SP's Land Forces Issue 03 - 2013

Volume 10 No. 3

SP’s

`100.00 (India-Based Buyer Only)

AN SP GUIDE

PUBLICATION

ROUNDUP

www.spslandforces.net

The ONLY magazine in Asia-Pacific dedicated to Land Forces

In This Issue

>> Interview

Page 5 Raising New Formations

Photographs: Anoop Kamath

While structuring a Mountain Strike Corps, we should keep in mind the following major factors which dictate its organisation and structuring: terrain and weather conditions and their impact on operations; adversary’s organisation and his force levels; likely employment of the Strike Corps; induction of modern technology; Army Aviation assets and fire support requirements in the mountains.

Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor Page 6 India’s Defence Cooperation with South East Asian countries Both the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of External Affairs need to coordinate their efforts in order to add meaningful substance to the evolving defence and security relationship with the ASEAN members as part of a composite endeavour to achieve success in the strategic objectives of its Look East Policy.

Brigadier (Retd) Vinod Anand Page 7 ‘A well structured and institutionalised planning process is in place for capability development and modernisation of the Indian Army’ Lt General Narendra Singh, the Deputy Chief of Army Staff (DCOAS) (P&S), Indian Army, in an interview with Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor, Editor, SP’s Land Forces, spoke at length about the different modernisation drives of the Indian Army. Excerpts: Page 8 Security of Central Asian Region The security interdependence between states in the region is particularly intense because of the nature of perceived security threats.

Lt General (Retd) P.C. Katoch Plus Flash Point LoC – ViewPoint Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

4

Pak Ambush at LoC– ViewPoint Lt General (Retd) Naresh Chand

4

News in Brief

11

‘There is the need for one Task Force Commander to coordinate with ITBP, NDRF and other agencies, preferably under the Army’ Lt General Anil Chait took over as the new Chief of Integrated Defence Staff to the Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee (CISC) on July 1, 2013. In an interview with Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor, Editor, SP’s LandForces, Lt General Chait elaborated on the Uttarakhand disaster which was handled by him as the Army Commander of Central Command. He spoke about the exemplary role and performance of the 8,000 soldiers deployed in the flood affected areas.

SP’s Land Forces (SP’s): When was the first formal indication given to the armed forces about their likely employment for relief and rescue operations in Uttarakhand? Was the severity of the disaster known at that time and did the local units and formations start the relief and rescue work even before the formal ‘Operation Surya Hope’ was launched?

Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (CIDS): On June 16, there were heavy rains and cloud bursts on higher reaches. On June 17 morning, forward troops in Tilwara, Harsil, Kedarnath, Badrinath and Dharchula sectors reported heavy rains and cloud bursts. Reconnaissance (recce) parties of Army were moved forward proactively and immediately to assess the situation. No

headway could be made as the bridges had been washed away and the recce parties had got stuck. This necessitated launch of additional parties. Weather did not allow flying of helicopters on recce missions either. Since inputs started arriving piecemeal, it was decided to prepare an intelligence preparation of the situation and preliminary estimates.

Applied for 3/2013 SP’s Land Forces

1

E D I T O R I A L

>> Interview As a result of the slow growth of the Indian economy in recent years, the defence budget was cut by a whopping `14,000 crore during the financial year 2012-2013, and acquisitions of new weapon systems were put on hold. This year, to start with, an uninspiring defence budget allocation was done which showed a meagre increase of only five per cent over the revised estimates. It was adversely commented by the analysts at the time of budget allocation because the defence services are involved in a major modernisation process with several acquisitions in the pipeline besides upgradation of infrastructure in the northeast along the border with China. The modernistion of all three services is way behind schedule and is adversely affecting the operational capabilities of the three services. To add to the existing woes, the fall in the value of the rupee will further reduce our purchasing power. The capital budget allocation this year is `86,740.71 crore. If we assume that 60 per cent of the total allocation will go towards the payment for past commitments, that leaves only `34,696.31 crore. If we deduct another 20 per cent because of the fall in the value of rupee, it leaves the three services with an available capital budget worth approximately

www.spslandforces.net

Simultaneously, local administration of the state too started making assessment of damage with the help of limited police network that remained functional. Inputs were obtained and fused into the matrix.

The picture started to become clear by the afternoon of June 17. In the evening, D.M. Rudraprayag requisitioned the local Army formation/units in aid to civil authorities. Overall therefore the severity of the disaster was not known initially, but as the inputs started to be collated on June 17 and 18 regarding threat to human lives, damage to bridges, formation breaches and cut off roads; it became possible to build, initial and preliminary estimates of the overall damage and put in place an adaptive planning process.

SP’s: When did the Army formally deploy troops and equipment for the rescue and relief operations in the affected areas of the state of Uttarakhand and what was the scale of initial deployment? How did the plan evolve and what changes did you have to make as you went along with the operations?

CIDS: On June 18, all formations of Central Command were simultaneously mobilised and then deployed without awaiting formal orders of requisition. The aim was to cover each of the four axes leading to forward area where damage had been reported and inputs were being received about the threat or loss of human lives as early as possible, as time was on premium.

GOC Uttar Bharat Area was tasked to move from Bareilly and deploy the Advance Headquarters of the area at Dehradun. He attended the first meeting of the State Crisis Management Committee on June 18 itself and ensured coordination and intimate cooperation with civil administration. His anchoring at Dehradun provided order and coherence to the overall plan.

On June 19, I met the Chief Minister and assured him of every possible help from the Army. The basic concept was to save every human, evacuate all pilgrims; provide medical aid/relief to the injured, establish camps/medical camps; provide food to people who were stuck in these areas and establish communication links so that rearward evacuation could be done.

The Army plan comprised of five phases which were not sequential but ran concurrently based on geographical area:  Phase I: Intelligence collection, reconnaissance, preparation of estimates and

2

SP’s Land Forces 3/2013

`27,757 crore between the three services. We are therefore looking at a bleak future for the defence preparedness of the nation.

The other staggering news concerns the “Himalayan Tsunami” or the disaster in Uttarakhand due to excessive rains and flash floods which have wiped out a large number of villages in the Garhwal region of Uttarakhand, mainly in the valleys leading to the four dhams namely Kedarnath, Badrinath, Gangotri and Yamnotri, and Hemkund Sahib. The destruction has been so enormous that the state is still not clear about the numbers killed and the number of people missing.

The Army operations in the 40,000 sq km of the area was led by Lt General Anil Chait, Army Commander, Central Command, who has now taken over as the head of the Integrated Defence Staff in the Ministry of Defence. He along with his command and control team, in keeping with the best traditions of the Army, positioned themselves well forward to make pragmatic assessments based on the situation on the ground in order to take timely decisions. An interview of Lt General Chait forms a part of this issue. The armed forces as usual rose to the occasion with alacrity, efficiency and dedication. They launched one of the

largest rescue operations, ever undertaken in the country and performed a marvellous job of providing, relief and medical facilities and evacuating the stranded pilgrims by air as well as on foot by building bridges and reconnoitring tracks on which the stranded people could move. The Indian Air Force (IAF), Army Aviation and private helicopter services did a commendable job while flying under adverse conditions of weather and visibility in those narrow valleys. They set aside the rule book and put their own lives in great danger. The nation salutes the brave hearts.

The articles in this issue include Ambush on the LoC; Part II of Mountain Strike Corps; India’s Defence Cooperation with South East Asian countries; Security of Central Asian Region; Operation Surya Hope, the rescue operation in Uttarakhand, and interview with DCOAS (P&S) Lt General Narendra Singh respectively.

deployment of advance parties. It also included deployment of forward logistics and administrative node at Gauchar.  Phase II: Deployment of soldiers/columns and evacuation along with insertion of troops in the area of Kedarnath valley. Preparation of area and shaping of land routes for ground evacuation.  Phase III: Continued evacuation through alternate land route as well as land and air means.  Phase IV: Facilitate security and handing back of areas for running of routine civil administration.  Phase V: Restoration and consolidation of military posture.

SP’s: What were the main stages of deployment and employment of Army troops and in which areas?

CIDS: On June 18, all formations of Central Command were mobilised along each of the four axes (Gangotri, Kedarnath, Badrinath and Dharchula). The mobilisation and rescue and relief operations were coordinated by a Brigade Headquarter commanded by Flag Rank officer along each axis. On commencement of operation, initially about 5,600 troops were deployed but two days later, the strength was reinforced to approximately 8,000 troops on ground and 150 Special Forces Personnel.

SP’s: What was the level of information available with the Army when the operation commenced?

CIDS: As I had said earlier, the initial information was scanty and inadequate when the operations started. Obviously the state government took time to start the process of collecting information. However, we the armed forces pressed both ground and aerial resources to carry out assessments.

SP’s: What was the overall command and control established on the ground to take care of the coordination between different agencies and with the IAF? CIDS: The Army established the Advance Headquarters at Dehradun under the GOC, Uttar Bharat Area, on June 18 itself. That set me free. I along with a core team moved forward to command and lead rescue operation in this area which spanned nearly 40,000 sq km. Evacuation, rescue and relief work along each axis was being monitored/ supervised by a Brigade Headquarters with control centres being established at Dehradun, Uttarkashi, Rudraprayag and Chamoli/

Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

generators could not be moved forward and charging facilities were scanty.

SP’s: Did the National Crisis Management Committee get in touch with you through the CISC? How were their instructions, if any, conveyed to you? What was the system followed?

CIDS: No. But our own Army and Air Force command and communication channels were active and we followed our procedures.

Joshimath. Evacuation hubs at Harsil, Bardinath and Sonprayag were handled by forward troops at the level of battalion.

Simultaneously, the Air Force was requisitioned on June 17. An Air Cmde rank officer was nominated as Air Task Force Cdr and stationed at Jolly Grant. AF HQ later detailed an AVM rank officer for coordinating the air effort.

The coordination between different agencies was carried out during daily evening meetings chaired by the Chief Secretary of Uttarakhand and attended by members representatives/all stakeholders in which the daily progress was monitored and next day’s schedule was worked out. In the forward areas, I was myself in touch with the head of civil administration at Chamoli/Joshimath, Rudraprayag/Gaucher and Uttarkashi/Pithoragarh to ensure implementation of strategy.

SP’s: What communications did you have with the forward troops and rearwards to Army HQ/Integrated Command Centre, if any, at Delhi?

CIDS: Radio sets, mobiles, Inmarsat, audio and video were used for communication.

My forward presence ensured intimate coordination between military commanders and local administration. Data links were reinforced by signals and I could directly address those waiting to be evacuated through video conferencing especially in those areas which I could not visit. Since I was in touch regularly with those waiting, it became very reassuring to evacuees in spite of their pain and suffering.

We exploited mobile communication.

Satellite communication was also very effective. We could not use radio sets as

SP’s: What was the role of the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) in the entire operation? Were the NDRF battalions employed for rescue and relief?

