Korea Social Sciences Review Vol.1 no.1

Vol. 1, No. 1, 2011

Korean Social Sciences Review Contents

Reflections on the Intangible Cultural Heritage Policy and Folk Culture Politics in the Postmodern Era - Lee, Hoon Sang A Psychological Inquiry into the Confucian Origins of East Asian Collectivism - Cho, Geung Ho The Geopolitical Perceptions of Kim Ku and Syngman Rhee - Kim, Myongsob and Kim, Seok Won New Citizens’ Participation and ‘Struggles for Recognition’ - Yi, Hee Young Territorial Politics and the Rise of a Construction-Oriented State in South Korea - Park, Bae Gyoon A Reconsideration of ‘Colonial Modernization’ - Kim, Nak Nyeon Constitution, National Agenda, and Presidential Leadership - Park, Myung Lim South Korean Media System - Rhee, June Woong; Cho, Hang Je; Song, Hyun Joo; Jung, June Hee

The Center for Social Sciences, Seoul National University UCLA Center for Korean Studies

Korean Social Sciences Review

Korean Social Sciences Review (KSSR) contains scholarly papers on Korean society from the various disciplines of social sciences, which were originally written in Korean and recently published in academic journals in Korea, and are translated into English specifically for this edition. The basic objective of Korean Social Sciences Review is to provide opportunity for non-Korean speakers to get access to Korean materials on contemporary Korean society written by Korean social scientists. The selection and translation of the papers contained in this edition has been processed by the collaboration between the Center for Social Sciences of Seoul National University and the Center for Korean Studies of UCLA. This publication is funded by the grant from the Korea Foundation.

Editorial Board Oh, Myung Seok (Chief Editor, SNU, Anthropology) Chang, Duk Jin (SNU, Sociology) Ku, In Hoe (SNU, Social Welfare) Kweon, Sug In (SNU, Anthropology) Kwon, Hyeong Ki (SNU, Politics) Lee, Chul Hee (SNU, Economics) Lee, Hoon Jin (SNU, Psychology) Lee, Jae Hyun (SNU, Mass Communication) Sohn, Jung Yul (SNU, Geography) Yi, Ok Yeon (SNU, Politics)

Copyright Š 2011 by The Center for Social Sciences, Seoul National University (SNU) First Seoul National University Press E-Journal Edition: October 31, 2011

ISSN 2234-4039

Korean Social Sciences Review Vol. 1, No. 1 | 2011

Contents Reflections on the Intangible Cultural Heritage Policy and Folk Culture Politics in the Postmodern Era: An Autoethnographic Account of the Reconstruction of Kasan Ogwangdae Lee, Hoon Sang A Psychological Inquiry into the Confucian Origins of East Asian Collectivism Cho, Geung Ho

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37

The Geopolitical Perceptions of Kim Ku and Syngman Rhee: Focusing on the Period of Japanese Occupation Kim, Myongsob and Kim, Seok Won

105

New Citizens’ Participation and ‘Struggles for Recognition’: An Oral Case Study of Identity Construction of North Korean Defector-Residents Yi, Hee Young

143

Territorial Politics and the Rise of a Construction-Oriented State in South Korea Park, Bae Gyoon

185

A Reconsideration of ‘Colonial Modernization’ Kim, Nak Nyeon

221

Constitution, National Agenda, and Presidential Leadership: Focusing on the Comparison between the Articles on Economy in the “National Founding Constitution” and the “Post-Korean War Constitution” Park, Myung Lim

263

South Korean Media System: Toward a Democratization Model Rhee, June Woong; Cho, Hang Je; Song, Hyun Joo; Jung, June Hee

303

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Reflections on the Intangible Cultural Heritage Policy and Folk Culture Politics in the Postmodern Era: An Autoethnographic Account of the Reconstruction of Kasan Ogwangdae*

Lee, Hoon Sang** This study examines the study of folklore and the intangible cultural heritage policy of the Republic of Korea through the lens of the author’s personal experience of reconstructing the mask dance drama Kasan Ogwangdae. Folklore studies in Korea have been rooted in nationalism for a long time and have served as the basis of the intangible cultural heritage policy. The policy’s aim is to preserve Korean culture by identifying valuable items of the country’s cultural heritage and by supporting and controlling them in the project of building a modern nation-state.

Through use of autoethnography, this study illuminates the close relationship between folklore, the intangible cultural heritage policy, and folklore under government control. In the process, the personal experiences of the author in the 1970s are expanded upon through his research on mask dance dramas of the Japanese colonial period and the modern nationstate building project. This study also discusses the appropriation of rural folk knowledge by modern urban elite and emphasizes the need for further introspection in order to understand the postmodern world.

Keywords: Government Manufactured Folklore, Gasan Ogwandae, Intangible Cultural Properties, Policy of Cultural Properties, Popular Culture, Politics of Folk Culture, Folklorism

Translated from the published article in Cross-Cultural Studies 16(2): 31-69, 2010 with permission from the Institute of Cross-Cultural Studies. ** Professor, Department of History, Dong-A University *

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I. Introduction Focusing on my own experiences of reconstructing a mask dance drama, in this paper I explore folklore and the intangible cultural heritage policy, which is based in folklore studies. It is no longer a new idea that the transcendence of folk culture based on nationalism has prevailed in Korean folklore, and that this has been the basis of the national intangible cultural heritage policy. However, scholars of folklore in Korea only started addressing this issue a few years ago.1 The project categorizes certain items as Intangible Cultural Properties, or representatives of Korea’s cultural heritage that must be preserved and transmitted. It then supports and controls the recognized cultural or art items. This system has been institutionalized only recently in Korea, but it has been regarded worldwide as one of the most important projects of modern nation-states.2 In South Korea, this institutionalized project, the intangible cultural heritage policy, placed folklore under government control.3 This project also arose from the need to preserve and transmit Korea’s premodern cultural heritage, which was on the verge of disappearance in the challenging aftermath of colonial modernization. Such a project was intended to rescue Korean society from the hostilities, tensions, and ideological conflicts that had resulted from the Japanese colonial era by igniting the collective imagination of the nation through a meta-narrative linking the past and the present (Lee, H. 1998: 330-335).

Rooted in this collective imagination, folklore fell into an intellectual predicament caused by an emergent crisis of representation. In recent years some scholars have addressed this situation with research designed to 1

In May 2004, Hallym University’s Asia Research Center held a symposium to systematically examine how the study of folklore has dealt with the connections between nationalism, modernity and folklore. These efforts produced a book entitled “East Asian Modernity and the Emergence of Folklore” (2008).

2 See Jung, Soo Jin (2004: 475-508; 2008a, 2008b: 135-166; 2009: 99-128), Nam, Kun Wu (2009c), and Lee, Jang Yull (2005).

3 By this I mean folk culture that is performed according to the wishes and directions of the government.

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systematically analyze the correlation between folklore, nationalism, and the intangible cultural heritage policy (Jung, S. 2008a). Others have attempted to expand their arguments to folklorism, which emphasizes the appropriation and objectification of folklore (Nam, K. 2008a, 2009b). These attempts to overcome the crisis of representation have borne some fruit.

Encouraged by these recent trends, folklorists have carried out research exploring new approaches, yet it seems that the relationship between studies of folk culture and government projects related to folk culture has changed little since the 1960s. It is not easy for researchers who are accustomed to this relationship to subvert these foundational ideas and conceive of new approaches. In an attempt to engage with new trends, many scholars pursue active engagement through participation in various government cultural projects and the enhancement of their roles as cultural coordinators.

Consequently, although many conventional approaches have been pursued, few scholars have reflected on the fundamentals of folklore.

Researchers continue to discuss problems and solutions related to the preservation and transmission of Intangible Cultural Properties, but always in connection with the policies and actions of the national and local governments. By and large, little has changed in the way that issues of preservation and transmission of Intangible Cultural Properties, as well as of the need for assistance with preservation and transmission, have been addressed, although the cultural contents planning role of local governmental bodies has become more significant since the 1960s.

This research is an extension of various critical approaches surrounding the intangible cultural heritage system, policy, and discourse. In this paper, I provide an ethnographic narrative from the field in order to link the creation and practice of knowledge, essential to the study of folklore, to a discussion of policy. Through this ethnographic narrative, I hope to convey the dynamic and complex nature of folklore, which is otherwise hard to communicate through pure analysis or discourse on the system. Recently there have been studies that address the importance of ethnographic narrative in field research (Ko, J. 2004), yet few personal ethnographic accounts of cultural activists or autoethnographic works have been published.

In 1974, I reconstructed Kasan Ogwangdae, a mask dance drama from South Kyŏngsang Province’s Sach’ŏn County near the city of Jinju, which

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had ceased to be performed. I also developed conditions favorable for the transmission of the art. At that time, there were a number of people in addition to myself participating in the post-1960s transmission of mask dance dramas as a cultural movement activity. This current study communicates my experiences autoethnographically. I feel it is the responsibility of participant observers (in reconstruction efforts) to report on and communicate their cultural activities.

When I address autoethnography in this paper, I am committed to reflexivity, assessing my impact on the object of study, and vice-versa.

Autoethnography-based fieldwork can more effectively convey the researcher’s subjectivity as it relates to the public sphere. In other words, autoethnography reveals how the seemingly insignificant actions of an individual can in fact change history by causing a crack in the established system.

In this regard, there are a number of problems that remain to be explored.

First of all, when one describes some collective experiences through the lens of one’s own experience, it is difficult to include alternative viewpoints.

Autoethnographic accounts can therefore fail to communicate the rolesharing experience of the researcher in the field; in fact, in my account as well, I have not been able to incorporate the views and roles of other participants.

Second, in such an account, too much emphasis is placed on personal memory as a source of information (Chang 2008). Finally, academics can be critical of the tone in papers written as first-person accounts that include the author as the subject.

However, honest acknowledgement and clarification of the limitations of autoethnograpy can resolve these issues to some degree. Recently, researchers have taken to using a storytelling writing style in papers utilizing autoethnographic fieldwork. There is a growing interest in how this style of writing can enhance anthropological explanation, and it is now being explored in various intellectual spheres. Some even argue that autoethnographic accounts are postmodern (Reed-Danahay 1997).

Autoethnography regarding the reconstruction of mask dance dramas requires both deconstruction of folklore and folk culture and introspective observation. Research and reconstruction of Kasan Ogwangdae necessitated the identification and construction of a hierarchy amongst the reconstruction team, and introspective reflexivity was necessary to observe these facts.

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In short, autoethnography is an appropriate method for clarification of the complicated relations among structure, system, and the selections and decisions of individual participants.

The reconstruction of the Kasan Ogwangdae mask dance drama was a process of confronting the limitations and the potential of conventional folklore’s logical structure and discourse. Therefore, I focus on the issue of the wŏnhyŏng, the archetypal form, in describing the reconstruction of Kasan Ogwangdae in the following section. In addition, I attempt to broaden my intellectual horizon to address the impact of the formation of a folklore under government control on folk culture and folklore politics after the 1960s. Finally, I discuss the utilization of mask dance dramas in ideological movements during the 1970s, when the reconstruction of Kasan Ogwangdae was being carried out.

As a result of the cultural movements of the 1970s, folk culture, including mask dance dramas, began to attract the interest of the cultural elite, although in the preceding years only a few specialists had been interested. This cultural movement also promoted a conflict between Korea and the West. Folk culture became an important symbol of nationalism in Korea, and research on mask dance dramas was carried out by scholars who adhered to the “internal development theory.” The discourse on research on the historical development of mask dance dramas was utilized in promoting collective identity in Korea; but this created misunderstandings of the historical context surrounding the performances.

An important misunderstanding arose because the researchers disregarded the fact that cultural performances developed and spread through the cooperation of the (Chosŏn Dynasty [1392-1910]) ruling class and power structure. People also disregarded the fact that the planning of performances

by Chosŏn era performers was driven by their desire for reciprocal benefit from powerful people in the community. This point has been accurately articulated in publications on the historical development of mask dance dramas and their inclusion in rituals during the Chosŏn Dynasty (Lee, H. 1995, 2001).

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II. Kasan Ogwangdae’s Reconstruction According to an Imagined Wŏnhyŏng The Kasan Ogwangdae reconstruction project started in the fall of 1973 when Professor Kang Yonggwŏn first introduced this mask dance drama to academia (Kang, Y. 1972: 23-32). During further investigation in the field we confirmed that the performance had been discontinued, but we learned that some of the former performers were still alive. Most of the performers were farmers, and some of the key performers had already moved away from Kasan. Kasan used to be an affluent county serving as a hub for collecting, preserving and transporting grain taxes. There were once 200 households in Kasan, but after 1895, when the grain tax-transport warehouse closed, people began to leave; by 1972, there were only 70 households remaining.

Kasan Ogwangdae had been performed during village rituals, but after 1960 performances had ceased. Additionally, with the beginning of the Saemaŭl (New Village) Movement, the village ritual ceremony ceased to be observed. At first the villagers were advised that they should perform this mask dance drama voluntarily, but it was difficult for the villagers to afford the reconstruction. After a pilot study, I traveled to Kasan with three other researchers to evaluate the possibility of reconstructing the art. We were, however, met with cold indifference in the village (At that time, as it was raining, we could not find any shelter, and we had to sleep a few days on the floor of the village community center without any blankets). After that trip, we conducted one more pilot study, and then we decided to lead the reconstruction effort ourselves.

The reconstruction project started in the spring of 1974, and it included collecting dialogue, reorganizing the costumes, preparing the masks and other props and cultivating the desire to practice Kasan Ogwangdae on the part of the local villagers. Since traditionally the masks were burned after the performances, there were no old masks. At that time we could not find any villagers with experience making the masks. Thus, we had to bring a traditional artist, Kim Manhŭi, from Seoul to Kasan to make the masks according to villagers’ descriptions. However, to my disappointment, the villagers were not very enthusiastic. One of the key performers, Han

Reflections on the Intangible Cultural Heritage Policy 7

Yunyŏng, tried to remake the masks based on his own memories, and when the villagers responded favorably, those masks became the standard.

Han Yunyŏng went to the traditional market and bought fabric, and he asked the older married women in the village to make the costumes. All of these preparations were constantly observed and evaluated by the villagers who used to participate in Kasan Ogwangdae. We made two copies of each of the props and sent one copy as a donation to the Sogang University Museum.

Unfortunately they were destroyed due to poor preservation techniques (It has been less than forty years since we made those props, but I think today’s clothes and masks are very different from those we made in 1974. People who participated in the reconstruction project also agree with me on this point).

The memories of pre-1960s performances held by the performers were complicated and contradictory. We tried to reconstruct the script based on these recollections, and then each performer reviewed the reconstructed script. We used this transcript for our rehearsals and continued to perfect the script as time went on, particularly to reduce discrepancies between the memories of different individuals. We spent more than fifteen days, night after night, with the village performers on these rehearsals. While the researchers were being trained by the performers, we also spent our days reconstructing or reorganizing the memories of the performance. In particular, we paid a visit to Pusan, where Han Chaejun and other key performers were living, and persuaded them to return to Kasan to assist in the reconstruction. They confirmed that our reconstruction project had been completed accurately.

When we were sure that our reconstruction project was complete, we went to the Sach’ŏn County District Office and met with the county commissioner.

We explained the necessity of the reconstruction project and finally succeeded in conducting our first post-reconstruction performance on the stage of the Sach’ŏn County Citizens’ Hall. After this performance, in November 1974, we invited the Kasan Ogwangdae performers to Seoul, and they performed the mask dance drama with the members of the undergraduate club, Minsok munhwa yŏn’guhoe (Folk Culture Research Society). Later, we taught Kasan Ogwangdae to other college drama clubs and guided their performances.

This was part of our attempt to popularize Kasan Ogwangdae and create a transmission environment.

At first, I did not intend for Kasan Ogwangdae to be designated an

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Intangible Cultural Property; in reality it was difficult enough for me to pursue the immediate goal of its reconstruction. At that time I did not logically analyze the situation, but I thought that Kasan Ogwangdae should not be designated an Intangible Cultural Property, because I felt that the interference of the government in the preservation of folk culture was inappropriate. In general, in the 1970s, college students had a negative opinion of the government and its policies, and the college students who participated in the Kasan Ogwangdae reconstruction shared these sentiments.

Eventually we came to agree that Kasan Ogwangdae should indeed be designated an Intangible Cultural Property, so we tried to popularize and spread awareness of this mask dance drama through various activities.

The other members of the folk culture research club and I had to pay all the costs of the reconstruction as well as the procedural fees for designation of the art as an Intangible Cultural Property. When we conducted this reconstruction project, I was a college sophomore, and I was the founder and president of Sogang University’s Folk Culture Research Society. Looking back, I realize that it is hard for people to understand how a college student could have carried out this project, but in 1974, far fewer Koreans attended university, and those students who did proudly considered themselves intellectuals. Furthermore, Korea was a heavily centralized society, and at that time, the fact that we came “down” from Seoul to the countryside was in and of itself impressive to the villagers. It was not difficult to meet with the county magistrate and gain his support for persuading the reluctant villagers to participate in the reconstruction project. In addition, we actively utilized the media, such as TV, in the campaign to have Kasan Ogwangdae designated an Intangible Cultural Property. The fact that we were college students also helped us gain media support.

At that time we were filled with pride and zeal that we had given the villagers back a traditional type of play that they had lost. Our attempt was an act of resistance against the government’s campaign for modernization that promoted hard work as the first priority. I romanticized the idea of a rural community, of going “down to the countryside” and becoming a long-term contributor to the village through the reconstruction project.

Most of the participants in the reconstruction project were born and raised in the urban environs of Seoul, and so they were called “alphalt kids,” who

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did not like to walk on dirt roads. My experience with farm life was limited to participating in a high school club that was concerned with the problems of rural communities. Club members, motivated by patriotism, also carried out periodic volunteer activities on farms. After they became members they were educated by their upperclassmen about issues in rural communities. With this training, I believed that it was my duty to confront the modernization project’s victimization of farmers. Therefore, as a patriot, I felt sympathy for the farmers, who I felt were the victims of unequal treatment.

Behind the reconstruction project, there was an underlying patriotic attitude held by urban intellectuals. As someone from the capital, I viewed the “countryside” as an object of enlightenment and felt a sense of responsibility to uncover the wŏnhyŏng, the original form, of the rural communities. The combination of these two ideas motivated me to commit to the reconstruction project and to passionately explain the necessity of the reconstruction of the mask dance drama to the villagers.

In addition, I should mention that other personal experiences contributed to my lack of hesitation in engaging with the reconstruction project. I first experienced mask dance drama and p’ansori narrative singing as a high school senior. I was fascinated by these art forms, but I was already deeply involved in drama. Anyone who remembers the situation that the Korean drama industry faced in the late 1960s and early 1970s can recall the empty stages and sense of failure, as some lamented that there was no more room for drama. Despite this situation, my friends and I organized a drama club and promoted a movement for the staging of minor performances. During that time, I participated in the staging of many realistic dramas, and this experience convinced me that I was able to conduct the reconstruction project to determine the wŏnhyŏng for a mask dance drama.

My experience as a drama producer and coordinator helped me study the history of mask dance performances; in other words, my experiences with drama enabled me to seriously examine the reconstruction and reproduction, historical development, and the different elements of Kasan Ogwangdae. For example, it is common knowledge that mask dance dramas are collective performances in which every single role is important, not only the starring roles; cooperation among all performers is necessary in order to stage a successful performance. However, the process of designating

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certain performers “national human treasures” created friction and struggle regarding the hierarchy among the performers. On top of that the process introduced an external authority who attempted to exert some control over the group, a strategic error that was totally counter to the nature of a collective performing art such as mask dance dramas.

On the one hand, in such collective performances, it is vitally important to have leadership or competent individuals equipped with good skills in negotiating solutions within the group and coordinating performances. This might seem to contradict the idea that every performer plays an important role. My own studies on the development of popular culture4 during the late Chosŏn Dynasty have proven that certain small groups of people with excellent production skills and the powerful people who supported them made it possible for this kind of folk performance to develop (Lee, H. 2003: 142-147). On the other hand, the Intangible Cultural Heritage policies have ignored the historical inter-group relations and have only shown respect for performers with dominant personalities who do not necessarily have the required production, coordination and leadership skills. This has resulted in friction within groups, even though it is vital for both individual leadership and voluntary participation of all performers to exist in a group. This is not a secondary consideration; rather, this is the most important factor when considering the management of performing arts groups.

One of the biggest dilemmas that we faced in the reconstruction of Kasan Ogwangdae was the issue of post-reconstruction transmission. As I mentioned earlier, I focused only on the reconstruction project, because I 4

I believe that for mask dance dramas, p’ansori and other similar performing arts, “popular culture” might be a better term than “folk culture” because they are representative of the development of popular culture from the mid-19 th century onwards. Popular culture is differentiated from mass culture produced after industrialization, but it is not proper to translate this as mass culture because “mass” has been used as a term related to social class. P’ansori and mask dance dramas are not cultural forms only enjoyed by a specific class. For example, p’ansori was enjoyed by almost everyone, from the king to members of the lowest rung of Korean society.

Unlike in Western society, where there were distinct gaps between elite culture and popular culture, in Korea, the line was quite blurry. The translation of this term needs to be discussed further in future publications, but I do not attempt to clarify it further in this paper.

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thought that once we reconstructed Kasan Ogwangdae, it would be naturally transmitted in the village. I thought that the villagers would pass on Kasan Ogwangdae and other traditional entertainment forms after we helped them reconstruct the art. In fact, it was extremely difficult for us to proceed with the reconstruction project, and therefore, we did not have enough energy to think realistically about transmission.

At first the villagers in Kasan were extremely unfriendly, but they eventually became excited about the evening performance, and the villagers and the students from Seoul became good friends. During the day, we helped the villagers in the fields in order to develop our relationship, but even the way we dressed while farming became the subject of disapproving talk. It was not easy for us to follow the local customs. Nowadays, when students volunteer on farms, there are clear directions for behavior, but in the 1970s such a system had not yet been established.

The villagers held high hopes for the reconstruction, but it became clear that if there was no external interest in our reconstructed Kasan Ogwangdae, the villagers would not continue performing. The villagers initially did not have much interest in the reconstruction per se because they thought that Kasan Ogwangdae was not that important. The women in the village thought that the men’s claims that they were reconstructing Kasan Ogwangdae were really an excuse for them to go drinking. There was also some skepticism as to whether the men in the village should perform without being paid, as the performances would be taking time away from their source of livelihood, farming. Tension arose, for example, between villagers and the key performer, Han Yunyŏng, who was overly enthusiastic about the reconstruction projects and sometimes got involved in conflicts with the villagers. This made it hard to bring agreement between the villagers. Without realistic and visible reward to the villagers, it seemed obvious that Kasan Ogwangdae should not continue.

I do believe that outsiders should compensate insiders in order to gain access to the insiders’ culture, but usually it takes some time for outsiders to realize this. As is well known, the cultural policy in Kyŏngju is a typical example of a failed cultural policy. The policy makers only focused on the preservation of heritage and ignored the fact that people actually live in Kyŏngju. As a result, we are now confronted with some resistance from

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Kyŏngju’s citizens. Both government organizations and scholars who participated in the design of cultural policy forcibly curtailed the rights of Kyŏngju citizens, and in retrospect, I also failed to realize the costs of the reconstruction project. I started the reconstruction project to recover the village community, but I was unaware of the villagers’ priorities. Also, I had not been concerned about whether the reconstruction of this drama could contribute to the recovery of the village community. When I started the project, I believed that outsiders could persuade the insiders to join forces in the reconstruction. I perceived the destruction of folk culture to be the result of rapid modernization and, furthermore, viewed folk culture as a symbol of the past that required protection. At the same time, folk culture had been marginalized and objectified. However, I realized too late that I should pay the costs for enjoying this marginalized culture.

At last, I realized that Kasan Ogwangdae should be designated an Intangible Cultural Properties and I applied all my energy to that goal. I had to give up all the information and materials that I had found and gathered in the course of reconstruction. People paid a lot of attention to Kasan Ogwangdae because, while the performers of other mask dance dramas had mostly passed away, many of the Kasan Ogwangdae performers were still alive, and this made it easier for this mask dance drama to be designated as a Cultural Property. However, as I devoted myself to the project, my dilemma became greater, because I was not really enthused about the designation and I had misgivings about the culture of the village community becoming included in the government’s project. In other words, I worried that reconstruction would not produce vitality in the village community. I recalled not feeling very excited when I heard that Kasan Ogwangdae had been designated a national intangible Cultural Heritage in 1980, and I wondered whether this was the best way to transmit this culture.

In the process of reconstruction, I faced a lot of important issues, especially issues related to this mask dance drama’s wŏnhyŏng, or archetypal form.

However, it was much later that I discussed this issue as a fundamental problem. At the time of the reconstruction, I felt that wŏnhyŏng was a critical issue, but did not emphasize it or consider it at length. I was not sure whether wŏnhyŏng could actually exist and what should even be considered as wŏnhyŏng.

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Collecting the lines and organizing the dialogue required much compromise and ran counter to the principle of wŏnhyŏng. I, as a Seoulite, could not understand well the Sach’ŏn dialect, but I believed that I should collect the dialogue in the original dialect. This was problematic as I could not converse with the performers in the dialect, and they were forced to use standard Korean to communicate with me, especially when using the most complex vocabulary. Furthermore, I created a dialogue in accurate standard Korean and had the performers practice this dialogue.

It was only twenty years ago that I realized the problem of standardizing the Korean language in mask dance dramas. I started thinking about the hegemony exercised on the locals by the center and about the “othering” of the outlying areas. I became aware of the problems with the policy of standardization of Korean, employed as a part of centralized planning.5 However, I was confused about the standards of wŏnhyŏng from the very beginning, and I am still curious about how other researchers overcome this problem when dealing with the preservation and transmission of other Intangible Cultural Properties. Although there are some studies that problematize the documentation of wŏnhyŏng, I have not found any research specifically focused on such issues.6 Like all the other mask dance dramas, the length of the performance was problematic, too, an issue directly related to wŏnhyŏng. The most senior performer told me that Kasan Ogwangdae was previously performed all night long, but he did not remember the contents of such a long version of Kasan Ogwangdae. It was revealed that in the past the performers would invite a p’ansori singer from outside of Kasan who would sing between two acts in the drama. They related how during the Japanese colonial era, the Kasan Ogwangdae team had traveled to perform in other areas. Outside Kasan, they had to end their performance within a certain period of time, but at home they had the freedom to perform all night long. Considering these circumstances, when carrying out the reconstruction project, I thought that 5

In this regard, see my study on the “othering” of rural areas and the hegemony of the central government in Korea (Lee, H. 2000).

6 Jung, Soo Jin’s research on this topic is worth reading. She pointed out the issues concerning the documentation of wŏnhyŏng, specifically focusing on the case of the salp’uri dance.

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the wŏnhyŏng of Kasan Ogwangdae should be dramatized by focusing on its theatrical elements. With this in mind, I composed the script and had people perform with that script. In short, I created a kind of standardized version.

At that time, I was positive that I was approaching the reconstruction project in an objective and realistic way, but in retrospect, it would be fair to say that my perspective of the reconstruction project had been formed by the intellectual framework in Korean society at that juncture. I thought I was setting an example of preservation and transmission by granting the newly made script canonical authority. However, I paid relatively less attention to such characteristics of folk culture as the involvement of the audience and the standard performance conditions, since I regarded those as accessories to the play.

My understanding of wŏnhyŏng was rooted in what I knew of the intangible cultural heritage policy. 7 When an item of folk culture is designated an Intangible Cultural Property, it is supposed to be preserved as it was at the time of designation. However, in reality, the people involved try to preserve the oldest possible version, which they consider to be wŏnhyŏng (Jung, S. 2004, 2008a, 2008b; Lee, S. 2007). Furthermore, only one type of the performance is regarded and accepted as wŏnhyŏng, despite the existence of multiple versions. In this regard, I must confess that before getting involved in the reconstruction project, I was fascinated by the scholarship on religion by theorists such as Carl Jung and Mircea Eliade. Through their theories, I was convinced that there was an essence in a folk culture called wŏnhyŏng that could be given new life. I appropriated Eliade’s arguments on archetypes and made them the theoretical foundation for the reconstruction project.8 From the current point of view, the theoretical foundation for the reconstruction of wŏnhyŏng was based on an imagined understanding of the past, which can be remembered and rearranged at the time when a folk culture is designated. Thus, it reflects the transcendental cognition of folklore.

Wŏnhyŏng theory is based on the essentialization of knowledge. When 7

For a better understanding of originality or the intellectual genealogy of theories of wŏnhyŏng, I recommend Jung, Soo Jin’s recent work (2008a). She addresses these issues in several places in her work. In particular, see pages 207-224.

8 This also is addressed in Jung, Soo Jin’s work (2008a: 52).

Reflections on the Intangible Cultural Heritage Policy 15

participating in the reconstruction project, I was a firm believer in wŏnhyŏng.

That is to say, the reconstruction project was designed in order to create a canonical version of the art.

Although I became doubtful after Kasan Ogwangdae’s designation as an Intangible Cultural Property, I still believed that the performers should conform to such an imagined wŏnhyŏng. In this sense, Kasan Ogwangdae is not unique. Once wŏnhyŏng is established, the law insists on action in accordance with wŏnhyŏng. This runs contrary to the nature of folk culture, which continues to transform, adapting itself to changes in the environment.9 Nevertheless, it must be admitted that this conception of wŏnhyŏng has been an intellectual foundation for transmitting Intangible Cultural Properties.

People think that once an art is designated an Intangible Cultural Property and is put under the custody of the government, the wŏnhyŏng of a folk culture will be transmitted intact. However, transmission of wŏnhyŏng is not always successful because it transforms, prioritizing the views of the government and the wishes of interested parties. For example, in Kasan Ogwangdae, P’ojol, one of the characters who is a Chosŏn Dynasty policeman, becomes Sunsa, a Japanese police officer. Kasan Ogwangdae is the only art form that includes a role from the Japanese colonial period. When reconstructing Kasan Ogwangdae, all the performers remembered that the character was Sunsa, not P’ojol.

However, when Kasan Ogwangdae was designated an Intangible Cultural Property and nationalistic discourses were addressed, the performers in Kasan changed the Sunsa character back to P’ojol. I heard that it was not a problem in the further evaluation for designation. Lampooning Sunsa in their play would have been the villagers’ cultural response to the Japanese colonial occupation. Yet the performers in Kasan dramatized the play in an older and more nationalistic version by including P’ojol, a character from the Chosŏn Dynasty (Lee, H. 2004: 78). This change is a kind of new cultural response and once again it makes us question what wŏnhyŏng is. We can witness similar occurrences in the developments of Miryang City’s paekjungnori 9

Lee, Gyung Yup addresses various aspects of transmission, pointing out the problems with the intangible cultural heritage policy’s selection of and standardization of all possible versions of an art (2004: 298-304).

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celebration (Lee, S. 2007: 306-336).

In addition, looking back, I realize a process of acculturation occurred in conjunction with the reconstruction. I remember that my colleagues and I consistently used expressions such as ‘national culture’ or ‘culture’ in order to persuade the village performers to join the reconstruction project. Those who did not show any interest in the reconstruction were exposed to such expressions repeatedly and later internalized them. Through the villagers’ use of these terms in relation to Kasan Ogwangdae, they revealed their pride in the art. After the reconstruction, they changed their colloquial term for performing Kasan Ogwangdae (maegunonda) to the formal standard Korean term for performing (kongyŏnhada). Thus, they appropriated the more elevated expression for themselves as artists and Kasan Ogwangdae as an art.

The reconstruction of Kasan Ogwangdae was the most significant event both in the history of Kasan village and in the lives of the individuals there since the abolition of the grain-tax collection warehouses. For the reconstruction, about fifty college students came down to the small village and spent a long time there on research and practice. Further, we persistently endeavored to get the play designated an Intangible Cultural Property and coordinated its public performance in Seoul. It was not a momentary event.

Our efforts to reconstruct the drama resulted in having the performance and memories about it standardized. This standardization was further reinforced by the village performers, who repeated their knowledge about the performance outlined through the reconstruction to new researchers visiting their village.

After the designation, the performers were given the responsibility of preserving wŏnhyŏng and transmitting it intact. They had to practice the same choreography over and over. In Kasan Ogwangdae, the dialogue is much more important than the dance and thus it seems that creativity is stifled. From the local community’s point of view, I doubt whether this Kasan Ogwangdae can be appropriated as a new art. Putting aside the cases of those mask dances of North Korea such as Pongsan t’alchum, which have long been isolated from their local community, we should pay attention to the fact that the yayu field-plays and ogwangdae performances from Pusan and South Kyŏngsang Province lost their ability to respond to the changing cultural environment by conforming to the criteria of the central government and researchers.

Reflections on the Intangible Cultural Heritage Policy 17

Since the Japanese colonial period, mask dance dramas appropriated the idea of Western drama and transformed themselves, focusing on dramatic elements, into a major national performing art. Besides, it was recently revealed that they were edited and reinterpreted according to various external opinions, including those of the Japanese Governor-General of Korea. In a word, mask dances during the Japanese colonial period were appropriated according to different contexts in various ways. This polysemy, a major characteristic of mask dances, is believed to be a historical product. I argue that mask dance dramas developed closely interwoven relationships with rituals in small villages and provincial towns called ŭpch’i (Chosŏn era term for county seat) during the late Chosŏn Dynasty (Lee, H. 1995: 84-91).

Rituals in ŭpch’i were usually carried out according to the politics of local governance. Thus, the development and performances of mask dances should be understood in such contexts. After the 19 th century, plays developed dramatically and were included in rituals. Thus, plays and rituals have possessed similarities while maintaining their distinctive characteristics.

However, the post-1960 intangible cultural heritage policy and folklore policies backing up such policies have not considered their differences and ambiguities. As a result, local cultures were conflated and placed under the control of the central government.

As is well-known, as with other important Intangible Cultural Properties, only the key performers of Kasan Ogwangdae were designated “national human treasures.” Until recently, financial support was directly provided mostly to the “national human treasures.” This support system, through which only a small number of performers receive benefits, runs contrary to the nature of mask dance dramas, which require a large number of performers.

A new hierarchy emerged when the central government granted the special status of “national human treasure” to some individuals. Such a hierarchy did not exist before in the daily lives of Kasan villagers, and it is obvious that the policy did not consider the historical background of mask dance dramas in the area. Kasan Ogwangdae was formed based on the voluntary participation of villagers. However, the policy employed by the central government generated discord and tension among the performers, and it became an issue in the village with the majority of the villagers over who should perform in Kasan Ogwangdae. Kasan Ogwangdae is led by a

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particular family of local residents, the Han lineage, which is a very unusual case. Amongst the Han lineage, Han Yun Yŏng is the most significant figure, and without him, the reconstruction of Kasan Ogwangdae would not have been possible. However, his headstrong nature made it difficult for him to win the villagers’ cooperation, and his designation as a “national human treasure” aggravated the situation.

In addition, the methods used to examine and evaluate potential “national human treasures” are problematic. Using particular criteria, a small number of performers are chosen, and outside assistance is provided to them. As as result of this process, the performers of mask dance dramas, including those of Kasan Ogwangdae, have been made subservient to a new power: an examination and evaluation regime. Accordingly, order within a performing group is now controlled by an outside authority, whereas in the past, mask dance dramas were planned and led by the performers.

As I mentioned earlier, the fact that one performer has excellent performing skill does not guarantee that that person will also be a good leader who can successfully organize and plan a performance. However, the examination and evaluation from outside and the decisions made according to the said examination and evaluation play a significant role in placing certain people in leadership roles. Moreover, a governmental support system, which revolves around certain performers, has been established.

This environment hampers the development of a cultural leadership that can bring new creativity and life to a performance. It must be noted that Kasan Ogwangdae is not the only group under this government direction that experiences these problems. It seems reasonable to assert that the problems mentioned above were caused by the intangible cultural heritage policy makers’ ignorance of the important historical background of mask dance dramas. The policy of forcing groups to conform to the governmentled system has brought about unwanted results. Moreover, because of Korean society’s propensity to respect intellectuals, performers subordinated their opinions to those of outside scholars.

There has been research on folklorism that has attempted to overcome wŏnhyŏng or essentialization (Nam, K. 2008b). Other research has argued that the idea of preserving any folk plays according to wŏnhyŏng should be discarded (Heo, Y. 2009b). Such arguments suggest that we should re-

Reflections on the Intangible Cultural Heritage Policy 19

examine the historical backgrounds of folklore in a broader context, since folklore has been the foundation of the current preservation, transmission and supporting mechanism.

In particular, folklorism itself assumes the existence of cultural elements, and thus, a new study about such cultural elements is needed. This is different from the previous conceptualization of wŏnhyŏng and needs further explanation. What are the cultural elements? Should we regard them as prototypes? Should we consider them as something close to authentic?

Folklore has not paid much attention to power, class and politics. The notion of a transcendent historicity or continuity of folklore might be related to these elements. This is why I deploy autoethnography and will next discuss the designation of Kasan Ogwangdae as an Intangible Cultural Property and its post-designation activities in relation to the politicization of folklore under government control.

III. F ormation of a Folklore Under Government Control and the Politics of Folklorism Since the 1960s It is a well-known fact that since the 1960s modernization policies have accelerated the dissolution of village communal ceremonies. As a part of the modernization project, each village was incorporated in order to mobilize the power of the central state; consequently, many shrines and village ceremonies based on those shrines disappeared, weakening the communal foundation of culture in these communities. The reconstruction of Kasan Ogwangdae was carried out in the early 1970s as an attempt to revive this village culture.

Knowledge of village ceremonies or mask dance performances during the pre-modern period is incomplete. However, it is certain that in the 1960s the village ceremony of ch’ŏllyongje was regarded as a superstition standing in the way of the government’s promotion of modernization, so its role in unifying the village was weakened. Accordingly, Kasan Ogwangdae, closely linked to that ceremony, ended up losing its performance context. The restoration of Kasan Ogwangdae was conducted after the basis of the performance had been lost, and it was transmitted and incorporated into the system for the

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protection of Intangible Cultural Properties in their performance format.

The Folk Arts Contest, originating in the Folk Arts Festival, is a representative example of the projects that have pursued the contradictory goals of modernization and the resuscitation of a vanishing traditional culture. Accordingly, folk arts were incorporated into the purview of the national government. Especially at the end of the 1960s, when national mobilization and industrialization were taking place on a grand scale, the foundation of folk culture was being eroded nationwide. There were a lot of conflicting ideas related to the protection of folk culture and the arts, but no serious tension or friction amongst those ideas and their advocates.10 It is not proper to solely point to the role of the government as the agent behind the modern project of “protecting” folk arts. The specialists who emphasized the values of folk culture and folk knowledge took the ideological lead in the early years of the policy. They worked to develop and systematize various programs, and the mass media joined the effort.11 In this regard, the intangible cultural heritage policy, promoted as part of a government-driven modernization project, had everyone’s support.

In fact, it was not the policy makers nor the specialists but rather the performing groups and individual performers who first exposed the problems with the intangible cultural heritage system and policy. It is also necessary to note that the discussion of the crisis of representation that folklore is facing, as well as an introspective examination of modernity, existed long before issues with the intangible cultural heritage policy became publicized. When compared to other intellectual sectors, researchers inside and outside of the country began to notice such problems quite late.

Serious skepticism about folklore had already been expressed due to the recognition of the huge gap between the expected results and actual research results and, furthermore, because the researcher’s biases and agendas were obscured in standard research projects (Iwatake Mikkako 1996). This innate contradiction existed from the earliest stage of the development of the field 10

Jung, Soo Jin (2004).

For further understanding, please see the research of Jung, Soo Jin (2008a) and Lee, Jang Yull (2005). In this regard, mass media played a major role, so it is my view that there should be more studies on the role of mass media.

11

Reflections on the Intangible Cultural Heritage Policy 21

of folklore. Folklore studies were developed with the dual concept that they would leave tradition to modernize independently and at the same time would induce integration by compensating for the loss and alienation created during the modernization process.

Furthermore, the paradox was that the object of attention was the culture of the disadvantaged lower classes, not that of the elites. Yet, the executor of the studies of folklore were the intellectual elite, who carried out the studies according to elite ideals and an elite concept of the nation. The traditional dichotomy between farming/fishing communities and the city is a clear example of the existing structure. Since folklore studies began with intellectuals examining rural areas, the agrarian area was not only an object of study but also the oppositional example that allowed the city to demonstrate its secure modern identity.

In this regard, folklorists obsessed over exotic or unfamiliar things, turning their gaze away from the familiar. The fact that outsiders showed an overwhelming interest in village ceremonies, even when these ceremonies had almost disappeared, continued to unilaterally reflect city intellectuals’ viewpoint. Korean folklorists continue to focus on pre-modern customs as an index for modern society without significant discussion, even though the boundaries between the rural and the urban have been significantly weakened because of urbanization and the spread of the market economy.

The project of re-evaluating and theorizing the intellectual tradition of Korean folklore has focused on cultural heritage in agrarian pre-modern society. Although it has now expanded to consider the actions and histories of cities, the research scope still seems insufficient. Early Korean folklorists ignored various formation factors due to their obsession with romanticized origins, an obsession that has made folklore ahistorical by excluding complexity in the relations of power and class.12 In this respect, it is now a 12

In this regard, there still exist such trends in recent studies; for example, in 2009 the Korean Folklore Society (Han’guk Minsok Hakhoe) decided to discuss the origin of mask dances in their summer conference. The keynote speakers, Lim, Jae Hae (2009) and Jeon, Kyung Wook (2009), addressed the correlation between the obsession with origin and the obsession with wŏnhyŏng. However, the historical discussion of formation was actually disregarded. Basically such an obsession with origin shows that ahistorical mythologization still exists in the study of mask dance dramas.

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relief that a proposal by a folklorist emerged for fellow folklorists to conduct research that critically intervenes in the political authoritarian structure of folkloric discourse (Nam, K. 2009a).

The crisis of restoration displays the paradox of folklore. The historical origin of folklore studies in Korea dates to the Japanese colonial era. Because folk culture, including mask dance dramas, was cast as a symbol of cultural nationalism, folk culture was respected as rural art. This process led the arts to take on the characteristics of a government-led folklore under government control (Nam, K. 2004). The polysemic characteristics of performance of the Japanese colonial era originated in the late 19th century, at a time when the proliferation of mask dance dramas along two opposing tracks—continuity and modification—become clear.

Researchers’ opinions on the period of development and proliferation of mask dance dramas and on the reason the performances were discontinued are ambiguous. I suspect that, similar to other forms of popular culture such as p’ansori, mask dance dramas suddenly spread after the late 19th century. It seems that the proliferating performances, combined with the local governing system of the dynasty and the cultural networks in local society, evolved as a part of narye exorcism rites. And driving these ceremonies were local petty officials called hyangni. Therefore, as far as the basis of dramatic performance is concerned, I think that there is a considerable difference between the late Chosŏn period and the Japanese colonial era.13 Meanwhile, the elderly, such as those who participated in dramatic performances after the Japanese colonial era or those who were in the senior citizens’ associations for the ŭpch’i local government seats, played an important role in ŭpch’i rituals. Those senior citizens groups, or yangnohoe, continued to exist in local ŭpch’i communities, even as they became incorporated into modern cities. In fact, they became the hub of the revival of mask dance dramas. In this regard, continuity with the late 19th century can be pointed out. Other than the changes to the background of pivotal individuals who restructured the dramatic performances, the Chosŏn 13

There is no systematic study of the reproduction of mask dance dramas during the Japanese colonial period. The case of the Tongnae yayu mask dance drama demonstrates that we need further studies (Jung, S. 2009).

Reflections on the Intangible Cultural Heritage Policy 23

Dynasty and colonial era were the same in this regard.

It is worthwhile to note that Song Sŏkha and other early folklorists who became interested in mask dance dramas during the Japanese colonial era started to collect information in this field after hearing Japanese academics make statements such as, “Chosŏn has no theatre.” Originally they may have intended to emphasize the dramatic composition of mask dance dramas, imagining Western theatrical elements as an index of comparative advantage. During this process, the new term “kamyŏn-gŭk” [literally, mask performance + drama] was used to give mask dance dramas a name that held commonalities with Western theater.

Calling mask dance dramas, which were incorporated as a part of narye rites in local society, kamyŏn-gŭk was not simply a change in the name but also an indication of a transfiguration of the dramas.14 That by thoroughly teaching and studying Pongsan t’alchum, mask dance drama could modernize while keeping the ancient rural art illustrates this point. As was mentioned earlier, various factors that constitute dramatic performance other than dramatic composition was often overlooked during this modernizing process.

In 1958, when the first Folk Arts Contest since Korea’s independence was held, it was apparent that the artistic aspect of folk culture was highly valued. However, such a focus on artistry runs contrary to folk cultures’ core characteristic of simplicity that promotes community-wide participation.15 This change was a result of the invented tradition in the post-colonial era, which regards theatrical factors as indicators of comparative advantage and the basis for promoting the mask dance drama revival movement.

However, the revival and dramatic performance during the Japanese colonial era is another symbol of the modernization of the dramas. At that time, Pongsan t’alchum was protected as one of the recommended rural recreation forms, according to the policy and principle of the Japanese 14

In contrast to the above point, there is an argument that differentiates narye (rites of exorcism) and kamyŏn-gŭk (mask dance drama). In this study, Jeon Kyung Wook argues that kamyŏn-gŭk emerged after narye (Jeon, K. 1998). I believe that he disregarded the fact that mask dance dramas are included in narye without the need to discuss kamyŏn-gŭk separately.

15 In this regard, Jung, Soo Jin points out that the Folk Arts Contests cannot disregard the contradiction between artistic merit and adherence to wŏnhyŏng (2009).

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colonial government, and similar examples are found in other regions. It has been proven that since 1939 the Japanese colonial government conducted research on rural folk arts in each region under the pretext of dissemination and promotion of government-approved rural arts and that Pongsan t’alchum was the first art to be so appointed (Nam, K. 2003, 2008a). In short, there was a close correlation between folklore and the nation, and the fact remains that the authority of the colonial government influenced the spread of mask dance dramas. In this context, it is certain that the folklore in the 1960s and the formation of a folklore under government control based on that folklore are closely tied to the experience of folklore appropriated during the Japanese colonial era.

IV. Mask Dance Dramas as an Ideology Utilized in Movements, and the Historical Development of Mask Dance Dramas as Popular Culture During the 1970s and 1980s, mask dance dramas re-emerged as an ideological symbol of resistance and reform. Under the slogan, “Recovery of Community,” mask dance dramas became a new symbol of the culture of the masses. It is a well-known fact that the democratization movement led by university students was promoted through a vision encapsulated by mask dance dramas (Kim, K. 1989; Abelmann 1996; Ko, C. 2004; Heo, Y. 2009b). In this regard, there are two eras in which performances were used as vehicles of protest.

The 1970s protests used traditional mask dance dramas, and the post-1970s performances on university campuses used madanggŭk, which were new theatrical productions that borrowed heavily from traditional mask dance dramas.

The movements to resurrect mask dance dramas disapproved of the folklore under government control, but their ideology was somewhat similar. In other words, they were both based on nationalism or a myth of national community. In addition, they both agreed that folk culture best represented a national community’s culture. Moreover, they frowned on the individualism that was developing through the process of industrialization and urbanization, and suggested the rural village community as an example

Reflections on the Intangible Cultural Heritage Policy 25

of retaining the community-based culture of the past. In this context, popular discourse conflated national culture and folk culture.

In the ethnically homogenous Korean society, the nation has been regarded as the most ideal community. Thus, activists believed that national community could heal all the serious rifts and frictions that Korean society had experienced. In this light, although the mask dance drama movement advocated resistance and reform, it was also deeply connected to social conservatism.

After the end of the 1970s, folk art and culture was portrayed as the resistance and reform-oriented culture of the masses. This view was largely promoted by urban intellectuals, the majority of whom were university students. Activists promulgated a new national culture and art project, madanggŭk, as distinct from the government-led national culture preservation project. However, considering that the two seemingly different projects perceived farming communities of the past as ideal, it is difficult to find any obvious differences in their perspectives on folklore.

Not only were mask dance dramas deemed to be historical symbols of resistance and reform, but they were also appropriated as a vision of the past in order to put resistance and reform into practice. The cultural movement at that time had a teleological perspective on history. In other words, the cultural movement aimed to reinterpret the historical context in which mask dance dramas were performed and then project the spirit of the performance culture of the past onto modern society. The discourse about the development of mask dance dramas in relation to the growth of the masses interacted with the “internal development theory,” which had been very well received by Korean historians at that time. At present, the internal development theory, which had prevailed as the mainstream in Korean historiography since the 1960s, has fallen out of favor, but there are still some historical perspectives based on the internal development theory as a backdrop for explaining the historical development of mask dance dramas.16 16

The impact of the internal development theory on Korean studies in Korea has been tremendous, and this theory greatly influenced studies on mask dance dramas. Thus, issues regarding internal development theory should be pointed out if one wants to find a new approach to the studies of mask dance dramas. The internal development theory has been discredited in a systematic way, but there are still quite a number

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I argue that if you examine history, this hypothesis can be disproven. It has been verified that mask dance dramas such as Pongsan t’alchum, Yangju byŏlsandae, Kosŏng ogwangdae, Tongnae yayu, T’ongyŏng ogwangdae and Chinju ogwangdae spread rapidly after the 19th century, developing in ŭpch’i that became modern cities. After the late Chosŏn Dynasty, these county seats were found in rural society in general, but they were differentiated from other rural communities in that they were governmentally-led towns housing both government offices and the living quarters of government officers. The more important fact is that government officers, such as the local petty officials, played a large role in the development and spread of mask dance dramas.

Although such local petty officials were of relatively low rank in the Chosŏn government, they were in positions that wielded strong cultural influence, such as presiding over rites in county seats. For example, the hojang, the local headman who conducted Kangnŭng tano kut, was the head of the local petty officials. The more important point is that the local petty officials played an important role in arbitrating disputes between the central government and local communities or between the literati upper class yangban and commoners. In short, the development and spread of mask dance dramas in the late 19th century was closely related to the role of these petty officials in arbitration.

This understanding of power in local society has deconstructed the historical hypothesis that presumed mask dance dramas were a symbol of cultural essence. Since this kind of historical imagination has supported the values of folklorists for a long time, genuine historical discussion of folk culture is even more necessary. Nevertheless, folklorists are still obsessed with the transcendence of folk culture. This is because they cannot distinguish between the subjective desire for an ahistorical world, where power and class do not exist, and the real world.

The case of Kasan Ogwangdae also supports this argument. Kasan was not an ŭpch’i, but it was a busy center of distribution, because it housed a of scholars obsessed with it or use it as the starting point for their arguments. My research is critical of earlier research based on internal development theory. In this regard, reading my other papers on social history and the cultural history of Korea would be helpful.

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regional grain-tax collection warehouse, an office that administered the taxes sent to Seoul. The Han lineage maintained power in the local government in Kasan. Therefore, even though the rituals and performances realized the imagination of the community, in reality the performances were strongly related to the maintenance of order in the local community. In short, Korean historical imagination, which has long considered mask dance dramas as representations of an ideology of people’s protest, does not accord with historical fact. Rather, social integration through the role of arbitration was more important in easing conflicts, which is why mask dance dramas at that time can be defined as a ritualized protest.

Such an argument has led mask dance dramas to be defined under a new category, popular culture, not as a class culture for the masses. The point is that arbitration, which made the coexistence of opposing values possible, is considered an important attribute of mask dance dramas. I argue that the main reason mask dance dramas were a dynamic source of cultural florescence since the late 19th century lies in the mask dance dramas’ role in arbitrating various opposing values.

Since the late 19th century, mask dance dramas have been discontinued and resurrected several times due to their powerful popular appeal. The reasons for this are as follows: 1) mask dance drama structure can contain many conflicting values and ideologies; 2) mask dance dramas absorbed the conflicting values differently in each time and context; and 3) the effects of mask dance dramas differ according to their performers. The performers of the mask dance dramas have varied considerably. In addition, the meaning of the mask dance dramas has changed according to various historical contexts.

Not only did local government officials, including the low ranked hyangni petty officials, play a vital role in the development and spread of mask dance dramas in the late Chosŏn Dynasty, but they were also the organizers of mask dance dramas. Important performers were at times military officers, itinerant entertainers, butchers, low-ranking petty officials who circulated in the district, and government-employed slaves. People from different social classes joined and organized mask dance dramas. Such diversity shows that mask dance dramas appealed to people of all classes, both rulers and subjects, who may have been engaged in hostile relations with each other in the hierarchical social system of the Chosŏn Dynasty. Such wide participation

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also reveals that mask dance dramas could be interpreted differently by each group of participants, an aspect that enabled mask dance dramas to be vital and dynamic over a long period of time. In this regard, we can assume that mask dance dramas were developing into a popular culture sweeping across all social classes and regions, rather than into a culture for a specific class.

This assumption can also be applied to p’ansori operas. If mask dance dramas and p’ansori had been monopolized by a specific class, they would not have been able to survive through the massive transformations of modern Korean society. This seems particularly valid for p’ansori, and researchers should examine p’ansori as popular culture rather than as folk culture. The intangible cultural heritage policy and the cultural movement in the 1970s did not correspond with the pre-modern popularity of mask dance dramas and p’ansori. The intangible cultural heritage policy called for creation of a cultural canon, and the cultural movement in the 1970s regarded mask dance dramas as a culture exclusively for one particular social class.

It should also be pointed out that mask dance dramas flourished after the middle of the 19th century during the late Chosŏn Dynasty, when the incorporation of rituals became standardized in the mask dance dramas. The combination of rituals that reaffirmed and reproduced the established orders and the sarcastic and critical stance that mask dance dramas demonstrated towards the established social order could be redefined as a ritualized protest (Lee, H. 1995). The most serious problem with the earlier studies on mask dance dramas is that researchers separate the dramas from rituals and selectively extract contents for discussion. The following fact shows the validity of my argument: Peasant uprisings did not occur in ŭpch’i where mask dance dramas were performed. Rather, ŭpch’i where performers of mask dance dramas resided became the target of such uprisings after the middle of the 19th century.

During the Japanese colonial period, mask dance dramas were protected by the Japanese colonial government. I think this is because the severe criticism of the upper class yangban literati implied in mask dance dramas somewhat matched well with the Japanese colonial government’s stance on the ruling class. The Japanese tried to emphasize the incompetence and corruption of the yangban in order to justify their colonial rule. However, it would be erroneous to consider only the connection between mask dance

Reflections on the Intangible Cultural Heritage Policy 29

dramas and the Japanese colonial government while disregarding other various aspects of the dramas. This is because the criticism of the yangban in mask dance dramas was not just a belated parody of a historical subject.

Although the conventional notion holds that the yangban literati collapsed before the demise of the Chosŏn Dynasty, the yangban endured into the Japanese colonial period (Wagner 2008; Song, C. 1987). Thus, the mask dance dramas’ criticism of the yangban should be regarded as a cultural response to changes villagers were experiencing under Japanese colonial rule.

In short, we should not disregard the various layers of meaning in mask dance dramas. It would be erroneous to argue that mask dance dramas were a symbol of Japanese colonialism, simply focusing on Japan’s protection of them. It is not surprising to observe that the mask dance dramas evolved during the colonial era because mask dance dramas were already quite diverse in their process of historical development as popular culture.

V. Conclusion The abolition of the grain-tax transport warehouses in 1894 came as a blow to the residents of Kasan. A recollection of this incident is found in a villager’s diary (Han, S. 1937), and it describes how the hierarchy of power and the economic structures based on the warehouses suddenly collapsed. Kasan was included in Sach’ŏn County, but according to the Japanese reform of the local government system, Kasan was originally incorporated into Chinju City, then known as Chinjumok. At the time of the reconstruction, no one in the village remembered that fact.

After the abolition of its status as a grain-tax transport warehouse district, the village seemed to wilt. Nevertheless, it is believed that rituals and mask dance dramas in the village functioned as a fount of culture, acting as a bond for the remaining villagers. This is highly probable considering the fact that at the end of the Chosŏn Dynasty, Kasan Ogwangdae performers travelled to neighboring villages to put on road shows as fundraisers for the establishment of a private school in Kasan. In the 1970s, almost sixty years after that tour, people in Kasan still remembered this event. I think having such a tour was a new experience and a precious memory to the villagers. The

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fundraising event demonstrates the flexibility of the people in Kasan: Facing difficulties after the abolition of the grain-tax transport warehouses, locals utilized their mask dance, combined with rituals, at a new level.

The development of Kasan Ogwangdae during the Japanese colonial period and up until the 1970s is unclear. No one could remember it. Chŏng Inbo and Song Sŏkha, who researched other folk arts in the Chinju and Tongnae area, failed to mention Kasan Ogwangdae. Although other mask dances from several different ŭpch’i were exposed to a variety of changes throughout the Japanese colonial period, they remained essentially the same; therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that the rituals and the mask dance drama of Kasan did not change much until the early 1960s, except during wartime mobilization in the 1940s.

In 1974, Kasan Ogwangdae was reconstructed through the leadership and planning of village outsiders. In addition to Kasan Ogwangdae, several other mask dance dramas from various parts of Korea were temporarily discontinued and later reconstructed and performed. In this process, although those performers who had actual experience performing mask dance dramas played an important role, the intervention of outsiders such as myself played a vital part.

At that time, everybody was convinced that they had succeeded in reconstructing the mask dance drama through objective research and study. No one broached the subject that the views and education of outside intellectuals could have affected the reconstruction project. In this regard, the use of autoethnography is needed, because it allows for reflexivity in a discussion of the emergence of folk culture and folklorism. The intellectuals organized knowledge and created folk culture; hence, the descriptions of their intention and experiences are absolutely integral to expanding into new intellectual territory.

In the process of designating Intangible Cultural Properties and supporting them, the judgment and ideology of outside examiners became more important than performers’ own decisions and agreements. Thus, the outsiders’ plans and power became much more influential than expected.

In this sense, folklore studies were allied with the hegemony of the central government. In this regard, I believe that researchers or managers who participated in and were involved with the project should produce

Reflections on the Intangible Cultural Heritage Policy 31

autoethnographic accounts of the process.

After Kasan Ogwangdae was designated an Intangible Cultural Property, it became an important item of cultural capital that had impact on the villagers’ daily life. Most of the villagers were performers of Kasan Ogwangdae, and they frequently received invitations to perform. Thus, the villagers’ lives become closely related to events in the outside world. Kasan used to be secluded, with little change in the local population, but it transformed into a place that was easily accessible. Kasan Ogwangdae was appropriated as a rallying point for community building in Kasan in the 1970s, causing both tensions and new visions. However, I am not sure if Kasan Ogwangdae can be a valuable factor in the present or future of Kasan.

Different parties may evaluate the direction of folklore development differently. The methodology for future folklore studies is particularly important. In this regard, I expect folklore to encounter a new intellectual area and experience creative tensions. For this, folklore should part with the current practice of promoting the hegemony of the center and the “othering” of the periphery. Folk culture, including mask dance dramas, is developed as the “other” on the periphery, and this is actually part of the process of creating the ascendancy of the center. In other words, folklore and culture should transcend the rural/urban divide in order to provide knowledge and culture of local areas. The current system of designating mask dances as Intangible Cultural Properties and supporting them is center-oriented. It gives the central government superiority over the folk culture at the periphery, leading the center to reinforce its own superiority.17 The rhetoric of folklore has changed mask dance dramas into elements of a government-led folklore under government control with added weight accorded to outside perspectives. Thus, local performers are restricted to repeating reconstructed performances constantly. Because of this stance, when I approached the villagers, I saw them as the “other.” The purpose of this autoethnography is to confess this perspective and shed some historical light on such experiences.

Autoethnography might give an impression that an author’s personal 17

With respect to the hegemony of the central government and the “othering” of local governments in Korean studies, please see my research (Lee, H. 2000).

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subjective experiences are the truth. However, despite such a drawback, its merits include the ability to clarify facts that cannot be seen in a conventional narrative. Autoethnography can address the fact that there is always a space where an individual can move, choose, and change an ideology or an institute or the system. In this regard, it is my hope that this autoethnographic account of Kasan Ogwangdae can contribute valuable information to a new area of national knowledge.

References Books and Articles in Korean Heo, Yong Ho, 2009a, “Handing down and Preservation of Folk Drama as Intangible Cultural Heritage,” The Journal of Asian Comparative Folklore 39: 517-556 (“무형문화유산으로서 민속극의 보존과 전승”, 『비교민속학』 39: 517556). , 2009b, “A Study on Daedongjae (Campus Festival) in 1980’s,” Journal of Japanese Studies, Institute of Japanese Studies, Seoul: Dongguk University (“그들이 만들려했던 공동체 - 1980년대 대학 대동제 연구 서설”, 『일본학』 9: 123148).

Jeon, Kyung Wook, 1998, Korean Mask Drama: History and Structural Principle, Seoul: Yeolwhadang (『한국 가면극 그 역사와 원리』). , 2009, “The Types of Korean Mask Dance Dramas,” The Korean Folklore 50: 513-575 (한국 가면극의 계통을 보는 시각, 『한국 민속학』 50: 513-575).

Jung, Sang Bak, 2009, “Status of Busan Deul Norum,” Proceeding of International Conference on Asia Pacific Music and Dance, Busan: Busan National Gukak Center (“부산 ‘들놀음’의 위상”, 『아시아-태평양음악국제학술회의논문 집』).

Jung, Soo Jin, 2004, “Institution and its Historicity of Intangible Cultural Properties of Modern Korea,” The Korean Journal of Folk Studies 40: 475508 (“무형문화재 제도의 성립, 그 역사성의 재고”, 『민속학 연구』 40: 475-508). , 2008a, Invention of Intangible Cultural Properties of Modern Korean, Seoul: Yoksabipungsa (『무형문화재의 탄생』). , 2008b, “The primary Study on Discourse of Wonhyung in Folklore,” The Korean Journal of Folk Studies 47: 135-166 (“민속학적 원형론의 기초연구”, 『민 속학 연구』 47: 135-166).

Reflections on the Intangible Cultural Heritage Policy 33

, 2009, “Korean Folk Art Festival is the Delivery Room of the Intangible Cultural Property?” The Korean Journal of Folk Studies 50: 99-128 (“한국민 속예술축제, 과연 무형문화재의 산실인가?”, 『민속학 연구』 50: 99-128).

Kang, Yong Kwon, 1972, “A Character of Kasan Ogwangdae,” The Journal of Korean Language and Literature Association (“가산오광대의 특성”, 『국어국문 학』 55 · 56 · 57: 23-42).

Kim, Kwang Ok, 1989, “People’s Cultural Movement as a Mechanism of Political Conversation: Madangkuk as a Social Drama,” The Korean Cultural Anthropology 21: 53-78 (“정치적 담론 기제로서의 민중문화운동”, 『한국문화인류 학』 21: 53-78).

Lee, Gyung Yup, 2004, “An Intangible Cultural Treasure and Actuality of Folklore Transmission,” The Korean Folklore 40: 293-332 (“무형문화재와 민속 전승의 현실”, 『한국민속학』 40: 293-332).

Lee, Jang Yull, 2005, Policy of the main Intangible Cultural Assets of Korean Government, Seoul: Kwandong Publishing Co. (『한국 무형문화재정책』).

Lee, Seung Soo, 2007, “The Invention and Systemization of Folklore Archetype,” The Korean Folklore 46: 303-342 (“민속 원형의 창출과 제도화”, 『한국민속학』 46: 303-342).

Lim, Jae Hae, 2009, “The Self Sustainable Formation and Development of Korean Mask Dance,” Proceeding of Summer Symposium of Korean Folklore Society (“탈춤의 자생적 형성과 전개에 관한 재론”, 한국민속학회 하계학술대회 발표논문집).

Nam, Kun Wu, 2003a, “The Modernity of “Folklore” and Folklore Studies as PostModernity,” The Journal of Korean Folklore 38: 191-220 (“‘민속’의 근대, 탈근 대의 민속학”, 『한국민속학』 38: 191-220). , 2003b, “On ‘Modernity’ of Bongsan t’alchum,” The Folk News 96: 7-9, Seoul: The National Folk Museum (『봉산탈춤의 ‘근대’』). , 2006, “Folk Culture between Cultural Property and Tourism,” The Journal of Korean Folklore 43: 205-253 (“민속의 문화재화와 관광화”, 『한국민 속학』 43: 205-253). , 2008a, Chosŏn Folklore and Colonialism, Seoul: Dongguk University Press (『‘조선민속학’과 식민주의』). , 2008b, “From the Urban Folklore to Folklorism,” The Korean Folklore 47: 29-69 (“도시민속학에서 포클로리즘 연구로”, 『한국민속학』 47: 29-69). , 2009a, “Folklore as Tourism Resource and Folklore Studies,” The Korean Folklore 49: 213-245 (“민속의 관광자원화와 민속학 연구”, 『한국민속학』 49: 213245).

34 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 1, No. 1, 2011

, 2009b, “The Concours of Folklore, its Transformation into Art,” The Journal of Korean Literature 36: 289-356, Seoul: Dongguk University (“ 민속 의 경연과 예술화”, 『한국문학연구』 36: 289-356). , 2009c, “The Disenchantment of “Folklore=The Logic of National Culture,” The Journal of Asian Comparative Folklore 49: 213-252 (“‘민속학= 민족문화학’의 탈신화화”, 『비교민속학』 49: 213-252).

Song, Jun Ho, 1987, The Social History of Chosŏn Dynasty, Seoul: Ilchogak (『조선 사회사연구』).

Lee, Hoon Sang, 1995, “A Study on the Structure and Ritual of County Seat in Late Chosŏn Dynasty,” The Korean Historical Review 147: 47-94 (“조선후기 邑治 사회의 구조와 祭儀: 鄕吏集團의 정체성 혼란과 邑治 祭儀의 유희화”, 『역사학 보』 147: 47-94). , 1998, “Intentional Forgetting and Narratives of Linear Histories: Consciousness and Historiography on the History of Late Chosŏn Dynasty under the Japanese Colonial Rule,” The Journal of Chin-Tan Society 88: 321-350 (“의도적 망각과 단선적 역사서술”, 『진단학보』 88: 321-350). , 2000, “‘Chibang’ (Local Society) as Other and The Hegemony of ‘Chungang’ (Center) in Korean History and Historiography,” A Study on the Problems of Local History by The Association for Korean Historical Studies, Seoul: Kyeongin Publishing Co. (“타자로서의 ‘지방’과 중앙의 헤게모 니 - ‘지방’과 중앙의 이분구도에 기초한 지식 권력에 대한 비판 담론의 구축”, 『한 국 지방사 연구의 현황과 과제』). , 2001, “A Study on the Multilayeredness of Public Ceremony and County Seat Ritual of Local Society in Late Chosŏn Dynasty,” Journal of Sungkok Foundation 32: 389-440 (“조선후기 공공의례의 다층성과 읍치의 중재 제의”, 『성 곡 논총』 32 상권: 389-440). , 2003, “The Conflict among the Social Norms and Hyangli’s Cultural Reaction in Late Chosŏn Dynasty: P’ansori Hung-bu ka and Mediation Culture,” The Journal of P’ansori 16: 139-180 (“조선후기 사회규범들 간의 갈 등과 향리사회의 문화적 대응”, 『판소리연구』 16: 139-180). , 2004a, “General Review: East Asian Modernity and the Emergence of Folklore,” Proceeding of Symposium, Chuncheon: Asia Research Center, Hallym University (“총평문: 동아시아의 근대와 민속학의 창출”, 『근대민족국가 의 성립과 민속학 심포지엄발표논문집』). , 2004b, Kasan Ogwangdae, Daejeon: National Research Center of Cultural Heritage (『가산 오광대』). , 2008, “From Dead Past to Living Past: General Review on Rediscovery

Reflections on the Intangible Cultural Heritage Policy 35

of Values of the Hanok (traditional Korean style houses) village of Jeonju,” Proceeding of Symposium, Jeonju: Museum of Chonbuk National University (“죽은 과거에서 살아있는 과거로: 전주 한옥마을의 재발견 심포지엄 에 대한 총평”, 『전주한옥마을 심포지엄발표논문집』).

Books and Articles in English Abelmann, Nancy, 1996, Echoes of the Past, Epics of Dissent: A South Korean Social Movement, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Chang, Hee Won, 2008, Autoethnography as method, Walnut Creek, CA: Left Coast Press.

Han Sayŏ, 1937, Memoir, Manuscript.

Iwamoto, Michiya et al., 2008, East Asian Modernity and the Emergence of Folklore, Seoul: Minsokwon (『동아시아의 근대와 민속학의 창출』).

Iwatake, Mikkako, 1996, Politics of Folklore, Tokyo: Miraisha (『民俗學の政治性』).

Ko, Chung Ja, 2004, “On the Transmisson and Performers of Korean Mask Dance Drama Kosŏng Ogwangdae,” Ph.D. Dissertation, The Graduate University for Advanced Studies Japan (“‘韓国の仮面劇’ 仮面劇の伝承と演戱者 - 固城五 広大保存会の変遷”).

Reed-Danahay, Deborah E., 1997, “Introduction,” in Deborah E. Reed-Danahay, ed., Auto/Ethnography: Rewriting the Self and the Social, Oxford: Berg: 1-17.

Wagner, Edward W., 2008, Compiled and translated by Lee Hoosang, Ascription and Accomplishment of Chosŏn Society, Seoul: Ilchogak (『조선왕조사회의 성 취와 귀속』).

Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 1, No. 1, 2011: 37-103

A Psychological Inquiry into the Confucian Origins of East Asian Collectivism* Cho, Geung Ho** Compared with individualistic culture of Western countries (e.g. America, Canada, Australia, Britain, France, Germany, and Netherlands etc.), East Asian countries (e.g.

Korean, Japan, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore etc.) have the collectivistic culture. People in these two cultures have different psychological and behavioral tendencies.

In individualistic culture, they place high values on the independence and autonomy, frank expression of private feelings and needs, and stable consistency between personal dispositions and behaviors. On the other hand, in collectivistic culture they strive to achieve interdependence and harmony with others, to control the private feelings and needs, and to change themselves in accordance with their situations and relations with others. On the background of these differences, there lie different views of human being in general and selfconstrual. That is, those living in the individualistic culture have individual-centered view of human being and independent (and separate) self-construal; in contrast with this, those in collectivistic culture have relation-centered view of human being and interdependent (and holistic) self-construal. In this paper, the author tried to explicate the origins of these cultural differences in the traditional system of thought in the Western and East Asian societies, and their theories of ideal person derived from these systems. From these review, it was found that the origin of Western individualism lies in the ideocentric liberalism, and that of East Asian collectivism lies in the strong tradition of Confucianism.

Keywords: Individualism-Collectivism, View of Human Being (Individual-centered vs. Relation-centered), Self Construal (Independent vs. Interdependent), LiberalismConfucianism

Translated from the published article in Korean Journal of Social and Personality Psychology 21(4): 21-53, 2007 with permission from the Korean Psychological Association. ** Professor, Department of Psychology, Sogang University *

37

38 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 1, No. 1, 2011

It is well known that East Asian countries, such as Korea, Japan, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, are characterized by a strong collectivistic culture, which is in contrast with the individualistic cultures of Western societies such as those of North America, Australia, and Northwestern Europe (Hofstede 1980, 1991). Compared to Westerners, East Asians tend to identify themselves in relation to others, prioritize collective goals over individual goals, find the driving force of social action in social rules, duties, and responsibilities, and try to maintain harmonious relationships with the group even when it is not favorable to the individual (Triandis 1995).

Thus, East Asian countries show more interest and place great values on collectivistic behavior, which includes prioritizing group members over the individual, developing and maintaining harmonious relationships with group members, and adhering to social rules and responsibilities.

The single largest commonality among East Asian countries, where collectivistic culture prevails, is their Confucian background. China is the birth place of Confucianism, and from the Han dynasty (202 B.C.E. to 220 C.E.) on, all Chinese dynasties turned to Confucianism for their political ideology, with the result that Confucianism permeated the society and influenced the psychological and behavioral tendencies of the Chinese (Kong, B. 1994: 17). Beginning from the 11th century, Korea has adopted Confucianism in a large scale and has been referred to as “the most Confucian country among all the East Asian countries since the Chosŏn dynasty (1392-1910)”. Korea is more “Confucian than Taiwan and China, let alone Hong Kong and Japan” (Ko, B. 1996: 280). Relatively, Confucianism is not deeply rooted in Japan; but in the Edo period (1603-1867) of the Tokugawa Shogunate, Confucianism became widespread as an “ideology to justify class distinctions for feudality and to create loyalty towards the upper class” (Cho, K. 2000: 219). Since the Meiji Restoration in 1868, Confucianism “played a role to provide the whole society with the justification to guarantee loyalty towards the Emperor of Japan” and has been the dominant ideology until now (Cho, K. 2000: 219).

Confucianism was the ruling ideology of the state throughout almost the entire history of China and most of the early modern history of Korea and Japan. After the Opium War (1840-1842), there arose strong agitation against

A Psychological Inquiry into the Confucian Origins of East Asian Collectivism 39

Confucianism in the aftermath of the Western imperialist penetration of Asia.

Before long, however, such Confucian reform movements as the “Eastern Ways, Western Machines” movement of the late nineteenth century and the Modern Neo-Confucianism of the twentieth century became powerful.

Confucianism is still “the mainstay of cultural tradition and remains as the backbone of the mindset/psyche of East Asians” (Lee, K. 1998: 63) and contributes to creating “the Confucian habits of the heart” (Tu, W. 1996: 343).1 1

The reason why Confucian traditions manifested in East Asia lies in the environmental conditions of Ancient China. China was the source of East Asian cultural development. Nisbett (2003) suggested that the reason why Westerners (individualists) and East Asians (collectivists) differ in general psychological content and process lies in their differences in environmental conditions and philosophical social structure.

