Strategic Vision, Issue 57

STRATEGIC VISION for Taiwan Security Volume 12, Issue 57

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November, 2023

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ISSN 2227-3646

Israel-Hamas War When Terrorism is Strategy Mor Sobol

AI and PRC Propaganda Ching Ya Chang

North Korean Crypto Theft James Jin Kang

SCS Fishery Cooperation Needed Gregory Coutaz

NATO, European People Ambivalent on China Hon-min Yau & Weronika Jakubczak

STRATEGIC VISION for Taiwan Security Volume 12, Issue 57

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November, 2023

Contents The political context of the Israel-Hamas war................................4 Mor Sobol North Korea-sponsored cryptocurrency theft................................8 James Jin Kang European people, elites ambivalent on China.............................. 14 Hon-min Yau & Weronika Jakubczak PRC propaganda and the need for media literacy....................... 20 Ching Ya Chang Cooperation needed to manage SCS fisheries..............................24 Gregory Coutaz

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Enhanced photograph of canine handler from the IDF Oketz Canine Unit and his dog is courtesy of the government of Israel.

From The Editor

Editor Fu-Kuo Liu Executive Editor Aaron Jensen Editor-at-Large Dean Karalekas Editorial Board Chung-young Chang, Fo-kuan U Richard Hu, NCCU Ming Lee, NCCU Raviprasad Narayanan, JNU Hon-Min Yau, NDU Ruei-lin Yu, NDU Osama Kubbar, QAFSSC Rashed Hamad Al-Nuaimi, QAFSSC Chang-Ching Tu, NDU STRATEGIC VISION For Taiwan Security (ISSN 2227-3646) Volume 12, Number 57, November, 2023, published under the auspices of the Center for Security Studies and National Defense University.

All editorial correspondence should be mailed to the editor at STRATEGIC VISION, Taiwan Center for Security Studies. No. 64, Wanshou Road, Taipei City 11666, Taiwan, ROC. Photographs used in this publication are used courtesy of the photographers, or through a creative commons license. All are attributed appropriately.

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n October 7, the world looked on in shock as Hamas operatives infiltrated Israel territory and conducted the most brutal acts against mostly civilian targets, proudly posting bodycam footage of their barbarity on social media within hours of the attack, and taking hundreds of hostages back with them into the Gaza Strip. As the Israeli Defense Forces continue their counteroffensive, this reignition of tension in this age-old conflict has spurred numerous protests, with varying degrees of peacefulness, across the Western world.

This issue of Strategic Vision begins with an analysis of this horrific event by Dr. Mor Sobol, an assistant professor at Tamkang University and an expert in terrorism studies. Dr. Sobol offers his perspective on the Israel-Hamas War, and highlights the political context of the current conflict in the Middle East.

In our next article, Dr. James Jin Kang, an associate professor at National Taiwan University, looks at the rash of cryptocurrency theft perpetrated by hackers acting on behalf of North Korea, and what effect the dip in valuation of those cryptocurrencies might have on the financial stability of the Hermit Kingdom.

This is followed by a piece by Dr. Hon-min Yau, a member of the Strategic Vision editorial board, and Prof. Weronika Jakubczak, an associate professor at The Main School of Fire Service in Warsaw, Poland. They look at the disunity in perspectives about China’s increasing influence, especially among the elites who make policy at NATO and among the capitals of the West, and the people of Europe, with the latter being far more sanguine about China’s rise than their leaders.

Next, Ching Ya Chang of the Graduate Institute of International Security at the ROC National Defense University offers her analysis of the importance for Taiwan’s population of news and media consumers to develop the skill of media literacy as a defense against misinformation being pushed by Beijing, and how the keys to defeating PRC propaganda may just be found in mutual understanding and people-to-people dialogue.

Finally, Dr. Gregory Coutaz, an assistant professor at Tamkang University, looks at the overlapping territorial claims in the turbulent South China Sea, and how the parties involved would benefit from working towards a common fisheries policy, not just to manage pelagic resources, but as the beginnings of a potentially more wide-ranging modus vivendi among competing claimant nations.

As our thoughts and prayers go out to the innocent victims of the ongoing Israel-Hamas War, the editors and staff of Strategic Vision hope our readers find themselves safe and warm as we enter the winter season, and we look forward to continuing to provide you with the finest analysis of the events impacting security in the Indo-Pacific region, and the world.

Dr. Fu-Kuo Liu Editor Strategic Vision

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Strategic Vision vol. 12, no. 57 (November, 2023)

Israel-Hamas War Identifying the political context of the current conflict in the Middle East Mor Sobol

photo: IDF

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Soldiers with the paratroopers brigade regain command of Kibbutz Be’eri after Hamas terrorists slaughtered hundreds of civilians.

n the morning of October 7, 2023, Hamas launched what would become the deadliest terror attack in the history of the IsraeliPalestinian conflict. It marked the largest loss of Jewish lives since the Second World War and the Holocaust. Tragically, the attack resulted in the loss of more than 1,200 lives, the majority of whom were civilians, including women, children, and the elderly.

Thousands were injured, and approximately 240 hostages (again, mostly civilians) were kidnapped and taken back to the Gaza Strip.

In fact, even the often-made comparisons to the September 11 terror attack or the 1973 Yom Kippur

War do not seem to capture the magnitude of this horrific event, neither in terms of the level of violence and the number of deaths as a percentage of the total population (in the case of 9/11), nor in the failure of the Israeli security establishment to predict and eventually respond to the events that unfolded on October 7 (in comparison to the 1973 War). It was indeed Israel’s darkest hour.

In response to the attack, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) launched operations in the Gaza Strip, combining heavy aerial bombardment with a ground offensive, with the objective of neutralizing Hamas both militarily and politically.