CIDS: NDMA is the apex national body for disaster management and is entrusted with the responsibility of laying down policies, plans and guidelines for disaster management. NDMA also moved forward one of its members to Dehradun, to lend a helping hand and provide expertise.

Two NDRF Battalions with 14 teams were deployed for the rescue and relief operations. At present nine teams are still deployed for assisting the state government.

SP’s: What was the state of preparedness of Uttarakhand state which is a disaster prone region? How did the state administration react to the news of the disaster?

CIDS: I think the disaster preparedness process is still evolving. As I said earlier, the state administration initially took some time but later they quickly aligned to the situation. The State Crisis Management apparatus was activated. They put an Additional Secretary level officer to coordinate various aspects, to critically identify resources and coordinate with us.

SP’s: What were the medical facilities established in various areas to take care of the sick and the wounded, both humans and animals?

CIDS: Twenty four medical teams were deployed by the Army in the affected areas from military hospitals located in Dehradun/Uttarkhand and services of two psychologists (specialists) from Military Hospital Bareilly and Military Hospital Jabalpur were employed to counsel the pilgrims.

Medical aid has been provided by the Army to approximately 30,000 people till date. Medical officers were tasked to give advisories to locals and pilgrims on hygiene as also on prevention measures against outbreak of any disease. Seven medical camps

Interview >> were deployed by the Army units in Harsil, Rudraprayag, Joshimath, Govindghat, Gothi, Dharchula and Gwaldam.

Veterinary teams of the Army were pressed into service for providing aid to wounded and injured cattle and animals.

SP’s: What was the arrangement for handling the aid/relief items flowing in from the hinterland? How was the entire logistics handled?

CIDS: The handling of relief being a state subject was taken care of by the civil administration. Requirements sought by the Army were provided. However, there was coordination by the Air Force and Army Aviation to airlift and drop loads from load centres located at Jolly Grant, Pithoragarh and Sarsawa to affected areas. Total tonnage dropped so far is approximately 460 tonnes by Air Force and 30 tonnes

by Army Aviation as on date. Handling of logistics was a challenging task as the loads had to be secured properly and delivered in difficult areas in bad weather conditions.

We have to look towards training of concerned agencies for air dropping palletised loads especially in view of induction of new generation aircraft/helicopters by the armed forces.

SP’s: What were the major tasks performed by the Army in terms of road opening, construction of bridges, reconnaissance of remote areas/ravines, logistics including distribution of aid items, etc?

CIDS: Army did all conceivable tasks whether chartered or not, starting from saving every human life, evacuation of the stranded, providing immediate succour, food, clothing, establishment of communications, connecting people to their near and dear ones, and facilitating in every way, every citizen and human being to come out from the jaws of imminent death.

The Engineering Task Forces were deployed along each axis and tasked to clear the landslides/breaches. The troops were tasked to construct ropeways, makeshift rope bridges and foot-over-bridges. The BRO today are employed in reconstruction process and about 100 plant equipment to include dozers, JCBs and excavators have been pressed into service in the affected areas. They have constructed two Cl III bridges at Lambagarh and Sonprayag.

One of the important decisions taken was to permit landing of helicopters being operated by civil operators at the Army helipads. At present Army patrols are providing assistance to villagers in inaccessible areas of Elagad, Tawaghat, Sobla, Chhirkilla, Bugdyar, Dharchula, Gothi, Dedang and Jibti.

The most important task however was to trudge every trail and comb the area of responsibility—find survivors, lift and assist our countrymen and shift them to relief centres. After that it was easy to evacuate them safely to the rear. I salute my soldiers to have done this task in a most exemplary manner to the satisfaction of our countrymen.

SP’s: What were the total numbers evacuated by roads and by air from various regions and what were the arrangements made? Please give us the statistics of the sorties flown by the IAF and Army Aviation?

CIDS: The rescue and relief operation in Uttarakhand was one of the biggest relief and rescue operation ever undertaken wherein more than 1,00,000 people have been evacuated from affected areas by air and road. The Army has evacuated 38,720 people by road and Army Aviation helicopters. Army Aviation employed about 14 helicopters and flew 737 sorties. They have also airlifted about 30 tonnes of load.

IAF has evacuated 21,000 people and flew 2,630 sorties employing about 45 aircraft/ helicopters. They have also airlifted about 460 tonnes of load.

SP’s: What were the major weaknesses in the civil administration and armed forces observed by you during the entire o ­ peration?

CIDS: The initial response of the civil administration was non-existent. The state administration was not visible in the forward areas and resources, warning systems and communication in forward areas were non-existent.

There is the need for one Task Force Commander in the armed forces to coordinate all resources including armed forces, IndoTibetan Border Police (ITBP), NDRF and other agencies, preferably under the Army.

There is also a need for establishing Unified Operational Emergency Control Centres which could become communication hubs.

SP’s: What have been the extent of damage to existing assets and roads and the residences of locals in Kedarnath and Badrinath sectors and elsewhere in Uttarakhand?

CIDS: All 13 districts of Uttarakhand have been affected. Out of 1,603 villages affected, 59 villages have been ravaged. About 1,000 pukka houses have been completely damaged and 2,000 partially damaged. Six hundred fifty animal sheds have been damaged and people have lost about 700 big animals and 8,500 smaller animals.

As per the assessment of BRO, there are about 270 landslides and breaches with cumulative road damage of about 8.5 km and 38.7 km respectively. Out of 140 all types of bridges damaged, 14 big bridges have been totally washed away. Initially, about 960 water schemes were damaged and about 3,760 villages affected by power cut offs. The restoration of water schemes and power supply is in progress.

There are reports of about 1,000 people dead and about 4,000 still missing.

SP’s: Media has reported the employment and deployment of Special Forces for some tasks. Could you elaborate these?

CIDS: The induction of these soldiers with special skills was with a view to locate, guide, assist and bring evacuees from inaccessible places to helipads. They are capable of living off the land and are self contained to operate in hostile environmental conditions for limited durations.

The Special Forces have capability to traverse down the cliffs. Both Garhwal and Kumaon Scouts who also have similar capabilities and skills were already committed on ground in Joshimath. Army HQ sanctioned the deployment of 150 Special Forces personnel and the High Altitude Warfare School (HAWS) instructors.

We managed to reconstitute and deploy about a column in the area of Sonprayag and Jangal Chatti and shape the space for employment of Special Forces.

SP’s: What is your overall impression of the gigantic task undertaken by the nation?

Could you give us your personal views?

CIDS: The nation has responded well to this disaster situation. Armed forces and government ministries and departments also reacted to the situation in a most professional manner.

SP’s: What are some of the major lessons that can be derived from the experience of handling this operation?

CIDS: The states are aware of the possible likelihood of the types of disaster which may occur in their respective regions. To provide relief material in a timely manner, it is important that the states identify helipads for MI-17 helicopters, where airdrops by fixed-wing aircraft can also be undertaken if helicopters cannot land due to any reason.

There is a need for training and awareness of first responders; and mapping of local assets such as dozers and JCBs should be known. All stakeholders need to sit together and conduct an audit of what they claimed and what they did. May be actual lessons will then emerge. SP

3/2013 SP’s Land Forces

3

>> Viewpoint

Flash Point LoC As a large and matured nation we should avoid getting bogged down by a border incident no matter how gruesome it may seem to be. To give Pakistan a chance to survive and engage in economic activity will in the long run be more conducive to stability in the region.  Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

H

eadlines of national dailies both in English and Hindi of August 7, 2013, were full of the news of the five soldiers of the Indian Army killed during an ambush by a border action team of the (BAT) of Pakistan Army. A sixth soldier was also injured in the same operation. An extract from Defence Minister A.K. Antony’s statement in the Parliament read: “A patrol of Indian Army comprising one non commissioned officer and five other ranks was ambushed on our side of line of control (LoC) in Punch Sector of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) early morning on August 6, 2013. In the ensuing fire fight, five Indian soldiers were killed and one injured. The ambush was carried out by approximately 20 heavily armed terrorists along with persons dressed in Pakistan Army uniforms.”

It was also stated by the Defence Minister that the numbers of infiltration attempts have doubled this year in comparison to the corresponding period (January 1-August 5) of 2012. There has also been 57 cease fire violations this year which is 80 per cent more than the violations last year during the same corresponding period. The Indian Army successfully eliminated 19 hardcore terrorists in the recent months of July and August along the LoC and in the hinterland in J&K. The effective counter infiltration

grid on the LoC has ensured that 17 infiltration bids were foiled this year.

The opposition severely criticised the Defence Minister stating that he was providing an alibi for Pakistan by saying that it was an act of terrorism and thus absolving the State from any role in this dastardly act. On August 8, 2013, the Minister said that “specialist troops” of the Pakistani Army were responsible for the killings, thus ending the impasse in the parliament. The Indian Army personnel it seems were on a routine “area domination patrol” in the stretch between the line of control and the anti-infiltration fence constructed on own side by India. Fourteen Maratha LI which had arrived in the sector recently was in the process of taking over the area and was familiarising itself with the terrain along with the personnel of the outgoing 21 Bihar battalion and therefore it was a mixed patrol that was ambushed by the Pakistan Army personnel. Pakistan, meanwhile, has vehemently denied the involvement of its troops. This was in keeping with the usual reaction of Pakistan to all such intrusions and actions on the line of control.

The larger issue that needs to be debated is whether we are being too soft in dealing with Pakistan which apart from fostering a proxy war in Kashmir, is continuing to train and encourage terrorist activities across the border through the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) in the entire state of Jammu

and Kashmir and indeed, on a lower key, in the rest of India too. It is anticipated that after the withdrawal of the US forces from Afghanistan, the battle hardened Taliban may well be diverted towards India thus increasing our security problems and commitments. This incident also seems to have marred the revival of the composite dialogue scheduled to begin later this month with the Secretary level talks over the Wullar Barrage. It is reported that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is likely to go ahead with his plan to meet Nawaz Sharif on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly meeting next month. The opposition in the meantime has warned the government against giving any quarter to Pakistan, thus virtually reducing the manoeuvre space for Manmohan Singh ahead of elections in 2014.

The larger question that remains unanswered is “should we or should we not go ahead with the talks with Pakistan”. My views on this issue are very clear that as a large and matured nation we should avoid getting bogged down by a border incident no matter how gruesome it may seem to be. We are aware that there are many power centres in Pakistan but to give their democracy a chance to survive and to engage them in economic activity will in the long run be more conducive to stability in the region. We should engage them but on our terms of putting down certain conditions on the table. The Indian Army is quite capable of taking care of itself and

can inflict punishment on Pakistan Army. The best way to make Pakistan Army desist from such acts is to severely punish them and thus dominate our area of responsibility.

