KOREA FOCUS - March 2012

Table of Contents

- Korea Focus - March 2012 - TOC - Politics 1. Post-Kim Jong-il North Korea’s Foreign Relations 2. Inauspicious Changes in North Korea 3. Korea Surrounded by Space Powers 4. ‘Fresh Declaration for Korea-U.S. Alliance’ - Economy 1. Abuse of Ideology in Election Year 2. Multiple Benefits of Korea-China FTA 3. New Perspective on Taiwan 4. Revival of True Entrepreneurship 5. Expectations for ‘Lee Jong-wook ― Seoul Project’ - Society 1. Why the Mobile Environment Needs Upgrading 2. Who Would Support My Parents?

3. Civic Activists Stand on the Slope 4. Refugee Law Brings Hope to Asylum Seekers in Korea - Culture 1. When Pansori Meets Cuban Melodies 2. Traditional Culture that Bolsters ‘Korean Dream’ 3. The Right to Live amid Familiarity 4. Two Years of Wikitree, Ten Years of Wikipedia - Essay 1. An Outlook for the North Korean Situation in 2012 2. [Roundtable] Prospects for the North Korean Situation and Inter-Korean Relations in 2012 3. Economic Influence of the Recent North Korea-related Risk and Policy Suggestions 4. The Age of the New Family

- Feature 1. A Korean Wife and Her French Husband Who Loves Korea 100 Times More Than She Does 2. Seoul Fortress on the Road to World Heritage Status - BookReview 1. The Symbolism of Black Dragons in Korean Culture 2. Meeting the Kings of Joseon alongside their Graves - Interview 1. Park Moo-ik: “The number of candidates has an overriding importance in presidential election results.�

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- Post-Kim Jong-il North Korea’s Foreign Relations - Inauspicious Changes in North Korea - Korea Surrounded by Space Powers - ‘Fresh Declaration for Korea-U.S. Alliance’

Post-Kim Jong-il North Korea’s Foreign Relations

Han Sung-joo Professor Emeritus, Korea University Former Minister of Foreign Affairs

How will North Korea conduct its foreign relations following the death of Kim Jong-il? In view of the uncertainty regarding who will seize real power in North Korea and through what process, a prediction of Pyongyang’s future behavior is not an easy task. But, based on the action taken so far by the postKim Jong-il North Korea and responses of neighboring countries, it would be possible to estimate what sorts of policy choices and alternative diplomatic options Pyongyang can afford to make.

Just a few days before the announcement of Kim Jong-il’s death on December 19, North Korea and the United States were reportedly negotiating the terms for resuming the long-stalled six-party talks on denuclearization in the North.

In the negotiations held in Beijing on December 15 and 16, North Korea was said to have agreed to U.S. demands to freeze its uranium enrichment facilities

at Yongbyon and allow the return of an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection team. In return, Washington reportedly promised 240,000 tons of “nutritional assistance” to the North. The deal ran aground upon Kim’s demise, but that does not mean its viability has been completely washed away.

Existing circumstances that underline North Korea’s foreign relations are much more consistent than assumed. China has manifested its position of recognizing and supporting the succession of Kim Jong-un to the throne, while other major parties concerned, including the United States, Japan, Russia and South Korea, have all displayed their preference for a stable power transition.

Pyongyang has also been trying to assure that there would be no abrupt change or interruption in its foreign policy.

Would North Korea be able to make an epochal decision to shelve its nuclear ambition, as Seoul and Washington have persistently demanded, in order to resuscitate its moribund economy? Common sense says the North would face enormous difficulties in making such an extraordinary decision in the absence of an absolute ruler like Kim Jong-il. However, one cannot rule out the possibility that Pyongyang, even without an absolute ruler, would have the potency to eventually scrap its hostility toward Seoul and Washington and take a flexible stance in dealing with the nuclear issue.

What would be the conditions conducive to leading Pyongyang to demonstrate flexibility? First, North Korea after Kim’s death faces greater needs than ever for China’s political, economic and diplomatic support. What Beijing is urging Pyongyang to do can be summed up as follows: return to the six-party talks, refrain from taking provocative acts that escalate military tension on the Korean peninsula, implement economic reforms and opening to the outside world, and ameliorate relations with the United States and other surrounding countries. North Korea would find it difficult to ignore China’s propositions.

Second, the succeeding regime headed by Kim Jong-un is burdened with the grave task of reviving the country’s extremely tattered economy in the shortest possible period. In view of its desperate need for economic restoration, North Korea would have to pursue economic cooperation and exchanges with the United States, Japan and South Korea and, in that process, would be compelled to exhibit greater flexibility in dealing with its nuclear issue.

However, there are also negative factors that impede Pyongyang’s efforts to break out of isolation and establish smooth relations with Seoul and Washington. Kim Jong-un and his supporters are too busy with the pressing task of consolidating their grip on power to make a far-reaching strategic decision to shed off isolation. Furthermore, it appears that the top military brass clinging to hard-line positions have increased their already strong influence within the power hierarchy. This means that Kim Jong-un and his civilian supporters, even if inclined to a moderate foreign policy, are hampered by formidable difficulties in pushing through their policy preference.

In addition, the North’s power elite may well be obsessed by their perceived strategic value of nuclear arms for sustaining the regime following the departure of Kim Jong-il, who believed that nuclear arms were indispensable for maintaining his rule. The late Kim’s successors must also be sharing the view that, should the nuclear deterrence be abandoned, North Korea would be left vulnerable to military interference by foreign powers that want to see its regime change.

But then, until the very eve of Kim Jong-il’s death, Pyongyang showed its intent to exercise a certain extent of flexibility in negotiations with Washington. The North’s display of such willingness must have been based on Kim’s personal decision. If that is the case and as long as his successors have

intent to make a policy change, the deceased leader’s final judgment can be best utilized in ushering in a new phase in North Korea’s foreign relations.

Beijing’s assurance guaranteeing the regime security would also help Pyongyang’s new leaders to take a more flexible approach.

The countries involved in the six-party talks would all welcome such a determination by the North. They share the common interest and understanding of the need to forge a constructive relationship with the postKim Jong-il regime and to lead North Korea onto the path of peace, reform and openness. Pyongyang must realize that now is the time to accede to such benign positions of the surrounding powers and to take the opportunity to discard isolation and rejuvenate its troubled economy.

[Chosun Ilbo, February 3, 2012]

www.koreafocus.or.kr

Inauspicious Changes in North Korea

Yoo Ho-yeol Professor of North Korean Studies Korea University

A month has elapsed since the sudden death of North Korean leader Kim Jongil, with a stable and swift power transition to his third son Jong-un.

Immediately after the deceased leader’s funeral ceremony, the Politburo of the ruling Workers’ Party declared Kim Jong-un the “Supreme Leader” of the party, military and the people. With the dawning of the New Year, the young successor set out to make a series of on-site inspection visits to military units and economic establishments as part of his explicit performance as the country’s new leader.

Notwithstanding the ostensible stability in the succession process, there are reports about unanticipated and conflicting developments within the core of the North’s ruling hierarchy, suggesting that the country’s overall situation remains fluid. On December 28, when Kim Jong-il’s funeral ceremony took

place, the party organ Rodong Sinmun expounded that the first of the late Kim’s three “great revolutionary legacies” was the launching of an artificial earth satellite and the creation of a nuclear power state. It is yet to be seen whether North Korea in the Kim Jong-un era would give up its nuclear ambition or continue nuclear arms development.

However, for Kim Jong-un who will be bound for a certain period of time by the precepts of his father, the publicized emphasis on the North’s being a “nuclear weapons state” as a fait accompli would contradict his another potential choice of advocating the will of his grandfather, Kim Il-sung, that is, the realization of a “nuclear-free Korean peninsula.” Had the hard-liners in the military staged a preemptive bid for sustained nuclear development, the newspaper article may well be seen as a portent of internal strife over the policy direction in the Kim Jong-un era.

Another anomalous turn of events during the funeral period was the promotion to army four-star general of Chang Song-taek (Jang Song-thaek), the administration department chief of the Workers’ Party, and a “vertical leap” in ranks of O Kuk-ryol, a vice chairman of the National Defense Commission (NDC). In official television programs showing Kim Jong-il’s lying in state and other functions, Chang made his first appearance in a general’s uniform, indicating his key role in the military as well as the party to act as a powerful mentor to Kim Jong-un. During the momentous period, O’s position jumped from the 27th to the 12th in state ranks, suggesting his reemergence as a strong supporter of the young leader.

The conspicuous rise of Chang, another NDC vice chairman, and O leads to speculation that they may form an alliance to launch a collective leadership under Kim Jong-un, who was declared the Supreme Leader based on the “October 8 instructions” of his father. Conversely, there also is a possibility

that in the process of formulating a power base for the untested young leader, feuds between the new elite and old guards may escalate into a power struggle within the inner circle under the pretext of following through with the late Kim’s instructions.

In the wake of Kim Jong-il’s departure, North Korea’s political decisions have largely been made by the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party. Kim Jongil exercised absolute authority through his secretariat and the NDC instead of relying on the party’s Central Committee. But Kim Jong-un, though enthroned as the Supreme Leader, is incapable of running the country as head of the National Defense Commission because he lacks the experience and leadership his father possessed.

After all, Kim Jong-un is highly likely to assume the role of party general secretary, which is primarily limited to confirming the debate and resolutions adopted by the Central Committee. Backing up such a prediction, major decisions in the Kim Jong-un era have been made in the name of the Central Committee and the Politburo. To change the political mechanism, the Supreme People’s Assembly, due to open in April, could amend the state constitution so as to institute a power structure similar to the one that existed in the early years of the Kim Il-sung era.

The New Year joint editorial for 2012 carried by major North Korean newspapers appears incomplete in many respects because it had to be prepared within two weeks of Kim Jong-il’s death. The time was too short for policymakers and editorial writers to clearly present the policy lines of the Kim Jong-un era; the editorial was relatively shorter than usual with obvious traces of corrections and partial rewriting.

Along with the North’s reiterated motto of building a “strong and prosperous

nation,” the editorial stressed economic development initiatives, including “Industrial Revolution of the New (21st) Century” focused on the promotion of knowledge economy and other high-tech sectors and “Flames of Hamnam” referring to the progress of heavy and agricultural industries in South Hamgyong Province. These economic campaigns may eventually lead to North Korea’s opening to the outside world in its own terms of globalization, but the process is apt to touch off internal disputes over how to balance juche (self-reliant) economic policy and international outreach.

Coming down to specific sectors, wrangling is apt to take place between the parties engaged in the mining of mineral resources and export authorities over the extent of each side’s profitability or contribution to the state in earning foreign hard currency. Such rows can be conjectured through the mercurial regulations on the matters even under the tight rule of Kim Jong-il. Another issue concerns the widening gap and potential friction between the general populace depending on meager market economy and large, state-supported organizations earning foreign currencies, which has to be fundamentally dealt with by the party and the state. In all, post-Kim Jong-il North Korea will eventually have to make a grave decision on reform and opening.

The era of Kim Jong-un has begun, but many things are left shrouded in darkness. Though the North is unlikely to engage in reckless provocation against South Korea, its criticism of the Seoul government would not abate ahead of the general and presidential elections this year. As Pyongyang has stiffened its stance in negotiations with Washington on food aid, prospects are murky for early progress in their bilateral talks for rapprochement and resumption of the six-party talks. In light of subdued yet apprehensive moves in the North’s inner circle, Seoul should step up international cooperation to obtain accurate information and get ready to properly cope with all changes in the North.

[Chosun Ilbo, January 16, 2012]

www.koreafocus.or.kr

Korea Surrounded by Space Powers

Kim Kyung-min Professor of Political Science Hanyang University

Japan is pushing for a legal revision to pave the way toward the development of space weapons. In 2008, Japan enacted the “Basic Space Law” in a stealthy effort to allow the Self-Defense Forces to operate reconnaissance satellites for defense purposes. Now, it is revealing its intention to openly develop outer space for military purposes. Japan has built a peaceful image in the international community while accumulating military technologies in outer space at the same time since it declared the “principle of using outer space for peaceful purposes” in 1969 in the name of its House of Representatives.

In November 2011, China made a fuss about becoming the world’s third country that had succeeded in space docking of two satellites. But, since November 1997, Japan has succeeded in docking satellites three times already by launching the engineering test satellite “Kiku-7,” which consists of two

satellites named “Chaser” and “Target,” by an “H-2” rocket. Unlike China, Japan has been accumulating space technologies quietly and stealthily for years.

Space technologies are dual-use technologies that can be used for peace as well as military purposes. Satellites are used not only for peaceful purposes, such as typhoon forecasts and assessing natural disasters, but also for military purposes, including intelligence gathering. If a country possesses its own rocket capabilities, it can launch both weather satellites and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

I once asked a Japanese rocket developer what was Japan’s most proud space technology. He said, “It’s docking technology.” Possessing excellent docking technology means that the country also has an excellent technology of intercepting incoming missiles in outer space. Japan has the capability to develop ICBMs anytime, if it intends to. After being launched from the ground, an ICBM will travel through outer space, re-enter the atmosphere, and fly toward a ground target. Therefore, no country can claim it has acquired ICBM technology before succeeding in tests to have ICBMs re-enter the atmosphere.

Japan has succeeded in having two rockets re-enter the atmosphere: Orex in February 1994 and then Hyflex in 1996. Besides, Japan has the capability to launch a six-ton satellite into outer space, meaning that it has the technology of launching long-range ballistic missiles. Its military satellites are capable of obtaining high-resolution images of an area in the 30 cm range on the ground.

Japan is expected to catch up soon with the U.S. technology, which is in the 10 cm range. The United States’ GPS technology is based on Japan’s “quasizenith satellite system.”

Besides the United States, Russia and Japan are the only countries in the world that can send astronauts and cargo to the International Space Station. Japan is such a space power that its “H-2B” rocket took over the task of transporting cargo to the ISS after the United States ended its space shuttle program worth nearly a billion dollars per launch. Unlike China, however, Japan has never made a fuss about its space development because it does not want to arouse wariness among neighboring countries.

Korea will launch more satellites this year than before. The Arirang-5 radar satellite capable of observing the ground, regardless of rains or clouds, will be launched by a Russian rocket. The Arirang-3 optical satellite will be launched

by Japan’s “H-2A” rocket from the Tanegashima Space Center, south of Kyushu. The Science and Technology Satellite-3 is also scheduled to be launched with the help of a Russian rocket. A third launch of the satellite Naro slated for October will be successful, if the Russian-made first-stage rocket works with no glitches this time.

All these satellites will be launched with the help of foreign countries because we do not have our own rocket capabilities. Here lies the reason why we should succeed in developing a rocket by the target year of 2021. It is high time that we kept in mind that all neighboring countries are space powers.

[Chosun Ilbo, January 7, 2012]

www.koreafocus.or.kr

‘Fresh Declaration for Korea-U.S. Alliance’

Choe Myong-sang President Institute for Korea Security and Aerospace Strategy; Visiting Professor of Myongji University

The “new global military strategy,” which U.S. President Barack Obama outlined recently, is believed to be a defense strategy tailored to removing Cold War dynamics and meeting the needs of futuristic wars. But its key point is cuts in defense spending. The new strategy envisages reductions totaling US$489 billion over the next decade to help overcome the financial crisis currently facing the United States. Washington is expected to invest in efforts to reinforce the Navy and Air Force, while reducing the number of the Army soldiers from 570,000 to 490,000. It is also aimed at increasing intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities as well as counter-terrorism and cyber warfare capabilities.

President Obama is giving priority to the Asia-Pacific region in response to the

rise of China. Fortunately, he said, there would be no cut in the number of U.S. military personnel in this region. But we need to formulate national policies and strategies for our own security. First, Seoul and Washington should make a “fresh declaration for the Korea-U.S. alliance,” whereby Washington would change the status of the U.S. Forces Korea based solely on an agreement with Seoul under any circumstances. The USFK troop level will be maintained at about 28,500 for the time being, but Washington has unilaterally pulled out its troops from the Republic of Korea in the past. My suggestion is all the more important in light of the scheduled transfer of wartime operational control of the ROK forces to Korea and disbandment of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command in 2015.

As soon as he was sworn in as the U.S. president in 1969, Richard Nixon reformed the deficit-ridden economy and revamped the military, the two sectors ravaged by the protracted Vietnam War. He cancelled the convertibility of the U.S. dollar into gold, which ended the Bretton Woods system of international financial relations, and declared a new defense policy of reducing the number of U.S. troops overseas and demanding the host countries bear the defense burden themselves. In 1971, he pulled out the Seventh U.S. Infantry Division from the South Korea without prior discussion with its government.

We need to establish a perfect security and defense posture through a policy based on national consensus. Concerned about security vacuum left by the sudden departure of U.S. troops, then President Park Chung-hee hastily launched a policy of self-reliant defense. He introduced the powerful “Yushin Revitalizing Reform” in defiance of democratic processes. He sought to achieve national unity as part of his efforts to prevent South Korea from becoming a second Vietnam. He thus fended off provocations from North Korea while boosting self-reliant defense capabilities by establishing the homeland reserve forces, introducing a defense tax and launching the

“Yulgok” military modernization project.

But our society has changed significantly. People now have different political views. They no longer tolerate developmental or military dictatorship on the pretext of national security. Korea’s democratized society, in which people freely express their personal desires, is now facing difficulties in security issues. Especially, we should wisely overcome political maneuvers, schisms among regions and classes, social confusion, and insidious activities by proPyongyang left-wing activists, ahead of the general and presidential elections this year. In a word, we need a national strategy to turn the crisis into an opportunity.

Kim Jong-il’s sudden death is an opportunity for both North and South Korea.

The Korean people have survived all kinds of crises throughout history. We should guide North Korea, which is experiencing instability after Kim’s death, onto the road of reform and opening in cooperation with the international community. In particular, we will have to seek cooperation with China to change the North, while watching attentively how the 28-year-old “rookie leader” Kim Jong-un seizes power.

The people of South Korea have turned one of the world’s poorest countries into a major economic power, and a beneficiary of international assistance into a donor. We should turn the current crisis into an opportunity to further consolidate national security and achieve territorial reunification at an early date through a perfect security posture and strengthened alliance with the United States.

[JoongAng Ilbo, January 12, 2012]

www.koreafocus.or.kr

- Abuse of Ideology in Election Year - Multiple Benefits of Korea-China FTA - New Perspective on Taiwan - Revival of True Entrepreneurship - Expectations for ‘Lee Jong-wook ― Seoul Project’

Abuse of Ideology in Election Year

Kang Cheon-seok Chief Editorial Writer The Chosun Ilbo

Koreans will go to the polls on December 19 this year to elect their next president, who will likely win by a slim margin after fierce election campaigning by the ruling party’s candidate and a unified opposition candidate. Around midnight that day or in the early morning of December 20, the president-elect will speak to the nation. Though emotional, the speech will be all too familiar.

Regardless of the era, victory speeches by presidents-elect have been nearly identical. One of the most common lines is as follows. “At this very moment, the wall separating the people who supported me and the people who cast a vote for my rival candidate has crumbled. Let’s unite and help rehabilitate the economy. I will pour my heart and all efforts into ensuring that benefits of economic recovery would be evenly spread across all income classes. On the

basis of economic stability, I will strive to remove barriers between the two Koreas and work for the national reunification.”

On their victory night, presidents-elect seriously mean what they say. But their pledges tend to be forgotten quickly and everything they say simply goes in one ear and out the other. The people are prepared to be deceived once again.

The next president will be expected to offer ways to revitalize the economy when he speaks on Election Day or on Inauguration Day two months later. In a recent survey, 24.7 percent of the respondents named “economic recovery and stimulation” as the top priority for the next president. Other priorities were: price stabilization (16.6 percent), job creation and reduction of unemployment (12.7 percent), easing of income disparity and social bipolarization (6.0 percent), reducing the working population’s housing shortage (4.4 percent) and expansion of the welfare system (2.9 percent).

In other words, 67.9 percent of the respondents are anxiously waiting for a “miracle hand” that is capable of resuscitating the economy. Only 8.1 percent chose improvement of inter-Korean relations as the top priority, while political reform was cited by 3.5 percent. The next president may feel heavily burdened by the survey results.

The economy is not an electric stove that heats up quickly as soon as it is turned on. The economy can be likened to the conventional kitchen furnace, called “agungi,” in Korea’s ondol floor heating system. It takes quite a long time before the floor area closer to the furnace becomes hot and even more time before the warmth of the lower part of the floor spreads to the upper part.

The system works well only when the stone slabs are properly arranged beneath the floor. If they are improperly laid, even heaps of firewood would only produce eye-stinging smoke and fail to remove the chill.

The people are generally impatient. Soon after the elections, they begin to get irritated and angry. Things could get far worse, if key government posts are doled out to the eggheads who churned out election campaign pledges, and to political sycophants who saturated the presidential campaign trail. If such concerns turn into reality, the new president’s popularity would immediately plunge.

These days, the ruling Grand National Party is embroiled in an internal dispute over whether to retain or remove the word “conservative” from its platform.

Likewise, the main opposition Democratic United Party is busy reconfirming its commitment to “rule of law” and “market “economy” after briefly abandoning these politically sensitive words. In short, both parties are debating whether to shift their policies and platforms farther to the left.

The argument is that the left is the new mainstream. That is a very shallow way of thinking. They may believe that room floors can get hot faster if the kitchen furnace is moved to the left and rice can cook faster if the kitchen range is moved to the left. In the past, people were once thrilled after wrongly assuming that a wholly new world would be on the horizon only if the kitchen furnace and range were moved to the left. Their hopes were eventually dashed and they developed serious health problems from cold floors and were forced to eat raw rice.

Furthermore, ideology cannot be treated like firewood; it can’t be chopped and burned. There has been no historical instance in which a state improved its people’s livelihoods by discarding an ideology. In today’s Korea, the ideology of freedom is being dismissed by both rightists and leftists as “anti-people and anachronistic.” Under the communist dictatorship of the former Soviet Union, which touted itself as a heaven for proletariats and claimed to embody the

“ideology of equality,” freedom was brutally suppressed and denounced as the most impure and dangerous ideology. Back then, “freedom” meant the ideology of revolution and “equality” was an ideological cudgel to wield against the people.

