Advisory Board
Contents 3
SCOTT C. BILLINGS Hewlett-Packard Houston, Texas
GREGORY A. BROTHERS Senior Vice President & Chief Financial Officer South Texas College of Law Houston, Texas
JOHN P. COGAN, JR. Cogan & Partners, LLP Houston, Texas
PAUL N. KATZ
King & Spalding, LLP Houston, Texas
JOHN L. KEFFER
King & Spalding, LLP London, UK
JAY D. KELLEY Jay D. Kelley, PC Houston, Texas
E. DOUGLAS MCLEOD, L.L.M. The Moody Foundation Galveston, Texas
M.A. (TONY) NUNES Cogan & Partners, LLP Houston, Texas
An Unprecedented Change in Mexican Energy Politics Adrian L. Talamantes
13
T h e W o r l d T r a d e O rg a n i s at i o n O b l i g at i o n s a n d Legislative Polcy: Choices in Developing Countries for Biotechnology Ramesh Karky and Mark Perry
26 AUSFTA, Korus FTA and Now TPP: Free Trade Agreements
Are Now Reaching Further than Ever Before Laura Chung
38 E ye
of the
Domestic Health Policies
T iger : E xamining T ensions
Trade Regime Melissa Peach
55 P l e a s i n g
into
I ndonesia ’ s
H e l p f u l t o N o n e : S o f t wa r e L i c e n s i n g f r o m t h e B e r n e C o n v e n t i o n t o t h e Strange Case of UsedSoft v. Oracle Taylor Roznovsky to
All
in
and
71
Corruption in the World Bank’s Integrity Vice Presidency: Seven Years Later Kevin Tipton
DORIS RODRIGUEZ Andrews Kurth LLP Houston, Texas
JAMES W. SKELTON, JR. The Stinemetz Law Firm Houston, Texas
Currents Winter 2013
Letter From The Editor
Currents
Dear Reader, On behalf of the Editorial Board and Members of CURRENTS: International Trade Law Journal, it is my pleasure to present to you the Volume 22, Number 1 Edition. CURRENTS is a student-run scholarly journal committed to emphasizing timely and practice-oriented articles on international trade and economic issues. To this end, this edition features a diverse selection of works from domestic and international scholars and law students. This publication begins with an in-depth discussion of Mexico’s passage of sweeping and historic Constitutional energy reform that allows the participation of private capital in its upstream, midstream and downstream oil and gas businesses. Then we turn our focus to a critical analysis of the potential policy issues facing developing and least-developed countries in the creation of comprehensive biotechnology regulatory systems and touch upon problems with agricultural biotechnology and intellectual property obligation under the TRIPS agreement. After that, we highlight the dichotomy between the provisions in recent U.S. free trade agreements that directly relate to cost saving pharmaceutical-reimbursement formularies and the U.S. industry-led countermovement pushing for the expansion of intellectual property protection. Following that discussion, we shift our attention to the current Indonesian trade regime and examine how Indonesian law addresses the tension between local and foreign interests. We then consider the impact of the WIPO Copyright Treaty and learn how it actually polarizes, instead of harmonizes, existing national and international copyright doctrines. Finally, we close with a critical assessment of the scope and application of procedures implemented to combat corruption within the World Bank’s Integrity Vice Presidency and contemplate what additional measures must be considered. On behalf of the Editorial Board and Members, I would like to thank the authors who continue to provide CURRENTS with material that furthers the academic discourse and improves the work of practitioners. I would also like to thank the South Texas College of Law administration, faculty, and staff members who continue to be a source of support and advice to the Journal—in particular our Academic Advisors Associate Dean Elizabeth Dennis and Professor Cherie Taylor. We appreciate your patronage and hope you enjoy this edition of CURRENTS. Sincerely,
CURRENTS is published Summer and Winter by South Texas College of Law.
Please cite CURRENTS as CURRENTS: INT’L TRADE L.J., Winter 2013. Please direct inquiries and correspondence to: Editorial Board
CURRENTS South Texas College of Law 1303 San Jacinto Street, Suite 219 Houston, Texas 77002-7006 E-mail: currents@stcl.edu
Copyright 2014. CURRENTS: International Trade Law Journal All rights reserved. Volume XXII, Number 1.
Editorial Board Fall 2013 Editor-in-Chief Jason Klein Managing Editor Joshua Woods Information Editor Sean Wilson
Spring 2014 Editor-in-Chief Alejandra Hamilton Managing Editor Kevin Tipton Co-Managing Editor Andres Rejas
Articles/Notes Editors Logan Hastings Michael Hodge Taylor Roznovsky Kevin Tipton
Articles/Notes Editors Ambreen Dharani Karen Wood
Members Adam Aldrete Anthony Cacciatore Joseph Collins Ambreen Dharani Susan Fickert A. Madison Freeman Alejandra Hamilton Sterling Jones Ben Rothchild Matthew Steinfeld Jennifer Whittington Karen Wood Paul Wyatt
Members Adam Aldrete Anthony Cacciatore Joseph Collins Susan Fickert Samin Hessami Sterling Jones Matthew Steinfeld Jennifer Whittington
Faculty Advisors Assistant Dean Elizabeth A. Dennis Professor C. O’Neal Taylor Publications Coordinator Sammy Miles
Credits Publication Services Sammy Miles
Alejandra Hamilton Editor-in-Chief
Currents Winter 2013
Cover Art
iStockphoto
An Unprecedented Change in Mexican Energy Politics A D R I A N
L .
TA L A M A N T E S
In an unprecedented change in Mexican
host government instrument the State creates Adrian L. Talamantes is Counsel in the Global Transactions practice group of King & Spalding. His practice focuses on a wide variety of domestic and international business transactions, including project development and energy projects, mergers, acquisitions, divestitures and joint ventures, with particular emphasis on matters relating to investments in Latin America.
and implements, except for concessions.7
Gortari privatized the banking industry, sold
President sought a contractual regime purely
and pipeline distribution of crude oil, natural
the State’s majority equity stake in Teléfonos
based on profit-sharing, maintaining for
gas, petroleum products and petrochemicals,
de México (then the only terrestrial telephone
all practical purposes the use of Pemex as
and the first-hand sales of such resources and
service provider in Mexico), and signed the
the most significant source of government
by-products, all subject to the issuance of a
North American Free Trade Agreement
revenue.
permit by the Comisión Reguladora de Energía
energ y politics, the government has amended its Political Constitution to allow the participation of private capital in its upstream, midstream and downstream oil and gas businesses. 1 The extraordinary step continues a liberalization trend that commenced more than twenty years ago, when then President Carlos Salinas de
5
These companies may also engage in the treatment and refining of petroleum and the processing of natural gas, subject to the issuance of a permit by the Secretaría de Energía, the federal government’s department of energy.8 Furthermore, companies may also participate in the storage, transportation
(NAFTA) with the United States and
With the two sides at odds on the best
(CRE), the midstream and downstream
Canada, creating one of the largest trading
policy solution, a congressional debate
regulator.9
blocs in the world.2
ensued. By mid-December 2013, the generally
—————————————————
The amendments reflect an uncommon,
antagonistic congressional forces had unified
E&P Regime
joint effort between Partido Acción Nacional
their views, resulting in a new energy policy
—————————————————
(PAN) and Partido Revolucionario Institucional
that is nothing short of remarkable for a
The State will now conduct oil and gas E&P
(PRI), the latter being the political party
country which has traditionally considered
through two specific legal schemes: it may
with which current President Enrique Peña
the use and exploitation of its natural
assign a state company, including Pemex, its
Nieto is affiliated and PAN´s traditional
resources as a prerogative reserved exclusively
right to explore for, develop, and produce
adversary on most any political matter. Each
to the sovereign.
hydrocarbons in specific areas;10 alternatively,
3
6
party had advanced a proposal for a bill to
Under the amended Constitution, all
it may enter into a contractual arrangement
amend the Constitution. PAN, with its free-
types of hydrocarbons under the soil
(other than a concession) granting such rights
market view, advocated the implementation
continue to be owned by the Nation, but
to a state, domestic or foreign contractor,
of a concession regime; one that would
state and privately-owned domestic and
each of which may, upon government
maximize hydrocarbons revenues to the State
foreign companies may now compete for
consent, in turn fulfill its obligations under
and gradually wean it from its well-known
and directly engage in the exploration and
the assignment or contract by subcontracting
dependence on the cash generated by Petróleos
production (E&P) of liquid, solid and
with another party.11
Mexicanos (Pemex), to date the country’s
gaseous hydrocarbons, conventional or
Once implementing legislation is enacted,
sole national oil company. In contrast, the
unconventional, pursuant to any type of
the Secretaría de Energía will establish,
4
3
Currents Winter 2013
conduct, and coordinate energy policy, select
under the premise that such interests are
or licensee acquires the exclusive right to
assignment and contracting areas, adjudicate
exclusively owned by the State.
explore for hydrocarbons in a contract area,
16
assignments, and design the technical aspects
The Comisión Nacional de Hidrocarburos
to develop any discovery made therein, to
of all E&P contracts. The Secretaría de
(CNH), the upstream regulator, will award
acquire ownership of most or all the oil and
Energía will also have sole discretion to
and enter into contracts with private parties
gas ultimately produced and to freely dispose
choose the type of contract it will implement
and state companies through a tender
of such production.
in each of its projects, including, but not
process in which the most important award
Some members of Partido de la Revolución
limited to:
criterion will be the percentage of profit or
Democrática (PRD), Mexico’s major leftist
• a service contract, under which the
production share the contractor proposes
political party and the energy reform’s main
contractor may be paid a fee for its
in its bid (in the case of a profit-sharing
detractor, share the view that licenses are for
services;
or production-sharing arrangement), 17
all practical purposes concessions in disguise,
• a production-sharing or profit-
the amount of bonus, royalty or other
calling them a “simulation” that should not
sharing contract, under which the
—————————————————
be tolerated by the Mexican people.19 Why,
contractor may be paid with a
if not for the sake of political correctness,
Fondo Mexicano del Petróleo (FMP), a
But while Mexican legislation is indeed imprecise, well settled Mexican legal doctrine does differentiate licenses and concessions in terms of both the nature of the administrative act and the nature of the rights granted to the licensee and concessionaire.
Mexican trust that will be formed
—————————————————
implementing legislation that contemplates
to administer all revenues generated
consideration payable to the State (in the case
licenses as a host government instrument.20
from E&P activities.13
of a license) and the amount of the tariff
But while Mexican legislation is indeed
As allowed by most other hydrocarbon-
payable to the contractor per barrel of crude
imprecise, well settled Mexican legal doctrine
producing nations, the contractor under
oil equivalent produced from a contract area
does differentiate licenses and concessions in
a profit-sharing contract will be able to
(in the case of a service contract).
terms of both the nature of the administrative
book for accounting and financial purposes
—————————————————
act and the nature of the rights granted to
12
share of the production or its monetization, respectively; or • a license, under which the contractor may take at the wellhead title to the hydrocarbons it produces in exchange for the payment of royalties or other consideration to
its production-related economic right or revenue stream.
18
The Political Issue
would PRI and PAN maintain in Article 27 the current restriction on the granting of concessions for oil and gas E&P? This animus, together with a noticeable ambiguity in Mexican legislation regarding the legal nature of both a concession and a license, may very well give PRD legal arguments to challenge the constitutionality of any
the licensee and concessionaire. Under a
Under a production-
—————————————————
license, the governmental authority merely
sharing contract, license, or other contractual
One could reasonably question the
removes a legal restriction to the exercise
arrangement under which it has a right
legislature’s wisdom in expressly prohibiting
of a preexisting right.21 Under a concession,
in and to production, the contractor will
the granting of hydrocarbon concessions
the governmental authority grants the
be able to book reserves, provided the
in the Constitution, while at the same time
concessionaire a right it did not previously
applicable instrument states that all forms
mandating that implementing legislation
have and would not have had but for
of hydrocarbons in situ remain the property
expressly permit the granting of licenses,
the granting of the concession.22 In this
of the Nation.15 As expected, the contractor
particularly because, in the oil patch
doctrinal light, the license described in the
will not be able to book any economic right
upstream, oil and gas concessions and
amendments seems more like a concession
or reserves under a fee-based service contract
licenses are typically regarded as the same.
than otherwise.
14
Under both instruments, a concessionaire 4
Currents Winter 2013
The legislators who voted in favor of
the United States.25 In essence, PRD seeks to
the required number of registered voters have
the reform will argue that the nature of
submit the energy reform to a process akin
requested the public consultation? Should
the constitutional prohibition regarding
to a national election, a popular consultation
the manner in which the State generates
the granting of concessions does not rest
under Article 35 of the Constitution and
revenue with its natural resources to finance
on an administrative act or on whether or
its implementing legislation, both of which
the expenditures budget be subject to a
not a concessionaire has a pre-existing right
expressly grant registered voters the right
popular vote?29 Further, should an adverse
to perform an act, but on the ownership
to express a binding opinion in matters that
result from a public consultation override
of the resource under the ground, which, as
are “transcendental” at the national level,
a law that has been properly legislated and
expressly stated in revised Article 27, is at
including acts of Congress that are legislative
enacted, and has created rights in the subjects
all times inalienable, not subject to adverse
in character.
being regulated? These and other questions
26
possession and vested in the Nation. This is
It’s unclear whether the recent energy-
will likely be asked, debated and answered by
a corollary to the views of President Lázaro
related amendments to the Constitution could
the high court if the voter number burden
Cárdenas, the architect of the celebrated
or would be subject to such a consultation.
is met, for a popular vote reverting the
1938 nationalization of the oil industry and
Though Article 35 is unambiguously clear
new regime to its former glory will surely
sponsor of the now infamous constitutional
that Congress must call for a popular
trigger claims of expropriation and fair
limitation: “a concession grants [its holder],
consultation if at least two percent of the
compensation by those who move forward
in a very limited and precarious manner,
registered voters demand it, its subject matter
and invest in Mexico once implementing
rights to directly own and exploit the subsoil,
must nevertheless be both transcendental
legislation provides the ground rules.
making the State a mere regulator and
and have a national impact. Implementing
—————————————————
policeman of an activity, a function that is
legislation does provide guidance as to what
Sink or Swim
wholly insufficient in hydrocarbons-related
is “transcendental throughout the Nation,”
—————————————————
matters as a result of the expropriation.”23
—————————————————
Colombia’s overwhelming recent success in the upstream oil and gas sector certainly
making of payment to the State, the license
In essence, PRD seeks to submit the energy reform to a process akin to a national election. . .
cannot be deemed a concession under the
—————————————————
of 830,000 bbl/day in 1999 to less than
Constitution. The issue is far from settled
but it focuses on when a matter has a national
600,000 bbl/day in 2003, mainly as a result
under Mexican law and jurisprudence, and
impact rather than on when a matter is
of the natural depletion of existing oil
will be debated at some point.
“transcendental.” Without full legislative
fields and a lack of investment.30 Facing an
—————————————————
guidance, the issue may well have to be
economic precipice, Colombia restructured
answered at trial by the Mexican Supreme
its energy sector in many significant ways,
—————————————————
Court, who will have jurisdiction over the
including by reorganizing and transforming
Last December 15, PRD’s national leader
matter.
Empresa Colombiana de Petróleos, its
It reasonably follows that if a licensee acquires ownership to the hydrocarbons at the wellhead upon their production and the
Opposing Strategy
27
28
inspired the Mexicans. Like Mexico, Colombia’s crude oil production had declined significantly, falling from a peak
vowed to cause the party’s militants to
The future of an industry that is a source
national oil company, into Ecopetrol, a
routinely engage in “actions for the defense
of national pride for many Mexicans is
public corporation in which the Colombian
of petroleum.”24 The so-called “15 to 15
unquestionably transcendental to some, but
State owns 88.49% of the total shares,
Strategy” would culminate in 2015, he
then so are many other matters that could
and domestic and foreign pension funds
said, with a popular rejection of an energy
not be reasonably and practically left to the
and banks own the remaining 11.51%.31
reform that hands over the Nation’s wealth
vote of the citizens. Does a matter become
With greater managerial autonomy and its
to foreign powers and capitalists, particularly
transcendental to the Nation simply because
regulatory and natural resource-management
5
Currents Winter 2013
functions stripped and given to the Agencia
power is exerted through the control of one-
The language in the amendments and their
Nacional de Hidrocarburos, the Colombian
third of the company’s board of directors,
exposition of motives clearly demonstrate
upstream regulator, Ecopetrol gained the
and its collective bargaining agreement has
that except for the preferential treatment
ability to better focus on its fundamental
historically extracted employment benefits
Pemex will be given in the assignment of
purpose: to explore and exploit hydrocarbons
that are uncommon in the international
areas, Pemex will be treated like any other
in an internationally-competitive market.32
oil and gas practice.37 The burden is so
E&P operator in Mexico.42 This means Pemex
Mexico now seeks to replicate the
great that in 2012 Pemex’s liability for
will succeed in the new regime both as a state
Colombian success, if not its precise
employee benefits represented 56.14% of
company and successful market competitor
methods. The implementation guidelines
the company’s total liabilities and 74.28%
only if the government is able to change its
in the amendments indicate the CNH, a
of its total sales. It exceeded the company’s
nature from an instrument of social welfare
relatively new and formerly toothless agency,
consolidated gross income by approximately
to a true corporation with a clear business
will be granted status as a legal person,
$36,442,402 USD.
purpose and managers who seek to maximize
38
technical and managerial autonomy, and
Due to the company’s shortcomings, the
shareholder value. There is nothing in
the power to regulate all upstream activities,
transitional articles of the amendments
the contemplated structure of the energy
conduct tenders, and award and enter into
mandate that implementing legislation
reform suggesting the government will let
E&P contracts. The CNH will also function
grant Pemex and any other state company
Pemex fail, but by the same token nothing
as the Secretaría de Energía’s technical branch
engaged in oil and gas E&P, budgetary,
therein prevents it from allowing Pemex to
in all upstream matters, compiling geologic
technical and managerial autonomy, subject
sink, spinning-off the company’s various
and operational information, administering
only to their respective balance sheets and
upstream, midstream and downstream
the technical aspects of assignments and
a ceiling for personal services spending.
39
business segments into stand-alone state
contracts, and approving and supervising the
Each of them will be taxed and pay royalties
companies or creating new, competing
execution of exploration and development
and other consideration to the State as any
state companies and instrumentalities—
plans, all matters formerly under Pemex’s
other operator in the business, and be free
uncorrupted by the past—to take over or
control.
to structure its investments and enter into
complement Pemex’s activities.43
There are a number of reasons why
contracts under a special, more flexible
—————————————————
Pemex did not live up to its expectations
—————————————————
Caveat Emptor
as a profitable company and successful oil
—————————————————
regulatory environment that restricted
There are a number of reasons why Pemex did not live up to its expectations as a profitable company and successful oil and gas producer.
the manner in which it could transact,
—————————————————
its significant hydrocarbon reserves, but its
invest, explore, produce, refine and market
procurement regime for goods and services.40
ability to access and profit over the long term
hydrocarbons, and a grossly inadequate
Most importantly, Pemex will make business
from incoming private investment will be
corporate governance structure that affected
decisions through a ten-person board of
determined by its future actions; in great part
its business judgment, mostly by influence of
governmental and independent directors
by how well it treats, protects, and regulates
the oil workers union,35 are just some.
which, although ultimately controlled by the
the inbound investment.
and gas producer. A burdensome fiscal regime implemented to fund social programs and other non-economic endeavors,
33
a
34
By properly setting the basis for the liberalization of its energy sector, Mexico placed itself in a position to attract the risk capital and technology it needs to develop
The approximately 150,697 member-
President and Senate through appointment,
Though its treatment of foreign investment
union, which represents 72.6% of Pemex’s
removal and voting power, will no longer
at different times has not been stellar,44
workforce, has been the company’s Achilles
house the representation and interests of
Mexico has a fair track record of treating such
heel in many respects. Too much corporate
the oil workers union.
investment in a non-discriminatory manner
36
41
6
Currents Winter 2013
and in accordance with international private
government put in place institutions, policies
and production concessions, had until mid-
law. Its current economic and financial ties
and procedures that address issues beyond
2013 failed to attract meaningful foreign
with major world powers, other developed
the oil patch such as low income, economic
investment due to burdensome regulations
countries and strategic partners are also
inequality and corruption, all of which
and government actions negatively impacting
strong, and its laws include at least twenty-
have led to Mexico’s current insecure
such investment and investor confidence.53 In
five bilateral investment treaties and twelve
environment.
contrast, Brazil had made, until recently, all
free trade agreements, most of which contain
The crafters of legislation and the regulators
the right moves to attract big oil to its riches,
clauses for the protection of investments,
must also recognize their inexperience in
awarding much desired concessions in most
including NAFTA. Much of the Mexican
matters relating to international oil and gas
of its licensing rounds.54 Then came the late
risk, however, lies elsewhere and particularly
practice in a competitive market. They should
2010 reforms for the pre-salt reserves, which
in the country’s social instability, inexperience
also look to Colombia as a role model and
in lieu of a concession for the Libra field (an
in international oil and gas practice, and the
take into consideration the expectations and
approximately 600 square mile area expected
greed the government may experience when
suggestions of the intended target group: the
to be a find larger than Mexico’s Cantarell),
it tastes the fruits of its work.
—————————————————
implemented a production-sharing contract, one that in principle should not have been
did shut down some established regional
The crafters of legislation and the regulators must also recognize their inexperience in matters relating to international oil and gas practice in a competitive market
crime organizations, a plethora of other
—————————————————
perhaps signaling that the fiscal terms were
criminal groups emerged as stand-alone
oil patch. Just two and one half years ago,
too onerous and risky.57
crime syndicates, seeking to take hold of the
Poland, sitting on top of one of the largest
The Polish, Argentine and Brazilian
47
territory left behind by the former cartels.
shale gas reserves in Europe, dreamt of
experiences highlight Mexico’s need to
These groups have notably engaged in
energy independence from Russia, attracting
proceed in a carefully planned manner with
“express” kidnapping and extortion schemes
the likes of ExxonMobil, Talisman and
the implementation of its energy reform, as
to finance part of their activities, targeting
50
Marathon Oil to their “shale revolution.”
interested investors will be watching with a
in many cases oil and gas workers, including
Today, all such companies have abandoned
critical eye. While the increase of oil and gas
those laboring in the State of Tamaulipas,
their once-promising Polish projects
revenue sought by the reform is important
48
home of Mexico’s largest dry gas reserves.
officially citing unsuccessful attempts to
and undoubtedly the most significant motive
To exacerbate matters, last December
find commercial levels of hydrocarbons,51
behind it, regulations should mainly focus
15th, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
but mostly deemed by observers to be due
on preventing waste of natural resources,
Liberación del Pueblo, a newly formed and
as a result of delays in the enactment of
protecting third party rights, preventing
self-denominated guerrilla-type organization
meaningful fiscal and regulatory reform,
the contamination of the environment and
whose scope of influence and range of
inadequate contractual terms and an overly
ensuring the safe conduction of all energy-
action is unknown at this time, publicly
bureaucratic regulatory process.52
related activities. In sum, regulations should
45
In 2006, former President Felipe Calderon sought to fight organized crime in an unprecedented manner, declaring war for all practical purposes on a drug trade that to such date presumably had been controlled by a few hands. But while the noble effort 46
unappealing to the patch. 55 The round, however, attracted only one serious bidder, a consortium of Petrobras (40%), Total (20%), Shell (20%), CNPC (10%) and CNOOC (10%).56 Key players ExxonMobil, Chevron, BP, BG and Statoil stayed away,
declared itself against the energy reform
In the Americas, Argentina, whose
and announced that oil companies would
fundamental E&P regime has been in place
be deemed military objectives.
These
since 1967 and provides for the granting
circumstances demand that the Mexican
of contractor-friendly exploratory licenses
49
let the free market play out.
7
Currents Winter 2013
be advisable to design a progressive fiscal
to subcontract with third parties for the
system which can adjust to the recurring
provision of oil field services under a more
—————————————————
volatility of crude oil markets and a project’s
flexible procurement regime and enter into
The Mexican government must now draft
increase in profitability. True contractual
joint venture, operating or other government
and enact implementing legislation—a tall
stabilization in Mexico is rare, but if it were
approved upstream agreements under arm’s-
order and no easy task considering more than
to be implemented, it would have to be
length terms to further explore, develop
25 secondary laws will have to be created
carefully conceived and tailored to protect
or increase production from such areas.
or amended. The mandatory guidelines set
the investor against changes in government
These transactions could represent the first
forth for such laws in the transitional articles
administration and political goals and views,
opportunity for IOCs to enter Mexico under
of the amendments do provide a solid basis
and to curb future government greed in the
the new oil and gas E&P regime.
upon which the legislator will elaborate, but
light of an IOC’s E&P success.
—————————————————
Steps Forward
The Mexican government has taken just
Industry regulators also must strive to
one more step, albeit significant, to avoid
make all public tenders transparent and
becoming a net importer of crude oil and
To succeed, the government must find
grant everyone equal access to all material
enhance its world-wide influence as a major
a way to not unduly limit the broad and
information without preferring one investor
exporter of crude oil. There is a bright light
promising scope of the energy reform set
over another. Part of the reform’s success
at the end of the tunnel, but it is still seen
forth at the constitutional level, through
will lie not only in the ability of Mexican
from afar. As previously stated, the reform’s
new laws or host government instruments
investors and companies to benefit from
success or failure will lie in its detail.
containing provisions that discourage, rather
energy sector’s liberalization, but also in the
than entice, the international oil company
IOC’s confidence in Mexico’s institutions and
(IOC).
governmental authorities. The IOC will be
they are not all-encompassing and there is much to be done.
In the eyes of an IOC, the government
part of Mexico’s success only to the extent it
take (whether in the form of up-front or
is treated fairly and is able to bargain at arm’s-
back-end bonuses, royalties, taxes, profits
length with all industry participants. To ensure
or production share or carry) must be
this, regulators must be subject to internal
reasonable and balanced in light of oil price,
and external controls and reporting, and
cost (capital and operating) and risk (prospect
be appropriately and effectively supervised
size and probability of success) estimates,
and audited on a continuous basis in the
and the IOC’s expected internal rate of
areas of accounting and discipline. Citizens
return. The legal regime must also assure
and market participants must also have an
the IOC that the fiscal and other terms to
effective mechanism to express opinions and
which it has agreed up front will remain in
file grievances.
58
59
place over the duration of its agreement.
Pemex has now requested the assignment
In other words, that the IOC will have legal
of some of the areas it currently explores
stability in the context of a long-term, capital
or exploits, and the Secretaría de Energía
intensive investment in which returns may
will grant such request if the former
not materialize for many years.
demonstrates it possesses the technical,
Public pressure and the resulting
financial and operational capacities to explore
temptation to coerce the renegotiation of
and exploit hydrocarbons from such areas in
a deal or assert windfall taxes as a result
an efficient and competitive manner.60 Once
of high oil prices will be great, so it may
such areas are assigned, Pemex will be able 8
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End Notes 1. See Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], arts. 25, 27 and 28, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 20 de Diciembre de 2013 (Mex.), available at http://www.diputados.gob.mx/ LeyesBiblio/votos/20131211_ energia/dof_20dic13.pdf. 2. Alina Rocha Menocal, The Myth of the Infallible Technocrat: PolicyMaking in Mexico under the Salinas Administration, 9 J. P ub . & I nt ’ l A ff . 167, 169-70 (Spring 1998), available at https://www.princeton. edu/jpia/past-issues-1/1998/9. pdf. 3. Clare Ribando Seelke et a l ., C o n g . R e s e a r c h S e rv ., R43313, M exico ’ s O il and G as S ector : B ackground , R eform E fforts , and I mplications for the U nited S tates 1 (2014) [hereinafter M exico ’ s O il and G as ]. 4. See Iniciativa con Proyecto de Decreto que Reforma, Adiciona y Deroga Diversas Disposiciones a Los Artículos 25, 27 y 28 de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Draft Decree Initiative Amending, Supplementing and Repealing Various Provisions of Articles 25, 27 and 28 of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States], Gaceta del Senado, 31 de Julio de 2013 (Mex.), available at http://www.senado.gob.mx/ sgsp/gaceta/62/1/2013-07-31-1/ assets/documentos/Inic_PAN_ art.25-27-y-28-Const.pdf; see also Iniciativa de Decreto por el que se reforman los artículos 27 y 28 de la Constitución Política de los Estado Unidos Mexicanos [Decree Initiative Amending Articles 27 and 28 of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States], Gaceta del Senado, 14 de Agosto de 2013 (Mex.), available at http:// w w w. s e n a d o. g o b. m x / s g s p / g aceta/62/1/2013-08-14-1/ assets/documentos/ INICIATIVA_PRESIDENTE_ A R T S _ 2 7 _ Y _ 2 8 _ CONSTITUCIONALES.pdf. 5. Mexico’s Oil and Gas, supra note 3, at 3. 6. Id. at 4. See also Decreto por el que se Reforman y Adicionan Diversas Disposiciones de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos M e x i c a n o s, e n M a t e r i a d e Energía [Decree Amending and Supplementing Various Provisions of the Political Constitution of the
United Mexican States, on Energy], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 20 de Diciembre de 2013 (Mex.), available at http://www. sener.gob.mx/res/Resumen_ Refor ma_Constitucional_ Energetica_2013.pdf, and see Votaciones del Senado de la República, and see Dictamen de las Comisiones Unidas de Puntos Constitucionales, de Energía, y de Estudios Legislativos Primera, con Proyecto de Decreto por el que se Reforman y Adicionan Diversas Disposiciones de la Constitución Política de Los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, en Materia Energetica [Opinion of the Joint Commission on Constitutional Issues, on Energy, and First Legislative Studies, with the Decree Project Amending and Supplementing Various Provisions of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States, on Energy], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 10 de Diciembre de 2013 (Mex.), available at http://www.senado. gob.mx/libreria/impresiones/ imprime_votaciones_2.php?a no=2&tp=O&np=1&lg=62& id=1949. 7. See Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], art. 27, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 20 de Diciembre de 2013 (Mex.), available at http://www.diputados.gob.mx/ LeyesBiblio/votos/20131211_ energia/dof_20dic13.pdf. 8. S ee Decr eto por el q u e s e Reforman y Adicionan Diversas Disposiciones de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos M e x i c a n o s, e n M a t e r i a d e Energía [Decree Amending and Supplementing Various Provisions of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States, on Energy], transitorios Décimo (a), Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 20 de Diciembre de 2013 (Mex.), available at http://www. diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/ votos/20131211_energia/ dof_20dic13.pdf. 9. S ee Decr eto por el q u e s e Reforman y Adicionan Diversas Disposiciones de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos M e x i c a n o s, e n M a t e r i a d e Energía [Decree Amending and Supplementing Various Provisions of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States, on Energy], transitorios Décimo (c),
Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 20 de Diciembre de 2013 (Mex.), available at http://www. diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/ votos/20131211_energia/ dof_20dic13.pdf. 10. See Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], art. 27, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 20 de Diciembre de 2013 (Mex.), available at http://www.diputados.gob.mx/ LeyesBiblio/votos/20131211_ energia/dof_20dic13.pdf. 11. See id.; see also David L. Goldwyn, Atlantic Council, Mexico Rising: Comprehensive Reform at Last? 10 (2013), available at http:// www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/ publications/Mexico_Rising.pdf. 12. S ee D ecr eto p o r el q u e s e Reforman y Adicionan Diversas Disposiciones de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos M e x i c a n o s, e n M a t e r i a d e Energía [Decree Amending and Supplementing Various Provisions of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States, on Energy], transitorios Décimo (a), Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 20 de Diciembre de 2013 (Mex.), available at http://www. diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/ votos/20131211_energia/ dof_20dic13.pdf. 13. S ee D ecr eto p o r el q u e s e Reforman y Adicionan Diversas Disposiciones de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos M e x i c a n o s, e n M a t e r i a d e Energía [Decree Amending and Supplementing Various Provisions of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States, on Energy], transitorios Cuarto, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 20 de Diciembre de 2013 (Mex.), available at http://www.diputados.gob.mx/ LeyesBiblio/votos/20131211_ energia/dof_20dic13.pdf (the instrument may also provide for a mixed form of compensation (i.e., a combination of two or more of the described forms of payment)). 14. S ee D ecr eto p o r el q u e s e Reforman y Adicionan Diversas Disposiciones de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos M e x i c a n o s, e n M a t e r i a d e Energía [Decree Amending and Supplementing Various Provisions of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States, on Energy], transitorios Quinto, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 20 de
Diciembre de 2013 (Mex.), available at http://www.diputados.gob.mx/ LeyesBiblio/votos/20131211_ energia/dof_20dic13.pdf. 15. Id.; see also Goldwyn, supra note 11, at 10, 17-18, 24 n.9. 16. See Dictamen de las Comisiones Unidas de Puntos Constitucionales, d e E n er gí a, y de Estudios Legislativos, Primera, con Proyecto de Decreto por el que se Reforman y Adicionan los Artículos 25, 27 y 28 de la Constitución Política de Los Estados Unidos Mexicanos en Materia Energía [Opinion of the Joint Commission on Constitutional Issues, on Energy, and Legislative Studies, First, with the Decree Project Amending and Supplementing Articles 25, 27, and 28 of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States on Energy] 211-12, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 10 de Diciembre de 2013 (Mex.), available at http://comunicacion.senado. gob.mx/pdf/2013/dic/RefEne. pdf. 17. A contractor usually enters into a production-sharing contract with a national oil company, which by its nature is able to use and sell production, and share production or its monetization with contractors. Though the CNH could eng ag e a state company to participate in such a contract, it remains unclear from the constitutional reform how the former will share profits or production with a contractor. See Kristen Bindemann, ProductionSharing Agreements: An Economic Analysis, Oxford Inst. for Energy Stud. 1 (1999), available at http:// www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/ wp-content/uploads/2010/11/ WPM25-ProductionSharingAg reementsAnEconomicAnalysisKBindemann-1999.pdf. 18. S ee D ecr eto por el q u e s e Reforman y Adicionan Diversas Disposiciones de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos M e x i c a n o s, e n M a t e r i a d e Energía [Decree Amending and Supplementing Various Provisions of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States, on Energy], transitorios Décimo (b), Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 20 de diciembre de 2013 (Mex.), available at http://www. diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/ votos/20131211_energia/ dof_20dic13.pdf; see also Dictamen
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de las Comisiones Unidas de Puntos Constitucionales, de Energía, y de Estudios Legislativos, P r i m e r a , c o n P r oy e c t o d e Decreto por el que se Reforman y Adicionan los Artículos 25, 27 y 28 de la Constitución Política de Los Estados Unidos Mexicanos en Materia Energía [Opinion of the Joint Commission on Constitutional Issues, on Energy, and Legislative Studies, First, with the Decree Project Amending and Supplementing Articles 25, 27, and 28 of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States on Energy] 211-13, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 10 de Diciembre de 2013 (Mex.), available at http://comunicacion.senado. gob.mx/pdf/2013/dic/RefEne. pdf. 19. Luis Sánchez Jiménez, Las Licencias son los Nombres que la Industria Petrolera Inter nacional da a las Concesiones Modernas [Licenses are the Names that the International Oil Industry gives Modern Concessions], Grupo Parlamentario PRD, LXII Legislatura (11 de Diciembre de 2013), http://prd.senado.gob.mx/ wp/?p=12250; Mauricio Torres, El Senado Aprueba la Reforma Energética [The Senate Passes Energy Reform], CNNExpansión (Martes, 10 de Diciembre de 2013 a las 00:16), http://www.cnnexpansion. com/economia/2013/12/10/ refor ma-energ etica-senadopemex-petroleo; Dave Graham et. al., Mexico Energy Reform Eyes Big Opening for Private Capital, R euters (Sun., Dec. 8, 2013, 4:04 PM EST), http://www. reuters.com/article/2013/12/08/ us-mexico-refor ms-energ yidUSBRE9B70C120131208; Juan Montes et. al., Mexico Congress Passes Historic Energy Bill, Wall St. J. (Dec. 12, 2013, 12:39 PM ET), http://online.wsj.com/news/ articles/SB100014240527023039 32504579254013051981266. 20. For example, the Ley General de Bienes Nacionales, which defines the types of property owned by the Nation, including hydrocarbons, indistinctly refers to “concessions, permits and authorizations” for the use, enjoyment and exploitation of property owned by the Nation (the term “license” is referenced only once, specifically as the instrument to be granted for the construction on or improvement of federal lands used for religious purposes). See Ley General de Bienes Nacionales [General Law of National Assets], as amended, arts. 16 y 83, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 20 de Mayo de 2004 (Mex.), available
at http://www.diputados.gob.mx/ LeyesBiblio/pdf/267.pdf. The Ley General de Pesca y Acuacultura Sustentables, which authorizes fishing and hunting activities, defines each of “concession” and a “permit” as a type of document rather than by its intrinsic legal nature (the term “license,” though used twice, is not defined). See Ley General de Pesca y Acuacultura S u s tenta bl es [ Ge n e r a l L aw of Sustainable Fisheries and Aquaculture], as amended, arts. 4(XII), 4(XXVI) y 63, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 23 de Enero de 2007 (Mex.). Still, the Ley Minera, which establishes a mining concession regime, authorizes the industry regulator to grant third parties “authorizations” to perform work for the E&P of coal on lands that have been assigned for crude oil exploitation (asignaciones petroleras). See Ley Minera [Mining Law], as amended, art. 20, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 26 de Junio de 1992 (Mex.), available at http://www.diputados.gob.mx/ LeyesBiblio/pdf/151.pdf. For a further discusison over the legal nature of licenses, concessions and permits see Jorge E. Calafel, Teoría General de la Concesión [General Theory of the Concession], I nstituto de I nvestigaciones Jurídicas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, http:// www.juridicas.unam.mx/publica/ librev/rev/jurid/cont/26/pr/ pr19.pdf (access by searching for the Titulo, Teoría General de la Concesión, in the Consulta de Artículos, http://biblio.juridicas. unam.mx/revistas/). 21. A c o n s t r u c t i o n p e r m i t i s representative of a license, for the licensee landowner, as part of its bundle of ownership rights, has the preexisting right to make improvements on his or her land, though the exercise is restricted for public policy and revenuerelated reasons. See Andrés Serra Rojas, Der echo Administrativo [Administrative Law], Editorial Porrúa, S.A., 272-273 (México 1985) and Calafel, supra note 20, at 220. 22. U n d e r a M e x i c a n m i n i n g concession the Nation originally owns all the minerals under the ground and only grants the concessionaire the right to use, enjoy and exploit them on a going forward basis. See Rojas, supra note 21, at 220, 300. 23. See Iniciativa con Proyecto de Decreto que Reforma, Adiciona y Deroga Diversas Disposiciones
a Los Artículos 25, 27 y 28 de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Draft Decree Initiative Amending, Supplementing and Repealing Various Provisions of Articles 25, 27 and 28 of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States], Gaceta del Senado, 31 de Julio de 2013 (Mex.), at 6, available at http://www.senado.gob.mx/ sgsp/gaceta/62/1/2013-07-31-1/ assets/documentos/Inic_PAN_ art.25-27-y-28-Const.pdf; see also Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], art. 27, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 20 de Diciembre de 2013 (Mex.), available at http://www.diputados.gob.mx/ LeyesBiblio/votos/20131211_ energia/dof_20dic13.pdf. 24. See Senate Passes Draft Energy Bill, The News (Dec. 11, 2013), http:// thenews.com.mx/index.php/ mexico-articulos/16778-senatepasses-draft-energy-bill. 25. See Anuncian Estrategia 15-15 Contra Aprobación de Reforma Energética [Announcement of 15-15 Strategy Against Approval of Energy Reform], E l E conomista (Dec. 12, 2013), http://eleconomista. com.mx/sociedad/2013/12/11/ anuncian-estrategia-15-15contra-aprobacion-refor maenergetica; Estrategia 15-15 en defensa del petróleo [15-15 Strategy in Defense of Oil], Informador. com.mx (Dec. 12, 2013), http://www.infor mador.com. mx/mexico/2013/502214/6/ estrategia-15-15-en-defensa-delpetroleo.htm. 26. See Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], art. 35, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 20 de Diciembre de 2013 (Mex.), available at http://www.diputados.gob.mx/ LeyesBiblio/votos/20131211_ energia/dof_20dic13.pdf (The results of such a consultation will be binding on the federal executive and legislative branches of government if at least 40% of the registered voters cast their vote in the same way). 27. See Ley Federal de Consulta Popular [Federal Law on Popular Consultation], art. 6, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 14 de Marzo de 2014 (Mex.), available at http://www.diputados.gob.mx/ LeyesBiblio/pdf/LFCPo.pdf. 28. See Ley Federal de Consulta Popular [Federal Law on Popular Consultation], art. 5, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 14 de Marzo de 2014 (Mex.), available at http://www.diputados.gob.mx/ 10
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LeyesBiblio/pdf/LFCPo.pdf. 29. According to Article 11 of the law implementing article 35 of the Mexican constitution, matters relating to the State’s income and expenditures are not within the scope of a referendum. See Ley Federal de Consulta Popular [Federal Law on Popular Consultation], art. 11, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 14 de Marzo de 2014 (Mex.), available at http://www.diputados.gob.mx/ LeyesBiblio/pdf/LFCPo.pdf. 30. Colombia, U.S. E n e rg y I n fo . Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Energy, EIA. gov , http://www.eia.gov/ countries/cab.cfm?fips=CO (last updated Jan. 7, 2014)[hereinafter Colombia]. 31. Composición Accionaria [Shareholder Composition], EcoPetrol, http:// www.ecopetrol.com.co/contenido. aspx?catID=542&conID=39684 (last updated July 31, 2014). 32. Colombia, supra note 30; see also LT 500: Latin America’s Largest Companies, Latin Trade, Jul.-Aug. 2009, at 20 (Today, Ecopetrol is the largest oil and gas company in Colombia and the second largest public oil and gas company in Latin America), available at http:// latintrade.com/rsrch/2009_ LT_500.pdf. 33. Considering all burdens, Pemex paid up to 70% of its gross revenue to the federal government during the last 10 years. Adrian Talamantes & Ken Culotta, Mexican Congress to Consider Constitutional Oil and Gas Reforms: Bold Stride Forward or Half-Step?, King & Spalding Energy Newsletter (Oct. 2013), available at http://www. kslaw.com/library/newsletters/ EnergyNewsletter/2013/ October/article1.html (last visited April 6, 2014). 34. Before the amendments, Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution and its regulation effectively banned Pemex from entering into “risk contracts” in the form of concessions or licenses, production-sharing agreements a n d r i s k - s e r v i c e c o n t r a c ts. Secondary laws, in turn, placed significant limitations to its procurement process, seeking in principle to prevent its officers from engaging in corr uptive practices. See Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], art. 27, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 5 de Febrero 1917 (Mex.). 35. The oil workers union (Sindicato de Trabajadores Petroleros), accused of repeated misuse of funds and shady business dealings, controls
five out of the fifteen positions in Pemex’s board of directors. Once the amendments are fully implemented, the union will have no board positions. See Reforms in Mexico: Oil’s Well that Ends Well, The Economist, Dec. 14, 2013, available at http://www.economist. com/news/americas/21591579bumpy-year-ends-high-note-oilswell-ends-well. 36. See Petróleos Mexicanos, Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2012 (Form 20-F), 159 (Apr. 30, 2013) [hereinafter Petróleos Mexicanos], http://www.ri.pemex. com/files/content/Pemex_2012_ Form_20-F_130913.pdf (filed with the U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n); Imelda García, Reforma Energética: ¿Golpea el Poder del Sindicato de Pemex? [Energy Reform: Did You Hit the Power of the Union of Pemex?], ADN Político (Dec. 26, 2013, 7:38 PM), http://www.adnpolitico. com/gobierno/2013/12/24/ reforma-energetica-inicia-el-findel-sindicato-petrolero. 37. Under the collective bargaining agreement, a union member may form a company and participate in Pemex’s public bids and tenders or assignments of work, transportation and ser vices, potentially entitling him or her, for all practical purposes, to a salar y and the profits generated by such a company. Se e P e t r ó l e o s M e x i c a n o s , Contrato Colectivo de Trabajo celebrado entre el S indicato de T rabajadores P etroleros de la R epública M exicana y P etróleos M exicanos , art. 34 (2013), available at http://www. pemex.com/acerca/informes_ publicaciones/Documents/ contrato_colectivo/cct_20132 0 1 5 . p d f . Re p r e s e n t a t i v e s who negotiated the 2013-2015 collective bargaining agreement received 105 million pesos (roughly 8 million dollars) as compensation for costs incurred in negotiating the agreement, plus travel expenses for those representing each of the 36 sections of the organization. Imelda García, Contrato de Sindicato Petr oler o Cubr e Hasta Cirugía Plástica [The Oil Union Contract Even Covers Plastic Surgery], ADN Político, (Sept. 26, 2013, 3:54 PM), http://www.adnpolitico. com/gobierno/2013/08/27/ contrato-de-pemex-y-petroleroscubre-hasta-cirugia-plastica. 38. See Petróleos Mexicanos, supra note 37, at 127 (filed with the U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n). 39. See Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], transitorios Vigésimo, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 20 de Diciembre de 2013 (Mex.), available at http://www.diputados.gob.mx/ LeyesBiblio/votos/20131211_ energia/dof_20dic13.pdf. 40. Id. If Pemex is to compete efficiently in the market, this regime should have no unreasonable limitations as to process, form or substance other than those inherent to international best practices and anti-corruption laws. Juan Montes, Mexico Energy Bill to End Pemex’s Monopoly on Oil, Wall St. J. (Dec. 7, 2013, 4:38 PM ET), http://online.wsj.com/news/ articles/SB100014240527023034 97804579244503254132812. 41. See Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], transitorios Vigésimo, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 20 de Diciembre de 2013 (Mex.), available at http://www.diputados.gob.mx/ LeyesBiblio/votos/20131211_ energia/dof_20dic13.pdf. 42. Pemex’s failure to fulfill its commitments on an exploration plan, for example, will trigger a reversion of the areas to the State. See Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], transitorios Sexto, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 20 de Diciembre de 2013 (Mex.), available at http://www.diputados.gob.mx/ LeyesBiblio/votos/20131211_ energia/dof_20dic13.pdf. 43. The decree requires that, following 12 months after the enactment of the new Law Regulating Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution in Petroleum Matters, the executive branch submit to Congress a bill to create the Centro Nacional de Control de Gas Natural, a public instrumentality that will operate the national natural gas pipeline and storage systems, which are currently owned and operated by Pemex. See Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], transitorios Décimo Sexto, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 20 de Diciembre de 2013 (Mex.), available at http://www. diputados.gob.mx/LeyesBiblio/ votos/20131211_energia/ dof_20dic13.pdf. 44. In a 2011 decision, the Mexican 11th circuit court (Tribunal Colegiado de Circuito) annulled an I.C.C. $300 million dollar award in favor of Commisa, a Mexican subsidiary of Kellogg, Brown and Root, holding that Pemex, as a State instrumentality, could
not be subject to arbitration and could only be sued through administrative proceedings in Mexico. A New York federal court upheld the ICC award in late 2013, stating the circuit court violated all basic notions of justice in its ruling. Corporation Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral, S. de R.L. de C.V. v. Pemex-Exploracion y Prod., 962 F. Supp. 2d 642 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 45. Mexico is also a party to several OECD agreements covering foreign investment, notably the Codes of Liberalization of Capital Movements and the National Treatment Instrument. P a t r i c k W. N e e , H o w t o Get Rich Doing Business in M exico : M exico B usiness G uide and C ontracts , Ch. 6 (Internationalist Publ’g Co., 2014), available at books.google.com/ books?id=imwmAwAAQBAJ. 46. See CNN Library, Mexico Drug War Fast Facts, CNN World, http:// www.cnn.com/2013/09/02/ world/americas/mexico-drugwar-fast-facts/index.html (last updated Mar. 15, 2014). 47. Id. 48. J. Reyes, Confirma Pemex Secuestro de 16 de sus Trabajadores [Pemex Confirms the Kidnapping of 16 of its Workers], El Economista (Jan. 13, 2011), http://eleconomista.com.mx/ seguridad-publica/2011/01/13/ confirma-pemex-secuestro-16sus-trabajadores; See also Tracy Wilkinson, Mexican Drug Cartels Cripple Pemex Operations in Basin, L.A. Times (Sep. 6, 2010), http:// a r t i c l e s. l a t i m e s. c o m / 2 0 1 0 / sep/06/world/la-fg-mexicopemex-20100ninety; Secuestran y Extorsionan a Empleados de Pemex [The Kidnapping and Extortion of Pemex Employees], 24-Horas (Oct. 18, 2013, 2:14 AM), http:// www.24-horas.mx/secuestrany-extorsionan-a-empleados-depemex/. 49. See Petroleras Extranjeras Que se Instalen en México Serán Atacadas: Guerrilla FAR-LP [Foreign Oil to be Installed will be Attacked: Guerilla FAR-LP], A ristegui N oticias (Dec. 17, 2013, 8:14 AM), http:// aristeguinoticias.com/1712/ mexico/empresas-petrolerasextranjeras-que-se-instalen-enmexico-seran-atacadas-guerrillafar-lp/. 50. A.E., Mad and Messy Regulation, The E conomist (Jul. 10, 2013, 17:00), http://www.economist. com/node/21581678. 51. Id. North American Firms Quit Shale Gas Fracking in Poland, BBC News Bus. (May 8, 2013),
http://www.bbc.com/news/ business-22459629. ExxonMobil Dr ops Shale Plans in Poland, Market Watch (June 18, 2012, 12:16 PM ET), http://www. marketwatch.com/story/exxonmobil-drops-shale-plans-inpoland-2012-06-18-124851613. 52. Id. Exit by Two Foreign Firms Leaves Polish Shale Gas Under Cloud, Reuters (May 8, 2013, 11:12 AM EDT), http://www.reuters.com/ article/2013/05/08/poland-shaleidUSL6N0DP2WH20130508. ExxonMobil Leaves Poland Guessing, N at u r a l G a s E u ro p e (June 20, 2012, 12:00 AM), http:// www.naturalg aseurope.com/ exxonmobil-leaves-poland-shalegas. 53. These included restrictions on an investors ability to import and export funds from Argentina, hold money in offshore accounts, repatriate capital and profits, and export production without g overnment consent. US oil Companies Interested in Investing in YPF, but have Their Conditions…, MercoPress (Jul. 19, 2012, 7:58 UTC), http://en.mercopress. com/2012/07/19/us-oilcompanies-interested-in-investingin-ypf-but-have-their-conditions. Argentina, O ffice of the U.S. Trade Representative, USTR. Gov, http://www.ustr.gov/sites/ default/files/2013%20NTE%20 Argentina%20Final.pdf. 54. See Areas Under Concession, Agencia N acional D o P etróleo , G ás N atural E B iocombustíveis ANP (2014), http://www.brasilrounds.gov.br/arquivos/mapas/ Julho_2014/Mapa_Brasil_Areas_ Sob_Concessao_11072014.pdf. 55. Id. President Dilma Rousseff proposed a production sharing arrangement because the overall exploration risk to the contractors would be significantly lower than for other fields in Brazil. Susana Moreira, Dilma Rousseff and Brazil’s Oil Sector, AS-COA. org (March 2011), http://www. as-coa.org/sites/default/files/ DilmaRousseff_BrazilsOilSector. pdf. 56. Shell Announces Successful Bid for Giant Field in Deep Water Brazil, S hell G lobal (Oct. 21 2013), http://www.shell.com/global/ aboutshell/media/news-andmedia-releases/2013/brazildeepwater-bid.html. 57. Among them are those requiring the payment a 6.8 billion dollar signing bonus, giving operatorship to Petrobras and a 41.65% share of profit oil to the government. According to some sources,
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Raymond James stated that with the hefty signing bonus and other commitments, investment returns on Libra will range between 9% and 15%, depending on the price of crude oil and the daily production rate, which under a traditional concession, would yield a 23% return, assuming a 12,000 bbl/day production rate. See Post-2003 Blackout Rules Lead to Millions in Fines, Fuelfix.com (Aug. 13, 2013, 7:02 AM), http:// fuelfix.com/blog/2013/10/28/ analysts-criticize-economics-ofbrazils-libra-field/ and http:// seeking alpha.com/cur rents/ post/1361842. Other sources state that the 35-year term of the contract will not allow the parties to full amortize their capital investment, estimated by some at 160 billion dollars. Emily Pickrell, Analysts Criticize Economics of Brazil’s Libra Field Bid, L atin A merica (Oct. 28, 2013, 5:00 PM), http:// fuelfix.com/blog/2013/10/28/ analysts-criticize-economics-ofbrazils-libra-field/. See also Libra Journey Begins for the Petrobras / Shell / Total / CNOCC / CNPC Consor tium, E r n s t &Y o u n g (2013), http://www.ey.com/ P u b l i c a t i o n / v w L UA s s e t s / Estudo_Libra_pos_leilao/$FILE/ Estudo_Libra_P%C3%B3s_ Leil%C3%A3o_23_10_2013_b. pdf. 58. Daniel Johnston & James Bush, I nternational O il C ompany Financial Management I n N ontechnical L anguage 155 (1998), available at http:// b o o k s. g o o g l e . c o m / b o o k s / about/International_Oil_ Company_Financial_Mana. html?id=sYIqxibXy1kC. 59. Peter D. Cameron, Stabilization in Investment Contracts and Changes of Rules in Host Countries: Tools for Oil and Gas Investors 12 (Research Paper), AIPN.org (July 6, 2006), available at http://www.rmmlf.org/ Istanbul/4-Stabilisation-Paper.pdf. 60. See Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], transitorios Sexto, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 20 de Diciembre de 2013 (Mex.), available at https://www.aipn.org/ mcvisitors.aspx?type=v; Adrian Talamantes, Pemex Requests Mexico E&P Areas from SENER, King & Spalding Energy Law Exchange (Mar. 26, 2014), http://www. energylawexchange.com/pemexrequests-ep-areas-sener/.