In the early 1990s, insurgency in J&K was at its peak and Pakistan resorted to clandestinely establishing a post in the Indian village of Kirni in the same Poonch Sector.

In the ensuing incident of an attack by the Indian Army to evict the post and subsequent counterattacks by Pakistan Army to regain the post resulted in very heavy casualties being inflicted on the Pakistan Army by artillery fire, resulting in more than 200 soldiers killed and wounded. For the next few years, the Pakistan Army did not dare to taken any action in the Poonch sector. The lesson is that they understand the language of violence and therefore the only way to teach them is to give them a taste of their own medicine. If we know our Army they will do just that. So let us give a free hand to our Army and not get too worked up as a nation on this issue. There are many more serious concerns with regard to modernisation of the armed forces and capability building which our Defence Minister is neglecting and which needs to be seriously addressed by the ineffective UPA Government. SP The author is a specialist in armoured and mechanised warfare, and in the art of wargaming. He was the Commandant of the Army War College at Mhow.

Pak Ambush at LoC After dealing with the Pakistan Army for over six decades, the Indian Army understands it too well that Pakistani Army only understands and respects ‘violence’, and the Army needs a free hand to deal with them  Lt General (Retd) Naresh Chand

www.spslandforces.net

D

efence Minister A.K. Antony made a bland suo moto statement in both the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha on August 6 regarding the ambush by the Pakistani troops on Indian Troops on the line of control (LoC).

He said that a patrol of Indian Army comprising one Non Commissioned Officer and five Other Ranks was ambushed on our side of LoC in Punch Sector of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) early morning on August 6, 2013.

In the ensuing firefight, five Indian soldiers were martyred and one soldier injured. The ambush was carried out by approximately 20 heavily armed terrorists along with persons dressed in Pakistan Army uniforms. On August 8 he changed his statement and said, “It is now clear that the specialist troops of Pakistan Army were involved in this attack.”

He then gave out the following statistics:  The numbers of infiltration attempts have doubled this year in comparison to the corresponding period (January 1-August 5) of 2012.  There have been 57 cease fire violations this year which is 80 per cent more than the violations last year during the same corresponding period.  The Indian Army successfully eliminated 19 hardcore terrorists in the recent months of July and August along

4

SP’s Land Forces 3/2013

the LoC and in the hinterland in J&K.  The effective counter infiltration grid on

the LoC has ensured that 17 infiltration bids were foiled this year.

He strongly condemned the unprovoked incident. He also informed the house that the Government of India has lodged strong protest with Government of Pakistan through diplomatic channels.

Details of the ambush Further details emerged through the spokesman of HQs Northern Command–Udhampur. The incident happened between Cheeta and Begum post, almost three kilometers north of Chakan-da-bagh, a LoC trade point between India and Pakistan. Troops belonging to 21 Bihar Battalion (outgoing battalion) and 14 Maratha LI (relieving battalion) were deployed on the Sarla forward post along LoC in Chakan-Da-Bagh sector of Poonch and their patrol had lost contact with their HQs around 0115 hours on August 6. The attack took place 450 metres from the LoC on the Indian side. It was possible that the ambush might have been planned by the Pakistani troops to mask the infiltration of Pakistan terrorists into India which is one of the common tactics adopted for aiding infiltration; the other is providing fire to the infiltrators. Standard measures like patrolling and security measures have been heightened along the bor-

der with Pakistan after the ambush. Troops have also been placed on high alert all along the LoC. Army Chief General Bikram Singh is expected to visit the region and meet the Commanding officer and troops of 21 Bihar.

It has also been reported that Director General of Military Operations, Lt General Vinod Bhatia would speak to his Pakistan counterpart on the killing of Indian soldiers inside the LoC. Pakistan has as usual blatantly denied any involvement in the post midnight attack in Poonch sector.

Response of the Government & Opposition While replying to a debate in the Rajya Sabha, Antony said that New Delhi’s response will depend on signals and actions from Pakistan. Pakistan’s Deputy High Commissioner Mansoor Ahmed Khan was summoned by the Indian Government and a strong protest has been lodged.

The opposition took this opportunity to condemn the ambush and majority of the political parties demanded a “befitting reply” to Pakistan over the provocative act in Poonch sector of J&K. There were also demands that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh should not meet his Pakistan counterpart Nawaz Sharif in New York next month.

In the Rajya Sabha, leader of the opposition Arun Jaitley said Antony’s contention that the attack was carried out by “persons

dressed in Pakistan Army uniform” provides “an escape route” to Pakistan.

Comment The response of the Indian Army, Government of India and the opposition, has been routine and similar to other such incidents in the past. The media also will keep it alive till it has another ‘breaking news’. This time, the border ambush occurred when the Parliament session was on and the state as well national elections are on the horizon, resulting in aggravated response from the opposition. On the other hand the response of the government is rather muted and passive. Numerous such incidents have taken place since 1947 and Pakistan has always responded with violence when it gets a chance. After the failed Vajpayee-Musharraf summit during July 2001, there was attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001 which resulted in mobilisation of armies on both side of the border. After dealing with the Pakistan Army for over six decades, the Indian Army understands it too well that Pakistani Army only understands and respects ‘violence’ and the Army needs a free hand to deal with them. SP The author is a former Director General, Army Air Defence, member of Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme and member secretary of the first National Radar Council.

Mountain Strike Corps >>

Raising New Formations

The military budget of China has been increasing by double digits for more than two decades, which is quite alarming for India. In this second part of the article on the Indian Army’s new formation, the Mountain Strike Corps, find out what the Indian Army needs to focus on in order to counter China’s fast growing capabilities.  Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

W

hile structuring a Mountain Strike Corps, we should keep in mind the following major factors which dictate its organisation and structuring: terrain and weather conditions and their impact on operations; adversary’s organisation and his force levels; likely employment of the Strike Corps; induction of modern technology; Army Aviation assets and fire support requirements in the mountains. Employment of the Strike Corps having been discussed in the first part of the article, some other vital aspects of structuring are discussed in the following paragraphs.

Photograph: Indian Army

Indian Army’s Lancer helicopter in mountainous terrain

India’s Response in Terms of Infrastructure

Terrain and Weather Conditions The terrain comprises high mountains and rarified atmosphere in high altitude areas in which physical exertion takes a heavy toll on the stamina and resilience of the soldiery.

Hence acclimatisation and physical fitness of the soldiery is vital. Thus a mountain strike corps cannot be located in the plains because then the formations will have to get acclimatised before employment and their employment in high altitude areas will be restricted to start with. Therefore, the peace time location and the key location plan (KLP) of the mountain strike corps will have to be in the mountains and their unit and sub unit level training will invariably have to be done in areas similar to their areas of operational employment. Thus we can say that physical fitness, mobility and survivability, are closely linked characteristics of fighting formations in the mountains.

Weather conditions are generally such that by mid-day the skies get clouded and the weather packs up leading to rain and even thunderstorms. Thus employment of fighter/ground attack aircraft is generally confined to early hours of the morning.

Hence reliance has to be largely placed on the integral weapons of the Army and it is in this context that the Army needs its own aviation assets in the form of armed and attack helicopters located at Forward Area Arming and Refuelling Points (FAARP) for which large helipads (helidromes) have to be constructed in peacetime with underground pens for the attack helicopters.

China’s Ground Forces The military budget of China has been increasing by double digits for more than two decades. The International Institute for Strategic Studies in a 2011 report stated that if spending trends continue, China will achieve military equality with the United States in 15-20 years. Jane’s defence forecasts in 2012 estimated that China’s defence budget would increase from $119.80 billion to $238.20 billion between 2011-2015. This would make it larger than the defence budgets of all other major Asian nations combined. Hence India can ill afford to ignore the trends of military modernisation being undertaken by China.

The Annual Report to the US Congress in 2012 states: “On March 4, 2012, Beijing announced an 11.2 per cent increase in its annual military budget to roughly $106 billion. This increase continues more than two decades of sustained annual increases in China’s announced military budget.

Tibet and as many as 15 surrounding it.

The main airfields within the region include Gongar, Hoping, Pangta, Linchi and Gar Gunsa. The Gongar and Pangta airfields are being upgraded to cater to additional transients. Other additional airfields include Donshoon, Nagchuka and Shiquane. In fact, Pangta is known to have the highest elevation in the world. Further, ten new airports are planned to be constructed in the next five years. Of the 15 airfields in and around Tibet, only three are open for civilian activity. The improvements of operational airfields will impart a better rapid deployment capability to the PLA and enhance their overall mobilisation and logistics capability.

Analysis of 2000-2011 data indicates that China’s officially disclosed military budget grew at an average of 11.8 per cent per year in inflation-adjusted terms over the period.”

At the strategic level, to support the People’e Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) expanding set of roles and missions, they are ensuring sustained investment in advanced cruise missiles, short- and medium-range conventional ballistic missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles, counterspace weapons and military cyberspace capabilities.

Of particular relevance in the modernisation of the PLA Ground Forces is the transformation of ground forces into a modular combined arms brigade-focused force structure. The thrust in ground forces is on missile warfare, cyber warfare, command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capability, network-centricity, enhancement of Special Forces, increased rotary-wing aviation assets including the fielding of Z-10 attack helicopter, combined arms operations, long-range firepower and mobility.

What should be India’s thrust areas of modernisation When the above PLA capabilities are compared to India’s advancements in its ground forces modernisation; the vast gap becomes evident. India has not introduced any new weapon system, barring a few missiles and a few indigenous helicopters in the Army in the past two decades or so. Heavier weapons apart, even the basic infantry weapons which need replacement have not been changed.

A mountain strike corps is vital for the mountainous terrain of the Eastern theatre where the challenge from our principle adversary, China, is looming large

Apathy at political and bureaucratic levels, lack of professionalism, inefficiency, departmental turf wars, lack of systematic integrated planning and allocation of funds on a long-term basis, corruption and complicated procurement procedures are hall marks of India’s defence modernisation.

In light of China’s growing capabilities, the Indian Army needs to focus on acquiring certain key capabilities. These include, air transportation of troops, battlefield air support with aviation assets owned and operated by the Army, modernisation of Special Forces units, conventional missile capability, cyber warfare capability, long-range firepower and precision-guided munitions, helicopter-borne and airborne operations to hasten the achievement of tactical objectives in the mountains, infiltration techniques by units and sub units, mountain warfare techniques of capturing objectives from difficult approaches, and surveillance and reconnaissance through a wide variety of means.