Ideology is a double-edged sword. An ideology, if used incorrectly, can instill in an unenlightened public an illusion that a new world is close at hand and all necessities can be earned effortlessly. In this case, ideologies can be misused as a “kindling” to ignite a political instigation.

Both right-wing and left-wing politicians had better stop toying with an ideology. We’ve already had enough. The main opposition Democratic United Party has threatened to dismantle large conglomerates, or chaebol, and impeach President Lee Myung-bak as soon as it wins the parliamentary majority in the April general elections. It remains to be seen whether the liberal opposition party’s radical election pledges would appeal to the voters.

On the other hand, the ruling Grand National Party’s emergency committee appears to have achieved marginal success. Under the current political circumstances, the GNP stands little chance of winning this year’s parliamentary and presidential elections. The struggling governing party should be relieved to know it has regained some public attention thanks to its emergency committee’s performance.

People want to live in a nation where neighbors can encourage, console and praise each other in a warmer environment than now. They are anxious for an “era of sympathy.” Whether we can open such a society and usher in a new era doesn’t necessarily depend on the location of the fireplace. The more important prerequisites are the virtues of a good leader who can sympathize with people, efficient policies that can evenly distribute the “heat between the lower and upper parts of room floors,” and the honest implementation of the policies.

[January 7, 2012] www.koreafocus.or.kr

Multiple Benefits of Korea-China FTA

Yun Chang-hyun Professor of Business Administration The University of Seoul

During my recent trip to Beijing, I had a chance to meet a senior official of China’s Ministry of Commerce and talked about bilateral trade relations between China and South Korea. The official said that the annual bilateral trade volume is estimated at US$250 billion, with China’s exports and imports with Korea totaling $83 billion and $163 billion, respectively. But the figures differed from those of a Beijing-based official of the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA).

According to KOTRA’s tentative tally, China’s exports and imports with Korea reached $90 billion and $130 billion, respectively, in 2011, with their two-way trade volume standing at $220 billion. The official explained that the differences in the trade figures between the two countries are caused by different calculation methods. For instance, Korean goods exported to China

via Hong Kong are included in Beijing’s trade data.

China accounts for approximately 25 percent of Korea’s trade in Chinese statistics and about 22 percent of it in Korean statistics. Anyway, one country out of some 200 in the world accounts for a quarter of Korea’s total trade volume of more than $1 trillion. Moreover, China’s share of Korea’s trade is bigger than that of the United States and Japan combined and is expected to expand further in the future.

While in Beijing, I also met a research fellow of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, who raised questions over Korea’s triangular relationship with China and the United States. “Recently, the U.S. seems to be putting too much pressure

on

China.

(Korea)

depends

on

China

economically

but

simultaneously depends on the U.S. in the foreign affairs and security fields.

(Korea’s) attitude is somewhat problematic,” the research fellow said.

Amid strained relations between Beijing and Washington, the researcher’s remarks indirectly reflected China’s uncomfortable position toward Korea’s relationship with the United States. The Chinese people seem displeased because Korea appears to be leaning towards the United States despite its considerable economic dependence on China. Even though not all Chinese think that way, some say that the majority of ordinary Chinese people should be regarded as being unfriendly toward Korea. Therefore, I believe that the time has come for us to hold more serious discussions on the issue.

Hwang Jang-yop, former secretary of the North’s Workers’ Party and the highest-ranking North Korean defector, used to stress the importance of South Korea-China free trade on several occasions before his death in October 2010.

Hwang, who came to Seoul in 1997, said that China’s existence and role are very important factors in inter-Korean relations and Seoul should deepen its

dialogue and relationship with Beijing in order to resolve North Korean issues.

Hwang insisted that a free trade agreement between South Korea and China would pave the way to a deeper dialogue. He believed that the FTA would uncover clues to promoting peace on the Korean peninsula and resolving reunification issues.

In this sense, a recent agreement between Seoul and Beijing to more actively pursue a free trade deal seems to have multiple implications. During his January 9 visit to Beijing, President Lee Myung-bak told his Chinese counterpart, Hu Jintao, that South Korea will soon begin procedures for starting formal FTA negotiations with China.

Of course, a Seoul-Beijing trade pact would have enormous economic effects and significantly boost Korea’s stature, as it would have FTAs with both China and the United States, or the so-called Group of Two. In addition, it would provide an opportunity to deepen mutual understanding of each other’s realities. That could mean more Chinese consideration for South Korea rather than unilateral siding with North Korea, which could help curtail the North’s provocations against the South. In short, besides economic benefits, a South Korea-China FTA would help resolve the complicated geopolitical risks of the Korean peninsula.

Against this backdrop, the two countries urgently need to begin working-level discussions, though they may not have to hastily reach an agreement. I sincerely hope that Seoul and Beijing will be able to conclude an FTA through proper negotiations and position adjustments, thereby maximizing its anticipated beneficial effects in Korea’s national status, economics and diplomacy as well as peace on the Korean peninsula.

[Korea Economic Daily, January 16, 2012]

www.koreafocus.or.kr

New Perspective on Taiwan

Kang Jun-young Professor of Chinese Studies Graduate School of International and Area Studies Hankuk University of Foreign Studies

Taiwanese President Ma Ying-jeou has been re-elected to a second four-year term in a vote seen as reaffirming his policy of promoting stable relations between Taiwan and China. Contrary to pre-election expectations of a close race, Ma of the Chinese Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang (KMT), drew 51.5 percent of the vote, comfortably beating opposition candidate Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), who had 45.6 percent.

The January 14 presidential election drew worldwide attention, as Taiwanese voters evaluated Ma’s economic policies and the nation’s economic recovery before China’s leadership change at the end of this year. Ma has been credited with engineering a dramatic turnaround in relations with China that have greatly reduced tensions.

Consequently, both China and the United States breathed a sigh of relief, because Ma has promised to maintain peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Officials in Washington and Beijing probably feared that an election victory by Tsai’s DPP, which favors formal independence from China, would lead to cross-strait conflict and fresh Sino-U.S. confrontation. China regards Taiwan as a breakaway province. Cross-strait relations worsened under proindependence President Chen Shui-bian from 2000 to 2008.

Over the past four years, Ma has led his country’s economic recovery and development, most conspicuously by signing the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) with China in 2010. Ma focused his campaign on maintaining stable relations with China, whereas Tsai denied the so-called “1992 Consensus,” asserting that an excessive dependence on the mainland would undermine Taiwan’s independence.

The 1992 Consensus is a cross-strait agreement, which states, “Both sides of the Taiwan Strait agree that there is only one China. However, the two sides of the Strait have different opinions as to the meaning of one China.” Denouncing this as an “ambiguous” accord, Tsai offered her vision of a “Taiwan Consensus” and demanded that the Taiwanese determine their own future through democratic procedures.

The Taiwanese people displayed an adequate sense of balance under these circumstances. Ma’s campaign for realistic approaches to the Chinese market was positively received, but he won 1.41 million fewer votes than in 2008.

KMT retained its majority in the parliamentary elections, held simultaneously with the presidential poll, though with a reduced margin. The ruling party won 64 out of 113 seats in the Legislature, losing 17 seats. In contrast, the DPP increased its seats by 13 to 40, indicating the voters’ wish to hold the ruling

party in check. As a result, cross-strait exchanges are expected to remain stable for the time being.

At this juncture, we should reflect on what the result of Taiwan’s presidential election means to Korea. This year marks the 20th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Korea and China. But we have forgotten the stark reality that Korea and Taiwan mark the 20th anniversary of the severance of their diplomatic ties.

In the wake of the Taiwan election, China and Taiwan said their relations would enter into a new phase. Regardless of the complicated past and realistic international strategies, Taiwan is certainly an important country for Korea that should not be dismissed. Above all, Taiwan is one of Korea’s five largest trade partners.

Japan has been expanding large-scale investments in Taiwan since the conclusion of the ECFA between Beijing and Taipei. Southeast Asian countries are also aggressively expanding economic exchanges with Taiwan. Closer cooperation with Taiwan will help facilitate Korean enterprises’ inroads into the Chinese market. Korea and Taiwan have sufficient room for enlarging economic cooperation, as they can complement each other’s limitations.

Despite the painful history of severed diplomatic relations, bilateral cultural exchanges between Korea and Taiwan have rather been active, with Southeast Asia’s hallyu, or the Korean Wave, radiating from Taiwan. The Taiwanese people remain as enthusiastic as ever about Korean popular culture. Expansion of economic, social and cultural exchanges with Taiwan doesn’t conflict with the one-China principle stipulated in the Korean-Chinese statement issued when they established diplomatic ties in 1992.

Diplomatic promises between nations should be strictly kept, but Taiwan, a major global economy, should not be overlooked. We don’t have to be excessively conscious of China at least in the economic and social fields. We, too, don’t discourage the international community from conducting exchanges with North Korea.

Likewise, Taiwan should no longer be inactive. The hardly-won effects of cross-strait cooperation could be halved if Taiwan only wants other countries to extend favors. What is more dreadful than a love-hate relationship is indifference. Korea and Taiwan have sufficient room for expanding economic exchanges in many fields and share social and cultural consensus. Therefore, it is utterly natural for Korea to broaden its study and understanding of Taiwan.

[Maeil Business Newspaper, January 19, 2012]

www.koreafocus.or.kr

Revival of True Entrepreneurship

Yang Sun-hee Editorial Writer The JoongAng Ilbo

The founders of Korean conglomerates, or chaebol, were different from their children and second-generation business owners, even in the manners they sat.

There was an interesting episode that happened about 15 to 16 years ago. At that time, the former presidents Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo were standing trial after being indicted for their roles in the military coup of December 12, 1979, which brought Chun to power, as well as for their involvement in cracking down on the May 18 Gwangju Democratization Movement in 1980.

Simultaneously, a number of chaebol chairmen were indicted on charges of offering slush funds to Chun and Roh during their presidency. As a legal beat reporter, I covered those trials. Sometimes, peripheral news materials that were not reported in the newspapers are more vividly remembered than those

reported. In one instance, I still remember my personal impressions of chaebol founders and their son heirs appearing in court.

The defendants’ seats looked uncomfortable at first glance. The indicted conglomerate chairmen were seated in tightly spaced and hard wooden benches. They soon began to fall into two categories. The founding owners sat upright and maintained expressions of pained concentration throughout the trials that lasted over one hour. But many chaebol heirs fidgeted, looked around restlessly and shook their legs to show how uncomfortable they were.

Their restlessness even distracted the gallery and clearly showed their difference with chaebol founders.

In the wake of the 1997 foreign exchange crisis, I covered numerous cases of corporate failures as a business reporter. My colleagues even called me a “specialist” in corporate liquidation. I had a number of sources in the liquidated companies but lost contact with most of them. After years passed, I have run into several of the first-generation business founders who are now seeking to rebuild their businesses.

A few years ago, I met by chance a former founder and owner of a large-scale fashion company, who said he opened a small shop in Dongdaemun Market.

Though the elderly man was once called a chaebol owner, he is now busy meeting with various people with bunches of documents on his self-devised business project under his arms. “I built a company with my bare hands from the rubble of the Korean War. I’m not scared of being empty-handed,” he told me. Regardless of the feasibility of his latest business ideas, his daring and unyielding entrepreneurship gene was very impressive.

According to recent news reports, children of chaebol founders are actively starting their own businesses. But the energetic vitality characteristic of the

corporate founder-owners can hardly be found among the second-generation business owners, who start out with the abundant resources and support from their family’s conglomerate.

Last year, for example, a controversial “bakery war” among daughters of chaebol founders made headlines. Their success was somehow mitigated by having their fathers standing by with wide safety nets should they fall. Of course, this type of business establishment has very high economic efficiency.

The problem is that the chaebol scions lack the spirit of challenging and innovative entrepreneurship that marked their parents’ rise to fame and fortune.

What is worrisome is that the stories of chaebol offspring thriving on abundant financial support may devitalize the business creation market. With a number of chaebol scions jumping into businesses traditionally run by small and medium-sized companies, potential entrepreneurs from less richer families would be discouraged. It is regrettable that chaebol founders’ spirit of challenge and adventurism appears not to be handed over to their offspring Creation of more job opportunities is a top priority of the government this year. In particular, the government encourages new business start-ups, with President Lee Myung-bak vowing to extend 500 billion won (US$445 million) to one-person entrepreneurs. Kim Seok-dong, chairman of the Financial Services Commission, has pledged to promote the social environment for entrepreneurial activities and corporate start-ups by taking extraordinary measures, such as opening a special market for small and medium enterprises and venture companies.

Of course, a simple lip service offered by government authorities is unlikely to bring about dramatic social changes. Starting a new business is very

challenging these days. The first-generation chaebol founders had it easier because they started when there was virtually no industrial activity. They blazed new trails where there were none. Today, however, Korea is a wholly different country. The markets abound with all kinds of goods and services and funds are dominating industries like empires. It is a jungle, where money makes money. Nevertheless, paradoxically, our young generation should be encouraged to keep starting businesses.

Without a mindset of venturing into new fields and seeking fresh innovations, Korea’s comfort-seeking society will only age quickly. Challenge, venture and concentration are among the key virtues required of business founders. Now is the time to spread these virtues across society. British historian Arnold Toynbee argued that the ancient Mayan and Mesopotamian civilizations crumbled and reverted to the wilderness because they lacked a challenging spirit. We should learn a lesson from their history and encourage our youths to embrace challenging entrepreneurship.

On the surface, all markets appear saturated but there are still niches waiting to be discovered. Few companies last longer than a century. Our young people must continue to challenge themselves to fill the potential industrial void.

[January 6, 2012]

www.koreafocus.or.kr

Expectations for ‘Lee Jong-wook ― Seoul Project’

Kang Dae-hee Dean of the College of Medicine Seoul National University

On January 9, Seoul National University (SNU) College of Medicine held a ceremony to welcome eight medical professors from the National University of Laos, who came to study basic medical technology. The ceremony marked the second term of the “Lee Jong-wook ― Seoul Project,” named after the late former director-general of the World Health Organization.

After World War II, advanced countries began to earmark budgets for international aid programs. In the early stages, the aid was designed to promote global peace and economic prosperity. At the same time, military support helped stabilize regimes and ideologies. The Lee Jong-wook ― Seoul Project was launched by benchmarking the Minnesota Plan, the nickname for a seven-year U.S. assistance program that educated 226 SNU medical professors beginning in 1955 and supplied medical equipment.

In the 1960s, advanced countries set up the Development Assistance Committee under the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Since the 1970s, “aid efficiency” has become the most critical issue, as the focus of international aid strategies shifted from economic growth to meeting the basic human needs.

To that end, the 189 member states of the United Nations promised in 2000 to free people from extreme poverty and multiple deprivations and this pledge became the eight Millennium Development Goals to be achieved by 2015. In 2005, countries from around the world endorsed the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, a more comprehensive attempt to inject principles of partnership in the way donor and developing countries interact. During the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in Busan last year, the aid paradigm

was

changed

from

“aid

effectiveness”

to

“development

effectiveness.”

Korea’s success experience, especially in the medical and healthcare sectors, stands out amid the changes. Judging from statistical indices, it is easy to understand why the world has paid so much attention to Korea. In the 1950s, the average life expectancy of Korean women was 51 years, about 20 years shorter than the advanced countries’ average of 69 years. In 2010, Korean women’s average life expectancy rose to 84 years, ranking sixth among OECD member states. As for infant mortality rate, no official statistics are available for the 1950s. It stood at 32.6 deaths per 1,000 births in 1985, and was 3.2 deaths in 2011, a 10-fold decrease in 26 years and a below-average figure in the OECD. Korea’s success can be attributed to the University of Minnesota’s educational and technical support for Korean medical professors. At that time, the

Minnesota Plan was not simple invitational training. Only 33 out of a total of 77 invited trainees were young doctors, who served as unpaid teaching assistants. Of them, three obtained doctorate degrees, while eight others were granted master’s degrees.

Professors with administrative duties underwent short-term training, one year for assistant professors and two years for younger professors. In addition, 11 advisors were sent for training in overall school administration. They later led consultations

on revising school

curriculum

and promoting school

development, eventually helping lay the foundations for the development of Korea’s medical education.

At the same time, aid funds were also extended to help improve hospital facilities. The United States offered US$10 million during a period of six years and eight months, while the Korean government gave $6.9 million. The development of Korea’s medical sector is not solely attributable to the assistance from the United States and the international community, however. Today’s success has been made possible by the enthusiasm and dedication of the trailblazers of our medical industry.

The Lee Jong-wook ― Seoul Project, which has just entered its second term, was planned based our experiences as a repayment to the international community. The project consists of four pillars: invitational training, visit consulting, equipment support and building infrastructure for sustained exchanges. The project organizers are exploring methods of assistance by taking advantage of our country’s advanced information technologies as well as our medical sector’s competitiveness.

Invited trainee professors can gain not only medical knowledge and technologies, but also learn about leadership, research and policymaking in

medicine and community medical care. This program itself is important. But what is even more important is that we, too, went through exactly what they currently are experiencing. For that reason, we’re able to sympathize with them.

Nevertheless, the Seoul Project has much to be desired. Korean trainees were given first-class tickets when they flew to Minnesota and were paid better than U.S. resident doctors, according to school records. But we are now providing participants in the Seoul Project with economy-class tickets and minimal living expenses equivalent to those earned by migrant workers.

I’m convinced that the Seoul Project is more substantial and advanced than the Minnesota Plan at least in terms of program content and attention-getting. But the project still lacks detailed caretaking and emotional impact. Korea is on the threshold of joining the ranks of advanced countries but we should clearly remember our past. I hope sincerity and dignity would be added to our government’s external aid programs so that the world community will remember Korea as a role model for sharing and repayment of gratitude.

[Seoul Shinmun, January 19, 2012]

www.koreafocus.or.kr

- Why the Mobile Environment Needs Upgrading - Who Would Support My Parents?

- Civic Activists Stand on the Slope - Refugee Law Brings Hope to Asylum Seekers in Korea

Why the Mobile Environment Needs Upgrading

Oh Se-jung President Institute for Basic Science

The political season is in full swing. The news media is producing a flood of reports on the ruling party’s emergency committee and the main opposition party’s general convention, with political fever heating up the social networking services (SNS) such as Twitter. With the general legislative elections in April and the presidential election in December, the fever will not subside throughout this year. Moreover, with more than 30 countries looking forward to major elections, politics should make the most popular topics around the world during this year. At home, the entire nation may split into groups and argue all year over which side is right.

Politics is important, for sure. It should certainly be an important task to gather popular views to decide the direction for the nation to move ahead. But only the phenomena that have come to the fore tend to become issues and the center

of debate while the underlying substance and implications are far more important than visible symptoms in most events in our world. For example, half-priced college tuition is one of the biggest issues these days, but the real problem lies in the poor quality of college education and the barren job markets than the amounts of tuition.

Investment in welfare has also emerged as a vital political issue, but at its root is the worsening economic bipolarization. In spite of the apparent importance of the debates on how much to cut college tuition or how much to increase welfare spending, they are merely superficial arguments; the fundamental points should be how substantially improve university education and how to ease the ever-intensifying bipolarization of our society. While engrossed in squabbling over superficial issues, it’s hard to look for basic solutions. This will be even truer in a political season when all parties are engaged in a life-ordeath struggle to seize power.

Even in such a chaotic situation, however, somebody should seriously ponder the crucial problems and search for their fundamental solutions for the longterm survival and prosperity of the nation and society. It is necessary to take care of what is needed and what we can do right now, while closely monitoring socio-economic changes in the world. Regardless of whether this will be politically beneficial or not, one should push forward undauntedly for the sake of the nation’s future.

What are the most urgent tasks for us in 2012? There must be different things to do in each area, but given that the fundamental energy for change comes from science and technology, it is most important to correctly understand and cope with the current trends in science and technology. As witnessed in the changing political topography in Korea and the power transitions in the Middle East, where the Internet and social networking service have played a

significant role, technological advancement is the most fundamental driving force behind social reform.

In this regard, our foremost priority should be investment and deregulation toward building an optimal mobile environment. If the Internet and personal computers led the transition into a full-fledged information society in the past, the mobile environments are ushering in a more advanced information society.

In the past, Internet access was available only through personal computers, but smartphones now make it possible anytime and anywhere, bringing about qualitative changes in social and technical terms.

These changes represent both opportunities and crisis. Just as Korea overtook electronics powerhouse Japan in the transition from analog to digital, IT powerhouse Korea may also fall behind if it fails to adjust to the tide of change. In particular, Korea needs to strengthen itself further because it lagged behind industrial countries in introducing the mobile environment due to excessive regulation. The domestic political agenda should not delay the construction and use of mobile environments. Instead, the opportunity should wisely be taken advantage of. This would be of great help in encouraging young entrepreneurs to start up new businesses boosting economy and creating jobs.

Secondly, the nation should abandon the copying and chasing paradigm of the past and swiftly shift into a trend-setting, creativity-oriented society. The time is gone for Korea’s large conglomerates quickly copying the products of other companies and mass-producing them to enter the global markets. From its experience in the past several years, the nation has learned that this outdated strategy cannot create more jobs for young people, let alone raise the per capita GDP beyond $20,000.

Korea should become the first source of products that others cannot even imagine, if it is to join the ranks of advanced nations. In order to do so, it is crucial to encourage creative research in basic sciences and development of original technologies and bolster investments in these areas. In view of the global trend of interdisciplinary research and technological convergence, it is also very important to stimulate basic research in the humanities as well as science and technology. There is no need to say that all this can be done through education designed to cultivate the creative ability of students.

If it wastes this year on unproductive power games, the nation may find itself lagging far behind other countries. Even amid the political hubbub of an election year, it is necessary to perform the tasks that are truly important for Korea’s future.

