Honorable Catherine Shaffer
SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR KING COUNTY
THE DINH PLAINTIFF GROUP,
Plaintiffs, v.
RIDE THE DUCKS INTERNATIONAL, LLC, a foreign company; RIDE THE DUCKS OF SEATTLE, LLC, a Washington company; STATE OF WASHINGTON; CITY OF SEATTLE; TRACEY ENTERTAINMENT ASSOCIATES LLC; a foreign company; BRIAN TRACEY AND JANE DOE TRACEY, and their marital community, Defendants
No. 15-2-28905-5 SEA
CONSOLIDATED COMPLAINT FOR PERSONAL INJURIES, DAMAGES, AND PUNITIVE RELIEF
Plaintiffs allege: 1. Parties
1.1 The Dinh Plaintiff Group consists of the following plaintiffs whose claims have been fully consolidated for all purposes: :
A. Phuong Dinh was an 18 year old single woman residing in Seattle, King County, Washington.
i. She was seated in the window seat, on the left side just forward of the
CONSOLIDATED COMPLAINT FOR PERSONAL INJURIES, DAMAGES, AND PUNITIVE RELIEF - 1
middle of the motor coach.
ii. As a direct and proximate result of the incident and conduct set forth below, she sustained injuries including but not limited to numerous orthopedic injuries, complex facial lacerations and other injuries.
B. Yuta Masumoto was a 21 year-old single man residing in King County, Washington.
i. He was seated in the window seat in the third row from the front on the left side of the motor coach.
ii. As a direct and proximate result of the incident and conduct set forth below, he sustained multiple fractures to the pelvis, hip, leg, a lacerated spleen, and other injuries.
C. Mazda M. Hutapea was an 18 year old single woman residing in Seattle, King County, Washington.
i. She was seated above and directly behind the driver on the motor coach. Upon impact she was thrown down into the stairwell of the motor coach, landing on her teacher near the entry door.
ii. As a direct and proximate result of the incident and conduct set forth below, Mazda suffered numerous injuries including pelvic and tailbone fractures, three broken ribs, a concussion and other injuries.
D. Yu Zhuang was a 19 year old single man residing in Seattle, King County, Washington.
i. He was seated in the first row on the right side of the motor coach.
ii. As a direct and proximate result of the incident and conduct set forth
below, he sustained physical injuries to his chest, abdomen and ankle.
E. Gunter Zielinski and Fenna Zielinski are each over the age of 18 years and are a married couple residing in Emmeloord, Holland.
i. Gunter and Fenna Zielinski were seated directly behind the driver in DUKW 6.
ii. As a direct and proximate result of the incident and conduct set forth below, Gunter Zielinski suffered numerous injuries, including a traumatic brain injury, neck and back injuries, double vision, fatigue and cognitive impairments.
iii. As a direct and proximate result of the incident and conduct set forth below, Fenna Zielinski suffered multiple injuries, including 11 rib fractures, two fractured vertebrae, a fractured collar bone, a left hip fracture, a pelvic fracture and a fractured coccyx.
F. Rhonda Cooley and JoAnn Gerke are each over the age of 18 years and are a married couple residing in Madison, Wisconsin.
i. Rhonda Cooley and JoAnn Gerke were seated on DUKW No. 6, approximately 5 rows behind the driver.
ii. As a direct and proximate result of the incident and conduct set forth below, Rhonda Cooley suffered numerous injuries, including a left hip acetabular fracture, rib fracture and left shoulder injury.
iii. As a direct and proximate result of the incident and conduct set forth below, JoAnn Gerke was ejected from the Duck, and suffered multiple injuries, including fractured left tibia, right lumbar transverse process
fractures and a right hip injury.
G. Richard and Terry Sheldon are each over the age of 18 years and are a married couple residing in Riverside, Riverside County, California.
i. Richard and Terry Sheldon were seated on DUKW No. 6, in the window and aisle seats respectively, of row “F.”
ii. As a direct and proximate result of the incident and conduct set forth below, Richard Sheldon suffered numerous injuries, including fractures of the clavicle, left leg and ribs, lacerations to the head, ankle and foot, internal injuries, musculoskeletal injuries and contusions.
iii. As a direct and proximate result of the incident and conduct set forth below, Terry Sheldon suffered multiple injuries, including laceration of her hand, musculoskeletal injuries and contusions.
H. Ronald Sheldon and Kathleen Sheldon are each over the age of 18 years and are a married couple residing in Appleton, Wisconsin.
i. Ronald Sheldon and Kathleen Sheldon were seated on DUKW No. 6, in the aisle and window seats respectively, of row “E.”
ii. As a direct and proximate result of the incident and conduct set forth below, Ronald Sheldon suffered numerous injuries, including a laceration of his left leg, musculoskeletal injuries and contusions.
iii. As a direct and proximate result of the incident and conduct set forth below, Kathleen Sheldon suffered multiple injuries, including a mild traumatic brain injury, head laceration, musculoskeletal injuries and contusions.
I. Toshihiko and Sonoko Hiraoka are each over the age of 18 years and are a married couple residing in Saitama Prefecture, Japan. Kenichiro Hiraoka is their 25 year-old son, and Yousuke Hiraoka is their 21 year-old son, both residing in Saitama Prefecture, Japan.
i. Toshihiko Hiraoka, Sonoko Hiraoka, Kenichiro Hiraoka, and Yousuke Hiraoka were seated in row G, near the back, in seats 1-4 on DUKW No. 6, moments before the crash. Toshihiko was seated in seat G3 by the aisle on the right side of the Duck, Sonoko Hiraoka was seated in G4 by the window on the right side of the Duck. Kenichiro Hiraoka was seated in seat G2, by the aisle on the left side of the Duck, and Yousuke Hiraoka was in seat G1 by the window on the left side of the Duck.
ii. As a direct and proximate result of the incident and conduct set forth below, Toshihiko Hiraoka suffered numerous injuries, including loss of consciousness, injuries to his head, face, neck and back.
iii. As a direct and proximate result of the incident and conduct set forth below, Sonoko Hiraoka suffered numerous severe orthopedic injuries, including fractured acetabulum and sacrum. She also sustained severe lacerations to both of her legs.
iiii As a direct and proximate result of the incident and conduct set forth below, Kenichiro Hiraoka suffered numerous injuries, including a broken right incisor and multiple abrasions and contusions.
i. As a direct and proximate result of the incident and conduct set forth below, Yousuke Hiraoka suffered numerous injuries, including abrasions
J. Min Kyeong Kang was a 21 year old single woman residing in Bellingham, Whatcom County, Washington.
i. Min Kyeong Kang was seated in the window seat in the very back, on the right side of the motor coach.
ii. As a direct and proximate result of the incident and conduct set forth below, Min Kyeong Kang suffered physical injuries to her face, head, neck and back.
