Volume 9, 2009 -Volume 10, 2010 Water Festivals of Thailand: The Indian Connection
Ruchi Agarwal Challenges of Pharmacy Education in Thailand
Srisombat Nawanopparatsakul, Sindhchai Keokitichai,
Somjade Wiyakarn and Chomjin Chantaraskul
European Union Soft Power: Cultural Diplomacy & Higher Education in Southeast Asia
William J. Jones Tourism Trail in Lower Mekong Basin Economic Circle (Thailand-Laos-Cambodia-Vietnam)
Supachai Wanalertsakul, Kanokwan Manorom,
and Boonyasarit Aneksuk
The Russo-Siamese Relations: The Reign of King Chulalongkorn
Natanaree Posrithong
20.00
Industrial Decentralization Policies and Industrialization in Thailand
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Percentage
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0.00 1961
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-5.00
-10.00
-15.00
Apisek Pansuwan
-20.00 Year
GDP growth (annual %) ..
GDP per capita growth (annual %) ..
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Book Review
Matthew Copeland
Silpakorn University International Journal SUIJ
Copyright All rights reserved. Apart from citations for the purposes of research, private study, or criticism and review,no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored or transmitted in any other form without prior written permission by the publisher. Published by Silpakorn University Printing House. Silpakorn University, Sanamchandra Palace Campus, Nakhon Pathom 73000
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Editorial Advisory Board
Silpakorn
University
Emeritus Prof. Chetana Nagavajara, Ph.D. International Journal is published Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn Anthropology Centre, in June by Silpakorn University. The Thailand journal features articles and research Prof. Santi Leksukhum, Ph.D. notes/articles in the fields of Art Department of Art History, Faculty of Archaeology, and Design and the Social Sciences Silpakorn University, Thailand and Humanities. Its aim is to Emeritus Prof. Kusuma Raksamani, Ph.D. encourage and disseminate scholarly Department of Oriental Languages, Faculty of Archaeology, contributions by the University’s Silpakorn University, Thailand faculty members and researchers. Assoc. Prof. Rasmi Shoocongdej, Ph.D. Well researched, innovative works Faculty of Archaeology, Silpakorn University, Thailand by other scholars are welcome. A Assoc. Prof. Maneepin Phromsuthirak, Ph.D. review committee consisting of Faculty of Arts, Silpakorn University, Thailand academic experts in the relevant fields Prof. Samerchai Poolsuwan, Ph.D. will screen all manuscripts, and the Faculty of Sociology & Anthropology, editorial board reserves the right Thammasat University, Thailand to recommend revision/ alteration, Assist. Prof. Wilailak Saraithong, Ph.D. if necessary, before their final English Department, Faculty of Humanities, acceptance for publication. Chiang Mai University, Thailand Assist. Prof. Alice Thienprasert, Ph.D. Director, Silpakorn University Research and Development Institute, Thailand
Editor Assoc. Prof. Thanik Lertcharnrit, Ph.D. Faculty of Archaeology, Silpakorn University Editorial Board Asst. Prof. Bamrung Torut, Ph.D. Faculty of Education, Silpakorn University Instructor Kamonpan Boonkit, Ph.D. Faculty of Arts, Silpakorn University Instructor Supaporn Nakbunlung, Ph.D. Department of Sociology-Anthropology, Faculty of Social Sciences, Chiangmai University Prof. Miriam Stark, Ph.D. Department of Anthropology, University of Hawaii, USA Assoc. Prof. Peter Smith, Ph.D. International College, Mahidol University, Salaya, Nakhon Pathom Assist. Prof. Matthew Liebmann, Ph.D. Department of Anthropology, Harvard University, USA Managing Editor Pranee Vichansvakul All correspondence should be addressed to : Managing editor, 44/114 Soi Phaholyothin 52, Phaholyothin Road, Klongthanon Saimai, Bangkok 10220 Telephone : 080-5996680 Fax : 66-2973-8366 E- mail address : pranee_aon1@hotmail.com Web site : http: //www.journal.su.ac.th and www.surdi.su.ac.th Information about the Journal An electronic journal is provided on the web site (http://www.journal.su.ac.th and www.surdi.su.ac.th) The journal is available at Silpakorn University Book Center. Telephone : 66-3424-4054
Silpakorn University International Journal Volume 9-10 (January - December) 2009-2010
Contents
Editor’s Note
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Articles Water Festivals of Thailand: The Indian Connection Ruchi Agarwal Challenges of Pharmacy Education in Thailand Srisombat Nawanopparatsakul, Sindhchai Keokitichai, Somjade Wiyakarn and Chomjin Chantaraskul European Union Soft Power: Cultural Diplomacy & HigherEducation in Southeast Asia William J. Jones Tourism Trail in Lower Mekong Basin Economic Circle (Thailand-Laos Cambodia-Vietnam) Supachai Wanalertsakul, Kanokwan Manorom, and Boonyasarit Aneksuk
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The Russo-Siamese Relations: The Reign of King Chulalongkorn Natanaree Posrithong Industrial Decentralization Policies and Industrialization in Thailand Apisek Pansuwan Book Review Matthew Copeland
Contributors
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Editor’s Note
Please accept our apologies for the belatedness of the current issue of the Silpakorn University International Journal. Changes in both editorial management and journal structure resulted in unavoidable delays in production, but we trust that our readers will find the new format worth the wait. The former editor, Dr. Maneepin Phromsuthirak, has recently been appointed the Dean of Silpakorn University’s Faculty of Arts, and I was invited to serve as the incoming editor. A number of new members have also been added to the advisory board, while many of the old members remain. Furthermore, there will also be a change in the title and content of the journal beginning with this issue. From 2011 on, the journal will be known as Silpakorn University Journal of Social Sciences, Humanities, and Arts and will be paired with a sibling publication, Silpakorn University Science and Technology Journal. The aims of these journals, however, remain the same—to encourage and disseminate scholarly contributions to all fields of academic inquiry. As has been our previous editorial policy, we welcome papers and book reviews on the social sciences, humanities, and arts, all of which are subject to the peer review process.
Thanik Lertcharnrit thanik@su.ac.th
Water Festivals of Thailand: The Indian Connection Ruchi Agarwal Abstract Indians and Thais share a common religious, cultural, and linguistic heritage. One facet of this sharing involves festivals celebrated in Thailand. The most important Thai festivals are Loy Krathong and Songkran, Both festivals linked to the Indian festivals. Thais celebrate Loy Krathong on the full moon in November and pay respect to the river by floating the banana leaf cups and asking for forgiveness from the River Goddess Ganges. River Ganges has no connection with Thailand but still is respected by Thais on this day. It is related to the Indian festival of Kartik Purnima which gets its name from the month of Kartik (November-December). On this day people will bathe in sacred rivers as the beliefs are that Gods descend of earth and reside in the holy rivers that flow naturally for healthy growth and spiritual grace. The Thai New Year, Songkhran, falls on the 13th-14th of April every year. The word ‘Songkran’ derives from the Sanskrit word “Sankranti,” a festival celebrated in other parts of Asia. It portrays the typical ways of life of the people which are involved in the agricultural aspects in India as well as Thailand. Both the festivals are celebrated in India and Thailand with different names but with the same purpose somehow and are related to water. My paper deals with the cultural religious connection of such festivals of Thailand with India. Key Words: Thailand, India, Myanmar, Songkran, Sankranti, Phalgun Thagyamin, Thingyan, Brahma, Krishna
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Introduction The Indian subcontinent’s civilization is one of the oldest in the world. It has had a cultural continuity and has also had a great impact over most of Asia and this can be traced back to the history itself. The contribution to Southeast Asia’s culture comes mainly from trade route and commercial contacts. This lead to a transformation of tribal societies found in Southeast Asia to a number of kingdoms where a lot of Indian elements like religion, language, kingships and others were adopted. As Buddhism spread to East Asia and Southeast Asia, the Indian art style had a profound impact over the cultures of Nepal, Tibet, China, Korea and others. It is because of these that the entire region of Asia shares a lot of commonality among them. (Rhoads Murphey 1996, p1-8) My purpose in writing this paper is to understand this commonality with emphasis on the one of the two Indian water festivals and to show that the way people in Southeast Asia have interpreted the festival has become a hybrid of the original. For this reason, particular emphasis will be placed on Thailand and Myanmar. For example, in India people apply color on each other to celebrate Holi. However in both Myanmar and Thailand people use water instead of colors. On the other hand, the festival serves the purpose of merit making and praying for good harvest in all the countries where it is celebrated. In this paper I will first focus on the geographical proximity which has allowed people to witness the common cultural elements. Further the focus will be on the history of migration in this region giving rise to common practices. The paper will also present the popular myths associated with each of the two festivals covered in this study. Lastly the paper will conclude with the argument that the water festivals which are said to have been introduced to Thailand during Sukothai era are actually dating back to a much earlier period and are Indian in origin.
Geography and Monsoon Asia Let’s first look at the geographical aspects of this region to understand how the cultures were diffused due to the geographical proximities. It is right to say that half of the world lies in Asia which is from the east of Afghanistan and south of the former USSR. This part of the world also has the oldest living civilized traditions. India
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and China both developed sophisticated cultures and technologies long before Europe. India, China and Southeast Asia are all equally rich in their cultural variety. South Asia is located at the South extreme of Eurasian continent. It was partly isolated from the rest of Asia because of the Himalayas. Even then traders in the early times used the mountain pass through the Hindu Kush, westward to Asia and the Mediterranean and northeastward towards China. The Indian history was therefore influenced by the invasions of people from the north and northwest using these mountain passes. The invaders and their belief systems were easily absorbed and enriched over time with the main Indian civilization.
The Common Cultural Patterns There are four major sub regions of monsoon Asia, namely India, China, Southeast Asia, and Japan. These are divided from each other based on the size, population, population density and others. However there is a broad range of institutions, ideas, values, conditions, and solutions that have long been distinctively Asian. These are the things which are common to each of the four major parts of monsoon Asia and have evolved in Asia in its own distinctive ways. Specifically, these include the basic importance of extended family and kin network; the respect and the importance attached to learning; the veneration of ancestors; the traditional roles of women, the hierarchical structuring of society; the awareness and the importance attached to the traditional past; importance given to group welfare over individual interest; and several other cultural traits are common to all parts of monsoon Asia.
Agriculture
Ever since the past, most of Asia has traditionally been and still remains an agrarian based economy. Its agriculture has its distinctive for its labor intensiveness. In most areas including construction and maintenance of irrigation systems, human labor is still very much in use. This dates back to the origins of the great Asian civilizations, which arose on the basis of agricultural surpluses produced by labor intensive means. The monsoon Asia has had a large population concentrated in
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the plains, river valleys, and deltas. The high crop yields have therefore been able to support this large population. Since the first millennium B.C, monsoon Asia had the largest and the most productive agricultural areas in the world. This also links us to the idea that people in this part of the world were performing rituals to please the God of Rain in order to have good harvest. As Heikkila-Horn points out, Hinduism has deep roots in Southeast Asian countries as most of them belonged to the Indianized states. The most common feature of all the Indianized states was the religious influence from Hinduism and Buddhism. The Indian culture is known to have been carried by the merchants to this region. The Brahmins priests played an important role as they also followed the traders after the trading centers were established in the region. The Brahmin priests and their religious practices were warmly welcomed by the local kings. The kings in these states will practice either Buddhism or Hinduism and sometimes even both. However in the 14th century, Islam began to dominate and both Hinduism and Buddhism were loosing their grip in Malay Peninsula and Indonesian islands. As she mentions, Thailand remains the only country in Southeast Asia where the royal rituals still have Brahmanic elements to it. (Marja Leena Heikkila-Horn 1989 p. 112-113) To see these elements as the seeds of Indian hybridity, I will focus on at least two common festivals widely celebrated in most parts of Southeast Asia. These include the New Year festival which falls in March-April and the festival of lights which falls in the month of November each year.
New Year Festival March is the month when many countries in Asia celebrate their new year. It is the month when the weather is hot and dry and is also the time when the farmers gather their harvest and pray for a good monsoon. This is the time when people pray for good harvest, good rainfall, and a good harvest in the year to come. Water festival therefore plays a vital role in agricultural societies where regular and adequate rainfall is essential to the well-being of the people. Since the weather is hot and dry, one common way of celebrating this is by splashing
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water over each others. It’s the day when enemies become friend and together everyone celebrates and enjoys the festivities. This New Year celebration is celebrated in several countries in Southeast Asia with different names however all originating from one place which is India. The original is Holi celebrated throughout India, Songkran in Thailand, Feast of Thingyan in Myanmar, Bpee Mai (New Year) in Laos, Chaul Chnam Thmey in Cambodia, Vietnam, and Yunnan, China as well. In this research paper, it is mandatory to include the legendry stories related to Holi, Songkran and Feast of Thingyan in order to show the cultural and religious linkage to India and Hinduism.
Holi This is an ancient festival of India originally known as ‘Holika’. There have been detailed descriptions of this festival in the Vedas, Puranas and also in Jaimini’s Purvamimamsa-Sutras and Kathaka-Grhya-Sutras. According to historians, beliefs are that Holi was even celebrated by Aryans but more in the Eastern part of India. As noted by Ram Nath and Rajendra Kumar, the Aryans came to India after the Dravidians and married Dravidian wife as there was a shortage of Aryan women and started worshiping several gods. The festival of Holi and Vasant was given to the Indians by the Dravidians.1 A stone inscription found at Ramgarh, Vindhya mentions about this festival and this inscription belongs to 300 BC 2. As Manohar points out, the inscription at Sitabenga do mention about the great festival of full moon in the month of Phalguna which now is known as Holi. In addition, King Harsha also mentions about holi in his work Ratnavali written in the 7th century 3. Holi is said to have existed several centuries before Christ but have changed over the years. In the earlier period it was more of a special rite performed by married women for the happiness and well-being of the families.
Ram Nath & Rajendra Kumar, Anthropology p. 170-171. Manohar Laxman Varadpande, History of Indian theatre p. 277 3 Harsha, Ratnavali 2004 p. 15-16
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The day is celebrated on the last day of the year which is Phalgun Purnima and beginning of the New Year when the spring starts (Vasant Ritu). The day therefore commences the spring season and is also sometimes known as the Vasanta-Mahotsav.
Legendry Myths
There have been several myths associated with this festival. The most prominent one as noted by Robin Rinehart, is associated with demon king Hiranyakashyap, who wanted everyone to worship him. However, his own son Prahlad, was a great devotee of Lord Narayan. Hiranyakashyap tried every way to make his son not to worship Narayan. When every thing failed, he commanded his sister, Holika, who had a boon from Brahma that fire will not cause her any harm, to enter a blazing fire with Prahlad in her lap. However, she was not aware that the boon worked only if she enters the fire all alone. As a result Prahlad was saved for his devotion to Narayan but Holika was burned for her sinful desires. The festival, therefore, celebrates the victory of good over evil and also marks the triumph of devotion. (Rinehart, pp. 136-137) In addition to the above account, there is also a legendry story of Krishna who started the tradition of playing with colors. Krishna used to apply colors on his beloved companion Radha and other milkmaids. Over the years this has gained popularity with the people and became more of a tradition. On the eve of holi, people will light a bonfire marking the triumph of good over evil. This practice was also evident during the Vedic period where the sacred fire of Holi was burnt along with the chanting of specific mantras which were intended for the destruction of the demonic forces. The day of Holi is then celebrated with colors and splashing of water on each other. Holi marks the end of the winter season and the beginning of spring time.
Feast of Thingyan This is also known as the Feast of New Year and celebrated widely in Myanmar. Thingyan has derived from a Sanskrit word which means the entry of Sun to either of the Twelve signs of zodiac. It marks the entry of Sun from Pisces to Aries and therefore the end of one solar year. The festival therefore falls between 13 to 16 April every year.
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This contrasts with the Hindus who celebrate the New Year from the time when the Sun moves out from Pisces. For this reason the festival of Holi is celebrated in the month of March. It’s a three day festival where the belief is that the King of Gods, Thagyamin, comes down on earth for annual visit. According to Maung Htin Aung4, the day of Thagyamin’s arrival is known as the Day of Descent, the day he departs is the Day of Ascent and the day in between is the Day of Sojourn. There is also an interesting story behind this annual visit of the King of Gods. According to legends, when the earth was created there was no life on it. Some Brahma gods seeing this newly created world came down on earth to inspect it. They were attracted by the sweet smelling soil and decided to taste it. These gods found the soil so tasty that they ate more and eventually found themselves losing their supernatural powers. As they kept eating the soil, the celestial rays of light from their bodies disappeared which lead to complete darkness. As they cried out in fear, it was the King of Gods who came down to console them. It was then that the gods of planets decided to make themselves visible from earth in the form of sun, moon and other planets. It was only then did vegetation and animals appeared on earth. The Brahma gods had to stay on earth while Thagyamin returned to his celestial abode promising to return every year at the end of each year. As Htin Aung points out, Thagyamin is no one other than Sakra and in Hinduism he was Indra but was adopted by Buddhim as a guardian god with the name Sakra. (Maung Htin Aung, 1962, p. 33) This Feast of New Year thus celebrates the return of Thagyamin each year for 3-4 days. During this festival, special feast is prepared and is also shared with the neighbours. The time of arrival and departure of Thagyamin is signaled by booming of cannons and firing of guns. There will also be New Year pots filled with flowers and leaves to welcome the god. At the time of arrival the head of the family will lift the pots to the sky to pay his homage and at the time of departure water from this pot will slowly be poured with prayers of good fortune, rainfall and harvest for the coming year. People outside the house will splash water over each other for at least three days.
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Maung Htin Aung 1962, p. 23-24
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Songkran in Thailand In Thailand there are a number of festivals which celebrate Buddhist holidays. However there are a number of others which are more of Hindu festivals and over time have integrated into Buddhist celebration. Songkran is one of them and is now a main tourist attraction for foreigners. However people in the countryside still retain the very traditional ways of celebrating this festival. According to Yavaprapas 5 Songkran is not originally an indigenous festival but is of Indian origin and traces itself back to Lord Buddha’s lifetime. The origins of this festival are described in a chapter of Buddhist sermons called “Sermon on Maha Songkran.” It is believed that the Indian myth of Songkran and ceremonies were diffused to Thailand through Burmese influence in the 11th century A.D. Ever since that time the traditional New Year has been observed in the ancient Lanna Kingdom with Chiang Mai as the main place of attraction and from there spreading to other parts of Thailand. The festival is celebrated during 13-15 of April and the astrological reason for this is based on the solar calendar which is the same as Burmese beliefs as already mentioned earlier. As the sun moves from Pisces to Aries, the occasion is described as Maha Songkran and marks the beginning of the New Year.
Songkran Myth
It is widely believed that a young man, Dhammaban was so intelligent that he could even understand the language of birds. One day God Brahma came down to test Dhammaban’s intelligence and asked him a question “Where is the glory of a man in the morning, afternoon and evening?” Brahma also set a condition that if Dhammaban fails answer the question correctly within the next seven days, his head will be cut off but if he did succeed, Brahma himself would cut his own head. Since the question was difficult, Dhammaban put all his effort to get an answer to this question. One day as he stopped by a large tree in a forest he found two birds on this tree. By coincidence he heard the Suttinee Yavaprapas, Ministry of Culture’s official website 2008., http:// webhost.m-culture.go.th/culture01/en/index.php/articles/traditional-festival/17songkran-festival.html
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female bird telling the male bird about this bet. It so happened that the male could answer the question and Dhammaban with his abilities could hear the conversation between the two birds. The answer was that in the morning, the glory of man was on his face because one has to wash one’s face every morning. In the afternoon, the glory would be on the body or chest since one takes shower and in the evening it’s on the feet as one has to wash the feet before going to bed. A person that can act this way is admirable as he/she washes all the dirt away to block the glory. As Dhammaban got the answer he rushed to see Brahma and as part of the condition, god was obliged to cut off his head.6 However, the head of God Brahma was too sacred and if it falls on the earth then it would lead a destructive fire and if it fell into the ocean, the ocean would dry with the intense heat. In order to avoid the calamity, God Brahma ordered his seven daughters, to carry his head on a platter and keep it in the cave on Mount Kailash, the Residence of God Shiva. From then onwards it was the beginning of the practice where once a year, one of the seven daughters must take turns to carry Brahma’s head in procession. with several other gods and goddesses around Kailash for the happiness and prosperity of all mankind. This day of procession is celebrated as the Songkran day. The head of Brahma resembles the Sun which appears glorious at spring time in Northern India and the seven daughters are the seven days of the week. Although in Thailand there is no such season but it suits well for the farmers whose main occupation if agriculture. During the month of April the weather is hot and fields are dried and not the time for agriculture. The farmers therefore spend their leisure time praying for a good rain and good harvest while waiting for monsoon.7
Suttinee Yavaprapas, Songkran Festival, Ministry of Culture’s official website 2008.http://webhost.m-culture.go.th/culture01/en/index.php/articles/ traditional-festival/17-songkran-festival.html 7 Suttinee Yavaprapas, Songkran Festival Ministry of Culture’s official website 2008. http://webhost.m-culture.go.th/culture01/en/index.php/articles/ traditional-festival/17-songkran-festival.html
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The day of Songkran is therefore celebrated for centuries as a day marked with the sprinkling water over the Buddha images, the bathing of revered persons, and splashing water over each other and getting blessings from monks and elders. It’s the day of giving and forgiving which is serving exactly the same purpose as the Indian festival of Holi.
Integration of Hindu practices dating back to Angkorian period It is widely believed that this and some other Hindu/Brahmanical festivals in Thailand date back to the Sukothai era. However they date back to much earlier period around the Angkorian period of around eleventh and twelfth century. As David Wyatt 8 mentions from the reign of King Jayavarman VII (r1181-1219), major religious institutions were found and these in addition to Buddhism also included people devoted to Saivite or Vaisnavite cults which were served by the brahmanical priests. During the 11th and 12th centuries, the ethnic composition of the population in the Lao areas and Siamese areas of Thailand this empire became Tai. In both of these areas, Buddhism had greatly influenced the religious beliefs and practices. However there was a mixture of brahmanical religion as well. There were several ceremonies performed in order to have good harvest, good health or rites of passage. These stemmed from the non-Buddhist practices which meant the popular form of brahmanical religion which was practiced in the Angkorian days. (David K Wyatt 1984, p. 26-28)
Later developments It was only in 1948 that the government officially announced the 13th of April as Songkran Day and a public holiday. Later in 1989, the General Chatichai Choonhavan’s government proclaimed the 12th to the 14th of April as public holidays so that people could return to their
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K. Wyatt. David.1984. Thailand A short history
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hometowns to make merits and visit their family and relatives. However in 1997, the General Chawalit Yongchaiyuth’s government changed the official dates of Songkran holidays to be the 13th of April to 15 of April in accordance with the traditionally observed days in the past.9
Conclusion As shown in this article, the Thai version of Songkran is a hybrid version of Indian festival of Holi. The way the festival is celebrated is sort of similar yet also has some differences as well. For example the use of color is evident in India but colors are not used in Thailand or Myanmar. The festival is mainly a harvesting festival and since the region of monsoon Asia is an agricultural region, it is common for the farmers to celebrate this festival. Originally farmers would have festivities in their leisure when they are done with their harvest, the weather is dry, and ploughing cannot be take place. Prayers and merit making takes place on this day in order to please the God of Rain for good rainfall which in turn will bring good harvest in the next harvesting season. The dates for the festival are calculated according to the astrological calendar. Therefore the New Year festival marks the approaching end of the hot season and the beginning of the monsoon. The festival of lights (Diwali in India, Loy Krathong in Thailand, and Tazaung-mon in Myanmar) marks the end of the rainy season and the beginning of winter. It is also interesting to note that Brahmanical beliefs and religions practices entered Southeast Asia during the Angkorian period and not during the Sukothai era as some scholars’ may belief. There are several other festivals like Loy Krathong as well that have their origins in India. Further research on this will reveal yet many other elements that culturally link India with rest of the countries in Southeast Asia.
Suttinee Yavaprapas, Songkran Festival, Ministry of Culture’s official website 2008. http://webhost.m-culture.go.th/culture01/en/index.php/articles/ traditional-festival/17-songkran-festival.html
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References Diana L. Eck, Banaras. (1983) City of light. Routledge & Kegan Paul. Harsha. (2004) Ratnavali Global Sanskrit Literature Series in English-4. Global Vision Publishing House. Heikkila-Horn. Marja Leena. (1989) Hinduistic Elements in Theravada Buddhism-A Review, TEMENOS 25, 1989 pp.109-121. Maung Htin Aung. (1962) Folk elements in Burmese Buddhism. Oxford : Oxford University Press. Murphey, Rhoads. (1996) A History of Asia. 2nd Ed. Harper-Collins. Rinehart Robin. (2004) Contemporary hinduism: ritual, culture, and practice. ABC-CLIO SCFI, History of Holi (Retrieved on March 15, 2010) http://www. holifestival.org/history-of-holi.html. Sharma, Ram Nath & Sharma, Rajendra Kumar. (1997) Anthropology. Atlantic Publishers and Distributors. Suttinee Yavaprapas, Songkran Festival, Ministry of Culture’s official website (2008) http://webhost.m-culture.go.th/culture01/en/ index.php/articles/traditional-festival/17-songkran-festival.html (Retrieved on March 15, 2010) Wyatt, David K. (1984) Thailand-A short history, Chiang Mai : Silkworm Books.
