SP's Land Forces Fab-Mar 2010 by SP Guide Publications Pvt Ltd

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February-March • 2010

SP’s

Vo l 7 N o 1

AN SP GUIDE

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LandForces ROUNDUP

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T h e O N LY j o u r n a l i n A s i a d e d i c a t e d t o L a n d F o r c e s

In This Issue

The US Congress received a notification by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) of a possible FMS to India for 145 M777 Howitzers with Laser Inertial Artillery Pointing Systems (LINAPS) worth approximately $647.

The Indian Army, with its multifarious operational challenges in varied terrain configuration comprising high mountains, plains and desert terrain, requires UAVs for tactical and strategic roles.

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SP’s RESEARCH TEAM

E d i torial

BMP2-Infantry combat vehicle

LIEUTENANT GENERAL (RETD) P.C. KATOCH

Mired in RED TAPE

The current situation is disturbing and, if allowed to go on indefinitely, will seriously compromise the Indian Army’s preparedness to fight the next border war BRIGADIER (RETD) GURMEET KANWAL

“New procurements have commenced... but we are still lagging by 15 years.” —A.K. Antony, Defence Minister

Modernising for an Era of Strategic Uncertainty Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

RUCHIKA CHAWLA

Mod e r n i s a t i o n

Photographs: SP Guide Pubns & www.rheinmetall-defence.com

The threat from China is getting more and more potent by the day. The news that Beijing is keen on establishing military bases in Pakistan is ominous. Combined with China’s past conduct vis-à-vis India, it is indeed an alarming development. No doubt, India would have to face two fronts simultaneously in any future conflict. India’s military preparedness is proceeding at a sluggish pace. The lack of preparedness is apparent from the operational voids existing within the army, especially in the Eastern Command responsible for military operations in the Northeast against China. The list of critical deficiencies includes fire power and precision guided munitions; army air defence; army aviation and air assets for observation; reconnaissance, armed attack and troop lifting; electronic warfare units; missile units for destruction of battlefield targets in TAR; light tanks for deployment (offensive and defensive) in critical areas, surveillance and target acquisition devices; night fighting capability in all arms, and other force multipliers. Threat from China can materialise in three different ways: high level, medium level and the low (smaller) level. In the interim, it is the low level threat that should be India’s focus because it could achieve complete surprise and embarrass Delhi enormously. By deploying just four to five divisions of their rapid reaction forces, China could develop these offensives in Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim and Ladakh at very short notice. Hence, India’s war games and current planning must focus on key areas of required operational capabilities. US Annual Report 2009 warns about the pace and scope of Beijing’s military transformation. While the infrastructure developments in Tibet are very impressive, the rapid pace of modernisation of their conventional forces in the form of Rapid Deployment Forces and their vastly improved asymmetric capabilities in the arena of space, counter space and cyber warfare are equally striking. It is time the defence procurement procedure is restructured so as to make it less difficult for the decision makers at the Service Headquarter as also at the bureaucratic and financial levels to facilitate speedy and timely acquisition of high value weapon systems. This edition carries a wider variety of articles for the target audience during Defexpo 2010.

There is an urgent need to accelerate the development and fielding of the Battlefield Management System as part of essential capability building of the Indian Army.

In the prevailing era of strategic uncer-

tainty, while terrorism is gradually becoming the primary threat, the external and internal threats and challenges faced by India are such that a large army is still required to be maintained. Also, a high degree of preparation and operational readiness are still necessary as conven-

tional war, though improbable, cannot be categorically ruled out due to unresolved territorial and boundary disputes with China and Pakistan. At the same time, heavy capital investments in modern defence equipment are undoubtedly a drain on a developing economy that is 1/2010 SP’S LAND FORCES

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Indian Infantry soldiers during the Army Day parade

ill equipped to handle the burgeoning defence expenditure. Several eminent analysts have recommended that qualitative upgradation should be accompanied by quantitative downsizing of personnel strength of the army to generate funds for modernisation. However, given its responsibilities for border management and the manpower-intensive sub-conventional operations that the army is involved in—this is easier said than done. Future conventional conflict on the Indian sub-continent will in all probability result from the ongoing low-intensity limited war on the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan or the unresolved territorial and boundary dispute with China and will be predominantly a land conflict. The Indian Army lacks a potent firepower punch, especially in the mountain sector. Precision-guided munitions (PGMs) have still to enter service in numbers large enough to make a real difference. The reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition (RSTA) assets necessary for the optimum exploitation of even the existing firepower assets are grossly inadequate. Automated command and control and decision support systems have been on the drawing boards for several decades but are yet to mature. According to former Vice Chief of Army Staff Lieutenant General (Retd) Noble Thamburaj, the modernisation focus of the 11th Defence Plan is on “precision fire power, air defence, aviation, Future Infantry Soldier as a System, infrastructure development, network centricity and achieving battlefield transparency through improved surveillance, night vision and target acquisition... Considering the receding span of technological cycle, (the) right balance has to be maintained between state-of-art, current and obsolescent technologies”.

Main Battle Tanks: T-90S replaces Arjun

On Army Day 2010, Chief of the Army Staff General Deepak Kapoor admitted that a large number of India’s battle tanks are “night blind”. The indigenously designed Arjun main battle tank (MBT) has been in the pipeline for over two decades. Though the tank has many

Nishant UAV

good features, it has consistently failed to meet the army’s General Staff Qualitative Requirements for an MBT and orders have been placed for only 124 tanks to be manufactured. The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) had been repeatedly pressing for comparative trials of the Arjun with the T-72M1 and the T-90S. Success in these trials has led to orders being placed for another 124 Arjun MBTs. Since the lack of progress on the Arjun MBT had significantly slowed down the pace of armour modernisation, in 2000, India signed a deal with Russia to acquire 310 T-90S tanks and assemble 1,000 in India. In 2008, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) decided to acquire another 347 T-90S tanks. The first India assembled T-90S (Bhishma) rolled off the production line on January 8, 2004. Ultimately, according to Brigadier (Retd) Arun Sahgal, “The army’s future armour profile could comprise approximately 1,700 T90S, 1,800 upgraded T-72M1 and 250 to 500 Arjuns.” Almost 1,800 T-72M1 (Ajeya) tanks are still awaiting modernisation. The lack of a suitable fire control system and night fighting capability are major handicaps. The upgradation of 500 to 600 of these has now commenced “at the rate of 200 tanks per year”. The upgrade package includes a new fire control system comprising a TISAS (thermal imaging stand alone systems) night sight and TIFCS (tank integrated fire control system), new TADIRAN radios, a gyro-based navigation system and a Laser warning system. The ability to fire on the move is being improved with a better stabilisation system. An add-on ERA (explosive reactive armour) package will enhance protection against APFSDS and HEAT rounds. Eventually, the T-90S 1,000 hp power pack, de-rated to 850 hp, will be retro-fitted. The problem of defective indigenous ammunition is still to be resolved. The DRDO has commenced conceptual stage development of Future Main battle Tank and Future infantry Combat vehicle for the 2020-25 time frame. T-90S Russian tanks have provided new teeth to India’s strike formations in the plains and corrected the imbalance that had

The Indian Army lacks a potent firepower punch, especially in the mountain sector. Precision-guided munitions have still to enter service in numbers large enough to make a real difference resulted from Pakistan’s acquisition of T-80 UD from Ukraine and the Al Khalid tanks jointly designed with China. Hence, armour modernisation is proceeding apace but cannot yet be classified as a success story.

Generating firepower asymmetries

In a future conventional war that will be fought under the nuclear shadow, manoeuvre will be extremely limited. This restriction will lead to much greater emphasis being placed on firepower to achieve the laid down military aim. Hence, it is imperative that artillery modernisation is undertaken with alacrity so as to generate firepower asymmetries on the future battlefield. After a long spell of keeping the powder dry, action on modernisation of the Indian artillery is livening up once again. Beginning in January 2008, the MoD issued three global tenders for 155mm guns and howitzers for the mountains, the plains and self-propelled guns for the deserts. Summer and winter trials were expected to be held over the next one year and it was anticipated that contracts would be awarded as early as in the first half of 2010. However, none of the manufacturers have as yet been invited for trials. It is a well-established fact that potent artillery firepower had turned the tide and eventually paved the way for victory during the Kargil conflict. Despite the lessons learnt in Kargil, modernisation of the artillery has continued to lag behind. The last major acquisition of towed gunhowitzers was that of about 400 pieces

of 39-calibre 155mm FH-77B howitzers with a range of 30 km from Bofors of Sweden in the mid-1980s. This gun had proved its mettle in the Kargil conflict. After two decades of neglect during which the 100mm and 122mm field guns of Russian origin and the indigenously developed and manufactured 75/24 Indian Mountain Gun joined the long list of equipment bordering on obsolescence but still in service with the army, tenders were floated and trials were held for a 52-calibre 155mm gun to replace all field and medium guns. Just when a contract for 120 tracked and 180 wheeled self-propelled (SP) 155mm guns was about to be concluded after years of protracted trials, South African arms manufacturer Denel, a leading contender for the contract, was alleged to have been involved in a corruption scam in an earlier deal for antimaterial rifles (AMRs). The other two howitzers in contention, from Soltam of Israel and BAE (Bofors) of Sweden reportedly did not meet the laid down criteria and Army HQ recommended fresh trials, setting the programme back at least three to four years. Another bone of contention was that the howitzers that had been offered were technology demonstration models and not guns that were in actual service with the home country armies. The probability of the next conventional war breaking out in the mountains is far higher than that of a war in the plains. With this in view, the artillery recently conceptualised a requirement for a lightweight towed howitzer of 155mm calibre for employment in the mountains. Neither the present Bofors howitzer nor its 52-calibre replacement will be capable of effective operations in the mountains. A lightweight 39 or 45-calibre 155mm howitzer weighing less than 5,000 kg, with a light but adequately powered prime mover, is ideal for the mountains. The gun-train should be capable of negotiating sharp road bends without the need to unhook the gun from the prime mover. It is now learnt that India would be acquiring 145x155 mm M777 light weight Howitzer from the US (BAE System) in a direct government to government transaction through the Foreign Militory Sales (FMS) route. 145 pieces of ultra-light 39-calibre 155mm towed howitzers will be used by the Indian Army’s mountain formations. Presumably, these will also be employed by the army’s rapid reaction divisions—as and when these are raised—as these howitzers will be easy to transport by air. 145 howitzers will be adequate to equip seven medium Artillery regiments and will cost approximately Rs 3,000 crore. The MoD has also floated a global tender for the purchase of 400, 155mm, 52 calibre towed Artillery guns for the Army, to be followed by indigenous manufacture of another 1,100 howitzers, in a project worth a whopping Rs 8,000 crore. The RFP was issued to eight prospective bidders including BAE, General Dynamics, Nexter (France), Rhinemetall (Germany)

Skyshield

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Modernisation plans of tube artillery alone are likely to cost Rs 13,000 crore at FY 2008-09 prices. The major acquisitions will be of initial lots of 400 towed howitzers of 155mm calibre, with a barrel length of 52-calibres, costing about Rs 4,000 crore, 140 ultra-light weight 155mm towed howitzers, with a barrel length of 39-calibres, costing Rs 3,000 crore and 180 SP 155mm howitzers costing Rs 5,000 crore. The “Shakti” project for command and control systems for the Artillery, earlier called Artillery Combat Command and Control System (ACCCS), has reached the stage of maturity and is now being fielded extensively in the plains. Gradually it will be fielded up to

After a long spell of keeping line powder dry, action on modernisation of Indian artillery is livening up once again the corps level and the two Artillery divisions will be equipped with it. Efforts are also underway to add ballistic as well as cruise missiles to the artillery arsenal. The BrahMos supersonic cruise missile (Mach 2.8 to 3.0), with a precision strike capability, very high kill energy and range of 290 km, is being inducted into the army. A ceremonial induction function of the Block-I version was held in July 2007. Since then, the Block-II version has successfully completed trials. It is a versatile missile that can be launched from TATRA mobile launchers and silos on land, aircraft and ships and, perhaps in future, also from submarines. 50 BrahMos missiles are expected to be produced every year. Efforts are afoot to further increase its strike range. BrahMos Aerospace has orders worth Rs 3,500 crore from the army and the navy, which has opted for the anti-ship as well as the land attack cruise missile (LACM) versions. These terrain hugging missiles are virtually immune to counter measures due to their high speed and very low radar cross section and are far superior to sub-sonic cruise missiles like Pakistan’s Babur. Chile, Kuwait, Malaysia and South Africa have shown interest in acquiring this missile.

Infantry modernisation

The Indian Army is extensively engaged in ongoing internal security (IS) and counter-insurgency operations (CI) and simultaneously needs to prepare itself for a future border conflict that may spill over to a larger conventional war in the plains. In keeping with these twin requirements, Army HQ have apparently decided to upgrade the IS and CI capabilities of infantry battalions as well as enhance their firepower-mobilityelectronic warfare punch for a possible war in the plains against Pakistan or in the mountains against China. The Army Chief ’s modernisation vision is to “adapt to high-end technology, improve night-fighting

capability... (and) information technology, information warfare and network centric warfare”. Despite its large-scale employment on border management and extensive commitments in IS and CI operations, infantry modernisation had been languishing for several decades. MoD finally cleared a visionary plan to modernise the army’s infantry battalions by according “in principle” approval in the form of Modification 4B to the war establishment of a standard infantry battalion in 1998. However, no funds were specially sanctioned for this purpose till the BJP-led NDA government approved the expenditure of Rs 3,500 crore in September 2003. Thereafter, approval had to be sought on file for each new weapon system or piece of equipment on a “case-bycase” basis as has become the norm. It is by now well-known how each such case chronicles the saga of an uphill struggle to get approval first from the MoD, then MoD (Finance) and, finally, the Ministry of Finance. All this is only possible after the DRDO has first certified that the weapon system or equipment in question cannot be developed and manufactured indigenously and such a certificate is hard to come by. Gradually, these archaic procurement and acquisition procedures are being reviewed and improved.

F-INSAS project

The army’s Future Infantry Soldier as a System (F-INSAS) project focuses on enhancing the lethality and survivability of soldiers. It seeks to transform soldiers into fully networked, mobile warriors with a high degree of situational awareness and the ability to operate in all weather conditions in all types of terrain. The programme envisages equipping infantrymen with lightweight integrated helmets with a ‘head up’ display with a built in communication system and night vision goggles, hand-held computer display, Global Positioning System (GPS) and lethal fire power, including laser-guided weapon systems at appropriate levels. A global tender for 43,000 close-quarter battle carbines was issued in early-2008. The acquisition will be followed by the local manufacture of approximately 1,17,000 carbines. While 250 Kornet-E anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) with thermal imaging sights have substantially increased the anti-tank capability of infantry battalions, most efforts to modernise the equipment held by infantry and Rashtriya Rifles units are aimed at enhancing their capability for surveillance and target acquisition at night and boosting their firepower for precise retaliation against infiltrating columns and terrorists holed up in builtup areas. As many as 200 hand-held battle field surveillance radars (BFSRs), with practical ranges up to seven to eight km, where clear line of sight is available, 2,000 hand-held thermal imaging devices, with ranges up to 2,000 metres, for observation at night and stand-alone infra-red, seismic and acoustic sensors with varying capabilities have enabled infantrymen to dominate the LoC so completely that infiltration has come down to almost a trickle.

The newly acquired weapons, which complement these surveillance and observation devices, include 1,500x84 mm rocket launchers, including some disposable ones; 1,000 AMRs (anti-material rifles); 8,000 UBGLs (under-barrel grenade launchers); 4,000 new generation carbines; 300 bullet proof vehicles; and, several hundred accurate sniper rifles. However, the numbers acquired and the ammunition stocks are still inadequate and need to be made up more rapidly. The INSAS 5.56 mm assault rifles have now been in service for almost 10 years. The light machine gun version is still facing teething problems and the carbine version for close quarter battle has not found favour with the army. RFP for 3.5 lakh new assault rifles for the IA has been issued by the MoD. Efforts are also being made to provide infantry platoons and sections with integrated GPS-based navigation system, secure lightweight walkietalkie radio sets and better protective gear with a helmet that incorporates a built-in head-up display.

Mechanised infantry

The mechanised infantry is now equipped with about 2,000 BMP-1 and BMP-2 ICV Sarath of which over 1,000 have been built since 1987. A new variant is the 81 mm Carrier Mortar Tracked Vehicle that is based on the chassis of the Sarath ICV and has been indigenously developed to enhance the integral firepower available to mechanised infantry battalions. Other variants include a command post, an ambulance, armoured dozer and engineer and reconnaissance vehicles. Reconnaissance and Support Battalions (Mechanised) need better surveillance radars, fire-and-forget ATGMs and effective night fighting capability. However, their capabilities can be upgraded on a lower priority compared with infantry battalions that are engaged in border management and IS/CI operations. The MoD has issued a RFI for 200 light tanks and 100 wheeled armoured personnel carriers in November 2009. Plans to buy light strike vehicles for counter-insurgency operations may also be considered.

UAVs for infantry battalions

The army’s infantry battalions also need their own mini or micro unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) like Elbit’s Skylark or Rafael’s Skylite, among others, to partly reduce the extent of patrolling necessary in internal security environment and to improve their surveillance capability in conventional conflict. These UAVs should have a range of about 10 km to 15 km, should be lightweight (less than 10 kg), hand-launched, carry a single payload, e.g. a daylight video camera or infra-red camera for night operations, and should be inexpensive enough to be dispensable. A mini ground control station should be authorised at battalion HQ for planning and control. Ideally, these should be indigenously designed and developed and locally manufactured.

DRDO project for future soldiers

A new DRDO project, that is reported

Illustration: Ratan Sonal

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and Samsung (South Korea). An RFP has also been issued for 180 wheeled self-propelled 155mm guns for around Rs 4,700 crore for employment by mechanised forces in the plains and semi-desert sectors. Since the Bofors 155mm Howitzer was introduced into service, the indigenously designed and manufactured 105 mm Indian Field Gun and its (not so) light version, the Light Field Gun, have also joined the list of guns and howitzers heading for obsolescence. Approximately 180 pieces of 130mm M46 Russian medium guns have been successfully “up-gunned” to 155mm calibre with ordnance supplied by Soltam of Israel. The new barrel length of 45-calibres has enhanced the range of the gun to about 40 km with extended range ammunition. There has been notable progress on the rocket Artillery front. A contract for the acquisition of two regiments of the 12-tube, 300mm Smerch multi-barrel rocket launcher (MBRL) system with 90 km range was signed with Russia’s Rosoboronexport in early-2006 and the equipment has since been received. This weapon system is a major boost for the long-range firepower capabilities of the army. If this weapon system had been available during the Kargil conflict, Pakistan’s brigade HQ and forward airfield at Skardu and other targets deep inside POK could have been hit with impunity. Extended range (ER) rockets are being introduced for the 122 mm Grad MBRL that has been in service for over three decades. The ER rockets will enhance the weapon system’s range from 22 km to about 40 km. A contract worth Rs 5,000 crore has also been signed for the serial production of the Pinaka MBRL weapon system, another DRDO project plagued by time delays and completed with help from Larsen and Toubro and the Tatas. The Pinaka rockets will have an approximate range of 37 km. Counter-bombardment (US term counter-fire) capability is also being upgraded, but at a slow pace. At least about 40 to 50 weapon locating radars (WLRs) are required for effective counter-bombardment, especially in the plains, but only a dozen have been procured so far. In addition to the 12 AN-TPQ 37 Firefinder WLRs acquired from Raytheon, USA, under a 2002 contract worth $200 million (Rs 925 crore), Bharat Electronics Limited is reported to be assembling 28 WLRs. These radars will be based on both indigenous and imported components and are likely to be approved for introduction into service after extensive trials that are ongoing. The radar is expected to match the capabilities of the Firefinder system and will have a detection range of about 40 km. The indigenous sound ranging system for locating the positions of enemy guns based on the sound of their firing does not appear to be making worthwhile progress and may be shelved in favour of an imported system. In fact, it needs to be considered whether this relic of the two World Wars, that is rather cumbersome to deploy and maintain, deserves a silent burial as gun and mortar locating radars now provide accurate locations of enemy guns and mortars.

Army’s current profile: Light utility helicopter, T-72 tank and Brahmos missile

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MASTER IN STRATEGY

Design and production of electronic defence systems by ELETTRONICA S.p.A.

Patriot missile and its variants like PAC-2 GEM, GEM/C, GEM/T (or GEM+) (made by Raytheon) and most advance Patriot Advance Capability -3(PAC-3) made by Lockheed Martin. Israel has offered a joint venture with the DRDO calling it the MRSAM (earlier named Barak ‘Next Generation’) with a possible range of 70 km. This actually is meant for the Indian Air Force, but AAD and the Indian Navy should join the project to make it a more viable option. Evidently, the state of preparedness of AAD is very low and it would require strong a strong push at the decision-making level to steer the ship of modernisation to its logical end.

Communications, ISR & PGMs

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BMP1-Infantory Combat Vehicle

to be ongoing, aims to equip future soldiers with lightweight force multipliers. Soldiers of the future will have miniaturised communication and GPS systems, small power packs, weapon platforms and smart vests with fibre-optic sensors. The soldiers will also have better and lighter combat fatigues, boots, belts, ammunition pouches, rucksacks and rations in the form of meals-ready-to-eat. Though somewhat akin to the US Army’s Land Warrior programme, the Indian Army programme for modernisation of infantry battalions will result in only incremental changes. However, these would be significant enough to make a difference on the future battlefields of the Indian Sub-continent. The infantryman’s average combat load is approximately 27 kg, including the 3.06 kg 5.56 mm INSAS assault rifle and its “on weapon” ammunition. If this can be reduced by even a few kg, it will enable the soldier to improve his agility in battle and counter-insurgency operations. Ultimately an infantryman has to be prepared to engage in hand-to-hand combat and agility can make a difference between life and death. For over 350 infantry battalions, plus about 150 Rashtriya Rifles, Assam Rifles and Territorial Army battalions, these major changes will be extremely costly to implement and will spill over at least 10 to 12 years—that is, if the funds can be found. What is certain is that there is no alternative to making the financial commitment that is necessary to enhance the operational capabilities of the army’s infantry battalions. Without modernising this cutting edge of its sword, the army will soon begin to resemble the armies of India’s lesser neighbours. Anti-Tank Capability: Another DRDO project that is way behind schedule is the Nag anti-tank missile system. The antiquated Jonga-mounted SS-11 B1 ATGM system has been replaced in missile battalions by MILAN shoulder-fired ATGMs. However, a vehicle-mounted missile system like the Nag is definitely necessary for reconnaissance and attrition tasks and for anti-tank screens.

