From Soft to Hard Insecurity In The Horn of Africa: The Role of Militia, Predatory States & Rogue Ca by The Consulting House

TCH

Working Paper No. 004/011/2013

FROM SOFT TO HARD INSECURITY IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: THE ROLE OF MILITIA, PREDATORY STATES & ROGUE CAPITAL Mutahi Ngunyi | Musambayi Katumanga | Judy Mutahi Mbugua wa Mungai | Jennifer Shamalla | Wangeci Chege

The

CONSULTING

This work was carried out with the aid of a grant from the International Development Research Centre, Ottawa Canada

HOUSE

Policy Innovation and Security Thinktank

SOFT AND HARD INSECURITY IN THE HORN An Audit of Organised and Organic Militia in Three Convergences

Dr Mutahi Ngunyi Dr Musambayi Katumanga Philip Gathungu With the Assistance of Alex Flemmings Losikiria

TCH/IPEX Working Paper No 01/11/2013

Research supported through a grant from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC)

An Audit of Organised and Organic Militia in Three Convergences

1.0RHODESIAN CONSTRUCTION OF THE AFRICA STATE 1.1 Introduction: State 'Failure' or State Mis‐Engineering?

The African state has experienced many 'markings'. It has been described as having 'failed', 'collapsed' and at best 'weak'. And these 'markings' have been borrowed by discourse almost uncritically. In our attempt to understand militia foreboding in the horn, we encountered some conceptual diﬃculties with these 'labelings'. The one question we could not answer is whether the state in Africa was actually formed. We had our doubts. And if it had not formed, how could it have 'failed', 'collapsed' or become 'weak'? At this point, we summoned historical evidence. This led us to an obvious fact: the state was handed over to the natives as if it was a bag of potatoes – intact and ready to use. With this evidence at hand, we posed another question: Is it possible that this 'inherited state' was ab inito designed to 'fail', 'collapse' and be 'weak'? Is this how it was deliberately engineered – a junk state? The evidence did not suggest conspiracy. Instead, it suggested naivety, downright connivance and greed. In the place of state 'failure' and 'collapse', historical evidence pointed us to 'state mis‐engineering'. And the agents of this distortion are not important – native or colonial. What is important is 'how' the state in Africa was 'wired not to work'. We attempt a historical explanation to this and how the Rhodesian distortion accounts for militia foreboding and the regional 'bandit economy' in the Horn of Africa. 1.2 Engineering the State as a Company: The Rhodesian Model

When Cecil Rhodes imagined a highway from Cape Town to Cairo the original blueprint of the African state was hatched. The design was simple: To build a highway that would transport the virgin resources from the hinterlands to the waterways. To supervise this extraction, he needed a secretive, cold‐blooded 'machine' to be called the 'state'. But for its operations to be eﬃcient, it had to be designed as an extraction company: ruthless, interest‐serving and hungry. And this is how the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC), constituted as the original 'modern' state in the East African Protectorate, was formed. At the core of its DNA, it was extractionist, although the outer shell mimicked a 'modern' state.

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An Audit of Organised and Organic Militia in Three Convergences

In its original formulation, therefore, the African state was constituted as an extraction company. And its 'shareholders' had only one interest: Dividend. The pressure for the 'state' to declare dividends became its raison de tre. In fact, 'state dividends' became the organizing ideology for elite recruitment, socialization and competition. Ethnic banality around 1 'our time to eat' was also informed by the dividend logic. But dividend and extraction could not summon the African natives to 'civic duty'. A state persona, diﬀerent from that of a company, had to be created.

This persona had to be moral. It targeted long‐term predation and 2 establishment of hegemony through moral persuasion . The intention was to weave a 'civic morality' that would facilitate extraction. And such morality was not possible where the dominant social order was in direct conﬂict with extraction ethos. To re‐create this order, a modicum of 'false consciousness' in African natives was necessary. As the agent of moral persuasion, therefore, the persona of the Rhodesian state had to be that of a seducer of the masses, and a schizophrenic lair with a multiple personality disorder. In sum, the state was intentionally designed as a moral pervert. And through this persona, it weaved a civic morality that demonized the ethno‐customary regime, declaring that 'ethnic and native morality' were primitive. In so doing, it made the morality of Rhodesian capital 'superior' to that of the African oracles.

The dual identity of the Rhodesian state as an agent of predation on 3 the one hand, and a seductive charmer of native aspirations on the other, became engraved in the DNA of the African state. But this double persona in the African state attracted a double persona in the African 4 masses as well . One persona was artiﬁcially civic, the other persona was intrinsically traditional. And this duality of existence became the bedrock upon which the nation‐building project was to advance. Overtly, the African paid allegiance to the predatory civic state; covertly, the civic spirit of the native remained imprisoned in the normative‐traditional sphere. The civic morality imposed by the state was only tenable in the public arena. In the private arena, native action was moderated by the normative‐traditional morality.

This is a Kenyan rationalization of ethnic competition for political power. 2 Antonio Gramsci (1971) argues that hegemony is established through persuasion, not force. This is how the state is able to impose false beliefs and values in order to maintain and justify its dominance. Through what Marx calls false consciousness, consent from the populations was achieved. 3 Education, assimilation, urbanization etc for instance. 4 The attraction suggests a relationship, but the relationship is not necessarily causal. 5 For purposes of this study, we single out ve defects, but we recognize that there could be more. 6 See Achille Mbembe (1992:22)

1.3 The Five Rhodesian Distortions of the African State

This Rhodesian formulation produced ﬁve design distortions in the African state. First, and true to the Rhodesian spirit, the African state was not constructed as an assemblage of civic institutions. It was constituted as a collectif of dominant interests; a cabal of predatory forces. On the surface, the state emerged as the creator and custodian of the civic sphere of authority. At the core, however, it retreated to an illicit predatory sphere where dominant interests jostled for hegemony. In straddling the two spheres, the state became a realm of 'stylistic 6 connivance' . And this is how the African successor class was socialized to run it. As we shall argue later, this straddling of spheres is also responsible for militia foreboding and its corresponding 'ethnic banality'. From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 01/11/2013

An Audit of Organised and Organic Militia in Three Convergences

The Second Rhodesian defect is the imprisonment of native 'civic spirit'. As already observed, the state did not have the moral standi to summon it. This spirit found residence and expression in the normative‐ traditional sphere instead. And this is why the native found himself/herself mobilizing “…not just a single identity but several ﬂuid identities…(which were)…constantly revised in order to achieve maximum instrumentality (…) as and when required” (Mbemba, 1992:5). To the native, therefore, civic power was something to “…bridle, trick and toy with …instead of confronting…(or engaging with)… it” (Ibid., 22) This detachment from civic authority resulted in the normative‐ traditional sphere becoming the heat and light of native action. Because the 'civic spirit' of the native did not migrate to the civic sphere, it found expression in ethnic articulation. The normative‐traditional sphere, therefore, became the space for ethnic agitation, connivance and competition. Constitutional and other political settlements were negotiated and sealed in this space. The civic 'rubber‐stamping' of such settlement is what the formal state was relegated to do.

The third Rhodesian defect has to do with the 'morality' of civic law as the instrument of civic adjudication. This law is sound in its letter, but 7 wanting in the essence of its spirit . That is, its contractual order is solid; but its non‐contractual order is non‐existent. The point here is that the 'morality' of law is derived from the negotiations that are held before adopting it. This pre‐adoption negotiation is what Talcott Parson (1951) calls the non‐contractual order or the non‐contractual elements of contract. It is the unwritten understanding that binds actors and their actions to the precepts of this law. In the absence of this understanding, law, protocols and regulations are developed, but applied sub‐optimally. In fact they result in a 'regulatory double‐bind', as we call it in this study. This is a situation where the need to adopt a law or protocol is urgent; but the need to mis‐engineer this law, mis‐apply it or dislocate it from the application site is also urgent. Either way, the regulatory intent fails. This is because a pre‐existing non‐contractual order is either non‐existent, artiﬁcial or was ignored during drafting. This Rhodesian dilemma, therefore, produces a situation where regulatory frameworks exist, alright, but the obligation to order conduct according to their precepts is lacking. Or a situation where such frameworks are over‐ran by embedded interests. These interests are local and international; they are located within the state and in markets. During the day, they are at the core of creating policy and enforcing it; at 'night', they are the prime movers of illegality and economic extraction.

The letter of the law is a preserve of legal discourse; the spirit of the law is a preserve of discourse in the areas of political science, political philosophy, history and other social sciences. This, however, is an area that is not su ciently studied from a sociological/philosophical perspective in the region 8 Ngunyi and Katumanga (2012: 19)

The fourth defect resulted from an implosion within the Rhodesian state. You will recall our argument that this state operated two separate spheres: the civic sphere, which is recognized by law, and an illicit predatory sphere where political meaning and extraction were negotiated. The two spheres were a preserve of the state until a wave of 8 'patronage inﬂation' hit the region in the 1990s. In this wave, the patron‐ client networks of the state were hit by two problems: On the one hand, From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 01/11/2013

An Audit of Organised and Organic Militia in Three Convergences

economic conditionality reduced aid significantly. This meant that the finances necessary to maintain a critical 'client base' were no longer available. On the other hand, while the one party state had limited political choices for this 'client base' the new wave of competitive politics increased the choices. The dilemma for the state therefore was this: its 'client base' had many political suitors after the collapse of the one‐party system. But this plurality of choices was made worse by the fact that the one‐party state was officially broke as a result of conditionality. This dual tragedy saw a rapid increase in the cost of maintaining a patron‐client network. The resultant 'patronage inflation' led to the creation of an illicit sphere of markets to deal with the challenge. And, as we shall show later, this is how 'soft insecurity' became a 'fifth factor' of production in parts of the region. But the new mode of production could not exist within the civic sphere. The predatory sphere had to be expanded to include actors outside the formal state. And once this 'liberalization' happened, the sphere acquired a life of its own.

The ﬁfth defect of the Rhodesian state was the bi‐furcation of the security sector. The 'company' wing of this state created two police forces; one for the productive sector, the other for the 'unproductive' native labour reserves. The native police managed the reserves; while the regular police and the army secured the white settler farms. This formulation did not change after independence. The regular forces continued to police the productive sectors of the state, but the native police was disbanded, leaving the native spaces unpoliced. This coincided with the burgeoning of slum areas as the new 'native labour reserves'. But since the regular police could not manage them, organic gangs began to evolve to ﬁll in the security vacuum. This growth was not catastrophic until the predatory sphere was liberalised. Creating a sphere of illicit markets corroded the ability of the state to provide violence as a public good (monopoly of violence). It had to produce violence covertly as a private good (oligopoly of violence) in order to service the starved patron‐client networks. The inelastic violence provided by state monopoly became elastic, as consumers got substitutes for 'state violence' at a cost. Thispower oligopoly, and the 9 shift from monopoly to oligopoly of violence bred what Bemba (2002) calls multiple forms of 'private indirect governments'. These alternative spaces of 'government' are what James N Rosenau (2007) refers to as 'spheres of authority'. We will return to this concept and the emergence of the three spheres of authority in the horn later. 1.4 'Hard' and 'Soft' Revisions to the Rhodesian State

bid., (2012: 25) See The East African Alternatives, August Issue 1998 10

Two decades of the independence state proved it untenable. The Rhodesian experiment went through a revision. And the process was dominated by two modes of regime change. The ﬁrst was constitutional 10 elections; the second was 're‐invented militarism' . Constitutional transition was problematic given the one‐party hegemony at the time. The enduring question was: Can the constitutional route mediate a fair From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 01/11/2013

An Audit of Organised and Organic Militia in Three Convergences

regime change? More so in a situation where the political instruments of power were dominated by the one‐party 'Toad Kings'. Of equal and long‐ term importance was another question: Does a constitutional transition 11 result in a corresponding culture of constitutionalism ? For regime transition to be meaningful, a shift from personal rule to constitutionalism was crucial. But were the 'Toad Kings' in power capable of mediating this transition through elections? And the consensus 12 answer was No!

The one‐party hegemony had put the opposition in a political 'double bind'. That is: whatever options they exercised, they were guaranteed to lose. If they chose the constitutional route, the regime was sure to rig the election. If they chose the military coups of the 1960s‐70s, the option was frozen by the 1980s. Besides, this mode of change was not acceptable by any standards of political practice. Given this 'double bind', opposition had to invent a new way of eﬀecting transition outside the formal constitutional mechanisms. It is from this contestation that the second mode of regime change emerged: re‐invented militarism. This mode constituted one of the revisionist paths to the Rhodesian formulation. 1.4.1 Militarized Democracy and the Rise of 'Hard' Insecurity in the Horn

In this paper, we de ne constitutionalism as the practice of ordering politics using the constitution. The argument during this period was that constitutions were drafted in the new democracies, but were not adhered to. Politics was ordered using instruments other than those de ned in the constitutions. See also, Okoth-Ogendo (1988) Constitutions Without Constitutionalism: Re ections of an African Paradox ( American Council of Learned Societies) 12 This consensus was however untrue in some countries in Southern Africa for instance. See Michael Cowen and Mutahi Ngunyi (1997) Politics of the Two Transition Elections in Kenya (University of Helsinki, IDS Working Paper 086, 1997) 13 Word used to mean that the Generals were not recognized by any formal institutions as so. 14 Meaning that they were a popular civic response to regime repression. 15 We de ne and develop this dichotomy of organic and organised armies later. 16 The second rebellion in DRC led by RCD was such a case in point. The split within SPLA is a fresh testimony of this. 17 Contrasted with the old militarists who used the formal institutions of the military to take over power. 18 For instance NRA in Uganda became NRM; SPLA has now been institutionalised as SPLM; while RPF in Rwanda has replaced the political activities of RPA.

Re‐invented militarism was a political innovation by opposition aimed at conflating armed struggle with a popular uprising. The despondent opposition therefore concocted 'tin‐man' armies, recruited 'chocolate soldiers' (including children); converted their politicians into 'home‐ 13 made Generals' , then matched towards the capitals. But this was done 14 in small installments. They began as organic opposition to the regime‐in‐ 15 place, then became organised as their struggle consolidated . And the closer they got to power, the more they built consensus through dominance, as opposed to dialogue. This happened in DRC, in Rwanda, Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and South Sudan. By the time they captured government, a tension between the dominant and the dominated had emerged within their ranks. This triggered the first wave of militia 16 formation in the period immediately after the 'liberation' wars . The 'dominated ' group opted for exit and constituted the 'new struggle'. And a new wave of armed conflicts emerged. We trace the rise of 'hard' insecurity to the fact that a consociation settlement that accommodated the interests of the dominant and the dominated was not arrived at. Where this was attempted through Peace Agreements, they were not long‐lasting. 17

Once in power, the new 'militarists' switched identity from that of 'home‐made Generals' to the new breed democrats. And this was the ﬁrst thing they did: appropriating a political identity. The second thing they 18 did was to institutionalize their rebel movements as political parties , before embarking on the democratic 'project'. Critical here was to constitutionalize their militarism through democratic elections. At the From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 01/11/2013

An Audit of Organised and Organic Militia in Three Convergences

core, therefore, the regime's DNA remained 'military'; on the surface, it assumed a democratic 'cloak'. And this is why whenever these regimes were substantially challenged, the democratic 'cloak' collapsed revealing 19 their military core . This democratic project, hatched by the new 'militarists' to constitutionalize its politics, is what we call 'militarized democracy' in this paper. In this democracy 'project', the political 'back oﬃce' is intrinsically military; its 'front oﬃce' has patchworks of democratic practice.

But how did this model of democracy result in 'hard' insecurity? We discern three cumulative processes as discussed below. 1.4.1.1 Demobilization Without De‐Militarization

When the new militarists settled, their ﬁrst order of business was to demobilize the auxiliary armies that supported the armed struggle. Most of these were recruited into the newly constituted formal army. However, the need to 'right size' this army meant that some of the rebel groups could not be accommodated. The resultant model was therefore that of demobilization without demilitarization. Some of the soldiers were sent home without alternative forms of gainful employment. In some instances, the soldiers were demobilized but send home with their guns. Because these soldiers were not gainfully employed, they fell back on their weapons as a 'tool of trade'. They became the cannon fodder for counter‐insurgency groups, but more fundamentally, they assumed a 'marketised' persona to support their activities. Our ﬁndings suggest that these groups are at the core of illegal extraction of resources in the countries selected for study. 1.4.1.2 High Militarization Co‐Existing with Low Politicization

Once their regimes were consolidated, the militarists gravitated towards entrenching a martial order instead of a 'civic order'. While this was necessary in the establishment of hegemony, a cut‐out was necessary in order to migrate to civic politics. But this did not happen. As a result, the emerging political culture was high on militarization and low on politicization; low on civic competence and high on martial competence. For every political dilemma, the solution was naturally militaristic. Even citizen response to government action became militarized. And this explains why the natural response to political repression in parts of the horn is more militarized than civic. Unwittingly, the new breed militarists had encouraged a martial response to every civic matters.If they went to the bush because the 'toad kings' had stiﬂed civic expression, their emerging political culture tended to repeat the original sin. This, explains in part, the cyclic nature of 'hard' insecurity in the horn.

Most obvious during elections where a formidable opposition is at play.

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1.4.1.3 From Liberation to Economic Extraction 20

A shift from liberation to economic extraction , reminiscent of the Rhodesian formulation of the state began to show. For this extraction to happen, a tri‐furcated axis of actors emerged. It comprised of predatory elements within the states, rogue capital and organised militia groups. At first, this 'fellowship of three' was symbiotic. They needed each other to finance the insurgency and counter‐insurgency. However, after an equilibrium was achieved, there was a shift from 'war financing', to pure predation. At this point the relationship between the three became parasitic. In some instances, the militia were the parasites; in others the parasites were the rogue capital or even the predatory states. As a result, predation had become the new raison de tre for 'hard' insecurity. Artisanal mining in DRC is one case in point. Each space of extraction, especially in the Kivus, has a specialised hard‐core militia securitizing it. And as we shall argue below, sometimes these groups are in competition, other times they complement each other. The determinant factor here is the predatory activities. 1.4.2 Governance Without Governments: The Soft Insecurity Paradox

If militarised democracy was the 'hard' revisionist path confronting the Rhodesian state, power oligopoly was the 'soft' revisionist trajectory. There were two variations to it. The first is 'forced oligopoly' arising from distance decay. The thesis here is that distance is an enabler or a disabler of militia action. The further a given space is from the centre of power, the lesser the interaction with formal authority. And as this interaction 'decays', the affinity of the space towards illicit power grows. This distance decay, therefore, 'forces' the state to indulge or sanction illicit groups to govern the ungoverned. In this case, state‐indulged suppliers of violence are 'licensed' to operate within illicit spaces. This oligopoly of violence creates a situation of 'governance without government'. And by extension, 'soft' insecurity is justified. Kivu and Loki convergences are a case in point. Illicit forces, challenging the state from these ungoverned spaces were dealt with using state‐indulged 'illegal' groups. For the most part, such encounters were rendered in the form of 'hard insecurity'. However, when the state‐indulged groups were not combating the 'hard‐ core' militia, they engaged in 'soft insecurity' operations of predation and extraction.

This is used to justify the sacri ces made during the liberation war.

The second variation of power oligopoly was 'designed' and aimed at ﬁnancing state activities through illicit markets. This was done in response to 'patronage inﬂation' and the rising cost of 'governing without government'. While distance decay and 'forced oligopoly' were about geographical distance;this second variation of 'designed oligopoly' was about 'governance decay' or a 'decay of practice'. In distance decay, therefore, we speak of 'state absence'. And that militia festering is as a result of this geographical absence. But in 'governance decay' our assumption is that the state is not absent; it is abstaining. As a From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 01/11/2013

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result, abstinence is a practice, not a geographical inhibition. If this observation is true, then state abstinence became the main source of 'soft insecurity' 1.5 The Three Regulatory Personas of The State

The revised Rhodesian state was incapable of evolving a singular sphere of authority. And this is because its formal regulatory sphere suﬀered from a 'crisis of compliance'. The result was a tri‐furcated regulatory persona of the state. In discussing this, we borrow J.N Roseneu's (2007) imperatives of a sphere of authority. He contends that for such a sphere to evolve, it must have three basic elements: collectivities, systems of rule, and compliance. Collectivities are entities that serve as repositories of authority; a collectif of actors whose actions evoke compliance in others. Systems of rules are the avenues through which authority is exercised. They are the steering mechanisms in the form of written codes, or collectively agreed upon stands of behaviour. On its part, compliance is the response of community to the demands of the collectivities. And the logic here is simple: Authority is not exercised if those towards whom it is directed do not comply. A sphere of authority is therefore said to exist if it's 'collectivities', using a system of rules, can elicit compliance.

In the case of the revised Rhodesian state, adequate 'systems of rules' emerged. However, a dominant 'collectivity' to impose this system did not evolve. What we had was contesting 'collectivities' exercising diﬀerent forms of moral power over the people. As a result, civic compliance was not forthcoming, except through brut force. This situation bred three diﬀerent spheres of authority, with each occupying a distinct regulatory space. Civic compliance was therefore derived from the three spheres sometimes simultaneously. The failure of the civic sphere to elicit compliance except through force is what led to the growth of the etho‐customary and the predatory spheres. But as argued, already, the predatory sphere was also a creation of state elements wishing to accumulate outside formal regulation. We examine the three spheres below and how their interaction engenders militia foreboding.

De ned loosely as the law regulating the activities of the civic citizen.

1.5.1 The Civic Sphere of Authority 21

This is the formal sphere of authority governed by 'civic law' . It is the de jurecustodian of the contractual order discussed by Parsons (1951) and mentioned above. It is also meant to be the home for collective 'civic spirit' Activities in the civic sphere are regulated through formal institutions of government charged with the responsibility of rule application, and adjudication. Similarly, relationships are mediated through a formal contractual order embedded in the constitution and obtaining instruments. The crisis of militia and gang governance stems from the contradictions of this sphere. Although it exists as the de jure 'mediation hub' that governs relationships, allocates authority, rewards, From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 01/11/2013

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and power, there is a crisis of conﬁdence in its institutions and history. As such, its moral authority to elicit compliance is limited. And this is why the ethno‐customary sphere has emerged as the de facto 'hub' for mediating relations and summoning the citizen to civic duty. 1.5.2 The Ethno‐Customary Sphere.

In our original formulation, and other works, we call this the 22 normative‐traditional sphere . However, the evidence we have summoned suggests that this sphere is less dominated by tradition, and more by ethnic consciousness and obligations. And as Mamdani (1988) observes, this is because in creating the civic sphere, there was an attempt to de‐racialise the emerging civic order. But as this happened, the Rhodesian 'engineers' ensured that the native 'order'was bonded to ethnicity. As a result, the emerging successor class was automatically 'tethered' to some ethnic mortif in its political mobilisation and civic action. And since the migration to the civic sphere did not happen, the normative‐traditional sphere morphed into an ethnic space. Similarly, its 'systems of rules' were drawn more from evolving customary exchange, than from established traditions. This is why we called it an ethno‐ customary sphere. If the civic sphere is the custodian of the contractual order; the ethno‐customary sphere is the custodian of the non‐ contractual orderas espoused by Talcott Parsons (1951).

This sphere is managed by an ethno‐customary regime. The regime combines a pattern of relationships that determine the allocation of power and resources on the one hand. (See Bratton, et al, 1997: 37‐41). On the other, it summons a set of adjudicatory institutions that aggregate norms and regulates their application to situations. Through this regime, therefore, normative dialogue or a pattern of social exchange is codiﬁed into normative law. And relationships in the sphere are regulated by this law; an agreed sense of what is good for all. Given the familial and ethnic bedrock of this sphere, it tends to be 'high trust' in its legitimacy and has a higher compliance level than the civic sphere. In times of crisis, political settlements are cut in this sphere and then legitimised through formal instruments in the civic sphere. Because this sphere is not involved in the making of regulations to contain militia groups, formal regulations attract lip service and limited compliance from this space. And this is particularly so because organic milita groups are incubated in this sphere to protect ethno‐national interests. We will demonstrate this in the case of the Kivu, Loki and Ogaden militia groups. 1.5.3The Predatory Sphere

Mahmood Mamdani (1996; 1998) calls it the traditional sphere

This sphere is regulated by 'bandit law' and has a selective application of civic and ethno‐customary law. The 'bandit economy' is the bedrock of this space. Unlike the conventional conflict where there are two opposing sides and a defined disagreement, predatory conflict is different. Its context derives from a mutation of historical and cultural From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 01/11/2013

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practices . The sphere is about a predator, a prey and a parallel market system. Carjacking, the traﬃcking of humans, arms and drugs; 'marketised' cattle rustling are some types of predatory conﬂicts regulated by this sphere. But as already mentioned, this sphere is largely patronised by state oligopoly. It is a space for unchecked accumulation. Its 'collectivities' (group of actors) are drawn from state spaces and the bandit economy; its 'system of rules' is improvised and created depending on dominant interests; and its 'compliance' is achieved through force or a state of détente. We expect to use these tri‐furcated spheres to analyse state response to militia foreboding; the axis‐of‐extraction; emergence of the regulatory double‐bind; and the phenomenon of distorted masculinities in the context of soft and hard insecurity.

1.6Demarcating Militia Sanctuaries in the Horn

This study focused on three militia convergences in the Horn. Most of these are located along the borderline belt that brings the Horn Countries together. The first is the Kivu Convergence, and is located along the borders of Uganda, Rwanda and DRC. The actual location is South and North Kivu and has one of the highest numbers of militia in the region. The second is the Ogaden Convergence. While Kivu has a 'looterable resource' in terms of minerals, timber, coffee and oil, this one is more of a Hub for contraband products. It is located along the borders of Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya. Eritrea is a bio‐actor in this space in the sense that she does not share a border with any of the countries, but is involve in the convergence. A third convergence, located between the borders of north‐western Kenya, northern Uganda, South Sudan and Ethiopia exists. This is probably the oldest convergence zone in the region. It harbours both the 'soft' and the 'hard' insecurity militia ranging from the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) to non‐descript, 'soft‐core' milita groups. 1.7 Defining a Militia and its Identities

In this study, we argue that there is no static classification of a militia group. In fact, given the peculiarities of militia and gang formations in the horn, we are reluctant to offer a clear‐cut definition of both in this paper. Not yet. And this is because we do not want to straight‐jacket the research to existing definitions. However, for purposes of the study, we offer some working definitions. We define a gang as a group that is armed in contravention of state regulation. Whilst this definition also applies to militia groups not sanctioned by the state, it mainly targets groups that are mobilized to dispense violence for commercial and political interests. Consequently, these groups can be heterogeneous in nature recruiting across ethnic, tribal and clan divides. Criminal Gangs and Political Party gangs fall in this category.

For instance, traditional cattle rustling for bridal price.

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An Audit of Organised and Organic Militia in Three Convergences

The difference between a gang and a militia in our view is determined by four elements. One, levels of 'tonnage power' required to decimate a group. The more the 'tonnage power' the more a group can be described as a militia. Two, levels of organisation, and firepower exhibited by a group. The more sophisticated the organisation and arsenal, the more it acquires the militia persona. Three, levels of value proposition to the predatory enterprise, including rogue elements within the state. The higher the value of a group, the more it ascends to the status of a militia from that of a gang. Four, existence of a constant cause. This may be economic or political, but it resonates with members of the group. The more defined and consistent the cause, the higher the likelihood for a gang to be described as a militia.

In this study, therefore, we define a militia as an armed civic formation, mobilized along homogenous lines, and sharing a unified aggression 24 against a common target . The state may choose to support or proscribe militia groups hence influencing their de facto status. However, the identity of militia groups can mutate when they extend their activities from the conventional scope and take up the use of violence for commercial and political purposes. Militia groups tend to be dormant and can be quickly animated in times of crisis through ethno‐customary mechanisms and chains of command such as the age group and traditional leaders.

But we further distinguish between 'marketised' and 'militarised' militia in this study. Marketised militia are organised for economic gain only; they have no political cause. Militarised militia, on the other hand, are organised and armed to redress a grievance. A further clariﬁcation, in this paper is that between organised and organic militia. This distinction is not appreciated or understood in security discourse. Like the green formations, organic militia have a legitimacy in community. In fact, they are created out of a community demand for security. Organised militia, on the other hand are opportunistic in their relationship with community.

UNDP/TCH From Monopoly to Oligopoly of Violence: An Exploration of Organised and Organic Militia in Kenya (September 2011) 25 Ngunyi and Katumanga, op.cit

1.7.1Militia Morphing and Identity Switch

Militia identity switch is a function of 'regulatory decay'. This is the other form of distance decay. And in the convergences, two factors seem to explain this. One, the rules‐of‐play are in place, but the agents of enforcement are ineﬀective. As a result, communities tend to go to alternative suppliers of violence in order to secure themselves. This has 25 created a symbiotic relationship between community and militia groups. And in the context of this symbiosis, the groups can change identity as they wish. It is not unusual, for instance, to have a militia acting as a rebel group in one side of the convergence, and crossing the border to the next country to assume the identity of a community – policing unit or a self‐help group.