K. Seohee Bak is a 21 year old single woman residing in Seattle, King County, Washington.
i. Soehee Bak was seated in an aisle seat in the very back of the motor coach.
ii. As a direct and proximate result of the incident and conduct set forth below, Soehee Bak suffered physical injuries to her legs, head, neck and back.
L. Alena Lutz was a 21 year old single woman residing in Steinach, Switzerland.
i. Alena Lutz was seated on DUKW No. 6, in the aisle seat in the front row on the right side moments before the crash.
ii. As a direct and proximate result of the incident and conduct set forth below, Alena Lutz suffered numerous injuries, including injuries to her right shoulder and left knee.
M. Partners In Care is the duly appointed Administrator of the Estate of Claudia Derschmidt, deceased. Decedant, Claudia Derschmidt, was and at all times
relevant herein was a resident of Austria. Claudia Derschmidt was 49 years old when she was killed on September 24, 2015 in an amphibious duck boat incident in Seattle, Washington. Moritz Derschmidt is a surviving adult son of decedent Claudia Derschmidt, residing in Austria. Felix Derschmidt is a surviving minor son of decedent Claudia Derschmidt, residing in Austria.
i. Based on information and belief Claudia Derschmidt was seated on the side of the motor coach that took the full brunt and force of the collision.
ii. As a direct and proximate result of the incident and conduct set forth below, Claudia Derschmidt suffered severe injuries and subsequently died.
iii. As a direct and proximate result of the incident and conduct set forth below, Felix Derschmidt and Mortiz Derschmidt suffered general and special damages related to the death of their mother.
N. Donald Clouse was a 69 year old married man residing in Olympia, Thurston County, Washington.
i. Donald Clouse was the driver of the motor-coach.
ii. As a direct and proximate result of the incident and conduct set forth below, Donald Clouse suffered physical injuries to his legs, chest and abdomen.
O. Li Liu Edwards was a 37 year old married woman residing in Wayne, Pennsylvania.
i. Li Liu Edwards was seated on DUKW No. 6, in seat D1, a window seat on the left side.
ii. As a direct and proximate result of the incident and conduct set forth
below, Li Liu Edwards suffered numerous injuries, including injuries to her neck, throat and limbs.
P. Jennifer Emery was a 30 year old single woman residing in Valrico, Florida.
i. Jennifer Emery was seated in the window seat on the driver's left side in the second to the last row of DUKW No. 6.
ii. As a direct and proximate result of the incident and conduct set forth below, Jennifer Emery suffered numerous injuries, including a left shoulder separation, nose fracture, neck injury, back injury, headaches, migraines, left leg pain and hematoma, bilateral knee pain, concussion, post-concussion syndrome, vertigo, inability to concentrate, sleep disturbance, and PTSD.
Q. Timothy Gesner and Susan Gesner are each over the age of 18 years and are a married couple residing in Clermont, Florida.
i. Timothy and Susan Gesner were seated near the back of DUKW No. 6.
ii. As a direct and proximate result of the incident and conduct set forth below, Susan Gesner suffered numerous injuries, including a dislocated left shoulder with reverse Hill-Sachs impaction fracture of the humeral head.
iii. As a direct and proximate result of the incident and conduct set forth below, Timothy Gesner suffered multiple injuries, including contusion to his back and cervical and thoracic sprain/strain.
R. Sarah R. Johnson was a 40 year old woman residing in Snohomish County, Washington.
i. Sarah R. Johnson seated in the aisle seat on the driver's left side in the second to the last row of DUKW No. 6.
ii. As a direct and proximate result of the incident and conduct set forth below, injury to right side of head with bruising/swelling, cervical muscle strain/sprain, injury to right shoulder; possible scapular separation or fracture, lower left extremity muscle strain, large hematoma to left thigh, abrasions to left shin, right shoulder, chin, back pain, rib sprain, PTSD.
1.2 Ride the Ducks International, LLC (“RTD International”) is a limited liability company organized under the laws of the State of Missouri with its principal place of business in the State of Georgia.
1.3 Ride the Ducks of Seattle, LLC (“RTD Seattle”) is a limited liability company organized under the laws of the State of Washington with its principal place of business in King County, Washington. RTD Seattle is a citizen of the State of Washington.
1.4 The State of Washington is a governmental entity responsible for the design, construction, inspection, maintenance and operation of SR 99 within state boundaries, including the portion of SR 99 which constitutes the Aurora Bridge.
1.5 The City of Seattle is a governmental entity responsible for the design, construction, inspection, maintenance and operation of SR 99 within state boundaries, including the portion of SR 99 which constitutes the Aurora Bridge.
1.6 For ease of reference, when the term “Ride the Ducks Defendants” is used, it refers to RTD Seattle, and RTD International. When the term “Governmental Entity Defendants” is used, it refers to the State of Washington and City of Seattle.
1.7 Tracey Entertainment Associates, LLC, is a limited liability company organized under
the laws of the State of New Hampshire conducting regular business in King County, Washington by and through its owner, Brian Tracey, a citizen of the State of Washington.
1.8 Brian Tracey and Jane Doe Tracey are citizens of the State of Washington residing in King County, Washington. All acts of Brian Tracey were performed individually and on behalf of the marital community.
2. Jurisdiction, Venue, and Tort Claims
2.1 The Superior Court of King County, State of Washington, has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to RCW 2.08.010.
2.2 Jurisdiction is proper in the State of Washington because the alleged causes of action arose out of activities within the State of Washington, including but not limited to the transaction of business within this State, and the commission of tortious acts within this State, because: a) RTD Seattle has its principal place of business in this State; b) Brian Tracey is a resident and citizen of this state c) Tracey Entertainment Associates, LLC has its principal place of business in this State d) the Governmental Entity Defendants are of this State. RCW 4.28.185; RCW 4.12.025.
2.3 Venue is proper in and for King County, Washington because RTD Seattle and Tracey Entertainment Associates, LLC have their principal places of business and transact business in King County, Washington, the City of Seattle defendant is situated in King County, and because the crash giving rise to this lawsuit occurred in King County, Washington. RCW 4.12.020-025.
2.4 RTD International was at all relevant times conducting substantial and continuous business in the State of Washington by selling products to entities within this State, and
by engaging in a licensing agreement with RTD Seattle, under which RTD International was entitled to and received five (5) percent of all gross ticket sales from all tours operated by RTD Seattle. The State of Washington has jurisdiction over RTD International for the below-described claims. To the extent RTD International defectively manufactured products in Missouri or Georgia, this Court has the authority and jurisdiction to apply the punitive damages laws of those states to this action.
2.5 Mr. Tracey and RTD Seattle are citizens of and/or is organized and/or incorporated in the State of Washington. Accordingly, this action may not be removed pursuant to 28 U.S. Code § 1441(b)(2). In addition in this case the Federal Court does not have jurisdiction over the Governmental Entity Defendants.
2.6 Plaintiffs have filed legally sufficient Claims for Damages in this matter with the Office of Risk Management for the State of Washington. More than 60 days have elapsed since each of the Claims was filed with Defendant State of Washington.
