The Barrel of a Gun

Strategic Vision vol. 9, no. 47 (September, 2020)

China seeks ‘world-class military’ to reach New Era goal of regional Dominance

M.S. Prathibha

PLA tanks roll down Xidawang Lu in Chaoyang district in the east side of central Beijing past the luxurious shopping centre Shin Kong Place.

photo: Dan

China’s quest to build a world-class military for the New Era is integral to achieving the Chinese Dream. The New Era, in the current Chinese political lexicon, underscores a China that is on the path to ascendancy. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) believes that this ascendancy, characterized by wealth and status, has to maintain its momentum, to ensure that China emerges victorious in the future.

The New Era—broadly encapsulated in Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics— advocates an absolute embrace of the Marxist ideology to guide policies, and reaffirms the CCP’s ability to accurately judge historical patterns and trends. Most importantly, the New Era is a time during which the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation will be realized, a deadline set for 2049. China’s goal is to build a world-class military by 2049. To better direct its resources and provide clarity, the intermediate goal of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is to complete its military modernization by 2035.

Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers march in unison during a military parade.

photo: Government ZA

The scope of the transformation and use of terminology such as “world-class” have inevitably invited comparisons to the US military. IR experts such as Taylor Fravel believe that the concept does not define global military ambitions on a par with the US military, but that it serves rather as a force-development concept. It is believed that the “world-class military” capabilities sought by the PLA does not imply projecting power beyond East Asia. Not for the time being, at least.

Regional focus

A survey of the Chinese literature on the “world-class military” concept does not reveal any desire to project beyond the region, and does support such a hypothesis. Moreover, China wants a world-class military to fight against the world’s best militaries, whereby science and technology-led innovation would drive military readiness, alongside modern joint command and operations capabilities.

There are other factors that support these assessments. Despite the growth in the PLA’s capabilities, its military posture is still confined to its regional neighborhood. Comparisons between the US and Chinese militaries remain premature because the US military, with its technological edge and professional troops, is sustained by its freedom to move throughout the global commons, unrestrained and unimpeded by other military powers. Unlike the US, the Chinese military neither has a network of alliances nor supply chains in the global theatre that could aid its military operations beyond its home region.

Chinese scholarship on world-class military capabilities might be about being a dominant military power in East Asia. However, to establish itself as a world-class military, it would have to challenge US primacy in the region, regardless of its desire to avoid conflict.

There are contradictions within the Chinese policy between its aspirations to become a world-class military to secure its territorial and sovereignty claims and its motivation to avoid confrontation with the United States. There are two factors that will compel the Chinese to challenge US primacy. First, the Chinese policy is to achieve national rejuvenation with the help of the PLA. For instance, the Chinese

US and Chinese soldiers work together during the 2018 Disaster Management Exchange at Jurong Military Installation, China.

photo: Geordan Tyquiengco

believe that, to fulfill the Chinese Dream in the New Era, it has to overcome resistance from countries that object to China’s new status, as these would actively forestall its ascension to regional hegemon and global power. Leaders in Beijing have concluded that the lack of advancement in science and technology has historically adversely impacted the Middle Kingdom’s military power, which led to Imperial China’s failure to resist colonial forces and revolution, and forestall the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1912.

No doubt, this narrative drives their argument that the quest for a world-class military is both an obligation to the past and vision toward the future, returning China to its rightful place in Asia, and in the world.

The New Era precisely imagines such a perilous world environment, where the military’s role is to protect China’s newfound wealth and ensure that the CCP realizes the Chinese Dream. For example, in the 2019 white paper titled, “National Defense in the New Era,” the Chinese leadership integrated the political goals of Xi Jinping’s New Era and the modernization goals of the PLA until 2049. The PLA’s objective therefore is to safeguard the path that China takes to complete its national rejuvenation project. Hence, the PLA as a world-class military would have to play a role for China to resolve its sovereignty issues, and US primacy will not be sufficient to stop the Chinese from pursuing confrontation, if that is what is required.

Second, the Chinese policy is likely to confront US primacy because it is maintained and reinforced by institutional and norm-building architecture in the region. China would like the very projection of its world-class military power to compel countries to make compromises with it rather than enter into confrontation with Beijing. However, without contending with the constraints imposed by the American security model in Asia, i.e., the primacy of US forces in the region, its alliances and norms, China will find it difficult to achieve its political and military goals.

As of now, Chinese military power is perceived to be formidable, judging by the reluctance shown by other countries in the neighborhood to confront it, though not because the Chinese military can successfully impose its will on US forces in the region. Therefore, to be recognized as a world-class military, China would have to break the constraints, which requires either a confrontation with the United States, or for the US military to recognize that the PLA has become too powerful to confront.

