The Axis of Extraction in the Horn by The Consulting House

1.0 Introduction

Militia Groups, Predatory States and Rogue Capital

This paper examines the 'tripartite fellowship' between predatory states, rogue capital and militia groups in the horn. In summoning the evidence, we focus on the three convergences of study: Kivu, Ogaden and Loki. The three represent complex conﬂict systems with diﬀerent manifestations of illicit markets. We then advance to explain the 'axis‐of‐ extraction' in each of the convergences contributes to both soft and hard insecurity.

In interrogating the historical, statistical and empirical evidence, we put to debate positions occupied by UN Reports and those by selected western institutions with our own primary data. Our position, in some instances, is that UN and other popularly consumed reports tend to misread the extraction business in especially the Congo. Commonplace positions have been uncritically adopted in discourse without a rigorous triangulation of the evidence. We attempt to debate the evidence and raise questions of interpretation. Given that this is 'work‐in‐progress', our conclusions remain tentative pending further analysis and review.

Focus of the paper is the extraction chain in the Kivu Convergence and the new players in place, including China; the contra‐band economy in the Ogaden Convergence and the role of formal armies in the extraction chain; and the illicit SAWL trade in the Loki Convergence. An attempt to link the three convergences is on‐going, but this paper will treat them separately.

Buzan B (1991), People, States and Fear, 2nd edition, An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post war Era, Harvester Whitshiaf, New York 2 Lonsdale J, States and Social Processes in Africa ' African Studies Review 29,2-3, 1981

2.0 Context of Vertical Extraction 2.1 Historical Extraction Chains

Vertical extraction in the horn has its root in centuries of predation of touching on human and material resources1. Critical in the former are the effects of slavery. Few regions did suffer consequences of predation like the kingdom of Kongo, that brought together the Bakongo of present day Angola, and the DRC with their capital at Mbanza‐Kongo. In contact with Europeans as early as 1491, the Kingdom would suffer severe 'human extraction' with the last 'human cargo' diverted to Liberia at the end of the slave trade bonanza. To this should be added the emergence of predatory states that lived on raiding, capturing, and selling captive2. This From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 02/11/2013

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primordial extractionwas accompanied by intense territorial fragmentation, and structural stagnation. More so because, the predating entities were inclined towards resource seizure rather than territorial expansion3. The second half of 19th Century saw continuity of raids by bands of slave raiders in the south east of the chad basin and attempts at centralization in some parts of the continent4. Predatory activities of the likes of El Zubeir Pasha along the Ubangi River; and Tipu Tipu Msiri of Katanga and Mirambo in Tabora reactivated caravan trade. Using raids, authoritarian tribute systems, and the recruitment of thousands of carriers the extraction machine was set.

Contemporary geographies of extraction in the Kivu, Loki and Ogaden convergences have their origins in the foregoing. A systematic process of institutionalizing extraction characterized their histories. In fact, their early 'inclusion' into the business of predation formed the basis for vertical integration into the international economic system. With maturation, this was cemented by concessionary arrangements5 where companies emerged equipped with mineral privileges, sovereign rights, allowing them to raise taxes, and to maintain armed predatory forces. It is these companies that laid the framework for 'hard' insecurity in the region. Sustained by predation, they animated atomization of lineages and clans while institutionalizing murder, and pillaging.

The colonial extraction plan started with forced disarmament and violent dispossession of the natives. It targeted both the individual and the collectif. Here legal distinctions were enforced by the state and reinforced through institutions that mediated civic participation. The first distinction was structured around race and ethnicity in the context of security. In a Foucaultian sense, security was meant to enhance the survival of the race, from threats rooted among those classified as tribal natives. Security institutions, therefore, emerged to operationalize not only the bio politics of the race, but also to enforce the logic of those who had a right to live and those who had to die. Those biologically defined as races were administered under civil law. They were allowed to express themselves in the language of rights and could bind and limit state action. The converse was the case for natives who were administered under customary laws, spoke the language of tradition6. Here custom was enforced not checked.Through this plan, civic power was de‐racialized while native 'spaces' remained ethnicized7. This way, the successor class found itself permanently 'tethered' to the tribe, while the native was forced to appropriate numerous forms of identities to survive. Ab initio, therefore, and as a result of colonial engineering, the state advanced from a position of 'diminishing stateness'. With stateness 'withering away', security would be 'commoditized' and extraction would be facilitated. And this brings us to the other distinction of the colonial plan.

3 Melilassoux ,C , Anthropologie del'esclave. Le ventre de Fer et d'argent. Paris, preses Universitaire de France 1986) 143-235. 4 Cordell D: The savanna Belt of North-Central Africa. In D Birmingham and P.M Martin (ed) History Of Central Africa Vol 1,64-65 5 See Coquerry-Vidrovitch C, Le Congo au temps des grandes companies Concessionaires, 1898-1930. Paris Mouton 1977 6 Mamdani M Citizen and Subject. Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of late colonialism( Princeton University Press, 1996) p22 7 Mamdani M : Understanding the Democratic Republic of Congo: Civil and ethnic Citizenship and the Making of the Second Rebellion. . East African alternatives Sep/Oct 1999 p30 8 Mbembe On Post Colony. Ibid. p75

Although 'tethered' to the tribe by design, the post‐colonial elite would displace what Mbembe calls the sites for political, regulatory and technical choices and transfer of them to international trustees8. With From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 02/11/2013

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this, they lose the motivation to be accountable to their citizens, instead transferring accountability to external actors. In return, they are assuredof security through strategies such as security overlays or outright outsourcing of security through either peace keepers or mercenaries. More and more functions that would otherwise be performed by public entities as a means of engendering and enhancing input‐out put roles of the state are performed by private entities that are inclined more towards extraction than public good. And this forms part of the vertical extraction DNA. 2.2Contemporary Context of Extraction

Perspectives abound drawing a nexus between resources and conflicts. Resource model theorists for instance put emphasis on internal dynamics that anchor human production. For them resource related conflicts emerge subsequent to an apparent introduction of scarce resources in an environment of scarcity. Homer‐Dixon (1991), for instance, points to scarcity of renewable resources such as agricultural land, forests, water and fish. This he attributes to three aspects; demand‐ induced scarcity animated by population growth in a given space; supply‐ induced scarcity due to resource degradation and structural scarcity arising out of unequal social distribution of resources 9. The net effects include decreased agricultural potential, regional economic decline, population displacement and disruption of legitimized and authoritative institutions and social relations10. For resource theorists these effects engender articulate grievances around social cleavages, such as ethnicity or religion, thus increasing the probability of social or civil violence especially when the societal balance of power facilitates the opportunity for grievances to be expressed as a challenge to authority11. The core objective here is to engender survival of a group through relative gains in a process animated by real or imagined threats.

Paul Collier drawing a link between resource type, its centrality in a state's economy and its modes of extraction with conflict especially rebellion. For him, oil is seen to be core to the economics of civil war. Underlying this is the fact that it encourages extortion, looting and resource predation especially where 26% of gross domestic product is dependent on resource extraction. In this sense, extend of predation determines the rates and nature of conflicts. For Collier, the risks increase with resource dependence rather than ethnic or religious diversity12. Notably, the nature of state, governance and external variables are excluded. Organized violence as clausewitzs notes is basically politics by armed means, it is about a failed process of effecting a social contract13 at the level of leadership with respect to mediating the process of allocation resources authoritatively 1 4 . Absence of instrumental competence is manifested by this crisis of state.

Homer-Dixon 1994, p 8 11 Homer-Dixon 1991, p 91 11 (Homer-Dixon 1994, p 27). 12 Collier P, The Economic Causes of Civil con ict and their Implications for Policy ( Washington DC: The World Bank 2000). 13 Hobbes Thomas. (ed. Pegson Smith). Leviathan. London, oxford University press. 14 See Easton D. A Framework for Political Analysis( Englewood Cli s,N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1965. 10

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Attempting an explanation for conflicts rooted in resources, Le Billon points to the distinctive characteristics, such as enclaves and nodes in the commodity chain that facilitates predation at a tactical level15. This includes, the ability of these chains to hold up supply to and from the pipelines. Michael Ross, in an attempt to evolve a causal logic puts to three characteristics. The first is the rentier effect (low taxes, high patronage that dampens pressure for democracy). Secondly to repression effect engendered by the direct state control over sufficient revenue to bankroll excessive military expenditures and expanded internal security apparatus. Thirdly, to modernization effect that move into industrialization and service sector jobs that disinclines elite to push for democracy16. Both Collier and Ross are in effect pointing to the challenge of vertical extraction with out meaningful value addition. This engenders exclusion, marginalization and indeed violence that can only be resisted by organized counter violence. Conflict here emerges out of the crisis of leadership at the level of ideas. This has a net effect of first of all, undermining the logic of institutional and infrastructural development. Secondly engendering interpretation of a states' mission of securitizing its physical base as objective. Instead, the state elite opts to emphasis resource extraction in disregard of human resource and territory. In this process, it is the investor and his enabling environment that counts, a process that leads to poor application of the principle of mass and economy of force at all levels.

It is imperative that dynamics that underpin resistance to state rule and especially counter organization, international and state elite role play that converges forms and modes of resource extraction are grasped if state degenerative process or fragility is to be understood. Three elements are core. The ﬁrst is nexus between lack of organization and development in the state due to elite predation and state disorganization. Second are invisible international companies and their violent mode of extractions. The ﬁrst two underpin the third which we refer to as mirror extraction by termite groups. Mutations across the three extractions converge out of apparent entropy of extraction behavior of the state to morph into astrophic resistance and violence at tactical level that at times cannibalizes. This dynamic is rooted in dependence based incorporation logic of spaces over time. Violence has to be located in the duality of extraction and destruction of growth and attributed to the process of morphing of the physical base to the metro‐ pole. Here it is not merely mineral but also human resources that is morphed out of state thus under‐ping vicious fragility. Dependency here experiences both continuity and rapture. Rapture with respect to the successor class in terms of color and continuity with respect to role and functions allocated to the state17 and its modes and forms of resource extractions.

P.Le Billion, The Political Ecology Of war ', Political Geography, Vol .100(2001)pp.561-84 idem 16 Michael Ross does oil hinder democracy? World Politics, vol. v, iii (2001) pg357 17 Elikia M'Bokolo, Historicité et Pouvoir d'état en Afrique Noire, Relations Internationales, no 324, 1983, pp.197-213

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The foregoing produces new forms of rule and political authorities that shape modes of what Roles calls governable spaces. These spaces continue to be mutated by evolving perspectives of imaginations about sources of threats and the resultant responses. To this we should add Michael Klaire's dimension of the economization of international relations, here access or imagined denial of access animates competition over the same while providing enabling resources to diﬀerent groups in their resolve to prevail over others. Convergences of extraction are characterized by the lack of penetrative infrastructure a factor that compounds distance decay. This in turn allows termite groups time and space to organize and consolidate through exploitation of terrain. By reinforcing bandit and termite economies open space to external extraction of primary materials at lesser a cost. The net violence closes the space to locals while enhancing vertical incorporation. Violence here becomes an instrument that midwives both monopolies and oligopolies of extraction.

It does not matter whether resources are diffused and proximate(meaning that they are closer to the centers of power) or diffused and spatially spread out. How groups maximize on these resources in space over time has an impact in the modes and forms of contestations. Both diffused and proximate resources are availed urban and rural areas as are diffused and distant resources in rural frontiers. The nature of the resources not only explains relations among and within groups, and between groups, but also their relations with the state, the security architecture and actor behavior. It is the attempt to gain or resist control of resources that produces conflict in spaces.

Fundamental here, is control of the infrastructure and nodes that facilitate both extraction and transactions. In this sense, actors or alliances evolve in a cascading logic driven by the need to maximize on such infrastructure to assume and consolidate over resources and by inference political power. Diﬀused and distant resources found in rural frontiers such as cattle, and responses of state security explains the security architecture of the state. In this respect, politics of marginalization will tend to converge with the impact of the kin country phenomenon to increase insecurity for neighboring states especially those that are attempting to reduce fragility thus evolving regionalized local spaces, transforming them into spaces of conﬂict.

Where termite groups objective is not geared towards the overthrow of the regime, it will not evolve programs and structures of deconstruction but rather encirclement and militarization of resources to sustain their predatory tendencies in a mirror image of state behavior. On the other hand, where diﬀused but proximate resources are found in areas proximate to political power the tendency for the state elite is to militarize them. Collapse especially in the periphery produces interesting state of nature dynamics. First are violent dynamics and poverty dynamics. Second are huge capital accumulations by a few which are From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 02/11/2013

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stored outside the state in global actors and local state actors respectively. The conﬂict in Kivu exempliﬁes this .

Collier is partially right when he attributes civil strife to economic decline (growth collapse) arguing that conflicts are animated by the availability of young male members without or with little education seeking financial rewards through conflicts18. The roots of conflict are in the failure of the state mission and consolidation of sovereignty in favor of inequitable distribution of income. An examination of states like Kenya points to the fact that strife can be a function of inequality, a fight for access to spaces of accumulation. This can take place in the context of economic growth. Underlying this are two factors; that is the attempts by elite factions to consolidate access to and control over lootable resources, thus implying the need to align themselves with various armed bandit groups in the society, and the ability of these groups to find reason for existence as a result of this. The combination of these two factors converge with various groups in a given space to seek access to resources, thus transforming the said spaces into convergences of conflict. Collier is right when he notes that natural resources are not the only geographical factors that underlie conflict. It is the aspect of relative location the space used plays in terms of whether armed groups can control territory, communication networks, legal or illicit to facilitate connectivity to the outside world. The post 1990's have seen new forms of “wars” pitying governments with termite movements seeking to be allowed to predate on society in a mirror fashion. These groups extract within the state and sustain their extraction without being encumbered by the necessity for external infrastructure. Their existence is a point to a reconfigured state and is rooted in the context of the fact that their center of gravity is located in both the political place and the public.

The latter group is sustained by the unwillingness of the former to allow state structures to play their role of facilitating stateness. Over time, they evolve a parasitic logic on the society that allows them to extract resources and sustain the same with little cost. Diﬀused and proximate resources are able to sustain bandit groups and some form of warlordism that does not seek the immediate overthrow of a system. Indeed, it points to the fact that civil strife can become a function of both economic growth in the context of exclusion, entrepreneurial spirit of non state actors capable of building infrastructure to centralize accumulation from diﬀused resources, indeed, making them point resources.

Collier P (2000), Doing well out of War , in M Bedal and D M Malon (ed) PP91 - 111

It is notable that these accumulations taking place in neo‐liberal spaces eventually create contested realms thus weakening stateness, while establishing a value addition and symbiotic relations between political actors and bandit groups seeking to access and maintain control over political spaces. It is this phenomenon that produces diﬀerent levels of violence while enhancing the emerging logic of instrumentalising ethnicity, capital and violence. This succeeds in animating the process of From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 02/11/2013

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closing spaces. In this sense, the risk for full scale conﬂicts are higher consequent not as Collier notes, due to resource dependency, but more as a result of the paralysis of state institutions to operationalise their dominance over the instruments of power, at one level, and the increased levels of ethnicization of spaces through what is referred to as the process of liberating ethnic spaces at another.

While little profit goes to society morphing of resources ensures that production here remains a social action as expropriation remains a private activity. The net effect is the inability of the state to meet economic, political, social national, security, and by inference its inclination to mute freedom of self‐expression. Resource capitalism here is operationalized through the complex that converges the unity firm, state elite predation community capture and bandit entrepreneurial activities conceived as organic security activities. Overtime this evolve into spaces and fields of extractions. The convergence in turn produces state unviability and regional instability, resource extraction, collapse of customary and civic space (which in turn fry community relations at a local level producing tensions over property rights, land disputes and instrumentalized mobilization.

We note that shifting identity, forms of rule, gender relations, youth and generational conﬂicts, ethnic tensions, the collapse of local authority all are emergent of these dynamics. In the case of Africa and unlike the Foucaultian dynamic where governable spaces are conceived in a panoptical sense of closure and overwhelming aura of domination geared towards disciplining to add value to the collectivity, what is present are spaces of predation due to unconsolidated state and its ability to animate distance decay. The sustainance of this and collapse of the physical base consolidates integration into the international system as unequal partners legitimized by the ideology of free market monopolies and oligopolies. The dualities of vulnerabilities at state and regional level introduces not only the aspect of the region but also the region centric perspective in conceiving the notion of state and its viability.

In the end we can talk of fields of domination territorialized by global, regional, state and local alliances. These can be vertical or horizontal. What is common is their extractive logic. It is mode of accumulation (this includes trafficking) that sustains alliances and mediates relations, extraction. The higher the value and modes of extraction the higher the extent of complicity and violence applied to enforce compliance. This in turn explains responses, external, state, regional whenever there is contestations seeking to reverse the logic of extraction. It also explains the character of shadow networks engaged in lobbying and perverted bureaucratic procedures, businessmen, middlemen, mercenaries, traffickers and types of termite movements in the milieu in question. Equally included are military, intelligence and money laundering activities that act as force multipliers. From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 02/11/2013

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The main dilemma for many of these states, is the triple logic apparent in these processes. First what Olsen calls a bandit state in which elite deploy a captured state to extract from the society for heir own private ends. Second are organized or organic termite movements that mirror the former in extraction process. Third, is the dynamic under which a symbiotic and parasitic logic evolves between the two at one level and both with the society at another in the task of suctioning oﬀ both society and state their sustenance.

Where a symbiotic mode of existence occurs between termite groups and the political class, the former's services especially violence are purchased by political actors to gain power. In this setting, the state becomes a lootable resource while corruption is intrumentalized to facilitate access to power. Ripe sites for extraction include security institutions. Here, the political “class'' is able to extract surplus value merely by tendering and supplying poor quality equipment at exorbitant prices. The net effect is the degeneration of probity, competence and capacity of security organs. Organized termite groups provide some form of security to the community evolving a symbiotic order before mutating into parasites that predate on it thus necessitating the setting up of a counter poise force. It is this inflation that animates an inflation of violence. Here state fragility and abstinence plays a greater role. In other words, the greater the retreat of the state as a distance decay, the deeper the symbiotic relation between termite movements and society. Politicians on the other hand use looted resources to bribe the electorate and instrumentalize them a long ethnic lines to gain power. The ability to mobilize termite groups in time and space by various actors using ethnic numbers calls for “ coalitions”.

This process sees political actors migrate to the predatory spheres to battle each other before transiting back to the civic realm with political power. The resultant logic, transforms an apparent monopoly of power into an oligopoly of power, or state only to the extent that actors stay together with their termite forces. The termination of political contests results into a stand‐down ,by some of the termite groups and the rise of resistance among others. Those that stand down resume their normal predatory activities parallel to formal and informal extractions located at the center of the state power. Herein lies the explanation for fragility and indeed unviability of states.

The duality of extractions by state elite and external actors straddling the formal realms at one level, and criminal elite ,lumpen and peasant entrepreneurs at another converge to suck local spaces into the international under‐ground system . The resultant diﬀerentiated forms of state weaknesses or vulnerabilities and by inference insecurities are manifested at all levels of the state's triage. In addition to the foregoing are two other dynamics; the ﬁrst is the destruction of productive capital through war or diseases. The second is the preparation of a future favorable ground for predatory activities through distance decay. The From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 02/11/2013

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foregoing vicious cycle underpins the framework for future extraction through both local out sourcing of violence and external extraction animated by ruling elite sanctioned security outsourcing in the form of peace‐ keeping activities. For instance, at an average cost of US$ 1.2b the Un peacekeeping operations have costed ‐‐‐‐‐the last years. In the mean time, more than ‐‐‐‐women have been raped, social infrastructure destroyed and more than –displaced. Outsourcing here allows the elite to predate on an average US$500 million allocated for defense alone.

