Sober Assessment

Strategic Vision vol. 10, no. 49 (May, 2021)

New Delhi remains clear-eyed on ongoing threat posed by Beijing’s ambitions

Ilias Iliopoulos

photo: BMN Network

Japan’s former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is widely credited with coining the term “IndoPacific,” or at least injecting it into the modern geopolitical, strategic, and maritime conversation, when he first used the term in his 2007 “Confluence of the Two Seas” speech to the Indian parliament. Truth be told, it was a brilliant officer of India’s Navy, Captain Dr. Gurpreet S. Khurana, former executive director of the National Maritime Foundation of India and a visiting professor at the Naval War College in Goa, who resurrected the “Indo-Pacific” designation, which was introduced almost eight decades ago by another soldier-scholar, Karl Haushofer. Statesmen, diplomats, military officers, and policy analysts in India, as well as in Russia, understand historical and geopolitical realities much better than many of their American and Western European counterparts. India’s foreign policy and defense community is not fooled by Beijing’s façade of neighborliness. Almost a decade ago, then Chief of India’s Army General Staff General Vijay Kumar Singh warned that India must “wake up” to her military shortcomings and the threat posed by China, adding that unresolved border disputes could be used as a pretext to “put India down” anytime China perceived that India was becoming too powerful. General Singh advocated increased spending on defense and referred to Beijing’s subjugation of Tibet, its wooing of Nepal and Myanmar, and its use of Pakistan as a cat’s paw. One must bear in mind that China’s border disputes with India during the period of 1960–1962 left 3,000 Indian soldiers dead. Notably, the border dispute remains unresolved. The ruling state and party elites of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) claim an entire state of the Federal Republic of India, Arunachal Pradesh, which borders on Bhutan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and China, and is roughly the size of Portugal. Beijing calls the 90,000 square-kilometer area “Southern Tibet.” Moreover, the PRC continues to occupy roughly 39,000 square kilometers of Indian territory—in Aksai Chin, high in the Himalayas.

At this point, it must be remembered that the PRC has territorial claims against 17 of its 24 neighbors. Moreover, in Beijing’s relations with all of these nations, the potential for the use of force by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) remains an ever-present possibility. One may see here a remarkable analogy to Turkey: specifically, with respect to Beijing’s geopolitical doctrine of “vital space,” which is roughly equivalent to “Lebensraum” in Friedrich Ratzel’s classic term, which extends far beyond a state’s borders, and includes land, sea, air, underwater, and even space. It bears a striking similarity to neo-Ottoman Turkey’s doctrine of “strategic depth.”

Notably, Beijing’s military outreach is directed more towards the Indo-Pacific, which is reflected in the type of weaponry it is amassing, including Kilo-class submarines; Sovremenny-class destroyers; Luyang II (Type 052C) class guided-missile destroyers equipped with HHQ-9 SAM (55-NM range) and YJ-62 antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) (150-NM range); Luyang III (Type 052D) class guided-missile destroyers with an extended-range variant of the HHQ-9 SAM, and YJ18 ASCM (290-NM range); Jiangkai II (Type 054A) class guided-missile frigates; and Renhai-class cruisers (Type 055 destroyers), launched in June 2017. The latter, while formally designated by the PLA Navy as a guided missile destroyer, is closer in displacement and scale of armament to the US Navy’s Ticonderoga-class cruisers than it is to the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.

The barrel of a gun

There is no doubt that these weapons will unscrupulously be turned against Taiwan, to serve Beijing’s publicly declared goal of annexing the democratic island. They will also enable the PRC to gain control of vital sea-lanes through which 80 percent of its oil imports pass, and to project power in the South China Sea and out into the Pacific.

US and Indian soldiers train together during exercise Yudh Abhyas at Chaubattia Military Station, India.

photo: Samuel Northrup

Since New Delhi officially adopted the Look East Policy in 2006, the Indian Navy has been building a strong base on the eastern front, namely at the Visakhapatnam-based Eastern Naval Command, to keep an eye on the strategically significant South China Sea. Since that time, India has pursued an impressive naval construction program to redress the obsolescence of much of its fleet. Then Chief of the Naval Staff of the Indian Navy Admiral Nirmal Verma, on the eve of Navy Day on December 4, 2011, outlined an ambitious expansion plan for the Navy, which would give India a greater footprint in the South China Sea.

