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The People's Spin
Strategic Vision vol. 9, no. 47 (September, 2020)
Beijing report plays up COVID-19 successes to burnish tarnished image
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Shao-cheng Sun
The coronavirus pandemic has been a disastrous worldwide event. The virus was first detected in November 2019 in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). However, local officials in the city of Wuhan did not disclose the information when the outbreak first hit the city. It was this initial silence that allowed the contagious virus to expand as widely throughout China, and around the world, as it has.
The US Department of Homeland Security has determined that the PRC government “intentionally concealed the severity” of COVID-19 from the international community during these early days, using this time to buy more than two billion masks and 25 million pieces of protective clothing from overseas suppliers before the true extent of the COVID-19 outbreak made itself known.
When the number of victims began to increase by the end of January 2020, China’s leadership launched a national campaign marked by aggressive measures, such as locking down entire cities, closing schools, constructing temporary hospitals, and deploying medical staff to Wuhan. These measures seemed to be working. Reports of new cases began to drop significantly. Meanwhile, the rest of the world paid a huge price for China’s initial delays: By September 9, 2020, there were around 27,560,000 people who had tested positive, and close to 900,000 had died. The world has been deeply affected by the pandemic. On April 21, China Watch Institute, a think tank sponsored by the Chinese government, released a report titled “China’s Fight against COVID-19.”
The report was an attempt to control the narrative: China’s international image suffered greatly after having opened the Pandora’s box of coronavirus, and the report painted the Chinese authorities in a positive light by detailing the success of their efforts to contain the virus. This report outlines the key strategies of China’s anti-coronavirus campaign that Beijing wants to highlight.
When COVID-19 first began to spread in China, the Beijing regime commanded local governments and the Chinese people to take an active role and aggressive measures to reduce the number of new cases. Social management has proved to be a key factor in containing the spread of the virus. As the epidemic snowballed in Wuhan, local officials went door-todoor to conduct health checks. Drones equipped with loudspeakers were employed to hover above the streets and warn people to stay indoors.
Information technology, particularly artificial intelligence technology, was also widely used. For example, facial-recognition software linked to a smartphone application assigned each citizen a color-coded designation, based on his existing and potential risk as determined by the government. The China Watch Institute’s report highlights these and other measures taken by the Chinese government.
First, the report cites effective public mobilization. Chinese authorities released updated data to provide citizens with information about government policies concerning the epidemic. The PRC National Health Commission posts on its websites the number of new confirmed cases, suspected cases, confirmed recovered cases, discharged cases, and deaths. The epidemic map was updated in real time to display figures on infections and deaths. Research institutions also posted medical recommendations through press conferences and the Internet, and promoted simple self-protection measures.
Second, there was a focus on rigorous self-isolation. Self-isolation proved to be an effective measure to slow down the spread of the virus. Travel was suspended and tight restrictions were enforced. The Wuhan lockdown that started on January 23 lasted over two months, during which time public transportation was suspended and public entertainment venues were ordered to close. At those public places that had to be open, measures like sanitation, disinfection, inspections, and crowd limits were implemented. Government agencies and enterprises implemented prevention, tracing, and control measures to manage employees, and workplaces adopted more flexibility, such as allowing employees to work online.
Third, widespread screening, testing, and monitoring was conducted. Screening, testing, and monitoring became an essential method of curbing virus transmission and providing early treatment to infected patients. All confirmed cases were hospitalized, and those having symptoms such as fever were sent to designated locations to be quarantined. Persons who had close contact with confirmed patients were also sent to quarantine sites. Epidemiological teams were set up to trace and cut off transmission channels. Data technology and digital systems were used to enhance epidemiological tracing.
Fourth, rigorous treatment plans were instituted. The initial epidemic outbreak strained medical resources, leading to delays in treatment. The Chinese government thus increased the number of hospital beds to accommodate the rise in patient numbers. Through the construction of temporary hospitals, the expansion of designated hospitals, and the conversion of general hospitals, more than 100,000 beds were added. Both Clinical treatment and scientific research were utilized to improve the effectiveness of drugs and to conduct research into vaccines.
Effective medicines
There is no effective vaccine yet, but certain herbal medicines were found to be effective. The treatment plan has reduced the number of cases with mild symptoms that developed into serious ones, and improved the recovery rate from 14 percent to 93 percent. In late July, Chinese health officials claimed that they had begun dosing some of their own medical personnel with an experimental COVID-19 vaccine.
Fifth, the effective allocation of resources was made a priority. The Chinese government allocated domestic resources, streamlined organizational structures, and enhanced the emergency-response provision of medical supplies and daily necessities. Medical workers were quickly mobilized and dispatched to severely affected areas. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) deployed its medical staff to Wuhan. Thousands of companies retooled to produce medical supplies. Technological support provided services to the public including online consultation and medical training. Medical personnel also utilized a remote visual medical treatment system and AI-assisted surgical equipment. The PRC State Council ordered the production of daily necessities throughout the whole country.
Sixth, a command system was set up and strategic policies were promulgated. According to the report, China launched a “people’s war” of disease prevention and control under Xi Jinping’s leadership. Xi has presided over meetings of the Politburo and at the central leadership level. The Chinese Communist Party established the Leading Group for Novel Coronavirus Prevention and Control, led by Premier Li Keqiang. Li also administered government departments and coordinated the relationship among epidemic control and prevention, economic development, and the lives of the people. Local governments set up their own leading groups to implement the central government’s orders.