[Dong-a Ilbo, January 13, 2012]

www.koreafocus.or.kr

Who Would Support My Parents?

Kim Yong-ha President Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs

According to the latest social survey report released by Statistics Korea, the percentage of Koreans who believe that aged parents should be supported by their children plummeted to 36 percent in 2010 from 89.9 percent in 1998.

This is shocking. Considering that the ratio was 63.4 percent in 2006, we can see that the public perception of supporting the elderly has changed rapidly in recent years. In fact, the percentage of senior citizens aged 65 and over living alone or only with their spouses amounts to 61.8 percent.

It is hard to consider the survey result as a sign of family disintegration but it may well be regarded as a reflection of changes in how families are defined.

The average household size has shrunk from a three-generation extended family to a two-generation nuclear family. The number of children has also decreased from more than five to two or one, and there is even a trend among

young people to avoid marriage itself. Marriages are deferred with the divorce rate on the rise.

Those who believe that children are not responsible for supporting their parents may not mean they do not care whether their parents are alive or dead.

Indeed, the survey found that 47.4 percent of respondents believe that the responsibility of supporting the elderly should be shared by the government, society and families. While the number of those who said children are responsible declined, those who consider it a joint responsibility dramatically increased.

This should be viewed as a shift in perceived responsibility, from families to government and society, as in the advanced countries of Western Europe. The problem is whether our government and society are prepared to cope with the changing public perception. Presently, less than 20 percent of Koreans aged 65 and over benefit from public pension systems, including the national pension program. Since the “basic old age security system” was introduced in 2008, 70 percent of the nation’s elderly population is receiving a monthly allowance of some 90,000 won per person, barely escaping from the “un-pensioned” state.

Moreover, the survey found, the national pension program will be available only for 30 to 50 percent of baby boomers who are soon to join the ranks of the elderly. Also, the old age pensioners are taking about 400,000 won a month on average per person, which is far too insufficient for their livelihoods. Of course, public pension plans alone cannot satisfy the ever-increasing welfare demand in an era when life expectancy reaches 100 years. It is inevitable for the government, enterprises and individuals to share the responsibility appropriately.

Individuals should prepare for their old age by properly mixing public,

retirement and private pensions and savings. In Western welfare states, people have depended on public pensions for more than 60 percent of their living expenses in old age, but lately the trend is changing to emphasize the responsibility of individuals. In our case, however, the government, enterprises and individuals should share responsibility, expanding their portions as required by circumstances. There is no correct answer as to how to adjust the portions among the three parties, but it is clear that the government should take a greater responsibility for people in the low-income bracket while individual responsibility should increase for those in the high-income bracket.

When an individual’s post-retirement living cost is divided into thee levels of minimum, optimum or sufficient, the portfolio can be designed with a public pension guaranteeing the minimum level, a corporate pension enabling the optimum level and a private saving meeting the sufficient level. However, this scenario can only be applied to those who have enough financial resources of their own. A significant number of people have no other choice but to rely on the insufficient national pension. Even so, there is no way to call for the expansion of public pensions, which will mean transferring a significant portion of the financial burden to future generations.

The government needs to draw up exclusive measures for different age groups.

Those who are already in the elderly group are mostly unprepared for old age.

However, considering they have more children while showing relatively low levels of consumption, they may need just a little more support in addition to the basic old age security program. For the baby boomers who have not retired yet, circumstances to keep them employed should be created so they can subscribe to the national pension program for longer periods and then strengthen tax benefits for retirement and private pension programs. Efforts should also be made to reduce the “dead zone� of the low-income classes, including the self-employed.

[Dong-a Ilbo, January 20, 2012]

www.koreafocus.or.kr

Civic Activists Stand on the Slope

Ahn Kyong-whan Professor of Law Seoul National University

“If everyone enters politics, who would remain to raise the cattle?” This is a voice of concern heard from the civil society these days. A strong wind has been blowing across our society since the election of Park Won-soon, once a symbol of Korean civil society movement, as the mayor of Seoul in October last year. Encouraged by Park’s “successful” transformation, young activists are rushing to the political front one after another.

A considerable number of ambitious would-be-politicians from civic groups have gathered around Moon Sung-keun, a former actor who joined the Democratic United Party after successfully spearheading the so-called “Million People’s Riot” (baengman millan). In addition, quite a few high-fliers are throwing their hats into the ring, directly targeting the general elections in April. It is like watching the reemergence of the “386 generation” that pushed

Roh Moo-hyun into the presidential office in 2003.

Precisely put, there is no particular occupation named politician. Nor is there any official route to become a politician. The departments of political science at universities do not present certificates for politicians, either. Literally speaking, anyone can become a politician simply by making up his/her mind to do so. This is what makes politics even more difficult. Anyone can dream of it but it is no road to take rashly. It is a swamp. Once you put your foot in it, you can never get out. Yet, very few politicians wrap up their careers with respect from people.

It is not so unnatural to switch from a civic movement to politics. Actually, Korean civics cannot be strictly distinguished from politics, which sets Korea apart from the so-called “advanced countries” in Europe, the United States or Japan. The civil society movement in Korea began due to the nation’s political situation. Today’s civic movement has its root in the anti-dictatorial and democratization movement under past authoritarian regimes. This is why some hard-line fundamentalists still hold the view that the state and government are evil enemies of the people.

The civic movement led by NGOs (non-governmental organizations) takes an important role in modern democratic politics. Their main responsibility is to monitor and criticize the government’s activities and suggest constructive alternatives. Since its founding, the United Nations has continuously included active participation by NGOs in its operation. The term, “civil society,” which is commonly used in U.N. documents, refers to NGOs. NGOs and civic groups should form an “uncomfortable” partnership with the government. If NGOs repeat what the government wants to hear like state-run think tanks, their raison d’etre dissipates. Such derailed NGOs are often

disparaged as “near government organizations.” Once there was an organization dubbed the “red guards” of Cheong Wa Dae, the presidential office. Civic activists dreaming of joining the government later are also sarcastically called “next government officers.” No matter how hard they tried from the outside, old evils wouldn’t budge an inch. So, they set out to change the world by participating in politics directly.

I applaud their courage. What I hope is that they won’t lose their original intentions after their successful entry into politics. In this regard, I hope, they will create momentum to remove the public distrust of the existing party politics. The problem is not those who left but those who stay. Those who left the civil society expect to receive unconditional support from their former organizations. Therefore, the burden of those who stay grows. Since they waged lonely and tough struggles together for a long time, they have probably accumulated an unusual emotional bond.

The biggest problem of all is that the majority of civic activists take on what is popularly considered a “politically progressive inclination.” When human alliances are intertwined with political targets, civic groups lose ground and their credibility falls. Strict self-censorship is needed on the part of activiststurned-politicians in their selection of goals and action plans. I express concern as well as welcome at the news of some civic activists entering politics.

Suddenly, the famous opening lines of “A Tale of Two Cities,” a novel by Charles Dickens, occur to me. “It was the best of times, it was the worst of times···we had everything before us, we had nothing before us···” I hope they will not grumble about their choices later. Hwang Sun-won’s controversial novel, “Trees Stand on the Slope” (1960), could be an epigram for them. I hope that young people in this country will not make everyone a victim by hurting each other while waging a war as depicted in this novel. For elections are wars waged by people in times of peace.

[Hankook Ilbo, January 25, 2012]

www.koreafocus.or.kr

Refugee Law Brings Hope to Asylum Seekers in Korea

Lee Ho-taeg Executive Director Refuge pNnan

A black woman, her face wrapped up in a black veil, knelt down and cried her eyes out immediately upon entering my hotel room. The floor of the hotel room in Kinshasa, the capital of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, was covered with concrete. The woman did not know any language to explain her painful situation to me. However, her tear-smeared face revealed all the pains and weight of life she had to withstand for the past four years.

Yombi, her husband, was imprisoned for reporting on irregularities committed by the president of their country while taking power in 2002, when he was a senior official for a state information agency. Anticipating a possible death penalty, Yombi escaped from prison and fled his country with a fake passport.

After enduring many difficulties, he concluded that he could probably protect his life in South Korea. Back home, since authorities considered him a thorn in

their side, his wife and three children had to live in hiding, in a mud hut at a garbage dumping site. Skipping meals often, the children could not attend school.

Yombi succeeded in escaping to Korea, but had to live as an “illegal alien.” He could not bring over his wife and children, who were living in fear like criminals. I came to know Yombi while running an NGO that assists refugees and made all possible efforts to help him attain refugee status so his family could be spared from further suffering. Yombi and I requested the Korean government to grant him political asylum on the grounds that he could not go back to his country where he would certainly face political persecution. But our requests were repeatedly rejected for lack of sufficient evidence that he had been persecuted in his country.

It is clearly evident that anyone who suddenly leaves his country in a lifethreatening situation cannot prepare enough documents to prove his status as a refugee. Yet the Korean government was unwilling to acknowledge such exceptional circumstances. We presented clippings from local newspapers that reported on his detention, to which our government responded that “newspaper stories can be fabricated with money in Africa.”

Eventually, I decided to go to the Democratic Republic of the Congo myself to collect necessary documents. It seemed incredulous that I had to fly 9,000 kilometers to secure additional evidence material, but it was the only way to help get Yombi accepted as a refugee. Watching his wife kneeling down and crying endlessly in front of me, I was reassured I made the right decision. In front of a person who had flown from the other side of the world to help her husband, Yombi’s wife burst into tears feeling a thin ray of hope that she might be reunited with her husband after enduring tremendous sorrow and fear to protect their children over the years.

With her tears in my mind and carrying “indisputable” evidence to support Yombi’s refugee status, I boarded the plane back to Korea. One of Yombi’s colleagues secretly made a copy of a government document on his interrogation and delivered it to me. And I visited a local newspaper company and purchased copies of the back issues from which I had made clippings to present to the Korean government. After reviewing the additional material, the Korean government finally accepted Yombi as a refugee in 2008. His wife and three children came to Korea in 2009. His church in Incheon and the motor company GM have presented them a house to live in.

Yombi hopes that his country will become democratized like Korea. On December 30, last year, Yombi and about 30 of his compatriots staged protest rallies in front of the Embassy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in Jongno and the Belgian Embassy in Itaewon, in Seoul. They claimed that the electoral commission in Kinshasa rigged vote counts and made a false announcement that the incumbent DRC President Joseph Kabila won over the opposition candidate Étienne Tshisekedi in the presidential election held on November 28. They believe that Belgium, the former colonizer of DRC, exerted influence in the process.

While attending the rallies along with Yombi, I thought of Yi Seung-man (Syngman Rhee) and Kim Gu, leaders of Korean independence movement, who wandered around the world for decades, pleading for help for Korean people who were suffering under the brutal rule of Japanese imperialists.

Someday in the future, Yombi will return to his country and serve his fellow countrymen as their leader. Then, the people of the DRC will regard Korea as a “Good Samaritan” who helped a neighbor in difficulty.

At of the end of June in 2011, a total of 3,301 people from conflict regions or

dictatorial countries, including Pakistan, Myanmar, China, Nigeria, Uganda and Bangladesh, have applied for refugee status in Korea, of whom 250 have acquired refugee status. With the National Assembly’s passage of a refugee bill, initiated by the ruling party lawmaker Hwang Woo-yea, on December 29, the groundwork has been laid to accelerate granting refugee status to the qualified and providing them with support in employment, housing and medical care during the screening period. It is hoped that with the enactment of the Refugee Law the Republic of Korea will become a land of hope for nations suffering under dictatorship and poverty.

[Chosun Ilbo, January 25, 2012]

www.koreafocus.or.kr

- When Pansori Meets Cuban Melodies - Traditional Culture that Bolsters ‘Korean Dream’ - The Right to Live amid Familiarity - Two Years of Wikitree, Ten Years of Wikipedia

When Pansori Meets Cuban Melodies

Song Hye-jin Professor of Traditional Korean Music Graduate School of Traditional Culture and Arts Sookmyung Women’s University

“Quiéreme mucho, dulce amor mío / que amante siempre te adoraré.” Cuba’s national opera troupe members put a lovely spin on the innocent love song, offering a precious moment for a Korean audience, which finally enjoyed the original version of “Quiereme Mucho” (Love Me Much), a song that gained global popularity after tenor Placido Domingo famously sang it. It was quite a fascinating experience.

Late last year, when a cold spell hit Seoul, the Olympus Hall in Samseongdong was filled with exotic and lively energy of Cuban musicians. The Korean audience was instantly mesmerized when the magical music broke down all the barriers between music, people and countries. The heart-warming performance through which the audience and musicians shared their

understanding and affection was a Korea-Cuba joint cultural project titled “Cuban Nomadic Project 2011 Seoul: Summer Meets Winter.” The concert, which lasted a bit longer than expected, turned out to be a special venue where artists from both countries exchanged their music.

In the first session of the concert, a soprano and a baritone performed famous opera arias and Cuban songs, rearranged and accompanied by a Korean ensemble of piano, violin and guitar. Due to the close distance with the audience, the musicians at first seemed nervous but quickly regained their pace and went on to stage a performance that had neither exaggeration nor pretense.

The next artists were Aire de Concierto, a four-man jazz band in their 30s.

They put on a great show of color and rhythm, featuring the piano, drum, clarinet and double bass, as well as saxophone and percussion instruments.

Their impressive mastery of music was liberating, as if the Korean audience was suddenly brought to a Caribbean beach on a sunny day. The audience fully enjoyed the Cuban rhythms that evoked a bright sense of happiness.

The second session presented even more pleasant surprises. The Cuban group collaborated with Korea’s leading traditional musicians such as Huh Yunjeong. Native Korean tunes in sanjo and pansori styles as well as the familiar folk song “Jeongseon Arirang” based on string instruments such as gayageum and haegeum were mixed with Cuban lullabies and folk songs. The joint performance started from “exploration” and developed into “dialogue” to achieve “sympathy,” reaching an impressive climax that encapsulated adorable communication.

Following the sweeping show, pansori artist Lee Ja-ram and two percussionists came onto the stage to prepare for another performance. Their wardrobe seemed far too casual. The reason became obvious only a minute later when

their Cuban counterparts appeared on the stage and the audience burst into laughter. The Cubans, clad in traditional Korean hanbok and wearing a playful smile on their faces, sang the pansori classic “Song of Sim Cheong” along with Korean musicians. The Cuban musicians switched freely between soulful rhythms to a rueful melody and then a fluent recitation of Korean lines that described a villain.

The Korean-Cuban music project was jointly organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Arts Council Korea in a bid to improve relations with Cuba, which does not have formal diplomatic relations with South Korea. As it was perceived as a “diplomatic concert,” some worried about a possible negative reaction from the audience, but the result was exactly the opposite. The show’s resounding success resulted largely from mutual efforts to bridge a gap and understand each other. The musicians earnestly tried to understand each other, thereby achieving genuine two-way communication in which they generated interactive reverberations by responding to each other’s sound to create a magnificent harmony.

The Cuban musicians flew into Seoul on a cold winter day and worked with Korean musicians, relaxing and laughing. In meeting with young Korean musicians, they must have shared much more than musical melodies and rhythms. The audience must have also experienced a lot more than the simple pleasure of music; they probably tasted happy sentiments and artistic sympathy that went beyond diplomatic relationship building that commonly involves complicated calculations surrounding treaties, politics and practical gains.

Amicable cross-cultural relations are increasingly important in our days. Arts can surely open an ideal road to friendly relations with other nations by overcoming wariness and caution with relative ease. It would be truly nice if Korea can grow up into a cultural leader in the 21st century by hosting more activities like the Cuban Nomadic Project more often and in more refined manners.

[Dong-a Ilbo, January 14, 2012]

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Traditional Culture that Bolsters ‘Korean Dream’

Emanuel Yi Pastreich Professor of East Asian Cultural Studies Humanitas College, Kyung Hee University

Korea is emerging as a country that should be emulated among countries in Southeast and Central Asia, the Middle East, Africa and South America, when it comes to government policies, SOC (social overhead capital), technologies and business practices. A growing number of foreign businesspeople and government officials are flying into Seoul to learn about Korea’s water purification system or e-government solutions. Top executives from around the world are visiting Korean factories and department stores to identify what makes Korean entrepreneurship so powerful these days.

Korea has become a prime example of success among emerging countries.

Unlike American culture, Korea’s traditional culture is well received in many countries. Korean culture is particularly influential among the youth in other nations. Korean cosmetics, fashion apparels, music, dance and movies are

gaining popularity among the young generation across the globe. In addition, Korea is taking the lead in a slew of cutting-edge technologies.

Many of Korea’s strengths have long been underestimated, especially in the cultural sector. There is no doubt that the Korean Wave, or hallyu, is deemed far more important than ever. However, the majority of Koreans are not aware of the fact that Korea is playing a crucial role in the international community.

If Korea had 20 more years to prepare for such a role, there would not have been any problem. Unfortunately, Korea now must handle a position in which it must justify its elevated stature far earlier than previously imagined.

The Korean Dream, as with the American Dream, symbolizes a hope that Korea is now capable of doing something positive for the world. Korean youngsters, in particular, will be inspired to assume more leadership roles in the international community and setting new trends outside of Korea. What’s important is that the Korean Dream is also an important impetus that drives Korean youth to take responsibility for their actions. The awareness of responsibilities and sense of duty is an essential quality that Koreans should develop before jumping onto the international stage.

After all, Korea’s young people could set either good or bad examples, which will shape the country’s image in the eyes of millions of people around the world. For instance, a bright and caring Korean leaves a lasting impression by focusing on the buildup of a fair and just society and the protection of the environment. This positive impression can influence hundreds of millions of people across the world in a positive way, helping respective societies to move forward. Depending on a slight change in attitude by Koreans, the impact could be sweeping in the long term.

In contrast, Koreans could leave a negative impression that they only care

about material satisfaction, luxury goods and appearance. This will certainly have a repercussion among foreign youngsters who are eager to imitate Korean culture. This mundane and distorted materialistic lifestyle demonstrated by some misguided Koreans would lead to bigger sales of luxury items. Living like a Korean should not mean a blind preference for big cars or a waste of food at a fancy restaurant. Wasteful consumerism and damage to the environment could not and should not be part of the Korean style, not least because its results would be far-reaching and devastating.

I am not in a position to define the Korean Dream, but I can propose what it should and should not be. For example, the Korean Dream should include the affection for the family, respect for others, more humanistic technologies, human-oriented tradition and global perspectives. It is none other than Koreans who create the Korean Dream. At this critical juncture, Koreans should decide which dream should be followed. Depending on the decision, Korea will be able to take up the leadership role in the international community. With luck, Koreans will play a bigger role in the world’s history through their own actions.

[Munhwa Ilbo, January 20, 2012]

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The Right to Live amid Familiarity

Park Mi-kyung Director Gallery Ryugaheon

It’s been three years since I opened my gallery in a traditional Korean house in Tongeui-dong of Seochon (Western Village), in central Seoul. Seochon is called what it is because the district literally sits on the west side of Gyeongbok Palace. Tongeui-dong is a nostalgic neighborhood filled with traditional Korean houses, or hanok, so many that part of it has been designated an official hanok restoration zone. The buildings also are mostly short and squat. It is, in all aspects, one of the genuinely “retro” streets of Seoul.

Seochon is more or less a maze of tiny alleys lined with homes inhabited by elderly ladies who live on their own. Their existence resembles the few lonely winter persimmons left unpicked on a tree to feed magpies. For decades, they have made their home here and they will continue do so. They don’t change,

just as the alleys don’t change. Passages are so cramped that it would be awkward not to say hello to whomever you happen to meet there. It’s no wonder my life has become so closely entwined with these ladies’.

In the hanok next door, a 91-year-old lady going by her Christian name of Katrina lives by herself. She has a distinct Pyeongan Province (North Korean) accent and is really quite robust for her age. I remember the first winter I moved into this neighborhood when the whole village was blanketed in snow as deep as my ankles. As I was clearing the snow in front of my gallery, she shouted from behind my back, “Hey, you there! You’re quite good at that. Why don’t you do my front yard, too? I don’t seem to have the energy.”

She caught me by surprise for hers was a voice you could not ignore; it was full of strength and confidence. I immediately thought of what a social worker had once told me, that the elderly who live alone are used to asking for help. I became slightly concerned that Katrina might continue to ask for favors in the days ahead.

Soon after this incident, it happened that I heard rumors of Katrina going out of her way to avoid one of our employees who enjoyed wearing a hunting cap with a visor. Whenever she encountered this young man, she would jump a little and turn away. It turned out that this hunting cap reminded her of Japanese police officers who had worn hats like these during the colonial period she had lived in. Memories, especially tragic ones, are hard to erase.

The times that Katrina must have endured made my heart ache.

Since then, I fell into the habit of clearing Katrina’s yard whenever it snowed.

I also asked some of my more frequent visitors with hunting caps to take them off in her presence. As I started to clean the alley on a regular basis and hand out the potted orchids leftover after exhibitions, Katrina confided in me that

the neighborhood has gotten better since I moved in. But I had not known what Katrina was really talking about. It soon became clear.

One night as I was closing up after work, Katrina opened her wooden front door a crack and asked, “Do you mind sleeping over there? The alley becomes too lonesome at night.” Before I turned it into a gallery, Ryugaheon used to be someone’s home, built with two “ㄷ” shaped hanok buildings sitting side by side. The smell of doenjang (bean paste) soup used to seep out through to the tiny back streets, and people could be heard talking long into the night. Then, Katrina had a new next-door neighbor, and it was a gallery. It was pretty much the same situation going on in the house in front of Katrina’s, and the one behind and next to hers. She was soon surrounded by galleries or some other kind of art space that all empty at night after people leave for their real home.

To save her gas bills, Katrina gets through the coldest of winters with an electric mat. Upon being designated a hanok restoration zone, Seochon has become flooded with cultural edifices, causing real estate prices to skyrocket.

Some ask why she doesn’t just sell her house and move to an apartment where she can be warm and comfortable.

These days, I look twice at the people who say things like that. Would it be that easy for you to pack up and leave behind the things so familiar to you, I want to ask. Then I think about how many familiar things Katrina had to let go of during her 90 years of life. To Katrina, the hanok has been her home for many, many years.