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Challenges of Pharmacy Education in Thailand Srisombat Nawanopparatsakul, Sindhchai Keokitichai, Somjade Wiyakarn and Chomjin Chantaraskul Abstract Pharmacy education enables pharmacists to deal with the safe and effective use of drugs, primary healthcare, preventative medicine, health promotion and responsible for preparing students to enter into the practice of pharmacy and to function as professionals and informed citizens in a changing health care system. Pharmacy education needs to take a lead role in strengthening pharmacy’s image and in establishing duties and responsibilities that others will immediately recognize as being in the pharmacist’s domain. There are evolution of pharmacy profession and pharmacy education that have the important role on the future of pharmacy education and there are many factors affecting pharmacy education in Thailand, the important point to develop pharmacy education is the quality of education and service .In the future, faculty of pharmacy must develop both academic and professional organizational to prepare the pharmacists to the health care system and develop good health care system. Key Words: Pharmacy education, Quality, pharmacist, health care system
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Introduction Pharmacy, like every other healthcare profession, is changing rapidly. Almost every aspect of its knowledge and practice base is affected by external change technological developments; changing patient expectations; patient safety; especially medication errors; quality assurance and quality improvement; informed consumers; accountability; trust and confidence; aging population; increased demand for pharmacy services; challenges of management of patients with chronic conditions; demonstrated benefit of pharmacist services; collaboration with other healthcare professionals; outcomes focus; new professional governance requirements; developments in other professions; a modernizing health service; and acute(commercial) competition in the community sector. Pharmaceutical Sciences and Practice have made tremendous progress during the last two decades. Several life savings drugs have been discovered during this period and practically some of the diseases have been totally eradicated from the face of this planet but there are some diseases that occur and cannot cure. Pharmacist from the dispenser of medicines has emerged as a knowledge worker who not only dispenses medicines but also is the provider of information on medicines to the patients and other healthcare professionals. On the other side, observing that the pharmacy profession is based on providing for the needs of the society and since the education affects the knowledge gained, skills learnt and attitudes taken, a dynamic approach to pharmacy education is seen. Hence pharmacy practice has expanded from dispensing in retail setting to providing pharmaceutical care with empathy to patients. As the profession of pharmacy is entering the period where the emphasis is on patient care rather than dispensing, the pharmacy education is emulating many of the features of medical education. Currently a strong move throughout the developed countries is towards having records, internationally recognized higher education and quality assurance processes (Suresh, 2001). Pharmacy education enables pharmacists to deal with the safe and effective use of drugs, primary healthcare, preventative medicine and health promotion. It also emphasizes on the research and development of pharmaceuticals and the production of new drugs. Pharmacy education is responsible for preparing students to enter into the practice of pharmacy
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and to function as professionals and informed citizens in a changing health care system. It is responsible for generating and disseminating new knowledge about drugs and about pharmaceutical care systems. Since pharmacy education must prepare pharmacists who can optimize medication therapy in the provision of patient-centered and population– based care, consideration must be given to important societal and health care trends or changes that are likely to influence our future pharmacy practice and education needs. Pharmacy educator should provide sufficient attention to the populations and the impact on health care in order to prepare students to care for these residents. Pharmacy education should serve as a resource and catalyst for the conduct of clinical research in the practice community and prepare students to incorporate a “research culture” in their future practices. Pharmacy education must also teach students to effectively use technology to develop and manage drug distribution systems, to access patient and scientific information, and to optimize patient care provision in a variety of practice settings. Pharmacy education needs to take a lead role in strengthening pharmacy’s image and in establishing duties and responsibilities that others will immediately recognize as being in the pharmacist’s domain. Pharmacy education will prepare pharmacists to provide patient-centered and population-based care that optimizes medication therapy; to manage health system resources to improve therapeutic outcomes; and to promote health improvement, wellness, and disease prevention. (Babar, 2005; Trinda, 1997; Roche, 2006 and Brink et al, 2006) The profession of pharmacy has evolved in an ever-changing environment. Changes in the profession occurred in the US, in other countries and in Thailand, with the schools of pharmacy as a leading force. Schools of pharmacy play a critical role in determining the quality and quantity of the profession, and thus the capacity of the profession of pharmacy to meet societal needs depends on the capacity that the schools have to prepare the workforce that can meet these needs ( Katanawijistrasin, 1997) .
Evolution of pharmacy profession and pharmacy education Early years of pharmacy education trained the pharmacists in compounding. Globally, pharmacy profession is maturing into a
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clinical professional, the job of pharmacist has changed from dispenser to information manager. Demands for clinical practice of pharmacy increased with reduced requirement for compounding, increase in the number of pharmaceuticals, increased awareness of drug related problems and automation in dispensing function. Society has been transform to technology literate and technology driven. Socioeconomic changes have increased the expectations for quality healthcare delivery. The mission of pharmacy is to maximize health and well being of the community. For pharmacy education to move from adequacy to excellence, we need to draw a broad plan that involves: identifying the local and national priorities and key targets to be achieved. (Babar, 2005) The social roles of the higher pharmacy education are cultivating advanced pharmacy talents, undertaking pharmacy researches and promoting its applications, pushing forward the development of pharmaceutical industry and public health affairs, providing various higher pharmacy educations, these functions are embodied quite good in the higher pharmaceutical education in some developed countries for example in USA, UK , France and Japan. (Suresh, 2001) The role of pharmacists in the 1950s influenced the role of the academy. Since the focus of pharmacy practice was on the drugs, the focus of educational institutions was on the drugs. By the 1960s there was a strong movement, particular largely within academic pharmacy, academic pharmacy recognized that it was no longer sufficient to focus on the drugs. If pharmacists were to be true healthcare professionals they would have to orient their focus toward the patient. Throughout the later half of the 20th century, the academy assumed greater responsibility for experiential learning and worked at expanding the role of pharmacists within the health care team. Pharmacists would become true drug experts and have responsibilities for therapeutic selection, consultation etc. (Skau, 2007). Since pharmacy education must prepare pharmacists who can optimize medication therapy in the provision of patient-centered and population-based care, consideration must be given to important societal and health care trends or changes that are likely to influence our future pharmacy practice and education needs. Key identified societal and health care trends or changes include the aging of society, greater emphasis on public health, scientific and technological advances,
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globalization, market forces in health care, increasing accountability, shortages of faculty and academic leaders, and a changing teaching model. (Roche, 2006)
Background of pharmacy education in Thailand 100 years of Thai pharmacy education will be in 2013. Pharmacy education in Thailand has undergone many changes in the past 90 years. Westernized pharmacy education in Thailand started from three-year courses during 1913-1937 to four-year, five-year programs and recently six-year, Doctor of Pharmacy programs now in operation. The first phase of pharmacy education was from 1913-1935, during which all students studied 3 years to receive a certificate of pharmaceutical production. Pharmacy education expanded to a 4 year program in 1941, and then to a 5-year bachelor’s degree program in pharmacy in 1957 and in 1989-1990 development of courses to tracts, areas of interests, including clinical pharmacy aspect in 5 years programs. Currently, another transition in pharmacy education is occurring in Thailand, all Thai pharmacy schools have recently expanded to a 6-year doctor of pharmacy curriculum (PharmD)(Kapol et al, 2008; Chan et al 2005). Right this moment, there are now 17 schools of pharmacy in Thailand, 12 public-funded faculties of pharmacy and 5 private-owned schools. (Sripanidkulchai, 2008) As already decreed and endorsed by the Pharmacy Council of Thailand, the pharmacy professionals governing body-such authority to issue pharmacy licensure for professional practice, all schools of pharmacy in Thailand now must offer only 6-year curriculum. All 6-year pharmacy courses in Thailand must be complied with the core pharmacy course structure guideline as recommended by the pharmacy council of Thailand comprising not less than 140 credit hours for professional contents including professional practice not less than 2,000 practical hours. Practical experiences in the areas of hospital pharmacy and community pharmacy (drugstores) (minimum requirement of 500 practical hours) are compulsory for every pharmacy student. The remaining professional practice time is depend on each individual’s interest-hospital, community, research and development, manufacturing, regulation and jurisdiction (FDA), etc. Right after pharmacy graduation, all pharmacy graduates will take the registration examination for the professional licensures, this
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process for licensure was applied since 2003-2004 for those pharmacy students graduated from state-/national universities. For those from the private-owned universities and foreign-graduated ones, they have to sit for the licensure examination many decades ago (Kaewkitichai, 2008). Pharmacy education consortium of Thailand (PECT) was task force and informal meeting in 1977 and formally established in 1988, the members of PECT are all deans of faculty of pharmacy, the goal of PECT is to control the standard of pharmacy education and produce high quality pharmacy graduates. PECT set trends and ability of new generation of pharmacists by 2013 capability in 1) providing pharmacy services (through prescriptions) 2) collaboration with others such as community leaders, doctors, nurses and dentists 3) strategically educating the customers/ patients(health promotion/prevention) 4)accountability (subjected to certain audit process) 5) learning and adjustability and 6) harmonization and global practice (Sripanikulchai, 2008). Factors affecting pharmacy education in Thailand The changes occurring in medical education and highlighted a variety of influential “environmental trends� include (1) managed care and the need to recapture the educational mission (2) multidisciplinary perspectives and the need for integrative educational structures (3) the new science of learning, technology, and instructional innovations (4) shifting views of health and disease and need for a responsive curriculum and (5) accountability and new assessment technologies (Skeff et al, 2007) . Factors affecting Thai pharmacy education are 1) global factors such as technology, free trade, globalization/harmonization, energy crisis etc.2) National factors such as public management quality assurance (PMQA), New financing and budgeting system, student income contingent loan (ICL) ,autonomous universities, new health law(emphasizes on health prevention/promotion) and new student admission system 3) professional factors such as new pharmacy council of Thailand regulation and accreditation (all Pharm D, 6 yr in 2009), increase in member of new pharmacy schools, increase competitiveness (national/international), cross academic discipline(trans-discipline), new emerging technologies and residency program and board certified in
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pharmacotherapy and consumer protection (Sripanikulchai B.2008). To study trend to develop the pharmacy education in Thailand, PECT reports situation analysis by study strength and weakness of mission, culture and management , structure , material, process or system and outcome. Another report from PECT is the situation analysis of opportunities and threats of stakeholder, input, preceptor, graduate, professional organization, social, economic and political (Babar Z. 2005). Another situation analysis evaluated by SWOT analysis in the second meeting of pharmacy education in Thailand, the results were as follows the strength are unity, young staff and experts; the weakness are the ability to accomplishment, body of knowledge and student quality; the opportunity are health services, future distribution need of pharmacist, consumer protection concept, university autonomy and consortium ; the threat are gap to meet client demand, deprofessional, isolation, ethical problems, expanded role of other profession, professional organization and legal commitment (Sripanikulchai, 2008; Tongnopnea, 2002). Undergraduate pharmacy education hadl the following as common obstacles related to undergraduate pharmacy curricula are lack of resources/funds (lecturers, supporting staff, teaching material and books, infrastructure, equipment), lack of coordination between curriculum and practice and between departments within the university, no political will/government support/government policies, lack of recognition within the healthcare system for pharmacists, unavailability of jobs, lack of experience of teachers, inertia/bureaucratic mindset of people, dependency on expatriate knowledge, weak enforcement on the implementation of the new curriculum. The possible and appropriate solutions which are as follows a national political statement, its need to be translated into action and enforced ,government policy on funding, provision to obtain experts, resources, incentives for implementers, active participation of pharmacists in the formulation of national health and drug policies and their implementation, setting up of a statutory body, pharmacy council, training of trainers on trends of practice and education, network and collaboration, meeting of faculties from different universities and bringing committed and motivated people together as a core group, adopting benchmarking and quality assurance from other countries if appropriate, adequate infrastructure, providing adequate
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and appropriate employment in the government sector/recognition in the private sector/job security, accreditation of pharmacists’functions, transparency in all steps of planning, identify relevant books and journals, access to electronic libraries of universities/use of internet, virtual visits,share resources on regional centres (Thompson, 2005). Concept and paradigm to develop pharmacy education in Thailand emphasises on patient-oriented services, produce drug by good manufacturing practice, recommend people how to administration of appropriate drug uses at low cost and counseling the patient to use drug effective safety and good quality of life correlated with professional ethic that produce good pharmacy practice . The effectiveness management of education considers the factor affect on curricula such as the philosophy, objective, the content or knowledge that correlate with the objective, the proper method of teaching. To search the answer of pharmacy education, it must consider the outcomes of education, desired graduate depends on social needs, professional needs and individual needs (Kaewkitichai, 2002). PECT set goal of pharmacy education in next century is to develop pharmacist graduates that have ethic and knowledge leadership, can work with health care team, can help social and consumers, emphasize graduates to solve the problem and have lifelong learning, so the faculty need the educator who have ethic and knowledge to be the model for the process of learning of the students and so we will prepare and keep the educator to work with the faculty. Trend to develop the professional of pharmacy in next century, pharmacy education may change the model of defense to be more push forward and there are many factors affect the management of pharmacy education so we may set guideline for development the performance of the educator in quantity and quality to teach the knowledge and skill to the students and show the clear role of pharmacists. In the future, the development of pharmacy education must have the positive outcome to the students and the educator must have the experience of pharmacist to transfer the knowledge to the students more than the theory and the educator will be at the preceptor to co-develop pharmacy with the preceptor and we will have the standard guideline of desired pharmacist educator and the PECT may set the mechanism together to search desired pharmacist educator to work in the faculty of pharmacy (Kaewkitichai, 2003).
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The concept of good pharmacy education is the conceptual framework to manage pharmacy education to produce pharmacist that have knowledge, competence and behaviour and set the desired pharmacists competency into 2 groups; firstly is the outcome of education specific to pharmacist : care-giver, manager, teacher and the other are the propreties of desired graduate and educate people (decision maker, communicator, leader and lifelong learner ). From the SWOT analysis, the strategies to develop pharmacy education are adjust the education system, develop lecturer to more professional , adjust teaching method to more student-centered, adjust the curriculum, cooperative education, share resources, develop more specialist, division of roles, new body of knowledge, expand education role, student recruitment and No-NATO(No action talk only). The national and international networking and collaboration can be developed: making curricular changes. To resolve this, they recommended that the universities work with international organizations to get support and resources, conduct seminars with local and international organizations, include expenditure in curriculum development in annual budget, work within capacity, prove that it is important; show outcomes; success stories ,convince administration using data and research from other countries, start with including important topics in a course before having the whole course, vetting and review from other experts (Tongnopnea, 2002). Good pharmacy practice involves four main groups of activities: 1) Activities associated with the promotion of good health, the avoidance of ill-health and the achievement of health objectives 2) activities associated with the supply and use of medicines and of items for the administration of medicines or for other aspects of treatment 3) activities associated with self-care, including advice about and, where appropriate, the supply of a medicine or other treatments for symptoms of ailments that lend themselves to self-treatment and 4) activities associated with influencing the prescribing and use of medicines. The goal of faculty of pharmacy is the good faculty, there are many strategies to be a good faculty such as selection of appropriate students, socialization of students: good infrastructure, good evaluation system, external reviewers ,good training and clerkship, internal and external audits, modernizing and monitoring in learning process, evaluation by students, moderation of
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question papers: agreeing on certain standards and accreditation process, exit exam in final year, syllabi workshops, structure-process-outcomes assessment and presentation of new curriculum to various stakeholders. It was also discussed that undergraduate education and health promotion in the globalized world should address global (Kaewkitichai, 2002). Undergraduate pharmacy curriculum expected outcomes are seven-star pharmacist: care giver, decision maker, communicator, leader, manager, lifelong learner and teacher (Tongnopnea, 2002). Professional competencies that must be achieved by graduates through the professional degree program curriculum are the ability to 1) provide patient care in cooperation with patients 2) manage and use resources of the health care system 3) promote health improvement, wellness, and disease prevention in cooperation with patients (Vlasess, 2008). Standards 2007,6 areas: mission, planning and evaluation, organization and administration, curriculum, students, faculty and staff, and facilities and resources. (Roche, 2006) Pharmacy students feel the need for different teaching methods, more practical ones, such as case studies, practical courses and internships. Different teaching methods will make education more attractive and effective. Students also expressed a need for good teachers: in several faculties, professors are attached to the university due to research, and not because they are brilliant teachers. Students think professors should also learn proper teaching skills. Students think that basic scientific knowledge is very important for the pharmacist: this gives value to pharmacist in the healthcare system, due to their specific knowledge on drugs that other professionals do not have. Finally, students want to see more flexibility and the opportunity to choose for a certain direction in their education in the last years of their education. This phase would be dedicated to specialization in a certain field of pharmacy (Brink et al 2006).
The evolution of faculty of pharmacy development Faculty of pharmacy is the source of academic and professional of pharmacy, which has the 4 main tasks. They consist of education, research, service academia and maintain culture include the development of pharmacy professional. The faculty of pharmacy have effective plan
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of development and have the clear target include support to solve the health problem of the country. Pharmacists will develop and maintain a commitment to care for, and care about, patients and an in-depth knowledge of medications, biomedical, pharmaceutical sociobehavioral, and clinical sciences. The PECT proposed the vision of the pharmacy education organization as the organization that support education, create ethic graduate, excellence in pharmacy and help social. The desired graduate would have ethic, excellence in knowledge, skill, experience in pharmacy professional and have leadership depend to help social and country. The mission are support teaching method emphasize on student, support curriculum and management process to create desired graduate to support co-operation between pharmacy professional (include health) organizations (Kaewkitichai, 2003). The strategies to improve pharmacy curriculum are 1) the formation of an advisory committee on pharmaceutical education in ASEAN 2) to improve collaboration between in ASEAN 3) to look on the possibility of publishing a scientific and professional journals 4)exchange of staff and teaching materials and 5)regular evaluation of programs by a committee(Hussin, 2003). The PECT proposed the strategies of pharmacy education to 3 phases; 1) create intense of network (now-2013), 2) development to network of knowledge (2014-2020), 3) unity of professional.(2021 -‌). The potential and trend to produce pharmacist of different faculties have different identity depend on age and philosophy of each institute. Faculties of pharmacy produce pharmacists from undergraduated curricula, and faculties of pharmacy can open the master degree program to produce M.Pharm. The faculties of pharmacy in Thailand must plan together to produce pharmacists that have the strength of their own faculty and find the proper amount and quality of new pharmacists each year .The faculty that have potential to produce the MPharm may consider to increase quantity and quality more than produce undergraduate pharmacists and build new curricula for research and development for specialist (Sakonchai, 2001). Recommendations for Pharmacy schools, the expectations of a new curriculum are as follows: future curricula revisions should
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emphasize patient-oriented content. The most important competency to provide pharmaceutical care is promoting rational drug use. Productoriented material should be focused mainly on product differentiation, and extemporaneous and general preparations rather than skills in special product preparation. General competencies should be integrated into core curriculum courses. The most important general competencies needed are to practice within applicable laws, professional standards and ethics, and to communicate and disseminate knowledge effectively. Pharmacy schools should re-evaluate their curriculum periodically to satisfy Thai pharmacy competency standards.
Quality of education and service It can be said in general that since the quality assurance and control system has officially been introduced into nation–wide education management particularly in higher education, all Thai faculties of pharmacy have complied with this essential regulation. Some schools events make it at benchmarking level(s) of global standards. In terms of assuring quality of services as well as pharmacy graduates, it is to bring into concerns about (1) relevant indicators for quality of services and assurance (2) trends and directions of e–services (3) quality assurance system being used (4) benchmarking of satisfaction of services and quality andn (5) public surveys and hearing with competent advisory board. Thus, approaches to create possible “Virtual Institutions” are considered as a challenge of foresight or vision of legislative administration, pharmacy educators and professional bodies. It will be a great shift of focus of education from “Seat Time” to “CompetencyBased Learning/Teaching and Evaluations”. It is suggested that: If keep it at “Status Quo” then consider it at “Level One”; challenges to advance ahead for greater outcomes and more productivity will be ranked as “Level Two”; assertive and initiative moves to produce innovative strategy and realm of operational plans and actions is “Level Three”; So, the question arising will be “Where is the stance of Faculties of Pharmacy in Thailand?” It may depend upon each individual countries’ circumstances and contextual support in higher education. (2) What indicators for measurable results and outcomes of academic duties and services? (3) How far shall we go beyond present situation? A
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“Must–To–Do” master blueprints for developing an excellent quality of Pharmacy Education and Services is adopted for strategic management. They are startegic operational plan(s) with details and declaration to public via information technology system as well as by other means; Self-Assurance Report (SAR) and documentation of evaluation of such relevant outcomes to publics; and evaluation of development of strategic operational tasks, activities or programme(s). Since there are diverse dimensions of evaluation, they are: dimension I: mission efficacy; dimension II: efficiency of strategic operations; dimension III: higher quality of services; dimension IV: development of organization. Mission efficacy is aimed to measure and evaluate the outputs in accordance with strategic plans as well as to evaluate tasks completed or successful in operational improvement/development. Also, de-regulation and/or regulation in favour of better outcomes and efficacy within timeframes will be considered. On matter(s) dealt with strategy efficiency, what to be considered seriously are the followings (1) strategis reduction of costs and expenditures; (2) to strategically lessen unit time employed in providing services; (3) e-Office(s) with strategically efficient outsourcing (4) relevant measurements of productivity and improvement and (5) strategic management being used. Major factors/KPI, Key Performance Indicators, to justify the quality of services provided by faculties of pharmacy/pharmaceutical sciences will be based upon those KPI for quality of services and assurance themselves. Since advances of higher education management, information technology and telecommunication technology are in extremely development, e-services become more and more in focus with the quality assurance system being used for monitoring and benchmarking of satisfaction of services and quality provided by the academic institutions. Public surveys and hearing with competent advisory board(s) will of course be conducted (Vlasess, 2008).
Academic and professional organizational development In order to develop and/or improve the quality and competencies of faculties of pharmacy as well as pharmacy profession institutions, in this case: the pharmacy council of Thailand, to meet globally international criteria and standardizations, the following criteria and
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strategies are summarized: (1) cost-effectively manpower allocation and re–allocation with optimum sizing; (2) strategic de-regulation and empowerment; (3) strategies of philosophy, missions, goals and expected outcomes for individuals conforming with organizational level(s);(4) strategic development of the controls and auditing; and (5) strategic innovations to better outcomes of services. Every level needs essentially “Joint-Commitment” of all members, personnel and stakeholders involved in the health–related pharmacy education and professions. The “Ultimate Strategies” to manage better such standardized Pharmaceutical Education, Innovative research and services will be “TO LEAD OR TO FOLLOW” in: national/international leader in knowledge transfer; creativity of knowledge–based society with integration concepts of multi-lateral disciplinary ability to come a national source of healthsciences/healthcare–related heritages; provision of academic services with value-added and revenue–generation activities to the organizations; Endurance and/or creativity to support, comprehend and integrate all possible intercorrelated disciplines; To produce pharmacy students and graduates with good/higher academic scholastic capability as well as skills with conscientious and etiquettes; strategic organization management with good-governance; personnel development INQUEST OF LEARNING SOCIETY; through forming/ creat/ sustain partnerships, alliances and quality network, innovative differences can be jointly created; from innovative consideration and lateral thinking, chances and opportunities are openning; then, more and more strategic outcomes can be possibly and relevantly foreseen. Henceforth, aiming to higher level of quality of academic standardization as well as a better conduct of pharmacy professional practices will then be achieved (Kaewkitichai, 2002).
Trend and concept to develop faculty In order to develop further, it is well-considered to make decision dealing with ideology, knowledge, belief, practice, culture, treatments, measures, standards, etc. right before expanding the management’s and stakeholders’ vision or foresight into future. For this instance, education reforms for the professional degrees in pharmacy/pharmaceutical sciences and related disciplines with emphasis on high quality of
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performance, outcomes and standards may be based upon what educators and stakeholders never ever thought seriously about before. “WHAT” and “HOW” to elaborate “Future Curriculum”? The answer may be “LifeLong Learning Programs” which is an optional shift of route to the successful elaboration of a terminology called “CCPD” standing for “Continuing Pharmaceutical Profession Development”. Such tangible development in education, management and profession will bring the quality of persons-students, graduates, teaching and supporting personnel, people in communities, and finally the nation-to better qualify as “Talented” or even “Multi-Talented” one(s) needed in global-wide. The strategic development as such may lead to complement faculty’s or university’s aims for students and graduates to be more satisfactorily self-learning, self-practiced, self-motivated and self-disciplined. The expected ultimate achievable targeted Goals are the OPPORTUNITY for productivity improvement, organization growth and sustainable wealth with a pace at the races with no dismal productivity. To achieve such relevantly strategic on-going development-in not only education organizations but also other institutions and societiesone needs to adopt: (1) paradigm shift, (2) information-based foresight, (3) strategies with most efficient surviving genomes, (4) performancefocused strategic plans, (5) quality networks and partnerships, (6) activities with value-added prioritization, (7), relevant auditing systems and evaluation for accreditation, (8) revisions of strategies with flexibility, (9) management with Good-Governance Decisive Administration, (10) Personnel and Management working with highly responsibility and senses of loyalty and belonging, (11) strategic budgeting plans and funding allocation for relevant incomes, revenues and expense estimations, (12) financial-based performance monitoring and evaluation, (13) role-specific teamwork with definite TOR and specification of job well–designed / assignment, (14) cost-effective utilization of resources allocated or funded, (15) strategic plans for investment, returning rates of revenues, cost–effectiveness of organization’s/personnel performance and projects,(16) strategic management for outsourcing as against value-added expenses and costing, (17) capable practice of lateral thinking with foresight and decisive but broad–minded consideration and (18) good manner self-respect and respecting others.
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On the other hands, faculty’s and university’s ultimate goals in the academic arena increases in research and service activities with all sectors-learning society with rationale of innovative knowledgeefficiency in management, loss minimization, increases of value-chain investment, resources sharing and sustenance of talented personnel. The possible mechanisms to perform excellently and strategically may be to elaborate joint-agreement on common structure of understanding in resources sharing, co-management, co-investment and joint-foresight in trends of futurism. In order to develop and/or improve the quality and competencies of faculties of pharmacy as well as pharmacy profession institutions, in this case: the pharmacy council of Thailand, to meet globally international criteria and standardizations, the following criteria and strategies are summarized: cost-effectively manpower allocation and re–allocation with optimum sizing; strategic de-regulation and empowerment; strategies of philosophy, missions, goals and expected outcomes for individuals conforming with organizational level(s). Every level needs essentially “Jont-Commitment” of all members, personnel and stakeholders involved in the health-related pharmacy education and professions. Henceforth, aiming to higher level of quality of academic standardization as well as a better conduct of pharmacy professional practices will then be achieved. Pharmacy education needs many developments expecially the manage system to search the desired educator, happy in working, model to teach, the students have the knowledge and skill in professional. May consider the need of quantity and quality of the educator, the increase of new faculty. The management of pharmacy education need the cooperation from every profession associate, pharmacy council, hospital, menufacturer and other organization to coordinate to develop system of pharmacy education and give opportunity to the people to develop the system and may set the image of desired graduate of pharmacist that professional and social need to work in next century. In the past, the development of faculty of pharmacy (of each faculty) depends on the plan of each faculty. They did not cooperation with other faculties and had some limitations. From the situation analysis, the problems in each faculty are not different and the problems in Thailand and other countries have similar started at the structure of
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the faculty and the system of working. It appears that perceptions about faculty development are improving, potential adopters are expanding, and contextual factors are mandating a greater focus on this process. Given these changes, the future for the growth and further dissemination of faculty development in medicine is positive.