China’s Infrastructure Developments China’s infrastructure developments provide an interesting study. Rapid build-up of China’s national road and rail transport system has greatly enhanced the PLA’s landbased transport capabilities. Many key civilian highway and railway projects, especially trunk rail lines and inter-provincial highways linking interior and coastal regions, have been constructed to military specifications and can be turned over to the PLA in the event of war. During China’s Eighth Five Year Plan, more than 50 national highways were built or renovated to military standards, including three roads leading into Tibet. China has developed a network of internal highways and subsidiary/feeder roads in the TAR to connect strategically significant border areas with India, Nepal, Bhutan and Pakistan by means of motorable roads. It has developed 58,000 km of road network in Tibet, including five major highways and a number of subsidiary roads. It is learnt that the PRC plans to build additional roads in the TAR to link 92 per cent of the TAR’s towns and 70 per cent of its administrative villages in the near future.

There are five operational airfields inside

The increased force levels in the Eastern Theatre will not be operationally sustainable if the road and airfield infrastructure does not keep pace with the increased strengths of personnel and transport. Not only would it be difficult to mobilise at short notice, even subsequent maintenance of the troops and equipment located in remote high-altitude areas would be difficult, and in war, sustenance of this force on limited arteries would be a nightmare. Deficiencies on the Indian side have been noted by the government especially in the border areas with China in Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh. The Border Roads Organisation (BRO) has been tasked to complete eight roads termed ‘strategic’ in Arunachal Pradesh by 2013. Only four have been completed as yet. Monika Chansoria, Senior Fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), in her paper on China’s Infrastructure developments in Tibet states: “The BRO had been directed to complete construction of 608 km of roads stretching from Ladakh to Diphu La in Arunachal, at a cost of `992 crore ($203,000,000) by 2010. As many as 75 roads with a total length of more than 6,000 km are now under construction at a cost of `5,000 crore. Besides this, 7,000 km of roads costing `12,000 crore are under various stages of construction in the northeast. The Special Accelerated Road Development Programme for the Northeast (SARDP-NE) was divided into two phases: The first phase involving 1,300 km of roads, primarily in the northeastern states, to be completed by 2010; the second phase involves 5,700 km with a 2013 deadline. Further, the Inter-Ministerial China Study Group proposed construction of at least 75 roads all along the border, of which 36 have been earmarked for Arunachal Pradesh alone.”

The Indian Air Force (IAF) has reportedly begun upgrading its advanced landing grounds (ALGs) in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh. The IAF has built four air bases in Ladakh since 2008, with plans to upgrade such bases in Arunachal in a time bound manner as well. It has been reported that India is also progressively reactivating old ALGs like the Daulat Beg Oldi, Phukche, Chushul and Nyoma airstrips in Ladakh.

Similarly, apart from building new helipads and upgrading air bases, the IAF is also going to soon start basing its Sukhoi-30 MKI fighters in larger numbers in the eastern theatre for the first time.

Continued on page 10

3/2013 SP’s Land Forces

5

>> SOUTH EAST ASIA

India’s Defence Cooperation with South East Asian countries Both the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of External Affairs need to coordinate their efforts in order to add meaningful substance to the evolving defence and security relationship with the ASEAN members as part of a composite endeavour to achieve success in the strategic objectives of its Look East Policy Photograph: PIB

 Brigadier (Retd) Vinod Anand

www.spslandforces.net

T

he dominant impulse of India’s Look East Policy that was launched in 1992 was economic and cultural, the objective being to reintegrate India economically and culturally with our civilisational neighbours of South East Asia. In December 2012, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)-India Commemorative Summit was held in New Delhi to signify two decades of India’s Look East Policy.

Growing trade ties have corresponded with the expansion of relationship in the areas of defence and security; the engagement which was primarily political and economic has acquired strategic content in the recent years. India and countries of South Asia share many threats and challenges especially in the areas of non-conventional security. India and South East Asian nations have been strengthening their defence and security relationship both at bilateral and multilateral levels to address such threats.

Defence cooperation with ASEAN members is geared primarily towards exchanges of high-level visits, strategic dialogues, port calls, training exchanges, joint exercises and provision of defence equipment.

The Prime Minster during his visit to Myanmar in April 2012 observed that both India and Myanmar need to “expand security cooperation that is vital not only to maintain peace along our land borders but also to protect maritime trade which we hope will open up through the sea route between Kolkata and Sittwe”.

Recently, India ramped up cooperation with Myanmar through high level visits by the Defence Minister A.K. Antony in January 2013, and last year through the visit of Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee and Chief of the Air Staff Air Chief Marshal N.A.K. Browne from November 26-29.

The Myanmar Army has been looking for hardware and India has been providing items such as transport aircraft, helicopters and other defence equipment. India is also focussed on expanding training and capacity building of the Myanmar armed forces.

Further, Myanmar Navy has been regularly taking part in India’s Milan series of naval exercises since 2006.

Malacca Straits is the pivotal transiting point through which most of the oil and gas transportation of India, South East and East Asian countries take place. Increasing incidence of piracy for ransom and smuggling in the high seas, which threatens uninterrupted transportation of oil and gas, has prompted these states to secure the sea lanes. Here cooperation with Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia to secure Malacca Straits and the neighbouring areas, remains strategically important.

Malacca Straits are important to both India and Indonesia and the two countries signed a Defence Cooperation Agreement in 2001 and have had regular defence exchanges including the exchange of high level visits, ship visits, officers studying in Staff Colleges in either country and joint coordinated patrols in the mouth of the

6

SP’s Land Forces 3/2013

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at the plenary session of the ASEAN-India Commemorative Summit 2012

Malacca Straits. The Indonesian Navy ships have consistently participated in the MILAN series of exercise conducted near the Andaman and Nicobar islands by the Indian Navy.

Last October, Antony visited Indonesia to attend the first Ministerial level biennial defence dialogue between the two countries.

Antony observed, “We have a vital stake in the evolution of balanced security and cooperation mechanisms through which we can build consensus and pursue dialogue.

We seek to improve our partnership with all countries in the Indian Ocean Region on bilateral basis as well as through multilateral

Malacca Straits is the pivotal transiting point through which most of the oil and gas transportation of India, South East and East Asian countries take place. Increasing incidence of piracy for ransom and smuggling in the high seas has prompted these states to secure the sea lanes.

platforms like Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), etc.”

India has also been supporting the freedom of navigation and United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) though South China Sea where some of the ASEAN countries are at the receiving end of China’s assertive policies.

Further, as part of deepening its engagement with the South East Asian countries through military-to-military relations, India has provided access to Singapore armed forces to use Indian training facilities like Air Force and Artillery firing ranges.

Singapore has signed the Defence Cooperative Agreement in 2003 and a Bilateral Agreement for the Conduct of Joint Military Training and Exercises in India. Naval exercises between both the navies are being conducted annually since 1994. In 2011, the naval exercise between both the navies was conducted in South China Sea and the shore phase of the exercise was conducted at the Changi Naval Base of Singapore.

During Antony’s visit to Singapore in June this year, India and Singapore signed a fresh agreement to extend the use of training and exercise facilities in India by the Singapore Army for a further period of five years. A bilateral agreement for utilisation of facilities in India by the Singapore Air Force and Army was signed in October 2007 and August 2008 respectively. Singapore is the only country to which India is offering such facilities.

The third country which remains important in the context of Malacca Straits

and adjoining maritime area is Malaysia.

India-Malaysia defence relations have been growing over the years after signing of Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Defence Cooperation (MIDCOM) in 1993.

The ninth meeting of the MIDCOM was held in Kuala Lumpur in January 2012. India’s Chief of the Air Staff visited Malaysia in February 2012 and Malaysia’s Chiefs of Army and Navy both visited India in April 2012. The IAF Training Team deployed in Malaysia trained Malaysian pilots on the Su-30 MKM aircraft for two-and-a-half years since February 2008. Malaysia has also been looking for training its Scorpene submarine crew and maintenance of the submarines. These are the areas where both sides can cooperate as India is also acquiring such submarines.

Thailand is another important Indian Ocean littoral state with which India shares maritime boundary. Cooperation between the two countries based on the Joint Working Group on Security established in 2003, has been now upgraded to include defence exchanges. The first meeting of India-Thailand Defence Dialogue was held in New Delhi in December 2011 and a bilateral MoU on defence cooperation was signed in January 2012. The current defence cooperation comprises regular joint exercises, coordinated maritime patrols near the international maritime boundary to counter terrorism, piracy and smuggling; training of officers at each other’s armed forces training institutions and participation as observContinued on page 9

INTERVIEW >> Photograph: Neetu Dhulia

‘A well structured and institutionalised planning process is in place for capability development and modernisation of the Indian Army’

Lt General Narendra Singh, the Deputy Chief of Army Staff (DCOAS) (P&S), Indian Army, in an interview with Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor, Editor, SP’s Land Forces, spoke at length about the different modernisation drives of the Indian Army. Excerpts: SP’s Land Forces (SP’s): In the reconstitution of responsibilities within the Army Headquarters, DCOAS (P&S) has been assigned far greater responsibilities. All the DGs of line directorates now report to him. Hence the role assigned to the DCOAS (P&S) has been enhanced considerably.

How is the system functioning? What are your views in this regard?

Deputy Chief of Army Staff (P&S) DCOAS (P&S): The reconstitution of responsibilities in the Army Headquarters (HQ) has made the functioning smoother for all line duties as well as for the DCOAS (P&S). Having said that, I would say that there has not been any paradigm change of responsibilities or the hierarchy. As the DCOAS (P&S), I am responsible for the modernisation of the Army and managing the capital budget. The system facilitates consolidating requirements which are common to all the line directorates and projecting consolidated cases for modernising the Army. This leads to economy of scales and financial prudence. In addition, it obviates the duplicity of effort and reduces the gestation time for induction of new equipment.

Arms and equipment like small arms, bullet proof jackets, night sights, vehicles and host of other equipment is being procured across the board. Various line directorates are nominated as the lead directorate for a particular type of equipment. This streamlines the procurement process, as coordination between the line directorates becomes much simpler, being directly under the DCOAS (P&S).

absorbing technology transfers; while the long-term requirements would be met by indigenous developments.

SP’s: Field Artillery’s equipment profile has been adversely affected by non-procurement of 155mm guns and howitzers, both self-propelled (SP) and towed variety, resulting in fire power deficiency in the Indian Army. This has been reported extensively in the media. Can you update us on the status of procurement of 155mm (Towed) guns to replace older generation equipment; acquisition of the 155mm/ 39 calibre ultra-light weight howitzers (ULH) which is being procured through the foreign military sales (FMS) route; procurement of 155mm self-propelled (SP) guns to fill existing voids.

DCOAS (P&S): The Army is looking at equipping Indian Artillery with state-ofthe-art fire power platforms. Towards this end, several initiatives to procure various types of 155mm guns for varied operational roles are at various stages of fructification.

A three pronged approach is being adopted, wherein the immediate requirement would be procured ex import; the medium-term requirements would be manufactured after

SP’s: L-70 guns have been with us for more than 40 years. The radars of this system have been changed many times but the gun system has not been changed. They constitute almost 50 per cent of the strength of air defence systems in the Army. What is being done in this regard?

