EU-Russia review: Issue 3

THE EU-RUSSIA REVIEW Issue Three After Putin… What Next?

Russia Today – Energy & Foreign Policy, Civil Liberties & the Rule of Law, The Media

March 2007©

EUEU-Russia Centre Review 3 Introduction The future of EU-Russia relations will be a priority for both sides in 2007. What will be the outcome of the negotiations to replace the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA)? How will the energy card be played? How will the EU and Russia deal with their considerable internal problems? The German presidency hopes to achieve some progress on the stalled constitutional treaty but it is difficult to see progress until after the French presidential elections in May. In Russia, attention will be focused on the race to succeed Vladimir Putin as president.

A major part of this review is devoted to this question. In his analysis of the election race, Professor Eberhard Schneider outlines several options ranging from a constitutional amendment allowing him to run again (unlikely) to a package deal involving the two main camps, the Siloviki represented by Sergei Ivanov, and the centrists, represented by Dmitri Medvedev. He concludes that whoever wins, there are unlikely to be major changes from current policies.

Four distinguished political analysts - Gerhard Mangott University of Innsbruck), Marie Mendras (Sciences Po), Andrei Piontkovsky (Hudson Institute) and Alex Pravda (Oxford University), - then comment on Professor Schneider’s options.

While there is broad agreement with the list of likely candidates there are also some interesting nuances in their assessments. Gerhard Mangott thinks that a new president will lead to substantial personnel changes and wonders whether the EU might not prefer the devil it knows. Marie Mendras suggests that the new president will have to move quickly to differentiate himself from his mentor otherwise he may become prisoner of the influential financial and corporate interests in Russia. Andrei Piontkovsky dismisses the idea of a conflict between various interest groups and considers that there is complete moral and political unity among the elite. Alex Pravda believes that Putin will continue to play an influential role and the succession will not change the strategic direction established by him The second part of the review contains the summary reports of three workshops the EU-Russia Centre organised in Brussels in December. These brought together several EU and Russian experts to discuss foreign policy and energy; civil society and human rights; and the state of the media.

The working group on foreign policy and energy examined the key actors and drivers of Russian foreign policy, and considered Moscow’s main interests and priorities before assessing the use of the energy tool for political purposes. The civil society and human rights workshop assessed the implications of the new NGO law and examined the importance of the Council of Europe, especially the European Court on Human Rights, in influencing the judicial system in Russia.

The working group on the media noted the increased state controls on the Russian media and the limited access many Russians have to a broad range of information sources.

Not surprisingly, the experts were unanimous in calling for a more coherent and values-based EU policy towards Russia in order to help strengthen democracy,

2

human rights and civil society. This is something that the EU-Russia Centre will continue to promote in 2007.

Finally, it is a pleasure to announce that four distinguished political figures have agreed to form our Founding Board. They are Lord Ashdown (president), Pat Cox, Gunter Burghardt and Heidi Hautula. We are extremely pleased to have their support in our future work.

Fraser Cameron Director

3

Putin’s Successor

By Eberhard Schneider

Contents Introduction The powers of the president Putin’s successor – the possibilities 1 A third term 2. A Centrist candidate 2. A Siloviki candidate 4. A compromise candidate 5. President of a new union between Russia and Belarus 6. Putin as head of government 7. A weak nominee nominee 8. Mr X Assessment Consequences for Western policy

4

Introduction In March 2008, Russian president Vladimir Putin will reach the end of his second term.

According to the constitution, he is forbidden from running for a third consecutive term of office. As the whole Russian political system is based on the presidency, the question as to who will succeed Putin is of major political importance.

The powers of the president In order to understand the current powers of the president, it is useful to review how these powers have developed and the way in which they are implemented. The president is the central figure in the Russian political system. He is not only the head of state, but also the chief of the executive arm of government. The constitution recognises the office of head of government but accords the president the right to chair cabinet meetings1. The president also appoints the prime minister, although he must receive the approval of the Duma. The appointment of ministers does not require Duma approval but it must take into account the wishes of the prime minister. While the president does not have the power to dismiss individual ministers, he can demand the resignation of the whole government2.

When forming a government, the president does not have to consider the strength of political parties in the Duma because the government is a cabinet of technocrats whose period of office is linked to the presidential term and not the parliamentary legislative period, unlike the Duma. The Russian government is not answerable to parliament.

When Boris Yeltsin was president, he made the ministries dealing with security matters (Siloviki) directly responsible to himself. These ministries included defence, interior, federal security or FSB, foreign affairs, justice, civil defence, emergency and disaster services, as well as federal agencies responsible for gathering foreign intelligence, homeland protection and border protection (now transferred to the FSB). With the transfer of responsibility in these areas away from the prime minister, the government was more or less reduced to an economic and administrative role.

The president has the power to veto legislation, but this veto can be overruled by a two thirds majority of the Duma and the Federation Council3. The main political power of the president lies in the decree4 that can be used for anything which has the least legal significance, as long as it does not contravene the federal constitution.

The president can also dismiss the Duma if it has rejected his nomination for prime minister three times and he has no further candidate5; when the Duma has repeated a vote of no confidence in a government the president wishes to maintain within three months6; or when the Duma refuses the prime minister’s request for a vote of confidence in his government 7.

The constitution allows the president to determine the direction of domestic and foreign policy8 and he is in charge of external affairs9. The president is the guardian of the constitution, as well as of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of Russia’s citizens10. He also has the power to pardon11. He makes proposals to the Federation Council (the Upper Chamber) for judges to serve on the constitutional court, the Supreme Court and the appeal court, and nominates the attorney general. In addition, (Art. 83b).

(Art. 83c) 3 (Art. 107 para 3).

4 (Art 90) 5 (Art 117) 6 (Art. 117 para 3) 7 (Art 117. para 4).

8 (Art. 80) 9 (Art 86) 10 (Art. 80) 11 (Art 89) 1 2

5

the president can ask the Federation Council to dismiss the attorney general. The president alone has the power to determine other federal judicial appointments12 The president is also the head of the armed forces13 and appoints and dismisses service chiefs14. In case of an attack, or an immediate threat of attack, the president can declare a state of war across the whole country or individual regions, but he is obliged to inform the Federation Council and the Duma immediately of his decision15. He has a similar duty to inform them if he declares a state of emergency at national or regional level16. The Federation Council is required to confirm the appropriate presidential decree. The president also has the power to set aside legislation introduced by republics or regions (until such time as the appropriate court has passed judgement) if they contravene federal law or international agreements concerned with subjects such as human rights and freedoms17.

As a counterweight to an overpowerful presidential executive role, the constitution includes a complicated system of impeachment for high treason or other serious crimes involving the following procedure: the Duma (a) with a minimum one third (150 members) can decide to bring a charge of treason or other similarly serious crime against the president. The documented charges would then (b) be considered by a special commission that has been agreed by a simple majority of the Duma (requires 226 votes). Any charge proposed by the commission will need the support of two thirds of all Duma members (300). Then (c) the Supreme Court needs to document evidence that the president has indeed committed a crime. Following this, the constitutional court produces an opinion (d) that demonstrates that the correct procedure has been followed (Art 93). Finally, stage (e) the Federation Council must, by means of a two thirds majority (119), reach a decision within three months to remove the president from office18.

Given the substantial powers enjoyed by the president, Russia is often referred to as a state with a “super-presidential system”. Although modelled on the French fifth republic, it has in fact more features of the American system. The problem of the powerful presidential system is that it tends to promote patronage and is not conducive to the development of strong and healthy political parties.

Putin’s Successor - the possibilities Having understood the powers of the president and the different government mechanisms, it is possible to analyse the different scenarios concerning the succession to president Putin. There are a number of ‘players’ and differing interests at play which are reviewed here, though in no specific order of probability

.(Art. 83).

(Art 87) 14 (Art 83).

15 (Art. 87).

16 (Art 88) 17 (Art.85 para 2) 18 (Art. 93) 12 13

6

1. A third term Putin’s presidential term ends in March 2008. Article 81 of the constitution states that the president is elected for a four year term and can only serve for two consecutive terms19. Of course, this article could be amended. According to Article 136, such an amendment would fall under federal constitutional law procedure that requires the agreement of a minimum two thirds of members of the Duma and three quarters of the Federation Council20.

There is speculation that Putin’s repeated denials that he neither seeks a third term nor is looking to amend the constitution to allow a third consecutive term are not necessarily the last word. Altering the constitution would diminish Putin’s reputation in the international community, but this in itself would not have any real consequences as the West would soon be obliged to return to Realpolitik or ‘business as usual’. Recently, there have been a number of attempts to persuade Putin to run for a third term and therefore to introduce the necessary constitutional changes. This was the method successfully adopted by Belarus president Alexander Lukashenka in October 2004.

The following have already declared themselves to be in favour of a third presidential term for Putin: Governor of Yaroslavl Anatoly Lisitsyn, Mayor of Moscow Yuri Luzhkov, Governor of Novosibirsk, Viktor Tolokonsky, president of the republic of Mari El, Leonid Markelov, the governor of Nishni Novgorod, Mikhail Prussak, the governor of Voronezh, Vladimir Kulakov, the ex-president of the republic of Chechnya, Alu Alchanov, the Chechen prime minister, Ramzan Kadyrov, and the governor of St Petersburg, Valentina Matvienko, as well as a host of members from regional parliaments in Ivanovo, St. Petersburg and Primorsky Krai.

Another way of obtaining a constitutional amendment would be a referendum. This would allow Putin to declare that while he personally did not seek changes to allow a third term, he could not ignore the wishes of the majority of the Russian electorate. To this end, the Consensus and Stability Movement of north Ossetia has begun a Federation- wide media campaign to demand a referendum to change the constitution.

The Kremlin has denied any association with this campaign. Valery Gissoyev, chairman of Consensus and Stability, has declared that the move to a referendum will properly commence when it has the support of at least 40 members representing the regional parliaments.

An open letter could be published calling for a change to constitutional article 81 para 3 so that a president will be allowed to stand for more than two consecutive terms of office. Putin associate and chairman of the Federation Council, Sergei Mironov, when speaking to journalists about the above proposal on 7 June 2006, said that he regretted Putin could not run for a third term, but that he had no doubts that Putin’s successor would continue his policies. Some 56 representatives of the regional parliaments support the idea of a referendum.

The referendum law of 28 June 2004 allows for constitutional amendments21 to be decided by referendum. Article 7 para 3 states that no referendum can take place in the final year of the Duma legislative period (the next ends on 7 December 2007). A referendum would require the formation of initiative groups in a minimum of 40 states of the federation and the collection of two million signatures22, something that could quickly be carried out if the Kremlin so wished. It is for the president to determine the referendum23. The referendum can only take place 60 days after first notification24.

(para 3) (Art. 108 para 2) 21 (Art 6 para4) 22 (Art 17 para 2) 23 (Art 84c) 24 (Art. 23 para 3 of the referendum law) 19 20

7

Therefore, the latest date a referendum could have taken place would have been the beginning of December 2006, which would have implied the collection of signatures by the beginning of October 2006. As referendum legislation falls under the area of federal constitutional law, it would have been possible, given the political will, to make the necessary changes that would allow a referendum during the last year of the legislative period. This, however, would also have required a majority of at least two thirds in the Duma and approval by three quarters of the Federation Council25.

However, on 27 September 2006, the Central Electoral commission, whose members come from all political parties represented in the Duma, decided unanimously that such a referendum, regardless of the formulation of the question, would be illegal. In the opinion of the commission, referenda can only be held to clarify details of constitutional law. Referenda cannot be used to amend legislation in order to reverse its meaning.

The chairman of the Duma, Boris Gryzlov, who is also a member of Putin’s St. Petersburg ‘clan’, has also commented on the public’s readiness to elect Putin to a third presidential term should the possibility arise. On 8 June 2006, he made reference to an opinion survey carried out by research company, the Levada Centre, in which 60% of the public said they would vote for Putin as president once more. Putin could certainly run for a third term after a break.

In response to the north Ossetia referendum proposal, Gryzlov has stated that the majority of members of parliament see themselves as guardians of the constitution as it stands, thus sidelining the proposal.

The chief mover in the campaign for a third Putin term is Igor Sechin, deputy leader of the presidential administration and Putin confidante. He and his colleagues want Putin to be re-elected so that they can keep their current powerful positions that have allowed them to become bureaucratic oligarchs and therefore able to decide strategic economic policy (see below).