I felt a sense of jealousy for the Canadians who, when they grow old, instead of being sent to live in nursing homes, are encouraged to live in their own homes with social workers living in nearby quarters to take care of them. It’s

the kind of welfare that really thinks about what people want, and their right to live in familiarity.

On the “lonesome” night Katrina asked me if I could sleep at my gallery, I left the lights on. Soon afterwards, I installed a street lamp in our alley. It was the least I could do to show my regret for having unwillingly become a part of “unwelcome change.”

[Hankook Ilbo, January 17, 2012]

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Two Years of Wikitree, Ten Years of Wikipedia

Lee Jin-young Staff Reporter The Dong-a Ilbo

Wikitree first earned its fame for a breaking story known by many as the “hanbok incident at Shilla Hotel.” The story was about a celebrated hanbok (traditional Korean clothing) designer who was denied entry to Shilla Hotel’s buffet restaurant because she was wearing a hanbok.

Wikitree is a news website based on social networking services. In just two years since it opened on February 1, 2010, it has carried about 56,000 stories and been cited as one of the media most frequently viewed by Twitter users.

The news website is operated mostly along the same lines as Wikipedia. But unlike Wikitree, which has shown such explosive growth, the Korean version of Wikipedia lags far behind, despite having been in operation much longer. It will mark its 10th anniversary in October this year.

To date, Korean Wikipedia has only 186,000 pieces of knowledge posted.

Some statistics show that Wikipedia is the least used online search tool compared to the number of Korean Internet users. So how come Wikitree can make it but Wikipedia can’t?

Wikipedia’s co-founder Jimmy Wales says it’s because of a strong rival called “Knowledge Search.” He was, of course, referring to the search portal Naver, where individuals provide separate answers to questions posted on the website.

Nobody but the original authors can edit the answers. Wikipedia, on the other hand, has people colluding on a single subject, all the while constantly editing to fine-tune.

Dr. Hwang Joo-seong, senior researcher at the Korea Information Society Development

Institute,

defines

Naver’s

Knowledge

Search

as

an

“individualistic collective intelligence,” in contrast to Wikipedia, which he calls a “collaborative collective intelligence.” Based on this analysis, he believes the Korean Wikipedia’s lack of progress is due to a cultural and fundamental absence of collaboration and discussion.

Comparing Koreans and Americans who have participated in creating collective intelligence, he has learned that Americans are more appreciative of group processes such as collaboration and discussion. They also believe that collective rewards are more effective in promoting collaboration than individual rewards, and that even a random group of people will eventually establish its own order and rules.

Kim Sang-bae, a professor of diplomatic science at Seoul National University, sees different types of knowledge and information preferred in the East and the West. Westerners place more emphasis on sharing objective information with people in an official relationship. To Asians, emotional contact with their

primary group such as family and friends is more important. This is why Koreans prefer empirical knowledge over objective knowledge and find more joy in exchanging thoughts and feelings on social networking sites than from conversing to form new knowledge.

Asians also are guided by the Neo-Confucian view that knowledge represents one’s character. Having one’s writing edited by others, therefore, would be a direct challenge to his or her character. These are the reasons why the Wikipedia model is not applicable to Korean culture.

But what was poison to Wikipedia was the formula of success for Wikitree.

The folks at Wikitree may call it “history written together,” but collective effort is rare. Reporters write under authentic IDs and are measured by the amount of writing they produce. The more prolific they become, the bigger the chances of working up to the “pine tree” level, starting from the lowest “apricot tree.” Wikitree is also a media specifically controlled by relationships and networking; more than 70 percent of the website traffic is from those using social networking services such as Twitter and Facebook.

The stark contrast in the development of Wikitree and Wikipedia is unfortunate as it seems to prove that Koreans are interested more in flocking together to exchange trivial information, chit chat and gossip. They seem to lack the selfless intellectual temperament for using verifiable information to create an open-ended knowledge ecosystem for the public at large.

Jeong Yak-yong, one of Korea’s greatest thinkers who went by the pen name of Dasan (“Tea Mountain”), left behind a legacy of more than 500 books cowritten with his students of the Dasan Circle in the 18th century, an age without the blessing of the Internet. He must surely have been a mutant.

Fortunately for us, a mutation can be inherited.

[January 18, 2012]

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- An Outlook for the North Korean Situation in 2012 - [Roundtable] Prospects for the North Korean Situation and Inter-Korean Relations in 2012 - Economic Influence of the Recent North Korea-related Risk and Policy Suggestions - The Age of the New Family

An Outlook for the North Korean Situation in 2012 Cheong Seong-chang Senior Fellow Sejong Institute

The year 2012 portends many changes in leadership. They include Taiwan’s presidential election in January; Russia’s presidential election in March; the power transfer in the Chinese Communist Party leadership in July; the U.S. presidential election in November; and the presidential election in South Korea in December.

Just two weeks before this tumultuous year began, the world was alerted by the sudden death of Kim Jong-il, general secretary of the North Korean Workers’ Party, who had ruled the last Stalinist country with an iron fist for 17 years after the death of regime founder Kim Il-sung. Given these circumstances, this paper attempts to foresee what kind of leadership system will emerge in Pyongyang and how the regime will handle internal policies and external relations in 2012, the North’s target year to proclaim a “strong and prosperous nation.”

‘Collective Leadership System Led by Chang Song-taek’ North Korea’s Central TV aired footage of Chang Song-taek (Jang Songthaek), director of the Administration Department of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party, dressed in a uniform for a four-star general when he paid his respects to the late Kim Jong-il at the Kumsusan Memorial Palace on December 25.

Some South Korean experts then raised the possibility that the Kim Jong-un

regime would be controlled by a “military-led collective leadership system.”

The regime will likely “muddle through an emergency situation by upholding Kim Jong-un as the supreme commander of the military and creating a military-style collective leadership around Chang and high-ranking officers,” they speculated. The North Korea watchers also said that Chang appeared in full regalia of a four-star general to demonstrate his stature as the “de facto regent” in the Kim Jong-un regime.

Nonetheless, there is a risk in overestimating Chang and the possibility of a collective leadership; it could lead to an inappropriate evaluation and response to the power transition in the North. The following are some problems surrounding the debate on the possibility of a collective leadership with Chang Song-taek as the key player in the system.

First, it is noteworthy that a commentary in the Rodong Sinmun, the official organ of the Workers’ Party, hailed Kim Jong-un as the “Supreme Commander” on December 24, a day before the North’s state media reported on Chang’s public appearance in a four-star general’s uniform. The commentary may have implied that party leaders made important decisions regarding the young leader’s position in the military on the previous day.

If only Chang had been promoted to four-star general, with Kim’s status left intact, it could have been assumed that Chang was on the fast track to promotion. On the contrary, if Chang had been promoted in the process of elevating Kim to the supreme commander status, this must have been done supposedly to give Chang the authority that he had not possessed as director of the Administration Department of the party’s Central Committee ― the position that “guides” military organizations such as the State Security Department and the Ministry of People’s Security ― as Kim became the supreme commander.

Second, it should be noted that there are military leaders higher in rank than Chang, like the vice marshals Ri Yong-ho and Kim Yong-chun. It is hard to imagine Chang bypassing these two men and acting as the regent for the “Supreme Commander.” Even in the Central Military Commission of the Workers’ Party, Chang is a mere “member,” but Ri is a “vice chairman.”

Furthermore, it needs be understood that Chang’s promotion to four-star general does not necessarily mean that he may now “command” the State Security Department and the Ministry of People’s Security. He may still be just “guiding” them.

Third, it is more important to find out who gave Chang the rank and when it took place. It was a well-known fact that Kim Jong-il, while alive, awarded the rank of four-star general to his younger sister Kim Kyong-hui, Chang’s wife and director of the Light Industry Department of the party’s Central Committee, and Choe Ryong-hae, a party secretary for workers’ organizations, but not to Chang, his brother-in-law, for fear that he might expand his influence on the military. Under these circumstances, Chang, clad in a Mao suit, paid his respects to Kim Jong-il at the Kumsusan Memorial Palace on December 20 and 23, though standing next to Kim Jong-un and uniformed military leaders. Then, on December 24, he was seen in full regalia of a fourstar general when he reappeared at the memorial palace. This suggests that he was given the rank sometime between December 23 and 24.

The supreme commander usually awards the rank of full general to military leaders in the North. If the North Korean military leadership upheld Kim Jongun as the supreme commander on December 23, then on the same day Kim could have decided to make Chang a full general. No military leaders are found to have been awarded the rank yet by the party’s Central Military Commission. But it is also possible that Kim conferred the title on Chang in

the capacity of vice chairman of the commission.

Kim Jong-un, accompanied only by high-ranking officers from the party’s Central Military Commission, the National Defense Commission and the Korean People’s Army Supreme Command, paid respects to Kim Jong-il on December 24. This prompted some North Korea watchers in the South to speculate that these military leaders will play a central role in managing state affairs. But if this speculation is accurate, it should be interpreted that Kim’s reappearance at the memorial palace on December 26, accompanied by a large cohort of party, government and military leaders, as he was on December 23, could mean that the center of gravity again moved from the military to the party and military in just two days.

But the experts who offered such speculation did not revise their views that the military would play a central role in the regime. It would be difficult to correctly understand the reality in the North where Kim Jong-un is controlling both party and military elites, if one fails to grasp the implications of one event while focusing on the other.

Speedy Transition to the Kim Jong-un Regime Kim Jong-un began gaining control of the military and security organizations in the first half of 2009 after he was chosen as heir to his ailing father in January the same year. From the second half of that year, all reports from military and security agencies were sent to Kim Jong-il through his son and heir. By 2010, all reports from almost all sectors were submitted in this way.

All this shows that the dynastic succession scheme was carried out in a very speedy and substantive manner. Moreover, after his father’s death, Kim Jongun seems to be gaining control of the regime even more rapidly.

The five core organizations of governance ― the party’s Central Committee and Central Military Commission, the National Defense Commission, the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly, and the Cabinet ― jointly announced the death of Kim Jong-il on December 19. The announcement said, “Today, at the forefront of our revolution, there is our comrade Kim Jong-un standing as the great successor to our juche (self-reliance) ideology and the leader of our party, army and people.”

The announcement, which was adopted on December 17 and released on December 19 in the name of the five key governing bodies, called Kim the “great successor” and “outstanding leader of the party, military and people.”

This made clear that the regime will be led not by a regency system led by Chang Song-taek or a collective leadership system, but by Kim’s unitary leadership system.

North Korea announced a state funeral committee on December 19, in which it used the title “comrade” for only Kim Jong-un to distinguish him from the other elites. When disclosing the roster of the state funeral committee members the following day, the Rodong Sinmun printed the name of Kim Jong-un with a font three times larger than that used for all the rest of the committee members. This clearly showed that Kim was de facto chairman of the state funeral committee and had a superior position over the other elites.

On December 24, even before his official accession to the position of the supreme commander, North Korean authorities began describing Kim as the de facto “supreme commander” and “general secretary of the party.” The Rodong Sinmun implied in a commentary the same day that he would soon be upheld as the supreme commander. It said, “We will accomplish the songun (militaryfirst) revolution to the end, while hailing comrade Kim Jong-un as our

supreme commander and our general.”

Already during the first half of 2009, the North’s “military led by Kim Jong-il” was turning into the “military led by Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un.” It seems to be an inevitable conclusion that the military should now be led solely by Kim Jong-un after his father’s death.

On December 24, the state-run Korean Central News Agency introduced the new slogan, “Let’s defend the Party Central Committee headed by our respected and beloved comrade Kim Jong-un with our lives!” The expression “Party Central Committee headed by Kim Jong-un” implied that, although he had never been formally installed in the position, Kim was virtually serving as the party general secretary. Now that his father who was the party general secretary is dead, it should be natural for Kim Jong-un to act as such: he has been practically playing the role as the secretary for organization affairs under the party’s Central Committee, a number two position, since he was officially declared the successor in January 2009.

North Korea also indirectly revealed that Kim Jong-un is the de facto “head of state” by having the Rodong Sinmun quote the condolence messages from foreign leaders addressing him as “Your Excellency” or “Supreme Leader of the Republic.” North Korean authorities referred to Kim Jong-il as “head of state” a year and six months after Kim Il-sung died. This time, however they used the same title for Kim Jong-un just four days after Kim Jong-il’s death.

The North started calling Kim Jong-il “Great Leader” six months after Kim Ilsung’s death. But this time, it also began using the same title for Kim Jong-un immediately after Kim Jong-il’s death.

The power transition to Kim Jong-un is proceeding at high speed due to a combination of factors: he already took over a significant portion of power

while his father was alive; his strong desire to grasp power and his personal charisma; the North’s past experience with hereditary succession; the consistent debate abroad on a sudden change in the North; and the ruling elites’ desire to maintain their vested interests through an early safe landing of the Kim Jong-un regime.

Kim Jong-un’s Succession and Prospects of Domestic and Foreign Policies As North Korea launched Kim Jong-un’s “unitary leadership system” immediately after Kim Jong-il’s death and declared Kim Jong-un’s role as the de facto party general secretary and the supreme leader of the military, the succession process has been virtually completed. Now that Kim Jong-un was upheld as the supreme commander of the military at a session of the party’s Central Committee Politburo on December 30, it only remains to place him in the position of the party general secretary before the entire succession process is officially finished.

Some experts in South Korea seem to believe that the transition process remains incomplete before Kim Jong-un assumes chairmanship of the National Defense Commission as well. But just as Kim Jong-il abolished the presidency and proclaimed Kim Il-sung as the “Eternal President of the Republic” after his death, so will Kim Jong-un highly likely abolish the chairmanship of the National Defense Commission by revising the country’s constitution and proclaim Kim Jong-il as the “Eternal Chairman of the National Defense Commission.” It normally takes at least a few months for the party to convene a conference or a representatives’ meeting to elect a new general secretary.

Accordingly, the North is expected to hold either a party conference or a meeting of party representatives around this autumn to officially finalize the

succession process.

As it has repeatedly pledged to “open the door to a strong and prosperous nation” in 2012, North Korea will likely call for increasing production and speed up opening doors to China in a bid to make tangible achievements in the economic sector. During the funeral period for Kim Jong-il last December, the regime continuously urged people to increase production through the Rodong Sinmun. The atmosphere was notably different from the mourning period after Kim Il-sung’s death, when economic activities were suspended.

North Korea needs to improve relations with the outside world to celebrate the centenary of Kim Il-sung’s birth in a festive mood this year. But it will most likely stick to its hard-line policies against South Korea in defiance of the Lee Myung-bak administration’s expression of sympathy only to the North Korean people, not to the regime, over Kim Jong-il’s death and its prevention of all but a few private citizens from visiting the North to pay condolences. In contrast, Pyongyang is expected to take a flexible attitude towards the United States, complying with Washington’s demand for the suspension of its uranium enrichment program, in a bid to receive food aid.

To successfully celebrate the centenary this year, the North is also expected to speed up the opening of doors to China. It may focus attention on developing the special economic zones of Rason and and Hwanggumpyong Island, and Kim Jong-un may visit China to hold a summit as the North’s new leader.

Immediately after Kim Jong-il’s death, China clarified its position by saying, “We hope that North Korea will build a strong and prosperous socialist nation and march toward long-standing stability and peace on the Korean peninsula, while rallying around the Workers’ Party under comrade Kim Jong-un’s leadership.” In this context, the North is expected to express thanks to China

for its support and strengthen bilateral cooperation through Kim’s visit.

How the South Should Respond It is very unfortunate that the post-Kim Jong-il North Korea did not adopt a collective leadership system but Kim Jong-un has inherited his father’s absolute power based on personal leadership. Nevertheless, as long as it has no means to influence domestic politics in the North, South Korea needs to implement a long-term policy that would help the North shift to a collective leadership system and further move toward democratization.

Hwang Jang-yop, the highest-ranking defector from the North, where he was a secretary of the party’s Central Committee, arrived in South Korea in 1997. He once said critically, “Some people here are saying that the North will sink into extreme chaos as soon as the dictatorship collapses. No fallacy can be more absurd than this.” He meant chances are slim for a “power vacuum” to arise in the North, even if Kim Jong-il died, because there are power elites who determine the course of their country.

Hwang also advised that it would be unrealistic for the South to demand that the North realize free democracy in the short term after Kim Jong-il’s death.

“The South should help the North follow the Chinese model of reform and opening after Kim Jong-il’s death, with a long-range perspective that once it begins Deng Xiaoping-style reforms on its own, North Korea will at long last become a free and democratic society and eventually be absorbed into South Korea,” said Hwang. The South should not rashly demand the North’s democratization, he said.

Accordingly, the South Korean government should use all dialogue channels,

including bilateral summit and ministerial talks, to persuade Kim Jong-un and to seek cooperation from China so that the North’s new leader can take the path to Chinese-style reform and openness.

[Current Issues and Policies, January 2012, published by the Sejong Institute]

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[Roundtable] Prospects for the North Korean Situation and Inter-Korean Relations in 2012 The North Korean Economic Research Team at the Korea Development Institute (KDI) invited Vice President Kwon Tae-jin of the Korea Rural Economic Institute, Korea University Professor Yoo Ho-yeol and Ewha Womans University Professor Cho Dong-ho to a New Year round-table discussion on North Korea’s “Strong and Prosperous Nation” campaign following the death of Kim Jong-il and prospect of inter-Korean relations. The participants exchanged views on the future of the North Korean economy and the Kim Jong-un regime as well as inter-Korean economic cooperation in connection with South Korea’s policy toward the North and the situation on the Korean peninsula. The contents of the discussion are published here with the consent of the three experts.

New Year Discussion Subject: “Prospects of Inter-Korean Relations in 2012, the First Year of ‘Strong and Prosperous Nation’ in the North” Place: Seminar Room 3, KDI Moderator: Chun Hong-taek, KDI Discussants: Kwon Tae-jin, Vice President, Korea Rural Economic Institute Yoo Ho-yeol, Professor, Korea University Lee Seok, Research Fellow, KDI Cho Dong-ho, Professor, Ewha Womans University Editor: Kim Eun-young, Researcher, KDI (key@kdi.re.kr)

Chun Hong-taek: Thank you for your participation in this discussion arranged by the North Korean Economic Research Team of the Korea Development Institute. First, I would like to ask you to focus the discussion on how the Kim Jong-un rule in the North will move on following the death of Kim Jong-il late last year. Then we would deal with the prospects of inter-Korean relations and the North Korean economy with your suggestions on the desirable course of Seoul’s policy on the North. You may also provide your opinions on how the South-North economic cooperation should be developed. Now, let me ask Professor Yoo to start with talks on political matters. Then we will go on to discuss economic issues.

Transition in Stability

Yoo Ho-yeol: I believe the Kim Jong-un system will remain stable for the time being. He was officially designated as successor to Kim Jong-il at the third party representatives’ meeting on September 28, 2010, where he was named vice chairman of the party’s Central Military Commission, a position newly installed at this time. With that arrangement, Kim Jong-un was prepared to lead the party and the armed forces through the Central Military Commission

in the event his father died suddenly. Even more important is the fact that the 17 members of the military commission, who are all close confidants of the new leader, form the structural and personal basis of stable rule in the Kim Jong-un era.

However, stability at this stage refers to the transitional period when Kim Jong-un is following the instructions of his father. When time passes and Kim Jong-un makes his own policy decisions to start his own era, conflicts may arise concerning new policy measures. When the new leader fails to resolve the possible disputes, structural rifts may appear and the system may be thrown into a crisis. It is still too early to say for sure but the mid- and longterm prospects of the Kim Jong-un rule are negative.

With regard to inter-Korean relations, Kim Jong-un is expected to maintain the existing policy direction and not attempt fundamental changes until the time when he becomes confident about the stability of his rule. This means he will maintain the current confrontational stance toward the Lee Myung-bak government and watch the outcome of the elections in the South this year with an attempt to establish new relations with the next administration in Seoul.

Therefore, no epochal breakthrough can be expected of the South-North relations. There is the possibility of some form of military provocation but there is an even greater possibility of no provocation. As China and all other neighboring countries want stability on the Korean peninsula, Kim Jong-un, for his part, will take a wait-and-see attitude while maintaining a critical stance toward the Lee government.

In external relations, dialogue between North Korea and the United States is expected to resume. The North will need to talk with the Americans in order to get food and nutritious aid for children. They will exhibit some sort of flexibility on the six-party denuclearization talks and seek to improve relations

with the United States. China will continue to support Kim Jong-un as stability in the North is Beijing’s primary concern.

Kwon Tae-jin: I have a similar opinion about the prospect of stability in the North. But, after a short period of stability, the new system will face considerable challenges. A refugee from the North, who was a senior member of the ruling Workers’ Party, recently said that Kim Jong-un has secured stability in the upper hierarchy of the regime through extensive personnel changes, but the two-year period of preparations for succession was not enough to build the basis of support among the general public. The transition is being stabilized faster than expected and it will be extended for stable rule over a short time. Kim Jong-un will accelerate the stabilization process by faithfully following the instructions of his father and taking advice from the core members of the party and military. As the external world, including China and the United States, wants North Korea to achieve stability at an early date, there will be no serious problems as far as short-term stability is concerned.

There is little likelihood that the inter-Korean relations will significantly improve for a while. The New Year joint editorial of major North Korean newspapers made no particular mention about dialogue or cooperation with the South. The editorial repeatedly quoted the North’s three-point “charter for the fatherland’s reunification” and the North-South Joint Declaration of June 15, 2000 and demanded the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea in a more incensed tone than before. They also strongly criticized the Lee Myung-bak

government for restricting condolence visits by South Koreans after Kim Jongil’s death. Considering these remarks, North Korea apparently has no intention to improve ties with the South and has rather given up hope of getting any substantial aid from the South during the Lee presidency.

