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the author was the Flag officer Commanding-inChief, Southern naval Command from July 2018 till he retired on november 30, 2021. He is a navigation and direction specialist. He was also the director General, naval operations and the Chief of Personnel. He commanded the Western Fleet from august 2013 to october 2014 and oversaw the integration of Vikramaditya into the in’s concept of operations. on promotion to the rank of Vice admiral he took over as the director General naval operations on december 31, 2014. He was the Chief of Personnel of the indian navy from May 2016 to July 2018. n
aRtiCle on PaGe 25, 29, 127
Colonel alok Mathur retired from indian army in 2012 after 33 years of service. He did his Ma in economics from delhi university and Master of Social Work from Pune university. He also holds a nCC ‘C’ Certificate air Wing. He joined indian Military academy 65 Regular Course and was commissioned on december 22, 1979 in an armoured Regiment. He had tenure with national Security Guards, assam Rifles, national Cadet Corps and defence Research & development organisation. after retirement he has been writing on military operations and current affairs. His over 60 articles have been published in various professional journals and websites. n
aRtiCle on PaGe 61
a fighter pilot, test pilot, and a pioneer of Mirage 2000 fleet in the indian air Force (iaF). Has commanded operational airbases in both Western and eastern sectors. Retired as air officer Personnel, he was also responsible for education and training in the iaF. He is currently director General, Centre for air Power Studies (CaPS). Has been a member of the armed Forces tribunal, lucknow bench, and member of the executive Council of Jawaharlal nehru university (Jnu). He has over 400 published articles on air power and strategy. n
aRtiCle on PaGe 33, 123
He spent over three decades in the indian navy as a Submariner and is an anti-Submarine warfare Specialist. He has held five command tenures on frontline platforms including four submarine commands. He was the naval adviser at the indian High Commission, london and after retiring was Senior
Vice President of a leading european MnC in india. Currently he is Vice President, indian Maritime Foundation. He is also former Co-Chairman, national defence and aerospace Committee, associated Chambers of Commerce (aSSoCHaM) and a former member, defence audit advisory board. n
aRtiCle on PaGe 9
ambassador anil trigunayat is a former indian ambassador to Jordan, libya and Malta and presently is the distinguished Fellow at the Vivekananda international Foundation and associated with several think tanks apart from commenting on foreign policy and international relations especially in West asia, africa and Russia. n
aRtiCle on PaGe 1
Major General atanu K. Pattanaik from the indian army after 37 years of experience as a helicopter pilot as well as in various leadership positions in active operations. He headed the China & neighbourhood desk at the d efence intelligence agency, was the Chief Humanitarian officer of un Mission in l ebanon 2001-02 and also served as Chief of Staff of a Corps in the north east from 2016-18. His Ph.d. research was on combat stress in conflict missions drawn from various international and domestic operations and counter insurgency missions. He is a regular on the lecture circuit related to security/ geo-strategy/military technology and has numerous op-ed columns and articles published in reputed newspapers and professional journals. n
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ayushee Chaudhary is an aerospace journalist by profession and a space enthusiast by passion. an english Honors Graduate from delhi university, she holds a Post Graduate diploma in Journalism from indian institute of Journalism and new Media, bengaluru alongside a Master in Space economy certificate from SeaC business School, Germany. She was nominated for Global aerospace Media awards 2020 as well as aerospace Media awards-asia 2020 for her stories. Her curiosity keeps her on the path of continuous exploration, learning and she hopes to combine her journalism with policy research and storytelling about the aerospace world. n
aRtiCle on PaGe 137
Major General C.P. Singh (Retd) is a scholar soldier accredited with Ma , MSc, llb, Mba , M Phil (def Mgt) and M Phil (international Strategic affairs). Widely travelled in india and abroad, the General officer is an avid reader and prolific writer. Post retirement, he is a Social activist, Career Consultant and a Motivational Speaker of repute. n
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lt General dushyant Singh has served in varied terrains and theatre of operations, in india and in the un as Military observer. the General officer has commanded an infantry battalion, brigade and a division in Jammu and Kashmir. He also holds the distinction of having served twice in the nSG, as the deputy inspector General (operations) and the inspector General (operations). the General officer has also held the appointment of brigadier General Staff of a Corps in the east and Chief of Staff, eastern Command. the General officer commanded a Corps and thereafter headed the army War College. He is a prolific reader, writer and a keen sportsman. He writes regularly in leading dailies and military journals and has his own website. n
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a scholar warrior and senior strategic military leader with nearly 42 years of service. an expert on Siachen and ladakh with experience in counter insurgency operations in J&K and north east; un Peace Keeping Missions in West africa and expert on information Warfare. as part of directorate of Military operations for over five years at different levels have seen through many crisis situations. intensely committed to academic pursuance with doctoral thesis on Civil Military Relations and many articles on military and strategic leadership. Have been writing for various magazines and speaking in various forums and institutes on transformational leadership. He is distinguished Fellow at dRdo n
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Group Captain Joseph noronha is an experienced fighter pilot and a Qualified Flying instructor (QFi a2). Commissioned in the fighter stream of the indian air Force in december 1974, he later commanded a MiG-21M squadron and served as directing Staff at the d efence Services Staff College, Wellington, nilgiris. He also served twice on the staff of the Flying instructors’ School, tambaram, Chennai. Post retirement, he continues to keep in close touch with aviation issues and is a prolific writer for a variety of aviation periodicals and journals. n
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admiral Karambir Singh was india’s 24th Chief of the naval Staff (May 2019 to november 2021). the admiral was commissioned into the indian navy in July of 1980. a naval aviator, he earned his wings in 1981 as a helicopter pilot. as the deputy Chief of naval Staff, he discharged his responsibilities towards the indian navy’s current and future operational and combat capacity and capabilities. He then served as the Vice Chief of naval Staff, involved with the development of the “future navy”. He has a rich store of senior command experience and has been the Flag officer Commanding-inChief, eastern naval Command. He assumed the Chairmanship of the national Maritime Foundation, new delhi, on January 17, 2022. n aRtiCle on PaGe 13
dr Md. Muddassir Quamar is associate Fellow at Manohar Parrikar institute for defence Studies and analyses, new delhi. He holds a Ph.d. in Middle east studies from Jawaharlal nehru university. He has wider interest in Middle east strategic affairs and india’s relations with the region. He has authored several books and research articles and is a frequent contributor in the media on contemporary developments in the Middle east. n aRtiCle on PaGe 71
ambassador P. Stobdan is an outstanding scholar of extraordinary insight whose achievements are varied and impressive. He is an eminent and influential figure in the newly created union territory (ut) of ladakh. He brings decades of experience as an analyst, academician, diplomat and a leading expert with unparalleled insight into the political, economic and security landscape of asia/eurasia and has been closely following the Himalayan affairs, particularly the india-China boundary issues. in all, he has 40 years experience of working in the think-tanks, Government and other bodies. as an erudite scholar, Stobdan is an acknowledged authority on asian/eurasian security affairs. His articles get the national and global level attention. He is currently on the advisory Council of oxus Society for Central asian affairs, Washington d.C. He authored several books, policy briefs, strategic commentaries and monographs. He has written/writes op-ed articles for various national/international journals and dailies. n
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lt General P.C. Katoch superannuated as director General information Systems of the indian army. a third-generation army officer, he commanded the Strike Corps in the South Western theatre. He has served as defence attaché in Japan with accreditation to Republic of Korea. n
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an electronics and telecommunication engineering graduate, M. tech from iit, Kharagpur and M. Phil from Madras university, Major General P.K. Mallick was commissioned in the Corps of Signals of indian army. the officer has interest in Cyber Warfare, electronic Warfare, SiGint and technology. His last posting before retirement was Senior directing Staff (army) at national defence College, new delhi. He runs a popular blog on national security issues and currently holds the CoaS Chair of e xcellence at the Centre for land Warfare Studies (ClaWS) and is a Consultant with Vivekananda international Foundation, new delhi. n
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Prachita Singh Saxena is a scholar of Strategic affairs, holding a Master’s in international Relations from Christ university. She has done her research on the “Spread of terrorism by Pakistan”. She has been associated with uSi of india, a Strategic think tank of Goi a prolific reader and a budding writer, she regularly contributes to leading Journals, Periodicals and newspapers on Strategic affairs and international Relations. n
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lt General P.M. bali, was commissioned into 19 PunJab in June 1981 and later commanded 24 PunJab, while deployed in intense counter insurgency operations. He has commanded an infantry brigade in the desert sector and a Mountain division in the north east. He was the GoC of 33 Corps in Sikkim during the doklam crisis on the laC with China. He has also held various important staff and diplomatic appointments in india and abroad. these include Staff officer logistic operations in united nations Mission in Somalia and defence attaché at the embassies of india in Japan and in Republic of Korea. He has also been the Secretary to the Chiefs of Staff Committee, bGS (China) and MGGS (doctrine) at HQ aRtRaC and director General Perspective Planning, at army Head Quarters. Post-retirement, he writes on strategic issues for various newspapers and magazines. n
aRtiCle on PaGe 53
Dr Prasanta Kumar Pradhandr Prasanta Kumar Pradhan is a Research Fellow and Coordinator of the West asia Centre at the Manohar Parrikar institute for defence Studies and analyses (MP-idSa), new delhi. He holds a doctorate degree from the School of international Studies, Jawaharlal nehru university, new delhi. He has been researching on foreign policy, security and strategic issues in West asia, and india’s relationship with West asia and the wider arab world. He is also working on the implications of arab upris-
ings for the region and india. dr Pradhan has published several research articles in reputed journals and has contributed chapters to several edited volumes on security and strategic issues in West asia and india’s bilateral relations with the region. n
aRtiCle on PaGe 75
lt Colonel Prashant nakra (Retd) is a veteran armoured Corps officer. an alumnus of the iMa , he was commissioned in the oldest Cavalry Regiment, the officer has seen active service in various ops including op Meghdoot (Siachen Glacier), multiple tenures in op Rakshak (J&K), op Vijay (drass & Kargil Sector) amongst others. the officer has held Staff appointments as a G-3 of a RR Sector (anantnag Sector), a G-2 (internal Security) of a Corps HQ in J&K and as a G-1 (Ci/Ct) of an important directorate in aHQ. after an eventful career, the officer took premature retirement and worked in the Corporate in operations side of both, indian Startups and international companies. n
aRtiCle on PaGe 57
brigadier Rahul bhonsle has three decades of experience in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism in india and abroad. He had hands-on experience in military modernisation and training during his service period heading a number of tactical and technical innovation projects at the operational level. Post retirement since 2006, he has combined his military expertise with extensive study of future trends and coordinated a number of projects for the directorate of net assessment in the integrated defence Staff, Centre for the Joint Warfare Studies and Centre for land Warfare Studies. He is at present director of Security Risks, a South asian security risk and knowledge management consultancy. n
aRtiCle on PaGe 147
Commissioned in december 1978 in the Poona Horse, the General retired after over 37 years of distinguished service in February 2016. during his service he has commanded one of the oldest Cavalry unit of india, an armoured brigade and a Mountain division opposite China. He has seen service along india’s both Western and northern borders. He served as the additional director General of Military operations (b) for the last three years of his service. Post retirement, he worked with the uSi of india, initially as a distinguished Fellow, and then as the Head of Research. He currently is a Professor of Practise with iit Madras, Senior Fellow with the Peninsula Foundation, a Member of the Chennai Centre for China Studies, and a Member of the indus international Research Foundation.
an avid follower of international Relations & Geo-Politics for over three decades, a multi-dimensional security expert for over two decades, the General is also an avid China watcher since 1999.
He has many articles and papers published in indian Journals and magazines (including web editions) and has presented his papers in several indian and international Seminars/Webinars. He has edited/authored four books and a monograph. n
aRtiCle on PaGe 91
Rohit Goela media and publishing veteran, he has led aviation, aerospace and defence publishing in different capacities, in the region, for over 25 years. a keen follower of geopolitical developments and security landscape around the region, especially in asia and the Middle east, he has an extensive understanding of the political, economic, social and internal security matters that shape the military and strategic environment of the region. based out of South east asia earlier, for nearly 15 years, he has firsthand experience of internal security matters in the region and has regularly written on aviation, security and strategic affairs in various leading publications. n
aRtiCle on PaGe 65, 113, 273
Major General Rohit Gupta, a Combat arms officer, retired as the addnl dG Weapon and equipment of indian army and currently heads the aerospace and defence business vertical at Primus Partners. the officer has commanded a Counter insurgency Force in J&K and has extensive Counter-insurgency and High altitude operational experience in Jammu & Kashmir and ladakh as well as Mechanised operations. He has done eight years in three ranks and five appointments in defence
procurement. He has done his M.Sc. and M.Phil in defence and Strategic studies. n
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He was commissioned into the iaF in the fighter stream and after 37 years of service, superannuated on august 31, 2020. as air Vice Marshal, he have served as air defence Commander eaC; aCaS ops (off) at air HQ; and aCidS (tech int) at idS under the CdS where he was closely associated with iSRo and its agencies for resolving various iSR issues. as air Cmde and later as air Vice Marshal at air HQ, he controlled all offensive air assets of the iaF, including operationalisation, deployment, mobility, training & exercises. He was also Chairman of weapon contracts negotiating team and also provided guidance for indigenous weapon development by dRdo labs in coordination with private agencies. n
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Major General (dr) Yash Mor, is an alumnus of the indian Military academy. the officer was commissioned in the brigade of the Guards in June 1985. He has tenanted important instructional and staff appointments including un Force HQ at Mozambique. He has completed his Ph.d. in nuclear doctrine and Strategy from osmania university. He is a motivational speaker and a regular contributor on defence and strategic issues. n
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1. New Delhi (HQ Integrated Defence Staff)
2. New Delhi (Integrated HQ of MoD (Army)
3. New Delhi (Integrated HQ of MoD (Navy)
4. New Delhi (Integrated HQ of MoD (IAF)
5. New Delhi (HQ Strategic Forces Command)
6. Udhampur (HQ Northern Command), Army
7. Chandimandir (HQ Western Command), Army
8. Kolkata (HQ Eastern Command), Army
9. Jaipur (HQ South-Western Command), Army
10. Pune (HQ Southern Command), Army
11. Lucknow (HQ Central Command), Army
12. Shimla (HQ Training Command), Army
13. Vishakhapatnam (HQ Eastern Naval Command), Navy
14. Mumbai (HQ Western Naval Command), Navy
15. Kochi (HQ Southern Naval Command), Navy
16. New Delhi (HQ Western Air Command), IAF
17. Shillong (HQ Eastern Air Command), IAF
18. Allahabad (HQ Central Air Command), IAF
19. Gandhinagar (HQ South-Western Air Command), IAF
20. Thiruvananthapuram (HQ Southern Air Command), IAF
21. Bengaluru (HQ Training Command), IAF
22. Nagpur (HQ Maintenance Command), IAF
23. Port Blair (HQ Andaman & Nicobar Command)
16.
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it (Military Yearbook) is a valuable book. Dr Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Second President of India
the Guide Publications of new delhi have brought out the Military Yearbook. it is useful to have suitably compiled information in one volume. i commend the efforts of the Publishers. Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri, Second Prime Minister of India
SOME ONLY PATROL THE SURFACE. OTHERS ONLY LOOK BELOW. WE DO BOTH.
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i am in receipt of the SP’s Military Yearbook 2020-2021. the publication indeed appears very promising and i am certain that anyone who goes through it will gain immensely. the continuing efforts of your team in compiling SP’s publications are indeed laudable. Please extend my congratulations to the editorial staff for their admirable research.
looking forward to being a continued recipient of this valuable treasure.
Air Marshal G.S. Bedi Director General (inspection & Safety) indian Air Force, Air headquarters West block – 6, r .K.Puram New Delhi 110 066
December 15, 2021
i wish to thank you for sending me a copy of all-new SP’s Military Yearbook 2020-2021
Please convey my compliments to your efficient editorial team for publishing an informative and well enunciated compendium on military matters.
May your Publishing House grow from strength to strength and continue to enrich reader’s perspective immensely on diverse contemporary military topics and strategic issues.
Lt General S.S. Mishra Quartermaster General Quartermaster General’s Branch integrated headquarters of Ministry of Defence (Army) New Delhi 110 105
January 11, 2022
thank you very much for sending me a copy of SP’s Military yearbook 2020-2021 the book is very well designed and presented. the topics on Strategy and Perspectives’ technology and indian defence have been aptly chosen and are very informative. Please do convey my compliments to the creative team involved in its production.
rear Admiral C.r . Praveen Nair Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Policy & Plans) integrated headquarters of Ministry of Defence (Navy) room No. 25A, South Block New Delhi 110 011
February 15, 2022
as always it is a pleasure to receive the SP’s bulletin. incisive and objective it remains a key publication which keeps us updated. also i must add the SP’s Yearbook which you kindly forwarded to me {as aCnS (air)} last year was really useful. May i take this opportunity to compliment your entire team who put in many hours of research to create these documents/publications.
on behalf of the team at Goa naval area, may i wish you and your team the very best and all success in the future.
rear Admiral Vikram Menon Flag Officer Commanding Goa Area & Flag Officer Naval Aviation headquarters, Goa Naval Area & Naval Aviation Vasco-da-Gama, Goa 403 802
July 25, 2022
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since 1965
48th issue
SP Guide Publications was founded in 1964 by Shri S.P. Baranwal, who was its Founder, Editor and Publisher. SP’s Military Yearbook was first launched as a Military Yearbook in 1965 as a reference book on the Armed Forces of India. In its early years, the Yearbook was endorsed by the second President of India, Dr Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan, the second Prime Minister of India, Lal Bahadur Shastri and several other eminent national leaders. From a humble beginning, the Yearbook has transformed into a comprehensive reference book for the Asia-Pacific region covering, not just the regional military balance, but also geostrategic perspectives, advances in military technology, defence equipment and indigenisation, and several other related topics, all contained in a handsome, illustrated and hard-bound reference book of nearly 700 pages. SP’s Military Yearbook today is a trusted compendium of reliable and high-quality reference information for understanding of the Indo-Pacific military markets, with the quality of its content being at par with international standards.
SP’s Military Yearbook 2021-2022 has been further enhanced, as is the practice every year, consequent to inputs received after a detailed online survey involving a large number of armed forces officers, the defence industry, think-tanks and academia. Based on the feedback, this year’s Yearbook has not just focused on the needs of its readers, but also included several perspectives to give a wider view of global defence developments, especially those that impact the Indo-Pacific region. We have attempted to make the information as extensive and accurate as possible and have expanded some chapters to include unique content, which is probably not available elsewhere. The contents have been updated and complemented with info-graphics, charts, graphs, etc.
A set of kind words from Dr S. Radhakrishnan, Second President of India, addressed to our Founder Editor-in-Chief, in March 1966.
The first article under this section covers the ongoing tussle for global dominance between the US-led West on the one hand and the ‘no holds barred friendship’ between China and Russia on the other side, as evinced by the ongoing Ukraine War, which commenced with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. Geopolitical competition between the West and Russia is being projected as a superiority contest between two kinds of political systems – western liberal versus an autocratic form of government – and its result will decidedly frame the future world order. The Ukraine war was the most consequential event of 2022 and its geopolitical fallout and military lessons are discussed in detail which highlight that future wars will be hybrid in nature. The article highlights that the fact that war has gone on beyond a year, and shows no sign of resolution, has also raised questions about the Indian military’s belief that future wars will be ‘short and sharp’, with attendant issues on stocking of ammunition and spares.
This article examines the complementarities between QUAD and AUKUS, both of which have evolved in response to the rise of China. It posits that both AUKUS and QUAD are evolving, and once they mature, will not be mutually exclusive, with AUKUS providing the cutting edge of the hard power required to contain China’s in the Indo-Pacific. Another article examines the challenges to QUAD and wonders whether it will survive the divergent interests of its member countries vis-à-vis China, especially due to its critical position in global supply chains and deep economic linkages with all QUAD countries. The article recommends that in order to deal with its own internal dissonance, QUAD needs to expand mutual trade and its security mandate, and possibly include countries such as South Korea, Vietnam and New Zealand in an enlarged future QUAD.
Managing an increasingly aggressive China remains the foremost challenge for the global community, especially India. The first of two reports by Vice Admiral A.K. Chawla (Retd) examines China’s path to military and maritime modernisation over the past four decades, which has ensured that China’s ships, submarines and aircraft are today comparable to their counterparts in advanced navies. The second article zooms into China’s aircraft carrier programme, which is based on their aspirations of achieving sea dominance. Starting with a refurbished Ukrainian-built carrier, China has already commissioned its second (and first indigenously built) carrier, and is
of Military Yearbook 1965
The cover of the current edition of SP’s Military Yearbook 2021-2022
well on its way to commissioning a third, and much larger indigenously designed carrier, with future nuclear powered aircraft carriers already in the design phase. The author underlines the fact that China’s aircraft carrier programme is a reminder, if one was needed, for India to fast track its own aircraft carrier programme. Air Marshal Anil Chopra (Retd) examines China’s growing air power and the options available to India to counter this growing asymmetry. After a detailed examination of China’s capability, he concludes that there is no option for India but to rebuild the IAF to 42 fighter squadrons with associated air defence and new age technological capabilities such as hypersonic weapons and unmanned platforms, which will inevitably require a much higher capital outlay. The next analysis focuses in detail on China’s space programme, which is the fastest growing in the world. China has 467 satellites in orbit today, second only to the US, its own space station, and a growing Lunar and Mars exploration programme. Its space programme also has an extensive defence orientation, of which India needs to be cognizant. The final report on China examines its growing presence and influence in the Central Asian Republics, which China considers as vital for supply of raw materials, and as a gateway for the markets of Eur-
asia and Europe. Russia is being gradually edged out of this strategic region and the Ukraine War has only accelerated this shift.
Two reports, one on the current situation in Afghanistan and the second on India’s northern borders, incisively examine these sensitive and difficult areas. The report on Afghanistan examines the ongoing tussle for influence inside Afghanistan between Pakistan, India and China. While Pakistan has not reaped the benefits it envisaged by supporting the Taliban, China is playing its cards more cleverly, indicating that India needs to be more proactive in engaging the Taliban, who seem to be firmly entrenched in power since August 2021. Also, the stand-off between the Indian and Chinese armies in Ladakh is at a stalemate, and several meetings to resolve the impasse have seen only incremental progress. The report on India’s northern borders looks at the current situation in Ladakh and concludes that such stand-offs will continue to happen, requiring a pro-active mind-set and the necessity to counter them from a position of strength.
US-India strategic relations are one of the most consequential partnerships in the world today. The analysis on the strategic relationship between the world’s oldest and largest democracies examines this ever-growing partnership, that has weathered many difficulties and emerged stronger every time, the latest being a shared vision of the future of Indo-Pacific. For the US, India’s importance lies in it being the only possible counterweight to China in the Indo-Pacific (apart from the US), with the QUAD is testimony to this belief. The author correctly points out that India’s true importance lies in its economic potential and human resources, which the US recognises as being vital for its own national interests and future prosperity.
The analysis on Russia-India relations examines the history and current state of relations with India’s most time-tested friend and strategic partner since our independence. The most consequential part of the India-Russia relationship is cooperation in the field of defence since the late 1960s. While this relationship has gradually diminished in importance, due to growth in India’s economic and
defence relations with other countries, notably the US, France, EU, Japan, Israel, etc, Russia offers us an invaluable counterweight to China and hence India continues to attach great importance to bilateral relations, as evinced by India’s nuanced stand on the Ukraine War.
The analysis on Indo-French relations brings out the fact that France has become one of India’s most trusted strategic partners with congruent visions of the Indo-Pacific region since the initiation of a strategic partnership between both countries 1998. In the field of defence, this has manifested in the acquisition of major weapon systems such as the Scorpene submarines and the Rafale fighters. The report undertakes a detailed examination of this growing cooperation, and opines that defence cooperation will remain the cornerstone of this relationship.
Three articles look at the key Middle-East region, especially as it pertains to India. The first article on Turkiye and Iran, examines
the militarisation of their foreign policy, by using the supply of weapons to their neighbourhood and beyond, in order to expand their political and military influence in the Middle East, which has had the effect of diminishing stability in the region. The second article examines a novel diplomatic initiative between India, Israel, UAE and the US, with an evocative acronym – I2U2. While focussed on non-military issues of water, energy, transportation, space, health and energy, the grouping has the potential to enhance stability and prosperity in the Middle East and most importantly, has opened a window for further developing Israel-Arab relations, as also enhancing India’s influence in this region of critical economic importance to our country. The third article looks at the burgeoning growth in defence relations between India and Israel over the past two decades. Focused on areas of hi-technology and cyber security, where Israel has considerable expertise, both countries are also bound by congruent approaches to terrorism.
The constant tension between India and Pakistan, especially due to Pakistan’s intransigence over Kashmir and its use of state-sponsored terrorism to achieve its aims, is a key issue that constantly confronts our decision makers, especially in the field of defence. While Pakistan has been effectively de-hyphenated from India due to the huge asymmetry in Comprehensive National Power between both countries, the fact that Pakistan is a nuclear weapons power, with a propensity to bring up the nuclear card to offset its conventional asymmetry, is examined in the first article. The next article
examines the heavy price that Pakistan is paying for harbouring terrorism over the past four decades, with its main sponsor being the Pakistan military. The result is Pakistan’s descent into internal violence and fundamentalism, which has had a disastrous impact on its economy, as evident from the ongoing financial emergency in that country.
Technology is constantly re-shaping the battlefield from the strategic to the tactical level. An article on future warfare looks at the various generations of warfare and concludes that 5th Generation Warfare is already upon us, which is intrinsically multi-dimensional and multi-domain in nature, with substantial use of new technologies; and that the 6th and 7th generations of warfare will be upon us in the next two decades. The fact that China is today a co-leader (with the US) in many key technologies requires India to invest heavily in the field to avoid falling behind. The article on non-traditional security threats provides a good compendium of all non-military threats which confront us today, and which can only be faced with a multi-agency approach.
The implications of emerging technology are today central to effectiveness and victory in the modern battlefield. An article by former Navy Chief Admiral Karambir Singh (Retd) incisively examines the need for the Indian Navy to leverage technological innovation and adopt new technologies through indigenisation. This is indeed important as new technologies and doctrines are increasingly
challenging a navy’s traditional roles and capabilities, which the Indian Navy has been adopting in a proactive manner. This section also contains a detailed brief on the major technological innovations and new technologies that are transforming the way militaries are preparing for conflict, such as Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems, equipped with Artificial Intelligence, Directed Energy weapons, Hypersonic weapons, Bio-weapon technology, etc. Separate articles look closer at developments in future military aircraft across the world, especially 6th Generation aircraft and hypersonic missiles, which have been used by Russia against Ukraine in the ongoing conflict. Another article looks in detail at autonomous warfare, exemplified by loitering ammunition, which has been used to deadly effect in the 2022 Armenia-Azerbaijan war and the ongoing Ukraine conflict.
India’s principal adversary, China, has a declared doctrine of ‘Informationised’ warfare to achieve ‘information dominance’ over an adversary and has stated that ‘intelligent’ warfare is on the horizon. An article on China’s strategy of ‘Informationised and Intelligent’ warfare explains how China plans to impose significant costs on an adversary, even one that is conventionally superior, by targeting its command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) network. It warns that India need to prepare assiduously to counter this strategy to prevent being taken by ‘technical surprise’ in a future conflict; and that this is only feasible through a national strategy to develop key defence technologies in a time-bound manner by harnessing both our public and private sectors.
A major story of 2022 has been India’s push for Atmanirbharta in the field of defence. The first article in this section examines the major landmarks achieved in developing India’s indigenous defence industry over the past year. The second article examines the Indian Government’s vision to achieve a domestic turnover of $25 billion and export of $5 billion in the aerospace and defence sector by 2025. It also looks the various challenges that need to be overcome to achieve this aim and how they can be overcome. The third article examines the key role that India’s private sector can play in investing in Defence R&D, and concludes that more incentives need to be provided by the government to harness this potential. The fourth article takes a clear-eyed view of the current state of our defence exports, which amounted to $1.63 billion in 2021-22, and concludes that the bulk of these exports were of equipment of low value. It opines that unless we move up the value chain and start exporting major defence systems, with ancillary services such as training and long term maintenance support, India cannot expand its defence exports as envisaged. This section also contains a comprehensive detail of the Ministry of Defence’s ‘Positive Indigenisation Lists’.
A key aspect of the Yearbook is to enable defence business by providing updated references for the Asia-Pacific region, which includes:
• Comprehensive contact details of Ministries of Defence (MoD) of the 20 biggest buyers of defence equipment in the Asia-Pacific.
• Exhaustive details on doing defence business in India. DAP 2020, FDI, defence reforms, GoI policies and incentives, dedicated defence corridors, etc.
Several distinguished authors and industry experts contributed to make this edition of SP’s Military Yearbook a quality product. Pages 8, 10, 12 and 14 will give a quick reference to these writers of eminence and global standing.
Our special thanks to Vice Admiral A.K. Chawla, who recently retired as Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Southern Naval Command in enabling significant updates in the contents of this Yearbook.
Sincere thanks, also, to Major General Atanu Pattanaik (Retd) and Air Vice Marshal Sanjay Bhatnagar (Retd), for enabling important & substantial improvements to the contents.
As usual, our whole team led by Rohit Goel, including the research team of Bharti Sharma, Rimpy Nischal and Survi Massey, and the design team of Vimlesh Yadav and Sonu Bisht, at SP Guide Publications whose dedication and hard work enables an updated edition to be published every year. Neetu Dhulia and Rajeev Chugh have worked hard on the front of collaborations with the particpating companies.
Clarifications: Most countries are reluctant to part with information on their armed forces and military equipment. Sincere efforts have been made to garner information from the most authentic open sources. It is quite possible that variations may crop up in some cases.
Articles in this volume contain the personal opinions of the contributors and do not reflect the views of the publishers or the Indian Government, including the Ministry of Defence.
Suggestions for improvements will be appreciated and carried out to the extent possible and practically viable.
As part of our coverage of the regional military balance, there are updates on the security environment,military expenditureand military equipment ofthe armies, navies and air forces of nearly 45 countries across the Asia-Pacific including: Central and South Asia; East Asia the Pacific Rim & Australia; and West Asia and North Africa.
In Regional Balance, we have an overview of the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region covering vital strategic, geopolitical, economic, military and security trends in the AsiaPacific. This overall summary is followed by recapitulation of dedicated and localised security events that impacted the three mentioned regions, to provide a detailed analysis of the dynamic and fast changing security paradigms in each region.
The war in Ukraine has overshadowed international security. It is the most intense conflict on the continent for nearly half a century and regardless of how long it lasts or how it ends, it is sure to have a long lasting impact with important consequences for the Asia-Pacific. Some of these ramifications are already emerging. Prominent among them are questions about relations between the region’s major powers, as well as between them and the Asia-Pacific’s middle powers and small states. While most of the analysis is dominated by global players like US, Russia, China, Europe and India in a regional context, peripheral players like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, Japan, Australia, in important roles, are also covered extensively.
A separate section also covers the Who’s Who and Profiles of Asia’s Defence Forces. This includes the profiles of the Military Leadership of the country along with the organisation structure in their Ministry of Defence and comprehensive contact details of key personnel in the organisational hierarchy. Any Aerospace and Defence company wanting to enter and do business in any of these countries will find this information extremely useful as it gives them where to start from.
The modernisation drive for the three Services is covered in this section. This includes separate sections on the Integrated Defence Staff, the Indian Army, the Indian Navy, the Indian Air Force and the Indian Coast Guard. It also includes the organisation structures of MoD, Indian Army, Indian Navy, Indian Air Force, Indian Coast Guard and the DRDO. Holding of all major weapons systems has also been updated. As usual there are separate sections on the Who’s Who of Indian Defence, the Department Of Defence Production and the Defence Research and Development Organisation. An update on Jointness in the Armed Forces, which has slowed down after the unfortunate demise of General Rawat in December 2021 in a helicopter crash, is also covered in this section. There is also a separate section on the Ministry of Home Affairs & Central Armed Police Forces, as also recent advancements In India’s Coastal Security organisation.
I wish our readers an enjoyable reading experience with interesting strategic insights on international and regional geopolitics, national security developments, and the business of defence and technology.
We at SP Guide Publications strive to work towards continuous process of improvement and look forward to the feedback from our esteemed readers.
Happy Reading!
Jayant Baranwal Editor-in-ChiefCopyright © 2022
SP Guide Publications
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AVANI is the current market leader in the armoured and combat vehicles segment in India with the expertise and capabilities to fulfil the requirements of the Armed Forces.
AVNL (AVANI) is one of the seven new Defence Public Sector Undertakings so created. Incorporated on August 14, 2021 and headquartered at Avadi (Chennai), AVANI heralds a new dawn in the firmament of defence manufacturing. Born during the Amrit Kal of Azadi Ka Amrit Mohotsav, AVANI has an auspicious beginning and promises to be a world class armoured vehicles manufacturer and a strong pillar of Atmanirbhar Bharat.
It has the following 5 production units:
• Heavy Vehicle Factory (HVF), Avadi, Chennai
• Engine Factory Avadi (EFA), Chennai
• Vehicle Factory Jabalpur (VFJ)
• Ordnance Factory Medak (OFMK), Hyderabad
• Machine Tool Prototype Factory (MTPF), Ambernath, Mumbai.
AVNL has one of the largest state-of-the-art production facilities for armoured vehicles production in the world. It is involved in the production of armoured/ combat vehicles, such as, T-72 (Ajeya), T-90 (Bhisma), MBT Arjun, Infantry Combat Vehicles BMP-II (Sarath), support vehicles (MPV, AERV, Armoured Ambulance etc.) and defence mobility solutions (Stallion, LPTA etc.). AVANI is the current market leader in the armoured and combat vehicles segment in India with the expertise and capabilities to fulfil the requirements of the Armed Forces.
AVNL has had an exceptionally successful first six months, with a profit of `54.19 crore. At present, AVNL has an outstanding order book of `36,000 crore. As per its long term corporate plan, AVNL shall strive to double its turnover in the next 3 years from the current level of `3,300 crores to `6,600 crore and position itself as a global Armoured Vehicle brand in the next 10 years.
AVNL has one of the largest state-of-the-art production facilities for armoured vehicles production in the world
AVNL has established its credentials and credibility by being able to turnaround and earn profit in the very 1st year of our operation. With the Trinity of Integrity, Innovation and Excellence as its MOTTO and its three pillars of strength are 11,500+ highly skilled manpower, State-of-the-Art technology and positive & vibrant work culture, AVNL is firmly poised on the runway of growth and success. AVNL, with its rich history & heritage and promising present, is looking at a bright and confident future as it fulfills its foundational purpose of being the “Force behind the Forces”. •
Bharat Dynamics Limited (BDL) was established in the year 1970, at Hyderabad, as a Public Sector Undertaking under the Ministry of Defence, Government of India to be the manufacturing base for guided missiles and allied equipment for the Indian Armed Forces.
Over the years, BDL has evolved into a multi-product, multi-customer and a multi-located enterprise manufacturing products meeting international quality standards. BDL offers Surface-to-Air Missiles, Air-to-Air Missiles, Air-to-Surface Weapons, Launchers, Test Equipment, Underwater Weapons, Counter Measure Systems in addition to Anti-Tank Guided Missiles. The Company also offers Product Life Cycle Support and Refurbishment/Life Extension of vintage Missiles. BDL is also making in-roads into new areas such as drone delivered pay loads like Bombs, Missiles, Mines etc.
Taking into cognisance modern-age warfare, the Company is giving more thrust to offer AI based products to its customers by harnessing the next generation of technologies.
BDL has forayed into international market by offering its exportable range of products to friendly countries. BDL is offering Akash Weapon System (Surface- to- Air Missile), Astra Weapon System (Air-toAir Missile), Smart Anti-Airfield Weapon & Helina (Airto-Surface Weapon), Light Weight Torpedo & Heavy Weight Torpedo (Underwater weapons), Counter Measures Dispensing System and Anti-Tank Guided
Missiles namely Nag and Konkurs - M for exports. BDL has already exported the Light Weight Torpedo to a friendly country and is receiving leads from several countries for export of other products.
BDL currently has manufacturing facilities located at Hyderabad, Bhanur, and Ibrahimpatnam, all three in Telangana State and the fourth one at Visakhapatnam in Andhra Pradesh. To cater to the growing demands of the Indian Armed Forces and friendly foreign nations, BDL is setting up two more units - one at Amravati in Maharashtra and another one at Jhansi in the UP - Defence Corridor.
BDL is constantly upgrading its manufacturing technologies and processes to state-of-the-art including industry 4.0, Robotics operated workshops, latest Surface Mounted Devices assembly lines and maintains highest quality standards in its products by adopting best QA practices.
While fulfilling its basic role as guided weapon system manufacturer, BDL has built up a strong inhouse R&D Division primarily focused on Design & Engineering activities. This approach has resulted in significant achievements in the areas of Indigenization and realization of value-added products and product variants. Thrust is being given to explore tie-up with foreign OEMs for new weapons for potential Transfer of Technology, in addition to DRDO programmes.
The quest for technological excellence is the guiding principle of BDL and to live up to the sobriquet, ‘THE FORCE BEHIND PEACE’. •
Prime Minister Modi commissioned the indigenously built IAC-1 Aircraft Carrier into the Indian Navy as INS Vikrant in a glittering ceremony at the Cochin Shipyard on September 2, 2022, a fitting tribute to India celebrating its 75 years of Independence.