Future prospects The plan for pharmacy development is classified under four broad headings: better access to services; helping patients get the best from their medicines; re-designing services around patients; staff development and clinical governance (Silcock et al, 2004). Education and health policies are two key factors for the future of pharmacists. The mission of pharmacy undergraduate program should focus on nurturing competent pharmacist. The mission of pharmacy graduate program should focus on the research and development in specific field. In addition to setting a clear mission, we will implement a standard pharmacy education program that meets the international standards. The goal of pharmacy education consists of preparing pharmacy students with the appropriate skills, attitudes, knowledge, and values to render them competent professionals (Manasse et al, 2007). Pharmacy, as the health discipline with practitioners specifically trained and educated in the chemical properties and clinical implications of drug therapy, can play an important role in modern health care, which is growing ever more reliant on biological and pharmaceutical products for patient care. It is pointed out that the health care enterprise needs a pharmacy work force that processes sufficient personnel, training and organizational, technological, and financial resources to protect the public against preventable injury and mortality that can stem from medication use. Pharmacy’s preferred future is addressed. The Joint Commission of Pharmacy Practitioners developed a document that details the preferred future for pharmacy to be attained by 2015. the vision document sets forth that pharmacists will communicate and collaborate with patients, caregivers, health care professionals, and qualified support personnel. The changes in the practice of pharmacy, combined with an aging society with chronic diseases and newly approved medications, result in the need for a significantly expanded
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pharmacist work force with appropriate education and training Manasse et al, 2007). Societal factors impacting future health care, advances in science and technology potentially impacting both the content and process of teaching/learning, the present and future pipeline of students for pharmacy practice and pharmaceutical sciences research, and the science and technology education of the next generation of potential pharmacists and pharmaceutical scientists (Roche, 2006). To achieve targeted goals under such new contexts of competition and narrow-down globe, interlinking/networking interdisciplinary and multi-disciplinary with integration of holistic strategies-plans, programs, cross-disciplines, resources-can lead successfully to the “HEART of SURVIVAL� and leading paces for: Quality Concordance with Trends of Changes; better and challenges improvement of development strategies; serving the organization’s aims, missions, goals, functions and responsible roles in societies and communities ; sustainable development and growth of the organization(s);ongoing strategic competencies and more efficient performance and outcomes.
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References Babar, Z. (2005) Pharmacy Education and Practice in Pakistan: Are there Affecting our Healthcare System.[online URL:www.chowk.com/ articles/pharmacy-education-and-practice-in-pakistan-are-theyaffecting-our-healthcare-system-Zaheereddin-Bab.html] accessed on May 13,2009. Brink, M. T., Marques, P. and Chirita, O. (2006) Students’overview on pharmacy education in Europe. Quality assurance in pharmacy education. In Proceedings of the EAPF Annual conference, Estonia. Suresh, B.(2001) Challenges in Pharmacy Education. In Proceeding of the 2 nd AASP Symphosium and 2 nd APEM Conference 2005 on Regional Cooperation in Pharmacy Education, research and service,Thailand. Chan, R.C. and Ching, P.L. (2005) Pharmacy practice in Thailand. American Journal of Health-System Pharmacy, 62:1408-11. Hussin,A. H.(2003) The Regional workshop on the development of pharmacy curriculum for countries in Asean and Western Pacific region. In Proceeding of the workshop on the development of pharmacy curriculum for countries in Asean and Western Pacific region, Penang, Malaysia. Kaewkitichai, S. (2002) The strategic management of pharmacy education under the reform of education and health system . In Proceeding of the second symphosium of pharmacy education,Bangkok,Thailand. Kaewkitichai S. (2003) The “US-Thai Consortium for the development of pharmacy education in Thailand” for 1993-2006. In Proceeding of the US-Thai Consortium for the development of pharmacy education in Thailand, Bangkok, Thailand. Kaewkitichai S. (2008) The Development of Pharmacy Education in Thailand In Proceeding of the US-Thai Consortium for the development of pharmacy education , Wisconsin, USA. Kapol, N., Maitreemit, Pongcharoensuk, P. and ArmStrong, E.P.(2008) Evaluation of curricula content based on Thai Pharmacy competency standards. American Journal of Pharmaceutical Education, 72(1): 1-9.
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Katanawijistrasin, S. (1997) The social responsiveness of the profession and the university. the role of the pharmacist in the health care system. Preparing the future pharmacist: curricular development. In Proceedings of the third WHO Consultative group on the role of the pharmacist, Canada. Manasse H.R. and Speedie M.K. (2007) Pharmacists, Pharmaceuticals, and Policy Issues Shaping the Work Force in Pharmacy. American Journal of Pharmaceutical Education,71(5): 1-2. Roche, V.F. (2006) AACP reports Roadmap to 2015: Preparing competent pharmacists and pharmacy faculty for the future.Combined report of the 2005-6 Argus commission and the academic affairs, professional affairs, and research and graduate affairs committees. American Journal of Pharmaceutical Education, 70(5): 1-27. Sakonchai, S.(2001) Role of pharmacy council on the development of professional in ninth decades ,Pimdee Publishing Ltd. Bangkok: 217-286. Silcock J, Raynor DK, Petty D. (2004) The organization and development of primary care pharmacy in the United kingdom. Health Policy: 67: 207-214. Skau, K.(2007) Pharmacy is a science-based profession. American Journal of Pharmaceutical Education, 71(1): 1-2. Skeff, K.M., Stratos, G.A., and Mount, J.F. (2007) Faculty development in medicine; a field in evolution. Teaching and Teacher Education, 280-285. Sripanikulchai B. (2008) US-Thai Consortium and Development of Pharmacy Education in Thailand. In Proceeding of the ACCP meeting, USA. Sripanidkulchai B. (2008) Trends and challenges of collaborative management under future US-Thai consortium. In Proceeding of the 10 th US-Thai consortium meeting, USA. Sripanikulchai B. (2008) Pharmacy education in Thailand In Proceeding of the 96 th years of pharmacy in Thailand, Bangkok, Thailand Thompson, D.F. (2005) Undergraduate Medical and Pharmacy education: the need for change and the way forward. Health Action International, 1-24.
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Tongnopnea N. (2002) Changing of context that affect pharmacy education : strategic to develop academy and professional of pharmacy In Proceeding of the Second seminar on pharmacy education, Bangkok, Thailand. Trinda, C.E. (1997) Adapting Education today for Needs of Tomorrow: Experience in the USA and the Americans the role of the pharmacist in the health care system. Preparing the future pharmacist: curricular development. In Proceedings of the third WHO Consultative group on the role of the pharmacist, Canada. Vlasess, P.H. (2008) Quality assurance and advancement of U.S.pharmacy education. In Proceeding of the US-Thai Consortium for the development of pharmacy education, Wisconsin, USA.
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European Union Soft Power: Cultural Diplomacy & Higher Education in Southeast Asia William J. Jones Abstract European Union foreign policy engagement in Southeast Asia is predicated upon its institutional capabilities which are limited both by institutional design and ideological forbearance for the application of traditional hard power. It is my argument that European Union higher education funding in Southeast Asia has at its foundation, motivations for the revival of European influence and power within the region. European Union engagement with Southeast Asia is designed to further EU and EU member states agenda’s in the realm of politics, economics, trade and security by utilizing soft power instruments which has as its target, Southeast Asia’s next generation of influential business, academic and government leaders via culture and/or a value based model inculcation in order to establish long term goals of influence, power, prestige and to buttress EU diplomacy. Key Words: higher education, soft power, European Union, cultural diplomacy, Southeast Asia
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European Union Soft Power
Introduction Due to the European Union’s institutional limitations in military power deployment combined with its ideological penchant for constructive engagement via partnership dictates the EU resort to foreign policy methods based on applicable use of soft power.1 In Southeast Asia, economic potential, geographic distance, regional challenges by the rise of China and preeminence of Japan has led the EU to devise a number of policy engagement mediums to address geopolitical needs; among these is higher education policy. Higher education as a method of influencing future relations via co-option and internalized agent cooperation is being utilized as a foreign policy tool and proactive medium, in an attempt to establish long term security concerns by utilizing soft power methodologies. The European Union’s inability to bring to bare offensive military force to buttress its foreign policy objectives is often seen as its critical weakness.2 These assumptions stem from cultural and theoretical interpretations distilled from realist notions of international relations and classic typologies of state action based on zero sum outcomes in diplomacy and/or Hobbesian variations of human and state behavior. To analyze European Union foreign policy exclusively through these lenses takes a myopic view of the European system and is a discredit to the profound effects that World War II had on Western Europe, its people, states and the intentions of the founding fathers of the European project. This essay’s focus will be towards tertiary education policy in Thailand, Malaysia, providing an overview of EU higher education policy within Southeast Asia. I will begin with an historical overview
P. Colson, Soft Power Discourse and the Significance of European Union Foreign Policy Methods in F. Laursen ed., The EU as a Foreign and Security Policy Actor, European Union Centre of Excellence, Nova Scotia, 2009 2 R. Kagan Power and Weakness, Policy Review, 113, 2004 & K. L. Nielsen The Weakness of the EU’s Soft Power Strategy, 4th Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, University of Latvia, September 25-27, 2008
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of European tertiary education initiatives, which led to a viable EU led education export product. Following is an analysis of Nye’s soft power approach to international relations and perceptions of power within an institutionalist and sociology of power framework directed towards higher education. Factors for EU engagement in internationalization of European higher education such as tertiary student consumption patterns, cultural transfers and perceptions of Southeast Asian’s of the EU [Europe] will be analyzed. Lastly, EU driven external higher education policy in Southeast Asia pertaining to European Studies and Erasmus Mundus programs will be analyzed to prove that the EU is engaging with willful intent to in an attempt to influence Southeast Asian decision makers and support EU foreign policy objectives by exercising soft power in its funding of higher education.
Historical Evaluation of EU Education Initiative Development An historical evaluation of European education initiatives in higher education can be traced back to the Magna Carta Universitatum of 1988. This document is not of singular importance due to any revolutionary or breakwater event that occurred due to its being. But rather this document exemplifies a concerted European awareness for the need of an integrated approach in the field of higher education structure, recognized universities primacy as mediums for cultural awareness and enhancing competitiveness as a driving force for change, responding to needs of a global economy.3 Later the Sorbonne declaration of 1998 as a front runner to the Bologna Process one year later would further emphasize: h roles that universities play in developing intellectual, cultural, and social elements within the European integration process h harmonization of education systems via ECTS h emphasis on greater student mobility h need to create European Higher Education Area
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Magna Carta Universitatum, Bologna 18 September 1988
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However, in a wider context the Sorbonne Declaration should be noted for its explicit political undertones stated as “the international recognition and attractive potential of our systems are directly related to their external and internal readabilities.” 4 This demonstrates concerted awareness of the position that European university systems have in the broader framework of pan-European competitiveness and the role in which the abovementioned play in the broader realm of European [external relations] politics. Education therefore is directly conferred with the status of being a contributing factor to European abilities to function in a capacity that engenders relationship generation by cognitive social value perceived in utilitarian terms as well as what Vuving terms as ‘beauty’ within the contextual confines of his external validity and power currency analysis.5 Furthermore, it signifies the leading role that education plays with third party individuals and nations conceptualization of the EU, its nuances, mentalities, intricacies, providing an avenue for an environment which is conducive for understanding and at least a minimum of recognizability and acquaintance. The Bologna Process while reiterating much of Sorbonne has its importance in its emphasis on the need to make European education more competitive and quality assurance in developing comparable criteria and methodologies.6 As Jones argues, importance lay in Bologna’s reform capacity for education systems both within Europe by providing governance models7 and externally in partnership forms both to attract inbound students to give credibility and value to degrees
Sorbonne Joint Declaration, Paris 25 May 1998, Joint Declaration on Harmonisation of the Architecture of the European Higher Education System 5 A. L. Vuving, How Soft Power Works, paper presented at American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Toronto Canada, September 3, 2009 6 The Bologna Declaration of 19 June 1999, Joint Declaration of European Ministers of Education 7 P. Jones, The EU-Central Asia Education Initiative, EUCAM Working Paper No. 9, 2010
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obtained and also to strengthen partner institution capabilities in line with European standards; which is of particular interest to this paper later in relation to the Erasmus Mundus program. It is of peculiar interest that the word harmonization which was a centerpiece terminology of the Sorbonne Declaration is missing from the Bologna Declaration; in place of harmonization is the vaguer term of ‘compatibility and comparability’. This signals the recognition of member states of their own staggering diversity, yet conversely implies the ever present need to base one another’s higher education systems on commonalities and institute a regime of convergence rather than simply amalgamation of diverse systems.8 In and of itself this demonstrates the degree to which European nation states inside and outside of the Union placed dual priority on education as a vehicle to further European integration and promotion of Europe to the wider world. The Lisbon Agenda is best known for its view that Europe should aspire “to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” by 2010.9 According to Corbett the motives for EU awareness, hence consolidation of the political perspective of quantitative personification the Lisbon agendas’ significance is in its underlying motive “to stimulate the ‘Europe of Knowledge’ which is deemed by the EU’s political leaders to be one of the characteristics which the EU needs to assert ever more powerfully on the world stage.”10 In sum total, an historical view of European higher education initiatives begins with a European integrationist view of reform
8 B. Wächter, The Bologna Process: Developments and Prospects, European Journal of Education, 39(3), 2004 9 The Lisbon Special European Council March 2000: Towards a Europe of Innovation and Knowledge 10 A. Corbett, Ideas, Institutions and Policy Entrepreneurs: Towards A New History of Higher Education In The European Community, European Journal of Education, 38(3), 2003
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mindedness to converge disparate systems into a harmonized form. It is with Sorbonne and Bologna that saliency is found in exporting higher education reform and products as well as linking external relations to the European Higher Education Area. Lisbon attempts to find an integrative and synergistic function for higher education on cross cutting issues linked to security, stability and the Union’s wider role in international relations that is present in policy documents and policy presently.
Soft Power & Higher Education Higher education as a both a medium of social capital as well as cultural transference should not be underestimated within the context of individuals operating within ‘institutionalized’ societies and both states and international organizations being at different levels, parts of organic systems of social construction and social/cultural reproduction. Moles attributes great importance to education, describing it as “one of the processes by which the past is incorporated in the present to fashion the future…organizing the sum of knowledge acquired by the community to aid the individual to take his useful place in society in a spirit of solidarity.” 11 If this is taken as a basic foundation of education as a vehicle for transmission of ideas/ideals to an elite demographic, it can not be assumed that it will be value free, in which case Durkheim surmises that “education is necessarily a deliberate and value-laden [moral] enterprise” 12 and medium of social reproduction. Furthermore, Durkheim makes it clear that there are no objective criteria so to speak pertaining to education but rather these are to be found in the larger political society to which socialization is subjectively applicable.13 What is of particular interest in Durkheim’s functionalist view of education
P. G. N’Diaye, Culture Development: Some Regional Experiences, UNESCO, 1981, 42 12 E. Durkheim as quoted in Young, P, Adler, S. A., Shadiow, L. K., Cultural Foundations of Education, Pearson, 4th ed, 2006, 126 13 E. Durkheim, Education and Sociology, Free Press, NY, 1956, 71
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is embedded not in what education is intended to mean but rather its functions which applies within societies at large. This view coincides with social stratification and prestige construction which graduates enter into and employ throughout their social lives in a given society by taking their social position in a larger system of citizenry.14 Joseph S. Nye formulated his thesis and understanding of soft power in the early 1990’s as a means of juxtaposing military or use of coercive power instruments against a more nuanced use of cultural, attractive and implantation of power.15 This typology of power is critical for evaluating education and its value transference capacity. Criteria for formulating a model of soft power usage as formulated by Nye must consist of first a reason and intent of the actor in question, a policy vehicle and lastly a medium of exchange so as to promote the interests and intent of the actor in question. Noya argues that Nye’s soft power ontology must be distinguished in its applicable form from its counterparts of military or economic power which are classified as hard powers. Noya’s argument is clear in its assertion that soft power is indeed measurable and indistinguishable from hard power if it is perceived by the subject/s as being intrinsically attractive. In essence Noya stipulates that hard power is exercised exogenously and expressed as attractiveness upon the subject whereas soft power is internalized subjectively establishing preference, thereby constructed objectively as part of the subject in their perceptions of the power transmitter.16 Lukes also confers the intrinsic nature of
T. Kazepides, Educating, Socialising and Indoctrinating, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 16(2), 1982, 158 15 J. S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, Perseus, 2004(a) 16 J. Noya, “The Symbolic Power of Nations”, Place Branding & Public Diplomacy, 2(1), 2006. Noya’s argument in this piece is derived from his conclusion that soft power if applied, internalized and reconstructed ontologically it indeed is equivalent to traditional hard power as it has produced an end product that is just as effective for shaping and coercing choice.
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internalizing of perceptions and mobilizing of soft power as being effective in that the subject is susceptible to it.17 Lukes and Noya both attribute soft power affectability to the legitimization of the power source/product in the ability of the subject to internalize the ideology of ideas, which is based on reputation of the power source, effective benefits of the power product or method of application of power. Sรถlter further stresses the assumption that western states success in soft power application as being embodied in ideas and values that can only be achieved by exchange or rather transference in the propagation of beliefs.18 The critical point of inflection is the value system or ideacentered conceptualization that is being propagated via higher education funding of European Studies and the Erasmus student mobility program. In terms of European Studies and Eramus Mundus it is the capital value of social/cultural export systems and social immersion which presents an opportunity for European historical and contemporary interpretations of the EU and Europe as a global actor within the theoretical enclaves of achieving Kantian peace, liberal institutional values, multilateral engagement, adherence to international law, normative concepts as a contemporary postmodernist European enlightenment project. Nye distinguishes what he states as the second face of power as the ability to get others to want or desire what you yourself desire, or what he terms as co-option.19 The conception of co-option should be considered further in light of the source of power generation, which within the framework of desires and wants points towards both an external motivational factor of power in prestige or social legitimacy and internal motivations
S. Lukes, Power and the Battle for Hearts and Minds, Millennium, 33(3), 2005 18 A. A. Sรถlter, The Renaissance of Soft Power Rediscovering Cultural Diplomacy In Transatlantic Perspective, CMG Workshop, Goethe-Institut Toronto, 2008 19 J. S. Nye Jr., Power in the Global Information Age From Realism to Globalization, Routledge, London, 2004(c), 56
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for internalization20 of those external power products. Colson’s insight into Nye’s soft power discourse makes a critical distinction between Nye’s core conceptions of co-option and cooperation. Co-option is not about getting actors to do what they might not want or ‘bringing them on board’ but rather it points towards agents coming from a higher or dominant power position of interests and/or resources and the maintenance of this by attracting others to your source of power.21 Attractiveness of higher education in routing soft power towards a currency of effectiveness is deeply rooted in interest subjectivity and outcome objectivity towards social utilitarian value in social mobility and conscience social acceptance.22 To understand interests of actors is presage to recognizing policy objectives of the Union in its funding of higher education. Co-option from state level attraction in terms of EU higher education policy derives from resources [money, scholarships, and funded partnership programs] allocated and available to countries and legitimacy of the funding allocation as to conditions of resource take up, in this case higher education is seen as positive public goods to domestic populations that contribute to a country’s knowledge capability. On an individual level of agency, resources can be defined as prestige of European tertiary institutions, social legitimacy that is derived by and from attending and graduating from these universities in the domestic social context, prestige and social legitimacy of attending and graduating from prestige imbued universities domestically that are hosts to European Studies programs. The prestige of social acceptance
20 J. S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century, British Council Parliamentary Lecture, January 20, 2010 21 P. Colson, Soft Power Discourse and the Significance of European Union Foreign Policy Methods in F. Laursen ed., The EU as a Foreign and Security Policy Actor, European Union Centre of Excellence, Nova Scotia, 2009 22 S. Lukes, Power and the Battle for Hearts and Minds: On the Bluntness of Soft Power, in F. Berenskoetter, M. J. Williams eds., Power in World Politics, Routledge, NY 2007, 87
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value in attaining these public goods is objectified as cultural capital [symbolic capital] and a measure of social capital of institutionalized credit which graduates as individuals carry with them when they enter into social systems.23 Soft power is inherently elusive and should be viewed through the lens of legitimacy in order to capture a conceptual analysis as argued by Cooper who sees legitimacy as being at the core of soft power and behaviors.24 This reflects back to legitimacy as the creator of power currency as stated by Vuving in his analysis of power generation.25 Higher education as a legitimate and valued public good both from a development [state level] as well as from an individual to social perspective is the generator of this soft power and will drive EU foreign policy in higher education. If successful in reformulating the subject’s social construction soft power in this sense has indeed co-opted via cooperation both of the transmitter and subject and the interlocutor inherently stands pinned on legitimacy. European Union Engagement with Southeast Asia The Commissions’ 2001 communication “Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships” reiterated much of
P. Bourdieu, The Forms of Capital, in J. G. Richardson ed., Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education, Greenwood, New York, 1986, 241-258 and S. R. Clegg, D. Courpasson, N. Phillips eds. Power and Organizations, Sage, New York, 2006, 253 24 R. Cooper, The Goals of Diplomacy, Hard Power, and Soft Power, in Held, David, Koenig-Archibugi, Mathias eds. American Power in the 21st Century, Polity, UK, 2004 25 A. L. Vuving, How Soft Power Works, paper presented at American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Toronto Canada, September 3, 2009. It is important to note that Vuving denotes soft power production into benignity, brilliance and beauty to which higher education as I have analyzed conform and show characteristics of all three such as promotion of self-esteem, capability in excellence and shared ideals that can produce a dichotomous effect of “other” if value structures are inculcated, given legitimacy and juxtaposed as per the subjects own experience in their domestic context
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what was presented in the 1994 predecessor, stressing the need for greater awareness of the European Union. In the Commissions’ 1994 communication “Towards a New Asia Strategy”, specific mention of the need to “raise the profile of Europe in Asia…greater knowledge of the Union and its activities would increase the regard in which it is held in Asia.”26 In order to achieve this the Commission suggests “strengthening higher education and training links with Asia, including University Co-operation schemes targeted into specific technological, policy and management studies and emphasizing the implementation of joint or mutually recognized post-graduate programmes…these will include, inter-alia, support to European and Asian Studies Centers.”27 However, added emphasis was placed on education in relation to services and the degree of competition from other regional educational players. Presumably there is no coincidence that the greatest numbers of inbound students come from Asia and the US has a significant lead in terms of students that will be exposed to culture transmissions and hence soft power derivatives. If tertiary education competition is a factor then one must look at volumes of students and where they are going for tertiary education services. From the perspective of global exports of education services it is apparent that the United States is by far the global leader in terms of national education exportation. In aggregate terms from 2004 the United States hosted 572,509 students or 23.3% of total inbound student flows with the closest competitor being the United Kingdom with 300,056 students or 12.2%.28 Furthermore, 40% of students consuming education services in third countries originate in Asia with Europe coming a distant second with 30%.29 In Asia aside from former British colonies the United States is far in advance of any European country
COM (94) 314 final, 13 July 1994, Communication from the COMMISSION to the COUNCIL, Towards a New Asia strategy 27 Ibid 28 UNESCO report on tertiary education consumers 2004 29 Ibid
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in terms hosting tertiary education students by margins ranging from 2:1 to 12:1.30 While the Bologna Process according to the OECD has augmented Europe’s attractiveness to Asian inbound students to nearly equal America, it is the massive potential of Asia in having over 1.2 million citizens abroad studying in OECD higher education institutions in 2007 that demands EU awareness and policy action.31 Deficiencies in European tertiary institution attractiveness are prominently publicized as “the great majority of Asian students studying abroad tend to go to North America or Australasia as a first priority.”32 European Commission Communication (COM (2001) 385) reinforces the importance of education services to pan EU interests “there is an ever-increasing demand for international education and student mobility. The number of international exchange students has never been greater; but they flock mainly to the US.”33 Of particular interest to this paper is further reference to deficiencies in “the number of European academics or students with links to Asia remains very small, while European Studies remains an underdeveloped field in most Asian countries.”34 Purposeful intent of the Commission is best evidenced by its own words in (COM (2001) 385) to “strengthen European studies capacities in third countries…the Commission will extend the network of European Union Studies Centers and Jean Monnet Chairs around the world, so as to provide a full service to interested academics and to
30 UNESCO report on international tertiary education students by host countries 1998 31 OECD (2009), Higher Education to 2030 Volume 2 Globalisation, OECD Publishing, Paris, 67 32 COM (2001) 469 final, 4 September 2001, Communication from the COMMISSION, Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships 33 COM (2001) 385 final, 18 July, 2001, Communication from the Commission to the EU Parliament and Council on strengthening cooperation with third countries in the field of higher education 34 COM (2001) 469 final, 4 September 2001, Communication from the COMMISSION, Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships
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demonstrate the activity of the EC in this field within universities.”35 The aforementioned states the clear intention of enticing third country students to study in Europe. However, it is not possible to bring all hopeful students to Europe; therefore a parallel approach of exporting education models has become a second strain of EU policy. Where there may be financial or other constraints that restrict third country students from studying in Europe an appeal to bring European education to those has been an applicable model for utilization. This model of European integration or European Studies is of specific interests in that the EU is in fact supporting the exportation of a specific EU tertiary education program and pedagogy via the use of foreign lecturers. It is within this competitive context that the EU has identified an area of concern and is actively engaging in the competitive struggle to uplift and broaden EU awareness. Internal documentation clearly demonstrates that the Commission is ostensibly concerned in reversing trends in global tertiary education flows. For in terms of higher education “the number of international exchange students has never been greater, but they flock mainly to the US.”36 Even top level political officials such as Former US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s’ view promotion of higher education as a source of invaluable cultural tribute, stating “I can think of no more valuable asset to our country than the friendship of future world leaders who have been educated here.”37 Tuition payments and economic incentives are a major factor as well and should not be underestimated as underscored by Wende who sees the 25%+ market share of UK inbound higher education students as ‘internationalisation in the UK can be summarized as the mobilization of the skilled human resources needed to make the UK a more internationally competitive
COM (2001) 385 final, 18 July, 2001, Communication from the Commission to the EU Parliament and Council on strengthening cooperation with third countries in the field of higher education 36 Ibid 37 J. S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power and Higher Education, in M. Devlin, R. Larson, J. Meyerson eds., The Internet and the University: Forum 2004, Educause, 2004(b), 42
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trading nation and to maximize export earnings by selling education services to paying customers”38 The EU’s role in funding and supporting education as a functional and integral part of EU relations with third countries is engendered in Article 149 of TEC. For Article 149.2.3 illustrates the role of the EU, which is to promote cooperation of education establishments. In relation to direct external relations policy Article 149.3 clearly states that “the Community and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third countries and the competent international organizations in the field of education, in particular the Council of Europe.”39 Significant relevance should be paid to Article 151.3 of the TEC. As it specifically recognizes needs for the Community and member state involvement to “foster cooperation with third countries and the competent international organizations in the sphere of culture.”40 In addition Article 151.4 clearly charges the Commission with responsibility for actions which have culture as an immediate concern so as to “respect and promote the diversity of its [European] culture.”41 In action concerning education policy, member states clearly retains the right to influence and make decisions concerning education within their respective territories as this pertains to the right of individuality of culture and diversity. Conversely, Community institutions have competence in taking actions that are considered to ‘value add’, in instances where acting together can accomplish more than acting alone,42 acting as an educational subsidiary working in parallel with
M. Van Der Wende, The International Dimension in National Higher Education Policies: What Has Changed in Europe in the Last Five Years, European Journal of Education, 36(4), 2001, 438 39 Consolidated Version of Treaty Establishing The European Community Art. 149.3 40 Consolidated Version of Treaty Establishing The European Community Art. 151 41 Ibid 42 COM (2001) 385 final, 18 July, 2001, Communication from the Commission to the EU Parliament and Council on strengthening cooperation with third countries in the field of higher education
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member states. It is within this framework that the Commission operates in a vague and ambiguous area of policy that is not a full competence of the Community, yet by default due to global realities and globalization, neither is it a monopolized sector of member states. Member states have in their own interests promoted higher education in third countries on their own behalf [i.e. British Council, EduFrance], yet in terms of impetus and pan-European promotion, the Commission has been a driver of convergence and played a significant role in the education landscape.43 The Commission has taken its initiative in education derived from the legal ambiguity and as Corbett points out that “commissioners had produced policy actions in such Treaty ‘Grey Areas’ as education”44 that is present in the founding treaties. Commission involvement in education regarding third country participants is best known for its Erasmus Mundus program which has been under Commission direction since 1987. The Erasmus Mundus program objectives are to encourage [European regional mobility] third country tertiary students, primarily graduate and post graduate level students to attend European universities. 45 The European Commission in its paper of July 2001 Cooperation with Third Countries in the Field of Higher Education emphasized the need for education in achieving other broad aims such as eradication of poverty and need to strengthen European Studies capacities in third countries.46 Within the context of
R. Keeling, The Bologna Process and Lisbon Research Agenda: The European Commission’s Expanding Role in Higher Education Discourse, European Journal of Higher Education, 41(2), 2006 44 A. Corbett, Ideas, Institutions and Policy Entrepreneurs: Towards a New History of Higher Education in the European Community, European Journal of Education, 38(3), 2003 45 COUNCIL Decision 87/327/EEC, 15 June 1987, Adopting the European Community Action Scheme for Mobility of University Students (ERASMUS) 46 G. Wiessala, Re-Orienting the Global Learning Experience: Higher Education in the Relations between the European Union and Asia and the Subject of European Studies, Chulalongkorn University Journal of European Studies, 11(1), 2004
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direct linkages between Europe-Asia; Asia-Link, ASEM, and Eramus Mundus are the most noticeable indicators of education cooperation.47 Gains brought about by culture and knowledge transfers are shown within the 2003 Commission Communication, education; in particular higher education is given a more prominent role. In fact in this document higher education/culture warrants an individual subheading, indicating its increasing significance within the sphere of EU-Asia relations. Of particular interests is reference made to the targeting of EU efforts in its 2001 Communication (469) “in Asia, the target population would include opinion makers, media, universities, business and government circles.”48 The 2001 Communication (385) is targeting intellectuals, in particular students is reiterated “Europe’s political and commercial success in the world is dependent on future decision-makers in third countries having a better understanding of, and closer ties with, Europe.”49 When realized from a structural perspective this would indicate the EU’s intent of focusing on a high socio-economic demographic in order to facilitate the an intrinsically motivated transformation of opinion, awareness, and subconscious consent garnered via greater awareness, familiarity with the EU, and positive elite opinion utilizing positive power with regard to the aforementioned which it seeks. Furthermore, the targeting of tertiary education institutions academics to diffuse information, European expert lecturers to disseminate information, and ‘elite’ student bodies to receive information pertaining to European integration adds to legitimacy of the entire process of formalizing policy. Transformation as a process, with education as a medium and legitimizer is important for policy direction in that it attempts to fuse and integrate power fragmentation
47 See N. Snow 2008 for historical analysis of Fulbright program which is the American equivalent of Eramus Mundus for political, social, cultural objectives attached to intercultural diplomacy. 48 COM (2003) 399/4, 9 July 2003, Communication from the COMMISSION, A New Partnership South East Asia 49 COM (2001) 385 final, 18 July, 2001, Communication from the Commission to the EU Parliament and Council on strengthening cooperation with third countries in the field of higher education
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by policy and structural spillover by value creation of relationships rather than narrow conceptions of zero sum power gains which are essentially one off and expensive to maintain. Legitimization and efficacious use of soft power and its evolutionary derivative smart power are stated by Condoleezza Rice as exhibiting an enlightened form of power engagement that suits the contemporary world by stating “transformational diplomacy is rooted in partnership; not paternalism. In doing things with people, not for them, we seek to use American diplomatic power to help foreign citizens better their own lives and to build their own nations and to transform their own futures”.50 The targeting of so called opinion makers is indicative of a top down approach whereby the EU could extend its influence to an assemblage that would be more adept and susceptible to EU overtures. These are values and ideals that the EU wishes to export to the rest of the world and education higher education is serving as a medium of exchange that the EU could inherently profit from for many years into the future. Structural theory points to a widening of EU interests due to what Smith terms the logic of ‘functional spillover’ whereby “actors may have to push for institutionalization in one domain to achieve goals in another domain.”51 The concept of ever ‘widening’ EU engagement and involvement in various policy fora underlies a deliberate constructive process that will if successful lead to a greater degree of ‘deepening’ of EU-Asia relations. From a spillover perspective, it seems apparent that greater cultural/social links fostered via investment in third country tertiary education may lead inevitably towards increased interactions and cooperation in future EU-Asia relations. Spillover would pertain directly to Southeast Asia by the realization that “by 2050 the centre
E. J. Wilson III, Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power, ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 661(1), 2008, 117 51 M. E. Smith, Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation, Cambridge, 2004, 33
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of gravity of the world economy will have shifted to the Asia Pacific region, with ASEAN emerging as the world’s largest exporter”52 where market forces and trade relations enjoy preeminence. The dynamic of policy spillover or cross issue interdependence and linkage is best exemplified by the External Relations Directorate General (Directorate-Asia) “Asia and Europe have increasingly to deal with the same issues. Many Asian security issues - notably of terrorism, drugs and illegal immigration - spill over into the EU. Asia is home to many volatile hotspots that impact globally and that warrant coordination with the EU.”53 It is this sort of candid appreciation of global dynamics which leads this writer to believe that EU involvement in Asia is a pragmatic approach to world politics. Furthermore, cultural diplomacy in higher education funding from the Union to Southeast Asian states is “not primarily about building trust, but about achieving specific policy-driven transactional objectives.”54 Beginning with the 1994 EU-Asia strategy and continuing on to the 2003 EU-Southeast Asia and 2003 European Security Strategy there is a harmonious and consistent structural approach taken to cross cutting security issues. The attempted generation of influence by the EU is twinned to and runs parallel to member states promotional institutions such as EduFrance, British Council and Goethe-Institut in order to facilitate inbound student mobility while accessing prestige holding universities in third countries as EU initiatives to build European studies centers in order to influence culturally oriented maxims. The process by which the EU has emerged from complete obscurity in Southeast Asia to one which is subtlety present and emerging is bound up within the context
COM (2003) 399/4, 9 July 2003, Communication from the COMMISSION, A New Partnership South East Asia 53 COMMISSION of the European Communities External Relations Directorate-General-Directorate Asia, Strategy Paper and Indicative Programme for Multi-Country Programs in Asia 2005-2006 54 J. Melissen, Wielding Soft Power: The New Public Diplomacy, Clingendael Discussion Paper in Diplomacy #2, 2005, 26
52
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of European integration and increasing influence of the Commission within non-traditional policy spheres such as tertiary education.