2. A centrist candidate candidate At the beginning of his term of office, Putin had to balance the interests of the five power groups that saw him as their representative: the Yeltsin family. president Yeltsin, had nominated Putin as his successor when he resigned on 31 December 1999: (a) the oligarchs - Boris Berezovsky, the most influential oligarch of the period, actively recommended Putin to Yeltsin as his successor; (b) the Siloviki or security service ministries; before he became prime minister in August 1999, Putin had headed up the FSB; (c) the reformers, because Putin had been made deputy to the reforming mayor of St. Petersburg, Anatoly Sobchak, in 1990, with whom he had also studied law at Leningrad University; and finally (d) the regional leaders, as Putin had also held an important office at regional level.

Since that time, Putin has sidelined three of these groups: the Yeltsin family with new ministerial appointments and the resignation or dismissal of their last main representatives; the oligarchs, by exiling Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gussinsky, as well as imprisoning Mikhail Khodorkovsky; and the regional leaders, with their close connections to Moscow.

There are therefore only two groups left: the Siloviki and the reformers, (who have in the meantime become the centrists). It is between these two that the power struggle for Putin’s successor is taking place. This became evident on 14 November 2005 with the surprising appointment of the reform-minded former chief of the presidential administration, Dmitri Medvedev, to the position of first deputy prime minister and the additional appointment of ex-defence minister, Sergei Ivanov, to the job of deputy prime

25

(Constitution Art 108 para 2).

8

minister with responsibility for the military industrial complex. Both come from Putin’s power base in St Petersburg.

Dmitri Medvedev is the centrist candidate to be Putin’s successor. He was born in 1965 in Leningrad (called St. Petersburg since 1991). Until 1987, he studied law at Zhdanov State University, where Putin also graduated from the law faculty in 1975. Between 1989 and 1996, Medvedev worked as a legal expert for the chairman of the committee for foreign economic relations. That chairman, Anatoly Sobchak, was a former university law teacher who taught both Putin and Medvedev who had in the intervening period become the reform-minded mayor of St Petersburg. Medvedev was also a lecturer at Leningrad University at that time.

In November 1999, Medvedev, after a not particularly successful excursion into the private sector, became deputy leader of Putin’s administration and then chief of Putin’s election campaign. In December 1999, Putin appointed him deputy leader of the presidential staff, and on 3 June 2000, he was made first deputy leader, and on 30 October 2003, he was promoted to leader. Medvedev was also elected successor to Viktor Chernomyrdin as chairman of the board of Gazprom on 3 June 2000.

As deputy prime minister, Medvedev’s first job was to ensure that the four national programmes on housing, health, education and agriculture were operational before the presidential election. To do this, he controlled a budget of billions, mainly provided by the high receipts from oil exports. This financial windfall has enabled him to increase the 2007 budget on education by more than 20% ($10.5 billion) and on health and sport by 24% ($7.8 billion). If Medvedev is able to ensure the success of these projects, then he will be able to take over from prime minister Mikhail Fradkov, who has not been involved with these programmes. Medvedev is wholly loyal to Putin but has shown little initiative or imagination when dealing with the national projects. He is the sort of politician who reacts rather than acts. In addition, as a result of his shady dealings in Leningrad which could put him in a compromising position, the general consensus is that he will always be the sort of person who will be led by others.

The deputy leader of the presidential administration, Vladislav Surkov, responsible for domestic policy and, in particular, for the United Russia party, could also be described as a centrist. He has connections to the intelligence services, namely the GRU (military intelligence). where he spent his military service from 1983-85. Other centrists are presidential advisors Sergei Prikhod’ko (foreign affairs), Sergei Yastrzemski (Europe), Dzhakhan Polyeva (education and science), Larissa Brytscheva (constitutional law), economics minister German Gref, and finance minister, Alexei Kudrin. Centrist foreign policy is geared to cooperation between Russia, the US and Europe.

Medvedev wants to be seen as a democrat. To this end, he criticised Surkov’s “sovereign democracy” idea for the United Russia party, at the end of July 2006, as totally unsuitable. These expressions are attempts to answer western criticism about increasingly authoritarian traits in Russian domestic policy. Surkov also wants to establish himself as a new kind of ideological chief, but he has failed. His new definition of Russian democracy did not even find favour with Putin. In Medvedev’s view, any attempt to characterise democracy with a specifics is suspect because it arouses the suspicion that whatever this “specific” form of democracy is, it is not the usually accepted kind. This debate demonstrates that the reform camp is not homogeneous.

3. A Siloviki candidate candidate The Siloviki, whose basic ideology rests on patriotism, Russian orthodoxy and a statecontrolled economy, are not politically homogeneous but a collective with differing interests. There are liberal Siloviki who have always maintained contact with the St. Petersburg reformers and who have always put their personal interests ahead of the group. Their leading figure is FSB Lt. General, defence minister and the other deputy prime minister, Sergei Ivanov.

9

In contrast to Medvedev, Ivanov is an independent character. He is also seen as the candidate that is best prepared to become president. He sees all of Putin’s papers, which makes him well informed about matters way beyond his own area of responsibility. Ivanov was born in Leningrad in 1953 and studied English in the state university (Zhdanov). In 1974, he spent 16 weeks at Thames Valley university in the UK. Like Putin, he graduated (1977) from the KGB Institute in Minsk, and later (1982), from the Moscow KGB Institute. In 1977, he met Putin while working for the KGB in Leningrad. Subsequently he worked in London, Helsinki, Nairobi and Stockholm in the 1980s. Under Putin (1998-99), he was deputy head of the FSB and later Putin’s successor as secretary of the national security council (1999-2001).

As chairman of the military-industrial commission, Ivanov controlled a budget of some $25 billion. Putin is likely to measure his political success at rebuilding the army, rather than pushing through the military reforms that he worked on in 2000, reforms that now seem to have been forgotten.

Ivanov will be pleased with a 13% increase in the military budget to $31 billion in 2007.

Over the next decade, some $145 billion will be spent on the military. In November 2006, Ivanov was appointed by Putin to be the chairman of the supervisory board of the new United Aircraft company which is two-thirds under state control. This new holding should unite the civil and military parts of the aircraft industry and will have a budget of $3.6 billion from April 2007.

Ivanov’s image will also be improved with the creation of a new consultative body in the defence ministry. This body will allow representations to be made by the parents of serving soldiers to the military authorities. Ivanov has also shown an interest in the energy sector by offering military assistance to protect the planned Baltic gas pipeline.

One should also consider potential candidates from the radical Siloviki group, responsible for the distribution of economic resources and headed by deputy head of the presidential administration and Putin's chancellor, Igor Sechin. Others associated with this group include FSB chief Nikolai Patrushev; minister for the interior General Rashid Nurgaliev (2000-2002, deputy FSB chief); and until the beginning of June 2006, attorney general Vladimir Ustinov, whose son Dmitri is married to Sechin’s daughter, Inga; and Sergei Bogdanchikov, who was confirmed as chairman of the board of the state oil concern Rosneft (the recipient of Khodorkovky’s oil company Yukos) on 8 June 2006. The chairman of the Rosneft board since July 2004 was Sechin. Last year, Sechin wanted Rosneft to take over the gas concern Gazprom while Medvedev wanted Gazprom to take over Rosneft. As they could not agree as to which concern should survive, Putin ruled out both.

Another group is lead by Putin’s chief of staff in the presidential administration, FSB Lt General Viktor Ivanov, who was deputy FSB chief from 1999 to 2000. He is a close ally of Sechin and oversees the oil and gas industries, as well as the military industrial complex and aviation.

Siloviki foreign policy doctrine desires a strong Russia with the primary neo imperialist goal of re-establishing military and political power in the CIS. Their methods of achieving this are through the traditional control of raw materials, visas, military bases and the “Russianisation” of policy in the CIS. They are against any Europeanisation of Russia, preferring more contact with China and India in the form of joint military manoeuvres, procurement agreements and cooperation in oil and gas (as both Asian powers have growing energy needs).

In recent times, Putin has done nothing to strengthen Sechin’s position. When the post of chief of the presidential administration came free with the departure of Dmitri Medvedev on 14 November 2005, the job was given to an important regional figure,

10

Sergei Sobyanin, the governor of the important oil-producing area of Tyumen. This appointment maintained a political balance between the two deputy leaders of the presidential administration, Igor Sechin and the Kremlin’s man responsible for domestic affairs, Vladislav Surkov.

On 3 June 2006, Putin unexpectedly dismissed Attorney General Ustinov, who had been in office since May 2000. The Federation Council voted 142 for , and with no votes against, to support Putin’s decision. Only a few weeks before, in April, Putin had successfully asked the Federation Council to extend Ustinov’s term for a further five years. The explanation for the circumstances surrounding Ustinov’s departure is, according to Duma member Alexei Khinschtein and the founder of the Institute for Strategic Studies, Stanislaw Belkovsky (both of whom have good connections in the FSB), to be found in the politics of the run-up to the presidential election.

The surprise dismissal of Ustinov and Alexander Savennkov, military advocate and deputy attorney general, was because both of them sought to discredit Medvedev and Ivanov as suitable candidates under orders from Sechin and in order to force Putin to stand for a third term. In seeking to discredit Ivanov, Sechin states that (a) Ivanov gave the contract for the provisioning of the whole army to a company run by his son and (b) the indictment brought by the military legal authorities against the defence ministry over the mutilation of conscript Andrei Sychov by drunken soldiers during the night of New Year’s Eve 2005/2006. Ustinov’s successor, appointed in mid June, is neither from the Siloviki nor the centrist group, but is one of Putin’s own men, justice minister, Yuri Chaika.

If the Siloviki think they are in danger of losing the battle for Putin’s successor, one cannot rule out the possibility that they will use tactics to increase tension both domestically and in international relations with the aim of increasing demands for the need for a strong leader.

4. A compromise candidate If Putin is unable to negotiate a compromise package with the Siloviki and the centrists, where one of them provides the president and the other the prime minister, it is not impossible that he will suggest –as he did in the case of a successor to prime minister Mikhail Kasyanov in March 2004 - an outsider who has had connections to both parties in the past. In this case, it was Mikhail Fradkov, Russia’s ex-ambassador to the European Union.

In answer to questions in Shanghai on 15 June 2006, Putin said that he might propose someone not as well known as the two front runners as his successor, meaning Ivanov and Medvedev. He also confirmed that he would not be seeking a third term and that he had no desire to amend the constitution, as this would damage his moral authority as head of state. One could not require the people to obey the law if one did not do so oneself.

One compromise figure could be Vladimir Yakunin, who has been responsible for Russia’s railways since June 2005, and has been a friend of Putin since their time together in St Petersburg. Yakunin, an independent sort of politician, was born in 1948 in the region of Vladimir and spent his childhood in Estonia. He graduated in 1971 from the Leningrad Mechanical Institute and then worked in the Institute for Applied Chemistry. From 1977, he worked in the Soviet Committee for Foreign Trade, and between 1985 and 1991, he was at the Soviet embassy to the UN in New York, where, from 1988, he was first deputy leader of mission and also a KGB officer.

When Yakunin was president Boris Yeltsin’s chief of the north western administrative inspectorate, Nicolai Patrushev, later head of the FSB, was his right hand man. With the resignation of Voloshin, Yakunin was talked about as a possible successor as leader of the presidential administration. He enjoys free access to Putin without first having to go

11

through Sechin, and during the Easter services of 2005 and 2006, stood immediately behind Putin as candle bearer. Yakunin has an open-minded interest in foreign affairs.

He is a good listener and even accepts criticism about Russian domestic politics.

Together with the Russian Academy of Sciences, he has already set up a centre to look at policy programmes, along the lines of the centre established in 1999 by Putin to develop strategy. He is an active commentator on politics and speaks at conferences on the question as to how power and leadership in the modern state can be best combined.

In a country that has 11 time zones and no motorways, the railway, alongside the aeroplane, is the most important means of transport. According to deputy Prime Minister Alexander Shukov, reforming Russia’s railways is a major test for Yakunin. One indication that Yakunin could be a viable Putin successor would be using him to replace over-extended prime minister Fradkov before the presidential election. This would, however, require experienced ministers for finance and economics, something that is not the case in the present Fradkov cabinet.

5. President of a new Union between Russia and Belarus A further possibility could be Putin becoming president of a new Russia-Belarus union.

Under this scenario, both presidents Putin and Lukashenka would agree an interim constitution prior to a referendum on the creation of a new union. The new constitution would be drafted by the chairmen of both parliaments, Boris Gryzlov (Russia) and Vladimir Konoplev (Belarus). In 2007, both parliaments should agree the new constitution and a new parliament elected towards the end of the year. The union should have just eight powers: customs, borders, technical cooperation, norms and legal standards, finance, currency and some other undefined functions. The Kremlin expects that other countries, such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Armenia, would also join. If this happened, the first president in 2008 could be Putin.