Conceived and conceptualised by Indian Navy’s Warship Design Bureau (WDB), with detailed engineering and construction by the Cochin Shipyard Limited (CSL), INS Vikrant is the largest and the most complex warship to be ever built in the maritime history of India. About 40,000 tons of steel, a deck size equivalent to that of two football fields, and its length 80 meters longer than the world’s tallest statue (Statue of Unity), Vikrant is rightly dubbed as a floating city propelling India into a small elite group of world powers that can design and build complex aircraft carriers.
INS Vikrant is a resounding example of Atmanirbhar Bharat with over 75 per cent of indigenisation and amongst the most comprehensive illustration of ‘Make in India’. It is the first time in the country, that a ship of the size of an Aircraft Carrier was completely modeled in 3D and production drawings extracted from the 3D model, thus reflecting the highend design capabilities assimilated due to this project. Over 550 Indian companies, big and small, including
over 100 MSMEs, each with their own culture and process were brought together by the CSL to deliver the mighty Vikrant. The project provided jobs to about 2000 people at CSL and about 20,000 other people in the ancillary industries across India.
The skill sets accrued through the INS Vikrant project are of the highest level on account of the complexity of the project. It has acted as a catalyst for high-end capability development in the country. A major result of constructing IAC is the immense skill development of the highest order that has materialised over various trades and disciplines in engineering design & construction. This will be particularly useful considering the talks about India’s need to have a third aircraft carrier to safeguard its interests, after INS Vikramaditya and INS Vikrant.
The experience gained by CSL during various stages of the construction of the IAC-1 backed by the yard’s inherent thirst and constant endeavour to transform into one among the leading global shipyards, helped us in producing a quality warship during the most challenging times. Cochin Shipyard Limited, currently celebrating its golden jubilee year, is so proud to be part of this historic moment in our great nation, and thanks the Indian Navy for making it part of the INS Vikrant story. •
Exicom Technologies is a RF Engineering Company, determined to support Indian Defence and Security with much needed defence modernization. Exicom offers Multi-Platform IP Mesh Manet radios here in India. Manufactured under the ‘Make In India’ initiative, the fundamentals to Exicom’s advantage over its competitors are Exicom’s robust waveform and its family of Tactical Mesh Manet System that are interoperable across the entire OFFGrid line up, that includes Condor, Condor Lite and Cockatoo Series. The OFFGrid Family of Radios utilises COFDM waveform, which enables High Bandwidth communication for tough RF environments, NLOS and BVLOS airborne ISR platforms.
What is Swarm? Swarm is a collective behaviour of a group on decentralised, self-organised system, where individual nodes perform simplistic task, in order to complete a major objective. The utilisation of Swarm systems of battlefield and for ISR is a major require-
ment by the Indian defence right now. There are two major aspects that enables a Swarm system - Swarm architecture code and the communication systems. Exicom comes into picture in the latter half of the requirement. Exicom’s OFFGrid Family of radios are a truly mobile system – one which will deliver in environments too tough for other radio solutions to cope with. Unlike traditional wireless options, the Exicom’s selfhealing self-forming, Mesh seamlessly reconfigures as nodes move, working out which are in range and finding the best route to send data throughout the network with minimum delay.
Exicom’s mission critical solutions secure, share and communicate real time situational awareness on land, sea and air. Exicom works with Army, Airforce, Navy, Counter-terror units, Homeland Security, Police, UxV systems manufacturers and system integrators to meet key connectivity and communication challenges. •
Known worldwide for its aircraft, such as the A-29 Super Tucano light attack and training aircraft and the multi-mission transport aircraft C-390 Millennium, Embraer, global aerospace company with more than 50 years of history, offers several defence solutions, such as border surveillance and monitoring, sensors, tactical and strategic communications, as well as command and control. Embraer Defense & Security has a modern and complete portfolio of innovative products and solutions for the air, land, sea, space, and cyber domains, with a growing presence in the global market with products and solutions being present in more than 60 countries.
The C-390 Millennium, brings a new concept to market, offering a versatile and multi-mission platform with very low operating costs and fast turnaround, which is an unbeatable combination. The aircraft delivers unrivaled mobility and cargo capacity, rapid role re-configuration, high availability, improved comfort, flight safety, and adequate management of operational costs through its life cycle all in a single platform.
In addition to the Brazilian Air Force, the Hungarian Defence Force and the Portuguese Armed Forces have signed orders for the aircraft. Both the Portuguese and Hungarian fleets will be configured to perform Air-Air
Refueling and be fully NATO compatible, not only in terms of hardware but also in terms of avionics and communications. The Hungarian Defence Force fleet will be the first in the world to feature an Intensive Care Unit configuration, an essential feature for performing humanitarian missions.
Most recently, the Netherlands Ministry of Defence announced the selection of a fleet of five C-390 Millennium aircraft, highlighting the performance and operational output of the aircraft, to succeed their current fleet of C-130 Hercules. The Netherland’s Ministry of Defence conducted rigorous research when comparing to the C-390 Millennium and the C-130J, and concluded, “that the C-390 has higher availability and needs considerably less maintenance. This means that more hours can be flown with the same number of aircraft. The C-390M has a multimission concept, whereby the required mission types are incorporated in a standard configuration. The C-390M scores higher than the C-130J on a number of operational and technical requirements and meets operational needs. The C-130J can meet the Dutch operational requirement but must be equipped with various mission-specific elements that are not available in the COTS/MOTS configuration we require. The C-390 Millennium is, besides a tactical deployable aircraft, also more suitable to be used for strategic movements than the C-130J.”
Embraer also offers the P600 AEW&C in partnership with ELTA Systems Ltd (ELTA). Designed to compete in a new segment of the AEW&C market, this next-generation aircraft, based on the super-midsize platform of the Praetor 600 business jet, addresses the growing market of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance market for countries demanding cost-effective, high performance, and flexible solutions for defence and homeland security missions.
Coupled with ELTA’s superior radar technology, the P600 AEW&C offers the benefits of cutting-edge, proven systems, and provides capabilities previously only available only on much larger platforms. The aircraft can provide an extended Air Situational Picture, monitoring air activity in areas outside of ground radar coverage. It can perform various missions, such as Air Defence, Early Warning, Command and Control, Fighter Fleet Efficiency, Land Defense, and Maritime Surveillance. Embraer has been developing AEW&C aircraft for more than 20 years and its main customers are the governments of Brazil, Mexico, Greece, and India.
Embraer offers integrated solutions for Border Surveillance and Monitoring encompassing the complete surveillance cycle, from the collection and transfer of data to its analysis and interpretation, delivering reliable information to support decision makers. Currently, Embraer is responsible for the Brazilian Army’s Integrated Border Monitoring System (SISFRON), one of the largest border surveillance projects being implemented on the planet.
On the radar portfolio, Embraer offers equipment such as the SABER M60 and the SENTIR M20, radar for ground surveillance and is already in operation in the SISFRON.
The Saber M-60 is a 3-D low altitude anti-aircraft artillery radar able to track up to 60 targets simultaneously within a radius up to 32 nautical miles and up to 16,400 feet in height. The radar uses Doppler pulse technology that allows unique target detection and automatic aircraft classification. As for the Sentir-M20, it is a ground surveillance radar capable of detecting a crawling man up to 1 km, a walking man up to 10 km and vehicles up to 30 km, performing the automatic classification and tracking of up to 100 simultaneous targets on land or low altitude. •
FFV Ordnance, part of the global defence and security company Saab, has been for decades one of the world´s leading suppliers of man-portable support weapons. Now they have, through discussions with users, developed the new HE 448 high-explosive round and FCD 558 fire control device that take the Carl-Gustaf user experience to a new level, providing troops with solutions to common battlefield challenges.
The successor to the HE 441, the HE 448 is a powerful high-explosive round designed for use against
Carl-Gustaf M4unprotected troops, troops in defilade, and soft skin targets including vehicles. An interface in the round allows it to communicate with the new fire control device (FCD), greatly enhancing accuracy. Meanwhile, reduced weight and modifications to the composition, help increase the range, fragment distribution and lethality of the round. A fuse allows the HE 448 to be used in both direct attack and air burst mode.
A common request among users has been for a HE
round with better ability to defeat body armour. Such armour is increasingly being worn by hostile forces and can limit the effectiveness of fragmentation rounds.
Saab´s designers addressed this challenge in several ways. One was to replace the mechanical fuse of the HE 441 with a much smaller electro-mechanical in the HE 448. At the same time, the 800 steel balls in the HE 441 have been replaced with 4,000 tungsten pellets in the HE 448, increasing fragment density and the overall probability of striking vulnerable areas on the enemy combatant, such as the neck.
Meanwhile, while the legacy FCD and HE round allowed the engagement of targets at up to 1300 metres, users looked for even longer range.
The engineers at Saab listened and responded by reducing the overall weight of the HE 448 by 500 grams compared to the HE 441, down to a lean 2.7 kilogram. The reduced weight gives higher muzzle velocity and ability to cover more ground. At the same time, advances in ballistics ensure that not only does the HE 448 fly further, it is able to maintain outstanding levels of accuracy over that distance.
A key concern for every fire team is first-round hits. Once you fire on the enemy, you make your own position known and become a clear target.
To address that request for better accuracy, an interface has been created between the round and the fire control device that allows for even more precise ballistic calculations. Via a protocol known as ‘Firebolt’, the round provides the FCD with exact information on the temperature of its propellant. This is a key factor in ballistics, as rounds with cooler propellant will generally travel slightly slower, while warmer propellant causes a round to travel slightly faster. The ballistic computer in the FCD 558 uses this information on propellant temperate to slightly adjust the round’s exit trajectory, greatly enhancing the chance of a first-round hit. This is particularly helpful for air burst mode where the round is set to detonate in the air just above the target.
The Carl-Gustaf system is known around the world for its simplicity and durability. For example, while the fuse of the legacy HE 441 round needs to be set manually prior to loading, to enable air burst
mode, the procedure for the HE 448 is far simpler. The gunner simply uses a toggle on the FCD to select the correct mode.
Similarly, while the legacy fire control system required different range knobs to be fitted depending on the round used, the digital interface on the FCD 558 removes this need. When a Firebolt-compatible round is chambered, the FCD is immediately able to identify the round type. Once the gunner inputs the range, the ballistic computer in the FCD uses the range, round type, attack mode along with propellant and ambient temperature to calculate the best trajectory for a successful hit. While the previous fire control system relied on mechanical adjustments to achieve the trajectory, this is achieved electro-mechanically in the FCD 558. It is fully compatible with standard optical sights via a picatinny rail.
Meanwhile, a reduction in weight for both the fire control device and round reduces the burden that fire teams are required to carry.
While the HE 448 and FCD 558 produce optimal results when used together, they are both compatible with legacy Carl-Gustaf systems. A legacy round will not be able to communicate its type and propellant temperature to the FCD 558. However, the gunner can simply enter the round type via a toggle to enable the ballistics computer to choose the correct trajectory. •
HTL Ltd. (Subsidiary of HFCL Limited), is an AS 9100 accredited company which caters to Build to Print Electrical Wiring Interconnect Solutions for Aerospace & Defence Segments.
HTL Ltd is also a Prominent Optical Fiber Cable Manufacturer & an Industry Acclaimed Fiber & Copper Cabling Solutions Provider as well. The Aerospace & Defence Division of HTL Ltd offers Build to Print Wire Harnesses, Electro Mechanical Assemblies & Electrical Wiring Interconnect Systems to its customers from its Chennai & Hosur Facilities. Today, both these plants contribute to an annual capacity of building more than 25,000 cable assemblies.
HTL Ltd. offers a unique proposition in the industry given its ability to leverage vertical integration synergies that could be explored seamlessly within other product divisions across Fiber Optics & Passive Connectivity Solutions to extend into Electrical Wiring Interconnect Solutions (EWIS) for Air, Land & Sea. HTL Ltd. had won the ‘Emerging Company of the Year’ Award during the 8th International Aerospace & Defence Awards 2022’ which bears testimony to our unique competencies as an EWIS Provider in the Aerospace & Defence Domain.
In a span of less than two years, HTL Ltd has established itself as a trusted partner for EWIS Installations
at Customer Designated On-Site Locations & a Reliable Partner for Defence PSUs for their Indigenization Projects as was the case with one of the ‘Make in India’ projects that involved the development of Optical Fiber Cables (OFC) for Marine Platforms for Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Ltd (MDL), Mumbai.
HTL Ltd. have played a pivotal role in ongoing marquee projects like Jaguar, Sukhoi & LCA-NP5 Aircraft to name a few. The capability to cater to HighVolume Production projects & Special Development Programmes have culminated in securing major projects like P75 Submarine, Arjun Main Battle Tank & Modular Bridges from renowned Defence PSUs and Private OEMs. HTL Ltd. currently works with more than 16 customers for their strategic defence programs comprising of HAL, BEL, MDL, CVRDE, BHEL, TASL, HCL, L&T Defence & Other Private Companies.
The strategic focus of the Aerospace & Defence Division is on tapping on to the Build to Print EWIS requirements as arising of Tier 1 Indian Companies who are engaged in JVs/MoUs with Global Aerospace & Defence Majors.
HTL Ltd. is constantly working towards adding value to its customers by being a significant contributor to the Self Reliance Mission and the Make in India and Make for the World Objective. •
Defexpo 2022 sets the stage for IAI India, the new business formation IAI has set for India. The new company is in the making and follows over 30 years of successful and ever-growing businesses
IAI has pursued with India. The local executive team is investing great efforts to adopt a new formation and business infrastructure to support ongoing and new activities within the new realities of the Indian market.
IAI has a well-established operation in India, working with various partners and customers in the Indian market. Through the years, IAI has pursued a flexible and adaptive business policy to comply and respond to PM Modi's Self-Reliance and Make for the World vision.
IAI is positioned to expand and grow its activities by forming IAI India Group, an Indian holding company, which will become the center of IAI's local activities. As a local company, it will be able to expand current and future businesses through joint ventures (JVs) with Indian prime contractors and partners from the public and private sector and establish wholly-owned local companies to pursue specific opportunities. In this way, IAI India will continue to act as an essential
actor in the Indian Aerospace, Defence, and Homeland Security market.
Throughout the years, Israel's defence companies were the first to adapt to new regulations. IAI was among the first to comply with India's offset requirements fully. It developed a supply chain of over 70 suppliers to meet and exceed its offset obligations within the large-scale programs IAI provided to the Indian military.
While the new regulations pose significant challenges for foreign participants, they also offer great opportunities for those willing to change and adapt. IAI India leverages the experience and reputation its parent company has won through 30+ years of activity in India, establishing a business ecosystem engaging local companies across the subcontinent as subcontractors and suppliers. Many companies that have entered this supply chain will now be evaluated to join as IAI's JV partners, sharing IAI's ambition to grow and expand in the Indian market. Today, this experience serves IAI well in its move to address India's thrives for Self-Reliance.
There are endless opportunities to pursue and IAI is set for success, and willing to dare. •
India Optel Limited (IOL) as Soldier’s Eye is a new Defence company fully owned by Government of India. Leveraging the platform of DefExpo 2022 show to showcase itself for the first time, the company marked its arrival on the world stage of OptoElectronics market.
With a turnover of $125 million in inception year itself and an assured order book $1 billion for the next five years, IOL is ready to emerge as world class manufacturer in defence opto-electronics market. It is a matter of pride that majority of Sighting and Fire Control systems, pertaining to land forces are being produced by IOL.
Since its inception, IOL has launched new products with committed focus on indigenisation. In collaboration with DRDO (IRDE) indigenous products developed include STIK, CTI-T72, CTI-T90 and DNS which were showcased to the world at DefExpo2022.
Focusing on Atmanirbharta in Defence, IOL has reasserted its role in handholding Start-ups and private
defence industry partners. With success in collaborative development of Automatic Control Unit, Voltage Converter and Power Unit for T-90, IOL has placed 69 Project Sanction Orders on the Indian Industry. IOL has also sponsored five projects under iDEX, and is actively engaged with iDEX partners in the development process.
Since its inception, the state-of-the-art production and testing facilities at IOL have created a lot of buzz and interest amongst Defence PSU, Private defence companies as well as international defence technological partners. Apart from supplying products to Defence PSUs like BDL, BEML, AVNL; IOL is also reaching out to defence companies like L&T, Bharat Forge, etc.
MOUs have been signed with leading defence majors like OIP, Belgium; Safran and Photonis of France. Apart from the above many more business delegations from India and abroad have shown their interest in Business relationship with IOL. •
SP Guide Publications (SP’s): What has contributed to Kasstech’s success?
Vivek Saxena (Saxena): Kasstech’s success can be attributed to several factors such as agility, innovation, and technical expertise. The company has been able to adapt to the dynamic demands of the aerospace and defence sector, which has helped it stay at the cutting edge of technological innovation. In addition, Kasstech has formed several collaborations to expand its offerings and act as a solution provider in the fields of aerospace technologies, aviation, and defence in India.
SP’s: What technical support does Kasstech offer?
Saxena: Kasstech has a CAR-145 approved MRO at Narnaul, Haryana, where it offers maintenance services like engine overhaul and aircraft repair. The facility is dedicated to Diamond aircraft and Austro engines. The company also provides maintenance support for large UAVs and repairs and maintains their airframes and engines. Kasstech partnered with Dynamic Solution Systems (DSS micro) Inc. to provide propeller balancing services as well as the calibration of Microvib Propeller balancer systems.
Kasstech’s tie-up with Teledyne FLIR enables it to offer thermal imaging sensors that can pick up temperature differences by sensing heat emitted by objects which has proved to be the best solution in various automation, industrial and defence applications.
(Top Left) Austro Engines; (Top Right) Teledyne FLIR Thermal Cores;
(Above)
Vivek Saxena Managing Director Kasstech Aerospace.
SP’s: What inspired Kasstech to pursue multiple collaborations?
Saxena: Kasstech pursued collaborations to address emerging opportunities in its operations. For example, the growing market for small aircraft influenced the company’s partnership with Diamond Aircraft of Austria. Kasstech also partnered with Teledyne FLIR to provide help in a wide range of applications in military, defence and industrial areas, and with Oxywise to supply modern medical oxygen plants during the Covid epidemic. Kasstech is also a distributor for Austro Engine GmbH, thermal OEM Cores from Teledyne FLIR systems, Dynamic Propeller balancer systems from DSS, and oxygen and nitrogen generator/plants from Oxywise and is also the sales representative of Diamond Aircraft in India.
SP’s: What is the role of Kasstech’s R&D division?
Saxena: Kasstech’s R&D department has developed India-centric applications to meet the government’s ‘Make in India’ and ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ initiatives. Many system integrators in India employ FLIRprovided cameras for their drone systems and finished goods for the defence industry. Several FLIR Thermal cores are on order and in the delivery process, indicating the maturation of Indian Thermal Camera manufacturers and how India’s defence demands are being met both locally and for exports. Based on this technology, Kasstech is creating industry-tailored solutions. •
Lockheed Martin, the world’s largest and most advanced defence manufacturer, proudly celebrates its decades-long partnership with India and remains fully committed to advancing the Government of India’s vision of self-reliance, or Atmanirbhar Bharat. For Lockheed Martin, this means supporting the growth of an indigenous defence manufacturing ecosystem in India, advancing the aerospace and start-up ecosystem, and strengthening India’s strategic security and industrial capabilities.
The F-21 will advance the India-United States security cooperation relationship in multiple ways. The
F-21 features numerous India-specific capabilities— uniquely configured to meet the Indian Air Force’s requirements. “This program represents an opportunity to support a $165 billion global sustainment market and includes a robust production plan,” said Michael Kelley, Vice President – India for Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Strategy and Business Development. “The F-21 will serve as a force multiplier for the Indian Air Force with superior capability at a low life-cycle cost.”
The F-21 is the perfect complement to India’s current fleet in terms of operational performance by providing a single engine, low Life Cycle Cost (LCC) platform at a Max Take-Off Weight (MTOW) complementary to India’s Rafale and LCA Tejas. The F-21 is configured with the latest sensors and mission avionic
systems that couple onboard and off-board data information into an effective, easy to manage combat situation display. Additionally, the F-21 is truly a multi-role fighter – meaning it can be configured for both air-toair and/or air-to-ground missions. It includes a triple missile launcher adapter (TMLA) enabling 40% more air-to-air weapon carriage.
Lockheed Martin is leveraging technologies across its entire fighter portfolio for the F-21. In terms of 5th generation technologies, the advanced Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar is one example. The F-21’s AESA radar has detection ranges nearly double that of legacy versions. An advanced cockpit with a Large Area Display leverages both hardware and software from Lockheed Martin’s 5th generation fighters and will greatly enhance pilots’ situational awareness. The Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance System (Auto GCAS) is also included in the F-21 offering. This lifesaving technology detects when a pilot becomes disoriented or is at risk of losing control and automatically takes control of the aircraft. Auto GCAS has saved multiple pilots’ lives and aircraft.
“Lockheed Martin has a long history of leveraging capabilities across platforms, and we have an extremely high level of confidence in the maturity and performance of these 5th generation capabilities when integrated onto the F-21,” said Brett Medlin, F-21 India Campaign Lead, Aeronautics Strategy and Business Development, Lockheed Martin.
The F-21 offering includes sourcing advanced systems and components from across India via an unrivaled track record of developing robust industrial ecosystems across the globe. This program will be ‘Made in India’, generating tens of thousands of highly skilled jobs through the maturation of India’s large and emerging aerospace and defence (A&D) manufacturing network.
Lockheed Martin already has a robust A&D footprint in India that spans more than three decades. Two successful joint ventures — Tata Lockheed Martin Aerostructures Limited (TLMAL) and Tata Sikorsky Aerospace Limited (TSAL) — have been instrumental toward helping India develop an A&D supplier ecosystem, promote indigenous manufacturing and participate in the global supply chain.
Lockheed Martin partnered with TLMAL to build one of the most technologically complex aerostructures
Indian Air Force C-130J in formation. Lockheed Martin’s C-130J is extensively used by the IAF.
— a fuel-carrying 9G, 12,000 hour, interchangeable/ replaceable fighter wing. This prototype project was completed in December 2021 proving TLMAL’s capability to produce an on time, affordable and quality fighter wing. The transfer of technology and manufacturing rigor that Lockheed Martin and Tata demonstrated through this fighter wing qualification project will transfer to the F-21 program.
“Lockheed Martin is one of the only aerospace and defence companies with a complex aerostructure capability for advanced fighters in India,” Medlin said. “Production of fighter wings will aid in building a global defence ecosystem and increase indigenisation by accelerating India’s manufacturing and technical capabilities while creating thousands of new jobs in India.”
Today, TLMAL is the single global source of C-130J empennage assemblies included on all new Super Hercules aircraft. “There are more than 70 Indian sub-tier suppliers currently involved in the sourcing of material for C-130J empennages,” said Tim German, C-130J Pursuit Director with Lockheed Martin. “We plan to celebrate delivery of the 200th C-130J empennage in Spring 2023.”
The Government of India operates a fleet of 12 C-130J Super Hercules airlifters, which are used to support a variety of critical missions, including humanitarian aid, airlift, natural disaster support, and search and rescue operations. “Our established partnerships with TLMAL and within the Indian industrial supply chain through the ongoing work with the C-130J will strengthen and support the F-21 program,” German said.
Lockheed Martin is committed to its strong partnership with the Indian government and Indian industry and looks forward to the opportunity to build upon that partnership in the decades to come. •
SP Guide Publications (SP’s): What are the key pillars of your road map towards ‘Self-Reliance’ in Naval Shipbuilding?
Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL): MDL has been continuously striving to enhance the indigenous content in the successive deliveries of Ships and Submarines. Today MDL is capable of building Destroyers, Frigates, Corvettes as well as Conventional Submarines. MDL’s stellar efforts and commitment towards indigenisation are evident from the fact that percentage of indigenisation in the ships built by MDL has been steadily increasing from 42% in P15 Delhi Class Destroyers (built in 90s) to 75% in P17A Nilgiri Class Frigates (under construction).
Steps Taken by MDL for Self-Reliance:
• MDL has set-up a dedicated Department of Indigenisation in Oct 2015 to boost and strengthen the indigenisation effort.
• MDL has launched a separate “Atmanirbhar Bharat” webpage on the company’s website. The process of indigenisation, various items/equipment indigenised, items required to be indigenised (EoIs) are displayed under the webpage.
• MDL has been able to successfully indigenise some of the critical equipment/items required for Warships and Submarines.
• Indigenisation of these items has not only resulted in considerable cost savings to the exchequer but also helped India in becoming self-reliant as far as these items/equipment are concerned. Further, indigenisation are presently in progress.
• Currently MDL is constructing Scorpene class Submarines (Project-75) with provision for Transfer of Technology (ToT) through French Collaborator Naval Group. MDL has fully absorbed the transfer of technology to construct the Scorpene submarines independently without any support from the collaborator from third boat onwards.
Vice Admiral Narayan Prasad, AVSM, NM, IN (Retd) Chairman and Managing Director (Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited)
• For Project-17A, Fincanteri, Italy is the Know How Provider (KHP) for Technology Upgradation & Capability Enhancement (TUCE) for Integrated Construction of P17A Ships.
SP’s: Please share MDL’s key achievements in the last one year period?
MDL: Some key achievements of MDL in the last oneyear period are as follows:
• MDL launched one Advanced Stealth Frigate (Udaygiri) and one Guided Missile Destroyer (Surat) as a double launch on a single day on May 17, 2022, an unprecedented event in Shipbuilding in India.
• Despite Covid-19 pandemic, MDL delivered 2 Submarines (INS Vela and INS Karanj) and 1 Destroyer (INS Visakhapatnam) to Indian Navy in year 2021.
• MDL actively supported the nation’s effort to fight the Covid-19 Pandemic.
– MDL handed-over 27 ambulances, refrigerated vaccination van and 02 hearse vans in 2021.
– MDL handed-over refrigerated vaccination truck in March 2021.
– MDL has supported Cama & Albless hospital in setting up of 13 KL Liquid Medical Oxygen (LMO) tank for Covid 19 wards in January 2022. •
MBDA is unique in the guided missile sector in its ability to meet the missile system requirements of all three operational domains: air, land and sea.
This offers benefits to customers keen to maximise supply and servicing logistics as well as missile system modularity. MBDA weapons on the India Air Force’s Rafales such as MICA and Meteor combined with precision deep strike weapons such as the stealthy SCALP are capable of ensuring air dominance long into the future – and perhaps also for the Indian Navy’s future carrier strike fighter aircraft. The IAF’s Mirage 2000 fleet is being upgraded and it features MBDA’s MICA missile with its IR and RF seeker variants to deal with short to beyond visual range air combat. India’s Jaguar bombers also stand to have their battle capability significantly enhanced by MBDA’s ASRAAM missiles.
The threat of air attack is increasing. Low cost cruise missiles, manned and un-manned aircraft and the appearance of new ranges of ballistic missiles are threats that MBDA is best qualified to counter. Here the company leads with its range of ground and naval based air defence systems using the Mistral and CAMM missiles. Mistral, with its unmatched success rate of over 96%, during all firings, has been selected by many forces around the world and has been offered to the Indian armed forces to meet their VSHORAD requirement. Working with HAL, integration of the Mistral ATAM system on the Dhruv helicopter and the Light Combat Helicopter (LCH) has been very successfully completed. CAMM marks the next step in short range air defence, with its nextgeneration active radar seeker, two-way datalink and soft-launch technologies; it has an unrivalled ability to intercept multiple air threats across 360 degrees, combined with easy platform integration and the latest in maintenance-free design – making it the ideal Short Ranged Surface to Air Missile (SRSAM). Coastal and blue water operations require an effective anti-ship capability. MBDA is already supplying the Indian Navy’s new Scorpene submarines with its Exocet SM39 missile system. Similarly, other versions of the world-famous Exocet family are being
proposed for a number of Indian maritime aircraft requirements.
The concept of partnership with Indian industry is key to MBDA’s long-term strategy. In fact, MBDA’s links with Indian industry go back some 50 years, thanks to its partnership with BDL currently manufacturing the MILAN missile under license for the Indian Army.
Together MBDA and Larsen and Toubro formed a joint venture (JV) in 2017 to deliver Make in India programmes for the Indian Armed Forces. Capabilities already offered by the JV include Sea Ceptor (using CAMM) for the Indian Navy’s SRSAM requirement and the development of a new antitank guided missile (ATGM) for the Indian Armed Forces. •
Navantia, the Spanish shipbuilder, 100 per cent owned by the Spanish Government, is a world reference in the defence sector, offering services based on new technologies to find the most efficient solutions for its clients’ needs. Together with their partners, they work on finding the best solution for each customer´s needs, and then make it real with a wide range of products, systems and services.
It has a proven strength and extensive track record in the design, construction, and integration of state-of-the-art warships, as well as civil ships, offshore structures including offshore wind, ship repairs & modernisations. It also has a sound capability in the design and manufacture of Integrated Platform Management Systems, Fire Control Systems, Command and Control systems, Propulsion Plants and through life support for all its products. Additionally, even though its main line of activity is in the naval field, Navantia designs and manufactures systems for the Army. Navantia has a large experience in building the most technologically advanced ships like destroyers, frigates, corvettes, amphibious ships, patrol vessels, and submarines.
Navantia is currently building four S-80 submarines for the Spanish Navy, the first of which is currently in Sea trials. This is an exceptional 3,000 tonnes submarine, provided with a revolutionary third generation AIP System, being proposed as baseline for the future P-75(I) submarine project in India. Also, Navantia has contracted five F-110 frigates for the Spanish Navy, the new and state-of-the art frigate design which incorporates cutting-edge technologies, innovations and developments for further crew reductions, low life cycle cost and high level of survivability.
Over the last years, Navantia has supplied ships for several navies: Norway, Australia, Spain, Chile, Malaysia, India, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey with newly signed contracts for UK and Morocco. This experience, together with a continuous commitment to innovation, the use of the latest technologies and a highly qualified work force, makes Navantia one of the most competitive companies in the world.
Navantia has commercial delegations in Norway, Turkey, India, USA, the Middle East and subsidiary companies in Australia and Saudi Arabia which
serve as a lever to strengthen collaboration agreements with local industry in these countries. In addition, Navantia UK was recently created to fulfil the forthcoming contract for the collaboration in the manufacture of three logistics ships for the Royal Fleet Auxiliary.
Australia is one of Navantia’s principal clients, for whom it has built two LHD amphibious ships, 12 fast landing crafts, two AOR logistic support ships and provided design and transfer of technology for 3 Air Warfare Destroyers. In November 2022, an Official Order from the Commonwealth of Australia (CoA) has appointed Navantia Australia as the Destroyer Capability Enhancement (DCE) Platform System Designer for Destroyers that were designed by Navantia. As DCE Platform System Designer, Navantia Australia will be responsible for conducting all design assessments and design activities on the Hobart Class Destroyers SEA4000 Phase 6 Upgrade.
In 2022, the collaboration with the Norwegian Ministry of Defence was renewed with a view of extending the service life and upgrading the F-310 frigates that were designed and built by Navantia.
Navantia is building five 3,000 tonnes light frigates for the Saudi Arabian Navy, with three units already in the water. Navantia also carries out in cooperation with the Spanish Navy a complete training programme using cutting-edge technologies for both the crew and the maintainers. Due to the excellent results in this programme, Saudi Arabia and Navantia have signed a memorandum of understanding to acquire and build a number of multi-mission combat ships for the RSNF.
In relation to OPVs, during the last few years, Navantia has delivered 16 units between 1,600 and 3,000 tonnes. Currently, there is one 2,000 tonnes unit under construction for the Royal Moroccan Navy.
Navantia is providing design and technical assistance for the Turkish LHD programme, which is the fourth unit derived from the internationally successful Spanish Navy LHD “Juan CarlosI”, with two units build for Australia. This vessel is also proposed as baseline for the future Indian LHD project, tailored to the Indian requirements, in collaboration with its Industrial partners, based on a transfer of technology programme and support by a qualified group of Navantia experts, inorder to accomplish the “Make in India” national programme.
Navantia is delivering maintenance and support services in the Rota Naval Base to the four DDG-51 Arleigh Burke destroyers of the US Navy that are deployed in Europe as part of the anti-missile shield. As a result of a very successful 7 years of support, the US Navy has recently decided to renew the agreement and increase the scope with two additional DDG’s and two more auxiliary units. It is also worth to highlight that similar support is being provided in Norway and Australia for the ships that have been designed by Navantia.
In the area of systems, “Navantia Sistemas” is a centre of excellence for the design, development
and integration of complex systems of high technology, offering an added value to Navantia services as systems supplier, which differentiates it from the rest of the traditional shipyards. It defines, develops, produces and integrates the Combat Systems for the naval units that Navantia builds, is responsible for the development of the Commandand Control Systems, Communication Systems and Integrated Platform Management Systems, and is working, as well, with the new models of support to the life cycle.
The principal advantage of Navantia, achieved in many years of experience and clients, is the flexibility to adapt to different requirements of the client, both technical and commercial, as well as the capability to offer global solutions throughout the entire life cycle of all its products: ships, systems, propulsion and energy, providing engineering capability, transfer of technology and technical assistance to its clients in every part of the world. •
During the last 121 years of activity of Rubin Design Bureau for Marine Engineering, 1066 submarines have been built to the designs of the Bureau, including 116 ships that were exported to Navies of 16 countries. The Bureau is also engaged in development of underwater robotic systems and facilities for offshore development. The Company is a subsidiary of the United Shipbuilding Corporation.
In June 2022, two submarines of Project 677 were laid down at the Admiralty Shipyard. Project 677 submarines Vologda and Yaroslavl are the fourth and fifth ships of the Lada class constructed to the Rubin’s design. The series features improved technical design. Performance capabilities and reliability of all radio & electronic equipment and systems (sensors) have been improved. Nonnuclear Project 677 submarine belongs to the fourth generation of submarines and possesses very powerful Sonar Suite, Missile-Torpedo Weapons and Sensors. The Project 677 submarine is single-hull, which enabled to reduce considerably her displacement, construction costs of hull structures, as well as hydro acoustic noisiness. All these have made the submarine less visible.
When ships of this serial join the Russian Navy, it will increase the defence capability of general-purpose naval forces.
Amur 1650
Amur 1650 is an export version of Project 677 submarines. Amur 1650 is the next generation of the world-known Kilo class submarines. More than 70 ships based on the basic design and its upgraded versions have already been constructed and inducted into the Russian Navy and those of friendly countries. She is more compact: with similar weapons composition (six torpedo tubes with ammunition comprising 18 torpedoes and missiles) the normal displacement has been reduced; the displacement of Project 636 submarines is about 2,400 tons while that of Amur 1650 is less than 1,800 tons. Due to automation the crew has been reduced from 52 to 35 persons.
Special features of the Project are as follows:
• Powerful torpedo-missile complex, capable of striking both underwater and surface targets, as well as to attack land targets;
• Improved stealth is ensured by advantageous configuration of submarine hull lines, carefully
RUBIN’s latest and most advanced developments are implemented in the next generation of submarines
designed propulsor (propeller), low-noise propulsion motor on permanent magnets, application of specially developed low noise equipment, wide application of advanced means ensuring acoustic protection, use of external anti-sonar coating;
• A large-area forward array plus availability of towed array sonar, as well as advanced processing techniques enable detection of very low-noise targets at considerable distances;
• The submarine is designed for operations in tropical areas as well;
• Ergonomic Combat Information Centre (CIC): operators’ consoles are of modern design and are equipped with user-friendly interface. Accommodation of operators in CIC ensures their swift and accurate joint work during standard combat and emergency situations.
Amur 1650 Project may be completed with AIP Plant. The Rubin proposes AIP Plant based on diesel fuel reforming. Diesel fuel reforming is attractive from operational point of view:
• Hydrogen is not stored on board, instead it is produced and instantly used (absence of “hazardous stock”);
• Only in case of diesel fuel reforming, the submarine gets the opportunity to store one type of fuel only and use it for diesel-generators, as well as for AIP system which reduces operational costs;
• Use and storage of diesel fuel onboard submarines has been mastered long ago;
• All naval bases of the world have adequate infrastructure for diesel fuel storage;
• It is possible to develop a range of plants, from low to high power;
• AIP Plant requires no special maintenance as design solutions secure AIP resource until overhaul.
Amur-950 submarines are based on technical solutions applied in Amur-1650 Project, but the displacement of Amur-950 is less and the crew is only 19 persons. Having relatively small displacement the submarine has a high striking power.
Amur-950 Submarine is intended for engagement of enemy submarines, surface ships, vessels and land objects as well as reconnaissance missions. The Project can have two design options, with TTs, and with TTs and vertical missile launchers of the Club-S Complex. Amur950 Project features high upgrade potential and can be customised to meet the customer’s requirements.
The main differences of Amur-950 Submarine compared to conventional submarines of the previous generation are: single hull architecture and smaller displacement; Integrated Automated Combat Control System which ensures a large extent of the submarine control automation; significantly higher stealth capability due to lower level of physical fields; electric propulsion system based on Variable Speed Permanent Magnet Synchronous Motor; significant reduction in the number of people in the crew.