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Two, where the rules are in place, 'regulatory decay' happens because the rules have a low legitimacy. And this is as a result of the crisis of application. The formal, but 'bastardised regulations' have led to a gradual shift from the 'rule‐of‐law' to the 'rule‐of ‐rogue'. The argument here is that “…at least the rule‐of‐rogue works faster, with guaranteed 26 results compared to the rule‐of‐law” This acceptance of rogue 'law' accounts in part for militia morphing. If militia identity switch is a back and forth movement, militia morphing assumes a linear progression. It is a growth of sorts. And the most common form of morphing is from organic to organised militia. But sometimes, this is a seesaw of sorts, with milita groups switching from organic to organised identities and vis versa. 1.8 Militia Classiﬁcation and Typology

In generating a typological classiﬁcation of militia formations in the horn of Africa and determining their contribution to insecurity, we apply a 27 standardized framework of analysis that considers three broad factors .

a. The formation and breeding logic of the Militia. Was it formed gradually over time or was there a pivotal event that led to its formation? What is the group seeking to achieve? (Secession, 28 Reform, Liberation?) b. The organizational structure of the Militia. Is the group organized or organic? Is its ideology ethnic, secular or religious? Is its leadership structure personalized or institutionalized? What is the level of internal resilience and discipline? What is the contribution of organized and organic groups to insecurity in the Horn? c. The community response to the Militia. How do communities organize themselves to protect their interests? Does the militia group have a symbiotic or a parasitic relationship with its host community?How is it that some of these 'organic militias' (driven by community interests) later morph into organized hard‐core groups?

Interview with a militia 'bene ciary' in Mogadishu, May 2013 27 See Ngunyi and Katumanga (2012) From Soft to Hard Insecurity, TCH Working Paper 001 of 2012 Pgs. 8 and 13 28 Clapham, C [Ed.] (1998), African Guerillas, Boydell & Brewer ltd.

2.0MILITIA 'COMMODITIZATION' AND FORMATION LOGIC 2.1 Rented Terrorism and the Violence Enterprise

In the three convergences, we identiﬁed the 'commoditization' of militia groups as a dominant feature. This is more pronounced in Kivu and Ogaden, and less in the Loki convergence where formation logic is predominantly ethnic. In Kivu, almost all militia groups, organic or organized are 'commoditized'. Somewhere in their logic of existence, mineral extraction has to feature. While some are formed to supervise the artisanal extraction chain, others impose taxes on this chain or do actual mining to support their struggle. In Ogaden, the militia formation logic is political islam. However, with the caliphate 'project' underway, a new breed of militia groups seem to emerge. This breed conﬂates Islamic extremism with local grievances. A radicalization circuit running from the From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 01/11/2013

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Indian Ocean to CAR though Eritrea and Southern Sudan seems to be emerging. But what is noteworthy about this is that, as Islamic extremism ﬁnds a 'kindred spirit' in local grievances, the resultant militia groups develop a dual identity. One identity remains true to the cause; the other identity is only 'rented'. The 'rented' identity is that of Islamic extremism. The ﬁnancial gain associated with acts of terror has created a rationale for militia 'commoditization'. As a result, 'rented terrorism' is becoming a feature of security discourse in the convergence.

2.2Militia Formation Logic in Kivu Convergence: Identity or Enterprise? 2.2.1 Identity Sources of Militia Foreboding

This convergence is the most active with regard to militia proliferation and engagements. Ironically, even though new formations emerge in this convergence with some regularity, the formation logic is essentially the same. Control over mineral rich areas appears to be the common thread amongst all the militia groups in the eastern DRC. Even in those areas where the mineral deposits are unproven, the groups there are still striving to gain control over the available natural resources including wildlife. The politics of identity in this region tend to revolve around the question of belonging (indigene) i.e. Who is a true 'son of this soil'? Who 29 was here first? This had led to the formation of two rival caucuses; the Rwandophones and non‐Rwandophones. A thin slice evaluation would cluster the FARDC, FDLR and Mai‐Mai formations in the non‐ Rwandophone caucus, whilst placing the M23 in the Rwandophone camp. However, this is an oversimplification. This linguistic division is but the first of many layers in a complex web of fluid rivalries amongst the ethnic groups in the eastern DRC that continually fuel low intensity conflict amongst small organic groups and high voltage engagements amongst the more structured ones. Militia groups purporting to represent the indigenous ethnic communities in the DRC such as the Nande, Hunde and Fulira have regularly collaborated with Rwandophone formations in the past.Furthermore, the politics of identity provide these groups with an easy avenue through which to escalate localized conflict between rival ethnic groups into a regional confrontation that sucks in 30 other groups that share kinship, cultural and anthropological ties .

Research Council of Norway (2010) The Right to Africa's Soil http://www.forskningsradet.no/servlet/Satellit e?blobcol=urldata&blobheader=application% 2Fpdf&blobheadername1=ContentDisposition%3A&blobheadervalue1=+attach ment%3B+ lename%3D%22TherighttoAfrica's soilBøås.pdf%22&blobkey=id&blobtable=MungoB lobs&blobwhere=1274462173707&ssbinary=tr ue [Retrieved 20 October 2013] 30 A similar situation where the politics of identity have escalated a localized con ict into a regional confrontation can be found at the outbreak of World War I in July 1914. The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in the Serbian capital, Sarajevo led to the AustroHungarian invasion of Serbia with the support of Germany. Russia in turn interpreted this as Aryan aggression against the Slavic peoples and promptly declared war on the two states. Both Britain and France were forced to support their Russian ally by also declaring war on Austria-Hungary and Germany.

But who are the Rwandophone? Rwandophone is generally anyone who speaks Kinyarwanda. A rapid survey showed that there are approximately 250,000 Rwandophones. This includes Congolese Hutu and Tutsis who have been traditionally resident in the DRC. It also includes the influx of refugees from Rwanda following the genocide, but excludes the génocidaires (Interhamwe) who fled from Rwanda in 1994 and joined the FDLR. The Rwandophone identity is borne of political expediency and is therefore imprecise in its application. For the 'indigenous' communities of the eastern Congo such as the Bembe, Nande, Hunde and Fuliro, it is an identity of differentiation and exclusion against the Hutu and Tutsi living in the eastern DRC who are viewed as outsiders. In truth, the exclusion is directed more at the 'Nilotic' Tutsi From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 01/11/2013

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than the Bantu Hutu. However, at diﬀerent times, both the Hutu and the Tutsi are lumped together. In turn, the Hutu and Tutsi in eastern Congo have appropriated the Rwandophone identity as an instrument of unity against the hostility they face from the 'indigenous' communities. Again, it appears that this is more of a Tutsi dominated response. What is not clear is whether the Rwandophone identity transcends the eastern DRC and is present in the minds of Hutu and Tutsi living in 'safe' spaces such as Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi.

Since the Congolese Rwandophones live in mineral rich areas and they consider themselves to be Autochthones (true 'sons of the soil'), they lay claim to both economic and political rights of these areas they live in. Specifically they are interested in directly benefitting from the mineral resources and representation in political and administrative spaces. Consequently they resist attempts to confer Allochthon (Alien) status on them by the indigenous communities as a strategy to exclude them from mining and deny them political representation. The political economy of the Rwandophone identity makes the accumulation of political power a prime objective for the pursuit of both their economic and security agendas. In a region where security organs such as the police and the army ( F A R D C ) have gone rogue, political power gives the Rwandophones a modicum of legitimized access and control over the state security apparatus. Reliance on allied militia such as the M23 can only be a short‐term strategy for the Rwandophone. In addition to undermining their cause in the civic spaces, it also cements their Allogène(Alien) status in the minds of surrounding communities thereby making it a self‐defeating strategy. For the Rwandophones, capturing the positions of political leadership means that they have greater control over their security and livelihoods in a legitimate and sustainable way. On the flipside, it gives greater inroads to Rwandophone friendly governments in Kigali and Kampala and stokes the fears of collusion that Kinshasa harbours.

In addition to their traditional enemy, the FDLR, the Rwandophone feel they have faced high levels of hostility from the other 'indigenous' ethnic groups in the eastern DRC who perceive them as outsiders. To raise the level of alarm among the Rwandophone, the 'indigenous' Congolese also constitute the majority within both the Police nationale congolaise (Congolese National Police) and the Les Forces armées de la RDC (FARDC) and hence are perceived to oﬀer them little protection. In response, Rwandophones and especially the Tutsi have formed armed groups such as the CNDP and the M23 to protect themselves from aggression. There is also a high level of cross border aﬃnity among the Rwandophones especially the Tutsi in the eastern DRC, Uganda, Rwanda and the diaspora and it is assumed that they provide material support to these armed formations.

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2.2.2 Formal Armies and Extraction Enterprise

Perhaps the most startling revelation is the contribution the Congolese armed forces (FA R D C) make to insecurity in this convergence.Rent seeking enterprises by elements of the FARDC are rampant. For instance, the notorious 85th Brigade under the command of Col. Sammy Matumo, controlled a cassiterite, mine in Bisie. The 85thBrigade was replaced by the 212thBrigade, which was in its turn former CNDP and mobilized into Mixage/Brassage(integration). The 212thbrigade was engaged in a mini‐mutiny when they resisted efforts to eject them initiated by the top commander of Amani Leo operations, Col. Balumisa Chuma, to replace them with another unit over which he had greater control. Col. Chuma was reportedly dissatisfied with the remittances (salongo) made to him by the 212th from their illegal taxation regime at Bisie. Another army unit that has been in the spotlight for its interests in mining is the 69th Brigade of the FARDC. Gold tax is reportedly at a fixed rate at approximately USD 5 but it fluctuates depending on the remoteness of the mine and the risk incurred in protecting it. In contrast, taxes on the 3T's are based on the volumes extracted usually ranging between 2%‐5% of the extracted value. In the case of extracted cassertite volumes at Bisie alone, the FARDC was reportedly collecting USD 9,200 per week in taxes. By 2013, the FARDC was in control of over 64 Gold, Cassertite and Coltan mines in the Kivus and Ituri. In addition, the FARDC is aloso implicated in the extraction of bush meat, charcoal, coffee, ivory and timber.

In return however, the military is credited with establishing a semblance of law and order that allows for the stable and uninterrupted operation of mining activity. For instance the 69th brigade has been reported to regulate the mining of coltan and cassertite in Kisengo, North Katanga. Considering that army salaries are capped at 90,000 Congolese francs per month, which is less than USD 100, is it any wonder that the military imposes a tax on regulating commerce in mineral rich areas? Many of the senior oﬃcers exploit their positions as the guarantors of 31 security to also double up as mineral exporters (comptoirs) . For the miners in many of the stabilized mining areas, this somewhat symbiotic relationship with the FARDC is the lesser of two evils compared to the volatile regions under militia control where the relationship between the mining community and the armed group is purely predatory. 2.2.3 Of Mixage and the Proliferation of Militia.

For instance the 5113th Battalion posted to Nyambembe in Shabunda, South Kivu facilitated and pre- nanced cassertite mining.

At the end of 2007, the FARDC launched a major assault in North Kivu against rebel troops of the CNDP under the command of renegade General Laurent Nkunda. The odds were stacked against the CNDP who ﬁelded a force of 4,000 soldiers against the 25,000 of the UN‐supported FARDC. The campaign was a disaster for the FARDC who were not only trounced by the better‐organized CNDP, but they also lost signiﬁcant swathes of territory in the process. This defeat is in part attributable to From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 01/11/2013

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the lack of a monolithic military culture in the DRC armed forces, which in turn resulted in a lack of professionalism. The FARC is a chaotic aggregateof remnants of Mobutu's Zairian national army, Forces Armées Zaïroises (FAZ) and the various militia formations that backed Laurent Kabila in his push to oust Mobutu during the second Congo war between 1998 and 2003. Once Kabila came to power in 2003, it was expected that he would quickly reconstitute the organs of national security as part of regime consolidation. Principal among these actions would be the integration of the militia into uniﬁed brigades to form thenew national army, a process known as Brassage. However, the process was delayedfor two years until 2005 and when it was eventually launched, it was beset by serious problems ranging from underfunding to resistance by embedded interests amongst the political and military elite as well as the militia command structures themselves.

The challenges facing full integration ofmilitia formations into the military resulted in a settlement in 2008 that allowed for limited military integration dubbed Mixage.Under this compromise solution, militia commanders such as the CNDP's Laurent Nkunda were allowed to retain control of their men and administrative districts. Even though the CNDP was integrated into theFARDC chain of command, they were insulated from working with 'enemy' non‐RCD‐Goma militia. Furthermore, the CNDP would bypass the standard integration (tronc commun) process meaning that they would not be subjected to the delays in pay and deplorable conditions found in the centres de brassage et recyclage. In essence, Mixage allowed the diﬀerent militia groups to retain their identities and create parallel chains of command. In essence it allowed for the creation of 'an army within an army' and for an environment where ethnic and political loyalties as well as embedded economic interests have an opportunity to play out.Mixageis not without its shortcomings and these were most visible in the emergence of the M23 group in 2009, 32 which cited violations of the 2008 Goma agreement . Since then, there has been an explosion of Mai Mai formations most of which are opposed to the M23 and alliedin turn to the FARDC and at times to the FDLR. Our count yielded over 9 Mai Mai variations that have emerged or gained prominence since the rejection of Mixageby M23 in 2009. These include Mai Mai ACPLS, Mai Mai PARECO and Mai Mai Kifuafua. The ACPLS appear to be the most organized of these and was notable for its hostility to the FARDC and the UN mission to the DRC, ACPLS is also said to have a working relationship with FDLR and alliances with Autochone interests. As a result other militia formations have emerged to counter these groups such as the Raia Mutomboki, the NDC and the MCC. Other groups that have emerged in the same period for predatory purposes include Mai Mai Kashogorosi and Mai Mai Gedeon.It would be presumptuous to conclude that the failure ofMixageand the emergence of M23 are the only factors responsible for the proliferation of militia and particularly Mai Mai. However, there appears to be a correlation between the two events. It is possible that the failure of Mixageis the pretext that both Rwandophone and non‐Rwandophone militia were seeking to maintain a state of controlled chaos in the eastern Congo to facilitate extraction?

The M23 say the DRC government violated the 2008 Goma agreement by denying CNDP o cers adequate ranks and salaries, railroading the Tutsi political leadership in national government and failed to repatriate Congolese tutsi refugees who had ed to Rwanda. The government alleged that the M23 mutinied because their illegal extraction networks were being brought to an end and because the FARDC was redeploying some of their top o cers elsewhere in the country

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2.2.4 The Militia Formation See‐saw In the Kivu Convergence, a militia formation see‐saw seems to exist. As one militia type thrives, another type gets destroyed. And a recent example is that of the thriving ﬂora of Mai‐Mai militia groups and the defeat of M23.

The Mai‐Mai formations are the most pervasive in this convergence and run the gamut from serious organized outfits numbering several thousand fighters, for instance the M23,PARECO (Mai Mai Lafontaine) andRaia Mutomboki to rag‐tag squads of a few dozen men e.g. Mai‐Mai Kashogorosi. The link between militia and extraction is clearest in this convergence. The breeding logic for these groups is a varied as their origins. What is clear is that the political economy of conflict in the Kivus favourslarger armed groups. They have a clearer political agenda, apply greater leverage over the political system and enjoy more traction with their host communities compared to the smaller predatory formations. However, the destitution of state security agencies, abundance of cheap labour and mineral resources and proliferation of SALW's means that the cost of entry into the fraternity of the unstructured Mai Mai is very low. Increasingly, the smaller, newer Mai Mai groups are not organically reproduced in response to a security lapse by the state organs but instead they are 'genetically engineered'by local elites. In some instances such as those of the MCC, Mai Mai Morgan and Mai Mai Mushombe (Ntamushobora), kinship ties between the leadership of the militia and the political and administrative heads of the regions they occupy is very clear. These militia are expressly created for extractive purposes and in some instances such as that of Mai Mai Sheka (NDC), they could be acting as a front to disguise the predatory activities of other actors e.g. rogue elements of the FARDC.

As they Mai‐Mai francise thrives, the military defeat of the M23 33 inNovember 2013 came as a suprise. It was a unique event because it broke the mould in several ways. One, the new Congolese armed forces, FARDC were able to declare their first decisive victory over a major militia group since they were formed. Two, for the first time since it was billeted there, the UN mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) was engaged in active combat operations against an armed group. This was achieved through a 3,000 strong special intervention brigade drawn from mainly SADC countries and mandated by a UN Security Council resolution (UNSC 2098) to initiate hostile action against militias. Thirdly and most importantly, the amnesty option was removed from the table. The DRC government hardened its position on amnesty and published a list of the top 100 M23 commanders who would not be eligible for amnesty under 34 any peace agreement . This is because in the past, the 'amnesty incentive' has backfired on the DRC government and the UN as a pathway to peace. Indeed, what has been observed is that militia formations have exploited the lull that followed a political settlement to reorganize and re‐arm before launching a renewed and more vicious

BBC News (2013) DR Congo's M23 rebel chief Sultani Makenga 'surrenders'http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldafrica-24849814 [Retrieved 13 November 2013] 34 Reuters (2013), Congo rules out amnesty for top M23 rebels, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/19/us -rop-congodemocratic-rebels-amnestyidUSBRE98I0RV20130919 [Retrieved, 13 November 2013]

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oﬀensive under a diﬀerent identity. This is precisely what happened with the emergence of the M23 militia in March 2012.

This group was essentially a 'rebranded' version of the CNDP, which enjoyed a short period of military dominance over parts of North Kivu. The trajectory of engagement between the between the state and militia in the DRC appears to be choreographed dance where the non‐state actor keeps changing. A pattern has developed where a potent militia group enters the stage and engages the government forces in violent conﬂict thereby forcing a political settlement in which the armed non‐ state group gains concessions. This pattern was observed in the case of the militias that were active in the second Congo war between 1998 and 35 2003 . The pattern was set in 2005 when the Congolese parliament passed legislation that abrogated the presidential decree on one hand but also expanded the period within which pardonable oﬀences fell by an 36 additional two years and two months . A blanket pardon was granted to militia formations in the east and a process of integrating them in to the 37 national army was initiated . A third round of Amnesty was granted in 2008 to various Mai‐Mai groups and in 2009 to the CNDP as part of the Goma peace accords covering acts of war and insurrection committed by these parties the provinces of North and South Kivu between June 2003 38 and May 2009 . But the question to pose over the defeat of M23 is whether it will regroup or morph into a new militia group?

2.3 Militia Groups in Ogaden Convergence: Political Islam and Rented Terrorism 2.3.1 From Clan Identity to Political Islam in Militia Formation Logic

DRC Presidential Decree No03-001 of 2003 set o the cycle of amnesty measures that exempted the most active combatants in the con ict from prosecution. 36 The amnesty period in the presidential decree ran from August 2, 1998 to April 4, 2003 and excluded genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The parliamentary law expanded this period to between August 20, 1996 to June 20, 2003. 37 ICTJ (2006) Amnesty Must Not Equal Impunity http://ictj.org/sites/default/ les/ICTJ-DRCAmnesty-Facts-2009-English.pdf 38 Original agreement available at http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un .org/ les/CD_090323_Peace%20Agreement%2 0between%20the%20Government%20and%2 0the%20CNDP.pdf [Retrieved 13 November 2013] 39 Hansen, S. J (2013) Al-Shabaab in Somalia. The History and Ideology of a Militant Isalmist Group 2005-2012. Hurst & Company, London. Pgs. 15-18 40 Ibid

In the Ogaaden, indications are that sectoral aﬃliations are superseding clan loyalties as the new militia formation logic. And this is tentatively attributable to the process of radicalization when Somali militia groups begun to increasingly adopt political Islam as their codiﬁed 39 ideology . As a result, organized militia groups dominate this convergence. The relationship between the groups and their host communities has become increasingly asymmetrical especially in the case of the Al‐Shabaab and the Ras Kambooni movement.

In this convergence, our preliminary findings show that organized clan groups that were characteristically identified by warlords in the 1990's replaced the organic clan groups that emerged following the deposition of Siad Barre in 1991. As the curtain was drawn on the era of warlords circa 2006, organic religious movements such as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in turn replaced the organized clan militias. This means that religious ideology supplanted clan affiliation as the principal mobilization mechanism for hardcore militia such as the AIAI, the ICU and their inheritors ASWJ and Al‐Shabaab. The formation logic of militia in the Ogaaden appears to be organic in origin but the groups rapidly mutate into organized formations. Tentatively, we ascribe this to a deliberate process of radicalization when Somali militia groups begun to 40 increasingly adopt political Islam as the codified ideology . From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 01/11/2013 18

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For instance, the Ras Kambooni movement, ASWJ and Al‐Shabaab have all displayed multi‐clan composition and leadership but their differences lie in the interpretation of the political role of Islam. The Somali nation is predominantly Sunni Muslim. However, there is a spectrum of believers ranging from moderate Sufis that constituted the Al Sunnah Wal Jamaah paramilitary group to extremist elements of the Salafist movement that make up the Al‐ Shabaab terrorist group. Therefore, we contend that the basis of homogeneity of militia, specifically in Southern Somalia shifted from the clan to religious persuasion. This was evidenced by the emergence of the ICU and its latter variations the Ras Kamboni brigade, Hizbul Islam and Al‐Shabaab. A new mutation appears to be in progress, where organized militias that are driven by a predominantly economic agenda are emerging to challenge the organized religious militia. This is so in the case of the Ras Kambooni movement, which is opposed to the Al‐Shabaab mainly over control of the resources and trade in Jubaland and critically the Port of Kismayu.

Our impression therefore, is that in the Ogaaden, clan identity has become secondary in the composition of hardcore militia. The extremist groups appear to be sustained by support solicited from the diaspora, local economic activities such as trade in untaxed goods and charcoal exports and funding from like‐minded formations elsewhere in the world. A fourth revenue stream from governments in the region i.e. Kenya and Ethiopia has also been noted especially for the ASWJ and Ras Kambooni movement. 2.3.2 Of Rented Terrorism: The Quid‐Pro‐Quo Militia

We noted a tentative correlation existed initially between the potency of the Al‐Shabaab and that of the MRC. Reports indicate that this was no coincidence and indeed there was a tangible connection between the two groups. For instance, the period in which the Al‐Shabaab were at the height of their powers and engaged in combat with the KDF, coincided with the period that the MRC was at its most active. Similarly with the suppression of the Al‐Shabaabin southern Somalia, the MRC appears to have undergone a similar decline. However, following renewed Al‐ Shabaab attacks in Mogadishu, Uganda and most notably Kenya, it would appear that the MRC project was merely an inﬁltration mechanism by the Al‐Shabaab in preparation for the spectacular attacks on Kenya. The impression is that there was a convergence of approaches between these ideologically disparate groups. Both were engaged in a state‐ subversion project against the republic of Kenya even though Al‐Shabaab espoused reformist ideology whilst the MRC subscribed to secessionist ideals.

The transcendence of religious ideals over clan and ethnic loyalties is also observable in the emergence of other Al‐Shabaabaﬃliated formations such as the Al Hijra Muslim Youth Centre (MYC) who recruited From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 01/11/2013

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Muslim militants from Kenya including non‐Somalis to go and fight in the Jihaad inSomalia.The MYC has also been linked to IED and grenade attacks on downtown Nairobi and Garissa town. Kenyans of Bantu origin have also been arrested with caches of arms and explosives and confessed to being affiliated to Al‐Shabaab and MYC. Further indications of the increasing heterogeneity of Muslim militancy in this convergence is also visible in Tanzania, where another group that is sympathetic to the Al Shabbab called the Ansar Muslim Youth Centre (AMYC) has also been identified.The new development here is that the war in Somalia is not an ethnic (Somali) problem but an ideological (Muslim vs. infidel) one. Hence it has become easier for religious militia to recruit across the clan and ethnic divide. And this is the logic that informs the rise of quid‐pro‐ quo militia groups engaged in 'rented' extremism and terrorism.

In this phenomenon, we discern an emerging nexus between local militants and radical extremist groups. One part of this nexus is expressed through 'marketised radicalization' where the local motive is quick money. This is where the quid‐pro‐quo militia fall. The other part exploits violent extremism as a way of drawing attention to its local cause (MRC for instance). This condition, where classical terrorism co‐opts and exploits local grievances, is what we call 'Neo‐terrorism'. It is a condition through which, local conflicts (especially the marketised type) become radicalized and find expression in 'rented' terrorism. That is, the terrorist expression of grievance is based on a quid pro quo logic in which the local militants are radicalized for a price. And even then, the 'price' is for a specified period of time (rented). But this is only one part of the nexus. The other part is built around religious resonance in political islam amongst the youth. Although the 'rented' consciousness is stronger, a new breed of convicted indigeneous radicals is emerging amongst the Muslim youth in Eastern Africa. Grey literature suggests that the 1998 terrorist attacks in Kenya and Tanzania were aided by 'rented terrorism' executed through criminal networks. However, the July 2010 Kabalagala attack in Uganda and the September 2013 Westgate Siege in Nairobi exhibited a different breed of terrorism. The two were linked to a local 'franchise' of Al Hijra, (a mutation of Al Shabaab) which combines 'rented' terrorism with 'soft' jihadism. This breeding of terrorism in spaces where traditional conflict has existed for years in the convergence is new.

But there is one more dynamic to this complex breed: It is cross‐border in its design and resonance. In fact, we discern a local 'radicalization circuit' running from river Congo in Central Africa Republic (CAR) to Kismayu in Somalia. Within this regional circuit, the militia corridor extending from the Indian Ocean to Mt Elgon on the border between Kenya and Uganda has been captured. The process of radicalizing the corridor from Kismayu to Chad through Eritrea and South Sudan is on course as suggested by grey literature. This cross‐border connectivity between militarized groups and violent extremists is yet to be described,explained and analyzed in policy and academic literature.

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2.3.3The Slow‐Punctured Secessionist and Ethno‐Regional Militia

In the Ogaden convergence, secessionist and ethno‐regional militia have become slow‐punctured. The reduced profile of militia groups pursuing a nationalist ideal such as the OLF could be attributable to three main factors; one, the internal divisions within the OLF that resulted in inter‐factional conflict that culminated in one of the factions denouncing the OLF cause and choosing to cooperate with the government. Two, the blacklisting of Eritrea in 2009 after its stood accused of supporting both Al‐Shabaab and ONLF fighters led to an arms embargo that could have resulted in reduced flow of arms to the OLF. Three,a reduction in OLF sanctuaries in Sudan, Kenya and Somalia. In the case of Sudan, this was due to a normalization of relations between Addis and Khartoum following the Ethiopia‐Eritrea war in 1998. In the case of Kenya, the OLF did not have official support and could only operate from there sporadically. In the case of Somalia, the AMISOM intervention and specifically Ethiopia's occupation of the upper Shabelle valley in North Western Somalia (AMISOM sector 3) deprived the OLF of strategic operational bases they had held since 1999.

We observe that the momentum for secessionist organizations such as OLF and MRC has been on the decline. And we speculate that in addition to the above factors, the raison d'être for the OLF struggle has been lost because some of the fundamental reasons for the struggle were addressed by default when Mengistu's totalitarian regime was toppled. In addition the new administrations for instance under Meles Zenawi oﬀered both political and economic incentives for the abandonment of the secessionist cause. In the case of the MRC, government interventions in the land sector at the coast appear to have stolen the momentum from this group. Furthermore, alleged links to the Al‐Shabaab may have denuded its legitimacy and support base amongst Kenya's non‐extremist and non‐Muslim coastal residents.

The only group in the region that seem to have a continued existence is the Ogaden National Liberation Front. And this is probably because an inter‐governmental diplomatic initiative aimed at dealing with their grievances is afoot.