2.7 Plaintiffs have filed legally sufficient Claims for Damages in this matter with the City of Seattle. More than 60 days have elapsed since each of the claims was filed with Defendant City of Seattle.
3. Facts
3.1 About 11:11 a.m. local time on Thursday September 24, 2015, a 1945 GMC DUKW No. 6 – an amphibious military vehicle modified and remanufactured for tour operations by RTD International, and operated by RTD Seattle - was traveling northbound in the center lane on the SR 99 Aurora Bridge at approximately block no. 2900.00, 1000 feet from Raye Street
3.2 DUKW No. 6 was occupied by Eric Bishop, its 54 year old driver, and 36 passengers.
3.3 At the same time, a 2009 MCI motor coach, operated by CWA Inc. dba Bellair Charters Hesselgrave South, was traveling southbound on the center lane on Washington State Route 99 (SR 99) also known as the Aurora Bridge.
3.4 The motor coach was occupied by a 68 year old driver and approximately 45 to 50 passengers.
3.5 The two vehicles were traveling in their respective lanes heading in opposite directions on the southern span of the bridge when RTD Seattle driver, Eric Bishop reported hearing a loud “bang” and lost control of DUKW No. 6.
3.6 The DUKW crossed the center line of the SR 99 Aurora Bridge into the oncoming southbound lanes of traffic, then struck and penetrated into the left side of the motor coach.
3.7 There was no center barrier on the bridge to divert the DUKW from crossing over the centerline and into the motor carrier.
3.8 The National Transportation Safety Board documented the damage to the crash scene, the DUKW vehicle and motor coach using three-dimensional laser scanning technology. The following figures show the 3D scans of the left front side of the DUKW and left side of the motor coach:
3.9
DUKW No. 6 was originally a 1945 military model. RTD International remanufactured, refurbished, and modified DUKW No. 6 and similar military vehicles to perform the new and unusual function of transporting large numbers of tourists on guided tours by road, highway, and also by water.
3.10 RTD Seattle advertises that the “DUKWs are likely the most unique craft you’ll see on the road or in the water.” This is true, as DUKWs are novelty vehicles.
3.11 In approximately 2005, RTD International sold DUKW No. 6 to RTD Seattle and retained licensing rights.
3.12 As a licensor, RTD International was entitled to, and received, five (5) percent of all gross ticket sales from all tours operated by RTD Seattle. RTD Seattle and RTD International formed an express and/or implied contract for the common purpose of manufacturing, selling, and using the DUKW vehicles for guided tours in the City of Seattle, and therefore were engaged in a joint venture with respect to the incident, claims, and damages alleged.
3.13 On or before October 2013, RTD International determined that the axle housings in their manufactured, refurbished, and modified DUKWs were dangerously defective.
3.14 On or about October 2013, RTD International issued a notice to purchasers, licensees and/or joint venture/enterprise partners of approximately 57 of its refurbished, manufactured and modified DUKW vehicles. The notice alerted the purchasers, licensees, and/or joint venture/enterprise partners to dangerous defects in the axle housing. The notice provided guidance on a modification to strengthen the axle housing to prevent fractures. The notice also recommended daily inspection, while acknowledging that “the visual detection of a failing axle housing is not possible.”
3.15 RTD International took no further action to ensure that purchasers, licensees and/or joint venture/enterprise partners, of its manufactured, refurbished, and modified DUKW products had in fact remedied the dangerous defects.
3.16 RTD International did not issue a recall of its defective and dangerous DUKW products.
3.17 According to the NTSB: The left front axle that failed on the accident vehicle had an earlier modification to the axle housing that had been recommended by RTD International but did not have an associated service bulletin.
3.18 The “earlier modification” to the axle housing was not the same recommendation outlined in the October 2013 service bulletin as a recommended fix for the DUKW.
3.19 At the time of the incident, RTD International and RTD Seattle were consciously acting together in a tortious manner, creating and allowing a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of harm to Plaintiff and others. RTD International and RTD Seattle were therefore acting in concert at the time of Plaintiffs’ injuries.
3.20 According to The Seattle Times story of September 29, 2015, RTD Seattle mechanic Dominick Anderson stated he had never seen the October 13, 2013 service bulletin.
3.21 RTD International issued a statement after the incident stating that it warned purchasers about potential failure of the front axle housing assembly on 57 vehicles in service throughout the country, and that it recommended specific inspections and repairs to reinforce the housing.
3.22 The NTSB has possession of the DUKW vehicle and its component parts. It is currently performing metallurgical examination of the axle components, review of the motor coach company’s onboard video systems, and other investigatory acts.
3.23 Following the crash, the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission (“WUTC”) suspended RTD Seattle’s operations pending a full examination into its fleet.
3.24 On December 15, 2015, the WUTC released its report identifying 442 safety-related violations, stating, “All of the violations discovered were avoidable and must be corrected immediately.”
3.25 RTD Seattle had implored the State to act with “urgency” so that the vehicles can be placed back in service and the company’s 130 employees sent back to work.
3.26 On December 21, 2015, WUTC allowed RTD Seattle to resume limited operation of nonstretch DUKW vehicles, provided that the extensive safety violations were addressed and remedied.
3.27 Following the release of the WUTC recommendations, the Mayor of Seattle issued a letter requesting the WUTC continue the full suspension of RTD Seattle operations until such time as the safety violations had been cured and other concerns were addressed.
3.28 RTD Seattle has informed the State that it will no longer use the SR 99 Aurora Bridge.
3.29 RTD Seattle informed the State it would be using the Fremont Bridge. This drew an objection from the City of Seattle.
3.30 RTD Seattle has informed the State that it will now use a separate driver and tour guide instead of combining the two functions in one employee.
3.31 RTD Seattle has now re-commenced its operations with its non-stretch vehicles which no longer travel upon the SR 99 Aurora Bridge.
3.32 The George Washington Bridge is a steel cantilever and truss structure that carries State Route 99 (Aurora Avenue North) over the west end of Lake Union. The bridge was
opened to traffic in 1932 and listed in the National Register of Historic Places in 1982. It is one of the tallest and longest spans in Seattle.
3.33 The bridge is 2,945 feet long, 70 feet wide and 167 feet above the water.
3.34 The bridge is a key north-south route that carries more than 80,000 vehicles each day into and out of Seattle. The bridge carries local and regional bus service to downtown Seattle and is also a significant freight corridor moving roughly 13,109,000 tons annually.
3.35 In 2007, the Federal Highway Administration National Bridge Inventory found the bridge to be “functionally obsolete.” An FO rating is applied if a bridge with an approach roadway alignment, deck geometry, or structural adequacy is rated at “3” or less (substandard). It was given a sufficiency rating of 55.2% and evaluated to be “better than minimum adequacy to tolerate being left in place as is.”