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Currents Winter 2013
The World Trade Organisation Obligations and Legislative Polcy: Choices in Developing Countries for Biotechnology R A M E S H
K A R K Y
A N D
M A R K
Many developing and least-developed nations are exporters of conventional agricultural products, and such products have traditionally been free of genetically modified (GM) material in the international
P E R RY *
Organization Agreement on Trade Related Ramesh Karky is a Postdoctoral Fellow in Law at the University of Western Ontario, Canada, and Mark Perry is Professor of Law at the University of New England, Armidale, Australia.
market.1 Now the scenario has changed, and
Aspects of Intellectual Property obligations related to biotechnology and offers policy choices relating to the patentability of innovation that utilizes: biotechnology; genetically modified organisms;
they are facing issues for international market
European Parliament adopted the Directive
commercialization and risk assessment of
access. These countries have had genetically
on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological
genetically modified plants, crops, foods and
modified products introduced into their
Inventions in 1998, and many EU Members
other products; co-existence of genetically
markets without their consent or knowledge.
have incorporated the provisions of this
modified, conventional and organic farming;
For example, it has been reported that
Directive into their domestic law by
and some basic principles of the law relating
soybean farmers in Argentina have used
enacting specific biotechnology laws or
to biotechnology.
unlicensed (“brown bagged” in GM crop
amending existing intellectual property
—————————————————
parlance) genetically engineered seed from
law. The European Patent Convention
I. Concepts
Brazil, and that Bt cotton was in the fields
of 1973 has been amended to include the
—————————————————
in India before any governmental approval.2
provisions of the Directive and it introduced
A few words on biotechnology would be a
Research on seeds smuggled in from other
specific provisions to address the field of
useful introduction to the issues discussed
countries indicates that a regulated seed
biotechnology. Even amongst the countries
in this paper. There is no single specific
market would be safer than the current illegal
that have biotechnology laws, there is
definition of biotechnology, but a broad
market. When people adopt GM crops in
little harmonization either at the policy or
generic meaning would be “[u]sing living
a free-for-all atmosphere, it holds potential
regulatory level.
organisms, or their products, for human
3
7
8
9
10
This paper explores the potential policy
benefit, to make a product or solve a
Many developing and least-developed
choices in the process of developing
problem.”11 Biotechnology, as defined by the
nations still lack or are in the process of
comprehensive biotechnology regulatory
Convention on Biological Diversity,12 is “any
developing comprehensive regulatory
systems in developing and least-developed
technological application that uses biological
systems to address the challenges brought by
countries. This paper also critically examines
systems, living organisms, or derivatives
agricultural biotechnology.5 Some developed
the potential problems of agricultural
thereof, to make or modify products or
nations, such as the U.S. and Canada, do
biotechnology and offers measures to solve
processes for specific use.”13 Genetically
not have specific biotechnology laws.6 The
it. It further discusses the World Trade
modified organism (GMO) is the term
dangers.4
13
Currents Winter 2013
commonly used for a life-form that has been
of biotechnology, and at the same time
Agreement.28 “Members may, but shall not
altered using recombinant DNA techniques.14
provides options to minimize the risks
be obliged to, implement in their law more
Although Hungarian engineer Karl Ereky
posed by biotechnology. Although it would
extensive protection than is required by this
15
coined the term “biotechnology” in 1919,
be misleading to suggest that law alone
Agreement . . .”29 Article 16.4 of the WTO
it was the discovery of the DNA structure
is sufficient to address all GMOs-related
Agreement only requires conformity of
in 1953 by James Watson, Francis Crick,
concerns,23 there is no doubt that addressing
laws with its obligations as provided in the
Maurice Wilkins, and Rosalind Franklin,
these issues with a regulatory perspective will
annexed Agreements.30 It does not require
which was followed by the development
help to provide better use and understanding
the conformity of Members’ laws with the
of recombinant DNA technologies in the
of their deployment.
provisions of the WTO Agreements.
1970s, that forms the cornerstone of modern
—————————————————
In the context of
the conformity
obligation, it is relevant to mention here
agriculture sector in favor of the use of GM
II. Issue of Compliance with WTO/TRIPS Biotech Obligation
biotechnology include: high yield of crops,
—————————————————
of an actor, whether a nation or industry,
high quality of crops, and a decrease in the
The
Trade-Related
and a specified rule.31 In the international
cost of farming,17 i.e., traits being introduced
Aspects of Intellectual Property24 (TRIPS
context, compliance is often specified as
to improve output for a given input. At the
Agreement) is one of the major agreements
a “[nation’s] behavior that conforms to a
same time, some serious concerns have been
of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
treaty’s explicit rule.”32 Compliance with an
expressed about introducing genetically
Agreement.25
international obligation and the effectiveness
modified crops, which include: the possible
prescribes
its
of that obligation are two different things;
risks to human health of food products
—————————————————
compliance may be high but effectiveness
derived from genetically-modified crops;18
low. There is a presumption that a state
regulation of genetically modified plants,
[Biotechnology Law] deals with biotechnological innovations, GMOs, commercialization and risk assessment/regulation of genetically modified plants, crops, foods and other products, and the co-existence of genetically modified, conventional and organic farming.
crops, foods and other products, and
—————————————————
inventions, whether products or processes,
the co-existence of genetically modified,
members. One of the obligations is to
in all fields of technology, provided that
conventional and organic far ming. 21
bring national legislation into conformity
they are new, involve an inventive step and
Different jurisdictions have been practicing
with the WTO Agreement.
The WTO
are capable of industrial application.” 36
biotechnological law in varied forms, such
Agreement requires that “[e]ach Member
According to the TRIPS Agreement, patents
as patent law, seed law, plant protection
shall ensure the conformity of its laws,
must be available for inventions, and
law, pesticide law, food and safety law, and
regulations and administrative procedures
patent rights must be enjoyable without
environment law. 22 Biotechnology Law
with its obligations as provided in the
discrimination as to the place of invention
brings a social dimension to the field of
annexed
TRIPS
and whether products are imported or
biotechnology. Biotechnology Law may
Agreement further states that Members
locally produced.37 The TRIPS Agreement
offer opportunities to harness the benefits
shall give effect to the provisions of this
furthermore states that “[m]embers may
biotechnology.16 Some of the particular arguments from the
the possible production of toxic compounds resulting from genetic modification; and, 19
the uncertain impact on the environment.20 Laws regulating biotechnology may be thought of as “Biotechnology Law.” It deals with biotechnological innovations, GMOs, commercialization and risk assessment/
Agreement
on
The
certain
WTO
obligations
26
Agreements.”
27
14
Currents Winter 2013
Agreement
The
to
that compliance generally refers to a state of conformity or identity between the behavior
would perform its international obligations in good faith.33 However, international law generally is indifferent as to how states meet their international obligations.34 The TRIPS Agreement gives patentees the right to prevent any commercial use of the materials.35 The TRIPS Agreement states, “[p]atents shall be available for any
provide limited exceptions to the exclusive
other than micro-organisms and
innovations, which are necessar y to
rights conferred by a patent, provided that
essentially biological processes
protect ordre public or morality, including
such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict
for the production of plants or
protecting human, animal or plant life or
with a normal exploitation of the patent and
animals other than non-biological
health or avoiding serious prejudice to
do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
and microbiological processes.45
the environment.50 This provision of the
interests of the patent owner, taking account
However, any Member country
TRIPS Agreement certainly covers the scope
38
of the legitimate interests of third parties.”
excluding plant varieties from
of genetically modified plants or foods
This provision for patent exceptions provides
patent protection must provide
and the freedom of the Member State to
members with some flexibility in drafting
an effective sui generis system of
allow or not to allow genetically modified
patent legislation and may allow exemptions
protection.
products to be brought into its market or
46
for research purposes.39 “WTO members
According to Article 27 of the TRIPS
environment if the said situation exists.51
are also free to determine what ‘invention’
Agreement, a Member State may deny
Furthermore, the general principle of the
means, how novelty and inventive steps are
—————————————————
TRIPS Agreement allows Member countries
interpreted, and the scope of claims that will
to adopt measures necessary to protect
This includes inventions dangerous
[Art. 27.2] of the TRIPS Agreement certainly covers the scope of genetically modified plants or foods and the freedom of the Member State to allow or not to allow genetically modified products to be brought into it’s market or environment if the said situation exists.
to human, animal or plant life or
—————————————————
their sustainable development objectives
health or seriously prejudicial to the
patentability for some biotechnological
. . . In addition, many developing countries
environment. This is subject to
innovations, like plants or animals, and
find themselves in circumstances that
the condition that the commercial
essentially biological processes for their
make it difficult to plan for the future and
exploitation of the invention must
production. However, Article 27 of the
therefore to tailor their policies to specific
also be prevented and that this
TRIPS Agreement requires Members to have
development goals.”54
prevention must be necessary for
a patentability provision for micro-organisms
It can be inferred from Article 16.4 of
the protection of ordre public or
and non-biological and microbiological
the WTO Agreement and Article 1.1 of
morality.43
processes.48 Also, Article 27 of the TRIPS
the TRIPS Agreement that WTO Member
(ii) Diagnostic, therapeutic and
Agreement states that Member States are
States are required to fulfill the obligation
surgical methods: Diagnostic,
free to deny patentability to any kind of
prescribed by Article 27 of the TRIPS
therapeutic and surgical methods
biological innovations which are contrary
Agreement in their domestic law. 55 In
for the treatment of humans or
to public morality (ordre public), including
another words, all 159 WTO Member States,
animals may be excluded from
human, animal or plant life or health and/
including developing and least-developed
patentability.44
or environment.49
countries, are obligated to enact some form
be admitted.”
40
Furthermore, the TRIPS Agreement provides for specific exclusion from patentability. The permissible TRIPS Agreement exclusions are: (i) Ordre public or morality: Inventions contrary to ordre public or morality are excluded from patentability.41
42
47
public health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest.52 Article 27.3(b) is the most contentious provision of the TRIPS Agreement. 53 Since Article 27.3(b) covers the fields of biotechnology, it is extremely important for developing and least-developed countries. “What is less clear is how they can take advantage of its provisions to further
(iii) Plants and animals other than
The TRIPS Agreement also highlights
of biotechnology law or to incorporate
micro-organisms: Members
a Member State’s ability to prevent the
provisions of biotechnology law into their
may exclude plants and animals
commercial exploitation of patentable
domestic law sooner or later.56
15
Currents Winter 2013
law and policy to promote welfare-enhancing
the Southern District of New York denied
biotechnological innovation. Moreover,
patent protection for isolated human genes
many of these countries have no biological
and associated diagnostic methods in the
industries to speak of, and they may have
Myriad case.67 In June 2011, on appeal, the
—————————————————
reason to be highly skeptical that such
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
“Regulating biotechnology, a new, complex,
businesses will spring up just because life-
(“Federal Circuit”) partially reversed the
expensive, research-intensive and rapidly
forms, micro-biological, and non-biological
District Court decision, and stated that genes
advancing field, presents particular challenges
processes can be patented.
can be patented because the isolated DNA
—————————————————
III. Biotech Legislative Polcy Choices
62
63
for developing country policymakers.” For
Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement allows
developing and least-developed countries,
WTO Member States to deny patentability of
developing a biotech regulatory framework
any kind of biological innovations which are
On March 20, 2012, the U.S. Supreme
is a costly and lengthy process. Of course,
contrary to ordre public or morality, as well as
Court, after Prometheus v. Mayo, 69 issued
countries need to choose their biotech
those that protect human, animal or plant life
a “grant-vacate-remand order” (“GVR
policy in accordance with their needs and
or health and/or environment. European
Order”) for the Myriad case. It granted
situation and people’s aspiration. Generally,
patent laws have provisions denying patents
certiorari, vacated the Federal Circuit
the regulatory framework needs to address
to any inventions that are contrary to ordre
decision, and remanded the case back to
the following areas of biotech:
public or morality, whereas the U.S. and
the Federal Circuit for further review in
Canada have no such provisions.
light of the new Supreme Court decision
57
58
(i) Scope of patentability of biotech
64
has a “markedly different chemical structure” from DNA within the body.68
After 30 years of patenting human genes,
in Prometheus.70 On August 16, 2012, the
(ii) Commercialization of GM plants,
there is again some debate in the U.S. as
Federal Circuit again upheld its previous
crops, foods and other products
to whether an isolated DNA molecule is
decision, and concluded that isolated genes
and scientific risk assessment; and,
—————————————————
are markedly different from native genes and
After 30 years of patenting human genes, there is again some debate in the U.S. as to whether an isolated DNA molecule is patentable subject matter.
are patentable.71 On November 30, 2012,
—————————————————
nature and not patent eligible merely because
patentable subject matter. This issue has been
it has been isolated, but cDNA is patent
under consideration by the courts in the U.S.
eligible because it is not naturally occurring.”72
innovations;
(iii) Co-existence of GM, conventional and organic farming.59 A. THE SCOPE OF PATENTABILITY OF BIOTECH INNOVATIONS
Legislative policymakers first face a question as to whether or not patenting of all kinds of biotechnological innovations should be permitted in their jurisdiction.60 Regarding the patenting of biotechnological innovations, “[m]any developing countries are unclear about how to tailor their patent regulations to promote their interests in the acquisition, development and application of biotechnology.”61 If developing countries lack a clear vision of how—and whether— biotechnology can benefit their economies and improve the lives of their citizens, they may not be in a position to design a patent
and Australia.
on the question of whether human genes are patentable, and on June 13, 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court held that, “[a] naturally occurring DNA segment is a product of
The same issue is under consideration
In the U.S., the U.S. Patent and Trademark
before the Supreme Court of Australia.
Office (USPTO) granted patents for the
In 2010, Cancer Voices Australia filed a
human genes BRCA 1 and 2 to Myriad
lawsuit to stop Myriad Genetics and Genetic
Genetics, Inc. and the University of Utah
Technologies from patenting genes BRCA
Research Foundation.65 The Public Patent
1 and 2.73 The Federal Court of Australia
Foundation and the American Civil Liberties
(Sydney) in its decision in Cancer Voices
Union filed suit in the U.S. District Court
Australia v. Myriad Genetics Inc.74 dismissed
for the Southern District of New York.66
the case and upheld the patents for BRCA
On March 29, 2010, the District Court for
1 and 2. The Court found that the patented
16
Currents Winter 2013
the U.S. Supreme Court granted a certiorari
nucleic acid sequences for BRCA1 and 2
plants may have on the environment: (1)
occurring to man or the environment
are independent and isolated from native
within the agricultural system and (2) the
following exposure under defined conditions
DNA, and that the sequences could not exist
natural one, which is outside the agriculture
to a risk source(s).”88
in isolation without human intervention.
system. “Within the agriculture system, the
Biotechnological innovations, including
Thus, the patented matter consists of
potential risks include the transgenic plant
patented ones, are generally subject to
“an artificially created state of affairs,” a
becoming a weed, the spread of the trait
health and environmental controls under the
necessary condition for invention under
to weeds within the crop, possible effects
regulatory frameworks that a government
the Australian legislation. Cancer Voices
on non-target organisms, the spread of the
may put in place. Countries may decide
Australia appealed the decision of the
transgene to non-GM crops, and the impact
whether to allow genetically modified
Federal Court, and the issue is now under
81
of any changes in agricultural practices.”
products into the market/environment with
consideration before the Federal Court of
In “nature, system concerns include the
or without satisfactory results of scientific
Australia. Judges of the Full Federal Court
spreading of the trait could adversely affect
risk assessment.89 The EU has provisions
partially heard this case on August 7 and 8
—————————————————
regarding health safety risk assessments
of 2013. The U.S. Supreme Court judgment
of genetically modified products before
this case, but the cases are about the same
Both sides—pro-GMO and anti-GMO—have strong arguments in their favor.
patents held by the same owner.78
—————————————————
invoke a safeguard provision and temporarily
that ecosystem or that the transgenic trait
ban a GMO product if it is possibly harmful
can spread into wild relatives of the crop in
to human health or the environment. 91
centres of origin and diversity.”82
Also, EU Member States may declare a
75
76
77
does not have a direct precedential effect on
B. COMMERCIALIZATION OF GM PLANTS, CROPS, FOODS AND OTHER PRODUCTS AND SCIENTIFIC RISK ASSESSMENT
their introduction into the market or environment.90 The EU Member States may
There is serious debate about the risks of
GMO-free zone under certain conditions.92
genetically modified products on human,
Even the U.S. has such provisions in cases
question: whether or not genetically modified
animal and plant health and life.
Both
where GMO products have potential health
plants, crops, foods and other products
sides—pro-GMO and anti-GMO—have
risks. 93 Additionally, Canada has safety
should be allowed to be brought freely
strong arguments in their favor.84 There is
assessment provisions for all kinds of
into the environment or commercialized.
no clear and undisputed scientific evidence
genetically modified products (plants with
A possible risk to the health of humans
that GMO products are good or bad for
novel traits, in Canadian terminology).94
and other animals, possible risk to the
human, animal and plant health and life.85
“There are concerns about the impact of
environment, and socio-economic and
But certain types of risks, as mentioned
biotechnology on many areas including
ethical issues are the main three areas of
above, though small have scientific basis.
86
health, the environment, biodiversity, access
concern regarding the release of GM crops
Hence, “[i]n many parts of the world, the
to genetic resources, ethics, indigenous and
or plants or products.79 “Concerns about
application of transgenic technologies
local communities, and farmers’ rights. It is
human and other animal health revolve
in agriculture triggered new regulations
therefore appropriate that these issues be
around the possibility the introduction
requiring the safety assessment of genetically
considered by the relevant regulatory frame
of one or more genes from completely
modified organisms (GMOs) and derivative
works.”95 Given these concerns, a nation
unrelated organisms might produce toxins
products prior to their environmental
should have a safety assessment legislative
or allergens in the product. These effects
release and commercialization.”87 “A formal
provision for genetically modified products
might be directly from the gene itself or
definition of risk assessment is the “process
in cases where a country wishes to allow
indirectly from the process of insertion of
of evaluation including the identification of
production and access to GMO products.96
the genes.”80 There are two possible negative
the attendant uncertainties, of the likelihood
As an example concerning developing
environmental impacts that transgenic
and severity of an adverse effect(s)/event(s)
nations, Thailand has extended bans on
The legislative policymakers face another
83
17
Currents Winter 2013
GMOs and decided to maintain the ban
to have labeling requirement.103 “Farmers’
of GMOs in conventional fields below
until national biosafety regulations are
rights” are another area policymakers need
minimum level.109 Co-existence rules also
developed. 97 In India, there has been a
to consider.104 The farmers’ rights in question
provide for compensation to farmers
heated public debate over the cultivation
are the right to save seeds and the right to
who suffer economic losses due to cross-
of the GM crop.98 In fact, India has limited
replant seeds, which are considered natural
contamination.110
cultivation of GM cotton seeds since 2002.
and customary rights of which they should
The Indian seed company Mahyco, which is
not be deprived.
Co-existence law covers the economic aspect of GMO and non-GMO cultivation.
105
a partner of the U.S. company Monsanto,
Co-existence law does not cover health
developed BT eggplant. It has undergone
C. CO-EXISTENCE OF GM, CONVENTIONAL
or environment risks.111 For the first time,
field trials since 2008 and has received
AND ORGANIC FARMING
the EU Commission on July 23, 2003
commercial cultivation approval from the government in 2009. However, because of the serious health concerns raised by the public, in addition to worries over threats to many non-mainstream eggplant varieties, the Government of India postponed BT eggplant cultivation until it is proved safe for human health and the environment. The 99
next important question is: will developing countries be able to examine scientifically such GMO products and analyze their contents (traits) and the possible risks to the environment or health? Clearly many developing countries lack modern equipment and qualified scientists; accordingly, there is doubt as to these developing countries’ ability to conduct risks assessments of GMO products. In respect of GM products, policies also need to determine whether the public has a right to know about genetically modified products. The EU has mandatory labeling requirements for GMO products.100 Canada has no mandatory GMO labeling requirement. The U.S. also has no provisions 101
for mandatory labeling requirements, unless such GMO products pose risks to health.102 Labeling requirements for GMO products give consumers knowledge on genetically modified products and the ability to choose. In the U.S. and Canada, there is public pressure
Legislative policymakers need to address whether to allow the co-existence of genetically modified, conventional and organic farming in their jurisdiction, i.e., “co-existence” laws. Co-existence rules give farmers the freedom to choose between cultivating genetically modified crops, —————————————————
Legislative policymakers need to address whether to allow the co-existence of genetically modified, conventional and organic farming in their jurisdiction, i.e., “co-existence” laws. ————————————————— organic crops, or conventional crops. 106 There are certain implications from the cultivation of genetically modified crops or plants over non-GMO crops or plants. The main implication is the unintended and unavoidable presence of genetically modified genes in non-GM crops/plants through cross-pollination. 107 The adventitious presence of GMOs affects the identity and economic value of the non-GMO crops/ plants, and it can result in income loss to the non-GMO farmers. 108 Co-existence requirements and rules prescribe basic measures aimed at keeping the presence 18
Currents Winter 2013
adopted a Recommendation on guidelines for the development of national strategies and best practices to per mit the coexistence of genetically modified crops with conventional and organic farming.112 The EU Commission on July 13, 2010, adopted a new Recommendation on guidelines for the development of national co-existence measures to avoid the unintended presence of GMOs in conventional and organic crops.113 It is a non-binding recommendation, and it states, “Member states may take appropriate measures to avoid the unintended presence of genetically modified organisms in other products or crops, such as conventional or organic.”114 It further states, “[t]he objective of co-existence measures . . . is to avoid unintended presence of GMOs in other products, preventing the potential economic loss and impact of the admixture of GM and non-GM crops (including organic crops).”115 It also has a provision declaring GM-free zones.116 In some cases it may be necessary to exclude GMO cultivation from large areas if measures are not sufficient to prevent the unintended presence of GMOs in conventional or organic crops.117 Sixteen EU Member States have already adopted coexistence guidelines and enacted co-existence laws.118 Co-existence requirements and rules in Europe are aimed at keeping the presence
of GMOs in conventional fields below a
the Precautionary Principle.128 The 1992
health. Other people claim that genetic
0.9% threshold. The adventitious presence
Rio Declaration on Environment and
modification will have significant health
of GMOs above the tolerance threshold on
Development contains the Precautionary
benefits.”137
non-GMO crops requires it to be labeled as
Approach. 129 T he 1998 Wingspread
The Precautionary Principle is enshrined
containing GMOs.120
Statement on the Precautionary Principle
in EU treaties and legal decisions. Article 174
states, “[w]hen an activity raises threats of
of the EC Treaty states,
119
Canada and the U.S. have no co-existence laws.
There are no provisions or measures
harm to human health or the environment,
“[c]ommunity policy on the
minimizing the threat of gene transfer, nor
precautionary measures should be taken
environment . . . shall be based
are there provisions for compensation to
even if some cause and effect relationships
on the precautionary principle and
farmers who lose income due to cross-
are not established scientifically.”
The
on the principles that preventive
contamination.122 It is noteworthy to mention
—————————————————
action should be taken. When
that cross-contamination genes may be
However, the Precautionary Principle is not without criticism, and countries such as the U.S. have not adopted this principle in their regulation and policy.
there are reasonable grounds for
—————————————————
the precautionary principle has
—————————————————
2000 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to
been politically accepted as a risk
Although the Precautionary Principle’s
the Convention on Biological Diversity also
management strategy in several
applicability is debatable, it is principally
contains an expression of the Precautionary
fields.”138
applied to biotechnology regulation that
Principle.131
121
protected here as patented genes, and the patented gene owner is not responsible for any losses caused by cross-contamination.
123
—————————————————
IV. Biotech Legislation and the Precautionary Principle
130
concern that potential hazards may affect the environment or human, animal or plant health, and when at the same time the available data preclude a detailed risk evaluation,
The European Court of Justice (ECJ)
policymakers in developing countries should
However, the Precautionary Principle is
in Monsanto v. Italy (2003)139 has interpreted
be familiar with. In the EU, protection of
not without criticism, and countries such
Article 12 of Regulation 258/97,140 as well
human, animal and plant life and health and
as the U.S. have not adopted this principle
as the Precautionary Principle. On the issue
the precautionary principle are the major
in their regulation and policy.
Some
of GMO foodstuff and bans made by
foundation of policy and regulation.124 This
writers have viewed the Precautionary
Italy pursuant to the measures of Article
policy is influenced by the popular anti-
Principle as “wholly arbitrary”
and
12 of Regulation 258/97, the Court ruled
biotechnology sentiments in Europe and
“literally incoherent,”
and it has been
“it is apparent that, in the light of the
the basic overriding concern that consumers
characterized as an anti-scientific, simplistic,
precautionary principle, the implementation
should not be expected to bear all of the risk
and irrational shortcut.
Professor Cass
of such measures is necessary in order to
with little benefit.125 EU policy fundamentally
Sunstein states, “[t]he most serious problem
ensure that novel foods do not present a
differs with the U.S. policy in respect of its
with the Precautionary Principle is that it
danger for the consumer.“141 Article 12 of
application of the Precautionary Principle.126
offers no guidance—not that it is wrong,
Regulation 258/97 is a codified version
“In the fields of food safety, plant and
but that it forbids all courses of action,
of the Precautionary Principle, and it
animal health protection, the need for
including inaction.”
He further writes, “[g]
allows member states to temporarily ban
taking precautionary actions in the face
enetic modification of food has become a
products if there are “detailed grounds for
of scientific uncertainty has long been
widespread practice. But the risks involved
considering that the use of a food or a food
widely accepted.”
In 1982, the United
are not known precision. Some people fear
ingredient . . . endangers human health or
Nations World Charter for Nature for the
that genetic modification will result in serious
the environment.“142
first time gave international recognition to
ecological harm and large risks to human
127
136
134
135
132
133
19
Currents Winter 2013
—————————————————
take into account the views and concerns
according to their needs. Perhaps
of the public.
In the EU, the Deliberate
biotechnology regulation may change the
Release Directive states that Member States
existing situation in developing countries
—————————————————
shall consult the public when introducing
where GMO products are already in the
In addition to the agreements discussed
GMOs into the environment.153 In New
market without consumer knowledge, and it
above, participatory approaches are another
Zealand, a participatory approach has
may facilitate the benefits of biotechnology
area of biotechnology where policymakers
been adopted.
In 1999, the Independent
by reducing the risks posed by biotechnology.
in developing countries need to recognize
Biotechnology Advisory Council was
Biotechnology law aims to bring a regulatory
the importance of information, transparency
established to inform and consult the
safeguard to protect human, animal and plant
and public participation in the process of
public on matters of biotechnology.
In
health through scientific risk assessment
law and decision-making. Public input into
the United Kingdom, the public is engaged
processes. If a GM product has a negative
the regulation of biotechnology, particularly
extensively in consultation.
It is important
effect to health or the environment, such
GMOs, is significant as is the demand for
to incorporate the participatory approach in
a product should not be allowed to be
enough time.
It is the public who eats
GMO regulation, and to have provisions for
brought into the market or escape into
GMO products and assumes potential
access to information, public participation in
the environment. Policies should provide
risk. In many countries, the public has
decision-making, and access to justice.
consumers and farmers the freedom to
already expressed their concerns over the
—————————————————
choose between GM, conventional and
V. Biotech Legislation and Participatory Approach
143
151
152
154
156
155
regulation of biotechnology, particularly
VI. Conclusion
GMOs food or crops, and its risk on health
—————————————————
level of GMO adventitious presence. Any
and the environment.
The Convention on
In the context of biotechnology or GMOs
policy needs to provide mechanisms that can
Biological Diversity145 obligates Contracting
crops/plants, the foremost challenges
protect the identity of non-GMO crops/
Parties to have a provision permitting public
faced by developing and least-developed
plants. In respect of GM products, the policy
participation in its relevant laws.
The
countries are how to protect their farmers
also needs to determine the extent to which
requires that parties
from the potential monopoly of big biotech
the public has a right to know how a product
shall consult the public in the decision-making
companies. This problem may not have
is being deployed. Labeling provisions for
process regarding living modified organisms
appeared in many developing and least-
GMO products allow consumers to know
and shall make the result of such decisions
developed countries yet, but it will appear
that they are buying a GMO product, and
available to the public.
The Aarhus
soon. The farmer’s right is another area that
they give consumers the potential freedom to
Convention on Access to Information,
policymakers need to address. Proper biotech
choose what they want to eat, in spite of the
Public Participation in Decision-making and
policy should address these problems. In
fact that determining the levels that trigger
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters
developing countries, more than 60% of the
labeling or other regulatory mechanisms is
1998 emphasizes public concern about the
labor force is based in rural areas dependent
difficult.158
deliberate release of genetically modified
on agriculture as the dominant sector of
It is essential that policymakers give prime
organisms into the environment and the
occupation, whereas in developed countries,
consideration to the participation of citizens
need for increased transparency and greater
the labor force involved in agriculture is less
in the process of making laws pertaining
public participation in decision-making in
than 3%.
This shows the importance of
to biotechnology and any biotech related
this field.149 Article 5.2–5.4 of the African
agricultural biotechnology in developing
decision-making process. Naturally, this
Model Law on Safety in Biotechnology150
countries.
includes informed voices from all sectors of
144
Cartagena Protocol
147
148
146
157
organic farming, and help minimize the
provides that the public should participate in
Developing and least-developed countries
society, from scientists that understand the
decision-making by means of both a notice-
are free to choose their biotech legislative
field to those with visceral reactions to the
and-comment. National authorities are to
policy and to adopt regulatory frameworks
idea of GM. Sometimes public participation
20
Currents Winter 2013
may not produce outcomes that are favorable to governments, but such participation will ultimately be in the greater interest of society and lead to long-term policy stability.
End Notes * The authors thank Catherine McCorquodale, Natasha Zervoudakis and Sarah Nguyen for their research assistance and funding by the Government of Canada through Genome Canada and the Ontario Genomics Institute (OGI-046). 1. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Policy Issues in International Trade and Commodities, Study Series No. 29, International Trade in GMOs and GM Products: National and Multilateral Legal Frameworks, at 7, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITCD/TAB/30, U.N. Sales No. E.04.II.D.41 (2005) [hereinafter UN Conference on Trade and Development] (by Simonetta Zarrilli). 2. G ay a t h r i Va i d y a n a t h a n , A Search for Regulators and a Road Map to Deliver GM Cr ops to Third World Farmers, N.Y. Times, March 31, 2010, at 2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ cwire/2010/03/31/31climate wire-a-search-for-regulatorsand-a-road-map-to-de-53658. html?pagewanted=all. 3. Id. 4. Id. 5. UN Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 1, at 6. 6. See Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg. 23, 302 (June 26, 1986) (discussing the U.S. government’s 1986 announcement of its Biotechnology Policy); see also Regulation of Biotechnology— Second Report, C an . H ouse of C o mm o n s —S ta n d i n g C o mm . on E nv ’ t & S ustainable D ev . (June 1996), http://www.parl. gc.ca/Content/HOC/Archives/ Committee/352/sust/minutes/ sust_issue-03_19-29/report-e. html [hereinafter The Regulatory Framework]. 7. Directive 98/44/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 13, 21 & art. 17.
8. See, e.g., Report of the European Commission to the Council and European Parliament on the Development and Implications of Patent Law in the Field of Biotechnology and Genetic Engineering, at 6–7, COM (2002) 545 final (July 10, 2002), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= CELEX:52002DC0545:EN:NOT (discussing the 1973 EPC and the EPO’s adoption of the relevant aspects of the Directive through enacting “The Implementing Regulation to the Convention on the Grant of European Patents Rule” (1973, as amended in 2004)); see also Case T 1191/01, ICOS Corp. v. SmithKline Beecham & Duphar Int’l Res. B.V., 2002 O.J. Eur. Patent Office (06/02), p.293, available at http://www.epo.org/ law-practice/case-law-appeals/ recent/t011191eu1.html. 9. Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199. 10. See, e.g., Thomas Margoni, The Roles of Material Transfer Agreements in Genetics Databases and BioBanks, in Comparative Issues in the G overnance of R esearch Biobanks (Giovanni Pascuzzi et al. eds., Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=2228696; Ramesh Karky & Mark Perry, Disharmonization in the Regulation of Transgenic Plants In Europe, in Biotechnology Law (Mark Perry et al. eds.) (forthcoming 2014) [hereinafter Karky & Perry— Disharmonization]. 11. W. J. Thiemann & M.A. Palladina, Introduction to Biotechnology 2 (Beth Wilbur et al. eds., 2d ed., Pearson Edu., 2010). 12. United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, art. 3, June 5, 1992, 31 U.N.T.S. 818 [hereinafter C o n ve n t i o n o n B i o l o g i c a l Diversity]. 13. Id. 14. Mark Per r y, Fr om Pasteur to Monsanto: Approaches to Patenting
Life in Canada, in An Emerging I n t e l l e c t ua l P r o p e r t y P aradigm —P erspectives from C anada 69 (Ysolde Gendreau ed., Edward Elgar Publ’g 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/ abstract=1291344. 15. U.N. Secretary General, Policy Brief: Modern Biotechnology and the OECD 1 (June 1999), http://www.oecd.org/science/ biotech/1890904.pdf. 16. Leslie G. Restaino et al., Patenting DNA-Related Inventions in the European Union, United States and Japan: A Trilateral Approach or a Study in Contrast?, 2 UCLA J.L. & Tech. 1, 1 (2003). 17. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Key Issues in Biotechnology, at 5, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/TEB/10 (2002). 18. Id. at 6. 19. Id. 20. Id. 21. S e e g e n e r a l l y C o o r d i n a t e d Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology Products, 51 Fed. Reg. 23, 302 (June 26, 1986); The Regulatory Framework, supra note 6; P e w I n i t i a t i v e o n Food and Biotechnology, Guide to U. S. Regulation of Genetically Modified Food and A gricultural B iotechnology Products ii n.2 (2001) [hereinafter Pew 2001], available at http://www. pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/ www pewtr ustsorg/Repor ts/ Fo o d _ a n d _ B i o t e ch n o l o g y / hhs_biotech_0901.pdf; L u c Bodiguel et al., The Regulation of Genetically Modified O r g a n i s m s : C o m pa r a t i v e A pproaches (Luc Bodiguel & Michael Cardwell eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2010); G eorge T. T zotzos et al ., G enetically M odified P lants : A ssessing S a f e t y a n d M a n ag i n g R i s k (Academic Press 2009). 22. See Pew 2001, supra note 21; The Regulatory Framework, supra note 6. 23. Karen Morrow, Genetically Modified Or ganisms and Risk, in T h e R egulation of G enetically
Modified Organisms: Comparative Approaches 54, 75 (Luc Bodiguel & Michael Cardwell eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2010). 24. TRIPS: Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 25. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1144 [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]. 26. Id. art. 16.4. 27. Id. 28. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 24, art. 1.1. 29. Id.; see also Appellate Body Report, India—Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, ¶ 59, WT/DS50/ AB/R (Sept. 5, 1997) (“‘Members are free to determine how best to meet their obligations under the TRIPS Agreement within the context of their own legal system . . .’ [a]nd, as a Member, India is ‘free to determine the appropriate method of implementing’ its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement within the context of its own legal system.”). 30. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 25, art. 16.4. 31. See also Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of Compliance as a Function of Competing Conceptions of International Law, 19 M ich . J. I nt ’ l L. 345, 346 (1998) (noting that some compliance theorists argue that concepts of compliance vary given different theories of international law). 32. R o n a l d B . M i t c h e l l , I nternational O il P ollution at Sea: Environmental Policy a n d T r e at y C o m p l i a n c e 30 (MIT Press 1994); see generally R oger D. F isher , I mproving Compliance with International Law (Univ. of Va. Press 1981); Jose E. Alvarez, Why Nations Behave,
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19 Mich. J. Int’l L. 303 (1998); Beth A. Simmons, Compliance with International Agreements, 1 A nn . Rev. Pol. Sci. 75 (1998); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 Yale L.J. 2599 (1997). 33. Kwan K. Sim, Rethinking the Mandatory/Discretionary Legislation Distinction in WTO Jurisprudence, 2 World Trade Rev. 33, 59 (2003); see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 34. Oppenheim’s International Law § 21, at 83 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., Oxford Univ. Press 9th ed. 1992). 35. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 24, art. 28.1. 36. Id. art. 27.1. 37. Id.; see also Panel Report, Canada— Pharmaceutical Patents, ¶ 7.94, WT/ DS114/R (Apr. 7, 2000) (explains the meaning of the term “without d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ,” i n T R I P S Agreement art. 27, and notes “[t]he ordinary meaning of the word ‘discriminate’ is potentially broader than these more specific definitions . . . Discrimination may arise from explicitly different treatment, sometimes called ‘de jure discrimination,’ but it may also arise from ostensibly identical treatment, which, due to differences in circumstances, produces differentially disadvantageous effects, sometimes called ‘de facto discrimination’ . . . ‘Discrimination’ is a term to be avoided whenever more precise standards are available, and when employed, it is a term to be interpreted with caution, and with care to add no more precision than the concept contains.”). 38. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 24, art. 30. 39. Mywish K. Maredia, Application of Intellectual Property Rights in Developing Countries: Implications for Public Policy and A gricultural R esearch Institutes 16 (2001), available at http://www.wipo.int/export/ sites/www/about-ip/en/studies/ pdf/study_k_maredia.pdf. 40. Id. 41. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 24, art. 27.2. 42. Id. 43. Id. 44. Id. art. 27.3(a). 45. Id. art. 27.3(b). 46. Id. 47. Id. (finding that plants or animals are known as higher life forms); see Perry, supra note 14, at 79; Harvard Coll. v. Canada (Comm’r of Patents), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45,
Currents Winter 2013
and practices. See Council Directive 98/44/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 1, 13–21 [hereinafter 1998 Council Directive], available at http:// eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1998:2 13:0013:0021:en:PDF (covering the topic of patentability of biotech innovations); see Directive 2001/18 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of Genetically Modified Organisms and Repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC, 2001 O.J. (L 106) 1 [hereinafter 2001 Council Directive], available at http:// eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:1 06:0001:0001:EN:PDF (covering the topic of risk assessment and commercialization); Commission Recommendation, of 13 July 2010 on Guidelines for the Development of National CoExistence Measures to Avoid the Unintended Presence of GMSs in Conventional and Organic Crops, 2010/C, 2010 O.J., (C200) 1 [hereinafter 2010 Co-existence Recommendation], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= OJ:C:2010:200:FULL:EN:PDF (covering the topic of coexistence). The U.S. and Canadian Courts have established case law in the area of patentability of biotech innovations, and there are rules governing risk assessment, but there are no co-existence rules or regulations in the U.S. and Canada. 60. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 24, art. 27.1; Harvard Coll., [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45; Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 316 (1980); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013); Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 52, Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S 199; 1998 Council Directive, supra note 59, art. 23. 61. Dutfield et al., supra note 54, at 2–3. 62. Id. at 65. 63. Id. 64. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 24, arts. 27.2, 30. 65. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 184–85 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) aff ’d in part, rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011) cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v.