Even recent actions by the PLA around the Asia Pacific attest to this reality. To show that it can defend its core interests during the pandemic, the leadership in China relied on military power to deter any perceived threats in the neighborhood. Whether it was Chinese military actions through deterrence operations during the COVID-19 situation, or the increasing uneasiness among neighboring countries over China’s military posture, recent events have shown that Beijing believes that the use of military power is crucial to proving its credibility, even if this means raising the level of conflict with the US military. Therefore, the only way for China to use its world-class military to counter the US security model in Asia is to show that it can trump any US security guarantee.

One way for China to attain world-class military status without conflict would be to emulate the manner in which the United States established its own primacy in the Asian theatre. China might embark upon a campaign of discrediting the US presence in the region while portraying its own military as an engine for world peace and stability. Such a strategy would require a substantial contribution of military power, however. It would have to equal, for example, the substantial US commitment of both material and men to defeating Imperial Japan in World War II. It was the US military defeat of the Axis powers that enabled it to impose peace through norms and alliance-building that allowed Asian countries like Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea to develop their economies

US Air Force F-16s at Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska prepare for exercise Distant Frontier.

photo: Aaron Larue Guerrisky

and secure their boundaries under the US security umbrella. While countries in the region that rely on US security alliances might seek autonomy, they do not desire independence as this would divert their priorities from economic development to bearing the heavy of cost of apportioning their resources to obtain security and peace.

Military power needed

In the case of China, applying its military power in a norm-building and peace-imposing exercise would require both the substantial use of military power and the defeat of the existing powers. Moreover, its ability to impose a new peace and enact new norms would also have to happen under structural duress in the region, without which countries would be unwilling to accept Chinese terms. Otherwise, there would be no difference between the Chinese contribution and others, regarding peace-keeping activities or military assistance. At least they will not earn the credibility of being a world-class military. Therefore, in the absence of a breakdown of order in Asia, China will have to use its military power by confronting the existing status quo to defend its interests.

In the current scenario, China hopes to establish its world-class military by engaging in regional diplomacy to thwart US intervention. However, it cannot succeed without the capability to impose military power against its neighbors. Consequently, the security apprehensions it triggers in the neighborhood must be multifaceted, and depend on each country’s assessment of the implications of confronting the PLA.

Though other nations in the region might be united in their worry that the PLA’s rapid military modernization is changing the regional balance of power in China’s favor, they remain divided on just how to counter it. Most countries do not believe that Chinese military power has yet become a threat to their survival, but they are convinced that it has risen to the extent that China’s ability to dictate a new status quo in the region has become the new normal. This has led to a sense of urgency on the part of the nations in the Asia Pacific region, where the US is attempting to coalescence a concerted response.

Predicting these orientations toward using military power, Beijing wants to evade these trends and achieve superiority in spatial domains. It purports to bring the acceptance toward compromise (on issues such as army building and sharing resources with other countries) to reduce the avenues for confrontation.

As aspirational as that may sound, in the Asian theatre, where territorial integrity and sovereignty are tied to national identity, most countries—including

China—would rather choose confrontation over compromise on such core issues. Moreover, the countries in the region would have to see a breakdown of political and economic order of WWII proportions before they would be willing to accept Chinese military power in return for a dilution of their territorial claims.

Therefore, the countries in the region might be motivated to lessen avenues of confrontation with China, but they would not be able to accept China’s claims in their respective territorial and sovereignty disputes with Beijing. If China cannot prove its world-class military status and confront US primacy, the countries in the neighborhood will find it difficult to cede to China’s many claims.

Confrontation is a more likely outcome, as China will increasingly push confrontation with powers in the region in an effort to prove its credibility. The realities of using military power will drive Beijing to use it for achieving their geopolitical goals and to take on the US security model in Asia. If Beijing chooses this path, and can make a success of it, then China would become more than a regional power by extension. It would be a fallacy to believe that the consequences of the Chinese world-class military status in East Asia would be confined to that region. In fact, being a world-class military in the region would enable it to establish control beyond the region, and to become a global military player.

Using military power to challenge US primacy in East Asia would mean that it would become a global military power as a consequence. Moreover, the Belt and Road Initiative appears poised to give China ample opportunity to establish bases and networks far afield before it will be ready to challenge the United States. For instance, the combination of Belt and Road investments in economic and commercial sectors through land-rail connectivity and trade infrastructure and the building of port facilities and communication networks both underwater and inland will enable China to push for building onshore facilities that could be used by the PLA navy. Corresponding plans by the Chinese navy toward increasing its power-projection capabilities, such as aircraft carriers and the PLA Navy Marine Corps, might not be as extensive as the global reach of the US military, but it may be sufficient to challenge the United States in East Asia.

China’s Type 002 aircraft carrier nears the end of construction. Following the US model, Beijing hopes to project power through the use of aircraft carriers.

photo: Tyg728

Dr. M.S. Prathibha is an Associate Fellow at the East Asia Centre, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (MP-IDSA), New Delhi.