C O M M E N TAT O R Second Response to Holden Hill Ken Matheson, St. Francis Xavier University In his essay, Efficient Causation in Aristotle’s Reproductive Causal Framework, Holden Hill makes a sound argument in support of his thesis that contemporary criticisms of Aristotle’s theory of reproduction arise from a misinterpretation of Aristotle’s causal framework. Hill points to Thomas Aquinas’ account of Aristotle’s theory and argues that it is Aquinas and not Aristotle who is the source of the notion that the male offspring is the telos (ultimate object or aim) of reproduction, and anything else is thus a defective, unactualized form. Although I find Hill’s argument sound, I think it could be more persuasive in two areas. First, if Aristotle was not postulating the male embryo as the telos of reproduction, what was Aristotle trying to explain, and second, a clearer explanation of the difference between Aquinas’ account and Aristotle’s. Let us consider whether a theory of male offspring as the telos of reproduction is consistent with the rest of Aristotle’s thoughts on reproduction. In his On the Soul. Aristotle claims that reproduction is the most natural act, the goal of which is continuation of the species. All living things seek immortality to participate in the eternal and the divine, but, as all living things have a finite lifespan, eternity is only possible if the living thing creates something like itself to continue its existence.1 Aristotle was a biologist who based his science on observations of the natural world, and he, therefore, would know that sexual reproduction requires the collaboration of a female and male member of the species. If he were to postulate that male offspring is the telos of reproduction, then actualization of that ultimate objective would yield a species with only male members, eliminating the possibility of continuation of the species. Claiming that the goal of reproduction is continuation of the species while also claiming that male offspring is the telos of reproduction is a contradiction, and, in my opinion, it is unlikely that Aristotle intended to claim the latter. After reading Hill’s account of the Thomistic tradition, I am left with two questions: 1. When Byrne, outlining the Thomistic account, says, 1 Aristotle.
“On the Soul” in The Basic Works of Aristotle. Edited by Richard Peter McKeon. (New York: New York : Random House, 1941), II.4.415a25-415b8
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