The Statesman, December 2014

NOVEMBER 2014

REARMING THE ARCHIPELAGO How a postwar Japan reconiliates its aversion to militarization

CLARITATE DEXTRA Vol. 2 No. 2

Penn

Penn students and local elections

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Cover Story

Militarization of Japan Republican

Legalization of gay marriage

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Rand Paul’s foreign policy

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Conservatism

Peter Viereck and conservatism Legacy

Magna Carta

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16 18

November 2014

Dear Reader, T

hese past few months have been an exciting time for The Statesman. We have renewed and expanded upon our commitment to furthering intelligent, informed conservative discourse and providing a lively, discourse-driven community for right-of-center students at Penn. In September, we hosted Donald Devine, former Director of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management in the Reagan Administration, who spoke about his experience in the White House and about the challenges facing effective governance today. Moving beyond our engaging speaker events, we are pleased with the presence that The Statesman has developed on Penn’s campus. Intrigued students contact us, finding our articles a refreshing break from the same old partyline opinions constantly plugged by our partisan colleagues across the University.

In this issue, we hope to continue this appeal to a broad variety of students with diverse interests. Our subjects range from domestic politics to East Asian geopolitics. In his article, McKenna Klein (C’17) focuses on elucidating Rand Paul’s often ambiguous foreign policy stance. On a similarly relevant political topic, Grant Schiller (C’18) provides a dynamic exposition of marriage equality and uses discussion of legal precedent to develop a new perspective for a new Republican Party. Moving closer to home, Nicholas A. Zarra (W’16) writes about the ethicality of Penn students participating in local Philadelphia elections. On a more philosophical note, Aidan McConnell (C’16) plumbs the depths of conservatism, referencing Solzhenitsyn and Peter Viereck in his exploration of the “truth-seeking” heart of conservative thought. Finally, Joe Kiernan (C’17) explores the strategic, security, and political implications of rearming Japan and the constitutional barriers to resurrecting a formal military structure for our island ally.

As we march towards a new year, the mood here at The Statesman is one of optimism and excitement. We are profoundly thankful to those who have provided with us the support needed to bring our objectives to fruition. Nurturing conservative thought and community at Penn, and beyond the boundaries of our University, is our core responsibility. We are honored to continue our mission.

Sincerely,

Editor-in-Chief Nicholas A. Zarra C/W’16 Assistant Editor-in-Chief Joeseph J. Kiernan C’17 Content Dillon Weber SEAS’16 Ben Fogel C’17 Grayson Sessa W’17 Chet Heldman C’18 Design and Layout Donald Sonn C’16 Grant Schiller C’18 Finance and Fundraising Aidan McConnell C’16 Praneeth Tripuraneni C’17 Liz Sanchez C’17 Relations Justin Wong C’16 Nayeli Riano C’17 Liz Sanchez C’17 Technology Alexander George SEAS’17 The Statesman, November 2014 - 3

PENN

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Should Penn students vote in local elections?

By Nick Zarra

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n just over a year, Philadelphia will elect a new mayor to deal with city’s impressive accumulation of challenges and inept bureaucracies. There is not a single clear cut candidate to replace Mayor Michael Nutter (W’79), although State Senator Anthony Williams and current district attorney Seth Williams have been named by multiple sources and the decision by former Philadelphia candidate Sam Katz (having lost by less than two percentage points in 1999) to resign from the PICA board has generated rumors of another run. Yet, as the political landscape changes, I cannot help but remember a conversation from my freshman year over lunch.

One student tried to convince another classmate who had not lived in the United States for many years to vote in the upcoming municipal elections, because “you should always vote for higher property taxes, even if you don’t pay for them, as they always go to socially positive purposes like education.” Penn students should think carefully about the ethical implications of their vote before casting them, remembering they are likely to be only temporary travelers in a city with a long cultural history and deep roots Before making my argument, I would like to preface it with the belief that certain Penn students should vote in local elections. The University of Pennsylvania prides itself on its relations with the local Philadelphia community and there are a large number of Philadelphia residents that attend the University. Most likely, these individuals do have the ties to Philadelphia proper and have a concerted interest in the results of the

election for both reasons of economic and cultural heritage. Similarly, there are certain individuals at Penn who do become involved with the Philadelphia community, begin to understand the situation, and develop a vested interest in Philadelphia beyond simple benevolence.

Most Penn students live within the “Penn bubble.” We most likely stay within the confines of campus and of Center City where there is a distinctive cultural and economic dissonance from the rest of Philadelphia. The challenges of Philadelphia, including crime, are essentially shielded to us due to the services provided by the University in addition to municipal services.

Similarly, the average Penn student spends four years at Penn before leaving upon graduation, most likely to another major urban hub. Within this bubble, we might feel part of the Penn community, but there are no apparent ties between Penn and say Upper Darby or Bustleton in Northeast Philadelphia. This bubble effect creates two main issues: the knowledge issue and the stakeholder issue.

Yet, do we as Penn students truly understand the delicacies of local affairs and local politics?

