CABLE CONFLICTS A Subsea

Cold War

BY JOHN TIBBLES

Subsea cables are now recognised as a critical part of the internet and the ‘cloud,’ i.e., virtually all human communication. Recognition has led to them becoming politicised with concerns expressed about their security and the consequences of interruptions or the risks of interception.

At the time of writing subsea systems are not just politicised but tools and targets of geopolitical and even military conflict. Media frenzy about cutting cables and stealing the data they carry has increased pressure on politicians to ‘do something.’

Personally, I think this is sad. In the 1970s I saw how telecom networks brought countries and peoples together and shrank the world despite cold-war era geopolitics. It wouldn’t be stretching the truth too much to suggest that from 2023 cable strategies might end up pushing people and societies further apart.

HOW DID WE GET HERE?

Cutting cables is nothing new; telegraph cables were cut as part of wartime strategies in WW1 and the Spanish America war. But telegrams were not integral to all international commerce trade and social interaction to the extent that the internet is today.

From the 1920s through to almost the end of the century cables were a secure means of communication. The INTELSAT satellite era which arrived in the early 1970s used capacity and flexibility to eclipse cable economics, but they still used readily interceptable radio wave technology.

The Millennium: cables are again the dominant factor in global telecoms. The application of high-speed optical technology radically increased capacity that could not readily be intercepted, except at landing stations. The Cold War was over, ushering in a relatively stable and cooperative era in international relations. Of course, efforts were still underway to intercept traffic carried by cables - it was very secret and didn’t make the news.

Twenty years on instability reigns again. A new form of economic superpower conflict developed re-awakening mistrust. In the telecom’s world, it began with the 5G controversy. The idea that equipment sourced from a potentially hostile power could control or monitor networks in distant countries. Leaks to the media resulted in stories of huge-scale interception of subsea traffic by traditional Western allies arousing concerns that the cable network could be vulnerable to interception and interruption in the event of a new major conflict. In 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine and National Security is again front and centre. In a cyberspace-era conflict the components of the internet and the cloud become potential weapons - none more so than subsea cables.

HOW VULNERABLE ARE SUBSEA CABLES?

Interruption And Deterrence

Cables are hard to find in the deep oceans; they may be thousands of kilometres long but just a couple of centi- metres in diameter. Closer to shore the task is easier with published maps and landing station locations. However, aggressor vessels are vulnerable close inshore being easy to detect and warned off. In ‘times of heightened tension’ one would hope that some serious military and intelligence tasks would be to intercept such submersible or surface vessels.

Increased risk occurs in areas where there is a significant concentration of cables, such as:

• The inshore areas of the North Atlantic

• The Red Sea, even before Sudan erupted

• Singapore and the Malacca Strait

• South China Sea.

Is it possible to deploy deterrence vessels to all such locations, and will there be more no-go areas?

On land traditional cable stations have largely disappeared but it is not difficult to trace the land routes of the cable from shore to a data centre and duct routes are vulnerable to any kind of special forces or embedded terrorist intervention.

CYBER-ATTACKS - COMPROMISING THE NOCS

A more recent threat might not be to the cable itself but to attacking it through its control systems -the NOCs. Modern technology allows systems to be controlled remotely, often very remotely. In some cases, this is to outsource this activity as a cost-saving or operational measure. While physical assault on such NOCs is possible, locating them is harder as they can be in countries not even served by the system they manage. A more realistic threat is ‘hacking’ - i.e., a cyber-attack which is entirely conceivable since remote NOCs are connected via the internet.

GEOGRAPHIC RISK - LATENCY OR SECURITY

Any aggressive action against systems might well focus on these high-risk areas due to the proliferation of ‘targets.’ Geography limits the mitigation of these risks in these regions and alternative routes can add hundreds or even thousands of kilometres of route length resulting in increased costs and perhaps more importantly increased latency. Difficult choices persist!

Interception

The alternative to interrupting/cutting subsea systems is intercepting them to steal data. Deliberate cutting of one cable might not be that significant but cutting a large number would be harder. Also unintended consequences could damage the aggressor, inability to trade or lack of access to financial markets. Additionally, if you can intercept a cable for intelligence purposes why cut it if you can decipher what it carries?

Subsea cables have been successfully intercepted - the best-known example being the US Navy’s Ivy Bells proj- ect during the Cold War. Tapping into a coaxial cable was possible, but tapping into an 18 Terabit data stream (just one of many pairs in modern subsea cable) presents the aggressor with a vast amount of data much of which has encryption overlaid on the basic optical data stream.

What you do with all that data and how you do it without the cable operator knowing is a massive challenge. The easiest way to undertake this is at a CLS and it is widely known that many countries undertake this form of interception and analysis. However, its value can be limited because the majority of the data relates to the home country of location ‘espionage target’ and communications interruption ‘tapping’ can have complex legal and political implications.

GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION: THE NEED TO ‘DO SOMETHING’

These potential threats lead initially to identifying a clear need for diversity on a geographic as well as network architecture. In the last two years, geopolitical issues have risen to the top of the security tree. This has resulted in regulators or other government agencies in some countries persuading or mandating their major subsea system users to avoid cables landing in specified countries or being manufactured by certain parties. Until recently that meant users might choose one system over another for other than purely economic reasons for example to avoid the perceived risk of interception or areas of high risk, e.g., the Red Sea.