Army Air Defence

L70 Gun System: AAD inherited L60 gun of Second World War vintage in

1947, which was replaced by L70 gun system. During the early 1960s, this was a fairly modern system with its own fire control radar for night firing and it took almost two decades to transform the complete L60 inventory into L70. Meanwhile, the DRDO commenced development of an AD gun which was to replace the L70. However, after many twists and turns lasting over two decades the project failed and was shelved. AAD now started looking at the global market for replacement but it appeared that guns were going out of flavour and possible choice narrowed down to Skyshield of Rheinmetall Defence which has an effective range of 4 km and rate of fire of 1,000 rounds per minute. It can be matched with any fire control radar and the most redeeming feature is the Ahead (advance hit efficiency and destruction technology) ammunition. It contains 152 heavy tungsten metal, spin stabilised sub-projectiles and ejected by a time fuse. Since it led to a single vendor situation thus it is likely that the process will be repeated and a fresh RFP is issued, causing a delay of a couple of years. Meanwhile, the L70 gun will shortly celebrate its 50th anniversary, much to the glee of some of India’s hostile neighbours. Suppose the future gun’s induction starts in 2015, then to change the whole inventory may take another 20 years and notionally, if the gun remains current for another 20 years, which brings us to 2055. This is a mind boggling and unimaginable time frame. Unless some drastic action is taken, L70 may die of old age without leaving a successor. 23mm Twin Gun: This is a highly mobile light gun with a high rate of fire of 2,000 rounds/minute and eminently suited for the field army but it is purely a mechanical gun thus has become obsolete to meet the current and future threat specially with respect to UAVs, which are going to proliferate at battalion and brigade level. Adding a fire control radar will only make it heavier, but giving it a power drive and a modern optronic sight will more than foot the bill at reasonable cost. Such an upgradation project has been going on for the last decade or so with Bharat Electronics Limited and hope that it succeeds soon. Finally, it will be most cost effective to have a common successor

to L70 and 23mm Twin Gun. Schilka: This is a self-propelled gun system, having a fire control radar and a very high rate of fire of 3,400 rounds/minute with its four barrels. It is ideally suited for supporting mechanised forces and, after 35 years of service, it has become obsolete. Its successor was Tanguska and one regiment worth equipment was imported but for some unexplained reason no further procurement was carried out. There is a requirement for finding a suitable replacement which ideally could be the latest version of Tanguska or try to mount L70’s successor on a suitable platform.

Missile Systems

Quick Reaction Surface-To-Air Missile: OSA-AK system was imported from erstwhile Russia to fill the void of threat against armed/attack helicopters. Meanwhile, Trishul was being developed to succeed OSA-AK by the DRDO. However, the project did not succeed and was foreclosed. OSA-AK is fast becoming obsolescent and the options to succeed are the Surface Launched Advanced Medium

A tri-Service Defence Communication Network is in the stage of advanced planning. An RFP for the system is expected to be issued in 2010. Range Air-to-Air Missile (SL-AMRAAM) and Hawk-21, both Raytheon’s, Spyder of Israeli (already selected for the Indian Air Force), Russia’s Tor M-1 and so on. Medium Range Surface-To-Air Missile: The current system is Kvadrat of Russian origin with a range of 25 km and has been in service for more than three decades. It is now obsolete and needs replacement immediately. The DRDO was developing the Akash system for more than two decades but without success and perforce AAD has to look for global options of which there are many, such as Russia’s BUK-M1, Aster30, MICA,

An automated command and control and decision support system for use by the General Staff is still a far cry and so are supporting systems like the battlefield surveillance system and air space management system. The urgent requirement of real-time satellite reconnaissance systems has still not been operationalised despite the nuclear overhang under which the armed forces now operate. Even though the cameras on India’s remote sensing and cartographic satellites now have sharply enhanced resolutions, less than one metre, military-grade photographs of still better resolution need to be purchased from the open market. These sources may dry up quickly during war. A “system of systems” approach must be followed so that scarce RSTA and communications resources can be synergistically configured and optimally exploited. The war in Iraq fought in March-April 2003 was based on the concept of “network-centric warfare” in which surveillance sensors, targeting systems and “shooters” are fused together in a seamless “system of systems” that reduces response time between the acquisition of a target and its destruction to 15 to 20 minutes. While such a system may take over a decade to establish, a beginning must be made right away. While some Stentor long-range BFSRs have been in service for over a decade, medium-range radars are still to be acquired. Israeli Searcher-I unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have been introduced into service but these are few in number and it will be a long time before these will really make a difference by providing a real-time surveillance capability so that ground forces can initiate action even as a fresh input is received. Only a small number of Searcher–II UAVs, with an upper ceiling that makes them suitable for the mountains, have been acquired. Indigenously designed UAVs that are in the design and development pipeline include Gagan, Pawan and Rustom. Pilot-less target aircraft include Lakshya and Nishant. India does not as yet have a programme to either acquire or indigenously produce unmanned combat air vehicles of the Predator variety being used to kill terrorists in the Af-Pak region by the US and NATO forces. PGMs are increasingly gaining currency as weapons of choice in conflict on land, both to accurately destroy critical hard targets quickly as well as to avoid or at least minimise collateral damage. During Gulf War I in 1991, despite all the CNN-generated hype of smart bombs flying unerringly through ventilators, PGMs formed less than 10 per cent of the total high explosive dropped over Iraq and were rather inaccurate. The “collateral” destruction of an air raid shelter harbouring women and children has been too well documented to bear recounting. The coalition forces did not destroy a single Iraqi Scud missile launcher. In Kosovo, PGMs accounted for about 30 per cent of the ordnance dropped and accuracies had improved considerably by 1999. In the post-September 11, 2001 retribuContinued on page 13

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E x c lusive Inter view

‘LTTE’s global network

a long-term concern’ Photograph: Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe

Lieutenant General Jagath Jayasuriya, Commander of Sri Lanka Army who was at the forefront of the COIN (Counterinsurgency) strategy deployed against the erstwhile Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, speaks at length about the successful defeat of the rebels and underlines the work ahead to rehabilitate displaced populace and develop the nation in the years ahead SERGEI DESILVA-RANASINGHE

s the only army in recent times to have defeated a formidable and sophisticated insurgency, the Sri Lanka Army has discredited the idea that established insurgencies cannot be defeated. In an exclusive interview, Lieutenant General Jagath Jayasuriya, the present Commander of Sri Lanka Army, talks about his contribution to the final military campaign against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the significance of Sri Lanka’s victory, his vision as army commander and, finally, how the Sri Lanka Army intends to disseminate its experience in counter-insurgency.

Eelam War 4

Throughout Eelam War 4 (2006-2009), Lieutenant General Jayasuriya was appointed as the General Officer Commanding Security Forces Headquarters–Vanni (also spelt Wanni), which played a vital role in leading offensive formations and securing rear areas of the region located in the country’s northern hinterland. As the

and 59th Divisions and Task Forces 1, 2, 3, 4 and 8 (the 57th and 55th Divisions were attached from Security Forces Headquarters–Jaffna). “As the Security Forces Commander Vanni, the entire northern operation was conducted in the tactical area of responsibility that came under my command. I was actively involved in the ground operations executing the directives from Army Headquarters and the Ministry of Defence from the very inception of the northern humanitarian operations, starting from Mannar in 2007, right up to the very end, May 18, 2009. The most challenging part of the whole northern humanitarian operations was to minimise civilian casualties which we did very successfully, considering the magnitude of the operations and the number of the civilians used as human shields by the LTTE. “The most challenging was the latter part of the operations where hostage rescue operations were carried out, as done in no other conflict in recent times. The other

the world to date has faced such a diverse array of threats and succeeded. “As the LTTE had been considered in some quarters of the world to be an invincible international terrorist organisation the victory itself is unique. Even though terrorist organisations in different countries share common characteristics the solution to each states terrorist problem will be unique to that state. What is unique in Sri Lanka’s victory in its three decade war is the unwavering political will and hardline stand in the fight against terrorism,” stated Lieutenant General Jayasuriya. The LTTE model of insurgency and terrorism was frequently paraded as a successful model for aspiring insurgentterrorist groups worldwide to emulate, a point which was emphasized by the FBI, the world’s premier law enforcement agency: “The Tamil Tigers are among the most dangerous and deadly extremists in the world... its ruthless tactics have inspired terrorist networks worldwide, including al Qaeda in Iraq.” As such, its demise is a major contribution to region’s security and stability, which has had far reaching repercussions and appears to have seriously influenced governments, especially in South and Southeast Asia, to re-examine their counter-insurgency strategies, particularly in Pakistan, India, Burma, Thailand and the Philippines, with a view to using transferable lessons from Sri Lanka’s experience.

Sharing its experience

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Commander of Sri Lanka Army Lieutenant General Jagath Jayasuriya inspecting a guard of honour

Sri Lanka Army’s largest and most strategically important regional command (which covered an estimated land area of 25,000 sq km stretching as far north as Pooneryn, Elephant Pass and Chundikulam to as far south as Mannar, Puttalam, Anuradhapura and Weli Oya) Security Forces Headquarters–Vanni had under its purview around 51 battalions in holding operations consisting of Area Headquarters Mannar, 21st Division, 56th Division, 61st Division and Area Headquarters Weli Oya, Task Forces 5 and 6. In addition, he commanded approximately another 3,000 Sri Lanka Navy troops, several hundred Sri Lanka Air Force troops, 10,000 policemen and 5,000 Home Guards. Holding formations were responsible for eliminating over 150 LTTE guerrillas and operatives in numerous rear echelon skirmish actions within the area covering Security Forces Headquarters– Vanni. Finally, seven offensive formations composed of 51 battalions were also under his command, namely the 57th, 58th

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challenges were to absorb a large number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) within a very short span of time. Dealing with INGOs/NGOs and other UN agencies whilst maintaining transparency in human rights issues was another major challenge,” explained Lieutenant General Jayasuriya.

Significance of the victory

Up until 2009, many commentators considered it impossible to defeat the LTTE, yet by its improbable victory the Sri Lanka Army ultimately disproved critics and brought an end to the conflict that spanned nearly three decades. At its military zenith, the LTTE controlled around 15,000 sq km; fielded a large and well-equipped army of fighters; built a sophisticated maritime force capable of challenging conventional naval forces, raised a nascent air wing, refined the art of suicide terrorism on land, sea and air and perfected the use of IEDS and landmines. Hence, what makes the Sri Lanka Army’s experience so unique is that no army in

Since the defeat of the LTTE in May 2009, there has been growing international interest in studying the lessons from Sri Lanka’s successful counter-insurgency campaign. The repercussions of the victory throughout the region were publicized by various media agencies. For instance, in August 2009 the BBC News reported, “Pakistan had already asked if it could send its military cadets to train in counterinsurgency operations.” Similarly, in October 2009, the Bangkok Post stated: “The (Thai) government is considering adopting techniques used by Sri Lanka...in its efforts to contain the insurgency in the South. (Thai) Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva yesterday held talks with his Sri Lankan counterpart, Ratnasiri Wickramanayaka, on the Sri Lankan government’s success in putting down the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam movement.” In November 2009, B. Raman, a retired Research and Analysis Wing official and defence commentator affirmed to the Sri Lankan Daily Mirror: “The victory of the Sri Lankan Armed Forces over the LTTE was even more remarkable than that of the Indian security forces over the Khalistani terrorists, who were as ruthless as the LTTE.” “With the successful completion of operations against the LTTE, several countries have requested that we share our knowledge and experiences on counterinsurgency operations. In response to this, we are working on plans to incorporate foreign student officers to join our ongoing

training course. To meet this requirement, a few modifications to our training institutes need to be completed. Further, we are also looking at high level and middle level delegations visiting Sri Lanka for interactions with our officers who were involved in the operations. This is mainly to exchange and share knowledge and expertise on counter-insurgency operations. With regard to upgrading of training schools to meet the intended expansion to accommodate foreign students, basic infrastructure will be upgraded,” emphasised Lieutenant General Jayasuriya. According to Lieutenant General Jayasuriya, there are moves afoot to compile an operational doctrine for the Sri Lanka Army: “This is something that needs to be done very carefully. We will venture on this project in due course and incorporate this into all our training institutions at all levels.” Furthermore, he confirms: “As the Commander of the army, my vision is to transform the army into a highly trained, motivated, ethical and disciplined professional force which will be well-organised and structured to suit the current and future requirements of the country.” Since the end of the insurgency, the Sri Lanka Army has recalibrated aspects of its force posture towards the new challenges that have emerged, namely, mine clearance, resettlement of IDPs and heavy involvement in public works projects. As such, it is increasingly apparent that the Sri Lanka Army’s role in post-conflict Sri Lanka will continue to remain an important one, not only from the standpoint of providing security, but also in being a major contributor to the rehabilitation and development of Sri Lanka in the years ahead. Nonetheless, Lieutenant General Jayasuriya warns that while the fight against the LTTE in Sri Lanka has decisively concluded, the LTTE international network will continue to remain a longterm concern: “External support of the LTTE is no longer limited to just having a firm base in a neighbouring country, but has today gone far beyond that. Even though the LTTE is defeated in Sri Lanka its transnational network continues to remain intact with many LTTE front organisations operating under cover of the diaspora. This strategic platform will allow the remaining LTTE leadership to have a choice of external support bases.” Counter insurgency analysts worldwide would be well advised to pay close attention to the views of Lieutenant General Jayasuriya. His experiences as a veteran commander of a successful anti-terrorist campaign, one which lasted for decades and required changing strategies and tactics, provides valuable lessons for other militaries engaged in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations. While each situation is unique, militaries around the world can always learn from the experiences of others in the field and adopt transferable lessons that benefit their respective operational disposition. SP

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US’ M777 howitzer for India

A c quisit ion

BAE systems, the manufacturer of M777 ultra light weight howtizer has welcomed the US-India strategic agreement for a FMS

M777 in action

aining ground in obtaining latest weapon technology, Indian defence has once again shown keen interest in strengthening USIndia strategic relations through a Foreign Military Sale (FMS) to acquire the M777 155 mm Light Weight Towed Howitzer. The US Congress received a notification by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) of a possible FMS to India of obtaining 145 M777 howitzers with Laser Inertial Artillery Pointing Systems (LINAPS) worth approximately $647 million (Rs 2,990 crore). The total cost also includes associated parts, equipment, training and logistical support for a complete package of the M777. In its notification to the US Congress, the DSCA indicated that the sale would increase the ability of Indian and US troops to operate together. “The howitzers will assist the Indian Army to develop and enhance standardisation and to improve interoperability with US soldiers and marines who use the M777 as their primary means of indirect fire,” the DSCA stated, emphasising that US defence would not face any adverse impact in readiness as a result of this proposed sale. BAE Systems, the manufacturer of howtizer and the possible acquirer of the FMS has expressed great enthusiasm. “BAE Systems welcomes the news of the US Congressional notification of a potential FMS purchase of the M777 ultra light

weight howitzer by the Government of India,” shares Guy Douglas, spokesperson, BAE Systems. “The M777 is, by some considerable margin, the lightest 155mm howitzer in the world, and the only system proven in battle. The procurement of M777 should be seen as a victory in procuring the best equipment for the Indian Army,” he adds.

M777 Howitzer Up-Close

India reportedly did not have a hard time deciding on BAE systems, considering that the M777 howitzer is already in service with the US Army and US Marine Corps in Afghanistan and Iraq. Significant work share would be completed in India by the Mahindra and BAE Systems joint venture company, which will eventually become an Indian centre of excellence for artillery systems. “BAE Systems’ intention is to develop, over time, an artillery centre of excellence in India that covers not just manufacturing but testing, development and support. The towed and ultra light weight systems currently in the news in India represent just some of BAE Systems’ artillery solutions so there are many opportunities coming up to start building capability in our JV company with Mahindra. In terms of M777, FMS is a government to government system and the details of any deal would be a matter for governments, but BAE Systems stands by to fulfil their wishes,” explains BAE Systems spokesperson. Currently, there are 862 M77s on contract around the world, with 572 in active service. The M777 attracts the Indian Army’s needs of its mobility to inaccessible areas such as mountainous borders, and its compatibility to meet the requirement for the Indian army’s Ultra Lightweight Howitzer programme. The M777 is the only

M777: Making a Difference • Optimised for versatility, counter fire, and offensive operations in support of light and medium forces • More mobile, more rapidly deployable, more survivable and more accurate than the M198 it was to replace. • 40 per cent lighter, 25 per cent smaller footprint, 21 per cent lower profile • 266 per cent faster emplacement, 550 per cent faster displacement—more survivable • Modern digital fire control for 25 per cent accuracy improvement • The gun has been proven in battle in Iraq and Afghanistan • Has been tested in all weather conditions, including a four month evaluation in the Arctic

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M777 Specifications Calibre/barrel length:

155mm/39 calibre

Weight:

9,300 lbs (replacing the M198 at 16,000lbs)

Performance Emplacement: Displacement: Rate of fire: Sustained rate of fire: Range Maximum: Transportability Fixed wing: Rotary wing:

< 3 minutes < 2 minutes 4 rounds/minute for 2 minutes 2 rounds/min > 24.6 km unassisted C130, C141, C5, C17 CH47, CH53D, CH53E and MV22

The M777 has increased survivability through: • Unsurpassed tactical & strategic mobility

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• Low thermal & radar signature • Rapid emplacement/displacement • Low silhouette LINAPS A self-contained gun-mounted navigation, pointing and weapon management systems, LINAPS enables rapid and accurate artillery deployment in all weather conditions both by day and night. Operational advantages of LINAPS: • No surveying of gun emplacement • No setting up of aiming posts or selecting known distant objects • Faster into action time • Improved accuracy and repeatability • Easy deployment • Easy concealment • Easy night deployment • Easy to use • Minimal training

lightest 155mm howitzer in full production and proven in battlefield operations. Sporting a British design, the M777’s fire control is handled by a computerised system which allows faster response time and more accurate shooting. The M777’s compatibility to most 155mm ammunition is another plus point for India, as it will not require replacement of Krasnopol, the Russian guided shell which India currently uses. The

M777 is transported via helicopter across tough terrain, allowing it to reach mountain tops and rough land borders. Implementation of the proposed M777 howitzer sale will require annual trips to India involving up to eight (8) US Government and contractor representatives for technical reviws/support, training, and in-country trials for a period of approximately two years. SP

Filling the void India will use the howitzers to modernise its forces and enhance its ability to operate in hazardous conditions, states the American Defence Security Cooperation Agency Future threats and challenges compel India to seek the induction of three critical technologies/capabilities, namely, Long Range Precision Firepower, Integrative Technologies (C4I2) and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability. Former Vice Chief of Army Staff Lieutenant General Noble Thamburaj, addressing the Fire Power Seminar on March 30, 2009 at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies in Delhi, stressed that the current operational design is no longer to fight sequential battles, but to deliver multi-

howitzers fills a void in the army’s requirement of heavier caliber artillery for the mountains where the lack of suitable roads and track system precludes the carriage of guns to the forward areas so as to reach out deeper in the enemy sectors. Defensively it would enable the army to carry out quick intra-theatre movements, thus substantially improving its flexibility. M777 is a 155mm 39 calibre towed howitzer that weighs less than 10,000 lbs (4,218 kg). With a range of about 30 km, the allweather howitzers will also enable tactical

Indian Army’s artillery modernisation has been languishing since long. The M777 deal represents a forward movement finally. dimensional firepower to maximise shock and disruption, by employing direct firing weapons, unmanned aerial vehicles, attack helicopters, aircraft, missiles and rockets, alongside fully networked, combined arms teams of manned and unmanned ground systems. He stressed that firepower should be viewed as a joint concept which includes effects delivered by land, air and maritime weapons. The aspect of firepower becomes more crucial in the mountains where direct firing weapons, such as tanks, cannot take part in the battle. Here even air power is handicapped at times due to the adverse weather conditions which preclude the timely discernment of targets. Hence, the artillery has additional and dominant responsibilities in supporting military operations through direct and indirect fire. It is in this context that the deal to acquire 145 ultra-light howitzers from the US should be seen. This will give the Indian Army the ability to swiftly deploy artillery in inaccessible areas in the mountains and high altitude areas by road or even by helicopters. Strategically, it will enable the army to shift firepower within a theatre of battle and between theatres of war (Eastern or Western Front) should India have to face a two front situation. This involves a direct government-to-government deal worth $647 million (Rs 2,990 crore). Boost ‘interoperability’ Notifying the US Congress of the Obama administration’s intention to sell 145 M777 howitzers to India, the American Defence Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) asserted the sale would boost ‘interoperability’ between Indian and American soldiers and marines. The mandatory notification follows a request from India for the light-weight towed howitzers, with laser inertial artillery pointing systems and other equipment. The last major acquisition of towed gunhowitzers was that of about 400 pieces of 39 calibre 155mm FH-77B howitzers with a range of 30 km from Bofors of Sweden in the mid-1980s. The procurement of the airmobile

Photograph: SP Guide Pubns

Photograph: BAE Systmes

RUCHIKA CHAWLA

support to Para-Special Force battalions while they operate behind enemy lines and in ‘outof-area contingencies’. Moreover, the two new divisions, namely, 56 and 71 Mountain divisions, being raised primarily for the Eastern front with China, with around 20,000 soldiers each, are also to be equipped with these ultralight howitzers manufactured by BAE Systems. Next: Indigenous manufacture In the US Army, the first 18 such systems were delivered to the 2nd Battalion, 11th Field Artillery in Hawaii in October 2006. The M777 will also be the artillery system for the Stryker Brigade Combat Teams. The system is fitted with the digital fire control system designated M777A1, and those with the software update which allows the firing of the Excalibur projectile, M777A2. In the US Army, all M777A1 systems will be upgraded to the A2 standard. The M777 has been deployed by the US Army and Marine Corps in Afghanistan in December 2007 and in Iraq in 2008. The Excalibur projectile, which is a precision guided projectile, was first deployed in Afghanistan in March 2008. The DSCA has announced, “India will use the howitzers to modernise its forces and enhance its ability to operate in hazardous conditions. The proposed sale will also improve the security of an important partner which continues to be an important force for political stability, peace and economic progress in South Asia.” Indian Army’s long-delayed artillery modernisation programme is yet to take-off. The Ministry of Defence has reportedly also floated a global tender for the purchase of 400 x 155mm 52 calibre towed artillery guns for the army, to be followed by indigenous manufacture of another 1,100 howitzers. The Request for Proposal (RFP) was issued to eight prospective bidders, including BAE, General Dynamics, Nexter (France), Rhinemetall (Germany) and Samsung (South Korea). An RFP has also been issued for 180 wheeled self-propelled 1,555mm guns for employment by mechanised forces in the plains and semi-desert sectors. Lieutenant General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor

1/2010 SP’S LAND FORCES

Tec hnolog y

FIRST

OF A SERIES OF SIX ARTICLES ON BATTLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

HARNESS Information Technology

There is an urgent need to accelerate the development and fielding of the Battlefield Management System (BMS) as part of essential capability building of the Indian Army

uture military operations will be combined and joint, comprising all arms and inter-service elements. These operations will require units and sub-units of other arms to operate subordinated or in cooperation with each other. Also, successful execution of fast moving operations will require an accelerated decision-action cycle and an ability to conduct operations simultaneously within an all arms group. The key to success will lie in effective command and control across the force. Therefore, commanders at all levels, more so at the cutting edge level require pertinent information in order to enhance their decision making and command capability. Harnessing information technology here will act as a force multiplier to enhance operational effectiveness of commanders and troops at all levels by enabling exchange, filtering and processing of ever increasing amounts of digital information currently available but not integrated.