71–72 (Can.) (ruling that higher life forms are not patentable in Canada, similar to Europe. However, in the United States, higher life forms are patentable). 48. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 24, art. 27.3(b). 49. Id. art. 27.2 (addressing provisions of morality and public order under TRIPS. U.S. and Canadian patent law has no such provision); see Perry, supra note 14, at 71 (noting there is no provision of public policy/morals or exclusions or exceptions to patents in the U.S. Patent Act. However, recently the U.S. included a prohibition on patents covering human organisms); Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 11229, § 33(a), 125 Stat. 340 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of title 35 of the United States Code) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no patent may issue on a claim directed to or encompassing a human organism”). 50. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 24, art. 27.2. 51. Id. arts. 27.2, 30. 52. Id. art. 8. 53. Id. art. 27.3(b). 54. G r a h am D u t f i e l d e t a l . , E xploring the F lexibilities o f TRIPS t o P r o m o t e B i o t e c h n o l o g y C a pa c i t y Bu i l d i n g a n d A ppro pr i at e Technology Transfer 11 (2006), available at http:// www.ecologic.eu/download/ projekte/1800-1849/1802/wp7_ final_report.pdf. 55. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 25, art. 16.4. 56. See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Extension of the Transition Period under Art. 66.1 for Least Developed Country Members, IP/C/64 (June 11, 2013) (providing least-developed countries an extended transitional period up to 2013 to fulfill TRIPS obligation. Now this transition period has been extended to July 1, 2021), available at http://www.wto. org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ ta_docs_e/7_1_ipc64_e.pdf. 57. Dutfield et al., supra note 54, at 65. 58. UN Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 1, at 6. 59. No countries have drafted a single regulatory framework addressing all biotech issues. The European Union has a systematic regulatory framework under different Directives and Regulations. This biotech regulatory framework has been based on European regulation 22
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (U.S. 2012) and opinion vacated, appeal reinstated, 467 F. App’x 890 (Fed. Cir. 2012) and aff ’d in part, rev’d in part, 689 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2012) aff ’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (U.S. 2013). 66. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 702 F. Supp. 2d at 183. 67. Id. at 185–86. 68. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 69. Mayo Collaborative Ser vs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1289 (2012). 70. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012). 71. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 72. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 133 S. Ct. at 2111. 73. Cancer Voices Austl. v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. [2013] FCA 65, ¶ 2 (Austl.); see Ryan Heighton, The ‘Myriad’ with the Golden ‘Gene’: Australia Upholds Breast Cancer Gene Patents, IP Osgoode (Mar. 3, 2013), http://www. iposg oode.ca/2013/03/the%E2%80%98myriad%E2%80% 99-with-the-golden-%E2%80%98 g ene%E2%80%99-australiaupholds-breast-cancer-genepatents/. It should be noted that the Supreme Court in Australia is not the highest court of the land, but rather two steps away from such, namely the High Court of Australia. 74. Cancer Voices Austl., [2013] FCA 65, ¶ 138. 75. Id. ¶¶ 101–02. 76. Joe Schneider, Myriad Genetics Win on Gene Patent Ownership is Appealed, B loomberg (Mar. 3, 2013), http://www.bloomberg. com/news/2013-03-04/myriadgenetics-win-on-gene-patentownership-is-appealed.html. 77. Top US Court Decision Blocks Patent on Cancer Genes, TimeBase (June 15, 2013, 3:59 PM), http://www. timebase.com.au/news/2013/ AT445-article.html. 78. Id. 79. Tzotzos et al., supra note 21, at 32. 80. Id. at 31. 81. Id. at 32. 82. Id. 83. Id.; see also Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 12, at 5–6. 84. I n t ’ l L aw A s s ’ n , R i o d e J aneiro C onference (2008): I n t e r n a t i o n a l L aw o n
Biotechnology 6 (2008), available at http://www.wipo.int/export/ sites/www/meetings/en/2009/ wipo_ls_biot_ge_09/pdf/1_ila. pdf. 85. Tzotzos et al ., supra note 21; GM S c i e n c e R e v i e w P a n e l , First Report: An Open Review of the S cience R elevant to GM Crops and Food Based on the Interests and Concerns of the P ublic 10 (2003), available at http://imag e.guardian. c o. u k / s y s - f i l e s / G u a r d i a n / documents/2003/07/21/gmscireport1-full.pdf (“To date worldwide there have been no verifiable untoward toxic or nutritionally deleterious effects resulting from the cultivation and consumption of products from GM crops.”). 86. Tzotzos et al., supra note 21, at 31; see also Ruby R. Fernandez, Monsanto and the Requirement for Real Risks in GM Food Regulation, 28 Loy. L.A. Int’l. & Comp. L. Rev. 335, 336–337 (2006). 87. Tzotzos et al., supra note 21, at 34. 88. Id. at 35. 89. Under the U.S. system, GM products can be commercialized without risk assessment if they have no distinct threat to public health or the environment. Under the EU system, every GM product has to go through the risk assessment process. Emily Marden, Risk and Regulation: U.S. Regulatory Policy on Genetically Modified Food and Agriculture, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 733, 734 (2003); A Description of the U.S. Food Safety System, U.S. Food & Drug Admin. (Mar. 3, 2000), http:// www.fsis.usda.gov/OA/codex/ system.htm. 90. 2001 Council Directive, supra note 59, at 1. This directive addresses all major aspects of the deliberate release of genetically modified plants. Id. There is a particular emphasis on the authorization procedure, scientific assessment of the risks to human and animal health and environment, experimental release into the environment (field trials), and cultivation or placing on the market. Id. However, the EU has left the issue of the co-existence between genetically modified crops, conventional crops, and organic crops to member states. Id. at 2. Under this Directive, the applicant (“the notifier”) needs to submit an application (“the notification”) for authorization to the competent authority of the Member State where such experimental release will take place. Id. at 3. The notification
needs to contain an environmental risk evaluation carried out by the notifier. Id. Then, the competent national authority examines the contents of the application and risk evaluation, and if it thinks that the application meets the requirements prescribed by Directive 2001/18/EC, it delivers a decision and authorizes the field trial. Id. In Europe, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA), composed of highly qualified scientists, conducts the environmental risks assessment of GM plants. Id.; see also Commission Regulation 258/97/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January, 1997, Concerning Novel Foods and Novel Food Ingredients, 1997 O.J. (L 043) 1 [hereinafter Commission Regulation 258/97]. Regarding genetically modified foods, an application is submitted to the competent member state authority where the GMO would be marketed, along with the required information and documents. Id. The competent member state authority forwards the application to the EFSA, and then the EFSA conducts risk assessments. Id. 91. See Commission Regulation 258/97, supra note 90, at 8 (“Article 12 of Regulation 258/97 allows member states to temporarily ban products if there are “detailed grounds for considering that the use of a food or a food ingredient . . . endangers human health or the environment.”); see also Case 236/01, Monsanto Agricoltura It. SpA v. Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri [Presidency of the Council of Ministers of Italy], 2003 E.C.R. I-8111, I-8140 to I-8142 (2003) [hereinafter Monsanto Case], available at http://curia.europa.eu/ juris/showPdf.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7 d2dc30db6e64463da6e14a358edd badf28c610c4.e34KaxiLc3qMb40 Rch0SaxuMahj0?text=&docid=48 138&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN &mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&par t=1&cid=193381 (demonstrating support of the Article 12 provision by the ECJ). Many EU member states have invoked the safeguard provision and banned GM foods. Id. For example, Italy invoked the safeguard clause (Article 12) under Regulation 258/97 on novel foods in August 2000; France banned the cultivation of the GM maize variety MON810 on February 7, 2008. Id. at I-8119. 92. 2 0 1 0 Co-existence Recommendation, supra note 59, at 1. Recommendation Number 1 states, “Member states may
take appropriate measures to avoid the unintended presence of genetically modified organisms . . . in other products . . . [or] crops, such as conventional or organic.” Id. Recommendation Number 4 states, “The objective of coexistence measures . . . is to avoid unintended presence of GMOs in other products, preventing the potential economic loss and impact of the admixture of GM and non-GM crops (including organic crops).” Id. Recommendation Number 5 has a provision declaring GM-free zones. Id. “In some cases . . . it may be necessary to exclude GMO cultivation from large areas . . . [if] other measures are not sufficient to prevent the unintended presence of GMOs in conventional or organic crops.” Id. 93. The U.S. has a provision for issuing a “determination of non-regulated status” to new GM plants, that is, only to non-plant pests. See Terence P. Stewart & David S. Johanson, Policy in Flux: The European Union’s Laws on Agricultural Biotechnology and Their Effects on International Trade, 4 Drake J. Agric. L. 243, 249–250 (1999). Developers of a new GM plant submit an application to the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of the United States Department of Agriculture. Id. Then, APHIS conducts an environmental risk assessment and determines the plant’s possible effects on human health and the environment. Id. 94. The Canadian Environmental Protection Act of 1999 (CEPA) requires that all products of biotechnology new to Canada be subject to an assessment for their potential “toxicity” before they can be manufactured, imported or sold in Canada. Canadian Environmental Protection Act, of 1999, S.C. 1999, c. 33 (Can.), available at http://laws-lois. justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-15.31/. Various directives provide the environmental safety requirements. See Directive 94-08: Assessment Criteria for Determining Environmental Safety of Plants with Novel Traits (2012); Directive 2000-07: Conducting Confined Research Field Trials of Plants with Novel Traits in Canada (2007); Directive 2009-09: Plants with novel traits regulated under Part V of the Seeds Regulations: Guidelines for determining when to notify the CFIA (2009). Health Canada has also Guidelines for the Safety Assessment of Novel Foods. Guidelines for Safety Assessment of Novel Foods, Health
Can. (June 2006), http://www.hcsc.gc.ca/fn-an/alt_formats/hpfbdgpsa/pdf/gmf-agm/guidelineslignesdirectrices-eng.pdf. 95. A n d r e w B l a t t ma n e t a l . , Austl. Dep’t of Foreign Aff., I n t e l l e c t ua l P ro p e rt y a n d B iotechnology : A T raining H andbook 2–33 (Spruson & Ferguson publ., 2001), available at http://www.spruson.com/au/ pdf/Biotechnology_IP_Manual. pdf. 96. See, e.g., id. 97. Int’l Ctr. For Trade & Sustainable Dev., GMO Update: US-EU Biotech Dispute; EU Regulations; Thailand, B ridges T rade B io R es , Sept. 10, 2004, available at http://ictsd. org/i/news/biores/9482/. 98. India Puts on Hold First GM Food Crop on Safety Grounds, BBC News (Feb. 9 2010, 2:48 PM), http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_ asia/8506047.stm. 99. Id. 100. See Commission Regulation 1830/2003, Concer ning the Traceability and Labeling of Genetically Modified Organisms and the Traceability of Food and Feed Products Produced from Genetically Modified Organisms, 2003 O.J. (L 268) 1; Commission Regulation 1829/2003, Genetically Modified Food and Feed, 2003 O.J. (L 268) [hereinafter 2003 Commission Regulation (1829)]; see also UN Conference on Trade and Development, supra note 1, at 4. 101. In February 2011, the Canadian Parliament defeated a bill requiring mandatory labeling or disclosure of GM content. See James Bradshaw, Ottawa Rejects Stronger Export Regulations for Genetically Modified Crops, The Globe & Mail (Feb. 9, 2011, 11:04 PM), http:// www.theglobeandmail.com/news/ politics/ottawa-rejects-strongerexport-regulations-for-geneticallymodified-crops/article566642/. 102. The Genetically Engineered Foods Right to Know Act, H.R. 3377, 106th Cong. (1999) (requiring mandatory labeling but never passed by U.S. Legislatures); see also Intl. Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 71–72 (2d Cir. 1996). 103. In the U.S., the Genetically Engineered Food Right-to-Know Act was submitted to Congress in 1999, but it was never successful. See The Genetically Engineered Foods Right to Know Act, supra note 102. In Canada, C-287, a private member’s bill requiring mandator y labelling of GM foods, was defeated in Parliament on October 17, 2001. Canada
23
Currents Winter 2013
Agricultural Products Act, C.R.C., c. 287 (Can.). Again, in February 2011, a bill that required labelling or disclosure of GM content was defeated in Parliament. See Bradshaw, supra note 101. 104. See Craig Borowiak, Farmers’ Rights: Intellectual Property Regimes and the Struggle over Seeds, 32 Pol. & S oc ’ y 511, 511–543 (2004), available at http://pas.sagepub. com/content/32/4/511; Robert Schubert, Farming’s New Feudalism: Percy Schmeiser and Other Casualties of Industrial Agriculture’s Drive to Own It All, 18 World Watch Mag. 10 (2005), available at http://www. worldwatch.org/system/files/ EP183A.pdf. 105. FAO, International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture art. 9, Nov. 3, 2001, 31 I.L.M. 818; see also Regine Andersen et al., Crop Genetic Diversity and Farmers’ Rights, in R ealising F armers ’ R ights to Crop Genetic Resources: Success S tories and B est P ractices 7 (Regine Andersen & Tone Winge eds., 2013). 106. Mark Perry & Ramesh Karky, Agriculture Under Threat—A Crisis of Confidence? The Solution: Redefine Adventitious Presence Maximum Levels from Zero to Zero++, 11 Can. J. L. & Tech. 25 (June 2013) [hereinafter Per r y & K ark y—Agricultur e Under Threat]; 2010 Co-existence Recommendation, supra note 59, at 3 (promulgating guidelines for the development of national coexistence measures to avoid the unintended presence of GMOs in conventional and organic crops). 107. Perry & Karky—Agriculture Under Threat, supra note 106, at 25–26; see also A.M. Timmons et al., Risks from Transgenic Crops, 380 Nature 487, 487 (1996). 108. Per r y & K ark y—Agricultur e Under Threat, supra note 106, at 25–47; Drew L. Kershen & Alan McHughen, Commentary, Adventitious Presence: Inadvertent Commingling and Co-existence Among Farming Methods, 1 Council for A gric . S ci . & T ech . 4 (2005); see generally Chidi Oguamanam, Tension on the Farm Fields: The Death of Traditional Agriculture?, 27 Bull. Sci. Tech. & Soc. 260 (2007); C.G. Gonzalez, Trade Liberalization, Food Security, and the Environment: The Neoliberal Threat to Sustainable Rural Development, 14 Trans. L. & Contemp. Prob. 419 (2004); Richard A. Repp, Biotech Pollution: Assessing Liability for Genetically Modified Crop Production and Genetic Drift, 36 I daho L. Rev. 585, 593 (2000); Norman
Currents Winter 2013
C. Ellstrand et al., Gene Flow and Introgression from Domesticated Plants into their Wild Relatives, 30 Ann. Rev. Ecology & Systematics 539, 541 (1999); David S. Bullock & Marion Desquilbet, The Economics of Non-GMO Segregation and Identity Preservation, 27 F ood P ol . 81, 83 (2002); Katie Black & James Wishart, Containing the GMO Genie: Cattle Trespass and the Rights and Responsibilities of Biotechnology Owners, 46 Osgoode Hall L. J. 397, 404–405 (2008). 109. See generally Karky & Perry— Disharmonization, supra note 10; 2010 Co-existence Recommendation, supra note 59. Sixteen European countries have co-existence laws. See, e.g ., G e n t e c h n i kg e s e t z [German Genetic Engineering A ct ] (amended 1993) (Ger.); Decreto-Lei n.o 160/2005 de 21 de Setembro [Decree-Law No. 160/2005 Ruling on Genetically M o d i f i e d P l a n t V a r i e t i e s .] (Port.). 110. Perry & Karky—Agriculture Under Threat, supra note 106, at 44. 111. 2 0 1 0 Co-existence Recommendation, supra note 59, at 1, ¶ 4 (“The objective of coexistence measures . . . is to avoid unintended presence of GMOs in other products, preventing the potential economic loss and impact of the admixture of GM and non-GM crops (including organic crops).”). Health and environment risks are covered. 2001 Council Directive, supra note 59, at 1. 112. S e e g e n e r a l l y C o m m i s s i o n Recommendation 2003/556 of 23 July 2003 on Guidelines for the Development of National Strategies and Best practices to Ensure Co-existence of Genetically Modified Crops with Conventional and Organic Farming, 2003 O.J. (L 189) 36 (promulgating guidelines for the development of national strategies and best practices to endure and the co-existence of genetically modified crops with conventional and organic farming). 113. 2 0 1 0 Co-existence Recommendation, supra note 59. 114. Id. at 4, ¶ 1.4. 115. Id. at 1, ¶ 4. 116. 2 0 1 0 Co-existence Recommendation, supra note 59, at 1, ¶ 5 (providing a provision declaring GM-free zones, stating: “In some cases . . . it may be necessar y to exclude GMO cultivation from large areas . . . [if] other measures are not sufficient to prevent the unintended presence of GMOs in conventional or organic crops”). Many regions of the EU have declared “GM-
free Zones.” See generally Karky & Perry—Disharmonization, supra note 10. 117. 2 0 1 0 Co-existence Recommendation, supra note 59, at 1, ¶ 5. 118. Karky & Perry—Disharmonization, supra note 10. 119. 2 0 1 0 Co-existence Recommendation, supra note 59, at 5, ¶ 2.3.1. The minimum threshold is. 0.9%. 2003 Commission Regulation (1829), supra note 100, at 1. 120. 2 0 1 0 Co-existence Recommendation, supra note 59, at 5, ¶ 2.3.3. 121. See Nataliya Dormann, Regulatory Fr a m e w o r k f o r B i o t e c h n o l og y Derived Crops with Specific Focus on New Plant Breeding Techniques in Canada, Can. Food Inspection A g e n c y , h t t p : / / i p t s. j r c. ec.europa.eu/presentations/ documents/07Canada.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 2013); The U.S. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology Products of 1986, 51 Fed. Reg. 23302 (June 26, 1986), available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/ brs/fedregister/coordinated_ framework.pdf; see also Perry & Karky—Agriculture Under Threat, supra note 106. 122. See Perry & Karky—Agriculture Under Threat, supra note 106, at 44. 123. Ja n e M a t t h e w s G l e n n , T h e Coexistence of Genetically Modified and Non-genetically Modified Agriculture in Canada: A Courtroom Drama, in The Regulation Of Genetically Modified Organisms: C omparative A pproaches 255, 257–258 (Luc Bodiguel & Michael Cardwell eds., 2010). 124. European Union, Consolidated Ve r s i o n o f t h e Tr e a t y o n European Union and of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 174, 16 Apr. 2003, 2003 O.J. (C 321) 123 (stating: “Community policy on the environment . . . shall be based on the [P]recautionary [P] rinciple and on the principles that preventive action should be taken”); see also Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, at 3, 14, 22, COM (2000) 1 final (Feb. 2, 2000) [hereinafter Precautionar y Principle]; see also Diahanna Lynch & David Vogel, T he R egulation of GMO s in Europe and the United States: A Case-Study of Contemporary European Regulatory Politics (Council on Foreign Relations pub. 2001), http://www.cfr.org/ agricultural-policy/regulationgmos-europe-united-states-case24
study-contemporary-europeanregulatory-politics/p8688; see also Ramesh Karky & Mark Perry, P olicy C hoices for B iotech Legislative Enactments: Genetic Modifications in the Food Chain, (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 15) (on file with authors). 125. Ian Sheldon, Europe’s Regulation of Agricultural Biotechnology: Precaution or Trade Distortion?, J. Agric. & Food Ind. Org., 2004, at 6. 126. Precautionary Principle, supra note 124, at 14; see also Monsanto Case, supra note 91; Douglas A. Kysar, It Might Have Been: Risk, Precaution and Opportunity Costs, 22 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 1, 3 (2006); Cass R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the P recautionary P rinciple 13 (Cambridge Univ. Press pub., 2005); Lawrence A. Kogan, The Precautionary Principle and WTO Law: Divergent Views Toward the Role of Science in Assessing and Managing Risk, Seton Hall J. Dip. & Int’l Rel. 77, 79 (2004); Carl F. Cranor, Some Legal Implications of the Precautionary Principle: Improving Information-Generation and Legal Protections, 17 Int’l. J. Occup. Med. & Env. Health 1, 21 (2004). 127. Sanitary & Psytosanitary Measures (“SPS”) Agreement Training Module: Chapter 8.2—The “Precautionary Principle”, WTO, http://www. wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/ sps_agreement_cbt_e/c8s2p1_e. htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2013). 128. World Charter for Nature, G.A. Res. 37/7, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/ RES/37/7 (Oct. 28, 1982). 129. T h e R i o D e c l a r a t i o n o n Environment and Development, 14 June 1992, 31 I.L.M. 874, 879 (1992). 130. W i n g s p r e a d S t a t e m e n t o n t h e Precautionary Principles, WHO (Jan. 20, 1998), http://www.who.int/ ifcs/documents/forums/forum5/ precaution/wingspread/en/ (click download link at the bottom of the page). 131. The Car tagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 1027, 1027 (2000) [hereinafter Cartagena Protocol], available at http://www.cbd.int/ doc/legal/cartagena-protocol-en. pdf; see also Lesley K. McAllister, Comment, Judging GMOs: Judicial Application of the Precautionar y Principle in Brazil, 32 Eco. L. Q. 149, 154 n.20 (2005). 132. Jonathan H Adler, The Problems with Precaution: A Principle without Principle, The American (May 25, 2011), http://www.american.com/
archive/2011/may/the-problemswith-precaution-a-principlewithout-principle; Sunstein, supra note 126, at 4; Giandomenico Majone, What Price Safety? The Precautionary Principle and its Policy Implications, 40 J. Common Mkt. Stud. 89, 95 (2002). 133. Adler, supra note 132. 134. Sunstein, supra note 126, at 4. 135. Majone, supra note 132, at 101; Adler, supra note 132. 136. Cass R. Sunstein, The Paralyzing Principle: Does the Precautionary Principle Point us in any Helpful Direction?, R egulation , Winter 2002–2003, at 33. 137. Id. at 33–34. 138. Jesse Male, The State of Genetically Engineered Crops in the European Union Following Monsanto v. Italy and the Adoption of a New Regulatory Framework for Genetically Modified Food and Feed, 9 Drake J. Agric. L. 439, 444 (2004). 139. See Monsanto Case, supra note 91, at I-8105. 140. Commission Regulation 258/97, supra note 90; see also Fernandez, supra note 86, at 335. 141. See Monsanto Case, supra note 91, at I-8144. 142. Commission Regulation 258/97, supra note 90. 143. Luc Bodiguel & Michael Cardwell, Genetically Modified Organisms and the Public Participation, Preferences, and Protests, in The Regulation of Genetically Modified O r g a n i s m s : C o m pa r a t i v e A p p roac h e s 1 6 ( O x f o r d Univ. Press 2010) [hereinafter Bodiguel & Cardwell—Genetically Modified Or ganisms]; see, e.g ., Cartagena Protocol, supra note 131, art. 23(2); Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 12; Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, 25 June 1998, 2161 U.N.T.S. 447 (entered into force Oct. 30, 2001). 144. Bodiguel & Cardwell—Genetically Modified Organism, supra note 143. 145. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 12. 146. Id. at 14(1). 147. Cartagena Protocol, supra note 131. 148. Id. art. 23. 149. Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision–making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, 1998, concluded under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. Aarhus C o n ve n t i o n o n A c c e s s t o Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental
Matters, June 25, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 517 (entered into force Oct. 30, 2001), available at http://www. unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/ pp/documents/cep43e.pdf. The European Community ratified the Convention in 2005. See Council Decision 2005/370/ EC, of 17 February 2007 on the Conclusion, on Behalf of the European Community, of the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, 2005 O.J. (L 124) 1 (2005), available at http://eur-lex.europa. eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do ?uri=OJ:L:2005:124:0001:0003 :EN:PDF; see also Commission Regulation 1367/2006/EC, of The European Parliament and of the Council of 6 September 2006, on the Application of the Provisions of the Aarhus C o n ve n t i o n o n A c c e s s t o Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters to Community Institutions and Bodies, 2006 O.J. (L 264) 13 (2006), available at http://eur-lex.europa. eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?u ri=OJ:L:2006:264:0013:0019:EN: PDF. 150. African Model Law on Safety in Biotechnology, Annexes for the Draft African Model Biosafety Law, African Union (Apr. 2001), http://www. africaunion.org/root/AU/AUC/ Departments/HRST/biosafety/ DOC/level2/African%20 Model%20Law%20with%20 Annexes-EN.pdf. 151. Bodiguel & Cardwell—Genetically Modified Organisms, supra note 143, at 16. 152. 2001 Council Directive, supra note 59. 153. Id. art. 9. 154. Bodiguel & Cardwell—Genetically Modified Organisms, supra note 143, at 18. 155. Id. at 18. 156. Id. 157. Labor Force—By Occupation, Cent. Intel. Agency, https://www.cia. gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/fields/2048.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2013). 158. Perry & Karky—Agriculture Under Threat, supra note 106.
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AUSFTA, Korus FTA and Now TPP: Free Trade Agreements Are Now Reaching Further into Domestic Health Policies than Ever Before LA U R A
—————————————————
I. Introduction
————————————————— Free trade agreements signed by the U.S. during the last two decades are characterized by their unique intellectual property agenda. Since the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”)
C H U N G *
Laura S. Chung is a skilled patent attorney with extensive experience in preparing and prosecuting U.S. patent applications in a wide range of technologies, including fuel and solar cells, wireless power technology, and chemical reaction control and method of manufacturing raw materials for lithium-ion batteries.
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II. Ever-Increasing Reach of International Trade Regime
————————————————— The reach of the international trade regime into traditionally domestic affairs such as food-safety regulation, domestic-patent law, and public health policy has continued
in 1994, all free trade agreements that the
countries. Public awareness for the potential
to increase since the establishment of the
U.S. signed include provisions regarding
impact of these new provisions is necessary
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) and
intellectual property (“IP”) protection. 1
to protect the cost-saving formularies found
the adoption of the Agreement on Trade-
These provisions restrict the use of parallel
in many national healthcare systems.
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
4
importation of patented medications,
The United States currently lacks a
Rights (“TRIPS”) in 1995. Aside from the
extend patent terms for delays in regulatory
centralized healthcare system, but whether
TRIPS that required all WTO member
approval process, and exclude the use of
such a system will benefit the public is
countries to provide product patents for
clinical data submitted by the brand-name
hotly debated, as seen with respect to the
pharmaceutical products, approximately
pharmaceutical companies for years.2
Affordable Care Act. However, outside of
300 free trade agreements have been signed
Two recent free trade agreements—the U.S.-
the United States, the debate is already over.
among countries.7 Many of these free trade
Australia free trade agreement (“AUSFTA”)
Currently about fifty countries worldwide
agreements include IP provisions that go
of 2004 and the South Korea-U.S. free trade
are providing some form of universal
further than the requirements found in the
agreement (“Korus FTA”) of 2011—include
healthcare for their population, and many
TRIPS agreement, including patent term
the aforementioned provisions, and also
more countries are gearing their national
extensions, patent linkage to the regulatory
include new provisions that directly relate
resources to expand healthcare coverage. So
approval process of medications, and data
to national healthcare systems and their
great is the movement to achieve universal
exclusivity, which have proven to result
3
pharmaceutical reimbursement formularies.
healthcare coverage that the World Health
in a noticeable increase in the price of
Similar provisions regarding pharmaceutical-
Organization (“WHO”) noted “universal
medications in several contracting states.8
reimbursement formularies are also expected
coverage” to be “a widely shared political
to appear in the Trans-Pacific Strategic
aim of most countries.”
5
6
The expansion of trade regime into intellectual property protection was
Economic Partnership Agreement (“TPP”)
engineered by industry leaders in the
that is being negotiated among the U.S.,
U.S., especially multinational business
Chile, Peru, Mexico, Vietnam, Singapore,
entities, such as IBM, General Motors,
Brunei, New Zealand, and other trans-pacific
General Electric, DuPont, and Monsanto, 26
Currents Winter 2013
as well as the pharmaceutical manufacturing
roughly 95% of the global pharmaceutical
at the request of an applicant directly
association of the U.S., now known as
market is comprised of the top industrialized
affected by a recommendation or
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers
economies, whereas the small remainder of
determination.21
of America (“PhRMA”).9 However, in 1996,
the market is spread across all other global
These provisions require the national
the inclusion of intellectual property issues
populations.17 With a per capita GDP of less
government of both nations to provide
into NAFTA and WTO has been described
than $100018, medications that cost $10,000
an independent administrative court for
as “one of the great ironies of the recent
to $15,000 per year per patient were clearly
drug producers to challenge the exclusion
drive to global free trade,” because, “by
19
out of reach for this sector of the market.
of their medications from the national
definition, protecting intellectual property
Nevertheless, the practice of including IP
formulary, provided the nation’s “federal
is about restricting trade in certain goods.”
provisions in free trade agreements is far
healthcare authorities” operate or maintain
from waning.
a phar maceutical for mular y or set
—————————————————
reimbursement amounts for a “federal
10
Nevertheless, the practice of trading heightened intellectual property protection
Trade Representative since the NAFTA
III. International Trade Regime and Regional Healthcare Systems
negotiations to the present time.11 A rationale
—————————————————
November of 2011, and entered into effect
proposed at the time was the argument that
The U.S.-Australia free trade agreement
in spring of 2012.23 During the Korus FTA
insufficient IP protection of pharmaceuticals
ratified in 2004 proved that free trade
negotiation, which began in June 2006,
in other countries was costing the industry
agreements can reach farther into domestic
based on the PhRMA’s recommendation,
billions in trade per year. According to a
policies than ever imagined before. Based
the U.S. Trade Representative argued that
1988 study published by the United States
on the assertion of the U.S. pharmaceutical
South Korea’s national health insurance
International Trade Commission (“ITC”),
industries that national healthcare systems
drug-formulary is a potential barrier to
many of these countries did not have any
are making it difficult for brand-name
trade.24 Thus, Korus FTA similarly includes
patent protection for pharmaceuticals.13
drug producers to recoup the cost of
provisions regarding an independent review
The study alleged that, if equivalent patent
innovation, the U.S. Trade Representative
process by which pharmaceutical companies
protection systems existed in these countries,
conditioned the trade free agreement
may challenge the exclusion of drugs from
and if these countries could sustain the
negotiation on agreements regarding
the national drug formulary. For instance,
volume of patented-medication use at the
Australia’s pharmaceutical reimbursement
Article 5.3 of Korus FTA states that
price demanded by the U.S. pharmaceutical
mechanism. For instance, Annex 2-C of
[t]o the extent that health care
companies, the top ten U.S. pharmaceutical
AUSFTA states that
authorities at a [nation] Party’s
for market access to the United States has been fully supported by the U.S.
12
20
healthcare program.”22 The free trade agreement between South Korea and the United States was ratified in
companies might have made approximately
[t]o the extent that a [nation] Party’s
central level of g overnment
$2 billion more in sales.14
federal healthcare authorities
operate or maintain procedures
However, the HIV epidemic of late
operate or maintain procedures
for listing pharmaceutical products,
1990s illustrated the flaws of the ITC
for listing new pharmaceuticals
medical devices, or indications
study.
During the HIV e pidemic,
or indications for reimbursement
for reimbursement, or setting
millions of the world population perished
purposes, or for setting the
the amount of reimbursement
without the ability to afford anti-retroviral
amount of reimbursement for
for pharmaceutical products or
medications, demonstrating that many
pharmaceuticals, under its federal
medical devices, under health
living in the developing world simply did
healthcare programs, it shall . . .
care programs operated by its
not have sufficient resources to pay for
make available an independent
central level of government, a
the patented medications. The fact is that
review process that may be invoked
[nation] Party shall . . . make
15
16
27
Currents Winter 2013
available an independent review
of the individual medication, and whether
process that may be invoked at the
the product is under a patent protection.
27
The process by which the Korean government evaluates whether to include a
request of an applicant directly
However, as explained later, the South
drug in its formulary is reproduced in Figure
affected by a recommendation or
Korean and Australian governments
1 from the European Observatory on Health
determination.25
determine the reimbursement amount
Systems and Policies.31 The National Health
based on “cost-effectiveness analysis,”
Insurance Corporation of Korea determines
not based on whether a product is under
whether to include a drug in its drug
[u]nder health care programs
28
a patent protection. The South Korean
formulary based on efficacy, safety, cost-
operated by its central level of
dr ug for mulary system was modeled
effectiveness analysis, reference pricing, sales
government, the [nation] Party
after the Australian system, which applies
volume, and whether the drug is essential
shall . . .ensure that the Party’s
health economics to determine the optimal
to life, through a price negotiation process
determination, if any, of the
allocation of its ational budget.
with the drug producer that can last several
In addition, Article 5.2 of Korus FTA states that
29
reimbursement amount for a
Further, the national health authorities of
years.32 Thus, the extra layer of independent
pharmaceutical product or medical
Australia and South Korea in fact already
review may not be necessary. Rather, the
device, once approved by the
provide the pharmaceutical companies with
independent review process is based on a
appropriate regulatory authority
an extensive negotiation process for the
premise that the pharmaceutical companies
as safe and effective, is based on
pricing and inclusion of a medication in the
are entitled to governmental reimbursements
competitive market-derived prices;
national drug formulary.
for their drugs, and concerns exist that the
30
or if its determination is not based
review process may allow the pharmaceutical
on competitive market-derived
companies to disrupt the formulary one drug
prices, then that Party shall: (i)
at a time, making it difficult for the national
appropriately recognize the value
government to provide an efficient coverage
of the patented pharmaceutical
system for the entire population.33
product or medical device in the
—————————————————
of the pharmaceutical product
IV. World Healthcare Systems and Drug Price Regulation
or medical device to apply, based
—————————————————
on evidence of safety or efficacy,
A drug formulary is used by many nations
for an increased amount of
of the world.34 With respect to providing
reimbursement over that provided
medications for the national population,
for comparator products, if any,
national health authorities are taking on
used to determine the amount of
increasingly important roles of setting
reimbursement.
formularies, determining reimbursement
amount of reimbursement it provides; (ii) permit a manufacturer
26
Article 5.2 of Korus FTA emphasizes that the price of the medication should be set at the “competitive market-derived prices” or that the pharmaceutical companies should be provided with an administrative court to request an increase in the reimbursement
rates, setting prices or making bulk Figure 1. Korean Government Forumlary for Evaluating the Inclusion of a Drug Source: Chang Bae Chun et al., Health Systems in Transition: Republic of Korea Health System Review, 11 Eur. Observatory On Health Sys. and Pol’y, no. 7, at 124 fig. 6.4. (2009), available at http://www. euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/101476/ E93762.pdf.
amount based on safety and efficacy data
See Figure 2. 36 According to Schoonveld, the author of Price of Global Health, the global pharmaceutical market can be segmented into four major payer systems, including:
28
Currents Winter 2013
purchases.35
some de facto regulation occurs through several competitive private insurance companies, and federal- and state healthcare programs.45 With relatively high medication prices, the size of the U.S. market in terms of dollars is similar to the combined market size of countries using the therapeutic referencing systems. Currently, private health insurance companies, the managed healthcare organizations, and approximately forty state Medicaid programs, maintain drug Source: Ed Schoonveld, The Price of Global Health: Drug Pricing Strategies to Balance Patient Access and the Funding of Innovation (2011).
formularies. 46 Some public healthcare
therapeutic referencing systems, health
rather than setting reimbursement rates. For
companies de facto perform price controls
economics nations, competitive insurance
instance, France directly sets pharmaceutical
similar to those performed by national
system, and emerging cash markets.37
prices on detailed five-year renewable
healthcare systems of other countries,
Therapeutic referencing systems are most
contracts with pharmaceutical companies,
such as classifying drugs in different tiers,
common in Europe. Used as early as the
detailing different prices based on various
applying co-payments, and even negotiating
1990s in Germany and Netherlands, it is now
volumes used by the population.42 Other
reimbursement rates of ser vices and
also used in France, Italy, Spain, Japan, and
countries that set the price include Italy,
medications.47
other European countries.38 The therapeutic
Spain, and Japan.43
Figure 2. Segmentation of the Four Major Payer Systems
programs and private health insurance
In addition, several developed countries,
referencing system is also used in the United
In the United States, approximately
including aforementioned South Korea,
States in approximately forty states as part
58% of the population are covered by
Australia, Canada, and the UK, use health
of its Medicaid programs.39 Therapeutic
one or more private health insurances or
economics to determine drug reimbursement
referencing is based on the natural concept
managed care organizations, while public
rates.48 A health economics system tries
of how a consumer makes purchase choices
healthcare programs, such as Medicare and
to determine the tangible and intangible
regarding a new product. For instance, when
Medicaid, cover another
a new product is introduced into the market,
27%. About 15% of the
the price of the new product is determined
population is uninsured.
based on the price of a comparable product
When the Affordable Care
that has similar indications.40 Currently, the
Act is fully implemented,
Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical (“ATC�)
the coverage is expected
system is influential for drug reimbursement
to expand to the entire
or price determination in many European
population, and certain
countries. The system classifies medications
aspects of the care may also
based on the organ system on which
become centralized.44
41
they act or their therapeutic and chemical characteristics.
While the national g o ve r n m e n t d o e s n o t
In addition, some therapeutic referencing
directly control drug prices
countries actually set the price of medications,
for the entire population,
Figure 3. Healthcare Coverage in the United States Source: Ed Schoonveld, The Price of Global Health: Drug Pricing Strategies to Balance Patient Access and the Funding of Innovation (2011).
29
Currents Winter 2013
benefits of a medication to the patient
the growth of out-of-pocket healthcare
pay out-of-pocket for their medications, the
and society, and sets reimbursement rates
expenditures.
patients no longer care whether a more cost-
based on these benefits. For instance, if a
—————————————————
efficient alternative exists.63 However, once
49
57
a wheelchair after using a medication or an
V. Effect of Formularies on Pharmaceutical Market
HIV patient can enjoy twenty additional
—————————————————
This demonstrates that, while the
years without hospitalization, the medication
In general, the drug formularies and
reimbursement mechanism is a powerful
confers a benefit to the patient that may
reimbursement schemes devised by the
tool for controlling price, it may also be one
be quantified into a numerical value using
national healthcare authorities are quite
of the few available mechanisms that can
measurements such as quality of life scales.50
powerful in influencing consumer decisions.
be used for price control when the national
rheumatoid arthritis patient can walk without
the drug price exceeds the reimbursement amount, demand drops significantly.64
For instance, the standard measurement for
government decides to shoulder the cost
determining the cost effectiveness of a drug
of medications. If the national government
is “cost-per-quality-adjusted-life-year-saved,”
could not place a limit on the reimbursement
or cost/QALY.
amount, the pharmaceutical companies
51
By quantifying the benefit to a numerical
could theoretically indefinitely increase the
value, health economics allow policy makers
price without lowering the demand for their
to allocate the limited resources in such a
product.
way that the most benefit is delivered to the entire population. In these countries, 52
a cost-effectiveness analysis generally
Figure 4 Elasticity Under Multiple Indications Source: Ed Schoonveld, The Price of Global Health: Drug Pricing Strategies to Balance Patient Access and the Funding of Innovation (2011).
—————————————————
VI. How Pharmaceutical Companies Set Price
becomes a part of a formula for determining
For instance, Germany uses the WHO’s
—————————————————
pharmaceutical reimbursement rates.53 As
ATC classification system for its therapeutic
While in the generic drug market, competition
a result, the use of a patented medication
referencing system to deter mine the
with other generic drug producers tends to
is naturally discouraged when a lower-cost
reimbursement rate for medications in
lower the medication cost, the innovator
alternative exists.
its formulary. In 2003, a generic version
pharmaceutical producers are often the
Lastly, approximately 90% of the world
of Merck’s Zocor, a statin medication for
single supplier of a patented medication.65
population lives in countries that do not
controlling cholesterol, became available,
As such, provided the patented medication
yet have a sufficient regulatory framework
while Pfizer’s Lipitor was still covered under
is far superior to other available products in
to control drug prices. In these countries,
a patent. As a result, the reimbursement rate
the market, the innovator company is often
patients generally pay for medication as
for Lipitor decreased substantially. By 2005,
in a position of setting its price irrespective
an out-of-pocket expense, and are often
Pfizer lost approximately 75% of Lipitor
of the cost of production,66 especially in a
deprived of access to expensive innovative
sales in Germany,61 indicating a majority of
products such as antiretroviral therapies
patients switched over to the generic version
for HIV/AIDS, and new treatments for
of Zocor.
58
54
cancer, cardiovascular disease, and other non-communicable diseases.
59
60
According to Schoonveld, in a reimbursed
These
market, the demand for a medication has
countries make up less than 9% of the global
a fixed volume substantially equal to the
pharmaceutical market.56 Many developing
number of patients who benefit from the
countries are currently in transition to
medication, unless the actual price of the
establish a regulatory framework to increase
medication exceeds the reimbursement
coverage for their population and to control
amount.62 When patients do not need to
55
Figure 5 Economic Effects of Profit-Maximizing Behavior by the Patentee of a New Plant Variety Source: Ed Schoonveld, The Price of Global Health: Drug Pricing Strategies to Balance Patient Access and the Funding of Innovation (2011).