This is the knowledge issue of the Penn bubble. While we might be somewhat cognizant there is a Philadelphia education crisis (which Aidan McConnell C’16 covered last October) and that an election is coming up, there is definitive gap in fully understanding the peculiarities of Philadelphia. What does this lead to? Most likely, individuals voting based on national trends and politics, ultimately Barack Obama is

irrelevant to the race for Philadelphia comptroller. Or perhaps Penn students might vote on some form of inner feeling, similar to my freshman friend. This leads to votes based not on community future, but ignorance or mal-incentives. But more perhaps even more important is the nonpolitical component of the knowledge issue: Penn students generally do not feel the impact of Philadelphia policy to the fullest degree. We do not fully feel the impact of over 2.9 billion dollars of education expenditures for the Philadelphia School District (open PA.gov) on the Philadelphia community; we do not feel the fullest impact of changes to municipal police

Do we truly understand the delicacies of local affairs and local politics? budget, and we do not fully feel or understand the impact of the change in other government services. Hence, when we vote, we most likely vote without this important experiential knowledge.

This differential in experiencing the results of municipal policy is not just a knowledge issue, but also a stakeholder issue. By not experiencing the full impact of the Philadelphia School District and especially the full impact of taxation policy, the Penn vote could be making crucial decisions that do not affect them, especially once they leave the area.

Clearly, this makes Penn students non-stakeholders in elections. On an ethical ground, it is disconcerting to

believe that individuals without a full buy-in or interest in a community could affect the lives of the almost 1.6 million people living in that community. On a pragmatic level, this moral hazard leads to concerns on what grounds on which a vote might be taken. Suffice it to say, the investment decisions of the City of Philadelphia—especially given its current deleterious situation—should not be put in the hands of those who contribute little to that investment.

Of course, the standard rebuttal is that Penn students ought to care and ought to act as benevolent stakeholders. In an ideal world, that is true. However, the average Penn student does not experience the consequences from enacted policy, and assumptions of benevolence are more precisely to assume ignorance in voting. This truth has consequences.

A Penn student most likely does not see him or herself as a stakeholder in Philadelphia nor does he have the requisite civil commitment. Apart from a few exceptions, he or she does not have de facto interest in the race or its outcome. For example, an initiative related to our university might make us full stakeholders in a decision. Should that be the case (which given current rumblings about changing taxation policy to the city), then there is the prerequisite civic activism that leads to voting.

It is a disservice to the city and its residents for us to vote if we do not hold a true commitment to — or understanding of — Philadelphia.

Regardless of what Penn students might feel, the measures on which they might vote during their time at Penn will not affect them like they will the full-time West Philadelphians.

The Statesman, November 2014 - 5

COVER STORY

REARMING THE Rectifying Japanese Strategy-Policy Dissonance

By Joe Kiernan

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n the summer of 2013, I was strolling down the streets of Kyoto, Japan when I came across a small, but impassioned group of protesters.

As a naturally curious American tourist on his first trip to this remarkable country, I investigated.

The protesters, generally composed of secondary school and collegeage youth, were assembled outside of a department store in the heart of the business district, holding placards decrying the continued U.S. military presence on Okinawa. I was intrigued by how security issues, enshrined more than sixty years prior, maintained such rhetorical relevancy in Japan. This speaks to the lack of cognizance in the United States about the implications of our strategic decision-making in a part of the world where the impact of maintaining power projection capabilities hits closer to home. That aside, this encounter raised fundamental questions of the future role of Japan in determining its security destiny in the face of shifting geopolitical realities in the Asia-Pacific region.

This nation of islands is in a unique

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E ARCHIPELAGO situation: an economic heavyweight with constitutional and deep ethical disinclinations towards developing power projection capabilities, all the while perched in one of the most geopolitically-contentious places on Earth: Northeast Asia. The Japanese government under conservative LDP Prime Minister ShinzĹ? Abe argues that Japan’s martial strength should be more reflective of its regional prominence and the development of security threats. What is Japan to do?

Defining strategy-policy dissonance The Japanese constitutional renunciation of war and the mutual defense assurances historically provided by the United States have created strategy-policy dissonance for the Land of the Rising Sun. What is strategy-policy dissonance? It is a disjunction between the geopolitical security realities facing states and the policies of states which fail to match the strategic situation appropriately.

The disharmony between strategic reality and political perception can be caused by a host of domestic political, international strategic, and historical components which aggregate.

In this way, dissonance is a countrywide consciousness with a varying degree of incongruence between the national mindset and the exogenous relative power tensions between states. Three factors have a profound The Statesman, November 2014 - 7

impact upon Japanese strategy-policy dissonance from great power politics: history, China and the United States.

How Japan reacts to remedying its dissonance will certainly have a major impact on the future state of affairs in the Asia-Pacific region.

Japan’s renunciation of war, enshrined in the Constitution, has a profound impact upon the national reluctance to militarize. The document reads, “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.” – Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution.