3.36 In 2005, concrete barriers were anchored onto the sidewalks to protect pedestrians. Those changes came after an incident in 1998, when a man fatally shot a Metro bus driver, whose bus then swerved across oncoming traffic and off the bridge. The bus landed in the front yard of an apartment building.
3.37 In 2011, a suicide-prevention fence was built. About 230 people had died jumping off the bridge up to that point.
3.38 In 2013, seismic retrofitting was completed on the bridge.
3.39 The bridge is operated and maintained by Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT) and City of Seattle Department of Transportation (SDOT). These governmental entities had the duty and responsibility to ensure that the roadway was safely constructed, maintained and repaired. Specifically, the governmental entities should have ensured a centerline barrier, adequacy of lane width, and appropriate designation of safe speeds.
3.40 The bridge has six lanes of travel, three northbound and three southbound. The lanes are notoriously narrow. They are believed to be the narrowest on any 6-lane bridge in the state.
3.41 While the modern standard lane width is 11 to 12 feet, on the Aurora Bridge, the center northbound lane is 9 feet, 3 inches wide. The other lanes on the bridge are 9 feet, 6 inches wide to 9 feet, 8 inches wide.
3.42 The width of Duck 6 is 8 feet, 2.4 inches, leaving just over a mere 6 inches of room within the bridge lanes on either side of the vehicle.
3.43 The width of the motor coach is 8 feet, 5 inches, leaving 4 inches of room within the bridge lanes on either side of the vehicle.
3.44 The lanes on the Aurora Bridge are narrower than any other lane on the SR 99 corridor. By contrast, current Federal standards call for arterials to have 11 to 12 foot lanes.
3.45 There are no shoulders available for vehicle emergency use on the bridge.
3.46 The narrow width of the lanes coupled with the absence of shoulders and effective speed limit, increased the risk of severe lane departure crashes on the bridge.
3.47 The narrow width of the lanes coupled with the absence of shoulders and effective speed limit, increased the risk that trucks and other large vehicles could affect the public safety by off-tracking into adjacent lanes.
3.48 WSDOT created this chart describing the lane width deficiency of the SR 99 corridor and in particular on the bridge.
3.49 WSDOT has determined that the narrow lane condition on the bridge contributes to the occurrence of accidents.
3.50 WSDOT has determined that traffic on the bridge typically travels at speeds exceeding the 40 mph posted speed limit by 10 to 20 mph.
3.51 There are centerline barriers to the north and south of the bridge span, but none on the bridge deck according to the WSDOT diagram:
3.52 WSDOT has long been aware that the bridge lacks a centerline barrier to separate opposing traffic typically traveling at speeds exceeding the speed limit.
3.53 The narrow width of the lanes coupled with the absence of shoulders, effective speed limit, and lack of a centerline barrier increased the risk of severe lane departure - median cross over crashes on the bridge.
3.54 In a 2003 study, WSDOT noted that the bridge’s narrow lanes posed risks, and that the lack of a centerline barrier to separate cars often traveling faster than the speed limit, “increases the risk for crossover/head on traffic accidents.”
3.55 In the ten years before this incident according to the Washington State Patrol (WSP):
a. There have been at least 142 crashes and 63 injuries on the bridge;
b. In 2013 there were five crashes caused when a vehicle crossed the center line;
c. In 2014 there were four crashes caused when a vehicle crossed the center line;
d. In 2015 there were six crashes caused when a vehicle crossed the center line –two of those occurred after this incident.
Partial Summary of Cross Over Centerline Crashes on Aurora Bridge
2/21/2013
11/3/2013
Cross over center line on bridge causing three car collision, and collision with bridge side rail and light pole
Cross over center line with one vehicle contacting both sides of bridge
11/21/2013 U-turn just off of bridge, crossing center line, causing two collisions
11/21/2013
12/8/2013
4/16/2014
Rear-end collision on bridge causing cross over center line and additional collisions
Multiple car collision in sb lanes, causing cross over to nb lane and an additional collision
Vehicle 1 made mid-span u-turn, causing collision between vehicles 1 and 2, and 1 was forced back over center line, stopping facing NB in SB lane
11/29/2014 Icy roads cause cross over center line and vehicle collision
12/3/2014 Cross over center line on bridge - cause mirrors of vehicles to collide
12/12/2014 Collision on sides of NB and SB vehicles
1/29/2015 Report mentions lanes of bridge being narrow, one vehicle was a waste management truck, mirrors of vehicles collided
2/1/2015 Vehicle one cross over center line, possibly in attempt to pass vehicle causing collision
3/24/2015 4 car collision that resulted in vehicle three crossing center line and head on collision in opposite lane
6/2/2015 Impact of two vehicle mirrors - one traveling SB one traveling NB
3.56 According to the Seattle Police Department (SPD), over the past ten years before this crash there were at least 219 crashes on the Aurora Bridge. The SPD records reveal more crashes than the WSP records (219 v. 142).
3.57 According to the SPD, in the nine months of 2015 before the crash there were 18 collisions on the bridge.
3.58 The SPD has not yet produced documentation indicating which of these crashes involves vehicles crossing the center line.
3.59 WSDOT classified the bridge as a High-Accident Corridor (HAC) for more than a decade before the crash.
3.60 The bridge is located within the third worst HAC in the State.
3.61 A Seattle Times analysis of federal records revealed that the bridge was the “tightest sixlane highway bridge in the state, some 4 ½ feet leaner than any of its peers.” In addition the article noted the bridge did not have a median divider like most comparable bridges in the state.
3.62 Because the existing lanes are barely wide enough to contain some vehicles, operators of buses and trucks often straddle multiple lanes and/or stay in the far curb lanes.
3.63 The governmental entities are aware that larger vehicles straddled multiple lanes on the bridge.
3.64 Brian Tracey, President of Ride the Ducks Seattle, says extraordinary measures were supposedly employed by its drivers on the bridge: “Normally when we go over the Aurora Bridge we put the flashers on and slow down…”
3.65 The governmental entity defendants accepted the route driven by RTD and its drivers despite knowing that the SR 99 Aurora Bridge was unsafe to be traveled upon by a DUKW due to the bridge’s narrow lane configuration, lack of a center median, and posted speed limit.
3.66 Despite knowledge that the bridge was unsafe in particular for large vehicles to travel, the governmental entity defendants sanctioned Ride the Ducks’ use of the bridge as part of the company’s novelty touring operations since 1997.
3.67 In March 2012, Brian Tracey submitted a City of Seattle land use application on behalf of one of his investment groups. The purpose was to create land, street, and water frontage improvements in order to build ramps into Lake Union for expanding RTD Seattle operations.
3.68 The City of Seattle was provided with a technical memorandum regarding Traffic Analysis on February 16, 2013. As of that date if not sooner, the City expressly knew that:
a. RTD Seattle owns 17 vehicles.
b. Tours originate from two locations – one operating year round and the second operating during peak season.
c. The number of tours varies greatly by season.
d. The month of September is considered peak season.
e. During peak season, tours sometimes leave in platoons.
f. During peak season nine DUKW vehicles depart per hour.
g. Vehicles are scheduled to enter Lake Union about 45 minutes after they leave the facility for a tour and then spend about 30 minutes on the lake.