According to him, Ancient Greece was surrounded by high mountains, and on the narrow seashore, the polis (city-state) developed. Migration and commerce among cities flourished, and confrontation and debate in the market and policy meetings were very important parts of life. However, in Ancient China, a centralized and hierarchical society developed on the broad and fertile prairie. The Ancient Chinese settled down in one region over a couple of generations and focused on agriculture.

Therefore, pursuing collaboration and harmony with neighbors were very important parts of life.

Therefore, Ancient Greeks discriminated between me vs. not me, human vs. nature, and one object vs. another object and categorized them. Ancient Greeks abstracted their own consistent and invariable essence and tried to find their controlling principles. As a result, the independent subject, which was separated from context, became the focus of attention. Ancient Greeks tried to be aware of stable and invariable features of these separated subjects. Categorization, conflict resolution based on logical regulation, and analytical thinking were developed. On the contrary, the Ancient Chinese viewed the individual subject as not having any meaning and saw everything as existing in context. They tried to understand related roles and obligations in a constantly changing context and achieve harmony and order in collective life. Therefore, the whole field where they were located rather than separated and isolated subjects became the focus of attention. They tried to understand dynamically changing variability in the universal context and develop unity. Similarity of relationships, awareness of the Middle Way, conflict resolution through dialectics, and holistic thinking developed.

Westerners were influenced by Ancient Greek philosophy. They viewed society as consisting of separated and independent individuals as ultimate units, regarding society as only a congregate of individuals. Therefore, they showed strong tendency of

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For example, although only 0.5% of Koreans reported Confucianism as their religion, Koreans demonstrate Confucian behaviors, attitudes, and habits in terms of basic actions and daily practices. Therefore, it has been suggested that 91.7 % of Koreans are “Confucians based on their beliefs and behaviors” (Ko, B. 1996: 294). In contemporary times, “many Koreans are Confucian in practice” (Youn, Y., Park, M., and Hur, N. 1985: 370). According to a group of researchers centered on M. H. Bond, East Asian college students from China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, and Korea retain strong values reflecting “Confucian Dynamics” in comparison to Western college students from the United States, Britain, Canada, Germany, and Sweden (Chinese Culture Connection 1987). This suggests that Confucian practices are part of the general lifestyle of Chinese and Japanese, as in Korea.2 individualism that emphasized the individual rather than the group. Understanding society could be achieved by understanding individuals as units to construct society.

They viewed stable and invariable unique inner traits that individuals accomplished (personality, ability, preference, attitude, need, emotion, will, and so on) as the impetus for individual actions and society’s operation. This individualistic view of human beings made Westerners perceive themselves as having an independent and autonomous existence separated from others. To the contrary, East Asians had been influenced by Ancient Chinese philosophy for a long time. They viewed society as consisting of relationships among people or groups, such as families, that form the prototype for relationships. They thought that a society was an organism in itself.

They demonstrated a collectivistic tendency to emphasize the group where they are situated rather than the individual. Therefore, they demonstrated a relation-centered view of human beings in which each role, responsibility, and group regulation in the relationship is the impetus for individual actions and society’s operation. They perceived themselves as related to others in a network of general relationships.

Finally, Western individualism set priority on the individual as a unit rather than the group and society to which the individual belongs. This individualism flourishes in the ‘liberal’ ideology that views individuals as being equal, independent, and autonomous and emphasizes on the individual’s freedom, rights, and reason. The theoretical origin of modern individualism is liberalism. To the contrary, East Asian collectivism set priority on the group (family, friends, church, alumni, teams of the company, and so on) rather than the individual as a unit. Collectivists emphasized relationships among people. Their theoretical origin can be found in the Confucian system, in which compassion and interest in related others, social responsibility, and morality are important.

2 Keel, H. 1998: 3; Lee, K. 1998: 64-93; Tu, W. 1985, 1996: East Asians’ traditions include

A Psychological Inquiry into the Confucian Origins of East Asian Collectivism 41

In this context, people from contemporary East Asian countries, such as Korea, China, and Japan demonstrate collectivistic psychological and behavioral tendencies which can be assumed to be a result of their common cultural background, the Confucianism. Many studies have been conducted in order to examine this assumption. However, previous research on the influences of Confucian culture on East Asian societies, in general, focused on the negative behavioral characteristics of contemporary East Asians, particularly Koreans. It attributed the following characteristics of Koreans to a variety of systems, such as Daoism and Buddhism, in addition to Confucianism.

Therefore, the theoretical origin of East Asians’ collectivism is not found only in Confucianism. Although there are many differences among these theoretical systems, they have more similarities with one another than they do to Western philosophical and religious systems. “All three orientations shard concerns about harmony, holism, and the mutual influence of everything on almost everything else” (Nisbett 2003: 17).

That is, Daoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism perceive everything holistically rather than individually because all things in the universe relate to each other and exchange influence. These traditions view maintaining harmony in the network as the ultimate purpose of existence. East Asians’ traditional theories view everything, including human beings, as having a constantly changing, flexible existence in relationships: Everything reveals their real nature in the process of change. In this way, East Asians’ traditional theories, such as Daoism, Buddhism, and Confucianism, had something in common; pursuing harmony in comprehensive interdependent relationships and focusing on dynamic variability.

Daoism emphasized connectedness and harmony between human beings and nature and their dynamic exchange of influences. This system viewes worldly human beings as belonging to nature. This system focused on nature rather than human beings (Morohashi, T. 1982/2001; Chen, G. 1994/1996; Nisbett 2003). Buddhism seeks the reason of human beings’ sorrow in the human existence and spatial-temporal connection. Their theory of awareness or self-cultivation viewed phenomena as neither fixed nor invariable; truth is constantly changing and circulating (Yun, H. 1999; Morohashi, T. 1982/2001). That is, Buddhism emphasizes that human beings need to escape from the ties of this world and their dynamic relationships. Buddhism showed a tendency to ignore reality. To the contrary, Confucianism emphasizes interdependent connectedness and dynamics among human beings and promotes harmony in relationships among human beings. That is, Confucianism focuses on human relationships in groups and on the actual world of living (Morohashi, T. 1982/2001; Cho, G. 2003a; Chen, G. 1994/1996). In this context, among East Asian traditional theories, Confucianism is the closest system to the features of collectivism, which has been shown in modern psychology.

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the influence of Confucianism: the loss of autonomy and individual freedom, patriarchal familism, class consciousness, customs that place the government over the people, respect for authority, emphasis on face, past-oriented thinking (Yoon, T. 1969, 1970), trying to read others’ minds, dependency, emphasis on moral justification, suppression of emotion and desire, lack of reasoning ability and creativity (Cha, J. 1994), toadyism, factionalism, looking down on technology, and aspiration after fame (Hyon, S. 1949).

While it is problematic to have focused on the negative aspects of East Asians and especially Koreans, a more serious problem was that the previous research neglected to discuss the specific connection between aspects of Confucianism and present behavioral traits or characteristics. There are several reasons why the previous research struggled with such problems.

First, the researchers had no consistent framework for analysis of the effects of Confucian culture on the people of East Asia and simply tried to match quotations from the Confucian classics to specific behavioral characteristics.

Second, analysis was conducted based on groundless everyday prejudice without collecting empirical data on characteristics of contemporary East Asians’ psychological and behavioral tendencies. And third, the discussion was not based on thorough investigations of Confucianism as a system of thought regarding human nature and behavior, but was carried out on the level of common sense reasoning.

Therefore, this paper attempts to demonstrate that Confucianism provides the background for East Asian collectivism by using empirical data on behavioral characteristics and by using the theoretical framework for understanding human nature found in the Confucian classics.3 This paper makes use of concepts from contemporary cross-cultural psychology to survey and compare psychological and behavioral tendencies between East 3

The Confucianism comprehends the system in the pre-Qin period, that in the HanTang period, Neo-Confucianism in the Song period, that in the Qing period, and contemporary Modern Neo-Confucianism. Among these, the pre-Qin system, opened

by Confucius and succeeded by Mencius and Xunzi, is the originator. In this paper, the author explored the Confucian theories of cognition, emotion, and motivation based on classics of pre-Qin Confucians such as Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi; and NeoConfucians’ new annotations and interpretations about pre-Qin classics, especially those of Zhu Xi of China and T’oegye and Yulgok of Korea.

A Psychological Inquiry into the Confucian Origins of East Asian Collectivism 43

Asians and Westerners along with views on human beings derived from the Confucian classics as a basic frame of analysis. This paper will seek to uncover if there is logical consistency between the empirical data on East Asians’ cognition, emotion, and motivation provided by cross-cultural psychology and the theory on the nature of the mind-and-heart (simsŏng) extracted from Confucian classics.

I. Basic Framework for an Overview of Cultural Differences An urgent task in psychological research on culture is the categorization of various cultures through the use of a small number of comparable types. That is because these become fundamental references to infer the relationship among culture, human psychology, and human behavior through cultural comparison. Therefore, a number of systems have been suggested as the criteria for comparing cultural differences. And the most prominent is the dimension of individualism-collectivism proposed by Hofstede’s comprehensive cross-cultural research (1980) with sixty-six countries (fiftythree cultural groups).

Since then, cross-cultural psychologists expected that the dimension of individualism and collectivism would be the most salient criteria for revealing cultural differences. The reason why cross-cultural psychologists paid more attention to this dimension was as follows (Kagitcibasi 1997): Most of all, this classification system is the most important dimension on which differences prevail among diverse cultures; that is “this is the major dimension creating differences in social actions among a variety of cultures all over the world” (Triandis 1988: 60). Therefore, it was expected that this classification system would be the general principle to explain cultural differences (Greenfield 2000: 231; Kagitcibasi and Berry 1989: 515-520). Then, through this dimension was posited a close relationship between individualism and economic development (Hofstede 1980: 165-169; Hofstede 1991/1995: 116-119) that triggered the cross-cultural researchers’ long-standing interest to explain social phenomena (i.e., economic development) according to psychological tendencies (i.e., need for achievement, modernization, individualistic traits).

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Also, this dimension was similar to other dimensions with which social scientists had been familiar, such as Toennies’ (1887-1957) Gesellshaft– Gemeinshaft. This classification of culture featured simplicity and inclusivity, so it corresponded with the “principle of economy” which was required in scientific theory, and thus appealed to researchers’ interest since the 1980s.

With this background, the individualism-collectivism model “organized cultural differences into overarching patterns, which facilitated comparative research and launched a rapidly expanding body of cultural and cross-cultural research in the ensuing 20 years” (Oyserman, Coon, and Kemmelmeier 2002: 3). Since 1980 a massive amount of work has been carried out with the Individualism-Collectivism model, “so much so that the 1980s may be called the decade of I/C in cross-cultural psychology” (Kagitcibasi 1994: 52), and “judging from the research activity in Individualism/Collectivism up to now, we can expect this field to be active in the near future also” (Kagitcibasi 1997: 39).

According to Hofstede’s findings (1991/1996: 87; Table 3-1), East Asian countries, such as Taiwan (score 17), South Korea (18), Singapore (20), Hong Kong (25), and Japan (46), were skewed towards collectivism. 4 Western countries from North America and Northwestern Europe, such as the United States (91), Australia (90), Britain (89), Canada (80), Netherlands (80), Italy (76), Belgium (75), Denmark (71), and France (71), demonstrated extreme individualism. Looking at these findings, East Asian countries, such as Korea, Japan, and China (including Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore), belong to a typical collectivist culture, and it is assumed that psychological and behavioral tendencies of East Asians should reveal features of collectivism.

Therefore, cross-cultural researchers considered the United States, Canada, 4

In this analysis, the range of distribution for individualism-collectivism scores was from 0 to 100 points. A higher score means stronger individualism, and a lower score means stronger collectivism. The mean estimated theoretically is 50 points. Scores under 50 indicate a collectivistic culture, and scores over 50 indicate an individualistic culture. Although these data did not include China, China has the strongest tendency toward collectivism in the East Asian region, according to Triandis (1995: 90-91). In Hofstede’s data, countries related to China such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore demonstrated strong collectivism. This result suggests that China is a very strong collectivistic society.

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and Australia as representative cultures of individualism and China, Japan, and Korea5 as representative of collectivistic cultures and made comparisons between the characteristics of their psychological and behavioral tendencies (Kagitcibasi 1997; Oyserman et al. 2002; Triandis 1995).

In collectivist cultures, the primary group, such as a family, is the basic constructing unit of a society, and serves as the prototype for all social relationships. People in collectivistic cultures regard human beings and the self as being in a relationship and think that the meaning of life cannot be found away from relationships or the group. Therefore, the “relation-oriented view of human beings” and “interdependent self-construal” emerged as the dominant view of human beings and self-construal. On the contrary, in individualistic cultures, the basic unit of society is the individual who is independent and self-sufficient. People from individualistic cultures define human beings and the self as distinct individuals and the individual thinks himself/herself to be independent from others. They assume that one can find the meaning of life by expressing oneself and actualizing one’s uniqueness.

Therefore, the “individual-centered view of human beings” and “independent self-construal” emerged as the dominant view of human beings and selfconstrual.

These differences in the dominant views of human beings and selfconstrual between collectivist and individualistic cultures create fundamental 5

Even though three countries—Korea, China, and Japan—are categorized as one group of collectivist countries, their common classification does not mean that they do not have any differences among them. They have “collectivism” and “Confucian dynamics” in common. However, they demonstrate huge differences in the dimension of “masculinity-femininity” and “uncertainty avoidance” (Hofstede 1980, 1991/1995).

These three countries also showed differences in the process of Confucian foundation.

For example, in China (after Emperor Mu in the Han period) and Korea (after King Kwangchong in Koryŏ), the Civil Examination System administered and Confucians became governors for national operation. Japan does not have this history.

Even though the three countries had the same background of Confucianism, the developmental process differed. However, according to cross-cultural research in the modern history of the three countries, they have a common history of Confucianism; and thus demonstrate very strong features of collectivism compared to Western individualistic society. Refer to the author’s article (Cho, G. 2007: chapter 6) on this issue and cultural differences among groups in the same country (i.e., among generations, levels of education etc.).

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differences in three aspects: origin of impetus for action, mode to express oneself, and changeability/stability of personhood in varying contexts or time series. Thus, different views of human beings and self-construal can be explained as differences in these three aspects,6 which reflect three central types of awareness regarding the mode of existence of human beings.

The origin of impetus for action refers to the issues of sociality, such as how to relate to others and what kind of uniqueness to retain. Therefore, the origin of impetus for action makes differences of attention, whether actors focus on self-sufficient individuals (individualism) or on contexts and social relationships (collectivism).

The mode to express oneself, or whether to disclose or conceal oneself, refers to issues regarding the activity of self-manipulation. Therefore, they try to control the environment to fit it to the self and in this process manifest oneself actively (individualism) or control the self in accordance with the environment and relationships with others and in this process hide one’s true self (collectivism).

The spatial-temporal changeability/stability refers to issues of consistency in one’s existence. Through this aspect one can divide people by those who identify their individual existence as stable, consistent, and substantial (individualism) or by those who identify their individual existence as a process of change according to their embedded situations and relationships (collectivism).

These three aspects of human behavior and psyche, sociality of human existence (origin of impetus for actions), activity (mode to express one’s self), and changeability/stability (possibility of change in time and space), have been the essential issues of a number of philosophical and psychological explorations to deal with human issues in the history of human intelligence.

1. Location of Impetus for Action This aspect is concerned with whether the impetus for social action comes 6

The author proved that most of the differences found in the cross-cultural studies between collectivism-individualism cultures can be arranged and understood on the basis of these three aspects (Cho, G. 1993, 1996, 1997, 1999a, 2000, 2003, 2006, 2007).

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from relationship features, such as roles, obligations, rules, expectations, and norms, or from unique individual traits, such as personality, capability, values, desires, and emotions. This reveals differences in the conceptions about “to where one’s attention is paid”: either interdependence and relationship characteristics, or independence and individuality characteristics.

This aspect shows the duality of human existence as a social being and as an individual. It reveals differences in attention—whether to focus on social features (collectivism) or individual features (individualism). As a matter of fact, to which features human beings pay more attention has been a central issue in cross-cultural studies (Allport 1968; Dulmen 1997/2005; Fiske, Kitayama, Markus, and Nisbett 1998; Greenfield 2000; Kagitcibasi 1997; Kim 1995; Laurent 1993/2001; Lukes 1973; Nisbett 2003; Triandis 1995). Whether they emphasize sociality or individuality represents fundamental differences in social structures and systems (Nisbett 2003: 29-39; Ross and Nisbett 1991: 177-200). In reality, this aspect corresponds to the fundamental differences between collectivism and individualism.

In collectivistic culture, where the relation-oriented view of human beings dominates, people recognize human beings in the context of interpersonal relationships and place the impetus for actions on the obligations, roles, and concern for others which are implied in such a relationship. Therefore, people attend primarily on one’s relationships with others and on contexts of their relationships. As a result, others, instead of oneself, stand out as the main focus of attention. And the pursuit of harmony in these interpersonal relationships becomes the purpose of any social action (Emphasis on Interdependence and Harmony).

On the contrary, in individualistic cultures, where individual-oriented views of human beings dominate, the impetus for social action stems from psychological traits, such as personality, ability, motivations, emotions, attitudes, and values, which independent and self-sufficient individuals have. In these cultures, individuals and their intrinsic traits are the focus of attention. Therefore, the purpose of any social action would be to expand an individual’s autonomy and uniqueness (Emphasis on Independence and Autonomy).

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2. Style of Self-expression This aspect shows differences in the conception about whether human activity should be immersed inwardly or diffused outwardly. This is rooted in the different perspectives on the object of control. If one thinks that context and relationships with others are the center of the world, one’s own self would stand out as the target to be controlled, and the most of one’s activities are going to orient to one’s inner world. Therefore, in this case, when there is a discrepancy between the needs and goals of oneself and those of others, people tend to suppress their own needs and change themselves to harmonize with the needs of the context and others. On the contrary, if one thinks that his/her own self is at the center of the world, the context and other persons outside of the self will be the orientation of activity. Therefore, when there is a discrepancy between the needs and goals of oneself and those of others, people are likely to find the context and the other outside of the self as the object to control. That is, they tend to change the outer world to fit them in the needs of one’s own self (Markus and Kitayama 1991a: 228-229).

This aspect reveals differences in awareness about the orientation of human activity. Jung (1923/1971) proposed “introversion” and “extraversion” as the two fundamental personality types which represent the general attitudes on life and human activities. “Extraversion refers to an attitude on life that is directed to the outer world, whereas introversion refers to an attitude on life that focuses on the inner world (one’s own thought, emotion, experiences, etc.)” (Min, K. 2002: 68). That is, “extravert is directed toward the outside world while the introvert directs his attention inward” (McAdams 2001: 309). His theory of two types of personality orientation affected a number of personality psychologists, such as Eysenck and Rotter and the “Big Five Model” (Hong, S. 2004: 190-192; Hall and Lindzey 1978/1987: 154-159; McAdams 2001: 368-371), and has been accepted as the most fundamental way to analyze personality and modes of adaptation to the world.7 7

Hall and Lindzey (1978) stated that “the originality and audacity of Jung’s thinking have few parallels in recent scientific theories, and no other person aside from Freud has opened more conceptual windows into what Jung would choose to call ‘the soul of

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In collectivistic cultures, where relation-centered view of human beings prevails, it is expected that people control their desires or goals as much as possible, suppress oneself, yield to, and cooperate with others, because the pursuit of individual desires and goals tend to interfere with harmony and provoke conflicts in social relationships. In addition, in this culture, suppressing and hiding the self in the group would be regarded as the way to maintaining harmony within the group (Emphasis on Self-restraint).

On the contrary, in individualistic cultures, where individual-centered view of human beings is dominant, the pursuit of one’s own desire is considered as a natural human right and it is taken for granted that people control the environment and others in order to pursue their own interests, needs, and goals. Therefore, active self-assertiveness to reveal one’s own uniqueness and self-expression to reveal one’s needs, goals, and emotions are emphasized even though they impair the harmony of the group (Emphasis on Self-assertion).

3. Variability/Stability The aspect of variability/stability reveals differences in the conceptions of human changeability or fixedness; whether the individual, as an actor in a society, is open to change or has fixed invariableness in terms of time (series of past, present, and future) and space (a variety of relationships and contexts). That is whether individuals are “in the process of becoming” in response to changing circumstances in life, or are “fixed and stable entities” that are irresponsive to changing circumstances.

The variability debate over whether human beings can or cannot change has deep roots so that any theory of personality can be correlated to this aspect. The questions that arise here are: Is the individual’s personality structure able to change substantially as time goes on? Furthermore, is change indispensable in the development of a personality structure? Or man’” (149), and appraised Jung’s theoretical system on extraversion-introversion very highly. It is true that “the influence of Jung’s theory is significantly powerful in most of the scientific sphere such as humanities and social sciences” (Hong, S. 2004: 192). The favorable evaluation of Jung’s achievement reveals that the dimension of autonomy and action orientation is one of the core aspects to understand human beings.

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is the apparent change that we observe in others only just the pretense of change in overt behavior without changing innermost structure of one’s personality? Most of personality theorists demonstrate differences in regards to this problem of personality stability (Hjelle and Ziegier 1981/1983: 35). For example, Erickson’s theory is based on the assumption that human beings are constantly changing, whereas Freud’s theory is based on the assumption that the personality, which was developed during infancy, is not going to change basically in the course of life.8 In collectivistic cultures, where the relation-centered view of human beings prevails, the stability of a society depends upon the stability of relationships which are constituents of the society. People in this cultures assume that stability will be realized when they adjust their own actions flexibly in accordance with changing roles in a variety of contexts and relationships. Therefore, flexible variation in dispositions (personality, ability, and so on) in accordance with context is appreciated and emphasized. In collectivistic cultures, an individual’s personality and ability are considered to change as time and contexts are varying, so the present individual is always in the process of changing. Therefore, every person should ascertain and improve one’s weaknesses and shortcomings, and this is the chief way of improving oneself (Emphasis on Variability/Flexibility and Improvement of Shortcomings).

On the contrary, in individualistic cultures, the stability of a society is grounded on the stability of individuals as the constituent elements of the society. People in this culture assume that because each individual has consistent and enduring stable characteristics from birth, they do not change as context and relationships are varying, and regard variability as serious threats to their existence. Therefore, rather than acknowledging their own weaknesses and improving them, they try to find out and expand their own original strengths, and accept this as the chief way of self-improvement 8

According to Hjelle and Ziegler (1981/1983), Freud (35-36, 83), Adler (130-131) and Murray (211) exhibited a strong position of invariability, whereas Erikson (35, 170171), Skinner (257), Bandura (302-303), Kelly (394-395), Maslow (431-432), and Rogers (475-476) asserted strong position of variability. Allport (351-352) suggested a mediating position in this continuum. The author proposed some hints to consider in comparing Western and East Asian cultures in this aspect (Cho, G. 2003: 479-480).

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(Emphasis on Stability and Expansion of Strengths).

4. Comparison of Framework for an Overview of Cultural Differences The differences in the emphasis of these three aspects, which are derived from differences in the modes of understanding human beings, form the cultural imperatives which each society pursues. In collectivistic cultures, which regard social relationships as the ultimate constituent of a society, the pursuit of connectedness and harmony, self-restraint, flexible variation with time and context, and improvement of one’s own weaknesses would become the cultural imperatives. On the contrary, to pursue independence and autonomy, self-assertion, stability, and expansion of one’s own strengths would operate as the cultural imperatives in individualistic cultures, which assume an individual as the basic constituent of a society. According to the viewpoint of social constructionism, these cultural imperatives are molded into general human psychological tendencies, such as cognition, motivation, and emotion (Gergen and Davis 1985; Markus and Kitayama 1991a, 1991b, 1994a, 1994b; Nisbett 2003; Sedikides and Brewer 2001).

In this paper, the author will review research findings about distinctive differences in cognition, emotion, and motivation between people from collectivistic cultures and from individualistic cultures, using abovementioned framework. As elucidated above, the three aspects of the framework correspond to the essential conceptions about human existence; what is the chief constituent of a society (sociality/individuality), whether to hide the self or express it (activity), and whether the self is changeable or fixed (variability). Therefore, the above-mentioned framework, with which the author is going to review and explain psychological and behavioral differences between collectivism and individualism, has very wide range of application and logical coherence. Table 1 provides a summary of the frameworks for an overview of cultural differences.

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Table 1. Cultural differences in emphasis on the three aspects Aspects

Collectivism (Relation-oriented view of human beings)

Individualism (Individual-oriented view of human beings)

Impetus and goals for social action (focus of attention)

Emphasis on connectedness and harmony

Emphasis on autonomy and uniqueness

Mode of self-expression (object to control)

Emphasis on self-restraint

Emphasis on self-assertion

Variability/Stability of Emphasis on flexibility and Personhood (strategy for weakness improvement self-development)

Emphasis on stability and expansion of strengths

II. Characteristics of Mentality and Behavior in Collectivistic and Individualistic Cultures As discussed earlier, collectivism and individualism are the most important systems producing differences in social action among a variety of cultures all over the world. Since the 1980s, this system was held to be a universal principle that can explain cultural differences and thus stimulated most of the cross-cultural researches. These cross-cultural studies compared and analyzed differences in a number of aspects of mentality and behavior such as cognition, emotion, and motivation in college students and adults between two cultural groups: Korea, China, and Japan (collectivistic culture) and the United States, Canada and Australia (individualistic culture). In this paper, the findings of these researches will be summarized based on the differences on emphasis according to the three aspects described in Table 1.9

9

Refer to the author’s articles for details of the differences in three-aspect emphasis between two cultures in the area of cognition, emotion, and motivation (Cho, G. 2003: chapters 3, 4 and 5; 2007: chapters 3, 4 and 5).

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1. Focus of Attention: Emphasis on Connectedness/Harmony vs.

Autonomy/Uniqueness The aspect of the impetus for action refers to whether impetus for social actions are triggered by the relationship traits, such as responsibility, obligation, expectation, and regulation, or by the individually unique psychological traits, such as personality, ability, value, desire, and emotion.

This reveals differences in perceptions of the focus of attention: on relationship and interdependence or on individuality and independence.

In collectivistic cultures, where relation-centered view of human beings dominate, human beings are defined in their relationship with others, thus responsibility/obligation in these relationship and concern for/compassion to related-others would operate as the impetus for social action. In these cultures, people should focus their attention more on the relationship characteristics than on their individuality. Therefore, the purpose of social action becomes the pursuit of harmony in these relationships. On the contrary, in individualistic cultures, where individual-oriented view of human beings dominates, the impetus for social action comes from one’s psychological traits. Therefore, autonomy and uniqueness of an individual is emphasized as the fundamental purpose of social actions.

1) Interpersonal Assessment Due to these differences in focus, the two cultures emphasize different contents in socialization and thus appreciate different features in interpersonal assessment. In collectivistic cultures, the focus of socialization is imposed on learning “Who am I?” (understanding one’s position in the group) and on pursuing similarity with other group members. The establishment of harmonious relationships with group members becomes the main way of positive self-assessment. Therefore, they appreciate highly and try to develop relationship features (kindness, compassion, gentleness, humbleness, generosity, and so on) which would bring about harmony in social relations.

On the contrary, people in individualistic cultures place emphasis on learning “What can I do?” (understanding one’s capabilities) and pursue one’s uniqueness in the process of socialization. Improvements in individual traits

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(ability, achievement, etc.) would be the basis for self-assessment. Therefore, they make an effort to identify and enhance unique strengths of their own, and value highly the traits related to expressing their strengths actively and positively (extroversion, self-assertiveness, leadership, volubility, etc.) (Bond and Hwang 1986; Fiske et al. 1998; Heine and Lehmanm 1997; Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, and Norasakkunkit 1997; Rhee, Uleman, Lee, and Roman 1995; Triandis 1995).

2) Attribution In collectivistic cultures, people perceive their relationships as based on external situational factors rather than individual personality traits. Because they regard social pressure and responsibility in the relationship as impetus for action, they display a situationalist bias (searching the reason for actions in contextual factors rather than personal traits) in their attribution.

In contrast, people in individualistic cultures perceive themselves as an independent entity with psychological stability. Therefore, people consider these independent individual traits as impetus for action and display a dispositionalist bias (finding the reasons for actions primarily in personal traits rather than situational factors) in their attribution (Fiske et al. 1998; Markus and Kitayama 1991a; Morris and Peng 1994; Nisbett 2003; Nisbett, Peng, Choi and Norenzayan 2001).

3) Emotion Collectivists are sensitive to emotions that contribute to maintaining compassionate and harmonious relationships and appreciate these emotions highly. Therefore, in collectivistic cultures, the integrating emotions, such as sympathy, empathy, and shame, which take others as the primary locus of reference, are encouraged in socialization process, and thus collectivists experience these emotions more in the course of everyday life.

By contrast, individualists tend to be sensitive to those emotions which contribute to maintaining and enhancing individual autonomy and uniqueness, and value them highly. Therefore, in individualistic cultures, the differentiating emotions, such as pride, happiness, or anger, which regard an individual’s inner states as the primary locus of reference and which can promote separation and independence among individuals, are encouraged in

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the process of socialization, and thus individualists experience these emotions more in everyday life (Markus and Kitayama 1991a, 1994b; Matsumoto 1989).

4) Motivation In collectivistic cultures, communion motives are appreciated because these motives “produce behavior that brings the individual closer to other people and fosters a sense of community between the person and his or her social environment” (Geen 1995: 249). This communion motives prioritize the concern for others and the group over the individual, and are oriented toward belonging to the group. The motives of belongingness, respect, imitation, closeness, and social forgiveness are included in this category, and are appeared more frequently in the collectivistic cultures than in individualistic cultures.

On the contrary, in individualistic cultures, agency motives are emphasized.

These motives “are associated with behavior that tends to separate the individual from the immediate community and to emphasize individual gains that are either independent of or at the expense of other persons in the social environment” (Geen 1995: 249). This agency motives prioritize the individual over others or the group, and promote and enhance individualists’ sense of individual independence from others. They enclude the motives of autonomy, independence, success, dominance, and self-demonstration and so on, and are experienced more in individualistic cultures (Geen 1995; Markus and Kitayama 1991a; Wiggins 1992).

2. Object to Control: Emphasis on Self-restraint vs. Self-assertion Differences in the styles of self-expression reveal differences in awareness about whether human activity should be submerged inwardly or diffused outwardly. This aspect reflects differences in perspectives regarding what is considered to be the object to control. If one assumes that surrounding context and relationships with others are at the center of all happenings, and that one’s activities should direct toward oneself, then he/she would find the object to control in his/her own self. But if the self is located at the center of all things, and one’s activities direct toward the surrounding context and others, then he/she finds the object to control in the context or others besides

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oneself.

In this background, it is presumed that in collectivistic cultures, where the relation-centered view of human beings prevail and the pursuits of personal needs or goals are assumed to disrupt harmony and to create conflicts in social relationships, people are encouraged to control their desires or goals as much as possible, to suppress the self, to yield to others, and to cooperate with them. To the contrary, in individualistic cultures, where the individualcentered view of human beings are dominant and individuals’ pursuit of their personal goals and desires are taken for granted because it is one of their natural rights, it is encouraged for their members to control the environment and others and to express oneself freely and actively in the course of pursuing their personal interests, needs, and goals.

1) Interpersonal assessment Differences in the modes of self-expression bring forth the differences in the style of resolving interpersonal conflicts. People in collectivistic cultures like to resolve conflicts through making concession and mediation, and prefer to avoid conflicts rather than to face them, whereas people in individualistic cultures like to resolve conflicts by facing them through competition and confrontation (Nisbett 2003; Peng and Nisbett 1999; Triandis 1989).

Differences in conflict resolution style have a connection with differences in features that are valued in each culture. That is, in collectivistic cultures, making concession, cooperation, modesty, and introversion are valued as contributing to harmonious relationships, whereas in individualistic cultures, activeness, frankness, competition, and extraversion to express personal uniqueness and achievement are valued (Barnlund 1975).

2) Attribution Collectivists are more likely to show a modesty bias in the process of attributing achievement; they attribute their own success to external factors such as luck or others’ help, whereas attributing failure to internal factors such as deficiency of ability or effort.

To the contrary, individualists tend to display an ego-enhancing bias; they attribute their success to internal factors such as superior capability, and attribute failure to external factors such as bad luck (Davis and Stephan 1980;

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Fiske et al. 1998; Heine and Lehman 1977; Markus and Kitayama 1991a).

3) Emotion The display rules for showing one’s emotional state regulate and control emotional expression in a social context (Ekman 1982). In collectivistic cultures, the expression of other-focused emotions such as sympathy and empathy is recommended, but expression of ego-centered emotions such as pride and anger is inhibited.

In contrast, in individualistic cultures, because emotional expression is assumed to reflect frankness and sincerity, people are advised to express freely any affects. In these cultures, inhibition of emotional expression is seen as provoking psychological maladjustment, so to express freely even the negative affect such as anger is assumed to bring about positive results in regulating relations among humans (Markus and Kitayama 1991a, 1994b; Matsumoto 1989, 2000).

4) Motivation In collectivistic cultures, people experience personal competency through sensitivity toward others, adjustment to the needs of the context, and selfinhibition and regulation. In these cultures, the meaning of control becomes inhibiting inner traits such as personal needs, goals, and feelings in order to develop the sense of interdependence and connectedness. Therefore, selfinhibition and the maintenance of harmonious interpersonal relationships are the sources of self-respect, and the motives to control inner desires are strongly encouraged.

To the contrary, in individualistic cultures, because people experience personal competency through expressing inner needs, feelings, and capabilities freely and overcoming social pressure actively, control means changing the social context and external restraints in order to achieve personal goals.

Therefore, in these cultures, uniqueness, superiority, effective self-expression, and freedom from external restraints are the sources of self-respect, and motives to control the external environment are promoted (Markus and Kitayama 1991a; Rothbaum, Weisz, and Synder 1982; Weisz, Rothbaum, and Blackburn 1984).

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3. Variability in Mindset and Action: Emphasis on Flexible Change vs.

Stability The aspect of variability in human mindset (e.g., personality, ability, etc.) and behavior represents differences in awareness of whether the individual as a living organism in society is open or closed in regard to time (time sequence such as past, present, future) and space (a variety of contexts and relationships).

In collectivistic cultures with relation-centered view of human beings, they assume that stability of a society is based on the stability of relationships of which the society is constructed, and that social stability will be achieved when an individual regulates and vary his/her behavior according to the variation of contexts and relationships, so flexible variations in accordance with the changing contexts are highly emphasized. However, in individualistic cultures with an individual-centered view of human beings, people assume that individual stability is the basis of the stability of a society and that each individual has stable and consistent characteristics from birth. Therefore, in these cultures, variability with the changing contexts and inconsistency in the modes of adaptation are regarded as serious threats to the individual, so stability and consistency in the process of living are strongly appreciated.

1) Interpersonal assessment Collectivists strongly believe in variability, that is, they believe that personality can change according to time and context, so individual behavior is induced by interactions with context rather than stable inner characteristics (Norenzayan, Choi, and Nisbett 2002). It was found that collectivists demonstrate the “Barnum effect� (the phenomena that people think they have both positive traits such as politeness and negative traits such as rudeness as well) more often than individualists do (Choi, I. and Choi, Y. 2002), and they (Koreans, Chinese, and Japanese) indicate that the rate of negative traits and positive traits that they have is the same or the percentage of negative traits is higher than their positive ones (Bond and Cheung 1983; Stigler, Smith, and Mao 1985). This means that negative traits are tolerated as likely as positive ones in collectivistic cultures.

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On the contrary, individualists (Americans) identify themselves with only positive traits; that is, they evaluate that their positive traits outnumber their negative ones by four or five times (Stigler et al. 1985).

2) Attribution In collectivistic cultures, as people emphasize variability—that is, they change their behaviors in accordance with variations in context—the effort to change to fit one’s context is more valued than relatively stable and fixed capabilities; thus, people tend to attribute performance to effort rather than ability.

In contrast, because individualists regard stable and consistent traits as the impetus for actions, fixed and stable capability is valued more than contextvariable effort, and people are more likely to attribute performance to ability (Mizokawa and Ryckman 1990; Stevenson and Stigler 1992).

3) Emotion In collectivistic cultures, the cultural imperative is the establishment of connectedness, so people focus on compassion and harmony maintenance and make efforts toward self-inhibition, exploring one’s weaknesses, and improving them. Therefore, they are more sensitive to their own negative traits and negative feelings than their positive traits and positive feelings, and are more accepting of negative feelings. That is, collectivists frequently experience negative feelings such as shame, sadness, pity, and regret, and they tend to consider those feelings desirable.

In contrast, in individualistic cultures, people are more sensitive to positive feelings, such as pride, happiness, joy, and pleasure, and they tend to experience positive feelings more frequently. In these cultures, only positive feelings are considered to be desirable, and the extent of tolerance of negative feelings is very limited (Cha, K. 1995; Diener, Suh, Smith, and Shao 1995; Kitayama and Markus 1991a, 1994b; Suh and Diener 1995).

4) Motivation As people in collectivist cultures acknowledge and focus on variability in psychological and behavioral tendencies, discrepancy between individual inner traits and overt behaviors or between actions in various social settings are not regarded as troubles, thus people in these cultures do not tend to

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pursue consistency.

In contrast, since people in individualistic cultures see individual behavior as the representation of stable inner traits, discrepancy between inner traits and behaviors or between actions in social contexts are expected to induce serious confusion in individual identity, and the motives to achieve consistency become stronger in these cultures (Fiske et al. 1998; Heine and Lehman 1997; Markus and Kitayama 1991; Nisbett et al. 2001).

III. C onfucianism and Features of Collectivistic Culture Confucianism, which has been the basis of East Asian’s life since ancient times, starts with propositions about innate characteristics of a person (Theory of Human Nature), then induces from this propositions the ideal states a person can achieve (Theory of the Superior Man), the way to accomplish this ideal (Theory of Self-cultivation) and the lifestyles of the ideal person (Theory of Moral Practice) (Cho, G. 1998, 199b, 2003, 2006, 2007). Among these four systems, the basis of Confucianism is the theory of human nature (Kim, C. 1982: 170, 172-175; Fung, Y. 1948/1977: 105-107; Needham 1969/1986: 2129). According to the Confucian understanding of human nature, all human beings are endowed with the Four Beginnings (benevolence [humanity, humaneness], righteousness, propriety, and wisdom) which form the basis of the sociality and morality of human existence. All of the other systems of Confucianism (the Superior Man, moral practice, and self-cultivation) are based on this understanding of human nature as a social and moral being, and we can trace the intellectual foundation of East Asian collectivism on this background.

The core of Confucianism can be summarized as the “expansion of human existence.” Confucians scrutinize the possibility of existence-expansion through perspectives on the innateness of morality, sociality, and plasticity (human nature), establish an ideal model of existence-expansion (Superior Man), and suggest a method to expand one’s existence (self-cultivation and moral practice).

The most basic way to expand human existence put forth by Confucianism

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is to have concern for others, to have compassion for them, and to assist them, as well as the self, in achieving the status of Superior Man, thereby to unite oneself with others in the Way that human beings should pursue in the course of everyday life.

Confucianism regards interest in and compassion for others as the basic impetus of human life. East Asians have lived with Confucianism as a basic way of life for a long time. Therefore, Confucianism was the theoretical background that led collectivism to flourish in East Asian society. In this context, it is evident that above-mentioned three aspects of emphasis in modern collectivistic cultures (connectedness and harmony, self-restraint, and variability and self-improvement) have a close logical relationship with understandings of human beings and their psychology in Confucianism.

1. Confucian View of Human Beings and Its Collectivistic Features The basis for Confucians’ emphasis on the expansion of human existence lies in the fundamental framework by which they understand human beings.

The basic perspective for understanding human beings permeates the Confucian classics, especially those from pre-Qin Confucianism, and can be summarized in three different ways.10 Confucians assert that human beings are identified as having infinite potential and plasticity, existing and living in social relations, and pursuing morality subjectively. That is, humans are social beings who should accept and perform social responsibility given to them in the interpersonal relations and are dynamic moral subjects with the potential to overcome their personal/biological limitations, and thereby to expand their existence.

The following three statements in Xue Er (Book 1), chapter 1 11 of the Analects written by Confucius, the founder of Confucianism, reveal that Confucians identified human beings from these three perspectives.

10

Refer to the author’s article for details (Cho, G. 2006: 297-320; 2007: chapter 2).

This refers to Chapter 1, Xue Er (Book 1) in the Analects based on Zhu Xi’s The Collected Annotations of the Analects. From now on, citation of the Analects will follow this example.

11

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Confucius said: “To learn and to realize what one has learned all the time, isn’t that a pleasure? A still greater pleasure rests in friends coming from far, doesn’t it? Is he not a Superior Man who feels no discomposure at others’ failure to appreciate him?”

The first statement indicates that human beings possess infinite possibilities (a person can become a Superior Man through learning); the second shows that humans are social beings (a person is supposed to get along with others in relationships); and the third reveals that human beings are dynamic moral subjects (the self, as a moral being, is the subject for everything in life, and each individual needs to find behavioral impetus in the morality one has from birth and take full responsibility by oneself).

1) Person as a Social Being and Focus of Attention (1) Social Being In the Analects Confucius asserted that humanity (benevolence) is the core of his thought, and the compassion for and concern about others form the core of humanity. Confucius said: “Humanity (benevolence) is establishing others first if you want to establish yourself, and letting other achieve first if you want to achieve” (Analects, Yong Ye, 28); “Humanity (benevolence) is not allowing others to do what I do not want to do” (Yan Yuan, 2; Wei Ling Gong, 23); and “Humanity (benevolence) means loving others (Yan Yuan, 22).” This reveals that Confucius defined human beings’ sociality (compassion for and concern about others) as the core of human existence.

The fact that Confucius emphasized the features of humans as social beings most of all can be found in his proposition of Rectification of Names.

He said that conducting completely one’s own responsibility in society is the core of maintaining social order and harmony. That is, Confucius stated: “The king needs to take the responsibility of the king, the minister needs to take the responsibility of the minister, the parent needs to take the parent’s responsibility, and the child needs to take the child’s responsibility” (Yan Yuan, 11). This proposition is the fundamental basis of both political and social affairs to create order and harmony in society, as seen in Confucius’ statement that if he took responsibility for political affairs, he would first rectify names (work to let each individual fully meet his or her own

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responsibility) (Zi Lu, 3).

Confucius’ opinion was followed Mencius and Xunzi in the pre-Qin period. Mencius said that human beings possess inherently the basis of morality, which is known from the fact that everyone loves his/her parents and respects his/her elder siblings without learning (Mencius, Jin Xin I, 15).12 Mencius asserted that “The core of humanity (benevolence) is living with one’s parents, the core of righteousness is following elder siblings, the core of wisdom is learning and maintaining these two, and the core of propriety is regulating these two and decorating them beautifully” (Li Lou I, 27). From this assertion, we can understand that Mencius sought for the core of moral principles—humanity (benevolence), righteousness, propriety, and wisdom— in the emotions sprung up in social relationships (feelings of love for one’s family and respect for the old).

In this way, Mencius found the purpose of human existence in social relationships. He proposed that features of human existence manifest in interpersonal relationships such as parent-child, king-minister, husbandwife, old-young, and friend-friend, and the purpose of individual existence cannot be found without and outside these interpersonal relations. According to him, there are five responsibilities that human beings need to meet in each of the five relations above, respectively: affection, righteousness, separation of functions, order, and trust, through which harmony can be brought to these relations. The statement that “If human beings live freely without learning, they are going to be animals, so the Sage was concerned and had people learn to observe human responsibilities” (Teng Wen Gong I, 4) demonstrates Mencius’ opinion.

Xunzi also focused on sociality and identified social relationships as the basis of human existence. He argued that interdependence and connectedness is the very core features of human existence, and thus human beings do not live independently and separately from each other. Xunzi proposed: “The relation of king-minister, parent-child, elder-younger siblings, and husbandwife is the first and the last, the last and the first, has the same principle as Heaven, continues to exist forever in all ages, and is called ‘the great 12

This refers to Chapter 15, Jin Xin I in Mencius based on Zhu Xi’s The Collected Annotations of Mencius. From now on, citation of Mencius will follow this example.

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basis’” (Xunzi, Wang Zhi, 19-20).13 This statement points out that social relationships, such as parent-child, king-minister, old-young, husband-wife and friend-friend, are the ultimate unit to construct a society.

As confirmed evidently up to now, Confucians seek fundamental features of human existence in their sociality. That is, Confucianism is the system to identify features of human existence in the various interpersonal relations, and, to summarize in a word, it has the perspective to view person as a social being. Because the feature of sociality is the core of Confucian view of human beings, all the other important thoughts of Confucianism, such as the innateness of Four Moral Principles (benevolence [humanity, humaneness], righteousness, propriety, and wisdom), are derived from this perspective of human sociality.

(2) Emphasis on Others and Relationships The Confucian proposition to understand person as a social being derives from the conception of social relationships as the ultimate constituent of a society. Confucians argue that the purpose of social actions is to pursue order and harmony in interpersonal relationships, and this order and harmony can be achieved by performing his/her original responsibilities inherent in each of the relationships. Therefore, in Confucianism, the impetus for social action can be found in performing responsibility and obligation in relationships with others, and thus interconnectedness and harmony among people and concerns about others are emphasized. This position is consistent with the characteristics of collectivistic cultures, which focus on connectedness and harmony among people, contrary to individualistic cultures, which focus on autonomy and independence, as summarized in the first row of Table 1 (focus of attention).

2) Person as a Moral Being and the Object to Control (1) Moral being The second feature of the Confucian understanding of human beings is emphasis on the activeness and subjectivity of human beings as moral 13

This refers to pages 19-20, Wangshi in Xunzi based on Wang Shunkyum’s The Collected Annotations of Xunzi. From now on, citation of Xunzi will follow this example.

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subjects. Confucians seek the basis of morality in ordinary men’s subjective perception of the innateness of their sociality and in their search for their own moral responsibility in social relations. Confucius said: “Practicing humanity (benevolence) depends on the self, not others” (Analects, Yan Yuan, 1). That is, the Superior Man is well aware that he himself is a moral subject, so “Contrary to ordinary people who lay their responsibilities on others, the Superior Man takes his own responsibility” (Wei Ling Gong, 20). Therefore, the “Superior Man feels no discomposure at others’ failure to appreciate him” (Xue Er, 1), because the Superior Man searches the cause (the reason why others do not appreciate his true superiority or nobleness) in his own incapability or deficiency (Li Ren, 14).

Mencius found the basis of human activeness and identity in the fact that human beings innately possess the beginnings of morality: humanity (benevolence), righteousness, propriety, and wisdom (Mencius, Gong Sun Chou I, 6). Mencius said that human beings need to be aware that they themselves are moral subjects and expand this awareness in order to maintain the good moral beginnings that they originally possess (Gong Sun Chou I, 6). In order to perceive and expand themselves as moral subjects, “Human beings need to find all responsibilities in themselves” (Li Lou I, 4). That is, because “Everyman has all the principles of things” (Jin Xin I, 4), every person is a subject of all things, and all things are from him/her, thus he/she, as an autonomous subject, need to find all the responsibilities in himself/ herself.

Xunzi also identified humans as active and autonomous beings in moral point of view. According to him, human beings grant order to Nature, govern all things by their own active and autonomous effort (Xunzi, Tianlun, 2123), and take part in the harmony of all things (Theory of Ritual, 24-25). “The Way is neither from Heaven nor from Earth. The Way is what humans should conduct and the Superior Man is to follow” (Ruxiao, 9-10). This opinion reveals the position of understanding humans as the entities who identify the self as active and autonomous moral being.

Such human activeness and subjectivity is based on awareness of human sociality and morality. The self possesses all the basis of morality innately, should maintain and nurture them, and should practice them in daily life; this is the basic Confucian position regarding the attitude toward an active

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and autonomous life. Therefore, the position to understand human beings as active moral subjects originate from the perspective on humans as social beings.

(2) Emphasis on Self-control The position of Confucians to understand human beings as active subjects is derived from their awareness that human beings innately possess the basis of morality. This position tends to attribute the causes of any social actions to one’s innate moralities, and to emphasize exploring this inner world as the originator of one’s social actions. That is, every person is the source of active and autonomous actions, and so the person takes responsibility for all the results of one’s actions automatically. Therefore, Confucians assume that the very target to control is oneself as the originator of one’s actions, and selfrestraint is recommended rather than self-assertion in situations of conflict.

As depicted in the aspect of the object to control (mode of expressing the self) in the second row of Table 1, this is the same as the position of collectivistic cultures in emphasizing self-restraint, unlike the individualistic cultures’ focus on self-assertion.

3) Person as a Plastic (Variable) Being and Action Variability (1) Plastic (Variable) Being From pre-Qin period on, Confucianism emphasizes the importance of learning and teaching. Confucians define human beings not as a congregate of fixed and self-sufficient attributes but as a plastic and variable being who are in the process of becoming through learning. Confucius called himself “the person who loves to learn” (Analects, Gong Ye Chang, 27) and “the person who does not neglect teaching” (Shu Er, 33). This shows how much Confucius emphasized the values of learning and teaching in human life. Confucius and his disciples tried to improve themselves through learning, teaching, reflecting on what they had learned, and practicing them in daily life; and thought this is the very core in the process of self-cultivation (Xue Er, 4; Shu Er, 2, 3). Confucius believed that teaching enables anyone to be nice. He did not discriminate against people (Wei Ling Gong, 38) and taught anyone who came to see him politely (Shu Er, 7).

Although Confucius called himself the person who loves to learn (Gong Ye

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Chang, 27), he said that Yen Hui was the only one of his disciples who loves to learn. He said: “One of the conditions to love learning is not repeating a fault like Yen Hui” (Yong Ye, 2) and “It is a fault that one does not correct one’s faults” (Wei Ling Gong, 29). And he also stated: “Do not mind correcting a fault” (Xue Er, 8; Zi Lu, 24). According to him, the attitude to try to achieve self-improvement by reflecting on the self and correcting one’s faults is the criteria to evaluate the value of a person. This shows evidently Confucius’ understanding of human beings as an entity with infinite possibility and plasticity.

Confucius’ position emphasizing the core value of learning and teaching in the process of self-improvement was followed by Mencius and Xunzi.

According to Mencius, because any one possesses from birth the Intuitive Knowledge that he/she has all the beginnings of morality and the Intuitive Ability to practice them in daily life, he/she should reflect on his/her shortcomings and improve them until reaching to an ideal state people can achieve (Mencius, Jin Xin I, 15). He argued: “If human beings realize and expand their own innate good beginnings, anyone can become a Sage” (Gao Zi II, 2) Xunzi also identified humans as beings with infinite possibilities as Confucius did. This can be reasoned easily from his conceptions of human nature and self-cultivation. According to him, human beings possess innate abilities to perceive their original morality and to practice them in daily living (Xunzi, Zhengming, 3), and thus, they can reach to the state of a Superior Man, an ideal state of a person, through learning and practicing Propriety, the supreme regulative system of the Way, with these innate capabilities (Rongru, 31-32; Xing’e, 2-3, 13-14). This reveals well Xunzi’s proposition that human beings are not defined as having fixed and complete attributes, but as having infinite capabilities and possibility to become.

As expressed evidently in the above statements, Confucians identify the value of human beings in their future states of becoming, rather than in their past achievements, fixed attributes they have got. This position to understand humans in their future becoming, together with the view of humans as social and moral beings, comprises the whole system of Confucian’s perspectives on human beings.

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(2) Emphasis on Self-improvement The position to understand humans as a plastic and variable being with possibility of future becoming originates from the perspective that human beings possess the capacity for moral awareness and practice. This is the basis of belief in the ability to change, which means that human beings are able to perceive and perform constantly changing roles and responsibilities in the network of varying social relations. In addition, this is the basis for the belief in the capability to change through which human beings accomplish selfimprovement by finding out and correcting their shortcomings and faults.

Therefore, the emphasis on human beings’ possibility to change and efforts to accomplish self-improvement come from the position to understand humans as beings to have this possibility to change. This position is consistent with that of collectivistic cultures, which highlight the capability to meet the needs of situational change, contrary to individualistic cultures, which emphasizes consistent psychological and behavioral stability in the aspect of variability dimension, as depicted at the third row of Table 1.

2. Confucian Understandings of Psychology and Their Collectivistic Features The author proposed the framework for comparison the differences between collectivistic and individualistic cultures in three aspects (focus of attention, object to control, and variability) in Table 1, and reviewed the differences between these two cultures with this framework and found the differences in psychological and behavioral tendencies, such as interpersonal assessment, attribution, emotion, and motivation between these two cultures, are consistent with the anticipations of the framework. Then in above section, the author made it clear that the emphasis on connectedness and harmony, self-restraint, and variability and self-improvement observed in collectivistic cultures are exactly congruent with the Confucian view of human beings, which identify humans as social beings, active moral subjects, and beings with possibility, respectively. From these results, the conjecture that Confucian system has acted as the leading guard to flourish collectivistic culture in East Asian society gets full support. Now, the author will search for the theories of cognition (interpersonal assessment and attribution), emotion,

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and motivation derived from the Confucian classics, and explore if the features appeared in these Confucian theories have logical congruence with characteristics found in collectivistic cultures, so as to ascertain, once more, on a firm theoretical and empirical ground that Confucianism has been the intellectual background of East Asian collectivism.

1) Confucian Theory of Social Cognition and Its Collectivistic Characteristics Contrary to the traditions of Western philosophy since ancient Greece, which have understood the structure of human psychology based on three constituent system of cognition, emotion, and motivation with special emphasis on rationality (cognition), Confucians understand the structure of human psychology based on four constituent system of morality, cognition, emotion, and motivation, and they assert that morality must integrate and control the other structural elements of psychology. The Superior Man is the person who achieves the state in which morality integrates and controls all the rest constituents of his/her mindset. As the Superior Man is the ideal human type put forth by Confucians, he/she would become the standard against which Confucians evaluate the value of a person and the level he/ she arrived. Therefore, on what criteria the Superior Man assesses persons and from which elements he searches for the causes of his actions become the prototypic model of Confucian theory of social cognition (interpersonal assessment and attribution). In this context, we can extract social cognition theory originating from Confucianism from the character and attributional style of the Superior Man.14 In the Analects, Confucius suggested three types of the Superior Man: one who improves the self and achieves the perfection of character by selfcultivation through reverential carefulness; one who promotes harmony with others based on the perfection of character; and one who succors all the people based on the perfection of character (Xian Wen, 45). In the Mencius, Mencius suggested three types of the Sage: one who achieves the perfection of character and maintains one’s purity; one who promotes harmony in social relationships; and one who takes on and fulfills social responsibility (Wan Zhang II, 1). In the Xunzi, Xunzi seeks features of the Superior Man and 14

Refer to the author’s article for details (Cho, G. 2003: chapter 6; 2007: chapter 3).

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the Sage in four aspects: self-cultivation, problem-centered attitude in work situation, interpersonal harmony, and the acceptance of social responsibility (Jundao, 6-7). In the Great Learning, three rules—residing in the state of ultimate good, loving the people and caring for them, and illustrating one’s innate virtue to enable all people to realize that they are their own moral subjects—were put forth as the ultimate goal of great learning.

Improving the self and achieving perfection of character through cultivating oneself (Confucius); maintaining the purity of one’s character (Mencius); cultivating oneself and having problem-centered attitudes in working situations (Xunzi); and residing in the state of ultimate good (the Great Learning): All of these refer to personal features of the ideal persons (the Superior Man and the Sage) in terms of their personal becoming as moral subjects. Promoting harmony with others in interpersonal relations (Concius, Mencius, and Xunzi); and loving the people and caring for them (the Great Learning): These are features of the ideal persons in terms of their social relationships with others as social beings. Succoring all the people who live together in this world (Confucius); accepting and fulfilling social responsibilities (Mencius and Xunzi); and teaching and illustrating people to realize that they are their own moral subjects (the Great Learning): These demonstrate features of the ideal persons in terms of their performing social responsibilities they have got in the course of living together in this social world. Therefore, Confucianism describes the ideal image of human beings in three aspects: self-completion via self-cultivation, promotion of peace and amity in interpersonal relationships, and acceptance and fulfillment of social responsibilities.

(1) Acceptance of Social Responsibilities and Emphasis on Connectedness/ Harmony The Superior Man who achieves perfection of character through selfcultivation does not develop harmony only with people around him, such as family, relatives, or friends. He thinks that the purpose of humans’ existence as social beings is in the acceptance and fulfillment of social responsibilities. And he tries to teach all people in the world the Way of humanity (benevolence) and righteousness and leads them to follow this Way. Thus, he assumes that succoring all the people is responsibilities assigned by Heaven, and that

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he should accept and try to fulfill them willingly. Confucius expressed this feature of the Superior Man as follows: The Superior Man who achieves moral self-improvement through self-cultivation does not stop at self-cultivation and caring for others. He is interested in the whole society, leads people to the state of moral awareness, and makes them feel more comfortable (Analects, Xian Wen, 45; Gong Ye Chang, 15; Yan Yuan 1, 16; Wei Ling Gong, 17; Zi Chang, 3). That is, the Superior Man is aware that the self relates to all other people, maintains a harmonious life with them, and takes responsibilities to succor them all.

Mencius said that “the Superior Man takes upon himself the heavy charge of the whole world” (Mencius, Wan Zhang I, 7; Wang Zhang II, 1). He tries to take upon himself the heavy responsibilities of saving a chaotic society and protecting people around him, and to meet these responsibilities with determination (Gong Sun Chou I, 2; Gong Sun Chou II, 2; Wan Zhang I, 6, 7; Wan Zhang II, 1; Gao Zi II, 6; Jin Xin I, 31; Jin Xin II, 38). Xunzi said that the Superior Man respects older people and deals with younger people with propriety; does not try to compete with others; performs their own social responsibilities; assists others in meeting their responsibilities; and therefore develops connectedness and harmony among people (Xunzi, Jundao, 6-7). In the Great Learning, these features of the Superior Man enable all the people to live in harmonious and peaceful World through enabling them to realize that they themselves are moral subjects.

Overall, the Superior Man achieves moral perfection of character; leads people around him to feel comfortable; develops connectedness with all the people of the world; takes responsibilities to lead and succor them; and meets these responsibilities in everyday life. He lives with strong connections with others, focuses on developing harmony in the course of life, and takes social responsibilities.

As evidently shown up to now, the core feature of the character of the Superior Man is the acceptance of social responsibilities. This feature originates from the understanding of human existence as “social beings”; the Superior Man understands human beings in their “connection” with others and accomplishes “harmony” with them. The Superior Man considers relationship with others as representing the meaning of human existence and highlights sociality in the course of life. Therefore, Confucians assert that people always

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need to achieve and maintain harmonious connections with others, and to take upon themselves social responsibilities. In this context, it is clear that “taking and completing social responsibilities in everyday life” produces “connectedness” and “harmony” in social relations, which collectivists in East Asia emphasize in the aspect of the focus of attention as depicted in Table 1. Here we can confirm a basis of the argument that the background of East Asian collectivism lies in the Confucian system.

(2) Promotion of Peace/Amity in Interpersonal Relationships and Emphasis on Self-restraint Confucius said that the Superior Man can promote harmony with others after cultivating himself with reverential carefulness (Analects, Xian Wen, 45); and highlighted the attitude of the Superior Man to live with others harmoniously in his daily life (Wei Zheng, 14; Yan Yuan, 5; Zi Lu, 23; Wei Ling Gong, 21; Yang Huo 4, 24). According to Confucius, the Superior Man with moral selfcultivation is involved not only in self-improvement, but also in leading people around him to a state of moral awareness by building harmonious and comfortable relationships with them.

Mencius identified these features as those of the Sage who promotes harmony in interpersonal relations (Mencius, Wang Zhang II, 1). Mencius suggested that such an ideal person like Hui of Liu-Hsia (the prototypic Sage of harmony) can embrace all people, because he makes peaceful relations with any other persons and receives them with attitudes of amity and harmony (Gong Sun Chou I, 2; Wang Zhang II, 1; Gaozi II, 6; Jinxin I, 22; Jinxin II, 15). Xunzi addressed that the Superior Man embraces all the people in interpersonal relationships, guides them with righteousness so that they do not feel confused, and attains harmony among them (Xunzi, Chendao, 6-7). In the Great Learning, these features of the Superior Man are the second purpose of great learning, which was termed loving the people, i.e. after achieving moral perfection, sharing it with people so as to attain harmonious relationships. Therefore, in Confucian classics, following Confucius’ idea that the Superior Man promotes with and gives rest to all the people after attaining self-cultivation, developing harmony in interpersonal relationships was set forth as one of the features of the ideal person.

The reason why the Superior Man can develop harmony in interpersonal

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relationships is that he is interested in others in making relationships with them, considers others first, embraces a wide range of people, and inhibits his own self. Confucius addressed: “Humanity (benevolence) means loving others” (Analects, Yan Yuan, 22); “Humanity is not doing unto others that which I would not want to be done to myself ” (Yan Yuan, 2; Wei Ling Gong, 23); and “Humanity is establishing others first if you want to establish yourself, and letting others achieve first if you want to achieve” (Yong Ye, 28). In these statements, Confucius asserted that considering others first and inhibiting the self are shortcuts to develop harmony with others.

Mencius assumed that having the attitude of concern for and compassion on others makes it possible for a person “to influence others through selfinhibition” (Mencius, Liang Hui Wang I, 7), and “to be with others whether they were happy or not” (Liang Hui Wang II, 4). Xunzi suggested that to have concern for and compassion on others leads “to embrace others generously.”

According to Xunzi, embracing others generously is one of the features of the Superior Man. The Superior Man inhibits the self and embraces all the people, including who are lazy, foolish, uneducated, and impure (Xunzi, Feixiang, 17), as the Superior Man “understands others from his own standards” (Feixiang, 13). In the Great Learning, “understanding others on the basis of the self ” (the Great Learning, 10) was identified as the core of developing harmony in interpersonal relationships. The Superior Man embraces all the people with the attitude of putting themselves in the position of others, shows interest in others, considers others first, inhibits the self, and finally develops harmonious interpersonal relationships.

The argument to posit harmonious interpersonal relationships as the second feature of the Superior Man is derived from the Confucians’ conception of human beings as active moral subjects. Because the Superior Man realizes fully that others also possess the same morality, needs, preferences, and emotions as his, it is possible for him to inhibit his own self and to consider others first in interpersonal relationships. In this context, it is evident that building and maintaining harmonious relationships with others would produce “the attitudes of self-restraint,” which East Asian collectivists stress in the aspect of the object to control as depicted in Table 1. Here we can validate another basis of the argument that the background of East Asian collectivism lies in the Confucian system.

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(3) Encouragement of Self-cultivation and Emphasis on Flexibility/Selfimprovement Confucius stated that “The Superior Man is a person who cultivates himself in reverential carefulness” (Analects, Xian Wen, 45), so the most important feature of the Superior Man is to be aware of the fact that he himself is the subject of morality and to practice these innate moralities in daily life through self-cultivation. Because the Superior Man achieves self-cultivation through practicing humanity (benevolence) and righteousness in daily life, he/she does not mind correcting himself/herself when he/she has a fault (Xue Er, 8). He tries to imitate a good person when he encounters one, and he reflects upon and improves himself when he encounters a person who is not good (Li Ren, 17). The Superior Man is able to correct his faults and improve himself because he seeks all responsibilities in himself as a moral subject.

As the Superior Man always improves himself and seeks all responsibilities in himself, he is emotionally stable (Yan Yuan, 4), and is able to inhibit his selfish desires (Xue Er, 14). Therefore, Confucius viewed the variability and self-improvement of human beings as the essential feature of self-cultivation.

Confucius identified “to achieve moral self-perfection through selfcultivation” as the first feature of the Superior Man. Mencius viewed this state as that of the “Sage who secures the self purely and achieves self-perfection” (Mencius, Wan Zhang II, 1), and referred to Po Yi as its prototype. Mencius suggested that Po Yi was the Superior Man who continued to conduct the Way innocently in his whole life through self-cultivation (Gong Sun Chou I, 2, 9; Li Lou I, 13; Wan Zhang II, 1; Gaozi II, 6; Jin Xin I, 22; Jin Xin II, 15); maintained humanity (benevolence) and followed righteousness (Jin Xin I, 15); and accomplished self-perfection. Xunzi sought the features of the Superior Man who achieved self-perfection in the aspects of “self-cultivation” and “problem-centeredness in work situations” (Xunzi, Jundao, 6-7).

According to Xunzi, this feature of the Superior Man is achieved through moral self-perfection through self-improvement, which are consistent with Confucius’ and Mencius’ positions. In the Great Learning, “residing in the state of ultimate good”, as one of the three rules to practice the Way, refers to the state of moral self-perfection through self-improvement and selfcultivation. In this context, to achieve moral self-perfection through selfcultivation is one of the basic features of the Superior Man derived from all of

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the Confucian classics.

The basic precondition for self-improvement is to understand certainly that human beings, as moral subjects, are equipped with all the basis of morality innately (Analects, Yong Ye, 28; Yan Yuan, 1; Mencius, Li Lou II, 14; Gaozi II, 6; Xunzi, Tianlun, 28-29). Because the Superior Man understands very well that he is an innate moral subject, he has strong attitudes to seek all the responsibilities of his actions in himself (Analects, Xue Er 16, Yong Ye 14; Xian Wen 32; Wei Ling Gong 18, 20; Mencius, Li Lou I 4; Jin Xin I 4; Xunzi, Faxing 21-22). As the Superior Man has a strong tendency to attribute all the causes of his actions to himself, he is not hesitant in correcting their faults so as to achieve self-improvement (Analects, Xue Er, 8; Li Ren, 17; Zi Zhang, 21; Mencius, Gong Sun Chou I, 9; Gong Sun Chou II, 8; Xunzi, Quanxue, 2).

As mentioned above, the Superior Man is the person who understands deeply that all the beginnings of morality are endowed within himself from birth, thus, on the basis of this firm understanding, his tendency to correct his own faults through seeking all the responsibilities in himself is derived.

He discriminates correctly what he should do from what he should not do (Analects, Yan Yuan, 1; Mencius, Li Lou II, 8; Zin Xin I, 17, 44; Xunzi, Tianlun, 25). He also takes care of his business in daily life in accordance with moral values (Xunzi, Jiebi, 17). What he, as moral subject, needs to do is to inhibit and control his selfish biological desires and personal emotions, which are induced and fulfilled according to extraneous contextual elements, and accordingly he pursues exclusively keeping and increasing morally based other-oriented emotions and motives. In this way, the Superior Man tries to improve himself through self-control and self-constraint in order to achieve self-perfection.

Self-cultivation, one of the basic features of the Superior Man, mirrors the Confucian belief in the “infinite possibilities of change” of human beings.

This self-cultivation is brought about through endless personal effort. In this context, it is evident that “self-perfection through self-cultivation,” a feature of the Superior Man, should induce “flexible change” and “self-improvement,” which East Asian collectivists focus on in the aspect of variability of human existence as depicted in Table 1. Here we can validate yet another basis of the argument that the background of East Asian collectivism lies in the Confucian system.

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2) Confucian Theory of Emotion and Its Collectivistic Characteristics Pre-Qin Confucians such as Confucius, Mencius, and Xunzi viewed human emotions as having a negative influence on desirable adjustment and therefore needing to be regulated and controlled through vigorous selfcultivation. These emotions which need to be controlled are ego-focused ones provoked by extraneous conditions as the Seven Passions (joy, anger, sorrow, fear, love, hate, and lust) (Liji, Liyun, 301).15 But emotions which are otherdirected in their orientation and are helpful for moral cultivation like the Four Beginnings must be recommended rather than inhibited.

Mencius asserted that human beings have Four Beginnings, which constitute the essential goodness of humans, innately, and recommended expanding these virtues. This point plays a unique role in understanding emotions in pre-Qin Confucianism. The Four Beginnings are the followings: compassion to feel sorry for people in trouble; being shameful when self and others are not quite right; yielding to and respecting others; and discriminating between right and wrong. These Four Beginnings can be seen as social emotions (Chung, Y. 1970: 86-90; Hahn, D. 1994: 108-134, 221222) which are aroused in association with the moral principles (norms) of human life, and will be the full-flourished virtues (humanity [benevolence], righteousness, propriety, and wisdom, respectively) through self-cultivation.

According to the theoretical system of pre-Qin Confucianism, the Four Beginnings are the most representatives of other-directed or normative emotions. These are autonomous and endogenous emotions which arise from either one’s own moral cultivation or from interest in and concern about others’ well-being. Because these emotions are provoked and satisfied in accordance with what people do in the course of self-cultivation, Confucians encourage and emphasize people to experience and expand these emotions.

That is, to expand the innate other-directed or norm-based emotions, like the Four Beginnings, so as to make them full-flourish in daily life, is one of the basic features of Confucian theory of emotion, and, according to 15

This refers to page 301, Liji jinzhu jinyi (Taibei: Shāngwùyìnshūguǎn) by Wang Mengou (1969). From now on, citation of Liji (The Book of Ritual) will follow this example.

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Confucianism, this is a core way to cultivate one’s self.

By contrast, the Seven Passions are assumed to be extraneous emotions which are provoked by outside conditions. These are ego-focused emotions which are induced by comparing extraneous conditions with one’s own situations. For example, “joy” is induced when extraneous conditions are positive for the satisfaction of personal needs, while “anger” is induced when they are negative. Confucians asserted that the inducement and satisfaction of these emotions depends on extraneous conditions, so these emotions need to be controlled and vigorously regulated in daily life, because free expressions of these emotions are very likely to harm harmony in interpersonal relationships and to make persons lose their composure. Thus, to lay great emphasis upon the inhibition and regulation of ego-oriented emotions, like Seven Passions, is another feature of the Confucian theory of emotion.

As mentioned above, the core processes of Confucian self-cultivation lay in the emphasis on experiencing and expanding the Four Beginnings (otherdirected or norm-based emotions) and on inhibiting and controlling the Seven Passions (ego-focused emotions). According to Confucianism, through regulation of these two types of emotions (expanding Four Beginnings and inhibiting Seven Passions), human beings can get away from personal limitations and are then free to achieve emotional sublimation and selfimprovement, and eventually reach to the state of moral self-perfection. This emphasis on the sublimation of emotions through emotional regulation is one another features of Confucian theory of emotion.

In pre-Qin Confucianism, other-directed or norm-based emotions which are provoked in social situations need to be pursued and expanded, whereas ego-centered emotions which are induced in accordance with extraneous conditions and urge to fulfill individual selfish needs must be vigorously regulated and controlled; for Confucians, this double-edged standard is the kernel to deal with emotional problems. In this context, it is evident that the core of self-cultivation suggested by pre-Qin Confucianism is to expand the Four Beginnings and to inhibit the Seven Passions.

This position of pre-Qin Confucianism has continued as an essence of contemporary Confucianism. Neo-Confucianism, established as a metaphysical system in theoretical competition against Buddhism and Daoism, inherited this position. The Confucians of Chosŏn dynasty (1392~1910)

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took over the Neo-Confucianism of Zhu Xi, but the Neo-Confucians of the Chosŏn dynasty was more strongly obsessed with this double-edged understanding of emotions than those of China.

Neo-Confucians in the Chosŏn dynasty systematized Confucian theory of emotion with full uniqueness through the Four-Seven Debate, a debate on the nature of and relations between Four Beginnings and Seven Emotions, which went on continuously for approximately three hundred years. This Four-Seven Debate was “the accomplishment of continuous exploration from the mid-16th century to the end of the Chosŏn dynasty” (Yoon, S. 1997: 6). This had been a representative question in the Neo-Confucianism of the Chosŏn dynasty because almost every Confucian at that time participated in this debate. In this context, the author will review questions to understand emotions in the Neo-Confucianism of the Chosŏn dynasty and verify clearly that East Asian collectivistic culture originates from Confucianism.16 (1) Encouragement of the Four Beginnings and Emphasis on Connectedness/ Harmony The first goal of the Four-Seven Debate is to prove theoretically and realistically that peoples have good nature from birth, which can be developed and realized actually in their process of living. Confucians’ belief in the “goodness” of human nature comes from the fact that the Four Beginnings 16

The Four-Seven Debate of Chosŏn Neo-Confucianism tried to understand the framework of igi-ron (theory of principles [I] and materials [Gi] of human mind) by connecting the Four Beginnings and Seven Passions to the theory of good and evil. Some critics have contended that it is difficult to conduct psychological evidence-based research with this topic. Additionally, there are different opinions about whether discriminating what is right from what is wrong, one of the Four Beginnings, is regarded as an emotion or not. However, the Four Beginnings have been understood traditionally by comparing with the Seven Passions, which are emotions aroused in seven representative real-life situations. Therefore, it is evident that the Four Beginnings have been regarded as the core of other-directed and normbased social emotions (Chung, Y. 1970; Han, D. 1994). Aside from the philosophical issues of igi-ron, the author identifies the Four-Seven Theory only as the basic reference of Confucian theory of emotion. The fundamental position of Four-Seven Theory in this paper is consistent with theory of emotion extracted from texts of preQin Confucians. Refer to the author’s article for details (Cho, G. 2003: chapter 7; 2007: chapter 4).

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are endowed to humans innately. On this foundation, Confucians try to seek the way to develop and realize one’s natural goodness in the possibility of inhibiting one’s self-centered selfishness represented in the Seven Passions.

Viewing from this point, it is no exaggeration to say that the theoretical as well as realistic ground of the Four-Seven Debate lies in the strong attitudes of humanism and respects for the human development (Yoon, S. 1992: 8).

