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Appraising Biden
Strategic Vision vol. 10, no. 49 (May, 2021)
Appraising Biden: New US administration seen continuing America’s support for Taiwan security
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Thomas J. Shattuck
Former US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage meets with President Tsai Ing-wen in the Presidential Office in Taipei.
photo: ROC Presidential Office
While Former US President Donald Trump was viewed as one of Taiwan’s greatest friends by certain camps in Taiwan, the US-Taiwan relationship under the Trump administration was largely characterized by uncertainty and unpredictability. After he took office in January 2017, reports—and worries—abounded about whether or not President Trump would use Taiwan as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). He was, after all, an expert dealmaker who famously put all options on the table. Would he put Taiwan on the table to strike some sort of grand deal with the PRC? The 45th President infamously compared Taiwan to the tip of a marker in terms of its importance compared to China’s. For four years, career civil servants in the United States and around the world were unable to predict what Trump would do—or tweet—next. Time and time again, US government officials offered reassurances that Taiwan would never be used as a bargaining chip, but this unpredictability never subsided in the media, despite the passage of a number of pro-Taiwan laws during the Trump era. After four years of Trump’s unpredictability at an end, how should US-Taiwan relations proceed, and what should the new administration seek to accomplish over the next four years?
Four years of breathless media speculation that the White House would use Taiwan as a bargaining chip ended with the inauguration of US President Joe Biden, and it appears unlikely that Biden will consider such an arrangement when dealing with Beijing. The new president’s views on foreign policy, and those of his advisors, can be gleaned from the public record, due to his voting record during his long career in public service. In 1979, for example, then-Senator Biden voted in favor of passing the Taiwan Relations Act after then-President Jimmy Carter derecognized the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan.
Biden understands the importance of working with allies and partners, as well as the proper way to treat them. As enunciated in the administration’s Interim National Security Guidance, “We will support Taiwan, a leading democracy and a critical economic and security partner, in line with longstanding American commitments.” This sentence—while admittedly pretty bland—is the beginning of the administration’s thinking on how to better incorporate Taiwan into US regional strategy and policy, and even how to respond in the event of a military escalation or invasion by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Since the interim guidance was released, the administration has scheduled discussions with both Japanese and Australian leaders on the topic of Taiwan’s defense, and Secretary of State Antony Blinken promised that the State Department would make it easier for US officials to meet with their counterparts from the ROC.
Senator and future President Joe Biden with then-President Jimmy Carter in 1979.
photo: US Congress
In addition to these policy changes and discussions, the administration has been vocal in its support for Taiwan in the face of PRC aggression. In a January 23, 2021, press release, State Department Spokesman Ned Price said, “We urge Beijing to cease its military, diplomatic, and economic pressure against Taiwan and instead engage in meaningful dialogue with Taiwan’s democratically elected leadership.” That sentiment has been echoed by senior Biden officials, particularly Secretary Blinken, who expressed continued American support for Taiwan during his confirmation hearing. The Biden administration faces a number of challenges, but US-Taiwan relations do not need to be repaired, as do ties with other important allies and partners. The foundation of the relationship is solid, especially with the uncertainty and unpredictability of the Trump era removed, but the Biden administration cannot risk letting the bilateral relationship stall in the face of other pressing issues. President Biden has cited the “China challenge” as one of his top priorities, and Taiwan must be a critical element of any US policy regarding China and the Indo-Pacific.
Foreign policy test
While some political camps in Taiwan watched the American presidential transition with bated breath, the new administration’s first months in office quickly demonstrated the Biden team’s resolve over Taiwan. The reason that Taiwan became a foreign policy test early on was that Beijing sought to test the new administration’s commitment by increasing the number of military aircraft sent into Taiwan’s southwestern air defense identification zone (ADIZ) from the normal one-to-two aircraft per incursion, to over a dozen. Later reporting by The Financial Times on the January 23-24 incursions confirmed that the PLA aircraft were simulating an attack, not on Taiwan, but on the nearby USS Theodore Roosevelt carrier strike group. In response to the incursions, the Biden administration issued the above press statement voicing support for Taiwan and criticizing Beijing’s continued pressure on Taipei. Despite US statements warning China about its air incursions, Beijing continues to send PLA military aircraft into Taiwan’s ADIZ.