Dr. Mor Sobol is an assistant professor at Tamkang University where he teaches a course on terrorism studies. He can be reached for comment at 155876@o365.tku.edu.tw

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Following the October 7 attack, global voices united in condemning the tragic loss of innocent lives.

However, an alternate perspective quickly emerged, particularly as Israeli operations in Gaza intensified, resulting in a sharp increase in Palestinian civilian casualties. This perspective emphasizes the attack by Hamas in the broader political context of the Israeli occupation.

This line of argument found resonance among hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in cities like Istanbul, Berlin, London, and New York, where chants of “free Gaza” and “free Palestine” reverberated through the streets. It was also articulated by prominent figures, including United Nations SecretaryGeneral António Guterres, who asserted that Hamas’s attack on Israel “did not happen in a vacuum,” while Former US President Barack Obama stated, “What Hamas did was horrific and there’s no justification for it, and what is also true is that the occupation, and what is happening to Palestinians, is unbearable.”

Indeed, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict desperately calls for a peaceful resolution, one that inevitably

includes ending the decades-long Israeli occupation and the establishment of a Palestinian state. Yet, framing the attack solely as a consequence of the occupation and as a symbol of the struggle for selfdetermination oversimplifies the situation, and those making this case may not fully grasp Hamas and its objectives as an organization. Similarly, attributing the horrific civilian casualties to sheer barbarism does not really contribute to a complete understanding of the situation. After all, rather than being random, terror is a strategic, calculated act of violence. With this in mind, it is worthwhile to examine the October 7 attack through the lens of terror studies.

Strategies of terrorism So what did Hamas want to achieve in this attack?

In addition to instilling fear within Israeli society, maximizing casualties among the Israeli people, and taking hostages to use as bargaining chips for future prisoner exchanges, the attack exhibited strategies similar to those identified in the 2006 seminal study

Photo: IDF Archaeologists with the Israel Antiquities Authority sift through the ashes to help identify individual victims.

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by Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter, titled “The Strategies of Terrorism.”

Provocation The first strategy is that of provocation. The attack’s ISIS-style atrocities, including torture, rape, and beheadings of innocent civilians, aimed to provoke a strong, perhaps even disproportionate, response from Israel. Essentially, this strategy served multiple objectives.

First, a strong response will increase the suffering of the Palestinian population in Gaza (and the West Bank) and might bolster local support for the organization as well as generate greater animosity toward Israel.

Second, seeing the civilian Palestinian population suffer might push other (state and non-state) actors to join the fight.

Third, the emerging humanitarian crisis in Gaza could also attract stronger support from the international community (states and the general public) to champion the Palestinian cause, as well as to justify the actions of Hamas.

Fourth, the devastating impact of the Israeli response on the Palestinian population might force the international community (including the United States and European countries, some of Israel’s closest allies) to restrain Israel from taking aggressive measures against Hamas, thus ensuring its survival as an organization.

As it stands, Hamas has effectively achieved success on all these fronts.

It is important to note that, for provocation to be effective, the targeted country must possess the determination and the means to mount a strong response, and Israel definitely fits the bill. However, provoking actors without visible constraints, like China, Russia, or Syria, could potentially backfire, as the targeted country may opt to eliminate the organization along with the local population.

Spoiling This strategy known as spoiling aims to block any development (like peace talks) that might undermine the organization’s goals through violence and by discrediting the moderate voices on both sides.

photo: IDF IDF Chief of the General Staff LTG Herzi Halevi delivers a briefing to troops of the Israeli Defense Forces as they prepare a counterattack against Hamas.

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image: IDF

In the field of management studies, “spoilers” are participants in a negotiation who deliberately undermine any agreement, as they believe it will threaten their power and interests. Spoiling as a tactic was used by Hamas in the 1990s with the objective of blocking the peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. In the case of the October 7 attack, Hamas, acting as a proxy of Iran, aimed to thwart the normalization process between Israel and Saudi Arabia, which would have created a US-Saudi ArabiaIsrael coalition to counterbalance the Iran-led “axis of resistance” (and to a lesser extent, China and Russia).

Here again, Hamas achieved a victory, leading to the suspension of normalization talks between Saudi Arabia and Israel.

Outbidding The next strategy is outbidding. In situations where multiple actors are vying to represent their people, as Hamas and Fatah have been doing for over 35 years, extreme actions are necessary to demonstrate a commitment to the cause and to assert leadership in the struggle. Hamas previously employed this strategy to differentiate itself from other Palestinian organi-

zations by introducing suicide bombing campaigns against Israel.

In the context of the October 7 attack, Hamas, compared to the more moderate and passive approach taken by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Fatah, aims to portray itself as the primary advocate for the Palestinian cause, protector of Palestinian interests, and representative of the Palestinian people. Once again, Hamas has achieved a win, garnering substantial support not just among the Palestinian people living in Gaza, but those in the West Bank as well.

Taken together, analyzing Hamas’ October 7 attack through the lens of terror studies helps us gain a deeper understanding of the attack while considering both internal and external dynamics and factors.

Finally, it is crucial to assess the potential implications of the recent conflict for Taiwan. The ongoing Gaza conflict between Israel and Hamas offers Taiwan a real-time case study that sheds light on various security threats that could emerge in the event of a conflict across the Taiwan Strait. In fact, Taiwan’s Defense Minister, Chiu Kuo-cheng, has already announced the establishment of a task force on October 12 to analyze the Gaza conflict.

Initially, in the aftermath of Hamas’s attack on Israel, several elements emerge as pertinent to Taiwan’s decision-makers and security establishment. These include the importance of high-quality intelligence gathering and analysis; the mobilization of reserves; improving civil defense measures, ranging from enhancing citizen resilience to ensuring accessible shelters and citizen training; and securing key military assets and infrastructure against missile attacks. Moreover, the Gaza conflict can provide insights into responses from all parties involved in the conflict, including America, China, Russia, and key European states.