European Union, Thailand & Malaysia In EC-Thailand 2005-2006 NIP education is far more clearly defined in terms of a strategic policy priority “the Commission proposes that given the limited funds available for cooperation with Thailand the single priority for cooperation with Thailand in 2005-2006 be higher education.”55 With the rationale that recognition and “knowledge in Thailand about the EU, and the process of European integration are insufficiently developed….knowledge of European issues and culture among Thai students is not very high. Thailand’s younger generations have directed their attention to other Asian countries and cultures, in particular Japan, as well as to the English speaking world…consequently, there is a clear need to enhance cultural exchanges and deepen the relations between the EU, as an economic, political and social entity, and Thailand.”56 Alteration of perceptions and attitudes are clearly defined as objectives, EU action is envisioned to “allow Thai students to gain a positive and more accurate view of modern Europe…the action would contribute substantially towards the improvement of economic, and cultural links between the EU and Thailand.”57 Within the framework of this program are earmarked substantial funds for education, to the indicative amount of €3.2 million. When compared to the overall budget allocation for the two focal areas of trade/investment and health/services which total €10 million for the entire 2002-2006 period and compare this with the allocated amount of €3.2 million for education a glaring fundamental seems to be present. The stated non-focal area of education that is alluded to in CSP (2002-2006) has budget allocation equal to 32% of the total allocated to focal areas. Furthermore, both focal areas have €5 million allocated between them, over a period of 5 years, indicating
EC/Thailand National Indicative Program 2005-2006 Ibid 57 Ibid 55
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€1 million per year on average. Education in the NIP as stated prior has €3.2 million allocated for the period 2005-2006 (2 years), which is equal to €1.6 million per annum. Taken in this comparative context education funding originating from the Erasmus program would appear to have a higher priority then the stated focal areas of trade and public health, in fact judging from aggregate figures, education is funded at a higher percentage equal to 60% or €600,000 greater than focal areas per annum in the final two years of NIP consideration. When reviewing these from a holistic perspective and indeed conjoined point of view one can deduce that EU funds are utilized strategically for core measures [trade and development] but a higher portion aggregately is apportioned for soft power measures of linking the two entities via European education institutions. Malaysia’s CSP is quite similar in content, but the structure of the EC-Malaysia CSP is different, in that, education is given an explicitly higher status in terms of being a focal area of cooperation and assistance. Trade is given priority status in the form of WTO related commitments such as TRIPS and TRIMS, conforming to EU regulations/legislation, supporting the EC business community, and environment for investment. With regard to higher education the European Studies pilot program at the Universiti Sains Malaysia is viewed as a key indicator of progress and indeed is a primary focal point if not the keystone to EU overtures in terms of higher education as a pathway to greater intercultural awareness. A key EU priority is the creation of European Studies programs within Malaysia as is evidenced by the 2002-2004 NIP “promoting EU-Malaysia university partnership and networking with a view in particular to the promotion of European studies in Malaysia.”58 The entire EU budget allocation for this period is €3.5 million of which €2 million is allocated for trade issues (focal area 1) and the remainder €1.5 million allocated for Higher Education (focal area 2).59 With relation to budget allocation it is instructive to observe
58
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that of the total budget 43% is allocated specifically for higher education purposes, particularly the implementation and expansion of European Studies within Malaysia. With regard to this kind of budgetary appropriation the Commission of the “opinion that there is a need to integrate in a bilateral initiative trade and investment issues and higher education to achieve cross-fertilization.” 60 This harks back to the earlier discussed phenomenon of ‘spillover’ and linkage. Commission patronage of higher education programs is clearly shown to have a hoped for derivative effect on bilateral EC-Malaysia trade relations. With regard to this ascertation I would contend that the Commissions’ expressed view that ‘partnerships’ will be fostered and strengthened due to greater linkage and understanding garnered via higher education links is genuinely of a nature that seeks to establish a firm EU demographic and academic footprint within Malaysia. For within the specific context of the 20022004 document there is numerous mention of perpetuating European Studies within Malaysia (namely via Universiti Sains Malaysia). In addition, a key criteria objective in gauging success of the NIP is the “number of students participating in higher education programs, namely in European studies.” 61 In as far as this NIP is concerned it is fair to assume that Commission funding is strategically aimed at fostering an environment of understanding and building foundations which will instigate and evolve into greater competitive advantages for the EU and its member states in the future. The ’05-’06 NIP allocates in its entirety €2.1 million to financing the Erasmus Mundus program within the framework of the ‘Malaysian Window’.62 It is stated by the Commission that the underlying objective and intended outcome of this funding is “that students who receive scholarships will return to Malaysia and pursue high-level careers; and that their positive experiences in Europe are disseminated to others…selected students may become decision makers in Malaysia in the future.” 63
Ibid Ibid 62 EC/Malaysia National Indicative Program 2005-2006 63 Ibid 60
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It is of critical importance that the re-launch of a Malaysian based European studies program took place against the backdrop of the rather dismal prior performance and domestic rejection of the defunct pilot European studies graduate program at the University of Malaya. Re-launching of graduate level European studies program at University Sains Malaysia was rebranded as the Master of International and Diplomacy Studies in order to broaden the appeal of European studies while retaining core content of European studies programs elsewhere. This distinctly points towards the problematic nature of trying to use tertiary education within the highly competitive environment of educational services and the absolute need to connect legitimacy strains of utility as well as prestige to any degree confirmation. Failure to take root of European studies is indeed indicative of other aspects of European integration performance and perception, namely the credibility and expectations gap which exists not just in theory but in practice. This shortfall or gap is largely owed to lack of knowledge, levity and awareness of the EU as an entity but also its lack of credibility outside of the low politics sphere of trade and economics. In terms of targeting higher education institutions in Thailand and Malaysia, it would appear that choosing two nationally prestigious institutions [Chulalongkorn University, Universiti Sains Malaysia] in and of themselves serves to legitimize the degrees awarded on completion of graduate level requirements. The targeting of prestigious national universities to legitimize European Studies as a ‘valuable’, ‘worthwhile’, and ‘credible’ field of study which will produce graduates of top national universities that will enter workforces and bureaucracies with nationally prominent qualifications serves to legitimize the qualifications in and of themselves. Other objectives that appear to serve EU interests are further expressed as intent towards Malaysian students gaining “a positive and more accurate view of modern Europe…contribute substantially towards the improvement of political, economic, and cultural links between the EU and Malaysia.”64 This indicates substantial weight
64
Ibid
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put upon the assumption that cultural grafting can take place via studying for a period of time and being exposed to ‘European culture’. Furthermore, Commission impetus for action in this policy area is due to the acceptance that “knowledge in the EU about Malaysia and knowledge in Malaysia about the EU and the process of European integration are insufficiently developed…the level of knowledge of European issues and culture among Malaysian students is not very high.”65 EU goals of greater recognition and awareness of itself upon the wider world stage serves to facilitate member state interests as well as it “is generally considered that. Malaysia’s younger generation have directed their attention to other Asian countries and cultures…the great majority of Malaysian youngsters who plan to study abroad think primarily of the US & Australia.”66 Within this competitive context the Commission further anticipates an “increase future demand from Malaysia for European higher education.”67 There is a logical progression of not only operational functionality in regards to EU policy action within Thailand and Malaysia, but also a structural change in the evolutionary context between these two countries and the wider regional context. Transformations which have been shown represent a paradigmatic shift in practice of EU engagement with individual Southeast Asian countries as there is progress towards a deeper stage of relations. At present the EU is carrying out its external education policy in tertiary education under the auspices of Erasmus Mundus, Asia-Link, and ASEM programs in Southeast Asia.68 The monies allocated for higher education programming is not substantial for these objectives as €60 million are allocated for 2007-2010 for all of Asia69 which signals that
Ibid Ibid 67 EC/Malaysia National Indicative Program 2005-2006 68 European Commission Regional Programming for Asia Strategy Document 2007-2013 69 European Commission Multi Annual Indicative Programming for Asia 2007-2010
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immediate concerns lie elsewhere in the EU’s perception, yet the direct link of student mobility and cross-fertilization of cultures, minds, future decision makers is still present. The nature of higher education engagement exhibits one of developing maturity in that twinning programs, student and instructor exchanges and research promotion are now stressed, with research partnerships exhibiting a deeper and more developed degree of partnership evaluation. This procession of synergistic soft power engagement is inherently trying to achieve what Knight terms an “internationalization [of higher education] by integrating international/intercultural dimension into the teaching, research and service elements of an institution.”70
Conclusion Use of higher education in order to increase soft power differentials should not be stringently viewed through the context of an asymmetry of power or inculcation of ideas towards any target population. An enhanced perspective indicative of agent specific socialization would lead one towards a symmetrical perspective of multi-level communications understanding. This model situates a myriad of players within the dynamic of cultural, financial and educational symmetry. In order to be successful, soft power instruments must be accepted by the host university, prospective students/populations and the initiator or facilitator of soft power. Implicit within this framework is that the EU is in fact operating its cultural diplomacy from a relational position of weakness via the USA and its dominant position of cultural attraction while being in symmetrical bilateral relations with host countries and universities of EU studies programs. Levels of engagement for influence operate part and parcel on a vertical level between the EU and host nationals, and horizontally via subjects of
J. Knight (1995, 2000) as quoted in R. D. Trilokekar, International Education as Soft Power? The Contributions and Challenges of Canadian Foreign Policy to the Internationalization of Higher Education, Higher Education, 59(2), 139, 2010
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influence and domestic audiences as well as subjects and foreign audiences. These different levels of power perception inherently interact within a milieu of contested legitimacy and are often either resisted, rejected or inculcated in some measure on micro, macro and meso levels of social interaction. The failure of European studies to take hold in Malaysia with the now defunct European studies program at the University of Malaya stands as testimony to not only rejection of European studies as a cultural-educational and economic worthwhile public good, but also the inherent lack of attractionability, beauty and prowess of the EU and its primary educational export product, European Integration Studies. The policy avenue of higher education engagement and attempted use of soft power can be viewed through a dual prism of institutionalism and liberal ideology. Soft power in EU foreign policy is necessitated by the Union’s institutional deficits of bringing traditional sources of hard power to bare as well as its lack of positioning where populations are not aware, thus can put little value to its products. Yet to simply state that the Union’s apparent military weakness is to underestimate the value in engaging the wider world from a constructive angle. Instead of being viewed as an axiomatic weakness, the use of soft power and institutional restraint which it is bred from, should be considered a point of strength as it prevents the EU from being drawn into conflicts and arousing dangerous anti-European sentiments and backlash which America is currently suffering from, due to its foreign policy adventurism by using stringent hard power instruments under the George W. Bush administration. The lack of institutional hard power capacity exhibited in the EU’s CFSP and ESDP are deeply rooted in a post-World War II renaissance in notions of Kantian peace, constructive engagement and liberal multilateral institutionalism. Interest level cognition of EU objectives can be found in growing ambitions that try and place a commiserate foreign policy to its economic prowess, visions of security and stability balanced against regional and national powers which are the apparent drivers of its attempted use of soft power as exhibited in higher education funding. EU soft power is essentially subject to domestic perceptions, contested legitimacy, socio-historical constructs and social constructivism bound within agency as transposed into the
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larger habitus of networked social relations. This stands as its consequent weak point which has been identified by the Commission and stark reminder of the Union’s foreign policy shortcomings.
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References Bourdieu, Pierre. (1986) The Forms of Capital, in Richardson J. G. ed., Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education, Greenwood. Clegg Stewart R., Courpasson David, Phillips Nelson eds. (2006) Power and Organizations, Sage. Colson, Philippine. (2009) Soft Power Discourse and the Significance of European Union Foreign Policy Methods in Laursen Finn ed. The EU as a Foreign and Security Policy Actor, European Union Centre of Excellence, Nova Scotia. Cooper, Robert. (2004) The Goals of Diplomacy, Hard Power, and Soft Power, in Held David & Koenig-Archibugi Mathias eds. American Power in the 21st Century, Polity. Corbett, Ann. (2003) Ideas, Institutions and Policy Entrepreneurs : Towards A New History of Higher Education in the European Community, European Journal of Education, 38(3). Commission of the European Communities (1994) 314 final, 13 July 1994, Communication from the Commission to the Council, ‘Towards a New Asia strategy’. (2001) 385 final, 18 July, 2001, Communication from the Commission to the EU Parliament and Council on strengthening cooperation with third countries in the field of higher education. (2001) 469 final, 4 September 2001, Communication from the Commission, ‘Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships’. (2002) EC/Malaysia National Indicative Program 2002-2004. (2003) 399/4, 9 July 2003, Communication from the Commission, “A New Partnership South East Asia”. (2005) EC/Malaysia National Indicative Program 2005-2006. (2005) EC/Thailand National Indicative Program 2005-2006. (2007) European Commission MultiAnnual Indicative Programming for Asia 2007-2010. (2007) European Commission Regional Programming for Asia Strategy Document 2007-2013.
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Commission of the European Communities External Relations Directorate-General-Directorate (2005) Strategy Paper and Indicative Programme for MultiCountry Programs in Asia 2005-2006. Consolidated Version of Treaty Establishing The European Community 25 March 1957 Articles 149.3 and 151. Council of the European Union (1987) Council Decision 87/327/EEC, 15 June 1987, Adopting the European Community Action Scheme for Mobility of University Students (ERASMUS). (2000) The Lisbon Special European Council March 2000: ‘Towards a Europe of Innovation and Knowledge’. Jones, Peter. (2010) The EU-Central Asia Education Initiative, EUCAM Working Paper No. 9. Kagan, Robert. (2004) Power and Weakness, Policy Review, Volume 113. Kazepides, Tasos. (1982) Educating, Socialising and Indoctrinating, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 16(2). Keeling, Ruth. (2006) The Bologna Process and Lisbon Research Agenda: The European Commission’s Expanding Role in Higher Education Discourse, European Journal of Higher Education, 41(2). Lukes, Steven. (2005) Power and the Battle for Hearts and Minds, Millennium, 33(3). Lukes, Steven. (2007) Power and the Battle for Hearts and Minds: On the Bluntness of Soft Power, in Berenskoetter Felix & Williams M. J. eds., Power in World Politics, Routledge. Magna Carta Universitatum, Bologna 18 September 1988. Melissen, Jan. (2005) Wielding Soft Power: The New Public Diplomacy, Clingendael Discussion Paper in Diplomacy #2. Nielsen, Kristian L. (2008) The Weakness of the EU’s Soft Power Strategy, 4th Pan-European Conference on EU Politics, University of Latvia, September 25-27. Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2004)(a) Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, Perseus.
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Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2004)(b) Soft Power and Higher Education, in Devlin Maureen, Larson Richard, Meyerson Joel eds., The Internet and the University: Forum 2004, Educause. Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2004)(c) Power in the Global Information Age From Realism to Globalization, Routledge. Nye, Joseph S. Jr. (2010) Soft Power and Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century, Lecture given at British Council Parliamentary Group, January 20. Noya, Javier. (2006) The Symbolic Power of Nations, Place Branding & Public Diplomacy, 2(1). N’Diaye, P. G. (1981) Culture Development: Some Regional Experiences, UNESCO. OECD. (2009) Higher Education to 2030 Volume 2 Globalisation, OECD Publishing, Paris. Smith, Micheal. E. (2004) Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation, Cambridge. Snow, Nancy. (2008) International Exchanges and the U.S. Image, ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616(1). Sölter, Arpad A. (2008) The Renaissance of Soft Power Rediscovering Cultural Diplomacy In Transatlantic Perspective, CMG Workshop, Goethe-Institut Toronto. Sorbonne Joint Declaration, Paris 25 May 1998, ‘Joint Declaration on Harmonisation of the Architecture of the European Higher Education System’. The Bologna Declaration of 19 June 1999, Joint Declaration of European Ministers of Education. Trilokekar, Roopa D. (2010) International Education as Soft Power? The Contributions and Challenges of Canadian Foreign Policy to the Internationalization of Higher Education, Higher Education, 59(2). Vuving, Alexander L. (2009) How Soft Power Works, paper presented at American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Toronto Canada, September 3. Wächter, Bernd. (2004) The Bologna Process: Developments and Prospects, European Journal of Education, 39(3).
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Wende, Marijk Van Der. (2001) The International Dimension in National Higher Education Policies: What Has Changed in Europe in the Last Five Years, European Journal of Education, Volume 36(4). Wiessala, Georg. (2004) Re-Orienting the Global Learning Experience: Higher Education in the Relations between the European Union and Asia and the Subject of European Studies, Chulalongkorn University Journal of European Studies, 11(1). Wilson, Ernest J. (2008) III Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power, ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616(1). Young P., Adler S. A., and Shadiow L. K. (2006) Cultural Foundations of Education, 4th edition, Pearson. United Nations Educational, Scientific, Cultural Organization (1998) UNESCO report on international tertiary education students by host countries 1998. (2004) UNESCO report on tertiary education consumers 2004.
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Tourism Trail in Lower Mekong Basin Economic Circle (Thailand-Laos-Cambodia-Vietnam) Supachai Wanalertsakul, Kanokwan Manorom, and Boonyasarit Aneksuk Abstract The purpose of this article is to engage in a preliminary study on the promotion and development of tourism among Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam within the Lower Mekong Basin Economic Circle. The collaborative link has as its goal the connection of tourism in the provinces in the four countries that lie close to one another. This kind of multi-destination tourism connecting attractions in several countries must have greater appeal to prospective visitors than tourism in any one particular country. This is because each country has different attractions associated with its geographical topography and social and cultural conditions that together with those of other countries could serve as stronger incentives to tourism in this sub-region. Key Words: Lower Mekong Basin Economic Circle, Tourism Trail, Indochina, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Ubon Ratchathani Province.
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Introduction The Lower Mekong Basin Economic Circle was an idea conceived by the Chamber of Commerce, Ubon Ratchathani province, to develop the province into a centre for tourism interlinking with Indochinese countries which consist of Thailand, Lao PDR, Cambodia and Vietnam. It relies upon the framework for administering the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) project. The said Chamber of Commerce decided in 1991 to propose the Lower Mekong Basin Economic Circle to develop the economy of the northeastern part of Ubon Ratchathani province (“Lower Isan”) and the lower part of the Mekong sub-region, with Ubon Ratchathani province as the centre [Refer to Figure 1]. This was a consequence of the fact that the province itself is at the heart of the lower part of the sub-region. As a large province with the potentiality to develop, including the availability of basic amenities as part of the information, it is also ready to support the idea of the Lower Mekong Basin Economic Circle. To address the issue, the Chamber of Commerce of the province set up a working group initially called the Indochina Economic Coordinating Committee (IECC). Later the name was changed to “The Committee for Economic Coordination in Indochina” to operationalize the Circle mentioned, and it has functioned till today. It took fifteen years to survey the connecting routes between Ubon Ratchathani province and neighbouring countries, covering Lao PDR (southern provinces, namely Champasak, Salavan, Xekong, Attapu, and Savannakhet), Vietnam (Kon Tum, Da Nang, Hue and Quang Tri), and Cambodia (Preah Vihear, Siem Reap, Strung Treng and Ratanakiri). (The Ubon Chamber of Commerce, 2006) The rationale was to advocate for routes which would be interlinked to promote trade, tourism and communications in the face of difficulties in entry and exit between countries and poor road conditions.
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Fig. 1 Ubon Ratchathani and Economic Circle in Lower Mekong Basin
Source : The Ubon Chamber of Commerce, 2010.