In external relations, North Korea is expected to move closer to the United States, China and Russia. Pyongyang should find no reason to aggravate ties with Washington and the United States will also seek to improve bilateral ties with the North as part of its efforts to contain China’s thrust. North Korea had its last official contact with the United States over food aid and the resumption of the six-party talks shortly before Kim Jong-il’s death, and similar meetings are expected to be arranged. In future talks with the United States, the North is likely to raise the issue of building a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula with a call for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea.

North Korea will maintain close ties with China. The joint editorial stressed the need to develop the traditional friendly relations with China and Russia, recalling Kim Jong-il’s visits to the two countries last year. The North will particularly seek to maintain close ties with China, whose help is vital for its economic recovery. North Korea-Russia ties will also become closer. Moscow sent $5 million worth of food aid to the North through the World Food Program last year while China provided $1 million.

External Relations and Economic Policy

Cho Dong-ho: The joint editorial was published only a short time after Kim Jong-il’s death and I suspect that the major part of it was prepared while Kim was still alive. Kim’s death was mentioned in the article but its writers must have had little time to touch on economic policy. If they had more time, they still would not have to change much, because there has been no conspicuous change in economic policy under the new leadership. But I could notice traces of updating concerning the inter-Korean relations. The editorial contained expressions of an extremely hard-line stance toward the South and the United States. They would not have used the term “U.S. imperialists” if Kim Jong-il was alive. It was a message of “leave us alone” so that they can celebrate the birthday of Kim Jong-il in February and the centennial of Kim Il-sung’s birth in April without trouble.

If the Lee administration takes a reconciliatory stance and proposes summit talks, Kim Jong-un would not be ready to accept it. He is tied to internal problems that are far more urgent. Likewise, there seems to be no reason for Kim to contemplate provocations against the South. He is not ready yet to make a choice between tension and cooperation with the South at this moment; he is in no position to think about such an issue. In this regard, the North should want no business with the South for the time being.

A two-fold complexity is involved in reinvigorating relations between the two Koreas. We have the problems of the Cheonan sinking and Yeonpyeong Island shelling while the North has the hurdle of the South’s prohibition of condolence visits. And the North has reiterated it would not deal with the Lee Myung-bak government. These problems are not easy to resolve without a dramatic turn of events. Currently, the North has to be totally absorbed in domestic matters, whereas it is an election year in the South. The ruling party in the South has little energy left for dealing with inter-Korean problems. It is

likely that inter-Korean relations will stay put with a faint possibility of change, either good or bad.

As for external relations, dialogue with the United States will reopen soon and stay on course since it is included in Kim Jong-il’s instructions. Relations with China as the primary aid provider will be carefully maintained but Kim Jongun’s diplomatic capability will remain a problem. Those in charge of U.S. affairs in the North are easily identified. They are Kang Sok-ju and some others. But it is not clear who is handling business with China, the biggest donor for the North. It is because the supreme leader, Kim Jong-il, took charge of China relations. Even if the North Korea-China ties are normalized as partyto-party relations and China continues to provide assistance, in the process of building his own diplomatic network Kim Jong-un cannot be expected to exhibit negotiating skills comparable to his father’s. And there may be some grumbling as the North seeks ties on equal terms with China.

Lee Seok: I generally agree with the other panelists. But I’m a little more concerned with the likelihood of instability of the Kim Jong-un regime. There are two reasons. First, North Korea is actually undergoing a power transition for the first time. As for Kim Jong-il, he already had power in his hands when he took over the regime from his father. But Kim Jong-un is in a different situation. In socialist states in the past, a successor handpicked or favored by his predecessor did not last long before being overthrown. In an attempt to secure legitimacy, a new leader tries to differentiate his system from his

predecessor’s through various means, including shaking up the past leadership, which can cause conflict with the old guard. Second, North Korea’s power elite, like us, should also believe that the stability of Kim Jong-un’s rule is a short-term phenomenon and the new leader will soon face challenges. If so, the elite group should try to prepare for their precarious future right now, instead of sometime later. This will advance the time of challenges to Kim Jong-un to a point much earlier than we expect now. For these two reasons, we should closely watch developments in North Korea and be prepared for any eventualities in the North.

Cho: When we discuss the mid- and long-term prospects of the Kim Jong-un regime, we should separate it from the stability of the North Korean system itself. North Korea cannot but remain unstable without reforming its socialist economic system, but the Kim Jong-un regime will secure stability temporarily. Dynastic power succession in dictatorships has shown stability because it retains authority and prevents possible repercussions from people by excluding them from the power restructuring process. When Kim Jong-un has full control of the situation he will feel burdened by the presence of the old guard and will attempt to remove them. This will be the time when instability begins for the Kim Jong-un regime.

Chun: I would like to ask you to discuss when mid- and long-term changes will start in the North and what the signs of such changes will be.

Signs of Changes Yoo: The North Korean regime has structural factors of schisms, which have grown over the past years. They are schisms between the elite and the common people, between the pro-market and anti-market forces, between the center and

the provinces, and between the rich and the poor. Conflicts eventually will escalate between the elite and the people over the question of reform and openness due to the systemic absurdidies of Kim Jong-il’s songun (miliaryfirst) policy and Kim Il-sung’s juche (self-reliance) ideology. And the possibility of such conflicts is already growing rapidly. There still is one more problem related to the rivalry between the party and the military. Kim Jong-il controlled the two pillars of power with his uncontested charisma, keeping them in mutual check and in competition. If Kim Jong-un fails to perform a comparable role, serious disputes will erupt between powerful organizations.

When we closely examine documents produced in North Korea after the death of Kim Jong-il, we can detect signs of power struggle taking place already in the North.

During the mourning period, North Korean authorities announced the achievements of Kim Jong-il to be inherited under his instructions. They included nuclear arms, space satellites, industrial revolution and economic development, and the single-minded unity of the people. I have doubts as to whether Kim Jong-il personally chose these purported achievements to be passed on to leaders of the next regime as national tasks. I suspect the list might have been prepared by the members of the new leadership. Kim Jong-il pushed nuclear development, but he also asserted that his father Kim Il-sung had ultimately pursued the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. With the North’s possession of nuclear arms included among the achievements of Kim Jong-il, the new leadership may intend to pursue the existing nuclear policy instead of trying to coordinate conflicting interests. But this could probably indicate a power struggle has already begun over the nuclear policy.

While the new leadership of the Kim Jong-un regime will follow Kim Jong-il’s instructions, their opponents will seek to return to Kim Il-sung’s philosophy in an attempt to change the power structure based on Kim Jong-il’s military-first

policy. I believe Kim Jong-un’s rule based on his father’s “deathbed instructions” will not last long; it will not be longer than the three years after Kim Il-sung’s death in 1994. There will be leadership changes in major neighbors in 2012, which will force North Korea to determine its policy direction as well. In this process, internal conflicts will inevitably surface not only on the horizontal level but also vertically between the upper and lower echelons. Therefore, I think the transition period will last just about a year or so.

Kwon: No matter how stable it may seem outwardly, Kim Jong-un’s rule cannot be much more than a temporary stopgap in the wake of Kim Jong-il’s abrupt death. Individual players must be following a makeshift system because of their complex interests intertwined in a very uncertain state of affairs.

Foreign powers, meanwhile, should probably want to deal with the Kim Jongun regime after the North Korean society stabilizes. Destabilizing factors can emerge not only from the inside but also from outside of the country.

Following the death of Kim Jong-il, we have detected constantly changing attitudes of the Chinese media toward North Korea. The latest position of Chinese leaders clearly suggests that they are reserving judgment on the thirdgeneration dynastic power succession in North Korea and are showing their support because stability in North Korea serves China’s interests. Media expressions carry the nuance that China may abandon North Korea’s new leader whenever it determines that his regime is detrimental to China’s interests.

Initially, China will provide economic assistance to the North to help the new regime maintain stability. However, if Kim Jong-un clarifies his identity that goes against its interests, China may discontinue economic assistance. Amid scarcity of goods the new leadership will lose public support, which will incite resistance in the upper echelon. Such a situation will not take a long time to

unfold; it may happen within a year.

Cho: We seem to agree on when and how rifts will begin to appear in the Kim Jong-un regime. But I have a little different view about the consequences.

After some time, there will be clashes between the military-first group and the economy-first group. And then there will be problem with national slogans.

Kim Il-sung proclaimed “juche” (self-reliance) and Kim Jong-il chanted “songun” (military first), and now what will be Kim Jong-un’s catchphrase? I think it will have to be something related to economy. The Kim family has envisioned a strong state: the regime founder Kim Il-sung pursued an ideologically strong state and his son and successor Kim Jong-il wanted to build a strong military power, and the next task should be an economic power.

Kim Jong-un should resolve the problem of feeding the people. It should also be considered that China’s pressure for the North’s economic opening will become increasingly stronger in the days ahead. Kim Jong-un’s catchphrase will be related to the “economy” or “openness.”

Lee: The present situation in North Korea reminds me of the time when Mikhail Gorbachev emerged in Soviet Russia. Leaders in Moscow at that time had little popular support while the new leader Gorbachev did not have the power base to control the existing political elite. So he attempted to rally the support of people from outside of Moscow in order to neutralize his rivals.

Gorbachev’s policy of reform and openness was adopted out of necessity. In other words, he took advantage of popular interests in resolving the power struggle.

If a power struggle occurs in North Korea, what will be the consequences?

Kim Jong-un has grasped power but he is still not capable of controlling all the political forces around him. If he seeks to follow the Gorbachev model, he will adopt a policy of reform and openness which is certain to be popular among

the people. In a reverse case, if a contender or an opponent group seeks to oust Kim Jong-un, they may also take steps that will be welcomed by the people. In this regard, we will have to carefully watch the course of economic measures to be implemented in the North in the days ahead because they will imply where power lies, rather than simply be aimed at reviving the North’s dire economy. When an economic policy is announced by the Kim Jong-un regime, it could be reflecting a new power structure in the secretive state or a new factor influencing the creation of a new power base.

Cho: I have a little different idea. Kim Jong-un has no other choice but to emphasize economy. A strong economy is Kim Jong-il’s instruction. North Korean media reports on Kim Jong-il’s death stressed that he achieved an ideologically and militarily strong state and that he died of overwork on his way to conduct on-site guidance to build an economically strong state. When focusing on the economy, Kim Jong-un will have to build his theory on the ideology of self-reliance and military-first policy. The three subjects have different contents but they should at least be packaged together. Here is the difference between North Korea and Gorbachev’s Russia. North Korea is maintained by three guiding principles, that is, dynastic power succession, a monolithic ruling system and reverence for the “Great Leader” (suryong), and there can be no reform and openness that denies these three cornerstones of the state. Kim Jong-un is going to do what his father and grandfather left undone.

Therefore, a total policy shift is hard to expect in North Korea unlike in Soviet Russia. When emphasis is shifted from the military to the economy, conflict of interests is expected to arise among the power elite, which will likely be suppressed without serious consequences.

Lee: Basically I agree with Professor Cho. But there are some different aspects to consider. North Korea faces a dilemma that as long as it maintains the existing policy framework, it will be hard to pursue a pro-economy policy.

And the North Korean people as well as the power elite know about this problem. Kim Jong-il was able to maintain power without paying much heed to the interests of the general public and North Korea’s power elite were unable to raise any objections. In the current state of emergency the situation probably remains virtually unchanged. But when the situation is stabilized, I wonder if the regime would be able to continue to ignore the interests of the people as it did under the rules of Kim Jong-un’s father and grandfather. I am not sure but one thing seems clear. Changes that happened to socialist states in the past did not come all of a sudden but they were results of the accumulation of factors over a long time coming to the fore and causing change. I believe it is reasonable to expect that even in a society like North Korea quantitative change can lead to qualitative change to bring about reform.

Chun: Well, this year is supposed to be the first year of a “strong and prosperous nation” in North Korea. Now would you comment on how North Korea will handle this matter?

‘Strong and Prosperous Nation’ Kwon: North Korea has recently begun using a rather simple expression of “building a strong nation” instead of proclaiming a “strong and prosperous nation (kangsong taeguk).” This year marks the centennial of Kim Il-sung’s birth and the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Choson (Korean) People’s Army. In observance of Kim Jong-il’s instruction, the North will be engrossed in economic recovery throughout the year. As the construction of a “strong nation” means a national take-off on the basis of the juche ideology and the socialist system, it is likely that ideological and institutional control over residents will be intensified.

At present, as it is difficult to expect the introduction of foreign capital into North Korea on any significant scale, the North will seek to maximize internal capital. The New Year joint editorial also suggested satisfying the demand of raw materials for light industry with resources from domestic deposits. The emphasis on “Flames of Hamnam” should be part of a policy to encourage natural resources development in the Hamnam (South Hamgyong) region.

Control of markets, including urban private markets, will be strengthened more forcefully than before. In the meantime, efforts will be increased to restore the rationing and state-run distribution systems in order to improve the foundations of the planned economy. North Korean authorities reportedly are cracking down on the circulation of foreign currencies in the official and unofficial markets, which can help stabilize exchange rates and overall prices.

If the market is successfully controlled with the use of foreign currency remaining uncontrolled, prices will rise and people will suffer.

North Korea has announced that the amounts of food rationing will be increased this year, and this is deemed possible. Grain harvest last year was good and China is providing more food to the North. China has recently imported more than 60 million tons of bean and several million tons of maize to become a net importer of food grain. But it still exports maize and fertilizer to North Korea at its request. The United States is also ready to provide “nutrition aid” for North Korean children.

A strong and prosperous state first needs to solve the problems of eating (agriculture) and clothing (light industry). Food shortages in 2012 will amount to 700,000 tons, which is a little less than 2011. When 325,000 tons are imported as planned, the shortage will be reduced to 400,000 tons. If substantial amounts of food aid are acquired from China, the United States and U.N. agencies, food shortage will almost be resolved and the food supply situation this year will be best in several years. Early this year, the

improvement of production facilities at Hungnam Fertilizer Plant will be completed and the plant will begin to produce coal-based nitrogen fertilizer.

North Korea imported a large amount of fertilizer from China last year and is believed to have enough fertilizer reserves now. All these indicate the possible improvement of food supply and stabilization of prices.

Improving Food Situation Chun: If the food situation improves and the ruling system is stabilized, the Kim Jong-un regime will have greater self-confidence. Will this then cause a stronger crackdown on markets?

Cho: If I am allowed to introduce my conclusion first, there will be no suppression of markets and the campaign for a “strong and prosperous nation” will be shelved. North Korea is already using the weaker expression of “kangsong kukka” instead of “kangsong taeguk” and the joint editorial said, “Let’s enter the centennial years,” instead of the “centennial.” But the North will continue to push for the construction of an economically powerful state, which is Kim Jong-il’s instruction and the best way of securing public support.

But economic recovery is impossible without the markets. North Korea is not financially capable of fully implementing a planned economy. Therefore, they may try to prevent the excessive expansion of markets but will have to allow their operations to a certain extent. Another reason for the inevitable existence of markets in the North is that powerful people are involved in the markets.

The military, for example, is the biggest beneficiary of market expansion.

Lee: North Korea is currently known to be controlling markets, suppressing the use of foreign currencies and strengthening surveillance on the Chinese border. North Korean authorities must recognize the necessity of markets but

they are afraid of various rumors circulating through markets and possible objections to the ruling system by people gathering at markets. To be able to control the market, though temporarily, the authorities should be able to release food and other basic necessities through the rationing system. At present, they have obviously reserved enough materials in preparation of the 2012 events for proclaiming a “strong and prosperous nation.” Therefore, it is difficult to say the North’s state rationing sustem cannot meet demand for the short term at the least.

After a certain period of time, however, the North Korean authorities will face the problem of making a choice. When the reserves have dried up, they can no longer continue to suppress markets. They need either to exhibit flexibility to allow markets or provide goods by other means, such as accepting shipments from the United States or South Korea by improving relations with these countries. I personally presume that a shift to greater flexibility towards markets may be decided around April 15, the birth anniversary of Kim Il-sung, when the North is supposed to proclaim a “strong and prosperous nation.”

Yoo: The central question is what course the North Korean economy will take in the future. The big problem is the “accumulation of absurdities” in external relations, especially with China, and domestic economy. While there are talks about the possibility of another currency reform, most North Korean merchants use U.S. dollar and Chinese yuan even in domestic transactions.

These merchants suffered heavy losses in the 2009 denomination, so they are more reluctant to use the North Korean currency. If the hitherto preparations to become a strong, prosperous state are discontinued and greater regulation is applied on markets, it could suggest early exposure of policy conflicts on overall economic operations in the North.

The military has been primarily in charge of businesses for earning foreign

currency. Out of every 10 such projects, the military handled eight to nine and the rest went to the party. At this time of transition, disputes may arise from conflicts of interests rather than from ideological differences. They can affect the power structure itself and paralyze economic operations. Economic campaigns like “Flames of Hamnam” reveal too clear limitations. Kim Jongun is said to be leading the “CNC (computer numerical control) industrial revolution” of the new century but it still has no substance and is far from serving as a growth engine for the North Korean economy. North Korea’s overall economic operation plan will be maintaining the current industrial frame while making efforts to gain as much foreign aid as possible.

Absurdities

are

exposed

regarding

policy

orientations

and

actual

implementations. Without overcoming these absurdities, the North Korean economy cannot but enter a major depression sooner or later.

Lee: As far as economic policies are concerned, we can find two occasions to initiate changes. One is the Day of Sun, the April 15 birth anniversary of Kim Il-sung, and the other is the end of the year when elections in neighboring countries have been completed. Up until April 15, Kim Jong-un will be able to maintain the present economic stance, pouring the resources reserved for the year. But afterward, with these materials running out, North Korean authorities will find it difficult to continue their control of the economy and will be forced to seek new measures. The policy shift will require acquisition of goods from the outside, yet, coincidentally, South Korea, the United States and China are to undergo a change of government. Under this fluid situation, it will be hard for Pyongyang to negotiate with these governments to get any substantial amount of aid. It therefore is predictable that the North will take no significant actions until the end of the year.

Dialogue with the United States will be held intermittently on the reopening of the six-party denuclearization talks and provision of humanitarian aid. From

China, some additional aid will be acquired while high-level exchange of visits continues during the year. Domestically, control measures will be partially eased to allow trading in private markets tacitly. Then, late this year, it is likely that Pyongyang will begin to move actively to engage in negotiations with the new governments of neighboring countries and the United States. If this process is smooth, North Korea will probably introduce new economic policies during the first half of next year.

South Korea’s Policy toward the North Chun: Then what steps do you suggest the South’s current and next governments take toward North Korea?

Yoo: For the Lee Myung-bak government it is neither possible nor desirable to change its North Korea policies at this moment. Considering the transitional nature of the situation, it is inevitable for the Lee administration to maintain its policies. Yet, it is recommended that the present government rearrange the May 24, 2010 measures on North Korea, which were taken after the sinking of the patrol craft Cheonan earlier that year [and shift] to the direction that corresponds to public opinion. A change of pace is necessary for the South to hold initiatives in future inter-Korean relations.

It is also necessary that the incumbent government paves the foundation for future policies on the basis of a factual outlook on the North’s new regime. As Dr. Lee pointed out, Kim Jong-un is likely to take the course of Gorbachev but he is bound to fail due to circumstances, although we have yet to understand his leadership and personal character. Compared to his father, who was thoroughly informed of the goings of North Korea as well as the South, Kim Jong-un must have only shallow knowledge about his own country and its

structural contradictions, even if he has other abilities. Kim Jong-il had the absolute purpose of achieving the survival of North Korea and sustaining the socialist system established by Kim Il-sung. Kim Jong-un will fail when he tries to resolve his country’s problems arbitrarily without understanding what its problems really are.

Then what shall we do about Kim Jong-un’s North Korea? Do we have to allow him to become a second Kim Il-sung or Kim Jong-il and drag on for decades, or try to understand his policy direction and character in order to create proper conditions for him to seek to change his country on his own? We should make a choice. I would prefer the latter and believe that the South should make efforts in the direction of maximizing contradictions in the North and pushing it toward changes.

Kwon: Lately, the government is somewhat easing its hard-line stance toward the North as the inter-Korean relations have remained frozen too long and the effects of the May 24 measures have been diminishing. But, it will be hard for the administration to make a major policy shift while the basic policy package is still in place. An abrupt change cannot win public approval and has no guarantee of positive North Korean response. So it is desirable that the government maintains the present keynote and gradually introduces flexibility.

This means that it continues to comply with the cooperative arrangements with the United States, China, Russia and Japan. Washington has maintained the position that the six-party talks cannot progress without improvement in the inter-Korean relations.

Unification Minister Ryu Woo-ik has emphasized both principles and flexibility. Flexibility should start by expanding civic groups’ contact with North Korea. When the North responds positively, we may expand interKorean trade and explore the possibility of new cooperation projects other

than the Kaesong (Gaeseong) Industrial Complex.

Cho: Neither the North nor the South can attempt to create a major turning point in bilateral relations this year. Many say that the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun governments had problems with principles but recorded some achievements. The Lee Myung-bak government has kept its principles but achieved little. President Lee should maintain his principles until the end of his tenure but should do something to build the foundation for future development of South-North relations. The core obstacle is the May 24 measures, which cannot be repealed. What the Lee government can do is to take steps that do not contradict its policy package, such as social and cultural exchanges, permission of private-level visits to North Korea, humanitarian assistance, joint anti-disaster projects, and expansion of the Kaesong complex.

It is undesirable that whichever party wins power in this year’s election acts on the premise that the Kim Jong-un regime will have a short life. Even if internal conflicts may take place occasionally, the North’s overall system will not be easily shaken. Besides the durability of the North Korean system which is more stable than expected, China is the decisive factor. Beijing will continue to provide political, economic and military support to the North as the stability of its next-door neighbor serves its own interest. On the other hand, the Kim Jong-un regime will be compelled to seek changes in its system, especially the economy. Through its North Korea policy as well as displomatic efforts, South Korea has to create circumstances under which the North will pursue openness for economic revival more speedily and broadly. Pyongyang’s steps of economic opening will be extremely cautious, limiting them to special economic zones of Hwanggumpyong and Rason close to the Chinese border or designating more special zones.