Confucians in the mid-Chosŏn dynasty including Yi Hwang (T’oegye) and Yi I (Yulgok) participated in the debate on the origins and the relationship between the Four Beginnings and the Seven Passions, expressing different opinions. However, they agreed on the point that the Four Beginnings are originally pure goodness itself. T’oegye argued: “The Four Beginnings are derived from the nature of human mind, such as humanity (benevolence), righteousness, propriety, and wisdom, whereas the Seven Passions are provoked by extraneous objects and conditions, that is, extraneous objects and conditions stimulate our senses and bring about the Seven Passions” (T’oegye chŏnsŏ 1, 406).17 Therefore, “the Four Beginnings are all goodness itself ” (406, 412). In addition, Yulgok viewed “compassion for others in trouble” as the pure good in such emotions as joy, sorrow, love, and lust; “shame about doing wrong” as the pure good in anger and in hate; and “yielding to others” as the pure good in fear. “Discriminating between right and wrong” is also all pure good, as it involves knowing what is right and what is wrong with regard to the Seven Passions (Yulgok chŏnsŏ, 199).18 This position is consistent with T’oegye’s opinion.

As the Four Beginnings are other-oriented (“compassion to feel sorry for others in trouble” and “yielding to and respecting others”) or based on moral norms and principles (“being shameful about doing wrong” and “discriminating between right and wrong”), these emotions originate from the innate nature of human beings and are pure and good; thus these are encouraged strongly by Confucians. The other- and norm-oriented Four 17

This refers to page 406 in Book 1 of the T’oegye chŏnsŏ, which was published by Academy of East Asian Studies (1958), Sung Kyun Kwan University. From now on, citation of T’oegye will follow this example.

18 This refers to page 199 in Yulgok chŏnsŏ, which was published by Academy of East Asian Studies (1958), Sung Kyun Kwan University. From now on, citation of Yulgok will follow this example.

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Beginnings are the most representative emotions directly derived from the position of understanding humans as “social beings.”

The position of understanding humans as social beings leads to the view that responsibilities and obligations laid in interpersonal situations are regarded as the impetus for social action, and the goal of any social actions is to attain order and harmony in social relationships. This is consistent with the position of collectivism that emphasizes connectedness and harmony with others. In Confucianism, the Superior Man, a model of ideal person, has described as having compassion upon and feeling concern about others and society. Therefore, his focus of attention is concentrated on others or society rather than on his own self. Consequently, he seeks standards of interpersonal assessment in whether peoples have compassion upon and concern about others or not. This tendency produces the attitude that stresses and promotes “other-directed emotions”, such as the “Four Beginnings” and “shame.”

The position of Confucianism to consider humans as social beings induces the features of collectivistic culture (impetus for social actions = responsibilities and obligations laid in the relational networks; goals of social actions = to attain connectedness and harmony; focus of attention = others and society) in the aspect of impetus and goals for actions (focus of attention) as depicted in Table 1. The fact that Confucian theory of emotion highlights “encouraging other- and norm-oriented emotions” indicates the fact that Confucianism is the background of the development of collectivistic culture in East Asian society, in where this theoretical system has dominated people’s daily life for a very long time.

(2) Inhibition of the Seven Passions and Emphasis on Self-restraint Neo-Confucians of the Chosŏn dynasty all agreed that the Seven Passions are a mixture of good and evil and can easily slide towards evil. T’oegye posited: “Because the Seven Passions are provoked by the stimuli in extraneous conditions, they are indecisive to be good or bad” (T’oegye chŏnsŏ 1, 406); or “They are originally good, but easily become evil” (412). He asserted that if the arousal of the Seven Passions loses li (principle), they become evil; and this is one of the reasons why human beings become evil.

Yulgok asserted that the Four Beginnings are all pure good, but the Seven Passions are mixed with good and evil. He stated: “Whereas the Four

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Beginnings represent only pure goodness, the Seven Passions represent both selfish mind and good mind” (Yulgok chŏnsŏ, 199). The Seven Passions which are mixtures of good and evil tend to flow toward evil, if peoples fail to differentiate between when they need to feel these emotions (joy, anger, sorrow, fear, love, hate, and lust) and when they should not feel (199).

As the Seven Passions have the possibility to make people become evil, Neo-Confucians asserted that the Seven Passions needed to be suppressed.

Why do these Seven Passions tend to become evil? It is because they are exogenous emotions which are provoked if extraneous conditions, including other persons, are favorable to meet one’s aspirations, expectations, or needs (in this case, one feels joy, love, or lust) or not (in this case, one feels anger, sorrow, fear, or hate); that is, because the Seven Passions are ego-centered and selfish in nature. In this regard, Neo-Confucians agreed that egocentered selfish emotions like the Seven Passions hinder a person from or have negative influence on developing one’s natural goodness and improving oneself, so these harmful emotions need to be controlled and inhibited.

According to the Confucian thought, every person can control and inhibit the ego-centered Seven Passions, because he/she is fully aware of the meaning of human existence as moral subjects and is equipped with autonomous capacities to practice and expand his/her innate moral basis (the Four Beginnings) in daily life; that is, human beings as “autonomous moral subjects” can control and inhibit one’s selfishness emanating from egocentered “Seven Passions.”

The position of considering human beings as autonomous moral subjects highlights the attribution of the causes of one’s social actions to his/her innate moralities. This position is consistent with a collectivistic culture’s stress on self-restraint in the mode of expressing the self. Viewing from this point, all the causes of one’s actions reside on the self as a moral subject; therefore, human beings should attribute responsibilities and reasons of their actions to themselves. And also, the responsibility to maintain order and harmony in society and interpersonal relationships depends on oneself. This is why the self rather than external contextual conditions are rising up as the target to control, and consequently, constant self-restraint is highlighted as the way of self-cultivation in Confucian thought. In this context, Confucians’ tendency to emphasize self-restraint and self-control is conspicuous in the aspect of

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emotion. Since Confucians understand that the provoking and satisfying conditions of ego-centered emotions reside in the extraneous situation, they assert these feelings, such as the Seven Passions that hinder self-cultivation, should be vigorously inhibited and controlled.

From this position of Confucians to view human beings as autonomous moral subjects, arises the collectivistic features (mode of expressing self = selfrestraint; object to control = self) in East Asian society, whose characteristics are consistent with those of the aspect of the mode of self-expression (the target to control) depicted in Table 1. In this context, we can induce another evidence proving the fact that in the theoretical background of East Asian collectivism lies the Confucianism, which conceives person as an autonomous moral being and emphasizes inhibiting self-centered feelings, especially the Seven Passions, in its theory of emotion.

(3) Sublimation of Emotions and Emphasis on Self-improvement The core of Confucian theory of emotion is in the inhibition of ego-centered feelings such as the Seven Passions and in the encouragement of otherdirected and norm-based emotions such as the Four Beginnings. Confucians assume that these control and regulation of emotions are the kernel of selfcultivation, through which one can improve oneself. The fundamental goal of Confucianism, especially Neo-Confucianism, is in learning the way to be a Superior Man through abandoning human greed (selfishness) and pursuing the principles of Heaven (morality). Neo-Confucians suggested Kŏgyŏng (residing in reverential carefulness) as a basic way to abandon human greed and to pursue the principles of Heaven. This is “a mind control strategy to maintain the state of Gyŏng (reverence)” (Hahn, D. 1994: 76). T’oegye and Yulgok viewed “Gyŏng as the essence of both the beginning and the end of learning the way to be a Superior Man” (T’oegye chŏnsŏ 1, 210; Yulgok chŏnsŏ, 431), because “Gyŏng is the controller of the mind and the basis of all affairs” (T’oegye chŏnsŏ 1, 203).

Neo-Confucians asserted that the way to control and to regulate human emotions can be achieved by “Kŏgyŏng,” as “Kŏgyŏng” embraces the whole process of achieving self-control of the mind. According to Confucian logic, this control and regulation of human emotions in the state of Kŏgyŏng enables one to inhibit the Seven Passions which are “indecisive in choosing

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good or evil” (T’oegye chŏnsŏ 1, 406) and “likely to be evil” (412). In other words, Kŏgyŏng enables the sublimation of emotions come true by inhibiting the Seven Passions and encouraging the Four Beginnings in daily life, and so leads people to the state of pure goodness. Chung, Yang Eun (1970, 8690) asserted that the roles of the Four Beginnings as social emotions are most important in the course of emotional regulations; because, even though the Seven Passions are provoked, if the effect of the Four Beginnings is powerful enough, then the Seven Passions would be diminished automatically. In other words, he proposed that one should not respond to others’ physical existence (in this case, the Seven Passions are provoked), but should rather respond to others’ psychological aspects as social stimuli (in this case, the Four Beginnings are aroused). Anyway, Confucians emphasized the sublimation of emotions through arousing the Four Beginnings instead of provoking the Seven Passions in daily social relations; and, according to the NeoConfucians, the only way to achieve the emotional sublimation is the method of Kŏgyŏng.

Confucians, especially Neo-Confucians, highlighted the value of emotional sublimation, to make the other-directed and norm-based emotions are the controller of all the emotional responses by inhibiting the Seven Passions and encouraging the Four Beginnings, in the process of self-cultivation and self-improvement through Kŏgyŏng practice (residing in reverential carefulness in everyday life). All Neo-Confucians participating in the FourSeven Debate agreed on this position. Neo-Confucians’ assertion on the possibility “to sublimate emotions through Kŏgyŏng” is derived directly from their perspectives on humans as “beings with infinite plasticity (variability) to become a Superior Man.” The Confucian understanding of humans as having infinite possibilities is based on the perspective which emphasizes human capacity to perform their constantly varying roles and responsibilities in the networks of social relationships; and this belief in human changeability is represented as it is in the Confucian theory of emotion, which stresses emotional regulation in daily life. Viewing from this Confucian perspective, human beings are supposed to make every effort to improve themselves through self-reflection on their weaknesses and faults and correcting them in daily life; thus, self-cultivation and self-improvement are raised as important standards of interpersonal

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assessment. In addition, Confucians highlight emotional sublimation (inhibiting ego-centered emotions such as the Seven Passions and trying to make other-directed and norm-based emotions such as the Four Beginnings be the dominant emotions) in the process of endless self-improvement, which are consistent with the characteristics found in East Asian collectivistic cultures.

The Confucian theory of emotion, which encourages to control and regulate emotions, has strong coherence with the features of collectivistic cultures in respect that this cultures accept and stress human changeability; in this respect, it is evident that these Confucian views bring about the features of collectivistic cultures (appreciating flexible change with varying contexts rather than stable consistency; encouraging to improve one’s weaknesses rather than enhancing one’s strengths as the chief way for self-advancement) in the aspect of human variability as depicted in Table 1. This is yet another point proving the proposition that Confucianism lies in the theoretical background of East Asian collectivism.

3) Confucian Theory of Motivation and Its Collectivistic Characteristics The motivation theory of pre-Qin Confucians can be summarized in terms of the following three features: First, humans possess a number of motives, such as biological, sensual, selfish, and moral motives; and among them, only moral motives enable humans to control themselves, so they are the most essential for humans; Second, not only does the satisfaction of motives other than moral ones depend on extraneous conditions, but also pleasure from the satisfaction of these motives leads people to lose righteousness, so these motives must be controlled and inhibited; Third, moral motives not only are the most essential ones to enable human beings to control the self with, but also are located in the supreme position of the hierarchy of motives; thus, other subordinate motives should be governed by the moral motives; Being free from the constraints of these subordinate motives and making moral ones dominate one’s life (sublimation of motivation) is the chief way to become an ideal human being.

Neo-Confucians inherited this theory of motivation from pre-Qin Confucians. However, Neo-Confucians laid more emphasis on the features

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of evilness of biological and selfish motives, and they demonstrated a stricter proposition in focusing on absolute control of them with moral motives. The core of the theory of motivation suggested by Neo-Confucians, especially those in the Chosŏn dynasty, lies in the theory of the Human Mind (source of selfish desires) and the Moral Mind (source of moral motives). The essential points of this theory are as follows: Encouragement and development of the moral motives; Inhibition and control of the selfish desires; and Sublimation of motivation through Kŏgyŏng.19 (1) Encouragement of the Moral Motives and Emphasis on Connectedness/ Harmony The fundamental reasoning of the Neo-Confucian theory of the Human Mind and the Moral Mind is that the Human Mind is the basis of the selfish desires derived from biological features, while the Moral Mind is the innate human nature from which originating the moral motives. Every human being, no matter who he or she is, has these two kinds of motives. T’oegye addressed: “The Human Mind causes strivings for external objects to satisfy one’s biological and selfish desires, whereas the Moral Mind causes strivings for innate righteousness and li (principle)” (T’oegye chŏnsŏ 1, 208). This statement points out clearly that biological and selfish desires are based on the Human Mind, and moral motives are based on the Moral Mind. Yulgok expressed the same proposition and “identified the need for pleasant sounds, colors, scents, 19

There are some controversies as to whether the theory of the Human Mind and Moral Mind is regarded as a theory of motivation or not. In particular, the Moral Mind is the basis for the Four Beginnings, and the Human Mind is the basis for the Seven Passions. Therefore, this theory can be considered as a theory of emotion. NeoConfucians such as T’oegye and Yulgok agreed that the Human Mind is based on the biological and selfish needs, and so leads the behavior to let oneself ahead of others; while, the Moral Mind is oriented toward goodness, and so leads the action to practice moral motives with and for others. In this context, both the Human Mind and the Moral Mind have the features of originating and invoking human actions, which is the chief characteristics of the definition of motivation; therefore, the theory of the Human Mind and the Moral Mind can be considered as the fundamental axis of the Neo-Confucian’s theory of motivation. Three fundamental positions of the theory of the Human Mind and the Moral Mind have the same logical construct as the theory of motivation derived from the classics of pre-Qin Confucians.

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and flavors as the product of the Human Mind and the orientation toward humanity, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom as the Moral Mind” (Yulgok chŏnsŏ, 453). He also stated the same idea in different ways: “The Moral Mind promotes allegiance to the king and filial piety to parents, whereas the Human Mind arouses desires for food to eat when hungry and wish for clothes to put on when cold” (757).

Of these two kinds of mind, “the Moral Mind represents the principle of Heaven, so it has only natural goodness and does not have evil. By contrast, the Human Mind has the principle of Heaven as well as human greed, so it has both good and evil” (Yulgok chŏnsŏ, 282). The Moral Mind is pure and good, because from which the Four Beginnings, the core evidence of human natural goodness, come forth (T’oegye chŏnsŏ 1, 816, 849; Yulgok chŏnsŏ, 199, 283). Therefore, the moral motives originating from the Moral Mind, which is pure good human nature, is supposed to be the core of all human motives rather than biological and selfish desires derived from the Human Mind, which is a mixture of good and evil. This is the position of the NeoConfucians of the Chosŏn dynasty, and is consistent with that of the pre-Qin Confucians.

According to the Neo-Confucian proposition, the Moral Mind is pure goodness itself by nature. T’oegye stated this point as follows: “The Moral Mind refers to the innate original human nature itself, and it is working as the basis of every human actions from beginning to the end and from birth till death; whereas the Four Beginnings refer to the clues from which is manifested the existence of the Moral Mind” (T’oegye chŏnsŏ 1, 849). This statement points out clearly that the existence of the Moral Mind is known through other-directed and moral manifestations of the Four Beginnings. As suggested in the above section on emotions, The Four Beginnings are sources of other-directed and norm-based emotions; that is, the nature of the Four Beginnings reveals in their other-directedness. Therefore, the Moral Mind, from which The Four Beginnings come forth, gives rise to the moral emotions and motives which are directed toward others or norms in interpersonal relations. Yulgok expressed the position indirectly as follows: “The Moral Mind arouses such action-readiness as will to pledge allegiance to the king and will to devote filial piety to parents, which are basically moral in nature” (Yulgok chŏnsŏ, 757).

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According to the theory of the Human Mind and the Moral Mind, moral motives are the most essential of all human motives, and the Moral Mind, as its root, should be encouraged and developed always in the process of everyday life. This proposition is derived from Confucians’ efforts to identify humans as social beings. Moral motives lead people to other-directed actions, such as having compassion toward and concern about others as well as promoting their well-being. Therefore, when people maintain this motivational state in daily life, they perceive themselves as connected with and strive for promoting harmony with others. In this context, “encouraging moral motives and enhancing its root, the Moral Mind” is one of the basic features of the Confucian theory of motivation. And this feature enables East Asian collectivists to make every effort to promote “connectedness” with others and to maintain “harmony” in daily life. This position of encouraging other-directed moral motives in everyday human life, which is a basic feature of the Confucian theory of motivation, validates the reasoning that East Asian collectivism is based on the Confucian system (2) Control of the Selfish Desires and Emphasis on Self-restraint According to the theory of the Human Mind and the Moral Mind, the Human Mind is the basis of selfish desires originating from human biological features. T’oegye addressed this point as follows: “The Human Mind elicits selfish desires” (T’oegye chŏnsŏ 1, 897); “The Human Mind is the basis of selfish desires, and selfish desires are overflows of the Human Mind” (897); and “Since the Human Mind is the antithesis of the Moral Mind, it belongs to the selfish aspect of the body” (849). In these statements, T’oegye clarified the proposition that the Human Mind is the basis of biological and selfish desires.

In this context, Neo-Confucians asserts that if people pursue the Human Mind which is the basis of biological and selfish desires, they tend to get in trouble; thus, it is encouraged for them to inhibit the Human Mind and to maintain the Moral Mind, from which emanating moral motives. Yulgok expressed this proposition as follows: “The temptation of the selfish desires leads human beings to become evil. If people indulge in seduction of selfish desires and are not aware of it, then they will not come back even after losing eventually all of the principles of Heaven (moral motives and basis of morality)” (Yulgok chŏnsŏ, 467); or “People are deprived of any will to do

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good … if they lose their innate genuine mind” (469).

For this reason, the Human mind needs to be controlled and the Moral Mind should be protected. T’oegye asserted:“Even though there are many ways to learn how to control the mind, only two things are most important: one is to inhibit selfish desires, and the other is to maintain the principle of Heaven. Inhibiting selfish desires belongs to learning in the aspect of the Human Mind, whereas maintaining the principle of Heaven belongs to learning with respect to the Moral Mind” (T’oegye chŏnsŏ 1, 849). This is the fundamental point of the famous theory of inhibiting selfish desires and residing in the principle of Heaven (208). Yulgok also expressed the same opinion as follows: “People need to observe themselves solemnly, and whenever a thought occurs to them, they need to pay attention to where this thought comes from. If they perceive physical and selfish desires activate this thought, they need to win over and control it, so it will not grow. However, if they perceive the Moral Mind (humanity, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom) activate this thought, they need to preserve and maintain it, so it will not leave” (Yulgok chŏnsŏ, 453). Yulgok also expressed this position elsewhere, saying: “Humans should not let the Human Mind grow wildly. They need to lay high emphasis on inhibiting and controlling selfish desires. They need to think highly of preserving the Moral Mind and to let it grow and expand” (758).

As the Human Mind is the basis of selfish desires derived from human biological features, when external seductions satisfying these desires tempts, people are not able to come back and control evil even after they lose all their Moral Mind (Yulgok chŏnsŏ, 467), or are deprived of any will to do good for themselves and for others (469). This Neo-Confucian argument is consistent with that of the pre-Qin Confucians.

In this way, Confucians stress strongly to control and inhibit one’s biological and selfish desires. This position is consistent with the characteristics observed in East Asian collectivistic society, where self-constraint, especially in the situation of self-expression, is highly appreciated, as depicted in Table 1.

According to the Neo-Confucians propositions, to inhibit and control selfish desires is a way to become an ideal person, which is the goal of human life; whether or not one can achieve this goal solely depends on oneself; that is, it is his/her responsibility because, as moral subjects, people are equipped with

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the Moral Mind to do good things for oneself and for others; thus, one should make every effort to inhibit and control one’s selfish desires. In this context, the inference that Confucian position stressing “inhibition and control of selfish desires” has brought about collectivistic characteristics in East Asian society have logical validity.

(3) Sublimation of Motivations and Emphasis on Self-improvement Neo-Confucians asserted that in order to get freedom from the constraints of the Human Mind, the source of biological and selfish desires, human beings should not only suppress (T’oegye chŏnsŏ 1, 208, 849) or inhibit their selfish desires (Yulgok chŏnsŏ, 453, 758), but also control them through encouraging the Moral Mind; and thus let moral motives overwhelm selfish desires and superintend all their lives. T’oegye addressed this point as follows: “Since the Human Mind is the antithesis of the Moral Mind, it belongs to the selfish aspect of the body; So because the Human Mind is already inclined toward selfishness, it needs to listen to the commands from the Moral Mind and to become one with it” (T’oegye chŏnsŏ 1, 849). Yulgok expressed the same opinion more strongly, stating that: “A person who are going to control his/ her mind should expand and fulfill the Moral Mind whenever he/she learns to know that a certain idea striking him/her at that moment is coming from the Moral Mind; However, if he/she perceives that this idea is flowing from the Human Mind, he/she should inspect it thoroughly and control it through the Moral Mind, and so let the Human Mind follow the command of the Moral Mind. Then the Human Mind will become one with the Moral Mind eventually” (Yulgok chŏnsŏ, 282-283). Furthermore, Yulgok argued that if the Moral Mind controls the Human Mind and they become one, “li (principle) and righteousness (a representative of moral motives) will be always preserved and accordingly human greed (biological and selfish desires) will fade away. Therefore, taking this attitude toward everything, whatever it is including other persons, there is nothing that will not fit the Golden Mean (the Way)” (453).

The Confucian proposition, that Moral Mind should control the Human Mind, and then, the Human Mind is able to become one with the Moral Mind, means the fact that the Human Mind and the Moral Mind are not

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two separate ones. T’oegye addressed this point as: “While the Human Mind causes strivings for external objects to satisfy one’s biological and selfish desires, the Moral Mind causes pursuing for internal righteousness and principle; However this does not mean that there are two different minds, because these two are different only in their orientations, whether toward outside or toward inside of the self ” (T’oegye chŏnsŏ 1, 208). As the Human Mind and the Moral Mind differ in the level of goodness, whether a mixture of good and evil or pure goodness itself (Yulgok chŏnsŏ, 282), advancing from the state of the partially good Human Mind to the state of the wholly good Moral Mind (sublimation of motives) can be achieved.

Neo-Confucians suggested “residing in reverential carefulness” (Kŏgyŏng) as a way to control the selfish desires, to maintain the principle of Heaven, and eventually to achieve the sublimation of motives. Zhu Xi, the originator of Neo-Confucianism in later Song period, also suggested “inspecting the mind thoroughly and maintaining it consistently” as the core of Gyŏng, which can match with the state of Kŏgyŏng (Yun, S. 1997: 267-271). In NeoConfucian thought, Kŏgyŏng is a concrete strategy to control the Human Mind and preserve the Moral Mind.

T’oegye and Yulgok agreed: “Gyŏng is that which superintends the mind and so is the basis of all things” (T’oegye chŏnsŏ 1, 203, 208; T’oegye chŏnsŏ 2, 796); therefore “Gyŏng is the beginning and the end of ‘the Study to be a Superior Man’ (it refers to the whole system of Confucianism)” (T’oegye chŏnsŏ 1, 210, 203; Yulgok chŏnsŏ, 431). As this Kŏgyŏng becomes the basis of Kungni (exploration of principles in depth), which is another method in learning how to be a Superior Man (T’oegye chŏnsŏ 1, 185-186; Yulgok chŏnsŏ, 431, 433-434), it can be advocated that learning how to be a Superior Man begins with Kŏgyŏng and ends with it (T’oegye chŏnsŏ 1, 203; Yulgok chŏnsŏ, 431).

T’oegye and Yulgok traced the core of Confucian theory of self-cultivation to the function of Kŏgyŏng. The state of Gyŏng (residing in reverential carefulness) has both the cognitive and the motivational functions in the whole process of personal self-control. The cognitive function is to concentrate one’s attention without distraction (Kim, S. 1989: 160-181); and the motivational function is to select the goal which matches well with the Way and to activate the appropriate behavior to achieve this goal in daily life

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(Hahn, D. 1994, 91-96). If the function of Kŏgyŏng is regarded as the core in the course of psychological self-control, it is easily understood that Gyŏng controls biological and selfish desires (the Human Mind) and activates moral motives (the Moral Mind). Yulgok advocated this position as follows: “At the state of Gyŏng, selfish desires do not grow up from within; and seduction of objects in the outer world cannot go into the mind at all; … Gyŏng is a weapon with which to fight against the temptation from one’s outside. When a person resides in reverential carefulness (Kŏgyŏng), he/she understands the principle of Heaven well, and his/her selfish desires cannot come into his/her inner mind” (Yulgok chŏnsŏ, 476).

Because biological and selfish desires, which lead people to evil, can be controlled by Gyŏng, “following goodness and discarding evil depends on maintaining the state of Gyŏng and understanding principles of the Heaven correctly” (T’oegye chŏnsŏ 1, 684). Yulgok expressed this point as: “Through this function to control selfish desires, Gyŏng wins over all the evils” (Yulgok chŏnsŏ, 476). So, Kŏgyŏng becomes the direct way toward the sublimation of motivation.

As stated explicitly in the above quotations, it is the fundamental proposition of Neo-Confucians in Chosŏn dynasty that human beings should and can control the basis of biological and selfish desires (the Human Mind) and expand the source of moral motives (the Moral Mind); then, their Human Mind would be one with the Moral Mind and the command of the Moral Mind prevail all their lives (T’oegye chŏnsŏ 1, 849; Yulgok chŏnsŏ, 192, 282283); and thus, they can achieve the sublimation of motivation. According to them, this sublimation of motivation is the whole ground of self-cultivation and self-improvement. The position that “sublimation of motivation through the transformation of Human Mind into Moral Mind by means of Kŏgyŏng” is derived from a perspective on humans as “beings with infinite possibility” to achieve ideal state of person by themselves through constant process of “self-improvement.” This advocacy verifies that Confucianism is the origin of East Asian collectivism, which stressing on the flexible change in accordance with varying contexts and on the incessant self-improvement, as depicted in Table 1.

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IV. Theoretical Background of East Asian Collectivism: Confucian Thought The author examined the idea that collectivistic cultures in East Asian Confucian countries such as Korea, China, and Japan are derived from the theoretical background of Confucianism. Confucianism was respected as the supreme ideology of governing these countries for about 4 to 5 hundred years (in case of Japan), a thousand years (Korea) and two thousand years (China) until the modern era. Although the Confucianism of Japan was different from those of Korea or China, in that China and Korea had selected public officials through the state examinations in Confucian Classics, contrary to Japan, all of their governments encouraged Confucianism. In East Asian Confucian countries, Confucianism is not an already dead tradition of past; Even nowadays, Confucianism continues to be central to East Asians’ thoughts, behaviors, and value systems. That is, “the Confucian habits of the heart” (Tu, W. 1996: 343) still control their lives today.

The theoretical basis of Confucianism is the position that humans are moral and social beings with flexible plasticity (theory of human nature). On this ground, Confucians established an ideal type of a person as the goal in human living (theory of Superior Man) and suggested the way how to achieve such a goal (theory of self-cultivation) and mode of the lifestyle of this ideal person in interpersonal relations (theory of moral practice). The essence of Confucianism is laid in the innate characteristics of human nature and the concept of the Superior Man. In a word, Confucianism is a theoretical system to pursue the “expansion of human existence” toward the Superior Man as an ideal model, which is set on the basis of the innate existential characteristics of human beings.

The theoretical reason why Confucians pursue the expansion of human existence is based on their framework for understanding human beings. The fundamental understanding of human beings in Confucian classics can be summarized as follows: They consider humans as social beings, autonomous moral subjects, and changeable beings with infinite possibilities. That is, Confucians perceive humans are such beings who should accept social and moral responsibilitie, practice them in their relationships with others, and try to achieve the expansion of their existence through their autonomous moral

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cultivation.

Confucians seek the fundamental features of human existence in one’s interpersonal relationships; that is, their basic position to understand human beings is to search for fundamental features of human existence in their sociality. They assume that human morality is originated from human sociality; that is, people have moral concern about others, because they are social beings to live and have harmonious relationship with others.

Human being’s variability and possibility, emphasized by Confucianism, are also grounded on human sociality and morality. That is, human beings are equipped with innate basis of morality. The Confucian attitude of autonomous and active life involves maintaining and nurturing this basis of morality and practicing them in daily life situations; and through which people improve themselves and achieve the goal to be a Superior Man. This position comes forth from a perspective on humans as social beings. In this context, it can be inferred that East Asians with Confucian traditions developed collectivistic characteristics on the ground of Confucians’ great emphasis on human sociality.

As depicted in table 1 and found in the review of the comparative studies on the differences between individualistic and collectivistic cultures, in individualistic cultures people emphasize autonomy and independence, self-assertion, and stability in the aspects of impetus and goal for social actions (focus of attention), mode of expressing the self (object to control), and stability/variability of personhood (strategy for self-development), respectively. To the contrary, in collectivistic cultures people highlight connectedness and harmony, self-inhibition, and variability. These three aspects are associated with three positions to understand human beings in Confucianism.

The position of viewing humans as social beings holds social responsibility and obligation to be the impetus for social actions and seeks the goal of all social actions in pursuit of order and harmony in social relationships.

This is consistent with the position of collectivistic cultures focusing on connectedness and harmony in the aspect of impetus for social actions.

The Superior Man is interested in others and society and places priority on caring for others and society along with self-cultivation. Therefore, their attention focuses on others or society rather than the self, and consequently,

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the criteria for interpersonal assessment are concentrated on having concern about and caring for others and society. This tendency creates the position of respecting and encouraging other-directed emotions whose basic references are on others and norms such as the Four Beginnings and shame. The tendency to care for society leads actions to respect and encourages moral motives toward others and society. Also, the satisfaction of these emotions and motives mostly rely on the level of moral self-cultivation. This position of viewing humans as social beings in Confucianism demonstrates features of collectivistic cultures (impetus for social actions = role, responsibility, and obligation in the networks of social relations; goal for social actions = connectedness and harmony; focus of attention = others and society) in the aspect of the focus of attention and the impetus and goals for actions. In this respect, it is evident that the Confucian system of understanding humans as social beings functions as the origin of developing collectivism in East Asian society.

The position of viewing human beings as moral subjects emphasizes that, since human beings are equipped with moral foundations, they need to attribute causes of social actions to the self and explore their inner world. This position is consistent with the characteristics found in collectivistic cultures, which stress on self-restraint in the aspect of the mode of expressing the self.

Because people in collectivistic cultures assume that all things depend on the self as a moral subject, they attribute all the responsibilities to themselves. The responsibility to develop and maintain social order and harmony depends on the self; thus, they restrain the self and control their internal attributes rather than extraneous contextual conditions and others. The tendency to restrain the self and to highlight self-control stands out more prominently in the aspect of emotions and motives. They tend to vigorously inhibit and regulate ego-centered emotions such as the Seven Passions and biological and selfish desires; it is because they assume that strivings for these emotions and motives hinder their moral cultivation, since the conditions for induction and satisfaction of these ego-centered emotions and motives rely heavily on extraneous contexts. The Confucian position on human beings as moral subjects is consistent with the features of collectivistic cultures (mode to express self = self-restraint; target to control = self) in the aspect of object to control and the mode of expressing the self. In this context, it can be inferred

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clearly that the Confucian system of understanding human beings as moral subjects originates collectivistic cultures in East Asian society.

Finally, the view of humans as changeable beings with infinite possibilities emphasizes the flexibility to meet constantly varying responsibilities in the networks of social roles. This is consistent with the characteristics of the collectivistic cultures, which focuses on variability in accordance with the context in the aspect of variability/stability of personhood. People in collectivistic cultures strive toward self-improvement, they try to reflect upon themselves all the time and to find out and correct their weaknesses and faults. The level of self-cultivation and self-improvement would be come out as the criteria for interpersonal assessment. In the process of constant selfimprovement, they need to inhibit and control ego-centered emotions such as the Seven Passions and biological and selfish desires, and let other-directed and norm-based emotions and moral motives preside over all of the selfcentered emotions and selfish desires. Therefore, they need to achieve selfdevelopment through self-improvement. The view of humans as changeable beings with infinite possibilities is consistent with the features of collectivistic cultures (variability/stability of personhood = variability; strategy for selfdevelopment = self-improvement). Viewing from this point, it is certain that the Confucian system to understand humans as changeable beings is also the theoretical origin for the development of collectivistic culture in East Asian society.

These three aspect of emphasis found in collectivistic cultures match very well with the three positions to understand human beings in Confucianism.

In addition, it is shown that criteria for interpersonal assessment, mode of attribution, theories of emotion and motivation derived from Confucian thoughts are fully consistent with those from collectivistic cultures.

These facts verify that Confucianism has functioned as the origin for the development of collectivism in the East Asian region.

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The Geopolitical Perceptions of Kim Ku and Syngman Rhee: Focusing on the Period of Japanese Occupation*

Kim, Myongsob** and Kim, Seok Won*** This paper compares the geopolitical perceptions of Syngman Rhee (Yi Sŭngman) and Kim Ku. The major findings are as follows. First, during the period of the Taehan Empire, Rhee and Kim had cast off their old Sino-centric geopolitical perceptions and embraced the concept of sovereignty. Protestantism, which was crucial to the rise of the modern conception of sovereignty, certainly played a role in the establishment of Rhee and Kim’s perceptions.

Second, during the period in which the Korean Provisional Government experienced internal conflicts over whether to partner with the Russian Communists, Kim and Rhee were both wary of the expansion of Soviet influence. Third, during the Asia-Pacific War, Rhee and Kim advocated a united front with China (Asia) and the U.S. (Pacific) against Japan’s geopolitical scheme of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Fourth, Rhee focused on the strength and value of the U.S., which was expanding into the Pacific, and relegated China to the role of a secondary collaborator. In contrast, Kim valued highly the symbiotic relationship with China. Fifth, Rhee had a keen understanding of the global milieu but his senses were relatively dull to the revolutionary atmosphere of the Eurasian continent including Asia. On the other hand, Kim’s perception of the world was relatively narrow but he was more sensitive to the revolutionary atmosphere of the Eurasian continent. Sixth, as the Cold War escalated and the two camps jockeyed to keep the Korean Peninsula within their respective spheres of influence (in traditional geopolitical terms, continental versus maritime), the differences in two men’s geopolitical perceptions began to take center stage rather than their similarities.

Despite these differences, the similar geopolitical perceptions shared by these two men, who contributed to the independence and founding of Korea, can provide a cornerstone for the geopolitical strategy of a 21st century Korea working to balance its continental and maritime priorities and continuing to face the problem of the North-South division.

Translated from the published article in Korean Political Science Review 43(3): 51-75, 2009 with permission from the The Korean Political Science Association. ** Professor, Department of Political Science & International Studies, Yonsei University *** Ph. D. Student, Department of Political Science in the Graduate School of Yonsei University *

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Keywords: Kim Ku, Syngman Rhee, geopolitical perception, geopolitics, TaehanCheguk (the Great Han Empire), TaehanMinguk (the Republic of Korea)

I. Introduction This study provides a comparative analysis of the geopolitical perceptions of Syngman Rhee (Yi Sŭngman, 1875-1965) and Kim Ku (1876-1949). We conceptualize geopolitical perception as a way of seeing the world that an individual has vis-à-vis the temporal and spatial milieu surrounding on self and that one had developed due to that milieu.1 This concept is part of the wider corpus of geopolitics which has been developed by scholars such as John Rudolph Kjellén (1864-1922), Halford J. Mackinder (1861-1947), and Alfred T. Mahan (1840-1914). More recent understandings of geopolitics tend toward post-modern and decentralized conceptualizations (Flint 2006; Lacost 2006; Chauprade 2007). Similar viewpoints have also been articulated in traditional Korean scholarship; Hong Taeyong (1731-1783), a scholar of the Northern Learning School (北學派) in late Chosŏn Korea, proposed that the concepts of center and periphery are meaningless in an unbounded space and consequently argued against the “civilized/barbarian” Sino-centric view

1

“Geopolitical perception” may be distinguished from “foreign perception” or “perception on international politics,” since it takes into account the interaction between individuals and their geopolitical milieus and does not clearly distinguish between subject and object. Other researchers have used the term “foreign perception,” which delineates “in” and “out,” but they have run into the problem of where to draw the line separating the two. In particular, there is little consensus on where that line was during the period of Japanese rule. Geopolitical perception is distinct from “perception on international politics,” which is fundamentally about interstate relations, since geopolitical perception concerns the perception formed as a result of the interaction between an individual and the concentric strata which surround him.

Consequently, an analysis of geopolitical perception is not only concerned with the way an individual’s political thinking is shaped by considerations of nation and state, but also those arising from history, religion and language. It takes an anthropological stance to look at how such factors shape “the whole man” in the community of being (seinsverbundenheit).

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of geopolitics (Hong, T. 2008: 158-62).2 This study focuses specifically on the geopolitical perceptions of Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku for the following reasons. First, because of their status as founding fathers, a comparative understanding of Rhee and Kim’s geopolitical perceptions is essential to molding future Korean geopolitical strategy. Not only were they significant figures in the Taehan Empire (Taehan cheguk), the Korean Provisional Government (Taehan min’guk imsi chŏngbu) and the Republic of Korea, their political significance will be also immeasurably important in the future of two Koreas. Rhee began his political activities as a young member of the Independence Club (Tongnip hyŏphoe) and became the first president of the Korean Provisional Government in 1919. He later became the first president of the Republic of Korea in 1948. Kim’s political activities began as a member of the New People’s Association (Sinminhoe), which officially proclaimed republic government, advocating Enlightenment movement, and he also served as head of the Korean Provisional Government.

After liberation from Japanese rule in 1945, he and Rhee led opposition against the establishment of a Soviet-style communist government, thereby contributing to the establishment of the Republic of Korea. Though his efforts for establishing a unified government through the compromise between North and South Korea, held April 19-30, 1948, in P’yŏngyang, failed, Kim will be remembered for his commitment to the ideal of peaceful unification.

For that ideal is clearly stipulated in the preamble of the Korean Constitution (Doh, J. 2003: 239-42).

Second, previous researches has mainly compared and contrasted the two men as “political leaders of Korea,” within the context of rather specific geopolitical space, namely, the Korean Peninsula. 3 Moreover, evaluations 2

Hong, Tae Yong claimed that those sub-entities which had been under Sino-centric order and content with its rule could themselves each be a center: “Every spiritual thing borne by the sky and raised by the earth is a human being. All those who rise above the herd to rule are princes. All those who raise walls and dig moats to protect their borders are nations” (Hong, T. 2008: 158-9).

3 Son, Se Il has already conducted a comparative study of Rhee and Kim (Son, S. 1970).

This study examined the relationship between “place and political orientation,” and provided valuable inspiration for this project. Doh, Jin Soon has looked at Korean politics between 1945 and 1949 with a focus on Kim and Rhee (Doh, J. 1997a). This

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limiting the scope of their considerations to the Korean Peninsula or Republic of Korea have tended to focus on the split between Rhee and Kim over the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948, thereby, leading to somewhat polemical controversy on the legitimacy of Republic of Korea.4 This study therefore not only examines the geopolitical perception of these two men visà-vis the Korean Peninsula but also beyond that scope, an approach that more fully embodies their stories of conflict and collaboration in a wider context.

The method of “close reading” is employed to analyze the records and works of the two men, and relate their contents to the temporal and spatial milieu in which they lived. The comparisons can begin simply with the sheer gap of amount of records left by the two figures. Rhee was a renowned journalist of the Taehan Empire era and a Princeton Ph. D. Working from the U.S., he took advantage of his freedom of speech, using Voice of America broadcasts as well as writings in both Asian and Western languages to support the struggle for Korean sovereignty. Consequently, he left a large corpus that can be analyzed to better understand his geopolitical perception. Kim, however, was more action-oriented and operated under the harsh pursuit of the Japanese authorities in Asia, leaving few writings.5 Therefore, we will study similarly brought into focus the global significance of Kim and Rhee in history.

In a debate held among scholars and the press on the 60th anniversary of the Republic of Korea (2008), Shin, Yong Ha asserted that the proposition that Kim had not participated in the establishment of Korea was a misconception. He argued that what Kim did not participate in, if anything, was the establishment of a ‘divided government.’ This seems to represent a mix of both positive valuations of Kim’s political legacy and reservations about Korea (Shin, Y. 2008: 157, 169). To learn more about the political and academic debate surrounding the use of Kim Ku’s likeness on the ₩100,000 bill, see the following: “10 man wŏn kwŏn amsal chiryŏng: P’yojŏk ŭn Kim Ku” (“Order of assassination on the ₩100,000 bill: Kim Ku is the Target”), Han’gyŏreh, November 14, 2008.

5 The correspondence and various writings in mixed script of Rhee are included in Ihwajang sojang Ungam Yi Sŭngman munsŏ tongmun p’yŏn (18 volumes). His letters were also separately published in Yi Sŭngman tongmun sŏhan chip (3 volumes). In Korean, Rhee authored Tongnip Chŏngsin (Independence-oriented thinking, 1910) and Han’guk kyohoe p’ippak (Persecution of the Korean church, 1913), and he also translated Ch’ŏng-Il chŏn’gŭi (The first Sino-Japanese War, 1917) (these three works are included in the above compilations). In English, he wrote Neutrality as Influenced by the United States (1912), which was the book based on his doctoral dissertation, and Japan Inside

4

The Geopolitical Perceptions of Kim Ku and Syngman Rhee 109

utilize his own works to the extent possible, but also rely on the recollections of his acquaintances, documents assumed to have influenced his perception, and his actual actions to indirectly indicate his geopolitical perception.

II. The Initial Formation of Two Men’s Geopolitical Perceptions Born in 1875 and 1876 respectively, Rhee and Kim both spent more than twenty years of their lives as subjects, not citizens, of the Chosŏn Dynasty.

Both Rhee, a scion of a fallen branch of the royal family, and Kim, who came from a ruined family of yangban origins and was treated as a low class commoner, entirely devoted themselves to preparing for the civil service examination in their early years. Under the rule of the Chosŏn Dynasty, the examination was the only road available to them to achieve upward social mobility.6 Rhee thought that “learning the Chinese classics, literature, history, culture, and religion and taking the examination” was his duty, and believed that “there is no religion superior to Confucianism.” When Kim first met the teacher of his village school (sŏdang), he considered him “a god or a sage.”

(Ch’ŏngnyŏn Yi Sŭngman Chasŏjŏn, 1995: 85; Kim, K. 2008: 53) After the Manchu invasion of 1636, Chosŏn was incorporated into the Qing-centered Sino-centric order of Northeast Asia, and the only way to become an elite intellectual in Chosŏn society was to gain expertise in the learning and philosophy that came in from China.7 During their early years, as with most Out: The Challenge of Today (1941). Both English works are now available in Korean.

Kim’s Paekpŏm ilji and Towaesilgi are both included in Paekpŏm Kim Ku chŏnjip, 12 volumes). Kim’s works mainly report his personal experiences and actions, and are therefore of a different nature from the works of Rhee, which clearly express his political opinions.

6 Looking at the self-consciousness of the two individuals, Rhee had a “royal consciousness,” while Kim had “a commoner complex” (Son, S. 2008: 21-57).

However, neither Kim nor Rhee was in the ruling class of Chosŏn society. No one in Rhee’s family up to seven generations back had risen to government office or even passed the qualifying civil service examinations (Chŏng, P. 2005: 52).

7 Although Chosŏn society idealized the Ming Empire and looked down on the Qing Empire, Sino-centrism even toward the Qing remained. For example, Kim, Yun Sik

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of their peers, the geopolitical perceptions of both Rhee and Kim were Sinocentric in nature.

The Treaty of Shimonoseki (下關條約), which ended the Qing-Japan War in 1895, stimulated an awareness of the modern perception of sovereignty among the people of Chosŏn by specifying in the first clause that “the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea.” In such a transitional milieu, the geopolitical perceptions of Rhee and Kim were transformed. While Rhee’s transformation was revolutionary, Kim went through a more gradual process of change involving much self-doubt and hesitation. Rhee joined the Hyŏpsŏnghoe,8 an organization established by Philip Jaisohn (Sŏ, Chae P’il, 1864-1951), and went on to engage in political and journalistic activities in the Independence Club. The Independence was a kind of zeitgeist at that time, and that prevailing atmosphere was epitomized by the establishment of the Taehan Empire, which was proclaimed as the first modern sovereign state on the peninsula, on October 12, 1897. In the same year, when Rhee graduated from Paijai (Baejae) school, he gave a speech titled “the Independence of Korea,” similarly fitting in with the times (Han, H. 1976: 84-108; Kim, M. and Kim, S. 2008: 63-6).

During this period, Kim lived in hiding with An T’aehun (1862-1905), the father of An Chunggŭn (1879-1910), because of the role he played as a leader of the defeated Tonghak movement. Unlike Rhee who viewed the QingJapan War and the year 1895 in terms of the concept of independence (Rhee, S. 1993: 109-94), Kim actually experienced battle against Japanese forces during the Tonghak revolt. Kim’s studies of Tonghak philosophy formed the foundation of his geopolitical perceptions, which opposed Western imperialism in protecting the East.9 (1835-1922) considered the Qing Court the center of culture and a political power. As long as Confucian civilization remained, it mattered little whether the Manchus or the Han Chinese actually ruled China (Jang, I. 2002: 256-7).

8 Translator’s note (hereafter TN). The Hyŏpsŏnghoe was a debating society that was a forerunner to the Independence Club.

9 Son Se Il thought that Tonghak, based on the principles of “anti-western, antiJapanese, all people are equal (反洋反倭萬民平等),” was influential in the establishment of Kim’s nationalism (Son, S. 1970: 18). Prior to joining the Tonghak movement, Kim read the Tonggyŏng taejŏn and Yongdam yusa (Kim, K. 2008: 69). Regarding his state

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Kim intensified his anti-western perceptions through his studies of “clear away the false” (斥邪, ch’ŏksa) thought, even though Tonghak did not agree with the whole points of that philosophy except its anti-western element.

During his time with An T’aehun, Kim met Ko Nŭngsŏn, a Confucian scholar of the Hwasŏ school.10 Ko’s teaching of the Confucian idea of moral righteousness (義理) served to inspire Kim for the rest of his life (Kim, K. 2008: 100-6). Ko Nŭngsŏn advised Kim to visit Qing China to find ways to save their country. Kim visited Qing twice and during his second visit, he met the son of Xu Yusheng, a general who died in the service of the Qing during the Qing-Japan War, and became his sworn brother near the Amnok (Ch., Yalu) River (Kim, K. 2008: 109-11, 123-5).11 Kim’s efforts during this period to save his country through ties with the Qing were not irrelevant to his later efforts to support Korean sovereignty through close cooperation with China during the years of the independence movement and the Asia-Pacific War. The transformation of Kim’s geopolitical perception occurred after the 1897 proclamation of the Taehan Empire. The new books he read while in his imprisonment at Inch’ŏn prison set him free from the conventional Sinocentric worldview. In particular, Kim found limitations to the lessons of Ko Nŭngsŏn while reading books such as a translation of Robert MacKenzie’s of mind when he joined the Tonghak movement, he stated: “When they told me, as I grieved over my plight as a commoner, that there is equality among those within Tonghak, and when I was told that there would be a new nation since the fate of the Chosŏn Dynasty was sealed, I was reminded of the grief I experienced taking the civil service examination” (Kim, K. 2008: 69). But later, Kim sometimes regretted his decision as “a folly, like chasing the wind” (Kim, K. 2008: 102).

10 TN. The Hwasŏ school was adamantly opposed to the opening of Korea and to the acceptance of Western thought.

11 Doh Jinsoon states that Kim’s efforts to collaborate with the Qing Court were based on veneration of the Ming Empire and looked to the Qing in a realist light, only to borrow their strength. But as described in footnote seven, at that time, it was hard to differentiate between veneration aimed at the Ming and Qing Empires, and both were at the heart of Sino-centrism. The Hwasŏ school was sympathetic to the Qing Empire.

For example, Yu In Sŏk (1842-1915) asserted that breaking off relations with the Qing and proclaiming independence were not matters to be celebrated but rather, mourned.

Many Hwasŏ scholars even favored the despotic rule in Korea of Yuan Shikai (18591916) after the Imo Kullan (壬午軍亂, Military Mutiny of 1882) (Oh, Y. 1999: 230).

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A History of the Nineteenth Century, and he consequently adopted the view that there were things to be learned from countries all around the world (Kim, K. 2008: 184).12 Kim’s epiphany in prison and change in geopolitical perception was very similar to the experience of Rhee described later in this paper (Lee, M. 2007: 60). Thenceforth, Kim regretted that he had ever considered breaking off his friendship with An T’aehun due to allegations by Ko Nŭngsŏn that An had an interest in Western learning. He resolved to “learn loyalty from Confucian scholars but also the best cultural and institutional practices of countries around the world.” The fact that Kim, having cut off his topknot, met Ko Nŭng Sŏn, and refuted his views as followed remark, offers a clear proof to the magnitude of the change in Kim’s geopolitical perception.

I told him of the state of the world as I learned from the books I had read and the unreasonableness of his philosophy of revering China and treating the Westerners as barbarians, and that we should not simply label as uncivilized barbarians those who have big noses and recessed eyes . . . How can we reject the barbarians of other countries when we can’t even do the same with the barbarians in our country? Those countries across the sea are well-organized and civilized. Their regulations and institutions are more advanced, though they have never seen even the shadow of Confucius or Mencius . . . In my opinion, there are many things we should learn from the barbarians, and indeed many we should discard from Confucius and Mencius (Kim, K. 2008: 272-3).

Such statements clearly demonstrate Kim’s desire to diverge from a Sino-centric geopolitical perception.13 Although Kim and Rhee had different trajectories, the establishment of the Taehan Empire in 1897 and accompanying social transformation incited in both a strong desire for independence from China.

For both Rhee and Kim, joining the Protestant church marked a shift in their perceptions of the world. Sino-centrism cast the emperor of China as 12

Son Se Il also focuses on the influence of this translation of MacKenzie’s book on the transformation of Kim’s perceptions (Son, S. 2008: 439-48).

13 Lhee Hojeh has some reservation on this evaluation. He understands Kim’s perception at this time as a postponement. He argues that Kim had left behind “the Confucian conception of a Sino-centric international political order,” but did not have a “new conception of international order” which could replace it (Lhee, H. 1994: 353).

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the ‘Son of Heaven’ and ranked the countries around China in a hierarchy with a strictness approaching that of a kind of religion. Protestantism lent great moral support to the cause of Korean independence because temporally it offered a better world to come beyond Sino-centric world and spatially it was directly related with the Western powers. Though Rhee sympathized with Philip Jaisohn and H. G. Appenzeller’s (1858-1902) western political ideas from the outset, he initially rejected Protestantism, asking “How can an educated scholar believe such stupid dogmas when he already knows the great Buddha and the wisdom of Confucius?” (Ch’ŏngnyŏn Yi Sŭngman Chasŏjŏn, 1995: 86) However, he converted in 1899, while he was imprisoned at Han-sung prison. He stated that “although the teachings of Protestantism may not have been true, I firmly believed that they were uniquely able to change the hearts of our people, which had been so egoistic and self-centered as to be indifferent to the well-being of our compatriots” (Lee, J. 2002: 101).

Rhee reconciled the ideals of Protestantism with those of independence.

Protestantism led Rhee’s geopolitical perception to encompass the system of sovereign states established by the Peace of Westphalia, which had been spreading since the end of the Thirty Years War in 1648 (Kim, M. and Kim, S. 2008: 81-2).14 Like Syngman Rhee, Kim Ku also accepted Protestantism after he experienced imprisonment, escape, a journey to the southern region of Korea, and the deaths of his father and fiancé. His entrance into the Protestant church was as important as his meeting with Ko Nŭngsŏn, in the sense that it was accompanied by intensive study of the Bible and training as a church leader. A Bible class in P’yŏngyang that Kim attended followed a strict religious training that taught doctrine and faith through a schedule comprising of “an early morning prayer meeting, breakfast, 30 minutes of worship, morning Bible study, lunch, afternoon bible study, choral lessons, spreading the Gospel, dinner, and an evening of discussion” (Kim, K. 2008: 285-8; Ok, S. 2001: 30-1; Choi, G. 2003: 33). The following statement from Kim demonstrates his synthesis of Protestantism and the ideal of 14

It can be argued that Protestantism itself is an evenness-friendly religion. The emergence and rise of Protestantism is often interpreted in the context of the “democratization of faith” (McGrath 2007: 52).

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independence, similar to that of Rhee.

In P’yŏngan-do, and needless to mention Hwanghae-do, education reform began in Yesugyo (Jesus religion). Most people who supported cultural development were the followers of Yesugyo. People who had been exclusively concerned with bolting the door and maintaining tradition learned about the outside world from the tongues of western people. The followers of Yesugyo are mostly people of the middle class and therefore barely learned and foolish, but this only made it easier for them to learn from even the words of halfdumb missionaries; those who frequently listened not only learned faith but also patriotism. Therefore, it is an unavoidable truth that those who are patriotic are also the believers of Yesugyo. An old friend of mine, U Chongsŏ, was a missionary, and at his urging, I decided to devote myself to education reform and believe in Yesu (Jesus) after my mourning [for my father and fiancé] ended (Kim, K. 2008: 285).

Like Rhee, Protestantism not only provided a religious faith for Kim but also formed the ideological foundation that led to his new geopolitical perception.

As Hong Taeyong before him, Kim acquired a geopolitical perception that can be thought of as concentric circles centered on oneself and one’s own nation, rather than being fixed on traditional imperial subject-hood and the Central State (中國, China). Though the two men acquired their belief in independence through different experiences, the Protestantism helped consolidate the foundations of their ideologies.

Rhee and Kim’s geopolitical perceptions were again transformed by the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). This was the consequence of intellectual efforts to discern what threats there were to Korea’s sovereignty after the dissolution of the Sino-centric order.15 Rhee viewed Russia through the same pro-independence lens through which he had viewed the Qing Empire, and as a result, was persecuted by the royal circle of Korean government, which adopted a pro-Russia policy. Rhee’s short interest in Japan’s anti-Russian pan15

This refers to the perception of the threats posed by Russia and Japan, which arose after the fall of the Sino-centric order. Lhee Hojeh asserts that the Ch’ŏn-Il ch’aek, written by Min Yŏng Hwan (1861-1905), is the first modern foreign policy work written by a Korean. He believes it to show that caution toward Russia and Japan has long been a part of Korean diplomacy.

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Asianism, which was attractive to some Koreans, was associated with the geopolitical circumstances during this period (Oliver 2002: 59-60). His antiRussian stance was strengthened through his readings and entrance into the Protestant church during his imprisonment. Rhee believed Russia’s aggressive nature came from the Russian Orthodox Church, which had proclaimed imperial universality like Sino-centrism, and he believed that Russia’s geopolitical ambitions toward Europe, which had been thwarted by the Crimean War (1853-1856), were now pointed at Asia (Lew, Y. 2002: 322-3).

Even before the spread of Russian communism, Rhee viewed the expansion of the Russian empire with a vigilant stance.

Kim’s anti-Russian geopolitical perception was similar to those of Rhee and other contemporary intellectual elites. The Tonghak movement, in which Kim once participated, considered Russia the most threatening invader of all external powers (Lhee, H. 1994: 59). It is also likely that Kim’s geopolitical wariness toward Russia’s territorial ambitions was strengthened by reading MacKenzie’s book, which was covered with overtone of Russo-phobia.16 However, he was more suspicious of Japan than Russia. Kim, who had already directly expressed his hostility against Japan through his involvement in the Tonghak rebellion and the killing of Tsuchida Joryo, whom Kim suspected for his involvement in the assassination of Empress Myŏngsŏng (Queen Min), fled to Sajik-dong of Changnyŏn county after the Japanese occupation of P’yŏngyang in 1904 (Kim, K. 2008: 661). He also started an anti-Japan demonstration and petition following the conclusion of the so-called JapanKorea Treaty of 1905 (乙巳勒約).17 The persistent tendency that Kim kept a wary eye on Russia but an even more alert one on Japan is a theme that continued even into his post-1945 independence political orientation.

With the establishment of the Great Korea (Taehan) Empire in 1897, 16

The original version of The 19th Century: A History, on chapter five of the third book describes Russia as follows: “During this intervention period(from Peter the Great to Alexandre II), the history of Russia is a record of incessant expansion to all directions” (Mackenzie 1880: 379). The book reflects the Great Game between Britain and Russia.

That is to say, there is clearly seen the cautiousness with which the British regarded Russia. Rhee also carefully read this book and his geopolitical perception was influenced by it (Lew, Y. 2002: 91-3).

17 Kim perceived Japan as consistently imperialistic both before and after WWII.

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Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku firmly believed in Korean independence and Korean sovereignty. Rhee once offered a response to the popular notion that “the people of Chosŏn had been subjects of China for many years—so why independence now?” He argued that “independence allows people to avoid being treated as beasts, and adults being treated as children.”18 To enervated yangban and idle commoners, Kim issued a call to “wake up, whether yangban or commoner!” (Kim, K. 2008: 314-5) Rhee and Kim learned through Protestantism the reality of the geopolitical situation surrounding the newly born Great Korea Empire, and began to see with a vigilant stance threats from both land (Russia) and sea (Japan) following the dissolution of the Sino-centric regional order.

III. P olitical Split within the Korean Provisional Government, and the Two Men’s Geopolitical Perceptions Established in 1919, the Korean Provisional Government (Taehan min’guk imsi chŏngbu) embodied the spirit of national sovereignty envisioned in 1917 by the “Proclamation of Great Solidarity” and claimed legitimate succession to the Taehan Empire, as seen in the preservation of the name “Taehan” (Yun, D. 2006: 36-7). Through its struggles over the next twenty-seven years, the Provisional Government left an outstanding mark on the history of anti-colonialism worldwide. 19 In the initial phase of the Government, Rhee and Kim walked together under the same cause, with Rhee becoming the first president of the Provisional Government in 1919, and Kim the Director General of the Police Bureau. During this period, Rhee operated in the U.S., warily watching the links between the U.S.’s “Open Door Policy” toward China and Japanese expansionism on the continent. Meanwhile, Kim operated in China, opposing communism, which was rapidly spreading on 18

“P’aemanghan nara tŭl ŭi tanghan kyŏlsil” (“The results of the defeated and ruined countries”), Cheguk sinmun, February 28, 1903.

19 Kim Hŭi Gon argues that Korea through this process experienced a modernization equivalent to a civil revolution, which he calls “the theory of modernization through the independence movement” (Kim, H. 2009).

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the Eurasian landmass, and keeping a hopeful eye on the Pacific. The activities of the two men reflect the commonalities in their geopolitical perceptions.20 Rhee’s geopolitical perception is well described in his doctoral dissertation, “Neutrality as Influenced by the United States.”21 His proposal which was based on the core implication of his dissertation, that Korea should be made a mandated territory through the League of Nation under the U.S. leadership, became an ongoing issue of controversy and undermined his credibility to lead independence movement. However, at the time at least, the approach to recovering sovereignty through collaboration with the U.S. itself was the one adopted by the Provisional Government. It made sense that the Provisional Government gave more consideration to the U.S. than the Russia (later Soviet Union, 1922). The U.S. was emerging as a major world power both economically and politically, and was orchestrating the Paris Peace Conference (1919) as one of the victors of World War I , whereas Russia was suffering from devastating influence of post-revolution civil war (Manela 2007: 52-3). At that time, Kim was serving as police head, and wasn’t as prominent as Rhee, An Ch’ang Ho (1878-1938), or Yi Tong Hwi (1873-1935), who were the top three leaders of the Provisional Government. But since the police of provisional government had the authority and even clout to exercise lethal force in the Shanghai French Concession (where the menacing force of Japanese secret service operated), by the 1920’s Kim was considered by the Japanese police as one of the five most powerful men in the Korean Provisional Government (Kim, K. 2008: 467-8).

It is possible that Kim was antipathetic to the way that Rhee reduced the status of Provisional Government to a symbol, refusing to come to Shanghai and instead pursuing diplomatic activities through the Washington D.C. 20

There is no way to know with certainty how Rhee and Kim perceived WWI at this time. In the case of Rhee, we have a passage from Japan Inside Out (1941) which states that the losers of the Paris Peace Conference were the democratic states that could not achieve cohesion, but this critique was written after the outbreak of WWII with the advantage of hindsight, and cannot be taken as reflecting his views at the time in question.

21 In this piece, Rhee concludes that the most important problems to be resolved with American influence were “1) the approval of independence, 2) the inviolability of the sovereignty of neutral states, 3) freedom of neutral trade” (Rhee 2000: 145).

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based Korean Commission (Sin, P. 2003: 372-4). But Kim still aligned himself with Rhee’s pro-U.S. line rather than the pro-Russia stance of Yi Tonghwi.

This is clearly seen in his refusal to join the Korean Communist Party22 in Shanghai, despite the request of Yi Tonghwi. He not only refused the request but issued the following stern warning to Yi, who was then the Prime Minister: I asked in response, “Will we be able to lead a communist revolution by ourselves without the orders or guidance of the 3rd International?” Yi answered in the negative and said it was impossible. I told him firmly, “an independence movement without Korean identity, under the orders of the 3rd Comintern, is a meaningless movement without self-respect. Your call runs counter to the charter of the Korean Provisional Government, and it is definitely wrong. I cannot follow your guidance. I politely ask you to be more self-restraining” (Kim, K. 2008: 473-4).

Kim’s geopolitical perception can be seen in the conflicts surrounding the three big issues at that time, namely, Convention of National Representatives (Shanghai), the Washington Naval Conference (Washington), and the First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East (Moscow), all held during the years 1921 and 1922. The Washington Conference, held from November 1921 to February 1922, launched the Washington Treaty System, composed of (among other things) the Nine-Power Treaty aimed at the preservation of Chinese territorial integrity, the “Open Door Policy,” and the Four-Power Treaty, which replaced the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The Washington Treaty System achieved a kind of compromise or interim solution in the struggle between the U.S. and Japan over supremacy in the Pacific under a multilateral framework. An effort by Rhee and his Korean Commission to raise the Korea problem during the conference was not successful, and Rhee’s pro-U.S. foreign policy was seen to have irrevocably failed (Ko, J. 2006: 23). Kim Kyu Sik (1881-1950), who had worked with Rhee in the Korean Commission, also began to advocate a position that was anti-U.S. and pro-Soviet. Furthermore, 22

The Korean Communist Party of Shanghai was established in 1920 in Shanghai and held as its objectives the followings: organizing a unified Korean Communist Party and the recognition by the Comintern (Lim, K. 2004: 194-205).

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Kim Kyu Sik participated in the First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East, and criticized the U.S. for unmasking itself and entering into a treaty with the exploitative nations of England, France, and Japan, “Bloodsucker nations” (Kim, K. 1922: 137-47).23 Demanding a pro-Soviet realignment and adjustment of political orientation in the government, which had begun in 1921, and concurrent calls for Syngman Rhee’s resignation and reconstruction of the Korean Provisional Government were only strengthened following the conference in Moscow. There was severe conflict between the reconstruct faction (改造派), which advocated the reformation and expansion of the Korean Provisional Government, and a more radical faction (創造派), which advocated the complete dissolution of the Korean Provisional Government in favor of a new government. Eventually, the radical faction broke off, chartered a new separate government, and moved to Vladivostok to seek support and approval from the Soviet Union, but ended up a failure (Yun, Y. 2006: 202-4, 220-7).

During this time, Kim was included in a faction that defended the Korean Provisional Government and was considered “an absolute supporter of the provisional government in fully putting his trust on the current president and his cabinet members” (Yun, D. 2006: 205).24 When Yŏ, Un Hyŏng (1886-1947) attended the Moscow Conference in 1922, Kim resigned his membership in the New Korea Youth Association (Sinhan ch’ŏngnyŏndang) which had been launched by Yŏ.

Kim also thought that those who advocated the Convention of National Representatives were sponsored by Moscow. Once he became Minister of the Interior for the Provisional Government, his first decree was an immediate dissolution of the Convention of National Representatives (Kim, K. 2008: 23

The First Congress of the Toilers of the Far East was held in Moscow January 21, 1921 to February 2, 1922. As representative of the Korean delegation, Kim, Kyu Sik gave a speech in which he sharply contrasted the U.S. and Russia (Lim, K. 2004: 523).

However, after he witnessed the realities of Soviet tyranny, he left behind his proCommunist stance (Lee, C. 1974: 88-9).

24 Kim told Pak, Ŭn Sik (1859-1925), who was advocating the Convention of National Representatives, that “if you go ahead with the Convention of National Representatives, you will become a bigger enemy of the people than Yi, Wan Yong” (Paekpŏm chŏnjip p‘yŏnch‘an wiwŏnhoe 1982: 127).

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475-7). Kim did not sympathize with the effort to incriminate and dismiss Rhee in 1925. 25 Some of anti-Rhee element in the government who did argued as follows: The purpose of diplomacy is to further the interests of one’s nation through negotiations with other countries. Taking this into consideration, a country in our situation should have chosen China, small other nations, the Soviet Union and the 3rd International as the primary targets of our diplomacy, since they are also suffering from and stand against aggressive capitalism and imperialism. There are other world powers such as the U.S., Great Britain, and France who are fighting Japan for their rights and interests in China and the Pacific but they can be no more than a secondary consideration for us.

However, Rhee considered the Soviet Union a threat because it is red and China not an option because it is weak, holding only the U.S. [in high esteem] as the sky in servitude because it is white and strong. But I have yet to hear of any support from the U.S. for our national independence movement.26

Pak, Ŭn Sik, who succeeded Rhee as President of the Provisional Government, emphasized a geopolitical strategy, which embodied perceptions such as the one above, involving alliances with China, the Soviet Union, and India. Pak, Ŭn Sik thought that through its successful revolution, Russia had gone from aggressive expansionism to republicanism (Im, K. 2004: 44). Based on such perceptions, Pak, Ŭn Sik argued as follows: Our independence movement must move of our own will, our own words, and with the collaboration of 400 million Chinese, 150 million Russians, and 300 million Indians, so that we may improve our people’s knowledge, arouse

25

It appears that at this time, Kim, along with Cho Soang (1887-1958) and others, corresponded with Rhee to discuss a series of measures to prevent the outbreak of chaos in the provisional government. Rhee replied to Kim as follows: “Through the exchange of several letters with Cho Soang, we knew that you were doing your best with us. I had long hoped to share words with you, so thank you for writing me first.

The long-sighted plan you showed us is definitely one we must implement, but which we cannot being without financial support” (Yu, Y. et al. 2009: 10-1).

26 “Yi Sŭngman kun ege irŏn ŭl yŏ hanora” (“A word to Mr. Rhee Syngman”), Tongnip sinmun, March 31, 1925.

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sympathy around the world, and pose a threat to our enemies.27

Thus, the impeachment of Rhee in Shanghai occurred against the backdrop of conflicting geopolitical perceptions, with a U.S. and Pacific-centric viewpoint on the one hand, and another focusing on Russia, China, India, and other countries on the Eurasian continent instead of Western powers.28 In the midst of this heating controversy, the fact that the geopolitical perceptions of Kim and Rhee were in accord has significant implication. What made this accordance possible?

First, from Kim’s point of view, in order to deal with the financial difficulties of the Provisional Government, it was necessary to get funding from countrymen living overseas in America, who were relatively prosperous.

Kim had seen how the pernicious internal struggle caused by financial support from Moscow contributed to the disunion of the Provisional Government by promoting the factionalism of Yi Tonghwi and his followers.

Therefore, Kim believed that severing relations with western societies would undermine the practical and financial foundations of the Provisional Government, since they were operating in the international city of Shanghai.

Around the time of President Rhee’s inauguration, many Chinese and even western people with their blue eyes and big noses sought out the Korean Provisional Government, but now, no one comes by …. We could not but place the fate of the Korean Provisional Government in the hands of brothers overseas …. There are tens of thousands of Koreans living in America, Hawaii, Mexico, and Cuba, and though they were mostly laborers, at least their hearts were full of the patriotism they had been taught by Philip Jaisohn, Dr. Rhee, An Ch’angho, and Pak Yongman (Kim, K. 2008: 490-1, 494).

Second, it was the Soviet Union, rather than the U.S., which provoked antiwestern sentiments in Kim while he was operating in China. At the time, 27

“Tongnip undong ŭi tae pangch’im ŭl pujinham” (“Unable to advance the independence movement”), Tongnip sinmun, October 21, 1925.

28 That even An Ch’ang Ho, who was by no means a socialist, in 1921 began supporting the coalition of Korea, China, and the Red Russia against Japan, was a sign of the times (Yi, A. 1999: 23-7).

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Lenin was planning to harness the energy of colonized peoples in Asia to compensate for the falling off of revolutionary fervor in 1920s Europe (Carrère d’Encausse 1985: 15-9). This Soviet operation fed into the anti-Russian sentiments that Kim had harbored since the time of the Taehan Empire. Kim could not speak English, nor could he speak Chinese. With the Chinese he was at least able to communicate in writing, but even this was not possible with the Russians. This was in a similar vein to Kim’s later views that blind obedience toward Soviet Communism was flunkeyism.

Our people’s sad fate is the product of worshiping flunkeyism. No one was concerned with the people’s happiness and the nation’s interest. We preferred to fight for centuries to strengthen the theories of Zhu Xi, while our own national spirit withered away. The only thing we developed is a reliance on others, so how could we not face ruin …. Those who sneered at the blind followers of Chengzi (Cheng Yi) and Zhu Xi are now the ones who blindly follow Lenin. Immature Koreans must come to their senses (Kim, K. 2008: 541).

In contrast to Rhee who operated in America, Kim’s sphere of influence was in Eurasia, but his geopolitical perception was not confined to that continental framework.

IV. The Asia-Pacific War and the Two Men’s Geopolitical Perceptions The history of the Asia-Pacific War, which started in turmoil of Manchu and China in 1930s and ended in the demise of the Japanese Empire in 1945, brought a convergence of the geopolitical perceptions of the two men who had been working for Korean independence on opposite sides of the Pacific.29 Kim thought that there would be an all-out war between China and Japan, which would eventually result in Korea’s restoration of sovereignty. This was consistent with the geopolitical perception that Kim acquired while he was 29

This paper refers to the war which occurred in the Pacific and on the Asian mainland from 1937 to 1945 as the “Asia-Pacific War” (Kim, M. 2009: 75-81).

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traveling in Qing China following the Qing-Japan War (1894-1895). Kim’s view on an all-out war between China and Japan was also convergent with Rhee’s life-long prediction of the “inevitability of war between the U.S. and Japan.” This was because Kim believed that a China-Japan war would certainly expand into a world war in which Japan would be defeated (The Association of Commemorative Service for Kim Koo Scholarship ed., 1982: 235, 249-50; Namp’a Pak Ch’anik chŏn’gi kanhaeng wiwŏnhoe 1989: 205, 232).

In spite of severe financial hardship, Kim was preparing some funds from Koreans residing in America for an “impressive undertaking” (Kim, K. 2008: 493, 498).30 For Kim, the Manchurian Incident (1931) was a harbinger of war between China and Japan. What Kim planned to do with the money from Koreans in America was to take advantage of the opportunities presented by a Sino-Japanese conflict to resolve the discord that Japan had sown between Korea and China (Kim, K. 2008: 502). The heroic activities of Yi Bong Chang, on January 8, 1932, and Yun Bong Gil, on April 29, 1932, were planned against this backdrop, and were extremely effective for that purpose.

Their actions stimulated both moral and material support from Koreans in America (Kim, K. 2008: 505), and more importantly, gave impetus to serious collaboration between Kim and the Guomindang led by Chiang Kai-shek (Kim, K. 2008: 522-3).

After the patriotic martyrdom of Yun, Kim published Towaesilgi, in which he recounted the facts of the incident and prescribed a symbiotic relationship between Korea and China, drawing on the history of the 16th century Imjin War (1592-1598) to emphasize the bonds between the two countries: Violent Japan’s invasion of China was similar to their actions towards us ….

India was a large country but was ruined, while Nepal lives on, despite its small size. This teaches us that the size of a country does not determine its fate, but rather how hard its people are willing to fight …. China has lost its northeast but if its 400 million people resist without fear of death, its weakness 30

During this time, Kim was “researching what would be useful to our people, and whether I would be able to do those things.” He recalls that “coincidentally, several hundred dollars arrived from Hawaii. I hid it away in a money pouch in some raggedy clothes and continued living like a beggar, just as before. I was the only one that knew that there was over a thousand dollars hidden under these threadbare clothes.”

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can become strength and it can expect progress towards a desirable outcome.

Our 30 million Koreans will support our allies with our hearts and bodies to chase out our foes. When Japan tried to invade Ming China through Korea, we refused their request and consequently, we suffered the ravages of war.

But we were able to secure victory with the help of the Ming. It is clear that our relationship is one of mutual benefit, so called Soon-chi (脣齒, relationship between lips and teeth).31

The Yi and Yoon’s activities which were mentioned above arranged by Kim were the outcomes of such a geopolitical perception. In his preface to the 1946 edition of Towaesilgi, Rhee who was generally skeptical to terrorism also opined that “the martyrdom of Yun was not a simple act of terror but an event that helped realize the alliance between the Guomindang and the Korean Provisional Government, an event of international significance that was felt even at the Cairo Conference” (The Association of Commemorative Service for Kim Koo Scholarship 1999: 667).

As the Manchurian Incident transformed into the Sino-Japanese War (1937) and the Asia-Pacific War (1941), the destinies of China and the U.S., as well as Korea’s independence, became intertwined. As the Sino-Japanese conflict escalated, Kim authored a treatise titled “A Warning to the People of China” in which he stated that “China’s entrance into the fight gave me and my comrades a chance to seek retribution for 29 years of grievance,” and that “when China wins its fight, other weaker smaller nations will be able to gain strength from its victory and achieve freedom.” He therefore urged cooperation between the Provisional Government and China in the struggle against Japan (Chu, H. 1972: 105).

Meanwhile, Rhee made assertions toward the Americans which were similar to what Kim said about the Chinese. In his book Japan Inside Out, written in 1941, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, Rhee stated that: On the other hand, if the American people had seen Japan in 1894 and 1904 31

Towaesilgi is a booklet published by Kim in December 1932 to spread the word to the Chinese about Korea’s anti-Japanese efforts. This book, which was first published in Chinese, was translated into Korean, slightly supplemented and republished in 1946 by Ŏm Hangsŏp (Towaesilgi, The Association of Commemorative Service for Kim Koo Scholarship ed., 1999: 662).

