Const. art. IV, § 1 ............................................................................................ 12

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 742, 769, 466 P.3d 213 (2020) (parties lacked standing where constitutional provisions at issue did not apply to them). Article IV is clear that “[t]he judicial power” is “vested” in the “courts,” not private citizens. Const. art. 4, § 1. Accordingly, the courts have exclusive control over activities that preserve the judicial function. See, e.g., WSBA v. State, 125 Wn.2d 901, 909, 890 P.2d 1047 (1995) (“regulat[ing] court-related functions, including the administration of the Bar Association”); Juvenile Director, 87 Wn.2d at 245-46 (listing other inherent judicial powers). So, to the extent the inherent power to compel judicial funding exists, it necessarily inheres solely in the courts, as its very “purpose is to preserve the efficient and expeditious administration of Justice.” Juvenile Director, 87 Wn.2d at 245 (cleaned up). Furthermore, it is a fundamental separation-of-powers principle that the “core” functions and inherent powers of one branch “cannot be delegated” to another branch or entity. State v. Williams, 97 Wn. App. 257, 264, 983 P.2d 687 (1999). The Washington Supreme Court has held that “the inherent power of the judiciary to require payment of necessary funds for the efficient administration of justice”—the very power Plaintiffs seek to invoke—is nondelegable. Zylstra v. Piva, 85 Wn.2d 743, 749, 539 P.2d 823 (1975). “The court cannot . . . relinquish either its power or its obligation to keep its own house in order” through “its inherent power to control and administer its functions.”13 Id. at 748; cf. Port of

13 That principle distinguishes this case from precedents permitting private citizens to raise separation-of-powers challenges to “an unconstitutional encroachment” on a branch’s powers. State v. Rice, 174 Wn.2d 884, 896, 279 P.3d 849 (2012). In those cases, the plaintiff was merely objecting to the encroachment. Here, Plaintiffs are improperly seeking to exercise the inherent judicial power,

MOTION TO DISMISS Case No. 21-2-06462-7 SEA 15

Perkins Coie LLP 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900 Seattle, Washington 98101-3099 Phone: 206.359.8000 Fax: 206.359.9000

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 Tacoma v. Parosa, 52 Wn.2d 181, 184, 324 P.2d 438 (1958) (invalidating delegation of legislative power to private party). The nondelegation principle makes sense, because private plaintiffs do not bear the institutional costs of exercising the inherent judicial power and therefore should not be permitted to wield it. As the Washington Supreme Court has cautioned, compelling funding “outside the normal political process c[an] have an adverse effect on working relations between other branches of government and weaken public support for the judiciary.” Juvenile Director, 87 Wn.2d at 247-48. “By its nature, litigation based on inherent judicial power to finance its own functions ignores the political allocation of available monetary resources by representatives of the people elected in a carefully monitored process.” Id. at 248. Accordingly, courts should be circumspect in invoking their power to compel funding, and if they do so at all, must direct it “at local as distinguished from state budget authorities,” and “usually for marginal increases in personnel or equipment shown to have been previously required.” Id. at 248 n.3. Courts’ “inherent power is to be exercised only when established methods fail or when an emergency arises.” Id. at 250. Plaintiffs’ complaint runs headlong into Juvenile Director’s warnings. They ask this Court to order funding for everything from “[h]elp for self-represented persons” to unspecified “[p]rograms to address the unique justice needs” of various “vulnerable populations.” FAC p. 49 ¶ 5.d, f. The relief they seek is not “local” or for “marginal increases,” nor is it tied to the “basic needs of the[] courts,”

which itself encroaches on the judicial branch’s authority—and that authority, in turn, represents a rare exception to separation-of-powers principles.

MOTION TO DISMISS Case No. 21-2-06462-7 SEA 16

Perkins Coie LLP 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900 Seattle, Washington 98101-3099 Phone: 206.359.8000 Fax: 206.359.9000

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 as defined in the relevant case law. Juvenile Director, 872 Wn.2d at 245, 247 n.3.

What’s more, Plaintiffs’ attempt to have this Court compel statewide judicial funding contravenes the Washington Supreme Court’s determination last year that it would be inappropriate to exercise its “inherent authority” to compel funding in a manner that would “impact counties across the entire state.” Rocha, 195 Wn.2d at 431.

No case has recognized a private plaintiff’s right to demand more funding for the judiciary. Indeed, the limited precedent addressing Juvenile Director confirms that the court “itself” must exercise the power “[o]n its own behalf.”14

Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King County v. State, 90 Wn.2d 476, 528, 585 P.2d 71

(1978). In Seattle School District, the Washington Supreme Court held that the “high standard” set by Juvenile Director applies in cases “dealing with Court funding” and “the financial needs of the judiciary,” and that a court invoking it must meet that standard “[o]n its own behalf.” Id. Other cases likewise reflect that inherent judicial power is exercised, if at all, by the judiciary itself. See, e.g., Rocha, 195 Wn.2d at 431-32 (declining to exercise inherent power); Bennion, Van Camp, Hagen & Ruhl v. Kassler Escrow, 96 Wn.2d 443, 452, 635 P.2d 730 (1981) (describing inherent judicial power as “be[ing] exercised by the branch . . . itself” (cleaned up)); State v. Perala, 132 Wn. App. 98, 118-19, 130 P.3d 852 (2006) (because trial courts are “charged with upholding” indigent criminal defendants’

14 The one decision to address the specific issue in this case—whether private plaintiffs have standing to seek court funding—is unpublished and issued prior to 2013. Woolery v. State, 171 Wn. App. 1016, 2012 WL 5347825, at *7 & n.22 (Oct. 24, 2012) (unpublished). The State therefore does not rely on it. See GR 14.1(a).

MOTION TO DISMISS Case No. 21-2-06462-7 SEA 17

Perkins Coie LLP 1201 Third Avenue, Suite 4900 Seattle, Washington 98101-3099 Phone: 206.359.8000 Fax: 206.359.9000