6. Putin as head of government Putin’s successor could name him as head of the government with similar powers to those of a western prime minister. However, this would require, a change in the constitution in order to strengthen the head of government’s position at the expense of the president’s powers - along the lines of Ukraine.

7. A Weak Nominee Another possibility is that Putin could put forward a weak politician such as the chairman of the Duma, Boris Gryzlov, who was previously interior minister and a close ally of Putin. Gryzlov is also the chair of the United Russia party. After two years of the normal four year period in office, such a ‘technocratic’ president would resign and pave the way for Putin to replace him, something that is allowed under the constitution. Only a third successive candidature is forbidden. One could also foresee a situation where Medvedev, after his first term as president, decides not to run again and thus opens for door for Putin to stand again.

8. Mister X It is possible that Putin does not know who he will support as his successor today. It is said that he often changes his mind and is heavily influenced by his immediate colleagues. Therefore one cannot exclude that Putin’s successor may not come from any of the above possibilities and is someone nobody has heard of today.

Assessment In examining the various possibilities regarding the successor question, one has to take into account the concrete political circumstances of the election. If there was a terrorist act a few days before the election, for example, the Siloviki representative, Sergei Ivanov, could be expected to gain votes.

12

The Kremlin might unite behind one candidate and not allow Medvedev to stand against Ivanov or Yakunin. Boris Gryzlov, chairman of the ruling United Russia party, is also unlikely to stand against the Kremlin candidate, whereas the chairman of the LiberalDemocratic party, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, and the chairman of the Communist party, Gennady Zyuganov, are likely to stand. It is also possible that Yakunin, as part of a package deal, might be put forward as prime minister under a president Medvedev.

According to a December 2006 Levada Centre poll, Zyuganov would gain 10% of votes, Zhirinovsky 12%, Ivanov 23% and Medvedev 38%. But these results do not count for much at this stage. In the opinion of Boris Makarenko, a candidate would only have a serious chance of succeeding Putin when he has 40% in the polls and his opponent only 15%. The above results only show that the electorate has not yet made up its mind and merely reiterates the candidate who appears most on television. In addition, Putin has not declared who is his favourite. A further Levada Centre poll in October 2006 also revealed that one third of the voters were prepared to support whoever Putin recommended. In any case, there will be a run-off as no candidate is likely to receive an absolute majority in the first round.

A further poll carried out by the Moscow High School for Economics in the summer of 2006 asked representatives of political and business elites for their assessment of likely presidential candidates. This time, Medvedev had a narrow lead over Ivanov.

Which of the above possibilities regarding Putin’s successor are most likely? An essential point to consider is what Putin wishes and what his entourage wishes. The first possibility of a change to the constitution to allow a third term in office would not meet the publicly-stated wishes of Putin, but cannot be ruled out. Some in the Kremlin would prefer to see this ‘Lukashenko’ model carried out.

Which candidate is likely to receive Putin’s support? One year before the election, it is difficult to assess whether a centrist (Medvedev) or a Silovik (Ivanov) candidate will succeed Putin. It is a characteristic of Putin, when there are two sides in an important argument, that he does not rush to a decision but gives both sides an opportunity and watches who gains the upper hand. The two rival power groups do not differ fundamentally from each other in terms of politics. Both want to preserve a strong state and both want to ensure that key industries (especially oil and gas) remain under state control. The differences between them relate more to respect for democracy - or rather its manipulation.

If there is a stand-off and no compromise is possible between these groups, then Putin could nominate a third candidate with connections to both sides who would thus see their interests protected. This fourth possibility has only a small chance of being implemented as both groups would seek to draw the compromise candidate, possibly Yakunin, to their side.

The fifth possibility, Putin as president of a new Russia-Belarus Federation, is the least likely outcome. Lukashenko is not ready or willing to form such a Union under Russia’s conditions and neither is Putin ready to allow Lukashenko a powerful role in any such Union. Another variation, according to the Ukrainian model, whereby the prime minister’s office is strengthened through a constitutional change, and then Putin takes this position, is also highly unlikely.

The seventh possibility has the best chance of being realised. Putin takes a break for a relatively short period and when his successor resigns, he can stand for president again.

Even at the end of his second term in office, Putin’s authority should be strong enough to ensure that he can successfully oppose any successor that goes against his wishes.

Regardless of what solution is found for Putin’s successor, the new president will only have limited room for manoeuvre as he will have to take into account the interests of

13

both power groups, the centrists and the Sivoliki. It is quite probable, therefore, that the current mix of Siloviki and liberal conservatives will continue in the form of a strong, sometimes authoritarian, state practising economic liberalism, albeit with key industries under state control.

On 13 May 2006, Putin stated that, as a citizen of Russia, he would announce his preferred candidate but would not actively campaign for that candidate or impose him on the country. There is evidence to suggest that he has considered who should succeed him from the very beginning of his second term and how this might happen. But Putin is likely to wait before declaring his favoured candidate, otherwise he would risk the danger that no one would take him seriously for the remainder of his term in office.

Consequences Consequences for Western Policy One could argue that it does not really matter who takes over from Putin as the power groupings and the political constellation will not change. To a certain degree, this is correct, especially in the early stages of a new presidential period. But if the occupant of the Kremlin is unimportant, why then the bitter power struggle? The reality is that it has to do with the distribution of jobs in Moscow – will the present occupants keep their jobs or will newcomers take over? Will a new type of oligarchy emerge?

The new president will undoubtedly seek to set his mark and protect the interests of the group(s) he represents. What are the possible consequences for Western policy?

If Sergei Ivanov is the new president then he will represent the Siloviki views in foreign policy – an area he has always been interested in – supported by the income from oil and gas. He will take a strong position on perceived Russian national interests and may even be willing to seek a confrontation with the US on some issues – without allowing things to get out of hand. As regards Europe, Ivanov stated in a speech at the February 2006 Munich security conference, that regardless of Russia’s Euro-Asiatic geographical position, Russia was a European power and would concentrate its political and economic interests on Europe.

If the lawyer, Dmitri Medvedev, becomes president, then he is more likely to promote Russia’s interests through economic instruments. He does not think in traditional security and power terms. As chairman of the Gazprom supervisory board, he would seek to promote his favourite plan of merging Gazprom with Rosneft to create a super energy concern. Instead of confrontation with the US, he is more likely to seek to conquer the gas market in the US as soon as Gazprom is technically capable of doing so. In the CIS and in Europe, we can expect an increase in prices without any sentimentality. The market price will rule. As under Putin, Gazprom will remain a domain of the president.

If neither Ivanov nor Medvedev becomes president, then there could be an interim period before two new terms for Putin. In this period, one should not expect any major changes or reforms.

2007 will thus be dominated by jockeying for position as the various power groups seek to promote their preferred candidate. A key factor will be Putin’s wishes and it is difficult to see anyone winning the election without his blessing.

14

Professor Gerhard Mangott Gerhard Mangott has been Professor of Political Science at the University of Innsbruck since 2003. He has been Permanent and Senior Research Fellow on Eastern Europe and the former USSR at the Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP), and a lecturer at the University of Advanced Sciences and at the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna.

Any evaluation of the constitutional consequences of Vladimir Putin’s obligatory departure from the office of Russian president in 2008 will need to consider the following factors: The expectations of the Russian public The relevance of constitutional stability for the rule of law The implications for democracy of the way changes are made to constitutional law Ensuring political stability Continuity in economic, financial and foreign policy.

Putin’s term of government, measured against the expectations of the Russian public and the state of the country when he took up office, can be regarded as impressive.

Before he became president, political power was fragmented and anarchic. There was macroeconomic instability, the structures and functions of a modern state were breaking up, and the centrifugal forces exerted by the regions were harming the maintenance of a unified application of the rule of law. Given these factors, the present situation is striking.

Among Putin’s main achievements have been the stabilisation of the Russian economy, the reconstruction of responsible state institutions, and a consolidation of the country’s political and business elites. The cost, however, has been high: there has been clear damage to basic federal institutions; the parliament has been further marginalized in the national decision-making process; competition between political parties has all but disappeared; the activities of civil society organisations have been restricted; and press freedom has been further reduced.

Public approval of Putin has been consistently high ever since he took up office – running on average at 72.3 percent - and in November 2006, approval of Putin was 81 percent. The provision of stability, dependability and a modest standard of living (even though aggregate figures for real income growth do not correctly reflect the increasing social inequalities and regional differences) are, and were, the public’s core expectations of their president, and for most of them, these expectations have been fulfilled. For this reason, in May 2006, some 59 percent of Russians were for a change to the constitution that would allow Putin to stand as a candidate in the 2008 presidential elections. Satisfaction with Putin’s presidency and a desire for stability are the main characteristics of majority Russian public opinion.

Currently standing in the way of these expectations are constitutional barriers – Article 81 (3) of the 1993 constitution says that Russian presidents can only serve for two consecutive periods of office. The much-discussed amendment to this article would be the first one to this constitution. Any revision to the constitution is (because of the hardfought discussions over the original text) particularly difficult but a proper legal way to carry out changes is foreseen. The amendment process is, legally, clearly defined, though technically burdensome, but in principle, has a clear outcome.

The most difficult hurdle to overcome is obtaining the approval of the regional parliaments for the proposed amendment. Personally, I think that this hurdle can be overcome. In regard to the protection of democratic standards when carrying out this

15

process, there are some provisos to take into consideration. The members of parliament, who have to vote, have all been elected as a result of ballot rigging, although probably to an extent no more than will be used in the 2008 presidential elections. This somewhat neutralises this argument in the succession debate.

In considering the fundamental caveat against extension of the presidential period of office, one could use the argument that prime ministers in the parliamentary system have been able to maintain long periods in office. An amendment to Article 81 (3), according to the rules set down in Chapter 9 of the constitution, would not fundamentally have any negative implications for the development of democratic values and attitudes among Russia’s elites and population in general. Amending the constitution by means of a referendum would be simpler to carry out and easier to manipulate to give the right result, but it would be clearly a perversion of justice.

Without doubt, this method would not be legitimate.

The central problem of the upcoming presidential succession is not a legal one but a question of national political stability. As president, Vladimir Putin has been able to rely on the support of different elite groups whose influence he has kept approximately balanced. Representatives from the security services have had a clear advantage in leading economic, political and administrative positions, but have been kept in check by the moderate liberal economist camp and the pragmatic technocratic legal camp.

Throughout his presidency, Putin has always made changes in key personnel to correct the balance of power when it looked like it could move out of kilter.

Putin’s departure in 2008 has set in motion a process of increasing friction between the various camps. These factions are now taking up positions on the succession question and attempting to set agendas that cover both policy and personnel. The fights over what direction to take and how to divide up power are becoming worse and have already led to disquiet, a feeling of diminishing dependability in Russian political life, and suspected intrigues (for example, the murders of Anna Politkovskaya and Alexander Litvinenko).

It has also weakened Putin’s authority and position. For the moment, it looks like he will be leaving the presidency and therefore he can only count on limited loyalty from individual factions. Putin’s presumed departure makes him a lame duck president for the last year of his term (a perfectly normal phenomenon for presidential systems with limited terms), but in the Russian context, this weakening of such an important institution is a major destabilising factor. In Russia, authority lost by the president is not automatically taken up by other institutions, but instead results in intense and obscure in-fighting amongst the president’s entourage that, as a general rule, is detrimental to government.

In my opinion, the destabilising struggle between the various camps will be exacerbated because of Putin’s “crown princes”, Medvedev, Ivanov and Yakunin. The liberal and the pragmatic-technocratic camps are properly represented but Ivanov for the Siloviki is not a true Siloviki member. Although he comes from the security apparatus, he does not belong to the operating circle that surrounds Sechin, Patrushev and Ivanov. It is therefore no surprise that it is precisely the Siloviki who are trying to convince or force Putin to have a third term as president.

Such instability at the executive level can also have repercussions for the legislature.

Current polling shows that the ruling United Russia party should get 49 percent of the votes in the December state Duma elections. This should be enough to give United Russia the necessary majority to approve constitutional amendments, as the only other parties who look likely to make it into the Duma are the communists KPRF and the extreme right LDPR who support the government. Many other parties, including the liberals, are likely to fall at the 7 percent entry hurdle. The effect of this could well be that Putin’s last few months in office will see a continuation of excellent executive–

16

legislative relations. This parliamentary stability, however, is likely at some point to disappear with the election of a new president; United Russia could then implode and fragment. This will result in a realignment of parliamentary parties but the precise results are difficult to predict at the moment. It is feasible that a new president may well find his ability to govern efficiently will be limited, at least during the first year.