This started with demands from the USA to remove Huawei 5G equipment from major networks in the US and, significantly, its allies. This raised concerns over what original equipment manufacturers could embed in systems that might impair a nation’s security. At the same time, it was becoming clear that major US users, (by definition the OTT group who are the dominant voices in subsea) would not use systems manufactured by or operationally controlled by Chinese companies or parties seen as close to China - Hong Kong being the largest victim.

By far the most direct intervention of recent years saw the US government persuade the participants in the SEMEWE 6 cable system - (3500 miles from the USA) to overturn their original choice of supplier in favour of US-owned SubCom. This involved a combination of (subsidised) lower pricing and political pressure on the consortium members. A major escalation.

China, the target of this action, also has global political influence, especially in the developing world. It has rapidly growing and competitive content mass, potential AI deployment as well as the technical capability to manufacture subsea systems. Inevitably China reacted by announcing a new Chinese manufactured system over much the same path. SEMEWE 6 developments were the first steps in an able cold war.

TWO INTERNETS, TWO CABLE NETWORKS?

Of course, many parties along the route of the two systems have the opportunity to access two ultra-high capacity systems, improving diversity and lowering prices but is that the precursor of superpowers mandating that if you want to access networks in one country you cannot choose but must use the system built and operated by that country? - Google on System A; Tik Tok on system B - In effect two internets.

For the moment there is a large disparity in terms of content, accessibility, and traffic volume in favour of one party. This has led to suggestions that there will soon be two ‘clouds‘ but only one of which can be trusted and only one of which provides access to the largest content and service provider base in the world.

The current state of geopolitics has led to suggestions that only one of the clouds and their supporting cable networks can be trusted. The US has a great deal of influence on subsea the largest users are nearly all-American OTTs and SubCom is a significant manufacturer, even more so with direct government support. While not formally US policy there are voices in America calling on the government to extend support both financially and politically to this concept of a ‘Trusted Cloud’ an internet based on democratic and market accountability.

THE MIDDLE GROUND, IS THERE ONE?

Other countries have an interest in this struggle. The EU is the world’s largest trading bloc and while dominated by NATO members it seeks to go its own way on trade and today that includes digital technology; 5G, AI, Internet/Cloud and social media. They all rely on subsea cables in one way or another.

The EU is home to the world’s largest subsea cable supplier, ASN. A genuinely European company with a Finnish owner, it is based in France with an important component supplier in the UK. Can the EU allow such a critical resource to be adversely impacted by the policies of two competing trading blocs? Can it maintain its preferred position of balance and independence, or must it be relegated to a supporting role in America’s ‘grand design’?

Similar questions face NEC, based in Japan traditionally a strong US ally, NEC has been a supplier in many systems in Asia and around the world. Will both companies have to compete with heavily subsidised products from US or China; can they compete with the power politics deployed to influence customers and countries? France has made its own position clear by terminating both SEAMEWE 6 and its Chinese counterpart.

In recent years new countries have emerged as major destinations for cables; countries that are increasingly shaping the future. What is India’s view as the world’s largest country by population and the dominant force in the Indian

Ocean cable strategy? Other significant countries are Brazil (larger than the continental USA and dominating the South Atlantic, South Africa (a true global bridge nation where two Oceans meet) Indonesia the fourth most populous nation will rival Singapore as Asia’s gateway. All have tried to maintain an independent political status in recent years must they be forced to choose, or do they have the political will and economic strength to resist?

Conclusions And Speculation

Why are super-power politics relevant to Global Capacity? System capacity globally has been influenced by technology development to increase the capability of individual systems and the availability of finance to fund the construction of multiple new ones. As demonstrated above there is now a very big factor impacting the choice of system supplier and commercial use of the subsea network. Ultimately the development and structure of the global subsea network itself. In a word, Geopolitics!

Two internets backed by powerful political differences mean two cable networks. On some paths, capacity will be duplicated while on others only one choice will be viable or permissible. Some new routes will be longer to avoid problems but that increases latency. More competition on some paths, less on others. More choice of suppliers in some cases, less in others. Both scenarios impact how much capacity is available at what cost and when. So yes it is very very relevant.

Are we seeing the creation of a ‘digital cold war’ dominated by the USA on one side and China on the other?

Will the sheer complexity and cost of ‘two internets,’ but without direct links between the two largest global economies, highlight the need to cooperate?

Perhaps, once again the sheer ability to freely communicate will bring people together rather than push them further apart. I hope so! However literally as I finish writing this a media item pops on my PC G-7 to support deep-sea cable network for emerging nations Digital chiefs to outline financial assistance with World Bank at Japan meeting - never out of the news these days.) STF

JOHN TIBBLES has spent a working lifetime in global telecoms much of it in the subsea cable arena where he held senior positions responsible for subsea investments and operations at Cable and Wireless and MCI WorldCom and as an internal advisor consultant to Reach and Telstra Reach. John spent many years working for C&W in Bermuda and established the first private subsea cable offshore company and has worked extensively with both consortia and private system models. He has a wide background and expertise in most commercial matters of international telecoms and since ‘retiring’ he has remained active in the industry as a consultant, commentator and at times a court appointed expert and has been a panellist and moderator at international events.