Series of Kilo class submarines became the now second largest series of Soviet and Russian non-nuclear submarines, amounting to 75 units. Project 636 Warshavynka underwent a number of modifications. Submarines built to this design meet all up-to-date requirements.
Diesel-electric submarine of Project 636 (Improved Kilo) is designed for fighting against underwater and surface ships, protecting naval bases, coastal areas, sea communications and for reconnaissance and other missions. Submarine of 636 Project has high reserve of buoyancy and unsinkability. The boat features stateof-the-art equipment for reducing self-noise down to natural noise of the ocean.
Project 636 submarine is different from its foreign counterparts of the same class in terms of exclusive powerful weaponry, ability to attack land targets and the ability to counteract hostile surface vessels and submarines. Improved Project 636 features advanced on-board complexes and systems designed by Russian specialists in XXI century.
• The submarine is equipped with missile weapons
that allow firing missile salvo attacks against sea and land targets;
• Capability of target detection at distances that exceed enemy’s capabilities, low noise level;
• Submarines are equipped with electronic equipment based on state-of-the-art components that allow keeping the equipment in operable condition during entire operating cycle of the submarine;
• Availability of the significant reserve for future development, capability to optimise the Project to meet the foreign customer’s requirements;
• Project 636 submarines with “Club-S” Complex in different versions are operated in the Russian Federation. They have proved their high reliability and performance in foreign navies of different countries;
• Production partnership in construction of Project 636 submarines is well-proven and allows to complete construction within the shortest time possible.
The Rubin capabilities allow designing the entire range of underwater vehicles – from midget to extra large AUVs. The Rubin develops robotic underwater systems in a fully-digital environment which speeds up calculations, reduces concept-to-delivery time and makes it possible to avoid nearly all rejects during manufacture and assembly of the vehicle.
In February 2022, Rubin launched new production facility in the town of Kronshtadt. The production platform is intended for simultaneous assembly of several superheavy, heavy, medium and small underwater vehicles. The Marine Robotics Centre comprises three manufacturing areas including two slipways as well as testing facilities and quality control units.
The Rubin is in interaction with various shipyards and wide range of OEMs. Owing to multi-year partnership in the field of defence cooperation, we have an experience in the creation of advanced systems and are ready to employ it in the designs of any complexity. •
TCL stands as one of the leading manufacturers of troop comfort items, military gears and other personnel protective equipment in India. It has state-of-the-art manufacturing set up located at Kanpur, Shahjahanpur, Hazratpur and Avadi with a workforce of around 6000 employees with an annual turnover of 900 Crores. It is a Government of India Enterprise under Ministry of Defence and has its Head Quarter located at Kanpur.
TCL is committed to be the most preferred competitive global developer and supplier of contemporary clothing products to customers and adopts manufacturing practices that are cost effective and are supported by state-of-the-art technology.
TCL is empowered to act towards offering a complete solution to its customers under the newly unveiled brand of “TROOPS”. It is steadfast in innovation-led exponential growth in R&D of various specialized garments like, Bullet proof jackets, High altitude clothing, Flame retardant garments, etc by the constant study of its dedicated experts for increased indigenisation leading to a larger cause of “Atmanirbhar Bharat”. Strict adherence to quality standards imbibed in every process is the hallmark of the organisation.
Further, TCL has also expanded its existing business through agreements various leading research and educational institutions viz., CSIR, IIT Delhi, IIT Madras, CLRI Chennai, NIFT Delhi among others for design and development of various products to rope in contemporary technological & design inputs.
The recent birth of Troop Comforts Limited, a newly created DPSU should not be a factor to downplay its expertise and quality of output. This unit has been carved out of the defence giant Ordnance Factory Board, whose legacy dates back to 1801. Having served the nation for more than two centuries, these OFs have accumulated unmatched infrastructure, skilled manpower and the emotional connect that helps us understand our customers like NO ONE ELSE.
Armed with the expertise and wisdom of years together, coupled with the contemporary corporate governance practices and financial powers, TCL is now aiming to empower its esteemed customers with better products, better technology and better service. It is also aspiring to expand its customer base in export markets and to establish its global presence. •
WB Group specializes in state-of-the-art solutions for international armed forces, radio communication equipment, and weapons systems
WB Group/WB India designs state-of-the-art solutions that integrate communication systems, unmanned aerial systems, such as the Fly Eye Mini UAV, the loitering munition WARMATE, the fire control system Topaz, software-defined radios, and more. The WB Group, the largest privately held defence company from Poland, has established its presence in India through a Joint Venture, WB Electronics India Pvt Ltd, popularly known as WB India.
WB Group has already planned to manufacture its world-class systems in India, in line with Aatmanirbhar
Bharat, Make in India, and Make for the World initiatives, with a key focus on Unmanned Aerial Vehicle solutions and award-winning Artillery Fire Control System: Topaz offered by WB Group, which has proven to be the best in its class.
WB Group's Unmanned Aerial Platforms are considered one of the top UAV solutions in the world today, especially due to their extensive battlefield experience.
WB India is targeting the vast talent pool of Indian engineers while setting up its manufacturing facilities in India to cater to both the export market and the domestic market. •
Geopolitical competition between China-US and West vs Russia is being projected as a superiority contest between the two kinds of political systems - the western liberal versus autocratic, and brings about an ideological divide between them, which is turning difficult to bridge.
ussia-Ukraine War has in fact been a war between US and the West on one side and Russia on the other, supported by China. Was the war preventable; the answer is yes! But the US objective was to weaken President Putin (Russia) and send a message to China (Xi Jinping) with an implicit regime change agenda. That is precisely the reason that genuine Russian security concerns pertaining to eastward expansion of NATO, by including Ukraine, despite various implicit and explicit understandings after the demolition of Berlin Wall, were neither addressed nor even considered. The deep state on both sides has continued to play geopolitics and subvert any chance of rapprochement. The Russian redlines were breached, or at least perceived so by Kremlin, and Putin sought irrevocable guarantees from President Biden that NATO will never be including Ukraine. Washington had no incentive to accede to this demand. At the same time, no one could justify Putin‘s military aggression or so called special operations against Kiev since February, 2022. The humanitarian disaster and refugee crisis in Europe has its own tales of woes for ordinary people.
Anil TrigunAyATtion that the US-Russian nuclear arms control framework should be expanded to include China put its future in doubt. The possible demise of arms control and a range of new weapons technologies—including hypersonic, precision conventional, low-yield nuclear, cyber, and space weapons—hold out the prospect of a new US-Russian arms race. 1 Meanwhile, the UK closest ally of USA, with an Indian origin Prime Minister in Rishi Sunak decided to cancel the nuclear deal and cooperation with China stating that the ‘Golden Era’ of bilateral relations is over.
This has been a disaster in the 21st century as the world has barely come out of the severe impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, when the unexpected Ukraine-Russia war happened, creating an unprecedented crisis in food and energy, as also the threat to global security through veiled and unveiled insinuations of a nuclear war, that could herald the World War III. As such the international disarmament regimes especially the agreements like START and ABM treaties have been either abandoned or in tatters. China is enhancing its nuclear arsenal at an unprecedented pace and will be the third largest by 2035 if the recent Pentagon report is to be believed. No wonder, USA’s recent defence strategy (2022) considers China and Russia as strategic rivals.
The New START Treaty that limits US and Russian strategic nuclear weapons was to expire in early 2021, but can be extended for an additional five-year term. However, the current US posi-
Recently, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova acknowledged that the decision to leave the nuclear weapons negotiating table with the United States is based on the current poor relations between Moscow and Washington. The US State Department denounced that Russia had unilaterally withdrawn from talks to reformulate the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which were due to begin in early December (2022) in Cairo, Egypt. However, Zakharova regretted that relations between the two powers are “at the highest level of toxicity and hostility”, and accused the United States of being behind a “hybrid war” that has nothing more than the “pathological desire” to harm Russia. Even then, Zakharova vainly expects the US side to make “conscientious efforts” to ensure conditions that would facilitate a rapprochement between the two countries, culminating in a new round of talks on the issue. Earlier in 2019 USA withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty after alleging that Russia had violated it, which Russia denied. In May 2020, the Trump administration announced its intention to pull out of the Open Skies Treaty. It is clear that both are equally culpable.
As such President Biden (December 1, 2022) in a presser with visiting French President Macron stated that he was willing to talk and sit down with Putin if he was ready or had proposals to stop the war in Ukraine. This is Kite flying at its best to say the least, since possibly this is the worst phase of relations between Washington and Moscow, while trust deficit remains at the peak. Russia remains
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Since the war, the oil prices have sky rocketed, global inflation has gone up, energy prices in Europe have multiplied and countries there now face a recession. Militarily, it shows that wars will be Hybrid in nature, a blend of conventional and unconventional.
n February 24, 2022 the world woke up to the horrors of yet another needless war. The war in Ukraine is the first one in Europe after the 1991-92 wars in the Balkans when Yugoslavia, torn by the rise of ethno-nationalism disintegrated into five successor states: Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia, and Serbia & Montenegro. Russia was in no position at that time to either respond or intervene in the war as the break-up of the Soviet Union resulting in economic disarray and low oil prices left it with little choice. The tables have turned now as Russia wages a war to protect its vital strategic interests while the US and NATO are left to announce multitudes of ineffective sanctions and pledging billions of dollars’ worth weapons in support.
again in 2004 to include former Communist countries despite Russian objections, becoming a 30-member block from 15 at the end of cold war. Instead of focussing their gaze on an unstoppable China in the Indo-Pacific, the west continued to ignore Putin as he solicited security assurances and no NATO expansion to its very own borders. The Ukraine situation reminded the world of the 1962 Bay of Pigs standoff when the USSR placed its missiles in Cuba, barely 90 miles from the US coast and the way the world came to the brink of a nuclear war.
Nearly one year down the line, since the war stared, there is no end in sight. Meanwhile, the Nord Stream 2 pipeline has been blown up, rupturing a vital Russo-German energy link that took a decade and $11 billion to build. A key prestigious and strategic bridge linking Russia to Crimea was partly damaged in a sabotage attempt, allegedly schemed by western intelligence operatives. The EU and the UK are reeling under inflation touching double digits and could officially slide into an economic recession. A cold winter with energy costs that are ten times what prevailed a year back continues to stare at most Europe households. Yet, the rhetoric from both sides – Ukraine (with the support of US led NATO) and Russia does not seem to calm down in order to open up any avenues for peace to return.
Russia, after the breakup of the Soviet Union, has been persistently opposed to the expansion of NATO, a Cold War-era grouping, to include the former Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Despite very public assurances by the then US Secretary of State James Baker that there shall be no eastward expansion after a unified Germany was admitted, NATO expanded in 1997 and
In response to the ousting of pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych through the Maidan protests or the Revolution of Dignity in February 2014, Russia seized and annexed the Crimea. Weeks later, Russia threw its weight behind a separatist insurgency that broke out in Ukraine’s Russian-speaking east. Since 2014, Ukraine has veered sharply to embrace far-right foreign militias integrating them into its paramilitary forces and using them to conduct shelling and raids in the Donbas region. In 2020, these foreign fighters numbered about 1,02,000 men, about 40 per cent of the Ukrainian forces. Despite the Minsk Agreements 1 & 2, more than 14,000 people have died in the fighting in Donbas and at least two million people have been forced to flee their homes, mostly pouring into Russia. Though not part of the NATO, Ukraine began to increasingly conduct multinational NATO joint exercises on its soil and received modern arms and munitions as a major NATO partner state.
A language law came into force in Ukraine on January 16, 2022 that required all national print media to be published in the country’s official language, Ukrainian, in a bid to push back against the use of the Russian language in the public sphere which riled the 30 per cent Russian speaking minority. Then the Ukrainian forces launched heavy artillery shelling in Donbas on February 16, 2022 in preparation for another major operation. On February 22, 2022 President Putin recognised the DPR and LPR and invoked Article 51 of the UN Charter on February 24, 2022 to launch security operations on request of the newly recognised states.
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There has been a distinct shift in the global geopolitical and geoeconomic centre of gravity to the Indo-Pacific. The multitude of regional mechanisms in the Indo-Pacific cannot be mutually exclusive of each other in addressing the regional security concerns, and therefore offer a multi-layered and multidimensional approach.
the announcement of AUKUS, a trilateral security arrangement between Australia, the UK and the US in September 2021 took the world by surprise and signalled a significant shift in the emerging regional security matrix in the Indo-Pacific, not least because of Australia’s U-turn on its nuclear policy. Such a major strategic development could obviously not have taken place without adequate discussion at the highest levels and a carefully calibrated approach, but even a whiff of these developments was not available in the public domain prior to the announcement. This arrangement, with very distinct military overtones, and mainly focussed on delivering nuclear attack submarine capability for Australia, led to the raising of Chinese hackles which was understandable and French petulance, which was not. France accused the US of ‘stabbing it in the back’ and in a fit of pique, recalled its Ambassadors to Canberra and Washington.
Prime Minister Scott Morrison clearly stated that the Attack class submarines (as these were designated), were not adequate for Australia’s emerging security considerations in the region. France perhaps believed that it could have been the technology provider for the SSN capability too on the back of the SSK programme. Infact, many observers had felt that the French design, known as the ‘Short Fin Barracuda’, based on the French Barracuda class SSN, was chosen in the first place as it allowed Australia the option of introducing a SSN capability if it decided to exercise the nuclear option later.
France was upset at finding itself out in the cold with the abrupt cancellation of the contract for 12 conventional submarines to be built in Australia for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), in collaboration with the French company Naval Group (NG), formerly known as DCNS. This programme was already facing intense criticism in the Australian parliament as well as in the media because the costs were spiralling out of control (the original contract for AUS $50 billion, had already reached an estimated AUS $90 billion, without even an approved design of the submarine being ready). This behaviour clearly highlighted the French government’s deep involvement in its defence export business, which we in India too are familiar with. Fortunately, after some time the storm blew over and relations were soon back on an even keel with France’s primary concern being that of protecting its own as well as the EU’s interests in the region. This also included the resumption of the Australia-France-India trilateral, which had been established less than a year before this.
The AUKUS trilateral is more than just a pact for developing Australia’s nuclear submarine programme and also includes cooperation on developing quantum technologies, artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities, electronic warfare and hypersonic technologies amongst other things. It makes no bones about being a military arrangement aimed at containing China’s increasing maritime belligerence and its aggressive intent in the larger Indo-Pacific. China, not surprisingly, is very visibly upset with the formation of AUKUS and expressed its displeasure verbally and through some of its actions including trade sanctions on Australian products and commodities including the import of Australian wine.
Countries in the Indo-Pacific have a host of formal and informal multilateral, mini-lateral and bilateral arrangements amongst themselves. These include both formal and informal interaction across many areas, but two aspects that underpin most of these is the concern about ensuring a Free and Open Indo-Pacific and the underlying concern about China’s intentions in pursuit of its ambitious agenda of regional, and ultimate global dominance. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or the QUAD is one such. It is an informal grouping of four like-minded democracies (Australia, Japan, India and the USA), the origin of which could be traced to the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief initiatives in the aftermath of the tsunami that struck the region on December 26, 2004.
in September this year, during the commissioning of the country’s first indigenous aircraft carrier, the Vikrant, Prime Minister Modi spoke about the need for strengthening the Indian Navy in order to secure the nation’s maritime interests in a rapidly changing global scenario. He also stressed the need for enhancing the Navy’s capabilities while also lauding the “indigenous potential, indigenous resources and indigenous skills” that made the Vikrant a unique reflection of self-reliant India.1
As the Indian Navy continues to build its force capability – three frigates, one destroyer, one submarine, two diving support vessels and one survey vessel were launched, and three air squadrons and the P-15B destroyer, INS Mormugao, were commissioned this year2– it is also apparent that it would need to consider two important aspects. First, even as the Navy’s future force structuring is more-or-less defined by what is called the Integrated Capability Development Plan – a 10-year comprehensive acquisition plan of the Indian Armed Forces, which is prepared by the Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff – the changing security scenario would continue to impact this plan. Second, any future capability would be influenced by the rapidity at which new technologies are innovatively disrupting commercial and military affairs.
Indeed, the Navy does take cognisance, inter alia, of these important factors. The strategic security situation is continuously assessed through the Navy’s internal mechanisms, and appropriate measures are instituted to address specific issues in the near-term, as well as in the long-term. That said, the evolving geopolitical realities and the changing paradigms of conflict also warrant that the traditionally accepted roles of navies – which were, until very recently, upheld as enduring – be also revisited. This is not in as much as that the roles of navies themselves have changed, or mutated, but because a whole range of developments – from doctrinal to technological – increasingly challenge navies’ traditional capabilities in countering threats that would invariably emerge from them.
As far as absorption of technology and indigenisation is concerned, the Indian Navy made a good start by setting up the Directorate of Indigenisation at the Naval Headquarters in 2005, and more recently, the Naval Innovation and Indigenisation Organisation (NIIO) in 2020. It is evident that the Indian Navy has been proactive in adopting new technologies, through indigenisation and innovation, which would enable it to perform its functions more effectively. In July 2022, the Navy hosted the maiden seminar of the NIIO at New Delhi. Aptly titled ‘Swavlamban’ or ‘self-reliance’, this seminar examined the role of industry and academia in accelerating niche technology induction into the Indian Navy.3
The highlight of the seminar was the release of the iDEX DISC74 (SPRINT) challenges by the Prime Minister, Narendra Modi. SPRINT (Supporting Pole-vaulting in R&D through iDEX, NIIO and TDAC5) is a collaborative project between the Defence Innovation Organisation (DIO) and NIIO aimed at developing at least 75 indigenous technologies and products as a part of Azadi Ka Amrit Mahotsav. The challenges span a wide range of niche technology fields including Artificial Intelligence (AI), autonomous and unmanned systems and Information Technology.
This article examines, briefly, the future challenges that the Indian Navy would likely face, and thereafter, in greater detail, the capabilities that it would require to effectively address those challenges. The article attempts to presage the likely trajectory along which maritime threats and risks could take shape, and correspondingly, the doctrinal imperatives that would be necessitated in order to address these. The article concludes with a prognosis of future-ready naval capabilities for the Indian Navy.
In the last two decades, India has been an ardent propounder of peace and stability in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and is now increasingly seen at the centre stage of global geopolitics. India’s
A whole range of developments, from doctrinal to technological, increasingly challenge navies’ traditional capabilities in countering threats. Indian Navy has been proactive in adopting new technologies, through indigenisation and innovation, which would enable it to perform its functions more effectively.
China’s critical position in global supply chains and its factories making products for global export, leads to deep economic linkages and individual concerns of the QUAD member countries and presents a humongous challenge to the stability of the QUAD and its ability to balance China.
The QUAD is an informal strategic forum comprising India, USA, Australia, and Japan. It aims to secure a rules-based global order, freedom of navigation and a liberal trading system. The coalition also aims to offer alternative debt financing for nations in the Indo-Pacific region. On the face, it looks to be an economic forum that wishes to curb the interference of China in trade that flows through the Indo-Pacific. However, from for the past few years, the member countries are also conducting combined military exercises. For example, Australia, Japan, India, and the United States — conducted the Malabar naval exercises off the coast of Guam from August 26-29, 2021. Similarly, JapanIndia Maritime Exercise (JIMEX 22) was held in September 2022, with the Indian Navy hosting the exercise in the Bay of Bengal. Likewise, as recent as in November 2022, India and the US successfully concluded 18th edition of joint military exercise ‘Yudh Abhyas’ in Uttarakhand close to the India–China border. The US Embassy in India in a tweet said, the joint military exercises such as Yudh Abhyas reinforces our commitment to the Indo-Pacific region, improves interoperability and takes the US-India Defence partnership to new heights. “The Indian Army also talked about the greater synergy between both the armies as a result of the exercise.” Such military, events do convey signals to the adversary that, if need be, the member countries may assist each other militarily either directly or indirectly, in the event of an attack on any member.
What concerns the QUAD is the aggressive force posturing by the Chinese in the Indo-Pacific around Taiwan, indirect threatening to Japan and South Korea through its proxy North Korea by way of launch of missiles and in the case of South Korea even by artillery fire. The artillery barrage in the waters near the ongoing US–South Korea joint Naval Exercise on December 5, 2022 is a recent example. The concerns of the US stem from the expansionist design of China
in the East China Sea (ECS) and South China Sea (SCS) over various disputed reefs and islands in these seas with Japan and ASEAN countries such as Vietnam, Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia and Taiwan. Any military action by China will draw Japan into the military confrontation either directly or indirectly, thereby forcing the member countries of QUAD to also take a position in favour of the US. These concerns are discussed in detail below.
Besides ensuring its maritime interests in the Indo-Pacific, use of force against Taiwan by China is a distinct possibility and cause of a major concern for the US. Xi has said that “Taiwan is Chinese territory” and only China and Taiwan can resolve the Taiwan question. To resolve Taiwan, he has also made it clear that he would use all measures necessary to unite Taiwan with China including use of force if needed. However, Xi has clarified that the aggressive intent is primarily directed at external elements and separatists opposed to the reunification of Taiwan. Any move by China has the potential to cause a Ukraine–Russia war-like situation and does not augur well for the stability in the Indo-Pacific.
China has two major adversaries, US at the global level and India at the regional level. While in terms of force levels, the statistics weight heavily is favour of Chinese Armed Forces, in almost all major parameters of military power, India’s human resources are operationally better experienced and more capable of fighting in the Himalayas as compared to China. India’s actions in Doklam, Galwan and Kailash Ranges bear testimony to this aspect. Yet China is a major concern for India as it is constantly influencing its neighbours against India, land-grab along the LAC in areas rightfully belonging to India, colluding with Pakistan militarily, supporting terrorism in Kashmir through Pakistan, and provid-
When the PLAN (Chinese PLA Navy) commenced its modernisation drive in the mid-1980s, its naval forces were suitable only for brown water operations. Recognising the technological inferiority of its weapon systems vis-à-vis the West and the Soviet Union, China set about remedying this, with the military being one of the ‘four modernisations’ formally taken up by Deng in 1977. To their credit, it needs to be acknowledged that they got their fundamentals right. Indigenisation of hi-technology, through reverse engineering, of weapons and systems, or by stealing technology from their rivals, was the first step. This was followed by the accumulation of human capital capable of improving technological capability, some through Soviet scientists lured to China after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, but mainly through Chinese nationals, trained abroad at the world’s best universities and retained in the PLA through special schemes and incentives.
Defence industries were reorganised, defence procurement made cost-effective and efficient by re-structuring various state-owned enterprises, competition was encouraged by allowing the private sector to participate in defence R&D and manufacturing, and arms exports were promoted to ensure economies of scale. R&D in the defence sector was funded on a large scale and national institutions such as the National Defence University and the PLA’s Academy of Military Sciences were tasked to prepare the macro-guidance for the modernisation drive to be properly focussed, including the study of the theory, strategy and tactics of naval operations. To meet the demands of indigenisation of its equipment and galvanise China’s defence science, technology and industry, a new ‘Commission for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence’ was set up in March 1998. The Commission drafted regulations to introduce market competition in the national defence industry and enhance its capacity. As a result, in July 1999, the corporations of five military industries involved in nuclear, astro-
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nautics, aeronautics, ship-building and weapon sectors were reorganised into ten corporations, namely: China National Nuclear Corporation; China Nuclear Engineering and Construction Corporation; China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation; China Aerospace Machinery and Electronics Corporation; China Aviation Industry Corporation I & II; China Ship Building Corporation; China Ship Building Industry Corporation; China North Industries Group Corporation; and China South Industries Group Corporation.
Based on the realisation that naval build-up takes time to fructify, the PLAN had set out a three-stage development process in the 1990s. The first phase would be completed by the end of the 20th century and would develop rapid response task forces capable of attack and deterrence in the seas beyond China’s territorial waters and possess: a relatively large radius of action, reaching the ‘first island chain’ including the Yellow Sea, the western East China Sea and the South China Sea; a strong rapid response capability; reasonably effective amphibious power; independent protection and attack forces; and a credible second strike nuclear deterrence capability. In the second phase, which would extend over the first two decades of the 21st century, the PLAN would extend its control over sea areas within the ‘second island chain’, gradually break into the West Pacific, and enter oceans around the world. By then, the task forces formed in the first phase would be led by aircraft carriers and form a three-dimensional system of attack and defence. The third phase would go beyond the year 2020, when China’s naval capability would be that of a major maritime power. The timelines for the development of its services and arms were revised in 2008, when China stated that: a solid foundation would be laid by 2010, major progress in mechanisation and informationisation made by 2020; and the goal of modernisation of national defence and in armed forces attained by the mid-21st century. These were again amended in 2019, to generally achieve: mechanisation by 2020 with significantly enhanced informationisation and greatly improved strategic capabilities; complete the modernisation of national defence by 2035; and transform the PLA into world class forces by
China aims to control a vast ocean area, termed by them as the ‘Two-Oceans Area’, comprising mainly the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean. Since China’s maritime strategy requires sea control capability, the principal instruments for exercising this sea control will be their Carrier Task Forces (CTF).
aircraft carriers have been in the news this year due to the commissioning of India’s first indigenous aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant, on September 2, 2022, as also the launch in July this year of China’s People Liberation Army (Navy)’s (PLAN) latest and largest aircraft carrier – the Fujian – which at 85,000 tonnes will be close in tonnage and dimensions to the US Navy’s super carriers, and which is likely to carry an air wing of over 60 aircraft. In comparison, the Vikrant weighs in at a more modest 45,000 tonnes and is planned to carry an air wing of about 30 aircraft. While the commissioning of the indigenous aircraft carrier is cause for great celebration, being one of the most significant milestones towards India’s dream of an Atmanirbhar Bharat, the scale and speed of China’s aircraft carrier programme should drive home the urgency of pursuing the programme for larger and more capable aircraft carriers for the Indian Navy.
Many Indians would be surprised to learn that the first Plan Paper made for the Indian Navy in 1948 included the need for a three aircraft carrier Indian Navy to enable it to exercise sea control in the Indian Ocean. It was, therefore, not surprising that India joined the elite group of countries that operate aircraft carriers very early after its independence when Vikrant was commissioned into the Indian Navy in 1961. Unfortunately for the Navy, conflicts on India’s land borders focused attention and funds away from the seas, and even the Indian Navy’s hour of triumph in the 1971 War only brought it back for a short interregnum. Consequently, despite the Indian Navy being the major resident maritime force in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and playing a stellar role in ensuring stability and freedom of navigation on its waters, a three aircraft carrier Indian Navy has remained a distant, and some would say, an unaffordable dream.
However, a resurgent China should awaken us from our slumber. After its economic liberalisation commenced in 1978, China
realised early on, that without maritime power, it could never achieve its dream of becoming a global power. It consequently focussed its attention on building its Navy and today has the world’s largest number of blue water combatants – surpassing even the US Navy. It has two aircraft carriers in commission, with a third, much larger carrier, due to be commissioned in 2024 and its long term plans are to have a six aircraft carrier navy. For a Navy that landed its first helicopter on board a ship only in 1980, something that the Indian Navy has been doing routinely since the late 1950s, its revolutionary transition over the past three decades is indicative of its likely capability in the coming years.
More worrying for India is the fact that China’s current maritime strategy of ‘Offshore Waters Defence with Open Seas Protection’ is a ‘Sea Control’ strategy, with long term ambitions of attaining ‘Command of the Seas’. Under this strategy, China aims to control a vast ocean area, termed by them as the ‘Two-Oceans Area’, comprising mainly the Pacific Ocean, Indian Ocean, and the littoral regions of neighbouring Asia, Africa, Oceania, North America, South America and Antarctica, spanning 50 per cent of the globe and 71 per cent of the global ocean area. Chinese strategists deem this region important for China’s future security interests and strategic development, especially ‘resource extraction’, ‘space utilisation of the oceans’, and ‘development in the two Polar Regions’ (to use their terms). If this strategy is combined with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), especially its maritime leg, the Maritime Silk Road (MSR), it is evident that the first priority of China’s maritime expansion in the Two-Oceans Area is towards the Indian Ocean. Since China’s maritime strategy requires sea control capability, the principal instruments for exercising sea control will be their carrier task forces (CTF), which could be resident in our waters by the end of this decade. Indeed, the US Department of Defence reported on December 1, 2022 that the first Chinese overseas naval base at Djibouti has operationalis ed a 450-metre pier at its facility, which has the entire infrastructure
The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is the third largest air force in the world with nearly 1,700 combat aircraft and is closing the gap with Western air forces across a broad spectrum of capabilities such as aircraft performance, command and control, and electronic warfare.
ir power remains the most potent means of prosecuting war. It provides long range, precision, and flexibility. Modern fighters are omni-role, thus can do multiple missions in a single sortie. The ranges have got extended with aerial refuelling. The AEW&C gives cover deep in enemy territory. For long it is very clear that for ground or sea war to be won there is a need for dominance in the air. The fighter aircraft remains the most potent platform for both offensive and defensive operations. While many are predicting the future to be unmanned, practically all the fifth and sixth generation fighters that will see the world through this century are evolving as manned fighters. India is one of the most threatened nations in the world. It has two nuclear weapon possessing neighbours. With both of whom there are serious boundary disputes and have had repeat wars and border skirmishes.
IAF today is at an all-time low of 30 fighter squadrons. The government has already announced that the four remaining MiG-21 Bison squadrons will be retired by 2025. In this period, only around two squadrons of LCA, at best, will be inducted. This would mean further depletion of the squadron strength. At the same time Pakistan Air Force (PAF) currently has over 400 fighter aircraft in 22 fighter squadrons, and plans to add two more. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is the third largest air force in the world, and of its nearly 1,700 combat aircraft, 900 are 4th generation-plus. China also has additional air power with the PLA Navy (PLAN) with nearly 500 aircraft and expanding number of aircraft carriers. Clearly India’s neighbours are expanding their air power.
Nearly 50 fifth-generation J-20 stealth fighters have been inducted and PLAAF plans to have 200 by 2027. Second stealth aircraft, J-31 development is being hastened. PLAAF operates nearly 750 J-7 variants, 100 J-8s, 465 J-10s, 225 J-11 air superiority fighter vari-
ants, 52 Russian Su-27s, 73 Russian Su-30 MKK multi-role aircraft, 24 Russian Su-35S, and 176 H-6 jet bomber variants. The extended-range H-6K variant can carry six air-launched Cruise missiles. They also have 20 IL-76 jet transport aircraft and around 90 smaller propeller transport aircraft. China has inducted around 20 Y-20 large transport aircraft that can lift up to 66 tonnes. The new variants are planned to support airborne command and control, logistics, para-drop, aerial refuelling, and strategic reconnaissance operations. They have three IL-78 MD/ TD Russian jet aerial tankers, and eight Tu-154M Jet patrol/ELINT aircraft. The AEW&C aircraft include four turbo-prop KJ-200 and five KJ-500, and four KJ-2000 jets. PLAAF has a variety of indigenous and Russian helicopters of Z-8/9/10 and Mi-17 class. Meanwhile, newer Z-18 and Z-20 are being inducted. PLAAF has approximately 59 fighter/ground attack brigades with operational theatre commands. Each Brigade reportedly has 24 aircraft. Each bomber regiment has 18 aircraft. PLAAF also has a large number of indigenous unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) of global standards. Many of these carry armaments (UCAV).
They are developing new long-range stealth bomber H-20 to strike regional and global targets, which is expected to be ready by 2025. PLAAF is also inducting state-of-the-art long range aerial missiles with ranges up to 300 kilometres.
With the support of indigenous industry which is producing all genres of aerial platforms, PLAAF is fast acquiring top-end systems and weapons of global class and reach. There is much greater emphasis on modern technologies, including stealth, hypersonic, Artificial Intelligence (AI), cyber, electronic warfare, and long range missiles. PLAAF also reoriented its flying training and tactics, and there is much higher emphasis on realistic exercises. The PLAAF has made major changes in its operational doctrine based on global reach requirements. Air defence of critical assets; long-range offensive precision strikes; integrated battlefield support missions; intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR);
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China’s space aspirations are amply clear by way of various writings on the subject. It aspires to become a major space power (‘taikongliliang’ in Mandarin) and it considers this to be its rise to a terrestrial great power (‘da guo’). China has been making it clear that it intends to increasingly compete with the US for pre-eminence in space, both strategically and commercially.
The space power drive by China has been outlined in China’s White Paper on Space Activities, published every five years. President Xi Jinping himself has been a great exponent of Chinese Space Power dreams, and spelled out on China’s first National Day of Space Flight on April 24, 2016. On the same occasion, Xu Dazhe, the then Director of the China National Space Administration (CNSA), explained that space industry projects aim to make China a major power in the space industry. He added that China has only just begun leveraging its space capabilities.
China’s space programme started in the late 1950s with R-2 rocket technology transfer from the erstwhile Soviet Union under a 1957 agreement. Initial collaboration helped China develop its indigenised versions called Dong Feng or East Wind rocket. It launched its first rockets in September 1960, but this cooperation ceased soon because of the Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s.
In its formative years, the Chinese space programme enjoyed direct support from Chinese premier Zhou Enlai. Continued impetus led to development of a new rocket, the Chang Zheng (CZ) or Long March (LM).
After the successful launch of Sputnik-1 by the erstwhile Soviet Union in October 1957, US launched Explorer-1 in January 1958. France and Japan launched their own satellites into orbit in the following years. This ushered in a new space era in satellite launch and China did not lag behind. With the launch of Dong Feng-1 in April
1970, it became the fifth country to indigenously launch a satellite into orbit.
Today, it has developed 15 different variants of launch vehicles, all by the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). Long March series of rocket continues to be the workhorse of China’s space programme. China has advanced in the areas of satellite launches, the navigation programme and crewed missions to space.
In terms of the total number of operational satellites, China has 467 satellites, having overtaken UK (349) and Russia (168). The US is way ahead with 2,804 satellites, India incidentally has only 61.
In terms of the number of launches per year, China surpassed the US in 2018 with 39 launches. In 2019, it led the world with 32 launches. In 2020, China had 48 launches, including 10 by private space industry. 2021 proved to be an exciting and a landmark year, of the total 145 launches, China led the tally with 55, leaving behind the US with 51 and Russia with 25 launches this works out to almost one launch per week for China, sending more than 100 spacecraft into space. In 2022 China kept up the momentum and had a record total of 60 launches, including 51 of Long March family itself.
All this has made China stand out on the global stage in space arena, making western nations acknowledge its achievements. The world has witnessed a marked improvement in China’s launch capabilities in recent years, with an urgency to cash on the economic dividends and security implications. While the number of launches may not be an accurate indicator of the space prowess, more launches implies that it has also deployed more payloads, it surely demonstrates a strong launch infrastructure.
The Chinese space programme is directed by the China National Space Administration (CNSA), an agency under the State Administration for Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence (SASTIND), responsible for launches. The Long March
China’s space programme has been one of the fastest growing in the world. Over the next few years China is seeking to develop its space transportation capabilities, test new technologies and embark on interplanetary exploration missions.Air ViCE MArshAl sAnjAy BhATnAgAr (rETd)
China regards the Central Asian Republics (CARs) as vital for its gateway to the markets of Eurasia, Europe, and Russia. It is silently changing the rules of business in Eurasia, comprising of weak states, to promote a kind of Chinese crony capitalist model.
We are witnessing the beginning of a new strategic competition which will possibly spread into different regions of the world, including Central Asia. In fact, the recent escalation in diplomatic tensions between the US, China, and Russia will impact the Eurasian region the most.
P. sToBdAngrouping launched in January this year vowed to increase the trade target to $70 billion by 2030.
As we prepare for an ‘Indo-Pacific’ response, China is speedily encroaching into Eurasia’s space on Halford Mackinder’s line to make it its own glacis. Beijing seems to be taking over Russia’s “near abroad” without even displeasing Moscow.
More specifically, fallout of the ongoing Ukraine war could be serious for Central Asia without precedent. Sanctions on Russia have blocked all the Eurasian outlets, disrupted the logistic chain, and crippled Central Asian economies that are tied with those of Russia. The resource-rich countries have lost access to their export markets in the West. Kazakhstan’s oil exports through Russian ports have been badly affected. Turkmenistan has resumed gas supplies to Russia after 2019. But cutting off gas supplies from Moscow by western countries will have an immediate impact on Ashgabat.
The economic costs have been heavy. Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan sent 7.8 million workers to Russia in 2021. Remittances from Moscow accounted for 30 per cent of their GDP. The fall of ruble has caused the faltering of their national currencies impacting everyday life. Russia banned the export of grain and sugar that entailed grim prospect for Central Asian food insecurity.
Central Asian Republics have walked a diplomatic tightrope in their response to the Ukraine conflict. Ironically, Central Asians have endorsed the Taliban coming to power next door but have rejected Russia’s actions in Ukraine.
Profiting from russia’s Crisis
Russia’s crisis means an opportunity for China and Russia is being edged out in trade with Central Asia. China’s trade with Central Asia hovers at is $40 billion; half of which is with Kazakhstan not counting Chinese ownership stake in Kazakh energy and mining. A quarter of Kazak oil production is Chinese-owned. Turkmenistan is fully under a dependency trap – exports 90 per cent of its gas to China. Uzbekistan’s largest trading partner too is China. Beijing’s ‘China + Central Asia’
A recent US research lab aiddata.org report finds China having spent a total of $126 billion in the South and Central Asian region during 2000-2017 alone – mostly in energy pipelines and connectivity projects – ostensibly to get their economies tied to the Chinese network. From there on, China’s new modus operandi now under the BRI is to clasp everything in the region from big to petty businesses.