The net eﬀect is that rural spaces are occupied and curved out by predatory and organic groups that extract while proclaiming themselves as alternative security providers. In the RDC's North KIVU alone, there are –Mai Mai. In addition, there are regional negative termite movements such as FDLR and ADF. In urban and peri‐urban areas, there emerges a dynamic that begins with the process of bifurcating the states role of security to include its ability to integrate the intangible center of gravity. In Kenya for instance, there are a total ‐‐‐‐‐‐The role of security is bi‐furcated to limit state to that of policy and provision of an enabling environment. This is read to mean down‐ sizing and commoditization of security, while liberalizing it to allow external participation. The local version evolves through inability and distance decay which allows proposition and “ invasion of” spaces by termite groups to provide security. While the former challenges the notion of security as a public good, its liberalization evolves commoditization, mutation and the eventual evolution a new mechanism of rule. This in turn mediates access to power, rights to life and property. The precarity of the individual and constant fear becomes a mode of economic extraction. The exercise of citizenship, become a function of economic ability to purchase security.

In the end, it is not disengagement that is occurs but a process within which international networks (traffickers, middlemen, bankers, oil barons) engage and intertwine with local actors within and without the state, formally and informally in a process that reinforces in formalization of the state and the creation of an apparent official perfect disorder. The main drive is to invest in violence, and commoditize security. Intentionally or un‐intentionally, external and internal agencies end up knitting together a type of state –an expression structured around centralism with limited internal capacity but with a corresponding strong vertical extraction. It is this that expands favorable spaces of resistance. The dogma of inviolability of the borders is challenged by inability to exercise stateness in he midst of increasing discovery of valuable resources. Half hearted regime enhancing integrative activities are undermined by the definition of objects of security that need securing if the process has to succeed. Over time this is made apparent by security incapacity and the ceding of this fundamental role to the region or ex‐colonial actors as termite movements constantly challenge the state enabled from within or without the region.

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Africa's extractive vertical integration is cemented but this time, the process is paralleled with informal global underworld networks of extraction. Worse still is the violence and humiliation the physical base is subjected to by fragmented pubic authority and the emergence of multiple forms of private indirect governments that follows these two processes of exclusion and parallel economies. To this should be added external extraction in the form of AID and Loans a process that completes triple logic of extraction. The fact that the core beneficiary here is the vertical extractor, ensures that there is the development of discourse that seeks to dissimulate the course of violence and conflicts to facilitate continuity of conflicts critical for anchoring extraction. For instance, it is easy to lay blame on Rwanda when it comes to the chaos in DRC, however, the fundamental question about why the ruling elite has failed to evolve a credible internal and external security institutions is down played.

This all about the failed process of state forming characterized by lack of elite moral courage. This in turn leads to the stunting of a productive youthful component as a result of diminished subsidies to health, education and agricultural sectors and the resultant defeat of policy making process thus muting any hopes of consolidating sovereignty. The foregoing process raises possibilities of incoherence of societies and sovereignty. Contrary to assumptions that see this process as unplanned it may be safe to see rationality of extractions that fans disorder. Part of this is evident in the apparent scrabble for access to resource access and its accompanying logic of denial at one level and mirror resistance mediated by groups such as Alqaeda and the West at another. It is our argument that the point of convergence of the two will mediate the nature and form that African spaces take and the survival of groups such as M23, LRA and ADF. It is this that will bring economic, religious and ethnic identities together. 2.3The Political Economy of Extraction

We can in effect attribute intractable conflict convergences to the failed process of securitizing the triage of the State. Critical here is the referent object of ideas. These have to do with how the leadership wants to form, consolidate and assure it. Ideas revolve round core questions what do we want to do with the state? What are the core referent objects, what are the conceived threats and how do they measure up along the phenomenon of intensity of threat analysis. How should it be secured? Pre‐occupation and effective response to these questions, accords with the apparent task the social contract gives to Hobbes' rational actor. The latter is obligated to secure three referent objects. The first is the citizens and their property in exchange with their pre‐contract insecurity. The second referent objects are the contracts resultant institutions. These are manifested in the form of organizational infrastructure at Economic, political, social and security levels. The third referent object is the community and the encircling framework that is the territory of the state. From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 02/11/2013

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The end state of leadership's generated ideas is enhanced stateness. These are manifested by ability to guaranty security, evolve input out put balance and lastly engender identity.

The converse is failure also referred to as insecurity. Insecurity here is characterized at the objective level by the threats on his values and at a subjective level with the fears of the actual attacks. This is synonymous with diminishing stateness. It is manifested by degeneration at all the three levels of the triage. This is measured by the levels with which interest driven ideas descending from without overwhelm internal interest. They are a reﬂection of lack of eﬀective leadership or capture by external interests.

Notably failure of ideas critical to addressing internal security engenders insecurity‐generating ideas. Whether the state is emerging out of or drifting into conflicts the determining variable is that of the type of organizing ideas. Where these are derived from the logic of consolidating the state, they are likely to be contested by external actors due to the insecurity potential they engender to the latter. Such state will in nature evolve as a revisionist state with the ability to impact and distort the existing regional space. Where the converse is the case, the state will evolve to be a security challenged status quo state. The drift of the latter into instability and conflict engenders insecurity to itself and its neighbors. The net cost of conflicts is eventually heavy to the consolidating revisionist state.

States challenged by insecurity of ideas tend to generate three forms insecurity engendering fields of extraction. First is externally driven vertical extractions mediated by ruling elites. Examples here include mineral extractions through fishy concessions, neo‐liberal policies and “aid”. These deprive the state off its fundamental role thus destroying it and the region. The emphasis is on material protection. Their net effect is the destruction of the human component of the state. In effect, they create the environment for future conflicts and spaces of extraction.

The second is the centralized extraction from Physical and socioeconomic security realms in the form of predation on allocated budgetary lines. The main source of extraction is rooted in the commoditization of security in the context of failed ideas for state development. Extraction from the center of the state, is done by elite through security related predation on budgetary allocations, elite outsource both global state‐centric “police and Military” and non ‐state actor mercenary companies to protect mine extraction. This process in turns spawns insecurities ranching from poor health services, un‐ available resources for education and security institutions. The latter two produce criminals as a supply side and inability to secure as a crisis at the demand side of security.

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If the ﬁrst variable engenders mirror image behavior inform of excluded groups seeking inclusion or exit, failure to invest in the second provide the favorable dynamics in space for resistance to evolve. Excluded group logic animates the production of termite movements and extraction especially if the groups fail to evolve a state deconstruction –reconstruction leadership and organizational capacity. This in essence constitutes the third mode of extraction. The end state of these, shapes nature state, collapse or even better its evolution into an unviable entity. Enhanced convergence of these can only engender collapse conceived here as a diﬀusive degeneration leading to deployment and concentration of violence at basic survival levels of the state. The resultant weak capacity. This is animated by dynamics such as corruption, to insecurity dilemma at state and regional level caused by the sharping of kin‐country dynamics, factionalism and state collapse.

The out break and sustainment of conflict underpins the fourth mode of extraction. This is the process of outsourcing one fundamental role at the core of state existence: security in the name of peacekeeping operations and enforcement at both military and police levels. This process becomes self‐sustaining due to the duality of interests. The need to extract resources by troop supplying states at one level, and at another the state elite who can now siphon budgetary allocation with abandon. Complementary to the foregoing are spaces of extraction. These have the net effect of animating state unviability suctioning. Suctioning here is manifest in extensive migration driven hemorrhage whose flip side is extensive process of expatriate extraction.

Anchoring the foregoing is the discourse of insecurity. It begins with emphasis on blame logic of others, hence the production of multiple initiatives. The individual is not identified as the main object of security. Underlying this is the fact that such identification would expose the apparent distance and institutional decay prevailing in the state. Instead of the individual, physical Base and territory, the emphasis is on material resources in exclusion of human resources, human rights violation by the state, peace‐ keepers and termite groups becomes the order of the day. This process engenders the manufacture of discourse blaming other actors as a means of diverting attention from the need to account for dispensed resources. Worse still it allows the forming of the supply side of future conflicts that includes youth who have normalized earning a living around a gun. The forth component of extraction is in the form of “ foreign Aid and Loans both equally expropriated by state‐ centric insecurity generating elite and their external allies. The latter in effect predate on their taxpayers.

The net effect of the foregoing is the unviability of the state and the region due to the cascading nature of conflicts and the production of convergences of conflict and extraction. The sustainability of these conflicts facilitates material extraction. Here neighboring states especially revisionist ones begin to act as absorbers of instability and From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 02/11/2013

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conduits of extraction. The actual final ends are sites of value addition. This is the process we refer to as vertical extraction. In view of this conflicts remain violent and concentrated in a self‐reproducing epicenter. The converse dynamic pre‐supposes that where extraction is horizontal and value added, the propensity to engender insecurity reducing growth at socio‐economic levels will force demand for physical security to secure human, infrastructure and materials. He foregoing in turn will necessity political infrastructure. The net effect will be the shift from immature to mature anarchies and individual, state and regional security and an end to peace keeping.

Soon the local space is regionalized and globalized producing multiple geographies of extraction and violence. Multiple fields of extraction combine to animate movement of conflict generating regional tectonic plates. In both the great lake and horn of Africa, there exists three sets of tectonic plates emergent out of geo‐political imaginations of colonial powers. Core in all these three convergences is the shaping of the state that has seen identities cut across frontiers. In KIVU there are the different layerings of Banyarwanda‐phones, in Orgden Juba corridor are the Somali clans while in Juba are the Jie groups. Animation of unsolved identity question in the post‐colonial states engenders cross border alliances and refugee flows which when militarized regionalize state‐ centric conflicts. Our interest with respect to convergences is to understand causes and effects of war and how they affect tectonic plates of tension and together with vested interests cause conflict subductions.

This rooted in how inverted mirror images of states interact with causes of and use war. The aim here is to conceive the effects of the cascade inherent the cause and effects of war on the state formation, development and power at one level and the region at another. What for instance explains the ability of some elites to maximize on war to consolidate and develop the state where others fail?. What explains war engendered collapse of state?. These questions are salient in the context of Africa and more specifically given the role collapse plays in limiting state and the regional growth. It is generally noted that war is organized and organizing. The organizational level entails the ability of the leadership to maximize and mobilize political, economic and social efforts. Success at the front is a direct function of extends of organization from the rear down to the state.

This phenomenon is also true with respect to organized resistance movements. The extent of organization is directly proportional to the leadership; institutional development and state program and by inference the extent of legitimacy. This in turn stands inverse to the extent of legitimacy and disorganization of state leadership phenomenon we refer to as distance decay. We can also conceive a third dimension within which both the state and resistance leadership are characterized by disorganization, limited levels of legitimacy and therefore recourse to violence and extraction as their raison d'être. The From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 02/11/2013

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net effect is what can be based described as entropy; that extensive levels of disorganization measured by, unavoidable misplaced energies in a closed environment. Underpinning these are logistics systems procurements, bureaucratic organization of different actors. The apparent higher levels of these convergences points to the low degree of organization. The horn and the Kivu convergences are characterized by chaos and destruction because they are right within the eye of the storm of differentiated complexities.

The foregoing are amplified at a regional level by the absence of strong regional structures. Regions are conceived here as that analytical gap between the state and the international system level analysis regional security becomes clear. In security terms, a region can be conceived as that distinct and significant subsystem of security relations existing among states whose fate is their being locked into a geographical proximity with each other. 19 The notion of insecurity in Africa is pronounced in this realm. It is underpinned by amity and enmity among states and communities. Core here is the internal weak structure of the states especially inability to control their peripheries a factor that produces the phenomenon of regionalized localized realms occupied by criminal elements. There are also state‐centric policies that see counter or sponsorship rebels against each other. Vulnerabilities at capacity and resource levels at one level, and the issue of community contiguity that animates the kin‐country phenomenon compound insecurity challenges. Mutual state dependencies such as differentiated access to transport, port facilities, water resources also animates the insecurity situation. Here interaction of geography and anarchy produces security dilemma. The more state weakness evolves into collapse, the more it engenders the emergence of insecurity interdependence.

These interdependence defines regional security and insecurity complexes. A security complex here is defined by Buzan to imply a situation where a group of states whose primary security concern is linked together sufficiently closely that their national security can not realistically be considered apart from another. It is defined by the anarchic regional structure. The insecurity notion here is a function of the extent to which threats converge with vulnerabilities at state level and in turn interact with the regional structure of anarchy20. The implication is that collapse in one state refracts on the weak internal structure of the neighboring states, and the region generating regional security threats.

See BuzanB: People, States and Fear: An Agenda For international security Studies. Person Longman: 1991.p190-191 20 Anarchy here is the absence of a centralized authority that can mediate state behavior. 21 Where regional state formations evolve structures that are characterized by self help power struggles, mistrust, search for independence from others, hegemonic tendencies.

The net appreciation of these dynamics is what is referred to as conflict cascades. Here, conflicts cascade from the state to the region and back. The second aspect is state weakness that transits from one state to the next producing state weakness of fragility cycles. In the horn and great lakes cascades and weaknesses converge to link subsystems. The durability of these dynamics is a reflection of the extent of immature anarchies21 and the nature of convergences. If states seek to evolve From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 02/11/2013

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security communities by building up on mature anarchies22 where threats are shared and dealt with collectively, then regional insecurity should be contained.

The fact that the greater horn and the great lakes regions are structured around layering of weakness, near collapse and reconstruction helps to animate the shifting geographies and intensity of resistance in the convergences. There is a discernible pattern within which states in the region at individual and collective level pass through cycles from weakness to collapse. Under the cascade dynamic, conflicts resulting from state crisis, and collapse transit state to region and back to the state. This phenomenon helps define a characteristic of convergence as a realm of insecurity complexes. Differentiated security sector transformation especially with reference to ex‐combatants becomes critical in cases where the neighborhood remains unstable. The supply side of unemployed youth, ex‐combatants converge with armed supplies to weaken the states further.

Hence security dilemma; that situation where a groups of states' primary concerns link together suﬃciently close that their national securities cannot be realistically considered apart from one another23. Convergences are equally shaped by aspects of low and high levels of insecurity complexes. Low levels are made up of states whose power elite are not interested pursuing interest or accumulations beyond their borders. The converse is made up of states whose elite seek wider regional interests. Both instances are animated and transformed by actors external to the region with wider global capacity seeking economic and security interests. It is imperative that the notion of insecurity complexes is emphasized with attention being focused on animating factors and various forms they take to facilitate understanding and operationalization of threats.

The convergence of multiple threats in space with vulnerabilities and state at the regional level is what anchors the phenomena of intractability of conflicts. This creates a duality of security and insecurity threats at individual, state and regional levels. Worse still is the evolution of insecurity‐security overlays by external actors. This ranges from the supply of military systems, to sustenance of actors in the name of assistance. The dynamics is mutated and solidified over time the normalization of spaces of extraction; State and global actor extraction, Peace keeping operations and Bandit activities. We have to grapple with several questions: How should resource based threats be conceived in terms of intensity, specificity and identity? How should they be grasped in spatial and temporal terms, probability of occurrence, weight and consequences?. Under what circumstances might states like Kenya be saved?, how are or will modes of resistance be perceived and identities settled by what type of a state? What is the propensity of degeneracy outside regional engagements? Several possibilities exits, forced political integration driven by security driven spaces and actors; locally driven and

Characterized by increased trust, information sharing, predictability, collective approach to issues, institutional constructions that seeks common good. 23 Herz ,John H.' Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma ', World politics 2:157-80

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nationally orientated movements seeking de‐reconstruction seeking to go beyond the Kin‐country phenomenon. Conversely is the possibility of the egg shell Yugoslavia that negatively redraws maps.

If we conceive intractability to point to the diﬃculties of resolution that are anchored in both capacity, political will and external interference, we will have to think of innovative options that may be hard but not impossible to achieve. This includes thinking of convergences as platforms for viable state construction.

This is what new regionalism is about. Here, regional dynamics are expanded beyond economic integration and cooperation which takes long and is dependent on elite and whose benefits are unequal. Even more disadvantageous is the fact that sovereignty constrains the ability of neighbors to come in and support a state under security threat even though their own threats are apparent. New regionalism points to the return of the political. 24 It seeks to help states combat effects of classical mercantilism (a product of historical process) that sought to protect the state and enhance pursuit of national interest. New regionalism seeks to defend the state within the regional framework against effects of globalization. It has a potential of allowing states and other actors (individuals and communities) to redefine insecurity and offer alternatives for securitizing the individuals, states and the region. It offers opportunity to shift form neo‐functionalism to collective security. It provides a chance to think outside the limits posed by sovereignty and international system and instead conceives regional securities, referent objects to be secured and the means of their securitization from a collectivized perspective.

3.0 THE AXIS‐OF‐EXTRACTION IN THE KIVU CONVERGENCE

Hatne News About Congo, 15 March 2009 Available at: "Congo with $24 Trillion in Mineral Wealth BUT still Poor". Retrieved on the 17 September 2013 26 Garrett, Nicholas (2007) Preliminary observations from the democratic republic of the Congo (DRC) The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) & Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining (ASM) 25

3.1 Contextualizing the Greed for Congo

The DRC is estimated to have $24 trillion worth of untapped deposits of raw mineral ores, including the world's largest reserves of cobalt and signiﬁcant quantities of the world's diamonds, gold and copper. 25 While the true size of reserves is largely unknown, due to a lack of modern geological surveying, the DRC is estimated to possess around 35% of the world's cobalt reserves, and 25‐65% of the world's coltan reserves. 26 Despite its wealth, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) ranked 227 out of 228 countries as one of the least developed nations in the world with an estimated per capita GDP of US$ 300 in 2009, a fact attributed to the long standing civil war and lack of infrastructure. Reports have argued that the greed for DRC's resources are the principal driver of atrocities and conﬂict throughout Congo's tortured history.

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The current extraction enterprise in Eastern Congo is a consequence of along durée process of state collapse. Similar extraction saw ventures such as Société Minière et industrielle du Kivu (Sominki) become less competitive. With the collapse of prices in the tin industry, more and more mining activities become artisanal 27. Efforts by Sominki to commercialize artisanal mineral extractions failed due to the low prices it offered28 and institutional corruption. Without state investment in the physical base's three objects of security‐ the population, material resources and the territory at one level and institutions at another apparent due to insecurity engendering ideas of such as corruption, mining become the main source of earning more so as the state was engulfed in wars. Two wars are critical here. The first occurred between 1996 and 1998 and resulted in the over‐throw of Mobutu Seseko, by Laurent Kabila and his Alliance for Democratic Forces For the Liberation of Congo (AFDL). Underlying the first conflict was the desire by Rwanda, Uganda and Angola to contain security threats domiciled in Mobutu's Zaire. The same underpinned Rwanda‐Uganda's return in 1998 until 2003 when multiple accords ranging from Sun City, Lusaka, to Luanda. Kabila response to this second war has basically framed the discourse of security in the Kivu convergence.

That conflict in the eastern DR Congo is a function of Rwanda –Ugandan interests in resource extraction in the DRC. A counter position advanced by Uganda, Rwanda and some ethnic identities, points to an existential security question rather than mineral resources. This hypothesis has over time become a self ‐fulfilling. First with UN Panel of experts reports that point to what it saw as the nexus between conflict in the region and exploitation of resources. Rwanda and Uganda military and political elite were accused of wanton extraction. The report noted that between 2000 and 3000 tons of Cassiterite and 1000 and 1500 tons of Coltan were extracted from the DRC between 1998 and April 1999. These states point to the presence of the Armed criminal groups such as ADF, LRA and the FDLR( FOCA). Adding to the security discourse are Rwanda‐ phone communities whose fight for inclusion is constantly contested thus raising the need to have their own remaining in the KIVUs to provide them security. What is also notable, is the apparent mutation that has over time evolved to the extend that the need to access resources has engendered morphing process across state elite, external extraction networks, local artisans and more specifically armed groups and populations the core victims.