When considered alongside the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, the Israel-Hamas war should underscore the urgency for Taipei to intensify efforts to enhance its preparedness for a cross-strait conflict. n

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Bitcoins and other cryptocurrency denominations have become a tempting target for opportunistic hackers in the DPRK.

Strategic Vision vol. 12, no. 57 (November, 2023)

Crypto Crime Wave North Korea-sponsored crypto theft provides wakeup call for democracies James Jin Kang

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ne of the biggest impacts of the collapse of FTX, a fraud-ridden cryptocurrency exchange and crypto hedge fund based in the Bahamas, was the erosion of trust in all forms of cryptocurrency trading. When the world’s second-largest crypto exchange, valued at US$32 billion, announced bankruptcy, it called into question the soundness of cryptocurrency investing around the world, including in the world’s most notorious hermit kingdom.

It has long been known that hackers linked to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) engage in cybercriminal activity to fund the nation’s nuclear and missile program. The sanctions imposed

by the United Nations, as well as those of the United States and its allies, have forced the North Korean leadership to find alternative ways to generate income to keep their economy afloat and continue their ongoing provocations by conducting more missile tests. Since the imposition of border closures for the COVID-19 pandemic and tightened firewalls by banks, cryptocurrency theft became a vital source of income for the regime of Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un. The FTX bankruptcy, coupled with the similar collapse of cryptocurrencies Luna and TerraUSD, developed in South Korea, has wiped out millions from

Dr. James Jin Kang is an associate professor at National Taiwan University and teaches computing and security at Edith Cowan University. He can be reached for comment at James.kang@ecu.edu.au

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North Korea’s stolen crypto funds. This has surely affected the DPRK’s income flows, but it appears unlikely this will stop, or appreciably slow down, the provocative missile development program and nuclear testing conducted by the rogue state.

Pyongyang sponsors several hacker collectives, such as Lazarus Group and APT38. With names such as Guardians of Peace, Whois Team, Hidden Cobra, and Zinc, hacker collectives in the employ of Unit 121—the cyberwarfare agency attached to the Reconnaissance General Bureau, North Korea’s foreign intelligence agency—use cybercrime to hack the state’s enemies and steal money to fund espionage operations. They are in alignment, indicating tactical overlaps, with another hacking group dubbed Kimsuky (aka Black Banshee, Thallium, or Velvet Chollima).

While no one knows exactly how many hackers North Korea sponsors, it is believed that Kim Jong Un has about 6,000 - 7,000 hackers working for him, both inside and outside of North Korea. The efficiency and size of a national army of cybercriminals is almost unstoppable for any single organization to defend against. Among the big four hacking nations

(Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea), Pyongyang has been invested in hacking for more than 15 years.

While many hackers target customer data, intellectual property, employees, business and government data, North Korea has focused on stealing cryptocurrency rather than secret information from enemy states. It sounds unconventional for state-sponsored hackers to target money instead of military intelligence and technology, as China and Russia do; however, it is not surprising given North Korea’s history of illegal financial activity, such as producing counterfeit super notes, as long as it feeds their sclerotic economy.

The best-known attack by North Korea was the 2014 hack in retaliation for a movie called The Interview, made by Sony Pictures Entertainment. The group that claimed responsibility, Guardians of Peace, demanded “Stop immediately showing the movie of terrorism which can break the regional peace and cause the War.” In 2021, the US Department of Justice filed an indictment against three North Korean military hackers for their wide-ranging schemes to commit cyberattacks and financial crimes across the globe. US government

photo: FBI The US unsealed a federal indictment against three North Korean computer programmers in 2021 for conspiracy to conduct a series of cyberattacks.

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photo: Uwe Brodrecht Members of the Pyongyang Defense Command march down the streets of Pyongyang.

agencies warned that healthcare organizations are susceptible to these attacks as these organizations may be willing to pay ransoms as their services are critical to human life and health. Unsurprisingly, COVID-19 contributed to the vulnerability as this type of extortion can cause serious consequences and disruption to healthcare organizations, in addition to targeting military and diplomatic entities.

North Korean hackers stole US$620 million in cryptocurrency from the video game Axie Infinity—an online video game that uses non-fungible tokens in its gameplay and which has an in-game economy that runs on Ethereum-based cryptocurrencies. This lucrative heist supplied funds to the regime to finance its weapons development and to feed the party elites.

Meanwhile, in 2016, hackers with the Lazarus Group targeted Bangladesh’s national bank and came within an inch of success in their virtual heist of US$1 billion. A typo in the computer code resulted in them getting away with US$81 million, but the transfers were halted when the activity was detected.

North Korea-linked hackers have been accused of stealing US$571 million from cryptocurrency ex-

changes between January 2017 and September 2018, US$316 million from 2019 to November 2020, and US$840 million in the first five months of 2022, according to Chainalysis data. This represents over US$200 million more than the amount plundered in 2020 and 2021 combined. In 2021, North Korean hackers may have walked away with nearly US$400 million in cryptocurrency. This year, it is just under US$1 billion. To put those figures into context, North Korea earned only US$89 million in official exports in 2020, according to KOSTAT, South Korea’s official national statistics organization.

Interestingly, in terms of dollar value, Bitcoin now accounts for less than one-fourth of the cryptocurrencies stolen by North Korea. According to Chainanalysis, in 2021, only 20 percent of the stolen funds were Bitcoin, whereas 22 percent were either ERC-20 tokens or Altcoin.

It is difficult to say exactly how much cryptocurrency has been stolen, and used, by North Korean hackers—and therefore how much might remain.

In June, blockchain analyst and former FBI analyst Nick Carlsen told Reuters one of North Korea’s cryp-

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to caches had lost 80 to 85 percent of its value in a number of weeks, falling to less than US$10 million.