DCOAS (P&S): L-70 guns, despite its vintage, have an effective range compatible with present day gun systems. The system has also undergone modifications for increased rate of fire, usage of improved ammunition and change of fire control radar. Currently, a two-pronged approach is being adopted for replacement of the L-70 gun, to include:  Upgradation of select number of existing guns with an improved sighting system, power laying and onboard power supply.  Procurement of a successor gun system in a phased manner to meet the balance requirement.

SP’s: Army Air Defence is in dire straits. No new equipment has been inducted in the last three decades or so. All equipment currently held is outdated and in many cases obsolescent. What are the measures being taken to rectify this situation?

DCOAS (P&S): A carefully formulated capability development plan of Army Air Defence has been put in place which is in line with the current Army Air Defence philosophy. The philosophy envisages a significant shift from point defence air defence system to theaterised employment of air defence resources. The concept of theatre air defence involves dynamic and centralised employment of air defence resources to provide layered and tiered area air defence cover against air and missile threats.

Necessary impetus is being given to progress numerous procurement cases, which are at varying stages of the procurement process. Issues of limited vendor base for technologically complex air defence systems, along with security restrictions on transfer of technology and limited indigenous capability for development of complex air defence systems had led to new equipment being inducted. These have now been addressed through research and development (R&D), transfer of technology, indigenisation and involvement of private industry.

SP’s: What is the status of Arjun Mk II and what is the plan for further induction of Arjun tanks?

DCOAS (P&S): MBT Arjun has been in operational service with the Indian Army since 2007. For an emerging world power, we have to be self-reliant, with a strong indigenous defence industry. Therefore, MBT Arjun is a step in the right direction. We are now focusing on introducing an improved MBT Arjun Mk II with upgrades, to make it a truly world class tank. The Army has clearly articulated its long-term perspective plan for induction of tanks based on its armour philosophy. MBT Arjun and its upgraded version have a defined role to play in this.

SP’s: What is the status of future main battle tank (FMBT)?

DCOAS (P&S): The FMBT will be an indigenously designed and developed tank. All stakeholders would be brought onboard as the project progresses. It would be based on the guidelines of the DPP and indigenous industry would be involved to the extent possible. The developmental project will be monitored in all stages of development, from the principal staff qualitative requirements (PSQR) stage to the bulk production, so that we get a state-of-art tank, comparable to/ better than any futuristic tank of the world.

SP’s: In the alternate fuel vehicles (AFV) seminars held in the past, the requirement of light tanks for the mountains in the east as well as in the western sector had emerged. Is there any move in this direction? It seems that an Independent Armoured Brigade is being raised for the Eastern theatre with light tanks as reported by the media.

DCOAS (P&S): The capability of an Army is an amalgam of equipment and manpower, both of which are processed in parallel for capability enhancement. The numbers required for the capability depends upon dynamics of threat assessment as well as financial prudence. To that end, Indian Army periodically carries out realistic threat assessment and formulates capability required for undertaking its mandated charter. Accordingly, modernisation and force structuring proposals are taken up with the government. As far as the equipment modernisation is concerned, any contemporary Army endeavours to maintain 30 per cent of equipment as state-of-theart. Accordingly, Indian Army also endeavours to induct new equipment/weapon platforms as per operational requirements, in step with the current trends in the world.

Towards that, various new platforms to be inducted in the Army are being considered for various arms and services.

SP’s: The overhaul of the T-72 tank is behind schedule by a few years. This will adversely affect the fleet of tanks held by the Army.

How are we planning to get over this issue?

DCOAS (P&S): As you are aware, our T-72 fleet is being overhauled along with the upgrades. Our present overhaul capacity is also being enhanced. All these steps will ensure that the complete mid-life overhaul of the tank, along with the upgrades, is completed in an acceptable time frame which meets our operational requirement.

SP’s: Long-term strategic planning is the domain of DCOAS (P&S) as well as the VCOAS? Functionally how are the responsibilities shared between the two?

DCOAS (P&S): A well structured and institutionalised planning process is in place for capability development and modernisation of the Indian Army. The VCOAS is responsible for the overall direction, evolution and coordination of these plans. DCOAS (P&S) is responsible for execution and monitoring progress of this process. The responsibilities of the two offices, though separate, are complimentary to each other.

SP’s: Is the capital budget allotted to the Army adequate considering the voids in the inventory and requirements to modernisation and induction of new technologies?

DCOAS (P&S): Though the initial allocations this year are low, there has never been a constraint of capital budget for modernisation and induction of new technologies.

Adequate budgetary support has been promised for the new schemes as well as committed liabilities.

SP’s: The Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) 2011 was formally released on January 13, 2011. One of the criticisms is that the Ministry of Defence has missed another opportunity to revamp the whole system as the initiatives introduced are of marginal nature and only aim at strengthening the stranglehold of the public sector.

What are your views on this issue?

DCOAS (P&S): DPP 2011 has evolved as a comprehensive, representative and robust compilation based on the experiences gained while undertaking defence procurements in the past. These have been taken into account while preparing a functional and acceptable DPP in line with ground realities.

The DPP has recently been reviewed. An important aspect of the review is the preferred order of categorisation for all capital Continued on page 10

3/2013 SP’s Land Forces

7

>> Central Asia

Security of Central Asian Region The security interdependence between states in the region is particularly intense because of the nature of perceived security threats. Transnational non-traditional security threats dominate the Central Asian security narrative, implying that these have an extensive impact on the region and require a regional response but regional security dynamics are defined by mutual suspicion.

Photograph: Eurostat

 Lt General (Retd) P.C. Katoch

T

he Central Asian Region (CAR) comprising Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan measures some four million square kilometers and is inhabited by just over 64 million people with most population concentrations in the Ferghana Valley, its periphery, and the north of Kazakhstan. With GDP of $166 billion and per capita GDP of $2,700, access to sea ports range from 2,770 kilometers to 5,500 kilometers. Alternation in expanses of desert and mountain ranges has led to vast unpopulated areas lying alongside other relatively densely populated areas. Many are unaware that bulk of present day Indian population has its ancestry in CAR and it is the eastward migration of CAR inhabitants centuries ago on account of drying up of river basins that led to the origin of Indus Valley Civilisation.

For the CAR, unexpected breakdown of USSR did create chaos with territorial disputes erupting overnight, but it also created new opportunities including new partners and allies. The US, Turkey, Iran, India, Pakistan, China and Russia were quick to establish relations with the new countries.

What is referred as the ‘New Great Game’ today, actually is the modern version of the traditional power plays in the region by the major players (Russia, China, the US) due to the increasing importance of Central Asia stemming from existence of vast reserves of hydrocarbons (oil and gas) and minerals like uranium, plus its strategic position as a link between major markets of Europe and Asia. The region is inexorably linked to Afghanistan with growing uncertainties post 2014. A regional security perspective must include internal dynamics of CAR and the external factors. The security paradigm in Central Asia is often not regionally interrelated and interdependent but influenced by external powers on an individual state-unit rather than regional level, multilateral security frameworks notwithstanding. CAR countries have differing attitudes towards external attempts to influence regional politics and security. For example, 80 per cent of the US investment in CAR is in Kazakhstan, which is perhaps not liked by some other CAR countries. It would not be wrong to say that Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan regard the US influence in the region as a threat in itself. Therefore, CAR countries can be expected to respond at different levels to foreign interventionist presence despite possibility of increased Taliban influence in Afghanistan.

www.spslandforces.net

Internal Dynamics Economy, unemployment, drug trade, illicit weapons are factors that contribute to instability in any country coupled with lack of governance, inept handling of social change, lack of avenues of political expression and justice. Central Asia is an area offering certain geo-economics advantages to countries or multinational corporations that have particular regional or global aspirations, due either to their own interests or to the need to neutralise other nations or companies which they see as rivals. As per the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in

8

SP’s Land Forces 3/2013

Caucasus and Central Asia, the economic outlook remains favourable, reflecting high oil prices that are benefiting oil and gas exporters, supportive commodity prices and remittance inflows benefiting oil and gas importers, and, for both groups, moderate direct exposure to Europe. The positive outlook provides an opportunity to strengthen policy buffers to prepare for any downside risks. However, the outlook on unemployment, drugs and illegal weapons, is not that bright. The economic crisis has caused millions of migrant labourers from Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to lose their jobs in the boom economies of Russia and Kazakhstan. Unemployment rates in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan are 6.1 per cent, 8.2 per cent and eight per cent respectively, which are manageable.

However, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan have unemployment rates of 60 per cent and 70 per cent respectively. This in conjunction with their immediate neighbour Afghanistan’s unemployment rate of 36 per cent, form a trilateral of instability conducive to terrorism, especially since this large unemployed segment has access to vast quantities of drugs from both Afghanistan and Iran. In 2009 itself, some 90 metric tonnes of drugs came from Afghanistan. Then is

Economy, unemployment, drug trade and illicit weapons are factors that contribute to instability in any country coupled with lack of governance, inept handling of social change, lack of avenues of political expression and justice

the problem of illegal weapons which has alarmed most CAR countries and seizures by security forces has taken place in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Gun running in CAR is endemic with illegal weapons coming from Russia, China, Iran and Pakistan, latter via Afghanistan.

In June 2012, Kyrgyzstan admitted that only half of the small arms that went missing during the country’s 2010 political and ethnic violence have been accounted for and the missing quantities are considered enough to carry out another revolution.

Another important factor contributing to instability and insecurity in the CAR is border disputes. For example, borders among Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are not properly defined. Ferghana Valley is rife with territorial disputes, especially in densely populated areas with competition for resources and friction periodically erupts into violence among Kyrgyz, Tajiks and Uzbeks. Ferghana Valley is also teeming with various extremist/ terrorist elements and their role in larger conflicts cannot be discounted. There has also been problem of rivalry like between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Serious ethnic divisions like in Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 caused hundreds of people and mostly Uzbeks killed, and over 2,000 homes and buildings destroyed.

There is also the risk that Central Asian jihadis currently fighting alongside Taliban in Afghanistan may take their struggle back home after 2014. This would increase instability and pose major difficulties for Central Asia and even China. Tajikistan already faces a threat from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a group with a vision of an Islamist caliphate that is fighting in Afghanistan alongside the Taliban.