These words, ratified in 1947, have an undeniably profound effect upon Japan’s current geopolitical status not to mention signifying the remarkable historical development of a nationstate with a strong martial tradition renouncing war in perpetuity.

What are the implications of such a revolutionary codification? Sixtyseven years of reliance upon other nations, namely the United States, to act as military partners, providing for the national defense. Looking back, it seems strange that Japan would be subject to “permanent” disarmament while West and East Germany developed highly-advanced militaries.

However, this is fundamentally misleading as the opposition to remilitarization, initially promoted by the United States, was adopted by Left-leaning members of the Japanese political establishment while the U.S. shifted its views towards a more realist perspective in light of the deepening Cold War. Describing Article Nine as pure American strategic caprice 8 - The Statesman, November 2014

is also disingenuous, as there were serious reasons for curtailing, legally, the Japanese government’s ability to wage war.

Japan’s aversion to war not merely an American import. The immense physical and psychological toll of the Second World War devastated the country and had a profound and lasting impact on successive generations. We must remember that Emperor Shōwa was allowed to remain on the throne and there was far more continuity of government in Japan than in Germany. The lack of division between the wartime and peacetime regimes may also illuminate certain Japanese reluctances to admit to the committal of war crimes across East Asia. It is crucial, when examining the struggle of remilitarization to remember the shadow cast by the memory of the war.

However, the Constitution represents more than social sentiments, it is a codification of these beliefs in the renunciation of aggression and therefore, adds political and legal gravitas to any moral argument against militarization.

Foremost, however, it is crucial to understand the development of the Constitution and the demilitarization of Japan.

Following World War II, to prepare for the withdrawal of U.S. occupying forces (except for on Okinawa where they remain to this day), the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), Douglas MacArthur, effective military autocrat of Japan and retroactively characterized as the Gaijin Shogun, or “foreign shogun” announced the creation of a 75,000-man National Police Reserve in 1950. The NPR would evolve, in a gradual fashion,

Japan’s renunciation of war, enshrined in the Constitution, has a profound impact upon the national reluctance to militarize.

Constitutional constriction, subtle into today’s Japan Self-Defense Forces strengthening (SDF). The first major step towards a more formalized national military Remilitarization remains a was born on March 8, 1954 when the controversial issue in Japan and Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement is heavily influenced by historical was signed between the United States factors. The pacifist ideals embodied and Japan. Allison delivered remarks in the Constitution (which was honoring the event, announcing “The effectively enacted by thee United very essence of the documents we are States military government in Japan) signing today is that they represent have developed into strong social the beliefs, both of the Japanese and norms. As mentioned prior, the American negotiators, that their war weariness following the 1930s signatures will be in the mutual and 1940s is a probable cause. interest of both our countries, these

The Japanese surrender at Tokyo Bay on Sep 2 1945

agreements require our countries to assume mutual obligations but they give our countries mutual benefits.”

The U.S. soon began to undermine the 1947 Constitution as it transitioned from an idealistic model of international security, at least in regards to Japan, towards containment. The United States, led by figures including John Foster Dulles, pushed for the gradual ratchetingup of Japan’s military capabilities in the 1950s as part of the larger U.S. Cold War bloc-building effort to counter Communist advances.

U.S. support for militarization is evident through the passage of the Defense Agency Establishment Law in 1954 and other measures which significantly increased military aid to Japan. Japanese resistance to the “militarization” of the nation was strong and vocal. The Japanese Left utilized slogans such as “Permanent peace and absolute independence” to characterize their pacifist wishes.

There were also domestic fears that Japan would become yet another pawn in the bipolar struggle of the Cold War. By the late 1980s, as

James E. Auer points out, there was significant support in Japan for a downsizing of its Self-Defense Forces.

But take this with a grain of salt. The USSR never presented the immediate security threat to Japan that China now poses. Additionally, one may argue that American backing of the Park Chung-Hee regime in South Korea may have acted to shield Japan from becoming the frontline defense against Asian Communist forces.

From a realist perspective, the policy of ensuring independence without defense capabilities seems The Statesman, November 2014 - 9

A Japanese Maritime SelfDefence Force destroyer

naïve in the extreme. In the absence of U.S. military protection, how will Japan defend its “independence” without the capability to preserve its sovereignty? It is curious that General MacArthur, who supported the renunciation clause, would also comment that “if attacked, Japan would have the right of self-defense.”

Although MacArthur’s constitutional qualification seems logical, the language of the Constitution does not include a clear self-defense provision.

Furthermore, where does the line between self-defense and offensive capability end? It is entirely realistic to argue that arming Japan with nuclear weapons, which it would never conceivably use, would be a rational self-defense measure. It would take a serious shift in relative power between the United States and China to provoke such a drastic measure.

By analyzing the historical record 10 - The Statesman, November 2014

and the genesis of the SDF, we see that the mentality of defense without defenders is hedged on the strength of American power projection.