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as they see her today, they would have looked askance at Japan’s annexation of Korea, and would have tried to meet Japanese expansion of sea power, which now offers a powerful threat on the other side of the Pacific. … Can you still believe the forest fire is far way? Can you still say, “Let the Koreans, the Manchurians, and the Chinese fight their own fight; it is none of our business”? … With this in view, we will not interest ourselves in the SinoJapanese conflict as a whole, but only in a certain phase of the conflict that affects foreigners in general and Americans in particular. … It means just this: the Mikado in the East and the Fascist and Nazis in the West are bent on conquering the world. As they have great mechanized armies, they believe they are destined to rule the world (Rhee, S. 1941: 9-11).

Rhee’s logic that what was happening in both east and west Eurasia was of relevance to U.S. national security, corresponded with the geopolitical logic of American realistic strategist, which opposed American isolationism and emphasize the threat posed by the Axis Powers (Iriye 2004: 164-9).

The second volume of Paekpŏm ilchi, which Kim started writing in 1941, explains that Kim also observed the times from the point of view linking Asia and the Pacific.

Since the Provisional Government was established, we have made much effort on the diplomatic front, but have received no official aid, only informal, from the governments of China, the Soviet Union and the U.S. Now, however, President Roosevelt announced to the world that “Korea will become a fully independent country,” and the Chinese President of the House, Sun Ke (孫科), during a public address commemorating the 23rd anniversary of the March 1st movement, argued that “the best solution for China to eliminate Japanese imperialism is to formally recognize the Korean Provisional Government.”

Additionally, the Provisional Government has established a foreign relations committee in Washington and placed Dr. Rhee as its chair to energize diplomatic and propaganda efforts (Kim, K. 2008: 451).

Kim absolutely supported Rhee in his leadership of the diplomatic efforts towards the U.S. as chair of the foreign relations committee during the AsiaPacific War. Their solidarity, based on a common geopolitical perception, reached its climax during this time. Not only in the personal opinions of Rhee and Kim but also in the common view of Korean society in the U.S and

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China, the grand trend of cooperation between the U.S. and China meant a truly “Asian-Pacific” War in geographical scope.32 The convergence of the two men’s geopolitical perceptions reached a climax when Rhee appealed for help from those within Korea through the “Voice of America” broadcasts from June to July of 1942. American communications technology rendered both sides of the Pacific into a unified geopolitical theatre for the independence struggle. The U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS) requested that Rhee make his broadcasts in an effort to incite a guerilla war by the Korean people against Japan (Lew, Y. 1996: 196). His broadcast began, “I am Syngman Rhee. I am speaking to my 23 million countrymen scattered both in and outside Korea.” He announced in the broadcast that the Korean Provisional Government in Chongqing and the Korean Gwangbok (literally, Light Restoration). Army were fighting Japan with financial support from America and the political support of the Guomindang.33 Up to this time, Rhee had advocated diplomacy and careful preparation for an eventual conflict, while Kim had been mainly concerned about interference from the Soviet Union despite the importance he attached to military action. That Rhee agitated for a guerilla war through the broadcast signified the historically meaningful convergence of Rhee and Kim’s geopolitical perceptions.

32

The solidarity between Rhee and the Provisional Government in Chongqing signified an alliance of the non-communist nationalist between America and Asian continent.

Syngman Rhee’s plans, which were passionately proposed from 1942 to 1943, for organizing Korean guerilla units, were the result of close consultation with Kim and signified the collaborative relationship and complete mutual trust between the two men (Jung, B. 2007: 295-332).

33 The contents of this section are as follows. “Our provisional government is operating in Chongqing under the leadership of the patriots Kim Ku, Yi Siyŏng, Cho Wanku, Cho Soang. Our Restoration Army is led by generals such as Yi, Ch’ŏng Ch’ŏn, Kim, Yak San, Yu, Tong Yŏl, Cho, Sŏngh Wan who have established a headquarters and are fighting the enemy. With the support of Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his wife, we have received the materiel needed by our army to be rightfully called the army of a sovereign nation. Our countrymen in the U.S., Hawaii, Mexico and Cuba continue to send us financial support. We will therefore be able to continue supplying our army with what it needs, so that day by day its members and courage will grow (VOA Broadcast, June 13, 1943; Rhee, S. 1993: 291-2).

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At the same time, their geopolitical perceptions, which were so similar during the Asia-Pacific War, also had some differences. First was the perception on China. Since the time of his service as President of the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai, Rhee had understood proindependence activities within China to be important but he considered them secondary to efforts involving the U.S. and the West.34 As with his warning about the crisis of the “Open Door Policy” before the Asia-Pacific War, during the war Rhee approached it as an application of the Atlantic Charter to the Asia-Pacific region.35 Overall, Rhee considered China secondary to the East Asia policy of the U.S. On the other hand, Kim, while continuing to advocate autonomy visà-vis Guomindang, placed a high value on China’s influence on efforts to regain Korea’s sovereignty. Kim considered the Sino-Japanese War as a more important campaign than the one of Europe and the Pacific in World War II. Kim regarded the political situation of Asia (especially China), from where the Asia- Pacific War was originated, as the most vital factor in the worldwide political situation.36 This can be seen in the fact that Kim welcomed Korea temporarily being included in the Chinese theatre (of operations) at the end of the war.37 This reflected the urgent need of provisional government for the 34

Regarding the division of labor between the provisional government and the Korean Commission, Rhee trumpeted the role played by the later which he had established (Ko, J. 2004: 213-7).

35 These facts are clearly shown in the proceedings of the Korean Liberty Conference which was held February 27 to March 1, 1942 under the leadership of Rhee.

(Cromwell, “Forward,” in Korean Liberty Conference, 1942, Hotel Lafayette, Washington D.C.). This provided a counterpoint to the anti-Western spirit of the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Japan, which proposed the aforementioned plan, did so in opposition to the 1943 Atlantic Charter, as a “Pacific Charter” (Kim, M. 2006: 219).

36 Kim on August 25, 1940, in a statement titled “My support for Sino-Korean collaboration,” said the following: “China’s struggle is not only for China, but on behalf of the entire world” (Paekpŏm haksurwŏn 2005: 100-1).

37 In a congratulatory message to the American commander of the Chinese theater, A. C. Wedemeyer (1897-1989), Kim expressed his gratitude, saying that “including Korea in the Chinese theater is a farsighted decision both in terms of military and political strategy” (Taehan min’guk imsi chŏngbu charyojip p’yŏnch’an wiwŏnhoe, volume 13, IV, 2006, 269). However, as a result of General Order No. 1, which went into effect March 15, 1945, Korea came under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Commander for

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material assistance of the Guomindang government. It also reflected the risk of overdependence on the Guomindang by the Provisional Government. In fact, Chiang Kai-shek (1887-1975), who Kim first met in 1933, emphasized an anti-Japanese line based on Sun Yat-sen’s (1866-1925) Three Principles of the People (Kim, K. 2008: 544-5).38 Later on, Kim and fellow government officials, while adjusting the “Nine Principles of the Restoration Army” issued by Chiang Kai-shek’s Guomindang, did their best to maintain the independence of the Korean Gwangbok Army and the Provisional Government against Guomindang’s persistent attempt to control their action. As early as 1942, as prospects of Chinese victory increased, the Chinese began pressuring the Provisional Government in ways that seemed to presage restoration to the historically subordinate relationship (Ku, D. 1995: 108). But efforts by the Korean Provisional Government to maintain independence from China were limited not only by the need for material support from China but also by considerations colored by the history of a symbiotic alliance (Sunch’i ŭi tongmaengnon) (Han, S. 2006: 28-9).39 Second were perceptions on the United States. In Japan Inside Out, Rhee framed Korea’s loss of sovereignty in the historical contexts of the postwar settlement of the Russo-Japanese War, of WWI and the origins of WWII, and criticized the irresponsibility of the U.S. (Rhee, S. 1993: 217-28). Rhee’s overall point, embodied in the final line of the book, “Let the United States act— and act now,” was in the same spirit as the strategy of Franklin D. Roosevelt (1882-1945) and his second administration (1937-1940),40 which gradually the Allied Powers, Douglas MacArthur, and his subordinate, John R. Hodge, who commanded the XXIV corps of the US Tenth Army.

38 Sun Yat-sen repeatedly asserted that the territories of smaller countries in the region including Korea, the Philippines and Vietnam were lands that were to be recovered

by China. Moreover, he asserted that though the losses of Taiwan and Indochina occurred in situations “beyond its control,” the independence of Korea occurred when “China had no control,” so the issue logically should be “reopened” (Bae, K. 2006: 238-50; Ku, D. 1995: 125). Korea’s independence activists needed China’s help to fight Japan and could only remain cautious against such geopolitical perceptions.

39 Ko, Jung Hyoo has indicated that one of the reasons the Restoration Army could not closely collaborate with the American forces through the OSS was due to the subtle restrictions imposed by the Chinese provisional government (Ko, J. 2004: 453).

40 The Roosevelt administration began in its second term to transform American foreign

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put an end to American isolationism and began to envision spreading of U.S.style democracy in Eurasia (Rhee, S. 1993: 252). Over time, Rhee’s thinking evolved such that he considered it necessary to keep American influence on the peninsula even after the achievement of restoration. To the contrary, Kim’s sentiments toward the U.S. were somewhat ambiguous. Certainly, the Provisional Government under Kim’s leadership actively courted the U.S. in the pursuit of restoration, and understood the important role of the U.S. in the post-war world (Han, S. 2006: 26-7). Also, as described in Na ŭi sowŏn (My Hope, 1947), Kim viewed U.S.-style democracy in a favorable light.

But as shown above, his basic ideal was confined in “Eastern Way, Western Technology” (Tongdo sŏgi).

I do not advocate outright adoption of U.S.-style democracy. I was simply making a relative comparison between the despotic Soviet-style of democracy and the U.S.-style of democracy, which guarantees freedom of speech. I meant that if I had to choose one of the two, I would choose the one which guaranteed freedom of speech and ideas. I do not think that U.S.-style democracy is a perfect or complete political system. Just as in any other aspect of life, political systems also evolve. Moreover, a country like Korea which over the course of five thousand years has experienced many different systems of government will have had both defective and effective systems. Looking at the recent Chosŏn era, institutions such as the Office of Special Advisors, the Censorate, and the Inspector General that applied ideas arising from among the people to the conduct of government were great systems. Such systems and those like the civil service examination system and secret royal commissioners are worth studying. I believe that we can learn many useful things if we carefully examine the systems of past generations (Kim, K. 2005: 429-31).

policy from isolationism to participation on the world stage, once a certain amount of recovery from the economic crisis had been achieved (Iriye 2004: 131-69). In his “Quarantine Speech,” delivered October 1937 in Chicago, Roosevelt did not explicitly name enemy states but did say that America must play a decisive role in an era marked by a “reign of terror and international lawlessness.” This put an end to the isolationist foreign policy that he had followed since he assumed the presidency in 1933 (Divine 1981: 16).

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Kim was also impressed by the wealth and power of the U.S. during the war.41 In Kim’s view, Northeast Asia was an open space which should never be exclusively dominated by the Soviet Union or Japan. However, we can hardly say that Kim thought the U.S. should therefore remain a permanent presence in Asia.

Third was the perception on the Soviet and communism. The distrust between the Guomindang and the Chinese Communists eventually broke out into armed conflict during and after the end of the Asia-Pacific War. It is therefore hard to believe that the Provisional Government and the Korean Gwangbok Army, who were closely tied with Guomindang, deeply trusted communists, having seen such actual and pernicious confrontation. 42 Kim understood communism as a form of dogmatic toadyism, and also a “fearful dictatorship” premised on thought control.

Among all dictatorships, the ones to be feared most are those based on ideology or philosophy …. Soviet-style democracy which the communists advocate is amongst these the most thorough, and exercises dictatorial practices to their utmost (Kim, K. 2005: 427-8).

Nevertheless, Kim’s Korean Independence Party (Han’guk tongniptang), was strongly exhorted by the Guomindang during the period of the Second 41

Kim’s perception that the U.S. military was stronger than the Japanese one was decisively confirmed as he observed the infiltration training program of the OSS (Kim, K. 2008: 602).

42 Even as collaboration earnestly progressed, Kim deeply mistrusted Kim Wŏnbong and his fellows for “outwardly supporting nationalism but internally advocating communism” (Kim, K. 2008: 550-1). This attitude is clearly seen in the recollections of those around him. Kim Jun Yop experienced the Chinese Civil War as well as a sneak attack on Guomindang forces by the 8th Route Army after the establishment of the Second United Front, and recalled that these stirred in him a deep interest in communism (Kim, J. 1989a: 214-5). In a conversation with Kim Ku after the NorthSouth talks, one of his close lieutenants, Pak Ch’anik, stated that “as can be seen in the Second United Front, communists make gestures only to achieve their ends and are a sort with which there can be no compromise.” Taking into account such statements, it does not seem likely that the left-right collaboration of the Korean Provisional Government was of transformative significance leading to a genuine cooperation (Namp’a Pak Ch’anik chŏn’gi kanhaeng wiwŏnhoe 1989: 321).

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United Front (國共合作) in China, collaborated with Kim Wŏnbong’s (18981958) National Revolution Party (Minjok hyŏngmyŏngdang) across the ideological divide.43 Even after the end of WWII, Kim still held reservations about the Soviet, but remained within the political orientation to construct a united Asian front against Japan.44 On the other hand, Rhee was extremely wary of Soviet geopolitical expansion. Beginning in the 1920s, he argued that communism could undermine the national movement for sovereignty, leaving Korea to be taken advantage of by the Soviet, not to mention that he distrusted their economic policies as well.45 Moreover, Rhee framed WWII as a conflict between democracy and totalitarianism, and categorized the Soviet Union as totalitarian. His perception mirrored the Western liberal point of view that fascism and communism were both part of the same broader category of totalitarian governments (Rhee, S. 1993: 241-52; Iriye 2004: 131-5). Lastly, Rhee thought that traditional geopolitical ambitions of Russia Empire were in resurgence by the rise of Soviet Union at the end of the war. The following is an excerpt from a message that Rhee sent to one of his followers: My lifelong studies in international relations had dealt with Europe as well as with Asia. My travels in Europe also tended to sharpen my awareness of the significance of the trend of events in that part of the world. It was obvious that the nationalistic guerilla operating in southeastern Europe were themselves divided into two groups—communist and non-communist. When Roosevelt and Churchill agreed not to invade the European continent through the

43

Kim simultaneously believed that collaboration with the left actually diminished the effectiveness of national identity (The Association of Commemorative Service for Kim Koo Scholarship ed. 1982: 297, 304).

44 Looking at the record of independence in retrospect, Kim also worried about the encroachment of the Soviets onto the Korean Peninsula. However, this point of concern was confined to the peninsula (Kim, K. 1984: 46-7; Kim, J. 1989: 426). This attitude was clearly differed from Rhee’s concern over the global meaning of Cold War. 45 Refer to the following editorials, probably attributable to Rhee: “Kongsanjuŭi ŭi tang pudang” (“the rights and wrongs of communism”), T’aep’yŏngyang chapchi, March, 1923; “Sahoe kongsanjuŭi e taehaya” (“regarding social communism”), T’aep’yŏngyang chapchi, July, 1924.

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Balkans, it was also apparent that an agreement had been reached to leave this area primarily to Soviet influence … and in Poland the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland gave communism a great advantage for exploitation of Russia’s design of expansion. … It was evident that President Roosevelt’s policy of ‘unconditional surrender’ by the Rome-Berlin-Japanese Axis was being paralleled by another policy of Allied acquiescence in the essential pattern of Russian imperialism (Oliver 1973: 197).46

Harboring such perceptions, Rhee became famous as a “precocious Warrior of Cold War” by proclaiming at the San Francisco Conference (April–June 1945), where the charter of the United Nations was signed, that the post-war powers handed Korea over to Soviet influence in the Yalta secret agreements (Ko, J. 2004: 454-68). As the Asia-Pacific War came to a close, the anti-Russia geopolitical perception, which had existed during the Taehan Empire era, was resurrected anew in Rhee’s thinking.47 Fourth were perceptions on East Asia. The two men lived in different places: Rhee in the relatively stable America with its well-established institutions, and Kim in a turbulent Asia ruled by ‘war and revolution.’ As a result, there were differences in the way the two men perceived East Asia (Son, S. 1970: 41-52). Notwithstanding Truman’s (1884-1972) somewhat proud reminiscence that “Our citizens were tightening their belts and making every sacrifice to help save the world from tyranny,” (Truman 1955: 224) the U.S. was a stable place during WWII, where people could even experience prosperity.48 Relatively speaking, the circumstances of the Korean Provisional Government in China were bleak. Kim stated that “while we were diehards 46

This passage is quoted from Oliver’s book in English. There is one mistake in the Korean translation of this book published in Konkuk University Press in 2002. The crux of this letter was that Russia’s traditional expansionism was resurgent, so the phrase “Soviet imperialism” is inaccurate. The original states “Russian imperialism” as well, so it is more accurate to refer to it thusly.

47 Shin Bok Ryong distinguishes between “anti-Russianism and anti-communism” in explaining the anti-communist stances of Kim and Rhee (Sin, B. 2003: 369-72).

48 During WWII, the U.S. experienced an existence completely different from those of Asia and Europe. Regarding America’s experience during the war, John Galbraith (1908-2006) states “in the history of warfare, there has never been so much talk of sacrifice without actual sacrifice” (Leffler 2007: 40).

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even when we were in Shanghai, in Chongqing we were actually dying.” He also commented that his personal finances while in Shanghai were such that he was “a beggar even amongst beggars.” (Kim, K. 2008: 452, 485)49 Living in the U.S. where the communists held little clout, except the spy ring including Alger Hiss, Rhee could refuse to collaborate with communists and flippantly say that “I would rather raise chickens in the countryside” (Oliver 2002: 224-225). For Kim, however, the dire straits faced by the Korean Provisional Government did not allow for such luxuries. Continually facing internecine ideological strife, the Provisional Government was described as having “more factions than the number of chairs in the building they were renting” (Chang, J. 1985: 207-9). Even though he did not follow communism and had no expectations of good will from the Soviet Union, while he was in China, which like Korea was undergoing “anti-feudal and antiforeign” strife, he accepted the political climate, which was such that both nationalism and socialism had to be accepted as “competitive companions in the liberation of the people” (Yun, D. 2006: 268). Thus, Kim had to achieve collaboration across the ideological divide, a unique experience which Rhee did not have.50 The post-war influence of the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists expanded throughout Northeast Asia that included Korea.

Rhee’s understanding of the American perspective was such that he foresaw the advent of the Cold War, but he was less attuned to the atmosphere of revolution in Asia.51 While Kim’s geopolitical perception was narrower in 49

Kim Ku’s mother, Kwak Nag Wŏn (1859-1939), repeatedly entreated that he conduct his revolutionary activities from the U.S. since the situation in Shanghai was so difficult, but he refused, stating that “revolutionary activities cannot be conducted from a place of opulence” (The Association of Commemorative Service for Kim Koo Scholarship ed., 1982: 169).

50 Choi Sang Yong opines that despite Kim’s firm anti-Soviet, anti-trusteeship stance after liberation, the action-oriented nationalist in him understood the potential of “national independence and independence-oriented left-right collaboration” (Choi, S. 1998: 169).

51 This is not to say that Rhee was ignorant of the revolutionary climate of Asia. He himself was a leader of an Asian people’s liberation movement, and had visited Russia twice; he knew full-well the revolutionary climate of Asia. Indeed, he understood the threat posed by this atmosphere which was being precipitated by Soviet influence. On this basis, during the independence movement and as the first

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comparison, he was more sensitive to the revolutionary atmosphere of Korea and its environs.

V. Conclusion The conclusions of this study are as follows. First, during the time of the establishment of the Taehan Empire and the Qing-Japan War (1894-1895), Kim and Rhee both developed a sense of independence and moved away from a China-centered geopolitical perception. They strengthened their sense of independence by accepting the principle of national sovereignty and joining the Protestant church which had boosted the principle of Westphalian sovereignty in Europe. Both men, as leaders first of the Korean Provisional Government then the Republic of Korea, foresaw the historical significance of Korean sovereignty vis-à-vis international politics. But the different ways in which each obtained his sense of independence led to different geopolitical perceptions. Unlike Rhee who looked toward the Pacific, Kim maintained aspects of the perceptual framework that he learned from the Tonghak movement and the Hwasŏ school. Such differences could be seen in the different threats each saw to the sovereignty of Korea. Rhee saw Japan and Russia as the main threats that had entered the void left by the downfall of the Sino-centric regional order. Kim did acknowledge the Russian threat, but his hostility was mainly focused towards Japan.

Secondly, when the Provisional Government experienced conflict over the matter of collaboration with the Soviet Union, Kim and Rhee presented a united front. Kim refused to follow the Soviet Union which was exercising considerable influence over the mainland including China, while Rhee operated in the U.S., keeping his hopes focused toward the Pacific. president of the Republic of Korea, he asserted that the U.S. must support and heed Asia more than ever. He criticized those in the U.S. with Atlantic-centered points of view, and agreed with those focusing on the Pacific (Oliver 1978: 67, 73, 101). In line with such views, Rhee, together with Chiang Kai-shek and Elpidio Quirino (18901956), president of the Philippines (1948-1953), in 1949 prior to the Korean War, began calling for a Pacific Pact similar to the North Atlantic Treaty (Kim, M. 2000: 127-54).

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Third, the cooperation of Rhee and Kim during the Asia-Pacific War symbolized the geopolitical collaboration between China (Asia) and the U.S. (Pacific) against the Japanese ambitions for a Greater East Asia CoProsperity Sphere. Rhee predicted that the United States’ “Open Door Policy” toward China would collide with Japanese plans for a Greater East Asia. To the Americans, who had grown complacent behind the buffer provided by the Pacific, he warned of the danger of a war in Asia crossing the ocean and posing a threat to American national security. Meanwhile, Kim operated a successful semi-military campaign with the aid of men like Yi Bong Chang and Yun Bong Gil, established firm relations with China, and planned for active diplomacy toward the U.S. through Rhee.

Fourth, during the Asia-Pacific War, Rhee valued the might and worth of the U.S. foremost, considering China a secondary partner.52 On the other hand, Kim privileged the mutually beneficial relationship with China. Rhee focused on Russia’s geopolitical ambitions, and the totalitarian nature of communism. He also foresaw the escalation of the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Though Kim likewise rejected communism, he did so because he saw it as a form of toadyism. On the contrary to Rhee, Kim did not see it as such a main global divisive issue in the aftermath of World War II. Fifth, Rhee’s geopolitical perception formed in the stable environment of the U.S., and Kim’s perception formed in the turbulent environment of China; each had its own strengths and weaknesses. Rhee had a broad perspective of the world but was less attuned to the atmosphere of revolution in Asia. While Kim’s geopolitical perception was narrower in comparison, he was more sensitive to the revolutionary atmosphere of Korea and its environs.

52

In his book published in 2009, Bruce Cumings argues that the emergence of the U.S. as a world power followed on its transformation from an Atlantic-oriented U.S. to a Pacific-oriented U.S., and that this important “tipping point” in world history occurred at Pearl Harbor (Cumings 2009). Viewed from this perspective, Rhee, who was living in the U.S. during the Asia-Pacific War, foresaw the historic flow referred to by Cumings, and tried to put Korea atop this wave. Oliver opines that “if the importance of Asia continues to rise, future researchers will take greater interest in Rhee, who contributed to the westernization, modernization and democratization of this region, which occupies half the world” (Oliver 2002: 341).

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Sixth, immediately after the end of World War II, Rhee and Kim collaborated in an anti-communist, anti-Soviet, and anti-trusteeship stance.

But on August 15, 1948, when, as they had long hoped, the Republic of Korea finally assumed the mantle of sovereignty handed down from the Taehan Empire and the Provisional Government, the two men went their separate ways. As the Cold War escalated, more differences emerged between the two men’s geopolitical perceptions. Those differences were evinced in their disagreement over a continental versus a maritime focus, since both sides wanted to keep the Korean Peninsula under their influence. For Rhee, who was serving as the first president of the Republic of Korea, the falling out with Kim was significant because the latter represented “those who are not wealthy,” unlike Rhee (Gayn 1948: 434). It also signified the loss of his most powerful and trustful ally, who once argued that “the first president of a unified Korea must be Dr. Rhee,” and one who shared his geopolitical perception (Sonu, J. 2009: 331). Despite these differences, the similar geopolitical perceptions shared by these two men, who contributed to the independence and founding of Korea, can provide a cornerstone for the geopolitical strategy of a 21st century Korea working to balance its continental and maritime priorities and continuing to face the problem of the NorthSouth division.53

53

According to his son’s witness, prior to his departing, for the North-South talks, Kim said the following: “You know the history of the Manchu invasion of 1636, right? Without the realism of Ch’oe Myŏnggil (1586-1647), who compromised with the Manchus, the nation would probably have fallen. Subsequent generations have said ‘today, we cannot do without Myŏnggil; 100 years from now, we cannot do without the Samhaksa (three learned gentlemen who opposed negotiations with the Manchus, allying themselves with the Han Chinese);’ they were referring to this sort of reasoning (Kimsin chŭngŏn, Cho, G. et al. 1987: 368). This indicates that even though Kim agreed to a certain extent with Rhee’s proposal for the election of 1948 and understood the urgency of establishing a government in South Korea, he also wished to play a role which was of historical necessity. Such was Kim’s quandary and his political legacy, one which Korea must fulfill, by both working towards unification, as mandated in the constitution, and building a more perfect nation-state.

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30(2) (“전쟁명명의 정치학: 아시아-태평양 전쟁과 6 · 25전쟁”, 『한국정치외교사 논총』 제30집 2호).

Kim, Myongsob and Kim, Seok Won, 2008, “The Geopolitics of Independence: Syngman Rhee’s Geopolitical Perception and the Protestantism in the TaeHan Chekuk (The Great Han Empire, 1897-1910),” Korean Political Science Review vol. 42(4) (“독립의 지정학: 대한제국시기(1897-1910) 이승만의 지정학적 인식과 개신교,” 『한국정치학회보』 제42집 4호).

Ko, Jung Hyoo, 2004, Syngman Rhee and Korean Independence Movement, Seoul: Yonsei University Press (『이승만과 한국독립운동』). , 2006, “Syngman Rhee, as a President of Korean Provisional Government,” in Young-ick Lew ed. Reappraisal of President Syngman Rhee, Seoul: Yonsei University Press (“대한민국 임시정부 임시대통령으로서의 이승만”, 『이승만대통 령재평가』).

Ku, Dae Yeol, 1995, A Study on the History of Korea International Relations II: Liberation and Independence, Seoul: Yuksabipyungsa (『한국 국제관계사 연구 2: 해방과 분단』).

Lee, Chong Sik, 1974, A Life of Kim Kyu Sik, Seoul: Singu moonwhasa (『김규식의 생애』).

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Lee, Min Won, 2007, “The Change of Kim Koos’s view of the World and His Logic behind Cutting Topknot of Koreans,” Journal of Baikbum Kim Koo and Korean National Movement Studies vol. 5 (“백범 김구의 세계관의 변화와 단발 문제”, 『백범과 민족운동 연구』 제5집).

Lew, Young Ick, 1996, The Life and Dreams of Syngman Rhee (1875-1965): Prior to His Assumption of Presidency in 1948, Seoul: The Joong Ang Ilbo (『이승 만의 삶과 꿈: 대통령이 되기까지』). , 2002, Youthful Syngman Rhee: A Study on His Activities and Writings in the Seoul Prison, 1899-1904, Seoul: Yonsei University Press (『젊은 날의 이승 만: 한성감옥생활(1899-1904)과 옥중잡기 연구』).

Lhee, Ho Jeh, 1994, Korean Approaches to International Politics, Seoul: Bǒbmun Sa (『한국인의 국제정치관: 개항 후 100년의 외교논쟁과 반성』).

Lim, Kyong Sok, 2004, The Origins of Korean Socialism, Seoul: Yuksabipyungsa (『한국사회주의의 기원』).

Namp’a Pak Ch’anik chŏn’gi kanhaeng wiwŏnhoe, 1989, A Biography of Nampa Park Chan-ik, Seoul: Eulyoo Moonhwasa (『남파 박찬익 전기』).

Oak, Sung-Deuk, 2003, “The Conversion of Baikbum Kim Ku to Protestant and his early Proselytizing Activity,” Newsletter of The Institute for Korean Church History No. 47 (“백범 김구의 개종과 초기 전도활동”, 『한국기독교 역사 연구소 소식』).

Oh, Young Sob, 1999, The Thought of Hwasŏ school and Nationalistic Movement, Seoul: Kookhak Jaryowon (『화서학파의 사상과 민족운동』).

Oliver, Robert T., 2002, Syngman Rhee: The Man behind the Myth, Jeongil Hwang trans., Seoul: Kunkuk University Press (『이승만: 신화에 가린 인물』).

Shin, Bok Ryong, 2003, The Politics of Separation of the Korean Peninsula, 19431953, Seoul: Hanul (『한국분단사연구 1943-1953』).

Shin, Young Ha, 2008, “Baikbum Kim Ku and the Founding of Republic of Korea.” Policy and Activity of Baikbum Kim Ku after his Return to Korea (“백 범 김구 선생과 대한민국의 건국”, 백범김구선생기념사업협회 · 백범기념관 · 백범 학술원 학술회의 주관 학술회의, 『백범 김구 선생의 환국 후 정책과 활동』 발표문).

Son, Se Il, 1970, Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku, Seoul: Ilchokak (『이승만과 김구』). , 2008, Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku, 1875-1919, 1-1. Seoul: Nanam (『이승만 과 김구: 제1부 양반도 깨어라 상놈도 깨어라』 1권).

Sonu, Jin and Choi, Ki Young ed., 2008, The Years along with Baikbum, Seoul: Purunyuksa (『백범 선생과 함께한 나날들』).

The Association of Commemorative Service for Kim Ku Scholarship ed., 1982, Baikbum Kim Ku: His Life and Thought, Seoul: Kyomunsa (『백범 김구 - 생

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애와 사상』).

Yun, Dae Won, 2006, A Study of Shanghai Provisional Government of Korea, Seoul: Seoul National University Press (『상해시기 대한민국임시정부 연구』).

Books and Articles in English or Other Languages Carrere d’Encausse, Helene, 1978, L’Empire éclaté, Paris: Flammarion.

Chauprade, Aymeric, 2007, Géopolitique: Constantes et changements dans l’histoire, 3ème ed., Paris: Ellipses.

Cumings, Bruce, 2009, Dominion from Sea to Sea: Pacific Ascendancy and American power, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Divine, Robert A., 1981, Roosevelt & World War II, New York: Penguin Books.

Gayn, Mark, 1948, Japan Diary, New York: William Sloane.

Flint, Colin, 2006, Introduction to Geopolitics, New York: Routledge.

Iriye, Akira, 2004, The Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations III: The Globalizing of America, 1913-1945, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kim, Kyu Sik, 1922, “The Asiatic Revolutionary Movement and Imperialism,” Communist Review vol. 3 No. 3 in Dae-Sook Suh, Documents of Korean Communism, 1918-1948, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kim, Myongsob, 2000, “Declined Invitation by Empire: The Aborted Pacific Pact and the Unsolved Issue of Regional Governance,” Dong-Sung Kim, KiJung Kim, and Hahnkyu Park eds., Fifty Years after the Korean War: From Cold War Confrontation to Peaceful Co-existence, Seoul: KAIS. Lacoste, Yves, 2006, Géopolitique: La Longue Histoire d’ Aujourd’ hui, Paris: Larousse.

Leffler, Melvyn P., 2007, For the soul of Mankind: The United States, The Soviet Union, and The Cold War, New York: Hill and Wang.

Mackenzie, Robert, 1880, The 19th Century: A History, London: T. Nelson and Sons, Paternoster Row. Manela, Erez, 2007, The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

McGrath, Alister, 2007, Christianity’s Dangerous Idea: The Protestant Revolution —A History From the Sixteenth Century to the Twenty-First, New York: Harper One. Oliver, Robert T., 1973, Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth, Westport: Greenwood Press.

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, 1978, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 1942-1960: A Personal Narrative, Seoul: Panmun Book Company.

Truman, Harry S., 1955, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman I: Year of Decisions, New York: Doubleday.

Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 1, No. 1, 2011: 143-184

New Citizens’ Participation and ‘Struggles for Recognition’:

An Oral Case Study of Identity Construction of North Korean Defector-Residents* Yi, Hee Young** North Korean defectors who are settling into South Korean society are becoming a ‘meaningful’ minority. Having experienced the ideological antagonisms produced by the Cold War and now trying to make their lives in South Korea, i.e., on the other side of the political border, these actors’ biographies are of great socio-theoretical significance as a social reality mutually constructed by the individual and society. Following this perspective, this study employs a qualitative methodology to examine the socio-political identities of North Korean defector-residents as they are (re)constructed in interaction with ‘generalized others’ in Korean society.

The case study shows, firstly, that North Korean defector-residents carry out everyday recognition struggles in order to assert their civil rights which cannot be reduced to South Korean citizenship. Transcending the binary political logic of having to choose between ‘proNorth’ or ‘anti-North’ as well as going beyond the legal belonging known as ‘citizen of the Republic of Korea’, they engage in various forms of everyday struggles for recognition, from ‘devotion,’ and ‘assimilation,’ to ‘superiority’, and ‘criticism.’ This can also be understood as a process of identity (re)construction whereby North Korean defector-residents interact with the reality of being disrespected by generalized others in South Korean society—as coming from an ideologically hostile nation or as ‘food refugees’—, and through which they strive to secure their self-respect and social esteem.

Secondly, the settlement of North Korean defector-residents in South Korean society signifies the participation of new citizens with personal life stories, political belonging, and socio-cultural experiences that differ from those of other South Koreans. In particular, the various forms of ‘distancing’ based on the biographical experiences of North Korean defectorresidents do not indicate their ‘lack of adaptation’ to the dominant value system in South Translated from the published article in Korean Journal of Sociology, 44(1): 207-241, 2010 with permission from the The Korean Sociological Association. ** Professor, Department of Sociology, Daegu University *

143

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Korean society, but rather imply the possibility of acting as a new critical power for South Korean civil society.

Thirdly, in order to overcome the limitations of existing research on North Korean defector-residents’ ‘adaptation’, this study explores theoretical possibilities of understanding them as active subjects of a multicultural civil society. In this process, the author inquires into the discussions on identity formation based on the notion of ‘recognition struggle’ as one such possibility. At the same time, the findings show that Honneth’s ‘struggle for recognition’, which implicitly presupposes the modern nation-state as the public sphere for action, is limited in conveying the lives of migrant and other minorities that are actualized by acts of border crossings between states.

Keywords: North Korean defector-residents, North Korean refugees, minority, ‘struggle for recognition,’ identity (re)construction, self-respect, ‘generalized Others’

I. Introduction North Korean defectors 1 who are settling into South Korean society are becoming a ‘meaningful’ minority.2 First of all, they are leading lives that transcend the political boundaries of North and South that have been separated by the war. Having experienced the ideological antagonisms produced by the Cold War and now trying to make their lives in South Korea, i.e., on the other side of the political border, these actors’ biographies are of great socio-theoretical significance as a social reality mutually constructed by the individual and society.

At the moment, their political belonging is legally defined as ‘citizens of the Republic of Korea.’ However, an individual’s social and political experiences and identity cannot be reduced to one’s legal belonging. In 1

North Koreans in South Korea are called by various names such as North Korean defectors, North Korean migrants, or new settlers. In this essay, I will use the official legal terminology of “North Korean defector-residents.” However, depending on the context, this expression will be used co-terminously with “new settlers” and “North Korean defectors” as well.

2 Minorities are not determined by the size of the collective or by numbers. In fact, the term is understood in relations to societal power. Also, the concept of ‘minority’ is newly constructed during the process of social change (Pak, K. 2008: 12-64).

New Citizens’ Participation and ‘Struggles for Recognition’ 145

particular, North Korean defector-residents experienced history, culture, and politics in socialist North Korea, which maintains a hostile relationship with the South in the context of the Cold War; what socio-political experiences these persons live through in their interactions with the ‘generalized others’ of South Korean society, and what kind of action-orientation the former develop as a result, cannot but become important socio-theoretical questions.

In short, this is a question of ‘the politics of recognition’ in South Korea.

However, within current studies of North Korean defector-residents, the question of the socio-political identities of North Korean defector-residents is not treated in depth. This tendency in existing research may result from a politicized interpretation framework which strictly construes North Koreans’ choice of ‘defecting from North Korea’ as an anti-North and proSouth statement. Also, in South Korean society, where the National Security Law still exists, everyone’s free expression of political views is restricted, irrespective of whether you are from North or South Korea. Moreover, it is all the more probable that the binary norms of South Korean society operate even more strongly against the political stance of these people who have come to South Korea by crossing the political border. This may constitute the main reason why both researchers and North Korean defectors’ have kept silent about their socio-political identities and inclinations.

With the questions raised above, this study examines the socio-political identities of North Korean defector-residents being (re)constructed in their quotidian experiences of South Korean society. Instead of following the black/white logic of ‘anti-North or pro North’ or studying their identities as ‘phenomena of deviation’ within the framework of adaptation or assimilation, this research aims at understanding the socio-political identities of North Korean defector-residents in light of their different biographical experiences and as (re)constructed through their participation and actions within the various spheres of interaction in South Korean society today.

More specifically, the research questions raised in this study are as follows.

Firstly, what kind of life histories did the interviewees bring with them to the South? Secondly, what are the everyday interactions that these subjects experience as ‘meaningful’ in their lives within South Korean society? Thirdly, what are the characteristics of the socio-political identities that are being (re)constructed in this process, and what is their sociological significance?

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To critically examine the above questions, this paper will first explore the concept of identity in relation to discussions on the ‘struggle for recognition’ (Honneth 1992; Taylor 1995).3 Afterwards, the biographic experiences of North Korean defector-residents will be reconstructed utilizing qualitative methodology. This paper will then conclude with a discussion of the results of this case study and their significance for sociological studies.

II. Theoretical Discussion and Research Methodology 1. Examination and Discussion of Existing Literature The number of North Korean defectors who—due to the economic hardship in North Korea—are crossing the border to settle in the South has continually been on the rise. According to the following statistics on North Korean defector-residents in South Korea, this number has been rapidly increasing since the mid-1990s, and in recent years has reached around two thousand per year.

With the rise in number, however, the purpose of border crossing seems to have been changing as well. In addition to the difficulties brought on by the “Arduous March” in North Korea in the past decade, the ‘blurring of borders’ resulting from the development and spread of various media technologies seems to have contributed to the rise.4 One study shows that the motivation of North Korean defector-residents to risk their lives and cross the border has been changing from escaping food shortages to ‘pursuing a better future.’ This implies dynamic changes in the biographic experiences that North Korean 3

Although Taylor first proposed ‘the politics of recognition’ in his 1992 essay, this paper uses his 1995 work. Hegel’s argument of ‘recognition,’ which had been previously reinterpreted by Habermas, has been continued by Honneth and Taylor.

4 According to the oral testimonies, since 2000, North Koreans watching video recordings of South Korean TV dramas have been on the rise, particularly in the border regions. Through these, they are becoming increasingly familiar with Korean pop songs and culture. Moreover, the mass media are also enabling a growth of ‘fantasies’ about South Korean society (Interview Transcript Kim, Yŏllan, 2008).

New Citizens’ Participation and ‘Struggles for Recognition’ 147

Table1. The Current Settlement Status of North Korean Defector-Residents Year

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

Men Women

43 13

56 30

53 18

90 58

179 133

294 289

Total

56

86

71

148

312

538

Year

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

Men Women

506 632

469 812

626 1268

423 960

509 1509

570 1974

609 2200

Total

1139

1281

1894

1383

2018

2544

2809

defector-settlers are bringing to South Korea.

Since the mid-1990s, various studies have been conducted not only on the situation and realities of these border crossers but also on their everyday experiences in the South.5 What these studies have in common is their focus on the ‘assimilation’ or the ‘adaptation’ of North Korean defectors according to sex, age or group.6 According to these studies, androcentric structures and relationships are still being maintained within North Korean families living in South Korea, despite the changes in gender roles and status in South Korean society. With regard to women, their role and influence within the family have increased in comparison to life in North Korea and with this, their critical awareness of marital relations have been raised as well (Yoon, I. et. al. 2007). The myriad of problems these women face every day has also been illustrated (Cho, Y. and Jeon, W. 2005). Moreover, the studies also point to the lack of social support and the effect this has on the adaptation into South Korean society by North Korean defector youths (Pak, Y. and Yoon, I. 2007).

5

Two examples of such studies are The Report on the Conditions and Human Rights of the North Korean Food Refugee published by Good Friends in 1999 and The Current Status of the Defectors, which came out in 2005 (Kim, I. 2005).

6 The Theory of Attitude Change, by Yoon Yeo Sang, is one such theoretical work that discusses ‘the adaptation perspective.’ (Yoon, Y. 2002) Some recent works have looked into the psychological adaptation of North Korean women in South Korea (Cho, Y. and Jeon, W. 2005), the problem of ‘family’ adaptation (Yoon, I. et. al. 2007), and the adaptation of North Korean youths (Park, Y. and Yoon, I. 2007).

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However, there have been relatively few works on the formation of North Korean defector-residents’ socio-political identities. For example, in a quantitative study conducted on the ‘value-orientation’ of defector-settlers, the North Korean defectors are shown to be more accepting of authority and order than South Koreans. In addition, they are shown to have a higher degree of ‘vertical individualism,’ which is related to goal-orientedness. In the following studies on the social adaptation of North Korean defector-residents (Yoon, I. 2007), the subjects identify themselves as being more ‘progressive’ (27.6%) than ‘conservative’ (13.8%) and admit to being emotionally closer to North Korea than South Korea despite living here. The studies cited above provide important knowledge for understanding the adaptation of North Korean defectors in South Korea today.

Yet, studies that do not describe only one side of interaction by relying on the chronicling of the difficulties and conflict faced by North Koreans, but that encompass both sides and explore the origin of these problems and the dynamics of change as interactive processes, are still warranted. In fact, indepth studies that examine the interactions between the ‘generalized others’ of South Korea and the North Korean defector-residents and look at the socio-political action orientations produced by the everyday experiences of these subjects are fairly recent.7 This tendency in existing research correlates to the limitations often found in early studies of immigrants’ which mainly concentrated on their ‘adaptation’ into the ‘host society.’ However, the notion of ‘adaptation, irrespective of how broadly it is ‘defined’, presupposes a certain ‘core’; this perspective builds on the premise that a given society has relatively homogeneous values and rules and, consequently, operates as a mechanism for instituting social discrimination and exclusion. Various forms of prejudice against North Korean defector-residents that are found in South Korea today are products of interactions in which this notion of ‘core culture’ is utilized as a yardstick for ‘differences.’8 7

Works such as Chung, Byung Ho’s study on the apoliticization of defector-refugees (Chung, B. et al., eds. 2006) and Lee Jung Woo’s examination of the socialization process of North Korean defector youths (Lee, J. 2006) have already pointed to these problems.

8 Kang, Ju Won’s work, which analyzes the mechanisms that use the notion of North Korean defector-residents as “others” in South Korea today, provides an important

New Citizens’ Participation and ‘Struggles for Recognition’ 149

Furthermore, the methodological problems within current studies conducted on the socio-political identities of North Korean defector-residents needs to be pointed out. The works cited above (Dockgoh, S. 2001; Yoon, I. 2007) utilize quantitative methodology to approach issues of socio-political identities. These studies take the South Korean liberal democratic order and its capitalistic culture as ‘the standard’ for assessing the degrees of adaptation.

With such an approach, these studies cannot adequately convey the dynamic identity construction process of the actor-subject, which transcend the narrow boundaries of adaptation. On the other hand, some of the more recent studies on the identity formations of various North Korean defector groups have tried to explore these issues more in-depth based on qualitative methodologies and are showing possibilities for new interpretations and understandings.9 In short, the discussion thus far on the literature on North Korean defector-residents shows not only the need for critically reflecting on the problems of the ‘adaptation perspective’, but also for deepening and widening the prospects of qualitative research on the subject.

2. The ‘Struggle for Recognition’ and Identity This section will critically examine the theoretical concept of socio-political ‘identity’ in relation to discussions on the ‘struggle for recognition.’ In this study, the adoption of ‘recognition struggle’ to understand identity construction resulted from a process of abduction. While analyzing the oral testimonies on the everyday experiences of North Korean defector-residents, changes in their socio-political identities surfaced as an important aspect of the interviewees’ overall biographic experiences. Such experiences led the author to explore the theoretical significance of the ‘recognition struggle’ to better explain the characteristics of the cases studied.

The concept of identity has been frequently used in migration and point in this regard (Kang, J. 2002).

These qualitative studies have been mainly conducted as part of MA theses. Some of these works have looked into the identity of North Korean women (Kim, J. 1999), the identity of North Korean children (Kim, Y. 2002), the self-identity of North Korean defector-residents (Park, S. 2002) and the identity of North Korean defector-resident college students (Kwon, N. 2006).

9

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minorities studies but has faced much criticism.10 The main critique of the concept emphasizes that identity is often essentialized and construed as static, and thus functions as a mechanism of social exclusion (Riegel 2004: 124). In contrast, with regard to explaining the individual’s identity formation, the discussion on the ‘struggle for recognition’ (Honneth 1992; Taylor 1995), which is based on Hegel and Mead’s theories on ‘mutual recognition,’ seems to provide a more productive theoretical underpinning for understanding the lives of North Korean defector-residents from the perspective of the politics of difference.

Honneth deems Mead’s classic argument, that the identity of a human subject is formed by intersubjective ‘recognition,’ as having rescued Hegel’s discussion on intersubjectivity from the planes of metaphysics. According to Mead, “the individual identity maintained within the collective can only be so when others recognize the individual as such” (Mead 1963: 194). From the viewpoint of the ‘generalized others,’ self-understanding, which allows one to define the Self, is derived from a process of inter-recognition. In the process of socialization, an individual experiences not only the duties and responsibilities attached to him or her by society but also the rights granted. With these rights, the individual comes to understand that his or her demands are being legally valued within the social collective and as result, arrives at the point of ‘self-respect’ (Selbstachtung). Through the recognition of rights bestowed, the members of society come to ‘recognize’ the individual as a particular human being and concordantly, the individual comes to acquire the identity of self-affirmation (Honneth 1992: 127-128).

Honneth here uses Mead’s thesis of the incomplete subsumtion of the passion and impulsiveness of the subjective ‘I’ by the objective ‘Me’ to explain the psychological mechanism in the individual that makes the mutual recognition of social rights possible.

In any given situation, the existence of the objective ‘Me’ makes the subject explore new forms of recognition for the subjective ‘I.’ In so doing, the possibility to actively resolve moral conflicts is opened up as well. To cite 10

Niethammer in particular criticizes collective identity to be nothing more than a ‘plastic concept’ (Plastikbegriff) that exhibits exclusionary tendencies (Niethammer 2000).

New Citizens’ Participation and ‘Struggles for Recognition’ 151

Taylor, human beings, as ‘self-interpreting animals’, re-evaluate hopes and actions by interacting with others. Eventually, this leads to an expansion of the horizon of self-interpretation (Taylor 1976). That is, for the passion and impulsiveness of the subjective ‘I’ to acquire legitimacy by the objective ‘Me’, the subjects cannot but continue to deconstruct the norms embodied in the ‘generalized others.’ Honneth terms the mode of social practice whereby the individual—based on this mechanism of actions—strives to expand the recognition of his or her rights as the ‘struggle for recognition’ (Kampf um Anerkenung) (Honneth 1992: 136). In short, the process of ‘struggling for recognition’ is another expression for the construction of individual identity.

According to Honneth, depending on the type of social interactions, social recognition is categorized into love, right and solidarity. Out of selfbelief, the individual comes to construct a sense of self-respect (Selbstachtung) and self-esteem (Selbstschaetzung). At the same time, all forms of humiliation and insult against an individual’s dignity or the revocation of one’s social recognition needs to be paid attention as well, for the destructive danger it poses on one’s sense of self-identity. Experiences of physical abuse and violence, social discrimination, exclusion, and of devaluation as an inferior social class all feed into conflicts in the formation of individual identity.

Honneth understands the ‘moral feelings of denial’ that are derived from experiences of neglect, humiliation and shame as violations of individual identity. At the same time, he also sees their potential as an energy source for staging social ‘recognition struggles’ (Honneth 1991: 150- ). With this, Taylor proposes not so much the recognition of particularity or of universality, but ‘the politics of recognition’ whereby the demand for privileged recognition of particularities can be made. He emphasizes that the identity of an individual is formed in dialogue with the ‘generalized others’ and that the suspension of social recognition can become a form of social repression (Taylor 1995: 1-230).

Based on the above discussions, this study will consider the formation of the individual’s socio-political identity as a process of ‘recognition struggles’, which changes due to interactions between the individual and ‘generalized others.’ Such exploration of the politics of recognition and difference offers the possibility of overcoming the limitations of the ‘uniform universality and absolutism’ much criticized within studies on minorities and

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multiculturalism, thus providing a more in-depth understanding of the lives of North Korean defector-residents. To sum up, this approach will allow us to consider not only the actions of North Korean defector-residents but, at the same time, those of the ‘generalized others’ in South Korean society, from the viewpoint of their mutual interaction. It provides a perspective from which we can study the process of recognition struggles, i.e. the socio-political identities of North Korean defector-residents without treating them as objects having to unilaterally adapt to South Korean culture but as subjects actively constructing their lives and identities.

3. Qualitative Research Methodology and Research Process Based on the theoretical discussion above, this study will reconstruct the life experiences of North Korean defector-residents using the methodology of biographical reconstruction much used in qualitative social research (Rosenthal 1995; Yi, H. 2005). The biographical reconstruction methodology emphasizes that the individual’s identity is formed with reference to his or her past, present, and future life time, and expressed through the medium of narratives. In dialogue with others, using both physical and non-physical linguistic symbols,11 individuals engage in a process of newly constructing themselves through mutual recognition. Biographical reconstruction aims at studying in depth the everyday experiences of actors, by way of comparative analysis of oral texts produced in narrative interviews from the different viewpoints of ‘talk’ and ‘experiences.’ This approach critically reflects on problems that have been raised in theoretical discussions of methods used within North Korean studies, such as the specificity of research materials and the problem of ‘arbitrary interpretation’ on part of the researcher, and considers these as important in the research process (Kim, K. 2002; Kyongnam University Graduate Studies on North Korea 2003). Moreover, this methodology allows us to be attentive to the ‘process of fleeing North Korea,’ recognized in recent studies as an important aspect to comprehend the forms of adaptation and life experiences of North Korean defector-residents in 11

This ‘broad range of texts’ includes not only recorded interview transcripts, but physical gestures and written records (autobiography, letters, memos etc.) as well.

New Citizens’ Participation and ‘Struggles for Recognition’ 153

South Korean society (Cho, Y. and Jeon, W. 2005: 19). The methodology of biographical reconstruction thus constitutes a useful tool to explore North Korean defector-residents’ experiences, as they relate to specific times and themes, against the horizon of their entire biographies.

The meetings with interviewees to be discussed here came about through various routes from 2006 to 2008. The very first interview for this research took place with Ms. Kim Chuhŭi (Case #3) in the summer of 2006. The author met her through an acquaintance at an academic conference on North Korea.

At that time, the author was conducting field research on social groups on the ‘margins’ of politics. Over the years, these encounters became the foundation for this research. Also, the help and contacts received from ‘Good Friends,’ a Buddhist organization working in support of North Korean defectorresidents, and other support groups in various regions cannot go without mention. Through these three routes, the author had the opportunity to hear the life stories of the following interviewees and to record them in order draw a map of life experiences within the parameters of her comprehension and interpretation. The data of the interviewees to be discussed are as follows (See Table 2).

The biographic characteristics of the interviewees summarized in diagram #2 are as follows. Firstly, although the sex ratio had not been paid particular attention at the outset of this research, in the end, the number of interviewees totaled eight people, with five women and three men. This ratio also resembles the current trend with 60-70 percent of new arrivals from North Korea are women.12 Moreover, women’s more active participation in South Korean society indicates a higher chance of meeting them as interview subjects than men. In fact, the author was frequently told during interviews that North Korean men faced more obstacles than women in becoming active in South Korean society. There are various reasons for such statements; e.g. the menial labor many recently arrived men end up with as employment, and the difficulties they face with this kind of physically strenuous work as they 12

According to reports by the Ministry of Unification, until the end of 1990s, most people arriving from North Korea were men. Since 2003, the number of women has doubled in size in comparison to men (2003: men 268, women 813; 2004: men 626, women 1268). This trend still continues today (see chart #1 on the current settlement status of North Korean defector-residents).

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Table 2. Profile of the interviewees13 Case no.

13

Name (Sex)

Occupation Escaped Arrived Date of Hometown/ in from in Current birth Current North North South Occupation (current Address Korea Korea Korea age)

1

Yu Chimin 1983 Hambuk/ (F) (25 yrs) Kyŏngbuk Andong

Middle School Graduate

1999 (16 yrs old)

2003

Graduate Student

2

Cho 1977 Hambuk/ Myŏnghŭi (31 yrs) Daegu (F)

Student

1997 (20 yrs old)

2002

Housewife

3

Kim Chuhŭi

1959 P’yŏngyang/ Poet in (49 yrs) Seoul Writers’ Federa-tion

1998 (39 yrs old)

1999

Ph.D. candidate & magazine editor

4

Ko Sunja

1951 Hambuk/ (57 yrs) Seoul

Manager in 1998 Food pro(47 yrs) cess-ing plant

2003

Active in NK settlers organization

5

Kim Yŏllan (F)

1941 Hambuk/ (67 yrs) Seoul

Teacher, Laborer

2006 (65 yrs old)

2006

Pensioner

6

2002 Pak 1952 Chagangdo/ Economic (50 yrs T’aesu (M) (56 yrs) Seoul Financial Bureau-crat/ old) Overseas work experience

2002

Runs private tutorial school

7

Cho Kwang 1945 Hambuk/ mo (M) (63 yrs) Daegu

8

Kim Ch’ŏlnam

1966 (42 yrs old)

Hambuk/ Kyŏngbuk Andong

Doctor

1995 (50 yrs old)

2000

Published auto-biography

Medical Profession

2003 (37 yrs old)

2004

Works in service Sector

For reasons of data protection, interviewees’ names and locations have been altered.

In some cases, sensitive information has been partially withheld or revised as well.

The year 2008 has been used to calculate the age of the interviewees.

New Citizens’ Participation and ‘Struggles for Recognition’ 155

have undergone a prolonged period of food deprivation.14 As stated previously, six of the eight interviewees live with their families in South Korea. Some defected from North Korea with their family (case no.

3, 4, 6, 8), while others escaped separately and then later reunited with their families once in South Korea (case no. 2, 7). This is certainly the case for Ms. Cho Myŏnghŭi. She is the daughter of Mr. Cho Kwangmo who first left North Korea and came to Korea. As for Ms. Cho, she came to Korea via China and then later her older brother and mother joined the family. 15 As one of the two interviewees who are single (case no. 1, 5), Ms. Kim Yŏllan was already so when she was living in North Korea. She married young and, after her divorce, made a living through menial labor. Ms. Yu Chimin, on the other hand, left her family at an early age and defected.

Most of the interviewees lived near the North Korean-Chinese border and were aided by ‘defection guides’ (also known as ‘brokers’). They came to Korea via China and other countries. Ms. Kim Chuhŭi, on the other hand, received an order for expulsion from P’yŏngyang and after being deported to Ch’ŏngjin, fled to China. Mr. Pak T’aesu worked overseas as a high-ranking economic bureaucrat and directly sought asylum in South Korea. As for the age groups, the interviewees range from the 20s to 60s. The difficulties brought by food shortages during the ‘Arduous March’ (or the March of Tribulation) in the 1990s and the escalating political tensions compelled them to escape to China and other nations.

III. The Reconstruction of Case Studies In this section, the interviewees’ life experiences will be analyzed and introduced. In order to understand the narrators’ experiences of specific situations as well as their actions and strategies in the context of their 14

This was also confirmed in Mr. Kim Ch’ŏlnam’s testimony (Case #8).

So far, many of the North Korean defectors came to South Korea via China. Persons who first passed through other countries (Mongolia, Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand) are categorized into those who sought asylum at foreign consulates in China and those who forged passports in an attempt to directly enter South Korea (Chung, B. 2006: 52)

15

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entire biographical horizon, the author will try to convey the development process of the biographical histories as much as possible. Due to the page limitations, however, the discussion will center on the main characteristics found. These typical features surfaced in the process of establishing themes from the oral cases through a comparative perspective and analysis of the distinct characteristics of each case. The four cases introduced below have been selected based on maximum and minimum points of comparisons of characteristics of each socio-political identity construction process.16 In the following, in consideration of the interviewees who have families in North Korea, personal information and the testimonies of some of the interviewees have been withheld for protection of privacy.

1. “I am devoted to wherever I am given recognition”: Ko Sunja 1) The ‘non-citizen’ who left North Korea The author was introduced to Ms. Ko Sunja by a Buddhist organization and meet her for the first time at her home in January of 2008.17 In total, three meetings took place, and during the interviews Ms. Ko spoke of her life as the daughter of a ‘family who was politically persecuted for thirty years in North Korea.’ Ms. Ko Sunja was born as the sixth of seven children in December 1951. During her initial narration, she wept bitterly as she spoke of “[Korean] Thanksgiving day on September 20th 1964,” when her father was arrested and taken to some unknown place from which he never returned. (Interview Transcript Ko Sunja, 2008 I/6-7).18 According to the interviews, when her family faced economic difficulties because her grandfather, who had been 16

Cases exhibiting commonalities have been referred to as a case of minimum comparison. Cases showing differences have been used as a case of maximum comparison. For a more detailed discussion, see (Yi, H. 2005: 143).

17 The interviewee works at a North Korean defector-resident support organization.

In our meetings, she tried to deliver information regarding North Korean defectorresidents as ‘professionally’ as possible. In fact, she served as an important ‘gatekeeper’ who opened up the North Korean defector-resident community to the researcher.

18 This is the citation style of the oral transcripts for this paper. For example, the code within the brackets refers to quotations from the transcript from pages 6-7 of the first interview taken in 2008.

New Citizens’ Participation and ‘Struggles for Recognition’ 157

a doctor under Japanese imperialist rule, supported the independence movement abroad, her father started work as a manager at a forestry site near the border operated by the Japanese colonial government. However, during the 1960s, when programs to establish cooperatives were being carried out in North Korea, this family history seems to have become the basis for their political persecution. After her father was arrested, the interviewee’s family was officially categorized as “supporters of and ready to die for Japanese Imperialism,” and it appears they faced physical and non-physical forms of political oppression. When the interviewee received awards for perfect attendance and excellent grades at her high school in 1967, her record of having a “bad family origin” prevented her from being admitted into a university. She was also turned down for admittance into an agricultural professional school.19 Until she married in 1978, she worked at a farm near her home as a menial laborer for 10 years.

In North Korea, I am of the lowest class, but you know ~~ even when I worked at the farm, I never lagged behind others, anyway, what (I) mean ~~ we, when others were taking one step after the other at a time, we had to take ten steps, when others were walking ten um, taking ten steps um~ we had to take hundred, you know, we took hundred steps running, we, others, could follow others ~ we could do that ~

(Interview Transcript Ko Sunja, 2008 I/15-16)20

In the above text, the interviewee emphasizes how she and her family tried their very best given the situation. That is, in order to compensate for her ‘bad family origin,’ she “ran hundred steps when others were walking ten steps.”

After her marriage, through her active participation in local affairs, she was 19

A similar case and thus a case of minimum comparison is Ms. Kim Yŏllan’s. With parents who had moved to the South Korea in 1947 and an aunt who was purged at the end of the 1970s, the interviewee was categorized as a ‘person under surveillance.’

She experienced so many difficulties in her everyday life that she eventually defected.

20 To reproduce the narrations as closely as possible, this paper uses the following signs within the transcripts cited. (3) indicates pauses in the narration (time in seconds). (( )) indicates an explanation added by the recorder. ~~~ stands for the narration slowing down. Bold letters signal loud voice. __________ (underline) means that this word was emphasized in speech, and (…) signifies an omission.

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recognized for her diligence and abilities. From 1986 until her defection, she was the de-facto manager in charge of the food processing plant where she worked.

On the other hand, her family’s efforts to rehabilitate themselves and get her grandfather’s support of the independence movement recognized finally succeeded in the mid-1990s when they became known as a “family of a patriotic martyr.” However, at around the same time, the so-called ‘Arduous March’ officially began in North Korean society.21 Unlike in P’yŏngyang and other major cities, in the border regions rations had already been discontinued a long time ago and, in the mid-1990s, deaths due to starvation became more and more apparent. Even those who had special privileges were engaging in ‘black market trade,’ still wearing the party uniform. By 1998, the interviewee’s eldest daughter was working without any wage or rations at the propaganda unit. She was told to take a leave of absence. At the time, leave of absence meant ‘time to engage in business or any other means of earning a living without working.’ However, the interviewee’s family did not have the seed money to start a business.22 Inevitably, the eldest daughter crossed the border with China-bound brokers in order to obtain money. In June 1998, when the eldest daughter failed to return after one week despite her promises, the interviewee, who was forty-seven years old at the time, crossed the border into China with her other daughters “to live and to die together (as a family).”

The following transcript describes what the interviewee wrote to her older sister just before she left North Korea.

Sister, by the time you get this letter ~ I don’t think I will be here ~ OO ((the name of the oldest daughter)) if I find her, I will come back ~ if I cannot find, 21

Shortages in the food ration system were already apparent during the 3rd Seven Year Plan. Followed by severe cold weather in 1994 and floods in 1995, the ration system as a whole became impossible to maintain. In the official New Year address of 1996, the North Korean government urged people to be armed with the “Spirit of the Arduous March.” (Kim, S. 1997) 22 With the increased economic difficulties of the 1990s, many women who had been housewives became the actual head of the household through their engagement in trading activities. The most basic economic activity carried out in order to earn a living or obtain foreign currency were various forms of trade, followed by forming work groups within family networks (Lee, M. 2006: 37- ).

New Citizens’ Participation and ‘Struggles for Recognition’ 159

I will not come back anyway ~~ (3) tsut ((tongue clucking sound)) yet will still what I wanted to say inside ~~ um ~~ originally I THAT ~ HERE ~ I WORKED DILIGENTLY FOR THIS COUNTRY. I when I think back it was too much ~ when I went to the police station ~ it’s written there ‘serving the people,’ I don’t know if ~ I am included within that category of people, these people who say they serve the people ~ without any proof, arrest people, say ‘this b**ch that b**ch,’ without any proof come into the house ~ touch everything ~~ how can they do this? ~~, (…) because of this, because it was like this for me, this ~ country where I lived until now, I feel no great attachment I wrote this ~~ yet, although it is such ~ country, it is the country where I was born and lived until now that I would pray that things will be okay for this country ~ this is what I wrote all down ~ after that I packed – (4)

(Interview Transcript Ko Sunja, 2008 I/23-24)

In the above paragraph, the interviewee emphasizes the fact that her crossing of the border was the desperate choice of a mother with children. At the same time, she shows strong feelings about leaving a society that refused to recognize her as one of ‘the people.’ In this part of the story where her narration moves from past to ‘present,’ her escalating voice takes us back to a time ten years ago in 1998, when she was writing the letter just before her defection. The narrator demonstrates that the reason for the North Korean regime arresting her family members without any evidence, violating her privacy and exploiting her through bribery and corruption—even though she showed ten times more dedication than others in order to overcome the political stigma and discrimination forced upon her as being of ‘bad family origin’—was the fact that she was not recognized as one of ‘the people.’ According to the case analysis, although the family was politically rehabilitated as a ‘family of a patriotic martyr’ in the 1990s, in everyday life, they were continually denied their rights and treated as ‘non-people.’ Faced with increasingly negative public attitudes that threatened not only their social existence but their very own life, it appears this ‘females-only’ family made the decision to cross the border. In other words, after the mid-1990s, the North Korean regime was politically unable to care for what constituted the elite in North Korean society, for those with privileges and whom they called a ‘patriotic martyr family.’ During this process, the interviewee lost pride and political solidarity with the society she belonged to and as result,

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left her country. Yet, despite all this, in the last paragraph of the interview, she expressed her ‘emotional affinity’ to the country where she had grown up and lived.

2) Physical Abuse and Migration to South Korea After leaving North Korea, many of the interviewees stayed in China for some time; from one year to 5-6 years. During that time, they experienced various forms of physical abuse.23 They experienced forced marriage, slave trade, sexual abuse, and endured physical abuse under threats of deportation.24 Ms. Ko Sunja described her time in China as “an experience she never wanted to recall.” In 1998, members of her family who had been sold to various places in China were reunited again. After strenuous efforts, they arrived in South Korea through the South Korean consulate in Beijing in January 2003. It appears the interviewee and her daughters heard about other North Korean defectors through South Korean radio broadcasts and hoped to find a way to reach South Korea. Having already lost her political solidarity with the North, she lived in China under constant fear and faced physical abuse. She evaluated her coming to Korea as “really being shoved into coming to the South” (Interview Transcript Ko Sunja, 2008 II/34). Given China’s political ties with the North Korean regime, the pressure levied by the Chinese government towards the defectors seems to have paradoxically become an important catalyst in making them choose the South.25 23

In the case of Ms. Kim Yŏllan, a few days after leaving North Korea in 2006 with the help of a broker, she took a plane from China and came through Inch’ŏn airport.

As a result, she did not experience any physical abuse in China. After 2002, various different routes of travelling directly to South Korea seem to have developed.

24 Studies show that the sexual violence North Korean women experience as refugees in China and other countries prior to their arrival in South Korea have an effect on their settlement process in Korea (Cho, Y. and Jeon, W. 2005: 19). For a report on the general conditions of these women during this time, see the following (Paek, Y. 2002: 247-253).

25 According to the 2004 report by ‘Refugees International,’ an American professional civilian organization, the majority of the 65 people surveyed expressed hopes of living in China, from where they would have the possibility of returning due to the proximity to North Korea, if only they did not have to fear arrest and forced deportation. It was rare to find anyone who wished to sever ties with North Korea.

New Citizens’ Participation and ‘Struggles for Recognition’ 161

3) Being committed to my rights In the second interview, the interviewee gave a detailed and lively testimony of the “disappointment” she felt while speaking about the discrimination and corruption of South Korean officials who were in charge of educating the defectors (Interview Transcript Ko Sunja, 2008 II/43-44).26 An important point in the case analysis was that the officials in charge exercised this ‘privilege’ intended for the security and protection of the interviewee to further their own interests. This also happened in a circumstance where the interviewee could plainly see and directly experience this type of behavior.

In other words, although the interviewee and her daughter were present, the officials were acting as if the two were incapable of understanding their actions. What the interviewee protests against through the interview is the denial of her lawful rights and the humiliation of not being recognized as a moral being. Despite having gained citizenship of the Republic of Korea, in reality, the interviewee experienced the demotion of her social status, unable to receive recognition as a moral being of equal capability and intelligence.

According to the continuing biographical material, her leadership skills came to be recognized among her peers at a support group organized by North Korean defectors. For four to five years, she provided great emotional and other forms of support, and it was this that made others recognize her leadership skills. She assumed the role of a mentor to many North Korean defector-residents. According to the case analysis, this interviewee who lacked material and social support for herself, sought to actively participate in her current life world based on her own diligence and her very best efforts.

I, at this age to for me to ~ I ~ so hard ~ worked hard at what was given, I was so grateful that they were able to do that for me, anyway, as I worked to my very BEST (…) At the present, I am just ~ motto is like this ~ just me ~ day by day ~ to do my BEST, I ~ it is my motto. Just to do MY BEST everyday ~ last ~ as if it is my last day, to do my best, that is my motto (Interview Transcript Ko Sunja, 2008 I/ 51-52).

(Chung, B. 2006: 58).

To protect the interviewee, the rest of the transcript has been omitted.

26

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In the text above, she thanks the North Korean defector-residents’ organization for entrusting her with a leadership role. At the same time, within the text, she repeatedly stresses her diligence and efforts to implicitly show her pride and social recognition. The important analytical point here is the parallel between her tenfold efforts she made in North Korea and the ‘very best efforts’ she is currently making in South Korea. In short, whether it is overcoming the stained family background of pro-Japanese collaboration or her social minority status as a defector, one can see the performance of ‘dedication’ that she exhibits. The biographic history of Ms. Ko Sunja shows her efforts to gain respect and recognition through her devotion to sociomoral values and rules of the society to which she belongs, regardless of the political ideologies of North Korean socialism or South Korean capitalism.

This is also being carried out through interaction with the ‘generalized others,’ be it through the political repression in North Korea or the discrimination against defectors in the South. In fact, this constitutes the other side of her identity she is currently constructing with the heightened ‘devotion’ discussed above.

2. “I have the ability to assimilate into South Korean society”: Yu Chimin 1) Towards an Independent Life Ms. Yu Chimin belongs to the youngest generation among the interviewees.

She is the daughter of a family with no party membership. After graduation from high school, she was unable to find a suitable job. The fact that she came to South Korea through China makes her a case of minimum comparison to Ms. Ko Sunja. Ms. Yu Chimin was born in 1983 as the only daughter to a father who worked overseas and a mother who was a housewife. Although she ended up neglecting her studies to care for her mother who suffered from asthma, thanks to her father’s resourcefulness, she grew up in a relatively wealthy household. Her family was affluent enough to avoid hunger even during the ‘Arduous March.’ In 1995, when the interviewee turned fifteen, her mother succumbed to an epidemic outbreak and died. The following year, her father remarried and it appears the interviewee began to experience emotional difficulties. The loss of her mother who had been with her everyday

New Citizens’ Participation and ‘Struggles for Recognition’ 163

and her father’s sudden remarriage seem to have made the interviewee all the more aware of her “lone” existence and fueled her desire for ‘an independent life.’

In 1998, just before her high school graduation, the interviewee attempted to enlist in the military to become a party member, but gave up after opposition from her family. Around the same time, she established close ties with ‘a younger sister’ in her town who went to China and was deported back. As a result of contacts with her, the interviewee seems to have begun harboring dreams of going to unknown places such as Harbin. In 1999, when she was 17 years old, the interviewee crossed the border into China “to work six months to earn seed money for a business.” She was first sold to an old farming couple as a laborer, but in 2001, she was able to escape to another region where an older North Korean female acquaintance lived. She bought a forged Chinese family registry and got a job as an assistant guide at a Korean travel agency there. Yet, she was living in an unstable situation without a legal residence permit. In 2003, after finding out that her employer helped people travel to South Korea, she asked for his help. In the winter of 2003, the interviewee arrived in South Korea through the South Korean consulate in Beijing.

2) Becoming a ‘Citizen’ of the Republic of Korea After finishing her education at Hanawŏn in 2004, the interviewee was by herself when she was assigned rental housing in the Kyŏngbuk region.

In the interview, the interviewee evaluated “the year 2004 as one of the hardest years.” The loneliness arising from not having any emotional and unconditional support seems to have been the main cause for this hardship.27 Being a foreigner who “did not know anything, computer, did not know how to use a computer, culture, do not know culture, style of speaking, cannot adapt to the style of speaking,” she felt as if she “was branded for being like a foreigner, embarrassed by it and also felt shame like a criminal.” The 27

A study on the social support of North Korean defector youths (Park, Y. and Yoon, I. 2007) shows that in comparison to South Korean youths, North Korean defector youths lack a support base. The study also illustrates how close supporting relations play an important role in their lives.

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reason for feeling the stigma of not being born a South Korean comes from a devaluation of lifestyle and beliefs of North Koreans by the hierarchical South Korean social values. The interviewee probably experienced ‘the revocation of recognition’ where she felt humiliation and shame rather than support and encouragement for her abilities to make contributions to society.

In this case, computer skills become not simply knowledge but a marker that distinguish her from a ‘citizen of South Korea.’ Given such experiences, instead of risking unfriendly stares by revealing her origin, the interviewee seems to have decided to erase the stigma that separated her from the rest of the society. She chose to do so by becoming a ‘citizen of the Republic of Korea.’ First, she registered for computer classes and learned how to use a computer. Utilizing her experience of working at a Korean travel agency in China, she manufactured ‘an appropriate resume.’ To produce an identity suitable for local society, she changed her hometown and style of speaking to the Kangwŏn dialect and made revisions to her time in China (Interview Transcript Yu Chimin, 2008 I/19). With the newly manufactured resume and ‘a bright and energetic appearance’ in hand, the interviewee got her first job at a cosmetic sales counter. However, more than any other occupation, this occupation was inundated with foreign words that she did not know.

Yu admitted to feeling quite anxious when she learned how the job entailed timely responses towards numerous products and fast changing trends. Her fellow colleagues were puzzled by the interviewee who did not know not only the names or brands of the various cosmetic companies, but also the types of cosmetics such as toner, lotion, and spray. All these were foreign words to the interviewee. Invariably, just three days after beginning her work, she came to agonize whether to quit her job. She decided to stay on by telling herself that she “was at a crossroad between life and death and that (she) could do this” (Interview Transcript Yu Chimin, 2008 I/20). With a fabricated resume, Yu ended up learning the counter work through observations and guesswork. As a result, she seems to have been assigned cleaning more than learning the sales work, and this seems to have produced problems as well.

She spoke about her incomprehension of the shop owner’s request to go out and purchase a hotdog. Not even knowing whether a hotdog was an edible product, she expressed in her interview the difficulties she faced when she decided to assimilate into Korean culture through a presumed South

New Citizens’ Participation and ‘Struggles for Recognition’ 165

Korean identity. The price paid for not risking the obvious contempt and discrimination that awaited her once ‘coming out’ as a North Korean defector was to learn the ropes of South Korean mainstream culture through side glances and guesswork.