Historical Background Survey of Tourism Trail in Lower Mekong Basin Economic Circle As a consequence of the idea of the Lower Mekong Basin Economic Circle, the said Committee undertook surveys, from its inception until now, in the following important areas : 1) Project on economic circle caravan between Ubon Ratchathani province, Savannakhet and Da Nang (between 20-25 June 1994) ; 2) Project linking relations between Ubon Ratchathani province and five southern provinces of Lao PDR (Champasak, Salavan, Xekong, Attapu and Savannakhet) ; 3) Project to survey the route from Ubon Ratchathani to Siem Reap ; 4) Project to survey the route from Ubon Ratchathani via Pakse, Champasak area and Attapu area to the Vietnamese frontier at the town of Kon Tum and leading to the South China Sea at the town of Binh Dinh (Quy Nhan) (this survey was presented at the 16th
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plenary meeting of the Chambers of Commerce at the national level between 23-24 January 1999) ; 5) Project to survey the route from Ubon Ratchathani via Pakse, Champasak area and Attapu area (on the Lao and Vietnamese frontier), Kon Tum town, Da Nang, Quang Tri, Dan Lao Bao (on the Lao-Vietnamese frontier), Savannakhet, Mukdahan, and Amnatcharoen back to Ubon Ratchathani ; and 6) the Project to survey the route of the Economic Circle between 22-24 May 2005. (Chavalit Aoungkavanich, Interview)
Agreements on Tourism Agreement Between Thailand and Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam for Tourism
Thailand made agreement with Lao PDR, Cambodia and Vietnam on Mutual Exemption of Visas for Tourism in Lower Mekong Basin Economic Circle have as follow : Thailand and Laos [1] Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic on Mutual Exemption of Visas for Holders of Diplomatic Passports, 1994. [2] Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic on Mutual Exemption of Visas for Holders Official Passports, 1999. [3] Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic on Visa Exemption for Holders of Ordinary Passports, 2004. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, 2010) Thailand and Cambodia [1] Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of the Kingdom of Cambodia on Mutual Exemption of Visas for Holders of Diplomatic Passports, 2001. [2] Protocol to Amend the Agreement on Mutual Exemption of Visas for Holders of Official Passports, 2006. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, 2010) Thailand and Vietnam [1] Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of
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Thailand and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on Mutual Exemption of Visas for Holders of Diplomatic and Official Passports and Visas Facilitation for Ordinary Passports, 1997. [2] Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on Visa Exemption for Holders of Ordinary Passports, 2000. [3] Protocol to Amend the Agreement on Mutual Exemption of Visas for Holders of Diplomatic and Official Passports, 2004. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, 2010) Thai nationals holding a Thai passport can cross the border at the International Border Crossing to Laos and Vietnam. However, Thai ordinary passport holders cannot cross the border to Cambodia. It is possible to apply for Visa on Arrival at the Border. [Details in Table 1]
Results and Discussion The researcher has paid particular attention to the tourism links between the group of Indochinese countries, namely Thailand, Lao PDR, Cambodia and Vietnam through the land routes under the Economic Circle [Details in Table 2]. He has surveyed the route to prepare a tourism map under the project “One day, tourism in four countries : Lower Mekong Basin Economic Circle”. An important reason for this is that this is a route interlinking with four countries, with tourism as the lead factor in trade and investment as conceived by the Committee for Economic Coordination in Indochina. (The Ubon Chamber of Commerce, 2006) The survey programme began in Ubon Ratchathani province and proceeded to Thung Si Muang Park, Sirinthon district, and the Thai-Lao frontier (Chong Mek-Vang Tao customs post) as a gateway to Indochinese countries via Pakse town (Champasak province) and Champasak Palace Hotel (Boun Oum royal palace), to the Lao-Cambodian frontier (Veun Kham-Dong Kralor customs post), via the towns of Strung Treng and Kratie in Cambodia, to the CambodianVietnamese frontier (Trapaing Sre-Hoa Lu customs post), via the towns of Binh Phuoc and Binh Duong, with the final destination of Ho Chi Minh city (arriving in the evening).
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The trip took 14 hours, covering 763 kilometers. The accommodation was at Ho Chi Minh city on the first night, and the trip progressed to famous touristic spots in Ho Chi Minh City, for example Ho Chi Minh People’s Committees Building. Then the visit proceeded to the town of Tay Ninh, leading to the Vietnamese-Cambodian frontier (Moc Bai-Bavet customs post), though the towns of Svay Rieng, Prey Veng and Kandal, to Phnom Penh, the capital of Cambodia. A visit was paid to the Sihanouk Palace and other touristic spots in Phnom Penh. The second night was spent in Phnom Penh. Then the trip proceeded from Phnom Penh, via the towns of Kampong Cham and Kampong Thom, to Siem Reap. Angkor Wat and Angkor Thom, wonders of the world, were visited [Details in Table 3]. The third night (the final night) was spent in Siem Reap. Then the trip continued directly to the town of Anlong Veng, through the Cambodian-Thai frontier (Chong Chorm and Chong Sa-Ngam customs post), back to Ubon Ratchathani province. [Details in Table 1 and Table 2] The whole trip took 3 nights 4 days with a distance of 1,644 kilometers, covering four countries (Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam). [Details in Table 4 and Figure 2] Table 1 International Border Crossing in Lower Mekong Basin Economic Circle International Border Crossing Chong Mek
Vang Tao
Ubon Ratchathani (Thailand)
Champasak (Laos)
Veun Kham
Dong Kralor
Champasak (Laos)
Strung Treng (Cambodia)
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Information Passport (30 Days) Exemption of Visas for Diplomatic, Official and Ordinary.
Passport and Visa (30 Days) Exemption of Visas for Diplomatic and Official. *Ordinary (not implemented in Cambodia).
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Trapaing Sre
Hoa Lu
Kratie (Cambodia)
Binh Phuoc (Vietnam)
Moc Bai
Bavet
Tay Ninh (Vietnam)
Svay Rieng (Cambodia)
Chong Chorm
Chong Sa-Ngam
Oddor Meanchey (Cambodia)
Sisaket (Thailand)
Passport and Visa (30 Days) Exemption of Visas for Diplomatic and Official. *Ordinary (not implemented in Cambodia). Passport and Visa (30 Days) Exemption of Visas for Diplomatic and Official. *Ordinary (not implemented in Cambodia). Passport and Visa (30 Days) Exemption of Visas for Diplomatic and Official. *Ordinary (not implemented in Cambodia).
Source : Researcher (Survey), 2010. Table 2 Road’s Condition in Lower Mekong Basin Economic Circle
Road’s Condition
Information Road No.217 from Ubon Ratchathani to Sirinthon district (Chong Mek Boundary Post) (Thailand-Laos)
Road No.10 from Vang Tao International Crossing Point to Pakse, Champasak (Laos-Thailand)
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Road No.13 (Wikipedia, 2010) from Pakse to Veun Kham International Border Crossing (Laos-Cambodia)
Road No.7 (Wikipedia, 2010) from : 1) Dong Kralor Immigration (Cambodia-Laos) to Strung Treng and Kratie 2) Kratie to Snoul city (Trapaing Sre International Border Crossing) (Cambodia-Vietnam) Road No.13 (Wikipedia, 2010) from : 1) Hoalu International Border Crossing (VietnamCambodia), Loc Ninh to Binh Phuoc 2) Binh Phuoc to Binh Duong 3) Binh Duong to Ho Chi Minh City Road No.22 (Wikipedia, 2010) from : 1) Ho Chi Minh City to Tay Ninh 2) Tay Ninh to Moc Bai International Border Crossing (Vietnam-Cambodia) Road No.1 (Wikipedia, 2010) from Bavet International Border Crossing (Vietnam-Cambodia) to Svay Rieng Prey Veng - Kandal and Phnom Penh
Road No.6 (Wikipedia, 2010) from : 1) Phnom Penh to Kampong Cham 2) Kampong Cham to Kampong Thom 3) Kampong Thom to Siem Reap Road No.67 from : 1) Siem Reap to Oddar Meanchey 2) Oddar Meanchey to Anlong Veng, Chong Chorm International Border Crossing (Cambodia-Thailand)
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Road in Ban Zaeprai Sisaket, Chong Sa-Ngam International Border Crossing (Thailand-Cambodia) to Road No.24 (Sisaket-Ubon Ratchathani)
Road No.24 from Khukhan Crossroad (Sisaket) to Ubon Ratchathani
Source : Researcher (Survey), 2010.
Table 3 Interesting Tourist Attractions in Lower Mekong Basin Economic Circle
City/Country
Interesting Tourist Attractions and Information
Ubon Ratchathani - Thailand
Thung Si Muang Park
Located at the center of town in front of City Hall, this pleasant little park has several points of interest : [1] A bright yellow elaborately carved candle sculpture, completed in 2000, standing 22 meters tall and dedicated to the King, showcases of Isan art styles and has become the symbol of the city. The candle is placed on a barge, with a garuda eagle at the bow and a naga serpent around it. [2] A statue of Phra Phatumvoraratsuriyawang commemorates the tersely named founder of the town. And [3] A Monument of Merit has been erected by former World War II POWs to commemorate the kindness of the people of Ubon Ratchathani. (Wikitravel, 2010)
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Pakse, Champasak - Laos
Champasak Palace
Is the former residence of the Prince of Champasak, Chao Boun Oum. It was built for Prince Boun Oum, as a residence, but he had to abandon it in 1974, before it was finished as the Royal Lao government was overthrown by the communist Pathet Lao. After the revolution, the building was completed and served as a venue for the Communist party congresses and accommodation for visiting dignitaries. The Palace was then converted into a hotel in 1995 after a Thai company succeeded in its negotiations with the Lao government. (Wikipedia, 2010) Royal Palace
Phnom Penh Cambodia
Is a complex of buildings which serves as the royal residence of the king of Cambodia. The Kings of Cambodia have occupied it since it was built in 1866, with a period of absence when the country came into turmoil during and after the reign of the Khmer Rouge. The palace was constructed after King Norodom relocated the royal capital from Oudong to Phnom Penh in the mid1800s. It was gradually built atop an old citadel called Banteay Kev. It faces towards the East and is situated at the Western bank of the four divisions at the Mekong River called Chaktomuk (an allusion to Brahma). (Wikipedia, 2010)
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Angkor Wat
Siem Reap Cambodia
Is a Hindu temple complex at Angkor, Cambodia, built for the king Suryavarman II in the early 12th century as his state temple and part of his capital city. As the best-preserved temple at the site, it is the only one to have remained a significant religious centre since its foundation - first Hindu, dedicated to the god Vishnu, then Buddhism The temple is the epitome of the high classical style of Khmer architecture. It has become a symbol of Cambodia, appearing on its national flag, and it is the country’s prime attraction for visitors. (Wikipedia, 2010) Ho Chi Minh City - Vietnam
Ho Chi Minh People’s Committee Building
Was built in 1902-1908 in a French colonial style for the then city of Saigon. It was renamed after 1975 as Ho Chi Minh City by People’s Committee. Illuminated at night, the building is not opened to the public or for tourists. A statute of the namesake is found in park next to the building. (Wikipedia, 2010) Source : Researcher (Survey), 2010.
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Table 4 Road’s Distance in Lower Mekong Basin Economic Circle
Information
Kilometers (Km.)
Ubon Ratchathani - Ho Chi Minh City
763
Ho Chi Minh City - Phnom Penh
270
Phnom Penh - Siem Reap
314
Siem Reap - Chong Sa-Ngam
135
Chong Sa-Ngam - Ubon Ratchathani
162
All Distance
1,644
Source : Researcher (Survey), 2010.
Fig. 2 Tourism Trail in Lower Mekong Basin Economic Circle (Cambodia-Thailand)
Sirinthon
Chong Chorm-Chong Sa-Ngam Sesiket
Anlong Veng R67
R24
Ubon Ratchathani
Pone Tong
R217 R10 Chong Mek-Vang Tao (Thailand-Laos) R13
Oddar Meanchey R7
R6
Pakse (Champasak) Muang Khong Veun Khem-Dong Kalor (Laos-Cambodia) Strung Treng Kratie
Siem Reap
Snoul
Kampong Thom
Trapaing Sre-Hoa Lu (Cambodia-Vietnam)
Kampong Cham R1 Phnom Penh
Kandal
Prey Veng
(Cambodia-Vietnam) Moc Bai-Bavet R22 Svay Rieng
Source : Researcher (Survey), 2010.
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Tay Ninh
R13
Loc Ninh Binh Phuoc Binh Duong Ho Chi minh City
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Conclusion The Lower Mekong Basin Economic Circle has provided an important impetus for Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam to develop its infrastructure, which essentially consists of upgrading roads, permanent checkpoints, transportation services, and border control offices, together with the improvement of the immigration and customs procedures and the general environment in the city, with a view to promoting of tourism. Though these development activities have not yet been completed, they have already resulted in the city being able to function as a centre and hub linking tourism in the Indochina and to widen its relations with the countries in this sub-region.
Acknowledgement I offer my special thanks to Prof. Vitit Muntarbhorn, Department of International Law, Faculty of Law and Asst. Prof. Theera Nuchpiam (Ph.D.), Advisor of Institute of Asian Studies (IAS), Chulalongkorn University. And Prof. Phijaisakdi Horayangkura, Faculty of Law, Assumption University (ABAC), Bangkok, Thailand. I feel indebted for their valuable suggestion throughout this period of article and research. And their ongoing technical support to the very end which gave me the most positive, inspirational support throughout the research process and wonderful moral support.
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References Canby Publications. (2010) Cambodia : International Overland Border Crossings, http://www.canbypublications.com/cambodia/over land.htm, August. Chavalit Aoungkavanich. (2010) Interview, Chairman’s Advisor The Ubon Chamber of Commerce, 21 January. Discovery Indochina. (2010) Laos Cross Border, http://www.discovery indochina.com/laos/laos_crossborder.html, August. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand. (2010) Cambodia, http:// www.mfa.go.th/web/2386.php?id=51, August. _______________. (2010) Laos, http://www.mfa.go.th/web/2386. php?id=148, August. _______________. (2010) Vietnam, http://www.mfa.go.th/web/2386. php?id=273, August. The Ubon Chamber of Commerce. (2010) Economic Circle in Indochina, http://www.ubonchamber.com/mapbig.jpg, July. _______________. (2006) Indochina Economic 2006, The Ubon Chamber of Commerce News Journal, (Special Copy) B-C. _______________. (2006) One day tourism in four countries : Tourism Road’s in Indochina Economic Circle, The Ubon Chamber of Commerce Newspaper, September. Wikipedia. (2010) Angkor Wat, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angkor_ Wat, August. ________. (2010) Champasak Palace, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Champasak_Palace, August. ________. (2010) Ho Chi Minh City Hall, http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Ho_Chi_Minh_City_Hall, August. ________. (2010) National Highway 1 (Cambodia), http://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/National_Road_1_(Cambodia), November. ________. (2010) National Highway 6 (Cambodia), http://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/National_Highway_6_(Cambodia), November. ________. (2010) National Highway 7 (Cambodia), http://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/National_Highway_7_(Cambodia), November. ________. (2010) National Road 13, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ National_Road_13_(Vietnam), November.
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________. (2010) National Road 22, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ National_Road_22_(Vietnam), November. ________. (2010) Route 13 (Laos), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Route_ 13_(Laos), November. ________. (2010) Royal Palace, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Royal_ Palace,_Phnom_Penh, August. Wikitravel. (2010) Ubon Ratchathani, http://wikitravel.org/en/Ubon_ Ratchathani, August.
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The Russo-Siamese Relations: The Reign of King Chulalongkorn Natanaree Posrithong Abstract The long lasting Russo-Siamese relationship had officially established since 1897 when King Chulalongkorn paid his first visit to St-Petersburg. The welcoming attitudes of Tsar Nicholas II changed the Siamese diplomatic strategy in dealing with the European expansion completely. By the end of nineteenth century, Siam was encountering territorial conflicts with both major European powers, France and Britain. As a consequence of the 1893 Franco-Siamese War, Siam had converted into a “buffer” state. With its utter position, the Siamese King sought ways to preserve his predominance in the region. Hence, King Chulalongkorn headed to the road he termed “modernisation” which inspired him to realise the importance of imperial diplomacy. Four years after the Franco-Siamese war, the Siamese King had reached his way to one of the greatest royal courts of the world, the Romanov. The main goal of this paper is to explore the origins of the relationship between the two royal courts of Russia and Siam as well as the legacy of the Russo-Siamese relations in the comparison of the Russification process to Siamification process. Through primary records from the Thailand’s National Archives, books, and journals, this research will lead to the new discoveries of the history of Russo-Siamese relations in which still remain reserved for over one-hundred and twelve years since the two great Kings met. Key Words: History of International Relations, Imperial Diplomacy, Territorial Conflict, Russification, Siamification
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Introduction The long lasting Russo-Siamese relationship started in 1891 when King Chulalongkorn paid his first visit to St-Petersburg. The welcoming attitudes of Tsar Nicholas II, to a great extent, influenced the Siamese diplomatic strategy in dealing with European expansion. Siam had been encountering territorial conflicts with both major European powers, France and Britain. As a consequence of the 1893 Franco-Siamese War, Siam had been converted into a “buffer” state. With its geo-political position, Siam sought different ways to preserve its predominance in the region. As a result, King Chulalongkorn headed to the road he termed “modernisation” which involved the importance of imperial diplomacy with the Western World. Four years after the Franco-Siamese war, the Siamese King had reached his way to one of the greatest royal courts of the world, the Romanov. One of the main hypotheses of this discovery is to find out that the Siamese King’s visit to Europe was directly related to the territorial conflicts it was facing with the European expansionists, namely France and Britain. Literatures suggest that the King’s European visit was involved with the safeguarding of the political sovereignty of Siam. Karl Weber states in his article “Dynastic Diplomacy in the Fifth Reign: Siam’s Relations with German Bridgeheads” that King Chulalongkorn had chosen the ‘buffer strategy’ over the position of ‘buffer state’.1 As a result, he had adopted the ‘pro-active’ stance against the colonial powers. Hence, this stance served Siam as the safeguard to colonialism. Weber’s term pro-active was tactical in this sense. The King’s European visits proved to be the outcome of the pro-active stance at this point. By allying with other European royalties, the King gained tremendous popularity. He became a “cousin of European royalty”, as Weber concluded. 2 A Thai scholar Thammanit also stressed the king’s pro-active position in King Chulalongkorn: recorders of significant
Weber, K. (2004). Dynastic Diplomacy in the Fifth Reign: Siam’s Relations with German Bridgeheads. Journal of European Studies. Chulalongkorn University, 12 (1). 2 Ibid.
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events during his reign. The book provides a cohesive summary of important events in the Siamese history under the reign of King Chulalongkorn. Once again, the visits to Europe were praised most highly. Thammanit gave a similar account to Weber that the king had chosen to approach the West with the “pro-active” stance. He suggests that France’s influence on Indochina and Britain’s in Malaya were the major causes of the King’s second European visit in 1907 --- “to directly negotiate with France and Britain”. In addition, Thammanit also mentioned a special relationship the King had with Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany which served as the backup ground for the Siamese bargaining power.3 The visits to Europe were successful. King Chulalongkorn had proved to the European monarchs that he was a “civilized cousin of European royalty”. This appraisal was also given by Tsar Nicholas II of Russia. Chalong Soontarawanit states in his article “Politics behind the European visits” that Tsar Nicholas II had warmly hosted the King of Siam at St-Petersburg in 1897. Chalong also argues that as a result of this visit, the relationship between the two countries had been born.4 This highlights the starting point of the great friendship between the two leaders. Ever since then the Siamese and the Russians have initiated their diplomatic ties. Gorapin Taweta also mentions in her article “Long Lasting Russian-Thai Relationship” that the King Rama V had decided to send his son, H.RH. Prince Chakrabongse Bhuvanath to study military in Russia, after he has returned from his visit. One year later, the Tsar also appointed the First Charge d’Affairs, Mr. Alexandre Olarovsky, to Siam while Phraya Mahibal Borrirak was also sent to St. Petersburg as the first Siamese Ambassador in 1899.5 Therefore, both literatures have clearly emphasized the importance of the forming of the diplomatic foundation that began in this period.
3 Thammanit. (2008). King Chulalongkorn: Autobigraphy. Bangkok. 4 Chalong, S. (2001). The King Rama the Fifth Visit’s to Europe: The 60th Year Anniversary. Matichon, 227-268. 5 Gorapin, T. (nd.). Russia-Siam: The Lasting Relationship. Sillapakorn University Journal. 46 (6), p. 84.
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Yet literatures already suggest that the Russo-Siamese relationship was born on the imperial playground, the true legacy of this friendship still had not been determined. Therefore, the main goals of this research are; first to explore the origins of the relationship between the two royal courts of Russia and Siam, and second to discover legacy of the imperial friendship. To do this, the research will be divided into three main chapters. Chapter One aims to examine the origins of RussoSiamese relations in which records of the exchanges between the two royal courts since the first Czarevitch’s visit to Siam (1891) will be studied. This includes personal promises the two leaders exchanged, i.e. records of princes who were sent off to study in Russia under the Tsar’s guardianship. Chapter Two approaches the analysis of the diplomatic relations. This chapter analyses the role and the limitation of Russia in the Siamese-Franco conflict. Chapter Three examines the legacy of the Russo-Siamese relations. Through all these explorations, this study’s final goal is to answer the question: To what extent was the alliance with the Tsarist Russia important to Siam’s sovereignty during the years of European colonialism?
The Origin of the Russo-Siamese Relations Many European countries had already established their relationships with Siam since the Ayutthaya period. However, the friendship with Russia was not formally established until 1891, with the first Russian visit of Czarevitch Nicholas to Siam.6 Ever since then the relationship between the two royal courts was initiated. This was highlighted by the process of royal exchanges and visits. Indeed, this bond was unique and distinct from most other foreign relations Siam initiated. It was founded on the royal affiliation rather than trade or colonial interests. Chalong Soontarawanit mentioned in his work Russia - Thailand Relations during the reign of King Rama V to King Rama VI, that Russia had no interests to colonize Siam. 7 Neither
In Russian it means Crown Prince. Chalong, S. (1973). Russo-Siamese Relations: The Reign of Kings Rama Fifth and Sixth. Bangkok.
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7
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were any trade agreements signed before the two royal families met. Even though K.A. Anquis, Captain of the Royal Navy ship “Gleyak”, suggests in his report to Foreign Ministry that Russia should open trade with Bangkok for cotton, sugar, pepper, and red wood; there was no response from Russia.8 Therefore, it is essential to explore the actual origin of the Russo-Siamese relations by dividing this chapter into three sub-parts; the Czarevitch’s visit to Siam, King Chulalongkorn’s visit to Europe, and other personal relations.
The Czarevitch’s visit to Siam 1891 King Chulalongkorn invited Crown Prince Czarevitch Nicholas to visit Siam through the Russian government with specific intentions. While it is apparent that Russia had no interest to colonize or even trade with Siam, Chulalongkorn had many reasons behind this invitation. First and most important, was the security reason. Siam was turned into a buffer state by the arrival of the two great colonial rulers, Britain and France. While Siam saw that Russia was the least harmful among all other European states to Siam’s security, the King initiated this royal relationship by sending his brother Prince Damrong to personally escort the Czarevitch from Singapore to Siam. In spite of the rumors of the outbreak of cholera, which were supposedly made up by Britain, Nicholas accepted the invitation most willingly. The King of Siam knew well that if he could establish a royal relationship with the Romanovs, Siam would gain bargaining power with France and Britain in the territorial disputes. Without a surprise, Chulalongkorn made sure that the Czarevitch was well received by the Siamese. The five-day visit of the Crown Prince was well planned and escorted by the King’s brothers. Siam showed to the Russian Prince that it also possessed what the West called “civilization”. Although King Chulalongkorn had never seen Europe until 1897, he had already carefully observed and studied
Committee Historical Documents. (1997). 100 Years of Russo-Siamese Relationship.Thammasat University, Bangkok.
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the Europeans from both personal interactions with foreign settlers and books. As a result, the Czarevitch’s visit was tremendously successful. The prince mentioned as he was being received at the port: Since the far away time when the embassy of Louis XIV arrived to this country, no visitors have been received with so much trust and warmth, and have been awaited with so much impatience and hope….The Siamese feel that we are not after their independence or their national existence. King Chulalongkorn has, it is said, made it known to his people that the Czarevitch must be welcomed as a national guest, even as a friend.9 The statement illustrates a clear attitude that the Russian Prince had towards this visit. He realised Chulalongkorn’s position and wanted to ensure the King that his arrival was friendly and sincere. As a consequence, the King gained a great deal of trust from the Czarevitch and vice versa. Prince Uchtomskij, one of the followers of the Crown Prince during his visit in Siam and Saigon, described in his journal of the unforgettable journey in Siam that the Siamese treated the Czarevitch and his crew as distinguished guests. Moreover, Uchtomskij praised the Siamese people in their attitudes and the blissful culture. He even criticized the way the West have pictured the Siamese as being backward and uncivilized. The prince claimed “they (Siamese) are our brothers not only as to their external image but also according to common internal gifts”.10 As it has been demonstrated, the first encounter between the two royal families was not a coincidence. Instead, it was carefully planned by King Chulalongkorn. Eventually, this success would lead to the growing relationship between the two states. The tie would strengthened through more visits i.e. Prince Damrong’s visit to Russia
Uchtomskij, P.E.E. (1997). Czarevitch Nicholas of Russia in Siam and Saigon. Bangkok, p. 7. 10 Ibid., p. xxiii.
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Fig. 1 King Chulalongkorn (left) and Tsar Nicholas II (right) one year after the Czarevitch visited Siam. However, the Siamese-Russo history would only reach its turning point six years later when Chulalongkorn paid his first visit to Europe as not only a national guest but a friend of now Tsar Nicholas II.
King Chulalongkorn’s visit to Europe 1897 The death of Tsar Alexander III at the age of forty-nine shocked the European affairs. However, when the news reached Siam, a new hope was born. In 1894, Chulalongkorn’s good friend succeeded the Romanov throne. Czarevitch Nicholas was crowned Tsar Nicholas II. As the world was watching, how the young Tsar was going to reign in the vast Empire of Russia, the King of Siam continued to face tensions from the European rulers in Southeast Asia. The new hope that Chulalongkorn looked upon was the wish to persuade Russia into the region in order to increase his own bargaining power with Britain and France. Indeed the Siamese King had been encouraging Russia to get involved in the territorial affairs ever since the Czarevitch’s visit. Nevertheless, nothing official had been established. Even though the
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Czarevitch had shown his great appreciation from his previous visit to Siam in many of the records of his followers, Russia still refused to sign any bilateral agreements with Siam. In other words, Siam had been too unimportant to Alexander III throughout the period from around 18911894. Soon Siam’s status was going to be more noteworthy, not by the Tsar’s own will, but largely by Chulalongkorn’s initiative. Chulalongkorn said to R.AS. Yonin, the Russian ambassador in Bern, Switzerland. “I am most grateful to be meeting with the representative from Russia. As I am now visiting Europe and all these great capitals, my most desired destination is Russia. Throughout these years, I’ve never forgotten his majesty’s kindness given to Siamese people. Every time I think of it, I remember his majesty’s visit as the great and most joyful cerebration”.11 This statement demonstrates that the King of Siam was ultimately determined to visit Russia and the Tsar. In other words, his Russian visit was the highlight of his voyage. Indeed, it was really the highlight for Chulalongkorn. The visit did not only strengthen the imperial friendship but also led to the establishment of the diplomatic relations and highlighted the status of Siam within the international context. The establishment of the official diplomatic relations between the two countries was initiated right after the King returned from his European visit. The appointment of the first Russian Consul of Bangkok went to Alexander Olarovski, the Consul-General in New York. Olarovski was appointed on the 21st of February 1898, only half a year after the king’s visit to St. Petersburg. Nicholas II clearly stated that “this appointment of to the first Russian Consul in Bangkok aims to institute a firm diplomatic relationship between the two nations besides our brotherhood (Chakri and Romanov) and our great friendship that have already been established”.12 This diplomatic establishment was also
Committee Historical Documents. (1997). 100 Years of Russo-Siamese Relationship.Thammasat University, Bangkok, p. 11-13. 12 Ibid., p. 64-65.