See Ra aelli M:, Rise and Demise of Commodity agreements: An investigation in to the Breakdown of International Commodity agreements , Cambridge , woodhead Publishing, 1995, Pp 181-2001. 28 See Mthembu- Salter G. Social and Economic Dynamics of mining in Kalimma, DRC, Institute for Security Studies, April 2009,p3 29 Un security Council, report of the Panel Of Experts on the Illegall Exploitation of Natural Resources and other forms of wealth of emocratic Republic of Cong, 12 April2001, UN Doc.S/2001/357, 33 30 Kabanga Musau Donatien: Le remodelage du paysage socio-economique dans les zones de con it du Nord Kivu et du Maniema( R.D. Congo), In La Afrique des Grands lacs, annuaire 2004-2005, pp 235-261 31 Lamb G, Alusala N, Mthembu-Salter G and Gasana JM, Rumours of Peace , whispers of war: Assessment of reintegration of exCombatants into Civilian life in North Kivu and Ituri, Democratic Republic of Congo , Transitional demobilization and reintegration Program (TDRP), February 2012,p17.

Under‐laying this process is the failed project of state building and indeed post conﬂict reconstruction. For starters the process of state collapse enhanced Artisanal logic. According to Kabanga Musau, nearly a third of the entire population was involved in extraction as a means for sustaining survival during the war30. By 2008, there were an average 500000 miners in Eastern Congo providing direct and indirect support to over 10 million people all over DRC. 31 With this, evolved new modes of extraction that were characterized by extraction networks and new From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 02/11/2013

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modes of violence such as rape and underpayment. It is this that is conceptualized as “ Conﬂict minerals”. The minerals at the center of this debate is Tin Ore( Cassiterite), Tantalium Ore (columbite tantalite‐Coltan) , Tungsten Ore( Wolframite) and Gold or 3T s and gold.As a 6th largest producer of Tin, Congo accounts for an estimated 6 to 8 % of the world's production32. It equally accounts for 15 to 20% of global Tantalum production.

3.2 The Congo Axis‐of Extraction

State collapse through war or political engineering by embedded interests has created a complex axis‐of‐extraction in Eastern Congo. The first is rooted in artisanal mining without state legal and security protection. The second is extraction by privatized state and non state armed 'termite groups'. The third mode of extraction is undertaken by a network of “entreprenuers”. These include the “negociants” who buy and organize transport of ores to selling fields owned by individuals who trade them. Selling fields or Maisons d'achat relay the ore to Comptoirs(exporters) who bring them to the global fields of extraction for processing. These actors, mediate extraction by investing in evasion state through bribery, corruption, violence in the process contributing to its unviability. The forth form of extraction is anchored by bandit state elite that expatriate state wealth. These extractions converge to mediate state unviability regional state insecurity and security threats. Fundamental in this is the process security outsourcing as mode of resource extraction.The figure below demonstrates this.

Magnowski. Daniel, Tin Price Spike Shows Congo's growing Origin Role Reuters, October 30, 2008, Available at Http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idU sLU661455.

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Figure 1: From Mines to International markets33

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Artisanal and Small Scale Mining (ASM)

In 2008, the UN Expert report on Congo identiﬁed 13 major mines and approximately 200 total mines in eastern DRC region. Of these, 12 of the 13 major mines and approximately 50% of all the mines in Eastern DRC were controlled by armed groups mainly the FDLR and the Congolese army. 34 Reports have indicated that the armed groups use mass rape as a deliberate strategy to intimidate and control local populations, thereby securing control of mines, trading routes, and other strategic areas.

The World Bank estimates that 10 million Congolese (16% of the population) are dependent on the artisanal mining industry in the country. However, the Congolese government does not recognize the legitimacy of artisanal mining hence leaving the artisanal miners open to exploitation by armed groups. Artisanal miners are monolithically perceived by the Congolese government, and most international development organizations and financiers, as a nuisance. 3 8 Governmental officials have argued that such mines, in their illicitness, subvert millions of dollars in potential tax revenues; while at the same time discouraging foreign capital from investing in larger, more productive mining operations hence promoting the sustained poverty in the region. According to the Congolese government, any workable solution to Congolese development would require a concerted government effort to close down the artisanal mines.39

33 Compiled by TCH from Field notes and IMF Direction of Trade Statistics 2012. 34 UN Panel of Experts Report 12th December 2008 35 BSR, 2010. Con ict Minerals and the Democratic Republic of Congo 36 'Upstream Pilot Implementation of the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Con ict-A ected and High-Risk Areas. Baseline Report on the Supplement on Tin, Tantalum, and Tungsten' 2011 37 World Bank, 2008. Growth with Governance in the Mining Sector, Report No. 43402, 38 Ibid 39 Ibid 40 Report by Global Witness, July 2009 'Faced with a gun, what can you do?' War and Militarization of Mining in Eastern Congo. Pg.24 41 Cellular News 2007, Coltan, Gorillas and Cellphones. Available at http://www.cellularnews.com/coltan/ 42 OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Con ict-A ected and High-Risk Areas. Available at http://www.oecd.org/fr/daf/inv/mne/mining.ht m 43 We nd however that withdrawal does not necessarily mean a stop in operations. Corporations with multiple identities continue even when one subsidiary has closed shop. 44 Mantz, Je ery (2008) Improvisational Economies: Coltan Production in the Eastern Congo European Association of Social Anthropologists Pg. 42

Notably, of the 200 mines identiﬁed in eastern DRC, virtually all the mining is done artisanally. 35 Artisanal mining is carried out on a seasonal basis; during school holidays or in combination with other activities and is often not a permanent activity. In some mines only a fraction of the diggers are local people. The majority of diggers arrive from other provinces with the hope of earning a livelihood.36

The minerals are dug by hand or with very basic tools. 40 Basins are dug in streams by scrapping oﬀ the surface mud, then 'sloshing' the water around the crater, which causes Coltan and other mineral ores to settle to the bottom of the crater where it is retrieved by the miners. 41 Artisanal mining is a dangerous venture, with a constant risk of mine collapse; being buried alive or accidental slippage. There are also the dangers that come with lack of correct protective clothing and head coverings, including ventilation gear without which miners are exposed to respiratory illnesses. The OECD 42 has set out guidelines aimed at protecting miners from exploitation and human rights abuses. Multiple MNCs have been found to be in contravention of these guidelines and have withdrawn from43 the region as they are being investigated. Despite the inherent danger of the mines however, and their attraction to roving militias, the mines provide one of the few sources of income, prosperity or hope for rural eastern Congolese.44

The DRC has three types of mines: Underground, open –pit and alluvial as the images below show; From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 02/11/2013

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Figure 1: An alluvial Mine, Bisie

Source: Mark Cræmer, 2008

Figure 2: An underground mine shaft

Source: Mark Cræmer, 2008

Figure 3: Open Pit Cassiterite Mining in Bisie.

Source: Mark Cræmer, 2008

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Fundamental to artisanal mining is the informal logic that not only underpins it but also reﬂects the crisis of failed leadership and state consolidation. Few are registered. Despite 2002, DRC mining code that legalized artisanal mining, the absence of state implies that conditions are those of the state of nature. In the process, and without any form of security, they have become hostage to multiple proto states and sites of predation. Most mines are under the control of armed groups, which impose forced labor, crude working conditions and poor pay. The underground ﬁelds of extraction are mainly old disused mines with tunnels us long as 500m and 30 meters deep. Here miners use innovative tools such as hovels, spades and old sport lights. Many miners die under 45 collapsed walls, asphyxiation and outright violence. The average wage is between 1% and $5 Us $ a day. Over 500000 miners are estimated to 46 operate in these pits in the eastern DRC alone . Together with other artisans across Congo they support an estimated 10million people47 The 48 mines equally employ children between the averages of 10 to 16 .

Figure 4& 5: Child Miners.

Matthysen k , Hilgert F., Schouten P, & Mabolia A,, A detailed analysis of Oriental Province's Gold Sector, IPIS/GIZ/ICGLR Pp10-11 46 See Pact ,Promines Study. Artisanal mining in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 2010 P5-6 47 See LambG, Alusala N., Mthembu-Salter G and Gasana J.m. Romours of Peace, whispers of war: assessment of the reintegration of excombatants into civilian life in in North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri, democratic Republic of Congo, Transitional Demobilization and reintegration Program(TDRP), February 2012p17 48 See John Prendergast and Sasha Lezhnev. From Mine to Mobile Phone. The Con ict Mineral Supply Chain . The Enough Project . www. enoughproject. org p2

Source: Mark Cræmer, 2008

In a sign of the state of economic distance decay miners barter their cassiterite for basic items with independent traders. In January 2007 estimates 1kg of cassiterite exchanged for kg of flour, rice, or beans or three 300g of sugar or two bottles of palm oil. 2kg of cassiterite afforded one a beer(72 cl). 3 kg of cassiterite afforded one 1kg of bear. Given collapsed transport infrastructure, miners handover the ore to traders who employ porters to carry cassiterite on a two day journey carrying an average 50kgto comptoirs d'achat where the Goma based Sodexmines, Panju, Amur, MPC, Bakuliira, Starfield and GMB and Muyeye and olive of Bukavu access them.. For this, they receive an average us$ 20.

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Figure 6 & 7: Porters carrying up to 50kgs of cassiterite

Militia Groups, Predatory States and Rogue Capital

Source: Mark Cræmer, 2008

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Figure 8: Small plane loaded with minerals on Goma-Walikale Road.

Figure 9: A small plane is turned around by hand on Goma-Walikale Road

Cassiterite is eventually motorized to walikale airport(Kilambo)‐ in effect what remains of the Goma ‐Walikale road. Here small planes that have to be turned round to fly off lift them out to Goma to offices trading companies where it is sorted and packaged in 25 tones load before being put on road to either Rwanda or Uganda to global markets via 50 Mombasa . Source: Mark Cræmer, 2008 Source: Mark Cræmer, 2008

Rules for Sale: Formal and informal Cross Border Trade in Eastern DRC. A Pole institute Report Goma, May 2007 p24

The foregoing constitute the ﬁrst stages of along the vertical extraction ladder of tyranny. It is notable that it's availability on the market due to “cheap production” has apparently been blamed for the collapse of the Talison led production in Australian. From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 02/11/2013

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Part of the dynamics in artisanal mining, are contestations that anchor organic security. Underlying this are claims laid on mines by communities through their chiefs a factor that prompts the establishment of organic militias. Walikale cassiterite mine is one such mine where ownership is contested. Both the ethnic group and the state under the law lay claims it. While the community organized under the GMB (Groupe Minier Bangandula)mainly land owners from the Bangandula clan, a south African ﬁrm MPC(Mining and Processing Congo laid claim to it too. MPC sells cassiterite to its sister ﬁrm the MPA (Metal Processing Association) of Gisenyi in Rwanda. GMB claim is predicated on the argument that Bisie mines form part of the old concessions of the para‐statal SOMINKI ( Societe Miniere et Industrielle du Kivu) and that it signed a lease with Sakima( Societe Aurifere du Kivu et Maniema) a successor of Somniki. This is disputed by MPC which notes that the mine lies outside the concession in question and that in any case it had a concession from the Ministry of Mines in Kinshasa on the 29th September 2006 to 4 areas including Bisie. Currently it buys mineral ore from artisans. In October 29, 2006, gunmen attacked MPC team in Bisie with complicity of the military units in the place. On the 30th December 2006 MPC 's representative Benjamin Moore and Yves van Winden signed a deal with traditional chiefs in which $us 90 will be paid to the Walikale District for each ton of cassiterite.51

Attempts by the communities to evolve their defensive measures to secure their interests and security underpins organic logic of the security while their lose of control mediates not only the spiraling logic of parasitism but also inﬂation of armed groups. 3.2.2 Mechanized Mining

The minerals in the DRC are trapped in deposits that require industrial scale mining and processing to turn them into useable forms. The Congolese government therefore requires large capital for mining ventures, which multi‐national corporations provide. However, the eastern part of the DRC being a volatile, high‐risk place to conduct business, many MNCs are wary of investing in expensive equipment on the ground, and resort to using middlemen and ASMs to obtain minerals which are the exported elsewhere in raw form for value‐addition. 52 In addition, because of the absence of infrastructural investments like roads, rail, and shipping network, the terrain is largely oriented to small‐ scale operations. In fact, many of the artisanal mines are hit and run ventures carved out along roadsides, where a small amount of ore is extracted and the mine abandoned after only a few weeks.53

See Rules For sale Opcit p23 Report by Global Witness, July 2009 'Faced with a gun, what can you do?' War and Militarization of Mining in Eastern Congo. 53 Mantz, Je ery (2008) Improvisational Economies: Coltan Production in the Eastern Congo European Association of Social Anthropologists Pg. 42 54 Report by Global Witness, July 2009 'Faced with a gun, what can you do?' War and Militarization of Mining in Eastern Congo. 52

3.2.3 The Role of Armed Militia in the Axis‐of‐Extraction The relationship between the armed groups and rogue capital appears to be a symbiotic one. The armed groups are known to charge taxes to the companies for the use of the mines and to use forced labor. 54 A From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 02/11/2013

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supposition can be drawn on how mining companies would benefit from this arrangement. The low cost of extraction as a result of the cheap/forced labor method employed by the militias maximizes profit margins for the MNCs. This in turn feeds into the vicious cycle where warring groups are empowered by the income from the MNCs and so have arms‐buying power. Armed groups appear to put battlefield differences aside when it comes to commercial gain. A Global Witness Report states that the FARDC and the FDLR often act in collaboration, carving up territory and mining areas through mutual agreement and sometimes sharing the spoils. The FDLR use the roads controlled by the FARDC, and vice versa without difficulty. Minerals produced by the FDLR are sent out through local airports controlled by the FARDC in South Kivu.55

The armed militias are varied. They include state agents such as the military and non ‐state actors both internal and regional. What is notable is the discourse each pedals to rationalize their actions. While armed state actors see this as a form of payment and indeed a mirror image of state political and military leadership's extraction but also their failure to lead. Armed groups on the other hand see their actions in the broad prism of waging war against their constructed enemy. If their core narrative revolves around the organic rationalities, it soon degenerates and morphs in reality into a mode and form of predatory extractions comparable on to pre‐colonial and colonial, Portuguese and king Leopold predation respectively. In these two case, extraction targeted the individual as a collectivity and the material base. In the process ensured that the possibilities of evolving the bio‐power never existed56. The current predation in eﬀect determines who should die and who should be let to live. Not only are ﬁelds of extraction structured on individuals and the collective in terms of forced labor but also in collective destruction through sexual violence directed at the female as a reality or as a construction (raping of males).

Report by Global Witness, July 2009 'Faced with a gun, what can you do?' War and Militarization of Mining in Eastern Congo. Pg.24 56 Foucault 57 See Mukengere, Mkwege D and Cathy Nangini( 2009.www.plsmedicine.org vol6(12):e100024.do1:10.1371/journal.Pmed.1 000204 . 58 See Mukengere, Mkwege D and Nangini opcit.

Unfortunately for the KIVU convergence, the main discourse revolves around material resources except for a few individuals like DR Mukengere Mukwege of Panzi hospital whose actions continue to focus on sexual violence57. Panzi hospital which treats rape victims noted a strong correlation between termite violence of groups such as Mai and FDLR and their extractions. For instance areas with high concentrations of rape cases were also those occupied by these groups for mineral extraction. Walungu with its gold and casiterite reported . Shabundu had 951 (9.7%), Uvira 785(8%), Kabare 3050(31.2%).Bukavu 1499(15.3%), Walngu had 3251(33.2%)58.

The need eﬀect is that more than 400000 women have been raped and their bodies mutilated despite the presence of peace “keepers” in the Eastern DRC. In 2008, armed groups are said to have earned $185 million. They are in control of many artisanal mines. FDLR controlled most of the mines in the South KIVU. Bisie Mines in North Kivu which From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 02/11/2013

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accounts for 70% of the Cassiterite ore was initially under the control of the Mai Mai militia then constituted as un integrated 85th brigade of the Congolese Army before its control shifted to an integrated FARDC control under Colonel Manzi of CNDP. The approximately 2000 Miners in Bisie and transporters get basically little. Bisie mine in walikale north Kivu is the main producer of tin ore. Of the 13 main mines in eastern Congo, 12 were under the control of rebels by 2012. An average 50% of the 200 mines 59 in Eastern Congo are under rebels . Lueshe Pyrochlore mine Rutsuru was under the control of both CNDP and the FARDC. It produced Niobium. 60 Bisembe, Mwenga territory in South Kivu is under FDLR . They in eﬀect tax miners and together with Military, business networks and political 61 elite pocket 70% of the proﬁts ..

The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) collect big sums of money from minerals business in the areas under their control. Minerals Business is one of their sources of revenues critical for ﬁnancing their operations. Both FOCA HQs and operational units held mining sites under their control where their oﬃcers are deployed and collect revenues in form of direct mineral sale or taxes levied to business operators. Revenues collected are reported to the commander of the unit who is responsible for their management.

In the walikale territory of the North Kivu, FDLR has mines in Ilama, Oninga, Makutaniro and Muhanga. In Lubero territory FDLR controls the mines in Mabinga, Fatua, Bunyantenge, Kasiki, Kayere and Kalehe.

key mines include Minembwe, Misisi, Mpo , Gakombe, Bwina, Benzia, Wamiti, Kinyinya, Ihana group, Bibatama, Riva Gauche, Mugerero, Lugushaw, Milimani SeeInteractive Map of militarized mining areas in the Kivus August 2009. Http://.Ipis research. Be/ maps/mimiki/areas/web/ 60 Enough Project. Team with the Grassroots Reconciliation Group April 2009 p12 61 Nicholas Garrett, Sylvia Sergiou and Koen Vlassenroot, negotiated Peace for Extortion: The case of Walikale Territory in Eastern DR Congo, Journal of Eastern African Studies3(1)March 2009

Figure 10: Minerals being weighed before transportation under the supervision of an autonomous section of the FADRC

In the South Kivu, FDLR controls the mines in Mwenga territory such as Kankove, Nabaleke, Miza, Kigobe, Kitumba, Musheke. FDLR also control mines in Bisembe in Mwenga territory of south Kivu. Retaining its ideological objective of eliminating Tutsis, FDLR' s armed wing is referred From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 02/11/2013

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to as Force Combattant Abacunguzi ( FOCA). It has morphed to set up an enterprise of extractions. Essentially part of this is for sustaining these fighters who also predate on the communities through violence or be punished by their leadership62. They have evolved as a predatory species to make money and now exits for that reason. It mutates as dynamics dictates fighting the FARDC when need dictates especially when the latter collaborates with RDF against it or along side it when the former alliance collapses. Rebel groups do not necessarily have to control the mines to the extend that they control the outlets, border crossings , they can impose “taxes “ This is the case of CNDP. Collaboration between FDLR and the FARDC in mineral extraction have been documented by Global witness63 and pole institute. FDLR construct themselves as the vanguard of those Rwandese they politically construct as Hutu, and see Rwandaphones politically constructed as Tutsi as enemies. Their allies in DRC are defined by their reactions to Rwanda. As a result of their violence, group such as CNDP and M23 emerged as a counter force to the likes of the FDLR but also as vanguard for these Rwandaphones afraid and suspicious of the Kinshasa regime. Their resultant ideological construction, and more specifically their convergence of existential threats at one level and their inability to go beyond their organic logic at another explains their limited legitimacy within the DRC.

