12 minute read
Building Connections
Strategic Vision vol. 10, no. 51 (December, 2021)
America can contribute to stronger relations between India and Taiwan
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Patrick Mendis & Antonina Luszczykiewicz
ROC Presidential OfficeFormer ROC Vice President Chen Chien-jen, right, receives Indian scholar Vandana Shiva at the Office of the President.
photo: ROC Presidential Office
Although US President Joe Biden’s White House has openly stated it would not support Taiwan independence, the first year of Biden’s presidency has seen a significant tightening of US-Taiwan relations. Since the unprecedented invitation of Taiwan’s de facto ambassador to Biden’s inauguration in January 2021, the White House under the 46th US president has been intensely developing both political and economic relations with Taiwan—which most recently led to resuming talks on the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA).
This US-Taiwan revival was not initiated by President Biden, however. It was rather his predecessor, President Donald Trump, whose decisions left the new administration with little room to deviate from his aggressively anti-China—and as a consequence, pro-Taiwan—strategy.
Only a few days before President Trump left the White House on 20 January, 2021, his National Security Council declassified the US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific as one of the last maneuvers of Trump’s presidency. In the declassified document, the Trump White House recognized China as the biggest “threat” and a strategic “competitor” to American interests in the newly-defined “Indo-Pacific” region, which combined the Indian and the Pacific Oceans’ military commands of the Pentagon. The document advocated for the defense of the so-called first island chain, among which priority was given to Taiwan. It likewise promoted strengthening US alliances with “like-minded” democratic countries—with the main focus on India.
Although the declassification was a sensation among policymakers and scholars, it was of considerably little importance in comparison with the stream of laws that the US Congress has enacted over the last few years to counterbalance Beijing’s aggressive behavior towards India, Taiwan, and other countries in the Indo-Pacific. These laws make it even more difficult for the Biden White House to diverge from the policies of the Trump administration. Moreover, the challenge for Biden’s national security team is to balance current US laws with the emerging geopolitical dynamics of Taiwan’s New Southbound Policy (NSP) as well as the Act East Policy (AEP) of India in Southeast and South Asia.
The Trump administration has championed the biggest revival of US-Taiwan relations since Washington acknowledged Beijing as the official representative of China in 1979. In accordance with the One China policy, Washington severed formal diplomatic relations with Taipei; however, the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 guaranteed Taiwan’s de facto independence. The original act provides an ambiguous framework for “the policy of the United States to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan.”
Unsinkable aircraft carrier
The very basis of this bilateral relationship originated from the “Memorandum on Formosa,” a top secret—and now-declassified—cable message transmitted to Washington in 1950 by General Douglas MacArthur, then the supreme commander of allied forces in Japan. The American commander argued that Taiwan should be an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” for the United States to project American power and to preserve American national interests in the Pacific. Thus, China’s historical apprehension with the United States has been a part of the enduring deep consciousness of Beijing leadership. In a declassified secret memo by the CIA titled “Deng Xiaoping’s Discussion of Taiwan with the President [Ronald Reagan],” for example, the Chinese leader reverted to MacArthur’s term to express his “unease with US foreign policy” in April 1984. Undoubtedly, the undercurrent of General MacArthur’s rationale has been the driving force of mutual anxiety in Beijing and Washington.
Soldiers of the Rajput Regiment do a march past during a Republic Day Parade.
photo: Antônio Milena
Six Assurances
In October 2020, the Trump White House declassified the diplomatic cable behind the Six Assurances given to Taiwan by President Ronald Reagan in 1982. It has still been part of the foundational elements of American policy towards Taiwan and China. This loosely-kept secret of the Six Assurances outlined a set of foreign policy principles which confirmed America’s unwavering support and US arms sales to Taiwan. Though originally declared as informal rules, the content of the secret cable was later adopted by the US Congress in a non-binding resolution in 2016 as the cornerstone of the bilateral relationship. It was a precursor to President Trump’s decision to sell arms to Taiwan.