Capability void

As of today, the Indian Army (IA) lacks an integration tool supporting every level of military users ranging from individual soldier to Battalion Group/Combat Group Commander in the Tactical Battle Area (TBA), which can provide in near real time an appropriate, common and comprehensive tactical picture by integration of inputs from all elements of the battle group. Requirements at these levels are of battlefield transparency through situational awareness and a Common Operating Picture; pick up the enemy much before he picks you up, see the target and direct fire in quick time using the best weaponry available, as also monitor the after effects. Situational awareness existing in the IA at present is on an ad hoc basis whereas the requirement is for an integrated network system. Most foreign armies, including those deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, have situational awareness packages of various types. The IA requires situational awareness customised to its requirements. Fielding of the Battlefield Management System (BMS) will be an important facet of capability building in the army.

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Operational necessity

Operational necessity of the BMS can be summarised as under: • Enable a faster decision process by commanders at all echelons. • Enable better decision due to reliable operational information provided in real time. • Ability to quickly close the sensor to shooter loop.

Technology

Technology has allowed commanders to see their areas of responsibility in depth and in real near time. It is possible to develop an accurate common picture and share it both horizontally and vertically. Precisely

locating, identifying, tracking and attacking targets by appropriate means and monitoring effects is a reality. Operating in joint environments and mature capability to conduct multi dimensional simultaneous operations is facilitated. The technology being sought by the IA is mostly available in the world market and the Indian industry appears to be competent to meet the system requirements as is evident from the approximately 26 responses received on issue of a Request for Information (RFI) for the BMS by the IA during 2008. The foreign partners are keen to have a Transfer of Technology with their Indian counterparts and some of them are ready to share the source code as well.

Foreign systems

Some of the battlefield systems deployed in foreign armies are as under: • FBCB2 (USA): Designed for Brigade and below level, the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2) is deployed in the Stryker Brigade and its units/sub-units. It meets the typical grass root level requirements of “where am I, where are my buddies, where is the enemy, where are the dangerous areas and how do I now capitalise knowing all this”. The software has been developed by Raytheon. The programme has demonstrated improvements in combat effectiveness and is leading the endeavour to digitise the US Army’s battlefield for the 21st century soldier. Important features include near real time, accuracy of locations, fully automated icons and every platform ubiquitous. The benefits include expanded range of operation, reduced communication time, coordinated manoeuvre capability by night and in bad weather, faster decision making with better certainty, reduced fratricide and increased lethality. • T-BMS–Commander Battle (France): Produced by Thales, over 1,500 systems have been deployed in SF Brigade, Intelligence Brigade, Mountain Infantry Brigade, Parachute Brigade, Light Manoeuvre Brigade and also in the French-German Brigade. The system

Illustration: Ratan Sonal

LIEUTENANT GENERAL (RETD) P.C. KATOCH

Situational awareness existing in the IA at present is on an ad hoc basis whereas the requirement is for an integrated network system has a variety of sub systems like GIS Information System (vector, raster, elevation maps, synchronised 2D/3D view, navigation aids, and so on), Situational Display Services (Tactical Editor, Military Symbols, Order of Battle, ID Cards), Messaging Services, Mission Preparatory Services (Map Workshop–Terrain Study and Interpretation of the Battlefield, Plans and Orders Preparation, Itinerary Planning, Radio Network Configuration, and so on), and Mission Executive Services (Situational Awareness including Blue Force Tracking, automated sharing, graphics and alerts, Orders and Reports Generation, Logistics Status Management), and After Action Review Services (replay of operational sequence, recall/review tactical changes, messages received, and so on). • Hunter (Israel): Developed by Elbit, the system concept is for combining all C4I efforts in the ground forces to achieve full operability, synergising doctrine, manpower, planning, development and training. Platform integration includes the non-line of sight platforms

(mortars, artillery, MLRS), manoeuvre platforms (tanks, infantry, reconnaissance elements, engineers, logistic elements, intelligence elements), airborne platforms (helicopters) and air defence. The project to integrate various media for seamless connectivity is called Tiger. Future Tactical Combat Radio and Secure Cellular through IP routers and Gateways are part of the project. • P-BISA–Bowman (UK): Produced by General Dynamics, this system is based on tactical and secure voice and data communication. This has been developed around commercially available off-theshelf (COTS) or militarily available offthe-shelf (MOTS) equipment by engaging key equipment partners in system level design from the beginning and minimising new and redevelopment.

BMS for the Indian Army

Scope: Overall scope of the system is to integrate, test and field a BMS duly integrated with other components of the Tactical Command, Control, Communications and Information (TacC3I). The system being customised to the specific requirement, needs to be first integrated and tested in a controlled environment for which a Test Bed Laboratory will need to be established. After testing in the laboratory conditions, validation trials of the system will be carried out in field conditions. After successful validation of the system in field, the process for equipping will begin. Concept: The concept is to have an ideal system which should be able to integrate means of surveillance and engagement Continued on page 14

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Mired in Red Tape

Continued from page 6

Surface Ballistic Missile Prithvi - II tion inflicted on the Taliban militia and its al Qaeda supporters in Afghanistan, the share of PGMs had risen to nearly 60 per cent. In Gulf War II in Iraq, the ratio of PGMs went up to nearly 70 per cent. The Indian artillery does not have

PGMs in quantities large enough to matter. Only limited quantities of the Russian Krasnopol PGM have been imported for the Bofors 155 mm howitzer. Among others, the Bofors Bonus PGM is a suitable candidate, subject to successful trials in the deserts and the mountains. While some modern frequency hopping radio sets with integral encryption devices have been introduced into service in recent years, networked communications, which form the backbone of an effective C4I2SR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Information, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) system, need substantial upgradation. The Plan AREN system has been in service for almost three decades and is based on outdated and bulky technologies. Tenders have been floated for a Tactical Communication System for offensive operations and a

Battlefield Management System (BMS) for communication at the tactical level. The BMS will be integrated with the ASCON communication system. The ASCON provides voice and data links between static HQ and those in peace-time locations. It still has some years of service left as it is of modular design and can be upgraded to a limited extent. However, its capability to provide data links is rather limited as data requirements have grown by leaps and bounds over the last decade or so. The new optical fibre network being laid as an alternative to the 3G spectrum freed by the armed forces will go a long way in providing modern land-line communications. TacC3I: According to Lieutenant General (Retd) Prakash Katoch, former DG Information Services, Tactical Command, Control, Communication and Information (TacC3I) system is under development. Under this mother system, various other systems such as CIDSS (Command Information Decision Support System), ACCCS, Battlefield Surveillance System, Air Defence Control and Reporting System and BMS are being developed. Efforts are also underway to finalise a net-centric warfare philosophy. A tri-Service Defence Communication Network (DCN) is in the stage of advanced planning. However, little progress has been made towards addressing inter-service interoperability challenges in the communications field. An RFP for the DCN system is expected to be issued in 2010. Cyber security and offensive cyber warfare are other areas that do not appear to have received the attention that they deserve. With China moving rapidly towards creating “one million laptop warriors”, neglecting this field will prove to be very costly in the long term.

Army Aviation

Modernisation of Army Aviation is also not making much headway. The aviation fleet continues to be based on vintage Chetak and Cheetah helicopters. The long-pending acquisition of 197 light helicopters has been mired in controversy. It was reported to have been awarded to Eurocopter and was then cancelled due to discrepancies in the tendering process. The US company Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. is also in the race to win the contract. The only addition has been that of small numbers of Dhruv light utility helicopters for logistics duties. Upgradation of India’s attack helicopter capabilities is also pending though a tender has been issued for 24 attack helicopters for two squadrons of the IAF. Medium and heavy lift capability also must be enhanced for effective troop transportation and logistics support in the mountains and in the plains.

Conclusion

Finally, the approach to army modernisation must be more focussed; the priorities must be clearly established and then adhered to. The government must give a firm commitment in terms of funds and the MoD must streamline its procedures and processes for speedy procurement of high priority weapons and equipment. It is time to institute a rolling, non-lapsable defence modernisation fund of Rs 25,000 crore as a viable method of ensuring that defence procurement is not subjected to the vagaries of annual budgets. The present situation is disturbing and, if allowed to go on indefinitely, will seriously compromise the army’s preparedness to fight the next border war. SP The writer is Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.

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1/2010 SP’S LAND FORCES

Harness Information Technology

Continued from page 12

through an automated decision support and command and control system. The concept aims to exploit technology for mission accomplishment in the TBA by: • Rapid acquisition, processing and transfer of information. • Enhance situational awareness. • Acquire capability to react to information. • Sharpen ability to synchronise and direct fire. • Thereby establish and maintain overwhelming operational tempo. Mission Capabilities: The objective of the system is to provide a Command, Control and Information (C2I) integration tool supporting every level of military users ranging from individual soldier to Battalion Group/Combat Group Commander in the TBA, which will provide in near real time an appropriate, common and comprehensive tactical picture by integration of inputs from all elements in a battle group. The integration will include inputs from command and control elements, detachments, supporting arms, surveillance devices and headquarters, thereby providing a distinct edge in successful conduct of operations and optimisation of resources. The capabilities required of the BMS are summarised as under: • Provide a command and control system spanning the TBA spreading across individuals, detachments, combat platforms, sensors, sub-units, units to the Battalion Commander/Regiment Commander. • Achieve faster reaction capability and flexibility in command and control by providing information automatically at the right place in the right time, thereby compressing the OODA (observe, orient, decide and act) loop. • Provide a strong foundation for making decisions based on near real time, consistent and well structured information, thereby enhancing the information handling capability of commanders at all levels. • Strengthen information exchange by having a strong messaging and replication mechanism. • Improve and modernise presentation of information in near real time. • Integrate with other command and control system.

Areas of interest

• Develop a suitable application on an intuitive operating system. • GIS suitability customised to meet military requirements. • Voice and data communications, which is always up. • Computer hardware which is rugged and non-obtrusive. • Retro fitment maintaining platform integrity. • System integration to include application software, data links with radio systems, integration of battalion/ regiment level sensors BFSR, Thermal Imagers, UAV data, satellite imagery, and so on.

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Linkages & components

Equipped to perform a variety of operational situational awareness and decision support functions at a Battalion Group/ Combat Group level, the lowest level to which the BMS will be connected is individual soldier/combat platform; the highest level would be the Battalion/Regiment Commander. The system will be further integrated to the TacC3I system through the Command Information Decision Support System (CIDSS). The infantry intends to independently handle computer and radio sub-systems plus software integration of project F-INSAS. This would be a folly as this phase of F-INSAS should be part of the BMS which will ensure ab initio army wide integration at battalion/regiment and below level. The latter approach would also be much more cost saving and reduce the development time as well. Should the infantry continue on their own, yet another

SP’S LAND FORCES 1 / 2 0 1 0

project would then have to be initiated to integrate the F-INSAS with the BMS. The BMS will comprise a Tactical Hand Held Computer with individual soldiers and Tactical Computers at Battle Group Headquarters and Combat Vehicles. Computers will be integrated employing application and database servers connected on a data enabled communication network. The system will enable generation of common operational picture by integrating inputs from all relevant sources within a battle group by integrated use of GIS and GPS. The BMS will be a highly mobile system which is able to network itself by integration of components and provide a high data rate. The communications should not interfere with the legacy communication equipment and should easily be retro fitted into combat platform. The communications system should optimally utilise the bandwidth available for military communications involving voice and data including video streaming and imageries. It should be scalable to ensure its availability to all elements and range from being man-portable to being fitted in combat vehicles.

Communication devices

When pitted against the future requirements, the legacy communication devices are physically incompatible, follow different link protocols have issues of addressing, reachability and Quality of Service (QoS). The legacy of existing Combat Net Radios (CNR) are with fixed frequency (analog), are capable of limited communication and data rates besides the requirement of a modem for data transmission, are not secure and have no data encryption facility. In effect the present family of radio sets do not meet the requirements of a Network Centric Force that would facilitate transmission of voice, video and data simultaneously. For a BMS to be successful there is a need for a reliable, robust, resilient and efficient communication system that assures that the network is always functional. Net centricity warrants a paradigm shift from voice centric to data centric systems and networks eventually enabling Net Centric Warfare capabilities. For BMS communications, the IA would be looking for long ranges, high bandwidth data transmission (live streaming), facilitating messaging including voice mail, quickly deployable, self-configuring and self-healing networks, easy to customise, rolling coverage and interoperability. The focus will have to be on change in network topology, nonline of sight communications, spectrum management, network management systems, Quality of Service (including latency, assured delivery, jitter), security of communications, networks and storage, robustness and authentication. Deployment of new technologies, like Software Defined Radios (SDRs) to offset growth in demand for spectrum need serious thought. Compression technologies for passage of information must also be capitalised.

Quantities involved

It is proposed that the initial scaling of the system be limited to all elements in a Battalion Group/Combat Group in all types of operations/terrain configuration. The detailed scaling will be worked out on termination of test bed and subsequent General Staff evaluation. Considering that the BMS will be fielded pan army at the battalion/regiment level, the requirement will be huge. More importantly, similar system will eventually be required by the Para Military Forces (PMF) and even the police forces involved in anti-terrorist operations if we are to achieve national net centricity to counter the increasing asymmetric threats from terrorists, non-state actors and state sponsored non-state actors.

Deployment schedule

The proposed time lines for implementation of the BMS are as follows: • Phase I: Integration of the system,

establishment of the test bed lab and field trials at test bed location (one Combat Group and three Infantry Battalion Groups) by 2012. However, this proposed time line has been stalled already by six months due to indecision in the delimitation between the BMS and the F-INSAS. • Phase II: Equipping by 2017. • Phase III: Change management and upgradation of the system by 2022.

•

Financial aspects

The project is a finance intensive project, thereby necessitating its spread perhaps across three Army Plans. The exact financial implication can only be holistically worked out at the end of Phase I. However, based on the analysis of the response to the RFI and the tentative costs quoted in the same, the approximate cost of Phase I of the system is estimated to be around Rs 350 crore.

•

Source of acquisition

The integration of the system needs be taken with civil military cooperation as most of the equipment as system envisaged are COTS or MOTS, thus cutting down customisation cycle, reducing costs and time overruns. This is evident from the fact that 26 Indian Companies responded to

For a BMS to be successful there is a need for a reliable, robust, resilient and efficient communication system that assures that the network is always functional

•

• • •

the RFI issued by the Army in 2008. While categorising the Project BMS, the Army and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) needs to ensure that a level playing field is made available for the private industry as well as the DPSUs. This will ensure that the best solutions are identified, customised to the Indian requirements and environments.

Required focus

It would be prudent to focus on the following issues: • The Army required the BMS “yesterday”. Delay in processing the development and fielding would be at the cost of operational capability, including in ongoing sub conventional operations. A decision on delimitation between the BMS and FINSAS should be taken without further loss of time. Phase III of the F-INSAS dealing with computer and radio sub systems and software integration must be part of Project BMS, ensuring interoperability and integration with All Arms and Services in the Army, cost savings and eliminate reinventing/redevelopment thereby saving time. • Test Bed for the BMS should be at full scale, down to the individual soldier. It is prudent to do this and then think of eliminating a particular piece of equipment than adopting the reverse approach. • There is a need to review the communication philosophy of the Army. While legacy radios have their limitations, the change management towards fielding of latest technology like SDRs and communication infrastructure will need to be fine tuned. Applications will need to be standardised and adaptable to any communication system including COTS products. • Bandwidth requirements for the BMS need to be viewed keeping in mind the incremental requirements that would be required progressively over the years.

A conservative approach by the Army at this stage, which is likely due to the limitations of legacy communication equipment, could limit exploitation of future technology. As an indicator, the US Army plans on 1GB bandwidth for a combat team in 2010 that would go up incrementally over the years. The government needs to examine allotment of a dedicated Defence Band from the spectrum not only to meet the bandwidth requirement of the Services but keeping in mind future threats to national security. This will also adequately address the communication requirements of the BMS. Training for the personnel handling the BMS needs to be well planned. Aside from individual digitised training packages, the Army needs to work out a comprehensive training package for these personnel. Considering the numbers involved, such collective training will perhaps need to be decentralised at brigade/battalion level. India still has little indigenous R&D in developing state-of-the-art technologies for networked systems. We must develop our own operating systems, GIS software, computing and networking hardware with standardised proprietary protocols and standards. The industry must go all out in development of new technologies, customised for military use as this is the biggest implementation challenge in our efforts towards net-centricity. Robust security algorithms must be speedily developed to ensure security of both stored data as well as transmitted information. For developing the BMS a level playing field should be ensured encompassing the private industry and the DPSUs. The MoD should examine how to telescope the long drawn “Make Procedure”. While software of the BMS would allow interoperability between All Arms and Services of the Army at Battalion/ Regiment level, interoperability with PMF and police for anti-terrorist operations would be the right step in the direction of national net-centricity. This will need to be thought of at the ministerial level. In fact, at some point of time we need to start thinking of interoperability with friendly foreign forces with who we will be in partnership for peace, especially under the UN flag.

Conclusion

A project like the BMS is a multi disciplinary process. It is, therefore, imperative that some of the critical issues as mentioned are addressed at the inception stage. Evolution of an enterprise architecture, integration and interoperability, communications, bandwidth and latency, introduction of new technologies, robustness of transmission, message and signal routing, sensor exploitation, management of data bases, information security, information overload, integrated logistics, dangers of micro management, commercial influences, strategic initiatives and time for Implementation must all be thought of. Various sub systems of the TacC3I, like the CIDSS; Artillery Command, Control and Communications System; Air Defence Control and Reporting System; Battlefield Surveillance System; Electronic Warfare System, and so on have been under various stages of development and fielding in the army at the brigade and above level. However, the net centricity that would be achieved from the above will have little dividends if it is not be optimised through a BMS at the battalions/regiments that are at the forefront and do the actual fighting in the TBA. There is an urgent need to accelerate the development and fielding of the BMS as part of essential capability building of the army. SP The author recently retired as Director General Information Systems, IA.

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N e w Ar my Doctrine

Reviewed & Restructured The ongoing review of the Indian Army Doctrine appears headed in the right direction. Its relationship with military strategy and capability development appears highly credible and reassuring. BRIGADIER (RETD) VINOD ANAND

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Thrust Areas of the New Doctrine

The strategic environment in which the doctrine is placed has undergone considerable changes in the five-year interregnum. Foremost among the changes is the continued ascendance of China at the expense of the US. The global economic meltdown of 2008 has placed the US and China in a position of forced economic embrace from which either can extricate itself only at its own peril. This has forced Washington to virtually accede to the pre-eminence of Beijing in Asia as evidenced from President Barack Obama’s refusal to meet the Dalai Lama during the latter’s visit to the US and the reference to China’s possible role in addressing the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan during the President’s China tour. With a publicly declared time schedule for the US withdrawal from Afghanistan fast approaching in 2011, the US leverage over Pakistan is also set to decline rapidly. Under these circumstances, China would be free to assert its hegemony in South Asia. The early indicators of such an approach have been visible for a considerable time. Frequent transgressions into hitherto Indian held areas along the Line of Actual Control, particularly in the Central and Northern sectors, have become par for the course. It would be surprising if this posture of the Chinese went unnoticed by the political leadership in Delhi, much less the military. In a departure from his normally measured and deliberate approach,

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Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh was constrained to note that China has been asserting itself. With China and Pakistan being freed of most external restraints, the possibility of a collusive threat manifesting itself has increased in comparison to the time when the first doctrine was issued. This more than validates the first thrust line of the review of the Army doctrine. The Global War on Terror is now floundering due not only to its overreach but also the inability of organised nation states to set up a global security infrastructure that can combat a distributed and networked

lack of overall resources and processes to ensure its execution. However, the violent reaction to its basic concept from almost all shades of opinion in Pakistan, does point to its relevance in the realm of deterrence and strategic communication. Apparently, Pakistan Army Chief General Ashfaq Kayani gives much greater credibility to the Cold Start doctrine by stating that those planning the use of conventional forces in a situation of ‘nuclear overhang’ are “charting a course of dangerous adventurism whose course can be both unintended and uncontrollable”. No doubt, assessments of

strategy. He has also referred to Indian strategy shifting from ‘Only Deterrence’ to ‘Punishment Deterrence’, most certainly the equivalents of ‘Deterrence by Denial’ and ‘Deterrence by Punishment’ respectively. The publication of this paper a full month ahead of the public announcement of the review of the army doctrine was certainly prescient. While such a shift on the Pakistan front is acknowledged by Indian military planners, the observable features of the Indian political and military posture clearly point to a shift from ‘Dissuasion’ to ‘Deterrence by Denial’. If the enhanced military force levels in the Eastern theatre are employed in a manner that deny the PLA the ability to seize any significant military objectives like Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh, deterrence by denial could be achieved. Therefore, the development of the new doctrinal concepts needs to be watched carefully by those following Indian military strategy.