President Tsai Ing-wen visits a Cheng Kung-class guided missile frigate during a visit to Tsoying Naval Base in Kaohsiung, Taiwan.

photo: Makato Lin, ROC Presidential Office

After tremendous efforts had been made—with 46 warships and submarines having been constructed, and another 49 in the pipeline—Admiral Verma declared in August 2012, “Today, I am confident we do not suffer asymmetries with anyone. We have the wherewithal to defend our maritime interests.” It is estimated that by 2027, the Indian Navy will have 500 aircraft of all varieties and 150 ships in its inventory.

In this regard, particular reference must be made to the fact that India’s first domestically constructed nuclear submarine capable of firing ballistic missiles was part of a program to make India a major power in the Indo-Pacific. The INS Arihant was the first of its class, with four more to follow. The strategic significance of this particular weapons platform lies in the fact that, as Admiral Verma put it, “The advent of INS Arihant into the fleet will complete the crucial link in India’s nuclear triad – the ability to fire nuclear weapons from land, air and sea.” There can be no doubt that the reason for India’s determination to add nuclear-armed submarines to its military is the threat posed by China, although as might be expected, India’s policy-makers and diplomats have been elusive when questioned on this. Remarkably, up until the INS Arihant, the only countries capable of launching a submarine-based ballistic missile were the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and the PRC.

BRICS disunity

And what of the BRICS, one might reasonably ask. Despite being included—along with Brazil, Russia, China, and South Africa—in this supposed historical, and geopolitically meaningless, “bloc” of major emerging economies, India remains wary of China, if truth be told; as does Russia, which also regards itself as an Indo-Pacific Power, and increasingly so. Despite all the trade and diplomacy that takes place among BRICS members, India’s admittedly wise statesmen and experienced diplomatic corps and military are not so naïve as to let their guard down. They are similarly reticent about placing too much reliance on Washington for their defense, particularly after US President Donald Trump has been overthrown by the pro-China globalist elites inside the United States. For they must know that, in any Indo-Pacific conflict, it is highly unlikely that the United States will confront the PRC.

India is the added factor in the geopolitical equation: full of potential, but in need of drastic transformation to fulfill that potential. In point of fact, India is the key factor of the major Indo-Pacific geopolitical region.

In view of Beijing’s revisionism and expansionism— increasingly and persistently manifested by all means, from full-scale use of sharp power and economic penetration of major regions to the use of force—and also facing Pakistan’s aggressiveness and state-sponsored terror, India will have to become the pioneer of an alliance among Indo-Pacific nations that resist despotism and bullying in international affairs. Given that Taiwan has explicitly and emphatically been named as Beijing’s next victim—and this likely in the near future—Taipei must carefully examine all possibilities of co-operation with New Delhi, most notably in terms of security and defense.

At this point, one should bear in mind that formal diplomatic recognition is by no means a strict precondition of establishing, maintaining, and strengthening military cooperation between two geo-strategic (i.e., state) actors. The history of international relations, military history, and intelligence history provide strong evidence for this assertion. For instance, despite the complete absence of diplomatic recognition by Israel, there had been an impressively close and long-lasting military co-operation between the Republic of China (Taiwan) and Israel.

As the Orthodox Byzantines learned before us; it is not wise to busy oneself debating the sex of angels while the Ottomans are laying siege to Constantinople.

Indian and American soldiers take part in the Yudh Abhyas exercise, aimed at building an enduring Indian-US partnership and improving interoperability.

photo: US Indo-Pacific Command

Dr. Ilias Iliopoulos is a professor of History and International Relations at the National University of Athens and a visiting scholar at the Taiwan Center for Security Studies. He can be reached at iliasmunich@hotmail.com