The foregoing construction of counterfeit organic groups that mirror armies is not limited to external elements and their Congolese opponents, but also indigenous Congolese groups. Core in these are the multiple Mai Mai termite groups. Believing in the magic power of water to neutralize bullets, Mai Mai emerge essentially as self defense organic units through eﬀorts of local leaders before they degenerate into parasites taking the names of their villages ethnic identity or their leaders. Larger formations include Pareco and alliance for Patriotes for Free Sovreign Congo( APCLS), Kifua fua Mai Mai in Walikale and Yakutumba which is remembered for taking hostage aid workers in south Kivu. South Kivu has Mai Mai Kapopo, Nyakibilibi, Fujo, Museleket, Khumbi, Chochi, Mupekenya, Mushombe. In North Kivu, there are Mai Mai Nyatura, Vutura, M26, APCLS, UPCP, Simba, FDN Mai Mai which collaborate with FDLR. There are other groups such as Patriotic Forces for Liberation of Congo( FPLC) led by Gad Ngabo in South Kivu. There is Front For Patriotic Resistance in Ituri initially led by Germaine Katanga and its splinter group the Popular front for Justice in Congo( FPJI) which operates south of Ituri and whose leader jean claude Baraka was arrested . FRPI's leader Cobra matata returned to the Marquis from the brassage process.

Woodman Conor : Unfair Trade op cit.p125 63 Global witness, Control of mines threatens peace e orts in Eastern Congo( September2008), Available at http://www.globalwitness.org/media_library_ detail.php/663/en/control_of_mines.

The nature of the mining process in effect anchors multiple fields of extraction and in each field, their exits dominant actors in constant interactions. These converge as they also diverge depending on the ability of the dominant actors to impose consensus by domination. For instance if rebel groups impose control over a mine and extract through forced labor while appropriating the surplus value, along the way, there From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 02/11/2013

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Source: Generated by TCH Geo-Spatial Unit

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are other smaller actors that ranch from gangs to other militias who impose tax in exchange for the right of passage. An average $40 is extracted per sack. Militias are estimated to have extracted Us$75m from transport ﬁelds out of the total estimated $180 million64. The ability of militia extraction is better appreciated when it is noted that state's own army the FARDC was identiﬁed as the second main source of insecurity by Citizens in Eastern RDC by GRIP study of 2009 which surveyed 10,000 households65 . Under pining this are issues of crisis of political will, doctrine, training, Command and Control, corruption, non payment of salaries, poor logistics,

Dynamics of extraction morph from the intense violence infested field of vertical extractions to an apparent orderly vertical export networks. We can argue that absence of state and indeed multiple monopoly over instruments of violence at tactical levels engenders entropies which also atrophy. Spaces of extraction here anchor multiple fields that are saddled by actors depending on their differentiated specialities. Their are those predating on poor peasants (tax, rape66), those who extract from porters, miners. The huge numbers involved underpins the multiple entropies. Hence our contention that vertical extraction by nature spawns violence as various groups seek to create alliance to overwhelm each other. The lack of order and value addition only prepares favorable fields for morphed process of extraction. Underpinning this termite predation on the state is economic distance decay that has engendered state absence.

3.2.4 The Négociants

Ibid p4 Groupe de Recherche et d'information sur la Paix et la Securite(GRIP). Armes Legere dans L'est du Congo: Enquete Sur la perception de L'insecurite, Brussels, 2011 66 See Mukengere Mukwege and Nangini Cathy opcit, 67 Mantz, Je ery (2008) Improvisational Economies: Coltan Production in the Eastern Congo European Association of Social Anthropologists Pg. 42 68 Report by Global Witness, July 2009 'Faced with a gun, what can you do?' War and Militarization of Mining in Eastern Congo. 65

The Négociants are a step below the Comptoirs in the extraction chain. As their names suggest they are in direct contact with the source of minerals and negotiate on behalf of their clients who would be the Comptoirs or sometimes directly with rogue capital. In this sense there appears to be blurred lines between the roles of the négociants and the comptoirs. At times, miners (creuseurs) extract the minerals without any machinery or tools, and cross vast expanses of forested land to négociants (low level middle men) for sale to foreign buyers. 67Minerals can only be transported by individuals with a miners' or a traders' card. In North Kivu, the petit négoçiants, who buy cassiterite at the mining sites and sell to négociants in larger villages, are often as informal as the miners, as they too lack the required trading license. They tend to escape regulation and often contribute to the exploitation of the miners by underpaying them.68 3.2.5 The Comptoirs

Comptoirs are an important link in the extraction chain and Rogue Capital for two reasons. One, they provide a wall for corporations to hide behind. Since they have legal registrations, they take due diligence out of the hands of corporations. Two, they reduce the cost and maximize From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 02/11/2013

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profits for corporations by cutting deals with warring groups in control of mining fields. The Group of Experts at the UN identified several comptoirs in Bukavu as “directly complicit in pre‐financing negociants, who in turn work closely with FDLR.” 69. “These companies are the top five exporters of cassiterite, coltan and wolframite from South Kivu, according to 2007 Government statistics, and are explicitly licensed to export minerals by the Government.70

Négociants and comptoirs, often of non‐Congolese (Belgian, South African, Rwandan, and Asian) nationality have formed regional oligopolies and monopolies over the exportation (legal and illegal) of coltan and other minerals. 71 Congolese public officials collaborate with them and so would not condemn these middlemen for their lack of fiduciary transparency or tax evasion, as these are often the same individuals with whom the Congolese government and provincial officials in North and South Kivu have negotiated patronage relationships.72

As the minerals reach Comptoirs, the disorder prevalent in the open ﬁelds of extractions begins to diminish engendering a form of order. This seems to converge with increase in value which in return underpins the order. In other words, the higher the value derived, the higher the order given by the apparent presence of vertical structures of order. Here, every body knows every body. The logic of extraction here is a function of low distance decay or a continuing reduction of distance decay between the sellers and the buyers (Comptoirs). This is inversely related to the apparent distance decay between sellers and the State. The higher this variation, the higher the intensiﬁcation of violence and disorder at the source of extraction.

It is notable that there is no violence at the Comptoirs level upwards. Indeed, order begins once the exporters buy minerals from trading houses, process and sell them. Most of the Minerals are send by boats, road, planes to neighboring states. While some minerals are legally exported and taxes paid to the state, large quantities are transported across by exporting companies to neighboring states. These are eventually exported to east Asia where 80% of Tin smelting or chemical processing is done in large furnaces through either Mombasa or Dar es salaam73. Of the 12 tin producers in 2010, ﬁve are located in China, 2 in Indonesia, one each in both Thailand and Malaysia. Others are in Peru, Belgium and Bolivia74.

Final report of the UN Group of Experts on the DRC, S/2008/773, 10 December 2008, 70 Ibid 71 Mantz, Je ery (2008) Improvisational Economies: Coltan Production in the Eastern Congo European Association of Social Anthropologists Pg. 42 72 Ibid 73 74

United States Geographical Survey(USGS), 2010 Mineral Year book-Tin, May 2012, p.77.2.

Most Cassiterite or Tin ore from the north Kivu heads for Belgium through MPC, Trademet, SDE, and STI followed by Rwanda. The later through MPC exports, Gama, Metachem, MPA and Eurotrade . Trademet, SDE and STI exported 2289.69 tons of Tin to Belgium while MPA and EuroTrade exported 435.07 tons to Rwanda in 2006. The later, exports the same to Hong Kong( China). Panju from Bukavu exports to Malaysia and Russia. Comptoir Ibak exports mainly to the UK under the name Bakulikira. Equally exporting to UK is Afrimex which exported 73.8 From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 02/11/2013

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tons. Despite its massive production, China remains a net importer and accounts for 43% of world consumption75 of tin. Four companies are dominant in tantalum processing. These are located in in German, USA, China and Kazakhstan. Tungsten is processed in China Australia, and Russia. Gold is send mainly to Dubai through Kenya. Other destinations include Switzerland, Italy and Belgium76.

In between, the state losses out to undervaluing, corruption and bribery process mediated by its own agents. These include custom and tax officials. For instance cassiterite value from Goma stood at Us$ 7m in 2006 while its actual value was about Us $ 25m77. State officials have been informalized into a bandit economy that operates outside the law the formal law. The net effect is that the state agents encourage predation and violence that those who seek to mitigate it either pay or opt to “exit” the state economically. Either way, the individual is criminalized by default contributing to insecurity. A pole institute interview of a business man explains this setting when he notes:

“If you want to export legally, lots of services come and witness the loading operation, and each of them demand a payment for having been there. They come to witness, later they demand that you come to their oﬃce and they ask for $ 300 and if don't pay, you are arrested. In order to avoid this, they negotiate with you that you don't declare the entire amount and you give them part of the taxes you save “78

The extent of this termite predation on the individual by agents of the state is apparent in the numbers of agents wearing the insignia of these state super visionary institutions but appear in their individual capacity to extract. These include CEEC –the oﬃcial mineral certiﬁcation body; OCC‐ export control, OFIDA –customs agency, DRAD state revenue collection agency, the provincial mining division, Representative of the governor. Also included some times are ANR intelligence, DGM immigration control agency, DEMIAP –military intelligence, Police de mines, GR‐ presidential guard and Provincial military police79. For their 'services' of weighing and packaging and being around each has to be paid. Here the probity and competence of these institutions disappears and instead they begin to engender both security and insecurity threats.

United States Geographical Survey(USGS), 2010 Mineral Year Year book-Tin, May 2012, p.77.1. 76 Ibidp6 77 Rules for Sale: Formal and informal Cross Border Trade in Eastern DRC. A Pole institute Report Goma, May 2007 p24 78 Rules for Sale: Formal and informal Cross Border Trade in Eastern DRC. A Pole institute Report Goma, May 2007 p26 79 Rules for Sale: Formal and informal Cross Border Trade in Eastern DRC. A Pole institute Report Goma, May 2007 p26

3.2.6 Extraction Ramiﬁcations for Regional Security

The logic of security outsourcing has a net eﬀect animating regional insecurities as state and non‐ state actors seek to secure themselves by any means possible. These attempts converge with security challenges to transform the regional security sub‐subsystem. We have termed this as the mutually of regional insecurity. Mutations are a function of the ability of actors in the subsystem to forge alliances with external actors including criminal networks. Any pressure in the existing unstable tectonic plates produces movements that can be best described as security tsunamis. They can range from Mass movement of refugees to overt state centric or worse still subsystem block clashes . From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 02/11/2013

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What is described by the ICGLR as the KIVU triangle converging Uganda, Rwanda and DRC plays host to this dynamics. It has been characterized by conﬂict cascades, that run across the crisis of state and community insecurities. From the state reconstituting insurgences that reconstituted predatory states of Uganda and Rwanda to state un‐ consolidating insurgencies and termite movements in DRC, Rwanda and Uganda( the latter have their habitat in the DRC). For the former Zaire now DRC, the current crisis has roots in the Kabila led ADFL . This was an alliance that brought together Kabila's units(Lubakat), Andre Kisase Ng'andu(Nande) and Masasu Nindanga ( Bashi) in 1996. They were joined by Maimai. The collapse of this alliance through Kabila's consolidation and the out break of the second 1998 war saw the emergence of a new alliance with RCD as its acronym under Wamba Dia Wamba with the support of Uganda and Rwanda. Its bi‐furcation into RCD Goma and RCD Kisangani and the emergence of MLC of JP Bemba, Thomas Lubanga's Union of the Congolese Patriots (UPC) ‐‐‐ and Mbusa Nyamwisi 's‐‐‐.

The peace accords that ended the conﬂicts saw the three MLC, ADFL and RCD form a government. Yet the process of brassage failed to form a national force that could dominant instruments of violence and engender stateness. Worse still, both the state and the Monuc failed to deal with the FDLR and ADF and later own LRA thus sustaining the region's security challenge80. Afraid of what would be fall their ethnic kin, core groups maintained their geographical control that in most case coincided with ethnic identity. Entities like Mai mai disintegrated further motivated by their newfound power of the gun and the failed process of demobilization and reintegration.

The inability of the Government after elections to honor ‐‐‐agreements saw the out break of hostilities as Conseil militaire Pour la Defense du Peuple (CNDP) emerged under Laurant Nkunda from the failed FARDC Brassage process. For most part, little efforts had been made to address fears of these ex‐RCD officers who made up 81,82, 83 rd brigades that controlled Masisis and Walikale. These included security for their kin from both FARDC and the FDLR. The latter factor tended to converge their interests with Rwanda's to their detriment at internal level. A factor that attracted other groups that sought to act as counters to what they saw as Rwanda's resource and territorial ambitions. Core in these were the different gangs and militias that went under the brand of MaiMai. Core in these included Patriotes Resistance Congoliase (Pareco) as a counter to Nkunda. The Government's attempt to crush Nkunda with new units (20,000 send to the province ) despite its increasing collaboration with FDLR failed81. After several fighting and interventions including Obasanjo led talks CNDP was reintegrated in the FARDC, Nkunda was later arrested and confined in Rwanda. A brief moment of regional collaboration began that saw DRC and Rwanda begin joint operations against FDLR. Ntaganda took advantage to gain controle of key mining areas Nyabibwe, Bisie, Bibatama. The Lueshe Pyrochlore Mine in Rutshuru district in the North Kivu was under FARDC and CNDP82.

Interview with Col Felix Kulagye UPDF. Juba South Sudan 2013 81 See Jason Stearns: From CNDP to M23: The Evolution of an Armed Movement in Eastern Congo. Rift Valley Institute/ Usalama Project. Understanding Congolese Armed Groups Phil Moore 2012 p30 82 See also Woodman Conor. Unfair Trade . Op. cit p127.

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In addition to FDLR are other regional groups such as the Lords Resistance Army which killed 1796 people and abducted another 2377 and Allied Democratic Forces/ National Army for the liberation of Uganda (NALU) led by Mukulu Jamil ad aligned to Alqaeda83. There is also FNL from Burundi which operates from around Ruzizi plains. 6th of May 2012 another mutiny evolved into a new group known as M23. Unlike the CNDP which had managed to bring in to its fold officers from Banyamulenge, Hutu and Tusti Communities, M23 was plagued factionalism first between its top leaders Bosco Ntaganda and Sultani Makenga. However this did not stop it from drawing in its ranks Hema and lendu in Ituri. Its main aim was to pressure the Joseph Kabila regime to honor previous agreements signed. Soon these expanded to assume a broader reform questions before factions emerged in the leadership leading to the overthrow of both Ntaganda and its political face Rev Runiga. By November 20th 2012, the group had taken GOMA before withdrawing to concentrate on talks in Kampala. Like the previous revolts, Rwanda and Uganda were accused of arming and supporting it. The disorganization, demotivation, and their contribution to the under‐ performance of the FARDC, issues of command and control, morale and logistical support not withstanding was not under consideration when putting in to context the “success” of M23. It did not matter what authorities in Rwanda said, it stood accused for the success Indeed a few days later a leading FARDC commander was relieved off his command arrested and brought to Kinshasa for diverting logistics to rebels.

What was lost to many was the fact that for 16 months Rwandan special forces had been operating in DRC with the permission of the DRC Government. This had enabled it to degrade the ability of FDLR. More than anything else if her interest was extraction, then the same were more likely to be facilitated by such cooperation rather than war84. Indeed when this cooperation was interrupted, the FDLR merely re‐occupied the areas they had been expelled from. Instead since then attacks from FDLR have increased. For instance , on the 27 November 2012, FDLR attacked RDF positions at Muti Rubavu District Western Province. The attack was repulsed with FDLR suﬀering 30 dead, injuries and one captive. The last attack took place on 24th May 2013 in Bisoke85. FDLR equally relocated its ﬁghting units from Walikale and Masisi towards Rutsuru closer to the Rwandan border. Currently FDLR has an estimated strength of 4640. RUD has 300 while SOC has 130 bring the total number of Armed groups to 5070.

83 According to Ugandan Intelligence Sources Mukulu operates from Kenya. This is however Refuted by Kenyan Intelligence Services 84 Interview with Gen Karenzi Karake Chief of intelligence .Rwanda . 85 See PPt Presentation by Franco Rutagengwa CMI RDF.

Equally, Congolese Businessmen bring their resources in Rwanda much easily when there is peace than war. In other words it is the interest of Rwanda that there is peace along its border with the DRC than war. There were other strategic reasons that militated against such support. The ﬁrst is geo‐economic. Without war, Rwanda is attracting mineral prospectors targeting her and the DRC. It has many Businessmen who trade legally in the Congolese minerals. More critically, From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 02/11/2013

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her minerals are being tagged by the International Tin Research Institute( ITRI). Indeed the need to access global market animates sensitivity in Rwanda over conflicts it is blamed for. The Eastern Congo is a critical market for Rwandese Agricultural produce. It is imperative to not that districts of Musanze and Rubavu which in effect anchor production are the heart land of the former regime and were at the core of the post Habyarimana resistance. This rebellion was crushed to a large extend through economic regeneration. Rwanda would not like to engage in conflicts that would destabilize these regions. Musanze has emerged as an important tourist point following heavy investments from the government and with the formation of Rwandan National congress; the regime in Rwanda remains sensitive to any form of instability.

Both Rwanda and Ugandan regimes have built their legitimacy on the Variable of stability peace and order; they as much as possible would like to sustain it. For Rwanda especially instability manifested by Grenade attacks tends to be very traumatizing, any destabilization in KIVU given the low depth of Rwanda implies that it would give opponents a strategic advantage.

Both Rwanda and Uganda have been investing in Strategic Mineral and energy resources in areas close to the DRC border. In Uganda, this has been necessitated by the discovery of oil around lake Albert( see Map below). In Rwanda, there are investments in natural gas especially methane around lake Kivu and other plants for iron production. The sensitivity to attacks on these strategic assets disinclines rather than incline these states towards conflicts. Indeed they confirm our contention that horizontal value extractions tend to disincline states towards conflicts in favor of consolidation. The interest of these two states is to transform the KIVU's into their strategic market rather than a war zone taking advantage of the ethnic contiguity.

For Rwanda officers, the strength and efficacy of M23 was exaggerated86. Indeed they considered the leadership to be disorganized at a political level, and in capable of mobilizing the Congolese population. For many of them, M23 had not faced an organized FARDC to gauge its strength and in any case abandoning territory was not a sign of defeat. As if to affirm this fact, Rwanda did not object to the idea of Monusco deploying Drones and the intervention brigade force. It considered the M23 as a Congolese problem, which would be animated by the actions of FDLR as a more serious threat to the DR and the region than M23. Rwanda went to the extent of facilitating the movement of the Tanzanian Units. As events would have it by the end of October 2013, M23 had laid down their arms in Uganda. Immediately, this happened, the discourse changed. “M23 had been defeated because Rwanda had been pressured to abandon them”. The re‐organization of FARDC and the support of the FIB and Monusco had been minimized completely.

Interview with Gen Karenzi k Nairobi 2013

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Source. Monusco: ICGLR. Kigali Experts meeting update on armed Groups in Eastern DRC.Monusco.POC 7-7-11.

Naturally Rwanda remains concerned about the lot of Rwanda ‐ phones in DRC indeed there are more than 70,000 refugees in Rwanda. But it considers these people as a Congolese problem. Its main pre‐ occupation remains the FDLR due to its genocidal ideology and the emerging rebel groups by former senior functionaries like Gens Kayumba Nyamwansa of the Rwandan National Congress(RNC) and Emanuel Habyarimana. For Uganda, the threats revolve around both ADF and the LRA given their terroristic tendencies and the links ADF has with with Alqaeda.

Of concern too, is what happens to the Rwandaphone communities in Eastern Congo with the M23 off the game. How Monusco, FARDC and the FIB respond to the FDLR and other Mai mai to assure their security will determine to a wide extent the direction of events. The converse raises a potential for a new cascade and the morphing of the conflict including the potential for transforming the Kivu conflict plates into a crush point of inter‐systemrush point.

3.3 INTERROGATING THE EXTRACTION EVIDENCE 3.3.1 Statistical Ground‐Truthing of the Extraction Evidence 87

Mainly the UN Expert Reports on DRC tend to exaggerate the evidence

Most reports quoted in this paper, and used as ground‐truths on DRC extraction are built around unveriﬁable statistics. The observation in these reports, for instance, is that Rwanda and Uganda are predatory states in DRC. And that their predation is done through organized and individualized channels of extraction. Most of these channels, it is assumed, are also informal and therefore invisible. The same assumption From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 02/11/2013

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is made regarding Charcoal trade in the Ogaden convergence made by the predatory foreign armies in Somalia. Some of these assertions may bare some grains of truth, but the trade statistics tend to falsify them.