Jointmanship & Synergy

Illustration: Ratan Sonal

irst published by Simla-based Headquarters Army training Command in October 2004, the original Indian Army Doctrine was in three parts with an envisaged five-year review. As reported in the media, end-2009 the army held a closed door seminar as part of the ongoing review. Soon after, sections of the media reported one main thrust of the review, triggering a flurry of reactions, particularly from Pakistan. A public appraisal of the developments related to the ongoing review has now become necessary and topical. Published doctrines fulfill several roles, intended or unintended. In the intended roles, a published (or articulated) doctrine serves as a tool for communication not just for an internal audience but also for external entities or agencies. It indicates to adversaries what a military intends to prepare for and do in battle, and thus serves the ends of defence or dissuasion. An articulated military doctrine can convey that political direction is already available to shape military strategy. More interestingly, in a situation where dialogue between the military and civilian leadership on military issues is unstructured or scanty, doctrine can serve the purpose of communicating the capability profile and thrust of operational preparedness of the military to the political leadership at large. The review of Indian military doctrine is organised along five major thrust lines—first, dealing with the eventuality of a two-front war; second, countering military and non-military facets of asymmetric and sub-conventional threats; third, enhancing ‘strategic reach’ and Out of Area Contingencies (OOAC); fourth, attaining operational synergy between the three services; and lastly, achieving a technological edge over adversaries.

agglomeration of ‘jihadi’ elements for whom borders and the rules of international conduct hold little significance. With multiple failed/failing states in its vicinity a distinct possibility, India has to contend with sub-conventional and asymmetric warfare in all its manifestations. Important issues also include the role of the army in countering left wing insurgencies in the hinterland and its role in providing manpower for the Rashtriya Rifles, the Assam Rifles and other similarly placed organisations. Third major thrust of the ongoing review pertains to enhancing strategic reach and developing OOAC capabilities stretching from the Persian Gulf to the Malacca Straits. This thrust is closely linked to the requirement to attain operational synergy with the Navy and the Air Force. While the relevance and risks of launching Indian armed forces in OOACs are open to discussion, the security of India’s island territories, its international commerce over the sea lanes and its heavy reliance on the oil resources of West Asia leave hardly any doubts about the extent of the country’s regional geo-strategic interests. Further, an eventual withdrawal of western military forces from the region does require India to have a credible military option to bring to the table in a discussion of any new regional security structures.

Reactions to the Cold Start doctrine

The Cold Start doctrine enunciated by the Indian Army after Operation Parakram has been dissected by many commentators in the strategic community. That doctrine may have structural infirmities and a perceived

this kind are designed to create a scare in the international community and amount to little less than brinkmanship. China’s reactions to the Cold Start doctrine and the ongoing review have been comparably, and perhaps surprisingly, muted. Given that the two front scenario forms a major thrust of the review, fresh reactions from Chinese analysts may be expected in due course. That the two front thinking is not aspirational should be clear from the force structuring decisions being taken. These include the resuscitation of airfields on the Chinese border, a major fillip to road construction in the border areas, the raising of two new infantry divisions for the Eastern theatre, placing of modern aircraft, like the Su-30s, at Tezpur and highly public demonstrations of the Anti-Ballistic Missile trials by the Defence Research and Development Organisation point to the government’s intentions of developing a robust conventional capability against the Chinese threat. The government also appears to be addressing nuclear deterrence capability through the focus on development and acquisition of nuclear powered submarines and the continuing development of the Agni III. The Advance Technology Vessel, that is a nuclear-powered submarine, has already been launched last year. It appears that the message has reached the Chinese. Chinese military analysts, like Hao Ding from the China Academy of Military Sciences, have already started talking about India’s dual-tasked formations. Hao Ding refers to Indian Army formations being given ‘Double Combat Missions’ in the pursuit of a ‘Two Front Mobile Warfare’

Further, the ongoing review provides a context for evaluating synergy between the three services and the state of jointmanship. In a military as large as India’s, competition for resources and mission capabilities is natural. A larger operational role gives greater access to resources, and as a much desired corollary, greater upward mobility to the cadres. Therefore, it was hardly surprising that the army’s doctrine of 2004 was followed within two months by the maritime doctrine. The revised maritime doctrine was released in end-August 2009. It lays emphasis on ‘synergy’ and ‘intelligence’ and also envisages the employment of the Navy in an expeditionary role with amphibious capabilities. The Indian Air Force was the first to come out with an Air Power Doctrine as early as 1997. In later years, the Air Force has been emphasising its role in making India a ‘regional’ power and in ‘shaping the battlefield’ for the army and the navy. The envisaged roles emphasised out-of-area and offensive capabilities raising apprehensions in the army over a possible lack of emphasis on close air support. The Integrated Defence Staff itself has to compete for operational and bureaucratic space in the inter-service competition and joint doctrines are a major instrument of such assertion. Evolution of Joint Forces Doctrine of May 2006, the Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations and the Joint Doctrine for Special Force Operations in September 2008—all have come about as a result of enunciation of joint precepts. Thus, it is clear that articulation of doctrine has been an essential component of interservice interaction in the face of the unwillingness of the government to carry through the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee pertaining to the appointment of the Chief of Defence Staff. Thus, the ongoing review of the Indian Army Doctrine appears headed in the right direction. While its relationship with military strategy and capability development appears highly credible and reassuring, not much can be said on the basis of current evidence about the intricacies of employment of military force in wars waged at short notice. Due to the escalatory nature of such wars political leadership and second order effects may have a greater role to play than the capture of shallow territorial objectives and partial destruction of conventional military potential. SP

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Sagem’s JIM LR

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Sagem JIM LR with its remote video tactical teminal

IM LR is a multi-function handheld thermal imager with numerous integrated functions in one tactical and portable piece of equipment.Developed and produced by Sagem’s (Safran group), JIM LR is becoming a standard equipment in several military combat units, as well as for security applications and border surveillance. It includes visible and infrared vision, telemetry, a laser pointer, orientation, GPS and data transmission. Powered by Sagem’s highly efficient image processing software, the JIM LR is an information and action system in an ergonomic housing. It provides units in operations with the services expected to confront diverse missions and situations. Tactical, compact and very easy to use, JIM LR is a support for troops in all range of operational situations, in offensive or defensive actions, from peace keeping missions, protection of areas or borders, special air-ground operations, to combat in high intensity environments. For military forces in operations, JIM LR detects threats day and night, designates targets with metric precision in short-time loops, while gathering intelligence for the command level or contact units though tactical radio networks. Furthermore, it can be remotely controlled off the threats using

tactical portable terminals. As part of battlespace digitization, JIM LR is interoperable with C4ISR networks linked to effectors using precision weapons. In France, JIM LR is interoperable also with FELIN, the France’s soldier modernization system (for which Sagem is the prime contractor). To date, several hundred JIM LRs have been ordered and are in use by several NATO armies, including the French Army (850 units ordered), US, UK and Canada. Last October, its performance in protecting infrastructure was noted during the October 2009 NATO Belcoast demonstration in Belgium. JIM LR has been chosen for border protections by several European Union countries, most recently Bulgaria and Slovenia, demonstrating its effectiveness under difficult climatic conditions. This was a fine performance for JIM LR, a system manufactured in Sagem’s French factory with high-tech and high precision components from Vectronix, its Swiss subsidiary, including a magnetic compass, a laser and day optics. Sagem is drawing on the lessons learned from its use on the ground over the past two years to improve the services it renders, with a housing that is still as ergonomic, compact and light (3,3 kg with the battery). JIM LR in on dynamic demonstration on the Sagem stand at Defexpo 2010. SP

Artillery Systems:

When Sagem Sigma 30 is Rising to the Precision and Mobility Challenge

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he operational trends of modern artillery are clearly underlined by the gunners themselves: the need for high mobility, guns firing within a short notice in a “shoot and scoot” mode. Sagem, company of the Safran Group, has carefully addressed all these demanding requirements. Designed strait forwards for such specific Artillery constraints, Sagem’s Sigma 30 is a stateof-the-art hybrid inertial navigation and artillery pointing system using a digital RLG (Ring Laser Gyro) specially optimised for high accuracy pointing within a short notice in a high shock daily environment. It combines ruggedness, precision and flexible operation, such as alignment on the move without the need of a GPS. Sigma 30 covers a range of performance, addressing from the most demanding accuracies requested by MLR’s or 52 cal howitzers, down to humbler performance typical of 105mm light gun or mortars applications. In 2009, Sigma 30 became a worldwide reference in the European Artillery community illustrated by selections on the Swedish Archer, the German Donar and PZH 2000 upgrades, the Franco German MLRS upgrades, the French

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2R2M 120mm mortar. Sigma 30 is now fully qualified and in service with the French Army’s 155mm Caesar gun Mounted System. Supporting the troops in combat, Caesar fitted with this high accuracy Sigma 30 is now labelled “combat proven” in harsh thermal, mountainous and mobility environments. In India, in a cooperative project with the Ministry of Defence’s DRDO/ARDE, Sagem has delivered Sigma 30 to equip two PINAKA multiple rocket launchers regiments of the Indian Army. Moreover, in the frame of this programme, Sagem has achieved, in India and in France, the training of the Indian Army EME engineers to ensure “I” level repair of Sigma 30 in an army workshop. This workshop is already shaped to support more programs utilising Sigma 30, for instance the WLR counter battery radar or any ULH or 52. cal howitzer using Sigma 30. Sigma 30 also represents the core sensor of Uliss 30XP a new Positioning and Azimuth Determination System (PADS) designed for survey and topographic missions in replacement of aging systems in service in the Indian Army and difficult to maintain in condition. SP

The Sigma 30 on a 155 mm Caesar gun

Sigma 30 laser gyro pointing system is combat proven

Revamping Defence R&D

DR DO

Even after 48 years of its formation, India’s DRDO has not been able to achieve its targeted mission of self-reliance DRDO & Agni III Missile

r V.K. Saraswat has taken over the reigns of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) at a time when there has been an increasing clamour among the strategic and scientific community to overhaul and restructure the organisation to make it more efficient. DRDO’s main mission is the establishment of capability for indigenous production. This mandate is accomplished through 50 laboratories/establishments whose activities are organised through specific projects. It was envisioned that by 2005 it should be possible to achieve an indigenous defence production capability to the tune of 70 per cent. Of that target, only 30 to 35 per cent could be achieved. Therefore, India is still largely dependent on imports and the DRDO, even after 48 years of its formation, has not been able to achieve its targeted mission of self-reliance in defence production. Of course, the DRDO may not solely be responsible for the current state of affairs. Delays in some of the DRDO projects could also be ascribed to genuine difficulties, such as technical complexity, technological denialregime, non-availability of infrastructure within the country and extended user trials. The Parliament’s Standing Committee on Defence in its reports has been pointing out that there was an urgent need for a thorough review of DRDO’s functioning and its organisational/structural set up, in order to identify the strengths and weaknesses.

Suggestions

Against this background, the Defence Ministry had set up a committee under former Department of Science and Technology Secretary Dr Rama Rao to suggest a roadmap to transform the DRDO into an efficient research body. The committee submitted its recommendations to the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in March 2008. The recommendations of the committee were to be vetted by the MoD and submitted to Cabinet Committee on Security for approval and, thereafter, implemented. However, it is only recently that the MoD has set up another high level committee (Defence Minster A.K. Antony announced this in the Parliament in mid-July 2009) under the

BRIGADIER (RETD) VINOD ANAND

Chairmanship of the Defence Secretary and including army, navy and air force chiefs to look into responses and suggestions made by various stakeholders on the recommendations of the Rama Rao Committee. Though Rao Committee’s recommendations remain classified, some of the broad features are: • The DRDO should focus its attention on selected critical projects, like missiles, antimissiles systems, light combat aircraft, aero engines, electronic warfare and development of high altitude extreme endurance weaponised unmanned aerial vehicles; • De-merger of around 20 per cent research laboratories to allow the DRDO to focus on mainstream defence technologies; • More joint military ventures, like the BrahMos cruise missile project (with the Russians), should be set up; • Strength of both the public and private sectors be synergised for technology transfers and R&D so that products with civilian applications can be produced; • All new futuristic weapons programme should have timelines and benchmarks; also the administrative structure of the organisation should be revamped; • More top level scientists and middle level scientists should be recruited; and a large corpus earmarked for setting up advanced weapons research facilities; and • Establishment of the Defence Technology Commission which would act as a thinktank on military research. A large number of the suggestions and recommendations made by the committee had, in some form or the other, already been suggested by the Parliament’s Standing Committee on Defence (SCD); and, in principle, some of the measures recommended have in some manner or the other been accepted. The Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP), which was last revised in August 2008 and which builds upon DPP 2006 and earlier versions, has provisions where R&D tasks for systems can be directly assigned to defence public sector undertakings (DPSUs) and private industries. The DRDO already has more than 400 industrial partners in its various projects. Under the provisions of the DPP, the MoD is empowered to fund 80 per cent of development funds to

industries for defence items within the ambit of the “Make” clause by the Indian industry. The proposal for shared development cost of DRDO projects under “Make” Procedure (DRDO 70 per cent, respective services 10 per cent, industry 20 per cent) was initiated by the organisation in April 2007, which has been accepted in principle. This is expected to fructify in the current 11th Five Year Defence Plan period spanning 2007 to 2012 and is reflected in the latest DPP.

Recruit & Retain Talent

The government has already accepted recommendations of the SCD that a comprehensive national policy should be formulated to recruit and retain talented and experienced scientists who would make the pursuit of science a viable academic and commercial proposition. Attraction and retention of talent poses a serious challenge to the DRDO. The government has already introduced many measures to retain the talent. Currently, the DRDO is spending about 6 per cent of the defence budget. There have been discussions regarding increasing this allocation for conduct of more and more R&D activities for the three services. Even though there has been gradual increase in the absolute amount allotted to the DRDO, defence observers have been suggesting the budget be increased to 10 per cent of the defence budget; some have even recommended 15 per cent. Target of self-reliance is expected to be achieved through national efforts by the MoD, production agencies, DPSUs, ordnance factories, the DRDO and extensive involvement of the private sector. Effectively, defence R&D budget would go up when the MoD starts funding industries directly for taking on development tasks. If the government expands the educational and professional institutions, it would create further scope to increase the fundamental/ applied research work as outsourced work.

Private sector participation

Already, there have been many cases where the DRDO has involved private sector for development and production of sub-systems and components. For example, PINAKA multi-barrel rocket systems are now being

produced by the Tatas and Larsen and Toubro; Mahindra and Mahindra is also involved in production of defence items. They have also partnered with international firms. Many private companies have successfully developed and produced defence systems and equipment and the DRDO is also allowing usage of its facilities by the private sector. The DRDO has delivered many technologically complex products, like the Prithvi, Agni, Lakshya, electronic warfare systems, radars, sonars, torpedoes, NBC Systems, and so on. It has taken longer time than initially predicted for complex systems, which were taken up in the early 1980s due to limitations of industry, constraints from foreign suppliers, and technology problems being attempted for the first time by the DRDO. The present trend of entering into collaborative R&D, wherever feasible, will cut down development time and costs. But it will be difficult for the DRDO to develop the entire spectrum of products required by the services. At present, the DRDO is expected to concentrate on the “Make” of strategic, complex, security sensitive projects. All other types of equipment are to be developed by the industry; all upgrades would be executed by industries. Pre-production and Limited Series Production, lifecycle support, post-induction upgrades and lifecycle support would be handled by the manufacturer/contractors. Since the private industry does not have the capacity to invest in R&D, the need for government support in making the industry technologically more capable has been accepted by the administration. However, while most advanced countries are spending at least 2 per cent of the GDP on basic science and technology in universities and research institutions even as the industries, both public and private sector, across the globe invest between 4 and 15 per cent of their turnover towards R&D, the comparative figures for the same are very low in India. The private industry in India today has developed very high capabilities in engineering and has a reasonable capability in design; but its contribution to R&D is very low. Therefore, it is mandatory that the government takes fresh initiatives to encourage private sector to spend more on defence R&D. SP

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A r moured Veh icles

Enhanced

FIRE POWER

KBP-designed modernized fighting compartment of the BMP-2—an efficient way of upgrading armoured vehicles

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t present, the development level of armoured vehicles signifies to a large extent the military potential of the country’s land forces. Infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) are the most widely-used type of the land forces’ hardware. Constant upgrade of the combat vehicles fleet is performed by means of developing novel combat assets and modernization of existing armoured vehicles. The service life of the armoured vehicles is rather lengthy, amounting to 30 -40 years. Many countries of the world are retrofitting the majority of their combat vehicles. The US is currently refurbishing its Bradley M2A2 IFV up to the M2A3 configuration. The Russian-made BMP-2 IFV being the main CV of the land forces in many countries was put into service in 1980 and appeared to be superior to the majority of its foreign counterparts in terms of combat characteristics. Currently, the BMP-2 still complies with the modern requirements as regards its armour protection and riding performance. Analysis of current status and developmental tendencies of armament and fire control systems suggests BMP-2’s weapon system lagging behind the modern state of the art as regards several combat characteristics: • Guided weapon firing on the move and when afloat is not possible because of the wire guidance of the Konkurs missile. • The Konkurs weapon system features low rate of fire due to launcher reloading. There is considerable loss of time during the reloading procedure, and the operator can get injured by fragments and small arms fire. • Night firing can be conducted only by means of the automatic gun and the PKT machine-gun to the range of not more than 800 m. • Non-automated FCS of the BMP-2 (the absence of the on-board computer, modern sights and target autotracker) makes it impossible to perform accurate firing and constrains the effective range of fire by the 30mm gun to 1100-1400 meters. Considerable errors while firing on the move are caused by insufficient stabilization

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accuracy of the line of sight implemented by the BPK-2-42 sight rigidly connected with the weapon. • Firing from the automated gun with 30mm rounds with flat trajectory does not allow engagement of hidden and entrenched manpower. • Firing at air threats conducted by means of the 1PZ-3 target aspect sight basically has only psychological effect because the kill probability against a typical aerial target does not exceed several hundredths. The lethality of the combat vehicle is determined by the weapon system, and it is improvement of the weapon system that enables to achieve the highest enhancement of combat effectiveness. The BMP-2 has large potential of evolution of the weapon system. KBP Instrument Design Bureau has solved the problem of enhancing the fire power of current BMPs that ensures their superiority over all existing IFVs. The retrofitting is performed on the basis of the standard BMP-2 turret with the 2A42 automatic gun (while retaining the hull and internal layout of the turret) within a short period of time. In terms of design it includes the following: • installation of two armoured launchers of the Kornet-E anti-tank guided missiles on the sides of the turret. Each launcher is for two ready-to-fire missiles and is fitted with stand-alone electromechanical elevation laying drives; • installation of the gunner’s combined sight (instead of the BPK-2-42 sight) with an independent LOS stabilization system. The sight includes optical, thermal imaging and laser range finding channels, as well as the missile guidance channel; • installation of the digital onboard computer with a system of sensors; • installation of the TV/thermal automatic target tracker; • installation of the 30mm grenadelauncher with an autonomous drive from the gun and a magazine of up to 300 grenades; • installation of the commander’s panoramic sight with an independent LOS stabilization system, which includes TV and laser range finding channels.

Weapon System for Armoured Vehicles (with Kornet-E ATGM)

The weight of additionally mounted weapons and hardware does not exceed 500 kg, 260 kg out of this being the weight of additional ammunition: ATGW and 30-mm grenades. It’s worth to mention the realized principle of modular arrangement of the proposed fighting compartment. The customer according to his own requirements under the limited financing can select the upgrade package variant: full or partial package. The sighting equipment and armament (panoramic commander’s sight, second ATGW launcher, grenade launcher) are installed additionally in the relevant locations of the armoured cupola and

are connected with FCS by the cable joint to the connectors in the armour of the armoured cupola. The upgraded BMP-2 with the advanced B05Ya01 fighting compartment has the following advantages as compared to the standard BMP-2: • Thanks to the day-and-night FCS it provides the precise firing by all types of ammunition including newly developed, guided and unguided rounds against moving and stationary targets, engagement of all targets nomenclature in stationary position, on the move and afloat by day/at night including automatic gun firing at ranges up

Photographs: KBP

to 4000m, Kornet-E ATGW - up to 5500m and automatic grenade launcher – up to 2100m. • Kornet-E ATGW armour penetration increase up to 1000-1200mm provides the reliable engagement of advanced ERA-protected tanks (Leclerc, Abrams, Leopard). Besides the HEF warhead of the missile destroys concrete fortifications and pillboxes. Targets engagement beyond the enemy’s effective response fire guarantees the upgraded BMP-2 victory in the fighting with tanks and IFVs. • Four (4) ready-to-fire guided missiles positioned in two (2) stabilized launchers of the upgraded BMP-2 significantly

increase the ATGM fire rate. Here it is not necessary to reload the ATGM launcher during the battle that increases the survivability of the loading soldier and CV in whole because it doesn’t stop for ATGM reloading becoming the easy target on the battlefield. • The use of TV/TI target autotracker makes it possible to increase by 3-6 times the tracking accuracy as compared to the manual mode. The man is excluded from the aiming contour, the firing results do not depend upon the gunner’s psychophysical condition that is especially important under the stress conditions of the battle. The

precise target tracking becomes the guaranteed performance which reduces the gunners training requirements and training period itself. The target autotracker gives the totally new quality to the FCS realizing the “fire-andforget” principle when guided missile firing. In this case the missile cost is greatly reduced as compared to the missile with the homing head acting as target autotracker. • Kornet ATGW firing with elevation above LOS practically excludes the missile detection by the enemy. • ATGM laser guidance system with missile TV-lining in the beam guarantees

high immunity to all types of jamming because the jam source cannot be in the IFV rear and can not have the same codes. • Salvo firing by two Kornet-E ATGMs in one beam is provided to penetrate the targets active protection and to guarantee engagement of some highly important targets. • The automatic gun and grenade launcher fire accuracy (by all types of ammunition) is highly increased thanks to consideration of the most important firing factors: range to the target (to be measured by the laser rangefinder or introduced manually), CV and the tar1/2010 SP’S LAND FORCES

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Side view

get velocity and direction, wind speed, temperature and air pressure, charge temperature, round muzzle velocity deviation from nominal value, target elevation angle, roll and pitch angle, round ejection angle. Thanks to the digital onboard computer the fire settings are produced automatically.The effective firing range of 30mm rounds of the automatic gun is increased from 1100-1400m to 1800-2000m. • The BMP-2 AD fire effectiveness is also greatly increased: the kill probability when firing from automatic gun against usual air targets like “helicopter”, “assault aircraft” is increased by several times and is close to kill probability of specialized AD missile-gun close-in systems, with less ammunition expenditure. Therefore the BMP universalization principle is successfully realized by giving the AD capabilities without additional costs. • The manpower is effectively engaged at ranges up to 2100m including behind terrain slopes and in trenches thanks to low ballistic weapons (AG-30M automatic grenade launcher with new GPD30 grenades). • Potential of combat operation of the IFV’s commander extends owing to installation of the panoramic TV sight with technical vision. Such a sight is installed in the BMP for the first time. The commander has panoramic fieldof-view in azimuth. The field-of-view in elevation is extended to 60°. The LOS maximal angular velocity increases from 5-6 to 20 degrees per second. This allows to increase the number of targets detected by CV in 2.5 times and also to raise the accuracy of target designation for the gunner in 10 times and completely duplicate the commander’s operation as well as to fire against aerial targets in the automatic mode. Modernization of the BMP-2 answers the purposes of advanced IFVs in the next 20-30 years, and the modernized BMP-2 can be successfully used till 30-40-ties of the 21st century. Modernization of the BMP-2 is comprehensive and results not only in ordinary improvement of some characteristics of the weapon system but makes it possible to create a CV with fundamentally new performance, which successfully competes with other CVs in the military market. Calculations of the effectiveness of the improved and organic BMP-2 in combat conditions both as independent unit and while supported by tanks showed that the required number of vehicles can be reduced by a factor of 3.8 while keeping