Few months after this incident, her experience of selling cosmetics to Chinese students who visited the shop motivated her to apply to graduate schools in the hopes of securing a better future. After six months of training at “the professional school for simultaneous translation,” she was admitted into the Chinese studies program at a local university in March 2003. Her life experience in China became an important biographic resource. Due to her fluency in Chinese, the interviewee came to be accepted among her peers in the university (Interview Transcript Yu Chimin, 2008 I/24). Currently, the interviewee is engaged in various extra-curricular activities and also serves as the president of the student recruitment club for her department. She is now open to telling her experiences of defection and encourages other students to volunteer at support organizations for North Korean defector-residents.

3) “No matter what anyone says, I am a citizen of the Republic of Korea” In the above retelling of her life history, the interviewee showed a highly concentrated effort to construct a biographic experience by someone in their twenties. While enduring ‘the unfriendly stares’ that North Korean defectorresidents faced every day, she came to acquire the culture and abilities of a ‘citizen of the Republic of Korea’ through furtive glances, guesswork, and studies on her own. Opting to invest in her future rather than in a job that pays the bills, the interviewee is now in her 4th year of university, facing graduation. She assesses her life at the moment “as the best in my life” (Interview Transcript Yu Chimin, 2008 I/36). In all the interviews with her, the interviewee emphasized, despite the loneliness and hardship, her pride and hope in the better future she was forging ahead here in Kyŏngbuk than she ever did back in North Korea.

On the other hand, the interviewee admitted to shedding tears when she watches North Korean athletes at the Olympic Games and wishing them victory. Also, tears welled up in her eyes when recollecting memories of her family left behind in North Korea (Interview Transcript Yu Chimin, 2008 I/31). Although she chose to leave, to the interviewee, North Korea

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is an emotional pillar that has allowed her to believe in herself (self-belief, Selbstvertrauen) by giving her unconditional support and encouragement. Yet at the same time, the interviewee emphatically defines herself as a citizen of the Republic of Korea.

No matter what anyone says, even though I speak with a Ch’ŏngjin dialect, I am a citizen of the Republic of Korea. Legally, I am so and since I am going to live and contribute to this country, my being here, of course when others see, just because I receive support from the state, that this person will become a burden, towards such prejudice, I say there is absolutely no such thing. Of course, there are others who don’t say that as well. LIVING IN A COUNTRY WHERE I PAY TAXES, I AM GOING TO BECOME A PERSON NEEDED

BY THIS SOCIETY. THAT KIND OF PERSON, I AM. I also tell the new settlers, you are all needed people, who is ever not needed? How is it that people need only what they want?

(Interview Transcript Yu Chimin, 2008 I/39)

In the above paragraph, the interviewee emphasizes that legal membership to the modern nation-state should be given to individuals regardless of their ‘North Korean dialect.’ Furthermore, in lieu of the widespread prejudice that sees ‘the welfare-receiving North Korean defector as social burden,’ she reminds herself of becoming ‘a needed person’ who will ‘contribute’ to this nation. In short, the interviewee is promising her social contribution as payment for the legal rights bestowed upon her. This is an attempt to compensate for her membership in the South Korean nation-state that was not as ‘naturally’ acquired through blood and birthplace as it has been for others. Moreover, it also speaks of her strong desire to be recognized as having the necessary social values and not as a freeloader. By possessing the needed social values, she wishes to forge solidarity with this society. From what has been examined thus far, the life history of Ms. Yu Chimin shows active efforts to be ‘assimilated’ into the culture and order of South Korean society. This indicates the interviewee’s distinct biographical practice aimed at winning herself the recognition of South Korean society as someone who has crossed the border in her teenage years. Moreover, it is an identity reconstruction process of someone who is trying to define herself as a citizen of Republic of Korea “no matter what anyone says.”

New Citizens’ Participation and ‘Struggles for Recognition’ 167

3. “I am an internationally trained businessman.” - Pak T’aesu28 Considering that the above two cases showed the experiences of persons who – as non-party members – were committed to or lived their lives in North Korean society when being faced with the ‘Arduous March’ of the mid-1990s and subsequently crossed the border, the case of Mr. Pak T’aesu, who led a life as part of the high elite of North Korean society until he became subjected to a political purge in the mid-1990s that led him to flee to the South, serves as a case of maximum comparison. Based on his experience of working as an executive officer of an economic bureau, he spoke about various aspects of North Korean society in a logical and systematic fashion. Also, by speaking freely and frankly of his biographic experiences in both North and South, he provided a glimpse into the figure of a ‘broad-minded and virile’ North Korean economic bureaucrat.

1) The Purge of an Overseas Trade Bureaucrat and Exile The interviewee was born in 1952 into a proletariat family in Chagang Island.

In his 2008 interview, he described his early life as “never having enough to eat.” After the early passing of his parents, the young interviewee led an orphan-like existence and graduated from middle school in 1969. For 10 years afterwards, he worked as an official of the Chosŏn Socialist Labor Youth Federation at a military supply plant. In 1979, when he was 27 years old, his loyalty as a worker to the plant was recognized, and he was admitted to the best university to study economics. In this way, he established the foundations to spend “the prime of his life” as a trade bureaucrat (Interview Transcript Pak T’aesu, 2008 I/4).

The interviewee first began working in overseas trade in 1986. Starting from his mid-thirties until he sought asylum in 2002, the subject visited numerous countries in a period of fifteen years. In particular, he witnessed the collapse of East European states and the opening and reforms in China.

28

Two interviews with this interviewee took place between January and February of 2008. While interviewing him at his private tutorial school, a brief introduction to his wife took place as well.

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Moreover, with his direct experience of Western capitalist societies, he came to see the crisis within the North Korean economy as well (Interview Transcript Pak T’aesu, 2008 II/22-23). During the interview, the interviewee described the inner conflict he felt while working as a North Korean economic bureaucrat engaging in overseas trade. He evaluated his inner turmoil as the status of a trader coming from “a wretched society.” As a proletariat who ended up going to the very best school to become a trading elite, he felt ‘wretched’ in having to ‘lie’ to maintain his socialistic life. This visible gap between ideology and rules enforced in the public sphere and everyday life experiences in socialist systems has been pointed out as one of the factors that led to the inevitable collapse of the East European socialist system (Niethammer, et al. 1991). It can also be seen as the result of a gap between ideal and reality of socialist society, which allowed no open criticism of the system.

In the summer of 1996, the interviewee, who had been working as a North Korean economic representative in Poland since January of that year, was removed from his post and was ordered to two years of farm labor. He was found to be lacking enthusiasm in expressing his loyalty to the central party and, as a punishment, he was ordered to carry out a revolutionary project at a rural farm. The reason for this demotion seems to have come from efforts to prevent the defection of overseas workers by the party. When the discontinuation of rations made the failure of the North Korean system public in February of 1996, it appears the central power undertook efforts to stall the ideological deviation of overseas workers; one method to do so was to intensify ‘ideological conflicts.’ During his time at the farm, the interviewee and his family made a living by hard labor. In 1999, he was reinstated by the central apparatus, and in July 2000, he was appointed as the head of the overseas joint venture company for three years. However, in February 2002, he detected another possible purge. He took his wife and his youngest child with him to South Korea via Amsterdam. He turned his back on North Korean society, which had not only refused to recognize his social values but had also threatened his life. In search of a “place which is good merely by allowing him in” he came to South Korea.

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2) To Compete in the Capitalist Private Education Market After the re-education period at Hanawŏn, the family was given housing in Seoul. Soon afterwards, his wife began her training as an English teacher for ‘Education.’ The interviewee who had first hand knowledge of the market principles of capitalism, focused his attention on the South Korean private education market. As the daughter of an elite North Korean family, his wife was “educated in Switzerland where Kim Jeong Il’s children studied, taught

by American kids and also studied abroad” (Interview Transcript Pak T’aesu, 2008 II/17). After obtaining her private teaching certificate, she began working as a visiting private tutor. However, when the regional director of the institute in her area “refused to accept a teacher from North Korea,” she was assigned to a branch far from her home. Moreover, her students’ parents complained: “Are we so lacking that we have to be taught by a North Korean defector,” and cancelled her classes. In effect, in these important social relationships, the interviewee’s family faced situations in which they were not judged on their personalities but reduced to belonging to the socially devalued group of ‘North Korean defectors.’ However, with near native pronunciation and excellent teaching skills, the interviewee’s wife began teaching the remaining students. In one year, she became one of the most sought after teachers at the institute. Possessing superior foreign language skills wanted by the Korean private education market, the interviewee’s wife eventually received recognition as an individual with worthwhile social values.

Also, the interviewee earned a living by working at construction sites such as the Ch’ŏnggye creek restoration project. According to the interviews, the interviewee’s family did not use up all of the money they received from the government for settlement and living support. They pooled the money together and with extra wages earned by him and his wife, they saved as much as possible. In fact, they were so focused on this endeavor that in a matter of three years, the family was able to accumulate one hundred million Korean Won of start-up capital. This was the result of living according to ‘the principle of maximum economic activities and minimum consumption.’

Based on this, in the middle of 2006, the interviewee overcame the contempt and discrimination of his neighbors to open up a regional branch of the

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said private tutorial institute. Also, in 2007, a year after the opening, his branch was selected as the best out of the 600 tutorial institutes in Korea. The interviewee, utilizing his biographic experience as an overseas trade official, now successfully transformed himself into a competent businessman in the South. Moreover, having witnessed the changes in East European socialism, he told of his plan to open up an “education business” in North Korea once the unification is about to happen. The interviewee and his family successfully competed in the South Korean private education market. With superior foreign language skills and business acumen, he and his family were able to establish an economic base and receive social recognition.

3) The Loss of Social Prestige and Despair However, at the end of the second interview, the interviewee confessed recent bouts of feeling “despair.” Unlike his attitude in the previous interview, when he spoke of his life and thoughts without any hesitation, this time, he slowly unraveled the “unspeakable” and poured out his heart. According to the interviews, as a cost saving measure, instead of hiring a driver for the institute school bus, the interviewee had decided to drive the school bus himself. From his words, the ‘humiliation’ and ‘dismissal’ he suffered from children and their parents became apparent.

See, because it was shaking, the car, driving with the kids at night going to dark places, how could the car go? My heart was palpitating. Stopped the car for about four ~ five minutes, tears started to come down. Wow, this, I mean this, is the sin for deserting the Fatherland this great? That was when the thought came to my mind. No, I must endure all this in order to become successful, let’s clap my hands together ten times (…) honestly. I mean, wow ~ I can die like this. No, MORE THAN DEATH, I FEEL AS IF I AM IN DESPAIR, drowning in pain.

(Interview Transcript Pak T’aesu, 2008 II/33)

The above text shows how—despite having established an economic foundation in the South—the loss of ‘social prestige’ by ‘deserting the Fatherland’ makes his attribution of self-worth a struggle for the interviewee.

The contempt and discrimination against North Korean defectors as shown by the children and their parents also added to this difficulty felt by the

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interviewee. He experiences a sense of shame considering the difference between his past self “travelling the world” and his present self enduring the cutting remarks of “mothers and their kids.” The biographic experiences of Mr. Pak T’aesu’s examined thus far show the will and tension as well as the attempt to compensate for the loss of social prestige and recognition derived from political exile with economic ‘supremacy.’ In short, Mr. Pak T’aesu’s internationally trained, outstanding economic activities are an important mode for carrying out ‘struggles for recognition’ by utilizing his biographical resources in capitalist South Korean society. The results of the case reconstruction illustrates the interviewee’s action orientation as he asserts the ‘superiority’ of the successful businessman who manages to overcome the dismissal and discrimination against North Korean defectors through his everyday ‘recognition struggles.’ The ‘superiority’ of being a successful entrepreneur and ‘the despair’ felt from the loss of social prestige are the core dual aspects of the new identity he is constructing at the moment.

4. “I am ‘a critical intellectual’ who is in solidarity with North Korean residents.” - Kim Chuhŭi If Mr. Pak T’aesu constitutes a case of someone from the proletariat becoming high elite through college education, Ms. Kim Chuhŭi is a case of someone born one. This interviewee was born into ‘an intellectual family’ and was recognized for her literary talents. She provides a case of minimum comparison to Mr. Pak T’aesu.

1) The Political Banishment of a Poet of the Writers’ Federation and Physical Abuse Ms. Kim Chuhŭi was born in 1959 as the eldest daughter to a family of four sons and two daughters in P’yŏngyang.29 Her father was a teacher who served as the vice-president of the Chosŏn-Soviet Union Literary Association of P’yŏngyang, and her mother studied in Japan. Examining the interview 29

Interviews with Ms. Kim Chuhŭi took place twice, in May 2006 and August 2007.

The case was reconstructed with interview materials as well as her autobiographical account (2005) and her MA thesis (2006) and other writings she contributed.

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material, it seems that the interviewee nurtured her literary ambitions within such intellectual family atmosphere. In 1977, after graduating from high school, the interviewee worked at a factory for a while and later as a manuscript copier for the editing bureau of a publisher. At the same time, the interviewee studied under her brother, who worked as the senior translator of the P’yŏngyang April 15th Creative Group, and in 1980, she published two poems in the ‘P’yŏngyang Newspaper’ and received social recognition at the young age of 21 (Interview Transcript Kim Chuhŭi, 2006 I/28-30). In 1991, she graduated from the Kim Hyŏngjik Teacher’s College Creative Writing Course and with a publication in Chosŏn munhak, the most prestigious literary journal in North Korea, she began her professional career as a poet.

When she reached her mid thirties, in 1994, the interviewee married a widower who was seventeen years older than her. Her husband’s social standing as one of the first graduates of the Kim Ch’aek Industrial College in the physics department and as an official in the North Korean atomic industrial bureau, provided her with a stable living foundation and childrearing experiences. As a result, the interviewee was able to lead an uninterrupted life of creative writing (Interview Transcript Kim Chuhŭi, 2005: 65-68). However, three years after her marriage in 1997, the interviewee’s family received orders to be deported from P’yŏngyang to Ch’ŏngjin. When the ideological conflicts deepened due to the ‘Arduous March’, her stepson’s ‘bad behavior’ became welcome fodder for the party apparatus, which was already critical of the interviewee for lacking enthusiasm in her praise of Kim Jeong Il. When one year of petitioning and pleas came to naught, the interviewee and her family boarded the train to Ch’ŏngjin in May 1998. To secure their livelihood amidst the food shortage, job loss and banishment to the countryside, the interviewee and her husband agreed to divorce.

Afterwards, when desperately searching for employment, the interviewee came into full contact with the chronic shortage of supplies already underway in the rural areas as early as the late 1980s. She went around the outskirts of the Ch’ŏngjin area for two months in search of employment and came to see ‘border- crossings’ happening in public. With the encouragement of her cousin, in the early morning of July 11th, 1998, she crossed the border to not only alleviate her hunger but also to freely engage in her creative writing efforts.

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After crossing by herself, the interviewee later risked two more crossings to bring her son. However, in China, she was sold into slavery many times. In her autobiographic account, the interviewee describes in graphic detail the horrendous sexual violence and threats to life that she suffered during this period. In January 1999, the interviewee, in clothing stained with blood and sweat and with her son in her arms, sought refuge inside a church. Under the protection of Korean missionaries in the Yanbian area, the interviewee went into hiding for ten months and on November 13, 1999, the interviewee arrived at Kimp’o Airport via the Mongolian border. Writing of her feelings at the time (The autobiography of Kim Chuhŭi, 2005: 295), she described herself as a woman who had been deserted by someone she had loved. In the book, she confesses how she was abandoned by the North Korean regime despite her avid courtship and devotion. Thrown into the rough seas of life, she reveals how she ended up coming all the way to ‘the enemy state’ of South Korea. Through this description, one can witness the strong resentment she felt towards the North Korean state that responded to her life-long devotion as an artist not with protection and love but with banishment from P’yŏngyang, deprivation of her livelihood, experiences of hunger, human trafficking, and sexual violence, eventually driving her into the enemy state of South Korea.

According to the results of the case reconstruction, it is not the interviewee’s flight from North Korea that constitutes her biographical turning point.

Instead, her fall from social grace and the multiple border-crossings (19981999) that were tempered with repeated experiences of hunger and violence were the factors that became the biographical turning point in her life.

2) Reflection Not as a ‘Defector’ but as a Writer After her arrival in South Korea, the interviewee underwent several months of education on settlement and was assigned an apartment in the Ch’ungch’ŏng region in 2001. To continue her literary career, she applied to and was admitted into a Women’s Studies program at a college in Seoul, and graduated in July 2006. During her graduate studies, she published an autobiographic account of her flight from North Korea and also came to see new sides to the black and white histories of North and South Korea that she had been taught before. Within her own biographical history, she faced the

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task of having to newly reconfigure the South Korea her past self had known and the North Korea, now seen from within South Korea as the political ‘other.’

In a similar context, through the publication of her book, she presented a biographical perspective of “I, who had to go through unprecedented life experiences to reflect on both South and North and become a border-crosser” and illustrates her efforts to newly understand herself and the ‘generalized others’ mutually interacting with her. This also constitutes the interviewee’s new self-understanding. At the same time, in her MA theses written between 2005 and 2006, she projected and reflected on her self-image as a female poet in her analysis of the works of North Korean female poets.

However, despite these self-reflections, the interviewee often faced the reality of being defined only as ‘the North Korean defector.’ One specific case where she faced such problem took place at an academic conference (Interview Transcript Kim Chuhi, 2006: I/14-15). While preparing for a Women’s Studies event, she felt humiliated for being dismissed as a North Korean defector.

In her interview, she told of how a ‘non-major’ in Women’s Studies, food nutrition major, was given an opportunity to present on an issue related to Women’s Studies while she was relegated to giving a presentation on her ‘defection.’ As she saw this unfolding before her eyes, the interviewee seems to have felt her academic knowledge and her life experiences being reduced to that of the ‘North Korean defector.’ It is quite possible that she, who had been treated as the best artist in North Korea, felt ‘humiliated’ at being dismissed as less than a student of food nutrition. Moreover, she came to realize how she was being defined only by her ‘act of escaping from North Korea’ within her peer group. The moral contents of any given society, that are based on such reduction and hierarchization of an individual’s sex, skin color, birth place, etc into distinct categories, rather than each and everyone’s ‘individuality’, provide a typical example of social exclusion and discrimination.

3) The Path Towards Forging Solidarity with North Koreans as an Intellectual In 2003, the interviewee met her future husband who had also escaped from North Korea and was living in Japan working in mass media. Three years after a meeting by chance, in 2006, the two got married (Interview Transcript Kim Chuhŭi, 2007 II/16). Moreover, in 2007, she became an editor of a magazine that is devoted to informing others on the life of North Koreans. Through

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her husband, the interviewee came to hear the news that North Koreans were being sent to third countries. With her husband, she collected these news stories and decided to devote her life to editing them. In the very first issue of the magazine, the interviewee speaks of her life that had been “turned upside down.”

For the first time since coming to Korea, I came to reflect upon my identity.

For the first few years, I thought if I studied hard and settled well, I would become Korean. What happened afterwards only reminded me of the fact that I was nothing other than a North Korean (…) It was the process where I came to realize how the historical destiny of the North Korean problem must be solved by North Koreans themselves. In the end, I gave up the dream of going to Harvard. I came to accept North Korea which I swore I will never look back at lest the grave dirt gets into my eyes, as all of my remaining future (…) The path of the poet – choosing the road of destiny pointed out by the heart.

(From magazine article, Kim Chuhŭi, 2007: 9-10)

In the above paragraph, the interviewee deems her decision to embrace North Korea once again as “the path of the poet—choosing the road of destiny pointed out by the heart.” Also, she emphasizes that this choice came after long reflections on her life in Korea. According to the case analysis, the interviewee, through meeting her husband, came to see the North Korea she had left from a more social scientific perspective. The interviewee has come to ‘scientifically understand’ her political banishment and defection to be not of her fault for not adhering to the socialistic principles. Instead, she developed an understanding of how the structural incompetence of the North Korean regime had produced an “overall supply” crisis. By so doing, she was able to absolve herself of the guilt she had been harboring. Moreover, by identifying with the voice of North Korean residents who were suffering under the incompetence and corruption of the Kim Jeong Il regime, she discovered possibilities for forging solidarity with North Koreans despite herself being in the South.

The biographic experiences of Ms. Kim Chuhŭi highlight the critical action orientation of someone who can politically belong to South Korean society and yet still go beyond the territorial borders to forge solidarity with North Koreans. This is an expression of the critical identity that has been

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formed through the supra-national experiences of traversing the borders of ideologically hostile nation-states. From this perspective, the interviewee’s struggle for recognition which is based on her ‘criticism’ transcends the sphere of action that is the modern nation-state.

5. Comparison of Cases and Characteristic Features According to the results of the above biographical case reconstructions, the interviewees experienced the changes in North Korean society, which, following the famines of the mid-1990s, appeared as political and everyday tensions, then as an accelerating crisis and provided different biographical backgrounds for their flight from North Korea. With threats to their survival and fear of political retaliation hanging over their heads, these defectors came to South Korea through China and other third countries. In this relatively ‘long process of defection,’ the interviewees seem to have lost their identification with North Korea as a ‘value community’ (Honneth 1992: 221). To most of the interviewees, South Korea is the next-best place for obtaining a legal residence permit and securing the conditions for survival. At least until the early 2000s, only a small number of people crossed the North Korean border in the hope of reaching the South. Those who ended up in South Korea coming from China often did so in order to avoid complications arising from their uncertain status as illegal aliens, economic hardship and physical abuse.

In South Korea, defector-residents also experience various forms of exclusion and discrimination in their everyday life interactions with the hierarchical order of the ‘generalized others.’ With the traditional culture and values of North Korean defector-residents being socially devaluated as inferior, their pride as moral beings are violated and as result, they experience shame and humiliation. In the face of such ‘withdrawal of recognition,’ the interviewees utilize their biographic experiences as resources to produce action orientations ranging from ‘devotion’ and ‘assimilation’ to ‘superiority and ‘criticism.’ This also constitutes the main characteristic of the process whereby the interviewees constructed new identities When examining the characteristics of each case, Ms. Ko Sunja and Ms. Yu Chimin show a process in which non-party members of the North Korean state end up crossing the borders due to the economic crisis. Ms. Ko Sunja,

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whose experience of physical abuse and the fear for her survival in China ‘pushed her towards’ South Korea, uses her biographic resource of ‘devotion’ to lead the North Korean defector support organization in the Republic of Korea which affords her ‘recognition’ as a citizen. In short, the biographical history of Ms. Ko Sunja shows an identity of a devoted individual constructed to secure social recognition across societies based on opposite political ideologies. In contrast, Ms. Yu Chimin, who crossed the border dreaming of a new future in her teen years, attempts to deflect social devaluation against North Korean defectors by actively acquiring the cultural code and resources of South Korean society. By showing herself as ‘an individual who can assimilate’ into the value system of South Korean society, she seeks recognition of her rights as citizen. From a cosmetic salesperson to a major in Chinese Studies, she defines herself as a citizen of the Republic of Korea. She also demands the hierarchical value system of South Korea to ‘recognize’ the culture and values of the North Korean residents as well.

Mr. Pak T’aesu and Ms. Kim Chuhŭi, who are cases of maximum comparison to Ms. Ko Sunja and Ms. Yu Chimin, share a common history of undergoing a political purge by the North Korean regime. This specific instance of political repression became the catalyst for their defection to South Korea. Deprived of their social rights and with threats made against their lives, South Korea became the last resort to seek refuge against the apparent dangers they faced. From the stand-point of biographical history, the two cases show rapid political transformation from socialism to capitalism and vertical status change from social elite to that of social minority at the same time. As the son of a proletarian and with his long history of loyalty to the party, Mr. Pak T’aesu worked as an overseas trade bureaucrat from the mid-1980s until his defection in 2002. With his second political purge imminent, he sought asylum in South Korea, which ‘legally accepted’ him. Mr. Pak T’aesu, who previously mastered surplus accumulation of a capitalist society, employed his ‘superior’ economic skills and his wife’s fluency in English as biographic resources to build entrepreneurial success.

The economic success he is accumulating at the moment, however, cannot erase the deprivation of social prestige he experiences on a daily basis in the running of their business. The ‘superiority’ of the successful entrepreneur and ‘despair’ over the loss of social prestige forms the central duality constructing

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his new identity. As for Ms. Kim Chuhŭi, before coming to South Korea, she led a life of North Korean high elite who adhered to the rules and values of North Korean socialism as the absolute truth. However, after the political purge, her life had meant a rapid fall from social grace when she experienced divorce, malnutrition, sexual violence and even threats to her life. Whereas Mr. Pak T’aesu was loyal to the system despite being aware of the hypocrisy immanent, for Ms. Kim Chuhŭi, despite her critical awareness as an artist, she had no opportunities to raise questions on the fundamental problems of the socialist system. In this regard, her relatively long ‘self-reflection’ which is continued through her graduate studies and her literary activities, can be understood as a process of change into a ‘critical expert’ trying to distance herself from the ‘self-understanding’ as a member of the North Korean high elite and critically reflecting on both North and South Korea.

Her ‘criticism’ of not only the North Korean regime but also of the South Korean social hierarchy and its actualization of capitalistic values is an important mode of constructing her identity at the moment. Also, her work as the editor of a magazine on North Korea shows her action orientation to become ‘a citizen of the Republic of Korea’ who can transcend political boundaries to establish solidarity with North Koreans.

When the individual identities above are examined in conjunction with the collective identity of the ‘political regimes’ of North and South, the interviewees all show their traversing of the binary logic of the ‘North or South Korean state.’ Specifically, in the case of Ms. Ko Sun Ja, she displays a dual identity of accepting both North and South Korea and devotes herself to this ‘Korean Nation.’ Ms. Yu Chimin in contrast, despite her emotional affinity to North Korea, by actively trying to become ‘loyal’ to the South, displays a more individualized trait. Mr. Pak T’aesu, on the other hand, desires to use his economic skills to establish ties to both North and South Korea. In other words, his case illustrates a perspective which, rather than being based on political convictions and aimed at becoming a member of the political communities of either the North or South, assesses North and South Korea from an understanding orientated towards his economic activities. For Ms. Kim Chuhŭi, she seeks to approach North and South, not from the level of the nation-state but from the perspective of class or status. As such, Ms. Kim is a legal citizen of South Korea who tries to maintain a critical distance

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to both North and South and yet establish solidarity with North Korean citizens at the same time as well.

The construction processes of the interviewees’ socio-political identities examined here show the following commonalities. Firstly, in the life histories of the interviewees, North Korean society is no longer considered a subject that grants them legal rights, i.e. the impersonalized values derived from being members of society; nor does it afford them with social worth or extend solidarity. Yet, the North Korea they know still exists as a source of emotional affinity. Many interviewees do not shy away from providing material support to families and relatives left behind in North Korea. Direct and indirect communication and exchanges take place as well.

Secondly, the interviewees distance themselves from the quotidian values of South Korean society, based on their previous experiences in a socialist society. The distance maintained as North Koreans and their ‘margins’ are means of problematizing the ‘denial of recognition’ for North Koreans by South Korean society and also functions as the mode of affirming belief in oneself as a moral being. In other words, with the ‘unfamiliar eyes’ of ‘the stranger’ (der Fremde) (Schuetz 1972), these North Korean defectors are raising questions on the quotidian order of South Korean society. For example, their problematization of the capitalist order is not simply a complaint launched by individuals who had been inured to being ‘dependent’ on a (socialist) state, but that of ‘new citizens’ whose life experiences can throw light on the omniscient belief in the market. From this point of view, the social participation of North Korean defector-residents as ‘new citizens’ holds the potential to serve as a new source of critical energy within South Korean society.

IV. Conclusion In conclusion, the case studies examined here show the ‘recognition struggles’ North Korean defector-residents face in their daily experiences. The lack of recognition that these defectors encounter in relations to ‘generalized others’ act as a catalyst for their reconstruction of everyday life identities. In comparison to foreign migrant workers, North Korean defector-residents

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have relatively easily gained the political right of being citizens of the Republic of Korea. Yet, at the same time, they are devalued as ‘food shortage refugees’ from ‘an ideologically hostile state.’ As a result, the assignment of self-respect and attribution of social worth to their own traditions of culture and values have been deferred at the moment. To transcend the limitations of legal nationality and secure their actual rights as citizens, the interviewees carry out various modes of social participation from ‘devotion’ and ‘assimilation’ to ‘supremacy’ and ‘criticism.’ This way, their identity reconstruction process shows the blurring of the binary politics of choosing between ‘North or South Korea.’

Secondly, although many of these North Koreans moved to South Korea as the next-best option and despite engaging in complex processes of ‘recognition struggles,’ many of them do not wish to turn their lives back to the life before ‘defection.’ The case study of everyday ‘recognition struggles’ examined here hints at the new possibility of North Korean defectors, ‘the strangers’ who bring different biographical experiences, becoming ‘the new citizens’ of South Korean society. The various forms of ‘distancing’ based on the biographical experiences of North Korean defector-residents do not indicate their ‘lack of adaptation’ to the dominant value system in South Korean society, but rather imply the possibility of acting as a new critical power for South Korean civil society.

These results leave the following theoretical and methodological task for research on North Korean defectors. Firstly, they show the necessity for a research framework that can overcome the existing reliance on the ‘adaptation’ perspective and interpret North Korean defectors as active subjects of a multicultural civil society. The discussion on the ‘struggle for recognition’ by Honneth and Taylor provide a useful theoretical framework for this task. Second, despite its usefulness in provoking questions on identity, Honneth’s notion of ‘struggles for recognition’ have been applied strictly within the confines of the modern nation-state. This brings about limitations for understanding North Korean defectors, whose lives as migrants and minorities in South Korean society have been initiated through acts of border crossing. Therefore, theoretical explorations that can adequately convey the multiple ‘risks and chances’ brought about by increased global mobility and the demands this mobility creates for individuals are warranted.

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Thirdly, a more active use of qualitative methodologies is called for in the indepth examination of the everyday lives of defectors. The limitations with quantifying migration status and adaptation process have been pointed out before. New theoretical experiments are needed whereby researchers can qualitatively transform these dynamic life experiences into new horizons of understanding.

Lastly, the case studies show the changes that have been taking place in the everyday life worlds of North Koreans residing near the borders since the early 2000s. They show an increase in migrants who cross the border in search of a better life more than those who do so as ‘food refugees.’ Since the 1990s, the transnational human network formed by North Korean defectors, aided by various information and media technologies have been increasingly blurring the political and cultural boundaries of the two states, which reminds of East Germany just before re-unification. What kind of social transformation—from the perspective of the individual’s life world— the various tangible and intangible economic and cultural communications passing between South and North Korean society via third countries and transcending the political reality of Korea, where the National Security Law continues to exist, will trigger remains as an important research question for the future.

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Choi, Jini, 2005, Choi, Jini: The woman who crossed the state border three times, Seoul: Book House (『국경을 세 번 건넌 여자, 최진이』).

Chung, Byung Ho, 2006, “The Apoliticization of the North Korean Refugees Problems,” in Welcome to Korea: Living in South Korea as North Koreans’, Seoul: Hanyang University Press (“탈북 난민 문제의 탈정치화,” 『웰컴 투 코리 아. 북조선 사람들의 남한살이』, pp. 47-63).

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Chung, Byung Ho, Jeon, Woo Taek and Jung Jin Kyung, 2006, Welcome to Korea: Living in South Korea as North Koreans’, Seoul: Hanyang University Press.

Dohkgoh, Soon, 2001, “Value Orientation of North Korean Defectors,” Korean Journal of Sociology 35(1): 149-174 (“탈북 주민의 가치정향에 관한 비교 연구,” 『한국사회학』 35 (1): 149-174).

GOODFRIENDS, 1999, Report on the Reality of North Korean‚ food refugees’ and their human rights, Seoul: JungTo (『북한 ‘식량난민’의 실태 및 인권보고서』).

Jung, Jin Heon, 2007, “Post –division, the Age of Multiculturalism, Minority Ethnographies and New Settlers Alienate ‘Us.’,” in Multiculturalism in South Korea : A Critical Review, Seoul: Hanul Academy, 136-166 (“탈분단· 다문화 시대, 마이너리티 민족지: 새터민, ‘우리’를 낯설게 하다,” 『한국에서의 다문 화주의. 현실과 쟁점』).

Kang, Ju Won, 2002, “The distinction from South Korean Society On North Korean Minority in South Korea,” MA Thesis, Hanyang University (“탈북 자 소수집단에 대한 남한사회의 구별 짓기,” 한양대학교 문화인류학과 석사학위논 문).

Kim, In Sung, 2005, “Analysis of the Overall Status of North Korean Defectors: Analysis of the Whole Process from Defection, Stop –over to settlement,” The Research of Ethnology, 14: 6-34. Korea Research Center of Ethnology (“탈북자 현황 분석: 탈북, 중간기착, 정착까지의 전과정의 총체적 분석,” 『민족연 구』).

Kim Jung Mi, 1999, “A Study on the Transformation of the Identity of the NorthKorean Refugee Woman,” MA Thesis, Ehwa Women’s University (“탈북여 성의 정체성 변화에 관한 연구,” 이화여자대학교 여성학과 대학원 석사학위논문).

Kim, Keun Sik, 2002, “Human Rights in North Korea: Starting from the Inside,” in Korean Human Rights Foundation, ed., Peace and human rights in the Korean peninsula vol. I, Seoul: Saram saenggak (“북한의 인권: 안으로부터의 시작,” 『한반도 평화와 인권 I』).

Kim, Sang Hwan, 1997, “The ‘Arduous March’ of the Kim Jeong Il era—what does it mean,” North Korea 312: 42-49, Institute of North Korea Studies (“김정일 시대 ‘고난의 행동’ 무엇을 의미하나,” 『북한』 312: 42-49).

Kim, Yoon Yong, 2002, “School life and Identity of North Korean Refugee Children,” MA Thesis, Hanyang University, 2002 (『탈북 아동들의 남한 학교 생활과 정체성, 한양대학교 대학원 문화인류학과 석사학위 논문).

Kwon, Na Hye, 2006, “Cultural Identities and Lived Experience of North-Korean Diasporas in South Korea,” MA Thesis, Yonsei University (“남한 내 탈북 이 주민 대학생의 정체성과 생활경험,” 연세대학교 대학원 사회학과 석사학위 논문).

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Kyongnam University Graduate Studies on North Korea eds., 2003, Methodology of North Korean Studies, Seoul: Hanul Academy (『북한연구 방법론』).

Lee, Jung Woo, 2006, “A Study on North Korean Adolescent Refugees’ Socialization Process,” Social Studies Education 45(1): 195-219 (“탈북 청소년의 사회화 과 정에 대한 질적 연구,” 『사회과교육』 45(1): 195-219).

Lee, Mi Kyung, 2006, “Prospects for North Korean Women’s Status after the Economic Difficulties by Interviewing Female Defectors,” Family and Culture 18(1): 33-55 (“탈북여성과의 심층면접을 통해서 본 경제난 이후 북한여 성의 지위변화전망,” 『가족과 문화』 18(1): 33-55).

Lee, Yong Pil compiled, 2002, The ideology of Communalism and the State in the Globalization Process, Seoul: Sinyu Munhwasa (『세계화 과정에서 공동체주의 이념과 국가』).

Paek, Young Ok, 2002, “Research on the Actual Conditions of the North Korean Female Refugees in China and Aids Policies for Them,” North Korean Studies Review 6(1): 241-264, The Korean Association of North Korean Studies (“중국 내 탈북 여성실태와 지원방안에 관한 연구,” 『북한연구학회보』 6(1): 241-264).

Park Heung Soon, 2007, “Multiculture and New Identity: Towards a Postcolonial Perspective,” Multiculturalism in Korea: A Critical Review, Seoul: Hanul Academy, pp. 111-134 (“다문화와 새로운 정체성. 포스트콜로니얼 시각을 중심 으로,” 『한국에서의 다문화주의: 현실과 쟁점』).

Park, Kyung Tae, 2008, Minority and Korean Society, Seoul: Humanitas (『소수자와 한국사회』).

Park, Sung Ae, 2002, “Study on the Life Experiences and Self-Identity of North Korean Defector-Residents,” MA Thesis, Academy of Korean Studies (“북 한이탈주민의 생활경험과 자아 정체성에 관한 연구,” 한국정신문화연구원 한국학 대학원 석사학위논문).

Park, Yun Sook and Yoon, In Jin, 2007, “Characteristics of Social Support for North Korean Migrant Adolescents and its Effects on their Adaptation in South Korea,” Korean journal of Sociology 41(1): 124-155 (“탈북 청소년의 사 회적 지지 특성과 남한사회 적응과의 관계,” 『한국사회학』 41(1): 124-155).

Yi, Hee Young, 2005, “Reconstruction of Biography as a Sociological Method,” Korean journal of Sociology 39(3): 120-148 (“사회학 방법론으로서의 생애사 재구성,” 『한국사회학』 39(3): 120-148).

Yoon, In Jin, 2007, “Social Adjustments of North Korean Migrants and Measures to Facilitate Their Resettlement,” The Journal of Asiatic Studies 50(2): 106182 (“북한이주민의 사회적응 실태와 정착지원방안,” 『아세아연구』 50(2): 106-

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182).

Yoon, In Jin and Park, Young Hee et al., 2007, “Social Adaptation of North Korean Migrant Families and Changes in Family Relations,” Korean Journal of Family Welfare 12(2): 89-108 (“북한이주민 가족의 사회적응과 가족 관계의 변화,” 『한국가족복지학』 12(2): 89-108).

Yoon, Yeo Sang, 2002, “A Study of Attitude Change Theories for North Korean Defector’s Adjustment,” Korean Journal of Political Science 10(1): 195-223 (“탈북자 적용에 관한 ‘태도변용이론’의 적용 가능성,” 『대한정치학회보』 10(1): 195-223).

Books and Articles in English and other language Honneth, Axel, 1992, Kamp um Anerkennung, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp (Mun Songhun and Yi Hyonjae trans, Seoul: Tongnyok) (『인정투쟁: 사회 갈 등의 도덕적 형식론』).

Mead, G. Herbert, 1963, Mind, Self and society, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Niethammer, Lutz, 2000, Kollektive Identitaet. Heimliche Quellen einer unheimlichen Konjunktur, Reinbeck bei Hamburg.

Niethammer, L. A. V. Plato and D. Wierling, 1991, Die Volkseigene Erfahrung, Berlin: Rowohlt.

Riegel, Christine, 2004, Im Kampf um Zugehoerigkeit und Anerkennung.

Orientierungen und Handlungsformen von jungen Migrannten. Eine Sozio– biografische Untersuchung, Ffm & London: IKO–Verlag fuer Interkulturelle Kommunikation.

Rosenthal, Gabriele, 1995, Erlebte und Erzaehlte Lebensgeschichte: Gestalt und Struktur Biograpischer Selbstbeschreibungen, Frankfurt: M.: Campus.

Schuetz, Alfred, 1972, “Der Fremde. Ein Sozialpsychologischer Versuch,” pp. 5369 in. ders., Gesammelte Aufsaetze, Bd.I., Den Haag: Martinus Nijihoff.

Taylor, Charles, 1976, Erklaerung und Interpretation in den Wissenschaften vom Menschen, Ffm: Suhrkamp. , 1995, “The Politics of Recognition,” in Philosophical Arguments, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 225-256.

Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 1, No. 1, 2011: 185-220

Territorial Politics and the Rise of a ConstructionOriented State in South Korea* Park Bae Gyoon** There have been some critical debates about the construction-oriented, developmentalist nature of the Korean state among the Korean scholars. However, no clear explanation has emerged for why the Korean state adopted such construction-oriented, developmentalist selectivity. This paper seeks to answer this question of why the construction-oriented state has developed in South Korea by employing the strategic-relational approach to the state. In this paper, the author argues that the construction-oriented, developmentalist nature of the Korean state has been strengthened because at the local and regional scales, highly politicized territorial interests have been mobilized as a result of complex interactions among spatial selectivity of the Korean state, uneven regional development and territorialized party politics from the 1960s to the present. More specifically, the author emphasizes that the following conditions were the most influential in the formation and intensification of constructionoriented state building: 1) As the central cleavage structure of party politics is based on locality, parties and politicians easily accept local developmental politics, and thereby influence governmental decision-making according to regional interests; 2) Due to the weak development of class politics (at the national scale) and immature grass-root democracy (at the local scale), place-based interests and identities tend to be strongly territorialized; 3) Continuing from the 1970s and influenced by the politics of regionalism, the ways in which the Koreans interpret the political and economic realities has been constructed on the basis of the discursive frame of the highly politicized “center-local” relations, which has led to the intensified inter-local/inter-regional competition for the central government’s spending on local/regioinal development projects. Based on this analysis, this paper argues that the situation of South Korea’s neo-developmentalism and construction-oriented tendency needs to be understood through the mechanisms of more complex political, social, and economic conflicts and interaction effects among social forces acting in and through the state, and that the question cannot be explained simply by the ‘irrationality, incapacity, and immorality’ of

Translated from the published article in Space and Environmemt 31: 49-87, 2009 with permission from the The Korean Association of Space and Environment Research. ** Professor, Department of Geography Education, Seoul National University *

185

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the government and its officials.

Keywords: Construction State, New developmentalism, Politics of development, Territorialization, Strategic relational approach, State space

I. Introduction Among the various criticisms of the Lee Myung Bak government’s administrative leadership, one of the main points is that policies are extremely focused on land development and construction projects.

Especially, it is constantly pointed out that the national government’s main policies—such as the pursuit of the Korean Peninsula Grand Canal and the Four Great Rivers Improvement projects, deregulation of the restrictions on the development of the Capital region, support for a construction economy, and the easing of curbs on real estate speculation—are centered on construction and development projects. It is important to examine the state’s construction-oriented and development-centered policies and suggest new policy alternatives. However, as this has been done by many scholars and civic organizations, this paper aims to uncover the underlying factors driving these policies by analyzing and explaining how South Korea’s constructionorientation developmentalism has evolved. It first answers the following question: are the construction-oriented policies unique to the Lee Myung Bak government? Or, regardless of what specific regime is governing, is it an issue of a more general structural and strategic selectivity of the Korean state?

Here, it is argued that the problems arising from construction-oriented policies and their side effects do not originate from a specific individual government’s policy direction or ideological preference, but from the strategic selectivity of the South Korean state. This argument is based on the fact that South Korean state’s construction-oriented selectivity has been augmented and intensified continuously, and furthermore, most political forces, including both the governing and opposition parties, have not shown significantly different opinions regarding the present construction-oriented, developmentalist projects. In fact, the state’s pro-construction orientation started from the time of the Roh Moo Hyun (No Muhyŏn) government,

Territorial Politics and the Rise of a Construction-Oriented State in South Korea 187

said to be more progressive than the current Lee Myung Bak government.

As resistance to and criticism of several regional development projects that were pursued by the previous Kim Dae Jung (Taejung) and Roh Moo Hyun governments—such as the Saemangŭm project, Kyŏngin Canal construction, nuclear waste dump construction, new town development in the capital region, the City of Administration complex, the enterprise city, the innovative city, S-project, and so on—are similar to current debates, some scholars have explained and criticized the state’s construction orientation using the concept of neo-developmentalism (Cho, M. 2003; Byeon, C. 2005; Hong, S. 2005).

Thus, an important contribution for scholars to make is to explain the evolution of South Korea’s path to this extreme construction orientation in terms of cause and effect, rather than through a particular evaluation of Lee Myung Bak government’s construction-oriented policies. The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to explain the evolution of South Korea’s construction orientation, in particular analyzing how the boom of developmental politics based on territorial interests has influenced the formation of the state’s construction-oriented tendency.

II. Critical Review of Debates on NeoDevelopmentalism The debate on neo-developmentalism began in 2000, when conflicts between development and preservation intensified over state-led development projects such as the Saemangŭm project and nuclear waste dump construction. Some progressive scholars started to criticize the government’s pro-development position and called it “neo-developmentalism.” Cho Myung-Rae (2003: 50) stated, “on the surface, the government emphasizes the preservation and value of the environment, but in reality, it promotes development, and we call this neo-developmentalism.” The paradigm of neo-developmentalism was used to show that even under the governments of Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun, thought to be comparatively more liberal and more tolerant of civil society involvement, state-led projects were paradoxically geared towards development over environmental protection and preservation. Based on this awareness, Cho (2003) defines neo-developmentalism as “the phenomenon of

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our society’s ‘development inertia’ working in a new way within a society that still prefers an expanding economy, featuring utilization of the environment according to the market logic of neo-liberalism.” After this initial attempt to interpret South Korea’s construction- and development-oriented policies as “neo-developmentalism,” “neo-developmentalism” became a conceptual umbrella encompassing critiques of state policies favoring development over the eco-system and environment, quantitative growth and commercialization of space and place over quality of life, protection of regional communities, and state-led economic competitiveness policy over balanced regional development; this “theory of the construction-oriented state,” questioning the state’s overemphasis on infrastructure construction, has been much discussed since the mid-2000s.

The important issues that neo-developmentalism and constructionoriented state theory suggest can be summarized in two parts. First, neodevelopmentalism appeared when the hegemony of developmentalism, which has been maintained under the Korean developmental state and state-led economic growth, was combined with neoliberalism, which speeds up the commodification of space and environment. Regarding this point, Cho (2003) shows how “developmentalism” employs “behaviors and concepts that ideologically embrace the value of exploitation and use of natural environment or natural resources,” and discusses how this type of developmentalism had been the fundamental ideology of the past thirty to forty years in South Korean society, politics, economy, and daily culture. Cho argues that this ideology operates as a hegemonic discourse and philosophy that extends from individual behavior to national policies. He also points out that this developmentalism grew and materialized within the milieu of state-led artificial economic development, based on strong leadership and repressive rule against the general public during the process of capitalistic industrialization (Cho, M. 2003). Since the 1990s, this developmentalist ideology has been combined with neoliberalism, which argues that allowing individual freedom in the market is the best way to improve welfare, by consolidating the concepts of space and environment commodification and developmentalism together, resulting in “neo-developmentalism.”

Second, the material base of neo-developmentalism’s emergence and expansion is a construction alliance that grew and was consolidated under

Territorial Politics and the Rise of a Construction-Oriented State in South Korea 189

the developmental state. This construction alliance is based on connections between the land-construction interests of politicians, the state (especially the key bureaucrats composing the core of government-affiliated development organs, state-owned enterprises responsible for development, various government-affiliated research institutes on urban and regional development, etc.), capitalists (especially those involved in construction and developmentrelated areas), media, and academia (Hong, S. 2005; Choi, J. 2003; Oh, K. 2003; Chung, K. 2003). Thus, some scholars call the South Korean state a “construction-oriented state,” emphasizing that this construction alliance greatly influences both policy making for and implementation of state-led projects.

For the last forty years, systematic study of this important aspect South Korea’s state behavior, labeled “developmentalism” or “constructionorientation,” has been rare; the concept of neo-developmentalism and construction-oriented state theory are therefore very useful tools to explain South Korea’s path. Furthermore, this state-led construction orientation is found not only in South Korea, but also is common in other Asian countries such as Japan and Taiwan (of course, the specific development formation is different for each).1 However, as there is in general not much research done on this trend in East Asian developmental states, analyzing and conceptualizing how and through what kinds of political, economic, social, and spatial processes Asian countries become construction-oriented and developmentalistic would be a major contribution to understanding contemporary Asian societies. Still, the current literature on neodevelopmentalism and the construction-oriented state seems to be lacking in a few areas.

1

The word “construction state” was used to emphasize the negative social and political effects of construction-oriented public works in Japan, where construction enterprises make up an especially large portion of the total economic activity (Woo, S. 2004).

Gavan McCormack (2002) points out that the Japanese state faces a debt crisis due to the fact that Japan is under the system of a “construction state” and that this system is maintained by the “Iron Triangle” of politicians and bureaucrats, financial enterprises, and construction companies. These arguments are supported by Table 1, which shows that South Korea and Japan have a higher percentage of construction industries as a percentage of GDP than other OECD countries.

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Table 1. Construction Industries as Percent of GDP in OECD Countries (1980-2000) South Korea Spain Iceland Poland Austria Ireland Portugal Greece Japan Czech Republic Netherlands Australia Finland Luxembourg Slovakia Denmark Germany Hungary Turkey England Mexico Belgium Canada Italy France United States New Zealand Norway Sweden

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

8 8 10.3

8.1 10.4 6.1 9 8.9

7.2 8 7.3 7.4

6.4 7.6

5.7 6.1 6.2 7.5 7.2 7.2 6.6 4.9 4.9 5.2 6.6

7.3 6.4 9.2

6.8 6.2 5 6.8 7.5

5.2 6.8 6.9 4.3

4.9 5.9

6.1 5.6 4.3 5.3 6 6.5 5.4 4.7 5.4 4.9 5.7

11.3 8.6 9.2

6.9 5.4 5.9 7.8 9.6 10.8 5.9 6.6 8.3 6.8

5 6.1

6.4 6.7 3.9 5.5 6.8 6.1 5.7 4.3 4.1 4.6 6.7

11.6 7.5 7.5 7.1 7.8 5.3 6.6 6.4 7.9 8.7 5.4 6.2 4.5 6.2 5.1 4.5 6.7 4.6 5.5 5 3.9 5.2 4.9 5.1 5.2 3.9 4.2 4.5 4.4

8.4 8.4 8.4 8.1 7.8 7.7 7.7 7.5 7.2 7.1 5.8 5.6 5.5 5.5 5.4 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.1 5 5 4.8 4.6 4.4 4.3 4.1 4

Source: the Bank of Korea (2004).

First, the explanation and understanding of the materiality of and ontological basis for the rise of neo-developmentalism are insufficient. They consider neo-developmentalism as a result of hegemonized discourses, where “developmentalist” ideology and discourses have penetrated into the Korean society and been combined with neoliberal ideology. No systematic or empirical analysis is offered to explain what the material conditions are at

Territorial Politics and the Rise of a Construction-Oriented State in South Korea 191

the base of hegemonized developmentalist discourses, and through what kind of political and economic processes the developmentalist discourses become combined with neoliberalism. Previous debates on neo-developmentalism locate the material basis for the expansion of developmentalism in the formation of development coalitions or construction alliances. However, no specific explanation is given for what kind of political and economic interests and social relations ground the establishment of development coalitions and construction alliances and the process by which they came to influence the state actions.

Moreover, the more pressing problem is that the literature tends to look at the formation and behavior of development coalitions only at the national level. It is true that political and economic interests were formed and developed in relation to the continuation and expansion of development and construction projects promoted at the national scale, but one needs to pay attention to the fact that, in reality, the majority of development projects are pursued based on the territorial interests defined at the urban and local scales.

Usually, the introduction of local or regional development politics is considered to have emerged after the enactment of political decentralization (in the 1990s) in South Korea, but actually, regional development politics were operating even before the start of decentralization. For example, in 1965, a Development Conference was held in Taegu to attract industrial complex construction and expand local roads by the city of Taegu and its Chamber of Commerce. They invited several national cabinet-level officials such as the Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of the Interior, and Minister of Construction in order to help obtain the central government’s support for these development projects. The mayor of Taegu even wrote a letter requesting President Park Jung Hee (Pak Chŏnghŭi) to attend the event (Park, B. 2003).

Around this time as well, in the city of Kwangju and in Chŏnnam Province, the governor of Chŏnnam, along with the mayor of Kwangju, the Kwangju Chamber of Commerce, and assembly members from the region, formed various development alliances such as the Asia Motor Factory Establishment Committee (1962), the Kwangju Industrial Complex Promotion Committee (May 1962), the Mistreatment of Kwangju Correction Committee (September 1966), the Honam Rights Movement Committee (1968), the Chŏnnam

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Province Modernization Promotion Committee (1970), and the Chŏnnam Development Promotion Committee (1971), in an enormous great effort to gain the central government’s support for development projects for Kwangju and Chŏnnam Province (Jung, K. 1991; Park, B. 2003; Kim, D. 2009).

Also, in the late 1960s, regional development politics intensified around the Kyŏngbu Highway construction project, one of the largest construction projects of all-time. In Kwangju and Chŏnnam Province, critical public opinion spread that the construction of Kyŏngbu Highway would intensify regional economic disparities and expand the isolation of Kwangju and Chŏnnam Province, and this became the major lobbying issue for assembly members from Kwangju and Chŏnnam Province. These processes then became the main basis for the further formation of regionalist politics, which appeared in the early 1970s. This kind of regionally organized and mobilized development politics existed as far back as the 1960s, when the centralization of authority was extreme, and it significantly affected the national policy making processes.

Another case of important territorial politics expressed at the local scale is the recent issue of the Grand Canal construction project and related political debate. The Lee Myung Bak government’s ambitious Korean Peninsula Grand Canal project, which began as Lee took office, is a typical case revealing the neo-developmentalist characteristics of the government. Scholars against this project led a national anti-development movement marked by extensive protest. This debate on the Korean Peninsula Grand Canal project was won by the anti-development coalition, and the Lee government announced on June 19, 2008 that it would in effect withdraw the project. The overall canal construction project was defeated at the national scale by strong resistance, but at the local scale the canal project still proceeds in various pieces.

Problematically, aligned with territorial interests at the local scale, some of the activists who opposed the national canal project now approve of small-scale canal construction projects, thus contradicting themselves. This indicates that the developmental interest groups’ collective support is still strong for construction-oriented development projects such as canal construction; these groups have the potential to significantly influence government policy making in the future.

From the examples, if one accepts that regionally formed territorial

Territorial Politics and the Rise of a Construction-Oriented State in South Korea 193

Figure 1. A Conference on the Construction of a Canal in Yeongsan River, held in Gwangju on 19 April 2007. The slogan in the placard says, “Revive the Waterway in Yeongsan River, the Lifeline of the Southwestern Region!”

interests, and development politics based on those interests, significantly influence government policy decisions, looking for the material conditions of neo-developmentalism only in the nationally formed construction alliances is a very limited approach. Some of the literature on neo-developmentalism discusses the problem of local development alliances, but it falls short of giving a clear explanation of in what political, economic, and social contexts local development alliances are created and function. Also, some interpret local development alliances as a result of the expansion of centrally-formed development alliances since the start of decentralization (Cho, M. 2003).

Therefore, many overlook the fact that even before decentralization, locallevel territorial politics significantly influenced construction-oriented development projects. In sum, previous discussions of neo-developmentalism fail to grasp the fact that the spread of developmentalism is not just an ideological problem but is based on the materiality of locally created territorial interests.

Secondly, discussion of neo-developmentalism and the constructionoriented state focuses on the state’s selectivity to prefer certain types of

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policies and projects, but the mechanism of how the Korean state has made its developmentalist and constructed-oriented selectivity is not fully explained. Besides discussion of the existence of development or construction alliances, an explanation of the political and economic motivations behind South Korean or other East Asian states’ construction-orientation does not clearly emerge. Construction-oriented national development projects may help economic growth, but also they may inhibit capital accumulation at the level of national economy. Also, social conflicts from unreasonably imposed construction projects may not be helpful in establishing a state’s hegemonic legitimacy. Given these limitations to construction-led development projects, in that they can harm capital accumulation or lessen support for legitimacy of the existing political system, why and how the South Korean state shows selectivity towards construction development projects still needs to be explained. Is it just an expression of the pre-modern irrationality remained in the Korean society? Or is it a result of the ignorance, incapacity, and moral deficiency of the political powers that be? If these explanations are not helpful, then scholars need to suggest more systematic and analytical explanations for the Korean state’s construction-oriented selectivity.

Therefore, this paper sheds light on the political, economic, and social processes undergirding the creation of South Korea’s constructionoriented developmentalism using 1) strategi-relational state theory and 2) a theorization of development politics based on territorial interests.

III. A Strategic-relational Understanding of the State The strategic-relational approach to the state has been developed by British sociologist Bob Jessop. Jessop (1990), influenced by Poulantzas’ state theory, critiqued both the reductionist or essentialist Marxist understandings of the capitalist state and the Weberian view of the state emphasizing the state autonomy from social forces. For Jessop, although an economy (or capital) and politics (or the state) functionally depend on each other, this functional integration is always problematic due to institutional separation between the economy and politics. He argues that functional integration of economy and

Territorial Politics and the Rise of a Construction-Oriented State in South Korea 195

politics is possible only through strategic activities, i.e. accumulation strategy or hegemonic projects, of both the state and social forces acting in and through the state.

The core concept of strategic-relational state theory is a “state’s strategic selectivity.” A capitalist state always shows certain kinds of selectivity, privileging specific social forces, interests and actors over others’. In this light, Jessop challenges a reductionist or essentialist view to the state, which is based on the notion that the state cannot help but serve the interests of capitalist class or show such selectivity because of demand from capital accumulation. He argues that among diverse social forces acting in and through the state, through constantly continued social and political struggles and mutual interactions, a state’s selectivity is constructed, and he calls this “strategic selectivity.” In other words, although it is conditioned and constrained by the economic necessity for capital accumulation and the political necessity of maintaining the legitimacy of the existing social-political order, a state’s selectivity is made through strategies of diverse social forces and their interactions; these strategies are selected on the basis of complex and sometimes coincidental judgments of social forces within specific historical, social, political, and geographical conditions and situations. In this sense, Jessop acknowledges “the state as political strategy” and explains that the state power is based not on what the state possesses, but on what comes from the social forces acting in and through the state; in other words, the state’s institutionalized powers and duties are defined through the specifically defined and situated relations and interactions among these social forces under certain political and economic contexts.

Building on Jessop’s strategic-relational approach to the state, Brenner (2004) tries to spatialize the state theory by focusing on the spatial explanation of a state’s “strategic selectivity”. In order to do this, Brenner first suggests the concepts of “state spatial project” and “state spatial strategy,” which explain state actions from a spatial perspective. Here, the “state spatial project,” as a spatial framework of political regulation, represents the strategic expression of the state’s distinctive form of spatial organization as a discrete, territorially centralized, self-contained, and internally differentiated institutional apparatus. Thus, state spatial projects internationally stipulate state-regulated space as a closed territory, in order to obtain uniform integration of a state’s

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territory, and internally differentiate state activities among different levels of territorial administration and coordinate state policies among diverse locations and scales. On the other hand, “state spatial strategy” is associated with the ways in which state institutions are mobilized to regulate social relations and to influence their locational geographies. Specifically, it refers to the state activities to plan and implement various policies that have direct or indirect spatial effects such as industrial policies, economic development plans, infrastructure construction, regional policies, urban policies, labor market policies, and so on. In this sense, the construction-oriented state development projects can be understood as a form of the state spatial strategy.

The “state spatial project” and the “state spatial strategy” tend to result in favoritism toward specific regions, spaces, and scales over others, and this phenomenon is called “spatial selectivity.” Brenner explains this “spatial selectivity” in terms of strategic relational processes. In other words, based on strategic relational interactions among various social forces acting in and through the state, state spatial projects and strategies are created, reflecting a few selected interests’ accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects.

These spatial projects and strategies, therefore, show a certain kind of spatial selectivity. In understanding the strategic relations that construct a state’s spatial selectivity, Brenner pays special attention to the path-dependent influences of the existing spatial organizations of the state. In other words, as a result of strategic relational interactions, once the specific institutionalized arrangement, framework, and spatial selectivity are formed, they in turn affect strategic relational interactions among social forces and interests at the next stage. This strategic relational interaction affects a state’s spatial form and spatial selectivity, and this revolving process is repeated. Based on this reasoning, Brenner argues that state spatial selectivity is a result of a dialectical interaction between: 1) inherited patterns (for example, territorial partitionings, scalar configurations, etc.) of state spatial organization; and 2) emergent state spatial projects and strategies that aim to modify or reshape the entrenched spatial form of the state. Through this process of dialectical interaction, a state’s spatial form and selectivity are ceaselessly evolving and constantly being restructured. Therefore, the processes of spatial and scalar restructuring of the state such as ‘glocalization’ and ‘decentralization’ that take place in many countries can be understood as the results of these changes

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in state’s spatial form and selectivity stemming from strategic relational processes.

From a strategic relational point of view, in order to explain South Korean state’s neo-developmentalism, and its construction-oriented nature, the following questions need to be answered: 1) If one looks at this construction-orientation as one of the specifics that define South Korean state’s spatial form and selectivity, what are the political and economic processes that brought about this pattern?

2) How has the construction-oriented nature of the Korean state developed in relation to the state’s accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects that are constructed through strategic relational interactions among diverse social forces acting in and through the state?

3) How has the construction-oriented nature of the state affected subsequent strategic relational interactions among social interests?

4) Within these continuous changes and interaction processes, how has the construction-oriented nature of the Korean state changed and evolved?

IV. Territorial Interests Mobilization and Developmental Politics In order to fully answer the above questions, more systematic analysis of the construction alliances is necessary, as these alliances are the most important interest groups influencing state strategic selectivity of “developmentalism.”

An understanding and explanation of the interest bases, the mechanisms through which members of the construction alliances form their coalitions, and how this kind of construction alliances influences state activities are needed. Previous discussions on the construction alliances have mainly focused on how and on what kinds of institutionalized and organizational interests the main actors promoting construction activities—politicians, bureaucrats, media, and academia—form construction alliances and initiate development projects (Hong, S. 2005). Although this attempt has contributed much towards explaining one important aspect of the construction alliance

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formation and its operation, previous research has not paid enough attention to the role of development politics based on territorial interests, a key element of construction alliance formation.

An analysis on the political actions based on territorial interests helps to explain construction-oriented developmentalism because of the inevitable place-based natures of construction projects. The state’s construction projects are a field in which place and spatial selectivity is more directly and clearly revealed than for any other state activities. Construction projects clearly bring about benefits and costs at the national scale, their impact and side effects are more clearly seen at the local scale. Thus, locally dependent actors react very sensitively to positive or negative effects of construction projects at a specific place; as a result, each specific construction project features very different pros and cons.

Furthermore, for construction projects there is inevitably a gap between exchange value and use value. Construction projects may differentiate the use and exchange values of land and real estate, and hence the actors who are fixed and dependent on a specific place may have different benefits and costs depending on the location and ownership of the land and real estate they are associated with. Coupled with the spatiality of construction projects, such differentiation of spatial values is a core condition that makes construction projects become an important political issue. Considering the spatiality of these construction and development projects and consequential political competition and conflict, one must inevitably consider the territorial interests related to each construction project in explaining the formation of a construction alliance and a state’s construction-oriented tendency.

Then, through what process do political activities based on territorial interests appear? According to David Harvey and Kevin Cox, territorial politics occur from dialectical interactions between mobility and fixity, two contrasting tendencies inherent in capitalism. Paying attention to competitive relations among capitalists in capitalist economies, Harvey (1982, 1985, 1989) mentioned two contrasting strategies that capitalists deploy in order to best the competition: one is by developing better technology, designing a more efficient corporate organization, or selecting a better location where resources, infrastructure, market, and labor are easily attainable. The other way is to keep a competitive advantage by consolidating monopolistic control

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of superior technology and location so that other capitalists cannot obtain such technology and location easily. According to Harvey, such contradictory relations between these two competitive strategies are the conditions that ultimately bring out territorial politics.

The former of these two competitive strategies can be spatially expressed as capital’s ceasless search for new locations, which results in the tendency of capital mobility and the continuous instability of the capitalist space economy.

The spatial expression of the latter strategy is the creation of ‘structured coherence’ in production, technology, social relations, consumption patterns, labor processes, class relations, and culture in a specific place or region, through which the monopoly of previously-obtained superior technologies and locational advantages can be secured and increased. These two conflicting tendencies are contradictory to each other; the structured coherence created in a specific place or region is constantly threatened by constant instability and the pressure for restructuring, stemming from the unstable characteristics of the capitalistic space economy. According to Harvey, such situations of the continuous instability and crisis tendencies appear unbearable to capital and labor, both of which are dependent on the structured coherence created in that region or place. Territorial politics arise as such place-dependent actors respond to this crisis.

Thus, capital and labor attempt to maintain the circulation and accumulation of capital within their city and regional economy by protecting this structured coherence. However, this process is highly political, because policies to protect and save an urban or regional economy and the implementation of such policies do not equally distribute benefits to all social groups and interests.

Moreover, if these policies that are carried out in the name of saving the urban or regional economy put more burden on residents of that city or region via additional fees and taxes, competing interests will easily clash, collide, and quarrel. In order to evade this situation, the social forces that try to protect an urban or regional economy can mobilize territorializing strategies by privileging territorial interests and identities over other social and political interests and identities based on class, gender, ethnicity, and so on. The result of such urban politics is the formation of regional class alliances in each city or region. Furthermore, such class alliances compete and oppose each other in order to maintain the structured coherence of the

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cities, where they are dependent, and through this, competition and conflict among cities or regions can be created (Harvey 1985, 1989). In other words, certain forms of territoriality are created in cities or regions, and people are politically mobilized based on this, leading to the rise of territorial politics.

Building on Harvey’s argument that the contradictory relations between mobility and fixity are the required condition for the rise of territorial politics, Cox suggests that locally dependent actors can organize the politics of local economic development by forming growth coalitions in order to protect or enhance their place-dependent interests at the local scale (Cox and Mair 1988; Cox 1993). Because place-dependent interests are not just always related to exchange values of place but also related to use values of place, the actions aiming at protecting place-dependent interests do not always lead to developmental politics. However, in many cases, the actions aiming at attracting values created at the wider cicurlation of capital flows to the region, or capturing values made in or within that region, are likely turned out to be a form of developmental politics, which tries to attract outside capital to the region by improving the social and physical infrastructure of the place.

Cox (1997, 1998) argues that in this process, territorial identities and ideologies can be strengthened in order to bring about political participation and agreement among the place-dependent actors whose bases are on use values rather than exchange values or the actors who have weaker placedependent interests. As a result, the processes of territorialization can occur. Here, territorialization means the social-political process by which “territory” is created. In particular, it is related to an effort to reinforce the boundness and exclusiveness of a place on the bases of certain placebased ideologies and identities, to distinguish “us” and “others,” and to set down relational features in a specific direction within a specific place (Sack 1986).2 The processes of territorialization increase cohesion and integration 2

Territory refers to a portion of geographic space which is claimed or occupied by a person or group of persons or by an institution, and thus it is an area of ‘bounded space’ (Storey 2001: 1). Therefore, it should not be seen as pre-given or natural, but it is socially and politically constructed by human actions. In regards to this, Sack (1986) looks at the creation of territory through the perspective of power conflict and struggle, and he argues that the creation of territory is an effort to exercise influence and control over people, circumstances, and their relations as individuals or groups

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Figure 2. Placard on Korean Peninsula Grand Canal Construction Project in the Region of Yŏju (February 2007).

within the place, and intensify territorial competition and conflict against other places. For a representative example of this territorialization process, Figure 2 shows a slogan (“Is One Really A Yŏju Citizen if One Opposes Canal Construction?” – (Yŏju Korean Peninsula Grand Canal Promotion Central Committee), proclaiming that if one opposes the Korean Peninsula Grand Canal construction project, he/she will be seen as being against Yŏju’s territorial interests. Such a process of territorialization makes opposition to specific developmental projects within the region unpalatable, bringing about full support from the region’s residents.

In summary, in the process by which spatially-fixed and place-dependent actors try to protect or enhance their place-dependent interests in the capitalist space economy, which faces constant instability and change, territorial politics originate as actors engage in competition against other regions and politically mobilize territorial identities and interests. Based on this argument, it can be argued that the construction projects are directly tied to actors who have a stake in place-dependent and spatially-bound interests because of their spatial immobility and strong local effects on the use and exchange values of places. The locally dependent actors form development alliances or growth by setting boundaries on a specific region and claiming control of it. If one looks at territory through this perspective, the creation of territory and the establishment of boundaries are political strategies to achieve specific purposes, and the establishment of boundaries leads to the exclusion and inclusion of “us” and “others.” Territory is created by human activities aiming at occupying better positions in power struggles.

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coalitions at the local scale and actively try to attract construction projects that can increase their place-dependent interests.

V. Territorial Politics and the State’s Construction-Oriented Tendency Developmental politics based on these territorial interests occur in every capitalist society; however, the concrete forms of the territorial politics may be expressed in many different ways. Also, while developmental politics based on territorial interests may greatly affect state activities in some countries, in others it may not. Why does such difference occur? Under what conditions do developmental politics based on territorial interests affect state activities, especially a state’s strategic selectivity? We require a conceptual framework that will allow us to answer these questions in order to explain the Korean state’s construction orientation.

As Brenner (2004) has argued, the capitalist state has spatial selectivity in its activities. The policies or strategies of the state tend to privilege certain regions or spatial scales over others under strategic interactions among various social actors acting in and through the state. The state’s spatial selectivity can be expressed in diverse ways, such as in explicit spatial policies by which a specific region or city receives much more support and benefits from the state, or in aspatial policies like industrial, trade or investment policies by which, nonetheless, a specific region or city implicitly receives disproportionate benefits. Such spatial selectivity of state behavior becomes an important factor that explains economic development and growth differentials between localities or between cities.

In the case where uneven regional development is greatly influenced by the spatial selectivity of state behavior, regional competition and conflict can be provoked by state policies and strategies. When disadvantaged by the state’s spatial selectivity, some regions or cities will criticize or challenge state policies and strategies, while favored regions or cities will be more likely to try to continue working the spatial selectivity of the state to their benefit. When competition and conflict over a state’s policies and strategies intensify, territorial politics may arise to protect and enhance the place-dependent interests of local

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actors on the basis of the mobilization of a specific region’s territorial identity and interests. The result is the intensification of regional conflict, emergence of regionalist politics, and intensification of center-local conflict.3 Such conflict between localities or between scales is a serious threat to maintaining national unity. In order to resolve this, the state may implement several spatial strategies and spatial projects as a hegemonic project to appease regional competition and conflicting situations. This is demonstrated by the fact that the states in all capitalist economies implement various policies to resolve regional disparities and to mitigate regional conflicts despite variations in the degree of differentiation.

A state’s spatial strategies and spatial projects become more or less development-oriented according to the degree of political mobilization of territorial interests. Because the magnitude of mobilization of territorial politics at the local scale can be very high, when regional competition or conflict, or center-local conflict, is intense, it is not easy to mediate various local interests and demands. As a result, it is likely for state policies to become more construction-oriented in order to fulfill territorial demands. On the other hand, when territorial interests are mobilized inadequately and other political mobilization mechanisms such as class, race, or religion become more important issues, it is easier to control territorial interests nationally, and the state is less influenced by local or regional demands for development.

Then, what kinds of conditions increase the levels of the political mobilization of territorial interests? Although numerous conditions operate in complex ways, three conditions are mentioned here to help explain the construction-oriented tendency of the Korean state.

The first condition is the structure of political cleavage. It is important to know how party politics work. Parties organize and compete to get power and votes in a democratic political system. Therefore, parties must organize their political bases in order to win an election, and as a result, a political cleavage structure of interests is formed. In order to win an election, parties must search for various sources of political cleavage, such as class, race, region, and 3

See Park, B. (2003) for a representative case study that interprets South Korea’s regionalist politics as a result of uneven development conditioned by the state’s spatial selectivity and the resultant territorial politics.

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religion. If regionally-based political-economic interests and identity issues are used to form a party’s support base, then a political cleavage structure will be created based on regional and territorial interests. Even though class conflict, the main contradiction of capitalism, affects political cleavage structures, it is only contingent if class conflict turns out to be the main factor.

If the labor movement is nationally organized, based on strong class solidarity and politically closely associated with a specific party, then class politics will be vigorous, and class interests are more likely to be used as the main sources of political mobilization (Taylor and Johnston 1979). If this is not the case, then other factors such as regionalism, race, and religion are likely to be used for political base construction.

In the case of South Korea, the country experienced rapid development of capitalism and intense labor-management conflict, but class politics did not grow as the main dimension of party politics; thus, class politics has had little effect on the formation of political cleavage structures. In this void, parties looked for other ways to mobilize supporters, and regional interests are one route they found. The developmental state pursued state-led economic growth, and its spatial selectivity caused the problems of regional economic disparity. This intensified regional conflict and competition regarding governmental policies. This condition of underdeveloped class politics led parties to create their political support base by mobilizing territorial interests at the regional scale. The result is the current South Korean politics of regional cleavage (Park, B. 2003).

When political cleavage structures are organized around regions in this way, developmental demands that are based on territorial interests will be even more magnified and reproduced by parties and politicians, and will more profoundly affect government policy. If political cleavage structures are organized around non-regional factors such as class, the involvement of parties and politicians in developmental politics based on territorial interests will be greatly weakened, and this will have the effect of weakening a state’s construction orientation.4 4

It is possible to interpret Japan’s construction-oriented state as magnified and reproduced by the effects of a similar territorialization of politics. Traditionally in Japan, pork barrel politics—local parliamentary members trying to exchange

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The second condition intensifying the territorial politics is the spatial scale at which territorial interests are mobilized. Territorial interests can be defined and mobilized at various geographical scales. In fact, the emergence of nationstates is a result of the mobilization and institutionalization of territorial interests at the national scale. This does not mean that territorial interests are not mobilized when class politics are active and a social democratic political system is instituted. In such cases, territorial interests are mobilized at the national scale and expressed as inter-national competition for capital accumulation. However, the degree of territorial interest mobilization at the local scale is comparatively weak. In contrast, the emergence of regionalist politics or local party politics greatly increases the possibility of territorial interests being mobilized at a geographical scale below the national scale.

The other important factor that influences the geographical scale in which territorial interests are mobilized is a state’s spatial form, especially at what scale regulatory processes are mainly taking place. With the centralization of the political system, if the state’s regulatory processes are taking place at the national scale and political decision making at the local level is less important, then the territorialization processes of politics at the local scale can be weak.

However, with decentralization of the state, if local government decisionmaking becomes important, then the processes of territorialization can become active at the local scale. After decentralization in South Korea, the rise of small-scale regionalism and intensification of inter-local competition votes and central government grants—were widespread (Fukui and Fukai 1996).