Perhaps the most intriguing consequence of these historical factors is the surreptitious build-up of Japanese military capabilities under the guise of the SDF. In addition, when the Constitution was written and the precursors to the SDF established, the Japanese economy was in ruins. With this considered, allotting a maximum 1% of the GDP to national defense spending seemed minimal and sufficiently restrictive to inhibit widespread rearmament.

However, 1% of GDP is a significant figure when the nation’s GDP is almost $5 trillion USD. An equilibrium between the aforementioned pacifistic tendencies and the realities of national security was tenuously established over the

past decades. Some critics of the SDF have challenged its constitutional legitimacy, but the SDF is stronger than ever before in no small part to incremental budgetary increases under recent administrations. The fulcrum of debate is concerned less with funding and more with the application and use of funding on hardware and missions. This compromise leads to the limitation of the extent of Japanese military investment which seems, in a realist lens, imprudent. If it serves Japan’s strategic interests, for conventional deterrence, and is within Japan’s economic means to field an advanced, unrestrained military, bending to constitutional precedent is difficult to justify. Therefore, the impact of 1947 Constitution and the quiet militarization continue to impact Japanese policy and strategic considerations. The realities

of American military influence shielded the Japanese government from developing a military along strategic rather than constitutional lines, constructing strategy-policy dissonance that exists today.

Harmonizing under pressure Japan’s strategy-policy dissonance is a function of its history, but its manner of adjustment is dependent upon China and the United States. In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, prominent offensive neorealist John J. Mearsheimer projects that in the long-term a much stronger China will attempt to rollback American power projection capabilities from the eastern Asia-Pacific region.

how Japan will have to struggle with its identity as a “limited, constrained junior” in a world where the tides of geopolitics are changing.

With the hollow “Pivot to Asia,” a shrinking defense budget and renewed commitments in the Middle East, the United States does not seem primed to back up its Asian allies in the long-run. Increasing uncertainty drives destabilization of the status quo. As Mearsheimer noted, however, this is a long-term game, geopolitical bridge rather than blackjack, and we must consider the balance of power in terms of decades rather than months.

Regardless, Prime Minister Abe is not sitting on his hands waiting for the world to change. For 2014, the Japanese budget included a 3.5% spike

The United States does not seem primed to back up its Asian allies in the long-run.

American security interests aside, this will have profound consequences for Japan and is increasingly becoming part of the strategic calculus of the Japanese government. Shifting to the Chinese viewpoint, Avery Goldstein in Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security notes that “China remained nervous about taking steps that might encourage Japan to depart from its familiar role as a limited, constrained junior ally of the United States.” It would seem that China is wary of convincing Japan that it needs to fully arm, not to mention the threat of nuclear weapons development.

Combining Mearsheimer and Goldstein’s observations, we can see

in defense expenditures bringing the total up to a substantial $53 billion.

As mentioned before, tackling the strategy-policy dissonance is less of a fiscal challenge than a matter of will and public opinion. Increasingly, it would seem that in order to satisfy General MacArthur’s self-defense qualification, Japan will have to venture into uncomfortable political territory. The United States might be motivated by ideas of “containing” China, but Japan’s reasoning for amending Article Nine should be first and foremost about establishing enough relative power with Zhōngguó for sufficient deterrence.

What should Japan do? Should it continue to rely upon American

military strength? This is a difficult standard to maintain for both Japan and the United States as Japanese officials observe a rising China and the U.S. requests that Japan invest in expanded military capabilities. Article Nine remains an impediment to the development of a formal military and unless the Abe government can garner enough support to change the Constitution, it is likely that Japan will continue to operate under its unique equilibrium between idealistic statute and strategic reality. The United States is certainly to blame for hamstringing Japan by refusing to accept realist principles in the adoption in the Constitution. We see the same failed injection of idealism that sank the Wilsonian “new world order” after the First World War. But, the onus for the dissonance also lies on Japan. Its struggle to recognize the obsolescence of Article Nine and the shifting power dynamics in its home theater is a problem that could be ignored in the 1990s, but no longer.

Analyzing the Japanese remilitarization issue through the lens of a realist, the nation seems to be reluctant to act in its national strategic interest. There is a battle between pragmatism and norms. One could easily investigate the current Japanese policy position from a non-realist perspective, especially a constructivist approach. But, what is perhaps most intriguing is tracing the evolution of the norms…from American idealism, to post-war pacifism, to modern-day reluctance to rearm. This complex interplay of foreign policy, social forces, and national security is the core behind the idea of strategypolicy dissonance and its effect on the governance of states.

The Statesman, November 2014 - 11

REPUBLICAN PARTY

When The Party Got It Wrong:

The Case for Abandoning Legal Opposition to Same-Sex Marriage

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n 2013, Tom Corbett addressed inappropriate comments made by his legal team in which they compared same-sex couples’ desire for marriage to children wanting to get married. He noted that neither can get married in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Corbett decided that the most graceful way to apologize for this blunder was to reframe it in a different and even more demeaning manner: “I think a much better analogy would have been brother and sister, don’t you?”

