11 minute read
Sitting Idle
Strategic Vision vol. 6, no. 35 (October, 2017)
A closer look at Chinese failure to pressure North Korean denuclearization
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Alžběta Bajerová
The People’s Republic of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are close allies and ideological partners.
photo: Roman Harak
Throughout the escalation of the North Korea missile crisis, China has been seen by the West as holding the key to the problem. This narrative has not only been adopted by the media, but also by the current US administration. US President Donald Trump said during a state visit to Beijing that “China can fix this problem easily and quickly,” and slammed Beijing on Twitter for allegedly doing “nothing” to solve the issue. In order to analyze whether China is indeed capable of ridding the world of North Korea’s nuclear threat, but is actively choosing not to do so for its own interests, one first must step back from Washington’s interpretation of Beijing’s actions and examine China’s interests on the Korean Peninsula.
The notion that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) possesses the ability to exercise influence over North Korea’s nuclear program stems from the significant economic leverage that Beijing has over Pyongyang. China is North Korea’s biggest trade partner, accounting for more than 90 percent of its total international trade.
A crucial element of trade is North Korea’s coal exports to China that was facilitated in 2015 by a high-speed rail route built between the North Korean border and China’s northeastern Liaoning province. Despite economic sanctions, trade volume between the two countries has been steadily rising. What recently caught the public’s eye were the numbers from the first half of 2017, when China-North Korea trade totaled US$2.6 billion, up 10 percent from the same period in 2016. This apparent increase occurred despite China’s announcement that it was going to cut down on coal imports from North Korea, in accordance with sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council.
Inaccurate data
The accuracy of official economic data released by China is regularly disputed. According to US researchers, it is obvious that China exports crude oil to North Korea, although the state has not reported any transactions since 2014. Thus, the numbers reported by China should be been seen rather as a minimum benchmark, and less as a fact. This unwillingness of China to adhere to sanctions and act upon the North Korean economic dependence is source of frustration for Washington. So why doesn’t China exerts more pressure on North Korea?
In fact, China has very little incentive to truly exercise sanctions on North Korea. First, China does not view its trade leverage as a key to actually ending the nuclear threat. Instead, it perceives the economic and nuclear issues as completely separate. From Beijing’s perspective, the reason behind North Korea’s aggressive politics is the US military superiority in the region, and hence only a bargain in this area might change Pyongyang’s posture. China’s ambassador to the United Nations has openly stated that if the United States and North Korea do not attempt to reduce tensions and denuclearize, there is nothing that China can do.
Graphic: TUBS
Beijing has proposed a solution in this area. Together with Russia, it has offered to broker a “dual suspension” deal that would bind North Korea to suspend its nuclear weapons program in return for the United States ending its military exercises with South Korea. The very idea of such deal, sometimes labeled “freeze for freeze,” has been repeatedly turned down by Washington. This is not unreasonable, as Washington’s strategic relationship with Seoul is based on the Mutual Defense Treaty dating to 1953, and the impairment of this treaty is one of Pyongyang’s principal objectives.
Second, making such concession to a rogue, nuclear-equipped state could set a dangerous precedent in the international community. Third, US withdrawal from the peninsula would cause a power shift in the region—a very favorable development for China.
Another reason China avoids using its significant economic leverage over Pyongyang is the direct impact of such conduct. If Beijing were to halt trade with the country, North Korea would suffer a great shortage of goods. That would put the small country—in which an estimated two out of five citizens are already malnourished—in dangerous proximity to a full-blown humanitarian crisis. Research on the effects of economic sanctions has shown that sanctions often fail because totalitarian regimes typically compensate for their losses by taking more resources from their own people.
The severity of Kim Jong Un’s regime toward its own people has already been proven. The famine in the 1990s killed as many as one million North Koreans, roughly five percent of the population at that time. Despite rather generous reaction from the international community, North Korea regularly puts roadblocks in the way of donors. Humanitarian aid has since become an item in diplomatic negotiations regarding the nuclear program. The regime, however, has been largely unresponsive to negotiation revolving around its granting or withdrawal.
Misplaced priorities
Even now, despite international sanctions and increased proximity to famine, North Korea disregards its population’s needs and continues to allocate large a portion of its GDP to military and weapons development, and spends generous amounts of money on lavish projects such as the Masikryong ski resort.
Children in an orphanage in North Korea during the 1997 famine. As many as one million North Koreans are belived to have died in the famine.
photo: Justin Kilcullen
Therefore, there is no reason to anticipate that North Korea would amend its actions; neither by the influence of sanctions, nor when facing the starvation of its own population.
The friendship bridge links Sinuiju, North Korea across the Yalu River to Dandong, a Chinese city.
photo: Roman Harak
Testing the limits of a rogue regime equipped with nuclear warheads and willing to sacrifice its citizens could have significant consequences, especially for a bordering state like China. If Beijing indeed discontinued all trade ties, many North Koreans would encounter extreme hardship and may attempt to defect or rebel. With social and economic instability rising, Pyongyang would be forced to impose even harsher punishments in order to control the population. Such pressure, combined with extreme food scarcity, would create a migration wave that would hit Chinese border areas.
At the same time, China would also lose the middle-sized businesses that currently make a profit by exporting to North Korea. The border areas (such as Dandong and Shenyang) would suffer from unemployment, and likely face an influx of migrants. In other words, China would be facing a spill-over crisis. Should Pyongyang fail to suppress a rebellion, the crisis might escalate into violent conflict, and a civil war in a border country is a very dangerous issue to have to contend with.
