ENPI Policy Paper #1

THE ENPI POLICY PAPER #1 TOWARDS A C OMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TOWARDS THE REFUGEE CRISIS

By: ANDREI BUGA, ELISE SAADE, GHAZI MABROUK, ILIAS KHALAFI, JUAN GALVAN, PIER LUPINU, RICHARD PROCEE Edited by: TEODOR KALPAKCHIEV

According to the EU28 Asylum Quarterly published by Eurostat, in the Q2 of 2015 we saw a 104% increase number of asylum applicants from Syria (up to a number of 43 995) and a 323% of those from Afghanistan (up to 26 995), as well as a 470% increase of those from Iraq (up to 13 910) compared to Q2 of 2014. Interestingly, this trend has triggered an upsurge in the applications coming from the Balkans, especially from Albania – 354%, Kosovo – 386% and Montenegro – 255%, which, especially in the case of Germany are often disregarded due to suspicions of hidden economic migration.

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Even though Syrian applications are by far approved at the rate of 96%, the rising numbers have provoked a discourse over sharing the burden of Germany, France, Italy and Sweden. The new distributive quotas have been opposed by a number of countries, which are shattered by xenophobic

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Figure 1. Absolute Change Q2 2014 to Q2 2015: Eurostat

sentiments, whilst the questions of capacity and post-approval integration in the desired locality remain open.

The 90th UN GA provided another momentum in the Syrian turbulence – the premature shaking of the hands of West and East resulted in second intervention in the Syrian War, this time on behalf of Russia.

Not surprisingly, it brough about a wave of discontent in Saudi Arabia due to the imbalance of forces and it is likely to intervene too. Furthermore, the US has decided to lend an invisible helping hand by simply dropping tons of ammunitions to the rebels. The Turkish Kurdish movement has been a traditional proprietor, but was shattered to pieces on the 10th of October, with the culprits most possibly being ISIS or the Turkish repression state itself, especially bearing in fact the forthcoming elections and Erdogan’s desideratum – the 100 years anniversary of the modern Turkish State. Parallels can be drawn with the Madrid 2004 train bombing, which amongst other effects, resulted in the loss of elections for the Popular Party.

I.

The Actors Involved

a) International Actors: At this moment it is advisable to distinguish among existing actors and try to identify possible coalitions for the solutions we would like to put forward. The issue of migration has already been well institutionalized, with IOM and UNHCR being the main project coordinators, dealing with money donated by the US, the EU’s MS and the Gulf Countries, with the latter however receiving none refugees. b) Local Actors: Due to their proximity, as well as possible job opportunities and cultural closeness, the main projects and camps that are to be found are inside Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon. From the three, the Turkish capital remains best kept, both due to its natural protection, as well as increased security measures, including in the airspace. Turkey’s principal position is against the Assad regime, which leaves good space for maneuver of the Kurdish resistance, which by means of its participation in the civil war is diminishing the strength of the minority in Turkey.

a) Post-Crisis State-Building: Whatever the immediate outcome, the question of the post-crisis governance of the Syrian territory remains. Definitely, the actors that would be involved in a possible reconciliation would include Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Turkey, Russia and the EU, however the question of the representation of the Kurds, the remains of ISIS as well as US remain highly sensitive. The EU must thus begin reproaching these actors well ahead of time and prepare the ground for round table talks. The proven 5+1 format from the Iran nuclear deal would also hardly work without a line of dialogue between Iran and Syria, but it must be clear that Assad’s involvement in these must be made temporary.

As soon as the immediate threat in the face of ISIS is dissolved, a technocratic government that lends from Ukraine’s experience must be formed with the widest possible participation of experts, which must be, however, and by all means, an EU-headed one. Potential state building must be preceded by the establishment of an an ad-hoc criminal court for crimes against humanity, which would be meant to put end to the grievances created by Assad’s regime.

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Our Position and Solutions

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II.

b) The role of the High Representative: The HRCFSP must therefore increase its diplomatic presence in the countries and begin talks on high level summits, whilst also keeping an eye for possible Russian retaliation in the East, especially in Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh that would be meant to downgrade EU’s bargaining position for heading a state-building format. Furthermore, any dichotomies between the HRCFSP and the EC President must be avoided at forums such as G8 and coordination at the GA Council must be catered for, so that the MS come up with the most uniform stance possible. c) Create further buffers: When it comes to the refugee waves themselves, it might be expected that the upward rise in number will continue, which is why the EU should begin catering for possible livable habitats in all the MS, which should allow both concentration and coexistence on the territory.

Furthermore, the EU should use Turkey’s experience in building a well-catered for camp for massive numbers of refugees and establish a similar one between Jordan and Egypt, which should act as a temporary buffer until the sweeping of ISIS takes place. The EU should strengthen its position also within the Gulf Cooperation Council by stating that it might stop importing oil from OPEC countries, if the Gulf countries do not begin taking refugees too (allegedly ~100 000). Last but not least, the EU, represented by Frontex should strengthen it’s the passport checks on planes, as well as the coastal border guards in order to make sure that situation is not exploited by economic migration.

III.

Financing

Speaking of financing the new refugee camps, possibilities such as harnessing the potential of remittances must be enhanced for example by ICT (sending donations to a fund via SMS) in all the countries, which are involved, as well as crowd funding, whilst a participation of the private sector must be stimulated. It is namely the private sector on the ground that can give the most potential advice on where the funds for re-qualification must be targeted, thus also increasing the possibility for its participation in the initiatives. Whilst any aid related activities must prioritize education and health related projects, realism should remain a guiding principle for provision of equitable solutions, so as to avoid the incapacitation of public infrastructure, as is the case with the hospitals in Lebabon. Last, but not least, the European Court of Auditors must strictly oversee the spending of any pooled financial means, be they public or a mixture of public and private.

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The highest number of asylum applications for Q2 2015 has been registered from Iraq (470%), Kosovo (386%) and Syria (102%).

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The ENPI suggest the preparation of round table talks for future state building, increased visibility for the High Representative and strengthened control.

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Further policy options include the convening of an ad-hoc criminal court for crimes against humanity, technocratic state building in Syria, as well as usage of ICT for the financing of further projects for providing organized shelter, based on the already existing experiences.

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In essence:

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IV.