mid-1990s, the US Army’s Product Manager, Light Tactical Vehicles, recognised the need to address the rapidly rising operation and support costs

SP’S MILITARY YEARBOOK 2013 Please send your requirements, NOW at: order@spsmilitaryyearbook.com

SP's MYB Ad full Page.indd 24

29/12/12 11:17 AM

6/2012-13 SP’s Land Forces

>> Homeland Security

Countering Land-based Threats The way forward to strengthen the homeland security scenario in India would require active management of the policy framework, regulations, process and fiscal environment to create an integrated and self-reliant homeland security apparatus by the government Photograph: CRPF

 Lt General (Retd) P.C. Katoch

ost 9/11, homeland security got fast tracked in the US and it is generally believed that the mainland has not suffered any terrorist incident since then. But then, what is a terrorist act? The August 2012 shooting at the Wisconsin Gurudwara killing six people was publicly described by the US Attorney General as an act of terrorism motivated by hate. There have been plenty other similar hate crimes in the US which were not acknowledged as terrorist acts despite the basis of any terrorist act being ‘hate’. Therefore, homeland security should not be simplistically related to only terrorist acts. Most countries have come to realise that homeland security has much wider canvas than protection from acts of violence. Within India, the fabric of homeland security apparently comprises a host of dots that are yet to be fully connected; integration of the security sector, intelligence, surveillance, national net-centricity, et al. The mere fact that the erstwhile Home Minister had recommended establishment of a Ministry of Homeland Security while proposing the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) is indication enough that the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) in its current shape and huge responsibilities cannot holistically cope with the requirements of homeland security.

Definition Akin to there being no universal definition of ‘terrorism’, there is no universal definition of ‘homeland security’ either. There are many definitions and understandings of the latter. However, the following definition by Kettl, coined in 2004, appears appropriate: “Homeland security is, at its core, about coordination: coordination between functions and between governments, developing new tools, and effectively weaving together the nation’s experts and resources to connect the dots; a matter of doing some new things, many old things much better, and some old things differently, all in an environment that can punish any mistakes severely.” When Kettl says between governments, we may apply the same also to Centre-state relations in India.

www.spslandforces.net

Implications Any state must ensure that the citizenry can enjoy the resources and fruits of development in a safe and secure environment. Homeland security is inexorably a vital part of national security, the importance of which has heightened manifold in this age of asymmetric wars. In terms of national security, a nation needs to possess economic security, energy security, environmental security, etc. Security threats involve not only conventional foes such as other nation states but also non-state actors such as terrorists, narcotic cartels, multinational corporations (MNCs) and non-government organisations (NGOs); some even include natural disasters and events causing severe environmental damage in this category. A November 2012 report in the US highlights the vulnerability of the power grid to terrorists, bringing out that power system disruptions even from natural disasters or malfunctions have had immense economic impacts. Some international studies even include agricultural land security, productivity, ecological security,

SP’s Land Forces 6/2012-13

 Reconsider the need for a separate Min-

istry of Internal Security.  Terrorism should be classified as a sub-

ject to be dealt with by the Centre.  Speedy establishment of National Intel-

CRPF personnel with recovered arms

food security, demographic security (read refugees) and cyber security intrinsic to homeland security. Homeland security involves proactive policies and implementation in terms of analysis, reorganisation, diplomacy, intelligence gathering, building and synergising the security sector, or whatever it takes to proactively defend the homeland. It goes far beyond civil defence. The buzzword is preemptive mitigation of threat by actually preventing an attack/incident in the first place. It is important to distinguish homeland security from related terms like national security, anti-terrorism, disaster preparedness, hazard management, emergency services, crime prevention, strategic coordination, threat mitigation, and risk assessment. Homeland security consists of all these things and more. It is a broad concept relevant to safety and security, to be sure, but at its heart, the concept must include the idea of balancing security and citizens’ liberty.

Intelligence With terrorism as a major threat to homeland security, it requires a blend of both foreign and domestic intelligence. Administrative lines of separation and geographical boundaries of agencies if not eliminated through integration, result in poor intelligence that is capitalised by terrorists. While advance warning of a terrorist act may not always be possible, 100 per cent effort must go towards rapid transit of intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination, with the analytic process being a synthesis or fusion decision support processes based on all source intelligence.

Technology Rapid advances in technology must be continuously optimised and integrated into the homeland security infrastructure to incrementally upgrade the security levels. Besides facilitating national net-centricity, technology can effectively cover threats like intrusion prevention and access denial while solutions include surveillance, radio frequency identification, etc. India’s homeland security market is expected to be worth $16 billion (`80,000 crore) by 2018, growing annually at 35 per cent against seven per cent globally. India’s share in global expenditure in the sector is also expected to rise to six per cent by 2020 from 3.6 per cent now, of which, government constitutes about 30 per cent of the spending within the country.

Indian Scene India has a land border of 15,072 kilometres (3,431 kilometres with Pakistan), mostly through rugged and/or porous terrain. The coastline is 3,863 kilometres running through nine states and four union territories. Some 29 terrorist organisations are operating within India and both China and Pakistan are actively fanning these fires. In addition are the mafias, crime syndicates and drug cartels in large metros, particularly Mumbai. The Minister of State for Home Affairs informed the Rajya Sabha on August 29, 2011, “A total number of 84 districts in India witnessed violent activities of some nature”, while 119 more districts reported Naxalite presence in the form of “overground activity of the front organisations of the CPI (Maoist) and other left-wing extremist (LWE) outfits”. Thus, “the total number of such districts (LWE affected) in 2011 was 203.” The threats to homeland security are of a nature that requires a national effort. Take for example, intelligence, which requires a billion eyes on the ground concept. While the public-private partnership as a whole needs integration, the lead for this need is to be taken by the government, which does not appear to be happening. The problem is compounded by the fact that in a democracy like India there is free movement. Then there is the problem of the Centre-state relationship, which in certain cases amounts to resistance for the sake of resistance just because both are ruled by different political parties. The case in point is that of NCTC which should have been in place a decade back. Resistance from states is also partially due to the fact that despite coping with terrorism for over two decades, we have not been able to classify ‘terrorism’ as a subject to be dealt with by the Centre. States continue to treat the issue as ‘law and order’. Resultantly, a strong NCTC is considered by them as an infringement on the power and sphere at the state level. Though homeland security is increasingly perceived as critical to the overall security of the country and steps are being taken to upgrade the homeland security infrastructure with increased budgetary allocations, introduction of unique identification (UID) and establishment of the Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems (CCTNS), etc, much more is required to be done. Some of the areas that need focus are as follows:

ligence Grid (NATGRID) and a strong NCTC.  Concurrent establishment of state level STCTs duly linked to the NCTC.  Total integration of all intelligence agencies, which has not been fully established yet.  UID cover to all citizens.  Introduction of effective legislation deal with terrorists and speedy justice; changes to legislation made in recent times are largely cosmetic.  Achieving synergy in the security sector; armed forces, Special Forces, Paramilitary Forces, Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF), police forces, Coast Guards, intelligence services, private security services, Customs and Immigration Services, Government—Ministries of Defence, Home/Internal Affairs, Law and Justice, Human Resource and the like and most importantly the citizenry as a whole.  Initiate steps to deal with externally sourced threats to homeland security through covert and proactive employment of Special Forces, a potential that has not been optimised to this end yet.  Holistic police reforms are desperately needed instead of mere increase in numbers. CAPF and police units earmarked for counterinsurgency/counter-terrorist tasks must be reorganised on the lines of Assam Rifles/Rashtriya Rifles.  Leverage technology and public-private partnership to institutionalise the ‘safe and secure city’ concept against both natural and man-made disasters and violence.  Critical infrastructure security optimising latest technologies.  Education and training of the masses.  Address causes of dissent through improved governance. The way forward to strengthen the homeland security scenario in India would require active management of the policy framework, regulations, process and fiscal environment to create an integrated and self-reliant homeland security apparatus by the government. India and the US are already looking at ways to improve their intelligence-sharing mechanism and forging cooperation in new areas for strengthening homeland security. Similarly, it would be prudent to establish close cooperation with other countries like Russia and Israel also facing terrorist threats.

Need for Holistic Review The increased importance of homeland security requires little emphasis with the environment in our neighbourhood likely to deteriorate further with the US/North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) pullout from Afghanistan post-2014, increased Chinese aggressiveness and existing evidence of Chinese and Pakistani links with terrorist/ insurgent outfits operating in India, directly or by proxy. If the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) returns to power in Bangladesh, we may witness revival of terrorism in that country. We need periodic holistic review of homeland security, a roll on roadmap and its speedy implementation. SP

>> Strategy

The Civil-Military Friction In recent times, the Army is seen more in the secondary role than the primary one. It is in this context that we should critically look at national security, the role of military as well as civil-military relationship so that these could be mainstreamed into the governance architecture.  M.G. Devasahayam

www.spslandforces.net

he British East India Company rule in India effectively began in 1757 and lasted until the enactment of Government of India Act, 1858, that led to the British Crown assuming direct control. The company was dissolved in 1874 and its functions absorbed into official government machinery in the British Raj with its private army nationalised by the British Crown. In the Madras Presidency there has been an anecdote about drill training for this private army. The raw recruits could not understand the command ‘left-right’ for marching during drill practice. So the trainers had to tie a piece of cloth (selai) on one leg and palm-leaf (olai) on the other. The drill command for marching then was a strange-sounding olai-kaal (leftleg) selai-kaal (right leg)! The literacy levels of military recruits then was so abysmal. Those were the days of feudal-monarchy when lowly men, commanded by aristocrats, comprised the military. It was in this era that Alfred Lord Tennyson came out with the dictum for the military men: “Theirs is not to reason why, but to do and die.” (“Charge of the Light Brigade”, 1854) India’s military today comprise of welleducated and highly-skilled men who have a mind of their own to distinguish good from the bad and right from the wrong. Officers who command them come through a rigorous selection process based on merit. Yet India’s political-bureaucratic elite functioning in a seemingly democratic system is sticking to the Tennyson doctrine. This is reflected in the recent observations made by the Union Minister of State for Defence while delivering the Field Marshal K.M. Cariappa Memorial Lecture—“The military forces have remained loyal to the elected government and have been its obedient servant.” It is not surprising therefore that the successive governments have failed to define a proper and fair civil-military relationship. However, taking the initiative, Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat in his treatise, The Soldier and the State (1998), attempted a definition: “The modern military profession exists as part of the government insofar as the term ‘government’ includes the executive departments of the nation-state...Modern democracies therefore pay great attention to the supremacy of the political class over the military in governance, normally referred to as ‘civilian control of the military’. This is clearly how it should be, since ultimate power and decisionmaking should be wielded by the elected representatives of the people.” General V.K. Singh fully endorsed this (2012) but challenged the Tennyson dogma: “Civilian supremacy must always be rooted on the fundamental principles of justice, merit and fairness. Violation of this in any form must be resisted if we are to protect the institutional integrity of our armed forces.” Combined views of former Navy and Army Chiefs go beyond ‘loyalty’ and ‘obedience’ and set forth certain non-negotiable imperatives for civil-military relationship:  Democracy functioning as per established norms  Military profession existing as part of government  Decision-making and civilian supremacy by the ‘elected representatives of the people’  Such supremacy to be rooted on the principles of justice, merit and fairness

SP’s Land Forces 6/2012-13

 Violation of this can be resisted to protect

the institutional integrity of armed forces

Estrangement not Relationship An institutionalised well established civil-military relationship would factor in all the above imperatives. But what is happening now is ad hoc and patch-work and there is more of discord than accord. It was inevitable therefore that matters drifted, intrigues prevailed and things have happened that strike at the very integrity of the Army as an institution. These include creating and pursuing ‘line of succession’ at senior echelons of the Army; the resultant pre-meditated manipulation of the date-of-birth of a serving Army Chief forcing him to move the Supreme Court where he was advised to ‘blow with the wind’; bribe offered to a serving Army Chief for defence deals in his very office; a corrupt PSU chief involved in Tatra scam, enjoying patronage at highest levels, issuing open threat to a serving Army Chief; leakage of a `top secret’ letter from the Army Chief to the Prime Minister about the defence unpreparedness; false and fabricated accusations against Army Chief of spying/ snooping on the Defence Minister and what is worse, insidious insinuation of military coup, casting aspersion on the Army Chief himself. Fall-out of these sordid happenings on the Indian Army is best summed up by defence analyst Maroof Raza: “The system has closed around the Chief and this will only embolden the bureaucracy. The fallout will be that at least for two generations, no military commander will raise his head. And the message for military commanders is that it isn’t merit or accuracy of documents that will get them promotions, but pandering to the politico-bureaucratic elite. The last bastion of professional meritocracy in India has crumbled. The damage will be lasting.” Despite such damning indictment nothing was done to undo the damage. Instead the politico-bureaucratic agenda was rammed through and the ‘line of succession’ consummated. The President, also the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, remained mute having become functus officio by allowing politicians and bureaucrats in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to gleefully misuse the delegated powers. The Lady President refused even to meet a delegation of retired General Officers and received a memorandum signed by over thousand veterans and concerned citizens. It is evident that despite the President being the ‘Government of India’ as per General Clauses Act, is incapable of ensuring adherence to the ‘fundamental principles of justice, merit and fairness’, an essential prerequisite for cordial civil-military relationship. This epitomises the near total collapse of the institutional framework and alienation between the civil and military hierarchies. The widespread perception is that while the rank and file is subjected to severe disciplinary action for even minor offences, those higher up, with the right connections, can get away with anything and get promoted to highest ranks as long as they remain ‘obedient servants’! Hence this disturbing view, circulating at many levels of military, that it is not worth fighting for a country that is in the grip of ‘conniving, corrupt cabals’. Lord Tennyson’s dictum is being turned on its head! This is clear manifestation of civil-military estrangement and if allowed to persist, could imperil the security of the nation, both internal and external. Yet the political-bureaucratic combo aided and abetted