In so doing, he revealed a larger problem with the way in which many leading Republicans deal with samesex marriage and LGBT rights in general: They simply do not take the issues seriously. It was not much of a surprise in May 2014 when his legal team lost the case with an unequivocal 12 - The Statesman, November 2014

By Grant Schiller

decision from Judge John E. Jones in which the ban on same-sex marriage in Pennsylvania was deemed unconstitutional in violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Constitution. It was even less of a surprise when the Corbett administration decided not to appeal, revealing its recognition that it was fighting a futile battle. As situations like this become all the more common, it is clear that the Republican Party has placed itself on the wrong side of the legal battle over same-sex marriage.

While some Americans morally disapprove of same-sex marriage, personal moral beliefs are not sufficient legal grounds for a ban on same-sex marriage. Many argue that the institution of marriage is fundamentally religious. While it may

be true that religion does play a major role in the marriages of people, the law does not make this a fundamental part of its understanding of marriage.

Before the ban on same-sex marriage was lifted in Pennsylvania, marriage was defined as a, “civil contract by which one man and one woman take each other for husband and wife.”

This definition does not recognize the role of religion and tradition in marriage. In the legal definition of marriage, it is a legal, not religious, bond between two people. Why then should there be a distinction made between two people of different sexes and two people of the same sex marrying? Many have argued that same-sex couples should be allowed civil unions which would provide the same rights as marriage while also protecting its unique traditional The Statesman

position as a union between a man and woman. This, however, can be seen as a “separate but equal” policy which is unconstitutional as a result of the decision in Brown v. Board of Education in 1954. Whitewood v. Wolf and other cases have emphasized that civil unions do not carry the prestige of marriage. They also carry a social stigma which makes them both separate and inferior to marriages.

This is not to say that those who oppose same-sex marriage on a religious basis should not be allowed to have their concerns about broadening the definition of marriage. These personal beliefs should be understood and respected, but they cannot be kept as law. The legal reality is that the basis for banning same-sex marriage is quickly vanishing.

Further, the manner in which the Supreme Court of the United States is approaching this issue reveals that same-sex marriage will inevitably be legalized across the country. To some, the decision of the Court to not fully rule same-sex marriage as legal in United States v. Windsor or even set the level of scrutiny that should be applied to cases involving same-sex couples was an indication that it was not fully on the side of legalizing same-sex marriage. Instead, this should be viewed a measured approach that the Court is taking to legalizing same-sex marriage. This can be seen in comments by Justice Ginsberg regarding Roe v. Wade in which she stated that the decision was right but the court moved, “too far too fast” with it. This, she continued, spurred the growth of The Statesman

the pro-life movement. Instead, she believes, the Supreme Court should take a slower approach and allow the states to sort out major issues like this on their own. That is exactly what is currently occurring in the United States. The Supreme Court will not give a sweeping decision on the issue of same-sex marriage because it wants to allow a judicial consensus to be reached. The Court recognizes that a strongly worded decision that makes a major change to laws across the country can make it more difficult, not less, for societal

Personal beliefs should be understood and respected, but they cannot be kept as law change to occur. This can lead to a culture war in which those opposed to the Court’s ruling, which they view as illegitimate, fight against the change. By acknowledging the states’ rights to determine whether samesex marriage should be legal, the Supreme Court allows there to be both a legal and a cultural change.

As marriage is much more than just a legal institution, this makes a lot of sense. Ultimately, this points to the fact that the court seems to view the legalization of same-sex marriage as an inevitability. Likewise, conservatives should understand that this legal battle is over regardless of their personal moral objections.

Mainstream conservative politicians will have to consider carefully how they approach LGBT rights issues in the future. While they may oppose the right of same-sex couples to marry on a moral basis, legally this is simply not enough to prohibit their marriage. At the same time, public opposition to same-sex marriage is dwindling. A 2014 Pew Research report revealed that the percentage of Americans who oppose same-sex marriage has steadily decreased, while the percentage of Americans who favor same-sex marriage has steadily increased. The report also revealed that there is a considerable generational gap in opinion with younger Americans more in favor of same-sex marriage than their parents and grandparents.

This means that opposition to samesex marriage may not be a tenable position in the future as there may not be as many people against it still alive. Thus, the GOP needs to rethink its opposition to same-sex marriage lest it alienate a generation of Americans because of its position on only one issue, for one thing is certain: Republicans will not be able to rely on voters who support bans on same-sex marriage forever.

The GOP should recognize that it needs to give up on opposing same-sex marriage if it is to succeed.

Even for those who dearly hold the traditional definition of marriage to be a union between one man and one woman, it is simply not a fight worth fighting anymore. The approach of the courts to the issue along with changing popular opinion have dealt a fatal blow to any attempts to stop same-sex couples from marrying.

The Statesman, November 2014 - 13

Where Do You Stand, Rand Paul?