Losses will have intensified following the FTX collapse. According to a Chainalysis report, in January 2023, North Korea held about US$170 million in stolen unlaundered cryptocurrency, taken from 49 hacks conducted between 2017 and 2021. It also claims that Ether was the most common cryptocurrency stolen

by North Korea in 2021, making up 58 percent of the total theft.

Valuation crash Ether’s value fell by more than 20 percent following the FTX crash, and remains low. It is reasonable to expect North Korea will wait before cashing out. When it does, experts looking on will be in a better place to figure out how much is held by the rogue state.

The DPRK is highly invested in stealing crypto to fund its nuclear weapons tests because international sanctions and border closures due to COVID-19 have made it so difficult for North Korea to trade

and generate funds for its goal of becoming a formally recognized nuclear state. There is a lack of global regulatory controls on cryptocurrency, and North Korea has exploited this situation to steal digital currencies to fund its nuclear weapons and missile programs. In 2019 they stole about US$2 billion to fund their weapon’s program, according to CBS News. Cryptocurrency is an ideal means of exchange due to the lack of government control or interference, its anonymity, and the speed of transactions. Also, hacking cryptocurrency exchanges is easier than banks, which comes with toughened regulatory and security risks. So hackers target cryptocurrency as a way to sidestep sanctions. Even with the decline in restrictions from Covid-19, it is still a lucrative and efficient way for North Korean hackers to steal and fund cryptocurrency for the regime, which has shifted its focus to international banks.

“North Korea’s illicit cyber activities are really gaining traction,” says Ellen Kim, an expert on Korea at the US-based Center for Strategic and International

photo: Austin Gillam A US Navy landing craft comes ashore at Hwajin-Ri Beach, South Korea during Exercise Ssang Yong 23.

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Studies think tank. “They used to use their cyber capabilities to attack South Korean government departments, but now they’ve really shifted their focus to international banks and infrastructure in other countries.”

The dip in the value of cryptocurrency will negatively impact Pyongyang’s missile development program as the amount of loss and accessibility to the money, as well as laundering the ill-gotten gains, becomes harder. Nevertheless, the regime has proven to be innovative in finding new sources of illicit income, with almost unlimited human resources, including through supporters and South Korean followers of the DPRK’s official Juche ideology, as well as assistance from an American sympathizer, Virgil Griffith, who helped North Korea improve its crypto technology. Griffith subsequently pleaded guilty to violating US law by helping the DPRK evade US sanctions using cryptocurrency.

China is also a key player, and if general sanctions are to work, Beijing must be on board. This is not the case, however, and therefore sanctions do not appear to be working, as trade between China and North Korea continues. Thus, unless Beijing decides to wholeheartedly support the DPRK sanctions, it is unlikely that the devaluation of cryptocurrency will stop North Korea from continuing work on its weapons program.

Individual risk The widespread hackings conducted by state-sponsored organizations do not specifically target cryptocurrency held by individuals. Nonetheless, this does not make them free from attacks, as the hackers continue using ransomeware. Hackers will not disappear as long as they have a chance to gain from their theft, and it is only a matter of time before hackers

photo: Dean Karalekas DPRK hackers have been charged with conspiracy to create and deploy multiple malicious cryptocurrency applications and a blockchain platform.

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photo: Dean Karalekas While the poverty rate has been estimated at 60 percent, the privileged elite of North Korea enjoy special status, and are allowed to live in Pyongyang.

penetrate a given system, even when the security protecting that system has been bolstered. It does not matter whether North Korea continues, or stops, its program of cryptocurrency theft. Even if North Korea stops, there are many potential players out there, and the only solution is for everyone to work harder to protect their money and information security to dissuade attackers from attempting theft.

In general, it is not easy to stop the practice of profiting from easy money, particularly when state-sponsored hackers are good at doing what they have built up and operated for many years. North Korea has used, and continues to use, a wide variety of methods to make money such as producing counterfeit bills, engaging in drug trafficking, exporting labor, and mass-producing opium. For North Korea, stealing

They are aiming to steal access to private information, intellectual property, cryptocurrency, patent technologies, and intelligence on the enemy’s military, defence, politics, economy, and so on.

This will likely result in a worldwide tightening of controls over information security, with even democratic countries expected to expend more resources to implement security measures, ostensibly for privacy and information security, in a way similar to how, in the aftermath of 9/11, a raft of surveillance operations and restrictions on travel were introduced almost unopposed. In a way, North Korea, along with other rogue states, helps by creating an awareness of security threats that could potentially be used by more powerful state actors to consolidate their power in times of crisis or conflict.

crypto has been more efficient and less risky than most of these other schemes, due to the nature of the activity, which gains access to targets remotely.

It is likely that we will continue hearing news of crypto thefts by North Korea in the media. Their targets are unlimited, including but not limited to individuals, corporate entities, and government agencies.

As technology continues to evolve, cyberattacks will only grow in sophistication. North Korean hackers will continue to be at the forefront of this effort. By studying North Korea’s methods and tactics, democratic nations can better prepare themselves to defend against other state-sponsored hackers and cyberthreats. n

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Strategic Vision vol. 12, no. 57 (November, 2023)

Divergent Perspectives European public does not share NATO’s growing concern over rising China Hon-min Yau & Weronika Jakubczak

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he leaders of NATO member states met with four of their counterparts from the Asia-Pacific region on July 11, 2023.

Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, and New Zealand Prime Minister Chris Hipkins gathered in Vilnius, Lithuania to discuss important issues facing the NATO alliance and provide strategic direction for its activities.

In addition to the Russo-Ukraine War that has ravaged Europe for over a year, and whose impact has been felt around the globe, the security alliance also

photo: NATO National leaders from NATO countries pose at the 2023 NATO Vilnius Summit.

discussed the increasing global challenges presented

by China. However, most European elites are also growing worrisome about the competitive rhetoric between their most important security ally, the United States, and their economic partner, China.