by a group of grovelling former military brass are pursuing activities that pose serious threat to the nation’s sovereignty and integrity. These include attempts to sell out Siachen glacier through sinister means and the still-burning Northeast cauldron due to Army’s Command failure.

Adhocracy, not Bureaucracy Despite the shortcomings, Indian military is professional in its structure and functioning. It has primary and secondary roles. The former is to preserve national interests and safeguard sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of India against external threats and the latter is, assisting government agencies to cope with ‘proxy war’ and other internal threats and provide aid to civil authority when requisitioned for the purpose. In recent times, the Army is seen more in the secondary role than the primary one. It is in this context that we should critically look at national security, the role of military as well as civil-military relationship so that these could be mainstreamed into the governance architecture. What are the factors that prevent such mainstreaming? First is the strong administrative, procedural and bureaucratic control over the armed forces without any expertise in military affairs. Second, exclusion of military from crucial decision-making forums, thus denying it a role in the policy-making process, strategic assessments and weapons procurement, all having adverse effect on defence preparedness and national security. Even so, the military has considerable autonomy concerning its own affairs: training and education, threat assessments, force structure, doctrine, innovations, appointments (up to a certain rank) and miscellaneous welfare activities. This practice of strong bureaucratic control with military autonomy is paradoxical and could create more conflicts than it could resolve! Is the control really bureaucratic? One wonders! Bureaucracy administers through laid down rules and is by and large meritdriven. Adhocracy on the other hand is nurtured through violation of processes and procedures to ensure that favouritism and nepotism prevails. Such adhocracy, which is antonymous to meritocracy, has substantially subverted the decision-making process and governance standards, vastly encouraging corruption and dishonesty. It started with the civil services, spread to the military and blossomed into a joint-venture between civil and military adhocracies. It is this adhocracy that has severely soured civil-military relationship.

Needed a Catalyst Civil and military are two sides of governance. Though military should be an intrinsic part of India’s governance, it is not so because there is an inherent conflict between the two streams—mediocrity versus excellence. As always, mediocrity keeps excellence at arm’s length and given the current civil-military equation, the twain shall never meet! Instead, driven by self-interest, military, at least the higher echelons seem to be drifting towards mediocrity. This indeed is the dilemma. The way out is to redefine governance and make ‘human security’ a new paradigm for development and governance. ‘Human security’ combines and harnesses four vital elements—material sufficiency, human dignity, democracy and participatory governance— that constitute the core of a civilised human society. Governance, structured around such concept can achieve excellence.

Once we broad-base “defence” or “military” and move towards the “human security” sector, civil society participation becomes imperative in national security strategies, military affairs and expenditures. Governance then could really become a catalyst for civilmilitary relationships and adhocracies will have no place in such relationship. For this to happen, a specific role need to be assigned to the civil society, so that the issue is dealt with in a democratic rather than adhocratic manner.

Suggestions Given the mess that India’s higher defence management is in, it would be better to emulate the model that centralises military’s operational authority through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as opposed to the Service Chiefs and institute parliamentary oversight on defence management. Following steps could be taken to build and sustain an abiding civil-military relationship:  Revisiting the entire rubric of higher defence management and role of bureaucracy, factoring the reports of various committees  Legislation to institutionalise the ‘fully joint force’ and Parliamentary oversight/ involvement in defence management  Amending Government of India Rules of Business 1961 to recognise the role of military in national security, making them integral to the governance structure  Scrutiny of the delegated authority of the President under Rules of Business and its rectification to prevent misuse for pursuing political and private agenda  Abolishing adhocracy in Ministry of Defence (MoD) by replacing the archaic ‘generalist’ practice in senior appointments with domain knowledge/experience  Reconfiguring national security framework with inputs from all stakeholders and involvement of civil society  Bridging the distance between communities, academia, think-tanks and the military through transparency and assistance from civil society

The Way Out Two thousand years ago, Kautilya had said: “When diplomats fail to maintain peace, the soldier is called upon to restore peace. When civil administration fails to maintain order, the soldier is called to restore order. As the nation’s final safeguard, the Army cannot afford a failure in either circumstance. Failure of Army can lead to national catastrophe, endangering the survival of the nation.” The need for an abiding and cordial civilmilitary relationship cannot be put forth in a better way. Such relationship cannot float on shallow waters, but should be moored on an unshakable anchor. In war or conflicts, military men do not offer the ‘supreme sacrifice’ just for money or rank. There is something far more precious called ‘honour’ and this is embedded in the Chetwood Hall credo which most military leaders have passed through. Civil-military relationship moored on such anchor would subsist on equality and equity, not supremacy and subservience. Military veterans should set the tone for this relationship by abandoning the current ‘petitioning’ approach to articulate their grievances and replace it with a pride-cum-principle strategy. Only then will things change. SP The author is a former Indian Army and IAS Officer.

Technology / Tecknow >>

Humvee Steers towards... continued from page 11 Photograph: AM General

AM General not only builds the most versatile, dependable and mobile light tactical vehicle in the market, but also provides a total package solution to include training, parts and support to the user

associated with these ageing vehicles and began to develop a programme to rebuild and upgrade the fleet of over 1,00,000 vehicles. The programme’s initial objective was to return HMMWVs to a near zero hours/miles condition to extend their life for an additional 21 years. As of February 2011, the HMMWV recapitalisation programme had converted over 45,000 vehicles in total.