Predictions about political continuity will naturally depend, inter alia, on who the successor to Putin is. At the moment, they can only assume that it will be one of the “crown princes”. Polls carried out in January 2007 showed that Medvedev would get 33 percent in the first round presidential election to Ivanov’s 21 percent, and that in a runoff, Medvedev would come out 54-46 percent ahead. Apart from election results, one also has to try and forecast what policies the new president will follow. It should be no surprise that there will be changes in some policy areas; indeed it is to be expected.

Given these reservations, the greatest level of continuity could be expected from Yakunin. Medvedev would probably liberalise economic, financial and investment policy but without reducing the state’s control over key sectors in the domestic economy such as energy, metals, air and space, defence and transport. Ivanov would probably pursue a more radical national interest course in foreign, security and defence policy.

None of the “crown princes” could take on the role of an interim president, resigning after one or two years to allow Putin to stand again for election. One indication that this variation cannot be definitively ruled out, however, is the fact that in the autumn of 2007, there are plans to pass a 2008-2010 budget. In this way, expenses in a number of key areas will be fixed, ensuring that the any interim president would have limited room for manoeuvre. Whoever takes on the role of interim president will have to be without personal political ambition but have sufficient charisma to win the election, and such a person will be hard to find. In addition, such a strategy is also very risky, given that nobody can actually force a properly-elected office holder to resign.

Under current circumstances, a new president will not result in much substantive change or new policy – at least not in any abrupt manner – but it will mean lasting and substantive personnel changes. Consequently, there will be long-lasting and massive upheaval and instability as groups jockey for position.

The EU member states might well give serious consideration to the option of a constitutional amendment (any amendment done properly is perfectly legal) that would extend the presidential term and allow Putin to stand in 2008. For the EU, this may well be a better option than the likely instability and imponderables that would follow a simulated election. In any case, the much-vaunted opinion that any alteration to Article 81(3) would automatically be undemocratic is untenable.

17

Professor Marie Mendras Marie Mendras is a member of the EU-Russia Centre advisory board and Professor at Sciences Po University and a Research Fellow with the Centre for International Studies and Research in Paris. She lectures in Russian politics and foreign policy issues at the IEP and is on the editing board of the journals Esprit and East European Constitutional Review, and is a member of the Moscow Centre for the Study of Constitutionalism.

Both domestic and foreign thinking about the post-Putin era indicates that Russia seems to be attached to a single individual. This is the direct result of a Russian political system in which power has become increasingly identified with one figure and the arbitrary exercise of presidential prerogative. It is therefore not only essential to analyse the preparations and various scenarios for the succession, but also to use the occasion to better understand the nature of the system in place. For a number of years, the authorities have functioned in an opaque manner, seeking to hide their intentions, but the debate surrounding the succession is now providing an insight as to how the system really works. Universal suffrage, the last vestige of the immediate post-communist period of 1988-1993, obliges Vladimir Putin and his entourage to put the political ball in the public court after years of having done everything possible to stifle political life in Russia. Commentators abound, there are increasing numbers of opinion surveys, and imagination is permitted on a “virtual” subject whose time is rapidly approaching.

Eberhard Schneider has not really developed this approach, preferring to concentrate on the various concrete alternatives for the succession and I would therefore like to examine other avenues in my contribution. I share Schneider’s working hypothesis and would like to present my views, both pro and contra, in the context of the workings of the Russian political system.

Schneider’s study is valuable. It provides the basis for serious consideration of the various options open, or closed, to Russian leaders. It explains the constitutional powers of the president, the weakness of constitutional controls on the head of state, and the concentration of power invested in the presidency. Schneider is correct to underline that the presidency has not cut back on its administrative remit but now has de facto control over large industrial and financial concerns as well as military organs. As a result, there has been a rapid deterioration in other institutions, such as the national parliament, government, tribunals, the constitutional court, and regional and state administrations, as well as a smothering of the media and civil society. Underhand methods and corruption are rightly present in Schneider’s article as major obstacles to the succession procedure.

It is perfectly correct that Vladimir Putin has not yet decided which option to take.

Perhaps he is still hoping to find a method that will allow him to remain president of Russia. It would seem he is looking for a solution that is unlikely: remain the strong man without being president. Schneider points out that for two years, Putin has always maintained: “I will not amend the constitution to my advantage but I will remain a major player in Russian political life.” In September 2005 and again in September 2006, Putin reiterated this theme in the course of two lengthy meetings with the Club of Valdai. He emphasised that he would never abandon Russia and that he would continue to have a key role in shaping the destiny of his country. On 25 October 2006, during a three hour television programme of a public question and answer session with the president (called Direct Line), Putin was grateful for the question posed by a member of the public: Vladimir Vladimirovitch wanted to know what would happen after Putin’s departure, were he to go? Putin’s reply to reassure this middle-aged Russian was that he would never abandon his country.

18

Is this a reassuring reply? From the legal and political point of view, it is troubling and destabilising for it was an emotional response to what was certainly an emotional question, rather than something vital for proper constitutional and institutional working of the state. One expects a president to produce clear and well thought- out arguments.

I am surprised that Putin daily shows himself capable of dressing up reality and twisting the facts on a host of subjects, making not the least effort to lie about his intentions in order to convince both Russians and foreigners that he will allow democracy to function, and the people to make their choice from among a number of serious and appropriate candidates. He does not claim that the next president will be the victor of an honest and pluralist political contest. At times, he attempts to calm the debate by reassuring the public that he will “choose a successor”, implying that this “successor” will certainly be elected. There has been no effort to acknowledge representative democracy, competition between political parties and their programmes, and the candidates freely registered by the electoral commission.

On the fundamental question as to how the state should deal with a change of leadership at the top, Vladimir Putin does not hide his authoritarian and paternalistic preferences. Moreover, the spin-doctors and other directors of institutions loyal to the Kremlin are publishing a profusion of studies about the succession - but almost nothing on electoral procedure!

All this demonstrates clearly that vested interests are bringing their weight to bear on the possible post-Putin outcome. Schneider condemns this when he emphasises the financial muscle of those close to Putin or the ability of a possible successor, such as Dmitri Medvedev or Sergei Ivanov, to control a major portion of the national budget. His denunciation, however, does not go far enough. The nature and size of this economic clout makes these men of power, and their adherents, political and financial fortresses.

Consequently, the presidential succession is not limited to a change of the man at the top and his executive team, but also brings into focus vast and complex personal and corporate interests whose function and durability depend on the Putin circle.

The ex-boss of Yukos, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, was arrested in October 2003 during the campaign for the December elections in order to increase the pressure on political and economic actors independent of the Kremlin. In 2006-2007, the pressure has been even more pronounced. The assassination of the well-known journalist and opposition figure Anna Politkovskaya on 7 October 2006 was a most tragic demonstration of this.

The political atmosphere is particularly threatening, economic confrontations are increasingly brutal both domestically and in relations with other countries, and even the average Russian feels uncertainty and disquiet as opinion surveys have shown.

For me, Schneider’s differentiation between the centrists and the Siloviki is no longer valid. Perhaps in the years following 2000, there was a distinction between those still known as liberals or reformers and those who represented the security services. The latter came back into positions of influence with the arrival of Putin and the weakening of the family entourage of Boris Yeltsin made up of those close to the president and the oligarchs, powerful financial and industrial figures. Some of the Siloviki also belonged to circles in St Petersburg where Putin worked during the first half of the 1990s.

In 2007, it is no longer valid to see the St Petersburg faction against the Siloviki or the Siloviki against the centrists, all the more so as a number of these centrists have spent part of their careers in the security or associated services. This division is an illusion. The political and financial clans are more numerous, more complex and more changeable.

How can one categorise, for example, the Luzhkov (mayor of Moscow) clan, or the arms manufacturers or the regional bosses, some of whom are very powerful (as in Tatarstan or Yekaterinburg)?

In the scenarios put forward by Eberhard Schneider, the one for a four year “interim do nothing president”, who would keep the seat warm for Putin in 2012, is certainly a

19

technical possibility (as the constitution forbids three consecutive terms). But this scenario has no chance of success. In 2000, Putin clearly demonstrated that the head of the Kremlin cannot remain for long in the shadow of his predecessor. On the contrary, with this sort of imposed succession, the crown prince must swiftly differentiate himself from his mentor and make his mark to consolidate his position. If not, he runs the risk of being caught up in the dangerous clutches of financial and corporate interests.

Vladimir Putin alone will not choose what will happen in 2008. The way in which the decision will be made, the persons who will be involved, the time that will be chosen for the announcement, will need to be taken into account in our projections as to what will ensue. One issue is not in doubt: the legislative elections in December 2007 and the presidential elections of March 2008 will not be free, fair or properly pluralistic.

Another thing is certain: no foreign leader or government will be informed in advance.

Russia’s partners and the European Union will all have their own reactions, the nature of which will have important consequences for future relations with Moscow. We have been warned, we are engaged, and there will be no excuse for saying that we were not prepared for this or that option.

20

Andrei Piontkovsky Andrei Piontkovsky is a Visiting Senior Fellow at The Hudson Institute in Washington DC, and since 2004, has been a Yabloko party member of the Federal Council in Moscow. Until recently, he was director of the Strategic Studies Centre in the Russian capital and had been Senior Visiting Fellow at Emmanuel College, Cambridge.

Professor Eberhard Schneider’s presentation of the facts and personalities of Russian politics during this crucial transitional period is very accurate and instructive. I would make only two factual remarks.

First, amending the Russian constitution requires not only a two-thirds majority vote in the Duma and a three-quarters majority vote in the Federation Council but also approval of two-thirds of the regional legislative assemblies. Secondly, the phrase (about Sergei Ivanov) ‘Like Putin, he graduated (1979) from the KGB Institute in Minsk…’ is confusing as Putin did not study in Minsk.

I would like to suggest some additional conceptual framework around Prof. Schneider’s paper that I believe is necessary to give readers a deeper understanding of Russian political reality. Initially, the current transition problem should be regarded in the context of the nature of the socio-economic system that has evolved in Russia over the past 15 years.

Most experts describe it in basically the same terms: crony capitalism, family capitalism, oligarchic capitalism, gangster capitalism, corporate capitalism. The choice of epithet is a matter of linguistic taste and temperament. What is essential is that this is a system in which personal wealth and power are totally enmeshed, and where the word ’corruption’ is an inadequate description of what is going on.

Classic corruption requires two partners: a businessman and a government official whom the businessman bribes. The Russian oligarchs and top government officials don't need to waste their time on precarious interactions, and the two roles are merged in the same personalities. The only difference is that under Yeltsin, businessmen became part-time ministers, and vice versa under Putin, where ministers became parttime businessmen.

Putinism is not a rejection of Yeltsinism. It is a logical mutation of the preceding Yeltsin model through the replacement of the Yeltsin generation of oligarchs by new ones: the ’patriotically-oriented’ scions of the intelligence services and, in a major way, by the greatest collective oligarch of all, the bureaucracy and security agencies.

Such is the reality of today’s Russian ‘KGBitalism’. That’s why the point where I differ most with Professor Schneider’s analysis is his use of the terms ’liberals’ and ’reformers’ while describing one of the competing Kremlin factions. Such formulae as ’the reform- minded former chief of the presidential administration’ or ’only two groups left: the Siloviki and the reformers’ may give a misleading impression of a serious ideological conflict between two politically-driven camps in the Putin entourage.

There is no such conflict! At the top of the Russian establishment, there is complete moral and political unity. Who are the ‘liberals’? They are the Kudrins, Grefs and Chubaises, people who have always longed for a Russian Pinochet who would ’with an iron fist lead Russia towards an economic prosperity’. They ally easily with the authoritarianism of the Putin regime.

21

And who are these representatives of the security agencies, the Chekists? Do you imagine them protesting against the sacred principle of private property? Not at all, unless perhaps only to the extent that this property belongs to other people, as demonstrated with the ’Yukos’ robbery and dozens of similar cases. The friction between them and the old-style Yeltsin oligarchs was no more than the revolt of dollar millionaires against dollar billionaires. But ideologically, ‘Silovikis’ and ’Liberals’ equally support and introduce the same authoritarian model of ’managed’ democracy. This does not, however, rule out the possibility of very dramatic, sometimes even literally deadly, personal or clan rivalries over the ’monitoring of financial flows’.

These enormous financial flows, not ideology, are at stake in the current struggle of Kremlin clans. The losing side may lose not only power, but wealth - and perhaps freedom as well. The 15 to 20 people who run Russia today not only run the country, they also own it - particularly its oil and gas resources.