3.69 The governmental entity defendants had the power and authority to regulate the charter tour routes taken by DUKW vehicles on roadways within city limits.
3.70 The governmental entity defendants did not discourage, place restrictions upon, nor prevent RTD Seattle from operating its DUKW vehicles on the dangerous SR 99 Aurora Bridge.
3.71 The governmental entity defendants have long been on notice of the dangers and threats to public safety posed by the dangerous conditions on the SR 99 Aurora Bridge.
3.72 Despite knowledge of the increased risk of danger and threat to public safety and innocent third persons who are travelling on the SR 99Aurora Bridge, the governmental entity defendants failed to use ordinary care to design and maintain the roadway in a reasonably safe condition for ordinary travel.
3.73 The SR 99 Aurora Bridge presented and continues to present an inherently dangerous condition for drivers and the public, and the governmental entity defendants have taken no corrective actions to protect drivers and the public from catastrophic collisions such as the collision at issue in this action.
3.74 If the SR 99 Aurora Bridge had adequate lane width and a centerline barrier, DUKW No 6 would not have crashed into the motor carrier.
3.75 If the SR 99 Aurora Bridge had adequate lane width and a centerline barrier, DUKW No 6 would not have penetrated the motor carrier.
3.76 If the two pedestrian walkways on the SR 99 Aurora Bridge had been reconfigured into one or placed under the bridge surface, there would have been additional room available to make the lanes wider and the bridge safer, and the crash would not have occurred.
3.77 If the SR 99 Aurora Bridge had not been available for use by large and over-sized vehicles, or if the governmental entity defendants imposed speed and travel restrictions on large and over-sized vehicles, the crash would not have occurred.
3.78 As a result of the collision, approximately 64 people were injured, five of whom were killed.
3.79 As a direct and proximate cause of the above-described catastrophic crash on the Aurora Bridge, the plaintiffs of the Dinh Plaintiff Group suffered severe injuries, trauma, disability, and general and special damages in amounts to be proven at the time of trial.
3A. Additional facts
3.80 Brian Tracey was the President/CEO of RTD Seattle during the time of the conduct described below.
3.81 In addition or in the alternative, Brian Tracey was acting in part or in full as an employee or agent of Tracey Entertainment, LLC during the time of the conduct described below.
3.82 Starting in at least 2013, as the hands on CEO/President of RTD Seattle, Mr. Tracey knew or should have known that most all service and maintenance bulletins issued by RTD International were not being performed, that there were too few mechanics and too few resources to perform adequate maintenance during tour season, and that the underperformance of the maintenance posed a significant safety risk to captains, tour passengers, and the public.
3.83 Mr. Tracey knew or should have known of the serious safety risk described in the preceding paragraph, from meetings and communications with the mechanic leadership team, his Operations Manager, General Manager and others. RTD Seattle mechanics repeatedly expressed urgency and extreme concern over what they perceived as ongoing safety hazards, and repeatedly requested a higher maintenance budget just to keep up with routine maintenance of the duck vehicles.
3.84 Mr. Tracey as CEO/President of RTD Seattle, failed to exercise ordinary care to meet the company’s duties to passengers and the public.
3.85 Mr. Tracey as CEO/President of RTD Seattle failed to exercise extraordinary care to meet the company’s common carrier duties to passengers and the public.
3.86 Mr Tracey failed to hire sufficient numbers of qualified mechanics and other maintenance personnel to ensure the safety of the duck vehicles.
3.87 This understaffing of the maintenance department was in part to avoid downtime of vehicles that would result in missed tours and therefore missed revenues.
3.88 Mr. Tracey fostered a reactive culture within the maintenance department which was described as: once it breaks then we will fix it.
3.89 RTD Seattle is a closely-held business that relies heavily on the support and involvement of its principal shareholders.
3.90 Mr. Tracey acted on behalf and with the input of the other RTD Seattle owners and Board of Directors, namely, Steve Burnstead, Joyce Ismon, Kevin Fortun, and Robert Dunlop, in making top level operating decisions by and on behalf of RTD Seattle.
3.91 The Board of Directors and owners were specifically required to review and approve an annual operating budget and capital budget for each year. The resulting cash flow statement was intended to help “discuss the need to preserve cash and the ability to make distributions” to owners.
3.92 Mr. Tracey negligently ran the company in a manner that sacrificed safety in order to maximize profit for the benefit of the board member owners of the company.
3.93 Mr. Tracey hired people with little to no applicable work experience to hold key safety positions within RTD Seattle.
3.94 The hiring of inexperienced key safety staff was driven by the relatively low salaries offered by Mr. Tracey.
3.95 Ryan Johnson was Director of Operations for RTD Seattle. Mr. Johnson was studying geology in college when he was hired to work in the ticket booth the summer of 2003.
a. Within a few months he was promoted to customer service manager.
b. In 2005 he started working on the operations side in addition to his customer service manager role.
c. In 2007 he helped clean in the maintenance department in order to obtain a further promotion. He had no experience with mechanics and did no actual mechanical work. He was promoted to operations manager around this time.
d. By 2008 in his role as operations manager he was responsible for organizing training, organizing personnel, tour dispatch, scheduling, captain training and holding certain courses.
e. His duties included working with the Director of Safety in managing the Safety Management System on behalf of the company; overseeing the training of captains and safety sensitive staff; managing and directing the director of safety and captain staff; and partnering with the fleet maintenance manager, general manager and officer personnel to ensure all company goals were accomplished.
3.96 Robert Krauthamer was the Director of Safety for RTD Seattle. Mr. Krauthamer graduated from college with a fine arts degree and was a long time television news editor, held various video production jobs, and worked in a few failed startups before being hired on as a duck captain by RTD Seattle between 2010 and 2012. He returned to the company in 2015 to become its Safety Manager.
f. After leaving RTD Seattle in 2012 he held a number of miscellaneous jobs including giving sailing lessons, teaching at a Community Center, and working in sales.
g. He had made films about safety training though he did not have input into the safety protocols shown in the films.
h. He was one of 200 volunteers in the coast guard auxiliary and once every few months taught the course that helped residents obtain their boater safety card.
i. He had never created a safety manual.
j. When he was hired as Safety Director RTD Seattle did not send him to a formal safety training course.
k. His job duties included safety oversight management for all employees of RTD Seattle.
l. Because he had no training or experience in maintenance, he delegated safety of the maintenance department to Joe Hatten, the maintenance supervisor.
3.97 Neither the Operations Manager nor Safety Director for RTD Seattle had adequate training or experience to hold their positions.
3.98 Tracey knew and should have known that a business serving over 300,000 customers per year and involving over 11,000 duck vehicle excursions on city and state roadways, highways, and waterways, should have employed key management staff who were adequately trained and experienced in safety.