The USS Theodore Roosevelt transits in formation with the Makin Island Amphibious Ready Group in the South China Sea.
photo: Faith McCullum
In the face of this pronounced Chinese threat, the administration has dispatched military vessels to transit through the Taiwan Strait, an international waterway. On February 4, 2021, the US Navy confirmed that the Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer USS John S. McCain transited through the Taiwan Strait. This journey marked the first such transit during the Biden administration, which at the time had only been in office for three weeks. The US 7th Fleet said in a statement, “The ship’s transit through the Taiwan Strait demonstrates the US commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific. The United States military will continue to fly, sail and operate anywhere international law allows.” As of April 1, 2021, three such transits have taken place. In addition to the February 4 transit, another occurred on February 24 when the USS Curtis Wilbur sailed through the Taiwan Strait, and again on March 10, when the USS John Finn followed suit. Interestingly, all three transits were made by Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyers. Regularizing such transits through the Taiwan Strait will continue to send a consistent message of US support for Taiwan, as well as demonstrate continued American power in the region. Reducing the number of Taiwan Strait transits—or stopping them altogether—in an effort to reduce tensions with Beijing should not be considered as an option. This would be a sign of deference by the United States, at a time when Beijing should be the one sending signals to Washington that it is willing to reduce regional tensions. Given Director of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chinese Communist Party Yang Jiechi’s speech to the National Committee on US-China Relations on February 2, it looks as though Beijing wants to put that impetus on the Biden administration. However, National Security Council Coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell’s statement that US-China relations will not improve until Beijing changes its behavior regarding Australia suggests that it is unlikely that the Biden administration will fall into that trap: it is incumbent upon China to lower tensions, not the United States.
Cmdr. Ryan Easterday, CO of the guided-missile destroyer USS John S. McCain, scans the horizon as the ship conducts operations in the Taiwan Strait.
photo: Markus Castaneda
US Air Force Raptors fly alongside a KC-135 Stratotanker during a training flight near Mt. Fuji, Japan.
photo: Rebeckah Medeiros
Beyond regularizing US transits, the US Navy should send a carrier group through the Taiwan Strait and, depending on COVID-19 precautions, conduct military exercises in the East and South China seas as well as in the waters east of Taiwan.
Message of support
While sending guided missile destroyers through the Taiwan Strait shows that the US Navy will not back down, a carrier group would send a stronger message of support—and force. Despite bipartisan support in Washington for Taiwan’s attendance at the 2020 Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) in Honolulu, Hawaii, the ROC military was not invited to join the international maritime warfare drills. Around 30 countries had been initially invited to participate, but in the end, only 10 took part as the exercise was scaled-down due to COVID-19 precautions. In addition to the United States, the navies of Australia, Brunei, Canada, France, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, the Philippines, and Singapore participated. Assuming that the COVID-19 pandemic is over by the next RIMPAC in 2022, the United States should formally invite the ROC military, which should accept, and participate fully. The United States sells a significant amount of military hardware and equipment to Taiwan, so it makes sense for the ROC military to be more thoroughly included in US-led military exercises—beyond the simple rationale that the US and ROC militaries should conduct exercises together, as a means of more fully integrating Taiwan into America’s Indo-Pacific strategy. The next RIMPAC will be an important marker for how the United States plans to cooperate with Taiwan; its participation would also force countries around the globe to decide between bowing to the pressure that the PRC is expected to exert in order to force Taiwan’s exclusion, or to allow themselves to be seen participating with Taiwan in such a large-scale, multilateral military exercise. Perhaps pointing to the potential for greater maritime cooperation, Washington and Taipei announced the establishment of a Coast Guard Working Group to better coordinate policy.
The final area of military cooperation between the United States and Taiwan is the continuation of arms sales. Under the Trump administration, the United States announced over US$18 billion in weapons sales. The Biden administration should continue the practice of not bundling arms sales in giant packages, as had been the custom in previous administrations. Selling items on an as-needed basis provides Taipei with more flexibility in its defense planning, since deliveries do not occur until years after the purchase is finalized. The recent announcement of Taipei’s decision to purchase Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) Missile Segment Enhancement (MSE) interceptors suggest that the Biden administration is committed to continuing sales of military hardware to Taiwan. Former US President Barack Obama infamously declined to sell new F-16s to Taiwan, in an effort not to rupture ties with China. This mindset of connecting arms sales to relations with China does not appear to be a factor in the Biden administration. If the administration is serious about Taiwan’s defense, then it should work with Taipei to sell arms that fit into the country’s defense plans. Certain items, especially the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, are probably off-limits for Taiwan. The Chinese government had a strong negative reaction to THAAD’s deployment in South Korea; a similar—and probably more aggressive—response would occur if Taiwan even expressed an interest in purchasing it.
Economic obstacles
While the prospects for greater military cooperation are high under President Biden, economic relations will likely remain an obstacle. The US-Taiwan Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), formerly the primary mechanism under which the two sides would discuss trade, is essentially dead. According to the United States Congressional Research Service, TIFA talks stopped after 2016. Talks had previously been suspended in 2007 over agricultural import issues, but resumed in 2013 after Taiwan lifted some of those restrictions. With calls on both sides of the aisle in the United States for a bilateral trade agreement (BTA), and strong interest in Taipei, the Biden administration should re-launch TIFA talks.