Defining Presidential Contender’s Foreign Policy Stance

By McKenna Klein

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The Statesman

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enator Rand Paul (R-KY) has been deemed the poster child of isolationist foreign policy. Many libertarianminded conservatives hoped, while mainstream conservatives feared, he was cut from same ideological cloth as his father, former Rep. Ron Paul (RTX). As Senator Paul’s notoriety has grown from a Tea Party senator from Kentucky to presidential hopeful, his foreign policy has changed from its original non-interventionist to one more squarely in line with the Establishment’s views.

Early in Senator Paul’s tenure, he proposed a measure to cut all foreign aid including to America’s our allies like Israel. The move would have been part of a sweeping $500 billion cut to the federal budget. Senator Paul came under intense scrutiny when he qualified his proposition by saying he was in favor of ending aid to Israel.

He said, “I support Israel. I want to be known as a friend of Israel, but not with money you don’t have.”

With that in mind, this summer, as Israel was continuously assaulted by rockets from Gaza, Senator Paul voted in favor of sending $225 million to Israel to fund its missile defense system called the Iron Dome.

Furthermore, Senator Paul has always been critical of US meddling in Iraq. This summer, as ISIS gained momentum and traction in Iraq, Senator Paul seemed to have reservations about US involvement.

In June, he shared that he had mixed feelings about airstrikes against ISIS because it aligns us with Iran. Iran is supporting the Iraqi army in their fight against ISIS and the use of US airstrikes, essentially, designates the US as the Iran’s air force against ISIS. The Statesman

A couple of weeks later, in response to the beheading of two journalists, Senator Paul adjusted his position in support of US airstrikes on ISIS. In an email, he proclaims, “If I were President, I would call a joint session of Congress. I would lay out the reasoning of why ISIS is a threat to our national security and seek congressional authorization to destroy ISIS militarily.”

Evidently, Senator Paul finds himself in between a rock and a hard place when handling foreign policy. His recent hawkish positions have unsettled his dovish libertarian supporters.

Jacob Sollum of the libertarian publication, Reason Magazine, writes, “Given his sudden conversion and the weakness of the reasons he has offered, it is hard to take Paul seriously on the subject [of foreign policy].”

Meanwhile, many Republicans remain cold to his past remarks and evolving foreign policy positions.

Fellow senator and potential 2016 presidential candidate Marco Rubio (R-FL) made swipes at Senator Paul’s beliefs in a September speech that subtly lumps Paul with President Obama’s failing foreign policy. Even Texas Governor Rick Perry (R) has offered his two-cents on Rand Paul’s early views on the ISIS situation in Iraq.

Governor Perry remarked that “Paul seems curiously blind” to the national security threat of groups like ISIS. So, the question is: Where does Rand Paul stand on foreign policy?

Does he follow a more isolationist doctrine or is he will to subscribe to the hawkish narrative of the

establishment?

According to Paul, his views are more congruent with the GOP platform than most people believe.

In August, he wrote an opinion piece in Time lambasting the claims of his supposed isolationist tendencies. Senator Paul appeared to take the middle ground between non-interventionism and the GOP’s foreign policy thought.

He notes, “While my predisposition is to less intervention, I do support intervention when our vital interests are threatened.”

He went on to describe how he would approach the Middle East crisis, even paying tribute to one of the most recognizable faces of conservative foreign policy when he says, “I agree with Reagan’s idea that no country should mistake U.S. reluctance for war for a lack of resolve.”

It appears that Senator Paul is not as elusive as he is portrayed by the media and within the Republican Party. Earlier this year, he described himself as “libertarian-ish.”

He continues, “I think a libertarian twist or a libertarian influence in the Republican Party is good, but I’ve pretty much just stayed with the party and plan on doing so.”

In regard to foreign policy, the junior Senator from Kentucky brings a libertarian flair to the Republican Party. Although his foreign policy positions have not always been consistent, neither have the affairs our country deals with. In the age of ever-changing foreign affairs, Senator Paul’s ability to adapt to situations without compromising his principles is a necessity that will prove beneficial to his national image.

The Statesman, November 2014 - 15

CONSERVATISM

William F. Buckley, Jr enjoying a moment with then President Ronald Reagan

Dark Nights and Tragic Affirmations

By Aidan McConnell

D

espite its status as a seminal work, William F. Buckey’s God and Man at Yale did not initially receive the universal respect and admiration afforded to it by contemporary conservatives. The wayward conservative poet and professor Peter Viereck harshly criticized Buckley’s writing as lacking in reflection, writing in The New York Times that “the difference between a shallow and a profound conservatism is the difference between an easy, booster affirmation that precedes the dark night of the soul and the hardwon, tragic affirmation that follows it.” To Viereck, Buckley’s entrance into the post-war conservative 16 - The Statesman, November 2014

atmosphere was an indicator of the movement’s substantive decline in favor of a populist bent. While we now know that Viereck, like many of his contemporaries, utterly failed to predict the renaissance heralded by God and Man at Yale, his criticism remains a valid insight into the genesis of conservative thought: it is the “dark night of the soul,” a grain of self-doubt and confusion, that allows an individual to attain maturity of thought and experience.