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seen as a very significant step for the Siamese government. Olarovski wrote to the Tsar that the King had granted the best building in Bangkok, close to the Grand Palace, to set up the first Russian Consulate. “Until now, there are no embassies of any countries that have as privileged location as ours”.13 Furthermore, he described the atmosphere of the reception of the opening of the embassy to be very impressive. He stated that as many as a hundred and seventy-five Siamese and a hundred and thirty Europeans attended the reception. This demonstrates that both Siamese nobility and European officials realised the importance of the new proclamation of Russo-Siamese diplomatic relations. 14 Apart from the establishment of the new Russian Consulate in Bangkok, the first Thai Consul also arrived to St. Petersburg in 1898. This apparently completed the diplomatic affiliation between the two nations. The confidential report from the Russian Foreign Ministry to Olarovski, dated the day he was appointed as Consul-General of Bangkok, demonstrates a significant evidence of Russia’s concerns over Siam’s situation. The report meant to prepare Olarovski to understand the root of the Siamese-Franco-Briton conflict and to confirm the main objectives of his new task as the first Consul-General in Bangkok. One part of the report states that Britain and France had agreed in the declaration in 1896 that the Mekong River was going to serve as the frontier between France and Siam. But later on, France violated the agreement by claiming the area on the right side of the Mekong (the Siamese side) and menaced to annex provinces in the south of Indochina bordering Siam such as, Battambang and Angkor.15 At this point, France was seen as one of the most dangerous foreign powers to Siam. Russia sympathised with this fact, but the Russo-Franco alliance had only recently been initiated. Russia could not afford to risk this special relationship just yet. Therefore, Olarovski’s main enemy in Siam
Committee Historical Documents. (1997). 100 Years of Russo-Siamese Relationship. Thammasat University, Bangkok, p. 4-9. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid., p. 3-21.
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was not France, but Britain. When the French never ceased their expansion in Southeast Asia, so did the British. Britain inserted its power into a region of Malaya which, according to a Russian report, was subservient to the Siamese control. Plus the Siamese educated nobles tended to admire and believe in British liberalism. These two reasons made Russia hostile to Britain’s position in the region. The document advise Olarovski “to oppose the expansion of Britain in Indochina” by using the diplomatic means.16 Nevertheless, the document stresses that the most important task for Olarovski as the Consul-General was to ensure the status of Siam in order to treasure the great imperial friendship of the Emperor and the King. In addition, Nicholas II hoped that Olarovski would serve as the mediator to compromise and balance the power between France and Britain, while helping Siam maintain its sovereignty. Evidently, this was not going to be an easy task for Olarovski as tensions between the three states never ceased. As one can see, Chulalongkorn’s visit to Europe had not only strengthened the imperial friendship but, more importantly, increased Siamese bargaining power in the territorial conflicts by the support of Russia. As the King said “staying in Russia will ever remain the brightest memory of all my travels in Europe”.17 Indeed, it will remain the brightest memory for the history of Siam as a whole.
Other Personal Relations The Russo-Siamese relationship was not based solely on the exchange visits of the Tsar and the King. It also emerged on the ground of personal relationship, to the great extent, of the Siamese nobles. In fact, the first Siamese who visited imperial Russia was not King Chulalongkorn but his favourite brother, Prince Damrong. The Russian Consul-General in Singapore wrote to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
Ibid. Struve. (1897). Letter from Master of the Court Struve 679/148. Unpublished manuscript. National Archives of Thailand, Bangkok.
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17
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July 1891, only a few months after the Czarevitch’s visit, to inform the Prince’s visit to Russia. The letter praises Prince Damrong for his charm and his language skills. “Prince Damrong speaks English fluently and he is also Minister of Education”.18 Moreover, the Consul mentioned that the Prince officially declared that he does not have any political agenda in his first Europe’s visit. The main aim was to bring the Siamese royal insignia to the Tsar Alexander III. However, the Russian consul in Singapore strongly believed that Siam must have had political objectives behind the prince’s visit, judging from its current situation.19 The Consul actually foresaw the conflicts of interests between France and Britain. He intentionally warned the Foreign Ministry to prepare an answer to the Prince’s approach on the Franco-British conflict.
Fig. 2 Ekaterina Desnitskaya or Mom Catherine Chakrabongse (left), Chula Chakrabongse (middle), Prince Chakrabongse (right)
Committee Historical Documents. (1997). 100 Years of Russo-Siamese Relationship. Thammasat University, Bangkok, p. 14-15. 19 Ibid.
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Not until 1898 was the first Siamese student sent to study in Russia. Prince Chakrabongse arrived to Russia when he was only fifteen years old to enroll at the Royal Cadet Academy. Tsar Nicholas II responded to Chulalongkorn’s wish to provide guardianship and accommodation for the Prince at the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg.20 This adoption highlights the firm personal relationship between the two rulers. After finishing his education, Prince Chakrabongse was trusted by the tsar to serve as his royal page for a few years until he returned to Siam. While studying in Russia, the prince returned to his home country several times. Olarovski praised Chakrabongse in his letter to Russia that “the prince looked most elegant among all other nobles of Siam… he also has adopted the proper attitude as a cadet and was widely popular in both Siamese and European societies”.21 At this point, it can be concluded that Prince Chakrabongse was one of the people who helped strengthen the Russo-Siamese friendship. As a result, one year after Prince Chakrabongse arrived to St. Petersburg, another noble, Prince Thongthikayu Thongyai, was also sent to enroll at the Royal Cadet Academy.22 Both of these nobles were going to contribute to building up of the Siamese military. Apart from the military, these two also challenged the conservativeness of the Siamese noble class by marrying Russian ladies. This aspect will later be explored in the last chapter on the legacy of the Russo-Siamese relationship. Siamese students were not all faithful to the mother country, for example, in the case of Nai Phum, a non-noble scholarship student. The evidence demonstrates that Nai Phum had fled his government duty to return to Siam. After Nai Phum completed his education, he wrote to the Tsar: I arrived to Russia when I was only fourteen years old. With the majesty’s kindness, now I have completed my study at the Royal Cadet Academy. The fact that I have left my home country
Ibid., p. 23-29. Ibid., p. 86. 22 Ibid., p. 97. 20
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for a long time makes me realise that Russia has now become my new home. I am most willing to dedicate my life to Russia as to repay for your majesty’s kindness. I, therefore, ask your majesty for a permission to adopt Russian as my new nationality.23 Nai Phum’s decision to reside in Russia definitely upset the Siamese government. The evidence shows that the Siamese government had stopped sending students to Russia because of Nai Phum’s case.24 Not until 1913, were three nobles and one non-noble student sent to be educated in Russia. The foundation of the great Russo-Siamese relationship, as demonstrated, is unique in its nature. It was based on all three origins; the Czarevitch’s visit to Siam, the King Chulalongkorn’s visit to Russia, and finally the other personal relationships between the Siamese and Tsar Nicholas II. Whether this relationship is going to benefit Siam as it expected, will be approached in the next chapter.
The Russian role in the Siamese-Franco affairs The Siamese-Franco conflict had started since the early 1890s as explored in the first part of this paper. However, the situation became most intensive in 1893 with the Paknam incident. As it has been demonstrated earlier, the relationship of the Romanov and Chakri families was initiated with political objectives from the Siamese side. The prime goal of Czarevitch’s invitation to Siam (1891), Prince Damrong’s visit to Europe (1891), and later King Chulalongkorn’s visit to Europe (1897) were all to do with the conflict that Siam was facing with the two colonial empires of Britain and France. With Chulalongkorn’s modern mind and great intellect, he thought Russia was going to be the best ally for Siam to help balance the power on the negotiation table. Indeed, the King made the right decision. There were various reasons why Russia was chosen to be the “mediator” for
23
24
Ibid., p. 2. Ibid., p. 11-12.
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Siam during the territorial conflict with France. According to Kraireuk Nana, the author of Behind the Czarevitch’s visit to Siam: The New Vision of Politics during King Rama V (2009), there are two main factors that made Russia the most suitable ally to Siam. First, the dispute over the Balkan and the Russian encroachment into Northern China through Siberia made Britain naturally made Russia’s main enemy.25 Both areas mentioned were of course considered to be under the British influence. In order to protect the naval power in the Mediterranean, the British supported the Turks to defend the Tsarist dream to expand its power downwards. Meanwhile, the result of the Opium War also gave confidence to Britain that it would have its firm hands over this vast territory of East Asia. However, China surprisingly granted the permission for Russia to build the Tran-Siberia railway through Manchuria, which shook the British secured position in the region. Second, the Franco-Russian alliance in 1894 was seen as the way for Siam to get to negotiate with France by using Russia as the mediator.26 This alliance gave foundation to the military cooperation between the two powers later during the First World War. Besides the Security Pact, Russia also received a four thousand million francs loan from France for the construction of the Tran-Siberia railway. Both of these factors highlight that Russia was the most suitable ally for Siam at the time. In addition, the unique Russian position also contributed to King’s choice of alliance. As Russia demonstrated that it had no colonial aim in Southeast Asia, Russia consequently gained the trust of Siam. Therefore, all of these reasons made Russia a perfect Siamese imperial partner in the midst of the colonial quest. In order to understand the role of Russia in the Franco-Siamese conflict, this part of the paper will be divided into two components; first, the role of Russia through the work of Alexander Olarovski; second, the limitations of the Russian role.
Graireuk, N. (2009). Behind the Czarevitch Nicholas’ Visit to Siam: The New Political Phase of King Chulalongkorn. Bangkok. p. 91. 26 Ibid., p. 101.
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Franco-Siamese conflict and Alexander Olarovski When Olarovski was appointed as the Consul-General of Siam, his two major tasks were to first defend Siam from other foreign aggression, second, to act as the mediator between Siam and France as mentioned in the confidential letter from the Foreign Ministry.27 Therefore, it is quite reasonable to say that, to a great extent, the Russians had been backing the position of Siam against France. Even though later on Russia would find that it was more important to preserve the Russo-Franco alliance than to defend a small kingdom, Olarovski had shown the effort to pursue his task as a protector of Siam. This effort is highlighted in many of the early Olarovski reports sent to St. Petersburg. Especially on the issue of Luang Prabang, Olarovski had demonstrated that he had sympathy for Siam. He claimed that the French had the wrong perception of the relationship between Siam and Luang Prabang and so that caused a dispute for which Siam should not be blamed.28 However, he also foresaw that there were no other solutions for Siam to this dispute apart from ceding Luang Prabang to France in order to prevent further complications.29 Eventually, Luang Prabang was ceded to France. Nevertheless, Olarovski was, at some point, successful in trying to improve the Franco-Siamese relations. This was seen in the telegraph from the Russian ambassador in Paris to the Russian Foreign Ministry which mentioned that the Siamese representative and Foreign Minister of France had successfully signed the treaty confirming the Siamese control over Chantaboon.30 Although at the latter stage Siam saw this gain more as a loss because it had to trade with France a large portion
Committee Historical Documents. (1997). 100 Years of RussoSiamese Relationship. Thammasat University, Bangkok, p. 3-21. 28 Olarovski, A. (1898). Letter to Count Muraviev 493/1780. Unpublished manucript. National Archives of Thailand, Bangkok. 29 Ibid. 30 Committee Historical Documents. (1997). 100 Years of RussoSiamese Relationship. Thammasat University, Bangkok, p. 207-208.
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of land on the left side of the Mekong, this agreement would not have succeeded without the help of Olarovski. The Russian Consul-General in Bangkok indeed helped Siam regain Chantaboon, the province that the King claimed had more Siamese settlements, from France. Without Olarovski, Franco-Siamese relationship might have had died completely after 1893. In contrast, within four years, there was a slight sign of peace between the two nations, mostly through the effort of the Russian Consul-General.
Limitations to the Russian role in the Franco-Siamese conflict Chalong Soontarawanit claims that Olarovski was assertive to help Thailand solve the territorial conflict with the French only at the beginning of his post in Bangkok.31 The author believes that Olarovski’s attitude had changed. His close relationship with Dumer, GovernorGeneral of French Indochina (1897-1902), and the Russian plan to construct a fuel station in one of the French controlled islands were the two key factors to the changed approach, which tilted towards France.32 However, it is important to note at this point that there were other limitations besides the failure of Olarovski’s effort to the role of Russia in the Franco-Siamese conflict. These limitations were: Russia’s instability and resistance from the Pro-British Siamese elites. Russia had established a Russo-Franco Alliance since 1894, and Siam believed that the result of this association would be beneficial to Siam’s position. Therefore, it is not a surprise that Chulalongkorn would make use of the royal relationship that had begun in 1891 with the Czarevitch. There are various reasons for the establishment of the Russo-Franco Alliance. The major reason was to do with both nations’ common enemy, Germany. By this time, Russia considered France as the major ally that it chose to turn to and, of course, France thought vice versa. Due to a strategic position of Russia and an abundance of
Chalong, S. (1973). Russo-Siamese Relations: The Reign of Kings Rama Fifth and Sixth. Bangkok. 32 Ibid.
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resources including manpower, Russia was seen as the perfect ally for France.33 Nevertheless, Russia’s position started to decline by 1904 with the war against Japan. The result of the war was a humiliation of the Emperor of Russia, who had lost the war to the newly minted Asian Empire. This defeat not only highlighted the fall of the Russian monarchy, but it also signaled that Russia was going to have to strengthen its relationship with other European powers in order to save its own face. Hence, the relationship with the major ally, France, was strengthened. As a consequence, the importance of Siam then became less visible. Moreover, Russia demonstrated its growing fear towards Japan’s influence in Indochina in 1908 in the confidential letter from the Russian Foreign Ministry to the newly appointed ambassador to Bangkok. It mentioned that Japan had established a diplomatic relationship with Siam since 1898 and still wanted to assert more power in Indochina as a whole.34 Therefore the most important advice for the new ambassador was to keep his eyes close to the imperialist Japan’s role in Indochina, not only for the safeguard of Siam but mainly for the impact on the Russian relations with the other European nations, i.e. France and Britain. It addition, this letter also states another evidence that demonstrates the decline of the Siam’s importance to Russia itself. It suggested that Russia should, from now on, keep a distance from the Siamese affairs with the three following nations: France, Britain, and Japan. Plus, the relationship with France was to be upheld always in Russian affairs.35 At this point, one can actually say that the Siamese hope for Russian safeguard had practically ended. Comparing this letter to the letter sent to Olarovski ten years ago, Russia had changed its attitude completely.
Graireuk, N. (2009). Behind the Czarevitch Nicholas’ Visit to Siam: The New Political Phase of King Chulalongkorn. Bangkok. p. 120. 34 Committee Historical Documents. (1997). 100 Years of RussoSiamese Relationship. Thammasat University, Bangkok, p. 26-31. 35 Ibid.
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Another very important limitation to the role of Russia in the Siamese-Franco conflict was resistance to Russian help from the pro-British elites in Siam. Olarovski admitted in his report to Russian Foreign Ministry that there were a number of the pro-British members of the Siamese court, who tended to build the safeguard against the Russian involvement in political affairs.36 Since France was the main Russian ally, the pro-British elites felt that it was rather difficult to trust the Russian motive. Therefore, this can be considered as an internal resistance Russia faced in the arbitration process between Siam and France.
The Legacy The special relationship between the Romanov and the Chakri dynasties had faded since the 1917 Bolshevik revolution. After Nicholas II abdicated the throne, a new chapter of Russian History was only about to begin. Meanwhile, Siam still had to go through a period of reformation towards modernization. One has to thank Britain and France, for the force that pressured Chulalongkorn to initiate the Siamese reformation. Thongchai Winichakul mentioned in his work, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-body of a Nation, that the crisis in 1893 was the “culminating moment of the emergence of the geo-body of Siam”.37 In other words, the Thai national identity had been shaped through the forces of the colonial conquests. However, giving credit to the British and French is not enough. The Siamese owed most part of this promotion of the “Thai” national identity ---Siamification--- to Russia. And that is a true long lasting legacy of the imperial friendship that needs further exploration.
Ibid., p. 101-110. Thongchai, W. (1994). Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-body of a Nation. Silkworms: Hawaii: Hawaii University Press, p. 142.
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Chulalongkorn vs. Nicholas II Although both nations shared the common political scheme, with the royal family as the absolutist rule of the state, the nature of politics in the two kingdoms were relatively different if one explores in details. According to Maurizio Peleggi, the Siamese monarchy had been a great civilizing agent of modernity most apparently during the reigns of King Chulalongkorn and King Mongkut. 38 Indeed, the Siamese “civilization” became a clearer picture during Mongkut’s reign. However, one should not forget that the great foundation was already laid since Chulalongkorn. In other words, Mongkut could not have succeeded his civilizing mission without his modern minded father, as Thai academics always praised Chulalongkorn’s great diplomatic skills that had saved Siam from the colonial danger of the nineteenth century. To a great extent, the statement is true. The fact that the King chose to ally with Russia by inviting the Czarevitch to visit Siam was a great evidence of his adroit strategy. Peleggi argues that the “primary goals of the Chakri Reformation were the establishment of the monarchy’s authority over a newly bounded national territory and the uplifting of its prestige in the international arena”.39 From this statement, there are two main keys to point out; first, the centralisation of the administration and second, this reformation aimed at gaining a better position internationally. The uniformity is probably the best term to define the reformation in the administration of Siam during Chulalongkorn’s reign. Centralization was promoted through reforms in administration and education. For example, school textbooks became standardized under the government’s supervision. Moreover, the military was also uniformed with the first Cadet School was founded in 1887.
38 Peleggi, M. (2002). Lords of Things: The Fashioning of the Siamese Monarchy’s Modern Image. Hawaii: Hawaii University Press, p. 10. 39 Ibid., p. 9.
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Of the Chakri’s reforms, the most far-reaching were the social reforms. It came as a surprise for the court when the King “announced the abolition of the ancient practice of prostrating before the monarch, which he regarded as unsuitable for a modern nation” at his coronation in 1873.40 Ever since then, the Siamese court had been acting as an agent of civilization. However, the most remarkable social change that carried out extensively was the abolition of slavery. Besides the great image the king gained from this populist policy, he also changed the whole root of Thai society towards modernization. Indeed, in an ordinary Siamese person’s eyes, these changes might be too obscure for them to understand. However, the major purpose of these modern reforms was to attract the Western attention that Siam was as civilized as the European nations. In contrast to Chulalongkorn, Nicholas II chose to pursue the policy of his father, Alexander III. His reign was marked by “reaction, repression, and a pathological fear of change”.41 While liberalism became more and more popular in Europe, Russian conservatism that is already firmly established grew even stronger. The young Tsar opposed liberal reforms and saw them as threats to Russian stability. Therefore, on the one hand he was known to the world as the great emperor of the Russian Empire, on the other hand he was seen as “narrow-minded, weak, and unusually dependent upon the advice of others” including his ministers and the Tsarina Alexandra.42 One similarity between the two monarchs was the common supporting group of the regimes which were mainly the gentry. The gentry still maintain its extensive control in Russia. However in the case of Russia, most of the aristocrats were known as the backward group whose only aims were to seek their
Federal Research Division of the Library Congress, Chulalongkorn’s reforms. Retrieved February 26, 2010, from http://www.country-data.com/ cgi-bin/query/r-13687.html 41 Smith, G.B. (1992). Soviet Politics: Struggling with Change. New York, p. 25. 42 Ibid. p. 26.
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own benefits. Most of the provincial governors who controlled the countryside on behalf of the Tsar usually “sought only to preserve their own interests”.43 Indeed, the elites anywhere would do the same, to seek the highest benefits, when they had the ability to do so. The one distinct common character of the Siamese elites that differed from the Russian aristocrats was the former’s modern-mindset. In Siam, the King tried everyway to promote modernity together with the loyalty oath to the nation. Therefore, the Siamese king was considered to be a more modern and stronger monarch than Nicholas II. While occupied by wars, Nicholas heavily relied on his wife who was lured into the influence of the unpopular monk Gregorii Rasputin. This affair not only marked the decline of the Romanov’s reputation but it also demonstrates another weak character which defines the reign of Nicholas. On the contrary, Chulalongkorn had never lifted his firm grip over the ruling of Siam. So even the two monarchs were true absolutists, Chulalongkorn’s rule, to a higher extent, was more rigid than the Russian emperor’s. Nonetheless, one should keep in mind that the Russian political situation before 1905 was not as threatening as it was for Siam. Russia, by 1904, had completed the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, which highlighted the Russian engaging policies in the Far-East. Together with the Russo-Franco Alliance, Russia could still maintain the status as the most resourceful and powerful empire of Europe. In contrast to Siam, which would unlikely have survived colonization if it was not because of Chulalongkorn’s awareness and diplomatic capability. Although the two characters’ weaknesses and strengths differed due to distinct political backgrounds, there was one policy that they had in common--- the promotion of cultural domination. To do this, both Siamese and Russians sought to reduce the cultural powers of other ethnic groups and gradually (or in some cases forcefully) assimilated them into the dominant culture.
43
Ibid., p. 25.
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Russification vs. Siamification The terms Russification and Siamification are not only similar in their verbal structures but also in their implications. While the Russians had started the process of Russification since the time of Alexander III, the Siamese King was most likely to have been influenced by it and decided to adopt the policy during his remarkable reign of modernization in the late nineteenth century. At the time Siam adopted this policy, one might have not thought that it would become one of the most extensive and lasting legacy of the Siamese history. Therefore, the aim of this part is to explore and demonstrate the true origins for the Siamese adoption of the policy and how it has become the legacy of Russian-Siamese relationship. The vast territory and the diverse ethnicities always had been the major concerns of the Tsarist Empire. While Siam’s territory could not be compared that of Russia, it was the latter problem that was apparent. Siam was composed of a number of distinct ethnic groups of people such as Khmers, Laos, Malays, Chinese and Tais.44 As Chang Noi claims Thailand is a “melting pot” of various cultural elements.45 Similarly, Russia’s vast area was comprised of various cultures and people such as, Ukrainians, Belarusans, Lithuanians, Poles, Finns, and Jews. As a result, Russia had been promoting Russification since 1863. The policy became more intense from the reigns of Alexander III to Nicholas II. Theodore Weeks mentions in his journal that since the failed upraising in 1863, Ukrainians and Belarusans were no longer recognized as nationalities “but simply as branches of the Russian nation”.46 The rejection to the acknowledgment of other nations was the first step to the process of
Tai is one of the major cultures of Asia, alongside those of India and China. The Tai peoples, scattered in a band across Southeast Asia from southwest China to eastern India, are a major population group. 45 Chang Noi.(August 14, 1999). What does ‘Thai’ really mean?. The Nation. Bangkok. 46 Weeks, T. R.(Spring, 2001). Russification and the Lithuanians, 1863-1905, Slavic Review, 16 (1), pp. 96-114.
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Russification. Then the next step is assimilation. In case of the Finns, Nicholas attempted to assimilate them into Russian culture through language. The Manifesto of Nicholas II to the Grand Duchy of Finland in 1900 stated that “the Russian language should after gradual steps be adopted as the principal language in matters concerning the administration of the region”.47 The document clearly demonstrates that Russia forced the use of Russian language as the official language of Finland. This was of course with the intention to turn the Finns into Russians culturally, which is considered to be the second step of Russification. Russification, indeed, brought ‘security’ and ‘domination’ to Russian control over its enormous empire. In the same way, Siam’s major concerns in the late nineteenth century were also surrounded around the same concepts of ‘security’ and ‘domination’. However, it is sensible to argue that Siam’s need for Siamification was far greater than Russia’s Russification due to the colonial factor. Unlike Russia, the minorities of Siam were not seen as threats to Chulalongkorn. In fact, the diverse ethnic groups had been living together quite peacefully under the dominance of the Siamese monarchy. Nevertheless, it is most important to keep in mind that the colonial aggressions of Britain and France were the main causes for Siam’s need of Siamification. For Siam, the promotion of Siamese, as a dominant culture, was considered largely as part of the process of modernization. Peleggi said Chulalongkorn’s most important concern was the promotion of his image as “the King of the Siamese rather the King of Siam”.48 This statement clearly demonstrates that the most essential element of the Siamese modernization was the Siamese identity. Hence Siamification was introduced not only to assimilate the people into Siamese, but it also
Kruhse, P. 1900. The Collection of Decrees for the Grand Duchy of Finland. Nr 22. Retrieved March 1, 2010, from http://www.histdoc.net/ history/kieli1900.html 48 Peleggi, M. (2002). Lords of Things: The Fashioning of the Siamese Monarchy’s Modern Image. Hawaii: Hawaii University Press, p. 9.
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served as a main ingredient of modernization. In Chulalongkorn’s eyes, Siam was in desperate need to build up a strong nation in order to resist the European aggressions. As a consequence, most of his reforms, which some claim to have seen copied directly from the West, were aimed at the progression towards modernization or siwilai, another adoption from English for the condition of being civilized. As Siamification was the most important foundation to promote a strong nation, the policy was carried out in a similar way to Russification but with less violence. One could thank Prince Damrong for the great success of Siamification. The nationhood concept or Prathed Chat was fully implemented by 1911. In Pasuk’s chapter “the Absolutist State”, she claims that the term ‘chat’ (birth) when combined with the word “prathed” (territory, country) means a people living together within a defined geographical space, hence a nation.49 This notion was created to indicate that all the people who were born in the Siamese territory were of the Thai race. In addition, the Nationality Act was passed in 1911, despite the aims to unify the country in order to balance power with the West; it also established a key foundation of kingship, now that the nation had a single community with one king. The Act relegates all people born in the recently mapped kingdom of Siam, regardless of ethnic origins as subjects. Ever since, the Siamese identity was created. The process of Siamification was not much different from Russification. It involved the promotion of various cultural values, most primarily, language. The central Thai language was widely promoted throughout the Siamese territory. A Russian report on Siam states that Siam can be divided into three main regions: North, Central, and South. One of the more remarkable aspects of this document is the emphasis on the Northern part of Siam. The report mentions that the north is mostly populated by ethnic Lao, who speak a different language from the
Pasuk. P & C. Baker. (1997). Thailand Economics and Politics: Chapter 7Absolutist State. Oxford: Oxford Press, p. 234.