Replacement Programme With cost and other factors involved, now the US Army is looking for replacement of Humvee and has selected three vehicles for the joint light tactical vehicle (JLTV). Getting contracts valued at a combined $185 million (`925 crore) are AM General, Lockheed Martin and Oshkosh. The programme is worth an estimated $20 billion

(`1,00,000 crore). The Army wants at least 20,000 JLTVs, with the potential to buy a lot more. Officials want to replace a third of the 1,50,000 vehicle Humvee fleet with the JLTV. The Marine Corps plans to buy 5,500. AM General has put forth the JLTV prototype called the blast resistant vehicle-off-road (BRV-O). Many have described it as a “Hummer on steroids.” Lockheed Martin along with BAE Systems is another contender. The two beefed up force protection while cutting weight and cost during the technology demonstration phase. It already has conducted helicopter lift tests—a critical issue in early development—and has logged more than 2,56,000 testing kilometres. Oshkosh Defense is another contender who has taken the success of the M-ATV’s modular and scalable protection and packaged it into the light

combat tactical all-terrain vehicle (L-ATV). The diesel-electric power train was replaced with an electric power train, but mobility is its key strength. The TAK-4i intelligent suspension system provides up to 20 inches of independent wheel travel. These combine to provide a vehicle that is 50 per cent faster offroad than the M-ATV.

Right-hand Drive Market While the US military programme is on, AM General is eyeing global military spending and targeting international customers who drive on the left side of the road. As such, about a sixth of its total Humvee sales have been outside the US and with the right-hand drive market, it hopes it will boost its revenues. Roughly 18 months and $10 million (`50 crore) in investment later, the right-hand drive Humvee

was launched by AM General at the Singapore Air Show in February 2012. AM General is planning to make inroad into markets such as the UK, Ireland, Japan, India, Pakistan, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, South Africa and many more where vehicles are driven on the left side of the road. “We studied the right-hand drive market and realised that there is no other light tactical vehicle available that can compete with the HMMWV,” said Rick Alpaugh, Vice President, International Sales, AM General. “We worked very closely with our design, engineering and production teams to ensure that the right-hand drive HMMWV meets the same high quality standards as the lefthand drive HMMWVs in use with the US Military.” This is one of three new internationally focused HMMWV models the company is now offering—aiming to expand beyond the 68 countries it is in. Nearly 50,000 Humvees are in use in these countries. AM General not only builds the most versatile, dependable and mobile light tactical vehicle in the market, but also provides a total package solution to include training, parts and support to the user. Keeping with the changing trends, AM General also announced the launch of a new programme to sell civilian Humvee kits comprised of certain military-style Humvee body and chassis components minus the power-train. Initial orders for this oneof-a-kind kit are now being taken at the newly launched Humvee C-Series website, genuinehumveekit.com, for the base price of $59,995 (`29,99,999). The Humvee C-Series kit will offer the best in industry mobility technology with a host of off-road ready options, including AM General’s central tire inflation system, electronic locking differentials and others. The initial C-Series offering is a soft top body style. The Humvee has indeed come a long way. Wherever American soldiers go, their Humvees go with them, at least, until now. SP

TECKNOW

Photograph: DARPA

LS3 Robot Plays Follow the Leader

or the past two weeks, in the woods of central Virginia around Fort Pickett, the Legged Squad Support System (LS3) four-legged robot has been showing off its capabilities during field testing. Working with the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL), researchers from DARPA’s LS3 programme demonstrated new advances in the robot’s control, stability and manoeuvrability, including “Leader Follow” decision making, enhanced roll recovery, exact foot placement over rough terrain, the ability to manoeuvre in an urban environment, and verbal command capability. The LS3 programme seeks to demonstrate that a highly mobile, semi-autonomous legged robot can carry 400 lbs of a

squad’s equipment, follow squad members through rugged terrain and interact with troops in a natural way similar to a trained animal with its handler. The robot could also be able to manoeuvre at night and serve as a mobile auxiliary power source to the squad, so troops can recharge batteries for radios and handheld devices while on patrol. “This was the first time DARPA and MCWL were able to get LS3 out on the testing grounds together to simulate military-relevant training conditions,” said Lt. Col. Joseph Hitt, DARPA Program Manager. “The robot’s performance in the field expanded on our expectations, demonstrating, for example, how voice commands and “follow the leader” capability would enhance the robot’s ability to interact with warfighters. We were able to put the robot through difficult natural terrain and test its ability to right itself with minimal interaction from humans.” Video from the testing shows the robot negotiating diverse terrain including ditches, streams, wooded slopes and simulated urban environments. The video also shows the map the LS3 perception system creates to determine the path it takes. The December testing at Fort Pickett is the first in a series of planned demonstrations that will test the robot’s capabilities across different environments as development continues through the first half of 2014. The DARPA platform developer for the LS3 system is Boston Dynamics of Waltham, Massachusetts. SP Untitled-3 1

17/08/12 5:31 PM

6/2012-13 SP’s Land Forces

>> Special OP Vehicles

Learning from the US Experience Protected mobility will be a vital ingredient in capacity building both for defence and homeland security. A holistic appraisal and an effective roadmap are required to provide this capability to fighting elements of our security sector. Special vehicles are an essential part of mobility that needs to be addressed. Photograph: SP Guide Pubns

 Lt General (Retd) P.C. Katoch

he requirement of armoured mobility confined to conventional war in yesteryears has multiplied enormously because of activation of the sub-conventional spectrum; terrorism, guerrilla warfare, low-intensity conflict, fourth generation warfare and the like. In the Indian context, we have been experiencing all these forms of conflict over the past few decades with fluctuating intensity. However, such intensity has risen considerably with increase in levels of terrorism in recent years amid an array of weaponry and sophisticated explosives available to terrorists/ insurgents/guerrillas, periodic blowing up of Central Armed Police Force (CAPF) vehicles, including mine protection vehicles (MPVs). Nomenclatures abound in this category of vehicles like light strike vehicles (LSVs), armoured infantry vehicles (AIVs), infantry carrying vehicles (ICVs) armoured security vehicles (ASVs), all terrain vehicles (ATV) and the like, though the Indian Army has not had a special vehicle in service for effective use at the tactical level in diverse terrain other than the BMP which is referred to as the ICV. Activation of the sub-conventional spectrum of conflict and increased threat of terrorism has hiked the global demand for such vehicles in billions of dollars. The Indian Army too has been on a hunt for LSVs.