3.99 Mr. Tracey was motivated by maximizing profits to benefit the board member owners regardless of the safety of the operation for employees, patrons, and the public.
3.100 The year before the crash, RTD Seattle reported seven figure increases in income over the past several years. This was accomplished by proactively using media coverage and social media to fill seats coupled with monitoring of its spending habits. The sole focus of the board report was financial gains and status with no mention made of safety. Net profits exceeded the maintenance budget about tenfold.
3.101 The RTD Seattle Fleet Maintenance Manager regularly complained that the maintenance department was understaffed and underfunded to such a degree that safety was impacted. Mr. Tracey was aware of these concerns and for the most part ignored them in order to keep costs low and profits high.
3.102 Mr. Tracey knew or should have known that according to the Operations Manager as of December of 2013 RTD Seattle had not done a large majority of the RTD International Service Bulletins (including the October 2013 service bulletin on point in this case) because due to work load they went onto the back burner.
3.103 In or around January 2015, Tracey conducted a meeting with the maintenance supervisors and Operations Manager wherein maintenance was informed that by not having duck vehicles running full time $317,000 in revenue was lost in 2014.
3.104 Mr. Tracey created an environment where the maintenance department was being blamed for revenue loss if duck vehicles were not in continuous operation.
3.105 Mr. Tracey’s purpose in blaming the maintenance department for financial losses was to motivate the managers to keep duck vehicles in service. This led to a culture where vehicles were not properly inspected and maintained before being loaded with passengers and sent onto the streets and waterways of Seattle. This culture was enabled by the
malleability of the Director of Operations and Safety Officer who deferred to Tracey even when his decisions were in conflict with their safety duties.
3.106 Instead of using company profits to adequately fund maintenance and safety of RTD Seattle, Mr. Tracey turned operating capital into distributable profits for the board member owners.
4 Liability
4.1 RTD International is a product manufacturer and product seller within the meaning of RCW 7.72 et seq.
4.2 RTD International manufactured or remanufactured DUKW No. 6, the relevant product, which was not reasonably safe in construction. When the product left the RTD International manufacturing plant, it deviated in a material way from the design specifications or performance standards of the manufacturer, or deviated in a material way from otherwise identical units of the same product line. To wit, DUKW No. 6 had dangerous defects in the axle housing, resulting in fractures and other hazardous defects, that deviated from specifications, standards, and other products manufactured or remanufactured by RTD International.
4.3 RTD International is strictly liable for all damages proximately caused by the fact that DUKW No. 6 was not reasonably safe in construction. RCW 7.72.030.
4.4
RTD International is liable for Plaintiffs’ damages because DUKW No. 6 was not reasonably safe as designed. At the time of manufacture or remanufacture, the likelihood that the product would cause the Plaintiffs’ harm or similar harms, and the seriousness of those harms, outweighed the burden on RTD International to design a product that would have prevented those harms and the adverse effect that an alternative design that was
4.5
4.6
practical and feasible would have on the usefulness of the product. RCW 7.72.030.
RTD International is liable for Plaintiffs’ damages under RCW 7.72.030(1)(b) because DUKW No. 6 was not reasonably safe because adequate warnings or instructions were not provided with DUKW No. 6 to RTD Seattle regarding maintenance and repair of the product, and the likelihood that the product would cause Plaintiffs’ harm or similar harms, and the seriousness of those harms, rendered the warnings or instructions of the manufacturer inadequate..
RTD International, is liable for negligence under RCW 7.72.030(1)(c) and the failure to properly and adequately warn RTD Seattle after the product was manufactured about the dangerous defects in DUKW No. 6 that caused the above-described crash and injuries, of which RTD International was aware or reasonably should have been aware.
4.7 RTD International was negligent in failing to comply and assure compliance with the safety standards of WAC 480-30-221, including but not limited to the requirement that operators must “Maintain all motor vehicles in a safe and sanitary condition” and “Ensure that vehicles are free of defects likely to result in an accident or breakdown.”
4.8 RTD Seattle is vicariously liable for the negligent acts and omissions of its employees and agents under the doctrine of respondeat superior
4.9 RTD International is vicariously liable for the negligent acts and omissions of RTD Seattle because the Ride the Duck Defendants were engaged in a joint venture, and the tortious acts and omissions described above were within the scope of the joint venture.
4.10 RTD Seattle was negligent in many respects, including but not limited to: a) failing to properly inspect, maintain, and repair DUKW No. 6; b) failing to use reasonable care to detect hazardous defects in DUKW No. 6; c) failing to use reasonable care to warn and
remedy those defects; d) failing to address the 2013 notice issued by RTD International; e) operating an unsafe, dangerous and defective vehicle on a state roadway; f) requiring its drivers to have the dual function of both operating a vehicle and entertaining its passengers; g) creating a travel route that included utilization of SR 99 Aurora bridge despite having actual or constructive knowledge that the bridge had an inadequate lane width to accommodate a DUKW safely as well as no center median; h) failing to properly train and supervise its mechanics and drivers; i) endangering the public safety by operating a modified WWII vehicle at highway speeds that were excessive given the physical dimensions, capacities, and characteristics of a DUKW and the SR 99 Aurora Bridge, and j) violating relevant provisions of WAC 480-30-221, including but not limited to the requirement that operators must “Maintain all motor vehicles in a safe and sanitary condition” and “Ensure that vehicles are free of defects likely to result in an accident or breakdown.”
4.11 RTD Seattle was and is a common carrier as that term is defined pursuant to Washington law.
4.12 A common carrier in Washington is held to the highest degree of care for the safety of its passengers.
4.13 RTD Seattle failed to provide to the passenger Plaintiffs the highest degree of care for Plaintiffs’ safety.
4.14 RTD Seattle and RTD International are liable to the DUKW passenger Plaintiffs because the design, manufacture, and operation of the DUKW vehicles as constructed exposed Plaintiffs and others to an unreasonable risk of enhanced injury. The DUKW vehicles were not and are not crashworthy for many reasons, including, but not limited to,
Defendants’ failure to install passenger safety belts, the failure to install reasonably safe and stable seating, and the failure to otherwise protect against the risk of full or partial ejection in a vehicle designed without windows. RTD International is strictly liable for such design defects.
4.15 Tracey was negligent in the management and operation of RTD Seattle. He was aware that Safety and Maintenance Bulletins were not being performed and that mechanics did not have the time or resources to perform adequate maintenance. He was also aware of the resulting risk of serious harm to the captains, passengers, and the public. Tracey nevertheless failed to use reasonable care to protect against the foreseeable dangers of operating WWII vehicles for thousands of miles a year on the public roads of the State and City.