2.4 Militia Groups in Loki Convergence: The Identity and Resource Factors

The configuration of militia groups in the Loki convergence is static, but engagements between them are ongoing. And this is because the identity of militia is principally linked to the ethnic identity. The exception may lie in the emergence of bandit formations lacking any political motive from the different ethnic communities. Our impression is that we do not foresee the emergence of new militia groups but we could see collaboration between bandit formations. It is possible that with the discovery of significant hydrocarbon resources and the extension of From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 01/11/2013

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critical infrastructure to this area, elite competition within the different nations could lead to the emergence of marketised intra‐ethnic militia. The organized militia formations specific to this convergence are moribund. And this is attributable in part to the political developments that have occurred in this and the Ogaaden convergence over the past 30 years. The most significant of these is the independence of South Sudan, the deposing of Mengistu Haile Mariam in Ethiopia, the collapse of Somalia and the ending of the bush war in Uganda. For these reasons, organized formations in the Loki convergence were subject to one of four fates; achievement of their political objectives as in the case of the SPLM, increasing pressure as in the case of the LRA, denied an object of aggression as in the case of the OLF or orphaned by their erstwhile supporters as in the case of the ONLF. 3.0 MILITIA AUDIT IN THE HORN

3.1 The Kivu Convergence Militia

The Kivu Convergence covers the three countries of DRC, Rwanda and Uganda. Burundi is also an actor, but in this study we did not pay attention to her. Focus of the convergence study was around the Kivus and niegbouring regions in Rwanda and Uganda. Evidence suggests that this is the area with the highest concentration of militia groups, partly because of distance decay from Kinshasa and because of the conﬂict minerals. As we argue in TCH/IPEX Working Paper No.02/11/2013 on Axis‐ of‐Extraction, artisanal mining is a compelling reason for militia foreboding in the Kivus. The militia groups in this convergence are varied and range from organic to organized; marketised to militarized. Most of them are 'hard‐core' militia although we also note the emergence of a group we call the 'blue formations'. These are the rogue elements in the formal armies engaged in extraction and 'soft insecurity'

3.1.1 The Militia Formations of DRC

As already argued, militia formations in DRC are many. In this study, we concentrated on ﬁve of the most dominant; M23 (which was defeated in November 2013), FDLR, PARECO, MCC and FARDC. The map below provides the GPS locations of some of these groups generated through a geo‐spartial technic known as remote sensing. We discuss each of the groups and their features below

3.1.1.1 M23 41

The rebels allege that the DRC government failed to keep its promise to integrate the CNDP and various Mai-Mai militias into the FARDC at the appropriate rank and with a regular salary. The DRC government holds the position that the real issue was the desire of the militias to retain military and economic control over the territories they had occupied

The M23 was supposedly formed on 23rd March 2012 but the dates of the oﬃcial announcement vary between made in April and May of the same year hinting at a leadership tussle between the political and military wings. The M23 begun as an armed Mutiny against Kinshasa's attempts to dismantle the CNDP (National Congress for the Defense of the People) and integrate it into the 41 national army (Mixage) . With an estimated peak force of 6,000 soldiers, Bosco Ntanganda and Sultani Makenga who once served as the FARDC deputy

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commander of the Amani Leo operation in South Kivu in 2009 were the leaders of the M23. However following Ntanganda's surrender to the US embassy in Kigali and the sacking of Political leader and Ntanganda ally, Jean窶信arie Runiga Lugerero in March 2013, Sultani Makenga now retains sole military command Bertand Bisimwa is the titular president and spokesperson for M23. 3.1.1.1.1 M23Structure, Ideology and Support The name M23 was in remembrance of the Goma Peace accord signed between the government of the DRC and the CNDP on March 23, 2009. This peace deal was to mark an end to the CNDP insurgency led by General Laurent

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Nkunda and integrate the CNDP, into the national army. M23 rebels claimed that the Congolese government failed to honour critical provisions of the 2009 42 Goma peace accords with the CNDP . Seen mainly as a Tutsi formation, emergence of the M23 led to a crystallizing of militia allegiances in north Kivu along ethnic lines. Non‐Rwandophone militia who advocated for the Autochone agenda such as PARECO‐Fort and Nyatura gained traction in the region and were said to be in league with the FDLR prompting the emergence of counter‐ militia such as Raia Mutomboki. The M23 began making overtures to ideologically aligned groups such as Raia Mutomboki through the oﬃces of Lt. Col Eric Badege, a key tactical oﬃcer whom begun building alliances and executing operations with the group. 3.1.1.1.2The rise and faltering of M23

Over the course of six months between May and November 2012, M23 won string of military victories over a disorganized FARDC. These culminated with the brief occupation of Goma, the regional capital of North Kivu, in November 2012. The M23 achieved this victory over the FARDC virtually unopposed and right under the noses of the resident UN peacekeeping force who were powerless to stop them. In its hubris, the group threatened to march on Kinshasa and had to be compelled to withdraw from the city under international 43 pressure . Peace negotiations were initiated a month later but broke down in April 2013 when the UN, still stinging from the humiliation in Goma rejected the option of a political settlement and authorized the deployment of a special intervention brigade to rout the M23 and other armed groups out of eastern Congo. Upon resumption in June, the talks broke down again in October when there was a deadlock over the issue of amnesty for the top M23 commanders. At the same time, the M23 had begun a war with two adversaries facing a reinvigorated and much better organized FARDC and the UN intervention brigade. Fighting between the M23 and Congolese army re‐intensified and M23 42 Original agreement available at lost as much ground as it had gained during its advance on Goma and in fact was http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un pushed to a small strip of territory along the Uganda border. Attempts by the .org/ les/CD_090323_Peace%20Agreement%2 M23 at securing a ceasefire failed as the combined government forces pressed 0between%20the%20Government%20and%2 44 0the%20CNDP.pdf [Retrieved 13 November their advantage . On November 2, 2013, the last M23 stronghold in Bunana fell 2013] to the UN/FARDC force. On November 5, 2013, Sultani Makenga announced the 43 Some of this pressure was controversially surrender of the M23 and the decision to pursue a diplomatic solution. This applied on Rwanda by the governments of the Netherlands, the UK, Norway and Germany announcement came a day late as the Congolese government had already 45 who suspended budgetary support following declared a military victory over the group . Ostensibly, this was to neutralize allegations in a UN report that Rwanda any leverage the group would have over the peace settlement that is to follow provided military and logistical support to the M23. Rwanda strenuously denies these and to take away the initiative from the group. In the period after the surrender 46 allegations 44 of M23, the DRC has shown declining interest in post‐conflict negotiations . BBC News (2013) DR Congo M23 rebel group calls for cease re http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa24799932 [Retrieved 13 November 2013] also BBC News (2013) DR Congo M23 rebels 'wanted cease re' http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldafrica-24812534 [Retrieved 13 November 2013] 45 BBC News (2013) DR Congo Claims Defeat of M23 rebels http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldafrica-24815241 [Retrieved 13 November 2013] 46 BBC News (2013) DR Congo refuses to sign M23 'accord' in Kampala http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa24915550 [Retrieved 13 November 2013]

3.1.1.1.3 Prospects Post‐M23 But what does military defeat for M23 mean if the root causes for the rebellion remain unaddressed? The main challenges that plague the DRC and foment the formation of militia groups include the continued existence of the FDLR and its alleged ties to the state security organs in the east, the deﬁciency of internal order, the poor reputation of the FARDC as a national army and its implication in impropriety, the clamour by Rwandophones for recognition and inclusion in the representative governance frameworks, the resolution of land

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and resource conflict and the repatriation of refugees. Furthermore, the Kampala peace talks broke down on failure to build consensus on amnesty provisions for M23 commanders. The DRC was adamant on the arrest and trial of the top 100 M23 commanders. Who will the DRC government negotiate the peace with if the actors that enjoy legitimacy with the Rwandophone are incarcerated? Whereas amnesty has proven not to work, there is the risk that the DRC may make the same haughty mistakes the M23 made at their moment of victory. The impression is that remnants of the M23 will go underground and join up with or form another militia group to launch another insurgency in north Kivu and possibly Ituri. Also it is possible that they will filter into South Kivu and join up with like‐minded Mai Mai formations, thereby increasing their firepower. Finally, as long as the FDLR which is perceived to collaborate with the FARDC and other Autochone militia like Mai Mai ACPLS continue to pose a threat to Rwandophones this military victory over the M23 will turn sour and peace in the eastern DRC will remain an illusion. The latest development is like Michael Jackson's Moonwalk; we have the impression of moving forward but we remain on the same spot. 3.1.1.2 FDLR ‐Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda.

The FDLR is the largest militia formation in the eastern DRC controlling large swathes of territory in both North and South Kivu. It is a nationalist group composed mainly of members of the ousted Hutu government, soldiers from the disbanded Forces Armées Rwandaises(Ex‐FAR), Génocidaires in the Interahamwe, Hutu refugees who ﬂed from Rwanda following the civil war in the 1990's and an increasing number of non‐Rwandophone Congolese in the Kivus.The reason FDLR enjoys a certain level of local support is because the military and civilian personnel of the group live in the same areas as the general population. Members of the FDLR have married local women and become integrated into the local communities. This is why the agenda of the Autochone populations and that of the FDLR tends to be confused as one and the same. However, it is important to note that the FDLR are seen as a Rwandophone outﬁt that shares a common enemy in the Tutsi with the Autochone populations. Some observers state that the attitude of the FDLR towards the local 47 populations is paternalistic . The group also enjoys extensive support from sympathetic Hutus in the diaspora and has a sophisticated communications 48 structure including a twitter account . The FDLR traces its roots to the Armée de Libération du Rwanda (ALiR), which is in turn was begotten from theRassemblement pour le Retour des Réfugiés et la Démocratie au Rwanda (RDR).The stated purpose of the FDLR is “to use military pressure to open inter‐ Rwandan dialogue with the current Rwandan government and that it is prepared to return to Rwanda should such a dialogue take place and security 49 conditions be assured” . The FDLR has undergone several mutations since 1995. The FDLR has splintered several times with factions breaking away from the main organisation because of internal disagreements. The Rally for Unity and Democracy (RUD) is one such group that is large and active enough to qualify as a serious militia organization. Whilst the top leadership and central core of the FDLR is still constituted of personalities old enough to have beenGénocidaires, the newer cadres are initiates to the Hutu nationalist ideology of the group and are too young to have actively participated in the genocide. This makes the terrorist designation of the FDLR problematic.

47 Spittaels and Hilgert (2008) Mapping con ict motives in the eastern DRC, IPIS 48 Twitter feed available at https://twitter.com/IFDLR [Retrieved 14 November 2013] 49 The o cial website of the group can be found at http://ikazeiwacu.unblog.fr [Retrieved 14 November 2013]

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3.1.1.2.1 FDLR Structure

The FDLR has two political structures known as resistance committees (RCs). The military wing of FDLR is called FOCA (Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi). The resistance committees are charged with intelligence gathering, revenue collectionand recruitment drives.The military headquarters of the group were in Kalonge, in Masisi territory of North Kivu. However in 2012, the FDLR general staﬀ were forced to relocate northwards from south‐western Masisi to the convergence between Walikale, Rutshuru, and Masisi after losing 50 several engagements with the Mai Mai formation Raia Mutomboki . The FDLR was estimated to number 7,000 troops at is peak but the troop strength could have fallen to as low as 1,200 following concerted joint military operations 51 against it between 2008 and 2010 .The FDLR is said to be organized into four brigades but they have been so weakened that in reality, there are three. The North‐Kivu Brigade composed of 4 battalions is located in eastern Rutshuru, western Masisi, southern Lubero and eastern Walikale. The South‐Kivu Brigade composed of 4 battalions is located in Fizi, Mwenga and on the borders of the Kahuzi‐Biega Park.The Reserve Brigade composed of 3 battalions, has billeted its troopstostraddle the borders of north and south Kivu in Kalehe, southern Masisi and eastern Walikale.In order to rebuild the strength of its decimated battalions, the FDLR begun in 2009 to enter into alliances with otherAutochone militia such as the FRF and Mai Mai Yakutumba in South Kivu. In South Kivu, the FDLR has also been forced to consolidate, moving many of its troops out of its former strongholds in Kalehe and Shabunda, toward the Mitumba mountains overlooking the Rusizi Plain.

3.1.1.2.2 FDLR Leadership

Ignace Murwanashyaka who is now on trial in Germany for crimes against humanity since 2011, was a leader of the group. In his absence, leadership of the FDLR fell to Callixte Mbarushimana who was also arrested in 2010 in France then indicted and subsequently released by the ICC in 2012. During his incarceration, the military leader of thegroup, Sylvestre Mudacumura who is based in the eastern DRC was in sole command. It is unclear if the leadership has reverted back to Mbarushimana following his release. Mudacumura also has an outstanding arrest warrant with the ICC that was issued in 2012 for crimes against humanity.

Stearns, J (2013), Raia Mutomboki: The awed peace process in the DRC and the birth of an armed franchise, Rift Valley Institute 51 These were operations Umoja Wetu, Kimia II and Amani Leo

3.1.1.2.3 FDLR Activities

The FDLR is the most active armed formation involved in mineral extraction in the Kivus and with a 14 year history in the minerals trade has been so for the longest time. The mineral of preference is gold especially in South Kivu. The FDLR also has interests in the other precious metals as evidenced by the level of involvement in the coltan, cassiterite and wolframite in their territory. The model of extraction varies from direct extraction through forced labour for instance in Walikale to acting as négociantsand at timescomptoirs tradingin the minerals for instance in Fizi territory The group also operates roadblocks all over their territory where they impose taxes on the populace and especially miners and mineral traders from sites that are not under FDLR control. FDLR revenues are estimated to run into several million dollars annually making it an extremely proﬁtable

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militia that is able to establish extensive trading networks that eases the exit of minerals and re supply of weapons and ammunition throughout the region and especially in Burundi and Tanzania.

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3.1.1.2.4 Government Response to FDLR

In the past,Kinshasa has weakly called on the FDLR to demobilize and disarm in preparation for repatriation (DDR) back to Rwanda on several occasions. However, these calls have gone unheeded as the incentives for the FDLR to do so for instance assurances of amnesty, commensurate levels of financial income and retention of political influence are lacking. The rank and file of the FDLR are said tobe generally unaware of existing DDR initiatives and those who are aware are too afraid to desert.In the past, three structured military operations have been mounted against the FDLR by the DRC government. The first and most decisive was Umoja Wetu launched in January 2009. This was a joint military operation with the government of Rwanda targeting the FDLR and the CNDP. The offensive led to the dislodging of the CNDP from its strongholds in eastern Congo and the arrest of CNDP General, Laurent Nkunda. FDLR forces were also dislodged from their strongholds in North Kivu and forced to retreat southward where the Banyamulenge blocked their retreat. As Rwandese forces withdrew leaving the FARDC to complete the victory over the FDLR,the group begun to target Congolese civilians. The second operation against the FDLR was a designed as a 'mop‐up' exercise dubbed Kimia IIthat was conducted with the support of MONUC. The objective was to scatter the FDLR and eject them from their economic base in the mining areas. Kimia II involved an estimated 16,000 FARDC troops stationed in bothNorth and South Kivu. However, Kimia II was a farce as the operation was compromised by low morale and ill discipline in the FARDC. Government soldiers took the opportunity to loot, rape and pillage the areas of operation. The third military offensive against the FDLR was launched in January 2010 and called Amani Leo. The objective was to take and hold FDLR controlled territory.Amani Leo included the deployment of Military Police to curb the excesses of the FARDC as they interacted with civilians. Amani leo alsoended in disaster and had to be ended prematurely when the FARDC 52 was hit by the mutiny that gave birth to the M23 . What is telling is that Kinshasa allowedthe FDLR to recapture lost territory immediately the M23 emerged meaning that it was to act once more as a counterweight militia just as it had during the reign of the RCD‐Goma/CNDP.

It is clear that the response by government of the DRC to the FDLR has been lacklusture. And this could possibly stem from a calculation that 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend'. The FDLR was a key ally of Laurent Kabila's forces when he was fighting off the invasion by Rwanda and the Rwanda‐backed RCD‐Goma in 1998. The FDLR has also been a counter‐weight militia to the inheritors of RCD‐Goma, the CNDP and the M23. It would therefor be easy to understand why Kinshasa has been reluctant to decisively root out the FDLR in the east as long as groups like the M23 remained in existence. With the defeat of the M23 in November 2013, international attention has turned to the other milita groups in the region and most notably the FDLR. The question on everyone's minds is whether the revitalized FARDC and the UN special intervention brigade will seek to defeat the FDLR with similar vigour, or if the lessons of the past where the government has come to bitterly learnthat their eastern flank is exposed without a potent and reliable pro‐Kinshasa militia group will undermine the 52 Reuters (2012) Kabila halts military operations momentum to pacify the Kivus.

in east Congo http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/12/co ngo-democratic-militaryidUSL6E8FC4G820120412 [Retrieved 14 November 2013]

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3.1.1.2.5FDLR Collaboration With Other Groups

The military engagements between the FARDC and the FDLR have all yielded inconclusive results. Indications are that the FDLR and FARDC tend to tolerate each other and tacitly cooperate in the fight against the CNDP/M23 and allied Mai Mai formations. For instance during the first FARDC offensive against the CNDP in December 2007, the FDLR aligned its military operations to complementary offensives by the FARDC. The FDLR also works closely with PARECO‐Hutu with whom they share common political and perhaps ideological interests. However, these other groups publicly deny ever working with the FDLR which is a 'pariah Militia' due to its connections to the genocide in Rwanda. Reports indicate that the FARDC funnel weapons and ammunition to the FDLR. For instance in June 2007 FDLR units received deliveries of arms from the renegade 85thFARDC Brigade and other deliveries from the 14thFARDC Brigade commanded by Hutu Colonel David Rugayi who is said to enjoy business 53 links with the FDLR . The 84thFARDC Brigade under Colonel Akilimali has also been implicated in the shipment of arms to the FDLR. The mapping of militia shows that PARECO and the FDLR territories overlap for instance in the districts of Walikale, Lubero and Kabare but a review of ACLED data shows no military engagements between the two groups.

3.1.1.3 Mai Mai

Nearly all Mai Mai groups claim to have organic origins but our research shows that for a signiﬁcant number of the supply‐driven, marketized formations, this is a mechanism of mobilizing legitimacy. For a smaller number of the more potent groups, organic roots are traceable but similarly, a proportion of them have morphed from demand driven community security apparatus to supply driven organized and militarized actors in the violence and illicit extraction markets.

The Mai Mai are the most pervasive militia formation in the eastern DRC with a vast territorial range that stretches from Ituri in the north, through both regions in the Kivus and southward into Katanga. The reason for their extensive jurisdiction is because the Mai Mai was the traditional defense force for autochonecommunities in the Congo. Composed principally of the non‐ Rwandophone communities, the Mai Mai by and large were aligned against the Rwandophone communities. The original Mai Mai formed to oppose "Tutsi domination" and the various Tutsi‐led militia in the DRC ranging form the RCD, to the CNDP to the M23. The Mai Mai rapidly proliferated in the aftermath of the second Congo war when Rwanda's government forces mounted a campaign to oust the government of Laurent Kabila with the support of mainly Rwandophone allies in the Congo. Consequently, the Mai Mai have been considered in the simple imagination to be allies of convenience to other anti‐Tutsi forces such as the FDLR and genocaidaires. However, this is an oversimpliﬁcation as the many of the current variants were a key component of the forces lack a clear political objective and frequently change allegiances in response to market forces.

CongoSiasa (2009), News round up http://congosiasa.blogspot.com/2009/10/news -round-up.html [Retrieved 14 November 2013] also in UNSC report S/2008/652 available at www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/...6D27... /DRC%20S2008652.pdf

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3.1.1.3.1Formation and Breeding Logic

3.1.1.3.2 Command Structure

Each of the new Mai Mai groups had its own locally speciﬁc reasons for taking up arms. State authority is non‐existent in a wide swath of the Kivus. Newly integrated FARDC units (ex‐CNDP) had advanced into areas where they are viewed with deep suspicion. FDLR targeting of the civilian population since the beginning of operation Kimia II contributed to the formation of more local self‐defense groups. None of these groups, old or new, appeared to want to or be able to create wider instability. However, should these groups coalesce with other anti‐government forces (FDLR, Mai Mai Kifuafua, APCLS), they could present a real challenge to the Congolese armed forces (FARDC).

Given their informal nature and limited professional military capacity, the potency of a Mai Mai formation is a direct function on the background, training and connections of the overall commander. And this is reflected in how a majority of the Mai Mai formations are captive to the personality of the commander to the extent of adopting his name as part of their corporate identity. For the smaller rag tag formations, the personal interests of the commander are directly translated to form the objectives of the group. Mai Mai commanders often appropriate the rank of 'Colonel' even though they have not formally attained that rank in the military or lack a martial background altogether. The reason for the popularity of this particular rank amongst the smaller militia is historical. During the colonial administration, the Belgian army contingents deployed to the DRC were so small that general officers in the rank of brigadiers and above were in short supply. Consequently, it fell to the lower ranking senior officers such as colonels, lieutenant colonels and majors to serve as the overall military commanders of vast administrative districts. This meant that they had far‐reaching powers and were essentially the ultimate authority in the region and subsequently in the popular narratives no higher‐ranking positions could be imagined. 3.1.1.3.3The Scramble for Identity.

There is little homogeneity among the various Mai Mai groups. And this is partly due to the degree of liberalization in the mechanism of adopting the Mai Mai identity. Many of the Mai Mai formations are actually no more than small bands of poorly armed, untrained and ill‐disciplined men numbering no more than a few dozen. In the absence of a central command structure, a unified ideology and common objectives, the groups in order to differentiate themselves use the names of their various commanders such as Morgan Fujo, Kyatende, Kirickicho and Kapopo. However, there are also other larger and more serious Mai Mai formations that are heterogeneous in composition and better organized with a clear command structure and codified political objectives. In May 2009, Mai Mai from fifteen of the groups in the Kivus formed a political party called the "Union de Resistance Democratique 54 Congolaise (URDC) . Mai Mai Yakutumba dominated the positions of leadership with Vincent Ngeya Tambwe, the Yakutumba representative to the Amani structures serving as president and the spokesman for Mai Mai Yakutumba, Assanda Mwenebatu, serving as Secretary‐General. A second Mai Mai coalition called Alliance des Forces Populaires et Patriotiques du Congo

The fteen groups in the URDC coalition were Mai-Mai Yakutumba, Zabuloni, Nyakiliba, Mahoro, Kapopo, Kasindien, Shikito, Kirikicho, Simba, Rwenzori, Mongol, Mudundu 40, PARECO/South Kivu, UJPS, and Raia Mutomboki.

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(AFPC) was formed by seven other Mai Mai groups in both sides of the Kivu . However, politico‐military parties have a short‐shelf life due to limited pools of recruitment the ﬁckleness of the membership and narrow political objectives. For instance, the URDC was seen to be a vehicle to facilitate access to government positions for the leadership under the Goma accords of 2009.

3.1.1.4 Mai Mai PARECO

Founded in Pinga town, Walikale territory approximately 100km Northwest 56 of Goma, on 14 March 2007 by Col. (later General) Sikiuli Lafontaine . PARECO was formed by the discontented Hutu military and political elites uncomfortable with the increasing inﬂuence of the CNDP and particularly 57 Laurent Nkunda. Among these were Mai Mai commanders , senior politicians from Goma and Kinshasa. Other communities such as the Hunde, Nande, 58 Nyanga and Tembo augmented the Hutu majority in PARECO .

3.1.1.4.1 PARECO Command Structure

PARECO's convergence of different interests is reflected in its command structure, which attempted to accommodate the different ethnic groups, and individuals that felt disenfranchised by the regime in Kinshasa and the CNDP in Goma. For instance the Commander‐in‐chief, General Sikuli Lafontaine was from the Nande, the Deputy commander, Colonel Hassan Mugabo was a Hutu whilst the rest of the command structure displayed a good mix of Nande, Hutu 59 and Hunde Officers .

3.1.1.4.2 PARECO Activities

These were PARECO, Mai-Mai Vurondo, Kasindien, Shabunda, Mongol and Simba (in both North and South Kivu) 56 Stearns, J (2013) PARECO; Land, local strongmen and the roots of militia politics in North Kivu. Rift Valley Institute Pg. 26 57 For instance Col. Mugabo, Col. La Fontaine 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid 60 Among these were the joint CongoleseRwandan Operations Umoja Wetu ('Our Unity') in early 2009, which evolved into Operation Kimia II ('Peace II') that included MONUC. 61 United States Department of State, 2011 Tra cking in Persons Report - Congo, Democratic Republic of the, 27 June 2011, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4e12ee8837.ht ml [accessed 19 April 2013] 62 2,872 soldiers were from North Kivu and 426 soldiers were from South Kivu 63 Stearns, J (2013). Op. Cit

PARECO was the Mai Mai's Political and Military response to the perceived inﬂuence of the CNDP and by extension the Tutsi domination of local FARDC units. PARECO allied with the FARDC and participated in the sub‐par armed 60 engagements against the FDLR. The top brass in PARECO has been implicated in illegal extraction of resources. For instance Colonel Gwigwi Busogi who commanded PARECO in Kalehe was arrested for mineral and 61 human traﬃcking in mid 2011 . 3.1.1.4.3 Integration and Exit from FARDC

PARECO was integrated into the Congolese national army as part of the Goma accords. A total of 3,298 PARECO soldiers were absorbed into the 62 FARDC . Subsequently, PARECO participated in the joint Congo‐Rwanda counter militia operations such as Umoja Wetu in January 2009 and Kimia IIin August of the same yearthat mainly targeted the FDLR. PARECO soldiers constitutedmost of the soldiers on the frontline brigades, such as the 241stand 63 242nd out of Kalehe . Poor handling of the Brassage and Mixage processes led to the collapse of the Goma accords in April 2009. Many of the integrated rebel groups begun to mutiny and exit from the army when they realized that their interests were not being served. Most of them having lost their command structures begun to drift towards Laurent Nkunda's CNDP which was seen to be more accommodating. For instance, PARECO and CNDP shared

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3.1.1.4.4Political Participation.

responsibility the maintenance of public in Masisi .Integration into the FARDC was disastrous for PARECO because it facilitated the cannibalization of the command structure of the group, which was struggling with internal cohesion ab initio. The situation worsened when splinter factions of PARECO attempted to exit the FARDC only to auction themselves to the CNDP. As a result of this dislocation from the rural communities and deployment to areas in which they had no roots, the elements of PARECO that were deployed by the CNDP to south Kivu to catalyze a mutiny against the FARDC either 65 deserted and rejoined the FARDC or were quickly defeated . When the CNDP morphed into M23 in 2012, PARECO's identity had become so distorted and the leadership so scattered that the rural populations from whence it had initially drawn its support could not diﬀerentiate it from the FARDC, the CNDP or the M23.

The initial failure of the CNDP mutiny in south Kivu thatthe military option alone was not suﬃcient for the CNDP to retain control of the Kivus and that the missing element was political mobilization especially among the Hutu elite, PARECO‐Hutu quickly launched a political wing. This alienated it from the other PARECO factions opposed to Tutsi domination such as the FRF and PARECO‐Nande. This move essentially catalyzed the division of PARECO into Rwandophone and non‐Rwandophonedivisions. The growing links between 64 In 2009, a parallel police structure was created elements of PARECO‐Hutuand the M23 were taken to signal the ascent of the Rwandophone agenda in the region and fuelled fears that led to the re‐ in Masisi led by Col. Esaie Munyakazi(CNDP) and Zabulon Munyamariba(PARECO). emergence of non‐Rwandophone PARECO remnants in South Kivu. The most According to a UN report, this police force was visible werethe Nyaturabased in the Kalehe plateau and PARECO‐Fort based in a major revenue generator for Bosco Ntaganda Central Masisi. These groups drew their support mainly from the Nande and who received over USD 140 000 per month in Hunde communities but they were more of a military than a political response. tax collections 65 Ntaganda's initial goal was to consolidate The new groups cooperated with the FDLR in operations against CNDP control in the Kivus in response to Rwandophone populations provoking a government response from the Kinshasa's attempt to dismantle the ex-CNDP FARDCand a community response in the form of a new Mai Mai militia called network. Raia Mutomboki. As of October 2013, we had identiﬁed over 20 variations of the Mai Mai:

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3.1.1.4.5 Mouvement Congolais Pour le Changement (MCC)

The MCC formed in 2012 as a conglomerate of several armed groups by Col. Bede Rusagara who hails from from the Bafuliiri Ethnic Community. Col. Rusagara served under Mai‐Mai Commander, Col. Baudouin Nyakabaka. He joined the RCD, the CNDP and integrated into the FARDC. He deserted in 2011 to form this Anti‐FARDC militia. With an estimated force of 250 Soldiers, the MCC is Actively recruiting Banyamulenge including from refugee camps in Burundi and Uganda. Because Rusagara is a deserter from the FARDC, the MCC presumably has weapon stocks from the FARDC arsenal. Resupply is from raids on FARDC training camps and alleged connections with the M23 and ALEC: Alliance de libération de l'est du Congo. MCC are said to control the entire Ruzizi plain in South Kivu because Bike Rusagara, acting Chief of the Ruzizi Plain and Bede Rusagara are cousins.

3.1.2 The Militia Formations in Uganda

Militia groups in Uganda have basically been decimated. But there is an ambiquity regarding some of them, while state‐indulged militia groups seem to be on the rise. We examine some of the groups that seem to pop up in literature and during our ﬁeld visits. 3.1.2.1 Allied Democratic Forces(ADF)

A rapid scan of reports on the ADF indicates that the group has been 66 dormant . This can be attributed to a series of military oﬀensivesagainst the group. The ﬁrst was in 2005 codenamed “Operation North Night Final” led by FARDC with UN support, targeted elements of the ADF and NALU. The UPDF also mounted a counter‐insurgency operation codenamed “Ruwenzori” against the ADF in June 2010. However, in January 2012, the Government of Uganda warned that the ADF has begun remobilizing probably as a consequence of 67 deteriorating relations between Kampala and Khartoum .

3.1.2.1.1 ADF Structure, Ideology and Support

Sheikh Jamil Mukulu, a prominent Ugandan Islamist and member of the Salaf 68 Tabliq Jamaat movement formed the ADF in 1989. ADF is eﬀectively a coalition of former members of the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU) and radicalized Islamists recruited from the Salaf Tabliq group. In spite 66 Jane's World Insurgency and Terrorism [A of its religious roots, the ADF espouses a markedly ethno‐nationalist ideology. Publication of Jane's Defence Weekly] Nov 09, Propaganda from the political arm of theAllied Democratic Movement (ADM) 2011http://articles.janes.com/articles/JanesWorld-Insurgency-and-Terrorism/Alliedbetrays stong pro‐Hutu sympathies especially for the post‐genocide community Democratic-Forces-ADF-Uganda.html whom they feel have been harshly treated.The ultimate objective of the ADF is 67 Muhumuza, Rodney. 'Resurgent ADF the overthrow of the government of President Yoweri Museveni's Threatens Stability in Great Lakes Region'. Think administration which they perceive to be Tutsi‐dominated.The ADF also Africa Press, 17 January 2012 http://thinkafricapress.com/uganda/resurgent- appears to have mildly xenophobicleanings. The group advocates for the adf-threatens-stability-great-lakes-region expulsion of refugees from Uganda, particularly Sudanese, Rwandese and [Retrieved 13th October 2012] Kenyans. The Government of Sudan and the national islamic front have been 68 This is the largest Islamic Missionary group in said to materially support the ADF. Support from Hutu groups conducting illegal the world. The blend of Islamic ideology and extraction in the eastern DRC is also suspected. missionary methodology, imbues the group with multiple identities ranging from radical/extremist to moderate Islamist

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3.1.2.1.2 ADF Activities and Atrocities ADF lay dormant from 1989 to 1995 when it became operationally active. The 69 70 group adopted terror tactics such as public bombings , forced displacement , random kidnappings and disﬁgurement of victims. Through a sustained campaign that lasted from April to June 1998, the ADF damaged the credibility of the Ugandan government to maintain public order. The ADF

3.1.2.1.3 Government Response

In 2000, the UPDF launched a concerted offensive to annihilate the ADF. This begun with the destruction of several well known ADF camps. In a campaign that lasted over 2 years, the UPDF drove the ADF out of Uganda and into the eastern DRC. Vestiges of the group led by Mukulu are said to be still based there although unconfirmed reports indicated that he may have been seriously wounded or even killed during a Congolese‐led counter‐insurgency in August 2010known as operation Rwenzori against the ADF and its allies in Beni. On October 5, 2011 the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated Jamil Mukulu, Commander of the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), for his role as head of a foreign armed group operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) that impedes the disarmament, repatriation, or resettlement of combatants. This action was taken pursuant to Executive Order 13413, which targets individuals and entities determined to be contributing to the conflict in the DRC. Mukulu is also the subject of a February 2011 INTERPOL red notice for his connection with terrorism. As a result of this action, U.S. persons are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with Mukulu and any assets he may have under US jurisdiction are frozen.