In fact, while the world’s attention remains focused on rivalry on the waters, China is silently changing the rule of business in Eurasia comprising of weak states beset by corruption. Beijing is using new tool of influence that enables it to promote a kind of Chinese crony capitalist model to all corners in its backyard, according to an Oxus Society study.
In 2020, when Kyrgyzstan faced a pandemic induced economic crisis, angry mobs hounded the country’s President, stormed into Chinese-owned gold mines, and chased out Chinese workers. But, when a new leader Sadyr Japarov emerged from the street protests, he too quickly looked towards Beijing for help in return for pledging protection for Chinese investments, and the safety of workers. Beijing has deferred Kyrgyz repayment for now, but soon it will go for asset-stripping, eating up Kyrgyz iron-ore and gold mines. It is a typical case of falling victim to China’s predatory economy.
Tajikistan’s case is no different. The country earlier had to cede land to ease its debt burden. In 2014, China signed a $3 billion contract to exploit Afghanistan’s copper deposit in Mes Aynak in anticipation of Afghan peace deal to come through.
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BRI projects have traction in Central Asia but they also result in more security concessions to China in exchange for debt relief. Beijing holds over 40 per cent of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan’s national debt.
in August 2021, Afghanistan was thrust back into the headlines.
Taliban forces rapidly closed in on Kabul, and the United States began making its final military withdrawal. Suddenly, the world was confronted with images of desperate people squeezing their way into Kabul’s airport for a chance to flee. Almost overnight, nearly everything that the United States and its allies had accomplished in 20 years of fighting, spending, and building in Afghanistan disintegrated. The collapse of the Afghan republic required urgency on the part of both regional countries and neighbours to deal with new authorities who had suddenly taken over Kabul.
A similar spectacle confronted India, who had heavily invested in Afghanistan since 2001. A predicament of strategic crisis was thrust upon India, China and Pakistan and other countries bordering Afghanistan; dealing with the Taliban, was no more a luxury, but had become a necessity.
All the neighbours, including India, Iran and China find themselves in a difficult position as a sudden change of regime of this kind was not anticipated. While India had played a significant role in the reconstruction and rehabilitation process in Afghanistan, Pakistan had continued to pursue a dubious policy of keeping engaged with and supporting the Taliban and simultaneously for consumption of US and its allies, extend a half-hearted support to the Afghan government. China on the other hand kept engaged with both the Taliban and the current government in pursuance of its interest of keeping the Uyghur movement under control as well as progress its strategic Belt Road Initiative (BRI), including China Pak Economic Corridor (CPEC) which had started encountering difficulties. Pakistan has started facing heat on the disputed Durand Line and the terrorist attacks by Tehrik-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP), India has been practically excluded, China is still unsure of it’s engagement with the new regime, Iran and CAR in an unsettled situation. After more than a year of the Taliban regime, all of them find in a precarious cauldron.
Since the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1980—and particularly since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001—the India-Pakistan conflict has also been injected into Afghan affairs. Each perceives influence in Afghanistan as critical to achieving its primary national security objectives, and both approach Afghanistan as a zero-sum dynamic in which one side’s gain is a loss for the other. Both have highly disparate goals for Afghanistan, and they thus undertake very different activities. Delhi had striven to bolster the previous government in Kabul and integrate Afghanistan into wider regional political and economic structures. By strengthening Afghanistan, India aimed at advancing its own national security objectives—namely, eliminating a critical safe haven for terrorists who attacked India and continued plotting to do so in the future, projecting power throughout South Asia (and beyond), and gaining access to Central Asian trade and energy resources. Goal certainly involved minimising Islamabad’s influence in the country.
In contrast, Pakistan’s goals for Afghanistan have always been India-centric. Islamabad’s endeavour was for a weak Kabul government dominated by a pliant, supportive Taliban so that it could maintain strategic depth” against an Indian invasion, guarantee safe haven for anti-Indian proxies, undermine Delhi’s influence in Afghanistan, prevent Indian power projection in the broader South/Central Asia region, and obstruct India’s ability to support separatists in the Pakistani province of Balochistan. In Islamabad’s Afghanistan calculus, protecting Pakistan against Indian encroachment takes precedence over pursuing Pakistan’s broader geopolitical and economic goals. Part of the reason for this strategic orientation is the preeminent decision-making role played by the Pakistani military, which emphasises security matters over virtually all other elements of foreign policy. So long as India is viewed as an existential threat, and so long as the military plays a central role in setting Pakistani policy, a fundamental shift in this policy bias is unlikely.
The sudden collapse of the Afghan government and the US withdrawal from Afghanistan imposed a predicament of strategic crisis on neighbouring countries like India, Pakistan and China, all of whom seek to advance highly disparate interests through their respective strategies for engaging the country.
China respects and listens when spoken to from a position of strength. This is where the QUAD Strategic grouping of India, US, Australia and Japan can play a key role by being militarily more visible in the South China Sea, to which China would always be hyper sensitive.
india has an inimical neighborhood, both in the West and the North. While the western adversary has been a constant irritant, it does not pose a major threat by itself. The main issue of concern is and will remain China, with whom the unsettled land borders stretch across the Himalayas. China has always been an enigma to external observers and under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) it has acquired a mystique which shrouds its intent. Added to this is a complex play of words in stating policy and diplomacy, with its political trajectory firmly in the control of the communist regime.
lT gEnErAl PrAdEEP BAli (rETd)terms would therefore gain priority for the CCP leadership in the days ahead. As an emerging superpower which seeks parity with the USA on the global stage, China needs to have armed forces with matching capabilities. Whether it can meet the self-imposed deadline of a fully modernised PLA by 2027 or not, the world is likely to witness an increasingly assertive China which will tend to seek and take on a more influential role far beyond its shores and this will need the backing of military muscle. A clear pointer is the time line of the PLA Navy for acquiring a sizeable number of aircraft carriers which would be a prerequisite for expeditionary forces.
The recently concluded 20th Congress of the CCP, saw not only the emergence and endorsement of the paramount leader but also was a clear pointer of how China will conduct its business on the global stage. Xi Jinping’s strident stance at the G20 summit in Indonesia, was not only a reflection upon his perceived dominance as a powerful leader but also how China now views the world.
At the CCP congress, the official line was very clear about the approach to local (neighbourhood) conflicts and how China intends dealing with them. These are mainly regarding Taiwan, disputes in the South China Sea, island territories with Japan and the trans Himalayan conflict on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with India.
While Taiwan and other maritime disputes can well be managed by a combination of deft brinkmanship, coercion and economic influences, a major concern will remain the plethora of issues with India. The unsettled land border stretching for 3,488 km along the LAC, has well identified disputed and sensitive areas. This border, which is contested all along due to the ambitiously manufactured Chinese claim lines, has become live or rather lively due to their testing the waters in Eastern Ladakh with indifferent results. The presence of the Dalai Lama and the Central Tibetan Administration in exile on Indian soil has always been a sore point in bilateral relations. Added to all this, China sees India as the sole challenger to its regional domination in Asia, which it aspires for as a prelude to global superpower status. Resolving these irritants with India on its
A superpower which dominates the world through its influence and impact on geo-politics and strategic issues, should have a safe and secure homeland, well insulated from any threat or disputes, at least on its immediate borders. The US is the prime example for this as fortress America has never experienced any direct dangers except the terror attack of 9/11. In this vein, China would want to ensure its dominance in the region with no nettlesome issues affecting its own borders.
To safeguard our national interests and to deter China from inimical actions, whether military or non-military in their scope, India needs to be proactive in dealing with the Northern adversary. Militarily we have always been reactive, whether it was the debacle of 1962 or even when the PLA got a bloody nose in 1967 at Nathu La and Cho La in Eastern Sikkim. At Sumdrong Chu in Arunachal in 1986, Doklam in 2017 and presently in Eastern Ladakh, the responses were a consequence of aggressive actions by the PLA. China, apart from maintaining a belligerent military posture, would amply harness media and psychological propaganda, to look for every opportunity to keep India in a reactive mode, while dragging on with any dispute resolution mechanisms.
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For India, being proactive does not necessarily imply being aggressive but rather being pre-emptive in our planning and actions, to counter any perfidy by outguessing the adversary. It also means having credible deterrence capabilities which in fact is the
India emerged in the 21st century as increasingly vital to core US foreign policy interests and a potential counterweight to the growing clout of China. India is now often characterised as an “indispensable partner” of the US, a status based on mutual respect and understanding.
the United States and India established diplomatic relations prior to India’s formal independence from the British Empire. The multistage independence process agreed to by the Indians and the British allowed for the creation of an interim government with the authority to conduct relations with other states before India attained full, sovereign independence. The United States recognised the Union of India as an independent state on August 15, 1947, when US President Harry S. Truman sent a congratulatory message to Lord Louis Mountbatten, Governor General of the Dominion of India. Diplomatic relations and the American Embassy at New Delhi were established on November 1, 1946, when the US Department of State raised the status of the American Mission at New Delhi to a full-fledged Embassy.
istrations of Presidents George W. Bush (2001–2009) and Barack Obama (2009–2017), the US has demonstrated accommodation to India’s core national interests and acknowledged outstanding concerns.
From the 1970s to the 2000s i.e., from the tenures of Richard Nixon/Indira Gandhi to Bill Clinton/A.B. Vajpayee, Indo-US relations touched its deepest low, especially when the Clinton administration imposed sanctions after the conduct of India’s nuclear tests including
Cutting off all military and economic aid.
Freezing loans by American banks to state-owned Indian companies.
Prohibiting loans to the Indian government for all except food purchases.
Currently, India and the United States enjoy close relations and have often seen eye-to-eye on issues such as counterterrorism (including concern of Pakistan’s involvement), mutual distrust on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme, and most importantly, Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific.
In 1954, as the United States made Pakistan a Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) treaty-ally. India started to cultivate strategic and military relations with the Soviet Union to counter Pakistan–United States relations. In 1961, India became a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement to avoid involvement in the Cold War power-play between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Nixon administration’s support for Pakistan during the Indo-Pak War of 1971 affected relations until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. In the 1990s, Indian foreign policy adapted to the unipolar world and developed closer ties with the United States.
Of late, Indian foreign policy has sought to leverage India’s strategic autonomy in order to safeguard sovereign rights and promote national interests within a multi-polar world. Under the admin-
Prohibiting American aerospace technology and uranium exports to India.
Requiring the US to oppose all loan requests by India to international lending agencies.
However, these sanctions proved ineffective. India was experiencing a strong economic rise, and its trade with the US only constituted a small portion of its GDP. Only Japan joined the US in imposing direct sanctions, while most other nations continued to trade with India. The sanctions were soon lifted. Afterward, the Clinton administration and Prime Minister Vajpayee exchanged representatives to help rebuild relations.
In the last decade or so, the following have become key milestones and a measure of speed and advancement on the path to closer US–India relations.
Increase in bilateral trade & investment.
Cooperation on global security matters.
Inclusion of India in decision-making on matters of global governance (UNSC).
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The cordial bilateral relations with Russia have been the key pillars of Indian foreign policy since 1947. Over the last 75 years, India has seen Russia as a long standing and time tested friend that has contributed significantly in economic development and security of the nation.
russia has been a long standing and time-tested partner for India and the friendship between India and Russian has stood the test of times and through difficult situations. Over the last 75 years, Russia as a longstanding and time tested friend, has contributed significantly in economic development and security of India. The adoption of Planning in India since 1951, Technological and financial assistance in Hydro projects, Steel Plants, Fertiliser Plants, Thermal and Nuclear Power projects, License production of Military hardware like Armoured vehicles and Fighter Aircrafts, Indo-Soviet Friendship treaty of 1971 are the landmarks of eternal friendship between two great nations.
of the 77th session of the UN General Assembly, and in Moscow on November 8, 2022. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and Defence Minister Shoigu-led India-Russia Inter-Governmental Commission on Military & Military-Technical Cooperation (IRIGCM&MTC) is another high-level bilateral mechanism whose 20 meetings have been held so far. Recently, the Ministers held a telephone conversation on October 26, 2022, and discussed bilateral defence cooperation as well as the situation in Ukraine.
Development of India-Russia relations has been a key pillar of India’s foreign policy. Since the signing of the “Declaration on the India-Russia Strategic Partnership” in October 2000 (during the visit of President Putin), India-Russia ties have acquired a qualitatively new character with enhanced levels of cooperation in almost all areas, including political, security, defence, trade and economy, science & technology, culture, and people-to-people ties. During the visit of the Russian President to India in December 2010, the Strategic Partnership was elevated to the level of “Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership.”
The Annual Summit between the Prime Minister of India and the President of the Russian Federation is the highest institutionalised dialogue mechanism in the strategic partnership between India and Russia. The last Summit was held on December 6, 2021 in New Delhi. During the last Summit, 28 MoUs and agreements were signed. A Joint Statement titled “India-Russia Partnership for Peace, Progress and Prosperity” was also adopted. The two leaders had most recently met on the sidelines of the SCO Summit on September 16, 2022 in Samarkand, Uzbekistan.
Not just these two leaders maintain regular contact, the foreign ministers of both countries too maintain regular contacts, the last meetings being in New York on September 24, 2022 on the sidelines
The last and 21st bilateral summit between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Vladimir Putin on December 6, 2021 was preceded by the first ever India-Russia 2+2 Dialogue, meeting between Defence Minister Rajnath Singh with Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu under the framework of the IndiaRussia Inter-Governmental Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation and the two foreign ministers co-chairing the two Inter-Governmental Commissions (one on Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technological and Cultural Cooperation (IRIGC-TEC) gave further impetus to the India-Russia Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership. Both countries signed a programme of cooperation in the field of defence for the next ten years (20212031) and set a target for $30 billion in trade and $50 billion in investment by 2025.
Indo-Russia Defence Cooperation is known to the World. 80 per cent of Indian Defence hardware is of Russian origin. The first supersonic IAF squadron was equipped with Russian made MiG-21 fighter jets in 1964, which was considered better than US F-104 Star fighter and F-86 Sabres. Hindustan Aeronautics established two assembly Plants for under license production of MiG-21 fighters at Nasik, Maharashtra and Koraput, Odisha in 1967. HAL has manufactured 657 Nos of various MiG-21 variants till date (FL,M,BIS,BISON). MiG-21s played an important role in Bangladesh War 1971, Kargil Conflict 1999 and in intercepting Pak F-16s post Balakot Air strike.
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india and France have built one of the premier strategic partnerships for advancing peace, stability and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.
They share a vision of a free, open and rules-based Indo-Pacific region, based on commitment to international law, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, freedom of navigation and a region free from coercion, tensions and conflicts. In 1998, the two countries entered into a Strategic Partnership, marking convergence of their views on a range of international issues apart from a close and growing bilateral relationship.
Between India and France, there exists the highest level of close interactions, both at the discussion table and on the ground. This kind of mutual understanding is rare in India’s strategic relations with other friendly countries. Year 2022 marked a significant mark-up in this relationship, with regular parlays between the two countries at the top political and military levels.
The importance of India-France relations can be gauged by the fact that Prime Minister Modi, who was on a three-day Europe visit during the first week of May 2022, met French President Emmanuel Macron in Paris during the final leg of his tour and held extensive talks with Macron, who was re-elected as the President of France only a week back. It was a golden opportunity for Prime Minister Modi to ‘drop in’ Paris on his return journey for a brief working visit to congratulate President elect Macron on his second consecutive election victory. Reflecting on his personal relations with the French President, Prime Minister Modi in a tweet wrote, “Delighted, as always, to meet my friend President @EmmanuelMacron. We talked at length about bilateral as well as global issues. India and France are proud developmental partners with our partnership spread across different sectors.”
Though defence is a strong pillar of India-France relations, this was not the only item on the menu of Modi-Macron meeting in Paris on May 4, 2022. The comfort level of strategic relations between European and Asian giants are so high that strategic observers have already started comparing India’s relations with Russia during cold war days to the present state of ties between India and France.
Giving details of the Modi-Macron discussions on defence cooperation, the Indian Foreign Ministry stated, “When two strategic partners speak, it covers the discussions in a format which is not necessarily focussed on transaction or individual platforms. India and France are very strong strategic partners and also have very strong defence partnership. The context of defence partnership is defined in case of our two countries by not just trade in different platforms, but it also extends to co-development, co-designing, co-manufacturing of different defence equipment in India. This is very much sync and in line with our own domestic policy of Atmanirbharta.” Taking forward this momentum, and based on mutual trust, both sides agreed to find creative ways for France’s deeper involvement in the “Atmanirbhar Bharat” (Self-reliant India) efforts in advanced defence technology, manufacturing and exports, through increased industry-to-industry partnerships.
From defence to diplomacy, France has an impressive track record of protecting and promoting India’s interests. After France stood with India in the wake of international opprobrium after May 1998 Pokharan nuclear explosions, both the countries signed the strategic partnership agreement, which has helped both the nations cement their relations in defence, space and nuclear sector among others.
During the visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in May 2022, the French President had reiterated his support for India’s bid for permanent membership in the UNSC. Furthermore, France reiterated its commitment to support India’s entry into the elite cluster of Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). This also was mentioned in the joint statement issued by the two countries after the meeting at the top level. Besides France, five Nordic countries comprising Norway, Finland, Denmark, Iceland and Sweden have also affirmed their support for India’s permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). During PM Modi’s visit to the above nations recently, the heads of all the nations together emphasised on their commitment to making these institutions such as the UNSC more inclusive, transparent and accountable with the aim of addressing global challenges more effectively.
India and France have come a long way in their Strategic Partnership over the last 25 yearsrohiT goEl
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the Middle East has experienced serious threats to its security and stability in recent times. These threats emanate from various sources including frictions among regional states, interventions from external powers, mass uprisings, failed states, jihadism and militancy. Regional geopolitical rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia, for example, has undermined the security in many regional states and cause, proxy wars. Similarly, external military interventions, such as by the United States (US) in Iraq and Libya and by Russia in Syria, have caused internal strife, repercussions of which have been felt far and beyond. Authoritarian regimes, mass uprisings and failed states are a common occurrence in the region with countries like Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen struggling to put their house in order. Violent ideologies represented through jihadism and militancy have created havoc, undermining not only regional security and stability but threatening peace and tranquillity beyond the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).
However, the factors noted above are not the ones threatening regional security and stability. A key issue that normally escapes attention of academics and analysts is the growing militarisation in MENA. Accumulation of military power, procurement and supply of arms and weapons, including weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), both externally and through indigenous production, and military interventions in neighbouring states for achieving narrow national objectives are serious issues afflicting MENA. Notably, no major small or big power can escape the blame for growing militarisation. Regional powers, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran and Turkey, as well as smaller powers, such as Israel, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have indulged in militarisation and a sort of arms race.
A combination of threat perceptions and power ambitions have fuelled the militarisation. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE and Qatar have preferred to rely on external procurement
of arms and weapons to counterbalance threats from states and non-state actors. They have also intervened in neighbouring countries; for example, Saudi Arabia and UAE intervened in Yemen, while Egypt, UAE and Qatar have done so in Libya. Israel, on the other hand, is a nuclear state, a major arms supplier in the world and is considered a global innovator in military technologies. Its domestic and regional policy is highly securitised in the backdrop of conflicts with neighbouring countries and with the Palestinians. It is also known to undertake pre-emptive military operations in the region when feeling threatened.
Turkey and Iran are two major regional powers that have adopted a militaristic neighbourhood policy diminishing security and stability in the Middle East. Both have adopted a combination of policies, including accelerated arms production, sales and supply, limited military operations, deployment of military personnel and advisors, and support for proxies, to expand their political and military influence in the neighbourhood. They have also, at times, indulged in competitive militarisation against each other reminiscent of their historical rivalry. This increasing militarisation has seriously threatened the security and stability in MENA, especially in the Persian Gulf, the Eastern Mediterranean and the South Caucuses. This has, in turn, enhanced threat perceptions among other regional powers causing competitive militarisation and arms race and creating fears of widespread regional insecurity and instability.
Turkey is a major regional power in the Middle East. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, it has wielded power in the Balkans, the South Caucuses and the broader Black Sea region. In the 21st century, Ankara gradually recalibrated its foreign policy to engage with the Middle East more extensively. Hence, relations with Iran, Iraq, Syria and the Gulf States improved significantly until 2010. In the meantime, Turkey also had begun investing in its indigenous arms industry, especially in the wake of the US arms embargo after
Turkey and Iran are two major regional powers that have adopted a combination of militaristic policies, including accelerated arms production, sales and supply, to expand their political and military influence in the neighbourhood, diminishing security and stability in the Middle East.
the India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and the United States grouping (known as the I2U2) has emerged as an important minilateral grouping. Given the political clout, economic power and technological capability of the member countries, this group has been perceived as a potential multilateral grouping capable of impacting global economic, environmental and developmental issues.
dr PrAsAnTA kuMAr PrAdhAnThe idea of forming the group was concretised during a meeting of the foreign ministers of all the four countries in October 2021. While India’s External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar visited Israel in October 2021, the UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan and US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken joined virtually. Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid joined the meeting. According to the Spokesperson of the US Department of State, “The Secretary and the Foreign Ministers discussed expanding economic and political cooperation in the Middle East and Asia, including through trade, combating climate change, energy cooperation, and increasing maritime security.”1 Except the issue of maritime security, all other issues in the initial meeting of the foreign ministers focused on economic and human security issues.
The formation of the I2U2 minilateral was assumed to be another quad like the Australia, India, Japan and the United States grouping with political motives. The presence of the US in both the groupings and alliance with like-minded regional powers gave further impetus to such assumptions. Initially, the group was referred to as the ‘West Asian QUAD’ suspected to focus on the military and security issues in West Asia and the Mediterranean. It was also rumoured that the formation of this group has been targeted against Iran as members like Israel, the UAE and the US have long standing rivalry with Iran. Except that of India, other three
members of the I2U2 grouping have strong views on Iran, particularly on the Iranian nuclear issue. The Biden Administration is renegotiating with Iran and other countries to restore the Iranian nuclear deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in Vienna. Israel has raised its objections regarding the Iranian nuclear programme and the dangers of Iran having nuclear weapons. Similarly, the UAE also shares serious concern about the Iranian nuclear issue. India has adopted a moderate position over Iranian nuclear issue and is keen to strengthen bilateral relationship. India’s relationship with Iran has been affected because of the sanctions imposed by the US and India had to stop buying Iranian oil after fresh rounds of sanction imposed on Iran. But later it became amply clear that formation of the group is intended to forge consensus between the member states over non-military or strategic issues.
The Abraham Accords signed in September 2020 opened a new chapter in the history of the West Asian region. Israel signed normalisation agreements with the UAE as well as Bahrain, and in a sharp departure from the past, recognised each other and started diplomatic relationship. The US played a key role in bringing them together, shed their past rivalry and forge a new partnership for the future. As a result, the erstwhile rivals have now started normal diplomatic relations among themselves. The emergence of the I2U2 group in the aftermath of the Abraham Accords is a reflection of the success of the Israel-Arab normalisation efforts. The I2U2 has provided the much-needed platform for further cooperation between Israel and the UAE in the region. It could also act as a catalyst in forging and strengthening Israel’s relationship with other Arab countries in the region.
In the aftermath of the Abraham Accords, Israel-UAE relationship has strengthened significantly. They have started exchanging diplomats with each other and have started a
The I2U2 grouping is of significant interest for all the members states as collaborating on non-political and noncontroversial issues gives them a good opportunity to further strengthen their cooperation. It’s impact on politics and security of the complex and fluid West Asian region still remains unclear.
Both India and Israel are bound by common threats of combating terrorism, separatism and the need to keep external and internal borders safe. Cooperation in various areas ranging from technology to weaponry has led to India-Israel defence relations growing exponentially in the past couple of decades.
relations between India and Israel are ancient and go back to many centuries. According to Chaim Menachem Rabin, Israeli professor of Hebrew and Semantic languages, the connection between ancient Israel and the Indian subcontinent was recorded during the reign of King Solomon (10th century BCE). Jews who have settled in Kochi, Kerala, trace their origin back to the time of King Solomon and are called Cochin Jews. Subsequently, Paradesi Jews migrated to India from Spain in the 15th and 16th centuries. Trade relations of both communities can be traced back to 1,000 BCE and earlier to the time of the Indus Valley Civilisation. Trade connections between India and Palestine and Mediterranean Jewish communities continued, and later, the languages of these cultures began sharing linguistic similarities.
In 2022, India and Israel are celebrating 30 years of diplomatic ties. India recognised Israel on September 17, 1950. Thereafter, the Jewish Agency established an immigration office in Bombay, which was later converted into a Trade Office and subsequently a Consulate. Embassies by India and Israel were opened in 1992 which denoted establishment of full diplomatic relations.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi undertook the first ever visit by an Indian PM to Israel in July 2017, during which the relationship was upgraded to a strategic level and a number of agreements/ memorandums of understanding (MoUs) were signed including in the fields of Research and Development (R&D) innovation, water, agriculture and space. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited India in January 2018 during which government-to-government (G2G) agreements were signed including on cyber security. Earlier in October 2015, President Pranab Mukherjee visited Israel. This was reciprocated by Israeli President Reuven Rivlin by visiting India in November 2016.
Over the past decades India-Israel relations have grown exponentially in multiple sectors, an important part of which is defence relations. Cooperation in various areas ranging from technology to
weaponry has led to the opening up of a new potential partnership between the two democracies. Both countries are also bound by common threats of combating terrorism, separatism and the need to keep external and internal borders safe from foes inside as well as outside.
India and Israel have close coordination in intelligence sharing and good relations between intelligence agencies of both countries. The rise of Islamic extremism-terrorism against both nations has generated a strong bilateral strategic alliance. In 2008, India launched the military satellite ‘TecSar’ for Israel through the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO). Interestingly, the specialised electro-optics technology of Bengaluru-based Tonbo Imaging has been powering Israel’s precision-guided bombs for many years.
As part of the regular goodwill visits of Indian ships, three Indian naval ships from the Western Fleet made a port call in Haifa in May 2017. Next year INS Tarangini, a naval training ship, made a port call in Haifa in September 2018. In 2017, India participated in the ‘Blue Flag’ exercise at Israel’s Uvda Air Force Base in southern Israel for the first time; the Indian Air Force (IAF) complement was a Hercules C-130J and a contingent of ‘Garud’ commandos. In 2021, the IAF sent five Dassault Mirage 2000 fighter aircraft to participate in Blue Flag 2021 exercise. The National Security Guard has also been training in Israel.
Israel has been providing advanced defence technology to India and over the years has exported defence goods to India to the tune of $2.9 billion. Some of the weaponry and defence support provided to India includes: Searcher, Heron TP and Hermes unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs); hand-held thermal imaging devices; night vision imaging equipment; Electronic Support Measure sensors and an Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation simulator system; upgrading of the IAF’s Russianmade MiG-21 ground attack aircraft; laser-guided bombs; Barak1 surface-to-air (SAM) missiles; arms and ammunition during
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lT gEnErAl P.C. kAToCh (rETd)
Indian Nuclear policy makers have to keep in mind, while designing deterrence posture, that the situation it confronts with China and Pakistan mirrors two different conflict systems. With China it is rivalry at the strategic level, and with Pakistan it is a conventional military face-off with nuclear overtones.
the bane of Indian security paradigm has been its confrontation with two very hostile nuclear-armed countries. To add to the complications both are involved in deep-seated rivalry with India and have joined forces supporting each other against core interests of India. While Pakistan has done everything possible over the last 75 years, from fighting four conventional wars to state sponsored proxy war with Jehadi elements, its obsession with Kashmir doesn’t seem to be waning. On the other hand, China leaves no opportunity to humiliate India and show it down as an inconsequential player. Both have long history of clandestine cooperation in the nuclear field. China has gone to great lengths to protect key security issues of Pakistan by even blocking banning of known terror leaders operating against Indian with backing of Pakistani establishment. Thus, Indian nuclear policy makers have to keep this equation in mind while designing its deterrence posture. Militaristic or not, India is taking adequate strategic and conventional military precautions as the situation it confronts with China and Pakistan mirrors two different cold war conflict systems. With China it is rivalry at the strategic level, like the contest between the United States and the Soviet Union, and with Pakistan it is, in the main, a conventional military face-off with nuclear overtones.1
An important aspect of India’s nuclear doctrine is CMD, which refers to the quantity of nuclear forces that India needs to deter potential nuclear adversaries. As deterrence optimists, moderates are generally less concerned about the quantity or quality of nuclear weapons. India’s official nuclear doctrine have pointed out that credibility is a function of how well C2 functions; the essence of deterrence, he argued, is to have a command- and-control chain ‘from the political level to the implementing level’ that demonstrates its ‘survivability under the worst conditions of decapitation attack.’ What matters is not so much the ‘exchange ratio’ of damage
suffered by both sides, but how much punishment an adversary calculates that it can accept. This level of punishment is achievable ‘so long as India has a survivable retaliatory force.’
The idea of CMD, at least as visualised by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), a part of the National Security Council, in the Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND), was an elastic concept that sanctioned ‘sizable and progressively more modern nuclear forces.’ Moderates accept that, although it is not necessary for deterrence, CMD could be adjusted to facilitate ‘influencing the perception of the adversary’.
The Indian nuclear doctrine leaves Indian decision makers the option of using nuclear weapons to retaliate against chemical and biological weapons (CBW) use, something which was not considered in the DND. This expansion is something to which moderates have objected, but it is also an issue on which not much debate has been generated. Some moderates disagree with this expansion, arguing that this did not work in the case of the United States, and it ‘hardly makes the Indian nuclear deterrent more credible,’ an argument with which most moderates would agree.
India has this thorny relationship with Pakistan carved out as home for the Muslim population of British India in 1947. The ‘Two Nation’ theory, basis of the partition seems to have created a perpetual enemy state on our western border. Almost all governments have failed to make a workable strategy on dealing with Pakistan. Pakistan seems to be so obsessed with anti-India hatred that it has cultivated terrorism as a state policy, the consequences of which are visible in internal dynamics with almost the whole country at war with itself. The defeat in the 1971 war and creation of Bangladesh still rankles the minds of Pakistani establishment and the ‘deep state’. Its pursuit of nuclear technology is only centred against India and Pakistan feels that they have achieved a semblance of parity on
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born as twins of same motherIndia, Pakistan, since it’s birth in 1947, continued to follow an anti-India stance in all its politico-strategic formulations. Islamisation was used as a tool to legitimise their rule by successive rulers and dictators of Pakistan. The leaders in Pakistan spread fundamentalism as they wanted to get foreign assistance from Islamic countries, declaring itself as champion of Islamic states. The rulers of Pakistan were so myopic in their antiIndia stance that in order to inflict a thousand cuts and bleed India, they started encouraging extremist organisations, harbouring and training them for terrorism in India and subsequently exporting them to other parts of the world, on the name of religion.
Though the majority of Pakistanis feel that total Islamisation of the country would be disastrous. However, the anti–India feeling and Kashmir are the two factors, which make them accept these activities. The malaise has also spread inside the country and Pakistan is paying a heavy price for it. Fundamentalism, extremism and terrorism have grown so much that now it has become difficult for the Pakistani Government also to control this menace, though the efforts are also cosmetic in nature.
The Republic of Pakistan was created in the name of Islam, but Quaid-E-Azam, Mohd Ali Jinnah, wanted a secular Muslim state and not a theocratic Islamic state controlled by fundamentalists. In 1947, when Pakistan was carved out, the population was not fundamentalist, but with passage of time, the inhabitants have become more and more fanatical, many turning into religious zealots.
Once Pakistan was created, ulemas stressed that the country must be an Islamic state and sharia laws should be implemented. Nonetheless, the founders of Pakistan did not impose Islamic laws in the constitutions of 1956 and 1962. Several Muslim states in the world rendered special support to Pakistan because the country was created in the name of Islam and Pakistan happily accepted
that. Islam was projected to integrate various ethnic groups. Islamic fundamentalism took roots in Pakistan due to poverty, ignorance, illiteracy and the incapability of society to redress the problems of masses. Religious organisations, including a few terrorist outfits, provided the poor masses hospitals, education, food and dwelling places. This won their hearts and slowly increased the following of religious extremists, thereby bringing in funds and recruits for them.
The ruling class, whether military or civil, also exploited religion to give legitimacy and popularity to its regime. Instead of curbing the menace of fundamentalism, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, an elected prime minister of the country, also leaned towards Islam when he realised that his socialist policies had become unsuccessful and he was losing public support. General Zia was the main proponent of Islam in the society and also radicalised the Pakistan Army.
Terrorism in Pakistan mainly originated during the SovietAfghan war in 1980s. This conflict brought terrorist into south Asia in the name of Jihad. These Mujahideen were trained by American CIA and other western intelligence agencies to carry out insurgencies in Afghanistan and to fight a proxy war against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Mostly these Mujahideen were not disarmed after the war ended in Afghanistan. Some of these Mujahideen found safe places in tribal areas of Pakistan near the Pakistan-Afghan border.
Soon after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, General Zia allowed the establishment of a chain of Deeni Madarassas (religious schools) along the Pak-Afghan Border to create religiousoriented students to reinforce the Afghan Mujahedeen. These madarassas indoctrinated students with hardcore religious teachings and brainwashed them into religious hardliners. This radicalised the Pak society in due course of time. These educated hardliners subsequently embraced violence for furtherance of religious dictats and became terrorists. The Taliban is also a product of these madarassas.
The malaise due to harbouring and training terrorist organisations has spread inside the country and Pakistan is paying a heavy price for it. Fundamentalism, extremism and terrorism have grown so much that now it has become difficult for the Pakistani Government to control this menace.PrAChiTA singh sAxEnA
‘Warfare is the Tao of deception. Thus, although you are capable, display incapability to them. When committed to employing your forces, feign inactivity. When your objective is nearby, make it appear as if distant; when far away, create the illusion of being nearby.’
—Sun Tzu1The Theatre Commander watched with horror and surprise at the devastation over the battlespace, despite what appeared to be a brave fight by his troops. It seemed that in certain sectors they hit thin air, despite clear surveillance and electronic indicators to the contrary. Further, as the campaign unfolded, in sectors where there was a confrontation there seemed to be a time and space warp in favour of the enemy as he seemed to move much faster than that indicated by his latest C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) systems, till they lasted. The destruction, degradation, disruption, dislocation of most of his resources on the ground, in the air, space, maritime, cyber, communications and infrastructure domains, achieved by the enemy, was complete.
The enemy appeared to be everywhere and yet nowhere. The swarm of drones, UAVs, UCAVs, UUVs, long range precision fires, directed energy weapons, white-out conditions for cyber, space grid and communications, appeared seemingly out of nowhere, undetected or detected in different and divergent sectors confusing decision-making. The human casualties had been enormous and the political will, already fragile over the last few years due to extensive internal turmoil (entropic warfare2), collapsed and accepted all the humiliating terms on border and other geopolitical, geostrategic and geo-economic issues laid out by the enemy.
His mind went back to the last few years during which the country had witnessed unexplained large scale internal strife on issues that seemed inconsequential. These had a direct social, economic and political impact leading to very deep fissures within the society. There was intermittent power, energy, transportation, financial grid disruptions leading to decoupling by many foreign companies and loss of Foreign Direct Investment. This further aggravated the labour market due to job-losses, adding to the strife. The political fissures compounded the issue and as the internal strife grew
the military deployment in aid to civil authorities expanded, much against the wishes of the military hierarchy, which warned of the gathering storm on the borders and the need to prepare for it.
Was it all linked, thought the Theatre Commander? Even as he asked the pilot to turn his aerial command post back, he saw a swarm of insects flying towards his helicopter. That they coalesced into a large mass was the last thing he witnessed even as the coalesced swarm of drone insects blew up to destroy his state-of-art aerial command post.
The scene depicted above is not from any Marvel movie or a figment of imagination but what could happen by 2040-45, given the evolving disruptive technologies. The technologies employed by the adversaries in Syria, Yemen, Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine, indicates the possible trajectory of future wars. Use of multidomain challenges in all the military, trans-military and civilian domains has already been witnessed since the ‘colour-revolutions’ in the post-Soviet Union space since 1990s. F. William Engdhal called it Full Spectrum Dominance3 by the US and the West, wherein ever since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 plans were put in place by the Pentagon to dominate every domain of National Power across the globe, something that was being done earlier in select regions only. The Chinese learnt from these and evolved their concepts Comprehensive National Power (CNP, Deng Xiaoping’s ‘zonghegouli),4, 5 Unrestricted Warfare or Warfare beyond Rules6, and the Three Warfares Strategy7
Different strategies were invoked to effectualised these concepts in the early days by the US, through regime change, insurgencies, small wars and geo-economic pressures. However, in today’s globalised world, with digitisation, spread of social media, proliferation of media, think-tanks and education institutions, the strategies to implement these concepts of multi-domain challenges
non-traditional security issues refer to a broad range of security challenges that go beyond the traditional military and strategic threats to a state’s sovereignty. In the 21st century, many non-state actors, such as terrorist networks, drug cartels, maritime piracy networks, and civil wars, have emerged as new-age threats to states’ national security. In addition to the transnational actors, the impact of environmental degradation including climate change, resources like water, energy, food scarcity, infectious diseases, natural disasters and irregular migration, have emerged as a credible and severe threat to the future existence of today’s nation-states. These security challenges are now termed Non-Traditional Security (NTS). The implications of non-traditional security issues on national security are significant and multifaceted. These types of issues can have both direct and indirect effects on a country’s stability and prosperity. They are likely to cause more harm to a greater number of people than conventional threats of interstate wars and conflicts.