While the intensifying Sino-US competition could likely divert much-needed US military focus away from Europe and towards the Indo-Pacific region, in the foreseeable future, Europe will face the difficult choice of defining a strategic position between these two giants. In fact, the most important supernational organization in the region, the European

Dr. Hon-min Yau is an associate professor and director of Graduate Institute of International Security at the ROC National Defense University. He can be reached for comment at cf22517855@gmail.com Prof. Weronika Jakubczak is an associate professor at The Main School of Fire Service (SGSP) in Warsaw, Poland. She can be reached for comment at wjakubczak@sgsp.edu.pl

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Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), in April 2023 conducted a survey of 11 member states (Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and Sweden) to investigate this critical issue. The results of the ECFR survey show that the general public in Europe has a different perception than their political elites, at least regarding the challenges coming from Xi Jinping’s China. More than 62 percent of European interviewees expressed a preference for neutrality in any potential Sino-US conflict. Moreover, the survey results also indicate that European citizens are reluctant to pursue a policy of de-risking from China, even though this is being orchestrated by European leadership, in particular the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen. This reveals contradictory views between the European public and security elites in NATO. In his seminal On War, Prussian strategist Carl von Clausewitz warned about the importance of understanding the trinity when designing strategy. The con-

stituent parts of the Clausewitzian trinity comprise violence, chance, and policy, respectively embodied by a country’s people, government, and military commander. He emphasized that a “theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.” Hence, a lack of synchronized understanding among the European trinity would likely deliver an ineffective strategy to the challenges presented

by China under the current Xi Jinping leadership.

Gap of understanding Indeed, European policy should be decided by Europeans, and serve European interests. There seems to be a gap of understanding between the European public and the security elites even amid the ongoing Russo-Ukraine War. The ECFR survey reveals a lack of adequate discussion regarding the challenges posed by China, and sufficient under-

photo: Joshua Brittenham US Marine Corps F-35C fighters land at Royal Australian Air Force Base Williamtown, New South Wales, Australia.

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standing of the potential impacts of a Taiwan contingency to Europe and the world.

In fact, before the 2023 Vilnius Summit, the European security establishment in NATO had already revised its Strategic Concept at the previous Madrid Summit in June 2022, 10 years after its last security document. This new NATO Strategic Concept named China a “systemic challenge,” which contrasts with the message presented by the ECFR survey. One important aspect of studying strategy is to recognize the constant change of dynamics within a strategic environment, and an old security formula will not be sufficient to deal with a new security reality. Ten years ago, Europe was busy dealing with the financial crisis and fighting against Islamic terrorism, and Russia was still complaining about China’s intellectual property theft of its defense technology. However, current-day Europe faces different threats, including Russia’s unprovoked war in Ukraine, supply chain insecurity, and the expanding influence of authoritarianism in Europe. In addition, due to the current prolonged

war, Russia seems to have become a vassal state under China’s growing global influence, due largely to Vladimir Putin’s failure to predict Ukraine’s will to resist, and the support that Ukraine would receive from Western countries.

NATO was founded in 1949 during the Cold War to safeguard freedom and security. But while it is impossible to completely separate Europe from the Indo-Pacific region in the interconnected world of the 21st century, European security experts recognize that new strategic thinking is required to ensure NATO’s continued relevance. China’s increasing influence in the global infrastructure supply chain, as well as its building of new global norms, have become systemic challenges that Europe ignores at its own peril.

The 2022 NATO Strategic Concept actually contains an analytical vehicle to demystify the puzzling confusion presented by the ECFR survey, as this strategic directive states, “The People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security, and values.” An

photo: Patrick King A US Marine conducts pistol marksmanship training at Marine Corps Base Hawaii.

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photo: Jordan Brown The Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser USS Antietam operates in the South China Sea.

examination of these three elements could provide the European public with a deeper understanding of the situation.

Firstly, China’s provocative military behavior in East Asia, including the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait, presents a credible threat not only to the IndoPacific region, but also to European interests. If a conflict occurs in the Indo-Pacific region, it would undoubtedly obstruct the major international sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in East Asia and endanger the security of global supply chains.

Economic impact In retrospect, on September 21, 1999, when the devastating 921 Earthquake hit Taiwan, causing power shortages and blackouts for two weeks, the price of computer components rose substantially that year due to Taiwan’s role in the computer industry at the time. Today, Taiwan’s semiconductor industry sup-

ports every appliance of ICT devices among the social fabric of the 21st century. A disruption of the SLOCs would have a nuclear weapons-grade economic impact on Europe’s economy.

Secondly, regarding European security, China is not yet a direct military threat to Europe like Russia is, but without China’s support, the sustainability of Russia’s military capacity is questionable. In addition, China’s weaponization of its market in changing the behavior of foreign governments has reshaped the norm of depoliticizing economic activities after WWII. Beijing repeatedly uses its economic leverage to interfere with foreign governmental and corporate decisions. The authoritarian nature of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is undermining European military and economic security.

Thirdly, in terms of European values, the CCP’s abuse of political power in China, Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Tibet, and overseas repeatedly contradicts NATO’s founding values of democracy, individual

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photo: Liu Zhiyong Main battle tanks attached to an Army brigade under the PLA Eastern Theater Command rumble in complex terrain during live-fire training.

liberty and the rule of law, as well as to the peaceful resolution of disputes. Furthermore, Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union defines the Union as being founded on “the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights.” While Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan exemplify the feasibility of democracy within Asian political culture, the CCP is creating distorted narratives about the effectiveness of authoritarian political systems and endeavoring to establish an alternative worldview to justify its selfproclaimed political exceptionalism.