3.1.2.2 Lords Resistance Army (LRA)

The LRA lost territorial dominace of Uganda's northern regions in 2002 and has since variously operated in the Central African Republic, South Sudan and the DRC. The group traces its roots to the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) founded 69 The ADF is credited with bombing incidents in in 1986 by Ugandan mystic Alice Auma “Lakwena”. It has been claimed that two Kampala restaurants in 1998. 70 Auma was reportedly an aunt and on other ocassions a cousin to LRA leader This was achieved through attacks on Joseph Kony. However, these claims were refuted by Auma herself and instead civilians in trading centers, and private homes. The group also attacked security installations indicated that they were a clever ploy by Kony to blur the line between his LRA manned by the Uganda police and the UPDF as and her Holy Spirit Movement. The ideological schism between the two lay in well as extensively planting anti-personnel 71 Lakwena's apparent abhorrence of acts of violence on civilians or PoW's . The mines. 71 Van Acker, Frank, "Uganda and The Lord's LRA is a militarized cult of personality with Kony at the head. He is a self‐styled Resistance Army: The New Order No One prophet sent to purify the people of Uganda and to create a bastion of peace Ordered", 2004, African A airs 103(412), p.32 72 http://ideas.repec.org/p/iob/dpaper/2003006.h through a 5‐point plan . Whilst the HSM was a purely Acholi movement tml organized around a religeous ideology, Kony's LRA shed the ethnic shackles 72 One, to ght for the immediate restoration of that hampered eﬀective mobilization and instead recruited widely from competitive multi-party democracy in Uganda. veterans of the Uganda People's Democratic Army (UPDA) who felt dissatisﬁed Two, to see an end to gross violation of human with the terms of the Gulu Peace Accord of 1988 in which most of the former rights and dignity of Ugandans. Three, to ensure the restoration of peace and security in rebels were integrated into the government's army. With these core units he Uganda. Four, to ensure unity, sovereignty and formed the Uganda Christian Democratic Army and begun leading an economic prosperity bene cial to all insurgency against the government. Ugandans. Five, to bring to an end to the repressive policy of deliberate marginalization of groups of people who may not agree with the National Resistance Army's ideology.

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In 1991 the UCDA changed its identity to become Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).There are allegations that the Government of Sudan (GoS) has extended 73 support to the LRA has been extended at various times . For a time, the LRA and the Equitoria Defence Force (EDF) were allies in opposition to the SPLA enjoying mutual support from the GoS. The LRA was said to enjoy latent support from amongst the Acholi community though this theory has been widely discredited considering that the Acholi bore the brunt of LRA atrocities just as much as the other communities in Northern Uganda. Due to a limited and rapidly dwindling support base, the LRA quickly resorted to coercive means to maintain its force capability. Typically this involved the abduction and indoctrination of child soldiers. The LRA largely appears to be a 'pariah‐militia' driven out of nothern Uganda, hounded from South Sudan and harried in the CAR, it is a rootless organization reliant almost entirely on its capacity to terrorize and dominate civillian populations in the ungoverned spaces along the common 74 CAR, South Sudan and Uganda borders . In spite of this, the LRA still maintains a healthy weapons stockpile cached across various locations in a region awash with SALW and ammunition. 3.1.2.2.1 LRA Activities and Atrocities

The LRA is notorious for the abduction, rape, maiming, and killing of civilians, including children in northen Uganda, the CAR and eastern DRC. In the past, the LRA has collaborated with Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALiR, now FDLR) and other rebel groups opposed to the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD). Typically, these groups are heavily involved in illegal logging activities and illegal mining of gold and coltan in the Kivus. It is possible that an overlap between the economic activities of these groups and a small arms trade with the LRA takes place. The principal economic activity for the LRA appears to be human traﬃking. The LRA has consitently abducted young girls for use as sex and labor slaves. Other children, mainly girls, were reported to have been sold, traded, or given as gifts by the LRA to arms dealers in Sudan. 3.1.2.2.2 Government Response

In addition to deploying the UPDFagainst theLRA, the government of Uganda in the early 2000's also encouraged and supported the formation of counter‐militia groups such as the 'Arrow Boys' (Teso Community), 'Amuka Boys' (Lang'i community), Civic Defence Units (CDU), Kalangala Action Plan (KAP), Local Defence Units (LDU), and the Frontier Guards. These groups received rudimentary military training and arms from the government through the UPDF. Following the ejection of the LRA from nothern uganda, these groups were demobilized and integrated into the UPDF as reservists. Following Uganda's intervention in Somalia through AMISOM, a signiﬁcant number of 75 former militia have been recalled in to active duty . The united states have been supporting Uganda to eradicate the LRA through deployment of a 'token' force of 100 american soldiers serving in an advisory capacity to remove Kony from the battleﬁeld. The force was tasked with advising and assisting the regional armies in apprehending the LRA senior leadership and bringing them to justice. This advisory force deployed to Entebbe, Uganda, in late 2011, and from there moved to forward positions in the Central African Republic and South Sudan in early 2012. The African Union launched its own military force against the LRA in March 2012.

'Ugandan army says Sudan is backing Joseph Kony's LRA' http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldafrica-17890432 [last accessed 17 Dec 2012] also Schomerus Mareike, The Lord's Resistance Army in Sudan: A History and Overview. 2007 pg. 24 Small Arms Survey Sudan zttp://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/ lead min/docs/working-papers/HSBA-WP-08LRA.pdf [last accessed 17 Dec 2012] 74 O cial ties between the LRA and the GoS were reportedly terminated in 2006 75 'Daily Monitor' Nov 26 2012 UPDF recalls 2,000 reservists for Somalia duty http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/UP DF-recalls-2-000-reservists-for-Somalia-duty//688334/1629334/-/format/xhtml/-/ap32ki//index.html [Last accessed 17 Dec 2012]

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3.1.2.3 People's Redemption Army (PRA)

There are contestations on the exact nature of the PRA with both government and the opposition in Uganda accusing each other of supporting the group. The government line is that PRA was founded in 2001 by former UPDF colonels (and opposition leader Kizza Besigiye's conﬁdantes)Samson Mande and Anthony Kyakabale. They were reportedly joined in Rwanda by Col. Edson Muzoora also an alleged supporter of Besigye's FDC. The opposition's veiw is that the PRA is a 'dummy' militia formed by the NRM to instil fear of insurgency into the local populace and and foster support for the Museveni administration. 3.1.2.3.1Structure Ideology and Support

As thetrue nature of the PRAremains unclear amidst allegations and counter‐allegations by both sides, a definitive profile of the structure ideology and support of the group is difficult to come up with. However, on one hand the 76 museveni administration alleges that the PRA as a movement was founded by the FDC leadership to aquire state power by force of arms after losing the elections in March 2001. The Ugandan government further alleged that the PRA was receiving tacit support from the government of Rwanda at the time frosty relations prevailed between Kampala and Kigali. The FDC led by Besigye categorically denied being involved with the PRA. They alleged that the PRA was a fabrication of Museveni's government, created to discredit the opposition and provide a suitable pretext for political intimidation and incarcerations. FDC officials also alleged that the NRM government was using the PRA to implicate Rwanda in subversive activities and therefore settle scores over disagreements the two countries had over 77 disputed spheres of influence in the eastern DRC . The implication here is that the PRA benefitted from the illegal extratction that RCD‐Goma was engaged in at the time. 3.1.2.3.2Government Response.

The government launched an intelligence gathering operation against the PRA followed subsequently by a crackdown on supposed members. Several suspected members of the group were arrested and incarcerated. In July 2002, Colonel (now Brigadier) Noble Mayombo, who was head of the Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence (CMI) apperaed with Kizza Besigye on a live talk show airing on Monitor FM (now KFM). During the show, Mayombo accused Besigye of being the mastermind behind the PRA. The CMI and the Joint Anti‐Terrorism Task force (JATT) conducted a counter‐insurgencyoperation in Arua and 76 Koboko where in addition to arresting PRA suspects, the government UPDF spokesman, Lt. Col. Shaban Bantariza 77 recovered 76 riﬂes, 77 magazines, 83 bullets, 4 anti‐personnel mines, 24 anti‐ At the time, All the regions of the DRC that bordered Uganda were under the control of the personnel fuses as well as communications equipment and combat training RCD-Goma militia, who were allied to Rwanda. literature. 78

Kiboko is a Swahili word that means a whip, stick or cane usually used to administer corporal punishment whilst Tumbaku is the Swahili word fro tobacco. Kiboko squad is dominantly found in central Uganda particularly in the capital, Kampala. Tumbaku squad mainly operates in northern Uganda especially around Gulu.

3.1.2.4 The Soft‐Core Militia: Kiboko Squad and Tumbaku Squad 78

The Kiboko squad (NRM‐Kampala) and TumbakuSquad (NRM‐Gulu) aresaid to be NRM‐aﬃliated political party militia rapidly mobilized to disperse anti‐ government demonstrations. These squads claim to be vigilante groups of the

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NRM andOpposition politicians strongly believe that the government 79 supportsthem . These are relatively new actors beginning to shape the development of politics in Uganda. Their emergence has coincided with the advent of multi‐party politics and the struggle for the soul of Uganda currently raging between the NRM and opposition parties. Political party militias have begun evolving concrete identities and the inevitable counter‐militias formed 80 by the opposition led by the FDC have also emerged . Currently, assertions are that NRM militia are organized whilst the counter forces for instance, mtayimba are organic. The relationship between militia and politicians currently tilts the balance of power in favour of the politicians. Like Kenya in the 1990s, the militia are a tool in the hands of politicians. However, and as it happened in Kenya after political liberalization, this could rapidly change, particularly in the case of the NRM as the militia leadership gain confidence in the administration of violence and an appreciation of the leverage they have over the political class. The intensity of engagement between rival political party militia has risen in tandem with president Museveni's increasingly resolute grip on power, particularly the extension of term in office. The prognosis is for a growth and hardening of political party militia as President Museveni transitions from his 4th to 5th term of office in 2016. Increasing militarization of state responses to civilian unrest is also projected during this period. We hypothesize an upsurge in the potency of militia and counter‐militia formations as they aggressively recruit and arm themselves in the run‐up to the elections. There are allegations of collusion between the squads and top police officials who sanctioned or otherwise indulged their activities in the streets of Uganda's towns.

The squads actively and violently disrupted disrupted political assemblies organized by the opposition in the run‐up to the 2011 elections.The Electoral Commission (EC) witnessed an attack by Kiboko squad members on two polling stations in Bukoto South. During the mayoral elections in March 2011, the squad engaged win pitched battles with opposition youth at Super FM in Rubaga and beat up voters and journalists 3.1.2.4.1Government Response

The Uganda Human Rights Commission was petitioned by opposition politicians and on the activities of these squads. Subsequently, it ordered an investigation into the activities of the Kiboko Squad. The Commision report condemned police inaction for the growing strength of the Kiboko Squad. The report points to the failure to charge the self‐proclaimed leader of the group Juma Ssemakula, who was arrested in February 2011 and later released.

In the absence of credible, non‐state militia groups in‐country, rogue state security actors enjoying a measure of official indulgence have moved in to 79 'The Monitor' Uganda: Human Rights dominate both governed and ungoverned spaces and now largely run the Commission to Probe Kiboko Squad. http://allafrica.com/stories/200704220066.htm 'bandit economy'. There appears to be two levels of extraction; one, 'primitive' l [last accessed 18th December 2012] extraction where petty bribes are paid out for minor offences that do not pose a 80 We were unable to pin down concrete details direct threat to the regime such as traffic offences, minor assault, city by‐law on the opposition militia at the time of our visit violations etcetera. The civilian police force controls this market. The second other than the fact that they are in existence. 81 level is the 'polished extraction'. This is where sophisticated extraction and The Presidential Guard headed by Brig. Muhoozi, an alleged son of the President was capital transformation mechanisms are required for instance the illegal timber variously linked to a plethora of illegal and mineral trades, human trafficking, gun running and white‐collar crime. State extraction activities close to the DRC border indulged operatives often with military links or support are said to dominate this and in Central Uganda. 81 space .

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3.2 The Ogaden Convergence 3.2.1 Militia Formations in Somalia 3.2.1.1 Al Shabaab

Al‐Shabaab is the militant wing of the former Somali Supreme Islamic Courts Union (ICU) that had taken over most of southern Somalia in the second half of 82 2006from the transitional federal government of Somalia . The militia of the Islamic Courts Union were ejected from the capital, Mogadishu and other major cities by Ethiopian forces in a 2‐week war that lasted between December 2006 and January 2007.Observers conclude that thisaction by the US backed Ethiopian forces catalyzed the radicalization of Al Shabaab, which was originally 83 the small militia youth wing of the relatively moderate ICU . The involvement of Ethiopia and the US was a godsend to Islamistradicals, which allowed them to have a public relations field day where they were able to cast the conflict as a religious war (Jihaad) pitting Muslims against non‐beleivers (Kaffirs). Theconflict in Somalia was thus used to act as a 'lighning rod' for Al Shabbab to recruit both disenchanted Somalis and outraged Muslims alike.The Ethiopian invasion also shaped the operational strategies that were subsequently adopted by Al Shabaaband led it to adopt guerilla tactics as a parth to resistance against the larger, conventionally organized force. Al Shabaab was also able to gain grassroots support because it provided the populations in marginal areas with basic services such as healthcare, water and education. The group established a taxation and extortion regime to raise funds to finance the service deivert and fund its own activites.In retun, it became the de facto government in these areas able to operate training camps unmolested in the southcentral region of Somalia.Al‐Shabaab's objective is the establishment of an Islamic state in Somalia, based on Islamic law and the elimination of foreign 'infidel' influence. Al‐Shabaab seeks the creation of an 'Islamic Emirate of Somalia', to include Somalia, Somaliland, Puntland, north‐eastern Kenya, the Ogaaden region of Ethiopia and Djibouti.

Al‐Shabaab encompasses a number of elements, ranging from those focused solely on the domestic insurgency in Somalia to elements that support Al‐ Qaeda's global jihadist ideology. Al‐Shabaab is not centralized or monolithic in its agenda or goals. Its rank‐and‐ﬁle members come from disparate clans, and the group is susceptible to clan politics, internal divisions, and shifting alliances. Since early 2008, Al Shabaab has increasingly aﬄiated itself to Al Qaeda. This has beem the result of a symbiotic relationship between the two groups where on one hand, Al Shabaab has been able to make its cause more appealing to a larger pool of Islamic extremists and has gained access to global training resources and funding whilst on the other, Al Qaeda has found a new base to operate from after bowing to sustained international pressure in Iraq, Afganistan and Pakistan.Entry of Al Qaeda into Al Shabaab led to a fundamental transformation of the group. For instance, the ideological outlook of the group was re‐oriented outward from the internal failures of Somali society in adhering to the strict Islamic code to the portrayal of Somalia as a new front in the “global jihaad”. Internally the leadership of the group was also altered with the more radical elements especially those that had trained and fought with Al‐Qaeda in Afghanistancoming to the fore. In terms of tactics the group shifted from exlusively engaging military targets and begun training for and sanctioning

Hansen, S. J (2013) Al-Shabaab in Somalia. The History and Ideology of a Militant Isalmist Group 2005-2012. Hurst & Company, London. 83 Wise, R (2011), Al Shabaab, AQAM Futures Project Case Study Series No. 2 of 2011, CSIS available at http://csis.org/ les/publication/110715_Wise_ AlShabaab_AQAM%20Futures%20Case%20St udy_WEB.pdf [Retreived 16 November 2013]

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attacks on soft targets. Critically, the group's ideology was expanded to accommodate suicide attacks both within and without Somalia. Ayman al‐ Zawahiri, leader of Al‐Qaeda made the formal announcement linking the two groups in February 2012. Since then, the international identity of Al Shabaab has continued to grow. By 2011 at least 40 or more Americans have joined Shabaab of whom at least 15 have been killed either ﬁghting for or by the group. In addition, intelligence reports indicate that 3 Canadians and a number of UK 84 citizens are members of the group .Most of its ﬁghters are predominantly interested in the nationalist project and not entirely supportive of the global jihaad.

In 2011 East African leaders declared Al‐Shabaab a regional threat; Ethiopian, Kenyan troops entered Somalia to pursue the group. In October 2011 Kenyan forces moved into Somalia to counter cross‐border kidnappings and attacks by Al‐Shabaab. Al‐Shabaab steadily began losing ground in Somalia, and was weakened by a concerted military effort from a multi‐national African Union force and Somali government troops. Once they controlled large portions of the country; by 2013 they were only been able to carry out hit‐and‐run attacks in Somalia. The result was a fracturing within the group on how to re‐invigorate the fight for its objectives for a greater Somalia under its interpretation of strict Islamic law. Some Al‐Shabaab leaders wanted their fighters to operate within Somalia only, while others, like Mukhtar Abu Zubeyr, also known as Godane, pushed a more global Jihad or holy war. Al‐Shabaab militants still control large swathes of the hinterland areas especially in the Regions of Bay, Middle Jubba and Lower Shabelle. They are also resurgent in the Regions from which Ethiopian forces are withdrawing such as 86 Bakool and Hiraan . For instance, the group beheaded a religious leader in

CSIS (2013), The Future of Al-Qaeda; Results of a Foresight Project 85 These Regions fall under sector 2 of the AMISOM Force Posture to which KDF and Sierra Leone contingents have been billeted 86 These Regions fall under sector 3 where Ugandan and Burundian contingents have begun to move in to plug the gap left by the Ethiopian withdrawal. 87 Interview with AMISOM Force Commander, Lt. General Andrew Gutti, 25th March 2013. Also reported in Al-Shabaab Beheads Elderly Imam in Hudur http://allsomalia.com/AlShabaab-beheads-elderly-imam-in-hudur/ [Retreived 16th April 2013] 88 Interview with AMISOM sector 1 Contingent Commander, Brig Michael Ondoga, Mogadishu, 26th March 2013. 89 Interview with AMISOM spokesperson, Col. Ali, Mogadishu, 25th March 2013 90 Interview with Abdurahman Warsame, Mogadishu bureau chief, Xinhua news agency, Mogadishu, 22nd March 2013 91 Liberation of Merka has historical implications http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/pos t/3592/Liberation_of_Merka_Has_Historical_I mplications [Retrieved 28th March 2013] 92 Interview with AMISOM sector 1 Contingent Commander, Brig Michael Ondoga, Mogadishu, 26th March 2013. 93 Interviews with AMISOM sector 1 Contingent Commander, Brig Michael Ondoga, PIO Maj. Henry Obbo and Capt. Nasikilia (on leave from Baidoa) Mogadishu, 25th - 26th March 2013

Xudur, Bakool Region soon after Ethiopia's withdrawal . The group also 88

controls Baraawe port in Lower Shabelle, albeit at night . Baraawe has a small natural harbour from which agricultural produce and charcoal are exported. It is suspected that the militants may be receiving small shipments of arms from this entrepôt but respondents felt that this was highly unlikely given the 89 international anti‐pirate patrols operational in the area . It was reported that Al‐Shabaabare regrouping, recruiting and rebuilding their strength in the mainland as they are now training approximately 2000 militants in Dinsoor in the 90 southwestern Bay region . However, the group has suﬀered signiﬁcant setback such as the fall of Kisimayo to KDF in sector 2 and the capturing of 90 Marka seaport by the UPDF in sector 1 . These losses have severely curtailed the capacity of the group to raise revenues through external trade and all but paralyzed their ability to resupply arms and munitions. For instance, mortar and other medium calibre artillery attacks on AMISOM forces have dwindled to 93 almost none since the fall of these strategic sea ports .

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The Darker side of Al-Shabaab http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/pos t/3580 [Retrieved 28th March 2013] 95 Interview with Abdurahman Warsame, Xinhua news agency bureau chief Mogadishu 23rd March 2013. Corroborated in Libyan arms fueling warfare in Syria, Mali, Gaza Strip UN report http://rt.com/news/libya-arms-unreport-620/ [Retrieved 19th April 2013]

Distribution of AMISOM contigents in Somalia

Al‐Shabaabis now said to have resorted to criminal activity such as vehicle 94 hijackings and confiscation of private property in order to raise revenue . Al Shabbab is said to have received training from North Korea, Pakistani, Iran and former soviet republics which the locals believe they source their arms from. The instability and conflict that accompanied the Arab Spring in African states for instance Libya and Mali has provided the opportunity for arms flows to the militant group from these areas. Libyan ammunition has been found after 95 engagements with Al‐Shabaab . The flow in arms shipments to Al‐Shabaabis said to spike during the wet season staring in April for two reasons; One, the conventional AMISOM armies are bogged down by the impassable road network. Two, the wet (Gu') season coincides with heightened religious activity where Islamic extremists have the opportunity to infiltrate the country posing as tourists and pilgrims. They are then able to bring in telecommunication equipment, landmines and small arms to Al‐Shabaab.

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Al‐Shabaab sleeper cells and militants lurking in Mogadishu have adapted asymmetric tactics as means of survival. During the day they blend into the local population and hold normal occupations for instance as traders in Bekkara Market, the largest in Mogadishu and notorious for its trade in competitively 97 priced automatic weapons . They are also said to be in force at the local livestock markets where currency liquidity is high and hence the livestock trade could be an avenue of money‐laundering. However when activated they switch identities particularly in the evenings or at night and conduct attacks. In Kismayo, the survival of Al‐Shabaab is thought to be linked to the need by minority communities to counter the support that the Ogaden and Raas‐ Kambooni get from KDF.

In 2013 they attacked the Mogadishu court complex, killing more than 30. And two years after Kenyan troops deployed to Somalia to fight Al‐Shabaab and help pave the way for the first government in 20 years, Al‐Shabaab took its fight 98 to Kenya . The group finally made good on that threat 21 September 2013, when armed men stormed the Westgate mall in upscale Nairobi, killing over 76 people and injuring about 175. The Westgate Mall terrorist attack was an indication of the militant group's adaptive tactics including manipulation of Social Mediaand growing capabilities. 3.2.1.2Al‐Hijra (Muslim Youth Centre)

Known initially as the Pumwani Muslim Youth, the MYC was formally founded in 2008 in the Majengo slums bordering Eastleighas a small Muslim NGO in Nairobi. The MYC opened offices in Mombasa and Garissa. It has 96 Interview with Abdurahman Warsame, autonomous branches inside Somalia where it is an affiliate organization to the Mogadishu bureau chief, Xinhua news agency, Al‐Shabaab. Although it is not a militia in its own right, the organization has Mogadishu, 22nd March 2013. Broadly echoed 99 by AMISOM spokesperson, Col. Ali, Mogadishu, supplied recruits to Al Shabaab since 2009 . Members of the MYC members had 25th March 2013 already been travelling to Somalia to train and fight alongside Al‐Shabaab¹⁰⁰. 97 An AK-47 automatic ri e is said to retail for The two organisations begun been cooperating in planning terrorist attacks approximately USD 300 in Bekarra market. Informal interviews with Mohamed Fanah, across East Africa over the same period.Like Al‐Shabaab, Al‐Hijra's jihadist local guide Mogadishu, 22nd - 25th April 2013 origins intersect with the Al Qaeda network responsible for the 1998 US 98 Nzes, F (2012) Terrorist Attacks in Kenya embassy bombings and the 2002 Mombasa attacks. In early 2010, the MYC Reveal Domestic Radicalization in CTC Sentinel begun to openly operate in Kenya, helping to organise street protests against Vol. 5 Issue 10 (October 2012) 99 the arrest of an extremist Muslim preacher from Jamaica, Abdallah al‐Feisal, and One of the earliest known MYC members killed while ghting inside Somalia was the launch of a video message entitled Nairobi Tutafika, which advocated the Muhammad Juma Rajab, also known by his expansion of 'jihad' to Kenya, declared support for Al‐Shabaab, and featured nom de guerre Qa'qa, who died during an alimages of the recently deceased Kenyan Al‐Qaeda figure, Saleh Ali Saleh Shabab ambush of an Ethiopian convoy in the Nabhan. summer of 2008 at Bardaale near the western Somali city of Baidoa Anzalone, C (2012) Kenya's Muslim Youth Center and Al-Shabab's East African Recruitment in CTC Sentinel Vol. 5 Issue 10 (October 2012) 100 These included the ideologues of the group such as Ahmed Iman Ali and Sheikh Aboud Rogo who relocated to Somalia to lead the MYC's armed wing in the Juba Valley. 101 CSIS (2013) Op. Cit 102 For instance, in April 2012, Samir Khan Abu Nuseyba , a senior Al-Hijra cleric and AlShabaab advocate based in Mombasa, was found mutilated and murdered following his abduction from a public taxi, together with an associate, Mohamed Kassim Bekhit.

Reports indicate that at least two Al‐Hijra cells began operating in Kenya in late 2011, exploring possible targets in Nairobi while seeking access to arms and explosives¹⁰¹. In January 2012, Al‐Shabaab officially announced the appointment of Ahmed Iman as its representative in Kenya, effectively merging the two organizations. The KDF intervention intoSomalia broke the momentum of the MYC/Al‐Shabbab alliance by pushingAl‐Shabaab militia further away from the Kenyan border and forcing the abandonment of training camps previously used by Al‐Shabaab and Al‐Hijra. Simultaneously, a number of Al‐Hijra figures were either arrested or killed, disrupting the group's networks and planning¹⁰². At the international level, the United Nations Security Council singled out Sheikh

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Aboud Rogo for targeted sanctions; speciﬁcally a travel ban and assets freeze 103 on 25 July 2012 . Rogo was killed a month late in an ambush in Mombasa. Al‐ Shabaab immediately released a statement condemning his murder, and stating that although Rogo had not oﬃcially been a member of Al‐Shabaab, he had shared religious ties with the group.

The UN Security Council had also designated Abubakar Sharif “Makaburi”, a 104 known associate of Rogo for targeted Sanctions . Makaburi surrendered to the Kenyan authorities to stand trial rather a week after Rogo's death. The death and detention of the Al‐Hijraleadershipdisrupted its momentum and diluted its ideological authority. Al‐Hijra responded to these setbacks with a low‐ level with a number of grenade and improvised explosive device (IED) attacks in the Kenyan capital during the course of 2012. The leader of the group, Ahmed Iman Ali, remains at largebuilding his reputationas as an international jihadist leader. The members of of Al‐Hijra who have undergone training and experienced combat in Somalia between 2008 and 2013 may return to Kenya or travel to other East African countries, especially Tanzania, where they enjoy close ties to the Ansar Muslim Youth Centre (AMYC) to regroup. 3.2.1.3 Ansaar Muslim Youth Centre (AMYC)

The Ansaar Muslim Youth Centre (AMYC) in Tanzania is headed by Sheikh Salim Abdulrahim Barahiyan and like Al‐Hijra, has been linked to Al Qaeda since 105 the 1990s and developing ties with Al‐Shabaab .Formed in the 1970s, as the Tanzanian Muslim Youth Union (UVIKITA), the organisation was renamed AMYC in 1988 for the purpose of propagating Salafi Islam. In the late 1990s, the 103 Declassi ed sections of the UNMG report AMYC began to drift toward radicalism, apparently through its association with linking Rogo to the Al Shabaab is available at the Saudi‐based charitable foundation Al‐Haramayn, which provided funding to http://www.somaliareport.com/downloads/U the AMYC. The head of Al‐Haramayn's Tanzanian office between 1997 and 2003 N_REPORT_2012.pdf [Retreived 17 November 106 2013] was reportedly an Algerian known as Laid Saidi .In the aftermath of the 1998 104 Complete Monitoring group report available US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, both Abu Huzhaifa and Al‐ at 107 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?sy Haramayn's Tanzanian office were accused of links to terrorism . Abu Huzhaifa mbol=S/2013/440 [Retreived 17 November was arrested and deported by the Tanzanian authorities in 2003 and a year later, 2013] the Al‐Haramayn office in Tanzania was designated by the UNSC as an affiliate of 105 CSIS (2013) Op. Cit 108 106 Al‐Qaeda and closed . A.k.a. Abu Huzhaifa a.k.a. Ramzi ben Mizauni ben Fraj Shinn, David (2004) Fighting Terrorism in East Africa and the Horn, Foreign Service Journal, September, 2004 http://elliott.gwu.edu/assets/docs/research/Shi nn.pdf [Retreived 17 November 2013] also The East African (2004), Saudi Charity Plotted to Bomb Zanzibar Hotels, US Charges http://allafrica.com/stories/200401270645.htm l [Retreived 17 November 2013] 108 UN listing of Al Qaeda linked organizations http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/NSQE 10604E.shtml [Retreived 17 November 2013] 109 Nur Abubakar Maulana (a.k.a. Abu Maulana ) and Omar Suleiman. CSIS (2013) Op. Cit 110 BBC News (2012) Tanzania arrests man over recent Nairobi attack http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa18426049 [Retreived 17 November 2013] 107

According to the United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, following the closing of Al‐Haramayn's Tanzanian office, at least seven former employees of Al‐Haramayn joined the AMYC. Two of these individuals, reportedly became acquainted with Aboud Rogo during their service with Al‐ 109 Haramayn . Through this connection, AMYC recruits were routinely sent to study in Kenya at institutions associated with Rogo and the MYC/Al‐ Hijra.Between 2006 and 2011, “Abu Maulana” and other prominent AMYC figures travelled regularly to Somalia to take fight in the jihaad taking with them numerous recruits. However, compared with MYC/Al‐Hijra, the input of AMYC to the war in Somalia wasnegligible. Far more important wasthe use of Tanzania as a safe haven and base for planning operations elsewhere in the region. In June 2012, Tanzanian police arrested a German national of Turkish origin, Emrah 110 Erdogan, on suspicion of being a member of Al‐Shabaab and suspected 111

involvement in a May 2012 bombing in Nairobi that injured over 30 people . Police were led to Erdogan by his communications with Al‐Hijra operatives in

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Kenya and Tanzania who were themselves linked to Al‐Shabaab and actively involved in planning operations in East Africa.