Crucial China Factor Lee: Our government needs to take more positive steps toward the North. If Kim Jong-il was still alive, the Lee government would have to maintain its principle and work toward solidifying a foundation on which the inter-Korean relations can develop in a more desirable direction in the future. But the administration had better reconsider whether it is desirable to maintain the direction of its North Korea policies after the death of Kim Jong-il. The Kim Jong-un regime can be described with the single word: uncertainty. There are many possibilities but none is certain. Under these circumstances, what is most important is that we in the South inform the North Koreans and the international community that we are the masters of the Korean peninsula, we are the directly involved party in inter-Korean relations, we support North Korea’s development, and we want changes in the North more than anybody else.

For this, the government should make it clear that South Korea intends to make a new start in relations with the North upon the passage of the Kim Jong-il era. More in-depth discussion will be necessary but, first of all, the government has to decide what kind of signals it should send to the global community and the people of the two Koreas.

Yoo: There is no likelihood that the May 24 measures will yield the desired effect. They were punitive steps for the North’s provocations, but North Korea has neither assumed responsibility for its actions nor made an apology. The next administration may continue to press the North to acknowledge its responsibility, but it could also seek other measures. The current government has to decide whether it will keep the measures fully valid until its last days or amend them gradually before its tenure ends so the measures will be given a proper place in the history of inter-Korean relations.

[KDI North Korean Economy Review, January 2012, Korea Development Institute]

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Economic Influence of the Recent North Korea-related Risk and Policy Suggestions Lee Myong-hwal Senior Research Fellow Korea Institute of Finance

The recent North Korea-related risk is unprecedented in that it may be a destabilizing factor to our economy in the medium to longer term.

Accordingly, as financial authorities focus on stable foreign exchange while overseeing monetary and fiscal policies, they will need to take into account the possibility that North Korea risks could increase throughout this year.

The domestic financial markets shivered briefly after the death of Chairman Kim Jong-il of North Korea’s National Defense Commission on December 19, 2011. The KOSPI plummeted 63 points (3.4 percent) on the day, the wondollar exchange rate jumped 16.2 won (1.4 percent), and both the (three-year) government bond yields and CDS (credit default swap) premiums rose 9 percentage points. However, the markets bounced back the next day to their previous levels.

Previous North Korea-related incidents usually triggered volatility in the domestic financial markets for a short time. But the mid- to long-term effects on the market and on the real economy were largely insignificant. When Kim Il-sung died in 1994, the KOSPI fell slightly for a day and then recovered. The won-dollar exchange rate also rose but the increase was limited.

The impact of North Korea-related incidents on stocks was temporary, but bond yields fluctuated under the influence of not only North Korea-related risks but also economic conditions and fund flows at the time. In the foreign exchange markets, the influence was relatively brief. The won-dollar exchange rate rose at the time of incidents but returned to previous levels within a couple of weeks.

When the recent North Korea-related risks are compared with those from Kim Il-sung’s death, there are several differences that could turn the latest risks into medium to long-term destabilizing factors in spite of the obvious similarities in circumstances.

First, North Korea’s economy remains in a similarly anemic condition as when Kim Il-sung died. In the 1990s, the North’s economy was devastated because of its closed economic structure, which emphasized self-reliance and politicsfirst management. North Korea’s third seven-year economic plan (1987-1993) failed, as the collapse of the socialist bloc left the country without trade partners. Extreme crop failures added to the crisis, pulling down the economic growth rate to -2.1 percent in 1994, -4.1 percent in 1995 and -3.6 percent in 1996

The North Korean economy remains as precarious as ever. Stiffened international sanctions and suspended aid, food shortages, failed currency reform and internal controls on market activities have combined to take a heavy toll. There are fears that any further aggravation of the North’s economy will destabilize the regime. North Korea’s economic growth rate was estimated at -0.9 percent in 2009 and -0.5 percent in 2010. In particular, the failed currency reform in late 2009 has sparked steep inflation and exacerbated food shortages.

On the political front, however, the current succession process differs from the post-Kim Il-sung transition. From 1974 to 1994, when Kim Il-sung died, Kim Jong-il stood by as the official successor, solidifying his support base at the party, military and social groups. In contrast, Kim Jong-un was named the official successor in September 2010, only 16 months before his father died. It is hard to rule out the possibility of unstable succession and consequential political confusion due to the short preparation period.

As for the South Korean economy, it is relatively more vulnerable to North Korea-related risks now than at the time of Kim Il-sung’s death. In the early 1990s, the South’s economy continued high growth thanks to brisk private consumption and construction investment. This offset slowing export growth due to a global economic slump and the end of the so-called “Three Lows” (low interest rate, low oil price and low value of the U.S. dollar) that had bolstered the trade competitiveness of South Korean companies and kept operating costs down.

Now, as the Kim Jong-un succession unfolds, the South Korean economy is slowing down with exports ebbing amid global headwinds such as the tepid U.S. economic recovery. In addition, unlike the 1990s, domestic demand is simultaneously shrinking. Hence there are concerns that the North Korea risks

this time could coalesce with the global problems to weigh down the South Korean real economy.

At the same time, the sharp increase in foreign investors’ influence on the domestic financial markets, compared with the early 1990s, is also escalating the financial markets’ volatility caused by North Korea risks. After the domestic stock markets were opened to foreign investors in 1992, the foreigners’ equity share hovered around 15 percent until the mid-1990s, giving them limited influence on stock markets when Kim Il-sung died. In contrast, foreign stock and bond holdings have recently surpassed 30 percent and 6 percent of the total, respectively, making the domestic financial markets increasingly vulnerable to massive outflows of foreign capital when sovereign risks increase.

Although the post-Kim Jong-il risks from North Korea are different from those at the time of Kim Il-sung’s death in several aspects, the domestic financial markets remain relatively calm. One conspicuous reason is that South Korea’s economy has sound fundamentals when compared with other emerging and advanced economies, and the nation’s macroeconomic management is relatively stable. Despite the European fiscal crisis, major international credit rating agencies have positively evaluated the South Korean economy. Another reason is that international investors already have sharply reduced their exposure to emerging economies, including South Korea, since last August amid the intensifying global economic uncertainties. If they scale back in South Korea any further, there are few alternative destinations that are notably

better.

As it will take considerable time to find out whether power transfer has been smoothly completed in North Korea, the uncertainties related with the latest North Korea risks are not likely to be dissolved in a short time. Instead, the domestic financial markets will likely show greater volatility whenever negative news related with the communist regime is reported. Accordingly, when it implements its economic policies this year, the South Korean government will have to keep in mind the possibility of increasing North Korea risks.

In monetary policy, the government should continue its efforts to stabilize prices to prepare for possible instability in the financial markets and a deepening slowdown. In fiscal policy, it should determine the right time for additional stimulus to prevent economic setback if the global financial crisis drags down conditions further. To stabilize the currency markets, the government will need to focus on stabilizing foreign exchange liquidity by diversifying the sources of its foreign currency lending, expanding the share of mid- to long-term loans and enhancing the receiving bases of foreign currency deposits.

Policymakers also will need to work out liquidity support plans for domestic small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) that may see their funding affected by North Korea risks as well as global financial crisis. Funding from state-run financial institutions, such as Policy Financing Corp., Export-Import Bank, Industrial Bank of Korea and Korea Credit Guarantee Corp., needs to be re-examined.

Financial service firms will have to consider replenishing their reserves in preparation for their loans to SMEs turning sour while working out ways to

support the smaller borrowers by helping them hedge against foreign exchange risks and reduce losses from any wild fluctuations of foreign exchange markets.

[Weekly Financial Review, Vol. 21, No. 3, January 7, 2012,published by the Korea Institute of Finance]

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The Age of the New Family Special Coverage Team The Maekyung Economy

The traditional family structure is breaking down as new types of families appear one by one. Childless couples and single-person households are already common enough. Added to the list are so-called “self filial duty” families, where one does not force the spouse to look after one’s parents, multicultural families and families borne out of economic necessity. But social systems and institutions are slow to catch up to these changes. This report takes a look at the diverse new family types and the state of related social systems.

Single Moms and Multicultural Families Gong Ji-young’s novel “My Happy Home” features a single mother living happily with three children, all with different surnames. Expressing the selfassurance of a single mother, the novel recalls the real life story of the author, who has been divorced three times and has three children with different fathers. New family types are commonly found not only in literature but also on television. In place of the traditional extended family, viewers are being presented with diverse family situations, including divorced women, single mothers and stay-at-home dads (or househusbands), reflecting the great changes in family structure in Korean society.

What exactly are those changes? First, family size is shrinking. The number of 3-4 member households, the mainstay of Korean society, has been falling as single or two-member households take their place. According to Statistics Korea, two-member families accounted for the largest proportion of households with 24.5 percent of the total. This represents a considerable

change in the past five years, as 3-4 member families made up the lion’s share up till 2005. There is a reason for the growing proportion of two-member households: the rise in the number of empty nesters, that is, parents whose children have grown up and moved out of home.

In the days when most couples had three or more children, parents did not live alone for long. But as most families have only two children these days, once those children are married parents are finding themselves alone at an earlier age. An added factor here is that people are also living longer. Other types of two-member households are the DINKs (double income no kids), PINKs (poor income no kids) and the PINK + PETs (no kids but pets). Coming a close second to two-member households are single-person households, which account for 23.9 percent of the total. These are mostly elderly people or single men and women who live alone.

Second, the types of families are becoming more varied. With divorce on the rise, more children are being raised by their grandparents. According to the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, the number of households consisting of grandparents over the age of 65 and children under the age of 16 has almost doubled from 35,194 in 1995 to 69,175 in 2010. In more than 80 percent of these cases a grandparent is raising the children alone, and in half of these cases they have taken on the responsibility because of the parents’ divorce or remarriage.

There are also a large number of single mothers and so-called “Miss Moms,” single women bearing children from donated sperm or raising an adopted child.

With the rise in the number of foreign residents in Korea, the number of multicultural families has been increasing. In 2010, the number of

international marriages came to 34,200, a rise of 900 over 2009.

The family diversity has heightened social isolation at certain levels of society but measures to deal with the problem are sorely lacking. Although the government is taking great pains to promote childbirth, the shortage of childcare facilities poses an obstacle. Ministry of Health and Welfare figures show that, as of 2010, public childcare facilities account for only 5.3 percent of the total and those operated by social welfare foundations 3.9 percent, less than one-tenth the level of their counterparts in Japan. Aside from workplace childcare centers (1.1 percent), the remaining 89.7 percent are privately operated facilities.

Lack of Childcare Facilities and Rise in Childless Couples It seems the corporate world is also ignoring the childcare problem. According to the childcare law, any workplace with more than 500 employees or more than 300 female employees must operate an in-house childcare facility. But only a handful of companies actually comply with this rule. Figures compiled

by the Ministry of Employment and Labor and the Ministry of Health and Welfare show that, as of December 2010, 41 percent (236) of big companies surveyed did not operate a childcare facility or provide any childcare support.

If this is the case with large companies, the situation with small and mediumsized enterprises can easily be imagined.

Moreover, there is a dearth of support measures for single mothers and multicultural families living in poverty. A 2009 survey by the Ministry of Health and Welfare shows that the average monthly income is less than two million won in 60 percent of multicultural families. The case is little different with single mothers. Ministry of Gender Equality statistics show that 40 percent of working single mothers are part-time employees, and 35.3 percent work in the service industry or sales and retail. Half of them earn between 500,000 and 1,000,000 won per month. Park Young-sook, chair of the U.N. Future Forum, explains, “As family disintegration increases, public support must be expanded to prevent social problems that could arise from changes in family structure.�

Evolution of Family Structure As the economic slowdown drags on and on and real income drops, the number of goose-father families, PINK families, self-parental duty families, and slow growth-era large households is on the rise. With the change in the times and changes in values, there is also an increase in the number of (university) student couples, remarried couples, and multicultural families.

Following is an introduction to the new family types appearing these days.

New Multicultural Family

Families formed by North Korean defectors settling in the South, and by Korean women and men with spouses from abroad

Geese Family Families where the father lives far away from the rest of the family for their own graduate studies or for the sake of their children’s education

Without Family: Single Household Divorced singles, “Gold Miss” singles, Miss Moms

Filial Duty for One’s Own Parents Married couples who look after their own parents respectively rather than their in-laws

Married Again Families consisting of elderly first-marriage couples or couples where at least one partner has been married before

Matriarchal Society Families living with the wife’s parents because of childcare needs

INKS (DINK, PINK) Married couples who choose not to have children because of heavy workloads

or for financial reasons

Large Family in Recession Era More than one generation living in the same house for financial reasons

Young Couple University student couples who ignore social disapproval

N New Multicultural Family In February this year, North Korean defector “A� held the first birthday party

of her child that she had long dreamed of. After defecting to South Korea in 2006, A got a job working a pattern machine at a box factory, a worksite that regularly employs defectors. She was introduced to a man working at a construction site and married him. Having adapted to the way of life and culture in South Korea, she gave birth to her first baby last year. “We’re not well off,” A says, “but we’re thrifty and work hard. Thanks to my family, my husband and child, I’m happy.”

The number of married couples consisting of a North Korean woman and South Korean man is on the rise. The term “multicultural family” originally applied to families made up of people from different cultures. But over the past 60 years since national division, cultural alienation between the South and the North has become severe. Moreover, with the North’s economy worsening, more North Koreans have been defecting to the South. As the defectors settle in the South, marry and have children, a new type of family is emerging.

“North Korean women are impressed by South Korean men, whom they see as having a gentle manner of speech and sophisticated appearance and manners,” said a counselor at Hana Center, a support center for defectors. “As they receive economic benefits from the government, such as housing (under 60 square meters), they are popular with the men here.”

According to the multicultural population statistics released by Statistics Korea on November 3, 2011, the number of children born in multicultural families reached 20,312 in 2010, a 6.8 percent rise over 2009. By nation, 34.5 percent of the female spouses in multicultural families came from Vietnam, followed by China with 27.9 percent.

Aside from the typical multicultural family type where the wife comes from another nation, the number of Korean women marrying foreign men is also on

the rise. “B,” a native Korean woman who has never even studied overseas, recently married a British man. “Although he lived on the other side of the globe, we overcame the physical distance with the Internet and free telephone services, and grew sure of our feelings for each other through frequent contact,” she said as she explained how she decided to get married. Hence technological development has played a part in the formation of new multicultural family types.

E gEEse family Researcher “C,” who works at the research institute of an electronics company located in Suwon, Gyeonggi Province, was married recently but only sees her husband on weekends. Her husband used to work at the same place but has since taken time off work to attend graduate school in another city, Pohang.

“Of course we’d like to see each other more since we’re newly-weds, but in preparation for the future we’re living as a ‘geese couple’ [long-distance couple],” she said.

Mr. D, who works for one of the big corporations, recently enrolled his children in an international school located on Jeju Island off the south coast.

Though he wanted to send them overseas to study, he decided that in terms of cost and efficiency, the Jeju school would be better. Every Saturday he takes a plane to Jeju and spends the weekend with his children in a house he has there, and flies back to Seoul on Sunday night. “Fortunately, a lot of budget airlines have appeared and I can save a lot of money if I buy my ticket in advance,” he said.

In the past there were many geese fathers who sent their children and wife overseas while they stayed home in Korea. But these days the distance for such geese fathers has become closer, allowing families to reunite on weekends. Statistics on elementary and secondary school students studying

overseas released by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology and the Korean Educational Development Institute show that the number of such students departing the country in 2010 was 18,741, a decrease of more than 10,000 over 2006 when the number reached 29,511.

“The rush to send young students overseas has died down somewhat with the establishment of international schools and other alternatives in Korea, where similar educational conditions to those overseas are provided,” said Jang Eunsuk, president of a national parents’ association.

Economic uncertainty and international instability have also contributed to the rise in so-called “near-distance geese families.” As to the main reason for living separately from their families or spouses, both C and D cited economic instability. Living this way may be a hardship for all concerned but, considering the extreme competitiveness of society, it is hard to sit back and do nothing, they said.

W Without Family: Single Household Koreans tend to see those living on their own as lonely and pitiful beings. But those living alone don’t necessarily see it that way. A single person with money can live a more abundant life with fewer economic constraints.

Lawyer “E” recently divorced her husband. Now that her children have entered university, she no longer has the burden of childcare and has decided to live on her own. This was possible as she has always worked. Those around her are worried about her, but she has no time to feel lonely thanks to the many “Returned Singles” and “Gold Misses” that she knows. On weekends they go hiking, and on major holidays they travel overseas together. On their own they

form a definite family type.

The number of single households is on the rise. The age when marriage is an option rather than a must has arrived. There are also more people living alone after a divorce. Forming communities with others in similar circumstances, they spend their leisure time together in pursuit of various hobbies. There are also cases of single men and single women living together.

“F,” who works in the IT sector, has decided to remain single after thinking about the matter for a long time. “I think it is hard to give one hundred percent to both family and work. For now, the most important thing for me is to build my career,” he said. But the problem is housing. He has always lived with his parents but the situation has changed when his younger sister married recently.

His sister and her husband come to visit every weekend, and he finds this extremely uncomfortable. His parents’ nagging also has increased, so he moved into an apartment near work.

A colleague who has also decided to move out of his parents’ house was looking for a place as well, so they have agreed to share the apartment. “We share the same house but don’t invade each other’s privacy. It’s not as lonely as living alone and cheaper too, so it’s like killing two birds with one stone,” said F. Some women who have no desire to get married still want to have children.

“G,” who lived overseas for a long time, dreams of becoming a “Miss Mom.” This term refers to unmarried women who raise children born from donated sperm obtained from a sperm bank. “I want to have children so I looked into sperm banks, but having a baby that way looks like it’s going to be very difficult in Korea. Miss Moms are not legally recognized. I’ve heard that it’s possible overseas, so if I live overseas again I plan to have a baby then,” G

said.

F Filial Duty for One’s Own Parents “When we were dating he never called his parents, but after we married he became a different person. He calls his parents whenever he gets the chance and makes me go and help his mother when the kimchi-making season comes around. He keeps looking out for his parents and siblings. If he wants to be a good son, he can do it on his own. I can’t understand why he keeps forcing me to look after his parents as well.”

“H” married last year. She complains that her husband keeps laying the blame on her. She has a hard time working and doing the housekeeping at the same time and thinks he’s being inconsiderate in laying yet another burden on her shoulders. These days, young married couples call the old practice of passing on one’s filial duties to the spouse “remote-control filial duty.” It comes from the habit of ordering one’s spouse to do this or that. In the past the role of the daughter-in-law was so firmly established that women often took this for granted.

The situation has changed, however. In more families both the husband and wife work. Statistics Korea figures show that the number of double-income families comes to 5.07 million, surpassing the number of single-income families at 4.91 million. Reflecting the times, a new term has emerged, “self filial duty,” which means one should not force one’s spouse to look after one’s parents. In other words, if you want to be a good son or daughter, do it yourself.

“It doesn’t mean I don’t want to do my duty to his parents. But I think we should equally share our responsibilities to our respective families,” H explained. “In giving spending money to our parents, the most sensible thing

would be for each of us to put money aside in proportion to our respective wages and using that for family affairs when needed,” she said.

A Married Again With the rising proportion of second marriages in the total number of marriages, another new family type comprising remarried partners is emerging. Marriage statistics show that the proportion of first marriages by both spouses fell from 89.3 percent of the total in 1990 to 76.5 percent in 2009. The proportion of couples where both partners have married more than once rose from 4.7 percent to 12.8 percent during the same period.

Remarriage patterns are also diverse. While many remarrying couples are made up of men and women in their 30s and 40s, there are also a considerable number of “golden remarriages” consisting of couples over 60. The number of golden remarriages in Gyeonggi Province reached 1,438 last year, double the number 10 years before.

“I,” a man in his 60s living in Seongnam, Gyeonggi Province, married a second time with a woman in her 50s. He had divorced his first wife because of personality differences in 2001 and lived alone for one year before he was introduced to his present wife by a friend. At the time of their marriage, he was 54 and had two sons and his wife was 47 and had a son and a daughter. So when they married they became a family of six. “At the time I was most concerned about how my children would react. I’ve seen people marry despite their children’s objections and suffer when their children refuse to accept the situation till their dying day,” said I. Though I’s two sons agreed to their father remarrying, the wife’s son objected, saying he hoped she would never remarry. But the daughter was all for the idea and helped the marriage to take place. “By living together we can ease each

other’s loneliness and take the burden off our children. And because I’ve been through the trial and errors of marriage before, I can make a better job of it this time around,” said I.

M Matriarchal Society When “J” married in May four years ago, she hung onto her parents and cried and cried at the wedding. At the time she was sad at the idea of leaving her parents’ home. But she moved back home 10 months ago when she had her second child. J and her husband, Y, are now living with her parents.

A rising number of men are living with their wife’s family, like Y. According to Statistics Korea, the number of women living with their husband’s family decreased from 444,634 in 1990 to 198,656 in 2010, while the number of men living with their wife’s family rose from 18,088 to 53,675 during the same period.

The major cause behind this trend is childcare. In Y’s case, they did not live with the wife’s family from the outset. “Since we both work, we first chose to live somewhere convenient for both of us. But when our first child was born we moved close to the in-laws,” said Y. That’s when differences of opinion appeared. Y wanted to live within a 5-10 minute drive from his in-laws but J wanted to live within a 5-minute walk from her parents. The wife had her way in the end.

Because they both worked and often had night shifts, J’s mother took over the care of their first child. The child was handed over in the morning and brought home in the evening or on the weekend. The child grew closer to her grandmother and sought her out before her mother when she cried. Seeing this, Y began to seriously consider moving in with the in-laws. “It’s not easy, since our habits and ways are different, but when we think of the children there’s no real alternative,” said Y. “The big rise in double-income couples is turning Korea into a matriarchal society.”

I INK Tribe (DINKs and PINKs) “K” and his wife are DINKs, that is, a couple with Double Income and No Kids, something on which they agreed when they married three years ago.