The European public should be aware of the RussoUkraine War and realize that once deterrence fails and war breaks out in any part of the globe, the whole

than sending military personnel and equipment to the region in the event of a Taiwan contingency. As Sun Tzu cautions us: “Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all!” Hence, practical advice for Europe is that, while good decisions come from good intelligence, it would also be beneficial if European countries, including both European policymakers and the public, along with NATO members, take part in the crisis game with Indo-Pacific partners to understand the potential impact of a Taiwan contingency to the region, and to Europe.

world suffers the serious social and economic costs.

The same lesson speaks to the context of the IndoPacific area. However, the result of the ECFR survey indicates that there is still a need to expand dialogues and exchange information, as poor decisions can result from an incomplete view of the global situation.

Indeed, there are options for European citizens other

In addition, European scholars and civil society should make a greater effort to understand the strategic connections and values that link East Asia and Europe. In June 2023, it was reported that NATO was planning to set up a liaison office in Japan in order to collect more local knowledge of the region. However, the initiative was later deferred until further notice,

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as reported by The Guardian on July 12, 2023, due to the China mission’s response to the official EU statement. According to Beijing, “Any actions that jeopardize China’s legitimate rights and interests will be met with a resolute response.” A European liberal view of world affairs is based on dialogues and exchange of information, but a government led by an authoritarian regime, in the case of the CCP, would perceive these acts of information-sharing as jeopardizing its interests. The practical advice for Europe is to seriously consider whether the European public and elites want to stick with European values, or whether they should submit to China’s pressure without creating opportunities to make good decisions.

European countries must continue to deepen their practical knowledge regarding the Indo-Pacific region even amid a major conventional conflict within Europe. The security establishment has to realize the three security pillars as defined in the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept: deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and good cooperative security.

Before NATO and European states rethink their areas of responsibility to Asia, there are practical suggestions following these three elements that European security partners could take to mitigate the unthinkable risks incurred by China’s rise. They consist of expanding intelligence cooperation with regional partners to enhance deterrence; studying the political and economic impact of material coming from and going to the Indo-Pacific region through SLOCs during a conflict; and deepening exchanges and policy cooperation with regional partners to collect reliable intelligence for better decision-making and synchronization of their future actions.

In the end, the 2023 NATO Vilnius Summit did not suggest any future NATO-like development in the Indo-Pacific region to stand against China’s more egregious excesses. However, there are practical things that European countries can do to enhance their public’s understanding of the regional context, and to better plan ahead for what eventualities could likely be coming in the future as a result of an increasingly revanchist and confident China. n

photo: Zhang Hailong Sailors with the PLA Northern Theater Command hoist and load missile canister into the vertical launch system of a guided-missile frigate.

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Strategic Vision vol. 12, no. 57 (November, 2023)

Mutual Understanding Media literacy, people-to-people dialogue keys to defeating PRC propaganda Ching Ya Chang

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rtificial intelligence (AI) has become a trendy topic in recent years. People have benefitted from it in different ways, and are eager to know more about what can be accomplished with AI assistance. When it comes to national defense, the power of AI must never be underestimated. Observing the Russo-Ukraine War, it is evident that Russia utilized the power of AI in its creation of an informational battlefield. The relationship between Taiwan and China has often been

seen as analogous to that of the Russo-Ukraine situation. Therefore, it is foreseeable that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will be employing cognitive warfare techniques to shape the ideological landscape in a Taiwan contingency.

In recent years, the nature of warfare has undergone a significant transformation, fueled by advancements in technology and global interconnectivity. Cognitive warfare, unlike the more traditional political warfare, is a collection of activities aimed at influencing or

photo: Alisdare Hickson An anti-war protestor in central London holds a placard likening Putin to a Soviet-era dictator as he calls for an end to the Russia-Ukraine War.

Ching Ya Chang is an administrative assistant of the Graduate Institute of International Security at the ROC National Defense University. She can be reached for comment at qazwsxas830725@gmail.com

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disrupting individual and group cognition with the objective of gaining a political advantage. By gathering data and presenting information that aligns with audience preferences, the CCP possesses the capacity to manipulate public opinion and consolidate its political influence. Given the CCP’s control over information for domestic consumption, it is challenging for democratic countries to influence public perception in China. As such, cognitive warfare serves as an asymmetric warfare strategy that gives the CCP a distinct advantage in relations across the Taiwan Strait.

Vital questions That being said, the questions to ask are: How does the CCP harness the power of AI to conduct cognitive warfare, and how can the government of the Republic of China (ROC) best address the issue?

The cognitive warfare strategies employed by the CCP can be categorized into three sequential steps: 1) erasure of previous information from collective memory, 2) manipulation of mental ideologies, and 3) transformation of the overall mindset. Leveraging the capabilities of AI, the manipulation of public opinion among the Taiwan populace was particularly evident during the COVID-19 period, from 2019 to 2022, as individuals relied heavily on traditional media as well as online sources for much-needed information. According to a report from a Japanese Defense Ministry think tank, from late-2019 to late2020, Beijing launched 1.4 billion cyber-attacks on political, economic, and military targets in Taiwan.

Although it may appear that the gray-zone tactics employed by the CCP did not directly influence the outcome of the 2020 presidential election, the evidence shows that ROC citizens should exercise increased vigilance in detecting the CCP’s cognitive warfare strategies and propaganda, especially as the 2024 presidential election approaches.

Cognitive warfare strategies can be classified into three distinct levels: 1) the national-strategic level, 2) the military-strategic level, and 3) the battle-strategic level. Cognitive warfare strategies at the latter two levels are closely intertwined with military strategies, while the focus of cognitive warfare at the nationalstrategic level is directed towards the general population and the armed forces, with these strategies being implemented during peacetime. By employing these asymmetric warfare tactics unbeknownst to its target, it is nearly impossible for the CCP to lose the upper hand.