User Requirements

www.spslandforces.net

What should the user look for in this category of vehicles can be generically summed up as protection against small arms fire, protection from splinters, mines and improvised explosive devices, maximum possible deflection from anti-tank weapons, firepower, cross country mobility in diverse terrain, large radii of action, carriage capability to suit individual requirements, low noise, low signatures, pliability on diverse surfaces (land and water as possible), light weight, air/helicopter portability, easy maintenance, self-sealing tires and the like. Considerable global research and development for ushering sophistication is through exploiting technology. Take the case of BAE Systems, there are two examples: first, ongoing research and development (R&D) to detect faults in military vehicles and preempt it by taking remedial action through an Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM) that will monitor engine and vehicle structure via built in sensors and will identify faults using mathematical reasoning in order to establish a diagnosis, who will take relevant action to rectify the fault; second, an ‘invisibility cloak’ that allows a vehicle to blend into its surroundings. Adaptiv, the patented technology, is based on sheets of hexagonal ‘pixels’ that can change the temperature very rapidly. Onboard cameras pick up the background scenery and display that infrared image on the vehicle, allowing even a moving tank to match its surroundings. Alternatively, it can mimic another vehicle or display identification tags, reducing the risk of fratricide. Indian Scene Lashed with sub-conventional war and terrorism, the Indian Army has been looking for a suitable LSV for some time and is currently evaluating some including the Mahindra Axe and Tata Motors LSV. Diverse terrain like plains, desert sand dunes and soft sand patches, waterlogged areas, marshes, mountains and extreme cold of high altitude

SP’s Land Forces 6/2012-13

Tata Motors’ light armoured vehicle

and forested areas need to be negotiated. Air portability by aircraft and medium-lift helicopters is required to increase the reach and lethality of special operations. The scope in India is vast considering the mobility and armoured protection requirements in this category of Paramilitary Forces (PMF), Central Armed Police Forces and police units that are battling insurgency and terrorists. To add to this is the considerable scope in the tourism sector; desert and jungle safaris, dune buggies for fun and frolic deserts, traversing difficult areas, cross country racing, para-sailing and the like. To capitalise on this market, various models are already available in India. Ashok Leyland Defence Systems is also engaged in the development of a range of tactical and armoured vehicles with military payloads ranging from 1.5 to 20 tonnes, on the Colt, Stallion and Super Stallion platforms. The product range includes light specialist vehicles (LSV), light bullet proof vehicles (LBPV), light artillery machines (LAM), mine protected vehicles (MPV), field artillery tractors (FAT), multi-barrel rocket launchers (MBRL) and other special applications vehicles. The US Experience Over the years, the US besides going in for improvements in all user requirements, has ensured standardisation of the inventory to facilitate maintainability of the large fleet of this category of vehicles. There are, however, exception in the case of Special Forces forming part of the US Special Operation Command, who rightfully have what suits their special requirements, an example being the 4x4 and 6x6 Polaris ATVs. How the US Army handles requirement of vehicles in this category can be studied from the armoured security vehicles (ASVs) operated by them including in large numbers in Iraq and Afghanistan. Textron Marine and Land Systems has been a main supplier to the US Army. The ASV protects the troops through employment of multiple layers of armour, defending against small arms fire, artillery projectile fragments, IEDs and land mines. It is equipped with a M2 .50 calibre machine gun, a MK 19 40mm grenade launcher, dual-mounted weapons station, M248 SAW coupled with M36 day/night sight and 360-degree vision. With speeds of over 100 kmph, 45 cm ground clearance and 3,360 pound payload, it can negotiate a 60 degrees

slope and medium fording. It has a 700 km range, can operate for 2,410 hours and has a central tire inflation system (CTIS). The ballistic protection has an integral threatspecific solution; protection being scalable—payload capacity allows tailoring and future growth. Integrated laser range finder ensures first round hit capability while precision power controls and stabilisation reduces target acquisition time and shoot-on-themove capability. It is a versatile platform that can deliver exceptional mobility, reliability and versatility, enabling security forces to undertake a wide range of combat missions. The M117 version ASV, named Guardian, provides the military and police with a light armoured vehicle that provides sustainability in hostile environment, substantially increases lethality, mobility and survivability, the main function being convoy protection. With a crew of three and one passenger, it has intercom with CVC helmets, armament system MK 19 40mm and M2 .50 calibre plus NBC protection. The ASV is available in many versions, including the M1117 Guardia and the M1200 Armoured Knight. The ICV version too has three levels of protection, one piece door option, crew of two with eight passengers, gunner protection kit mounting crew served weapon, 700 km range on 50 gallons of diesel and Harris radio with wireless intercom for dismounts. The MSV has been combat-proven in Iraq and Afghanistan (including in mountainous region of Afghanistan) in protecting soldiers, convoy escorts, check points, cordon and search, combat raid and reconnaissance/surveillance patrols, for-

Lashed with subconventional war and terrorism, the Indian Army has been looking for a suitable LSV for some time and is currently evaluating some including the Mahindra Axe and Tata Motors LSV

ward operation base security, urban extraction under armour protection, quick reaction force and fire support, plus providing tactical supervision for civilian and police operations: In addition to the above, the US forces in Afghanistan are also operating the Oshkosh MRP-ATV (transports five soldiers). Lessons from US Experience The lessons we can learn from the US experience are as follows:  A holistic appraisal of operational requirements can help us arrive on a commonality matrix that will have tremendous advantage rather than going in for procurements piecemeal and landing up with a variety of LCVs with little commonality.  The commonality matrix that we should look at should aim at the highest possible percentage of common spare parts and components with existing military systems.  Commonality with existing military systems should include engine, transmission, differentials, wheel ends, wheels and tires, central tire inflation, turret, turret components, etc and in case of the ASV, this commonality matrix is as high as 60 per cent.  The design must be modular for maintainability in terms of minimum time for removing and replacing power pack, removal and replacement of turret, removing and replacing axle, and removing and replacing transfer case. In the case of the ASV, removing and replacing power pack takes three hours, removing and replacing the turret takes two hours, removing and replacing axle takes five hours and removing and replacing transfer case takes three hours.  Protection must be scalable with modular ballistic protection system to cater to all types of conflict situations and varied operational scenarios.  Similarly, weapon mounting and firepower can be scalable—increasing or reducing the levels to match the operational requirements.  It will also reduce costs of indigenisation with hundreds of LCVs requiring common material for production. This in turn will also facilitate production including centralising machining, tooling, welding, etc that will in turn, optimise production capacity.

