The American Bioeconomy and
RECOMMENDATIONS 1) Increased US investment in cybersecurity for the biological sciences Over the last decade, China has increased their investment in the bioeconomy and cybersecurity more broadly. And while the United States still has a larger biotechnology industry, the mismatch in investment puts the US at risk of being outpaced by China, thus making us dependent on the Chinese for most medical and pharmaceutical products. For this reason, it is important for the United States to increase our investment in cybersecurity as a way to protect biological and life sciences data that is produced through research and development efforts.
2) Develop formal oversight programs for DIY bio The DIY bio, or citizen science community, has expanded significantly in the last 10 years. While the DIYbio community can be a great source of innovation and can increase science literacy through the general public, the current method of oversight for this community is the development of trusting relationships between the FBI and members of the community. It relies heavily on self-reporting of incidents or suspicious behavior. Instead of continuing to rely on this method in the future, formal ethics and practice laws and regulations should be developed. Such laws will allow citizen scientists to continue exploring and learning within the life sciences, but will provide strong biosecurity and biodefense protections.
CONCLUSION As technology continues to advance and reliance on globalized supply networks continues to be a central aspect of the global economy, it is vital that pandemic preparedness addresses the vulnerabilities inherent in these systems. The recommendations provided in this
paper offer straight-forward and realistic solutions to address some of the most complicated issues at the intersection of globalization, technology, and pandemic response.
Authors of The American Bioeconomy and What Can be Done to Support It Primary Author: Christine Crudo Blackburn Deputy Director of the Pandemic & Biosecurity Policy Program
Secondary Author: Gerald Parker, DVM, PhD Director of the Pandemic & Biosecurity Policy Program
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Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs