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the same level of probability of successful mission fulfilment. In terms of lethality the upgraded BMP2 reaches the level superior to the possibly best IFVs like Bradley (USA) and Marder (Germany). The technical solutions used in the design of the B05Ya01 fighting compartment allow the BMP-2 to outperform in terms of combat potential the American M2A2 Bradley IFV by a factor of 2.4 and its latest upgraded version M2A3 by a factor of 1.87, and the cost of the BMP-2 retrofitting is much less. The new weapon system is a part of the B05Ya01 fighting compartment, which, being a part of the BMP-2, passed all kids of trials with positive results according to programs coordinated by the Russian MoD. At present KBP performs serial production of the BMP-2 modernized fighting compartment. The main part of the light weight CVs Front view

park of the land forces in some foreign countries is constituted by BMP-2 IFVs which are manufactured at local plants. The proposed version of BMP-2 modernization was successfully demonstrated outside Russia. In 2004 a foreign crew trained within a day and a half conducted firing trials and showed the results comparable to those of the Russian crew. The trials were held with the BMP-2K commander’s vehicle, which was reequipped by joint efforts of Russian and foreign specialists within 15 days at a local plant without preliminary production preparation. The Russian party delivered the FCS, Kornet-E anti-tank guided missile launchers, grenade launcher unit and cable set. Foreign specialists together with the Russian specialists dismounted the standard fighting compartment, upgraded the armoured cupola, and prepared mounting

seats for installation of the weapons, FCS units including sights. The fighting compartment was assembled, adjusted, the acceptance trials were held and the fighting compartment was mounted on the standard chassis of the local-made BMP-2. After firing at a shooting-range the upgraded BMP-2 was accepted. In 2003, 2004 and 2005 the upgraded BMP-2 successfully passed demonstration trials in various countries of the world. Thus the advantage of the BMP-2 IFVs equipped with the B05Ya01 fighting compartment is high fire power and proven technology of the BMP-2 modernization. Moreover, retrofitting of combat vehicles can be performed not only at serial-production plants, but also at plants, which repair armoured vehicles. The advertorial is based on the article by I.V.Stepanichev and L.M.Shvetz SP

1/2010 SP’S LAND FORCES

I n ter view

‘India can avail all

Raytheon

systems that

Photographs: Abhishek / SP Guide Pubns

work in the US’ Sanjay Kapoor, Vice President, Patriot Programs, Raytheon Integrated Defense Systems

SP’s Land Forces (SP’s): The Indian Army’s Corps of Army Air Defence as well as the Indian Air Force (IAF) hold a large variety of air defence missile systems that are being phased out. Has Raytheon offered any air defence systems to replace these obsolescent missile systems? Have any presentations been made in this regard?

Sanjay Kapoor (Kapoor): Yes, and we have made an offer, approved by the US Government, of our Hawk-XXI system with embedded SL-AMRAAM (Surface Launched Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile) capability in response to the QRSAM (Quick Reaction Surfaceto-Air Missile) request from the Indian government. Are there other Raytheon systems that make sense for air defence in India? The answer to that is yes. One is, of course, the Patriot, and we are working with the US government right now to get all necessary clearances and licenses to make that happen. And as for the second question as to whether any presentation has been made on this topic, the answer to that is also yes. Over the past several years, both classified as well as unclassified presentations have been made to the Indian government on the capabilities of the air defence systems.

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SP’s: In the context of presentation, has any concern been conveyed by the OEM regarding Transfer of Technology (ToT)?

Kapoor: Let me answer in context of the 12 to 16 countries where we have Hawk and Patriot. We have the same question everywhere, every country has requirements for ToT, and India is not an exception at all. Many countries require ToT, offset programmes, local manufacturing, and so on. Based on the country, we work with the US government to address every one of these individual programmes. So, for India, we will find solutions for what can and what cannot be transferred. For technology that can be transferred, we will undoubtedly work with the appropriate local companies here to try and develop indigenous capabilities. SP’s: Do you have the US government’s support to supply the products to the Indian armed forces?

Kapoor: Again, like I said, at least in the case of the Hawk-XXI with the embedded SL-AMRAAM capability we have got the support and that’s how we responded to the request on the QRSAM proposal. We are working with the US government on

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other capabilities that Raytheon Company has in air & missile defence and, at this moment, progress looks good. Of late, there have been multiple developments, including the deals inked during US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s visit to India. Things are moving in a positive way. SP’s: What are the capabilities proposed by Raytheon to fulfill India’s integrated air and missile defence (IAMD) architecture requirements?

Kapoor: In terms of integrated air and missile defence, everybody looks at layered defence, that is, the low tier, the mid tier and the upper tier. Based on India’s requirements, our offerings fundamentally have been the Hawk XXI and the SL-AMRAAM, and we are working with the US government to get Patriot released. The advantage that Raytheon Company offers is that we can integrate these systems. Since we are the OEMs on these systems and we are the designers of these systems, we actually know how to integrate these systems together, so they become interoperable and linked with each other. So that would be something we would work on with the Indian government at the next stage. For now, we’re trying to get the Hawk XXI and SLAMRAAM to India, followed, hopefully, by the Patriot system. SP’s: Would you prefer offering products to India under the Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) or via Foreign Military Sales (FMS)? As a customer, which mode is friendlier to India?

Kapoor: That’s a tough question to answer. I can tell you that I do business in Japan direct. We have been doing business in Japan for 50 years, and both they and we are comfortable doing DCS, including for Patriot. I also do business in Saudi Arabia, usually direct. There are multiple other countries, like Taiwan, where it’s a formal trade. On the other hand, if I consider some of my traditional customers, like the Netherlands, Germany and Greece, they are all FMS. So it really depends on the country and the kind of flexibility its acquisition process demands. There are several advantages to the FMS process; it’s something that has always worked and the US government has some ease on it. So it really depends on what the Indian government would like; we can work both ways. Having said that, in most countries our dealings are based on FMS. It makes it a little easier, particularly for

new countries aligning with the US. The process under the FMS is clean; it’s not faster but it’s clean. The pricing you get in an FMS environment is something that the US government will negotiate with the Raytheon Company. SP’s: Have the Indian armed forces expressed any interest in your Patriot system which is the foundation of the US Army’s integrated air and missile defence architecture?

Kapoor: Yes. If you look at the Patriot system, it’s the only combat-proven system successfully deployed in two recent wars – Operation Iraqi freedom and the first Gulf war. We have had more than a thousand missile firings and tests since the system was built. So if any country is looking for a reliable, combat-proven, tested system with advanced capabilities that can handle today’s and evolving threats, then it has to consider the Patriot. At the end of last year, the United Arab Emirates signed a $3.3 billion contract for new-production Patriot fire units, so the lines are active and the new Patriot units will have the latest technology built in. We think, anyone interested in a successful IAMD structure will want to look at the Patriot system. SP’s: Have you carried out a study on how the Patriot system could provide a canopy for defending for India’s eastern and western theatres?

Kapoor: Have we done a study? No. Are we capable of doing the study? Yes. The study would have to be coordinated in conjunction with the US government, the Indian Army, the Indian government and, obviously, engineers from Raytheon Company. Do we have simulations, models that exactly execute instructions? Obviously yes. It’s a necessity and the appropriate thing to do at the right time so that we can actually help. SP’s: There is a requirement for QRSAM for the Indian Army. Do you think your products, like the SL-AMRAAM and Hawk XXI, can meet this requirement?

Kapoor: Absolutely. The Hawk-XXI is an upgraded Hawk system with 360 degrees capabilities and incorporated with the 3D A/N-MPQ-64F1 Sentinel radar that has tremendous capabilities against anti-jamming. Like Patriot, Hawk has been combat proven in several conflicts. Most recently, the Kuwaiti Hawk systems destroyed 15 jets and one helicopter in response to the

Iraqi invasion prior to Desert Shield/Desert Storm. We are selling the same systems in other parts of the world. SP’s: What enhancements does the Hawk XXI incorporate to meet the operational requirements of modern air threat, including those from unmanned aerial vehicles and cruise missiles?

Kapoor: The fundamental improvements in Hawk-XXI are in the radar that basically increases the range, the altitude and other such factors. When you do that, you get additional time to react and, in the case of the Hawk XXI, the reaction time has been decreased by almost 50 per cent. Hawk XXI provides a multi-spectral sensor suite, is more ECM resistant, has much higher reliability, and with the addition of SL-AMRAAM, has much higher fire power. Those are some improvements in the Hawk-XXI system. We think it is the right kind of capability for the threats the Indian Army has articulated. SP’s: Both the Indian Army and the Indian Air Force require the medium range SAM. Which version of the Patriot will meet the requirement and why?

Kapoor: Currently, 12 countries have Patriot and pretty much everybody is upgrading to the latest configuration, Configuration-3, which has significantly improved radar capabilities and also ability to fire PAC-3 (Patriot Advanced Capability 3) and PAC-2 missiles, and both the missile have different requirements. PAC-3 is a hit-to-kill missile produced by Lockheed Martin, but is only workable when we upgrade the radar to Configuration 3, the launchers to Configuration 3 and so on. PAC-2 missile, produced by Raytheon and also called GEM-T (guidance enhanced missile), is a blast fragmentation kind of missile that’s cheaper and has different capabilities. Most countries, like UAE, contract for a mixture of PAC-3 and GEM-T. As to what would work best for the Indian army, will have to be decided between the US government, the Indian Army and the Raytheon Company. SP’s: Would you be willing to offer both the PAC-2 and PAC-3 systems to the Indian armed forces?

Kapoor: We would be willing to offer the systems that work in the US. The final decision rests with the US government in conjunction with the Indian government and the Indian Army.

been tested and operational. In the case of the Patriot, it has been tested and operational for a very long time, almost a thousand missile firings. Third thing you would want to look at is the alliance group of countries using the Patriot system because, at the end of the day, each of these countries contribute on an annual basis small amount of funds so that collectively we decide what kind of improvements need to be made to the system. So the larger the pool the more improved capabilities we will have. Last, but not the least, you would also want to look at the lifecycle cost. When you look at lifecycle cost, that is, maintenance and the warranties, the Patriot is significantly better than any other system. And, finally, you would want a system that is interoperable.

SP’s: In the Indian context, have you been able to resolve issues like ToT and offsets?

Kapoor: Have we done ToT and offsets in other countries? Yes. We are currently working with Turkey. They have fairly good industry, supported by the Turkish government and there are companies, like Roketsan, that are aligned with defence acquisition. Recently, we announced a deal with Roketsan to make certain actuation motors and missile components. Some countries have direct offsets, some countries have indirect offsets. SP’s: Can you name the countries that have acquired the Patriot and Hawk systems?

Kapoor: In addition to the US government, there are 1l countries that have

acquired Patriot – The Netherlands, Germany, Spain, Greece, South Korea, Japan, Israel, Taiwan, UAE, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. In the case of the Hawk, there are 17 countries which have the system today. They are Bahrain, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Turkey, and UAE. SP’s: What edge would the Patriot afford India over its competitors from Europe, Russia and Israel?

Kapoor: The Patriot is not only reliable, lethal etc., but it’s actually combat proven. Secondly, as a buyer you would want to look at how long the system has

SP’s: What’s the ratio between Raytheon’s domestic sales versus export for the Patriot system and the Hawk programme? Has Raytheon tied up with any Indian partners for either of these programmes?

Kapoor: I can’t give you that proportion. Not because I don’t have it but because we don’t disclose it. As a CFO, I can’t give you information about financial data that’s not in the public domain. Having said that, it’s very easy for somebody like you to figure out that in the last 12 months, we have predominantly signed contracts internationally, but we have also signed some contracts domestically for the ‘Pure Fleet’ programme. Under the ‘Pure Fleet’ initiative, the US government is upgrading all its Patriot units to Configuration 3, and we have signed several orders worth more than half a billion (more than $500,000,000, or Rs 2,330 crore) associated with this programme. Have we

tied up already with some Indian firms? We would like to, and although we have not yet tied up specifically, we are working with several of them. For now, we have agreements akin to MoUs, but we haven’t finalised anything. SP’s: In the case of the PAC-3, remote launch features have increased the distance of launchers from the engagement control station from 10 km to 30 km. What additional advantage would this provide to the user?

Kapoor: for one, the defended areas significantly increase. The second, more important is the reaction time. In my perspective, these are the two big advantages. SP’s: The US Army reportedly plans to equip each US Patriot fire unit with a combination of six PAC-2 and two PAC-3 launchers. How will this make the system more versatile and effective?

Kapoor: The US government and many other countries use a combination of PAC-2 and PAC-3. Again, the missiles have different capabilities and different costs. In any air defence system, you would want to have options as to what to shoot when, so most countries deploy the combination, including the recent purchase by UAE. That’s also the strength of the combination of Patriot and Hawk XXI offered by Raytheon. We provide fully integrated, air and missile defence capabilities that handle all threats from the smallest unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and cruise missile up through tactical ballistic missiles. One system can’t do it all, but the integrated System of Systems offered by Raytheon can defeat the threat. Patriot and Hawk have proven in combat their ability to do so. SP

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2/12/10 10:18:37 AM

U nmanned Aerial Vehicles

& COMBAT

UAVs are remotely piloted or selfpiloted aircraft that can carry cameras, sensors, communications equipment or other payloads

Photographs: www.army.mil & www.af.mil

Surveillance MQ-1C Sky Warrior

SP’s RESEARCH TEAM

he development of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has essentially been for intelligence gathering, but over the last one decade, improved technology in the fields of composite materials, communications, sensors, artificial intelligence and image processing, GPS guidance and precision munitions has served to considerably expand the scope of these aircraft. Today, UAV applications cover a very wide range of missions, including armed attack and sophisticated operations. The Indian military became aware of the significance of this “force multiplier” ever since consciousness dawned of their weaknesses in the field of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance during “Operation Parakram” in 2001-2002. However, indigenous efforts failed to produce satisfactory results, compelling the Indian armed forces to seek UAVs from abroad. This article briefly surveys the developments of UAVs in the Indian Army and in the armies world over, including Pakistan and China. UAVs are remotely piloted or self-piloted aircraft that can carry cameras, sensors, communications equipment or other payloads. These can be used for reconnaissance, intelligence-gathering, real time imagery, surveillance of a designated area and for attack. More challenging roles have been and are being envisioned which include combat missions with specialised platforms. These can fly autonomously based on pre-programmed flight plans or more complex dynamic automation systems. To distinguish UAVs from missiles, a UAV is also defined as being capable of controlled, sustained level flight and powered by a jet or reciprocating engine. In addition, a cruise missile can be considered to be a UAV, but is treated separately on the basis that the vehicle is the weapon.

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UAV Classification

UAVs typically fall into one of six functional categories (although multi-role airframe platforms are becoming more prevalent): • Target and decoy—providing ground and aerial gunnery a target that simulates an enemy aircraft or missile • Reconnaissance—providing battlefield intelligence • Combat—providing attack capability for high-risk missions • Logistics—UAVs specifically designed for cargo and logistics operation • Research and development—used to further develop UAV technologies to be integrated into field deployed UAV aircraft • Civil and commercial UAVs—UAVs specifically designed for civil and commercial applications These can also be categorised in terms of range/altitude and the following has been advanced as relevant at industry events: • Handheld: 2,000 ft (600 m) altitude, about 2 km range

• Close: 5,000 ft (1,500 m) altitude, up to 10 km range • NATO type: 10,000 ft (3,000 m) altitude, up to 50 km range • Tactical: 18,000 ft (5,500 m) altitude, about 160 km range • MALE: (medium altitude, long endurance) up to 30,000 ft (9,000 m) and range over 200 km • HALE: (high altitude, long endurance) over 30,000 ft and indefinite range • HYPERSONIC: high-speed, supersonic (Mach 1-5) or hypersonic (Mach 5+) 50,000 ft (15,200 m) or suborbital altitude, range over 200 km • ORBITAL: low earth orbit (Mach 25+) • CIS Lunar Earth-Moon: transfer

The US Concept of Tier System

The US Army classifies tiers as under: • Tier I: Small UAV. Role filled by the RQ11A/B Raven. • Tier II: Short Range Tactical UAV. Role filled by the RQ-7A/B Shadow 200. • Tier III: Medium Range Tactical UAV. Role currently filled by the RQ-5A / MQ-5A/B Hunter and IGNAT/IGNATER, and now Extended Range MultiPurpose (ERMP) MQ-1C Warrior

Key Functions

Remote Sensing: UAV remote sensing functions include electromagnetic spectrum sensors, biological sensors, and chemical sensors. An UAV’s electromagnetic sensors typically include visual spectrum, infrared, or near infrared cameras as well as radar systems. Other electromagnetic wave detectors, such as microwave and ultraviolet spectrum sensors, may also be used, but are uncommon. Biological sensors are sensors capable of detecting the airborne presence of various microorganisms and other biological factors. Chemical sensors use laser spectroscopy to analyse the concentrations of each element in the air. Transport/Logistics: UAVs can transport goods using various means based on the configuration of the UAV itself. Most payloads are stored in an internal payload bay somewhere in the airframe. For many helicopter configurations, external payloads can be tethered to the bottom of the airframe. With fixed wing UAVs, payloads can also be attached to the airframe, but aerodynamics of the aircraft with the payload must be assessed. For such situations, payloads are often enclosed in aerodynamic pods for transport. Scientific research: Unmanned aircraft are uniquely capable of penetrating areas which may be too dangerous for piloted craft. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration began utilising the Aerosonde unmanned aircraft system in 2006 as a hurricane hunter. AAI Corporation subsidiary Aerosonde Pty Ltd of Victoria (Australia) designs and manufactures the 35-pound system, which

can fly into a hurricane and communicate near-real-time data directly to the National Hurricane Center in Florida. Beyond the standard barometric pressure and temperature data typically culled from manned hurricane hunters, the Aerosonde system provides measurements far closer to the water’s surface than previously captured. Reconnaissance & Surveillance: UAVs have a vital function to perform in the above context. In Iraq, a miniature UAV called Desert Hawk, weighing just 3 kg, made from expandable polypropylene, launched by a bungee cord and controlled through a portable computer was used extensively in cooperation with foot patrols aimed at disrupting insurgents and terrorists. In the Indian context, this function is vital in conventional conflicts and in internal security operations, such as counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism or anti-naxal operations where the requirement of surveillance is paramount so as to avoid jungle bashing and collateral damage. Armed attack: MQ-1 Predator UAVs armed with Hellfire missiles are now used as

platforms for hitting ground targets in sensitive areas. Armed Predators were first used in late 2001 from bases in Pakistan and Uzbekistan, mostly for killing known terrorist leaders inside Afghanistan. Since then, there were several reported cases of such killings taking place in Pakistan, this time from Afghan-based Predators. The advantage of using an unmanned vehicle, rather than a manned aircraft in such cases is to avoid a diplomatic embarrassment should the aircraft be shot down and the pilots captured, since the bombings took place in countries deemed friendly and without the official permission of those countries.

Varied Methodology

Interestingly, the US Air Force and Army use their individual UAVs differently. For the army, the UAV is a tool for the local combat commander. So much so, that each combat division has a squadron of UAVs, such as the Sky Warrior. Combat brigades will also get detachments (of two to four UAVs) as needed (even though the brigades always have several smaller Shadow 200 UAVs

UAS by Selex Galileo In the UAS sector, SELEX Galileo has full responsibility from the Mini-Macro to the tactical UAVs and leverages through the Group its wide experience in avioncs and a full range of payloads.

Falco

Mirach

The Falco The Falco UAV System, designed and manufactured by SELEX Galileo at the Ronchi dei Legionari site in Italy, is a tactical UAV System designed to supply command and control netcenters with a tactical overview of the operational scenario and target cueing in real time. Its characteristics of deployability, endurance, survivability and its wide suite of payloads make it suitable for missions of homeland security as well as civil and military surveillance . General description The capability of the Falco UAV System enables 7/24, all-weather persistent surveillance which allow it to perform missions ranging from border patrol, coastal watch, immigration control, law enforcement to power and pipelines surveillance, illegal fishery prevention and environmental monitoring. Falco features a fault-tolerant architecture which meets European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Airworthiness Guidelines for both civil and military oriented products. In addition to its inherent automatic Short-Take-Off ability from semi-prepared airstrips, the Falco air vehicle, can be launched from a pneumatic catapult in a tactical environment The Mirach 100/5 Integrated Aerial Target System The Mirach 100/5 is the standard high-performance reusable, multi-threat target, designed and manufactured by Selex Galileo, a Finmeccanica Company. In use with worldwide Armed Forces to train and qualify major Weapon Systems, the Mirach 100/5 delivers reliability and manoeuvrability, making it the best state-of-the-art, multi-role, target drone system on the market. General description The system is controlled by a Ground Control Station that allows mission planning and retasking, mission rehearsal and play back, operators training. A wide and flexible selection of mission payloads, installed inside the fuselage and under the wings, effectively complies with the requirements of most complex missile systems engagement scenarios for training and weapon systems test and evaluation Continued on page 30

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I n t er view

‘OPTICAL NETWORKING

is the only future-proof technology’ Sanjay Nayak, is the Co-founder, CEO & MD of Tejas Networks, Bangalore India. SP’s Land Forces (SP’s): Tejas claims to be a ‘leading enabler of high-performance telecom infrastructure’. Elaborate.

Sanjay Nayak (Nayak): Tejas pioneered the development of cost effective, next-generation SDH/SONET as well as Carrier Ethernet products that enable telecovm carriers to converge traditional voice-based transmission networks with the new data-dominated networks. We meet stringent reliability and uptime requirements of carriers and we consistently see over 99.999 per cent field performance for our products. Our products enable a seamless transition from traditional TDM based networks to the new intelligent packet-enabled networks. Tejas is a leader in the Indian telecom market and amongst the top-10 companies worldwide. The company’s products are being used in more than 50 countries around the world. SP’s: What other types of carrier Ethernet services does your company provide?

Nayak: Carrier Ethernet can be used to pro-

vide multiple services over a single network interface that is based on widely deployed Ethernet technology, but provides the reliability and resilience required by Carrier networks. For Voice over IP traffic that is now becoming a popular form of communication, there are strict very QoS guarantees that are required. Video conferencing and collaborative applications are handled by the multipoint and multi-cast capabilities of Carrier Ethernet. Highly reliable services used for connecting mission-critical data-centers can leverage the reliability and protection schemes available through the Carrier Ethernet technology. SP’s: Your company provides solutions for network planning, design and optimisation. Have these been offered to the defence forces?

Nayak: Tejas has been responsible for several pan-India network rollouts and has a strong background in network planning, implementation and operations. During our three

years of association with Indian defence, we have gained considerable understanding of their requirements and have had frequent dialogue with the defence network planning teams on the review and evaluation of various technologies, their relative applicability and merits. We have incorporated the same in our products and solutions. Network Management and Network Operations Software are our added strengths. SP’s: Optical fiber has a virtual monopoly as a communication medium and is also being used by the defence forces. Elaborate on the next generation of optical networks.

Nayak: Optical networking is the only scalable and future-proof technology that will enable future broadband networks that can carry several terabits of data. With defence forces needing more voice, video and data communication, they will need optical networks that are scalable, resilient, easy to manage and easy to troubleshoot. To address this, intelligent control planes and network management will be required in optical networking equipment, in addition to their capability to seamless carry large capacity voice, video and data traffic. SP’s: What are the products and services you have offered or propose to offer to the defence forces?

Nayak: We address the defence market in three broad areas. The first is the backbone network or the strategic network where our multi-service packet optical platforms and our Carrier Ethernet offerings are needed. The second is the Tactical Battle Area where we can provide ruggedised switches, optical access switches and routers. The third area is the flexible networking platform which has the potential to be adapted to various specialised applications. We also have capa-

bilities to enhance/customise our products and partner with other, larger defence contractors to provide a best-in-class solution. Of course, our strong base in India also allows us to provide a rich set of support services, which are very crucial to the defence forces. SP’s: Have you formed any joint ventures with defence PSUs or any other companies?

Nayak: We view the defence and other PSUs as a key asset of the country due to their long engagement and credibility with the defence forces. They have very good end-to-end system integration capabilities, and we complement them with our focused technology expertise, products as well as speed of execution, to offer an even more compelling solution to the Defence forces. We already have MoUs in place for collaboration with many PSUs and are enhancing the scope of these relationships to include joint-research and development of critical technologies and products. SP’s: Has the Ministry of Defence’s proposal of public-private partnership taken off?

Nayak: DPP-08 has been a positive development to encourage the participation of private sector in defence projects. While the PSUs have a lot of experience and system integration capabilities for defence, the private sector has a lot of technology and managerial talent to quickly develop leading-edge products and solutions that serve the specific need of Indian defence. As a nation, to achieve self-reliance in critical areas like communication and security, the collective effort and collaboration between public and private entities would give the desired results. SP For full interview, visit www.spslandforces.net

Solution providers for network centric warfare Strategic networks

Networking Platforms

Tactical networks Flexible product development Platforms for Defence Solution Providers

Highly resilient multiservice optical networking Connectivity in extreme battle conditions Tejas Networks is a pioneering telecom product company from India with a focus on optical networking products . Tejas builds innovative carrier class communication products based on Next Gen SDH/SONET, C/DWDM and Carrier Ethernet. Over 150,000 Tejas systems are deployed in service provider networks globally to deliver latest voice, video & data services. Tejas is proud of its association with Indian Defence. Our understanding of service provider needs combined with our knowledge of Defence specific requirements uniquely positions us to best address the communication needs of the Indian Armed Forces.

Visit us at DefExpo 2010 Hall 7G, Booth 7g1 Pragati Maidan, New Delhi

Future Ready, Today www.tejasnetworks.com 1/2010 SP’S LAND FORCES

Surveillance & Combat

Continued from page 28

assigned.) The air force uses Predator and Warrior class UAVs more as strategic reconnaissance aircraft. The teams that actually fly the larger air force UAVs (including Predator), and operate the sensors, do so from a base in the US (via a satellite link). When air force UAVs go overseas, only their handling and maintenance crews accompany them. The army sends everyone over. The army and air force also have different tastes in sensors carried in the UAVs. But in practical terms, the air force has been using Predators more by army rules recently. The air force and army have already agreed to cooperate on supporting Predator and Sky Warrior UAVs, which will be economical for both services. The basic difference is that the air force employs trained pilots for flying the UAVs while the army is not using pilots at all as operators. The army believes the future holds technological solutions for this problem. The air force also employs non-pilots for microUAVs (similar to the army’s five pound Raven), which are used to help guard air force bases. But for larger UAVs, the air force is concerned about collisions, with other UAVs or manned aircraft.

Requirements of the Indian Army

WWW.SPSLANDFORCES.NET

The Indian Army, with its multifarious operational challenges in varied terrain configuration comprising high mountains, plains and desert terrain, requires UAVs for tactical and strategic roles. So far it has sought the Searcher series of UAVs (Searcher 1 and 2) and Herons from Israel. It is now shopping for mini and micro UAVs for surveillance roles at unit level. Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO), under the aegis of Aeronautical Development Establishment (ADE), has been pursuing a UAV project with Nishant as the main product for the defence forces. One of the major technological challenges was to develop an ultra lightweight airframe to optimise the payload within the overall weight ceiling of 300 kg. This was successfully achieved by developing a laminated fibre reinforced composite airframe using glass/carbon resin systems, soft composite tooling and matched die-moulding fabrication process. Nishant: Uses a low speed pusher propeller driven by an engine of German origin. The 60 kg machine, ALVIS AR-801, is capable of producing 15 kg torque, and has an endurance of five hours at a height of 1,000 m. The UAV is launched from a Tatra heavy duty platform with a 14 m launch rail. The launcher provides an initial velocity of 170 kmph at 7° incline. Lakshya: The ADE has been working on other programmes like Lakshya—a high subsonic reusable target already operational in service. Kapothaka & Ulka: Kapothaka was developed as a technology demonstrator mini RPV to validate in-flight video transmission capabilities and to implement ground take off and parachute recovery. On the other hand Ulka is an air-launched supersonic target to simulate an aerial threat and to train surface to air missile crews. Its performance envelope covers realistic radar signatures over the speed range of 0.7 to 1.4 Mach and altitudes from 50 m to 13,000 m. It is the first Indian aerial vehicle to incorporate a canard configuration.

Future Developments

During Aero India 2005, India and Israel reportedly entered into a new partnership under which Israel will help India in its development of remote vehicles. Under the deal, Israel Aircraft Industries will assist ADE, India’s leading UAV laboratory, to develop: • The Rustam medium-altitude longendurance (MALE) UAV, • The Pawan short-range UAV, and • The Gagan tactical UAV. SP

SP’S LAND FORCE S 1 / 2 0 1 0

SELECTED ARMY UAVS IN USE ACROSS THE WORLD UAV Type / Specifications USA Shadow 200 (RQ-7A) Raven MQ-1C (Sky) Warrior

Mission

Payload

Speed (MPH. OR NO.)

Endurance (HR / Max Range (Mi)

Max Altitude (ft.)

Remarks

Multimission

EO/IR-SAR

131

6 hrs

16,500

in production

Recon / Surveillance EO/IR Target 4 AGM Hellfire or 8 AIM-92 Stinger Multi purpose EO/IR, EW, IRLS Target Various

25-60 155

1 hr / 0.5 mi 36 hr

10,000 29,000

under development Armed Attack UAV

125

8-12 hr / 238 mi

15,000+

in production

M 0.85

1.25 hr

40,000

Recon / Surveillance EO/IR

35-80

4 hr

10,000

BQM-147 Exdrone UK Buster

Recon/Multipurpose Various

2.5hr/30 min

5,000

Recon / Surveillance EO/IR

35-80

4 hr

10,000

launch from elastic-powered rail

Watchkeeper Raven

Recon / Surveillance Recon./surveillance TV, Flir

175-194 75 (cruise)

10 hr 3 hr + / 60 mi

15,000

Desert Hawk CHINA ASN-206

Recon./surveillance

TI and IR

40-80 km/h

75 min

1083

Catapult launch, parachute recovery. Miniature UAV Systems

Recon./ surveillance Target Recon./surv. /target Target

113

4-8 hr./80 mi.

R/c -

149 500

1 hr. 3 hr.

R/c

565

45 min.

Target

R/c

106

2.6 hr.

Recon./surv./ target acq. Recon./surv./ target acq. Recon./surv. /target acq. Recon / Surveillance Recon / Surveillance

TV, IR

127

12 hr./175 mi.

15,000

TV, IR

137

5 hr./62 mi.

15,000

TV, Flir

124

16 hr./155 mi.

18,500

250 Kg Various

207

40+ hr 20 hr

32,800 18,000

Flir

155

5 hr.

15,000

155

3.5 hr.

15,000

Day TV, Flir, SAR, Airborne relay Day TV, Flir, EW, SAR

12 hr./125 mi.

20,000

130

6 hr./125 mi.

17,000

ESM Flir SAR/ warhead Jammer

95 95 95

5 hr. 3.5 hr. + 4 hr. +

13,000 13,000 13,000

5 hr.

13,000

Based on KZO. In production for German army. In development for German army. 2005 entry into service. Based on KZO.

Skyeye MQM – 107E Streaker Buster

B-2 Changhong I Changkong IC D-4 ISRAEL Hunter Ranger Searcher Mk. 2 Heron Hermes 450 FRANCE Crecerelle Crecerelle-EW

Recon./surv./ target Comm. jamming

Sperwer-EC/LE

Recon./ multipurpose

Sperwer/Ugglan

Recon./target

GERMANY Fledermaus KZO Taifun

EW Recon./surv./target Recon. and attack

Tucan/Mucke INDIA Searcher Mk. 2

launch from elastic-powered rail several hundred produced since 1985

Made by Xian ASN Technology Group. Made by Beijing Aerospace University. Made by Nanjing Aerospace University. In production. US Army, French army operation. In production. In use in Israel.

Real-time video downlink. Deployed w/French army. EW version is for comm. jamming. In production. In development for recon/target and radar jamming. In production for Dutch, Swedish (UGGLAN), Danish, French and Greek armies

Recon./surv. /target acq./Arty adjustment & damage assessment Reconnaissance

TV, IR

125

16 hr./155 mi. approx

18,500

With IA

185

99.5 mi

11,810

trial

Recon.

8,202

8,200

Yak-060

Recon./EW

8,202

8,200

Tu-141 (VR-2 Strizh) Tu-243 (VR-3 Reys-D) M-932 Dan

Tactical reconnaissance Tactical reconnaissance Target

TV or EW jammer TV, IR, rad. det.

683

621 mi.

19,686

Entered service in 1997 as part of Stroy-PM system. Limited production in 1982 as part of Stroy-PM system. 152 built 1979-89.

TV, IR, rad. det.

584

118 mi.

16,405

Tu-300 is replacement.

Transponder

440

40 min.

29,500

Replacement for La-17. Recoverable, ground-launched.

PAKISTAN Vector Mk-2 Vector Mk-1 Jasoos HST Jasoos II Mukhbar

Medium Range Close Range Close Range Recon/Surveillance Recon/Surveillance

5 kg 20 kg 5 kg

120 205 km/h 140 km/h 160 km/h 220 km/h

5 hr 4.5 hr 1.5 hr 4-5 hr 1.5 hr

140 kts

14 hours

25,000ft

810 km/h

25,000ft

Has a range of 500 nautical miles Tactical Support

216 km/h

2, 25 hours 8-14 hours

Medium Range UAV Medium Range UAV

Nishant Russia Pchela 1

ITALY SKY-Y SKY-X Strix-A Falco

1.2 tons (Max take off weight) 1.2 tons (Max take off weight) Recon & Surveillance Surveillance -

MALE Class (Recon & Svl) UCAV (Fixed Wing)

Sources: www.uvs-international.org, www.aviationnow.com, www.defense-update.com, www.wikipedia.com

S t r ateg y & Ar mament

Restructure

Illustration: Ratan Sonal

CAPABILITIES Conventional response is not going to deter adversaries who are employing asymmetric strategies against the nation. The challenge is to find the appropriate balance between the old way of conducting war and the new. LIEUTENANT GENERAL (RETD) P.C. KATOCH

odernisation of the Indian Army (IA), the world’s third largest, is a complex issue. Continued aggression by statesponsored non-state actors, vast borders over inhospitable terrain and host of terrorist organisations within the country (some aided and abetted by adversaries) limit the possibilities of manpower reduction, diverting such cost savings towards modernisation. While the sub-conventional division of the continuum of war is expanding exponentially, the force has to be prepared for the entire spectrum of war, including limited wars in a nuclear backdrop—a reality in context of South Asia, particularly in the sub-continent. At the same time, “winning a war without fighting it” will continue to be the favoured global strategy giving rise to newer forms of warfare. IA’s 600-odd modernisation schemes, amounting to over Rs 70,000 crore, in the 11th Plan (2007 to 2012) continue to be encumbered with elaborate bureaucratic procurement processes and yearly surrender of much needed modernisation funds of the Defence Budget. The much hyped refinement in Defence Procurement Procedure over the years has done little to accelerate the pace of modernisation. A dispassionate analysis would indicate that the gap between the IA and China’s People’s Liberation Army apparently is widening exponentially in favour of the latter. There a need to accelerate the pace of modernisation of the IA, duly prioritised and executed within laid down time frames.

WWW.SPSLANDFORCES.NET

Future Trends in Warfare

Wars will continue to be an instrument of power; although direct all out confrontations between nations are less and less likely. Where wars do take place these will be short and intense, characterised by rapidly deployable and highly manoeuvreable ground forces that can leverage the effect of modern precision weapons, thereby avoiding collateral damage. Space will be more and more relevant to air, land and sea operations. Information operations, air and missile defence and cyber operations will have a telling effect on the war. Emphasis will be on standoff weaponry, stealth technologies and electronic counter measures. Change in declining possibilities of conventional war is attributable to key factors of globalisation, devastating effect of modern weaponry, sensitivity to large number of casualties, collateral damage and the crippling effects of war on economy of a nation. Nations with asymmetry in conventional forces will resort more and more to asymmetric war. While clashes of conventionally trained and equipped troops will continue in the present environment, covert operations and asymmetric strategies are becoming more important. Future trends will have greater emphasis on the sub conventional.

Focus would be on fighting and reducing the enemy through virtual and asymmetric wars and effect based operations with synergistic employment of diplomatic, economic, information operations, military and economic resources. Resource and weather warfare too are no more impossibilities. The erstwhile ‘Fog of War’ has expanded and encompassed the ‘Fog of Peace’ as well. The boundary between war and peace is blurred and state boundaries too are being made irrelevant by non-state actors. Today, we are confronted with a fluid, non-linear and adaptive battle space. Asymmetric wars have unleashed elusive inimical forces that present sketchy targets and fleeting opportunities highlighting the necessity of improved situational awareness, net-centric forces and requirement of near real time round the clock response all 365 days. While developments in technology lend to enhance combat potential, the same developments in technology, economy, culture and communications have enabled non-state actors into becoming more deadly. Employment of chemical, radiological and biological weapons by such forces is a real possibility. The constant fear of non-state actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction poses the greatest global threat with catastrophic consequences. Net Centric Warfare (NCW) capable forces will be more and more in evidence with enhanced situational awareness, capability of identifying, monitoring and destroying targets in near real time in a telescoped OODA loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act), with enhanced ranges and lethality. Aim would be to employ overwhelming force at the point of decision. Underpinning this promise are technologies that can create network architectures, comprising high quality sensors rapidly integrating data through myriad sources and speedily transmitting this fused and integrated data through the command and control echelons and centres, enabling the commanders greater situational awareness.

The Indian Scene

Asia has been the global strategic centre of gravity for some time now with a combination of rouge states, non-state actors and peer competitors. Developments in India’s neighbourhood, particularly in Pakistan and Afghanistan, have brought South Asia to the centre stage of sub-conventional conflict and instability. Additionally, terrorism, low intensity conflict motivated by economic disparity, religious fundamentalism, narcotics trade, threat of nuclear weapons falling in wrong hands, and other such scenarios, remain issues of concern for the region. Future threats would also encompass war on drugs, radical groups, control of resources and religious extremism. The use of space and cyber space has added a new dimension to conventional wars.

As the battlefields merge, the wars of the future would also be played where energy, trade, and aid can be used as a weapon. China, in its quest to develop greater Comprehensive National Power and emerge a major player in the world order, appears intent on muscle flexing southwards through unsettled borders, Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and Asia-Pacific. Future energy requirements prompt Beijing to reach for the Indian Ocean. Hence, China’s growing claims to so called “South Tibet” and Doklam Plateau, railway through the Karakorams, waterways and roads through Myanmar, ports in IOR and the “String of Pearls”, recent additives being the proposal to establish foreign bases, commencing Pakistan. Chinese defence cooperation (including nuclear, biological and chemical) and support to Pakistan is well known. According to a book published in Karachi in 2000, Zhou-en-Lai had suggested to Ayub Khan that Pakistan should prepare for prolonged conflict with India and raise a Militia Force to act behind enemy lines. Against such a backdrop, Chinese involvement in terrorist/separatist activities in the Northeast region, including through Maoists in Nepal, can hardly be discounted, especially with ULFA training camps in Chinese territory. China also has an extensive cyber warfare capability and perhaps willingness to use it more aggressively than any other country. Pakistan, meanwhile, has been waging asymmetric war against us for decades. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)Pakistan Army combine will continue to rule Pakistan; and the jihad factory of some 32,000 madrassas can be expected to continue churning out millions of jihadis annually. Pakistan’s proxy war aims are strategic and wider in scope, intentions not being Kashmir specific. It emerges from a smaller nation’s strategy of bleeding a major adversary through asymmetric warfare. Islamabad stands emboldened to strategically taunt India due to a combination of factors, like Delhi’s inability and restraint in not countering its designs effectively, Pakistan’s nuclear blackmail and collusion with China. Islamabad is also aware that US-Pakistan mutual dependency will remain critical vis-à-vis US-India needs in strategic and security values, at least in the short and mid terms, and especially till US presence remains in Afghanistan. The present government in Bangladesh is traditionally India friendly. However, the continuing problem of illegal migration and the emergence of radical groups in Bangladesh, ISI nexus and close military relations with China need monitoring. Back home, India is plagued with some three scores of terrorist organisations and the Maoists have created the biggest fault line, affecting 180 districts in 17 states. These terror organisations are exploitable by China, Pakistan’s ISI, al-Qaeda, Taliban and the Lashkar-e-Toiba.

With multifarious threats and challenges in the emerging environment, the key ones being related to terrorism, border management and maritime security, India’s dilemma is further fuelled by conventional and nuclear threats, asymmetric threats including terrorism, failed/failing states in the immediate neighbourhood and demographic assault. Against this backdrop, the country may face the following threats/conflict situations: • Conventional conflict that may be limited in nature with China, Pakistan or both in a nuclear backdrop or without it. This could either be preceded, succeeded or in combination of a period of irregular conflict, requiring low intensity conflict and stabilisation operations. • Chances of limited conflict are more across the Line of Control/Line of Actual Control, predominantly in mountains. However, its escalation elsewhere cannot be ruled out. • Nuclear backdrop is likely to restrict manoeuvre, albeit vertical envelopment may have greater role. Greater emphasis will be placed on firepower to achieve the military aim. • Boundaries between regular and irregular wars will remain blurred. Non-state actors may increasingly acquire conventional capabilities that were earlier the exclusive preserve of nation states. • Asymmetric strategies, including cyber warfare, will be employed by adversaries regularly. Enemy will aim at crippling the country’s combat potential before battle is joined. • Non-state actors/state sponsored nonstate actors may attempt simultaneous multiple 26/11s and even cause damage through cyber, financial, kinetic, chemical, radiological and biological attack. The dynamics of nuclear deterrence and escalatory control are more relevant against nation states. However, their employment through non-state actors by unethical neighbours is possible. • Conventional conflict/hybrid wars will see increasing use of standoff weaponry, PGMs, third dimension, space, air and sea power.

Trends in the Indian Army

The major trends of modernisation may be summarised as under: • Artillery Fire Power: The up-gunning of some 200 x 130mm M46 Russian medium guns to 155mm calibre enhancing the range to 40 km with extended range ammunition, induction of Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher (MBRL) and BrahMos I have catered to part of the much needed boost to the artillery. Planned acquisitions of 145 x ultra light M77 howitzers, 400 52-calibre 155mm towed artillery guns, 180 wheeled selfpropelled guns, Smerch MBRL system and Continued on page 33

SP’S LAND FORCES 1 / 2 0 1 0

CAE’s land simulation capabilities help

prepare Army soldiers for today’s challenges

AE has been providing advanced land simulation and training solutions to armies around the world for almost three decades. Now through CAE India Pvt Ltd, CAE is bringing its full breadth of simulation products, capabilities and expertise to India’s defence forces. Some of CAE’s portfolio for land forces includes simulation-based training solutions for command, control, and communications; forward observation; air defence; armored vehicle drivers and gunners; and command and staff training. These training systems have been helping prepare ground forces and their commanders to accomplish a range of missions on today’s battlefield, and CAE India is demonstrating several world-class products at Defexpo 2010. The nature of today’s battlefield is changing rapidly and placing more demands on the training systems required to support Army soldiers and commanders. Whether in combat or providing humanitarian aid, soldiers now face a wide range of situations that are often unplanned and unexpected. One answer to the training challenge is to make increased use of realistic, immersive synthetic environments in which you can subject the soldiers and battlefield commanders to challenging situations. Perhaps no other company better understands the use of modeling and simulation than CAE. This includes the application of modeling and simulation to not only traditional training, but also analysis as well as operational decision-making. CAE’s experience and expertise in simulation and synthetic environments is perfectly suited to providing armies with a full complement of simulation-based solutions – from the initial up-front use of simulation for

Restructure Capabilities

CAE and TATA have developed a comprehensive suite of T-90 tank training systems.

concept development and experimentation through to embedding simulation into operational systems so commanders can conduct real-time “what if ” scenarios. Simulation is still the most cost-effective means of training, and CAE’s track record and experience in the land simulation domain is extensive. Some of CAE’s most notable training systems for armies include: • Simulators for armored fighting vehicles and tanks; • Forward observation, close air support and forward air controller trainers; • Command and staff constructive training systems. CAE India and TATA Advanced Systems Ltd (TASL) have recently developed a complete T-90 training system that comprises three state-of-the-art simulation devices: a T-90 driver trainer, a T-90 gunner trainer, and a T-90 crew gunnery trainer. The comprehensive training solution offers the fidelity and realism required to efficiently and cost-effectively train the entire crew in the T-90 tank. Importantly, the crew can be trained individually or collectively as

CAEís INFRONT 3D forward observer trainer is in use by the British Army and is ideal for training forward air controllers in a high-fidelity synthetic environment.

part of a troop, and the T-90 trainers are housed in a container for operation from within and deployment to any location. “Our development of the T-90 training systems, as well as T-72 trainers, supports CAE’s decision to make CAE India the company’s centre of excellence for land simulation solutions,” said H.J. Kamath, President of CAE India Pvt Ltd. “The T-72/ T-90 training systems are a perfect example of developing world-class simulation technologies and capabilities here in India, while at the same time creating solutions with significant export potential.” The CAE Infront 3D forward observer trainer provides realistic training in the application and adjustment of artillery and mortar fire. In addition, the CAE Infront 3D trainer can be used by forward air controllers to train for guiding fighter pilots in the release of ordinance on a chosen target. CAE’s GESI Command and Staff Training System is a constructive simulation system designed to run complex and comprehensive exercises from the company level up to division level. Using

the CAE GESI system, commanders and their staff conduct normal training exercises in regular command posts while using operational equipment. They have no perceptible contact with the simulation. The CAE GESI system is then used to represent a virtual battlefield, including weapons, vehicles, aircraft, ground forces and more. The commanders determine the course of the simulation exercise by the decisions they make. The CAE GESI system is currently in service with six European nations for command and staff training from the battalion to brigade level. CAE is an experienced provider of land training systems for armies worldwide, and the company’s continued developments related to simulation for analysis, training and operations give CAE some unique and exciting capabilities in this area. To see some of CAE’s world-class simulation-based training solutions for land forces, visit CAE India’s booth (Hall 18, Booth #31G) at Defexpo 2010. SP

Continued from page 32

BrahMos II version will provide a further boost to the artillery fire power. • Armour: The tank strength is being boosted with the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) manufactured 124 x Arjun Main Battle Tanks, the IA having declined to accommodate more of these. In 2000, 310 x T-90S tanks were contracted ex-Russia. Indigenously assembled T-90S tanks have been under production since January 2004. About 500 such tanks will eventually form part of the inventory. • Infantry: Modification 4B to war establishment of a standard infantry battalion approved in 1998 has still not been fully implemented. Under this, the infantry battalion is to get enhanced surveillance (including night capability) and more potency of fire power. Battlefield surveillance radars (BFSRs), Hand Held Thermal Imaging, disposable rocket launchers, anti-material rifles, underbarrel grenade launchers and anti-mine/ Improvised Explosive Device vehicles have been added. Kornet-E anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) with thermal imaging sights have substantially increased the anti-tank capability. The Future Infantry Soldier as a System (F-INSAS) is being initiated to make the infantryman a weapon platform with situational awareness, increased lethality and sustainability in the digitised battlefield. F-INSAS is to be effected in three phases—Phase 1 includes weapons, body armour, clothing and individual equipment; Phase 2 is the Target Acquisition System and Phase 3 comprises the Computer Sub System, Radio Sub System, Software and Software

Integration. The infantry is planning to develop Phase 3 of F-INSAS on its own, rather than being part of the Battlefield Management System (BMS) of the army. This will amount to re-inventing the wheel. The mechanised infantry has been equipped with the BMP-2 ICV an 81 mm Carrier Mortar Tracked Vehicle. A command post, an ambulance, armoured dozer and engineer and reconnaissance vehicles have also been developed. The SS-11 B1 ATGM system has been replaced in missile battalions by MILAN shoulder-fired ATGMs. • Air Defence: Army air defence (AD) has been in a state of continued neglect. DRDO’s indigenous Akash mediumrange and Trishul short range surface-to-air (SAM) missile projects are far behind schedule. The SAM-6 and SAM-7 Kvadrat-Strela medium range missile systems are vintage and need replacement. The Tungushka and the OSAAK missile systems are on the obsolescence list and the 23mm, multi-barrelled Schilka tracked AD gun system is already obsolete. The fledgling BMD project of DRDO, too, is way behind and caters to a limited area. • Engineers: Remote delivery of mines, helicopter deliverable aerial bridges are nowhere on the horizon. Nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) protection capability is limited. Indigenous programmes for replacing the bridging equipment for linear obstacles is much delayed. Combat dozers for retrieving armoured vehicles are in critical short supply. • Information Systems: At the forefront of capacity building in NCW

is the Tactical Command, Control, Communications and Information (TacC3I) System under development, with various sub-systems catering to aspects of automated command and control, decision support, control of artillery fire, air defence, air space management, battlefield surveillance, battlefield management, and so on. The TacC3I is expected to be fully operational in the latter half of this decade. • Communications: The tri-service Defence Communication Network is some years away. The Tactical Communication System (TCS) has been inordinately delayed. The latter is also a setback to the required corps level test beds for the TacC3I sub systems. The Plan AREN system is mostly outdated. The ASCON at present has limited capability to provide data links. The army intranet is not wholly secure and the Army Wide Area Network (AWAN) caters only to text messaging albeit latter versions are planned to also have voice and video capability. • Surveillance: Searcher-I and Heron unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and a small number of Searcher-II have been introduced into service. While procurement of 15 armed UAVs is on the anvil, many more will be required.

Required Thrusts

Considering the emerging trends of warfare and the threats and conflict situations that India is likely to face in the future, thrust areas required by the army are as under: • Infantry is the cutting edge of the army, especially in confronting the emerging threats and new forms of warfare. There

is a crying need to boost its modernisation on fast track basis. The 400-odd Infantry and Rashtriya Rifles (RR) battalions, not counting the Assam Rifles (AR) and Infantry Territorial Army (TA) battalions, have a packed counter-insurgency/counter-terrorism schedule, which is likely to get tighter with continuing instability and strife in India’s neighbourhood. Every infantryman and every weapon must have night fighting capability. Critical shortages of compasses and Global Positioning Systems need to be plugged. Equipment and weapons for anti-terrorism tasks, like body armour, corner shots, stun grenades, rappelling ropes, enhanced mobility and micro UAVs, need to be provided. Modification 4B should be completed earliest and F-INSAS implemented. Phase 3 of F-INSAS (Computer Sub System, Radio Sub System, Software and Software Integration) should be developed as part of the BMS. Such capacity building should also be planned for RR, AR and Infantry TA battalions in the long run. Use of 120 mm mortars (discarded by artillery) by infantry even as single tubes in mountains should be examined. Mechanised reconnaissance and support battalions need better surveillance radars, fire-and-forget ATGMs and effective night fighting capability. • Vertical envelopment and aerial delivery of troops will be important in fast moving battle. Medium lift helicopters with night capability must be acquired by the army on a priority basis. The number held by the air force are grossly inadequate and with little night capability. Existing critical shortages in heavy drop equipment, paraContinued on page 37

1/2010 SP’S LAND FORCES

L a n d Warfare

IMPACT of

Illustration: Ratan Sonal

changes on Indian Military The Fourth Generation of Warfare will tend to be dominated by small, highly manoeuvrable, agile forces. The aim would be to cause enemy to collapse internally rather than physically destroying him. LIEUTENANT GENERAL (RETD) V.K. KAPOOR

“Would you please tell me which way I ought to go from here? Said Alice That depends a good deal, on where you want to go said the Cheshire cat.” —Lewis Carrol, Alice in Wonderland

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ndia faces three types of threats in the future. The traditional variety of threat from Pakistan and China, respectively, may take the form of limited, mid/high intensity, conventional wars. Internal threat and contemporary challenges, on the other hand, are likely to take the form of terrorism and insurgencies emanating from traditional adversaries, international terrorist networks, non-state actors, and/or from dissident groups of homegrown variety. The transnational nature of these threats and the increasing involvement of state actors in using sub-conventional conflicts to unleash ‘war by other means’ have exacerbated their complexity. Conventional conflicts are likely to be of short duration, and may vary from a few days to a few weeks, due to inevitable international pressures. Reaction time, during crises situations, especially in the case of terror attacks, will be very limited and, therefore, there is a constant need for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance to preempt attacks and react in a timely manner in case preemption is not feasible. Low intensity conflicts (LIC) fall under the category of ‘politico-military confrontation’ between contending states or groups. LIC ranges from high-grade internal security situations to the extensive employment of army in counter-insurgency operations. LIC may be waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational and military instruments. Such conflicts as opposed to conventional wars may prolong indefinitely because conflict resolution has to be achieved within many contradictory influences. India is likely to fight hybrid conflicts involving conventional as well as low intensity threats simultaneously. The types of threats are, by themselves, indicative of a threat-cum-capability based force structure in which the potential adversary’s capabilities and threats can both be countered by acquiring a full spectrum capability but without overstretching the countries resources. This could be achieved by employing a new joint war fighting doctrine which combines the strengths of each service through technology with innovative Operational Art evolved contextually.

Land Warfare Watersheds

Land warfare has witnessed three watersheds in which the change has been qualitative. The tactics of the era of the smooth bore muskets and the linear battle of lines and columns reflected the First Generation of warfare. The Second Generation warfare

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was characterised by the rifled weapon, breechloaders, barbed wire, machine-gun and indirect fire. Tactics were based on fire and movement and these remained essentially linear. The Third Generation warfare also reflected increase in battlefield firepower. This term was created by the US military in 1989, and refers to the tactics of warfare used consequent to the development of the blitzkrieg concept by the Germans. Essentially, this marked the end of linear warfare on a tactical level, with units seeking to out-maneuver each other to gain advantage instead of meeting in a head on clash. The German concept of ‘Blitzkrieg’, developed after the advent of the aircraft and tanks, brought about a major shift at operational level in World War II in which emphasis was placed on manoeuvre, speed and tempo to carry out wide outflanking movements avoiding enemy’s defences to strike at his rear areas in order to cause his psychological collapse. Germans exploited their tactical excellence to cause unprecedented defeats in the first two years of the war. Despite German successes in the early years of the war, Hitler’s impractical strategic aspirations and underestimation of Soviet capabilities led to the ultimate defeat and destruction of Germany. Americans picked up their ideas from the Germans and from the Russians of ‘Manoeuvre Warfare’, of simultaneous engagement of operational components of the enemy’s defensive system, to cause ‘Operational Shock’ by development of an operational momentum far exceeding the relative reaction capability of the opponent. Post Vietnam, doctrinal reform in the US Army led to adoption of “Active Defence” doctrine in the early 1970s. This was followed by a sharp revolution in doctrinal thinking, which led to second stage of post-Vietnam doctrinal reform and the evolution of the doctrine of Airland Battle. The tenets of depth, agility, initiative and synchronisation became the heart of the Airland Battle doctrine. The basic idea, applicable to offence and defence, was to throw the enemy off balance with an offensive from an unexpected direction, to seize and retain the initiative and defeat the enemy. The Airland Battle provided the conceptual basis for US Army to adopt an initiative oriented readiness posture. The concept developed along with principle of directing the main strike into the opponent’s principal operational weakness. The doctrinal reform was the symbol and basis of 1970s and 1980s modernisation of the US Army. It is now seen that the classical logic, legitimacy and effectiveness of employing force to safeguards national interests is becoming more intricate and sophisticated due to a large number of pressures on both political and military leaders. Non-

state actors do not seem to be deterred by the military sophistication of the western world. India, despite having one of the largest armies in the world and a very strong and effective air force and navy, has not been able to deter insurgencies and terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir and in the Northeast and has been at the receiving end of a Proxy War advanced and encouraged by Pakistan since 1989. Evidently, classical deterrence is less reliable against asymmetric challenges, such as insurgencies and terrorism, and yet military doctrine and force structures have been slow to adjust to these new security challenges.

Fourth Generation Warfare

William S. Lind and others of the US Army have deliberated, reflected and then written on the Fourth Generation of warfare in which the target is the whole of enemy’s society (ideology, culture, political structure, infrastructure and civil society). This generation of warfare, is characterised by dispersion, increased importance of actions by small groups of combatants, decreasing dependence of centralised logistics, high tempo of operation and more emphasis on manoeuvre. Concentration of men, materiel or firepower may become a disadvantage, as it will be easy to target. Small, highly manoeuvrable, agile forces will tend to dominate. The aim would be to cause enemy to collapse internally rather than physically destroying him. There will be little distinction between war and peace. It will be non-linear, possibly to the point of having no definable battlefields or fronts. Major military and civil facilities will become targets. Success will depend heavily on joint operations. If we combine these general characteristics with new technology we see one possible outline of the new generation of warfare. It therefore emerges that to defeat ideologically oriented but amorphous terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Toiba currently ensconced in Pakistan, will require the adoption of such concepts to defeat their designs.

Asymmetric Warfare

Asymmetric threats are not new and have been acknowledged since ancient times. Forces which are weaker have always employed surprise, new weapon and technology together with innovative tactics to deal with stronger forces. Today, non-state actors are employing the very same concepts in their terrorist activities against stronger opponents. The al-Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center and other targets in the US on September 11, 2001 were of this nature. Wikipedia describes asymmetric war as war between belligerents whose relative military power differs significantly, or whose strategy or tactics differ significantly. It goes on to state: “It is a conflict in which

the resources of two belligerents differ in essence and in the struggle, interact and attempt to exploit each other’s characteristic weaknesses. Such struggles often involve strategies and tactics of unconventional warfare, the ‘weaker’ combatants attempting to use strategy to offset deficiencies in quantity or quality.” Asymmetric means employed could also include nuclear, biological and chemical or radiological warfare, terrorist strikes against soft targets, information or cyber warfare. Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui of the People’s Liberation Army of China, in their highly publicised book, Unrestricted Warfare champion the art of “Asymmetrical Warfare”. They advocate that the more traditional practice of urban terrorism (as witnessed in Chechnya, Somalia, Northern Ireland, Kashmir and in Islamic Jihad against the Western World) combined with current technology tools as a method of imposing a severe psychological shock on the adversary. The highly imaginative colonels outline a new doctrine of total war by conducting asymmetrical or multi-dimensional attacks on almost every aspect of the opponent’s social, economic and political system. This new form of warfare, which borrows from ancient wisdom of Sun Tzu and his doctrines of surprise and deception, also employs civilian technology as military weapons “without morality” and with “no limits” in order to break the will of democratic societies.

Concept of Discriminate Force

Another viewpoint of the new generation of warfare is the “Case for Discriminate Force” put forward by Professor Ariel Levite and Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall. According to them, western democracies are facing increasing constraints on the use of their overwhelming military power because the logic of use of force to safeguard national interests is becoming less applicable. State and non-state adversaries who threaten important values and vital interests are no longer deterred by the western military might. At the same time, globalisation and the growing transparency of the battlefield and changing western value systems are compelling civilian and military leaders to wield military power selectively and to use fine judgment in the choice of the method adopted to achieve the political and military aims. It is obvious that even in the post-Cold War era, preventive diplomacy has to be backed by credible threat of use of force, but classic deterrence is not reliable against asymmetric challenges such as terrorism. The authors state that non-military means of coercion often fail to change the behaviour of adversaries while military responses have not changed fundamentally despite the new realities and constraints. Hence, they are of the view that unless the military changes its structures and methods

to adapt to the changing nature of war, it will be weakened in three respects. First, it will not be able to repel attack on its territory or its interests abroad. Second, it would not be able to coerce or compel the adversary to cease hostile action. And third, it would be weakened, as a viable war fighting tool should diplomacy, deterrence and compellence fail. Selective and discriminate use of force will reinforce the three areas mentioned and increase the effectiveness of military action—and this can come about through doctrinal and technological innovation. The three doctrinal imperatives advocated for making a successful transition to a discriminate force strategy in order to delicately balance the requirement of resolve and restraint include ‘Pre-emption’, ‘Image Wars’ and ‘Modifying the Concept of Victory’. Pre-emption: It is favoured because it affords the opportunity to reduce the challenge from non-state actors to national security before it manifests itself because conventional and nuclear capabilities do not deter terrorists and insurgent groups. Another benefit is that action is taken before the situation worsens to a stage when use of discriminate force is no longer feasible. It also prevents the adversary from misconstruing restraint as weakness or lack of resolve thereby encouraging the adversary in escalating his activities. India has refrained from using force against the terrorist groups in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir despite extreme provocations and this has encouraged them in increasing the tempo and intensity of their activities from time to time. Pre-emption requires high quality real time intelligence about the adversary. Image War: The second imperative focuses on influencing images and public perceptions in determining the outcome of

contemporary military engagements. It necessitates a thorough preparation to win this war. This led the US military to evolve the concept of “embedded journalists” during the Iraq War. Success in deriving political benefits from military action requires a good level of integration of military and non-military means to monitor the events in real time, share information with the public, refute false allegations, discredit and disable adversary’s communications with its troops and followers and promote a positive image without resorting to blatant propaganda. Modifying the Concept of Victory: The third imperative deals with the concept of victory. Victory has been perceived to be accomplished through death, destruction and territorial conquest. These were considered legitimate in a righteous war. Today these are not acceptable as objectives and even unintended consequences must be kept to a minimum. Thus the goal of war has to redefined as success rather than victory where success is measured as much in avoiding excessive civilian causalities, suffering and destruction as in furthering political goals underlying the military operations. This requires excellent management of the image war as well as improvement in war fighting capabilities to provide a greater range of options to political and military leaders.

Network Centric & Effects Based Operations

Network Centric Operations have also been described as high tempo, precise, agile style of manoeuvre warfare focused on Effects Based Operations (EBO) that derive their power from robust networking of geographically separated entities. EBO themselves are coordinated sets of actions directed at shaping the behaviour of friends, foes and neutrals in peace, crises and war. Iraq war

in 2003 and effects based targeting clearly demonstrated the changed paradigm from old war to new—from former military objectives of exhaustion and attrition to the more direct achievement of control utilising a far smaller scale of force and involving less ground combat. This implies timely, appropriate and skillful use of all or selected element(s) of national power, which include political/diplomatic, economic, technological, social, psychological, information/ media and military among others. Timely sharing of information and intelligence results in increased speed of command, higher tempo of operations, greater lethality and increased survivability. In essence, therefore, Network Centric Warfare advocates and enables integration and “jointmanship” in which the three services, in the Indian context, are lagging behind despite all their diplomatic eloquence from time to time. The final aim is to achieve strategic (political) objectives of war with the least amount of tactical effort which, incidentally, is also the essence of “Operational Art”. Hence, “jointness” and “integration”, together with innovative Operational Art, are vital parameters of this type of warfare. At the national and military strategic levels, the Indian military continues to underplay and ignore these issues. Its so called “Jointness” is neither functional nor formalised.

Use of Air/Space Power & PGWs

The vital characteristics of modern air and space power are its reach, responsiveness, concentration and flexibility. Modern multirole fighter aircraft together with force multi-pliers, like the AWACS, networked through C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers and intelligence,

surveillance and reconnaissance) capabilities, can be configured to undertake any type of offensive role and deliver a wide variety of conventional or non-conventional munitions. Even transport aircraft and helicopters can be used to deliver weapons in addition to their primary role of logistic support. The flexibility of airpower is limited only by the imagination of the user. With the advent of precision guided munitions and target designation, modern technology has given airpower the capability of destroying targets with single digit CEP and with least amount of collateral damage. Given the wherewithal, these characteristics endow air power with the ability to psychologically and physically imbalance an opponent and achieve strategic aims set by the national leadership with highly selective employment of land forces. This calls for a change in the methodology of military operations. It promises a capability of achieving operational and strategic level objectives with speed and precision and with selective use of the army. The Indian armed forces also require enhanced intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capability, and a greater quantity and more variety of precision munitions, but foremost is the need for national will for an “air-first” response considering that the Indian Air Force was made to sit out the war in 1962 and in Kargil, the air response was delayed as it waited to be “cleared” by the government. Such “operational disconnects” could prove embarrassing in the next war.

Impact on the Indian Army

The Indian Army is organised, equipped and trained for third generation, industrial age, low and medium technology, conflicts. The threat from traditional adversaries requires Continued on page 36

1/2010 SP’S LAND FORCES

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Impact of changes on Indian Military

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Continued from page 35

preparation and readiness for high intensity conventional conflicts in addition to low intensity wars and internal strife. The above concepts find relevance in the entire spectrum of conflict but more effectively in low intensity spectrum and would need detailed examination and contextual amendments before adoption. The army’s traditional methods of war fighting in conventional conflicts favour deliberate set piece military operations against fixed defences and, hence, offensive operations are attrition oriented and tactically biased. These need to be changed in favour of manoeuvre both in the mountains and in the plains. Tri-service planning and execution should be resorted to at the operational level through integrated/joint staff work. The Indian Army deploys a large number of combat formations (pivot formations) in defensive operations and has considerable staying power and exceptional resilience but this capability will have to transformed into a dual capability for undertaking offensive and defensive operations as per the prevailing operational requirement. Achieving political objectives of war in short duration conflicts waged at short notice demands a nuanced capability for offensive operations in limited conventional conflicts and LIC environment involving counterinsurgency and counter terrorism operations. The new structures must include rapid deployment forces, smaller fully integrated strike forces (integrated with air power) for the initial stages of offensive operations followed by larger “follow up” formations should the war last longer than anticipated, and forces for LIC, and for out of area contingencies. India would also need integrated Special Forces for Special Operations for internal and external use and a robust army aviation force capable of undertaking close support aviation tasks on the battlefield. Modern weapons and equipment will have to include, among others, larger quantum of army aviation comprising attack

load data. NOA is designed for snipers who operate under harsh environmental conditions, and need to detect and accurately engage targets at long ranges reaching more than 1,000 meters. Mepro MOR – multi-purpose, multiactivated “red dot” reflex sight with laser designators, provides an answer for every situation. Mepro MOR is the

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helicopters, troop lifting helicopters and helicopters for observation and liaison; long range artillery capable of firing precision guided ammunition; land attack cruise and ballistic missiles, mobile air defence weapons capable of destroying multi-role fighters at different altitudes and ranges, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance means to achieve C4ISR capability. The requirement for restructuring will have to be met through reengineering of the existing forces. Eastern theatre against China, neglected in recent times, will require additional formations for creation of an offensive capability in the mountains. Inter and intra service network centricity will enable coherent jointness which facilitates battle space awareness, enhanced command and control, synergised application of force, focused logistics and protection.