“A conservative is a liberal mugged by reality” is today’s common expression for Viereck’s observation. Broadly applied, this quip seems to adhere to external antagonists extremely well: a pro-

government activist becomes disenfranchised by the nepotism and fiscal irresponsibility of bureaucracy, an apolitical churchgoer begins to fear the encroaching presence of secularism, a lonely Classics professor finds the Western tradition subverted

by Marxist dialectics in the halls of academia. But the implication that reality “mugs” an individual into conservatism, as if something inherent in the atmosphere forces a personal transformation, presents an incomplete picture. No one understands this better than the wandering Zina of Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s The Red Wheel.

An admirable individual—strong, resilient, and unusually liberated for a subject of Czarist Russia— Zina engages in an affair, eventually finding herself abandoned with her lover’s child. Angry and disenchanted by her fate, she nevertheless gives in to her passions when beckoned back by the very same lover; however, while away, her young child is neglected and dies. Understandably, Zina struggles to cope with such a horrific event and blames her lover, Russian society, and the whims of fate and chance before finally turning her thoughts inward and contending with the uncomfortable fact of her own role. Her inner dialogue points out that which she missed before: for all of Zina’s energy and love for adventure, she lacked the doubts and deliberation to self-reflect. Only by accepting her own influence on the creation of a hapless state did she possess the ability and knowledge to exhibit personal growth through selfrestraint—in effect, to quit mugging herself.

The silver lining in Zina’s life is that The Statesman

Solzhenitsyn implies her time in the wilderness was not in vain, but rather a necessary struggle to comprehend her inner being. Viereck would consider such a process of transformation a hallmark of conservatism; so would Karl Mannheim, who wrote in Conservatism: A Contribution to the Sociology of Knowledge that “authentic conservatism first becomes self-reflective and conscious of its own nature when other ways of life and thought come upon the scene within the same life-space where it is situated, against which it must distinguish itself in ideological struggle.” Consequently, a struggling conservative actually faces the same dilemma as Solzhenitsyn’s despondent former libertine. For a perspective emphasizing order as the most desirable element of a good life, the crushing contradictions between what a conservative believes ought to exist and what the world actually supplies can erode confidence in basic life principles and make society appear warped, nonsensical, or even predatory. Just as Zina’s faith in her independence could not prevent her from making a series of egregious mistakes, a general assumption of conservative values does not guarantee stability and enlightenment.

This is why the fundamentalist variant of conservative thought is so unsuccessful in attaining its objectives. Fundamentalism, whether from the American right wing or any philosophical viewpoint, is derived from the wholesale rejection of challenges to deep-seated beliefs and is thus a failure to acknowledge how one’s own place and personal contributions can still endure in a changing world. Without selfThe Statesman

reflection, the conservative that chooses the extremities of thought is unwisely attempting to utilize an “easy, booster affirmation” to escape the discomfort of doubt and intellectual exploration.

But what about the conservative who pursues wisdom by persevering through Viereck’s “dark night”?

Mannheim notes that conservatism, when faced with a challenge to its affirmations of truth, “preserves itself…by raising to the level of reflection and methodical control those attitudes to the world which

History and custom play an informative role in how a conservative chooses to act during moments of uncertainty. would otherwise have been lost to authentic experience.” In other words, history and custom play an informative role in how a conservative chooses to act during moments of uncertainty. Again, however, the search for guidance in historical precedent suggests that there is a formula for developing a philosophical path. Deeper inquiry reveals that this is not quite true for most conservatives. Russell Kirk, renowned for his identification and description of the “permanent things,” created

a framework for understanding the importance of enduring truth without providing a defined plan for incorporating truth into daily existence. Kirk’s omission helps form a clearer picture: a conservative in the midst of confusion can draw upon the truths passed down through generations as a source of energy, but that energy must be applied on a unique, individual level to exit the wilderness and develop intellectual maturity. As it is, the “happy warriors” of the Western tradition embody the spirit of a personal journey, constantly grappling with the reflective aspects of being conservative in a progressive world.

These philosophical warriors and other wise conservatives know that the dark night of the soul is the instance of unrelenting assaults on the knowledge and wisdom held most dear. It is the process by which a wanderer recognizes a new direction for intellectual development, and it is the crossroads at which that wanderer chooses the siren song of fundamentalism or the multidimensional enlightenment of reflection and deliberation. It is the stage of personal growth in which selfassessment is most desperately needed and most adequately applied. Peter Viereck was, after all, wrong about Buckley; the man now known as the Father of Modern Conservatism was not merely a shallow, frustrated alumnus of Yale University, but rather a deeply considerate thinker who understood the personal struggles required of any truth-seeker. Like the experienced conservative of Vierick’s imagination, Buckley knew that “truth…is there, but people must want her and seek her out.”