Poignant consequences
If China fully embraced its economic power over Pyongyang and let the regime collapse, the negative consequences would be poignant. At the same time, the outcomes of such a development could not possibly serve as sufficient compensation for taking such a risk. In the event of a regime collapse in the north, South Korea, backed by the United States, would very likely come to the rescue and pursue swift unification under its own terms. Such a development would strip China of its buffer state, and leave it with a US ally directly on its border.
US Pacific Command has deployed the first elements of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, known as THAAD, to South Korea.
photo: DoD
Although China will undeniably push its own interests, it would be difficult to control the outcome in a rapidly failing state. Besides, a direct clash between China, South Korea and the United States could also potentially harm Beijing’s other long-term interests.
On the other hand, what if unification could be controlled? For 20 years, South Korea and the United States have led negotiations with North Korea while having eventual unification in mind. As for China, however, the idea of a unified Korea brings mixed results either way.
Of course, even from Beijing’s perspective, the unification scenario has some compelling arguments. It would solve the imminent nuclear threat that China is very close to, and not particularly happy about. Moreover, there is the prospect of removing the justification for the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-ballistic missile system that irks Beijing. If the officially-stated threat was gone, Seoul could easily be maneuvered into dismantling it. From an economic point of view, a reasonable and developing neighbor with an open market to replace North Korea would also be beneficial to China.
China’s fears and concerns over the possibility of a US ally on its border are not unjustified. When Beijing looks back to German unification at the end
of the Cold War, it views the United States as having taken advantage of Soviet, and later Russian, weakness to not only maintain its Cold War alliance, but also push it further toward the Russian border. China likely expects the same strategy to be applied in Korea, with US troops theoretically being placed as far as the Yalu River. This is what China fought the Korean War to prevent.
Beijing currently opposes Korean unification, and has the will and capabilities to prevent it. Since the PRC props up North Korea economically and could intervene militarily to block unification in the event of collapse, its veto over moves toward unification is effective. Thus, for the United States and South Korea to achieve such an outcome, China must believe that unification is in its best interest. That means, for unification to move forward, it almost certainly must come with a reduction of the US role on the Korean peninsula.
Common goals
The desire to push the United States off the Korean Peninsula is the point when China and North Korea shake hands. Other than that, however, their relationship can be described as nothing short of cold. China’s preferred scenario for North Korea’s future involves political and economic reform, abandoning its nuclear program, and becoming a perfect buffer state. China’s large investments in the nation suggest that there have been intentions to lead North Korea in such direction for quite some time. Kim Jong Un, however, is adamantly unresponsive to such tactics.
Also out of the picture is Kim Jong Nam, the ousted brother of the North’s despot leader and Beijing’s former protégé, who, in case of a successful silent coup, could have been installed as a puppet leader in Pyongyang to bring North Korea closer to China and its interests, while continuing the rule of the Kim dynasty. With his murder, China lost what was possibly its last chance for transformation on its own terms. With Kim Jong-Un apparently achieving a credible nuclear capability, it has also lost a great deal of influence over Pyongyang.
Observing the unfavorable development of its neighbor, China has gone from criticizing the February 2014 UN report that detailed human rights abuses in North Korea, to backing UN Resolutions 1718 and 2375, which imposed the harshest sanctions on the regime so far. China does not believe in the influence of sanctions and likely also does not respect them, therefore, one can interpret Beijing’s current actions on the UN floor as a statement for the international community. China is prepared to cooperate on North Korea, and does not seek to help the regime any further. It will not, however, go against its own interests and contribute to a possible crisis on the border.
A North Korean ballistic missile is on parade during the celebrations for North Korea Victory Day in 2013.
photo: Stefan Krasowski
Soldiers from the north and those from the south are posted in close proximity to each other at the demilitarized zone.
photo: Dean Karalekas
North Korea is a failed state waiting to happen, and China possesses the power to push it over the edge. Although China may not be entirely satisfied with North Korean nuclear capability and increasing disobedience, it will avoid any moves that could cause a sudden regime collapse. Even though Beijing has taken a tougher stance lately, China is not going to threaten North Korea’s survivability. Not only would this result in chaos, but also potentially in nuclear disaster.
Stability first
For Beijing, stability on the Korean Peninsula has always been prioritized over denuclearization. This strategic approach differs vastly from the one adopted by Washington, which has been pressuring North Korea to completely give up its nuclear program by imposing a variety of sanctions. China and the United States are also in diametric discord over who is to take the next move toward ending the Korean nuclear missile crisis and how. The United States blames China and its unwillingness to use its economic leverage over Pyongyang to bolster the sanctions, meanwhile China pushes the United States to meet some of Pyongyang’s demands and reduce its presence in East Asia.
The question at the core of the disagreement between China and the United States might be whether the Korean crisis shall end in the regime’s collapse or not. Both countries derive their answers from their respective priorities (denuclearization vs. stability), proximity to the potential area of crisis, as well as from their geopolitical interests. In the middle of the quarrel over a solution, however, North Korea has achieved the ability to carry out a nuclear attack. It is therefore possible that in the near future the need to act will surpass any other strategic objectives.
Alžběta Bajerová is a research intern at The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence and the Editor-in-Chief of the Institute of Asian Studies’ monthly newsletter.