I would define the current struggle in the Kremlin over the 2008 problem as the fight between ’the party of the Successor’ and ’the party of the Third Term’. The third party in the game is Putin himself.

My understanding of Putin’s mentality and character tells me that he does not want to run for a third term. Not out of his great reverence for constitutional provisions, but because this ’most outstanding example of mediocrity of our political class’ will prefer to spend the rest of his life on the most pleasurable pastimes on the planet; enjoying the life of a respected and very wealthy retired statesman. All that is required then is for Putin to reach agreement with the inner circle of his entourage, the five or ten ‘old boys’ of the Petersburg Brigade.

The problem with this Putin inner circle is that they have no plausible candidate among themselves, and the only Putin successor acceptable to them is Putin himself. Ivanov is not the Siloviki's candidate. He has no power base either in the army, where he is regarded as alien, or among the security services.

As for ’the Successor Party’, their candidate is certainly Medvedev. But I am not sure that he is Putin's candidate. Moreover, I think that the whole Medvedev-Ivanov TV advertising affair is just a cover operation by Putin to conceal his real intentions.

Though Medvedev is personally loyal to Putin, he would never be accepted by the inner circle, and besides, Putin himself may be too bothered by Medvedev’s close association with the ‘liberals’ clan. At the end of the day, he will only trust his future personal security to one of his own. The main function of Medvedev’s operation seems to be dissuading part of the business and intellectual communities (which are concerned by Chekist dominance) from supporting an opposition candidate like Kasyanov, and seducing them in the other direction with the prospect of a ’liberal successor’.

So realistically, there are three main scenarios for the transition.

1).

A compromise candidate, to use the article’s terminology. Schneider is absolutely right to focus our attention on Vladimir Yakunin, the KGB generalturned railways state oligarch. Putin will try to convince his inner circle to accept him as successor, although Yakunin does not belong directly to their clan.

2).

A weak nominee, again in the article’s terminology . As Schneider rightly noted, even without any amendment, the present Russian constitution affords an elegant mechanism providing for a lifelong rule of Putin with a brief interruption every eight years for the inauguration and subsequent funeral (political, not necessarily literal) of some sacrificial lamb. In our macho society, a woman may become the most credible weak nominee (for his entourage), such as Saint Petersburg governor, Valentina Matvienko. Putin may manage to con his

22

comrades-in-arms to accept the prospect of this scenario and so leave his office without their resistance. If he fails, the next scenario could emerge.

3).

The recent chain of political assassinations in Moscow and London seem to signify that Putin's Chekist entourage will not be placated by either of the first or second options, and are determined to make Putin change the constitution and run for the third term. If, due to their continuing special operations, RussianWestern relations continue to deteriorate at the same pace as during the latest months, The Hague will become the only place in the West where Putin will be welcome after his departure.

Under such circumstances, he will be left with no alternative but to stay in power in Russia forever.

23

Professor Alex Pravda, University of Oxford Alex Pravda lectures in Russian and East European politics at St Antony’s College, Oxford, and is Director of its Russian and Eurasian Studies Centre. He was previously Senior Research Fellow and head of the Soviet Foreign Policy Programme at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) and a specialist adviser to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee.

The presidential succession poses a difficult problem for Putin’s agenda of managed and orderly politics. He wants the legitimacy conferred by constitutional elections without the risks inherent in genuine contest. To minimize those risks, he will try to steer the process, but in Russia’s weakly institutionalized political system, any element of contest brings with it the danger of destabilizing conflict among and within groups close to the centre of power.

There are three main options for handling the 2008 problem: a third term, coronation, and a managed ‘primary’ process.

1. A Putin third term. On the face of it, this seems the easiest way forward.

Continuity would assure the political establishment and would avoid in-fighting over candidates and alignments. This option would also be the people’s choice.

Putin commands very high approval ratings (typically in the 70% plus range) and remains far and away the most trusted politician in the country. There is considerable popular support for his standing a third time. Polls suggest that an increasing majority of Russians find this acceptable and that between a third and two fifths of the electorate would vote for Putin were he to be a candidate in 2008. We have had a steady stream of proposals to amend the constitution to allow Putin to run again. Some of these initiatives are attempts to curry favour with the Kremlin, others may be trial balloons to gauge public and political elite response. But the president himself persistently claims he has no intention of standing in 2008. The most plausible explanation for Putin’s reluctance to continue is that he wishes to move on from the presidency. One cannot rule out, however, that he might still change his mind, especially if problems at home or abroad create a crisis that makes presidential continuity a national imperative.

2. Coronation. Designating a successor would ensure his election, as polls suggest that a majority of Russian would probably vote for a Putin nominee; a third or more say they would definitely give him their support.

The following are most often mentioned as possible contenders for Putin’s favour and are likely to figure as candidates in 2008.

•

Dmitri Medvedev, a close associate of the president and currently First deputy prime minister and the head of the programme on national projects (covering housing, health, education and agriculture). It is possible that Medvedev could replace the hapless Fradkov as prime minister shortly before the election, in a way reminiscent of Putin’s own path to the Kremlin. The leading member of the St Petersburg group with a legal rather than security background, Medvedev takes a managerial approach to political problems and a relatively moderate line in debates on Russia’s national interests. Enjoying growing media exposure, he has steadily pulled ahead of other contenders in terms of popular support (his recent approval ratings have been just under a fifth, with twice as many respondents favouring him in an election).

•

Sergei Ivanov, the deputy prime minister is usually ranked second, with popular trust ratings of around 10% and potential electoral support of about 20%.

Ivanov is linked to the security part of the president’s inner circle though he is

24

•

probably closer to Putin himself than to other leading Siloviki, notably Sechin with whom he reportedly has difficult relations. His ministerial portfolio means that Ivanov takes a relatively tough public line on issues of national interest. He seems recently to have lost ground in popular support, largely because the public has far greater interest in the economic and social issues for which Medvedev has responsibility.

Vladimir Yakunin, the head of the Russian railways, appears as the slight outsider of the trio. But he has considerable administrative experience in St Petersburg and Moscow, and is a close personal friend of Putin’s. Yakunin is closely involved with the Orthodox Church, which commands broad public trust, coming second only to the presidency as an institution in which Russians have confidence.

Among the most plausible of outsider candidates are Sergei Sobyanin (former governor of energy-rich Tyumen region and Putin’s current chief of staff) and Valentina Matvienko, governor of St Petersburg.

3. A quasi ‘primary’ process.

Putin has so far refused to declare support for any contender and he may wish to well avoid doing so until immediately before ballot day. Having two or possibly more establishment figures to appear as possible contenders may carry some risk of increasing factional alignments and in-fighting. But the establishment affiliation of both Medvedev and Ivanov and the highly controlled media will cushion against any serious de-stabilizing effects. Allowing a leading candidate to emerge through public exposure in quasi-‘primary’ style has the advantage of delivering an official candidate with some genuine popular support. There is the additional benefit of minimizing Putin’s period as a ‘lame duck’ president.

If none of the key potential contenders does sufficiently well in the ‘primary’ process, Putin has sufficient authority to parachute in a surprise crown prince (or even princess). He often speaks of an outside candidate entering late in the day.

And in order to increase tactical surprise, some reports suggest he might choose to make that day earlier than March 2008, possibly timing the presidential elections to coincide with those to the Duma in December 2007.

Post-presidential Putin. Whatever the result of the election, Putin is likely to remain an authoritative national figure. Early speculation highlighted the possibility of his retaining supreme power by becoming president of a RussiaBelarus Union. Such notions have died away as the prospect has diminished of such a Union ever coming into being. Two positions seem far more likely and might even be combined.

•

State party chairman. Putin might become head of United Russia.

Leadership of the majority party would give Putin the possibility of becoming prime minister as there have been proposals for constitutional movement in that direction. Were this to happen, it is conceivable that the office of prime minister could come to outweigh that of the president, but this seems unlikely in the short term.

•

Energy tsar. This is a more likely alternative and one that would hold greater personal appeal. Putin could become the head of an energy superconglomerate based on Gazprom and Rosneft. The president supported the merger of these two energy giants last year but in-fighting about the process has so far prevented it from coming about. This might be considered almost as a sideways move, since being the head of what would amount to Russia Energy Inc., would give Putin enormous power at home and a prominent role abroad.

25

Whatever position Putin chooses, he will play a key national role, capitalizing on the public trust he commands, and may well stand in the presidential elections due in 2012. Should economic or other problems create a crisis situation, it is conceivable that elections could be brought forward and Putin would make an earlier comeback.

Prospects of continuity The new presidential administration may well bring extensive, if gradual, personnel change. But it is likely to bring continuity and consolidation of the political regime and strategic direction established in Putin’s second term.

• Consolidation of ‘vertical’ control by Moscow over the regions. In the run-up to the elections, the Kremlin might take a more accommodating line in order to secure administrative support for the elections. But after 2008, the scope for regional financial and political bargaining will once again be rather limited.

• Increasing priority to social policies to meet growing demands for improvements in state services, a tendency visible in the focus of the National projects. There is concern in the administration about rising popular dissatisfaction surrounding social inequality and increasingly expensive public services.

• Continuing expansion of state control over strategic sectors of the economy in which foreign involvement is to be severely limited. After the 2007/8 electoral cycle, the process of defining and applying statistical rules of the game is likely to become more predictable.

• Key negative features of this environment, high and growing levels of corruption, opaque governance and tight constraints on political pluralism are unlikely to show marked improvement in the short term.

• Foreign policy will remain assertive and nationalist in tone, especially in the period leading up to March 2008. Moscow will continue to focus its external efforts primarily on securing post-imperial influence over the former Soviet south. Any new administration will continue to try and make maximum use of Russia’s energy resources to try and punch above the country’s general economic, military and political weight. Moscow will persist in seeking to play the role of a global great power in an international system it sees being shaped increasingly by struggles over natural resources and marked in future by ‘energy wars’.

26

EUEU- RUSSIA CENTRE WORKSHOP REPORTS Rule of Law, Human Rights & Civil Society Chair :Jens Siegert (AB) Rapporteur Olga Shumylo (International Centre for Policy Studies, Ukraine) Maria Ordzhonikidze (EU-Russia Centre, Russia) Bill Bowring (Advisory Board, UK) Eberhard Schneider (Advisory Board, Germany) Viorel Ursu (OSI, Brussels) Toby King DG (DG Relex, European Commission, Brussles) Alexei Kozlov, (Head of the movement 'Civil United Green Alternative, Russia)

Foreign Affairs & Energy Chair : Fraser Cameron (EU(EU-Russia Centre)Centre)Rapporteur : Andrew Monaghan (EU-Russia Network, UK) Michael Emerson (CEPS, Brussels) Arkady Moshes (UPI, Finland) Franz Batthyany (Advisory Board, Austria) Stefano Silvestri (IAI, Italy) Richard Tibbels, (DG Relex, Brussels ) Carl Hallergard, (Council of Ministers, Brussels )

Media Chair :Georgy :Georgy Bovt - (Advisory Board, Board, Russia) Russia) Rapporteur: Sara Oates (Glasgow University, UK) Sigitas Babilius (Advisory Board, Lithuania) Barbara von Ow Freytag (Foundation for German-Russian Exchange Germany) Marie Mendras (Science Po University, France) Natella Boltyanskaya, (Ekho Moskvy Radio Station, Russia)

27

Rule of Law, Human Rights and Civil Society Introduction The group discussed the impact of a new law on non-governmental organisations in Russia, and made a number of suggestions on how to assess its future impact. It then went on to discuss the state of human rights and the rule of law in Russia. For both of these topics, the group proposed a series of recommendations for the EU-Russia Centre on how it should engage on these issues.

Civil Society: the Law on NGOs and the Protection of Human Rights 1. The Law on NGOs Over the last couple of years, the federal administration in Russia has taken a number of steps that appear to be aimed at excluding the public from providing input to important governmental decisions. New institutions such as the Public Chamber cause concern, since they provide a veneer of democracy while blocking channels where citizens could genuinely express their views and influence policy.26 The adoption of a restrictive new law on NGOs should also be seen in this light. It appears that the federal administration is concentrating all power in its hands by minimizing the role of the legislature, undermining the independence of the judiciary, and restricting public input to the decision-making process.

The draft law on NGOs was pushed through the Duma without prior public discussion – even within the Public Chamber that should represent NGOs’ interests. It was met with a strong public outcry, producing a wave of criticism from the NGO community both in Russia and internationally. Eager to show that the law was not intended to restrict legitimate NGO activity and that he is sensitive to Western concerns, president Putin agreed to delete certain provisions from the draft law, especially those that could have jeopardized the activities of foreign NGOs operating in Russia. Nonetheless, he claimed that the law was necessary “to prevent the financing of political activities from abroad” in order to protect Russia’s national interests and security.