In attempting a statistical ground‐truthing of the extraction evidence, we look at the formal evidence ﬁrst, and then the informal evidence purportedly said to be invisible. On the formal statistics, we rely on the IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Year Book (2012) and the Comesa Data Portal (COMSTATS) to establish ﬁve things.

1. One, the four most important export destinations for DRC. We focused primarily on export of ores and metals; speciﬁcally, coltan, tin, cobalt, and wolframite. The intention here was to establish the volume of exports by DRC against those by Rwanda and Uganda. From this, we were to make a comparison in order to determine whether the predation by Rwanda and Uganda was material. 2.Two, we looked at the trends in production and exports of these ores and metals from Rwanda and Uganda to end‐user countries. The intention was to ground‐truth the assumption that these countries are exporting more than they are producing as reported by the UN and other Euro‐centric reports. 3. Three, if the exports of these countries exceeded their production, we wanted to know by how much. But more fundamentally, what the percentage of this excess was in relation to these countries' GDP. What we were interested in here was whether this contribution was signiﬁcant or not. And whether it was worth all the international noise or the noise was a decoy. 4. Four, we set out to approximate what the DRC MNCs are making from the mines in comparison with what Rwanda and Uganda allegedly export. The purpose of this was to determine who the actual predators were and why the 'bells‐and‐whistles' around the Rwanda‐Uganda axis of extraction.

Ibid. Ma, T. 2009. China and Congo's coltan connection, Futuregram 09-003, The Project 2049 Institute. 90 Bank of Zambia, 2011. Zambia Direction of Trade Report-1st Quarter 2011. 91 Bedder, J. 2013. Cobalt Production in the DRC; Major Changes, Minor Implications, Roskill Information Services. 92 Bank of Zambia, 2011. Zambia Direction of Trade Report-1st Quarter 2011. 93 U.S. Department of State, 2012.U.S. Relations With Democratic Republic of the Congo. Downloaded at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2823.htm on September 13th, 2013 at 12.07pm (+3GMT). 94 Ipis, 2002. The Destination of DRC Diamonds in 2002 89

3.3.1.2 How Material is Rwanda and Uganda Predation in DRC?

The accusation that Rwanda and Uganda predate on DRC metals and ores has been made. If we are to assume, (uncritically) that this is true, how material is this predation? On average DRC main export destinations are China (40%), Zambia (16%), Belgium (12%), USA (10%) and Finland (5%) respectively. 99% of DRC exports to China are minerals mainly cobalt, copper88 and coltan89. Exports to Zambia are made of cobalt90 and copper ores91, which are then processed andexported to Switzerland and China. 92 The USA is said to be monopolizing the Oil and gas sector; whose production capacity is estimated to be 25,000 barrels per day93 and accounts for over 90% of all USA imports from DRC. The main exports from DRC to Belgium are Diamond and forest resources, such as timber.94

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From these accounts, we can establish the following: One, the USA and Belgium are either absent in the mineral extraction or have insigniďŹ cant presence. Two, the main consumers of DRC minerals are the Chinese, either directly or through Zambia. But the fact that China is the main importer of DRC ores and metals, does not mean that these are delivered by Chinese companies. Because China is not bound by the Kimberly Process, it is easier to sell conďŹ&#x201A;ict minerals to the country using any forms of companies. Three, if predation is happening in DRC, most of the exports are done directly from DRC, not through neigbouring countries. And that these exports are primarily destined to China. If this statistical truth holds, then the predators of Congo are companies, not states. These companies are owned by all and sundry, but the big ones are from the West and the East. Those from the region, Uganda and Rwanda, are just engaged in 'primitive accumulation'.

Ibid.

But there is another fact that could negate the notion that serious predation happens at all in the DRC. Between 2005 and 2011, export value from DRC to China averaged 1200 million US dollars annually and has more than doubled since 2009. The rise of DRC's export to China is attributed to a bilateral trade agreement between the two governments signed in 200895 which implied that in exchange for an access to 10.6 million tons of copper and 600,000 tons of cobalt in the Katanga region, China would invest US$ 6 billion in vital infrastructures and US$ 3 billion in mining. However, IMF forced a renegotiation of terms which saw the mining component scrapped and the infrastructure investment halved. It was argued that Congo appeared to be giving China a guarantee that its

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debts would be repaid as a priority above other nations despite the fact that DRC was heavily indebted at that time (with external debts totalling US$ 11.5 billion) and had requested for a debt relief. It was argued that providing debt relief to Congo would have amounted to donor nations 96 subsidising Congo's debt repayments to China. The question to raise from this is: What if there is no signiﬁcant predation in DRC, and that trade between China and DRC has increased legitimately? And maybe discourse has failed to keep pace with the changing extraction reality?

Back to the question of how material Rwanda and Uganda predation are, we looked at exports of ores and metals found in DRC. The graph below indicates that in 2005 for instance, Rwanda exports of ores and metals were equivalent to 16% of what DRC exported. And that Uganda's exports of the same stood at 4% of what DRC exported. This statistic can be interpreted to mean three things. One, that Rwanda and Uganda were predating on DRC during this time. In fact, out of every 100 tones of ores and metals exported by DRC, Rwanda exported 16 tones and Uganda 4 tones. In other words, given that Rwanda and Uganda have no mines, the 16 and 4 tones must have been stolen from DRC. This is the commonplace and pedestrian interpretation in most reports.

Global Witness, 2012. China and Congo: Friends in need

While the ﬁrst interpretation of this statistic focuses on Rwanda's and Uganda's percentage of what DRC exported, it misses out on something. It fails to look at trends in production. Some of the Euro‐centric literature seem to suggest that before Joseph Kabila, the two countries predated galore. But what it fails to say is that what Kabila has brought to DRC is relative calm, which has resulted in an increase in export volumes as the ﬁgure below shows. Between 2005 and 2012 according to Comesa and IMF statistics, export volumes for DRC metals and ores increased by 1098% due to stability. That of Rwanda only increased by 136%, and that of Uganda increased by 32%. What this means therefore is as follows: If in 2005, Rwanda exported 16 tones out of every 100 tones exported by DRC, by 2012, this had gone down to 3 tones only. But this is not because From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 02/11/2013

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Rwanda's exports went down. It is because of the astronomical increase in DRC exports.

The third explanation has to do with Rwanda's and Uganda's export increase by 136% and 32% in 2012. A common interpretation of this would jump on predation. But a more nuanced appreciation points to the existence of petty smugglers who favour the two countries due to their progressive tax regimes. The argument given by business men is captured here as follows:

“ Exporting 60% of your merchandise fraudulently is normal. Rwanda encourages exports in order to have access to hard currency. The DRC discourages exports through its export tax regime through which we mean we import much more than we export and lose hard currency. We would like to be able to import and export via Congolese banks, but they don't have enough currency hard currency. Repatriated export earning pass through the Central bank in Kinshasa and often the government borrows them for its own requirements so thy do not come to Goma. So a trader in Goma will ﬁnd himself blocked. That is why we do not use our banks. We have the impression that our government prefers to keep our banking system dead so as to encourage money laundering and a circuit of earning distribution outside the oﬃcial system”97

Rules for Sale: Formal and informal Cross Border Trade in Eastern DRC. A Pole institute Report Goma, May 2007 p28

It is notable that for many Congolese businessmen exporting unofficially and subsequently re‐exporting from Uganda and Rwanda, these states offer them advantages for trade. Exporting unofficially to Rwanda and Uganda and re‐exporting, as locals from there has other advantages for traders besides saving taxes. It allows them to keep their business in Rwandan and Ugandan banks rather than Congolese banks that they do not trust. Under the Rwandan law, export revenue in hard currencies have to be repatriated into the Rwandan banking system. The Rwanda Revenue authority takes a 30% tax on these profits annually. From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 02/11/2013

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Businesses ﬁnd this better than the Congolese model that imposes tax based on export value rather than proﬁt.98

In other words, Uganda and Rwanda have better prices given the tax differentiation. Tax on coffee leaving DRC is 7% of the value compared to 1% in Rwanda and Uganda99. Stability and order on the Rwandan side explains its increasing value as a strategic bridge ‐head in the heart of the Great lakes. It is increasingly acting as such for many investments targeting both the DRC and Rwanda who use it as either a forward or real logistical base. According to Goma branch of Congolese Business Federation (FEC), mineral trading firms are either owned by or financed by Lebanese, South African and Rwandan trading firms who bring their own because the Congolese banking system also discriminates against them100.

If between 2005 and 2012, there is an increase in export of minerals by 136% in Rwanda, and 32% in Uganda, this is because of an increase in petty traders looking for cheaper tax regimes and friendlier banks. But it can also be argued that what is 'smuggled' into the Rwandese and Ugandan economies is also a form of predation. However, we must ask how material this is and whether it is oﬃcial? Back to the statistics aforementioned, Rwanda's mineral exports as a percentage of DRC's stood at 4% in 2012. That of Uganda stood at 1%. And these exports include the 'smugglers' and these countries' own production.

At this point, we must introduce another variable. What if the exports done by Uganda and Rwanda are made informally, hence remaining invisible? According to the Comesa statistics, informal trade in the region accounts for 40% of what is recorded. That means out of every 5 transactions in the region, 3 are recorded but 2 are not. If we are to assume that the two countries exported atleast 40% of what they have declared informally, the question of how material this is must be raised ﬁrst. In the case of Rwanda, this means that 1.6% of its mineral exports compared to those of DRC, were done informally. For Uganda, this stands at 0.4%. This means that out of every 1000 tones of metal done by DRC, Rwanda exports 16 tones informally and Uganda exports 4 tonnes. Even if this was predation, it is insigniﬁcant in our view. But even then, where these informally exported minerals end up is mysterious because informal trade between Rwanda and China for instance does not exist. If there are any informal exports, therefore, they are within the region.

Based interview in Goma, April-May 2007 see Rules for Sale: Formal and informal Cross Border Trade in Eastern DRC. A Pole institute Report Goma, May 2007 p27 99 Rules for Sale: Formal and informal Cross Border Trade in Eastern DRC. A Pole institute Report Goma, May 2007 p29 100 Rules for Sale: Formal and informal Cross Border Trade in Eastern DRC. A Pole institute Report Goma, May 2007 p28

There is one other argument to make here. Where informal trade happens, it does so through sanitization processes availed by MNCs and channeled through China. The foregoing raises questions with respect to the argument that Rwanda and Uganda fan the conﬂict to extract minerals. As noted, corruption has made it easy for the entire mining activity to be informalized and naturally captured by groups seeking to raise capital to sustain their criminal activities. Tax evasion is undertaken through smuggling networks in the FARDC, exports by unregistered From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 02/11/2013

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actors, under‐declaration of quantities, false declaration of the type of exports and falsiﬁcation of custom declarations101. Those who seek to export legally ﬁnd their operations to be costly. A container of 25 ton cassiterite exported from DRC attracted an average $Us 6500 in tax compared to $us 200 if exported through Rwanda, and $Us 20 if exported through Uganda. Notably many opt to take their produce to Either Uganda or Rwanda.

“ At the moment to export one container of 25 t cassiterrite legally from the DRC I have to pay $ Us 6500 in tax. If I export from Rwanda I pay $200: if export from Uganda $Us 40. So if I can get my product to Rwanda or Uganda ﬁrst and export oﬃcially, from there, I save a lot of money. Avoiding DRC taxes costs me $2000 for one container . So I save $us 4500. DRC is the only country which still levies an export tax. All others have abolished it”102

According to Garret N and Mitchell H. an estimated half of Cassiterite and Coltan are extracted and exported informally103. Underlying this are criminal networks whose capacity become apparent when more than 7 tons of Gold from DRC disappeared from Nairobi despite President Kabila's attempts to retrieve it. The networks linked elements in the Congolese embassy in Nairobi, as well as some elements in Kenya and elite in Zimbabwe. In March 2008 two tons of minerals were seized in the Goma airport from Congolese Soldiers and their militia allies104. Several times the Rwandan government has conﬁscated and repatriated smuggled and untagged minerals back to the GoDRC: For instance, on 3rd November 2011, GoR handed back to GoDRC eighty two (82) tones of smuggled minerals which included cassitarite, wolframite, Tungsten and Tantalum. These un‐tagged minerals had been smuggled through the porous borders over a period of ﬁve months. Another 8,4 tones that are currently held by the Rwanda Geology and Mining Authority ready to be handed back to GoDRC subsequent to the due process.

101 See Ndungu Mukasa a and Kilosho Buraye J. La Filière Stannifère artisanale au Sud-Kivu: Cas du coltan et e la cassiterite, in : l'Afrique des Grands Lac, Annuaire 2008-2009, p229 102 Rules for Sale: Formal and informal Cross Border Trade in Eastern DRC. A Pole institute Report Goma, May 2007 p26 103 Garrett N and Mitchell H. Trading Con ict for development: utilizing the Trade in Minerals from the Eastern DR Congo for Development , Resource Consulting services, 2009 104 See Africa Con dential. How Smuggling Pays for Killing. 49(23) November 14, 2008.

The salience of informal cross border trade links North Kivu to Both Rwanda and Uganda in particular and East Africa in general cannot be understated. Critical is the ethnic kin country dynamic of the Banyarwanda and the Nande communities in the North Kivu and their kin in Rwanda and Uganda. While Banyarwanda are concentrated to the South or the pitit nord, the Nande are dominant in the grand Nord in Beni/ Butembo with trade links with Uganda. The ties are strong such that both Goma with a population of 500,000 and Gisenyi with a population of 150,000 seam contiguous. Core here are two grand and petite barriers on lake Kivu and Goma Airport respectively that mediate transit movements of tens of thousands e each day morning and evening across the two states. The salience of informal trade is apparent in huge warehouses and trading stores especially in Rwanda's Musanze and Gisenyi towns. The movement mediates a wide range of good that traverse the border including agricultural produce such as beans, Bananas from the DRC and From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 02/11/2013

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Chicken, beef milk and transit goods from Kenya. Security and order has enabled many Congolese to set up accounts and transact from Rwanda It is notable that lots of goods in and out of North Kivu transit the frontier informally. Underlying this is that they are declared to be free of either import or export tax and are thus not registered. Some traders bribe customs oﬃcials, goods are hidden underneath non taxable goods, tax regimes are not applied by tax oﬃcials. Or those with links to state and military elite intervene to facilitate exemption105.

Where the exemption is not forth coming, individuals smuggle them out to Rwanda with the assistance of the military to the extent that they are bribed. Indeed despite un reports that seemed to have pushed down sales in houses down to around 50 tons a months, in Bukavu, mines continued to operate including areas controlled by FDLR. The UN report seemed to have merely created a black market logic. Malaysian Smelting Corporation (MSC) third largest supplier of smelted metals continues to remain a core actor. It also imports cassiterite from both Congo and Rwanda.106

Processed metals are sold to electronic companies starting with circuit board and computer chip manufacturers before they are set to cell phone and electronic manufacturers: Intel, Nokia, Hewlett Packard, Ninendo for cellphone production, portable music players, video games, laptops107. Value addition and the resultant surplus value explains order at points of manufacture compared to entropies in eastern Congo. The billions of value that make up earnings of these companies explain the apparent threat they feel as a result of the Frank Todd legislative measures of the US congress seeking to impose transparency in the supply logic of minerals from the DRC. These companies have spent an average $US2m per month to lobby congress to relax the rule. 108 It is not hard to understand this dynamic. He foregoing underpins our contention that neighboring states to DRC are not the problem. They are conduits in a mercantile process whose main beneficiaries are in the metro‐pole. Had the extraction been essentially horizontal or vertical with a value addition logic, the space would be peaceful given the fact that it would create multiple fields of accumulation, allow taxation which if well used would enhance the physical base. State and spillover region‐centric extraction would engender a build up effect increasing mutual security for states, and communities. Given the fact that the states to the east of Congo have order and infrastructure, many exporters prefer these routes.

105

See Rules for sale : Formal and Informal Cross-Border Trade in Eastern DRC. A Pole Institute Report .Goma , May 2007 p14 106 See Woodman Coner. Unfair Trade. The Shocking Truth Behind Ethical ' Business . Business books 2012,p134n 107 See Woodman Coner. Unfair Trade. The Shocking Truth Behind Ethical ' Business . Business books 2012,p143n . See also Prendergast and Lezhnev op cit. 108 Prendergast and Lezhnev op cit. 109 See Woodman Coner. Unfair Trade. The Shocking Truth Behind Ethical ' Business .

While European companies purport to have stopped buying leaving this to Chinese and Malaysians, they still buy the processed metals from China and Malaysia. Some Chinese buyers go to the extent of calling on Congolese traders to falsify documents and disguise the country of origin documents to show minerals to be from Rwanda or Ethiopia 109 . Fundamental to the entire process of extraction is the variable demand inherent in vertical extraction value addition.

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Increasing demand from western electronics industry drives the supply of DRC's most valuable resources, cassiterite and Coltan. Once exported from Congo the main smelting and processing companies that transform the minerals into usable components are Thaisarco, owned by British company AMC, British‐owned Afrimex, Belgian Trademet and Traxys – and Malaysian MSC.110

Business books 2012,p134n 110 See Woodman Coner. Unfair Trade. The Shocking Truth Behind Ethical ' Business . Business books 2012,p143-4 111 See Prendergast J and Lezhnev Sasha. From Mine To Mobile Phone. The Con ict Supply Chain . Enough Project .www.enough project.org p7 112 See Nutt Samantha ,M.D. Damned Nations: Greed ,Guns, Armies and Aid. Mclleland & Stewart Ltd 2011p57 113 See Spittaels and Hilgert Filip. Accompanying Note on the Interractive Map of Militarized mining Areas in the Kivus. IPIS. Antwerp, August 2009 p15 114 See Spittaels and Hilgert Filip. Accompanying Note on the Interractive Map of Militarized mining Areas in the Kivus. IPIS. Antwerp, August 2009 p15 115 US Geological Survey Mineral Commodity Survey for tantalum (2009), Available at http://www.usgs.gov. 116 See Spittaels and Hilgert Filip. Accompanying Note on the Interractive Map of Militarized mining Areas in the Kivus. IPIS. Antwerp, August 2009 p15 117 See Spittaels and Hilgert Filip. Accompanying Note on the Interractive Map of Militarized mining Areas in the Kivus. IPIS. Antwerp, August 2009 p15 118 See Prendergast J and Sasha Lezhnev. From Mine to mobile Phone. The con ict Mineral Supply Chain. Enough Project. P 5 119 Ibid p5 120 See Bank of Rwanda, Monthly Exports, January to June 2013 , July 29, 2013, Available at http://www.bnr.rw/index.php?id=171&elD=da m_frontend_push&docID=578. Interviews with Rwandan Security o cials. 2012, 2013 121 Anastanse Syaka.. Musanze 122 Interview with Commandant Musanze Sta Collage. See also Independent Reporter, Rwanda turns to minerals to boost revenues

This is despite that they buy the same from comptoirs linked to armed groups such as FDLR. These ﬁnally end in the assembly lines where companies such as Nokia Apple, Motorola and Dell come into play111 . Others include Philips, Sony, Telefonica, Western Digital, IBM, Panasonic, Nitendo, Toshiba, and Xerox. Compared to the extreme poverty and violence in Congo an examination of the global market of tantalum market estimated at more than US$6b with more than half used to manufacture 1 billion cell phones112. It is notable that DRC accounts for 15 to 20 % of Global tantalum113. In 2008, Eastern Congo “produced” 155 tons114 compared to global production of 815 tons115 Core here in the process of creating Marx's surplus values is a cheap source of these supplies. DRC 's eastern region produces an estimated 24, 592 tones of Tin compared to global production of 350,000 tons in 2008. It accounts for 6‐8 % of global production116. In 2008, Eastern Congo produced 1300 tons compared to estimated global production of 54,600 tons. It accounts for 2‐4% of the metal. Eastern Congo accounts for about 1% of Gold. An estimated 6.5tons was mined from Eastern Congo compared to world production of 2,330 in 2008117. 3.3.1.3 Can Predation Be Explained by the Diﬀerence Between Production and Exports?