Capacity Building Faced with prospects of increasing violence on account of insurgencies and terrorism, asymmetrically hostile neighbours and disturbed internal situation, the battling security forces need to be provided with adequate armoured mobility with requisite firepower. India is just about waking up to this requirement which until now has been limited to mainly the mine protection vehicles besides some vehicles with limited protection with police. We need to take a call on our requirement, learn lessons from militaries of developed nations and then go for procurements, followed by centralised indigenisation to meet national requirements. Protected mobility will be a vital ingredient in capacity building both for defence and homeland security. A holistic appraisal and an effective roadmap are required to provide this capability to fighting elements of our security sector. Special vehicles are an essential part of the mobility that needs to be addressed. SP

Technology >>

Developing Directed Energy Weapons DEWs are the answer to the Sino-Indian asymmetry as they can render all current nuclear weapons and the delivery systems worthless—burn them off in seconds including missiles in the initial upward boost phase of flight itself Photograph: Northrop Grumman

 Lt General (Retd) P.C. Katoch

o say that weaponisation of space is not taking place would be denying the obvious. Origins of Indian mythology of Mahabharata apart, China’s bid to play down its anti-satellite (ASAT) test of 2007 do not obfuscate the fact. A host of countries have focused on research and development (R&D) in developing directed energy weapons (DEWs) through primarily laser-based weapons and delivery systems—land-, sea-, air- and space-based. DEWs in fact are the answer to today’s nuclear weapons and their delivery systems—the proverbial ‘death ray’ travelling at the speed of light. The DEW emits energy in the desired direction, onto the desired target (effects of which may be lethal or non-lethal depending on what the attacker wants), destroying or disabling it without using any projectile. Not only will this be the next paradigm of war, they will likely be deployed in large numbers by the year 2020. By then, even the problem of plasma breakdown in air causing the laser to de-focus and disperse energy into the atmosphere, particularly during fog, smoke and dust, would have been overcome. Most significantly, laser weapons will have limitless ammunition given sufficient power source. In addition, their range will be much more as compared to ballistic weapons with favourable atmospheric conditions and power level. In a test firing during 2010, Raytheon’s ship-borne laser successfully destroyed an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). In another test in the US, the cannon aboard a ship at sea fired a relatively weak 15 kilowatt laser beam disabling an enemy vessel. The US Yal-1A Boeing aircraft-based laser system that generates a laser beam having 1megawatt of power can kill enemy aircraft at the speed of light. A one megawatt laser beam can burn through 20 feet of steel in a single second. Northrop Grumman has developed the truck-mounted laser. A laser assault rifle too has been devel-

Northrop Grumman’s joint high power solid state laser

oped whose energy output can be controlled—high-power for lethal outcomes or low power for non-lethal effect. BAE Systems and Boeing are in partnership to blend kinetic and laser weapons onto naval platforms. The Russian ASAT is MiG-31 based. Chinese programmes are under wraps but undoubtedly being vigorously pursued. India too is looking into uses of laser technology. The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) identify DEWs, along with space security, cyber security and hypersonic vehicles as future projects. India has been developing the kilo ampere linear injector (KALI) linear electron accelerator for some time. Currently, it is not a laser weapon albeit China thinks so since it can be progressed into a high-powered microwave weapon. A laser dazzler has been developed that will impair vision temporarily to control unruly crowds. In addition, DRDO’s Laser Science and Tech Centre (LASTEC) is developing Aditya, a vehicle-mounted gas dynamic laser-based DEW system (as tech-

nology demonstrator)—a 25-kilowatt laser system under development to hit a missile in terminal phase at a distance of 5-7 km. The next step is to create solid state lasers which are very portable and can be fitted on various platforms. This is projected to be achieved by 2020. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap identifies DEWs and anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons as thrust areas over next 15 years. India has identified development of ASAT weapons for electronic or physical destruction of satellites in both low earth orbit (2,000 km altitude above earth’s surface) and the higher geosynchronous orbit in the long-term integrated perspective plan (2012-27). DRDO is working on 6,000 square kilometres radius systems in respect of exo-atmospheric kill vehicles. DEWs are the answer to the Sino-Indian asymmetry as they can render all current nuclear weapons and the delivery systems worthless—burn them off in seconds including missiles in the initial upward boost phase

of flight itself. Undoubtedly, the vital aspect will be to have accurate and effective radars to locate and track enemy missiles instantaneously on launch and activate own DEWs to neutralise them. Such radars will essentially have to be space-based (mounted on satellites) as ground-based, ship-based and airborne radar systems with limited range and accuracy have a limited capability to locate and track such missiles. To say that space is only being used for civilian and reconnaissance purposes will be a misnomer for the simple reason that countries like the US, China and Russia would already be doing so because of the dual usage of such radars. Similarly, DEWs when mounted on satellites will be difficult to detect unless actually fired. Chinese military strategy of shock, deception and surprise coupled with Chinese record of ambiguity and deceit lends itself to space weaponisation. There is no reason why India should not cater to such asymmetry. Great nations must remain committed to lofty moral principles and humane values, but one must understand that the power of principle can be most effectively pursued when it is complemented by the principle of the relevant power of the times. Officially, China may have pooh-poohed the Agni-V test but internally it surely is very concerned that Beijing and focal centres of its economic progress are within Indian missile range. It is assumed that the next generation of Chinese assuming power in Beijing five years from now, is likely to be much more aggressive. However, it would be prudent for them not to be so, least countries so threatened get going a strategic partnership (not necessarily alliance) in developing DEWs for collective response. In any event, India must leapfrog optimising the laser, bearing in mind the Chinese penchant of not only ‘human wave’ tactics on ground but also ‘mass missile attacks’. Concurrently, active denial systems against DEW attacks too must be developed expeditiously. SP

Defence Reforms... continued from page 10 lack of preparedness of the country’s armed forces and to make pragmatic recommendations to redress the visible inadequacies that might lead to yet another military debacle.