Critics argue that the real aim of the law was not so much to make the work of civil society organisations more transparent, as to make them easier to control. By allowing the authorities to weigh NGOs’ activities against ‘national interests’, the law gives them a justification for intruding into the work of NGOs and ensuring that NGOs’ actions are in line with official state policy. Since many of the terms in the law are poorly defined (such as ‘national interests’), officials have a very broad brush to interpret the law as they see fit.

The law on NGOs entered into force on 10 April 2006, imposing a stricter regime for domestic and foreign NGOs operating in Russia: -

Registration: Registration over 400,000 active NGOs were/are required to re-register at the Federal Registration Service. The registration procedure for non-commercial organisations is costly and burdensome in comparison to the simple procedures that apply to for-profit entities. For example, it costs $60 just to register an NGO, and the money is not returned if the authorities decide to refuse registration, which poses a significant problem for many small organisations from the

26

The Public Chamber was created on president Putin’s initiative in accordance with the Law on the Public Chamber passed by the Duma. The Public Chamber is an independent public institution which conducts public review and provides expertise on socially important legislation.

It is supposed to represent the interests of civil society and to supervise the government and Duma. However, experts claim that the Chamber has no real control over decisions made by the executive or the legislature.

28

regions. In addition, all informal groups must inform the authorities of their existence.

-

Monitoring of foreign funding: funding the authorities now have the right to audit the activities and finances of all NGOs and to request any documents from them.

Russian NGOs are obliged to report on all foreign funding they have received (there have been cases of the authorities requesting reports on activities/funding that were held/received more than five years ago)

-

Reporting to the Registration Service: Service Both Russian and foreign NGOs are obliged to report to the Registration Service on their activities. Activity reports for 2006 should be submitted by 15 April 2007. Foreign NGOs are subject to even more extensive scrutiny as they also have to report on their activity plans for 2007 (descriptions of planned activities, expenses and quarterly financial reports). The Law gives no clear template or guidance about the expected size or content of these reports. It also does not give a clear list of all documents that could be requested from NGOs. As a result, some requests for documents have bordered on the absurd. For example, the well-known Russian NGO “Memorial”27 was told to provide a report on every staff member it had had since it was established over ten years ago; it took four months to collect the necessary information.

Russian NGOs also have to prove that their activities are carried out in accordance with their Charters. Registration Service officials may refuse a registration for the next year if they perceive an NGO’s reported activities to contradict its declared sphere of activity under its charter. The registration of foreign NGOs may be denied or revoked if their goals, objectives and/or activities are found to ‘create a threat to the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity….of the Russian Federation’,28 another very broad definition that could be interpreted in numerous ways.

-

Foreigners’ involvement in civil society activities: activities foreigners have limited rights to be involved in Russian NGO activities or to establish public associations and NGOs. The law imposes (unconstitutional) restrictions on who may be a founder or a member of an NGO.

The role of the EU, the Council of Europe and international nonnon-governmental organisations organisations EU officials claim they are ready to take a strong position towards Russia, and often raise concerns with Russian officials concerning human rights standards, democracy and the free media. However, constrained by the EU’s dependence on Russian gas, they are not willing to connect this criticism with economic and security issues by imposing conditions on co-operation. The failure of EU leaders to forcefully address the deteriorating human rights situation in Russia during recent summits with Russian leaders has been disappointing to the NGO community. The Council of Europe remains one of the most influential international organisations in Russia. Foreign nongovernmental organisations (e.g. Human Rights Watch) were able to comment on the adoption of the NGO law, but in practice, their influence remains limited.

The immediate impact of the Law on NGOs:

27

Memorial is a movement which arose in the perestroika years. Its main mission is to awake and preserve society’s memory of the severe political persecution in the Soviet Union’s recent past. It is a group of specialized research, human rights, and education centres in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and several other cities.

28 “Persecution of NGOs and Human Rights Defenders in Russia”, Centre for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights (p.5)

29

1. General impact on democracy and Russia’s international obligations: the new law gives the authorities the right to intrude into the activities of non-governmental organisations. This may lead to the oppression of citizen activism, the closure of many Russian NGOs, the departure of foreign NGOs, the termination of foreign funding to many socially important projects, and, overall, to a reversal of democracy in Russia. An initial assessment of how the law has been enforced over the first few months suggests that it has not resulted in the immediate closing down of Russian or foreign NGOs. However, the law poses a serious threat to the right to freedom of association and expression, in violation of Russia’s obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Furthermore, the mere threat of closure may force NGOs to undertake a form of ‘self-censorship’ by avoiding any topics that they fear may make them a target of administrative pressure.

2. Vague wording coupled with administrative burden: burden the law distracts NGOs from undertaking functions such as government oversight or supporting vulnerable groups.

Instead, they must spend more time on technical issues such as registration and reporting. Critics of the law are most concerned by two issues – the vague language used in the law and the obligation to report to the authorities. The former has a chilling effect on NGOs, since the law allows the authorities to interpret it at their discretion and to apply a selective approach towards NGOs that are too active in criticizing the state.

The latter imposes a heavy administrative burden on NGOs (especially for young, small and grassroots NGOs outside Moscow) that may not have sufficient human and financial resources or capacity to report appropriately.

3. Human rights organis organisations under special scrutiny: scrutiny There is evidence to suggest that organisations that expose human rights abuses (e.g. in Chechnya) are most likely to come under the watchful eye of the authorities. For example, the Moscow Helsinki Group claims that human rights groups are coming under increasing pressure through financial scrutiny, such as the investigation of grants, tax returns, and donations. This puts into question the existence – or at least their ability to have any influence - of over 2,000 human rights advocacy organisations. A further 15,000 NGOs include human rights issues among their activities.

4. The first test for the NGO law29 The first test of the implementation of the new legislation proved a fairly negative experience. The law required mandatory re-registration of all foreign and international NGOs present in Russia by 18 October 2006. Just two weeks before the expiration of the deadline, only 50 out of an estimated 500 foreign groups were registered. This was the result of extremely restrictive and excessive application of requirements by the Registration Service. Foreign NGOs were told to provide information that is not required by the law, including: the translation into Russian of national laws pertaining to NGOs – even though in many countries, such as the UK, the activities of NGOs are not covered by separate laws; personal data such as home addresses and telephone numbers of founders and board members; internal organisational documents and board decisions that do not exist etc. Another complaint was that the Registration Service’s reception hours were short and unpredictable, making it even more difficult to submit documents within the necessary time frame.

It is too early to evaluate the full impact of the law on NGOs. This can be done only once it becomes clear what effects it has had on NGO activity, especially if the authorities’ assessments lead to a massive shut-down of NGOs or the closing of certain NGOs that are particularly critical of the state.

2. Protection of Human Rights

“Persecution of NGOs and Human Rights Defenders in Russia”, Centre for the Development of Democracy and Human Rights (p.6-7) 29

30

As noted above, the vagueness of the new law on NGOs allows the federal and local authorities to pay ‘special attention’ to human rights organisations. The authorities can justify closing human rights organisations by referring to the need to ‘protect’ the state.

In turn, this may lead to the deterioration of human rights protection in Russia, since the state will increasingly become free of any independent control or scrutiny. This is despite the fact that according to the Russian Ombudsman’s evaluation, the protection of human rights in Russia is already unsatisfactory.

The Council of Europe: The EU often underestimates the role of the Council of Europe and its influence on Russia. The Council of Europe has been one of the most influential international organisations to whose membership obligations Russia agreed to adhere.

The pressure it is able to exert varies from training and information dissemination,30 through strong statements by Tomas Hammarberg, the Commissioner for Human Rights, and to pressure asserted by Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE).

Last but not least, the dependency of the Russian judicial system, and Russian citizens’ corresponding lack of trust towards it, means that the European Court of Human Rights is one of the most popular courts for Russian citizens when it comes to human rights protection. In 2005, the Court received over 10,500 complaints from Russia (23% of total appeals), 40% more than the year before. However, two problems occur in this respect: the lack of a legal culture and of qualified lawyers in Russia, which lowers the quality of the complaints that are lodged and results in a high percentage of cases being sifted out at the very early stage.

The EU has always relied on the Council of Europe where human rights protection in Russia is concerned. Recently, the EU has declared its intention to play a more active role in these issues through permanent consultation mechanisms within the EUEU-Russian Dialogue on human rights. rights The existence of such a dialogue at the level of EU and Russian Foreign Ministry officials is an achievement in itself. The two parties discuss human rights problems in Russia, the EU, as well as wider human rights issues (e.g. the UN Human Rights Council). However, the EU is not ready yet to move on from discussing human rights abuses in Russia to taking firmer actions (e.g. to connect human rights to economic cooperation). Another pitfall of the Dialogue is its limited scope for public participation. Russian NGOs are not welcomed at these meetings. In this regard, the Open Society Institute has presented a good example to other donors and international organisations by organizing alternative roundtables on human rights and other burning issues in Russia for Russian and foreign non-governmental organisations and EU officials.

The Rule of Law and the Judicial System There are a number of reasons to explain the lack of the rule of law in Russia: -

The judicial system remains under constant pressure/control from authorities: This pressure starts at the highest level, for instance through regular meetings between president Putin and top judges to discuss judicial reform and the implementation of key laws31. Beyond high-level meetings, there a variety of other ways in which the federal authorities can pressure judges. Some experts claim that there has been some progress in reforming the judicial system (e.g. improvements in the arbitration system, and the adoption of new criminal and civil codes). However, many procedural and substantive problems remain (e.g.

30 For instance, the provision of publications to the Human Rights Library in the Chechen State University in Grozny.

31 Hypothetically this may not involve coercion. Presumably this implies that if reforms and laws are not implemented in the way the Kremlin finds appropriate, judges will come under pressure (sacking them, threatening them with kompromat, passing laws that further limit their independence, etc.)

31

judges remain vulnerable to corruption and outside pressure due to their low salaries).

-

Quality of judges: In addition to pressure exerted on judges, they also lack training and technical capacities. Both the Council of Europe and the European Union have offered training for Russian judges, legal administrators and court officers, but the scale of the task remains daunting.

-

Last but not least, laws are drafted in a way that gives the authorities freedom to interpret and apply the laws to their benefit. benefit. A vast range of agencies have the potential to abuse this freedom, from the Registration Service to the tax administration and to those in control of environmental protection. As a result, ordinary citizens and non-governmental organisations find it difficult to protect themselves against the arbitrary interpretation and unpredictable enforcement of legislation.

While the first reason can only be addressed at a high level, the second and third problems can be addressed at a technical level: -

Pressure Pressure and support from the Council of Europe: The Council of Europe is able to influence the development of independent judiciary in Russia by monitoring the situation, making statements within PACE (e.g. on the danger to the rule of law), and by providing professional training to judges. The European Court of Human Rights remains the ultimate instance for Russians seeking an impartial and independent interpretation of the law. Some experts claim that although many cases make their way to the Court in Strasbourg, this does not actually put much pressure on Russia, since the state prefers to pay out when it is found liable, rather than attempt to fix the defects in its legal system.

-

EUEU-Russia cooperation on judicial system reform: The EU and Russia cooperate on judicial reform within the framework of the EU-Russia Roadmap (the third priority area, focusing on ‘justice’). The EU aims to make the system more effective and increase the independence of judges.

The EU supports the training of judges, court administrators and personnel of arbitration courts with a view to strengthening the rule of law, including the legal protection of individual rights and of companies' activities. A twinning project on legal norms supported by the Commission is being implemented between the Austrian Ministry of Justice and the Russian Ministry of Justice, and twinning is also underway, building cooperation between the constitutional courts of Russia and EU Member States. TACIS has also launched policy advice on the creation of administrative courts.32 A number of individual EU member states (e.g. the UK) and other countries (e.g. the US) have run their own extensive training programmes for Russian judges after the collapse of the Soviet Union. With this support, significant progress has been made in breaking with the Soviet legacy.

However, experts diverged over whether this training is adequate (in terms of the number of judges that went through training and topics that are taught) to solve the systemic problems faced by the Russian judiciary and to increase the quality of judges. Moreover, even if Russian judges have successfully learnt from their Western counterparts, there are questions about whether they understand how to apply this knowledge to current conditions in Russia.

Conclusions & Recommendations 32

Information on technical assistance projects is taken from EU’s web-site (http://europa.eu )

32

1. Wider outreach: The EU-Russia Centre should continue to act as a platform for discussing Russia-related issues. It should also aim to broaden its outreach (e.g. by setting up a special Internet web site and mailing out a regular newsletter).