As Al‐Shabaab steadily loses ground inside Somalia and the presence of Kenyan Defence Forces on the Kenya‐Somali border makes movement between the two countries increasingly diﬃcult, a growing number of ﬁghters from Al‐ Shabaab, Al‐Hijra and AMYC have begun to make the journey by sea to Tanzania. This means that it could emerge as a secondary hub of jihadist activity in East 112 Africa . 3.1.2.4Ahlu Sunna Wal‐Jama'a (ASWJ)

The ASWJ is a political, social, and militant group aligned with TFG and Ethiopian forces. They support Ethiopian operations against Al‐Shabaab, and find their support in Somalia's Sufi population. The ASWJ had approximately 4,500 fighters as of 2011. The TFG and ASWJ signed an agreement on March 15, 2010, that gave the militia control of certain ministries, diplomatic posts and other key positions. The Ethiopian government and ASWJ leadership freely admit that Ethiopia provides training to ASWJ fighters. The specific nature of this training is unclear.

Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a, or ASWJ, are a Suﬁ Somali militia trained and supported by the Ethiopian government, conducts operations against Al‐ Shabaab in Somalia to indirectly support Ethiopian security interests on its southern border. ASWJ, however, is only loosely aﬃliated with the Somali government and its security forces, further contributing to diverse clan‐based militias vice a centralized national‐security apparatus.

By the end of 2008, rival Islamist militia groups began to confront Al‐ Shabaab. Ahlu‐Sunna wal‐Jama, a Suﬁ brotherhood of moderate Islamists, called in late December for a government of national unity and attacked Al‐ Shabaab militias in Mogadishu. The desecration of grave markers by Al‐Shabaab followers may have contributed to this conﬂict. Ahlu‐ Sunna wal‐Jama also took control of two towns in central Somalia controlled by Al‐Shabaab, including Ayro's stronghold of Dusa Mareb.

During the fighting, groups used small arms such as AK‐47s, PKM machine‐ guns, RPGs, anti‐tank weapons, and 60mm mortars. In addition to the use of “technicals,” the ASWJ also utilized armored personnel carriers (APC) during the fight in Dusa Mareb, which it acquired from the Somali national army after it collapsed. Al‐Shabaab had more PKMs and 60mm mortars at its disposal, but the group lacked mobility and resiliency, which contributed to its losses. Furthermore, relying on the use of mortars in populated areas in both Dusa Mareb and in Guraceel had a negative effect on popular support. In addition to the use of APCs, ASWJ was able to defeat the better‐trained and numbered Al‐ Shabaab forces through more effective military tactics.

111

Capital News (2012), 2 people wanted over Nairobi bombing http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2012/05/2people-wanted-over-nairobi-bombing/ [Retreived 17 November 2013] 112 CSIS (2013) Op. Cit

ASWJ reacted violently after Al‐Shabaab challenged their form of worship and assassinated approximately 40 prominent personalities who had questioned the way they were ruling the region. While forces loyal to al‐ Shabaab received support from the population due to their prior resistance to the Ethiopian occupation, there were signs that Somalis — at least in Galgaduud region and in Mogadishu — hade grown weary of their presence. This was

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manifest in the decision of Galgaduud's clans and traditional Suﬁ shaykhs to throw their support behind the ASWJ.

Sufism had been in Somalia's religious landscape since Islam first came to sub‐Saharan Africa centuries ago. Organized Sufi groups in Somalia had rarely been involved in politics, except for the anti‐colonial wars of the 19th century where they played a major role. In modern Somalia, Sufi religious organizations — such as the ASWJ — had been most active carrying out religious affairs within their communities. Only in mid‐2008 did the ASWJ begin to constitute as a fighting force.

In terms of numbers, ASWJ could call on more armed ﬁghters than Al‐ Shabaab, but they were not as disciplined or well‐trained. The ASWJ's poor training was a result of its ﬁghters being drawn from clan militias, whose members usually do not have formal military training. ASWJ came out in support of Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Ahmad's new unity government. In June 2010, the Somali government appointed a new cabinet. The new cabinet includes members of Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaa, who signed an agreement with the TFG a few months earlier. 3.1.2.5 The Supreme Islamic Courts Union / al‐Ittihad Mahakem al‐Islamiya (ICU)

The collapse of Siad Barre's regime in 1991 created a power struggle between local Somali warlords and Islamic militia leaders. Since the collapse, the rule of law had mainly been maintained by various Islamic courts, instituting "Sharia" (Islamic) law, much like in Afghanistan prior to the fall of the Taliban in 2001. They banned anything associated with Western culture (i.e. music, movies) and even disallowed people from watching the World Cup. Violators had known to be publicly executed. These Islamic militias gained popularity amongst their separate clans in Somalia by providing educational and medical services that became unavailable without a central government. In 2000, 11 of the clans that held these courts decided to consolidate their power. They formed the Supreme Islamic Courts Union (al‐Ittihad Mahakem al‐Islamiya and known by the acronym ICU). Their stated goal was to make Somalia a peaceful and stable Islamic State. The majority of Somalis were Sunni Muslims.

The ICU was a creation of al‐Ittihad al‐Islamiya (AIAI), a group formed in 1984 from al‐Jamma al‐Islamiya and Wahdat Al‐Shabaab al‐Islam. The latter groups were created in the 1960's during the rise of Sayyid Qutb and his radical anti‐ Western writing about militant Islam. For decades these groups, with the help of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF, an ethnically‐Somali Ethiopian separatist group), had carried out cross‐border attacks against Ethiopian forces. The ICU was established in 2000 after AIAI suﬀered signiﬁcant losses during direct confrontations with Ethiopian forces. AIAI was believed to be a supporter of Al‐ Qaeda and was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the US State Department.

Although the presence of diﬀerent clans stood as a potential obstacle to its survival, the ICU's popularity and strength grew since its inception. The ICU's main opposition was the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), formed in Nairobi in October 2004 by warlords supported by Ethiopia and a largely‐ assumed CIA‐backed group known as the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace

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and Counter‐Terrorism (ARPCT). It had also been speculated that the ICU had been funded by Ethiopia's adversary Eritrea, while the ARCPT had received aid from American ally Djibouti.

The Chairman and de facto spokesman for the ICU, as of October 2006, was Sheik Sharif Ahmed. However, Ahmed was viewed as a moderate and might not have had much power within the ICU. Ahmed's militant deputies, Sheik Hassan Dahir Aweys and Sheik Adan Hashi Ayro, organized the attacks on Mogadishu in June 2006 and were presumed to be more powerful. Aweys, a former AIAI leader, was the Secretary‐General of the ICU and was designated as a terrorist by the US State Department and the United Nations in 2001. Ayro, also a former AIAI leader, was trained in Afghanistan and fought in the Soviet‐Afghan War. He was charged in absentia by a Somaliland court for the murder of 4 foreign aid workers in 2003.

In May 2006, heavy fighting broke out in Mogadishu between the non TFG‐ affiliated Supreme Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and TFG warlords hoping to curry favor with the United States by fighting against supposed terrorist supporters. The ICU was formed in 2000 by former members of al‐Ittihad al‐Islamiya (AIAI), a group that fought along with the ethnically‐Somali Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). AIAI and OLF forces sought the secession of the Ogaden region from Southern Ethiopia. The TFG warlords, and a group known as the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter‐Terrorism (ARPCT), were widely believed to be receiving money from America. In June 2006, the ICU seized control of Mogadishu and much of the Southern Somalia. As the Islamic Courts Union militias try to extend their control in Somalia, there are conflicting views about the ICU's governing style and objectives. Some said it brought calm to a troubled country, while others suggest links to terrorist groups. As of October 2006, the ICU controlled the majority of Southern Somalia. Semi‐autonomous Somaliland and Puntland remained in control of their respective regions in the north. A concerted offensive by forces of the TFG along with Ethopian military between December 2006 and January 2007 effectively dispersed the ICU. The militant component, known as Al‐Shabaab, continued the fight against TFG and foreign forces. 3.2.1.6Hizbul Islam

Hizbul Islam was formed in January 2009 by a merger of four groups; ARS‐A, Jabhatul Islamiya, Ras Kamboni Brigade and Harti clan's militia. The groups had initially taken part in the Islamist Insurgency against Ethiopia and the TFG as part of the ARS that included a Djibouti division led by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. In December 2010, Hizbul merged into Al‐Shabaab but re‐separated in September 2012 due to long‐standing ideological diﬀerences, such as the group's opposition to the use of foreign jihadists.

Sheikh Omar Imam Abu Bakar was the ﬁrst leader of Hizbul Islam, however in April 2009 he was ousted and replaced by Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys who accused Abu Bakar of being too moderate. Aweys co‐led the Islamic Courts Union in 2006 with Sheikh Sharif Ahmed. Sheikh Aweys was trained in al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan during the 1990's and is on the US most‐wanted list for his involvement in Itihaad al‐Islamiya, (Islamic Union), and its support of the Al Qaeda‐perpetrated bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. He is also on the United Nation's terrorist sanctions list for his ties to Al

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Qaeda. In June 2013, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys was arrested by government forces in Mogadishu, although it is still unclear whether he defected from Al‐ Shabaab or surrendered.

Hizbul Islam's ideology has changed over time. Hizbul Islam's ultimate goals has been to topple the Transitional Federal Government, implement shariah law, and rid Somalia of AU troops According to Aweys, the African Union Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia is the true 'enemy of the Somali people.' The group believes in emulating the first three generations of Muhammad's followers. They consider anyone that deviates from their interpretation as an apostate and have therefore targeted Somali's Sufi population. More recently the group has attempted to align their goals with Al‐Shabaab to create an Islamic state based off of a strict implementation of sharia law. Another sign in the shift of ideology has included attacking Somali media networks.

Much like Al‐Shabaab, Hizbul Islam benefits from piracy along the Somali coast. The group receives monetary benefits and resources from pirates; for example, in the coastal town of Xarardheere, elder pirates agreed to split their ransoms with Hizbul Islam and Al‐Shabaab. In addition, the group receives funding through 'fida' (Islamic ransom) and 'zakat' (Islamic charity). The group attempted to control the piracy and ransom market in Haradhere after it evolved into a "stock exchange,' complete with ransom brokers, especially after they lost control of the southern port of Kismayo to Al‐Shabaab in 2009. Pirates seize ships and crews after which they negotiate payments, which served as an opportunity for Hizbul Islam to dominate the market and impose harbor taxes to gain revenue.

Up until mid‐2012, Hizbul Islam and Al‐Shabaab control southern and much of central Somalia including Lower Jubba, Middle Jubba, Lower Shabelle, Gedo, Bay, Bakool along with parts of the capital, Mogadishu. By August 2012, Al‐ Shabaab forces began withdrawing from Mogadishu, due to pressure from African Union and Kenyan forces.

Hizbul Islam has used numerous strategies to challenge the leadership of the TFG and has openly embraced the use of suicide bombing as a tactic to rid Somalia of AU forces. In addition, the group engages in the raiding of towns, shootings, and assassination of TFG leaders.

After its formation in 2009, Hizbul Islam leader Sheikh Aweys stated that he "welcomed" mediation between his groups and former ally Sheikh Sharif. He stated that their diﬀerences were "not personal, but based on principles." The Somali Government led by Sheikh Sharif Ahmed has attempted to bring members of Hizbul Islam into the government, but Aweys has refused to join. In June 2013, Aweys signaled his interest in participating in talks with the government; however, he was arrested upon arrival at Mogadishu airport and currently remains under government custody.

ninety days after its formation, Hizbul Islam split into two factions. On March 24, 2009 an opposition group led by Yusuf Mohammed Siad Indho Ade denounced Omar Iman as chairman of the group. Such disputes led to the group splitting in two, with Indho Ade leading one group and Hassan Aweys leading the other. On May 17, 2009 Indho Ade's group defected to the Transitional Government, only to defect again in 2010 over disagreements with the

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government. Increased tensions over defection occurred in January 2010 when one Ras Kamboni movement leader Madobe was accused of joining Ahlu Sunna Walijama.

Ras Kamboni Brigade was one of the four groups that merged to form Hizbul Islam. However, in February 2010 the group, with an estimated number of 500‐ 1,000 fighters, left Hizbul Islam and merged with Al‐Shabaab. The group released a statement announcing that it had joined Al Qaeda's affiliate in Somalia, signed by the founder and leader of Ras Kamboni Brigade, Sheikh Hassan Turki, and the leader of Al‐Shabaab, Ahmed Abdi Godane. According to Sheikh Turki, Ras Kamboni Brigade severed ties with Hizbul Islam to join Al‐ Shabaab as a measure of unification amongst mujahideen. The Kamboni rebel group and Al‐Shabaab contended that they should put their differences aside to join Al Qaeda's international jihad.

Hizbul Islam has had an unstable and constantly changing relationship with Al‐Shabaab. However, the relationship between the two groups unraveled as they fought one another in the southern port of Kismayo. Tensions escalated as taxes collected at the port of Kismayo are an important source of funding for both groups. Hizbul Islam troops led by Ahmed Madobe were forced to leave.Much like Al‐Shabaab, Hizbul Islam has also forged a relationship with Al Qaeda, though the group was at ﬁrst against foreign interference foreign jihadists to come to Somalia. Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama, a pro‐government Suﬁ Islamist militia that controls several regions in central Somalia, also clashes with Hizbul Islam and Al‐Shabaab. Ahlu Sunnah has fought Hizbul Islam in the town of Beledweyne in the Hiran region near the border with Ethiopia, freeing the city from the control of Hizbul Islam. Ahlu Sunnah also clashed against Al‐Shabaab and Hizbul Islam at Wabho village in the Galgudad region of Central Somalia, after which some believed Sheikh Aweys had been injured.

LikeAl‐Shabaab, Hizbul Islam considers itself a protector of the Somali people. Yet Hizbul Islam's true motives are unclear, as a pirate from Haradhere claimed that Hizbul Islam demanded a share of the piracy trade. In the past, Dahir Aweys has emphasized the importance of maintaining the support of the people. He criticized his members for extorting money from civilians. However, tribal rivalries have aﬀected Hizbul Islam's relationship with communities. For example, Ras Kamboni and Anole, two factions of Hizbul Islam that overtook Kismayo in 2008, are members of the Darod sub‐clan who have a tumultuous history with Marehans, the locally dominant group in Kismayo. Such tribal tensions led the Marehans to align themselves with Al‐Shabaab over Hizbul Islam. 3.1.2.7The Ras Kamboni Movement

The Ras Kamboni Movement is a splinter group from the Ras Kamboni Brigade, led by Sheikh Ahmed Mohammad Islam Madobe. Better known as Sheikh Madobe, he decided to leave the Ras Kamboni Brigade faction of Hizbul Islam after they the group abandoned Hizbul Islam to merge with Al‐Shabaab in February 2010. The Ras Kamboni Movement has allied itself with the AU's mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Kenyan and Somali government forces, although some Somali government oﬃcials deny ever having cooperated with the Ras Kamboni Movement. In October 2012, this group successfully pushed Al‐ Shabaab out of the strategic port city of Kismayo.

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The Ras Kamboni Movement's leader, Sheikh Madobe, is fervently opposed to Al‐Shabaab and his stated goal is to chase away Al‐Shabaab from Kismayo, the capital of the lower Jubba region. From 2006 until the Ethiopian overthrow of the ICU, Sheikh Madobe was the governor of Kismayo. After gaining back control of Kismayo from Al‐Shabaab last year, Madobe has laid claim to the presidency of the Jubba region.

The Ras Kamboni Movement is purportedly supported by the Kenyan government. It fights alongside Kenyan forces that are part of the AU's mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Kenya supports the Ras Kamboni Movement because they most likely want the border region of Jubbaland to act as a security buffer between Kenya and Somalia. This has led to tensions between the Somali Federal Government and the Kenyan government; in June 2013, Somalia's President warned the Kenyan President that if Kenya continued to give clandestine support to Sheikh Madobe, “it would lead to the deterioration of relations between the two countries.” Furthermore, the Somali government has accused Kenya of infringing its national sovereignty in the Jubbalands by granting offshore oil permits to Western companies in Somalia's waters.

The Ras Kamboni Movement has had a rivalry with Al‐Shabaab since its inception; the group was formed by Sheikh Madobe who defected from the Ras Kamboni Brigade when they left Hizbul Islam to join Al‐Shabaab. According to a spokesman from the Ras Kamboni Movement, the group considers Al‐Shabaab “to be the greatest threat” to Somalia. In early 2010, the two groups began to clash over towns in the lower Jubba region, such as Afmadow and Dobley. It is then rumored that Sheikh Madobe fled to Kenya after losing these towns to Al‐ Shabaab, although a spokesman from the Ras Kamboni Movement denied these claims. In October 2011, the Ras Kamboni Movement re‐captured the town of Ras Kamboni from Al‐Shabaab, with the help of Kenyan defense forces. Ras Kamboni is a strategic site along the Kenyan border that has, in the past, hosted terrorist training camps. It is also a jumping‐off point for raids and excursions onto the coast of Kenya. In November 2011, the Ras Kamboni Movement claimed a strategic victory over Al‐Shabaab in the border Jubba regions. With the help of the Kenyan army, the Ras Kamboni fighters were able to seize weapons and supplies from Al‐Shabaab bases in Tabta and Afmadow. In October 2012, the Ras Kamboni Movement successfully pushed Al‐Shabaab out of Kismayo, with the help of AMISOM, Kenyan, and Somali government forces. These different groups, however, are still vying over control of the city; in July 2013, it was uncovered that the KDF and the Ras Kamboni Movement had worked out a deal to divide the revenues from Kismayo's seaport between themselves.

Ethiopia is nervous about Ras Kamboni's activities in Kismayo, since it is a strategically important region that could provide Ethiopia with access to the Indian Ocean. Ethiopia is wary about the new administration run by the Ras Kamboni Movement who, in the past, has allied itelf with the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF). Madobe, as well as many other residents of Jubbaland, are from the Ogaden clan that also are the majority clan in the Ogaden region of Eastern Ethiopia that borders the Jubbaland. Ethiopia worries that if the new administration in Kismayo becomes too powerful, ONLF rebels will increase their demands on Ethiopia with the backing of the Ras Kamboni Movement.

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3.1.2.8 Alliance for the Re‐Liberation of Somalia (ARS)

ARS was an Islamist formed in 2007 when members of the Islamic Courts Union met Somali Opposition leaders in Asmara Eritrea to oppose the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The group had about 191 members and 10 members of the Executive Committee.The central committee was chaired by Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, the former ICU leader while the Executive committee was headed by Sheikh Sharif Ahmad. Other top leaders included the former TFG speaker of Parliament Sharif Hassan and the former TFG Deputy Prime Minister Hussein Farah. The Alliance aimed at removing the Ethiopian backed government either through negotiations or by force. In May 2008, the group split. The former ICU leader felt that he did not hold a formal position in the Alliance and this led to ﬁghts within the Alliance. Between May and June the same year, the Somalia Transitional Federal Government and the Alliance held peace agreement in Djibouti to terminate all acts of armed confrontation. ARS also agreed to cease and condemn all acts of violence and to disassociate itself 113 from any armed group. Sh. Sharif Ahmad and the former TFG Deputy Prime minister welcomed the Idea but Hussein Aweys, the former ICU leader denied claiming that no one authorized the Alliance to hold peace agreements.

113

In 2009, the Peace agreement resulted to the formation of a new Transitional Government and expansion of the parliament where Sh. Sharif Ahmad was elected the president. The United Nations also agreed to deploy an international 114 security force to stabilize the situation in the state. After the Djibouti peace agreement, Aweys, the former ICU leader (the real power), ﬂew back to his base in Asmara Eritrea to regroup. Four major rebel groups; ARS, the Ras Kamboni Brigades, Jabhatul Islamiya and Muaskar Anole joined to form a new group called Hizbul Islam. Aweys said that unless the Ethiopian government withdrew and left the country, he would not agree to the peace agreement. The Ethiopian troops left Somalia but Aweys still claimed that Sharif's government was an instrument of International Community. Hizbul Islam vowed to ﬁght 115 Sharif government claiming that it was supported by Ethiopian government.

In April 2009, Sheikh Hassan Aweys returned to Somalia. He settled in Mogadishu and declared a war against AMISOM. He refused to meet Sheikh 116 Sharif accusing that he was not elected by the people of Somalia. In May 2009, there was a battle in Mogadishu (Battle of Mogadishu) between Hizbul Islam and Al‐Shabaab. The two groups tried to gain territories in the State's region while trying to topple Sh. Sharif's government. Al‐Shabaab captured more territories but failed to overthrow the government. In October 2009, the two groups Hizbul Islam and Al‐Shabaab again fought in Kismayu (The Kismayo 117 Battle). Hizbul Islam was defeated, forced to surrender and join Al‐Shabaab. In 2010, Hizbul Islam and Al‐Shabaab had come under one umbrella of Al‐ Shabaab.

The agreement between the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and The Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) http://unpos.unmissions.org/Portals/UNPOS/R epository%20UNPOS/080818%20%20Djibouti%20Agreement.pdf 114 AMISOM African Union Mission IN Somalia, Somali/Djibouti Peace Process http://amisomau.org/about-somalia/somali-peace-process/ 115 The Free Library by FARLEX Byline: Daily Star Stu , Accessed in April 2013. http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Hardline+Som ali+opposition+leader+arrives+in+Mogadishu +on+...-a0198377608 116 BBC News, Somalia's Kingmaker Returns, by Mohamed Mohamed 28 April 2009; Accessed in 2013 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8020548.stm 117 DEMOTIX, Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam o cially Join Together, by Abdul A 21 December 2010; Accessed in April 2013 http://www.demotix.com/news/546834/AlShabaab-and-hizbul-islam-o cially-jointogether#media-546815

3.1.2.9Somalia and the Caliphate Project: An Analytical Note The realm between the Kenya Somali frontier is evolving to converge local, state‐region and global security threats. Over time, the space has mutated, from hosting organized contraband, traﬃcking and foreign ﬁghter conduits into Al Shabaab ‐ Al Qaeda ranks to a critical forward base for a broad asymmetrical

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strategy aiming at setting up a caliphate project. It has evolved into a launching pad for local, regional and global confrontations that are both mutually reinforcing and apparently separate. Underpinning this, are the mutations that Al Shabaab has undergone in space over time. From its radical roots as Al‐Ittihad al Islami (Islamic union) established by returning Somali Mujahideens like Ahmed Abdi Godane (Mukhtar Abu Zuber) who took over as its northern leader with links to Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda to its subsequent strategic alliance with other radical groups to form the Islamic Courts Union (ICU).

ICU eventually brought to an end the era of the warlords in Somalia. ICU's over throw by Ethiopian forces mediated its third mutation. This saw elements like Ahmed Abdi Godane and Aden Hashi Farah form Al Shabaab. The former is its current leader. Subsequent to this overthrow, Al Shabaab pledged loyalty to Osama Bin Laden. It equally broadcasted its broad objective to be the setting up of an Islamic caliphate. In one of his interviews on Al Jazeera, Sheikh Muktar Robow (Abu Mansur) elaborated on operationalization of this objective through sequenced steps that would lead to the overrunning of Kenya and Tanzania. What Robow was articulating derived from Osama Bin Laden's for grand objectives; Objective 1: Expel American influence from Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula; Objective 2: Remove secular governments within the region; Objective 3: Eliminate Israel and purge Jewish and Christian influence; Objective 4: Expand the Muslim empire to historical significance.

While the base as Al Qaeda is known, sought to remain just that, this projects' operationalization was to be realized through the capture and consolidation of control over local spaces characterized by either state absence or abstinence. These would be eventually used for attracting local, regional recruitments for training and indoctrination of recruits within the said space. Once the state is eventually captured, regional elements advance forward to their respective local spaces to repeat the capture of state. In the mean time what appears as local diﬀerentiated contestations evolve ungovernable regionalized local spaces tying together state and region in a web of twin security and insecurity dilemmas. In his conception, Fazul, Abdullar Mohamed, Al Qaeda's point man in East Africa, saw the operationalizing of this to lie with the destabilization of Kenya. Just as his counterpart in North Africa, the Algeria based emir Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud advised Ansar Eddine commanders of Al Qaeda in the Maghreb after they seized control of Northern Mali after cannibalizing the National Movement for the liberation of Azaward.

For Fazul, the fall of Kenya, given its' geostrategic position in the region would destabilize the region thus facilitating the broad objective of Al Qaeda. Maximizing on the variables of space and time, Fazul retreated in space to create time by embedding himself in Siyu Islands. Setting himself out as an alternative state, Fazul set out to respond to prevailing social insecurities providing a well and a Mosque to the Island's inhabitants. Filling the void left by state absence, Fazul was not only integrated but that he also took advantage of 118 this to set up networks for his future operations in Kenya and Somalia . 118 Maximizing on time, Fazul penetrated far‐ﬂung state administrative and See also Marc Lacey: Why a Village Well is a weapon in the War on terror. April 30th, 2004. emigration structures not only to acquire an identity card and business http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/30/world/Si networks but also to eventually use them as his platforms for his three yu-journal-why-a-village-well is-a-Weaponoperations ‐ the 1998 August 7 bombing of US embassies in Kenya and Dar es in-the war-onSalaam and the 2002 twin operations at the Kenyan Coast (bombing of an Israeli‐ terror.html?ref=fazulabdullahmohammed owned hotel and an attempt to bring down an Israeli‐owned plane taking oﬀ from the Moi International airport.

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These networks along the coast and through Kenya's North Eastern Province will outlast combined Kenya ‐ US eﬀorts to continue supplying Al Shabaab with global and local recruits. More fundamental, it played a critical role in diminishing the probity and competence of Kenyan internal security structures especially the police and immigration. For instance, despite attempts at capturing Fazul, he escaped with the help of his ability to corrupt and though leaked intelligence. Identiﬁcation papers have continued to be acquired by suspects to traverse the state. By maximizing on ungoverned spaces in Somalia and the apparent state abstinence in some parts of North Eastern and Indian Ocean Islands, Fazul helped Al Shabaab prepare for a long duree engagement with Kenya through out administration of the state.

Despite his death in an ambush, his allies seem to have kept faith in the broad project. Acting a long the principle of a potato onion, Al Shabaab has evolved to converge nationalists, federalist, global jihadists and their regional components. This ensures that the more it is 'peeled' oﬀ by pressure, the more its most radical core emerges pure and ready to infect the eyes of those against it. By 2005, the group had morphed to realize its regional project in a bid to support the establishment of the Caliphate project. For instance, it played a critical role in helping to train Nigeria's Boko Haram. In addition, it enhanced the recruitment of youth from Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. In Kenya, the recruitment was under the banner of Muslim Youth Center (MYC) in 119 Pumwani . The Kenyan branch assumed the name Al Hijra under the leadership of Sheikh Ahmed Imam Ali. Among its top leadership are Maalim Abass Guyo, Ahmed Imam Ali, and Jan Mohamed Khan (Abu Musab Al Mombasa). This set of leaders soon reconstituted cells in Kenya from their initial forward bases in North Eastern to Mombasa and Nairobi. What is notable is the fact that within a period of almost a year, the North Eastern province has evolved as a favorable space of Al Shabaab assymetrical war linked to Nairobi and the Coastal city of Mombasa in terms of interrelated but mutating forms of violence.

Unlike other groups that deploy terrorism at a tactical level, Al Shabaab retains a high level of ﬂexibility that allows it to withdraw into space and switch to raw terrorism before switching back to classical guerrilla nationalist resistance that also includes taking and holding territory. Its most innovative ability is the emerging ability to converge and project a Somali nationalistic identity while in Somalia, regional identity through Kenyan‐based regional and local enablers once in Kenya, hence its apparent ability to operate on both Kenyan and Somali sides of the border despite the presence of Kenyan Defense Forces and internal security units. This process is enabling it to sustain itself by recruiting and accessing capital through activities ranching from laundering, drug traﬃcking and poaching. Helping to enhance their activities is the dynamic of distance decay rooted in state design and subsequent policies of marginalization.

Al Shabaab and its local aﬃliate have continued to build on this to consolidate a favorable space. Such a space anchors cost and utility seesaw rationalities that mediates their selection of targets and decision to strike. Costs in space are conceived in terms of net cost of mitigations to constraints that militate against their intended actions in a geographical space including their 119 He graduated from Jomo Kenyatta University eﬀorts to enhance constraints to government security activities. Constraints of Science and Technology a degree in here include square mileage of the geographical space plus obstacles plus engineering . sanctuaries, plus information, communication, technology and transport.

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Obstacles here include both natural and man‐made features that have the ability to slow down, impede, divert or stop movement. These can be structured in four clusters. These are physical geography/topography, demography, infrastructure and weather. In North Eastern Kenya, the physical geography characteristics include, the vegetation that allows concealment of agents and cache of arms. Its geopolitical positioning close to the collapsed state of Somalia and both the Middle East and Afghanistan, allows it to converge and broadcast the reality of ongoing asymmetrical contests that pity radical Islamists and the US led coalition. It also facilitates the nurturing of networks that allow movement of logistics and person from across theatres of contestation in Afghanistan, Yemen and Iraq.