4.16 Tracey sacrificed the enhanced duty of safety owed to customers and the impacted public, instead focusing on maximizing profit for the board member owners of the company. Tracey diverted operating capital which should have been used to adequately fund the maintenance department and otherwise address important safety issues, instead declaring such funds as profits and distributing them to the board member owners. This negligence was a proximate cause of the failures of RTD Seattle described in the preceding paragraph.
4.17 Tracey Entertainment Associates, LLC is vicariously liable for the negligent acts and omissions of its employees and agents under the doctrine of respondeat superior
4.18 The governmental entity defendants had and have a duty to exercise ordinary care in the design, maintenance, and operation of their roadways such that they are reasonably safe for ordinary travel
4.19 The governmental entity defendants failed to design, maintain, and operate the SR 99 Aurora Bridge in a condition that was reasonably safe for ordinary travel
4.20 The governmental entity defendants failed to take any corrective action to protect drivers and the public from the inherently dangerous conditions on the SR 99 Aurora Bridge.
4.21 Prior to the incident, the governmental entity defendants had received reports of a history of incidents and collisions relating to the inadequate lane width, lack of median barrier, and speed issues on the SR 99 Aurora Bridge. These conditions rendered the bridge unsafe for ordinary use, unsafe for tourist novelty vehicle use, and constituted a public nuisance.
4.22 Because of the long history of incidents on the SR 99 Aurora Bridge, the police reports filed regarding these incidents, the studies performed and resulting recommendations from the governmental entities themselves, the governmental entity defendants had sufficient notice that the SR 99 Aurora Bridge was unsafe for ordinary use, unsafe for tourist novelty vehicle use, and had sufficient and reasonable opportunity to correct these hazardous and unsafe conditions.
4.23 In spite of the history of deficiencies and dangers existing on the SR 99 Aurora Bridge, Defendants have taken no action to correct the conditions stemming from inadequate lane width, lack of median barrier, and/or appropriate posted speed.
4.24 The failure of the governmental entity defendants to provide a reasonably safe roadway at the SR 99 Aurora Bridge constituted tortious conduct.
4.25 The tortious conduct of all Defendants, as described above, was the proximate cause of the subject incident, the injuries to Plaintiffs, and their resulting losses.
4.26 Ride the Ducks of Seattle, LLC, Ride the Ducks International, LLC, Tracey Entertainment Associates, LLC, and Brian and Jane Doe Tracey are jointly and severally liable because they were acting in concert when they caused Plaintiffs’ damages.
4.27 The governmental entity Defendants are jointly and severally liable because their acts combined with the Ride the Duck Defendants actions to also proximately caused the incident, and because Plaintiff is not at fault for causing the incident.
5
Damages
5.1 As a direct and proximate result of the above acts, omissions, and other conduct of Defendants, Plaintiffs have suffered and continue to suffer permanent physical injuries, disability, disfigurement, pain and suffering, emotional trauma, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of consortium, all damages as provided under RCW 4.20.010, RCW 4.20.020, RCW 4.20.046 and RCW 4.20.060 and other general damages in an amount to be proven at the time of trial.
5.2 As a direct and proximate result of the above acts, omissions, and other conduct of Defendants, Plaintiffs have been required to seek various medical treatments and will continue to require medical treatments in the future, as well as other special damages in amounts to be proven at the time of trial. Such damages include, but are not limited to, wage loss, lost earning capacity, caregiver expenses, and increased educational expenses.
5.3 Although Washington has the most significant relationship to the conduct underlying the negligence and products liability claims, RTD International committed conduct in its state of citizenship, Missouri, that was outrageous because of RTD International’s reckless indifference to the rights of others, including the plaintiff in this case, and Missouri possesses the interest in punishing and deterring such conduct. Accordingly,
RTD International is liable for punitive damages under Missouri law. Singh v. Edwards Lifesciences Corp., 151 Wn. App. 137, 210 P.3d 337 (2009).
5.4 In addition or in the alternative, RTD International committed acts of willful misconduct or wantonness in its other state of citizenship, Georgia, and Georgia possesses the interest in punishing and deterring such conduct. Accordingly, RTD International is liable for punitive damages under Georgia law. Singh v. Edwards Lifesciences Corp., 151 Wn. App. 137, 210 P.3d 337 (2009).
5.5 In addition, because RTD Seattle is in a joint venture in concert with RTD International, RTD Seattle is liable for punitive damages under Missouri and Georgia law.
5.6 Plaintiffs have incurred other damages to be proven at the time of trial.
6 Prayer for Relief
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against Defendants, jointly and severally as follows:
6.1. For special and general damages in amounts to be proven at trial;
6.2. For punitive damages against Defendant Ride the Duck International under Missouri and/or Georgia law;
6.3. An order requiring the governmental entity Defendants to abate this public nuisance by installing a median barrier on the SR 99 bridge;
6.4. An order requiring the governmental entity Defendants to abate this public nuisance by reconfiguring the SR 99 bridge to increase lane width to a reasonable and acceptable safe configuration;
6.5. For costs and disbursements;
6.6. For statutory attorney fees;
6.7. If Defendants bring any frivolous or unfounded defenses, for attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to RCW 4.84.185 and/or Rule 11 of the Superior Court Civil Rules;
6.8. For statutory interest on the judgment from the date judgment is entered until paid in full;
6.9. For prejudgment interest on the special damages;
6.10. For prejudgment interest on liquidated damages; and
6.11. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and equitable.
DATED this 18th day of August, 2017.
STRITMATTER KESSLER WHELAN KOEHLER MOORE KAHLER
/s/ Karen K. Koehler
Karen K. Koehler, WSBA #15325
Andrew Ackley, WSBA #41752 Counsel for Plaintiffs
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on August 18, 2017 I delivered a copy of the document to which this certification is attached for delivery to all counsel of record via electronic filing and/or email.