Some of the reports have argued that both Rwanda and Uganda are exporting more minerals than they are producing. And this has been used to explain predation by the two countries in the Kivus. While this argument, especially made by Enough Project severally, may sound compelling, it falls far short of statistical ground truths. Enough Project Report points to official mineral production in Rwanda Uganda and Burundi in 2007. Uganda gave it figure as less than $US 600 yet exported over US $ 74 m of Gold118. According to the report, Rwanda produced Us$ 8m worth of tin ore but indicated to have exported at least US $30 m of tin119. The notion of re‐export, as a result of activities of Congolese or for that matter increasing production in Rwanda is lost out. For instance exports of tantalum rose by 112% between 2012 and the first half of 2013 from 545 tons to 1,153 tons. The value in millions also rose from US $ 23.7 m to US$69m120. Studies point to huge quantities of minerals in Rwanda121. This fact is evident in the increasing activities in the Rutongo mine and others where investors such as Saphire Mines Innyamasheke, Rogi Mining in Burera and Gicumbi for Gold, Trans Africa in Gicumbi, and Ruzizi , EMR resources Rwanda Ltd( Ruzizi), Karongi and Nyamasheke122.

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Allegations against Rwanda's production and export in minerals rose from the fact that its minerals exports grew steadily in the past decade. Reports have questioned for instance, mineral exports by Rwanda between 2010 and 2011 when the mineral exports rose by 62 percent 123 compared to a 22 percent rise in domestic mining production . Tin exports in particular, rose by 65 percent over its six‐year average, from 4,211 tons to 6,952 tons in 2010 while domestic tin production rose only by 14 percent.124 Statistics on Rwanda's tin production125 indicate that in 2007 and 2008, tin export volumes exceeded production volumes by approximately 1000 tonnes before levelling oﬀ in 2009. In 2010, Rwanda's tin production volumes surpassed the exports by close to 1000 tonnes although the trend was reversed in 2011 as illustrated below.From the illustration above it is seen that in 2010, Rwanda did not export all the tin that it produced and might account for the quantities that it exported over and above what it produced in 2011. Can this be a possible explanation to 65% rise in Rwanda's tin export compared to a 22% rise in production? If so, would it be possible that Rwanda was stockpiling before 2007 that would account for the excesses in exports?

Of note is the fact that the export trend for Rwanda is symmetrical to the global tin prices with a one year lag. Rise in tin exports were subsequent to increases in global tin prices and vice versa. Global tin prices peaked marginally during the 2007‐2008 period which led to a slight peak in tin exports in 2008. The global recession of 2008 which resulted in sharp fall in commodity prices in 2008 resulted in a dip in Rwanda's tin export for 2009 followed by a subsequent rise in exports after 2010 as commodity prices begun to recover in 2009.

123

Ba lemba F., Lezhnev S. and Zingg S. W., 2012. From Congress to Congo-Turning the Tide on Con ict Minerals, Closing Loopholes, and Empowering Miners, Enough Project 124 Ibid. 125 Ministry of Natural Resources-Rwanda, 2013. Potential Investment in Rwanda Mining Sector

For coltan, Rwanda exports statistics have consistently surpassed production volumes except for 2009 when exports and production volumes equalled. However, compared to tin, both the production and export volumes for coltan are low ranging from 500‐900 metric tonnes. Of note is the fact that margin of export of coltan in excess of production has been decreasing. The highest margin was reported in 2007 when From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 02/11/2013

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exports nearly doubled the production volumes (879 metric tonnes compared to 496 tonnes in production.

Source: Compiled by TCH from Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook

Similar pattern is depicted in the production and export of Wolfram. The highest diďŹ&#x20AC;erence in export compared to production was recorded in 2007 where the export volumes surpassed the production volumes by more than 800 tonnes. In 2011 however, Rwanda produced more wolfram than it exported.

Source: Compiled by TCH from Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook for Rwanda

In terms of total export volumes, if one compares total mineral exports by Rwanda to China's imports from DRC; 99% of which are minerals, Rwanda export proportion dropped from a high of 37% in 2005 to low 4% in 2010 and 6% in 2011.

This means that, in 2011 for instance, for every 6 million US dollars' worth of minerals that Rwanda exported to the world; including its own production, China imported 100 million US dollars' worth of minerals from the DRC. (Given that almost of all of the major mines and approximately 50% of all mines in eastern DRC are controlled by military units, who are more likely to interact with/fund militia?) From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 02/11/2013

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Source: Compiled by TCH from Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook

In Uganda, the main export minerals are Cobalt, wolfram, Gold and Colombo tantalite/coltan respectively.

Source: Compiled by TCH from Uganda Mining Journal 2012

Table 1: Uganda's Mineral Production

Mineral production in Uganda peaked after 2003, a fact attributed to the enactment of the mining act which facilitated the issuance of mining licence.126Uganda's trade in gold has been the most suspicious.127 Over the years, Uganda's exports volumes in gold have consistently surpassed the production volumes with production being intermittent and almost negligible. Gold production peaked in 2008 when 2 tonnes were reported while exports peaked in 2002 at 7.6 metric tonnes. The export quantities have however been declining steadily from a high of 7.6 tonnes in 2002 to a low of 0.4 tonnes in 2009.

Table 2: Trends in Gold Production and Export from Uganda 126

Government of Uganda, 2012. Mining Journal Special Publication, Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development. 127 Human Rights Watch, 2005. The Curse of Gold-Democratic Republic of Congo, New York, USA.

The alleged smuggling of 40 tonnes of gold through Uganda as reported by the UN Panel of Experts in 2009 does not correspond with the export statistics for Uganda. Uganda exported 400kgs and 500kgsof gold in 2009 and 2010 respectively.

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Cobalt is the only mineral in Uganda whose production has continuously surpassed export volumes since 2004. From 2009 onwards, although cobalt production statistics have been reported, no exports ďŹ gures have been available raising the question whether Uganda could be stockpiling.

For coltan, two patterns are evident; between 2002 and 2006, Uganda produced more coltan than it exported. Thereafter, in 2007 and 2008, export volumes exceeded production volumes. Coltan production and export in Uganda became marginal thereafter.

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exported by close to 60 metric tonnes as illustrated below and can partly be explained by a global rise in the price for wolfram from USD 97,554 per 128 tonne in 2009 to USD 110,231 per tonne in 2010 . Could this be a pointer that Uganda has been stockpiling some of its Wolfram?

3.3.1.4 Who is the Predator? Rogue Capital or the Neighboring States? According to our tabulations from the Comesa data portal, which does not differ significantly with the IMF statistics, between 2005 and 2012, DRC exported metals and ores worth US $ 2,216 Million on average. During the same period, Rwanda exported an average of US$ 98.9 Million, while Uganda exported US $ 22 Million. Of the DRC exports worth US $ 2,216 Million estimates hold it that the approximately 142 MNCs operating in the mining fields made approximately US $ 1,420 129 Million .

128

Infomine Global Wolfram prices downloaded at http://www.infomine.com/investment/metalprices/ferro-tungsten/5-year/ on 10th October 2013 at 10.37 am (+3GMT). 129 This is based on averages calculated from returns made by MNCs operating in the region.

These statistics suggest two things: One, Rwanda's mineral exports are equivalent to those of only 1 MNC. And those of Uganda, are equivalent to one‐ﬁfth of what one MNC in DRC would export. Put diﬀerently, the total exports by MNCS are 14 times what Rwanda exports, and 70 times what Uganda exports. If indeed there is illicit mining in DRC, who is more likely to be culpable? This statistic suggests that the MNCs are 14 times more likely to be the extractionist compared to Rwanda and 70 times more likely to predate compared to Uganda. Even if you bring in the factor of informal exports by Uganda and Rwanda, they cannot approximate what the MNCs extract.

Two, and as suggested earlier, if there is any predation in DRC, it possibly leaves the mines directly to the global market without passing through the alleged predatory states. And if this is true, then the From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 02/11/2013

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When compared, in the 2002‐2006 period when coltan productions exceeded exports, Uganda's stocked approximately 13.53 tonnes while in the 2006‐2009 period when exports exceeded production Uganda exported 10.89 tonnes over what it produced resulting in over 2 tonnes of coltan reserves. Could this back the idea of stockpiling?When compared to North Kivu, coltan export for North Kivu grew from a four times margin in 2003 twenty ﬁve times margin in 2008 as illustrated in the table below.

For wolfram, prior to 2008, Uganda had consistently produced more than it exported. By summing the production and exports volumes for Uganda's wolfram between 2002‐2010, Uganda produced more than it From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 02/11/2013

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predators are a cocktail of actors. Rwanda, Uganda and the MNCs are all in it together. But, while the 'predatory states' are involved in 'primitive accumulation' through companies associated with them, the main extractionist are the MNCs. 4.0 THE AXIS‐OF‐EXTRACTION IN THE OGADEN CONVERGENCE

4.1 Extraction without borders; looting in the context of state collapse

The Ogaden convergence has fewer lootable and extractable resources compared to the Kivus. What thrives in this convergence is a bandit economy stretching form the pirate dens of Puntland to the lower reaches of the Juba Valley in Somalia and across the Gulf of Aden and the Red sea to the GCC states. Throughout the past two decades, in spite of the lack of eﬀective national governance structures, Somalia has maintained a robust informal economy, mainly dependent on agriculture and especially livestock. The region is also a major destination for inward remittances and plays host to money transfer and telecommunications companies. Unlike in the 1970s and 1980s, when the region had a small manufacturing sector and many services were provided by the public sector, virtually all industrial production, services provision and trade today are ﬁrmly in the hands of an informal private sector.130

The Somalis are thought to be one of the most resilient people in the world based on their determination, entrepreneurialism, mobility and a culture of solidarity and generosity that spans both local and international spaces. Business networks in Somali involve many Somalis outside the country, operating across borders and continents but held together by extensive ties of family and trust whose foundations were 131 laid in the years before the fall of Siyyad Barre in 1991.

After the fall of Siyyad Barre, Stateless Somalia provided ample opportunities for business elites to trade, invest and operatein a domestic market completely devoid of price controls and state regulation. Many have argued that the unregulated parallel economy that prevailed after the formal economy crumbled in Somalia has been partially copied in or exported to Kenya where a considerable proportion of Somali enterprise mainly hotels, real estate and transport industries are now flourishing. 132 Eastleigh has acted as a central point for the distribution of goods around East Africa and further afield. Until 2003, the Eldoret International Airport was one of the main entry points for untaxed goods with a majority imported from Dubai by Somali traders or by freight companies owned by Somali networks operating largely out of Eastleigh. It is argued that currently, Somalis have established sufficient investment clout in Kenya and can influence political decisions in the country.133

130 Abdulaamed Farah, 2011. Somali Investment in Kenya, Chatham House brie ng paper 131 Ibid 132 Ibid 133 Ibid

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In Somalia, the business community in most southern regions and in Mogadishu in particular had to seek protection and pay warlords or establish their own militia to protect their enterprises134. This is the major contributing factor to the growth of militia in the region. The militia control strategic locations, mainly the major ports and have even become part of the business community; for instance in the export of charcoal.135

4.2 Somalia's scattered economy

134

Somalia has a negative balance of trade given that it imports more commodities than it exports. Agriculture is the most important export sector accounting for about 65% of the GDP overall and employing two‐ thirds of the workforce. Livestock alone roughly accounting for about 59.3% of GDP and more than 50% of export earnings, followed by the services sector accounting for 33.5% and manufacturing taking 7.2%.136 In 2000, Saudi Arabia imposed a ban on live animal imports from Somali ports following concerns over Rift Valley Fever. Somalia shifted its main export outlet to the port of Djibouti to circumvent the ban. The ban was lifted in 2009 and since then the port of Berbera in Somaliland and the port of Bosasso in Puntland have since regained much of their temporarily lost market share.137 The export mix for Somalia has remained fairly unchanged since 2005 with peaks in 2007 and 2010. The composition of commodities other than livestock steadily declined after 2007. Of note however, is the fact that prior to 2009, Somalia exported considerable volume of gold destined for U.A.E despite it having no production capacity or import statistics to support the trade. Could this be indicative of Somalia being used as a smuggling route for Gold from DRC since it is not a signatory of the Kimberly process? In contrast to popular perception, Charcoal export statistics for Somalia since 2005 have consistently been below 0.16% of the total value of exports according to the available oﬃcial statistics. 138 However, according to the Somalia Ecological Society (SES), 70, 000 tonnes of Charcoal are exported annually from Somalia packed in 25 Kg sacks which are sold for between $10 and $15 per sack in the Arab Countries. 139 This approximately generates between 28 million and 42 million dollars for the Somali economy.

Ibid UN Security Council, 2012. Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea 136 Central Bank of Somalia Annual Report 2012 available at http://media.wix.com/ugd/beb93a_28d547aa 03b1b5ba025b4f6aa679cbaa.pdf [Retrieved 23 November 2013] also https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/so.html [Retrieved 23 November 2013] 137 USAID 2012, Livestock export from Northern Ports in the Horn of Africa 138 The Observatory of economic complexity downloaded at http://atlas.media.mit.edu/explore/tree_map/e xport/som/all/show/2010/ on 29th September 2013 at 1150hrs(+3GMT) 139 Somali report downloaded at http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/pos t/3291 on 23 October 2013 at 12.38 pm (+3GMT) 140 Orozco, M and Yansura, J (2013) Keeping the lifeline open; Remittances and Markets in Somalia, Oxfam America. Available at http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/ les/bp-keeping-lifeline-open-somaliaremittances-310713-en.pdf 135

On the other hand, remittances statistics indicate that each year, Somali migrants around the world send approximately $1.3 billion to Somalia. Of this amount, approximately $215 million comes from Somali‐ Americans and Somalis in the United States (this figure is comparable to the total amount of development and humanitarian assistance that the US government sent to Somalia in fiscal year 2012 totaling $242 million) 140. These flows, facilitated by Somali‐American money transfer operators (MTOs), represent about one fifth (20%) of the total GDP and help reduce Somalia's reliance on assistance from foreign governments and international organizations.The Central Bank of Somalia estimates that that over 60% of foreign exchange earnings in Somalia are generated by remittances. Remittances support the largest segment of the country's From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 02/11/2013

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141

urban population and fuel an estimated 75% of startup business capital . Remittances have also been responsible for arresting the decline in per capita incomesbecause they were used to oďŹ&#x20AC;set the sharp drop in per capita output. Finally, remittances have also been cited having contributed to the stabilization of the local currency.

When compared to the proceeds from export and foreign aid, remittances have been consistently higher in value. It is only in 2011 that the volumes of foreign aid to Somalia rose suďŹ&#x192;ciently high enough to approach the level of remittances. The spike in foreign aid injections is attributable to the famine crisis. These trends are illustrated in the chart below.

141

Central Bank of Somalia (2012) Op. Cit

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Remittances from Somalis in the diaspora have been crucial in raising capital investments for enterprises in Kenya. Capital ventures from Somalis include shopping‐malls142, hotels, clearing and forwarding companies, transport companies, real estate and Lodges. 4.3 Somalia's Multinational Corporations

4.3.1African Salihiya Clearing Cargo (ASCC)

It is a multimodal freight forwarding company established in 1993 and based in the UAE. Dubai is its main hub from whence goods are received from all over the world for onward distribution. In East Africa, the Eldoret International airport is the entry point for goods dispatched by this company. ASCC operates full charter flights from Dubai to Eldoret every week and sea freight through the port of Mombasa. An advantageous aspect to the road freight is the fact that adjustments can be made to final delivery should final requirements change once cargo has been initially collected. Sea freight on the other hand includes transportation of less than container load (LCL) as well as full container load (FCL) shipments. To ensure and secure time for services needed, ASCC has maintained committed relationships with leading airlines besides chartering their own flights solely for cargo. 143 ASCC tends to import everything from boxing gloves to handbags, ceramics to electronics, furniture, textiles, spare parts, mobile phones and accessories. 144 Their rates are quite reasonable compared to other international clearing and forwarding companies and they tend to be very flexible, acting in proximity with their clientele. 4.3.2Dahabshiil Group Limited

142

They are a group of companies engaged in various business sectors such as banking, international remittance services, telecommunications and general trading. They are the leading remittance company in East Africa with oﬃces in London, Hargeisa, Mogadishu and Dubai. Their businesses target and revolve around migrant communities across the globe as remittances account for their core business. Today it is Africa's largest money transfer operator with more than 24,000 agent locations and branches across the world. 145 Tie‐up agreements with strategic partners ensure its services reach the maximum possible number of Somali expats. The World Bank estimates that the Somali diaspora worldwide sends around $1bn (GBP632m) each year to relatives in Somalia, a regular capital ﬂow that has helped to bolster its economy.146

Such as Amal, Baraka Bazaar, Garissa Lodge and Sunshine Plaza 143 See more at : http://www.africansalihiya.com/, accessed on 23/10/13 144 Their facebook o cial account: https://www.facebook.com/AFRICANSALIHIYA 145 Dahanshil Group, https://www.facebook.com/dahabshiilgroup/a pp_349313058487732 146 Africa Business, Dahabshiil Provides Vital Remittances, Says BBC, LONDON, February 3, 2011 /PRNewswire/, See more at: http://www.prnewswire.com/newsreleases/dahabshiil-provides-vital-remittancessays-bbc-115187439.html 147 Barclays defends plan to close Somali remittance accounts as Dahabshiil court case enters day 2, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bhC4XTsre4

The fate of the popular Hawalla system of money transfer remains unknown for now following a decision by Barclays Bank UK in May 2013 to close he accounts of 250 money transfer providers147. Even though the deadline for closure was extended to 16 October 2013, it is projected that eventually the bank will enforce the decision in an eﬀort to reduce its risk exposure as an agent of money laundering. This move however, is clearly From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 02/11/2013

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motivated more by fears that informal money transfer mechanisms could be easily compromised to facilitate the flow of terrorist funding. It is possible that other financial institutions especially from the Middle East may be willing to step into the breach left by Barclays but we are unsure if they will be able to offer a similarly extensive network of branches or institutional capacity to the Hawwallas. In Kenya, Barclays Bank has not been providing services to Hawalla operators as a matter of internal policy. As a result, the decision from London is not likely to have immediate consequences on the relations between the local Barclays Bank subsidiary and Hawalla operators such as Dahabshill. However, it could have far reaching effects on the Hawalla operators who will face challenges transacting with registered financial institutions and facilitating remittances to Somalia and Kenya. In the worst‐case scenario, Hawallas will be unable to secure the services of an alternative financial institution before the stipulated deadline. This means that the informal money‐transfer industry could go underground hence making it more opaque and more attractive to terrorist organizations. The Hawalla system is very efficient with regard to transaction time compared to the formal banking system. 4.3.3 Somali Transport Companies

Somali operators (both indigenous Somali and Kenyan‐Somalis) have established direct bus lines such as E‐couch, Maslah, Crown and Garissa Bus. These buses also link Nairobi to other East African capitals and major cities. In Nairobi, Somalis have also entered the matatu (minibus) business, which began as an informal mode of transport but was later legalized and now forms a key part of the public transport system. In the last 17 years, over ten major Somali trucking companies have been formed in Kenya. With an initial capital investment of around $5 million each which now show substantial annual proﬁts of around $20 million. Leading companies such as Awale, Tipper Freighters, Dakawe and Ainu‐ Shamsi Transporters own hundreds of trucks each. There are also many individually owned and run truck companies operating with two to six trucks, and this growing sector plays a very signiﬁcant role in Kenyan transport market.148 4.3.4 Hass Petroleum

Founded in 1997 by two brothers, the late Abdirizak Ali Hassan and Abdinasir Ali Hassan, the HASS Petroleum Group is a regional Oil Marketing Company (OMC) with signiﬁcant presence in East Africa and the Great Lakes region. From its humble beginnings as a fuel re‐seller, the company is now one of the most renowned oil marketers, with fully ﬂedged operating business units in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Southern Sudan, Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 148

http://www.somaliaonline.com/community/ showthread.php/70874-Somali-companiesand-bussiness-people-doing-it-big-in-africa!