The Chinese government’s strategies for blocking virus transmission by mobilizing public and medical personnel, implementing social distancing, utilizing information technology, allocating resources, and setting up command systems seem to be working: very few new cases are reported in China now. Moreover, the screening, testing, and supervision measures appear to have been relatively effective. This is how the Beijing authorities were able to flatten their curve.
The Chinese government is claiming victory in its fight against COVID-19. Mass quarantines and lockdowns contributed to the dramatic decrease in confirmed cases, from the hundreds in early February to the single digits in mid-March, according to Chinese official media. The following are some traits of China’s government crisis management.
First, covering up the truth at the initial stage. When the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic began in China in 2003, the World Health Organization (WHO) warned people not to visit Hong Kong or Guangdong province. In response, the PRC held a news conference and the health minister stated that China was safe, and that SARS was under control. However, retired surgeon Jiang Yanyong accused the minister of lying. With COVID-19, the Chinese government again tried to keep a lid on the information, not responding until after January 23.
There were serious blunders in the early stages, many due to a lack of transparency. The national and Hubei provincial health commissions sent expert teams to Wuhan. However, these experts were not free to talk to doctors working in the infectious disease wards. When they visited hospitals and inquired about medical staff infections, the hospital administrators and doctors that they met told them that there were none. Local government officials silenced doctors and punished whistleblowers who revealed the seriousness of the disease. These officials and hospital cadres were afraid that they would lose their positions if news of the extent of the widespread epidemic got out, and thus they attempted to conceal the truth.
Second, authorities followed the crisis management model of SARS. The Chinese government conducted preventative action to contain SARS in 2003. The PRC State Council sent out inspection teams nationwide to find unreported cases. The local governments sealed off villages, apartment complexes, quarantined tens of thousands of residents, set up temperature checkpoints, and built temporary hospitals. The SARS Control and Prevention Headquarters of the State Council was established to coordinate national efforts to combat the disease.
The SARS model
When the Chinese government finally started to fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, officials followed the crisis management model established during SARS, by locking down cities, closing all schools, and deploying medical staff to Wuhan. Based on the experience of building hospitals during the 2003
SARS crisis, two hospitals in Wuhan were constructed in just 10 days. The central and local governments in China have accumulated and possessed certain crisis management capabilities during past earthquakes, flooding, and other epidemics.
The PRC government is also using information technology (epidemic mapping, AI technology, 5G, drones, facial recognition software, etc.) to enhance its capability of curbing COVID-19. With the help of technology, the PRC government has become more effective in implementing countermeasures and in bringing down the number of new cases.
Third, the government promoted its success. Beijing is working to turn the signs of success into a larger narrative to broadcast to the rest of the world and rebuild its stained reputation—a reputation that resulted from its initial cover-up and mismanagement of the crisis. Chinese official media is claiming that China is helping other countries to improve quality supervision of anti-epidemic procedures and contributing to international cooperation. The media also boasted that China shared its experience with the WHO and the international community, strengthened scientific research, and offered assistance to other countries. For example, when no European states responded to Italy’s appeal for medical equipment and protective gear, China sent ventilators, masks, respirators, protective suits, and test kits. It was later reported that many of these ventilators were defective and had to be returned.
China has also dispatched medical teams and masks to Iran and sent supplies to Serbia. To highlight its contribution, the homepage of the PRC’s overseas embassies advertise China’s efforts to help different countries with goods and information. Chinese cyber forces have also intensified their censorship efforts and have been successful in blocking criticism of the Chinese government. China is working very hard to reverse its previous poor image for spreading the virus.
The government administrators that covered up the epidemic have done grave damage to China’s international image, and anti-China sentiment is on the rise. Despite this criticism, the Chinese government has been successful in bringing down the curve of new confirmed cases. Beijing’s strategies include fast public mobilization, strict social distancing, frequent testing, tight monitoring, effective treatment plans, and effective allocation of resources. As for the traits of crisis management, their COVID-19 preventative measures are similar to the crisis management employed during the SARS epidemic. In the midst of mounting international condemnation, the Chinese government utilized its government mouthpieces to promote its image so that they can shift from crisis to opportunity.
Asian countries (such as Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam) have been praised for their success in containing the infections by taking it seriously. They responded quickly, curtailing flights from China, making tests available, implementing contact tracing, isolating potential patients, implementing early social distancing, and keeping the public well informed. Taiwan has been especially successful, mainly due to good coordination of various ministries and local governments, cooperation from the public, and integration of mass media.
Taiwan’s effective prevention measures also include early intervention, disciplined, transparent, and comprehensive prevention strategies, integrated medical big data, and proactive information disclosure. Taiwan has used information technology successfully. In spite of its remarkable success, Taiwan’s government can still learn from China’s fast mobilization of different resources within a short time period, and its utilization of advanced technology in a time of serious pandemic, such as the building of temporary hospitals within 10 days, as well as Beijing’s widespread utilization of facial-recognition systems and drones.
Dr. Shao-cheng Sun is an assistant professor at The Citadel specializing in China’s security, East Asian affairs, and cross-strait relations. He can be reached for comment at ssun@citadel.edu