2. More influence/impact: The EU-Russia Centre should strengthen its influence and its ability to have an impact on the situation in Russia by establishing and deepening cooperation with new Russian partners (such as NGOs, businesses and politicians) who are ready to fight for their rights or are potential champions of change (e.g. a Russian judge at the European Court of Human Rights). The EURussia Centre should invite a wider range of experts from Russian nongovernmental organisations to its events and discussions. It might also be useful to explore the possibilities for establishing cooperation with the Public Chamber, and to identify suitable mechanisms for such cooperation.

3. Broaden the Centre’s focus: The EU-Russia Centre could reach a greater audience and increase its influence by broadening its focus in the following directions: - Focus not only on the role of the EU and EU-Russia relations, but also on the Council of Europe, Europe its Russia-related activities, and its capacity to influence events in Russia. It could consider developing a plan for cooperation with the Council of Europe.

- Continue research and identify issues where Russia has had demonstrable progress (e.g. judicial system) and areas where there has been no progress or things have gone backwards (e.g. law on NGOs). Publicise these issues to ensure that they are well-known and understood within the EU: it should not be forgotten that many things that are obvious and clear to Russia are not known in the EU. - Continue to act as a source of information about Russia for the EU. Identify areas where the EU’s experience and knowledge could be beneficial and useful to Russia. Develop recommendations on how the EU could improve its assistance to help Russia more effectively.33 - Encourage the EU to widen the framework in which judicial reform is being discussed to approach this topic from a justice and home affairs perspective.

- Advise the EU to monitor the consequences of the adoption of the law on NGOs and lobby the EU to put pressure on Russia to amend the law if its implementation results in a massive shutdown of NGOs or a selective approach to NGOs closure that suggests that the authorities are closing NGOs that they dislike for political reasons. The EU-Russia Centre should organise a round-table to discuss the consequences of the NGO law in 2007 with the participation of Russian and foreign NGOs, Russian governmental representatives and international organisations.

4. Promote RussiaRussia-related issues in EU capitals: Continue to promote debate on Russia-related issues across the EU by supporting and organizing events in EU member state capitals (both those that hold the presidency [Germany, Portugal] and others such as Poland). Use other meetings (e.g. EU-Russia Summits) to raise problematic issues (such as the violation of basic freedoms in Russia).

33

Unfortunately, the new regulations for the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) which have been approved bring no significant change to EU support for Russian NGOs, except that procedures have become slightly simpler. The European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (a new financial instrument which will be launched in January 2007) focuses primarily on cooperation with the Russian authorities.

33

5. Training: The EU-Russia Centre should urge EU institutions to provide training both for civil servants (such as training for mid-level civil servants which carry no political connotations but ensure the transfer of technical skills such as lawmaking) and NGO staff members (e.g. on how to comply with the law on NGOs).

34

Russian Foreign Policy and Energy Diplomacy Introduction The discussion about Russian foreign policy and energy diplomacy was wide-ranging and assessed a number of interlinking themes. This report elucidates the main strands addressed in the discussion, looking first at the key actors and underlying drivers of policy. It then turns to examine the various vectors and priorities of Russian foreign policy. In the third section, the report assesses Russia’s energy diplomacy more specifically, before finally drawing together some conclusions and recommendations.

Foreign Policy Drivers: Russian foreign policy is driven by a number of actors and a number of themes. The presidential administration plays a key role in formulating policy while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) executes policy. Other important actors also have influence in both policy creation and implementation. These include the military industrial sector and major energy firms such as Gazprom, which have been the guiding forces behind increasing Russian activity across the world. This is a situation facilitated by the complex blending of state and private sectors.

Though it lacks a coherent doctrine, Russian foreign and security policy was considered by some to be increasingly assertive, as Russia was increasingly prepared to use its growing economic strength for foreign policy purposes. Although there is an element of bluff to this more assertive policy, the greater confidence shown by Moscow on the world stage reflects Russia’s sounder overall economic position based on its energy wealth. On this foundation, several interlinking themes stand out in Russian foreign policy, two key elements of which are wealth and power.

It was argued that those who run Russian foreign policy are mostly focused on financial gain. This was important to note for three reasons. First, it reflects the differences between Russia today and the USSR. Too often, the claim is made that Russia is returning to the bad old days of the Soviet Union, but the drive among the current elite to acquire property and wealth is one key difference. Second, this provides some grounds for EU policy – it both gives some grounds for exerting leverage on Russian policy and means that a Russia governed by this elite is unlikely to pursue policies seriously inimical to Europe’s energy security by turning off the taps to blackmail the EU. This is a theme to which the report returns below. Third, it introduces a short-term aspect to Russian policy, since the key actors are aware that their term in office is limited.

The wealth factor is not an independent driver however, and it is linked to the enhancement of power. This means that political ideas also play a role. The key ideas behind this are the Russian president’s aim to achieve recognition for Russia as a global actor and to be accepted in Europe as an equal partner on its own terms – without double standards, lecturing on values, or interference in Russian domestic development. A third strand, reflected in the concept of ‘sovereign democracy’, forwarded by Vladislav Surkov, has a largely (but not exclusively) internal focus, and reflects both another important influence on Russian foreign policy and another view of Russian policy as being more defensive.

The concept of ‘sovereign democracy’ seeks to enhance state management of the democratic process in Russia and state control of strategic economic resources in order to minimise domestic instability and enhance Russia’s sovereign independence. This is, in part, a reaction to perceived actions by other actors in the world, most particularly the EU and NATO, which are considered by many in Russia to be a tool of US influence.

These three main strands were summarised effectively as a strategy of self-affirmation,

35

and they also reveal the ongoing tensions between the active and reactive elements in Russian foreign policy.

Foreign Policy Vectors: The The CIS, China, the USA and the EU: Russia’s relationships in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) provoked some disagreement in the group. One of the key Russian aims, it was noted, was the reestablishment of its influence, of “soft hegemony”, in the CIS. The discussants were divided over whether Russia really had significant current interests in the CIS, but it was noted that there was a large Russian diaspora throughout the CIS (and large diasporas from the CIS in Russia), and Russia had significant economic and energy interests in he CIS. There was also some disagreement about the extent of Russia’s influence in the CIS. Some considered that Russia’s image was worsening in the CIS – Russia was simply not an attractive model for the other CIS members who have instead begun to look elsewhere, particularly towards the EU and NATO. No longer was Russia the carrier of an attractive idea – such as world communism, pan Slavism or Russian Orthodoxy – and nor did it have the effective instruments to implement a coherent policy.

Nonetheless, others suggested that although the recent CIS summit indicated that the organisation is ’past its sell-by date’, and that some member states such as Azerbaijan had not yet made up their mind about their strategic direction, Russian influence in the CIS area is not totally in decline. It has other tools in the region, including the CSTO, the Eurasian Economic Community, and in more negative ways, such as continuing blocking of the so-called ‘frozen conflicts’. Where possible, Russia seeks to exert influence in these conflicts to try to achieve its own ends.

Russia-China relations are also ambiguous. China represents possibilities both for partnership and as a threat to Russia. This means that there is no strategic decision in Moscow about how to develop relations with China. There are growing economic and political links, not least in cooperation in the United Nations Security Council and in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). There are also growing security links, represented by the recent large military exercises. However, there are concerns about Chinese migration into the largely unpopulated eastern regions of Russia – an issue potentially exacerbated by Russia’s demographic problem. Moreover, Moscow is aware of the growth of Chinese influence in Central Asia, and there are concerns that the SCO will become China’s pet project, rather than Russia’s. Indeed, to counter this, Russia invited India and Iran to become associate members in 2005 to help offset Chinese influence.

There was consensus among the participants that there was little substance to USRussia relations, despite the apparent cooperative approach adopted since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, since when Russia has enjoyed greater freedom of manoeuvre in pursuing its own rather robust agenda in the war on terror, with only limited criticism from the USA. Trade relations have been decreasing and the energy relationship remains very limited.

EU-Russia relations are very different to US-Russia relations: whereas the US looks at its relations with Russia in a limited, sectoral fashion, the EU and Russia enjoy relations across the board. Nevertheless, there are a number of difficulties in EU-Russia relations.

The discussion focused on the preparation of a new strategic agreement to replace the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), since this is outdated – both parties are at very different stages in their development in comparison to when the PCA was first prepared and agreed.

One participant suggested that president Putin seeks to conclude a new agreement before he leaves office, which gives the EU some leverage in negotiations. Two key

36

problems, however, are the lack of common values and the inability to push Russia into making concessions. Any strategic agreement document would therefore simply be a ’trophy treaty’ – a framework with little real substance. Moreover, it was likely to face problems at the ratification stage. Thus it was suggested by one participant that the EU could use the temporary pause to reconsider what the game should be and, particularly, how to reintroduce values into the relationship.

There was also discussion of Russian views of the EU. This was described as a form of ’schadenfreude’ – Moscow is quite happy that the EU cannot speak with one voice on many issues and will try to develop bilateral relations instead. It was also suggested that Moscow believes that the EU has de facto agreed to put values aside in the relationship over the last two years, simply using it as a useful tool in negotiations. Indeed, few in Moscow expect the EU to become serious about the propagation of democracy in Russia – there is far more concern about the US in this regard – and few believe that EU members either fully subscribe to the full liberalisation of energy markets or oppose what happened to Yukos, reflected in the investment of European banks in Gazprom and Rosneft (which took over parts of the dismantled Yukos company). Finally, Russia adopts a dual approach to the EU as a whole – professing ignorance of how it works, but also exploiting the PCA to the letter.

In these circumstances, how far the EU would be able to gain leverage over Russia and the real gains that would be achieved remained questionable. Yet if there are problems, there is nonetheless a political market for a new agreement – both sides have an interest in it and would lose face if they climbed down from trying to reach one. The report now turns to examine Russian energy diplomacy.

Russian Energy Diplomacy: Consensus was reached on a number of points in this section of the debate. There was consensus that Russia would not ratify the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) and Transit Protocol in its current state. However, another key point agreed on was that Russia is unlikely to use its position as the major energy supplier to Europe, particularly in terms of gas, as a lever to blackmail the EU. This was for two main interconnected reasons.

First, as noted above, the Russian elite is interested in generating wealth for itself, and this is the main opportunity to do so. Second, and associated to this, it was agreed that the energy ’weapon’ was a clumsy one which could only be used once and only ’to shoot oneself in the foot’. Russia’s desire to maintain its reputation as a reliable supplier to the EU, both to support the economic interests of the elite, and the broader economic and political growth and stability in Russia, means that using energy to blackmail the EU would be counterproductive.

This did not mean that there are not problems facing the EU in terms of its energy security. However, other issues also have to be addressed, particularly in terms of improving the consumption strategy. There should be more inter-connectivity within the EU itself, for instance, to facilitate broader access to energy reserves wherever they are within the EU. Second, more energy-saving and efficiency programmes should be employed, particularly in the new member states.

The consensus that Russia was unlikely to use its energy against the EU also did not mean that Russian energy diplomacy was not problematic or beyond criticism. The sustainability of Russian reserves was questioned, and the continuing need for major investment in Russia’s energy sector was noted. This is also important to sustain Russian domestic consumption. The finite nature of Russian current production means that it is likely to become increasingly difficult for Russia to meet both rising domestic consumption and export contracts – in a crisis situation, Russia would have to meet its domestic needs at the expense of its exports.

37

Blackmail was too a strong term, according to one discussant, but bribery might be a better one to describe Russia’s energy diplomacy with states in the CIS, particularly with Ukraine, for instance, when other issues are negotiated concurrently with energy prices.

Moreover, Gazprom’s monopolistic behaviour, particularly in the South Caucasus where it tries to control infrastructure to dominate or even eliminate competition and maintain its influence on local and regional consumers of its gas, was noted with concern.

Equally, though, it was noted that Ukraine would not cede control of its infrastructure, and there was a complex interweaving of pressures in the South Caucasus: in seeking to influence Azerbaijan to withhold energy supplies to Georgia, Russia may be knocking on an open door since Azerbaijan has its own reasons for a similar policy of exerting pressure on Georgia.

Conclusions and Recommendations In concluding the discussion, a number of points emerged. Perhaps most importantly, the need for greater coherence in EU policy was reiterated. If president Putin’s policies were having a unifying effect on the collective thinking within the EU, pushing it towards greater increasing coordination, it remains to be seen how far this will translate into practice. Nonetheless, the tension remained between the overall aim in developing a new treaty with Russia – whether the EU should aim to tie Russia down with an agreement and oblige it to develop along the lines desired by the EU, or whether the EU should sign any agreement at all until Russia agrees to abide by OSCE values and standards.