Constraints in the infrastructure here include the nature of nomadic settlements, which facilitate inﬁltration and concealment. The urban settlements are no better for the state. In reality, the nature of security organization is such that it is an obstacle for the state security agents. In the demographic realm, obstacles include ethnic and clan structures formation. Given the apparent distance decay and polarities that reﬂect identity‐based politics in Kenya, Al Shabaab has sought to exploit the same in a bid to sharpen polarities in its favor. As it is, given the extent of state penetration in the society, three categories can be discerned. There are those on the side of the state, neutrals, and the few active sympathizers. Neutrality and alignment to the latter is a negative to the state. Obstacles when maximized upon can be transformed or used to enhance sanctuaries. Sanctuaries here can be economic, political or social.

Economic sanctuaries include poverty, massive unemployment and corruption. There are also other sanctuaries such as smuggling networks. These range from those smuggling sugar, to those involved in wildlife traﬃcking. In all these Al Shabaab has been involved. With poachers hitting sanctuaries as far as Tsavo east and West, and Laikipia Kenya lost over 152 elephants. 52 have been 120 lost this year alone . That Al Shabaab has penetrated this sector implies that it is not only sabotaging the tourism industry but also raising capital. In eﬀect, it is undermining the state from within by degenerating the state agents probity and competence.

These have the eﬀect of animating the demand side of terrorism and other bandit activities. Political sanctuaries range from organizational logic of political and administrative institutions' mode of organization. Depending on whether they are inclusive or exclusive, modes of organization may engender development of parallel ones that host asymmetrical actors. Dynamics such as exploitation of perceived sense of oppression and lack of administrative and political reach can transform as space into a sanctuary. The positive value of Information, Communication and Transport (ICT) for asymmetrical groups depends on their ability to conceal and maximize on information and platforms such as Internet, social media and transport networks compared to the state. The more the state is challenged in this, the more space is negative to the state.

120

Kiarie Joe and Mnyamwezi Renson: Intelligence report Links Alshabaab Militia to Wildlife Tra cking in Kenya. Standard June 6,2013

Where, the costs of operating in these spaces are low and facilitate access to target of high strategic value, any group engaged in an asymmetrical engagement of out‐administering the state will be attracted. If the aim is to strike at targets of high strategic value to advance their interests, the foregoing related to costs explains utility of actions. To the extent that the dynamics in

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space respond to MS = Mis +OB+SAN‐ICT the said space manifests distance decay. On the side of the state an expansive territory characterizes the favorable space with limited infrastructure at economic, political and social security levels. Security actors are confronted by challenges of time due to large swaths of territory they have to cover despite inadequate motorized capacity. Worse still the state security agents have to confront the sense of alienation, which anchors social distance decay.

For Al Shabaab, several factors converge to enhance the threats it poses. These include poverty‐driven vulnerabilities that expose citizens to inducements, presence of and high value western interests, close relations with western states and the proximity of Kenya to the Middle East conﬂict 121 epicenter at the demand side level. At the supply side level, there are factors such as the presence of a huge number of high value local and international strategic assets that are attractive for attacks. These include economic and social political soft targets. There is also a crisis of governance and state collapse in the region, failed process of security sector reforms, and identity crisis, weak criminal justice systems, political and legal vulnerabilities, elite corruption and failed ideas of state building in Kenya. Terrorist options continue to change, posing challenges to the state. The ability to dissimulate, maximizing on time in terrain gives those planning terror acts initiative. The innovativeness of these groups including the adaptation of Forth Generation Warfare (4GW), which allows them to sustain themselves by using available political, economic, social and military networks to convince decision makers that their strategic goals are unattainable or too costly for the preset beneﬁts. The assumption here is that superior political will prevails when employed despite economic and military balance in favor of a conventional actor.

Measured in decades, 4GW uses international, transnational, national and sub‐national networks. It takes place across all sectors of security. An action targeted at an economic asset will impact environmental, political, military and social sectors. Here there is no strategic necessity of defending production assets such that actors are free to concentrate more oﬀense without need for logistical burdens. Their main assets are capital and ideas channeled through existing societal structures that the state has little control over. The main casualty here, are civilians. There is a lot of maximization of media, some non‐ governmental networks and other economic activities a factor that makes it 122 diﬃcult to locate them.

Al Shabaab agents to their advantage, exploit dynamics inherent in distance decay. At the social level, this includes the felt sense of alienation towards the state security agents, and living conditions. At economic level, there are dynamics of exclusion and poverty. A core sanctuary that has been exploited by Al Shabaab constitutes the refugee camps. They have exploited these to set up 121 See 'Why ghting crime can assist structures for enabling their agents to cross into Kenya. It also uses the same to development in Africa. United Nations O ce bring and cache arms besides raising capital through human trafficking. The flip Drugs and Crime (UNODC) May 2005 122 side of this and an enabling factor is the extent of corruption by Kenyan security Currently there is an ongoing UN agents especially immigration, border, customs and traffic police agents. investigation of businessmen involved in sugar imports and transportation of relief aid to Having created Al Hijra as its Kenyan branch and recruited and trained its Somalia who have been accused of diverting fighters from across Kenya's ethnic groups, Al Shabaab has increased its ability WFP aid to Al Shabaab. See 'UN probes Kenya to operate in Kenya by setting up cells in Maua, Migori, Eldoret and Kitale. link to Al Shabaab', The Star Friday October 16th 2009 Pg 1, 4.

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In all these areas, the common denominator is distance decay. This is manifested by the spread of attacks in the state. The telling ones include shootout in Githurai that lasted for more than 5 hours, in addition to IED's in Nairobi. Other operations that failed include planned attacks on the Parliament and the Holy Family Basilica. The mode of operation is through cell structures. These are hard to locate but easy to secure when it comes to operational security. The leadership and membership of each cell has no idea about the plans of the others. Each maximizes on space to create time. This is used to plan attacks. Cells act like section units. Their training includes local tasks for enhancement of operational capacity. Training begins in spaces such as those controlled by Al Shabaab.

It includes Quran and Islamic classes, physical training, target practice, weapons, counter surveillance, mobile security, practical missions, reconnaissance, hand‐to‐hand combat, reacting and dealing with sudden changes. Emphasis is on improvisation, use of assets available in the society. From the use of easy‐to‐acquire, conceal and transport 9mm hand‐gun, hunting 123 knives, wind‐proof lighter, petrol bombs Ingram Mac 10 or SMGs . Where operations need additional expertise, cells call upon regional units which act as mobile units. The latter equally draw on local cells as platforms for mounting spectacular attacks on assets that have local, regional and global implications across a wide range of security sectors. Despite crackdowns, Majengo in Nairobi remains one of the most vibrant areas for recruitment.

Notably despite its being headquartered in Somalia, Al Shabaab is emerging as a serious security threat to Kenya given the Somali question. With an operational space stretching from Mogadishu to the Kenyan border, and in a bid to establish its caliphate project stretching from Somalia up to Mozambique Al Shabaab is on the march. Al Shabaab has increased its ability to recruit from within Kenya and sustain its operations through drug networks, illegal smuggling of goods such as sugar and piracy. The decision by the Kenya Government to set up a Jubaland security zone and to support the transitional federal government through recruitment and training of Somali elements along the Kenya‐Somali border has animated the levels of militarization while creating the potential of a Pakistani Taliban equivalent were it to be unable to sustain the implantation of these militarized elements.

123 See Cruickshank Paul, Tim Lister and Nic Robertson. Evidence Suggests that Al Shabaab is shifting focus to Soft targets CNN , September 27, 2013 updated 0038GMT(0838 HTK). http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/26/world/Lon don-bombing-plot-Al-Qaeda/index.html

Despite not so successful attempts to court Mombasa Republican Council whose end‐state is the de‐linkage of Kenya's coastal province, Al Shabaab has re‐established its networks at the coast building up on it previous agents such as Fazul Abdullar and Swaleh Labhan. Core here are radical preachers and agility of its operative such as Samantha Lewthwaite and Abu Sandheere. Apparently married to Abdi Wahid a former member of the Kenya navy, Samantha was able to turn her residence near Shanzu into an Improvised Explosive Devise (IED) manufacturing unit. Sandheere, whose parents are Maasai and European is seconded to Al Shabaab from Al‐Qaeda. He acts as the group's regional intelligence, logistics and special operations oﬃcer. There have been fears of terrorism activities by Al Shabaab using boats as delivery platforms to target critical socio‐economic assets such as tourism and the oil reﬁnery.

This idea is not out of question, to the extend that it would provide the group a wide range of multiple objectives to strike and values to derive including the media attention. Al Shabaab not only has the operational capacity, but that its

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local networks and ability to complement these with external support in addition to vulnerabilities in security infrastructure makes this a real possibility. What is notable is that Al Shabaab's success points to its ability to make a value proposition that the Kenyan state remains incapable of oﬀering. Core here is the failure to respond to the challenges of distance decay.

To grasp these dynamics, we have to cast ourselves within the broader visualization of geopolitics, economics and their resultant reconfiguration of geographies as perceived. For analytical purposes, we adopt the map below to point to evolving dialectical contestations between global‐regional state and non‐state actors that apparently seem to operationalize not only geographies of conflict but also the caliphate project. The said map frames contending broad geo‐political, economic and security interests. While Al‐Qaeda remains the base, relentless drone attacks, have forced it to a re‐organization that has speeded up the growth of regional commands and spaces. What appears to be unconnected, contestations are in fact interlinked with a specific aim of connecting state‐centric through convergences in regionalized local spaces before eventually inter‐connecting regions.

As a result regionalized local spaces are being globalized leading to the destruction of communities and states as currently conceived. Core actors are ﬁrst released in a given space to build networks of cells, initiate local organization and mobilization. Later a full‐ﬂedged resistance is initiated bringing into alliances other local termite groups before these are eventually cannibalized. Soon a secure favorable space is created allowing pilgrims interested in training. Once they mature they are quickly posted forward to start new cells. For instance, while Fazul et al helped enable Al Shabaab, he was set loose to build up cells in Kenya. A consolidated Somali space facilitated training for Boko Haram elements. The overall head East African region in this sense is an Emir in the name of Godane.

Other forming regions includes the middle east where, the Islamic state of Iraq and Alsham (ISIS) formerly Al‐Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) pushed into eastern Syria from Iraq. It is led by Emir Abu Bakr el Bagdad. The aim here is the creation of a contiguous section of the caliphate from Syria in to Iraq. In North Africa, the Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) aligned itself to a local component in Mali Known as Ansar Eddine. The latter cannibalized other resistance groups in northern Mali including the National Movement For the Liberation of Azaward. It is their rushed operationalization of an extremist brand of Wahabism against the advice of Emir Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud that would quickly alienate them from the local population. Their threats to integrity of Mali and the entire West African region saw the French intervene. In Mali, ﬁghting elements from Boko 124 haram of Nigeria would support the group.

124

AS of now these groups exist as follows: Core Alqaeda in North Wazirstan in Pakistan. Taliban in Afghanistan, Lashkhar e- Taiba Pakistan, Jabhat al Nusra in Syria. Islamic State of Iraq and Alsham(ISIS) in Iraq, Boko Haram in Nigeria , Ansra al sharia in Egypt, Lybia, Mali, Yemen, Alqaeda in Arab Penisular Yemen, Alshabaab in Somalia, Alhijra in Kenya, Allied democratic Forces in Uganda, Alqaeda in Magreb in Lybia, Niger and Algeria

For Al‐Qaeda, the operationalization of the caliphate is a long durée process that maximizes on innovation, distance decay and failed processes of democratic transformations especially in the Arab and African geographies. For many Western powers, this emerging geography allows them to contain these groups away from their borders. Indeed, as they reinforce their systems to reduce vulnerabilities, it becomes costly for these groups to mount spectacular operations in the Western states. Africa on the other hand becomes the favorable space due to supply aspects that anchor terrorism. Attacks on western interests advance the objective of expelling them from what Wahhabis

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Salaﬁsts consider to be Muslim territories. For Western powers, contest with Al‐ Qaeda and its outﬁts are better contained and eventually defeated from afar using local resources with their role limited to deployment of drones, Special Forces and training elements.

125

Interviews with senior security O cers, Nairobi August 2013

It will be noted that insurgency wars are all about the dynamics of out administering an actor on a territory over which he is supposed to exercise sovereignty. Critical here is strategy defined by Liddell‐Hart as that art of distributing military means to fulfill the ends of policy. For insurgents operating within the fourth dimension, time within which war is fought is configured in decades. The broad aim is to avoid battles except when dynamics in space offer that strategic advantage. In the meantime, it is also fought within political and economic geographies. It is the foregoing that allows them to affirm Clausewitz's assertion that war is in fact politics by other means. The final arbiter in this battle of resolve between asymmetrical actors here is the incalculable variable of the mind. This as Liddel‐Hart notes, manifests itself in resistance. Success of any operation has to be measured in terms of how quick it is it is diminished. Critical here are connectivity of variables especially where we are dealing with States and organic entities.

Despite dislocating Al Shabaab from Kismayu, KDF failed to prevent it from retreating into spaces where it was able to gain time to re‐organize. Currently, it estimated to control more than 40% of the Somali Territory and a population. Maximizing on space, the group merely shifted its Center of Gravity (COG). As it is, it is able to access the population thus recruit deep in both Kenyan and 125 Somalia. Notably, its strength has grown to more than 6000 . It may be imperative to re‐examine the extent to which, initial attacks on Kenya were not part of the wider Fazul's Caliphate project with a broad objective of destabilizing Eastern Africa through a chaotic Kenya. If this is in the aﬃrmative,

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then the move into Jubaland apparently facilitates this. Even if is not the case, moving into Jubaland while failing to whittle down Al Shabaab resistance through the building up of local capacity through a reconstituted state from bellow has allowed it (Al Shabaab) to readjust and advance its broad project. Here, a twin strategy is becoming increasingly apparent. The ﬁrst seeks to create a favorable military space encompassing large stretches of Kenya and Jubaland. This may be achieved through a wide range of attacks in Kenya that seek to create a Poly‐drone. The second entails the operationalization of fourth generation warfare with an objective of making Kenya's stay in Somalia untenable.

Under the former, Al Shabaab continues to maximize on vulnerabilities and opportunities available in space as conceived by Hanrahan. Space here is appreciated in terms of Square mileage + Prevailing obstacles (manmade and natural features that impede, divert or stop movement. These include physical geography, psychological, topographic, demographic, infrastructural and weather related elements + Sanctuaries (economic, cultural, political and psychological) – information communication and Transport aspects. Where these elements are in place, a given square mileage (space) provides rationalities best suited for terrorist calculations. The assumption here is that every space chosen for operationalization of a terrorist attack is predicated on costs incurred and utility derived. The lower the cost in relation to the higher 126 utility derived, the higher the increase in opportunity . Between November 2012 and February 2013 at least 66 attacks had been experienced leading to the death of more than 111 civilians 21 Police and 5 soldiers had died. 488 civilian, 39 127 police and 9 military personnel had been injured . Many others have also been foiled. Garissa, Nairobi, Mandera and Wajir have continued to experience the worst. Garissa has 20 attacks, Nairobi 14, Mandera13, Wajir 10, Mombasa 8 and Lamu 1.

Sociological analysis of the signatures underpinning these attacks points to an organized group capable of deriving multiple strategic objects from a single tactical attack incidents have included, attacks aimed at sharpening polarities along ethnic, clan and religious divide while retaining the ability to broadly impact on economic and psychological Centers of Gravity. There is also an apparent economic and broad identity point being made. For instance, initial attacks revolved around grenade attacks launched against soft targets around bus terminus and social centers. Agents arrested pointed to the existence of multiple cells embedded in urban areas across the main ethnic identities. That Al Shabaab had managed this feat seems to aﬃrm its narrative of a broad movement. Most failed operations seemed to have been mediated by mainly its Somali inﬁltrators.

126

See Katumanga M and Miguta .F. Understanding Geographies of Terrorism.Unpublished paper 2013. See also NDC Lecture Notes: Karen 2013 127 See CMD. Kenya: Emerging Asymmetrical Contests and the Challenge of delivery a Credible Electoral Process. Unpublished Document, March 2013

It is in order for us to point to a polydrone star as new geographies with the possibilities of bringing in areas such as Nakuru, Eldoret and Kisumu. It is possible that these cities have been spared attacks either due to vigilance by internal security organs or that Al Shabaab has opted to retreat in space to gain time to plan attacks on objects of security; individuals, identity groups, strategic high value assets‐ oil tanks, water dams with the objectives being widened disruption at a strategic level.

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It would be fair to appreciate the Fazul project in the context of increased activities of ADF of Uganda. Besides this, the attacks would seek to widen geographies of disorder that would facilitate training ‐ “wearing down the enemy's morale at the level of intangible Centre of Gravity'' in addition to engendering the dislocation of KDF from Somalia. If this has to be achieved directly, through the strategy of maneuver and surprise, Al Shabaab will seek to to disperse KDF. If KDF's strength is dependent on stability, “equilibrium” of control, morale and supply, its dislocation through psychological and physical imbalance may be achieved through a strategy that seeks to force withdrawal. This is given the fact that the battle between KDF and Al Shabaab as noted earlier, revolves around the political mind (will), which manifests itself through resistance (resolve). The drive of Al Shabaab remains that of minimizing it and to wear it down to the point that the will of the government is undermined by 128 lack of support from Intangible Centre of Gravity ‐ popular support .

Our contention here is that Al Shabaab seeks to play on the variable of time and exploitation of vulnerabilities in space in a bid to gain initiative. To engender dislocation, and its subsequent exploitation, Al Shabaab will continue to maximize on maneuver and surprise by adjusting their means from conventional engagements to terror acts while adopting their plans to circumstances. Here, space is critical. Ideally expanding it to include the Polydrone in addition to JUBALAND is ideal. Fundamental here is the need to go for least expected targets that seek to polarize, such as attacks on soft targets and assassinations. This does not preclude plans for spectacular ones like, blowing up of dams, installations, fuel tanks ‐ the aim being the exploitation of lines of least resistance. Moves against such strategic economic targets that are also a source of supply will seek to undermine the will of the state to induce collapse and dislocation.

In focusing on a population, it is hoped that the will of the government will be worn down raising pressure for the military to be overstretched. To the extent to which threats on economic assets and spaces as referent objects of security is increased, the basic argument for which KDF incursion in Somalia was predicated will be increasingly brought into question. Pressure to secure this and the population as referent objects of security should force dislocation and eventual exploitation. Given the fear to secure this, the time dimensions compressed on the side of the Kenyan government and gained by Al Shabaab should allow consolidation of a larger space in North Eastern province, Nairobi and eventually Mombasa providing maneuver through exploitation of terrain.

128

See Liddell Hart B.H. Strategy: The Indirect Approach London : Faber & Faber 1967

Defeat of KDF in Jubaland constitutes the second. This does not have to involve frontal engagements but rather pointed tactical actions across a wide range of sectors that are mutually reinforcing but which also retain strategic implications. The broad strategy here is focused on the struggle for hearts and minds of not only the Somalis, but also Kenyans and the global populace. Increased attacks are meant to conﬁne Kenya Defense Force (KDF) to Kismayu. These may be followed up by attempts to sharpen contradictions between Kenyan on one hand and the regime in Mogadishu and its allies on the other. Underlying this are the external enablers that sustain Kenya's operations such as capital from the EU and soft power assets such as diplomatic and public goodwill. Both are dependent on the moral standing of the Kenyan force.

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All Al Shabaab needs to do is to maximize on international and local‐media, local NGOs to exploit the strategic relationship between KDF and MADOBE. Core here is the charcoal trade, which MADOBE needs to sustain his force. Kenya's choice here is to either pay MADOBE from its treasury or allow his operations at the risk of loosing EU and international public support. If the latter is the case, Al Shabaab will have achieved its objectives. These will allow it to sustain itself through the trade, while destroying the reputation of KDF through propaganda. Extended trade in charcoal and other illicit activities are also likely to draw in, some of the KDF elements eventually affecting morale, probity and competence. It will be appreciated that at the moment very little has been done to reduce distance decay at the local level to create any sort of extended legitimacy for MADOBE and his allies in the local populace. Notably there is nothing in there for them to fight for. In effect fights over spoils could see Al Shabaab under take trade‐offs that could disentangle and peel off some of KDF's local allies before turning them against her. The loss of political support at local, regional and international levels will be a disaster.

The groups increasing capacity to forge a global joint operation is apparent in its ability to mount local operations as diversions to a broad operation pulling together local, regional and global resources. The group's operations in Nairobi's West gate mall on 21st September 2013 and its follow up operations in Mandera point to this. The Nairobi operations followed an apparent inﬁghting that saw the killing of Omar Hammami Alias Abu Mansoor and his British colleague Usama al Britani and the defeat of the Nationalistic elements led by the likes of Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys by the Muktar Abu Zubayr alias Ahmed Abdi Godane faction. The planning of the attacks are said to have began 9 months with the hiring of a shop in the mall. This was followed by the use of the same as a platform as a forward base (FOBA) to cache their weapons and 129 ammunition . Underpinning this is the vulnerabilities apparent in security seams such as disconnectivities between socio‐economic spaces and security grids. For instance, there exists less access, analysis and sharing of strategic data among security, banking and communication platforms. Notably elements can open and withdraw cash from their accounts without being picked out. The vehicle used to ferry suspects to West gate was bought for 130 Kshs. 320,000 from a lady after the said withdrawals . Exchanges of this kind 131

are not uncommon . Despite suggestions to IGAD states on the need to evolve strategic data grids linking social, economic and security agencies, little to that eﬀect has been forthcoming in Kenya. Together with corruption, Al Qaeda agents are able to inﬁltrate and retreat into space and gain time to plan and strike at the place and time of their choice.

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Interviews with Senior Security O cials 25the September 2013. See also The Star : Attackers May have Set up shop at Westgate Mall 130 Mutua Martin: Police Probing Woman Who Sold Car to Westgate attackers . Standard on Saturday October 12,2013p 9 131 Katumanga M: IGAD Security Sector Program. Project Proposal Commissioned By IGAD April 2010 132 Mwaura Martin: Terror Suspect Grant Tried To Get Kenyan Identity Card; The Star Wednesday September 25,2013.p6

A British terror suspect Jermaine Grant almost secured an ID having presented applications and supporting documents to Muraru Sub‐location Assistant Chief Tibran Tumbo and Tausi division district oﬃcer Esther Waiganjo 132 purporting to be Robert Mwakio Mwata from Voi . Grant had entered Kenya on a false document as Ali Mohamed Ibrahim and also as a Canadian National Peter Joseph. This strike was followed by the killing of three police oﬃcers and the destruction of government vehicles in Mandera by more than 20 bandits believed to be members of Al Shabaab. According to intelligence sources, 20 Al Shabaab agents entered Kenya between 5th and 10th of September to carry out assassinations. Known as head‐breakers or Mandax Jibshe, they were under instructions to assassinate individuals in Nairobi and Mombasa. Led by Salaad

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Hassan and Khadar Abdi Abubakar the group entered the state assisted by Ahmed Bishar and Amniyat (Al Shabaab's intelligence network in Kenya and Somalia). The extent of their ability to manipulate dynamics in space is apparent in their ability to disguise themselves as refugees in the camps of Hagadera before acquiring refuge identiﬁcations and ﬁnding their way across 134 the state .

Amniyat agents and activities have increased across the state to as far as Kitale, Maralal, Isiolo, Mumias, Maua, Migori, Kisii, Oyugis, Kiambu and Busia. In Nairobi cell members have set up bases in Githurai, Dandora, Majengo while in Mombasa these are reported in Ukunda, Kisauni, and Likoni. The success of Al Hijra is apparent in the increasing radicalization among students' high schools such as Moi Forces, State House, Limuru Girls, St Georges, Aga Ghan, Eastleigh, 135 Nairobi tactical Secondary school and Sheikh Khalifa in Mombasa . Recruitments continue through some preachers. Swaleh Abdallar Said was charged in Mombasa for being in possession of a hand Grenade in Likoni and for recruiting and sending to Somalia for war Yusuf Turkana and 8 other youth from Lamu.

3.1.3 Militia Formations in Ethiopia

3.1.3.1Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)

The ONLF was founded in 1984 by the various Somali clans in Ethiopia united under the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) whose desire for self‐ determination was thwarted in the 1977‐1978 Ogaden war. Itis an ethnic nationalistmilitia advocating for a separatist agenda for the Ogaden region. Unlike other Somali nationalist movements, which have sought to consolidate all areas populated by Somalis into one country under the banner of a “Greater Somalia”, the ONLF seeks self‐determination only for ethnic Somalis in the Ogaden region. There was a temporary rapproachment between the group and the EPRDF when they collaborated in removal of junta leader Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991. The two groups jointly governed the Somali region as part of a transitional government. This arrangement lasted until 1994 when the ONLF once more fell out of governmentand it re‐launched its insurgency, demanding the right to self‐determination.

The ONLF has targeted Ethiopian troops in ambushes and guerrilla‐style raids. It has also kidnapped foreign workers in the Ogaden region who are 133 Mwaura M Ibid p6 134 Sunday Nation Reporter: Assault mastermind perceived to support the Ethiopian government. The government has also Said to be a Kenyan, 50, associated with Qaeda accused the group of organising bombings in the capital, Addis Ababa. ONLF Leader Fazul. Sunday Nation. September 29, has also targeted energy companies in the region insisting that it will disrupt 2013 p 5 the exploration of oil and gas in the region. In April 2007, the ONLF killed at 135 Nyambega Gisesa:Secondary Schools least 74 people, including sixty‐five Ethiopians and nine Chinese oil workers, radicalizing young Muslims NIS report, The and kidnapped seven,at an oil field in Abole. The Ethiopian government has Nairobian October 4-10, 2013 p7 136 Mwaura Martin. Suspect Recruited Us ,says designated ONLF as a terrorist group because of funding it allegedly received Preacher. Weekend Star. October 12/13,2013p4 from Eritrea.Peace initiatives with the group in 2010 were only partially 137 The Standard Newspaper (2012) Foreign successful as the group was internally split on the terms and the Ethiopian battles fought in Kenyan refugee camp http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2 government entered into agreement with a breakaway faction. In January 000049397&story_title=foreign-battles2012, the group decried the assassination of some of its top officials resident in 137 fought-in-kenyan-refugee-camp&pageNo=2 Kenyan refugee camps . Another round of peace talks from August to [Retrieved 16 November 2013] October of the same year ended failure in December.In May 2013, the group

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established ONLF Oﬃce of East Africa (OOEA) based in Nairobi . The mandate of the OOEA is to enhance and promote the values and interests of ONLF and Ogaden People. 3.1.3.2 Oromo Liberation Front (OLF)

3.1.3.3 Liyu clan militia

This is an organization established in 1973 by Oromo nationalists to promote self‐determination for the Oromo people against what they called "Abyssinian colonial rule". It has been outlawed and labeled as a terrorist organization by the Ethiopian government. Although some observers claim that the OLF has not committed any violent acts since 2002, there are reports that the OLF has increased its activity following the general elections of 2005.

It is claimed that the Liyu Police of Jigjiga or Special Police are a paramilitary clan militia group without a clear legal status. The unit was formed by Abdi Omar/Iley of Jigiga in 2010 to combat the separatist rebel group ONLF. The group has since spread terror in the Ogaden province by mass executions of civilians. It has been sanctioned to setup detention centers where those suspected of being members of ONLF or sympathizers are interrogated and mercilessly tortured or killed for information.

The Somali Ethiopian region has fallen into the hands of former ONLF supporters/members like the current Jigiga ruler Abdi Omar/Iley and his cronies, former ONLF rebels and leaders who marginalized other Ethiopian Somali clans. Abdi Omar/Iley convinced former ONLF/Ogaden tribal militia to give up their arm and return to Jigiga to join the so called Liyu Police to kill, terrorize and displace the non ONLF/Ogaden supporters of Somali Ethiopian clans.Even though the Liyu Police brutality have subsided since the Ethiopia Federal Government have warned Abdi Omar and his clan militia/Liyu Police, the only way to defeat the rebellious tribal militia/ONLF is to allow non Ogaden Somali clans of Ethiopia to arm themselves and protect their territory from ONLF and Liyu Police who have same goal in mind, terrorize and displace non Ogaden Somali Ethiopian clans. Arming non Ogaden Somali Ethiopian clans will isolate ONLF into their remote area; will have no accesses to cross lines of other clans.

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ONLF website https://www.ogadennet.com/?p=25004 [Retrieved 16 November 2013]

3.1.4 Militia Groups in the Loki Convergence

The Loki convergence is principally a collectif of a number of traditional nations i.e. the Toposa, Turkana, Karamajong, Oromo, Nyangatom, Suri, Didinga and Daasanech/Merile. Consequently organic, ethnic militia groups dominate this convergence. Our impression is that the formal state claims administrative authority over the region but has been unable to establish it. Even though this area is a convergence of national frontiers, the perceived scarcity of exploitable resources has acted as the main dis‐incentive for the central governments of Kenya, South Sudan, Uganda and Ethiopia to invest in establishing a robust presence. This means that the responsibility of policing the administrative borders was delegated to the traditional nations by the national governments. Eﬀectively, the vacuum caused by absence of the state, is the catalyst for the persistent organic responses to the challenges of security and administration in this convergence.

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For a long time the principal resources in the Loki convergence have been water and pasture which are subject to environmentally dictated cycles of scarcity and abundance. The reliance on these resources by the predominantly pastoralist nations has been the cause of conflict as they engage each other in a struggle aimed at establishing hegemony over a large territory as possible in order to secure their survival. In our view, militia foreboding in this convergence has mirrored these resource cycles. However, we note that external actors who have mobilized these nations to fight each other regardless of the resource availability status have subjected this pattern of conflict and cooperation to disruption. For instance, during the Second World War, the Italians armed and mobilized the Inyangatom and the Merille to fight with the British‐armed Turkana. Similarly, the collapse of the Amin government and subsequent civil war in Uganda contributed to increasing the stockpiles of weapons available to warring communities in this convergence and escalating the intensity of conflict. Our view is that the introduction of firearms to this convergence by various actors for instance traders, colonial and post‐colonial governments did not significantly change the configuration of conflict among the different ethnic groups but intensified it instead. In spite of social and economic relations between the communities, the traditional enmity has continued to persist and we could find no compelling evidence of alteration in the political relations between the groups i.e. we have not found instances of hostile groups becoming allies.