A computer programmer at an IT venture, K works an average of 12 hours a day and works nights for almost half the year. “We agreed not to have children, deciding to invest the time and attention that children need on each other,” he said.

“L” and his wife, married nine years, also have no children. It is not because they do not want children but because their economic circumstances make it

hard for them to do so. L is a laborer at a construction site, but in the winter there is little work available and therefore no regular income. His wife is not well and cannot work. Couples such as this with a low income who choose not to have kids because they can’t afford to raise them are called PINKs, which means Poor Income, No Kids.

Both K and his wife and L and his wife agree that children are not a prerequisite for a normal marriage. “When I see couples who are worn out from childcare, I can’t help thinking that they are wasting their lives. In contrast, we find happiness in eating together and spending a lot of time together. It’s something that is hard to find in homes with children,” said L. L Large Family in Recession Era “M” and his wife decided to move in with their parents three years after marriage. Currently they are a family of seven, both sets of in-laws, M and his wife, and their son, all living in one house. The reason for living as one large family is the decrease in family income, which makes saving difficult and the future uncertain. Families formed in this way, a nuclear family moving back in with one or both sets of parents, is these days referred to as a “recession-era large family.”

M and his wife are both working and have a combined income of 3.8 million won. Before they married, M’s parents took out a loan of 80 million won for key money on a leased apartment for them and began paying back the loan plus interest in monthly installments. In return M and his wife contribute to their living expenses. Every month M puts aside 2 million won for living expenses, interest payments, and insurance payments. This leaves 1.8 million won per month. Wondering how they could reduce expenses and save some money at the same time, they finally decided to join households with their parents.

“When we first got married we thought it would be easy to live on our two incomes. But the loan was a burden so we decided to live with our parents,” M said. The money both sets of parents were paying for rent is now being put into savings.

Y Young Couple While the average age for first marriages is gradually rising, some couples are choosing to get married much younger than most. “N” and “O” are 21-year-old university students and a married couple. Both have relatively elderly parents, who wanted to marry their children off early. After thinking over the idea, they decided to get married, and had their first child 10 months ago. They now live with the wife’s (O) parents. N works at a mobile phone store to support his family and O works casual jobs to contribute to the household expenses.

While it is difficult for them to take care of a child and a household, marrying early does have its advantages, they say. “Young parents can give birth to healthier children and as my parents are relatively young for grandparents it’s easier for them to look after the baby. It is also a help when it comes to preparing for old age,” N said. A child born to a couple in their 30s reaches university age when the parents are in their 50s. Paying tuition can become a problem if the parents are forced into early retirement. A couple who has a child in their 20s has less to worry about in this respect.

Tailored Support for Different Family Types While family types are changing rapidly, Korean society is lacking measures to keep up with the changes. The age for first marriage is steadily rising, as is the number of single households. Experts say we should monitor the tailored

new family policy measures that are being implemented in advanced countries.

The following are measures for the age of the new family.

1. Raising Birth Rate through Support for Unstable Families “In Korea, the strong family-centered mindset is paradoxically leading to family breakdown,” says Lim Hyeon-jin, sociology professor at Seoul National University. “As public support is practically non-existent, the burden borne by families is too large. Resources are limited and in an attempt to pass on as much to the children as possible, parents may choose to suffer, leading to the ‘goose father’ and other social phenomena. The family unit must now be considered when forming policies.”

Experts say that Korea has many support measures for the individual but almost none for the family as a unit. “There are many policies for individual households, including those of the elderly, low-income earners and the handicapped, but few measures that reinforce the function of family and provide support for unstable families,” said Dr. Kim Seung-gwon at the Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs.

The government seems to be well aware of the fact. Lim Gwan-sik, director of the family policy department at the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, points out, “The family is the basic unit of society and must be protected. But traditionally, family affairs have been a private matter, so while the problems are recognized there are few means to deal with them.”

One example of the few support measures available in Korea is the Korea Transportation and Safety Authority’s support program for the families of traffic accident victims. Under this program, traffic accident victims receive subsidies for the support of children under 18 or elderly parents over the age of

65.

“Although assistance is limited to those eligible under the Basic Livelihood Security System, it is notable in that the government provides support not for the victim but the victim’s family. Such measures must become more widespread,” said Dr. Kim. In Sweden, early implementation of family-centered support has successfully raised women’s employment rate as well as childbirth rate. For the first time in the world, Sweden implemented paid paternity leave in addition to paid maternity leave in 1974. When a couple expects a child, either of the parents may take a total of 480 days of paid leave during the period from 60 days before birth to eight years of age.

In addition, in 1995 the Swedish government implemented childcare or inhouse childcare service for all children between the ages of one and six and after-school care for all children between the ages of six and 12. Thanks to these measures the women’s employment rate reaches 60 percent in Sweden, second in the world after China. The birth rate is 1.86 children, which is higher than the OECD average rate of 1.71.

2. Recognition of De Facto Couples Experts say that as the extended family system emphasizing blood lineage is being replaced by the nuclear family system based on intimacy, policy directions must be changed accordingly. Currently only couples that have proof of marriage are eligible for any family benefits and support but policies that recognize nontraditional relationships are also needed, they say.

With cohabiting couples becoming an established family form in France, the

French government passed the civil solidarity pact (PACS; pacte civile de solidarité), which recognizes the civil union between two adults. Couples who present a civil union contract to the legal authorities have the same rights and obligations on taxation, lease contracts and loans as married couples. This applies to property taxes upon conclusion of the contract, and to income taxes three years after.

According to a 2004 survey by the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, 66.3 percent of couples living in Paris are legally married while 31 percent are in civil unions. Marie-Ségoléne Royal and François Hollande, the Socialist Party presidential candidates in the 2007 and 2012 elections, respectively, were living together in a de facto relationship. Though they have now separated, they lived together for 22 years and have four children. Thanks to the recognition of civil unions and various childcare support programs, France has a birth rate of 2.0 children, the highest of any OECD nation.

“It is now time for Korea to include an article on recognition of the rights of civil unions in the civil code and revise the family law to include measures to

promote childbirth,” said Jeon Gwang-hui, sociology professor at Chungnam National University.

“Private companies need to stop discrimination of de facto couples and married couples, and increase childcare services for employees with children,” said Yun Hong-sik, public administration professor at Inha University.

In the United States, for example, businesses operate in-house or outside childcare centers on their own or in cooperation with other firms. This is seen to arise from the importance placed on a liberal welfare regime and the role of the market rather than the state. Americans have traditionally opposed government intervention in family affairs, which is reflected in policies.

3. Increased Benefits for Senior Long-term Care Insurance Korea has already become an aging society and will soon have to worry about being a super-aged society. But the nation has a long way to go in dealing with the associated issues. “The greatest problem is poverty,” said Lim Gwan-sik, at the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family. “To solve the problem, we have to examine issues such as employment, education, economics, society and culture, and mental exhaustion, from an inter-departmental perspective, which is difficult in reality.”

But sitting back and doing nothing is an invitation to disaster. Japan is one country that quickly foresaw problems and dealt with them. Befitting the world’s longest living society, Japan’s family policies are focused on senior welfare. A major example is its long-term care insurance system. Implemented in April 2000, it covers 90 percent of the costs of using welfare facilities for the elderly.

The Japanese were motivated to implement this insurance system when medical costs for senior citizens jumped to account for 31 percent of total medical insurance costs back in 1995. When medical insurance failed to function properly because of the rising medical costs for the elderly, the longterm care insurance system specifically for the elderly was introduced. The insurance scheme is half funded by senior citizens over the age of 65 and medical insurance fees paid by those between 40 and 64, and half by the government.

In 1961, Japan also instituted partial coverage of living expenses for lowincome senior citizens and their entry into senior citizens’ homes. These homes can be divided into two groups. Type A residents are provided with meals, health, and bathing services, while type B must cook for themselves. Eighty percent of operation costs are covered by the government.

Korea also has a senior long-term care insurance system but the number of beneficiaries is small. As of August 2011, the number of senior citizens was 5.5 million but with strict regulations in place, only 320,000 (5.8 percent) of them are covered by the insurance scheme. Even though diagnosed with serious dementia, those able to move normally are very often not eligible.

Many agree that the insurance scheme needs to be expanded to increase the number of beneficiaries.

4. Population Statistics Should Reflect Family Diversity To enable effective support for diverse new family types, the method of compiling population statistics needs to be fundamentally revised. Professor Jeon Gwang-hui points out that some countries in Western and Northern Europe, homosexual and bisexual couples are included in marriage and family statistics and large-scale sample surveys. This means the subdivision of

categories in population statistics is more detailed, which allows for better preparation for the future.

Some say the concept of welfare also needs to be fundamentally reviewed as it will be difficult to solve problems associated with family changes with support policies based on fragmentary understanding of the issues.

“Current changes in family types are aggravating inequality between the sexes, social classes, regions, and generations [senior poverty rate at 45 percent, youth unemployment, etc.] in a society of economic supremacy and the law of the jungle.” said Professor Yun Hong-sik. “Fundamental measures need to be considered. The state should increase its role in the welfare of the citizens.”

Changing Corporate Culture in the Age of the New Family With the ongoing diversification of family types, businesses are moving quickly in response and various family-friendly companies are emerging.

Hanmi Global, Korea’s leading construction management company, provides financial incentives to its employees to promote childbirth. For the third child the company gives a bonus of 2 million won and for the fourth child 5 million won. It also gives 500,000 won each for the first and second child. A one-time bonus is insufficient in promoting childbirth so the company also provides unlimited tuition support, paying for education of all employees’ children from kindergarten to university.

In addition, Hanmi Global has also introduced a flexitime work system for women employees with children under the age of four. Under this system women have an hour’s leeway in the morning and evening so they can take their children to childcare and pick them up after work.

Women employees can also take six months’ childcare leave, during which they are given a monthly stipend of 100,000 won. This distinguishes Hanmi Global from other firms. Another distinctive feature is that tuition is also provided for any adopted children as well. “Adopted children receive the same benefits as other children. We also provide support for health check-ups not only for employees but also their spouses and in the case of a serious illness such as cancer, we help to collect money for treatment,” said Jeong Ik-gyo, a department manager.

Standard Chartered Bank Korea gives infertility leave to employees who are experiencing trouble in having a baby and provides support of one million won per year for no more than three years for infertility treatment and procedures.

In addition, employees with pre-schoolers may freely take childcare leave of less than two years.

The shutdown system, where the office is closed from Christmas to New Year, is also an outcome of the changes in family types. It was introduced at the end of last year by Doosan and other conglomerates, primarily to allow foreign employees living apart from their families to go home for a visit. It also allows for reunion of long-distance families, and for overseas travel by singles and DINK couples.

As family composition changes, the corporate culture is changing too. At foreign companies in Korea, employees are not allowed to ask someone “Are you married?” when they meet for the first time. Although this question is traditionally regarded as a kind of greeting or expression of interest, it is not considered appropriate in light of different family types such as de facto couples, divorced couples, couples with adopted children, and international marriages. Avoidance of such personal questions is spreading in the business

world, not just in foreign companies.

In addition to such changes in corporate culture, marketing methods are also changing. Transitions in family composition are altering the roles of family members such as father, mother and uncle under the traditional concept of family. This ultimately leads to changes in consumption patterns. In the case of singles, for example, they are responsible for their own upkeep, unlike when they lived with their parents and had little say in purchases. For example, now that their mothers no longer buy clothes for them, they tend to purchase fancier designs. In terms of price, sales channels and marketing, companies are making a distinction between single and elderly consumers. Marketing strategies no longer target the broad category of “family” but to the “individual.”

Lotte Shopping for one was quick to reflect the decline in the average number of family members. The rapid spread of Lotte Market 999, which features goods packaged in individual serves or small amounts for single households, should be noted. A cross between a one-price shop and a convenience store, Lotte Market 999 sells shampoo, soap and other household goods, processed food such as ramyeon, and fresh fruit and vegetables, in small packaging units and at a low price. E-mart too has established “singles zones” and “mini-mini zones” to attract the one-person household segment. Food, household goods, cars, electronics and many other goods that aim to satisfy the demands of the individual rather than the family are rapidly appearing on the market. * Illustrations by Jeong Yun-jeong * The special coverage team, headed by Kim Gyeong-min, included Park Suho, Mun Hui-cheol, Kim Heon-ju, Yun Hyeong-jung, No Seung-uk, and Yang Hye-rin.

[Maekyung Economy, No. 1641, January 18-31, 2012]

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- A Korean Wife and Her French Husband Who Loves Korea 100 Times More Than She Does - Seoul Fortress on the Road to World Heritage Status

A Korean Wife and Her French Husband Who Loves Korea 100 Times More Than She Does

Uh Soo-woong Staff Reporter The Chosun Ilbo

A Publishing House in France Specialized in Korean Literature In introducing Korean literature overseas, the biggest obstacle involves Korea’s failure to play a leading role in the publication process. Most often, its role has stopped at providing financial support, and the final decision has always been made by the publisher in each country. This has led to the lack of comprehensiveness in the body of works introduced, most of which are either stories catering to exotic tastes or those dealing with historical or social issues.

The situation would be different if Korea took the initiative and publicized Korean literature in its entirety by establishing a publishing house in the target country.

With this question in mind, Jean-Claude de Crescenzo, 60, an aficionado and translator of Korean literature, who is also a professor of Korean Studies at Aix-Marseille University, established his namesake publishing house in France specializing in Korean literature. A publishing house of this nature is in itself unprecedented, but what is more notable is the array of people who collaborate with him from Korea or in France.

The planning council in Korea consists of a group of prominent literary figures: the novelist Yi In-seong (former professor of French literature at Seoul National University), the poet Kim Hye-sun (professor of Seoul Institute of the Arts), and the literary critic Jeong Gwa-ri (professor of Yonsei University).

Collaborators in France include Jean-Bellemin Noël (professor emeritus of Université Paris-VIII), Claude Mouchard (professor of Université Paris-VIII), Noël Dutrait (who translated the works of Gao Xingjian, the recipient of the 2000 Nobel Prize in Literature) and Kim Hye-gyeong (professor of AixMarseille University, who is also wife of Professor de Crescenzo).

The marriage of the de Crescenzos was, in part, helped by the French husband’s love for Korean literature, which dates back over 20 years. He was working as a professor at University of Aix-en-Provence when he started to learn martial arts from a Korean instructor, and this experience led him to have interest in Korean culture in general, especially literature.

In 2003, he set up a Korean Studies major at his university, and invited Kim Hye-gyeong as an instructor. Later, they married. Kim, who is 12 years younger, said with a smile on her face, “I had never imagined I’d marry a French man. But here I am! It’s beyond my understanding, but he certainly loves Korea 100 times more than I, a Korean, do.” Professor de Crescenzo, whose hobby is learning hand acupuncture techniques, returned her smile and said, “I guess, in my previous life, I might have been a boy monk who would

make kimchi at a Korean Buddhist temple.”

The project to open a publishing house materialized around May 2011, when Jeong Gwa-ri met de Crescenzo at the Aix-en-Provence Forum held in France sponsored by the Korea Literature Translation Institute, where the Korean participant was immensely impressed by the French coordinator’s passion for Korean literature. Greatly contributing to giving them trust in the project was Keulmadang (www.keulmadang.com), the only webzine in France dedicated to Korean literature, which the de Crescenzos had published since June 2009.

The bimonthly webzine has published 14 issues so far with the interviews of 14 Korean writers, including Hwang Sok-yong, Jo Jung-rae, Yi In-seong, Lee Seung-u, Eun Hee-kyung and Shin Kyung-sook, and has introduced dozens of Korean literary works in French translation along with critiques. The webzine had over 300,000 visitors last year. “Now, Keulmadang receives frequent requests from authors and publishers to post news and introductions of their books on Korea to be published in France,” said de Crescenzo.

After Jeong returned to Korea, and with Yi In-seong and Kim Hye-sun also involved, the project gained momentum. They all agreed that the influential publishers who had introduced Korean literature to France, such as Actes Sud and Philippe Picquier, were less than perfect in playing effective roles. Yi Inseong pointed out, “I do recognize the pioneering roles of these publishers, but they have a tendency to introduce each work in isolation as if serving a la carte dishes, out of context of our literary tradition and with a lack of understanding of it.”

The role of Jean-Claude de Crescenzo under these circumstances is to do more than introducing individual works and try to publish a series that enables European readers to have a comprehensive view of the context and

significance of Korean literature. Currently, the board of eight Korean and French editors are drawing up a list of works to be published. Jeong Gwa-ri asserted, “In our efforts to globalize Korean literature, now is the time for us to make a qualitative leap using the accumulated outcomes. And De Crescenzo will serve as a foothold to promote Korean literature to enrich world literature.�

[January 2, 2012]

www.koreafocus.or.kr

Seoul Fortress on the Road to World Heritage Status

Kim Sang-min Staff Reporter The Chosun Ilbo

Song Min-ho, 55, is a professor of architecture and director of the Institute of Seoul Studies at the University of Seoul. When interviewed on December 30, he was excited at the prospect of the “Symposium for the Nomination of Seoul Fortress to the World Heritage Tentative List,” scheduled for January 18, 2012.

The symposium with a rather long title is the first step to having Seoul Fortress inscribed on the UNESCO World Heritage List.

The Institute of Seoul Studies is preparing for this function along with the Korean office of ICOMOS (International Council on Monuments and Sites), an agency which reviews nominations for world cultural heritage and conducts field surveys. According to Professor Song, Seoul Fortress is the world’s longest extant fortress wall that has demarcated the capital city of a country.

“Seoul Fortress (also known as Hanyang Fortress) functioned as the border of the capital city for over 500 years from 1394, when the Joseon Dynasty built its capital in Seoul, then called Hanyang, to 1910, when Japan colonized Korea,”

said

Professor

Song,

emphasizing

its

value

as

“unique

historical/cultural resources surrounding the urban center of Seoul.” He is conducting relevant studies with an aim to have the fortress formally included in the World Heritage List by 2015.

Some may wonder if a single city is enough to constitute a field of study.

However, since its founding in June 1993 as an affiliate organization of the University of Seoul with the support of Seoul City, the Institute of Seoul Studies has conducted broad research to rediscover the city’s historical significance.

Thus far the institute has published a total of 226 works of research, including “A Study on Inner Seoul’s Identity through Records on Changes in Historical Cultural Heritage and Survey of Citizens’ Awareness” and “A Study on International Exchanges and Urban Architecture in Jeong-dong during the Period of Korean Empire.” As soon as the institute published an academic thesis, the Seoul Museum of History would seek to disseminate the information by holding a special exhibition on the theme.

The institute’s eight researchers have searched for materials on Seoul in museums and other institutions in Korea and abroad. In this way, they found a number of paintings, including one at the Harvard-Yenching Institute, titled “All the Government Offices That Have Been My Posts” (Sukcheon jeado; painted by Han Pil-gyo, an official of the late Joseon Dynasty). Based on these findings, the researchers published “The Old Maps of Seoul” in 1995. In addition, the institute published “Corea, Coreani,” translated from an old manuscript with photographs of Seoul in the early 20th century, written by

Carello Rozeti, an Italian consul who stayed in Korea in 1902-1903. For this book, the researchers went to a great deal of trouble to obtain the documents going around in France and England.

“The Institute of Seoul Studies was benchmarked by Beijing Union University when they founded the Municipal Research Center for Beijing Studies in 1995 based on the academic exchange between the two institutions,” said Song.

Within Korea as well, the institute has shared its know-how with a number of municipal governments, including Incheon. Song noted, “Before the institute was founded, studies on the city were done independently in each field, such as history, art and others. But with the institute, interdisciplinary exchanges have flourished among a variety of fields, including history, literature, philosophy, architecture and urban planning.”

Professor Song is an academic architect whose career has been largely devoted to traditional Korean architecture. His interest in this subject started when he investigated the Gahoe-dong district [now part of Bukchon] for the preservation of traditional buildings in 1985 as a doctoral candidate of the department of architecture at Seoul National University.

He said, “In spite of the continued construction of traditional houses, people’s ideas about them seemed to have stopped at some of those ancient houses preserved in the traditional villages in Hahoe and Yangdong. So, I wanted to study about the change that traditional architecture had undergone in line with Seoul’s urban change itself.” So far, his main academic concern has been the traditional houses in Seoul, which transformed during Korea’s modernization period in the 1930s through the 1960s to adapt to urbanization.

Song received a Ph.D. in 1990 with a dissertation on this subject titled “A Study on the Types of Traditional Korean Houses in Urban Areas.” He said,

“Traditional houses have been adapted to the needs of modern city dwellers, and thus have been reborn to represent a new value in which the past and the present coexist.” He went on to say, “Korea’s past, including the Japanese colonial period, the Korean War, the rapid economic development, etc. is reflected in the traditional architectural heritage and the city of Seoul itself.”

Song finds it troublesome to see the district of traditional houses in Bukchon, which has been preserved under the support of the Seoul Metropolitan Government, turning into commercial and tourist attractions while losing its identity as a residential area. “The subsidies given to the owners of traditional houses in Seoul during the office of the former mayor Oh Se-hoon are thought to have resulted in higher house prices, making the district an unfavorable place to live in. I wonder how the current mayor Park Won-soon will resolve this matter,” said Song.

[January 4, 2012]

www.koreafocus.or.kr

- The Symbolism of Black Dragons in Korean Culture - Meeting the Kings of Joseon alongside their Graves

The Symbolism of Black Dragons in Korean Culture

Gu Bon-jun Staff Reporter The Hankyoreh

“Mireu, All about Dragons”

By Lee Hye-hwa, Book by Book, 256 pages, 13,500 won An organization studying Korean cultural heritage recently issued a press release expressing its alarm and concern over naming 2012 the “Year of the Black Dragon.” Applying the traditional symbolism of colors that represent the five cardinal directions, there are blue, white, red, yellow and black dragons.

Among them, the black dragon has frequently been condemned in history as an “evil dragon.”