Before the medium-constituency electorate system was replaced with the singledistrict electorate system in 1993, under the long-term ruling Liberal Democratic Party, Liberal Democratic candidates were competing with each other in the same electoral districts (Grofman et al. 1999; Katz 1986). As a result, ideological and policy differences between parties and interest groups had less of an effect on election results, and instead, it became very important which one among various Liberal Democratic candidates was more capable in lobbying the central government. Therefore, the important factor deciding electoral outcomes became who represented a region’s interests better (Grofman 1999: 390). In other words, stimulation of territorial interests became an important factor in party politics. In this situation, individual politicians were stroved to attract central government grants for public construction projects that represented territorial interests; this became the basis for growth and continuation of the Japanese construction-oriented state.

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have been influenced by the changes in the state’s spatial structure.

Along with this, the geographical scale at which the interests of capital are defined also influences the geographical scale of the territorialization. With the development of capitalism, the monopoly of capital intensifies and the size of firms becomes bigger, but each country shows different characteristics in its spatial scale at which the interests of capital are defined. For instance, the United States has a higher percentage of local companies operating in economic activities than Britain has. The utility companies in the U.S. that provide electricity, water, and gas are local firms based on specific regions, and hence they play a very important role in the formation of territorialized developmental politics. On the other hand, Britain has more nationally organized companies; thus, territorialized developmental politics at the local scale are less active than in the United States (Wood 1996). In South Korea, large conglomerates occupy a much larger portion in the economy than locally-based small businesses, so that the role of industrial capital is minor in the territorial politics at the local scales. Nevertheless, it does not mean that locally based companies do not exist. Some companies do have strong place-based interests at the local scale, especially in the form of construction companies or local media, and they make up important parts of t’oho (powerful local landed families), playing a key role in developmental politics based on territorial interests.

The third factor is the structure of discourse that interprets a region’s political and economic “reality.” Regional territorial politics are mobilized, and the way in which actors interpret the region’s political economic situation is oftentimes different from the region’s actual political economic reality.

Various alienation theories, such as the Honam alienation theory and the Jibang (the regions outside of the Seoul Metropolitan Region) alienation theory that are popular in South Korea play a very important role in the mobilization of territorial politics. Yet, these alienation theories are not based on a correct interpretation of that region’s political and economic “reality.”

Influenced by regionalist politics that appeared in the 1960s and the 1970s, South Korean locals have interpreted political and economic reality based on the beliefs that 1) state-led development projects greatly influence a region’s economic development, and 2) the distribution of such development projects to localities is influenced by the regional home of the main power figures

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in the central government. This interpretation regards relationships with the central power as more important than each region’s objective economic condition or historical development path. This shows how territorial developmental politics mostly revolves around regional equity and spatial selectivity of the central government’s development projects in South Korea.

Regional bids for national development projects result in blind bidding for the central government’s development projects without serious consideration of whether that national development project will improve the standard of living and local economy.

VI. Historical Processes of South Korea’s Construction-Oriented Neo-Developmentalist State Formation: An Exploratory Explanation 1. State-led Economic Growth and the Formation of a ‘ConstructionOriented Developmental State’ In the 1960s and 1970s the ‘construction-oriented developmental state’ first emerged in South Korea with two early characteristics. First was the growth of a construction bureaucracy and construction capital. Under state-led industrialization, the state invested in large scale, social and physical infrastructures, constructed various industrial complexes, and pursued various regional development projects. As a result, government ministries related to construction and the construction industry grew rapidly.

Furthermore, based on the growth coalition between the state and chaebŏls (large conglomerates), the connection between construction bureaucrats and construction conglomerates was strengthened. The second characteristic was that regional development-dependent political interests grew. Under the influence of regionalist politics that appeared during this period, mechanisms that mobilized political support based on regional interests were established.

As a result, the state’s regional development projects became a main interest of parties and politicians. Based on this growth of regional developmentdependent political interests, developmentalist discourses became a hegemonic ideology in South Korean society.

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Now, we need to look at how these two characteristics arose in relation to strategic relational interactions among varios social forces with regards to South Korea’s state strategies and state form of that time. First, we can summarize the South Korean developmental state’s state strategies and state form as follows. Regarding state strategies, the South Korean state, based on export-oriented industrialization in the 1960s and heavy and chemical industrialization in the 1970s, pursued an accumulation strategy aiming at maximizing the efficiency in economic growth through intensive mobilization of capital and labor. In addition, the South Korean government practiced hegemonic projects that included the establishment of political legitimacy through achieving national economic growth and delivering wealth to the people, the neutralization of political opposition through repressive and authoritarian political practices, the mobilization of regionalist political support, and the active utilization of ideologies such as modernization theory and anti-communism within its repressive political system. The state form was characterized as follows: 1) in terms of the form of political representation, an authoritarian regime that secured the state’s superior position over civil society by repressing political activities and weakening parliamentary democracy, and 2) in terms of the spatial form, the construction of a exclusive regulatory space within the national territory, the establishment of highly centralized state territoriality, and a strong tendency of spatial selectivity in the state activities promoting accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects.

These conditions have led to 1) the growth of construction bureaucrats and capital, and 2) the emergence of regional development-dependent political forces by influencing the strategic relational interactions among social forces, and eventually contributed to the rise of a construction-oriented developmental state in South Korea. More concrete mechanisms can be explained as follows.

1) Under state-led economic development strategies, the state had to develop physical infrastructure in order to deliver and use resources efficiently.5 This is evident in the use of foreign loans. At that time, when 5

Of course, some of this was necessary for national economic development, but at the

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capital for economic development was scarce, foreign loans were actively sought; most of these foreign loans were invested in physical infrastructure.

For example, from 1959 to 1969, 45.9% of foreign loans were invested in manufacturing and 47.82% in physical infrastructure (Seoul Social Science Research Center 1991: 183). Such vast amounts of investment in physical infrastructure construction resulted in the increased role of the construction administration, which mostly handled national land development as a part of economic development. This provided a chance for the construction bureaucracy and capital to grow in South Korea.

2) The authoritarian state form resulted in the immature development of political and civil societies and an immature class politics due to a repressive political system and labor regulation. In this situation, parties and political forces created a cleavage structure that tried to get political support based on the ideological binary of authoritarianism vs. democracy. However, this cleavage structure lacked material foundation, and parties and political interests continuously sought complementary cleavage factors.

3) Spatial selectivity of state strategies and form resulted in the creation of locally differentiated interests. First, under a centralized state structure, local interests had to mobilize the central government’s support and authorization for regional development. However, the state’s accumulation strategies showed clear spatial selectivity, so that government investment and support for industry and regional development became concentrated in the Seoul Metropolitical Region and in the southeast region, and this caused regional economic disparities. Additionally, because of the state’s hegemonic project of maintaining legitimacy through mobilization of regionalism (e.g. pro-government regionalism in the southeast) and recruitment of people based on regionally based social networks, territorial interests based on the Yŏngnam region (the southeast) were better represented politically. Under same time, national projects such as nation building, post-war recovery, and territory reconstruction that had continued ever since independence from Japan and the Korea War had also contributed to the creation of the Korean state’s path-dependent tendency to privilege the physical infrastructure development.

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a combination of these conditions, differentiated interests were constructed in different regions in relation to the regulatory practices of the state; thus, there appeared a sense of alienation and anti-government regionalism in the Honam region (the southwest), while arising pro-government regionalist discourses in the Yŏngnam region.

4) With the articulation of the above two conditions, the interests of parties and politicians in regional development issues increased. Besides the basic cleavage structure of “authoritarianism vs. anti-authoritarianism,” political forces that were trying to find a complementary cleavage factor began trying to secure their support base by politically mobilizing regional interests that were discriminatingly created by regional economic disparities.

Especially, on the basis of regional disparities and regionally-differentiated political interests and sentiments like the anti-government sentiment in the southwest and the pro-government sentiment in the southeast, territorialization strategies of political forces that were trying to win support started to appear in full scale in the 1971 Presidential election. The YŏngnamHonam opposition structure emerged, and regionalist politics grew as a result. Seizing the opportunity, political forces started to secure their support bases by mobilizing regional political-economic interests and sentiments, the regional economic disparities, regional alienation, and the call for regional development.

5) As social discontent over state-led industrialization since the 1960s and authoritarian control started to be expressed in full scale from the end of the 1960s, and as an effort to subdue this discontent and ensure political legitimacy, the state implemented various rural and urban development policies as a hegemonic project from the 1970s. i) Social discontent over state-led industrialization could not be expressed as class-struggle as a result of strong ideological influences of anti-communism and political repression of class-based movements. However, as one can see in the case of regionalist sentiment of alienation in the Honam region, discontent over the unfairness of state-led industrialization became a political issue with regards to regional inequality. In this situation, the state began to carry out regional policies that focused on dispersing populations and industries from big cities to the

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provinces from the early 1970s, and along with this, the state implemented the 1st Comprehensive National Land Development Plan in 1972. In this manner, various regional development projects came into being. ii) Also, because of the spatial selectivity in the state interventions in the economy, populations in big cities and their metropolitan areas (especially, the Seoul Metropolitan area) increased dramatically, and this led to congestion in cities like Seoul. This in turn increased the need for the spatial expansion of Seoul. It also led to housing problems for urban workers and increased the need for housing provisions. As a result, the reconstruction of urban areas and housing provision policies were initiated in full force in the 1970s. These regional, urban, and housing policies called for full implementation of largescale construction projects and a vast amount of investment in national land development, which led to an increased national budget for construction, and the expansion of the construction industry; this contributed to a strengthening of the state’s construction-oriented tendency.

6) At the start of the 1970s, the authoritarian Yushin regime was established

by Park in order to resolve the political-economic crisis of the late 1960s and the early 1970s. Spatial selectivity and form of political representation of this regime contributed greatly to the strengthening of construction alliances and developmentalism. i) The Yushin regime strengthened the spatial selectivity of the state by concentrating the construction of industrial complexes for heavy and chemical industrialization in the Yŏngnam region, which resulted in the intensification of the economic gap between the Yŏngnam and Honam regions. It also reinforced a bias towards people from the Yŏngnam region when selecting national governing elites. Given this, political and economic interests and sentiments became much more differentiated among different regions. ii) Also, under the Yushin regime, indirect presidential elections were held and crack-downs on the opposition party intensified. Via the parliamentary electoral system, representative politics were drastically weakened, but the weakened regionalist politics among party competitors led to a rise of regionalism mobilized by individual politicians who used regional development issues as a tool. In other words, when competition between parties weakened, individual candidates tried to win the hearts of voters by highlighting the question of “how well will the candidate perform for

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regional development in his relationship with central authorities?” Through this process of promoting regional development projects, the local legislative members’ lobby of the central government became stronger. As a result, development alliances that linked the center to local areas began to emerge.

In other words, a link between local legislative members, local government, interest groups within the region (e.g. Chamber of Commerces), the central bureaucracy (Construction ministry, Finance ministry), and construction companies became more important, and this led to an intensification of construction alliances and expansion and reproduction of developmentalist discourses.

The state’s construction-oriented tendency of the 1960s and the 1970s was continuously strengthened in the 1980s, which was related to the expansion of various urban or regional development projects. In the 1970s, the problems of state-led industrialization, such as labor exploitation and a rise of the urban poor, rose to surface in full force. In this situation, citizens protested against repressive systems and the demand for democratization spread. In response, several hegemonic projects related to urban and local development were pursued. 1) As a result of the Kwangju Democratization Movement following the Kwangju massacre, regional conflict and regionalist politics intensified.

In response, regional development policies expanded. 2) In order to provide housing in urban areas, the state pursued the development of large-scale apartment complexes. 3) As parts of the hegemonic projects, bids to host the 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Olympic Games were sought. Then, to prepare, urban redevelopment projects on a grand scale ensued. Thus, construction alliances expanded and multiplied.

Along with this, in the 1980s, regionalist politics expanded and intensified, and it was the period that the region became the core divisional structure for South Korean politics. Especially through the Kwangju Democratization Movement in the Honam region, anti-government and resistant regionalism intensified while in the Yŏngnam region, pro-government and hegemonic regionalism prevailed. Additionally, after the 1987 Democratization Movement, as formal democratization took a big step forward, the ‘authoritarianism vs. democracy’ cleavage structure that had essentially defined South Korean politics in the previous period weakened, and the spatial division element

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came into the void. Democratic movement groups were divided regionally, and several regionally-based political forces emerged. Regional interests thus became mobilized in full force, and accordingly, the dependency of political forces on regional development increased even more.

2. Conversion from a ‘Construction-oriented Developmental State’ to a ‘Neoliberal Construction-oriented State’ Entering the 1990s, the South Korean developmental state experienced fundamental changes in its strategies and characteristics. So-called neoliberalism began. This change was brought about by responses of the national ruling elites to destruction of the existing developmental model and the resultant crises of accumulation and legitimacy. The existing developmental model had been based on “state-led intensive mobilization of labor and capital” from the 1960s to the 1980s, but its effectiveness became greatly weakened from the late 1980s under various internal and external challenges. After the late 1980s, facing external conditions of intensification of international competition and the end of the Cold War, South Korea, which had established an exclusive regulatory space under nationalistic economic policies, was pressured to open its markets and liberalize trade. Internally, with democratization and the consequent growth of the labor movement, a system of repressive labor regulation collapsed. And, with the increasing autonomy of capital from the state due to the economic growth from the 1960s to the 1980s, the state’s intensive mobilization of capital became very difficult. This situation brought about accumulation and legitimacy crises for the governing elites, as economic growth began to decline after the late 1980s, and social movement groups continued to challenge the authoritarian regime.

In response to these crises, national ruling elites have attempted to reformulate the state strategies. First, in terms of the accumulation strategy, they tried to resolve the accumulation crisis by reorganizing the economic structure to be more market-friendly on the basis of the ideologies of neoliberalism and globalization. Second, in response to continuing challenges from social movement groups, they promoted expansion of procedural democratization, political-economic reforms, and some redistributive policies as a hegemonic project. However, such reorganization

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of state strategies provided the opportunity for construction interests and developmental ideology to strengthen and expand at the national and local scales through several social groups’ strategic relational interactions.

Housing and local development policies were expanded; this is evident from three sides. First, the urban population had drastically increased as a result of economic growth; construction-related bureaucrats and the construction industries formed an alliance; real estate speculation in urban areas became chronic, and South Korean urban housing prices showed a drastic increase in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. In order to appease the angry urban middle class and renters, the state carried out housing provision campaigns such as the 200 Million Unit Housing Construction Project. Secondly, because of intensified regionalist politics in the 1980s, regional interests became the core of the political cleavage structure. As a result, parties and political groups openly tried to strengthen and preserve their political support base, focusing on the regional economic disparities and regional development issues. In response, the state expanded several regional development projects aiming at promoting more balanced regional development like the West Coast Development Project. Thirdly, along with the expansion of several development projects, the state graducally relaxed various restrictions on development. With increasing demand for democratization and the rising influence of neoliberal ideology, public dissatisfaction with the state’s restrictions on political and economic activities intensified, leading to the relaxation of several development curbs such as the semi-agricultural zone development restriction. Such expansion of housing and regional development projects and relaxation of development restrictions provided abundant resources for the construction alliance to continue to grow.

The scalar restructuring of the state (e.g. the implementation of a Regional Autonomy System in the 1990s) and intensification of regionalist politics, a result of democratization, allowed the construction alliance and developmental ideology to simultaneously grow and intensify. First, because of the implementation of a Regional Autonomy System, local government leaders, such as governors and mayors, came to be elected by local residents.

This increased the role of the local government leaders as a representative for territorialized interests at the local scale. As a result, at the local scale

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territorial development alliance formation became more active. Also, with the decentralization, as the local government’s budgetary independence and responsibility increased, each local government began trying to attract private capital for regional development projects through public-private partnerships, which in turn provided an opportunity to form development and construction alliances at the local scale. As a result, the profit motive in local development projects was elevated, while the principle of the public good was drastically diminished. The start of decentralization also intensified inter-regional competition over central government funding for local development. This induced local parliamentary members, who lived by promoting regional development issues within the regional political cleavage structure, to become more actively involved in local development projects.

In the early 1990s, the neoliberal conversion began, but went into full force only after the 1997 Financial Crisis. However, even though this neoliberal conversion was taking place, it did not mean that the economic regulatory system would change completely to an ideal-type of neoliberalism. It has been widely observed that the “actually existing neoliberalism” in reality appears as a hybrid form stemming from the path-dependent, contextually specific interactions between inherited regulatory landscapes and emergent neoliberal, market-oriented restructuring projects (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Tickell and Peck 2003). South Korea adheres to this in that it follows ‘developmental neoliberalism’ in instances where neoliberalism shows a strong “neo-statist” tendency, because of strong path-dependency of the developmental state regulatory framework.

How does this mixed tendency emerge in regards to a state’s constructionoriented tendency? First, if one looks at the path-dependency of the previously created construction-oriented developmentalism, it can find the following tendencies: 1) construction interest groups and their alliances—such as construction bureaucrats, the construction industry, local government, local legislative members, media, and intellectuals—at national and regional scales continue to have political influence; and 2) since the 1960s, as continuous construction-oriented development and the consequent acquisition of wealth through real estate investment became the main source of upward mobility, real estate was identified as the most lucrative area for speculation. As a result, construction-oriented discourses such as the Real Estate Invincibility

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Legend and Real Estate Investment Supremacy became the predominant guiding ideologies for individuals hoping to get rich. Along with these pathdependent tendencies from the past, as neoliberalism spreads, discourses such as competition, markets, and entrepreneurialism became predominant, while discourses about the public good were minimalized. The combination of these two conditions has facilitated the active intervention of the central and local governments in urban and regional development projects under the name of improving national or regional competitiveness, and brought about ‘neo-developmentalism’, which promotes profit making and improvement in competitiveness as the goal of development rather than the public good.

Such neo-developmentalism attracts extensive support from the various construction-related interest groups at national or regional scales, such as land owners, construction-related capital, construction-related bureaucrats, local governments, local legislative members and the media. Furthermore, because of its neoliberal and market-friendly goals such as competition and efficiency, neo-developmentalism receives extensive support from followers of neoliberalism. As a result, the South Korean state has become a “neoliberal construction-oriented state.”

VII. Conclusion This paper speculates on what kind of political, social, and economic processes created the South Korean state’s neo-developmental tendency.

From the 1960s to the present, as a result of South Korean state’s spatial policies and complex political-economic processes surrounding them, the political mobilization of territorial interests at the local scale became very active. Hence, it is argued here that the state’s construction-oriented tendency has intensified. More specifically, this paper emphasizes: 1) as the central cleavage structure in party politics has been formed based on region, parties and politicians have easily complied with regional development politics and influenced governmental decision-making; 2) because of the immaturity of class politics and grass-root democratization, place-based interests at the local scale have been powerfully territorialized; and 3) because the effects of regionalist politics have continued since the 1970s, the discursive

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framework interpreting the region’s political-economic reality has become very much politicized around “center-local” relations, greatly influencing the intensification of the South Korean state’s construction-oriented tendency.

Because of the state-centric nature of the Korean social sciences, the political-economic processes at the local and regional scales have been rarely considered as the core of causal relations in explaining the Korean social phenomena. This has affected explanations on the construction-oriented development projects that have strong place-based and local characteristics.

Therefore, in the existing studies on neo-developmentalism or constructionoriented state theory, territorialized politics at the local or regional scales were regarded only as by-products or outcomes of national-scale development politics. However, this paper argues that territorial politics at the local or regional scales is one of the main factors explaining South Korean state’s construction-oriented tendency.

Based on this analysis, I argue that the efforts to resolve the problems arising from the Korean state’s neo-developmental policies and constructionoriented tendency requires not only attacking the discourses of developmentalism and criticizing the national-scale construction alliances, but also weakening the development politics organized at the local or regional scales.

Yet, as discussed briefly above, because the South Korean state’s constructionoriented development tendency is a result of political, economic, social, and spatial conditions intricately intertwined with the process of South Korean capitalist development, it would seem difficult to resolve the situation simply by institutional reforms of regional development practices or decision making processes. The political-economic system, seemingly unrelated to government construction projects or development politics, first needs to be fundamentally changed in order to hinder further revitalization of developmentalist politics based on regional interests. To design such measures, deeper empirical studies about the operation of regional development politics and the processes by which regional interests influence the strategic selectivity of the Korean state are necessary.

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Tickell, A. and Peck, J., 2003, “Making Global Rules: Globalization Or Neoliberalization?” in Remaking the Global Economy: EconomicGeographical Perspectives, Jamie Peck and Henry W. Yeung (eds.), pp. 163181, London: Sage Wood, A., 1996, “Analysing the Politics of Local Economic Development: Making Sense of Cross-national Convergence,” Urban Studies 33(8): 1281-1295.

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A Reconsideration of ‘Colonial Modernization’* Kim, Nak Nyeon** There has been much debate between the ‘exploitation view’ and the ‘colonial modernization view’ on how to assess the consequences of the institutional changes and industrialization initiated by Japanese colonizers in Korea during the colonial period, and how to identify what kind of legacies were passed on to Korea’s post-liberation period. Recently another view that criticizes both of the views and focuses instead on social and cultural aspects of colonial Korea has emerged. This third view, called the ‘colonial modernity view’, shares with the second view in stressing the complicated relations between colonialism and modernity, but unlike the other views, perceives modernity in a negative sense. This article surveys recent studies on political, economic, social, and cultural aspects of colonial Korea, and makes clear the points in which each view diverges from the others. Recognizing that each of the three views has its own strength and weakness in different aspects of their arguments, this article explores areas in which they come together in mutual and complementary understanding.

Keywords: exploitation, colonial modernization, colonial modernity, living standards, colonial public sphere, collaboration, disciplinary power, cultural hegemony, daily life, continuity and discontinuity

I. Introduction Research interests and perspectives on the colonial period have repeatedly undergone changes. In the post-liberation period, research on the colonial period focused on aspects of control and exploitation, or the nationalist movement that opposed colonialism. As Korea rose as a newly-industrialized Translated from the published article in Review of Economic History 43: 155-188, 2007 with permission from the Korean Economic History Society. ** Professor, Department of Economics, Dongguk University *

221

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nation and socialism collapsed after the 1980’s, nationalist history had to confront new challenges. In foreign countries, scholars argued that the “developmental state” that enabled the rise of Korean capitalism and highspeed growth had its origins in the colonial period. And domestic scholars, particularly those in the field of economic history, contended that a modern system was introduced in the colonial period, which accelerated economic growth. At this point, the debate between “exploitation” (sut’allon) and “colonial modernization” (singminji kŭndaehwaron) began.1 The idea of colonial modernization evoked a severe critical response because of the doubts that it raised about the established view on modern history of Korea.

The opposing sides of the debate condemned each other for supporting colonial rule or falling captive to nationalist ideology, and the debate ran in a wasteful direction. However, the process forced mainstream historical thought to reflect on itself and provided an occasion for a change of course (Chung, Y. 2000: 150-153).

Issues raised during the debate ran in many directions, but Chung, Jae Jeong (1996b: 112-115) proposes three points deserving further scrutiny: development or exploitation, growth or assimilation, and continuity or discontinuity. First, the issue of development or exploitation is often presented with one stressed over the other, but a methodology that comprehensively encompasses both should be found. Second, a segment of the Korean population pursued self-development and instrumental growth under colonialism but this was also the path of subordinate incorporation under the colonial system in which assimilation has been equated with collaboration, giving rise to the problem of where to position “collaborators” within modern Korean history. These two points are connected with economy (development and growth) and politics (exploitation and assimilation) under colonialism.

Third, particular factors are “cast in sharp relief ” when discussing continuity or discontinuity between the colonial and post-liberation periods, rather than recognizing the need for a comprehensive understanding of this issue.

1

Due to the limitations of space, the details of this debate are not included here. For a comparative and balanced summary on the unfolding of the debate and its central points, refer to Chung, Youn Tae (2000) and Chung, Jae Jeong (1996a; 1996b), though I disagree with some parts of their arguments which are presented in the latter part of this article.

A Reconsideration of ‘Colonial Modernization’ 223

Consequently, the debate has seemed to turn in on itself without serious examination of these issues. This article seeks to discuss these points, in conjunction with recently published articles. Statistical research on economic conditions during the colonial period has made some progress (Huh, S. 2005; Kim, N. N. ed. 2006), but these works have also raised questions on how living standards changed for Koreans under colonialism. This research can seem like an extension of the debate between “exploitation” and “colonial modernization”; but rather than relying on abstract concepts like “exploitation,” it is distinguished by its reliance on methods that can be statistically substantiated. I will examine some aspects of the debate later.

Consideration of the colonial period has received the recent influence of post-modernism and research topics have diversified away from politics and economy to include society, culture, and consciousness (Kim, J. and Jung, K. eds. 1997; Shin and Robinson eds. 1999; Kong, J. and Jung, K. eds. 2006).

These works consider modernity and colonialism as inseparable and focus on the connection between the two. The key word and the main characteristic of their research agenda is “colonial modernity” (singminji kŭndaesŏng).

However, what kind of relationship can be found between their research and the existing debate? Regardless of the conflict between the perspectives of “exploitation” and “colonial modernization,” Kim, Jin Kyun and Jung, Keun Sik (1997, 18) argue that both approaches considered modernity in a positive light and believed that modernization must be accomplished at some point. From that viewpoint, both approaches share the same perspective. In their research, Kim and Jung look at modernity negatively as something to be overcome, which fundamentally alters the topography of the existing debate. Consequently, many other scholars have followed this type of historiographical approach to the point of ubiquity. While this well demonstrates the theoretical viewpoint on which their works are based, it also indicates rigidity within the historiography that promotes over-simplification or distortion.2 2

Shin and Robinson, eds. (1999: 526-527); Namiki (1999: 111-113); Bae, Sung Jun (2000: 170-174); Matsumoto (2002: 31-32); Kim, Dong No (2004: 18); and Cho, Hyung Keun (2006: 50-51) all adopt a similar approach. Generally, they use Shin, Yong Ha (1998) and Ahn, Byung Jik (1998) as representatives of “exploitation” and “colonial modernization” respectively, stating that both sides of the debate share “a

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Regardless of whether one regards modernity positively or negatively, the bigger issue is the fact that there is a pre-determined value judgment. The features associated with the modern or modernity can be listed as nationstate and nationalism (politics), capitalism and commodification (economy), and individualism and rationalization (society). Although these features first appeared in the West, they were simultaneously proliferating in other areas and undergoing their own transformation through the process of diffusion.

These features could promote human freedom and welfare but in other forms, they could also lead to domination, oppression, and hazards. Taking any of the features listed above, none of them can be easily characterized as negative or positive on their own because of their complex character. Kim, Jin Kyun and Jung, Keun Sik (1997, 20-23) emphasized the negative aspects, but they were aware of the “duality of modernity.” Cho, Hyung Keun (2006: 54, 5967) goes to extremes and argues for the need to “revolutionize” modernity through “radical critique.” Beginning with a value judgment that equates the modern with negativity is the same as presenting a conclusion before doing any analysis.3 Consequently, this pre-judging research cannot be combined with other research. Cho’s historiographical overview shows that the conclusions of the preexisting academic debate have not been incorporated into the new research for this reason, but instead have been excluded. It is not necessary to narrow the scope of the understanding of the modern because of the presumption of particular value judgments.

In many cases, the difficulty of communication is due to differences in the longing for the modern,” which is ultimately the root of nationalism. Furthermore, they criticize these scholars for having unwittingly been won over by the “hegemony of the modern” and raising the modern to “divine” status (Namiki 2003: 10). However, it raises the question of how universally this critique can be applied to scholars on both sides of the debate. For example, studies of economic history that focus on the development of capitalism and industrialization in the colonial period seek to “explain” the phenomenon rather than thinking it is “something that must be achieved” or the object of “yearning.”

3 Kim, Dong No (2003: 309-321) points out that such concepts as “modernity” (kŭndae(sŏng)), “nation” (minjok), and “colonialism” (singminji), which have been widely used in the works on colonial history, are problematic for comparative historical or empirical researches when these concepts are invested with pre-existing values.

A Reconsideration of ‘Colonial Modernization’ 225

academic backgrounds of the researchers. Those involved in the early debate conducted research according to their fields. Studies of the independence movement focused on the colonial system and the resistance movement.

Economic historians looked at the economic system and market transactions, while social and cultural historians were interested in everyday life, the transformation of culture, and issues of identity. Since each field had its own inherent analytical concepts and methodology, even research on the same topic resulted in different perspectives and assessments. Depending on the extent of cooperation, research findings could have contributed to a complete understanding of the history of this period. However, the reality was that interdisciplinary communication was not easy and there were many cases where the debate yielded few results.

This article now turns to a simple examination of this period by field, such as colonial economy (section 2), colonial system of rule and politics (section 3), and colonial society and culture (section 4). I will focus on how the research findings in each discipline offer perspectives on the other fields, which illustrates possibilities for greater communication in the future. In addition, I will examine how the introduction of value judgments blocks communication in the existing research and how the concepts and methodology of each discipline places emphasis on different things in its analysis of the colonial period. At the same time, I will highlight the need to understand the limits of the approaches. I believe this type of work can lead to solutions by helping us reflect on the preconceptions within the ongoing debate and at the very least, help block wasteful debate.4 4

In regards to the title of this article, some explanation is required to help prevent misunderstandings. Originally, “colonial modernization” was a term coined by critics of studies in economic history that focused on the introduction of a modern system and the progress of industrialization. The term was loaded with criticism of the premise that colonial control was beneficial and that modernity was equated with positivity. Under the influence of post-modernism and the re-conceptualization of the modern as negative, however, the term as the union of “colonial” and “modern” has become fashionable without giving a sense of awkwardness. The historiographical summary of Cho, Hyung Keun (2006: 54-72) differentiates between “colonial modernization” (singminji kŭndaehwa), “colonial modernity” (singminji kŭndaesŏng), and “cultural colonial modernity” (munhwaron chŏk singminji kŭndaesŏng). Other terms are also being used like “colonial modern” (singminji chŏk kŭndae) (Jung, Tae

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II. Colonial Economy: “Exploitation” and the Living Standards of Koreans One of the most common criticisms leveled against “colonial modernization” is that it ignores the exploitation aspect in favor of stressing development.

This approach has been criticized as a “historical perception that effaces relief,” as “the supremacy of economic development” (Chung, Y. 2000: 144145), and a “colonial historical perspective” that “denudes the objective reality of exploitation” through the “magic of economics” (Jung, T. 2007: 191, 199). If we simultaneously examine both aspects of exploitation and development in a balanced manner as Chung, Jae Jeong (1996b: 113) proposes, will there be explanatory power? This method may not solve the problem. It is necessary to recognize the fundamental limitation on using the concept of exploitation in an analysis of the colonial economy. This limit is one of the obstacles that sometimes blocks communication between economics and other fields. Two examples are listed below.

The first example is the “exploitation” of rice in the colonial period. As everyone knows, agriculture was the main economic activity in Chosŏn Korea and rice was the largest export item to Japan. However, high school textbooks on modern Korean history describe this as Japanese “exploitation” of Korean rice (or “stealing”). These textbooks indicate that the drastic reduction of Korean per capita consumption of rice as a result of these exports is clear evidence that Korean living standards declined.

However, the export of rice was the result of voluntary transactions just like any other business deal. During the wartime years of early 1940s, the Japanese sought rice to expand their supply of food grains. The compensation Hern 2007: 39-63) and “colonial modern” (singminji kŭndae) (Yun, Hae Dong 2004: 235-239). If we discuss how these terms have different, or even conflicting, meanings, then it only contributes to the confusion of the readers. I believe that if we eliminate value judgments from our understanding of modernity, then there is no distinction between the terms in approaching the phenomenon of modernity in the colonial period. With that purpose in mind, I used the title of the article in an inclusive manner to connect the debate over “colonial modernization” and the subsequent discussion.

A Reconsideration of ‘Colonial Modernization’ 227

they offered to Korean farmers was much lower than the price that the farmers could receive elsewhere, so naturally the farmers avoided offering their rice. Consequently, the Japanese plan to expand rice deliveries became coercive in nature. The wartime plan to mobilize labor and volunteers operated in a similar fashion. Forced rice deliveries and forced mobilization of labor in the wartime control economy can be called exploitation. However, it is cannot be said that voluntary transactions undertaken in a market economy also constituted exploitation.

In that case, how do we explain the Korean per capita decline in rice consumption? If rice was “exploited,” then the reasons for the decline in rice consumption are obvious. However, if it was the result of voluntary transactions, then the reason for the phenomenon requires an alternative explanation.5 Today, an increase in rice exports signifies an expansion of the export market as well as the opportunity for farmers (or landlords) selling the rice to raise their incomes. In the colonial period, grain production was the most important industry. If more than half of the rice produced was exported, then what kind of influence did that have on the Korean economy?

A close examination reveals that in addition to the inflow of Japanese capital, increased rice production and expansion of exports also played an important role in colonial industrialization.6 If one focuses only on “exploitation,” then it becomes impossible to grasp the logic behind economic change.

Second, evidence for the economic exploitation of Korea by Japan is sought in the “outflow of surplus.” For example, Jung, Tae Hern argues that the outflow of capital was greater than the inflow of capital at a rate between 4.3 to 5 times (the rate increases to between 6.3 to 7.4 times if indirect flows are 5

Despite an increase in the production of rice, the decline in the per capita rice consumption resulted from population increase and rice exports, which was labelled as “famine exports” of rice. Cha (1998) argues that the most important factor was an increase in population pressure arising from the dissemination of modern techniques of hygiene and sanitation. Kim, N. N. (2003: 120-131) argues that as the Korean and Japanese economies were unified, an increase in rice prices suppressed consumption, and landlords’ greater control over tenant rice increased the commercialization rate of rice.

6 In this period, economic policy was less important than the role of the market, especially rice exports and the non-agricultural investment of landlord capital. For more, see Kim, N. N. (2006a: 208-219).

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included), which represents “capital exploitation” on a massive scale. But what is the significance of this “capital exploitation”? When capital flows in and out, assets or credits will flow in the opposite direction,7 so it is impossible to know how excessive outflow of capital can be equated with exploitation.8 Furthermore, the scale of capital outflow which Jung calls “exploitation” was an arbitrarily determined number that is meaningless.9 In the colonial period, overall trade was significantly in deficit (the service trades were also in deficit) which indicates that, in contravention of Jung’s argument, there were excessive inflows of capital. Also, Jung argues that capital outflow was greater than inflow by several times, but this would have been impossible with the currency system of that period (Kim, N. N. 2003: 112). In other words, Jung Tae-hern’s argument is incompatible with the formal logic of economics.

This is an example of how using concrete statistics to substantiate claims of “exploitation” results in inconsistencies.

There is an argument that “exploitation” should be understood as a “structural phenomenon” (kujo chŏk hyŏnsang) (Park, M. 1991: 178, 183).

“Even if the phenomenon of extortive situations between individuals and groups is not apparent, there were colonial conditions within Japanese control of Korea and Koreans, and those conditions were reproduced systemically and structurally. Exploitation was inherent in the structure.” If it was not 7

Transfer of funds such as subsidies or military expenditures was an exception since they were moving without payments moving in the opposite direction. Throughout the colonial period, the current account of the colonial government recorded a net inflow (Kim, N. N. 2004: 29-31, 37-38).

8 In the case of compulsory savings enacted under wartime controls, depositors bore the losses from inflation. Additionally, the Japanese bonds purchased with savings money were ultimately not redeemed after the war. Like wartime rice delivery or the conscript of labor, these examples can be considered exploitation within the financial sector. However, common financial transactions that were not compulsory in nature cannot be considered exploitation.

9 For example, among government expenditures, expenditures used for Japanese (In this case, the use of the term “outflow” is inappropriate and “use” (yongdo) will be substituted later. Jung, Tae Hern 2007: 198), export figures for mining products heading to Japan, and the Korean trade deficit with Japan are all categorized as “outflow” (yuch’ul) because they are the “exhaustion of productivity” or “export of surplus.” The combination of these items is meaningless within the field of economics.

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“extortion” (t’alch’ui) (or exploitation), it was “exploitation” structurally and in reality. The concept of “exploitation” used here is different from its dictionary meaning of stealing or robbing. It is understood as the structure and essence of the colonial system. However, using “exploitation” in the latter sense turns every phenomenon under colonial system into exploitation and makes it impossible to empirically analyze economic reality with that concept.10 The issue here is that it is difficult to substantially explain economic change while remaining critical of colonialism. The uniqueness of the market economy lies in the voluntary participation of the transacting parties as well as their mutual dependence in making a deal. This feature is accomplished regardless of the political structure of where the market economy is located.

Economics has its strengths in analyzing this type of market economy, but the flip-side is that economics has limitations in revealing the colonial nature of the system. The method of explicating concepts like “exploitation” in economic analyses cannot be successful. Colonial control involves compulsion, but it is not necessary to expand this to include the economic domain where everyday transactions occur. Colonialism is typically addressed in violations of sovereignty and the coercive process of supporting the system of control. This issue will be addressed in the next section on the colonial system and politics.

Next, we will focus on recent statistical researches on the colonial economy, especially those on the changes of living standards of Koreans. It may be meaningless from the perspective of “exploitation theory” to question how living standards of Koreans had changed during the colonial period.

However, the decline of living standards is not a foregone conclusion, but a topic that requires serious examination.11 Huh, Soo Youl (2005: 26-33) does 10

Chung, Youn Tae (2000: 153) says exploitation theory, “too easily accepts the ‘obvious premise’ of Japanese exploitation and nationalist resistance and it is quite careless in clearly uncovering the other facts of exploitation.” The task remains to “really discover actual exploitation that will convince the international community.” Jung, Tae Hern (2004: 62) states that “despite all the discussion, there has been no real progress in empirical studies that uncovers exploitation.” Why has this happened? The reason lies in concept itself of “exploitation” which cannot be statistically substantiated.

11 Living standards does not only include the material aspects of life but also the level of psychological satisfaction. If we seriously consider psychological wounds like damage

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not use the term “exploitation” since he does not believe that it appropriately describes the exchange relations of the period, but there is little difference between “exploitation theory” and his conclusions. That is to say, development in the colonial period intensified the extreme inequality between Korean and Japanese ownership of land and capital, which exacerbated the inequalities in income, and caused a steep decline in Korean living standards. The difference between this argument and “exploitation theory” is its utilization of statistical evidence and concrete numbers to indicate the extent of the inequality and the decline in living standards, which makes a serious examination possible.

Before examining Huh’s argument, we first look at the overall direction of the Korean economy, including the economic activity of the Japanese.

Kim, Nak Nyeon ed. (2006) estimated the national account statistics for the period from 1911 to 1940,12 relying on the standards established by the UN in its 1993 System of National Accounts. According to this system, the annual average growth rate of the economy was 3.7% while the population growth rate was 1.3%. Therefore, the growth rate of per capita income was 2.4%. The fastest growing sectors were mining, industry, electric, and construction (annual average 9%), followed by the service sector (5%). As a result, structural change was also rapid as agriculture declined from 68% to 41% in this period, while mining and industry increased from 5% to 14%. In that regard, growth in trade and investment led economic growth. Reliance on trade increased from the 20% level to 60% while the investment rate increased from 5% to 14%. Private consumption expenditures increased at an annual average of 3.3% which, considering population growth, resulted in an estimated per capita growth rate of 1.9%. Although grain consumption showed a slight decrease, consumption of other foodstuffs and industrial

to national pride, then it may be difficult to say that living standards in this period improved. However, the subjective nature of that type of damage makes it difficult to quantify for comparison. Therefore, this discussion will be limited to the material aspects.

12 Before the publication of these estimates, the GDP numbers estimated by Mizoguchi and Umemura (1988) have been widely used. Kim, N. N. ed. (2006) has significantly revised these numbers and for the difference on the estimates, see Kim, N. N. ed.

(2006: 281-287).

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products increased.13 These estimates can be linked to the statistics of post-liberation South Korea for international comparison. In comparison to post-liberation South Korea, the economic growth rate in the colonial period was only half, but growth showed a similar pattern led by the development of trade, investment, and industrialization. The economic growth rate was at the same level as that of Japan and Taiwan, but was quite high in comparison to other areas.

In this regard, the Japanese empire was not only unified in terms of money and tariffs but had been unified into a single market as a system. However, in comparison with the post-liberation period income inequality levels were high due to the landlord system. In conjunction with the low level of education rates, these factors account for the gap in economic growth rates between the pre- and post-liberation periods (Cha and Kim 2006).

Huh, Soo Youl (2005) is critical of these approaches which consider the whole colonial economy including Japanese economic activities. From the Korean perspective, economic growth in the colonial period was nothing more than development by Japanese for Japanese. Rather than examining the territory called Korea, the perspective of the Korean people has to be considered. Huh used distribution statistics for each nationality of rice production and land ownership to argue that estimated per capita rice income for Korean farmers (including landlords) decreased 33.2% from 1910 to 1941.

This study is, though limited to rice, an attempt to present concrete numbers indicating changes in Korean incomes and living standards.

A debate ensued in which Kim, Nak Nyeon (2005), Joo, Ik Jong (2006), Cha, Myung Soo (2006) gave their critiques, to which Huh, Soo Youl (2006) responded and to which Kim, Nak Nyeon (2006b) responded again. There were several key points of the debate. First was the issue of modifying the rice 13

Greater urbanization was also a result of the changes to the industrial and expenditures structure. If administrative units with over 20,000 people are classified as cities, then the urban population between 1925 and 1940 increased from 7% to 20% (Hori Kazuo 1995: 110-112). Although the level of urbanization was not high, the rate of urbanization was quite fast. Although still confined to a part of population residing in cities, there were significant changes to Korean lifestyles. The emergence of modern culture and lifestyles in the 1930’s which Kim, Chin Song (1999) describes was possible due to such changes in the economic structure.

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production statistics from the 1910’s, which saw the implementation of the land survey. The second issue was the productivity gap between land owned

by Koreans and Japanese. The third issue was the overestimation of the agricultural population growth rate before census survey, which was used to find peasant per capita income. Even Huh, Soo Youl recognizes the validity of the last point. On the first point, the question remains as to whether to accept the final rice production statistics adjusted by Government-General after the completion of the land survey. Without any clear evidence, Huh disregarded those statistics and estimated that production stagnated in this period by retroactively applying production trends from 1918 to 1926. However, he ignored the increase in the penetration rate of superior seed from 2.2% to 43.5% between 1910 and 1918 and that the effects of increased production were reflected in the statistics adjusted by the Government-General. On the second point, Huh estimated that the Japanese owned 14.6% of the land in 1931 (16.9% in 1941) and accounted for 44% of rice production in 1931 (54% in 1941), which means that the productivity of Japanese-owned land was between 4.6 to 5.7 times greater than Korean-owned land. However, this type of unrealistic productivity gap is not real but a result of misreading the statistics (Kim, N. N. 2006b: 327-330).

If the problematic numbers for the three issues listed above are adjusted in Huh’s calculations, then the rice production growth rate from 1910 to 1941 is 64.1% (compared to Huh’s 52.3%), the gap in land productivity is 28.5% (compared to Hŏ’s five times), and the annual average growth rate of the Korean agricultural population is 1% (compared to Huh’s 1.6%).

Consequently, the per capita rice income growth rate for Korean farmers is not the 33.2% decline presented by Huh, but rather an 8% increase (Kim, N. N. 2006b: 320-333).14 Although Korean farm income increased 8% over thirtyone years, which is quite different from a 33.2% decrease, it was still a slow growth rate. Furthermore, landlords were included within the average, so it is likely that income for tenant farmers and lower-class farmers stagnated.

Joo, Ik Jong (2006: 113-121) pursued a different approach and inferred an 14

Statistics on this period are comparatively abundant, but statistics that distinguish between nationalities are quite limited. Since the figures above are calculated partially on the guess only, these remain tentative results.

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increase in Korean per capita income for this period. The above-mentioned GDP figures (including Japanese economic activity15) increased 2.66 times from 1912 to 1939 (an annual average growth rate of 3.7%), while the Korean population increased 40% (an annual average growth rate of 1.3%). What might happen if the increase in income had all gone to the Japanese while Korean per capital income just stagnated? If the per capita income of Japanese living in Korea is assumed to be twice the per capita income of Japanese living in Japan in 1912, the gap between incomes in 1939 would have increased 6.5 times (the results do not change much even if the assumptions are changed).

In that scenario, many Japanese would have moved to Korea to seek greater income opportunities, but the reality is that the growth rate in the numbers of Japanese living in Korea decreased as time passed. The Japanese had an initially low population ratio of 1.7% so it would be unrealistic to assume that they captured all of the income increase. Consequently, it is logical to think that Korean per capita income also increased.

While this inference relying on aggregate statistics and assumptions suggests that Korean per capita income increased, it only shows averages. The landlord system in this period was expanding in the countryside, particularly after the Shōwa financial crisis. In the cities, the number of salaried workers and skilled laborers increased along with new types of occupations, but there were also many unskilled laborers. Cha, Myung Soo (2006: 321-328) has estimated the Gini coefficient in this period and shown an increase in income inequality between nationalities and classes. Overcoming the aforementioned limitation is possible through records of wages that were directly observed.

Wages in that period have been surveyed according to nationality and occupation, but it is possible to ascertain real wage trends by occupation for Koreans by estimating the consumer price index. Huh Soo Youl (1981) examined Korean wages by separating laborers into skilled and unskilled categories. From 1910 to 1938, wages for the former increased while wages for the latter stagnated.16 Kim, Nak Nyeon and Park, Ki Joo (2007) estimated real 15

Like today, the residents included in calculations of the national account are not distinguished by their nationality, but rather by their character as “center of interest” (usually they are considered residents if they have resided in the country for longer than one year). Most Japanese living in Korea at that time can be considered residents.

16 It is difficult to reconcile Huh’s findings of real wage trend with his above mentioned

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wages for Seoul factory workers from 1936 to 1956 and connected the two periods to ascertain long-term trends in real wages (1910-1975). According to their findings, real wages for unskilled and factory labor generally stagnated throughout the colonial period, unlike wages for skilled labor. Immediately after Liberation, wages for unskilled labor quickly fell and did not recover to pre-liberation levels until after the Korean War. Disregarding the chaotic periods of war and Liberation, average wages for unskilled Korean laborers before the outbreak of war between Japan and China in 1937 were 82% of average wages of South Korean factory labor from 1953 to 1967.

Many topics remain for future research on the colonial economy. This article emphasizes that the current debate can be moved from discussion of essentialist concepts like “exploitation� to substantial points like changes in Korean living standards. The pursuit and accumulation of substantial research demonstrates the possibility of escaping from conventional useless debates.

III. Colonial System of Rule and Politics: Domination, Resistance, and Cooperation Unlike the economic realm which relied on the autonomy of the transacting parties, the system of rule, to the extent that it relied on coercion, was a typical colonial sphere. Japanese methods of colonial rule were based on their command of the military, police, and bureaucracy, but were characterized by the pursuit of assimilation. Unlike Western imperialists, the Japanese believed that it was possible to establish permanent control through complete assimilation of Korea, due to the close geographical, racial, and cultural ties between themselves and their colony. In the process of pursuing these assimilationist goals, the Japanese found it necessary to compromise with reality, producing varying aspects at different times and in different areas.

Economically, the Japanese system was transplanted to Korea and there was institutional integration of the two regions from early on. The cadastral survey established modern land ownership rights and fixed the land tax system, but it was similar in nature to the land tax reform implemented in argument that Korean peasant income decreased by 33.2%.

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Japan. Japanese currency had been penetrating the peninsula immediately after the opening of the ports and ultimately replaced Korean currency. Bank of Chōsen notes and Bank of Japan notes were different but they could be freely exchanged at a 1:1 ratio so there was no functional distinction between the two. The tariff systems of Japan and Korea were combined in 1920. With the exception of a few items, there were no tariffs between the two regions.

In regards to economic laws (civil law, commercial law, etc.), Japanese laws were practically transferred wholesale (Kim, N. N. 2003: 44-73). From the businessman’s perspective, he was operating within an institutional environment that made colonial Korea seem like another region inside Japan.

As a result, trade between the two regions in goods, capital, and labor quickly expanded. In this respect, colonial Korea and Japan resembled the presentday EU, which has achieved currency, tax, and institutional unification. As mentioned in the previous section, the Korean economy moved in lockstep with the Japanese empire for precisely this reason. Unlike the EU, which was based on equal relationships between the participatory nations, colonial Korea and Japan had a different political relationship which was based on domination and subordination. The above-mentioned process of institutional transplantation was how Korea was colonized. In contrast to the EU, the economic unification of the two areas was a result of the domineering methods used by the Japanese in pursuit of assimilation.

In contrast, the Japanese avoided political assimilation and did not recognize the political rights of the Koreans. The laws implemented in colonial Korea were different from those in Japan (inner land; naichi) since it was classified as a “different-law region” or “outer land” (ihō chiiki or gaichi).

Some Japanese laws were selected for enactment in Korea for the sake of convenience, but the legal code related to election law was omitted. Other laws were enacted through regulations issued by the Governor-General (seirei). In other words, Koreans were blocked from participating in the formation of the laws that bound them. Since the composition of courts, appointment qualifications for judges, and disciplinary actions were all prescribed by Government-General regulations, judicial power could hardly be expected to be independent from government administration. In short, the Government-General in Korea naturally had administrative authority, but it also controlled legislative and judicial authority which essentially allowed

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it to wield unlimited power. Political rights for Koreans were permitted, but they were extremely limited and existed only on the local level (Kim, N. N. 2003: 35-44).

During wartime, assimilation policies developed in an extreme form.

Economically, a unified command economy was implemented across the Japanese empire. The switch began with the substitution of planning and control for market, but ultimately, the entire economic system was transformed. By the end of the war, the government was demanding that businessmen and peasants alike fulfill the production responsibilities assigned to them and to place the “public interest” (kongik) above personal interest.

While the wartime mobilization system was being established, greater efforts at psychological assimilation were being exerted. These were the “Japan and Korea as one body” (naisen ittai) and “imperialization of colonial subjects” (kōminka) policies. The adoption of these slogans further exposed the contradiction between assimilationist policies and the lack of political rights for the colonial people. With the enactment of the conscription system at the end of the wartime period, the Japanese decided to grant Koreans political rights but only in the most formal sense. Those rights were never implemented before liberation.

As stated above, the Japanese control policies aimed at complete assimilation and permanent merger and assimilation did make substantial process in certain areas. These methods of domination are striking in comparison to other colonial situations. For example, the Japanese simultaneously pursued aggression while also introducing modern systems and they rationalized colonial control through the façade of modernity. The complex and delicate nature of the Korean response to these policies can be attributed to this feature. Previous scholarship has focused on resistance to this system of control. When describing the colonial history of a country that was liberated from colonial control, it is only natural to concentrate on the history of the independence movement. Consequently, much research has been done from that perspective. However, focusing on the development of the national independence movement as has been done in a high school modern history textbook would impart a distorted view of the period. That research is based on a structure of domination and resistance that obscures the diverse array of responses pursued by the Koreans.

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Namiki (2003: 2-3) states that post-liberation politicians in North and South Korea exercised leadership that was legitimated by their participation in the national liberation struggle (particularly overseas) by being members of the Provisional Government or the communist partisan group (Ppalch’isan).

As a result, their political judgments and assessments have dominated up to the present day the perspective from which we have understood modern Korean history. He characterizes it as a “political refugee’s historical discourse”. For this reason, there is intense scrutiny of even minor details related to the national liberation struggle while the complex and diverse experiences of the majority of Koreans in the colonial period is disregarded, concealed, and undervalued.

Within a similar context, Yun, Hae Dong (2003: 24, 27-39) discusses the dichotomy between resistance and “pro-Japanese collaboration” (ch’inil).

Within this dichotomy, resistance was viewed only from the standard of nationalism, so it could not encompass diverse forms of everyday resistance.

On the other hand, the concept of pro-Japanese collaboration was infused with ethical judgments, while the ambiguity resulting from expanded use made it unsuitable as an analytical concept. Furthermore, the dichotomy obscured the real life of Koreans in the colonial period, who showed contradictory attitudes of cooperation and resistance within the fluctuating situations. Yun called this the “gray area” (hoesaek chidae). Another problem with the dichotomy was its distortion of the political history of the colonial period. On the one hand, all social movements were considered part of the national liberation struggle, which indicates the privileging of social history. On the other hand, everything else was excluded from the political realm. For this reason, while the period preceding and just after the March First Movement was colored as that of “total national resistance”, the period approaching the Second World War was described as that of “total national collaboration”, which was a completely reversed image of the former. The dichotomizing approach can thus be criticized as impoverishing the study of the political history of this period.

How then should we approach colonial period political history? This section focuses on issues that do not fit within the existing perspective on independence movement history and attempts to link them to colonial political history. First is how to introduce the concept of “colonial publicness”

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(singminji konggongsŏng) (or the “public sphere”), although this effort is still at the experimental stage. Namiki (2003: 16-7, 22, 29) argues that the particular characteristics of colonial politics and racial domination made reaching agreements difficult and that regardless of whether one was the ruler or the ruled, the costs of attaining one’s goals were too high. Some of the rulers and the ruled sought neither the overthrow nor denial of the other, but pursued the partial realization of their goals through negotiation and compromise in a “bargain” process that is conceptualized as the “public sphere.” The sphere includes not just resistance and collaboration but a gray area between the two that allows a mutual blending and diffusion (that is to say, resistance ↔ gray area ↔ collaboration). From this viewpoint, the actions of the ruled can be seen as “politics,” while society can be seen as having been dynamic.

Looking at everyday life, Yun, Hae Dong (2003: 36-39) saw that issues related to communal life fell into the public realm and were also political.

Even under colonial rule, participation in regional elections or various mass meetings all expanded the public sphere. Hwang, Byoung Joo (2007) did not presume the existence of “publicness” or a “public sphere,” but analyzed the various examples and meanings of the concept of “public” appearing in newspapers and magazines. Hwang saw the expansion of the value of “public” through all parts of society and confirmed the initial formation of the “public sphere.” Within the sphere, a limited form of politics was able to withstand the strong regulation of colonial power and endure. Although there are small differences in how scholars understand the “public sphere,” they share the understanding that the introduction of this concept allows the further development of discussions about colonial political history.

Second, we need to change how we address the issue of “pro-Japanese collaborators.” In the existing history of the independence movement, the “pro-Japanese group” is simply seen as a product of colonial rule or else is excluded from examination because of the moral judgment of the researcher.

However, this approach prevents an understanding of the internal logic of their actions. First of all, the term “pro-Japanese” should be replaced by the concept of “collaboration with Japan” (taeil hyŏmnyŏk) (Namiki 1993: 5556). The term “pro-Japanese” fosters the tendency to easily convict someone’s actions on their qualities as an individual. If the concept of “collaboration with Japan” is used, then general comparisons on aspects of collaboration can

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be made with other situations of colonialism or occupation. As emphasized by the recent theory on the margins (chubyŏnbu iron) in the study imperialism (Park, J. 2000: 113-144), collaborators should be included in the analysis of the structure and dynamics of imperialism.

Below is a simple introduction of actual research that approaches colonial political history with this kind of critical understanding. Kim, Tong Myung (2006) empirically describes the political process of the cultural policy period of the 1920’s. He focuses on the political process between the colonial government and the Korean political movement (divided into the three categories of the “assimilationist collaboration” (tonghwahyŏng hyŏmnyŏk) movement, “separatist collaboration” (pullihyŏng hyŏmnyŏk) movement, and the resistance movement), and explains the process of political exchange, or bargaining, between the two, consisting of suppression and conciliation, guidance and rejection, and adjustment and compromise. After the shock of the March First movement, the colonial government reformed the control structure to promote assimilation, but the contradictions inherent in that policy and the influence of the resistance movement led to a further change to promoting autonomy. However, the failure of that approach caused a return to the assimilation method. In other words, the colonial government could not unilaterally impose its will.

On the other hand, Korean political groups were pursuing their own goals and striving to expand their power, but in the midst of repeated internal conflict, competition, and division, they could not achieve their goals. In conjunction with the colonial “divide and rule” policy, the stubborn uncompromising attitude of Korean society prevented the mustering of political strength. Colonial rule, the independence movement, and the “pro-Japanese” activities have usually been addressed separately, but the uniqueness of this research is its focus on the dynamic nature of colonial political history that encompasses the interactions between all three elements.

If this was politics of the center, how was colonial rule implemented on the local level? This type of research has been comparatively active and features many controversies. For example, Kim Ik Han (2006) argues that village autonomy was maintained until the loss of independence due to the central role of the prominent families. However, these families lost their influence with the consolidation of regional administrative units and the

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implementation of the township system in the 1910’s, and the introduction of town councils in the 1920’s, which allowed the appearance of new community leaders that cooperated with the Japanese. Furthermore, active collaborators known as “intermediaries” (chunggyŏn inmul) emerged from among regular peasants in the 1930’s and the colonial government used them to extend its control all the way to the bottom of rural society. In regards to these people, Yun, Hae Dong (2006) argues that there has been a one-sided bias toward highlighting the aspects of control or systemization of the villages, and he emphasizes the need to also examine three other aspects of the situation.

Those are the infiltration of modern forms of control through the township system, village autonomy, and the role played by the mid-level ruling stratum (chunggan chibae ch’ŭng) that connected the two. The central figures of this stratum were the district chiefs (kujang) or the “intermediaries” (chunggyŏn inmul). These people had a dual nature: on the one hand they were agents of colonial rule, while on the other they were representatives of the autonomy and collectivity of the peasant society. It has been noted that during the War years, their role as the former was strengthened while the gap between them and village autonomy grew greater.

According to Matsumoto (1998: 27, 235-238), the village order that had been led by local leaders drawn from the middle and small landlords living in the villages was transformed into one led by “intermediaries” during a transition period from the late 1920’s through the wartime period. The definitive difference between these two periods is that the autonomy of the former period gave way inevitably to a new order as a consequence of the policy interventions of the colonial government. Such policy interventions as the mediation of tenant disputes and the Rural Revitalization Campaign of the 1930’s became key elements in the wartime system of control. Matsumoto argues that the relationship of domination formed between the colonial authorities and the peasants continued in the post-liberation period under the system of authoritarian control (namely, “strong state and weak society”). A point of interest in his argument is how the “intermediaries” accommodated themselves to the policy opportunities. The “intermediaries” were mostly composed of upper-middle class peasants who relied on family labor and personally practiced the diligence and frugality that were preached as policy slogans of village rehabilitation. When the push for village reorganization

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during the wartime years came into conflict with the egalitarian community ethics of the village, the intermediaries used the logic of agricultural modernization to persuade the villagers.

Ji, Su Gol (2007: 348-349, 361-362) states that the main administrative level for the colonial government’s system of local rule was not the township or the village but the county. He conceptualizes a “system of rule by government officials and community leaders.” This system corresponded to and represented continuity with the “system of rule by magistrates and local literati families” (suryŏng-sajok (yihyang) chibae ch’eje) of the Chosŏn period. Although the formal position of the county was weakened with the implementation of the township system which reorganized local administration into a two-tier system of the province and township, Ji argues that the county continued to be a site for civil complaints and petitions and maintained its place as a central space for local social movements.

He introduces groups of “community leaders” and “innovative youths” that are differentiated from the district chiefs and intermediaries (village representatives and mid-level ruling stratum) that were his focus of the abovementioned studies.17 The social background and composition of these two groups were largely indistinguishable until the 1920’s but distinct differences in their political positions began appearing with the buildup of local social movements aiming at systemic change in the 1930’s. The conflict between the two continued into the post-liberation period through the political activities of the left and right (Ji, S. 2005: 232-242). However, scholars are divided over the utility of the characteristics of these two groups as analytical concepts.18 There is empirical research on the members of provincial councils (including municipal councils), one type of public officials mentioned by 17

Ji separates individuals according to their character by stating that the “community leaders” are individuals included in registers like the Chosŏn kongjikcha myŏnggam (Register of public servants in colonial Korea) (1927) and the “innovative youths” are people in the Yojuŭi yosichallin myŏngbu (Register of suspicious people under surveillance) found in the county or village police stations (Ji, S. 2005: 199-201).

18 For example, Yun, Hae Dong (2006: 224-227) criticizes viewing “community leaders” (yuji) as a social status group because it exaggerates their power and overlooks their attributes as a mid-level ruling stratum situated between control and resistance. Kim Ik Han (2006: 69-70) is skeptical of the concept of an “innovative youth group.”

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Ji, Su Gol in his group of “community leaders.” Tong, Sun Hee (2006: 63136, 283-290) analyzed the family backgrounds, careers, home regions, and political activities of Koreans (approximately 1,400 people) who served one term or more on a provincial council between 1920 and 1945. According to the research, their average age was early to mid-40’s and they received a modern education (with about 40% having attended secondary schools).

While many of them were engaged in agriculture, a significant number (40%) worked at or owned shares in companies, stores, and banks. An examination of their careers shows that more than a few held public office in the military, police, or judicial fields before and after annexation in 1910. It is interesting to note that 30% of the total had been township heads. Some of these township heads used their authority as local spokesmen as a steppingstone to a seat on the provincial council. Ultimately, they advanced through their modern education, their commercial or industrial activities, and their participation in colonial officialdom, rather than their class background.

Many of them participated in the enlightenment and self-strengthening movement in the years before annexation or supported the movement to develop Korean capabilities (sillyŏk yangsŏngnon) after annexation. In the pursuit of modernization within the realities of colonial rule, some were satisfied with the idea of harmony between Korea and Japan or incorporation into the structure of colonial rule. Others however expressed local demands or complaints for lifestyle improvements like the expansion of social infrastructure in areas like education and argued for better treatment of Koreans. Due to this duality, they existed on an unstable boundary line situated between resistance and cooperation with Japanese colonialism.

They were trying to gain the confidence of locals as well as the trust of the Japanese, both of which were always fluid, so their position was usually quite precarious.

Finally, there are two points that should be mentioned. First is the significance and limitations of the “publicness” (konggongsŏng) as used in research on colonial political history. With the exception of the resistance movement, it was difficult to establish politics that obtained the consent of the ruled while under Japanese colonialism, and the “public sphere” (konggong yŏngyŏk) was limited to a highly restricted area of local politics. Some Korean participation within politics was part of the Japanese plan to “divide and

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rule,” and functioned as “white washing” or glossing over its colonial nature (Namiki 2003: 23). The dilemma of pursuing legitimate political activity in the colonial period was that it could be seen as approval or recognition of the system of rule and finally won over to that system. However, regardless of the colonizers’ plan, the expansion of the “public sphere” was still an opportunity for politics, albeit in distorted form. Considering its influence on post-liberation politics, empirical research in this area is an important task. Although it is in a slightly different context, Hwang Byoung Joo (2007: 9-10, 36-38) argues that the expansion of “public” was also an opportunity for greater control. The colonial government attempted to make a public (or citizenry) that accepted the idea of sacrificing personal interest for the public good, but the public pursued by Korean elites was also another means of disciplining the masses. Ji, Su Gol (2007: 356, 372) states that “public opinion” (kongnon) was often an “formal ritual” of local leader groups seeking to portray themselves as representativeness of the people and points out its limitations as a “pseudo-public” (saibi kong). These points are not issues limited only to the colonial period, but an empirical examination of the politics of that period should take these characteristics into consideration.

Second, the problem of pro-Japanese activities or collaboration is one of the central issues that must be addressed in any study of colonial political history. Namiki (1993: 34-46) divides forms of collaboration into the ideologue-type and the technocrat-type. Prominent people from the upper class who were clearly purposeful in undertaking pro-Japanese action fall into the former category, while the latter category encompasses administrators, teachers, legislators, and other participants in institutions of colonial control whose regular duties were connected to the practice of colonial control. In 1941, Korean employees of the Government-General (including educators) numbered 68,000 people, town and village employees including district chiefs totaled 74,000 people, and local council members reached 24,000 people.

Most collaborators fell into this latter category. Although the debate about “pro-Japanese” has mostly focused on the former category, collaborators from the latter category actually had much wider influence in the post-liberation.

Here we can examine the issue raised in the introduction regarding the connection of Korean self-improvement and instrumental development (kinŭng chŏk sŏngjang) with assimilation and “pro-Japanese” collaboration.

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The above-mentioned technocrat-type collaborators are the prototypical example. Of course, the instrumental growth of Koreans in this period was not limited to public servants but also included private citizens who developed in various ways, which signifies that not all were connected to assimilationist or “pro-Japanese” elements. However, this shows that the issue itself is larger than the collaboration problem and is related to modernization in the colonial period. Koreans in this period had a strong orientation toward modernization and civilization under the imposition of “modernity as hegemony” that will be discussed later. On the flip side, the colonial government presented itself as both the provider of modern facilities in various aspects of life and the spokesperson for modernization, even while applying coercive pressure. If a Korean wanted to encounter the modern in whatever form, contact with the colonial government was inevitable.

Collaborators experienced the modern before anyone else and pursued modern desires that would elevate their status. Based on this point, Namiki (2003: 24-25) conceptualized the issue of collaboration as “the site of actual contact between the ‘modern’ and the ruled,” which allowed an examination of the special qualities of modernization under colonial rule.

Previous research on colonial political history has focused on the national independence movement, but there is a need to include the transformation of the structure and policies of Japanese colonial rule as well as the various reactions and cooperation of Koreans within the “colonial public sphere.”19 When the mutual interactions between them are considered, then it will be possible to see the contradictions and dynamism of colonial politics.

19

In regards to the debate over “colonial publicness” (singminji konggongsŏng) and collaboration, Ji, Su Gol (2005: 243) admitted need to overcome the binary historical understanding by deconstructing the existing history of the colonial period, but was also cautious of falling into a reverse bias in the process. In other words, the concern is that by “grey-ifying” the historical understanding of this period, “it results in obscuring the course of political actions necessary for addressing the pro-Japanese issue and achieving social justice.” However, the aim of their debate is to explain the complex, entangling reality as well as the contradictions of colonial politics, which does not allow for directly addressing the issues of social justice and political practice.

The former aim is an expression of empirical interest, while the latter is premised on value judgments.

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IV. Colonial Society and Culture: “Colonial Modernity” The scope of inquiry regarding imperialism is continuing to expand. Study of the colonial structure is no longer limited to the military and political but includes issues of culture, epistemology, and consciousness. In other words, interest is moving from the material to the cultural. Scholars of postcolonialism argue that although formal military and political rule ended with the collapse of the colonial system, the negative legacies of colonial control in culture and consciousness have continued.

Post-colonialism theory has arisen against the theoretical backdrop of the critique of modernity of post-modernism, the body and discipline and the knowledge and power of Michel Foucault, and the Orientalism of Edward Said. Power was usually identified by power holders exerting their will through coercion. However, a characteristic of the modern is that even without the control or coercion of authorities, the self-regulation of individuals operates through modern subjectivity. Modern power works through micro-power structures, like schools and factories, on the soul and body of individuals within the institutions and manifests itself in disciplinary power that tames the individual as modern subjects (Foucault 1975).

Furthermore, there is power in all knowledge. Since power works through knowledge, there is an inseparable relationship between modern power and knowledge. Rather than simply suppressing or prohibiting, power chose a form to accomplish its aims through the production of knowledge (Lee, J. 1998: 129-145). As a result, control was not through simple coercion but by gaining voluntary consent, or hegemony. The modern forms of power (disciplinary power, power and knowledge, hegemony) were also achieved in colonial Korea. Because this power had the characteristic of operating through the realms of body, knowledge, and culture, it continued to exist in forms like Orientalism even after the collapse of the colonial system (Said 1978).

Let us examine three research trends in regards to this critical approach.

First, there is research focusing on modern subjectivity and colonial disciplinary power. Kim, Jin Kyun and Jung, Keun Sik (1997: 23-25) emphasize

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that the colonial government made the people into objects of control, but went further by trying to instill a self-reproducing subjectivity within each individual that forced him/her to respect and maintain the colonial order on their own. The Japanese repeatedly injected various types of discipline, in the form of “regulation of the mind” (K. simdŭk, J. kokoroe), into everyday life in an attempt to internalize and impress control upon the colonial body and soul. The sites for this training and education were the family, schools, factories, hospitals, and other institutions of the modern social system. The discipline did not simply contain a modern character, but also incorporated the logic of “making imperial subjects” (hwangminhwa) that distinguished it from Western colonialism. The Japanese were making imperial subjects who had internalized modern discipline and were constructing a system to mobilize them for war. In the division system of the post-liberation period, this control was reproduced in “corporeal anti-communist unconsciousness” (saengch’ehwa toen pan’gong muŭisik). Therefore, overcoming the division system does not stop with changes in the political and military dimensions, but involves the elimination of modern colonial power that has been inscribed upon the body and the consciousness to the present day.

How do we prove the inscription and internalization of disciplinary power and its continuity into the post-liberation period? Kim, Jin Kyun et al. (1997: 109-111) argue that secondary schools under the Japanese were aiming at the making of “industrial-type people” (sanŏphyŏng in’gan) and “soldiertype people” (pyŏngsahyŏng in’gan), and they used various means (corporal punishment, repetitive training, group activity, influencing the subconscious) to internalize discipline in children. In order to make modern workers in the factories, the Japanese used force in the form of fines, violence, and punishment, as well as values education through bonuses and commendations (Kang, Y. 1997: 152-164). Understanding the extent to which this discipline was internalized requires an examination of those on the receiving end, but this is difficult due to the limited records. Kang, Yi Soo (1997: 165-166) states that the disciplinary measures did not accomplish much due to Korean resistance or passive evasion, but does not explore further.

The critique of Chun, Woo Yong (1998: 419) is related to this point.

He states, “Colonial modern is a modernity where the mechanism of internalization did not work or could not work,” which explains why the

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Japanese continually resorted to punishment and coercion. There were fundamental limits to applying the logic of modern subjectivity, which was premised on Western society, to a colony under Japanese control. In addition, training sites for internalization like schools were inherently limited, while the imposition of the ideology of “making imperial subjects” was concentrated in the wartime period. From this perspective, the question of where to find colonialism becomes a topic for debate. Is it found in the argument that disciplinary power was internalized (where the logic of “making imperial subjects” worked together with the modern character)? Or is it found in the argument that internalization was difficult to achieve? Regardless, proving either contention is crucial.

The second research trend was influenced by post-modernism and sought to abandon the existing essentialist and binary historical understanding based on race and class. Instead, it focused on uncovering the diverse identities and complex histories hidden by the existing scholarship (Shin, G. 1997). According to this view, Western history cannot be considered universal history and the diverse courses of historical development should be recognized. Modernity is not a positive value that non-Western societies must chase but should itself be recognized as an object for critique. In particular, it is difficult to separate modernity and colonialism in countries that have experienced colonial control, but it is important to see the relationship between the two. Shin and Robinson (1999) are representative of this trend. In approaching the colonial period, they extract the keywords of colonialism, modernity, and nationalism and focus on the complex and subtle relationships between them. The introduction of the concept of “cultural hegemony” in their analytical perspective shows how colonialism did not simply rely on coercion but pursued hegemonic control. Within this context, they argue that there was an indivisible relationship between colonialism and modernity (Shin and Robinson 1999: 46).

For example, Lee, C. (1999) prefers to focus on the modern changes of colonial rule, rather than citing the repressive and undemocratic nature of colonialism as proof that it was a premodern form of rule. The colonial state established a legal system, utilized a sharply strengthened police force, and interfered in the minute details of everyday Korean life. The state inserted itself into hygiene, road maintenance, agriculture and sideline occupations,

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savings campaigns, and even the mediation of private disputes. While it naturally engaged in statistical surveys, the colonial state also intruded into the previously private realms of traditional society, like clothing, funerals, butchery, burials, brewing, and tobacco cultivation. Beyond rule that relied only on laws, the state attempted “spiritual rule” (chŏngsin e taehan chibae) through the ideology of “making loyal subjects.” The mode of power and control described here was different from Western modernity, but the differences in comparison with the previous period are starkly apparent. Shin and Han (1999) discuss the changes in the relationship between the colonial state and rural society through the implementation of the Rural Revitalization Movement of the 1930’s. This movement was the response of the colonial state to the intensification of the rural crisis resulting from the agricultural depression in the late 1920’s and the proliferation of tenant disputes. The significance of the movement was the state’s shift from its previous policy of caring for landlords to a social policy of protecting peasants. The movement not only focused on the economic rehabilitation of rural villages but also emphasized the spiritual aspect as well, thus indicating the extension of ideological and hegemonic rule to the masses. In the process, new village leadership was nurtured, like the previously-mentioned prominent people, along with the expansion of an organizational network of semi-official groups (village revitalization committees, credit unions, and mutual assistance associations for production [siksan kye]) that increased the grip of the state over rural villages. The resultant system could be called a “colonial corporatism” that provided the model for the post-liberation state-society relationship as expressed in the New Village Movement (Saemaŭl undong).

Robinson (1999) uses the subject of radio broadcasts to show the diverse, paradoxical effects of modern technology on colonial society. The Keijo Broadcast Corporation began broadcasting in 1927 as another means of promoting political control and assimilation in Korea. In the beginning, broadcasts were made in both Japanese and Korean. In order to expand the number of receivers and listeners, the station added a Korean-only broadcast channel, which became an opportunity to quickly increase radio sales.

Although this broadcast was under the control of the Government-General, it took the form of artistic performances with a Korean bond of emotional sympathy that transcended class and created a space of cultural autonomy. On

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the one hand, radio broadcasts were a modern technology that played a role in extending cultural hegemony in support of colonial control. On the other hand, they were also a double-edged sword that contributed to the formation of Korean identity through a new technological means, in direct opposition to the intent of the colonial government. The complex, subtle relationship intertwining colonialism and modernity is clearly apparent in this example.