As per Mely Caballero-Anthony, Non-traditional security threats may be defined as “challenges to the survival and well-being of peoples and states that arise primarily out of non-military sources, such as climate change, cross-border environmental degradation and resource depletion, infectious diseases, natural disasters, irregular migration, food shortages, people smuggling, drug trafficking, and other forms of transnational crime.1”
Now threats to international security come from mainly economic and social causes. Non-traditional security threats are: stateless, transnational and of non-military origin2. Remedies of these threats require comprehensive political, economic and social responses and humanitarian use of military force. Non-traditional security issues are frequently connected to one another.
Non-traditional security threats generally have the following common characteristics3:
The threats are transnational in their origins, conceptions and effects.
They do not come out of competition between states or shifts in the balance of power. They are often defined in political, social and economic terms.
Problems like resource scarcity and irregular migration cause societal and political instability to develop into threats to security.
Threats like climate change are usually caused by human-induced conflicts to the fragile balance of nature with grim consequences to both states and societies. It is difficult to reverse or repair.
National solutions are mostly inadequate. It requires regional and multilateral cooperation.
Security is not state sovereignty or territorial integrity only. It encompasses people’s survival, well-being and dignity at individual and societal levels.
Some examples of non-traditional security are:
Environmental degradation including climate security.
Infectious diseases and pandemics.
Energy, water and food.
Trans-national crimes, human trafficking and drugs.
Terrorism, extremism and violent non-state actors.
Chronic poverty, refugee flow and migration.
Disaster management including role of military in disaster relief.
Economic Crisis and disparities.
Corruption.
Responsibility to Protect.
Water security refers to the availability of clean, safe, and sufficient water to meet the needs of individuals, communities and ecosystems. It includes both physical and economic access to water and the protection of water resources from pollution and overuse. Some of the key factors that contribute to water security are:
Water availability.
Water quality.
Economic access to water.
Non-traditional national security issues are multifaceted and can have significant direct and indirect effects on a country’s stability and prosperity.
MAjorgEnErAl P.k. MAlliCk (rETd)
War fighting is undergoing significant transformations by leveraging technology trends to strengthen capabilities, optimise defence operations and augment military efficiency. This report explores major technological innovations that are transforming the way militaries around the world are preparing for conflict in the 21st century.
The implications of emerging technologies for warfighting and strategic stability are difficult—if not impossible—to predict, as they will be a function of many factors, including the rate of technological advancement, the manner in which emerging technologies are integrated into existing military forces and concepts of operation, the interactions between emerging technologies, and the extent to which national policies and international law enable or inhibit their development, integration, and use. Nonetheless, many emerging technologies exhibit characteristics that could potentially affect the future character of war. For example, developments in technologies such as Artificial intelligence (AI), big data analytics, and lethal autonomous weapons could diminish or remove the need for a human operator. This could, in turn, increase combat efficiency and accelerate the pace of combat—potentially with destabilising consequences.
Emerging technologies such as low-cost drones could shift the balance between quality and quantity, as well as between offence and defence. For example, swarms of coordinated, unmanned vehicles could overwhelm defensive systems, providing a greater advantage to the attacker, while directed energy weapons that provide a low-cost means of neutralising such attacks, could favour the defender. Thus, emerging technologies could shift the offencedefence balance multiple times over the coming decades.
Interactions among emerging technologies could also improve existing military capabilities or enable new capabilities—with unforeseen consequences for warfighting and strategic stability. For example, an enabling technology like AI could be paired with quantum computing to produce more powerful methods of machine learning, potentially leading to improvements in image recognition and target identification and enabling more sophisticated autonomous weapons. Similarly, AI could be paired with 5G communications technologies to enable virtual training environments or with biotechnology in a “brain-computer interface”
to enhance human cognition or control prosthetics or robotic systems. Such developments could, in turn, require new strategies, tactics, and concepts of operation.
Emerging military technologies—particularly complex systems such as AI and Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS)— could additionally produce unintended consequences if they fail to perform as anticipated. These consequences could range from system failure to violations of the law of armed conflict. In the most extreme case, an autonomous weapon could continue engaging inappropriate targets until it exhausts its magazine, potentially over a wide area. This could, in turn, result in mass fratricide or civilian casualties—a possibility that has led some analysts to call for a preemptive ban on LAWS.
Finally, emerging military technologies could raise an array of ethical considerations. For example, some analysts have argued that the use of LAWS would be inherently immoral—regardless of whether the weapon could be used legally—because a human operator would not make specific target selection and engagement decisions. Others have countered that human operators would continue to exercise “appropriate levels of human judgement over the use of force” and would remain accountable for ensuring that the deployment of LAWS conforms to the requirements of the laws of armed conflict. Those supporting a pre-emptive ban on LAWS have additionally appealed stating that weapons usage should conform to the “principles of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience.” Similarly, some analysts have raised ethical concerns about applications of biotechnology that involve human testing or modification as well as the weaponisation of biotechnology, which could potentially be used for targeted genetic attacks.
The US military has long relied upon technological superiority to ensure its dominance in conflict and to underwrite US national security. In recent years, however, technology has both rapidly evolved and rapidly proliferated—largely as a result of advances in the commercial sector. As former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel has observed, this development has threatened to erode
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Multiple 6th generation military aircraft are under development. The race is on between US, Europe, Russia and China for development of 6th generation air superiority aircraft that can dominate any contested air space in the coming future.
next-generation fighter platforms, their pilots and the future of air dominance will face more challenges than ever before, including a complex international security environment and rapidly evolving technologies from near-peer threats.
to the here and now,” said Kathy Warden, Chair, Chief Executive Officer and President, Northrop Grumman. “The B-21 Raider defines a new era in technology and strengthens America’s role of delivering peace through deterrence.”
The emphasis on close-combat dogfighting, which dominated 20th-century aerial warfare, is becoming a peripheral concern of aircraft manufacturers. Instead, ground attacks, cyber warfare, and even space warfare are increasingly relevant. The next generation of jet fighters will likely incorporate the ability to operate in a manned or unmanned configuration. Sixth-generation fighters will need to integrate with a variety of other jets, drones, soldiers, and sensors – in a saturated network meant to provide war fighters with a comprehensive picture of the battlespace.
UsaF B-21 raider — The ‘Future’ is here
Northrop Grumman and the US Air Force unveiled the B-21 Raider, the World’s First Sixth-Generation Aircraft, to the world on December 2, 2022. The B-21 joins the nuclear triad as a visible and flexible deterrent designed for the US Air Force to meet its most complex missions. It is the first new, long-range strike bomber in a generation and an aircraft specifically designed to be the multifunctional backbone of the modernised bomber fleet. Six B-21 Raiders are in various stages of final assembly and test at Northrop Grumman’s plant in Palmdale, California.
While the B-21 isn’t expected to be operational and introduced into service for several more years, the formal unveiling ceremony hosted by Northrop Grumman Corporation at its production facilities in California is a significant milestone in the US Air Force’s effort to modernise combat capabilities. The B-21 is designed to be a more capable and adaptable, state-of-the-art aircraft that will gradually replace aging B-1 Lancer and B-2 Spirit bombers now in service.
“The Northrop Grumman team develops and delivers technology that advances science, looks into the future and brings it
The B-21 Raider forms the backbone of the future for US air power, leading a powerful family of systems that deliver a new era of capability and flexibility through advanced integration of data, sensors and weapons. According to design requirements, the B-21 is a long-range, highly survivable stealth bomber capable of delivering a mix of conventional and nuclear munitions. Its sixthgeneration capabilities include stealth, information advantage and open architecture.
“The B-21 Raider is the first strategic bomber in more than three decades. It is a testament to America’s enduring advantages in ingenuity and innovation. And it is proof of the Department’s long-term commitment to building advanced capabilities that will fortify America’s ability to deter aggression, today and into the future. Now, strengthening and sustaining US deterrence is at the heart of our National Defence Strategy,” said Secretary of Defence Lloyd J. Austin III. “This bomber was built on a foundation of strong, bipartisan support in Congress. And because of that support, we will soon fly this aircraft, test it and then move into production.”
“With the B-21, the US Air Force will be able to deter or defeat threats anywhere in the world,” said Tom Jones, Corporate Vice President and President, Northrop Grumman Aeronautics Systems. “The B-21 exemplifies how Northrop Grumman is leading the industry in digital transformation and digital engineering, ultimately delivering more value to our customers.”
The B-21 is capable of networking across the battlespace to multiple systems, and into all domains. Supported by a digital ecosystem throughout its lifecycle, the B-21 can quickly evolve through rapid technology upgrades that provide new capabilities to outpace future threats.
While China’s true hypersonic capability may currently lag behind the hype there is no reason to believe it will always be so. India therefore has no choice but to accelerate the development of its own arsenal of hypersonic missiles and defensive systems against hypersonic attack.
f you thought the world’s major nations were busy these past two or three years fighting the COVID-19 pandemic or climate change, think again. Behind the scenes they are embroiled in yet another deadly arms race – this time, it is in the realm of hypersonic weapons technology. This race promises to be even more fast and furious than the ones in the past. It is also technologically more challenging and hugely expensive. Currently Russia, China and the United States (US) are all feverishly striving to develop long-range hypersonic missiles. For a change, the US trails the other two. But not for long, given that it is now accelerating testing for four different hypersonic weapons, and at least two may be made operational in 2023.
France, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Australia, Iran and India are other known or suspected players, albeit on a more modest scale. On March 18, 2022, Russia became the first country in the world to use a hypersonic weapon in combat when it launched its Kinzhal (Dagger) missile to strike an arms depot in the western part of Ukraine.
Hypersonic missiles are those that can fly long distances at greater than five times the speed of sound (Mach 5). At these speeds, they present a number of technological problems due to the extreme frictional heat generated as well as to accurately position and manoeuvre the high speed missiles. It is crucial to manage atmospheric drag during the flight. Manoeuvring is also difficult and even gentle turns can consume much of the missile’s kinetic energy and slow it down.
There are two main types of hypersonic missiles as under:
n Hypersonic cruise missiles fly with engine power throughout. They are powered by special scramjets (supersonic combustion ramjets) that have no moving parts, but burn fuel in a stream of supersonic air, compressed by the forward speed of the aircraft. n Hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV) or hypersonic boost-glide missiles are launched and accelerated to hypersonic speeds by
rockets, but then glide hypersonically towards the target.
A simple comparison would illustrate the time-critical advantage of hypersonic missiles. While a US Tomahawk cruise missile needs over an hour to travel to a target 1,000 km away, a hypersonic missile would reach in eight to ten minutes. However, speed alone is not what makes them deadly. It is their peculiar trajectory that renders them more difficult to detect and their ability to manoeuvre that makes them near impossible to intercept. They can evade most sensors currently used to track ballistic missiles, as well as the missiles deployed to destroy them. Even if the launch of a hypersonic missile is detected, the vehicle then flies outside the line-of-sight envelope of ground radars and provides even the most advanced defensive systems very little reaction time.
Russia, generally seen as current world leader in hypersonic technology, was the first to field an operational hypersonic missile in 2019 with the Avangard, an HGV with a claimed 6,000 km range. China followed suit in 2020 with the DF-17, an HGV with a range of 1,800 to 2,500 km. Russia has used the air-launched Kh-47M2 Kinzhal several times in its Ukraine operations. However, Kinzhal is really an aero-ballistic missile (a technology that is some decades old) and doesn’t fully meet the definition of a hypersonic missile. Russia is also developing the Zircon submarine-launched anti-ship HGV and several other types of hypersonic missiles. North Korea has tested the Hwasong-8, a shortrange ballistic missile, claimed to possess a hypersonic manoeuvrable re-entry vehicle. The US is unlikely to be able to deploy offensive weapons similar to these for another year or so.
China is keenly pursuing hypersonic technology for both commercial and military applications. Reports indicate that its fascination for hypersonic missiles lies more in their use for conventional regional warfighting than for an all-out nuclear attack. For instance, a US aircraft carrier lurking off Taiwan would be a juicy and legitimate target for a hypersonic missile. If China were to build a
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Loitering munitions have become the tip of the spear in the future of warfare, challenging all conventional assumptions in war-fighting doctrine as modern air defence systems and associated tactics, techniques, and procedures have all been developed to counter aircraft and missiles, which are much more detectable.
Ukraine war has once again brought focus to the loitering munitions, also known as the Kamikaze or suicide drone. The munitions are designed to arrive in the general target area, wait passively, look for the target, identify and then attack. Loitering munitions allow faster response against concealed or hidden targets that emerge for short periods, such as the air defence radars that remain silent and transmit selectively for short periods, among many others. The much less expensive drones are preferred over exposing high-value platforms such as fighters close to the target area. The drone attack can easily be aborted and drone repositioned in loiter mode. Loitering munitions fit perfectly in the space between cruise missiles and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), using the combat employment characteristics of both. The cruise missiles cannot loiter. The UCAVs can loiter but don’t have an inbuilt warhead and deliver weapons like aircraft.
aIr marshal anIl choPra (rETD)When the Surface to Air Missiles (SAM) combined with radars began to be used extensively, it became a deadly combination for jet combat aircraft. Taking out SAMs became a high priority. The loitering munitions evolved as possible counters. The aim was to remove the pilot to reduce human harm. The flight time of the flying platform could also be expanded. The in-build warhead was introduced. The munitions were thus expendable and relatively cheaper. They could now search for both known and unknown missile installations. The loitering munitions could be used stand-alone to clear an area of anti-air threats. Combined with following aircraft, the loitering munitions allowed jet fighters to retain their utility, without needing to be stealthy from launch.
Loitering weapons first evolved in the 1980s for use in the Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD) role against surface to air missiles (SAMs), and were deployed for the SEAD role in a number of military forces in the 1990s. Starting in the 2000s, loitering weapons have been developed for additional roles ranging from relatively long-range strikes and fire support down to tactical, very short range battlefield systems that fit in a backpack.
Kamikaze drones and loitering munitions have been very effectively used in the Ukraine war and have begun to define the future of warfare? Earlier they have been used in Afghanistan, Syria, and Yemen, but only in 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War they had come in the limelight in a contested environment for the first time. One of the military support package announced by White House for Ukraine included 100 tactical Switchblade loitering munitions. The videos going viral of direct hits on tanks and other ground vehicles indicate tactical successes. However to draw correct lessons, there is a need to understand the technology and employment dynamics.
Early 1980s saw evolution of the Israeli Delilah variants. In late 1980s IAI Harpy was the first loitering munitions widely exported, and also bought by the IAF. The Americans had the AGM-136 Tacit Rainbow which was often termed more as a UAV. They were used for SEAD role against SAMs, and were deployed for this role in a number of military forces by the 1990s. Starting in the 2000s, loitering weapons have been developed for additional roles ranging from relatively long-range strikes. IAI Harop was one such system. Later were developed smaller, tactical fire support, very short range battlefield systems that could fit in a backpack. They could fly, loiter, search and identify a target using own sensor, hit a target like missile, and were expendable. The sensors could be radar, thermal imaging, or visual sensor data. Loitering munitions could be as small as a model airplane or a little longer. Typically fixed-wing, and powered by pusher propellers, they could resemble everything from matchsticks with wings to a large bird of prey. Artificial intelligence, combined with the use of sophisticated sensors, is now allowing increasing levels of autonomy. Alternatively a human could select the target and order its destruction. Developments in communications technology, computing, processing, and miniaturised sensors means that loitering munitions can now serve a range of
China’s Informationised War doctrine looks to impose significant costs on an adversary, even one that is conventionally superior, by targeting its command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) network and civilian computer networks
china periodically announces major shifts in its military strategy through ‘Military Strategic Guidelines’ (MSGs) which dictate the tactics, equipment, training and manpower requirements to achieve the stated strategy. The PLA defines strategic guidelines as the ‘core and collected embodiment of strategy’, which contain ‘the programme and principles for planning and guiding the overall situation of war in a given period’. For the PLA, the concept of MSGs most closely approximates a National Military Strategy. As per authoritative Chinese sources, MSGs have four components: first, the identification of the strategic opponent based on China’s security environment and perceived threat to China’s national interests; second, the ‘primary strategic direction’, which refers to the geographic centre of gravity that will decisively shape the overall conflict as well as military deployments and preparations; third, the ‘basis for preparations for military struggle’, which describe the form of war or operations likely to be waged and hence the platforms and weapon systems required; and fourth, the ‘basic guiding thought’ for the use of military force or the general operational principles to be applied in conflict. The evolution of strategy occurs through ‘core concepts’ propounded by the Party General Secretary and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) (both posts normally held by the President of China) in speeches at the National Party Congress, which later become ‘strategic guiding thoughts’ or ‘strategic guiding ideology’ for the PLA. These thoughts are thereafter written into MSGs and then implemented through planning, acquisitions and resource allocations.
mobilisation of the Chinese people to repel an enemy. Though the term ‘People’s War’ has not been replaced due to political compulsions, its meaning has been subtly shifted to give primacy to technology, while retaining the importance of civil-military fusion to bring the country’s Comprehensive National Power (CNP) to bear upon an enemy. This shift actually started in the late 1980s after China’s lack of success in the Sino-Vietnam War in 1979 exposed the hollowness of its manpower-intensive army. Detailed introspection over a decade at the apex level led to the issue of the MSG of winning ‘Local/Limited Wars under Modern Conditions’ in 1988.
One of the most notable shifts in China’s Military Strategy over the past four decades, especially in the 21st century, has been its embrace of technology in waging warfare. This has been a remarkable change from Mao’s earlier strategy of ‘People’s War’, which was based on manpower intensive guerrilla warfare and wholesale
The strategy was then further modified to winning ‘Local Wars under Modern Hi-tech Conditions‘ (LWUMHTC) in 1992, in the wake of the technological superiority demonstrated by the US and Western forces while successfully prosecuting the First Gulf War against Iraq (1990-91). According to PLA military theorists, LWUMHTC would be characterised by: limited geographical scope and political objectives; short duration; high intensity operational tempo; high mobility and speed (manoeuvre warfare); high lethality of weapons; high resource consumption requiring efficient logistics support; high battlefield transparency; C3I intensive nonlinear battlefield; multidimensional combat (land, air, sea, sub-surface, space, informational); and joint operations. The war envisaged under this doctrine envisaged the use of fewer but elite troops, more flexibility, greater surprise, more trans-regional air mobility, long range raids (strikes), vertical envelopment and surgical operations. Precision-guided munitions, increase in non-nuclear (conventional) lethality and extensive use of advanced technology, especially C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence) was also envisaged.
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The ICT revolution and the Second Gulf War (2003-11) prompted continued Chinese discourse on the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), and they were convinced that unless they embraced technology on an even greater scale and incorporated it in their
Defence R&D is a critical enabler of developing cutting-edge defence technologies to achieve self-reliance in critical defence technologies and systems, while equipping the armed forces with state-of-the-art weapon systems and equipment.
US has long been considered to be the leader in the development of mission critical defence equipment through its investment in defence R&D. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is a research and development agency of the United States Department of
Defense responsible for the development of emerging technologies for use by the military. Following is an eclectic mix of some interesting technology programme being worked on at Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), to showcase the kind of research taking place in the development of defence technologies in the US industry.
The Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV) is developing an unmanned vessel optimised to robustly track quiet diesel electric submarines. The programme is structured around advance unmanned maritime system autonomy to enable independently deploying systems capable of missions spanning thousands of kilometers of range and months of endurance under a sparse remote supervisory control model. This includes autonomous compliance with maritime laws and conventions for safe navigation, autonomous system management for operational reliability, and autonomous interactions with an intelligent adversary. n
Linear accelerators, LINACs for short, are devices that accelerate electrons or other sub-atomic particles along a straight line to generate a beam of high energy. To generate more powerful electron beams using current technology, however, requires building larger LINACs that can grow to dozens of meters or longer depending on the application. DARPA has announced its Advanced Concept Compact Electron Linearaccelerator (ACCEL) programme whose goal is to develop a powerful, deployable electron LINAC. ACCEL metrics and objectives include beam power of up to 35 mega-electron volts (MeV), weight under 75 kilograms for the complete system, and ability to fit in a 1-meter long cylinder with 0.4meter diameter. n
India’s Defence sector is witnessing a significant wave of indigenisation as a part of ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ and ‘Make in India’ initiatives of the Government of India which has rolled out several policies to encourage and motivate self-reliance in defence manufacturing and technology in the country.
Path-breaking reforms were at the forefront for the Indian Ministry of Defence, during the year 2022, as giant strides were made with Defence Minister Rajnath Singh at the helm to transform the military into a youthful, modern and ‘Atmanirbhar’ force, as envisioned by Prime Minister Narendra Modi. While the Armed Forces were equipped with state-of-the-art weapons/equipment/technologies manufactured by a self-reliant indigenous industry, a major reform was rolled out with the aim to build a youthful & tech-savvy military ready to meet future challenges. Continuous efforts to increase defence exports in order to achieve the collective goal of global peace and prosperity, in line with the ‘Make in India, Make for the World’ vision, bore fruit as many countries showed keen interest in Indian platforms, resulting in record defence exports.
AyusHee CHAudHArygeared up to commence training shortly with improved training infrastructure.
Preparation and promulgation of Basic Military Training Policy governing training of Agniveers has been revised and implemented for smooth commencement of the training. Requirement of Training Infrastructure for Regimental Centres encompassing Simulators. IT Infrastructure, Training Aggregates, Physical Training/Sports Infrastructure and Works has been worked out and promulgated to cater for the reduced duration of training.
n The Agnipath scheme for recruitment of youth in the Armed Forces was launched in June, allowing patriotic youth (Agniveers) to don the sacred uniform and serve the country for a period of four years.
n The scheme has been designed to enable a youthful profile of the Armed Forces and bring about a transformational shift towards a more tech-savvy military.
n The recruitment entails an attractive monthly package with Risk & Hardship allowances as applicable in the three Services and a one-time ‘Seva Nidhi’ package to be paid to Agniveers upon completion of their engagement period.
n The response from patriotic youth towards the scheme has been encouraging. Over 54 lakh registrations, including by female aspirants, were received by the three Services for recruitment into the Armed Forces (Indian Army – 37.09 lakh; Indian Navy –9.55 lakh and Indian Air Force – 7.69 lakh). Training centres are
n India’s first indigenous aircraft carrier INS Vikrant was commissioned by the Prime Minister at Cochin Shipyard Limited in September. The commissioning showcased the country’s growing prowess of indigenous manufacturing and is a major milestone in the path towards ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’.
n With 76 per cent indigenous content, the 262.5 m long and 61.6 m wide ship is equipped with state-of-the-art equipment/systems, designed for a crew of around 1,600 officers and sailors.
n The carrier is designed with a very high degree of automation for machinery operations, ship navigation and survivability. It is capable of operating an air wing of 30 aircraft comprising of MiG-29K fighter jets, Kamov-31, MH-60R multi-role helicopters, in addition to indigenously manufactured Advanced Light Helicopters and Light Combat Aircraft Navy. Using the Short Take Off But Arrested Recovery method, INS Vikrant is equipped with a ski-jump for launching aircraft and a set of ‘arrester wires’ for their recovery onboard.
Other Major ‘Made in India’ Inductions/Launches
n LCH ‘Prachand’: Defence Minister Rajnath Singh presided over the formal induction of Light Combat Helicopter, designed and developed by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), ‘Prachand’ into the Indian Air Force in Jodhpur in October
The vision of the Indian Government is to achieve a turnover of $25 billion including export of $5 billion in Aerospace and Defence by 2025. After 75 years of independence, the indigenous defence industry is finally on the path to progress and scaling new heights.
india Armed Forces are among the world’s largest defence forces with a strength of over 14.4 lakhs (1.44 million) active personnel, because India has the largest unsettled borders of approximately 4,800 kms with two aggressive neighbours, who are also nuclear powers. India is truly justified to have high defence spending for operational readiness of such large force. India is also the second largest importer of military hardware making upto 8-9 per cent of global arms import. For a country as large as India with vast land frontiers and hostile neighbours, its defence cannot be guaranteed by 75 per cent of weapon imports, including critical technologies. The only answer to our strategic needs is self-reliance in matters of defence. The ultimate objective is to have ‘Made in India’ military hardware, so we start with small steps beginning with, ‘Make in India’.
ware, which resulted in dependence on other countries for spares and maintenance.
n Poor quality control by PSUs manufacturing defence equipment because they had a captive clientele in a monopolistic market.
n Very limited private sector participation in defence manufacturing.
n Lack of decision making for defence acquisition. A large number of scams and complaints of kickbacks resulted in hesitancy on part of decision makers to go for procurements. This resulted in large voids in operational readiness.
n Overlapping jurisdictions between the Ministry of Defence, Defence Production, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Industrial Promotion.
As India celebrates the ‘AZAADI KA AMRIT MAHOTSAV” after 75 years of independence, countrymen are delighted to witness the indigenous defence industry scaling new heights. The defence industry is finally breaking the shackles of Government Control after a long time and now making large strides with private sector partnership. India achieved exports of defence items and technology worth a record `13,000 crore in 2021-22 and this figure is likely to rise to ` 17,000 crore in 2022-23. The Indian pavilion at recently concluded DefExpo-2022, was named “Path to Pride” and aptly sums up the glorious path of progress by Indian Defence Industry.
The indigenous defence production faced a number of impediments after independence. However, a large number of them have been addressed in the last decade. The major problems are flagged as under:
n Lack of ‘State-of-the-Art’ technology due to limited investment in Research and Development.
n Limited ‘Transfer of Technology’ along with imported hard-
n Fragile relationship between academia, R&D institutions, production agencies (public or private) and end-users. Long gestation periods from research to mass production stage.
The vision of the Indian Government is to achieve a turnover of $25 billion including export of $5 billion in Aerospace and Defence by 2025. Over the next 5-7 years, New Delhi plans to spend $130 billion for fleet modernisation across all three services of Defence Forces. Moving a step further in making India self-reliant, the share of domestic capital procurement has been enhanced from 64 per cent to 68 per cent of the Capital Acquisition Budget of the Defence Services for FY 2022-23. The mission given out in accordance with the new strategy is as under;
Mission – Design, develop and lead to the production of stateof-the-art sensors, weapon systems, platforms and allied equipment for the Armed Forces such as arms and ammunition, tanks, armoured vehicles, heavy vehicles, fighter aircraft and helicopters, warships, submarines, missiles, electronic equipment, earth moving equipment, special alloys and special purpose steel.
To develop the desired Indigenous defence manufacturing base, India will require the development of sophisticated technology, which in turn, requires heavy investment in R&D. Over the last few years, Private sector companies have made substantive investments in developing infrastructure for manufacturing but investments in defence R&D have remained rather limited.
The defence r&d Conundrum Research and Development in defence industry is highly challenging due to intricacies of technologies and necessity for ensuring a fail proof outcome. This requires high degree of sophistication in many areas from metallurgy to kinetics. The Western military industrial complex and Soviet Union/Russia have dominated this arena over the years. China has made some recent forays in this sphere though the quality of the Chinese military equipment has been questioned particularly by several countries which have imported the same including Pakistan a close strategic partner as well as Bangladesh in the South Asian region.
In India defence R&D was the primary domain of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). While the DRDO has developed strategic systems, designing of conventional platforms including arms and munitions has exposed technological limitations. Thus adoption of the equipment by the armed forces has been low, nevertheless, this state is gradually improving.
To accelerate the pace of design and development of weapons and systems in India there is scope for increasing participation by the private sector in this critical sphere. As there is emphasis by the Government of India on privatisation of core industries including defence this will have to extend to R&D as well. Flexibility in hiring, ease of joint ventures and partnership with indigenous and foreign firms, mark to market and time sensitive delivery are some of the advantages that can accrue from such an initiative. The subject is however complex and thus needs deliberation with suggested models being attempted in this article.
An examination of global defence industry structure may be the first step for placing the issue in context. In the United States and Europe, private sector dominates defence production given structure of the industry in the market economies. In Russia and China
defence production is centralised under the government despite the Joint Stock Companies (JSC) floated in the former. Defence industry structures in these countries reflect the general manufacturing structure even though China has developed many companies in the civil sector presently.
On the whole USA and China spend approximately 12 per cent and 20 per cent of the defence budget on R&D whereas in India this is only six per cent. In the United States the private sector adds to the kitty. For instance, Lockheed Martin the top defence company in the United States spent $1.5 billion in this sphere in 2021 apart from allocations made by the US Department of Defence.
In India the defence sector continues to be heavily dominated by the government sector – the erstwhile Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) now corporatised into seven corporations and Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs). This is reflected in the listing of 100 top defence companies annually published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which includes three Indian entities OFB till 2021, Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) and Bharat Electronics Ltd in its list The OFB and DPSUs do make investment in defence R&D but can depend on the DRDO through direct and indirect linkages for design and development and thus can undertake manufacturing.
The absence of a private Indigenous defence company in the SIPRI list is emblematic of the limitations faced even though this sector has been opened in May 2001 to 100 per cent participation through licensing. Increasingly licensing has been liberalised and many private enterprises are taking to defence, as changing the over 1,300 companies who participated in the DefExpo 2022 that was held in Gujarat in October 2022. At the same time, private defence companies in the country are looking at assembling platforms with collaboration and thus do not feel the necessity for investment in R&D. On the other hand, to expand their share of the Indigenous and global defence market an investment in R&D would be essential.
In 2021-22, India’s defence exports improved with a value of $1.63 billion, a 54 per cent jump over the previous year. However, the bulk of India’s defence exports is equipment of low value. India cannot make a mark as a major arms and defence equipment exporter by selling ancillary items.
the Global Firepower (GFP) Annual Defence Review 2021 ranks India as fourth in terms of its power index with a score of 0.0979 (0.0000 being perfect). In a complete dichotomy of the above statistics, India remains the second largest importer of defence-related products, after Saudi Arabia, impinging adversely on its strategic independence and realising its global economic & military powerhouse potential. Foreign defence procurement stands at `50,061 crore ($6.1 billion) in 2021-22 viz `37,030 crore ($4.5 billion) in 2017-18. Countries, taking advantage of our nascent defence industry, mired in strait-jacket process-based procedures of procurement rather than the result, have thrived on our defence market to their benefit in generating finances to up-grade their defence industrial capabilities as well as create diplomatic leverage for their government. If we look at defence exports, as of 2021, India was the 23rd largest arms exporter in the world with a minuscule 0.2% share in the global defence market.
The value of indigenous defence production for the financial years 2020-2021 and 2021-2022 are `84,643 crore ($10.3 billion) and `94,846 crore ($11.53 billion), respectively. Indian internal demand, by itself, cannot sustain the high cost of Research & Development of high-technology products. Adding to this is the insecurity, in the minds of the developers, of their cost realisation through a product sale as well as, the debilitating timelines of procurement. While a lot has been done to alter the focus, a lot more needs to be done to bring about a feeling of investment security in the defence industry. While this discussion is ongoing, the focus of this article is on Catalysing Defence Exports, with its offshoot benefits of sustaining the investment of the Defence Industry with greater product realisation than feasible through only indigenous absorption.
Trends in indian defence exports & present Targets Defence exports had been gradually increasing in preceding years with figures of `1940 crore ($235 million) in 2014-15, `2,059 crore
($259.49 million) in 2015-16 and
`9,115 crore ($1.14 billion) in 201920. It is with this background, in 2020, the Indian Government had set a target of `35,000 crore ($5 billion) in defence sector-related export annually, within five years. This was part of the planned `1,75,000 crore ($25 billion) of defence manufacturing. Accordingly, in 2021-22, India’s defence exports showed a 54 per cent jump, with a value of `12,214 crore ($1.63 billion), over the previous 2020-21 of `8,434 crore ($1.06 billion).
The bulk of India’s principal defence exports is varied weapon simulators, 5.56mm cartridges, bomb suppression blankets, hardened armour plates, helmets, bulletproof jackets, tear gas launchers, torpedo loading mechanism gear, alarm monitoring and control systems, night vision devices, lightweight torpedo and fire control systems, armoured protection vehicles, mortar shell covers, high-frequency radios, and coastal radar systems. Most of this equipment is of comparatively low value, and low volumes and cannot, by itself, sustain a regular and substantial revenue to sustain the industry as an important supplement to internal demand. Additionally, India cannot make a mark as a major arms and defence equipment exporter merely by selling ancillary items.
There have been successful cases of sale of major equipment but very few and far between with a recently reported deal, closed in Sep/Oct 2022, of Pinaka multi-rocket launcher system to Armenia worth about `2,000 crore ($250 million); earlier beating Russia & Poland in the sale of four Swathi weapon locating radars for `329 crore ($40 million); sale to Vietnam of 12 fast attack ocean crafts under an `822 crore ($100 million) credit line.
In January 2022, India could get its first major export order of three batteries of the BrahMos medium-range cruise missiles, from BrahMos Aerospace Ltd Indo-Russian JV to the Philippines for `2797 crore ($375 million). This opens the potential of enlarging defence exports agreement with Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. Interestingly, as per a reported statement by A.D. Rane, Director General BrahMos Aerospace, to out-price its competitors
Ministry of Defence (MoD) has taken numerous steps to achieve ‘Atmanirbharta’ in defence and Positive Indigenisation Lists is one of the landmark initiatives towards achieving that vision. Following are the First, Second, Third and Fourth Positive Indigenisation Lists. All the Weapons/Platforms/Systems/Ammunition in the lists will be procured from indigenous sources as per provisions given in Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) 2020.
List 1 of 101 Items Announced on August 21, 2020 (Effective from December 2020) List
Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) acts as a point organisation for Jointmanship in the Minister of Defence which integrates policy, doctrine, warfighting and procurement by employing best practices. It is responsible for fostering coordination and enabling prioritisation across the different branches of the Indian Armed Forces.
nding 20 years of debate and dithering, on August 15, 2019, Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced the decision to appoint the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). The CDS will be the single point for military advice to the government and achieve jointness amongst the armed forces.
The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government completed its first tenure in May 2019. It would be useful to assess as to how far the government has been able to achieve broad objectives
of ushering in jointness and integrating the defence forces since taking over the reins in May 2014. When the new government was installed in May 2014, there were hopes and expectations that Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s administration would hasten some of the critical reforms that had been articulated earlier. The earlier NDA government (under Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee) had initiated defence and national security reforms after the Kargil conflict consequent to which HQ Integrated Defence Staff (HQ
Organisation of HQ Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) CISC
Chairman of Integrated Defence Staff to Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee (CISC)
DCIDS (PP&FD)
Deputy Chief of Integrated Defence Staff / Policy Planning & Force Development
DCIDS (DOT) Deputy Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (Doctrine, Organisation and Training)
DCIDS (OPS) Deputy Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (Operations)
DGDIA & DCIDS (Int)
Director General Defence Intelligence Agency/ Deputy Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (Intelligence)
DCIDS (Med) Deputy Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (Medical Branch) Source: IDS
Indian Army needs to transform itself for the future, through technological improvements coupled with new joint operational doctrines and innovative operational art, which is vital for preserving India’s sovereignty and furthering its national interests.
as India celebrates its 75 years “Azadi Ka Amrit Mahostav”, the Indian Army continues to be its most firm pillar that has underpinned its unity and territorial integrity. Over these seven decades, it has endured multiple challenges and undergone many transformations to be battle ready to confront the enemy within and without. Today, it faces multiple threats and challenges including a 2-1/2 front war scenario for which it needs to transform itself through technological improvements coupled with new operational doctrines and training.
The history of the Indian Army can be traced back to the period post the First War of Indian Independence 1857 when the three provincial armies of Bengal, Bombay and Madras were united and reorganised with Major Stringer Lawrence as its first Chief. The final shape and professional restructuring of the Indian Army before the onset of the First World War was carried out under General Kitchner, the Commander-in-Chief from 1902. At the start of the WW-I the strength of the Indian Army was about 1,50,000 men. It increased tenfold in numbers for the Great War of 1914-18. Over one million Indians served overseas. After WW-I, it was rapidly demobilised. By the time the Second World War started in September 1939, it had an effective strength of 1,94,373 which expanded to over 20,00,000 by the time WW-II ended in August 1945.
On gaining independence on August 15, 1947, the active strength of the British Indian Army along with countrywide movable and immovable assets was shared between India and Pakistan under a complicated scheme, supervised by an Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee under the Chairmanship of Field Marshal Auchinleck.
The late announcement of Boundary Award on August 16, 1947 led to the tragedy of partition witnessing killings and looting on a gargantuan scale. Out of the fourteen million refugees involved
in the migration, about half a million died. Meanwhile the exercise of nation building under Sardar Patel had started. Except for three, most of the 562 odd Princely States merged with India in accordance with the laid down directives. But much before the state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) could exercise its option, armed Pakistani frontier tribesmen backed by Pakistan’s regular troops invaded the State in October 1947 with a view to annex it. These kabaelis (tribesmen) soon crossed over into Kashmir to precipitate an undeclared war with India. The Indian Armed Forces reacted immediately after the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir signed the Instrument of Accession on October 26, 1947. A massive airlift operation was undertaken starting October 27, 1947 to mobilise Indian Army soldiers into Kashmir. The marauders were hounded out of the Valley in a series of tactical engagements. Finding its forces withdrawing from Jammu and the Valley, Pakistan launched a fresh offensive through the Northern Territories in February 1948. Ridding the main portions of Jammu province and the Valley of Pakistani presence took more than a year and the entire operation ultimately took up more than 80,000 troops.