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LEGACY that it is commonly felt that this understanding of freedom is an American invention. How strange it is then that the true synthesis of this tradition of freedom took place not only far from our shores but 800 years in the past; that the Birthplace of liberty was not Philadelphia but a field near Windsor in England. The Magna Carta was the founder of this great tradition, utterly changing the course of western history. The document’s influence can be seen all around us to this day, from constitutions of nations around the world, to England and Wales where elements of the document still remain on the statute books. 800 years after its creation The Great Charter retains its position as one of the most pivotal documents in History.

England in the Middle Ages

The Lasting Legacy of the Magna Carta

By Chet Heldman

“TO ALL FREE MEN OF OUR KINGDOM we have also granted, for us and our heirs for ever, all the liberties written out below, to have and to keep for them and their heirs, of us and our heirs” (Magna Carta 6/15/1215)

18 - The Statesman, November 2014

T

o the modern American, these words are familiar in a general sort of way.

Besides the mention of a Kingdom it could easily be a lesserknown passage of The Constitution.

The protection of liberties is so close to Americans’ understanding of politics that they are seemingly mutually dependent so much so

The social and political context of the Charter remains unique in history.

Although a huge advancement in its own right, the document was the culmination of a sea of change and circumstance that had been building in England and Northern France for centuries. Early Anglo Saxon Kings had developed an organization of town and country officials making England the best administrated nation in Medieval Europe. In some accounts this even included courts made up of a selection of nobles to sit in judgment of criminal and civil disputes. More significantly was the presence of The Witenagemot, meeting of wise men, which acted as a council of the realm made up of secular and ecclesiastical officers, which helped pass law codes and land grants as well as the prerogative

to choose the next king. Although much of this was swept aside by the Norman Conquest in 1066, the legacy remained in England. The next important development was found under the Angevin dynasty, which ruled England and a sizable portion of France from 1154-1216. The leader of the House King Henry II throughout his reign created a system of Magistrate Courts to act as the King’s justice through the kingdom.

These Courts sitting at Westminster or touring England began to refer to legal precedent far more then royal will, endowing the barons with the realization that the law was a different entity entirely then the monarch. This was the most important factor that led to the creation of the Magna Carta because it imbued on the nobility the idea that the law was something they too could call on for protection even against the king.

The Charter John the First of England was to be the catalyst for the baron’s assertion of their newfound legal power. Throughout his reign as king, John was always in desperate need for money as he tried to hold back the advances of the French King on the continent. As he began to exhaust traditional royal revenue streams, John began to expand them. John began to not only increase taxes but also attempted to capitalize on the estates of minors and widows in the crowns control, often times either making the inconvenient party disappear or force them to pay crippling inheritance taxes. Along with other corruptions, John managed to alienate and anger his barons till, after a defeat in

Normandy they revolted. Unable to defeat the rebels John was forced to meet with them at a field named Runnymeed. There the barons drafted a document proposing broad political reform to be signed by the king as a condition of ending the conflict. The Magna Carta despite its important was not a true constitution, although considered to be the initial document of the uncodified constitution of England. Its sixty-three clauses focus almost entirely on listing thing the King would no longer be allowed to do and proposing a council of

The Magna Carta represented above all else the end of arbitrary rule.

barons to keep him to the Charter.

John played along but at the earliest opportunity received an annulment of the treaty from the Pope and continued to fight till his death. The Charter was reissued again however, with revisions in 1216 and 1217 and finally in 1225 fully becoming party of English law and political thought.

Legacy The Magna Carta represented above all else the end of arbitrary

rule. Before it’s issuing, law was seen as the direct extension of the will of a divinely appointed king. Afterward law was its own force independent and above the authority of the King. This change opened up the opportunity for countless other advances. The idea of the rule of law above any individual or system laid the foundation of social contract theory and in turn democratic thinking. In England it acted as the foundation stone of the constitution leading to later grants of liberty such as Habeas Corpus. It also led to other constitutions around the world that laid a foundation for government specifying the power and limitations under law. Clause 61 went furthered this aim by calling for an assembly, or parliament, of 25 nobles to be chosen by their peers to ensure the King stayed true to the Charter. This Parliament was the forerunner to not only the Modern British Parliament, but also legislative branches everywhere, from Congress to the Reichstag. An assembly gathered to pass laws and keep watch over the executive to make sure he does not overreach his legal authority.

From putting limits on the Kings ability to tax to influencing how whole governments and societies are ordered, the Magna Carta has endured through time as a crucial turning point in World History. Marking the end of true despotism, it set England on a course for Parliamentary Democracy, which in turn spread to all the nations of the world England has influenced, From the Constitutional Conventions of the American colonies to the Indian Congress seeking to create a free India. Such is the legacy of the Document that it will always garnish the honorific Great.

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- Dillon Weber Content Director

champion the beacon for Penn conservatism we would like to personally thank the following people and institutions for making this issue of The Statesman possible:

Mary DeChristopher Dr. Barbara Nielsen Sara Weber Matt Wolfe Michael Cibik Joe & Jamie Kiernan Mr. & Mrs. James E. Maurey Alicia & Kevin McConnell John & Clare McConnell Matt and Michele Weber Rob Wonderling