Conflict Networks in North and West Africa (brochure)

Facts and figures Conflict networks in North and West Africa

CONFLICTS ARE MORE VIOLENT AND TRANSNATIONAL

Violence in North and West Africa is on the rise. In the last decade, clashes between government forces and local militias, rebel groups and extremist organisations have resulted in over 100 000 deaths. Conflicts have become more violent, increasingly targeting civilians,

particularly in rural and border areas, where state power and infrastructures have long been deficient. Conflicts are also spilling over national borders, creating instability and insecurity in multiple countries.

Fatalities involving Boko Haram, ISWAP and government forces, 2009-20

Source :OECD/SWAC (2021) based on data from The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), https://acleddata.com/. ACLED data is publicly available.

Lake Chad region

is the deadliest conflict of the region

59 000 fatalities since 2009 (6 times more than in Mali), including more than 36 000 civilians

20% Boko Haram + ISWAP (Islamic State’s West Africa Province) account for 20% of violent events

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ACTORS IN CONFLICT ARE COMPLEX

To better understand conflict dynamics, SWAC/ OECD maps the complex relationships between violent organisations using dynamic social network analysis. This enables the identification of which organisations are allied with whom and who is in conflict with whom (rivalries) and how these volatile relationships evolve over time. Understanding these relationships helps to better understand underlying barriers to peace and inform more efficient stabilisation

strategies. In North and West Africa, allegiences between violent organisations are continuously shifting. Groups that were allies one day can fight each other the next and return to co-operation later. New groups also arise, split and reunite in unpredictable ways. These complex relationships mean that conflicts are more and more difficult to resolve.

In 2019, the number of rivalries is four times that of alliances

200 rivalries 300 alliances

Notes: Data available through 30 June 2020

Source : OECD/SWAC (2021) based on data from The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), https://acleddata.com/. ACLED data is publicly available.

THE NUMBER OF VIOLENT ORGANISATIONS IS INCREASING

Fuelled by insurgencies, rebellions and coups d’état in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria and Libya, the number of organisations in conflict doubled between 2009 and 2019. This increase is largely explained by the lack of a common political goal. While many violent

organisations often share a common enemy, they don’t necessarily collaborate with each other. As a result, more groups contribute to further disseminating violence across the region, reaching previously peaceful areas.

Between 2009 and 2019, the number of organisations in conflict doubled

604 in 2009

1 199 in 2019

Notes: Data available through 30 June 2020

Source: OECD/SWAC (2021) based on data from The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), https://acleddata.com/. ACLED data is publicly available.

POLITICAL AND IDENTITY MILITIAS ARE GROWING

These militias are now the most common type of organisation operating in the region (one third in 2020). They are armed groups that are organised in the name of some form of culturalbased identity e.g. ethnicity, language, religion,

nationality, place of origin. State authorities, religious leaders and community strongmen often use militias as private armies to settle disputes, compete over access to resources and strengthen local power.

Organisations in conflict by type in North and West Africa, 1997-2019

Note: Data available through 30 June 2020. The ACLED data does not distinguish between the perpetrator and the victim of a violent attack, except for civilians, who are always victims of violent events.

Source: OECD/SWAC (2021) based on data from The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), https:// acleddata.com/. ACLED data is publicly available.

One-third of organisations in conflict in North and West Africa in 2020 are militias

THREE MAJOR CONFLICTS

These conflicts are in Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger), the Lake Chad region (Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria) and Libya. All three show that conflict is more and more centralised around a small number of belligerents who are increasingly violent and able to better dominate conflicts.

Conflict network in Mali and Central Central, 2020

The jihadist group JNIM in the centre of the figure below is a major transborder actor conducting attacks in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. It has the largest number of enemies in the region illustrated by the red lines linking to other actors.

Military Forces of Côte d'Ivoire

Fulani Ethnic Militia (Mali)

Military Forces of Sudan

Dogon Ethnic Group (Mali)

Unidentified Armed Group (Mali)

Government of Mali

Ambassagou

Dan Na Ambassagou

Dozo Communal Militia

Dogon Ethnic Militia (Mali)

Fulani Ethnic Group (Mali)

Civilians (Mali)

Dawsahak Ethnic Group

JNIM

MINUSMA

Military Forces of Mali

Tuareg Ethnic Group (Mali)

Police Forces of Mali

ISWAP

Military Forces of Niger

Police Forces of Niger

Military Forces of Burkina Faso

Civilians (Niger)

Dozo Communal Militia (Burkina Faso)

Civilians (Burkina Faso)

Police Forces of Burkina Faso

VDP

G5S

ISGS

Note : Note: Data available through 30 June 2020.

Koglweogo

Fulani Ethnic Group (Burkina Faso)

Unidentified Armed Group (Burkina Faso)

Armed Group

Source: Authors, based on data from ACLED (2020), The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, https://acleddata.com/data-export-tool/.

MILITARY INTERVENTIONS DO NOT LEAD TO LONG-LASTING STABILITY

Military interventions only temporarily weaken their opponents without achieving long-lasting stability. In some cases, interventions strengthen jihadist and rebel organisations by contributing to their resilience. For example, some weakened jihadist groups have pledged allegiance to global organisations such as the Islamic State,

split according to ethnic and geographical lines or merged with other groups. These groups have also responded by moving to more remote or less monitored areas and participate in the regional diffusion of violence.

WAYS FORWARD: CO-ORDINATED REGIONAL APPROACHES AND STRONGER GOVERNANCE

Military interventions alone cannot address the roots of deep-seated conflicts.

Co-ordinated regional approaches are required to address the diffusion of political violence across borders.

State authorities need to strengthen national cohesion by developing decentralised institutions and infrastructure and addressing civilian issues. Rural and border areas require place-based policies tailored to their specificities.

An online version of the book Conflict Networks in North and West Africa is accessible via www.oecd.org/swac/publications

The book is part of The West African Studies series, which examines current economic and social issues in West Africa. The full series, along with the West African Working Papers series, is accessible via www.oecd.org/swac/publications

www.oecd.org/swac

https://mapping-africa-transformations.org

West African Studies Conflict Networks in North and West Africa

SAHEL AND WEST AFRICA Secretariat