30
Currents Winter 2013
country without price regulation such as the
wide range of financial resources that are
For instance, in Europe, any act that tries
United States. The optimal price for a market
available for each country. Accordingly,
to prevent the parallel importation of
is the price that produces the largest profit,
patients in developing countries can better
medications within Europe is a violation
represented by block 1 in Figure 5.67
afford the necessary medications if they are
of European anti-cartel regulation. 73
priced differently in each country. In fact,
Additionally, in Germany, pharmacists are
As shown in Figure 5, the profit above
69
the cost of product, or the monopoly profit
obligated by law to dispense the parallel
for the pharmaceutical company, displaces
traded product when the price of the drug
consumer surplus. In addition, a number
is at least 15% below the German equivalent
of patients, represented by H-F, cannot
or the price difference is greater than €15
afford the medication. For example, it may
(approximately $20).74
cost $200 to produce an annual supply of certain medication, while the monopoly price is $10,000. The medication may have the potential to save a patient $20,000 in
Figure 6 Economic Impact of Partial Price Discrimination Source: Ed Schoonveld, The Price of Global Health: Drug Pricing Strategies to Balance Patient Access and the Funding of Innovation (2011).
terms of hospitalization cost and may also
With tariffs being virtually eliminated between countries of the European Union and with the low transaction cost in transport given the small size of medications, parallel importation is difficult to prevent. For
confer intangible benefit of prolonged life
the WHO supports price differentiation
example, when Spain and France set the
and health. When the medication is under
to a limited degree because it ensures a
price of Bayer’s cardiovascular drug Adalat
a patent protection, the patient may pay the
wider access to essential medications for
at approximately 40% below the UK price,
monopoly price ($10,000) to preserve his
those living in developing countries. From
the wholesalers in Spain and France started
or her health but may have to face certain
the perspective of the pharmaceutical
exporting Adalat to the UK.75 In an anti-
financial hardships, depending on the patient’s
companies, segmenting the market can
cartel lawsuit that ensued when Bayer tried
economic situation. Of course, even in this
substantially increase its profit by capturing
to limit its supply to Spain and France, Bayer
situation, the medication confers significant
additional consumer surplus—if such
alleged a loss of approximately €118 million
benefit to the patient, represented by block 2.
segmentations of market were in fact
($149.5 million) in sales between 1989 and
On the other hand, if the patient has an
possible. However, a perfect segmentation
1993 through the arbitrage sales.76
access to a health insurance or has access
of the global pharmaceutical market is not
In the United States, on the other hand,
to the generic version of the medication at
possible for numerous reasons, including (1)
parallel importation of patented medication
a price of $200, the patient can be spared
the availability of parallel importation and (2)
on a commercial scale is illegal. 77 For
the financial hardship. In fact, this type of
international price referencing.71
instance, a medication imported from
dilemma is not uncommon for patients who
—————————————————
Canada can be seized at the border if the
70
are faced with catastrophic illnesses in the
VII. Parallel Importation
United States, such as HIV or cancer. Some
—————————————————
patient.78 This allows the U.S. pharmaceutical
patients may end up spending a majority of
The possibility of parallel importation causes
companies to maintain a high domestic
their assets until they qualify for government
a medication to move from a low-cost region
price for a medication even when generic
benefits, such as Medicaid, Medicare or Ryan
to a high-cost region, provided the price
versions are available in other countries.79
White Fund, which now cover approximately
difference is substantial and the transaction
This being the United States practice, the U.S.
two-thirds of HIV patients in the United
cost of importation is low. In fact, trade
Trade Representative’s position in free trade
States.
liberalization facilitates parallel importation
agreements has been to request a prohibition
by removing trade barriers.
on parallel importations of pharmaceuticals
68
On the international scale, however,
72
there are different optimal prices for a
In many countries, parallel importation of
given medication in each country due to the
medication is not only legal, but encouraged.
Currents Winter 2013
31
medication is not for the personal use of a
in other countries.80
in the United States because the U.S.
and Japan—so called “A-7 pricing”—despite
market is much bigger than the Canadian
their argument that the average income
market.
If price discrimination cannot
of Koreans, approximately $16,000, was
—————————————————
be achieved, it would be possible for the
less than half of those living in the A-7
In addition, pharmaceutical companies
pharmaceutical companies to maximize its
countries.89 To balance the budget, the South
have noted that providing a medication at a
profit by foregoing the Canadian market.86 In
Korean government subsequently excluded
reduced price in one country tends to reduce
extreme circumstances, the pharmaceutical
certain medications, including Roche’s
its bargaining power to charge a higher rate
companies have delayed launching expensive
Fuzeon, a second line treatment for HIV
in another country. In fact, many countries
medications in a smaller market to maintain
from the national formulary.90
apply international price referencing systems
the high price in more lucrative markets.87
—————————————————
to calculate the reimbursement rates or to
The HIV/AIDS epidemic in African
directly set the price of medications. The
countries during the late 1990s and early
Canadian Patented Medicine Prices Review
2000s is an example of the pricing dilemma.
IX. Necessity of Price Regulation Under Universal Healthcare Coverage
Board (“PMPRB”), for instance, uses the
While the vast majority of HIV patients
—————————————————
median price of a medication in the United
were located in African countries, they were
The PhRMA proposal to submit national
States, the UK, France, Germany, Sweden,
left out of the pricing equation because the
dr ug for mularies under independent
Italy, and Switzerland as a reference. As a
healthcare systems of developed countries
review has raised concerns from the U.S.
result, pharmaceutical companies sometimes
could bare the burden of much higher prices
Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"),
set the local price of a medication above the
for the antiretroviral medications.
Hospital for Special Surgery (“HSS”), and
—————————————————
VIII. International Price Referencing
81
82
85
88
optimal price for the market, to the detriment
I n a d d i t i o n , b a cke d by t h e U. S.
certain congressmen during the Korus FTA
of their population.83 Patients in countries
government, the pharmaceutical industries
negotiation.91 The provisions in Korus FTA
with small market sizes are especially
have even pressured countries to increase the
and AUSFTA are not the first attempts by
vulnerable to being left out from the price
reimbursement rate or price of medications.
the pharmaceutical industries to resist the
setting equation.
In 1999, the Korean government was
use of a preferred drug list. For instance, the
For instance, in Figure 7 below, the
pressured to price certain medications at
PhRMA filed lawsuits against several state
price of a medication in Canada is set
the average price used in the United States,
Medicaid programs, including that of Maine,
at the optimal price of the medication
the UK, Germany, France, Italy, Switzerland
Michigan, and Florida, to prevent the use of
84
preferred drug lists in 2002.92 At the time, Michigan officials noted that the preferred drug list was saving the state approximately $1.1 million a week in prescription drug costs.93 PhRMA subsequently lost the cases against these states, and approximately forty states are now using preferred drug lists.94 By using the international trade regime, the pharmaceutical industry may have obtained leverage in its price negotiations with the government that they failed to obtain through its lawsuit against states. Figure 7 Simplified Example of Global Pricing Trade-Offs
Source: Ed Schoonveld, The Price of Global Health: Drug Pricing Strategies to Balance Patient Access and the Funding of Innovation (2011).
Governmental mechanisms for controlling price are vitality important. For instance,
32
Currents Winter 2013
generic and low-price alternatives through
opposition.106 This time period is generally
preauthorization procedures and co-pays.99
thought to be when the level of healthcare
In addition, the United States has exhibited
spending is around 5% of the GDP, and the
poor health outcomes in comparison to other developed countries, contrary to the
China and India are currently in the
belief of many U.S. citizens regarding the
optimal window of opportunity, with enough
superiority of the U.S. health system.
The
resources in the economy for the government
WHO recently ranked the world’s healthcare
to implement a national healthcare system.108
systems, and the U.S. healthcare system ranked
If appropriate regulations for controlling the
37th, while France ranked 1st.101 The ranking
out-of-pocket spending are not provided
was based on cost efficiency, healthy living,
within the window of opportunity, the out-
and life expectancy.
of-pocket spending will eventually increase
100
Figure 8 Per Capita Total Health Expenditures in Selected Countries, as a Function of GDP Per Capita Source: Rockefeller Found., Catalyzing Change: The System Reform Cost of Universal Health Coverage 52 fig.25 (2010)
GDP around $10,000.107
102
A comparison study
for amendable mortality rate consistently
faster than the economic growth.109
indicated that the amendable mortality
Initially, the out-of-pocket costs are largely
the monthly retail price of the leukemia
rates fell by an average of 16% in fourteen
pharmaceutical costs.110 The increase in the
drug, Gleevic, exceeds $54,000 per one-year
Western European countries, Canada,
out-of-pocket spending is likely to lead to an
supply in the United States if no insurance
Australia, New Zealand, and Japan between
inefficient allocation of resources because
is used. The U.S. Veterans Administration
1997–98 and 2002–03, while it fell by only
individuals often lack the knowledge or
currently pays approximately $28,000 per
4% in the United States, indicating the most
resources to make sound decisions regarding
patient per year. In developed countries,
sluggish improvement in health outcomes
the quality of care, efficiency, or the impact
the pharmaceutical companies can demand
among the nineteen developed countries.103
on health outcomes.111 Further, once an
prohibitively high prices for life-preserving
The importance of having a regional strategy
entire industry is built around the out-of-
medications such as Gleevic and HIV
for controlling healthcare expenditure while
pocket expenditure, it becomes politically
medications, because the government will
improving health outcomes cannot be
expensive to try to control healthcare
absorb the cost of the medication if patients
overstated in view of these findings.
spending.112
95
96
cannot afford them.97 In other words, to
In addition, the regulation of out-of-
In fact, the optimal window of opportunity
preserve lives, the governments can end up
pocket healthcare spending is extremely
passed long ago for the United States.
subsidizing the pharmaceutical companies
important for the developing countries.
104
William Baumol, the author of Cost Disease,
to the detriment of other industries and
According to Pablos-Mendez of USAID,
suggests that this may be the very reason that
the public in general. The U.S. healthcare
the percentage of GDP spent on healthcare
establishing a centralized healthcare system
expenditure would be prohibitively expensive
ranges from 2–3% in the least developed
would be met with political resistance in
if a strong price control mechanism is not
countries to around 15% in developed
the United States.113 According to Figure
in place.
countries.105 Based on comparative studies
8, the healthcare expenditure grew much
Based on statistics, the United States spent
of several developing countries and their
faster in the United States than in Canada,
17.4% of its GDP on healthcare in 2010,
economic development over decades,
Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands
while France spent 11.8%. The high cost
Pablos-Mendez and other scholars noted
between 1960 and 2010.114 As of 2008, the
under the present system occurs despite the
that there is often a window of opportunity
healthcare expenditure of the United States
fact that private insurance companies place
in which the country can obtain the essential
is approximately 16% of the national GDP,
control on healthcare spending, including
package of healthcare services for its
while the respective healthcare expenditures
their own formularies, setting reimbursement
population to prevent the growth of out-
of Canada, Germany, France, and Japan are
limitations, and encouraging the use of
of-pocket spending without strong political
10.4%, 10.5%, 11.2%, and 8.1%.115
98
33
Currents Winter 2013
With approximately 17.8% of the national
as well as by national healthcare systems
medication when they have to pay for it. A
economy built around the healthcare industry,
of other countries. In fact, it is a central
product meriting an innovator premium will nevertheless be rewarded for the benefit it confers to the society above and beyond the already available alternatives. As the United States transitions into a more centralized framework to provide a universal healthcare coverage, it may one day also adopt a centralized federal drug formulary. If so, the pharmaceutical reimbursement clauses found in AUSFTA, Korus FTA, and probably in in TPP will
Figure 9. Why Health-Care Costs Keep Rising. Source: William J. Baumol, The Cost Disease: Why Computers Get Cheaper and Health Care Doesn’t 11 fig.1.5 (2012).
definitely apply equally to the national formularies of Australia, South Korea, and TPP member countries.117 With the ever-increasing reach of the
any attempt to regulate the industry may
piece of regulating healthcare expenditure.
international trade regime into traditional
result in threatened livelihood or reduced
A successful national healthcare system
domestic affairs such as public health
income for a substantial portion of the
removes the burden of considering the
policy, a greater awareness on the part of
U.S. economy; thus, political resistance
price of medications from patients who
citizens is necessary to ensure that a limited
is inevitable. However, the healthcare
are suffering grievous illnesses and instead
number of interest groups’ agendas do
expenditure will continue to grow without
place that burden on the national health
not negatively impact in the interest of the
strong regulatory mechanism.
authorities. This eliminates the competitive
entire population during treaty negotiations.
market system for pharmaceutical products,
The continual inclusion of public health
because patients no longer need to consider
policies in free trade agreements based on
the price to make purchase decisions. Health
pharmaceutical industry perspectives can
economics and therapeutic referencing
result in a substantial policy space reduction
—————————————————
systems found in national healthcare systems
for the U.S. policy makers in implementing
The ultimate goal of private industries is
try to simulate the decision making process
a public health strategy that would best
profit generation. In fact, the goal of profit
that a patient would have performed if
serve the entire population. As citizens of
generation by pharmaceutical companies
the patient had to consider the price of
the world, the United States owes it to the
is not to be looked down upon, and the
his or her medication. A rational patient
rest of the world to encourage international
innovative medications that they developed
with full knowledge and information
trade policies that do not negatively impact
have conferred significant benefits to
would have considered any lower-cost
the healthcare systems of other countries,
the society. However, the goal of the
alternatives for a medication before making
which would be feasible if not for the U.S.’s
government is to strike a balance between
a purchase decision. Indeed, the fact that
own self-interest.
competing interests of the governed for the
most national healthcare systems do not
benefit of the entire population.
consider an innovator premium in setting the
116
—————————————————
X. Conclusion: Need for Inspection of the Political Process
Drug formularies are widely used by the
reimbursement amounts should not come as
U.S. private health insurance companies
surprise; as illustrated by the Lipitor example
and governmental healthcare programs,
in Germany, patients choose a low-cost 34
Currents Winter 2013
End Notes
* With Peter Vogel and Anacorlina Estaba, and research and editing assistance of Anthony Lauriello. 1. Robert Weissman, A Long, Strange TRIPS: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives Available to Third World Countries, 17 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 1069, 1077 (1996) (“[I]ntellectual property protection became a central component of the NAFTA, and promises to be included in any additional regional free trade agreement involving the United States.”). 2. Keith Eugene Maskus & Yongmin Chen, Ver tical Price Contr ol and Parallel Imports: Theory and Evidence 31 (The World Bank Dev. Research Grp., Working Paper Series No. 2461, Oct. 2000); see generally Issue Brief, Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières, Trading Away Health: How the U.S.’s Intellectual Property Demands for the TransPacific Partnership Agreement Threaten Access to Medicines 3 (Aug. 2012) [hereinafter MSF Issue Brief], available at http:// aids2012.msf.org/wp-content/ uploads/2012/07/TPP-IssueBrief-IAC-July2012.pdf. 3. Sean Flynn & Rep. Sharon Treat, A Drug Deal Gone Bad, Maine.gov (Mar. 30, 2007), http://www.maine. gov/tools/whatsnew/index.php ?topic=HouseDems+News&id =36220&v=Article [hereinafter Flynn, Maine]; Sean Flynn, TPP Negotiators Turn to Pharmaceutical Reimbursement, I nfojustice . org (Mar. 4, 2012), http://infojustice. org/archives/8694 [hereinafter Flynn, TPP]. 4. See I an F. F ergusson , C ong . R e s e a rc h S e rv ., RL 7-5700, The Trans-Pacific Partnership N egotiations and I ssues for Congress ii (2013); Flynn, TPP, supra note 3. 5. Max Fisher, Here’s a Map of the Countries That Provide Universal Health Care (America’s Still Not on It), The Atlantic (June 28, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/ international/archive/2012/06/ heres-a-map-of-the-countriesthat-provide-universal-health-careamericas-still-not-on-it/259153; Madison Park, Where in the world can you get universal health care?, CNN Health (June 29, 2012), http:// www.cnn.com/2012/06/28/ health/countries-health-care/
index.html; List of Countries with Universal Healthcare, T rue Cost Blog (Aug. 9, 2009, 9:25 P M ) , h t t p : / / t r u e c o s t b l o g. com/2009/08/09/countries-withuniversal-healthcare-by-date. 6. S u s t a i n i n g U n i v e r s a l H e a l t h Coverage, Sharing Experiences and Promoting Progress, World Health O rg ., http://www.who.int/ healthsystems/topics/financing/ hsf_uc_mexicodeclaration/en/ index.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2013) (discussing the Mexico International Forum on Universal Health Coverage in Mexico City in April 2012). 7. Fact Sheet, World Trade Org. [WTO], TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patents 2–3 (Sept. 2006), available at http://www.wto.org/english/ tratop_e/trips_e/tripsfactsheet_ pharma_2006_e.pdf; Regional Trade Agreements: Facts and Figures, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/ tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e. htm (last visited Oct. 14, 20143) (noting that over 600 regional trade agreements have been reported to the GATT and its predecessor the WTO). 8. Andrew D. Mitchell & Tania Voon, Patents and Public Health in the WTO, FTAs and Beyond: Tension and Conflict in International Law, 43 J. World Trade 571, 574 (2009); Weissman, supra note 1, at 1080–81; MSF Issue Brief, supra note 2, at 3, 8, 11–12. 9. Weissman, supra note 1, at 1075–76, 1082. 10. Id. at 1069. 11. Id. at 1078–80. 12. Id. at 1085. 13. M a r k D. E s t e s e t a l ., U.S. I nt ’ l T rade C omm ’ n , F oreign P rotection of I ntellectual Property Rights and the Effect on U.S. Industry & Trade, USITC Pub. 2065 1-5 to 1-9 (Feb. 1988), available at http://www.usitc.gov/ publications/332/pub2065.pdf. 14. Id. at 4-2; Weissman, supra note 1, at 1072. 15. H olger H estermeyer , H uman R i g h t s a n d t h e WTO: T h e Case of Patents and Access to Medicines 11–15 (2007). 16. Id. at 11-12, 11-14. 17. See Ed Schoonveld, The Price of Global Health: Drug Pricing Strategies to Balance Patient A ccess and the F unding of I n n ovat i o n 192–93, 206–07 (2011) (documenting how top developed economies comprise 95% of global pharmaceutical
market, with the United States and Japan together comprising over 62% of the global market). 18. I nteragency C oal . on AIDS & Dev., Access to HIV/AIDS Treatment in Developing Countries 1 (2001), available at http://www.icad-cisd.com/index. php?option=com_jotloader&se ction=files&task=download&c id=29_b634c8eece9cd639a1e734c 793f7051c&Itemid=260&lang=en (describing the contrast between the per capita GDP in high income countries (approximately $25,730 in 1999) with sub-Saharan Africa and south-Asia ($500 and $400 respectively)). 19. Id. at 1-2 (noting the inability of those in developing countries to obtain the medicines that ranged in cost from $10,000–-$15,000). 20. Press Release, U.S. Trade Rep., STR Releases 2004 Inventory of Foreign Trade Barriers (Apr. 4, 2004), available at http://www.ustr. gov/archive/Document_Library/ Press_Releases/2004/April/ USTR_Releases_2004_Inventory_ of_Foreign_Trade_Barriers.html. 21. Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., table annex 2-C, May 18, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 1248, available at https:// www.dfat.gov.au/fta/ausfta/finaltext/chapter_2.html. 22. Id. 23. William H. Cooper et al., Cong. Research Serv., RL34330, The U.S.-South Korea Free Trade A g r e e m e n t (KORUS FTA): Provisions and Implications ii (2013). 24. Flynn, Maine, supra note 3. 25. United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-S. Korea, art. 5.3, June 30, 2007, 46 I.L.M. 642, available at http://www.ustr. gov/sites/default/files/uploads/ agreements/fta/korus/asset_ upload_file899_12703.pdf. 26. Id. art. 5.2. 27. Id. 28. See Chang Bae Chun et al., Health Systems in Transition: Republic of Korea Health System Review, 11 E ur . O bservatory on H ealth Sys. and Pol’y, no. 7, 2009, at 124 fig.6.4, available at http:// www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/ pdf_file/0019/101476/E93762. pdf. 29. Sean Flynn, “Annex 2C-plus” provisions in the Korea-US FTA Pharmaceuticals Chapter, at 1-2 (2d ed., 2007)
30. Kees van Gool, Pricing Reform of Pharmaceuticals, H ealth P olicy M onitor (O ct . 2005), http:// hpm.org/au/a6/2.pdf (noting that pharmaceutical manufacturers may set their own prices on the Australian formulary, the Pharmaceutical Benefit Scheme); Soonman Kwon, Pricing Reform of Pharmaceuticals, Health Policy Monitor (Apr. 2007), http://hpm. org/kr/a9/1.pdf (“To contain pharmaceutical expenditure [sic], government [sic] decided to change the pricing of pharmaceuticals. Instead of a for mula-based pricing, National Health Insurance Corporation [sic] as a purchaser will [negotiate] [sic] prices with pharmaceutical [manufacturers] [sic].”). 31. Chun et al., supra note 28, at 124 fig.6.4. 32. Id. at 121–25. 33. Surachat Ngorsuraches et al., Drug Reimbursement DecisionM aking in T hailand , C hina , and South Korea S125 (2012), available at http://www.ispor.org/ consortiums/asia/ViH/3rdIssue/ Drug-Reimbursement-DecisionMaking-in-Thailand-China-andSouth-Korea.pdf. 34. E.g., Schoonveld, supra note 17, at 92. 35. Id. 36. Id. at 120 fig.8.1. 37. Id. 38. Id. at 65, 125; see Patricia M. Danzon & Jonathan D. Ketcham, Reference Pricing of Pharmaceuticals for Medicare: Evidence from Germany, the Netherlands, and New Zealand, in 7 Frontiers in Health Policy Research 1, 1 (David M. Cutler & Alan M. Garber eds., 2004), available at http://www.nber.org/ chapters/c9868.pdf. 39. See Flynn, Maine, supra note 3 (noting that “Korea’s drug formulary is substantially similar to the ‘preferred drug lists’ used by at least 40 American states for Medicaid purchases”). 40. S choonveld , supra note 17, at 125–27. 41. Id. at 63–64. 42. Id. at 276. 43. Id. at 295, 302, 312. Japan is one of few countries that provide an increase in reimbursement rate for an innovative product. Id. 44. Id. at 256 fig.16.1. 45. Id. at 121-24. 46. Flynn, Maine, supra note 3; see generally C ommon P ractices in
35
Currents Winter 2013
Formulary Management Systems: A R e p o r t P r e pa r e d b y t h e A cademy of M anaged C are P harmacy (2000) [hereinafter Common Practices]. 47. See generally Common Practices, supra note 46. 48. Schoonveld, supra note 17, at 128. 49. Id. at 128–31. 50. Id. at 76–77. 51. Id. at 77–78. 52. Id. at 74. 53. Id. at 77–80. 54. See id. at 207 fig.12.7 (noting that 91% of prescription drug sales are made in the United States, Canada, Mexico, Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Spain, Japan, Brazil, and the rest of Europe, with the other 9% to all other countries). 55. Id. at 131–32. 56. See id. at 207 fig.12.7 (noting that 91% of prescription drug sales are made in the United States, Canada, Mexico, Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Spain, Japan, Brazil, and the rest of Europe, with the other 9% to all other countries). 57. Jolita Butkeviciene et al., Services Performance in Developing Countries: Elements of the Assessment ¶ 55 (WTO Mar. 12-14, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org/english/ tratop_e/serv_e/symp_mar02_ unctad_e.doc. 58. Schoonveld, supra note 17, at 6365. 59. Id. at 65. 60. Id. 61. Id. 62. Id. at 56. 63. See id. at 57 (noting that government control of the pharmaceutical market “leaves the physician and patient indifferent of actual price as long as the drug is reimbursed”). 64. Id. at 56–57. 65. Generic Drug Costs, News Medical, http://www.news-medical.net/ health/Generic-Drug-Cost.aspx (last visited Oct. 14, 2013). 66. See Schoonveld, supra note 17, at 196 (noting “an example of a[n] . . . innovative drug, that to some extent can set a new price reference on the basis of its inherent value and is less limited by historical evolution of existing price levels”). 67. William W. Fisher III, The Impact of “Terminator Gene” Technologies on Developing Countries, in Costs and B enefits to the L ivelihoods of the Rural and Urban Poor Arising from the Application of So-Called “Terminator Genes” and S imilar T echnologies in Developing Countries 137, 140 fig.1 (U.K. Dep’’t for Int’l ’Dev. ed. 1999), available at http://www.
law.harvard.edu/faculty/tfisher/ terminator.html. 68. White House Off. of Nat’l AIDS P olicy , N ational HIV/AIDS Strategy for the United States 41 fig.5 (2010), available at http:// aids.g ov/federal-resources/ national-hiv-aids-strategy/nhas. pdf. 69. E.g., S choonveld , supra note 17, at 194 (noting that Canadian companies will vary their prices a ccor d i ng to U.S. p o l i ti ca l concerns). 70. Id. at 215. 71. Id. at 193, 197, 202–03, 217. 72. See id. at 202–03 (noting that “companies may reduce price in higher priced markets to limit the flow of parallel trade product”). 73. Id. at 200–01. 74. Id. at 291. At the time of publication, the exchange rate of euros to the United States dollar was 1.3566. US dollar (USD), Eur. Cent. Bank (Oct. 11, 2013), http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ stats/exchange/eurofxref/html/ eurofxref-graph-usd.en.html. 75. Bayer defeats EU in parallel imports case, The Pharma Letter (Jan. 5, 2004), http://www.thephar maletter. com/file/52981/bayer-defeatseu-in-parallel-imports-case.html. 76. Id. (Bayer’s $3.8 million fine was annulled by the courts); see also Russell Ong, Bayer welcomes ECJ ruling on ‘Adalat’ parallel imports, ICIS.com (Jan. 6, 2004, 1:16 PM), http://www.icis.com/ Articles/2004/01/06/547289/ba yer+welcomes+ecj+ruling+on+a dalat+parallel+imports.html. 77. N i c h o l a s d e l a To r r e & Jennifer Theis, United States, in P harmaceutical T rademarks 2013/2014: A Global Guide 84 (Joff Wild ed., 4th ed. 2013), available at http://www.brinksgilson.com/ files/pharma_2013_article.pdf. 78. See Prohibited and Restricted Items, U.S. Customs and Border Prot. (Mar. 3, 2013), http://www.cbp. gov/xp/cgov/travel/id_visa/ kbyg/prohibited_restricted. xml#Medication. Although the website does not name Canada explicitly, mention of the country as included in calculations of referencing systems implies their participation in import of prescription drugs on the U.S. border. 79. See Weissman, supra note 1, at 1080 (border protection against unwanted import competition allows for domestic price control by the United States). 80. Id. at 1087 (discussing the United States Trade Representative’’s numerous avenues for compelling
U.S. trade partners to make parallel imports illegal). 81. S choonveld , supra note 17, at 207–08. 82. Id. at 197. 83. E.g., id. at 194. 84. Id. at 193. 85. Hagop M. Kantarjian et al., Cancer Drugs in the United States: Justum Pretium—The Just Price, Am. Soc’y of Clinical Oncology (May 6, 2013), http://jco.ascopubs.org/ content/31/28/3600.full. 86. Schoonveld, supra note 17, at 195. 87. Id. at 207–08 (noting that “[global price differences] ha[ve] frequently caused pharmaceutical companies to be ver y hesitant to make patented drugs available at lower prices in developing countries”). 88. See generally W illiam W. Fisher III & Dr. Cyrill P. Rigamonti, T h e S o u t h A f r i c a A IDS Controversy: A Case Study in Patent Law and Policy (2005); Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Companies to Cut Cost of AIDS Drugs for Poor Nations, N.Y. T imes , May 12, 2000, available at http:// www.nytimes.com/2000/05/12/ world/companies-to-cut-costof-aids-drugs-for-poor-nations. html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (noting that “drug companies have been portrayed as racking up record profits by concentrating on drugs to cure relatively minor problems like obesity, baldness and impotence among rich Americans, Western Europeans and Japanese, who make up 80 percent of the world drug market, while ignoring dire suffering in places like Africa, which buys 1 percent of the world’s drugs”). 89. Flynn, Maine, supra note 3. 90. First International Consensus Guidelines Published for HIV Tr eatment Fuzeon (Enfuvirtide), Doc Guide (May 18, 2004), http://www. docguide.com/first-internationalconsensus-guidelines-publishedhiv-treatment-fuzeon-enfuvirtide; Kim Tong-hyung, Patients Given No Say in AIDS Drug Dispute, T h e K o r e a T i m e s (June 19, 2009,6:38 PM), http://www. koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/ biz/2009/06/123_47153.html (“The Korean government wants to put Fuzeon in the National Health Insurance system, but had failed to reach an agreement with Roche on price. The Ministry of Health, Welfare and Family Affairs wants to provide Fuzeon at 25,000 won per pill, but Roche isn’t willing to go below 30,000 won.”). 91. Flynn, Maine, supra note 3. 92. M i ke P a lm e d o , F r e e T r a d e A g r e e m e n t s M ay T h r e at e n 36
Currents Winter 2013
States’ Right to Control Drug Costs Through Preferred Drug Lists 2 (2006), available at http:// www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/ documents/FTAsandPDLs.pdf. 93. See id. at 1 (noting that “Michigan officials estimated that their preferred drug list saved $60.5 million in its first year of operation”). 94. Id. at 2; Flynn, Maine, supra note 3. 95. Robin K. Kelley & Alan P. Venook, Non-Adherence to Imatinib During an Economic Downtur n, 363 New Eng. J. Med. 596, 597 (2010), available at http://www. nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/ NEJMc1004656Imatnib. Imatinib Mesylate is known as Gleevec in the United States. Cancer Drug Information–Imatinib Mesylate, Nat’l Cancer Inst., http://www.cancer. g ov/cancertopics/dr uginfo/ imatinibmesylate (last updated Sept. 9, 2013). 96. See Flynn, Maine, supra note 3 (noting that “Gleevic . . . costs . . . $28,000 to the U.S. Veterans Administration”). 97. Small Market Drugs, Big Price Tags: Are Drug Companies Exploiting People With Rare Disease?: Hearing Before Joint Econ. Comm., 110th Cong. 5 (2008) (statement of Minn. Amy Klobuchar, U.S. Senator, Member, Joint Econ. Comm.), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ pkg/CHRG-110shrg44974/pdf/ CHRG-110shrg44974.pdf. 98. Adam Taylor, Yes, The US Could Probably Learn A Lot From The French Health Care System, B us . Insider (July 2, 2012, 6:31 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/ french-healthcare-system-2012-7. 99. Rockefeller Found., Catalyzing Change: The System Reform Cost of Universal Health Coverage 52 fig.25 (2010), available at http:// www.rockefellerfoundation.org/ uploads/files/ebafb89b-2d6845c0-885e-74d40e8c55d9.pdf. 100. Ellen Nolte & C. Martin McKee, Measuring the Health of Nations: Updating an Earlier Analysis, 27 H ealth A ff ., Jan. 2008, at 58, 61–64, available at http:// c o n t e n t . h e a l t h a f f a i r s. o r g / content/27/1/58.full.pdf+html. 101. Taylor, supra note 98. 102. Id. 103. Nolte & McKee, supra note 100, at 65 ex.5. 104. See WHO, H e a lt h S y s t e m s Financing: The Path to U niversal C overage 5 (2012) [hereinafter H ealth S ystems Financing ], available at http:// www.who.int/health_financing/ Health_Systems_Financing_Plan_ Action.pdf (“While all countries,
rich and poor, constantly seek to improve their health financing systems, the problems are much more daunting in poorer countries. Accordingly, the [World Health Report] 2010 also outlined areas in which the global community could assist lower income countries to develop their financing systems so as to move closer to UC.”). 105. Ariel Pablos-Mendez, The New World Health: Economic Transition of Health and Health Systems Strengthening, O’N e i l l I n s t . f o r N at ’ l & Global Health Law (Oct. 4, 2012, 1:20 PM) [hereinafter PablosMendez], available at http://apps. law.georgetown.edu/webcasts/ eventDetail.cfm?eventID=1834. 106. Id. 107. Rockefeller Found., supra note 99, at 71–75; Pablos-Mendez, supra note 105. 108. Rockefeller Found., supra note 99, at 26–28; Pablos-Mendez, supra note 105. 109. H e a lt h S y s t e m s F i n a n c i n g , supra note 104, at 5; Rockefeller Found., supra note 99, at 71–75; Pablos-Mendez, supra note 105. 110. Pablos-Mendez, supra note 105. 111. Health Systems Financing, supra note 104, at xvi–xviii. 112. W illiam J. B aumol , T he C ost D isease : W hy C omputers G et C h e a p e r a n d H e a lt h C a r e Doesn’t 11 fig.1.5 (2012), available at http://books.google.com/ books?isbn=0300179286. 113. Id. 114. Id. 115. Snapshots: Health Care Spending in the United States & Selected OECD Countries, The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found. (Apr. 12, 2012), http://kff.org/health-costs/ issue-brief/snapshots-health-carespending-in-the-united-statesselected-oecd-countries. 116. Baumol, supra note 112, at 178. 117. United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement, supra note 25, arts. 5.25.3; Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement, supra note 18, tbl. annex 2-C; Flynn, TPP, supra note 3.
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Eye of the Tiger: Examining Tensions in Indonesia’s Trade Regime MELISSA PEACH
—————————————————
I. Introduction
———————————————— International trading relations are inevitably accompanied by tensions between traders and host countries. Host countries want to control trade activity and ensure fair competition with local businesses while traders desire freedom and legal protection for their investments. This paper explores the current Indonesian trade regime; focusing on how Indonesian law addresses tensions between local and foreign interests. International trade is important for the economic growth of developing countries,1 and international trade law serves to avoid conflicts of law that arise between foreign traders and host countries. To examine 2
how countries successfully enable trade, taken into account are border barriers such as tariff and non-tariff barriers that affect market access at home, as well as opportunities given to exporters through agreements and preferential agreements with others.3 Additionally, broader sets of policies including border administration, infrastructure and telecommunications, and regulatory and security regimes that secure property rights and reduce transaction costs are evaluated. Market access, border 4
Melissa Peach is a 3rd year J.D. Candidate at the University of Melbourne and is the Melbourne Branch Director of the Asia-Pacific Youth Organisation. She holds a B.S. in International Relations from Florida State University, and speaks Indonesian, Malay, French, Arabic, and Russian. administration, infrastructure, and business environment are pillars that can be used by countries to benchmark various aspects of their trade policies.5 The highest-ranking economies promote trade by opening their markets and providing world-class infrastructure, administrative and regulatory systems. 6 Developed countries, which generally have low tariffs, also have low trade costs because economic development is intimately associated with enhanced capabilities in administration, infrastructure, and regulation.7 Likewise, the success of smaller developed countries stems from having simple tariff structures and good business environments. The adoption of broader sets of trade enabling policies are also increasingly important to enhance economic development in individual countries as well as to generate prosperity in their trading partners, as demonstrated by the solid gains the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries experienced as a result 38
Currents Winter 2013
of the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement.8 Thus, to evaluate Indonesia’s trade regime, these factors for success in enabling trade must be considered to evaluate its strengths and weaknesses. Indonesia’s considerable growth in the past decade makes it an attractive destination for trade and foreign investment.9 A strong demand for commodities, buoyant domestic consumption, and pickup in manufacturing activity piqued the interest of investors despite Indonesia’s recent slowdown in economic growth.10 However, events surrounding the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) have prompted Indonesia to lean towards protectionism and impose protectionist policies by way of tariffs and quotas.11 Growing protectionism, along with: infrastructure concerns, corruption, onerous import policies, and confusing government regulations, are all barriers to trade that may dissuade traders from investing in Indonesia.12 Despite the obstacles inherent in their domestic legal system, Indonesia has an open trade regime that has liberalized substantially and undergone myriad reforms since the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis (AFC). Furthermore, its membership in the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) and
ASEAN signify a strong political will to settle
the reforms be implemented23 as part of
in inter national markets. Domestic
relations with foreign investors by reference
conditions for Indonesia to receive monetary
institutions are important because they are
to the rule of law.
support after the AFC. This IMF supported
the final option to enforce claims in the event
—————————————————
program was critical for the maintenance of
of contractual breach, and the mechanism
a coherent economic agenda, especially since
by which winning parties seek enforcement
the political climate during the Crisis was
against the assets of the losing party, which
————————————————
tumultuous, ending with the fall of Suharto
are primarily located in the losing party’s
The history of Indonesia’s trade policy is
in 1998.
home jurisdiction.31
13
24
II. History of Indonesian Trade Policy
significant because it illustrates the evolution
25
From 2000 onward, Indonesia continued
Good institutions attract trade and are
from a closed and protected regime to an
to move towards a liberal trade regime.
26
particularly important for host countries,
increasingly open and liberalized trade regime
The Megawati administration succeeded in
because corruption becomes a greater
that accompanied its substantial economic
maintaining and improving macroeconomic
risk in weak institutional environments.32
reforms in the aftermath of the AFC.14
stability, but the investment climate in
Furthermore, in transnational relations,
27
Indonesia deteriorated during her presidency.
domestic enforcement of international
administration, Indonesia’s economic policy
Following her administration, Susilo
rulings is a vulnerable point, and compliance
was primarily a socialist one.15 From 1966
Bambang Yudhoyono’s (SBY) administration
with final rulings is not always ensured.
during Suharto’s reign, the economic
prioritized improving the investment
If the losing party ignores the ruling, the
policy shifted to a more market based
climate. In doing so, the SBY administration
winning party must use execution organs
approach
and progressively began to
proposed several ambitious policy reform
where the losing party has assets, which
liberalize thereafter. However, Indonesia still
—————————————————
tends to be in their home jurisdiction.33 Thus,
adopted protectionist trade and industrial
From 2000 onward, Indonesia continued to move towards a liberal trade regime.
the institutions there ultimately determine
In 1985, the first major trade reform
—————————————————
is also important as it lends greater credibility
occurred, and Indonesia significantly lowered
initiatives and had the opportunity to bring
to host countries by way of signaling
its trade barriers, resulting in a manufacturing
high growth to the economy. However, the
effects, which increase the perception of
boom that lasted over a decade.18 Indonesia’s
implementation of these initiatives has not
host countries as being reliable trading
exports expanded rapidly, and Indonesia was
been met with complete success due to
partners by outside parties.35 Since domestic
then able to join the ranks of the Southeast
fragmentation and lack of a clear, common
institutions are the final option for effective
19
Asian tiger economies.
vision resulting from recent political and
contract enforcement, uncertainty about
The 1997 AFC marked yet another turning
economic changes. Furthermore, political
the reliability of those institutions affects
point in Indonesia’s trade policy. The AFC
and economic uncertainty surrounding the
traders’ willingness to trade with the host
led to substantive liberalization reforms20
July 2014 general election may result in
country.36 Thus, signaling a favorable trading
and refocused attention on institution
backsliding from the progress that the SBY
environment and commitment to abide by
building to further economic liberalization.
administration has achieved.
international law gives the host country
In its response to the AFC, the Indonesian
—————————————————
greater credibility and positively affects their
Prior to 1966 during the Sukarno
16
licensing policies until the mid-1980s in an effort to promote industrialization.
17
21
28
29
30
whether or not the winning party’s claim can be enforced.34 Domestic institutional change
reform by eliminating non-tariff barriers in
III. Indonesia’s Domestic Legal Institution
certain industries. Further contributing to
————————————————
trade policy reforms was the International
Domestic legal institutions have strong
Indonesia’s first major trade reform in the
Monetary Fund’s (IMF) insistence that
explanatory power for a country’s integration
mid-1980s consisted of signaling devices,
government accelerated its trade regime 22
trading patterns with foreign entrepreneurs, who respond to the signaling by collectively changing their trading behavior.37
39
Currents Winter 2013
institution building, and policy changes in
anticipated, the adoption or enactment
that the country is a reliable trading partner in
trade and investment and related regulatory
of new laws are only a weak indicator
signaling their willingness to play by a set of
intervention, such as the lowering of import
for real institutional change. It follows
rules.54 However, while ratifying international
and export duties.38 Regulatory reforms
that weak implementation capacities and
legal instruments may send a strong signal,
were also adopted, including easing foreign
mechanisms to ensure action on policy
actions that undermine signaling such as
investment and capital markets rules, as well
decisions by governmental agencies are
failing to comply with its rules can weaken
as new banking regulations. The importance
48
major impediments to sustaining reforms.
a host country’s credibility and may require
of these reforms was to open Indonesia to
Despite the issues in statutory reform,
the country to go beyond signaling, such
trade and investment, and to signal to the
Indonesia also began a judicial overhaul
as by implementing and enforcing tangible
rest of the world their willingness to play by
in its reform efforts and fired corrupt
reforms.55
certain rules.40 Policy reforms and signaling
—————————————————
—————————————————
not only affected Indonesia’s trading patterns,
streamlining its licensing system and re-
Despite Indonesia’s reform efforts, investors remain skeptical about corruption and political stability.
liberalizing imports and exports, Indonesia
—————————————————
economies like Indonesia by gaining
shifted towards a more open trade and
judges, placing non-career judges drawn
market access to foreign services markets,
investment policy regime. The reform not
from academia and the legal profession in
which enables them to increase economic
only had a measurable impact on the flow
the courts. However, the effects of these
efficiency.56 This permits a more efficient
of goods across borders, it demonstrated
reforms remain to be seen.
allocation of resources, which improves
39
it also affected the perception of Indonesia’s institutions by the outside world. 41 By
42
47
49
IV. Market Liberalisation and Trade Reform
———————————————— Trade liberalization benefits developing
the Indonesian government’s willingness to
Despite Indonesia’s reform efforts,
overall economic capacity and, in turn,
fight corruption and improve its institutions,
investors remain skeptical about corruption
trade.57 An efficient financial services sector
thus enhancing Indonesia’s overall credibility
and political stability.50 Since perception
is central to building economic capacity and
as an attractive business destination.
is important for signaling purposes, the
progressing development.58
43
However, the role of Indonesia’s formal
problem for Indonesia since its credibility as a
Trade liberalization involves reducing
legal system has created problems for
trading partner or investment destination has
discrimination against foreign traders by
foreign parties because of its minor role
been undermined, is that signaling devices are
eliminating quotas, reducing average tariffs,
in the Indonesian economy.
Although
becoming less effective for attracting foreign
and strengthening trade related institutions.59
administrative acts are used to regulate
business.51 The perceived quality of a host
Similarly, liberalization of services sectors
economic activities when required, relations
country’s domestic institutions is paramount
involves reducing or eliminating barriers in
among non-state actors are primarily resolved
for their participation in international trade,
the form of prohibitions, restrictions, and
on an informal basis, the overall effect of
as they reduce international transaction
regulations.60 Such restrictions in trade and
which is one of lawlessness as a result of
costs and high quality institutions indicate
services may be prohibitive to foreign traders
the legal system’s lack of clear, consistent,
reasonable assurance to foreign investors
and entrepreneurs by limiting the share of
and binding standards. The informality
of the likelihood of contract enforcement
foreign firms in certain sectors, limiting the
which dominates formal legal arrangements
using the host country’s legal institutions.
52
number of expatriates that can be employed,
facilitates contradiction in the law by lower-
Involvement in international institutions
or restricting imports and services.61 For
level regulations and the daily actions of
is also meaningful, as this suggests that
trade in goods, reducing tariffs is central to
administrators.
international law may substitute for weak
improving market access, while improving
Furthermore, because formal laws may
legal institutions. Ratifying international
market access for trade in services requires
be ignored or implemented differently than
legal instruments influences the perception
reducing government policy interventions.62
44
45
46
53
40
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A good trade policy involves predictability,
overall business climate, and reforming the
Developing countries thus need a clear vision
transparency, and uniformity. Benchmarks
tax and custom administrations are key policy
for their trade policies,77 which can be done
to judge these policies and provide guidance
areas which are critical for legal reform.73
via trade agreements. A major incentive
63
for reform include: limited licensing; low
A primary concern from opponents
for developing countries to enter into
and uniform tariffs; an efficient customs
of Indonesian market liberalization is
trade agreements is to open up markets for
clearance process with little red tape; and
that Indonesian small and medium sized
certain products by removing tariffs or non-
measures to ensure competition prevails,
enterprises (SMEs) will not sur vive.
tariff barriers.78 In a complex and evolving
and that there is no discrimination against
However, there is no evidence to suggest
trade environment, developing countries
foreign suppliers. Additionally, factors such
that they have been negatively impacted by
must be able to negotiate and participate
as macroeconomic stability, a competitive
—————————————————
in trade agreements in order to promote
exchange rate, flexible labor markets,
A primary concern from opponents of Indonesian market liberalization is that Indonesian small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) will not survive.
their interests and obtain benefits.79 Such
or multilaterally. Unilateral liberalization
—————————————————
and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA).
occurs where governments liberalize trade
the shift towards trade liberalization. On
By participating in multilateral and regional
independently, regardless of the efforts of
the contrary, a free trade regime is likely to
arrangements in addition to its unilateral
other economies. Multilateral liberalization
generate more long-term benefits for SMEs.
liberalization, Indonesia has undergone
complements unilateral liberalization through
Furthermore, reliance on protectionist
comprehensive trade liberalization.80 Further,
trade agreements and negotiations, which
policies that restricted some of the activities
Indonesia’s participation in multilateral
operate within internationally enforceable
of domestic SMEs was a factor which helped
trade groupings, including the WTO,
rules. However, the effectiveness of trade
contribute to the abuse of local market
AFTA, GATT, and APEC, has influenced
agreements depends on the extent to which
power in Indonesia.
the pace of its trade liberalization81 and
parties have committed themselves to
—————————————————
64
65
competitive product markets, and policies that do not discriminate against foreigners in investment complement successful trade reform.