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4.3.4 Garun Investment Ltd

With its corporate headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya, the company's core business is the importation, distribution and marketing of petroleum products in countries where they have registered business units. The company also has invested signiﬁcantly in retail outlets ‐ petrol stations ‐ and sizable oil storage terminals. The company's recently commissioned oil terminal in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania has an installed capacity of 34 million litres, and serves the southern corridor markets of Tanzania, and the neighboring landlocked countries of D.R.C. ‐ Katanga Province, Rwanda, Burundi and Zambia. The northern corridor markets ‐ Kenya, Uganda, Southern Sudan, and D.R.C. (North‐East provinces) ‐ are served by imports via Kenya's Mombasa port.149

Garun Investment Ltd has been in the business of import and export since 2003. Garun back then, opened its ﬁrst oﬃce in Guangzhou city, China, famous for Spring and Fall trade fair under the name Garun Trading Company Limited. Garun has ventured into public buildings and commercial space development in large cities such Nairobi and Mombasa, Kenya.

Garun's founding partners have vast experience in organizing successful businesses for more than a decade. Core business area of Garun Investment is real estate development along with construction activities of varying building sizes. Since 2006, Garun Investment Limited has been primarily concerned in acquiring valuable lands for potential redevelopment while at the same time building housing units for families in Nairobi such as Eastleigh, South C, Syokimau and Parklands.150 4.4The Charcoal Trade. Somalia's Black Gold?

Somalia is a country with limited energy production capacity. There are no proven of deposits of non‐renewable resources such as oil and coal. However there are proven deposits of natural gas estimated at 5.7 billion cubic metres151. The country also is largely arid with few permanent rivers and those that there are such as the Juba and Shabelle cannot be exploited due to conflict. For instance, a planned hydroelectric facility on the Juba River near Baardheere, which was to have added 10,000 kW been delayed due to political instability. Renewable energy resources such as wind and solar energy also remain unexploited in the face of a hostile investment climate152. Somalia has an oil refinery at Gesira, near Mogadishu that was built with Iraqi assistance in 1978 but it ceased operations at the beginning of the civil war in 1991. As a consequence, Somalia imports energy resources such as petroleum products, which are used to power the national fleet of vehicles and generate electricity. In Mogadishu there is a power generation company known as Ente Nazionale Energia Elettrica, or ENEE. It has an installed capacity of 80MW which is entirely is thermally produced from heavy industrial diesel generators153. The reach of the power distribution infrastructure is limited

149 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XBLdH1v Qt1k 150 See more at: http://garun.wowcity.com/ 151 Encyclopaedia of the Nations (2013) Somalia Energy and Power http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Africa/S omalia-ENERGY-AND-POWER.html#b [Accessed 16 November 2013] 152 Somaliland Press (2013) Renewable Energy Potential in Somaliahttp://somalilandpress.com/renewabl e-energy-potential-in-somalia-43324 [Accessed 16 November 2013] http://www.mbendi.com/indy/powr/af/so/p 0005.htm [Accessed 16 November 2013]

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to the capital Mogadishu as the civil war resulted in extensive damage to the national grid. This means that the only immediately exploitable domestic sources of energy are ﬁrewood and charcoal154. Over 95% of Somalia's population rely on these traditional forms of energy.

Charcoal is called Dhuxul in Somali whilst rewood is called qoryo IUCN (2013) Acacia Bussei http://www.iucnredlist.org/details/19892420/0 [Accessed 16 November 2013] 156 UN (2013) UNMG report on Somalia and Eritrea 157 The UN Monitoring Group report on Somalia on Somalia and Eritrea dated 12 July 2013 estimated that in 2011, approximately 1 million sacks of charcoal were exported on a monthly basis from Kisimayu, with an international market value of US$ 15 million to 16 million 158 UN (2013) Op. Cit 159 ibid 160 UNSC 2036/2012 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?sy mbol=S/RES/2036(2012) [Accessed 18 November 2013] 161 In November 2012, the president reversed his initial position and begun supporting charcoal exports Somali president in U-turn over U.N. charcoal ban http://horseedmedia.net/2012/11/15/somalipresident-in-u-turn-over-u-n-charcoal-ban/ [Retrieved 24th April 2013]. He then reversed this position again in April 2013 and declared charcoal exportation to be a crime. Somalian President Hassan Says Charcoal Export Is A Crimehttp://panafricannews.blogspot.com/20 13/04/somalian-president-hassan-sayscharcoal.html [Retrieved 24th April 2013]. 162 Coastweek (2012) U.N. urged to lift ban on charcoal trade in Kismayu http://www.coastweek.com/3541_dhobley.ht m [Accessed 18 November 2013] It is alleged in the UN report that KDF and his Ras Kamboni forces prevented a presidential task force on the Charcoal trade from leaving Kismaayo airport and making a determination on its continuation 163 Under Security Council resolutions 2072 (2012) and 2073 (2012)

154

Men predominantly undertake charcoal production in Somalia. The majority of charcoal traders are also men, but there are some women involved in this trade. Production is concentrated in the southern river valleys where there is a profusion of the prized Acacia Bussei tree known as Qurac in Somali. The IUCN rates this species of tree as 'least threatened' meaning it is widely distributed in the East African region155. However, it is intensively exploited in the Somali regions of Bay, Bakool and Gedo as well as in the Middle and Lower Shabelle. Charcoal from Kismayu is preferred because the denser trees in the lower reaches of the river produce larger pieces of charcoal. The tree is used for firewood, charcoal, fencing and as a building material. Charcoal makers favour this tree because its longer burn‐time and aromatic scent places it in high demand in the Middle East where used as an exotic fuel in the grilling of meat among the wealthy and middle class155. Charcoal is therefore big business considering the market value for each sack destined for local consumption is between USD 5 and USD 10 for a 25 to 30 Kg sack. It is estimated that each household needs five to seven sacks of charcoal per month translating to an outlay of between USD 25 and USD 70 per month. At Kisimayu port, the prices per bag tend to rise three fold to USD 15 to 16 per sack for export quality charcoal157. Charcoal production in Somalia has led 'charcoal wars', where those who are involved in charcoal production clash with inhabitants of the area where the trees are being cut for charcoal production. This particularly is reflected in Al Shabaab held areas.

Charcoal was a key revenue stream for Al Shabaab who were estimated to have been raking in around USD 2 Million per month at their peak in 2011 totalling around USD 25 Million158. Exports of the commodity at the time stood at between 9 million and 11 million sacks annually. When KDF captured Kisimayu at the end of September 2012, reports indicate that there was a stockpile of approximately 4 million sacks of charcoal at the port. Its market value was conservatively estimated at USD 60 Million going by the USD 15/sack rate159.The exports to gulf states proceeded in spite of a UN ban as articulated in UNSC resolution 2036 of 2012160 and ﬂip‐ ﬂopping presidential ban161. Local charcoal traders apparently with the support of KDF and the African Union who called upon the Security Council to temporarily lift the ban on charcoal in order to clear the stockpiles exerted pressure on the president of Somalia to reverse his position on the charcoal ban162. However, the temporary reprieve given by the UN163 was said to have been exploited to expand the trade. By June 2013 the Monitoring Group estimated that charcoal exports had doubled to 24 million sacks per year valued at USD 360 million the bulk of which was systematically exported from the KDF/AMISOM/Ras Kambooni‐ controlled port of Kismaayo. It is reported that most of the charcoal From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 02/11/2013

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leaves Somalia through the port of Kismayo under the auspices of Ras Kambooni and an AMISOM/KDF/Ras Kambooni Ogadeni‐Kenyan nexus and also through Barrawe under the control of the Al‐Shabaab. KDFand the Ras Kambooni brigade were said to be sharing control of the port with a KDF officer, Major Maingi, designated as the focal point for authorizing the offloading and loading of vessels according to the confidential annexe. The trade in charcoal continues uninterrupted in Kisimayo because AMISOM's mandate does not stretch to the regulation of commercial activity, effectively rendering them impotent to control it.

The exportation of charcoal from Somalia continues unabated164 partly due to parallel command structures in the Somali government and alleged misinformation on the part of the KDF. Specifically, the confidential Annexes of the UNMG report indicate that the former Prime Minister, Abdiweli Mohamed Ali Gaas, had written to the Committee on 17 October 2012, on the eve of his leaving office, requesting a review of the charcoal ban. Similarly it is alleged that the AMISOM Deputy Force Commander for Operations and Plans had assured the President that Kisimayu was closed to commercial shipping traffic. Respondents in the report indicate that this commodity fell in to the hands of Raas Kambooni and well‐connected businesspeople that are now exporting the charcoal with the support KDF troops stationed at the port165. IGAD and the Kenya Government under the Kibaki administration are on record opposing the UN ban on the charcoal trade166.

164

Al Shabaab is reportedly still in control of 32% of the trade in charcoal in Kisimaayo through two individuals that act on its behalf. The confidential annexe of the UNMG report identifies one Hassan Mohamud Yusuf a.k.a. 'Awlibaax' who is also the Chairman of the coalition of charcoal traders and secondly, Ali Ahmed Naaji, who allegedly arranges financing for Al Shabaab, and makes investments for them in South Sudan where they have training camps for militants including Boko Haram. The Monitoring Group also identified six of the largest charcoal businessmen in Dubai including the Al‐Shabaab‐affiliated Saleh Da'ud Abdulla167. 18 ships bearing a cargo of charcoal are said to have left Kismayo between October and December 2012 bearing over 700,000 sacks of charcoal valued at USD 10.5 Million in November and 800,000 sacks estimated to be worth USD 12 Million in December. They included Fadhil Rabi, Topaz II, Star Island H, Lady Jana, and Loai IV. A dhows' average load is 33,000 sacks of charcoal with the capacity to load up to 50,000 sacks. Larger ships are said to be able to load between 100,000 and 150,000 sacks. The Un estimated that with an average shipping traffic of 29 vessels, including two larger ships, it was possible to export at least one million sacks charcoal from the port of Kismayo. They gave similar estimates for the Al Shabaab controlled port of Baraawe but clarified that since it is a smaller port that required larger vessels to anchor offshore, the process was more labour intensive. The main company in Barawe exporting charcoal identified in the report was called 'Taqfir'. According to the confidential annexe, Somali charcoal is considered to be contraband in the UAE and is

Jamestown Foundation, Su Militia Joins Somali Government Forces While RAS Kamboni Militia Distances Itself, http://www.refworld.org/docid/50ceef782.html [Retrieved 24 April 2013] 165 Interview with Jubba Clans leadership-inexile Ugaas Aweis Sheikh Hussein HoneroChairman, Bantu Traditional Community Leader`s Council, Mogadishu, March 24th 2013 also substantiated inAMISOM decries charcoal trade in Kismayu despite UN banhttp://www.nation.co.ke/News/AMISOMdecries-charcoal-trade-in-Kismayu-despiteUN-ban/-/1056/1613926/-/xutkty/-/index.html [Retrieved 9th April 2013] 166 Illegal Charcoal Shipments Continuehttp://www.aljazeera.com/news/afric a/2012/11/201211662514769781.html [Retrieved 9th April 2013] 167 Saleh Da'ud Abdulla owns the Al Baoon Trading Company. The others are Baba Mansoor Ghayedi, a.k.a. 'Haji Baba' who owns Al Qaed International General Trading, Abdulshakkuur Ismail Farah who runs Hamil al-Misk, Hassan Diriye Farah a.k.a. 'Dhurxul who owns Wadi al Hejaz General Trading, Dahir Sheikh Omar Mohammed who owns Al Aqeed General Trading and Basheer Khalif Moosa of Kismayo General Trading

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offloaded in the Creek of Sharjah, which is not secured and does not draw significant attention from customs officials.

Kisimayo is estimated to account for 80% of charcoal exports in Somalia which would yield an output of 1 million sacks per month or 12 million sacks valued at USD 180 Million per year. These figures are incongruent and represent only 50% of earlier UN estimates that placed production at 24 million sacks a year valued over USD 384 Million. The UN figures mean that charcoal was Somalia's No. 1 export beating livestock by 9.7%168. It also means that 94.1% of Somalia's export volumes go unreported and it is in these figures that we begin to have doubts. It also would mean that the rate at which deforestation is happening at the charcoal producing sites is unprecedented. The argument posited by the UN is that to make up for a reduced shareholding, Al shabaab increased production levels to compensate for the loss of revenue. The UN pointed to the seamless movement of charcoal trucks between Kismayo and Barawe and regular coordination between the two ports, as evidence of the tripartite collusion between KDF/ Ras Kambooni and Al Shabaab. What is possible is that charcoal production may have increased with the exit of Al Shabaab from the port but the group resorted to taxing it further up the supply chain. Reports indicate that the group was generating up to USD 1.5 Million from the check point at Buulo Xaji in the south of Kisimayu where the flat rate for large 12 tonne trucks was USD 500 whilst the smaller 6 tonne trucks attracted a fee of USD 250.

5.0 THE AXIS‐OF‐EXTRACTION IN THE LOKI CONVERGENCE 5.1The arms trade on the frontiers.

5.1.1The political economy of the small arms trade in the loki convergence.

The loki convergence is also much like the Ogaaden convergence in that it does not have obvious lootable resources. However, it similarly has a vibrant market for untaxed goods as well as small arms and light weapons. In the loki convergence, the supply of small arms has reduced relative to the periods when the convergence was a hotbed for nationalist conflicts. However, the appetite for weapons remains high but not desperate. This is because, the guns have a longer service duration and are not as expendable compared to ammunition.it would therefore take some time to for a working gun to require replacement as it can be serviced and undergo minor repairs should it break down. This explains why even the ageing British .303 inch and 7.62 x 51mm Le‐Enfield rifles manufactured eve before the 19th century are still in use at the moment and still as effective as the newly manufactured rifles of the early 20th and 21st centuries.

168

Akliliu, Y. (2012) Regional Livestock trade; Lessons for south Sudan. The 2011/2012 livestock export gures for Somalia was estimated to be valued at USD 350 Million.

www.agrifairsouthsudan.org

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In this convergence, the trade in ammunition tends to take greater prominence than the trade in firearms. However, as alluded earlier it does not mean that there is reduced appetite for guns. With the curtain being drawn on nationalist conflicts in Uganda, South Sudan and Ethiopia, the process of mopping up illicit weapons by the governments of these countries and even Kenya appears to be gaining momentum as the states consolidate their control over the peripheral regions. The pastoralist communities of these areas used to the gun culture have responded to state‐driven disarmament and demobilization drives by beginning to stockpile weapons to replace the ones that are confiscated by government or that they 'surrender voluntarily'. The demand for light armaments in this convergence is therefore relatively inelastic because there is no alternative to the gun as a means to personal protection and wealth acquisition. This means that changes in the price of guns and ammunition have little effect on demand. One of the drivers for the sustained demand for guns in this convergence is the place they have in the rites of passage. As a male youth reaches the age of gun carrying, it is the duty of the parents to arm him for his role as a warrior in the community militia.

The going rate for an AK‐47 assault riﬂe in 2013is between USD 57o and USD 740.Ten years ago the same weapon could have fetched as low as USD 200. Kalashnikov pattern ammunition (7.62 x 39mm) for this weaponsretails at USD 1.10 for each round in Turkana but varies according to the supply levels. NATO calibre ammunition (7.62 x 51mm) is the cheapest retailing at 50 US cents. 5.1.2Market dynamics for small arms in the Loki convergence

There is a complex dynamic that regulates the flows of small arms and light weapons in the Loki convergence. The first strand through which arms flow is between allied communities. Military alliances amongst ethnic militia is a self‐preservation mechanism in which communities develop a symbiotic relationship that allows them to capitalize on each other's comparative advantages and gain safety in numbers as they mobilize against a mutual enemy. This is reinforced by the trading in arms between them. This therefore means that the volumes of the flow in arms between the rival Turkana and Toposa are significantly lower that they would be between the Turkana and the Jie of Uganda or between the Toposa and the Nyang'atom169. However, small isolated exchanges between individual members of rival communities on the basis of a personal friendship. This means that the direction of trade in arms is more often than not cross border than in‐country in nature because the ethnic communities have local vendettas that necessitate the formation of trans national alliancesto neutralize them.

169

Political alliances in the Loki convergence are con gured as follows: The Turkana are rivals to the Toposa in South Sudan, the Dassenech in Ethiopia and the Pokot in Kenya. The allies of the Turkana are the Jie in Uganda and the Nyangatom in South Sudan/Ethiopia and the Diding'a.

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The known markets for the supply of arms in this convergence can be found at Agoroand Labone in Uganda where arms from South Sudan are supplied to serve the demand in Uganda. Other towns such as Nimule also act as transit points and markets for the arms flowing down from South Sudan to Uganda and northern DRC. These arms apart from are mainly sourced from commanders in the SPLA who subcontract agents transact on their behalf. These arms also filter southwards and eastwards towards central Uganda and Karamoja and some spill over into Kenya through the Pokot region whilst a small number some find their way into turkana through the Jie and the Matheniko communities. At Nakuwa on the Kibish side of southwestern Ethiopia is another small market among the Nyang'atom. The Lokichoggio market closed after the CPA was signed in 2005 and the Kenyan government embarked on a serious disarmament drive. The demise of the Lokichoggio gun market was also accelerated by Toposa attacks on the Diding'a convoys bringing arms for sale to the Turkana.However, there is a new market opening up in Narus at the moment. Following the signing ofa shaky peace agreement between the Toposa and the Turkana in June 2013, the turkan have taken the relative calm as an opportunity to replenish their stock of arms that have been depleted by state led disarmament drives and have suffered attrition over time due to reliance fickle state security agencies. Kalashnikov pattern ammunition (7.62 x 39mm) is retailing slightly cheaper in Narus at USD 1 for each round. Guns are also traded at more competitive prices ranging from USD 450 to USD 680.

An interesting trend that is emerging is the increasing preference for NATO calibre weapons such as FN‐FAL, SLR or LIAI by the Turkana. This is possibly because the ammunition is cheaper and more readily available. Following the collapse of the USSR and the post‐soviet boom in eastern European arms, the loki convergence has been dominated by the Kalashnikov pattern weapon. However, new conflicts for instance between Somalia and the US in the 1990's as well as other conflicts further afield such as the war on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan, mean that new weapon configurations may be beginning to find their way intothis market. Similarly, increased European and American strategic military interests in the region means that levels of military aid to governments in Juba, Kampala and even Nairobi could be on the rise resulting in a higher uptake of 5.56 NATO cailbre weapons and ammunition in the national security forces. The Turkana are tradin in their soviet‐era weapons with the Jie and the Matheniko who prefer Kalashnikov‐pattern weapons. In this case the Jie get the Kalashnikov pattern weapons while the turkana acquire NATO calibre weapons in exchange.

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5.1.3 State security agencies' complicity in the arms trade

State security agents in Kenya are also facilitating the trade in SALW. KPR officers are reportedly acting as conduits in the acquisition of ammunition for instance in Kakuma. For the equivalent of USD 17 officers at the armoury are able to smuggle out a full magazine of 30 rounds. The new arms market at Narus is fed by the flow from all the barracks in Eastern Equatoria and it is becoming a hub for the steady supply of guns and ammunition for the under‐supplied Turkana. The ease with which rogue state security officers are participating in the arms trade is due to regulatory laxity whereby the requirement to manage and keep record of arms and ammunition stocks have been deliberately neglected or mis‐ engineered at the local level.