Under these circumstances, the idea of increasing the overall capacity of media literacy has been widely promoted in Taiwan. China’s Ministry of State Security has gathered voluminous data pertaining to the political ideologies, demographics, and other information about opinion leaders in the nations and regions they target. This aids them in crafting messaging designed to appeal to those individuals.

Nevertheless, people from all age ranges should be equipped with the skills to distinguish fact from fiction. The significance of media literacy lies in its impact on the public’s ethics, and is not just about the

“Taiwan must engage in a cognitive warfare operation of its own, but one aimed at increasing mutual understanding and respect.” importance of thinking critically and independently; it is also about the general public’s understanding of how the Internet and social media platforms operate.

Nowadays, with the ever-changing nature of war, holding tight to traditional conceptions of warfighting is no longer practical. Tzeng Hua-feng, a Chinese scholar, proposed a significant concept known as “control over the brain” which emphasizes the importance of speed in cognitive manipulation. This concept underpins cognitive warfare, which is expected

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photo: Christian Tofteroo A US Marine Corps MQ-9A unmanned aerial vehicle takes off from Marine Corps Air Station Kaneohe Bay.

to have a profound impact on targeted nations. By collecting massive amounts of data from social media platforms, and analyzing it with AI, the CCP can manipulate cyber warriors, such as its 50 Cent Army or wumao, to disseminate information that aligns with the audience’s preferences. To avoid continuous exposure to a specific type of information and break this echo chamber created by the CCP, the general public must pay more attention to the information they share online. Once people are more aware of how the digital world operates, the importance of media literacy will become obvious.

A change of attitude Apart from the importance of widespread media literacy, to counter the negative impact of the CCP’s cognitive warfare strategies, people in Taiwan should change their attitude towards the Chinese people themselves, as distinguished from the threat posed by the government of China. With the frequent military drills launched by the People’s Liberation Army

(PLA), people in Taiwan are getting used to the constant gray-zone tactics being employed against them, and this puts Taiwan in a dangerous situation—a situation in which people might underestimate the very real threat of the outbreak of war. As the relationship between China and Taiwan worsens, one possible way of deterring the PLA from invading Taiwan is by drawing the Chinese people to our side.

It is important to note that the people and culture of China are totally different from their regime: Even though the CCP intentionally conflates the two, and they might seem inseparable to outsiders due to the party’s total control over information, Taiwan must engage in a cognitive warfare operation of its own, but one aimed at increasing mutual understanding and respect between the actual people in China, and those in Taiwan. This is the best way out, given Taiwan’s relatively weak military and economic position. After all, to maintain its grip on power, the CCP is obsessively concerned about controlling the lives of the people of China. Hence its massive and intrusive social-credit system, which dictates who is

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allowed to travel, shop, and otherwise benefit from taking part in society based on how loyal they are to the CCP regime.

To quote Alan Moore, people should not be afraid of their governments; governments should be afraid of their people. The people in China may be awakening to this axiom. The White Paper Revolution was a large-scale nationwide series of protests lodged by the Chinese people in 2022, to agitate against the Draconian measures instituted in pursuit of Beijing’s “Zero-COVID” policy. In response, the CCP lifted the policy almost immediately, fearing the ongoing negative tension from the people. This demonstrates that the CCP still has concerns about popular grievances. Hence, winning over Chinese public opinion would be a powerful deterrence capability for Taiwan.

Moreover, it is only through direct, people-to-people connections that citizens of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) can learn what true democracy looks like; likewise, the people of Taiwan might develop

a better understanding of what Chinese society has become since the CCP seized control of the country.

This might help to break the echo chamber effect and promote mutual respect.

Clinging to discrimination against Chinese people and society in the name of being patriotic is no longer sensible these days. It is high time that we rethink the definition of patriotism and strive to engage directly with the people of China. With the constant advancements being made in high technology, the power and influence of the Internet cannot be overstated.

Therefore, the ROC government should stop turning a blind eye to the power of cognitive warfare, and start promoting media literacy among the population. Aside from this, enhancing mutual understanding in Taiwan society itself, and between ordinary people on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait: these are the best solutions for breaking through the wall of disinformation. It is only when the people understand one another that the cross-strait conflict can be resolved. n

photo: Emili koonce Republic of Korea Army soldiers and US Air Force security forces personnel train at Kunsan Air Base in South Korea.

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Strategic Vision vol. 12, no. 57 (November, 2023)

Pelagic Cooperation Common Fisheries Policy needed to manage resources in South China Sea Gregory Coutaz

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he competition between rival fishing fleets in the South China Sea (SCS) to secure access to valuable marine living resources is not only threatening the livelihoods of millions of people in coastal states who depend on fisheries, but is also posing a serious risk of triggering a fullfledged crisis whose consequences could prove difficult to control. Although confrontations over the use and management of fisheries are fairly widespread, nationalist postures adopted by SCS claimants have led to an upsurge in violence between fishermen and national coast guards. Despite intermittent efforts to reduce tensions, durable solutions have so far been impossible to achieve, causing great concern

for future regional peace and stability. Little attention has been paid to the importance of fishery conflicts in the SCS dispute. This article hopes to make one attempt to remedy this omission. To that end, it focuses on the concept of cooperation to design a fishery arrangement that will make fishing in the SCS stable and sustainable, and prevent controversy arising when a foreign fishing boat enters a country’s territorial waters.

Biologically speaking, the SCS is one of the top five most productive fishing zones in the world in terms of total annual marine production. Covering only 2.5 percent of the Earth’s surface, the SCS comprises some 12 percent of the total global fish catch. Often

photo: Trey Ratcliff A calm sunset in the South China Sea provides a sharp contrast to the turbulent maritime disputes which plague the region.