Leadership & Command Style

The Indian Army has an excellent record of junior leadership, but the higher leadership, largely, remains mired in conservative attrition oriented methodologies. The command style is generally authoritative and excessively dominating, which prevents intellectual growth of junior and middle level leadership and encourages sycophancy, resulting in mediocrity being pushed up, in substantial measure, to senior ranks. Beyond the rank of major general, in the complex arena of operational art which requires versatility, good character and intellect, the promotions are age-based, and expertise and competence, quite often, get sacrificed for a younger age profile. These are some of the biggest drawbacks of the current Indian Army. Therefore, to adopt the “Directive Style of Command” which is suited for future conflicts, it will require a change of culture within the army—not an easy task without resorting to wide ranging reforms and adopting new training methods. So far as “jointness” and synergy between the services are concerned, it

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is disappointing to note that in the 21st century the Indian Army, and indeed the Indian Navy and the Indian Air Force, are still planning for conflicts essentially service wise, the way it was done in the early years of World War 2. Doctrinal differences, lack of suitably integrated/joint organisations,

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poor knowledge and experience of joint staff work and bereft of networked communications, the Indian armed forces lack the organisational culture and response to effectively fight future conflicts. SP The author is a former Commandant of the Army War College.

Restructure Capabilities

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chutes (including for combat free fall), radio beacons for drop zones, rappelling ropes, airborne equipment and paratrooping helmets must be filled. • Special Forces (SF) are force multipliers in times of both war and peace. The IA has seven SF units and plans are afoot to raise the number to nine in the next five years. SF have wide applications across the entire spectrum of conflict, more so as a controlled response along the escalatory ladder in the emerging strategic environment. Not a mere tactical tool for conventional war, they have ample scope of employment to face challenges of terrorism, information, asymmetric and NBC warfare. While SF should be central to asymmetric response, asymmetric warfare does not equate automatically to a physical attack. The focus should be to ensure that SF look primarily beyond borders to nip asymmetric threats in the bud and to control the fault lines of the country’s adversaries. Their tasking should include Asymmetric Warfare, Unconventional / Fourth Generation Warfare, Special Operations, Reconnaissance, Psychological Operations, Counter Proliferation and the like. Equipping of SF is lagging woefully. “Packaged Equipping” of sub-units has not taken off and critical equipment, like Laser Target Designators, are yet to be provisioned. The army’s emphasis has been on expansion, ignoring the universally acknowledged Four SF Global Truths—one, humans are more important than hardware; two, quality is better than quantity; three, Special Forces cannot be mass produced, and four, competent Special Forces cannot be created after emergencies arise. It would be prudent to first consolidate the existing seven SF bat-

•

talions and fully equip them before adding any more. Additionally, the army must not succumb to the clamour for “converting” Parachute Battalions to SF role as new raisings have distinct advantages and given that the para capability itself needs to be expanded. UAVs over the years have developed into sophisticated air breathing hunter-killer platforms. Armed UAVs need to be inducted in large numbers. All future acquisitions should be weapon mounted. Low Observable Technologies, like in stealth aircraft, should be applied to all UAVs/ Micro UAVs and helicopters. All tanks and infantry carrier vehicles (ICVs) must have night combat capabilities. Capability to fire missiles through the tank gun needs to be explored. Artillery modernisation must cater for maximum Precision Guided Munition (PGM)/ TGM/top attack ammunition. Weapon Locating Radars and Medium range BFSRs need to be inducted on priority. AD needs urgent holistic review and existing vintage weaponry replaced with night capable and state-of-the-art on emergent basis. The army’s capacity building must include remote delivery of mines through artillery as well as through helicopters. Indigenous programmes for replacing vintage bridging equipment must be speeded up. Net Work Centricity provides asymmetric advantages including seizure of initiative. The TacC3I project must be accelerated to the maximum extent. Electronic Warfare System and Electronic Intelligence System must be fully integrated into the TacC3I and brought under a single controlling authority. Communications need focus. Not only

Prithvi Missile

should establishment of the TCS be accelerated, concerted efforts are required to ensure an Interim TCS that can cater for Corps level test beds for the TacC3I and fully support the fielding of its various components. Additionally, the army intranet should be made fully secure to ensure proper utilisation of the AWAN and enable e-learning of classified course syllabi. • No ‘major’ organisational change has really been affected in the IA since the establishment of the RAPIDs (Reorganised Army Plains Infantry Division). The ongoing study on ‘Transformation of the IA’ needs to examine reorganisation to meet the future challenges. • It is abundantly clear that ‘jointness’ and seamless integrated operations will be the way for the future. Joint doctrines by themselves cannot suffice in absence of joint organisations. The army, therefore, needs to support bi-service/tri-service commands with lateral and horizontal integration with naval and air forces rather than resist the same.

Adapt & evolve

Pakistan and China are states which may

deliberately instigate or become embroiled in internal, regional, or great power conflict in the coming decades. Pakistan faces the backlash from some of the dozens of militant groups it has fostered and supported in an effort to influence its neighbours. Internal and external security are meshed today more than ever before. Conventional response is not going to deter adversaries who are employing asymmetric strategies against the nation. Italian army general Giulio Douhet had stated back in 1921, “Victory will smile upon those who anticipate changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after changes occur.” The challenge is to find the appropriate balance between the old way of conducting war and the new. In other words, restructure organisations, forces and doctrines—and, perhaps most importantly, mindsets—in order to address the changing nature of threats in the new environment. The IA’s modernisation programmes should be in sync with the emerging threats and types of conflict it would have to engage in. SP The author has recently retired as Director General, Information Systems of Indian Army.

1/2010 SP’S LAND FORCES

S e m inar Repor t

Army Air Defence in 21st Century Deliberations highlighted the urgent and imperative need for modernisation and upgradation, and induction of an integrated family of AD weapon systems LIEUTENANT GENERAL (RETD) NARESH CHAND

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Session I

The first session of the seminar focused on modern air threats and the measures required to counter these. Major General V.K. Saxena, Additional Director General AAD opened the session by speaking on the ‘Changing Contours of Air Threat and Counter Measures During the 21st Century’. The officer gave a detailed account on the multiplicity of threat platforms against the backdrop of Electronic Warfare, shape of future surveillance threat, impact of transition from high energy warfare to data centric warfare and of Directed Energy Weapons. He then proposed an array of futuristic family of AD weapon systems integrated with C4I2 (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Information, Intelligence) battle management system. He also suggested Ballistic Missile Defence to counter the threat from ballistic missiles. An update on ‘US Army Pacific Air and Missile Defence (AMD)’ was presented by

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Brigadier General John Seward, Deputy Commanding General, US Army Pacific Command (USARPAC). In his vision statement, the officer gave an overview of the USARPAC and elaborated upon the Mission Essential Task List of the 94th Army Air and Missile Defence Command which dealt primarily with the integration of joint missile defence programmes. He gave an update on the current US system, including THAAD, Patriot, Avenger, Sentinel and Counter Rocket Assisted Munitions, as also an insight into some of the futuristic systems of the US. ‘Indian Air Defence Control and Reporting (C&R) System’ was presented by Air Vice Marshal Daljit Singh, ACAS (AD) in which the speaker gave an insight intro the AD Battle Management System at national level. The paper on ‘Integrated Air and Missile Defence—A Conceptual Framework’ was presented by David Hartman, Director– Ballistic Defence, Patriot Programme, Raytheon, USA. He elucidated on the AMD integration by underlining the latest threat envelope from theater ballistic missiles (TBMs) and non-TBMs/Air Breathing Threat (ABT). The speaker concluded that the end state of the concept of Integrated AMD must include the four basic tenets of AD: mix, mass, mobility and integration.

Defence Minister Antony complimented the AAD for the commitment and dexterity in their service to the nation and highlighted the need of ensuring speedy induction of new equipment Laurent Duport, Strategy and Business Development Director, Thales, France spoke on the ‘Tactical Considerations for Operational Deployment of Air Defence System for a Field Army’. Furnishing an elaborate account of the air threat in the battlefield, he suggested effective solutions. Speaking on ‘An Industrial Perspective in the AD C&R System’, C.S. Venkatraman, General Manager-Tech Tata Power Strategic Electronics Division, presented a comprehensive AD solution keeping the joint requirement of the Indian Air Force and Indian Army in mind. The ‘RED SKY’ System–Enhancing the MANPAD into VSHORAD System’ was discussed at length by Bharat Malkhani, Chairman Max Aerospace Limited, and Colonel (Retd) Amnon Ben David, Head of Critical Infrastructure Protection and AD Department, Israel Military Industries

Limited. Spelling out the objectives, the speakers elaborated on the threat envelope and stated that the main issue was to address the low level threat.

Session II

Post–lunch, the session was dedicated to the identification of emerging technologies in various fields, such as guns, missiles and radar systems. A presentation on ‘Integrated AD of Combat Zone’ was made by Major General Bhaskar Chakravarty, MG Army AD, Western Command. The officer elucidated the structure of integrated AD system and outlined the challenges and (Top to bottom) Defence Minister A.K. Antony lights the lamp complexities of accompanied by Lt Gen Ram Pratap, DGAAD; SP’s Editor-inintegrated employChief Jayant Baranwal with the Defence Minister; Air Chief Marshal P.V. Naik and Chief of Army Staff General Deepak ment of AD system Kapoor with the Defence Minister in the combat zone and their futuristic requirements. ‘Modern trends in Integrated AD’ was delivery systems, sensors including their platforms and fire control systems, includpresented by Dr R.R. Panyam, Project ing design improvements. ‘Futuristic Fire Director Akash, Defence Research and Development Laboratory. The speaker gave Control Radar (FCR) System’ was preout the latest and future trends, includsented by A. Ravi Sankaran, Additional General Manager, Bharat Electronics ing emerging indigenous capability of the Limited. The speaker gave a brief on role industry in AD systems, particularly in missile technology. V.S. Noronha, Head of FCRs, the present air threat and trends in modern technology. Defence Business, Tata Motors Limited elucidated on ‘Mobile Platforms for AD The last presentation of the session was on ‘Trends in Ground Based AD Weapon System’. The speaker gave a brief on the System: Emerging Gun Technologies’ by long association of Tata Motors with the Fabian Ochsner, Vice President Marketing defence services and thereafter focused on the essential requirements of mobile AD and Product Management, Rheinmetall AD, Germany. The speaker deliberated system ranging from 4x4 type vehicles upon the evolution of AD giving out upto 12x12 variants for ABM launchers. ‘Integrated Air and Missile Defence changing nature of air threat, inputs of a (IAMD)–Methods and Operations for 21st German case study of threat development, the requirement of enhanced area AD and Century’ was presented by Charles C. Brown, Programme Manager Sr, Advanced finally the cost to kill economic factor. AD, Lockheed Martin Missile and Fire Each session ended with interaction Control, USA. The IAMD, he informed, between the speakers and the audience. was a comprehensive system being develSpelling success oped by Lockheed Martin. He stated the The valedictory session was chaired by functions of the IAMD and presented the issues concerning integration and Lieutenant General J.P. Singh, AVSM, Deputy Chief of Integrated Defence brought out the benefits of such a system. ‘Innovative Technologies for AD’ was preStaff (Perspective Planning and Future Development), Headquarters Integrated sented by M.K. Kundawala, Technologist (Mechanical System), Larsen & Turbo Defence Staff. On the whole, the seminar Limited. The speaker gave the status of the was well received by the large number of Indian industry with respect to the know defence personnel, including the foreign how and expertise in AD gun upgrades, and civil industry delegates, who actively ammunition handling systems, weapon participated in the deliberations. SP

Photographs: Abhishek / SP Guide Pubns

rmy air defence (AAD), and its myriad and complex aspects, attracted a large number of experts from India and abroad who voiced their views along with senior army officials at an international seminar organised by the Confederation of Indian Industry in Delhi on January 13. Inaugurated by Defence Minister A.K. Antony, Chief of Army Staff General Deepak Kapoor graced the event as the guest of honour. Delivering the keynote address, Lieutenant General Ram Pratap, Director General AAD highlighted the growing lethality and severity of the air threat with rapid advances in the field of avionics, stealth capabilities of aerial platforms, coupled with increase in the standoff ranges of munitions. Emphasising that suitable counter measures must be put in place to address the threat holistically, he stressed that AAD is looking for modern high technology equipment which is not manpower intensive. In his inaugural address, the Defence Minister complimented the AAD for the commitment and dexterity in their service to the nation and highlighted the need of ensuring speedy induction of new equipment. He stressed on active participation by the Indian industry in defence production. The present ratio of indigenous production and equipment ex-import is 30:70, he pointed out, noting that there was a lot of scope for the Indian industry to participate. He expressed hope that the ratio would be reversed to 70:30 by the year 2017. Deliberations in the seminar highlighted the urgent and imperative need for modernisation and importance of upgradation, besides stressing on the induction of an integrated family of AD weapon systems and flagging the areas where the industry can pitch-in to provide the required technologies.

N ews i n B r i ef India to buy Special-Ops all-terrain vehicles

The Indian Army has issued a request for information (RFI) regarding the purchase of a large number of all-terrain vehicles that can travel in snow-bound areas, marshes, creeks, beaches and deserts. The RFI has already been issued by the Defence Ministry to domestic and foreign manufacturers for the procurement of an undisclosed number of high-utility vehicles that can accommodate 10 fully-armed men. The vehicles will be used by troops for patrol duties in difficult terrain operable in high-altitude areas with the ability to cross crevasses. Additional features of the vehicles include a Global Positioning System (GPS) powered by its own electrical systems, wind and temperature tachymeter, fire extinguisher, external storage facility for rappelling ropes, ice aces, pick axes and shovels, and two 20l warming fuel jerry cans. Other attachments to the vehicle would include all-way blades, a rotary snow blower, a snow cutter and a tilt trailer. The RFI directed manufacturers to transfer the technology for manufacturing the vehicles in India in the future. The Indian Army is likely to procure both wheeled and tracked all-terrain vehicles, which are required to have convertible rack and seat system.

■ US Army to unveil first ray gun vehicle

Energy Systems Vice President Gary Fitzmire said the demonstration programme had successfully transitioned from the design phase to the fabrication phase. “This transformational, solid-state laser weapon capability will provide speed-of-light, ultra-precision capability that will dramatically improve warfighters’ ability to counter rocket, artillery and mortar projectiles,” Fitzmire said.

■ US Army to purchase long-endurance hybrid airship

The US Army has shown interest in buying a long-endurance hybrid airship to be used on surveillance missions in Afghanistan, and has issued military contractors with a request for proposals. A request for proposal for the long-endurance multi-intelligence vehicle (LEMV) contract is scheduled to be issued by Space and Missile Defense Command on January 29. The request outlines that the aircraft could be optionally manned but should be able to fly for up to three weeks with multiple intelligence payload of up to 1,134 kg at speeds of up to 80 kt. The National Defence Industrial Association has formed a consortium to support the LEMV project, which has already shown interest in Lockheed Martin’s Skunk Works prototype P791hybrid airship. The US Army says it will spend up to $76 million (Rs 355 crore) on the LEMV acquisition process in FY 2010.

■ Springer all-terrain vehicle for the British Army

The US Army will mount a laser cannon on a heavy expanded mobility tactical truck being delivered to Boeing in an effort to unveil the world’s first ground combat ray gun vehicle. The Oshkosh Corporationbuilt 20t, 8×8 wheeled blaster-lorry will be known as the high-energy laser tactical demonstrator and will be based in a US military base abroad. Boeing Missile Defense Systems Directed

S h o w Calender 15 February – 18 February Defexpo India 2010 Pragati Maidan, New Delhi, India URL: www.defexpoindia.in 2 March – 3 March Unmanned Aircraft Systems Conference Sheraton San Diego Hotel & Marina, San Diego, California, USA URL: www.ttcus.com 3 March – 4 March Border Security 2010 Crowne Plaza Rome St Peter’s Hotel & Spa, Rome, Italy URL: www.smi-online.co.uk 17 March – 18 March Irregular Warfare Conference Sheraton National Hotel Arlington, Arlington, VA, USA URL: www.ttcus.com 23 March – 24 March Cyber Security Conference Sheraton National Hotel Arlington, Arlington, Virginia, USA URL: www.ttcus.com 24 March – 26 March Future Artillery 2010 Hotel Russell, London, UK URL: www.future-artillery.com

Skylark II UAV, Israel

The Skylark II is a close-range tactical unmanned air vehicle (UAV) system principally designed for Israeli, Canadian and Korean defence forces to carry out intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance operations. The UAV was designed and manufactured by Elbit Systems. The Skylark II is a man-packed, hand-launched mini UAV system designed to operate in the battlefield using deployable Humvee-class field vehicles. It can be operated by a two-person crew from a ground control station (GCS). The vehicle is incorporated with a built-in launcher, GPS, a night camera and a laser marker. It is designed to perform brigade-level operations. It is self-reliant and can capture high-resolution images and videos of battlefields under adverse weather conditions. The Skylark II is equipped with an electro-optical/infrared multi-sensor, a cross-coupled display, a thermal imager, a laser illuminator and an optical laser designator, which is used for targeting battlefields. The thermal imager is used to capture high-resolution images during the night by penetrating through clouds, rain, smoke, fog and smog. The Skylark II features a payload of 10 kg and has a flight endurance of six hours. It can operate in medium and low altitudes. It has a service ceiling of 4,572 m and a maximum altitude of 16,000 ft. The maximum take-off and payload weights of the aircraft are 43 kg and 10 kg, respectively.

■ The Springer is an all-terrain vehicle developed for the British Army by UK-based Enhanced Protection Systems. The vehicle supports British troops in Afghanistan. The new vehicle fleet was delivered to the army in summer 2009. The vehicles can be deployed in landing zones to support airborne and light infantry units and used to move combat supplies from helicopter landing sites to forward operating bases. Designed as a light role load carriage platform, Springer is based on the US-made Tomcar all-terrain vehicle (ATV) platform. Tomcar first entered into service with Israel’s defence forces as a patrol vehicle. The two-seater British version design incorporates basic armour. It can accommodate two crew members. Springer vehicles have rear cargo beds to carry loads of up to 1t, which is high in comparison with similar ATVs. In addition to the rear cargo bed, all Springers are fitted with a load tray in front of the vehicle to carry an additional 100 kg of equipment. A roof section is also available for the transportation of electronics countermeasures packages. The payload capacity has been optimised through using light armour to achieve weight reductions. The Springer is fitted with weapons holders to carry light support weapons. SA80 A2 standard assault rifles are available for two crew members. The SA80 can be fitted with a SUSAT sight and a common weapon sight. Other weapons include a C7 rifle or a Minimi, a fully automatic light machine gun. The vehicle can also be fitted with a general purpose machine gun mount.

■

BAE unveils first modernised howitzer

A new modernised howitzer vehicle for the US Army has been unveiled by BAE Systems at its York facility in Pennsylvania, US. The upgraded Paladin integrated management (PIM) is the next-generation howitzer in the M-109 Paladin family of combat proven weapon systems.

■ Ap p o i n t m e n t s • Lieutenant General V.K. Singh, PVSM, AVSM, YSM, ADC, at present GOC-in-C, Eastern Command, has been appointed Chief of the Army Staff in the rank of General with effect from the afternoon of March 31. • Lieutenant General G.M. Nair, SM, VSM has assumed charge as the Military Secretary of the Indian Army on February 1.

Publisher and Editor-in-Chief Jayant Baranwal Editor Lt General (Retd) V.K. Kapoor Assistant Editor Arundhati Das Senior Technical Group Editor Lt General (Retd) Naresh Chand Contributing Editor Air Marshal (Retd) V.K. Bhatia Copy Editor Sucheta Das Mohapatra Special Correspondent Ruchika Chawla Assistant Photo Editor Abhishek Singh Sub-Editor Bipasha Roy Contributors India General (Retd) V.P. Malik, Lt General (Retd) Vijay Oberoi, Lt General (Retd) R.S. Nagra, Lt General (Retd) S.R.R. Aiyengar, Air Marshal (Retd) Vinod Patney, Major General (Retd) Ashok Mehta, Major General (Retd) G.K. Nischol, Brigadier (Retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, Brigadier (Retd) S. Mishra, Rohit Sharma Europe Andrew Brookes (UK) USA & Canada Lon Nordeen (USA) Anil R. Pustam (West Indies) South Africa Helmoed R. Heitman Chairman & Managing Director Jayant Baranwal Admin & Coordination Bharti Sharma, Survi Massey Design Associate Art Director: Ratan Sonal Layout Designs: Rajkumar Sharma, Vimlesh Kumar Yadav Sales & Marketing Director Sales & Marketing: Neetu Dhulia Head Vertical Sales: Rajeev Chugh Sales Manager: Rajiv Ranjan Manager Ad-Sales: Tushar Verma SP’s Website Sr. Web Developer: Shailendra P. Ashish Web Developer: Ugrashen Vishwakarma Published bimonthly by Jayant Baranwal on behalf of SP Guide Publications Pvt Ltd. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, photocopying, recording, electronic, or otherwise without the prior written permission of the publishers. Printed in India by Kala Jyothi Process Pvt Ltd © SP Guide Publications, 2010 Annual Subscription Inland: Rs. 600 • Overseas: US$180 Email: subscribe@spguidepublications.com Letter to Editor editor@spslandforces.net For Advertising Details, Contact: guidepub@vsnl.com neetu@spguidepublications.com rajeev.chugh@spguidepublications.com r.ranjan@spguidepublications.com tushar@spguidepublications.com SP GUIDE PUBLICATIONS PVT LTD POSTAL ADDRESS Post Box No 2525, New Delhi 110 005, India Corporate Office A 133 Arjun Nagar, Opp Defence Colony, New Delhi 110 003, India Tel: +91(11) 24644693, 24644763, 24620130 Fax: +91 (11) 24647093 Regd Office Fax: +91 (11) 23622942 Email: guidepub@vsnl.com Representative Offices BANGALORE, INDIA Air Marshal (Retd) B.K. Pandey 534, Jal Vayu Vihar, Kammanhalli Main Rd, Bangalore 560043, India. Tel: +91 (80) 23682534 MOSCOW, RUSSIA LAGUK Co., Ltd, Yuri Laskin Krasnokholmskaya, Nab., 11/15, app. 132, Moscow 115172, Russia. Tel: +7 (495) 911 2762, Fax: +7 (495) 912 1260 www.spguidepublications.com www.spslandforces.net RNI Number: DELENG/2008/25818

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