With the revival of US-Taiwan relations under the Trump administration, the overall American legal framework of Taiwan is now guided by a number of key pieces of legislation: the Taiwan Travel Act (TTA) of 2018, the TAIPEI Act of 2019, and the Taiwan Assurance Act of 2020. All these Congressional acts maneuver ingeniously around constraints related to Taiwan’s status by not outright stating support for Taiwan independence, but by strengthening the island’s international position. For example, the TTA of 2018 encourages “visits between officials from the United States and Taiwan at all levels.” It was demonstrated by the increasing number of President Trump’s cabinet officials visiting Taipei in 2019 and 2020.
An F-35 taxis while deployed to Misawa Air Base, Japan, in support of Operation IRON DAGGER.
photo: Grace Nichols
The Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act involves the United States in enhancing “economic, security, and diplomatic engagement” with countries that have “strengthened, enhanced or upgraded relations with Taiwan” while also punitively reducing American engagement with countries whose actions “undermine Taiwan.” The act also advocates for Taiwan’s membership in international organizations and for its observer status in international bodies—like the World Health Organization—where formal recognition is a prerequisite. The legislation further recommends signing a US-Taiwan free trade agreement.
Finally, the Taiwan Assurance Act expresses support for Taiwan’s defense strategy of asymmetric warfare and encourages Taipei to increase its defense expenditures. Moreover, it reaffirms American support for Taiwan’s participation in the United Nations and affiliated organizations that do not require statehood for involvement.
Although many of these laws, bilateral agreements, and assurances appear to form a mutually beneficial relationship, American military and political engagement with Taiwan is in fact a game of pawns similar to General MacArthur’s vision of the unsinkable aircraft carrier that can maintain US primacy in the Pacific and counterbalance the geopolitical ambitions of Beijing.
Even though the declassified document—together with the Congressional legislations—strengthens US commitment to Taiwan while giving India a “leading role in maintaining Indian Ocean security,” the prospects of Taiwan-India relations are largely muted in Washington, despite the fact that thriving IndiaTaiwan relations would clearly benefit American foreign policy and national security interests. As a result, Biden’s White House should not only independently support the AEP and the NSP, but also make it possible for India and Taiwan to overlap their geopolitical and economic strategies.
The launch of the Look East Policy in 1991 marked a strategic change in how India perceived itself in the post-Cold War reality. After over four decades of trade protection and state intervention, India finally liberalized its economy, opening up for private and foreign investments, and strengthened political, military, and cultural ties with Southeast Asian countries. Having done so, New Delhi went out of its traditional, geographically determined spheres of influence, and aspired to the title of not just regional, but continental power.
A great boost was given by Hindu nationalist leader Narendra Modi who elevated the Look East Policy to a completely new level by transforming it into the AEP in 2014—the very same year he became India’s prime minister. As this rapid and clearly prioritized name change suggests, India was expected to push for deeper and more active involvement in Southeast Asia. Moreover, originally an economic plan, the Look East Policy expanded both geographically to countries like South Korea and Japan as well as dimensionally to political and security domains.
Similar to Modi’s transformation of the Look East Policy into the Act East Policy, President Tsai Ing-wen put her stamp on Taiwan’s foreign policy in 2016 by introducing the NSP. Just as Modi added totally new dimensions to India’s Look East Policy, Tsai elevated the existing Southbound Policy to a higher level, focusing on boosting economic cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), South Asian countries, as well as Australia and New Zealand, and called for intensifying people-to-people exchanges in tourism and education.