66
Market liberalization can occur unilaterally
67
68
liberalization.69 When non-tariff barriers are in place for reasons other than health or safety, they
74
75
V. Impact of Trade Agreements
————————————————
are detrimental to economic growth since they lack transparency and encourage rentseeking behavior, which wastes valuable resources.70 Tariff escalation discourages the
agreements generally stem from involvement in international institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC),
spurred the opening of trade in services and liberalization of foreign direct investment.82 In its 1999 individual action plan, Indonesia committed itself to further liberalize trade and investment by progressively reducing
A. THE NEED FOR AND BENEFITS OF TRADE AGREEMENTS
tariffs, non-tariff barriers, simplifying import licensing, and harmonizing customs
Developing countries face complex
and other procedures in order to facilitate
71
challenges in managing and adapting to
trade.83 These developments have also been
Red tape, which describes burdensome and
a rapidly changing trading environment.
in part advanced by the SBY administration’s
redundant procedures, is often associated
Responding to the challenges inherent
willingness to move ahead on forming
with rent seeking and corruption, and it can
in the effective management of national
bilateral trade agreements.84 Indonesia will
give rise to substantial uncertainty, which
development objectives, regional initiatives,
also have more opportunities to ship to its
makes customs clearance efficiency and
and the overall trading environment requires
neighbors in the future as ASEAN has set
transparency all the more important.
developing countries to integrate domestic
the goal of regional economic integration
development with external commitments.76
by 2015 via the ASEAN Economic
development of intermediate industries.
72
Thus, improvement of the investment and
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Currents Winter 2013
Community—which will further open trade
By not participating in trade agreements,
contractual documents can be a source of
among member countries.
Indonesia runs the risk of trade being
confusion for some parties. The Indonesian
diverted elsewhere, which will be highly
Civil Code has an implied "good faith"
detrimental since Indonesia’s trade policy
performance concept that implies a general
depends in large part on multilateral and
duty for parties to a contract to perform
regional trade agreements.94 Its role in the
in good faith.97 Additionally, laws can be
WTO, APEC, ASEAN, and AFTA, as well
difficult to understand because they are vague
as its engagement with other countries in
and subject to different interpretations.98
the form of preferential trade agreements,
Finally, coordination problems across
indicate that much reliance is placed on
governmental agencies and ministries, which
trade agreements for trade liberalization,
have been exacerbated by changes in political
especially in an environment of creeping
architecture, have led to slow progress in
protectionism.
policy implementation.99
85
B. CHALLENGES
Although trade negotiations are an economically sound route to take, political will amongst parties to the negotiation is needed. The absence of such may lead to other options that do not involve a multilateral trade agreement.86 Additionally, the scope for added trade reforms must be considered in the context of Indonesia’s existing trade commitments, and the room it has to move depends on its commitments under ASEAN, APEC, and the WTO.87 Other challenges include various political security and general political challenges, which have discouraged and delayed greater economic integration.88 Indonesia also suffers from poor infrastructure and credibility problems resulting in vague and opaque rules that are not legally binding and cannot be enforced.89 Corruption is pervasive in Indonesia and this has led to an erosion of Indonesia’s competitiveness. This will in turn increase the demand for more protectionist policies.90 Furthermore, ASEAN and AFTA consist of dozens of agreements that often overlap or conflict, and there is sometimes reluctance to make firm commitments to binding legal rules.91 Indonesia’s commitment to the provisions of the WTO and to regional trade agreements, such as AFTA, suggest that it is unlikely
95
—————————————————
VI. Trading Concerns
———————————————— Traders have general concerns about the
One important constraint for delivering
Indonesian trade regime such as legal
a successful reform in Indonesia after the
uncertainty, economic nationalism and
AFC was nationalistic ideology, which
—————————————————
strongly opposed moving towards market
In Indonesia, economic nationalism and protectionism are illustrated by the recent trade and investment regulations that have been implemented.
liberalization. 100 Considerable difficulty exists in achieving economic reforms where wide public and nationalistic interests are involved. 101 In Indonesia, economic nationalism and protectionism are illustrated by the recent trade and investment regulations
—————————————————
that have been implemented. These changes
protectionism, infrastructure challenges,
include import licensing requirements,
corruption, and anti-privatization sentiments.
trading rights limitations, foreign equity
If unaddressed, these concerns will likely
restrictions, and domestic manufacturing
decrease Indonesia’s attractiveness as a
requirements.102
trading destination.
While the trend in Indonesia has been
A. LEGAL UNCERTAINTY
to back away from trade reform, and it
The uncertainty of Indonesia’s legal
is in Indonesia’s best interests to accept
system manifests in a lack of transparency
competitive liberalization and the advantages
and contradictory policies, as well as
it confers.92 Further, Indonesia’s commitment
confusion within the law. Collectively, all
to the WTO, AFTA, and ASEAN could
tend to dissuade investors from coming
counterbalance protectionist pressures.93
to Indonesia.96 The legal effect of some 42
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B. ECONOMIC NATIONALISM AND PROTECTIONISM
one of increasing liberalization, recently some areas have seen an increase in protection through highly distortionary and opaque non-tariff measures.103 Although Indonesia continues to move forward and meet international commitments, some Indonesians argue for increased protection while others insist that further liberalization is the ideal path to take.104 Despite this
tension, the trade reforms in the last decade
levels of the bureaucracy in providing
have successfully created many proponents
infrastructure.
of an open trade regime for Indonesia.
In the aftermath of the AFC, the IMF denied Indonesia $660 million in loans until
116
The challenges in infrastructure include
it made progress against corruption.127 As
Protectionism occurs through trade
water and sanitation, telecommunications,
a result, Indonesia increased its efforts to
policy backsliding, enacting restrictive trade
power, roads, and road transport.117 The
combat corruption and has set up special
related policies, or allowing anticompetitive
success of the government in addressing
investigatory teams to tackle corruption in
practices.
Beginning in 2001, there
these challenges depends on their ability
the government, civil service, and judiciary,128
have been continuing signs of increasing
to attract private investors to invest in
and, in 2002, created the Corruption
protectionism in Indonesia. These signs are
infrastructure, which in turn requires a
Eradication Commission (KPK), which
demonstrated by the issuance of various ad
clearer overall strategy and greater certainty
serves as the main government agency
hoc trade policies and protectionist measures
in the regulatory framework.118
established to combat corruption.129
106
105
in a number of sectors, and increases in tariffs, trade regulations, and licensing.107 Despite signs of increasing protectionism, Indonesia’s level of protection is still low compared to other Asian countries,108 and it is unlikely that Indonesia will return to high trade protection in the future.109 Indeed, much of the trade protection was phased out after the AFC.110 But while the AFC caused Indonesia to liberalize its economy, some have blamed liberalization as being the main source of the crisis.111 The protectionist groups resistant to market reform are prevalent, and cannot be underestimated; it
D. CORRUPTION
E. ANTI-PRIVATIZATION SENTIMENTS
Corruption is one of the most significant
Another concern for traders and investors
concerns that traders have in pursuing
is the slow progress of privatization in
business in Indonesia
and is exacerbated
Indonesia. 130 Contributing to the slow
by poor government coordination, the
progress is ambivalence in the government
uncertain legal framework, and lack of
to privatization, as well as anti-privatization
transparency. However, Indonesia has also
sentiment and unfriendly policies. 131
—————————————————
This sentiment seems to have further
Another concern for traders and investors is the slow progress of privatization in Indonesia.
stymied economic recovery by weakening
119
120
international market confidence in the Indonesian economy.132 —————————————————
—————————————————
VII. Trade Barriers
been recognized through empirical evidence
————————————————
as a country achieving high economic growth
In 2011, the Indonesian government began
despite high levels of corruption.121 This
planning to expand trade barriers that limit
is also within the context of corruption
unnecessary imports in response to concerns
The quality of Indonesia’s infrastructure
so entrenched in some cultures that one
of a surge in overseas products thought to
is poor, and inadequate infrastructure
had to overcome it in order to do business
hurt local businesses.133 The result has been
serves to further hinder investment. 113
with those cultures.122 It has been estimated
the introduction in 2012 of a range of new
The AFC dramatically reduced Indonesia’s
that the cost of bribes account for over 20
trade inhibiting policies.134 These include new
financial capacity to maintain and make
percent of Indonesia’s economy,123 which is
regulations on horticultural imports, imports
new investments in infrastructure.
in turn regarded as one of the most corrupt
of finished goods, mining commodities,
countries in the world.
limits on ownership of banks and mines,
would be hasty to conclude that pressures for trade protection will subside.112 C. INFRASTRUCTURE CHALLENGES
114
But
even before the crisis, poor institutional
124
regulatory frameworks and corruption
Corruption carries with it a number of
export taxes, and bans on raw materials and
stunted infrastructure development.115 Local
additional problems. For one, pervasive
food-import restrictions.135 Non-tariff trade
governments are not provided with adequate
corruption can bring a country to its
barriers have flourished, and Indonesia has
funds for infrastructure development, and
"economic knees," as demonstrated by the
created opaque and complex import licensing
there are overlaps between the various
downfall of President Suharto.
requirements, which restrict imports.136
125
126
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Currents Winter 2013
non-automatic import licensing procedures
and has fueled action from the United States
about their restrictive nature and may shut
on a range of products.
According to the
in the WTO.151 These requirements are said
off certain sectors like mining to new
U.S. Trade Representative, “Indonesia has
to be opaque, complex, and prohibitive.152
inward investment.137 The WTO has urged
informally limited application of the decree
Other import licensing requirements cover
Indonesia to reevaluate these trade-restrictive
to final consumer goods” and “appears to
goods such as textiles, which limit market
measures, which aside from import licensing
be exempting select registered importers
access for many products because only
and permit requirements, include restrictions
from certain requirements of this decree.”
146
approved local producers are authorized to
on import entry points, pre-shipment
However, concerns abound that “approval
import products, which are permitted for
138
inspection requirements, and export taxes.
to qualify as a registered importer is opaque,
use only as inputs in domestic production.153
Furthermore, there are a number of policy
ill-defined, and potentially discriminatory.”147
Also affected by import restrictions are cell
and administrative barriers including price
Other restrictive regulation include
control, exclusive licensing, and lack of
Ministry of Trade Regulation No.45/M-
Quantitative restrictions are also
legal assurance that the law will prevent
DAG/PER/9/2009, Decree 59/MDAG/
maintained, particularly on imports of
government action to create new barriers to
PER/9/2012, and import licensing for
agricultural products, and annual import
competition.139
agricultural products. Ministry of Trade
quantities are determined by Indonesian
Regulation No.45/M-DAG/PER/9/2009
agencies through nontransparent
—————————————————
processes.155 The Ministry of Agriculture
Quantitative restrictions are also maintained, particularly on imports of agricultural products, and annual import quantities are determined by Indonesian agencies through nontransparent processes.
sets the quantities of animal products that
—————————————————
importation of any chicken, turkey, and duck
requires that companies can only import
products.157 The Ministry of Agriculture
goods for further distribution or their
Regulation 60 establishes a mechanism that
own manufacturing, but not for both.
148
allows Indonesia the discretion to apply
Thus, companies are permitted only one
quantitative restrictions on imports of fresh
kind of license, forcing companies that
and processed fruits and vegetables.158 This
need both types of license to separate into
regulation stipulates that the quantity of
manufacturing and trading businesses.149
imports allowed by Indonesia will be based
Under Decree 59/MDAG/PER/9/2012,
on domestic production and demand.159
The new policies have raised concerns
A. IMPORT POLICIES
T he recent expansion in impor t regulations has increased burdens for foreign exporters.140 According to the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, regulations include “tariffs, import licensing procedures, permit requirements, product labeling requirements, pre-shipment inspection requirements, local content and domestic manufacturing requirements, and quantitative import restrictions.”141 Also, measures such as a new food law and new trade law contribute to limiting foreign imports.142 The concern surrounding tariffs is that combined with unexpected changes in applied rates, high bound tariff rates create uncertainty for foreign companies looking to enter the Indonesian market.143 In import licensing procedures, exporters to Indonesia must comply with numerous, and sometimes overlapping, requirements that impede access to the Indonesian market.144 In 2009, a measure known as Decree 56 was implemented, which imposed
phones, laptops, and tablets.154
may be imported into Indonesia, and the Ministry of Trade issues permits for the import of these products after receiving approval from the Directorate General of Livestock and Animal Health Service.156 The relevant regulations effectively ban the
companies are again limited to one kind
Product registration has become
of license and are required to demonstrate
increasingly burdensome for foreign
a special relationship with the foreign
companies, since the process of reviewing
company, which must be authenticated by
applications for the registration of certain
the Indonesian Embassy in the country
products has been slowed since 2008.160 This
where the foreign company is located.150
burden is enhanced by additional onerous
Import licensing for agricultural products has
Bahasa language-labeling requirements.161
significant trade restrictive effects on imports, 44
Currents Winter 2013
145
B. WTO DISPUTE
In January 2013, the United States (U.S.) brought a complaint to the WTO regarding Indonesia’s restrictive import measures.162 The major issue raised by the U.S. concerned the subjection of horticultural and animal product imports to restricting non-automatic import licenses and quotas. 163 The U.S. claimed that the licensing regime had significant trade restrictive effects on imports and were inconsistent with Indonesia’s WTO obligations.164 In particular, the multistep license processing procedure seemed to be more administratively burdensome than necessary; since Indonesian licensing measures do not inform traders of the basis for granting licenses and are applied inconsistently and unpredictably, the license issuance appeared to be delayed or refused by Indonesian authorities on nontransparent grounds that do not appear to be administrated uniformly, impartially, or reasonably.
165
C. RESTRICTIONS
Common restrictions on market access generally include those on foreign direct investment, licensing requirements, and restrictions on the form of establishment or type of legal entity.166 Indonesia is one of the most restrictive markets for banking services, distribution services, maritime services, and professional services.167 These economies are characterized by tight entry controls and restrictions on business operations.168 Foreign firms are granted a limited number of import licenses and are subject to limits and performance requirements.169 There are onerous nationality and residency
requirements in place for some sectors.170
worst.179 Because Indonesia’s exports are
Some foreign firms are also required to enter
the “engine of its economy,”180 mortgaging
the market through joint ventures with local
Indonesia’s trade competitiveness to ease
firms,
as is the case with foreign law firms.
budgetary pressure could jeopardize future
Foreign firms are also subjected to economic
growth. 181 Despite the best intentions
needs tests and have limited establishment
behind protectionism, the reality is that
and investment capabilities in local firms.
it benefits special interests at the expense
171
172
of consumers. 182 Additionally, imposing D. WHY IS INDONESIA MOVING TOWARDS A MORE INWARD TRADE POLICY?
protectionist measures such as export tariffs
The global market’s bleak outlook has
exploitation of natural resources since it
prompted Indonesia to safeguard its trade
will lower the domestic price relative to the
balance, which they expect will be the result
international price.183
of a more restrictive import regime. 173 Major incentives for Indonesia to move towards increased protection are a boost in government revenue, the preservation of Indonesia’s natural resources, 174 and to help domestic industries.175 Indonesia cites domestic production, moving the economy to a higher level of development, and agricultural self-sufficiency as the primary —————————————————
Because Indonesia’s exports are the “engine of its economy,” mortgaging Indonesia’s trade competitiveness to ease budgetary pressure could jeopardize future growth. ————————————————— reasons that the forward momentum of liberalization has been replaced by increasing economic nationalism and protectionism.176 The appeal of protectionism is that sensitive industries can be temporarily sheltered from foreign competition,177 with the hope that these industries will become competitive in time.178 However, this recent shift appears to be misguided at best, and dangerous for Indonesia’s long-term growth prospects at
or export bans is likely to encourage further
E. RECOMMENDATIONS
While introducing increasingly protectionist policies may give the government the impression that it is supporting domestic investors, these measures could have deleterious consequences for Indonesia’s long-term growth prospects. 184 Instead, measures better suited to achieve the goals Indonesia desires include more infrastructure, streamlined investment regulations, and a more competitive exchange rate.185 Furthermore, in order to increase economic growth through trade, Indonesia should focus on boosting its supply-side economy rather than falling into further protectionism.186 This can be achieved by Indonesia renewing its commitment to liberalization and enacting complementary sustainable policies,187 such as infrastructure development, investment in education, improvements to industrial technological capabilities, deepening sources of industrial finance, and enhancing g overnment capacities. 188 Additionally, Indonesia must implement trade and investment measures consistent with its international commitments and global trading rules, which
45
Currents Winter 2013
will better reflect Indonesia’s ambition to play
or multilateral conventions governing the
approvals for investments and oversees the
a leading role in global trade. These positive
operation of FDI or prescribing binding,
foreign investment regime.209 It takes into
measures would include lower tariff rates
substantive rules. 201 As a result, certain
account a “Negative List” which is meant to
and encouragement for greater investment
FDI measures can have restrictive effects
summarize all foreign investment restrictions,
flows, because lowering trade barriers is
on free trade, and in order to compensate
meaning that if a sector is not referred to, it
indispensable for continued economic
for FDI’s potentially negative impact, host
is open.210 However, in practice it is not so
growth.190 Other measures Indonesia should
countries may impose conditions on FDI that
clear-cut. Before foreign investors can acquire
take in order to create a contestable market
require investors to make use of domestic
shares in private Indonesian companies,
include enforcement of competition policy,
products.
Through its various investment
it must be converted into a foreign capital
preventing restrictive practices,191 developing
policies, Indonesia has done just that in an
investment company (PM company) and be
a clear vision of its services sector,192 as well
attempt to exert maximum possible FDI
regulated by BKPM as it moves forward.211
as various domestic adjustments193 such as
control to ensure compliance with domestic
Bapepam-LK is the Indonesian capital
bureaucratic reform.
interests.
This has been in response to
markets regulator, and regulates investment
—————————————————
increasing nationalistic sentiments and fear
activity in the capital markets.212 However, the
—————————————————
body is based mostly on bureaucratic practice and does not have clear statutory footing.213
has occurred, FDI has been associated
While Indonesia has an open foreign investment regime, it is subject to restrictions, limits, and conditions in certain sectors, and some sectors are closed to foreign investment altogether.
with rapid industrialization and improved
—————————————————
trade performance, thus enhancing the
of foreign domination within the country.204
competitiveness of domestic firms in world
Nevertheless, Indonesia is characterized
markets.196 FDI has a significant role to play
by an open foreign investment regime205
in the economic development of developing
and foreign investors continue to invest in
countries and represents a source of long-
Indonesia despite the inherent uncertainties
term capital, employment, and technology.197
of the Indonesian legal landscape.206 While
In environments characterized by open
Indonesia has an open foreign investment
trade and investment, the benefits of FDI
regime, it is subject to restrictions, limits,
are enhanced as FDI plays a crucial role
and conditions in certain sectors, and some
in improving the host economy’s capacity
sectors are closed to foreign investment
to respond to the opportunities presented
altogether. 207 Investments by foreign
by global economic integration. 198 The
investors in shares of private Indonesian
main benefits of FDI are in contributing
companies need prior regulatory approval,
growth, productivity, employment, and
and the foreign investment limit determines
development in the host country,199 and as
whether total acquisition is possible or
such, FDI has become an essential means
whether a local partner is required.208
189
194
VIII. Foreign Direct Investment
———————————————— Developing economies like Indonesia have been very successful in pursuing development strategies based on foreign direct investment (FDI). 195 Where this
202
203
of international trade.200 However, there
The Capital Investment Coordinating
are no settled international legal principles
Board (BKPM) is the body that grants 46
Currents Winter 2013
Thus, proposed transactions for larger stakes in public companies are considered on a case-by-case basis where the company is in a closed sector.214 A. FDI CONCERNS
There are some doubts attributed to FDI. Firstly, it involves an outflow of capital that is detrimental to the host country’s balance of payments in the long term.215 Secondly, FDI may result in the transfer of outdated technology, which creates technological dependence and hinders the development of local technology.216 Thirdly, most FDI occurs in industries where there are few market competitors and is managed by multinational corporations with greater resources than potential domestic competitors, so they can overcome domestic regulatory regimes.217 Fourth, FDI can damage local cultural values and national pride by introducing foreign values and bringing in alien influence on the economy.218 These doubts cause valid concerns regarding unfair practices of investors in host countries.219
In its 2013 National Trade Estimate Report
and transparent investment regimes, which
for a quick fix to the abundant structural
on Indonesia, the U.S. Trade Representative
has been realized by an accelerated pace of
problems, including lack of transparency.234
outlined concerns of the continuing legal
industrialization and economic growth via
Afterwards, Indonesia agreed to reform
uncertainty, economic nationalism, and
foreign investment. ASEAN countries, like
its political and economic structures in
disproportionate influence of local business
Indonesia, benefit from having progressive
order to receive IMF funding and win back
interests which typify Indonesia’s investment
domestic investment regimes, and due to the
FDI.235 The regulations implemented were
climate, as demonstrated by government
diversity of ASEAN countries, each must
intended to stimulate the financial sectors to
requirements which often compel foreign
be mindful of their assets and the needs
allow capital inflows from FDI to revive the
companies to conduct business with and
of potential investors.
Although FDI is
economy.236 Although much remains to be
purchase goods from local partners.220 Despite
the largest source of private investment in
done, there is still high potential for foreign
a 2007 investment law that was intended to
ASEAN, since the AFC, it has fallen by as
investment related growth in Indonesia,
improve transparency and protections for
much as 41 percent in the five largest ASEAN
and its ratification of the AIA Framework
foreign investors, the law restricted more
economies.
As a result of the changing
Agreement will provide uniformity with
sectors to foreign investment as well as
Asian investment landscape, a number of
other ASEAN countries and may stimulate
increased foreign equity limitations.
investors have left for opportunities in
further foreign investment in the country.237
Eastern Europe and Latin America.230
—————————————————
221
Furthermore, in transferring investment
227
229
228
decisions from the central government
Indonesia is a pivotal state in Asia,
to district governments, inconsistencies
and prior to the AFC, was a foremost
IX. Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
between national and regional laws have
—————————————————
————————————————
arisen.
There is always a question as to which
promote the inflow of FDI and instituted
Because the AIA Framework Agreement is aimed at enhancing investor confidence, investors have greater market access and enjoy national treatment, benefiting from lower costs related to investment procedures and operations.
legal regulations promoting transparency, as
—————————————————
in which a host country’s courts deal with
well as a dispute settlement mechanism.224
investment destination due in part to global
arbitration agreements.240 It is also a problem
This was done to halt the departure of
confidence in its overall stability, and its
when a party refuses to abide by the arbitral
foreign capital and to attract investment
growth encouraged foreign investment.231
ruling, uses the domestic court system
from wealthy countries, and, as such, is
However, once the financial crisis hit,
despite an arbitration clause,241 or simply
loaded with incentives to foreign investors.225
foreign investment disappeared and the
refuses to arbitrate.242 Furthermore, because
Because the AIA Framework Agreement
Indonesian banking and financial sectors
international commercial transactions
is aimed at enhancing investor confidence,
plunged into chaos.
As White describes,
involve traders from different legal regimes,
investors have greater market access and
“what once was a prosperous region, quickly
a conflict of law may occur.243 To remedy
enjoy national treatment, benefiting from
became a desolate vortex of malnourished
this, parties to a transaction may specify
lower costs related to investment procedures
economies.”
International investors
which substantive law to use, or whether
and operations.226 Members continue to
withdrew over $1.4 billion from the ASEAN
to follow an established set of contract
assume measures to promote progressive
region, and Indonesia turned to the IMF
principles.244 Additionally, foreign traders
222
B. INDONESIA AND THE ASEAN INVESTMENT AREA
Indonesia is one of the five original member countries of ASEAN 223 and ratified the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) Framework Agreement, which sets to
233
232
procedural and substantive rules apply to international transactions, which is significant - especially in light of the legal risks inherent in international trade.238 By giving regard to party autonomy, arbitration is a dispute resolution mechanism that addresses these legal issues most efficiently and equitably.239 However, a persistent problem is the manner
47
Currents Winter 2013
from diverse legal systems may feel that a
Indonesia are complicated where corruption
Asian average.259 As Indonesia continues
host country will not treat them equally to
is concerned, since no uniform standard of
to grow, trade with other countries could
domestic parties, which makes arbitration an
proof has been established.
In Himpurna
grow by billions of dollars.260 Indonesia is
attractive option.245
v. PLN, higher standards for corruption
also aiming to expend hundreds of billions
All of these dispute resolution concerns
and contractual invalidity for corruption
of dollars to upgrade its infrastructure
arise in the Indonesian context, and because
were applied. 255 Discrimination against
over the coming years, for failing to keep
foreign court judgments cannot be enforced
foreigners also remains a substantial issue
pace with modernization could seriously
in Indonesia, foreign investors will almost
for parties wishing to commence legal
inhibit Indonesia’s growth. 261 Despite
always choose to be subject to arbitration
action in Indonesia, as evidenced by new
various governance and bureaucratic issues,
in an internationally recognized arbitration
regulations requiring divestment of foreign
governance has improved at state owned
venue. 246 Most often, Singapore is the
majority interests in mining investments.256
enterprises, thus facilitating deal making for
preferred venue for arbitration in these
Furthermore, provisions in investment
foreign companies.262 However, Indonesia still
cases, adopting the Singapore International
—————————————————
needs to take more steps to facilitate business
Arbitration Centre’s international arbitration
transactions for international companies,
investors, with a panel of arbitrators that
Indonesia still needs to take more steps to facilitate business transactions for international companies, namely by imposing fewer restrictions, quickly processing imports, and by combating the perennial problem of corruption.
includes a number of foreign practitioners.249
—————————————————
government insisted that it would continue
But even if a foreign party successfully
treaties concluded by Indonesia often
to prioritize the interests of domestic
obtains an offshore arbitration award, it
contain onerous provisions with confusing
businesses. 265 However, Indonesia has
is not always practically straightforward
definitions, and these complex laws and
recently agreed to abandon import quantity
to enforce it against an Indonesian party
policies affect the admission and operation
limits on horticultural products, to revise
in Indonesia, since enforcement requires
of foreign investment.257 However, if such
regulations on horticulture importation,
registration and enforcement through
preliminary hurdles can be overcome,
and to not impose quantity restrictions on
Indonesian courts.
Particularly, it is very
investors seeking legal action may then argue
imports anymore.266
difficult to obtain specific performance
for protection under international treaty law.258
against Indonesian parties in Indonesia.251
—————————————————
rules.247 It is atypical for foreign parties to agree to Indonesian courts as the venue for dispute resolution, and it is strongly cautioned against.248 The Indonesian National Arbitration Board (BANI) is another dispute resolution mechanism available to foreign
250
254
It is generally accepted that foreign parties
X. Current Trade Regime
should only expect damages against an
————————————————
Indonesian party if action is taken through
The tariff restrictions removed after the AFC
Indonesian courts, a well-recognized country
included restrictions on trade, investment,
risk for Indonesian related transactions that
and production, in combination with
all foreign investors ultimately face.252
streamlining procedures at the border,
Arbitration cases against the Indonesian government are relatively rare.
resulting in increased efficiency that allowed
While
Indonesia to reduce its tariff to an average
facing similar issues as private arbitration
of less than 10 percent, making it lower
cases, investor-state arbitration cases in
than several countries in Asia and the East
253
48
Currents Winter 2013
namely by imposing fewer restrictions, quickly processing imports, and by combating the perennial problem of corruption. 263 In 2012, Indonesia’s growth slowed, prompting the introduction of new restrictive trade and investment measures.264 Following a WTO dispute with the U.S., the Indonesian
A. CURRENT LAW
Indonesia has undergone vast political and economic changes since the AFC and the fall of Suharto.267 Greater authority has shifted from the President to Parliament, and decentralization has shifted more responsibility to the regions.268 However, this has resulted in increasingly fragmented policy decision-making with lack of a common vision.269 Nevertheless, trade reforms have driven rapid trade growth, with exports
growing and significantly contributing to
The State Finance Law No.17/2003 was
While Indonesia maintains that their new
also enacted, which required an establishment
policies will strengthen domestic business,
It is well established that Indonesia moved
of a more effective and transparent treasury
they have caused foreign traders to question
towards a liberal trade regime since the onset
management and stipulated that budget
the security of their investments. Successfully
of the Crisis.271 Fair competition laws were
execution must be done in a clear and
maintaining growth boosts confidence
enacted in Indonesia in response to the
transparent manner.279
and trust among investors, 287 which is
Indonesian GDP growth.
270
IMF’s requirements for the bailout, leading
In 2006, a policy reform package to
essential amid a bleak global economy.288
to the enactment of Law No.5 of 1999,
improve the investment climate was issued,
However, new protectionist measures have
the Competition Law.
signaling a more systematic approach to
tainted Indonesia’s standing as one of the
monopolistic practices, restricts M&A
reform
as well as a more streamlined
world’s most attractive emerging markets.289
transactions that would increase market
and transparent investment procedure.281
Increasing protectionism, alongside a dip in
concentration, and prohibits exploitation
It focused on general investment policies,
growth, have caused foreign investment to
by firms with market control.
However,
customs, excise and duties policies, taxation,
decrease.290
this law is subject to interpretation and
labor, and SMEs.282 The investment package
Indonesian economic growth slowed
the objectives are written loosely to allow
included a new capital investment law, new
in 2013, and worries about the economy
a variety of interpretations.274 The general
—————————————————
were accompanied by a dip in the stock
objective of the law is to improve economic
exchange and fall in foreign investment. The
business competition practices, and
Increasing protectionism, alongside a dip in growth, have caused foreign investment to decrease.
encourage effectiveness and efficiency in
—————————————————
been strengthened by a U.S. $50 million trade
business practices.275 But because it is open
tax law, an amendment to customs and excise
surplus in October 2013.291 The economy
to such a variety of different interpretations,
law, and revisions to the manpower law.283
experienced its lowest growth rate in four
the basic thrust of the law is to maintain and
But because of the political sensitivity of
years, as it slowed to 5.62 percent growth in
promote competition as a means to achieving
the issues, increased nationalistic sentiments,
the third quarter of 2013.292 This fell below
economic efficiency has been lost.276
vested interests, and maneuvering by political
both Indonesian Finance Minister Chatib
factions in Parliament, the process was
Basri’s earlier prediction of 5.8 percent
No.5/2003 on the Economic Policy Package
turbulent.
Moreover, lack of capacity and
growth and the 6.3 percent forecast in the
in Conjunction with the Completion of
coordination between departments resulted
nation’s budget.293 And since easy global
the Government’s Program with the IMF
in the slow progress of its implementation.285
credit and large exports of commodities
was issued, aiming to increase investments,
These chronic coordination problems have
to China have decreased, Indonesia is left
exports, and employment, thus creating
reduced the effectiveness of the reforms.286
looking at lower growth for the near future.294
a climate conducive to the private sector
—————————————————
Indonesia’s sources of trade revenue
272
The law prohibits
273
efficiency, regulate the business climate to ensure competition, prevent unhealthy
In 2003, the Presidential instruction
280
284
Indonesian rupiah fell more than 19 percent against the dollar in 2013 over worries about a widening current-account deficit, but has
from natural resources are under pressure
include improving investment policy and
XI. Economic and Political Tensions
trade, decreasing legal uncertainty, bringing
————————————————
exports295 and lower prices for many of
through good institutions.
277
Key policies
regional regulations into line with higher regulations, improving infrastructure, increasing the transparency of public services, implementing programs for job creation, and to eradicate poverty.278
due to decreasing global demand for the natural resources it sells to the rest of
A. CURRENT ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
The deceleration of Indonesian economic growth creates a significant tension between Indonesian policymakers and foreigners.
the world.296 In addition to weaker external demand, protectionist government policies introduced in 2011-2012,297 such as the ban of raw and semi-processed rattan exports,
49
Currents Winter 2013
export tax on 65 minerals and enactment of
coordination having leaned towards
flavor about them. 318 For instance, the
restrictive import policies, have contributed
protectionism309 and uncertainty surrounding
mining sectors have been directed to install
to weak export growth.
Another factor
the 2014 general election, politicians have
smelters and process their resources before
complicating reform is the appreciation of
negatively impacted the economy by
export, a directive which is expected to be
Indonesia’s real exchange rate, thus putting
focusing on populist issues instead of
implemented regardless of whether or not
pressure on these tradable sectors.299
effective regulation. 310 With corruption
the additional processing is profitable.319 This
scandals engulfing SBY’s Democratic Party,
and other directives, appear to have stymied
conservatives in government have pushed
the expansion of exports while increasing
the confidence of foreign investors. This
economic modernizers to the sidelines.
the national import bill.320
could have costly ramifications, as foreign
There are also many political pressures to
Populist domestic politics and weakening
capital is needed to finance much needed
implement protectionist policies rather
leadership ahead of the 2014 election, and
domestic development.
than improve economic efficiency,
and
uncertainty afterwards, may blunt Indonesia’s
the implementation of these measures is
the leading presidential candidates have
economy.321 Overall, while the Indonesian
troubling as they lack prior consultation and
adopted populist rhetoric in order to garner
economy has made significant progress
have a retroactive impact.302
support.313 An enduring remnant from the
under SBY, increasing protectionism poses a
Although Indonesia’s 2013 growth rate
Suharto era is the nationalistic tone, which
threat to the sustainability of past success.322
decreased, maintaining growth at 5.6 percent
defined his tenure, and is popular among
is not bad and will likely continue to attract
voters.314 Inward-looking measures such as
foreign investors.303 And despite slowing
ownership caps appear to be part of a trend
growth, high inflation, and poor performance
—————————————————
of the rupiah and markets, the Finance
continue to cloud investment in the near
Populist domestic politics and weakening leadership ahead of the 2014 election, and uncertainty afterwards, may blunt Indonesia’s economy.
future as more investors have pulled out of
—————————————————
risky emerging markets.
While long-term
towards greater protectionism that goes
growth prospects have not deteriorated, the
beyond mere politicking.315 It is possible
confidence that Indonesia would continue
that this populist rhetoric is largely political
to grow at 6 to 7 percent annually has been
posturing, but if it becomes entrenched
undermined, showing that long-term growth
in future government policies after the
prospects were not as good as previously
election, Indonesia’s appeal as an investment
anticipated. Further economic reforms and
destination could be jeopardized.
298
Given weak external demand, protectionist policies are unwise
300
and threaten to shake
301
Furthermore,
Ministry has projected that Indonesia could achieve a 6 percent growth rate in 2014.304 However, current economic woes will
305
306
improving infrastructure will be required to sustain investor interest.307
312
311
316
Senior policy makers have denied that these new measures are protectionist, and claim that they will strengthen the Indonesian
B. POLITICAL PRESSURES
Political pressures constitute one of the biggest barriers to the Indonesian economy.308 With the most recent g overnment’s
economy by providing greater economic security.
317
While there is much to be said for
building up domestic industries to strengthen the economy, a number of the policies have had an interventionist and protectionist 50
Currents Winter 2013
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
Despite careful optimism for Indonesia’s economy, its position is tenuous and further government interference could cause more harm than good. Backing away from protectionist trade policies could help fix Indonesia’s structural issues, as they pose a large threat to the country’s financial stability.323 Tightening political control may stave off the trade effects of the Global Financial Crisis ahead of the 2014 election, but orienting the economy outward and enacting complementary policies are more likely to sustain long-term growth. 324 As a commodity-dependent economy, it would be pragmatic to pursue diversification and structural changes in Indonesia to reduce economic vulnerability and foster internationally competitive industrialization.325 In order to reach more rapid levels of economic growth, Indonesia must open up further to foreign investment and make headway on plans to revitalize its feeble infrastructure.326 Progress on these
fronts will require strong leadership after
still not ideal, as Indonesia ranks poorly
SBY’s term ends in order to ease tensions
in terms of trade supporting institutions
between traders and the current state of
and infrastructure, which will need to
affairs in the government and economy.
be developed in order to implement the
327
—————————————————
XII. Implications and Conclusions
desirable economic policies and will require the government to have the strength to respond to a liberalized environment.337
————————————————
Implementing reforms is difficult when
In sum, Indonesia has achieved major trade
strong public or nationalistic interest is
reforms since the AFC, and its liberalization
involved, and the process of Parliament’s
efforts have not been without merit328 as it
law deliberation and coordination problems
is still recovering from a multidimensional
indicate that significant reforms are unlikely
crisis that fundamentally changed its political
to occur unless an agreement between the
and economic frameworks.
government and Parliament is reached.338
329
The reforms
Indonesia has undertaken will greatly assist
Thus, while protectionist policies have
growth, and liberalization will improve
recently increased in the Indonesian trade
market access for foreign traders.330 However,
regime, the country’s historic progress
despite its remarkable progress, recently
towards liberalization should increase
increased protectionism as resistance to
investor confidence. Protectionist measures
reform has emerged.
seem unlikely to achieve the results the
331
Within the current framework, the
government desires, and as such, are expected
parameters for trade have moved.332 Indonesia
to be reformed in the future. Because of
is committed to regional liberalization within
the current economic uncertainty, the
AFTA, the exchange rate is largely market
government will likely experience opposition
determined, and the government has moved
to further liberalization, but if the results
to a rules-based market system.
However,
of the WTO dispute indicate anything, it is
the difficult economic environment has
that Indonesia will ultimately honor its trade
led to uncertainty on the future direction
agreements and act to improve the overall
of trade policy.
Although support for
business climate. Although there are legal and
further liberalization is low, trade openness,
regulatory challenges to traders who choose
confidence to invest, stable macroeconomic
to invest in Indonesia, the remarkable growth
policy, and minimal political uncertainty
it has experienced and potential for future
are needed, along with a clear trade policy
growth indicate the likelihood of further
that is credible with investors.
trade and investment in the country.
333
334
335
To achieve
this, Indonesia must reduce tariffs, remove opaque non-tariff measures, and move towards a regime that encourages investment and competition, and economic policies that encourage stable prices and competitive exchange rates. 336 While Indonesia has made progress, the investment climate is 51
Currents Winter 2013
End Notes 1. Kiki Verico, Trade Challenges and Indonesia’s Ideal Response, T he Jakarta Post (Feb. 15, 2013, 9:25 AM), http://www.thejakartapost. com/news/2013/02/15/tradechallenges-and-indonesia-s-idealresponse.html. 2. Clive Maximilian Schmithoff, C live M S chmittoff ’ s S elect Essays on International Trade L aw 54 (1988) [hereinafter Schmitoff]. 3. Id. at 426. 4. See id. passim. 5. See id. 6. See id. 7. See id. 8. Robert Lawrence & Margareta Drzeniek, Enabling Trade in a Changing World, T he J akarta Post (May 30, 2012, 7:54 AM), http://www.thejakartapost.com/ news/2012/05/30/enablingtrade-a-changing-world.html. 9. Dessy Sagita & Gabriel Kereh, Indonesia Must Undertake Major Changes and Take Risks, The Jakarta Globe (May 8, 2013, 9:22 AM), http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/ news/indonesia-must-undertakemajor-changes-and-take-risks-gitawirjawan-says/. 10. Ganeshan Wignaraja, Growth Dynamics and Policy Choices Facing Indonesia, V ox (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.voxeu.org/article/ growth-dynamics-and-policychoices-facing-indonesia. 11. See Verico, supra note 1. 12. Id. 13. Schmithoff, supra note 2, at 225. 14. David Vanzetti et al., Trade Policy at the Crossroads—The Indonesian Story 6 (2005). 15. The Bloodbath, Workers World (1998), http://www.workers.org/ indonesia/chap1.html. 16. Daniel Berkowitz et al., Legal Institutions and International Trade Flows, 26 Mich. J. Int’l L. 163, 181–82 (2004). 17. Vikram Nehru, Indonesia’s New Trade Policy Risks Repeating Past Mistakes, East Asia Forum (Sept. 4, 2012), http://www.eastasiaforum. org/2012/09/04/indonesias-newtrade-policy-risks-repeating-pastmistakes/. 18. Id. 19. Id. 20. Vanzetti, supra note 14, at 3. 21. Id. at 2. 22. See D epartment of F oreign Affairs and Trade, Indonesia: Facing the Challenge 61 (2000) [hereinafter DFAT].
60. Id. at 25. 61. Id. at 26. 62. McGuire, supra note 56, at 3–4. 63. Hoekman et al., supra note 59, at 32. 64. See generally id. (noting exceptions to limited licensing benchmark include health, safety, and environmental reasons). 65. Id. 66. See generally id. (describing institutional policies affecting trade reform). 67. McGuire, supra note 56, at 31. 68. Id. 69. Id. 70. Hoekman et al., supra note 59, at 6. 71. Id. at 7. 72. Id. at 11. 73. Soesastro & Basri, supra note 23, at 8–9. 74. Tulus Tambunan, The Impacts of Trade Liberalization on Indonesian Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 15 (Trade Knowledge Network Policy Paper), Int’l Institute for Sustainable Dev. (2011), www. iisd.org/tkn/pdf/impact_trade_ lib_indonesia.pdf. 75. Id. at 14–15. 76. Luis Abugattas Maljuf, Swimming I n T h e S pa g h e t t i B ow l : C hallenges for D eveloping C ountries U nder the “N ew Regionalism” 15 (2005). 77. Id. 78. Lucian Cernat & Sam Laird, North, South, East, West: What’s best? Modern RTAs and Their Implications for the Stability of Trade Policy 12 (CREDIT Working Paper No. 03/11, 2003). 79. Maljuf, supra note 76, at 16. 80. Lawrence & Drzeniek, supra note 8. 81. Tubagus Feridhanusetyawan & Mari Pangestu, Indonesian Trade Liberalization: Estimating the Gains, 39 B ulletin of I ndon . E co . Studies 51, 51–74 (2003)(Indon.). 82. See DFAT supra note 22, at 64. 83. Id. at 68. 84. Soesastro et al., supra note 25, at 20–21. 85. Sagita & Kereh, supra note 9. 86. David Gantz, World Trade Law after Doha: Multilateral, Regional and National Approaches, 40 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 321, 367 (2011). 87. Vanzetti et al., supra note 14 at 12. 88. Gantz, supra note 86, at 348. 89. Id. at 349. 90. Soesastro et al., supra note 25, at 20–21. 91. Gantz, supra note 86, at 348.
23. Hadi Soesastro & M. Chatib Basri, The Political Economy of Trade Policy in Indonesia 3 (Center for Strategic and International Studies, Working Paper Series 092, Mar. 2005), available at http://www.csis.or.id/ papers/wpe092.pdf. 24. Vanzetti, supra note 14, at 4. 25. Hadi Soesastro et al., Economic Reforms in Indonesia After the 1997/98 Economic Crisis 3 (EABER, Working Paper No. 18, 2006). 26. Id. 27. Vanzetti et al., supra note 14, at 25. 28. Id. at 24. 29. Id. 30. Id. 31. Berkowitz et al., supra note 16, at 164–65. 32. Id. at 166. 33. Id. at 167. 34. Id. at 167. 35. Id. at 165. 36. Id. at 168. 37. Id. at 177. 38. Berkowitz et al., supra note 16, at 182. 39. Id. at 189. 40. Id. at 182. 41. Id. at 182–83. 42. Id. at 183. 43. Id. 44. Id. at 186–87. 45. Id. at 187. 46. Id. 47. Id. at 190. 48. See Vanzetti et al., supra note 14, at 11–31. 49. Berkowitz et al., supra note 16, at 190. 50. Id. at 191. 51. Id. 52. Id. at 197. 53. Id. 54. Id. 55. Id. 56. G r e g M c G u i r e , T r a d e i n S e rv i c e s : M a r k e t A c c e s s Opportunities and The Benefits of Liberalization for Developing Economies 1 (2003), available at http://unctad.org/en/ Docs/icdtab20_en.pdf. 57. Id. 58. Id. 59. Bernard Hoekman et al., Trade Policy Reform and Poverty Alleviation 14 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 2733, 2001), available at http://www-wds. worldbank.org/external/default/ WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB /2002/01/18/000094946_020 10804031951/Rendered/PDF/ multi0page.pdf.