Before the remaining areas occupied by Pakistan could be liberated by Indian troops, a ceasefire came into effect on January 1, 1949. After bitter fighting lasting 14 months, UN mediation brought about an uneasy truce and the ceasefire line (CFL) later re-designated as the Line of Control (LoC) came into being. The Kashmir War gave the Indian Army its first experience of high-altitude operations amidst snow, ice and extreme cold conditions.
Hyderabad had also signed a ‘Standstill Agreement’ for one year at the time of India’s Independence, attempting to decide on exercising its option of merging with the Indian Union. As time had already run out and the local rebel forces known as ‘Razakars’ resorted to large scale violence and looting, a short, 100-hour engagement was forced on the Indian Army in September 1948, which at that time was heavily engaged in operations in Kashmir. 1 Armoured Division and some infantry units entered the State and settled matters amicably using minimal force. Once the rebel troops were rounded up and handed
mBTs
T-90S (Bhishma) Country of origin: russia
Characteristics
Crew : 3
Cbt weight : 46.5 tonne
Width, over tracks : 2.22 m
Height (over turret)
Roof : 3.78 m
Engine : V-84MS four-stroke 12-cylinder multifuel diesel engine, developing 840 hp
Road range : Paved road – 650 km, Unpaved - 500 km
Armament &
Ammunition Main : 1 x 125mm 2A46M SBG which fires an ATGM as well as conventional ammunition. Has a laser range finder and thermal imaging night sight [43 (22 - in autoloader) rounds] Coaxial: 1 x 7.62mm PKT MG (2,000 rounds) AA: 1 x 12.7mm MG (300 rounds)
Main gun rate of fire : 8 rounds/min
Protection : Armour plating + ERA (explosive reactive armour) NBC protection
Fire Control & Observation : Commander IFCS, Gunner FCS, Driver IR night viewer
Note: Manufactured in India by HVF Avadi under license.
T-72m-1 (ajeya)
Characteristics
Crew : 3
Cbt weight : 44.5 tonne
Height (turret roof) : 2.23 m
Country of origin: russia
Note: Other improvements include explosive reactive armour, integrated fire detection and suppression system and GPS.
arjun Country of origin: India
Characteristics
Crew : 4
Cbt weight : 58.5 tonne
Overall length : 0.190 m
(With gun forward)
Overall height : 3.03 m
(With AD gun mount)
Overall width : 3.864 m
Ground pressure : 0.85 kg/cm²
Armament Main : 1 x 120mm Rifled gun
AA: 1 x 12.7mm MG
Coaxial: 1 x 7.62mm MG
Main gun ammunition : 42 rounds (HESH/FSAPDS)
Main gun rate of fire : 8 rounds/ minute
Fire control : Director type & electro-hydraulic system & gun control
Night vision : Thermal imaging
Ballistic computer : Digital
Engine : MTU 838 Ka 501 10-cylinder liquid cooled diesel developing 1,400 hp at 2,500 rpm
Transmission : 4 Fwd+ 2 rev, Torque converter, Mech. Lockup clutch & hydrodynamic retarder
Steering : Double radii, Mechanical steering with neutral turn
Suspension : Indigenously developed hydro-pneumatic suspension system
Fuel : Renk transmission DHPP (A)
Engine : Up rated V46-6 engine; a 12-cylinder 4-stroke, V 60 turbocharged, watercooled, multi-fuel, direct injection engine developing 1,000 hp at 2,000 rpm.
Power to weight ratio : 22.98 hp/tonne
Max speed (on road) : 60 kmph
Max speed
(Cross country) : 35 to 45 kmph
Gradient ability : 60°
Vertical obstacle : 850mm
Trench crossing : 2.6 to 2.8 m
Shallow fording : 1.2 m
Armament Main : 1 x 125mm SBG coaxial: 1 x 7.62mm MG, AD: 1 x 12.7mm MG
Elevation/depression : 16° to -6˚
Traverse : 360°
Max range : 3 km
Main gun rate of fire : 8 rounds/min
Ammunition loading : Auto
Ammunition stowage : 44 projectiles/charges
Track : Original by Diehl L-German/Now by L&T
Max speed : Road: 70 kmph, Cross country: 40 kmph
Shallow fording : 2.15 m
Vertical obstacle : 0.914 m
Trench crossing : 2.43 m
Gradient : 35°
Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs)/ recce Vehs
Bmp-2 Country of origin: russia/OF medak
Characteristics
Crew : 3+7
Weight : 14,300 kg
Length : 6.735 m
Width : 3.15 m
Height : 2.45 m
Armament Main : 1 x 30mm Auto Cannon (500 rounds)
2A42 and 9M113 Konkurs ATGM
Coaxial (Both): 1 x 7.62mm PKT MG (1,000 rounds)
Indian Navy is leading the drive of ‘Atmanirbhar Bharat’ from the front. It has moved steadily on the path of indigenisation and today, almost all the warships and submarines being inducted into the Indian Navy, from patrol boats to aircraft carriers and submarines, are designed and built in India.
The maritime traditions of India can be traced back to the time of the Mohenjodaro civilisation with archaeologists discovering that a basin dating back to 2400 BC, discovered in Lothal, was the world’s first dry dock. Proof of Indian influence across the seas, over the past 3000 years is available from a large amount of historiographical evidence. The result was that Indian trade and culture were carried across the seas, both to the West and East, and the lasting influence of this is most stark in the South East and East Asian region today. Strong evidence exists of formal administrative structures for sea trade from the time of the Mauryas in the 4th Century BCE and extensive maritime interaction continued through the subsequent times, under the Satavahanas, Pallavas, Chalukyas, Kalingas, Pandyas, Cheras and Cholas. The epics of the Ramayana and Mahabharata spread by Indian seafarers can, even today, be seen in temple murals and carvings. India reached the apex of its maritime power under the Chola empire, the longest ruling dynasty in the history of the world (30 BCE to around 1300 CE) and in the 11th century CE its overseas empire encompassed parts of modern-day Indonesia and Malaysia, with its influence extending till Cambodia and Laos. The decline of the Chola empire at the beginning of the 13th century CE led to the weakening of India’s maritime tradition, coinciding as it did with the advent of Muslim conquests of the Indian sub-continent, first from West Asia and subsequently from Central Asia. The new rulers of north India did not have any maritime inclination or recognition of the importance of the seas and so, when the European maritime powers discovered the route to India, starting with Vasco da Gama’s arrival in Kozhikode in 1498, they faced little resistance. As succinctly stated by Sardar K.M. Panikkar in his master piece ‘India and the Indian Ocean’ “In fact it may be truly said that India never lost her independence till she lost command of the sea in the first decade of the sixteenth century”.
The growth of the Indian Navy post-Independence, centered around the remnants of a Navy established by the British to
safeguard their interests, has been remarkable. In the first two decades after independence, the Indian Navy acquired blue water platforms, including the aircraft carrier Vikrant, from the United Kingdom. In parallel, a major thrust was launched to achieve ‘selfreliance through indigenisation’, with the establishment of a Naval Design Directorate to commence warship design in India. Building of patrol craft started in newly set-up Defence PSUs in the early 1960s and progressed to the indigenous construction of frigates with necessary technology transfer from abroad. From the late 1960s, a number of ships and submarines were acquired from the Soviet Union, to make up shortfalls in the force level. India’s first indigenous designed and built ship, INS Gaodavari, was commissioned in 1984. Since then, the Indian Navy has moved steadily on the path of indigenisation and today, almost all the warships and submarines being inducted into the Indian Navy, from patrol boats to aircraft carriers and submarines, are designed and built in India.
The Indian Navy’s first major operation was the liberation of Junagadh in 1948. In 1961, the Indian Navy successfully carried out the maritime part of the Indian action to liberate Goa, sinking the Portuguese frigate Afonso de Albuquerque in a short and sharp gun battle. In the 1965 war, the Navy remained in a defensive posture on the Western and Eastern coasts, and was not deployed in offensive action by the Government of India. As a result of the 1965 war, the Navy, which had a total of 36 ships and about 120 aircraft then, underwent a major modernisation and the next few years saw the induction of missile boats and submarines from the USSR, anti-submarine warfare helicopters from the UK, construction of new naval bases, quickening of the indigenous ship construction programme, and the formation of a second Fleet on the East coast, named as the Eastern Fleet.
In the 1971 war with Pakistan, the Navy struck hard in both theatres, with its two fleets, in a fully integrated and joint manner with the
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Shishumar Class Type/HdW Type 209/1500
Indian Designation : Shishumar Class
Total No. in Service : 4
Names : Shishumar, Shankush, Shalki, Shankul
Specifications
Displacement (tonnes) : Full Load 1,700
Dimensions length
Dived 1,850
overall (metres) : 65
Beam : 8
Propulsion : Diesel-electric 4MTU 12V 493 AZ80
GA31L diesels; 4 Siemens alternators; 1 Siemens motor; 1 shaft
Speed (knots) : 22
Range (miles) : 8,000 Snorting at 8 knots 13,000 Surfaced at 10 knots
Complement : 36 (8 officers)
Torpedoes : 8 Nos. 21 inch (533mm) tubes. S/m carries 14 AEG SUT Mod 1 wire-guided active/passive torpedoes homing to 28 km at 23 knots; 12 km at 35 knots; warhead 250 kg.
Missiles : Anti-ship Exocet missiles retrofitted on all submarines.
Mines : External strap-on type for 24 mines
Countermeasures : Decoys; C303 acoustic decoys; ESM Argo Phoenix II AR 700 or Koll Morgen
Sea Sentry, radar warning, ESM-DR 3000
Weapon Control : Singer Librascope MKI, CCS 90-1/ISUS
Radars : Surface Search, Thomson-CSF Calypso; I-Band, KH 1007/2007
Sonars : Atlas Elektronik CSU 83 active/passive search and attack; Thomson Sintra
DUUV-5; passive ranging and intercept, CSU 90-14
Indian Designation : Sindhughosh Class
Total No. in Service : 7
Names : Sindhughosh, Sindhuraj, Sindhuratna, Sindhukesari, Sindhukirti, Sindhuvijay and Sindhushastra
Displacement (tonnes) : 2,300 surfaced; 3,100 dived
Dimensions (metres) : 73.0 x 10.0 x 6.6
Propulsion : 2 Model 4-2AA-42M diesels; 2 generators; 1 motor 1 shaft; 2 MT-168 auxiliary motors; 1 economic speed motor
Speed (knots) : 17
Range (miles) : 6,000 at 7 kt snorting; 400 at 3 kt dived Complement : 68 (7 officers)
Torpedoes : 6-21 in (533mm) tubes combination of Type 53-65 passive wake homing to 19 km (10.3 n miles) at 45 kt; TEST 71 ME anti-submarine; active/passive homing to 15 km (8.1 n miles) at 40 kt or 20 km (10.08 n miles) at 25 kt warhead 220 kg. Total of 18 weapons. Wire-guided torpedo on two tubes.
Other Weapons : Mines 24 DM-1 in lieu of torpedoes, some submarines carry shoulder held SA-N-10 Igla SAM launcher placed in fin for use on surface.
Countermeasures : ESM; squid head radar warning, Porpoise (Indigenous)
Weapon Control : Uzwl MVU-119EM TFCS
Radars : Navigation; Snoop Tray; MRP-25; I-Band
Sonars : MGK-400 and MGK-400 E, hull mounted, active/passive search and attack; medium frequency. MG-519; hull mounted active search; high frequency. Being replaced by Sonar USHUS manufactured by BEL, Bengaluru, fitted as five EKM and, in a progressive manner on submarines. Operational : The submarines have progressively undergone midlife modernisation refits commencing 1997, which includes installation of the Klub anti-ship and land attack cruise missile and the associated Lama fire control system, new sonars, electronic warfare systems, machinery control systems and an automated information and control system for the weapon package. One submarine is expected to be fitted out with BrahMos cruise missiles, the surface version of this Indo-Russian 290-km-range supersonic missile.
Multi-domain operations and hybrid warfare are going to stay and the Indian Air Force (IAF) is expected to contribute across the full spectrum of conflict. Thus, the IAF needs to realign and reform to keep pace with technology. To remain relevant, it needs to be future ready.
in view of the evolving geopolitical situation and changing global order, India’s neighbourhood continues to remain volatile and uncertain. China has been significantly modernising its Air Force and strengthening deployments of its air assets at major air bases close to the Line of Actual Control (LAC). We are operating in grey zone for most of the time, multi-domain operations and hybrid warfare are going to stay. The Indian Air Force (IAF) will be expected to contribute across the full spectrum of conflict. Air power has the capability to deter, defend and if required punish the adversary in a conflict. Thus the IAF need to realign and reform to keep pace with technology to remain relevant, it needs to be future ready.
The focus over the coming years would be to enhance the combat potential of the fleet both in terms of numbers and lethality, bolster air defence systems by induction of modern sensors and weapons as well as networking, enhance airlift and heli-lift capability to meet future challenges to national security.
The IAF was officially established on October 8, 1932. On April 1, 1933, ‘A’ Flight of No. 1 Squadron was raised at Drigh Road, Karachi with six officers, 19 Hawai Sepoys (airmen) and four Westland Wapiti IIA aircraft. The fledgling IAF saw action for the first time in 1937 during operations in the then North West Frontier Province.
During World War II, No. 1 Squadron with 12 Westland Lysander aircraft, was moved to Burma on February 1, 1942. Each carried a pair of 250 lb bombs on each Lysander and flew low level un-escorted missions against 20 Japanese air bases. However, when Rangoon fell to the Japanese in April 1942, the Squadron was relocated at Risalpur and was reequipped with Hawker Hurricane IIB fighters. The IAF expanded rapidly growing to nine squadrons by the end of 1944 and played a major role in the Arakan offensive which began in December 1944. In March 1945, recognition of the outstanding performance of the IAF came by way of addition of the prefix ‘Royal’ to its name. The IAF was thereafter known as the Royal Indian Air Force (RIAF).
In 1946, the RIAF squadrons were reequipped with the Hawker Tempest II, which has been called ‘the IAF’s first true fighter bomber’. The first RIAF transport unit, No. 12 Squadron, was also formed and was equipped with Douglas C-47 Dakota twin-engine transport aircraft.
When India attained independence on August 15, 1947, some RIAF units were transferred to Pakistan. The Squadrons that remained with the RIAF were Nos. 3, 4, 7, 8 and 10 equipped with Tempests, No. 2 Squadron with Spitfires and No.12 Squadron with Dakotas.
Role of Indian Air Force Post Independence
Post-independence, on October 27, 1947, the IAF initiated a remarkable feat of emergency task with Dakotas from Palam airfield to airlift Indian forces to Srinagar to thwart attempts by Pakistani sponsored invaders to wrest control of the Valley from India.
On January 26, 1950, India became a Republic and the RIAF dropped the prefix ‘Royal’. The modernisation process began in 1948 with the arrival of the de Havilland Vampire single-engine fighter aircraft from Britain, the first combat jet to be inducted into the IAF. This was followed by the induction of other combat jets such as the Ouragan (renamed as Toofani) and the Mystere from France as also the Canberra, Hunter and Gnat from Britain. All these combat aircraft entered service in the 1950s.
The Indian government decided not to use the IAF in an offensive role during the 1962 conflict with China; many believe that that the outcome of the conflict would have been different had the IAF been used in the offensive role. Closer strategic and military cooperation with the then Soviet Union, resulted in the IAF acquiring 12 MiG-21 supersonic aircraft and procuring SA-2 surface to air missiles called Dvina in 1963. From this point onwards, the IAF inventory acquired a distinct Soviet orientation, which also influenced the evolution of the aerospace industry in India.
The Indo-Pak conflict of 1965 witnessed the IAF aggressively using
Mikoyan MiG-21 Bison
NATO reporting names: Fishbed and Mongol (trainer version)
Country of origin : Russia / CIS. Manufactured under licence In India by the HAL
Type : Single-seat multi-role fighter
Number in Service : 60 (Approx)
Year of Induction : Commencing in 1964
Construction
Wings : Delta plan form with a 2° anhedral and 57° sweepback with small boundary layer fences at tips. Large blown plain trailing edge flaps.
Power Plant : The MiG-21Bis & Bison are powered by a Tumansky R-25-300 turbojet rated at 15,000 lb static thrust with reheat.
Fuel : Internal fuel capacity 2,750 litres with provision for drop tanks under fuselage and inboard wing pylons.
Cockpit : KM-1M ejection seat with 0-130 kmph capability.
Avionics and Equipment : IAF operates five squadrons of Bison. The upgraded Bison is equipped with the Kopyo multi-mode radar, ring laser based inertial GPS, semi glass cockpit, VOR, DME and ILS.
Armament : One twin-barrel 23mm GSh-23/2 cannon with 250 rounds, 2 x 500 kg bombs, S-24 and 80/57mm rockets. In addition the Bison carries R-73 and R-77 air-toair missiles.
Dimensions
Wingspan : 7.15 m
Length : 16.10 m, including pilot boom
Height : 4.5 m
Wing area : 23.45 m²
Weights
Take-off (combat) : 8,750 kg
Max take-off : 10,500 kg
Performance
Max speed
Above 10,000 m : Mach 2.23
At sea level : Mach 1.1
Combat radius
(lo-lo-lo) : 390 km
Max rate of climb : 6,500 m/min
G Limits : + 7/–1.5
Mikoyan MiG-29a/B Upgrade (UPG)
NATO reporting name : Fulcrum
Country of origin : Russia / CIS
Type : Single-seat air superiority fighter
Number in Service : 54
Year of Induction : 1986
Construction
Wings : Low-wing monoplane. Leading edge swept back at 42°, with large ogival wing roots. Leading and trailing edge flaps without tabs.
Power Plant : Two Tumansky RD-33 turbojets each with thrust rating of 11,250 lb dry and 18,500 lb reheat. FOD doors in each air intake duct actuated automatically with raising/lowering of nose-wheel on take-off/landing run. Total internal fuel capacity of 4,000 litres with a provision for a single 750-litre drop tank to be carried between engines underbelly. Later versions can carry wing drop tanks. Cockpit : K-36D zero-zero ejection seat in a pressurised and air-conditioned cockpit. Cockpit is high set and features a twopiece blister design.
Avionics : NO-19 Sapfir-29 (NATO ‘Slot Back’) coherent pulse Doppler radar with a 100-km detection and 70-km track range with full look up/down shoot down and multi-tracking capability. Limited look up/down shoot down IRST on nose on star-board side. Navattack computers, HUD, helmetmounted sights operable up to 40° off the axis. Advanced 360° passive RWR of unknown type. Comprehensive VHF/ UHF communication systems. AoA indicator, radar altimeter, 3-axis auto stabilisation system, auto pilot, deception jammer in wing root.
Armament : 1 GSh-301 30mm cannon in port wing root, with 150 rounds. Up to six AAMs including R-73, R-27R, R-27T Alternate loads of ground attack weapons with a total weight of 3,500 kg on six external hard points.
Dimensions
Wingspan : 11.40 m
Length overall : 17.34 m
Indian Coast Guard (ICG) is a multi-mission organisation, conducting round-the-year real-life surface and air operations at sea, to protect and preserve our oceans as well as India’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
Constituted as an Armed Force of the Union of India by an Act of Parliament on August 18, 1978, ICG (ICG) predominantly undertakes the peacetime tasks of ensuring the security of the Maritime Zones of India, in order to protect India’s maritime and other national interests in such zones and matters connected therewith. ICG functions under the Ministry of Defence, primarily for peacetime functions. It has a military function during war, when it conjoins with the Indian Navy. ICG, which began its journey with two old Frigates seconded from the Indian Navy and five patrol vessels seconded from the Central Board of Excise and Customs, is today a large force of 170 surface craft that range from Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) to tiny high speed Interceptor Boats and Air Cushion Vehicles and about 70 aircraft consisting of fixed wing aircraft and helicopters.
The Coast Guard Act, 1978 defines the roles of ICG as follows:
n To protect the maritime and other national interests in the Maritime Zones of India.
n Ensuring the safety and protection of artificial islands, offshore terminals, installations and other structures and devices in any Maritime Zone.
n Providing protection to fishermen including assistance to them at sea while in distress.
n To preserve and protect the maritime environment and to prevent and control marine pollution.
n Assisting the customs and other authorities in anti-smuggling operations.
n Necessary measures for the safety of life and property at sea
n Undertake collection of scientific data.
Many additional responsibilities have been assigned to ICG since its inception. Besides the duties and functions provided in the CG Act 1978, the ICG supports other Ministries, as provided by various pieces of legislation enacted by the Government of India.
n Lead Intelligence Agency for coastal and sea borders.
n Authority responsible for co-ordination of Coastal Security in territorial waters.
n Search and Rescue for Merchant vessels.
n Marine Oil Pollution Response Measures.
In pursuance of its missions, the Director General Indian Coast Guard (DGICG) has also been designated as:
n Chairman, National Maritime Search and Rescue Board (NMSARB).
n Chairman, National Oil-spill Disaster Contingency Plan Committee (NOSDCP).
n Chairman, Offshore Security Co-ordination Committee (OSCC).
n Indian Governor to Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP).
n Commander, Coastal Command under Coastal Security. These duties are carried out by the ICG over an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) measuring 2.01 million sq kms and Indian Search & Rescue Region spanning 4.2 million sq kms. It is entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring the safety and security of our 12 major ports and 187 minor ports.
The Headquarters of the Coast Guard is located at New Delhi. Operational functions are executed by a Coast Guard Commander, Western Seaboard at Mumbai, Coast Guard Commander, Eastern Seaboard at Visakhapatnam and by the five Regional Headquarters located at Gandhinagar, Mumbai, Chennai, Kolkata and Port Blair. Under these Regional Headquarters, there are 15 District Headquarters located along the coastal states and Union Territories. In total, there are 42 Coast Guard Stations. In addition, there are Air Stations at Daman and Chennai, Air Enclaves at Goa, Kochi, Kolkata, Porbandar, Port Blair, Bhubaneswar and New Mangalore and an independent Air Squadron at Mumbai. The organisational chart of the ICG, the structure of the service and a pictorial depiction of the organisation are shown in the subsequent pages.
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surface Platforms
Patrol Vessels (OPVs) samar Class
Total Number in Service : 4
Specifications
Make : Indian built
Displacement
(in tonnes) : Light 1,604, Deep 1,938
Dimensions
(LOAxBxD) : 102 x 11.5 x 3.5 m
Flight Deck : Integral Helicopter
Main Machinery : 2 Diesels, 4,710 kW each (SEMT PIELSTICK 16 PA6V280)
Speed (Knots) : 22
Range (N miles) : 6,000 at 15 Knots
Complement (crew) : 128 (including 15 Officers)
Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) sankalp Class
Total Number in Service : 2
Specifications
Make : Indian built
Displacement
(in tonnes) : Light 1,830, Deep 2,325
Dimensions
(LOAxBxD) : 105 x 12.9 x 3.64 m
Flight Deck : Integral Helicopter
Main Machinery : 2 Diesels, 7,710 kW each (SEMT PIELSTICK 20 PA6BSTC)
Speed (Knots) : 23.5
Range (N miles) : 6,500 at 12 Knots
Complement (crew) : 128 (including 15 Officers)
Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) Vikram Class (new)
Total Number in Service : 6
Specifications
Make : Indian built
Displacement
(in tonnes) : Light 1771.6, Deep 2,094
Dimensions
(LOAxBxD) : 98.2 x 14.7 x 3.52 m
Flight deck : Integral Helicopter
Main Machinery : 2 Diesels, 9100 KW each (MTU, 20V 8000 M90)
Speed (Knots) : 26
Range (N miles) : 5,000 at 12-14 Knots
Complement (crew) : 102 (including 14 Officers)
Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) Vishwast Class
Total Number in Service : 3
Specifications
Make : Indian built
Displacement (in tonnes) : Light 1,605, Deep 1,964
Dimensions
(LOAxBxD) : 94 x 12.6 x 3.6 m
Flight deck : Integral Helicopter
Main Machinery : 2 Diesels, 9,000 kW each (MTU 20 V 8000 M90)
Speed (Knots) : 26
Range (N miles) : 4,500 at 12-14 Knots
Complement (crew) : 110 (including 10 officers)
Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) samarth Class
Total Number in Service : 11
Specifications
Make : Indian built
Displacement (in tonnes) : 2350 (approx) at full load displacement
Dimensions
(LOAxBxD) : 105 x 13.60 x 3.65m
Flight Deck : Integral Helicopter
Main Machinery : 2 Diesels, 9100 KW each (MTU, 20V 8000 M90)
Speed (Knots) : 23
Range (N miles) : 6,000 at cruising speed (12-14 Knots)
Complement (crew) : 112 (including 14 officers)
Pollution Control Vessels (PCVs) samudraPrahari Class
Total Number in Service : 3
Specifications
Make : Indian built
Displacement (intonnes) : Light 3,196, Deep 3,946
Dimensions
(LOAxBxD) : 94 x 15.5 x 4.5 m
Flight deck : Integral Helicopter
Main Machinery : 2 Diesel Engine, 3000 KW each (Bergen B32, 40L6P) 2 Shaft Generator of 2100 KW 883 KW Ulstein Aquamaster bow thruster
Speed (Knots) : 20 (Ship is capable of cruising at 0.2 Knot speed during oil skimming mode with bow thruster)
equIPMenT CATALOGue: IndIAn COAsT GuARd
Range (N miles) : 6,000 at 14 Knots
Complement (crew) : 112 (including 12 officers)
Fast Patrol Vessels (FPV) sarojini naidu Class
Total Number in Service : 7
Specifications
Make : Indian built
Displacement
(in tonnes) : Light 235, Deep 259
Dimensions
(LOAxBxD) : 48 x 7.5 x 2 m
Main Machinery : 3 Diesels, 2,720 kW each (MTU 16V 4000 M90)
Speed (Knots) : 35
Range (N miles) : 1,500 at 12 Knots
Complement (crew) : 35 (including 06 Officers)
Fast Patrol Vessels (FPVs) Rani Abbakka Class
Total Number in Service : 5
Specifications
Make : Indian built
Displacement
(in tonnes) : Light 269, Deep 349
Dimensions
(LOAxBxD) : 50.39 x 8.36 x 1.845 m
Main Machinery : 3 Diesels, 2,720 KW each (MTU 16V 4000 M 90)
Speed (Knots) : 34
Range (N miles) : 1,500 at 16 Knots
Complement (crew) : 35 (including 06 Officers)
Fast Patrol Vessels (FPVs) Rajshree Class
Total Number in Service : 8
Specifications
Make : Indian built
Displacement
(in tonnes) : Light 244, Deep 303
Dimensions
(LOAxBxD) : 48.9 x 7.5 x 2.1 m
Main Machinery : 3 Diesels, 2,720 kW each (MTU 16V 4000 M90)
Speed (Knots) : 34
Range (N miles) : 1,500 at 16 Knots
Complement (crew) : 35 (including 06 Officers)
Fast Patrol Vessels (FPVs) Aadesh Class
Total Number in Service : 20
Specifications
Make : Indian built
Displacement
(in tonnes) : Light 246, Deep 297
Dimensions
(LOAxBxD) : 50.0 x 7.6 x 1.63 m
Main Machinery : 3 Diesels, 2,720 kW each (MTU 16V 4000 M90)
Speed (Knots) : 33
Range (N miles) : 1,500 at 12 Knots
Complement (crew) : 35 (including 06 Officers)
Interceptor Boats (IBs) C-143 Class
Total Number in Service : 11
Specifications
Make : Indian built
Displacement
(in tonnes) : Light 83.8, Deep 103.79
Dimensions (LOAxBxD) : 28.3 x 6.6 x 1.43 m
Main Machinery : 2 Diesels, 2720 kW each (MTU 16V 4000 M90)
Speed (Knots) : 40 Knots at 92% MCR (45 Max)
Range (N miles) : 500 at 25 Knots
Complement (crew) : 10 (including 02 Officers)
Interceptor Boats (IBs) C-154 Class
Total Number in Service : 6
Specifications
Make : Indian built
Displacement
(in tonnes) : Light 54, Deep 71
Dimensions
(LOAxBxD) : 28.75 x 6.20 x 1.2 m
Main Machinery : 2 Diesels, 1,630 kW each (MTU 16V 2000 M 92)
Speed (Knots) : 35
Range (N miles) : 500 at 20 Knots
Complement (crew) : 10 (including 02 Officers)
Interceptor Boats (IBs) C-401 Class
Total Number in Service : 42
Specifications
Make : Indian built
Displacement (in tonnes) : Light 82.27, Deep 103.04
Dimensions
(LOAxBxD) : 27.8 x 6.6 x 1.27 m
Main Machinery : 2 Diesels, 2,525 kW each (Caterpillar 3516C)
Speed (Knots) : 40 Knots at 92% MCR (45 Max)
Range (N miles) : 500 at 20 Knots
Complement (crew) : 13 (including 02 Officers)
Air Cushion Vehicle (Hovercraft) H-181 Class
Total Number in Service : 6
Specifications
Make : Indian built (in technical collaboration with Griffon, UK)
Displacement
(in tonnes) : AUW-25
Dimensions (LOAxBxD) : 21.15 x 11 x 0.32 m
Main Machinery : 2 Diesels, 597 kW each (MTU 12V 183 TB 32)
President & Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces
Vice President
Union Government
Prime Minister
Minister of Defence
Minister of State for Defence
Department of Defence
Defence Secretary
Droupadi Murmu
Jagdeep Dhankhar
Narendra Modi
Rajnath Singh
Ajay Bhatt
Giridhar Aramane
Principal Military Advisor to Defence Minister General Anil Chauhan
Special Secretary Nivedita Shukla Verma
Additional Secretary Dipti Mohil Chawla
Additional Secretary and Director General (Acquisition) .................................................................. Pankaj Agarwal
Joint Secretary (Armed Forces & Policy & Coast Guard & Coordination) ......................................... Manish Tripathi
Joint Secretary & Acquisition Manager (Maritime Systems)
Joint Secretary (Establishment/Planning/ Parliament/USC)
Joint Secretary (Land & Works & SSC)
Joint Secretary & CAO (Ceremonial) ....................................................................................................
Dinesh Kumar
D.K. Rai
Rakesh Mittal
Rajesh Ranjan
Joint Secretary & Acquisition Manager (Land Systems & Border Roads Organisation) .................. Dr Ajay Kumar
Joint Secretary & Acquisition Manager (Air) .......................................................................................
Joint Secretary (Ceremonials) & Chief Administrative Officer
Joint Secretary (International Cooperation)
Additional Director General Acquisition Technical (Army)
Dharmendra Kumar Singh
Rajesh Ranjan
Vishwesh Negi
Major General P.K. Saini
Additional Director General Acquisition Technical Manager (Maritime & Systems) ...................... Rear Admiral P.A.A.R. Sadiq
Additional Director General Acquisition Technical Manager (Air) ................................................... Air Vice Marshal L.K. Chawla
Financial Advisor (Defence Services)
Additional Secretary & Financial Adviser (Acquisition)
Additional Financial Adviser & Joint Secretary
Additional Financial Adviser (RS) & Joint Secretary ...........................................................................
Rasika Chaube
Longjam Siddhartha Singh
Eddie Lalrinliana Khawlhring
Rajesh Sharma
Additional Financial Adviser & Joint Secretary ................................................................................... Amitabh Ranjan Sinha
Additional Financial Adviser (SK) & Joint Secretary
Sanjay Kumar
Additional Financial Adviser (R&D) & Joint Secretary Vedveer Arya
Droupadi Murmu was sworn in as the 15th President of India on July 25, 2022. Previously, she was the Governor of Jharkhand from 2015 to 2021. She has devoted her life to empowering the downtrodden as well as the marginalised sections of society and deepening the democratic values.
Born in a Santhali tribal family on June 20, 1958 at Uparbeda village, Mayurbhanj, Odisha, Murmu went to Bhubaneswar on her own initiative to continue her studies. She earned the degree of Bachelor of Arts from Ramadevi Women’s College, Bhubaneswar and became the first woman from her village to receive college education. From 1979 to 1983, Murmu served as a Junior Assistant in the Irrigation and Power Department, Government of Odisha. Later, she served as an honor-
ary teacher at Sri Aurobindo Integral Education Centre, Rairangpur, from 1994 to 1997.
In 2000, Murmu was elected from the Rairangpur constituency as a Member of the Legislative Assembly of Odisha and continued to hold the post till 2009, serving two terms. With her rich administrative experience and thanks to her efforts to spread education in tribal societies, she carved a special identity for herself. She was appointed the Governor of Jharkhand on May 18, 2015. She was the first woman tribal Governor of a tribal-majority State.
Droupadi Murmu was associated with several tribal socio-educational and cultural organisations of Odisha. She is an avid reader and has keen interest in spirituality.
Narendra Damodardas Modi, is one of independent India’s most popular leaders. A ‘transformational leader’ known for delivering results, he is an embodiment of courage, conviction and compassion. He was re-elected Prime Minister of India by an overwhelming majority when he led BJP party and the NDA coalition to victory in the general elections in 2019. He took oath as the Prime Minister and formed his cabinet on May 31, 2019. Earlier, he became India’s 15th Prime Minister on May 26, 2014.
Born on September 17, 1950, Modi earlier held an impeccable track record as a Chief Minister, securing three consecutive two-third majority mandates for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in Gujarat in 2003, 2007 and 2012 Assembly elections. In his over 12 years tenure
as the Chief Minister of Gujarat, Modi brought about paradigm shift in the lives of the people in Gujarat. In 2014, people of India gave him a mandate to take the nation forward.
Modi has reached the pinnacle by sheer hard work, determination, extreme focus and a strong character. His first brush with the RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) was at the tender age of eight. At the age of 20, he became a Pracharak in 1972, devoting full time to the RSS. In 1987, he joined the BJP and on October 7, 2001, he took over as the Chief Minister of Gujarat. From heading a state, Modi has catapulted to heading the nation because of his organisational sense and his keen ability to efficiently construct any task.
Born on July 10, 1951, Rajnath Singh completed his MSc Physics from Gorakhpur University and worked as a lecturer of Physics at K.B. Post-Graduate College Mirzapur. He was the organisational secretary of ABVP Gorakhpur division from 1969 to 1971 and became the RSS karyavah (General Secretary) of Mirzapur city in 1972. He entered politics in 1974 and in 1977, he was elected as an MLA in the Uttar Pradesh Assembly. He was elected MLC for Uttar Pradesh Legislative Council in 1988 and became Education Minister in 1991. During his tenure as Education Minister in UP, he established some landmarks by introducing the Anti-Copying Act and Vedic Mathematics in the syllabus. He became a
member of the Rajya Sabha in 1994. On November 22, 1999, he became Union Surface Transport Minister. On October 28, 2000, he became Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh. On May 24, 2003, he became Union Minister of Agriculture and subsequently for Food Processing. He became the BJP National President on December 31, 2005, a post he held till December 19, 2009. In May 2009, he was elected MP from Ghaziabad in Uttar Pradesh. On May 26, 2014, Rajnath Singh took oath as the Union Minister of India and worked as Union Minister for Home Affairs till May 30, 2019. On May 31, 2019, Rajnath Singh was allocated portfolio of Union Minister for Ministry of Defence.
C.B. Ananthakrishnan Director (Finance) & CFO with Additional Charge of Chairman and Managing Director, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited
C.B. Ananthakrishnan was appointed as Director (Finance) & CFO of the Company with effect from August 1, 2018 and was entrusted with additional charge of Chairman and Managing Director (CMD) of the Company w.e.f August 1, 2022.
He is a Commerce Graduate and Post Graduate in Business Administration from Madras University and is a fellow member of Institute of Cost Accountants of India. Prior to his appointment as Director (Finance), he was holding the post of Executive Director
(Finance) in Corporate Office of the Company and handling overall Financial Planning and strategy, treasury management and taxation.
He joined HAL in 2004 and has over 35 years of work experience. During his stints in Helicopter Division as Head of the Finance, he was instrumental in developing financial strategies and policies for pricing, cost control and profit planning for achieving overall goals of the Company. He has played a pivotal role during Initial Public Offering (IPO) and listing of the Company shares during March 2018.
Bhanu Prakash Srivastava Director (Other Units), Additional Charge, Chairman & Managing Director & Director (Marketing), Bharat Electronics Limited
Bhanu Prakash Srivastava, who is Director (Other Units) of BEL since April 20, 2022, assumed Additional Charge as Chairman & Managing Director and Director (Marketing) on November 1, 2022. He was serving as General Manager of the Advanced Defence Systems- Navy (ADSN) Strategic Business Unit at BEL’s Bangalore Complex prior to being elevated to the Board.
Bhanu Prakash Srivastava holds a degree in Bachelor of Technology (Mechanical Engineering) from IIT-BHU and Master of Business Administration (Marketing). He joined BEL in August 1986 and in a career spanning 36 years in three Units of BEL (Kotdwara,
Amit Banerjee
Ghaziabad and Bangalore), gained rich experience in diverse functions such as Manufacturing, Project Management, Quality Management, Materials Management, Design & Development and Product Support. He had a 3 year stint in BEL’s New York Regional Office, where he had good exposure to international business.