External Factors There is no denying that USA and China are rivals competing for the booty of untapped mineral wealth and hydrocarbons, straddling the vast expanse from the XinjiangKazakh/Kyrgyz border to the western shores of the Caspian Sea. Their individual perceptions, how best their political and economic

interests can be served, differ vastly in geographical terms.  USA: At the Istanbul Conference on Afghanistan, Hillary Clinton, then Secretary of State had explained the US New Silk Road Strategy as “a web of economic and transit connections that will bind a region too long torn apart by conflict and division”. The US perceives Central Asia, South Asia and South East Asia as a region playing a crucial role in stabilising Asia, with Afghanistan as the bridge between CAR and Eurasia and South-South East Asia. However, the key problems are the outright refusal by Pakistan to provide access to Afghanistan by land to India and the US-Iran tensions on the nuclear issue. Resultantly, both the TAPI and Iran-PakistanIndia pipelines have not been realised yet. As of now, India’s access to CAR is through the Iranian port of Chahbahar.  China: China has made enormous investments in CAR; Kazakh and Uzbek oil, Turkmen gas and Kyrgyz and Tajik mineral wealth. Its geographical proximity is an enormous advantage. China already has trade with CAR to the tune of $29 billion as compared to just $500 in case of India. China also has stakes in Iranian energy resources, for which, she would like to make use of the IranTurkmenistan cooperation for oil and gas exploration and exploitation. This link once established and made functional would help China flood the Central Asian markets with its goods. China has also invested in Afghanistan including building a railroad from Logar to Kabul and China’s CNPC began Afghan oil production in October 2012, extracting 1.5 million barrels of oil annually. China has an active plan for a quadrilateral freight railroad from Xinjiang through Tajikistan, Afghanistan to Pakistan. The ultimate destination for China’s Silk Road politics is Eurasia across Central Asian Steppes or the heartland of the Turkic region and the former Eastern Europe.

China envisages rail, road and oil/gas pipelines through this heartland and numerous arteries feeding it from south and finally landing in the European Continent. China’s CNPC built a pipeline connecting China’s eastern coast with gas fields of Turkmenistan in just 18 months in 2007-2008 and is extending it to reach the Caspian Sea. CNPC plans to expand its natural gas network to all five Central Asian states and Afghanistan in the next five years. China has also taken on the region’s highway, railroad and electricity transmission challenges through very difficult terrain for Chinese goods to reach Europe, the Middle East and Chinese-built ports in Pakistan and Iran. But there are downsides to the China-CAR relationship with growing belief of economic hegemony laced with negative images of environmental depredation by Chinese mines, bad working conditions in Chinese plants, and Chinese businessmen squeezing out competitors with liberal bribes to officials. The nationalist sentiment in the region also views with suspicion Chinese demographic invasion including

Central Asia illegal immigrants. Beijing is starting to take tentative political and security initiatives in the region through Shanghai Corporation Organisation (SCO) but this organisation has proved ineffective in times of unrest. Beijing’s major concern also is the security and development of its Xinjiang Autonomous Region, which shares 2,800 kilometers of borders with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

The core of its strategy seems to be creation of close ties between Xinjiang and Central Asia, with the aim of reinforcing both economic development and political stability. China has been engaging Taliban to induce them to scale back their perceived support for Uighur separatist groups, such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM). Yet, Chinese policymakers have yet to come up with a clear plan to work toward stability in both Afghanistan and Central Asia while ruling out any military intervention even in a case of extreme unrest.

But if Chinese investments and national interests are threatened, they may force to do so. On balance, China’s CAR policy rests on four objectives; keeping Uighur separatists down, keeping north-eastern neighbours stable, managing natural resources effectively and continuing to develop new markets.  Russia: Russia is determined to maintain interests and access in Central Asia by dominating the security framework through Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and controlling major pipelines that allow resources to enter and exit the region. In addition to economic, labour and stability interests, Russian interests also lie with the large Russian populations in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. More recently, Russia is attempting to integrate CAR countries into the Eurasian Union that creates a dilemma for the countries in the region albeit Kazakhstan seems to have decided to join. Whether CAR countries, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan in particular, will join Russia’s Eurasian Union or tilt

to China is the test for influence in the region. Eurasian Union would have negative effect on the investment that China has made on both sides of its border. Erection of a Russia controlled tariff barriers will adversely affect China’s trade with CAR.  Iran: Iran has already invested $340 million in the development of Chahbahar port and India’s contribution is over 100 million dollars. At the same time, India has invested over 136 million dollars in the construction of Afghan Ring Road Highway (Helmand sector) that will be connecting Chahbahar with Kabul and thus provide Kabul access to Indian Ocean. This fits with the Russian concept of constructing NorthSouth corridors. Devoid of land access through Pakistan, this is the avenue for India to connect with Central Asia. Iran is eager to develop its eastern region and expand its trade with Afghanistan and Central Asia, and is also working to link Mashshad with Herat in Afghanistan.

The Chahbahar-Kabul link for trade and commerce will enable oil and gas rich Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan to reach the South East and South Asian markets. This route will also suit western nations in addition to via Caspian Sea.  Afghanistan: As per a report on the cost of the US war in Afghanistan from 2002 to 2013, released by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, USA on January 14, 2013, if all figures for FY 2001-FY 2013 that follow are totaled for all direct spending on the war, they reach $641.7 billion, of which $198.2 billion—or over 30 per cent—will be spent in FY2012 and FY2013. This is an incredible amount of money to have spent with so few controls, so few plans, so little auditing, and almost no credible measures of effectiveness. The vital revelation is that vast majority of the aid went to the Afghan National Security Forces and not development. This implies that the US was

never bothered about economic security of Afghanistan and with reduced troop strength post 2014, will be content with holding on to Northern Afghanistan as buffer to ensure Taliban do not reach the CAR. Therefore, a certain amount of chaos in South and East Afghanistan is very possible.

Regional Security Paradigm Threats and problems that confront the CAR can be summarised as follows:  Centrifugal forces causing disparity, rivalry, lack of trust.  Weak economy, political systems and corruption.  Security crisis; border and ethnic conflicts, drugs, radicals.  Taliban threat post 2014 through Afghanistan.  The US, China, Russia rivalry plus CSTO and SCO promoting geopolitical ambitions and concerns of Russia and China respectively.  Increasing PLA capacity and modernisation.

Regional Security Architecture The security interdependence between states in the region is particularly intense because of the nature of perceived security threats. Transnational non-traditional security threats dominate the Central Asian security narrative, implying that these have an extensive impact on the region and require a regional response but regional security dynamics are defined by mutual suspicion. Over the past few years, SCO and CSTO appear to be staking out complementary rather than competing mandates.

There appears to be under-the-surface competition between the two groups. The new International Crisis Group (ICG) writes in its report titled “China’s Central Asian Problem” that Russia continues to seek military influence in Central Asia but has become increasingly distrustful of the SCO and Chinese intentions. It also notes that China has not been able to match its ambitious economic moves with political and

>>

military muscle because of strong Russian influence in CAR security structures. Russia continues its monopoly of arms sales to CAR. Therefore, relations between CSTO and SCO remain uncertain and potentially competitive but these organisations have proved ineffective in crisis. ICG assesses that in case of a power vacuum in the region, even if either China or Russia is willing to intervene militarily in Central Asia, China may take the lead. However, this ICG assessment is just one view. Post 2014, there is also good chance of Afghanistan increasingly integrating with Afghanistan and SCO assuming greater role in Afghanistan.

Simultaneously, there is also possibility of more CSTO-NATO cooperation since China cannot provide security for its investments in the region, particularly Afghanistan, and Russia understands adverse effects of radical dispensation in Kabul.

Indian Concerns Despite all the overtures made to Pakistan over the decades by India including grant of the MFN status, a radicalised Pakistan obsessed by hatred has continued not to open trade and grant MFN status to India and facilitate the land route for India to trade with Afghanistan and CAR. South Asian markets, especially India, are important to CAR and Afghanistan for trade and easy business.

Concurrently, India needs the hydrocarbons of CAR for its energy needs. Indian goods have been routed to Afghanistan through the Chahbahar port in Iran and through Dubai and will continue to do so also with the CAR while Pakistan brews in its own stew.

Security Perspective The regional security perspective in CAR is fluid and has varied possibilities. Finally, the quantum US troops in Afghanistan post 2014, Pakistan’s capacity of mischief, the posture of Taliban, level of instability in Afghanistan and possibility of another international force (like from OIC countries) are a matter of speculation but CAR countries certainly need to integrate more intimately into the security framework. SP

India’s Defence Cooperation with...continued from page 6 ers in military exercises. Defence Minister A.K. Antony visited Bangkok in June this year. The two Ministers reviewed regional security situation and expressed their support for collaborative regional mechanisms such as Asian Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) for maintaining regional peace and security, freedom of navigation, keeping open sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and cooperation in areas such as anti-piracy, disaster relief and rescue.

Securing SLOCs and Malacca Straits is also important for the South East countries like Vietnam that has intensified its defence relationship with India. For the ASEAN countries it is geo-strategically prudent to forge a defence relationship of a greater or lesser degree with India and/or the US as some sort of balance of power arrangements possibly against a rising and assertive China, is hardly going to remain status quoits.

A MoU between Vietnam and India was signed in 2009 for defence cooperation though the defence exchanges between both the nations started prior to this period.

India and Vietnam face a common challenge from China and both have been target of muscular policies of China. Some of the engines of Vietnamese MiG-21 aircraft have been overhauled in India. There are also mechanisms for sharing of strategic perceptions and naval cooperation between the two countries. Coordinated patrols by the Vietnamese sea–police and the Indian Coast Guard are conducted jointly in addition to training of Vietnamese Air Force pilots.

Besides providing some defence equipment, India has also been helping Vietnam to set up a domestic defence industry.

Similarly, India has defence cooperation and exchanges with Cambodia, Laos, Brunei and Philippines. For instance, India is setting up an Air Force Academy in Laos. An Indian military delegation led by the Army Chief visited Laos in December 2011. Discussions revolved around ongoing defence cooperation initiatives between India and Laos. The Army Chief reaffirmed commitment to the capacity building of the Lao People’s Army and discussed a range of defence cooperation initiatives with the

With defence cooperation between the two countries having been formally established through the 2006 Philippines-India Agreement Concerning Defence Cooperation, Indian Navy and Coast Guard ships regularly visit the Philippines

Lao Army leadership. The delegation visited the Kaysone Phomvihane Academy for National Defence, where a two-member training team from the Indian Army has been in place for the last 15 years.

Exchange of visits of defence officials, goodwill visits by Indian naval ships to Cambodia’s ports, gift of medical equipment and other stores and imparting of training courses to Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) personnel in demining and peacekeeping operations have been part of the defence exchanges. On the security front, India and Cambodia have signed an Agreement on Combating International Terrorism, Organised Crimes and Illicit Drug Trafficking in December 2005. With Brunei there has been some degree of defence cooperation with Indian naval ships participating in the first-ever Brunei International Fleet Review to mark the 50th anniversary of Royal Brunei Armed Forces.

With defence cooperation between the two countries having been formally established through the 2006 Philippines-India Agreement Concerning Defence Cooperation, Indian Navy and Coast Guard ships regularly visit the Philippines. The participation of officers of the armed forces of both countries in various specialised training courses in each other’s countries has increased.