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Siamese.50 Now that Siam has emerged as a ‘geo-body’, the problem fell on the Lao people in the northeast. Mayoury and Pheuiphanh refer to Don T. Bayard of Otago University who affirms that “fifty years ago the areas north and east of Nakhon Ratchasima province up to and across the Mekong were almost all Lao-speaking, with very few people fluent in the language of Central Thailand”.51 Siam’s first attempt to introduce the use of the Central Thai language to all administrative and educational institutions was indeed extensively successful. Today people in this plateau belong to a centralized Siam. Most of these people are bilingual and it is predicted that by Bayard that by the next generation the Lao language will be replaced by the central Thai dialect. Those who should be rewarded for this success are the people in the bureau who have managed the system of ‘Siamification’ so well that in only a few decades, for the Lao people in Isan already felt more loyalty to Bangkok than to Vientiane. Siamification is the lasting legacy from the process of modernization that Chulalongkorn copied directly from the Tsarist Russia.
Conclusion The outcome of Siamification proved to be even more extensive and successful than Russification. One of the major factors contributing to this success may have come from Chulalongkorn’s own image that was portrait to be “siwilai” to the eyes of the Siamese elites. In contrast to Nicholas’ image, the Siamese king managed to extend his influence and power over the area encompassing Thailand today. Lao people who live on the Khorat plateau in modern-day Northeastern Thailand have become Thai Isaans. The Malays in the south also became Thai Muslims. The Lao origin settlers in the north also became Lanna Thais.
Committee Historical Documents. (1997). 100 Years of RussoSiamese Relationship. Thammasat University, Bangkok, p. 130-134. 51 Mayoury & P., Ngaosyvathn, Kith and Kin politics (1994). The relationships between Laos and Thailand, Journal of Contemporary Asia Publishers. Manila: Philippines and Wollongong: Australia, p. 25.
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As the evidence shows, Siamification has been to a great extent, more successful than Russification judging from its lasting end result. In terms of language, central Thai language is the one and only official language and language of instruction in all public schools in Thailand. However the most important element that holds the country together is the great image of the Thai royal family, which is one of the three elements of the Thai unifying Slogan; Nation, Religion (Buddhism), and the King. This distinct character is what made the Chakri dynasty stronger than the Romanov by the end of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, the Siamese monarch could not have had survived the colonial quests without the Russian help. Even though Russia did not resolve the Siamese problem due to its many limitations, its alliance was essential to the position of Siam in the international arena. At every step of the Russo-Siamese relationship, there was a benefit for Siam. Since the first part of this essay, the study explores that the firm foundation of the imperial relationship was laid for the benefit of Siam. This gave new status and reputation to Siam for its modernminded attitude. As a consequence when Siam was challenged by France in 1893, it did not fear to ask for help from the Tsarist Empire. One can probably argue at this point that if Russia did not establish the RussoFranco alliance, Siam might have not lost the territories it claimed. Due to the failed negotiations Siam had lost a large piece of land that it claimed, but this resembles a double edged sword. On one hand, Siam obviously was humiliated by its decreased domination in Indochina. However, on the other hand, Siam took this opportunity to adopt the policy of Siamification to build up a strong nationhood for its remaining territory. That is the true legacy of not only the Siamese-Russo relations but also for the Siamese modernization. In other words, Siamification was a drive towards a successful establishment of a modern centralised kingdom. Nonetheless, no one can fully say proudly that this “melting pot” is still consistently and peacefully assimilated under the same unifying slogan. Problems of minorities emerged in a form of “reverseddiscriminations” are becoming apparent while the Central Thainess that has been acting as a unifying factor for the past century is beginning to recede. As foreign texts are becoming more available to the Thais, new
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theories challenging the concept of the artificial Thainess became more popular. It is perhaps time for the Thai authority to start thinking of a different means to keep this melting pot together in peace.
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References Baker, C. & Pasuk, P. (1997). Thailand Economics and Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chang Noi. What does ‘Thai’ really mean?. (1999, 14, August). The Nation. Chalong, S. (1973). Russo-Siamese Relations: The Reign of Kings Rama Fifth and Sixth. Bangkok. Chalong, S. (2001). The King Rama the Fifth Visit’s to Europe: The 60th Year Anniversary. Matichon, 227-268. Committee Historical Documents. (1997). 100 Years of Russo-Siamese Relationship. Thammasat University, Bangkok. Gorapin, T. (nd.). Russia-Siam: The Lasting Relationship. Sillapakorn University Journal. 46 (6): 84-91. Graireuk, N. (2009). Behind the Czarevitch Nicholas’ Visit to Siam: The New Political Phase of King Chulalongkorn. Bangkok. Federal Research Division of the Library Congress, Chulalongkorn’s reforms. Retrieved February 26, 2010, from http://www.countrydata.com/cgi-bin/query/r-13687.html Kruhse, P. 1900. The Collection of Decrees for the Grand Duchy of Finland. Nr 22. Retrieved March 1, 2010, from http://www. histdoc.net/history/kieli1900.html Ngaosyvathn, Mayoury & P. Kith (1994).The relationships between Laos and Thailand, Journal of Contemporary Asia Publishers. Manila: Philippines and Wollongong: Australia. Olarovski, A. (1898). Letter to Count Muraviev 493/1780. Unpublished manucript. National Archives of Thailand, Bangkok. Peleggi, M. (2002). Lords of Things: The Fashioning of the Siamese Monarchy’s Modern Image. Hawaii: Hawaii University Press. Smith, G.B. (1992). Soviet Politics: Struggling with Change. New York. Struve. (1897). Letter from Master of the Court Struve 679/148. Unpublished manuscript. National Archives of Thailand, Bangkok. Thammanit. (2008). King Chulalongkorn: Autobigraphy. Bangkok. Thongchai, W. (1994). Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-body of a Nation. Silkworms: Hawaii: Hawaii University Press.
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Uchtomskij, P.EE. (1999). Czarevitch Nicholas of Russia in Siam and Saigon. Bangkok. Weber, K. (2004). Dynastic Diplomacy in the Fifth Reign: Siam’s Relations with German Bridgeheads. Journal of European Studies. Chulalongkorn University, 12(1). Weeks, T.R. (Spring,2001). Russification and the Lithuanians 18631905. Slavic Review, 60(1): 96-114.
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Industrial Decentralization Policies and Industrialization in Thailand Apisek Pansuwan Abstract It can be concluded that although, industrial development in Thailand was successful as newly industrial country but the industrial geographical dispersion was fail, we can find that the industrialization of Bangkok metropolis region (BMR) is very high concentration that is one of causes of income disparity and poverty in Thailand. From the study, it found that industrial geographical concentration in BMR and surrounding area were high, even though the Thai Government has attempted to lure businessmen to locate their industries in the periphery or rural area, including moving their industries from the core by using several types of tax incentives, secondary city or growth pole, and supporting the sub regional development. It can conclude that, Thailand has not succeeded in rural industrialization. Key Words: Industrialization, Industrial decentralization, Industrial development policy
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Introduction The phenomenon of industrial agglomeration and concentration has stimulated renewed interests among economists and economic geographers over the last decade, which related to the regional integration process that have appeared around the world in the second half of the twentieth century, especially on economic integration in Europe and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Pansuwan, 2009). Many theories and models, with particular emphasis on international trade and new trade theory and, more recently, the ‘new economic geography’, led by Paul Krugman were used to explain this evidence affected on regional specialization, industrial agglomeration and concentration (Krugman and Venables, 1990; Krugman, 1991). Spatial concentration of manufacturing always ends up with regional inequalities. This phenomenon is also true in the case of Thailand (Pansuwan and Routray, 2011). In Thailand, industrialization and urbanization have been the major driving forces toward modernization starting in the early 1960s (Panpiemras, 1988; Biggs et al., 1990; IFCT, 1991; World Bank 1993; Cuyvers et al. 1997). With the government’s objective of putting more emphasis on industrial development, many policies and strategies have been developed and adopted during the past four decades. Thus, the growth pattern of the manufacturing industries in Thailand could be divided into two sub-periods, namely: 1960-85 and 1986 to the present. The purpose of such grouping is to illustrate the growth performance of the different industrialization strategies under these two eras, specifically the import substitution (IS) and export promotion (EP) regimes, and considering also the fact that Thailand had pursued a typical IS industrialization strategy between the early 1960s and the mid-1980s (IFCT 1991; Douangngeune, et al. 2005; BOI,2006). Under the Third Economic and Social Development Plan (19721976), manufacturing of products for export was boosted. In fact it was in 1972 that the investment promotion law was revised to include provisions for the granting of more incentives to the exporting industries. Thus, starting from a small base, the quantity of manufactured products for export had rapidly magnified since then. The adoption of the export promotion strategy is still being pursued until the present. Meanwhile, the country’s industrial structure has also been diversified towards the
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intermediate and capital goods industries. As a result, starting in the late 1980s, investments in the manufacturing of intermediate products such as parts and components of computers, automobiles, and electronics have become very apparent (IFCT, 1991). The recent history of Thailand’s economy could be pictured as having more than a decade of sustained and rapid economic growth beginning in 1985 followed by a severe recession that started in late 1997. During the period of economic boom, the country’s average economic growth was more than 7% annually, which was one of the highest rates in the world (Glassman, 2001). When the Thai economy flourished during those past two decades of EP development especially in the industrial sector, Thailand became one of the world’s middle income countries in the world (World Bank, 2004). Despite the success of industrialization over the years, little emphasis has been placed on the dispersion of industries to rural areas, sectoral linkage and economic distribution (Panpiemras, 1988; MOI, 2002). The industrialization policies and strategies focused mainly on the importance of the import substitution and export oriented industries. As a result, most of the industrialization took place in and around the Bangkok Metropolis Region (BMR) as it is the most economically and most efficient location for the import substitution and export oriented industries. The concentration of factories in Bangkok then led to mass migration into the capital ending up with social ills such as the emergence of more slum dwellings, environmental pollution, traffic congestion and income disparities (Hussey, 1993). This paper therefore aims to focus on the industrial development policies and the factors that influenced the regional pattern of industrial concentration and development in Thailand, based on the new economic geography theory. The purpose of this study is to assess the effectiveness of Thai government policies to disperse manufacturing plants from Bangkok. This article consists of three sections. Firstly, it reviews the macro industrial development policies and programs under the national economic and social development plans (NESDP), investment promotion, regional development and trade policies of the government. Section 2 examines some policies assessment and impact, economic and industrial growth and industrial distribution. Finally, the last section
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provides some conclusions about the industrial development policies and their contribution to rural regional development.
The Industrial and Regional Development Policies Since the World War II, the Thai Government has placed great importance on industrial development (Panpiemras, 1988; IFCT, 1991). The establishment of the Ministry of Industry (MOI) in 1942 was mainly aimed to encourage and monitor the development in this sector, with other government agencies participating directly or indirectly in the formulation of industrial policies. These include, for example, the formulation of development strategies by the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), tax policies by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and investment promotion by the Board of Investment (BOI) (Sibunruang, 1986; Loha-unchit, 1990). The First and Second National Economic and Social Development Plans in 1960s for instance stated that the government would reduce its involvement in manufacturing (MOI, 2002). In this connection, the public sector was encouraged to provide private companies with investment incentives and carry on constructing vital infrastructures necessary for industrial development (IFCT, 1991). The industrialization strategies of the 1960s put more emphasis on the production of goods for the domestic market. Import-substitution industries including assembly plants largely using imported parts and components were fostered. Foreign direct investment (FDI) was also enthusiastically encouraged (Akrasanee, 1977; Reinhardt, 2000; Jansen, 2001). The promotion of the import substitution (IS) strategy helped in making a quick start of the industrialization process. Many foreign manufacturers and assemblers of consumer goods came to invest in Thailand (Hussey, 1993; Glassman 2007). As a result of the IS promotion however, almost all factories were situated in the BMR, since it is where infrastructures and facilities especially the container and commercial port as well as the international airport, which play the key role for the mobilization of raw materials and machineries, are situated (Hussey, 1993). The production of manufactured goods for export was promoted in the Third and Forth Plans. Thus in 1972, the investment promotion
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law was revised to provide more incentives to the exporting industries. Starting from a small base, production of goods for export had since then expanded rapidly (MOI, 2002). Such export promotion (EP) strategy is still being implemented until the present. Along with such development, the country’s industrial structure had also diversified towards the intermediate and capital goods industries (IFCT,1991; Hussey, 1993). In addition to advancing the export promotion strategy, the policy on dispersing industrial activities to different regions in the country was also prescribed in the Third Plans (Panpiemras, 1988; Tsuneishi, 2005). In fact, the revision of the investment promotion law in 1972 had enabled the BOI to provide more incentives to business firms operating in designated provincial areas (Figure 1). In the same year, the Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand (IEAT) was established as a state enterprise under the MOI to promote the creation of industrial estates (IEs) in different regions of the country (Figure 2). However, even in the late 1970s the industrial estates were still mostly located in provinces near the capital, due to the availability of better infrastructures as well as accessibility to the largest consumer market (Hussey, 1993; IEAT, 2006). Moreover, during the adoption of the Forth Plan, the Industrial Regional Promotion Branch was established as additional incentive for the promotion of rural industrial development in remote areas (MOI, 2002). In another development, the structural adjustment program as stipulated in the Fifth Plan, aimed to boost the labor-intensive, resourcebased and export-oriented industries. The program was also aimed at gradually phasing out certain inefficient operations through the rationalization of the incentive structures which were earlier formulated (MOI, 2002). In addition, development of small, medium-sized and rural enterprises was also pushed (NESDB, 2007). The Sixth Plan (1987-1991) continued to give priority to export-oriented, small-scale and regional enterprises, while agro-based and “engineering-based� industries especially those that manufacture metal products, machineries, electronics and communication equipment were also specified (MOI, 2002; BOI, 2006). In the industrial decentralization approach, the Thai Government encouraged the private investors both foreign and domestic, to invest in
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the country’s remote areas (Glassman and Sneddon, 2003; Tsuneishi, 2005). This concept was based on the ‘growth pole theory’. Thus, in the Fifth and Sixth NESDP, 12 cities (Nakhon Rachasima, Khon Kaen, Ubon Ratchathani, Udon Thani, Nakhon Sawan, Phitsanulok, Chiang Mai, Saraburi, Ratchaburi, Chonburi, Surat Thani, and Songkhla) were selected to serve as secondary cities where contributions to the rural economies and employment could be enhanced (Figure 3). Moreover, the MOI also planned to promote the development of provincial industries in some provinces by providing the necessary infrastructures and facilities support. Dubbed as the ‘City of Industrial Development Center’, nine (9) provinces were chosen to be involved in the so-called provincial industries, namely: Nakhon Rachasima, Khon Kaen, Nakhon Sawan, Phitsanulok, Chiang Mai, Saraburi, Ratchaburi, Surat Thani and Songkhla (Figure 4) (NESDB, 2007a). The development of rural industries was again emphasized in the Seventh Plan (1992-1996). This time the policy was supported by more concrete measures that included the setting up of a committee on regional development, and providing different incentives which were offered to industries located in different areas of the country. More developed provinces in the regions, such as Chiangmai in the Northern Region, Khon Kaen and Nakorn Ratchasrima in the Northeastern Region, and Songkla and Surat Thani in the Southern Region, were then specified as centers for regional development (Tienwong, 2004; NESDB, 2007a). Furthermore, the BOI’s promotion zones were also established in 1987 where all areas except the BMR were designated as promotion zones (IFCT, 1991; BOI, 2002). There was also an attempt to cut down on the incentives granted to areas not being advocated such as the BMR. However, since another government revamp took place less than a year later, such plan did not materialize. Under the new system, the investment promotion areas were grouped into three zones: the BMR as Zone 1; the inner ring areas consisting of Samut Songkhram, Ratchaburi, Kanchanaburi, Suphanburi, Ang Thong, Phra Nakhon Sri Ayutthaya, Chachoengsao, Nakhon Nayok, Saraburi and Chonburi as Zone 2; and Zone 3 comprising the outer ring areas. Designated by the BOI as the investment promotion zone, Zone 3 included all the provinces nationwide except the BMR and the inner
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Fig. 1 Zones Established by Board of Investment of Thailand
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Fig. 2 Location Map of Industrial Estates in Thailand
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ring areas, and was given the greatest amount of tax incentives and promotional privileges (BOI, 2006). An important element in Thailand’s industrial development during the 1980s was the development of the Eastern Seaboard (ESB) as the ‘new economic zone’ (Tienwong, 2002; Tsuneishi, 2005; Glassman, 2007). The ESB program was set up under the Fifth NESDP after the discovery of natural gas in the Gulf of Thailand (IFCT, 1991; Kaothien and Webster, 1998). A gas separation plant was subsequently built in the ESB area. Infrastructures including highways, deep seaports, and industrial estates were also constructed. Specifically, petrochemical and steel plants were set up in the Mab Taput industrial estate in Rayong Province, while light and export industries were being situated in the Laem Chabang industrial estate in Chonburi also along the ESB (Hussey, 1993; MOI, 2002; IEAT, 2006; NESDB, 2007a). During the Sixth and Seventh Plans, foreign investment projects specifically the intermediate and machinery-related industries had increased, more particularly in the production of electronics as well as automotive parts and components (MOI, 2006). Thus, under such export-oriented industrialization support program, four regions such as the Northern, Northeastern, Western and the Southern regions were designated as the ‘new economic zones’ following the ESB model (Tsuneishi, 2005). However, all plans were revised after the financial crisis in 1997. Nonetheless, since several policies were considered important in the previous plans including the promotion of export industries, smallscale and regional industries, these were continued to be emphasized in the Eighth NESDP (BOI, 2006). But it was also during the Eighth Plans that the Thai economy plunged into the worst recession of the post-war period. The country suffered a sharp economic downturn in 1997 and 1998 combined with currency and financial crises (BOI, 2006; NESDB, 2007a). The economic crisis was not foreseen and so with hindsight, many argued that the crisis was the cumulative effect of a number of structural weaknesses although it could have been triggered by a combination of short-term events (Lall ,1998; Glassman, 2001). With regards to the policies on industrial decentralization and improvement of industrial competitiveness, the Eighth Plans stipulated
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that opportunities for industrial development should be created by setting up special economic zones and tax-free zones along the borders to attract investments and trade within Thailand as well as with the neighboring countries (Tsuneishi, 2005). In addition, in 2000 the BOI also offered additional incentives for enterprises that relocate their factories in Zone 3 or in remote locations (BOI, 2006). Furthermore, the BOI granted corporate income tax exemption for three years on projects being carried out that invest in research and development activities. In fact these projects could import machineries and equipment for R&D activities with tax reduction or to some extent tax exemption for a period of eight years starting from the arrival date of their first shipment. Moreover, twenty two provinces considered as depressed areas were granted special incentives more than the usual privileges provided to other provinces in Zone 3 (BOI ,2006). The objectives specified in the Ninth Plan (2002-2006), include the promotion of economic stability and sustainability, establishment of a strong national development foundation, establishment of good governance at all levels of the Thai society, reduction of poverty, and empowerment of the people (Tienwong, 2004; BOI, 2006; NESDB, 2007a). Specifically under the industrial development program, enhancement of competitiveness was emphasized. In this regard, major approaches were undertaken such as restructuring of the different production and trade sectors; upgrading the quality of the infrastructures; improvement of productivity through the development of industrial clusters, network in different industrial sectors, and linking agencies in the public and private sectors; development of small and medium enterprises; enhancing cooperation with neighboring countries; improvement of trade negotiation systems; and advancement of science and technology as well as manpower development (MOI, 2006). In a related development, the Economic Cooperation Strategy (ECS) plan and the Great Mekong Sub-region Economic Cooperation (GMS-EC) program initiated by former Prime Minister Thaksin and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) focused on regional industrial development using the potentials of each region for balanced regional development as well as on strengthening the economic relations and mutual prosperity in the regions (Tsuneishi, 2005; NESDB, 2007c).
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Fig. 3 Location of Secondary Cities in Thailand
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Fig. 4 Location of City of Industrial Development Center in Thailand
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As stipulated under such plan and program, the Thai Government intended to boost special economic zones in the border areas. Thus, in the Northern region, Chiang Mai, Chaing Rai, Lamphun, and Lampang were planned to be developed in close collaboration with China, Lao PDR and Myanmar. In addition, Nong Kai, Mukdahan and Nakhon Phanom in the Northeastern region would be established as the gateways to Indochina. With Ubon Ratchathani as the center of the region, Nakhon Ratchasima and Khon Kaen could serve as centers connecting the North and the Eastern Seaboards, and promoting investment links with Indochina. In the Western region, Tak would be developed as the gateway to Myanmar. Lastly, in the Eastern region, Trat would be developed in close collaboration with Cambodia (Figure 5). The plan and program also emphasized that border provinces along the East-West Economic Corridor and the North-South Economic Corridor should be developed as gateways to the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) countries. The Tenth Plan (2007-2011), which is still being implemented until the present, has the main objective fostering the ‘economic sufficiency’ following the philosophy of King Rama IX of Thailand, His Majesty King Bhumibol Adulyadej. The Plan aimed to promote economic stability and sustainability during the rapidly changing globalization; establish a strong national development foundation; institute good governance at all levels of the Thai society; and reduce poverty and empower the people to cope with the global changes (NESDB, 2007a; UNDP, 2007). In terms of industrial development, enhancing competitiveness is still being emphasized through productivity development. The plan also prescribed that the Thai manufacturing sector should be improved from being low-waged production sector into an innovation-driven industry, and formed into clusters with modern technologies and know-how driven into efficient productivity, while environmental protection through green productivity development is also being highlighted (NESDB, 2007c). In accordance with its industrial development master plan, the NESDB (2007c) targeted 10 industrial groups to be boosted under the Thai industrial development program in order to make the industries survive in the midst of stiff competition in the world market. These include the petrochemical and plastics, automobile, electronic and electric appliance, steel, textile and wearing apparel, rubber, food
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processing, paper, ethanol and bio-plastic industries. Consequently, three (3) regions such as the Eastern, Western and Southern sea boards were specified as the ‘new economic zones’ for the said target industries. Moreover, based on Thaksin’s progressive economic policy towards the GMS, the Thai government has continued to support the concepts of wide-ranging economic zones (Tsuneishi, 2005).
Industrialization in Thailand During the post war era, the manufacturing sector grew much faster than the other sectors, resulting in the increased importance of the manufacturing sector, especially between 1986 and 1996. As a matter of fact, during the period from 1961 to 1985, the Thai manufacturing output grew at an average annual rate of 9.7% while from 1986 to 1996 the sector attained an annual average growth rate of around 13%. However, at the onset of the financial crisis, the growth of the manufacturing sector has slowed down, dropping to as low as 4.4% per annum. Considering the past four decades, the growth patterns of the Thai manufacturing sector can be separated into two sub-periods: 1960-85 and 1986 to the present (Kohpaiboon, 2003). The purpose of such segregation is to illustrate the growth performance of the different industrialization strategies between the import substitution and export promotion regimes. As discussed earlier, Thailand pursued a typical IS industrialization strategy between the early 1960s and the mid-1980s. From then on, the industrialization strategy has become more reliant on the EP. The mid-1980s is specifically selected because there has been a noticeable change in the market orientation of manufacturing products since then. As could be gleaned from various reports, during the first two and a half decades (1960-85), Thailand continuously promoted the IS industrialization strategy. While the government pursued privatesector-led industrialization, the government also offered investment privileges granted by the BOI, such as tariff protection and an escalating tariff structure to encourage local IS manufacturing. However, these policy-induced incentives distorted the domestic incentive structure as the import-substituting industries were more favored over the exportoriented ones. Nevertheless, this strategy also led to the expansion of
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Fig. 5 Cities in Thailand Designated under the Great Mekong Sub-region Economic Cooperation (GMS-EC) ]
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private investments and outpouring growth in the IS manufacturing sector. 1. The Import-substitution Industrialization Period (1960-85) A scenario which could perhaps be applicable only to Thailand could be glimpsed between the 1960s and the mid-1971s, when the growth of the country’s manufacturing sector was rapid at an average annual rate of 11.2% (Diagram 1). As a result, the share of the manufacturing sector to the country’s GDP also rapidly increased from 11.6% in the 1950s to 14.2% and 18.6% during the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s, respectively (Diagram 2). Although between 1976 and 1985, the trend of the growth of the manufacturing sector seemed to go downhill, it settled at the bottom in 1985. In spite of the average annual growth dropping from 10.4% during the period 1971-75 to 5% in 1981-85, the share of the manufacturing sector in the country’s GDP remained more or less the same at around 22% between 1976 and 1985. It is worthy to note that during the IS industrialization period, the country’s industrialization development started with the rapid expansion of the manufacture of textiles and clothing as well as that of transport equipment. Such trend led to the dramatic increased of the share of the manufacturing sector from 1.7% in 1950 to 13.1% from 1976 to 1980. It should also be noted that many import-substitution industries started with easy and very accessible IS opportunities. For example, the textile industries already had a wide range of developed production technologies, from the highly capital intensive, i.e. synthetic fibers to labor intensive inputs, i.e. fabrics. However, the rapid expansion of the Thai textile industry took place in the most labor-intensive segment, i.e. the weaving industry. Similarly, the Thai automotive industry began with the local manufacture of bulky, simple and quasi non-tradable parts, while it was heavily reliant on imports of complicated parts, especially the engines. Nevertheless, it should also be noted that in spite of such development, the import-substitution industries did not really contribute significantly to enhanced employment (Diagram 3). Between 1970 and 1985, the manufacturing employment accounted for only 8.2% of the total national employment. Although the employment share of
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the manufacturing sector increased from 4.5% in 1970 to around 8.4% in 1975, it remained more or less unchanged at this level during the following decade ending in 1985. 2. The Export-promotion Industrialization Period (1986-present) The IS industrialization strategy, which was implemented starting in the early 1960s, made the local manufacturing sector being heavily reliant on imported intermediate goods. In order to gradually lessen the successive deficits in the balance of payment between the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the government shifted from its industrialization strategy towards EP. Although the trade policy regime remained unchanged due to poor fiscal positions and high public foreign debt during the early 1980s, the government implemented the BOI promotion scheme to partly mitigate the adverse impact of input tariffs on the international competitiveness of the export-oriented industries. Under such scheme, the BOI imposed tariff exemptions on imported inputs over and above the usual investment promotion privileges for export-oriented activities. In the meantime, many East Asian investors were seeking an export base abroad in the mid-1980s, to maintain international competitiveness in their labor-intensive export products. The erosion in their respective home countries’ international competitiveness was enhanced by the outcome of wage increases and currency appreciation in the mid-1980s. In addition, the imposition and gradual tightening of quantitative restrictions by developed countries constrained the intensive production of certain labor-intensive exports from these East Asian countries, such as textiles, garments and footwear. In the electronics industry and other durable consumer goods industries, technological innovations allowed these investors to slice up the value chain of their production, relocating their efforts in the labor-intensive segments rather than in the entire industries in order to benefit from cheap labor which is readily available abroad. As a result, manufacturers from Japan and the North East Asian NICs have become actively involved with outward direct investment and have established a regional network to strengthen their international competitiveness. Thailand had been selected by these investors to be their labor intensive export base.