Srivastava, during his long tenure at BEL in various senior Management positions, has made major contributions towards sustained business growth and profitability in the areas of Radio & Data equipment, Military and Telecom Switching Equipment, C4I Systems for Civil & Military applications, Radars for Army, Air Force and Navy, Sonars, Fire Control Systems & Communication systems for Navy and Surface-to-Air Missile project for Naval Ships.
Chairman & Managing Director and Director (Rail & Metro) as Additional Charge, Bharat Earth Movers Limited
Amit Banerjee is a graduate in Mechanical Engineering from IIT (BHU), Varanasi. He joined as Asst Engineer in the year 1984 and in his professional career spanning over three decades in BEML, he has worked in R&D and manufacturing functions. His experience in R&D involves design & development of various prod-
ucts like SSEMU, Metro Cars, Catenary Maintenance Vehicle etc. Under his guidance, his team received the Raksha Mantri award for Design Effort towards Design & Development of Austenitic Stainless Steel EMU & Intermediate Metro Cars for Delhi Metro. He has played a significant role in phased indigenisation of Rolling Stock aggregates. Prior to assuming the present position, Banerjee was Director (Rail & Metro).
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The Department has established wide ranging production facilities for various defence equipment through the Ordnance Factories (OFs) and Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs). The Department also encourages the private sector in the manufacture of Defence equipment. The products manufactured by OFs and DPSUs include arms and ammunition, tanks, armoured vehicles, heavy vehicles, fighter aircraft and helicopters, warships, submarines, missiles, ammunition, electronic equipment, earth moving equipment, special alloys and special purpose steels.
'Make in India' – Defence
Self-reliance in defence has been the cornerstone of India’s defence production policy. Over the years, transparent and streamlined Procurement Procedures, Production Policies and ‘Make in India’ initiatives have provided significant stimulus to demand for indigenous products. Indian Defence industry, primarily catering to the needs of the armed forces, has evolved with diversified product mix and market.
Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) being notified over the years for capital acquisition of the Armed Forces of India aims to develop a robust industrial ecosystem by giving preference to ‘Make in India’ initiatives. Significant efforts have been made to ease the licensing/investment processes to allow participation of the private sector. Startups have been steadily gaining ground after the launch of the ‘Start-Up India’ programme. Innovations for Defence Excellence (iDEX) has provided a platform for startups to get connected to the defence establishment.
It is imperative that focused attention is laid on promotion of exports of Indian defence products. Export authorisation procedures have been streamlined through the introduction of online procedures and portals. Defence Lines of Credit (LOCs) being extended to sovereign governments are also enabling buyers in those countries, to import goods and services from India on attractive credit terms.
Defence Offsets are intended to leverage capital acquisitions of armed forces to develop domestic defence industry. The policies for offsets are intended to further boost the domestic industry’s capability through sourcing of defence products, investments in defence sector, transfer of technology etc.
The present ‘Defence Production & Export Promotion Policy 2020’ is positioned as Ministry of Defence’s overarching guiding document to provide a focused, structured and significant thrust to defence
production capabilities of the country for self-reliance and exports.
Policy has the following goals and objectives:
• To achieve a turnover of `1,75,000 crores ($25 billion) including export of `35,000 crore ($5 billion) in Aerospace and Defence goods and services by 2025.
• To develop a dynamic, robust and competitive Defence industry, including Aerospace and Naval Shipbuilding industry to cater to the needs of armed forces with quality products.
• To reduce dependence on imports and take forward ‘Make in India’ initiatives through domestic design and development.
• To promote export of defence products and become part of the global defence value chains.
• To create an environment that encourages R&D, rewards innovation, creates Indian IP ownership and promotes a robust and self-reliant defence industry.
Focus Areas:
• Procurement Reforms
• Indigenisation & Support to MSMEs/Startups
• Optimise Resource Allocation
• Investment Promotion, FDI & Ease of Doing Business
• Innovation and R&D
• DPSUs and OFB
• Quality Assurance & Testing Infrastructure
• Export Promotion
Several reforms in the Defence Procurement Procedure for capital procurement have been proposed and are being notified. DPP-2020 relies on the emerging dynamism of the Indian industry to build domestic capabilities for designing, developing and manufacturing defence equipment. In addition to above, following strategies are proposed for expanding the domestic defence manufacturing ecosystem.
Formed on January 1, 1958, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has emerged as a highly professional and mature organisation with a strong technology base and management systems to undertake indigenous development of state-of-the-art defence systems including design, development, integration and production. DRDO has achieved technological self-reliance in critical areas including ammunition, armoured systems, missiles, radar, avionics and electronic warfare systems, sensors, nuclear biological chemical (NBC) defence, low-intensity conflict technologies and advanced computing. The organisation plays a significant role in providing scientific and technological advice to MoD in support of defence policy; as evaluator of defence equipment for the operational requirements of the military and generating new technological knowledge to be transferred for indigenous development of state-of-the-art weapon systems. It also advises the government on technical assessment of international security threats and military capabilities of both current and potential adversaries.
Today, DRDO is a network of more than 50 laboratories which are deeply engaged in developing defence technologies covering various disciplines, like aeronautics, armaments, electronics, combat vehicles, engineering systems, instrumentation, missiles, advanced computing and simulation, special materials, naval systems, life sciences, training, information systems and agriculture. Several major projects for the development of missiles, armaments, light combat aircrafts, radars, electronic warfare systems etc are on hand and significant achievements have already been made in several such technologies.
Dr Samir V. Kamat assumed charge as Secretary, Department of Defence R&D and Chairman, DRDO on August 26, 2022. Dr Kamat completed B.Tech. (Hons) in Metallurgical Engineering from IIT-
Kharagpur in 1985 and PhD in Materials Science and Engineering from The Ohio State University, USA in 1988, and joined DRDO in 1989. Dr Kamat has provided leadership and direction to several critical materials programmes in DRDO such as the development of highstrength steels for naval ship hulls, development of high temperature titanium alloys and nickel-base superalloy-based components for aero engines, development of tungsten heavy alloys for kinetic energy penetrators, development of fused silica radomes for missile seekers, development of armour solutions for personnel as well as combat vehicles and stealth materials for airborne and naval applications. These have found use in various systems being developed by DRDO laboratories. In addition, he has superheaded the development of naval systems such as advanced lightweight torpedo, anti-torpedo decoy systems, autonomous underwater vehicles, advanced hullmounted and towed array sonars for ships, and fuel cells based air-independent propulsion systems for submarines. Dr Kamat has published more than 180 papers in international peerreviewed journals.
With its headquarters at New Delhi, DRDO is headed by a Chairman who is also the Secretary, Department of Defence Research & Development (DDR&D), Government of India.
Headquarters of DRDO located at New Delhi, coordinates the overall functioning of the organisation and is the interface between the government and the laboratories. The five CCR&D oversee the activities of the Corporate Directorates. These are:
CCR&D Production Coordination and Services Interaction (PC&SI)
CCR&D Human Resources (HR)
DRDO is the Research & Development (R&D) wing of Ministry of Defence, with a vision to empower India with cutting-edge defence technologies and a mission to achieve self-reliance in critical defence technologies and systems, while equipping our armed forces with state-of-the-art weapon systems and equipment. DRDO is India’s largest research organisation. It has a network of laboratories engaged in developing defence technologies and since being set up, has achieved many successes in developing major systems and critical technologies. to reaD the coMPlete article get yoUr coPy noW!
CCR&D Technology Management (TM)
in pursuance of these obligations, the Ministry of Home Affairs continuously monitors the internal security situation, issues appropriate advisories, shares intelligence inputs, extends manpower and financial support, guidance and expertise to the State Governments for maintenance of security, peace and harmony. During 2022, there were important developments that took place under the Ministry of Home Affairs and following is the summary of them:
Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh
n Number of terror incidents has decreased from 417 in 2018 to 229 in 2021, while the number of security forces personnel martyred has reduced from 91 in 2018 to 42 in 2021.
n There has been about 54 per cent reduction in terrorist incidents, 84 per cent in the deaths of security forces and about 22 per cent in recruitment of terrorists.
n Under the Prime Minister’s Development Package in Jammu,
The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) discharges multifarious responsibilities, important among them beinginternal security, border management, Centre-State relations, administration of Union Territories, management of Central Armed Police Forces, disaster management, etc.
Coastal topography
India has 7,516 km long coastline which includes 5,422 km of main land and 2,094 km of coastline of 1,382 islands. The coastline of the peninsular India has Bay of Bengal in the east, Indian Ocean in the south and Arabian Sea in the west; and is spread over nine states and four union territories. Lakshadweep and Minicoy in Arabian Sea and Andaman and Nicobar in Bay of Bengal form the two island groups. The topography of India’s coastline is diverse to include creeks, small bays, back waters, estuaries, swamps, mudflats etc, and is ideal for covert landings, smuggling of contraband including explosives and weapons and terrorist operations. The creeks along the coasts of Gujarat and West Bengal’s Sundarbans’ are especially suitable for clandestine activities, infiltration and smuggling. There have been serious security challenges earlier like serial blasts of March 1993 and terrorist attacks of November 2008 in Mumbai which can all be attributed to poor coastal security. After the 2008 Mumbai terrorists attacks when 10 armed terrorists landed on Mumbai’s coast, the Government of India launched a series of concrete actions to plug every possible gap in the coastal security.
Sea Trade and Ports
India is located at the crossroads of trans-Indian Ocean routes. Most merchant ships that sail between East Asia, US, Europe and Africa pass through Indian territorial waters. Around 95 per cent of India’s trade by volume and 70 per cent by value is carried through the sea routes. There are presently 12 major ports and 200 notified minor and intermediate ports in India. Kamarajar Port, located on the Coromandel Coast (formerly called Ennore Port Limited), is the 13th port and the first port which is a public company. As per United Nations Conference on Trade and Development’s (UNCTAD’s) report ‘Review of Maritime Transport Report 2020’; India’s maritime trade fell from 4.2 per cent in 2019 to minus 5.9 in 2020 due to COVID-19. The forecast is that it will grow to 3.9 per cent by November 2021 which is a net growth of 9.8 per cent. This is encouraging news.
India also has an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of about 2.37 million sq kms wherein India enjoys exclusive legal right to utilise all living and non-living resources.
There are about 23 minor fishing harbours and 95 fish-landing centres which formally provide landing and berthing facilities to fishing boats. As per the Department of Fisheries there are 1,376 landing points for fishing boats alone along the entire coast. India is the 7th largest fishing nation in the world and Indian coast accounts for approximately four million fishermen settled along the coast in 3,288 marine fishing villages.
Besides fishing, other major industrial and economic activities, nuclear power stations, defence installations, energy infrastructure, shipyards, refineries are located in the coastal regions. Special Economic Zones (SEZs) which have resulted in growth of number of industrial hubs such as Kandla SEZ in Gujarat; SantaCruz Electronics Export Processing Zone SEZ in Maharashtra; Madras Export Processing Zone SEZ in Tamil Nadu; Cochin SEZ in Kerala; Falta SEZ in West Bengal; and Vishakhapatnam SEZ in Andhra Pradesh. In case of Gujarat, Gulfs of Kutch and Khambhat have emerged as major corridors for importing crude oil
Proximity of India’s coasts to Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Gulf countries adds to its vulnerability. Gwadar in Pakistan and Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka are in the Chinese hands and a great threat to India’s maritime security and maritime economy.
The Sagarmala Programme was originally initiated by Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 2003 as the maritime equivalent to the Golden
for India.
There have been significant positive developments in India’s coastal security to overcome the serious challenges presented by the coastline of Peninsular India.
Amit Shah was appointed Minister of Home Affairs on May 31, 2019, in the re-elected government led by Narendra Modi. Amit Shah has risen to Head the ruling Party of India literally from the grass roots. he shouldered the responsibilities of Secretary as well as Vice President of BJP, Gujarat State. In 1997, he became National
Ajay Kumar Mishra Minister of State for Home AffairsBorn on September 25, 1960 he is an Agriculturist and Industrialist with Bachelor of Science & Bachelor of Law degrees. In May 2014, he was elected as Member of Parliament (16th Lok Sabha) and in May, 2019, he was re-elected to
nisith Pramanik Minister ofHe was born on January 17, 1986 in Cooch Behar district of West Bengal and was an Assistant Teacher in a primary school before joining politics. He was elected as Member of Parliament first time in the Seventeenth Lok Sabha, in 2019 as
Treasurer of the Bharatiya Janata Yuva Morcha.
In 2013, he was appointed as National General Secretary of the BJP and In-Charge of Uttar Pradesh. His efforts earned BJP a historic success in the Parliamentary elections of 2014. He took over as BJP National President in July 2014.
Amit Shah was elected to Rajya Sabha, on August 19, 2017, from Gujarat State. In the General Election 2019, he won with a huge margin from the Gandhinagar Constituency of Gujarat State.
17th Lok Sabha (2nd term). In September 2019, he became Member, Standing Committee on Food, Consumer Affairs and Public Distribution. On October 9, 2019, he became Member, Committee on Absence of Members from the Sittings of the House, and Member, Consultative Committee. On July 7, 2021, he became Minister of State in the Ministry of Home Affairs.
a Bhartiya Janata Party candidate. He was a Member of the Standing Committee on Information Technology and a Member of the Consultative Committee, Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment. At present, he is serving as Minister of State in the Ministry of Home Affairs as well as Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports.
Nityanand Rai was born on 1st January, 1966 in Bihar. He did his BA (Hon) from R.N. Degree College of Baba Saheb Bhim Rao Ambedkar University. He joined Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP) in 1990 and became the President of Bharatiya Janta Yuva Morch in 1998.
In 2000, he was elected MLA for Bihar Assembly from Hajipur. Later on, he held the post of State Secretary, General Secretary and President of BJP unit of Bihar. During his President-ship of Bihar BJP unit, the party and its allies won 39 seats out of 40 seats during the 2019 Lok Shaba election. He was first time elected for MP from Ujiarpur Lok Sabha Seat of Bihar State in 2014 General Elections.
Ajay Kumar Bhalla took over as the new Union Home Secretary on August 31, 2019. Earlier, he was Director General of Foreign Trade from October, 2016 with additional charge of Director, IIFT till June 30, 2017. Before joining DGFT, Ajay Bhalla worked as Additional Secretary,
Department of Commerce with effect from April, 2015. Prior to this assignment Ajay Bhalla worked as Joint Secretary, Ministry of Coal with effect from July 2010 and Additional Secretary, Ministry of Coal, from January 2015 to April, 2015.
A 1984 batch IAS officer, Ajay Bhalla has done M.Sc.(Botany) from University of Delhi, MBA from University of Queensland, Brisbane, and M.Phil (Social Sciences), from Punjab University.
A. The Budget allocations, net of recoveries, are given below:
Note from the Editor-in-Chief:
We had earlier introduced a new chapter ‘Ministry of Defence (MoD) organisations and contacts of Asian countries’ within the regular ‘Who’s Who in Asian Defence Forces’ section. We have further included the profiles of top leadership as much up to date as possible apart from the extensive information on Ministries of Defence in major Asian countries with critical facts like organisational structure, contact details, etc.
We sincerely hope that these information, which have been added, will make SP’s Military Yearbook even more useful and will especially enable all the stakeholders from the aerospace and defence industry in doing business and collaborate more expeditiously.
Countries being covered in the ‘MoD Contacts and Organisations of Asian Countries’ are:
n Algeria: MoD contact details and organisational structure
n Australia: MoD contact details and organisational structure
n Bangladesh: MoD contact details
n Brunei: MoD contact details and organisational structure
n Egypt: MoD contact details
n Indonesia: MoD contact details and organisational structure
n Iran: MoD contact details
n Israel: MoD contact details and organisational structure
n Japan: MoD contact details and organisational structure
n Kazakhstan: MoD contact details
n Malaysia: MoD contact details and organisational structure
n Myanmar: MoD contact details and organisational structure
n Nepal: MoD contact details
n Philippines: MoD contact details and organisational structure
n Singapore: MoD contact details and organisational structure
n South Korea: MoD contact details and organisational structure
n Sri Lanka: MoD contact details and organisational structure
n Taiwan: MoD contact details and organisational structure
n Thailand: MoD contact details and organisational structure
n Vietnam: MoD contact details and organisational structure
Compiled by SP Guide Publications team (as on March 1, 2023)
Abdelmadjid Tebboune
President, Algeria
Abdelmadjid Tebboune is an Algerian politician currently serving as the President of Algeria since December 2019. He took over the power from former President Abdelaziz Bouteflika and former Acting Head of State Abdelkader Bensalah. Previously, he was
Aymen Benabderrahmane
Prime Minister, Algeria
Aymen Benabderrahmane, born August 30, 1966, is an Algerian politician who is serving as Prime Minister of Algeria since June 30, 2021 and Minister of Finance since June 23, 2020. He graduated from the National School
Lt General Saïd Chanegriha
Prime Minister of Algeria from May 2017 to August 2017. In addition, he was also Minister of Housing from 2001 to 2002 for a year and again from 2012 to 2017 for five years. Tebboune was born on November 17, 1945 in Mécheria, Algeria. He graduated from the National School of Administration in 1965.
of Administration. From 1991 until 2000, he was Inspector of Finance at the General Inspectorate of Finance. In addition, he worked as General Inspector of Finance in 2004 and as General Inspector Chief of Finance in 2006. He was promoted to Governor of the Bank of Algeria in November 2019 serving until June 2020.
Chief of Staff of the People’s National Army Defence, Algeria
Lieutenant General Saïd Chanegriha was born on August 1, 1945 in El-Kantara, Wilaya of Biskra. He obtained military diplomas in the Fundamental Training, the Application courses, Tanks Company Chief courses, Armoured Arm Captains courses, Command and Staff courses and the War High studies.
Lt General Saïd Chanegriha assumed the responsibility, in the Land Battle Corps, of the following functions:
n Commander of Combat Tanks Battalion/Armoured Brigade/3rd MR;
n Chief of Staff of Armoured Brigade/3rd MR;
n Commander of Armoured Brigade/3rd MR;
n Chief of Staff of Armoured Division/5th MR;
n Commander of the Application School of the Armoured Arm/5th MR;
n Commander of Armoured Division/2nd MR;
n Deputy Commander of the 3rd MR;
n Commander of the 3rd MR;
n Land Forces Commander.
Lt General had participated in the campaign of the Middle East in Egypt. He has been promoted to the rank of General in 1998, to the rank of Major General in 2003 and to the rank of Lt General in 2020. Lt General Saïd Chanegriha has been decorated with the medal of PNA 1st, 2nd and 3rd chevron, the medal of PNA participation in two wars of Middle East 1967 and 1973, the Medal of Military Merit and the Medal of Honor.
Major General Benmeddah Mahfoud was born on the November 3, 1955 in Hadjout, wilaya of TIPAZA. He was incorporated in Naval Forces on 1974. He obtained military diplomas, State Engineer in Electro mechanics/Baku ex USSR 1974-1979, Command and Staff courses and armament/Russia 1991, Higher Armament courses/war High studies/Russia 1999. Major General Benmeddah Mahfoud assumed the responsibility, of the following functions:
n Commander of the missile-launching vessel 1982-1986;
n Chief of Tactical Chair of naval formation 1994-1996;
Commander of the Air Force, Algeria
Major General Mahmoud Laraba was born in the Wilaya of Constantine on October 15, 1945, and was incorporated in the People’s National Army in February 14, 1963. He has several trainings and machine qualifications in Algeria, Russia, France and USA. He has undergone higher course in English language (England).
Since July 18, 2020 he is holding the position of Air Force
ASiAn Who’S Who: LeAderShip proFiLeS–ALGERIA, AUSTRALIA
n Director of Naval staff courses/Naval High School 2002-2003;
n Director of studies/Naval High School 2003-2005;
n Commander of Naval High School 2005-2007;
n Commander of the West Maritime Façade 2007-2015;
n The Chief of Staff of Naval Forces 2015-2021;
n The Interim Commander of Naval Forces from the January 7, 2021.
Major General Benmeddah Mahfoud has been decorated with the medal of PNA 1st, 2nd and 3rd chevron, the Medal of Military Merit and the Medal of Honor.
Major General Ammar Atamnia was born on the July 1, 1950 in Haddada, Wilaya of Souk Ahras. He obtained a military Diplomas: Basic Training, Airborne Instructor, Company Commander, Reconnaissance officer, Officer’s Improvement Courses, Headquarters Courses and High Warfare Courses.
Major General Ammar Atamnia held Several Functions:
n Airborne Battalion Commander/4th Military Region;
n Para-Commando Regiment Commander/4th Military Region;
n Special Troops Division chief/LFC;
n Special Troops Application School Commander/4th Military
Commander. Earlier, he was promoted to the rank of Major General on July 5, 2011. Before that, he was promoted to the rank of General on July 5, 2006. Major General Mahmoud Laraba was decorated with the Medal of the People’s National Army 1st, 2nd and 3rd chevron, with the Medal of participation of the People’s National Army In the two wars of the Middle East in 1967 and 1973, with the military merit Medal and with the Medal of Honor.
Anthony Albanese was sworn in as Australia’s 31st Prime Minister on May 23, 2022. He previously served as Deputy Prime Minister and Leader of the House of Representatives.
As Infrastructure Minister and Communications Minister, he delivered nation-building projects, connecting the country through thousands of kilometres of roads
Region;
n 6th Military Region Chief-of-Staff;
n 6th Military Region vice Commander;
n 6th Military Region Commander;
n 5th Military Region Commander.
n He currently serves as the Land Forces Commander since the March 17, 2020.
Major General Ammar Atamnia was promoted to the Rank of General in 2002 and to Major General in 2006.
He was honoured by a Medal of People’s National Army 3rd Chevron, a Medal of Military Merit, a Medal of Honor and a Medal of Bravery of People’s National Army.
and rail, and rolling out the high-speed fibre National Broadband Network. He was widely recognised for his ability to bring stakeholders, businesses, and communities together to deliver projects that boosted the economy, enhanced productivity, and improved Australia’s quality of life.
Anthony was first elected to the Australian Parliament as the member for the Sydney seat of Grayndler in 1996. In 2019, he was unanimously elected as the Leader of the Australian Labour Party.
as the world emerged out from the grip of the pandemic and rebooted its economic activities, US–China antagonistic relations once again surfaced and reared up its ugly head. A resurgent India, stepping up both in economic development and military clout has further deepened the fault lines, with the US actively and proactively siding upto India in its bid to counter the dragon. The PRC, its image battered as the villain in the pandemic blustered in a bid to regain its edge in the region. The antiChina opinion, world wide came out in the open as countries scrambled to shift manufacturing bases out of China and PRC seeing its hegemony being challenged boosted its armed forces and entered a new phase of an aggressive policy of intimidating its neighbours. US and China have already been at loggerheads over Taiwan and a series of visits of top US leaders only further aggravated the already fragile relations. For some time the world waited anxiously as the US China relations spiraled out of control and as also affected by the ongoing Russia Ukraine war and countries entered and reentered into new political alliances. Moves and counter moves by all started translating themselves into new alignments as SAARC and NAM were replaced by AUKUS and I2U2 type of alliances. And these, led by the US saw the PRC more and more isolated and antagonised as China faced a belligerent world, blaming it for the outbreak. Moreover, stonewalling all efforts to investigate the origin only heightened the situation. At one time an axis of Russia – PRC and North Korea seemed a high possibility.
Even as the Russian invasion of Ukraine remains ongoing, the United States continues to expand its focus on Southeast Asia and the Pacific to address the rise of China. As regional tensions heighten and Beijing ramps up its military modernisation programme, the United States and its allies and partners face numerous challenges surrounding how to most effectively deter—and if necessary—defeat aggression and coercion. For the United States to meet the demands of China’s rising power, it must balance competing interests, economic security, regional politics, and the occasional tensions to forge closer alliances and partnerships with a diverse range of countries, including Australia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, as well as fortify its territories in the region, such as Guam.
As the war in Europe ground on and Russian forces suffered a series of setbacks at the hands of Ukrainians, buoyed by latest weaponry from NATO, a sanctions hit Russia explored newer and newer ways to raise foreign currency to offset the expenditure of war and India taking advantage rose to the occasion by becoming a major conduit of the outflow of Russian oil. India’s standing up to China in the border disputes
did nothing but put the dragon on a more belligerent attitude. As India ramped up its twin flagship programmes of Atmanirbhar Bharat and Make in India, especially in the field of defence, western block countries like US and France scrambled to enter in JVs with India in the field of defence manufacturing.
On the other hand, China’s Belt and Road Imitative continued its ingress into the developing countries of the region expanding and consolidation the hold of PRC on those countries who were at the receiving end of the Chinese largesse and they kept on sliding deeper in to Debt crisis. Directly impacted by these debt traps, first Sri Lanka and then Pakistan slid under. Many other countries scrambled to contain the damage and the whole region saw a massive upheaval. While we see a steady betterment of the economic situation of Sri Lanka, we see Pakistan sliding deeper and deeper in to chaos. Not a good situation as a already badly radicalised nation sits on the stockpile of nuclear weaponry. The continued worsening of the situation in Pakistan also saw China’s investments in the BRI project in an somewhat unpredictable situation as fringe insurgent groups of TTP and BLA moved to strangle the Pakistani economy.
Into this heady cocktail of the region, the withdrawn of US forces from Afghanistan and the fall of Afghanistan to Taliban highlighted the inherent instability of the region. At one time it did look that the PRC will step in to increase its sphere of influence in Afghanistan, it did not fructify, probably because a sinking Pakistan would not have been an ideal partner in this Chinese designs on Afghanistan.
Rise of India has by far been the only bright light in this cauldron Assuming the mantle of Presidency of SCO and G20 in one year, the stock of India shot up. Already high from the massive vaccination drive, both, within and to other countries, India furthered its economic policies of self-reliance and a preferred destination for FDI.
United States’ alliances and security partnerships in the region remain central to its efforts to sustain its national-security interests and ‘respond to the rise of China, North Korean nuclear ambitions and other regional threats’. The alliances with Australia, Japan and South Korea remain essentially strong despite differences with Washington. Although China has succeeded in gaining influence over the two US allies in Southeast Asia, the Philippines and Thailand, US has cultivated several significant security partnerships in Southeast Asia – notably with Indonesia, Singapore and Vietnam – that may help to compensate for its weakening alliances there. Meanwhile, the ‘major defence partnership’ with India is potentially of great strategic significance, though considerable differences of perspective continue to impede its development.
he Central Asian Republics (CARs) of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan obtained their independence in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union. These sovereign states in Central Asia have the Caspian Sea on the west and China on the east. The dominant ethnic groups in the region are Uzbek, Kazakh, Tajik, Turkmen and Kyrgyz. During their incorporation, earlier into Russia, and then into the Soviet Union, a large number of Russians and Ukrainians are also settled in these republics giving the whole region a multi-ethnic and distinctive character. Majority of the people in the region belong to the Sunni sect of Islam, the main religion.
After three decades of independence following the fall of the Soviet Union, these Central Asian countries continue to face challenges to their stability and governance. Last year saw large-scale domestic unrest in three of the region’s five countries — Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan — and a devastating cross-border conflict between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan was the largest ever trans-boundary escalation in the region. The first crisis unfolded in Kazakhstan in January 2022, triggered by domestic grievances and discontent over rising fuel prices and unequal living conditions, leading to 238 deaths. In Tajikistan’s large but sparsely inhabited Gorno-Badakhshan region — which has an ethnically and linguistically distinct population — long-simmering tensions boiled over into clashes in May between communities and authorities over the detention of local leaders, resulting in dozens of death. Elsewhere, changes to the constitutional status of Uzbekistan’s Karakalpakstan autonomous republic, as well as other socio-economic factors, sparked unrest in July and resulted in 21 deaths, according to the official tally. This is worrying for two reasons. First, it suggests that peoples’ legitimate day-to-day concerns are often ignored and instead blamed on abstract, far-away foreign interests. Second, governments direct attention toward international groups, many of whom, rather than attempting to create instability, are the ones who are working to address the very problems that could lead to grievances and unrest in the first place.
CARs are endowed with tremendous hydrocarbons reserves that has significant attraction for regional players like Russia, China, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and Turkey and remote players like USA and EU. The share of Central Asia in the world energy markets is substantial.
Central Asia and the Caucasus are considered by many to be the next oil and gas frontier. Overall, according to the Kazakhstan
Ministry of Oil and Gas, proven hydrocarbon reserves, both onshore and offshore, are estimated to amount to 4.8 billion tonnes, or more than 35 billion barrels. The OECD estimates that Kazakhstan holds 65 years of oil reserves and 308 years of coal reserves. Kazakhstan is the region’s leading oil producer and ninth-largest country in the world. Turkmenistan is the region’s main gas exporter, and exports its reserves directly to China through the Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline. Uzbekistan also supplies gas through the upgraded pipeline network. CARs also have immense hydropower potential of its rivers. A solution to leverage it is being sought through the Central Asia Energy and Water Development Program (CAEWDP) which is a partnership between the World Bank, the European Commission, Switzerland (through SECO), the United Kingdom (through DFID), and the US (through USAID).
CARs falls on the ‘ancient Silk Road’ and it serves as the starting point of the China–Central Asia transnational oil and gas pipeline. Because of its strategic position and rich oil and gas resources, Central Asia is a major focus of competition for the world’s political and economic powers like the United States, Russia, European Union and China. Most experts agree that the balance of power is changing in Central Asia, with Russia and China playing a greater role than the US, which had been the key guarantor of stability in the region until recently. With the withdrawal of US from Afghanistan, the stage is now set for another ‘great game’ in the region with a new player – China.
EU’s relations with our Central Asian partners have gone from strength to strength in the thirty years since diplomatic relations were established. The EU has high stakes in seeing Central Asia develop since together they are stronger to face the challenges in an increasingly complex world and that together, they can make a meaningful contribution to stability, security and prosperity in Central Asia and Europe.
The first meeting of the Heads of State of Central Asia and the President of the European Council took place on October 27, 2022, in Astana, confirming the new level of the interregional cooperation reached between Central Asia and the European Union. President of the Republic of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, President of the Kyrgyz Republic Sadyr Zhaparov, President of the Republic of Tajikistan Emomali Rahmon, President of the Republic of Uzbekistan Shavkat Mirziyoyev and President of Turkmenistan Serdar Berdimuhamedov (represented by Turkmenistan’s Deputy Chair of the Cabinet of Ministers) and President of the European Council Charles Michel welcomed the first regional high-level meeting in Astana.
to read the CoMPlete
Area : 27,24,900 sq km
Capital : Nur-Sultan (Astana)
Coastline : Landlocked with access to Caspian Sea
Population : 18,744,548 (July 2018 est.)
Ethnic Divisions : Kazakh (Qazaq) 63.1 per cent, Russian 23.7 per cent, Uzbek 2.9 per cent, Ukrainian 2.1 per cent, Uighur 1.4 per cent, Tatar 1.3 per cent, German 1.1 per cent, other 4.4 per cent (2009 est.)
Religions : Muslim 70.2 per cent, Christian 26.2 per cent (mainly Russian Orthodox), other 0.2 per cent, atheist 2.8 per cent, unspecified 0.5 per cent (2009 est.)
Languages : Kazakh (official, Qazaq) 74 per cent (understand spoken language), Russian (official, used in everyday business, designated the “language of interethnic communication”) 94.4 per cent (understand spoken language) (2009 est.)
Literacy : 99.8 per cent
Government : Presidential Republic
Suffrage : 18 years of age; universal
Administrative Divisions : 14 provinces and 2 cities Kazakhstan Armed Forces: Land Forces, Navy, Air Defense Forces
In early January 2022, Kazakhstan experienced its worst riots in recent history. Following the riots, the Kazakh government requested Russian assistance to quell the disturbance. But, by the time Russian troops were deployed, the Kazakh government already had the situation largely under control. The presence of Russian troops served more as a powerful deterrence to internal opponents, rather than an operational necessity. Over 2,000 troops were deployed under the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, a Russia-led military alliance. The troop deployment demonstrated to internal opponents that the government
has powerful allies around its borders.
These riots undermine Chinese interests in this resource-rich country. Over the past decade, China has emerged as an important economic player in Kazakhstan and Central Asia. By 2019, China’s largest state-owned oil company, Sinopec, along with a few other companies, had invested over $27.6 billion in the Kazakh oil and gas fields and other industries. Two-way trade between China and Kazakhstan surpassed $15.4 billion in 2020, China accounted for over 18 per cent of Kazakhstan’s foreign trade and there were more than 700 joint companies. Beijing has invested significant resources in cultivating the Kazakh elite and this investment has paid off. China’s main interest in Kazakhstan is access to the country’s vast energy supplies. Oil and gas imports from Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries reduce China’s dependence on the Middle East and also allows China to bypass the Malacca Strait in case of conflict with the United States. Trade and investment have gained China powerful friends among the Kazakh elite and ensured the protection of its interests.
Traditionally, the Kazakh elite was educated in the former Soviet Union. However, Kazakh ministers and senior security officials have studied in China. Kazakhstan’s current President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev is fluent in Chinese and served in China as a diplomat. He first held a constitutional referendum in June and then called snap elections in November, which he comfortably won and spent the rest of the year shoring up his power. Despite talk about the dawn of a ‘new Kazakhstan’, featuring true democracy and social justice, Tokayev’s actions were aimed at dismantling Nazarbayev’s power and legitimising his rule until at least 2029.
In contrast to China’s economic success, Russia’s economic presence has seen a significant decline, but Russian soft power remains somewhat high. Strong ties between Kazakhstan and Russia date back to the Tsarist monarchy and the Soviet period. Over 20 per cent of Kazakhstan’s population is of Slavic ancestry. According to UNESCO, an estimated 60,000 Kazakhs were studying in Russia in 2019, while 15,000 were studying in China. Russian language and cultural influence remain high. Russian TV stations are far more popular than local stations.
Kazakhstan’s increasing dependence on China and Russia may further erode US influence in the country and impact its billion-dollar investments in the energy sector. But Kazakhstan will continue to court US, European and Japanese investment as a way to mitigate its excessive dependence on China and Russia. The rapid deployment of Russian troops further demonstrated to Kazakh leaders that Russia is the ultimate guarantor of their security.
Defence
Active : 39,000 (Army 20,000 Navy 3,000 Air 12,000 MoD 4,000)
Paramilitary : 31,500
Conscript liability 12 months (due to be abolished)
Military Equipment by service
Army: 20,000
4 regional comd : Astana, East, West and Southern Forces by role
Manoeuvre
Armoured : 1 tk bde
Mechanised : 3 mech bde
Air Manoeuvre : 4 air aslt bde
Combat Support
3 arty bde
1 SSM unit
3 cbt engr bde
the EAPA is now increasingly looked at as part of the larger Indo-Pacific region after the US renamed its Pacific theatre command in a strategically more meaningful and functional context. Of course, the US State Department continues to oversee its affairs covering 30 odd countries eastward from Myanmar to Japan, the Pacific Island nations, Australia & New Zealand under the East Asian & Pacific Bureau. The significance is not lost on anyone as while the Asia-Pacific excluded India, the Indo-Pacific very much makes the latter an important player that constitutes the QUAD along with the US, Japan and Australia.
The importance of this region has only grown over the past three decades coinciding with the rise of China as an economic and subsequently military power to emerge as the primary challenger to the US. So much so that in a well-researched novel visualising the third World War titled “2034”, authors US Admiral James Stavridis and journalist Elliot Ackerman chose the Indo-Pacific as the centrum gravitates.
The region of East Asia and the Pacific saw some of the most ferocious battles being fought during the Second World War and was the only place to suffer from Nuclear Holocaust. Economically, financially and in terms of loss of personnel, countries in the region suffered heavily during the war only to bounce back after the war with dedication, perseverance and commitment to become either the most developed economies or the fastest developing nations in the world. Japan and South Korea experienced an economic boom. Taiwan blossomed into a high-tech powerhouse. Hong Kong, Singapore, and other Southeast Asian economies grew rapidly. Foundational institutions like the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the APEC Forum, and the Asian Development Bank, all contributed to growth in the region. United States established formal diplomatic relations with China in 1979, which facilitated economic exchange. At the turn of the 21st century, the United States advocated for China’s admission into the World Trade Organisation (WTO), with the belief that economic liberalisation would bring China into a greater partnership with the US and the free world.
Spanning a vast stretch of the globe from the west coast of the Pacific to the Eastern shores of India, the region is home to the world’s most populous states including nearly half of the earth’s population, more than half of the largest standing armies in the world and countries that possess nuclear weapons. Some of the world’s largest and busiest seaports are in the region. 60 per cent of global maritime trade transits through East and South—East Asia, with roughly one-third of global shipping passing through the South China Sea alone. Co-opting India
into the region logically, considering its rising economic and military heft, in May 2022 President Biden launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) with a dozen initial partners: Australia, Brunei, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. Together, they represent 40 per cent of world GDP. With 60 per cent of the world’s population, the Indo Pacific is projected to be the largest contributor to global growth over the next 30 years.
As the region grows in population and economic weight, it is extremely important to ensure that it is increasingly a place of peace, stability, and growing prosperity – and not one of disorder, conflict, and predatory economics. Embedding these free and open principles will require efforts across the spectrum of the global community with diplomatic initiatives, economic exchange and military cooperation.