92. M. Chatib Basri & Arianto A. Patunru, Keeping Indonesia’s Trade Open, East Asia Forum (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.eastasiaforum. org/2012/10/18/keepingindonesias-trade-open/. 93. Soesastro et al., supra note 25, at 20–21. 94. Basri & Patunru, supra note 92. 95. Id. 96. Sagita & Kereh, supra note 9. 97. Herbert Smith, Indonesia M&A Transactions: A Survival Guide 3 (2012), available at http://www. herbertsmithfreehills.com/-/ media/HS/J-160812-7.pdf. 98. John Malcolm Dowling, Competition Policy in Indonesia 9 (SMU Econ. & Statistics Working Paper Series, Research Paper 08-2006, 2006), available at http://ink.library. smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent. cgi?article=1870&context=soe_ research. 99. Soesastro & Basri, supra note 23, at 2. 100. Id. at 21. 101. Id. at 22. 102. Linda Yulisman, Revise and Improvise Trade Policies, WTO tells Indonesia, The Jakarta Post (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.thejakartapost.com/ news/2013/04/15/revise-andimprove-trade-policies-wto-tellsindonesia.html (quoting U.S. WTO Ambassador Michael Punke). 103. Vanzetti et al., supra note 14. 104. Id. at 7. 105. Soesastro et al., supra note 25, at 12. 106. Cernat & Laird, supra note 78, at 8. 107. Soesastro et al., supra note 25, at 7. 108. Id. 109. Id. at 12. 110. Id. 111. Id. 112. Id. 113. Sagita & Kereh, supra note 9. 114. Soesastro & Basri, supra note 23, at 3. 115. Id. at 19. 116. Id. at 4. 117. Soesastro et al., supra note 25, at 7. 118. Id. at 28. 119. U.S. Trade Rep., Indonesia (2013), available at http://www.ustr.gov/ sites/default/files/2013%20 NTE%20Indonesia%20Final.pdf [hereinafter USTR Indonesia]. 120. Id. 121. Nii Lante Wallace-Bruce, Corruption and Competitiveness in Global Business, 24 Melb. U. L. Rev. 349, 350–51 (2000). 122. Id. at 349. 123. Id. at 356. 124. Id. at 366.
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125. Id. at 358. 126. Id. at 359. 127. Id. at 374. 128. Id. 129. Profiles: Indonesia, Anti-Corruption A u t h o r i t i e s , h t t p : / / w w w. acauthorities.org/country/id (last updated July 2010). 130. Soesastro et al., supra note 25, at 17. 131. Id. 132. Id. 133. Linda Yulisman, Great Wall of Trade Barriers Planned, The Jakarta Post (Dec. 7, 2011, 8:06 AM), http://www.thejakartapost.com/ news/2011/12/07/great-walltrade-barriers-planned.html. 134. Titik Anas, Indonesia’s New Protectionist Trade Policies: A Blast From the Past, East Asia Forum (June 18, 2012), http://www. eastasiaforum.org/2012/06/18/ indonesia-s-new-protectionisttrade-policies-a-blast-from-thepast/. 135. Id. 136. U.S. Challenges Indonesian Import Restrictions, Farm Futures (Jan. 18, 2013), http://farmfutures. com/story-challenges-indonesianimport-restrictions-0-93794. 137. Ganeshan Wignaraja, Indonesia: Faltering Growth and a Hint of Protectionism?, East Asia Forum (Feb. 27, 2013), http://www. eastasiaforum.org/2013/02/27/ indonesia-faltering-growth-and-ahint-of-protectionism/. 138. Yulisman, supra note 102. 139. Dowling, supra note 98, at 5. 140. USTR Indonesia, supra note 119. 141. Id. 142. Id. 143. Id. 144. Id. at 2. 145. Id. 146. Id. 147. Id. 148. Id. 149. Id. 150. Id. at 2-3. 151. Id. at 3. 152. Id. 153. Id. at 4. 154. Id. 155. Id. 156. Id. 157. Id. at 5. 158. Id. 159. Id. 160. Id. at 5-6. 161. Id. 162. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, WTO Dispute Settlement Proceeding Regarding Indonesia Importation of Horticultural Products, Animals and Animal Products 78 Fed. Reg. 11725, 11725 (Feb. 19, 2013), available at http:// www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR2013-02-19/pdf/2013-03667.pdf.
163. Id. at 11726. 164. Id. 165. Id. 166. McGuire, supra note 56, at 26. 167. Id. at 16–18. 168. Id. at 16. 169. Id. at 17. 170. Id. at 18. 171. Id. 172. Id. 173. Anas, supra note 134. 174. Id. 175. Nehru, supra note 17. 176. Ambassador Michael Punke, U.S. Permanent Representative to the WTO, U.S. Opening Statement on the Trade Policy Review of Indonesia (Apr.10, 2013). 177. See Dep’t of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Indonesia: Facing the Challenge 69 (Ann Duffy, ed., Dec. 12, 2000), available at http:// www.dfat.gov.au/publications/ indonesia/ind_challenge.pdf. 178. Vanzetti et al., supra note 14, at 2. 179. Anas, supra note 134. 180. Id. 181. Id. 182. Soesastro & Basri, supra note 23, at 12. 183. Nehru, supra note 17. 184. Id. 185. Id. 186. Verico, supra note 1. 187. Wignaraja, supra note 10. 188. Id. 189. Yulisman, supra note 102. 190. Editorial: For Trade to Work, Reforms Are a Must, The Jakarta Globe (May 7, 2013), http://www. thejakartaglobe.com/opinion/ editorial-for-trade-to-workreforms-are-a-must/. 191. Soesastro et al., supra note 25, at 4. 192. Soesastro & Basri, supra note 23, at 18. 193. Id. at 25 194. Soesastro et al., supra note 25, at 14. 195. Vanzetti et al., supra note 14, at 30. 196. Id. at 29. 197. Id. 198. Id. 199. M i c h a e l P r y l e s e t a l . , I n t e r n at i o n a l T r a d e L aw : Commentary and Materials 56 (2d ed. 2004). 200. Id. 201. Id. at 1047. 202. Id. at 1049. 203. Sarita Sambijantoro, Nationalist Sentiment Thwarts FDI Plan, The J akarta P ost (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.thejakartapost.com/ news/2013/12/02/nationalistsentiment-thwarts-fdi-plan.html. 204. Id. 205. Smith, supra note 97. 206. Id. 207. Id.
208. Id. 209. Id. 210. Id. 211. Id. 212. Id. 213. Id. 214. Id. 215. See Pryles et al., supra note 199, at 56. 216. Id. at 1046; see also Vietnam Economists Warn Against Addiction to Foreign Investment, ThanhnienNews. com (Mar. 25, 2014), http:// thanhniennews.com/business/ vietnam-economists-war nagainst-addiction-to-foreigninvestment-24860.html. 217. See Pryles et al., supra note 199, at 1045. 218. See id. at 1047 (discussing that during neg otiations of FDI parameters countries recognized the impor tance of cultural sovereignty and values). 219. See generally id. at 1045–46 (discussing impact of foreign direct investment on host country). 220. USTR Indonesia, supra note 119, at 198. 221. Id. at 199. 222. Id. 223. George O. White III, Foreigners Beware? Investing in a Jungle with Many Predators: The ASEAN Investement Area, 37 Tex. Int’l L.J. 157, 159 (2002). 224. Id. at 170. 225. Id. 226. Id. at 171. 227. Id. at 172. 228. Id. 229. Id. at 168–69. 230. Id. at 169. 231. Id. at 172. 232. Id. 233. Id. at 175. 234. Id. at 164. 235. Id. at 172–73. 236. Id. at 173. 237. Id. at 176. 238. R i c h a r d G a r n e t t e t a l . , A Practical Guide to I n t e r n at i o n a l C o mm e r c i a l Arbitration 2 (2d ed., 2000). 239. Id. at 3. 240. Id. 241. Id. at 4. 242. Id. at 12. 243. Id. at 5. 244. Id. 245. Id. at 14. 246. Smith, supra note 97, at 11. 247. Id. 248. Id. 249. Id. 250. Id. 251. Id. 252. Id. 253. 7th Annual Forum of Developing Country Investment Negotiators, Jakarta, Indon. Nov. 4–6, 2013, 53
Currents Winter 2013
Investment Treaties and Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Reform or Reject?, 5, available at http://www.iisd.org/ pdf/2013/7th_annual_forum_ report.pdf. 254. Florian Haugeneder, Corruption in Investor-State Arbitration, 10 J. World Investment & Trade 323, 338 (2009). 255. Id. at 335. 256. Luke Nottage, Treaty-Based InvestorState Dispute Settlement Mechanisms Not All Bad, East Asia Forum (Aug. 17, 2012) http://www. eastasiaforum.org/2012/08/17/ treaty-based-investor-statedispute-settlement-mechanismsnot-all-bad/. 257. Simon Butt, Luke Nottage & Brett Williams, Japanese Law and the Asia-Pacific, Renegotiating Indonesian Investments in the Shadow of International Treaty Law, Univ. of Sydney Blogs, http://blogs.usyd. edu.au/japaneselaw/2012/04/ renegotiating_indonesian_inves. html (last updated Apr. 18, 2012). 258. Id. 259. B i j i t B o r a & I n g e N o r a Neufeld, Tariffs and the East Asian Financial Crisis, at 8, 12, UNCTAD/ITCD/TAB/14, U.N. Sales No. E.01.II.D.27 (2001). 260. Eric Bellman, U.S. Looks to Indonesia for Big Trade Boost, W all S t . J. (Nov. 13, 2012), http://webcache. googleusercontent.com/search? q=cache:r0qoIWQAAL0J:online. wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000 14241278873245563045781166 11245293072+&cd=1&hl=en& ct=clnk&gl=us (This is a cached article. It can also be found via a search engine or accessed through a subscription). 261. Id. 262. Id. 263. Id. 264. Wignaraja, supra note 137. 265. Yulisman, supra note 133. 266. M i c h a e l Ta y l o r, U P DA T E 1-Indonesia Scraps Horticultural Import Quotas to Head Off U.S. Spat, R euters (Apr. 12, 2013), h t t p : / / w w w. r e u t e r s . c o m / article/2013/04/12/indonesiausa-idUSL3N0CZ90A20130412. 267. Soesastro et al., supra note 25, at 24–25. 268. Id. 269. Id. at 25. 270. DFAT, supra note 22, at 69. 271. Id. at 57. 272. Dowling, supra note 98, at 3. 273. Id. 274. Id. 275. Id. at 4. 276. Id. 277. Soesastro et al., supra note 25, at 7. 278. Id. 279. Id. at 15.
280. Id. at 10. 281. Id. at 32. 282. Id. at 29. 283. Id. at 10. 284. Id. 285. Id. at 32. 286. Id. 287. Positive Economic Outlook in 2014, T he J aka r t a P o s t (Oct. 11, 2013), http://www.thejakartapost. com/news/2013/10/11/positiveeconomic-outlook-2014.html. 288. Id. 289. Ben Bland, Protectionism Hits Indonesia’s Reputation, F inancial T i m e s (June 12, 2012), http:// webcache.googleusercontent. com/search?q=cache:Rsv1ReHV L e E J : w w w. f t . c o m / c m s / s/0/4f1ae262-b46e-11e1-bb2e00144feabdc0.html+&cd=1&hl= en&ct=clnk&gl=us#axzz31YCsV NpY (This is a cached article. It can also be found via a search engine or accessed through a subscription). 290. Id. 291. Nilufar Rizki & Rieka Rahadiana, Indonesia Trade Sur plus A Relief For Rupiah, But Economy Worries Linger, R e u t e r s (Dec. 2, 2013), http://uk.reuters. com/article/2013/12/02/ukindonesia-economy-inflationtrade-idUKBRE9B103T20131202. 292. Joana Taborda, Indonesian GDP Growth Slows to 5.62% YOY in Q3, T r a d i n g E c o n o m i c s (Nov. 6, 2013), http://www. trading economics.com/ articles/11062013095209.htm. 293. B e n O t t o & To m Wr i g h t , Indonesia Finance Chief Basri Cuts 2013 Gr owth For ecast, W a l l S t . J. (Oct. 31, 2013), http:// webcache.googleusercontent. com/search?q=cache:kkn8V_n0rMJ:online.wsj.com/news/articles/ SB100014240527023038431045 79168861081992566+&cd=1&h l=en&ct=clnk&gl=us (This is a cached article. It can also be found via a search engine or accessed through a subscription). 294. Id. 295. Peter McCawley, Is The Indonesian Economy In Trouble?, E ast A sia Forum (Sept. 1, 2013), http://www. eastasiaforum.org/2013/09/01/ is-the-indonesian-economy-introuble/. 296. Indonesia’s Economy: Tipping the Balance, T h e E c o n o m i s t (Feb. 23, 2013), http://www.economist. com/news/asia/21572245gloomy-politics-so-how-longcan-bright-economics-last-tippingbalance. 297. Wignaraja, supra note 10. 298. Maria Monica Wihardja, Indonesia: W here Bad Politics Threatens a Good Economy, East Asia Forum
319. Id. 320. Id. 321. Wihardja, supra note 298. 322. Stiftung, supra note 313, at 32. 323. Wihardja, supra note 298. 324. Wignaraja, supra note 10. 325. Id. 326. Ben Bland, Indonesia vows to turn crisis into opportunity, F inancial Times (Sept. 11, 2013), http:// webcache.googleusercontent. com/search?q=cache:t-b38XJBKsJ:www.ft.com/cms/ s/0/207f8336-19da-11e3-93e800144feab7de.html+&cd=1&hl=e n&ct=clnk&gl=us#axzz31SZQM tO0 (This is a cached article. It can also be found via a search engine or accessed through a subscription). 327. Indonesia’s Economy: Tipping the Balance, supra note 296. 328. Vanzetti et al., supra note 14, at 6; see also DFAT, supra note 22, at 38, 61, 68. 329. Vanzetti et al., supra note 14, at 24. 330. DFAT, supra note 22, at 74. 331. Id. 332. Vanzetti et al., supra note 14, at 24. 333. Id. 334. Id. 335. Id. 336. Id. at 24–25. 337. Vanzetti et al., supra note 14, at 25. 338. Soesastro et al., supra note 25, at 34.
(Aug. 15, 2013), http://www. eastasiaforum.org/2013/08/15/ indonesia-bad-politics-meets-agood-economy/. 299. M. Chatib Basri & Hal Hill, Indonesian Growth Dynamics 25 (The Australian Nat’l Univ., Working Paper No. 2010/10, 2010). 300. Wihardja, supra note 298. 301. Indonesia’s Economy: Tipping the Balance, supra note 296. 302. Aditya Suhar moko & Rachel Armstrong, Analysis: Indonesia’s “Hatta-nomics” makes foreign investors nervous, Chi. Trib. (May 29, 2010), http://articles.chicagotribune. com/2012-05-29/business/snsrt-us-indonesia-investmentbre 84s1em-20120529_1_golkar-partyforeign-investors-coordinatingminister. 303. Positive Economic Outlook in 2014, supra note 287. 304. Id. 305. Ben Bland, Foreign direct investment falters in Indonesia, F inancial T imes (Oct. 23, 2013), http:// webcache.googleusercontent. com/search?q=cache:hMf2Oza G 1 g I J : w w w. f t . c o m / c m s / s/0/472f1d14-3bbf-11e3-b85f00144feab7de.html+&cd=1&hl=e n&ct=clnk&gl=us#axzz31SZQM tO0 (This is a cached article. It can also be found via a search engine or accessed through a subscription). 306. Id. 307. Andreas Ismar & Linda Silaen, Indonesia FDI Hits Record, But Growth Pace Slows, W all S t . J. (July 23, 2013), http://webcache. googleusercontent.com/search? q=cache:JfTC2vUPWSUJ:online. wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000 14241278873238291045786235 43755917964+&cd=1&hl=en& ct=clnk&gl=us (This is a cached article. It can also be found via a search engine or accessed through a subscription). 308. Ayu Purwaningsih, ‘Asian tiger’ Indonesia treads warily, DW (Aug. 30, 2013), http://dw.de/p/19Yux. 309. Suharmoko & Armstrong, supra note 302. 310. Purwaningsih, supra note 307. 311. Indonesia’s Economy: Tipping the Balance, supra note 295. 312. Purwaningsih, supra note 307. 313. Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2014: I ndonesia C ountry R eport 2 (2014), available at http://www. bti-project.org/fileadmin/Inhalte/ r e p o r ts / 2 0 14 / p d f / B T I % 2 0 2014%20Indonesia.pdf. 314. Suharmoko & Armstrong, supra note 302. 315. Id. 316. Stiftung, supra note 313, at 2. 317. McCawley, supra note 295. 318. Id. 54
Currents Winter 2013
Pleasing to All and Helpful to None: Software Licensing from the Berne Convention to the Strange Case of UsedSoft v. Oracle TAYLOR ROZNOVSKY*
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) recently ruled that the first-sale doctrine applies to software licenses, even for software not contained on a physical medium like a compact disc.1 This ruling is exactly contrary to U.S. case law, which is surprising given that both jurisdictions are enforcing statutes passed pursuant to the same international agreement—the World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty (WIPO Copyright Treaty).2 This article proposes that while the initial objective of the WIPO Copyright Treaty was to harmonize copyright law, the ultimate effect of those codifications has been to sanctify existing national copyright doctrines, further reinforcing the very climate the WIPO Copyright Treaty aimed to change. Furthermore, for a meaningful harmonization to occur, the WIPO Copyright Treaty must clearly articulate the underlying public policy it was intended to put into practice. —————————————————
I. Introduction
those licenses without interference from the
————————————————
original seller; those subsequent purchasers
To the author’s knowledge, this decision is
In July of 2012, the ECJ defined a new
will receive all rights entitled to the original
the first time that the ownership and licensing
doctrine that limited the rights of copyright
purchaser, such as software updates. The
rights have cross-pollinated while maintaining
owners by granting new rights to copyright
right diminished is the right of distribution,
their separate characters. Moreover, the
licensees. The landmark ruling allows for
while the right augmented is the first-sale
decision handed down by ECJ runs exactly
purchasers of software licenses to resell
doctrine (or “exhaustion doctrine” in the
contrary to U.S. case law, which consistently
3
4
55
Currents Winter 2013
European Union).5
holds that software licensees may not sell
very least will increase production costs for
[sic] in non-traditional contexts involving
their licenses to subsequent purchasers. The
software companies hoping to service both
emerging computer technologies.”13 What
very purpose of a license, says the United
markets.
follows are broad outlines of the various
6
States, is that it is not a sale, leaving nothing
This article will examine the copyright
legal areas implicated in the convergence of
for the purchaser to alienate (as they do not
regimes of the United States and the
IP and computer programs. The author has
“own” it in the first place).7 Curiously these
European Union, analyze their reactions
tried to frame these doctrines in as general
two jurisdictions reached their diametrically
after signing the WIPO Copyright Treaty,
and pan-jurisdictional a fashion as possible.
opposing positions from statutes codifying
and chart the trajectory of the resulting
obligations imposed by the same treaty—the
legal principles. Part II of this article gives a
WIPO Copyright Treaty.8 Both copyright
broad overview of the various legal doctrines
regimes (i.e., the United States and the
discussed and analyzed throughout this
It may be said that most (if not all) existing
European Union) are also signatories to the
article. Part III looks at the leading treaties.
copyright regimes define the rights of
treaty’s predecessor, the Berne Convention,
Parts IV and V examine the history behind
authors and consumers in implicit terms of
which has been in effect for over a century.
9
these doctrines in the United States and
statutory or natural rights. Statutory rights are
The principal aim of the WIPO Copyright
the Eropean Union, respectively. Part VI
those that are wholly created by constitution
Treaty is to har monize and stabilize
analyzes (1) the development of those
or statute and do not exist beyond them,
copyright regimes regarding new challenges
—————————————————
encountered in the digital era, including
harmonize copyright law, the ultimate effect
The principal aim of the WIPO Copyright Treaty is to harmonize and stabilize copyright regimes regarding new challenges encountered in the digital era, including those posed by computer programs lacking attendant physical media.
while natural rights flow from the inherent
of those codifications has been to polarize
—————————————————
the notion of “moral rights,” which are
existing national copyright doctrines, further
doctrines to reveal the underlying policies
those rights that are personal to the author
reinforcing the very climate the WIPO
regarding copyright in those countries and
alone and cannot be waived.16 Droit de suite,
Copyright Treaty aimed to change.
(2) the failure of the WIPO Copyright
a French doctrine, guarantees authors of
Producers of computer programs now
Treaty to synchronize them. Lastly Part VII
original artworks a royalty from subsequent
face totally different legal climates in the
will conclude with a proposal to remedy the
purchasers (essentially a percentage of the
U.S. and EU. While the long-term effects
WIPO Copyright Treaty’s striking failure.
purchase price);17 the EU has since mandated
are unclear, some commentators note
—————————————————
that all member states recognize it.18 Droit de
those posed by computer programs lacking attendant physical media.10 If that is the case, how could the implementing statutes have such radically divergent holdings? This article proposes that while the initial objective of the WIPO Copyright Treaty was to
A. NATURAL RIGHTS IN COPYRIGHT REGIMES
dignity of the human person and exist even without formal codification.14 Natural law existed at the inception of European copyright regimes in the 19th century, initially defined as protecting authors through the Lockean principle that “property rights result from one’s labor.”15 An early policy articulation came through
that the decision has the power to create
II. Doctrinal Overview
an entirely new market for secondhand
————————————————
This is not to say, however, that society-
licenses for software lacking attendant
The similarities in substance and differences
at-large is not also vested with natural
physical media, such as smartphone apps—a
in form between computer programs and
rights, even though those rights flow from
market that could not exist under present
traditionally protected forms of intellectual
a different wellspring. The natural rights
U.S. law. The short term, though, is likely
property (IP) have led to “[c]ourts taking
of individuals revolve around the protection
to see a restructuring of the way software
doctrines developed in the traditional context
of a property interest, while the natural
manufacturers draft licenses, which at the
of writings and applying them forceably
rights of society revolve around the moral
11
12
suite is inalienable and cannot be waived.19
56
Currents Winter 2013
imperative to make use of that individual’s
“common sense” rule and only an “informal”
of an individual copy of the work from a
property.
Although consumers’ natural
part of legal reasoning, as a “technique[]
seller to a buyer.29 The exclusive right to
rights are sometimes defined in terms of
which directs the attention of decision-
distribute, coupled with the implicit right to
the individual,
25
makers to a more appropriate regulation.”
prohibit others from distributing, is generally
them collectively as “social” rights, in that
It is considered a widespread (yet largely
referred to as the distribution right or right
they are the rights of everyone else except
unacknowledged) legal test that rarely finds
of distribution.30
the creator of the work or holder of the
its way into formal jurisprudence.26
20
21
this article will refer to
Complimentary to the right of distribution
copyright. Generally defined in terms of
Modern European legal scholars are
is the right of reproduction. This right allows
access and social utility, those rights serve
increasingly challenging the relevance of
the copyright holder to prevent others from
as a check on the creator’s monopoly right.
lex specialis as an arbiter of conflicting
making copies of her work without her
(For a discussion of those checks, a/k/a
legal norms. One commentator, surveying
authorization.31 The U.S. Copyright Office
the “traditional safety valves,” see Part II(E)
different legal maxims that control normative
points out that a copyright is literally a “right
below).
conflicts, has noted “when applying lex
to copy;”32 thus prohibiting all others to
Statutory rights are contrary to natural
specialis within the national legal order, it often
create reproductions of the work (free or for
rights in that the former cannot exist without
becomes a technique that confirms already
profit) is the probably the most rudimentary
statutory pronouncement.22 The statutory
existing norm-relations. This is only possible
manifestation of a copyright.33
rights discussed below are entirely defined by
—————————————————
It is easy to confuse the rights of
the written word. That said, simply because
The exclusive right to distribute, coupled with the implicit right to prohibit others from distributing, is generally referred to as the distribution right or right of distribution.
distribution and reproduction, but they
—————————————————
reproducing it (e.g., by selling a book),
because the domestic legal order is based on
and one may reproduce a work without
pre-determined relations between general
distributing it (e.g., by burning a compact
and specific regulations.”27 In other words, lex
disc). Fulfilling a work’s economic potential,
specialis may be used as an interpretative tool
however, generally requires the seller to
to support an existing rule of law, and it may
make and sell copies, which involve both
be selected precisely because the arbiter has
rights. Thus, it may be said that the rights
chosen in advance which outcome to achieve.
are complementary, and are ineffectual
23
a copyright provision is recorded does not mean it is a statutory right. It may well be a natural right if law of the jurisdiction allows it to be expanded beyond the scope of its original codification. B. LEX SPECIALIS
We may approach the doctrine of lex specialis as a particularly European choice of law provision. A contraction of the ancient Roman maxim “in tot iure generi per speciem deorgatur et illud potissimum habetur, quod ad speciem derectum est,” the concept translates to “in the entirety of law, the species takes precedence over genus, and anything that relates species is regarded as most important.”24 More simply, when two laws regulate the same subject matter, the law that identifies that subject matter more specifically controls over the one that identifies it less specifically. The effect? Commentators in the European Union have characterized lex specialis as a
reproduction is the right to create a copy of work; the right of distribution is the right to distribute that work, e.g., sell it, lease it, rent it, etc.34 One may distribute a work without
except when used in conjunction; 35 the C. RIGHTS OF DISTRIBUTION & REPRODUCTION
WIPO has noted “the right of reproduction would be of little economic value if the
Nearly all copyright regimes the world over
owner of copyright could not authorize the
grant the creator of a work the exclusive right
distribution of the copies made with his
to distribute that work for a limited period
consent.”36
of time.28 Many statutes and common law doctrines frame the regulation of copyright as the right to “distribute,” “vend,” “sell,” or as another right allowing transmission 57
Currents Winter 2013
have important distinctions. The right of
D. FIRST-SALE DOCTRINE, OR EXHAUSTION
As common as the author’s right of distribution is, there is corresponding right afforded purchasers. Phrased generally, a copyright owner’s interest (economic, artistic, etc.) in the work she produces terminates after the first sale (or transfer) of that work.37 Stated differently, the author of a work may not limit resale of that work, and is not entitled to any profits from resale.38 This is to guarantee, as one commentator put it, that the right of distribution is “a single shot pistol and not a machine gun.”39 It is most often referred to as the exhaustion doctrine in Europe, and the first-sale doctrine in the United States.40 (This article will use the U.S. terminology.) Public policy behind the first-sale doctrine concerns the public’s right to access protected material—the “social right” of Part II(A).41 The doctrine is one of copyright’s “traditional safety valves,” balancing “the public’s interest in open access with the property interests of the copyright owners.”42 The other two safety valves are the doctrines of fair use (allowing other artists, students, journalists, etc. to use partial amounts of a copyrighted work for commentary, parody, news reports, etc.) and public domain (the aggregate of all works whose copyrights have expired or were never copyrighted).43 All the safety valves limit an author’s ability to control his work by expanding consumers’ right of access to it. Where exactly the line is drawn depends on the values and theories of the individual copyright regime; the purpose of several WIPO treaties was to make sure that line was relatively stable across regimes.44
used “to augment the protection of ideas
E. SOFTWARE & COPYRIGHT
While many IP rights may be contractually defined between creator and buyer, application of IP law to computer programs has yielded uneven and uncertain enforcement between regimes, often compelling intergovernmental bodies to weigh in.45 The right of distribution and the first-sale doctrine might seem straightforward, but their applicability to software is increasingly complicated by the modern characterization of most software transfers as license agreements and not sales.
46
Various countries and the WIPO define a “license” as a more limited form of the —————————————————
The right of distribution and the first-sale doctrine might seem straightforward, but their applicability to software is increasingly complicated by the modern characterization of most software transfers as license agreements and not sales. ————————————————— right of distribution,47 allowing copyright owners to retain ownership of the work while contractually authorizing third parties to carry out particular acts with it. Title 48
remains with the author and the economic rights conferred to the licensees are generally limited in time and scope, memorialized with a written agreement between the copyright owner and the subsequent user.49 While the licensing concept is not new, its application to software is an example of what Judge Newman calls “taking doctrines developed in the traditional context of writings and applying them forcably [sic] in non-traditional contexts.”50 The transmission of a license in lieu of title was historically
and expressions otherwise difficult to protect under intellectual property law.”51 In the context of computer software, licenses are used because of the perceived differences between physical forms of copyrighted media and the incorporeal digital forms; commentators claim that traditional forms of copyright protection do not adequately shelter software,52 and licenses are generally thought as a way to better “fit” copyright law to software.53 The licensing model is currently the norm of computer programs and most forms of digital media (e.g., digital music or e-books).54 Many (if not the majority of) softwarelicensing schemes involve what is termed “clickwrap” licensing.55 The term comes from the earlier practice of “shrinkwrap” licensing agreements, in which agreements were wrapped in shrinkwrap cellophane around computer software packaging and became effective by the software not being returned after a set period of time.56 Like their physical namesake, these purely electronic schemes require the acceptance and acknowledgement of a license agreement to access the software itself.57 Users could unknowingly enter into dozens, if not hundreds, of these clickwrap agreements simply by trying to access software they believe they own. But is this really the best possible treatment of software? Though the right of reproduction has existed in some form at least since the 1886 Berne Convention, it has taken on a new dimension in the era of computers.58 Programs are stored in the computer’s read-only memory (ROM) when not being used by the computer’s operator,59 and when a user boots a program, the
58
Currents Winter 2013
program is copied into the random-access
substantially a sale.67 The result is the rule
Article 20 of the Convention allows for
memory (RAM), where the user can interact
of licensing impacts the rule of ownership.
its subsequent amendment.74 The section
with it.60 Most modern jurisdictions do not
—————————————————
reserves to the parties the right to enter
consider such copying a triggering event for
III. The Treaties
the right of reproduction, as it would not
————————————————
same subject matter as the Convention,
be possible to interact with the software at
So far, this article has merely reviewed
provided that the agreements increase the
all without incidentally copying it into the
the relevant legal doctrines necessary
author’s rights and do not contradict
RAM.
to comprehend the copyright regimes
the Convention’s then-existing articles.75
of the United States and European
An interesting addition to the Berne
Union. The next step is to understand the
Convention was the codification of the
extrajudicial international obligations of
French legal doctrine of droit de suite, which
those jurisdictions.
grants authors or their heirs an interest in
61
F. THE EVOLVING STATE OF THE LAW
How do all of these areas of law intersect? From a purely theoretical and abstract perspective, they would not. Their very nature as mutually exclusive theories
re-sales of original artworks and original A. THE BERNE CONVENTION
embodying different types of interactions
The global community’s first attempt at
between people and their stuff guarantees
establishing a coordinated copyright system
it. Licensing and ownership run parallel to
occurred in 1886 in Berne, Switzerland.68
each other. To apply the law of one to the
The Berne Convention for the Protection
other would seem inappropriate to their very
—————————————————
nature.62 Oil does not mix with water; and
by analysis of whether a transaction was a
Before the Oracle ruling, the closest those doctrines came to intersection was by analysis of whether a transaction was a license or “substantially” a sale.
license or “substantially” a sale. Well-settled
—————————————————
law provides that the right of distribution
of Literary and Artistic Works grew from a
and first sale applies only to subsequent
desire to protect “as effective and uniform
owners of a literary or artistic work.63 A
a manner as possible[] the rights of authors
license, however, is only permission to
in their literary and artistic works.”69 The
use a given work, and thus would not be
subject matter governed by the convention
eligible for the first sale doctrine.64 With
included “every production in the literary,
that in mind, foreign and domestic courts
scientific and artistic domain, whatever may
have taken notice that what a contract calls
be the mode or form of its expression,”70
a “license” may substantially be a “sale.”65
which was to be protected “in all countries
The greater trend in recent years has been
[adopting the Berne Convention].”71 Authors
to look to the substance of a transfer instead
received the exclusive right of reproduction
of its form.66 Authorities championing that
of their works.72 A minor caveat was made
approach do so in order to ensure that
for “certain special cases” that permitted
software manufacturers cannot simply avoid
the reproduction beyond the control of the
the limiting consumer’s rights by declaring a
authors.73 In anticipation of new “mode[s]
transfer of a license when the transaction is
or form[s] of . . . [artistic] expression,”
licensing does not mix with software. Before the Oracle ruling, the closest those doctrines came to intersection was
59
Currents Winter 2013
into additional agreements concerning the
manuscripts.76 The interest is not guaranteed by the convention itself—it must be present in national legislation to be enforceable, as the Berne Convention does not mandate that signatory countries adopt it.77 However, the mere possibility of droit de suite manifested a fundamental “natural rights” perspective of copyright, different from the American experience; that conflict would not come to a head for another hundred and twenty-six years. B. THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION COPYRIGHT TREATY
At the beginning of the third millennium the rapid proliferation of information technology and Internet usage facilitated instantaneous copying and widespread dissemination of copyrighted works for free, which concerned authors who wanted to protect their property rights.78 Regimes, statutes and copyright enforcement were far from uniform, with the WIPO itself acknowledging the “questions raised by new economic, social, cultural and technological developments.” 79 The WIPO Copyright Treaty was drafted to put those concerns
to rest,80 reflecting “a broad international
definition of “original or a copy” in article
provides that “[t]he Congress shall have
ag reement as to how copyright and
6 to “fixed copies that can be put into
power . . . [t]o promote the progress of
related rights should be handled in today’s
circulation as tangible objects.” Copyright
science and useful arts, by securing for
environment, including the context of digital
protection would only apply to works
limited times to authors and inventors the
technologies.”81
distributed by a physical media, not a purely
exclusive right to their respective writings
By operation of law, the WIPO Copyright
electronic one. Online-only works would fall
and discoveries.”89
Treaty is a “special agreement” within
outside the ambit of the WIPO Copyright
the meaning of the term in article 20 of
Treaty’s protection.
86
87
In its first opportunity to review the socalled “Copyright Clause,” the Supreme
the Berne Convention. To that end, the
Finally, the Treaty instructed its signatories
Court explicitly held that the right is statutory
WIPO Copyright Treaty defined “computer
to provide “adequate legal remedies against
only.90 The “Copyright Clause” does not
programs” as literary works within the ambit
the circumvention” of the rights guaranteed
simply record an existing natural right, but
of the Berne Convention’s Article 2, thereby
by the WIPO Copyright Treaty.
“created the right, secured for a limited time,
82
88
worthy of copyright protection. Article 6
At this point we have reviewed global
by the provisions of that law.”91 Thus the
of the Copyright Treaty codifies the right of
efforts of IP harmonization by the two
Court held that perpetual copyrights (which
distribution, granting authors of such works
—————————————————
occupy the same metaphysical framework
“exclusive right of authorizing the making
as “moral rights”) do not exist in the United
transfer of ownership.” That right was
Despite the purely statutory basis of copyright passage, the first-sale doctrine was initially judicially created.
limited, however, as
—————————————————
initially judicially created.93 In Bobbs-Merrill
[n]othing in [the] Treaty shall affect
leading copyright treaties of the modern
Co. v. Straus, the copyright owner of a book
the freedom of [its signatories] to
era, as well as the legal obligations
sued the bookseller for selling copies of
determine the conditions, if any,
imposed by each of them. With these
appellant’s book below the retail price of
under which the exhaustion of the right
understandings in mind, we may now
one dollar.94 The appellant had attempted
in paragraph (1) applies after the first
begin to review the copyright regimes.
to restrict resale of the book by printing
sale or other transfer of ownership
—————————————————
on the copyright page, “[t]he price of this
83
available to the public of the original and copies of their works through sale or other 84
States.92 Despite the purely statutory basis of copyright passage, the first-sale doctrine was
of the original or a copy of the
IV. The United States
work with the authorization of
————————————————
licensed to sell it at a less price, and a sale at
the author.
“Congress, by the [Copyright Act] of 1790, instead
a less price will be treated as an infringement
Thus the Treaty left the door wide open
of sanctioning an existing perpetual right in an
of the copyright.”95 The respondents then
for the signatories to legislate their own
author in his works, created the right, secured for a
sold the book for eighty-nine cents.96 In
limitations to the rights of authors via
limited time, by the provisions of that law.”
their ruling for the respondents, the Court
85
the first-sale doctrine. The effects of this failure to harmonize different regimes’
—Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 592 (1834).
The first-sale doctrine, however, was not
approached the question as one of statutory construction,97 ultimately concluding:
approaches to the doctrine would be most fully manifested in July 2012.
book at retail is one dollar net. No dealer is
[i]n our view the copyright statutes, A. INCEPTION OF THE FIRST-SALE DOCTRINE
while protecting the owner of the copyright in his right to multiply
the only limitation on the right of distribution
Protection of IP has been a concern of
and sell his production, do not
present in the WIPO Copyright Treaty. In
the American government since its inception.
create the right to impose, by
what this author calls the “attendant physical
Among its other grants of power to the
notice, such as is disclosed in this
media” doctrine, the treaty restricts the
United States Congress, the U.S. Constitution
case, a limitation at which the book
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shall be sold at retail by future
the Code annotations to that section note
transmissions of copyrighted works. 106
purchasers, with whom there is no
that “[a]cquisition of an object embodying
Congress chose not to act on the bill, “based
privity of contract.
a copyrighted work by rental, lease, loan, or
on the evidence before it at that time.”107
Restated, the copyright holder’s exclusive
bailment carries with it no privilege to dispose
Instead, Congress introduced what
right to distribute (“multiply and sell”)
of the copy under section 109(a).”102 The
was to become a joint study conducted
his work does not extend to secondary
language and statutory text of the first-
by the United States Copyright Office
acquirers (“. . . do[es] not create the right to
sale doctrine clearly notes that Congress
and the National Telecommunications &
impose . . . a limitation . . . [on] subsequent
considered and specifically excluded applying
Information Administration (NTIA).108 The
purchasers”).99
licenses to the first-sale doctrine.
stated focus of the study was an evaluation
98
of “the impact of [the DMCA] and the
Some observers may be tempted to argue C. THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT
development of electronic commerce on
the copyright springs from a natural right
In response to the new obligations
title 17 [concerning the first-sale doctrine
understanding. However, the Court’s ruling
imposed by the WIPO Copyright Treaty, the
and a limited right to reproduce computer
reflects an attempt to limit the reach of the
United States Congress passed the Digital
programs], and the relationship between
copyright holder to only the first copy. If
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).103 The
existing and emerging technology on the
anything, under this view, the holding in
DMCA was “minimalist” in its approach,
operation of those provisions [of the
Bobbs-Merrill further limited the rights of the
because it was drafted to enforce obligations
DMCA].”109 In a moment of preemption
copyright holder to be even closer in line to
not already codified elsewhere in the United
over the study’s findings, the House Manager
the statutory text, the true spring from which
States Code;104 thus, the codification of
also stated:
copyright comes in the United States.
the first-sale doctrine remained under the
The first sale doctrine does not
Copyright Act of 1976.
readily apply in the digital networked
that the judicial creation of the first-sale doctrine in the United States suggests that
B. THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1976
One year after the Bobbs-Merrill decision, the United States Congress codified the first-sale doctrine in the United States Code.100 That section underwent numerous changes to its current revision in the Copyright Act of 1976. The current Section 109(a) of that Act recites: [Despite the exclusive right of distribution], the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.101 Underscoring the “owner” requirement,
The existing codification, however, brought
environment because the owner of
about problems. Soon after passage, segments
a particular digital copy usually
—————————————————
does not sell or otherwise dispose
The DMCA was “minimalist” in its approach, because it was drafted to enforce obligations not already codified elsewhere in the United States Code. . .
of the possession of that copy. Rather, ‘disposition’ of a digital copy by its owner normally entails reproduction and transmission of that reproduction to another
—————————————————
person. The original copy may
of the public and members of Congress
then be retained or destroyed. The
expressed concern about the continued
appropriate application of this
application of the first-sale doctrine to the
doctrine to the digital environment
newly minted DMCA, 105 particularly to
merits further evaluation and this
sales of works lacking attendant physical
section therefore calls for such an
media. In the United States House of
evaluation and report.110
Representatives, Representatives Rick
In essence, the House Manager articulated
Boucher and Tom Campbell introduced
the concern, prevalent at that time, that
a bill that would have specifically applied
subsequent acquirers are not acquiring the
the first-sale doctrine to digital-only
original program itself, which would then
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the operation of sections 109 and 117 of
cease to be possessed by the seller. Stated
a sale. In F.B.T. Productions, LLC v. Aftermath
its application to software licenses.119 Such a
differently, the computer program could
Records, the Ninth Circuit questioned whether
ruling only reinforces the distinction between
not be truly alienated by the original owner.
a contractual arrangement between the
license transfers and ownership transfers
Rather, subsequent acquirers would acquire
rapper Eminem and his record company
by its strong protection of the distribution
only a copy of the program, permitting the
constituted a sale or licensing agreement.114
rights of the copyright holder.
seller to retain his copy as well.
In particular, the agreement concerned
To review, the United States' copyright
the payment scheme for files purchased
regime is drawn from and largely limited
online—i.e., for files lacking attendant
by statutory authority, flowing from the
physical media.
The payment amount
U.S. Constitution into Title 17 of the
depended on whether the transmission
United States Code. The WIPO Copyright
of the files was by licensure or sale. 116
Treaty attempted to address the 21st century
The court ultimately held that the original
copyright challenges and nominally left its
contract was controlling and unambiguous,
imprint on the Digital Millennium Copyright
—————————————————
Act—an act that did not realign copyright
The WIPO Copyright Treaty attempted to address the 21st century copyright challenges and nominally left its imprint on the Digital Millennium Copyright Act—an act that did not realign copyright jurisprudence behind the WIPO Copyright Treaty.
jurisprudence behind the WIPO Copyright
—————————————————
changing. The way we consume and enjoy creative
and that by those terms, the transactions in
works—music, movies, games—is changing. And,
question ought to be considered licenses.
if we want to keep the right balance, the legal
Those analyses, though, typically find
framework has to respond.”
D. SUBSEQUENT CASE LAW
To date, the Supreme Court has not explicitly addressed whether and how software licenses without an attendant physical media might interact with the first-sale doctrine; the Court has, however, idly speculated on it.111 In a surprisingly poignant line of dicta, the Court stated in Quality King Distribs. v. L’Anza Research Int’l that “because the protection afforded by [the statutory codification of the first-sale doctrine] is available only to the ‘owner’ of a lawfully made copy (or someone authorized by the owner), the first sale doctrine would not provide a defense to a § 602(a) action [concerning copyright infringement by importing gray market goods] against any non-owner such as a bailee [or] a licensee.”112 Such a holding is largely in line with the general attitude of U.S. law that title and licenses are on parallel tracks that do not intersect with, nor apply to, one another. Subsequent decisions in the circuit courts that have addressed the question of applicability of the first-sale doctrine to software licensing have used Quality King’s dicta to answer that question in the negative.113 The Supreme Court then denied certiorari to review those decisions, lending tacit approval to using and following the dicta of Quality King. A few jurisdictions have attempted to analyze the “substance” of a licensing agreement to determine whether it is actually
115
117
the contractual elements of the licensing agreement controlling and dispositive of
Treaty. Next, this article will examine the effects of the World Copyright Treaty on the other great producer of copyrighted works: the European Union. —————————————————
V. The European Union
———————————————— “Technology is changing. Business models are
—Neelie Kroes, Vice-President, European Union Commission
the issue in finding such transfers licenses.
Contrar y to the United States’ IP
Even without the dicta from Quality King,
experience, the copyright regime of the
the different circuit courts have been very
European Union is drawn from a theory
consistent in their refusal to pair licensing
of natural right that the interest of a work’s
with the first-sale doctrine. The Ninth
creator does not, and indeed cannot, truly
Circuit has explicitly ruled that the use of
ever terminate. Trying to identify major
a software license beyond its scope would
copyright principles with the European
infringe the owner’s copyright—that is, that
Union as a whole (instead of as individual
the first sale doctrine would not prohibit
countries) might sound like generalizing at
the copyright holder to assert his an interest
first blush. However, commentators have
in subsequent use.
That train of thought
noted that in the 1980s the EU revamped
had first emerged in the 1970s, long before
their member’s copyright regimes to align
118
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more closely for purely economic reasons,
of software transmission at that time—by
his consent exhausts the right to
in a process some call “europeanification”
floppy disk. Thus, the directive contemplated,
control resale of that object in the
[sic].
That newer, more singular body
while not allowing outright, that the right
Community.132
of law is what will be addressed in this
of distribution may apply to computer
Interestingly, the European Parliament
article. Important to note is recital 29 in
programs lacking attendant physical media.
had the foresight to restrict the right of
the Information Society Directive, which
Notably, the directive introduced the
distribution, and the first-sale doctrine,
specifically excludes online-only services
European Communities to the idea of the
to those works incorporated in a tangible
from the first-sale doctrine.
first-sale doctrine. The directive recited:
article. This restriction to only tangible
“The first sale in the Community of a copy
media is reinforced by paragraph 29, where
of a program by the right-holder or with his
Parliament notes and dismisses the potential
consent shall exhaust the distribution right
application of the new first-sale doctrine
—————————————————
to online-only software and services. 133
“License-versus-ownership” came to a head in the European Union with the landmark ruling of UsedSoft v. Oracle, a case that began as a marketing dispute in Germany.