Apart from the illicit arms trade mechanisms outlined above, there have also been oﬃcial government transfers to the local defence units in Uganda, the Kenya police Reservists (KPR) and the Ethiopian Police Reservists (EPR) to provide enhanced security functions to the populations on the frontiers. However, these transfers have been illegally diverted into civilian hands and eventually employed in criminal activities such as highway banditry and raids. The diversion and supply of arms to civilian hands has also been perpetrated by other state security agencies such as the Uganda Wildlife Authority and the Ugandan Peoples' Defence Forces who have diverted ammunition for use by the Dodoth, the Jie and the Matheniko. The Turkana on their part have been acquiring their ammunition from the KPR, the local chiefs and even the police who sell the ammunition for proﬁt.

In southwestern Ethiopia, the supply of arms and especially ammunition is carried out discreetly though there is anecdotal evidence of connivance and complicity of state security agents. The Ethiopian Police Reservists have armed more ethnic militia groups than their Kenyan counterparts. Furthermore, the open carrying of a riﬂe on the Ethiopian side is not criminal at all though Turkana and the Karamojong know it is illegal to do so in Kenya and Uganda.

Illegal transfers of arms and ammunition from state security agencies to ethic militia is traceable using special kits that reveal the factories in which the weapon or ammunition has been manufactured and for the use of which security agency. There is a strong correlation between the types, the markings and the numbers of ammunition shared by the state security agencies and the non‐state actors such as the pastoral warring communities in the convergence. For instance the UPDF, the UWA and the LDUs are the bonaﬁde agencies allowed to stock Ugandan arms. But these arms have been traced to the Jie and the Dodoth who also possess the ammunition marked “LI” which stands for Luweero Industries, the oﬃcial manufacturers of ordnance for the Ugandan security agencies. The Kenyan case also has the common use of ammunition marked “KOFC” representing the Kenya Ordnance Factory Corporation in Eldoret meant for the state security agencies. From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 02/11/2013

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It is interesting to note that a sample exists in the convergence of all the 19 plus Chinese ordnance factories. Czechoslovakian ammunition also has some presence in this convergence from an ordnance factory located close to Prague manufacturing under the trade name Sellier and Belliot especially among the turkana, whichmay have been purchased by Kenya for the state security agencies but was diverted into civilian hands.

The following ﬁndings from an arms tracing exercise carried out for the Small Arms Survey in 2008 will help concretize the explanations above170. The report makes the following conclusions.

1. The ammunition from at least 25 countries and 51 factories as per

head stamp markings circulates in the Loki convergence as drawn in by the many conflicts that have ravaged theregion over the past several decades. 2. There are greater similarities between the ammunition circulating within countries than there are between the countries, suggesting that once in the region the transfer of ammunition is relatively localized.For example, the Kenyan state forces ammunition stocks are strongly correlated (in types and numbers) with those of the Turkana pastoralists in Kenya, which indicates ammunition transfer between the two groups.The Ugandan state forces stocks are likewise correlated with those of the Dodoth and Jie pastoralists groups based in Uganda. The same has been the case with the south Sudan and even Ethiopia. 3. The arms proliferation is a cross border phenomena with more arms crossing into Kenya from South Sudan and Uganda and accounting for about 15% of ammunition entering Kenya from those countries. 4. With or without the government‐supplied ammunition, ethnic militia will still retain the access to numerous sources of ammunition because the region is already awash with the armaments. 5. Ammunition stocks of Non‐state actors tend to be heterogenous, given that they source in small quantities from different suppliers. Pastoralists and ethnic militia gave returns of over 220 differently marked types of ammunition from over 51 different factories in the sample. 6. A similar pattern is observed for the guns with weapons from inter alia; China, former Soviet bloc, Bulgaria, Iran, Pakistan, sudan, Uganda, Kenya ,Czech republic, and Romania

170

Bevan, J (2008) Blowback: Kenya's Illicit Ammunition Problem in Turkana North District, Small arms survey. With the assistance of Alexander Flemmings Losikiria

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5.2 Other forms of extraction in the Loki convergence

The other lootable and extractable resources in the Loki convergenceand mainly south Sudan are oil, gold, diamonds, timber, cement, gas, and agricultural produce. Gold, cement, forestry and possible oils are found in Western Equitoria. Gold is in Eastern Equitoria while Northern Bar‐el has good rice. Extraction of gum arabic by multinationals is also occurring along the borderline belt between the Sudans.

The halt in the pumping of oil in January 2012 by South Sudan heavily affected the country. The economy contracted by 54% in 2012 alone according to the IMF and is set to perform worse in 2013. This resulted in high inflation rates peaking at 79.5% in May 2012 as tensions between Sudan and south Sudan escalated. It is however not only the fact that South Sudan's revenue was sharply reduced that contributed to the poor growth performance but the added strain placed on the economy by the necessary austerity measures which were instated to cope with the loss of revenue. For a short period, hard currency inflows from Non‐ Governmental Organizations and development partners were shoring up the local currency171.

5.2.1 The currency black market

There is athriving black marketfor foreign currency in the Loki convergencebecause of the relative shortage of hard currency as well as the inconvertibility of the national currencies especially the Ethiopian Birr. The black market is an alternative, informal source of foreign currency. Large sums of currency are exchanged on the black market for instance in Juba however the transactions are high risk. There are some Somalis involved in the black market dollar business. 172In South Sudan, there were reports that the Chinese in an attempt to shore up the South Sudanese Pound brought in planeloads of dollars into the country.

171

Interview with Amb. Abdoul, IGAD Liaison O ce, Juba 172 Ibid 173 Interview with Dr. Spencer Kenyi, World Bank Juba

5.2.2 MNC's in the South Sudan oil sector

The South Sudanese government is also selling futures contracts to the highest bidder. Currently Chinese, Malaysian and Indian oil companies are pumping south Sudanese oil from confirmed oil deposits173. The ratios are 60% to the Chinese while 40% is divided between Malaysia and India. The government has targeted to raise between USD 1‐2 Billion from several oil concessions worth between USD 200 million and USD 300 million each. Unconfirmed reports indicated that a concession to an unnamed Nigerian company was worth USD 250 Million. Reports indicate that the government of South Sudan wants to bring in US firm Exxon Mobil and Kuwait's Kufpec to explore Block B. In auctioning‐off oil concessions, the government has been borrowing from the public to finance spending. It has so far issued USD 330 Million worth of treasury bills and borrowed another USD 117 Million from the central bank in late 2012. From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 02/11/2013

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5.2.3. Plundering the national coﬀers

The tax regime in South Sudan is flawed and measures to rectify it will be difficult to implement. Tax was focused on the border posts and those collecting the tax pocketed it for two reasons. One, they rejected the Government of National Unity legislation that regulated the collection of taxes. Two, since the volumes were insignificant as compared the oil revenues, the government was not keen to follow up on collection. It is noteworthy that although the national revenue authority is weak, the state revenue authorities, more so in Central and Eastern Equitoria are strong.Commercial banks receive allocations of foreign currency to give to importers. 8 billion dollars were borrowed from China and the new banks were set up to tap into in it. The new banks include: Mountain Bank, Charter Bank, Peoples Bank, Eco Bank, Eden Bank, Liberty Bank, National Commercial Bank, Buffalo Bank and Nile Commercial Bank. These banks are either South Sudanese owned or South Sudanese fronted. In addition, the banks are connected the President/Vice President or the Army Generals. In some instances the profit margins are used to maintain the militia in the bush. Most of the banks in South Sudan do not engage in 'classic' banking but exploit the exchange allocations174. Even if one does not corrupt the margins, the profit is sizeable. This is arbitrage although it is slightly different because of the existence of a black market with a price differential. For instance, in the formal bank, if two million is allocated to an importer the margin is 0.2 pounds on the dollar. On the black market, the one can make four times more in profit. The austerity measures have increased the demand for the dollar against no supply. Foreign currency is disbursed to forex bureaus by the Central Bank. Before the introduction of austerity measures, forex bureaus received 700,000USD weekly but now they are allocated 400,000 USD. However, there are loopholes in the management of foreign currency and individuals in the central bank exploit these loopholes for personal gain. For instance, the Governor of the Central Bank has opened a Forex bureau named Koryon, which is his first name, a few meters from the central bank. 5.2.4Illegal Trafficking/ Small Scale Mining.

Illegal migrants and some labour migrants, especially Ugandans who lack identiﬁcation and are looking for opportunities are engaged in illegal and small‐scale mining of minerals in South Sudan. 5.2.5 Human Traﬃcking

174

Interview with Eric Nderitu, Equity Bank Juba

In this convergence, the borders are terribly porous and poorly policed. The gazetted points of entry and exit to regulate movement of persons and goods and detect crime are poorly manned and lack the requisite technology.From southwestern Ethiopian border across Kokuro, Meyen and Todonyang, illegal Ethiopian immigrants from the From Soft to Hard Security||TCH Working Paper 02/11/2013

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Amharinya tribe are smuggled by agents through the border using the Dassenech canoes. They are later transported through the bush avoiding the Todonyang police post then through the rough road to Lokitaung through to Lodwar. The journey ďŹ nally takes them through the routes to Republic of South Africa. There are also illegal immigrants from south Sudan but they have always been thought to be refugees returning to the nearby Kakuma refugee camp run by the UNHCR. 5.2.6 Contraband goods and minerals

Untaxed goods and contraband such as maize, sugar, cement, timber, cigarettes crosses to and from South Sudan. Across the Nakuwa, Kibish, Moroto, Lokiriama and Oropoi, the illicit cargo passes every time through smuggling routes into South Sudan and Ethiopia. Across kenya's border with Uganda, there is a trade in liquor such as beer and spirits down to Lodwar through Moroto and Lokiriama. The popular Tusker lager is a candidate commodity for smuggling. The cheaper variety that is brewed by EABL in Jinja, Uganda is smuggled across the border from Moroto and down the escarpment to be consumed in Lodwar replacing the more expensive variety brewed in Ruaraka, Nairobi. A bottle of EABL Kenya Tusker costs USD 1.80 in Lodwar while the same bottle from EABL Uganda costs only half as much at 85 US cents in Moroto, Uganda.

5.2.7 illicit gold extraction

Of note note is the trade in minerals such as gold from south Sudan. South Sudan is said to have signiďŹ cant gold deposits and other unprospected minerals especially in the Toposa area of Napotpot in Kapoeta East County. There have been traders from especially Tanzania bringing in gold detecting machines to Kapoeta East County and Eastern Equatoria State. The government of south Sudan has not sanctioned prospecting for minerals and even outright mining but the political class are said to be using their leverage and connections to illegally prospect the minerals and especially gold. Armed Toposa militiamen provide security and deter pilferage escort the Tanzanian and Turkana dealers involved in the extraction of gold business. The Government of Eastern Equatoria has raised the alarm over this illegal extraction of gold and warned all those doing so to desist form this activity or risk being arrest and prosecution. This warning has howeverbeen ignored and the trade in gold continues unabated as the operatives enjoy political protection.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY: AXIS OF EXTRACTION BOOKS ARNOLD GUY, Africa: A Modern History, Atlantic Books, (10 Aug 2006)MEREDITH

MARTIN, The State of Africa: A History of the Continent Since Independence, Simon & Schuster UK (September 1, 2011)

MILLS GREG, Why Africa is Poor: And What Africans Can Do About It?, Penguin, South Africa, 2010 MTHEMBU SALTER G., Social and Economic Dynamics of mining in Kalimma, DRC, Institute for Security Studies, April 2009

NUTT SAMANTHA, Damned Nations: Greed, Guns, Armies, and Aid, McClleland & Stewart, Canada (July 17, 2012) Raﬀaelli MARCELO, Rise and Demise of Commodity Agreements: An Investigation into the Breakdown of International Commodity Agreements, Woodhead Publishing (2001)

SHAXSON Nicholas, Treasure Islands: Tax Havens and the Men who Stole the World, the Random House Limited, Vintage Books (5 Jan 2012) Woodman CONOR, Unfair Trade: The shocking truth behind 'ethical' business, Random

House Business (23 Feb 2012)

ZEEBROEK XAVIER, BERGHEZAN GEORGES, 'Armes lé gè res à l'Est du Congo: Enquê te

sur la perception de l'insé curité , Groupe de Recherche et dinformation sur la Paix et la Securite (GRIP), Brussels 2011

REPORTS

“Control of mines by warring parties threatens peace eﬀorts in eastern Congo”, 10th September 2008,

“Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and other forms of wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo”, 12 April, 2001, UN Doc. S/2001/357, 33

“RULES FOR SALE: Formal and Informal cross‐border trade in Eastern DRC”, A Pole Institute Report, Goma, May 2007

“The Curse of Gold”, Human Rights Watch, June 2, 2005 “U.S. Relations With Democratic Republic of the Congo”, Bureau of African Aﬀaires, Fact Sheet, November 8, 2013

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Bank of Rwanda, Statistics; Monthly Exports in Jan – Jun, 2013, http://www.bnr.rw/index.php?id=171&tx_damfrontend_pi1[pointer]=1#test BAWA YVES, “Artisanal Mining in the Republic of Congo”, PROMINES Artisanal Mining Study, Pact Inc. DRC, 2010

CHASE M ARSHALL, Conflict Minerals and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, June 7, 2010 http://www.bsr.org/en/our-insights/reportview/conflict-minerals-and-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo China and Congo: Friends in Need, Global Witness, March 2011 COOK NICOLAS, Conflict Minerals in Central Africa: U.S. and International Responses, Congressional Research Service, July 20, 2012 “Faced with a gun, what can you do? War and the militarization of mining in eastern Congo,” Global Witness, July 2009

GARRETT NICHOLAS, Preliminary observations from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) & Artisanal and Small‐Scale Mining (ASM), 2007 Joyce, Erick Billions in underpriced DRC State asset sales, 18 Nov 2008,

KABANGA MUSAU, « Donatien: Le remodelage du paysage socio‐economique dans les zones de conﬂit du Nord Kivu et du Maniema » (R.D. Congo), In « La Afrique des Grands lacs », annuaire 2004‐2005, pp 235‐261

LAMB G, ALUSALA N, MTHEMBU‐SALTER G, GASANA J M, “Rumours of Peace , whispers of war: Assessment of reintegration of ex‐Combatants into Civilian life in North Kivu and Ituri, Democratic Republic of Congo”, Transitional demobilization and reintegration Program (TDRP), February 2012, p17.

LEZHNEV SASHA, PRENDERGAST JOHN, “Rwanda's Stake in Congo: Understanding Interests to Achieve Peace”,| Oct 16, 2013 Managing State Companies and Concessions “Box: 9 Concession dealing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo‐Some unanswered questions”, Africa Progress Report, 2013

MATTHYSEN K, HILGERT F., SCHOUTEN P, & MABOLIA A., “A detailed analysis of Oriental Province's Gold Sector”, IPIS/GIZ/ICGLR pp. 10‐11

N. Garrett, H. Mitchell, “Trading Conﬂict for Development: Utilizing the trade in minerals from Eastern DR Congo for development”, 2009

PRENDERGAST JOHN, LEZHNEV SASHA, “From Mine to Mobile Phone; The Conﬂict Mineral Supply Chain”, The Enough Projectwww.enoughproject.org

STEARNS JASON, 'From CNDP to M23: The evolution of an armed movement in Eastern Congo', Rift Valley Institute (RVI), DRC, 2010 The Formalization of Artisanal Mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, International Peace Information Service (IPIS), 31 Dec 2012

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ARTICLES

“Coltan, Gorillas and cellphones”, Cellular News, 2007, http://www.cellular-news.com/coltan/ “Congo with $24 Trillion in Mineral Wealth BUT still Poor”, 15 March 2009, ( Retrieved on the 17 September 2013) “How smuggling pays for killing”, Vol 49, No. 23, Africa Conﬁdential, 14th November 2008 “Rwanda turns to minerals to boost revenues”, The Independent Reporter, Friday, 12 April 2013, See more at: http://www.independent.co.ug/rwandaed/rwanda/7657-rwanda-turns-to-minerals-to-boostrevenues#sthash.ciYAYaVI.dpuf

ABEDI CADET, « Congo‐Kinshasa: La RDC perd 70 millions $US à cause de la fraude du métal jaune »,15 Juillet 2009 ALTER LLOYD, Smartphones And Computers: "Bloodstains At Our Fingertips", December 6, 2010 (Accessed on 25th March 2013)

MAGNOWSKI DANIEL, “Tin Price Spike Shows Congo's growing Origin Role” R e u t e r s , O c t o b e r 3 0 , 2 0 0 8 , A v a i l a b l e a t Http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUsLU661455.

MILLER ROBERT, The Vile Scramble for Loot: How British corporations are fuelling war in the DR Congo, Corporate Watch, April 09, 2010

Somaliland Press (2013) “Renewable Energy Potential in Somalia”http://somalilandpress.com/renewable-energy-potential-insomalia-43324[Accessed 16 November 2013] JOURNALS

Garrett NICHOLAS, Sergiou SYLVIA & Vlassenroot KOEN, “Negotiated peace for extortion: the case of Walikale territory in eastern DR Congo”, Journal of Eastern African Studies, Volume 3, Issue 1, 2009

MANTZ JEFFREY W., “Improvisational economies: Coltan production in the eastern Congo”, Social Anthropology, Volume 16, Issue 1, pages 34–50, February 2008 MONTAGUE DENA, Stolen Goods: Coltan and Conﬂict in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sais Review,Volume 22, Number 1, 2002, MUKWEGE DENIS MUKENGERE, NANGINI CATHY, “Rape with Extreme

Violence: The New Pathology in South Kivu, Democratic Republic of Congo ”, Health in Action | published 22 Dec 2009 | PLOS Medicine 10.1371/journal.pmed.1000204

MAPS

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SPITTAELS STEVEN, HILGERT FILIP, Interactive map of militarised mining areas in the Kivus, (IPIS) Antwerp, (August 2009) http://www.ipisresearch.be/maps/MiMiKi/Areas/web/ PAPERS

“A Comprehensive Approach to Congo's Conﬂict Minerals ‐ Strategy Paper”, The Enough Project Team with the Grassroots Reconciliation Group | Apr 24, 2009 MUKASA ADAMON, NDUNGU, BURAYE KILOSHO, « La Filière Stanniﬁère Artinasale au Sud‐Kivu: Cas du Coltan et de la Cassitérite », L'Afrique des Grandes Lacs Annuaire 2008‐2009 Saded Abdulsamed, « Somali Investment in kenya », ChathamHouse, March 2011

MINERAL YEAR BOOKS PAPP JOHN F., ANTALUM (Data in metric tons of tantalum content unless otherwise noted), U.S. Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries, January 2009 United States Geographical Survey (USGS), 2010 Mineral Year book‐Tin, May 2012 Websites and Online Links

http://search.usa.gov/search?utf8=%E2%9C%93&sc=0&query=Mineral+Co mmodity+Survey+for+tantalum+2009&m=&affiliate=usgs&commit=Search http://fr.allafrica.com/stories/200907150336.html http://www.africa-confidential.com/articlepreview/id/2867/How_smuggling_pays_for_killing http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/109621 http://www.corporatewatch.org/?lid=3553 http://www.treehugger.com/gadgets/smartphones-and-computersbloodstains-at-our-fingertips.html http://www.enoughproject.org/reports/rwanda%E2%80%99s-stake-congounderstanding-interests-achieve-peace http://www.globalwitness.org/library/control-mines-warring-partiesthreatens-peace-efforts-eastern-congo

http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/ﬁles/library/DRCAfrica%20Progress%20Panel%20report%20-%20Congo%20pages.pdf http://www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/ﬁles/library/friends_in_need_en_l r.pdf http://www.newsaboutcongo.com/2009/03/congo-with-24-trillion-inmineral-wealth-but-still-poor.html http://ericjoyce.co.uk/2011/11/congo- ire-sale/

http://www.africansalihiya.com/,accessed on 23/10/13

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