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Bracing for Hostilities
Strategic Vision vol. 6, no. 35 (October, 2017)
India wary of resurgence of Chinese aggressiveness in Doklam border area
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Namrata Hasija
A single wreath adorns the Nathu La War Memorial, dedicated to the Indian soldiers who lost their lives during the 1967 border war against China.
photo: Abhishek Kumar
China’s extraordinarily rapid rise in the hierarchy of global power is raising concerns about its future policies. Opinion is divided as to whether the People’s Republic of China (PRC) will continue to assert its power in disruptive ways, or act more responsibly as its own stakes in the international system grow. Arguments can be made for both views. However, emerging signs suggest that China’s self-assertion is becoming an unpleasant reality, whereas the expectation that it will work for, and within, a global consensus remains more a matter of hope. The recent standoff between India and China in the Doklam area is a reflection of China’s willingness to act more assertively.
While Doklam may have appeared as an isolated incident to the wider world, it is in fact part of a long-term problem, which has been growing in recent years in stride with Beijing’s assertiveness. While China and India have temporarily set aside their differences, there are several factors which suggest that another Sino-Indian border crisis could well occur in the future. First, the overall level of Chinese military activity on the border has increased in recent years. Second, China’s aggressive maritime activity in the East China Sea and South China Sea could translate into a more muscular approach to land border disputes as well. Third, China’s increasingly hostile rhetoric toward India show a lack of respect for Indian concerns, and reinforces its aggressive undertakings on its periphery. Finally, the Doklam standoff has hardened public and elite opinion in India toward China, which is likely to translate into a hardened resolve against any future PRC actions along the border.
A Marine descends from an MV-22B Osprey with a fast rope at Camp Hansen, Okinawa.
photo: Andy Martinez
Vague border
Since the 1962 war between India and China, the Sino-Indian border has remained undemarcated in many areas, and military patrols by both sides have tended to stray across the vague border. In the late 1970s, there was an increase in People’s Liberation Army (PLA) patrols in the areas of Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh. These patrols often resulted in intense eyeball-to-eyeball confrontations with Indian military personnel. Later on, the Chinese identified “hot spots” along the border and began to lay claim to more areas. Over time, Chinese forces have moved into these areas and slowly consolidated their positions.
More recently, Chinese patrols have occurred in a more deliberate fashion. They have operated in specific locations more regularly, and as their strength and confidence has increased, so too has the aggressiveness of their patrols. In recent years, there have been hundreds of border incidents by Chinese military forces along the border. Despite the recent drawdown by both sides, practical concerns in the Doklam region remain. Indian and Chinese troops are separated from each other by a mere 150 meters. Additionally, some reports have suggested that China is building fortifications in the area.
These increased border tensions between China and India come at a time when China is pushing out into the East China Sea and the South China Sea. In the former, China has been more assertive in challenging Japanese claims to the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands. Much more notable however are China’s claims and activities in the South China Sea. China’s vast claims in the region overlap with large swaths of the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of Vietnam and the Philippines. Even more concerning, China has constructed huge artificial islands, and many commentators have speculated that these islands will be used for military purposes. In view of China’s aggressive posture and expansive claims in the sea, it is reasonable to question whether China will also take a more aggressive policy with regard to its border disputes in the future.
The rhetoric coming out of Beijing about India likewise suggests that troubles in the Doklam area may soon resurface. Prior to the end of the standoff, official Chinese media bombarded domestic Chinese audiences, as well as the international community, with a steady stream of threats and taunts toward India. Chinese state-sponsored media continually brought up the 1962 border war, and emphasized India’s loss. Prominent Indian scholars such as Mohan Malik have argued that Chinese elites look down on India, and that China sees India as a challenge to its ambitions in Central Asia and South Asia, particularly with regard to its Belt and Road Initiative. For this reason, tensions between China and India are sure to continue.
Simmering disapproval
The events in Doklam have produced a wave of simmering disapproval of the Chinese, not only among the top echelons but among common people as well. There have been strong reactions both from the government and defense personnel. A prominent example of this harsh new tone comes from Indian Army General Bipin Rawat, who said that “flexing of muscle” had begun and that China was “salami slicing,” or taking over territory in a very gradual manner, as a means of “testing the limits of our threshold,” which India has “to be wary about”. He has asserted time and again that the Indian military must prepare itself for a two-front war scenario.
India’s newly appointed Defense Minister, Nirmala Sitharaman visited the Nathu-La area on the SinoIndian border and interacted with Army personnel and Indo-Tibetan Border Police officials. Although bad weather in the area forced the cancelation of what was supposed to have been an aerial survey by Sitharaman, the defense minister pushed ahead and conducted a ground tour instead. This underscores the importance which top Indian officials give to the Doklam standoff.
Reorienting to realities
Even before the Doklam crisis, India had begun to reorient itself to the realities of a stronger China by seeking to deepen cooperation with friendly powers and by improving its domestic infrastructure in the country’s more sensitive regions. The recent 21st edition of the Malabar series of exercises was held in the Bay of Bengal from July 10 to 17. The weeklong trilateral naval exercise by the militaries of the United States, Japan, and India was seen as being aimed against China, especially given the timing: during the Doklam crisis.
A US Air Force F-35A Lightning II from Hill Air Force Base, Utah, taxis for take-off at Kadena Air Base.
photo: Greg Erwin
India also strongly supports deeper quadrilateral cooperation between the United States, Japan, Australia, and India. During the recent ASEAN summit in November, these four countries held discussions on the sidelines which sought to strengthen joint naval exercises, implement the rule of law, and take steps to improve safety of navigation.
Domestically, India is trying to develop its transportation infrastructure to boost connectivity in the northeastern region, especially in areas near the border with China and near countries under China’s influence. Recently, Prime Minister Narendra Modi inaugurated the country’s longest bridge over the Brahmaputra River, which will further enhance connectivity to the border region.
While the situation remains tense, some positive developments between India and China took place recently, when the 10th round of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs was held 18 November, 2017 in Beijing. A press release from the Indian Embassy said that both sides reviewed the situation in all sectors of the India-China border issue and agreed that maintenance of peace and tranquility in the border areas is an important prerequisite for sustained growth of bilateral relations. The two sides also exchanged views on further confidence-building measures (CBMs) and strengthening of military-tomilitary contacts.
The Doklam crisis, however, has produced a deep unease in India—an unease that is shared by both elites and common people alike. If a significant border crisis occurs in the future, it may be harder for leaders on the two sides to find a peaceful solution against an angry nationalist uproar. In order to produce a stable, long-term solution, both sides must commit themselves to dialogue, and to peaceful means for resolving disputes.
Namrata Hasija is a Research Associate at the Centre for China Analysis and Strategy.