In a bizarre contradiction to UsedSoft v.
120
121
A. DIRECTIVES
The primary legislative tool of the European Parliament is a directive. Directives are legislative acts that “lay down certain end results that must be achieved by every Member State.” 122 The means of accomplishing those tasks are left to the individual states. 123 They are frequently used to harmonize differing national laws, while giving the individual nations “room to manoeuvre” (sic) in their implementation.124 Directives are “particularly common in matters affecting the operation of [the transEuropean] market.”125 Treaty obligations affecting the individual member states are often promulgated through codification in directives passed by the European Parliament. The first directive addressing computer programs was Directive 91/250, passed while the computer age was still in its infancy in 1991.126 The directive also drew on Europe’s international obligations regarding copyright, which at that time, consisted only of the Berne Convention; the directive identified “computer programs” as “literary works within the meaning of the Berne Convention[].”
127
However, it defined
computer programs as “programs in any form, including those which are incorporated into hardware;”128 presumably, “hardware” may also include the predominant mode
and unambiguously proclaims that “[t] he question of exhaustion [of a copyright holder’s right to distribution] does not arise in the case of services and on-line (sic) services in particular.”134
—————————————————
Eight years later, the European Parliament
within the Community of that copy, with
passed Directive 2009/24, which expanded
the exception of the right to control further
protection of computer programs.135 Article
rental[.]”129
10 of the directive repealed the earlier
A second directive, passed in May 2001,
Directive 91/250, while incorporating the
was subtitled “on the harmonisation (sic) of
whole text into other articles of Directive
certain aspects of copyright and related rights
2009/24.136 This unorthodox re-legislation
in the information society.”130 Paragraph 15
was to have a (probably) unintended tolling
of the directive recited that it was passed
effect in cases to come.
in part to “implement a number of [] new international obligations” imposed by the WIPO Copyright Treaty, passed five years earlier in 1996.131 Among those obligations was another codification of the largely nonEuropean first-sale doctrine: Copyright protection under this Directive includes the exclusive right to control distribution of the work incorporated in a tangible article. The first sale in the Community of the original of a work or copies thereof by the rightholder or with 63
Currents Winter 2013
Oracle, the European Parliament clearly
B. ORACLE V. USEDSOFT
“License-versus-ownership” came to a head in the European Union with the landmark ruling of UsedSoft v. Oracle, a case that began as a marketing dispute in Germany.137 Oracle, a business software manufacturer, distributed its products via group licenses that would be purchased by other companies.138 The licenses in question could be used by up to twenty-five employees. 139 The companies would then distribute the licenses to the individual employees, who could
use them to download Oracle’s business
ECJ’s interpretation of German law became
the application of the first-sale doctrine of
software directly from Oracle’s website.
140
an interpretation of European Union law,
Directive 2009/24.154
The licenses also included a maintenance
to be applied to every nation party to the
agreement, which allowed licensees to
European Parliament.
The Court selected Doctrine 2009/24 as the applicable law over Directive 2001/29 by
download patches or software upgrades
In its determination, the ECJ first asked
relying on the doctrine of lex specialis.155 It held
for a predetermined period of time. 141
whether the transfer of the computer
Directive 2001/29 “leave[s] intact and . . . in
Those licensing agreements contained
program from Oracle to its initial purchasers
no way affect[s] existing . . . provisions [of
the following language: “[w]ith the payment
constituted a “first sale” within the meaning
European Union law] relating to . . . the legal
for services you receive, exclusively for your
of Article 4(2) of Directive 2009/24.
149
protection of computer programs’ conferred
internal business purposes, for an unlimited
Citing the need for uniform commercial law
by Directive 91/250, which was subsequently
period a non-exclusive non-transferable user
across the European Union, the ECJ chose
codified by Directive 2009/24.”156 Thus, the
right free of charge for everything that Oracle
to define “sale” autonomously, divorced
provisions governing the first-sale doctrine
develops and makes available to you on the
from any regional concept of the word.
150
of Directive 91/250—passed five years
basis of this agreement.”
The licensing
It defined the noun “sale” by “a commonly
before the WIPO Copyright Treaty—end up
agreement clearly and unambiguously
accepted definition” (without any formal
being dispositive in a case determined sixteen
declared itself a license, and thus limited
citation) as “an agreement by which a person,
years after the WIPO Copyright Treaty.
the rights purchasers would receive at
—————————————————
Moreover, Directive 2009/24 specifically
purchase—not rights of ownership.
refrains from mentioning the boundaries
licenses were good for twenty-five users, a
In its determination, the ECJ first asked whether the transfer of the computer program from Oracle to its initial purchasers constituted a “first sale” within the meaning of Article 4(2) of Directive 2009/24.
company of twenty might sell UsedSoft the
—————————————————
new discussions for the application of
part of the license covering the remaining
in return for payment, transfers to another
copyright to digital environments, the ECJ
five. Oracle discovered UsedSoft’s business
person his rights of ownership in an item of tangible
chose to circumvent all of that for a rule
model when UsedSoft advertised an “Oracle
or intangible property belonging to him.”
151
articulated when the primary mode of
Turning to the transactions in the
software transmission was the floppy disk.
142
UsedSoft “bought and resold” used software licenses.
143
Companies who
purchased Oracle’s software licenses would often sell the unused portion of the license to UsedSoft.144 For example, because all the
Special Offer,” and after a cease-and-desist letter was ineffective, Oracle filed suit.
145
instant case, the ECJ determined that “the
of the first-sale doctrine, while Directive 2001/29 specifically constrains the doctrine to only those computer works existing in a tangible media.157 Stated more succinctly, even though the WIPO Copyright Treaty imparted new standards and prompted
The Court ultimately held:
Although the case was originally filed in
downloading of a copy of a computer
[I]n the event of the resale of a
German court,146 the German statute (UrhG,
program and the conclusion of a user
user licence [sic] entailing the resale
¶ 69d(1)) is a word-for-word transposition of
license agreement for that copy form an
of a copy of a computer program
Article 5(1) of Directive 2009/24/EC. For
indivisible whole,” (i.e., that neither has
downloaded from the copyright
a definitive ruling, the Bundesgerichtshof
value except in light of the other), and must
holder’s website, . . . the second
(Federal Court of Justice), Germany’s court
be examined as a single unit to determine
acquirer of the licence [sic], as well as
of last resort certified the question of its
“its legal classification.”152 The unity of
any subsequent acquirer of it, will
interpretation to the ECJ.148 By definitely
the program plus right-to-use, in return
be able to rely on the exhaustion of the
answering the question, of course, the
for “remuneration corresponding to the
distribution right under Article 4(2)
ECJ had to give an exact interpretation of
economic value” of that unity, constitutes
of [Directive 2009/24].158
Directive 2009/24/EC; and by doing so, the
a “sale” as earlier defined,153 thus triggering
147
An interesting element of the final holding
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is that the ECJ does not attempt a substantial
manufacturers draft licenses, 164 this is
exclusively to fixed copies that can be put
analysis of the license to find it a sale.
merely speculation at this point, and the
into circulation as tangible objects.” 167
Rather, it explicitly introduces the practice
full implications are yet to be known.165 The
That principle was enshrined in Directive
of licensing into the right of distribution
European Union’s copyright regime draws
2001/29.168 This appears to be the codification
and the first-sale doctrines—doctrines that
its roots from a natural law understanding
of a simple principle, but in application it is
everywhere else in the world may only apply
of authorship, one that statutes before or
much more complex.
to copyright owners, not licensees.
since have not been able to modify. The
When it came time to apply that rule of
A corollar y effect of the r uling,
strictures of the WIPO Copyright Treaty
law, the ECJ employed the choice-of-law
unarticulated by the ECJ, is the prospect
were ignored almost summarily by an ancient
provision of lex specialis,169 which allowed
that licensing agreement clauses that attempt
Roman maxim more appropriate for Pliny
the Court to evade the Directive passed
to restrict subsequent sales (as the Oracle
the Younger than UsedSoft GmbH.
under the WIPO Copyright Treaty and
agreement did) are void as a matter of law.
—————————————————
apply the Directive that imported law from
159
The ECJ alluded briefly to the tool of voiding
VI. Analysis
1991.170 The former directive specifically
those contractual measures as an important
————————————————
excluded computer programs without
measure to “prevent the circumvention of
S o f a r, t h i s a r t i c l e h a s r e v i e w e d
attendant physical media from the right of
the exhaustion principle” without much
the effective copyright treaties of the
distribution,171 while the latter did not address
further detail.160 The question still remains
Ber ne Convention and the WIPO,
that category of computer program at all.172
as to what the final end result will be.
—————————————————
Thus the ECJ was able to issue a holding exactly contrary to the obligations incurred
software company and downloads software
Generally speaking, European copyright law has a strong foundation of natural rights.
for its use is deemed to have “bought” it.161
—————————————————,
copyright law has a strong foundation of
The consequence of this is that the purchaser
their attempted codification in the Digital
natural rights. As mentioned in Part II(A),
“owns” it. The software manufacturer loses
Millennium Copyright Act and Directives
Europe has a strong natural right foundation
its say in how the owner uses it, with the
2001/29 and 2009/24, and the case law
for its copyright regime.173
owner also being entitled to any subsequent
of each regime that has yielded holdings
What was intended to be codification of the
software support, including patches.162 Stated
perpendicular to each other on the resale
treaty into Directive 2001/29 and 2009/24
differently, the software manufacturer must
of computer programs, a topic that should
instead left loopholes that allowed for the
continue to work on and provide updates
never have been held so contrarily to
insertion of natural rights. In the largest case
to second- or third-hand buyers of their
sister signatories. Next, this article will
applying the brave new world of copyright
computer programs. Both the loss of the
explore the reasons behind these holdings.
law, Directive 2001/24, which was passed
In the European Union, one who enters into a perpetual software license with a
complete. The latter may sell it to whomever he wishes, to the complete derogation of the former.
163
happened? Generally speaking, European
pursuant to new international obligations
software manufacturer’s interest and the vesting of the software owner’s interest are
by the WIPO Copyright Treaty. What
A. EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT LAW IS BASED ON NATURAL RIGHTS
conferred by the WIPO Copyright Treaty,
As a brief review, the ultimate aim of the
2009/24, which re-codifies EU law passed
WIPO Copyright Treaty was protection of
was directly bypassed in favor of Directive years before the WIPO Copyright Treaty.
As of the date of this writing, few
computer programs, affording them the
The definition chosen of the word “sale”
commentators have written about the
traditional protections of literary works.166
itself reflects a hidden bias of the ECJ.
short- or long-term effects of the Oracle
Article 8 of that treaty notes (without
Part II notes that the right of distribution
ruling. While the short term is likely to
reservation) that “copies” and “originals
(which involves a transfer of property) and
see a restructuring of the way software
and copies” of computer programs “refer
licensing (which also involves a transfer of
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property) both transfer ownership rights
“owner” as one who has received a valid
contends are those regimes based on
to the transferee; the right of distribution
transfer of title.
Likewise, the concept
statutory rights, and those regimes based
transfers all ownership rights, while licensing
of ownership transfer is interpreted very
on natural rights. Because of that failure,
transfers a more limited bundle of rights.
literally, generally without resort to an analysis
it is inevitable that conflict should exist
Part V notes that the definition of “sale”
looking at the substance rather than form of
regarding the copyright regimes that express
used by in the Oracle decision was as “an
a work’s distribution.179 When the Ninth
and embody those differing fundamental
agreement by which a person, in return for
Circuit even considered such an analysis, the
theories.
payment, transfers to another person his
Court ultimately held that the contract was
Prudent readers will recall that Article 6(2)
rights of ownership in an item of tangible
entirely controlling as to the substance of
of the WIPO Copyright Treaty purposely
or intangible property belonging to him.” By
—————————————————
leaves determination of the conditions of
the Court’s own reasoning and very old and
the first-sale doctrine to its signatories.181
“substantially sales,” but merely maintained
The end result is that copyright law is subject to greater restriction and narrower interpretation in the United States than the European Union.
their characterizations as licenses.
—————————————————
many. Such an intentional lacuna practically
the agreement.180 Such substantial analysis
begs individual nations to preserve their
would ultimately be anathema in a U.S. court.
existing interpretations of the first-sale
The end result is that copyright law is
doctrine, further distinguishing regimes from
subject to greater restriction and narrower
each other when they should be more clearly
Copyright law in the United States is
interpretation in the United States than
reconciled.
expressly statutorily created by article 1,
the Eropean Union. This is not, however,
Moreover, the devastating irony of the
section 8 of the U.S. Constitution.174 The
to suggest that the United States has
WIPO Copyright Treaty is that by ordering
Supreme Court has ruled that the clause
implemented the strictures of the WIPO
that individual nations implement the
did not exist prior to its codification.
175
Copyright Treaty more thoroughly or
“new” international obligations, countries
the
faithfully than the European Union. As
essentially reaffirmed and re-codified their
implication there is that nobody may extend
noted earlier, the DMCA did nothing to
existing copyright statutes. However, because
rights beyond those authorized in the U.S.
meaningfully reshape U.S. law to codify the
of the so-called “new” statutes, courts of the
Constitution. United States courts have
U.S.’s new obligations. If the U.S. has done
EU and U.S. were prompted to reexamine
consistently found that copyright interests
anything meaningful, then it has moved on
them and rearticulate existing doctrine. The
only apply to owners of works, and that
the side of reluctance in the expansion of its
so-called “minimalist” approach of the
licensing agreements are permissible.
statutorily-created copyright regime.
DMCA failed to address software licensing at
well-settled law, a license cannot be a sale. But, as the Court tried to insist, the closing of Oracle did not identify the transactions as
B. THE UNITED STATES' COPYRIGHT LAW IS BASED ON STATUTORILY-CREATED RIGHTS
The theory animating it is statutory;
176
177
IP
178
rights cannot exist in American natural law; hence the quick codification of the first-sale doctrine soon after its judicial creation. What this means for U.S. copyright law
It states conditions triggering the doctrine completely within the discretion of the individual nations, 182 deferring to the individual what should be mandated for the
all; and the approach of Directive 2009/24, C. THE WIPO COPYRIGHT TREATY CANNOT RECONCILE THESE OPPOSING LEGISLATIVE GOALS
while actually addressing how the firstsale doctrine may intersect with software licensing, was circumvented by Directive
is that courts are impotent to assign greater
The WIPO Copyright Treaty preamble
copyright protection than exists by statute.
identifies the broad and vague goal of
The Supreme Court and circuit court cases
“harmonization” of international copyright
mentioned above were more or less restricted
regimes. However, it fails to define what
to a very narrow and specific definition of
is being harmonized, which this article
2001/29, passed years before the WIPO ever sat for the WIPO Copyright Treaty. D. THE WIPO SHOULD AMEND THE WIPO COPYRIGHT TREATY TO HARMONIZE EXISTING COPYRIGHT REGIMES BEFORE
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ADDRESSING NEW CHALLENGES
It is simply inadequate for the WIPO Copyright Treaty to hollowly recite that it reflects consensus and a broad understanding of the IP challenges of the 21st century. Implementation of the treaty has failed to yield consistent results regarding the first big challenge that has come before it. Harmonizing copyright regimes is a lofty goal, and one worthy of pursuit. Litigation in the hundreds of millions of dollars is commonplace, in national courts and before international tribunals or other bodies. For a true reconciliation, however, there must be a substantial effort of accomplishing it rather than mere instruction. For harmonization to occur there must be reconciliation between
that sales and licensing agreements are
conference of nations looking to predict over
entirely different bodies of law that should
the next several decades. The law should be
not cross-pollinate ideas from each other.
flexible in its strictures, always ready to adopt,
The inappropriate mixing of ideas between
yet strong and well defined in its underlying
licensing and selling only leads to contrary
theories and motivating goals. Only when
holdings across regimes. Moreover, the
sister copyright regimes share the same broad
addition should identify transmission of
outlooks will they determine the narrower
software without attendant physical media
issues in fashions that align.
as either sales or licenses, so that there will
—————————————————
be uniformity in the treatment of those
VII. Conclusion
transmissions across copyright regimes.
————————————————
Which one is chosen is not as important as
Although the WIPO Copyright Treaty was
only one being chosen.
intended to prompt its signatories to pass
A crucial lesson of UsedSoft v. Oracle is
statutes in compliance with their international
that the digital environment is a rapidly-
obligations, the underlying national public
evolving landscape in upheaval, difficult to
policies in fact governed what was codified
predict moment-to-moment—much less in a
in the United States' and European Union’s
the goals and fundamental theories of different copyright regimes. The WIPO Copyright Treaty should not be concerned with offending its parties, or prospective parties, by making difficult choices. By trying to please everyone, the treaty helps no one. Before the WIPO Copyright Treaty can address new IP challenges, it must surmount old ones. Simply instructing different copyright regimes to harmonize is a fool’s errand. There must be meaningful adaptations of U.S. and EU law, either by adopting each other’s laws, or to a new model proposed by the WIPO. Otherwise, there will simply be new cases applying the same law—and the longer preserved the case law, the more firmly it will be entrenched in each regime. For true change on a small scale—that is, on the issues—there must be true change on the large scale, that is, by legislation. This article proposes a new addition to the WIPO Copyright Treaty that recognizes 67
Currents Winter 2013
respective statutes. A more expansive and
in the jurisdictional approaches to the
ensure what is legal to “buy” in the United
unarticulated natural right in the EU and a
intersection of the first-sale doctrine and
States is legal to “buy” in the Eropean Union.
narrower statutory right in the U.S. dictated
computer licenses. The WIPO Copyright
those respective countries’ statutes—not
Treaty cannot merely hope for harmonization
the hollowly mandated “harmonization”
to exist; it needs some sort of interpretive
of the WIPO Copyright Treaty. This
guidance, or identification and endorsement
fundamental difference is contextualized
of the underlying legal theories, to truly
End Notes
* J.D., 2014, South Texas College of Law, Notes & Articles Editor for Currents: International Trade Law Journal. The author wishes to express his sincere gratitude to his fiancée, Peggy K. Rensberger. 1. Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’l. Corp., 2012 EURLex CELEX 62011CJ0128, ¶ 88 (July 3, 2012). 2. For the U.S., see U.S. Copyright O ffice , DMCA S ection 104 Report: A Report of the Register of Copyrights Pursuant to §104 o f t h e D i g i ta l M i l l e n n i um Copyright Act 8–9 (Aug. 2001) [hereinafter DMCA S e c t i o n 104 R eport ]; for the EU, see Directive 2001/29/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, ¶ 15, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 11 [hereinafter Directive 2001/29]. 3. See generally Directive 2001/29. 4. Id. 5. See infra Part II(C). 6. See infra Part IV(C). 7. Id. 8. See infra Parts IV, V. 9. See infra Part III(A). 10. See infra Part III(B). 11. Jennifer Baker, EU court ruling on software resale could shake up apps stores, Tech World (July 10, 2012, 11:32 AM), http://www.techworld. com.au/article/430090/eu_court_ ruling_software_resale_could_ shake_up_apps_stores/. 12. Id. In a cursory review of the ruling the same month it was issued, Squire Sanders determined that Usedsoft v. Oracle could only be applied to perpetual licenses; perpetual licensors could theoretically avoid the ruling’s strictures by switching to a term-license model. Does Oracle v. UsedSoft End Restrictions on Reselling Software Licenses?, Squire Sanders (July 2012), http://www.
squiresanders.com/does-oraclev-usedsoft-end-restrictions-onreselling-software-licenses/. 13. Jon O. Newman, New Lyrics for an Old Melody: The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in the Computer Age, 17 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L. J. 691, 692 (1999). 14. Black’s Law Dictionary 1437 (9th ed. 2009). This article will track the language for the definition of “natural right” (“[a] right that is conceived as part of natural law and is therefore thought to exist independently of rights created by government or society”) but will use the term “statutory right” instead of “legal right” (defined as “[a] right created or recognized by law”) to track the language used in Wheaten v. Peters. See 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 592 (1834). 15. Maurizio Borghi, Owning Form, S haring C ontent : N atural Right Copyright and the Digital E nvironment 205, reprinted in New Directions in Copyright Law, Vol. 5 (Fiona Macmillan ed., 2007). 16. Irma Sirvinskaite, Toward Copyright “Europeanification”: European Union Moral Rights, 3 J. Int’l Media & Ent. L. 263, 264 (2011). 17. Michael B. Reddy, The Droit De Suite: Why American Fine Artists Should Have the Right to a Resale Royalty, 15 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 509, 509–10 (1995). 18. Directive 2001/84/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 September 2001 on the Resale Right for the Benefit of the Author of an Original Work, art. 1(1), 2001 O.J. (L 272) 32, 34 [hereinafter Directive 2001/84/ EC]. 19. See also id. at 32–33, ¶¶ 1, 3, & 17. 20. See, e.g., Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, arts. 11 & 17(1) & (2), 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1, 11–12. Article 11 provides “. . . freedom to hold opinions and
to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.” Id. at 11, art. 11. Article 17 states “[i]ntellectual property shall be protected.” Id. at 12, art. 17(2). But, “. . . [t]he use of property may be regulated by law in so far as is necessary for the general interest.” Id. at 12, art. 17(2). 21. See generally Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 20. 22. Black’s Law, supra note 14. 23. Id. 24. Anja Lindroos, Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented Legal System: The Doctrine of Lex Specialis, 74 Nordic J. of Int’l L. 27, 35 (2005). 25. Id. at 36. 26. Id. at 37–38. 27. Id. at 40 (emphasis added). 28. A ndré L ucas , I nternational Exhaustion, reprinted in Global C opyright : T hree H undred Years since the Statute of Anne, from 1709 to C yberspace 305 (Lionel Bently et al. eds., 2010). 29. Id. 30. Id. 31. Understanding Copyright and Related Rights, W o r l d I n t e l l e c t ua l P r o p . O r g . , h t t p : / / w w w. wipo.int/freepublications/en/ intproperty/909/wipo_pub_909. html (last visited Nov. 15, 2013). 32. United States Copyright Office: A Brief Introduction and History, U.S. Copyright Office, http://www. copyright.gov/circs/circ1a.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2013). 33. Understanding Copyright and Related Rights, supra note 31. Before movable type, some commentators have argued that this right didn’t exist at all, as copying a work was so inconvenient and expensive as to not be economically feasible. It took the printing press to craft the right of reproduction into something modern eyes might recognize. J u l i e n H o f ma n ,
Introducing Copyright: A Plain Language Guide to Copyright in the 21 st C entury 1 (2009), available at http://www.col.org/Site C o l l e c t i o n D o c u m e n t s / Introducing_Copyright_online_ edition.pdf. 34. Understanding Copyright and Related Rights, supra note 31. 35. Id. 36. Id. 37. Lucas, supra note 28, at 306. 38. Id. 39. Id. 40. Id. 41. Nancy Kranich, The Information C o mm o n s : A P u b l i c P o l i c y Report 7 (Marjorie Heins et al., eds., 2004), available at http://www. fepproject.org/policyreports/ InformationCommons.pdf. 42. Id. 43. Id. 44. See infra Part VI. 45. See, e.g., Directive 2009/24/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009, on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, ¶ 2, 2009 O.J. (L 111) 16, 16 [hereinafter Directive 2009/24/EC] (“The d e ve l o p m e n t o f c o m p u t e r programs requires the investment of considerable human, technical and financial resources while computer programs can be copied at a fraction of the cost needed to develop them independently.”). 46. John P. Uetz, Same Song and Dance: F.B.T. Productions, LLC v. Aftermath Records and the Role of Licenses in the Digital Age of Copyright Law, 57 Vill. L. Rev. 177, 189 (2012). 47. Understanding Copyright and Related Rights, supra note 31. 48. Id. 49. Id. 50. Newman, supra note 13. 51. Elizabeth I. Winston, Why Sell What You Can License? Contracting Around Statutor y Protection of
68
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Intellectual Property, 14 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 93, 93 (2006). 52. Id. at 100. 53. See id. at 108. 54. Id. at 93. 55. Kranich, supra note 41, at 8. 56. Robert Lee Dickens, Finding Common Ground in the World of Electronic Contracts: The Consistency of Legal Reasoning in Clickwrap Cases, 11 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 379, 381 (2007). 57. Kranich, supra note 41, at 8. 58. See Mihály Ficsor, The Law of C opyright and the I nternet : T h e 1996 WIPO T r e a t i e s , their Interpretation and I mplementation § 3.17 (2002) (noting that the term “right of reproduction” does not appear in the Berne Convention, but elements of it are present throughout). 59. Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy Ownership, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1245, 1256–57 (2013). 60. Id. 61. Id. at 1257. In 1993, however, the Ninth Circuit controversially held even this incidental copying into RAM constitutes a “reproduction” under United States copyright law. See generally MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993); Liu, supra note 59, at 1256–58. This holding was even contrary to the statute’s authors, who noted that “the definition of [‘copy’] would exclude from the concept purely evanescent or transient reproduction such as those . . . captured momentarily in the ‘memory’ of a computer.” Id. at 1259. Although the holding was eventually overturned, it reflects the sometimes-poor fit the law contorts itself into when applied to the new field of computer software. 62. See infra Part IV(D). 63. Uetz, supra note 46, at 190. 64. Id. 65. See Winston, supra note 51, at 94. 66. UsedSoft GmbH, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX 62011CJ0128, ¶ 88. 67. Id. ¶ 32. 68. B e r n e C o nve n t i o n f o r t h e Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, at pmbl., Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 222, 1 B.D.I.E.L. 715 [hereinafter Berne Convention]. The Convention was subsequently revised in 1896, 1908, 1914, 1928, 1948, 1967, 1971, and 1979. All citations to the Berne Convention in this note are to the final 1979 revision. 69. Id. 70. Id. art. 2(1). 71. Id. art. 2(6).
72. Id. art. 9(1). 73. Berne Convention, supra note 68, art. 9(2). 74. Id. art. 20. 75. Id. 76. Id. art. 14ter(1). 77. Id. art. 14ter(2). 78. World Intellectual Proper ty Organization Copyright Treaty, at pmbl., Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997) [hereinafter WCT]. 79. Id. 80. Id. 81. The Advantages of Adherence to the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), Int’l Bureau of World Intellectual Prop. Org., http://www.wipo.int/ export/sites/www/copyright/en/ activities/pdf/advantages_wct_ wppt.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2013). 82. WCT, supra note 78, art. 1; Berne Convention, supra note 68, art. 4 (“The works mentioned in this Article shall enjoy protection in all countries of the Union.”). 83. Id. art. 4. 84. Id. art. 6(1). 85. Id. art. 6(2) (emphasis added). 86. Id. 87. WCT, supra note 78, arts. 6 & 7. 88. Id. arts. 11, 18. 89. U.S. C onst . art. II, § 8, cl. 8. (“Copyright Clause”). 90. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 592 (1834). 91. Id. 92. Id. 93. Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 343–46 (1908) (“We therefore approach the consideration of this question as a new one in this court, and one that involves the extent of the protection which is given by the copyright statutes of the United States to the owner of a copyright.”); see also DMCA Section 104 Report, supra note 2. 94. Bobbs-Merrill, 210 U.S. at 341. 95. Id. 96. Id. at 342. 97. Id. at 347–48. 98. Id. at 350. 99. Id. 100. Quality King Distribs., Inc. v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 141–42 (1998). 101. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 106(3), 109 (West 2011). 102. H.R. R ep . N o . 94-1476, at 80 (1976) (emphasis added). 103. DMCA Section 104 Report, supra note 2, at 8–9. 104. Id. 105. Id. at 14. 106. Id. at 15. 107. Id. 108. DMCA Section 104 Report, supra note 2, at 17.
109. Id. at 17–18. 110. S ta f f o f H. C o mm . o n t h e Judiciary, 105th Cong., Sectionby-Section Analysis of H.R. 2281 as Passed by the U.S. H.R. on Aug. 4, 1998, at 24 (Comm. Print 1998) (emphasis added). 111. Quality King Distribs., Inc., 523 U.S. at 147. 112. Id. at 146–47 (emphasis added); see also Supreme Court Issues Significant Decision Regarding Importation and Sale of “Grey Market” Goods, Buchanan, Ingersoll, & Rooney PC (Mar. 22, 2013), http://www. bipc.com/supreme-court-issuessignificant-decision-regardingimportation-and-sale-of-greymarket-goods-03-21-2013/ (“Grey market goods are goods that are only authorized for sale outside of the United States, usually at lower prices than the corresponding products sold in the United States.”). 113. Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102, 1107–08 (9th Cir. 2010). 114. F.B.T. Productions, LLC v. Aftermath Records, 621 F.3d 958, 965 (9th Cir. 2010). 115. Id. at 964–65. 116. Id. at 965. 117. Id. at 967. 118. Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1092 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 119. Id. 120. Sirvinskaite, supra note 16, at 264; Neelie Kroes, Vice President, Eur. Comm’n responsible for the Digital Agenda, Speech at the 2012 Intellectual Property and Innovation Summit: Copyright and Innovation in the Creative Industries (Sept. 10, 2012). 121. Alexander Góbel, The Principle of Exhaustion and the Resale of Downloaded Software — the UsedSoft v. Oracle Case, 9 Eur. L. Rep. 226, 230 (2012), available at https:// w w w. a l e x a n d r i a . u n i s g. c h / publications/217631/L-en. 122. What Are EU Directives?, European C o mm ’ n ( J u n e 2 5 , 2 0 1 2 ) , http://ec.europa.eu/eu_law/ introduction/what_directive_ en.htm. 123. Id. 124. Id. 125. Id. 126. See Council Directive 91/250/ EEC, On the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 1991 O.J. (L 122) 42 (EC). 127. Id. at 44, art. 1(1). 128. Id. at 42, pmbl. (emphasis added). 129. Id. art. 4(2). 130. Directive 2001/29/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects
of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 [hereinafter Directive 2001/29]. 131. Id. at 11, ¶ 15. 132. Id. at 12, ¶ 28 (emphasis added). 133. Id. at 12, ¶ 29. 134. Id. 135. Directive 2009/24/EC, supra note 45. 136. Id. 137. UsedSoft GmbH, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX 62011CJ0128, ¶¶ 24–27. 138. Id. ¶ 21. 139. Id. ¶ 22. 140. Id. ¶ 21. 141. Id. 142. UsedSoft GmbH, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX 62011CJ0128, ¶ 23. 143. Id. ¶ 24. 144. Id. 145. Id. ¶¶ 25, 27. 146. Id. ¶ 27. 147. UsedSoft GmbH, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX 62011CJ0128, ¶ 29. 148. Id. ¶ 34. 149. Id. ¶¶ 40, 42. 150. Id. ¶¶ 40, 41. 151. Id. ¶ 42; see infra Part VI (providing an analysis of the Court’s definition of “sale”) (emphasis added). 152. UsedSoft GmbH, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX 62011CH0128, ¶ 44. 153. Id. ¶¶ 45, 46. 154. Id. ¶ 51. 155. Id. 156. Id. ¶ 51. 157. Directive 2001/29, supra note 2, at 12, ¶ 28. 158. UsedSoft GmbH, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX 62011CJ0128, ¶ 89(2) (emphasis added). 159. Góbel, supra note 121, at 231. 160. Id. at 231 161. Berry, Kathy, EU—UsedSoft v. Oracle: ECJ approves sale of ‘used’ softwar e, Linklaters (Nov. 26, 2012), http://www. linklaters.com/Publications/ Publication1403Newsletter/ TMT-News-November-2012/ Pages/EU-Used-Soft-Oracle-ECJapproves-sale-used-software.aspx. 162. Id. 163. Id. 164. Baker, supra note 11. 165. One such commentator has suggested that the decision, while a break from the “closely minded judicial path,” actually follows current trends, as downloading from the Internet as a mode of transmission is increasing, while CD-ROM sales are declining. Góbel, supra note 121, at 229, 232. 166. WCT, supra note 78, art. 4. 167. Id. art. 8 (emphasis added). 168. Directive 2001/29, supra note 2, at 12, ¶ 29. 169. Usedsoft GmbH, 2012 EUR-Lex CELEX 62011CJ0128, ¶ 51.
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170. See supra Part V. 171. Directive 2001/29/EC, supra note 2, at 12, ¶ 29. (including those computer programs without a “material medium” into “on-line [sic] services”). 172. Id. at 16, art. 4(2). 173. See supra Part II(A). 174. U.S. Const. art. II, § 8, cl. 8. 175. Wheaton, 33 U.S. at 592. 176. Black’s Law, supra note 14. 177. See supra Part IV(D). 178. See, e.g., Quality King Distribs., 523 U.S. 146–47 (providing that the protection afforded the first-sale doctrine only applies to the “owner of a lawfully made copy”). 179. F.B.T. Productions, LLC, 621 F.3d at 965. 180. Id. 181. WCT, supra note 78, art. 6(2). 182. Id.
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Corruption in the World Bank’s Integrity Vice Presidency: Seven Years Later K E V I N
T I P TO N *
“My dream is that my staff changes their
extent, he is correct in his assessment: the
and aid from those who need it most and
orientation from thinking they are a people of power,
INT has implemented many new procedures
into the hands of the elite.6 Alternatively,
to thinking they are servants of the people.”
and rules to facilitate a steady escalation in
in developed countries, corruption can
anti-corruption efforts. Sadly, if one looks
lead to representatives who engage in
deeper than a cursory overview at the INT’s
fraud, embezzlement, and other failures in
own analysis, one would find a disease still
upholding ethical standards.7 Corruption
resting deep at the core of the institution.
acts as a catalyst, turning an organization
—————————————————
Today, the INT is certainly functioning at a
or government dedicated to serving the
In 2007, the Department of Institutional
much higher standard than in 2007, but this
interests of its people into a parasite
Integrity of the World Bank came under
standard is certainly much lower than what
that saps both money and faith from the
attack from across the globe as a result
we should, or must, demand of the premiere
people. Recognizing this, the World Bank
of corruption within the World Bank.
developmental bank in the world.
is only one entity among many countries
—Nur mahmudi, mayor of Depok, Indonesia
1
—————————————————
I. Introduction
Reacting to a worldwide movement against
The World Bank needs to lead the charge.
and organizations across the globe to have
corruption decades in the making, the Bank
Frank Vogl, founder of Transparency
recently ramped up the stakes in the contest
scrambled to save its international image.
International and former World Bank
against corruption. If one is to conceptualize
At the behest of an independent panel, the
employee, wrote recently that the World
why and how the World Bank must act, then
Department was immediately promoted
Bank has been more “a part of the problem
understanding the pressure on every level of
to the level of Integrity Vice Presidency
than a contributor to the solution.”3 He
society to combat corruption is important.
(“INT”). The INT responded with sweeping
recalls an economist who called the World
changes to both external and internal
Bank the Vatican of development aid: “its
investigation procedures in an attempt to
rulings are dominant, its authority enormous,
retain, or perhaps regain, the respect of
and its decisions rarely if ever questioned by
the international community. Rightfully so,
professions in the international official aid
for how can the Bank be trusted when the
community.”4 The World Bank must step out
organization endowed with the responsibility
of the darkness today, and once again stand
of protecting the virtue of the Bank is itself
as a guiding light for all to follow.
corrupt?
—————————————————
Leonard McCarthy, extolled the progress
II. Corruption Worldwide and at the World Bank
made since then in the 2012 fiscal report.2
—————————————————
The report appears to show a fundamentally
Corruption is the abuse of entrusted
new INT wholly dedicated to, and successful
power for private gain. 5 In developing
in, the pursuit of anti-corruption. To an
countries, corruption steers resources
Six years later, the head of the INT,
A. THE WORLD’S EFFORTS
For many years, the United States was the only nation fighting corruption via the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which penalized U.S. citizens for transnational bribery of foreign officials.8 Recently, the World Bank announced it has received and substantiated many referrals thanks to the statute—two referrals alone allowed the World Bank to eliminate fraud in contracts worth over $41.5 million.9 In today’s world, the U.S. is no longer alone—individual countries battle corruption
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Currents Winter 2013
every day. In 2006, Britain attacked corruption
especially prolific organization that places a
banks to ensure effective sanctions for
directly by creating a £100 million fund to
high priority on anti-corruption. Not only
disbarred firms. 25 In a public message,
provide aid to victims of corruption in
has the UN adopted a Convention dedicated
Leonard McCarthy said that the INT was “in
developing nations.
The fund aids the
specifically to corruption, it has even
the driver’s seat,” espousing anti-corruption
media, parliamentarians, and trade unions in
established December 9th as International
as a central focus of the Bank.26
developing nations in holding their leaders
Anti-Corruption Day.19
—————————————————
10
accountable. Lending his support for the 11
fund, Britain’s international development secretary Hilary Benn cited corruption as one ailment to overcome in helping nations develop: “Time is running out and if we miss this opportunity we will give up for the moment probably the single most important step we can give to developing countries, which is the chance to earn and trade their way out of poverty.”12 South Korea’s Chairman for anti-corruption, Lee Jae-Oh, praised his country’s efforts in this fight. South Korea requires any public 13
organization that receives even the smallest amount of government funds to subject itself to an integrity test.14 Lee noted that the international community values a country based not on its wealth, but on its anticorruption efforts.
15
World organizations are committed to anti-corruption. At the 2012 G20 Summit, the participating leaders agreed corruption inhibits economic growth, attacks integrity of trade, sabotages fair trade, warps resource allocation, and undermines public trust and the law.16 The leaders urged all relevant stakeholders to play an active role in fighting corruption.17 The 2012 strategy report of the Secretary General for the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”), an organization of thirty-four nations dedicated to strengthening the world economy, said the OECD needed to be at the “forefront of integrity and anti-corruption efforts.”18 The United Nations (“UN”) is an
B. THE WORLD BANK’S EFFORTS
For many years corruption was off the radar at the World Bank, which consistently encouraged an environment where corruption was ignored for over 50 years—if you can’t see it, it’s not there.20 The World Bank formally recognized the importance of anti-corruption almost two decades ago. The “cancer of corruption” was one of the focal points of then-President James Wolfensohn’s 1996 annual address.21 Wolfensohn went on to remark that we all —————————————————
World organizations are committed to anti-corruption. ————————————————— know corruption is a major barrier to sound development.22As a result of this recognition, three years thereafter, the Department of Institutional Integrity was operating in full force to prevent corruption internally and in Bank projects.23 The INT has had a rocky road since its inception. Non-governmental organizations such as the Government Accountability Project (“GAP”) have been calling the INT’s processes ineffective, or even detrimental.24 Despite this, the INT still believes it is making excellent progress toward creating a world without corruption, citing high numbers of investigations, an efficient process for complaints, and new agreements with other anti-corruption entities and developmental 72
Currents Winter 2013
III. The Process
————————————————— No one can say that the Bank does not, at least on its face, vehemently support anti-corruption efforts. The primary point of dispute is how the INT approaches this issue. From initial investigation to the sanction proceedings and beyond, critics are quick to point out flaws. The words of its leaders, while recognizing a need for improvement in many areas, paint a picture which does not match the barren landscape illustrated by their opponents. To weigh the merits of either argument one must gain an understanding of the investigative process the INT uses today. The process begins when the INT receives a complaint. A complainant will come to the INT with information that an entity has engaged in a sanctionable practice27 in a World Bank project.28 The complainant has a variety of reporting options, including e-mail, phone, and even an “Integrity App” available on iPhone.29 Upon receiving the complaint, the INT will determine whether the complaint is considered high priority and will act on it accordingly.30 The next step is the investigation of a case. Investigators have the burden of proving the alleged conduct occurred using a balance of probabilities standard—as opposed to the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of criminal law—to show it is more likely than not that the conduct did actually occur.31 If the claim is substantiated and the burden of
proof met, investigators will look further
beacon for anti-corruption work then these
Panel in early 2007 as an independent panel
into the actions of the guilty party and
two issues must be resolved. Of course,
of experts.40 The Bank placed control of the
determine whether it has engaged in other
the two reports delve far deeper than these
panel entirely in the hands of Paul Volcker,
corrupt practices in the past.
overarching issues and touch upon specific
citing his “longstanding career characterized
Upon completion of an investigation, a
problems, which must be met with solutions.
by integrity, leadership, and professionalism”
guilty party will be subjected to sanctions
The reviewing groups were formed as
in support of his appointment.41 Volcker was
and, hopefully, legal recourse. In 2012 alone,
a consequence of many accusations of
tasked with appointing the rest of the panel,
the World Bank debarred 83 corporations
uselessness, inferior methodology, and even
presumably to ensure its impartiality.42 The
and individuals who had substantiated
corruption in nearly all facets of the World
Bank would eventually publish the report in
claims filed against them.
Depending
Bank, which later resulted in the resignation
September of 2007.43
on the severity of the transgression, they
of Bank President Paul Wolfowitz.38 Their
The integrity of the report has often been
will be debarred for many years. Other
goal was to investigate every aspect of the
criticized since its release. The crux of the
substantiated claims saw the INT placing
INT and identify issues. One of the review
complaints center around Suzanne Folsom,
firms on conditional non-debarment and
groups, commonly called the Volcker
the then-Director of the Department of
serving them with letters of reprimand.
35
Panel, was commissioned by the Bank as an
Institutional Integrity. GAP believes that
Beyond sanctions, the World Bank will
independent group to determine the extent
the entire panel review was tainted by
refer the investigation materials to the
of the corruption in the Department and
Folsom’s shadow. Supposedly, she doctored
transgressor’s governing state in the hope
—————————————————
documents, altered Bank practices simply
that the state will sanction the transgressor
to fraudulently influence the Panel, and
certainly warrant recognition of its qualified
The most critical issues that impacted every aspect of the INT’s investigations were the lack of a review mechanism and the inability of the INT to affect change.
success.
—————————————————
they provided testimony.45 The Bank itself
—————————————————
to make recommendations. At the same
also confirmed that Folsom did intimidate
time the Volcker Panel was conducting its
witnesses with the help of an informant on
investigation, GAP received requests from
the panel.46
32
33
34
there as well. The INT claims that, on 36
average, a single credible complaint will lead to fourteen investigations in eight different countries. If substantiated, these claims 37
IV. Problems Seven Years Ago
—————————————————
Bank insiders that it make an independent
retaliated against witnesses.44 The retaliation has since been corroborated during a Bank Administrative Tribunal hearing where Panel witnesses swore they received threats that they would never be promoted if
GAP contends that the existence of
The new and revamped investigative process
review of the state of the Department.
39
the threats should invalidate the Panel.47
is the direct result of the negative reviews
Both reports recommended a number of
Indeed, all evidence points to the shade of
of two reports in 2007. Changing the
solutions to the myriad of issues facing
fraud upon the Volcker Panel. As a result,
investigative process was only the beginning
the World Bank’s integrity. It is essential to
a high degree of apprehension should be
of the crusade to remedy the ineffectiveness
explore their observations and suggestions
applied when analyzing the panel’s report.
of the Department of Institutional Integrity.
in order to fully realize the extent of the
This corruption should lead one to question
Together, the two reports paint a picture of
disease inside the Department in 2007.
whether all the problems facing the INT were
the bleak state within the INT. The most critical issues that impacted every aspect of the INT’s investigations were the lack of a review mechanism and the inability of the INT to affect change. If the INT is to be a
accurately illustrated. This corruption should A. VOLCKER PANEL
President Wolfowitz and the Board of Executive Directors convened the Volcker
not, however, lead one to necessarily doubt the veracity of the panel’s recommendations regarding the issues it did know about. The INT may have selectively presented issues to
73
Currents Winter 2013
the panel, but these issues did exist and the
the INT be impartial or else the INT
qualitative peer review program with other
recommendations by the panel were valid.
would lack the respect of the international
organizations.59
One should not take the lack of an issue in
community.
The Bank must strive to improve the
the report as evidence it does not exist, but
There must be an external advisory
effectiveness of referrals to national law
one should equally consider as truthful the
oversight board. The panel noted that such
enforcement. There are complaints that
panel’s recommendations for the issues it
a board would help the INT to remain
the INT does not provide enough evidence
does reveal.
both independent and accountable.
If
to prosecute individuals under the law of
The report also addressed issues with
the Bank was the only group to oversee
member nations.60 The INT defended this as
both the external and internal investigative
the INT, those ideals might easily be
a result of confidentiality requirements.61 The
processes. While the INT follows roughly
compromised.53 Independence is necessary
INT considers the referral a success even if it
the same process at all times, different
to reinforce confidence in INT’s lack of
does nothing but notify the member country
considerations exist for each type of
54
political sensitivities. Accountability must
of the corruption.62 While the Panel did not
investigation, which then leads to alternate
—————————————————
make any specific suggestions to resolve this
issues and solutions. At the same time, some
conflict, it implicated that the current state of
entire report would be excessive as the panel
Oversight and transparency are necessary when investigating individuals and firms involved with Bank projects.
finds dozens of issues, but there are some
—————————————————
assisted in the training and investigations of
especially notable suggestions extended by
be maintained to relieve concerns that
national governments when the request is
the panel which deserve recognition.
the bank is a “black box beyond regular,
made to the Bank after a referral.63
problems are so far-reaching they trickle into every part of the INT’s work. To restate the
i.