Third, the above-mentioned critical approach is related to the current interest in everyday life in the colonial period. Research in this area appears in diverse forms but Jung, Keun Sik (2006: 16-21) divides critical approaches or methodologies of research on everyday life into the “quotidian as the object” and the “quotidian as the method.” The former approach disregards the structural or institutional aspects in favor of pursuing the concrete details of everyday life. In other words, this approach seeks to uncover the complex and varied reality within the realm of everyday life (such things as apathy, evasion, entertainment, and pleasure lying outside of resistance and collaboration) that cannot be captured in the dichotomy of domination and resistance. The latter approach seeks to rediscover the structure, the system, and policies of rule within the various aspects of daily life. The focus of this approach is to find the macroscopic aspects of colonial control hidden within the microscopic phenomenon of daily life. In the process, this approach also seeks the “cracks” and the “fissures” in which colonial aims were subverted.

Research on everyday life in the colonial period is quite diverse, but only the following two examples will be introduced. First, Kong, Jae Wook (2006) addresses the topic of clothes and discusses Japanese control of clothing that saw the suppression of white clothes in favor of colored clothes and the wartime promotion of loose trousers and Japanese clothing. The logic of suppressing white clothes was based on ideas of economic efficiency because those clothes had to be washed often and were inappropriate as work clothes, but the change was also based on the idea of changing aspects of traditional life in the making of “citizens” (kungmin). These trends were even more pronounced during the war. These attempts were not always accomplished according to Japanese plans, which indicates the cracks and fissures that appeared. This research shows the process by which the personal realm of clothing and lifestyle was invaded by the logic of efficiency and modernization on the one hand and by the domineering logic of Japanese

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colonialism on the other hand. Thus, the establishment of this kind of system appears broadly in the research of colonial everyday life.

Jung, Keun Sik (2006) uses the topic of chemical seasoning (Ajinomoto) to show the process by which modern “taste” was formed in colonial Korea and continued into the post-liberation period. Through advertising and the application of the image of science, chemical seasoning found a new market and changed both food culture and the idea of taste. It was the modernization of food lifestyle driven by private capital (min’gan chabon).

However, this particular pleasure was only available to some social strata, which left many Koreans unable to satisfy their desires. Through an analysis of the “8-year chemical seasoning war” between Miwŏn and Mip’ung in the 1970’s, Jung shows how both companies used sales strategies that appealed to the frustrated appetites and envy of consumers who still remembered the taste of Ajinomoto. By using pertinent documents, Jung was able to explore the concept of “taste” as well as the continuity of “frustrated desires,” which are usually difficult to substantiate. The debate on colonial modernity, which has heretofore been focused on the issue of state power, has been expanded to include research that captures the transformation of daily life by market principles led by private capital.

The research trends described above illustrate the characteristics of the “colonial modernity” viewpoint. Colonialism and modernity are not regarded as exclusive terms, like that found in traditional understanding, but rather as tied together within an indivisible relationship. Depending on how the relationship between the two is arranged, a variety of opinions can be accommodated. Shin and Robinson (1999) use the term “colonial modernity” in the title of their book, and while they do not offer a concrete definition, they emphasize the three-way relationship between colonialism, modernity, and nationalism. However, Shin and Robinson are criticized because within the three-way relationship, their stress is on modernity. Park, Myoung Kyu (2001: 51) argues that among the three, the concepts of modernity and nationalism are clear, but the meaning of colonialism is sketchy and ambiguous. It is similar to the criticism that it is a “colonial modernity that omits colonialism” (Do, M. 2006: 16-20). Cho, Hyung Keun (2006: 61) also criticizes the perception that modernity was first originated in the West and subsequently expanded (or was transformed) into colonial societies.

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Consequently, the meaning of colonialism based on this perception became nothing more than “modernity that occurred in the colonial period.”

Then what about these critiques? If modernity and colonialism in the “colonial modernity” understood by Cho, Hyung Keun (2006: 61-67, 75-77) are not different, then colonialism and modernity itself should be criticized and the goal should be to overcome both. If Shin and Robinson (1999) argue that modernity and colonialism are different and the interdependent relationship between the two must be understood, then Cho emphasizes the sameness and duplication of the two. Colonialism is contained within modernity and colonialism is a manifestation of modernity. Consequently, the difference between the modernity of the West that dominated their colonies and the modernity of colonies that were dominated then becomes ambiguous. If “colonialism and modernity are not different situations,” then the logical contradictions within the argument that the difference between the two should be uncovered become apparent.

Matsumoto (2002: 42) sees modernity and colonialism as each responding to “simultaneity” and “stages.” The development of modern transportation and communications technologies allowed faster circulation of people, goods, capital, and information, a “simultaneity” which occurred even under colonial rule. The “simultaneity” of the colonial period was initiated by Western culture (mainly via Japan), but the limitation of contact to certain social strata shows the nature of “stages.” Regardless of the fact that many colonial people were alienated and frustrated in their attempts to enjoy Western culture, their longing did not diminish, which only strengthened colonial hegemony.

The colonial government used this longing as stepping-stone to establish a form of colonialism where the people pursued their own modernization and civilization. From this perspective, modernization was another means of domination by which hegemony could be achieved. This shows the close accord between colonialism and modernity. However, the nature of “stages” is closer to the idea of late development than to colonialism. That logic generally appears in various undeveloped regions, even if they are not colonies.

The debate on “colonial modernity” covers more research than those listed here, but it is difficult to find a definition that includes all of them. If they have something in common, it is the fact that they share a critical consciousness that recognizes the close relationship between colonialism and modernity.

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From this viewpoint, there is little that separates the “colonial modernity” view from the “colonial modernization” view. The former argues that it is fundamentally different from the latter by emphasizing its differences, but as discussed before, the differences are only exaggerated because of the injection of positive or negative value judgments on modernity. Furthermore, the colonialism that they present is slanted toward the aspects of culture and consciousness. Regardless of their emphasis on colonialism, it is relegated to a secondary role in comparison to modernity (Shin and Robinson, eds. 1999); or colonialism is equated to modernity, throwing the concept into chaos (Cho, H. K. 2006), or colonialism is substituted for backwardness (Matsumoto 2002). Therefore, colonialism should not only be considered in the cultural aspect, but it is important to consider the contradictions in the system of rule and colonial politics as described in the previous section.

V. Conclusion How should we construct the entirety of Korean society in the colonial period? There are great differences among scholars according to their interests and their academic backgrounds. Each academic field has its own distinctive concepts and methods and while it is necessary to recognize the characteristics and differences between the fields, it is also important to aim at communication and synthesis as well. Let us consider the complementary relationships between the three areas we considered earlier; the colonial economy (A), the colonial system of rule and politics (B), and society and culture (C).

First, let us examine the relationship between (A) and (B). There were two points raised in the introduction. The first point was the issue of how to understand development and “exploitation” within a comprehensive framework. As stated above, attempts to prove exploitation in everyday economic transactions, as argued by the exploitation view, ultimately failed.

Despite the colonial system of control, there existed an economic sphere where autonomous transactions could be undertaken and that sphere operated according to its own logic. The importance of understanding the balance between different spheres should be recognized. The second point

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is that the self-improvement and instrumental development of Koreans ultimately depended on a subordinate incorporation, assimilation, or a “proJapanese” orientation. Under Japanese imperialism, Koreans who sought the modern were confronted by this dilemma of colonial politics. However, it is impossible to categorically conclude that economic development or Korean self-improvement had to fall under the colonial system of control. In the long term, those activities were significant because they provided the economic foundation for post-liberation society. The colonial economy (A) was under the restrictions of the colonial system (B), but it was not a unilaterally regulated relationship.

Next is the relationship between (B) and (C). The colonial system was maintained not only through the force of the bureaucratic apparatus and the military (B), but also through cultural hegemony and the regulatory force internalized in the body and soul of the colonial people (C). Seeing the complementary relationship between the two allows a fuller understanding of colonial domination.

Next is the relationship between (A) and (C). The development of a market economy and the advance of capitalism, industrialization, and urbanization (A) brought vast changes to everyday life and the realm of the consciousness (C). In comparison to the period of high-speed growth in the post-liberation period, the scale and scope of this process was limited but clearly there in the colonial period. If the “colonial modernization” view was focused on the former (A), then the “colonial modernity” view focused on the phenomena of the latter (C). Regardless of the emphasis of both views on the differences in their conceptions, they are still interrelated. In order to see the whole of society in the colonial period, the realities of (A), (B), and (C) should be examined, but the interrelationships between the three must also be considered.

Finally, the last point put forward in the introduction was the question of continuity or rupture between the colonial period and the post-liberation period. Judgment on this point differs greatly depending on the area (politics, economy, or society and culture) as well as the perspective of the researcher. Looking at the political sphere, there is a clear break between the colonial system and the independent state. On the other hand, the internal development view (naejae chŏk palchŏn non) sees continuity between

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the colonial system (or dependency on foreign powers) and the national movement (or minjung movement) that opposed it throughout the early twentieth century. Although the viewpoints are different, “strong state and weak society” (Matsumoto 1998) and “colonial corporatism” (Shin and Han 1999) also see continuity between periods.

In terms of the economic sphere, both aspects of continuity and rupture can be found. Some argue that the model “developmental state” (kaebal kukka) found in Korean capitalism or the Park Chung Hee system had its origins in the colonial period (Eckert 1991; Kohli 1994). However, there is still insufficient empirical evidence to support that argument. For example, the interventionist state is cited as evidence for the colonial origins argument of the developmental state, but this phenomenon was limited to the period of wartime control and cannot be retroactively applied to the previous period (Kim, N. N. 2006a: 200-208). In fact, the institutional legacy and totalitarianism of the wartime control system remained strong in North Korea (Kimura 1999a, 1999b). While South Korea was partially influenced by the control system in the post-liberation period, it inherited the market system of the pre-wartime period. Using the outbreak of war between Japan and China in 1937 as the turning-point of the colonial period, the economic systems before and after were qualitatively different and debate on the continuity or discontinuity of the economic system should consider this difference.

On the other hand, there is also the argument emphasizing discontinuity in the economy. For example, Huh, Soo Youl (2005: 313-330) argues for discontinuity based on the fact that only one-tenth of all manufacturing assets before liberation was ultimately inherited by South Korea due to peninsular division and the Korean War. Industrialization in this period disappeared like a mirage and the South Korean economy was turned back into the agricultural society that existed before annexation. Consideration of human capital and the institutional legacy was excluded from the study due to difficulties in finding proof, but the influence of these factors over the long term was certainly more important than the material assets. Chung Jae Jeong (1996b: 114-115) argues that irrespective of the fact that North Korea inherited more of the legacy of colonial industrialization than South Korea, the failure of the North Korean economy invalidates the continuity argument.

However, his argument is deductions based on a premise limited to material

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assets, which overlooks the importance of the system.

Studies of society and culture emphasize the continuity argument. For example, Kim, Jin Kyun and Jung, Keun Sik (1997: 15-20) emphasize that the disciplinary power of the colonial period and the logic of wartime mobilization were inscribed upon the bodies and consciousness of the Korean people and continued in the post-liberation period, supporting the system of North-South Korea division. They define “the colonial modernization” view as the discourse of “positive continuity” in the sense that it simply accepts both the present and the past as positive, and differentiate this view from their discourse of “negative continuity.” The research (Sin, J. 2006) which emphasizes the continuity of the militarization of physical education from the period of wartime mobilization into the 1970’s Yusin (Renewal) system falls into the same category.

As demonstrated above, evaluations can be separated into diverse groups according to the research interests and perspectives of scholars. In the economic sphere, judgments can vary based on whether one is limited to material assets or focuses on the institutional aspects. Furthermore, it is possible to discuss continuity or discontinuity depending on the specific element, but it is difficult to discuss continuity or discontinuity across the two periods from a comprehensive perspective. In order to make communication and synthesis between various fields of researches possible, at least two things are required. First is the elimination of value judgments from those evaluations. Failure to do this will result in the exclusion of differing evaluations.20 Also, there is a need for more empirical research on 20

Among historical research, studies advocating praxis face a similar issue. Studies that emphasize “modernity as an aim,” which exists outside of “modernity as existence,” would be one example (Chung, Y. 2000: 153-163). Studies in the latter category are interested in history as “explanation,” while studies in the former category, are focused on praxis. In the case of the former, values dictating the aim of research, political evaluations to put those values into practice, and ideology are apt to interfere. As a result, other perspectives are excluded and communication becomes difficult.

This is linked the issue in history about what should be studied. In this respect, the “colonial modernization” view relies on proof in historical research and is limited to explanations of the phenomenon. On the other hand, the “exploitation” view (which is the flip-side of the “internal development” view) gives serious consideration of praxis.

In this regard, the “colonial modernity” view is close to the latter perspective, but does

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the elements and ways the pre-liberation period has affected the present.

In comparison to material factors, it is difficult to prove the continuity of institutions, structures, and internalized consciousness. In this respect, topics remaining for research far outnumber topics that have been researched.

These two points should not be limited to the problem of continuity and discontinuity, but should apply to the entirety of research on the colonial period.

Reference Books and Articles in Korean Ahn, Byung Jik, 1997, “New Paradigm of Research on Modern History of Korea’, The Quarterly Changbi (Creation and Criticism) 98: 39-58, Changbi Publishers (“한국 근현대사 연구의 새로운 패러다임”, 『창작과 비평』 98: 39-58).

Bae, Sung Jun, 2000, “Debate on ‘Colonial Modernity’,” Dangdae Bipyeong 13: 161-178) (“‘식민지 근대화’ 논쟁의 한계 지점에 서서”, 『당대비평』 13: 161-78).

Cha, Myung Soo, 2006, “Economic Growth, Income Distribution, Structural Change,” in Kim, Nak Nyeon ed., Economic Growth in Korea: 1910-1945, Seoul National University Press (“경제성장·소득분배·구조변화”, 『한국의 경 제성장 1910-1945』, pp. 299-341).

Cho, Hyung Keun, 2006, “Research Trend on Colonial Modernity in Korea”, in Kong, Jae-Wook and Jung, Keun-Sik eds., Daily Life in Colonial Period: Rule and Crack, Munhwa kwahaksa, pp. 49-82 (“한국의 식민지 근대성 연구 의 흐름”, 『식민지의 일상: 지배와 균열』).

Chun, Woo Yong, 1998, “Book Review: New Paradigm for Research on Modern History of Korea, a Limit of Newness,” Critical Review of History 43: 416420 (“서평: 한국근대사 연구의 새 틀, 그 새로움의 한계”, 『역사비평』 43: 416-20).

Chung, Jae Jeong, 1996a, “Colonial Industrialization and Korea’s Economic Development,” in Research Team of Modern History in Joongang Daily Unification Research Institute ed., Inquiring Once Again What Japan is, Hangilsa, pp. 39-75 (“식민지공업화와 한국의 경제발전”, 중앙일보 통일문화연구 소 현대사연구팀 편, 『일본의 본질을 다시 묻는다』, 한길사). , 1996b, “Achievements and Tasks of 1980s’ Studies on Economic History not have a clear direction for praxis.

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in Colonial Period,” in Institute for Korean Historical Studies eds., Korea’s ‘Modern’ and Critique of ‘Modernity’, pp. 77-115 (“1980년대 일제시기 경제사 연구의 성과와 과제”, 『한국의 ‘근대’와 ‘근대성’ 비판』, 역사비평사).

Chung, Youn Tae, “Modern Korean History in the 21st century and Seeking for New Theory of Modern History”, in Korean History Research Association ed., Historical Studies in the 20th and 21st century, pp. 125-63, The Institute for Korean Historical Studies (“21세기의 한국근대사 연구와 신근대사론의 모 색”, 『20세기 역사학, 21세기 역사학』).

Do, Myoun Hoi, 2006, “Translator’s Commentary: Colonial History from the Perspective of De-nationalism,” Shin, Gi Wook and Robinson, Michael, eds., Colonial Modernity in Korea, translated by Do, Myoun Hoi (“옮긴이의 글: 탈 민족주의 관점에서 바라본 식민지 시기 역사”, 『한국의 식민지 근대성』).

Dong, Sun Hee, 2006, “A Study on Korean Members of Provincial Councils in Colonial Period,” Doctoral dissertation, The Academy of Korean Studies (“일제하 조선인 도평의회·도회의원 연구”, 한국학중앙연구원 한국학대학원 박사 학위논문).

Huh, Soo Youl, 1981, “An Estimate of Real Wage in Colonial Korea,” Review of Economic History 5: 213-246 (“일제하 실질임금(변동)추계”, 『경제사학』 5: 21346). , 2005, Development without Development, Eunhaengnamu (『개발 없는 개 발』). , 2006, “The Mistaken Perception of the Colonial Economy in the Reinterpretation of the Independence Era,” Critical Review of History 75: 149-212 (“『해방전후사의 재인식』의 식민지경제에 대한 인식 오류”, 『역사비평』, 75: 149-212).

Hwang, Byoung Joo, 2007, “Diffusion and Reformation of Concept of ‘Public (公)’ in Colonial Period,” Society and History 73: 5-44 (“식민지 시기 ‘공’ 개념의 확 산과 재구성”, 『사회와 역사』, 73:5-44).

Ji, Su Gol, 2005, “A Study on the Local Power Elite Groups and the Reformist Youth Groups in Buyeo County and Nonsan County in the Period of Japanese Colonial Rule,” Han’guk Munhwa: Korean Culture 36: 197-247 (“일 제시기 충남 부여·논산군의 유지집단과 혁신청년집단”, 『한국문화』 36: 197-247). , 2007, “Local Ruling System and Gun-level ‘Bureaucratic OfficialsLocal Influentials’ Collaboration under Japanese Colonial Rule,” YOKSA WA HYONSIL: Quarterly Review of Korean History 63: 345-379, The Organization Of Korean Historians (“일제하 지방통치 시스템과 군 단위 ‘관 료-유지 지배체제’”, 『역사와 현실』 63: 345-79).

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Joo, Ik Jong, 2006, “Living Standards in Colonial Period,” in Park, Ji Hang et al. eds., New Understanding of Korean History Before and After Liberation, Ch’aeksesang, pp. 107-144 (“식민지 시기의 생활수준”, 『해방전후사의 재인식』).

Jung, Keun Sik, 2006a, “Significance of Research on Daily Life in Colonial Period”, in Kong, Jae-Wook and Jung, Keun-Sik eds., Daily Life in Colonial Period: Rule and Crack, Munhwa kwahaksa, pp. 13-46 (“식민지 일상생활 연 구의 의의와 과제”, 『식민지의 일상: 지배와 균열』). , 2006b, “Empire of Taste, Advertisement, and Colonial Legacy,” in Kong, Jae-Wook and Jung, Keun-Sik eds., Daily Life in Colonial Period: Rule and Crack, Munhwa kwahaksa, pp. 193-228 (“맛의 제국, 광고, 식민지적 유산”, 『식 민지의 일상: 지배와 균열』).

Jung, Tae Hern, 1995, “Capital Outflow and Tax Policy in Colonial Period,” YOKSA WA HYONSIL: Quarterly Review of Korean History 18: 189-224 (“일제하 자금유출구조와 조세정책”, 『역사와 현실』 18: 189-224). , 2004, “Problems of Approaching Colonial Economy with Economic Growth Theory,” in Park, Sub et al., Understanding and Critique of Colonial Modernization, Baeksan Sŏdang, pp. 59-101 (“연구사를 통해 본 경제성장론 식민지상의 대두배경과 문제점”, 『식민지 근대화론의 이해와 비판』). , 2007, Reflection on Colonial Modernity of Korea, Sŏnin (『한국의 식민지적 근대 성찰』).

Kang, Yi Soo, 1997, “Factory System and Work Discipline,” in Kim, Jin Kyun and Jung, Keun Sik eds., Modern Subjectivity and Colonial Disciplinary Power, Munhwakwahaksa (“공장체제와 노동규율”, 『근대주체와 식민지 규율권력』).

Kim, Dong No, 2003, “Reshaping Perception of Colonial Period,” in Kim, Kŭiok et al., Studies on Social History of Korea, Nanam Publishing House, pp.

303-334 (“식민지시기 인식의 새로운 방향 정립”, 『한국사회사연구』). , 2004, “Modernity and Colonization of Daily Life in Colonial Period,” in Yonsei University Institute For Korean Studies eds., Japanese Colonial Rule and Daily Life, Hyean (“식민지시기 일상생활의 근대성과 식민지성”, 『일제의 식 민지배와 일상생활』).

Kim, Dong-Myung, 2006, Rule, Resistance, and Collaboration, Kŏngin munhwasa (『지배와 저항, 그리고 협력』).

Kim, Ik Han, 2006, “Colonial Rule on Township and Changes in Social Structure in Rural Area,” in Kim, Dong No ed., Formation of Ruling System in Colonial Korea, Hyean, pp. 65-110 (“일제의 면 지배와 농촌사회구조의 변화”, 『일제 식민지 시기의 통치체제 형성』).

Kim, Jin Kyun and Jung, Keun Sik eds., 1997, Modern Subjectivity and Colonial

A Reconsideration of ‘Colonial Modernization’ 259

Disciplinary Power, Munhwa kwahaksa (『근대주체와 식민지 규율권력』).

Kim, Jin Kyun and Jung, Keun Sik, 1997, “Colonial System and Modern Discipline,” in Kim, Jin Kyun and Jung, Keun Sik eds. (1997), Modern Subjectivity and Colonial Disciplinary Power, Munhwa kwahaksa, pp. 1329 (“식민지체제와 근대적 규율”, 김진균·정근식 편, 『근대주체와 식민지 규율권 력』).

Kim, Jin Kyun, Jung, Keun Sik, and Kang Yi Soo, 1997, “Primary School System and Discipline,” in Kim, Jin Kyun and Jung, Keun Sik eds. (1997), Modern Subjectivity and Colonial Disciplinary Power, Munhwa kwahaksa, pp. 76116) (“보통학교체제와 학교 규율”, 『근대주체와 식민지 규율권력』).

Kim, Jin Song, 1999, Formation of Modernity: Allow Dance Hall in Seoul, Hyŏnsil munhwa yŏn’gu (Cultural Studies) (『현대성의 형성: 서울에 딴스홀을 허하라』).

Kim, Nak Nyeon, 2003, The Korean Economy under Japanese Colonial Rule, Haenam (『일제하 한국경제』). , 2004, “An Estimate of Korea’s Balance of Payments in the Colonial Period”, Review of Economy History, 37: 3-50 (“식민지기 조선의 ‘국제수지’ 추 계”, 『경제사학』 37: 3-50). , 2005, “Book Review: Huh, Soo-Youl, Development without Development”, Review of Economy History, 38: 211-219 (“서평: 『개발 없는 개발』(허수열 저)”, 『경제 사학』 38: 211-219). , 2006a, “Reconsideration on Industrialization in Colonial Period,” in Park, Jihang et. al. eds., New Understanding of Korean History Before and After Liberation, Ch’aeksesang, pp. 188-228 (“식민지 시기의 공업화 재론”, 『해 방전후사의 재인식 1』). , 2006b, “Was Koreans’ Living Standard Aggravated during the Japanese Colonial Rule?”, Critical Review of History 77: 320-335 (“일제하 조선인의 생 활수준은 악화되었을까?”, 『역사비평』 77: 320-335).

Kim, Nak Nyeon ed., 2006, Economic Growth in Korea: 1910-1945, Seoul National University Press (『한국의 경제성장 1910-1945』).

Kim, Nak Nyeon and Park, Ki Joo, 2007, “Consumer Price Index and Real Wage in Seoul, 1936-1956,” Review of Economy History 42: 71-105 (“해방 전후 (1936-1956년) 서울의 물가와 임금”, 『경제사학』 42: 71-105).

Kong, Jae Wook, 2006, “Control on Clothes and Making ‘Nation’,” in Kong, Jae Wook and Jung, Keun Sik eds., Daily Life in Colonial Period: Rule and Crack, Munhwa kwahaksa (“의복통제와 ‘국민’ 만들기”, 『식민지의 일상: 지배와 균열』).

Kong, Jae Wook and Jung, Keun Sik eds., 2006, Daily Life in Colonial Period: Rule

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and Crack, Munhwa kwahaksa (『식민지의 일상: 지배와 균열』).

Lee, Jung-Woo, 1998, “Translator’s Commentary,” Michel Foucault, L’ordre du discours, translated by Lee Jung-Woo, Sogang University Press, pp. 55-153 (“역 자해설”, 『담론의 질서』) Park, Myoung Kyu, 1991, “The Worn - Out Theory in a New Fashion,” The Journal of Korean History 75: 157-184 (“낡은 논리의 새로운 형태: 宮嶋博史의 『朝鮮土地事業史の研究』 비판”, 『한국사연구』, 75: 157-184). , 2001, “On Time and Space in Colonial Historical Sociology,” Seok, Hyun Ho and Lew, Seok Choon eds., Debate on the Nature of Modern Korean Society: Colony, Class, Personality Ethic, Jontong gua Hyundae, pp. 35-57 (“식민지 역사사회학의 시공간성에 대하여”, 『현대 한국사회 성격논쟁: 식민지, 계 급, 인격윤리』).

Park, Ji Hang, 2000, Imperialism: Myth and Reality, Seoul National University Press (『제국주의 신화와 현실』).

Shin, Gi Wook, 1997, “Research Trend on Colonial Korea”, Citizens’ forum on Korean history 20: 43-57 (“식민지 조선 연구의 동향”, 『한국사 시민강좌』 20: 4357).

Shin, Yong Ha, 1997, “Critique on Reestablishment of ‘Colonial Modernization’,” The Quarterly Changbi (Creation and Criticism) 98: 8-38, Changbi Publishers (“‘식민지근대화론’ 재정립 시도에 대한 비판”, 『창작과 비평』 98: 8-38).

Sin, Ju Back, 2006, “Militarization of Physical Education and Forced Health,” in Kong, Jae-Wook and Jung, Keun-Sik eds., Daily Life in Colonial Period: Rule and Crack, Munhwa kwahaksa, pp. 229-256 (“체육교육의 군사화와 강 제된 건강”, 『식민지의 일상: 지배와 균열』).

Yun, Hae Dong, 2004, “Colonial Modern and Advent of Mass Society,” in Lim, Jie-Hyun and Lee, Sung shi eds., Beyond Myth of Nationalist History, Humanist, pp. 233-263 (“식민지 근대와 대중사회의 등장”, 『국사의 신화를 넘어 서』). , 2006a, Colonial Gray Area, The Institute For Korean Historical Studies (『식민지의 회색지대』). , 2006b, Rule and Autonomy, Critical Review of History (『지배와 자치』).

Books and Articles in Japanese Hori, Kazuo, 1995, Historical Analysis on Industrialization of Korea, Yuhikyaku (『朝鮮工業化の史的分析』).

Kimura, Mithuhiko, 1999, North Korean Economy from Emergence to Collapse, Soubunsha (『北朝鮮の経済: 起源·形成·崩壊』).

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Matsumato, Takenori, 1998, Colonial Power and Korean Peasants, Shakai hyoronsha (『植民地権力と朝鮮農民』). , 2002, “Recent Research Trend on ‘Colonial Modernity’ in Korea,” Asia Keizai 43(9): 31-45 (「朝鮮における「植民地的近代」, 『アジア経済』 43(9): 31-45).

Mizoguchi T. and Umemura M., 1988, Economic Statistics of Former Japanese Colonies: Estimation and Analysis, Touyou keizai shinposhya (『旧日本植民 地経済統計 推計と分析』).

Namiki, Masahito, 1993, “Political Participation of Koreans in Colonial Period,” Chosenshi kenkyukai ronbunsyu 31: 29-59 (「植民地期朝鮮人の政治参加につい て」, 『朝鮮史研究会論文集』, 31, 29-59). , 1999, “Commentary on Political and Social Historical Research of Colonial Korea,” Chosen bunka kenkyu 6: 109-130 (「植民地期朝鮮政治·社会 史研究に関する試論」, 『朝鮮文化研究』 6: 109-130). , 2003, “‘Colonial Modernity’, ‘Colonial Public Sphere’, ‘Collaboration with Japan’”, Kokusai kouryu kenkyu 5: 1-42 (「朝鮮における「植民地近代性」·「植民 地公共性」·対日協力 ― 植民地政治史·社会史研究のための予備的考察」, 『国際交 流研究』(フェリス女学院大学), 5, 1-42).

Books and Articles in English Cha, Myung Soo, 1998, “Imperial Policy or World Price Shocks? Explaining Interwar Korean Consumption Trend,” Journal of Economic History 58(3): 731-754.

Cha, Myung Soo and Kim, Nak Nyeon, 2006, “Korea’s First Industrial Revolution, 1911-40,” Naksungdae Institute of Economic Research Working Paper, 2006-3.

Eckert, Carter, 1991, Offspring of Empire: The Koch’ang Kims and the Colonial Origins of Korean Capitalism, 1876-1945, University of Washington Press.

Foucault Michel, 1975, Surveiler et punir: Naissance de la prison, translated by O, Saeng Keun (2003), Nanam Ch’ulpan.

Kimura, Mitsuhiko, 1999, “From Fascism to Communism: Continuity and Development of Collectivist Economic Policy in North Korea,” Economic History Review, New Series 52(1): 69-86.

Kohli, Atul, 1994, “Where do High Growth Political Economies Come From? The Lineage of Korea’s ‘Developmental State’”, World Development 22(9): 12691293.

Lee, Chul Woo,1999, “Modernity, Legality, and Power in Korea Under Japanese Rule,” in Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson, eds., Colonial Modernity in

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Korea, Harvard University Press.

Robinson, Michael, 1999, “Broadcasting, Cultural Hegemony, and Colonial Modernity in Korea, 1924-1945,” in Gi Wook Shin and Michael Robinson, eds., Colonial Modernity in Korea, Harvard University Press.

Said, Edward, 1978, Orientalism, translated by Park, Hong Kyu (2007), Kyobo Book.

Shin, Gi Wook and Han, Do-Hyun, 1999, “Colonial Corporatism: The Rural Revitalization Campaign, 1932-40,” in Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson, eds., Colonial Modernity in Korea, Harvard University Press.

Shin, Gi Wook and Robinson, Michael, 1999, “Introduction: Rethinking Colonial Korea,” in Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson, eds., Colonial Modernity in Korea, Harvard University Press. , eds., 1999, Colonial Modernity in Korea, Harvard University Press, translated by Do, Myoun-hoi (2006), Samin.

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Constitution, National Agenda, and Presidential Leadership:

Focusing on a Comparison between the Articles on Economy in the “National Founding Constitution” and the “Post-Korean War Constitution”* Park, Myung Lim** This paper analyzes the dynamism among Korea’s Constitution (institution), national agenda (economic reform), and leadership (president) by comparing the 1948 National Founding Constitution (NFC), which pursued an “equal economy” and a “market economy,” with the 1954 Post-Korean War Constitution (PKWC).

First, under the condition of the postcolonial agenda on land reform, the NFC promoted a socialist market economy that stipulated strong involvement by the state in the economy or an equal economic system of social democracy and not a liberal market economy. This was in line with the republican tradition that had existed since the Korean Provisional Government.

Second, through the active use of the NFC, the South Korean government and President Syngman Rhee (Yi Sŭngman) executed a policy of land reform—the biggest national agenda at the time—which led to the downfall of the radical left and had a decisive influence on the expansion of farmer support for the government. The landlord class and the Korean Democratic Party were also weakened. These outcomes were a result of a combination of a key national agenda (land reform), the principles of the Constitution, and Korea’s presidential leadership.

Third, Korea’s Constitution was transformed to promote a market economic system after the Korean War. The change in the spirit of the Constitution was due to the achievements of postcolonial reform through the success of land reform and the collapse of the left along with the emergence of a new national agenda to support postwar reconstruction and secure foreign aid. The constitutional basis for a market economy system was not laid out in the

*

**

Translated from the published article in Korean Journal of International Relations 48(1): 429-454, 2008 with permission from the Korean Association of International Relations.

Professor, Department of Area Studies, Yonsei University

263

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NFC but in the PKWC. Fourth, the amendment of the articles on the economy in the PKWC was done as a consequence of American demands. The US regarded the NFC as a Constitution that promoted ‘state socialism.’ As a result of the socialist orientation of the NFC and Washington’s strong objection to it, a tense confrontation regarding the matters of the state’s role in the constitutional articles and in the economy emerged. However, due to the need to secure American aid, Korea was obliged to amend the articles on the economy to support the US-backed market economy system. Washington felt the need to block the South Korean government’s excessive involvement in the economy unless it was aimed at a market economy system and tried to establish this through a constitutional amendment.

Fifth, Syngman Rhee, who had been opposed to the amendment in the face of American pressure, used a strategy of exchange with regard to both Korean politics and the economy as well its power structure and economic system to ensure his third consecutive run for the presidency and to secure aid from the US. From a state development point of view, Rhee’s strategy was a combination of “the regression of democracy, [and the] development of the market economy.” Regarding the effects and consequences of the amendment, the PKWC led to a change in the Korean economic system and Korea’s entry into the market economy system, an increase in American aid and changes in the aid package, the success of post-war reconstruction, and the establishment of the basis of the Korean market economy.

More than anything else, the constitutional amendment heavily influenced the quantity and quality of American aid and thus provided a legal and institutional tool for Korea’s postwar economic development. In addition, the constitutional amendment provided enabling conditions as well as confining conditions in the trajectory of the development of Korean society as seen in the fact that the norms and spirit of the Constitution at the time of the amendment are still maintained without fundamental changes in Korea even today.

Through a comparison of the NFC and the PKWC, the success in mutual correspondence and relational dynamics among South Korea’s early national agenda, the Constitution, and national leadership is clearly shown. In other words, there is a very strong correlation among the national agendas as regards land reform and post-war reconstruction, the principle and articles of the Constitution, and Korean leadership.

Keywords: National Agenda, Constitutional Change, Presidential Leadership, American Influence, National Founding Constitution, Post-Korean War Constitution

I. Introduction Recently, there has been increased interest, both academic and practical, in Korea’s constitution in Korean society. This seems to be a product of an understanding that numerous social and political problems in Korea

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stem from institutional, and even more so, constitutional factors. The increased interest and research on the constitution not only focuses on the current democratic constitution, which was established after the June Democracy Movement in 1987, but also extends to the time when modern constitutionalism was introduced to Korea (Suh 2006). This is a current issue that has provoked a need for tracing its historical origin and path.

Even in academia, the issue of the constitution goes beyond the disciplines of constitutional studies and political science; it is widely spread over philosophy, women’s studies, international relations, history, sociology, peace studies, and cultural studies (Citizen’s Action ed., 2007). Today, the issue of the constitution cannot be avoided when attempting to explain Korean politics and social problems.

Focusing on the time of the founding of the Republic of Korea, this paper seeks to analyze the correlation between leadership and national agenda through the lens of the constitution. In other words, it analyzes the dynamism among Korea’s national agenda, constitution, and leadership.

While there is no previous analysis that correlates these three variables, this paper offers an in-depth analysis based on primary sources of the relationship among the national agenda (economic reform), leadership (president), and the institution (constitution) in the early years of the Republic of Korea.

Specifically, this paper tries to explain this relationship by analyzing the constitution’s articles on the economy in the National Founding Constitution and in the Post-Korean War Constitution. That is, it compares the differences in the principles, spirit, and contents of the National Founding Constitution and the Post-Korean War Constitution and seeks to find the reasons and process that led to these differences.

In terms of sources, this paper seeks to find and analyze new facts using primary sources from not only within Korea but also from the US National Archive, which have thus far not been used in research (both in Korean and in other languages) on South Korea’s early politics and constitution. These primary sources are important in that they empirically and analytically connect the lacunae in academia, through new historical facts, with the relationship between constitutional changes in modern Korea and KoreaUnited States relations and the Korean national agenda and its leadership.

More broadly, it can be said that this new material fills the void in the

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research on the constitution of modern Korea, Korea’s economic institution, and Korea-US relations.

The dynamics among the national agenda, constitution (institution), and leadership is an area that has rarely been dealt with in the disciplines of international relations, constitutional studies, history, and economics.

However, the dynamics among the three elements enables us to analyze Korea’s politics, economics, constitution, presidential leadership, and relations with the United States systematically. The constitution, as a part of the institution, is an object of integrated studies, where politics and law studies as well as reality analysis and a normative approach come together. It could also be the most appropriate means of inter-disciplinary research through its deconstruction of traditional boundaries in the relationships between leadership, institution, and social conditions.

The constitution is one of the fundamental elements through which one may objectively come to know a country’s politics, regime, and development of democracy as well as its characteristics, identity, ideologies, economic system, and judicial system. An in-depth study on a country’s nationbuilding, regime, and democracy is inconceivable without research on its constitution. It is impossible to understand a country’s formation, development, and characteristics fully without a close examination of the spirit, process, characteristics, conditions, influences, and consequences of the constitution. Thus, it is ironic that research on the constitution based on primary sources has been largely ignored despite the explosive growth in research on post-1980s South Korea in the fields of politics, economics, history, and constitutional studies. Therefore, this paper examines the dynamics among the Korean constitution/institution, national agenda/social condition, and leadership with a true inter-disciplinary mindset.

Prior research on the “Post-Korean War Constitution” from the fields of constitutional studies, political science, and history has focused mainly on interpreting the reorganization of the power structure, as the expression Sasaoip kaehŏn (rounding off to the nearest integer in a constitutional amendment) symbolizes. However, in terms of content and influence, the 1954 Constitution was more important in the transformation of the national economic system than of the power structure. Above all, it was through the “Post-Korean War Constitution” that Korea finally adopted the market

Constitution, National Agenda, and Presidential Leadership 267

economy system, established not in 1948 but in 1954. The consolidation of the division of the peninsula and the South Korean-US alliance in the aftermath of the Korean War together have been viewed as the two major elements that stipulated the Post-Korean War system. In addition, the market economy system has become a major element in the national institution. The two major factors that have come to define modern Korea’s international relations—the Korean-US alliance and the introduction of a capitalist market economy—were introduced at the time of the formation of the “Post-Korean War system,” not during the nation’s founding in 1948. In other words, Korea’s basic national system was founded in 1953, not in 1948. Major questions that this paper seeks to answer are as follows: First, regarding basic facts, this paper shows what the 1948 National Founding Constitution (NFC) and the 1954 Post-Korean War Constitution (PKWC) respectively state with regard to the economy and tries to clarify what their basic principles and orientations were. What do they have in common and what are their differences? These are questions that have not been dealt with sufficiently in the fields of constitutional studies, political science, and history.

Second, what caused the changes made in regards to the economy in the constitutions? What were the agents, main causes, and processes of the changes? This paper deals with this under-studied topic. Why did Korea drastically change its National Founding Constitution?

Third, what is the relationship between the national agenda and the spirit of the Constitution (or the principle of the Constitution and the establishment of a national agenda)? Is it a close relationship? Is there any correlation between the 1948 National Founding Constitution and the key national agenda on land reform during the time, and between the 1954 Post-Korean War Constitution and the two key national agendas of its day: obtaining US aid and post-Korean War reconstruction? In answering these questions we can clarify the background and process of certain clauses that were added to the later constitution as well as observe the role of the constitution in the realization of national agendas.

Fourth, how and with what understanding did Korea’s national leadership, especially that of Syngman Rhee, who was president throughout much of this period, attemptattempts to utilize the constitution for the fulfillment of a

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national key agenda? The answers would show clearly the correlation among the 1948 National Founding Constitution, land reform, and Rhee’s leadership, as well as the correlation among the 1954 Post-Korean War Constitution, securing US aid and post-war reconstruction, and Rhee’s leadership. The correlation and dynamics among the three—the constitution as an institution, land reform, securing US aid; post-war reconstruction as a key national agenda; and national leadership—best exemplify the three elements of a modern democracy: national agenda, institution, and leadership. In short, clarification of the utilization and role of the constitution helps to evaluate the ability of a leadership structure that uses institutions for the realization of social agendas.

Lastly, what are the two constitutions’ micro and macro influences on Korea’s modern Constitution, constitutional government, and economic management? The answer to this question would clarify the real and practical influence that an institutional change generates. It would have certain implications for the current argument for a constitutional amendment.

II. The National Founding Constitution and the Beginning of the Early Economic System: The Economic System of Equality What were the spirit and principles of the 1948 National Founding Constitution that defined the economic system of the newly formed Republic of Korea? From the beginning, the National Founding Constitution aimed simultaneously at market fundamentalism as well as state socialism.1 In other words, the National Founding Constitution (NFC) was, as the author of its first draft wrote, “abolishing the system of an individualistic capitalist country,” seeking to do so “…while adopting the socialistic principle of equality, aims for the realization of a new type of state that harmonizes and 1

The following contents are a summary and revision of Park, Myung Lim’s (“Constitutionalism and Democracy in South Korea: Mixed Government and Social Market Economy”, Korean Political Science Review Vol. 37, No. 1, 2003: 113-134, The Korean Political Science Association.

Constitution, National Agenda, and Presidential Leadership 269

amalgamates the strengths of individualistic capitalism, i.e., the freedom and equality of individuals and the valuing of creative ideas” (Yu 1949: 177). It is very surprising that even under the US military occupation, South Korea began with “abolishing the system of an individualistic capitalist country,” when today a capitalist market economy is considered as the zeitgeist and the basis for the national economic system.

The establishment of an economic democracy at the time of the founding of Korea has been termed “the biggest characteristic of Korea’s Constitution” (Ibid., 10). By declaring in its preamble “To provide for the fullest development of the equality of each individual in all fields of political, economic, social and cultural life . . . To permit every person to discharge his duties and responsibilities . . . To promote the welfare of the people,” 2 the National Founding Constitution aimed to establish equal economy as the fundamental goal of the Constitution (Ibid., 15). Article 84 also had a strong constitutional restraint on a liberal market economy system by stipulating: “The principle of the economic order of the Korean Republic shall be to realize social justice, to meet the basic demands of all citizens, and to encourage the development of a balanced economy. Within the limits of the foregoing paragraph the economic freedom of each individual shall be guaranteed.” The architects of the Constitution designed this article to emphasize “the development of a balanced economy,” which put equality ahead of competition as “the principle of the economic order of the Korean Republic” (Ibid., 176).

The articles that discuss the development of a balanced national economy are strongly and thoroughly against a market economy. The contents declare, “Mines and other important mineral resources, marine resources, water power, and natural powers which may be utilized economically shall be owned by the State. In order to utilize and develop such resources, licenses shall , in case of necessity, be granted for a limited period to private persons in accordance with the provisions of law and shall be canceled in accordance 2

Translator’s note: The quotes of the Constitution are from the official translation that was agreed to between the Secretary General of the Korean National Assembly and the US. Liaison Office (copy received by the editor from the Department of State, Washington, in August, 1948).

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with the provisions of law.” (Article 85) and “Important transportation and communication enterprises, financial and insurance institutions, electricity, irrigation, water supply, gas and any enterprises having public character shall be owned and managed by the government or by the public. Foreign trade shall be under the control of the government” (Article 87). Such statements consistently stipulate the state’s strong involvement in the economy and disavow a liberal market economy by defining state-owned and governmentcontrolled management of the public like a social market economy. It is not an exaggeration to say that these clauses appear to support a socialist constitution.

However, Article 15 of the National Founding Constitution had a principle that not only stopped at constricting a liberal market economy but also eschewed a centrally planned socialist economy: “The right of property shall be guaranteed. Its nature and restrictions shall be defined by law. The exercise of property rights shall conform to the public welfare. Expropriation, use, or restriction of private property for public purposes shall be accompanied by due compensation in accordance with the provisions of law” (Ibid., 45).

The principles in the articles on the economy in the National Founding Constitution therefore could be described—from the fact that it combined the procedure of a market economy, government involvement, liberal market economy, and a planned economy—as approaching a third way or the social market economy of post-war Europe.3 The fact that the Republic of Korea abolished the individualistic market economy system through the National Founding Constitution when it was occupied by the US and that present day Korea thoroughly supports a capitalistic market economy points to a major research topic that must be given proper academic attention. Research needs to clearly show when, why, and through what process the capitalist market economy was introduced.

3

However, it does not necessarily mean that South Korea had a social market economy system. It can be said that South Korea, borrowing from the wording of that time, utilized an equal economic system. The recent Constitution of the European Union revised ‘social market economy’ of the postwar era into ‘a highly competitive social market economy’ and embraces it as the goal of Europe as a whole. EU Constitution Article I-3: The Union’s Objectives, Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Official Journal of the European Union, Vol. 47 (16 Dec. 2004), C310/11.

Constitution, National Agenda, and Presidential Leadership 271

Most of all, it came about through a reflection of the Korean spirit and the history of a long constitutional revolution within modern Korea—including its Provisional Government—rather than from US pressure or the mere import of a specific ideology from the West (Park, M. 2003: 115-117). In other words, it was the extension of a time-honored emphasis on the pursuit of equality, republicanism, the doctrine of Equality of Three (politics, economy, and education) and public property. The architects of the Constitution made sure that the articles discussing economics either reflected republicanism or the economic idea of equality that had been utilized since the Korean Provisional Government during the Japanese colonial period—Preamble, Article 15, 84, 85, and 87—and which rejected the classic market economy by positing “economic and social democracy.”4 The National Founding Constitution declared that the “duty” of property rights should promote in an appropriate manner the welfare of the public, thus making the protection of property rights non-absolute. However, by stipulating that the expropriation, use, or restriction of private property for public purposes must be accompanied by due compensation in accordance with the law, it also included declarations that clearly reject forfeiture without compensation, free distribution, and the denial of private property (Yu 1949: 45-47). To emphasize the point again, the fundamental spirit of the National Founding Constitution was the sublation of both capitalism and socialism as well as the market economy and a planned economy. The US occupation forces, which had a policy of transplanting a market economy system in the face of socialism, regarded the articles on economy in Korea’s the National

4

As the architects of the Constitution mentions, the FC was less a mere embracing of the Weimar Constitution (Weimarer Verfassung) than an extension of the system and design ever since the Provisional Government (Yu 1952: 26). This is similar to the Chinese pursuit of capitalism and socialism simultaneously since the Nationalist Revolution and shares characteristics of a third way that was booming in East Asia.

This needs further in-depth study together with the fact that the Constitution of the Provisional Government, which is considered as the forerunner of the FC, was strongly influenced by the Chinese Constitution. Refer to Simei Qing, From Allies to Enemies: Vision of modernity, Identity, and U.S.- China Diplomacy, 1945-1960 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2007) for research on the third way and the mixed economy in China.

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Founding Constitution as “a kind of state socialism.” (sic) 5 As will be explained later in this paper, this perception and assessment by the US shows how minor the American influence was in the legislation of the articles on the economy in the NFC, which later prompted Washington’s persistent efforts to change the economic articles to that of a market economy orientation.

In terms of the national agenda, the issue of land reform was central; not only was it necessary to break the colonial economic system, but it was also the core national agenda that would determine the direction of the economic system as well as the democratic path of the newly formed country in terms of national administration—including the status of land ownership, the demands for political and social parties, the occupation policy of the military government, farmers protests, and competition with North Korea. In other words, the issue of land reform as a key national agenda was directly related to the issue of what type of prospects a post-colonial, newly formed country would have. In South Korea at the time when colonial rule ended in 1945, the total farmland owned by landlords and the necessary distribution was 1,447,000 chŏngbo.6 (Government-vested farmland: 269,000 chŏngbo. Landlord-owned farmland: 1,178,000 chŏngbo.)7 This extremely unequal structure of land ownership had been a resource for the radical left. Even after the distribution of land under the USMG (United States Military Government) at the end of 1948, 1,024,000 chŏngbo remained to be distributed (Ibid., 20), an enormous amount. By the time real land reform began in June of 1949 under Rhee’s government, 833,881 chŏngbo of land was to be distributed. (Government-vested farmland: 232,832 chŏngbo. Landlordowned farmland: 601,049 chŏngbo.)8 The will and strategy of Rhee was firm and clear when he became the 5

“Report on Economic Provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea” (March 24, 1954), National Archives (Maryland), Record Group (RG) 469, RECORDS OF THE US FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AGENCIES, 1948-61, Office of Far Eastern Operations, Korea Subject Files. 1953-59, Entry 422, Box 20. The same materials are, in a different categorization, also included in the following documents: RG 84, Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, Korea Embassy General Records, 1953-1955.

6 Translator’s Note: One chŏngbo is about one hectare.

7 Department of Farmland at the Ministry of Agriculture 1951: 18.

8 Ibid., 42-43.

Constitution, National Agenda, and Presidential Leadership 273

leader of the new independent nation. Shortly after the enactment of the Constitution, Rhee repeatedly emphasized –beginning with his opening address to the National Assembly before the establishment of the government (May 31, 1948) and throughout his statements on the administrative policy while president of the ROK—the elimination of the dilemma of autocraticcapitalistic land ownership, the granting of autonomy to the farming economy, the abolition of the tenant-farming system, the establishment of the land-to-tiller principle, and the urgency and importance of land reform based on equal land distribution. He proclaimed that a land reform law would be, first of all, enacted for all of this.9 It showed his determination for the national agenda in regards to post-colonial economic reform.

In fact, contrary to popular understanding, Rhee leaned favorably towards a communistic economic policy after the end of colonial rule—or at least he was willing to actively embrace the economic policy of communism.

In Kŏn’guk kwa isang (The Founding of the Nation and Ideals), Rhee’s first book after his return to Korea, he revealed his feelings towards the design of the founding of the nation, stating, “Basically, I’m a person who has good feelings towards communism” … “I agree with its [communism] ideology to a certain degree” … “Later, there will be many things from communism that our government can adopt when making economic policy” and “By reforming capitalism and class egotism, the farmer can have land; the poor, consciousness” (Rhee 1945: 22). He continues by saying, “I can talk about communists in two parts; first is a group of people who argue to adopt economic policies for the welfare of the working class. I somewhat agree with this communism” (Ibid., 23). These statements show Rhee’s progressive plans for the economy. To formulate a constitutional basis for land reform, the clause “Farmland shall be distributed to self-tilling farmers. The method of distribution, the extent of possession, and the nature and restrictions of ownership shall be determined by law” was added to Article 86 of the NFC (Yu 1949: 181). While all of the specific statements in the land reform 9

“President’s Statements on the Administrative Policy”, 1986, National Assembly Secretariat, Progress Report of the Constitutional Assembly, 305-306; Robert Oliver, 1979, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 1942-1960, 152-153 (Seoul: Panmun Book Company).

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clauses were put into law, the declaration that “farmland shall be distributed to self-tilling farmers” was defined as its essential spirit and immediately became an article in the Constitution at the time of the founding of the country. The fact that these clauses were included in the National Founding Constitution shows Rhee’s awareness of the issues regarding land. If these clauses had been absent, land reform itself would have reached an impasse and might have been impossible (Kim et al. 1989: 434-452, 999-1000, 1005).

Therefore, the addition of an article on land reform to the Constitution was beyond the sphere of the norm and had enormous practical, political, and social implications. With land reform as a national agenda, post-colonial Korea could be effective and successful. The progressive land reform policies prevented protests from the landlord class as well as peasant revolutions, thus becoming the basis for the future industrial development that would spread socioeconomic equality. South Korea had therefore laid the cornerstone with land reform in the Constitution.

Just as important as the constitutional norms and national leadership was the organization of the bureaucracy to execute the national agenda. To succeed in land reform, Rhee appointed former communist Cho Pongam, who would later become his biggest political rival, as the Minister of Agriculture. It was a decision that was widely hailed as against the people’s expectations. With Cho as the head and Vice Minister Kang Chŏngt’aek, Director of Farmland Kang Chin Guk, and three left-leaning individuals (Yun T’aekchung, Pae Kich’ŏl, and An Ch’angsu), the core policy made in regards to land reform became decidedly radical, and came to represent the most progressive formation of an ideological spectrum that a South Korean regime could accept (Park, M. 1996: 482-483). The members of the Korean Democratic Party (Han’guk minjudang) criticized the people in charge of the Agriculture Ministry’s land reform by calling them “the Reds” (ppalkaengi) and the “running dog of the communists” (kongsandang apchabi) (The Dong-A Ilbo ed. 1975: 346; Kang 1965: 194). Truly, the initial design of land reform as planned by the Agriculture Ministry and based on the Constitution was the most radical outside the proposal put forth by North Korea and the communist left.10 10

For a comparison of various plans for land reform, refer to Korea Rural Economic

Constitution, National Agenda, and Presidential Leadership 275

The government’s initial land reform plan was “neither a purchase with compensation nor absorption without compensation but an appropriation with a certain amount of compensation for the public well-being.”11 It was an opportunity to take a “third way” or “third form” that repudiated purchasewith-compensation-and-distribution-at-a-cost as well as confiscationwithout-compensation-and-distribution-without-cost that was long wished for by both the left and the right (Kim, S. et al. 1989: 475-476). This “third way” was explained as “adopting ‘an intermediate position’ of purchasewith-compensation-and-distribution-at-a-cost and confiscation-withoutcompensation-and-distribution-without-cost” (Kang 1949: 16). The constitutional basis for the third way was not only laid down in Article 86 on land reform but also in Article 15 on private property. This demonstrates an attempt to not only bring about a practical compromise but also an integration of constitutional spirit and clause. Cho Pongam criticized both North Korean radical confiscation-without-compensation-and-distributionwithout-cost and the Korean Democratic Party/Democratic National Party’s scheme to try to get more compensation from the farmers, thus clearly displaying his support for the third way.12 While it was a retreat from the initial plan of the Agriculture Ministry, the South Korean land reform that was completed before the Korean War basically followed a set of guidelines based on the spirit of the NFC. The official government report declared that “Regarding the farmland distribution, a total of 420,000 chŏngbo had been completely distributed to 1,200,000 ho (household) by April 15, 1950” (National Assembly Secretariat 1971: 507-508).

The goal of the nation and its leadership to succeed in carrying out land reform as a main national agenda had therefore been completed before the catastrophe of the Korean War. In fact, to secure support for his own land Institute ed., 1986, Collection of Materials Related to the History of Land Reform, pp.

28-33; Kim, S. et al., 1989, p. 574.

11 Kang, Chin Guk, 1948, The Ideals of the Farmland Reform, quoted in Kim, S. et al., 1989, p. 474.

12 “The 57th Issue of the Stenographic Records of the 2nd Regular Meeting”, Stenographic Records of the 2nd Regular Meeting of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, from the 51th issue to 88th issue, p. 124.

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reform from farmers and ordinary citizens, Rhee once strongly opposed the USMG’s policy on land reform, saying that the “USMG has no right to dispose of it [land property] without an authorization by the Korean Assembly” (Oliver 1979: 154).

His appointment of Cho Pongam to the position of Minister of Agriculture was also a highly strategic decision that had a sophisticated political undertone. With successful land reform without the active participation of the landlord class, Rhee anticipated the dissolution of the political basis for the landlord class as well as the transfer of farmer support from the radicals to his government, thus keeping the landlord-centered Korean Democratic Party in check. With the success of land reform, the foothold and influence of the Korean Democratic Party rapidly collapsed and farmer support for North Korea ended. Through land reform, the Rhee-Cho Ministry accomplished its core national agenda by incapacitating not only the landlord-centered Korean Democratic Party but also the support for North Korea and the left’s radical revolutionary policy. In this sense, the success of Korean land reform reveals a well-knitted matrix of a core national agenda, a constitutional (institutional) basis, and leadership (the president and government official).

III. T he National Founding Constitution’s Economic System and Korea-US Relations: A Confrontation between ‘Plan’ and ‘Market’ After the end of the Korean War, the 1954 post-war Constitution significantly changed the statements made in the NFC on economy. What were the reasons and causes associated with the fundamental change of the principle and spirit of the socialist market economy of the NFC? There are four main causes that influenced the 1954 constitutional amendment on economy: the success of the post-colonial land reform as the key national agenda, the active involvement of the US, postwar reconstruction as a new national agenda, and the eventual approval of Rhee as the nation’s leader. The most dominant and compelling among these causes were the influence and pressures of the Americans and the strategic decisions made by Rhee while acting as Korea’s leader.

Constitution, National Agenda, and Presidential Leadership 277

First, as a result of land reform—the state-led dismantling of landlords, the success in putting conservatives in check, and the progressive reform policy to eradicate radicalism—ironically meant that the need to embrace farmers and their interests was no longer needed. The division between the North and South had become absolute after the Korean War, and the competition to secure farmer support between the two had ended when South Korean farmers pledged their support for the southern regime. Second, with the destruction of the war and the resources for postwar reconstruction absolutely scarce, the need to secure foreign aid was essential. Acquiring foreign aid and support when the Korean Constitution advocated equal economy, state-ownership, state-control, and state socialism was not easy. The third point concerns the American economic policy in South Korea. From the beginning, the basic spirit and principle of the NFC and US economic policy in South Korea were difficult to reconcile. The discord brought a fierce confrontation between the two. In this sense, the major economic agreements and treaties between South Korea and the US, from the founding of the country to the amendments in the postwar Constitution on the economy, need to be studied.

As mentioned above, the United States perceived the articles on the economy in Korea’s NFC as supporting state socialism.13 While this was indeed so, Washington regarded the NFC not as a product of advanced socialism but as a product derived from traditional elements in Korean history with no relation to Western socialism. Washington understood that “The economic provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea are the outgrowth of several factors peculiar to the history of Korea and they represent a natural development without the background of those socialistic movements which grew out of individualism and capitalism in Western cultures. Important factors are the tradition of authoritarianism, historical antecedents of government ownership of property, the necessity of providing quickly some kind of management for former Japanese property seized by American military authorities and transferred to the new government, the social structure of Korea and the attitudes of the Korean people towards 13

“Report on Economic Provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea” (March 24, 1954).

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Japanese property, and various political events shaping constitutional provisions.” (Ibid.)

The analysis of these causes, excluding the explanation that the NFC’s articles on the economy reflected Korea’s history of authoritarianism, surprisingly corresponds to the truth. The US fully comprehended the basic spirit and principles of the NFC and its meaning in Korean history.

American interest in and study of the NFC appeared to be more direct and intense after its enactment rather than during the process of its legislation.

A long held and dominant idea was that Korea’s NFC had been designed by the US and USMG. However, this view is incorrect as seen in both the contents of the Constitution and the process of its legislation. To begin with, the economic spirit and articles of the NFC are fundamentally different from that of the American Constitution. For an example, during the process of making the draft of the Constitution prepared, he USAMIG (United Stated Army Military Government in Korea) officials for the US-USSR Joint Commission stated “at no time during the work … on draft constitutional provisions, and in their occasional and casual consultation with a few leading Koreans, did they give any consideration to economic provisions such as government-ownership of property.” (Ibid.) This understanding was the exact opposite in the NFC. When we examine the translation of the NFC by the US immediately after its legislation, the socialistic terms used in the articles on economy are limited in that they reveal a simple and literal translation of the original text.14 This example proves that the US did not deeply intervene in the (legislation of the) economic articles in the NFC. According to the testimony and explanation of Ernest Fraenkel, a legal advisor at the time of the NFC’s enactment, the power structure in Korea was also very different from that in the US. Fraenkel explained, “It is misleading, however, to compare the presidential system of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea with the American type of government. Nothing comparable to the power of the Senate of the United States to consent to 14

General Headquarters Far East Command, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, “Selected Items for the Information of Commanders and Staffs of Far East Command,” No. 2163 (22 July 1948), No. 2164 (23 July 1948), RG 319, E85, Box 3107; “Revised English Translation of Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Korea” (16 July 1948), RG319, E85, Box 3107.

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the appointment of executive and judicial officers (with the exception of the Prime Minister and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court) can be found in the Constitution of this country. The absence of both a federal system of government and a system of autonomous, municipal self-government vests in the President of the Republic of Korea executive powers on all levels of government. These overall powers can by no means be compared to the powers of the President of the United States, which are checked and balanced by the powers of the executive officers of the various States and municipalities.” After all, according to Fraenkel, the argument that Korea adopted the American style presidential system is nothing but “the fallacy of the frequently repeated statement” (Fraenkel 1999: 447-455). Even after accepting that there is a large difference between the outer power structure and its inner organization, the statement above proves that the common view that “the presidential system of Korea is an import of the American presidential system” is wrong.

A lack of American influence was the case during the institution of the Constitution. According to American reports concerning the activities of the South Korean National Assembly, “strict order were issued by the American Command that Americans were not to interfere or to participate in any way in the work of the newly established National Assembly, and that these orders were scrupulously observed.” Thus, this document said that “the myth which seems to have gained some credence that Americans influenced the Koreans to incorporate what might be termed socialistic provisions in their Constitution relating to government-ownership of property, is entirely groundless and should be permanently laid to rest.”15 With these testimonies, we can consistently explain how Korea’s NFC came to have a socio-economic spirit as well as principles and articles that are fundamentally different from that of the US or which the US would want to export. We can also explain why the confrontation between South Korea and the US became so severe following the founding of the state in regards to the management and principles of the economy and why the US tried so desperately to intervene to introduce a market economy system at the time of the postwar legislation.

15

“Report on Economic Provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea” (24 March 1954).

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Without these testimonies, it is impossible to explain why the US concluded that the articles in the Korean Constitution and their orientation expressed state socialism.

In September of 1948, immediately following the founding the state, South Korea and the US signed the “Initial Financial and Property Settlement between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of the United States of America” (hereafter the “Initial Settlement”).16 While the full text consisted of fourteen items and supporting articles, the core clause in the Initial Settlement concerned the approval of the legitimacy of the USMG’s three year rule and its dealings with the economy as well as the transfer of every property right and duty of the USMG to the Korean government.

Japanese-owned property was treated in this manner as well. In spite of certain restraints, the Initial Settlement was an official action carried out by the newly independent South Korea, a recovery of economic sovereignty.

After the transfer of economic rights through the Initial Settlement, both countries signed the “Agreement on Aid between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America” (known as the “ECA Agreement”17) in December of 1948, which contained twelve items including a plan for aid to South Korea. The ECA Agreement was different from the Initial Settlement, as it aimed at better management and revival of the South Korean economy and included very strict and detailed restraints and regulations. South Korea had to discuss their overall economic policy with the US and had to establish their comprehensive economic revival policy in consultation with the US in order to ensure the efficient use of aid goods. Not only were the issues of budget, finance, trade, grain, foreign exchange, currency, and underground resources included in the ECA Agreement, it also regulated “the facilitation of private foreign investments in Korea together with the admittance of private foreign traders to transact business in Korea” (Article 2). The ECA Agreement was similar to the Initial Settlement in that it contained very detailed decrees 16

For an excellent study of the economic relations between Korea and the US during Rhee’s presidential rule that is based on primary sources, see Lee, Chong Won (1996); Lee, Dae Keun (2002).

17 It is called the ‘ECA Agreement’ or ‘ECA aid’ because it was signed based on the Economic Cooperation Act of the US and executed by the Economic Cooperation Administration.

Constitution, National Agenda, and Presidential Leadership 281

that were controversial enough to be considered to be infringing upon South Korea’s economic sovereignty. After the ECA Agreement, the US established the Economic Cooperation Administration Mission in Korea (the ECA delegation) in January of 1949 and began providing and carrying out ECA aid. Conforming to the American request, South Korea drew up a comprehensive economic revival plan that included the First Five-Year Plans for Production, the Five-Year Plans for Industrial Reconstruction, and the Five-Year Plans for the Procurement of Goods. It is very interesting to note that the origin of the concept of the Five-Year Plan for Economic Development—which is regarded as a unique feature of a planned economy and economic development designed by President Park Chung Hee—was not a result of the May 16th Coup d’état, but emerged long before that, during the Rhee government after the founding the state.

After the outbreak of the Korean War, when South Korea and the US were in a fierce battle concerning the future of Korea and unification, neither could make an economic plan or economic measure that went beyond the survival of South Korea and basic relief efforts. When truce talks began, it became imperative to come up with a specific plan for postwar rebuilding and economic reconstruction. Here, Rhee’s strategy was resolute. It appeared to be a strategy of “securing postwar security and aid” through a hard line approach that opposed the truce and sought to continue the war. Rhee’s strategy did not simply oppose the truce but proposed new conditions for it, stressing the importance of a strong South Korea-US alliance and the securing of aid. Rhee’s plan was a huge success. It is seen immediately in the strong South Korea-US alliance established through the signing of the ROKUS Mutual Defense Treaty. However, the postwar system did not singularly originate from the security sections of the South Korea-US alliance. The alliance appeared after lengthy discussions and negotiations and as a result of exchanging the “securing of American aid” for the “amendment of basic economic principles in the NFC.” First, after comprehensive study and close discussions before the truce, the United Nations Command and the South Korean government signed the “Agreement on Economic Coordination between the Republic of Korea and the Unified Command” (known as the Meyer Agreement) on May 24, 1952. The Meyer Agreement called for the establishment of the Combined

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Economic Board (CEB) for policy coordination and adjustment, which would consist of one representative from South Korea and one representative from the US. The CEB not only managed and enforced the aid fund but also acted as negotiator, adjustor, and advisor on the South Korean economy as a whole.

Everything from the basic direction of policies to the management of the Korean economy needed to pass through bipartisan negotiations. In fact, it was “something like a supreme decision-making organization on the Korean economy” (Lee, D. 2002: 277). Due to the war and the need for aid, the economic sovereignty of South Korea had to be severely restrained only four years after the founding of the state. According to Article 3, the South Korean government not only had to report to the CEB frequently on commercial business but was also supervised on budget, finance, and prices, and needed to consult on policies concerning wages, imports and exports, and foreign exchange prior to the ratification of these policies.18 After the signing of the Meyer Agreement, the US dispatched various delegation-cum-research groups to estimate what the actual conditions and the size of the aid to Korea would be. The importance of the Meyer Agreement for South Korea, which was signed in anticipation of the truce, was great. First, US President Eisenhower dispatched Henry J. Taska as envoy and asked him to investigate, research, and report on a comprehensive plan for the reconstruction of the post-truce South Korean economy. This famous report became known as the Taska Report. The key suggestions of the Report were “setting-up of the three-year economic plan for industrial reconstruction by the Korean government, separation of military aid and economic aid, and aid for relief and aid for reconstruction, need of 8,830,000 US dollars for the three-year of the plan, concentration of aid for economic reconstruction and military enforcement.” The Taska Report took on a role of an initial guide for US aid to South Korea after the truce.

Second, the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) requested that the Robert R. Nathan Association in the US research the actual

18

For the process of the signing of the agreement and its contents refer to RG 469, RECORDS OF THE US FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AGENCIES, 1948-61, Office of Far Eastern Operations, Korea Subject Files, 1953-59, Entry 422, Box 1.

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condition and establishment of the reconstruction plan.19 The Association submitted the “South Korean Economic Reconstruction Plan”—which is also known as the Nathan Report—to the UNKRA. Key points in the report were that South Korea’s rehabilitation and financial independence could be achieved within five years (1958-1959) provided that there was sufficient foreign aid and a suitable reconstruction plan; that 1.25 billion dollars in foreign aid was needed for this; that the UNKRA was essential to manage the aid fund efficiently; that South Korea had an advantage due to its excellent human resources; and that the government needed economic liberalization including prices and privatization. The third factor influential in establishing South Korean-US economic relations was the dispatch of the AmericanKorean Foundation led by Edgar M. Queeny, which is not well known and will be explained later.

The fourth was the dispatch of Tylor T. Wood. The American government dispatched Wood in August of 1953 as the CEB representative of the UN to work with the Korean government to establish a plan for the use of the aid funds. After fierce discussion and debate, the two parties signed the “Combined Economic Board Agreement for a Program of Economic Reconstruction and Financial Stabilization” (the CEB Agreement) on December 14, 1953. While serious debate continued on various issues related to the direction of Korea’s economic reconstruction and the composition of aid goods, exchange rates, and investment priorities, the key point of contention concerned “economic reconstruction” (on the Korean side) versus “financial stabilization” (on the American side). In other words, the controversy centered on stabilization versus growth. Although the American position became dominant, the signing of the CEB Agreement was important in that it established the principle and direction of the postwar Korean economic reconstruction and it secured American aid in the rehabilitation of the Korean economy.

We note that within a very short period of time, American officials were dispatched to South Korea, from Meyer, Taska, Queeny, the Robert R. 19

This comprehensive report was immediately translated and distributed in Korea.

See The Korea Development Bank, 1955, Nathan Report—Plan for Korea’s Economic Reconstruction.

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Nathan Associations, and Wood. This was a unique time when the focus of American teams and officials was not on Korean security or military, but on the economy. We can see that the postwar South Korea-US relationship was about the economy as much as it was about security. The CEB Agreement can essentially be called the founding agreement between South Korea and the US in regards to the postwar economic relationship, just as much as the ROKUS Mutual Defense Treaty was in the area of security. In a letter to President Syngman Rhee dated December 19th and sent soon after the signing of the CEB Agreement, Wood wrote that “I feel the success of our common effort to strengthen and rebuild your country, which has stood so valiantly under your leadership in the forefront of the fight against Communism, is of vital importance to the security of the whole world of free man” and “We now have a truly workable agreement under which we can go forward, with full respect for the rights and responsibilities of our two countries, toward the important objectives we seek.”20 We can therefore see American expectations of the CEB Agreement.

IV. From the ‘National Founding Constitution’ to the ‘Post-Korean War Constitution’: US Pressure and the Emergence of a Market Economy System After the signing the CEB Agreement, the Rhee administration submitted a bill to the National Assembly in January 23, 1954, to amend the Constitution only on matters concerning the economy. It was the only time the Korean government submitted a bill concerning only issues related to the economy since the founding of the state in 1948. The submission of a bill to amend the Constitution in January of 1954 was highly significant. In fact, the direct cause for the amendment was the recommendation of Edgar M. Queeny, who visited Korea with the American-Korean Foundation in August of 1953, to 20

National Archives, RG 469, RECORDS OF THE US FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AGENCIES, 1948-61, Office of Far Eastern Operations, Korea Subject Files. 1953-59, Entry 422, Box 2.

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President Rhee and his officials to transform the management of the economy into one that focused on private cooperation, citing that nationalization and other previous policies posed major obstacles to attracting foreign investment (Lee, C. 1996: 154). The American-Korean Foundation was a semiofficial organization that clearly played an incredibly influential role in Korea’s postwar reconstruction, but this is rarely discussed. Therefore, a detailed study of its role and influence is necessary.21 A report by the Embassy of the United States in Seoul sent on March 5, 1954 to the US Department of State admitted to America’s direct and powerful influence in Korea’s effort to amend the economic articles of the Constitution by declaring that “this decision apparently reflects in part suggestions made

by US officials and private individuals.” This was very different from the dealings with the NFC of 1948, when the US did not intervene out of concern over interfering in another country’s domestic affairs. The contents of the amendment were, according to the US Embassy’s understanding, “proposed in the National Assembly which would have the effect of substituting private ownership and free enterprise, as the basic economic principle underlying the Constitution, instead of state ownership and control as at present.” In a word, “the significance of this proposal therefore lies mainly in the Government’s decision to emphasize its preference for the free enterprise system at this particular time and to clear the way for future specific legislation.” In addition, the report included detailed explanations of the amendments made to Articles 85, 87, 88, and 89, which were key economic articles in the NFC.22 21

Refer to the following documents concerning the American-Korean Foundation: RG 59, GENERAL RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE DECIMAL FILES 1950-54, From 895B.49/1-551 To: 896.00/4-2850, NND 832905, Box 5698: RG 59 GENERAL RECORDS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DECIMAL FILES 1950-54, From: 911.63/1-253 To: 911.63/11-154, NND 852928, Box 5813: RG 469, RECORDS OF THE US FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AGENCIES, 1948-61, Office of Far Eastern Operations, Korea Subject Files. 1953-59, Entry 422, Box 18, 20, 22.

A detailed analysis is needed of the activities of the Foundation. These documents contain a wealth of material about the “Help Korea Train” Project that was promoted by the Foundation.

22 “Amendment of Economic Articles of the ROK Constitution,” RG 469, RECORDS OF THE US FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AGENCIES, 1948-61, Office of Far Eastern Operations, Korea Subject Files. 1953-59, Entry 422, Box 20.

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This clearly shows the aims of the report.

The aims of the report are well reflected in the dialogue between Rhee and Wood on September 7, 1953, before the signing of the CEB Agreement and when the conflict between South Korea and the US was at its peak. It is easy to see why Rhee wanted to keep industrialization controlled by the state and not private companies. Rhee had been deeply disappointed by the lack of patriotism on the part of Korean businessmen and thought that it would be absurd to leave the economic recovery in their hands. Rhee thought that the industrial facilities, at least initially, needed to be managed by the government. Wood, however, disagreed by claiming that he had seen many businessmen who had original ideas, energy, and patriotism and asserted that the president underestimated the potentialities of the private enterprises.

Wood argued further that the economy and prosperity of the US were built by private companies and that he hoped South Korea would follow the same path. Rhee responded by stating that he and the Korean citizens never believed in socialism. When the discussion turned to finding talented private businesses for economic development, Wood asked what Rhee thought about allowing American private capital into Korea, which would not only provide capital but also management skills. Rhee responded that he would welcome American businesses as long as they were not interested in solely exploiting Korea for their interests. Here, Wood confirmed that there were many good US companies interested in foreign investment and emphasized that any activities without interest would not be expected from businessmen.23 After conducting a comprehensive review of the South Korean economy and the Constitution after the signing of the CEB Agreement,24 the US stated that “there are several means for overcoming apparent obstacles to the development of free enterprise in Korea.” and “There are several kinds of obstacles, and they suggest their own respective kinds of remedies: constitutional obstacles, for which a constitutional amendment would be 23

RG 469, RECORDS OF THE US FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AGENCIES, 1948-61, Office of Far Eastern Operations, Korea Subject Files. 1953-59, Entry 422, Box 2.

24 “Report on Economic Provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea” (March 24, 1954), National Archives, RG 469, RECORDS OF THE US FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AGENCIES, 1948-61, Office of Far Eastern Operations, Korea Subject Files. 1953-59, Entry 422, Box 20.