A PAC-3 MSE Missile performs a unique over-the-shoulder manoeuvre to defeat a target attacking from behind during a test at White Sands Missile Range.
photo: John Hamilton
A range of issues
The Trump administration initiated the US-Taiwan Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue (EPPD) in November 2020, which covers “a broad range of economic issues, focusing on 5G networks and telecommunications security, supply chains, investment screening, infrastructure cooperation, renewable energy, global health, science and technology, and women’s economic empowerment as a cross-cutting issue,” according to a press release from the American Institute in Taiwan, the de facto US embassy there. The EPPD would be an important forum for the two sides to discuss areas of technological cooperation and integration before a BTA could be realized.
If the Biden administration proves reluctant to continue a Trump-era channel of dialogue, however, then the EPPD could be folded into TIFA even though EPPD was not under the auspices of the US Trade Representative. After all, TIFA historically is where the two sides would have discussed such issues. Relaunching TIFA, especially since the ractopamine issue is on the table, would help set the stage for indepth BTA discussions. Concluding a BTA would have a number of legal hurdles for both sides to address due to the unofficial nature of the US-Taiwan relationship. Taipei also needs to deal with certain domestic economic issues. In December 2020, the US Treasury Department added Taiwan to its watch list of currency manipulators. The US Department of Labor (DOL) likewise added Taiwan’s fishing industry to its list of goods produced by forced labor. The DOL report notes that Taiwan was added “for forced labor due to reports of adults forced to work in the production of fish on their [distant-water fishing] fleets” and “crews on Taiwan flagged vessels face confiscation of documents, long days with little rest, physical and verbal abuse, and lack of payment.” The Biden administration needs to ensure that labor abuses in Taiwan, especially those regarding migrant labor, are addressed by the Tsai Ing-wen administration if BTA talks are to be conducted.
A fishing crew lands their catch at port on Penghu Island. Taiwan’s fishing industry has been accused by the US DOL of using forced labor.
photo: Kevin Chung
As long as Taipei works to fix its labor abuses, it is in Washington’s interests to enter into serious BTA discussions at a time when the world is facing semiconductor shortages and supply chain issues. Lowering trade barriers to Taiwan’s semiconductor industry— particularly Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation (TSMC), which produces chips used in F-35 jets, the US fifth-generation fighter program— should be an essential part of the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific economic plan. American and Taiwanese semiconductor industry leaders called for a BTA during a February 2021 meeting, which, according to Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs, was attended by Biden administration officials. A BTA with the United States would be a sign for other countries around the world that Taiwan has the ability to be a reliable economic partner. Signing a BTA with the United States is a “gold standard” for countries to achieve, and considering Taiwan’s geopolitical status, it would send a message to other countries or trade pacts that Taiwan has made (or is in the process of conducting) necessary economic reforms.
While there is momentum in both countries, neither side should overestimate the likelihood of a reaching a deal. The historical failure of TIFA to reduce trade barriers is probably indicative of how BTA talks will proceed (if they even start) since TIFA was originally supposed to be the forum in which a BTA would be negotiated. In 2016, the United States noted Taiwan’s progress on intellectual property (IP) protection and enforcement, while agricultural issues were still a hindrance. Now, the agricultural issues may get resolved depending on the success of the Kuomintang Party’s efforts to hold a referendum with the potential to reverse the government’s decision to lift the ban on US pork imports due to the presence of a controversial feed additive called ractopamine. Overall, there is clear momentum on the BTA issue, but the two sides have never been able to resolve enough sticking points to conclude a trade agreement.
New avenues for cooperation
Despite former President Trump’s unpredictability, US-Taiwan relations saw new avenues for cooperation open with the bipartisan passage of the Taiwan Travel Act, the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018, and the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act, as well as National Defense Authorization Acts with important Taiwan clauses. While the bilateral relationship experienced great uncertainty due to the fear that Trump would use Taiwan as a bargaining chip, these laws have created openings for even more cooperation under a more predictable president, Biden. The new administration’s initial signals, messages, and actions show that government officials in Taipei do not need to worry about US-Taiwan relations over the next four years. It may even be working to expand the issue of Taiwan’s defense to other key regional actors. Now, these initial actions must be followed up with further cooperation and integration in the administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy. Nevertheless, those skeptical of the Biden administration can allow themselves to be cautiously optimistic.
Thomas J. Shattuck is a research fellow in the Asia Program and Managing Editor at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He can be reached at tshattuck@fpri.org
