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Automated Alternative
Strategic Vision vol. 7, no. 39 (August, 2018)
Unmanned subs offer alternative to costly submarine acquisition program
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Tobias Burgers
Taiwan has embarked on an ambitious program to develop indigenous submarines. The national government seeks to develop a new generation of submarines to replace the Chien Lung class, which have been in service more than three decades. As they near the end of their operational lifespan, which has been extended already, the government understands the urgency for a new fleet of submarines.
Foreign sales of submarines, from Germany, Japan, or Israel, for example, is not a feasible option, and Taiwan’s main armament and defense supplier the United States is not in the business of selling diesel submarines. Thus, Taiwan has opted to indigenously develop a new generation of submarines.
The Taiwan-based China Shipbuilding Corporation—the nation’s main naval vessel builder—has vied to win the government contract, and two years ago initiated a submarine development center in Kaohsiung. The development of eight submarines, with a possible increase to 12, has been foreseen within the space of two decades.
The first system is expected to enter service in 2026. The US Congress voted for the defense act in 2018, which included offering Taiwan technical support for its submarine program. With US assistance, Taipei’s aim to develop a new generation of submarines appears closer than ever.
The utility of submarines as asymmetrical tools has been widely documented. This is especially relevant to Taiwan, as China’s anti-submarine capabilities (or rather, its lack thereof) are well-documented. Acquiring submarines will not suddenly turn the tide of the strategic balance, but it would significantly enhance Taiwan’s deterrence ability.
Aging fleet
Yet developing these submarines is a daunting task. Taiwan has no native submarine development experience: its submarines are either Dutch, and nearing 30 years of service, or they are American models that date back to World War II. Furthermore, the United States has had no recent experience in developing diesel submarines—the kind of submarines Taiwan seeks to develop and build—for over 3 decades. As such, it seems that Taiwan’s defense industry has a steep learning curve ahead.
This was amply demonstrated when a Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments announcement called for foreign support. It is therefore likely that the timeframe and the estimated cost could increase dramatically by the time Taiwan receives its first new submarine. Rather, it seems likely that the project would extend beyond the initial timeframe for development and exceed its budget.
The history of weapons development is full of ambitious cases of defense systems that nearly all ended in costly overruns. Indeed, it is rare for a weapons development program to meet its initial time and cost estimates. With its limited defense budget and the deteriorating strategic balance vis-à-vis China, Taiwan does not possess the luxury that nations such as the United States and China have; being able to delay or even endure failed projects. Taiwan simply cannot. Time is also not on Taiwan’s side. With the first submarine not scheduled to become operational until 2026, in theory at least, it could be well over a decade before a single submarine can be deployed. Fielding the desired eight to 12 submarines could easily take another decade on top of that. With China’s military might growing by the year, Taiwan needs military resources now that can not only asymmetrically counter China’s military threats, but are also within its technical means and budget, and which can be completed in a reasonable amount of time.
Limited feasibility
Taiwan’s desire for submarine development is understandable, but it remains very much in flux. Furthermore, the feasibility of operating submarines in the shallow waters of the Taiwan Strait is limited. Submarines thrive in deeper waters, enabling them to hide from enemy detection. The shallow waters of the Taiwan Strait do not provide such an amenable operating environment. As such, they could be easily detected by the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s anti-submarine forces, rendering them effectively unable to threaten Chinese surface ships.
Therefore, Taiwan’s military planners should consider alternatives to manned submarines. Specifically, they should consider the development of unmanned submarines, or as they are better known, unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). The following points highlight the value and efficacy of UUVs for Taiwan’s defense.
First, when it comes to the development of unmanned systems Taiwan’s defense establishment and industry actually have significant experience in this area. Taiwan’s defense industry has developed a range of unmanned aerial vehicles. Furthermore, its software and hardware industry is among the world’s best, and it has the experience and skill to develop new software and hardware systems that would be essential for the development of UUVs.
Moreover, a possible joint venture between the government, defense industry, and the commercial software and hardware industry would produce the necessary skills, expertise, and understanding to embark on a UUV development project. Having gained experience in the development of unmanned systems, the lessons learned from these projects could be applied to other projects.
Second, and related to the prior argument: the US defense industry has significant experience in the research and development of unmanned technologies. Although much effort has been focused on the aerial element, in recent years the US Navy, in collaboration with the defense industry, has embarked on a number of UUV projects. It can be expected that neither the US defense establishment nor its industry will share its state-of-the-art technologies with Taiwan, but it will have considerably more experience and knowledge to share in this sector than in the diesel submarine sector in which it has near zero experience. Given that the US seems inclined to support Taiwan’s defense industry under the current government, it is likely that the Washington would assist Taipei in an effort to develop UUVs.
Significant advantages
From an economic perspective, the development of unmanned submarines would make more sense than producing manned submarines. Unmanned systems could be significantly smaller in size, and would not require the training and sustainment of a large crew. While money matters are important, it is in the tactical and strategic domains where the primary advantages of the UUV vis-à-vis conventional subs can be found.
First, the absence of manned operators allows for a number of offensive benefits. UUVs could remain on the surface: hidden, to be activated only in times of crisis. This would increase their stealth and would make it significantly more difficult for China to track all UUVs that could pose a threat. Once activated, UUVs can act more aggressively. With no concern over the loss of lives, UUVs can engage in more daring ‘suicide’ missions. In particular, if they could engage in so-called swarming tactics.
The use of several, possibly hundreds of smaller UUVs—in essence just automated and autonomous torpedoes—could easily overwhelm Chinese naval defenses. As noted before, China’s anti-submarine warfare capabilities are limited, and that is an assessment made for a scenario in which there are a limited number of manned, large submarines. Imagine a much larger number of smaller UUVs: Such an autonomous and automated force would have significantly more capability to strike at an invasion fleet.
The absence of manned operators on UUVs touches upon another problem along the manned submarine road: Personnel. Due their limited number, and the need for a large crew compliment, the loss of a submarine would be catastrophic for the military and would have a large impact on public opinion.
The hunters become the hunted
Public opinion and the political value of manned submarines could force the armed forces to deploy submarines in a moderate, defensive posture, due to the possibility of losing submarines and men. Such a scenario would turn the hunters—Taiwan submarines—into the hunted, effectively leveling any offensive benefit. UUVs simply do not have this problem: The loss of steel, plastic, metal, and electronics would not cause a public backlash the way that loss of life would.
The ROC Navy’s ability to recruit enough crew for its new fleet of submarines might also present a serious challenge. The Taiwan military’s recruiting numbers are flat; its effort to create an All-Volunteer-Force has proved a failed experiment; and there is almost no appetite among this generation of Taiwan’s young people to join the military. For these reasons, it remains very much an open question whether the Navy can recruit, train, and deploy sufficient numbers of personnel to man eight submarines.
Clearly, UUVs need staff too, but advances in artificial intelligence could allow for a lighter manned footprint. Furthermore, any force operating UUVs remotely, very much in the manner of a video game, would be most likely shore-based, and not locked away, hundreds of meters below the Taiwan Strait. The first vision surely sounds more attractive to potential recruits than the latter.
In sum, the combination of these factors illustrates that UUVs could pose a serious economic, political, and military alternative to the development of manned submarines. It is therefore imperative to conduct further studies into the feasibility and utility of such systems. Rather than betting on a single manned horse, the Taiwan defense establishment should consider multiple options. With China’s rise and increasingly assertive behavior, Taiwan has little room for costly strategic errors.
Tobias Burgers is a visiting scholar at the Institute of International Relations in Taipei. He can be reachedfor comment at burgers@zedat.fu-berlin.de