There are also arrangements for sharing of intelligence and perceptions on certain other sensitive issues. To enhance the defence cooperation further, a Joint Defence Cooperation Committee was constituted which had its first meeting in Manila in January 2012.

At the multilateral level, India has also become a member of ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meet–Plus Eight (ADMM-Plus). The basic objective of creating this framework was to bring about cooperative security, especially in the areas of humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, maritime security, counter-terrorism and peacekeeping operations. ADMM-Plus Eight has also proposed furthering of bilateral and multilateral dialogue and sharing of expertise among the military forces of member states. The arrangement also advanced proposals to counter particular threats and issues such as piracy and natural disaster through joint military exercises.

Both India and ASEAN members have been on an upward economic trajectory and as they grow, the security and strategic environment has also been becoming complex. While these nations have been in a beneficial economic relationship with India and China, they remain wary of China’s growing assertion and irredentist tendencies. India’s efforts in defence cooperation with ASEAN also aims at addressing its own strategic concerns both in Indian Ocean littoral as well as in South China Sea. Both the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of External Affairs need to coordinate their efforts in order to add meaningful substance to the evolving defence and security relationship with the ASEAN members as part of a composite endeavour to achieve success in the strategic objectives of its Look East Policy. SP

3/2013 SP’s Land Forces

9

>> Mountain Strike Corps / INTERVIEW Raising New Formations...continued from page 5 Technology Globally, the focus is on military capabilities that make maximum use of modern electronics and computers to improve combat capabilities at modest cost. This philosophy is termed as system of systems approach to military modernisation, as it places less emphasis on major weapons platforms than on what they carry and how they are networked. One could categorise the most important technologies into two groups: advanced precision munitions and information networks involving sensors and communication systems. In the mountains, long-range firepower is also essential so as to ensure support from own side of the border without having to move forward too often.

In the mountains, foot mobility of the soldier is impaired by the rugged terrain and high altitude effects which degrades the soldier’s physical capacity. This demands Spartan and self-reliant characteristic and an ability to employ traditional movement methods such as with porter, pony and man-pack. As a part of modernisation and capability building exercise, helicopters designed to operate at higher altitudes are a vital component of land forces operating in the mountains. This capability will impart both mobility and flexibility to land forces in the mountains and will tend to hasten the achievement of the

mission. Personal weapons, clothing and equipment of the soldiers will have to be light and rugged. Personal weapons will have to be integrated with night sights. Surveillance capability has to be inbuilt at the lower tactical levels apart from its availability at operational and strategic levels. High physical fitness levels and a robust mental attitude, especially to fight high-altitude warfare, is an inescapable requirement.

Aviation Assets Conflicts in the mountains are a likely scenario, in our context, both in our eastern and northern borders. In these settings, Army Aviation assets will play a pivotal role and will constitute the key element of a commander’s plans. The Army Aviation apart from being a force multiplier is the only integral element which can impart mobility and flexibility in the mountains. Other types of mobility are handicapped because of the terrain and weather conditions. Hence a higher capability in this regard can tilt the balance in any conflict. It would be pertinent to mention here that both our adversaries, China and Pakistan, have fully evolved Army Aviation Corps consisting of all class of helicopters including attack helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft as part of their inventory, whereas the Indian Army currently

possesses only light observation helicopters with some armed capability being inducted in the next few years. The Army at the operational level of a Corps, is looking at an attack/armed helicopter unit, a reconnaissance and observation helicopter unit and a light/tactical battle support helicopter unit with each of its Corps in the plains, deserts and in the mountains. The heavy-lift helicopters and light fixed-wing aircraft, which is also on the wish list of the Army, when created would be command/theatre assets, for enhancing the logistics and lift capability as well as their utilisation for command and control purposes. In the absence of adequate and suitable infrastructure on our eastern borders this could be a very critical resource.

The concept of Corps Aviation Brigades has already been implemented, the first one being already effective in 14 Corps with three helicopter units under its command.

Equipping the Manpower A mountain strike corps is vital for the mountainous terrain of the Eastern theatre where the challenge from our principle adversary, China, is looming large. China has laid claim over the entire territory of Arunachal Pradesh. Under the circumstances, India has no option but to engineer a potent defensive and offensive capability in the Eastern

Theatre. However, the mere availability of manpower of two or three mountain/infantry divisions without the necessary equipment and force multipliers will not impart any additional capability. Our procurement process is in such a bad state that no new weapon system has been inducted in the last two decades or so in the Army. The procedure is so complicated and lengthy that both the buyer and the seller get tired by the end of it.

A process which should take 24-36 months actually takes about 8-10 years or more and thus by the time the equipment is inducted, it is considered technologically outdated.

Deterrence has been defined as the prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is also defined as a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction. It is also accepted by military strategists that deterrence is a product of military capability plus political will to use the capability when required. India’s self image and its perceived image abroad do not qualify the nation to be in this league despite the military capability it may acquire. Hence this is one area we need to pay attention to, apart from our decision-making and procurement process, if our deterrence has to work. SP (Concluded)

‘A well structured and institutionalised planning process is...continued from page 7 procurement cases. In this, “Buy Indian” and “Buy & Make (Indian)” will be the preferred categorisation. Procedures for “Buy & Make (Indian)” category have also been simplified. This is likely to give boost to indigenous production and bolster the participation of Indian industry in the defence sector.

www.spslandforces.net

SP’s: How is our offset policy being made more practical?

DCOAS (P&S): The revised defence offset guidelines were ratified in July 2012. These guidelines have addressed major policy issues relating to expanding avenues for discharge of offset obligations through transfer of technology (ToT)/transfer of equipment (ToE) as valid means of offset discharge. Further, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has been permitted to acquire a selected list of core technologies as part of offset obligations from foreign vendors. In order to incentivise foreign companies to engage India’s micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs), the revised guidelines have also, for the first time, allowed multipliers of up to three for technology acquisition by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). Extension of banking period to seven years as against earlier period of two years will further facilitate the efficient discharge of offset obligations in the long term. The revised offset guidelines provide a relatively stronger monitoring system by way of creating a Defence Offsets Management Wing (DOMW) to replace the erstwhile Defence Offsets Facilitation Agency (DOFA), with more powers in terms of post contract management.

SP’s: What is the Army’s policy on sensors and surveillance devices and what is their status? In this we may include surveillance satellites, UAVs, LORROS, night vision devices, radars and other ground sensors.

How far have we progressed in this direction?

DCOAS (P&S): Battlefield surveillance is one of the most important force multipliers. Our surveillance philosophy caters to gap free surveillance from forward to depth areas. The sensors to be procured for strategic to tactical surveillance, have also been identified. These include aerostats, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), battlefield surveillance radars, weapon locating radars, long-range electrooptical sensors, sound ranging systems, etc.

10

SP’s Land Forces 3/2013

Aerostats equipped with surveillance radars and real time communication links have been planned to be inducted. The Heron, a medium-altitude, long-endurance UAV, has been acquired in addition to the Searcher I and II UAVs. Medium-range battlefield surveillance radars (BFSRs) have been introduced into the inventory of Army’s surveillance and target acquisition (SATA) units for enhancing the mediumrange ground surveillance capability of the Army. The long-range observation system (LORROS) provides day and night surveillance capability. Development of Nishant remotely-piloted vehicle designed by the DRDO, to undertake battlefield surveillance, reconnaissance, real-time engagement of targets by artillery fire-and laser designation has been successfully completed. In addition, we are also going in for enhancing the night fighting capability of our soldiers and combat systems. It can thus be seen that the requirement is being addressed in a holistic manner.

SP’s: Reconnaissance and Surveillance Troops and Platoons of Armoured Regiments and Mechanised Infantry units respectively, can be excellent assets in war, if equipped appropriately. Is anything being done in this regard?

DCOAS (P&S): The Reconnaissance Troops and Platoons of Armoured Regiments and Mechanised Infantry Battalions are force multiplying assets and are the ‘eyes and ears’ of the Combat Group Commander.

While so far they are based on light wheeled vehicles, we are now working towards equipping them with specialised light armoured multipurpose (LAM) vehicle. These vehicles will have adequate firepower and state-ofthe-art electronics and optronics. In addition, mini-unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are also planned to be inducted to provide reconnaissance support and extended reach to the Commanders on the field.

SP’s: What is the growth pattern of the Army Aviation which is a vital element of our offensive and defensive capability? By when will our Cheetah and Chetak helicopters be replaced?

DCOAS (P&S): Army Aviation Corps since it’s raising, has transformed itself into a

full-fledged arm and is poised to further grow exponentially, in tune with the capability development plan of the Army. The inherent knowledge of the Army aviators of ground warfare; and their affinity for troops on ground, makes Army Aviation a battle wining quotient for effect-based operations and tactical battle centric operations.

In the medium and long term, Army Aviation will have varied capability of reconnaissance, utility, armed and attack helicopters to respond swiftly and effectively to the Field Force Commander’s requirement.

As regards the Cheetah and Chetak helicopters; Cheetal and advanced light helicopter (ALH) are being inducted into the armed forces. Replacement helicopter are also being looked at. In addition, there are a large number of developmental projects in the pipeline like the light utility helicopter.

SP’s: The Army needs dedicated attack helicopters operated by the Army and in direct support of field formations in war.

What are implications of the latest government notification in this regards?

DCOAS (P&S): The future battlespace will witness complex, swift, short and very violent application of combat resources by the field force commanders who will need to ‘look, move and strike deep’. In order to gainfully employ and optimise the tasking of attack helicopters in the tactical battle area, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) has vested the ownership of attack helicopters with the Army.

Army Aviation as a manoeuvre arm in third dimension with its enhanced strike capability of attack helicopters will play a very decisive and lethal role; and provide intimate combat support to Battle Groups in the tactical battle area. Induction of these in the Army would be carried out in accordance with the capability development plans of the Indian Army.

SP’s: What is the status of the project future infantry soldier as a system (F-INSAS)? It does not seem to have progressed much.

DCOAS (P&S): Project F-INSAS perceives the soldier as a system—a situation aware soldier capable of performing multiple roles in battle. His weapon, sight, surveillance system and communication equipment will be an integrated system. It is designed to enhance an individual soldier’s capabilities

in terms of increasing his lethality while providing him necessary protection at the same time. We have moved from concept stage to execution stage of the project. In the initial phase, priority is being accorded to weapon systems, enhancing night vision, protection and battlefield mobility capabilities. The weapons and equipment are at various stages of procurement process and the project is progressing well.

SP’s: What is the progress of our efforts to modernise the Infantry at unit and sub unit level with particular reference to firepower, mobility, surveillance and reconnaissance and night fighting capability?

DCOAS (P&S): The future wars are likely to be different from the ones we have fought in the past. Full scale conventional conflicts are likely to recede, giving way to sector specific, short, intense and destructive battles under a nuclear backdrop. In addition, we shall be witnessing a fusion of insurgency and terrorism with the operational environment having a high degree of ambiguity. Hence, it is imperative that we build our capabilities to face the entire spectrum of conflict, from asymmetric to conventional war under a nuclear backdrop.