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On the other hand, the Thai manufactured products for export also rapidly expanded from 1986 to 1995. In fact, its share in the country’s total exports increased from 21.7% during the period 1970-85 to 55.8% and 72.2% in the second half of the 1980s and the 1990s, respectively (Diagram 4). From 2001 to 2003, the manufactured products for export accounted for 75.2% of the country’s total exports. This is considering the fact that the country’s development in the manufacturing of products for export commenced in late 1970s with the production of several processed food products, especially canned pineapple, canned tuna, frozen chicken as well as traditional labor-intensive manufactured goods, in particular garments. In 2006, the export of Thai manufactured products amounted to Baht 4,315 billion, which constituted mainly machineries and mechanical appliances including computers and computer parts, vehicles and auto accessories, and electrical appliances especially the integrated circuit products, which amounted to Baht 771.19 billion, 382.07 billion and 371.18 billion, respectively (BOT, 2008).
20.00
15.00
10.00
Percentage
5.00
0.00 1961
1966
1971
1976
1981
1986
1991
1996
2001
-5.00
-10.00
-15.00
-20.00 Year
GDP growth (annual %) ..
GDP per capita growth (annual %) ..
Manufacturing growth (annual %) ..
Agriculture growth (annual %) ..
Diagram 1: Thailand’s Economic Growth, GDP per Capita, Agriculture and Manufacturing Growth in 1961-2005
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40.00
35.00
30.00
Percentage
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20.00
15.00
10.00
5.00
0.00 1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Year
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP)
Manufacturing, value added (% of GDP)
Diagram 2: Structural Change in the Thai Economy: GDP Share, 1960-2005
80
70
60
Percentage
50
40
30
20
10
0 1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Year
Employment in agriculture (% of total employment)
Employment in industry (% of total employment)
Diagram 3: Structural Change in the Thai Economy: Employment Share, 1960-2000
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100 90
80 70
Percentage
60 50 40
30 20
10 0 1962
1967
1972
1977
1982
1987
1992
1997
2002
Year
Manufactures exports (% of merchandise exports)
Agricultural raw materials exports (% of merchandise exports)
Diagram 4: Structural Change in the Thai Economy: Export Share, 1962-2006
The labor-intensive manufacturing industries such as those that manufacture clothing, footwear, leather products, furniture, toys, jewels and gems, and electronics also had an impressive growth record. Their total share increased from 17.4% in the 1970s to 28.7% and 31.2% in the second half of the 1980s and the 1990s, respectively. However after 1995, further diversification of the export mix took place in the country when Thailand became an increasing attractive location for assembly activities, especially in electronics within the broader category of machinery and transport equipment. This resulted in the increased importance of manufacturing such products for export during the period from 1995 to the present. In contrast, exports of labor-intensive and resource based products, have become relatively less important, compared with the high-tech manufacturing industries (Diagram 5 and 6). The expansion of such labor-intensive manufactured products not only meant increased importance for the sector in terms of export earnings but also in terms of employment absorption. As a matter of fact, its employment share increased to 13.6% and 15.1% in 1991-95 and 1996-2000, respectively, from around 8.0% during the period 197085. Nevertheless, its performance in terms of national employment
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absorption seemed to be far from satisfactory sharing only around 10% of the overall national employment, while more than 50% of the employed workers still remained in the agricultural sector. Following up on this development, there appeared certain slowdown in the growth of the manufacturing of products for export in 1996-68. From the average annual growth rate of 23.2% during the period 1991-5, this declined to 0% between 1996 and 1998. This could be mainly due to the upward trend of the real wage rate and the successive appreciation of the real exchange rate (RER), especially in the early 1990s, leading to the deterioration of the competitiveness of the manufacturing sector while such export slowdown resulted in a decline in the growth of manufacturing outputs from 12% in 1995 to less than 2.0% in 1997, and further to a negative growth rate of -11.0% in 1998. Although the dramatic currency depreciation during the onset of the crisis could have served as the catalyst for a boom in manufacturing products for export, the exporters of manufactured products were restrained by the credit crunch in the financial sector. Exporters especially the high importcontent manufacturers, could not access adequate funds to acquire the necessary imported input materials. Devaluation led to increased costs in US Dollars of the import intermediates so that the exporters needed additional operating funds to buy such intermediates. The credit crunch in the financial sector therefore had retarded the growth of the Thai manufacturing exports. The growth of the manufacturing export has however, regained starting in 1999, with annual growth rate of 10% in 1999-2003, while the manufacturing output grew by 8.0% a year during the same period.
Industrial Distribution The data set used in this study was obtained from the industrial database provided by the Department of Industrial Work (DIW), Ministry of Industry. The data set includes data for 76 provinces where the manufacturing sectors are registered directly by the DIW. The timeline used is 1996-2005, which covers the pre- and post-financial crisis periods. In terms of the geographical distribution of workers in the manufacturing sector by region between 1996 and 2005, Table 1
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3,500,000.00
3,000,000.00
Million Baht
2,500,000.00
2,000,000.00
1,500,000.00
1,000,000.00
500,000.00
0.00 1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Year
Labor intensive products
High-tech products
Resource-based products
Other manufactured products
Diagram 5: Manufacturing of Export Products Classified by Product Group, 1995-2006
80.00
70.00
60.00
50.00
Percentage
40.00
30.00
20.00
10.00
0.00 1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
-10.00
-20.00 Year
Labor intensive products
High-tech products
Resource-based products
Other manufactured products
Diagram 6: Growth Rate of the Export Products Manufacturing Sector Classified by Product Group, 1995-2006
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showed that there have been significant changes in the geographical distribution of workers. Currently, Zone 2 has been the new location for Thai manufacturing base as it is the target for new industrial development promotion and for the new site of factories relocated from the BMR, while Zone 1 still has high concentration of the manufacturing industries. In 2005, the employment rate in Zone 2 increased to 23.63% of the total manufacturing employment from 18.15% in 1996. Zone 2 had about 372 thousand manufacturing employees during the same period. The employment rate in Zone 1 including the BMR remained high although the employment rate grew slightly slower. In fact, Bangkok’s share which reduced from 21.70% to 14.41% of the total manufacturing employment of whole country had a negative growth rate of around -0.72%, whilst its vicinity showed positive growth rates such as Samut Prakan and Samut Sakhon with escalating employment well above 151 and 94 thousand, respectively in terms of manufacturing employment. Among the 3 zones, Zone 2 and Zone 3 presented above average annual growth rate, especially in Zone 2 with Chonburi and Rayong as the center of the petro-chemical and auto-mobile industries as well as other businesses in the eastern region of Thailand. Zone 2 recorded very high positive growth rates (more than 2 times of the nation’s) which are also directly related to its GRP growth. On the other hand, the employment share in Zone 3 or the remote areas was still stable at approximately 28.6%, in spite of the industrial decentralization policy which has been prescribed since the early 1970s. Finally from 1996 to 2005, there seems to have been a shift in the manufacturing employment. The shift appears to form from the industrial core to the inner ring area, even though the BMR still occupied 47.73% of the total manufacturing employment. It should be noted that the relocation of factories during the late 1990s and the early 2000s corresponded closely to the rise and collapse of the bubble economy. In the early 1990s, financial institutions had increased their loans for investment in stocks and real estate, especially in the BMR following the deregulation and liberalization of the financial sector in Thailand. As a result, the prices of stocks and real estate increased remarkably and their respective capital gains brought huge wealth to the investors. However, when the bubble economy collapsed in 1997 with a drastic
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fall in the prices of stocks and real estate under the so called ‘Tom Yam Kung Disease’, the Thai economy entered into a recession. Indeed, the financial crisis was also associated with the rise and fall of the geographical concentration of the manufacturing industries in the BMR. Moreover, it should also be considered that Thai policy makers planned to enhance the promotion of Zone 2 as the new target industrial cluster area. Table 1 Change in the Distribution of Industrial Workers by BOI Zone Zone
1996 Number
2005 % Share
Number
% Share
Growth
Growth rate
1996-2005
(%)
1
1,352,470
54.83
1,656,697
47.73
304,227
2.50
2
447,693
18.15
819,984
23.63
372,291
9.24
3
666,494
27.02
994,104
28.64
327,610
5.46
2,466,657
100.00
3,470,785
100.00
1,004,128
4.52
Nation
Source: Calculated from DIW (2007)
Discussion It is also obvious that almost one half of the total manufacturing employment in Thailand has been concentrated in Bangkok and its adjacent provinces or the so-called ‘core area’. The major types of manufacturing industries located in the core area are the textile, wearing apparel and leather industries; paper and printing industries; and metal, machinery and electronic industries. On the other hand, the manufacturing industries that dominate in the periphery or rural areas are the wood and furniture industries; basic agro industries; food; beverages and tobacco industries; and non-metallic mineral products industries. Meanwhile, the high technology or capital intensive industries are found in the special economic zone (SEZ) such as in the eastern seaboard (ESB) where the petrochemical and auto-mobile industries are located.
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Many factors that have contributed to the industrial concentration both IS and EP period in the BMR and ESB are associated with location decision and policy factors, considering that industrial location plays the key factor for the industries’ operation performance. The BMR has been chosen by many enterprises due to its domestic market with a population of more than 10 million, and the availability of transportation and logistics facilities for accessing raw materials and exporting goods to the world market. In the BMR area, infrastructures and facilities such as water supply, electricity and communication systems are well developed and accessible. Moreover, labor productivity could be higher in the BMR because of trained and educated labor force. The BMR and its surrounding provinces also have sufďŹ cient ground-water potentials. Thus, agglomeration economies can reduce their operations and overhead costs when their factories are situated in the BMR and its vicinity (Pansuwan and Routray, 2011). However, the comparative advantages of situating factories in BMR tend to be lost over time in favor of the service industries in terms of higher wages, land price and environmental pollution. These factors explained the tendency to relocate most of the factories to the vicinity of the BMR and some areas in Zone 2 particularly in the ESB and the central region speciďŹ cally in Phra Nakhon Si Ayutthaya Province where electronic industries have now con-centrated (Pansuwan and Routray, 2011). In addition to the problems of congestion and pollution resulting from the intense concentration of industrial activities in the BMR, it is sad to note that the impacts of industrialization have not been widely and evenly spread to the other regions. Many provinces outside the BMR still depend heavily on agriculture-related activities where incomes remain limited and where technologies have not been advanced. The imbalanced and bias industrialization process of the country in the past has also contributed to the emergence of industries that place less emphasis on the utilization of the local and indigenous resources. There are two main reasons given by Myrdal that could lead to industrial concentration phenomena. Firstly, the spread effects becoming stronger and secondly, the role of the government which tend to interfere and influence the market forces (Das and Barua, 1996 citing Myrdal,
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1970). Moreover, Elizondo and Krugman established the relationship between regional disparities and trade policy regime, citing that in a country which follows a restrictive and inward looking policy, internal trade compensates for the meager size of its foreign trade. This leads to the concentration of production and trading activities in large metropolitan cities where there are more development-related and manpower training activities, more infrastructures, and very active financial transactions and marketing (Das and Barua, 1996 citing Elizondo and Krugman, 1992).
Conclusion Thailand has been quite successful in terms of industrial promotion and increasing the per capita income. Currently, Thailand is the 3rd most attractive business locations in Asia and the Pacific from the point of view of the transnational corporations (TNCs). This could be mainly due to the efficiency of the macro policies related to industrial promotion while the promotional incentives and the rapidly declining monopoly of the state-owned companies since 1960s, helped in creating new industries and firms with sizes much larger than most of the country’s traditional firms. The founders of such firms are typically those formerly engaged in merchandise and trading businesses, particularly the importers as well as the domestic distributors. Foreign firms also quickly came to Thailand either to establish their affiliates or to join the local firms in establishing various joint-venture industries. In recent years, Thailand had prescribed target industrial development policies which could transform Thailand’s manufacturing structure into an innovative-driven industry. While the ECS plan has also been working successfully with the neighboring countries, Thailand has continued to demonstrate the highest industrialization growth within the GMS. Meanwhile, industrial development in Thailand is successful but the country has failed in terms of industrial distribution. In fact, the very high magnitude of industrial concentration in the BMR could be one of the causes of economic disparity between BMR and the rural areas, and to some extent poverty in Thailand. As a consequence, the government has recently attempted to correct this geographical imbalance of industrialization in the country by putting more emphasis on rural industrial development and declaring that the rural industries are to
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become the centerpiece for the country’s overall future industrialization. As this change in the policy direction has been made only recently, there are still insufficient policy instruments and inadequate understanding of the problem to effectively implement the policy of industrial dispersion. Moreover, an effective institutional machinery to adequately support this new policy still does not exist.
Acknowledgements This research was made possible with financial support from the Faculty of Arts, Silpakorn University.
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References Akrasanee, N. (1977) Industrial Development in Thailand. Bangkok: Thammasat University Press. Akrasanee, N. (1991) Thailand’s Export-Led Growth: Retrospect and Prospects. Bangkok: Thailand Development Research Institute. Bank of Thailand (BOT) (2008), Economic and Financial Statistic: 1rst Quarter 2008, Bangkok: Bank of Thailand. Biggs, T., P. Brimble and D. Snodgrass (1990) Rural Industry and Employment Study: A Synthesis Report. Bangkok: Thailand Development Research Institute. Board of Investment (2006) BOI’s 40th Years Anniversary. Bangkok: Ministry of Industry. Cuyvers, L., P. D. Lombaerde, B. Dewulf, and D. V. D. Bulcke (1997) Export Strategies and Policies in Thailand until 1995 [Online URL: http://143.129.203.3/cas/PDF/CAS10.pdf ] accessed June 11, 2006. Das, S. K. and Barua, A. (1996). Regional Inequalities, Economic Growth and Liberalization: A Study of the Indian Economy, Journal of. Development Studies, 32:364-390. Department of Industrial Work (DIW)(2007) Industrial Database. Bangkok: Ministry of Industry. (Unpublished) Glassman, J. (2001) Economic Crisis in Asia: The Case of Thailand, Economic Geography, 77: 122-147. Glassman, J. (2007) Recovering from Crisis: The Case of Thailand’s Spatial Fix, Economic Geography, 83: 349-370. Glassman, J. and Sneddon, C. (2003) Chiang Mai and Khon Kaen as Growth Poles: Regional Industrial Development in Thailand and its Implications for Urban Sustainability, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 590: 93-115. Hussey, A. (1993) Rapid industrialization in Thailand, Geographical Review, 83: 14–28. Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand (IEAT) (2006) Industrial Estate Authority of Thailand: Roles, Responsibilities and Historical Background. [Online URL: http://www.ieat.go.th ] accessed March 1, 2006.
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Industrial Finance Corporation of Thailand (IFCT) (1991) Industrial Development in Thailand. Bangkok: Ministry of Industry. Jansen, K. (2001) Thailand: The Making of Miracle?, Development and Change, 32: 343-370. Kaothien, U. and Webster, D. (1998) Regional Development in Thailand: New Issues/New Responses, Regional Development Dialogue, 19: 139-157. Kittiprapas, S. (1999) Cross-Country Experience in Industrial Decentralization and Location Policies. Bangkok: Thailand Development Research Institute. Kohpaiboon, A. (2003) Foreign Trade Regime and FDI-growth Nexus: a Case Study of Thailand, Journal of Development Studies, 40 (2): 55-69. Krugman, P. and Venables, A. (1990) Integration and the competitiveness of peripheral industry in C. Bliss and J. Braga de Macedo (eds), Unity with Diversity in the European Community, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Krugman, P. (1991) Increasing returns and economic geography, Journal of Political Economy, 99: 484-499. Lall, S. (1998) Thailand’s Manufacturing Competitiveness: An Overview, In Competitiveness and Sustainable Economic Recovery in Thailand (Witte, J., and Koeberle, S., eds), pp. 211- 234. the Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board. Bangkok. Loha-unchit, C. (1990) Policies, Instruments and Institutions for Rural Industrial Development. Bangkok: Thailand Development Research Institute. Ministry of Industry (MOI) (2002) MOI’s 60th Anniversary. Bangkok: Ministry of Industry. Ministry of Industry (2006) MOI’s 64th Anniversary. Bangkok: Ministry of Industry. National Economic and Social Development Broad (NESDB) (2007a) National Economic and Social Development Plan. [Online URL:http://www.nesdb.go.th/Default.aspx?tabid=62 ] accessed October 1, 2007.
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National Economic and Social Development Broad (2007b) Gross Regional and Provincial Products 2005 edition. Bangkok: National Economic and Social Development Broad National Economic and Social Development Broad (2007c) Trend of Target Industry during 2007-2011 and Regional Industrial Development. Bangkok: National Economic and Social Development Broad. National Statistical Office (NSO). (1980-2007) Statistic of Thailand Various Year. Bangkok: Office of the Prime Minister. Panpiemras, K. (1988) Rural Industrial in Thailand. Bangkok: National Economic and Social Development Broad. Pansuwan, A. (2009) Regional Specialization and Industrial Concentration in Thailand, 1996-2005, Indonesian Journal of Geography, 41 (1): 1-17. Pansuwan, A. and Routray, J. K. (2011) Policies and Pattern of Industrial Development in Thailand. GeoJournal, 76 (1): 25-46. Reinhardt, N. (2000) Back to Basics in Malaysia and Thailand: The Role of Resource-Based Exports in Their Export-Led Growth, World Development, 28: 57-77. Sibunruang, A.(1986) Industrial Development Policies in Thailand. Bangkok: World Bank. Tambunlertchai, S. (1990) A Profile of Provincial Industry. Bangkok: Thailand Development Research Institute. Tienwong, K. (2004) Policy and Strategies for industrial development in regional area. Nakhon Phathom: Silpakorn University. Tsuneishi, T. (2005) The Regional Development Policy of Thailand and Its Economic Cooperation with Neighboring Countries. [Online URL:http://ir.ide.go.jp/dspace/bitstream/2344/174/1/ARRIDE_ Discussion_No.32_tsuneishi.pdf] accessed March 1, 2008. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2005) Prospects forForeign Direct Investment and the Strategies of Transnational Corporations 2005-2008. New York: United Nations. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2007) Thailand Human Development Report 2007: Sufficiency Economy and
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Human Development. Bangkok: United Nations Development Programme. World Bank (WB) (1993) The East Asian Miracle. Washington DC: World Bank. World Bank (2004) World Development Report 2005. Washington DC: World Bank. World Bank (2006) Thailand Investment Climate, Firm Competitiveness and Growth. Washington DC: World Bank. World Bank (2007) World Development Report 2008. Washington DC: World Bank.
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Book Review : Contesting National ‘Truths’: New Academic Writing on Thailand Matthew Copeland Review of Soren Ivarsson and Lotte Isager (editors), Saying the Unsayable: Monarchy and Democracy in Thailand, Copenhagen, Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Press, 2010; and David Streckfuss, Truth on Trial in Thailand: Defamation, treason, and lese majeste; New York, Routledge, 2011. In contemporary Thailand, the state asserts the right to act as the final arbiter of Thai-related truths, promoting some propositions and proscribing others. To many, this seems warranted. It is also in keeping with how “cultural resources” are managed and marketed in the international arena. Within the field of Thai Studies, however, truth claims are pursued differently. Therein, knowledge of things Thai – from cultural practices and political institutions through to social conflicts and public debates – is constituted through an ongoing series of critical exchanges, publically framed arguments and rebuttals that are oftentimes all about questioning prevailing understandings and challenging established authorities. The idea of singular national truths, proprietary meanings and understandings that must be vigilantly defended from ‘external’ assault, is at odds with the Thai Studies enterprise in several other respects as well. For one thing, area expertise is hardly a national monopoly; a brief glance at contemporary scholarship reveals an endeavor conducted in a multiplicity of languages by ‘authorities’ situated around the globe. For another, ‘foreign’ participation is in no sense new; the field is generally acknowledged to have been framed by pioneering ‘outsiders’, Westerners whose foreign-language histories and ethnographies of Siam provided models and points of departure for subsequent Thai-language studies. Foundational institutions like the Siam Society were from the outset multi-national and multilingual and in the subsequent period, the construction of a ‘modern’ Thai identity seems to have entailed a high Silpakorn University International Journal Vol.9-10 : 149-152, 2009-2010
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degree of direct and indirect transnational collaboration. The point can be better understood with reference to a recent history of legal reform in late 19th and early 20th century Siam. (Tamara Loos, Subject Siam: Family, Law and Colonial Modernity in Thailand, Chian Mai, Silkworm, 2006). Among other things, the author notes that the modernization process was a thoroughly transnational venture, driven in no small part by ‘external’ agency. The extraterritoriality clauses of Western—imposed commercial treaties provided an impetus for change. Western legal standards and practices served as models for revision. Hundreds of locals were sent overseas for periods of study and scores of foreign jurists - British, Americans, Belgians, Frenchmen, Ceylonese, and Japanese – were contracted and deployed locally to draft statutes, organize courts, and advise local counterparts. This collaborative modernization, in turn, constituted an important reference frame for distinguishing between things ‘foreign’ and things ‘Thai.’ Take family; in the late 19th century, Siamese kinship arrangements were sufficiently complex as to render the drafting of uniform legal codes almost impossible. Elites were generally polygynous, grouping wives and children into categories that afforded variable legal standing. Below this level, marital practices were much less formal, with sexual intercourse alone often sufficing to indicate marital status. Members of the foreign missionary community were scandalized by such practices, which were decried as both shameful and uncivilized. At the same time, polygyny had its defenders, among them foreign legal advisors who argued that such ‘traditional’ practices should be retained in law. Years of debate eventually engendered a compromise – a marriage law that, in limiting males to a single legal wife, appeared to support Westernstyle monogamous marriage without actually penalizing the popular but henceforth statistically invisible practice of polygyny. From this point onwards, however, it became possible to imagine an archetypical Thai family, one that extended vertically across generations as opposed to horizontally across maternal groupings. The development of the ‘modern’ Thai monarchy affords another example of cross-border collaboration, one of particular relevance to this review essay. The topic is potentially seditious, challenging ‘official’ representations of the Royal Institution as the unchanging center of
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Thai national life. The contemporary historiography of late 19th and early 20th century Siam makes it abundantly clear that local kingship was radically transformed by the colonial encounter, which provided the impetus, models, and methods for a European make-over. Less well documented and more difficult to assess are the transnational processes that have reworked the institution in the subsequent period: its awkward adjustment to Western-styled constitutionalism in the post-1932 period, its near-eclipse in the run-up to World War II, its re-emergence as potent symbol of conservative nationalism during the Cold War, and its current prominence in Thai political life. As these latter histories touch upon the god-like stature of the reigning monarch, academics have generally tended to write elsewhere. Self-restraint has also been buttressed by repeated state interventions, however - a point which David Streckfuss has thoroughly documented in his recent study, Truth on Trial in Thailand: Defamation, treason, and lese majeste (New York, Routledge, 2011). Streckfuss’ work is much more than a history of how law has been used to protect the monarchy from discursive crimes, however. He examines the way in which legislative frameworks that arose in a European theater have been redeployed locally to create a hybrid ‘regime of exception’ – a state that in unexceptional circumstances retains legal measures consigning extraordinary powers to a ruling elite, or to put it differently, a state that reserves the right to act as the final arbiter of Thai-related truth. Streckfuss’ work here is brilliant, informed by some 30 years of research and writing on Thailand. It remains to be seen whether his standing as perhaps the leading authority on lese majeste in a Thai context will keep state censors at bay. In the event Truth on Trial is unavailable locally, interested readers can find an excerpt of Streckfuss’s work, and whole lot more, in the second book under review here - Soren Ivarsson and Lotte Isager’s Saying the Unsayable: Monarchy and Democracy in Thailand. The biproduct of a conference hosted by the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies in Amsterdam in 2007, Saying the Unsayable is a collection of essays that flush in the recent history of the Royal Institution. A central theme of the text is the extensive political role of the monarchy in the post-1932, a taboo subject in that the monarchy is ‘officially’ situated somewhere
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high above the political realm. As contributors include of some of the better known scholars in the field, this book is difficult to ban. But not impossible; within the conservative realm of Thai royalist thinking, little space has been left for critical reflection. Official accounts of the monarchy are uniformly hagiographic. Critical scholarship, in turn, is extremely limited. In this context, the above mentioned studies are truly illuminating.
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Contributors Ruchi Agarwal Lecturer, Social Science Division, Mahidol University International College, 999 Phutthamonthon 4 Road, Salaya, Nakhon Pathom, Thailand 73170 Boonyasarit Aneksuk, Ph.D. Assistant Professor, Department of Tourism, Faculty of Liberal Arts, Ubon Ratchathani University, Ubon Ratchathani, Thailand 34190 e-mail address: b.aneksuk@gmail.com Chomjin Chantaraskul, Ph.D. Professor, Ubon Ratchathani University, Ubon Ratchathani, Thailand 34190 Matthew Copeland, Ph.D. Lecturer, Social Science Division, Mahidol University International College, 999 Phutthamonthon 4 Road, Salaya, Nakhon Pathom, Thailand 73170 William J. Jones Lecturer, Social Science Division, Mahidol University International College, 999 Phutthamonthon 4 Road, Salaya, Nakhon Pathom, Thailand 73170 Sindhchai Keokitichai, Ph.D. Associate Professor, Faculty of Pharmacy, Burapa University, Chonburi 20131 Kanokwan Manorom, Ph.D. Assistant Professor, Department of Social Science, Faculty of Liberal Arts, Ubon Ratchathani University, Ubon Ratchathani, Thailand 34190 e-mail address: k_manorom@yahoo.com Srisombat Nawanopparatsakul, Ph.D. Associate Professor, Faculty of Pharmacy, Silpakorn University, Nakhon Pathom, Thailand 73000 e-mail address: srisom@.su.ac.th
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Apisek Pansuwan Assistant Professor, Department of Geography, Faculty of Arts, Silpakorn University, Nakhon Pathom,Thailand 73000 e-mail address: apisekpan@yahoo.com Natanaree Posrithong Lecturer, Social Science Division, Mahidol University International College, 999 Phutthamonthon 4 Road, Salaya, Nakhon Pathom, Thailand 73170 e-mail address: natanaree@hotmail.com Supachai Wanalertsakul Lecturer, Integral Development Studies Program, Faculty of Management Science, Ubon Ratchathani University, Ubon Ratchathani, Thailand 34190 e-mail address: supachai.w@hotmail.com Somjade Wiyakarn, Ph.D. Assistant Professor, Faculty of Pharmacy, Silpakorn University, Nakhon Pathom, Thailand 73000
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