It is our impression that the insecurity see‐saw in the Loki Convergence will consequently swing to the extreme end of hard insecurity in the immediate future. This is because we anticipate that initially there will be an increase in politically‐ motivated inter‐ community violence over control of strategic points along the infrastructure corridors and hydro‐carbon resources. This in our view is what will drive the mutation of existing militia from organic to organized formations. We speculate that there will be an intensification of armed engagements between militia in the short term. We predict that there will be a government response to increased levels of violence, which will create the conditions for the emergence of a dominant and probably state indulged militia group. Eventually as the inter‐militia conflict levels out and the dominant group emerges, this convergence will then witness a reduction in the overall firepower of militia groups across the board but a concentration of firepower in the dominant group. This is what will lead to a swinging back to soft insecurity because we foresee a reduction in the intensity of armed engagements.

In the Loki convergence, our view is that continued weakness of state structures, ethnic loyalties and social expectations are the principal factors that drive the sustaining of organic militia. In particular, since normative/traditional authority structures supersede the formal civic structures, the militia in this convergence enjoy a high level of support from their host societies. And this is because they recruit exclusively from within the society and reﬂect the local values. However, criminally driven economic motives for sustaining militia in this convergence have begun to creep in and begun to subvert the traditional raison d'etre for militia formation. As a result there are (bandit) formations in this convergence that appear to straddle the middle ground between the organic and the organized.

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3.1.4.1 A General Appreciation 3.1.4.1.1Ethnic Militia in Loki Convergence

The ethnic militia in the loki convergence are not bound by the international boundaries which are considered to be vague markings in the sand. The ethnic groups have commonalities in socio cultural practices, livelihoods and lifestyle. Most of the things are done the same way except some small variations just like some tones in their dialect and language but meaning exactly the same thing. Speciﬁcally, these groups share the following; 1. Peripheral status and Geography. They live and occupy what is called the marginal lands at the periphery of their states. These areas are least developed and are the most deprived regions in eastern Africa if not in the world.

2. Language. The names given to the language by various groups may vary e.g. Ngàtoposa, ngàturkana, ngàjiye, ngàdootho, ngàtepeth,ngàbokora, ngànyangàtom but it is not different at all at all. The members of the Karamoja cluster do not need an interpreter amongst themselves. After the word ngà which simply introduces the dialect, the following word refers to the group (Ngà‐ Turkana, Ngà – Toposa, Ngà Jiye etc)

3. Culture. The culture is the broadest term to deﬁne. But where it is taken to mean the celebrated and the approved way of life of the people, the cultural attributes of these communities are basically the same. Dressing, dancing

4. Lifestyle. Lifestyle and livelihood appear to be synonymous but they are diﬀerentiated by the real components and synonyms of each term as below. Lifestyle is looked at from the direction of – Way of life, existence, standard of living, routine, life, daily life, everyday life and means.

5. Livelihood. Livelihood is looked at in the direction of: living, income, sources of revenue, employment, occupation, trade, business and work. Looking at the terms: trade, occupation, sources income. Standard of living, routine, everyday life… they compound and deﬁne what they speak loudly about the pastoral life led by the Karamoja people. It tells us the economy, the means of survival and the standards of living of the Karamojong communities that they share in common.

6. Ecological zone. The Karamoja group shares one of the most unstable and unpredictable ecological zones in the world. A zone that barely supports but merely accommodates their lifestyle. With dry weather all the year round, prone to droughts and famines, low rainfalls, low vegetation cover, experience perennial droughts that devastate livestock increase the household food security of the households in these regions. Owing to this, the communities have always been unable to escape from the vulnerability cycle hence living at the steepest slope of pauperization where recovery is hard to discern and recognize.

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3.1.4.1.1 Militia Formation and Breeding Logic

Ethnic militia in the loki convergence are not formally structured rebel movements or liberation armies. They are embedded in their respective communities as a mechanism to guard against insecurity and tribal rivalry. The youth form the largest composition in the structure; they are to be available at all times to be deployed to secure the interests of the community. Other desirable attributes are stamina, loyalty to the community, bravery, commitment to the community. It is also built around the authority and respect for the senior most in the group, secrecy for everything done, unity of purpose and objective and communitarianism at all times.

The ethnic militia groups take their orders from the traditional authority and orders from the community and the circumstances prevailing in the community. The mandate of the militia groups is very clear. It is not written anywhere. These are the attributes that run across the communities in the convergence and are therefore outstanding and salient on ethnic militia group formation and sustainability. The community prescribes the roles of the ethnic militia group and deploys them to perform any activity in its service in fact and any other activity as may be assigned from time to time is part of the job description.

When the ethnic militia goes out on a raid and comes back successful they are praised for their bravery and celebrated with songs to highlight the elements of the victory. The leaders of the miltia are bestowed upon new titles and rituals are undergone to purify and cleanse the group from the blood they spilt. The victory is used to challenge the other young men that did not participate in the raid to plan on how they could mount an even more daring ad spectacular raid of their own.

Participation in the militia activities is a rite of passage for one to be respected in the community, to find peers and company, to go through initiation, to marry and establish himself, graduate to other levels of community leadership such as to become a kraal leader or their deputies.Members of ethic militia also lead in civil works such as digging waters sources for the community, reconnaissance to map the location of natural and pastoral resources –water and pasture for the community, leading the community to safety during emergencies. The main distinctive feature of the militia activities is the physical benefit goes to the community but the honour remains with the individual who undertook the noble act in community's name. One is expected to participate with bravery and commitment on every processes that helps show that he is promoting community interests even if it means loss of oneself. In such events the dead is glorified and praised for noble behaviour and display of bravery and dedication for the community. His family is compensated by the community for the heroic act and this challenges others to do the same and if possible surpass his achievement. 3.1.4.1.2Organization, Structure and Roles.

The entire community acts as a support system to the militia. Men of all cadres are involved and have roles to play. The old men – former warlords, veteran ﬁghters sit at the upper echelons of the pyramid giving orders, blessings, advice, sanctions and conferring praises, challenges on the levels

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below it. The other level is that of the kraal leaders who exercise the function of day to day administration and coordination of the kraal aﬀairs such as where to settle, when to move, security of the kraal, the location of the water sources, mobilization of the reconnaissance and surveillance teams to move ahead and address the dangers on the kraal, managing inter kraal coordination, it is also a war council to sanction a raid on the enemy kraals as well as being the structure to be used to build peace.

Under the kraal leaders are the sectional heads that translate the orders of the kraal leaders in terms of what was endorsed above. These sectional heads are also directed to deal with any issues of retaliation or waging war on enemy kraals. It is in their hands to effect orders. They are the field commanders on the ground. If and when the enemy attacks at any point, they must not come to seek for orders to retaliate, they had been given the orders upon appointment. The sectional heads in every kraal are responsible for grazing and should be physically present in the kraal and when the animals are migrating or grazing so he can exercise the roles assigned to him as per the circumstances prevailing. When the animals are grazing, the sectional head sits with his (soldiers) armed youths at very strategic and vantage points of security advantage to see and engage and defeat the enemy. These vantage points were earlier identified and declared to them by the kraal leaders and the higher hierarchy upon appointment. Under the sectional heads are the armed youths that form the standing fighting force and army for the kraal. Every kraal has its similar or somehow slightly different structure but the mandate remaining the same.

Under the fighting force is the village or the kraal which benefits or suffers from the activities of the above structure. Sometimes the structure could pass a decree that the kraal opposes say migrating from one point to the other, mounting a raid on the enemy at some point in the year which could be precarious to the kraals security in terms of the retaliation by the kraal attacked or from moving away to destinations that are not lucrative in terms of pastoral resources. The kraal including women may voice their concerns as to the generalized and protracted dangers of the actions on the rest of the populations, livestock etc. for example the section commanders must not sanction or approve a raid on the enemy at some time in the year if that could have certain repercussions to the rest of the populations however strategic is the raid such as lack of the alternative place to settle with pastoral resources, if the raid could entertain the geographical escalation of the conflict to affect the whole of the tribe, if the gains from the raid are so meagre compared to the costs it could entertain. 3.1.4.1.3Transition mechanisms.

It is not easy to realize when one really leaves the militia process, since it is a lifelong call and mandate. Leaving it means leaving the community altogether and which is not easy. One must not live in the kraal to be a militia, even those in towns but with relatives and animals in the kraals and in the villages are part of the life in those set ups and are always called upon to assist at their level best. They assist by cursing the enemies of the community, the incidences against the community, defending the actions of their kraals against the rival tribes, supplying the community or their kraal with other means of livelihood, giving them moral support as well as ammunition should they ﬁnd some somewhere. Upon retirement from active engagements one may play other roles such as

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giving tactical advice, oﬀering gifts to boost morale on the militia, blessings to the young groups joining the cadres of the militia process, daring challenges and encouragement to new teams to take part in the militia activity and activism. 3.1.4.4 Codes of conduct.

Every game has its codes of discipline or taboos and rules of the game. In the militia process, there are many codes governing the conduct of affairs of the militia groups. Respect is at the top. Collectivism, communitarianism, communal benefit, preservation of public good, looking at the bigger picture is key as opposed to individual benefit, one had better be killed for the community to be safe, he can be praised and compensated. One cannot betray the community so as to gain as an individual whereas, the community can do everything to safeguard and protect its own.

Turkana militia at a pre-raid brie ng.

In the short stories above, we learnt of the length of distance the Turkana can go to protect their own and to bring nothing short of fame and honour to the community. In the event that one member of the community militia has broken a code, he takes disciplinary measures from his groups leadership as sanctioned by the rest of the community and the immediate level of leadership. If for example a member ran away from the battle and withdraw his support, fighting power when it was required, if a member trades off a secret to the Toposa for example on the turkana formations and plans of assault, disrespects a strategic advice to protect or save life and property, or does anything that is out of touch with the norms and rules of the community as expected of him, fights or abuses an elder, his father, decide to kill and eat animals without express permission from the owners, taking another man's wife, eloping with an unmarried lady without parents' consent ,etc, these expose them or that particular person to commensurate punishment going along with that act. He can be whipped by his

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peers, or his bull ordered for killing to be eaten by men or his peers, restricted from going to abroad so he doesn't expose any secrets, cursed to die etc depending on what a group or a member of the ethnic militia group has committed.

Discipline is the key standard and touchstone on which the affairs of the militia group is managed and regulated. These codes of discipline and conduct are available to and against every member of the community. Even if one is a kraal leader, a war veteran, a renowned warrior like Etengan, he cannot afford to break these taboos; they are many and known by heart by everybody. Violating one of them means you consented to undertake the consequences all the same. The codes of discipline can only be respected if they can be enforced. This is for everybody's benefit that must cooperate to ensure they are enforced and respected to manage the affairs or order in society. 3.1.4.1.5Militia‐Community Relations.

The Civil‐Military relationship between the community and the ethnic militia is symbiotic. There is a mutual arrangement to protect each other between the community and the militia group. They both have responsibilities to each other and none should betray the other whatever the case. For example whenever there is a crime committed by a member of the militia to the extent the rifle is required by the police, the community and the family concerned can do everything it can to reduce or shift the fine to anything else rather have the rifle taken away or the particular person jailed because the community will miss his service and the protection of that rifle. Simply a replay of what happened during Etengan's time. Also at a time when the youths are so many in town to the extent their presence would incite the security to arrest them for urban crimes, the communities organize a mechanism to send them to the kraals so they are not arrested and taken to prisons far away. This is because the community depends on them for many things and vice versa. This is a cordial and purposeful relationship that is mutually beneficial to the parties concerned.

When a member of the raiding party is captured by the enemy forces and is to be interrogated to divulge their community's security plans, war plans where they came from etc (just technical information on their security formations and strategy) before being killed, he would prefer to be killed instantly rather than betray his community by giving information to the enemy. In the case where he is injured in battle and fears he might not make it home, he would hand over the gun to his men to take home or shoot himself ﬁrst or ask them to shoot him rather than be alive in pain and be interrogated by the enemy forces. 3.1.4.1.6Loki Ethnic Militia Arsenal.

Firearms have replaced crude weapons such as bows and arrows, spears, stones, sticks. These range from the less sophisticated bolt‐action riflesof the early 20th century to the sophisticated weapons used in modern warfare. At times when the spears and the shields were used, it killingwas an abstract conceptand wars could be won without an actual engagement on the basis of which community fielded the largest number of warriors. The introduction of the gun changed the dynamics of warfare. It allowed smaller communities to take on larger ones and even engage them from a distance with little risk to themselves. Before the Karamojong acquired rifles, the Turkana attacked them

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and took their cattle. The Turkana had guns and the Karamoja challenged them to come closer so they could fight in the normal close range warfare of spears and shields. That was around Nakiloro in Moroto district in north eastern Uganda. Little did they know the Turkana could kill them from a distance. They thought the turkana were fleeing or playing some trick when they bent to fire and some sound came out. Just like the Maji Maji rebellion story, they learnt too late that the Turkana were armed with some strange weapons that took them out from a far. Only few went back home to tell the story as more than 200 were mowed down by the gun in just one battle and in minutes.

The gun sustains the ethnic militiaand the communities in the loki 139 convergence have learnt to live under a gun culture . In the convergence, everybody is a gunman from using a gun, having used the gun or aspiring to own and use a gun. The gun has become part of the attire except in urban centres where one could be confronted by the police. If not at the shoulder, it is hand carried over log distance in anticipation of other dangers on the war.These weapons have made work easier for the militia groups in all these communities in the convergence. They are in fact used even as sticks to return the animals to join the herd or merely as working or ﬁghting sticks.

All the communities in the Lokichoggio convergence are heavily armed. But some are more armed than others. The point here is not more arms than the rest but the type of weapons at their disposal. Those communities that live in the countries that once witnessed the civil strife or civil war are deemed to be more armed with heavy weapons and even more weapons than those whose were merely being served by the market outflows. The groups believed to be exposed to sophisticated weapons include the Diding'a, the Toposa such as the PK, PKM ‐ able to discharge over 500 rounds of ammunition in a belt, the RPG, Rocket launchers and even grenades including antipersonnel projectiles. The Diding'a and the Toposa benefited from the military take over and capture and recapture of Torit and Kapoeta from the SPLA and the Sudanese Army at various intervals. They have weapons such as field guns that can be pulled by donkeys, such as mortars and other heavy artillery.

A Toposa militiaman (L)and Chief Julius Lolim ®of Mogila location in Turkana West displaying a GPMG and Ammunition Belt

139

Atom is the name for gun derived from the ateker word for elephant etom. This is because both are considered mighty

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3.1.4.1.7Types of Firearms.

The other groups such as the Turkana, the Pokot (who also access their supplies from their Pokot brothers across the Nakapiripirit district in Uganda), the Matheniko, Tepeth, Bokora, the Jie, the Dassenech, Pian, and to some extent the Nyang'atom are not as armed as the two groups above. Though the Nyang'atom on the part of the south Sudan are as heavily armed as the Toposa. All they have are conventional weapons, which they acquired for conventional defence and sometimes aggression, though they all share in the fear for disarmament, which according to them will be the real chance, and opportunity for insecurity. The Dassenech appear to be currently armed externally to expel the Turkana of the ngissiger clan that are fishing on Lake Turkana and around the Todonyang area. These groups operate on the suspect claim that they are following the Omo delta. Of late, the Dassenech contingent killing the turkana fishermen around Todonyang are on speedboats. This indicates the influence of new actors, interests and dynamics in the traditional pastoral conflict in this region.

The convergence is home to all types of weapons. In 2006‐2008 this researcher was a key member of an arms marking and tracing exercise conducted in the region in collaboration with the arms experts from the SAS‐ Geneva. In this assignment, we were tracing not only the type of weapons in circulation but also their origin and country of manufacture and the quantity in circulation for bothgun and ammunition.

We also realized that owing to the love for guns and long history of dependence on the guns, the communities had even given these guns traditional names. The common one is for the AK 47 assault rifle commonly known as amakada across the region. The AK 47 has several variants (RPK 74,Type 56,Kalashnikov AK 47‐ original, Type 56 ‐2,AMD 65,Kalashnikov AKS 74,Type 56 ‐1,Kalashnikov AKM, Kalashnikov AK74) which are differentiated by among other things thecalibreof ammunition and other distinguishing features such the size of the muzzle, the make of the magazine whether its plastic or wooden, the stock make, whether it has bayonet mounted, markings on the receiver, whether stock is foldable or fixed, whether the stock is wooden or plastic and so on.

Apart from the Kalashnikov, there are other automatic rifles used in the convergence such as the FN FAL, SLR, Heckler and Koch G3, Beretta BM59, Simonov SKS,M59/66, CETME B/Model 58, type 56 carbine, Lee‐Enfield No.4,M14,M1Carbine,Mosin – Nagant 1891/30, M1 Garand. Some communities also have had access to some of the most deadly weapons owing to the spill over from war or looting of the military armouries during the civil wars in Ethiopia, Uganda and south Sudan. These include guns like the FAMAS, M60,RPD,IMI‐Galil ARM,RPK, FN‐FNC, FN‐MAG,PK,Steyr‐AUG, RPG, PKM, rocket missiles, antipersonnel mines and so many others that we could not identify according to the identification and tracing kits we were using. The most interesting thing nowadays is the local communities are now able to do minor repairs on these rifles and keep them more serviced and ready than even the police can do. Some of the parts they have been able to repair include the following parts; the stock, the pistol grip, the fore sight, hand guard, the magazine and even the receiver. For the sensitive interior parts, they have their inconspicuous and discreet sources from where they pay something to get the

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parts. Compared to the deployment of the police and the armed forces so far, these groups are more armed than the security personnel deployed to guard and protect them, yet there is still the security dilemma and gaps yet to be addressed. The issue here has been some form of local initiatives and attempts to privatize security as a service so that one provides security for own life and property better than the state security agents could do.

Toposa Militia with their weapons. Note the G3 ri e in the middle

3.1.4.1.8Usage of the ďŹ rearm.

In the convergence today, what matters is not the carrying of arms but the element of marksmanship and sharp shooting and not shooting to scare, it is about accounting for the scarcity of the ammunition and ensuring each shoots the target. The question in the end of the day when cattle come home is how many enemies or ďŹ erce animals did you kill? What can you be remembered with in the life of the community? Have you ever displayed some acts of bravery and courage in the time of emergencies and what did you safe? If ranking was to be done on bravery and the number of enemies killed, what number would you be? The Turkana and the entire Karamojong ateker group rationalize the use of the gun around the sayingAkitoe epolot (the stick used for ďŹ ghting is mightier). Ng'ae ebei nakituk a atom is another saying in use by the tribes in the convergence. It means who will dare stand at the muzzle (mouth) of the gun? This means the armed person shall have their way even if there were a multitude in front of them. This is how and why the weapons have made the work easier for the militia groups. The weapons have given them the courage and freedom to engage even overwhelming odds.

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3.1.4.1.9Why disarmament initiatives fail.

If one commissioned a survey to ask the communities across the convergence, which is more, armed than the rest, each community would point to the other. This is for precautionary and security reasons and the real answers will never see the light of the day.Owing to the regional disarmament being discussed and owing to the on going and unresolved conﬂict among these groups, the real security lies in their illegal small arms and not in the remote type of security to be provided by state security agencies according to them.

The militia process is incomplete without a record of events in one's name. It is nothing if you have not killed as many as possible. After every such event, one gains a new title that brings him automatic respect from every one including the old. It is a record that must be set and if possible surpassed. If your father killed nothing or few enemies, it is incumbent upon you to build a more robust record around your name by surpassing his record. 3.4.1.1.10 Socialization into militia.

It should be understood that the militia activity associated with killing is not as the same as the terrorist related ways and practices. The killing in this aspect is proportional to the harm threated by the victim to you as a person and as the community. So that you aspire to kill as many as possible in case you weaken the harm or wipe out the harm threatened to your community altogether. It is done to avenge the losses of this community to the other communities, to address the historical losses. That explains why the for example, the Turkana today are between the hammer and the anvil. It is payback time because they threatened everyone else in the past after acquiring the arms from Ethiopia and having gained the ﬁghting experience and use of guns from the world wars in Burma and India as troops of the KAR ‐Kings Africa Riﬂes regiment.

When a militia kills a victim from another rival tribe or community, some ceremonies are performed mainly to cleanse him from the blood poured, as regret for the sanctity of life lost for a purpose (self‐defence or protection of our property) and also to display for everyone to see his new achievement. This is elevation in status and respect at the same time. If you hear names ending with Moe, this is a title earned and conferred upon somebody after heroic battle in which he kills enemies. Just like professor, doctor, it is never taken away once earned. E.g. For example, my other local title is Bwang`amoe(Destroyed and dispersed all the enemies). Other names include, Lorukudemoe(killed the enemy at the highway), Lomorumoe(killed the enemy at the mountain), Lopiesmoe(killed the enemy at the bare land, airstrip), Lobwelimoe(killed the enemy at the water well), Lokineimoe(killed the enemy in a battle for goats or while herding goats).

In this ceremony, a white goat is killed and the dung is painted on the body of the killer, the skin of the white goat is made in to some strings that will be tied to the walking stick he uses. His forehead is shaven and the red ochre applied till the hair grows. He is restricted from any activity like herding, travels or heavy duties such as going to the raids since he would be likely to be noted and eliminated by the enemy. In this ceremony, the killer gets a new title on top of his surname. It would be abominable to call him by the surname since he is now with

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anew title. The elders confer this title to him in the morning and in full view of everybody. The name shall describe and be drawn from the circumstances in which he fought and killed. Whether he killed on the road, during the ﬁght over cattle, goats, at the water point… shall have the circumstances attached to the name.

At the ceremony, a date is also set for akiger (making special cuts on the body). This cuts run from the lower part of the thorax to the waist. They are cut using various instruments and differing from community to community. The Turkana and many other communities in the cluster use a torn call ebenyo and a razor blade while the Toposa use a piece of bead put in a string of small metal put to the fire to get red hot to make the markings. The purpose is to pour blood as a way of self‐cleansing for the blood spilt from the victim. If this is not done, the killer would be affected by the blood of his victim to the extent he will lose sharpness and appear dumb, mad or mentally possessed.

During this ceremony, there are pronouncements and blessings by the key elders to invoke blessings on the warrior. They bless him to be sharp, steadfast, keen, swift, alert, active, and responsive in front of the enemy and kill all the enemies of the community. They pour water, oil on him and the new title is oﬃcially conferred as it is pronounced by various elders as if to declare it. The warrior will be sat down with his legs straight; he is woken up straight again to his feet after the last elders have pronounced the name…. from now on his name is called Bwang'amoe while the audience answers to the aﬃrmative by saying yes. After the ceremony, the warrior is presented to his age group to walk with him and feed him and protect him.

The Jie for example are worth mentioning. The Jie are respected by the Turkana and the Toposa. The Turkana and the Toposa believe that they both came from the Jie now in Kotido district in Uganda. When the Toposa and the Turkana kill a Jie person, they perform the akiger and the ceremony explained above. According to them they have killed an enemy. But the contrary is when the Jie kills a Turkana; they don't go through the ceremony as according to them they have by accident killed their own brother. They instead go and destroy an anthill and come back home and take the animals out for performance of rituals to mourn a family member. This is funny as the turkana and the Toposa do not do the same for them.

3.1.4.1.11Strategies and Tactics used by Ethnic Militia in the Loki Convergence.

The militia activity is built on tactics in terms of how attacks are planned and executed, who is involved in the planning, time preferred to launch attacks, length of engagement, the avenues of retreat etc. the attacks are planned by the sectional commanders of various kraals and also depending on the strength required to raise the attacking force compared to the opposing force and strengths of the enemy kraal to be attacked. This starts all along by coordination of information and the intention to attack an enemy kraal. The sanction is also passed by the kraal leaders and the war veterans informed of the intention to do so. When the sanction is given the process now is left with the sectional heads and their teams to coordinate small logistics like surveillance and reconnaissance trips to conﬁrm the location of the kraal, the number of cattle (interest) to be raided, the routes to be used to drive the cattle, the strategic

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points to use as observation points and points of exit, the water points on the way, the key routes to seal to stop the pursuing enemies, the adjoining enemy kraals to block from rescuing the attacked kraal, down to the point where the loot will be distributed or shared. 3.1.4.1.12Reconnaissance, Intelligence gathering and planning.

Prior to the day of the attack, the reconnaissance teams bring back the information on the key issues of their tasks above. This is what informs the mobilization arrangements to stay or cancel the plans of the raid. This is shared in a popular gathering called ekokwa. The children and the women are not permitted in this meeting. It is for senior and important people with experience and war records as they have advice to share and experience to give. The finer details of the attack and assault plan are discussed, reviewed and endorsed from time to time till the final plan is arrived at.When the plan is finally approved and endorsed by the war council, the soldiers ‐ ethnic militia are now officially deployed to stage the attack. This is done after the serious blessings from the key elders believed to be pious, spiritual and reverent and with luck to help the militia win the battle. The blessings and the marching orders go with bulls eaten to give energy and to challenge the militia to come back victorious. Apart from these pool blessings, there are also blessings administered by various parents to their children. The parents additionally, fold off and don't use their beddings till the raiders come back home safely. The curses are also pronounced on the enemy fighters to be naïve, lousy, careless and weak so as to give the attacking groups the walkover over them. 3.1.4.1.13 Timing of the Attacks.

The time to launch the attack depends on variety of factors. The attack has to be planned in a manner that there is resounding success, minimized losses and costs on the attackers, there is resounding defeat for the enemy, the enemy has to appear to be initially weakened by other catastrophes say natural disasters, drought, famine, or livestock diseases and epidemics. The attacks are launched at the opportune time to take advantage of certain events above. The rainy season is one such opportune moment, the settlement of the enemies close to the enemy territory is another opportunity, the use of the peace to masquerade and disguise for planned attack, luring the enemy to share pastoral resources with them in your territory are the best times to launch the attacks, in these circumstances, the factors are allowed to hold so as to mount a successful raid on the enemy.

The battle of Narus in 1992 and the battle of Kanyang'ang'iro of 2004 have something in common. In that while it was dry in Turkana in both the times, the Toposa and the Dodoth alike invited the Turkana to share pasture with them in peace disguise then attacked them. The Turkana in both the circumstances had settled deeper in the enemy territory; the intention was to deal them a big serious blow and take all their property to avenge the historical defeats by them in the past. The Turkana fought so hard to disembark from the siege mounted on them and managed to safe so much in spite of the barricades and barriers of ambushes mounted to destroy them.

For the Dassenech for example, the best time to destroy them is when they come out of the Omo River. Any plan to attack and destroy them will materialize

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as they can't cross the river with boats and with all their belongings‐ children, livestock, women, the old, food supplies etc. the raid is paned and executed in a way that makes the enemy unable and capable to order and organize himself to put up a ﬁght and the same time defend his property. Another time to deal them a blow for example is when there has been a lot of rain on the Ethiopian side of the Omo River and their livestock are invested by tick and hence the need to migrate overland towards Kenya.

Generally, the attacks are stages in the rainy season so that there is no burden to feed the raided cattle since there are pastoral resources everywhere. At this point also, there would be no need for peace to share anything since everybody has enough water and pasture. As we have seen in the two examples of Narus and Kanyang'ang'iro above, the other best time is when the enemy plays in to the hands of his attackers by being invited to share pastoral resources. In the dry season, some communities especially the Turkana would want to move towards Uganda to share the pastoral resources with the Dodoth or the Jie. This is best time to hit them as happened before. The turkana on their part wait for the Dodoth and the Jie to climb down the Ugandan escarpment. The Nyang'atom on their part and the Pokot for example would do the same if the enemy settled close to their guns. The Matheniko once said the big river (nangolol apolon) has brought them cattle when the Turkana migrated to Uganda through the route of nangolol apolon. That is to say free cattle have been brought by the owners through the river and the battle to take them is cheap.

The time when a certain group is poorly organized or supplied in terms of ammunition is the opportune moment to raid them by the group that is organized or well supplied with them. During the height of the Sudanese, Ugandan and Ethiopian civil war, it was hectic to keep peace among these communities since there were steady ﬂows of arms into the illegal hands in the convergence and raids were a common place. It was also the time to acquire and try new acquisitions of arms. 3.1.4.1.14Duration and nature of engagements.

The length of engagement is not well‐studied phenomena in the fight. But is dictated by the among other things the strengths of the parties in conflict by being able to sustain the engagement, the amount of ammunition in possession by the groups, the achievement of the objective – that is if the cattle raided have been taken in the first fire and the attackers have left with them or the victims are still defending and resisting the attack to dispossess them of property. The death of key group leaders in the battle can lead to the intensification of the conflict or quick withdraw so as to safe the rest because the command would have been destroyed in effect by the death of the team leaders. The team leaders fight and do not just give orders from some hill or remote place somewhere. When the attackers have lost one of their leading men on the expedition, they will decide to ensure they don't lose cattle and now hold on taking more livestock to avenge his death as well or just safe the rest of the fighting men to fight another day which will be well‐planned and intensive than this one. The longer and the shorter the time of military engagement depend on the ability to walk over the enemy and for him to give in and also for the attackers to be satisfied with their loot and leave or the ability of the attacked to put up the best resistance or for them to inflict strategic losses on the attackers

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Toposa militia. The youth in the background is wearing an ammunition belt over the shoulder. In the right foreground, note the older bolt‐action riﬂe (ﬁghting‐stick) that complements the everday walking stick of the elder.