Patricia Buchanan
Duncan Fobes
Kasper Sorensen
Nicholas A. Carlson
Patterson Buchanan Fobes & Leitch, Inc, PS 2112 Third Ave Suite 500
Seattle, WA 98121
Counsel for Defendant Ride the Ducks Seattle pkb@pattersonbuchanan.com dkf@pattersonbuchanan.com kxs@pattersonbuchanan.com nac@pattersonbuchanan.com jrf@pattersonbuchanan.com jds@pattersonbuchanan.com klo@pattersonbuchanan.com aka@pattersonbuchanan.com ktk@pattersonbuchanan.com hyk@pattersonbuchanan.com tns@pattersonbuchanan.com lmb@pattersonbuchanan.com amm@pattersonbuchanan.com amm@pattersonbuchanan.com jpl@pattersonbuchanan.com jsm@pattersonbuchanan.com ali@pattersonbuchanan.com
Scott Wakefield
Dan Kirkpatrick
Fallon McKinley & Wakefield, PLLC 1111 Third Ave Suite 2400 Seattle, WA 98101
Counsel for Defendant Ride the Ducks International swakefield@fmwlegal.com dkirkpatrick@fmwlegal.com ahunt@fmwlegal.com jmonroe@fmwlegal.com sandy@fmwlegal.com cerickson@fmwlegal.com kim@fmwlegal.com
Steve Puz
Attorney General Of Washington Torts Division 7141 Cleanwater Drive SW PO Box 40126 Olympia, WA 98504-0126
Counsel for Defendant State of Washington SteveP@atg.wa.gov; PatriciaT2@atg.wa.gov;
Robert Tad Seder
Vanessa Lee
Seattle City Attorney’s Office 701 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2050 Seattle, WA 98104
Counsel for Defendant City of Seattle Tad.Seder@seattle.gov Vanessa.Lee@seattle.gov anne@elliott@seattle.gov tamara.stafford@seattle.gov belen.johnson@seattle.gov autumn.derrow@seattle.gov Scott.Kennedy@seattle.gov Kelly.Nakata@seattle.gov
Lawrence M. Kahn
Lawrence Kahn Law Group, PS 135 Lake Street, Suite 265 Kirkland, WA 98033
Counsel for Bishop lmk@lklegal.com; staff@lklegal.com; naomi@lklegal.com;
Brian Sullivan
Sullivan Law Group, PLLC 3209 Rockefeller Ave Everett, WA 98201-4316
Counsel for Bishop brian@sullivanpllc.com; Carissa@sullivanpllc.com
RichardF@atg.wa.gov; TrishJ@atg.wa.gov; AmandaC@atg.wa.gov;
Friedman Rubin
Michael N. White, WSBA NO. 28284
Counsel for:
Becker, Marva & Strassman, Catherine
KCSC Cause No.: 16-2-20242-0 mike@michaelwhitelaw.com AGust@friedmanrubin.com
Adler Giersch Ps
Arthur D. Leritz, WSBA NO. 29344
Counsel for: Emery, Jennifer KCSC Cause No.: 15-2-28905-5 mdcarter@adlergiersch.com aleritz@adlergiersch.com
Ressler & Tesh
Timothy R. Tesh, WSBA NO. 28249
Allen M. Ressler, WSBA NO. 5330
Counsel for: Fellores Arlette & Justin KCSC Cause No.: 1 6-2-05149-9 tim@resslertesh.com allen@resslertesh.com jon@resslertesh.com jonathan@resslertesh.com khanh@resslertesh.com
Adler Giersch Ps
Arthur D. Leritz, WSBA NO. 29344
Counsel for: Johnson, Sarah
KCSC Cause No.: 16-2-231 07-1 mdcarter@adlergiersch.com aleritz@adlergiersch.com
Lee & Lee PS
Nelson Lee, WSBA NO. 23590
Risa D. Woo, WSBA NO. 35411
Bethany C. Mito, WSBA NO. 42918
Counsel for: Oyama, Risa
KCSC Cause No.: 16-2-1 071-2-5 Nelson.lee@leeandleelaw.com Risa.woo@leeandleelaw.com
Bradley G. Davis Law Office Pllc
Bradley D. Davis, WSBA NO. 20764
Meredith A. Sawyer, WSBA NO. 33793
Counsel for:
Bramley Graham & Barbara KCSC Cause No.: 16-2-13088-7 brad@bdavislaw.com Meredith@bdavislaw.com Alyta@BDavisLaw.com meeghan@bdavislaw.com
Offices Of Brian H. Krikorian Pllc
Brian H. Krikorian, WSBA NO. 27861 And
Bradley Johnson Attorneys
Bradley Johnson, WSBA NO. 22898
Counsel for: Gesner, Susan & Timothy
KCSC Cause No.: 16-2-26078-1 bhkrik@bhklaw.com brad@bjattorneys.com
Lee & Lee PS
Nelson Lee, WSBA NO. 23590
Risa D. Woo, WSBA NO. 35411
Bethany C. Mito, WSBA NO. 42918
Counsel for: Iida, Yuki KCSC Cause No.: 16-2-1 071 I -7 Nelson.lee@leeandleelaw.com Risa.woo@leeandleelaw.com Bethany.lee@leeandleelaw.com d.sho.ly@leeandleelaw.com
Oseran Hahn Ps
Paul A. Spencer, WSBA NO. 19511
Counsel for: Joshua, Kenny KCSC Cause No.: 16-2-23103-9 pspencer@ohswlaw.com
Law Offices Of Jongwon Yi LLC
Jongwon Yi, WSBA NO. 31470
Counsel for:
Park, Jae Young, et al. KCSC Cause No.: 16-2-26648-7 jy@jyilaw.com
Bethany.lee@leeandleelaw.com d.sho.ly@leeandleelaw.com
Coluccio Law
Kevin Coluccio, WSBA NO. 16245 AND Evergreen Personal Injury COUNSEL
Stephen L. Bulzomi WSBA NO. 15187
Counsel for:
Reni, Ingerborg & Daniele
KCSC Cause No.: 16-2-29684-0 kc@coluccio-law.com sbulzomi@epic-law.com
Phillips Law Group Pllc
John W. Phillips, WSBA NO. 12185
Michael J. Madderra, WSBA NO. 48169 AND
Corrie Yackulick Law Firm Pllc
Corrie J. Yackulic, WSBA NO. 16063
Counsel for:
Wang Qian (Son g, Ru njie: Xia, Guirong)
KCSC Cause No.: 16-2-0792 1-1 jphillips@jphillipslaw.com mmadderra@jphillipslaw.com kharrison@jphillipslaw.com corrie@cjylaw.com patricia@cjylaw.com clerk@cjylaw.com
Law Offices Of James S. Rogers
James S. Rogers, WSBA NO. 5335
Cheryl L. Snow, WSBA NO. 26757
Counsel for: Yates, Jeremy (Sato)
KCSC Cause No.: 16-2-13906-0 jsr@jsrogerslaw.com csnow@jsrogerslaw.com leehwa@jsrogerslaw.com Justin@jsrogerslaw.com
DATED this 18th day of August, 2017.
Peterson Wampold Rosato Luna Knopp
Michael S. Wampold, WSBA NO. 26053
Felix G. Luna, WSBA NO. 27087
Leonard Feldman, WSBA NO. 20961
wampold@pwrlk.com luna@pwrlk.com Feldman@pwrlk.com
Pfau Cochran Vertetis Amala
Darrell L. Cochran, WSBA NO. 22851
Counsel for: West, Rebecca, et al.
KCSC Cause No.: 16-2-06389-6\ Darrell@pcvalaw.com kevin@pcvalaw.com
Hermann Scholbe
Charles Hermann, WSBA NO. 6173
Preet Kode, WSBA No. 45424
Crystal R. Lloyd, WSBA NO. 46072
Counsel for: Yoon Na Ra
KCSC Cause No.: 15-2-24364-1 charles@hslawfirm.com Preet@HSLawFirm.com crystal@hslawfirm.com
STRITMATTER KESSLER WHELAN KOEHLER MOORE KAHLER
/s/ Jesica A. McClure
Jesica A. McClure, Paralegal