China’s leaders have benefited from what they view as a “period of strategic opportunity” during the initial two decades of the 21st century to develop domestically and expand China’s “comprehensive national power.” Over the coming decades, they are focused on realising a powerful and prosperous China that is equipped with a “world-class” military, securing China’s status as a great power with the aim of emerging as the preeminent power in the Indo-Pacific region. After Xi Jinping consolidated his sway over Chinese politics after securing an unprecedented third term in October 2022, the region is coming into sharper focus as the US drumbeats the Taiwan Straits as the casus belli for a future contest for influence and power. According to some Chinese scholars, the Indo-Pacific strategy is a preliminary idea for the United States to connect the Indian Ocean and the Pacific region, to constrain China’s rise from a geopolitical perspective, and to safeguard its own leadership and interests in the region. Ongoing state-led efforts, which China implements both at home and abroad and which often feature economic and diplomatic initiatives, also support China’s security and military objectives:
n China continues to implement long-term state-directed planning, such as “Made in China 2025” and other industrial development plans, which stress the need to replace imported technology with domestically produced technology. These plans present an economic challenge to nations that export high-tech products. These plans also directly support military modernisation goals by stressing proprietary mastery of advanced dual-use technologies.
n China’s leaders seek to align civil and defence technology devel-
Area : 77,41,220 sq km
Capital : Canberra
Coastline : 25,760 km
Maritime Claims
Territorial sea : 12 nm
Contiguous zone : 24 nm
Exclusive
economic zone : 200 nm
Continental shelf : 200 nm or to the edge of the continental margin
Population : 23,470,145 (July 2018 est.)
Ethnic Divisions : English 25.9 per cent, Australian 25.4 per cent, Irish 7.5 per cent, Scottish 6.4 per cent, Italian 3.3 per cent, German 3.2 per cent, Chinese 3.1 per cent, Indian 1.4 per cent, Greek 1.4 per cent, Dutch 1.2 per cent, other 15.8 per cent (includes Australian aboriginal .5 per cent), unspecified 5.4 per cent(2011 est.)
Note: data represent self-identified ancestry, over a third of respondents reported two ancestries
Languages : English 76.8 per cent, Mandarin 1.6 per cent, Italian 1.4 per cent, Arabic 1.3 per cent, Greek 1.2 per cent, Cantonese 1.2 per cent, Vietnamese 1.1 per cent, others 10.4 per cent, unspecified 5 per cent (2011 est)
Literacy : 99 per cent
Government : Parliamentary Democracy (Federal Parliament) under a Constitutional Monarchy; a Commonwealth realm
Suffrage : 18 years of age; universal and compulsory
Administrative
Divisions : Six states and two territories
Like all countries, Australia faces various challenges and risks that could affect its governance, growth and stability. The relationship between Australia and China, has deteriorated in recent years due to various factors such as trade disputes, human rights concerns, security risks, and ideological differences. Australia has taken a firm stance against China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea, its interference in Hong Kong’s autonomy, and its detention of Australian citizens. China has responded by imposing trade restrictions, cyberattacks, and diplomatic pressure on Australia.
Although 2022 brought a change of government in Australia and a new public tone to its diplomacy, it also revealed the hold of deepseated geopolitical anxieties. While the new Labour government, led by Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, put aside the rhetoric about beating ‘drums of war’ and looked instead towards respectful, if cautious, cooperation with Beijing, it also underlined its strong commitment to the pillars of its predecessors’ policy: the American Alliance, AUKUS, and increased defence spending.
The AUKUS agreement, signed in September 2021, is a trilateral security partnership between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Its main focus is on sharing advanced military technology and intelligence in the areas of defence and security in the Indo-Pacific region, including countering China’s growing influence and military assertiveness in the region.
The AUKUS agreement has significant implications for the security environment in the Pacific region, and its impact will be closely monitored by other countries in the region, Australia benefits from being a part of AUKUS in several ways:
n Enhanced defence capabilities: AUKUS provides Australia with access to advanced military technology, including nuclear-powered submarines, which will significantly enhance its defence capabilities. This will help Australia to better defend its maritime interests and respond to security challenges in the region.
n Strengthened strategic partnerships: AUKUS strengthens Australia’s strategic partnerships with the United States and the United Kingdom, two of its closest allies. This trilateral partnership will help to deepen defence and security cooperation between the three countries and enhance their ability to respond to regional security threats.
n Increased intelligence sharing: AUKUS will facilitate the sharing of intelligence among the three countries, which could help Australia to better understand security threats in the region and respond more effectively.
n Improved regional security: AUKUS is designed to counter China’s growing influence and military assertiveness in the Pacific region. By enhancing the capabilities of Australia, the United States, and the United Kingdom, AUKUS could contribute to improved regional security and stability.
n Economic benefits: The AUKUS partnership could also provide economic benefits to Australia. For example, the construction of nuclear-powered submarines could create jobs and boost Australia’s defence industry.
Overall, Australia benefits from being a part of AUKUS by enhancing its defence capabilities, strengthening its strategic partnerships, improving regional security, and potentially providing economic benefits.
The announcement of the Solomon Islands/China security agreement, brought into the sharpest possible focus the brewing concerns about China’s reach into the Pacific. Expectations were high, then, for the advent of a Labour government. Where continuity has been demanded – on the QUAD, AUKUS and the US alliance – Labour has given willing assent. Where a change in tone was necessary, most clearly on relations with China and the Pacific, it has been expressed.
Current Middle Eastern conflicts can broadly be described as stalemates. Domestic and foreign actors alike are finding themselves unable to achieve their various political goals through military means. This realisation has led to a series of de-escalations. However, for the most part these measures are due to exhaustion. Syria and Yemen are the best examples of military stalemates resulting in de-escalation. In the former case, President Bashar al-Assad controls roughly two-thirds of Syrian territory but has little prospect of seizing the rest of the country, which is held by a variety of groups, including the United States-backed Syrian Democratic Forces. The opposition’s prospects for capturing territory held by Assad are even less promising. This context has resulted in a fragmented and fractured state.
In March 2022, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) hosted President Bashar al-Assadin Dubai – his first visit to an Arab country since the uprisings began in 2011. Despite US and European pressure, it is likely that more Arab countries will host the Syrian President in the coming months and years. In Yemen, a military stalemate following years of largely inconclusive fighting has led to de-escalation. In April 2022, the United Nations announced a two-month truce that was subsequently extended for another two months. The truce followed a two-year campaign – still ongoing – by the Houthi movement to seize Marib province, which contains oil and gas fields the Houthi leadership believes it must control in order to fulfil its aim of creating a viable independent state. Shortly after the announcement of the truce, Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, who had been in exile in Saudi Arabia for much of the past seven years, announced that he was stepping down as Yemeni President and handing executive authority to an eight-member Presidential Leadership Council (PLC).
A similar stalemate has characterised Turkey’s conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). In Egypt, the conflict between the state and Sinai-based militants is less a stalemate than a fading war. Iraq and Libya remain in tense states of uncertainty. In the former, concerns remain over whether there will be a new nuclear deal with Iran and what this might mean for Iraq, while in Libya, Presidential elections were postponed and the country remains deeply divided.
Three of the region’s longest-running and most violent conflicts – in Iraq, Syria and Yemen – have a significant sectarian element. Iranian troops, advisers or militias are present in all these countries. In Yemen, where the Houthis are Zaydi Shia, Iran succeeded in convincing the authorities to celebrate Ashura – a Shia festival – for the first time in the country’s history in 2019. In Syria, Iran has been using a combination of financial incentives, aid and scholarships to encourage conversions. In
Iraq, where conversion is less of an issue due to the number of Shiites already in the country, it has continued to exert control over militia groups, which has led to a fracturing of the Shia bloc.
Perceptions of Tehran’s gains (particularly those in Yemen and Syria) and concerns over its perceived pursuit of nuclear weapons have driven Iran’s regional rivals closer together – most notably Israel and the Gulf states. The Abraham Accords of 2020 have paved the way for further normalisation of ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia and will likely result in a muted response from Gulf states to further developments in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Israel continues to carry out strikes on what it says are Iranian positions inside Syria. The increasingly significant sectarian element of Middle Eastern conflicts and growing confrontation between Iran and its regional rivals have opened up divisions that may be impossible to rectify in the near term.
The political and territorial fragmentation of many Middle Eastern countries is another challenge working against efforts to transform fragile truces and ceasefires into lasting political settlements. Again, the two most obvious cases are Syria and Yemen. However, political fragmentation also plays a role in Libya and Iraq. In Syria, as noted above, Assad controls roughly two-thirds of the country but is unlikely to extend that control over the rest of Syria. This means that the country will continue to be divided. In Yemen, the issue is even starker. The Houthis have control over much of the north, where they have restructured the government, formed a separate economy and implemented their own vision of a state. In Libya and Iraq, political fragmentation and the various armed groups that have emerged over the past decade have also produced a political impasse. In December 2021, Presidential elections in Libya were postponed. Iraq, which has an autonomous Kurdish zone in the north, likewise appears to be incapable of piecing the state back together.
The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine was the coup de grace in terms of the collapse of great power cooperation in the Middle East, firmly pitting the US against Russia in the European and Middle Eastern theatres. At a moment when Russia could have been pushing Tehran to recommit to the JCPOA, it moved dangerously toward a close military alliance with Iran.
While the ramifications of the collapse of the global order in the Middle East will likely play out in 2023 and beyond, what is clear is that 2022 spelled the beginning of a re-intensification of great power rivalry in the Middle East.
Area : 23,81,740 sq km
Capital : Algiers
Coastline : 998 km
Maritime Claims
Territorial sea : 12 nm
Exclusive Population : 41,657,488 (July 2018 est.)
Ethnic Divisions : Arab-Berber 99 per cent, European less than 1 per cent
Religions : Muslim (official; predominantly Sunni) 99 per cnet, other (includes Christian and Jewish) <1 per cent (2012 est.)
Languages : Arabic (official), French (lingua franca), Berber or Tamazight (official); dialects include Kabyle Berber (Taqbaylit), Shawiya Berber (Tacawit), Mzab Berber, Tuareg Berber (Tamahaq)
Literacy : 80.2 per cent
Government : Presidential Republic
Suffrage : 18 years of age; universal
Administrative Divisions : 48 provinces
The period has been marked by some of the most dramatic political developments in recent Algerian history. These were sparked by the decision of the ruling FLN party that the ailing President Abdelaziz Bouteflika would stand yet again for a fifth mandate, to the dismay and indignation of the population and in breach of the constitution that had reintroduced a limit to presidential mandates in 2016. This decision sparked large-scale demonstrations in cities across the country.
With predominantly peaceful responses from all sides, the people, the army and police, Algeria managed to avoid violence. On April 2,
2019, the military dismissed Bouteflika, and the Head of the Senate Abdelkader Bensalah was appointed interim President. The presidential election on December 12, 2019 elected President Abdelmadjid Tebboune, a former Prime Minister under Bouteflika. A new government was formed, corruption cases were pursued and a number of political decisions and policies such as financial reforms to introduce Islamic banking, and new legislation to support startups, were launched after years of stagnation.
At the political level, the main challenge consists of overcoming the deep legitimacy crisis and the lack of trust toward the regime by ending repression and engaging in a serious dialogue with civil society and oppositional alliances like the FPAD. Urgent steps need to be taken to ensure the freedom of speech, freedom of the press and the freedom of assembly in order to ensure a minimum of trust in the government and in the potential for genuine political reforms.
The need to diversify the economy away from oil and gas dependency remains a key challenge in order to make Algeria less vulnerable to external shocks. The transition to renewable energies, where Algeria could develop a leading position, has the potential to create more jobs and ensure a more sustainable energy policy. Clear judicial independence and greater transparency are needed over ongoing court cases in order to ensure their credibility, rather than allowing them to appear as a manifestation of regime infighting.
Actions to support SMEs and independent associations, as well as the initiatives to support startups launched in 2020, are important. Equally, training, international exchanges and initiatives to create a more constructive relationship between the administration and citizens will likely bring benefits in terms of employment, creativity and economic development. Continued efforts are needed to modernise the civil service. The health system still requires serious investment, along with better conditions for health care professionals and the procurement of medical and other supplies. In the education system, improving all language training for Algerians would strengthen the position of young people in the job market. Further improving the opportunities for the Algerian community abroad to invest back home would encourage the exchange of knowledge.
With its well-equipped army and in-depth knowledge of the region, Algeria has the potential to play a key role in maintaining stability across the region. The country will need to work together with its neighbours to ensure fair and humanitarian control of its borders, as well as representing a strong response to trafficking, crime and terrorism.
defence
Active : 130,000 (Army 110,000 Navy 6,000 Air 14,000)
Paramilitary 187,200
Conscript liability 12 months
Reserve : 150,000 (Army 150,000) to age 50
Military Equipment by service
Army: 35,000; 75,000 conscript (total 110,000)
Forces by Role : 6 Mil Regions
Manoeuvre
Armoured : 2 (1st & 8th) armd div (3 tk regt; 1 mech regt, 1 arty gp); 2 indep armd bde
Mechanised : 2 (12th & 40th) mech div (1 tk regt; 3 mech regt, 1 arty gp); 4 indep mech bde
Light : 1 indep mot bde
Air Manoeuvre : 1 AB div (4 para regt; 1 SF regt)
Combat Support : 2 arty bn; 1 AT regt; 4 engr bn
Air Defence : 7 AD bn
this chapter contains specifications of some important military hardware being employed in the Asian region. Equipment having greater commonality within the region and those of comparatively recent origin have been chosen and presented for Army, Navy and Air Force separately. Salient details are as under:
n The chapter begins with a summary of equipment of each manufacturing country followed by more detailed characteristics of each type of equipment of that country.
n While the equipment mentioned is in use in the Asian region, each type of hardware is listed under its country of origin (manufacturer) like Russia, UK and the US.
n The development of weapon systems being a long-term process, a composite unit like a tank, ship or an aircraft passes through various phases/stages of development and appears in different
Army equipment is listed below by Country:
China
Main battle tanks (MBTs) : Type-98/Type-99, Type-99G, Type-90-II, North Industries Corporation (Norinco) Type-85-III
Light tanks (Lt Tks) : Type-62, Type-63, Type-63A
Armoured Personnel
Carriers/Infantry
Combat Vehicles (APCs), (ICVs) : Type-90, ZBD-04 IFV/ZBD (Type-97), Norinco VP1, Type-89 (YW 534), Type-85 (531H), Type WZ 501, Type-77, Norinco
YW 531 APC
Self-Propelled Guns and Howitzers : Type-83 152mm, PLZ45 155mm How, Enhanced PLZ45 systems Norinco, Type85 122mm How, 155mm (SP) System -SH1
Towed Anti-tank (A Tk) Guns, Guns
and Howitzer : Type-59-1 130mm Fd Gun, Type-66 152mm Gun How
variants with new fitments based on new technologies to cater for new operational parameters. Thus the equipment may seem old but in fact may have undergone numerous upgrades to modernise it for current and future conflicts.
n Some such variants of equipment have been included based upon information in the public domain and collated from various sources including other publications. For greater details, refer to other relevant media.
n Specifications have been listed in general terms and common features spelt out. Details of sensors, weapon control systems and other such subsystems have been omitted as they may vary from craft to craft even within the same class or category.
n The equipment held (types and numbers) in various countries of Asia along with other details is given in our chapter on Regional Balance.
Multiple Rocket Launchers (MRLs) : Type-90 122mm (40 round) MR System, WS-1B Multiple-Launch Rocket System SP Anti-Aircraft
Guns and SAMs : Type-80 Twin 57mm SP AA Gun System, PL-9C, Almaz S-300 — ‘Offensive’ Air Defence, China’s SD-10A Air Defence System Low Altitude (Alt) SAM System
Towed AA Guns : Chinese Type-56 14.5mm Gun, Norinco 37mm Type-74
Artillery-Delivered High Precision Munitions. The PLA is fielding long-range rocket artillery systems with the range to strike targets within or even across the Taiwan Strait. The most common of these is the PHL-03 12x300 mm multiple-rocket launcher – similar to the Russian 9A52-2 SMERCH, with a 150 km range. Improved warheads for these rockets may include vertical penetrators and sensor-fuzed munitions.
Czech/Slovak Republics
APCs/ICVs : BRDM-2, OT-64 C (SKOT-2A), BMP-1 &
OT90 APC
France
MBTs : Leclerc, AMX-30
Lt Tks : AMX-13
APCs/ICVs : Giat AMX-10P, Nexter Systems AMX-10P Marines, AMX VCI (ICV), Improved VAB 4 x 4 version (Wheeled), Panhard PVP, Panhard M3
SP Guns and Hows : GIAT Mk. F3 155mm SP Gun, GIAT 155mm, GCT SP Gun
SP AA Guns and
SAMs : Panhard M3 VDA Twin 20mm SP AA Gun System, Crotale Low Alt SAM System, Shahine Low Alt SAM System, AMX-30 twin 30mm SP AA Gun System
Germany
MBTs : Krauss-Maffei Wegmann Leopard 2A7, Leopard 2A6, Krauss-Maffei Wegmann Leopard 2 MBT
APCs/ICVs : Neuer Schutzenpanzer PUMA AIFV, Condor, Fuchs, Rheinmetall Landsystem Marder 1A3 ICV
India
MBTs : T-90, Arjun
Towed A Tk Guns, Guns and Hows : IFG Mk.2 105mm
MRLs : Pinaka MR System
Israel
MBTs : Merkava Mk3, Merkava 4, Sabra MBT
Reconnaissance
Vehicles : RAM family of light AFVs
SP Guns and Hows : Soltam L-33 155mm
Towed A Tk Guns, Guns and Hows : Soltam M-71 155mm Gun/How
Italy
SP Guns and Howitzer : Oto Palmaria 155mm, Oto Melara 155mm M109L [SP] Howitzer
Towed A Tk Guns, Guns and Howitzer : Oto Melara Model 56 105mm Pack How
Japan
MBTs : Type-74, Type-90, Mitsubishi TK–X MBT
Recce Vehs : Type-87
APCs/ICVs : Type-73, Type-89, Mitsubishi
Type SU 60 SP Guns
and Hows : Type-75 155mm, Type-99 155mm
MRLs : Type-75 130mm (30 round) MR System
Pakistan
MBTs : Type MBT 2000 (Al Khalid), Type Al Zarrar
APC : Type Saad, Type Talha, Type M113A2
Russia
MBTs : Black Eagle Development Tank, T-95,
T-54, T-55, T-55 (Upgraded), T-62, T-64B, T-72, T-80U, T-90S
Lt Tks : PT-76B
Recce Vehs : BRDM-2, PRP-4
APCs/ICVs : BMP-1, BMP-2, BMP-3, BMD-1 ACV, BTR50, BTR-80A, MT-LB, BTR-152VI
SP Guns and Hows : M 1973 (2S3) 152mm, M 1974 (2S1) 122mm (MSTA-S) 152mm Self-Propelled Artillery System 2S19
Towed A Tk Guns, Guns and Hows : D-30 122mm Fd Gun, M-46 130mm Fd Gun, 155mm Gun How D-20
MRLs : Splav 300mm BM 9A52 (12 round) Smerch MR System, BM-21 122mm (40 round) MR System
SP AA Guns and SAMs : ZSU-23-4 Quad 23mm SP AA Gun System, ZSU-57-2 Twin 57mm SP AA Gun System, 2S6M Tunguska System, SA-6 Gainful Low-to-Med alt SAM System, SA-8 Gecko Low Alt SAM System, SA-8B SAM System, SA-9 Gaskin SAM, SA-13 Gopher SAM System
Towed AA Guns : ZU-23-2 Twin 23mm Automatic (Auto) AA Gun, S-60 57mm Auto AA Gun, 100mm anti-aircraft gun KS-19Singapore
SP Guns and Hows : SSPH-1 Primus
South Africa
APCs/ICVs : Caspir Mk. III, Ratel 90
South Korea
MBTs : K1, Hyundai Rotem K2 MBT
Towed A Tk Guns, Guns and Howitzer : 155mm KH179 How
Spain
APCs/ICVs : BMR-600
Sweden
Towed A Tk Guns, Guns and Howitzer : Bofors FH-77 B 155mm
Towed AA Guns : Bofors L-40/-70, 40mm Auto AA Gun
Switzerland
APCs/ICVs : Mowag Piranha
Towed AA Guns : Oerlikon-Contraves GDF-002 and 005 Twin 35mm Auto AA Guns, Oerlikon Contraves 20mm GAI-B01 Auto AA Guns
United Kingdom
MBTs : Chieftain Mk 5, Centurion Mk 13, Challenger 2, Khalid, Vickers MBT Mk 3
Lt Tks : Alvis Scorpion
Recce Vehs : Alvis Saladin, Daimler Ferret Mk 2/3
APCs/ICVs : Stormer, GKN Def Desert Warrior, FV432
SP Guns and Hows : AS90 (Braveheart) 155mm SP Gun
Towed A Tk Guns, Guns and Hows : 105mm Lt Gun (L 118), 155mm
Lightweight How (M 777)
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Navy equipment is listed below by Country:
CHINA
Strategic Missile
Nuclear Submarines : Sui Class
Jin Class
Xia Class
Han Class
Shang Class
Aircraft Carriers : Type 001
Conventional
Submarines : Song Class
Yuan Class
Kilo Class
Ming Class
Qing Class (Experimental Submarine)
Destroyers : Luzhou Class
Sovremenny Class
Luyang I/ II/III Class
Luda Class
Luhai Class
Luhu Class
Frigates : Jiangkai I/II Class
Jiangwei II Class
Jianghu 1/II/V Class
Corvettes : Jiangdao Class
INDIA
Submarines : Shishumar Class
Scorpene Class
Kilo Class
Arihant Class (SSBN)
Chakra Class (SSN)
Aircraft Carriers : Kiev Class (Ex Admiral Gorshkov)
Indigenous Aircraft Carrier I (Vikrant under construction)
Destroyers : Kashin Class
Delhi Class
Kolkata Class
Visakhapatnam Class
Frigates : Godavari Class
Brahmaputra Class
Talwar Class
Shivalik Class
Hardware Section.
Soho Class
RUSSIA
equipment & hardware specifications: navy
Patrol Submarines : Kilo Class
Lada Class
Destroyers : Kashin Class
Udayloy I & II Class
Soveremennyy Class
Frigates : Krivak Class
Admiral Gorshkov Class
Admiral Grigorovich Class
Corvettes : Gepard Class
Buyan Class
Steregushchy Class
Nanuchka Class
Tarantul Class
SOUTH KOREA
Submarines : Chang Bogo Class
Son Wonil Class
Dolgorae Class
Amphibious Assault : Dokdo Class LPH
Go Jun Bong Class LST
Destroyers : KDX1, 2 & 3 Class
Frigates : Incheon Class
Ulsan Class
Corvettes : P O Hang Class
For details please refer to SP’s MYB 2009-10, Equipment and Hardware Section.
THAILAND
Aircraft Carriers : Chakri Naruebet Class
Amphibious Forces : Endurance Class
Nomed PS 700 Class
Frigates : Naresuan Class
Gwanggaeto Class
Oliver Hazard Perry Class
Knox Class
Jianghu II Class
Corvettes : Tapi Class
Khamronsin Class
Ratnakosin Class
ISRAEL
Submarines : Dolphin Class
Corvettes : Eilat (SAAR 5) Class
Patrol Forces : Hetz (SAAR 4.5) Class
Reshef Class
Super Dvora Class
UNITED KINGDOM
For details please refer to SP’s MYB 2009-10, Equipment and Hardware Section.
Destroyers : Type 45 or Daring Class
Frigates : Type 43 or Duke Class
Off-shore Patrol Craft : River Class
Corvettes : Qahir Class
NORTH KOREA
Submarines : Romeo Class
Sang-O Class
Yono Class
Frigates : Najin Class
For details please refer to SP’s MYB 2009-10, Equipment and
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
For details please refer to SP’s MYB 2009-10, Equipment and Hardware Section.
Guided Missile
Destroyers : Gearing Class
Frigates : Adelaide Class
Amphibious Forces : Austin Class
equipment & hardware specifications: navy
For details please refer to SP’s MYB 2009-10, Equipment and Hardware Section.
Submarines : Agosta Class (France, Spain)
Daphne Class (France)
HDW Class (Germany)
Frigates : Al Riyadh Class (France)
Madina Class (France)
La Fayette Class (France)
Descubierta Class (Spain)
Fast Attack Missile
Craft : Combattante Class (France)
Ratcharit Class (Italy)
Aircraft Carriers : Principe De Asturias Class (Spain)
china STRATEGIC MISSILE SUbMARINES
4 Jin Class (Type 094) (SSbN)
Displacement, tonnes : 8,000 surfaced, 11,000 dived
Dimensions, feet
(metres) : 449.5 × 38.7 × 7.5 (137.0 × 11.8 × 2.3)
Main machinery : Nuclear: 2 PWR; 150 MW; 2 turbines; 1 shaft
Speed, knots : 20
Complement : 140
Missiles : SLBM; 12 JL-2 (CSS-NX-5); 2-stage solidfuel rocket; Inertial guidance with stellar update to over 8,600 km, 12,000 km or 14,000 km depending on the variant; single nuclear warhead of 1 MT or 3-8 MIRV of smaller yield. CEP 300 m approximate.
Torpedoes : 6-21 in (533mm tubes)
Countermeasures : Decoys: ESM.
Radars : Surface search/navigation: Type-359; I-Band
Sonars : Hull mounted passive/active; flank and towed arrays.
Structure : Likely to be based on the Type-093 SSN design which in turn is believed to be derived from the Russian Victor III design.
1
Displacement, tonnes : 6,500 surfaced, 7,000 dived
Dimensions,
feet (metres) : 393.6 × 33 × 26.2 (120 × 10 × 8)
Main machinery : Nuclear; turbo-electric; 1 PWR; 58 MW; 1 shaft
Speed, knots : 22 dived
Complement : 100
Missiles : SLBM: 12 JL-1 (CSS-N-3); inertial guidance to 2,150 km (1,160 nm); warhead single nuclear 250 kT.
Torpedoes : 6-21 in (533mm) bow tubes. Yu-3 (SET65E); active/passive homing to 15 km (8.1 nm) at 40 kt; warhead 205 kg.
Countermeasures : ESM: Type 921-A; radar warning.
Radars : Surface search: Snoop Tray; I-Band.
Sonars : SQZ-3; hull-mounted; active/passive
search and attack; medium frequency.
Structure : Diving depth 300 m (985 ft). The Xia is a derivative of the Han Class SSNs, with an extended hull to accommodate 12 ballistic missile tubes.
3 Nuclear Propelled Attack Submarines Han Class (Type 091) (SSN)
Displacement, tonnes : 5,000 dived
Dimensions,
feet (metres) : 385 x 33 x 24 (98 x 10 x 7.4)
Main machinery : 1 nuclear pressurised water reactor, 1 shaft
Speed, knots : 25 dived, 12 surfaced
Complement : 75
Weapons : 6 x 533mm torpedo tubes for CET 65E and Type 53-51 torpedoes, up to 20 torpedoes or 36 mines Tube launched C-801 antiship missiles.
Programme &Structure : The first nuclear powered submarines deployed by the PLA (Navy). Five boats of the class were built and commissioned between 1974 and 1990. The first two are reported to have been decommissioned. They are known for a noisy reactor and poor radiation shielding and are inhibited in their ability to launch missiles while submerged. The submarines are equipped with SQZ-262 sonar made in China. All boats deployed with the North Sea Fleet and based at Qingdao.
6 Shang Class (Type 093) (SSN)
Displacement, tonnes : 6,500 dived
Dimensions, feet (metres) : 372 x 37.2 x 33.6 (110 x 11 x 10)
Main machinery : 1 nuclear pressurised water reactor, 1 shaft
Speed, knots : 30 dived
Complement : 100
Weapons : 6 x 533mm or 650mm torpedo tubes for a range of wire, acoustic and wake homing torpedoes and the submarine launched version of YJ-83 cruise missile.
Programme & Structure : The Type 093G is reported to be an upgraded version of Type 093, China’s second-generation nuclear-powered attack submarine, which entered active service several years ago. With a teardrop hull, the submarine is longer than its predecessor and has a vertical launching system.
13 Song Class (Type 039/039G) (SSK)
Displacement, tonnes : 1,700 surfaced; 2,250 dived
Dimensions, feet (metres) : 246 × 24.6 × 17.5 (74.9 × 8.4 × 5.3)
Main machinery : Diesel-electric; 4 MTU 16V 396 SE; 6,092 hp (m) (4.48 MW) diesels; 4 alternators;
Air equipment is listed below by platforms:
combat aircraft
China
: Xian H-6A/H/M Strategic Bomber (Licensed Variant of the Tupolev Tu-16)
: Shenyang J8B, J8F & J8H Third-Gen
Interceptor
: Xian JH-7 & 7A – Fighter Bomber
: Chengdu J-7 Fighter (Licensed Variant of MiG-21 – Under replacement)
: Chengdu J-10A, J-10B & J-10S – FourthGen Multi-role Fighter
: JF-17 Thunder Multi-role Combat Aircraft
: Chengdu J-20 – Fifth-Gen, Multirole, Stealth Fighter
: Shenyang J-11A, 11B & 11BH Air Superiority Fighter, (Licensed Variant of the Su-27)
: Shenyang J-16 Multi-role Fighter
: Shenyang J-31 or FC 31 Fifth-Generation Stealth Aircraft under development.
Russia
equipment & hardware specifications: air force
(MRTT)
: Dassault-Brequest Br 1150 Atlantic
Maritime Patrol/Anti-Submarine Warfare
Aircraft
: Ilyushin IL-76 Candid
: Ilyushin IL-78 Midas
: An-124 Condor Heavy Lift
: An-22 Heavy Lift
: An-26 Medium Lift – to be replaced by An-140S
: An-32 Medium Lift
: An-140S Medium Lift
Spain
: Airbus Military CASA C-212
: Airbus Military CASA CN-235M
: Airbus Military CASA C-295
: Airbus A-400M Atlas
Europe
: Eurofighter Typhoon Tranche 1, 2 & 3A
France : Dassault Mirage 2000C/D/N/5F
Dassault Rafale B/C
India : Light Combat Aircraft Tejas Mk I & IA
Israel : IAI Kfir – Multi-role Combat Aircraft
Russia : Mikoyan MiG-25R – In limited service
: Mikoyan MiG-29
: Mikoyan MiG-31/MiG-31BM
: Mikoyan MiG-35
: Mikoyan MiG-41 –Under developmnt
: Sukhoi Su-24 M/M2/MR
: Sukhoi Su-25SM
: Sukhoi Su-27
: Sukhoi Su-30M/M2
: Sukhoi Su-33
: Sukhoi Su-34P
: Sukhoi Su-35S
: Sukhoi Su-57 (Originally T-50 PAK FA)
Sweden : Saab JAS-39 Gripen
United Kingdom : Panavia Tornado
BAE Systems Hawk 200 Series
United States of America : Boeing F-15C/D Eagle
: Boeing F-15E Strike Eagle
: Boeing F/A-18A/B/C/D Hornet
: Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet
: Lockheed Martin F-16C/D Fighting Falcon
: Northrop F-5E and F-5F Tiger II
: F-22A Raptor
: F-35A/F-35B Lightening II Joint Strike
Fighter
Germany : Transall C-160
: Dornier Do 228
France : Transall C-160 –Produced jointly with Germany
: Airbus A-330 Multi-Role Tanker Transport
Ukraine
: Antonov An-26
: Antonov An-30
Antonov An-70
: Ant : : Antonov An-132
: Antonov An-148 Maritime Patrol
: Antonov An-178
: Antonov An-225
United States of
America : C-5M Super Galaxy
: C-17A Globemaster III
: Lockheed Martin C-130J-30 Super Hercules
Brazil
: Embraer EMB 110 Bandeirante
: Embraer Legacy 600 VIP Transport –Derived from ERJ 145
: Embraer 190 VIP Transport
: Embraer 120 Brasila
: Embraer 145 Utility
: Embraer 121 Xingu
: Embraer R 99 AEW&C/Elint
: Embraer KC-390 Medium Lift Transport
: Embraer Lineage 1000 Derived from Embraer 190
helicopters
France : Airbus H-215/
: Eurocopter AS 532 Cougar
: Airbus Helicopters H125, /
: Eurocopter AS 550/AS 555 Fennec
: Eurocopter SA 360/AS 365 Dauphin,
: Eurocopter SA 365/366 Dauphin II,
: Eurocopter AS 565 Panther
: Eurocopter SA 341/342 Gazelle
Germany
India
: Eurocopter (MBB) Bo-105
: Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) Dhruv
: ALH–WSI (Armed Version)
: Light Combat Helicopter (LCH)
: Light Utility Helicopter – Under Development by HAL
Italy
: AW101 VIP Communication
: AW139 VIP Communication/SAR
: AW 149 Medium Lift Military Helicopter
: Agusta A129 Mangusta Attack Helicopter
equipment & hardware specifications: air force
Russia : Kamov Ka-27
: Kamov Ka-31
: Kamov Ka-52 Attack Helicopter
: Kamov Ka-60/62
: Kamov Ka-226T Light Utility Helicopter
: Kazan Ansat
: : Mil Mi-8
: Mil Mi-17 V5
: Mil Mi-24 Attack Helicopter
: Mil Mi-25/-35 Attack Helicopter
: Mil Mi-26
: Mil Mi-28
: Mil Mi-34
: Mil Mi-38
: Mil Mi-54 : VRT 500
United States of America : Bell 407
: Bell AH-1 Cobra/Super Cobra
: Boeing AH-64E Apache
: Boeing CH-47F Chinook
: Sikorsky UH-60/HH-60/S-70/S-61R
: Sikorsky MH 53 Pave Low
: Bell Boeing V 22 Osprey
training
Brazil : Embraer EMB-312 Tucano
India
: HAL HJT-16 Kiran Mk I/IA and Mk II
: HTT 40 – Under development
: IJT – Under development
United Kingdom : BAE Systems Hawk Advanced Jet Trainer
China/Pakistan : K-8 Karakoram Basic Jet Trainer
: L-15 Advanced Jet Trainer
airborne early warning & control
Brazil : Embraer-145/R99 AEW
Sweden : Saab 2000 AEW&C
United States of America : Boeing E-3 Sentry, Northrop Grumman
E-2C Hawkeye
: Boeing E-767 AWACS
Russia/Israel : IL-76 with Phalcon System
India : Embraer ERJ 145 based
Netra AEW&C
combat aircraft
ChinA
hong–6
Western designation : B-6
User : China
Note: For details please refer to SP’s MYB 2009-10 Edition, Equipment and Hardware Section, page 499.
Jian–7
Western designation : F-7
Type : Single-seat fighter and close support aircraft
Design based on : MiG-21 F (of Soviet origin)
Other versions
(i) J-7 I
(ii) F-7A (export version of J-7I; exported to Albania, Egypt, Iraq and Tanzania)
(iii) J-7 II (modified and improved version of J-7I; also known as J-7B)
(iv) F-7 B (upgraded export version based on J-7II with ability to carry air-to-air missiles, exported to Bangladesh, Iran, Jordan, Pakistan, Zimbabwe); F-7BS (Sri Lanka)
(v) J-7 IIA (improved version of J-7 II)
(vi) J-7 H (improved version of J-7 II with improved ground attack capability)
(vii) F-7 M Airguard (export version of J-7 IIA)
(viii) J-7 II M (Chinese version of F-7M)
(ix) F-7 P Airbolt: (variant of F-7M to meet specific requirements of Pakistan Air Force including ability to carry 4 X air-to-air missiles; F-7 MP Airbolt (modified version of F-7 P)
(x) J-7C (J-7 III) (design based on MiG-21 MF)
(xi) J-7 D (J-7IIIA; Improved J-7C version)
(xii) J-7E (third-generationJ-7 version based on J-7II airframe)
(xiii) F-7 MG (export variant of J-7E)
(xiv) F-7 PG (variant of F-7 MG modified for Pakistan Air Force)
(xv) J 7/FT 7 Tandem two-seat operational trainer based on J-7 II
Users : China (J-7 II/ IIA/ H/ IIM/ III/ IIIA/ E), Bangladesh (F-7M), Egypt (F-7A/B), Iran (F-7M), Myanmar (F-7M), North Korea (F-7), Pakistan (F-7P/PG) and Sri Lanka (F-7BS).
Jian–8
NATO reporting name : Finback
Western designation : F-8
User : China
Note: For details please refer to SP’s MYB 2009-10 Edition, Equipment and Hardware Section, page 499.
Jianjiao–7
Western designation : FT-7
Users: Bangladesh (FT-7B), China (JJ-7), Iran (FT-7), Myanmar (FT7), Pakistan (FT- 7P/ PG) and Sri Lanka (FT-7).
Note: For details please refer to SP’s MYB 2009-10 Edition, Equipment and Hardware Section, page 499.
Qiang–5
NATO reporting name : Fantan
Western designation : A-5
Users: Bangladesh (A-5C), China (Q-5), Myanmar (A-5-C/-M) and Pakistan (A-5III).
Note: For details please refer to SP’s MYB 2009-10 Edition, Equipment and Hardware Section, page 499.
FC–1
Export version : Super-7
Users : China, Pakistan
Note: For details please refer to SP’s MYB 2009-10 Edition, Equipment and Hardware Section, page 500.
Jianji–10
Western designation : F-10
Type : Multi-role fighter
Design : Tail-less delta wing and close-coupled fore-planes; single sweptback vertical tail
FOR THE WORLD’S TOP DEMOCRACIES.