Improving Civil-Military Relations Civil-military relations in India have been strained at the best of times. The primary cause for this hiatus is the degeneration of civilian control over the military from political control—as it should be—to bureaucratic control in practice. This has happened as the political leaders have neither the time nor the inclination to go into the finer nuances of matters military. Consequently, the bureaucracy makes all the important decisions and controls the purse strings and the senior leadership of the armed forces plays little role in higher level national security decision-making. For example, during Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru’s time, the three Service Chiefs were always in attendance at the meetings of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC), but when Prime Minister Inder Gujral constituted the

Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) in 1997, the Chiefs of Staff were left out. The present situation is not only harmful for decision-making, but has also led to deep resentment on the part of the armed forces leadership for being so completely sidelined. This lacuna needs to be immediately corrected. A positive approach will go a long way in improving civil-military relations, which have deteriorated markedly in recent years. As a first step, the Services HQ must be genuinely integrated with the Ministry of Defence (MoD) by delegating financial powers to them, cross postings for better coordination and maintaining a ‘single file’ system rather than the MoD maintaining its own internal file on each issue and not disclosing its internal notings to the Services HQ. The services must be allowed to manage their own revenue budgets, while expenditure on the capital account can continue to be controlled by the Ministry of Defence. To a person in uniform, izzat (self-respect) is more important than anything else. He is brought up to believe that he must live up

to “naam, namak and nishan” no matter how difficult the circumstances. As such, his izzat matters more to a soldier than almost anything else and the government must ensure that he gets the respect due to him. The softer issues that do not impinge immediately on planning and preparation for meeting national security challenges must never be ignored as these can have adverse repercussions on the morale of the officers and men in uniform in the long-term. The numerous anomalies created by the implementation of the Sixth Pay Commission report must be speedily resolved. In fact, the ham-handed handling of this issue has led to a dangerous “them versus us” civil-military divide and the government must make it a priority to bridge this gap quickly. The exservicemen too have had a raw deal and have been surrendering their medals and holding fasts to get justice for their legitimate demand of “one rank-one pension”. The time has come to implement the one rank-one pension scheme without further delay and without setting up more com-

mittees of bureaucrats to look into the issue. While a Department of Ex-servicemen’s Welfare has been created in the Ministry of Defence in keeping with the UPA’s Common Minimum Programme, till recently there wasn’t a single ex-Serviceman in it. Such measures do not generate confidence among serving soldiers and retired veterans in the civilian leadership. Finally, rather unbelievably, despite the supreme sacrifice made by thousands of gallant soldiers, sailors and airmen, India is still without a National War Memorial. Though the establishment of a war memorial at India Gate in New Delhi has been approved in principle by the government, once again it is being suggested by political leaders and some sections of the media that it should be located elsewhere. It is heartening to note that the Defence Minister is standing firm on locating the war memorial at India Gate. SP The author is former Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi. The views expressed by the author are personal.

6/2012-13 SP’s Land Forces

>> news in brief DRDO brainstorms with private sector for heavy gun In the process of conceptualising a new 155mm/52cal towed artillery gun, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has officially kick-started proceedings by roping in the private sector to brainstorm. A three-day discussion session in Pune from October 29-31 was organised to draw up a list of which companies could contribute in which areas. Four Indian private limited companies that were involved in system level interactions were Tata Power SED, Larsen & Toubro, Bharat Forge Ltd and Mahindra Defence Systems. Eight private limited companies that were involved in sub-system level interactions were Dantal Hydraulics, Starwine India Ltd, PSPL, Avasarala Technologies, Accurate Engineering, HBL Power Systems Ltd, Moog Inc and System Controls Ltd. The DRDO has said in its newsletter that the 155mm gun it plans to develop

ReconRobotics announces strong international sales

ReconRobotics has announced that its international headquarters in Lugano, Switzerland, has closed the year with strong sales of micro-robot systems to military and police users in Norway, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, Germany, Hungary and France, in addition to an unspecified country in the Middle East. “Our robot sales were up more than 50 per cent in 2012, and it is our international team that has led the way in the last quarter,” said Alan Bignall, President

>> Show Calendar 16-17 January, 2013 Armoured Vehicle Survivability Le Meridien, Munich, Germany www.armoured-vehicle-survivability.com 21-23 January, 2013 Defence Geospatial Intelligence (DGI) QEII Conference Centre, London, UK www.wbresearch.com/dgieurope/home.aspx 22-24 January, 2013 Airborne Early Warning and Battle Management Espaces CAP 15, Paris, France www.airborneearlywarning.com

at the Armament Research and Development Establishment (ARDE) in Pune has “improved firepower to achieve first salvo effectiveness at longer ranges, higher accuracy and enhanced survivability are the primary requirements for this gun system. Efforts are being made to develop new technologies for weapon platforms, automation and control systems, recoil management, materials, etc., to achieve improved weapon performance.”

LoR for supply of 145 BAE M777 guns issued After multiple twists and turns, the Ministry of Defence has finally dispatched a letter of request (LoR) to the Pentagon for the supply of 145 BAE Systems M777 ultra-light howitzer (ULH) guns. The foreign military sales (FMS) deal is expected to be worth roughly $650 million (`3,250 crore). According to the original notification to the US Congress in 2010, the package also includes laser and CEO of ReconRobotics. “Military and counter-terror teams around the world are recognising that the unique reconnaissance capabilities of our Throwbot XT give them a big tactical advantage during highrisk operations, and this is driving sales at a fast clip. We expect this trend to continue in 2013.” About 4,000 of the company’s Recon Scout and Throwbot systems have been deployed by the US military and international friendly forces, and by hundreds of law enforcement agencies worldwide. Operators use these throwable micro-robot systems to determine the layout of enclosed spaces, identify potential IEDs and fix the location of civilians or enemy personnel. The Throwbot XT weighs 1.2 lbs (544 g) and can be deployed in five seconds and thrown up to 120 feet (36 m).

Russia begins trials of AK-12 rifle The Russian central arms testing body has started state testing of Izhmash’s newly developed AK-12 assault rifle, which is an upgraded variant of the Russian Army’s Soviet-era AK-74 Kalashnikov series. Trials will validate the rifle’s effectiveness after exposure to freezing temperatures, desert heat, humidity, as well as dust and other environmental impacts, according to RIA Novosti. Izhmash Chief Designer Vladimir Zlobin said that testing would start in early 2013 and be complete by July the same year; he went on to claim that the Russian Armed Forces and certain foreign customers have also shown interest in acquiring the weapon. Serial production of the rifle is scheduled to begin by the end of 2013.