Dr. Gregory Coutaz is an assistant professor at Tamkang University and holds a PhD from National Chengchi University in Taiwan. He can be reached for comment at gregcoutaz@hotmail.com

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photo: Brenden Delgado A US Marine fires a Javelin anti-tank missiles during Balikatan 23 in Fort Magsaysay, Philippines.

described as the marine equivalent of the Amazon rainforest, the SCS ecosystem consists of 3,365 known species including flying fishes such as tunas and mackerels, demersal fishes such as snappers and soles, invertebrates such as crabs, shrimps and squids, reef fishes such as groupers and parrotfishes, and small coastal pelagic fishes such as sardines and anchovies.

Unfortunately, those valuable marine living resources have been under heavy fishing pressure for several decades and are now in serious jeopardy. Fish stocks have fallen by 70-95 percent from their 1950s levels. If nothing is done to improve fisheries management, simulation models project that by 2045 all species groups will decrease by as much as an additional 59 percent from 2015 levels. The socioeconomic consideration of fisheries and fish processing to East Asia cannot be overestimated. In fact, fish

In addition to the crucial component of regional food security, the fishing industry is vital to the livelihoods of millions of people living in coastal areas who depend on it for their employment and revenue. Of the 3.2 million fishing boats operating worldwide, an estimated 1.7 million are plying the waters of the SCS, employing some 3.7 million people. Many of these fishermen have little option for alternative employment. Declining access to sufficient fish stocks makes it an enduring concern for the region’s coastal states, and fishing incidents play a prominent role in the current disputes. China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia figure among the leading fishery exporters in the world. This competition between rival fishing fleets operating in a semi-enclosed sea with overlapping maritime claims inevitably results in fishery conflicts. The decision by coastal states

has been, and continues to be, an important source of protein for countries in the region. While fish and other seafood comprises about 8.5 percent of protein in China, it makes up over 15 percent of total protein consumption in Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, and over 10 percent in Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam.

to enforce stricter laws and regulation in the areas that they consider to be under their exclusive jurisdiction has given rise to violent incidents involving an excessive use of force and the arrest of fishing crews from other states. For instance, as of September 2020, the Chinese coast guard reported that it had expelled 1,138 foreign fishing boats from the northern half of

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the South China Sea in the preceding four months, boarded and inspected dozens more, and detained 11 boats and 66 foreign crew members, “effectively safeguarding [our] fishery interests and maritime rights.” However, it was the presence of a flotilla of more than 200 Chinese fishing vessels anchored at Whitsun Reef in the Spratly Islands in March 2021 that triggered international consternation, proving once again that fisheries in the SCS remains a subject of heated geopolitical dispute.

Fishery arrangement The current state of fisheries in the SCS calls for the early initiation and conclusion of an appropriate fishery arrangement between the various parties involved. The purpose of such an arrangement would be twofold: one being the development of sustainable fisheries, and the other the prevention of tensions and frictions. When taking Europe as a point of comparison, it can be demonstrated that fisheries

can be an element of cooperation in the relationship between states, rather than an activity leading to confrontation. Introduced in the 1970s, the EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) constitutes the main vehicle for cooperation between member states on the topic of fisheries. Designed to manage a common resource, it gives all European fishing fleets equal access to European waters and fishing grounds, and allows fishermen to compete fairly. It also sets rules to ensure that the European fishing industry is sustainable, and does not threaten the fish population size and productivity over the long term. The CFP has been the subject of heated debate for many years.

Often criticized, it has been portrayed as one of the most discredited and unpopular pieces of EU legislation. Despite its shortcomings, the CFP has been a successful instrument to develop a form of social peace among the member states. In her analysis of fishing conflicts on a global scale, researcher Jessica Spijkers identified 168 fishing disputes within the EU, 314 in the Northern American region, and 419

photo: Brette Cote The US Coast Guard conducts passing exercises with the Indonesian Maritime Security Agency and the Singaporean Navy.

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photo: William Pugh A US B-52 bomber takes off at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam.

in the Asian continent between 1970 and 2016. The numbers show a rapid increase for the period 20132016: the EU recorded 29 cases of disputes, and Asia 169 cases, for the same time frame.

The existence of the CFP guarantees stability and offers an institutional structure for the settlement of fishery conflicts. The CFP sets out directives and laws that control and govern commercial fishing across the entire European continent. The notion of institutionalization places emphasis on the role that common goals play in the international system and the ability of international organizations to get states to cooperate. Unfortunately, the absence of international agreements leads to a destabilized environment in which no transformative change can be expected. In the case of the SCS, it seems evident that the different parties involved could benefit from such an arrangement.

Fish and seafood are certainly more tangible objects for negotiation than seabed energy resources ownership claims. In the absence of a proper regional management mechanism, it makes sense to look at the principles, rules, procedures, and institutional cooperation needed to regulate the disputed waters of the SCS. A number of countries in the region have

signed non-binding Memoranda of Understanding (MOU). In 1991, Taiwan signed an MOU with the Philippines on agriculture and fishery collaboration and on maritime navigation routes, but Manila unilaterally abolished the agreement in 1998. In 2013, China and Indonesia signed an MOU, aimed at managing the sustainability of a marine and fishery partnership. In 2021, Beijing and Jakarta added a second MOU on the project of boosting fishery cooperation between China’s Fujian province and Indonesia’s Salim Group.

That same year, Vietnam and Malaysia showed interest in signing an ambitious MOU to solve the issue of Vietnamese fishing boats entering Malaysianclaimed waters. This agreement would be the first to directly address infringement of maritime sovereignty in the SCS. Despite those intermittent efforts to increase cooperation, durable solutions have so far been impossible to achieve, causing great concerns for future regional peace and stability. The time has come for the countries bordering the SCS to transcend their unilateral interests and pursue an institutional approach dedicated to the preservation of fishing resources and regional stability. n

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