Nonetheless, in practice, despite the debate above, the EU is moving down the line of reaching a new agreement with Russia, though this will not be for some time. Currently the Common Space Road Map mechanisms are being used and provide a tool for the implementation of plans, a series of mechanisms to which the Russians are also committed. Some suggested that immediate prospects were potentially good, despite the recent problems of the EU’s lack of coordination, since president Putin is considered by some to seek a new agreement as part of his political legacy and since the GermanRussian relationship is essentially a positive one – which could have a positive bearing on EU-Russia relations during Germany’s presidency of the EU in 2007.

One participant noted that this approach did seem somewhat ’bitty’ and difficult to visualise and present to the public. Another stated that there was a ’lack of vision’ on the EU’s side, and questions remained about what kind of Russia the EU would like to see in 10 years. Others rejected this latter point, stating that a ’vision’ did exist – the EU seeks a political evolution in Russia towards greater openness and democracy, an increasingly civilised policing and judicial system’ and a Russia with which there was a more coordinated approach to the near abroad in the spirit of OSCE standards. The vision was there – the problem was how to reach it.

The PCA was based on the premise that Russia would be willing to change itself towards these goals, but this seems to be decreasingly likely. Nonetheless, the EU was taking a more robust approach to Russia – raising questions about the prosecution of Mikhail Khodorkovsky at the EU-Russia Helsinki summit in November 2006 and supporting the border assistance mission in Moldova, for instance. A more confident and, where appropriate, robust EU approach could also help to unify the differing positions, by creating the grounds for those states which take a harder line towards Russia to accept mainstream EU positions more readily.

A number of recommendations also emerged, particularly based on the point that the EU should approach its relationship with more confidence and seek to engage it.

-

values should be brought back to the agenda – the EU can use its position as a source of wealth and recognition for Russia to develop its agenda. The EU should

38

-

-

highlight the price of de-democratisation by refusing to open its banking facilities to those responsible for leading Russian politics the EU needs to show unity of purpose in dealing with Russia in general, but particularly in energy discussions the EU should continue to link issues in negotiations with Russia to increase its ability to achieve meaningful agreements the EU needs an increasingly credible neighbourhood policy, particularly helping Ukraine to reform. Reform in Ukraine, it was suggested, could create the grounds for reform in Russia. the EU should engage Russia by focusing resources to specific areas of the relationship, particularly in developing its energy sector and in enhancing educational programmes (by transferring TACIS funds to strengthen Erasmus Mundus).

Expectations should be carefully managed – both in terms of what to expect from Russia and from the EU-Russia relationship. Despite what was noted above, there are only limited means of persuading Russia to move towards the EU’s goals and the development of the relationship would take time.

39

The Media Introduction A central issue concerning the role of the media in Russian civil society is the current state of both the media output and the audience itself. In its initial discussions of the problem, the group was quick to point out that this is not simply an issue of state censorship. While there are considerable controls on Russian media output in terms of external constraints and journalistic self-censorship, diversity of opinion and information still exists (to a degree) in Russia. Members of the group cited sources such as Novaya Gazeta, the Internet, Echo of Moscow radio station and others.

However, two issues limit the impact of these lacunae of media freedom on Russian society. First, only about a quarter of the Russian population have access to both a reasonable range of opinion and to the Internet for broader information from abroad (and those people are in urban areas). In addition to the limited availability of a range of information sources, there were concerns that much of the Russian population would not engage with ‘alternative’ news sources. One participant cited a phrase from a newspaper founder who said ‘Russia is a democracy for the informed and remains a dictatorship for the uninformed’.

Thus, there is the combined problem of the relatively narrow availability of ‘non-state’ opinion as well as limited engagement in alternative viewpoints. The group felt that it was necessary to attempt, as much as possible, to think of strategies that would both encourage the spread of a broad spectrum of information as well engage the public with that information.

In discussing the issue of media freedom in Russia, the group felt that it could not be separated from other key pillars of civil society. As such, one also has to consider security, economics/energy policy and rule of law along with freedom of speech in Russia in order to form a policy strategy. It was agreed that Russia is slipping further and faster into a lack of engagement with the key notions of civil society. As one participant put it, Russia by itself is not an adequate source of freedom for itself.

Without falling back into the rhetoric of the Cold War, it was still felt necessary that Russians citizens could benefit from a more aggressive policy on the part of the European Union in championing rights to free speech.

The group was able to identify four particular areas that EU future policy could usefully address: 1. Changing the nature of the dialogue between Russia and the EU The group felt that the time had come to change the nature of the dialogue with Russia regarding media freedom. The EU should adhere to European standards of civil society and civic dialogue in dealing with Russia. For example, Russian politicians who speak in the West should be questioned about political actions and opposition within Russia. As one participant pointed out, it is not enough for Russians to point to opinion polls showing ‘support’ for Putin. Given the lack of political alternatives or transparency in the mass media, it is not surprising that people give Putin a high approval rating. It should not, however, be conflated with the same type of rating in a system with political choices and free flow of information to a broad base of citizens.

It is clear that Putin would like to be seen as European, as a leader who is constrained from implementing more liberal European policy in his country by a lack of understanding or civic will on the part of the Russian people. This view should be more cynically seen by the European community as a political statement of convenience on the part of the Putin administration. In addition, journalists and others in the EU should be very wary of allowing the Putin administration alone to define who can or should speak for Russia.

40

2. The war in Chechnya Chechnya The war in Chechnya remains, as one participant phrased it, the ‘core of the disease.’

Although Chechnya is a domestic conflict, the lack of dialogue and inaccessibility of the region to either Russian or foreign journalists is now rarely questioned. Chechnya needs to be part of any ongoing discussion about information strategy and media openness in Russia and beyond. It is not possible to discuss Russian civil society and media openness without confronting the issue of Chechnya. This relates to our first point about not allowing Russia to set the political agenda.

3. An understanding of the different regions of Russia Relations with Russia are channelled through Moscow and the Muscovite elite, which is natural as the capital city is vastly more powerful than any other part of the country.

However, the majority of Russian citizens live outside of Moscow and often inhabit very different political, social and cultural environments. While Moscow enjoys a range of media outlets and options – and Muscovites tend to have more resources to buy them – media outlets are not as well developed outside of the cities. In thinking of media policy and freedom of speech, the EU needs to be aware that the situation in Russia is very uneven. While dissemination of information is not an issue in Moscow, it is in many less urban areas.

4. Belarus as the model for Russia/EU relations?

As civil society becomes less open in Russia, it may be time to re-evaluate the appropriate model for the regime. There was some discussion in the group that Russia is rapidly becoming closer to Belarus than to any particular European model of society.

Evidence for a lack of democracy is found in the war in Chechnya; violence against journalists and high-profile assassinations such as Anna Politkovskaya; continuing consolidation of media outlets to Kremlin interests; changes in electoral law that will eliminate independent candidates from the Duma; and in other changes that restrict the democratic distribution of power under Putin.

There was the feeling in the group that Russians do not want to return to the Soviet era of a country as a ‘fortress’ but that currently, they have simultaneously repressive policies domestically and standing (more or less) as a ‘democracy’ internationally. Is it time for the European Union to send a clearer message about how it perceives the direction of Putin’s Russia?

Conclusions & Recommendations 1. Encourage interaction between Russian citizens and EU citizens It was felt that it would be beneficial to encourage interaction on all levels -- including grass-roots citizens, mid-level administrators and elites – between Russian and EU citizens. One way to combat the re-invention of a Russian ‘fortress’ would be to give people direct experiences and linkages with their European neighbours. An example mentioned by one group member was school exchanges. As one participant noted, Russians today do not have the somewhat more credulous nature that the Soviet citizens had toward the West.

Although Soviet citizens were often questioning of their media, it was possible for the Soviet media to present the West in a particular light given the virtual dearth of alternative information. The example cited was the fact that Soviet citizens could believe that Parisians also had to stand in line for bread (even though the picture was really of a queue for gourmet bread at a speciality shop in Paris). Continuing exchanges

41

and opportunities for citizens to experience life in European countries would help to keep that healthy credibility gap alive in Russia.

2. Interconnecting the journalistic community in Russia One of the most interesting points of discussion in the group was about the journalistic profession in Russia. It was acknowledged that Russian journalists have two particular challenges. First, they must survive in a difficult political and economic environment.

This can put them under enormous pressure to report favourably on local political and business elites. It was noted by those in the profession in Russia that there are journalists who withstand this pressure and – despite the high level of violence against journalists – are not afraid to pursue sensitive stories. However, while these individuals exist and some media outlets report on sensitive subjects such as corruption, bureaucratic incompetence and Chechnya, they are by far the exception and not the rule.

The second (and perhaps even more daunting problem) is the lack of engagement with alternative viewpoints by much of the population. However, as one participant from the former Soviet Union noted, citizens were interested in debating politics in the early 1990s. It is possible that these interests could be reanimated.

Yet how can this fragile sense of journalism as the ‘fourth estate’ be nurtured in Russia?

It was noted that groups such as Internews (an NGO that trains journalists) have identified many talented and resourceful journalists working across Russia. These journalists could be nurtured via a national network of seminars and other support mechanisms. There could be links built between them via the Internet (where possible), as well as through more traditional methods such as newsletters, regional meetings and mentoring arrangements.

It remains problematic that there is no national or regional training of journalists as a profession in the Western sense in Russia. While there are issues about suitability of this type of training, it is difficult to build a stable journalistic profession without national standards and/or training. It was noted by one participant that Ukraine’s leading national university (Kyiv-Mohyla Academy) has started a school of journalism along Western lines in recent years, and the students, graduates and faculty of the school were cited by Ukrainian politicians as a key factor in the (limited) success of the Orange Revolution.

3. Connecting the Russian journalistic community to the EU journalistic community While allowing Russian journalists to build a meaningful professional network is important, it is also important to provide examples of how the media function in various EU countries. EU countries provide a range of media models which are particularly useful in terms of demonstrating that there is no one single template for how media can contribute to civil society. Rather, societies ranging from Poland to the United Kingdom have quite different roles for print, broadcast and Internet journalism. By inviting Russian journalists for work, training and research experience in EU countries, they can be provided with a sense of both practicalities and philosophies of the role of the media in building civil society. One group member has been involved with Russian journalists who have worked with German media companies. It is particularly interesting to see the effect of their participation in ‘normal’ editorial activities – such as editorial board meetings – that are not part of the Soviet/Russian media tradition.

4. Support/nurture EuroNews broadcasts in Russia As participants from the former Soviet Union noted, EuroNews (produced in France and broadcast in Russia) is now available on the fifth channel on Russian television. This is the government-owned Culture Channel, the only channel to run commercial-free in

42

Russia, and is relatively widely available throughout the country. The presence of the news – which is broadcast in the popular slot of early-morning news – is perhaps more due to budget constraints on the part of the Culture Channel than any European initiative in Russia. In addition, the Culture Channel attracts a relatively small audience.

Nonetheless, it is a positive sign that television news produced in Europe is broadcast so widely in Russia. This could provide a particularly useful vehicle to present European views and ideas to the Russian public.

5. Establish the Anna Politkovskaya Scholarship and/or Chair of Journalism The murder of Anna Politkovskaya was noted with sadness by the group, particularly for the fact that so few in Russia were aware of her work. This was a function of the current Russia media system, which allows some expression but does not permit hard-hitting investigative reporters such as Politkovskaya to appear in state-sanctioned outlets such as central television news. The outrage over her murder in the EU was not matched by outrage in Russia, mostly because people were unaware of her work and lacked the information to challenge the Russian government’s contention that her work was unimportant.

Politkovskaya, however, was important enough to be assassinated and her contribution to information diversity via Novaya Gazeta was important. If she were recognised in a permanent, international manner, it would send a strong message to Moscow that her value was known and respected in the West. As such, the group supported the efforts of the Sciences Po (Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris) in France to establish an Anna Politkovskaya Scholarship and/or Chair. The scholarship award would not only memorialise the individual, but could provide some of the training discussed under Point 3 above. As one participant phrased it, ‘the message to the average Russian journalist would be that to honour Politkovskaya is to honour the notion of selfless journalism in the cause of building a more just society’.

43

Visit the EU-Russia Centre at www.eu-russiacentre.org

Contact us: Avenue de Tervueren 402 - 1150 Brussels, Belgium Tel: +32 (0) 2 761 66 81 Fax: +32 (0) 2 777 05 02 info@eu-russiacentre.org

44