Modernisation of the Infantry is being addressed on priority. State-of-the-art assault rifle and carbine are currently under advanced stages of procurement and shall be instrumental in enhancing firepower and lethality at the soldier level. To cater to the anti-tank defence at Infantry Battalion level, third generation, fire and forget anti-tank guided missiles and rocket launchers are being procured.

Enablement of the infantry to enhance the surveillance and effective engagement at night is the key priority area. Short-range battlefield surveillance radar (BFSR) coupled with mini unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) would further enhance the surveillance capability of an infantry commander. The initiatives in the field of mobility includes induction of high mobility vehicles, light specialist vehicles and superior troop and load carriage vehicles, lending enhanced mobility in all terrain scenario.

The vision of the Infantry is to have a fully-empowered soldier equipped with weapons and equipment which has a decisive technological edge over its adversary. SP

news in brief >> Indian MoD to invest $0.1 trillion for futuristic warfare weapons The Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD) is planning to acquire a wide range of advanced domestically manufactured equipment at the cost of `6 trillion ($0.1 trillion) to help prepare the armed forces for futuristic warfare over the next 15 years.

Involving robots, precision-guided missiles and watchdog satellites, the procurement is scheduled to be carried out ‘without compromising transparency, fairness and probity at any level’. The release of the MoD’s Technology and Capability Roadmap (TCR) document represented the Ministry’s effort to make both the domestic private and public sector industry aware about the requirements of the armed forces. Highlighting the importance of robots in ground battles, the document said the systems would be required by the Army for assistance during surveillance, reconnaissance, anti-mine and anti-improvised explosive devices (IED) role, as well as urban area combat and casualty extraction missions.

DRDO to develop robotic soldiers for futuristic warfare The Indian Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is currently working on development of robotic soldiers to boost the country’s unmanned fighting capabilities for future combat operations. Adding India to a select list of countries pursuing similar endeavour, the robots are expected to be manufactured with a very high level of intelligence to enable identification between a threat and an ally. DRDO chief Avinash Chander has said that the robots will feature very high level of intelligence than actually what is currently available. “It is a new programme and a number of laboratories are already working in a big way on robotics.”

Italian Army’s first ICH-47F Chinook completes maiden test flight

AgustaWestland has successfully completed the first test flight of the Italian Army’s first ICH-47F Chinook transport helicopter at its facility in northern Italy. Basic handling tests and main systems checks were carried

>> Show Calendar 13-15 August Integrated Air and Missile Defence Brazil Carlton Hotel Brasilia, Brasilia, Brazil www.airmissiledefencebrazil.com 26-28 August Actionable Intelligence for Defense and Homeland Security Washington Plaza, Washington, D.C., USA www.actionableintelsummit.com

out by the helicopter, which performed as expected during the 15 minute test flight.

Sixteen CH-47F Chinook helicopters were ordered by the Italian Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) General Directorate of Air Armaments (ARMAEREO) from AgustaWestland under a €900 million contract signed in May 2009. Along with options for an additional four helicopters, the contract also includes a five-year logistic support service package.

The US Department of Defense (DoD) has signed a contract with Russia for additional Mil Mi-17V5 military transport helicopters to be delivered to the Afghan National Army (ANA). The contract was agreed between the two parties as part of a joint effort to combat terrorism. It was signed between Russian state-arm-exporter Rosoboronexport and the US Army in Paris, France, RIA Novosti has reported citing a statement from Russia’s Federal Service for MilitaryTechnical Cooperation. Without providing any information regarding the contract value and number of helicopters to be supplied, the statement also highlighted that the two sides expressed hope to extend cooperation in the defence and technology sector. Rosoboronexport deputy head Alexander Mikheyev later claimed the contract was to cover delivery of 30 Mi-17V5 helicopters but declined to reveal its value.

Russian MoD to send 250 soldiers for INDRA 2013 exercise The Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) is planning to send 250 military personnel to participate in the counter-terrorism combat exercise, code-named INDRA, scheduled to be carried out with the Indian Army in October 2013. The annual drills will witness participation from more than 250 servicemen from Russia’s Eastern Military District and the same number of Indian soldiers, RIA Novosti reported citing a statement from the district’s press service. Scheduled to be carried out at the Mahajan Field Firing Range (MFFR) in Bikaner, Rajasthan, India, the drill is for training soldiers in joint planning and execution of anti-terrorist missions in a semi-desert environment, the statement added. The final planning stage for the exercise is scheduled to be conducted in Bikaner in August. A battalion-level exercise, INDRA is aimed at enhancing defence cooperation and interoperability, as well as strengthening military-to-military relations between the two armies.

US Army awards $4 billion Chinook contract to Boeing

Editor Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor Assistant Group Editor R. Chandrakanth Senior Technical Group Editor Lt General (Retd) Naresh Chand Air Marshal (Retd) B.K. Pandey

Assistant Editor Sucheta Das Mohapatra

Army Chief General Bikram Singh visited the flood affected state of Uttarakhand on June 28 to laud the efforts of soldiers and junior leaders who saved the lives of fellow countrymen while risking their own lives.

Interacting with the soldiers on ground, the Army Chief appreciated their valiant efforts to search, locate, establish contact and then conduct rescue, relief and evacuation operations on an unprecedented scale. Interacting later with the journalists at Gaucher, the Army Chief said that large number of soldiers hails from Uttarakhand and their own families have suffered. Unmindful of their personal concerns, the soldiers took active part in relief and rescue operations. In fact, some even refused to take leave and get back to their home to attend their kith and kin.

India to remain favourite Aerospace, Defence Destination India is poised to become a favourite destination for global aerospace and defence sector players with total offset opportunity for the commercial segment in the country set to cross $10 billion mark in 2013. With the government raising the foreign investment limit from 26 per cent to 49 per cent in the defence sector in 2013, the country is likely to witness the next rush of investments, as per a recent study by Deloitte, a global consultancy firm. According to Deloitte Aerospace and Defence Outlook 2013, while the global defence industry is expected to shrink, the growth in Indian defence sector is on the surge. The report entailed that milestones in certain deals are expected to be achieved in 2013, such as for submarines, missiles, and the Indian Air Force (IAF) medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA), apart from new joint ventures that are likely to be signed between Indian private and overseas companies. The government is determined to focus on indigenisation with increasing presence of Indian companies and also giving cost advantages relating to basic design and engineering services, components, and assemblies manufacturing. The total offset contracts of value more than $4.5 billion to $5 billion have been signed by Indian companies with foreign companies since the offset policy came into effect in 2005. SP

 Lt General Anil Chait has taken over

Boeing has been awarded a $4 billion contract for delivery of 177 CH-47F Chinook medium-to-heavy-lift helicopters to the US Army. Representing a cost-effective alternative to the annual contracts, the multi-year contract also features options, which if exercised by Army could increase the total number of aircraft to 215. Expected to help the US Government save more than $800 mil-

Publisher and Editor-in-Chief Jayant Baranwal

Contributing Editor Air Marshal (Retd) Anil Chopra

APPOINtMENTs

18-20 September Military Airlift 2013 Melsbroek Air Base, Brussels, Belgium www.militaryairliftevent.com

9-11 October Military Helicopter India The Oberoi, New Delhi, India www.militaryhelicopterindia.com

Army Chief visits Uttarakhand

US DoD orders additional Mi-17 helicopters from Rosoboronexport

10-13 September DSEi ExCeL, London www.dsei.co.uk

30 September -2 October Armoured Vehicles Turkey Hilton Istanbul, Istanbul, Turkey www.armouredvehiclesturkey.com

lion, the contract also eventually brings the Army’s CH-47F total procurement close to its intended target of 464 aircraft, including 24 units for replacement of peacetime attrition aircraft. The US Army Cargo Helicopters Project Manager Colonel Robert Barrie said the multi-year contract provides unprecedented savings for the US Army and taxpayers.

as the Chief of Integrated Defence Staff to Chiefs of Staff Committee (CISC).  Lt General Rajan Bakshi has taken over as General Officer Commanding-in-Chief Central Command at Lucknow.  Lt General Sanjiv Chachra has taken over as Chief of Udhampur based Northern Command of the Army.  Lt General Sanjeev Madhok has taken over as General Officer Commandingin-Chief of the Army Training Command at Shimla.

Contributors India General (Retd) V.P. Malik, Lt General (Retd) Vijay Oberoi, Lt General (Retd) R.S. Nagra, Lt General (Retd) S.R.R. Aiyengar, Air Marshal (Retd) Vinod Patney, Major General (Retd) Ashok Mehta, Major General (Retd) G.K. Nischol, Brigadier (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, Brigadier (Retd) S. Mishra, Rohit Sharma Chairman & Managing Director Jayant Baranwal Executive Vice President (Planning & Business Development) Rohit Goel Administration Bharti Sharma Senior Art Director Anoop Kamath Design Vimlesh Kumar Yadav, Sonu Singh Bisht Research Assistant: Graphics Survi Massey Sales & Marketing Director Sales & Marketing: Neetu Dhulia General Manager Sales: Rajeev Chugh SP’s Website Sr. Web Developer: Shailendra P. Ashish Web Developer: Ugrashen Vishwakarma Published bimonthly by Jayant Baranwal on behalf of SP Guide Publications Pvt Ltd. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, photocopying, recording, electronic, or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publishers.

Printed in India

by Kala Jyothi Process Pvt Ltd © SP Guide Publications, 2013 Subscription/ Circulation Annual Inland: `600 • Overseas: US$180 Email: subscribe@spguidepublications.com subscribe@spslandforces.net Letters to Editor editor@spslandforces.net For Advertising Details, Contact: neetu@spguidepublications.com rajeev.chugh@spguidepublications.com SP GUIDE PUBLICATIONS PVT LTD Corporate Office A 133 Arjun Nagar, Opp Defence Colony, New Delhi 110 003, India Tel: +91(11) 24644693, 24644763, 24620130 Fax: +91 (11) 24647093 Regd Office Fax: +91 (11) 23622942 Email: info@spguidepublications.com Representative Offices Bengaluru, INDIA Air Marshal (Retd) B.K. Pandey 204, Jal Vayu Vihar, Kalyan Nagar, Bangalore 560043, India.

Tel: +91 (80) 23682204 MOSCOW, RUSSIA LAGUK Co., Ltd, Yuri Laskin Krasnokholmskaya, Nab., 11/15, app. 132, Moscow 115172, Russia.

Tel: +7 (495) 911 2762, Fax: +7 (495) 912 1260 www.spguidepublications.com www.spslandforces.net RNI Number: DELENG/2008/25818

3/2013 SP’s Land Forces

11