GD and US Army test GPS-guided munition on Tiger Shark UAV

28-30 January, 2013 Military Sustainment Hilton Alexandria Mark Center, Alexandria, Virginia, USA www.militarysustainmentsummit.com

www.spslandforces.net

29-31 January, 2013 International Military Helicopter Pestana Chelsea Bridge, London, UK www.militaryhelicopterevent.com 5-8 February, 2013 International Armoured Vehicles 2013 FIVE, Farnborough, UK www.internationalarmouredvehicles.com 25-27 February, 2013 Military Radar Summit 2013 Ronald Reagan Building, Washington, DC, USA www.militaryradarsummit.com

SP’s Land Forces 6/2012-13

inertial artillery pointing systems (LINAPS), warranty, spare and repair parts, support and test equipment, publications and technical documentation, maintenance, personnel training and training equipment, the US Government and contractor representatives’ technical assistance, engineering and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics support. The ULHs will be easily transportable by heavy-lift helicopter or transport aircraft—in fact the CH-47F Chinook which the IAF has selected for its heavy helicopter competition is capable of transporting a M777 as an under slung load—one of the many requirements put down by the Indian Army for its light gun requirement. The M777 will be deployable in the Northern and Eastern sectors. The deal carries a 30 per cent offsets requirement. SP —SP’s Special Correspondent For complete versions log on to: www.spslandforces.net system and an ARDEC-developed fusing solution to provide precision-strike capabilities. GD Ordnance and Tactical Systems’ Seattle Operations General Manager Mark Schneider said the effort demonstrated a low-cost tactical version of a GPS strike weapon in the 10 lbs-class for tactical UAV platforms.

Harris to supply RF-7800I systems to Middle East Harris has been awarded a contract for delivery of its RF-7800I vehicular intercom systems to the military of an undisclosed Middle Eastern country. Under the terms of $8.7 million (`43.5 crore) contract, Harris will supply unspecified units of RF-7800I systems to the military for installation onboard its main battle tanks (MBT) and other armoured vehicles. Harris RF Communications International Business President Brendan O’Connell said the system has been developed as a complete solution for integration and interoperability with evolving tactical wideband networks.

Indian Army test fires Prithvi-II The Indian Army has completed successful test firing of its domestically developed nuclear-capable surface-to-surface missile Prithvi-II from a launch complex-III at the Integrated Test Range (ITR) at Chandipur, Odisha. An unidentified defence official was quoted in the media stating that the tests were conducted as part of routine user trials to evaluate the missile’s real-time effectiveness under direction of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). The whole exercise was aimed at studying the control and guidance system of the missile and providing training to the Army. A defence scientist informed that the missile was successfully tracked and monitored by an array of radars and electrooptical systems located along the coastline throughout its flight path. SP

>> Appointments  Lt General N.C. Marwah has taken

General Dynamics (GD) Ordnance and Tactical Systems and the US Army Armament Research and Development Engineering Center (ARDEC) have conducted a joint GPS-guided weapons test with the Tiger Shark unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). During the tests, the UAV launched an 81mm mortar from a height of 7,000 feet and was guided to within 7 m of a GPS-identified target grid in three separate engagements. The mortar was equipped with GD’s roll control fixed canard (RCFC) control

over as the Chief of Integrated Defence Staff to Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee (CISC).  Lt General D.S. Thakur has taken over as the Deputy Chief of Army Staff (IS&T).  Lt General R.N. Singh has taken over as the Director General Military Intelligence.  Lt General A.T. Parnaik has taken over as the Director General Border Roads.  Lt General S.H. Kulkarni has taken over as the Director General Mechanised Forces.

Publisher and Editor-in-Chief Jayant Baranwal Editor Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor Assistant Group Editor R. Chandrakanth Senior Technical Group Editor Lt General (Retd) Naresh Chand Contributing Editor Air Marshal (Retd) V.K. Bhatia Sr. Copy Editor & Correspondent Sucheta Das Mohapatra Contributors India General (Retd) V.P. Malik, Lt General (Retd) Vijay Oberoi, Lt General (Retd) R.S. Nagra, Lt General (Retd) S.R.R. Aiyengar, Air Marshal (Retd) Vinod Patney, Major General (Retd) Ashok Mehta, Major General (Retd) G.K. Nischol, Brigadier (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, Brigadier (Retd) S. Mishra, Rohit Sharma Chairman & Managing Director Jayant Baranwal Executive Vice President (Planning & Business Development) Rohit Goel Administration Bharti Sharma Senior Art Director Anoop Kamath Design Vimlesh Kumar Yadav, Sonu Singh Bisht Research Assistant: Graphics Survi Massey Sales & Marketing Director Sales & Marketing: Neetu Dhulia General Manager Sales: Rajeev Chugh SP’s Website Sr. Web Developer: Shailendra P. Ashish Web Developer: Ugrashen Vishwakarma Published bimonthly by Jayant Baranwal on behalf of SP Guide Publications Pvt Ltd. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, photocopying, recording, electronic, or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publishers. Printed in India by Kala Jyothi Process Pvt Ltd © SP Guide Publications, 2012 Annual Subscription Inland: `600 • Overseas: US$180 Email: subscribe@spguidepublications.com Letters to Editor editor@spslandforces.net For Advertising Details, Contact: guidepub@vsnl.com neetu@spguidepublications.com rajeev.chugh@spguidepublications.com SP GUIDE PUBLICATIONS PVT LTD Corporate Office A 133 Arjun Nagar, Opp Defence Colony, New Delhi 110 003, India Tel: +91(11) 24644693, 24644763, 24620130 Fax: +91 (11) 24647093 Regd Office Fax: +91 (11) 23622942 Email: guidepub@vsnl.com Representative Offices Bengaluru, INDIA Air Marshal (Retd) B.K. Pandey 204, Jal Vayu Vihar, Kalyan Nagar, Bangalore 560043, India. Tel: +91 (80) 23682204 MOSCOW, RUSSIA LAGUK Co., Ltd, Yuri Laskin Krasnokholmskaya, Nab., 11/15, app. 132, Moscow 115172, Russia. Tel: +7 (495) 911 2762, Fax: +7 (495) 912 1260 www.spguidepublications.com www.spslandforces.net RNI Number: DELENG/2008/25818

A DUTY TO PROTECT EVERY GOVERNMENT HAS A DUTY TO ENSURE THE SAFETY AND WELLBEING OF ITS PEOPLE. For more than 75 years, Saab has been pushing the boundaries of technology. Today, our offer to India provides the very best in coastal surveillance systems, customised and & naval defence systems, security systems, front-ranking fighter jets and reconnaissance & surveillance aircraft. We are committed to the transfer of skills and technology to ensure that India not only continues to manage all aspects of the systemâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s lifecycle, but also builds the capability to develop future technologies independently. Saab is proud to partner India in its long-term goals â&#x20AC;&#x201C; supporting the creation of an indigenous, self-sufficient and global-scale defence industry.

www.saabgroup.com

ANTICIPATE TOMORROW