The kind of engagement differs from the circumstances of the war or battle theatre. The time of engagement differs when the battle is fought at home or at the grazing point or water point or when the kraal is attacked while migrating. It is more heavy and lengthy when fought at home, in the water point than while the kraal is migrating or when the cattle are attacked while grazing. This is because the pockets and the spirit of resistance is big a home than when just out there. The attack while the kraal is migrating or at the water point is normally a surprise attack technique and tactic that is well planned to take the enemy by surprise and to defeat them. The resistance depends on the fighting pattern which is given when in a settled mood than when on transit or on surprise attack. It is operated on turning the enemy mistakes and disadvantages to the attackers' advantages in the encounter. However, even when the enemy appears to have been defeated and animals taken away; it is not unusual for them to mount another encounter on the attackers while on his way back home to victory. This explains the fact that until you get home and share the animals, it is not yet over. The pursuing enemy could even attack that evening or the other day. The strategy has been the planned attack is also merged with another sub plans to change the settlement – move away from the path of possible retaliation. This has happened many times. 3.1.4.1.15Withdrawal and Retreat. The avenues for retreat and withdrawal are founded on the developments of the battle. If the engagement is of a kind that inflicts losses on any side in the equation, then the battle is called off even by some key combatants asking their guys to stop it at that. This is done on the basis of carrying over or carrying

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forward the battle to the next day of encounter. Just like the formal army, the blame shall be on the head of the commander who orders the troops to advance to be finished rather than to retreat and withdraw to fight another day and to safe the honour of the army. At times when the losses are so colossal and significant, a retreat is advisable, it can be seen in the attacking plan and there are signs and indicators to it. It is the responsibility of the sector commanders to manage this. They will be called to account by the high command later after the battle. This lesson shall be shared to be avoided in the future battles. The withdrawal or tactical retreat is undertaken on the face of serious imminent danger to be suffered or serious defeat by the enemy. It is tactical in the sense that, you will have saved much in your plans but the enemy would rejoice he dispersed you. It is also another tactic to reduce the number of the regiment and attack the enemy with small quick and lighter force that is easy to command and mobilize. When or even before the battle plans go awry, the sector commander takes stock of his men to ensure none has committed a serious moral crime such as adultery or elopement with someone's wife. Such tings haunt the successes of the regiment and could result in serious losses and backlashes on the effectiveness and efficacy of the expedition.

Every raiding expedition has its name it is called ajore(meaning the brigade or the regiment). It is named after the name of the key leader, the year, place it is to raid, the main event to which it should mark for example: ajore aabiro(the regiment of the stick – abiro, in this expedition, the man called abiro let down the whole plan on the eve of the attack just 100 metres to enemy fences, he fired the gun by mistake and this called off the whole attack plan because the enemy was now alerted of the plans to attack. It was a very ghastly and sordid withdraw, he was later beaten and almost died), nakelikon (the regiment of those who eat anything. There are attendant inconveniences in the raiding expedition such as fatigue, hunger, lack of water, trekking for long etc. the raiders could even take months while in the bush which strategizing to attack, so they could eat anything they could find), ajore a ngisiet(a regiment in which raiders became starved and got skinny), ajore ameritaruk (this regiment was going to attack a place called Ameritaruk in Loole). The plans to wage and mount a successful raid are squarely on the shoulders of the commanders and their assistants. 3.1.4.2 Militia Groups in South Sudan

Following the elections that ushered in the interim government during the CPA period, some of the defeated candidates expressed dissatisfaction with the conduct and outcomes of the elections at local level. In a number of regions, losing candidates mobilized their communities into an organized militia and declared war on the state. This is an indicator that there were high expectations for post‐revolution rewards especially among former resistance 140 commanders . In most of these instances, these defeated candidates still commanded the loyalty of armed resistance ﬁghters particularly from their communities who had been demobilized from the SPLA after independence. These frustrated/ disgruntled members of SPLA who felt left out broke away to mount a series of insurrections against the state betraying the fact that the SPLA was probably never a truly national resistance movement but rather a 140 'chaotic aggregate' of community militia sharing a common object of Interview with anonymous local respondent, aggression. Gordon Kong, George Athor, Peter Gadet and David Yau Yau are World Bank Juba O ce examples of ethnic commanders who fall into this category. In other instances,

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once a leader gained public oﬃce, he would be unable to secure formal employment for many of his followers, as it required academic qualiﬁcations that they did not have.

3.1.4.2.1Yau Yau

Whilst many of the armed youth in South Sudan have eschewed adopting a formal militia identity, it has been left to them to look for alternative sources of income. They have resorted to the illegal taxation in the payams (administrative districts outside Juba). We gathered reports of Ad Hoc road levies being applied 141 by armed militia on commercial vehicles plying the Juba‐Nimule highway . As a consequence trade goods and transportation costs in Juba have also reﬂected a marginal increase. Conﬂicting reports indicated that traders and transporters were taking advantage of a few isolated incidents to hike their prices. Furthermore, a rising incidence of violent crime particularly targeting foreigners in the capital and other urban spaces is increasingly attributed to these demobilized but un‐integrated youth. In his independence day speech of 2013, the president of south sudan went as far as to express alarm at the soaring crime 142 rate in the cities . He stressed on the need to impose more discipline among the organised forces.

The South Sudan Democratic Liberation Army (SSDLA) under the leadership of David Yau Yau is the principal militia group active inside South Sudan. It is also possibly the only group that has its guns turned against the state. The group's operations have been concentrated in Upper Nile and Jonglei states. However after rejecting the amnesty offer in April 2013, Yau Yau has become further isolated and the Government of South Sudan has focussed its forces in containing the insurgency and limiting his operations to a smaller geographical area. He has been pushed out of the Upper Nile and is currently reported to be confined to the locality of Pibor in Jonglei state. We were unable to find any evidence of linkages of Yau Yau to community militia present further south in Eastern Equitoria and Loki convergence spaces. There are allegations that the 143. Government of Sudan supports Yau Yau Reports indicate that supplies of food and ammunition arrive via uncharted air corridors from Khartoum. The Government of South Sudan is unable to monitor civil aviation in these areas 144 because there are few airports and also due to capacity limitations .

David Yau Yau's re‐emergence in 2012 poses a signiﬁcant threat to the stability of South Sudan. Previously active as a rebel leader between May 2010 and June 2011, Yau Yau rejoined the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in June 2011 but re‐ defected in April 2012, resuming operations in Jonglei state in 141 Ibid August 2012. His forces and mobilized Murle youths have attacked SPLA 142 UNMISS (9 July 2013) Kiir says era of impunity installations in the major centers of Likuangole, Pibor, Gumuruk, Manyabol, and on corruption crimes is over http://unmiss.unmissions.org/LinkClick.aspx? l Koth Char in Pibor County. Yau Yau recently captured Boma town. Besides Murle eticket=t5Vl1UnwTx8%3D&tabid=3540&langu youths, Yau Yau's allied forces now include members of other communities such age=en-US [Retrieved 22 July 2013] as the Shilluk, Dinka, Boya and Toposa. 143

Small Arms Survey, Sudan (2012) http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/ lead min/docs/facts- gures/south-sudan/armedgroups/southern-dissident-militias/HSBAArmed-Groups-Yau-Yau.pdf [Retrieved 22 July 2013] 144 Interview with Lt. Col. Majak Akec Malok

Yau Yau launched his ﬁrst revolt in May 2010, operating primarily in Pibor County. His armed engagements with the SPLA resembled minor banditry attacks rather than full military operations and resulted in relatively low death tolls. Yau Yau also reportedly distributed arms among Murle youths who attacked Uror County in August 2011. Yau Yau's militia remains active, and is

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gaining ground in Jonglei, destabilizing not only that state but also into Eastern Equatoria, Upper Nile, and Central Equatoria. In April 2012, the SPLA announced that Yau Yau re‐defected from the SPLA. Yau Yau has since remained active in Pibor County. Its forces is said to be capitalizing on the Murle's heightened resentment over the SPLA's repressive disarmament process. Yau Yau is thought to have mobilized between 3,000 and 6,000 youths, though the exact relationship between the youths and the militia group is unclear. Yau Yau and his ﬁghters usually serve simply as conduits for arms and ammunition without having the youths' actual allegiance. Weapons and ammunition that the Small Arms Survey believes Khartoum supplied to Yau Yau's forces have been appearing in use in inter‐communal conﬂicts in several areas throughout 145 Greater Upper Nile .

The GoSS alleges that the Sudanese government provides material support to Yau Yau's rebellion, as it had supported George Athor. On 22 September 2012, UNMISS witnessed an unmarked ﬁxed‐wing aircraft dropping seven or eight packages a few kilometers from its base in Likuangole. The GoSS alleged that the airdrops came from Sudan. In February 2013, the Small Arms Survey found that the weapons and ammunition possessed by Capt. James Kuburin and his followers—who defected from Yau Yau in December 2012—were identical to those used by SAF and other Khartoum‐backed Southern insurgent groups. 3.1.4.2.2Bordeline Belt Groups.

These are the other militia groups that occasionally operate from inside South Sudanese territory but whose guns are pointed towards Khartoum. They include the SPLA‐North, Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM). In this same area are community militia from the Ngok and Bul Dinka communities, Lou Nuer and Murle in Abiyei, Southern Blue Nile, Kordofan and Jonglei states are engaged in inter‐community warfare and cattle raiding.

Militia that were previously funded and supported by the Khartoum government are returning to South Sudan. One example of the returnees is Kong. It is noteworthy that the army is currently beyond its capacity to absorb returning militia. In fact, frustrations and challenges set in when they cannot be absorbed more so when they cannot be absorbed at the rank they currently hold. One of the militia leaders that sought reabsorption was at the same rank as the president, this posed a serious threat. The current Vice President of South Sudan was a leader of a breakaway militia supported by Khartoum when he returned was absorbed into the number two position.

Even when a militia is legitimately absorbed, the army is unable to fully accommodate the total militia e.g. if 500 persons present themselves the army is only able to take in 200/300. The unabsorbed militia are engaged in much of the robbery that is ongoing in South Sudan. However most of these crimes are opportunistic. These men are not organized. 3.1.4.2.3Justice and Equality Movement

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Human security baseline assessment for Sudan and South Sudan

It was formed in 2003 by a group of educated, politically experienced Darfurians, many of them former members of the Popular Congress Party (PCP) of Hassan al Turabi, architect of Sudan's Islamic revolution. Most of its leaders

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and membership initially came from the Kobe tribe, a Zaghawa sub‐group more numerous in Chad than in Darfur. JEM is estimated to have more than 5,000 men armed with mounted anti‐aircraft guns, rocket‐propelled grenades, heavy machine guns, AK‐47s, around 1,000 vehicles, and at least two tanks, seized from the government. To this day, JEM remains the strongest and most cohesive military force in Darfur. JEM is said to have lost its main strongholds in North Darfur including in the mountainous Jebel Mun area in 2010 after it was expelled from Chad. The rebel group has reactivated a largely dormant presence across South Darfur—south of Ed Daein, along the main supply route 146 to Nyala, and south of Um Kadada .

Towards the end of 2010, JEM established a political presence in Kampala, along with several other Darfurian factions. The Ugandan government is said to have organized military training for JEM recruits outside Kampala. The rebel group has also been receiving ﬁnancial support from supporters in the Zaghawa and Islamist diaspora—especially by Arab Islamists who sympathized with the PCP but were expelled from Sudan, losing many of their assets, after the Islamist movement split in 1999 and Turabi was stripped of all his power. Since 2011, several factions have merged with JEM among them the notable Sudanese Bloc to Liberate the Republic led by its leader Magoub Hussein who was a former member of the LJM joined JEM in October 3, 2011 and Zakaria Musa JEM‐ 147 Corrective Leadership (JEM‐CL) in mid January 2012 .The rebel Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) claimed responsibility of the Saturday 27 July attack on military convoy escorting four tankers of fuel belonging to the United 148 Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) on Dalang‐Dibibad road . The group's oﬃcial spokesperson Gibreel Adam Bilal said they captured the four 149 tankers and other vehicles loaded with weapons and ammunition .

146

As the country's largest opposition movement, the JEM's active force 150 includes over 35,000 Sudanese . The organization also constitutes the most sizable component of the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF), a coalition of opposition groups.Since April 2012, JEM is said to have massed its ﬁghters in South Kordofan upon which the Darfuri group provided about the half of the force that attacked Abu Kershola on 27 April. JEM has recently been ﬁghting in Southern Kordofan for regime change, allegedly with support from South Sudan and Uganda.

Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan. http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org 147 Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan http://www.smallarmssurveysudan.org/ lead min/docs/facts- gures/sudan/darfur/armedgroups/opposition/HSBA-Armed-GroupsJEM.pdf 148 AP, Sudan says rebels kill 9 soldiers in ambush. Published July 31, 2013 149 Sudan Tribune. Wednesday July 31, 2013. Dilling attack was carried by Darfur rebels: MP 150 http://justiceandequalitymovement.com 151 Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan Small Arms Survey. Beyond Janjaweed Understanding the Militias of Darfur 152 Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan Small Arms Survey

3.1.4.2.4 Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF)

It was formed in November 13 2011 after the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the South Liberation Army faction of Minni Minawi (SLA‐ MM) and Abdul Wahid (SLA‐ AW) joined together in an alliance with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement‐ North (SPLM‐N). SRF is led by Malik Agar as the 151 Chairman and Al Hilu as the commander in chief of the joint military forces . Militarily, the alliance provides Darfur groups with access to the Nuba Mountains as rear bases and potentially as staging areas for attacks on Khartoum.

The SRF's locus of control resides in its bastion in Kaoda, and the Nuba Mountains, South Kordofan. Military activity is most prevalent in South 152 Kordofan but extends to Blue Nile and into South Sudan's border states . It's

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Darfurian members remain militarily active in Darfur but reﬂecting their proximity to Kauda and the South Sudan border.SRF also claimed the responsibility of the Saturday 27 July attack on military convoy escorting four tankers of fuel belonging to the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) on Dalang‐Dibibad road. The group's oﬃcial spokesperson Gibreel Adam Bilal said they captured the four tankers and other vehicles loaded with weapons and ammunition. 3.1.4.2.5Janjaweed

This rebel group was formed in 1988 with Sheikh Musa Hilal as its commander. Since its formation, the rebel group was silent until July 2003 when it became much more aggressive after two non‐Arab groups, the Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement, took up arms against the Sudanese government, alleging mistreatment by the Arab regime in 153 Khartoum . In response to the uprising, the Janjaweed militias began pillaging towns and villages inhabited by members of the African tribes from which the rebel armies draw their strength—the Zaghawa, Masalit, and Fur tribes. Hilal moved its operations to his base in Misteriya, southwest of Kebkabiya in North Darfur, under the direction of the Sudanese army. Misteriya is now one of the 154 largest militia training bases in the region .

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Janjaweed have been formally integrated into Khartoum's People's Defense Force (PDF), a paramilitary wing of the government forces. The Janjaweed are distinct from, but allied with, the indigenous nomadic Arab tribes of Darfur in the conﬂict. Janjaweed aid Khartoum by not only providing free military, terror, and ethnic cleansing services, but they also drive survivors to camps where the international community pays for their care. Khartoum generally refuses to acknowledge its support and/or control of the Janjaweed, claiming it does not have the authority to disarm the bandits. However, this disclaimer lost a great deal of legitimacy in January 2008 when Janjaweed leader Musa Hilal was 155 appointed to a high position as an advisor in the Sudanese government . The Janjaweed was identiﬁed as the leading regime force in the killing of more than 200,000 people in Darfur. In 2007, the International Criminal Court, issued an indictment for its commander, Abdul Rahman for allegedly leading in attacks in which more than 400 villages were completely destroyed, 400,000 lives were 156 lost and more than 2,500, 000 people displaced .

Slate Newspaper.Who are the Janjaweed? A guide to the Sudanese militiamen. 154 Human Rights Watch. Failing Darfur: Entrenching Impunity: Government Responsibility for International Crimes in Darfur. 1V. Ground Forces of Ethnic Cleansing the Janjaweed Militias. http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/ les/features /darfur/ veyearson/report4.html 155 WorldSavvy. JANJAWEED MILITIAS. http://worldsavvy.org/communityresources/monitor-resources/janjaweedmilitias/ 156 United Human Rights Council. Genocide in Darfur http://www.unitedhumanrights.org/genocide/ genocide-in-sudan.htm

3.1.4.2.6South Sudan Democratic Movement/Army

The Movement was formed in 2010 by former Sudan People's Liberation Army general George Athor after he failed to win the governorship of Jonglei in what was then the Autonomous Government of Southern Sudan. It is active in the state of Jonglei as well as neighbouring Upper Nile. Many SSDM ﬁghters are from the Murle, a minority tribe that has long disputed herds of livestock and pasturing grounds with a fellow cattle ranching tribe, the Lou Nuer. Under Athor's leadership, Murle tribesmen repeatedly clashed with the Lou Nuer and the armed forces of South Sudan throughout much of 2011. The rebel group signed a peace deal with the Juba government on 27 February 2012.

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3.1.4.2.7South Sudan Liberation Army The SSLM was formed in 1999. It operates and controls the upper Nile region in the context of widespread factional ﬁghting among the Western Nuer ethnic group of Unity, South Sudan, who had signed a peace treaty with the government on 21 April 1997. The rebel group Minni Minawi faction 's claimed responsibility in which two Ukrainians and four Sudanese nationals were held hostage after their helicopter made emergency landing in August 3, 2013.

3.1.4.2.8Anyanya II

Led by Gordon Kong, anyanaya was a peasant revolt against the SPLA that ran for several years before joining forces with Riek Machar during the 1991 Nasir split in the SPLA. When Machar rejoined the SPLA movement, Kong remained on the Khartoum side. A former deputy of Paulino Matip, Kong has drawn his support from the Nuer‐dominated Nasir area of Upper Nile. Kong lives in Khartoum, commands Tanginye, and maintains large numbers of loyalist‐ 157 armed elements in the North and South that are members of the SAF JIUs . 3.1.4.2.9Azania Liberation Front

It was an armed faction during the first Sudanese civil war. It was a part of the original South Sudan Liberation Movement, the first Sudanese secessionist movement. Formed after February 1965 when the Sudan Africa National Union (SANU) was divided into two sectors, the home and foreign. The home sector was led by William Deng Nhial, it sat in the Parliament on the issue of South Sudan's right to self‐determination. The foreign sector was directed by Sanus Aggrey Jaden, who fled to Kampala in Uganda. In November 1964 Joseph Oduho, the first president of SANU, after losing the presidency of the group to Jaden left, spliting the organization. On March 1965 Oduho formed his own organization, the Azania Liberation Front, Jaden then renamed the SANU loyalists the Sudan African Liberation Front. In June the two factions settled and by the end of 1965 they decided to reunite under as the Azania Liberation Front with Oduho as the president and Aggrey Jaden as vice president. In 1967 they headed the National Transitional Government of South Sudan (formed on August 15, 1967). 3.1.4.2.10SPLA Nasir

The SPLA‐Nasir was a splinter faction of the Sudan People's Liberation Army, a rebel group that fought in the Second Sudanese Civil War. Originally created as an attempt by the Nuer tribe to replace SPLA leader John Garang in August 1991, it gradually became coopted by the government.

3.1.4.3Organized Militia in South Western Ethiopia 3.1.4.3.1The Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) 157

Mayank Bubna (2011) Enough: South sudan's Militias 158 Encyclopedia Britannica. Western Somali Liberation Front. Role in Ogaden war. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/6 40893/Western-Somali-Liberation-Front

It was a separatist rebel group ﬁghting in eastern Ethiopia to create an independent state. It played a major role in the Ogaden War of 1977‐78 assisting the invading Somali Army. Since the end of the Ethiopian Civil War, the WSLF was almost totally incorporated into the Western Somali Democratic Party. The 158 group is believed to have approximately 35,000 regulars and 15,000 ﬁghters .

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3.1.4.3.2Benishangul People's Liberation Movement (BPLM)

It was established in 1995 and has continued to carry out cross‐border attacks, mainly against developmental facilities in Ethiopia's Benishangul 159 Gumuz state, which borders Sudan .There are allegations that Khartoum and Eritrea have had ties with the BPLM. The rebel group has been operating in Eritrea and in Sudan In June 2013 the Ethiopian government and the BPLM said that they had laid down their arms. Buses carrying hundreds of members of the Benishangul People's Liberation Movement (BPLM) arrived at Benishangul Gumuz region where they were reported to have been warmly welcomed by thousands of people. 3.1.4.3.4Gambelan Democratic Movement (GDM)

The rebel group was formed to ﬁght for the right of indigenous people of Gambela. In 2012,the group issued an announcement that unless the terms of land grab in Gambela region are reversed in favour of Gambela people, there won't be peace in the region. GDM has since been claiming to be ﬁghting in order to stop the sale of Anyuaks' [a tribe living in Gambela] land to foreigners and for the return of displaced Anyuaks to their ancestral lands from 160 concentration camps .

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Sudan tribute Ethiopia Somali Democratic Council. New Ethiopian rebel group "repulses" government attack in west 160

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onvergence Name of Group Year of Formation Coalition of Resistant Congolese A.k.a Mai Mai Formed March 2007 Mai‐Mai and FARDC General Kakulu Sikuli Vasaka

Fort (strong) Historical grievances over Land, Political disenfranchisement

Status/Size/Type of Formation

Factions/ Composition

Status: Active Organized and militarized militia formation 300‐400 soldiers1

Status: Active PARECO Splinter group led by Lieutenant Colonel Marcel Habarugira Rangira (Ex‐ FARDC and Ex‐ PARECO) assisted by Captain Innocent ‘Binebine’ Mateso

Several factions have emerged under the leadership of diﬀerent commanders e.g. LaFontaine and Mugabo Conglomerate of discontented Rwandophone (Hutu) military and political elites Sympathetic Elements of Nande and Hunde communities.

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SALW’s Principally Kalashnikov Pattern Riﬂes (AK‐47) Favour weapons ﬁring 7.62mm ammunition GPMG’s including FN‐ MAG (Belgium), PK (Russian) and Sterling (UK) machine guns RPG‐7 (Russian)

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Non‐Rwandophone communities (possibly Nande and Hunde) in South Kivu It is possible that this is a multiplication of identities to distance themselves

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Instruments of violence

Illegal mining Human traﬃcking

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Location of Operations Pinga Town, North Kivu and environs

Lukopfu, central Masisi highlands, North Kivu

State Responses, Engagement & Trivia Armed engagements against Tutsi forces Integrated into DRC national army in January 2009. Allied the FARDC Army) with the exception of Mai (Patriotic Alliance for a Free and Sovereign Congo) under Gen. Janvier Buingo Karairi

Opposed to M23

Armed Actors Issue Brief No. 1 April 2013 http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/ﬁleadmin/docs/G-Issue-briefs/SAS-AA-IB1-DDR-in-the-DRC.pdf [Retrieved 11 Sept 2013]

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40‐200 soldiers (mainly Ex‐ PARECO) 3

Nyatura (Hit hard) (a.k.a. PARECO‐Fort?): Formed August 2011 Led by Lieutenant Colonel Matias Kalume Kage Political wing led by Bizagwira Muhindi (President, PARECO South Kivu) Historical grievances on Land and Political disenfranchisement

CNDP National Congress for the Defence of the People Formed December 2006 by Laurent Nkunda (Former Commander in RCD)

Status: Active PARECO Splinter group or N. Kivu incarnation of PARECO‐fort 40‐200 soldiers (mainly Ex‐ PARECO)

Status: Defunct. (Oﬃcially disbanded in April 2012) Organized and Milititarized Tutsi Counter‐ militia group Estimated force of 8500 soldiers at its peak

Non‐Rwandophone communities in South Kivu (possibly Nande and Hunde) that are nevertheless opposed to Rwandophone (both Hutu and Tutsi) domination

Congolese Tutsi

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the bulk of the soliders in PARECO‐Fort are deserters from the main force SALW’s Principally Kalashnikov Pattern Riﬂes (AK‐47) Favour weapons ﬁring 7.62mm ammunition GPMG’s including FN‐ MAG(Belgium), PK (Russian) and Sterling (UK) machine guns RPG‐7 (Russian)

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Pro‐FDLR (DRC proxy militia. interhamwe/impuzamugam bi) Engaged in peace talks with Raia Mutomboki in November 2012 that led to a formal ceaseﬁre in February 2013

Illegal taxation (Collected in excess of USD 140 000 per month) Human rights Violations: Kiwandja Masssacre (North Kivu, 2008) in which 67 civilians were killed

South Kivu, dominated the Masisi highlands between Ngungu and Mweso

Alleged Rwandese Government Support Anti‐FDLR (DRC proxy militia. interhamwe/impuzamugam bi) Anti‐FARDC (DRC National Army) Nkunda arrested in 2009 and replaced by Bosco Ntanganda Ntanganda disbands CNDP in April 2012 but resists integration into FARDC (DRC National Army) to form M23 with Col. Sultani Makenga who was a

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*Weapons similarity is down to the fact that PARECO‐Fort and Nyatura could be the same group. Kalashnikov pattern machine guns FN‐MAG (Belgium) SPG‐9 Kopye ‘spear’73 mm recoilless gun (Russian) RPG‐7 rocket launcher (Russian)

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M23: 23 March Movement Supposedly Formed on 23rd March 2012 but oﬃcial announcements made in April and May. Armed Rebellion/ Mutiny against Kinshasa’s attempts to dismantle CNDP and integrate it into the national army (Mixage)

Status: Active Estimated peak force of 6,000 soldiers Initially led by Bosco Ntanganda and Sultani Makenga Sultani Makenga now retains sole military command following Ntanganda’s surrender and the sacking of Political leader and Ntanganda ally, Jean‐Marie Runiga Lugerero in March 20132. Bertand Bisimwa is the titular president and spokesperson for M233 Lt. Col Eric Badege is a Key tactical oﬃcer building

Former CNDP oﬃcers and servicemen who rejected mixage in 2012 Congolese Tutsi dominated

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*Since M23 is largely constituted of CNDP/FARDC deserters, we presume that the weapons arsenal is similar Kalashnikov pattern machine guns FN‐MAG (Belgium) SPG‐9 Kopye ‘spear’73 mm recoilless gun (Russian) RPG‐7 rocket launcher (Russian) *However M23 is also reportedly in possession of sophisticated military equipment reportedly supplied by Rwanda4 Night Vision Equipment 120 mm Mortars

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Occupation of Goma in November 2012 in deﬁance of MONUSCO presecence

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North Kivu

former commander in CNDP and allegedly responsible for the Kiwandja Massacre Alleged Rwandese and Ugandan Government Support Anti‐FDLR (DRC proxy militia. interhamwe/impuzamugam bi) Anti‐FARDC (DRC National Army) Clashes with MONUSCO intervention force in 2013 Opponents to the various Mai‐Mai factions but not all of them. For instance, Mai‐Mai Kifuafua are committed to ejecting the M23 but Raia Mutomboki as the franchise‐holders are focused on countering the FDLR. This could be a function of Geography whereby their territory does not overlap with that of the M23. Sultani Makenga was the FARDC deputy commander of the Amani Leo operation in South Kivu

Red Pepper, Sacked M23 Leader Arrested In Rwandahttp://www.redpepper.co.ug/sacked-m23-leader-arrested-in-rwanda/ [Retrieved 11 Sept 2013] Daily Maverick, (16 April 2013) Q&A: Bertrand Bisimwa, the man leading M23http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2013-04-16-qa-bertrand-bisimwa-the-man-leading-m23/ [Retrieved 11 September 2013 4 HRW (2013), DR Congo: M23 Rebels Kill, Rape Civilians https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/22/dr-congo-m23-rebels-kill-rape-civilians [Retrieved 11 September 2013] 3

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FDC: Forces de défense congolaise Founded by Gen. Luanda Butu Occasionally assumes the identity of Raia Mutomboki *

MCC:Mouvement congolais pour le changement Formed in 2012 by Col. Bede Rusagara

decampment of Bosco Ntanganda to the CNDP Hunde and Nyanga eththnic groups

Status: Active Rusagara is from the Bafuliiri Ethnic Community Estimated force of 250 Soldiers

Internecine ﬁghting has led to emergence of several yet unidentiﬁed factions

M23/ CNDP weapon stocks

Conglomerate of several armed groups Actively recruiting Banyamulenge including from refugee camps in Burundi and Uganda

Presumably weapon stocks from the FARDC arsenal

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Illegal taxation Control of cassertite and gold mines

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Attack on FARDC training camp

Southwestern Masisi

Alleged control of entire Ruzizi plain Kahanda Uvira South Kivu Luberizi

Enjoyed the support of CNDP/M23’s Bosco Ntanganda though reportedly a union of convenience Anti FDLR (Interahambwe) Collaborated with NDC/ Mai‐Mai Sheka in 2010 against FARDC Col. Rusagara served under Mai‐Mai Commander, Col. Baudouin Nyakabaka. He He joined the RCD, the CNDP and integrated into the FARDC. Deserted in 2011 to form his militia Cousin to Bike Rusagara, acting Chief of the Ruzizi Plain Anti‐FARDC Reported to collaborate with M23 and ALEC: Alliance de libération de l’est du Congo

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Interviews AbdurahmanWarsame, Mogadishu bureau chief, Xinhua news agency, Brig Michael Ondoga, AMISOM sector 1 Contingent Commander Capt. Nasikilia AMISOM Serviceman (UPDF on leave from Baidoa) Col. Ali, AMISOM spokesperson District OďŹ&#x192;cer, Mpeketoni, Tana Delta Kenya Lt. General Andrew Gutti, AMISOM Force Commander. Maj. Henry Obbo AMISOM sector 1 PIO and Orma herdsmen, Kilelengwani, Tana Delta Kenya

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Pokomo farmers, Kilelengwani, Tana Delta Kenya

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