One notable work of classic Korean literature on dragons is the “Yongbi eocheonga” (Songs of Flying Dragons), a series of epic poems written under orders of King Sejong, following the creation of Korean script in 1443, to

consolidate the heavenly mandate of the Joseon Dynasty. One of its chapters portrays a pair of dragons — one white and the other black — that appeared in a dream of Dojo, the grandfather of the Taejo Yi Seong-gye, the founder and first ruler of Joseon.

In the dream, a white dragon pleads for help, saying a black dragon is trying to occupy its abode. The next day, Dojo decides to seek out the white dragon in peril and finds the two dragons engaged in combat. Dojo shoots an arrow to kill the black dragon and save the white one. The poem goes on that the following night, the white dragon revisits Dojo in his dream to express its gratitude and predict “great events” in the future that would bless his descendents ― hence the founding of the Joseon Dynasty by his grandson.

Given such age-old negative connotations, the abovementioned organization asked the local media to refrain from using the term “black dragon,” on the grounds that it might spread unproven notions of inauspicious implications surrounding the year’s zodiac sign.

However, Dr. Lee Hye-hwa, a noted expert on dragons, sees things differently.

Citing historical evidence, he claims that some black dragons are portrayed as well-intended and there are not a few Korean folk tales favorably presenting black dragons. For instance, he notes, Yi I (1536-1584, pen name Yulgok) and Jeong Mong-ju (1337-1392, Poeun) — both among the most revered scholars in Korean history — were born with dreams of black dragons.

Since dragons are regarded as models of courage and bravery, military troops are often named after dragons, such as the Blue Dragon Brigade, the White Dragon Brigade, the Flying Dragon Brigade, the Sea Dragon Brigade, the Twin Dragon Brigade, etc. The ROK Marines Corps and the Army both have units named Black Dragon. The Black Dragon Marines recently drew attention

because the popular actor Hyun Bin was assigned to the unit.

“Mireu, All about Dragons,” published to mark the Year of the Dragon, offers a glimpse of the dragon as a common cultural icon of the East and the West.

The author is a former school principal who gained fame for reforming school libraries, but unbeknown to many, he is also an expert on dragons, having devoted more than 30 years to studying them. He earned his doctorate for a dissertation on “dragon thoughts” and wrote a book titled “Dragon Ideology and Korean Classical Literature.” With unexpected twists to bring up smiles, his latest book guides the reader into the world of dragons, called “mireu” in archaic Korean.

An outstanding virtue of this book lies in its attempt to break away from deepseated prejudices about dragons by revealing lesser-known facts about them.

Part of the prejudices should be related to the contrasting symbolism of the mythical creatures in the East and the West, where they have traditionally been perceived as being sacred and good-willed, and evil and malicious, respectively. The author clearly states the risks involved in such categorization. Just as there exist the evil Oriental dragons like the one killed

by Yi Seong-gye’s grandfather, there are kind Occidental dragons as well.

Lee explains that, in modern times when different cultures actively interact and intertwine with one another, misconceptions and prejudices about dragons are also changing and evolving in popular culture. For example, films such as “Dragonheart” and “How to Train Your Dragon” feature dragons that are atypically depicted as kind-hearted animals seeking to communicate with humans. In the popular online game “War of Dragons,” dragons from the East and the West align to fight evil forces together. As dragons supposedly have supernatural powers for transformation, it seems only natural for them to metamorphose along with the times.

[January 14, 2012]

www.koreafocus.or.kr

Meeting the Kings of Joseon alongside their Graves

Shin Jeong-seon Staff Reporter The Chosun Ilbo

“A True Record of Joseon Royal Tombs”

By Lee Gyu-won, Gloseum Books, 575 pages, 27,000 won King Jeongjo, the 22nd ruler of the Joseon Dynasty, never forgave his grandfather King Yeongjo for executing his father, Crown Prince Sado, by starving him to death. The depth of Jeongjo’s hatred is clear in Yeongjo’s grave, located at 197 Donggureung-no, or the Nine Eastern Royal Graves Street, in Guri, Gyeonggi Province. Yeongjo had wanted to be buried in the royal cemetery, Seo-o-reung, or the Five Royal Graves in the West, particularly near Myeongneung where his own father Sukjong was laid to rest.

Instead, Yeongjo was buried at another royal cemetery on the opposite side of the capital on the explicit orders of his grandson.

Even worse, Yeongjo’s grave is also where Hyojong, the 17th ruler of Joseon, had been buried before his remains were moved to another site as cracks formed in the grave’s stone structures. While even commoners avoided burying their family members at a site where another person had previously been interred because the site’s vital energy was believed to have been exhausted, Jeongjo was adamant about burying his grandfather at such a place.

In contrast, Jeongjo relocated his father’s tomb to Hwaseong from Yangju, north of the capital, as the ill-fated prince’s original burial site was known to be inauspicious, and paid utmost attention to looking after his father’s tomb.

He would travel to his father’s tomb once every year, and on such occasions, he ordered cattle to be slaughtered to generously feed local residents. Some say the widely popular “royal beef ribs” (wang galbi) of Suwon originated from these annual feasts ordered by the king.

Throughout world history, Joseon is the only monarchy spanning a period of more than five centuries with all of its royal graves perfectly preserved to this day, without a single incidence of destruction or damage. To write this book, the author toured the 49 tombs of Joseon kings and their immediate family members, from Geonwolleung, the tomb of the founder and first king Taejo Yi Seong-gye, to the grave of Yi Ku, the son of the last crown prince.

There are a total of 110 graves belonging to the Yi royal family of Joseon.

They are classified into three grades: 42 burial sites of kings and their spouses (reung or neung); 13 memorial gardens with graves of the kings’ parents, crown princes and their spouses (won); and 64 tombs of princes and princesses (myo). Among the 42 tombs of kings and queen consorts, 40 are in South Korea; they were inscribed on the UNESCO World Heritage List in 2009.

Prince Gwanghae, the 15th ruler, was born to a royal concubine but occupied

the throne for 15 years before he was ousted by his nephew, King Injo. Though an immoral son and brother, who killed his half-brother, stripped his stepmother of her royal status and imprisoned her in the process of his accession, Prince Gwanghae was a skilled and masterful ruler who led the nation through extreme hardship during the seven-year Japanese Invasions. He demonstrated exceptional diplomatic skills and taught the military how to manufacture modern firearms. However, after being dethroned in a coup and demoted to a prince, he had to move from one place of exile to another. He died at 67 and was buried beside his wife, Lady Yu, in Namyangji, Gyeonggi Province.

The grave of Prince Gwanghae is “living proof” that history is recorded by the victors. His checkered life story aside, the prince’s grave is shabby beyond description. It is located on a ragged mountainside in the precincts of a church cemetery; the burial mound dangerously perches too close to a steep cliff’s edge, surrounded with markedly shoddy stone objects. The author notes, “It looks more like a prison than a burial site. Any family with an ancestral grave at such a site would surely expect their lineage to be doomed. If the prince’s spirit is watching from above, he should be deeply saddened.”

Another royal tomb, Onneung, in Jangheung district of Yangju city, is also rife with sorrow. It is the burial site of Queen Dangyeong, the first wife of the 11th ruler, Jungjong. She married Jungjong, then a prince a year younger than her, when she was 13. Seven years later, when Jungjong became king as a result of a coup that ousted Prince Yeonsan, the queen was stripped of her title only seven days after her formal investiture and evicted from the palace, on the grounds that her father turned his back on the coup. Though he eventually had nine sons and 11 daughters with a new queen and concubines, Jungjong yearned for his first wife so deeply that he would mournfully look toward Mt. Inwang in sunset, where the ousted queen lived.

Jinjong is a “king” unfamiliar to most history students as well as general readers. He was Crown Prince Hyojang, the eldest son of Yeongjo, who was invested as heir to the throne at the age of seven. But he died an untimely death at the age of 10, two months after a prolonged bout of diarrhea that started on the very day of his marriage. As his son held on for dear life with no medicine in the world appearing to have effect, Yeongjo is said to have thrown off his royal robes, hugging his ailing son and sobbing that he would do anything and give anything, including his own crown, to save his heir.

What could have this young boy done for the monarchy and the people prior to his premature death? Despite an obvious absence of achievements, he was posthumously enthroned as King Jinjong by his nephew and adopted son, Jeongjo. He was further honored as the first of the seven emperors of late Joseon when Gojong proclaimed the Korean Empire in a bid to revive the waning dynasty. His remains are laid to rest along with two relatives in a vast royal graveyard covering 1.3 million square meters, or some 40,000 pyeong, in Jori district of Paju, north of Seoul. The status of his tomb was elevated to a royal grave from a memorial garden when Jeongjo made him the Great King Jinjong.

This book offers more than a tour to royal mausoleums. It is a treasure chest chock full of stories about the glory and disgrace of a monarchy that endured five centuries, which makes readers reflect on their own present and future.

The vivid tales of bloodshed by the royal family members who slaughtered their own kin to gain power brings to mind the old adage, “Dragon robes in a bolted castle are of less value than a hemp jacket in a thatched cottage.”

[January 21, 2012]

www.koreafocus.or.kr

- Park Moo-ik: “The number of candidates has an overriding importance in presidential election results.�

Park Moo-ik: “The number of candidates has an overriding importance in presidential election results.”

Lee Han-woo Staff Reporter The Chosun Ilbo

Park Moo-ik is now chairman of Gallup Korea. But I feel more at ease by calling him as “director,” the way I have referred to him over the past 20 years.

I thought of arranging an interview with him at the end of last year. Anyone who is curious about the results of the two high-profile elections in Korea this year ― the general elections in April and the presidential poll in December ― yet hesitant to visit a fortuneteller would surely like to have a meeting with him. In the afternoon of January 17, two days after the main opposition Democratic United Party elected its leaders, I visited Park at his office on the seventh floor of Gallup Korea’s headquarters in Sajik-dong, central Seoul, where I had a fantastic view of Mt. Inwang.

As soon as we sat down, Park said, “I cannot believe my ears. The opposition

party leaders are publicly vowing to take revenge on the ruling party. What do they mean? Did you ever hear the two Kims [Kim Young-sam and Kim Daejung] say such things while they were confronting the dreadful military regime?” Looking forward to turning 70, the nation’s foremost survey expert blurted out his “worries about the country” every now and then throughout the interview. ● Pre-election Polls Lead to ‘Cool’ Voter Reaction to Ballot Results Q. Many criticize the declining accuracy of public opinion polls, especially the surveys dealing with political matters.

A. Because of the widespread use of smartphones and a recent increase in single-person households, survey sampling has become a far more complicated procedure than before. Furthermore, survey companies have mushroomed, dampening respondent participation rates. Gallup, thanks to its good brand image, succeeds in collecting about 20 responses out of 100 calls on average, but smaller firms barely get 5 to 6 surveys done out of 100.

Q. Even the Gallup polls have suffered a serious blow in credibility when it wrongly predicted the result of the 2010 Seoul mayoral election by a large margin.

A. Our projection turned out to be inaccurate by 10 percentage points. It was mainly because we had conducted the survey using the traditional Automated Response System (ARS), failing to taking into account the fast changes in people’s lifestyle that goes increasingly mobile. Correcting the mistake, we adopted the Random Digit Dial (RDD) landline and cellular phone sampling method for the 2011 Seoul mayoral bi-election poll. Our prediction for the 2011 bi-election almost perfectly matched the exit poll results. Admittedly, the

2010 poll was a serious disappointment and misfortune caused by our failure in keeping up with the changing trends of the world.

Q. Gallup was the nation’s first public opinion pollster that announced predictions for presidential elections.

A. At 6 p.m., on December 18, 1997, I made a TV appearance on MBC to release our pre-election poll results. Gallup Korea predicted a slim victory of 2 percentage points by opposition candidate Kim Dae-jung over Lee Hoi-chang of the ruling party. In the beginning of the vote counting, however, Lee appeared to be beating Kim by 10 percentage points. Expecting a debacle in the poll prediction, the broadcasting company’s executives turned completely pale. In fact, the CEO of MBC, Mr. Lee Deuk-yeol, had not wanted to release the poll outcome on TV because he wished to comply with the agreement among three major television networks not to announce poll predictions. It was MBC’s election program producers who insisted on announcing the poll outcomes, making MBC the only major broadcaster that released the seemingly wrong poll prediction. If the figures had not been accurate, the company would have had to face acute criticism. After four hours of ballot counting, at around 10 p.m., Kim Dae-jung overtook Lee Hoi-chang to lead the race. In the end, the Gallup survey proved to be very close to the actual voting results. I recall our expectations for Kim and Lee missed the final vote counts merely by 0.4 percentage points and 0.2 percentage points, respectively.

Q. Real-time ballot-counting broadcasts are not as popular as before unless opinion surveys or exit polls predict a neck-to-neck competition.

A. That’s an important point. If I deserve any credit for the nation’s democracy, that would be my contribution through my work at Gallup polls.

Let me remind you of the situation before the 1987 presidential election. Here

and there people practiced mock polls among themselves to predict election results, and crowds in restaurants were often dragged into quarrels over who would be the winner. For the 1987 presidential election, Gallup predicted the conservative ruling party’s Roh Tae-woo would win the race, in contrast to the then common public forecasts that weighed against his victory. Actually our research showed that he never ceded his lead to any of his competitors throughout the entire campaign period. At 6 p.m., as soon as the voting was done, Gallup Korea announced its prediction of Roh’s presidential victory.

Q. Are you sure you did?

A. You may not even remember it. Japanese broadcaster NHK was the first that reported our prediction in its 7 o’clock news program. In Korea, KBS anchorman Park Seong-beom only briefly mentioned our survey in his news briefing, giving it no significant consideration. What about these days? Since various pre-election polls have become readily available public information, controversies over electoral violations have disappeared and the public accepts election results with greater cool and calm. Fairness in electoral democracy has become an indispensable part of the nation’s political life. ● ‘Even I Feel Completely at a Loss’ Q. In the past, political parties used to elect their leaders by combining the party members’ vote results and general public opinion poll results. These days, the latter component of opinion polls is increasingly replaced by direct mobile voting.

A. To begin with, I have never agreed on using public opinion survey results to influence party leadership elections. Surveys are surveys and they do not constitute legitimate political action. For example, in 2002, two opposition

parties agreed to unify their presidential candidates between Chung Mongjoon and Roh Moo-hyun and nominate a single candidate based on opinion poll results. Chung’s colleagues visited me to request a survey, saying that any of the two candidates who wins a public opinion poll, even by 1 percentage point, was to be nominated as the unified presidential candidate. However, a certain degree of error is inevitable within the range of minimum 3 percentage points in any opinion surveys. I declined their request to conduct a poll because their intended use of research results did not satisfy our ethical standards. Ever since then, however, the misuse and abuse of opinion polls have become commonplace. While decisions on presidential nominations are made according to opinion poll results, no one raises questions on such dubious practices.

Q. It is because all political parties aim to win elections by all possible means, isn’t it?

A. Political parties should put forward their political platforms and policy goals to the public and then await people’s judgment. A political party gets experience and gains in competence while it functions as an opposition party as much as when it serves as the ruling party, hence becoming more mature.

From some time ago, however, election victories have become the sole singleminded pursuit of all political parties in Korea. As partisan culture deteriorates in such a manner, public opinion surveys have been frequently abused. This is a shameful phenomenon.

Q. In the future, popular voting based on mobile platforms would be a common practice to nominate candidates for internal elections both in the ruling and opposition parties.

A. That should deal a critical blow to the basic principles of party politics. If

politicians find a problem in their party membership base, they should work harder to broaden party membership. They, instead, regard their weak partisan base as a fait accompli. Without making any serious efforts to overcome the structural weakness, they resort to a quick fix in the name of employing hightechnology social network service, to which any sham identity has easy access.

Cyberspace politics has become a new trend and I think it constitutes a grave distortion of public opinion. A political party without a solid membership base is not a legitimate existence. It is nonsense that non-members should wield influence in the election of party leadership. As both the ruling and opposition parties say they would do so, even I feel completely at a loss about how to interpret these recent developments in our politics.

Q. Anyhow, that is the latest trend, isn’t it?

A. The latest trend? Let me illustrate you an anecdote, seemingly unrelated to politics, though. In 1988, MBC started to select recipients of its annual “Top 10 Singers” awards through public opinion polls. It was the first attempt to include general public opinion across different age groups to gauge singers’ popularity nationwide. The use of public opinion polls was a departure from the conventional nomination method of counting the number of fan letters that arrived in the broadcasting company to support certain singers for the annual prize. The traditional method typically brought a large number of young pop singers to the top slots of the popularity list as teenage fans would send letters en masse. Our public opinion polls that year, however, indicated quite a different result. By age brackets, teenagers preferred youthful Lee Sun-hee, and the early-20-somethings opted for Kim Jong-chan. Late-twenties and their seniors, however, responded to favor Joo Hyun-mi, who sang “The Man in Shinsa-dong.” Overall, she turned out to be the nation’s most popular singer by an overwhelming majority. The next year Joo again got the first slot, and Hyun Chul was ranked second, after being seventh the previous year. In 1991, Hyun

topped the list, followed by Joo on the second. The application of Gallup’s scientific research method helped discover Hyun as one of the nation’s most celebrated singers as he widely toured local cities, singing his hit number “Passion of the Touch-Me-Not.” ● ‘Ahn Cheol-soo Syndrome’ and Comedian Kang Ho-dong’s Talk Show Q. Recently, IT tycoon Ahn Cheol-soo has suddenly become a high-profile political figure. What do you think of his dramatic rise in popularity among the general public?

A. The so-called “Ahn Cheol-soo Syndrome” originated from the talk show “Knee-Slap Shaman” hosted by comedian Kang Ho-dong. Ahn’s appearance on the popular TV show transformed him into a sort of legendary figure in Korea’s political scene of the 21st century. This program still continues to be aired on cable channels nationwide, probably more than 10 times a month.

Another thing to note is that the “Ahn Cheol-soo Syndrome” reflects recent changes in the domestic political economy in Korea. Economic growth campaigns based on the nation’s concerted efforts to make a better life for all have long disappeared. The communal sentiment of the past has changed into blame, “why are only a few rich?” For example, I have read a series of featured articles discussing the defects of capitalism in a local economic newspaper. To me those articles seemed like nothing less than the “Communist Manifesto.” As conservative media outlets also jump on the populist bandwagon to criticize the capitalist system, what messages do they deliver to the general public? In juxtaposition, news reports say that Ahn Cheol-soo shares his wealth with others in a selfless and humble way. These news reports portray Ahn as an almost divinely virtuous figure. The public’s disillusionment about domestic politics, combined with heroic illusions about Ahn, creates the “Ahn Cheol-soo Syndrome.” In my view, Ahn is also very clever in making

public appearances. He already behaves like a media-savvy politician.

Q. What are the key factors to influence the outcome of the December presidential election?

A. Presidential election results are strongly influenced by the structure of the candidacy. The number of presidential candidates has an overriding importance in the election outcome. Differences in ideology and policy are matters of minor consideration.

Q. But policy issues should still matter. Don’t you think so?

A. Welfare is the most closely observed policy area. It’s not the right time to debate on reunification with the North. Also, people’s feelings toward big businesses are increasingly turning hostile.

Q. As a growing number of people experience economic hardships, isn’t it natural that welfare becomes the center of policy debates?

A. Personally, what I am worried about is the danger of excessive welfare.

Those who argue for strong welfare regimes often talk about Scandinavian welfare states. However, most countries with a population larger than 40 million have failed in operating a strong welfare system. Northern European welfare states typically have small populations of below 10 million headcounts. A simple comparison of Korea with Scandinavian welfare states will not produce a meaningful insight.

Q. Are you saying these ideas as your personal opinion or as a public opinion research expert?

A. These observations are rather a matter of being a good, cultured citizen. My belief is that public opinion researchers should be well equipped with broad cultural learning in the humanities and have the mindsets sympathizing with the less privileged in society. For example, researchers need to have a caring mind toward the needy so that they are better in their job of surveying for the government’s welfare policies. This is why I am constantly worried about various social issues from politics to economic policies.

Q. These days, the ruling conservative Grand National Party is also raising calls for more generous welfare policies in competition against opposition parties.

A. I am not sure if the parties are competing for welfare of the people or competing for welfare-based populism to garner more votes. So far, large businesses in Korea have played a cushioning role in the economy. I am worried that the welfare debate could further escalate into arguments for sweeping reforms of the medical system beyond free school meals and halfpriced college tuition.

Q. The common understanding these days is that the ruling Grand National Party will be severely defeated in the general elections in April as well as in the December presidential election. What is your review?

A. The Grand National Party is self-destructing amid turmoil of internal conflicts. In fact, the current situation seems quite hopeless for the governing party. The presidential election, however, can be affected by any unforeseeable factors. There is what we call the “swing theory,” meaning that a landslide victory to one party may actually transform into an unexpected opportunity for the defeated. In other words, people may grant an overwhelming triumph to one party. However, if the winning party’s performance is found to be

unsatisfactory, voters turn their back on their previous choice and exact punishment by opting for alternatives in the next election. Opinion polls so far demonstrate that Korean people are very smart voters. The result of the December presidential poll will critically hinge on the performance of the parties and candidates after the general legislative elections in April.

Park is known to be one of the first generation of pubic opinion research experts in Korea. He holds an undergraduate degree in philosophy from Seoul National

University.

After

earning a

master’s

degree

in

business

administration, he started to work for the advertising and marketing division of Gold Star, an electronics company which later developed into LG Electronics.

There he acquired industry-wide reputation as a prominent advertising copywriter. Korea at that time did not have advertising agencies as separate entities. He was briefly engaged with Cheil advertising agency as one of the founding members before leaving to establish KSP, the nation’s first public opinion research firm, which later became Gallup Korea. He has been in the survey and research industry for the past 38 years.

As we finished our talks, he remarked, “Please include the following in your writing. A public opinion poll is like drawing a map of mass psychology. It does not produce a navigation system that tells you where to go. To reach a destination, each of us should carefully read the map on our own and walk the walk.”

[January 21, 2012]

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