Indian Navy Vice Admiral Ajendra Singh speaks with Commander Steven Lawrence, commanding officer of the USS Oklahoma City.
photo: Meagan Morrison
With the growing engagement of the United States in the Indo-Pacific, which counterbalances China by giving American allies more space to emerge from under the Chinese shadow, India might now wish to pursue a more open and assertive framework to collaborate with Taiwan. There seems to be a similar potential on the Taiwan side as President Tsai rejected the “1992 Consensus” framework in 2019, according to which both China and Taiwan would agree on the existence of only “One China” in order to proceed with talks, though each party has a different interpretations of what that means. By setting a collision course with Beijing, Taipei might now wish to give an unprecedented boost to its relations with New Delhi. Public opinion in both Taiwan and India seems to support the idea of developing Taiwan-India relations. In 2020, netizens of both countries, as well as of Thailand and Hong Kong, united in their anti-China sentiments under the Milk Tea Alliance, a social movement whose supporters called for strengthening democratic values and restraining the growing influence of Beijing. The Chinese Embassy’s note sent out to Indian media, which instructed Indian journalists not to cover the news on Taiwan’s National Day, enraged Indian public opinion, and mobilized social media users in both India and Taiwan to share posts and memes about India-Taiwan friendship.
In May 2021, the government of Taiwan rushed to help India—badly hit by the pandemic—by sending 150 oxygen concentrators and 500 oxygen cylinders. Even though these numbers seem small on the Indian scale, it was a meaningful and highly visible gesture, given that these two countries have not had official diplomatic relations since 1950.
One China doubts
Even though it is hard to expect New Delhi to change its stance on the One China policy, the ongoing border dispute with its northern neighbor—which culminated in June 2020 in a deadly skirmish in the Galwan River Valley—is pushing India closer to the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific, which include Taiwan. It might be the right time for the Indian government to ask itself whether its firm adherence to the One China policy over the last 70 years has been beneficial enough to neglect a 23-million, prosperous, and de facto independent island nation.
However, a real boost to Taiwan-India relations would be the development of joint projects and initiatives regardless of shared anti-China sentiment. With its economy hit badly by the covid-19 pandemic, New Delhi might now finally step out of the One China Policy shadow and welcome Taiwanese trade and investment to gain momentum for constructing innovative industrial parks in Bangalore, India’s Silicon Valley in Karnataka.
With the ongoing Sino-American Tech Cold War, the technological nexus between India and Taiwan may present opportunities for greater collaboration and American support to restructure the global supply-chains away from China. Since Taiwan’s GDP growth surpassed China’s in 2020, placing Taiwan in the elite group of countries whose economy expanded during the pandemic, it is clear that the United States should support Taiwan in trade and foreign investment—for its own economic benefit and security interests.
Ironically, the great Taiwan-India boost would be the first encounter between Taiwan and India that might truly unleash the great potential of their bilateral relations which so far has been highly untapped and unrecognized by the United States. As the Biden White House intends to continue the Trump administration’s policies on Taiwan and India, the marriage between the NSP and the AEP—not just geographically but also in the realms of political, economic, and ideological persuasion—might help this antiauthoritarian alliance in Asia grow stronger. If the United States wants to regain the upper hand in the Indo-Pacific, it needs to pursue its objectives not only in the military and economic domains but also by investing in the field of international educational exchanges as part of supporting alliances—including alliances between the like-minded democratic countries in Asia, particularly Taiwan and India.
Both governments now recognize the United States as a broker with the power to facilitate their broader foreign policy objectives in Southeast Asia against China within Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy under the Biden White House. With all the agreements and projects—together with Washington’s open support for India’s AEP and Taiwan’s NSP—the trilateral relations make the development of Taiwan-India cooperation possible to an extent never seen before. Flourishing Taiwan-India relations might then become a surprisingly positive and successful byproduct of the Sino-American rivalry if Taipei and New Delhi can step out of the shadow of the One China Policy and reinvigorate the over 70-year-old petrification of bilateral relations.
The Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70) transits the Indian Ocean.
photo: Isaiah Williamson
Dr. Patrick Mendis is a former American diplomat, a professor in the NATO and the Indo-Pacific Commands of the US Department of Defense, and a distinguished visiting professor at National Chengchi University.
Dr. Antonina Luszczykiewicz is an assistant professor at Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Poland, and served as a visiting scholar at Academia Sinica.