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required.” Saying that among the ways of overcoming the numerous restraints on a free enterprise, “constitutional provisions in Chapter VI, Economy, impose absolute restrictions against ownership of some types of property” it specifically pointed to Articles 85, 86, 87, and 88. It was extremely hostile towards Article 87. It may be purely coincidental, but all of the items that the US found strongly questionable were those that had been included in the constitutional amendment designed by Korean government. It was really identical and quite matching.

However, even after the submission of the revised bill by the Korean government, the US demanded more liberal, market-friendly, and businessfriendly measures and requested a clause-by-clause analysis of the amendments in Articles 85, 87, and 88, saying that “The purpose expressed by the administration in submitting these proposals was to expand and encourage the individual freedom and initiative of the people in their economic activities, and thus to stimulate a rapid increase in productive capacity and efficient development of the national economy. An examination of the text of the proposed amendments, indicates that if adopted they would not necessarily achieve the objective expressed. Ambiguities are introduced. Furthermore the general provisions stated would need legislative implementation. This is not a defeat in itself, since any such constitutional principle needs implementation; but the point is that free enterprise could not be magically introduced by merely adopting these amendments.”

In conclusion, they understood that “the task of introducing free enterprise into a country which has developed under a different way of life is difficult and cannot be accomplished by forcing on that country a complete new set of laws establishing a complete new set of relationships in economic activities. The cultural lag alone would prevent an immediate transformation.

Some of the idealism expressed in the constitution and inherent in Confucian influences may have worn thin during the course of the recent war. But enough of it lasts to constitute a serious obstacle to a complete reform at one time”: “A program of reform in constitution, laws and administrative procedures of government providing for State ownership of specified public service and public utility enterprises to be operated and managed by independent public corporations would satisfy the idealism of the Korean people and their aroused nationalistic pride. Efforts in the future could be

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directed towards modifying this situation if it seemed necessary. But in the meantime acceptance of this situation would represent a victory in principle for the Koreans. The price to be specified for such an acceptance would be the necessary changes in constitution, laws and administrative procedures which would clear the road for free enterprise in the other class of economic activity.” In other words, a technique is needed that clarifies the way towards free enterprise.

There is another important document in regards to South Korea-US postwar relations: a letter that Rhee sent to Queeny of the American-Korean Foundation just before submitting the bill to amend the Constitution. In the letter written on January 12, 1954, Rhee mentioned “I would like to call your attention the fact that people who do not understand our economic situation criticize us for government ownership of public utilities and strategic industries in general.” He also emphasized that “this government is opposed to socialism in principal and has been doing all it can to encourage private ownership of such industries.” However, he said that “Korean businessman cannot undertake the ownership and operation of these industries.” This is the same opinion that he had earlier expressed to Wood.

Furthermore, Rhee brought up the constitutional amendment, saying “Concerning your comment about the Constitution, as you know, the National Assembly has not been in complete cooperation with the Executive Branch of the Government, and we are waiting for the election of new legislators to consider needed change in laws. In May, legislators, including members of the Senate which was created only at the end of last year, will be elected and when the Assembly meets amendments will be introduced and changes made without much difficulty. I feel sure our new Assembly will give consideration to and will amend Articles 85, 87 and 88 of the Constitutions.25 Syngman Rhee, perhaps as a way to relieve the anxiety of the US with regard to the controversy regarding the Constitution, informed the US in advance about the bill to amend the Constitution. There is another point of great importance here. By January 12, Rhee had presumed that the bill would be passed in a new National Assembly to be formed after the general election in May. In spite of this, Rhee submitted the bill to amend the Constitution on 25

“Amendment of Economic Articles of the ROK Constitution”

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January 23 to the National Assembly and withdrew it, as discussed below, on March 9. A significant strategic political plan can be seen from this action.

Rhee may have planned to use the American pressure on constitutional matters as an opportunity to extend the term of presidency for the first president of the Republic of Korea. This, however, requires a more careful review of the materials and facts.

V. Congressional Debate on the Constitution and Economic System: The Great Debate of Market Economy vs. Equal Economy Fierce debates about the constitutional amendment unfolded in the National Assembly following the government’s proposal for the amendment bill on January 23, 1954. It was the second greatest debate on the political system since the founding of the state, the first being the dispute on the National Security Law of the Constitutional Assembly. While the first dispute had been about the direction and prospect of human rights and democracy, the second was about the economic system. The historical meaning of this debate was, first, that it served as the final seal at the level of constitutional conflict regarding the economic system since liberation in 1945 and during the formation of the nation. Second, it showed the urgency of postcolonial reform since the time of liberation, which went through the process of competition between the South and the North, establishment of the country, and the Korean War, and symbolized the urgency of the time, which required an embrace of radicalism. Third, despite the fact that the debate ultimately ended with the incorporation of the American-led capitalistic world system into Korea’s economic system, it showed that the market economy system was not simply implanted without mediation or internal struggle, for it only took root after a fierce internal battle that lasted until the end. Fourth, considering the meaning of the Constitution in the modern state, Korea’s state system, core managing principle, and, to put it in a more abstract manner, its raison d’être were equipped with a social consensus, stability in the area of the economy (a market economy system), stable foreign relations, and tenable national security (the South Korea-US alliance), not in 1948 at the time of the

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founding the state, but in 1954.

The government’s explanation of the proposal was nearly identical to the US proposal for a more liberal economy. Considering the turbulent disputes and conflicts of past years with the US, the explanations provided for its decisions to override or amend the NFC seemed no longer to be coming from the same government that had come to power after the Constitution was established six years before. Let us inspect the specific contents of the proposal. The proposal was made on January 23, 1954 and brought before the National Assembly on February 25 by President Rhee and all his cabinet members. 26 We can see that the president and government, which had previously opposed the amendment, were now taking the lead in proposing a new amendment. As shown below, the amendment in the economic articles of the PKWC, which was confirmed on November 29, 1954, were, except for minor modifications, no different from what was initially submitted.

Art. 85

Exploitation, development or utilization of mines and other important underground resources, marine resources, water power and all other economically available natural powers shall be in accordance with the provisions of law.

Art. 87

Any enterprises having public character shall be managed by the government or by juridical persons of public law. When required, such enterprises shall be licensed to private individuals in accordance with the provisions of law.

Foreign trade shall be controlled by the government in accordance with the provisions of law.

Art. 88

Private enterprises cannot be transferred to state or public ownership, or their management cannot be placed under control or direction of the state or juridical persons of public law, except when it is deemed urgently necessary in order to meet urgent necessities of national defense or national life in accordance with the provisions of law.

Art. 89

Article 15. Paragraph 3 of this Constitution shall be applicable to the transfer of private enterprises to state or public ownership as provided in Article 86.

First, regarding Article 85, the government openly questioned the clauses in the NFC that “Mines and other important mineral resources, 26

National Assembly Library, 1968, Materials for the History of the Constitutional Government, Volume 3—Proceedings of the Constitutional Amendment during the Second National Assembly, pp. 164-166.

Constitution, National Agenda, and Presidential Leadership 291

marine resources, water power and natural powers which may be utilized economically shall be owned by the State” by saying that this was “a problem in respect to private property and private management” and said that it should not be decided by the Constitution but by law in a way that is “appropriately flexible to the state of things at the time.” The government made itself more than clear that the reason for the 1954 constitutional amendment of the economic articles was that it intended to abolish stateownership and strengthen the principle of private property and a market economy.

On Article 87, the amendment bill wanted to strike out the whole of Part I, which was about government and public management: “Important transportation and communication enterprises, financial and insurance institutions, electricity, irrigation, water supplies, gas and any enterprises having public character shall be managed by the government or by juridical persons of public law. When required by public necessity such enterprises shall be licensed to private individuals in accordance with the provisions of law and licenses shall be cancelled in accordance with the provisions of law.” The government explained this removal as being “in the spirit of the promotion of private enterprise, to make it possible to broaden the possibility of acquiring licenses by providing that the provisions of law relax the condition for public enterprises to be licensed.” It is clear from this that the government intended to promote private enterprise. Part II was also eased in order to ensure that the standard of government control was to be under the jurisdiction of the law, not the Constitution.

The intent of the amendment of Article 88 was also clearly to deny the spirit of the NFC, which had defined the state and public ownership. The proposal for the amendment stated that Article 88 “focused on the possibility that private enterprises can be transferred to state or public ownership or that their management can be placed under the control or direction of the state or juridical persons of public law” and asserted that “while respecting private enterprises, move the focus to the opposite side after which private enterprises cannot be transferred to state or public ownership, or their management cannot be placed under the control or supervision of the state or juridical persons of public law, except when it is deemed urgently necessary in order to meet urgent necessities of national defense or national well-

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being in accordance with the provisions of law.” The amendment was clearly promoting respectful private enterprises and against the spirit and principle of the NFC. Regarding Article 89, the government explained that, among the applicable clauses from articles 85 to 88, “the expropriation or use of the right to cancel licenses in Article 85 and 87 shall be fully provided in the law; the pertinent clauses in Article 85 and 87 are to be deleted and restricted in Article 86 and 88.” The applicable scope of Article 89 was therefore scaled down by placing the relevant clauses in Article 85 and 87 under the jurisdiction of the law.

As a result of this proposal by the government, debate fiercer than that during the legislation of the NFC in 1948 developed in the National Assembly, although it may be more accurate to say that the true argument about the economic system that did not occur at the time of founding of the state finally began. The spirit of the clauses pertaining to the economy in the NFC had been accepted without any intense dispute due to the social consensus since the time of the Korean Provisional Government and the strong postcolonial demands at the time. Because the 1954 Constitution sought to overturn Korea’s long social consensus, however, a forceful argument had ensued.27 It is very interesting to note that the dispute on the economy and social system in 1954 had not occurred in 1948. The confrontation can be summed up as a dispute between equal economy supporters versus the market economy supporters and had the appearance of a dispute between republicanism and liberalism.

The main focus of the dispute is described in the following paragraphs.

The questions raised by members of the National Assembly who opposed the amendments (Chŏn Chinhan, Chang Hongyŏm, Ch’oe Kukhyŏn, Chŏng Namguk, Yi Yongsŏl, Im Kibong, Pak Ch’ŏrung) are as follows. First, did the economic effect and influence of the NFC fail so considerably that an amendment bill was required? Was the spirit of the NFC ever truly observed 27

National Assembly Library, 1968, Materials for the History of the Constitutional Government, Volume 3—Proceedings of the Constitutional Amendment during the Second National Assembly; National Assembly Library, 1968, Materials for the History of the Constitutional Government, Volume 4—Proceedings of the Constitutional Amendment during the Second National Assembly. Further research is required that interprets the discussions in these two proceedings based on the liberalist and federalist theory of the Constitution.

Constitution, National Agenda, and Presidential Leadership 293

and practiced? Second, was South Korea at a stage where a market economy and liberal enterprises could be adopted? Third, if South Korea was to receive foreign aid, why was a Constitutional amendment necessary? Would a legal revision be enough? Fourth, was the possibility of foreign economic domination being considered? Wouldn’t there be a danger in allowing colonial exploitation of the economy as the British and French had done in Iran, India, and Indochina? Shouldn’t “national capital” or “native capital” (minjok chabon) be fostered first? Fifth, was this not promoting an oligopoly by granting freedom to conglomerates? Would a class struggle not follow the deepening inequality and the permitting of rich-get-richer and poor-get-poorer methods?

To refute the criticisms of the opposition, the government (Prime Minister Paek Tujin) and those who supported the bill in the National Assembly (Kwak, Sang Hun, Sŏ, Pŏm Sŏk, Cho, Chu Yŏng, Kim, Pong Jae, Pak, Yŏng Ch’ul, Yŏ, Un Hong, Cho, Kwang Sŏp) argued that first it would not be a complete transformation from a command economy to a market economy. Second, the laws and institutions already set up by the government would be enough to safeguard an equal society even if the amendment passed. Third, the introduction of foreign capital was absolutely necessary because the economy was in tatters. Fourth, how much foreign capital would come in was more worrisome than an economic invasion by foreign capital, as the latter could be sufficiently regulated. Furthermore, fear of foreign capital could only be described as suicidal patriotism, and those who adhered to it were narrowminded isolationists and ultra-nationalists. Fifth, because the clauses on state ownership stood in the path of receiving foreign capital, resolving the shattered economy with an amendment was a reasonable argument. Sixth, an amendment was needed to ensure the autonomy and creativity of the enterprises and so that the concern over the monopolization of corporation, capital, and market could easily be regulated by policies.

However, in addition to the battle over economics, which most clearly presented differing views since the founding of the state, the issues concerning the Constitution at the time had a political dimension. In light of the movement to abolish the restriction on the reelection of the first president by a faction of the Liberal Party and right-wing organizations that began after the government’s withdrawal of the proposal on March 9, 1954, it is clear that Syngman Rhee intended to change the power structure using economic issues

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via his demand (the extension of his term) in conjunction with the American demand (the constitutional amendment on the economy). Considering that the provisions of the Constitution were a compromise of power, the transfer of a power structure for an economic system was an exchange that could be fairly attempted. Consequently, Rhee succeeded in establishing both. Judging from the movement by the right-wing political parties and supporters of the Liberal Party to abolish the restriction on the reelection of the first president after the March 9th withdrawal, attempting such an “equation of exchange” was worthwhile. That is, when the constitutional amendment on the economic articles became unavoidable due to American pressure, the revision regarding the reelection restriction was added. In fact, one faction of the demonstrators in the movement stemmed from the right-wing organizations that had participated in the Pusan Incident of 1952 (Pusan chŏngch’i p’adong).28 The same applies to the other political parties and the National Assembly, including part of the Liberal Party. The meeting of the Committee for the Promotion of the Constitutional Amendment (Hŏnbŏp kaejŏng ch’ujin wiwŏnhoe) held on April 30 and again on May 3 sought permission to allow a lifetime term solely for the first president, proving and demonstrating that the movement for the constitutional amendment began before the General Election of May 20. This portrays Rhee as a cunning and experienced politician.29 In terms of economic issues, part of the blame for the dispute in the National Assembly can be placed on the ruling Liberal Party’s creed, which did not match the government’s proposal for the amendment regarding the market economy. The Liberal Party from the beginning clearly envisioned itself, similar to the NFC, as champions of the tenets of the public good, harmony, denial of class, and cooperation—rather than of the individual, private property, and competition—as shown in its declaration of the foundation of the party, its political creed, and its policies. The declaration of 28

“Political Development in the ROK,” RG 469, RECORDS OF THE US FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AGENCIES, 1948-61, Office of Far Eastern Operations, Korea Subject Files. 1953-59, Entry 422, Box 13.

29 Regarding the movement and the trends for the constitutional amendment of 1954, refer to RG 469, RECORDS OF THE U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE AGENCIES, 1948-61, Office of Far Eastern Operations, Korea Subject Files. 1953-59, Entry 422, Box 12, 13, 20.

Constitution, National Agenda, and Presidential Leadership 295

the foundation of the Liberal Party clearly stipulated that “the construction of a cooperative society following the economic system for a cooperative life and where everyone can live together and every nation can mutually prosper while every state can stand side by side” was the historical mission for the party. The key contents in their political creed and policy sought to eradicate exploitation by the monopolizing ruling elite, to abolish class distinctions, to remove prestige, and to close the gap between the rich and the poor, while supporting and promoting pantisocracy; the rights and interests of laborers, farmers, and working mass as citizens in a democracy; the idea of mutual help; the construction of a cooperative world, the realization of public justice in terms of the coexistence, co-prosperity, and mutual cooperation between labor and capital; and the protection of another’s freedom before one’s own, among other ideals (National Election Commission, 1965: 124-126). A clear characteristic was the denial and exclusion of modern liberalism and the capitalist ideology that promoted self-interest, class structure, individualism, and competition, in a fashion identical to that of the NFC. A comparison between the economic articles of the 1948 NFC and the PKWC as established on November 29, 1954 is presented in the following table.

National Founding Constitution (1948)

Post-War Constitution (1954)

Art. 84. The principle of the economic order of the No changes Korean Republic shall be to realize social justice, to meet the basic demands of all citizens and to encourage the development of a balanced economy.

Within the limits of the foregoing paragraph the economic freedom of each individual shall be guaranteed.

Art. 85. Mines and other important mineral resources, marine resources, water power and natural powers that may be utilized economically shall be owned by the State. In order to utilize and develop such resources, licenses shall, in case of public necessity, be granted for a limited period to private persons in accordance with the provisions of law and shall be cancelled in accordance with the provisions of law.

Article 85. Licenses to exploit, develop, or utilize mines and other important underground resources, marine resources, water power and all other economically available natural powers may be granted for limited periods in accordance with the provisions of law.

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National Founding Constitution (1948)

Post-War Constitution (1954)

Art. 86. Farmland shall be distributed to self-tilling No changes farmers. The method of distribution, the extent of possession, and the nature and restrictions of ownership shall be determined by law.

Art. 87. Par. 1. Important transportation and com- Abolished munication enterprises, financial and insurance institutions, electricity, irrigation, water supply, gas and any enterprises having a public character shall be managed by the government or by juridical persons of public law. When required by public necessity such enterprises shall be licensed to private individuals in accordance with the provisions of the law and licenses shall be cancelled in accordance with the provisions of the law.

Art. 87. Par. 2. Foreign trade shall be under the Article 87. Foreign trade shall be control of the government. controlled by the government in accordance with the provisions of law.

Art. 88. In order to meet urgent necessities of national defense or national life, private enterprises shall be transferred to state or public ownership, or their management shall be placed under the control or supervision of the state or juridical persons of public law, when it is deemed urgently necessary in accordance with provisions of law.

Article 88. Private enterprises shall not be transferred to State or public ownership, except in cases specifically designated by law to meet urgent necessities of national defense or national life, nor shall their management or operation be controlled by the State or by juridical persons organized by public law.

Art. 89. Article 15, Par. 2 of this Constitution shall be applicable to the cancellation of a license and the expropriation, use, or restriction of property as provided in Arts. 85-88.

(Art. 15. The right of property shall be guaranteed.

Its nature and restrictions shall be defined by law.

The exercise of property rights shall conform to public welfare. Expropriation and the use or restriction of private property for public purposes shall be accompanied by due compensation in accordance with the provisions of law.)

Article 89. Article 15. Paragraph 3 of this Constitution shall be applicable to the expropriation of farmland as provided in Articles 86 and shall also be applicable to the transfer of private enterprises to the State or to public ownership as provided in the foregoing Article.

Constitution, National Agenda, and Presidential Leadership 297

VI. Conclusion The conclusion of this paper—based on primary sources and with Korea’s national agenda, Constitution, and leadership as variables—on the National Founding Constitution (NFC) and the post-war Constitution is as follows.

First, the National Founding Constitution of 1948 was not, given the condition that the key national agenda was land reform, aiming to establish a liberal market economy but was closer to supporting a socialist market economy or a social democracy that stipulated strong involvement from the state. This was in accordance with the tradition of the state’s republican involvement in the economy since the time of the Korean Provisional Government. A third way in which both the capitalist market economy and the socialist planned economy were eschewed had been a result of a social consensus in Korea that had been existed at the time of the Korean Provisional Government.

Second, the South Korean government under President Rhee was able to carry out land reform successfully, the major post-colonial national agenda, by utilizing the spirit and articles of the Constitution. This led to the collapse of the radical left and had a decisive influence on the expansion of a support base consisting of the peasant class. Farmer support and yearnings for North Korea also ended. At the same time, the influence of the landlord class and the Korean Democratic Party, the leading opponents of the land reform, was drastically decreased. In other words, the success of the land reform had three lasting effects in South Korea: the expansion of support for the government, the collapse of the landlord class, and the downfall of the left. It was the result of a perfect combination of the key national agenda of land reform, the spirit and principles of the Constitution that reflected the national agenda, and the leadership of President Rhee.

Third, during the course of the Korean War, the Constitution of Korea changed from an equal economy system or state capitalist system to a market economy system in order to secure aid in post-war reconstruction. Reflecting the change in the spirit and contents of the Constitution, a new national agenda emerged—due to the success of land reforms and the collapse of the left—to fulfill and promote post-colonial economic reform, post-war

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reconstruction, and the acceptance of foreign aid. Thus, the market economy system of Korea, at least according to the norm and spirit of the Constitution, was laid not in 1948 at the time of national foundation, but in 1954.

Fourth, the revision of the chapter on the economy in the Constitution, although not well known, was due to strong American pressure. Washington directly and fiercely questioned the Korean state’s excessive involvement in the economy and the shrinking of market autonomy, arguing that the socialist orientation of and the articles in the National Founding Constitution enabled this. This led to a conflict between Seoul and Washington regarding the articles in the Constitution and the role of the state in the economy, but in the end Seoul was obligated to revise the chapter on the economy in the Constitution to support a market economy in order to secure US aid. The US saw the 1948 Constitution as too egalitarian and as promoting state socialism.

Thus, Washington felt the need to hold back Rhee’s excessive involvement in an economy that was not oriented towards a market economy system and tried to realize this through a constitutional amendment.

Fifth, Rhee’s leadership embraced the American demands for a constitutional amendment. Seen in terms of the actual contents of the amendment, Rhee, who initially opposed the amendment, seems to have used a strategy of exchange in which he exchanged politics for economy and the power structure for the economic system in order to run again for the presidency for a third consecutive time and gain aid and support from the United States. Rhee’s exchange strategy, from a broad point of view on state development, led to a combination of “the regression of democracy and development of the market economy.”

Sixth is in regards to the effects and consequences of the amendment. The post-war Constitution led to a change of the Korean economic system and its entry into the market economy system, an increase in American aid and the changes of its content, the success of post-war reconstruction, and the establishment for the basis of the Korean market economy. It is questionable whether Korea’s post-war reconstruction could have been successful without its transition to a market economy system at the time.30 The Constitutional 30

Regarding the conflicts, the post-war constitutional amendment, ideology, and line and policy on national economic development see Park, T. (2000).

Constitution, National Agenda, and Presidential Leadership 299

amendment, more than anything else, was heavily influenced by the quantity and quality of American aid and therefore soon became a legal and institutional tool for South Korea’s post-war economic development.

Additionally, because the norms and spirit of the Constitution at the time have been maintained without fundamental changes thus far, it can be said that the amendment provided enabling conditions as well as confining conditions in the trajectory of the development of Korean society. From a broader standpoint, this marked the beginning of modern Korea’s market economy in earnest.31 In conclusion, regarding the initial question of this paper, the comparison between the National Founding Constitution (NFC) and the PostWar Constitution, Korea’s early national agenda (economic reform), the institution/Constitution of Korea, and Korea’s national leadership, uncovers mutual correspondence and relational dynamics. In other words, there is a very strong correlation among the national agendas of land reform and postwar reconstruction, the principle and articles of the Constitution, and Korean leadership. The leadership in the first republic inserted specific articles in the clauses on economy in the Constitution to carry out its national agenda by changing the economic articles in the Constitution. This demonstrates one of the most important characteristics of Korean democracy, that being the consensus about socio-economic reform and its realization. The problem of objectively measuring the accord or discord between the constitutional norms and the reality in the world, i.e., to measure objectively the size of the effect and influence of the constitutional norms on the real world, belongs to another study in the future.

31

In this regard, the experience of Korea may be thought of as an example of constitutional originalism, as discussed in-depth in Constitutional studies and in political theory on the historical roles of the early spirit and principle of the constitution. Constitutional originalism in Korea could go back to the Korean Provisional Government of the colonial period, but such an investigation is beyond the scope of this paper. Refer to the following for a recent discussion on constitutional originalism: O’Neill (2005); Goldford (2006); Park, S. (2006).

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REFRENCES Books and Articles in Korean Citizen’s Action ed., 2007, Re-reading the Constitution, Seoul: Changbi (함께하는 시민행동 편, 『헌법 다시보기』).

Kang, Chin Guk, 1949,“Prospects of South Korean Farmland Reform”, Minsŏng (Mar. 1949) (“남한농지개혁의 전망”, 『민성』).

Kim, Song Ho, Chon, Kyong Sik, Chang, Sang Hwan, and Park, Suk Du, 1989, “A Study on Farmland Reform”, Seoul: Korea Rural Economic Institute (『農地 改革史硏究』).

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Park, Myung Lim, 1996, The Korean War: Outbreak and its Origins Vol. 2, Seoul: Nanam Publishing House (『한국전쟁 발발과 기원』 2). , 2003, “Constitutionalism and Democracy in South Korea: Mixed Government and Social Market Economy”, Korean Political Science Review 37(1): 113-134 (“한국의 초기 헌정체제와 민주주의”, 『한국정치학회보』 제37집 1 호).

Park, Sung Woo, 2006, “Conflicts and Harmony between Democracy and Constitutionalism: Meaning and Role of Originalism in American Constitutional Interpretation”, Korean Political Science Review 40(3): 5577(“민주주의와 헌정주의의 갈등과 조화: 미국헌법해석에 있어서 원본주의 논쟁의 의미와 역할”, 『한국정치학회보』 제40집 3호).

Park, Tae Gyun, 2000, “Formation of Korea’s Economic Development Plans in 1956-1964”, Ph.D. dissertation, Seoul National University (“1956-64 한국경 제개발 계획의 성립과정”, 서울대학교 국사학과 박사학위 논문).

Rhee, Syng Man, 1945, The Founding of the Nation and Ideals, Seoul: Kukche Munhwa Hyŏphoe (『건국과 이상』).

Suh, Hee Kyung, 2006, “The Historical Origins of the 1948 Founding Constitutional Law in Modern Korea, 1898-1919: Focusing on The Understanding of the Democratic Republic in the General People’s Assembly, March First Independence Movement, and the Korean Provisional Government”, Korean Political Science Review 40(5): 139-163 (“대한민국 건국헌법의 역사적 기원 (1898-1919): 만민공동회, 3.1운동, 대한민국 임시정부헌법의 민주공화 정체 인식을 중심으로”, 『한국정치학회보』 제40집 5호).

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Yu Chin O, 1949, Interpretation of the Constitution, Seoul: Myŏng-sedang (『헌법해 의』). , 1952, New Edition of the Interpretation of the Constitution, Seoul: T’amgudang (『신고헌법해의』).

Books and Articles in English and Japanese Fraenkel, Ernest, 1999, “Legal Analysis of the Proposed Amendment to the Constitution of the Republic of Korea [1950],” Ernest Fraenkel Gesammelte Schriften, Band 3 , Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden.

Goldford, Dennis J., 2006, The American Constitution and the Debate over Originalism , Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press.

O’Neill, Jonathan, 2005, Originalism in American Law and Politics: A Constitutional History, Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press.

Oliver, Robert, 1979, Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 19421960, Seoul: Panmun Book Company.

Qing, Simei, 2007, From Allies to Enemies: Vision of modernity, Identity, and U.S.China Diplomacy, 1945-1960, Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press.

Lee, Chong Won, 1996, East Asian Cold War and South Korea-U.S.-Japan Relations, Tokyo: Tokyo, Daigaku Shuppankai Primary Documents in Korean “The 57 th Issue of the Stenographic Records of the 2 nd Regular Meeting”, Stenographic Records of the 2nd Regular Meeting of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea, from the 51th issue to 88th issue (『大韓民國國會 제2회 定 期會議 速記錄, 自 第五十一號 – 至 第八十八號』).

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Korea Rural Economic Institute ed., 1986, Collection of Materials Related to the History of Land Reform Vol. 1 (『농지개혁사 관계 자료집』 1권).

National Assembly Library, 1968, Materials for the History of the Constitutional Government, Volume 3—Proceedings of the Constitutional Amendment during the Second National Assembly (『헌정사자료 제3집-헌법개정회의록 제2대 국회』). , 1968, Materials for the History of the Constitutional Government, Volume 4—Proceedings of the Constitutional Amendment during the Second National Assembly (『헌정사자료 제4집-헌법개정회의록 제3대 국회』).

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National Assembly Secretariat, 1971, History of the National Assembly: the Constitutional Assembly, the Second Assembly, and the Third Assembly (『국 회사-제헌국회, 제2대 국회, 제3대 국회』). , 1986, Progress Report of the Constitutional Assembly (『제헌국회 경과보고 서』).

National Election Commission, 1965, Materials on Political Parties, Volume One—The Function, Political Creed, Policy, and Party Constitution of the Political Party (『정당연구자료 제1집-정당의 기구 기능과 정강, 정책, 당헌 등』).

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South Korean Media System: Toward a Democratization Model* Rhee, June Woong,** Cho, Hang Je,*** Song, Hyun Joo,**** and Jung, June Hee***** From a perspective of the media systems approach, we attempt to provide a media system model that accounts for the characteristics of the relationship between political and media systems in the democratization process of Korean society. Using the model, we explore the possibility by which media system has set the limit on the directions of political democratization. The notion of ‘political parallelism’ is employed to characterize the historical changes of the role of the news media in function of public spheres in relation to political system. The Korean way of ‘political parallelism’ accounts for the process by which mainstream newspapers and broadcasters have influenced political parties and civil society.

The implications are discussed in terms of the role of media system in democratization.

Keywords: Media Systems Theory, Korean Democratization, Political Parallelism, Relationship between the Government and the Press

I. Introduction During the democratic transition after the civil resistance against the authoritarian regime, how did the South Korean politics influence the media Translated from the published article in Communication Theories vol. 6 (No. 1): 144-190, 2010 with permission from the Korean Society for Journalism and Communication Studies. ** Professor, Department of Communication, Seoul National University *** Professor, Department of Communication, Busan National University **** Professor, Department of Communication, Hallym University ***** Researcher, Korea Broadcasting System *

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and how in turn the media responded to it? How have the Korean media and the politics, both in a separate and in a combined manner, contributed to democratic consolidation after the transition? What kind of public sphere have the Korean media functioned as? And what consequences will the public sphere function of the Korean media bring for the democratization?

To answer these questions concerning the media-politics interaction and its effects on the processes of democratic transition and consolidation in South Korea, we employ the notions of media and political systems and examine the ways in which the two systems interact with each other in contributing to the process of democratization.

In this study, we propose a democratization model of media system on the basis of reviewing media systems dimensions Hallin and Mancini (2004) provided. Then we add a dimension of functional role of the mass media as public spheres in society. Together with the original four dimensions of media systems, this functional dimension provides a way to characterize Korean media system in terms of its distinctive roles in shaping political terrains in the process of democratization. In particular, through the prism of this model, we examine the ways in which Korean news media have strengthened their political power and played characteristic roles in affecting the democratic outlook in the course of democratization.

This study extensively makes use of the comparative media systems approach suggested by Hallin and Mancini (2004). However, our intention is not to exaggerate how Korean media system is comparable to other media models in Western countries. By proposing the Korean model of media system, we rather attempt to explore the possibility of extending the media system approach in order to account for the interactions between media and political systems in post-authoritarian democratic transitional countries.

Through this, we expect to bring a case for the democratization model of media systems from the vantage point of Korean experiences of the transition from an authoritarian society to democratic consolidation.1 1

Celebrating the 50 year anniversary of Korean Society for Journalism & Communication Studies (KSJCS), there have been comprehensive evaluations and reflections on journalism and communication studies conducted to date. In the fields of political communication and journalism, review articles that overviewed past research, assessed the current outlook of journalism and communication studies, and suggested

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II. The Comparative Media Systems Approach In their book, Comparing Media Systems, Hallin and Mancini (2004) investigated the relationship between media and political systems from the perspective of comparative systems approach. They proposed three models that described the patterns of interactions between media and politics based on the observations of different types of democracies in Western societies. Hallin and Mancini suggested that their models could be applied to other countries in Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America with a little modification. We find their models helpful to capture the differences and similarities of countries from many other societies as well as Western countries. We do not think, however, the models are sufficient to account for some characteristic developments observed in the countries with some significant differences in historical and cultural back-grounds from Western countries. Rather than simply borrowing their framework of modeling media systems, we analyze the preconditions under which such comparative approaches are possibly made and then figure out ways in which the comparative approach bears on examination of non-Western media systems. for future research were produced (Yang 2009; Im, Y. 2009; Choe 2009). In the reviews, there was a recurring common theme: Though we had been conducting studies on journalism and communications for half a century, we could not produce original theories that had contributed to building a general theory of communication based on our own experiences. This self-criticism then led to a demand for intense observations of our reality and theorization, which were to become the primary tasks for the future of journalism and communication studies. There was also a request to guard against indiscreet importation of Western theories. For example, Lee, Sang Gil (2004: 91) suggested a post-colonial defeatism working behind the acceptance that “the others (generally) create ‘theories’ and ‘philosophies,’ but we (particularly) can only create anything through ‘our contexts’ and ‘case studies’.” He argued that in order to conduct and accumulate empirical studies, we ourselves could not avoid producing theories.

Also, Cho, Hang Je (2008: 141-142) lamented the reality that “where phenomena that can be captured by Western theories are considered ‘interesting’ and ‘meaningful’, the ones that resist the application of Western theories are left unexamined.” He criticized that in this way we had produced theories that were not understandable on our own.

But these two critics did not discuss whether theories could be ‘ours’ and, if possible, how to produce theories that are ‘distinctively ours.’

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1. Key Dimensions of the Comparative Media Systems Approach Hallin and Mancini proposed a series of media and politics variables to categorize different media and political systems in Western societies. As for comparative dimensions of political systems, they considered the five dimensions: (a) political history, (b) role of the state, (c) consensus v. majoritarian government, (d) individual v. organized pluralism, and (e) development of rational-legal authority. Though these system characteristics drawn from the history of Western countries, they are also highly illuminating when applied to Western societies. They provide a comparison point against which experiences and institutions of non-Western countries are posed to reveal systematic differences between Western and non-Western democratic political systems. The five dimensions do not weigh the same when applied to the countries in democratization. For example, the historical experiences of democratization, which is a part of the dimension of political history together with the level of pluralism in Hallin and Mancini’s specification, stood out a critical factor that determines the relationship among other dimensions in political system. That is, depending on the natures of democratic transition and consolidation, roles of the state, level of pluralism, and rational legal authority diverge into many different kinds of inter-relations, which do not allow a generalization of Hallin and Mancini’s layout.

Acknowledging the difficulty of applying Hallin and Mancini’s layout to the countries in the process of democratization, we believe the experiences of Korean democratization provide a revealing perspective from which the comparative dimensions of political system are rearranged to generate a valuable point about the relationship between media system and political system. For example, unlike the most of Western countries where a minimum level of liberal politics began to be established with institutionalization of rational-legal authority, Korean democracy in consolidation shows a stark contrast between a near completion of institutionalization of rational-legal authority in formal system and frequent negligence and violation of legal authority in practice. Part of the reason behind this contrast between formal institutions and informal practices of rational-legal authority stems from the unstable role of the state

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issuing laws that not all the constituents of civil society accept as rational and legal. Consequently during the democratic transition, the government was regarded both as a controller of democratic reform and as a target of democratic reform by different parts of civil society. In this article we propose a set of political systems variables that can capture the historical experiences of Korean democratization while maintaining the system comparative approach presented by Hallin and Mancini. They are (a) government authority during democratic transition and consolidation; (b) development of political parties, and (c) role of civil society movements in democratization.

Hallin and Mancini’s media dimensions are sufficiently general to be applied to media systems in developing countries: (a) development of newspaper industry, (b) political parallelism (c) journalistic professionalism and (d) role of the state in media system (i.e., strong v. weak state intervention). We think, however, that the following two points should be taken into account. First, rather than seeing these dimensions as equal and parallel with one another, one may want to consider hierarchical and causal relationships among them.

For example, we find the development of newspaper industry has influenced the development of journalistic professionalism and the pattern of state intervention in Korean media system. It is also observed that specific forms of journalistic professionalism and role of the state have determined the degree of political parallelism. In our view, hypothesizing these kinds of relationships could be one way of developing Hallin and Mancini’s comparative systems approach within a non-Western context like Korean media system.

Second, in order to illuminate the nature of the relationship between media and political systems variables, we find it helpful to take into additional considerations on the public sphere function of media and the democratic outlook of the society. Cho, Hang Je (2008), following the suggestion made

by Ferree (Ferree, et al. 2002), attempted to categorize public spheres into (a) an elite representative public sphere, (b) a mass participatory public sphere, (c) a civic discursive public sphere, and (d) a counter public sphere.

We generally accept his framework and expect that differing media systems will contribute to the operation of democracy in different ways according to the specific functions they perform in terms of management of public discourses. That is, in the societies under democratic transition like Korea, where its democratic outlook is still uncertain and contending paths to

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democratization are proposed, the different paths of democratic consolidation could be foreshadowed by the kinds of functions the media system performs as a public sphere. For example, if the media function as a ‘representative elite public sphere,’ a watchdog and information provider, the path to democratization will heavily gear towards to a representative and marketoriented democracy. On the other hand, if the media systems function as a ‘participatory public sphere,’ then the path will be more likely to lead to a participatory and deliberative democracy.

2. The Systems Approach Hallin and Mancini made it clear that the three media systems models are empirical rather than normative, which emphasizes their models are based on historical analyses of media systems established in specific social contexts. 2 Although normative values such as diversity, openness and autonomy are not explicitly praised in their description of media systems, their arguments are more than empirical in many ways. As they admitted, empirical observations and categorization can reveal the ways in which a certain condition of media systems will either lead to or limit materialization of normative values such as diversity and autonomy. For example, empirical modeling of commercialization of media industry can illuminate the way in which different levels of market development have consequences for establishment of normative values such as media autonomy and even journalistic professionalization. In principle, we are in agreement with this approach.

However, we believe more attentions should be paid to the followings in order 2

They of course theorized on their own idealistic premises. Although they avowed to overcome the limitations of The Four Theories of the Press which primarily focused on ‘philosophy’ or ‘ideology,’ it is hard to deny that they completely ruled out normative values implied in their modeling. Values such as diversity and autonomy were integrated in their classifying variables and the implications attached to them were presupposed in the descriptions of the resulting models. In addition, as they admitted, particular cases drawn from different countries are never homogenous and continuously changing defying to be consistently identified as the same model. We believe that the three comparative media systems models are basically ‘idealistic’ in the sense that they are abstract and suggest certain evaluative implications.

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for empirical and systematic modeling to be fruitful.

Hallin and Mancini’s comparative media systems approach does not give as much emphasis on “the systems theoretical approach” as on “the comparative approach.” As a result, they seem to skip the important question why in the first place we have to distinguish media system from other social systems and to treat it as a distinct sub-system like other de facto social systems such as political and economic systems. Recognition of media system as a distinctive sub-system requires specification of media system as having the same qualities that other sub-systems have as well as featuring some distinctive qualities that other sub-systems do not. But we find their modeling wanting in regard to characterizing media system in relation to other subsystems within the total system. Since the base for justifying the autonomous status of media systems and its relations with other sub-systems is not clear, the theoretical and empirical criteria to measure the independency from other social sub-systems are not clear either. In fact, Hallin and Mancini did not present persuasive arguments for particularities of media system and for the interdependency of media systems with other sub-systems. It is our standpoint that the task of comparing the ‘particularities’ of individual media systems that operate within a society should be further based on systems theoretic considerations in their own rights.

We need to reconsider the analysis of the interaction between political and media systems, which is the essential part of Hallin and Mancini’s comparative media systems approach. One cannot help but getting the impression that they regard media systems as depending on political systems but not the other way around. The idea that media systems mostly closely related to, sometimes as a subordinate part, political systems is generally supported by empirical evidences. However, the differentiation of media systems was never unilaterally determined by political systems. Thus, the notions such as ‘mediatization of politics’ (Mazzoleni and Schultz 1999), ‘institutional embracement of media logics by politics’ (Altheide and Snow 1979), and ‘mediated politics’ (Bennett and Entman 2001; Nimmo and Combs 1990) indicate that media system is not only passively determined by but also actively shape political systems. Media system, whether it is in a developed stage or not, contributes to the interactions among sub-systems including political systems.

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Media systems leave an important trace in the ruptures that are often found along the evolutionary paths of social systems, the fact of which has a significant implication for the nations under a democratic transition like Korea. For example, as it will be discussed later on in this article, ‘the strengthening of political power of the press’ during the Roh Tae Woo administration (1988-92) and the Kim Young Sam administration (199397) provide good examples. During these stages, the politically oriented press took over part of the roles of political system while party politics was not being fully established even after the remains of the past authoritarian regime began to wane. Interestingly, though the same period documented a rapid expansion of media market due to the first wave of de-regulation, the interaction between the media system and the economic system was not very extensive as compared to the one between the media system and the political system. The phenomenon that the politically oriented press filled the brief vacuum of political power can be interpreted as a consequence of media system’s active response to the changes at the system-level. This phenomenon characterized the nature of the relationship between the press and political parties in the transitional stage of democratization in Korea.

We believe it is important to focus on the interactions between subsystems. To give an example, the rational-legal authority, one of the factors suggested by Hallin and Mancini that determine the nature of political system, operates in a very interesting way in Korea. Since the levels of effectiveness of the rational-legal authority among different sub-systems are quite even, one cannot help but wonder whether the rational-legal authority in Korea is not transitive across sub-systems. In the political system, it is secured at least on a surface level whereas in other sub-systems such as real estate and religion it is hard to find it working appropriately. It seems that the rational-legal authority is accepted on in some factions of society, which belies the generality of the rational-legal authority. A plausible explanation of the unevenness of the rational-legal authority would be the lack of interactions among some subsystems.

Criticizing the static normative approach and the idealistic conceptualization of the models proposed in The Four Theories of the Press, Hallin and Mancini pointed out empirical modeling should not presuppose a developmental assumption. That is, any of the proposed models should not be regarded as

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more developed than the others. They explicitly emphasized that none of the models were an end point in the development of media systems. However, two things are glaring in their placement of the North Atlantic liberal model within the theoretical framework. First, the liberalist values such as media autonomy and journalistic professionalism were treated as a standard against which values of other media systems are compared and evaluated. Thus one may find it hard not to think of North Atlantic liberal model of media system as having a most developed set of journalistic values and practices. Second, the global tendency of converging media systems models into the North Atlantic liberal model was considered some sort of unavoidable process.

Thus for example, one may find it only natural to look at the process in which technological enhancement of the media leads to less emphasis of state regulations on media policies but more dominance of market forces in the media environment.

We find it important to have an explicit assumption about social development especially when we are to apply the media systems approach to account for the processes of democratic transition and consolidation.

Although we do not think it necessary to have a linear perspective or a teleological presupposition on social development in the system theoretical approach, we believe it indispensible to have an explicit outlook on the nature of changes when we talk about changes in media systems. Thus it is always important to ask the questions as to what kinds of values and ideas are presupposed in journalistic practices, what kinds of democracy the media are predisposed to endorse, in which direction of democratization the media and political systems

III. Characteristics of Korean Media Systems We first discuss the characteristics of Korean media system in terms of the media system dimensions presented by Hallin and Mancini: Development of mass media; political parallelism; media professionalization; state interventions. We then add a dimension of public sphere functions of the media system as a criterion dimension and examine how adding this functional dimension leads to a new understanding of the media system in

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Table 1. The Four Models: Western and Korean Media Systems Democratic corporatist model

Polarized plural- Democratization ist model model

Germany, Norway, Denmark, Netherlands,

Italy, Spain, Greece

South Korea, Postauthoritarian Countries

Media system - Developed characteristics mass media market - Low political parallelism - High professionalization - Low state interventions

- Developed mass media market - High political parallelism - High professionalization - High state interventions

- Underdeveloped mass media market -H igh political parallelism -L ow professionalization -H igh state interventions

- Rapidly changing media market - Dynamic political parallelism - Low professionalization - Various levels of state interventions

Role of the media as a public sphere

Consensusinducing pluralism, promotion of participation

Open and muckraking public sphere, external pluralism: advocacy

Advocacy, political sensationalism, conflictreproducing ideologization

Participatory (republican) democracy

Pluralist popular democracy

Under discursive struggles

Model Geographical Distribution

Liberal model US, Canada, UK

Impartial and open public sphere, internal pluralism, watchdog, depoliticization

Pluralist elite Democratic democracy outlook assumed in public spheres

regard to the types of media systems. Table 1 summarizes the Korean model of media system in comparison to the Western media models.

1. Rapid Development of the Korean Media Market and Its Instability Among the four dimensions that determine media systems models, the media market, that is, the ‘economic foundation of media systems,’ seems to work as an exogenous independent factor. Other dimensions such as professionalization, political parallelism and governmental interventions work more like interdependent variables interacting with each other.

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Although Hallin and Mancini proposed the four dimensions as being on an equal level, they also seem to recognize the different degrees and levels of influences among the dimensions. It is hard not to notice that they prioritized the development of media markets over other dimensions. That is, within a system where economic foundation of the press is consolidated by the development of media markets, it is more likely the press becomes an independent system in a society, free from the supports or subsidies from other sub-systems. This kind of independence leads to professionalization of journalism since journalists in developed media markets are self-sufficient in terms of means as well as norms to support for them. Consequently, the structural separation of media market from political and social influences, by and large, tend to facilitate journalistic professionalization while reduce ‘political parallelism.’ The Korean media market expanded rapidly during the process of democratization. The monopolistic media system set by the authoritarian regime broke down and was transformed into an expanding media market.

Until the mid-1990s, the entire media market grew up rapidly as evidenced by the grown size of advertisement revenues. However, the government still intervened in the market as a large advertiser for newspapers as well as the competition regulator. The government sustained the monopolistic advertisement agency for broadcasters, which controlled the cash flows in the broadcasting sector.

The growth of media market is demonstrated in the total revenue of the media. For example, the total revenue of national daily newspapers rapidly increased from KW (Korean won) 137 billion in 1980 to KW 288 billion in 1985. A total of KW 1,717 billion was recorded in 1995. A comparable growth was documented in the growth of overall shares of three terrestrial broadcasting networks. Thus it was not the size of the market, but the speed that characterized the development of the Korean media system. Nonsymmetrical regulation and preferential treatment of the government resulted in uneven yet fast growths in media sectors. However, the fast grown media industry in turn began to influence the government policies and initiatives.

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2. Political Parallelism ‘Political parallelism’ is an elaboration of the concept of ‘party-press parallelism’ devised by Seymour-Ure in 1974 (Hallin and Mancini 2004, 2730). Originally, party-press parallelism refers to the degree of ideological correspondence between the press and political parties. The correspondence is composed of (1) the ideology of contents, (2) connections between the press and the political parties on individual and organizational levels, (3) the overlap of the readers and political party supporters, and (4) the conformity of the journalists to the causes of the political parties they support. Following Hallin and Mancini’s extension of the concept, we designate political parallelism as the extent to which the press culture is interrelated to the politics within the domains that Hallin and Mancini specified.

Considering the fact that Korean journalists often move to the politics, and that the Korean press tends to be highly politically oriented not only in editorials but also in straight news, the degree of political parallelism in Korea must be very high. Political parallelism had been especially intensified since the ideological differentiation was accelerated after the democratic transition (Nam 2006; Yoon 2001). In Korea where civil society is underdeveloped and political parties are rather inefficacious in representing voices in civil society, it is the ideologically oriented press that wields a political initiative to lead political parties or social organizations. Under the condition that conservative newspapers dominate the market and the public opinion, the initiative could be even stronger. Indeed the notion of ‘political empowerment of the press’ has been frequently mentioned when discussing the role or position of Korean news media (Kang, M. 2004; Pak and Chang 2000). We believe that this empowered press constitutes the particularity of the Korean model of political parallelism which will be elaborated later in this article.

3. Weak Journalistic Professionalization The level of professionalization depends partly on the freedom of the press since it implies the independence of journalists from external authorities.

But it is also true that the reinforced economic foundation of the press

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resulted from the growth of media market can provide a foundation of critical professionalism that watches and criticizes other social actors and institutions. According to Hallin and Mancini, for example, in Britain, the United States and Central-Northern European countries, where the freedom of the press was firmly established during the process of industrialization and democratization, the journalistic professionalization strengthened as the media market grew.

Weak professionalization is one of the determining factors characterizing norms of Korean journalists. Since 1987 onward, the control of the news media by the transitional government had been weakened and the level of autonomy increased as the efforts for editorial independence had been paid off. While the journalists’ associations and unions gained their power within a space that was opened up by democratic transition, the autonomy of the news media became firmer through the on-going conflicts and negotiations within newsrooms between senior reporters and unionist journalists. For example, the introduction of the election of editors-in-chief in some newsrooms could be an indication of growing autonomy of the press in that period.

However, during the democratic consolidation period, as the media market expanded and the competitions among them got severe, the pressures from proprietors, managerial groups and advertisers increased. They were poised as a threat to the news media’s internal and external autonomy since they had driven newsrooms more sensitive to intensified market competitions and advertisement revenues.

Nam (2005: 8) noted that as the democratization proceeded, “the press seems to have given in to the pressure from the business rather than to achieve internal autonomy.” This is also the case from the viewpoint of professional norms and public service orientation. The recognition of journalistic norms and ethics has grown during the transitional period through the experiences of journalists’ associations and press unions. As the market competitions among newspapers became so intensified in the mid-1990s to the extent that they were termed as ‘the war of newspapers,’ journalists were succumbed to the managerial demand and, consequently, professional values and practices became neglected.

Under the Kim Dae Jung (1999-2003) and the Roh Moo Hyun (20032007) administrations, conflicts between the government and the dominant

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conservative newspapers intensified along with the disagreement on how to regulate and intervene in the media market. While major conservative newspapers, government, broadcasters, and progressive newspapers were in sharp conflicts against each other, the press as a whole played more of an advocate of political opinions than a provider of information. The picture was not so different for public service broadcasting when the board members of top management have been appointed by political parties.

4. Government Intervention with the Media During the democratization, the roles of the government became unstable.

In general, the state exerted significant influences on the regulation of public broadcasting and on the newspaper market, which may be a legacy from the previous authoritarian regimes. The state not merely managed and regulated the media market but also provided a significant amount of financial support in the form of public advertisement, subsidies to small newspapers and cable televisions, and monopolized the distribution of broadcasting advertisement through the Korea Broadcasting Advertising Corporation. However, as democratic authority of the transitional government did not get strengthened, the power of the state, separate from the bureaucratic authority, over the media had been actually attenuated. The media regulations and policies had to change from unilateral controls to institutional regulations (Cho 2003; Kang 2004; Park and Chang 2000).

Institutional regulations of the state, especially via a licensing system for new media businesses, however, led to severe social, political conflicts, which became more explicit under the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations. Particularly in that period, the government and the major newspapers severely clashed with each other on the issues like tax audit of the press and newsroom policies (Yang 2001). The media reform policies initiated by the reformist government were resisted by the conservative newspapers, which led to social, political conflicts that threatened the legitimacy of the reformist plans in other policy areas. In summary, the traditional role of the strong state intervention has been substantially weakened while new institutional regulatory frameworks were not consolidated. Each time the reformist policies were brought into social, political conflicts not producing

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Table 2. Government and Media Policies in Democratization Administration

Political Phase

Government

Media Policy

Major Media Newspapers Industry

Notes - Direct state regulations - Compulsory media mergers

Park Jung Hee Authoritarian Chun Doo Hwan (~1987)

Oppressive Authoritarian Subordinate control control lap-dog

Controlled market

Roh Tae Woo D Transie tion (1987~92) m o c r a t i z a t i o ConsoliKim Young n dation Sam (1992~97)

Subordinate Oppressive Controlled control and liberalization guard-dog weak governmental authority

Market - Press union movements (1987) expan- Broadcasting sion Commission (1988) - The Hankyoreh (1988) - Increase of the pages of newspapers (1988) - SBS (1990) - Political ads allowed (1992)

Strong authority

1st wave of de- Proregulation governmental watch dog

Kim Dae Jung (1997~2002)

Weak authority

Market - Consolidated Re-regulation Antiof newspaper governmental compe- Broadcasting Act (2000) - The Ohmynews (2000) tition watchdog industry -F air-trading rule on the press reintroduced (2001) - News portal sites burgeoning (2002)

- Market expansion - KBS1 TV commercials scrapped (1994) - Presidential TV debate (1995) - Cable TV (1995) - The JoongAng Daily turns into a morning paper, printing 48 pages (1995) - Homicide of The ChosunIlbo branch manager (1996) - Newspapers fair-trading rule scrapped (1994)

Roh Moo Hyun (2002~2007)

Laissez-faire/ Attack-dog conflictive

- Market competition Revision of electoral laws (2005) - Controversial pressroom mergers (2007)

Lee Myung Bak (2007~ )

2nd wave of Watchdog de-regulation

- Market competition - Controversial revision of Media laws (2009)

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consensual agreements among the stakeholders, the democratic authority of the government got weaker. Table 2 presenting major media policies of the government, role of the major newspapers in relation to the government, and responses of markets during the process of democratization shows the relationship between the government and the major newspapers.

5. Functions of the Media as a Public Sphere Here we introduce a media-related factor that has not been discussed in relation to the media system: the function of the press as public spheres.

We believe that the ways in which the media report social facts, mediate social conflicts, and build social consensus has significant consequences for the outlook of democracy especially in the process of democratization.

For example, the British and American press undertook the function of an impartial public forum by conveying the arguments and opinions of political elites, and by performing the role of a political watchdog. This kind of press presumes ‘monitorial citizens’ and a competitive democracy led by liberal elites. Meanwhile, the democratic corporatist model of media system projects a role of the media as a pluralistic public sphere, the primary function of which is to induce consensus and compromise across the diverse sectors of society. Within this model, the press fulfills the role of public sphere by representing the arguments and opinions from various social groups. This kind of press presumes a pluralistic participatory democracy. Lastly, in a polarized pluralist society, the media show tensions among social groups, reveal scandals and speak for polarized ideological positions. Thus in this kind of society, where the media as a whole presume external pluralism, each individual media player is highly ideological and openly advocating. These kinds of media expect ‘argumentative and participatory’ citizenship and presume pluralistic popular democracy as desirable.

Then what kind of role do the Korean media play, and to what kind of democracy do they expect to contribute? The Korean media designated to themselves the role of a representative voice of broader social sectors.

Journalists have claimed objective reporting and independence to be cherished professional norm. However, we observe they in fact have played an advocate of political ideologies. We then wonder what kind of public

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spheres they provide for public communication and what kind of democracy the kinds of public spheres presume. Before answering these questions, we have to take into account the interactions between the media system and the political system in terms of political parallelism.

IV. Political Parallelism in Korea No same processes of democratization take place between two countries (Bunce 2000; Geddes 1999). Democratic transitions proceed in different ways within the same regions such as Eastern Europe or Latin America as well as across the different regions. Consolidation processes after the transition also differ depending on the nature of transition: resistance of authoritarian cultures, economic growth, and religious or ethnic conflicts within civil society. Korean democratic transition (Choi 1993; Im, H. 1999; Sohn 1997) and consolidation (Choi 2005; Kang 2006) in post-authoritarian were not an exception. Korean experiences of democratic transition and consolidation provide so unique a pattern of democratization as to constitute a model of democratization.

1. Characteristics of Korean Political System Hallin and Mancini laid out three distinctive models of political systems.

As shown in Table 3, North Atlantic countries like the U.S. and Britain are characterized by liberal democracy with the tradition of moderate individualist pluralism and majoritarian rules, together with well-established legal and rational authorities. Germany and North European countries constitute the democratic corporatist model based on corporatist pluralism, a welfare-oriented state and consensual democratic traditions. In contrast, Mediterranean countries like Italy and Spain can be categorized as a polarized pluralistic model characterized by the role of strong state due to the weakness of civil society, ideologically and regionally polarized pluralist culture, and the lack of procedural rationality because of strong political clientelism.

Table 3 also presents the democratization model of political and media systems based on the observations of Korean experiences in comparison to

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Table 3. Characteristics of a Democratization Model Based on Korean Experiences Model

Liberal

Geographical US, Canada, Distribution Britain Political System Characteristics

Democratic Corporatist

Democratization

Italy, Spain, Greece

South Korea

- S tate’s role to - Liberalism; implement the weaker welfare consensus of state (US) social organiza- Individualized tions representation - Consensual rather than democratic traorganized dition: centralpluralism ized negotiations - Predominantly between social majoritarian: organizations, representation of general social and the coexistence of practiinterests cal cooperation - Rational-legal authority: ratio- and ideological struggles nal bourgeois’ demand for pre- - Rational-legal authority: wandictable legislation and admin- ing clientelism, low media istration instrumentalization

- S trong role of the state: absence of bourgeois civil society - S trong political clientelism, weaker development of liberal organizations and systems, intensification of clientelistic relationship between the press and politics -W eaker development of the concept of public interests - Reinforcement of private interests

- S trong role of the state after the era of anticommunism and authoritarian industrialization - From strong to weak governmental authority after democratization - Winner takes all majoritarian political culture -W eak political party system and weak civil society -W eak rationallegal authority

- Developed mass media market - High political parallelism - High professionalization - High state interventions

- Underdeveloped mass media market - High political parallelism - Low professionalization - High state interventions

- Rapid developing mass media market - Enhancing political parallelism led by the press - Low professionalization - Varied state interventions

Media System - Developed mass media market Charac- Low political teristics parallelism - High professionalization - Low state interventions

Germany, Netherlands, North Europe

Polarized Pluralist

the Hallin and Mancini’s three Western models. With regards to the political system dimensions, the Korean model can be characterized by (1) a strong bureaucracy reinforced by developmental strategies, (2) unstable roles of the state depending on differing levels of governmental authorities, (3) winnertakes-all majoritarian political culture, (4) a weak political party system,

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and (5) weak legal and rational authorities. To an extent, the Korean model looks similar to the polarized pluralist model of Italy and Spain. But the Korean political system shows a clear difference in terms, for instance, that a winner-takes-all majoritarian political culture prevails with little institutional arrangement of pluralist representation.

The following three factors are important to characterize Korean political system within the process of democratization: the changing authority of government after the transition; the weakening of the political party system; the fractured nature of civil society. We believe these three factors determine their relationship with media systems dimensions and thus reveal one of the important features of Korean democracy, i.e., competing values of rationality and differing senses of direction in democratization.

First, by means of the mobilization of anti-communism and industrialization policies, the traditional role of the state in Korea had been very strong in dominating in every part of society including the media sector. After the transition, however, two consecutive peaceful changes of the administrations brought about a systematic change of the way in which the state mobilized the society. As the state authority gradually divided into the administrative authority and the bureaucratic authority, the power of the former authority has been oscillated depending on the level of supports from various political sectors in society. For example, the two administrations after the democratic transition, the Kim Young Sam government (1992-97) and the Kim Dae Jung government (1997-2002), showed the typical instability of state administrative authorities near the ends of their administrative terms.

Even though both governments were democratic in principle, the Kim Young Sam administration inherited the political base from the previous authoritarian regimes as well as big-corporations, whereas the Kim Dae Jung administration had only received political supports from the reformative sectors. Both the Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung governments did not have the ability to generate political supports from the oppositions and to produce consensual supports from civil society. They could not secure the leadership to the extent of keeping on their political reform and policy agenda near the ends of their terms. In short, the democratic administrations in the consolidation stage could boast their political power only in the earlier period of their terms. Rapidly losing the grasp of political and policy agenda,

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the democratic government effectively proved inevitability of the recurrent theme of lame-duck, which has constantly weakened government authority.

Second, Korean political parties have been very weak in channeling the political demand and motivation into the formal terrain of politics.

Traditionally, major political parties have suffered from the chronic problems of regionalism, incompetent agenda-setting and poor mobilization of public forums. In addition, in every election, new political parties were established to replace the older ones just because there was the leadership change in the same ideological camps. Though they have been the primary political actors in democratic elections, political parties fail to represent people’s voices and to take accountability of political activities (Choi 2005). Whether conservative or progressive, most of the institutionalized political parties have a serious problem of low representation. This becomes more serious when it comes to representing various marginalized social groups and civil society movements.

Although progressive political parties was institutionalized during the consolidation stage, they had hard time to garner supports from broader sections of citizens because of their lack of effective policies in elections and low level of supports from civil society movements (Im, H. 2009).

Third, it is ironical to observe that as the democratization proceeded, the institution of civil society movements was disintegrated and the momentum of their political activities got weaker. During the democratic transition, civil society greatly expanded contributing to the democratization by such activities as monitoring political representatives, promoting civic participation, setting civil agenda, and prioritizing public interests (Im, H. 2000). For example, in the 2000 general election campaign, ‘the Citizens Alliance for General Election’ played an important role in the reform of the nomination processes within the major political parties and mobilized new generation of politicians. Korea Federation for Environmental Movements in tandem with other environmentalist groups also successfully drew public attention to eco-politics that had been largely neglected by the political establishment. However, as democratization proceeded, activities of civil society movements have turned into a target of political attacks, which made the civil society into an arena of social and political conflicts. Civil society movements began failing to maintain organizational coherence in producing consensual social and political agenda. State intervention through the

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medium of financial subsidies has weakened the legitimacy of civil society movements. Obviously democratization does not bring about matured civil society. Civil society becomes more fractured as diverse social and political demands are organized along the lines of different sectors of civil society (Kim, H. 2000).

In summary, the post-authoritarian political system in Korea demonstrates the characteristics of unstable government authority, weakened political parties and fractured civil society. After democratic institutions were introduced and established successfully, social norms and values that previously functioned within sub-systemic relations during the authoritarian era were also effectively disintegrated. However, democratic practices of the government, political parties and civil society movements were not sufficiently executed to the extent that newly established democratic institutions have become weaker through the democratization process. In addition, a ‘winner-takesall’ majoritarian culture continuously produced a tendency that rejects dialogues and negotiations among fractured political parties and civil society movements, which only contributed to maintaining of cientelism inherited from the authoritarian era.

2. Explaining Political Parallelism We focus on political parallelism in Korea to account for the interaction between media system and political system within the context of democratization. As shown above, political parallelism has been developed in a way that determines the party-press relationship in Korea. However, it is not our intention to argue that political parallelism is the single most important factor that determines the party-press relationship. Rather, we claim in this section the ways in which political parallelism has been strengthened reveals the nature of the role of the news media during the process of democratization.

Based on the observations of Western media system, Hallin and Mancini showed that political parallelism is related with the development of media markets, journalistic professionalization and state interventions.

Figure 1 presents a theoretical model explaining the inter-relationship among the key political and media dimensions within the context of

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Figure 1. explanatory Model of Political Parallelism in Korea.

Korean democratization. We attempt to show the explanatory factors such as journalistic professionalization, developments of political parties and fractured civil society have shaped the nature of political parallelism in Korea through the mediating factors such as strong advocacy and discursive struggles in public spheres as well as collusion and confrontations between government and the media. Though not shown in this figure, we also believe other political systems factors such as polarized pluralism and rational-legal authority also influenced political parallelism. this article limits the focus, however, on the three factors of professionalization of the press, developments of party systems and fractured civil society.

Journalistic professionalism is evaluated by variables such as political independence, establishment of distinctive professional norms, and public service orientations (Hallin and Mancini 2004: 34-6). In Korea, journalists’ public service orientations were generally high due to historical legacy inherited from national independent movements. However, the autonomy of journalists from other sectors of the society and the establishment of distinctive norms were considered underdeveloped even in the process of democratic consolidation. norms and practices regarding objectivity,

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impartiality, and autonomy were not pursed in the discussion of conflicting issues and events. Thus within each of issue public spheres prepared by the news media, contending voices were amplified with few chances of moderations among the conflicting interests. Strong advocacy and discursive struggles in public spheres created the environment where political parallelism was shaped in such a way as to give the political power to the news media channeling the voices. By contrast, as weakened political parties could not represent the diverse voices in civil society, they became more dependent on the media’s editorial selection of voices.

In Korea, development of political parties had a direct implication for political parallelism. Korean political parties, functioning as organizers of social interests (Schattschneider 1960), tended to instrumentalize the news media in order to exert influences on their coverage of political parties. In particular, as political parties recruited new candidates for general elections and communication directors for political campaigns from major news media, the human network between political parties and major news media including public service broadcasting got stronger. In addition, weakened political parties broadened the political space for new comers from civil society, which led to a dynamic style of political parallelism where the news media rather than political parties take initiatives in deciding whose voices should be heard in public spheres. That is, as political parties could not represent diverse voices in fractured civil society, they could not be a major news source for the news media. Various social movement groups bypassed political parties to make their voices heard in the traditional news media as well as in new media on the internet.

Then what is the characteristic of political parallelism in Korea? First, it seems that political parallelism was getting stronger as the democratization process folded out in Korea. Based on a content analysis of the news reports on South-North Korean relations in the Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung administrations, Yoon (2001: 185-91) demonstrated that ideological differentiation of news coverage between major newspapers was made clear between the two administrations. And this is the period when competitions in Korean newspaper market became more intense. That is, in Korea, as competitions in newspaper market got tougher, political parallelism became more intense, which is quite different from the British and American cases

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where market competition weakened political parallelism.

As mentioned above, low professionalization of the Korean news media, weakened political parties and fractured civil society were the factors that had shaped the dynamics of political parallelism in Korea. It should be emphasized here that the pattern of political parallelism in Korea is quite different from that in the Western societies: The news media took the initiative of the relationship between the media and political parties, not the other way around. In fact, it has been pointed out several times that the Korean news media, especially the conservative major newspapers, became a dominant power agent as the society underwent democratization (Cho, H. 2003; Lee 1997; Yang 1995). There was even an argument that the press has developed into a ‘state institution’ to claim a part of the state role (Park and Chang 2001: 93). From a modeling perspective, we find these claims have some points, especially considering our argument that the news media have led the strengthening of political parallelism in the course of democratization. In summary, the Korean news media, frequently replacing the roles of weakened political parties in channeling various voices in civil society, acted not merely an agent but as a main player of Korean politics by instrumentalizing social conflicts. Then how did this happen? What implications do the characteristics of political parallelism have on the democratic transition of Korea?

3. Development of Political Parallelism in Korea In order to examine our thesis of ‘the domination of the news media over the political system,’ we need to look into the changes of political parallelism passing through the different stages of democratic transition and consolidation. To show the changes in the pattern of political parallelism, we provide the figures illustrating political parallelism in three different stages of democratization. Figure 2 presents the pattern of political parallelism right after the democratic transition (1987-1992). It shows two horizontal lines, the one on the above for the ideological distribution of political parties and the other on the below for the ideological distribution of news media. The lines drawn on the vertical axis represent the cumulative distributions of political power as approximated by the number of voters depending on political ideologies: the dotted line for the authoritarian period and the solid line for

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Figure 2. Political Parallelism during the democratic transition (1987-1992).

the democratic transitional period. The change of political power distribution basically illustrates the changes of the political power base in the democratic transition. that is, the overall distribution of voters was transformed from the skewed dotted line to the solid line. The overall power distribution moved to the left forming a ‘middling voters’ at the center of the line of political ideology.

The democratic transitional government, the roh tae Woo administration (1987-1992), initiated ‘limited liberalization’ in diverse social sectors including media market. As a result of ‘liberalization,’ a progressive daily, the The Hankyorae, could launch (illustrated as ▲d in Figure 2) and a commercial broadcaster Seoul Broadcasting System received a terrestrial broadcasting license. In this stage of democratic transition, however, the political influence of newspapers and broadcasters was not very strong although the number of news media increased and their sizes got bigger. the news media did not contribute much to democratization. Korean democratization was a result of the combination of the movements from the below and the political pacts among the power elites (choi 2005). Political parallelism in this period was not fully shaped yet: There was little ideological difference between the two conservative parties: the ruling democratic Justice Party (A) and the opposing new democratic republican Party (c).

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Figure 3. Political Parallelism during the Initial Stage of democratic consolidation (19921997).

The ideological difference between other two liberal parties in opposition (B, d) was not so clear, either: reunification democratic Party (d) and Peace democratic Party (B). The ruling and opposition parties all took the relatively liberal stances in economic and social policies while they showed severe conflicts over the issues such as Korean re-unification and labor policies. under these conditions, the political orientations of major newspapers (▲a, ▲b, ▲c) and the public broadcaster (△e) were targeting the largest readership and viewership, respectively.

Figure 2 shows there was no systematic matching between political parties and the media. In fact, during the democratic transitional government, the conservative press did not have the willingness and capability to take a clear ideological stance distinguished from the past stance that had been violently regulated by the authoritarian regimes oppressive state. Similarly, the Hankyorae (▲d), a progressive daily, sometimes revealing a tone of editorial supporting the opposition parties, did not align itself ideologically with the opposition parties. rather, the newspaper played a role of checking the institutionalized opposition parties’ policies and ideologies from the perspective of far left political groups.

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When the president Kim Young Sam (1992-97) took the office after elected as the candidate of the merged conservative parties, the democratization process became stiffen, and party-press parallelism began to get a shape. The ruling New Korea Party (designated as A in Figure 3) showed more liberal stances in comparison to the ex-ruling Democratic Justice Party. In relation to the National Assembly for New Politics (B) and other semi-institutionalized progressive political parties (E), however, the New Korea Party showed much more conservative stances especially on the issues of labor relations and South-North Korean relationships. However, the distribution of the voters in support of specific political parties moved to a more or less normal shape shown in solid line.

Mainstream conservative newspapers (▲a, ▲b, ▲c) during this period, already having secured commercial autonomy and then trying to lead the market, entered into a fierce competition among them. Based on their footing in the market, they began to exercise political influence on the political parties. The Hankyorae (▲d) continued to show their discursive leadership on the issues of labor, industry, and culture. Due to the ideological difference, the opposition party could not adopt what the progressive newspaper advocated on the major issues, but it could not completely ignore what the newspaper editorialized either.

During the later stage of democratic consolidation from the Kim Dae Jung to Roh Moo Hyun government, South Korean society witnessed accelerated political, social, and ideological differentiations. As shown in Figure 4, the distribution of political power in general changed from uni-polar to bipolar, resulting no strong moderate voters in the middle of the road. Two major presidential elections ended up with a close competition between the two major parties mobilizing the ideologically differentiated voters. And the newspapers in this period exercised a serious amount of political power to the extent that Choi (2005: 229) declared that “after democratization, the press represented, consolidated, and mobilized the demands from the power elites.” Not only major conservative newspapers (▲a, ▲b, ▲c) but also the progressive newspapers like The Hankyorae performed a very similar function of providing public spheres with strong advocacy with discursive struggles among various social and political groups. Consequently, over the past fifteen years of democratic consolidation, it was the press, regardless of political

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Figure 4. Political Parallelism during the Initial Stage of democratic consolidation (19972007).

stances, that led ideological battles through the mobilization of political opinions.

Interestingly, during the latter part of the consolidation stage (19972007), public service broadcasters contributed to strengthening political parallelism (from e to e*) shifting its political stances in accordance with the incumbent political power. Internet newspapers, emerging from both side of the spectrum (both f and f*), rapidly expanded their influences. In other words, the news media in Korea, whether they are major newspapers, public service broadcasters and internet newspapers, represented ideological voices in society and contributed to intensifying the ideological confrontations in Korea. This resulted in increased external polarized pluralism with a limited development of internal pluralism, which shows a somewhat similar pattern of political parallelism in the media system model of Mediterranean countries on the outside. However, the kind of external polarized pluralism found in Korea is characteristically different from that of the Mediterranean model of media system in that political parallelism got strengthened during the process of democratization and was led by the news media under the conditions of low professionalism of the news media, weakened political parties, and fractured civil society.

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V. Conclusion: Political Parallelism and Its Implications for Democratic Outlook Based on the discussion about political parallelism in Korea, some of implications for the course of democratization can be drawn as follows.

First, the news media, especially the major conservative newspapers, could not provide an integrated public sphere where diverse ideological groups could voice their opinions and show democratic outlooks. In the early stage of democratic consolidation, the newspapers took the role of an ideological fighter in fierce ‘winner-takes-all’ social and political conflicts (Kang, M. G. 2004; Rhee 2005). And this trend continues: They do not reflect social and political conflicts in society but actively carry out ideological warfare against their ideological opponents. The journalistic norms such as objectivity and diversity are frequently referred but only within the context of protecting their socio-economic status.

In fact, the major newspapers do not even fear to engage in confrontation with the government. Routinely regulated by the government and showing ideological affinity with the conservative administration, the newspapers often took side of the government of the day. But in order to protect their interests, they would resist against the government. The conflicting relationship between the mainstream newspapers and the government was reflected in the controversial tax audit on major conservative newspapers led by the Kim Young Sam administration and the political debate over imposing the fair trading rule on newspaper industry during the Kim Dae Jung administration.

This became more apparent in the press reform policy of the Roh Moo Hyun administration and in the recent controversy over the revision of media law by the Lee Myoung Bak government.

By waging an ideological war against their opponents, they seriously restrict the democratic outlook. When covering the controversial issues such as reunification, foreign policy, national security, political reforms, environment, education and real estate, the news media reveal different democratic outlooks. Some are geared toward liberal democracy, others envision more or less participatory and egalitarian democracy. The problem is that there no consensual or integrated perspective emerged out of these

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competing visions and outlooks of democracy. For example, while the conservative press argues for the promotion of market-oriented liberal democracy, the progressive press puts forward prospects of participatory and egalitarian democracy. Depending on the assumptions behind these competing visions and outlooks, they provide completely different visions and outlooks as to what kind of democracy South Korea is heading for.

The competing democratic outlooks revealed in the news media’s coverage are presumed in the way in which the major newspapers functions as public spheres in mediating diverse controversial issues. And the problem is that even though they regard themselves as carrying out a liberalist or a participatory role of the news media within the society in the process of democratization, they in fact provide conflict-generating, advocate public spheres that have few chances of delivering social consensus among the conflicting parties. The dynamic nature of Korean political parallelism suggests the news media in Korea do not simply mediate elite opinion and convey group interests. They are the organizer of elite opinions and group interests. Considering this, it is hard to believe the claim made by conservative news media that they identify themselves as a representative liberalist institution of democracy. Certain they play more roles than this.

Likewise, when the progressive media consider themselves as to play the role of civic participatory and deliberative democratic institution, they conveniently ignore the amount of conflicts amplified by their coverage of controversial issues. Thus strangely, democratic outlook of Korean society seems to resemble the kinds of democracies that Korean news media envision. It is utterly conflicting and confusing not only to participants of public spheres but also to the audience in general. However, one thing clear is that much of the course of Korean democratization depends on the ways in which the news mediate public opinions and channel social interests functioning as public spheres.

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