INT-wide Issues and Solutions
The current status of the INT and its director are not suitable to the department’s calling. The Panel believes the INT must
52
relegating the board to only an advisory role
usage.64 At the time of the Panel, fieldwork
that could provide a different perspective for
for an investigation could take up to a year.65
the president.56
The Panel recognized that this may indeed be necessary in light of the obstacles moving
ii.
The External Investigation Process
Oversight and transparency are necessary
director cannot be a “. . . counselor to the
when investigating individuals and firms
[p]resident.” The Panel views the INT as
involved with Bank projects. The INT has
a unit which should command respect as an
stated that its own work should be measured
exemplary investigative organization.49 A
in terms of impact and outcome, yet the
promotion of the director to a vice president
Bank did not subject it to such criteria.57 The
would emphasize the importance of the
2007 annual reports did mention general case
INT in Bank policy-making. The panel
statistics, but the reports exposed to peer
also believes the director’s title as counselor
review neither the INT’s total investigation
to the president only leads to confusion as
time nor its policies and procedures. The
to the role of the director and accusations
panel suggested that outcome and impact
that the director’s ability to be independent
measurements should be considered by
investigator was compromised.
groups and the INT should initiate a
51
It is
58
against investigators, but it did not accept the protracted period of six months after the fieldwork dedicated to writing a report and legal department scrutiny.66 The panel suggested that the INT set standards to expedite the report review process so the norm is less than a year for all but the most intensive cases.67 Furthermore, the panel recommended that the INT issue regular reports regarding the "aging" of the review process status of external cases.68 iii.
The Internal Investigations Process
INT’s methods must be fundamentally fair to subjects of internal allegations and
fundamentally imperative that the head of 74
Currents Winter 2013
agenda would be promoted if the Bank
The INT is simply inefficient with its time
presidency within the Bank and that its
50
note that the interests of the anti-corruption
disinterested review.”55 The panel suggested
be promoted from a department to a vice
48
the referral process is ineffective. They did
witnesses.69 The panel notes that it received
advance notice would lead to
for complainants and victims to
many complaints questioning the fairness
destruction of evidence or witness
be adequately informed of the
of the procedure but still goes on to say the
tampering.
investigations.85
78
existing regulations are reasonable and fair
3. Investig atees must have the
In addition to fairness concerns, the
when taken as a whole.70 Perhaps the taint
opportunity to find witnesses and
report calls for clarity in the codification
of corruption that the GAP warned of is
adequately prepare a defense. 79
of the rights of staff members.86 The INT
to blame for these two contradictory ideas.
The panel found many complaints
did publish a Staff Guide to the INT, which
Regardless, the panel did make a variety of
that the Bank enforced strict
describes the procedures but did not make
minor recommendations to provide fairer
confidentiality in the investigation,
it clear whether these descriptions were firm
investigative procedures:
which limited the ability of an
rules.87 Codification of these rights would go
1. There must be guidelines for
accused to attain witnesses on
a long way toward maintaining the integrity
investigating e-mail after INT
her behalf. The Bank defended
of the internal investigations of the INT: the
approval has been given. In 2007,
this confidentiality protection by
INT would be unable to change any of its
the INT did have guidelines which
stating it routinely made exceptions
procedures without notifying the staff and
required approval of management
for this concern.
providing them an opportunity to challenge
to access the email of a Bank
dismissed the claim and suggested
employee.72 Once approval was
that more transparency and clarity
given, investigators were not barred
was necessary in determining when
from looking well beyond the
a bank employee can approach
The GAP review, published only a week
subject of the investigation.
73
potential witnesses.82 Failure to
before the Volcker report, tracks many of
Though no witnesses came to the
allow this could easily undermine
the same issues Volcker found.89 GAP began
panel with complaints of abuse, the
an investigatee’s honest attempts
its review at the request of confidential
panel believes that restraints must
in a defense.
whistleblowers who feared that the Director,
71
be placed upon investigators to
80
81
The panel
any change.88 B. GAP REVIEW OF THE INT
4. Complainants and victims need
Suzanne Folsom, was inadequate to ensure
74
to be kept apprised of progress in
the INT could be trusted in its inquiries.90
2. Failure to give adequate notice
the investigations. At the time of
Like the Volcker Panel, GAP’s report lists
to staff members who are under
the report, the INT was under no
dozens of issues it wants resolved. Many of
investigation is unacceptable. The
obligation to assure complainants
these issues are substantiated and addressed
panel received many complaints
and victims that it was working
in the Volcker report as well. However,
from employees who had no idea
diligently to satisfy their claims.84
GAP’s access to different sources revealed
why they were being called by the
The unspoken assumption made
extensive issues the Volcker Panel either did
INT to conduct an interview. 76
by the panel was that without clear
not know of or simply disregarded due to its
The INT did provide employees
requirements that complainants
own potential corruption. Four of the issues
with 24 hours of notice before an
and victims be informed, there
GAP identified are worth specific mention.
interview, but it did not disclose the
would be a spectre of perceived
First, there is an absence of coherent
subject matter in order to ensure
corruption haunting the INT
guidelines for prioritization and pursuit
the interviews were unscripted.77
if any accused did not seem to
of investigations.91 GAP does not actually
Disagreeing, the panel notes that
be fully investigated. Of course,
elaborate on this specific problem in its
non-disclosure of the subject
the details of the investigation
report. The determination that this issue
matter should be prohibited unless
would need to be kept confidential,
exists follows implicitly from the rest of the
the INT reasonably believes that
but the panel recognized a need
report. However, it should be noted that the
protect the privacy of employees.
75
83
75
Currents Winter 2013
Volcker Panel supported this conclusion, as
Finally, reporting procedures within the
the World Bank ensured that not only is the
it believes the current triage procedures for
INT are wholly inadequate to allow for review
INT now a Vice Presidency, but it is also
cases to be wholly inadequate. Regardless,
by third parties.
GAP requests “formal,
significantly more independent than other
it is certainly arguable that the lack of clear
transparent procedures for reporting” to
Vice Presidencies.104 Other Vice Presidents
guidelines in prioritization of cases and in
the Bank, national governments, and the
report to a managing director under the
investigations is per se an issue. GAP does
public.102 Opening INT reports to outside
President, but the INT Vice President
firmly suggest that “[e]xplicit and transparent
organizations will go a long way toward
reports directly to the President.105 While
procedures for triaging and investigating
ensuring the INT is kept in check by an entity
this does not eliminate possible influence the
cases” must be implemented.
other than itself. External oversight would
President may have over the INT, ensuring
Second, GAP questions the integrity of
craft an environment that actively encourages
that the INT can contact and report to the
the INT directorship. The Volcker Panel
the detection and eradication of corruption.
President without using an intermediary does
touched on this issue in their discussion
—————————————————
positively impact the perception of the INT
92
93
101
of Folsom’s conflicts of interest and her
V. Successes as of 2013
position within the organization. GAP
—————————————————
T he World Bank has created an
corroborates this issue and goes a step
The INT has taken the words of these two
Independent Advisory Board ("IAB").106
further. It suggests combating these conflicts
reports to heart and over the past half-decade
The Bank created the board in September
of interest with fixed terms that include
it has made large advancements in the quality
of 2008 as an anti-corruption mechanism.107
renewals based on performance goals.94 Such
of its anti-corruption work. Progress may
The IAB is tasked with protecting the
renewals would be based on Presidential
have been slower than the Volcker Panel
independence and strength of the INT by
recommendations and subsequent Board of
and GAP would have liked, but the INT has
providing advice to the President and the
Directors authorization.95
—————————————————
Audit Committee on the performance of the INT.108 Since its creation, the board has met
who are not Bank employees, the interviews
The Independent Advisory Board is tasked with protecting the independence and strength of the INT by providing advice to the President and the Audit Committee on the performance of the INT.
they conducted with INT members will
—————————————————
posted a number of its decisions on its
not sweep the reader away with praise for
breathed life into many of the suggestions
website.110 In addition, the annual reports
the INT’s practices. Many respondents
the groups have made. The INT is not even
published by the INT now include statistics
provided anecdotal evidence that breaches
close to mending all the woes of corruption
on expenses and time spent on a case, in
of confidentiality routinely occur.98 For
the reports mention, but the solid progress
addition to the general statistics such as
instance, the report indicates that one of the
made so far is commendable.
number of cases and sanctions. 111 This
Third, the INT’s whistleblowing policy is ineffective.96 Employees within the Bank are close to the corruption and so they are often in the best position to blow the whistle on misconduct.97 While the report does not mention the opinion of whistleblowers
confidential information by an informant.
The whistleblowers must have confidence that the INT will value their confidentiality or there will be a severe risk that whistleblowers will not act at all.
100
A. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF VOLCKER PANEL SUGGESTIONS
The first Vice President, Leonard McCarthy, was appointed in May 2008.103 Immediately following the Volcker Panel, 76
Currents Winter 2013
a number of times in person and through telephone conferences, and has published annual reports for 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013.109 The INT is more transparent. To facilitate the recommended external oversight, it has
progress ensures that skeptics can monitor
President’s counselors is often given “leaked” 99
as an independent body.
far more of the INT’s operations and more easily identify where the problems lie within the INT. Referrals to national law enforcement are more effective.112 The IAB heard evidence indicating that the referrals of the INT
have led to successful punishment under
how best to diagnose, determine, and
national law from five countries: Norway,
clean out corruption.”
Indonesia, the Philippines, Kenya, and the
actually already taken this to heart and, in
VI. Remaining Issues and Solutions
U.K.
Supporting this, the 2012 annual
2007, began working on a new procedure
—————————————————
report shows a positive trend in the number
for selecting cases for investigation. 122
While the INT has done a fair job of meeting
of cases sent for referral.114 Furthermore,
Previously, the INT would split the cases
the most prominent recommendations of
the INT is now working with other agencies,
up by region and rank them as low, medium
the Volcker Panel, it may not have gone far
such as the OECD and the European Anti-
or high priority, depending on a number of
enough. Even worse, it has done its internal
Fraud Office. Working with the OECD will
factors.
Normally, the INT could expect
investigation procedures and the GAP
allow the two groups to share information in
to investigate most of the high and some
recommendations little justice at all. In fact,
the hope of securing successful referrals.115
of the medium priority cases, depending
it appears to have ignored questions that go
The agreement between the INT and the
on the caseload in a given region.
With
to the heart of the INT’s effectiveness and
European Anti-Fraud Office will allow the
—————————————————
integrity. As it stands, the INT is merely a
two organizations’ investigators to work
shell of its full potential. It must earn the
and, therefore, in a better position to act on
While the INT has done a fair job of meeting the most prominent recommendations of the Volcker Panel, it may not have gone far enough.
a referral from the INT.
—————————————————
of the internal investigations process, shelter
Staff Rule 8.01 has been codified and
the new policies, the INT would make
and encourage whistleblowers, and pressure
now more effectively protects the integrity
sure to investigate all high priority cases,
its employees to fight corruption and
of internal investigations.117 Further, when
rather than discriminating by region.125 In
reward them for their efforts. Perhaps most
a staff member is given notice of an
fiscal year 2011, the INT further enhanced
important of all, it must be fully transparent
investigation, they are now apprised of its
the process at the suggestion of the IAB.
and work with anti-corruption organizations
specific nature.
This improvement involved refining the
to become a beacon others can look to for
have had an impact
selection process for matters going to full
hope and guidance.
on staff allegations. Furthermore, Staff Rule
investigation.126 The INT claims results of
8.02 provides for periodic updates to those
this change are clear: the number of newly
who report corruption to the World Bank.120
opened cases dropped to 73 from 194
While not all the issues the Panel identified
the year before, but 36% more cases were
have seen a remedy, it should not be quite as
substantiated.127 In addition, the percentage
unreasonable a task for the accused to mount
of cases classified as high priority increased
a proper and thorough defense.
to 68% from 18% the year before.128 In 2012,
113
together.
116
The arrangement should allow
the European Union to be significantly better informed of INT investigations in Europe
118
These, as well as some
other minor changes,
119
123
121
The INT had
124
a similar trend is represented in the statistics B. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GAP SUGGESTIONS
The INT has implemented new procedures for triaging cases to improve efficiency. In the first annual report after the Volcker Panel, President Zoellick theorized that “the challenge for the World Bank is
of the annual report, which shows the substantiation rate and the number of cases opened each increasing by about 10%.129 If these figures are truly representative of the progress of the new method, then the GAP’s recommendation has been successfully implemented.
—————————————————
respect of the world community for the virtue of the INT Vice President, make drastic improvements in efficiency, make more effective referrals, defend the equity
A. RESPECTING THE VIRTUE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
The Vice President must appear to be fully independent, faithful to the calling, and worthy of the title. While it is true the Vice President enjoys special access to the President, this is merely the lowest possible standard to meet the recommendations of the Volcker Panel. As it stands, the Vice Presidency is a life appointment, terminable only upon the Bank’s decision that the office holder is inadequate for the job. Such a system is wholly unarmed to protect itself against corruption. It is not difficult to
77
Currents Winter 2013
envision a Vice President, overzealous in the
arena as a force of anti-corruption. In
Upon a cursory glance, these statistics
eyes of the President, who is either coerced
the end, efficient investigations will be a
seem to show the INT is doing the Volcker
into submission or forcefully removed in
deterrent to future corruption since the
Panel a great honor in upholding its requests
favor of a more amenable Vice President.
INT will go through more corruption claims
for time efficiency. However, the percentage
It is the institutional equivalent of fighting
and thus increase the likelihood that each
figures have no context to compare with
a duel with one arm tied behind your back,
instance of corruption will be found and
previous years because fiscal year 2012
when your opponent is a known cheater.
punished. This chain of events means that a
was the first time the INT ever bothered
The Vice President needs to be limited
quick turnaround of investigations would be
to publish them. Furthermore, there was a
by terms, which can then be renewed. GAP
one of the most effective tools in the battle
significant increase in the average duration
recommended term limits in their report as
against corruption that the INT has to offer.
of a case from fiscal years 2010 to 2011.
a way to ensure the quality of performance
The INT is not an entity of infinite
The INT has tried to mislead the public by
Bank employees are often
resources and it cannot be expected to review
publishing an 11.5 month figure in 2012, but
measured by performance, with failure to
every plausible case in a few months. The
that number represents the median, not the
perform punished.
Of course, the type
INT made this very argument in front of the
average. In statistics, a median and an average
of punishment a normal employee receives
Volcker Panel, which summarily decided that
are two wildly different concepts that cannot
is probably not suitable for someone such
—————————————————
be used to compare different sets of data as
as a Vice President. However, this principle
the INT tries to have us do. One would do
overall performance of the INT. The Bank
The INT is quick to point to its investigation statistics as a source of pride in its newfound efficiency—sadly, these statistics are misleading and fall short of providing any workable information.
would do well to adopt these guidelines. Five
—————————————————
IAB to relate to the whole.137 They painted
years is enough time for a Vice President to
the goal should be less than 12 months
the problem quite eloquently in their report,
make effective changes. Only allowing one
with 18 months as a rare exception. 133
saying “the IAB continues to observe that
renewal will ensure no one has enough time
The INT is quick to point to its
despite the evident need, INT and other
to create ties with the Vice President that
investigation statistics as a source of pride
units within the sanctions system have yet
could be perpetually used against the INT.
in its newfound efficiency—sadly, these
to develop a standardized set of statistics
Since the Vice President has a firm control
statistics are misleading and fall short of
for reviewing and reporting their caseload:
over the INT, performance is a reasonable
providing any workable information. In fiscal
this is a problem that weakens performance
way to measure his or her effectiveness.
year 2012, the INT officially reported 52%
measurement.”138
of the position.
130
131
is applicable and supported by the Bank. According to the GAP report, the success of the Vice President should be measured every five years and the Vice President’s term should be renewable only once, based on the 132
B. EFFICIENCY IS THE KEY
Efficiency is of fundamental importance in the investigations of the INT. Efficient investigation will lead to quicker turnaround times and thus more investigations in a given length of time. This, in turn, will ultimately lead to a presence of the INT in the global
The IAB found this same issue in its 2013 report. There was a small amount of apparent progress in reducing the number of cases open for more than 18 months, but these numbers were impossible for the
of investigations were closed within one year
The solution to evaluating efficiency
of being opened and 73% were closed within
is to have the President and the IAB
18 months with a median duration of 11.5
review accurate, standardized statistics.
months. The INT had previously reported
This conforms to the suggestion of the
in fiscal year 2011 an average duration of
Volcker Panel, which suggested that the
17.1 months,135 which compared poorly to
numbers be made available for other groups
134
to monitor.139 Both the President and the the average duration in fiscal year 2010 of
Board are sensitive to the specific constraints
14.5 months.
surrounding the INT and its ability to move
136
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Currents Winter 2013
better comparing apples to oranges.
cases quickly. Their opinions on the progress
As the name suggests, the graduated
of the INT in this area should hold great
response strategy asks the Bank to respond
For an anti-corruption unit, the current
weight and should spur the INT to be more
with escalating severity if referrals are not
internal regulations are grossly inadequate
diligent in its turnaround time.
taken seriously. First, INT would simply
at preventing corruption in the Bank itself.
contact local law enforcement and provide
Before the unit can earn the respect of
them with the necessary information.144 If
the nations of the world, the INT must
the response was not adequate, the INT
earn the faith of the people in the Bank.
could use the Bank’s Country Directors to go
It is very difficult to spread the word of
through diplomatic channels of the central
anti-corruption when the prophets do
government. Complete failure could result
not believe their own words. Many of the
in the Bank using force to encourage the
recommendations of the Volcker Panel were
country to participate in anti-corruption.
ignored. Staff Rule 8.01, the only reliable
For instance, lending could be suspended to
source for Bank employee rights during an
—————————————————
INT investigation, does not adequately shield
The World Bank must adopt a strategy to make referrals successful.
those who it is designed to protect.
—————————————————
information in circumstances where this
a specific sector in the country until it made
information may assist in finding a witness
a reasonable effort to pursue the referral.
146
who can support your claim. This lack of
In developed countries, which often do not
protection is outrageous. Imagine being
see the impact of the World Bank, the Bank
told by the government that you can only
could suspend all companies in a sector from
use witnesses who already know the details
bidding on any Bank project until the referral
of your criminal charges when facing a
is acknowledged.
murder charge: you would not have the
C. REFERRALS PREVENT CORRUPTION
Successful referrals have a profound impact on corruption. A referral is successful when it is received by a national government and the transgressor is punished under domestic law. Like any other crime, the fear of severe financial penalties, loss of prestige, and even prison time would act as deterrents to corruption. In its current state, it appears that the INT has had its wings clipped when it comes to making a successful referral. The IAB noted in 2011 that in the twelve years prior the INT had made 167 referrals.140 On its face, this number could please the anti-corruption community until one considers the hundreds of cases the INT has substantiated in the past few years alone. Even worse, of those 167 referrals only sixteen have seen a completed prosecution or conviction.141 This success rate is embarrassing. Today, the INT does follow-up on its referrals to see if there are any comments, but this is hardly an affirmative push toward a successful referral.142 The World Bank must adopt a strategy to make referrals successful. The INT, as an institution, does not have the influence or the funds to bully nations into fighting corruption. The World Bank, as a whole, does. The IAB has asked the Bank, to no avail, to adopt a “graduated response”
145
There is still no provision that specifically provides a right to disclose confidential
The lack of political will in a country
ability to call your best friend to testify that
should never be an excuse for a failed referral.
you were not at the scene of the crime. This
This strategy could lead to serious actions,
procedural flaw is fundamentally unfair and
but the cause is worthy of the blowback.
requires no stretch of the imagination to
Referrals are perhaps the greatest tool the
foresee the abuse implicit in confidentiality
INT has in its arsenal and at the moment
requirements, which hamstring the defense.
they are criminally underused. The Bank
A provision allowing the use of a limited
has the power to force a country to effect
disclosure of confidential information
change in its anti-corruption policy and it
when contacting potential witnesses, which
must use its influence toward this purpose.
includes an exception for cases involving
A declawed INT cannot fight for the needs
extreme circumstances where the rights of
of anti-corruption.
others would be substantially prejudiced, must be codified immediately.
strategy in every report it has made. 143 This strategy would absolutely improve the referrals process.
Restrictions must be placed on the D. INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS MUST LIVE UP TO THE CALLING OF THE INT
investigation of e-mail. E-mail is used by
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Currents Winter 2013
many people for many different purposes
to both whistleblowers in the Bank as
acceptable punishment and reinstated
beyond specific work requirements.
well as any outside individual who reports
Kim.155 Four months after his reinstatement,
Investigators should not have the freedom
an allegation. 149 The Rule provides for
the Bank forced him to retire after 26
to peruse any e-mail ever sent in search
confidentiality as to the identity of the
years of service.156 There can be no excuse
of violations of Bank policy. There have
reporter or anonymity at their request,150
for the World Bank’s vile conduct in this
been reported instances of abuse in recent
a prohibition against retaliation,151 and a
case. While Kim did leak documents, his
years, where the Bank either hacked or
temporary move to a different department
testimony shows that he did it in absolute
filtered an employee’s e-mail and found
at the discretion of the Vice President and
good faith.157 The Administrative Tribunal’s
the only evidence it needed to fire him for
Human Resources.152 The Rule also allows
order was completely disregarded and the
whistleblowing.147 Sometimes the INT will
staff members to blow the whistle on outside
Bank carried through with its retaliation
need to examine e-mail correspondence to
sources in some cases if the established
in the end. The Bank needs to establish
find evidence of wrongdoing, but the scope
internal mechanisms are inadequate.
concrete, immovable restrictions against
153
of the investigation should be narrowly
In some ways, the current whistleblowing
retaliation. Bank punishment is unjustified if
defined. For example, the scope of the
policy is commendable. Providing for
the Administrative Tribunal has found such
investigation should be limited to only
baseline confidentiality to whistleblowers
punishment to be without warrant under
allow admissible evidence that supports the
is important, as is the option to report
the Staff Rules. The Staff Rules should be
original investigation. A respect for privacy
anonymously. This policy encourages
amended to better protect whistleblowers
is of the utmost importance as it allows
—————————————————
who act incorrectly, but in good faith.
employees to act legitimately without fear
The World Bank’s current whistleblowing protection is Staff Rule 8.02.
of persecution. A climate of fear would be counterproductive in eliminating corruption.
————————————————— E. WHISTLEBLOWING MUST BE ENCOURAGED AND PROTECTED
Whistleblowing is among the most effective ways to fight corruption. Without whistleblowers, corruption will harrow Bank projects without remorse. These are the people who take a stand against corruption on their own and seek the INT’s help in fighting it. They are champions of the anticorruption initiative and the INT has a duty to stand behind them in the face of any persecution. Whistleblowers who inform the INT of corruption as well as those who inform others of corruption in the INT need to be protected.
for potential whistleblowers. In theory, the prohibition against retaliation and the remedy of a temporary move are equally important efforts to ensuring the safety and comfort of whistleblowers. The Bank would be wise to ensure these safeguards remained in place. In other respects, the current policy is grossly deficient. There is anecdotal evidence that the policy against retaliation is summarily ignored. John Kim, an IT analyst for the Bank, leaked documents to a Forbes reporter when they were sent to him via e-mail from a co-worker and was subsequently terminated for the disclosure.154 A Bank Administrative Tribunal
The World Bank’s current whistleblowing protection is Staff Rule 8.02.
whistleblowing by creating a safe haven
148
It applies
did find the exception for whistleblowing to an outside source did not apply here, but it held that termination was not an 80
Currents Winter 2013
F. THE WORLD BANK MUST REWARD ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS
Altruism has no place in the current path to promotion in the World Bank. Frank Vogl wrote that a major problem in the World Bank was its officials working too closely to foreign officials. Personal success and promotions for World Bank officials are based on performance—the volume of the projects they pursue—without a focus on integrity. In this paradigm, saying no to corruption and halting a project for an INT investigation reaps no personal or professional benefits.158 The World Bank must set internal standards, which promote anti-corruption. Rewarding staff members for highlighting corruption is a must. The Bank cannot allow turning a blind eye to corruption to be the shortest ladder to professional success. Bank employees should not be punished for identifying corruption and pursuing it.
The Bank must internally recognize that
the World Bank has partnered with four of
forums would allow any interested party
the proper identification of corruption is as
the leading multilateral development banks
to make its voice heard and question the
important as a successful project and should
in a cross-debarment accord where, if a firm
policies of the INT. Making the INT the
be rewarded accordingly.
is debarred under one bank, the others will
focus of one of these panels would facilitate
follow suit.164 These improvements will each
discussion and improvement of the Bank’s
have a great impact on the efficiency and
anti-corruption strategy. The transparency
effectiveness in the battle against corruption.
would uncloak the INT’s faults and would
The World Bank should be lauded for its
encourage the INT to implement a remedy.
efforts, but they are not enough. The Bank
While the Vice President probably would not
should work to make more cross-debarment
want this exposure, it would put the INT in
agreements with any organization which
a position where it must act. In the end, the
prosecutes corruption. It should work to
world will benefit.
G. THE WORLD BANK MUST WORK WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Working with the global community to fight corruption is of the utmost importance. Transparency is the name of the game with regard to this endeavor. Information sharing and critiques of procedure will create an environment where corruption cannot prosper. Any institution lagging behind the others in anti-corruption efforts can be pulled up with the others through transparency. Corruption will be deterred when organizations routinely punish wrongdoers after a finding of corruption. Investigators could be shared among organizations so that the most important cases were always adequately staffed. These procedural improvements can be easily realized. The World Bank has made some progress working with other organizations. In 2010 it held the first meeting of the International Corruption Hunters Alliance (“ICHA”), a gathering of more than 200 officials from every part of the world. 159 The second meeting was held in June 2012 and boasted more than 300 officials in attendance.160 The members have all agreed that improving the quality and speed of information sharing is a necessity.161 The World Bank has also partnered with the OECD to share information.162 A recent agreement with the European Union will allow the INT to share both investigators and information more freely and effectively.163 Perhaps the most prominent procedural improvement is that
create even tighter networks of information
The Bank must change its public face to
sharing. These agreements, called impossible
a more transparent one. Frank Vogl notes
—————————————————
that reports are often dense and esoteric.
Perhaps the most prominent procedural improvement is that the World Bank has partnered with four of the leading multilateral development banks in a cross-debarment accord where, if a firm is debarred under one bank, the others will follow suit.
He wishes the Bank to respond to the class
—————————————————
—————————————————
of the Arab Spring—to educate them on its efforts—instead of catering almost exclusively to professionals rarely touched by corruption.168 Welcoming a broad public discussion on how development aid can assist the peoples of the developing world to improve governance would further anticorruption far more efficiently.169
by some critics due to the vastly different
VII. Conclusion
political environments in which development
—————————————————
banks operate,
are fundamental to a
Current World Bank President Jim Yong Kim
strong, universal accord against corruption.
recently re-affirmed his commitment to anti-
The World Bank must work to become
corruption in the INT’s 2013 Annual Report:
more transparent and invite others to
“I want to make it abundantly clear that the
discuss the policies. Twice a year the World
World Bank Group has zero tolerance for
Bank hosts a meeting with the International
corruption.”170 He continued by stressing the
Monetary Fund.166 Thousands of individuals
importance of “setting the right tone at the
are in attendance, including Bank officials,
top.”171 The World Bank needs to stand at the
government officials from across the world,
top of the anti-corruption movement. The
journalists, businessmen, bankers and other
INT is the vehicle which will take the Bank
non-governmental organizations. 167 The
there. Crippling issues must be addressed
topic of discussion in one of these meetings
if the INT is to come to the surface as a
must be amended to include, and even focus
pre-eminent authority in anti-corruption.
on, anti-corruption. The panels and open
The INT can and will be a beacon of hope
165
81
Currents Winter 2013
in this world—it needs only to overcome its
Goals (“MGD”), have been closely tied to
nations, then countries and organizations
own inadequacies.
anti-corruption. Transparency International
must end corruption. The INT must set fire
Frank Vogl, the founder of Transparency
has found “ample evidence of the value
to corruption and bring a new dawn in the
International, calls the fight against
of designing MGD action plans that
movement.
corruption a long war.172 The scale of the
adequately integrate governance and anti-
problem is enormous, he says—there will
corruption mechanisms.”174 Transparency
always be corruption in the government.173
International has charted a strong positive
The goal should be to limit it to the greatest
correlation between anti-corruption and
extent possible.
success in achieving MGDs in over 46
Perhaps the most monumental ambitions
countries.175 If the MGDs truly represent
of humankind, the Millennium Development
the aspirations of the human race and our
End Notes
* J.D., 2014, South Texas College of Law, Managing Editor for Currents: International Trade Law Journal. 1. Peter Gelling, Indonesia’s Muslim Party Widens Its Appeal, N.Y. Times (Mar. 20, 2006), http://www. nytimes.com/2006/03/20/world/ asia/20iht-indo.html?_r=1&. 2. Integrity Vice Presidency, A n n ua l R e p o r t : F i s c a l Y ear 2012 26 (2012), http:// s i t e r e s o u r c e s. wo r l d b a n k . o r g / E X T D O I I / Re s o u r c e s / WBG_IntegrityReport2012.pdf [hereinafter FY’12]. 3. Frank Vogl, Waging War on Corruption 214 (2012). 4. Id. 5. This includes, but is not limited to: (1) theft of public funds by government leaders and their cronies; (2) bribes being paid to those who hold public-sector power by those seeking special favors; and (3) extortion by politicians and civil servants to obtain illicit payments from ordinary people and from businesses by threatening them with bitter consequences if they do not pay or by withholding basic services from them. Frank Vogl, Waging War on Corruption 2–3 (2012). 6. Politics and Gover nment, T ransparency I nternational , http://www.transparency.org/ topic/detail/politics_and_ government (last visited Mar. 27, 2014). 7. Cor ruption by Countr y: USA, T ransparency I nternational , h t t p : / / t r a n s p a r e n c y. o r g / country#USA (last visited Mar. 27, 2014).
8. Lucinda A. Low, Transnational Cor ruption: New Rules for Old Temptations, New Players to Combat a Perennial Evil, 92 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 151 (1998). 9. Integrity Vice Presidency, Annual Report: Fiscal Year 2013 6 (2013), http://siteresources. worldbank.org/INTDOII/Resou rces/588889-1381352645465/ INT_Annual_Update_FY13_ WEB.pdf [hereinafter FY’13]. 10. Tania Branigan, £100M Fund to Combat Corruption Among Developing World Leaders, T he G uardian (July 13, 2006), http://www. theguardian.com/politics/2006/ jul/14/uk.internationalaidanddev elopment. 11. Id. 12. Id. 13. Lee Jae-Oh, Anti-Cor ruption and Transparency: South Korea’s Pathway to Preeminence in the AsiaPacific (May 24, 2010), http:// uskoreainstitute.org/wp-content/ uploads/2011/01/TranscriptLeeJaeOh.pdf. 14. Id. at 5. 15. Id. 16. G20 Leader’s Declaration, The White House, para.77 (June 19, 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/ the-press-office/2012/06/19/ g20-leaders-declaration. 17. Id. 18. OECD Secretary-General, Strategic Orientations by the Secretary-General, para. 28, OECD Council at Ministerial Level (May 23, 2012), http://www.oecd.org/about/ secretary-general/50452360.pdf. 19. Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. Doc. A/ RES/58/4 (Oct. 31, 2003).
20. See James P. Wesber r y, Jr., International Financial Institutions Face The Corruption Eruption: If The IFIs Put Their Muscle And Money Where Their Mouth Is, The Corruption Eruption May Be Capped, 18 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 498, 499 (Winter 1998). 21. See Wolfensohn Outlines a New Agenda, W orld B ank , http:// web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/ EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,conte ntMDK:20020434~pagePK:64 257043~piPK:437376~theSite PK:4607,00.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2014). 22. Id. 23. See About Integrity, World Bank, h t t p : / / g o. w o r l d b a n k . o r g / GFMUIT4D60 (last visited Mar. 27, 2014). 24. See generally The World Bank’s Integrity Vice Presidency, G ov ’ t . Accountability Project, http:// www.whistleblower.org/programareas/inter national-refor m/ world-bank/world-bank-int (last visited Mar. 27, 2014) (discussing numerous INT difficulties). 25. See FY’12, supra note 2, at 5–6. 26. World Bank, Anticorruption Strategy Puts World Bank in the Front Seat on Transparency Front, YouTube (Sept. 28, 2010), http://www.youtube. com/watch?v=VsMmxRWXiok. 27. There are five types of sanctionable practices: (1) corrupt practice, the giving of something of value to influence improperly the actions of another party; (2) fraudulent practice, an act or omission which is intended to mislead in order to obtain a financial benefit or avoid an obligation; (3) collusive practice, an arrangement between 82
Currents Winter 2013
two or more parties designed to achieve an improper purpose; (4) coercive practice, threatening to or actually impairing or harming any party in order to influence them; and (5) obstructive practice, deliberately falsifying, destroying, falsifying, altering, or concealing any evidence or making false statements to investigators in order to impede a Bank investigation, or forcing another party to do this under duress. See Guidelines, World B ank (Oct. 15, 2006), http:// siteresources.worldbank.org/ INTOFFEVASUS/Resources/ WB_Anti_Corruption_ Guidelines_10_2006.pdf. 28. The Investigative Process, W orld Bank, http://go.worldbank.org/ FBADMWYOD0 (last visited Mar. 27, 2014). 29. Report Suspected Fraud, W orld Bank, http://go.worldbank.org/ OBUOB60810 (last visited Mar. 27, 2014). 30. The Investigative Process, supra note 28. 31. Id. 32. See FY’12, supra note 2, at 33. 33. Id. at 41–43. 34. See id. at 35. 35. See id. at 45. 36. See id. at 14. 37. Id. at 10. 38. Paul Wolfowitz Scandal, G ov ’ t . Accountability Project, http:// www.whistleblower.org/programareas/international-reform/worldbank/paul-wolfowitz-scandal (last visited Mar. 27, 2014). 39. G o v ’ t . A c c o u n t a b i l i t y Project, Review of the D epartment of I nstitutional Integrity at the World Bank
(Sept. 5, 2007), http://www. whistleblower.org/sites/default/ files/ReviewoftheINT_0.pdf [hereinafter GAP Review]. 40. Ana Palacio, Volcker Panel Update, W orld B ank (June 18, 2007), h t t p : / / g o. w o r l d b a n k . o r g / SLO0GMI1B0. 41. Id. 42. See id. 43. P aul V olcker et al , W orld Bank, Independent Panel R eview of the W orld B ank G ro u p D e pa r t m e n t o f Institutional Integrity (2007), http://siteresources.worldbank. org/NEWS/Resources/Volcker_ Report_Sept._12,_for_website_ FINAL.pdf [hereinafter Volcker Panel]. 44. Beatrice Edwards, The World Bank’s Anti-Corruption Charade, G ov ’ t Accountability Project (Apr. 12, 2010), http://www.whistleblower. org/blog/31-2010/513-the-worldbanks-anti-corruption-charade. 45. AV v. Int’l Bank for Reconstr. and Dev., ICSID Case No. 419, Judgment for Applicant, para. 45 (July 21, 2009), http:// lnweb90.worldbank.org/crn/wbt/ wbtwebsite.nsf/cf688641367a3e12 852569f50001c5c8/086cd4507ec9 4a95852576c4007daf15/$FILE/ AVDecisionNo.419.pdf. 46. Id. para. 46. 47. Edwards, supra note 44. 48. Volcker Panel, supra note 43, para. 32. 49. Id. para. 31. 50. Id. para. 32. 51. Id. 52. Id. para. 34. 53. Id. 54. Id. para. 35. 55. Id. para. 36. 56. Id. paras. 37–38. 57. Id. para. 131. 58. Id. 59. Id. paras. 133–34. 60. Id. para. 85. 61. Id. 62. Id. para. 86. 63. Id. 64. Id. para. 91. 65. Id. 66. Id. 67. Id. para. 94. 68. Id. 69. Id. para. 32. 70. Id. 71. Id. para. 34. 72. Id. para. 33. 73. Id. para. 34. 74. Id. 75. Id. para. 35. 76. Id. para. 34. 77. Id. paras. 34–35. 78. Id. para. 35. 79. Id. para. 36. 80. Id.
81. Id. 82. Id. 83. Id. para. 37. 84. Id. 85. Id. 86. Id. 87. Id. 88. Id. 89. See GAP Review, supra note 39. 90. Id. at 3. 91. Id. at 4. 92. Volcker Panel, supra note 43, para. 15. 93. GAP Review, supra note 39, at 5. 94. Id. 95. Id. 96. Id. at 24–25. 97. Id. at 24. 98. Id. at 25. 99. Id. 100. Id. 101. Id. at 4. 102. Id. at 5. 103. I n d e p . A dv i s o ry B d ., 2010 A n n ua l R e p o r t 1 1 ( J a n . 2011) [hereinafter IAB 2010], available at http://siteresources. worldbank.org/PROJECTS/ Resources/40940-1244163232994 / I A B - 2 0 1 0 - A n n u a l Re p o r t finalJan31_2011.pdf. 104. Id. 105. Id. 106. Id. at 9. 107. Id. 108. T h e I n d e p e n d e n t A d v i s o r y Board, W orld B ank , http:// go.worldbank.org/S262CF3KD0 (last visited July 16, 2014). 109. Id.; see I ndep . A dvisory B d ., 2011 A nnual R eport 11 (Jan. 2011), http://siteresources. worldbank.org/PROJECTS/ Resources/40940-1244163232994 /IABAnnualReport2011-finalforweb.pdf [hereinafter IAB 2011]. 110. The Investigative Process, supra note 28. 111. See Integrity Vice Presidency, A nnual R eport : F iscal Y ear 2011 (2011) [hereinafter FY’11], a vailable at http:// siteresources.worldbank.org/ INTDOII/Resources/588889 1316720250792/INT_AR_FY11_ web.pdf. 112. IAB 2011, supra note 109, at 4. 113. Id. 114. From fiscal year 2009 through 2012, the number of referred cases increased each year: 9 in ’09, 32 in ’10, 40 in ’11, and most recently 46 in ’12. FY’12, supra note 2, at 33. 115. Id. 116. Press Release, Europa, World Bank and OLAF Step Up Efforts to Jointly Combat Fraud and Corruption in Development Aid (Nov. 2011), available at http:// europa.eu/rapid/press-release_ OLAF-11-14_en.htm.
117. World Bank Staff R. 8.01 para. 1.02 (Aug. 8, 2011), available at http://siteresources.worldbank. org/INTDOII/Resources/Staff_ Rule_801.pdf. 118. World Bank Staff R. 8.01 para. 4.03. 119. The Staff Rules were modified to ensure the staff member would receive a copy of the final investigative report so that they could respond to it and the Guide to Staff Rule 8.01 says the staff member will receive transcripts of any interviews within 10 days. Each of these was suggested by the Volcker Panel. World Bank Staff R. 8.01 para. 4.09. 120. World Bank Staff R. 8.02 para. 2.06 (June 13, 2008), available at http://siteresources.worldbank. o r g / I N T S TA F F M A N UA L / Resources/StaffManual_WB_web. pdf. 121. D epartment of I nstitutional Integrity, Improving Development Incomes: Annual I n t e g r i t y R e p o r t 4 (2007) [hereinafter FY’07], available at http://siteresources.worldbank. o r g / I N T D O I I / Re s o u r c e s / fy07report-complete.pdf. 122. Id. at 15. 123. These factors include (1) impact on development incomes; (2) impact on the Bank’s reputation and finances; (3) impact on present and future Bank engagements; (4) ability to deter future corrupt practices; (5) estimated cost of resolution; (6) likelihood of resolution; and (7) safety to bank staff and resources. FY’07, supra note 121, at 15. 124. Id. 125. Medium priority cases would be reviewed every month to determine if any new information has come about that warrants their promotion to high priority while low priority cases would be reviewed after 30 days and dismissed if no new information had surfaced (the INT blamed this state of affairs on a lack of resources to pursue all claims). Id. 126. FY’11, supra note 111, at 33. 127. Id. 128. Id. 129. FY’12, supra note 2, at 33. 130. GAP Review, supra note 39, at 5. 131. Id. at 13. 132. Id. at 5. 133. Volcker Panel, supra note 43, para. 28. 134. FY’12, supra note 2, at 34. 135. FY’11, supra note 111, at 34. 136. I n t e g r i t y V i c e P r e s i d e n c y , Annual Report: Fiscal Year 2010, at 28 (2010) [hereinafter FY‘10], available at http://siteresources.
wo r l d b a n k . o r g / I N T D O I I / Resources/588889-12863087934 20/WBG_IntegrityReport2010_ final_LO-RES.pdf. 137. I n d e p . A dv i s o ry B d ., 2013 A n n ua l R e p o r t 3 ( F e b . 2014) [hereinafter IAB 2013], available at http://siteresources. worldbank.org/PROJECTS/ Resources/40940-1244163232994 /IAB-2013-ANNUAL_REPORTFINAL-28FEB14.pdf. 138. Id. 139. Volcker Panel, supra note 43, para. 29. 140. IAB 2011, supra note 109, at 7. 141. Id. 142. IAB 2013, supra note 137, at 4. 143. Id. 144. IAB 2010, supra note 103, at 6. 145. Id. 146. Id. 147. Richard Behar, The Fate of a World Bank Whistle-Blower, Forbes (June 27, 2012, 10:53 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ richardbehar/2012/06/27/thesad-fate-of-a-world-bank-whistleblower/. 148. World Bank Staff R. 8.02 para. 1.01(June 13, 2008), available at http://siteresources.worldbank. o r g / I N T S TA F F M A N UA L / Resources/StaffManual_WB_web. pdf. 149. World Bank Staff R. 8.02 para. 1.03. 150. World Bank Staff R. 8.02 paras. 2.01(a)–(b). 151. World Bank Staff R. 8.02 para. 2.04. 152. World Bank Staff R. 8.02 para. 2.05. 153. A staff member may only report to an outside entity if such reporting is “necessary to avoid (1) a significant threat to public health or safety; (2) substantive damage to Bank Group operations; or (3) a violation of national or international law.” An internal mechanism is inadequate if (1) the staff member believes all avenues within the Bank will result in retaliation; (2) the staff member believes that reporting inside the Bank will cause all evidence to be destroyed or concealed; or (3) the staff member has reported the misconduct and has no received a status notification within six months of such a report. World Bank Staff R. 8.02 para. 4.02. 154. Behar, supra note 147. 155. John Y. Kim v. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, No. 448, paras. 80–83 (World Bank Admin. Trib. 2011) [hereinafter Decision No. 448], available at http://lnweb90. worldbank.org/cr n/wbt/ wbtwebsite.nsf/cf688641367a3e
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12852569f50001c5c8/747bfcd68 9ee1874852578b200722e5c/$FI LE/KimDecisionNo.448.pdf. 156. Behar, supra note 147. 157. Decision No. 448, supra note 155, para. 12. 158. Vogl, supra note 3, at 216. 159. International Corruption Hunters Alliance 2010, W o r l d B a n k , h t t p : / / g o. w o r l d b a n k . o r g / LF2ND3CF30 (last updated Feb. 2, 2011). 160. The World Bank’s Inter national Cor ruption Hunters Alliance W ill Attack Global Cor ruption with Technology, Partnerships and Knowledge, World Bank (June 6, 2012), http://go.worldbank.org/ USC3HMU890. 161. Id. 162. IAB 2011, supra note 109, at 4. 163. Europa, supra note 116. 164. Cross-Debarment Accord Steps Up Fight Against Corruption, World B a n k (Apr. 2010), http:// go.worldbank.org/B699B73Q00. 165. Frank A. Fariello, Jr. & Conrad C. Daly, Coordinating The Fight Against Corruption Among MDBS: The Past, Present, and Future of Sanctions, 45 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 253, 266 (2013). 166. Annual and Spring Meetings, World Bank, http://go.worldbank.org/ M5FBN0PW90 (last updated Jan. 18, 2013). 167. Id. 168. Vogl, supra note 3, at 216. 169. Id. 170. I n t e g r i t y V i c e P r e s i d e n c y , 2013 A nnual F iscal R eport 1 (2013), http://siteresources. wo r l d b a n k . o r g / I N T D O I I / Resources/588889-1381352645 465/INT_Facts_and_Figures_ FY13_WEB.pdf. 171. Id. 172. Vogl, supra note 3, at 3. 173. Id. 174. T ransparency I nternational , The Anti-Corruption Catalyst: Realising the MDGs by 2015, 1 (Sept. 14, 2010), available at http://www.transparency-usa.org/ documents/AntiCorruptionCa talystRealisingtheMDGby2015. pdf. 175. Id.
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